FROM TOWNS TO HOTELS. THE EFFECTS OF LONG DISTANCE COMMUTING ON LABOR UNIONS’ STRATEGIES. EVIDENCE FROM THE PERUVIAN MINING INDUSTRY

A Thesis
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science

by
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January 2015
A radical change in mining camps’ accommodations occurred in the last three decades. Long Distance Commuting (LDC) is replacing mining towns in many countries, opening discussions about its impacts on local development and on workers’ family time management. It is less what we know about LDC’s effects on mineworkers’ unions. Drawing on an in-depth case study from Peru, I argue that LDC is transforming unions’ capacity to organize in the local scale, given its impacts on three spaces: the camp, the household and the union hall. In contrast to pessimist accounts about the end of the mining town model, however, I also identify how new strategies are being developed to re-scale labor unions’ actions.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Omar Manky grew up in Lima, Peru, and graduated with a B.A in Sociology from the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Peru. He is currently a PhD student in the Department of International and Comparative Labor at Cornell University’s ILR School. Although most of his previous work has been done at the Catholic University, he also worked for the Peruvian Ministry of Employment and Labor and the International Labour Organization, conducting research about labor disputes.
DEDICATION

A los compañeros de Toquepala
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Two years ago I set out for Ithaca with a couple of books, many questions about the future, and countless fears of being a student again. It was my first time living outside of Lima in 26 years, and I was alone. As the workers this research is focused on, I have commuted a lot in the last two years. As some of them, I have been lucky enough to make wonderful friends outside home. I want to thank them first, as I cannot imagine this thesis without the community we build everyday. Joe, Elisa, Josh and Paulo helped me thinking of Latin America from new perspectives, while Hao and Jini taught me that my research can go beyond the Pacific ocean.

On a sunny day in April 2012, Sarosh Kuruvilla sent me an email to inform me that I had been accepted to the ILR School. After two years, I still feel both anxious and thankful when I get emails from him, as they usually mean that I will have to refine my arguments, read new books, and improve my methods. His ideas were extremely helpful from the start of this research, which originated in a conversation we had before I went back to Peru after my first year.

When I decided coming to the U.S., I was quite nervous about the process of adapting to a new life. Maria Cook helped me through my first months here, being not only a valuable advisor, but also someone I could use my Spanish with when it was the (emotionally) easiest way to talk about my work. Whereas my conversations with Maria kept me connected to Latin America, Eli Friedman provided great suggestions that kept me thinking sociologically. Our conversations in and outside the classroom, either in Ithaca, Yokohama or through Skype, always left me the feeling of having learnt something meaningful. I appreciate that very, very much.

Although I am grateful for the opportunity to read about what I love, and to be trained in a superb school, as any long distance commuter, I think of home everyday after work. Happily, my parents were always there to listen to me, and to make me laugh in each step of this project. My friends in Peru were central to remind me that thinking of my research’s practical relevance is just as important as using rigorous methods. Finally, I want to thank Jacqui, mi compañera, for all the support she has given me since the start of this adventure, and for the years to come.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last three decades, mining companies have transformed the way they organize the space and time of production. From Canada to Chile, from the Peruvian Andes to the Australian deserts, the mining town model has been abandoned, being replaced by Long Distance Commuting (LDC). Although recent studies deal with the effects of this regime on workers' private lives and on local development, no study has yet examined its effects on labor relations. To fill this gap, this thesis explores the impacts of LDC on labor unions' strategies.

Analytically, this question is framed within the ‘spatial turn’ in social sciences (Ellem, 2003; Gahan & Pekarek, 2013; Warf & Arias, 2008) and debates about union revitalization (Dixon, Roscigno, & Hodson, 2004; Fairbrother, 2008; Gahan & Pekarek, 2013; Tattersall, 2008). Although these frames have improved our knowledge about labor unions’ actions in the local and global scales, few studies have tried to map the connections between spatial scales and unions’ activities.

The question I try to answer relates to the ways LDC is affecting workers' bargain strategies. I approach this issue through a critical case study. A qualitative exploration of the union of a multinational company operating in Peru helps to explore the importance space and time have in the configuration of employment relations. Focusing on the spatialization of miners’ practices— at home, the public space, and the union hall—provides key understandings about how they contest and consent their working conditions.

This document is divided in five chapters. The first one defines LDC and frames the research question, both within the industry’s dynamics and previous studies. The second part discusses the methodology used in this study, whereas chapters three and four show the results of my inquiries. Conclusions are presented in the last section.
CHAPTER 1: LDC. AN EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL OVERVIEW

This research identifies the ways through which a policy in the mining industry has affected workers’ strategies. I call this policy “Long-Distance Commuting” (LDC), and I focus on its effects on Peruvian unions. This chapter starts defining and reviewing the literature about LDC. Afterwards, it explores the analytical relevance of the topic, and it ends presenting the question guiding the thesis.

Four transformations in the mining industry

It is important to start by putting LDC in the broader context of the global mining industry’s transformations. I will argue that LDC is only one among four changes. The first one related to the ownership structure. Through a process of mergers and massive acquisitions, a few companies have consolidated as the producers of most minerals in the world. (Shapiro, Russell, & Pitt, 2007). This process started in the early nineties, and by 2013, 10 companies controlled much the most important minerals, creating a new set of rules about the production and trading of minerals worldwide.

The second change consisted in the globalization of mining: although it was always a world-wide industry—e.g. Spanish colonization of the Americas, English imperialism in South Africa—, over the last two decades mining companies massively invested in the Global South (Bridge, 2004): companies such as Glencore-Xstrata, BHP Billiton or Vale not only produce most of the minerals, but they do this through operations located in countries as different as Zambia, Chile, Australia, Canada and Indonesia.

Technological innovations in the extraction, processing and transportation of minerals are the third transformation. As Dore (2000) argues, modern mining, characterized by the use of open-pits—in contrast to underground mining—needs workers to drive cranes, shovels and dredgers, instead of getting into the earth to take the minerals with their hands (Dansereau, 2006;
In a market in which global prices are constantly changing, time is crucial. Starting operations and extracting minerals in short time was only possible through these changes. As a consequence, the working conditions of miners improved—at least in large-scale mining, where, additionally, fewer but better trained workers are needed given the mechanization process (Dansereau, 2006; Dore, 2000).

Finally, there has been a modification in the space and time of production. Scholars call this FIFO (Fly-In, Fly-Out) and DIDO (Drive-In, Drive-Out) in Australia; Long Distance Commuting (LDC) in Canada and Chile; cumulative working system in Peru. But all these terms refer to a similar phenomenon: “all employment in which the work is so isolated from the workers’ homes that food and lodging accommodations are provided for them at the work site, and schedules are established whereby employees spend a fixed number of days working at the site, followed by a fixed number of days at home” (Shrimpton & Storey, 1992). Although mining is as immobile as in the past—capital cannot move to cheaper and less militant places as freely as in manufactory—, LDC has given both spatial and economic flexibility to the organization of production, both because companies can hire people from different cities, and because big investments in accommodations don’t have to be made.

The origins of the changes sketched above are historically different, although their effects on social practices are intertwined. The use of LDC in mining started in Australia and Canada, and companies from these two countries were the first implementing it in the Global South. The consolidation of a global market for commodities, on the other side, created a context in which companies needed to produce 24 hours a day to sell their products as fast as possible. Technological change allowed to rapidly produce in locations so isolated that making workers to move there with their families was unprofitable.

1 In this thesis, LDC is preferred over FIFO mainly because it does not imply the act of flying to the operation site. In fact, in countries such as Chile and Peru, workers use roads to go to their worksites. Moreover, both FIFO and DIDO fit into the LDC definition I use.
Among other consequences—on the environment or on the local development, for example—these transformations radically transformed mining’s employment practices. About a decade ago, the ILO reported that, although the industry had become more productive since the eighties, workforce in large-scale operations decreased systematically, while it got better working conditions than ever (International Labour Organization, 2002).

Summing up, today’s mining industry is quite different from that described in most twentieth century studies (Hardesty, 1998; Pfaffenberger, 1998; Rosenblum, 1998; Zapata, 1977; 2002). This research is a first step to understand the implications of these changes. By focusing on LDC, I show how classic images about mining and mineworkers—e.g. the isolated mass (Kerr & Siegel, 1964), the occupational community (Bulmer, 1975); the company towns (Borges & Torres, 2012; Crawford, 1995)—need to be reconsidered today.

The emergence and consolidation of LDC

In its ideal setting, LDC involves a twofold transformation. Spatially, in contrast to the traditional mining town—in which workers return home with their families on a daily basis—companies build single door rooms, dining halls and spaces of relax, such as gymnasiums, where workers sleep, eat and rest when they are not at work. After a fixed number of days at the camp, they go back home.

Temporally, both because workers tend to prefer having more days at home, and because companies find cheaper to use fewer shifts, a new working time regime emerges. In contrast to the traditional 8 working hours per day, miners work for 12 hours, and the ‘extra’ four hours are accumulated, in order to get more days at home. In Peru—but also in Chile, Canada and

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2 Note that this characterization is ideal because there are different ways to organize a LDC regime, depending on geographical characteristics (e.g. distance to a city); country’s legislation (e.g. maximum number of hours and days at work); company’s decisions (e.g. jobs offered to the local communities); and workers’ demands. Chapter 3 describes some variations of this model in Peru.
Australia—the legislation allows miners to work for up to 12 daily hours without receiving overtime payment, as long as they are compensated with adequate resting times.

The transformations of space and time are, of course, interlaced. A quote from one of the designers of the new mining camps is quite explicit: “On average, the mining worker is 12 hours a day in the field, and has 12 hours to rest […] The accommodations should provide an excellent use of the resting hours, because they are key for production and for the employee’s safety at work. These 12 hours ideally are divided in 8 hours of sleep, 1 hour for meals, 1 hour for transportation to and from the mine, and 2 hours for relaxing” (Correa3 Arquitectos, 2011)

Table 1 summarizes these changes.

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<td>LDC</td>
<td>12 daily hours. Diverse arrangements (4x4, 10x10, etc.)</td>
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Although a history of LDC is yet to be written, most scholars agree that it began in the oil sector. According to Storey, the first experiments with this regime took place in the Gulf of Mexico’s offshore—where the establishment of permanent communities was not an option—in the mid fifties (Storey, 2001). However, Slipchenko and Spies argue that this system had been used in Russia since the October Revolution, and by the sixties it was widely used to obtain natural resources in Western Siberia (Slipchenko, 1979; Spies, 2006). Regardless its exact origin, it is worth noting that LDC it is not completely new, and that it was, at first, an atypical system, used only in the oil and gas production, where extreme environmental conditions made impossible to build permanent accommodations.
Most studies also agree that LDC only became popular in mining in the last three decades (Houghton, 1993; O'Faircheallaigh, 1995; Sibbel, 2010). Even when companies also faced challenging environments throughout their history, the conditions were not comparable to those in the oil sector. Traditionally, when companies operated in remote regions they built company towns were workers lived with their families (Borges & Torres, 2012; Dinius & Vergara, 2011; Hoagland, 2010) 3.

By 1995, O'Faircheallaigh found that “the shift towards LDC has been so fundamental that for well over a decade, no new resource towns have been constructed in Canada or in some regions of Australia” (O'Faircheallaigh, 1995). By the mid nineties, LDC started being used in Peru and Chile, not only in new projects, but also in old ones: several mining towns were destroyed to build single dormitories. Nowadays, the legislations of countries such as Peru, Chile, Australia and Canada have institutionalized the use of “averaging” time regimes—working for more than 8 hours a day to get more resting hours later—, through which LDC is possible. From this perspective, LDC is close related to liberalization reforms. It not only means the end of the traditional eight hours; or breaking apart workers and their families to give economic flexibility to mining companies, but it has been accompanied by major reforms in the industrial relations systems.

Along with these institutional transformations, technological change was also crucial. In the first place, there has been an improvement of the transportation services. Better roads and cheaper flights allowed companies to transport workers without investing too much money or time. Also, the improvements of the materials used to build dorms in extreme environmental conditions have permitted to build camps in short time.

3 This is a simplification, since the patterns of this mining towns changed across time and space. Moreover, other systems also emerged during the twentieth century, such as the South African compound (Crush, 1994, Home, 2000) system, or the Peruvian enganche (A. DeWind, 1975, Laite, 1981, Noriega, 1911).
Through LDC, companies save the money they would spend on a new town and on the amenities for workers and their families (Houghton, 1993; Shrimpton & Storey, 1992). Expenditures in schools or hospitals are saved, while employers only need to invest in workers’ transportation through the life of the mine. Since new technologies have reduced the life expectancy of the operations, LDC gives enough flexibility to the companies. Moreover, both them and the governments do not have to be concerned about ‘ghost towns’ after the mines are closed, and the surrounding areas do not face unemployment in times of crisis. (House of Representatives and Standing Committee on Regional Australia, 2013).

Mining equipment needs, increasingly, to be managed by well-trained workers, which are usually educated in major cities. LDC permits companies to hire them without having to move them and their families to a remote region (McKenzie, 2010). Recent surveys in Australia and Chile (Barry & Michelotti, 2009; Carrasco & Vega, 2011; Windle & Rolfe, 2013) show that workers are generally satisfied with the chance of getting good salaries without renouncing the benefits of living in major cities. Additionally, companies do not have to invest in training local workers, or in ‘turning them into miners’, as occurred in many places during the twentieth century (Borges & Torres, 2012; Dinius & Vergara, 2011; Flores Galindo, 1974), when workforce shortages put in danger companies’ investments.

Additionally, LDC seems to give managers a better control of workers’ activities. Since people usually work for more than 10 hours a day, and they sleep in rooms run by the company, employers can impose specific rules regarding sleeping, dining and resting hours. Some studies have shown that, given their smaller size, punctuality, turnover or alcoholism are easier to manage in LDC dorms than in company towns (Heiler & Pickersgill, 2001) This use of space to control workers activities is not new. In fact, LDC can be read as variation of phenomena such as the ‘bachelor house’ (Weber, 1968 p.30) or the Chinese dormitory regime (Ngai & Smith, 2007).
Although it began about three decades ago, studies about LDC are relatively new, and most of them are based in Australia (Sibbel, 2010; Voysey, 2012) in countries such as Chile (Arias, Atienza, & Cademartori, 2013; Aroca & Atienza, 2011; Rowe, 2013) Russia (Eilmsteiner-Saxinger, 2011; Spies, 2006) or Canada (Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2001; Costa, 2004; Gibson & Klinck, 2005; Storey, 2008) research has just started, and most of the literature has not focused on its effects on workers’ organizations.

Two topics are identifiable in current studies. The first one explores LDC effects on workers’ psychosocial wellbeing (Gent, 2004; Hiba, De Echave, & Ospina, 2002; Sibbel, 2010) Studies about stress (Carrasco & Vega, 2011; Clifford, 2009; Voysey, 2012), divorcing patterns (Sandow, 2011), family disruption (Gallegos, 2006; McDonald, Mayes, & Pini, 2012; Taylor & Simmonds, 2009) and social deviation (Carrington, Hogg, McIntosh, & Scott, 2012) are some of the issues covered within this trend. Most of these works focus on the individual effects of LDC, tends to draw on surveys or in-depth interviews, and do not focus on the specificities of the employment relationship.

A second group of studies focuses on the impacts of LDC on local development, particularly on labor markets (Arias et al., 2013; Morris, 2012; Petkova-Timmer, Lockie, Rolfe, & Ivanova, 2009; Skaburskis, 1987; Storey, 2001; Storey, 2010). These works are concerned with the effects of the mining industry on aboriginal communities in Canada and Australia, and local communities in Chile. Their common concern is the lack of networks between mining operations and local communities, which do not experience the benefits of the production directly. A second line of thought, based on quantitative studies, has tried to describe the effects of LDC on local investments (Arias et al., 2013).

Although no study has focused systematically on LDC’s effects on workers’ bargaining power, there are references about this in the most general reviews about the system (Beach, Brereton, Cliff, & Minerals Industry Safety, 2003; Houghton, 1993; House of Representatives and
Standing Committee on Regional Australia, 2013; Sibbel, 2010). In all these cases, the panorama is quite pessimistic. Take, for example, D.S. Houghton (1993) work, where he argues “long-distance commuting has important implications in the area of industrial relations [this] practice works to the disadvantage of trade unions because the workforce is habitually fragmented. Indeed, it is alleged that some mining companies in Australia have introduced LDC as a deliberate strategy to weaken the power of trade unions”. (1993:283) Although most commentaries agree on its negative effects on mining unions, they have not explained how it weakens unions exactly.

Moreover, although LDC has an effect of labor unions, workers are not necessarily passive, and can actually renew their strategies. From this standpoint, an important exception to this trend is the work of Ellem (2006). Although his research was not exclusively focused on LDC, through a depth study in the Pilbara, the author shows how workers and local communities were able to build a strategy against BHP’s attack on labor rights. Although it was not a complete triumph, this case study shows that resistance under a LDC regime was indeed possible.

Analytical relevance

The lack of systematic research about LDC’s effects on labor unions is noteworthy, not merely because it contrasts with the system’s relevance, but also because of its relation to classic hypothesis proposed by Kerr and Siegel in the IR field, that of the “isolated mass”. In their seminal article from 1954, these authors argued that workers’ isolation explained the predisposition to strike among different industries. Miners, sailors and loggers would be prone to strike because they “form a largely homogeneous mass” living in their own separate communities with “their own codes, myths, heroes and social standards” (p. 191. See also Bulmer, 1975). Isolation sustained homogeneity and cohesion, and through them, the conditions for a union to become “kind of a working-class party […] rather than association among many” (p.193).
The isolated mass hypothesis was rapidly contested. Collective action scholars (Cronin, 1978; Crowley, 1994; Richards, 1996; Shorter & Tilly, 1974) argued that focusing on only one variable (i.e. isolation) to explain strikes was problematic because it simplified the dynamics of mobilization, reducing its complexity to one structural factor. As Tilly (1977 p.26) pointed out, the Kerr and Siegel argument gives an account about potential group interests and organizational outcomes, but it does not say much about other elements, such as mobilization—the process by which a group goes from passive to active participation in public life—or the political opportunities workers have in specific contexts. Labor process theorists remarked the limits of explaining workplace dynamics through “outside” variables. Edwards (1977; 1982), argued that the primary focus to understand labor conflict should be the point of production, regardless the isolation or other ‘contextual’ characteristics of the workplace.

In spite of these critiques, the only quantitative assessment of Kerr & Siegel’s work found that mining camps' isolation (measured as “distance from the colliery to the nearest town or city”) did affect strike propensity (Church, Outram, & Smith, 1991). Moreover, several qualitative studies have used the concept to explain mineworkers’ militancy around the world (Beynon, 1985; McCormick, 1979; McIlroy, 2004; Pitt, 1979; Szymanski, 1978). Kerr & Siegel hypothesis has had, therefore, a paradoxical trajectory. From a theoretical standpoint, it results too structuralist, and it underestimates the importance of workplace dynamics. Yet from an empirical perspective, studies drawing on it suggest it has some explanatory power.

I argue that this contradiction results from an under-theorization of ‘space’. Both Kerr & Siegel and their critics assumed that space was a passive stage on which people acted, ignoring that social relations and space are mutually constituted. Whereas Kerr & Siegel were not able neither to explain the mechanisms through which a community is built, nor to recognize that an ‘occupational community’ is not a mechanic result of isolation, their critics were unable to theorize the potential effects of space on collective action.
Moving away from these positivistic views, recently labor scholars have drew on Lefebvre’s (1991) work, arguing that space is both a product and a producer of power relations: “this conception departs from notions of space as a location, a background to social action, or a variable. The struggle for material and symbolic control of specific settings is constitutive of social life” (Stillerman, 2002 p.67). In the case of labor unions, several recent studies have shown how spatial structures limit and allow specific strategies (Kellogg, 2009; Rao & Dutta, 2012; Stillerman, 2002; Tilly, 2000). Building on this literature, this study is informed by three theoretical notions.

(a) Spatial fix relates to the ways through which capitalism not only occupies the space, but produces it (Harvey, 1982): “raw material and workers have to be brought together at particular locations so that accumulation may occur” (Rainnie, McGrath-Chap & Herod 2010). Mining towns can be read as forms of dealing with workers’ control during the 20th century (Herod 2011). The passage from underground to open pit mining required a new type of workforce, and mining towns, with their focus on workers’ families’ needs, were a solution to it. In Latin America, mining towns were spaces where thousands of peasants became proletarians and were disciplined (Cardenas, 2007; Di Tella, Touraine, Reynaud, & Brams, 1967; Finn, 1998; Garcés, 2003; Klubock, 1998) Drawing on this approach, issues about control under LDC can be analyzed.

(b) This approach needs to be complemented, however, with one that gives more attention to how “workers also seek to shape the landscapes in ways they see as beneficial” (McGrath-Champ, Herod, & Rainnie, 2010 p.8; See also Herod, 2001) Thus, the second stream is based on the movement from ‘geographies of labor’ to labor geographies. Whereas capital is constantly looking for profitable investment across space, miners were usually attached, both physically and emotionally, to specific landscapes (see Ellem 1999 p.545). The gap between capital’s view of the mining sites—i.e. temporary spaces of profitable production—and workers’
views—i.e. communities with emotional ties— is clear, at least in the traditional setting. This ‘groundedness’ made miners geographic agents, able to undercut capital’s power, producing their own communities. This is useful because, in contrast to studies assuming that LDC only undermines unions, a more insightful view about workers’ strategies is enabled.

(c) Finally, the third stream is organized around the notion of scale. Instead of theorizing it as a fixed metric, here I draw on Herod’s notion of scale as a social construction “produced through conflicts and compromises between capital and labour and their various segments either to equalize conditions across the economic landscape or to differentiate them” (Herod, Rainnie, & McGrath-Champ, 2007p.257) Contemporary discussions about the struggle for international frame agreements, the declining of industry-level bargaining, or the development of local coalitions illustrate this point (Cumbers, Nativel, & Routledge, 2008; Lévesque & Murray, 2002; Turner & Cornfield, 2007) Even in an industry as immobile as mining, scales are actively produced. As it is shown in Chapter 4, although the end of mining towns seems to undermine local strategies, workers can actually use their spatial mobility to mobilize in the regional scale.

How does this framework help evaluating the ‘isolated mass’ argument? First, spatial fix and scales denaturalize the conception of isolated places. Whereas mining towns were a solution to the high labor turnover and workers’ struggles during early industrialization processes(Crawford, 1995), LDC seems to be changing the types of links between mines and local, regional and national actors. It is not that mines are closer to bigger cities, but that the industry is able to reshape some of its previous characteristics through this mechanism.

Second, instead of thinking of space as the passive ‘background’ of action, it is seen as an ongoing product of power relations. Almost twenty years after he criticized the ‘isolated mass’ argument, Tilly(2000 p.135) explained how “spatial organization interacts significantly with
contentious politics", arguing that interactions between location, time/distance and representations of spaces are key to understand collective dynamics⁴.

Finally, a spatially sensitive approach goes beyond the sphere of production, and allows integrating the employment relations with other dimensions of workers’ lives. As Harvey mentions, unlike other commodities, labor power has to go home every night (Harvey, 1989 p.19): what the workforce does outside the workplace can be as important as the workplace dynamics in the configuration of labor relations. The impacts of living and working in a mining town are different than those of only living, or more precisely, sleeping, in a hotel: the identification with the place (Uzzell, Pol, & Badenas, 2002; Wiesenfeld, Raghuram, & Garud, 2001) or the confidence in the people living there (Ngai & Smith, 2007; Zolin, Hinds, Fruchter, & Levitt, 2004), are factors that one can expect to change in each regime.

In addition to this, workers’ repertoires of collective action are also embedded in spheres such as the home and the union hall. Regarding the former, several studies about mining communities have shown the importance of the household in the process of ‘being a mineworker’ (Beckwith, 1996; Kingsolver, 2012; Klubock, 1998; Mercier & Gier, 2007; Murphy, 1997; Smith, 2008). However, almost all of these studies have focused on historical accounts more than on contemporary analysis. Building on some of these studies, Jones (2002, p.161) argued that a “gender-inclusive model of community industrial relations” is needed, since “women’s groups support their male partners during periods of industrial activity”. In spite of this claim, it has not been common to go from historical accounts to contemporary perspectives. Through the analysis of mineworkers’ partners’ roles in the structuration of union’s activities, this study helps filling this gap.

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⁴ This argument is not new, but it is more explicit now than in previous decades. Several labor historians have actually shown how specific spatial dynamics affected labor unions’ strategies in both the US (Bergquist, 1986, Garb, 2014, Reiff, 2000, Stillerman, 2002)
Most of the literature about union halls is also historical and it has been based on single cases (Evans & Boyte, 1986; Fonow, 1998; Hirsch, 1990) However, it is possible to conceptualize them as free spaces, defined as “social settings that are insulated from the control of elites in a social system and therefore invite the voluntary participation of the subordinated and ready them for collective action” (Rao & Dutta, 2012 p. 626; See also Fantasia & Hirsch, 1995; Evans & Boyte, 1986) Therefore, they can “supply the activist networks, skills, and solidarity hat assist in launching a movement” (Polletta & Kretschmer, 1999). Within organizational studies, two recent studies have drawn on this concept, the “macro” approach of Rao and Dutta (2012) on religious festivals and regimental mutinies in the Bengal Army; and the micro approach of Kellogg (2009) about the employees’ resistance to institutional change in two American hospitals. Inspired by these studies, I attempt to show how different accommodation regimes affect labor unions’ strategies.

Research question

Through this research I attempt to understand the effects of LDC on labor unions’ strategies. Some precisions are necessary about this object.

First, I only focus on direct workers’ unions, and not on subcontracted workers’ organizations (which do exist in Peru). Although references to these workers are made in Chapter 3, their dynamics are different from those of the traditional unions, given their particular employment conditions. This does not mean that direct workers’ unions are more relevant, but they were the most feasible option as a first stage within a broader agenda. Analyzing a single type of organization might oversimplify dynamics of the workforce, but it is also a window to obtain clear insights about the phenomenon.

Secondly, “labor unions” is a vast topic, since several dimensions are involved in the activities of these organizations. Classic topics that might had been useful, because they are shaped by the type of accommodation workers live in, would have been their organizing efforts—this is,
actions taken to create unions--; workers’ demands; or their decision making process. These different subjects were narrowed down through a question about labor unions’ strategies, especially those used during the collective bargaining process, one of the most important moments for unions’ activities.

Analytically, I focus on unions’ repertories of collective action. Following Tilly, they are defined as “a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice. […] They do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge from struggle” (Tilly, 1993 p.264). This is a useful definition because it does not assume that they are a product of a conscious decision of the elites, but focuses on the specific, historical–and spatial– struggles in which they are embedded. However, a space of ‘relatively deliberate process of choice’ is taken into account, so agency will also play a role.
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

Given the lack of previous research about LDC’s effects on workers’ organizations, instead of a quantitative exploration that measures specific impacts, I followed a detailed comparative qualitative inquiry of Peruvian unions. This chapter is divided in three parts. First Peru’s election as a useful context for this study is discussed. Then the first set of data, based on a comparative analysis on Peruvian unions is described, and the critical case study is presented.

Why Peru?

First, Peru offers the chance to contrast companies using both the traditional and LDC regimes, something rare in countries were the latter is the only system available. Moreover, as LDC was adapted only since the early nineties, it is possible to find unions that experienced the change from the ‘mining town’ to LDC recently. In contrast to countries such as Canada, where it started more than thirty years ago, engaging in conversations with workers that experienced this change directly is possible.

Second, Peruvian unions are useful units of analysis because of the country’s decentralized bargaining system. Moreover, although the National Federation of Miners represent almost 90% of the country’s unions, its activities are more focused on organizing new unions; and on lobbying for specific laws than on unions’ negotiations and day-to-day activities. Therefore, each union negotiates with its employer separately. Operations can be analyzed and compared as independent units, in contrast to countries such as Australia, where unions bargain in the national level.

Moreover, taxes, labor and mining legislation are centralized, so the same regulations affect all unions, regardless of the region where they operate. In contrast with countries like Canada or

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5 They can certainly ask for the Federation’s help in some cases, but it is uncommon to see national leaders taking control over the union’s decisions.
Australia—where, in addition to national legislation, each region can rule labor relations differently—, unions’ decisions are embedded in the same institutional framework.

Fourth, Peru is a useful site given the country’s heterogeneous ownership structure. In addition to its high position in the world’s minerals ranking\(^6\), multinational corporations produce 70% of these minerals. The origin of these companies is quite diverse: Chinese, Australian, Canadian, American and Mexican investors make this country a rich site to analyze the dynamics a global trend such as LDC.

Last, the political relevance of studying mining in Peru is worth noting. This industry plays a key role in the country’s economy: in average, it represented almost 25% of the State’s budget, and 60% of its exports in the last decade (World Gold Council, 2011)—. Mineworkers, on the other side, have played a key role in the country’s labor history (Flores Galindo, 1974; Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979), and still today are one of the best-organized groups of the country.

Having Peru the above-mentioned advantages, three research approaches were possible. I briefly describe each of them to point out the particularities and advantages of the methodology followed in this study.

(a) Following the work of Church et. al. about the ‘isolated mass’ hypothesis a quantitative approach (Church et al., 1991) could have been used. Using all the unions operating in Peru as units of analysis, it had been possible to measure the impact of different accommodation regimes on variables such as strikes’ occurrences; union membership; or collective agreements’ duration. Although this had proved that LDC has an effect on labor unions, it would have been useless to learn about the mechanisms through which those effects take place. Giving the lack of specific hypotheses in the recent literature, this had been unfruitful.

(b) A second route had been to study only unions operating under LDC through a qualitative

\(^6\) By 2013, Peru was the 3rd world producer of zinc, tin, copper and silver, the 4th of lead and molybdenum, and the 5th of gold.
approach. This option is better than the first one, because it focuses on an exhaustive study of the system and its mechanisms. Comparing the dynamics of unions in small, medium and big operations had helped to understand the commonalities between cases, and how some variables—operations’ size, technology or age, for example—affect this regime. But such approach would not allow observing the particularities of LDC: How to be sure that the commonalities were caused by it, and not by other variables, such as the political or economic context in which companies act?

(c) The third approach—the one used in this research—helps to solve these issues. Acknowledging that the research on LDC is only beginning, it looks for the main differences between the traditional ‘mining town’ model and the LDC regime. A twofold comparison is therefore proposed. In the first place, I compare unions under both systems: Are their dynamics different? In what respects? Secondly, instead of focusing merely only on dynamics, the study adopts a longitudinal perspective too: How do unions’ strategies change once a company moves from the traditional to the LDC regime?

In what follows the cases and data used are described.

A comparative study of Peruvian mining unions

The comparison between different unions proposed here has two levels. Mining has a long history in Peru. Studies about the industry’s working conditions go back as far as the Spanish empire (Contreras, 2004), but in this research I only focus on modern mining, which began in the 20th century, with the arrival of American capitals to Peru (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979). First, I compare unions from a historical perspective. Using previous research on mining camps and archival material, I show the evolution of mining accommodations in the country, and the ways through which they shaped unions’ strategies. In a field dominated by historical studies, revisiting this literature to offer an overview is helpful to put LDC in context.

Second, I compare mining unions operating in Peru since 2000, looking for the potential effects
of different accommodation systems on their strategies. 2000 was chosen as the starting year because of two reasons: (a) this was the year in which Fujimori’s dictatorship ended, creating a new political context for workers’ organizations and (b) the Ministry of Labor’s available data became more precise that year. Additionally, although LDC started as soon as in 1994 in Yanacocha, it only became common after the beginning of operations in Barrick-Pierina (1998), Antamina (2000), and La Arena (2009). I used three data sources for this comparison:

- Statistical data from the Ministry of Labor. Information regarding the strikes and collective bargaining patterns, which nobody has yet used, was found and systematized for the period 2000-2013.

- Information regarding organizational features, such as the existence of a “Comité de Damas” or the development of subcontracted workers’ unions in camps was found for all the unions in large-scale mining. To get this data, I relied on the information provided by the National Federation of Miners and on informal conversations with the union leaders of those camps.

- Two mining camps were visited to get a better sense of the dynamics of a traditional and an LDC accommodation. First, I visited Marcona, a mining town managed by Shougang, a Chinese iron company. An American Corporation built this town in the mid fifties, and, in spite of its changes, almost 98% of its workforce live in town with their families. Secondly, I visited Antamina’s camp, which consists in a hotel-type structure, where workers have single rooms where they rest for 10 continuous days, after which they go home to rest for 10 days. These two cases were chosen because, among the large-scale mines, they were comparable in terms of profits and size, both of unions’ members and companies’ workforce (Table 2). However, it is worth-noting that there are also important differences such age, mineral produced, and ownership. Because of this, I decided to use them only as complementary cases of a critical case study.
Table 2: A comparison between Antamina, Shougang and Toquepalá

| Company                  | Antamina  
|                         | (LDC regime) | Shougang  
|                         |             | (Company Town) | Southern Peru-Toquepalá  
|                         |             | (Changed from Company Town to LDC) |
| Owners                  | BHP Billiton (Australia); Xstrata; Teck (Canada); Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan). | Shougang (China) | Grupo Mexico (Mexico) |
| Year of the beginning of the operations | 2001 | 1953 | 1952 |
| Main Product            | Copper | Iron | Copper |
| Position as producer in Peru | 1st (Copper) 2nd (Gold) | 1st (Iron) | 2nd (Copper) |
| Type of technology      | Open-pit | Open-pit | Open-pit |
| Number of direct workers (May 2014) | 2724 | 1896 | 1608 |
| Percentage of Direct Workers (May 2014) | 44% | 44% | 46% |
| Year of the creation of the union | 2002 | 1967 | 1961 |
| Number of strikes (2000-2013) | 0 | 26 | 8 |
| Number of collective agreements (2001-2013) | 4 | 8 | 4 |

A longitudinal case study

Although the comparison between different unions informs about a specific moment in time, it helps contrasting the impacts of different accommodation systems on unions, it doesn't illuminate the specific impacts of LDC. To deal with this issue, a longitudinal case study about the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Toquepalá y Anexos (STTA), the union of a company that changed from the traditional to the LDC regime in the last 14 years, is proposed.
Southern Peru Copper Corporation was, between 1970 and 1995, the most important and modern mining company in Peru (Arcienaga, 1986; Hiba et al., 2002), and today it is still among the largest producers in the country. This company owns two mining operations, each one with its own company town: Toquepala and Cuajone. This research will only focus on the first one because of three reasons:

(a) It is Peru’s biggest operation—in terms of workforce and production size—that changed from the traditional to the LDC system, which makes it comparable to Shougang and Antamina.

(b) It is the camp in which the change to LDC was more radical given its geographic isolation. In contrast to cases such in Cerro de Pasco and Cuzco, where mining towns were also replaced by LDC accommodations, but are located close to medium-size towns, the Toquepala camp allows to see a purer case of LDC adoption.

(c) Finally, several previous studies on the STTA existed. This allowed a better exploration about the union’s dynamics before the change towards LDC (Arcienaga, 1986; Becker, 1982; Diaz Palacios, 1988; Goodsell, 1974).

Toquepala’s camp was originally designed and managed by an American corporation, which sold the company in 1999 to Grupo Mexico, the biggest Mexican mining corporation in terms of production and investments. The camp was traditional company town until 2000, when LDC was adopted. Although it took about 9 years to finish the implementation of the system in the camp, by now most of the workers have moved out of the camp with their families to cities such as Tacna, Arequipa or Lima.

Up to 2014, Toquepala’s mine employed around 1800 workers and had two unions: The Sindicato Unico de Toquepala, SUT, a product of the 2013 merge of the blue-collar workers’
union (SET) and the operations’ workers’ union (SUTOTA), has around 300 members; and the STTA, the blue-collar workers’ union, created in 1951, and formed by 750 members by 2014.

Given the camp’s age, it was not built to support an LDC regime. Moreover, and in contrast to other cases in Peru, in which companies destroyed the old accommodations, in Toquepala workers still have right to a house in the camp. The company uses a 4 (days in the field) x 3 (days at home) system.

Regarding the methods, this study is based on a *thick description* of the union’s dynamics (Cefkin, 2009; Jimenez, 2007), and four sources were used.

First, I draw on the fieldwork I conducted in different periods of time between July 2011 and August 2014. During that time, semi-structured interviews to union leaders and to rank-and-file members, and structured group interviews with union members were conducted. I transcribed them in Spanish, and analyzed them with the help of the field notes I took. As I learnt about the unions, I discovered the importance of the private sphere in their dynamics. As a consequence, I also engaged in informal conversations with mineworkers’ wives in 2014. Overall, 50 interviews of 45 minutes average were conducted.

Second, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the companies’ HR managers; the state’s officials that worked as mediators during the collective bargaining; and civil society leaders from towns near the camps. A broader view about the conditions and consequences of unions’ actions was obtained through these 12 interviews.

Third, ethnographic data from unions’ meetings and informal workers’ gatherings was obtained. I rely on the field notes I use during my visits, as well as on the pictures I took in the camps. Additionally, I observed the camps’ social life. Although it wasn’t the main focus of this research, this provided information about the immediate context of workers’ lives and about their daily engagement with the union.
Finally, I relied on the archival sources provided by union, the Peruvian state and the company. From the union, I analyzed formal documents, such as those regarding its members’ characteristics, the demands presented before the company, and the decisions taken in the organization’s meetings; as well as its monthly newspaper. Peru’s Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Mining provided information about labor inspections, the collective bargaining processes (and their results), and the strikes. Finally, I also reviewed the company’s annual reports to contextualize the union’s activities.
CHAPTER 3: THE PERUVIAN MINING INDUSTRY AND LDC

Mining has been the most important activity of the Peruvian economy for the last two centuries. Gold, copper and silver were crucial both to connect Peru to the world economy during colonial times (Garner, 1988), and to build the nation-state after independence (Thorp & Bertram, 1978). It was in mining where a modern working class first emerged (Flores Galindo, 1974). Also, given the rise of mineral prices worldwide, the Peruvian economy grew significantly in the last 10 years—about 7% of the GNP per year. By 2013, more than 50% of the national exports were minerals (Minem, 2013).

In contrast with its economic success, the industry faced several social conflicts. According to the Ombudsman Office, between 2004 and 2013, 75% of the conflicts in the country were directly related to mining activities. The most contentious ones were those based on environmental threats and land grabbing, two elements that seem to have displaced labor disputes as the most visible struggles in many operations (Bebbington et al., 2008; Echave de, Diez, Huber, & Revesz, 2009). More than on strikes, today’s newspapers focus on communities’ opposition to new projects, as well as on local demands to improve environmental standards.

The change is puzzling, given the importance mineworkers had in the configuration of the country’s economic and political dynamics during the twentieth century (A. DeWind, 1975; Flores Galindo, 1974; Sulmont, 1980). The current literature reflects well the transformation described above: although mining has become the most studied topic, few scholars have analyzed the changing dynamics of the industry’s labor practices, the characteristics of its workforce, or the demands of its unions.

This chapter starts presenting the relationship between accommodation systems and labor struggles from a historical perspective, after which the institutionalization of LDC in Peru is

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7 The only exception is the study of Hiba, Echave & Ospina (2002)
reviewed. Finally, quantitative and qualitative data is used to describe the links between workers’ collective repertoires and LDC since 2000.

Mining’s spatial dynamics and mineworkers’ strategies in Peru.

During most of the nineteenth century, mining production was dominated by small operations (Contreras, 2004). This situation changed in the twentieth century, when American companies started investing in the country. By 1970, three American corporations owned the country’s three most important mines, and produced 80% of the minerals (Thorp & Bertram, 1978).

The oldest of these companies was the Cerro de Pasco Corporation (CPC). Its operations began in 1918, and by 1965 it was the country’s largest private employer. CPC grew through the acquisition of small and medium underground mines in the Sierra Central, soon becoming the biggest landowner in the country (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979; Laite, 1981).

The short distance between Sierra Central and Lima made the former a profitable site of agricultural activities, so peasant communities existed in the region prior to the consolidation of CPC. As a consequence, the company had to face their opposition in its efforts to get new lands to mine, and struggles regarding land-grabbing issues constantly emerged (Long & Roberts, 1984).

The relationship between company and locals worsened given the company’s needs of workforce: underground mines were not always a profitable or safe alternative to the traditional economy (Helfgott, 2013; Laite, 1981). To deal with this situation, the CPC used coercion to turn peasants into miners: “Cerro created a proletariat by largely coercive means, at a time when

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8 In contrast with the rich literature about mineworkers in South Africa, England or Chile, nobody has offered a synthesis of their dynamics in the Peruvian case. However, there are several classic case studies on which I drew to organize the following ideas.
state power was feeble and when capitalists customarily evinced not the slightest concern for workers’ human welfare.” (Becker, 1982 p.63).

Although this process was not uncontested, landless communities soon started sending workers to the mine, at least for specific periods of time. Usually, people moved to the mine for 6 to 9 months, and then they went back home to help with the harvest between April and May. This meant that miners and peasants had strong networks, which were reinforced every time mineworkers went back to their communities. As a result, the formation of a class of peasant-miners took place (DeWind 1975, Helfgott 2013).

Since the peasant economy supported part of the workers reproductive necessities, the company saved money in wages (A. DeWind, 1975; Flores Galindo, 1974). Moreover, instead of building houses for workers and their families, temporary barracks for single workers were built in most camps. In spite of the high turnover rate, this strategy was economical, and coherent with the low technologies used in most Cerro’s mines (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979). But this also created a situation in which workers supported peasants’ demands (e.g. those regarding land grabbing or environmental issues), whereas they received the support from local communities whenever labor issues arose (Helfgott, 2013; Laite, 1981). Writing about the land invasions carried out by peasants in this region between 1959 and 1963, Anthropologist J. DeWind stated: “The mine unions also offered support to the peasants. When government troops killed eight peasants in 1962, the Cerro de Pasco miners and railroad workers, some of whom were members of local villages and had taken part in the invasions, declared a strike. Peasant and miners barricaded La Oroya’s streets until government troops regained control” (J. DeWind, 1997 p. 258)

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9 This connection between peasant economy, temporary migrant workers and mining production has been well studied in South Africa through the notion of the compound system (Crush, 1994, Home, 2000). The key difference in the Peruvian case was, however, that the mineworkers were not far away from their communities, which allow them to maintain stronger connections with them.
By the late fifties, the company was more conscious about how dangerous these alliances were, and this, combined with technological advances in the industry—for example, through the development of open pit mining, and the mechanization of underground production—, demanded a smaller and more stable workforce (Kruijt & Vellinga, 1979). Small mining towns for workers and their families were built, looking for the consolidation of a more ‘professional’ group of miners. However, this attempt ended abruptly a decade later, when Velasco’s government nationalized the company in 1969. Although the Peruvian government continued these policies, by then, the economic crisis, corruption and constant stoppages took company’s profits down.

Meanwhile, other two American corporations had built the biggest mining towns in the country: Marcona Mining Company (MMC) in Ica and Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SP) in Tacna. They began producing in the early fifties—almost 40 years after CCP had started—, so the technologies they used, as well as their employment policies, contrasted to those of CCP. Since they managed open-pit operations, a large number of workers—at least compared to CPC— was not required. A small and well-trained workforce, able to use high-tech equipment to extract, process and transport the minerals was needed instead. Although small communities of people lived near these operations—both of them located in the Peruvian South—, companies preferred to attract its workers from further parts of the country: “The companies could not allow their training expense to leak away in high labour turnover. Moreover, they could not help being aware that a few disaffected workers might easily wreak enormous damage through inattention or sabotage. Hence, a stable and reasonably contented workforce was always of great importance to them” (Becker, 1982p. 63; See also Goodsell, 1974). Local communities, on the other side, were not as many or as organized as the ones in the Central region. Therefore, labor migration acquired a different pattern here. In both Marcona and Toquepala, workers came from
Puno, Ayacucho and Arequipa, the three biggest regions around these camps, and, in spite of their peasant background (Arcienaga, 1986; Pinto, 2011), they decided to stop being ‘indios’\textsuperscript{10}.

In order to educate and control their workforce, these companies offered high wages and high-quality accommodations to workers and their families, building mining towns that followed the American model of paternalist company towns (Crawford, 1995; Dinius & Vergara, 2011; Green, 2012): modern hospitals, American products in the shops, and outstanding schools were part of the workers’ contracts. Since the working conditions of open-pit mines were considerably better than those of underground mines, a more stable workforce emerged in these camps. Most of the retired workers I talked to in Toquepala and Marcona remembered that they first went to these camps because they had heard that it was “a little bit like living as a gringo”, and that it was “a great way to live in a city without having all the troubles you had when you move to Lima”.

Although free from the strong peasant-miners’ coalitions that characterized the struggles at CPC, this spatial fix created a new set of disputes. Organized around their working class neighborhoods, workers soon started mobilizing against the attempts of control of their daily lives by their employers (Arcienaga, 1986). Both in Marcona and Toquepala, unions for blue and white collar workers were organized a decade after companies started operating. In both cases they grew rapidly, and got some of the best collective agreements in the industry a few years after their creation (Arcienaga, 1986; Sulmont, 1980). Workers created their own communities and culture, contesting the attempts of management to have a workforce useful only for capitalist production (Arcienaga, 1986; This pattern has been also found in other mining camps. For Latin America, see: Borges & Torres, 2012; Dinius & Vergara, 2011; Klubock, 2004). In MCM, for example, the union hall was the biggest building in town after the company’s headquarters. In this hall, workers organized soccer matches and strikes; played movies and

\textsuperscript{10} In Peru, being a peasant—specially in the southern part of the country—is almost as ‘low’ as being indigenous in terms of status.
run dances; and the chance to go and complain about the company was offered to the whole community. Rather than being a space only for male miners, it soon became—and still is—a place in which housewives went to complain about housing conditions, urban insecurity or food prices. In both Marcona and Toquepala, autonomous and militant unions emerged as the only tool to oppose to the companies’ policies (Emmott, 2005; Pinto, 2011; For a historical perspective about Shougang, see Manky, 2013).

Summing up, these three companies faced constant and contentious labor disputes, but the nature of the conflicts, as well as the strategies used by workers changed over time. Whereas the CPC dealt with miners-peasants alliances, and its workforce was less educated and more militant—the Peruvian Communist party was there as soon as in the early thirties—; in MMC and SP workers developed a more independent type of unionism, strong enough to negotiate with the companies with satisfactory results, and more concerned about labor, school and health conditions than about land grabbing or environmental disputes (Balbi & Parodi, 1984; Sulmont, 1984).

Although elements relating to the origins of the workforce, the employment relations and the technological trends in each moment explain this change, the type of workers accommodations are also key. Moreover, building on the notion of spatial regimes (McGrath-Champ et al., 2010; Ngai & Smith, 2007) it can be argued that accommodations were the material base to attract a specific type of workforce, and to use specific industrial relations’ systems: workers living in temporary accommodations, and coming from nearby places had strong networks with peasant organizations, and built a political unionism; whereas a more independent unionism, focused on ‘bread and butter’ issues emerged in mining towns.
Table 3: A comparison between CPC and CPC/MCM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPC</th>
<th>Southern / Marcona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation System</td>
<td>Barracks where single workers lived for 7 to 8 months before going back to their communities.</td>
<td>Mining town providing accommodation and services for workers and their families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Movement</td>
<td>'Obrero-Campesino' (Peasant-Worker) Temporary workers with strong ties with their communities, located near the camps.</td>
<td>'Obrero Minero'. Immigrants(^\text{11}) that moved to the camps with their families, planning to live there until retirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions’ demands</td>
<td>Political demands: nationalization of the company, land grabbing combined with salaries and safe issues.</td>
<td>'Bread and Butter' demands, focused on accommodation, housing, and control in the workplace.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The emergence of a new model: LDC and the Peruvian Labor Law

These divergent styles of management did not mean that mineworkers were unable to form alliances, though. During the seventies, these three unions were the base of the National Federation of Mineworkers (Sulmont, 1980), and after the Peruvian government nationalized CPC and MMC, miners got more involved in national struggles as state workers. While the new administration was unable to improve workers’ conditions, workers started demanding industry-level agreements, something that had never occurred in the industry’s history. This situation became critical in the eighties, when miners from these three camps led the most important demonstrations in the country’s history (Balbi & Parodi, 1984; Sulmont, 1984). However, these attempts failed as a consequence of the economic crisis, the decline in the international price of minerals (Helfgott, 2013 Ch.4) and the internal war during the eighties (Canessa, 2011). By 1990, the industry faced its biggest crisis since 1929, and most unions were not strong enough to get their own collective bargaining negotiations settled (Solfrini, 2001).

\(^{11}\) I follow the distinction proposed by Vanselow, Warhurst, Brenhardt and Dresser (2010), for whom ‘migrant’ refers to transitory workers and ‘immigrant’ to workers who intend to take up permanent residency.
As other countries in the region, Peru applied a radical set of neoliberal reforms in the nineties (Cook, 2007 see Ch.4). In mining, three key changes are worth noting.

First, a radical privatization process put all the state-owned mines on sale, whereas a change in the land legislation allowed the massive acquisition of lands for new projects (Bury, 2005). As a result, multinational corporations such as BHP Billiton, Newmont or Barrick started both buying old mines and investing in new projects. Whereas Shougang is an example of the first process – it bought the mine formerly owned by the MMC in 1993—; Antamina—a joint venture of four global corporations— is an example of the second one.

Secondly, a new Labor Code was approved in 1994, allowing mining companies to change their labor practices. Among other transformations, labor flexibility, arbitrary dismissals and subcontracting became legal. Thus, temporary contracts replaced the life-long employment regimes, arbitrary dismissals made workers afraid of organizing unions and subcontracting took away a key base for new organizing efforts (Manky, 2014; Martinez & Vega Ruiz, 2001; Solfrini, 2001). Overall, this debilitated the entire labor movement but, in a country where the unionization rate that was never beyond the 15% in the private sector, the hit was harder in mining than in other industries. Today, around 70% of the mining workforce is subcontracted, and, in spite of their latest mobilizing attempts, they haven’t been able to be as strong as the traditional unions.

Finally, whereas the Labor Code of 1993 permitted a new working time regime—one in which it was possible to make people work for more than 8 hours a day—, the 1992 Mining Code allowed the use of alternative ways of accommodation. These two changes provided the institutional base of LDC. None of the companies that started operating after 1993 have built a mining town, and in some cases old family houses—such as those formerly owned by the CPC and SP— were converted into single dorms in the last fifteen years.
As in the progressive Constitution of 1979, the one approved in 1993 established that the regular workday could not go beyond eight hours, nor the regular workweek be longer than forty-eight. However, 1993 Constitution also consented the use of cumulative work schedules (“Jornada Acumulativa de Trabajo”), through which the daily working hours could be averaged. The Ministry of Labor defines the cumulative system as “that characterized by important rest intervals, in which the employee works for extended work days and then have compensatory rests” (Report Nº 03-2013-MTPE/2/14). According to the 1995 Labor Code Regulations of 1995, this system is a faculty of the employer, although it can only be used, “because of the special nature of the company’s activities”. Unlike other mining countries that also allow averaging systems, such as Australia, Canada or Chile, in Peru LDC it is not the product of an agreement between labor and capital and it cannot be applied in all types of business, but only in those where using the normal schedule would affect company’s productivity.

Most of the companies that started operating after 1993 have used cumulative work schedules. Even mines that operated before the reforms turned to the cumulative regime in the last years, some of them as early as in 1998, as in BHP’s Tintaya mine, or as late as 2007 in the case of Atacocha. Still, this trend left few camps using the traditional regime by 2014 (Table 4).

Only in 2006, as a result of a demand made by the STTA, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled the maximum number of weeks to be averaged, following the ILO Convention N.1, which establishes that: “where persons are employed in shifts it shall be permissible to employ persons in excess of eight hours in any one day and forty-eight hours in any one week, if the average number of hours over a period of three weeks or less does not exceed eight per day and forty-eight per week” (Article 2)\(^2\). Thus, whereas systems such as 4x3 (working 12 hours

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\(^2\) If one divides the total of worked hours by the number days of the complete period—including the resting days—, the result should not be more than 8 hours per day or 48 per week (Report Nº 03-2013-MTPE/2/14). Therefore a company can make its employees to work during 11 consecutive days for 12 hours a day (132 hours), as long as after this they receive 10 days of rest (132/21= 6 hours and 20 minutes per day; 132/3=44 hours per week).
per day), 10x10 or 14 x 7 (working 10 hours per day) are legal, 28x20 (working 10 hours a day) or 45x15 (working 8 hours a day) systems—common in the industry before 2006—are now forbidden.

Additionally, the Tribunal clarified that, if companies wanted to use the system, they had to achieve a “protection test” for mining workers. According to it, adequate security, health, alimentation, and rest should be provided, as well as a special treatment to the employees working in night shifts. An additional condition was to respect previous collective agreements that prohibited the change of working hours.

Although there is no information systematizing how many people work are under LDC regimes in Peru, or about the different regimes used by mining companies, the following table is helpful to get an image about LDC, and the ways through which it combines days of work and rest.

| Table 4: Top 10 Peruvian Mining Companies by Work Schedules |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Volcan Cia. Minera S.A.A.       | 10              | 14x10           |
| Cia. De Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.: Uchuchacua | 10              | 14x10           |
| Cia. Mra Milpo S.A              | 10              | 14x10           |
| Cia. Mra. Antamina S.A.         | 12              | 10x10           |
| Xstrata Tintaya S.A.            | 10              | 10x5            |
| Mra. Barrick Misquichilca: Lagunas Norte | 12              | 8x6            |
| Minera Yanacocha S.R.L.         | 12              | 4x4             |
| Southern Peru: Toquepala        | 12              | 4x3 / 5x3       |
| Shougang Hierro Peru (not-LDC)  | 8               | 6x1             |
| Soc. Mra. Cerro Verde S.A.A. (not-LDC) | 8               | 6x1            |

Source: Companies Annual Books, Ministry of Labor. They are sort by the number of daily working hours.

The transformation of working time regulations are accompanied by new legislation on housing and accommodation provisions. The 1993 General Mining Law, which replaced the one of 1981,
established a clear differentiation between two types of workplaces. First, in the case of employees working under the ‘traditional regime’—this is, the one of 8 working hours per day—, the law mandated companies to give them access “to adequate houses, for them and their families”. This was a copy of what the 1981 Law had established: schools, recreation facilities, health and well-being services must be provided when public institutions were far from the operations (See the Intro. of Sulmont & Valcárcel, 1993). Since most of mining production does take place in remote locations—legally defined as those more than 13 miles away from the closest town—, this meant that companies would have to build mining towns most of the time.

But, in the case of miners using the cumulative scheduling, the law established that they should have “housing facilities” exclusively for workers and not for their families. As in other countries, legislation about LDC’s housing arrangements is more flexible regarding the specific types, size and services provided to the workforce. (Carrasco & Vega, 2011; House of Representatives and Standing Committee on Regional Australia, 2013)

Thus, in contrast with the traditional mining town’s regulations, the standards for the LDC regime are fewer, and they leave space for companies to use different options. The results have been as heterogeneous as those regarding schedules. Whereas Antamina, Barrick or Tintaya use a “dormitory regime”, in which most workers spend the nights in modern facilities provided by the company; companies like La Arena subcontract hotels where workers stay protected, and controlled, by private security companies. In Southern, on the other side, former houses have been turned into single-worker rooms, where up to three miners share a house when they are in the camp. In spite of this heterogeneity, it is worth mentioning that LDC seems to be re-shaping unions’ strategies similarly. The last section of this chapter focuses on this point.

**Are LDC unions different? Some intuitions**

20 years after the reforms took place, mining has recovered its place in the country’s economy. Minerals’ exports went from $3'089 millions in 2002 to $25'921 millions in 2012. Although last
decade’s boom in the price of minerals was key for this growth, the institutional reforms were crucial to make production effective.

**Figure 1: Peruvian Exports 2000-2012 (In US$ Millions)**

Mining kept being, as in the past century, key for the country’s economy, although it also exhibited new features. While the twentieth century was dominated by American investments, after the structural reforms ownership structure became more heterogeneous: companies from Australia, Canada, Mexico and China started investing in the country since the early nineties (Table 5)
Table 5: Top Ten Mining Companies Operating in Peru (2000-2013)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Company</th>
<th>Investors’ country of origin</th>
<th>Number of mining operations by 2013</th>
<th>Minerals</th>
<th>Post-1993 operation?**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cia. Mra. Antamina S.A.</td>
<td>BHP-Billiton (Anglo-Australian); Glencore-Xstrata (Anglo-Swiss); Teck (Canada)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Copper, silver, Zinc</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cia. De Minas Buenaventura S.A.A.</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>11***</td>
<td>Gold, silver, zinc, lead, copper</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cia. Mra Milpo S.A</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zinc, copper, lead, silver and gold.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minera Barrick Misquichilca S.A.</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zinc, copper, lead, silver and gold.</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minera Yanacocha S.R.L.</td>
<td>Newmont Mining Corporation (USA), Buenaventura (Peru), IFC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gold</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shougang Hierro Peru</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Iron Ore</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. Mra. Cerro Verde S.A.A.</td>
<td>Freeport-McMoRan (USA) Sumitomo Group (Japan), Buenaventura (Peru)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Peru Copper Corporation</td>
<td>Grupo Mexico (Mexico)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volcan Cia. Minera S.A.A.</td>
<td>Volcan (Peru)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zinc, silver, lead</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xstrata Tintaya S.A.</td>
<td>Xstrata (Anglo-Swiss) Now Glencore Xstrata</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Copper, silver, gold</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
*The list is in alphabetical order. It was elaborated by the author through the revision of the Annual Reports of the Peruvian Mining Ministry. The list includes the ten biggest producers of the countries’ top mineral exports (copper, gold, silver, zinc and iron) between 2000 and 2013.

**Post-1993’ operation means that the newest company’s mine started producing after the neoliberal reforms.

***In addition to its 11 operations, Buenaventura also invests as a partner in other mines, such as Cerro Verde and Yanacocha.

It is worth noting that, although three of these companies are Peruvian, they got into the ranking because they own multiple mines, and not because they managed big operations, as in the case of Antamina, Yanacocha or Southern. It is also remarkable that only three of the operations listed above started producing after the neoliberal reforms. Although many of the
listed mines—Shougang and Southern, for example—have new owners, they are actually more than fifty years old.

In spite of the total privatization of the mines, and the new investments that the state attracted, most of the production is still controlled by a small number of companies. In 2012, there were more than 450 active operations, but few companies produced most of the country’s minerals. For example, Antamina, Southern and Cerro Verde produced 81% of the country’s copper; Yanacocha, Barrick and Buenaventura 48% of its gold; Antamina, Milpo and Volcan 36% of its zinc; and Shougang the 100% of its iron.

In a context of economic growth and massive investments, mining workforce’s characteristics changed as well. In quantitative terms, it grew from 37,000 workers in 2000 to 125,000 twelve years later. In terms of their monthly salaries, they improved from 2,604 soles in 2000 to 4,084 soles in 2013. Even when workers did not necessarily gained back the bargaining power they had in the seventies, the number of unions and collective bargaining agreements also increased: more than 114 mining unions were organized between 2000 and 2012, and the number of collective bargaining agreements went from 49 in 2000 to 86 in 2011.

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13 The national average, on the other side, also increase between those years, but only from 1,850 soles to 1,994 soles.
### Table 6: Peru 2000-2013. Strikes, Unionization and Workforce Size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strikes</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>% of the country</th>
<th>Unionized Workers</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>% of the country</th>
<th>(Formal) Workforce</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>% of the country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12100</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37945</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10850</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>37544</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10168</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>39755</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11657</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>43974</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16459</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>50296</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14708</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>48353</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13901</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>53270</td>
<td>4.30%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18963</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>66722</td>
<td>4.70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13554</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>86069</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15677</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>85109</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17285</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>98591</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18332</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>114564</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19790</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>125125</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26899</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>120557</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Regarding their repertoires of collective action, the number of strikes also increased over the last decade, although they have not gotten closer to the level of contention and national organization of the late eighties, when an average of 40 yearly strikes occurred (Núñez, 1986; Parodi, 1987; Yépez, 1986). Nevertheless, it is remarkable that, in average, 31% of the strikes occurred in Peru between 2000 and 2013 were organized by mineworkers. This is surprising since unionized miners—the only ones that can legally strike according to the Peruvian labor law—are about 15% of all the unionized workers in Peru. A remarkable fact, considering that miners are only 4% of the formal workforce: in average, 1.1% of the formal workforce organized a third of the stoppages of the last decade.
Miners are a small and yet quite active group. But this is not a new feature. Both labor historians (Bergquist, 1986) and sociologist (Sulmont, 1984; Zapata, 1977; 2002) have argued that, particularly in export-oriented economies, miners are more able to organize, strike and improve their working conditions than workers in other industries. Their strategic position in the economy gives them enough bargaining power (Silver, 2003) and, in a context of rise of the minerals prices, even a short strike can be enough to make a company lose millions of dollars.

The problem with this reasoning, however, is that it explains mineworkers’ ability to organize and mobilize only by focusing on structural factors. Even when it is known that a context of economic growth provides incentives for mobilizing (Aschenfelter & Johnson, 1969; Brandl & Traxler, 2009), incentives are not enough to explain social action.

The previous section showed how workers’ strategies changed according to the features of their working conditions. How is LDC affecting these strategies today? Table 7 helps to disentangle some factors shaping workers’ collective actions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation and number of strikes</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Top 10 company?</th>
<th>Type of Union</th>
<th>Number of Strikes</th>
<th>LDC?</th>
<th>Direct workers?</th>
<th>Open Pit mine?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcona: 26</td>
<td>Shougang Hierro Peru</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subcontracted</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atacocha: 11</td>
<td>Cia.Mra Milpo S.A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Yes (since 2007)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yauliyacu: 18</td>
<td>Los Quenuales</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Subcontracted</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uchucchacua: 17</td>
<td>Cia.De Minas Buenaventura S.A.A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Subcontracted</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orcopampa: 13</td>
<td>Cia.De Minas Buenaventura S.A.A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casapalca: 12</td>
<td>Cia. Mra. Casapalca</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Subcontracted</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Miguel de Cuari: 10</td>
<td>Cia. Minera Raura</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Subcontracted</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cerro Verde: 10</td>
<td>Soc. Mra. Cerro Verde S.A.A</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chorungua: 10</td>
<td>Century Mining</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toquepala: 8</td>
<td>Southern Peru Copper Corporation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Blue collar</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others - 5 or less strikes between 2006 and 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>174</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>321</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Top 10 Mines by number of strikes (2000-2013)

Although it only focuses on one strategy, strikes, they have been, historically, the most common tools used by Peruvian mining unions to defend their interests (Payne, 1965; Solfrini, 2001; Sulmont, 1984). In contrast with traditional approaches, that assume strikes are equally distributed, table shows the 10 mines where more strikes were organized in the last 13 years: 45% of all the mining strikes occurred there, in a country where more than 150 mining unions, and 400 operations exist. Common factors used to explain workers’ mobilizing strategies, such as labor laws or political representation affect all unions similarly, so they can be ruled out from the explanation. Moreover, although there is a tendency towards more strikes in underground operations (7 out of 10 cases) and in big companies (6 out of 10), a crucial element is the absence of LDC arrangements in most cases (8 out of 10). Moreover, in the two mines where LDC is used–Atococha and Toquepala–, its total implementation was recent–2007 and 2008, respectively–. In the case of Toquepala, most of those strikes occurred prior the LDC change, as it is discussed in Chapter 4.

Another way of reading table 7 is noting those operations that do not appear in it. Unionized operations such as Barrick, Yanacocha, Antamina or Xstrata-Tintaya have not experienced more than one strike since they started operating more than a decade ago. In all of these cases, LDC has been used since the beginning of the production. This is not conclusive, and it does not mean that these unions are weaker than those in mining towns. New strategies might be emerging in the new context.

During my fieldwork in Peru, I visited different camps. Contrasting the unions of two of them might shed lights on the dynamics described above. Antamina is a LDC company that provides modern hotel-type rooms to its workers, whereas Shougang is a company that inherited a mining town built in the fifties. Although I go back to some of their dynamics in the next chapter, here is worth mentioning some of their main features, as they help exploring the ways through which LDC is affecting labor unions’ strategies.
As it was mentioned above, the two biggest mining operations in Peru between the mid fifties and the mid eighties, MMC and SCC, were managed by American companies. In both cases, mining towns were built, and their unions were quite similar in terms of size, members' demographic characteristics, and strategies (Arcienaga, 1986; Diaz Palacios, 1988; Goodsell, 1974). In the nineties, however, their stories diverged. During the last decade, Marcona has been one of the camps with more strikes in the country, which has attracted interest from both journalists and scholars. In most of these reports, the large amount of disputes was explained by the managerial practices, since Shougang was the first big operation owned by a Chinese company in Latin America (Emmott, 2005; Pinto, 2011). However, the only comparative study about this case showed that, in fact, the company’s policies were not radically different to those of other companies, such as Antamina or Yanacocha (Irwin & Gallagher, 2012). Of course there are conflicts between the company and the union, but to explain their contentious relations it is necessary not only to focus on management’s strategies, but also on the workers’ ability to mobilize.

What’s particular about the Shougang union? My interviews and observations in the camp let me identify three important aspects, all of them suggesting a continuity of the ‘mining camp’ model above described.

(a) Culturally, workers constantly referred to managers as enemies. In addition to its racialization—‘I can stand a gringo, but a Chinese telling me what to do…that's different’—, workers mentioned the big houses in which managers lived—next to the beach, with many rooms— which contrasted with their own houses—“they have a golf club, we only have two small rooms for the whole family”. This created a strong feeling of injustice among the workers, who complained not only about their salaries, but also about the accommodations problems and their
children’s education quality\textsuperscript{14}. Labor issues, therefore, are constantly combined with demands regarding living conditions and local development.

(b) Secondly, workers have strong local networks: they are friends that play soccer every weekend; celebrate their children’s birthdays together; and go to the local bars to talk. This permits the union to have enough legitimacy to create a strong culture which, for example, reflects in a hall where people is always talking about their problems: “\textit{usually workers come here before going home if they have a problem in the mine… but they can also come just to play soccer}”. Additionally, living in the camp gives the leaders a strong control of the union’s members: “\textit{Those that don’t participate are humiliated in front of the whole community. We put papers with their names on the walls, and go to pick them up at home if they do not come to our meetings}”.

As a result, the union is quite active, even beyond the collective bargaining process. During a visit in 2011, I witnessed how, when a worker was suspended because of being drunk at work, the union leaders rapidly called all the union’s members. In less than an hour, around 200 workers were at the hall discussing the response to be given. Unsurprisingly, Marcona is the only camp within the large-scale mines where a subcontracted workers’ union was organized. All its leaders were Shougang workers’ sons, and, according to my interviews, they were friends even before working together.

(c) Finally, the union has strong networks with other groups inside Marcona. Over time, the city grew to provide services and products to the workforce(Pinto, 2011). Nowadays, every time the union strikes, workers receive the support from the local business owners, which provide food and even walk with workers during their demonstrations. On the other side, workers receive the

\textsuperscript{14}I explored this consciousness about managers and space inequality in a previous article(Manky, 2013).
constant support form their wives and partners, through a Comite de Damas, an organization that helps during the union’s demonstrations\textsuperscript{15}.

In this context, the union’s repertoires of mobilization are mostly focused on local strategies. The blue-collar workers’ union has organized, on average, two strikes per year over the last decade, managing to completely stop the company’s production four times. Usually, workers are able to block roads, which ends with either the company sitting to negotiate or the state intervening as an arbitrator.

In Antamina, two workers share a single room, but since they are in different shifts they are not supposed to see each other. The workforce lives in different Peruvian cities. Few of them live as far as in Cuzco, more than 1000 miles away from the camp, and most of them in Lima and Huaraz, around 310 and 100 miles away, respectively. Working for ten days at the camp, and resting ten days at home, the union’s features are rather different to those of Shougang.

(a) Culturally, workers don’t complaint about the differences between them and the managers. The salaries of the later group are much higher, but in the camp, “the only difference is that our bosses live in bigger rooms, but they eat in the same dining rooms we do, and live in the same building”. According to the HR manager, “we try to be democratic in the camp...my house in Lima might be bigger, but here, we all share in the same hotel”. On the other side, most workers use their free days either to study or to begin small businesses in their hometowns. Almost all my interviewees saw their conditions as miners as temporary. For them, this was only a way to save money to be their own bosses later.

(b) Secondly, workers don’t see each other outside the workplace. Since they live in different cities, “when we want to meet we have to coordinate at least two months ahead...each one has his own businesses, you know?” Although the union has a room within the camp, workers

\textsuperscript{15}Interestingly, the only camps where housewives’ organizations exist are those using a traditional system these camps are, among others, those of Casapalca, Los Queniales, PanAmerican, Raura, El Brocal, and Milpo
mentioned that it is usually empty, and that the only assemblies with many people are those in which the collective agreement is discussed. At the camp, after 12 hours of work, time for socializing is not much. “I’m usually very tired to go to our office and to complain about Antamina”. Moreover, as one miner explained, “most of us prefer to go to our rooms to call to our families”.

(c) Finally, in terms of their relationship with the local communities, except for the 15% of the unionized workers living next to the camp\(^\text{16}\), most workers just take a bus directly to Lima or Huaraz: “I’ve been in Antamina for more than a decade, but I’d lie if I said that I’ve been outside the camp more than 3 times”. Although workers are free to go outside the camp, they usually prefer to sleep there, so no links with local communities are built. Since most of the miners wives don’t know each other—they are not neighbors, like in Shougang—, a ‘Comité de Damas’ haven’t be organized. Moreover, since they don’t experience directly their husbands problems, they don’t engage in many of their claims: “of course my wife wants me to bring more money …but she also wants me to spend more days with her at home…”

This doesn’t mean, however, that the union lacks of bargaining power. Although in contrast to Shougang their last collective agreements were not one-year-long, but three, the union has successfully negotiated four agreements since its foundation. Workers’ are not completely satisfied with their results, especially with those of the first negotiation, but they have gotten better results over time. It’s worth noting that, in contrast to Shougang, were the state usually intervenes as an conciliator and sometimes even as an arbitrator that settles the dispute, in Antamina all the collective bargaining processes have been solved through a direct negotiation. Even the last dispute, when the company did not negotiate in fair terms, workers decided not to...

\(^\text{16}\) This, however, is changing, since Antamina—as other mining companies— are starting to hire more local workforce in the last 5 years, because of the pressure of local communities (Helfgott, 2013 Provides an example about this in Sierra Central).
mobilize. The final results were, however, quite positive according to union’s leaders. As the head of that negotiation described:

“After several months of bargaining we decided to approach the people living next to the camp...they had been complaining about the company’s environmental issues for the last 5 years, so, in the middle of our bargaining, I went there, just to talk with them about their situation. I knew the company would follow me, and would know that I’ve been there. Just two days later, the HR Manager called me, and asked me to stop going there. ‘We are part of the same team, he told me, and I know you cannot strike, but if you make the communities stop with you… then I’m screwed (‘estoy jodido’)… so he made us a new offer...the best one we’ve ever had’.

Summing up, the accommodations in which a union acts—a traditional mine town, or an LDC mine hotel—shape unions’ strategies and their organizational dynamics. Whereas Shougang, based most of their collective actions in the local level, Antamina’s workers try to engage with communities outside the camp. However, this could be the result not only of the type of camp, but also of the age and experience of workers—Antamina started operating almost 50 years after the mine in Marcona—; the companies’ labor process—although both have open-pit mines, Shougang produces iron, Antamina copper—; or the owners’ approaches to the unions—Shougang is a Chinese company, Antamina a joint venture of Australian and Canadian capitals, with more experience in mining investments—.

To make this evidence more conclusive, the next chapter builds on these elements but focuses on a critical case, Southern. By analyzing the changes of a union in the same camp, with the same managers and producing the same minerals, I hope to understand the mechanisms by which LDC is transforming mining unions.
CHAPTER 4: THE CHANGE OF STTA’S STRATEGIES IN THE LAST DECADE

In 2000, the year A. Fujimori resigned the Peruvian presidency, unionized workers had a good reason to celebrate. The end of his government was seen as an opportunity to improve working-class livelihoods. On December 5th, during the Miners Day’s celebration, Southern workers organized soccer and volleyball tournaments, in which both them and their families participated. That night, a ‘baile social’ took place in the Union Hall, and the morning after it the Major of Ilabaya – the district in which the camp is located- went there to talk and to celebrate with the workers. 13 years later, Miners’ Day ceremony was rather short, with key speakers during the morning, no sports’ tournaments and no party. These economic or political conditions had not been so good in decades, and yet, workers’ ties had never been so weak. In 2007, the union had stopped organizing major activities for its members. Yet, in contrast with approaches for which workers are passive actors when dealing with large corporations, Southern’s case shows that, despite what most of the literature about LDC argues about how the system is weakening labor unions, they can actually change their strategies to face new challenges. This chapter is divided in three parts. The first one not only provides background, but also adopts a historical comparative perspective about the union and the camp before LDC. The second focuses on Southern’s LDC politics, and how they were contested, and adopted in the last decade. The ways through which LDC affected the union, and how new strategies emerged are the themes of the last section.

Union’s strategies before LDC

The Toquepala camp, located in the region of Tacna, in the Southern Andes, has been operating since 1960. In addition to its mine there, Southern owns the Cuajone mine in Moquegua, and the Ilo refinery on the Pacific Ocean coast. The mineral extracted in Cuajone
and Toquepala goes there, from where it is exported. Figure 2 shows the location of the three operations.

**Figure 2: Location of Southern’s Operations in Peru**

![Location of Southern’s Operations in Peru](image)

Source: 2008 Southern Peru Annual Report

From its creation until the late nineties, Toquepala was the biggest and most important mining operation in the country and, for the last 15 years, it has been among Peru’s top 3 copper producers. An American Corporation built the camp in the mid twentieth century. Located around 792 miles from Lima and 100 miles from Tacna, the easiest way to go to the camp is driving from Tacna for about 3 hours. In contrast with the cases of the Sierra Central’s mines, no indigenous community lives next to the camp. In fact, Toquepala is the largest human settlement in the district of Ilabaya. (Table 8)

Given the camp’s isolation, the company first attracted workers from Arequipa, Tacna and Puno to construct the camp and the mine’s installations. Many of those migrants were hired and trained as miners later, getting work stability, a high status as employees of an American
corporation, and salaries above the national average (Arcienaga, 1986). Workers moved there to live in a town that offered them not only theaters, restaurants and bars, but also a church, schools and public spaces for their families.

Toquepala’s streets reflected the company’s hierarchies. Due to the layered Andes’ geography, nine neighborhoods were built, seven of them for blue-collar workers (“barrios obreros”) and two for white-collar workers (“barrios de empleados”). Additionally, the “barrio Americano” (American neighborhood), located 15 minutes away from the other neighborhoods, was built for the company’s managers. These groups were together, but they did not have the same rights. Education, health and recreation differences materialized in space, since each group had its own school and social club. As a result, workers had a strong spatial identity. A seventy-years old worker, now retired, mentioned that: “although the gringos gave us good stores, their kids went to an American school...whereas ours studied in one only for Peruvians. We had our club obrero, they had a golf field”. Even blue and white-collar workers lived in separate neighborhoods, and their children attended different schools. Differences were so vast that each group had their own union, the STTA for obreros and the SET for empleados.

Managing all town’s services and its access points gave the company control over its workforce beyond the point of production. After visiting Toquepala in the sixties, an American scholar found that, in contrast to older American companies in Peru, Southern did not have an anti-union orientation (Goodsell, 1974), but a paternalistic behavior, for which it was essential to take care of workers in order to avoid social conflicts. For example, it implemented several programs of social welfare, looking for the re-socialization of its workforce through the control of family habits: surprise visits to the houses; monthly reviews of the children’s performance at school; classes of nutrition and housework for miners’ wives were common up until the late eighties (Arcienaga, 1986).
In a context of permanent control, STTA became the most important civil society organization in Toquepala. Scholars described the union as the only tool—even more than Peruvian laws—to defend workers rights: “Exactly as often happens in heavily unionized industries in the United States and Britain, changes in work rules instituted unilaterally by management are invariably opposed for that reason alone, irrespective of their effect on workers’ routine.” (Becker, 1983 p.294)

Arcienaga, after spending four months in Toquepala in 1982, found that the union became increasingly radical and politicized: “the union hall is located in the camp’s central area, and union leaders meet there daily to discuss politics and labor issues. They not only defend the collective bargaining, but also advise the workforce permanently” (Arcienaga, 1986). Similarly to what happened in Marcona, local strategies were crucial: strikes were central, as well as the support found in the Comité de Damas and among small business owners.

During the seventies and eighties, most of its collective bargaining negotiations involved long strikes, and the union was able to get yearly agreements, in spite of the country’s economic crisis. The 1989 agreement—the last one before Fujimori got into power—had more than 126 clauses, and it was one of the best ones obtained by Peruvian mineworkers that year. That same year the union was a key organizer of a strike that aimed to get a Miners Retirement Law. After more than 40 days of strike, the law was approved.

This pattern changed in the nineties, when the company used Fujimori’s legal reforms to fire union leaders and subcontract workers. Southern shrunk its direct employed workforce from 5000 to 1500 miners, hiring around 4000 workers through subcontracting companies (MTPE 2004). Although these new workers also lived in the camp, they did it under multiple LDC regimes. The company was unable to change the schedules of mineworkers because of their collective agreements, but subcontractors managed to use the new legislation. As a result, the camp started getting empty: “I remember how hundreds of workers left the camp with their families […] the new workers lived in small spaces…one old family house was used by 4 or 5
It is not a house anymore...because now they turned it into a hotel". Today, and in spite of its increasing production, a couple of the old neighborhoods are totally abandoned, and most of them function as temporary accommodations.

Although I couldn’t get precise information about this workforce’s shrinkage, one can use the available data about Ilabaya’s population as a proxy. The number of people living there grew eight times after the mine was open, and it continued rising until 1981, when 12377 people lived there. According to Arcienaga’s study, by then almost 8000 people lived in Toquepala. In 1992 many workers and families started leaving the camp, a tendency that became clearer when LDC was applied to the whole camp after 2000. Although the difference between urban and rural areas couldn’t be found for 2009 and 2011, a study made by Ilabaya’s municipality specified that from the 4048 people living there in 2009, 1948 people lived in Toquepala.

Table 8: Ilabaya Population (1940-2011)

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<td>Total</td>
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<td>9795</td>
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<td>7817</td>
<td>4414</td>
<td>4048</td>
<td>3484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>6563</td>
<td>6504</td>
<td>9976</td>
<td>6668</td>
<td>3595</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>3232</td>
<td>2873</td>
<td>2401</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
<td>N.D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The data for the years 1940-2007 came from the National Censuses. 2009 and 2011 was provided by Ilabaya’s municipality.

Subcontracting, along with the open support of the State to private companies harmed the union. During the 1993 negotiation, the first one after Fujimori’s reforms, all the previous agreements between union and company were revised, and, as a union newsletter mentioned, workers “lost many of the benefits that three decades of struggle had gotten for us”17. Three years later, the collective bargaining was solved through an arbitration in which all the company’s propositions were accepted, giving workers not only quite a small wage increase, but

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17 Although there is not available data about what occurred to the mining industry’s collective bargaining after Fujimori’s reforms, the national data is worth-mentioning: from 1174 bargaining agreements in 1990 to 559 in 1993. Similarly, the number of strikes –75% of which are usually related to collective negotiations– went from 613 in 1990 to 151 in 1993. This is not conclusive, but helps putting the STTA’s existence in context.
also forbidding them to improve their working conditions in the short term, since it was a 6 years long agreement. As the 1993 agreement, workers read this as a defeat. But in a context of an authoritarian government, they also acknowledge how hard it was to get something better.

In spite of this critical context, it is worth noting that, in contrast with most mining unions in the country, the STTA did not disappear. In fact, workers kept bargaining despite the adverse conditions, in a moment when most unions in the Sierra Central were vanishing (Helfgott, 2013). Although the number of members didn't grow, the union kept organizing activities, maintaining their identity both through public statements and legal demands against the company\textsuperscript{18}. Finally, social activities kept being organized. Even workers that were hired in the late eighties remembered the nineties as a time of active social life: “even in 1996 we were able to maintain things like our kids’ right to a decent education, or our wives right to a good house…we were fewer, but we were together”. A worker remembered that “even in the middle of Fujimori’s government we organized soccer tournaments and parties…we were not as strong as in the eighties…but I knew my neighbors. Fujimori didn’t take that away from us” Union records show soccer tournaments and small demonstrations against the company’s policies being organized throughout that decade.

In contrast with companies like CPC or MMC, Southern was never nationalized. So when Grupo Mexico bought the company’s three operations–Toquepala, Cuajone and Ilo– to Asarco in 1999, workers were not particularly afraid of the change. In fact, for most of my interviewees the new administration was just like the American one, although “they wanted us to produce more and more”. As in other Peruvian unions, by 2000 the worst had happened for many workers: “they had outsourced most of the jobs, and our union was weak…when Fujimori got out of the country…we thought we could go back to the good old days…but then they implemented the ‘jornada atípica’”.

\textsuperscript{18} Union’s records show the efforts to make the company re-hire the collectively fired workers, for example.
The (slow) change towards LDC

In contrast to Antamina, Southern began its operations with a traditional 8 hours schedule. Although the move towards LDC was not uncommon in Peru, in contrast with companies in the Sierra Central—where unions were weaker after the nineties reforms (Helfgott, 2013)—, STTA resisted the change. As a consequence, LDC’s implementation was not a simple process. It started in the early nineties, with the subcontracted workers, and finished in 2008, when the maintenance workers started working under LDC schedules.

By the time Southern started using LDC for its direct workforce, several companies in Peru had already done so. Both new operations, such as Yanacocha, and old ones, such as Tintaya, used the system with good results in terms of productivity (Tintaya, 1999; Yanacocha, 2000). A Southern manager mentioned that, after Grupo Mexico took over the company, showing the investors how efficient the mine was resulted crucial. For the company, LDC was a necessity in a country where “every modern company was using it […] except for Shougang and some medium size companies…the best operations used it…and we wanted to be part of that group”.

In 2007, when the company negotiated its first collective agreement with an explicit reference to LDC, the final document stated this again: “LDC is crucial to increase workers’ productivity”.

Productivity was, however, only one of the reasons the company gave. The other one referred to its employees needs. As an HR manager mentioned, “for us, workers didn’t feel well in the camp anymore…and LDC was a great form to give them freedom”. This explanation is partially consistent with my findings: some families had gone out of the camp before 2000. Miners’ wives with their sons and daughters had moved to Arequipa or Tacna once children finished high school. Arcienaga (1968), and Sulmont and Valcarcel (1993) found the same pattern in the mid eighties: Toquepala’s miners didn’t want their kids to be manual workers, so it was crucial to send them to pursue a college education. Once that happened, workers stood in the camp for at
6 days a week, and visited their families—or were visited by them—on Sundays. For the company, miners needed a new scheduling to spend more time with their families.

Using workers’ needs was the company’s first strategy to implement LDC. In 1997, Southern agreed with the STTA to let those working in ‘Quebrada Honda’\(^{19}\) to use atypical schedules. A small group of less than 40 workers approved the change because their workplace was located far away from their houses at Toquepala (See Figure 1). Instead of taking around 50 minutes to get to work 6 days a week, the company offered them to work for 12 hours a day during 4 days a week, getting three days to rest. Many workers accepted and moved to Ilo and Tacna: “although it was further away from the camp, it was a worthy effort, because our families lived in a city, and got access to a different standard of life, far from the camp’s limitations”.

A second moment started on April 10\(^{th}\) of 2000—significantly, the same day Fujimori illegally won the Peruvian elections. In contrast with the 1995 change, the company’s decision was unilateral this time: 180 workers in the operations department were forced to work 12 hours daily under a 4x3 system. They were told that they could work an additional day (the 5\(^{th}\) one) getting an extra payment—the double of a regular day— if they wanted to\(^{20}\).

A couple days after the company imposed the new schedules, the union published a statement, arguing that working for more than 8 hours was dangerous for workers’ lives, as they worked with heavy machinery, and demanding the company to go back to the 8 hours shifts. The company kept using the system and, according to those days’ leaders “we decided to use the law to show how wrong everything was...organizing a strike or other radical measures was impossible... Fujimori was still in power, so that was the only way we had”.

\(^{19}\) Quebrada Honda is an artificial lake of 10 km\(^{2}\) of surface area, which began to be filled in 1996, after public outcry about the use of the copper tailings by Southern.

\(^{20}\) This informal arrangement was necessary since forcing them to work for 5 continuous days would violate the rule about working more than 48 hours in a single week. Most of my interviewees accepted this 5 day roosters because of the double payment.
Thus, the union sued the company, arguing that it did not follow the working time law, because it didn’t let workers know about the change in advance. A year after that trial began, the court decided that this was true for 28 workers—those able to prove that had received no notification—, and that the remaining 152 workers were rightfully working under LDC. The union also used the 2001 Collective Bargaining negotiation, which began in late 2000, to make the 12 hours regime illegitimate: *as a Defense Secretary, I made a crucial change in the final agreement, before the company could notice it…I wrote that ‘the regular working time in Toquepala is 8 hours’...you know what that meant? That not other agreement was possible! So we used that clause in the next cases against the company*.

After losing the first trial, and yet waiting for the result of its appellation—which occurred in 2006—, the union embarked on a second strategy. This time, with a new government in power, workers organized a strike against LDC: *“after 13 years of silence, we organized a 12 days strike...we fought against arbitrary dismissals and against the atypical schedules...they had been imposed during Fujimori’s government...he wasn’t in power anymore...and it was time to change them too”*. Both operations and maintenance workers—the biggest departments in Toquepala—acted together. The results of that strike were mixed. On the one hand, workers made the company sign an agreement forbidding arbitrary dismissals, the first one of this type in the country after Fujimori’s pro-employer reforms. On the other, although Southern didn’t agree on going back to the 8 hours regime, it did agree on following whatever decision the court made in the future without appealing. Most importantly, Southern also agreed on not extending the system to the rest of the workforce until a decision was taken.

The Constitutional Tribunal, the most important court in Peru, finally solved the demand in 2006, giving the most relevant ruling about LDC (Sentence N.4635-2004-AA/TC). Immediately after the state denied Southern the right to use atypical schedules, the company issued a public statement, announcing the end of the 12 hours shifts. However, the announcement made most
of the operation workers upset. By then, many of them were used to the system, and they and their families had started a new life outside the camp. Although he kept affiliated to STTA, a 40 years old worker described how “we had been working with these schedules for more than 6 years, and for the younger workers this was the only system they knew …how did they expect us to move our families back to the camp?”

By then, the majority of the union’s board came from the maintenance area, and they were against LDC. As a result, 40% of the operations workers left the STTA, feeling that their leaders did not understand the benefits of the system. Some months after this, these workers created a new union, SUTOTA, in an attempt to negotiate with the company an agreement that gave continuity to LDC. As one rank-and-file member of the SUTOTA explained to me in his house in Arequipa, “in 2002 I and my family moved here, because my wife’s sister was sick…and my kids had to get use to a new school, to a new neighborhood…and these guys wanted us to go back to Toquepala. I couldn’t accept that.” SUTOTA negotiated the new collective agreement in 2007. In that document, workers agreed to use a LDC regime, and recognized the existence of a “protection test” in Toquepala. This gave Southern legitimacy to keep using the system before the Peruvian courts. As the STTA lawyer mentioned: “the company lost in the tribunals, but because of the new union’s agreement, LDC was still valid in Toquepala”.

A year after SUTOTA’s agreement took place, in November 2008, the company decided to expand LDC to its entire workforce in Toquepala and Cuajone. STTA found difficult to resist the new system by then. Legally, there wasn’t much to do after the Constitutional Tribunal sentence. Strategically, many operations workers had left the organization. As the Defense Secretary mentioned, “this was something we were expecting since 2007…so it wasn’t a surprise for us at all”.

In addition to the change in the maintenance workers’ schedules, the company reformed the number of days worked. Since 2000, operation workers had been working in a formal 4x3
regime, but in the practice they had the chance to work a fifth day. In early 2009, however, the company reinterpreted the rule regarding the “fifth day”, and argued that a miner could actually work continually for more than 4 days, with no right to an extra payment, as long as one of those days were in a different week. So it implemented a new time arrangement—the one that is still used today—, through which groups of 4 and 5 days are combined through different weeks.

Table 9 shows the typical schedule of Southern workers today. As one can see, although they never work for more than 48 hours in a week—when it is defined as the period of time that goes from Monday to Sunday—they do work 60 hours in four weeks—defined as a seven days interval—, getting only three continuous days of rest during the last three weeks of their rosters.

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<td>R</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

D: Day Shift; N: Night Shift; R: Rest

After the company’s decision, workers from SUTOTA and STTA reacted coordinating their activities. A joint statement issued on November 19th said: “today a historical meeting took place in Toquepala. The unions are together to defend the protection test and the 5th day”. By then, STTA supported LDC, although it asked the company to improve its working conditions. Additionally, the union was able to make the company respect previous collective agreements, and to respect older workers’ rights to a family house, even when they and their families wouldn’t live there anymore. According to the person that was the union’s secretary in the periods 2002-2004 and 2010-2012, “we admitted that this was inevitable […] although some of
our members were against it, they were a minority. 8 years later, I had realized that we had to accept the regime, as a union, to try to get the best out of it…”

**Changing repertories of action**

The union’s changing position regarding LDC was a sign of weakness for some miners. But important changes had taken place in the last decade. Among others, the dynamics of mobilizations; the scale of the negotiations; and the types of allies changed. To develop the story of these transformations, I start showing how *local strategies* declined; afterwards I explain how LDC produced this; and I finish describing the strategies that seem to be emerging in the new context.

“*Strikes? No. We have small stoppages, but no strikes since 2004*”

“In the past, we had one-year collective agreements and big demonstrations when we struck…we really mess with the gringos, and had our own hymns…but that is lost now”. This miner, who had been working in Toquepala since 1979, remembered the militant past of the union, arguing that strikes are not used anymore. Yet not only old miners had this image about STT’s strategies. A worker that moved to the camp in 1995 mentioned that “*the only real strikes here occurred in 2002 and 2004*”. In contrast to Shougang’s collective mobilizations’ pattern in the last decade, strikes in Toquepala have declined over time. After 2008, only two strikes were organized. Moreover, they became shorter, and stopped involving demonstrations in the camp. Table 10 lists all the strikes occurred since 2000 in Toquepala, and table 4 compares them to those of Shougang from a broader temporal perspective.
Table 10: Strikes organized by the STTA (2000-2013)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Beginning</th>
<th>Ending</th>
<th>Duration (days)</th>
<th>Cause</th>
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<td>10/11/2002</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Other Causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/04/2004</td>
<td>03/05/2004</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mining Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31/08/2004</td>
<td>13/09/2004</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Other Causes</td>
</tr>
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<td>Collective Bargaining / Mining Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23/06/2007</td>
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<tr>
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<td>10/11/2007</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mining Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/12/2012</td>
<td>25/12/2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Collective Bargaining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/09/2013</td>
<td>26/09/2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mining Federation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Number of yearly strikes organized by the STTA and the Shougang's Blue Collar Workers' Union (1970-2013)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Toquepala</th>
<th>Marcona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970-1990</td>
<td>18 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990-2000</td>
<td>3(5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1 (12)</td>
<td>1 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2 (10)</td>
<td>2 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4 (8)</td>
<td>2 (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2(12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>1(21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1 (1)</td>
<td>1(28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 2000-2013</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 (6.6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (12.3)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average Duration in parentheses
As it was argued in the first section, a contentious pattern of mobilizations characterized Southern throughout the seventies and eighties. This pattern was broken in the nineties, when, as in other camps in Peru, the union faced structural reforms and state repression. For some union leaders, even the 2001 collective bargaining was part of the nineties’ pattern: “less than a year after Fujimori left the country…it was the same neoliberal system…and the same corruption in the Labor Ministry…we didn’t have much to do”. In its last public statement regarding that negotiation, union’s representatives said: “we know that a 6-years agreement is not fair, and we are not satisfied. But it’s the same corrupt government than in the nineties, and we are not strong enough to get a better contract”.

Fujimori’s authoritarian government had used fear and violence to debilitate unions (Burt, 2007), so the 2002 political context was promising. A new democratic government had been elected, and a progressive team was in charge of the Ministry of Labor (Villarán, 2006). The union, on the other side, had gotten new members. After a worker was unfairly fired\textsuperscript{21}, miners decided to strike, demanding both his return to work and to go back to the 8 hours schedule in the operations section: “We were tired of the company’s abuses and angry because of the 2001 negotiation. It was time to say enough”. The leaders of that moment remembered how easy it was to get everybody together in a big assembly: “even the people from operations, with their 12 hours schedules came to the union hall and supported the strike…it was our chance to show that we were still alive”.

The strike last for almost two weeks and, besides not going to work, miners blocked the camp’s main road. A local newspaper described how more than 150 families organized an “olla comúni” (common pot) to feed the strikers in Mesa Pelada, a site where all Toquepala demonstrations had taken place because of its strategic location as the camp’s main entry. Pictures taken by

\textsuperscript{21} An unfair firing occurs when a worker is fired without any justification. Although it is legal, most workers try to fight it back, arguing that it is one of the most damaging heritages from Fujimori’s government.
journalists showed women and children eating next to the strikers, not letting anybody enter the camp.

After the first week of strike, the company had lost around 3.5 million dollars (Mining Journal, 2002), and six days later the fired worker was rehired, and, most importantly, the company signed an agreement of job stability: no more arbitrary dismissals would occur in the camp, in spite of the legality of this figure. Both workers that participated in the eighties’ strikes and the younger ones agreed on the intensity of this mobilization. “We were on the streets again…our families walked with us…we were not a union, we were a big family…and I think the company knew that, and it was afraid of us”. In 2012, the union made a commemorative plaque, recognizing the Comité de Damas’ participation in the strike, because it “was a crucial pillar during the 2002 struggles”. An operation worker that took part of the strike, explained to me how afraid he was, because it was the first strike he experienced: “I was 24…and you know, I was terrified about being fired…this was Southern …but my wife’s friend told her that it was okay to participate, and she made me go to Mesa Pelada. I’m the miner, but she was there all the time with me”.

In 2004 the union decided to strike twice. It first did it following the National Miners’ Federation, which had called all its members to stop working, asking for better salaries in the industry and the end of subcontracting practices. That strike was unsuccessful in terms of its results, but the STTA was one of the only unions that actually stopped for more than 2 days, managing to stop Southern’s production again. In September the union struck again, asking for better salaries. Although the next collective negotiation would take place in 2007, workers felt that world’s copper prices made raises possible. Journalists from Lima went to the camp to report the strike, surprised about miners’ radicalism (La República, 2007) Even the state officials were concerned about this. As a representative of the Ministry of Labor in Tacna told me, “after a decade, miners
were on their streets again…I was excited about that, of course. Three strikes in two years…you could see that Fujimori was not in power anymore.”

Although workers were not able to obtain better salaries, the company ended offering a special 1000 dollars bonus to each worker. In contrast to the 2002 strike, most of the demonstrators were maintenance workers—“by then, many of our folks from operations were not living in the camp anymore, so many of them just stood at home, and didn’t come here to protest with us”—, but they managed to block the roads, making even subcontracted workers to stop going to the mine. As a result of that strike, the company made the union sign an agreement to stop mobilizing in the camp until the next collective bargaining as a requisite to get the bonus. Although they were not satisfied with these conditions, leaders decided to focus their attention on the next negotiation, so accepted it after all.

In 2007, a new collective bargaining started. In contrast to the 2001 negotiation, STTA made stronger ties with the unions from Cuajone and Ilo. According to the union’s legal advisor, “that was the first real negotiation in almost twenty years. Even before we started the process, a strike was organized in Toquepala, demanding the company our right to bargain together. The three camps were one fist”. In April, workers in the three areas stopped production for almost a week. In Toquepala, around 180 of the operation miners-those that had begun organizing their own union- kept working, and the strike did not have the impact the one in 2002 had had. The production suffered no change, in contrast to the 8% reduction of the monthly production that occurred in November of 2002 and September of 2004(MINEM, 2013). However, stopping the three areas did affect the company enough to made it sign an agreement, accepting to sit with the biggest union of each camp in the negotiation table.

Two additional strikes were organized in June and October that year, trying to make the company accelerating the negotiations. Overall, this reduced company’s productivity in 10%, and, during the October’s strike, miners stood up against the police, who threw tear gas to the
demonstrators. For many of my interviewees, this was the last strike in the camp: “it wasn’t as big as the one of 2002, but at least maintenance workers were together, and shut the mine off for some days…as always, the Government supported the company, the police came, and they scared our families…but we fought”

After more than 9 months of negotiations, company and unions agreed on 50 points, and left 10 to be solved by the Ministry of Labor. The union’s meeting minutes show that the agreement was considered a success for most workers, at least when compared to the previous two agreements. In 1996, there had been no negotiation, but only a decision taken by an arbitration tribunal. In 2001 workers got a raise of about 6% a year, whereas in 2007 this went up to 7.5% per year; on the other side, the ‘bono de cierre’\textsuperscript{22} was of 2000 soles to each worker ($574) in 2000, and of 8000 ($2580) in 2007. Most importantly, this wasn’t a 6 years agreement, but it would only last for 3 years.

There were no strikes during the five years following this negotiation: “In 2008 the Miners Federation called a national strike, but we decided to take no part in it…not because we didn’t want to, but because we had lost many members after SUTOTA was created”. LDC was completely implemented in the camp in late 2008, and during the 2010 negotiation workers were unable to organize a single mobilization. In the union’s records, there are several testimonies of people being against the strike. In contrast to 2007, workers were more concerned about going home than organizing demonstrations. It is even more shocking noting that the amount of attendance significantly reduced by then: from approximately 150 people in each meeting between 2000 and 2006 to less between 2009 and 2013. Moreover, those that went to the meetings in 2008 usually had comments against the union’s leaders. According to a 40 years old interviewee, who had been in Toquepala since January of 2007, “it was funny to see old workers asking for strikes, talking about the historical stoppages of the eighties in an empty

\textsuperscript{22} ‘Bono de Cierre’ is a traditional bonus paid to all unionized workers as a ‘price’ after a collective agreement is signed.
Moreover, by then the Comité de Damas had disappeared: “we tried to get the Comité de Damas back on its feet…but it was impossible…there were not many women available, and most of them were more interested in leaving the camp than on fighting for better housing conditions.” Lacking resources to develop its traditional collective action repertoire, the union was unable to imagine other tactics. Although it kept negotiating together with Cuajone and Ilo, even the ties between organizations were not strong enough, and it was difficult to agree on a common strategy: “Ilo wanted to strike…of course, because they could do it…they still lived together…but Toquepala was broken. You cannot strike in a place that is not yours” As a result, STTA signed a three years agreement that didn’t improve much the working conditions or miners’ salaries. Whereas in 2007 workers had gotten annual raises of 11%, 6% and 6%, in 2010 they only got three annual raises of 5%. In terms of non-economic benefices, there were no major changes.

In mid 2012, a new negotiation started. More than a decade after the start of LDC in operations, and 3 years after it began in maintenance, the union was better prepared. Interestingly, the main secretary was the same person that led the 2002 strikes: “as in 2007 and 2010, we decided to negotiate together with our brothers in Cuajone and Ilo. We knew that striking was not enough, as people were not fully committed. In the nineties, we lost against subcontracting. This decade we lost against the new schedules” Thus, the three unions used a new tactic, creating a network with groups out of the camps. In this regard, STTA organized a workshop about mining in Tacna, which scared the company enough to made it sit and improve its offers. Southern also published communiqués accusing workers of being “anti-mineros”, a nick used on radical environmental groups in the country. The union’s current general secretary, who organized this event as member of STTA board explained “they [the company’s managers] were very scared about our contacts with NGO’s and Tacna’s people… we knew that it was crucial to go beyond Toquepala”.

Internally, STTA also changed its approach, and, in spite of their discrepancies, it coordinated with SETA and SUTOTA to organize activities in the camp. Since these organizations were negotiating a new agreement too, STTA leaders thought they could get a better result working together: “We had been speaking since 2008, so it made sense to act together. Our biggest difference [LDC] was solved by then”. As a result of these meetings, the three unions in Toquepala decided to strike. On December 24th and 25th, they, as well as the unions in Cuajone and Ilo, managed to stop the company’s production through a surprise stoppage.

The strike was not legal, and it lasted less than 48 hours. For the leaders, “doing this on Christmas was strategic, because we knew that most of the workers would love to go home that day”. A worker that had been in Southern for two years by then mentioned that “it was my first strike, and I was scared…but they told me there would be no violence, and that all I had to do was go to Arequipa, and stay there with my family on Christmas Eve” No roads were blocked, and no demonstration was organized in Toquepala. The union hall, from where the leaders coordinated their actions, replaced Mesa Pelada, strikers’ traditional meeting point. It was quite short in time but, given the coordination between different organizations, the production of Southern dropped down in 84% those two days.

A similar event occurred in 2013. When the Miners Federation called a national mobilization, STTA workers just went home. Twelve years after the first strike of the century, strikes had transformed, from being the most important tool to affect the company-through roads blockages and long work stoppages- to an opportunity to go home and stay with their families. The 2013 had no major effects on the company’s profits, and for many workers “it was mostly symbolic”. For the leaders, these new dynamics created a new set of problems. When the strike was solved, most of the unionized workers were not in the camp: “so we had to run to the union hall and to start calling all our members to come back as soon as possible…we had to convince the
company to give us one extra day, because many of our folks were in Lima or Arequipa, doing personal things, while we negotiated here”.

Summing up, a transformation occurred in the union’s strategies between 2000 and 2013. The base of this change is the loss of power in the local level: there are no demonstrations in Toquepala, and usually workers are not as committed as in previous years. As I show in the next section, this lack of commitment has its material base in LDC. It is worth noting before explaining this, however, that the previous paragraphs have also sketched new allies, that slowly emerged in the last decade. Activities organized with the unions in Cuajone and Ilo, and those that took place in Tacna, seem to show a variation in the union’s strategies, and an effort to go beyond the camp.

“We don’t really see each other…the union hall is as empty as this camp…”

In this section I argue that the decline of local strategies is the result of LDC’s effects on three spaces: the union hall, the camp, and workers’ homes.

The union hall

To organize a strike in Peru requires accomplishing several requirements. The union needs to prove, both to the company and the state, that the majority of its members have agreed on striking. A written record with all workers’ signatures, as well as one of that of a lawyer must be showed, specifying the proposed dates of the start and end of the stoppage. In spite of how difficult it is to accomplish with this, mining unions were usually able to achieve them, given how easy it is to get together for those living in the same place. As an old Toquepala miner told me, “even when the state doesn’t want us to strike, we had many chances to get together, meet here, take a decision and just go with it”. However, to do this when no more than a third of the union members have time to meet is harder: whereas half of the workforce rests outside the camp, one group will be at work, and those that can actually meet are quite tired after 12 hours
of work: “even those that can come try to go to rest as soon as possible, and try to be here [in the union hall] for no more than an hour. And if we meet on the last day of the roster…well, they are just thinking of going home”.

In addition to getting the approval to strike, organizing assemblies has become difficult for union leaders in Toquepala too. Instead of having a big meeting on a single day, they organize at least three meetings in different days, to be sure that most of the workers will attend. As in Antamina, where taking a decision in an assembly can take up to one month because of the 10x10 days system, the decision-making process in Toquepala is quite slow. As a lawyer that advises both Shougang’s and Toquepala’s unions told me, Shougang’s hall “is full of workers asking me about their problems, and have big meetings in which I have to answer their questions for hours…. in Toquepala workers have problems too, but they are never here, they are as divided as their meetings”23. Even coordinating a meeting with all union’s board members is hard: “we have to set up meetings with days of anticipation…so dealing with emergencies is difficult, and in the meantime we lose people’s will to act”. During the three weeks I stood in the camp, I never saw the board together. Moreover, they were not sure who was in the camp and who wasn’t.

During my visits of 2014, the union was discussing the potential merger with other Toquepala’s unions. Issues regarding the number of representatives each organization would have in the board, the new union’s name and its future organizational structure had to be discussed. To do this, 8 meetings in 4 different days had to be arranged. In none of them the number of participants went beyond 20. For an organization with more than 700 members, this was a clear failure.

23 Even coordinating within the union’s board becomes difficult, at least compared to the traditional setting. According to the archival records, whereas the board—or at least most of its members—could meet every week before 2008, this became harder after LDC.
Yet this was not surprising for most of my interviewees. The image of an empty union hall has become common in the last 5 years. As a result, it was decided to rent some of the hall’s spaces. The old building is now divided in multiple rooms, which are leased to small business, such as restaurants and coffee shops. As a former union leader told me: “we just don’t need such a big space now…we will not be together again”. A medium size room is used for the meetings nowadays.

Most importantly, this difficulty to arrange meetings also affects workers’ ability to create a strong sense of community. Whereas most of the older workers remember specific assemblies in which important decisions were taken with enthusiasm, young workers tend to find meetings boring: “I’ve never seen this place crowded…and there are so many small meetings that I actually don’t know if my folks think the same way I do”. In contrast to Shougang, where the union hall still is a place where workers meet to talk about their daily problems, meetings in Toquepala are sometimes cancelled because there are not enough people. In this context, members of the three last boards of directors were upset about the lack of unity. As one of them mentioned, “sometimes this is quite a broken place, where each small group can come and criticize you…and where nobody cares about your work”.

Lacking a space to reproduce the union’s identity and to strengthen workers’ ties, coordinating collective actions is challenging. The situation is not better in Antamina, where the last two boards faced several trust issues. As the union’s 2011-2013 secretary told me at the end of his mandate, “This is a sick union. They thought I had a deal with the company under the table, and they accused the whole board of corruption…the sad thing is that they thought the same about the previous board. And I get it […] how would you trust in people you only see once a month? Would you have confidence in somebody that have never invited you to his house?”

The change to LDC has also affected union’s chances to celebrate important dates, which might help strengthening workers’ ties: “I haven’t been in a birthday party in a long time…even in my
own party [laughs]]. Whereas Labor and Miners' Days between 1990 and 2004 included soccer and volley tournaments for workers and their families, as well as a “baile social” over night, the organization has not organized any of these activities in the last 5 years. A 45-year-old miner contrasted his life before and after LDC: “I came in 1994...that is...twenty years ago...and you think I'm joking, but for me, the nineties were the good times...not because of el chino [Fujimori], but because of our parties, and because this was a lively place”.

Summing up, the union hall stopped being a safe place to talk about the company, to discuss about union’s issues, or to converse about daily life problems. LDC’s effect on workers use of time undermined their chances to spend there more than one hour a day, whereas workers’ homes’ increasing distance to the hall made it less central.

The camp

The decrease of meaningful interactions in the union hall goes along with a broader set of changes in Toquepala. Although the company gave workers the liberty to keep living there after atypical schedules were approved, most of them moved outside the camp. Many of the services that were available 15 years ago have now disappeared. There is just only one school in a camp where there used to be three, and the original three-floor hospital operates in only one. The theater has closed, and the soccer fields are usually empty.

In contrast to latest projects, such as Antamina, where workers live in spaces built originally as single dorms, Southern workers live in what used to be a mining town. Given their different experiences, workers can be grouped in three categories. First, there are those workers that used to live in Toquepala with their families, but decided to move out of the camp so now, even when they conserve their houses, use them as hotel rooms. These workers try to leave the camp as soon as their roster is over, and most of them live in Arequipa and Tacna. By far, this is

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24 Although the company hasn’t provide specific information about how many workers left the camp over time, the union’s records show that around 85% of the unionized workforce did it.
the biggest group in the union. Younger miners that started working after LDC was implemented, and that decided to live with their families outside the camp form the second category. The company hasn’t given them a house for themselves, so they share accommodations with other workers. Usually, three people live in a family house. Although they live together, they only see each other when they are at work: “after the last day my shift, we don’t stop even to say goodbye…each one goes to see his family and that’s all”. It’s worth noting how similar these comments are to those I found in Antamina. For most of my interviewees there, the 10 days spent in the camp are quite lonely: “the best hour of the day is when you go to the dining hall and see your folks…it’s only one hour [the other meal is taken in the middle of the 12 working hours], but is the best you can get before going to your room to call your family and sleep”

Finally, those new workers that decided to live in the camp with their families form a third group. Around 10% of STTA’s members are within this group, making it the smallest one. All of my interviewees within this group, mentioned that living in the camp was only a provisional solution to save money in education and health–company provides free school and hospital services to workers and their families–, and non of them was satisfied with the camp: “in spite of how boring this place can be, I can save money here…and I can see my children, at least when they are sleeping”. This is the group that resembles the most a traditional miner’s life: although they work for more than 12 hours per day, they are not quite under an LDC regime. But even these workers try to spend their free days outside the camp, either because they have small business outside Toquepala, or because they visit bigger towns with their families for recreational purposes.

In contrast to Antamina, where workers have to go to their rooms to sleep after certain hours, and all ‘public’ spaces –gym, soccer fields, TV. room– are guarded by the company, Toquepala’s size made it a harder place to control. As mentioned in chapter 3, living in a town
gives workers many spaces out of the company’s view. Moreover, the union had the chance to
control workers too. Take, for example, the comments given to Arcienaga in 1980: Here the
strikes are very strong...the amarillos [scabs] might go to work…but we know who they are, they
are called through microphones, and their names are put on the school’s door, so their children
know what type of parents they have”.

Today, even those workers living together as “transitory neighbors”, do not have time to share.
In addition to the 12 hours they spend in the mine, there is 1 hour to eat and 45 minutes to go to
and from the mine. Thus, workers have 10 “free” hours, 8 of which they use to rest. Giving these
conditions, and in spite of being together, finding moments to talk about the union about, the
company or merely about their daily problems is not easy: “in the eighties we went to local bars
to talk about our bosses... now we have no time to do that...it’s all about work. I have less
compañeros, more coworkers...”. Regardless if the workers live in Toquepala or not, time is
constraining: “if your family lives here, you want to run home to be with them at least a couple
hours...if they are not here, you want to call them to listen your kids’ voices for a while...in any
case, spending time with your friends is impossible”

As mentioned above, the town’s services –education, health, and entertainment– have declined
in the last decade. Today, Toquepala looks like a ghost town. One in which production has
increased over time, though25. It is rare to find people walking around the camp’s central square
between 8.00 am and 8.00 p.m., when people is either working or sleeping. The only moments
in which restaurants are full are those when there is a shift in the schedules. As a result, most of
the small businesses owners have either left because LDC, or are struggling with it. A woman
that first arrived to the camp in 1985, who opened a small restaurant in 1990, explained that
“since 2001 I sell less and less food, but by 2009 this was critical... now I just open [the
restaurant] for a couple hours a day, because the camp is dead most of the time”. As with the

25 Between 2000 and 2012, the yearly copper production in Toquepala went from 122,386 to 149,379 tons.
union hall, lack of social life in the camp has made workers less aware of each other’s problems.

Moreover, the union stopped being an important actor in town. Whereas 15 years ago it received at least a couple weekly complaints from Toquepala’s residents about the company (e.g. failing utilities, damaged houses), today it is rare to see non-workers in the union hall. According to its records, throughout 2013, only three people complained about issues not related to work. From a different perspective, whereas up to 2003 the union offered services to the local community, such as computation classes and nutrition workshops for miners’ families, no activities aiming to workers’ wives or children have been offered in the last 10 years. The density that once characterized the camp has been in crisis and with it, the support that workers used to get from local actors. This contrasts with Shougang’s situation, where workers usually receive food and other forms of material support from the local business owners, and the union offers classes of informatics to the community.

**The home**

The time invested in the union is short not only when miners are working at the camp, but also on their days out of work. Under the traditional regime, miners saw each other on Sundays and organized soccer tournaments and social activities in their neighborhoods(Arcienaga, 1986). Speaking about the camp in the nineties, a worker remembered he felt “free only on Sundays’ soccer games, although I kept talking about the company there. It was always there, even in a soccer field needing better grass”. Workers kept being miners, even on Sundays. Going back to the situation in Marcona helps remarking the importance of this dynamics. As the union’s secretary there stated, “if you want a big strike, you cannot stop in the union hall, and, of course, it’s hard to convince people at work, because supervisors can be always around…but you can go the soccer field…some beers after the game, you can tell them why the union is important. If you wait here, you are done”.
Under LDC, Southern miners stop being workers for three days a week. Whereas some workers use their resting days to study—a hard thing to do when they stood in the camp the whole week—, others have started small businesses in agriculture, renting cars or managing restaurants. A worker that had been in Toquepala since 1985 mentioned how after LDC started, “I finally have the time to invest my savings. Those days when a miner had to be just a miner are over…we can grow now”.

This is possible because of miners’ high salaries, but they were also above the national average in the eighties. In a survey made in Toquepala in 1992, D. Sulmont found that only 3% of the workers wanted their sons to be miners, whereas 90% wished their kids to go to college. He also found that most miners were proud about their work, and wanted to keep their jobs until retirement. Although the first trend still exists in the camp today, I found that most workers think about leaving the company at some point before they are too old. It is not only their sons and daughters, but workers see themselves as potential professionals or businessmen. Although LDC did not create this new habitus by itself, it certainly provides its material basis: “LDC changed my life. I’m not only my own boss half of the week, but I have employees myself”.

Speaking about the last collective bargaining, a union representative that had a small restaurant in Tacna mentioned “I understand Southern better now. You know? It’s hard to be a good boss”. Under these circumstances, the relevance the union has for workers is less than in a system in which their entire life is focused on what the company does for them. Lacking this centrality, active commitment declined. It is not that they want to be out of the union, or that they do not care about better salaries. But the willingness to give their time to assemblies, or to strengthen their ties with their coworkers is less. This is even more radical in Antamina, where many union leaders described to me how “our representatives only want to be part of the collective negotiation to spend some days in Lima, and take care of their families or business”
Finally, LDC changed not only miners’ engagement with the union, but also the way their families approach the organization. Whereas the Comité de Damas was crucial during the strikes of the eighties, and during the first strikes of this century—it fed workers and organized women to take care of the children during the 2002 and 2004 demonstrations—, “it became weaker after two of its leaders moved out of the camp with their husbands”. A former leader of the Comité, who I interviewed in Lima, explained how “the Comité made sense when we knew each other, and it was strong because although we were not workers, we also experienced the company’s abuses”. Lacking those conditions, and in spite of the efforts of STTA’s leaders to re-launch one, there has not been a Comité in Toquepala since 2007.

Although some women still live in the camp with their partners, the number, around one hundred, is not even close to the one of women in Shougang, where the Comité is quite active. In Antamina, the housewives do not know about their husbands’ jobs, and, although some on my interviewees there mentioned that their partners supported the union, there were also tensions, as “each minute I spend here [in the union hall] is less time with my children”.

“Significantly, although the union’s 2004 bylaw explicitly mentioned the Comité de Damas, it was never created, so the figure was erased after a modification in 2010.

“So that day I learned that Toquepala was not everything, and that we needed to change”

LDC has disrupted Toquepala’s social life, weakening union’s power in the local scale. Over the last decade, however, new strategies seem to be emerging. Although traditional methods have been undermined, workers obtained convenient collective agreements through other strategies. Building on the work of Herod (2001; See also McGrath-Champ et al., 2010) and Ellem (2003; 2006), this can be called a scaling process, one in which the union goes beyond the camp and engages with actors in different scales to successfully affect the company. In the case of Southern, the process has been based on four parallel strategies: (a) the use of a mobile-individual approach; (b) the unification process with unions both in and outside the camp; (c) the
creation of networks with regional actors; and (d) the links to national and international workers’ organizations. Although the degree in which each element has been developed varies, all of them have been consistently used in the last 7 years.

In spite of the radical changes experienced in the camp, neither the negotiations results have been entirely negative nor the number of STTA’s members decreased. In fact, between 2009—a year after LDC was applied to the entire workforce—, and 2014, STTA grew from 500 to more than 700 members. To accomplish this, making the company respectful of workers’ individual rights has been as important as obtaining a beneficial agreement. “In 2008 a worker died [in the mine]. And he was not part of our union, but they [the leaders] decided to help him, and got a good deal for his wife, even when she did not live in the camp”, explained to me a rank-and-file member. He had been working in Toquepala since 1995 and for him, whereas in the nineties the union’s leaders were focused on “doing something for everyone”, today they are more open to engage with workers’ individual demands. Looking at the union archival, this approach is not completely new—for example, many demands were made to defend workers that had been forced to retire in the nineties—, but today these efforts seem to be clearer: even subcontracted workers go to the union hall asking for help. Since many of the workers hired by Southern actually came from subcontracting companies, they have confidence in the organization, and they affiliate rapidly.

Moreover, younger workers recognize that the union can be useful to deal with specific issues such as getting healthcare or mobility bonuses for those living outside the camp. This change has not been easy. In fact, one of the tensions during the last collective bargaining was based on the type of benefits to be asked to the company. According to the meeting minutes, several workers demanded a decentralized health system—instead of a better hospital within the camp—. Although not many workers opposed to these requirements, some of my interviewees
explained to me that a union should ask for “better things for all its members, instead of breaking our collective rights apart”.

On a tactical level, the union has started to coordinate actions through cellphones and emails, decentralizing some of its actions. Although there tends to be a division between younger and older workers, those living outside the camp—this is, more than 80% of STTA members—, regardless their age, consistently state that managing high-mobility is crucial. As one leader explained, “some folks forget that most of us don’t live here anymore, and they go through the camp with a big megaphone to make people come to the hall. That’s like living in a black and white television show”. Because this face-to-face system is the only one they know, Southern workers seem to be less prepared to change than those in Antamina, where this type of coordination is common. There, the organizations takes advantage of where its members live, so they can fill paperwork in Lima, talk to labor inspectors in Huaraz and talk to environmental activists in Trujillo at the same time. One worker synthetized this quite graphically: “We are not a united fist, but a hand with long and independent fingers”

Although a Federation of Southern Peru Workers was already created in the late eighties, the organization was unable to create solid ties between the unions of the three operations. Fujimori’s authoritarian regime was a big obstacle, but so were the incapacity of workers in each camp to reach the others. One union leader from Cuajone, who had led his organization between 1975 and 1985, and who was elected again in 2012, described: “in the seventies we talked with Toquepala, but each operation could fight by itself…we knew it might be better to work together…but we didn’t feel it as necessary. Working-class unity is vital, but you know, even your communist ideology is not enough when you are strong to stand alone”

Since 2007, workers sit together with the company to get agreements valid for the three operations. The company tried to break this alliance in the subsequent negotiations, but Toquepala’s leaders decided that this was a priority. The negotiations now take place in Lima,
the political center of the country, where representatives from the three units reunite. Mobilizations to the buildings where these negotiations take place—a classic tactic within the Peruvian labor movement—became harder to organize. “So we started going to the media, talking to journalists in Lima, and speaking in the congress. We might not have our folks next to us, but the Ministry of Labor is there, so that opens a new discussion”.

Southern’s workers can work together because in addition to the mining operations in Toquepala and Cuajone, they have the help of the Ilo workers, where copper is processed and from where it is exported. Antamina’s union considered this type of coordination crucial too. In fact, workers in Punta Lobitos—the port from where the minerals are exported—have been considered in the collective bargaining demands since the beginning, even when they are not more than 10% of the unionized workers. This strategy towards coordination beyond the camp has also taken place in other LDC operations, such as the ones of Barrick (Pierina and Lagunas Norte) and Xstrata (Tintaya and Antapaccay). Lacking of the strong local ties of a mining town, workers have learned to go beyond the local level. Interestingly, those unions in camps where LDC is not used haven’t developed this strategy, even when they were part of the same company (e.g. Buenaventura’s operations of Uchucchacua, Orcopampa and Julcani; Milpo’s Cerro Lindo and Atacocha).

Whereas the major unions in Toquepala, Ilo and Cuajone worked together since 2007, a major change occurred in 2012, when the three unions in Toquepala decided to work in a common negotiation. Moreover, by 2013 SUTOTA and SET became a single organization, in a movement that was “the first step towards the total unification of Toquepala’s workers” (SUTOTA’s Newsletter, Aug. 2013). In 2014, all the meetings I attended in the STTA focused on the merge with the new union and, in spite of the short number of workers attending those meetings, all of them, as well as miners I talked to in the camp, agreed on the importance of merging, specially after the results of the 2013 strike: “those times in which we could strike
without the empleados’ [white collar workers’] are over. That strike was short but effective because we stop in all the important areas."

A third strategy consisted in creating networks with activists in Tacna and Moquegua. Although this is one of the most recent developments, it is significant because it can also be read as an attempt to go beyond the camp, reaching for allies outside the local community. Although workers used to vote in Ilabaya—which was their legal place of residence—, the district’s size made having allies there difficult. Since after LDC’s implementation they live in other cities, workers have a more direct contact with regional issues. Whereas between 2002 and 2007 workers’ mobilize inside Southern’s camps, the union organized a panel discussion about responsible mining in Tacna during the 2012 negotiation. It invited NGO’s and environmental activists from Lima to discuss about Southern’s activities. Although one of the organizers admitted that it was not a big event, “its effect on the company was immediate […] it suddenly started being more open to our demands, since it was scared of us talking to environmentalists”.

Southern made a series of public statements explaining the dangers of unionists’ “anti-mining” attitudes.

Although this type of network seems to be strategic more than the product of a real concern about Southern’s effects on the environment, it was a useful tool to pressure the company. It is worth-noting that, as explained at the end of chapter 3, Antamina’s workers have also use this pragmatic approach when they went out of the camp to speak with community leaders. After the collective bargaining was settled in 2012, the union’s leaders stopped coordinating with those communities. Since they do not live there, it seems to be hard for these workers to engage with the communities’ environmental demands in the long term. But temporary alliances beyond the camp can be used in critical moments.

Finally, the union has developed national and international networks over the last five years. This is, by far, the least explored strategy, but it has become increasingly relevant for the
present leaders. Regarding their national networks, STTA is not merely part of the National Federation of Miners, but it has been one its most active members, taking part not only in all the meetings the Federation organized, but also in the national strikes it called. More importantly, members of the last two Directive Boards have been part of the Federation’s board, conscious of the need of using the Federation’s network to gain bargaining power in Lima. In 2012, the leaders not only received the material support of the Federation—for example, they met in its office—, but also used its networks to reach congressman and government’s officials in Peru’s capital. Using this scale was key to move beyond Toquepala, and to call government’s attention about miners’ problems.

Regarding its international contacts, the organization started networking with other Grupo Mexico’s unions since 2011, when the 2012 bargaining strategy was being prepared. In fact, according to some workers, advisers from Mexico went to the camp to evaluate the situation and to give tips about the company’s business strategy. Although I didn’t find much information about this in the union’s archive, several leaders mentioned the role played by Mexican advisors during that negotiation to get a better image of Grupo Mexico’s financial weaknesses. By 2014, an agreement between STTA and the unions in Mexico was signed. This might be, however, a unique element in STTA, only possible because this is the only MNC from a Spanish-speaking country, which makes contacts easier.

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26 They referred, particularly, to financial information about the company’s debts, which was useful to know how much salaries could be raised.
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

Over the last three decades, LDC, a new spatial form of organizing mining production, emerged. In Peru, all large-scale mines that start producing after 1993 have used it. Although it has effects on companies’ performance and local development, analyzing them goes beyond the scope of this research, which only focused on how it has re-shaped labor unions’ strategies.

In contrast to previous studies, which just noted the end of the ‘mining community’, in quite abstract terms, I have tried to specify how LDC’s separation of work and household, along with its increase of working hours, affected labor unions through the transformation of three spaces. First, the camp became a solitary space, in which workers can hardly meet, and in which local allies have disappeared. Second, the household became less connected to the union activities, both because the lack of support from the miners’ wives and because of the emergence of private projects among workers. Finally, the union hall stopped being a space that encouraged miners’ participation. The large union meeting was transformed into small gatherings organized through several days, affecting workers’ ability to make rapid decisions. Although these changes made workers lose power in the local scale—i.e. reducing their abilities to strike and to organize demonstrations within the workplace—, they were able to re-scale their strategies. This process can be observed in (a) an individualized approach to its members, that take advantage of their mobility across the country; (b) mergers with other unions in and outside the camp; (c) coalitions with regional actors, particularly those focused on the environmental outcomes of mining; and (d) networks with national and international miners’ organizations.

These findings inform our knowledge beyond mining in two forms. First, this study shed light on an understudied element, that of workers’ mobility and of the spatiality of labor relations. During the last three decades, scholars have focused on the ways neoliberal reforms affected workers both through institutional reforms—i.e. politics of labor flexibilization— and ideological apparatuses—i.e. politics of individualism—. However, whereas similar national institutions and
values affect the mineworkers, the dynamics of unions cannot be understood if they are not put into the context of the spatial organization of production. In fact, this dimension shapes workers' daily experiences, as well as unions’ identities, decision-making processes and collective actions.

Second, this study further contributes to our understanding of how recent spatial reorganization of social reproduction impacts politics at the point of production. The connections found between union hall, household and workplace dynamics call for theorizing how the spheres of production and reproduction shape employment relations. Although this is clear in the case of mining, given how recent and radical the shift towards LDC has been, this study can also shed light on other industries too, such as agriculture or manufactory; or about other employment regimes, such as those of guest workers.

Two limitations can be identified in this study. First, it only focused on direct workers unions. Although this facilitated the comparison between different camps, and the access to stable organizational dynamics, it did not say much about subcontracted workers, although in the three studied cases they are about 40% of the workforce. Whereas direct workers are better trained, get higher salaries, and live far from mining operations; subcontracted ones tend to come from communities near the mines, given the employment promises companies make to acquire a ‘social license’ to operate\textsuperscript{27}, they are less trained and get lower salaries. Moving forward, it is necessary to understand how mobility shapes different miners’ identities and strategies.

Second, it is worth-noting that LDC is not a static regime, developed by companies in a homogeneous way. In fact, it does not only presents variations between companies, but also over time. Antamina, for example, has been using LDC since the beginnings of its operations, being quite successful in attracting non-local workers. However, whereas the percentage of locals was of only 14% in 2003, ten years later this number had increased up to 36%. Although

\textsuperscript{27} “Social license” is a term coined in mining to refer to “the level of acceptance or approval continually granted to an organization’s operations or project by the local community and other stakeholders”.

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LDC is still being used, commuting from nearby communities might have different effects than commuting from far away cities. How LDC intersects with other companies’ policies is an important question that future studies should consider, and it is a question that requires a shift in the focus, from labor unions to business strategies, which this research mostly assumed as given.
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