WALTER BURLEY ON THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION
AND ITS RELATION TO LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
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August 2014
WALTER BURLEY ON THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION
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Cornell University 2014

This dissertation defends the claim that Walter Burley (died c. 1345) develops a sophisticated account of the proposition, where a proposition is an entity fulfilling various semantic and epistemic roles – first and foremost, to be the primary bearer of truth value. In doing so, it attempts to correct longstanding misconceptions about a key aspect of Burley’s philosophy.

In contrast to most approaches in the literature, which claim that Burley is principally concerned with the nature of states of affairs, this dissertation argues that he is concerned rather with the metaphysics of the proposition. Motivated by two deeper semantic commitments, Burley argues that a proposition is a complex entity composed of “things outside the soul” (*res extra animam*). The proposition that Barack Obama is a human, for example, is composed of Barack Obama and the property of humanity. Moreover, encouraged by the view that truth is fundamentally a matter of the mind’s correspondence to the world, Burley argues that cognitive agents have the ability to arrange things together into propositions, where that arrangement is the exercise of a capacity to represent the world’s being some way or other – for example, to represent that Barack Obama is a human. Consequently, on Burley’s view, propositions are structured; they are complex, truth-conditional entities composed of things by mental acts.

This dissertation situates that account of the proposition within Burley’s wider
account of thinking and demonstrative science. To that end, it argues that Burley
develops a theory of mental language, according to which thinking is fundamentally a
matter of mind’s use of sentences composed of concepts, that is, of mental
representations. Burley’s commitment to mental language accomplishes a number of
goals. Most significantly, it helps him integrate his account of the proposition into his
account of demonstrative science, by resolving tensions brought on by the opacity of belief.

Finally, this dissertation examines the evolution of Burley’s account of the truth
conditions of the proposition, arguing that the final account of those conditions involves
the radical claim that things – the referents of categorematic expressions in natural and
mental language – must have certain intrinsic semantic properties.
Nathaniel Edwin “Nate” Bulthuis was born May 13, 1983 in Holland, Michigan. He received his primary and secondary education in the Holland Christian school system. For his undergraduate studies, Nate attended Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, from 2001 to 2005, receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science and in Religion and Theology. After a brief foray into the labor market, Nate attended Yale Divinity School, receiving a Masters of Arts in Religion degree in 2008, with a specialization in Philosophical Theology. Nate began his doctoral work at Cornell University’s Sage School of Philosophy in the fall of 2008, where he specialized in Medieval Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Philosophy of Language. He received his Ph.D. in August of 2014. Following the completion of his dissertation, Nate remained in Ithaca with his wife, having accepted a lectureship at Cornell University and anticipating the birth of his first child, a daughter.
For Sarah
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation is the result not just of my own labor, but of the influence, encouragement and hard work of many others as well. I would like to extend my appreciation to those individuals now.

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my dissertation advisor, Scott MacDonald. Scott has been at once my fiercest critic and my greatest advocate. Never allowing me to rest on my laurels, Scott has been relentless in pushing me to become a better speaker, a better writer, and a better thinker. At the same time, Scott has been generous in his support and encouragement during my time at Cornell, creating an environment in which I could achieve the lofty goals he set for me. He has read (and reread) countless drafts of this dissertation, often providing keen insights both into the ideas developed in them and the ways in which those ideas are best presented to the reader. He has also allowed himself to be a sounding board for a number of ideas that ultimately made it into this dissertation (and quite a few that did not). And Scott has provided opportunities for me that few graduates students enjoy – by arranging for a key scholar in my area of research to come to Cornell as a visiting professor, for example, and by involving me in a series of workshops on Augustine’s *De trinitate*, providing me the opportunity to get to know a number of leading scholars of medieval philosophy. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Scott has led by example, by displaying in his own work what it means to be an excellent scholar, an excellent teacher, and an excellent citizen of the university. I hope that I can emulate his example during the course of my own career.

I would also like to thank the other members of my committee: Matti Eklund and Derk Pereboom. Both have been unwavering in their support of the development of this dissertation, and of my growth as a scholar. Matti has been instrumental in shaping this dissertation in a number of ways. He has, of course, provided helpful and incisive
comments on drafts of this dissertation. But he also influenced its development at another level, by introducing me through two of his courses (a course on early analytic philosophy in the spring of 2010, and a course on the liar and sorites paradoxes, addressing questions about the nature of truth, in the fall of 2011) to a number of issues and ideas that are central to it. Derk’s charitable comments on and conversations with me about many of the chapters in this dissertation provided invaluable guidance with respect to the philosophical vocabulary I was attempting to employ and the concepts I was trying to express.

Beyond my committee members, there are a number of people who aided the completion of this dissertation that deserve special mention. First, special thanks is due to Laurent Cesalli. Laurent has been an indispensible sparring partner in this project – a fellow Burley scholar whose questions, criticisms and alternatives to the account I develop have helped me revise and hone my own views on a number of issues in Burley’s philosophy. I can only hope that our conversations have been as enjoyable and enlightening for him as they have been for me. Thanks also goes to Susan Brower-Toland and Bob Pasnau, each of whose conversations with me about Burley’s account of the proposition were immensely helpful in clarifying that account in my own mind. Susan’s comments on a draft of the third chapter of this dissertation were also instrumental in helping me realize that the account develops significantly over Burley’s career. I would also like to thank Francesca Bruno, my friend and fellow graduate student in medieval philosophy at Cornell. From the very beginning of this project, Francesca has been a great source of encouragement. She has also given generously of her time in support of this project, both through her participation in the many department workshop talks that I have given (no matter how ill-polished those talks may have been) and through her careful and reflective comments on so much of the material that is in this dissertation.

Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, George and Trudy Bulthuis, whose
unconditional love and support throughout my life have given me the means to become the scholar – and indeed the man – that I am today. I love you both so very much!

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife, Sarah. It is a product of her love and encouragement. It is also a product of her sacrifice, as she has steadfastly supported my pursuit of an academic career, even when that pursuit has taken us far away from our family and friends, and has come at the expense of her own dreams and ambitions. I cannot express how blessed I am to have her as my best friend, my wife and, in just a few short months, the mother of my daughter.
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I use the following abbreviations in referring to particular works of Burley:

Quaes.Perih  Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis
Comm.Perih  Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis
Quaes.Post  Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum Aristotelis
Art.Vet     Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis
Exp.Porph   Expositio super librum Isagogem Porphyrii
Exp.Praed   Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis
Exp.Perih   Expositio super librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1. THE NATURE AND AIMS OF THE PROJECT

This dissertation focuses on Walter Burley’s (c. 1275 – c. 1345) account of the proposition.¹ For Burley, a proposition is a complex entity composed of “things” (res) – concrete particulars such as Socrates and properties humanity.² Moreover, Burley argues that a proposition is structured by a mental act of predication, the exercise of a capacity

¹ Likely born in Burley-in-Wharfedale, Yorkshire, in 1275, Burley was a Master of Arts and fellow at Merton College, Oxford, by 1301, where he taught for about half a decade. He resigned his position as fellow of Merton College sometime between 1307 and 1309 to take up theological studies at the Sorbonne. Those studies, and much of the rest of Burley’s career, were largely funded by ecclesiastical appointments that came with pensions. By 1324, he had become a Master of Theology. Sometime around 1324, he held a quodlibetal disputation at Toulouse, and appears to have taught in Paris as a Master of Theology from 1324–1327. From 1327 to 1334, Burley’s focus turned from academic concerns to political ones. In 1327, he served as ambassador to the papal court in Avignon for King Edward III, and again (now as the king’s “beloved clerk”) in 1330. In roughly 1334, Burley joined the patronage and intellectual circle of Richard de Bury, tutor of Edward III, at which point Burley returned to intellectual pursuits. That circle included other prominent intellectuals of the day: Thomas Bradwardine (future Archbishop of Canterbury and a member of the Oxford calculators, who proved the mean speed theorem), Richard Kilvington (another member of the Oxford calculators), Robert Holkot, John Mauduit, and Richard FitzRalph. Briefly imprisoned in 1336 for a forestry offense, Burley held a quodlibetal disputation in Bologne in 1341, and travelled to Avignon in 1343 to present his commentary on the Politics to Pope Clement VI (a former schoolmate at Paris). He died sometime thereafter. Burley authored at least fifty – and as many as seventy – distinct works, including a number of commentaries on Aristotle’s logical treatises, the Physics, the De Anima, the aforementioned Politics, and the Ethics, and as well as independent treatises and longer works on various topics in logic, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. He may also have authored a work titled ‘On the Lives of the Philosophers,’ containing philosophical biographies stretching from Priscian back to the pre-Socratics; the authenticity of his authorship is disputed, however. For more on Burley’s life, see Jennifer Ottman and Rega Wood, “Walter of Burley: His Life and Works,” Vivarium 37 (March 1, 1999): 1–23; Mary Catherine Sommers, “Walter Burley,” ed. H.C.G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

² Socrates presents a somewhat complicated case here, as he does not currently exist, and so, as Burley argues in the Art.Vet, has merely objective being, that is, exists merely as an object of thought. In contrast, an individual that does currently exist – such as, at the time of this writing, Barack Obama – has subjective being, and it is that subjective being, Barack Obama himself, which is a component in the proposition that Barack Obama is a human. (On the distinction between subjective and objective being, see ch. 2, pp. 56–100 passim.) Setting aside that complication, however, and without prejudice to the ontological status of the components of any proposition, I will use Socrates as my standard example of a particular throughout the rest of this dissertation.
of the mind to represent the world’s being various ways. That propositions are structured
by the mind in that way has two important consequences. First, propositions are bearers
of truth and falsity. In fact, they are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Sentences in
natural and mental language have truth conditions, but only because they signify
propositions, that is, because they have propositions as their semantic contents, which
propositions have the truth conditions that they do essentially. Second, propositions are
the objects of one’s attitudes, such as belief. However, propositions constitute the objects
of one’s attitudes in a somewhat non-standard or loose sense for Burley, since he takes
one’s attitudes to be not strictly speaking relations to propositions but rather acts of the
mind by which that very propositional content is produced. To believe that Socrates is a
human, for example, just is to predicate humanity of Socrates assertively, rather than to
be related to some independent object as its content.

Burley’s account of the proposition is in many ways unique from anything else
one finds in medieval discussions of the proposition – so unique, in fact, that Burley’s
own contributions to the long history of philosophical investigation into the proposition
went largely unappreciated during his own career, and have been largely misunderstood
since then. However, it is an account borne out of the intersection of Burley’s more
general semantic, cognitive and metaphysical commitments. Those commitments
together constitute one expression of an intense, general philosophical interest throughout
fourteenth-century Europe – and at Oxford in particular – in issues at the intersection of
the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. William Ockham
Burley’s broad philosophical program parts with Ockham’s nominalist project at a fairly fundamental level, affirming that the reality of extra-mental universals and the nine Aristotelian accidental categories are essential to a successful epistemic and semantic theorizing. Burley, then, represents an important and sophisticated realist strand running through late medieval philosophical thought, distinct from the much more studied nominalist threads that begin at the first half of the fourteenth century.

However, scholars are only beginning to understand key elements of Burley’s overall philosophical project. The main cause for this has been that, relative to other figures in the late medieval period (e.g. John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) and Ockham), Burley has received little scholarly attention. The attention that Scotus and Ockham in particular have received is certainly well-deserved. Both are towering philosophical figures, whose intellectual acumen resulted in novel and sophisticated philosophical claims that touch on fundamental issues in the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of language. Ockham’s philosophical project in particular was paradigm-shifting, setting a philosophical framework within which friend and foe alike largely

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operated for more than a century. But the relative lack of scholarly attention paid to Burley has less to do with his philosophical abilities than it does more general institutional forces. Unlike Scotus and Ockham, for example, who were Franciscans, Burley was a so-called secular. That is, while a member of the church hierarchy for much of his life, Burley was not a member of a religious order. As such, there was no organization with a vested interest in preserving his philosophical works and promoting his philosophical contributions. The main consequence of this for present scholarship has been that Burley’s own works are far less readily available to the scholarly community than those of more well-known philosophical luminaries in the high and late middle ages. Whereas modern critical editions of the works of Ockham can be easily obtained at major educational research institutions, for example, and the works of Scotus are, if not entirely critically edited, at least readily available in some modern format, Burley’s philosophical corpus is being made available slowly, in only a piecemeal fashion. That even some of Burley’s corpus has been made available to the scholarly community is due to the work of a few individuals – Stephen Brown, Philotheus Boehner, Mary Sommers and Herman Shapiro especially – who have devoted their energies to publishing select works of Burley. However, those publications are but a small part of his much larger corpus, one which exists for the most part in manuscript form in rare book and manuscript libraries at various educational institutions around the globe.

4 Perhaps another reason why Burley’s own philosophical contributions never received the sort of philosophical attention they deserved is that many of his philosophical assumptions fell outside of the Ockhamist form of nominalism that came to dominant much of the fourteenth century.

5 Other notable scholars in this regard include Alessandro Conti, L.M. de Rijk, Sten Ebbesen, Marek Gensler, Romauld Green, Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, M.J. Kitchel, M.J. Kiteley, Frederick Scott, E.A. Synan, Mischa von Perger, and Hans-Ulrich Wöhler.
Because of the relative lack of readily available source material, and the piecemeal fashion by which what is available has been published, philosophical scholarship on Burley has been relatively sparse, and the community of serious Burley scholars is comprised of only a handful of individuals. Since the community of Burley scholars has been small, and given the relative dearth of textual resources, it is unsurprising that the scholarship remains unsettled on even some of the most fundamental and central commitments of Burley’s philosophical project. For example, Burley is often known to scholars of medieval philosophy for his commitment in the second half of his career to “exaggerated” realism, according to which substantial properties (such as humanity) are not parts of the concrete substances that they inform. But Burley scholars are only just now coming to grips with the ontological implications of that account, as well as its role in Burley’s larger philosophical project.6

Likewise, Burley is perhaps most known within medieval philosophical scholarship for his so-called theory of the propositio in re. But there is a great deal of scholarly disagreement about what, exactly, that theory amounts to.7 Some argue that it is a theory of propositional content; others argue that it is a theory of states of affairs. Some

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argue that one finds a consistent theory of the *propositio in re* throughout Burley’s philosophical corpus; others argue that that theory evolves significantly over the course of his career. In fact, I consider this concern with the theory of the *propositio in re* in Burley scholarship to be somewhat of a red herring. It is a red herring precisely because (like so much of his vocabulary) Burley uses the term ‘*propositio in re*’ to refer to entirely different kinds of objects at different points in his long career, with the consequence that there is simply no “theory of the *propositio in re*,” consistent or evolving, running throughout Burley’s corpus. A far better approach, I believe, is to look beyond Burley’s philosophical vocabulary towards some of the philosophical puzzles with which Burley is concerned – puzzles about the semantic contents of sentences, the objects of propositional attitudes, and the bearers of truth. It is partly in response to these sorts of puzzles, I argue, that Burley develops his theory of the proposition.

Though some of the particulars of Burley’s account of the proposition are exceptional in philosophical history, his interest in the sorts of puzzles I have mentioned also places him firmly within a tradition of philosophical inquiry into the proposition that stretches from Plato to the present day. Contemporary interest in the proposition begins with Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell (or perhaps even further back, with philosophers such as Franz Brentano and Anton Marty). But that interest itself is typically driven by puzzles having to do with the semantic content of complex expressions, propositional attitudes and truth – exactly the sorts of puzzles with which Burley and others in the medieval period wrestled. Those puzzles allow for a certain functional definition of a proposition, where a proposition is that which is (a) the primary bearer of truth and falsity, (b) the object of one’s propositional attitudes, and (c) the semantic content of
sentences in natural and mental language. Defined in this way, one’s finds inquiry into
the nature of the proposition not just in the last century or so, but at a number of points in
philosophical history. In fact, when defined in that way, interest in and serious reflection
upon the nature of the proposition during the late medieval period seems to me to rival
anything one finds on the philosophical landscape today. In that respect, Burley’s interest
in the proposition makes him far from a singular figure in the late medieval period, but
rather a product of his age.

The main aims of this dissertation are threefold. First, I aim to shift the debate
within Burley scholarship about the sorts of puzzles and projects that lie at the
intersection of Burley’s semantic, cognitive, and metaphysical programs. While some of
the confusion in the scholarship is simply exegetical, a significant portion of that
confusion is brought on by certain expectations about the broad conceptual framework
within which Burley is working. Those expectations can, at times, be reinforced by the
vocabulary that Burley himself employs. But the effects of assuming that framework
have been wholly unsatisfying, resulting in reconstructions of Burley’s larger semantic
and cognitive project that either fail to cohere with significant portions of the texts they
putatively explain, or are in tension with some of his more basic philosophical
commitments, or both. By understanding Burley’s philosophical concerns and interests in

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8 There is a temptation in contemporary philosophy to define propositions not just functionally but also
ontologically, with widespread agreement that a proposition must be abstract. For Burley (and most
everyone else in the late medieval period), however, propositions are concrete rather than abstract.
However, I do not think that ontological component is essential to the discussion. Consequently, I will
assume a purely functional definition in this dissertation, one which allows for a more coherent
conversation between medieval and contemporary philosophers.
the way I will suggest, in contrast, I believe that we find a philosophical project that is not only more coherent but more philosophically interesting as well.

Second, I aim to explain in a clear and convincing manner Burley’s account of the proposition, and to articulate how that account is meant to respond to the semantic, cognitive and alethic concerns I have mentioned. While his response concerns issues that are perennial in philosophy, Burley’s account of the proposition itself is exceptional. Burley defends an account according to which propositions are entities composed of things, but structured by mental acts of predication. It also assumes that the truth-conditionality of the proposition – and representationality more generally – is explained in terms of mental activity. One goal, then, is to provide a reasoned defense of that account, to show that that account is not ad hoc but rather motivated by deeper philosophical theses to which Burley is committed.

Because of his unique account of the proposition, Burley’s response to the concerns that motivate it is somewhat unorthodox. Propositional attitudes, for example, receive a non-relational analysis, such that attitudes are not a matter not of being related to a proposition but rather of crafting it. Likewise, the truth-conditional character of a proposition is itself analyzed in terms of the kinds of mental acts that the mind performs, which acts give a proposition its truth-conditional structure. A further goal, then, is to provide a defense of Burley’s response to those concerns both in terms of how Burley’s response to those concerns coheres with his larger semantic and cognitive program, and in terms of why those responses should have independent philosophical appeal. In particular, I intend to highlight how that account can provide new and important insights into the nature of propositions, and their roles as semantic and cognitive contents.
Third, and less immediately that the other two aims, I intend to advance research into those philosophical strands running through late medieval philosophical thought which run counter to the Ockhamist philosophical tradition that comes to dominate the fourteenth century. Burley is an interesting case study in this regard. Burley’s philosophical career was especially long, spanning more than four decades. Moreover, in the middle of his career, the philosophical landscape in England, and continental Europe shortly thereafter, underwent significant upheaval, as Ockham’s metaphysical views, and the complex semantic and cognitive theories that were meant to support it, began to gain widespread acceptance. Of course, Burley himself rejected Ockham’s philosophical program. And that rejection required significant revision to some aspects of Burley’s own realist philosophy. In the most obvious case, Burley’s theory of properties evolved from a moderate realist account (where properties were understood to be really the same as the particular substances which possessed them) to what has come to be called “exaggerated” realism.

Perhaps just as interesting as the ways in which Burley’s philosophical program was forced to evolve, however, are the ways in which it stayed the same. In particular, Burley’s semantic and cognitive programs remain relatively consistent throughout his career. I believe that the consistency of his semantic program in particular tells us something important about Burley: that Burley was not primarily driven by the largely metaphysical concerns of the thirteenth century, but rather was (like Ockham) a product of the linguistic turn in philosophy that began in Oxford at the turn of the fourteenth century. Consequently, Burley is perhaps far less a “conservative innovator,” as some have labeled him, whose primary goal is to retain the conceptual framework that
dominated the philosophical landscape before Ockham, than he is someone who takes a similar approach to philosophical problems as Ockham himself, by engaging in a deep study of the nature of language. The differences between Burley and Ockham represent not so much a clash of philosophical worldviews, then, as it does what results from very different starting assumptions about the nature of meaning itself.

2. PROPOSITIONS IN THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD

2.1. The Semantics of Sentences before the Fourteenth Century

As has already been emphasized, while Burley’s account of the proposition was unique for his time, the interests and concerns which motivated it are perennial to philosophy. To properly appreciate Burley’s own contributions to that line of philosophical inquiry, then, it is important to situate Burley within a larger historical framework. It is to that project that I turn now.

Interest in the nature of propositions can be traced as far back as Plato. A more sophisticated approach to the subject matter can be found in Stoic doctrine of the axioma. But medieval interest in the proposition has its roots mainly in Aristotle. That interest comes from two directions: the nature of the semantic content of sentences in

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9 For the notion of Burley as a conservative innovator, see Laurent Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 91.

10 This section draws heavily from Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity (North-Holland Pub. Co, 1973), and from Susan Christine Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions: Ockham and the 14th-Century Debate over Objects of Judgment” (Cornell University, 2002), chap. 1, pp. 7–21.

11 On the stoic theory of the axioma, a kind of lekton, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 45–74.
natural language, on the one hand, and the nature of the objects of one’s attitudes, on the other.

Medieval interest in the semantic contents of statements in natural language (and the semantic contents of expressions in natural language generally) were encouraged, both directly and indirectly, by the “old” logic, and in particular by Aristotle’s De Interpretatione. In the first chapter of that work, Aristotle articulates the semantics of expressions in natural language generally according to the thoughts that they signify. “Now spoken sounds are symbols of affections of the soul, and written marks symbols of spoken sounds [...]. But what these are in the first place signs of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; for what these affections are likeness of – actual things – are also the same.”12 Expressions in natural language signify certain features of the mind, then, which features are likenesses, or representations, of things in the world.

Moreover, echoing the distinction he makes in the Categories between those which are said in combination with one another and those which are not said in combination, Aristotle states that those said in combination are truth-evaluable, whereas those said without combination are not, since “truth and falsity have to do with combination and separation.”13 In other words, Aristotle distinguishes statements from the nouns and verbs that compose them. The former contain alethic properties while the latter do not. Moreover, Aristotle also suggests that statements, and sentences generally,

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have semantic content, just like the nouns and verbs that compose them. “A sentence is a significant spoken sound some part of which it significant in separation – as an expression, not as an affirmation.”\textsuperscript{14} In the fifth century CE, Boethius will connect these two theses, arguing that a statement is “a complex expression (oratio) signifying something true or something false.”\textsuperscript{15}

While one finds treatments of semantic issues generally before the twelfth century, it is during the twelfth century, especially within the works of Peter Abelard (d. 1142), that the semantics of sentences in particular come to be treated in a systematic and thorough-going fashion. As a general matter, Abelard argues that it is important to distinguish two kinds of significates that an expression in natural language has.\textsuperscript{16} First, expressions in natural language signify \textit{intellectus}, mental acts of attending to objects in the world. Expressions in natural language signify acts of that sort in the sense that speakers use words to express (\textit{exprimere}) their thoughts. It is this notion of signification that Aristotle treats in the \textit{De Interpretatione}, where he writes that a word establishes an understanding (\textit{constituit intellectum}). In addition to an expression’s signifying a certain mental state, however, Abelard argues that some expressions – nouns and verbs, for example – also signify in the sense of naming objects in the world. ‘Socrates’, for example, expresses a certain mental act of attending to Socrates and names Socrates himself.


\textsuperscript{16} See Nuchelmans, \textit{Theories of the Proposition}, 139–63.
Just like nouns and verbs, Abelard argues that statements (propositiones) express mental states. Moreover, like statements in natural language, Abelard takes mental states of this sort to be compositional, composed of an act of thinking about what the subject and predicate terms nominate, respectively, as well as a unique mental act, which, while not itself an intellectus (since it has no referential content), is rather an act of joining referring intellectus together. The result is a complex mental act, in which the mind thinks of one thing inhering in another. However, Abelard argues that, unlike nouns and verbs, statements are not referring expressions. That is, they do not name anything. They do not name anything, Abelard argues, because there is not anything for them to name. If they were to name, they would need to name things within the Aristotelian categorical system. But they clearly do not, since what is asserted in a statement is something’s being the case, but nothing like that is found within the Aristotelian categorical system.

Rather than in naming, Abelard argues that the semantic function of a statement is in saying (in dicendo). That is, a statement is used to make an assertion, and Abelard calls what it asserts a dictum. A dictum, Abelard emphasizes, is not a thing (res), nor a something (aliquid), nor even a complex of a number of things. It is also not nothing (nihil). It is none of those precisely because the use of those expressions to characterize a dictum is a kind of category mistake, those names being correctly applied only to objects within the Aristotelian categorical system. What can be used to “name” a dictum, in some very loose sense, is an accusative plus infinitive construction. But that doesn’t serve to refer to, or name, anything, properly speaking, because such a thing would need to be

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17 ‘Socratem legere librum’. Abelard calls these sorts of constructions quasi-names. By the late medieval period, quod- (or that-) clauses – for example, quod Socrates legit librum, ‘that Socrates reads a book’ – were seen as equivalent to an accusative plus infinitive construction.
either a substance or an accident. A construction of this sort, however, does not name either a substance (e.g. it does not name merely Socrates) or an accident (e.g., it does not name merely the accident of reading a book). While (or perhaps rather because) dicta fall outside of the Aristotelian categorical system, Abelard argues that dicta are the primary bearers of alethic and modal properties, a feature of the account made more even explicit in the generation or so following Abelard. Statements in natural language, and the complex mental acts that they express, then, have the truth-values they do on account of the dicta that they express.18

Abelard’s doctrine of the dictum was both innovative and challenging. It is one of the first systematic attempts to work through issues having to do with sentential content in the medieval period. The introduction of the notion of the dictum also served to highlight aspects unique to propositional content (e.g. truth-conditionality, modality) and to try to work out those issues against a broadly Aristotelian framework. But it also left the ontological status of the dictum itself somewhat opaque. In the generations following Abelard, some of his semantic insights were adopted, refined and disputed. Perhaps most important for our purposes is the debates that developed about the ontological status of the dictum.

Abelard’s metaphysical account of the dictum was mostly negative, telling us what a dictum is not. Subsequent generations attempted to describe the dictum in more positive ways. The author of one particular work – the Ars Meliduna – sets out three

18 As Susan Brower-Toland notes (see Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 15, n. 25), it is curious that Abelard does not use his theory of the dictum to address theological puzzles having to do with the object of belief. It seems that it wasn’t until sometime around the turn of the fourteenth century that questions about the significatum of a sentence were explicitly connected to questions about the objects of belief and other attitudes.
different analyses of the *dictum*. First, a *dictum* might be a linguistic entity of some sort: either a sentence in natural language or a complex act of thinking. Call this the *complexum* view. On the *complexum* view, a *dictum* is, in fact, something (*aliquid*), namely, a certain mental sentence-token. Second, a *dictum* might be identical with or reducible to things in the Aristotelian categorical system – the inherence of the property of whiteness in Socrates, for example. Call this the *res* view, since it claims that the *dictum* is not an intentional state but a thing, or *res*, towards which a mental state can be directed. On the *res* view, a *dictum* is again something, since it exists either within some or other Aristotelian category, or is at least something composed out of and ultimately reducible to things from one or more of the Aristotelian categories. Third, a *dictum* might be a *sui generis* entity, belonging (as the author of the *Ars Burana* remarks) to a category – the *enuntiabile* – distinct from the ten categories of Aristotle. Call this the *complexe significabile* view, following the terminology developed by Adam Wodeham (and subsequently Gregory of Rimini) in the mid-fourteenth century. On the *complexe significabile* view, the *dictum* of a sentence is not a thing, because it is not identical or reducible to thing(s) within one or more of the ten Aristotelian categories, nor is it a token-sentence in a language. It is, rather, extra-categorical.19 As we will see, all three sorts of positions were developed and defended in the late medieval period.

For the most part, philosophers in the thirteenth century tended to avoid investigations of the semantics of the sentence, favoring instead a close study of the semantics of the parts of a sentence (including a fairly rigorous debate about the grammar

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19 This still leaves unsettled what role *complexe significabilia* play in meaning and thought – whether they are propositions, for example, or states of affairs. Both Wodeham and Gregory appear to take *complexe significabilia* to be states of affairs.
of sentences themselves). By the end of the thirteenth century, however, it appears that at least some philosophers were interested in applying the results of that study to the signification of sentences considered as a whole. Perhaps most notable in this regard was Scotus. Scotus is an especially important philosopher for our purposes, because it seems highly likely that Scotus’s theory of sentential signification, and the larger philosophical concerns out of which it arises, had a significant impact on the debates about meaning and cognition that flowered at Oxford at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Indeed, that theory likely directly influenced the theory of the proposition that Burley would develop. Burley reports that he attended lectures by Scotus at Oxford, likely in 1297-98, and the similarities that Burley’s account shares with Scotus’ certainly suggests that Scotus had an impact on Burley’s account of the proposition.

Scotus himself mentions that there was, during his day, a great altercation about the *significata* of expressions of first intention in natural language – whether they directly signify things (*res*), or only indirectly signify them, by direct signifying mental representations (*conceptus*) of those things. Scholars disagree about whether Scotus in fact ever adopts a position in this debate. At least one plausible interpretation, however, argues that Scotus thinks the disagreement about the direct, or primary, *significata* of categorematic expressions in natural language is built on, on the one hand, a deficient

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20 Curiously, Scotus is almost completely absent from Nuchelmans’ seminal work on ancient and medieval theories of truth-bearers, as point noted by E.P. Bos in E.P. Bos, “The Theory of the Proposition according to John Duns Scotus’ Two Commentaries on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” in *Logos and Pragma: Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriël Nuchelmans*, Aristarium Supplementa III (Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987), 121–39. This is unfortunate, as Scotus appears to have been central in the development of that tradition during the late thirteenth and very early fourteenth centuries.

account of cognition and, on the other, an ambiguity in the terminology at issue. First, Scotus argues that, with respect to mental representation, one needs to carefully distinguish between the act of thinking, on the one hand, and what that thinking is about, on the other – or, put in another way, between vehicle and content. Second, the usual way in which the disagreement about signification is put does not seem to respect this distinction between vehicle and content, since ‘conceptus’ is ambiguous between vehicle and content, and ‘res’ is likewise ambiguous between content, which exists merely objectively in the mind, and the extramental reality, which exists subjectively outside the mind. In response, then, Scotus argues that expressions in natural language signify things as they are understood (res ut intelligitur), distinguishes them from species, vehicles of content, on the one hand, and existing things (res existentes), which have extramental existence, on the other.

Scotus combines that semantic thesis with a thesis to which Burley himself is committed: intellectualism. A consequence of intellectualism is that the primary bearers of truth are products of intellectual activity, being produced by the mind’s composing or dividing something (in a non-technical sense of “thing”) from another. Scotus argues that the things which the mind puts together are concepts – that is, contents of the mind, things as they are understood.

[T]he composition is not out of species but out of things – not, however, as they exist but as they are understood. And therefore truth and falsity are said to concern the composition and division of the intellect, because that composition is caused by the intellect and is in the intellect as it is cognized in the one cognizing, not as an accident in a subject.22

Scotus will go on to argue that it is a composition of things (*compositio rerum*) that sentences in natural language signify.

And through a spoken statement it is not a composition of species that it is signified but a composition of things, just as a composition of utterances is not signified through a written sentence but rather a composition of things.23 What a sentence in natural language signifies, then, is a certain composition of things as they are understood, that is, a certain complex content that the mind forms out of the contents of its species. Scotus’s account of a *compositio rerum* seems to have had an important impact in Oxford at the beginning of the fourteenth century. First, Burley appears to have been deeply influenced by it. Like Scotus, Burley argues that sentences in natural language signify a certain composition of things. Burley, as we will see, goes further. First, in his early works, he will explicitly label that composition of things a *propositio in mente*, or a mental sentence. Consequently, Burley will argue that a composition of that sort has predicate (or linguistic) structure, in virtue of which it can be said to have terms with certain semantic properties. Second, he will argue that a mental sentence is composed not just of things as they are understood, but rather of existing things, that is, things which have real, extramental existence. But the roots of Burley’s theory can be traced back to Scotus. Beyond Burley, Ockham too seems to have been influenced by Scotus (though not immediately, but rather likely via Scotus’s influence on the Oxford community). Like Burley, the early Ockham identifies the *compositio* as a mental sentence. More faithful to Scotus, however, the early Ockham holds that general

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23 “Videtur ergo dicenum ad istud, quod quantumcumque per idem multa significentur, quorum unum significatur, inquantum est signum alterius, si illud componatur in oratone cum alio, non est compositio signorum sed signatorum ultimorum, quae sunt signa, et per orationem prolata non significatur compositio specierum sed rerum” (Ibid., q. 2, n. 5–6, pp. 542–3).
mental sentences contain *ficta*, that is, contents which have merely objective existence in the mind, as their terms.\(^{24,25}\)

### 2.2. Propositional Attitudes before the Fourteenth Century

While Abelard and his immediate successors in the twelfth century (in a philosophical guise, at least) engaged in serious philosophical investigation into the nature of the semantic content of sentences in natural language, different but related problems were being discussed in theological quarters, concerning the nature of the objects of one’s attitudes.\(^{26}\) Two problems in particular interested the theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: the nature of the objects of religious faith, and the immutability of divine knowledge.

Augustine claims in his commentary on the gospel of John that what is believed is the same for all believers, despite the fact that the *antiqui*, such as Abraham, believed, for example, that Christ will be born, whereas the *moderni*, such as Augustine himself,

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24 Many of Ockham’s critics note the connection to Scotus. Adam Wodeham, for example, notes that “Scotus follows the same approach” as the early Ockham about the ontology of the terms of a mental sentence (Adam Wodeham, “The Object of Knowledge,” in *Mind and Knowledge (The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts)*, trans. Robert Pasnau (Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 327, quoted in Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 18, n. 32).

25 Karger notes that, for the early Ockham, the subject terms of singular mental sentences were not *ficta* but rather things. See Elizabeth Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” *Vivarium* 34 (1996): 210–28. Absent their disagreement about the reality of extra-mental universals, then, Burley and the early Ockham appear to have endorsed similar accounts of the proposition.

26 The distinction between philosophy and theology here, while real, isn’t nearly as clean-cut as the structure of this section might suggest. And this is because the theologians of the medieval period were also philosophers, having received an education in the arts before they would take up theological studies. Consequently, philosophical and theological reflection often intersected with one another. But this makes the distinct treatments of the semantics of sentences, on the one hand, and the objects of belief, on the other, all the more puzzling.
believe that Christ was born.\textsuperscript{27} Debates about the nature of the object of religious belief in the medieval period are articulated against this background. A compelling theory of the object of religious belief had to articulate, on the one hand, how the faith of believers remained the same, and, on the other, how one’s faith was effected by the temporal position she finds herself in. This lead to a general distinction between, on the one hand, what one’s faith is about, and, on the other, how that faith is expressed.

That background gave rise to two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, replies to the question of the nature of the objects of religious belief. First, some argued that the object of religious belief was a thing, \textit{res}. Among res-theorists, some held that that thing is simple, for example God or Christ. Others (e.g. Prevostin of Cremona) argued that that thing was not simple but rather complex – an event (\textit{eventus}), such as Christ’s birth or death.\footnote{On Prevostin of Cremona, see M.-D. Chenu, “Contribution À L’histoire Du Traité de La Foi,” in \textit{Mélanges Thomistes}, Bibliothèque Thomistie III (Paris: Vrin, 1934), 130.} Pure \textit{res}-theories were often rejected on grounds that such things could not be bearers of alethic properties, and so cannot be the sorts of things that are believed. In response to the difficulties of a \textit{res}-theory, then, other theologians argued that the object of religious belief is a certain linguistic entity which itself signifies a particular thing or event, such as the birth of Christ. In other words, theologians of this sort argued that the object of one’s religious belief was a \textit{complexum}. Debates among theologians who held an account of this sort, however, often centered around the precise character of this linguistic entity, and in particular whether it was tensed or tenseless, and what one’s views on that account meant for shared faith among believers. Moreover, many tried to

\footnote{Augustine, \textit{In Iohannis Evangelium tractatus}, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, vol. 35, Patrologia Latina (Garnier Frères, 1864), XLV, 9, pp. 1722–3.}
combine the \textit{res}-theory, on the one hand, with a \textit{complexum}-theory, on the other, to ameliorate the perceived deficiencies of each.

A puzzle similar to the object of religious belief concerned the immutability of God’s knowledge. On the standard medieval conception of divine nature, God is a simple being, and so not capable of change. At the same time, God is omniscient; he knows everything that can be known. Peter Lombard, a twelfth-century theologian, notes that these doctrines seem to be intension with one another.\textsuperscript{29} If, before he created the world, God knows that he will create the world, immutability appears to require that he knows even now that he will create the world. But God cannot know now that he will create the world, since all he can know now is that he has created the world. In response, many theologians argued that the immutability of God’s knowledge requires the immutability of the object of his knowledge, with significant debates about the nature of the object. The various positions in that debate match nicely with the positions articulated in the debates over the object of religious belief.

While medieval interest in the nature of the objects of one’s attitudes began in theological circles, it became a topic of philosophical interest in the early thirteenth century, with the re-introduction of and interest in Aristotle’s remaining logical works (the so-called “new” logic), and in particular with the introduction of his \textit{Posterior Analytics}. That work concerns the nature of a particular kind of attitude: scientific knowledge (\textit{scientia}), which is explanatory knowledge produced by a demonstration.\textsuperscript{30}

The overriding debate for much of the thirteenth century concerned which subjects of

\textsuperscript{29} See Nuchelmans, \textit{Theories of the Proposition}, 185–6.

\textsuperscript{30} For a fuller discussion of scientific knowledge, see ch. 4, §5, pp. 221–30.
inquiry could be scientific.  

Was theology a science, for example? At some point around the turn of the fourteenth century, however, philosophers seem to have shifted their focus from the proper domains of science to the objects of *scientia*, probing what, exactly, is known. It is, unfortunately, not at all clear what provokes this turn, nor even with whom serious consideration of the object of scientific knowledge first begins. Burley, in fact, might be a key player in that transition, since the overriding concern in his questions commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, written c. 1307, revolves around the nature of the objects of scientific knowledge. That concern recurs in his later works as well. In any case, the rise of that focus on the objects of scientific knowledge sparks a rigorous debate in the fourteenth century about the objects of propositional attitudes generally.

### 2.3. Propositions in the Fourteenth Century

Throughout the fourteenth century, the concerns about the semantics of sentences, on the one hand, and about the objects of propositional attitudes, on the other, that arose independently in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries begin to be treated as elements of a unified and systematic theory of meaning and cognition. A central figure of the story of that unification is certainly Ockham. Ockham’s sophisticated theory of mental language, and his explicit use of the mental language to address concerns about the nature of the objects of one’s attitudes, motivates an interest in propositional attitudes – and consequently propositions – for other central thinkers at Oxford, and, through them, transforms the philosophical interests and projects of philosophers on the continent.

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Moreover, that account of mental language (and the subordination of natural language to it) allows Ockham to connect issues of semantics, on the one hand, with propositional attitudes, on the other.

In fact, Ockham’s own view is that a sentence (and its nominalization) does not signify anything – that is, a sentence is not a referring expression – because there is not any one thing (*res*) that it could signify.\(^{32}\) At best, Ockham argues, the referents of a sentence are merely the referents of its subject and predicate terms. However, though sentences in natural language have no signification, Ockham maintains that they have a semantics, and that that semantics connects to debates about the objects of propositional attitudes. Ockham argues that natural language broadly is meaningful by being appropriately connected to a mental language, composed of concepts. The expression ‘cow’ has the meaning that it does by being subordinated to the concept COW, for example. Sentences in natural language too have this subordination relation. ‘Socrates is a human’, for example, has the meaning that it does because it is subordinated to the mental sentence SOCRATES IS A HUMAN, composed of the concept SOCRATES, the copula concept, and the concept HUMAN. It is these mental sentences, moreover, which Ockham argues are the objects of one attitudes.\(^{33}\)

Ockham’s treatment of the objects of propositional attitudes garnered significant attention, first at Oxford and then at Paris and other centers of learning on continental

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\(^{33}\) “[C]omplexes which are known through natural science are not composed out of sensible things nor out of substances, but are composed out of intentions or concepts of the soul which are common to things of that sort” (William Ockham, *Expositio in Libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Prologus et Libri I-III*, ed. Vladimir Richter and Gerhard Leibold, vol. 4, Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1985), prologus, p. 11).
Europe. The immediate influence is seen in the circle of intellectuals at Oxford that formed around Ockham’s thought in the 1310s and 1320s, so that, as Susan Brower-Toland notes, what we find is a “multi-faceted, “in-house” debate that develops around issues raised by [Ockham’s] discussion.” Many of those intellectuals took issue with Ockham’s position, the lines of those reactions largely mapping many of the lines seen in the theological and philosophical debates in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Robert Holcot (d. 1349), for example, approaches questions about the objects of one’s attitudes from the perspective of divine knowledge. Walter Chatton (d. 1343), in contrast, approach the issue from the question of the objects of religious belief. Finally, William Crathorn (fl. 1330s) and Adam Wodeham (d. 1358), Ockham’s secretary, engage the issue from the perspective of scientific knowledge. Moreover, just as the angles of approach differ among those intellectuals, so too do their responses to Ockham’s account. Holcot, for example, agrees with Ockham that linguistic entities serve as the objects of one’s attitudes. Both Ockham and Holcot, then, are complexum theorists. But he argues that the objects of one’s attitudes are not necessarily mental sentences but rather sentences in natural language. Chatton, in contrast, is a res theorist; he argues that it is not linguistic entities but rather things – substances and accidents – that are the objects of one’s attitudes. Finally, Wodeham (and maybe Crathorn as well) argues that the object of one’s attitudes is neither a linguistic entity nor a thing, but something sui generis.

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34 Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 19.

35 On Chatton’s reist account, see Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, 210–2. See also Dominik Perler, “Late Medieval Ontologies of Facts,” The Monist 77 (1994): 149.
fact, in contrast to the others, Wodeham connects the discussion of the objects of one’s attitudes to a positive proposal about signification, arguing that those *sui generis* entities are in fact the *significata* of sentences in natural and mental language.

At least by the 1330s, Ockham’s metaphysical and semantic program more generally had spread to the continent, with the discussion having been especially fervent at the University of Paris. John Buridan (d. 1360), for example, adopts the nominalist semantics that Ockham develops, and in many ways improves on it. Along with that philosophical system, however, many of the larger debates from which it developed spread to Europe as well – including interest in the nature and function of propositions. And unlike at Oxford, where the question of the signification of sentences in natural language received a negative reply (Wodeham excepted), debates about the signification of sentences in natural language were a key part of the discussion at Paris and elsewhere. In fact, it seems that it was Wodeham himself who indirectly gave rise to that interest, since Wodeham’s views clearly influenced the thought of Parisian thinker Gregory of Rimini (d. 1358), who argued that sentences in natural language signified a *sui generis* object which, following Wodeham, he calls a *complexe significabile*, that is, a certain object signified by a statement taken as a whole.37 Rimini’s views, in turn, were the focus on heated debate at Paris and elsewhere.38


37 On the relation of Wodeham and Rimini, and Wodeham’s influence at Paris more generally, see Jack Zupko, “How It Played in the Rue de Fouarre: Reception of Adam Wodeham’s Theory of the Complexe
3. The Scope of the Project

As I trust my brief historical sketch illustrates, reflection on issues having to do with the proposition is both serious and entrenched in the medieval period, both before and after Burley. Burley’s particular account of the proposition represents, then, but one contribution to a long and boisterous philosophical conversation. However, that contribution seems to me to be especially sophisticated and original (perhaps, in some ways, too original), one which ties together in a systematic fashion concerns that originate from different philosophical domains: semantic, cognitive and alethic. In this section, then, I will briefly recount the contents of my dissertation, with the intention of highlighting the ways in which Burley’s account of the proposition is both motivated by and serves as a response to various philosophical concerns.

The dissertation contains two parts, the second larger than the first. The first part of the dissertation (ch. 2) focuses on the ways in which Burley’s project has been portrayed in the secondary literature. The immediate goal of the first part of the dissertation is to evaluate those interpretations (or at least the most developed) relative to both exegetical and philosophical constraints, that is, to constraints of textual fit and philosophical coherence and plausibility. The broader goal of the first half, however, is to argue that most of the accounts in the secondary literature are motivated by incorrect


background assumptions about Burley’s philosophical commitments and goals, and in particular about his general semantic and cognitive commitments. Consequently, they fail to correctly grasp Burley’s central project: to provide a coherent and attractive account of the proposition, meant both to address concerns about meaning and truth, and to cohere with his more general semantic and cognitive commitments. The second half of the dissertation (chs. 3-5) develops that account along three lines: the metaphysics of the proposition, the truth-conditionality of the proposition, and the nature of the truth-conditions that the proposition determines. By developing that account along those lines, I hope to show how Burley’s account meets the three desiderata for the proposition that I set out earlier in this introduction, namely, that propositions are the semantic contents of sentences in natural and mental language, that they are the “objects” of propositional attitudes, and that they are the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Moreover, I argue that that account does so in a way that is motivated and philosophically compelling.

**Part I.** The interpretation of Burley’s project that I defend breaks with much of the prevailing scholarship at a fairly fundamental level. Before I articulate my own interpretation, therefore, I conduct a detailed analysis in chapter 2 of the main approaches to the relevant texts that one finds in the literature. Given how small the community of Burley scholars is, the number and variety of interpretations that one finds in the literature is surprising. However, despite their differences with each other, I believe the various interpretations one finds in the literature can be divided into two broad camps. Scholars of the first camp – which comprises most of the community of Burley scholars – believe that Burley’s central concern is the metaphysics of states of affairs (a concern expressed, many argue, in Burley’s phrase ‘propositio in re’), which these scholars take
to be the signicates of sentences in natural and mental language. This sort of approach faces a number of serious difficulties, however. In particular, the semantic account they favor seems unable to explain the meaning of false sentences. If the meaning of an expression is the thing which it signifies, but if false sentences do not signify any thing (their falsity consisting precisely in the fact that there is no state of affairs in the world to which they correspond), then it seems that false sentences are not meaningful.

Some scholars are fully aware of this difficulty. Alessandro Conti, for example, argues that it is precisely this difficulty which leads Burley to develop a more complex semantic account at the end of his career. On this interpretation, in the second half of his career, Burley distinguishes between two sorts of concepts – one which exists subjectively in the soul, the other objectively – reflecting the distinction between vehicle and content that Scotus had introduced. That distinction allows Burley to develop a semantic account where the semantic divisions are not threefold but rather fourfold: utterance, subjective concept, objective concept, thing. It also allows Burley to account for the meaning of false sentences in natural language, because it allows Burley to distinguish between the sense, or meaning, of an expression and its referent. False sentences signify certain mental sentences that exist objectively in the mind (and so are meaningful) but those sentences fail to correspond to any fact in the world (and so are false).

The interpretation that Conti favors is an especially exciting and provocative attempt to interpret the development of Burley’s account of the semantics of sentential expressions as a response to concerns about the semantic contents of false sentences.

39 Conti, “Walter Burley.”
However, that kind of interpretation founders at a more fundamental level. That interpretation requires a particular understanding of Burley’s more general account of signification, according to which expressions in natural and mental language signify things in only an indirect manner.  

On this account, expressions in natural language only signify things by signifying objects which have merely objective existence in the mind, which objects (in some cases, at least) signify things. But Burley, in no uncertain terms, rejects accounts of that sort at every stage of his career. In contrast to those sorts of accounts, Burley argues that expressions in natural language signify things primarily (primo) and directly (directe). Expressions in natural language might well have the significata that they do on account of a more fundamental relationship that they have to mental representations, but what an expression establishes in the understanding – that is, what it makes one think about, and so means – is the thing that it signifies. Even if, then, Burley were committed to a sort of merely objective mental entity in the second half of his career, that would not seem to resolve puzzles about the meaning of false sentences in natural language, because, on the interpretation that Conti and others favor, those sentences would still fail to have anything as their contents, there being nothing for false sentences to signify.

In contrast, a minority of Burley scholars argue that Burley’s central concern is not so much the metaphysics of states of affairs as it is what we might call propositional content. However, among these scholars, that is some debate about the nature of that content. Laurent Cesalli argues that what sentences in natural and mental language signify are certain sorts of complex, truth-evaluable entities which exist merely

40 It also fails on additional exegetical grounds. See ch. 2, §2.1.
objectively in the mind, and which are composed out of entities which exist merely objectively in the mind. As to why Burley says that the mind combines things (res) with one another, Cesalli argues that “thing” in this context is meant to emphasize Burley’s “constant theoretical intuition: the objective foundation of logical truth in extramental reality.” 41 However, Cesalli’s account faces some of the same challenges as Conti’s. In particular, it requires that expressions in natural and mental language signify things outside the mind in only an indirect manner, by signifying entities which exist merely objectively in the mind, which entities Cesalli argues are “the presence in the mind of extramental objects (this substance, that accident) as cognitive and objective contents.” 42

In contrast to Cesalli’s interpretation, Elizabeth Karger argues that Burley’s claim that the mind can predicate one thing of another represents a coherent account of what (drawing from Burley’s early works) she calls a mental sentence (propositio in mente), according to which the mind fashions propositional contents out of extramental things. 43 Karger’s approach is refreshingly simple and straightforward: take Burley at his word when he says that the mind can predicate one thing of another, and attempt to construct an account from what he says without any negative starting assumptions about its philosophical plausibility. What results is an exciting description of the metaphysical and semantic features of the proposition. For example, Karger notes that mental sentences can be composed of extramental things, which are put together by the mind when the mind asserts their identity or non-identity; indeed, for the mind to assert the identity or non-

41 Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 123.

42 Ibid., 131.

43 See Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 194–6.
identity of two things is, on Burley’s view, just to combine those things with one another, in an affirmative or negative fashion. Moreover, Karger argues that, at least in the later works and likely in the earlier works as well, those extramental things which compose a mental sentence, insofar as they compose a proposition, have a certain semantic property: supposition, in virtue of which even general mental sentences can be about particular substances in the world. Consequently, a mental sentence is something which has both syntactic and semantic properties.

I believe that Karger is on to something here. When appropriate philosophical attention is brought to bear upon it, Burley’s repeated claim that the mind can predicate one thing of another proves to be at least tractable. But Karger’s approach is at best a first step. What she does not do is situate that theory within Burley’s larger philosophical project, explaining the commitments that Burley has which motivate an account of that sort, or how that account fits with his semantic, cognitive and alethic theories generally. My dissertation, then, picks up where Karger’s article leaves off. My goal in the second part of the dissertation is to explain why Burley would possibly defend that account of the proposition, and thereby explain how that account fits within the theories of meaning, cognition and truth to which Burley is committed. The result, I argue, is a sophisticated and philosophically exciting account of the proposition.

Part II. The second part of the dissertation is divided into three distinct but related projects. First, I examine (ch. 3) Burley’s account of the nature of the proposition, and its metaphysics. I argue that three key commitments – referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism – motivate Burley’s claim that a proposition is composed of things by the mind’s predicating one of the other. Referentialism is the thesis that the semantic content
of a categorematic expression in natural language is the thing to which that expression refers. For Burley, this commitment is cashed out in terms of the notion of signification. According to Burley, categorematic expressions in natural language primarily (primo) and directly (directe) signify things outside of the mind (res extra animam). That commitment to referentialism is motivated in part by a more fundamental cognitive thesis, about the intentional contents of cognitive acts. According to that cognitive thesis, the immediate objects of mental acts are things, rather than any sort of objects internal to the mind.

Burley combines his commitment to referentialism with a commitment to compositionality: the thesis that the semantic content of a complex linguistic expression is built up from the semantic contents of the categorematic expressions which compose it relative to the syntax of that expression. ‘Socrates is pale’, for example, signifies something composed of what ‘Socrates’ signifies and ‘pale’ signifies. Referentialism and compositionality together constitute an exciting and at present prominent account of semantic content, according to which the semantic content of a complex expression is composed of things – objects, properties, etc. – and whose complexity mirrors the syntactic complexity of that complex expression itself. On this account, for example, ‘Socrates is a human’ signifies a complex composed of Socrates and the property of humanity arranged in some particular way.

While they motivate an exciting account of semantic content, referentialism and compositionality alone do not seem to be able to explain a key feature of the semantic contents of statements: their representationality, or truth-conditionality. That is, while referentialism and compositionality might determine what sorts of things make up the
semantic content of a complex expression, and even how those things are arranged relative to one another, they do not seem to be able to explain why certain sorts of complex structures which are composed of things – namely, propositions – have truth-conditions but other structures containing things do not. Burley’s commitment to a third thesis, intellectualism, addresses this issue. Intellectualism is the thesis that representing the world’s being a certain way – that is, representing that so-and-so is the case – is fundamentally something that the mind does. In other words, that sort of representation is explained fundamentally in terms of a certain sort of activity of the mind. According to Burley, that activity is predicative; the mind represents that Socrates is a human, for example, when predicating humanity of Socrates, so that Socrates and the property of humanity are structured in some truth-conditional way.

Motivated by his commitment to referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism, then, Burley argues that a proposition is a structured entity composed of things arranged in a truth-conditional way by the mind. However, Burley’s account of the metaphysics of that entity evolves over the course of his career. In the first half of his career, Burley argues that the proposition just is the mental act of predicating one thing of another. That account has some virtues: it explains the unity of the proposition by appeal to the mind’s predicative act itself, whose unity is guaranteed, on the one hand, by its status as an accident in the category of action, and, on the other, by its representational character. Because propositions are composed of things, however, Burley is forced to argue that the mind’s complex acts contain as parts things which exist wholly outside of the mind. The central disadvantage to that account, then, is mereological: the claim that wholes can be spatially disjoint from their parts.
Perhaps partly because of problems about mereology, Burley develops a different account of the metaphysics of the proposition later in his career. According to that account, propositions are analogous to hylomorphic (or “matter-form”) compounds. The “terms” of the proposition – that is, the things which compose it – are its matter, while the mental act of predication is now the “form” of the proposition, and so merely a proper part of the proposition rather than identical to it. That account avoids the sort of mereological worries that plagued the early account. However, it also entails that questions of unity can’t be resolved by appeal to representationality, since that account requires some further explanation of what unifies the mental act of predication to the things which it predicates. Burley addresses questions of unity by appeal to the Augustinian notion of intentio, and in the process makes an interesting suggestion about the nature of thought and its relationship to the mind’s volitional activity.

After I complete my examination of the metaphysics of the proposition, I turn (ch. 4) to issues of the proposition’s representational, or truth-conditional, character. Burley argues that the mind’s predicating one thing of another is the exercise of a certain representational activity of the mind. I explore whether Burley provides any explanation of the representational character of that activity. I argue that, according to Burley, the ability of the mind to represent is explained in terms of his commitment to a mental language, and a language of thought more generally. For Burley, the semantic contents of expressions in natural language is explained by a more fundamental relation that those expressions have to expressions in a mental language. That mental language has, first, a vocabulary, populated by concepts. That vocabulary is generated in two stages. In the first stage, concepts are generated via one’s causal interaction with the world. Then, in a
second stage, these basic concepts can then be combined to form more complex concepts. Once the mind has a suitably large vocabulary, the mind can then make use of those concepts, in two ways. First, the mind can engage in a kind of minimal use, which use just is the act of thinking about what that concept represents. Burley calls such use simple mental activity. Second, and far more interesting, the mind can make predicative use of its concepts, predicating one of the other. Such use just is, for Burley, the mind’s assertion that what one of those concepts represents is identical to (or different from) what the other concept represents – which is nothing except the mind’s predicating one thing of another. Consequently, the mind’s predicating one thing of another is the very same act as the mind’s predicating one concept of another, where which concepts it uses explains the predicative use that it makes of things. And so the mind’s “rational” activity of predicating one thing of another is explained by its real activity of predicating one concept of another to produce a mental sentence.

In addition to providing an explanation of the representational character of the mind’s predicating one thing of another, Burley’s commitment to mental language and the language of thought hypothesis more generally allows Burley to reconcile his account of the proposition (and the related account of thinking that it entails) with a certain position he adopts in the philosophy of science. For Burley, philosophy of science is principally a matter of demonstrative science, as developed by Aristotle in his *Posterior Analytics*. Scientific knowledge, on this view, is arrived at syllogistically, so that one comes to recognize the relationship of an attribute in a subject via a middle term. A central debate in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century about demonstrative science concerned the nature of what medieval philosophers calls a *demonstratio potissima*, or a
demonstration of the highest sort: whether the middle term in a demonstration of that sort was the definition of the subject, or of the predicate. A central criticism, developed by Giles of Rome in the late thirteenth century, of the view that the middle term in a *demonstratio potissima* was the definition of a subject argues that, if the middle term were the definition of the subject, then the conclusion of that demonstration would not be different from its major premise. For a name and a definition of the subject refer to the very same thing. It is a criticism that concerns, broadly speaking, the substitutability of co-referring terms in opaque contexts, such as knowledge contexts. Since, for example, ‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ (the name and definition of some subject, respectively) refer to the same thing – on Burley’s account, the property of humanity – it seems that ‘A human is capable of laughter’ and ‘A rational animal is capable of laughter’ have the same content. But if demonstrative science is a matter of knowledge production, and assuming that one’s attitudes are individuated by their contents, then it seems that knowledge that a human is capable of laughter is no different than knowledge that a rational animal is capable of laughter.

Burley rejects Giles’ argument because he rejects the assumption that one’s attitudes are individuated merely by their contents. Moreover, Burley’s argument for a language of thought, and the relationship of that language to cognitive activity, provides him with a justification for that rejection. Because complex mental activity involves the use not just of things but also of concepts that represent those things, complex mental acts, which constitute one’s attitudes, are individuated not just by the things towards which they are directed by also by the concepts upon which they operate. The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, is individuated not just by Socrates and humanity, but
also by the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN, whose predication accounts for the mind’s predicking humanity of Socrates. Since mental acts are individuated not just by things but also by concepts, Burley is able to defend an account of attitudes that is fine-grained enough to meet Giles’ challenge.

For a proposition to be representational, or truth-conditional, is nothing other than for it to have, or determine, truth-conditions. The last project (ch. 5) of the second part of my dissertation involves, then, an examination of the truth-conditions that a proposition determines. Burley is committed generally to a correspondence account of truth, and more specifically takes correspondence to be an asymmetric relation he calls adequation. Propositions are true, on this account, so long as they are adequated to features of reality, which I label facts. However, Burley’s analysis of correspondence, and his concomitant account of facts, evolves significantly over the course of his career, largely in response to criticisms William Ockham raises for Burley’s commitment to extra-mental universals, or what I call properties. In the first half of his career, Burley defends what I call a near-identity account of correspondence, wherein true propositions and the facts which make them true share the same “material” parts – the same things which compose a true proposition also compose the fact which makes it true – but differ in their structure, or “formal” parts. Propositions are structured by a mental act of predication, an act which asserts that one thing is identical to (or different from) another, whereas facts are structured by the very identity (or diversity) relations represented by true mental acts of predication. The challenge for Burley’s early account is thus mainly metaphysical: to explain how the things which are components of propositions that we intuit to be true can be identical (or diverse) in fact, even when it might seem, prima facie, that they are not.
For example, Burley’s account requires that the truth of the proposition that Socrates is a human consists in its correspondence to the fact of Socrates’ being identical to humanity, even though Socrates and humanity differ in important ways – for example, one is concrete, and the other is abstract. Burley, unfortunately, never provides a detailed analysis of the metaphysics of facts, but I construct an analysis which I argue fits with Burley’s early ontology and metaphysics of identity.

Roughly midway through Burley’s career, however, Ockham offers a number of criticisms of moderate realism (of which Burley’s early metaphysics was one variety), criticisms which also touch on the account of identity that Burley defends in the first half of his career. Two consequences follow from those criticisms. First, Burley abandons his early, metaphysically complex account of identity in favor of a simpler account of identity promoted by Ockham. Second, and in partial consequence of the first, Burley develops what has come to be called “exaggerated” realism, where properties and the concrete particulars that possess them are really distinct from one another. That account brings with it a number of fascinating metaphysical and epistemic consequences. For the purposes of Burley’s account of correspondence, however, the immediate effect is that the account of facts which seems to be required by his early account of correspondence is untenable, since properties such as humanity can never be identical to concrete particulars such as Socrates. And, because that account of facts is untenable, the near-identity account of correspondence is as well.

As we should expect, then, the second half of Burley’s career is marked by a very different account of correspondence, on the one hand, and the metaphysics of facts, on the other. With respect to correspondence, Burley argues that the truth of a proposition
consists, not in the identity (or diversity) of its terms, but rather the identity (or diversity) of the things for which those terms supposit. The theory of supposition began to be formalized in the early thirteenth century. However, significant advancements were made in the fourteenth century, advancements to which Burley was a primary contributor. An original intent of the theory of supposition was to provide medieval philosophers a way to codify and explain how sentential context allows one to use a term to talk about, or refer to, different things, and in what way we can refer to those things. For example, it allowed medieval philosophers to explain how general statements (e.g., ‘A human is an animal’) could be about particular humans and particular animals. One central advancement not for the theory so much as for its application comes in the late 1310s, when Ockham argues that supposition is a property not just of expressions in natural language but of expressions in mental language as well, since supposition is supposed to be a property of subject and predicate terms generally.

Perhaps partly on account of Ockham’s extension of supposition theory to expressions in mental language, Burley suggests in his last commentary on the *Categories* that the things which are components in a proposition have supposition as well, since they (like the terms in natural and mental language) are terms in a statement (*propositio*). That claim is extremely radical, because it requires that supposition can be a property not just of signs but of things as well. But it is also ingenious, since it coheres

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44 Note that this is a different notion of reference than the one I employ when I talk about Burley’s commitment to referentialism, according to which signification is a reference relation. Both are kinds of reference, on my account, because both involve talking about things. In fact, for linguistic items (but only for linguistic items), reference *qua* signification is required for reference *qua* supposition, since (in cases of formal supposition at least) a term has the supposition that it does in virtue of having the signification that it does.
with Burley’s more general thesis that his account of the proposition is an account of a
certain sort of semantic entity, and it provides him with a way to resolve questions of
 correspondence that respects his general metaphysical commitments. In particular, Burley
argues that the truth of a proposition is a matter of correspondence to the identity (or
 diversity) of the things for which its terms supposit. For example, the proposition that
Socrates is a human is composed of Socrates and the property of humanity – two really
distinct things. But it asserts the identity not of those things, but of the things for which
they supposit. Its truth, then, consists in the identity of what Socrates supposits for to
something for which the property of humanity supposits. Socrates supposits for Socrates.
The property of humanity supposits for each and every particular human, including
Socrates himself. Even on the account of identity Burley favors in the second half of his
career, however, Socrates is identical to Socrates. And so the proposition that Socrates is
a human is true, just as we might expect.

4. Issues of Terminology

The introduction to my dissertation is nearly complete. But before I turn to the
meat and potatoes of the project itself, I want to touch on issues of terminology: both my
own, and Burley’s.

4.1. Central Terminology in this Dissertation

With respect to my own terminology, two expressions deserve special attention.
First, I use the English expression ‘proposition’ extensively in this dissertation. By
‘proposition’, I typically mean something which is (a) the primary bearer of truth value,
(b) the object of one’s propositional attitudes, and (c) the semantic content of statements
in natural and mental language. Indeed, a central aim of my dissertation is to justify the claim that Burley has an account of the proposition in that sense. However, the use of ‘proposition’ is complicated by the fact that its Latin cognate ‘propositio’ is used extensively in medieval semantic discussions, and so we will confront that expression a great deal in this dissertation. Moreover, by ‘propositio’, medieval philosophers mean something slightly different than what I do by ‘proposition’. By ‘propositio’, medieval philosophers (typically) mean a token statement. Token statements are propositiones because they state (proponere) something. Token statements can be written, spoken, mental or (in the case of Burley) in re. Indeed, what I call a proposition in this dissertation is, according to Burley, a type of propositio. It is a propositio, according to Burley, precisely because, like all propositiones, it is a complex, syntactically well-formed object that states or (as Burley says) asserts something. Unlike other sorts of propositiones, however, which can state something only via signs, a proposition states what it does using the very things that it is about. In other words, unlike other sorts of propositiones, a proposition does not make or express a claim but rather just is that claim. I argue that it is precisely this fact that accounts for the proposition’s being the primary bearer of truth value, the object of one’s attitudes, and the contents of statements in natural or mental language. In any case, I will continue to use ‘proposition’ throughout this dissertation in the way I have been using it so far.

I recognize that this practice has disadvantages. The main disadvantage is that this dissertation is a dissertation in medieval philosophy, and, as such, detailed discussions of

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In fact, the use of ‘proposition’ in this way was standard until the early 20th century. On this point, see Brower-Toland, “Late-Medieval Theories of Propositions,” 35, n. 49.
the principal texts might be best served by staying as close to the Latin as one can.

However, that disadvantage seems to me outweighed by the central aim of this dissertation: to justify the claim that the mind’s predicating one thing of another is for Burley (a) the primary bearer of truth and falsity, (b) the object of one’s propositional attitudes, and (c) the semantic content of statements in natural and mental language. We need an expression to label that sort of object, and given contemporary usage, ‘proposition’ seems best.

Second, I also use the English expression ‘concept’ a fair amount in this dissertation. Like ‘proposition’, however, ‘concept’ has a cognate in Latin: ‘conceptus’. And, unlike ‘proposition’, whose Latin cognate ‘propositio’ is at least well-behaved in the primary literature, ‘conceptus’ is not. Indeed, as I will discuss shortly, ‘conceptus’ is not well-behaved even with Burley’s own corpus. So I want to stipulate now how I will use ‘concept’ in this dissertation. By ‘concept’, I mean a subjective mental representation of a thing (res). Concepts, on this use, are mental vehicles of content – real, subjective, representational features of the mind.

4.2. Burley’s Terminology

Beyond the way in which I intend to use certain key expressions, I need to say a word about how Burley employs his own vocabulary, for two reasons. First, my project draws from texts that cover the whole of Burley’s career, and, during that career, Burley will use key expressions to mean radically different things in different works. By cataloguing the various uses he makes of his semantic, cognitive and metaphysical vocabularies, we will be able to make better sense of larger philosophical themes and

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46 On Burley’s view, mental representations are qualities of the mind.
commitments in Burley’s corpus, and to trace their evolution over the course of his career. Second, I believe that there has been a significant failure in the secondary literature to recognize that Burley’s use of his vocabulary does not remain consistent over the course of his career, and that failure of recognition has either encouraged or reinforced incorrect assumptions about Burley’s semantic and cognitive projects and their evolution.

4.2.1. ‘Proposito’

Perhaps the most important set of expressions to consider at various expressions in Burley’s corpus involving ‘propositio’: ‘propositio in prolatione’, ‘propositio in mente’, ‘propositio subiective in intellectu’, ‘propositio obiective in intellectu’ and ‘propositio in re’. Many Burley scholars argue that the expression ‘propositio in re’ in particular tracks a fundamental notion in Burley’s semantics and cognitive psychology. Much of the disagreement in the secondary literature is thus framed in part in terms of whether the notion that ‘propositio in re’ expresses evolves over the course of Burley’s career, or whether it remains consistent. Driving that debate is the fact that Burley uses ‘propositio in re’ in both an early work (Comm.Perih) and a late work (Art.Vet). A full analysis of the secondary literature, including the ways in which various expressions have been used and understood, must wait until the next chapter. But what I at least suggest here is that some of these expressions express very different notions in the early and late works. So in this section I simply take each expression in turn, focusing on the use of these expressions (if any) in four key works: Quaes.Perih, Comm.Perih, Quaes.Post, and Art.Vet (which includes both the Exp.Praed and Exp.Perih).
Propositio in prolatione. This expression appears in the Quaes.Perih, Comm.Perih, and Art.Vet. It refers primarily to spoken sentences, but it often appears to be used by Burley to refer to sentences in natural language generally. Burley also uses ‘propositio in scripto’ to refer to written sentences in particular (though his mention of sentences of that sort is perfunctory; he quickly narrows his discussions to spoken language), and he uses ‘propositio in voce’ to refer to spoken sentences.

Propositio in mente. That expression appears in three works: Quaes.Perih, Comm.Perih and Art.Vet. It is used in the same manner in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih. In those works, it denotes an entity composed of things (res) and structured by a mental act of predication. In other words, in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih, it refers to a proposition. Things are very different in the Art.Vet. In the Exp.Praed, in commenting on chapter 12 of the Categories, Burley argues that propositiones in mente are of two kinds: one kind which “has subjective being in the mind, and a propositio of this sort is composed out of concept,” another kind which has objective being in the intellect, and a propositio of this sort is composed only by the consideration of the intellect and from parts having only objective being in the intellect, whether they are past utterances, or future utterances, and so on concerning the rest.

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47 Either Burley uses the expression to refer to sentences in natural language generally, or he simply ignores written language as an important object of study. There is historical reasons to think the latter is the case.

48 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), Exp.Praed, g7rb: “Propositio in mente est duplex, quia quaedam habet esse subjective in mente, et talis propositio componitur ex conceptibus, et quaedam est propositio habens esse objective in intellectu, et huiusmodi propositio componitur solum secundum considerationem intellectus, et ex partibus habentibus solum esse objective in intellectu, sive voces praeriterae sive futurae, et sic de aliis.”
Burley mentions *propositiones in mente* briefly in the *Exp.Perih* as well, contrasting them with *propositiones* in natural language and *propositiones* “composed out of things.”49 In the *Art.Vet*, then, Burley uses ‘propositio in mente’ to refer to very different sorts of objects than he does in the earlier works. In the *Art.Vet*, ‘propositio in mente’ does not refer to a proposition. Rather, it refers either to (1) a sentence in a mental language (that which is “composed out of concepts”); Burley mentions this sort of entity in his prologue to the *Exp.Praed* as well, calling it a *propositio in conceptu*. Or it refers to (2) a sentence composed of utterances that have either already been spoken or will be spoken. In fact, slightly earlier in his commentary on chapter 12 of the *Categories*, Burley suggests that a *propositio in mente* of this sort is an utterance-type, that is, “one common thing abstracted by the intellect from that and similar [token spoken] *propositiones.*”50 The purpose of this second variety of *propositio in mente*, I suggest, is to explain the ability of participants in metalinguistic conversational contexts to be talking about the same sentences in natural language – such as in the exercise of *obligatio*, where respondents need to affirm or deny what an opponent has uttered.

*Propositio subiective in intellectu.* This expression appears in both the *Comm.Perih.* and (in a slightly altered form) in the *Exp.Praed*. In the *Comm.Perih*, it tracks the same notion as the expression ‘propositio in mente’ does in that work, namely, the notion of a proposition. In the *Exp.Praed*, in contrast (where the expression is ‘propositio subiective in mente’), it tracks the same notion as the expression ‘propositio

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49 Ibid., *Exp.Perih*, k4rb.

50 Ibid., *Exp.Praed*, g7rb.
in conceptu’ does in the work – namely, a mental sentence in a language of thought. Consequently, it is the first sort of what Burley calls a ‘propositio in mente’ in that work.

*Propositio obiective in intellectu.* This expression is used in both the *Comm.Perih.* and the *Exp.Praed.* In the *Comm.Perih.*, that expression refers to an odd object in Burley’s metaphysics: a thing which is necessarily true, such that it is signified only by true propositions (and, derivatively, true statements in natural and mental language). My own view is that the notion which this expression is meant to track is the product of a confusion on Burley’s part of two different alethic concerns. On the one hand, Burley is motivated by the thought that truth is abstract. But his own account of the proposition, according to which the primary bearers of truth and falsity are concrete products of cognitive activity, cannot accommodate this fact. On the other hand, Burley is committed to a correspondence theory of truth. Burley attempts to address both issues at once, by analyzing correspondence in terms of signification to some entity that is both necessarily true and can exist objectively in several minds simultaneously. But the result of attempting to address both concerns in this way is in a significantly confused semantic theory, one which trades on an ambiguity in the notion of truth and which fits poorly with Burley’s more general semantic commitments. It is no surprise, then, that, while many of the alethic concerns which motivate it are developed in later works as well, the theory itself is entirely absent in those works.

In the *Exp.Praed*, the expression refers to a sentence-type of natural language. On this usage, see the explanation of ‘propositio in mente’ above.

*Propositio in re.* This expression appears in the *Comm.Perih* and the *Art.Vet.* In the *Comm.Perih*, it denotes the same thing that ‘propositio obiective in intellectu’ denotes
in that work, namely, an object that is necessarily true, in virtue of whose signification other statement-structured objects are true. In the Art.Vet, in contrast, it denotes an entity composed of things structured by a mental act of predication – that is, a proposition. Consequently, what Burley refers to as a propositio in re in the Art.Vet is what he refers to as a propositio in mente in the earlier works, and, in the Art.Vet, the expression ‘propositio in mente’ is repurposed primarily for talking about mental language.

Adding further confusion to an already confusing terminological landscape is the Quaes.Post, where Burley appears to adopt a somewhat different vocabulary for talking about the same issues. In that work, Burley distinguishes between a propositio proponens tantum, and a propositio proponens and proposita, and a propositio proposita tantum. The first is made out of expressions (in particular, spoken expressions) in natural language, the second is made out of concepts, and the third is made out of things. I do think there is some reason to worry that both the semantic theory and the metaphysics of the proposition that Burley develops in that work does not precisely cohere with the general trajectory of philosophical development that we find in Burley’s various commentaries on the Categories and the Perihermeneias. But, as a general matter at least, those three notions track the three sorts of predicatively-structured objects in Burley’s account now familiar to us: statements in natural language, statements in mental language, and propositions. In fact, it is in the Quaes.Post (composed around 1307) that we find the first hint that Burley is committed to a mental language, since it is the first work in which he argues that there are statements (propositiones) composed out of concepts.
The vocabulary Burley uses to talk about the semantics and metaphysics of statements, then, is a real mess. It is in part because it a mess, I believe, that we find so little consensus in the secondary literature about some of the most basic features of Burley’s semantics. My own first few years engaging with Burley’s semantic and cognitive works, at least, were hindered rather than helped by his vocabulary. It is also a further reason why I have attempted to avoid framing my dissertation around the vocabulary that Burley himself uses. What I try to do instead in my dissertation is look beyond his vocabulary to the ways – both functional and metaphysical – that Burley describes various semantic and cognitive entities, with the belief that those descriptions prove more fruitful than his vocabulary in revealing a compelling and coherent philosophical narrative.

4.2.2. ‘Conceptus’

Just as the vocabulary Burley uses to talk about statements and their contents is muddled, so too is his vocabulary of the more fundamental features of his cognitive and semantic account. Fortunately, it is less of a muddle, and the development of the ways in which Burley uses that vocabulary at least makes more sense, philosophically. Four terms are central here: ‘species’, ‘similitudo rei’, ‘passio animae’, and ‘conceptus’. As before, I take each in turn.

Species. Burley’s use of ‘species’ remains consistent throughout his career. A species is a mental representation that exists subjectively in the mind. Burley’s expression ‘species’, then, is always synonymous with my expression ‘concept’.

Similitudo rei. Absent in the Quaes.Perih, the expression appears in the Comm.Perih and the Art.Vet. In those works, it refers to a species qua that which
mediates an act of thinking. In other words, it refers to a species in its role as the mental mediator of cognition. Consequently, it is an expression primarily of cognitive psychology.

*Passio animae/passio rei.* This expression appears in the *Quaes.Perih, Comm.Perih,* and *Art.Vet.* In the *Quaes.Perih,* a *passio animae* refers to a thing (*res*) insofar as it is understood by the mind. In other words, ‘*passio animae*’ refers to a thing that exists outside the mind, and connotes that that thing is an object of cognition. In the *Comm.Perih* and the *Art.Vet,* in contrast, ‘*passio animae*’ (and, occasionally, ‘*passio rei*’) refers to a species *qua* that which mediates signification. In other words, in those works, ‘*passio animae*’ refers to a species in its role as the mediator of semantic content.

Because both ‘*similitudo rei*’ and ‘*passio animae*’ refer to the same thing, but connote different roles of that thing, Burley will sometimes gloss one with the other in the *Art.Vet.*

*Conceptus.* This expression does not appear in the *Comm.Perih,* but it does occur in the earlier *Quaes.Perih* and in the later *Quaes.Post* and *Art.Vet.* In the *Quaes.Perih,* ‘*conceptus*’ refers to a product, or *fictum,* of simple mental activity. Burley denies that simple mental activity is productive, and so he denies in the *Quaes.Perih* that there are concepts. In the *Quaes.Post* and *Art.Vet,* however, Burley uses ‘*conceptus*’ to refer to a species, typically in its role as mediator of signification. In those two works, then, Burley freely admits that there are concepts. But this is merely a difference in the use of his vocabulary; the underlying theory remains consistent throughout his career.

By mid-career, all four of those expressions refer to the same kind of thing: a representation that exists subjectively in the mind. In my dissertation, then, I adopt a single expression – ‘*concept*’ – to refer to that kind of thing.
To help the reader make sense of Burley’s vocabulary and its evolution over the course of his career, I have appended a chart to this dissertation (see appendix A) which maps the ways in which Burley uses many of the expressions mentioned in §4.2.1 above.
CHAPTER TWO
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE SCHOLARSHIP

1. INTRODUCTION

In the introductory chapter to this dissertation, I argued that Burley defends a sophisticated and philosophically interesting account of propositional content, according to which a proposition is a complex entity composed of things by a mental act of predication. But this claim is for the most part a novel one in the scholarship. In this chapter, then, I intend to explore that scholarship in a bit more depth, with the goal of situating my project relative to it.

One of the chief difficulties that one has in engaging with the secondary literature on the topic of Burley’s semantic theory is that, for as small as the community of Burley scholars is, there are in that literature a significant number of quite different interpretations of Burley’s semantics generally, and of the semantics of sentences in particular. They are different enough that it can be hard to find a small number of exceptionless categories into which they can be divided. However, I suggest that we divide approaches in the literature roughly, based on their reactions to a seemingly central claim in Burley’s philosophical project: that the mind can combine things with one another by asserting that those things are the same or are not the same. Two broad philosophical reactions emerge to this claim. The dominant reaction in the literature is that this claim represents a theory of obtaining states of affairs (hereafter ‘states of
affairs’). 1 Alessandro Conti, for example, defends an interpretation of this sort, as does Christian Rode. Less prominent is the view that the claim represents a theory of propositional content, that is, a theory of truthbearers rather than truthmakers. 2 Notable defenders of this view in the scholarship are Laurent Cesalli and Elizabeth Karger. 3

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3 Cross-cutting these reactions, however, are two further disputes. First, there is an exegetical dispute, over whether Burley intends for his claim to be taken literally. Conti and Cesalli, for example, argue that (at least in the case of some iteration of the theory) Burley means for his claim to be interpreted non-literally; Rode and Karger, in contrast, argue for a literal interpretation of the claim. Second, there is a philosophical dispute, over whether a literalist reading of Burley’s claim would represent a coherent and plausible theory. Beyond Karger, the only other scholar of Burley who seems to me to take the view that a literalist reading of the claim represents a plausible theory is Martin Lenz. (See Martin Lenz, “Between Things and Propositions: The Realism of Walter Burley and Walter Chatton,” n.d., https://www.academia.edu/3808506/Between_Things_and_Propositions_The_Realism_of_Walter_Burley_and_Walter_Chatton.) Lenz argues that Burley’s account offers a novel and insightful theory about actual states of affairs – that they enjoy a reciprocal dependence with mental activity. However, I must admit that I find Lenz’s position inscrutable. It seems to me to vacillate between a theory of content and a theory of states of affairs. My sense is that, if fully fleshed-out, the theory Lenz attributes to Burley would be deeply flawed, in just the ways that scholars such as Conti, Cesalli and Rode articulate.
While most Burley scholars understand Burley’s central project to be one of the metaphysics of states of affairs, substantial disagreement remains among these scholars over that metaphysics and its place within Burley’s wider semantic and cognitive theory. That disagreement typically centers around whether Burley’s understands states of affairs to in some way depend on mental activity. Alessandro Conti, for example, argues that Burley’s account of the metaphysics of states of affairs can be divided into two periods – an early and a late – and that that account evolves from one according to which states of affairs depend on the mind’s combining things in the world with one another, to one according to which states of affairs are wholly independent of mental activity. In contrast, Christian Rode argues that the role of mental activity in composing states of affairs, far from something that is dropped in the later account, is rather a development in the late account.

Though dominant, I argue that a state-of-affairs style interpretation of Burley’s project face a number of problems. At its most basic, it finds little textual support. It is at odds, for example, with Burley’s repeated claims that the products of the mind’s combining things with one another are bearers of falsity as well as truth. Moreover, it results in a theory that fits ill with Burley’s more general semantic and cognitive commitments.

In contrast to a states-of-affairs interpretation of the project, a few scholars of Burley have understood the theory to be centrally concerned with the nature of propositional content. But here too there is a great deal of disagreement. The central issue of disagreement is how the notion of a thing (res) in Burley’s theory ought to be understood. Some scholars – for example, Laurent Cesalli – argue that, appearances
aside, what the mind actually combines on Burley’s theory are not things which exist extramentally; rather they are things which only exist objectively in the mind, as the “objective presence” of particular things outside the mind within it. However, this kind of interpretation of the project faces a number of significant objections. Most significant of all, perhaps, is that the notion of objective being that is central to Cesalli’s interpretation finds little support in the texts themselves, and is at odds with Burley’s more general theories of meaning and cognition.

Cesalli’s interpretation is at least partly motivated by a worry that little sense can be made of Burley’s claim, if that claim requires that what the mind combines can exist extramentally. But at least one scholar – Elizabeth Karger – argues that we should pursue just the sort of interpretation that Cesalli finds philosophically problematic. And what results from that pursuit, she claims, is an exciting description of the metaphysical and semantic features of “the ultimate significate” of sentences in natural and mental language – something that is signified but does not itself signify anything further. For example, Karger notes that mental sentences can be composed of extramental things, and that those things are arranged predicatively, that is as subject and predicate terms relative to one another. Moreover, Karger argues that mental sentences are bearers of truth and falsity, and that an analysis of their alethic values comes by way of the supposition of the their terms, which are extramental things. Consequently, a mental sentence is something which has both syntactic and semantic properties.

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4 It is important to distinguish mental language – which involves mental sentences composed of concepts – from Karger’s expression ‘mental sentence’, which is composed of the (usually extramental) things signified by those concepts.
In many ways, this dissertation picks up where Karger’s brief article leaves off. Karger offers us just a sketch of the metaphysics of the mental sentence. But that metaphysics needs to be fleshed out in various ways: with respect to what (if any) more general semantic and cognitive commitments motivate it, with respect to its evolution (if any) over the course of Burley’s career, and so on. Moreover, Karger does not try (or, at least, does not try very hard) to situate that theory within Burley’s larger philosophical project, explaining how that account fits with his semantic, cognitive and alethic theories generally. In other words, Karger does not do much more than hint at what mental sentences are for. By filling out the metaphysical and functional picture of what Karger calls a mental sentence, I argue that we find a sophisticated account of the proposition, one which is central to Burley’s exciting theories of meaning and cognition.

In this chapter, I will proceed in three stages. First, I will examine two interpretations – those of Alessandro Conti and Christian Rode – which exemplify the view that Burley’s central concern in the relevant texts is an account of the metaphysics of states of affairs. While sophisticated, both face serious exegetical challenges. I will articulate those challenges, and provide diagnoses for why Conti and Rode, respectively, would make the sort of errors in exegesis that they do. Second, I will examine Laurent Cesalli’s interpretation, according to which Burley’s theory is a theory of propositional content. While the theory is broadly correct – Burley’s theory is a theory of propositional content – I argue that the specifics of Cesalli’s interpretation faces some serious challenges. Finally, I will turn to Elizabeth Karger’s analysis of that claim, an analysis according to which the mind can make “mental sentences” out of things, including things which exist outside the mind. Far from problematic, her analysis suggests that that claim
represents Burley’s commitment to a compelling theory of propositional content, and I argue that it provides a promising starting-point for a fuller investigation of that theory.

2. The Real Proposition as a State of Affairs

Every scholar of Burley’s semantic theory faces a difficult puzzle: what does Burley mean when he says that the mind can combine things outside the mind (res extra animam) with one another. Almost all Burley scholars, it seems to me, find this claim baffling. But, for the most part, scholars have come to see that claim as representative (some, perhaps, as somewhat misrepresentative) of a central concern about the nature and function of states of affairs. I examine two different versions of that kind of interpretation in this section.

2.1. Alessandro Conti

One of the more sophisticated and comprehensive analyses of Burley’s semantic and cognitive theories available has been developed by Alessandro Conti. Conti’s argument about the development of Burley’s views on meaning and cognition is complex, and has been developed over a number of decades. Among other things, Conti argues that, in Burley’s account, there is in general a symmetry between the relations of signification that obtain at the sub-sentential and sentential levels, but that Burley’s account of the signification evolves over the course of his career to accommodate certain concerns about meaning and truth.
According to Conti, throughout his career, Burley defends what Conti calls “real propositions,” which are signified by true sentences in natural and mental language. However, Conti argues that one finds two distinct accounts of the real proposition in Burley’s corpus, the latter of which is meant to address problems in the former. In the first half of his career, according to Conti, Burley admits of four kinds of propositiones: written, spoken, mental and real. Real propositions, Conti tells us, “are the significata of true sentences [...]. Real propositions do not properly exist in the extramental world, although they exist in our minds as intentional objects.” Conti here is articulating an account of the propositio in re (from which Conti derives his expression ‘real proposition’) that Burley develops and defends in the Comm.Perih. In that work, Burley writes that

we can say that some certain thing is a propositio in re [...] by calling that propositio which has only objective being in the intellect a propositio in re [...]. That which has only objective being in the intellect is not able to not be, nor not to be true.

Real propositions, then, (1) have merely objective existence in the mind, (2) cannot fail to exist, and (3) cannot fail to be true. Moreover, Burley argues that written, spoken and mental sentences are true because they signify real propositions. “Hence I say that truth

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5 See Conti, “Walter Burley.” Conti suggests that Burley is committed to an account of mental language throughout his career. But that commitment, I argue, is only explicit in the Quaes.Post, likely written around 1305. So there may have been a brief period early in his career where Burley was not committed to a theory of mental language.

6 See Ibid.

which is subjectively in the intellect is nothing except a certain adequation of the intellect
to a true *propositio* which has only objective being in the intellect." Conti argues from
this that real propositions are at least truthmakers in Burley’s early semantics.

In the first half of his career, Burley limits the use of the expression ‘*propositio in
re*’ to the *Comm.Perih*. But Conti argues that the notion which that expression picks out
is central to a number of the early logical works – in particular, to the earlier
*Quaes.Perih*. To defend that claim, Conti needs to flesh out the metaphysics of the real
proposition a bit more. In particular, Conti argues that

> [r]eal propositions are complex entities formed by the things to which [the terms
> of sentences] refer, together with an identity relation (if the proposition is
> positive) or a non-identity relation (if the proposition is negative). The things exist
> in the extramental world, but the identity relation is produced by our minds and
> exists only in them. This identity relation is a sort of intellectual composition by
> which we understand the thing (*res*) signified by the subject term and the thing
> signified by the predicate term of a proposition belong to the same substance(s).

On Conti’s reading, then, real propositions have an “indeterminate ontological status,
since they exist partly inside the mind, partly outside, and are yet entirely independent of
it.” Real propositions exist partly inside of the mind on account of the fact that the
identity relations that constitute them are products of cognitive activity, they exist outside
of the mind on account of fact that the things which those relations relate are extramental,
and they are still independent of the mind on account of the fact that they are truthmakers
for, among other things, complex mental acts.

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8 Ibid., para. 1.27, pp. 61–2.

9 Conti, “Walter Burley.”

10 Ibid.
What sort of textual evidence does Conti provide for this fuller description of the
metaphysics of the real proposition? While not entirely clear, Conti seems to be relying in
part on Burley’s comments in the prologue of the *Comm.Perih*, where he argues that “a
sentence in the mind (oratio in mente) is composed out of things which the intellect
combines with one another or divides from one another, whether those are utterances or
things signified through utterances.” It seems, then, that Conti takes what Burley calls a
sentence in the mind in the prologue of the *Comm.Perih* to be what Burley calls a
*propositio in re* later in that work. At least this seems to me to be the only way Conti
could justify the sorts of metaphysical features he attributes to the real proposition. The
expression ‘sentence in the mind’ (as well as the notion that expression is meant to pick
out) is present not just in the *Comm.Perih*, however, but in the *Quaes.Perih* as well. In
that work, Burley argues that “a sentence in the mind (enunciatio in mente) is composed
out of those which the intellect thinks to be the same, whether they are utterances or
things,” and that a sentence in the mind “is composed out of things which the intellect
asserts to be the same or [to be] diverse.” On Conti’s view, then, one finds a consistent
theory running throughout the earlier logical commentaries, according to which
truthmakers are hybrid entities, composed of extramental things and a mental act by
which they are combined.

Conti argues that two sorts of problems plague the early theory of the real
proposition. First, there is the “indeterminate ontological status” of the real proposition.

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11 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.02, p. 45. He might also be relying on the *Quaes.Post*. See §3, pp. 95–100.

The real proposition is “a state of affairs only in relation to its structure and semantic value, but not ontologically.” Real propositions, as Conti conceives of them, are structured entities and the truthmakers of true written, spoken and mental sentences, but they do not have the kind of ontological independence that genuine truthmakers must have, since they are partly constituted by a certain sort of mental act (or, at least, constituted by products of that act). Second, there is the problem of the meaning, or content, of false written, spoken and mental sentences. The problem, Conti explains, is that the real proposition of the earlier theory has to do double duty. It is at once a truthmaker for sentences in natural and mental language, and also their content. Since false sentences in natural and mental language do not signify real propositions (their falsity consisting precisely in this fact), there is nothing that can be readily identified as the contents of those sentences. Consequently, false sentences in natural and mental language are not just false, but meaningless.

Conti argues, then, that the early theory of the real proposition is interesting but ultimately flawed, a theory which Burley corrects in later works. But how faithful is Conti’s exegesis of those early logical commentaries? Not very, I argue. I will turn to particular problems of exegesis in a moment. First, however, as a more general matter, I suggest that Conti confuses two very distinct theories that are developed in the Comm.Perih – a theory about propositional content, on the one hand, and a theory about truthmakers, on the other. His confusion on this score is what leads him to many of his suspect exegetical moves. But the details of those theories, their development, and their relation to one another are complex. It may be helpful, therefore, to examine how those

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13 Conti, “Walter Burley.”
two theories develop in the early works, highlighting as we go how Conti’s analysis fails to appreciate that distinction.

In contrast to Conti’s own view, what Conti calls the theory of the real proposition is wholly absent in Burley’s earliest commentary on the Perihermeneias, the Quaes.Perih. In that work, Burley argues that there are three sorts of propositiones. The first two are generally recognized: written and spoken. The third – which Burley calls an enunciatio in mente, a sentence in the mind – is philosophically quite novel. The sentence in the mind is composed of whatever the mind combines with one another or divides from one another. Those might be inscriptions or utterances, but in the usual case they are things outside the soul (res extra animam), which are signified by meaningful inscriptions and utterances. These sentences in the mind are the significata of sentences in natural language, regardless of their truth-value. In fact, the truth-values that sentences in natural language have are due to the truth-values of the sentences in the mind that they signify. Burley writes, for example, that “a spoken sentence is true because of this, that it significative of something true, that is, because of this, that it is suited to signify something true.” But – and this is critical – Burley makes clear slightly later in the passage that a sentence in the mind is a bearer of falsity as well. The sentence in the mind, then, is the primary bearer of truth and falsity; sentences in natural language have the alethic values that they do by signifying sentences in the mind with those values.

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15 Ibid., para. 3.62, p. 251.

16 See Ibid., para. 3.622, p. 251: “I concede that a propositio is an accident in the way that an accident is distinguished from a substance, and has subjective being in the soul [...]. Hence Aristotle says, in Metaphysics 6, that the true and the false are in the soul, and the good and the bad are in things outside [the soul]; that would not be unless the true and the false have subjective being in the soul.”
Burley’s theory of the sentence in the mind, in other words, is a theory of propositional content, an explanation (among other things) of what the contents of sentences in natural language are, and so an account of why they have the truth values that they do.

The *Comm.Perih* begins by articulating the same theory of the sentence in the mind that Burley develops in the *Quaes.Perih*. In the prologue to the *Comm.Perih*, for example, Burley argues once again that there are three sorts of *propositiones*: written, spoken, and mental; and that mental *propositiones* can be composed of whatever the mind can combine or divide, regardless of whether those are signs or things signified by signs. Later in the work, however, Burley makes a curious claim. He writes that

> in the intellect there are two kinds of *propositiones*: one which is produced by the intellect and has subjective being in the intellect, and that sort of *propositio* Aristotle calls true being. Another is a *propositio* which has only objective being in the intellect [...]. We are able to say that a certain one is a *propositio in re* and a certain one is a *propositio in intellectu*, by calling that *propositio* which has only objective being in the intellect a *propositio in re*, and the other, which has subjective being in the intellect, a *propositio in intellectu*.

How should we understand this claim, in light of the theory of the sentence in the mind articulated both in the *Quaes.Perih* and in the prologue to the *Comm.Perih*? Conti apparently sees it as a clarification. Whereas the theory articulated in the *Quaes.Perih* and in the prologue to the *Comm.Perih* washes over fine divisions between sentences

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17 I suspect that the *Comm.Perih* was written within a few years of the *Quaes.Perih*, though its precise date of publication has not been conclusively established. More importantly, perhaps, is my view that the *Comm.Perih* was written before the *Quaes.Post*, such that one cannot rely on the *Quaes.Post* (as Conti and Cesalli appear to do) as a bridge between the theories developed in the *Quaes.Perih* and the *Comm.Perih*.

composed of concepts, on the one hand, and what Conti calls real propositions, composed of things, on the other, Burley clarifies that division here. Mental sentences, composed of concepts, exist subjectively in the mind, whereas real propositions, composed of things, exist in the mind merely objectively. Moreover, the confusions implicit in Burley’s earliest terminology – in particular, the expression ‘sentence in the mind’ – are resolved.

How could a sentence (propositio) composed of things outside the mind be subjectively in the mind? On Conti’s interpretation, it can’t. What can be subjectively in the mind, rather, are concepts, the combination of which represents something that exists in the mind only as an object.

But I argue that a closer reading of the passage reveals a very different interpretation. First, Burley states in this passage that a propositio in intellectu – which Conti suggests is composed of concepts – is what Aristotle calls “true being.” In the passage immediately prior, Burley sets out the metaphysics of a true being.

I say that the intellect makes true beings by putting together those with one another which are united in reality, or by dividing from one another those which are diverse in reality. For if the intellect asserts some to be the same, then it combines those which one another, but if it asserts some to be diverse, then it divides them from one another.19

A true being, then, is the product of the mind’s combining one thing of another which are united (or divided) in fact. But implicit in that claim is just the theory of the sentence in the mind Burley set out in the Quaes.Perih and earlier in the Comm.Perih: sentences in the mind are complexes of things produced by the mind’s combination of them, which are true just in case those complexes of things mirror the combination of those things in

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19 Ibid., para. 1.24, p. 60: “Unde dico quod intellectus facit entia vera componendo ea ad invicem quae in re sunt unita aut dividendo ea ab invicem quae in re sunt diversa. Si enim intellectus asserit aliqua esse eadem, tune componit illa ad invicem, sed si asserit aliqua esse diversa, tund dividit ea ab invicem.”
reality. Consequently, there is no textual evidence to support Conti’s suggestion that propositiones in intellectu are composed of concepts, that is, of subjective mental representations. Indeed, we now have a strong reason to reject it. Rather, given Burley’s comments about the nature of true being, it is clear that propositiones in intellectu are composed of things – a restatement of the theory of the sentence in the mind, rather than a clarification of it. Second, that a propositio composed of things would exist subjectively in the mind, while perhaps an odd claim, is perfectly consistent with what Burley says in the Quaes.Perihermeneias about sentences in the mind: “I concede that a propositio is an accident, in the way that an accident is distinguished from substance, and has subjective being in the soul.”

On this reading, then, the distinction that Burley makes between a propositio in intellectu and a propositio in re, far from a clarification to the account of the sentence in the mind that he had articulated earlier, is meant rather to introduce a further bit of theory on top of that account. That is, in addition to the claim that the mind can combine one thing with another, Burley is now also committing himself to another sort of propositio – a propositio in re, or real proposition – which exists merely objectively in the mind, exists necessarily, and is necessarily true.

What motivates the introduction of this extra bit of theory? It is motivated, I suggest, by alethic concerns that are largely absent in the Quaes.Perihermeneias. It is important to

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20 In fact, the expression ‘concept’ is completely absent in the Comm.Perihermeneias. Conti is likely importing terminology from the Quaes.Post here.

21 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.622, p. 251. Burley tempers his position by claiming that they are only accidents of reason, rather than real accidents. On this claim, see ch. 3, §3.
note that, unlike the Quaes.Perih, which is a questions commentary on the Perihermeneias, the Comm.Perih is a literal commentary. That is, it works slowly through Aristotle’s Perihermeneias, and deals with important philosophical issues that various chapters and verses give rise to. Consequently, Burley is forced to address concerns in the Comm.Perih that he could avoid in the Quaes.Perih. Burley is forced to address certain alethic concerns in particular when he comes to comment on Aristotle’s claim in the prologue to the Perihermeneias that “falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation.”\(^{22}\) Moreover, Burley’s discussion of that text makes clear that he is interested in two main issues: the nature of truthmaking, on the one hand, and a certain metalinguistic concern about truth, on the other. The theory of the real proposition that Burley develops in the Comm.Perih, I argue, is intended to address both concerns at once.

Burley had very briefly addressed questions about truthmaking in the Quaes.Perih, arguing that a sentence in the mind is true if “those denoted to be the same are the same, or those are diverse which are denoted to be diverse.”\(^{23}\) But the treatment of truthmaking in the Comm.Perih is far more extensive. In that work, Burley argues that a real proposition is a truthmaker for other sorts of propositiones. Burley writes:

> I say that truth which is subjectively in the intellect is nothing except a certain adequation of the intellect to a true propositio which has only objective being in the intellect. Hence I say that every propositio which has subjective being in the


human intellect can fail to be and can fail to be true [...], yet that which has only objective being in the intellect cannot fail to be or fail to be true.\textsuperscript{24}

Truthmakers, on this account, have a somewhat odd ontological status: they have merely objective existence, that is, they exist merely as objects of cognition. What might be partly behind their odd metaphysics, however, is just a general metaphysical problem for philosophers in the medieval period: that states of affairs do not appear to fit well within an Aristotelian metaphysical framework.\textsuperscript{25} The fact of Socrates’ being wise, for example, does not seem to fit into, or to be reducible to, one or more of the Aristotelian categories.\textsuperscript{26} In this work, at least, Burley appears to believe that attributing objective being to facts, which by their nature are extracategorical, helps address that worry.\textsuperscript{27}

Beyond the ontological status of truthmakers, however, Burley is also concerned with a further, metalinguistic worry. That worry is expressed in the form of a question from an interlocutor.

[I]f the truth of a propositio were in the intellect, since the same truth numerically speaking is not in diverse intellects numerically speaking, is it not necessary to say that the same propositio has as much truth as there are intellects thinking that propositio to be true?\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24} Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.27, pp. 61–2.

\textsuperscript{25} One difficulty, however, is that Burley’s later account of truthmakers does not have anything to say about their ontological status. So it is not clear how central the issue of irreducibility is for Burley.

\textsuperscript{26} One possible response is that Socrates’ being wise is somehow equivalent to wise Socrates. Conti suggests something of this sort in his appeal to macro-objects, which are “aggregates made up of primary substances together with a host of substantial and accidental forms existing in them and through them” (Conti, “Walter Burley”). At least on the mature account, Conti argues that real propositions just are macro-objects of that sort, or at least that they are “aspects” of macro-objects.

\textsuperscript{27} However, Burley seems to regard objective being as somewhat different in the \textit{Quaes.Post}, a slightly later work. See \textit{infra}.

\textsuperscript{28} Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.25, p. 61: “Tu dicis: si veritatis propositionis esset in intellectu, cum eadem veritas numero non sit in diversis
The interlocutor’s concern appears to be this: Assume that a certain token sentence, \( p \), is spoken. And assume that at least some of those who hear it think (correctly) that \( p \) is true. So each predicates truth of \( p \). But what is the nature of truth that each predicates? Well, on Burley’s theory of the sentence in the mind, truth is fundamentally a property of sentences in the mind. So predicating truth of \( p \) involves “borrowing,” we might say, the truth that primarily applies to the sentence in the mind that \( p \) signifies, and predicating it of \( p \), derivatively. However, sentences in the mind (and so their properties) are particular to the minds that form them. My predicating humanity of Socrates positively and your predicating humanity of Socrates positively involve the same things arranged in the same way, but they numerically distinct arrangements – if true, numerically distinct truths. The interlocutor’s worry, then, seems to be that the quantity of truth that a spoken sentence in natural language has – how truthful it is, we might say – depends on the number of individuals who consider its alethic value: the more individuals who hear it and subsequently predicate truth of it, the more truth that spoken sentence has.\(^{29}\) But, the interlocutor suggests, surely the alethic properties of \( p \) are not quantitative in this way.

In response, Burley turns to his own account of truth, which is more expansive than mere propositional truth. In brief, beyond a notion of propositional truth, Burley

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intellectibus numero, non oportet dicere quod eadem propositio habet tot veritates quot sunt intellectus intelligentes istam propositionem esse veram?"
\end{flushright}

\(^{29}\) It is not clear to me why Burley develops this objection as a metalinguistic concern. Surely a similar sort of concern applies in unreflective contexts: if the truth of a sentence in natural language is derived from the sentence in the mind that it signifies, then the more people who hear it, and so form the sentence in the mind that it signifies, the more truth that sentence in natural language will have. There is no need, it seems to me, to require that cognitive agents predicate truth of that sentence in natural language to motivate the objection; indeed, it seems to me to make the objection needlessly complicated. However, it may be that he has a certain philosophical exercise called *obligatio* in mind specifically. See pp. 81–2 \textit{infra}.
argues that there is also a notion of truth which everything has just in virtue of its being. Consequently, he suggests that his account of truthmakers provide him a way to deny that the truth of a sentence in natural language can be quantified in the way the interlocutor assumes. Since truthmakers are things of a sort, they too have this kind of truth. In response, then, Burley distinguishes between the sort of truth that sentences in the mind have and the sort of truth that truthmakers have.

[To] the truth ‘A human is an animal’ which has being outside the intellect [that is, to the real proposition] there correspond many truths having subjective being in the intellect, for many intellects can to be adequet to the same thing.30

With respect to sentences in the mind, the quantity of truth does depend on how many minds there are engaged in certain acts of predication. But that truth is now itself seen as borrowed from the truth that real propositions themselves have. With respect to real propositions, however, truth is never anything except one, since real propositions are not individuated by the minds that conceive of them.31 And so the truth that is predicated of a sentence in natural language, Burley suggests, is borrowed not ultimately from that truth that exists in the mind (since it, too, is now seen as derivative), but rather that truth which real propositions have, as truthmakers.


31 Though it is not entirely clear to me what the larger philosophical issue is, it likely is related to the disputes about the nature of the objects of knowledge that dominated Oxford in the early fourteenth century. See especially Robert Holcot’s quodlibetal question about whether God can know more than he knows: Robert Holcot, “Can God Know More Than He Knows?,” in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts: Volume 3, Mind and Knowledge, ed. Robert Pasnau, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 302–17. In that question, Holcot rejects Walter Chatton’s view that the objects of cognition are things in one or more of the Aristotelian categories, in favor of the position that the objects of cognition are token-sentences in natural and mental language. Burley’s response to the question above seems to attempt a middle path, according to which states of affairs are sentence-like in some crucial sense. That conclusion is problematic, however. See infra.
As inventive as Burley’s response might be, however, it is ultimately unsatisfying. That response trades off of an ambiguity in the notion of truth at issue. The interlocutor’s concern, I suggest, deals in a propositional notion of truth. This is clear from the fact that we can form a question analogous to the interlocutor’s, concerning falsity: is it not necessary to say that the same propositio has as much falsity as there are intellects thinking that propositio to be false? But, of course, truthmakers won’t provide any sort of response to this falsity problem, because they are necessarily true. The response Burley provides thus equivocates on the sort of alethic notion at issue. The success of Burley’s response requires that the truth that sentences in natural language have is borrowed or inherited from the truth of the things which they ultimately signify, so that true sentences in natural language have the same alethic properties as the real propositions that they signify. But, because the sort of truth that truthmakers have fundamentally differs from the sort of truth that sentences in natural language have, the truth of a sentence in the mind isn’t borrowed from a real sentence. Rather, it has the alethic properties that it does primarily, in virtue of its correspondence (or lack thereof) to a real proposition. Consequently, sentences in natural language “borrow” their alethic values not from real propositions, but rather from sentences in the mind.

It is not clear to me whether Burley himself is aware of the ambiguity in his response. Whether he is aware of it or not, however, his response includes two features which serve to mask that ambiguity. First, Burley argues that real propositions are signified by true sentences in natural language, and by sentences in the mind. As I discussed in chapter 1, how best to understand the signification of sentences was a issue of constant dispute in medieval philosophy. Some philosophers understood sentences to
signify things – whether those things are simple objects or complex states of affairs. Others understood sentences to signify something truth-evaluable, that is, something capable of bearing truth or falsity. Burley’s response to the interlocutor suggests that he is adopting the former approach. But his more general comments on signification suggests he is committed to the latter.

This feature of the response is problematic for another reason as well: it wreaks havoc for Burley’s semantics generally. The theory of signification that Burley develops both in the *Quaes.Perih* and the *Comm.Perih* holds that sentences in natural language signify sentences in the mind, that is, complex objects composed of things and structured by a mental act. In brief, they do this because their subject and predicate terms bring extramental things to mind, and their *copulae* bring about the mind’s predicating one of those things of the other. In what sense, then, can sentences in natural language be said to also signify real propositions? Perhaps they do so in virtue of signifying sentences in the mind, which (if true) in turn signify real propositions. But it is hard to see how sentences in the mind could be said to signify anything. The terms of a sentence in the mind are (typically) things, and so do not signify anything. The mind’s predicating one thing of another joins those things together by asserting that they are the same or different, but nowhere in Burley’s corpus is it suggested that asserting involves representing as a sign. So it is not at all clear how a sentence in the mind could signify a real proposition, at least with respect to the notion of signification that Burley commonly uses. That real propositions are somehow the *significata* of other sorts of *propositiones*, then, seems both *ad hoc* and inexplicable.
Second, the ambiguity in the notion of truth at issue is masked by the fact that Burley takes real propositions to be *propositiones*. On the standard medieval view, a *propositio* is a bearer of truth and falsity – a certain semantic object. The suggestion, then, is that real propositions are objects of that sort, and thus have the same sorts of semantic and (more importantly) alethic properties as other *propositiones* – most notably, the same sort as sentences in the mind. But truthmakers are obviously not bearers of truth and falsity. On the contrary, they are that, a relation to which (or lack thereof) truthbearers have the truth values that they do. Burley’s use of ‘*propositio*’ in this context, then, seems to have no other purposes than to reinforce the idea that notion of truth at issue in his response is propositional – even while his account of the metaphysics and function of the real proposition entail otherwise.32

I agree with Conti, then, that in the *Comm.Perih* Burley defends a theory of the real proposition, according to which real propositions (1) have merely objective existence in the mind, (2) cannot fail to exist, and (3) cannot fail to be true. Moreover, I agree with him that these real propositions are truthmakers for other true *propositiones*, and that truthmaking in the *Comm.Perih* is fundamentally analyzed in terms of signification. But Conti errs when he begins to import features into his account of the real proposition from an entirely distinct account of what Burley calls in early commentaries the sentence in the mind. In particular, Conti errs when he claims that the mind’s combining one thing with another is a feature of the real proposition. It is not; rather, it is a feature of a wholly different theory of propositional content.

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32 As far as I know, the claim that a state of affairs could be a called a *propositio* has no precedent before Burley. Nor does it appear to be a claim any other philosopher makes until John Wyclif near the end of the fourteenth century.
Conti’s difficulties with the earlier works can be attributed to his insistence that one finds the same general account running throughout all of the early logical commentaries – though more articulated in some than in others. Those difficulties also affect his interpretation of the later works, moreover, since he regards the theory articulated in the later works as in part corrective of Burley’s earlier, problematic theory of the real proposition. Conti argues that Burley responds to the problems of his earlier account (as Conti sees them) by adding a further epicycle to his semantics. On Conti’s interpretation, a written sentence signifies a spoken sentence, which in turn signifies a mental sentence, composed of concepts; in this regard, according to Conti, the late theory is identical to the early theory. However, Conti argues that, in the late theory, a sentence composed of concepts signifies a *propositio* whose terms are not things but rather mental entities which exist merely objectively. These sorts of *propositiones* are, Conti argues, the meanings of the sentences which directly or indirectly signify them. Moreover, if true, an objectively existing *propositio* signifies, in turn, a real proposition - which is now taken to be the referent and truthmaker of other sorts of *propositiones*. And so, Conti writes,

> [t]he problems connected with his first theory of the semantics of propositions are thereby solved. The real proposition of his first theory is split into the mental proposition *habens esse obiectivum in intellectu* and the (new) *propositio in re*, both of which have a well-defined semantic and ontological status. In addition, false propositions have meaning (i.e., the mental proposition *habens esse obiectivum in intellectu*), but no reference, as no real proposition matches them.\(^3\)

Consequently, Burley’s late semantics admits of two different sorts of mental *propositiones*, the old mental sentence, which is composed of concepts, and a new mental

propositio, composed of entities that exist merely objectively in the mind. The latter constitutes the meaning of sentences in natural and mental language. The real proposition, in turn, is no longer constituted by a mental act of combining or separating, but rather exists wholly independently of mental activity, so that its semantic and ontological status is no longer “indeterminate.” Rather, just as a certain sort of mental proposition accounts for questions about meaning, the new theory of the real proposition is now entirely devoted to issues of truthmaking. Consequently, then, while Burley’s account in the earlier works included four sorts of propositiones – written, spoken, mental and real – the theory of the late works include five, because Burley separates out in his ontology two different features of the earlier real proposition: its role as content, and its role as truthmaker.

Conti sees the theory Burley articulates in the Art.Vet as an evolution of a theory developed in earlier works. To the extent that Conti has misunderstood the earlier theory, then, the account of what he regards as the late theory is also suspect. However, there are also independent textual reasons to question his interpretation of the Art.Vet. First, while Conti sees the use of the phrase ‘propositio in re’ in the Art.Vet as recalling, broadly, the theory of the real proposition developed in the Comm.Perih, he thinks that the theory of the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet is unique at least to this extent, that it does not depend in any way on mental activity.34 He writes, for example, that

34 Conti does state, in an early work, that “the state of affairs (or real proposition), which is the ultimate significatum of a true affirmative sentence, is a complex object (ens copulatum) composed of an individual substance, and inherent accidental (or substantial) form, and an identity-relation. Such a relation (which is the formal part of the compound) does not exist outside of our minds, but only in them” (Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars Vetus,” 134). This suggests that, earlier in his career, Conti interprets Burley’s later theory of the real proposition to still involve mental activity in its composition. However, other remarks in that work seem to suggest that, ultimately, Burley does not think that real propositions depend on mental activity. (I admit that Conti’s account in
in this case [i.e. the case of the real proposition that Socrates is a human], the two forms involved are the *forma perficiens materiam* of Socrates (i.e. his soul) and the related but distinct *forma declarans quidditatem* (i.e., the species man). What unites them is Socrates himself, since he has the *forma perficiens materiam* as an essential element and instantiates the *forma declarans quidditatem*.\(^{35}\)

The real proposition, on this account, in no way involves mental activity. Rather, what combines the things which compose a real proposition is rather some primary substance in which the relevant forms both inhere.\(^{36}\) The sentence ‘Socrates is a human’, for example, is made true by the fact that Socrates’s soul and the property of humanity both inhere in the same primary substance, namely Socrates himself.

But Burley’s own discussion of the *propositio in re* in the *Art.Vet* calls that reading into question. He writes:

I believe that it is undoubtedly the case that in some *propositio* a thing is predicated of a thing, and in some *propositio* a concept is predicated of a concept, and in some *propositio* an utterance is predicated of an utterance [...]. Hence since a *propositio* is of three sorts – a certain spoken one, a certain conceptual one, and a certain one signified through a conceptual *propositio* which can be called a *propositio in re* – [i] a *propositio* spoken of in the first way, namely, a spoken *propositio*, is totally outside the soul, and *propositio* of this sort is composed out of utterances which have being outside the soul, [ii] a *propositio* composed out of concepts is totally in the intellect, and [iii] a *propositio* composed out of things is partly in the intellect, and partly outside the intellect. With regard to its

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that work is not entirely clear to me). In any case, in more recent works, Conti clearly holds that real propositions, on the later theory, exist independently of mental activity.

\(^{35}\) Conti, “Walter Burley.” On Burley’s late account of identity, two numerically distinct forms – such as Socrates’s soul and the species man – can never be identical to one another, since something can be truly predicated of one that cannot be truly predicated of the other. I fail to see, then, how inherence of two (broadly speaking) numerically distinct forms in the same primary substance would entail anything about the truth of a sentence that asserts their identity. On Burley’s later account of identity, see ch. 5, §4.1, pp. 287–9.

\(^{36}\) It is not clear to me how the semantics of true negative sentences – for example, the sentence ‘A human is not a cat’ – ought to be analyzed, given Conti’s analysis, since there is no primary substance in which both forms inhere.
form, it is in the intellect, and with regard to its matter it is outside the intellect.37

In this passage, Burley notes that a *propositio in re*, or real proposition, depends on the mind, since the form of that *propositio* – which Burley explains elsewhere is the mind’s “combining the subject with the predicate” – is something inside the mind.38 A real proposition, then, is composed of things which are arranged by the mind. In fact, given the interpretation of the *Comm.Perih* I articulated earlier, Conti appears to get things exactly the wrong way around! In the *Comm.Perih*, the real proposition is completely independent of mental activity, since it is what the mind’s predicating one thing of another might correspond to. In the *Exp.Praed*, in contrast, the real proposition does depend on the mind, since its structure is explained in terms of a certain complex mental act.

Conti’s account also relies on a suspect account of Burley’s semantics generally. His account relies on Burley’s commitment to the thesis that expressions in natural and mental language signify things in only an indirect fashion, by directly signifying mental representations which in turn signify those things.39 Only if expressions in language

37 Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), *Exp.Praed*, c4rb: “Et credo quod illud indubitanter sit verum quod in aliqua propositione praedicatur res de re, et in aliqua propositione conceptus de conceptu praedicatur, et in aliqua vox de voce praedicatur [...].Unde cum propositio sit triplex, quaedam in platone, quaedam in conceptu, et quaedam significata per propositionem in conceptu qui potest dici propositio in re. Propositio primo modo dicta, scilicet propositio in platone, est totaliter extra animam, et talis propositio totaliter componitur ex vocibus qui habent esse extra animam. Propositio vero composita ex conceptibus est totaliter in intellectu. Et compositio composita ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectu, quantum ad suum formale est in intellectu sed quantum ad materialia est totaliter extra intellectum.”

38 Ibid.

39 Conti attempts to make a weaker claim, that Burley is committed to the transitivity of signification, according to which whatever is a sign of a sign, is a sign of the thing signified by that sign. But Conti’s interpretation requires more than mere transitivity, since transitivity alone is compatible with the direct signification of things by expressions in natural language. Regardless, I think Burley rejects transitivity.
signify things in that way can a true sentence in mental language, for example, both
directly signify some propositio which has merely objective being in the soul, in virtue of
which that sentence is meaningful, and also indirectly signify some real proposition, in
virtue of which it is true. If signification didn’t operate in this way, given Conti’s account
of the semantics, Burley’s account of sentential signification would either fail to provide
a compelling account of truth (because all that a sentence in mental language would
signify, for example, would be some objectively existing mental propositio) or it would
fail to provide a compelling account of meaning (because all a true sentence in mental
language would signify would be some real proposition).

However, we have good grounds to reject the claim that, in Burley’s account,
things outside the mind are signified by expressions in natural and mental language in
only an indirect manner.40 For Burley holds explicitly and consistently throughout his
career that expressions in natural language signify things directly, rather than indirectly
signifying them by directly signifying concepts which themselves signify those things. In
the Quaes.Perih, for example, Burley writes that “some utterance immediately signifies a
thing outside the soul.”41 Similar claims are made in his late commentary on the

He argues, for example, that transitivity would entail ‘Socrates is a concept of Socrates’ is true, since
both ‘Socrates’ and ‘concept of Socrates’ signify Socrates – the one more remotely, the other less so.
1.14, p. 55.

40 Conti cites as evidence for his position the apparent endorsement of indirect signification in the prologue
to the Exp.Praed. But, in that passage, Burley explicitly references the theory of signification set out in
the first chapter of the Perihermeneias, and in his commentary on that chapter he explicitly rejects that
expressions in natural language signify things indirectly.

41 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, p. 212. See also
Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.16, pp. 55–
6.
Moreover, as Burley affirms repeatedly throughout his career, mental acts are directly (*directe*) about things (*res*), rather than about mental representations (regardless of whether those representations exist subjectively or objectively in the mind). One consequence of this account of cognition, then, is that, regardless of what sort of mental items Burley may or may not posit in his cognitive theory, the immediate objects of cognition are things. But signification, according to Burley, is parasitic on cognition. Expressions in natural language are imposed on the objects of cognitive acts, and thereby come to directly signify those objects. Consequently, regardless of what sort of mental items Burley may or may not posit in his semantic theory, the immediate *significata* of expressions in natural and mental language are, in standard cases, things which exist outside the mind. But if that is the case, then Conti’s account of the theory of content developed in the late works seems to be seriously undermined, because sentences in natural and mental language will directly signify composites of things – which, on Conti’s account, are real propositions, states of affairs. At best, the original deficiencies of the early theory would remain: only true sentences in natural and mental language have meaning, because only true sentences in natural and mental language signify something, namely a real proposition.

Where has Conti gone wrong in his reading of the later works? Well, already in his exegesis of the earlier works, of course. But, beyond that, I believe he has misunderstood, on the one hand, a number of projects – both old and new – that Burley deals with in the *Art.Vet* and, on the other, simply how Burley has repurposed the vocabulary from his earlier logical commentaries in the *Art.Vet*. With respect to Burley’s

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repurposed vocabulary, the description of the real proposition that Burley gives in the *Art.Vet* seems remarkably similar to the description of the sentence in the mind of the earlier works – so similar, in fact, that I think there can be little doubt but that Burley is articulating the very same theory: a theory of propositional content, according to which the mind can predicating one thing (*res*) of another. Part of Conti’s confusion, then, lies in the fact that, in the *Art.Vet*, Burley repurposes much of his earlier vocabulary – in particular, his expression ‘*propositio in re*’ – to discuss theories, many of which appeared in his earlier works under different names. What is called a sentence in the mind (*enunciatio in mente*) in the early works, for example, is called a real proposition (*propositio in re*) in the later works. What is called a real proposition (*propositio in re*) in the earlier works, moreover, is absent in the later works (a consequence, I suspect, of Burley’s recognition that that theory was fundamentally confused). And, for good measure, Burley re-appropriates the term ‘*propositio in mente*’ in the later works to talk about (among other things) sentences in a language of thought – that is, mental sentences, composed of concepts, a commitment which is wholly absent in the early commentaries on the *Perihermeneias*.

Beyond a justifiable confusion with the way in which Burley is using his own terms, however, Conti also goes wrong in his interpretation of the theories that stand behind that repurposed vocabulary, and that because he has misunderstood the problems that motivate the theories developed in the *Art.Vet* in the first place. In the most obvious case, he takes the theory of the real proposition developed in the *Art.Vet* to principally...

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43 Conti is not unique in this regard; most scholars don’t recognize that Burley has radically shifted his vocabulary. A notable exception here is Elizabeth Karger. See §4.
concern truthmaking. That assumption is plausible, given the theory of the real proposition developed in the *Comm.Perih*. But the theory of the real proposition developed in the *Art.Vet* is not at all directly concerned with issues of truthmaking. On the contrary, it is meant to address concerns about the nature of propositional content – the very same concerns that motivated the theory of the sentence in the mind (*propositio in mente*) in the earlier works. Indeed, it is that very theory, under a new and yet familiar name.

Conti also misunderstands the concerns that motivate Burley’s commitment in the *Art.Vet* to a certain sort of mental *propositio* which has only objective existence. Conti argues that that commitment reflects a concern about propositional content, and a recognition of the problems that plagued an early theory of the real proposition. But, rather than a concern about propositional content, I argue that Burley’s introduction of that notion in the *Art.Vet* is motivated by highly specific concerns, about the ability of speakers to refer to the same linguistic item in meta-linguistic contexts.\footnote{Even if Conti were to reject that this is the project which actually motivates Burley’s commitment to *propositiones* which exist merely objectively in the mind, Conti’s interpretation faces a further, purely exegetical problem: that Burley states that *propositiones* of this sort can signify something *false*, as well as something true. On Conti’s interpretation, recall, *propositiones* that exist merely objectively only signify when they are true, that is, they can only signify some truthmaker, their truth consisting precisely in the fact that they signify something further. But Burley writes that “a *propositio* which does not exist in the nature of things, but which exists in the intellect objectively, can signify something true or something false, and consequently can signify something to the intellect” (Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed*, g7rb). Burley repeats this claim at other points in the passage.}

The introduction of that notion in the late chapters of the *Exp.Praed* is framed by Burley’s desire to explain how a respondent in a certain dialogical exercise called *obligatio* can agree or disagree with the spoken utterance of an opponent. The respondent, Burley notes, can only agree or disagree with the spoken utterance of the opponent after the
opponent has spoken that utterance. But what, then, is the respondent agreeing or disagreeing with? Burley argues that the object of the respondent’s agreement or disagreement is the utterance spoken by the opponent himself, an utterance which does not exist at the time when the respondent responds to it.

In a disputation, if the opponent utters this, ‘God exists’, then the respondent has to concede that if he is not obligated to its opposite. But he does not concede that when it is offered, because then the opponent and the respondent had to speak at the same time, which is not true. And when it is not uttered, then it does not exist. Therefore he has to concede that when it does not exist.”

‘Exist’ here is technical; a thing exists if and only if it has subjective being. Things which do not exist, however, can still have another mode of being namely, as mere objects of thought.

After that [i.e. the utterance of the opponent] is spoken, it is an object of memory […]. A respondent judges correctly about the utterances of an opponent after they are spoken whether they are true or false, and depending on how he judges, so he responds. Therefore a propositio which does not exist except objectively in the intellect is judged to be true or false by the faculty of judgment, and so it is true or false [because the respondent judges correctly].”

In fact, Burley goes on to argue that propositiones of this sort are sentence-types of natural language.

45 Ibid., Exp.Praed, g7ra. “Quod patet, quia si in disputatione opponens proponat istam, ‘deus est’, respondens habet istam concedere, tunc non obligetur ad oppositum. Sed non concedit istam quando profertur, quia si opponens et respondens similiter habent loqui, quod non est verum. Et quando non profertur, tunc non est. Ergo habet concedere ilam quando non est.” Burley’s target here are certain “moderni” who deny that the following argument is sound: ‘ p, therefore ’p’ is true’, because the antecedent could be true and the consequent not true, if ’p’ does ceases to exist. Burley rejects that claim partly on grounds that it would “destroy all disputation,” since it would require two opponents in a dispute to talk at the same time. And, “although [the moderni] conduct their own arguments in this way, because they are always arguing over one another at the same time,” that kind of conduct in an argument is “exceedingly unfitting” (Ibid., Exp.Praed, g6va).

46 Idem, Exp.Praed, g7ra: “Et confirmatur. Nam postquam ipsa est prolata, est obiecta memoriae, quia alias oppositiones non haberet nec habere posset memoriae de prolatis a respondente, quod est inconveniens, quia tunc nunquam bene posset respondere. Ergo quando propositio non est, potest esse obiecta memoriae, et per consequens ipsi intellectui, et per consequens quando propositio non est, significat aliquid intellectui a quo intelligitur. Ergo significat verum aut falsum.”
I believe that in a disputation the opponent and the respondent direct their intellects to certain things common to all of the spoken sentences about which they dispute, and so they direct their intellects to the same thing, and so it is clear that a respondent is able to offer a refutation, because he is able to concede or deny one thing common to many individual, similar sentences. The intellect, however, is not able to concede or deny the same individual sentence, because it cannot utter the same individual sentence twice.47

The account Burley defends in this passage is fascinating for a number of reasons. First, it gives us some more insight into the practice of obligatio, a philosophical exercise about whose purpose scholars are still unclear. Second, it clearly echoes (though does not merely repeat) the metalinguistic concerns that drove the earlier theory of the real proposition.48 Third, it at least hints at the complex cognitive processes that underlie linguistic comprehension, and in the process fits well with Burley’s more general semantic picture. On the account of linguistic comprehension Burley suggests here, recognition of a particular utterance as an utterance of a particular meaningful type does not involve any significative relation between tokens and types. Rather, and in contrast to Conti’s account, the significiation of an expression in natural language, which is fundamentally an epistemological relationship whereby an expression calls something to mind, depends on (but is not reducible to) complex cognitive processes involving in part the categorization of a token utterance under some particular utterance type, the pre-

47 Idem, Exp.Praed. g7rb: “Credo quod in disputatione opponens et respondens fuereunt intellectus suos ad talia communia omnibus propositionibus prolatis de quibus disputant, et fuereunt intellectus suos ad idem, et sic patet quod respondens potest redargui, quia potest idem concedere et negare unum commune multis individuis propositionibus omnino similibus. Eadem tamen propositionem individuum non potest intellectus concedere et negare, quia idem individuum propositionis non potest bis proferri.”

48 It also reflects a position Burley sets out in the Quaes.Perih, that a propositio can have truth values even when it does not exist. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.62, p. 250–1: “It must be said that some propositiones are always true and [some] are always false, but no propositio always has being. Hence, to the objection [that the necessary truth of a propositio requires the necessity of its being], that a propositio is true does not require that the propositio exists in fact (sit actualiter).”
established subordination of utterances of that type to a particular concept with a certain content, and the activation of that concept in the mind upon the recognition of that token as a token of that type, which activation calls the thing the concept represents to mind.

In the end, then, Conti’s interpretation of Burley’s views on meaning and truth seems to me to leave a great deal to be desired. However, Conti’s interpretation is not the only example of a scholar who takes Burley’s project to be primarily about the nature of states of affairs. Perhaps an alternative defense might fare better.

2.2. Christian Rode

Like Conti before him, Christian Rode is primarily interested in Burley’s account of the *propositio in re*, or real proposition. Also like Conti, Rode argues that we find two different accounts of the real proposition in Burley’s logical works – an early account, and a late. However, unlike Conti, who argues that the early theory is dominated by the idea that a real proposition is composed by the mind and the late theory by the mind-independence of the real proposition, Rode argues that the opposite seems to be the case. In the early theory, Rode notes, the real proposition is “completely uncoupled” (*völlig losgekoppelt*) from intellectual activity.\(^{49}\) It is not formed by the mind, but rather exists merely objectively in the mind, as that to which true mental combinations can correspond. Rode argues that things are significantly different in the *Art.Vet*, however. In that work, real propositions have both material and formal components. The material components are typically extramental things, but the formal component – the copula of

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the real proposition – exists in the mind as an act of it, so that the real proposition is a hybrid entity, composed of both mental and extramental components.\textsuperscript{50}

Exegetically, Rode appears to better appreciate the development of Burley’s thought than Conti. Rode rightly notes that, in the \textit{Comm.Perih}, while the real proposition exists merely objectively in the mind, it is independent of thought or thinking, whereas, in the \textit{Art.Vet}, the real proposition includes an act of cognition as a formal component. Moreover, Rode agrees with Conti’s general interpretation of the theory as one of states of affairs. But, in contrast to Conti, Rode argues that, even on the later theory, Burley’s account faces serious philosophical challenges. Consequently, Rode argues, Burley’s account, while interesting, is not philosophically compelling. For a more compelling medieval account of states of affairs, we need to turn our attention to the theory of the \textit{complexe significabile}, a theory of states of affairs developed by Adam Wodeham and Gregory Rimini in the middle of the fourteenth century.

While not ultimately satisfying, Rode argues that the theory is still deserving of scholarly attention, for a number of reasons. First, Rode sees Burley’s late theory of the real proposition as a development of the earlier theory. In fact, Rode sees that development as positive; the later theory constitutes an important philosophical advancement over the earlier theory, because the later theory involves a less objectionable intermingling of language and mind, on the one hand, and reality, on the other. Second, Rode argues that the central concern driving the development of Burley’s account of the real proposition is to provide an account according to which the things that sentences in natural and mental language represent are suitably complex. On this point,

\textsuperscript{50} See Ibid., 74–5.
Rode argues that the development of Burley’s account tracks an attempt to develop an “intensional” interpretation of signification, as opposed to a merely extensional interpretation.\(^{51}\) That is, Rode argues that Burley’s aim is to move beyond the particular thing(s) that a sentence may be about (Socrates, for example) to a complex which includes not just particular thing(s) but also their arrangement. Third, then, Rode argues that the theory of the real proposition is, at root, a theory of states of affairs, which are what sentences in natural and mental language signify. States of affairs differ from mere substances or accidents in that they have a complexity that mere substances and accidents lack. In this respect, Burley’s work represents both a growing philosophical concern in the fourteenth century over the need for an ontological kind – the fact, or state of affairs – and attempts to square that need with a metaphysical commitment to the Aristotelian categorical framework.

On Rode’s interpretation, then, the central problem of the early theory of the real proposition is that it cannot provide the sort of complexity required of an account of states of affairs. It cannot provide the requisite complexity because, given that the truth of a sentence in natural or mental language requires that the “terms” of the real proposition it signifies are identical or non-identical to one another, those “terms” must in fact be the same thing – in particular, the very same particular substance. Burley attempts to avoid this result in various ways in the early theory – by appeal, for example, to the merely objective nature of the real proposition. But Rode argues that this is (in the minds of contemporary philosophers, at least) “an impermissible mixing” (\textit{eine unzulässige Vermengung}) of language and mind, on the one hand, and the reality they represent, on

\(^{51}\) See Ibid., 78.
the other.\footnote{Ibid., 72.} That is, Burley achieves the requisite complexity in what sentences in natural and mental language signify only by admitting a kind of being to real propositions (and their terms) that straddles the language-reality divide.

In his later account of the real proposition, in contrast, Burley no longer attempts to achieve the complexity required of states of affairs by appeal to a suspect “objective being” that the terms of the real proposition possess. Rather, on the later theory, the terms of the real proposition are entirely extramental things, so that the real proposition (with respect to its material components, at least) falls entirely on the side of reality. This position, Rode notes, requires that an affirmative real proposition has as its terms the very same thing, because the real propositions signified by true, affirmative sentences in natural and mental language involve the identity of their terms, and only the very same thing is identical to itself.\footnote{Consequently, Rode argues that the signification of sentences in natural and mental language is fundamentally articulated in terms of supposition, because the subject and predicate terms of sentences in natural and mental language – including true sentences – differ not just orthographically and phonetically but semantically as well, and it is only \textit{via} an account of supposition that a sentence containing semantically diverse subject and predicate terms can signify a real proposition whose “terms” are identical with one another. Rode assumes that he is simply following Conti on this point, and there is at least some reason to think that Rode is correct in this assumption.} In other words, Rode suggests, all affirmative real propositions must ultimately be tautologies.\footnote{Rode, “Sätze Und Dinge. Die Propositio in Re Bei Walter Burley Und Anderen,” 78–9.} With the respect to its “terms,” then, the real proposition on the later theory explicitly receives an extensional interpretation, since affirmative real propositions are constituted by some one particular thing, and negative real propositions by two non-identical particular things.
At the same time, Rode argues, Burley attempts to provide an “intensional” interpretation of the real proposition, by arguing that a real proposition is composed not just of things but also of a mental act of predication. Because real propositions are, on the later theory, composed by mental acts of predication, Burley argues that real propositions are intellectual, rather than real, composites. And Burley’s appeal to their status as intellectual composites, Rode argues, is meant to indicate that while the “terms” of the real proposition may in fact be the very same particular thing, the mind, in combining them, is sensitive not just to that particular thing but to a state of affairs of which it is a part.

Rode argues that the later theory improves on the earlier theory because it betters respects the divisions between language, mind, and reality, but that it is still deeply flawed, because (among other problems) it is unable to provide an account of the complexity of states of affairs which is divorced from cognitive activity. In this respect, Burley’s project is not compelling. However, Rode argues, that project is motivated by concerns shared by many other philosophers in the period – concerns about the need for facts in one’s ontology, for example – and those concerns come to be addressed, in a more satisfying fashion, by other philosophers in the middle of the fourteenth century – namely, Adam Wodeham and Gregory Rimini, with the theory of the *complexe significabile*.55 Burley’s fundamental philosophical limitation, Rode suggests, is that he is too wedded to an Aristotelian metaphysics, according to which everything that exists is apt for an analysis in terms of substances and accidents. It is only when Wodeham and

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55 See Ibid., 88–9.
Rimini reject this account that they are able to develop an account of signification which
provides a compelling account of sentential signification in particular.

Rode’s analysis of Burley’s project is interesting, and especially noteworthy for its attempt to situate Burley’s interests and commitments within a wider historical context. He argues, for example, that, in Francis de Mayronis’s (d. 1328) work, there appears to be a commitment to the view that what true, affirmative sentences ultimately signify is something whose terms are identical to one another – something tautological, as Rode sees it. Rode also draws comparisons to the views of John Duns Scotus and Francis de Prato (c. 1330s), who argue that sentences ultimately signify something whose terms have only objective being. However, the way in which Rode sees Burley’s account and its place within the philosophy of language and mind at the turn of the fourteenth century is motivated by two underlying assumptions – an exegetical assumption, and a philosophical assumption. First, Rode assumes that the theory of the real proposition articulated in the Art.Vet is a development of the account of the real proposition developed in the earlier logical treatises, and especially in the Comm.Perih. Second, Rode assumes that that development represents a philosophical concern – shared by many in the fourteenth century – about the nature of states of affairs.

Both are problematic assumptions. The former assumption is problematic because, as I argued above, the theory of the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet seems to be a development not of the theory of the propositio in re of the Comm.Perih but rather of the theory of the propositio in intellectu, that is, the theory of the sentence in the mind. But, as we have seen, the account of the propositio in intellectu in the Comm.Perih is not anything like a theory of states of affairs. Moreover – and this is the
second way in which Rode’s account is deficient – if one doesn’t assume that the theory of the real proposition in the Art.Vet constitutes a development of the theory of the real proposition articulated in the Comm.Perih, then there seems to be far less motivation to assume that the theory of the real proposition developed in the Art.Vet is a deficient account of states of affairs. Rather, and especially if one recognizes that it constitutes a development of the propositio in intellectu developed in the Comm.Perih, it appears to be an engaging account of propositional content.

While there are other examples of a state-of-affairs interpretation in the literature, none are as sophisticated, it seems to me, as Conti’s and Rode’s. But, as we have seen, both of those interpretations face serious challenges. I do not believe that any other interpretation of this sort in the literature fares any better under close scrutiny. Moreover, the more general challenge for any interpretation according to which Burley’s central aim throughout his career is to articulate the nature and function of states of affairs is that Burley’s seems far more interested in the nature of truthbearers than in truthmakers – and especially interested in the nature of the primary bearers of truth value. This strongly suggests that Burley’s main concern is not the nature of states of affairs but rather the nature of propositional content.

3. The Metaphysics of the Proposition I: Laurent Cesalli

Unlike both Conti and Rode, who see a significant theoretical evolution in Burley’s thought, Laurent Cesalli argues that any evolution that one finds in Burley’s corpus is merely verbal, and is meant simply to make more apparent Burley’s “fundamental and constant theoretical intuition: the objective foundation of logical truth
in extramental reality.” According to Cesalli, then, what might appear to be two distinct semantic theories in Burley’s corpus – an early and a late – is rather an equivocation in service of a heuristic purpose: to reinforce Burley’s commitment to the objectivity of truth.

Like Conti, Cesalli argues that the signification of expressions in natural language is indirect. Cesalli argues that Burley highlights this commitment in various works in order to draw attention to the need for a certain kind of *propositio* which is signified but does not in turn signify anything else. In contrast to Conti, however, for whom that final kind of “*propositio*” is in fact not literally a *propositio* (that is, a bearer of truth and falsity) but rather a fact which makes the *propositiones* that signify it true, Cesalli argues that the *propositio* which is signified and does not itself signify anything further is a certain sort of mental truthbearer.

[T]he *ordo significationis* is clear: a written proposition signifies a vocal one, a vocal proposition signifies a mental one which is itself a sign [...]. The crucial theoretical move will be to distinguish between two types of mental propositions – one of them being at the same time a sign and a significate, the other being merely a [significate].

The former sort of mental *propositio* – which Cesalli argues both is signified by a spoken sentence and signifies the second sort of mental *propositio* – is a sentence in mental language, composed of concepts. What those *propositiones* represent, Cesalli suggests,

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56 Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 123. By ‘logical truth’, Cesalli does not mean a certain sort of analytic truth. Rather, he means the sort of truth that statements generally can have, in contrast to the sort of truth that things (*res*) can possess. In this respect, Cesalli is following Burley’s account of truth. On Burley on truth and its kinds, see ch. 5, §§2, 7.


are entities which have merely objective existence in the mind. Objects of this sort are “the presence in the mind of extramental objects (that substance, this accident) as cognitive and objective contents.”\textsuperscript{59} The latter mental \textit{propositio} is composed of those objective mental contents, and structured by the mind’s combining them with one another. Consequently, what Conti takes to be a feature of the account developed only at the end of Burley’s career – according to which sentences in mental language signify \textit{propositiones} composed of objective contents – Cesalli argues is a persistent feature of the account from its very beginning.

Cesalli’s account differs from Conti’s in another, more significant way, however. According to Conti, a mental \textit{propositio} composed of entities which have merely objective existence in the mind might itself signify a real proposition (that is, some actual state of affairs, or truthmaker), and it is in virtue of its signification of that real proposition that it is true. According to Conti, then, entities which have mere objective existence are signs of things in extramental reality, and truth involves combining them in a way that reflects the actual combinations of the things they represent. In contrast, Cesalli denies that entities which have mere objective existence in the mind are signs; rather, they are simply the presence of extramental objects in the mind. Consequently, he denies that mental \textit{propositiones} composed of objective contents serve to signify anything further. According to Cesalli, then, truth and falsity are not articulated in terms of signification, but rather in terms of what Cesalli calls a relation of foundation. A mental \textit{propositio} is true, on Cesalli’s reading, if each of its parts – subject term, predicate term, and copula – corresponds to or is founded in a feature of reality. With

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 131.
respect to the subject and predicate term, it is founded in the two extramental realities themselves, and, with respect to the copula, it is founded in an extramental relation of identity or non-identity between those two realities.

Why, then, does Burley say repeatedly throughout his career that the mind can combine things (res) with one another? Because, Cesalli argues, Burley wants to drive home the foundation of truth in extramental reality. Objective mental contents are founded in extramental reality, because they are the objective presence of those things in the mind. It is that foundation that explains, for example, why my thought of a cat is about a cat. It also serves to explain the truth of my thought that a human is an animal: because all three parts of that thought – the content of a thought about humanity, about animality, and their combination – are reflected in the world by actual humans, actual animals, and an actual relation of identity that obtains between particular humans and particular animals.60

Cesalli’s interpretation seems to me to have one large advantage over Conti’s: consistency in interpretation. According to Conti, Burley’s account evolves over the course of his career, from one according to which the mind combines things with one another to one according to which the mind combines entities that exist merely

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60 There is a further, metaphysical problem for Cesalli’s (and, potentially, Conti’s) view as well – at least with respect to the second half of Burley’s career. As I understand Burley’s later metaphysics, extramental universals, or properties, do not do any metaphysical work. That is, they do not provide the natures of particulars. But Burley remains an ardent defender to the reality of properties in the second half of his career, a defense which only makes sense if those properties serve some philosophical use. That use, I suggest, must be semantic (see ch. 5, §5). However, on Cesalli’s interpretation, properties do not play a role in Burley’s account of meaning, since the only universals relevant to signification are universal contents, which exist objectively in the mind. Those contents are founded in reality, but a reality of concrete particulars (“this substance, that accident”), rather than in any extramental universals. If I am right about Burley’s later account of properties, then Cesalli’s interpretation Burley’s continued commitment to realism seems inexplicable. Moreover, Cesalli’s interpretation makes Burley’s account of meaning almost indistinguishable from the early Ockham’s.
objectively in the mind. But Burley claims not just in the early works but also in the late works that the mind can combine things with one another. He writes in the prologue to the *Exp.Praed*, for example, that

> [w]hatever the intellect can combine with one another, or divide from one another can be parts of a sentence (*oratio*), and consequently can be a subject and predicate. But the intellect can combine things (*res*) with one another, by asserting that those things are the same, and it can divide things from one another by asserting that those are not the same.61

On Conti’s interpretation, then, when Burley says in the late logical commentaries that the mind can combine things with one another, Burley must be speaking in some non-literal way. But Burley makes exactly the same claim in the early logical commentaries. Parity of reasoning would suggest that Burley either meant his claim non-literally in the earlier logical commentaries as well, or means to speak literally in the later logical commentaries. But neither position fits with the narrative of development that Conti defends. Cesalli, in contrast, can respect the fact that Burley seems to be committing himself in the late works to the same theory defended in the earlier works, by arguing for a non-literal reading throughout.

Unfortunately, however, Cesalli’s interpretation faces some serious exegetical challenges. Most serious of all is that the central thesis of Cesalli’s interpretation – that expressions in natural language ultimately signify the mere objective presence, or existence, of extramental things in the mind – finds little textual support, and a substantial

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amount of textual opposition. That thesis is central to Cesalli’s account because Cesalli argues that those objective contents are what the mind combines with one another to form complex objective contents – which are, on Cesalli’s view, the primary bearers of truth and falsity, the objects of the mind’s attitudes, and the significata of sentences in natural and mental language. However, the only textual evidence Cesalli cites in favor of Burley’s supposedly lifelong commitment to the objective nature of semantic and cognitive content comes in the earliest logical commentary, the Quaes.Perih.62 In that work, commenting on Boethius claim that an expression in natural language signifies an affection of the soul (passio animae), Burley writes that “to signify an affection in this way is nothing other than to signify a thing as it is proportioned to the intellect (ut est proportionatum intellectui).”63 The notion of a thing “as it is proportioned to the intellect,” Cesalli argues, suggests the merely objective presence of that thing in the mind.

But that reading is undermined by what else Burley says elsewhere in the same passage. First, Burley claims that “some utterance immedaitely signifies a thing outside [the soul] (res extra animam).”64 That phrase – “thing outside the soul” – shows up

62 Cesalli seems to make to also make a mistake on this point as well, by assuming that if something has objective being, then its parts as well must have objective being. But Burley clearly denies this, given his claim in the Quaes.Post (see supra) that a propositio composed of extramental (and so subjectively existing) things is itself an objective being.

63 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, p. 212. It is important to note that this phrase is completely absent from the Comm.Perih, a work I believe was written just a few years after the Quaes.Perih. That might suggest that Burley either recognized the confusion that expression could cause, or simply became more confident in his commitment to a direct realist account.

64 Ibid., para. 1.71, p. 212. ‘Res extra’ in this passage is clearly elliptical for ‘res extra animam’. See, e.g., Burley’s use of ‘res extra animam’ in Ibid., para. 1.82, p. 213.
repeatedly in Burley’s corpus, and it seems implausible that that expression is not meant to drive home the claim that expressions in natural language – quite literally – signify extramental things. The thesis that expressions in natural language immediately, or directly, signify things outside the soul, moreover, plays an integral part in Burley’s account of the sentence in the mind. He argues, for example, that sentences in natural language immediately signify sentences in the mind, composed of extramental things, because “a spoken utterance immediately signifies a thing outside [the soul].” So what sentences in natural language signify (indeed, directly signify) is a sentence in the mind, composed of things outside the soul.

Second, Burley considers a theory of signification in the *Quaes.Perih* very similar to the one Cesalli attributes to him, and Burley emphatically rejects that theory. With respect to Boethius’s claim that an expression in natural language signifies an “affection of the soul,” Burley notes that “some say that an affection [of the soul] is not a species received in the intellect, nor even an act of thinking itself, but is a term of that act, that is, something produced by the mind just as a kind of image, in which the intellect sees the thing outside [the soul].” Presumably, these quasi-images in the soul are similar to the sorts of objective beings that Cesalli sees as central to Burley’s account of meaning and cognition. But, for a number of reasons, Burley expressly rejects that account of

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65 On Cesalli’s account, then, ‘thing outside the soul’ refers to something that only exists within the soul! His account seems even more improbable relative to the later works, where Burley argues that the mind can combine things which are “totally (totaliter) outside of the soul” (Walter Burley, *Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed*, c4rb).


cognition, and the concomitant account of signification, in his early commentaries on the
*Perihermeneias*.\(^{68}\)

Beyond a suspect assumption about Burley’s fundamental semantic and cognitive
commitments, Cesalli also falls into many of the same exegetical errors as Conti, by
confusing Burley’s theory of propositional content with the theory of truthmaking he
articulates in the *Comm.Perih*. Like Conti, Cesalli writes that Burley is committed to
mental sentences (that is, sentences composed of concepts) in the early logical treatises,
and takes the distinction Burley makes in the *Comm.Perih* between *propositiones in
intellectu* and *propositiones in re* to be a clarification between mental sentences, on the
one hand, and what he takes to be *propositiones* composed of objective contents, on the
other. However, the distinction between *propositiones in intellectu* and *propositiones in
re* that Burley makes in the *Comm.Perih* is quite different – a difference between contents
composed of things and their truthmakers.

Cesalli does have a textual retort here.\(^{69}\) In another early logical commentary – his
*Quaes.Post* – Burley distinguishes between three sorts of *propositiones*: those composed
of significative utterances, those composed of concepts, and those composed of things.
The former two are signs; the latter is signified by those signs. Moreover, unlike
*propositiones* composed of signs, Burley argues that a *propositio* composed out of things
“has neither subjective being in the mind, nor subjective being outside the mind, but it is

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\(^{68}\) See Ibid., para. 1.6–1.65, p. 210–1; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s
*Perihermeneias*,” para. 1.14–1.15, p. 55. For more on Burley’s rejection of this account, see ch. 3, §2.1,

\(^{69}\) This is a retort that Conti could employ against my reading as well.
only an objective being.”70 The distinction in being that Burley draws here, it seems, is intended to map onto those three sorts of propositiones. Sentences in natural language exist subjectively outside the mind, whereas mental sentences, composed of concepts, exist subjectively in the mind. Propositiones composed of things, in contrast, do not have subjective existence either inside or outside of the mind, but rather merely objective existence in the mind.

Of course, Burley also draws the distinction between propositiones which exist subjectively in the mind and those that exist objectively in the mind in the Comm.Perih – namely, the distinction between propositiones in intellectu and propositiones in re. So can’t we then use the metaphysics of the various sorts of propositiones articulated in the Quaes.Post – and crucially the distinction between a propositio composed of concepts and a propositio composed of things – to better understand the metaphysical positions developed in the Comm.Perih? Cesalli, at least, suggests that we can.

However, I argue that we cannot, for two reasons. First, as we have already seen, Burley is already fairly explicit in Comm.Perih about the metaphysics of the propositio in intellectu, and it is a very different metaphysical picture than the picture of mental sentences that we find in the Quaes.Post. In particular, Burley argues in the Comm.Perih that a propositio in intellectu is composed out of things (res), rather than concepts. While perhaps superficially similar, then, the metaphysical accounts that we find in the Comm.Perih and the Quaes.Post of those propositiones which have subjective being in the mind differ in important respects from one another.

In fact, what we find in the *Quaes.Post* is, in some ways, a well-motivated regression to (and then development of) the theory developed in the *Quaes.Perih*. In the *Quaes.Perih*, recall, the only sort of *propositiones* are those composed of expressions in natural language and those composed by the mind of the things signified by those expressions. More generally, however, Burley is committed to the view that the signification of things by expressions in natural language is mediated by concepts in the mind. In the *Quaes.Post*, Burley finally generalizes that claim, by arguing that, just as sub-sentential expressions in natural language signify things by the mediation of concepts, so too sentences in natural language signify propositions composed of things by the mediation of mental sentences, that is, sentences composed of concepts. Moreover, unlike the theory developed in the *Comm.Perih*, which runs contrary to Burley’s more general semantic commitments, this development of the view is well motivated. Unsurprisingly, then, Burley remains committed to mental language for the rest of his career.

Second, we cannot employ the *Quaes.Post* to better understand the metaphysical positions developed in the *Comm.Perih* because the relevant notion of objective being at issue in the *Comm.Perih*, and the larger ontology of being in which it is situated, differs from the notion at issue in the *Quaes.Post*. In the *Comm.Perih*, the relevant notion of objective being concerns the unusual ontological status of truthmakers. They neither exist subjectively in the mind, as accidents of it, nor as subjective features of extramental reality. This is in contrast to sentences in the mind, which, while composed of things, are subjective features of the mind, in virtue of the complex act by which they are formed.\(^{71}\)

\(^{71}\) Ibid., para. 3.622, p. 251.
The notion of objective being in the *Comm.Perih*, in other words, seems motivated by the inability to reduce a truthmaker to some substance and/or an accident of it.

Compare that account of objective being to what we find in the *Quaes.Post*.

I deny this argument – “It [i.e. a *propositio* composed of things] is composed out of things, therefore it is a thing outside the soul” – because that composition is not a real composition, but an intelligible or intellectual composition. Hence a syllogism [composed out of *propositiones*] is neither a being *per se* nor a being *per accidens*, but it is contained under a middle term of that division of being, namely under true being. Hence a demonstrative syllogism composed out of things has neither subjective being in the mind, nor subjective being outside the mind, but it is only an objective being.\(^7^2\)

According to the *Quaes.Post*, then, the reason that a *propositio* composed out of things has objective being is because (a) it has true being, which being it has because (b) it is an intellectual composition. Now the notion of true being is developed in the *Quaes.Perih* and the *Comm.Perih* as well.\(^7^3\) And in both works, true being is the sort of being that a true sentence in the mind has, that is a *propositio* composed of things by the mind’s act of combining them. So the notion of objective being in the *Quaes.Post* does not seem to concern the irreducibility of something to one or more of the Aristotelian categories, but rather a certain unusual feature peculiar to sentences in the mind – namely, that they are, or can be, true beings.

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\(^7^2\) Walter Burley, *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum* (PIMS, 2000), para. 2.53, p. 63: “Ad ultimum dicitur negando istam consequentiam 'componitur ex rebus, ergo est res extra animam', quia ista compositio non est compositio realis, sed intelligibilis sive intellectualis. Unde syllogismus nee est ens per se nec ens per accidens, sed continetur sub termino medio divisionis ipsius entis, videlicet sub ente vero. Unde syllogismus demonstrativus compositus ex rebus nec habet esse in anima subjective nec esse extra animam subjective, sed solum esse objective. An ista responsio valeat, patebit alias.”

Of course, it is certainly possible that Burley means something different by ‘true being’ in the *Quaes.Post* that he did in earlier works; given Burley’s track-record, one might even expect it. However, it is important to note that, in the *Quaes.Post*, Burley explicitly links the notion of true being to the notion of an intellectual composition. This contrast between real and intellectual composition is in fact a persistent feature of Burley’s account of propositional content, a distinction Burley clearly sees as critical to the plausibility and success of that account. In the *Quaes.Perih*, for example, Burley writes that

[w]e need to understand that a sentence in the mind (*propositio in mente*) is not composed out of things by a real composition just as a house is composed out of wood and stones, but it is only an intellectual composition, which comes about due to the fact that the intellect thinks some things to be the same or [thinks them to be] diverse.74

The same claim is repeated at the end of Burley’s career. In his *Exp.Praed*, speaking about what in that work he calls the *propositio in re* he writes that

we need to know that a composition is of two kinds, namely, real and intellectual. An intellectual composition is a composition in which the intellect combines a subject with a predicate. A real composition is as a composition of a soul with a body, or as a house out of stones and wood.75

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An intellectual composition, in other words, is the product of the mind’s combining one thing with another. But this, of course, is a feature central to the Comm.Perih’s *propositio in intellectu*, rather than to its *propositio in re*! And, in both the *Quaes.Perih* and Comm.Perih, a *propositio* of that sort is said to have subjective, rather than objective, being.

All this suggests that the notion of objective being at issue in the *Quaes.Perih* is very different from the one at issue in the Comm.Perih. In the Comm.Perih, Burley is using the expression to get at certain feature(s) of a truthmaker – its irreducibility to some subject thing, and its mind-independence, perhaps. In the *Quaes.Post*, in contrast, Burley’s concern isn’t truthmaking but rather the essentially representational or truth-conditional, nature of propositional content.76 His use of ‘objective being’ in the *Quaes.Post*, then, is meant to capture the fact that propositional content, while typically composed of things that have subjective, extramental existence, is itself unique – a mental creation whose very essence is to represent the world.77

### 4. The Metaphysics of the Proposition II: Elizabeth Karger

We have good reason to believe that, on Burley’s theory, things outside the mind constitute the contents of expressions in natural and mental language and the objects of

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76 In the *Exp.Perih*, Burley appears to have reverted back to using ‘objective being’ in the way he did in the *Comm.Perih* – to denote entities which, while mind-independent, are not reducible to presently existing primary substances, their tropes, or their properties. For example, he argues that objective beings constitute the contents of empty names, such as ‘golden mountain’, and names of people who do not presently exist, such as ‘Cicero’.

77 In the *Quaes.Perih*, Burley identified this unique metaphysical aspect of propositional content by saying that it exists in a subject (i.e., the mind), but not as a real accident. Rather, it exists subjectively in the mind as a rational accident (*accidens secundum rationem*). See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.622, p. 251.
non-propositional cognitive activity, and that, because of this, the mind combines those very extramental things with one another, such that those extramental things compose propositional content, something capable of bearing truth and falsity. But the claim that the mind can combine extramental things with one another to form some truthbearing entity out of them sounds philosophically suspect to many scholars; in fact, it is in part because it sounds suspect that Cesalli felt the need to interpret that claim in the way he did in the first place. Is there a way to make sense of this claim in a way that both fits with Burley’s larger philosophical commitments and can itself be made to seem philosophically plausible, even if only prima facie? I argue that there is a way, and that the groundwork for it has been laid by Elizabeth Karger.

Karger’s brief article, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” compares, unsurprisingly, the commitments of Burley and the early Ockham to what Karger calls a mental sentence. With respect to Burley in particular, Karger is quick to point out that a mental sentence is not composed of concepts. On the contrary, mental sentences are “the “ultimate” sentences, those which can be signified by others, but which do not themselves signify anything.” As such, “mental sentences are composed, not of words, nor of concepts, but of “things.” And, Karger notes, “things” are the objects of cognition, most of which have extramental existence. “Reverting to

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78 The early Ockham’s theory differs from Burley’s in that only concrete particulars can be the extramental terms of mental sentences. General terms of mental sentences, in contrast, are merely ficta, which exist objectively in the mind. But this difference simply reflects a more general metaphysical disagreement that Burley and Ockham have over the existence of extramental universals, or properties.

79 Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 195.

80 Ibid., 196.
Burley’s claim that the terms of mental sentences [...] are “things,” and not words or concepts, we must, then, interpret him as saying that the terms of mental sentences are individuals or common natures and that they most likely exist extramentally.”81

However, though mental sentences are composed of things, mental sentences are sentences precisely because their structure is derived from a mental act of predication. The mind uses things, in other words, to form a mental sentence out of them, by predicating one of the other in various ways. The mind does this, Karger argues, by asserting the identity (in the case of an affirmative mental sentence) or non-identity (in the case of a negative mental sentence) of those things. Consequently, mental sentences are composed of “heterogeneous entities:” the terms of a mental sentence are things, which often extramental, but the copula – the mind’s combining or dividing those things – exists in the mind as an accident of it.

Karger argues that the theory of the mental sentence is found in both early and late logical commentaries, and is something to which Burley is committed throughout his long philosophical career. However, mental sentences are referred to by different expressions in the early and late works. Karger notes (almost in passing!) that “Burley himself referred to [mental sentences] in two different ways: in [Quaes.Perih] and [Comm.Perih], he called them “in mente” whereas in [Exp.Praed], he called them “in re.””82 Karger’s insight on this issue of terminology is extremely important. Unlike almost everyone else in the secondary literature, who attempts to connect, in some way, the accounts of the propositio in re set out in the Comm.Perih and the Art.Vet, Karger

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81 Ibid., 198–9.

82 Ibid., 195.
argues that the theory of the *propositio in re* articulated in the *Art.Vet* is in fact just the theory of the *propositio in mente*, or sentence in the mind, developed in the *Quaes.Perih* and *Comm.Perih*. In fact, in a footnote, Karger dismisses the claim that the theory of the real proposition developed in the *Comm.Perih* has anything to do with the theory of the real proposition developed in the *Art.Vet*.

It should be noted that Burley did not consistently use the expression “*propositio in re*” to denote the sentences he had originally called “*in mente*.” He sometimes used it to denote entities of a wholly different sort, which are not sentences in the ordinary sense, but rather actual states of affairs which happen to be apprehended by the intellect. He does so in the [*Comm.Perih...*].

What reason does Karger have for taking this line of interpretation? While she is never explicit, the reason is clear: the metaphysics and function of the real proposition in the *Art.Vet* map onto the account of the sentence in the mind (*propositio in mente*) set out by Burley in the *Quaes.Perih* and *Comm.Perih*, namely a complex entity composed of things by a certain complex mental act, which serves as the *significatum* of sentences in natural and mental language. The names have changed, in a perhaps unhelpful way, by the underlying theory is largely the same – a theory of what Karger calls the mental sentence.

Mental sentences play a central role in Burley’s semantic and cognitive accounts, according to Karger. They are the *significata* of sentences in natural and mental language. In fact, their structure mirrors the structure of the sentences that signify them. Just as sentences in natural and mental language contain two terms joined together by a copula, so too mental sentences contain the *significata* of those terms joined together by a mental act. Mental sentences are also products of complex cognitive activity, and so serve as the contents of belief and other attitudes. Indeed, as Karger points out, Burley does not

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83 Ibid., 193, n. 8.
recognize a force-content distinction. The mind’s combining or dividing – the copula of a mental sentence – always carries with it assertive force, so that belief, for example, just is the mind’s combining one thing with another in such a way that the mind asserts that they are identical or non-identical. Consequently, on Burley’s view, there can be no forceless content.

Karger’s analysis is an exciting and extremely promising account of a project central to Burley’s philosophy – the metaphysics of the proposition. It is surprising, then, that more scholars have not taken note of the interpretation that Karger develops. That Karger’s interpretation has been largely ignored in much of the rest of the literature, however, seems to me to be due to three main reasons. First, I think there has been a tendency in the literature to stick close to Burley’s use of his own vocabulary, and to see his use of that vocabulary in various works as a guide to the underlying theory. This seems to be the case, for example, with Conti, Cesalli and Rode; and those scholars are representative of the larger scholarship.

Second, at least some scholars have expressed doubt about Karger’s analysis because of what those scholars take to be unacceptable consequences of the position. In particular, scholars have rejected Karger’s claim that the “terms” of mental sentences – things – can have a certain semantic property: supposition. Rode, for example, explicitly cites this as a problem for Karger’s analysis when developing his own account of Burley’s project.84 This reaction in the scholarship is understandable. There are historical reasons to doubt that Burley would commit himself to the claim that things can supposit.

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84 Conti has expressed concerns about this consequence of the theory to me in personal communication as well.
The standard assumption in late medieval thought is that supposition is a property of signs. Even Ockham, who extends the theory of supposition beyond its usual application to natural language, still restricts supposition to signs. The claim, then, that things – the *significata* of signs – can supposit is extremely radical.

There are also textual reasons to doubt that Burley would endorse such a view. Burley explicitly treats the theory of supposition in two works: an early treatise titled *On Supposition* and a later work called *On the Purity of the Art of Logic*. In both works, Burley restricts his focus merely to the supposition of the terms of sentences in natural language. Moreover, Burley’s analysis of certain kinds of supposition – namely, simple and personal supposition – is articulated in terms of signification. Simple supposition is the kind of supposition a term has when it supposits for what it signifies. Personal supposition, in contrast, is the kind of supposition a term has when it supposits for its *supposita*, but the *supposita* of a term are analyzed in that work in terms of the signification of that term. If Burley were committed to the claim that things can supposit, however, one would expect that claim to receive at least some mention somewhere in the works that Burley writes about supposition.

This is a difficult feature of Karger’s interpretation – and, since I largely agree with Karger, of my own as well. However, two things can be said in response. First, while historical context can often be a helpful guide in figuring out the views of a particular philosopher, I would caution that relying too heavily on historical context can also become an obstacle to one’s scholarship. This seems to me one of those times, where too great a concern with historical context – specifically, too great a concern with what the theory of supposition has to be, given its usual treatment – has served to blind many
scholars to Burley’s actual project. Nor must Burley’s claim that things can supposit be seen as a complete rejection of the tradition. While I treat this issue fully in another chapter\(^{85}\), it is important to note that Burley, following the tradition, thinks that supposition is a property of a term in a *propositio*. Also following the tradition, Burley argues that supposition is the taking of something for something. That is, supposition is the use of something to represent something. The novelty of Burley’s position, then, is simply that he thinks that the taking of something for something needn’t be analyzed in terms of signification. That the supposition of terms in natural and mental language is analyzed in terms of signification, then, is not constitutive of supposition *per se*, but merely a consequences of the sorts of things that terms in natural and mental language are – namely, signs of things, rather than those things themselves.

Second – and this is one way\(^{86}\) in which my interpretation differs from Karger’s – I suggest that the reason that Burley does not mention that things can supposit in either *On Supposition* or *On the Purity of the Art of Logic* is that his claim that things as well as signs can supposit is a late development in his philosophy, one that occurs only after the composition of those works. It is a development brought on not just by his account of the proposition but also by a radical change in his metaphysics – in particular, his metaphysics of identity – and the consequences that that change has for his account of

\(^{85}\) See ch. 5, §5.

\(^{86}\) Another way in which Karger misinterprets Burley’s project is that – like Conti, Cesalli, and others – she claims that sentences in natural language signify things in only an indirect fashion, by first signifying sentences composed of concepts. In fact, the only scholar who seems to me to correctly understand Burley’s more general semantic view is Paul Spade, who argues that, for Burley (as for Ockham) the signification of things by expressions in natural language is direct. See Paul Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, 77–84, 142–46, http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf.
correspondence. In earlier works, Burley had no need for supposition theory in his analysis of the truth conditions of the proposition, because he held a complex account of identity, according to which, for example, particulars and common natures could be identical in some respect. Consequently, the mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates, for example, would be true just in case Socrates and the property of humanity were identical in some respect. Later in his career, however, perhaps in part because of criticisms developed by Ockham, Burley adopts a far simpler account of identity, one which entails that particulars such as Socrates and common natures such as the property of humanity are not identical in any respect. Consequently, Burley needs to explain how the mind’s asserting that Socrates is identical to the property of humanity can be true. And the solution Burley adopts is to claim that Socrates and the property of humanity are identical in their suppositis, that is, that the things for which they supposit are identical, since both supposit in that proposition for Socrates, and Socrates is identical to himself.

Karger, in contrast, argues that Burley was likely committed to the supposition of things as far back as the earliest articulation of his theory of the mental sentence, in the \textit{Quaes.Perih}, even if he was not explicit about it until the \textit{Art.Vet} nearly forty years later. Karger’s claim relies on a generalization from another claim that Burley makes in the \textit{Quaes.Perih}, that the terms of a mental sentence can be distributed. She writes that the \textit{Quaes.Perih} is a very remarkable text, revealing that, already in his early career, Burley was fully prepared to extend the property of distribution, originally assigned to terms of spoken or written sentences, to the terms of mental sentences [i.e. to things]. Distribution and supposition are properties of the same type, however, namely logical properties which terms have in sentences. It would be surprising, then, if
Burley had not been just as prepared to extend the property of supposition to terms of mental sentences [in that work].\textsuperscript{87}

But the property of distribution is essential to Burley’s early account of propositional content in a way that supposition it not, because Burley’s theory needs to account for truth-conditions of propositional contents in which subject terms are quantified relative to their predicates. It is because the property of humanity can be distributed, for instance, that truth of the proposition that every human is an animal is “saved” in its *supposita*, that is, “saved” in particular humans. The supposition of those terms, however, doesn’t play a central role – indeed any role, as far as I can tell - in Burley’s early account of propositional content and truth.

If supposition does not have an essential role to play in that account, however, it would not be surprising if Burley were not yet committed to the claim that things can supposit – it is, after all, a pretty radical claim. And that might explain, then, why Burley explicitly mentions that the terms of mental sentences have the property of distribution in the *Quaes.Perih*, but is silent when it comes to supposition – because he is committed to the former but not the latter. However, near the end of his career, when Burley comes to adopt a very different metaphysics of identity, his hand is forced. He needs the terms of mental sentences to supposit, because it is only in that way that he can make full sense of the truth conditions of propositions, given his view that what the mind asserts is a certain kind of identity (or difference) of its terms. And so, unsurprisingly, its only then, in the *Art.Vet*, that Burley acknowledges that things, the terms of what Karger calls a mental sentence, can supposit.

\textsuperscript{87} Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” 207.
Third, I think many scholars have not paid sufficient attention to Karger’s analysis because they find the very notion that the mind can combine things with one another utterly bizarre, committing Burley to something like psychokinesis. Karger does not say much to disabuse fellow scholars of this notion, unfortunately. But I believe that these concerns are largely unfounded. In fact, I argue that Burley himself was aware of the concern that his account committed one to psychokinesis (or something like it), and that he went to great lengths to disabuse his contemporaries of this notion. He stresses, for example, that mental sentences are not real but merely intellectual compositions. Burley’s point, I argue, is that the mind’s combining things together is just a more complex way of thinking about things. Just as the mind can think about Socrates, so too it can think about Socrates and humanity as related to each other in some way, namely, as being identical to one another, or identical in their supposit. Throughout this dissertation, I argue that we can understand cognitive activity generally in terms of a sui generis use the mind makes of the world, of which there are two sorts. Simple mental acts, where the mind thinks of some simple thing, involve a bare use – the use of that simple thing as an object of cognition. Complex mental acts, in contrast, involve more complexes uses of things – combining things in various ways such that the mind conceives that they are identical, or non-identical. This is not to dismiss the charge that the notion of use here is, in some way, mysterious. But that mystery has less to do specifically with the mind’s combining things with one another than it does more generally with the nature of the mental itself. Fortunately, however, I think Burley has

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88 Cesalli, for example, has expressed confusion to me about what it could possibly mean for the mind to combine extramental things together. I suspect that that reaction is representative of the larger scholarly community.
some important insights into the nature of the mental, insights which I explore in chapter 4.

Karger’s analysis of the relevant texts sketches an account of the metaphysics of the mental sentence, and it gives some indication of what mental sentences are for – the contents of sentences in natural and mental language, for example. But it is just a sketch – and a preliminary one at that. Far more work needs to be done to motivate that analysis – and, indeed, the metaphysical account of which it is an analysis. In the remainder of this dissertation, then, I intend to pick up the investigation where Karger left off. First (ch. 3), I situate the metaphysics of the proposition – the “sentence in the mind” of the early works, and the “real proposition” of the late – within Burley’s more general semantic and cognitive framework, arguing that that metaphysics is motivated by three deeper philosophical theses to which Burley is committed. Second, I argue that, contra Karger, Burley’s account of the proposition does in fact evolve over the course of his career.

Third (ch. 4), I examine the relationship between propositions, on the one hand, and sentences in a language of thought, on the other. Very little attention has been paid in the literature to Burley’s account of mental language, but it is important for three reasons. First, it constitutes an interesting account in its own right, a unique example – and perhaps one of the first – of the proliferation of theories of mental language in the first half of the fourteenth century. Second, it is central to Burley’s account of belief, among other attitudes, providing him tools to respond to potential problems that arise given his account of propositional content, on the one hand, and scientific knowledge, on the other. Third, it sheds some important light on Burley’s account of the nature of the mental itself.
Finally (ch. 5), I turn to Burley’s account of truth, and argue that that account evolves over the course of his career, due to philosophical pressures put on his early metaphysics. Because of that pressure, I argue, Burley adopts a radical thesis – that things as well as signs can have a certain semantic property: supposition. I examine what those pressures are, and how his use of the notion of supposition is meant to respond to them.

5. Conclusion

Scholars of Burley have long been at odds about what theory, exactly, Burley’s claim that the mind can combine things with one another represents, and moreover how successful that theory is. Most Burley scholars, such as Alessandro Conti and Christian Rode, understand Burley to be primarily concerned with the nature of states of affairs. But accounts of that sort face a number of difficulties: they are forced to make claims that contradict the plain reading of many texts, for example, and they seem to fit poorly with many of Burley’s more general philosophical commitments. Other scholars – rightly, in my view – conceive of that project not as primarily concerned with the metaphysics of states of affairs, but rather as primarily concerned with the nature of propositional content. But even given this general conception of the project, scholars disagree about the account of propositional content that Burley articulates. Laurent Cesalli, for example, argues that propositional contents are fundamentally a matter of the mind combining certain sorts of merely intentional objects with one another. Elizabeth Karger, in contrast, argues that Burley’s picture of propositional content is far more radically. On her reading, propositional contents, while constructed by the mind, are composed of things, most of which exist extramentally.
Of all the various interpretations that one finds of Burley’s project in the literature, I argue that Karger’s best fits with the particular claims that Burley makes, and the more general theories of meaning and mind that he develops over the course of his long philosophical career. But Karger’s analysis is brief, providing just a sketch of the metaphysics, and leaving the role of that project in Burley’s larger philosophical account relatively unarticulated. With that in mind, then, I turn to a deeper investigation into the metaphysics and function of the proposition in Burley’s larger semantic and cognitive theories in the following chapters.
CHAPTER THREE  
THE METAPHYSICS OF THE PROPOSITION  

1. INTRODUCTION  

In this chapter, I examine the development of Burley’s account of the metaphysics of the proposition. I argue that, for Burley, propositions are structured entities composed of things – for example, particulars such as Socrates and properties such as wisdom. They are intrinsically truth-conditionally, the primary bearers of truth and falsity, and they serve as the intentional content of one’s thoughts and the semantic content of declarative sentences in natural and mental language. The truth-conditional nature of the proposition is explained by a mental act of predicating one thing of another, since that act is the exercise of a certain representational capacity of the mind.¹  

Burley’s view of the proposition is motivated by three deeper philosophical theses to which he is committed. Burley is committed to a pair of semantic theses: (i) referentialism, the thesis that the semantic content (hereafter simply ‘content’) of a

¹ Burley discusses the metaphysics of the proposition in five works. His earliest work on the topic, a questions commentary on the *De Interpretatione (Quaes.Perih)*, was composed in 1301. There is some question about the precise date of his second work, a literal commentary on the *De Interpretatione (Comm.Perih)*. The received view has been that it was composed between 1308–1310. But recent scholarship (with which I agree) has suggested that it was composed shortly after the questions commentary, likely in 1302. For the recent scholarship, see Marta Vittorini, “Life and Works,” in *A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician*, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 31–2. The third work, a questions commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, was written sometime between 1301 and 1307; I believe the date of composition must be near the end of that range, since the works develops a theory of mental language that is absent in the questions and first literal commentaries on the *De Interpretatione*. The last two works – a literal commentary on the *Categories (Exp.Praed)* and a literal commentary on the *De Interpretatione (Exp.Perih)* – are part of a larger commentary project (*Art.Vet*) on the old logic, that is, on Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, Aristotle’s *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*, and a work by Gilbert of Poitiers, a 12th century logician, on the last six Aristotelian categories.
linguistic expression is the thing to which that expression refers, and (ii) **compositionality**, the thesis that the content of a statement is composed of the content of the terms of that statement relative to the syntax of the language. For example, given compositionality, ‘Socrates is a human’ has as its content a structured entity. That entity will be composed of whatever are the contents of ‘Socrates’ and ‘human’, its structure mirroring the grammatical form of the statement ‘Socrates is a human’. But, given referentialism, the contents of those two expressions will be Socrates and the property of humanity, respectively. In addition to these semantic commitments, Burley also endorses a third, alethic thesis: **intellectualism**. According to intellectualism, representing the world’s being some way or other is fundamentally something that the mind does.

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2 I use ‘semantic content’ as a translation of Burley’s expression ‘*significatum*. I assume a notion of semantic content in this dissertation according to which the semantic content of an expression is the denotation a hearer assigns to that expression, relative to any contextual factors salient to fixing that denotation (though, as it happens, the semantic content of most expressions, on Burley’s account, will be context-invariant). (On this notion of semantic content, see Jason Stanley, “Context and Logical Form,” *Linguistics and Philosophy* 23, no. 4 (June 1, 2000): 393–5). There is some scholarly debate about whether the notion of a *significatum* has any contemporary correlate. (That debate usually concerns whether there is any relationship between the notion of a *significatum* and the contemporary notion of meaning. But neither ‘meaning’ nor ‘*significatum*’ seem to me to enjoy the kind of technical precision in the respective philosophical communities in which they are used to allow that debate to be very fruitful. At best, one needs to go by cases). For Burley, at least, I do think we can treat the notion of a *significatum* of an expression and the semantic content of that expression as equivalent, since (for Burley) *significata* and semantic contents play similar roles and bear similar relations to expressions in natural and mental language.

3 The notion of compositionality I have in mind here is perhaps stronger than the standard notion, according to which compositionality requires only that the content of a complex, meaningful expression is a function of the parts of that expression. The notion I employ does seem to reflect an approach to content that has been and remains philosophically commonplace – for example, among those who are committed to structured propositions. In any case, I’ll use ‘compositionality’ and its cognates in that stronger sense throughout this dissertation.

4 ‘Statement’ is the closest English equivalent to Burley’s Latin expressions ‘*propositio*’ and ‘*enunciatio*’, which Burley uses as synonyms. ‘Statement’ is an appropriate translation in this context, for two reasons. First, a *propositio* is a particular kind of sentence or content - namely, one which is truth-evaluable. An interrogative sentence, for example, is not a *propositio*. So, rather than some more general term, like ‘sentence’, the specific expression ‘statement’ reflects this feature of a *propositio*. Second, *propositio* is (for Burley and others in the fourteenth century) ambiguous between a declarative sentence in natural language and the semantic content of that sentence. ‘Statement’ has the same kind of ambiguity.
Consequently, anything that is intrinsically truth-conditional – such as, on Burley’s view, a proposition – has to be explained in terms of a certain activity of the mind.

Intellectualism, on the one hand, and referentialism and compositionality jointly, on the other, might seem to pull in opposite directions, since intellectualism requires that representing is fundamentally explained in terms of the exercise of certain representational capacities of the mind, while referentialism and compositionality require that a proposition can be composed of things outside of the mind. Burley’s early metaphysics of the proposition reflects this seeming difficulty. On that early account, propositions are taken to be features of the mind, really identical to the mind’s act of predicating things, such that propositions inhere in the mind as accidents of it but are yet composed of things outside of the mind.

Perhaps motivated in part by the metaphysical difficulties of that view, Burley modifies his account of the metaphysics of the proposition at the end of his career. According to that later account, propositions are treated as structurally similar to hylomorphic (or “matter-form”) compounds. Consequently, Burley no longer regards propositions as features of the mind, really identical to mental acts of predicating. Rather, he takes propositions to be compounds of the mind’s act of predicating (the proposition’s “form”) and those things the mind uses in that act of predicating (its “matter”). However, unlike actual hylomorphic compounds, whose unity is accounted for by the inherence of a form in matter, Burley argues that propositions are united by intentio, a primitive kind of awareness that the mind possesses which unites mental acts with their objects.

I will proceed in two stages: first, I will examine Burley’s commitment to referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism, and the ways in which those
commitments bear on the kinds of features Burley suggests a proposition must have. I will then discuss how, constrained by those commitments, Burley’s account of the proposition develops over his career.

2. PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS

2.1. Referentialism

Referentialism is explicitly a thesis about the contents of categorematic expressions in natural (and mental) language – that is, the contents of nouns, verbs, and adjectives. According to referentialism, the contents of these sorts of expressions are the things to which they refer. ‘Socrates’, for example, has Socrates as its content, because

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5 I am inclined to think that Burley’s account also entails that sentences refer, since he argues that statements in natural language signify propositions. There are potential complications, however, since what Burley calls in the later theory the “formal” element of a proposition is not an object of mental activity, but rather is that very mental act itself, and so is not something that is signified by (the copula of) a sentence. (On Burley on sentential signification, see §7.) Burley could have followed the later Ockham, who argues that, strictly speaking, statements in natural language have no signification (though they are meaningful). On this account, sentences have what Susan Brower-Toland calls referential objects (i.e. the things signified by the terms of a sentence), but do not have any content-objects. See Susan. Brower-Toland, “Ockham on Judgment, Concepts, and The Problem of Intentionality,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2007): 98–9. See also ch. 4, §3, on the related issue of Burley’s non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes, a position related to Ockham’s later views on the nature of propositional content. Alternatively, we might see in Burley the early stages of what’s sometimes called the adverbial theory of signification, developed by (among others) Thomas Bradwardine, who was Burley’s junior colleague – though Burley himself appears to reject an adverbialist account proper in the prologue to the Exp.Praed. On an adverbial theory, a sentence’s signification is a matter not just of what is signified (the referents of the terms) but also how they are signified. On the adverbial theory, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, 180–2, http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf.

6 I assume (in this chapter, at least) that reference is a relation between an expression and the thing which that expression is about. I am inclined to think that Burley’s semantics incorporates not one but two reference relations. The first, discussed in this chapter, is dyadic and statement-independent; this is Burley’s notion of signification. It is a kind of reference that principally belongs to an expression (and so concerns linguistic meaning). The second, which we will discuss in chapter 3, is variably polyadic and statement- (or proposition-) sensitive, and is what Burley calls supposition. It is a kind of reference that principally belongs to the use of an expression (and so concerns speaker meaning). On reference, see Marga Reimer, “Reference,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, Spring 2010, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/reference/.
‘Socrates’ refers to Socrates. Likewise, ‘human’ has the property of humanity as its content, because it refers to that property. That a predicate expression like ‘human’ refers to the property of humanity is a consequence of Burley’s realism not only about particulars but also about properties. Burley maintains that the property of humanity has, like Socrates, real, extra-mental existence.\(^7\)

Burley’s referentialism is developed within discussions of signification, a notion central to medieval semantics. The notion of signification has its roots in Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione*, a work known to medieval philosophers via Boethius’ Latin translation. The central passage on the nature of signification from that work is found in a chapter on verbs, where Aristotle writes that a verb does indeed signify, because “the one who speaks it [i.e. a verb] establishes an understanding (*constituit intellectum*).”\(^8\) This notion of signification – that to signify is to establish an understanding – becomes the primary

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\(^7\) Earlier in his career, Burley defends a view according to which substantial properties (that is, certain kinds of universal features of reality) are real features of the world, but are only intentionally distinct from the particulars in which they inhere. By ‘intentionally distinct’, I take Burley to mean that particulars and their substantial properties are fully described in different ways. Really, however, particulars and their natures are the same, since neither is, on Burley’s view, existentially separable from the other. On the notions of real and intentional difference, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s *Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias*,” ed. Stephen Brown, *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974): para. 4.47, p. 273. Later in his career (following a devastating critique of his earlier view by William Ockham), Burley argues that properties - including substantial properties - are really distinct from the particulars upon which they depend. On this view, particulars are hylomorphic compounds of concrete matter and concrete form - in the case of Socrates, his body and intellective soul. While, then, concrete particulars possess various properties (e.g., Socrates possesses the property of humanity), none of those properties in any way constitute Socrates; Socrates would be who and what he is even if he did not possess the property of humanity. However, on Burley’s view, we would have no way to cognize or express what he is. See Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), *Exp.Praed*, d2vb–d3va.

notion of signification in medieval philosophy. To take just a small sample, we find it in the thought of the twelfth-century philosopher Peter Abelard, who argues that predicates, such as ‘human’, do not signify anything because “they establish no understanding of any thing.” We also find it in the writings of the mid-fourteenth century philosopher John Buridan, who notes that to signify “is described as being to establish an understanding of a thing. Therefore a word is said to signify that understanding which it establishes in us.”

Like most other medieval philosophers, the Aristotelian notion of signification is the primary notion of signification that Burley adopts. In his *De puritate*, for example, when distinguishing between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions, Burley argues that “every word that does not by itself establish an understanding is a

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9 Just like content and meaning for philosophers today, how best to analyze signification was a central issue for medieval philosophers. The standard analysis was taken from Aristotle. But, first, this was not the only notion of signification live in the medieval period. Second, even those who adopted Aristotle’s analysis as their primary notion of signification allowed that ‘signification’ is an ambiguous term, and that its other meanings are central notions in semantic theory as well; Burley, for example, writes in his later works that categorematic expressions in natural language primarily signify things, but secondarily signify the concepts in virtue of which they have the primary signification that they do (see Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perik*, k3va). And, third, the notion of the establishment of an understanding was analyzed differently by different philosophers; while some understood it to be a causal notion, for example, Burley does not define it in causal terms. In fact, beginning with William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, the notion of signification began to be incorporated into a larger semantic theory which minimized the psychological character of signification in favor a referential role of a term relative to its sentential context.


12 This is not to say it is the only use of ‘signification’ he employs. See ch. 4, p. 242–3, n. 89, on other uses of ‘significatio’.
syncategorematic expression.” The distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions plays an important role in medieval semantics. The distinction is, roughly, between words which signify by themselves and those which do not. In this passage, then, Burley appears to endorse the Aristotelian notion of signification, since he glosses that difference in terms of an expression’s ability, or lack thereof, to “establish an understanding.” Burley also makes the point more directly in the Exp.Perih. In that work, arguing that verbs, like nouns, are significative, Burley notes that verbs signify because to signify is to establish an understanding of something, and verbs establish an understanding of something. And, as we will see, it figures centrally in Burley’s response to another issue concerning signification.

The Aristotelian roots of the notion of signification provide an answer to what I will call the conceptual (or, in a more medieval vein, the formal) question about signification. But, besides the conceptual question, three other important sorts of questions remain. First, there is a question of origin: how do expressions come to have


14 This still leaves undetermined, however, whether syncategorematic terms have no signification or whether they have a signification, but only determinately when joined with categorematic terms. Burley argues that all terms have signification, though the signification of syncategorematic terms is determinate only when paired with an appropriate categorematic term. See Ibid., 27.

15 See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, l1va.

16 Note that these sorts of questions, and the answered supplied to them, are most convincing in the case of the signification of expressions in natural language. But Burley, like many philosophers in the late 13th and 14th century, also held that mental representations were signs. And it is not clear whether the standard responses to the typical questions raised about signification are adequate when mental representations themselves are considered signs. E.g., it does not seem that mental representations signify as they do in order to express one’s thoughts to others in her linguistic community. At best, then, the force of the answers to questions of this sort need to be restricted to signs of natural language.
the signification that they do? Burley’s account here relies on the notion of imposition. Expressions come to signify what things they do because someone imposes them onto those things, such that those things become the significates of those expressions. In fact, as we will see, Burley’s analysis of imposition involves an even deeper account, according to which expressions in natural language are imposed onto things by being subordinated to concepts in the mind, which concepts necessarily signify those things. Consequently, linguistic competence with an expression involves, on Burley’s view, the possession of the concept to which that expression is subordinated, and the use of that concept in the comprehension of that expression.

In addition to the question of origin, there is, second, the purposive question: for what purpose do expressions signify? Burley answers this question in both the *Comm.Perih* and the *Exp.Perih*. In both of those works, he claims that “utterances made to signify [something] are formed for expressing one’s thoughts,” writing that “conceptions of the mind are causes for the formation and imposition of an utterance.”

The purpose of natural language, then, is inter-personal. Language develops within a community so that members of that community can share their thoughts with one another.

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17 Burley does not tell us what he thinks the nature of an impositor must be. Is it an Adam figure, who sets out a language and the meaning of the words in it? Or is it any individual in a linguistic community who is fluent with the language? Or is it not any one individual in a given linguistic community but the community as a whole which sets and adjusts the signification of expressions in that language? All of these are live possibilities for Burley, but he does not provide enough evidence of his own position. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, *Franciscan Studies* 34 (1974): 207; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” ed. Stephen Brown, *Franciscan Studies* 33 (1973): 57.

Burley’s answers to the conceptual question, the purposive question, and the question of origin are fairly traditional, and he does not have much else to say about them besides providing those traditional responses. This rather cursory treatment of those issues of signification has led some to argue that Burley’s semantic theory does not contain any explicit theory of signification. While it is true that Burley does not treat in a very explicit and thorough-going fashion his answer to, among others, the conceptual question, claiming that he does not have any explicit theory of signification seems to me to be somewhat misleading, since it might suggest that issues of signification weren’t a concern for Burley. But Burley is, on the contrary, extremely interested in signification, and that interest is expressed, even if obliquely, at various places in his corpus. However, Burley’s primary interest in signification is almost wholly focused on a fourth question, which I call the content question: what is the nature of the content of an expression?

That this should be Burley’s principal concern about signification ought not to be at all surprising. At the end of the 13th century, medieval philosophers of language were concerned precisely with this issue. Duns Scotus, active a half generation before Burley, writes that there was during his time a “great altercation” about what an utterance primarily signifies. This altercation spread well into the fourteenth century. In one

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20 On the “great altercation,” see Giorgio Pini, “Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries,” *Vivarium* 39 (April 1, 2001): 20–51. I am taking some slight liberties with the relevant notions. In particular, different medieval philosophers often meant different things by ‘signification’ and its cognates (just as different philosophers today mean different things by ‘meaning’). But, as a general matter, I think it is helpful (especially for those unfamiliar with medieval philosophy of language) to conceive of the dispute as I have suggested, as one over the relationship between semantic content and reference.
camp, philosophers argued that expressions of natural language directly or primarily signify concepts. According to this position, things outside the mind are indeed signified by expressions of natural language, but only in an indirect or secondary fashion, because they primarily signify concepts, which signify those things in turn. Signification is, in other words, transitive, and that transitivity is essential to the signification of expressions in natural language. Philosophers in the opposing camp denied that expressions in natural language had to primarily signify concepts, arguing instead that those expressions can signify in a primary or direct fashion the very things that those concepts signify. What’s centrally at issue between these two sides is the role of concepts in semantic content. Those of the first camp believes that concepts are at least part (though not necessarily the only part) of the semantic content of an expression, serving as the primary objects of signification; the other camp rejects this, maintaining that concepts, while perhaps essential to an account of content determination, do not themselves figure into that content.


22 Or at least the view as we find it in the thirteenth century and onwards. It was during the thirteenth century that mental items, such as species, began to be thought of as signs themselves, signifying the extra-mental things of which they are species. Prior to that, a distinction was typically made between *symbola* (*notae* in Boethius’ translation), which are signs, such as conventional language, and *semeia* (*similitudines* in Boethius’ translation), which are likeness of things and are affections of the soul. See Aristotle, *Categories et Liber de Interpretatione*, 16a3–8, p. 49.

23 Roger Bacon is a well-known defender of such a view. Likewise, this is the view of the mature Aquinas, at least on one interpretation.
Burley himself was an active contributor to this debate; it is raised in all three of his commentaries on the *Perihermeneias*, which collectively span the whole of his intellectual career. In each of these commentaries, Burley defends the same position: expressions in natural language must be able to signify, in a direct or primary fashion, things outside the mind. Burley defends his position mainly by attacking the difficulties and, as he sees it, outright incoherence of the alternative. He begins with an argument concerning the conventionality of natural language. The contents of expressions of natural language are, as Aristotle himself recognizes, instituted *ad placitum*, conventionally. Yet, Burley argues, to hold that expressions of natural language must


25 Scholars disagree about whether Burley holds that expressions in natural language signify things. Alessandro Conti, for example, argues that Burley holds this view. See Conti, “Walter Burley”. But Laurent Cesalli argues that, on Burley’s account, expressions in natural language immediately signify concepts, and only signify things in a transitive fashion, on account of the representational content of those concepts. See Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 98–9. Cesalli stresses Burley’s claim in his questions commentary on the *De Interpretatione* that an expression in natural language signifies a thing “as it is proportioned to the intellect,” arguing that this suggests his interpretation of the account (Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.7, p. 212). But (1) that phrase appears nowhere else in Burley’s corpus, even in works that we written within a few years of that questions commentary, (2) what Burley intends by that phrase is unclear and (3) Burley considers and rejects in that very work the sort of view Cesalli attributes to Burley.

26 Burley makes an additional argument in the *Quaes.Perih* and *Comm.Perih* as well, that signification cannot be transitive, as his interlocutors require. He argues that otherwise ‘Socrates’ and ‘image of Socrates’ would signify the same thing – namely, Socrates – since ‘Socrates’ signifies Socrates and ‘image of Socrates’ signifies an image, which itself signifies Socrates. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.4, p. 208–9; Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s *Perihermeneias*,” para. 1.15, p. 55.

27 There is some debate whether the claim that the signification of expressions is *ad placitum* amounts to the claim that such signification is conventional, strictly speaking. Jennifer Ashworth, for example, has argued that *‘ad placitum’* ought not to be interpreted as ‘conventional’. *Ad placitum* literally means “at pleasure,” that is, at the pleasure of an impositor. So imposition appears to be a private or personal act - at least insofar as it is the impositor who unilaterally determines some semantic properties of an expression - with the result that expressions have the meanings that they do independent of their relationship either to other expressions in the language or the communicative intentions of the speakers.
primarily signify one’s concepts threatens the conventionality of natural language itself.

For the conventionality of natural language requires that one is able to make an expression signify whatever she wishes, no matter if that is a concept or the thing represented by that concept.

Similarly, this [i.e. the theory that expressions of natural language directly signify things] is confirmed, because if an utterance necessarily were to signify an affection of the soul [that is, a concept], as they say, <then> if I would want to impose some utterance to signify [something], it would be necessary for me to impose that utterance to signify an affection, whether I would want to or not. That is an absurd thing to say.28

One’s use of natural language is thus free in a way that Burley’s interlocutors are unable to respect. On his interlocutors’ view, the freedom of natural language consists in a person’s ability to make an expression signify whatever concept of hers she might wish. Burley objects that such a view fails to adequately construe how free natural language really is; one’s freedom to make an expression signify is total, in that she can impose that expression onto anything she wishes whatsoever, regardless of whether it is a concept or who use them. Conventionality, on the other hand, would seem to require conventions of trust and cooperation normative for a linguistic community as a whole which serve to determine the meaning of expressions in that language. But two things can be said here. First, Burley’s response to the purposive question - that signification is meant to express one’s thoughts to others - suggests that natural languages must be conventional, at least insofar as an impositor must intend her imposition and use of that expression to communicate her thoughts to others, and to understand others in turn. Second, it is not clear what notion of conventionality is operative in this discussion. There are weak notions of conventionality that seem to be consistent with the notion of *ad placitum* signification. For example, Stephen Laurence argues that the conventionality of natural language is weaker than the one employed in standard Gricean accounts of meaning, such that the platitude that language is conventional can be accommodated by theories according to which language acquisition and use is “a more or less automatic and autonomous process,” not dependent upon speaker and hearer intentions (Stephen Laurence, “A Chomskian Alternative to Convention-Based Semantics,” *Mind*, New Series, 105, no. 418 (April 1, 1996): 296).

28 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 209: “Similiter, hoc confirmatur, quia si vox necessario significaret passionem animae, ut ipsi dicunt, si vellem aliquam vocem imponere ad significandum oporteret me illam imponere ad significandum passionem sive vellem sive non; quod est absurdum dicere.”
a thing signified by a concept. Burley explicitly connects this notion of the freedom of natural language to its conventionality a little later in the text of the *Quaes.Perih*.

Furthermore, names are conventional. Therefore a name can be imposed to anything cognized, and this merely by the will of the one imposing [it]. Since therefore a thing outside [the soul] is cognized, a name is able to signify immediately a thing outside.\(^{29}\)

According to Burley, then, the conventionality of natural language requires that expressions can be made to signify whatever one wishes; conventionality requires freedom on the part of a user of a language to make a term signify not just concepts but also the things that those concepts naturally signify.

Yet, as his argument makes clear, Burley does not think that expressions can be imposed on anything whatsoever. Rather, expressions can only be imposed by somebody onto something *which is cognized* by that individual. Burley’s views on signification, then, are at least circumscribed in this way. But Burley does not regard this as a restriction on the conventionality of natural language. And that Burley does not regard it as a restriction should not be surprising, if signification is analyzed along Aristotelian lines, that is, in terms of the establishment of an understanding. Imposition requires that an individual is aware both of the expression and of that onto which the expression is imposed, so that she can actually impose the former on the latter, and thereby establish a semantic connection between the two.

Burley’s interlocutors, of course, will respond that their position does in fact respect the conventionality of natural language. What they will reject, however, is that the

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immediate object of one’s thought is something external to the mind. Since, on their view, what is “established in the understanding” is a concept, rather than a thing, and given the epistemic restriction on signification (and so imposition), freedom of imposition can only extend to the concepts that one has. Thus the disagreement over the conventionality of natural language – whether conventionality consists only in one’s ability to make an expression signify any concept of hers that she wishes, or in her ability to signify as well things outside the soul – is, at root, a disagreement about cognitive psychology. For one’s views on certain issues in cognitive psychology, according to the theory of signification under consideration here, must have a direct bearing on the theory of signification that one adopts. The disagreement, in effect, is a disagreement over what it means to “establish an understanding,” and in particular what is the nature of the thing understood.

To support his argument about the conventionality of language, therefore, Burley turns his attention exclusively to issues of cognitive psychology. Those who argue that the immediate contents of expressions in natural language must be concepts hold such a view, argues Burley, because they have an incorrect view about the nature of cognition generally, and the role and nature of concepts in cognition in particular. Burley’s targets in his early and late works are different, however. In the *Quaes.Perih*, Burley prefaces arguments on behalf of his interlocutors by noting that they say that an affection is not a species received in the intellect nor even an act of thinking, but it is the term of an act […] it is something fabricated by the intellect, as it were a certain image in which the intellect sees the thing outside [the mind].

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Those who think that expressions primarily signify concepts are led astray, Burley argues, in part because they take concepts to be neither species inhering in the soul (i.e. subjective features of the mind that are the mental vehicles of content) nor even to be acts of thinking (i.e. actualizations of the capacity to think, where the contents of those thoughts are determined by species), but rather products of acts of thinking, something like an image of the thing thought, fashioned wholly by the intellect in the act of thinking, to which that act is directed.\textsuperscript{31} It is via this constructed image that the intellect is able to “see,” as it were, the thing itself represented by that image. This view closely resembles what many in the literature have labeled the “\textit{fictum} theory” of concepts, variations of which were defended by a number of philosophers in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{32} According to such a theory, concepts are neither species nor acts

\textsuperscript{31} Granting that Burley’s interlocutors accept that to signify is to establish an understanding, it should not be surprising that they would go on to endorse the thesis that whatever is a sign is a sign of the thing signified. For everyone agrees that our written and spoken language are in some way about the world and not merely about one’s mental makeup. Once one regards some mental entity signified by speech as a sign of the world, it would appear natural to think that the relationship between mind and world is one of signification. But given this, only by endorsing the transitivity of signification will conventional language be about not just objects in our minds but the things that those objects represent.

\textsuperscript{32} It is not clear to me whom Burley has in mind here. Giorgio Pini has suggested that the view rests on a particular interpretation of Aquinas according to which the \textit{verbum mentis} is neither the act of thinking nor the thing which the thought is about but an intermediary through which that the object of cognition is seen. See Giorgio Pini, “Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century,” \textit{Medieval Philosophy and Theology} 8, no. 1 (September 1, 1999): 49–50. Aquinas does at points identify the \textit{verbum mentis} as a \textit{conceptus}, which Burley elsewhere in \textit{Quaes.Perih} regards as analogous to \textit{idolum}. But I have not found Aquinas using ‘\textit{idolum}’ synonymously with ‘\textit{verbum}’ or ‘\textit{verbum mentis}’. Furthermore, Aquinas himself does not seem to make any of the sorts of arguments Burley considers here. However, that these arguments have some historical antecedent cannot be dismissed, for we find the same arguments (in the same order, in fact) being given by Peter Auriol in his commentary on the Sentences. It seems likely, then, that someone has made arguments at least similar in kind to those Burley and Auriol offer on behalf of their interlocutors. See Peter Auriol, “Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum,” The Peter Auriol Homepage, July 25, 2011, d.9, a.1; d. 27, pars 2, a. 1, http://www.peterauriol.net/editions/electronicscriptum/contents/. The arguments may stem from an early
of the mind, but rather the products of mental acts, which exist merely objectively in the intellect. That is, they are not real, or subjective, features of the mind; rather, they are merely the contents of a feature of that sort. It is just this notion of a concept, and the larger cognitive psychology it presupposes, that Burley will go on to reject.

The main line of objection that Burley takes against this sort of view concerns the nature of immanent action. In particular, Burley argues that cognitive processes, such as an act of thinking, are actions “remaining in the agent,” that is, they are acts whose putative effects would not be outside and independent of the agent herself. On this, Burley and his opponents agree, since his opponents argue that the concepts involved in cognition exist only objectively in the mind, that is, in it as mere contents. But, Burley argues, this account of cognition is rejected both by philosophical authority and by reason. First, Burley argues that “no philosopher claims that something is produced in an agent, through an action remaining in the agent, which is really different from that action,” and he goes on to cite texts in support of that claim both from Aristotle and from Averroes. In other words, philosophical tradition teaches us that immanent actions are not the sort of actions that have products, or at least not products really different from them.

follower of Thomas. Thomas Sutton, a late 13th century follower of Aquinas, explicitly claims that the verbum mentis is distinct from the act of thinking. See Quodlibet 1.17 in Thomas of Sutton, Quodlibeta, (Munchen: Verlag der Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969), 115–23. Hervaeus Natalis is a likewise a possible source, though I have so far not found the arguments in Hervaeus work, and most scholars think his works post-date 1301.

However, for Ockham at least, it is important to note that he rejects the view that spoken nouns and verbs signify these concepts. Rather, he argues that what they signify are the things represented by such concepts.

In addition to philosophical authority, Burley also argues that we have rational grounds to reject that picture of cognition. In the first place, he argues that we have no reason to postulate cognitive contents of this sort when the things which they represent could just as well be the immediate objects of our cognition. There is no explanatory point, then, in introducing such representational intermediaries. Moreover, Burley argues that the view in question misconstrue the processes of cognition. The view of his interlocutors, Burley notes, requires that one have immediate epistemic access only to some representational mental content, and access to what it represents only via that content. But “the intellect does not think about something existing in it except through reflection. [But] direct intellection precedes reflexive intellection.” On Burley’s view, reflexive, or second-order, mental activity psychologically depends on non-reflexive, or first-order, mental activity. And what distinguishes first- and second-order mental activity is the nature of their objects. Assume, then, that first-order mental activity does indeed produce a concept (of the sort his interlocutors endorse). Even if that were so, that concept could not be what one thinks about in that act, because one thinks about what exists within the mind only reflexively. Rather, something else must be the object of the mental act in which that concept is formed, namely something that exists outside of the mind. But then, Burley argues, that concept is otiose. First, it is not itself the content of first-order thought. Second, it is not necessary for content-determination, since the mind’s possession of a species, that is, a mental representation that in the mind as a quality of it, can already account for the content of thought.


36 Ibid.
The works in which Burley attacks a fictum-style account of concepts were written in the first decade of the fourteenth century, at a time when those views were philosophically popular. At the end of Burley’s rather long career, however, views of that sort had fallen out of philosophical fashion. So it is unsurprising that Burley’s philosophical target with respect to these sorts of issues shifts in the later works. Instead of an account of concepts according to which concepts exist objectively in the mind as products of mental activity, Burley considers an account according to which concepts are “species,” that is, accidental features of the mind by which mental acts have the content that they do. And, unlike the earlier fictum theory of cognition, which he rejects entirely, Burley agrees with his interlocutors that such accidents play a crucial role in the process of cognition.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, because Burley recognizes that the signification of an expression, just like thinking itself, is mediated by cognitive processes (even if the content of that expression is something outside the mind), Burley argues that those accidents play a central role in the process of signification as well.\textsuperscript{38}

Because Burley agrees with his interlocutors that concepts of this sort are involved in cognition, and so signification, Burley’s approach to his interlocutors in the

\textsuperscript{37} It is important to note that, while Burley rejects the view that ficta are the significata of non-sentential expressions, he holds in his earlier commentaries on the Perihermenerias at least that the significata of sentential expressions are ficta. See, e.g., Ibid., 60. While it is unclear why Burley would hold this position (given his forceful rejection of ficta elsewhere), it seems to me likely that it has something to do with the truth-conditional nature of the proposition, a nature which the referents of sub-sentential expressions lack.

\textsuperscript{38} In the Quaes.Perih, Burley denies that there are concepts. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in Librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.8, p. 259. But by ‘concept’ he means a fictum in that work. Moreover, he accepts in that work that the mind possesses species, that is, subjective mental representations – which he calls concepts in the Art.Vet. Consequently, the psychological account is the same both works, even if the vocabulary is slight different.
Arts Vetus is more nuanced than his approach to his earlier interlocutors. He writes that Aristotle’s claim that nouns and verbs signify “affections of the soul,” that is, concepts, can be understood in two ways. In the first way, nouns and verbs signify affections of the soul such that they are the things which nouns and verbs are primarily imposed to signify. In the second way, it can be understood that they [i.e. nouns and verbs] signify affections of the soul such that they are the things by whose mediation they [i.e. nouns and verbs] are imposed to signify.\(^{39}\)

Burley’s interlocutor argues that expressions in natural language signify concepts in the first way, namely, as the thing onto which expression are imposed.\(^{40}\) But Burley argues that “it is not necessary that nouns and verbs signify affections of the soul in the first way.”\(^{41}\) Burley’s argument on this score follows a similar trajectory of his criticisms of the previous view. Just like the fictum-style view, Burley argues that an account of this sort unduly restricts the conventionality of language, and that because it relies on an implausible account of cognition, according to which concepts are the immediate objects of thought.\(^{42}\)

However, Burley is willing to concede that expressions in natural language signify concepts in the second way. That Burley is willing to concede this much reflects the picture of cognition that he wants to endorse. Burley writes that


\(^{40}\) It is not clear who, if anyone, Burley has in mind here. However, a possible target might be John Buridan. While Buridan rejects the doctrine of intelligible species, he does argue that expressions in natural language primarily signify concepts, and things only secondarily. See John Buridan, *Summulae de Dialectica*, 11.


\(^{42}\) It seems that Burley assumes that what an expression signifies, that is, what it “establishes in the understanding” is what an expression makes one think of. But it seems to me perfectly reasonable to regard these as separate relations, so that what we think of it not what the expression signifies, but what its significate signifies. Buridan might be someone who holds this position.
In an act of thinking we must consider three things, namely, the thing thought and the thinking intellect itself, and the species by whose mediation the thing is understood, so that that species is not that which primarily is thought but the thing primarily is thought by the mediation of the species.43

Every act of thinking involves three things: a thing which is thought, a thinking intellect, and a concept. But the role of that concept is not to be the immediate content of the act of thinking and something in which the intellect “sees” that which the concept represents. Rather, a concept is that by whose mediation a thought has the particular content that it does. In other words, concepts are vehicles for content; they are content-determiners, rather than contents themselves. And since they are not the contents of thought, they are also not the contents of expressions of natural language.44

Because signification is articulated in terms of epistemic notions, it is unsurprising that Burley draws close parallels between signification and cognition.

In an act of signifying we find again three things: an utterance signifying, a thing signified and a species of the thing by whose mediation the thing is signified. And just as a species is not that which primarily is thought, so a species is not that which primarily is signified but [rather] the thing [is signified] by the mediation of the species.45


44 I argue in chapter 4 that concepts mediate cognition by constituting acts of thinking themselves. See ch. 4, §§3, 5. On this picture, cognitive activity just is the occurrence of a particular concept in the mind. A thought of Socrates, for example, just is the occurrence of the concept Socrates in the mind, and that thought has Socrates as its content precisely because Socrates represents (indeed, on Burley’s view, signifies) Socrates. But however that mediation is articulated, it is clear why Burley would want to deny that concepts need to constitute the contents of thought: because concepts are merely vehicles of content, not (typically) contents themselves. On medieval theories of mental representation, see Peter King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental Representation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), 81–100.

Since expressions in natural language can be made to signify whatever we can think, but since what we are able to think is determined by the concepts we possess, those concepts mediate for us not only thought but signification as well.46 This is due, in the first instance, to the act of imposition, since, whenever an expression is imposed on something, it is imposed on it by an individual, an individual who has that thing in mind. But she only has that thing in mind when she uses a concept which represents that thing. Imposition, then, establishes a certain semantic relationship between expression and thing only by establishing a more fundamental connection between that expression and a concept, in which the expression is paired with, or subordinated to, that concept.47

Because imposition works in this way, moreover, linguistic comprehension itself involves that connection between expression and concept. ‘Socrates’ successfully signifies Socrates for somebody when it makes that individual think of Socrates. But ‘Socrates’ makes him think of Socrates only because, when hearing or seeing ‘Socrates’, that individual makes use of the concept SOCRATES, and so has a thought of Socrates.

46 Burley claims in both the Comm.Perih and the Exp.Perih that, whereas spoken language signifies conventionally, affections of the soul signify naturally. His argument for this claim rests on the premise that what signifies the same for all signifies naturally. But he never offers an argument for why affections of the soul should be said to signify, naturally or otherwise. A likely explanation of this claim, however, rests on the definition of signification itself, since affections in the soul do establish an understanding. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 53.

47 We can think of the relationships between concepts and expressions as causal, upon which the semantic relations that expressions have to things depend. Burley himself suggests that the relationship between concepts and expressions established in imposition is causal, writing that “conceptions of the intellect are the causes for the formation and imposition of expressions” onto things (Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4ra).
The way in which expressions signify concepts, then, is not semantic. That is, concepts do not figure into the semantic content of an expression. Rather, the way in which Burley understands expressions to signify concepts is best understood along the lines of what Paul Grice calls natural meaning. Natural meaning is factive. Something’s naturally meaning so-and-so entails that so-and-so is the case. And the signification of concepts by expressions does seem to be factive. One’s competent use of ‘Socrates’, for example, requires that one uses (and so possess) the concept SOCRATES. It cannot be the case that one’s use of ‘Socrates’ signifies that one possesses that concept, but in fact she does not possess it. Natural meaning is also involuntary. Considering a case in which spots mean that one has measles, Grice argues that one “cannot argue from ‘These spots mean (meant) measles’ to any conclusion about ‘what it is (was) meant by those measles’.” Similarly, it would be incorrect to say that what someone meant by her use of ‘Socrates’ was that she possessed the concept SOCRATES. With respect to a sense of signification something like Grice’s natural meaning, then, Burley is perfectly willing to admit that expressions signify concepts. The key mistake of his interlocutors, however, is to confuse this notion of signification with the notion of signification that is at issue in semantics, and communication more broadly.

2.2. Compositionality

The contents of simple cognitive acts, therefore, are things in the world, things which can exist independently of the mind. Consequently, linguistic expressions will have those things as their semantic contents, because of the nature of signification itself.

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49 Ibid., 377.
Thus the content of an expression will be a thing outside the mind. Burley combines this commitment to referentialism with a commitment to a principle of compositionality. Writing about the nature of the content of statements in natural and mental language, for example, Burley argues that “through a statement in speech and even one in concept, some complex thing is signified which is not properly something signified precisely through the subject, nor a thing signified through the predicate, but it is an aggregate of these.”\textsuperscript{50} The content of a statement in natural or mental language, then, will be a structured entity composed of the content of the subject and predicate terms of that statement, respectively. ‘Socrates is a human’, for example, has as its content a structured entity composed of Socrates and the property of humanity. In other words, Burley endorses a principle of compositionality, according to which the content of a complex expression in natural language is built up from the contents of the expressions which compose it given the syntactic structure of that complex expression.\textsuperscript{51} The content of a statement, for example, will be built up from the content of the subject and predicate terms of that statement relative to its predicate structure, such that the content of that statement contains the contents of the terms of that statement as components.

\textsuperscript{50} Walter Burley, \textit{Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed}, g6rb: “Et ex hoc patet quod per propositionem in voce et etiam in conceptu significatur aliqua res complexa quae non est proprie aliqua res precise significata per subiectum, nec res significata per praedicatum, sed aggregatum ex his, et illa res quae est ultimum et adequateum significatione propositionis in voce et in conceptu est quaedam ens copulatum, et propter hoc potest dici propositio in re, sicut declaratum est in principio huius libri.” ‘Aggregate’ here should not be understood to mean that these entities lack structure, but as a quasi-technical term denoting a complex entity (which, in this case, at least, has structure).

\textsuperscript{51} In point of fact, it seems to me that Burley has not three fundamental commitments here but two: referentialism and intellectualism. Compositionality is rather a consequence of Burley’s commitment to intellectualism, since intellectualism explains how complex semantic contents are built up from more basic contents. However, compositionality is still a commitment (just not a fundamental one), and together with referentialism provides for one common view of the nature of propositional content.
Referentialism and compositionality together provide a powerful analysis of the content of statements in natural language, one which philosophers have found and continue to find attractive. On such an analysis, the syntactic structure of language reflects the metaphysical structure of content itself. Because of this symmetry, complex, meaningful expressions can be built up from just a few basic, meaningful symbols in that language. Given his commitment to referentialism and compositionality, then, it should not be surprising that Burley’s defends a theory according to which propositions are structured entities composed of things – indeed, we should expect it.

2.3. Intellectualism

While referentialism and compositionality motivate a neat analysis of the proposition, it is only a partial analysis, since propositions are the sorts of things that have truth conditions. Indeed, many take propositions to be the primary bearers of truth and falsity. Statements in natural language, for example, have truth values, but those truth values are derived from the propositions that they express. Burley himself endorses this view, writing that “a spoken statement is said to be true for this reason, that it is significative of something true, i.e., for this reason, that it is suited by its nature to signify

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52 In terms of the contemporary landscape, I have in mind here neo-Russellians such as Scott Soames, Jeffrey King, and Nathan Salmon.

53 A bit more has to be said here, of course, about how exactly grammatical structure should be conceived, such that it reflects logical structure. Burley’s account on this point depends centrally on the role of the copula. Burley argues that the copula does not itself cause the mind to conceive of some distinct thing but rather “conveys” (importat) to the mind that the significates of its subject and predicate terms ought to be conceived as subject and predicate, respectively. But such conception is, on Burley’s account, just the mind’s predating one of the other. The role of the copula, then, is not to signify some distinct thing but to convey a certain truth-conditional structure composed of things; its function is to express structure rather than to have content (at least insofar as we have understood content in this paper). On Burley’s analysis of the copula, see Walter Burley, De puritate artis logicae, 1st Edition (Louvain: The Franciscan Institute, 1951), 54–55; 218–20. See also Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6rb–vb.
something true.”54 Statements in natural language have alethic properties, then, but only because they express propositions which have those alethic properties primarily. Of course, referentialism and compositionality might provide us with an account of why statements in natural and mental language express structured entities of a sort. But they fail to account for why such structured entities themselves have truth conditions.

One possibility is that the truth-conditional character of the proposition is a primitive feature of it. On an account of this sort, we simply cannot offer an explanation for why propositions have truth conditions. They simply do, and consequently the things which express them (i.e. statements in natural and mental language) do so as well. Burley rejects entreaties to primitivism, however. Rather, he analyzes the truth-conditional character of the proposition in terms of the more fundamental capacity of cognitive agents to represent, that is, to conceive of ways in which the world might be structured. On Burley’s account, the proposition’s ability to represent is explained in terms of the mind’s predicating one thing of another – where such predicating activity is the exercise of a capacity to represent. That predicating activity produces a structured entity, composed of the things towards which that activity is directed and having the truth conditions that it does because of the representational character of that act itself. The act of predicating humanity of Socrates, for example, produces a proposition composed of Socrates and the property of humanity, structured in a truth-conditional way. The mental act of predicating, then, accounts for the proposition’s having truth-conditions, because

that proposition is formed by a cognitive agent, i.e., by an agent exercising some capacity to represent.

That analysis of the truth-conditional character of the proposition is motivated by a certain alethic thesis: intellectualism. Intellectualism is the view that representing the world’s being a certain way is fundamentally something that the mind does, so that things which have truth conditions do so only on account of their relationship to such activity – either partly on account of that activity, if their truth conditions are extrinsic to them (such as statements in natural and mental language) or wholly on account of it, if their truth conditions are intrinsic to them (such as propositions).55

Burley’s commitment to intellectualism is most apparent in his discussions of the nature of truth. Those discussions can be found at various points in his career, but one of his lengthier discussions of the nature of truth comes in the *Comm.Perih*, written near the beginning of his career.56 In the work, Burley argues that there are two species of truth. “Truth is taken up in two ways: in one way it is the correspondence of a thing to an intellect and in another way it is the correspondence of an intellect to a thing, and in just the same ways the false is spoken of opposed to it.”57 The first kind of truth that Burley

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55 One could argue (as Jeffrey King does) that the truth conditions of a proposition (or, at least, what is a candidate to fulfill the role of proposition) are extrinsic to it. However, Burley’s view entails that propositions are intrinsically truth-conditional, precisely because their existence is explained in terms of a mental act of conceiving the world as being some way or other. On King’s view of propositions and their truth-conditions, see Jeffrey C. King, *The Nature and Structure of Content* (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2009), 25–64, and esp. 59–64.

56 He provides a similar account in his late commentary on the *De Interpretatione*. See Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih*, k4ra–b. In that work, however, Burley argues that truth involves the correspondence of the thinking power (virtutis cognoscentis) to the cognized thing. That is, correspondence is a matter of the correspondence of the mind’s activity (such as predication) to the world.

mentions, in which a thing corresponds to the mind, is causal, and we can set aside causal
notions of truth for our purposes here. The other kind of truth – a representational rather
than a causal notion – involves the correspondence of a mind to a thing in the world. It is
in his articulation of this representational notion of truth (hereafter ‘truth’) that we find
Burley’s commitment to intellectualism.

According to Burley, truth can be realized in two ways: “either [i] because the
intellect has complete knowledge of a thing or [ii] because the intellect asserts things to
be the same which are the same or asserts things to be different which are different.”

Our purposes concern the second sort of truth that Burley mentions here. But, in brief, the
first sort concerns having what Burley calls complete knowledge (completam notitiam) of
a thing, that is, it concerns the mind’s ability to have deeper or more superficial insight
into the metaphysical structure of a thing. For example, the thought of a human qua
human and the thought of a human qua rational animal (on a traditional conception of the

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58 Causal notions of truth concern the dispositions of things to produce mental states which more or less
accurately represent those things. Burley’s example here is counterfeit, or false, currency, which is false
precisely because it tends to make one conceive of it as something other than what it really is (i.e. as
actual currency). See ch. 5, §§2, 7. The notion of truth relevant to cognitive activity, like the mental act
of predication, is not a causal but rather a representational notion. Like representational notions of truth,
Burley explains causal notions in terms of correspondence, though in these cases the direction of fit runs
in the opposite direction: from the world to a mind.

See also Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k4rb.

60 Burley articulates the notion of complete knowledge in terms of concept possession. As was noted in
§2a, on Burley’s account of cognition, cognitive activity depends on one’s possession of a concept which
represents the thing to which that cognitive activity is directed. But one’s conceptual structure can be
more or less articulated. The concepts HUMAN and RATIONAL ANIMAL both represent, on Burley’s
view, the property of humanity. But only the latter articulates in any respect the metaphysical structure of
that property. Consequently, on Burley’s view, a thought of the property of humanity which is mediated
by the possession of the concept RATIONAL ANIMAL will more truly grasp the world as it is than one
which depends on the possession of the concept HUMAN. That analysis does seem to entail that the role
of a concept in cognition is not merely cognitive but has some epistemic significance. It is not clear to me
how to reconcile this analysis with Burley’s rather forceful anti-epistemic account of the role of concepts
in his discussion of signification.
nature of humanity) are both about the same thing. But, Burley argues, the latter involves deeper insight into the metaphysical structure of that thing than the former, and so involves having more complete knowledge of it. That first sort of truth, then, concerns simple cognitive activity – thinking-of rather than thinking-that.

The second sort of truth that Burley mentions, in contrast, concerns complex mental activity – what Burley calls the activity of “composition and division.” The activity of composition and division, Burley tells us elsewhere, is a certain predicative activity that the mind can perform. In the Exp.Praed, for example, Burley writes that “I believe that this is undoubtedly true, that in some statement a thing is predicated of a thing […]. Hence the intellect can combine with one another every simple thing which has been apprehended through the intellect.” What the mind can predicate, and predicate of, therefore, is anything which the intellect has cognized in an act of simple cognition – which, given Burley’s commitment to direct realism, will be things.

On Burley’s analysis, then, the mind represents the world’s being a certain way by predicating one thing of another. The mind represents that Socrates is a human, for example, by predicating humanity of Socrates. Burley argues that the mind’s

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63 Those exceptions are what Burley calls *entia copulata*, such as the proposition. On the notion of an *ens copulatum*, see §4.

64 As we will see in chapter 5, Burley’s theory of truth is a correspondence one, but intellectualism needn’t, I think, commit one to a correspondence theory; Ockham, for example, seems to me to defend an intellectualist theory of truth which doesn’t involve correspondence. Burley’s theory of correspondence evolves significantly over his career. In his early career, Burley favored an account of correspondence according to which a proposition is true just in case the things represented to be the same or represented
representing in this way is to be understood in terms of its asserting either the identity or
the non-identity (depending on the quality of the assertion) of the things used in the act of
predication.65 “[I]f the intellect asserts some things to be the same, then it combines them
with one another, but if it asserts things to be different, then it divides them from one
another.”66 Consequently, by predicating (in a positive fashion) humanity of Socrates, the
mind thereby asserts that Socrates is a human.

Burley’s account of truth, then, supplemented by his other, semantic
commitments, entails that propositions are structured wholes, composed of things
to be different are the same or are different in fact. But that account required a metaphysics which Burley
was forced to abandon, in light of criticism from William Ockham. Pressed to adopt a metaphysics not at
all amenable to his earlier account, Burley developed a new account of correspondence, one which is
articulated primarily in semantic rather than metaphysical notions. On the evolution of Burley’s account
of correspondence, see Nathaniel Bulthuis, “Properties in Walter Burley’s Later Metaphysics,” in
Responses to Ockham, ed. Christian Rode (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). See also ch. 5.

65 Burley does not appear to recognize a distinction between force and content. I do not think this was an
oversight on Burley’s part, since the distinction between force and content was widely recognized at this
point in philosophical history (See, e.g., Giorgio Pini, “Scotus on Assertion and the Copula: A
Comparison with Aquinas,” in Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-assertive Language: Acts of the
14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11-15, 2002, ed. Alfonso
Maierù (Firenze: L.S. Olschki, 2004), 324–31). Rather, I take his position to be motivated by the view
that cognition involves not two stages (content production, and then force, or attitude) but one stage, in
which one’s force is embedded within the structure of the proposition produced. It also suggests that
Burley details only a part of his theory of the proposition. Burley’s concern in his logical texts is
primarily belief contexts. Consequently, it is not surprising that theory would be developed in terms of
assertion. But it seems that, in other contexts, complex mental activity might not involve assertion but
rather denial, for example, or mere entertainment. These propositions would still have a predicative
structure, but their force would not be assertive. Moreover, it seems to me the theory could be expanded
to include imperatival, jussive, and interrogative contexts. (Alternatively, then, perhaps mere
entertainment involves predicating things in an interrogative fashion, and denial in a negative – though
still assertive – fashion.) In these contexts, the propositions produced would not have truth conditions,
but rather other sorts of satisfaction conditions. On that picture, differences in mood, like differences in
force, would involve differences in propositional structure.

66 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60–
1. See also Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.553, p. 249;
Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c3vb.
arranged in a certain truth-conditional structure by the predicative activity of the mind.67

One consequence of that view is that propositions alone are intrinsically truth-conditional. Houses and humans, for example, are structured, but they do not by their very nature represent the world as being some way or other. Rather, they are “real” objects in the world, existing independently of cognitive activity, in virtue of which the world is some way or other in fact. The truth conditions, if any, of a “real “object (such as a particular vocal utterance, like ‘Socrates is a human’) won’t be completely explained by anything intrinsic to that object itself but rather will be explained at least in part by the mind’s use of that object as truth-conditional.68 By contrast, propositions by their very nature represent the world’s being some way or other, in virtue of the fact that they are

67 More precisely, things arranged into a certain kind of token structure by the predicative activity of the mind. This speaks to what I take to be the most important difference between medieval and contemporary accounts of propositional content: with few exceptions, medieval philosophers took propositions to be concrete particulars, whereas it is almost a platitude in contemporary analytic philosophy that propositions are abstract. Burley is not unaware of the motivations for a conception of propositional content as abstract. In his first literal commentary on the Perihermeneias, for example, he considers an objection which assumes a unity constraint on truth, according to which the althetic values of propositional contents (and, consequently, propositional contents themselves) are abstract entities, so that different cognitive agents can have the same propositional content in mind. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.25–27, pp. 61–2. Burley’s response to the objection in that work involves (in my view) a confusion of two different notions of truth (one representational, the other metaphysical). In his later works, Burley seems to simply deny the unity constraint entirely (though his position still entails that, e.g., the content of your belief that Socrates is a human will be type-similar to the content of my belief that Socrates is a human, since each will be composed of the same things according to token representational structures of the same type).

68 That is, utterances and written marks may have truth conditions, and those truth conditions are certainly due in part to the syntactic structure of those utterances or marks. But that that structure is truth-conditional will be explained ultimately in terms of the representational capacities of cognitive agents. The structure per se cannot explain the truth conditions of the utterance or written marks that it informs. Burley himself notes that all truth-conditional utterances ultimately have their meaning because of the representational capacities of a cognitive agent. In his last commentary on the Categories, for example, Burley argues that “in every statement there is something material and something formal [...]. The formal thing in a statement is the copula joining the subject to the predicate, and that copula is in the intellect” (Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb). Statements in natural language, Burley here suggests, are ultimately meaningful because of the way in which cognitive agents use them.
produced by the exercise of the mind’s ability to conceive of the world’s being arranged in those ways.

Because propositions are intrinsically truth-conditional, and since truth-conditionality has to be explained in terms of the exercise of a certain representational capacity, propositions exist as the representational content of complex cognitive activity. Burley marks the peculiar kind of existence that propositions have by calling them beings of reason (and, elsewhere, diminished or fictive being), in contrast to real beings.⁶⁹ Real beings exist in the world, independently of human cognitive activity. A house, for example, exists independently of human cognitive activity, even if its production depends on human intention.⁷⁰ Propositions, however, as mere beings of reason, depend on complex cognitive activity for their existence. Consequently, while propositions can have for their components real things which exist independently of mental activity, propositions themselves – as complexes of those things structured by the representational powers of the mind – exist merely as contents of thought.

⁶⁹ On diminished being, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60. In the same passage, Burley notes that propositions are fictive beings, writing that diminished being “which is distinguished from real being, about which Aristotle speaks in Metaphysics VI, is something produced (aliquid fictum) by the soul.” The existence of ficta was controversial at this period in philosophical history. Ockham, for example, is famous for abandoning a fictum-theory of concepts. See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 23–27. Burley seems to me to have an account of the notion of a fictum which is, in some respects, more sophisticated than that of his peers. Many accounts treat the notions of fictum and obiectum as equivalent. But Burley distinguishes between them. Ficta, on Burley’s account, are representational, whereas obiecta are non-existent beings. On Burley’s early account of the proposition, then, a proposition is a fictum but not an obiectum, since it exists subjectively in the mind but has a merely representational mode of being. On Burley’s claim that propositions are ficta and subiecta (rather than obiecta), see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60.

Pace some in the literature, then, Burley’s project does not involve a confusion of two distinct philosophical issues – the nature of propositional content, existing wholly within the mind, on the one hand, and the nature of truthmakers, or facts, existing wholly outside of the mind, on the other. Rather, on Burley’s view, propositions are structured entities composed of things by the exercise of a capacity to conceive of the world’s being various ways. And that view makes sense, given Burley’s deeper philosophical commitments – namely, his commitment to referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism.

3. The Metaphysics of the Proposition

While referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism motivate a general picture of the proposition, they do not by themselves (even taken jointly) constitute an account of the metaphysics of the proposition. Rather, they put some constraints on any account of the metaphysics of the proposition that Burley might defend. First, referentialism and compositionality together require that propositions are structured entities composed of things, such as Socrates or the property of humanity. Second, intellectualism requires that the truth-conditional character of the proposition is explained by appeal to a mental act of predication, by which act a proposition is formed.

Even while sensitive to those constraints, however, the account of the proposition that Burley defends evolves significantly over the course of his career. In particular, I believe we can distinguish two very different formulations of the account – an early formulation and a late. According to the early formulation, propositions are really

identical to the acts of predicating by which they are formed. That is, on the early
account, a proposition just is a mental act of predication. Burley argues, for example, that
“no philosopher finds that through an action remaining in an agent is there something
produced in the agent really distinct from that action.” According to Burley, then, any
products of cognitive activity, such as (on his view) propositions, are not really different
from mental acts, that is, acts “remaining in the agent.” At the level of propositional
content, then, the act/content distinction is not a real distinction but merely a distinction
of some lesser kind. That is, the distinction between the act of predicking and the
propositional content produced is not a difference between things, but rather differences
between correct characterizations of the same thing. On this view, considered in one
way (i.e. as a mental act), a proposition exists subjectively within the mind (i.e. exists in
the mind as in a subject), as an accidental feature of it. Burley writes, for example, that
“[a] statement [i.e. a proposition] is an accident, in the way in which an accident is
distinguished from a substance, and has subjective being in the soul [...].” Considered in
that way, then, it is a property instance in the Aristotelian category of action. At the same

72 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.61, p. 211.

73 At the level of non-propositional activity, on the other hand, acts do really differ from their contents.

74 According to the metaphysical picture Burley defends in the first half of his career, two objects can differ
“intentionally,” where there is an intentional difference “when some differ more greatly than according to
reason (i.e. merely conceptually) but less than really” (Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in
librum Perihermeneias,” para. 4.47, p. 273). On that picture, two entities differ merely intentionally if
they are the same thing, res, but where a complete understanding of one does not involve a complete
understanding of the other. (On the notion of a complete understanding, see pp. 139–40 and n. 60). I take
it that acts of predication and contents differ in this way, since they are really identical but an act of
predication is correctly thought of as something real, whereas the relevant content is not real but merely
representational, that is, merely a product of conceiving of the world’s being some way or other. On the
Burley’s early account of identity, see ch. 5, section §3.1.

75 Ibid., para. 3.622, p. 251.
time, considered in another way, a proposition is intrinsically truth-conditional, representing the world’s being some way. “Yet it [i.e. the proposition] is not a real accident, but only an accident of reason, because it is produced by the intellect.” 76

Considered in this way, then, it has representational structure, being composed of things such as Socrates and the property of humanity by the exercise of a representational capacity.

Burley’s claim that propositions are really the same as mental acts of predicating is due at least in part, I think, to a tension Burley perceives between his commitment to intellectualism, on the one hand, and his commitment to referentialism, on the other. Intellectualism requires that representing is something that the mind does, so that a mental act is what accounts for the truth-conditions of a proposition. However, that act is essentially dependent upon the things that it uses. And referentialism (and, more fundamentally, direct realism) requires that what the mind uses must be things, such as Socrates. That is, propositions need to be structured entities, composed of things by the mind’s act of predicating one thing of another. This appears to require that the representational character of a mental act is not explained by appeal to that act alone, but also by appeal to things which can exist outside the mind.

In an attempt to accommodate both of those commitments, Burley’s early account of the proposition holds that mental acts of predication/propositions are at once wholly within the mind, as truth-conditional accidents of it, and yet are composed of things which exist outside the mind. Burley himself acknowledges this fact. He writes, for example, that “a statement [i.e. a proposition] has subjective being in the soul and yet its

76 Ibid.
parts do not. Hence, a thing composed by an intellectual composition has being in some place where its parts do not have being."\textsuperscript{77} Such a solution, Burley suggests, balances the tension between intellectualism and referentialism, by making things themselves part of the mental act. Mental acts, then, are dependent, but dependent merely as wholes on their parts, and dependence of that sort, Burley suggests, is innocuous. On that account, the representation is explained merely by appeal to a mental act of predication, since that act contains within itself the very things which it predicates, and predicates of.

But, while that view may be motivated by certain deeper commitments, it raises a number of metaphysical worries, chief among them a worry about the co-location of wholes and their parts. Propositions appear to be the singular exception to the rule that wholes are co-located with their parts. Socrates, for example, is co-located with his limbs, torso and head. Likewise, the mind is co-located with its various capacities and powers. Even spatially disjointed wholes, if there are such things, appear to be co-located with their parts. The aggregate of Big Ben, the whole of Australia and my left shoe is located in exactly the places in which those disparate parts exist.

Burley’s response to these kinds of concerns is to claim that the absence of co-location between propositions and their parts is plausible because propositions are structured entities “composed by an intellectual composition.”\textsuperscript{78} That is, Burley claims that the \textit{sui generis} nature of propositional content – that it is a kind of composite entity different from all other composite entities – allows for its exceptional metaphysical characteristics. But Burley never provides any reason for this claim. Indeed, it seems that

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., para. 3.623, p. 252.

\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., para. 3.623, p. 252.
the *sui geneity* of the proposition is itself due in large part to its odd metaphysical characteristics.\(^79\)

That early account of the metaphysics of the proposition is developed in the first decade (likely the first half of the first decade) of the fourteenth century. Burley does not return to issues of the metaphysics of the proposition until near the end of his career, over thirty years later. When he does return, however, he develops a very different account. That account is fundamentally driven by a distinction that Burley makes between the proposition, a certain structured entity, and the structure of that entity, namely, the mental act of predication. On that account, a mental act of predication is not identical to a proposition; rather, it is that in virtue of which the proposition has the (truth-conditional) structure that it does, such that that act is merely a part of the proposition. By distinguishing between the proposition and the mental act of predication in that way, Burley is able to provide some insight into the metaphysics of the proposition via analogy with hylomorphic compounds.

\[\text{In every statement [e.g. a proposition] there is something formal and something material. What is formal in a statement is the copula joining together the subject with the predicate, and that copula is in the intellect, because it is a composition or division by the intellect. Moreover, the materials [i.e. material parts] in a proposition are the subject and predicate.}^80\]

\(^79\) In general, I think Burley’s early account of the metaphysics of the proposition, while motivated, is simply unworkable. However, I do think Burley can at least attempt to respond in two ways. First, he can press the fact that mental acts of predication and propositions, while really the same, are still intentionally different, and that that difference has some metaphysical ground. On Burley’s early account of identity, see ch. 5, §3.1, pp. 261–71. Second, he can employ the notion of *intentio*, which he introduces at the end of his career, to argue that propositions can be dislocated from their parts because they are mental compounds rather than real compounds. On intentio, see §4. I am not convinced either of these responses would be ultimately successful, however.

A hylomorphic compound is a compound of a form, or structure, and matter which is so formed, or structured. My desk, for example, can be understood as a hylomorphic compound, composed of bits of wood and glass arranged deskwise. Like my desk, on Burley’s view, propositions are compounds of “form” and “matter,” since they are composed of things arranged by the mind’s predicative activity. The “form” of the proposition is the mental act of predication, since that is what gives (truth-conditional) structure to the proposition. The proposition’s “matter,” in contrast, are those things which the mind structures, the subject and predicate components of the proposition. The proposition itself is a compound of that “form” and that “matter.”

By conceiving of the relationship of the mental act of predication to the proposition in this way, Burley avoids many of the metaphysical worries that plagued the earlier view. In particular, his later view accommodates the position that wholes are co-located with their parts. The mental act of predication, the “form” of the proposition, is in the mind, whereas the “material” parts of the proposition often exist outside it. But, since the proposition is a compound of both, it will be located in where both its “form” and “matter” are located. Burley himself sees this advantage.

[A] composite thing, composed out of things [by the mind’s predicative activity] exists partly within the intellect and partly outside of it. In regard to its formal part, it is in the intellect, and in regard to its material parts, it is totally outside the intellect.81

It may, of course, seem odd that there can be a thing which exists partly in the mind and partly outside of it. But, first, if that worry simply concerns the fact that the proposition is

81 Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed*, c4rb: “Et compositio composita ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectum; quantum ad suum formale est in intellectu, sed quantum ad materialia est totaliter extra intellectum.”
poly-located, then that worry is not a worry about propositions *per se*, but is rather a general worry about the nature of composition. Consequently, it would be a problem in general metaphysics, rather than in the metaphysics of meaning. And, second, if the worry is more particularly about the precise nature of its bi-location – namely, that it is both inside and outside of the mind – Burley has a motivated response to that sort of worry, having to do with the peculiar nature of cognitive activity more generally (see §4). In any case, the sorts of worries that this view might engender seem to be far less stinging than those of the previous account.

Driving this account, however, is a fundamentally different view of how to balance the tension between intellectualism and referentialism. On this view, that the things which the mind employs in an act of predication exist outside of that act is not threat to the representational character of that act itself. This is due to the essentially asymmetric relationship that acts have to the things that they shape. Acts serve to form, or structure, matter. And structures need matter, as it is only within matter that structures are realized. A mental act, then, as a kind of act, must itself have a kind of dependency on things. That dependency is not a deficiency of the mental act, however, but rather a necessary consequence given the kind of thing that it is. Nor does that dependency mean that mental acts cannot alone determine the truth-conditions of a proposition. For those truth-conditions are determined wholly by the fact that that act is a predication of one thing of another – its being such an act because of its necessary dependence on things. Consequently, propositions have the truth conditions that they do because they are constituted by mental acts of predication, which determine some truth conditions or other. However, those truth conditions are still intrinsic to propositions. For complex mental
acts themselves are essentially parts of propositions, since it is essential to complex
mental acts that they are related to things as “form” to “matter,” and a proposition, on the
later view, just is a complex mental act’s being related to things as “form” to “matter.”

That representing is fundamentally a matter of the mental act itself is in fact
reflected in the correspondence theory of truth that Burley defends throughout his career,
where truth is a matter of the correspondence of a mental act to the world. In the
*Exp.Praed*, for example, Burley argues that truth is fundamentally a matter of
correspondence between structures.

To the copula existing in the intellect joining together the extremes of the
statement with one another truly there corresponds something in reality, namely,
the identity of the extremes, or the identity of those things for which the extremes
supposit. Moreover to a division or negative copula in a true negative statement
something corresponds in reality, namely, the diversity of the extremes, or the
diversity of those things for which the extreme supposit.  

Setting aside the notion of supposition that Burley invokes in this passage, Burley’s claim
is that correspondence principally involves correspondence of form, or structure – in
particular, correspondence of the mind’s predicating one thing of another (and thereby
asserting their identity and diversity) to identity or diversity relations in fact. Burley
provides a similar account in his *Exp.Perih.*

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82 Ibid., *Exp.Praed*, c4va: “Sed dubium est an ipsi copulae existenti in intellectu correspondeat aliquid in re
aut non. Dicendum quod copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis vere adinvicem
corresponder aliquid in re, scilicet, identitas extremorum, vel identitas eorum pro quibus extrema
supponunt, divisioni vero vel negationi copulae in propositione negativa vera correspondeat aliquid in re,
scilicet, diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro quibus extrema supponunt.” For a slight different version
of Burley’s correspondence theory, see Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on
Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, p. 60.

83 Supposition is a semantic property that the terms of meaningful statements have. It is what allows general
expressions to be about particulars in the world. It also seems to have been motivated by concerns about
the effects of quantifier expressions on the semantics of sentences. (See, e.g., Terence Parsons,
“Supposition as Quantification Versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect,” *Topoi* 16, no. 1
(March 1, 1997): 41–63). By the end of his career, Burley uses supposition theory to articulate the truth
conditions of a statement. On Burley’s view, for example, the proposition that every human is an animal
While Burley’s mature account of the proposition appears to bring with it a fair number of virtues over the early account, it also provides a new, somewhat different part-whole concern: the problem of the unity of the proposition. Why think that a mental act of predication, on the one hand, and things such as Socrates and paleness, on the other, can be unified into some further whole? That is, what accounts for the ability of a mental act of predication to structure things outside the mind into some truth-conditional whole?

Notice that these sorts of concerns are not pressing for the earlier account. On the earlier account, propositions simply are certain mental acts. As such, their unity consists in the kind of unity that acts more generally have, as accidents of some substance. Or, if one were to press on the *sui generis* nature of complex mental acts – namely, that they are truth-conditional contents – it would still be the case that the unity of the proposition lay

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is true just in case whatever ‘human’ supposits for is identical to something for which ‘animal’ supposits. That is, it is true just in case each particular human is identical to some or other particular animal. Moreover, and while I do not argue for it here, Burley’s comments here and elsewhere on the nature of supposition and the semantic function of quantifier expressions suggests that quantifier expression do not signify properties but rather serve to specify the representational structure of the proposition itself. So, for example, ‘Every human is an animal’ and ‘Some human is an animal’ have different content, but that difference is not one of constituents, since both contents are constituted by, and only by, the properties of humanity and animality.

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85 Scholarship on the unity of the proposition makes clear that there is not just one unity question, but a family of questions. (See, e.g., Matti Eklund, “Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions,” n.d., 10–2). Besides questions about what accounts for the proposition’s being some structured whole, for example, there is also the question of what accounts for the order of its constituents. Burley’s later theory suggests, in fact, that there are two separate questions about order. First, there is the question of what accounts for the order of mental act and things relative to each other. That question seems to be answered by the same thing which answers unity questions, namely, *intentio*. Since *intentio* has a directedness to it, it distinguishes between the mental act *a quo* and the things *ad quem*. (Likewise, and what seems to me to come to the same thing, that order could be explained in terms of the respective roles of mental act and things – the mental act functioning as the “form” of the proposition, and the things which constitute it functioning as its “matter”). Second, there is the question of how the things which constitute the “matter” of the proposition are ordered relative to one another. That question is answered by the particular mental act which partly composes the proposition. For example, the proposition that John loves Mary and the proposition that Mary loves John (let us assume) differ only in their order. That order itself is determined by the mental act of predication – whether it is a predicating loving and Mary of John, or is a predicating loving and John of Mary.
in entirely in its representationality. That Socrates and paleness, for example, are unified into some whole – the proposition that Socrates is pale – is explained on the earlier account by the mind’s power to represent Socrates’ being a human, the exercise of which just is that proposition. Consequently, the unity of that proposition is explained in terms of the power of the mind to conceive of Socrates’ being a human. That sort of response is unavailable on the later account, however, precisely because the exercise of a certain representational capacity accounts for only one part of the proposition (i.e. its truth-conditional structure) rather than the whole proposition itself. So, while the representational character of the proposition is explained in terms of the exercise of a power to conceive of the world’s being some way or other, what accounts for the proposition’s unity must come from another quarter entirely.

We can begin to get some purchase on Burley’s response to concerns about unity if we return to his analogy with hylomorphic compounds, since similar sorts of concerns can be expressed about hylomorphic compounds themselves. What accounts for the unity of a hylomorphic compound? What accounts, for example, for the unity of my desk, a compound of the wood and glass which constitute its material and the deskwise form that structures it? Hylomorphic analyses answer those questions by positing a primitive relation – inherence – which forms have relative to their matter. My desk is some unified whole, on this account, because a deskwise structure inheres in the bits of wood and glass that make up my desk.86

86 It is important to note that inherence is not itself a part of the desk. If it were, we would be set off on precisely the kinds of regress worries that Bradley sets out. On Bradley’s regress, see F. H Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1893), 24–34.
It may be tempting to think that inherence can do some work in the case of the proposition as well. Why not claim that mental acts of predication inhere in the things to which they are aimed? But the relationship between the mental act of predication and the things employed in that predication cannot be regarded as one of inherence, for two reasons. First, a mental act already inheres in the mind, as an accidental feature of it; its (real) role is to structure the mind in a certain (contentful) way. Second, actual hylomorphic compounds involve the inherence of a form in some subject matter. Matter here can be either uninformed (or prime) matter, or informed matter, i.e., some substance. But the subject and predicate of the proposition needn’t be either of these. In fact, it seems that very often they are not. The proposition that Socrates is a human, for example, is partly composed of the property of humanity, itself a form, and so not itself something suited to be informed. So the things of which a mental act of predication is the “form” need not be, strictly speaking, material.

What Burley’s mature account of the proposition requires is something that can play the role of inherence in the proposition. However, it must be something which can allow him to retain features unique to the proposition (e.g. that it exists merely as mental content, that it is a hybrid entity existing partly in the mind and partly outside it, that the proposition exists not really but only in a kind of representational way, that a proposition possesses “form” and “matter” in merely a metaphorical sense) which cannot be captured by the standard hylomorphic model. That “something,” Burley tells us, is intentio.
4. **Intentio and the Unity of the Proposition**

Throughout his career, Burley distinguishes between intellectual and real compounds. Propositions are examples of the former, humans and houses of the latter. In the early account, Burley uses this fact to dismiss metaphysical worries. But the persistence of that distinction in the latter account reveals that it is not motivated simply by *ad hoc* metaphysical considerations. Writing in his late commentary on the *Categories*, for example, Burley states that “a composition is of two sorts. An intellectual composition is a composition by which the intellect composes a subject with a predicate. A real composition is like a composition of a soul with a body, or like a composition of a house out of stone and wood.”

There is, in other words, something unique to propositional content that cannot be captured by typical hylomorphic analyses of compound entities.

What distinguishes intellectual composites from real ones? In his last commentary on the *Categories*, Burley analyzes that difference in terms of a certain mental power – *intentio* – that joins cognitive faculties with their objects. He writes that there is a doubt here how there can come to be one thing, composed out of a thing existing in the intellect and a thing existing outside the soul. It must be said that out of such things there can come about one composite thing, composed by the intellect. However, it is not a real composition, and such a composite thing can be called an *ens copulatum*, and an *ens copulatum* can come about not only through the intellect but also through a sense faculty. For Blessed Augustine says that *intentio* joins together a sense faculty or an operation of the sense faculty with its sensible object. For oftentimes some visible thing is offered to a sense

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87 Walter Burley, *Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed*, c4rb. See also Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.554, p. 250: “Hence it must be understood that a statement in the mind [i.e. a proposition] is not composed out of things by a real composition, just like a house is composed out of stones and wood, but there is only here an intellectual composition, which comes about because of this, that the intellect thinks some things to be the same or diverse.”
faculty which, though present to the sense faculty, is not sensed if the sense faculty neither turns towards nor pays attention to (attendat ad) the object. For oftentimes there are colors and visible things in front of one’s vision (ante visum), and yet we do not see them, because we do not have an intentio towards them, but when we turn our attention to (intendimus) them, then we see them. Hence intentio joins together the act of seeing or sight with an object.88

Burley claims that intentio is characteristic of, and essential to, all cognitive acts – simple and complex, intellective and perceptive. On his account, for example, intentio joins together an act of seeing – some internal, perceptual state in the mind – with a rock that exists outside of the mind, resulting in what Burley calls an ens copulatum, a coupled being. Burley argues that we can signify that ens copulatum with the expression ‘seen rock’. 89 Just as with simple cognitive activity, then, complex cognitive activity too involves the composition by the mind’s intentio of a mental act with the things towards which that activity is directed.90 Likewise, just as we can denote the compounds formed

88Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb–va: “Sed dubium est hic qualiter potest fieri unum compositum ex re existente in intellectu et re existente extra animam. Dicendum quod ex talibus potest fieri unum compositum compositione intellectuali, non autem compositione reali et tale compositum potest dici ens copulatum, et non solum per intellectu sed etiam per sensum vel per operationem sensus. Dicit enim Beatus Augustinus quod intentio copulat sensum vel operationem sensus cum sensibili obiecto. Multotiens nam visibile offertur sensui quod tamen praesens sensui non sentitur si sensus non advertat nec attendat ad obiectum. Multotiens enim sunt colores et visibilia ante visum, et tamen non videmus ea, quia non habemus intentionem ad illa. Sed cum intendimus ea, videmus ea. Unde intentio copulat actum visus vel visum cum obiecto. Unde hic vox, ‘lapis visus’ significat quoddam ens copulatum ex lapide qui est extra animam et actu videndi qui est in oculo, nec est inconveniens quod ex talibus sic loco et situ separatis fiat vere unum ens copulatum.”

89 Notice that ‘seen rock’ does not refer both to the rock and to the activity of seeing. Rather, it refers to that rock, but conveys or connotes that that rock is being perceived by the faculty of sight. Likewise, sentences in natural language refer only to the things which are the contents of their subject and predicate expressions, but also convey how those things are being used by the mind, i.e. as subjects and predicates. On the signification of sentences in natural language, see §6.

90 With regard to the case of complex mental activity, one should not confuse intentio with a propositional attitude, or even (if there are such things, though Burley denies this) a more basic cognitive relation to a proposition. In complex mental activity, intentio is the mind’s intentional awareness of things in the world, but an awareness of them as structured relative to one another in some way. For example, the thought that Socrates is a human involves an awareness of Socrates and of the property of humanity, but as identical (in some respect, at least) to one another.
in simple activity with expressions like ‘seen rock’, we can denote the compounds formed in complex mental activity with expressions like that- or, in the Latin, quod-clauses.91

Though Burley’s comments on intentio are brief, his remarks make clear that intentio is the intentional awareness of the mind, characteristic of its cognitive and volitional activities. It is what accounts for our active engagement in perception and intellection, our directing our cognitive attention to various intentional objects. Moreover, in the case of one’s propositional attitudes at least, Burley associates awareness of this sort with cognitive agency.92

And if someone were to ask by what is the intellect moved to make a copula of this sort, or a divisive or negative copula, it must be said that it is not moved except by those extremes in the statement, and by the will commanding the intellect to join together the extremes of the statement with one another or to divide the extremes from one another.93

91 While Burley seems to favor quod-clauses, one can also denote a proposition in Latin with an infinitive plus accusative construction.

92 I seems to me likely that Burley takes cognitive agency to be a necessary feature of all cognitive and volitional acts, not just complex cognitive activity, for two reasons. First, the claim that cognitive agency is a necessary feature of intentio is central to the Augustinian account from which Burley takes the notion of intentio. Second, Burley’s introduction of intentio and his discussion of the role of the will in forming propositional content are introduced within a few paragraphs of one another. If cognitive agency is a necessary feature of all cognitive and volitional acts, however, it seems that cognitive agency has to be understood in a weaker way. That is, it seems cognitive agency need not be robustly volitional but rather, in the case of some mental acts at least, such as perceptual acts, can understood in merely functional or goal-directed terms. On issues of cognitive agency in Augustine’s account of intentio, see Scott MacDonald, “Augustine’s Cognitive Voluntarism in De Trinitate 11,” in Le De Trinitate de Saint Augustin : Exégèse, Logique et Noétique, ed. Emmanuel Bermon (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Augustiniennes, 2012), 235–50.

93 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4va, text amended in light of ms Canon. Misc. 180, 13v; MS Canon. Misc 480, 13v; MS Bodleian 643, 18v: “Et si queratur a quo ergo movetur intellectus ad fabricandum huiusmodi copulam vel divisionem vel negationem copulae, dicendum quod non movetur nisi ab extremis ipsis in propositione et a voluntate imperante intellectui ad copulandum extrema adinvicem vel ad dividendum extrema abinvicem.” As the citation makes clear, Burley borrows the notion of intentio from Augustine. Augustine uses that notion to touch on issues of mental awareness and of cognitive agency, among others – just the sorts of features that are central to Burley own account of intentio. Augustine, for example, argues that intellection and perception both require three elements: an object, an informed perceptive or intellective faculty, and the intentio animi,
The impression of light onto our retinas, the production of a common perceptual experience from our various senses, even the production of our concepts – all of that is the effect of a passive causal process, something that happens to us rather than something that we do, in virtue of which our minds represent things in the world. But the formation of one’s beliefs and doubts (among other attitudes) – that is, the formation of various sorts of propositional content – is the result of one’s decision to so believe or doubt. To believe that Socrates is a human, for example, or that pop (or “soda”) is unhealthy, or that grading can wait until tomorrow finds its genesis in the decisions of the agent herself. On this picture, thinking—that is not passive but rather is the result of the exercise of one’s cognitive agency in a particular way, by training one’s attention on some things in such a way that it joins them together in a positive or negative fashion.

The notion of *intentio* provides a solution to the problems of the unity for the later account. Just as inherence, an irreducible feature of a form which binds that form to its matter, accounts for the unity of a hylomorphic compound, so too *intentio* is an irreducible feature that actualized mental powers have to their objects which binds acts of that sort to their objects, and so accounts for the unity of the proposition. On the later account, propositions are compounds of mental acts of predication and things, but what binds those acts to things is *intentio*, an intentional awareness characteristic of mental activity more broadly. Conceiving of the metaphysics of the proposition in this way also

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94 I take the passage quoted above to suggest that the cognitive agency characteristic of propositional thought is robustly volitional, because of the robustly volitional vocabulary Burley himself employs. One might worry, however, that this sets the requirements for belief and other propositional attitudes too high, since that position requires that every single instance of propositional thought is explained, in part, by appeal to an agent’s decisions and choices.
allows Burley to clearly distinguish between questions of unity on the one hand and questions about representationality on the other. Recall that in his early account of the proposition the proposition’s unity was tied to its ability to represent, since propositions were understood to be accidents of the mind, whose being was wholly tied up in their representing the world’s being some way. In the later account, however, questions of representationality are addressed by the “form,” or structure, of the proposition – that is, the mental act of predicating. Propositions represent, on this conception, because their structure – the mental act of predication – is an exercise of a capacity to represent. But what accounts for the unity of the proposition – a structured whole composed of the exercise of that power and the things to which it is directed – is intentio, the power of the mind to be intentionally aware of things in the world.95

5. **CONCLUSION**

I have argued that, for Burley, a proposition is a structured entity, composed of things outside the mind by the mind’s predicating those things, where that predicating activity is the exercise of a capacity to conceive of the world’s being arranged in various ways. That general conception of the proposition is encouraged by three more basic

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95 I am inclined to think that Burley’s later view is similar to an account of the proposition recently proposed by Scott Soames. On Soames’ view, propositions are event-types of the mind’s predicating one thing of another. (On Soames’ account, see Scott Soames, *What Is Meaning?* (Princeton University Press, 2010), 99–107). Intentio itself, I take it, constitutes the various and sundry events of mental life. While, then, a mental act of predicating and the things which it predicates might both be static (e.g. a state of the mind on the one hand and various substances on the other), what forms them into some unified thing is a dynamic process, namely, a certain awareness of the mind which can unite them, such that one perceives or thinks. However, Soames argues that questions of unity are fundamentally questions of representationality, suggesting that he views the relationship between the relevant event and act of predicating differently than does Burley. In that regard, Soames’ account seems more similar to Burley’s earlier account. Moreover, Burley’s account differs more generally from Soames’ because Burley takes propositions to be not types but rather tokens.
commitments. Burley’s commitment to compositionality and his commitment to referentialism jointly entail that propositions must be structured, and composed of things. Moreover, Burley’s commitment to intellectualism requires that propositions themselves are explained in terms of the exercise of a certain mental capacity to represent.

In trying to accommodate all three of those commitments in a way that withstands philosophical scrutiny, moreover, Burley’s account of the proposition evolves over the course of his career. In its first articulation, the proposition is taken to be an accidental feature of the mind, really identical to the act of predication by which it is formed. While composed of things outside the mind, the proposition itself inheres in the mind as a truth-conditional accident of it. That metaphysically suspect account is replaced later in Burley’s career with one which draws a comparison to hylomorphic compounds. On that later account, propositions are compounds of acts of predicating, on the one hand, and things towards which that activity is directed, on the other. But, unlike hylomorphic compounds, what accounts for the unity of the proposition is that intentional awareness characteristic of cognitive agency, which can unite the mind’s perceptive and intellective faculties with their objects, so that (in the case of complex mental activity) the mind forms compounds which represent the world’s being some way or other – that is, it forms propositions.

6. **Appendix: Sentential Content and the Copula**

Burley’s explicit discussion of referentialism is restricted to sub-sentential categorematic expressions of natural language. However, Burley does believe that
statements, and sentences more generally, signify. ⁹⁶ In this appendix, then, I want to examine how sentences signify, on Burley’s account. ⁹⁷

It is clear that the story of signification for sentences cannot be the same as the one Burley provides about sub-sentential expressions. Sub-sentential expressions have the contents they do by being freely imposed on things. Sentences, in contrast, don’t receive their contents by being freely imposed upon propositions. Rather, the content of a sentence is determined in some way by the expressions which make it up. We already have a little insight into that process, given Burley’s commitment to referentialism. ‘Socrates is pale’ signifies the proposition that Socrates is pale, for example, in part because ‘Socrates’ and ‘pale’ signify Socrates and the property of paleness, respectively. ⁹⁸ Beyond that, however, we haven’t had much to say about how sentences signify propositions. And yet it is an extremely important issue, since Burley’s account of the proposition and the larger semantic theory of which it is a part are meant to provide, among other things, a sophisticated account of how communication works – how our uses of linguistic symbols and their combination serve to communicate our thoughts to one another.

⁹⁶ Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, g6rb: “A sentence is not true unless because it is significative of a true thing.”

⁹⁷ Burley argues that sentences, like nouns and verbs, signify ad placitum, or conventionally. But Burley rejects the view that one can make a sentence qua sentence signify whatever she wishes. In the Exp.Perih, for example, Burley argues that if one makes a sentence signify something through imposition, then that sentence will signify as a dictio, not as an oratio. That is, that sentence will signify a simple thing, not a complex which bears sentential truth or falsity. See Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, l2rb.

⁹⁸ Or, rather, ‘pale’ signifies a being per accidens, a complex object composed of the property of paleness and the property of substance. On beings per accidens, see ch. 5, §3.3, p. 275ff.
Unfortunately, neither Burley’s commitment to referentialism and compositionality alone (nor even in combination with his commitment to intellectualism) explains how, for example, ‘Socrates is pale’ signifies the proposition that Socrates is pale. Referentialism and compositionality merely commit Burley to the claim that ‘Socrates is pale’ signifies something which is an aggregate of paleness and Socrates. But pale Socrates, just as much as the proposition that Socrates is pale, fits that bill. Moreover, intellectualism is articulated wholly in terms of mental activity; it doesn’t address issues of the semantics of natural language at all. What we require is a bridge principle of sorts, that can connect Burley’s semantic commitments of referentialism and compositionality with his alethic commitment of intellectualism.

For Burley, every sentence fundamentally has a three-part, subject-copula-predicate structure.\textsuperscript{99} Since every sentence contains that tripartite structure, and especially given the tripartite structure that the proposition has on the later theory, perhaps the most obvious response to those difficulties involves appeal to the role of the copula plays in a sentence. On this account, for example, ‘Socrates is pale’ signifies the proposition that Socrates is pale, rather than pale Socrates, because it contains a copula. This is, in fact, precisely the move that Burley will make; he argues that the copula makes an important contribution to determining the semantic content of a sentence that contains it, in virtue of which that sentence has a proposition, rather than something else, for its content. But a remaining – and perhaps far more interesting – issue concerns the nature of the

\textsuperscript{99} Burley suggests that a sentence will contain one of three copulae – past, present or future. Aspect, then, must be a part of the predicate, rather than a part of the copula.
contribution that the copula makes to determining the semantic content of its sentence. It is the nature of that contribution that I turn to now.

An initially plausible suggestion is that the copula contributes to determining the content of its sentence in just the way that the subject and predicate do. So, just as the subject and predicate of some sentence each signify something, and what each signifies is constitutive of the proposition that that sentence signifies, so too the copula signifies something, which likewise is constitutive of the proposition. And, we might think, this picture fits especially well with Burley’s later account of the proposition, since that account says that propositions contain three parts: two things, and a mental act of predication which joins them together. Perhaps, then, the copula signifies the mental act of predication, in just the way that the subject and predicate expressions of a sentence signify the things which are the objects of that mental act.

However, this suggestion becomes far less plausible under more serious scrutiny. First, recall that, even on the later account of the proposition, the mental act of predication does not have the same relationship to the proposition as do the things which it predicates. At the most superficial level, mental acts of predication are “formal” parts of a proposition, whereas things are “material” parts. But that terminological difference reflects the very different roles that mental acts and things play in a proposition. Things are the objects of *intentio*; they are what the mind is directed at when it predicates one thing of another. Mental acts, on the other hand, are the sources of *intentio*. Rather than objects of cognition, they are the cognitive acts themselves. So it would be surprising if the copula determined the content of its sentence in just the way that subject and predicate terms do.
Likewise, and a point deeply related to the last, signification is in part an epistemic notion. For an expression to signify something for someone is for that expression to “establish an understanding” of something, which for Burley means that that expression makes one think of it. But mental acts are not objects of cognition but rather sources of it. Burley’s account of the proposition would appear to entail, then, that, unlike the relationship between the terms of a sentence and the things of a proposition, the relationship of a copula to a mental act of predication, whatever it is, cannot be one of signification.

It should come as no surprise, then, that Burley denies that the copula helps determine the content of its sentence in just the way that its subject and predicate terms do. Instead, Burley argues that the copula is a completely different kind of expression than the subject and predicates terms of a sentence. The subject and predicate terms of a sentence are categorematic expressions (or at least expressions used categorematically). In contrast, Burley argues, the copula is a syncategorematic expression. In *De puritate*, for example, he writes that when ‘is’ “is predicated as a third component [i.e. as a copula], it is a syncategorematic expression.”\(^{100}\) The same view is expressed in the *Exp.Perih*, where Burley distinguishes between ‘is’ as a *secundum adiaciens* and as a *tertium adiaciens*, that is, between ‘is’ used existentially and ‘is’ used predicatively or, more generally, copulatively. He writes that “when [‘is’] is a *secundum adiaciens*, then it

\(^{100}\) Walter Burley, *On the Purity of the Art of Logic*, 139. Note that Burley elsewhere distinguishes between two senses of predication, an immediate sense and a mediate sense. The copula is immediately predicated of a predicate, since it is a syncategorematic term disposing the predicate relative to the subject, whereas a predicate is mediately predicated of a subject, namely, by the mediation of the copula. It is only this second sense of predication which Burley regards as proper predication. See Ibid., 141; Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, *Exp.Perih*, k6va.
is a categorematic expression, because then it signifies *per se* some nature, namely, the being of existence [*esse existere*], and when it is a *tertium adiaciens*, then it is a syncategorematic expression, signifying *per se* no nature determinately.”

We have already encountered the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions briefly, when we were explicating the notion of signification. The basic distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions, recall, is that the former but not the latter establishes an understanding of something by itself. For example, the term ‘human’ establishes by itself an understanding of humanity, because it is a categorematic expression. But since the copula is, according to Burley, a syncategorematic expression, it is unable to signify in that way.

While Burley’s claim that the copula is a syncategorematic expression is not novel, it was by no means the received view. William of Sherwood, for example, rejects the view that the spoken copula is a syncategorematic term. He maintains instead that ‘is’ is always a categorematic term, which signifies being. When used predicatively, Sherwood claims that the significate of ‘is’ - that is, being itself - is “specified” by the significate of the term to which it is joined. For example, Sherwood writes that “when I say ‘A human is an animal’, the thing belonging to the verb ‘is’ is specified by


102 This dispute over the nature of the spoken copula extended well into the 14th century. Ockham sides with Burley, claiming that the spoken copula is a syncategorematic term. John Buridan takes a position similar to Scotus, arguing that it signifies a mental concept (though Scotus’ own position is disputed in the literature; see n. 106).
Positions like Sherwood’s are at least partly motivated by a desire to maintain that the various uses of ‘is’ are univocal with one another. Sherwood argues that, just as the existential ‘is’ signifies being, so too the predicative ‘is’ signifies being, even if ultimately specified in a particular way. That motivation was not peculiar to Sherwood. Peter Abelard, for example, argues that “there is always an existential import in its [i.e. the copula’s] linkage.” But even those medieval philosophers who were willing to allow that the various uses of ‘is’ might be equivocal with one another did not necessarily go on to adopt the position that the copula is a syncategorematic expression. For example, in his theory of the copula, John Duns Scotus concedes that the significate of the copula is distinct from that of the existential ‘is’. But Scotus does not thereby conclude that the copula is a syncategorematic expression. On the contrary, Scotus argues that ‘is’ is equivocal between two sorts of significates. He writes that

‘is’ [esse] is equivocal to a thing of first intention and [a thing] of second intention, because when ‘is’ signifies a thing of first intention, then it is able to be

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predicated by saying ‘A human is’, [...] but ‘is’ as something uniting is not predicated.\(^{105}\)

According to Scotus, then, the existential ‘is’ is a term of first intention, signifying being itself or the being of existence.\(^{106}\) As Scotus remarks in the same passage, to say ‘A human is’ is to say ‘A human is existing’. (He neglects to discuss whether the ‘is’ of this analyzed sentence is part of the predicate or whether, independent of the predicate, it is used predicatively.) Scotus argues that the predicative ‘is’, in contrast, is a term of second intention. Unlike things signified by terms of first intention, which are things in the world that are conceived by an intellect, things signified by terms of second intention are, according to Scotus, entirely mental creations, relational concepts that relate one thing of first or second intention to another thing of first or second intention. ‘Genus’, for example, signifies a relational concept that holds of some common essence, a thing of first intention, relative to another common essence. Thus ‘genus’ is a term of second intention, and it signifies a mental concept. In the same way, the ‘is’ of predication is a relational concept, representing the identity or diversity of two things, whether those things are inside or outside of the mind. For Scotus, then, the copula is a term of second intention, which signifies that relational concept. Consequently, the signification of a sentence of natural language is simply a matter of adding together the significates of its three parts.


\(^{106}\) Scotus’ own view of signification is controversial. Some have argued that Scotus maintains that spoken words immediately signify concepts, and things only mediately. See Stephan Meier-Oeser, “Walter Burley’s Propositio in Re and the Systematization of the Ordo Significationis,” in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, by Stephen Brown (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 491–2. But Giorgio Pini has argued that Scotus never takes a position, merely illustrating reasons for and against each of the two main views. See Pini, “Signification of Names in Duns Scotus and Some of His Contemporaries.”
Scotus’s theory is clearly quite different from Sherwood’s. Whereas Sherwood argues that there are two parts to every sentence, Scotus recognizes three. In fact, it is precisely because Scotus argues that there are three parts in every sentence, rather than two, that he is able to allow for an equivocation between the ‘is’ of existence and the ‘is’ of predication. The former is a predicate (or, at least, includes the predicate), and so must be a term of first intention, whereas the latter is not the predicate, and so needn’t signify the same things as the ‘is’ of existence. However, despite their differences, both Sherwood and Scotus believe that the copula is a categorematic expression, which “establishes an understanding” of something. For Sherwood, it signifies being specified in some way; for Scotus, it signifies a particular second intention. Burley, however, denies that the copula is a categorematic expression, and so denies that the copula itself signifies some particular thing. But, then, what does the copula do, on Burley’s account?

To answer that question, we need to examine the semantic role of syncategorematic expressions generally. Giving a precise definition of a syncategorematic term is difficult, especially when the notion is analyzed logically rather than grammatically. Sherwood defines syncategorematic terms as “determinations of

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107 Norman Kretzmann argues that the logician’s interest in syncategorematic terms stems from an earlier interest in linguistic fallacies, many of them due to the presence of terms lacking any clear significatum of their own. While many of these were classified by the grammarians as syncategorematic terms, other were not. Thus, while the logician borrowed the term ‘syncategorema’ from the grammarian, and the class of syncategoremata for the logician was largely extensional with that for the grammarian, the logician’s interest in syncategorematic terms and classification of those terms as syncategorematic was largely pragmatic. Kretzmann writes that “the [logical] notion [of syncategorema] persisted and evolved because of its usefulness and not because it picked out a clearly recognisable category of linguistic or logical entities” (Norman Kretzmann, “Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophisma,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 213.
principle parts insofar as they are subjects or predicates.” Thus Sherwood distinguishes syncategorematic expressions from those words which determine categorematic expressions but not as a subject or as a predicate, such as prepositions. Burley largely agrees with Sherwood on this point; syncategorematic expressions modify subject and/or predicate terms. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, logicians in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries include in the list of syncategorematic expressions the standard quantifiers, negation and the logical connectives, as well as modal expressions. They also typically include exceptive and exclusive expressions, such as ‘besides’, ‘only’, and ‘alone’. The function of these syncategorematic expressions is to modify the semantic properties of the categorematic expressions to which they are joined. Gyula Klima, a contemporary scholar of medieval philosophy, for example, notes that “syncategorematic terms, when they are taken significatively, are imposed to exercise the logical functions of modifying the semantic functions of categorematic terms with which they are construed […].”

Categorematic expressions, on this account, provide content. ‘Socrates’, for example, brings Socrates to mind, and ‘pale Socrates’ brings pale Socrates to mind. Syncategorematic expressions, in contrast, don’t bring along additional content; rather, they modify how that content is used.

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108 William of Sherwood, *William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words*, 15. Peter of Spain provides a similar definition, stating that a syncategorematic term signifies a “disposition that belongs to a subject insofar as it is a subject or a predicate insofar as it is a predicate” (Peter of Spain, *Syncategoreumata*, ed. L.M. De Rijk and Joke Spruyt (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992), 38–9.). While Burley thinks some syncategorematic terms dispose the composition, and not merely one of its terms, his view of syncategorematic terms is in general agreement with Sherwood and Peter’s.

Because syncategorematic expressions modify, rather than provide, semantic content, Burley suggests that syncategorematic expressions do not signify anything in addition to the things signified by the categorematic expressions to which they are joined. In particular, they do not signify how something ought to be used. Rather, Burley writes that they convey [importat] those uses. While the notion of ‘convey’ that Burley uses seems to me to be at best quasi-technical, Burley’s use of that notion in this text suggests that to convey is to bring about the relevant kind of use on the part of the mind of the things which it thinks about. This reading of ‘convey’ fits with what Burley has to say about the function of syncategorematic expressions in language. According to Burley, “syncategorematic words exercise acts and adjectival verbs signify such acts.” In other words, the primary function of a categorematic expression (such as adjectival verbs) is to have a certain content, whereas the primary function of a

110 See Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 27.

111 This is a difference between Burley and Sherwood as well. Sherwood and his pupil Peter of Spain, for example, held that syncategorematic terms signify certain ways that the categorematic terms to which it is joined are. “[W]hen I say ‘every man is running’, the word ‘every’, which is a universal sign, does not signify that something belonging to ‘man’ is universal, but rather that ‘man’ is a universal subject [i.e. is universally a subject]” (William of Sherwood, William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, 15).

112 Peter does think that syncategorematic terms signify in a way different than categorematic terms, since syncategorematic terms do not signify a thing, but rather signify a mode. Perhaps, then, Peter’s sense of ‘signification’ in this context is roughly equivalent to that of Burley’s sense of ‘convey’. See Peter of Spain, Syncategoremata, 38–41.


syncategorematic expression is to exercise a particular use of that content. For example, Burley writes that “the quantifier ‘every’ exercises distribution; the verb ‘distribute’ signifies distribution.”¹¹⁵ In ‘every human is an animal’, then, ‘every’ does not signify some modification of ‘human’ but rather modifies the way ‘human’ functions, such that that ‘human’ signifies humanity as universally distributed.¹¹⁶

In addition to quantifiers, the logical connectives, and modal expressions, Burley argues that the copula is a syncategorematic expression as well. That he includes the copula on this list is motivated, in part, by the fact that it pertains to expressions only insofar as they are subject or predicate terms. Burley writes in De puritate that the copula is “the mere putting together of the subject with the predicate.”¹¹⁷ As a syncategorematic expression, however, the copula does not signify that act of putting together. Rather, “the verb ‘is’ exercises predication, and the verb ‘is predicated’ signifies predication.”¹¹⁸ Unlike Scotus’s mature view, then, according to which the copula signifies the putting together of a subject with a predicate, Burley argues that the copula serves to perform that very function itself.¹¹⁹ That difference is due precisely to their different views of the kind


¹¹⁶ This point of view seems more strongly held later in his career. In the Quaes.Perihermeneias, for example, Burley remarks that syncategorematic words signify in the way of a mode, whereas categorematic words signify in the way of a thing. This claim is absent in his De puritate. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” 212–3.


¹¹⁸ Ibid., 25–6.

¹¹⁹ Cesalli argues that, for Burley, the spoken copula signifies the composition of the subject with the predicate. See Cesalli, “Meaning and Truth,” 101. However, Cesalli gives no evidence for this claim, and the point is made when discussing the passage from De puritate on the property of copulatio that we have just considered, which seems to militate against such a position.
of word the copula is. Since the copula is a categorematic term for Scotus, it must signify something, and that is, according to Scotus, some relational concept which joins together subjects and predicates. For Burley, in contrast, the copula does not signify some mental concept but rather brings about the predicative use of various things.

But how, exactly, does the spoken copula carry out that function? Burley addresses that question most fully in the *Exp.Perih*. Quoting Aristotle, who writes that a verb is “a mark [nota] of something said of another,” Burley argues that, once we analyze a given sentence into its deeper, three-part syntactic structure, it becomes clear that the verb Aristotle references in this passage is the copula itself, and that this verb is what serves to mark out the predicate term.\(^{120}\) Furthermore, Burley claims, the copula is not only a mark of the predicate but likewise a mark of the subject.\(^{121}\)

When it is said that Aristotle says that a verb is a mark of a predicate and not a subject, I say that since Aristotle says that a verb is a mark of those which are said of another, the subject is touched upon just as much as the predicate, because if something is said to be said of another, two [things] are touched upon - on

\(^{120}\) De Interpretatione 16b24-5. See Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih*, k6va. We find the same claim in the *Comm.Perih*. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 71. It is also important to note that Burley justifies in both passages his claim that the verb is not part of the predicate because it is a mark of the predicate, arguing that “nothing is a mark of itself [...] Given that a verb is a mark of a predicate, it follows that a verb is not the predicate.” But it is clear that Burley operates with a different account of ‘mark’ than, e.g. William of Sherwood, who argues that a mark is nothing other than a sign. See William of Sherwood, *William of Sherwood’s Treatise on Syncategorematic Words*, 91.

\(^{121}\) In this regard, Burley’s views change quite radically from the *Comm.Perih* to the *Exp.Perih*. In the *Comm.Perih*, Burley claims that the copula holds more greatly on the part of the predicate than on the part of the subject, because “a verb is that which inheres in another [i.e., as a predicate] and it not that to which something inheres [i.e., as a subject]” (Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 71. In the *Exp.Perih*, Burley completely rejects his former view that the verb is something which inheres in another, and with that rejection comes a rejection of the view that the verb holds itself on the part of the predicate more so than on the part of the subject. Another issue deserving of more study is Burley’s relationship to what are regarded in the literature as the two theories of the copula live in the medieval period: the inherence theory and the identity theory. Burley is typically identified as an identity theorist, but his comments in *Comm.Perih* at least suggest that, at best, the issue is more complex and nuanced than the literature recognizes.
Because a verb is a mark of something which is said of another, that verb needs to mark that thing of which it is said as well, if it is to mark what is itself said of another. In other words, ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ are relative terms, such that to indicate in some way that something is to be a predicate requires that one indicate as well that thing of which it is a predicate to be a subject. It is the copula’s role of marking the subject as subject and predicate as predicate in which the copula carries out its function of joining the subject to the predicate.

How the copula carries out that function is due to the effect it has on the intellect itself. In the Exp.Perih, Burley argues that “when it is said that a verb is a mark of those things which are said of another, it is denoted [denotatur] that a verb is the principle [principium] of thinking something of another, namely, the predicate of a subject.” As a mark of the subject as subject and the predicate as predicate, the copula conveys to the intellect that what each term signifies must be understood as a subject and as a predicate, respectively. But to conceive of the significata of these terms in this way is nothing

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122 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va: “Et cum dicitur quod philosophus dicit quod verbum est nota predicati et non subiecti, dico quod cum philosophus dicit verbum esse nota eorum qu[a]e de altero dicitur, tangitur tam subiectum quam predicatum, quia si dicitur aliquid dici de alicui, tanguntur duo, secundum illud quod dicit, scilicet, predicatum, et illud de quo dicitur, scilicet, subiectum.”

123 Peter of Spain notes explicitly that these terms are relatives. See Peter of Spain, Syncategoreumata, 39–40.

124 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k6va.

125 In the Exp.Perih, Burley does not use the term ‘convey’, importat, but rather the term ‘notify’, notificat. See Ibid., Exp.Perih, k6va. In either case, it is not a relationship of signification, in the Aristotelian sense.
other than to carry out a mental act in which the latter is joined as a predicate to the
former as a subject, because of the relative nature of subjects and predicates. The
presence of the copula, therefore, affects how the other expressions of its sentence are
understood, that is, in what way their contents are to be cognized. Thus, on account of the
copula, the mind predicates the thing signified by the predicate term of the thing signified
by the subject term, thereby producing a proposition. For example, ‘Socrates is a human’
conveys to the mind that humanity is to be predicated of Socrates, and humanity being
predicated of Socrates just is the proposition that Socrates is a human.

In classifying the copula as a syncategorematic expression, then, Burley provides
himself with a way to bridge his semantic commitments, on the one hand, with his
commitment to intellectualism and the larger account of the proposition that that
motivates, on the other. As a syncategorematic expression, the copula has no semantic
content, that is, it does not refer to anything. In particular, it does not refer to a mental act
of predication. Rather, it marks out for someone competent in the language that various
expressions are to be understood as subjects and predicates relative to one another. But to
understand various expressions to be subjects and predicates relative to one another is, on
Burley’s account, nothing other than to actually predicate what the predicate refers to of
what the subject refers to – which is to say, to form a proposition. It is, I think, a
sophisticated and fascinating move, one perfectly suited to the account of propositional
content he wants to defend.

One final note on the metaphysical implications that that account has for the
semantics of syncategorematic expressions generally, implications which I think have
some relevance for contemporary debates. Standard contemporary approaches to
quantifier expressions, for example, hold that quantifier expressions have as their content second-order properties. But Burley’s account suggests that there aren’t any such second-order properties. ‘Every’, for example, carries with it no commitment to a second-order property of distribution, because ‘every’ has no such property as its content. Indeed, it does not refer to anything at all. However, this is not to say that syncategorematic expressions are meaningless. On the contrary, they are essential to the meaning of a sentence which contains them. But what they do is express formal features of the proposition, by conveying how the referents of the sentence are to be used, rather than what the referents of that sentence are. For example, Burley argues that universal propositions involve the distribution of a term of that proposition.

I concede that a universal statement has being in the mind [i.e. that there are universal propositions], because even if there was no spoken utterance, a human could syllogize, and a syllogism requires universal statements, and therefore there is something universal which is not spoken. And I concede that a true thing outside the soul is distributed, because to be distributed is nothing other than to be divided into [its] supposits, so that it is resolved into diverse supposits. However, this is not to say that syncategorematic expressions are meaningless. On the contrary, they are essential to the meaning of a sentence which contains them. But what they do is express formal features of the proposition, by conveying how the referents of the sentence are to be used, rather than what the referents of that sentence are. For example, Burley argues that universal propositions involve the distribution of a term of that proposition.

Distribution, then, is something that is done to a term in a proposition. But what does the distributing just is the mind, in the same way that it is the mind which predicates one term of another.

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126 In his What is Meaning?, Scott Soames calls this the Frege-Russell view. See Soames, What Is Meaning?, 122–9. He also mentions, but never fully explores, the account of quantification that Burley adopts.

127 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.643, p. 254: “Tu quaeres: Si enunciatio sic habeat esse in mente talis enunciatio est aliquis quantitatis, ita quod aliqua est universalis; igitur pars illius enunciationis distinguitur et ita vera res extra animam distinguitur; d icendum est: Concedo quod propositio universalis habeat esse in mente quia eti nulla vox esset prolata adhuc posset homo syllogizare et syllogismus non fit sine propositione universalis, et ideo aliqua est universalis quae non est prolata. Et concedo quod vera res extra animam distinguitur, quia distinguui non est alius quam in supposita dividit a qua salueretur in diversis suppositis; sed nulla universalis quae habet esse extra animam habet esse in diversis suppositis ita quod salvatur in quolibet.”
This is a kind of ontological parsimony only made possible by the particular account of the proposition that he develops. For Burley, the proposition that a human is an animal and the proposition that every human is an animal are about exactly the same things, namely the properties of humanity and animality. Consequently, the contain the very same terms. They differ, rather, in their formal aspects, that is, in the mental acts involved in the production of each. The latter act universally distributes the property of humanity, whereas the former does not. However, both acts are still the same kind of thing: a mental act of predication. And if one concedes that we need folk-theoretic entities like acts of thinking and belief anyway, then that view seems to have a distinct ontological advantage, since it is does not require second-order properties of quantification and the like.
CHAPTER FOUR
PROPOSITIONS AS MENTAL CONTENTS:
MENTAL LANGUAGE AND THE NATURE OF THOUGHT

1. INTRODUCTION

In chapter 3, I examined the metaphysics of the proposition. But that examination is, in at least one key respect, incomplete. As we saw, Burley is committed to intellectualism, the thesis that representing the world’s being some way or other is fundamentally something that the mind does. It does this, Burley argues, by predicking one thing of another. But what explains the ability of the mind to predicate one thing of another? Is this merely some primitive capacity of the mind, or can some explanation of that capacity be given?

Since the mind’s predicking one thing of another is some complex act that the mind undertakes, resolving those questions requires a thorough investigation of the metaphysics of complex mental activity itself. It is that project that I pursue in this chapter. Unsurprisingly, many of the most interesting and difficult features of Burley’s account of the proposition find their genesis in that act. In his earlier theory of the proposition, for example, a proposition just is a mental act of predication. Because that act represents things are related to one another as subject and predicate terms, however, Burley argues that that act contains as parts those things, even thought those things exist outside the mind. Likewise, in the mature theory, even though Burley argues that that act is merely one part of a proposition, and so not itself composed of the things that it employs, it is in virtue of that act, and that act’s necessarily having a certain intentio
towards things, that the proposition has the structure, the unity, and indeed the meaning that it does.¹

In this chapter, therefore, I intend to examine why mental acts of predication are necessarily representational, in virtue of which the propositions they necessarily compose constitute contents. To understand why mental acts are acts of predicing one thing of another, and why such activity represents, we need to introduce a new notion: mental language. A mental language, just as a language generally, contains symbols that have both semantic and syntactic properties. Given that syntax, more complex symbols can be generated from the basic symbols of the language, and likewise from symbols which themselves were generated in that language. Moreover, language requires that certain symbols can be combined in a law-like way to produce clauses, whose content is propositional. A language is mental, however, if the basic symbols of the language are realized by representational features of the mind, and if following the syntactic rules of the language is realized in the mind’s producing more complex symbols from less complex symbols in a way that is sensitive to the syntactic features of those symbols.

Burley defends an account of mental language. According to Burley, the mind contains concepts, mental qualities with both semantic and syntactic properties. Those qualities, consequently, can be combined to form more complex concepts. Both simple and complex concepts, on Burley’s account, signify things in the world. Additionally,

¹ In fact, in the Exp.Perih, Burley describes truth not as the correspondence of a proposition but rather of a *virtus cognoscentis*, that is, a power of the thinking individual to a relation of identity or non-identity. See Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), Exp.Perih, k4rb. This later account of correspondence involves the correspondence of the mental act of predication to relations of identity or non-identity in the world. See ch. 5, §5, pp. 304–6 and n. 87, and appendix D, pp. 407–11.
those concepts can be predicated of one another, where the mind’s predicking one concept of another constitutes a clause, or sentence, in mental language. Mental sentences of those sort signify propositions, the terms of a mental sentence signifying the terms of the proposition that it expresses.

Moreover, the mental language that Burley defends is motivated by his larger defense of a language of thought. The language of thought hypothesis combines a commitment to a mental language with the thesis that propositional attitudes are explained in terms of more immediate relations that the mind bears to mental sentences, whose contents are propositions. Thinking, then, is fundamentally a causal process, in which the processes of thought are sensitive to the syntactic structures of the concepts of the mind. For Burley, the mind’s predicking one thing of another is explained in terms of the mind’s predicking concepts which refer to those things. Thinking – and in particular deductive thought – is thus explained computationally, in terms of the mental sentences that the mind possesses. As Burley recognizes, deduction is a formal process, so that the generation of new sentences from sentences the mind already has requires sensitivity only to the syntactic features of those previously-acquired mental sentences. Moreover, since computations which are sensitive to syntax preserve relevant semantic features, the mind’s process of symbol manipulation and its deductive operations on mental sentences explains the semantic coherence of thought. And so the ability of the mind to predicate one thing of another is explained in terms of the mind’s ability to predicate one concept of another, which concepts represent those things. Burley’s endorsement of the language of thought hypothesis thus provides him with an explanation of the representational
character of the act of predicating, articulated in terms of the formal features of that act and the semantic contents of the concepts upon which it operates.

That account allows Burley to address a worry about his account of the proposition having to do with the substitutability \textit{salva veritate} of co-referring terms in intentional contexts. Indeed, it is this worry, rather than a desire to explain the representational character of complex mental activity, that primarily drives Burley’s commitment to the language of thought hypothesis. Burley expresses this worry mainly with respect to demonstrative science. Burley’s theory of demonstrative science requires that, in certain contexts at least, co-referring terms cannot be substituted \textit{salva veritate}. For example, Burley argues that one can know that a human is capable of laughter without knowing that a rational animal is capable of laughter. However, ‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ are co-referring terms. Given Burley’s commitment to referentialism, then, one might expect that they can be substituted \textit{salva veritate}, since they are equivalent in content.

To justify his claim that, in intentional contexts at least, co-referring terms cannot always be substituted \textit{salva veritate}, Burley suggests that propositional attitudes which contain the same content can be distinguished more finely than that content. Those attitudes can be individuated more finely because acts of predicating one thing of another are more fundamentally acts of predicating one concept of another, where those concepts represent those things. The belief that Socrates is a human differs from the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, on this account, because the former belief is an act of predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES, where the latter is a predicating RATIONAL
ANIMAL of SOCRATES – though both, as a consequence, have the same content, in which humanity is predicated of Socrates.

I will proceed in four stages. First, I will introduce the notion of a mental language, discussing the what features a language of that sort has, and then argue that Burley defends a theory of mental language. Second, I will explain the language of thought hypothesis, and argue that Burley defends a non-canonical version of it. Canonically, propositional attitudes are regarded as relations to propositional contents. According to Burley’s non-canonical version, propositional attitudes are interpreted not as relations but as acts, so that the mind’s belief that Socrates is a human, for example, just is the mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates assertively. Third, I will introduce Burley’s account of demonstrative science, and of a certain kind of demonstration – a demonstration of the highest sort – in particular, emphasizing Burley’s recognition of a seeming conflict between his account of demonstrative science, on the one hand, and his commitment to referentialism, and the larger account of the proposition that it motivates, on the other. Finally, I will explain how Burley uses the language of thought hypothesis to address the problems that arise, given his account of the proposition, on the one hand, and the particular account of demonstrative science he endorses, on the other.

2. Mental Language

2.1. The Nature of Mental Language

In his book *Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d’Ockham*, Clause Panaccio suggests that the idea of a mental language originated with William Ockham in
the late 1310s and early 1320s.\textsuperscript{2} Other scholars – notably Peter King – have argued that the idea was developed far earlier, by Peter Abelard in the eleventh century.\textsuperscript{3} I don’t have any position on whether Abelard developed a mental language. But I do think there is significant evidence that Ockham was beaten to the punch if not by centuries then at least by a matter of a few years, since Burley seems to me to have developed a theory of mental language (or, a sketch of a theory, at least) as early as the late 1300s.\textsuperscript{4} In this section, therefore, I argue that Burley himself developed and defended a theory of mental language. To do this, I plan to discuss the nature of mental language, and then to argue that Burley defends a theory of that sort. I also plan to investigate, at various points, whether that theory is philosophically satisfying.


\textsuperscript{4} Commitment to a mental language seems to me to be a rather minimal affair. All one needs is a commitment to two claims: that the mind contains mental representations, and that those representations can be combined in some way rule-governed way to produce mental sentences, that is, representations with propositional content, whose content depends in some way on the representations that compose it. It does not require, on my view, that one specify how those representations have their content, or the principles by which they can be combined so as to produce mental representations with propositional content. In this respect, then, I disagree with Clause Panaccio, who argues that a “full-fledged theory” theory of mental language requires “the grammaticalization of thought on the one hand, and a compositional approach to the truth-conditions of mental propositions, on the other,” where a compositional approach requires an explanation of “how to get from the semantical properties of simple concepts to the semantical properties of mental propositions” (Panaccio, “Mental Language and Predication: Ockham and Abelard,” 186; 189). That said, I think we can still distinguish between those accounts of mental language that, \textit{qua} mental language, are deserving of philosophical interest and sustained research, and those which are not. Presumably, those which deserve philosophical interest will be those accounts which, among other things, do articulate the grammatical features of concepts and the rules by which they can be combined into sentences – which is just to say that philosophically interesting accounts of mental language will explain, rather than merely assume, the syntax of that language. They would also, I suggest, give some account of the semantics of concepts, and an explanation of how mental language fits into a larger account of cognition and (perhaps) language.
To understand what mental language is, I suggest that we begin with considerations about language in general. Language requires, first, basic symbols, that is, symbols which are not themselves derived from other symbols of the language. As symbols, they will have a certain content, or meaning. As symbols of a language, however, they require more than mere content possession. Rather, those symbols must also have syntactic properties.

Why do linguistic symbols need a syntax? Because there are plenty of non-linguistic symbols in the world; something’s merely being symbolic does not ensure that it is linguistic. A picture of Justin Verlander is about Justin Verlander. That is, that picture represents Justin Verlander, or has him as its content. It is, in other words, a symbol of Justin Verlander. What distinguishes linguistic symbols from non-linguistic symbols, however, is that linguistic symbols can be combined in such a way that (1) their combination is itself contentful and (2) the content of that combination is explained by appeal to the meaning of those symbols themselves, and their syntax. ‘Justin Verlander’ and ‘is the best active pitcher in major league baseball’ can be combined to form the sentence ‘Justin Verlander is the best active pitcher in major league baseball’, a sentence which itself has some (unfortunately false, as of late) content, and where the content that it has is itself articulated in terms of the meanings of ‘Justin Verlander’ and ‘is the best active pitcher in major league baseball’, and the grammatical rules that allow them to be combined given their syntactic properties. The picture of Justin Verlander, in contrast,
doesn’t seem able to be combined with other things so as to produce a complex, meaningful expression of that sort.\(^5\)

As a language, then, mental language requires that there are certain basic symbols which (1) have content, and (2) are governed by a combinatorial syntax. But, as a mental language, those features must be realized in particular ways. First, the basic symbols of mental language must be representational entities or features of the mind, which we can call concepts. Those concepts, as basic symbols of a language, must themselves have both content and a combinatorial syntax. Consequently, there must be a grammar of mental language. That grammar will govern the ways in which the mind can manipulate concepts so as to form more complex concepts and mental sentences out of them; that is, the operations that the mind can perform on those concepts will be constrained by the syntactic properties of those concepts.

This syntax need not be as complex as the syntax of natural language. In fact, Burley suggests that the syntax that governs mental processes is far less complex than Latin, for example. In the *Quaes.Perih*, Burley argues that “grammatical modes of signifying are borrowed from the modes of thinking [...], but it does not follow from this that the parts of a sentence in the mind have some modes of signifying, such as case.”\(^6\) According to Burley, the syntactic rules that natural language (i.e. the “grammatical modes of signifying”) are in part derived from the syntax that governs thought. But that

\(^5\) Of course, there could be languages which are pictorial, such that basic symbols of the language are pictures that have semantic properties. As symbols in a language, the combination of those pictures will be syntactically constrained, so that the meaning of their combination is articulated in terms of the contents of those pictures and the syntax of that combination.

does not mean that all the syntactic features of natural language, such as case or gender for example, are features of mental language as well. The reason, it seems, is that some of the syntax of natural language is not content-determining. One implication for mental language, then, is that the syntax needs to be only as robust as meaning demands.

Beyond the way in which mental language realizes the semantic and syntactic features of language, however, mental language also distinguishes itself from natural language in one key respect. Mental language, unlike natural language, is unlearned. Natural languages are languages which are learned by users of that language. According to Burley, for example, participants in a natural language learn the language by associating expressions in that language with things in the world. More fundamentally, however, it is a psychological process of pairing those expressions with concepts.

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7 Ockham is far more explicit about this, writing that “gender and declension are grammatical features peculiar to spoken and written names. These features are not necessary to signification” (William Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, and Stephen Brown, vol. 1, Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1978), pt. 1, ch. 3, pp. 11–4). On the whole, Ockham is far more explicit and detailed about the syntactic features of mental language than Burley. Perhaps this should not be surprising, since (a) Ockham’s nominalism requires a more sophisticated account of meaning and cognition, and, (b) unlike Burley, Ockham does not have a further account of the proposition, in addition to his account of mental language, towards which he puts his philosophical resources.

8 Contemporary proponents of the language of thought hypothesis are divided whether concepts – the basic symbols of mental language – are innate, with an assumption among some that, if such symbols were not innate, they would need to be learned. And mental language cannot be learned, so the story goes, because language learning itself has to be articulated in terms of pairing expressions to be learned to symbols in a language of thought. For a recent defense of the nativist hypothesis, see Jerry Fodor, *LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 129–68. In contrast to nativists, however, Burley argues that basic concepts are acquired via one’s causal interaction with the world, writing that the intellect is “as if a tabula rasa, in which nothing is depicted, since a tabula rasa in which nothing is depicted is ready to receive any picture whatsoever without throwing out another” (Walter Burley, “The De potentiiis animae of Walter Burley,” ed. M.J. Kitchel, *Mediaeval Studies* 33 (1971): para. 133, p. 111). The crucial issue between nativists such as Fodor and non-nativists such as Burley is whether abstraction – the process by which concepts with general content would be formed if they are non innate – involves inferential practices. Burley, I take it, would deny that the process of abstraction constitutes induction.

Learning the meaning of ‘cat’, for example, is fundamentally a process of subordinating ‘cat’ to the concept CAT, so that comprehension of ‘cat’ involves use of the concept CAT. Mental language, in contrast, is not acquired via such association. Indeed, as Burley’s account of natural language acquisition implies, language learning presupposes that one already possesses concepts.

2.2. Burley on Concepts I: Semantics

If Burley defends a theory of mental language, his account will require concepts which have both semantic and syntactic properties. In this section, I intend to investigate Burley’s account of the semantic properties of concepts; I will consider their syntax in the next section. According to Burley, concepts have content. This was clear already in chapter 3, where we saw that expressions in natural language have the content that they do by being subordinated to concepts, which have their contents necessarily. Indeed, the idea that concepts have content permeates Burley’s cognitive program. He argues in the Comm.Perih, for example, that concepts “signify naturally. And we can prove this by the fact that whatever signifies the same thing for everyone signifies naturally. But a [concept] signifies the same thing for everyone.”\(^\text{10}\) That Burley takes concepts to have content, then, is uncontroversial.

However, given that concepts have content, it is natural to ask why they have content. And, on this point, we can distinguish between two sorts of questions when it comes to content: a general one and a specific one. The general question asks why

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\(^\text{10}\) Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.11, p 53.
concepts have content, that is, why they are intentional objects. The specific question, in contrast, asks why concepts have the particular, or specific, content that they do. Why does a concept of Socrates represent Socrates, for example, rather than Plato? I argue that Burley provides at least a *prima facie* satisfying answer to the specific question of content, but that his answer to the general question is unsatisfying. Moreover, the general question is explanatorily prior to the specific question. That is, any answer to the specific question – why something represents Socrates rather than Plato – will presuppose some explanation of why that thing represents. And so, given that Burley fails to provide a convincing response to the general question, his response to the specific question has to be seen as incomplete as well. However, I end this section with the suggestion that Burley has the resources available to him to provide a far more satisfying answer to the general question, an account which he, unfortunately, does not seem to give.

Let’s take the specific question first, despite its explanatory posteriority, since Burley’s answer to it will give us the necessary background for understanding the answer Burley might possibly give to the general question. So then: why does a concept represent a certain thing? According to Burley, a concept represents a certain thing because it has the same form as the form of the thing it represents. He argues that ‘affection of the soul’ can be understood in two ways, insofar as it is presently considered. In one way, by ‘affection’ [one can mean] a desire, and so regret, love, lust, anger, and others of this kind are affections. In another way, it can mean a disposition of the intellect, namely, a similitude of a thing in the intellect representing a thing outside the soul, and we use it in this way in this discussion.11

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Concepts, then, or ‘affections of the soul’, are qualities of the mind which represent things outside the mind. And they represent because they are similitudes of those things. Why some concept is a similitude of a thing can be articulated in many different ways; Ockham, for example, relies on an account of causal covariance. For Burley, however, a concept is a similitude of a thing because that concept has the same form as the thing it represents. It is, in other words, a conformality of account.

Burley explains conformality in terms of a sophisticated causal account of form-transmission and transformation. According to Burley, a person’s sensory and cognitive grasp of a thing involves the transmission of a form from an object, through a medium such as air or water, to a number of sensory and intellective faculties of the soul, successively. Moreover, some of those faculties – the inner senses and the intellect – are active faculties, not just preserving forms but manipulating them in various ways. For example, Burley argues that the faculty of common sense unifies the various forms it receives from the five external senses, producing a new form that represents the particular thing experienced in those various ways. In other words, the inner sense produces a unity of experience from the various senses that we have. Likewise, the intellect, which represents not particulars but universals, abstracts from the forms of inner sense to create general concepts, that is, concepts that represent properties (or certain forms) which those particulars have. While active, however, those faculties are still rule-governed, with the

12 On the issue of the picturing model of conceptual representation in medieval philosophy, see Peter King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental Representation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), 90–4.

13 Burley gives an extremely detailed account of this process in his De potentiss animae, including a thorough description of where the various sensitive faculties are located in the brain. See Walter Burley, “The De potentiss animae of Walter Burley,” para. 102–22, pp. 104–8.
consequence that we can tell a story that traces the form that resides in any given
particular faculty back to the thing which produced it.

Conformality is a symmetric notion. Representation, however, is asymmetric. If a
concept, or a species more generally, represents something, then we need some account
of that asymmetry. The general question of content, then, is the question of what that
account is, and so a satisfying explanation to the general question, then, requires some
explanation of that asymmetry. But Burley, as far as I can tell, does not provide a
satisfying explanation of the representational character of concepts. In fact, it is not clear
to me whether he provides any explanation at all. A common claim in high and late
medieval philosophy is that concepts (and species more generally) have what medieval
philosophers call intentional being. Burley himself makes a this sort of claim, arguing
that species have, as he puts it, “spiritual” being.

A species in a medium has more spiritual being than it does in an object, and
more material being than in an organ, and therefore a species in a medium has
itself in a middle way between spiritual being and material being. 14

The introduction of the notion of intentional, or spiritual, being was meant in part to
address the worry that, if the concept in the mind were to have the same being as the form
informing the thing represented, then the mind itself would need to become a thing of that
sort. If, for example, the concept in the mind were a real form of a sheep, then the mind
would need to become an actual sheep when it was informed by that concept. There is
some textual ground in Aristotle that he endorses something like that claim; he claims

14 Ibid., para. 93, p. 102: “Themistius aliam rationem ponit, et est quod natura in opere suo semper procedit
ab imperfecto ad perfectum. Embryo enim in matrice prius est animal quam homo. Sic in proportio est
ordo determinatus quod a re corporali et materiali ad spiritualem requiritur quod fiat transitus per
medium inter utrumque. Unde species in medio spiritualius habet esse quam in objecto, et materialius
quam in organo, et ideo species in medio se habet medio modo inter esse spirituale et materiale.”
that the knower becomes the known, for example. But most medieval philosophers took this claim to be merely metaphorical.\footnote{A notable exception here is William Crathorn. Crathorn argues that species must be the very same forms as the things which they represent, so that the mind, when it thinks about the color blue, for example, must literally be a blue color. “The soul seeing and thinking color is truly colored, not by a color existing outside the soul, but by the similitude in it, which is a true color” (William Crathorn, “In primum librum Sententiarum,” in \textit{Crathorn: Quastionen zum Ersten Sentenzenbuch : Einführung und Text}, ed. Fritz Hoffman (Münster: Aschendorff, 1988), q. 1, p. 120:30–4).}

That claim is merely metaphorical in the sense that knowers become the known only in the sense of possessing a form that merely represents a thing. And it represents precisely because it has intentional – or representational – being, rather than real being. Because Burley himself endorses the view that species have intentional, or spiritual, being, we might expect that he too would explain representationality in terms of the intentional, or spiritual, being that a species has. However, Burley seems to think that the spiritual nature of a species makes it less capable of representing, rather than more capable.

We must know that for a species to have more spiritual being is for it to have more feeble being. Hence to whatever extent a species is more spiritual, to that extent it more imperfectly represents that of which it is a species.\footnote{Walter Burley, “The De potentis animae of Walter Burley,” para. 94, p. 102: “Sciendum quod speciem habere spiritualius esse est ipsam habere esse debilius. Unde quanto est species spiritualior, tanto imperfectius representat illud cuius est species.”}

It is not clear (at least to me) how Burley intends for this claim to be read. I suggest two plausible readings. First, Burley might intend to endorse the view that intentional being is required for the representationality of species, though immediately qualifying that claim by noting that, in virtue of the fact that a species differs from the thing it represents with respect to being, that representation will always be imperfect. This does seem to fit better with the general medieval account of what intentional being actually is. On that reading,
then, Burley holds an interesting place within late medieval orthodoxy with respect to issues of representation. There can be no case of perfect representation, according to this reading, since perfect representation would require something like complete similarity (that is, similarity with respect to every feature, including its mode of existence). But complete similarity would require symmetry, and so the peculiar asymmetric character of representation would be lost in such a case.

If this is how the passage should be read, however, then Burley faces the same problem that everyone else in the medieval period who endorses this response to the general question faces, namely that it is really a non-response. It fails to explain why species, and concepts in particular, represent. It is analogous to the case in which, when asked why Ambien makes a person sleepy, an individual responds that Ambien has a dormitive property – which is just to say that it has the property of making a person sleepy. It does not explain what it is about Ambien that causes that effect in a person. In the same way, to advert to the intentional being of a species is really to say nothing other than that a species have a representational property – that is, it is a claim that species represent, rather than an explanation of why they represent.

If, in contrast, we take the passage above to suggest that Burley rejects that the representationality of a concept is to be explained in terms of the peculiar sort of being that it has, then Burley would seem to hold a very idiosyncratic view of the nature of intentional being. Because of its idiosyncrasies, Burley’s account wouldn’t be prone to the sorts of objections that explanations of representation in terms of intentional being rightfully receive. Unfortunately, however, since he appears to provide no alterative response to the representational character of a species, Burley trades a non-answer for no
answer at all. On either reading, then, it does not seem that Burley provides even a prima
facie satisfying response to the general question of content.

It may be tempting to think that the response Burley gives to the specific question
contains within it at least some of the resources needed to answer the general question as
well. I am sympathetic to that suggestion. For example, it appears that Burley could
explain representation in terms of the causal account of form-transmission that his
conformality account assumes. Moreover, since (as we will see) concepts are words in a
mental language, we might combine that account of concept production (as well as,
perhaps, a causal account of the regulation of their subsequent use, an account Burley
does not explicitly provide but which is compatible with – and seems to me even
desirable given – the account of concept acquisition he favors) with an account of the
linguistic role of those concepts. The combination of these two sorts of accounts, Peter
King notes, “is no less than a mediaeval version of functionalism, the idea that
determinate content is fully specified by inputs (covariance) and outputs (linguistic
role).”\footnote{17}{King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental
Representation,” 96.} That account would be far more satisfying that Burley’s possible appeal to the
peculiar being of concepts, and a species more generally. Nor is an account of that sort
unprecedented in the late medieval period; Ockham, for example, develops an account of
just this sort.\footnote{18}{See Ibid., 96–7 for King’s discussion of Ockham’s account.} Unfortunately, however, I see no evidence that Burley ever intended to
endorse that sort of account.
2.3. Burley on Concepts II: Syntax

If concepts are linguistic, then they must have not only semantic properties but syntactic properties as well. But that concepts have syntactic properties is a thesis to which Burley is clearly committed. In various works – but especially in his *Physics* commentaries and in his *Quaes.Post* – Burley argues that more basic concepts can be combined into complex concepts, whose content is articulated in terms of the contents of the more basic concepts which compose them.19 Discussing the nature of a middle term in a demonstration in a language, for example, Burley argues that a “middle term is composed out of many utterances or out of many concepts, which concepts or utterances signify expressly the principles of a thing.”20 For example, the concept RATIONAL ANIMAL can function as a middle term in a demonstration in mental language. That concept is complex, composed of the more basic concepts RATIONAL and ANIMAL, which signify rationality and animality, respectively. In combination, then, they signify the aggregate of rationality and animality – which just is the property of humanity, with each more basic concept itself signifying elements in the structure of that property. Moreover, Burley argues that concepts can be combined to form sentences in mental language. Again in the *Quaes.Post*, for example, Burley writes that “a statement can be considered materially, from that which it is composed [...]. A statement considered in the


20 Walter Burley, *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum*, ed. Mary Catherine Sommers (Toronto: PIMS, 2000), 11.52, p. 161: “Et cum dicitur quod medium est causa passionis sive causa quare passio inest subiecto, dicendum quod in demonstratione quae signum est medium est causa cognitionis respectu conclusionis, quoniam per medium in tali demonstratione importatur natura speciei expresse, quia tale medium componitur ex pluribus vocibus et ex conceptibus, qui conceptus vel voces significant expresse principia rei.”
third way is composed of concepts."\(^{21}\) Just as statements can be composed of utterances and of things, then, Burley argues that the mind can combine concepts in such a way as to produce mental sentences.

That Burley defends a mental language thus seems to me rather obvious. However, this is far cry from defending a satisfying or philosophically interesting theory of mental language. In particular, we should ask how the mind is able to produce complex expressions of that sort in mental language. In other words, we should demand a specific account of the syntax of that language. I suggest that we can cull some general syntactic features of mental language from various things Burley has to say about that mental language, and about language generally. Moreover, an investigation into some of the general syntactic features of mental language yields important results about the nature of the vocabulary of that language, and the nature of the mental sentences that can be produced from that vocabulary.

Like the later Ockham, Burley defends a parallelism between natural language, mental language, and the contents they express.\(^{22}\) He writes, for example, that “in some


\(^{22}\) On Ockham on the parallelism between natural language and mental language, see William Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, vol. 1, chap. 3, pp. 11–4. Ockham does not have a theory of the proposition like the one that Burley has. Instead, Ockham explain content wholly in terms of mental language. (Perhaps, however, Burley does much the same, in the end. See §5.)
statement a thing is predicated of a thing, and in some statement a concept is predicated of a concept, and in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance.” 23 Unlike the later Ockham, however, Burley sharply distinguishes between concepts, on the one hand, and mental activity, on the other. For the later Ockham, concepts simply are mental acts. 24, 25 The concept SOCRATES, according to Ockham, is simply the act of thinking of Socrates. Moreover, Ockham argues that simple mental acts are concepts; whatever simple mental acts that the mind can perform are elements in the vocabulary of mental language. But Ockham argues that not all simple mental activity involves representation, or signification, since some acts serve to relate other acts to one another, rather than represent something(s). 26 For example, an act of predication, when paired with certain other sorts of concepts – categorematic concepts – serves to predicate one of those concepts of the other. In contrast to the concepts it predicates, however, Ockham argues


24 On Ockham’s later account, mental acts are qualities. This is different from Burley, for whom mental acts are acts, that is, accidents in the category of action. My suspicion is that it is this difference which principally motivates their disagreement over the relationship of concepts to mental acts. Since qualities are not relational, there is no bar on concepts themselves – only some of which have determinate signification per se – from being “acts,” that is, qualities of the mind. For Burley, in contrast, since mental acts are indeed acts, on his account, and since concepts which have determinate content (i.e. categorematic concepts) are not relational, those concepts could not be acts.

25 On his earlier theory, Ockham argued that concepts were fictive items, and so were distinct from mental acts. Like Burley, then, the early Ockham distinguished between concepts, which were (as a general matter) categorematic, and mental acts, which were the mind’s relating those concepts to one another in various ways (e.g. predicatively). However, Burley and the early Ockham still disagree about the nature of concepts. Burley argues that they are species, that is, subjective features of the mind, whereas Ockham argues that they are fictive, so that they have merely objective being. On Ockham’s early account of mental language, see Claude Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, Ashgate Studies in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 146–51.

26 Ockham distinguishes four different notions of signification, and, on one of them, syncategorematic expressions do signify. But that is signification in only its most broad sense, meant to include all meaningful expressions, broadly speaking. Typically, Ockham will use ‘signification’ and its cognates in a more restricted manner, so that only categorematic expressions signify. On Ockham on signification, see William Ockham, *Summa Logicae*, vol. 1, pt. 1, chs. 1, 33, pp. 7–9; 95–6.
that the act of predication itself is a syncategorematic concept, since its function is not to represent something but to modify the semantic properties of the categorematic concepts to which it is joined. Consequently, Ockham distinguishes between (at least) two sorts of concepts: categorematic concepts and syncategorematic concepts. And this distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic concepts tracks the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions in natural language. Categorematic concepts signify thing(s); syncategorematic concepts modify the semantic properties of the categorematic concepts to which they are paired.

In contrast to Ockham, however, Burley sharply distinguishes concepts, on the one hand, and mental acts, on the other. In particular, Burley argues that mental activity involves the mind’s use of the concepts that it possesses. In his questions commentary on the *De Anima*, Burley argues that concepts are not sufficient for mental activity. Rather, mental activity also requires that the “agent intellect” – that is, that power of the mind which can bring about occurrent thought – actually brings about occurrent thought, by illuminating, as it were, a concept, making one actually think about that concept’s content.

It is in our power to think when we want, after we have acquired [a concept], as each person experiences in himself. But, however many [concepts] we have, we cannot think without the agent intellect, just as an eye, even if visible things are present, is not able to see without light.

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27 Ockham’s account of mental language might include concepts of a third sort, namely, non-categorematic, non-syncategorematic concepts. These concepts would be akin at least to the prepositions of natural language. On concepts of this sort in Ockham’s account, see Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts*, 155–58.

Concepts are what explain the content of thought, then, but actual thinking requires the “illumination,” or use, of those concepts. When not in use, Burley argues that concepts are stored in memory.

Therefore, memory, with respect to some part of it, namely, in as much as it is a storehouse of [concepts], ought to be placed in the intellective part [of the soul...]. It is the same power which receives [concepts] [i.e. intellecction] and which conserves them [i.e. memory].

Memory and understanding, then, differ in that the former involves the mere possession of a concept, whereas the latter involves its use. On this account, the mind contains a kind of storehouse of mental words – that is, it has a vocabulary – and mental speech, or thought, involves the mind’s use of those words to form statements.

That vocabulary can be built up in various ways. In the first instance, concept acquisition occurs via a causal process of species-transmission, originating in a thing and terminating in the mind. Second, the mind can increase its stock of concepts by combining them with one another in syntactically constrained ways. For example, the mind can introduce the concept RATIONAL ANIMAL by combining the concepts RATIONAL and ANIMAL with one another. Burley isn’t entirely forthcoming on the

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29 Walter Burley, “Circa tertium de Anima,” para. 1.27–8, p. 82–3: “Memoria igitur secundum aliquam parte sui, in quantum scilicet thesaurus specierum, debet poni in parte intellectiva, et etiam quod actum recordandi, secundum eos qui ponunt cognitionem memorativam in intellectu. Si tamen esset sola cognitio abstractiva in intellectu, tam de actu quam de objecto, non esset ponere in intellectu memoriam. Ad primum principale dicendum quod eadem est potentia quae recipit intelligibile species et quae illas conservat [...].”
nature of that syntactic constraint. But I argue that that syntax must be more permissive than the syntax of natural language, for two reasons. First, as we have already seen, Burley suggests that, unlike the syntax of natural language, the rules of syntax that govern cognition will only be as restricting as the semantics demands. In the *Quaes.Perih*, Burley argues that there are syntactic constraints, or constraints of “conguiy,” in thought,

but by another kind of congruity than a spoken sentence. Hence the grammatical modes of signifying are taken from the modes of thinking. Therefore, just as a grammarian has to consider congruity in the modes of signifying, so too the logician has to consider congruity in the modes of thinking. Nor on account of this does it follows that the parts of a [proposition] would have some modes of signifying, such as case or mode.30

Burley makes a number of interesting claims in this passage. First, he argues that the rules of syntax (or “congruity”) for natural language are in part derived from the rules of syntax that govern cognition. Second, while the grammarian’s concern is the syntax of natural language, the logician’s concern is the syntax of cognitive activity. Finally, and most central for our purposes, while natural language derives some of its syntactic rules from the rules governing cognitive activity, natural language contains additional rules of syntax, which need not be reflected in mental activity. In particular, natural language includes things such as case. The expressions of a mental language, however, won’t

30 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 3.643, p. 254: “Dicendum quod oratio secundum esse in mente est congrua sed alia congruitate quam oratio prolata. Unde modi significandi grammaticales sumuntur a modis intelligendi. Sicut igitur grammaticus habet considerare congruitatem in modis significandi, sic logicus habet considerare congruitatem in modis intelligendi. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod partes orationis in mente habeant aliquod modos significandi, ut casum vel modum.” I am not sure what feature of syntax a mode is (gender, perhaps?). Burley’s particular concern in the passage above is not mental language, but rather the mind’s formation of a proposition (something which, on Burley’s view, still has a kind of linguistic structure). But I suggest that the claims Burley develops in that passage apply equally well to mental language, given the tight relationship between the two (see §§3, 5). Like the mind’s formation of a proposition, then, I suggest that the syntax of mental language will be only as restrictive as the semantics of mental language requires.
apparently be governed by a case system – because a case system is not required for meaning (even if, in languages with a case system, that system is content-determining).

Beyond being simply leaner than the syntax of natural language, however, the syntax of mental language can be more permissive than the syntax of natural language because, second, the vocabulary of mental language is more restricted than the vocabulary of natural language. Unlike the vocabularies of natural languages, which contain not just nouns, adjectives, participles and adverbs but verbs as well, the vocabulary of mental language lacks any verb concepts.\(^\text{31}\) Because the vocabulary of mental language contains no verb concepts, the rules which govern how concepts can be combined with one another have to be rules articulated only with respect to how nominal concepts can be combined. In some cases (e.g., cases in which nouns and/or adjectives are combined), the syntactic rules can be extremely permissive. For any mere combination of concepts of that sort would represent an aggregate of the contents of all the concepts that compose it.\(^\text{32}\) The complex concept PALE BROWN SOCRATES, for example, would make one conceive of paleness+browness+Socrates. This would be an instance of what Paul Spade calls the additive principle. The additive principle is that

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\text{a syntactically complex expression signifies the sum total of what its categorematic terms signify. The idea is that, since – on the authority of}
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\(^{31}\) Also excluded from the vocabulary of mental language are prepositions. Just like the copula and other syncategorematic elements of natural language, I suggest that prepositions in Burley’s account of mental language are best conceived of as operations that the mind can perform on concepts. Unlike syncategoremata, however, those operations should not be understood as uses of concepts, that is, as acts of cognition, since Burley would seem to allow that, in mental vocabulary, there can be complex concepts that have some preposition structure to them, even when one does not think about what they represent.

\(^{32}\) One obvious restriction, even in this limiting case, is that no two concepts which refer to concrete substances can be combined with one another in this way. The concepts PETER and PAUL, for example, cannot be combined to form the concepts PETER PAUL.
Aristotle’s De interpretatione 3, 16b19 – signification is a matter of what you are made to think of when you encounter a term, therefore when you hear a string of terms, as you do when you hear a complex expression like ‘white Socrates’, you will be made to think of – and so the complex expression will signify – what each of the members of that string signifies.33

The additive principle is a semantic principle, one which presupposes that the relevant string is already well-formed. But, first, Burley’s metaphysics actually contains things which are the aggregates of the contents of noun and adjective concepts: being per accidens. And, second, if the syntax of mental language is only as restrictive as semantics demands, and since there will always be some aggregate which is composed of the referents of an arbitrary collection of noun and adjective concepts, then it seems that any combination of them should be a well-formed concept signifying that aggregate.

Of course, this initial account of how concepts can be combined still leaves a great deal to be desired. First, Burley’s mental vocabulary must contain not only nouns and adjectives, but participles and adverbs as well. Once we expand the account to include participle and adverb concepts, however, it seems that something like order becomes relevant.34 JOHN LOVING MARY is a different concept than MARY LOVING JOHN. Second, Burley will need to provide some account of how prepositional phrases of natural language should be translated into mental language. As far as I know, Burley provides no such account. However, the account which I think fits best with the general picture of mental language that Burley defends conceives of prepositions in


34 One difficulty here is how to account for order in an immaterial substance such as the intellect. Panaccio suggests that one must posit “a special mental syncategorematic term which turns the categorematic concept with which it is immediately grouped, into the subject-term of the proposition in which they both occur (and maybe another special predicate forming syncategorematic functor as well).” (Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 153–4).
mental language not as elements of the vocabulary of mental language – that is, it denies that there are preposition concepts – but rather conceives of them as structural features of complex concepts. So, for example, the complex concept JUMPING ON THE BED would be composed of the concepts JUMPING and BED, but that complex concept would have a structure that would realize its prepositional character. On this suggestion, then, the mind contains a number of different innate operations that it can perform on the concepts that it possesses, by which operations more complex concepts (among other things) are produced. And some of these operations involve the combination of concepts where that combination has something like prepositional structure. For complex concepts of that sort, then, what they represent is simply the aggregate of the contents of the concepts that compose them, but how they represent them (and so the formal import of those concepts in a mental language) differs from the mere combination of those concepts.

Despite these challenges, however, the account of mental language that Burley defends will at least not be restricted by rules of syntax that concern verbs. And this is because the vocabulary of mental language, according to Burley, simply does not contain any verbs. That the vocabulary of mental language does not contain any verbs, however, might seem to be fatal for Burley’s account of mental language. In particular, the lack of any verb concepts in mental language might seem to suggest that nothing like a sentence can be produced in mental language. But language is also – perhaps primarily – a tool to express (or, in the case of mental language, form) complete thoughts. Without the ability to produce mental sentences, then, Burley’s mental language would be seriously compromised. Moreover, Burley’s commitment to the Aristotelian tradition itself might
suggest that his mental language ought to have verb concepts. Burley notes, for example, that

Aristotle says that nouns and verbs which are in an utterance (that is, in speech) are marks of affections of the soul (that is, concepts, which are similitudes of things) [...]. Affections of the soul (that is, similitudes of things, existing in the mind) signify things outside the mind.35

If both nouns and verbs are “marks” of concepts, that is, if both nouns and verbs have the contents that they do by being subordinated to concepts which have those contents necessarily, then, mutatis mutandis, shouldn’t mental language, like natural language, contain both nouns and verbs?

To understand why mental language contains no verb concepts, we need to examine what Burley has to say about the nature of verbs in natural language. For Burley, every sentence of natural language has, at some fundamental level, a three-part structure: subject, copula, and predicate.36 In his De Puritate, Burley writes that “in every statement the verb ‘is’ or some oblique form of it is the copula, whether an adjectival or a substantival verb is expressed in the statement, or whether the proposition is about the present or about the past or about the future.”37 Burley argues in this passage, in other

35 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3va: “Dicit igitur philosophus quod nomina et verba quae sunt in voce est in prolatione sunt notae passionum animae, hoc est, conceptuum animae qui sunt similitudines rerum. Et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce, hoc est nomina et verba scripta significat nomina et verba prolata. Tale igitur ordinem signorum assignat hic Aristoteles, scilicet, quod passiones animae, hoc est similitudines rerum existentium in animae significat res extra, et nomina et verba prolata significat passiones animae, et illud non solum est verum de nominibus et verbis quae sunt partes enunciationis, sed etiam est verum de ipsa enunciatione. Nam enunciatio prolata significat orationem in mente quae est quaedam passio mentis et enunciatio scripta significat enunciationem prolata.”

36 See ch. 3, §7.

words, that sentences contain one of two kinds of verbs: substantival verbs or adjectival verbs. What kind of verb they contain will dictate the kind of surface structure that they have. Those which contain substantival verbs will have a three-part surface structure, whereas those which contain adjectival verbs will have a two part structure. Sentences containing substantival verbs have a three part structure because a substantival verb is simply some version of the copula – past, present, or future. Consequently, in those sentences, the surface structure of the sentence will itself mark the distinction between the copula, on the one hand, and the predicate, on the other. ‘John is tall’, for example, contains ‘John’ ‘is’ and ‘tall’, where ‘John’ and ‘tall’ are the subject and predicate, respectively, and ‘is’ is the verb linking the predicate to the subject.

In contrast, those sentences which contain adjectival verbs have only a two-part surface structure. ‘John runs’, for example, has ‘John’ for its subject, and ‘runs’ both for its verb and for its predicate. However, Burley argues that surface structure in those kinds of sentences is not the same as deep structure.

Thus, in ‘Socrates walks’, the verb ‘is’ is the copula. For saying ‘Socrates walks’ is the same as saying ‘Socrates is walking’. And in ‘Socrates walked’, the verb ‘was’ is the copula. For saying ‘Socrates walked’ is the same as saying ‘Socrates was walking’. 38

Whereas sentences composed of adjectival verbs superficially have only two parts, then – so that the verb acts both as the copula, linking the predicate to the subject, and as (at least part of) the predicate, referring to something – in point of fact the copulative element in those sentences is wholly distinct from the predicate. Consequently, it is possible to “resolve an adjectival verb into this verb, ‘is’, and into a participle of the same

38 Ibid.
time and same significations.”\textsuperscript{39} That is, we can provide a sentence, equivalent in meaning, in which the significative elements of the adjectival verb are nominalized (in particular, made into participles, or verbal adjectives), to reveal that the verb in those sentences just is the copula.

Whether Burley’s vocabulary contains any verb concepts, therefore, is ultimately a question of whether that vocabulary contains a copula concept. But a copula concept – if there is such a thing in the vocabulary of Burley’s mental language – would be a syncategorematic concept. And that is because $\textit{copulae}$ generally are $\textit{syncategorema}$\textsuperscript{40}. The difference between syncategorematic and categorematic expressions, recall, is that the function of categorematic expressions is to refer, whereas that is not the function of syncategorematic expressions.\textsuperscript{41} Rather, syncategorematic expressions modify the semantic features of one term in a sentence relative to the other. When used syncategorematically, for example, ‘every’ distributes the subject term to which it is paired relative to the predicate. In the same way, ‘is’ does not signify anything, but rather serves to mark (\textit{notare}) expressions as subjects and predicates relative to one another.\textsuperscript{42}

We should expect a copula concept to function in a similar way. It would not signify

\textsuperscript{39} Walter Burley, \textit{Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih}, k6va.

\textsuperscript{40} See ch. 3, §7.

\textsuperscript{41} The subject and predicate terms of a proposition, then, will always be categorematic expressions (or, at least, expressions used categorematically). That is, they will always refer – just as concepts do in Burley’s account of mental language. And so the difference between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions at the level of natural language is realized as a difference between concepts and uses of those concepts at the level of mental language.

\textsuperscript{42} On the claim that a copula marks expressions as subjects and predicates, see \textit{Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih}, k6va.
anything; rather, it would mark the other concepts to which it is joined as subject and predicate terms relative to one another.\textsuperscript{43}

The vocabulary of Burley’s mental language thus contains, at best, one sort of verb concept – the copula concept. That the account of mental language that Burley defends involves a copula of some sort is clear. He writes that

\begin{quote}
\textit{in every statement there is some material and something formal. The formal thing in a statement is a copula joining together a predicate with a subject, and that copula is in the intellect, because is a composition or division of the intellect. The material things in a statement, however, are the subject and the predicate.}\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

According to Burley, every statement – not just in mental language, but in natural language and in the case of propositions as well – contains three parts: two objects of predication, and a mental act of predication. In the case of a mental sentences in particular, the objects of predication are concepts. But, for Burley, the mind’s predating one concept of another will not itself be a concept, nor will the vocabulary of Burley’s mental language contain syncategorematic concepts more generally. First, as I argued earlier, Burley quite clearly distinguishes between concepts, on the one hand, and mental acts, on the other. Concepts are objects of use, rather than that use itself. Consequently, the mind’s predating one concept of another – a certain sort of use that the mind makes of concepts – will not itself be a concept, and so will not be an element in the vocabulary of mental language.

\textsuperscript{43} And, in fact, in Ockham’s mental language, this is exactly how the copula concept functions.

Second, Burley argues the mental statements are isomorphic to other kinds of statements. In particular, he argues that mental statements are isomorphic to the propositions that they express.\textsuperscript{45} He writes, for example, that “in some statement a thing is predicated of a thing, and in some statement a concept is predicated of a concept, and in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance.”\textsuperscript{46} Propositions, of course, have a three-part structure (on the later account, at least). But, among those parts, Burley sharply distinguishes between the things which are predicated, on the one hand, and the mind’s act of predicating them, on the other. The former are absolute items, words (\textit{very} roughly speaking) in a language of reality; the latter constitutes the mind’s use of those words, predicing one of the other and thereby asserting some relation between them.

Since mental statements are isomorphic to the propositions they express, we find the same sort of structure in mental statements as we do in propositions. Like propositions, mental statements have a three-part structure. But, also like propositions, only the subject and predicate terms of that statement will be words in mental language; the “copula” of a mental statement will be instead the mind’s use of those words as subject and predicate expressions relative to one another, a certain sort of operation that the mind performs on those concepts.

What exactly hangs on distinguishing concepts, on the one hand, and mental acts of predication, on the other? Is this is distinction without a difference? I argue that what

\textsuperscript{45} Burley also suggests that mental sentences and propositions are isomorphic with sentences in natural language. On that isomorphism, see \textit{infra}.

\textsuperscript{46} Walter Burley, \textit{Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed}, c4rb: “Et credo quod illud indubitanter sit verum, quod in aliqua propositione praedicatur res de re, et in aliqua propositione conceptus de conceptu praedicatur, et in aliqua propositione vox de voce praedicatur.”
motivates the distinction – both with statements in mental language in particular, and the
distinction between the formal and material elements of statements more generally – is a
recognition on Burley’s part that the mind’s predicking one thing of another is a feature
of syntax, rather than itself a unit in the vocabulary of mental language. The mental act of
predication is a rule-governed operation that the mind performs on the concepts it
possess, and so something the mind realizes only by actually performing that operation.
As such, it cannot have any sort of existence independent of the concepts in whose
predicative arrangement that activity is realized.

This position differs significantly from the later Ockham, for whom mental acts of
predication can and do exist independently of the categorematic concepts that they
structure. To conceive of the mind’s predicking activity as itself a concept is to conceive
of it as more basic than the statements that it structures. Consequently, on Ockham’s
view, mental sentences are composed of three mental “words:” a subject term, a predicate
term, and a copula. On Burley’s account, in contrast, mental sentences – while still three-
part structures – contain only two expressions in the vocabulary of mental language: a
subject term and a predicate term. The third part of a mental sentence – the copula – is
simply a structural, or “formal,” element in a mental sentence, an operation on those
terms by which those terms are related to one another as subject and predicate
expressions.

Ockham’s account might seem to have the advantage that it can better respect an
isomorphism between natural and mental language. Just as it seems that sentences in
natural language contain (as some level of structure) three distinct “material” elements –
a subject, a predicate and a copula – so too mental language contains three distinct
“material” elements: a subject-concept, a predicate-concept and a copula-concept. Burley, however, appears to be unwilling to concede that his account of the mental sentence requires an asymmetry between natural and mental language. According to Burley, Ockham is mistaken when he assumes that all sentences in natural language contain three “material” elements. In fact, Burley suggests that, in some respect at least, sentences in natural language contain only two “material” elements: the subject term and the predicate term. And this is because, on Burley’s view, we make a sentence in natural language only when we use expressions in that language as subject and predicate terms. First, just like sentences in mental language and propositions, Burley argues that “in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance.” That is, a sentence in natural language involves the predicate expression being actually predicated of the subject expression. Second, what does the predicating is, according to Burley, not the copula of

47 Later in the same passage, however, Burley argues that sentences in natural language are completely outside of the mind. “A statement spoken of in the first way, namely, a statement in speech, is totally [totaliter] outside the mind, and a statement of that sort is totally composed out of utterances which have being outside the soul” (Ibid). Moreover, at least one extant manuscript – ms lat. 146 – suggests that Burley’s claim that every statement is at least partly in the mind is meant to be restricted to propositions alone. “Therefore I say that no statement is composed of things completely outside the soul, because the formal element is such a statement is in the mind, that is, in the intellect, yet the material elements are outside of the mind. However [verumtamen, instead of unde, ‘hence’, which is present, for example, in the 1497 print edition, in ms Canon. Misc. 460 and in ms Gonville & Caius 139/79], since a statement is of three sorts – a certain spoken one, a certain conceptual one, and a certain one signified through a conceptual statement which can be called a propositio in re – a statement spoken of in the first way, namely a spoken statement, is completely outside the soul [...]” (Burley, Oxford, Magdalen Old Library, ms lat. 146, 12v). This manuscript suggests, then, that Burley’s claim that the copulae of all statements are mental acts of predication is not a completely general claim, but one restricted to propositions. On such a reading, statements in natural language would not be isomorphic with the propositions they express, since statements in natural language will have three “material” elements: a subject, a predicate and a copula, whereas as propositions (and mental sentences) will have only two. But it is not clear to me whether a lack of isomorphism would be problematic for Burley’s account. Burley can still provide a compelling account of how statements in natural language have propositions as their contents (and, indeed, he does; see ch. 3, §7), and this seems to me to be what drives the concern with isomorphism in the first place – that isomorphism somehow allows for a compelling account of how statements in natural language are related to their contents.

natural language but – just as in the case of a mental sentence or a proposition – it is rather the mind. “In every statement there is some material and some form. The formal thing in a statement is a copula joining together a predicate with a subject, and that copula is in the intellect.”49 Just as in the case of sentences in mental language and propositions, then, sentences in natural language involve the mind’s actually predicating one expression of another. It is this actual predication of one expression in natural language of another that constitutes a sentence in natural language. But, on that account, the copula of natural language in no way constitutes an element – “formal” or “material” – of a sentence in natural language.

None of this is to deny that the copula of natural language does not play a central role in an explanation of the production of sentences in natural language. That copula is “a principle of notifying the subject just as the predicate,” and so is “a principle of thinking as much about the subject as the predicate.”50 The presence of the copula, and its location between two categorematic expressions in natural language, is thus a precondition for the existence of a meaningful sentence in natural language; it indicates when it is appropriate to predicate one expression of another. But, on Burley’s account, a sentence of natural language itself is, strictly speaking, something that the mind forms, by predicating one expression of natural language of another. Consequently, for Burley, every statement – whether a statement in natural language, or a statement in mental language, or a proposition – has the same three-part structure: two terms, joined together by a mental act of predication. And so, like Ockham, Burley can account for an


50 Ibid., *Exp.Perih*, k8va.
isomorphism in the structure of statements; it will just involve a very different sort of structure than Ockham had envisioned.

The slightly idiosyncratic view that Burley has of sentences in natural language also serves to highlight an important feature of sentences in mental language. Sentences in natural language, on Burley’s view, exist only when the mind predicates one expression of another. As Elizabeth Karger notes, on Burley’s account, there are no sentences in a closed book. Presumably, however, that book still contains a great many words, standing at the ready to be put together into meaningful sentences by the mind. In a similar way, unlike concepts, which can exist in the “storehouse” of memory, available for use to the mind, in Burley’s account, mental sentences exist only when the mind actually predicates one concept of another. That is, the mind does not contain in its “storehouse” mental sentences along with various basic and complex concepts, so that thinking involves simply the “illumination,” or use, of one of those sentences. Rather, a mental sentence is itself partly constituted by the mind’s use of concepts as subject and predicate terms, and so something that occurs only when the mind actually thinks.

Moreover, that the mind can possess a mental sentence only occurrently, by actually predicting one concept of another, is no idle curiosity in Burley’s account, but plays a central role in Burley’s account of the proposition. For, as I will argue in sections 3 and 5, the mind’s predicating one thing of another just is the mind’s predicated one concept of another, which concepts represent those things. Consequently, the reason that mind’s predicating one thing of another— that is, thought – is representational, is because

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that act is an act of predicking one concept of another, where the content of those concepts together with the predicative structure of that act determine a certain propositional content.

I want to end this section by briefly expanding Burley’s account of mental language, to include other sorts of logical operations, or uses, that the mind can perform on the concepts that it possesses. I suggest that, for Burley, the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions in natural language is realized in mental language generally as a distinction between the vocabulary of mental language, on the one hand, and certain rule-governed uses that the mind can make of that vocabulary, on the other. That the copula is an operation that the mind can perform, rather than an expression in the vocabulary of mental language, is a consequence not of the fact that it is a copula but of the fact that it is syncategorematic, that is, that it is a certain sort of use to which the mind can put expressions of a language. Consequently, the rest of the syncategorematic expressions of natural language should be realized in the same way in mental language. So, for example, the syncategorematic expression ‘every’ of English can be realized in mental language as an operation in which a subject concept is universally distributed relative to a predicate concept. Likewise, modal expressions of natural language should be realized as certain operations that the mind can perform on concepts, whereby the mental sentences that they structure carry modal import.

I suggest that there is two ways in which these various operations can be related to one another. One possibility is that they constitute distinct, ordered operations that the mind can perform on concepts. On this conception, the mind’s predicking one concept of another would be the most basic of these sorts of operations, after which further
operations – of quantification or modalization, for example – could be applied to those concepts. An alternative possibility, however, is that all of the various uses of concepts can be realized in one complex operation of the mind. On this alternative, the mind possess a number of different predicative operations that it can perform, some of which involve “mere” predication, others of which involve predication which is modalized, and so on. This alternative account has the advantage of being more economical; all of the various syncategorematic expressions that a sentence in natural language might contain are realized as the level of mental language as one single, complex mental operation that the mind performs on two of the concepts that it possesses. Moreover, I think we have some reason to think that Burley endorses this alternative. Burley already recognizes a distinction in quality with respect of the mental act of predicating. That is, Burley recognizes that the act of predicating can be either positive or negative. There is not some separate operation, then, determining the quality of statement, consequent to the mind’s predicative act. Rather, the quality of the predication is built into the act itself; as Burley says, the mind either joins expressions together, or divides them. I suggest that a similar approach could be made with respect to quantity and mode as well.52

52 This account is an application at the level of mental language of what Karger suggests should be the case for Burley at the level of the proposition. See Ibid., 208–10. That application should be expected, given that the same act which predicates things, predicates concepts. However, with respect to quantity at least, a slightly different account might be preferable. While the suggestion that quantity is best understood as a feature of a predicative act works well for categorical propositions, mental sentences such as EVERY FARMER IN SOME TOWN OWNS/IS OWNING SOME DONKEY seems to require that quantification is an operation that the mind can perform at a sub-sentential level. Ockham adopts a position of this sort position, arguing that EVERY FARMER, for example, could be an independent unit in mental language. (For the later Ockham, that unit is produced by combining the concepts EVERY and FARMER. See Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts, 32–4; 146–54.) On this articulation, quantifier expressions operate in a way similar to the way I suggested prepositions might operate in Burley’s mental language, see n. 31.
3. **THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT HYPOTHESIS**

Presumably, Burley’s commitment to mental language plays some role in his larger semantic and cognitive program. That role, I argue, is to explain the nature of thought and thinking, with the consequence that Burley is committed to the language of thought hypothesis (LOTH). Thought – that is, having a propositional attitude – is a matter of the mind’s having a certain sort of content: propositional content, in a certain way. LOTH argues that, for a mind to have that sort of content is for the mind to possess a mental sentence with that content. Moreover, LOTH argues that the process of thinking ought to be explained in terms of the production of new mental sentences in the mind from prior mental sentences, where that production is sensitive merely to the syntactic features of mental sentences.

LOTH is at root a project of naturalizing intentionality.\(^{53}\) LOTH is meant to provide an argument for the way in which that the intentionality of propositional attitudes, at least, can be naturalized. First, proponents of LOTH at least assume that a natural explanation of the content of the basic symbols of mental language can be given. As we saw earlier, Burley himself seems to propose a naturalizing account of the content of the basic symbols of mental language, articulated in terms of conformality, and of the transmission and transformation of forms. Second, proponents of LOTH argues that the semantic contents of non-basic symbols – the phrases and sentences built up from the

\(^{53}\) In *LOT 2*, Jerry Fodor suggests that naturalism must be a reductive project, writing that naturalism “declines to leave intensional properties and relations (reference, propositions, and the like) unreduced.” That is, Fodor argues that non-natural properties must be explained in terms of natural properties. See Fodor, *LOT 2*, 18, n. 34. But naturalism can be a less demanding program, according to which non-natural properties merely need to be wholly determined by some natural property or properties. (In that same note, Fodor suggests that semantic properties are “primitive,” so suggesting a kind of non-reductive naturalism I endorse here. But he also claims that “propositional attitudes are relational states, taking mental representations as *relata*” (Ibid., 18). It’s a bit of a mess.)
basic vocabulary of the language – are function of the semantic values of the symbols which compose them together with their syntax (where that syntax, that is, the ways in which those symbols can be combined, is determined by the causal properties of the brain states upon which those symbols depend).

The representational nature of non-basic symbols in a mental language – that is, phrases and sentences – can thus be given a completely natural explanation, in terms of the semantics and syntax of the basic symbols which compose them. Consequently, the intentional character of one’s propositional attitudes can be explained by the various kinds of psychological relations that the mind can bear to sentences in that mental language, where the semantic content of that sentence itself will be explained in terms of the semantic content of the symbols which compose it and the syntactic rules governing its composition.

Proponents of LOTH typically argue that it is the thesis that thought and thinking “are done in a mental language, i.e., in a symbolic system physically realized in the brain of the relevant organism.”

That is, adherents to LOTH are typically committed to physicalism, and argue that LOTH provides a sophisticated philosophical program according to which non-physical states (such as the propositional attitudes) can be explained, either reductively or non-reductively, in terms of a system of representation (i.e. a mental language) that is itself realized within a physical system, such as the brain.

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Burley, however, is no physicalist. For him, general concepts at least (and, at the end of his career, singular concepts as well) exist immaterially.\(^{55}\) But I argue that LOTH itself does not entail physicalism, contrary to the way many of its advocates articulate it. All that LOTH requires is a suitably sophisticated computing device containing symbols with representational or semantic properties, the use of which is causally sensitive to the syntax of those symbols. And if we understand LOTH to be a program of that sort, namely, one of naturalizing thought (rather than one of providing a specifically physical explanation for thought), then I argue that Burley himself is committed to LOTH. First, with respect to cases of simple cognitive activity – that is, thinking-of – Burley analyzes that activity in terms of the mind’s use of a concept which represents that thing. I have a thought of Socrates, for example, when I use, in some very minimal sense, the concept SOCRATES. Second, complex mental activity – that is, thinking-that – is simply a matter of a more sophisticated use of those same concepts. My thinking that Socrates is a human, for example, consists in my mind’s using the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN predicatively, that is, it consists in my mind’s predicing HUMAN of SOCRATES.

However, though Burley is committed to LOTH, he is committed to a heterodox version of it. Canonically, LOTH endorses a relational analysis of propositional attitudes, according to which belief and other states of that sort are relations that the mind bears to a proposition, or to a mental sentence, or to both. Canonical versions of LOTH then attempt to naturalize belief and other states of that sort in one of two ways. According to

\(^{55}\) It is important to note that Burley’s immaterial intellect is no Cartesian mind. This is especially clear when we consider the sort of being that that intellect and its attributes have. While propositions themselves have a peculiar sort of being, the intellect and its concepts are all real features of the world, fitting within its causal structure. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” 60.
attempts which attempt to naturalize belief, etc., in the first way, the belief relation is treated as a three-place relation, so that belief is a relation of the mind both to a proposition and to the mental sentence which has that proposition as its content. In *Representations*, for example, Jerry Fodor argues that “beliefs are relations to propositions – viz., they are mediated relations to propositions, with internal representations doing the mediating.” The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, is a relation that a mind bears to the proposition that Socrates is a human – but that proposition is only the mediate object of that relation, being an object of that relation because that relation more immediately relates to a mental sentence which has that proposition as its content. On this view, different aspects of that relation resolve different philosophical worries. Epistemological questions about the content of knowledge are answered by appeal to propositions, whereas psychological worries about what explains the behavior of humans, for example, are addressed by appeal to the formal features of the mental sentences that one has and the psychological attitudes one bears to them.

According to attempts of the second variety, in contrast, belief is analyzed in terms of two two-place relations, where one relation supervenes, or depends, upon the other. One relation is between a mind and a proposition, whereas the other is between that mind and a mental sentence which expresses that proposition. On that account, for example, my belief that Socrates is a human involves a relation to the proposition that Socrates is a human, as well as a more fundamental relation to the mental sentence SOCRATES IS A HUMAN. This appears to be something like the position Fodor adopts

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in *LOT 2*. In that work, he argues that verbs of attitude ascription are ambiguous between two readings.

‘[T]he belief that...’ is ambiguous; it can be read either as transparent or as opaque at the ‘...’ position. Read in the first way, then ‘the belief that F(Paderewski₁)’ is ‘the belief that F(Paderewski₂)’; read the second way, it’s not. There is, of course, no fact of the matter about which is ‘the right’ way of reading it; it depends on the task at hand. By and large, however, psychologists are likely to have the second in mind, epistemologists the first.⁵⁷

According to Fodor in *LOT 2*, then, different readings of the ‘belief that...’ pick out different kinds of relations, so that which relation gets called “the belief relation” is domain- or interest-sensitive. If the interest is an analysis of knowledge, then the belief relation is the relation that the mind bears to a proposition. If the project is an analysis of explaining and predicting human behavior, in contrast, then it is the mind’s relation to a mental sentence that is more correctly labeled the belief relation.

In contrast to relational analyses of propositional content, however, Burley is committed to a non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes. As Burley’s commitment to intellectualism reveals, propositional attitudes are for him a matter of content creation, not content relation. Belief, for example, is a matter of predicking one thing of another in an assertive manner. My belief that Socrates is a human, on this account, just is my predicating humanity of Socrates assertively. On Burley’s account, then, the project of naturalizing thought isn’t a matter of describing in what way mental sentences figure into a relation that a mind bears to a proposition. Rather, it is a matter of describing how the mind’s production of a mental sentence contributes to its production of a proposition.

⁵⁷ Fodor, *LOT 2*, 74.
Like canonical versions of LOTH, however, it seems that Burley can describe that contribution, broadly, in one of two ways. First, he might hold that the mind’s predicating one thing of another depends upon, but is distinct from, the mind’s predicating concepts which represent those things. On this account, the mind simultaneously undertakes two distinct predicative acts: an act of predicating things, and an act of predicating concepts, and the former is explained in terms of the latter. Then, like Fodor in *LOT 2*, which act constitutes a propositional attitude will be relative to the domain in which the question is raised. Second, however, Burley might hold that the mind’s predicating one thing of another just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another, concepts which represent those things. The mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates, on this view, is the very same act as the mind’s predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES.

I argue that Burley adopts the second of these two positions. I argue this, in part, on grounds of economy; there is no need for two mental acts when one alone would do the trick. But, more than that, identifying acts of predicating things and acts of predicating concepts coheres with the broader account of cognition and concept use that Burley defends. According to Burley, simple mental acts just are the mind’s use of concepts. A thought of Socrates, for example, is a certain sort of simple use of the concept SOCRATES, on Burley’s account. In virtue of that use, the mind has a certain *intentio* to Socrates himself. In the same way, the thought that Socrates is a human is the mind’s predicative use of the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN. In virtue of using those concepts in that way, the mind has a peculiar kind of *intentio* to both Socrates and humanity, in which the mind arranges them in a predicate fashion.
This position also provides the best response to the sorts of problems that cause Burley to develop a mental language in the first place, problems having to do with an apparent tension between his account of the proposition, on the one hand, and his commitment to the productivity of demonstrative reasoning, on the other. Given those two commitments, Burley requires that belief-states which have the same content (i.e. are uses of the very same things arranged in the very same way) can be individuated more finely than that content. For example, his account requires that the belief that Socrates is a human is distinct from the belief that Socrates is a rational animal – even though both involve the mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates. But Burley argues the mind’s predicating one thing of another just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another. Consequently, the belief that Socrates is a human can be distinguished from the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, despite the fact that, in both cases, the mind predicates humanity of Socrates, because the former is more fundamentally a predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES, whereas the latter is more fundamentally a predicating RATIONAL ANIMAL of SOCRATES.

4. **Burley on Demonstrative Science**

Burley’s endorsement of a language of thought helps Burley resolve an apparent problem for his account of the metaphysics of the proposition, concerned with co-reference. It is perhaps best understood by way of example. Assume that Cato believes that Marcus runs. But ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ refer to the same individual, namely, Cicero. Therefore, Cato must believe that Tullius runs. But that inference seems unintuitive. It is quite easy to contrive cases in which a person asserts that Marcus runs,
but genuinely denies that Tullius runs, because (suppose) she mistakenly believes that Marcus and Tullius are two different people, and that one only of them is currently running. Accounts of propositional content motivated by referentialist commitments, then, appear to run contrary to some deeply-held intuitions about the sorts of inferences we can or cannot make in intentional contexts.

Problems of this sort today go by the name of Frege puzzles, or cases, named after Gottlob Frege, who uses cases of that sort to motivate a certain account of the nature of meaning and reference-shifting. But the problem has more medieval roots. The case of Marcus and Tullius, for example, is one that Burley himself discusses.59


59 Burley uses the Cicero case to draw a distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* readings of sentences whose verbs are intentional. Burley introduces the distinction in his treatise *On Obligations*. I translate the passage in its entirety; the distinction between *de dicto* and *de re* readings for sentences with opacity verbs is introduced in the second paragraph:

Another difficulty is where many names signify the same thing, as happens in the case of synonyms. For example, suppose that ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ are names of the same thing. Suppose that you are unsure of this, and suppose that you know [substituting for: ‘do not know’] whose name is ‘Marcus’, and suppose you know that he runs, and suppose that you do not know [substituting for: ‘know’] whose name is ‘Tullius’. Then you know that Marcus runs, but Marcus is Tullius, therefore you know that Tullius runs. Additionally, therefore, you know who is called ‘Tullius’. But the *positum* was that you are ignorant [of who is named ‘Tullius’].

Here is the solution. This is of multiple sorts: ‘You know that Tullius runs’. Because it either signifies that you know this *dictum*, ‘Tullius runs’, and this is false. Or it signifies that you know of this person who is Tullius, that he runs, and this can be true, although you do not know what is signified through this term, ‘Tullius’, in just the way that a layman knows that a human runs, and yet does not know what is signified through this term, ‘human’.

Through this, the solution to the following difficulty is clear. [The difficulty]: You know that Tullius is called ‘Marcus’, therefore you know that Marcus is called ‘Tullius’. For if it is denoted that you know this *dictum*, ‘Tullius is called ‘Marcus’’, then the consequence holds, given that you would know these convertible sentences: ‘Marcus is called ‘Tullius’’ and ‘Tullius is called ‘Marcus’’. [The solution]: But if it is denoted that you know of someone who is called Tullius, that he is called ‘Marcus’, it does not follow that, since you know that Tullius is called ‘Marcus’, you know that Marcus is called ‘Tullius’. Likewise, this does not follow: since you know that Tullius is Tullius, you know that Tullius is called by this name, ‘Tullius’. Likewise, it does not follow in all cases that, if *a* is called ‘*b*’, then *b* is called ‘*a*’. An instance [to show that this is true]: some human is called ‘Marcus’, therefore Marcus is called ‘some human’, because the verb ‘called’ requires a proper name after it.
sort appear to arise for anyone committed to an account of propositional content according to which that content is structured, and contains things (e.g. concrete particulars, properties) as parts. A central assumption, however, is that belief-states are only as fine-grained as their contents.

Burley’s concern about co-reference is not motivated so much by Frege-style cases, however, as it is by certain claims he wants to make about the nature of demonstration. The theory of demonstration is Aristotelian philosophy of science. It sets out the conditions for scientific knowledge – *scientia* – in any domain of study.

Aristotle introduces the notion of demonstrative science in his *Posterior Analytics*. In that

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Again, suppose that ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ are names of the same thing, and suppose that you are unsure of this, and suppose that it is proposed to you: ‘Either Marcus is called ‘Tullius’, or something doubtful is proposed to you.’ If you concede this, and not because of this part, ‘Marcus is called ‘Tullius’’, therefore [you concede it] because of this part, ‘something doubtful is proposed to you’, therefore you concede something doubtful, which [you are not] obligated [to do], therefore [you act] poorly. If you deny it, you have to reject that Marcus is called ‘Tullius’, because he who denies a disjunction, has to deny both parts of it, and so you deny something which is [merely] doubtful to you, and so [you act] poorly. If you respond with doubt, then this is true: ‘something doubtful is proposed to you’. Therefore the disjunction is true, and you know this well [i.e. without doubt]. Therefore you respond with doubt to a true thing known to be true, and therefore [you act] poorly. The solution: you must respond with doubt to that disjunction, nor does this follow: ‘You respond with doubt to that disjunction, therefore you respond with doubt to a true thing known to be true’.


Obligation was a form of medieval academic disputation, involving two individuals: an opponent and a respondent. The opponent sets out a number of claims, called *posita* (or a *positum*, if just one). The respondent traditionally concedes that set, at which point the game really commences. The opponent then makes a further claim, which the respondent can either concede, deny or take a doubtful position towards, depending on whether (1) he takes the claim to follow from the initial *posita*, or, if the claim is merely consistent with the initial *posita*, believes the claim on independent grounds, (2) he takes the claim to contradict the initial *posita*, or (3) he takes the claim to be consistent with, but not follow from the initial *posita* set out, and does not believe the claim on independent grounds. Any concession is added to the initial *posita* set out. The exchange continues for any number of rounds, until the opponent calls time, at which point any contradictions or errors of reason on the part of the respondent are noted. Scholars today are still not at all sure about the motivation for Obligation-style disputation.

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60 However, the problems are structurally similar: they assume that belief-states can be only as fine-grained as their contents, such that anyone who metaphysics of the proposition is motivated at least in part by referentialism will be forced to endorse inferences that run contrary to intuition.
work, Aristotle argues that scientific knowledge is gained “through a demonstration. By ‘demonstration’, I mean a scientific deduction”\textsuperscript{61} According to Aristotle, then, knowledge (or, at any rate, scientific knowledge) comes about through syllogistic reasoning, with the result of that reasoning being knowledge that is scientific. It is no surprise, then, that the early thirteenth-century philosopher Robert Grosseteste, in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, argues that the definition of a demonstration is “a syllogism producing knowledge.”\textsuperscript{62}

The formal structure of scientific knowledge, then, is syllogistic. But syllogistic reasoning is scientific only when it produces what Aristotle calls understanding. “[A]nd, by ‘scientific’, I mean one in virtue of which, by having it, we understand something.”\textsuperscript{63} Demonstrative knowledge involves insight not just into how the world is, but into why the world is that way. Aristotle writes that “[w]e think we understand a thing *simpliciter* [...] whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the object is, is the explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise.”\textsuperscript{64}

Scientific knowledge of a thing, then, requires (a) recognition of the cause why the thing is, (b) recognition of that cause as a cause, and (c) recognition that this causal connection is necessary. Consequently, scientific knowledge – as articulated here at least – involves having a noetic structure that mirrors the causal structure of the world itself. Just as some


\textsuperscript{63} Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 71b19, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 71b10–4, p. 2.
(metaphysically or physically) necessary facts depend upon other, more fundamental
(metaphysically or physically) necessary facts, so too scientific knowledge of these facts
must be arrived at via knowledge of those more fundamental facts.

Because scientific knowledge contains a structure of that sort, Aristotle argues
that there will be some principles – the “first principles” of a science – which have to be
known non-demonstratively. These principles, Aristotle tells us, will be “true and
primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the
conclusion.”\(^{65}\) They must be true because knowledge is factive. They must be immediate
because they are not themselves arrived at via deductive inference, that is, by mediation
of more fundamental principles. That immediacy also reflects their primitiveness in
noetic structure, as well as their priority in that structure relative to other principles and
conclusions of the science. Finally, because the priority that those principles have in a
noetic structure reflects an ontological priority of the facts that they represent, those
principles will be explanatory of the conclusions that one can derive from them, because
their relationship to each reflects a causal relationship that the facts which they represent
have with one another. In particular, the middle term of a demonstration serves as a
“cause,” or explanation, for why the attribute of a demonstration belongs the subject.\(^{66}\) A
triangle’s having three angles equal to two right angles, for example, is caused by its

\(^{65}\) Ibid., 71b21–2, pp. 2–3.

\(^{66}\) A syllogism is a deductive inference from two premises (i.e. a major premise and a minor premise) to a
conclusion. Consequently, every syllogism contains a subject, a middle term, and a predicate, or
attribute. The form of the syllogism depends on the quality and quantity of each premise, as well as the
relationship of the middle term to both the subject and the predicate.
having an extrinsic angle equal to the sum of two angles opposite to it.\textsuperscript{67} That is, having an extrinsic angle equal to the sum of two angles opposite to it is the explanation of why a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.

Both the formal and substantive constraints that Aristotle sets for demonstration are extremely high. Consequently, elsewhere in the \textit{Posterior Analytics}, Aristotle appears to relax the demands he had initially placed on demonstration, allow syllogisms to be demonstrative even if they do not meet all of the criteria set out at the beginning of the work. Those syllogisms which fail to meet all of the criteria set out in the beginning are what Aristotle calls factual demonstrations (\textit{demonstratio quia}).\textsuperscript{68} A demonstration is factual, for example, when one proves a cause through an effect – for example, if one proves that the planets are near because they do not twinkle.\textsuperscript{69} Likewise, a demonstration is factual when “the middle is set outside,” that is, when the middle term does not belong to the subject of the syllogism \textit{per se}, but rather an attribute peculiar to a more general kind.\textsuperscript{70} Moreover, a demonstration is merely factual if it isn’t “direct.” That is, it is merely factual if the middle term doesn’t immediately explain subject’s having the

\textsuperscript{67} On this example, see Giles of Rome, “Commentary on Posterior Analytics II 9, 93b26–8,” in \textit{Demonstration and Scientific Knowledge in William of Ockham: A Translation of Summa Logicae III-II: De Syllogismo Demonstrativo, and Selections from the Prologue to the Ordinatio}, trans. John Longeway (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 288–89.

\textsuperscript{68} On Aristotle on factual demonstration, and its comparison to an explanatory demonstration, see Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, 78a23–79a16, pp. 19–21.

\textsuperscript{69} The planets do not twinkle because they are near, and so, if one proves that the planets are near by the fact that they do not twinkle, one has not yet explained why the planets are near.

\textsuperscript{70} Consequently, subalternate sciences are necessarily factual, rather than explanatory, since explanatory demonstrations require the demonstrations (if any) from which their principles are derived to be explanatory as well. Optics, for example, is merely factual, since some of its first principles are arrived at via demonstration in geometry.
relevant attribute, but rather only explains it remotely, by more immediately causing some effect which itself is a more proximate cause of the subject’s having that attribute.\footnote{The sort of demonstration is factual because it does not serve to explain why the attribute inheres in the subject, since the middle term won’t explain its inherence, but rather explains the inherence of some intermediate attribute.}

In all of these cases, one or more of the conditions initially set out for demonstrative knowledge is not met – either the demonstration is not explanatory, or the middle is not proper to the subject, or the attributes’ relationship to the subject is not an immediate effect of the middle term.

In contrast to factual demonstrations, explanatory demonstrations (\textit{demonstratio propter quid}) do fulfill the criteria that Aristotle sets out at the beginning of the \textit{Posterior Analytics}. However, even among explanatory demonstrations, some are more preferable to others. For example, Aristotle argues that universal demonstrations are preferable to particular demonstrations, since “the universal is more explanatory.”\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, 86a31–32, p. 39. For Aristotle’s arguments for why universal demonstrations are more explanatory than particular ones, see Ibid., 85a14–86a30, pp. 35–9.} Likewise, affirmative demonstrations are preferable to negative demonstrations, since a demonstration is “better which, other things being equal, depends on fewer postulates, or suppositions, or propositions [...].” Aristotle’s argument for this claim, as Jonathan Barnes, is “embarrassingly bad [...]. Only surgery can save Aristotle’s reputation.”\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Posterior Analytics}, 187.} That surgery, Barnes argues, leaves us with the following argument: “D₁ is preferable to D₂ if it “depends on fewer items,” i.e., if it makes fewer conceptual demands than D₂. And probative deductions make fewer demands than privative ones; for the latter, as Aristotle
points out, require the concept of negation."⁷⁴ That is, an affirmative (or probative) demonstration is preferable to a negative (or privative) demonstration because it is conceptually simpler, since it does not require the use of the notion of negation.

Among explanatory demonstrations, then, certain kinds are especially prized. Those demonstrations have a particular syllogistic form: AAA in the first form, or Barbara. Barbara syllogisms are syllogisms which contain premises both of which are (1) universally quantified and (2) affirmative, and which are so structured so that the middle term is predicated of the subject, and the attribute is predicated of the middle term.⁷⁵ Moreover, as explanatory demonstrations, they fulfill the requirements set out for demonstration at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics, and in particular they contain a middle term whose inherence in the subject is more fundamental than and an immediate explanation of the subject’s having some attribute.

Even with regard to those especially prized explanatory demonstrations, however, we can always inquire into why the subject is characterized by the middle term itself. That is, we can ask how it is that we know the middle term is true of its subject. Have we come to know this demonstratively, or must we have come to know it in another way? Assume we know this demonstratively. Consequently, that middle term with be the term of an attribute in some more fundamental demonstration, which itself contains a new middle term. Of this new middle term, however, we can ask again how we know that it is in its subject.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Barabara syllogisms have the following form: ‘Every M is A, every S is M, therefore every S is A’.
Aristotle argues that, at some point, we will need to come to the first principles of the science, principles which are “true and primitive and immediate.” Explanatory demonstrations whose major and minor premises are first principles of a science are what medieval philosophers called a demonstration of the highest sort (demonstratio potissima). A demonstration of the highest sort, unlike other sorts of explanatory demonstrations, contains premises which cannot themselves be known demonstratively in that science. Medieval philosophers in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were extremely interested in demonstrations of the highest sort, and that interest was almost always motivated by a heated controversy over the nature of the middle term in that sort of demonstration.

What sort of thing can serve as the middle term in a demonstration which employs only the first principles of a science? Is it some attribute of the subject, or are all attributes, in the end, known demonstratively of their subjects via some other thing? This was a - perhaps the - central question in medieval discussions concerning the highest sort of demonstration. Until sometime in the fourteenth century, there was little consensus on what could serve as a middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort. Albert the Great, for example, writing in the middle of the thirteenth century, argued that a demonstration of the highest sort has as its middle term the definition of an attribute, because a definition of an attribute provides an explanation why that attribute is in its subject. Albert’s student, Thomas Aquinas, would argue instead that it was the definition of the subject that served as the middle in a demonstration of the highest sort. And, in turn, Giles of Rome, himself a student of Aquinas, defended the view of Aquinas’s master Albert, denying that the definition of a subject could ever serve as a middle term
in an explanatory demonstration, and affirming instead that it was the definition of an attribute that served as the middle term in these kinds of demonstrations.

Giles devotes an entire treatise to the question of what the middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort is, titled ‘What is the Middle Term in a Demonstration?’” Giles starts by noting that the proper attributes of a subject can be ordered according to their cause, that is, ordered according to the reason why they inhere in a subject. This order is relevant for demonstration, because demonstration (or explanatory demonstration at least) is a causal ordering of the proper attributes of a subject. Giles writes that “it must be known that one nature is determined to one thing, because from one nature and one form according to one genus of abstraction there immediately proceeds only one property or one attribute.”76 In other words, each thing can be considered more or less abstractly – for example, we can consider a human *qua* human or a human *qua* animal. Relative to a human *qua* human, however, only one attribute is true of it primarily, that is, possessed by it on account of no other attributes proper to it. For example, medieval philosophers argued that the attribute of being capable of laughter is the primary attribute of a human *qua* human; its inherence in a human is to be explained by no other attributes that a human possesses *qua* human. On this point about primary attributes, at least, Albert and Giles, on the one hand, and Aquinas, on the other, completely agree.

But what then explains the presence of a primary attribute in some subject? Aquinas argues that it is the very fact that the subject is the kind of thing that it is. For

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example, on this view, given the mere fact that a human is a rational animal, a human is a thing capable of laughter. The essence or quiddity of a thing – the what it is – is, on this view, the cause of the presence of a primary attribute in it. The subject’s definition, then, expresses this essence, making explicit an attribute’s reason for inherence. Giles, denying this view, argues that we must distinguish between proper attributes, on the one hand, and proper causes, on the other. Giles agrees with Aquinas that a primary attribute is in its subject on account of no other attribute proper to the subject \textit{qua} subject; it is a proper attribute of that subject. However, he argues that that attribute can be caused to be in that thing by an attribute which is proper to that subject at some higher level of abstraction. So, for example, it may be that the attribute of being capable of laughter, through proper to a human \textit{qua} human, inheres in a human being because of attribute that a human has \textit{qua} animal. At some point of abstraction, however, we will come to the principles of a science which are known either \textit{via} immediate sense-perception or \textit{a priori} intuition. And so, Giles writes, “[p]osterior attributes are always resolved into prior attributes, and more particular attributes into more common ones, until one arrives at those so common that they cannot be demonstrated, although, when the \textit{formulae} [i.e. the definitions] of these most common terms [i.e. those attributes] are known, they are known [non-demonstrably] to be in their subjects.”\textsuperscript{77}

This disagreement over the middle term of a demonstration of the highest sort is, at root, a deep disagreement about the nature of science. Aquinas (and later Burley and others in the fourteenth century) see science as engaged in an explanation of the necessary causal dispositions of a thing, dispositions that can be actualized in the correct

\textsuperscript{77} Giles of Rome, “Commentary on Posterior Analytics II 9, 93b26-28,” 286.
environment. Albert and Giles, in contrast, see science as contextualized to the actual environment, so that science consists in a causal ordering of actual states of affairs, an explanation of why things are the way they are given the metaphysical features of the actual world around them. On this account, our scientific knowledge consists in knowing things only insofar as we find them in this world, not in knowing those things in and of themselves.

In whatever way that deeper disagreement about the nature of science are ultimately settled, however, Giles argues that the Aquinas’s (and so Burley’s) position founders at a more basic level. If the definition of the subject serves as the middle term in a demonstration, providing the reason why the primary attribute inheres in its subject, then, Giles argues, the conclusion of a demonstration of the highest sort will be nothing other than the major premise of that demonstration. For the definition of a subject refers to that very subject, and so a subject (or, rather, a name of that subject) and its definition do not differ in referent. Giles writes that a primary attribute can never be demonstrated by a middle term which is the definition of a subject, because

then the middle is the same as the minor extreme [i.e. the subject], and then the conclusion does not differ from the major premise. But what is contrary to syllogism is contrary to demonstration. Since, then, this is necessary in a syllogism, that the conclusion be other than the premises, it will not be a demonstration unless the conclusion differs from every premise.78

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78 Giles of Rome, “De medio demonstrationis,” sec. I.5, p. 263: “Et quia forte haec per dicta non est plene clarum, possumus istam veritatem plenius declarare, quod scilicet prima passio non demonstratur [...]. Per subiectum non, quia tunc idem esset medium quam minor extremitas, et tunc non differat conclusio a maiori propositione. Sed quae repugnant syllogismo, repugnant demonstrationi. Cum igitur hoc in syllogismo sit necessarium, quod conclusio sit alia a praevis, non erit demonstratio nisi conclusio differat a qualibet praevis.” It might seem that a tu quoque objection is in order here. After all, Giles’s position is that the middle term is a definition of the attribute. It might seem, then, that that definition and the attribute (or, rather, a name of the attribute) likewise refer to the same things, leaving Giles’s with a similar problem. However, the name of an attribute and its definition (in particular, what Giles calls its explanatory definition) are not co-referential. This is because the definition of one attribute
In other words, Giles rejects the view of Aquinas because of problems of co-reference.

To put Giles’s argument in a slightly different way, demonstrative science demands that the conclusion of a demonstration is something we come to know through syllogistic reasoning from our knowledge of its major and minor premises. But, according to Giles, on the view that Aquinas advances, the knowledge to be gained through demonstrative reasoning (in the most foundational cases, at least) will be something the practitioners of that science already possess, in virtue of their knowledge of the first principles of that science.

Burley himself takes up the issue of the nature of the middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort in the 11th question of the Quaes.Post. Burley begins that question with arguments against both the position that the middle term is a definition refers to another attribute – in particular, an immediately prior attribute, which is its cause of inherence in the subject. The being of an attribute, unlike the being of a subject, is being-in-a-subject. Consequently, to define what an attribute is, is to explain why it is in a subject. And to explanation why an attribute is in a subject is to refer its reason for inherence – which is some immediately prior attribute. Of course, on Giles’s view, not all attributes will have an explanation for why they are in a subject, that is, they will lack a proper cause. We come to know their presence in a subject, then, through immediate experience. On Giles’s discussion of this issue, see Ibid., sec. II.2, pp. 266–7.

79 Giles’s argument relies on a logical claim of Aristotle’s, that syllogistic inference requires the conclusion to be distinct from its premises, and so Giles explicitly casts the problem in logical terms. But this objection can be understood epistemologically for two reasons. First, recall the definition of demonstration that Grosseteste provides. A demonstration is a syllogism producing knowledge. So even if syllogistic were to allow a conclusion to be identical to one of its premises, a demonstrative syllogism would still require that knowledge of the conclusion is distinct from knowledge of the premises. But if knowledge is to be distinguished according to its contents, then the view which Aquinas espouses requires that demonstration of the highest sort produce no new knowledge at all, contrary to the very nature of demonstration.

Second, Giles objection is understood epistemically by subsequent philosophers, including Burley. Burley considers the nature of the middle term of demonstration of the highest sort in his questions commentary on the Posterior Analytics. And in that work, one of the main objections to his account relies on the claim that the premises of a demonstration should be more known than the conclusion. Burley’s interlocutor argues, for example, that these sentences ‘every human is capable of laughter’ and ‘every rational animal is capable of laughter’ signify the same thing. But the thing signified through one is more known than the thing signified through the other. Therefore the same thing would be more known than itself (Walter Burley, Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum, para. 11.03, p. 151).
of the attribute, and the position that the middle term is a definition of the subject. The argument lodged against the thesis that the middle is a definition of the subject are clearly influenced by Giles’s critique. For example, Burley argues that the expressions ‘human’ and ‘rational animal’ completely signify the same thing. Therefore these sentences, ‘Every human is capable of laughter’ and ‘Every rational animal is capable of laughter’ completely signify the same thing, because sentences do not signify unless because [their] terms signify. And, consequently, if this is immediate, ‘Every rational animal is capable of laughter’, the other will be [also]. But the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent [is false].

The conclusion of a demonstration is not something that can be known immediately – that is, non-demonstratively – but can only known via a demonstrative syllogism. But, since what is known is what is signified, if we know non-demonstratively what is expressed by the sentence ‘Every rational animal is capable of laughter’, then it seems that we must already non-demonstratively know that every human is capable of laughter, an absurd result given that, on Burley’s own theory, this is supposed to be learned via a demonstrative syllogism.

Burley affirms the view that the middle term in a demonstration of the highest sort is a definition of the subject, and so it is incumbent upon him to respond to the problem for his account that Giles raises. To respond to Giles’s criticism of that view, therefore, Burley utilizes a distinction he makes earlier in the *Quaes.Post*. In the second question of the *Quaes.Post*, Burley argues that we must be careful to distinguish three types of demonstration.

[W]hen it is asked whether a demonstrative syllogism is composed out of utterances, or out of concepts, or out of things, it must be said that just as a statement can be taken materially from which it is composed, so too in the same way the syllogism [...]. If it is taken to be for the thing signified alone, then the

80 Ibid., para. 2.49, pp. 62–3.
demonstrative syllogism is a syllogism passively said, and in this way it is composed out of things by an intellectual composition and not by a real composition. If the demonstrative syllogism is taken for a sign [i.e. taken to be composed of sentences in natural or mental language], then it is composed out of significative utterances or out of concepts.\textsuperscript{81}

It is this distinction, then – between demonstrations composed of things and demonstrations composed of signs – that Burley will employ in his response to Giles’s objection. Burley at first concedes that, if we concern ourselves with a demonstrative syllogism composed of things, it is certainly the case that the major premise of that demonstration will not be more known than the conclusion.

[It] must be known that because the same thing is completely signified by a definition and a name of the thing defined, in a demonstration which is not a sign of another demonstration, the major is not more known than the conclusion. Hence the thing signified through this sentence ‘Every rational animal is capable of laughter’ is not more known than the thing signified through this sentence, ‘Every human is capable of laughter’.\textsuperscript{82}

But Burley argues that more than just a demonstration “composed of things” is relevant to demonstrative science. Rather, demonstrative science also should be articulated with respect to natural language and (more importantly, I suggest) mental language – which we can call generally demonstrations composed of signs. With respect to a demonstration of that sort, however,

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., para. 2.49, p. 62: “Ad aliud principale, quando quaeritur aut syllogismus demonstrativus componitur ex vocibus, aut ex conceptibus, aut ex rebus, dicendum quod sicut propositio potest accipi materialiter ex quibus componitur, sic eodem modo syllogismus [...]. Si accipiatur pro signato tantum, sic syllogismus demonstrativus est syllogismus passive dictus, et isto modo componitur ex rebus compositione intellectuali, et non compositione reali. Si accipiatur syllogismus demonstrativus pro signo, sic componitur ex vocibus significativis vel ex conceptibus.”

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., para. 11.50, p. 161: “Ulterius sciendum quod ex quo eandem rem totaliter significant definitio et nomen definiti, in demonstratione quae non est signum alterius demonstrationis, maior non est notior quam conclusio. Unde res significata per hanc propositionem, ‘omne animal rationale est risibile’, non est notior quam res significata per istam ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, etsi res significata per unum sit verum immediatum et res significata per relictum erit verum mediatum.”
that to which the attribute is attributed in the major and that to which the attribute
is attributed in the conclusion are not the same thing. But those to which the
attribute in the major premise and [the attribute] in the conclusion are attributed
are signs of the same thing precisely.\footnote{Ibid., para. 11.51, p. 161: “Unde per istam viam potest sustineri quod idem nunquam est notius se ipso,
quia in demonstratione quae est signum non est idem cui attribuitur passio in maiore et cui attribuitur
passio in conclusione. Sed illa quibus attribuitur passio in conclusione et in maiore sunt signa eiusmodem rei
praecise.”}

That is, the middle term in a demonstration composed of signs will differ from the
subject term of that demonstration, even if those terms refer to the same things. The
middle term differs from the subject because

such a middle is composed out of many utterances or many concepts, which
concepts or utterances signify expressly the principles of the thing defined. But
the name of the thing defined, which is the subject term of the conclusion, does
not signify the defined thing except implicitly, nor through such a name are
conveyed expressly the principles of the thing defined.\footnote{Ibid., para. 11.52, p. 161: “[...r] tale medium componitur ex pluribus vocibus vel ex pluribus conceptibus,
qui conceptus vel voces significant expresse principia rei definitae.”}

Demonstrations composed of signs are demonstrations in which the premises do
differ from the conclusion, then, precisely because the middle term of that
demonstration differs from the subject term. And so

that which is commonly said, that in a demonstration of the highest sort the
premises are more known than the conclusion, this is to be understood concerning
demonstrations which are signs of other demonstrations [...]. And when it is said
that the middle is the cause of the attribute or the cause by which the attribute
inheres in the subject, we should say that in a demonstration which is a sign, the
middle is the cause of cognition with respect to the conclusion, since through a
middle in a demonstration of that sort is conveyed the nature of the species
expressly, because a middle of that sort is composed out of many utterances or out
of many concepts, which concepts or utterances signify expressly the principles of
the thing defined.\footnote{Ibid., para. 11.51–52, p. 161: “Unde quod communiter, quod in demonstratione potissima praemissae sunt
notiores conclusione, hoc est intelligendum de demonstrationibus quae sunt signa aliarum
demonstrationum [...]. Et cum dicitur quod medium est causa passionis sive causa quare passio inest
subiecto, dicendum quod in demonstratione quae signum est medium causa cognitionis respectu}
The middle term differs from the subject term because they differ in syntactic structure – the name being a simple expression and the definition a complex one. In fact, it is precisely because they differ in this way that the latter but not the former conveys the complex metaphysical structure of the thing to which they both refer.

Aristotle’s claim that premises are more known than their conclusions, then, tracks, on Burley’s view, a feature peculiar to demonstrations composed of meaningful expressions – whether those are utterances in natural language or sentences in a language of thought, composed of concepts. With respect to demonstration composed of propositions, the major premise is not always more known that the conclusion. With respect to a demonstration composed of statements in natural or mental language, in contrast, the major premise is always more known than the conclusion. “And so,” Burley writes,

in this way one can maintain that nothing is never more known than itself, because in a demonstration which is a sign, that which is predicated of the attribute in the major premise and that which is predicated of the attribute in the conclusion are not the same.86

Burley is certainly correct that statements in natural or mental language can differ from each other, even if the referents of their terms are identical. But so what? How does that fact help resolve the issues that Giles raises for Burley’s account of demonstrative science? The theory of demonstration is an epistemic theory, about scientific knowledge

86 Ibid., para. 11.51, p. 161: “Unde per istam viam potest sustineri quod idem nunquam est notius se ipso, quia in demonstratione quae est signum non est idem cui attribuitur passio in maiore et cui attribuitur passio in conclusione.”
in particular. Giles’s criticism is that, given a commitment to a referentialist semantics (a semantics Giles himself appears to endorse), since demonstrations are syllogisms producing knowledge, the middle term of a demonstration has to refer to some object which is distinct from either the referent of the subject term or the referent of the attribute term. For only then will the content of the conclusion be different from the content of the major premise. A central assumption of Giles’s criticism, then, is that knowledge-states can only be as fine-grained as their content. Now if knowledge-states are only as fine-grained as their content, then Giles’s objection appears compelling. But, I argue, Burley’s distinction between demonstrations composed of things, on the one hand, and demonstrations composed of signs, on the other, is meant to deny that assumption. Knowledge-states are more fine-grained than their contents, on this picture, because they can be individuated by statements composed of concepts in particular, where those statements can differ even if they have the same content. In the next section, therefore, I return to considerations of mental language and the account of the language of thought of which it is a part, and explain how those accounts allow us to understand Burley’s response to Giles in that way.

5. Mental Language and Demonstrative Science

On a naive, contemporary analysis of propositional attitudes, propositional attitudes are relations to contents. Following terminology introduced by Susan Brower-Toland, we can call those contents, content-objects.87 On that analysis, for example, the

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belief that Socrates is a human has as its content-object the proposition that Socrates is a human. The analysis is naive because it takes propositional attitudes to be individuated by their contents; it is contemporary because it takes attitudes to be relations, strictly speaking. When paired with a commitment to referentialism, relational analyses faces Frege-style puzzles, precisely because it does not seem to be the case that co-referring terms can always be substituted *salva veritate* when they are within the scope of a verb of intention. In response to cases of that sort, LOTH proponents argue that those puzzles can be solved by supplementing that naive account of propositional attitudes with a commitment to a language of thought. That supplementation, as we saw (see §2), can be articulated in various ways.

On Burley’s account, however, our propositional attitudes have no content-objects, precisely because our propositional attitudes are not relations to propositions. This is not to say that our attitudes do not have content. Surely they do. The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, is contentful. But it has the contentfulness that it does because is it an act of predicating humanity of Socrates, thereby representing that Socrates is a human. In other words, the mind’s predicating one thing of another creates its content, rather than relates it to some content-object – the proposition – in virtue of which it would have the meaning and truth-conditions that it does. Moreover, Burley’s position does not entail that propositional attitudes lack intentionality, or aboutness. Propositional attitudes clearly do have aboutness, on Burley’s account, being about the very things which the mind uses in its predicative activity. The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, is about Socrates and the property of humanity. Again following Brower-Toland, call these things the referential objects of a propositional attitude.
Any solution Burley provides to Giles’s objection to Burley’s account of demonstrative science (or to the related puzzle of the non-substitutability of co-referring terms in intentional contexts), then, will be a solution provided within a larger, non-relational framework of propositional attitudes. As I suggested, an adequate solution on Burley’s part to Giles’s objection requires that propositional attitudes can be more fine-grained than the referential objects of those attitudes. For example, Burley’s solution must explain how the belief that Socrates is a human can be distinguished from the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, despite the fact that those two beliefs have the same referential objects, namely Socrates and the property of humanity. However, because Burley defends a non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes, Burley can easily explain how some beliefs, at least, with the same referential objects can be individuated. For beliefs with the same referential objects can still be individuated by their formal features. For example, given Burley’s account of the metaphysics of the proposition, the belief that all humans are rational animals and the belief that some human is a rational animal have the same referential object. They constitute different beliefs, however, because those propositions differ with respect to their formal features – in particular, their quantity. But differences in the formal features of a proposition, on Burley’s account, are differences in the kind of predicative acts that compose them. The belief that all humans are rational animals is constituted by an act of predication in which the subject is universally distributed relative to the predicate, whereas the belief that a human is a rational animal is constituted by an act that does not distribute the subject in this way.

Of course, the sorts of cases that Giles is worried about are cases in which the relevant beliefs have not just the same “material” features but all the same formal features
as well. The belief that a human is a human, for example, and the belief that a human is a rational animal, are cases in which the mind predicates humanity of Socrates, and where those acts of predication have the same quality, quantity and mode. In other words, Giles’s objection is that Burley has to way to distinguish propositional attitudes with the same content, where content is more than merely the referential objects of some cognitive act. A successful response to Giles’s objection, then, requires that Burley explain how mental acts of predication (and so attitudes like belief) can be individuated more finely than their contents.

Burley’s endorsement of mental language and his endorsement of the language of thought hypothesis specifically provide Burley with the resources he needs to individuate mental acts to the level of fine-grainedness that his account requires. Mental acts of predication are complex acts of thinking. To predicate humanity of Socrates just is to have the thought that Socrates is a human. But acts of thinking are, on Burley’s account, nothing more than the mind’s use of concepts. We saw this above in the case of simple mental acts, where concepts account for what acts of that sort are about, but simple cognitive activity itself is the mind’s or use of those concepts. Like simple cognitive activity, complex cognitive activity is also a kind of use to which the mind puts the concepts that it has – more sophisticated (or “complex”) than simple cognitive activity, no doubt, but use nonetheless. To think that Socrates is human, for example, is to use the concepts SOCRATES and HUMAN in a predicative way. But if the mind’s predicating one thing of another just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another (concepts which represent those things), then Burley can individuate those acts according to the concepts that those acts employ. The belief that Socrates is a human, for example, is the
mind’s predicating humanity of Socrates. But that act just is the act of predicating HUMAN of SOCRATES. And that act will be distinct from the act of predicating RATIONAL ANIMAL of SOCRATES, which act constitutes the belief that Socrates is a rational animal.

The success of Burley’s response to Giles depends on a (possibly contentious) account of act-individuation. In particular, it requires that mental acts can be individuated not just by their formal features, but also by the concepts whose use they constitute. But, again, this seems to required by Burley’s account of cognition generally. Since concepts are distinct from mental acts, acts of thinking need to be individuated in part by concepts whose use they are. The act of thinking about Socrates and the act of thinking about Plato, for example, involve the same sort of conceptual use. They differ, then, only because those acts involve the use of different concepts. Mutatis mutandis, then, complex mental acts as well should be individuated by the concepts whose use they constitute.

I take Burley’s response to Giles’s objection, then, to be this. It is certainly true that certain belief-states in the noetic structure of a science may have the same content. The belief that Socrates is a human and the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, for

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88 The reason that this account may be contentious is that the medieval notion of an act is a notion of a peculiar sort of relation. As such, it is unclear whether acts should be individuated by their objects. The relation of identity, for example, does not appear to be individuated by its relata. However, Burley may have a response here. Medieval philosophers regarded relations generally as monadic. See Jeffrey Brower, “Medieval Theories of Relations,” accessed June 21, 2010, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relations-medieval/. The distinction between properties and relations for a medieval philosopher, then, is not that the former is monadic while the latter is many-placed. Rather, properties and relations are distinguished from one another in that the former is an absolute entity, while the latter necessarily have a kind of directionality towards something – in the case of action, a patient (or patients) upon which that act operates. Consequently, Burley might be able to appeal to the thing(s) towards which an action is directed to individuate it, and, in the case of mental acts at least, does appear to make that appeal.
example, are both cases in which the mind predicates humanity of Socrates in an affirmative fashion. This is what a sentence in natural language signifies, since linguistic comprehension of a sentence in natural language is simply a matter of predicating what the predicate expression signifies of what the subject expression signifies in accordance with the various syncategorematic expressions in that sentence. Call a demonstration at that level of fine-grainedness a demonstration composed of things.

However, the mind’s predicating one thing of another – a particular act that the mind performs – can be individuated more finely, because those acts are in fact acts which predicate one concept of another. Indeed, the mind’s predicing one concept of another explains the mind’s predicating one thing of another, since those concepts refer to those things. Because two different concepts can refer to the same thing, moreover, the acts themselves can be distinguished from one another relative to the differing concepts that they predicate, even though those acts have the same referential objects. Since those acts of predicing just are acts of belief, however, belief-states will be more fine-grained than their contents, because those beliefs-states are, in part, acts of predicing concepts, where those concepts are more fine-grained than their contents. It is at the level of mental language, then, that belief has the fine-grainedness that Burley’s account of demonstrative science requires.

Note, crucially, that Burley’s distinction between a demonstration composed of concepts and a demonstration composed of things (or, at a more basic level, his distinction between mental sentences and propositions) does not amount to the claim that mental sentences, on the one hand, and the propositions that are their contents, on the other, are radically distinct, or independent, from one another. Rather, mental sentences
and the propositions that they express share the same “formal” part, namely, a mental act of predication. So, for example, the belief that Socrates is a human is at once an act of predicking humanity of Socrates, and of predicking HUMAN of SOCRATES, the former depending on the latter. Mental sentences and propositions are, in a sense, two sides of the same coin. That relationship between mental language and its content is central to the success of Burley’s account, for it is only because mental sentences and their contents are structured by the same act that Burley can individuate belief-states as finely as he does, given the non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes that he endorses.89

89 It is also central to what I believe should be Burley’s response to Frege’s Puzzle (though I think Burley fails to address that puzzle directly himself). Recall that, for Burley, categorematic expressions in natural language refer to things by being subordinated to concepts. Burley argues that, because expressions in natural language are subordinated to concepts in this way, they secondarily signify (or are marks, notae, of) those concepts. (See Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Perih, k3rb–va). In non-intentional contexts, that marking relation is not semantically relevant, since transparent statements merely indicate which thing must be predicated of which. In intentional contexts, however, that marking relation is semantically relevant. It is made semantically relevant by falling within the scope of a verb of intention. We can think of ‘believes’ and other verbs of intention as shifting the content of the categorematic expressions in their complement clause, so that those expression refer not to things but rather to the concepts by which those expressions signify. That is, verbs of intention shift the referent of an expression of natural language, from its primary significate (a thing) to its secondary significate (a concept), when those expressions fall within its scope. (For Burley’s endorsement of the claim generally that linguistic context can shift the content of an expression from its primary, or standard, content to a secondary, or non-standard, content, see Walter Burley, On the Purity of the Art of Logic, 91). Consequently, with respect to verbs of intention, verb phrases will refer not to propositions but to mental sentences, which express the propositions that those complement clauses refer to when outside the scope of a verb of intention. ‘The belief that Socrates is human’, for example, would refer to the mind’s predicking HUMAN of SOCRATES. Those mental sentences are of course more fine-grained than their contents, and so it will not always be possible to substitute terms with the same (primary) referents salva veritate. (Alternatively, Burley could respond that one can always substitute co-referring terms salva veritate, but that, under the scope of a verb of intention, two expressions are co-referential only if they orthographically and phonetically similar). This approach also seems to fit with the “adverbial” theory of truth that Thomas Bradwardine (a close associate of Burley’s) and others developed about a half-generation after Burley. On the adverbial theory, see Paul Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, http://pvspace.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf. Note that this response doesn’t take the view of what’s today often called naive Russellianism, where the belief that Socrates is human just is the belief that Socrates is a rational animal, but that inferences from one to the other are blocked on merely pragmatic grounds. (On the naive Russellian approach to Frege’s Puzzle, see Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle (Ridgeview, 1986)). Nor does it involve the standard contextualist approach, according to which sentences that contain verbs of intention have unarticulated
6. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Burley develops a sophisticated account of mental language, according to which the vocabulary of that language is constituted by concepts, and the production of a mental sentence involves the mind’s predicating one concept of another. Those concepts will be categorematic, that is, they will each have a referent. Some of the mind’s concepts – its basic concepts – are acquired through a complex causal process. Others – complex concepts – are created by the mind when it combines less complex concepts with one another in various rule-governed ways. The referents of these complex concepts will themselves be complex, constituted by the referents of the basic concepts that ultimately compose that complex concept.

Moreover, the concepts that the mind possess are all nominal in character: nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, so that that vocabulary lacks verb concepts. This is because all verbs of natural language are ultimately resolvable into some form of the copula, but the copula is a syncategorematic expression in natural language. Syncategoremata are realized in mental language not as elements of the vocabulary of that language, but as innate operations of the mind – in particular, certain uses to which the mind can put concepts.

Those uses, on Burley’s view, just are the activity of thinking. Consequently, Burley’s articulation and defense of mental language is in service of his commitment to the language of thought hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, thinking is done within constituents, so that ‘believes’ in fact expresses a three-place relation, appearances aside. (On contextualist approaches to Frege’s Puzzle, see Mark Crimmins and John Perry, “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs,” Journal of Philosophy 86, no. 12 (1989): 685–711). Indeed, on Burley’s account, ‘believes that...’ does not express any relation at all. Rather, the idea is that verbs of intention shift the referents of the categorematic expressions in their complement clauses, so that what the complement clause (or, rather, the verb along with its complement clause) refers to a certain belief that the subject has, which belief just is the mind’s predicating one concept of another.
a mental language, where the semantic, or rational, coherence of thinking is realized in the syntactic coherence of mental sentences with one another. However, unlike most proponents of the language of thought hypothesis today, who analyze propositional attitudes relationally, Burley believes that propositional attitudes are activities that the mind undertakes, namely, activities of predicating one thing of another. Mental language gives a naturalizing account of that activity, moreover, since the act of predicating one thing of another is, on Burley’s view, the same as the mind’s predicating one concept of another, which concepts represent those things.

The ultimate motivation for Burley’s endorsement of a language of thought, however, is an apparent tension between his account of the proposition, on the one hand, and certain commitments he has in the philosophy of science, on the other. According to Burley, the middle term of a demonstration of the highest sort is the definition of the subject of that demonstration. However, given Burley’s commitment to referentialism, subjects (or, rather, names of subjects) and their definitions refer to the same thing, namely, to the subject itself. Consequently, in any demonstration containing a middle term of that sort, the conclusion will refer to the same things as the major premise. But demonstrations are supposed to be syllogisms producing knowledge, so that the content of the conclusion differs from the content of either of the premises.

Burley’s endorsement of the language of thought, then, is meant to provide an account of how one’s attitudes can differ from each other even when they have the same content. According to Burley’s later account of the proposition, propositions are structured entities composed not only of things, but of mental acts of predication as well. Those acts of predication, however, can be individuated not just by their formal features,
but by appeal to sentences in a language of thought. For acts of predicating things are acts of predicating concepts which represent those things. Consequently, those acts can be individuated by appeal to the concepts upon which they operate. And since concepts themselves are individuated not just by their contents but also by their internal structure, the acts which operate on them can be individuated that finely as well. Consequently, propositions themselves can be individuated that finely, since propositions contain those mental acts of predication as their formal parts.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF THE PROPOSITION

1. INTRODUCTION

In chapter 3, I argued that, for Burley, propositions are entities composed of things, such as Socrates and the property of humanity, and structured by a mental act of predication. I motivated that account by appeal to more basic philosophical commitments that Burley holds: referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism. That a proposition consists in *predicating* is a consequence of Burley’s commitment to intellectualism. That a proposition consists in predicating *things* is a consequence of his referentialism, or rather of the direct realist account of cognition on which that referentialism depends.

A key assumption in chapter 3 was that the mind’s predicating one thing of another was representational, or contentful. In chapter 4, I argued for that assumption. For Burley, the mind’s predicating one thing of another represents, or is contentful, because that act is more fundamentally an act of predicating one concept of another, which concepts represent those things. In other words, Burley endorses a language of thought, where the content of one’s propositional attitudes (and so, given his non-relational analysis of propositional attitudes, propositions themselves) is articulated in terms of the semantic content of concepts and the syntax governing their combination in a sentence in a language of thought.

Chapters 3 and 4, then, are chapters intended to provide an explanation of what propositions are – of both their metaphysics and semantics. However, perhaps just as important as explaining what propositions are is the task of describing what they do.
Given the account developed in chapters 3 and 4, the most obvious thing that propositions do is serve as the semantic contents of statements in natural and mental language. But that propositions constitute the contents of statements in natural and mental language immediately gives rise to a further question: why do propositions constitute the contents of statements in natural and mental language? Or, to put it another way, why should we regard propositions as the semantic content of statements in natural and mental language, rather than as being related to statements in natural and mental language in some other way?

The reason that those propositions are the contents of statements in natural and mental language is that they determine truth conditions, which conditions statements in language assume when they have those propositions as their contents. In chapter 3, I gestured at this fact when I argued that propositions are, on Burley’s view, the primary bearers of truth and falsity. They are the primary bearers of truth and falsity in virtue of the fact that a mental act of predication – the “form” of a proposition, on the later account – is an essentially representational act. Insofar as chapter 4 constituted a defense of the representational character of that act, moreover, that chapter provides a philosophical justification for the claim that propositions have, or determine, truth conditions. In this

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1 David Lewis writes that “in order to say what a meaning is, we may first ask what a meaning does, and then find something that does that. A meaning for a sentence is something that determines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false. It determines the truth-value of the sentence in various possible states of affairs, at various times, at various places, for various speakers, and so on” (David Lewis, “General Semantics,” Synthese 22, no. 1/2 (December 1, 1970): 22). It might be suggested, then, that it would have been better to begin the project with an examination of how Burley understands the truth conditions of a statement, and then consider what, if anything, in Burley’s larger philosophical project determines those conditions. However, I am as much interested in this chapter in why statements have the truth conditions that they do as what those conditions are. And to understand why statements have the truth conditions that they do requires that one have a firm grasp of the metaphysical and semantical character of the propositions that they express.
chapter, then, I intend to articulate what, exactly, those truth conditions are. And, as we will see, Burley’s account of the truth conditions of the proposition evolves significantly over the course of his career.

As a general matter, Burley is committed to a correspondence theory of truth. Consequently, specifying the truth conditions of a proposition will be a matter of specifying what reality (or at least some portion of it) must be like for that proposition to be true. That is, the truth conditions of a proposition are a matter of specifying what fact(s) there must be, if that proposition is true. A fact, for Burley, is fundamentally a matter of one thing’s being identical to, or different from, another thing. The fact that Socrates is a human, on this account, is simply Socrates’s being identical to humanity. But Burley’s account of the metaphysics of facts evolves significantly over the course of his career, an evolution in tandem with the evolution of Burley’s account of correspondence itself.

In the first half of his career, Burley defends a near-identity account of correspondence, according to which true propositions and the facts which make them true share the same “material” parts – that is, the same things (res) will be components in a true proposition and the fact which makes it true – but differ in their “formal” parts. The formal part of a true proposition is the mental act of predication which represents the identity (or diversity) of those things, whereas the formal part of the fact which makes that proposition true will be the actual identity (or diversity) of those things. The central challenge for the early account, then, is metaphysical: to explain the kinds of actual identity and diversity relations that can obtain between the terms of a proposition, which explanation can at once respect intuitions both about the truth of certain propositions (e.g.
the proposition that Socrates is a human) and about the seeming differences of the terms of those propositions. In other words, Burley needs to develop an account of facts that can accommodate his near-identity account of correspondence.

Burley never explicitly develops an account of the metaphysics of facts in the first half of his career. But I argue that one can be constructed for him, given the broader semantic, alethic and metaphysical commitments that he has. In particular, Burley is committed to a complex theory of identity and diversity, according to which identity and diversity relations are of three sorts: real, intentional, and conceptual. Burley employs that theory to settle a number of philosophical disputes – for example, disputes about the relationship between existence and essence. I argue that he also uses it to defend a particular account of the relationship between concrete particulars and properties. For the early Burley, properties and concrete particulars are really identical to one another. Burley maintains that Socrates, for example, is really identical to the property of humanity. At the same time, Burley maintains that concrete particulars and properties are intentionally different from one another. I use those commitments, as well as his commitment to a relation I call sameness, to construct an account of the metaphysics of facts for Burley, an account which accommodates his near-identity account of correspondence.

Beginning in the late 1310s, however, the theory of identity (and the larger realism about properties it was meant in part to justify) that Burley defends in the first half of his career receives serious criticism from William Ockham. Ockham argues that moderate realist positions, according to which properties are really identical to, though less-than-really different from, the concrete particulars that possess them, are
implausible, because they require an account of identity and diversity that cannot withstand philosophical scrutiny. Moreover, Ockham argues that, absent an account of identity of that sort, the reality of properties themselves is philosophically suspect.

Burley’s response to those criticisms is twofold. In partial agreement with Ockham, Burley adopts a simpler account of identity and diversity in the second half of his career, according to which all relations of identity and difference are treated in a uniform matter, articulated merely in terms of the indiscernibility of identicals. In disagreement with Ockham’s nominalist project, however, Burley remains committed to the reality of properties. He argues that Ockham’s arguments against realism fail to address a form of realism often called “exaggerated realism” in the literature, according to which properties are not constitutive of the concrete particulars that possess them. Burley’s continued commitment to realism, I argue, is a consequence of Burley’s more general semantic commitments. For Burley, signification, or reference, is always a dyadic relation. Consequently, every meaningful expression in a language must refer to some distinct thing. Proper names and demonstrative expressions refer to concrete particulars. Predicate expressions, in contrast, need to refer to something common to many concrete particulars, because those expressions can be predicated of those concrete particulars. In other words, predicate expressions need to refer to properties.

Whatever the success of Burley’s “exaggerated” realism, however, that realism undermines the near-identity account of correspondence to which Burley was committed. Burley’s later realism, and the simplified account of identity that accompanies it, entail that Socrates and humanity, for example, are in no way identical, since Socrates is a concrete particular, whereas humanity is not a concrete particular. But, on the near-
identity account of correspondence, the truth of the proposition that Socrates is a human requires that Socrates is identical to humanity.

In response to these difficulties, Burley develops a very different account of correspondence. That account integrates a semantic notion – supposition – into the truth conditions of the proposition itself. On that account, the identity or diversity represented by a mental act of predication isn’t the identity or diversity of the things which are components in that proposition. Rather, what the mind represents is the identity or diversity of the things for which those things supposit. For example, on that account, the proposition that Socrates is a human is true just in case whatever thing(s) Socrates supposits for is identical to something(s) for which the property of humanity supposits. That account, I argue, is both radical and ingenious. It is radical precisely because it involves a controversial claim about things – that things essentially represent, in virtue of which they can supposit for the things which they represent. But it is ingenious in that it employs standard semantic tools of Burley’s day, extending them in natural ways given the account of propositional content that Burley defends.

I will proceed in four stages. First, I will examine Burley’s commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Second, I will consider Burley’s early metaphysical commitments, and how those commitments can motivate an account of the metaphysics of facts that fits Burley’s near-identity account of correspondence. Third, I will detail Ockham’s criticisms of those early metaphysical commitments, and the changes Burley makes in responding to Ockham’s criticisms. Finally, I will examine the consequences that those changes have for Burley’s account of correspondence, and the nature of propositional content more general.
2. Burley on Truth

To represent the world’s being a certain way requires truth-conditions. To explain what the proposition that Socrates is pale represents, for example, is to specify what are its conditions for truth. So, to explain what a proposition represents, we need to begin by articulating a theory of truth. Contemporary analytic philosophy is populated with a number of alternative theories of truth, with the two main camps represented by deflationary and correspondence approaches.² One finds a similarly dense philosophical landscape by the end of the fourteenth century. Nominalists such as Ockham, John Buridan and Albert of Saxony, for example, developed approaches to truth that (while broadly realist) are articulated fundamentally in terms of semantic notions, such as supposition and signification.³

Just like today, however, correspondence approaches to truth were popular in the medieval period. Moreover, as we saw in chapter 3, Burley himself endorses a correspondence account of truth. In particular, Burley defends what I call an “adequation” account of correspondence. He writes that “truth is of two kinds: in one way, it is the adequation (adequatio) of a thing to an intellect, and in another, it is the

² There are various deflationary versions of truth defended in the literature today, the most popular of which appears to be truth minimalism. Paul Horwich is perhaps the best known defender of truth minimalism. See Paul Horwich, Truth (Clarendon Press, 1998). Minimalism has received a fair bit of criticisms as well. See, e.g., Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy, and Michael Smith, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness,” Mind 103, no. 411 (July 1, 1994): 287–302.

adequation of an intellect to a thing.”

Unlike correspondence relations proper, which are symmetric relations, adequation relations are asymmetric relations. That a proposition is adequated to some fact, for example, does not entail that that fact is adequated to the proposition. That his theory of correspondence utilizes asymmetric relations is critical for Burley, in part because his theory of truth involves correspondence relations in two directions: from world to mind, and from mind to world; and Burley takes those relations to be distinct from one another. The world’s correspondence to the mind is a causal relationship, articulated in terms of a thing’s natural tendency to produce cognitive states in a mind, states which represent that thing as it really is. The mind’s correspondence to the world, in contrast, is representational, concerned with the ability of some feature of the mind to represent the world as it really is. Consequently, the world’s correspondence to a mind shouldn’t be confused with the mind’s correspondence to the world, nor do either kind of correspondence relation require symmetry between their relata.

As Burley’s more general account of correspondence suggests, alethic properties are not restricted to complex mental activity. First, beyond the correspondence that complex mental acts might have to the world, Burley argues that simple mental acts can correspond to the world as well.

There can be a kind of truth with respect to simple mental acts. For when a thing de se produces perfect knowledge (completam notitiam), then there is truth, spoken of in the first way, in the intellect.

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5 Ibid., para. 1.24, 60: “Veritas primo modo dicta potest esse comprehensionem simplicium. Quando enim res de se facit completam notitiam, tune est veritas primo modo dicta in intellectu.”
And, unlike in the case of complex mental acts, where truth is contrary to falsity, in cases of simple mental acts, truth is contrary not to falsity but rather to ignorance. Moreover, unlike falsity, which does not admit of degrees, Burley allows that one can be more or less ignorant of a thing. For example, one might have some level of insight into the nature of a human, such that she can, for the most part, adequately distinguish between humans and non-humans, but yet lack the kind of deep knowledge that comes with significant training in biology. In such a case, one is ignorant in this respect, that she could achieve further insight into human nature, but her ignorance is not total, in that she has a concept of a human, the possession of which allows her to discriminate between humans and non-humans with a certain degree of success.

Beyond alethic properties that mental acts possess, moreover, Burley argues that things outside the mind can have alethic properties as well, insofar as they have a tendency to produce mental states which accurately represent them. With respect to world to mind directions of fit, Burley distinguishes between the an object’s fit to the divine mind, and its fit to the human mind. He argues that truth is constitutive of the former (“just as a being [ens] is related to being [entitas], so too it is related to truth [veritas]”), because a thing cannot present itself to the divine mind as anything other than what it is.

With respect to a thing’s manifesting itself to the human mind, in contrast, Burley argues

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6 For Burley, we can distinguish between cases of “confused” and “perfect” knowledge of some object by looking at the concepts involved in each cognitive act. Perfect knowledge involves the use of a complex concept, whose components perfectly map the metaphysical features of that object, while confused knowledge involves the use of a concept that, while referring to the object at issue, is composed of one or more concepts which themselves could be further articulated. On this distinction, see Walter Burley, *In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1972), 6v–7r.

that falsity can, and sometimes does, occur – as, for example, in the case of counterfeit
currency, which has the form of money but lacks “due matter”: a certain metallic
composition in Burley’s case, the full faith and credit of the supposed issuing authority in
ours.

As interesting as Burley’s more general correspondence account of truth might be,
however, our interests in it in this chapter concern that account insofar as it addresses
issues of the truth and falsity of propositions (and so, derivatively, statements in natural
and mental language).8 For Burley, truth and falsity of that sort are fundamentally a
matter of the mind’s representing the world’s being a certain way, by combining things in
various ways. In other words, it concerns complex mental activity. In fact, at least a far
back as Aquinas, medieval philosophers connected that notion of truth with complex
mental activity. Aquinas writes, for example, that “[j]ust as the true is found primarily in
the intellect rather than in things, so too it is found primarily in an act of the intellect
joining and separating.”9 That approach to truth and falsity is motivated by Aristotle, who
writes in Metaphysics 8 that “that which is in the sense of being true and that which is not
in the sense of being false depends on combination and division [...]”; the combination and

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8 Or, more generally, to statements.

9 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de veritate, vol. 22/1, Opera Omnia (Romae ad Sanctae Sabinae:
the separation are in the thought, and not in the things.”\footnote{10} Far from novel, then, Burley’s commitment to intellectualism is fairly run-of-the-mill in the medieval period.\footnote{11}

The mind comes to possess certain truth-bearing states, then, when it engages in the activity of composition and division – that is, when it engages in predication, an act which produces some representational content. Moreover, given Burley’s commitment to a correspondence theory of truth, the truth conditions of that content will be articulated in terms of correspondence. But the real challenge of a correspondence theory of truth is to specify what the fact(s) are which make a given proposition true, and to specify why that proposition corresponds to those facts. Consider, for example, the proposition that Socrates is a human. On a correspondence account, that proposition is true just in case there exist certain fact to which that proposition corresponds. That account will be satisfying, then, only if it can provide some motivated account of (i) the nature of that fact and (ii) the proposition’s correspondence to it.

While I argue that Burley defends two different accounts of correspondence over the course of his career, there are some general commitments that Burley has, which constrain the ways in which those accounts are articulated. First, Burley is committed to the claim that what the mind represents by predicating one thing of another is that a certain identity relation (if it is affirmative) or diversity relation (if it is negative) obtains between things. In the *Comm.Perih*, for example, Burley writes that “[i]f the intellect


\footnote{11} However, that commitment, when paired with a commitment to referentialism, leads Burley to a theory of the proposition that is wholly novel in the medieval period.
asserts some things to be the same, then it joins them together, but if it asserts some things to be diverse, then it divides them from one another.” The same account is defended in the *Exp.Praed* some thirty years later. Burley writes that “[t]he intellect is able to combine things together by asserting that they are the same, and it can divide them from one another by asserting that they are not the same.”

Given that truth is a matter of the mind’s correspondence to reality, moreover, we should expect a further commitment: that facts themselves will involve relations of identity and diversity. And, in fact, this is precisely what we find. In the *Comm.Perih*, for example, Burley writes that

> when the intellect correctly puts things together or correctly divides them, then there is truth in the intellect, and when the intellect does not correctly put things together or correctly divides them, as, namely, when it puts those together which are really diverse, or when it divides those things which are really the same, then it is a false intellect.

A similar (though not identical) account is provided in the *Art.Vet*.

> to the copula existing in the intellect (i.e. the mental act of predication), which joins together the extremes of a true statement (*propositio*), there corresponds something in reality, namely, the identity of the extremes, or the identity of those things for which the extremes supposit.

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13 Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1967), *Exp.Praed*, c3vb. This passage suggests that truth is a matter of the actual identity or diversity of the terms of a proposition. But I argue in §5 that Burley defends a different account of correspondence in that work.


Setting aside for now the notion of supposition, these passages indicate Burley’s commitment to a certain general metaphysics picture of facts, according to which facts are complex entities, consisting of one thing’s being identical to, or different from, another.

That facts are complex entities, consisting of one thing’s being identical to, or different from, one another, and that propositions are true when they corresponding to those facts, represents a general framework within which Burley’s accounts of correspondence (and the concomitant accounts of facts) are formed. But, just as referentialism, compositionality and intellectualism place constraints on Burley’s theory of the metaphysics of the proposition but do not themselves entail a particular theory, so too Burley’s commitment to the thesis that facts consist in one thing’s being identical to, or different from, another, and to the thesis that propositions are made true by corresponding to those facts, merely places constraints on the related theories of facts and of correspondence that Burley might adopt. In the following sections, then, I want to discuss the particular theories of correspondence and facts that Burley defends over his career.
3. The Near-Identity Account of Correspondence

3.1. Background Metaphysics

In the first half of his career, Burley defends what I call a near-identity account of correspondence. On a near-identity account, there is significant metaphysical overlap between true propositions, on the one hand, and the facts that make them true, on the other. In particular, true propositions and the facts which make them true contain the same “material” parts but differ in their “formal” parts. That is, the things which the mind uses to make a true proposition are themselves constituents of the fact which makes that proposition true. For example, assume that the proposition that Socrates is a human is true. On Burley’s account, that proposition is composed of Socrates and the property of humanity. That proposition is true because it corresponds to some fact. And that fact which makes that proposition true is the fact that Socrates is a human, that is, the fact of Socrates’ being identical to humanity. However, true propositions are only nearly identical to the facts that make them true, because the relational or structural component of a proposition is a mental act of predication, which merely represents the identity or diversity of some two things, whereas the relational or structural component of a fact is that very identity or diversity of those two things itself. So the proposition that Socrates is a human is only nearly identical to the fact that Socrates is a human, precisely because

16 An identity account of truth is a rival to a correspondence account, since an identity account holds that a true proposition just is a fact, and its truth consists precisely in that identity. On identity accounts of truth, see Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic, “The Identity Theory of Truth,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta, Spring 2011, 2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entriestruth-identity/. Burley’s near-identity theory is still a correspondence account of truth, since true propositions differ from the facts that make them true. But it is a near-identity account because true propositions and the facts which make them true significantly overlap in their metaphysical makeup.
the former is composed of a mental act of predication, whereas the latter is composed of an actual identity relation.

Burley is fairly explicit in his earlier works about his endorsement of a near-identity account of correspondence. As we have already seen, Burley writes in the *Comm.Perih* that when the intellect does not correctly put things together or correctly divides them, as, namely, *when it puts those together which are really diverse, or when it divides those things which are really the same*, then it is a false intellect.17

Elsewhere in the same work, when discussing the nature of truth, Burley argues that the facts which make a proposition true involve the unity or diversity of the things which are components of that proposition.

The intellect makes true being by *putting together those things which are united in reality*, or by *dividing those from each other which are diverse*. For if the intellect asserts that some things are the same, then it puts them together, but if it asserts that they are diverse, then it divides them from each other.18

A similar though not as explicit claim about correspondence is made in the *Quaes.Perih*. In that work, Burley writes that a proposition is true so long as “those are the same which are denoted to be the same, or those are diverse which are denoted to be diverse.”19 I am unaware of any place in which Burley provides an account of the notion of denotation, or even of another place where Burley makes important use of that notion. But, for Ockham at least, denotation is a property of statements, where the denotation of a statement is

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17 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.24, 60.

18 Ibid., para. 1.24, 60–1.

what it represents to be the case. The denotation of a statement, in other words, is a certain state of affairs, and the denotata of true propositions are obtaining states of affairs, or facts. I suggest that Burley has a similar account in mind in the *Quaes.Perih*. Propositions denote things to be the case, and the things which true propositions denote are in fact the case, that is, are facts. Given the identity constraint that Burley puts on representation, then, propositions represent that one thing is identical to, or different from, another, and so denote that thing’s being identical to, or different, from the other. In the case of true propositions, moreover, what they denote actually obtains – that is, it is a fact – and so that proposition itself is true.

The near-identity theory of correspondence that Burley defends in the first half of his career has a kind of simple elegance to it. However, the challenge for this account is the far less simple metaphysics of facts that that theory of correspondence requires. What it requires is that things which can seem quite different are in fact identical to one another. If the proposition that Socrates is a human is true, for example, its truth consists in its correspondence to the fact that Socrates is identical to humanity. Presumably, it is at least possible that Socrates is a human. And so Burley is committed to the claim that it is at least possible that Socrates is identical to humanity – a puzzling claim, given that Socrates is a concrete particular, whereas humanity is a property, that is, a certain kind of abstract object.

I argue that Burley has the metaphysical resources to articulate a metaphysics of facts as complex as his simple account of correspondence requires. In particular, I argue

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that, in the first half of his career, Burley defends a complex theory of identity and difference, and that that theory can form the core of the metaphysical picture of facts that Burley’s early account of correspondence requires. According to the theory of identity and difference that Burley defends in the first half of his career, things can be identical to one another, or different from one another, in three ways: really, intentionally, or conceptually. Burley introduces his theory of identity in order to address a particular problem about the relationship of the existence of a thing and its essence – for example, the relationship between the existence of Socrates and the essence of Socrates. Burley rejects that the existence of a thing is wholly different from its essence – regardless of whether that difference is because existence is an accidental feature of a thing (as Avicenna, Albert, and Boethius maintain), or because existence is something “flowing out from the essential principles of the thing of which it is the being” (as Aquinas and Giles of Rome argue). But he also denies that a thing’s existence and essence are entirely the same as one another. He rejects, for example, a position according to which ‘existence’ and ‘essence’ refer to the same thing, but where ‘existence’, unlike ‘essence’, connotes a certain relation that a thing has to its creator.

21 In this section, I examine an account of identity and difference that Burley develops in the first half of his career. A further question is whether relations of identity or difference can be reduced to something else – the inherence of a substantial form in matter, for example, or an accident in some substance. Alessandro Conti argues that Burley is committed to “macro-objects,” which are “aggregates made up of primary substances together with a host of substantial and accidental forms existing in them and through them.” (Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and Universals,” 200). (See also Alessandro Conti, “Walter Burley,” Fall 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/burley/.) Perhaps, then, relations of identity, at least, can be articulated in terms of these macro-objects. However, it is not clear to me how this approach would work with respect to relations of difference.

In response to that problem, then, Burley attempts to cut a middle path between, on the one hand, positions according to which existence and essence really differ from one another, and, on the other, positions according to which existence and essence differ merely at the level of concepts. To cut that middle path, Burley adopts a threefold account of identity developed by Henry of Ghent a generation prior. Burley writes that it should be understood that in things there is a threefold difference, namely, real difference, difference according to reason [i.e. conceptual], and difference according to intention [i.e. intentional]. Those differ really which are diverse things regardless of the operation of the soul and they constitute something before both of those <together>; a human and a pale [thing] differ in this way. And others differ according to reason alone, and in that way the same thing differs from itself, because the understanding uses one as two. Also in this way a definition and a definitum differ, such as rational animal and human. And those which differ in neither way can be understood under the opposite of the other nor <need> the other <be> thought [in conjunction with it]. But difference according to intention is when some <entities> differ more greatly than according to reason and less than according to reality. Hence difference according to intention is in the middle between real difference and difference according to reason. In this way in simple <entities> genus and differentia differ: neither is of the understanding per se of the other in such cases, and likewise one can be understood under the opposite of the other. For a genus can be understood under the opposite of one differentia, because it can be understood under an opposite differentia. And it is said that in this way essence and being are different.23

According to Burley, there are three sorts of difference (and, consequently, three sorts of identity too): real, intentional and conceptual. First, things can differ really (differentia

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23 Ibid., para. 4.47, 273. “Intelligendum quod in rebus est triplex differentia, scilicet, differentia realis, differentia secundum rationem et differentia secundum intentionem. Ista differunt realiter quae sunt diversae res praeter operationem animae et constituant aliquid prius utroque istorum, et sic differunt homo et albus. Et alia differunt secundum rationem tantum, et isto modo idem differt a se, quia intellectus utitur uno et duobus. Isto etiam modo differunt definitio et definitum, ut animal rationale et homo. Et quae sic differunt neutrum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius nec etiam altero non intellecto. Sed differentia secundum intentionem est quando aliqua differunt magis quam secundum rationem et minus quam secundum rem. Unde differentia secundum rationem est media inter differentiam realem et differentiam secundum rationem. Isto modo in simplicibus differunt genus et differentia, et neutrum est de per se intellectu alterius in talibus, et similitur unum potest intelligi sub opposito alterius. Potest enim genus intelligi sub opposito unius differentiae, quia potest intelligi sub differentia opposita. Et dicitur quod isto modo differunt essentia et esse.”
realis). Real difference is a matter of two things having different modal profiles. Burley’s example of this sort of difference is a human and a pale thing. A human – Socrates, for example – might actually be pale. But Socrates is not really identical to a pale thing, because Socrates could exist without being pale – if, say, he went outside and became tan.

Second, things might differ conceptually. Conceptual difference (differentia secundum rationem) is, unsurprisingly, fundamentally a matter of differences among concepts, because it is a case in which “the intellect uses one thing as two.” A merely conceptual difference, then, is a difference in which the same thing is referred to by two different concepts, but where those concepts themselves differ from each other. Burley uses the example of humanity and rational animality. Humanity and rational animality are exactly the same property: the property of humanity. Consequently, the concepts HUMAN and RATIONAL ANIMAL refer to the same thing. But the concepts themselves are different concepts.\(^{24}\) The most obvious way in which HUMAN and RATIONAL ANIMAL differ from one another is with respect to their syntactic structure. HUMAN is a basic concept, such that it really doesn’t have an syntactic structure. RATIONAL ANIMAL, in contrast, does have syntactic structure, since that concept is syntactically derived from the basic concepts RATIONAL and ANIMAL.

In addition to real and conceptual difference, however, Burley defends a third sort of difference, which he calls intentional difference (differentia secundum intentionem). That sort of difference “is when some things differ more so than conceptually and less so

\(^{24}\) Consequently, conceptual difference is actually a kind of real difference between concepts.
than really.”

For Burley, then, the three notions of difference he endorses are nested. That two things differ really entails that they differ intentionally, which entails that they differ conceptually. Likewise, with respect to identity, that two things are conceptually identical (i.e. referred to by the same concept) entails that they are intentionally identical, which entails that they are really identical. That nested relationship also reveals something about the nature of intentional difference itself. On the one hand, because two things can differ intentionally but not really, two things which differ merely intentionally must have the same modal profile, so that neither could survive the loss of the other. On the other hand, since things can differ conceptually but not intentionally, two things which do differ intentionally must constitute different semantic contents – that is, different referents – for any concepts (and, derivatively, expressions in natural language) which might refer to them.

How can one tell when the referents of two concepts differ intentionally, rather than the concepts themselves differing merely conceptually? Burley never provides an explicit answer to this question. But I suggest that that answer is fairly straightforward. Things differ intentionally when something can be truly predicated of the one which cannot be truly predicated of the other. So, for example, Socrates differs intentionally from humanity because Socrates is a concrete particular, but humanity is not a concrete particular. Real difference, then, can be seen as the kind of difference which involves certain special predicates, such as the predicate ‘could exist independently of x’, where

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25 Ibid.
‘x’ is some intentionally specifiable thing. For example, Socrates would be really
different from Plato, because ‘Socrates could exist independently of Plato’ is true,
whereas ‘Plato could exist independently of Plato’ is false.

Burley introduces this complex theory of identity to address concerns about the
nature of existence and essence. But it is appears that he intends for it to have wider
application. In a different question in his *Quaes.Perih*, for example, Burley argues that
the nature of the species is one part of Socrates, but it doesn’t follow from this
that everything that remains (totum residuum) is another part, and this is because
the nature of the species and what remains are conjoined in being, and they are
not separated except according to the consideration of the intellect.

This passage might seem obscure. But what Burley is attempting to do in this passage is
navigate some tricky metaphysical waters, brought on by his commitment to the reality of
properties. In the first half of his career, Burley’s commitment to properties is a version
of what has been labeled moderate realism. Like many of his philosophical
contemporaries in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the early Burley argues
that properties are essential constituents of the particulars which possess them. That
Socrates is a human, for example, is due to the fact that Socrates is partly constituted by
the property of humanity. That property is what Burley describes in the passage above as
“the nature of the species.”

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26 Alternatively, we might assume (as Ockham appears to do; see §4.1) that the notion of mere intentional
identity and difference is what requires peculiar sorts of predicates, which are “restricted” or
“diminished” in some way. It does not seem to me that much hangs on how one articulates the difference
between real and merely intentional difference; what matters is that the differences between real and
merely intentionally different things requires that we can distinguish in some way between the sorts of
contradictory predicates truly predicated of things that differ really from the sorts of contradictory
predicates that can be truly predicated of things which differ merely intentionally.

Moreover, while it potentially exists within many concrete particulars, the property of humanity exists within each of the concrete particulars that it does as particularized. In the first book on a commentary on the *De Anima*, for example, Burley argues that “a common thing (*commune*) having being in a singular, or contracted to the singular, is individuated.”

Socrates’ humanity, then, is individuated, or particularized, humanity, and so is numerically distinct from Plato’s humanity. At the same time, Socrates’ humanity and Plato’s humanity are distinct particularizations of the same common entity: humanity; and that fact, Burley suggests, explains one way in which Socrates is similar to Plato – namely, with respect to humanity.

Finally, a concrete substance is not merely some particularized property. For example, Socrates is not merely particularized humanity. Indeed, if Socrates is to be constituted by particularized humanity, then humanity itself needs to be particularized by something. Nor can what particularizes humanity in Socrates be that humanity itself, since then Socrates’ humanity would not be particularized but rather particular. And to concede that would be to concede realism itself, since then Socrates’ humanity wouldn’t be a property (i.e. a form capable of being in many particulars) but rather a trope (i.e. a form particular in itself).

Consequently, there must be something, external to humanity,  


29 I use ‘trope’ in this context to denote a concrete particular, that is, something that is particular *per se*. Consequently, I distinguish between tropes and abstract particulars, since I take tropes to be concrete particulars (in particular, for philosophers like Ockham and the later Burley, concrete forms), whereas I take properties, whether particular or universal, to be abstract. Moreover, and in contrast to some contemporary accounts of *abstracta*, my use of the distinction does not take a position on whether *abstracta* have spatial and temporal location, or can be causally efficacious. In fact, Burley appears to
which particularizes humanity within Socrates. That something, for Burley, is the compound of concrete matter and concrete form – that is, Socrates’ body and soul. The compound of Socrates’ body and soul, then, is the “everything that remains” from the passage above.

The challenge for Burley is to provide a motivated account of the relationship between Socrates, Socrates’ humanity, and the compound of Socrates’ body and soul. One possibility is to treat the relationship as a straight parthood relationship. On this view, Socrates is a compound of two parts: his humanity, on the one hand, and the compound of his body and his soul, on the other, where both those parts are really different from one another. But Burley argues that that solution is not plausible, because “in what remains is the complete nature of Socrates.”

Burley’s solution is thus to argue that the relationship between Socrates’ humanity and the compound of Socrates’ body and soul is such that those two things are “conjoined in being, and are not separated except according to the consideration of the

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30 Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 1.821, 213. Also note that, on this conception of their relationship, a property would be need to be particular per se, since it is really distinct from some compound of particular matter and particular form, that is, it could exist as particular regardless of whether it was combined with some compound of particular matter and particular form – a position Burley rejects.
intellect.” In other words, he argues that Socrates’ humanity and the compound of his body and his soul are merely intentionally different from one another. In reality, however, Socrates’ humanity is identical to the compound of his body and soul, so that Socrates’ humanity does not constitute some further thing (res), in addition to that compound. Consequently, that compound needn’t be some proper part of Socrates, even if Socrates is constituted by the property of humanity, because that property (in Socrates) is really identical to that compound. Socrates’ humanity and that compound still differ from one another, however; they differ intentionally from one another. That compound, for example, is a concrete substance – namely, Socrates himself – whereas humanity is a certain abstract object realized within Socrates as his humanity.

3.2. Facts: Substantial Predication and Real Identity

With that background theory of identity and difference in place, we can consider the metaphysics of facts, according to Burley’s early account. In this section, I intend to construct the core theory of Burley’s early metaphysics of facts, given more general philosophical commitments he has. That theory will explain the metaphysics of those facts which make true only certain sorts of propositions—namely, propositions involving substantial predication. By ‘substantial predication’, I mean those propositions in which substances are predicated of substances. For example, the proposition that Socrates is a human involves substantial predication, since both Socrates and humanity exist in the category of substance. Similarly, the proposition that Socrates is Plato involves substantial predication, because both Socrates and Plato exist in the category of
substance. In the next section, I intend to supplement that core theory with a further
metaphysical theses to which Burley is committed, commitments that will allow us to
develop an account of the metaphysics of facts which is sufficiently robust to handle the
near-identity account of correspondence generally.

Facts which make propositions involving substantial predication true are, I
suggest, facts constituted by relations of real identity or real diversity. Burley’s
discussion in the *Quaes.Perih* about the relationship between Socrates, his humanity, and
the compound of his body and his soul straightforwardly applies here. The fact that
Socrates is a human contains Socrates, the property of humanity, and a relation of real
identity between them, but this is entailed already by what Burley has to say about the
relationship between Socrates, his humanity and the compound of his body and his soul.
Burley argues that Socrates’ humanity is really identical to the compound of Socrates’s
body and soul. But that compound is at least really identical to Socrates himself. Via
transitivity, then, Socrates’ humanity is really identical to Socrates.

Socrates still differs from humanity, of course. Socrates is concrete, whereas
humanity is not concrete. But that difference is not real but merely intentional. It is
merely intentional because Socrates and humanity have the same modal profile. First,
Socrates existentially depends on humanity because humanity is constitutive of Socrates.

31 I treat identity claims as a kind of predication. Identity claims can be treated in that way because Burley
adopts an identity theory of the copula, in contrast to an inherence theory. Identity theories of the copula
take the copula to establish a claim of identity between the subject and the predicate, whereas inherence
theories take the copula to establish the inherence of the predicate in the subject. For a discussion the
shift from inherence to identity theories in the early fourteenth century, see E. A. Moody, *Truth and
Consequence in Mediaeval Logic*, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics (Amsterdam:
Reconsideration of the Identity and Inherence Theories of the Copula,” *Journal of the History of
Socrates is essentially human, and he has the nature that he does on account of his possession of the property of humanity. Second, humanity, while itself a property, and so something that can be realized within many concrete particulars, exists in each concrete particular only as particularized within that concrete particular, and so is numerically distinct from other particularized instances of humanity. The humanity that exists in Socrates, then, exists as an abstract particular, peculiar to Socrates himself, and so existentially depends on Socrates. Consequently, since Socrates cannot survive the loss of humanity, nor can humanity, realized in Socrates, survive the loss of Socrates, Socrates and (his) humanity are existentially interdependent. That is, they share the same modal profile. But, on Burley’s account of identity, identity of modal profile is sufficient for real identity.

Whereas Burley is explicitly concerned in the *Quaes.Perih* with the relationship between concrete substances and their natures, however, the principles Burley employs in his response to that concern are general. Consequently, those same principles can be used to describe the relationship that any two substances might have to one another – for example, the relationship that two (substantial) properties might have. Consider the proposition that a human is an animal. That proposition is composed of the property of humanity and the property of animality. Its truth, then, requires that there is a fact of humanity’s being really identical to animality. But, since identity is a transitive relation, humanity’s being really identical to animality is guaranteed so long as there exists some human, such as Socrates, in whom humanity and animality are both realized, since both will be really identical to that particular. That a particular can be identical to a property is clear from what Burley says in the *Quaes.Perih*. Moreover, since identity is a transitive
relation, we can appeal to that fact to explain how two properties are really identical to one another. For example, if humanity is really identical to Socrates, and Socrates is really identical to animality, then, by transitivity, humanity will be really identical to animality. In fact, the relationship between humanity and animality is even tighter than that argument might suggest, because animality is itself constitutive of humanity, as its genus. So anything which realizes humanity ipso facto realizes animality as well.

Beyond true affirmative propositions which involve substantial predication, Burley’s account of truth helps handle true negative propositions of that type as well. Those propositions will be true just in case the things which compose it are really different from one another. For example, the proposition that Socrates is not a cat is true just in case Socrates is really different from the property of cathood. And, of course, Socrates is really different from cathood, since Socrates has a different modal profile from every instance of cathood. Falsehood, then, is simply a matter of the things which the mind represents as being really identical being in fact really different, or is a matter of the things that the mind represents being different, in fact being really identical to one another.

3.3. Facts, cont’d: Accidental Predication and Sameness

Unfortunately, the account of identity and difference that Burley develops in the Quaes.Perih can only go so far in articulating the metaphysics of facts for us. In particular, it doesn’t help explain the metaphysics of the facts which make true those propositions which involve accidental, rather than substantial, predication. The truth of the proposition that Plato is pale, for example, depends on Plato’s being identical to paleness. But, unlike in the case of propositions involving substantial predication, this
proposition, which involves accidental predication, can’t require for its truth the real identity of Plato and a pale thing.

Why can’t the account of identity developed in the *Quaes.Perih* help explain the truth conditions of propositions such as the proposition that Plato is pale? Because Plato can never be really identical to paleness. Real identity occurs when the relevant *relata* share the same modal profile. Plato and his humanity, for example, are really identical to one another because their existence conditions are identical. However, unlike with concrete substances and their substantial properties, concrete substances and their accidental properties have different modal profiles. Plato, for example, really differs from paleness, because Plato could lack the property of paleness – for example, if Plato were to go on vacation to some sunny beach hideaway, spending his days lying on the beach and getting tan. At the same time, it seems perfectly possible that the proposition that Plato is pale is true. Perhaps Plato has in fact been spending all his days indoors in front of a computer screen, furiously editing the *Republic*, and has become pale as a ghost in the process. Given Burley’s commitment to correspondence, however, the truth of the proposition that Plato is pale requires a fact, and in particular the fact of Plato’s being identical to paleness. Consequently, there must be a kind of identity that Plato bears (or at least can bear) to paleness that cannot be captured by the theory of identity Burley develops in the *Quaes.Perih*.

To address the truth of propositions of that sort, then, Burley’s account of the metaphysics of the proposition needs to be expanded. That expansion, I argue, involves
introducing a further notion: sameness. That which is the same as some accidental thing is said to be the same, in the way that a sitting person or a musical person is said to be the same as Socrates. And that an accidental thing taken up in this way is concretely the same in number as the subject is proven, because when we want to order someone or to call someone, oftentimes in ordering or calling we use the name of an accident, as when we say ‘You, the one sitting, come here’ or ‘I call the one sitting or the one arguing over to us’, which would not be unless an accidental thing were the same in number as the subject.

The theory of identity that Burley develops in the *Quaes.Perih* entails that, for example, Socrates cannot be really identical to a seated person, since a seated person is necessarily seated, but Socrates could be standing (and so not seated). But the theory of sameness that Burley develops in this passage allows that Socrates can be the same as a seated person. For we can call Socrates ‘the seated person’, and that we can do so is because the seated person can be, numerically speaking, the same as Socrates.

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34 Burley’s theory of identity and his theory of sameness are, I assume, theories of numerical identity and numerical sameness, respectively. Properties, then, enter into relations of identity or sameness only insofar as they are particularized in some concrete substance. In his later metaphysics, Burley denies that properties exist as particular in the concrete particulars that possess them, and so can never be numerically distinct, strictly speaking. See, e.g., Walter Burley, *Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Porph*, a4rb–vb. However, Burley argues that properties can be numerically distinct in a broad sense. See *Ibid.*, *Exp.Praed*, d3rb–va.
The notion of sameness that Burley introduces in this passage is not ad hoc, but rather can be motivated by his larger metaphysics. In his ontology, Burley distinguishes between beings per se, and beings per accidens.\textsuperscript{35} Beings per accidens are not merely accidental properties. Rather, they are compounds, composed of at least one property from one of the accidental categories as well as something from the category of substance. A pale thing (that is, the referent of ‘pale’), for example, is a complex property, composed of the properties of substance and paleness. Consequently, when one believes that Socrates is pale, one asserts the identity not of Socrates and paleness, but rather of Socrates and a compound of the property of substance and the property of paleness. Beings per se, on the other hand, are those particulars and properties entirely within the category of substance – Socrates, for example, or the property of humanity. Beings per accidens and beings per se are really different, because they have different modal profiles. Seated Socrates – a compound the property of being seated and Socrates – would cease to exist if Socrates were to stand, but Socrates himself can (and likely does) continue to exist if he were to stand. Though beings per accidens have different modal profiles from beings per se, however, a being per accidens is always partly constituted by a being per se, since beings per accidens are partly constituted by something from the category of substance.

Burley can employ that constitutive relationship in his explanation of how beings per se and beings per accidens can be the same as one another. In the simplest case, a being per accidens is the same as a being per se so long as that being per se is constitutive of that being per accidens. Socrates and pale Socrates, for example, are a

being \textit{per se} and a being \textit{per accidens}, respectively. Though really different from one another, pale Socrates is partly constituted by Socrates himself. Because Socrates partly constitutes pale Socrates, Socrates will be the same as pale Socrates. We can express this notion of sameness in the following way:

\begin{enumerate}
\item A being \textit{per accidens} will be the same as a being \textit{per se} so long as
\begin{enumerate}
\item any accidental property which is constitutive of that being \textit{per accidens} inheres in that being \textit{per se}, and
\item the substance which is constitutive of the being \textit{per accidens} is really identical to that being \textit{per se}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}

Socrates is the same as pale Socrates, then, just in case paleness inheres in Socrates, so that Socrates partly constitutes pale Socrates. Moreover, (S1) can also handle the kinds of cases Burley himself mentions in the passage quoted above, such as the case in which Socrates is the same as a pale thing. In that case, first, paleness inheres in Socrates, per (i). Second, the property of substance, which partly constitutes a pale thing, is really identical to Socrates, per (ii). Consequently, Socrates is the same as a pale thing. And that fact, I suggest, makes true the proposition that Socrates is pale.

While (S1) can handle the sorts of cases Burley himself considers, there are a great number of cases that it cannot. Consider, for example, the proposition that a human is pale. If that proposition is true, it is because the property of humanity is at least the same as a certain being \textit{per accidens} – namely, the compound of the property of paleness and the property of substance. Per (S1), that requires that the property of paleness inheres in the property of humanity. But Burley appears to deny that properties can inhere in
other properties.\textsuperscript{36} The property of paleness, for example, does not inhere in the property of humanity. Rather, it can only inhere in particular humans (as well as other particular substances).

The problem with (S\textsubscript{1}) is that it requires that accidental properties inhere in the relevant being \textit{per se} – which might be a property itself. However, because Burley argues that substantial properties are really identical to their particulars, we can modify (S\textsubscript{1}) in a way that accommodates cases of this sort, resulting in the following account of sameness:

(S\textsubscript{2}) A being \textit{per accidens} will be the same as a being \textit{per se} so long as

(i) any accidental property which is constitutive of that being \textit{per accidens} inhere in a particular that is really identical to that being \textit{per se} and

(ii) the substance which is constitutive of that being \textit{per accidens} is really identical to that being \textit{per se}.

Assume, for example, that Socrates is pale. Consequently, paleness inhere in Socrates, who (given Burley’s account of identity) is really identical to the property of humanity, as per (i). Moreover, as per (ii), the property of substance, which partly constitutes a pale thing, is really identical to the property of humanity, because Socrates is really identical to both properties, and identity is transitive.\textsuperscript{37} Consequently, the property of humanity is the same as a pale thing, that is, a compound of paleness and the property of substance.

\textsuperscript{36} With respect to terms of second intention, such as ‘property’ for example, Burley argues that those terms do not signify anything other than what terms of first intention signify, so that the meaning of terms of second intention are context sensitive. That they do not signify anything other than what terms of first intention signify appears to be motivated in part by worries that, if they were to signify some distinct properties, then properties would inhere in properties. See Ibid., Exp.Prol, a2rb–va.

\textsuperscript{37} In fact, the property of substance is partly constitutive of the property of humanity, since a human is rational substance.
And so the proposition that a human is pale is likewise true, because the constituents of that proposition are the same in fact.  

Before we conclude our analysis of sameness, I want to consider one final case. Besides cases in which a being per accidens is the same as a being per se, it also the case that two beings per accidens can be the same as one another. For example, a musical person might also be a pale person. (S₂) is explicitly articulated in terms of the relationship of a being per accidens to a being per se, however, and as such cannot accommodate these cases. But it seems to me that Burley already possess all the tools he needs to make sense of the relationships between two beings per accidens, along the following lines:

(S₃) two beings per accidens - (a) and (b) - will be the same as one another so long as

(i) every accidental property which is constitutive of (b) inheres in a particular which is really identical to the substance of (a) and

(ii) every accidental property which is constitutive of (a) inheres in that particular

(iii) the substance which is constitutive of (b) is really identical to that particular

38 Just as with general propositions involving essential, or substantial, claims, then, such as the proposition that a human is an animal, the truth of general propositions involving accidental claims are ultimately grounded in particulars, such as Socrates. This has two advantages for Burley. First, Burley argues that properties only exist within concrete particulars, and so the identity of any two properties would have to be due to their being realized within particulars. See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias,” para. 4.52–3, 274. Second, it seems to respect the fact that even general propositions are about particulars, even if those particulars are not themselves constituents of those propositions.
For example, assume that Socrates is both pale and a musician. Consequently, a pale thing is a musician. First, the property of being musical inheres in Socrates, who is really identical to the substance of a pale thing – namely, the property of substance itself. Second, the property of paleness also inheres in Socrates. Third, the property of substance – this time, as the substance of a musician – is really identical to Socrates. Consequently, a pale thing is a musician, because a pale thing is the same as a musician.39

Supplemented with the notion of sameness, then, the core theory of the metaphysics of facts can be expanded to include all the kinds of facts necessary to make sense of Burley’s first account of correspondence. Note, however, that the notions of real identity and real difference are still the central notions of the account, because the notion of sameness itself is partly articulated in terms of real identity. That also suggests, I think, that the account can be modified in such a way that Burley’s account of correspondence can be uniformly articulated with respect to both substantial and accidental predication – though it is unclear to me whether Burley himself would be amenable to such an account.

It involves, first, the introduction of a slightly different notion, sameness*. Sameness presupposes that at least one of the relevant relata is a being per accidens. Sameness* has no such presupposition, and so can capture the kind of real identity that substances can have with one another. Two things will differ*, moreover, just in case they fail to be the same*. With sameness* and difference* in hand, we can understand Burley’s theory of correspondence to be the following: propositions are true just in case they correspond to

39 (S3) isn’t perfect. In particular, it isn’t nuanced enough to handle different kinds of quantified propositions (e.g. the proposition that every human is pale vs. the proposition that some human is pale). Delving into those issues, however, would take us too far afield for our purposes in this paper. At the very least, it provides a general account of the notion of sameness, one which allows us to make sense of the truth-conditions of a large class of propositions.
the fact of their subject term’s being the same* as their predicate term (if they are affirmative), or correspond to the fact of their subject term’s being different* from their predicate term (if they are negative). We can capture the notion of sameness* in the following way.

(S4) two things - (a) and (b) - will be the same* as one another so long as

(i) the substance of (a) is really identical to some particular

(ii) any accidental property which is constitutive of (a) inheres in that particular and

(iii) any accidental property which is constitutive of (b) inheres in that particular

(iv) the substance which is constitutive of (b) is really identical to that particular

Since things in the category of substance are not constituted by accidental properties, those things will trivially fulfill clauses (ii) and (iii). Clauses (i) and (iv), however, requires that, regardless of whatever accidental properties they may have, two substances can be the same only if they are really identical. It also accommodates the old notion of sameness, however, since it requires not just that two things that are the same* have really identical substantial parts (at least transitively, via the real identity of each to the same particular), but also that, if they are constituted by any accidental properties, that those properties inhering in some particular which is really identical to its substantial part. Difference*, moreover, requires that two things fail to meet at least one clause in (S4).
Let me be clear: the account of the metaphysics of facts that I have developed in this section is speculative. It does not constitute a particular reading of some of Burley’s early texts, or even a reconstruction of a particular account Burley himself actually held, given those texts. My own view is that Burley never had any explicit account of the metaphysics of facts, especially in the first half of his career. I hold that view in part because there is at least some looseness in the relevant notions he employs when discussing the truth conditions of a proposition – sometimes discussing sameness (where it is unclear whether Burley means sameness or identity) and sometimes talking simply about things being “united in reality.” Rather than a reconstruction of a particular view, then, the account I have developed in this section and is a construction of a theory of the metaphysics of facts, whose construction is both motivated and constrained by certain other commitments – metaphysical, semantic, and alethic – which appear in various works of Burley’s early corpus. It is the theory of the metaphysics of facts that I think Burley is required to have, given his various views about the nature of correspondence, identity and sameness, and ontology generally – even if it is not a theory he did in fact ever hold.

4. **REALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS**

4.1. *Ockham contra Moderate Realism*

Whatever account of the metaphysics of facts that Burley held, or should have held, in the first half of his career, that account is closely tied to a particular program of realism about properties – moderate realism. Moderate realism is the thesis that substantial properties are constitutive parts of the concrete particulars that possess them,
and that those properties are really identical to those concrete particulars.\textsuperscript{40} The high watermark of moderate realism in the medieval period occurs at the turn of the fourteenth century, with the maturation of Scotus’ metaphysical system. But those metaphysical approaches die a fairly quick philosophical death in the subsequent decades, principally at the hands of Ockham.\textsuperscript{41} In fact, the target of Ockham’s criticisms of realism is broader than just moderate realism (though, as we will see, not as broad as Ockham himself took them to be). Developed most fully in his \textit{Ordinatio} and \textit{Summa Logicae}, Ockham attempts to argue that any form of realism is philosophically suspect, regardless of whether or not one takes properties to be really identical to the particulars that possess them.\textsuperscript{42} Ockham’s criticisms of realism clearly influenced in some way the development of Burley’s own metaphysics, pushing him to a radically different view of the nature of properties, the relationship between properties and their bearers, and the proper role of properties in a philosophical system. That influence is most apparent in the objections

\textsuperscript{40} This account of properties is most at home with respect to substantial properties, since substantial properties are, according to moderate realism, constitutive of concrete substances. Accidental properties, in contrast, are not constitutive of concrete substances. However, they are constitutive of beings \textit{per accidens}. Paleness, for example, is constitutive of pale Socrates. Ockham’s criticisms of properties are often directed towards substantial properties, even while those criticisms are represented as being applicable to properties \textit{simpliciter}. Ockham appears to expect that, if one comes to deny substantial properties, there will be little motivation left to accept accidental properties.

\textsuperscript{41} Realist metaphysics of that sort do appear to undergo a renaissance at the end of the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth century, with the metaphysical accounts developed by the “Oxford Realists,” philosophers such as John Wyclif, William Penbygull, and Johannes Sharpe. See Alessandro Conti, “Johannes Sharpe’s Ontology and Semantics: Oxford Realism Revisited,” \textit{Vivarium} 43 (April 2005): 156–86.

that the later Burley considers to his (very different) account of properties, objections which clearly originate with Ockham. But Burley’s response to Ockham’s criticisms of realism isn’t wholly reactionary; on the contrary, on some points at least, Burley’s later views are sympathetic to Ockham’s concerns. In particular, the later Burley agrees with Ockham that accounts which posit a multitude of identity relations ought to be rejected.

In this section, therefore, I intend to focus on arguments that Ockham raises against two different versions of realism. I will focus on Ockham’s arguments, first, against moderate realism, and in particular on his argument that a distinction between real and a less-than-real kind of difference is philosophically implausible. As we will see, the later Burley agrees with Ockham on this point, and consequently adopts in its place the simpler account of identity and difference that Ockham favors. That simpler account will have important consequences for both the account of correspondence, and the metaphysics of facts, that Burley develops in the second half of his career.

I then will focus on Ockham’s arguments against the general form of realism that Burley ultimately adopts, a form I label abstract universalism. Abstract universalists hold that numerically the same property can be in many particulars at once. Ockham rejects this account as philosophically (and theologically) problematic. Burley, however, develops a radical version of abstract universalism – “exaggerated realism” – which he argues escapes Ockham’s criticisms. I argue that the radical version of abstract universalism that Burley adopts indicates two things about Burley’s philosophical

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43 While Burley never identifies Ockham by name, addressing his response to ‘certain moderni’, the objections to realism that Burley considers are precisely the objections Ockham raises at various points in his corpus. There can be little doubt but that Burley has Ockham in mind in these passages. See, e.g., Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed*, d2ra–3va.
outlook – one general, the other specific. First, it indicates that Burley’s philosophical commitments are ultimately driven by semantic considerations. His commitment to properties, for example, is not ultimately driven by the belief that they do important ontological work, but rather by the belief that they are necessary for correct epistemic and semantic theorizing. In particular, Burley commitment to properties is driven by the belief that they are required to explain the semantic content of general expressions, that is, expressions which can be univocally said of more than one concrete thing.

Second, then, Burley’s later realism indicates that Burley has a very particular view about semantics, and especially about referentialism. For Burley, signification must be a two-place relation. For each categorematic expression in a language, in other words, there must be some one thing to which it refers. And properties, Burley argues, are the only things that general expressions could signify, since only they could explain the ability of those expressions to be univocally said of many. That account of referentialism is starkly at odds with Ockham’s own, since Ockham argues that signification is variably polyadic, that is, signification need not be two-place (and usually isn’t in the case of predicate expressions, since there is typically more than one individual of a given kind, and it is these particulars, Ockham argues, to which a predicate expression refers). Moreover, as we will see in §5, Burley’s account of reference, given the simpler account of identity and difference that he comes to adopt, also requires an account of correspondence that is very different from the near-identity account – one which integrates a central semantic notion into the analysis of correspondence itself.

Ockham’s attacks on moderate realism are principally aimed at Scotus’ metaphysical views, whose account Ockham appears to regard as the most sophisticated
form of realism available. But the criticisms of Scotus’ metaphysical views are, I argue, generalizable to any view according to which properties are abstract particulars, really identical to, though less-than-really different from, the concrete substances which possess them. Ockham’s criticism of Scotus’ metaphysics is two-pronged, though we will focus merely on the first prong here. On the first prong of his attack, Ockham attempts to undermine Scotus’ notion of a formal difference (a notion similar to Burley’s notion of intentional difference) by arguing that the distinction between real and merely formal difference is philosophically incoherent.

Ockham’s view is that the distinction between real and formal difference (and, mutatis mutandis, identity) is philosophically unsustainable. Anticipating McTaggart’s Dissimilarity of the Diverse – that if any two things are different, there is at least one feature which the one has and the other lacks – Ockham argues that Scotus’ notion of a formal difference leaves no room for real difference. As Marilyn Adams notes, Ockham takes the equality of inconsistency between contradictories to entail that “if some proposition of the form ‘x is F’ and ‘y is not F’ can be true about really existent property-

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45 On Ockham’s criticism of Scotus’s realism, see William Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III, 2:d. 2, q. 6, pp. 173–92.

46 McTaggart’s Dissimilarity of the Diverse is logically equivalent to Leibniz’s Law, the Identity of Indiscernibles. McTaggart argues that his own nomenclature is to be preferred, however, as it avoids any suggestion that there are indiscernibles that are identical to one another. See John McTaggart, The Nature of Existence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 101.
bearers that are only formally distinct, then any pair of contradictories can."47 That is, if some contradictory pair of predicates can be predicated of objects that are merely formally different on Scotus’ account, then, since each pair of contradictories are as contradictory as any other, every contradictory pair can in principle be predicated of objects that are merely formally different. For example, if Socrates is a human and Fido is not a human (but rather is a dog), they differ. But what reason does Scotus have for regarding that difference as real, rather than merely formal? Ockham suggests that Scotus has none.

One possible response which Ockham considers holds that things which differ really have what Ockham calls “primary contradictories” truly predicated of them, that is, contradictory predicate terms which are not restricted or diminished (either implicitly or explicitly) in some way. Merely formally distinct things, in contrast, can have truly predicated of them only contradictory predicates which necessarily are diminished in some way (by containing in some way the notion of being formally of a kind). For example, if a universal differs only formally from a particular, then, since ‘is a universal’ can be truly predicated of the first whereas ‘is not a universal’ is truly predicated of the second, these two contradictory terms – ‘is a universal’ and ‘is not a universal’ – must be restricted or diminished by implicitly containing the notion of mere formality, for example. But Ockham argues that “‘really’ is not a destructive or diminishing determination, and neither is ‘formally’.”48 In other words, Ockham argues that being


48 See William Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III, d. 2, q. 5, p. 158.
formally F and being formally not-F is just as contradictory as being F and being not-F \textit{simpliciter}, neither being a notion of restriction or diminution, so that the latter pair can no more pick out a real difference between two things than the former.

Whatever the ultimate philosophical success of Ockham’s arguments against the distinction between real and formal difference, Ockham’s intended result, among other things, is a simplified account of identity and difference, which does not recognize a distinction between real and merely formal identity and difference. On Ockham’s account of identity and difference, then, two things differ \textit{simpliciter} just in case something can be truly said of one which cannot be truly said of the other; they are identical \textit{simpliciter} just in case they can truly be said of, and truly have said of them, the very same things. The later Burley’s account of identity and difference reflects this position.\footnote{See also Walter Burley, \textit{In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones} (New York: Georg Olms, 1972), 9ra–b.} In the \textit{Exp.Perih}, for example, Burley writes that

if the one is [truly] predicated of something of which the other is not [truly] predicated, then they are not the same but diverse. And if something is [truly] predicated of the one which is not [truly] predicated of the other, they are not the same but diverse. But if something is truly predicated of the one which is [truly] predicated of the other, then they are the same.\footnote{Walter Burley, \textit{Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed}, g3rb: “Nota quod ex isto loco sumitur doctrina bona ad cognoscendum identitatem vel diversitatem alicuiorium adinvicem. Si unum praedicatur de alioqu de quo non praedicatur reliquum illa non sunt eadem sed diversa. Et si aliquid praedicatur de uno quod non predicatur de reliquo illa non sunt eadem sed diversa. Et si aliquid praedicatur de uno vere de quo reliquum praedicatur illa sunt eadem.”}

\footnote{Because of the way in which it is articulated, Burley’s account of identity and diversity in this passage may seem to face a serious problem. It relies on the notion of true predication, or truth, but truth itself is partly articulated by him in terms of identity and diversity. However, that problem is only serious if we take Burley to be introducing the concepts of identity and diversity via the notion of truth. Another way to conceive of Burley’s project here, I suggest, is one which tries to illuminate for us concepts we already possess, by setting out a clear criterion for their application. That criterion might already contain – explicitly or implicitly – concepts which are themselves partly articulated in terms of identity and diversity, but that should not matter if Burley’s goal is simply to produce a criterion for their applicability – one which both captures our intuitions about “obvious” cases and at the same time illuminates for why...}
Of course, Scotus could accept this principle as well, so long as the larger theory is suitably supplemented with an account of primary and diminished contradictory predicates. But Burley makes it clear in a number of passages that he does not intend for his account to be supplemented in that way. With respect to the relationship between concrete particulars and properties especially, and contra his earlier account, Burley uses that principle to acknowledge that concrete particulars and properties differ from one another. “And on the basis of that principle, given that there are many contradictories which can be truly predicated (verificantur) of them, it is clear that the singular and the universal are not the same.”52 And Burley is clear that the relevant notion of difference between concrete particulars and properties is not merely intentional. He writes, for example, that “the universal [...] outside the mind is some thing distinct (aliqua res distincta) from the singular thing out of which it is taken.”53 It seems, then, that Burley takes his principle of predication to entail more than merely intentional difference between the relevant subjects of that predication – including properties and concrete particulars.54

However, given that account of identity and difference, Burley can no longer claim that a property and a concrete particular that possesses it differ merely

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52 Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Porph*, a4va: “Et isto fundamento probatur quod singulare et universale non sunt idem per multa contradictoria qui verificantur de eis.”

53 Ibid., *Exp.Porph*, a4rb: “[U]niversale tam illud quod est in anima quam illud quod est extra animam est aliqua res distincta a re singulari qua extrahitur.”

54 For more on Burley’s later account of identity and difference, see Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and Universals,” 193–5.
intentionally, a consequence which Burley himself clearly recognizes. One option for Burley is to deny that they differ at all – in essence, to adopt Ockham’s nominalist position, and so deny that there are properties, something over and above concrete particulars whose natures those properties constitute. Another option, however, is to accept that a concrete particular and a property of it differ from one another, but to acknowledge that that difference is not diminished in any way. If one accepts that concrete particulars and properties differ in that way, however, the late medieval realist faces a dilemma: either she must continue to maintain that properties are abstract particulars, or she must now take properties to be abstract universals.

4.2. Burley’s Exaggerated Realism

Both horns, Ockham argues, are problematic for the realist. The first horn is problematic because it does not allow for a philosophically consistent account of realism about properties. Rather, Ockham argues, it leads to a (perhaps profligate) form of nominalism, since “properties” must be regarded as not abstract but rather concrete, and so leads to a rejection of properties in favor of tropes. Burley wisely never pursues this first horn, perhaps seeing the success of Ockham’s arguments against that view. Rather, Burley develops a version of the second. The second horn of Ockham’s dilemma takes a property to be an abstract universal, something capable of being in many concrete particulars as universal. Ockham argues that this form of realism too faces a number of devastating metaphysical challenges. We will focus on one of these challenges: the
problem of annihilation, since Burley makes explicit mention of this challenge when developing his mature ontology.

Annihilation, unlike mere destruction, is an act whereby all the parts of a thing are destroyed. To annihilate Socrates, for example, is to destroy all that composes him. Ockham assumes that annihilation is an action that God can undertake. But, more than simply that, Ockham assumes that God’s ability to annihilate some one thing need not infringe on God’s ability to sustain the rest of the created order.\textsuperscript{56} That is, Ockham assumes that it is possible that God could at once annihilate something – Socrates, for example – without that act of annihilation having implications for the continued existence of the rest of the things which make up reality, such as Plato. But Ockham argues that such an assumption is not possible for someone committed to the view that a property is an abstract universal. Since annihilation requires the destruction of everything that composes Socrates, it will require the destruction of humanity, a certain property that is a constitutive part of Socrates. But, since properties are understood to be abstract universals, the very same property of humanity is also constitutive of other humans, such as Plato. Since humanity is constitutive of Plato too, Ockham argues that the annihilation of Socrates (and so the destruction of the property of humanity) must result in the destruction of Plato as well. And this is because Plato cannot survive the loss of something constitutive of him, such as humanity. Realism, then, is unpalatable at least because it imposes unacceptable limits on divine power.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{56} See William Ockham, \textit{Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio, distinctiones II-III}, d. 2, q. 4, 115–6.

\textsuperscript{57} One might retort, of course, that, while realism imposes limits on divine power, those limits are not unacceptable. And, in general, many of Ockham’s arguments against abstract universalism are intended
Likely in response to arguments of this sort, Burley adopts what some have called “exaggerated” realism.\footnote{On the introduction of this term, see Herman Shapiro, “A Note on Walter Burley’s Exaggerated Realism,” \textit{Franciscan Studies} 20 (1960): 206.} Like the target of Ockham’s annihilation argument, Burley’s exaggerated realist take properties to be abstract universals. But, unlike that target, he argues that properties are not parts of the particulars which they inform. On this account, a concrete substance, such as Socrates, is composed of nothing except concrete matter and concrete form. Because properties are not parts of their particulars, Burley argues, his mature ontology escapes the problem of annihilation that Ockham presents.

[I]t is not necessary that, by annihilating an individual, humanity (\textit{species hominis}) will be annihilated, because humanity is not a part of Socrates. Thus, by annihilating this matter and this form, Socrates is annihilated, because Socrates is composed of nothing except this matter and this form.\footnote{Burley, Walter Burley, \textit{Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed}, d3rb: “Ad aliud dicendum quod non oportet quod annihilando individuum annihiletur species hominis, quia species hominis est non pars Socratis. Unde annihilata haec materia et haec forma annihilatur Socrates, quia Socrates non componitur nisi ex haec materia et haec forma.”}

As Burley sees it, it is in virtue of being a part of some concrete particular – Socrates, for example – that the property of humanity is destroyed when Socrates is annihilated. If, in contrast, properties were not parts of their bearers – if, for example, Socrates were nothing more than the compound of a concrete particular bit of matter (i.e. his body) and a concrete form (i.e. his soul) – then the annihilation of Socrates need not result in the destruction of the property of humanity itself. And, if that annihilation does not result in the destruction of something universal, then Socrates’ annihilation need not have any impact on the existential status of distinct concrete substances, such as Plato.

to show that the philosophical costs of that realism are simply too high, rather than to show that there is anything conceptually incoherent in that form of realism itself.
Scholars are still just beginning to understand what Burley’s exaggerated realism amounts to, and so just beginning to understand the philosophical implications that his commitment to it brings. Marilyn Adams, for example, in partial critique of Burley’s response to Ockham’s annihilation argument, argues that Burley’s exaggerated realism is unsatisfying because Ockham’s “annihilation arguments depend, not on whether universals are parts of particulars, but on whether they are essential constituents of them; and surely Burley would not deny that human nature is essential to Socrates.” On Adams’ understanding of exaggerated realism, then, questions of mereology are distinct from questions of nature. Even if properties are not parts of their concrete particulars, Adams argues, they must still be essential constituents of those concrete particulars, serving in explanations of why those concrete particulars are what they are.

Adams’ interpretation of Burley’s exaggerated realism raises interesting questions about the relationship between composition and constitution, and about the form – Aristotelian or Platonic – that exaggerated realism must take. However, more recent scholarship suggests a different interpretation of Burley’s exaggerated realism. Alessandro Conti, for example, writes that, on Burley’s theory, a property “is not a constitutive part of the individuals it is predicated of, but only a form coming together with their essences, and making their metaphysical structure known.”


61 On this view, for example, properties might be best understood as Platonic forms which particular substances exemplify. Particular substances are thus not composed of properties, but still essentially depend on them.

62 Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and Universals,” 194. Conti is not entirely clear about what this “coming together” relation amounts to; at least it must entail that particulars could, in some sense, exist without them. See also Catarina Dutilh Novaes, “The Ockham-Burley Dispute,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013),
suggests that exaggerated realism entails that properties do not constitute the essences of the concrete particulars that they inform, and instead merely “come together” with those essences.\footnote{54–62; Hans-Ulrich Wöhler, “Universals and Individuals,” in A Companion to Walter Burley: Late Medieval Logician and Metaphysician, ed. Alessandro Conti (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 173–89.} This interpretation has the resources to skirt some of the philosophical issues that Adams’ interpretation raises, since constitution can be treated as identical to, or at least a kind of, parthood relation. More importantly, it also suggests that Burley successfully responds to Ockham’s annihilation argument, since properties are not, on this interpretation, essential constituents of particulars.

The central question for Burley’s exaggerated realism, then, is whether or not properties, such as humanity, are constitutive of the concrete particulars that posses them. Adams suggests, of course, that they are – and so Burley’s exaggerated realism is still liable to Ockham's argument from annihilation. But, in a slightly later passage from the same work, Burley makes clear that properties are not essential constituents of concrete particulars.\footnote{63 Elsewhere, Conti argues that “macro-objects are what [are] signified by a proper name or definite description, such as ‘Socrates’ or ‘this man here.” (Conti, “Ockham and Burley on Categories and Universals,” 200; on Conti’s notion of a macro-object, see n. 19). I am not sure how to reconcile this claim with his account of Burley’s response to the annihilation argument, since that response appears to presuppose that ‘Socrates’, for example, signifies merely an aggregate of concrete matter and concrete form, rather than an aggregate along with the various abstract forms that that aggregate possesses.}

[Q]uidity and form are one, and therefore just as there are two sorts of form, namely, a form which declares (declarans) a quiddity and a form which perfects the matter, so too there are two sorts of quiddity, because a certain one is a quiddity which is a form which perfects matter, and a certain one is a form which declares the quiddity. The quiddity which is a form perfecting the matter is a part of an individual whose quiddity it is, but the quiddity which declares a quiddity is

\footnote{64 Conti himself makes note of this passage, and its implications for the constitution question. See Conti, “Ontology in Walter Burley’s Last Commentary on the Ars Vetus,” 142–4.}
not a part of the individual whose quiddity it is, nor is it a part of the essence (de essentia) of such an individual, but it essentially accompanies its essence.65

Burley's point in this passage is that a quiddity, or “whatness,” of some concrete substance is simply a form of that substance. And forms are of two sorts: concrete and abstract. Concrete forms – which are particular per se – “perfect” the matter in which they inhere. Socrates' soul, for example, is a concrete form in the category of substance, “perfecting,” or unifying, Socrates' matter in a certain way, and the matter’s being unified in that way by that form just is Socrates himself. A concrete form, then, is what principally explains why the thing which it constitutes is what it is. Socrates’ soul, for example, is constitutive of Socrates, and it makes him what he is: namely, a human, an animal, a thing capable of laughter, etc. In addition to concrete forms, however, Burley argues that there are also abstract forms, or properties – humanity, for example. These abstract properties are, on the mature account at least, universal, that is, they are able to be universally possessed by, or to be in, many concrete particulars. But Burley stresses that they are not in any way constitutive of the concrete particulars which they are in, arguing that they are not “parts of the essence” (de essentia) of the particulars that possess them.66 They rather merely “declare” the quiddity, or nature, of a concrete particular, a claim which we will return to in the last section.

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65 Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed*, d3rb: “Ad illud quando probatur quod species est pars individui quia est quidditas individui, dicendum quod quidditas et forma unum sunt, et ideo sicut forma est duplex, scilicet, forma declarans quidditatem et forma perficiens materiam, sic quidditas est duplex, quia quaedam est quidditas quae est forma perficiens materiam, et quaedam est forma declarans quidditatem. Quidditas quae est forma perficiens materiam est pars individui cuius est quidditas, sed quidditas declarans quidditatem non est pars individui cuius est quidditas, nec est de essentia talis individui, sed est essentialiter concomitans essentiam eius.”

66 Burley stresses elsewhere that particular effects can only have particular causes, though his concern in that passage is material causation. See, e.g., Ibid., *Exp.Praed*, d2vb: “[I]ndividuum est effectus particularis, et species est effectus universalis, et ideo individuum non componitur nisi ex haec materia et
This is an extremely radical metaphysics. So radical, in fact, that it is easy to see how scholars such as Adams could misunderstand the view. I do not think it is too much to suggest that the primary motivation for a commitment to a realist metaphysics throughout philosophical history has been metaphysical: the argument that realism best serves to explain why things have the intrinsic causal powers that they do.\(^67\) That Socrates is able to reason discursively, for example, or is able to laugh at a joke needs some explanation, and the realist suggests that that explanation comes in the form of Socrates' possession of a certain property: humanity. Burley's exaggerated realism is a radical outlier in the realist tradition, then, because his account of properties is not meant to answer those sorts of metaphysical questions. In fact, with respect to the question of why concrete particulars are what they are, Burley's account is almost identical to Ockham’s: concrete particulars have the natures that they do merely because of the compounds of concrete form and concrete matter that they are.\(^68\)

\(^67\) It might best to think of realism as traditionally motivated by two concerns: causality and similarity, with the realist holding that the same object – a property – can explain both. At least part of the novelty of Burley’s later account is that he separates these two issues. Issues of causality (that is, the causal powers of particular substances) are explained by appeal to concrete forms, whereas issues of similarity still require appeal to properties (though merely as representations of concrete particulars). On the issue of the role of properties in similarity relations, see Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Porph*, a4vb.

\(^68\) For the later Burley, the fact that a concrete form (e.g. Socrates’ soul) makes a thing that it constitutes what it is can’t depend on some property or other, since then the annihilation argument would retain its force. That is, explanations of a concrete form’s enabling the thing that it constitutes to act in various ways (and so have a certain nature) can’t involve appeal to some property or other, in virtue of which that concrete form provides that nature. Consequently, for the later Burley, concrete forms cannot instantiate or exemplify properties (see §5).
a human (i.e. has the causal powers peculiar to a human) not because of any property he
might possess, but rather because he is a concrete bit of matter structured by a concrete
substantial form (or, on Ockham’s account, a number of concrete substantial forms). That
Socrates is a human, then, isn't to be explained in terms of a property he possess, but
rather in terms of the compound of concrete matter and concrete substantial form that he
is.

4.3. Semantic Motivations for Burley’s Exaggerated Realism

Why, then, does Burley remain committed to the reality of properties, even when
that commitment requires an account of properties that in no way figures into causal
explanation? I argue that Burley remains committed to the reality of properties because of
a fundamental semantic commitment, a commitment which constitutes a (perhaps the)
core principle of Burley’s philosophical outlook. According to that principle,
signification is necessarily dyadic. In other words, each meaningful expression in a
language must have some distinct thing as its content. Proper names and demonstratives
will have concrete substances are their contents. But kind terms and predicates, since they
can be said of many concrete particulars, cannot have concrete particulars as their
contents. They require rather things which can be in many concrete particulars:
properties.

That Burley actually has this view of language should be fairly obvious, given the
theory of referentialism sketched in chapter 2. But that it is a central philosophical
commitment will require a bit more evidence. And the best evidence, I think, that Burley
is steadfastly committed to this position comes in his De Puritate – not (as we might
expect) in a discussion about the nature of signification, but rather in the context of a
discussion about another medieval semantic notion: supposition (simple supposition, in particular). I will have plenty to say about supposition shortly. But, right now, all that we need to know is (1) that supposition is “the taking of a term for something” (i.e. terms can be used to talk about things), (2) that there are different kinds of supposition, (3) that Burley and Ockham agree about the things that are talked about in at least one kind of supposition (i.e. personal supposition), but (4) that they disagree about how two kinds of supposition – personal and simple – should be defined. Ockham and Burley agree that personal supposition involves a term standing for, or representing, concrete substances. But Ockham argues that personal supposition is the kind of supposition a term has when it supposit for what it signifies, whereas Burley argues that a term supposit not personally but simply when it supposit for what it signifies.

Burley argues for his position in the following manner. First, he argues that “a name is not imposed except on the known.”69 Recall the notion of imposition introduced in chapter 3. Imposition is the act of imposing an expression onto something, and Burley includes an epistemic restriction on imposition: to impose an expression onto something, you need to be thinking of that thing. But, Burley continues, “he who imposed the name ‘human’ to signify did not know me or John who is now present.”70 In other words, whoever introduced ‘human’ into the English language had not ever heard of or seen –

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70 Ibid. Ockham will deny this. He argues that, in fact, anyone who is competent with ‘human’ thinks of each and every human, but he does not think of any one of them distinctly. On Ockham’s understanding of the epistemic constraint on signification, see infra.
indeed, had never thought of—either Burley or his friend John.71 And so Burley concludes, “[t]herefore, this name ‘human’ does not signify me or John who is now present.”72 But, if it doesn’t signify every human, but ‘human’ can supposit personally for every individual human, then personal supposition must not be the supposition a term has when it supposits for what it signifies.

Burley’s argument gets him (he believes) his preferred account of personal supposition. But it isn’t quite enough yet to secure the necessity of the dyadic nature of signification. For that, Burley needs a further argument. Besides relying on philosophical authority, Burley argues that “the name ‘human’ signifies something first.”73 As Paul Spade notes, Burley is here relying on the Aristotelian notion of the ‘first subject’ of an attribute; in other words, what an expression signifies “first” is what is “determinately and distinctly” thought by someone who understands the meaning of that expression.74 But, Burley argues, “it does not signify first Socrates or Plato, because in that case someone hearing the utterance and knowing what is signified by the utterance would determinately and distinctly understand Socrates, which is false.”75 That is, if Socrates

71 This might seem to presuppose a suspect picture of how expressions come to have the meaning that they do—by fiat from some Adam-like figure. But Burley’s position need not require this. For example, he could follow the example of Roger Bacon, and maintain that every use of an expression constitutes a re-imposition of that expression. See Roger Bacon, “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s ‘Opus Maius’: ‘De Signis,’” ed. Jan Pinborg, K.M. Fredborg, and Lauge Nielsen, Traditio 34 (1978): sec. 143–155, pp. 127–130. All that Burley’s argument requires is the concession that the competent use of an expression does not require that one think about each thing of which it can be predicated.


73 Ibid., 87.

74 See Ibid., 86, n. 30, and p. 88.

75 Ibid., 87–8.
were signified “first” by ‘human’, then competence with ‘human’ would involve a
determinate and distinct thought about Socrates. But that, of course, is absurd, since
plenty of individuals competent with the expression ‘human’ have never even heard of
Socrates. Of course, that is true for any given human individual. So “the name ‘human’
does not signify something singular.” And, since things are either singular or common,
“it first signifies a common entity. And a common entity is a species,” that is, a
property.

Burley’s argument here is far from great; Ockham himself, while accepting the
episodic constraint on signification, is going to reject the assumption that cognition must
be of a “determinate and distinct” variety. For Ockham, kind terms and predicates signify
congregate particulars, but they do so in a “confused” manner. Competent use of the
expression ‘human’, on this view, involves thinking about all the humans – but not any
one human in particular, that is, not any one in a “determinate and distinct” manner. And
this is because the concept HUMAN is itself confused, representing every individual
human, but no one human is determinately and distinctly.

Even if his argument is not all that great, however, I do think the argument reveals
that Burley is committed an account of signification according to which signification is
necessarily dyadic in nature. And I argue that his commitment to “exaggerated realism,”

76 Ibid., 88.
77 Ibid.
78 See William Ockham, Expositio in librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis, ed. Philotheus Boehner, vol. 2,
Opera Philosophica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1978), 354.88–355.105. See also Paul
Vincent Spade, “Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic
Theory, Version 1.2,” December 27, 2007, 154–5,
http://pvspade.com/Logic/docs/Thoughts,%20Words%20and%20Things1_2.pdf.
where properties are stripped of any sort of ontological role, strongly suggests how
deeply held that commitment is. It is Burley’s commitment to the necessity of a dyadic
analysis of signification, then – rather than any deep metaphysical concerns about the
necessity of properties to account for the causal powers of particular substances – that
sets him so opposed to Ockham’s nominalism.

5. A SEMANTIC THEORY OF CORRESPONDENCE

Burley’s “exaggerated realism” might be well and good on semantic and
metaphysical fronts (with a stress on ‘might’), but it raises a serious alethic concerns. As
we saw in §2, propositions involve representations of identity and difference. But
Burley’s mature account of identity and difference is much simpler than the earlier
account, and that simplicity threatens the complex metaphysics of facts that allowed his
“near-identity” account of correspondence to work. That simpler account of identity and
difference requires an equally simpler metaphysics of facts: each numerically distinct
thing is identical only to itself, and different from everything else.79 For example,
Socrates is identical to Socrates, and nothing else. Likewise, the property of humanity is
identical to the property of humanity, and nothing else. In particular, Socrates cannot in
any way be identical to the property of humanity, since Socrates is a concrete particular
but the property of humanity is not a concrete particular. There is, in other words, no fact
that Socrates is a human, since that fact would require that Socrates and humanity are
identical to one another, but they are not.

79 It is unclear whether Burley endorses the notion of sameness later in his career. Moreover, it is not clear
to me whether he needs it, since the semantic account of correspondence that he develops seems to treat
cases of substantial and accidental predication in a similar manner.
Given the simplicity of the metaphysics of facts that Burley’s new account of identity requires, his account of correspondence will need to become more complex. For, unlike the near-identity account, which merely required an appeal to the identity or difference of the terms themselves of a proposition, Burley’s simplified account of identity requires that the truth of most propositions will appeal to facts that are not constituted by the terms of those propositions. The truth of the proposition that Socrates is a human, for example, cannot consist in its correspondence to the fact that Socrates is a human, because there can be no such fact. Consequently, Burley’s commitment to a correspondence theory of truth requires a motivated account of how any given proposition can be made true by facts whose constituents may be wholly different from the terms of that proposition itself.

Late medieval semantics is dominated by two central notions: signification and supposition. Signification, as we have already seen, is the establishing of an understanding, and, for Burley, it is a property that a categorematic expression has just in virtue of being an expression in a language. Supposition, in contrast, is a property of a term in a statement, or propositio.80 Moreover, supposition is “the taking of a term for something,” that is, it is the use of a term to represent something – including, perhaps, itself.81 Unlike signification, then, supposition does not carry with it any epistemic

80 Supposition has its roots in the notion of natural supposition, which is roughly equivalent to the extension of a term. Unlike the property of supposition described here, however, natural supposition was not a semantic property had only within a sentential context. See Stephen Read, “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms,” accessed March 10, 2011, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms/. The theory of supposition was extended to conceptual sentences by Ockham, among others. See William Ockham, Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae, ed. Michael Loux (University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), chap. 63–4, pp. 188–91.

constraints. What an expression supposit for may be what one thinks when one competently uses that term; Burley in fact argues that this is the case when a term has simple supposition. But nothing in the notion of supposition more generally requires this.

Though it has its roots in the eleventh century, the theory of supposition matures in the early fourteenth century, in part at the hands of Burley.⁸² An original intent of the theory of supposition is to provide medieval philosophers a way to codify and explain how sentential context allows one to use a term to talk about, or refer to, different things, and in what way we can refer to those things.⁸³ On Burley’s view, for example, it explains how ‘human’ can be used to refer to individual humans (“personal supposition”) or the property of humanity which every human possesses (“simple supposition”) or the term ‘human’ itself (“material supposition”). So, while for Burley ‘human’ always

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⁸² There is little consensus in the literature on the purpose of supposition theory in medieval philosophy generally. Some claim that its principal purpose is to provide a theory of quantification, while others claim that it is a medieval theory of reference. See, e.g., Gareth B. Matthews, “Two Theories of Supposition?,” Topoi 16, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 35–40; Paul Vincent Spade, “The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent,” in Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy, vol. 32, Synthese Historical Library (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 187–224; Terence Parsons, “The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12th through 14th Centuries,” in Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 2: Medieval and Renaissance Logic, ed. Dov Gabbay (Boston: Elsevier, 2004), 157–280; Terence Parsons, “Supposition as Quantification versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect,” Topoi 16, no. 1 (March 1, 1997): 41–63. Catarina Dutilh Novaes, in contrast, argues that there is no direct contemporary counterpart to the medieval notion of supposition. See Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories: Suppositio, Consequentiae and Obligationes (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007). In particular, and contrary to most accounts, she argues that the theory of supposition is not a theory of reference. Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of “codifying the different uses of terms in propositions,” where different uses allows one to talk about different things - e.g., a particular which instantiates a universal, the universal itself, or a term which refers to that universal - and distinguishing such uses serves an important role in analyses of truth, inference and propositional content, among others (Catarina Dutilh Novaes, “Supposition,” ed. Henrik Lagerlund, Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 1230).

⁸³ Note that this is a different notion of reference than the one I employ when I talk about Burley’s commitment to referentialism, according to which signification is a referential relation. Both are kinds of reference, on my account, because both involve talking about things. In fact, with regard to linguistic entities, reference qua signification is required for reference qua supposition, since (in cases of formal supposition at least) a term has the supposition that it does in virtue of having the signification that it does.
signifies a certain property, different sentential contexts allow one to use that term to refer to – that is, to supposit for – things other than that universal. For example, in

(1) A human is an animal (*Homo est animal*)

‘human’ has personal supposition, so that it is used to refer to individual humans. But in

(2) Human is a species (*Homo est species*)

‘human’ has simple supposition, so that it is used to refer to its signifiate, that is, humanity itself.\(^8^4\) Personal and simple supposition are species of a more general kind of supposition, called formal supposition. Burley contrasts formal supposition with material supposition, in which a term is used to refer to itself. For example, in

(3) Human is a noun (*Homo est nomen*)

‘human’ is used to talk about the term ‘human’ itself. Formal and material supposition differ from one another in that, roughly, formal supposition concerns the semantic content (or form) of the expression, whereas material supposition concerns the matter of the expression, that is, the linguistic sign itself which has some content. For example, humanity, which is signified by ‘human’, figures explicitly into one’s analysis of the simple supposition of ‘human’ in (2). Moreover, it also plays a role in the analysis of the personal supposition of ‘human’ in (1). ‘Human’ supposits for individual humans in (1) because it signifies a property which all humans possess. However, when ‘human’

supposits materially, as in (3), what it is used to talk about does not depend on what it signifies but rather on the expression itself, as an element within some language.

In its canonical form, supposition theory is a theory about the semantic properties of terms in sentences of natural language. But that canonical form is revised by Ockham in important ways. In particular, Ockham argues that supposition theory can be used in a semantic analysis not just of the terms of sentences in natural language but in an analysis of the terms of sentences in mental language as well – that is, in an analysis of concepts. Ockham argues that concepts, like expressions in natural language, are signs. And a sign “is anything which brings something to mind and is naturally suited to supposit for that thing.”85 Concepts, on this picture, are regarded as expressions in a language of thought, capable of serving as subjects and predicates in mental sentences, and so capable of having the kinds of semantic properties (such as supposition) that terms of sentences more generally have.

Ockham’s move here is novel, and (when paired with the particular theory of supposition he develops) allows for a philosophical account that handles the semantics of general statements despite his relatively bare, nominalist metaphysics. But underpinning Ockham’s move, at least in part, is a recognition that supposition theory can be applied to the terms of anything that has predicate form.

On Ockham’s account, the only things which have predicate structure are sentences in natural and mental language. However, Burley’s view is that the predicate structure of sentences in natural and mental language reflects the predicate structure of the propositions that they express. In part because propositions have the same predicate

structure as sentences in natural and mental language, then, Burley argues in a later work that the terms of propositions (just as the terms of sentences in natural and mental language) can supposit. And it is just this ability to supposit that Burley will employ in his new account of correspondence. He writes that
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to the copula existing in the intellect (i.e. a mental act of predication), which joins together the extremes of a true statement (propositio), there corresponds something in reality, namely, the identity of the extremes, or the identity of those things for which the extremes supposit. Moreover, to a divisive or negative copula in a true negative statement, there corresponds something in reality, namely, the diversity of the extremes, or the diversity of those things for which the extremes supposit. But to the copula existing in the intellect, which joins together the extremes of a false statement, there corresponds nothing in reality except those extremes, as it clear with the copula of this statement: ‘A human is a donkey’. Similarly, to a divisive or negative copula in a false negative statement, there corresponds nothing in reality except those extremes.

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86 Elizabeth Karger argues that Burley likely intended already in the Quaes.Perih and Comm.Perih to extend supposition theory to the terms of a proposition. She points to the fact that Burley explicit claims that the terms of a proposition can have distribution, another semantic property, and she argues that it “would be surprising, then, if Burley had not been just as prepared to extend the property of supposition to terms in [real] sentences” (Elizabeth Karger, “Mental Sentences According to Burley and to the Early Ockham,” Vivarium 34 (1996): 207). But Burley needs to extend distribution to the terms of propositions in those works in order to have a fully coherent semantics. Given the metaphysics he defends in the early part of his career, however, he can account for the truth-conditions of a proposition without the use of the notion of supposition. Consequently, I am doubtful that Burley intended in the early works to extend supposition theory to the terms of propositions.

87 Walter Burley, Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis, Exp.Praed, c4rb: “Sed dubium est an ipsi copulae existenti in intellectu correspondet aliquid in re aut non. Dicendum quod copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti ultra propositionis verae adinvicem correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet, identitas extremorum vel identitas eorum pro quibus extrema supponunt, divisionis vero vel negationis copulae in propositione negativa vera respondet aliquid in re, scilicet, diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro quibus extrema supponunt. Sed copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis falsa adinvicem nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema, ut patet de copula huius propositionis: homo est asinus. Similiter nec divisioni vel negationi copulae in propositione falsa negativa nihil correspondet in re nisi ipsa extrema.” I treat the disjuncts in this passage epexegetically. There is some textual evidence for this approach. First, ms Canon. Misc. omits the claim that true propositions involve the identity of their terms (if affirmative) or non-identity (if negative), stating only that truth involves the identity or non-identity of the things for which the terms of the proposition supposit. Second, in a related passage in the Exp.Perih (see appendix D, pp. 407–11), Burley articulates the truth of a statement wholly in terms of the identity (in the case of affirmative statements) or non-identity (in the case of negative statements) of the supposit of its terms. However, even if the disjuncts should not be treated epexegetically, that does not undermine the reading that I defend. Rather, in that case, I think it just mirrors the distinction between simple and personal supposition, where simple supposition occurs when a property (or compound of property and particular) supposit for itself, and personal supposition occurs when the term of a proposition supposits for its supposit, that it, for concrete particulars.
On Burley’s view, then, the terms of propositions – things – can supposit, in just the way that expressions in natural and mental language can supposit, and those supposits can be identical or different. The correspondence of a proposition to some fact, then, is the correspondence of that proposition to the fact(s) of the thing(s) for which the proposition’s subject term supposits being identical to or different from something(s) for which its predicate term supposits.\textsuperscript{88} For example, assume that the proposition that Socrates is a human is true. Consequently, that proposition corresponds to some fact(s). Assume that Socrates supposits for himself. Assume also that humanity supposits for each and every concrete particular that possesses that property. Because Socrates is a human, Socrates possesses the property of humanity.\textsuperscript{89} So humanity supposits for Socrates. So both Socrates and humanity supposit for Socrates. Moreover, this is a fact: Socrates is identical to Socrates. And so the proposition that Socrates is a human is made true by the fact that Socrates is Socrates.\textsuperscript{90}

The move to extend properties of supposition to things – even if only insofar as they are elements (or “terms”) within some proposition – is extremely radical, and I am

\textsuperscript{88} In fact, as the text makes clear, it is not the proposition that corresponds to reality. Rather, it is the copula in a true proposition – that is, a mental act of predication – that corresponds to relations of identity or non-identity. On the later account, then, it might be best to think of facts not as compounds of things and identity and non-identity relations, but rather merely relations of identity and non-identity themselves, those relations being individuated by their relata. This account has the advantage of fitting easily within a broadly Aristotelian metaphysics, since identity and non-identity relations are simply objects in the category of relation, whereas compounds of things and identity relations don’t seem to fit easily in that framework. A disadvantage, however, is that even propositions just about substances (e.g. the proposition that Socrates is human) depend for their truth on entities in an accidental category, namely the category of relation.

\textsuperscript{89} Note, however, that he is not human in virtue of his possession of the property of humanity. He is human because of the compound of a particular body and a particular soul.

\textsuperscript{90} This provides an account of the truth of singular, or particular, sentences. General sentences will require a number of these truth-makers, taken jointly.
aware of no other medieval philosopher who takes a position even approaching this one. What is perhaps most radical about it, however, is not the extension of supposition per se to things, but rather what such an extension presupposes. Supposition is the taking of something for something. That is, supposition is a semantic relationship, between certain kinds of representations and the things represented by them. So mere predicate structure won’t sufficiently explain what the terms of that structure supposit for, and likewise how it is that they supposit in the first place. Sufficient explanation requires, in addition, an explanation of how the terms of a proposition represent the things for which they can supposit, in virtue of which they can supposit for them. Ockham, for example, argues that concepts can supposit for things because concepts represent (more specifically, are signs of) things, where that representation is analyzed in terms of a concepts causal covariance with a thing, or a kind of thing.91

The question, then, is whether we have any reason to think that things such as Socrates or the property of humanity can represent, that is, have semantic properties. I don’t want to spend too much time on the semantic properties that concrete particulars, such as Socrates, might possess, because, frankly, Burley has nothing expressly to say about them. But, briefly, Burley’s account requires that concrete particulars have a thin kind of representation: self-representation, in which they represent themselves. Because concrete particulars self-represent, those concrete particulars are able to supposit for themselves. Self-representation, I suggest, can be seen as a necessary consequence of

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91 See William Ockham, Quodlibeta septem, ed. Joseph Wey, vol. 9, Opera Theologica (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1980), Quodlibet 1, q. 13, p. 76. See also Peter King, “Rethinking Representation in the Middle Ages: A Vade-Mecum to Mediaeval Theories of Mental Representation,” in Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2007), 95–7.
being itself; in virtue of the fact that something has being, that thing represents itself. Consequently, it is not just concrete objects that self-represent. Anything that has being, has self-representation. Properties, for example, self-represent. But unlike properties, concrete particulars merely self-represent. And, because concrete particulars merely self-represent, they can supposit only for themselves when the mind uses them as terms in a proposition.

Self-representation, then, explains why a thing, whether concrete or abstract, can supposit for itself: because it necessarily represents itself. The success of Burley’s mature account of correspondence, however, requires that properties are able to supposit for more than just themselves. In particular, properties must be able to supposit for the concrete particulars that possess them. The proposition that Socrates is a human is true, for example, in part because the property of humanity supposits in that proposition for Socrates (among other particular humans), and Socrates is in fact identical to Socrates. But, if properties can supposit for concrete substances, they must represent those substances. How, though, can they represent them?

Representation of that sort, I suggest, is a matter of possession. Properties represent concrete substances when they are possessed by those concrete substances. The property of humanity, for example, represents Socrates, among other humans, because it is possessed by Socrates, in virtue of which humanity can supposit for Socrates. However, if that sort of representation is a consequence of possession, then a satisfying

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92 The self-representation of abstract objects is, in fact, a benefit rather than a cost for Burley, because there are some propositions whose truth requires that the abstract objects that are its terms supposit for themselves. For example, the proposition that human is a species (i.e. the significate of ‘homo est species’) contains the property of humanity as a term, and that proposition is true in part because that property supposits for itself. See infra.
explanation of that sort of representation requires a more fundamental explanation of property-possession itself. That is, to understand why properties represent concrete substances, we need to understand why concrete particulars possess the properties that they do. One possibility for the realist is that this explanation is ontological: property-possession is to be articulated in terms of the sorts of roles that properties play in explanations of what concrete particulars are. But, of course, that possibility is no longer live for Burley, since he denies that properties are constitutive of the concrete particulars that possess them.

Burley offers an alternative, semantic explanation. He argues that the possession of a property by a concrete substance is due to a semantic relationship that that property bears to a concrete form that does constitutes that substance. Recall his discussion of the nature and function of concrete and abstract forms earlier.93

[J]ust as there are two sorts of form, namely, a form which declares (declarans) a quiddity and a form which perfects the matter, so too there are two sorts of quiddity, because a certain one is a quiddity which is a form which perfects matter, and a certain one is a form which declares the quiddity.94

Burley’s point in this passage is to distinguish between abstract and concrete forms, that is, between properties and tropes. Tropes serve to organize, or “perfect,” a particular bit of matter. Consequently, they explain why a particular concrete substance has the abilities that it does. As we have seen, properties, in contrast, don’t factor into ontological explanations of that sort. But we now have reason to highlight the positive proposal Burley makes in this passage about the nature of properties. Burley argues here that

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93 See §4.2, pp. 293.

properties represent, or “declare,” tropes – the “quiddities,” or natures, of particular concrete substances that make them what they are. The property of humanity, for example, “declares” or represents (among other things) Socrates’ soul, a certain trope, which Burley argues is what explains why Socrates has the human nature that he does. Socrates’ soul makes Socrates human, then, and the property of humanity represents that soul.

Properties, consequently, have three different semantic relations essential to them. First, like all things, they are self-representational. Second, they represent tropes. Third, and as a consequence of the second, they represent the concrete substances that possess them. The third depends on the second because the possession of a property by a concrete substance is due to a more fundamental, semantic relation that that property bearers to a trope that is constitutive of that substance.

Can anything more be said about the semantic relation that a property bears to a trope? That is, is that semantic relation itself liable to further analysis? It does not seem that it is. If it were, we would expect that analysis to be ontological: properties represent tropes because properties bear some more fundamental metaphysical relation to them (exemplification, for example). But Ockham’s arguments generally against abstract objects, and the way in which Burley responds to them, give us good reason to think that any ontological explanation will not be in the offing. If those relations aren’t liable to

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95 Thomas de Vio Cajetan, in his commentary on Aquinas’ On Being and Essence, notes that Averroes uses the premise that “the essence of a thing is a substance manifesting [declarans] a thing quidditatively [rem quidditative]” to deny that matter is part of the essence of a thing (Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas’s On Being and Essence, ed. Lottie Kendzierski (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964), 90). Burley’s use of the notion of declaration in this context, then, might have been influenced by Averroes.
further analysis, however, Burley’s exaggerated realism requires that the most fundamental relation that properties bear is semantic, rather than ontological; properties, in other words, are to be understood as fundamentally semantic objects, representing tropes. This is, as far as I can tell, the heart of Burley’s exaggerated realism. And it is radical, an account of the nature of properties which doesn’t appear to find any parallels in the rest of the medieval philosophical tradition. Burley’s account requires that a certain semantic relation essential to properties is not just resistant to reductive analysis, but that that relation is a fundamental feature of reality itself.

I want to end this section by noting at least one way in which one might find Ockham’s nominalist alternative more inviting than Burley’s later realism, despite how ingenious and sophisticated his new account of correspondence seems to be. As I mentioned, a central disagreement between Burley and Ockham is over signification: whether or not signification can be variably polyadic in nature. Ockham argues that signification can be variably polyadic; Burley argues, in contrast, that signification cannot be anything but two-placed. But both recognize that semantic variable polyadicity needs to enter the semantic picture somewhere, since predicate expressions can supposit for all the concrete particulars of which they can be truly predicated, and that ability needs some further explanation. Ockham argues that what allows for that sort of supposition is signification itself; it is in virtue of the fact that predicate expressions (and general concepts in particular) signify those particulars that they can supposit for them. Burley, in contrast, cannot explain that sort of supposition primarily in terms of signification, since he denies that signification can be anything other than dyadic. Burley, instead, tells a reifying story: predicate expressions can supposit for concrete particulars
because their contents—properties—represent those particulars. Burley’s properties, then, are somewhat analogous to Ockham’s concepts, since they are central to the explanation of how it is that predicate expressions can supposit for many concrete particulars.

However, the later Burley—unlike Ockham—cannot explain the semantic relationship that predicate expressions bear to concrete particulars in terms of more fundamental natural or metaphysical relations. For Ockham, a general concept signifies particulars because those particulars are able to produce that concept within some mind; reference, in other words, is explained by more fundamental, causal relationships. Likewise, for the early Burley, the semantic relationship that properties bear to concrete particulars can be explained by a more fundamental ontological relation: constitution. But those sorts of analyses are unavailable to the later Burley. For him, that a property represent various concrete substances is fundamentally a matter of that property’s representing the concrete forms constitutive of those substances. But the semantic relationship that properties bear to concrete forms is not liable to further analysis. For anyone who assumes that non-natural features of the world, like representation, must be liable to further analysis, Burley’s later realism seems likely to be a tough pill to swallow.96 None of this results in the charge that the position Burley adopts is incoherent, of course. But it at least challenges some deeply-held philosophical assumptions about the relationship between representation and reality.

96 Jeff Brower has pointed out to me that Burley’s account might be more plausible if properties in Burley’s later account were treated rather as ideas in the mind of God. On such an account, their semantic properties would be explicable in terms of their status as representations in the divine mind. However, Burley appears to hold that there are both properties in individuals and ideas representing those things in the divine mind, and that only the former are at issue here. See, e.g., Walter Burley, *Tractatus de Universalibus*, ed. H.U. Wöhler (Leipzig: Verlag der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 46–60.
6. Conclusion

As a general matter, Burley is committed to a certain kind of correspondence theory of truth, according to which truth is a matter of adequation. Moreover, throughout his career, Burley is committed to the idea that the truth conditions of a proposition fundamentally involve representations of identity or difference, so that correspondence is a matter of representations of identity or difference being adequated, or made equal, to facts which are constituted by relations of that sort. Burley’s account, therefore, faces a choice: either provide a suitably complex metaphysics of facts to account for truth conditions of those sorts, or provide a suitably complex account of correspondence itself. The first half of Burley’s career is dominated by a push in the first direction. During that time, Burley endorses a complex theory of identity and difference which, when paired with a notion I call sameness, allows for a near-identity account of correspondence. On the near-identity account, the same things constitute true propositions and the facts that make them true, but where true propositions and facts differ is in their “formal” features. The “formal” feature of a proposition merely represents the identity or difference of its terms, whereas the “formal” feature of a fact is the actual relation of identity or difference of those terms.

That theory of identity receives rigorous philosophical scrutiny at the hands of William Ockham. And, shortly after Ockham raises his objections to that theory of identity, and the moderate realism it was meant in part to support, Burley abandons that account of identity in favor of one which does not distinguish between different kinds of identity and difference. That change of opinion about the nature of identity and difference, however, means that Burley’s ontology of facts has to become far sparser – so
sparse that it cannot support the “near-identity” account of correspondence Burley defends in the first half of his career.

Consequently, Burley develops a very different account of correspondence in his later works, one which is articulated in large part in terms of the semantic notion of supposition. That move is, I argue, ingenious, because it sees Burley employing the standard philosophical tools of his day to address an essential feature of his broader semantic program. It is also an extremely radical move, since (especially when paired with his “exaggerated realism”) it requires a highly unusual ontology, involving both tropes and properties, and moreover assumes that properties fundamentally serve a semantic, rather than an ontological, function in philosophical theorizing.

7. APPENDIX: AQUINAS AND BURLEY ON TRUTH

The account of truth that Burley defends isn’t wholly novel. In fact, on its face, it looks very much like the account developed by Thomas Aquinas. Like Burley, Aquinas distinguishes broadly between two kinds of correspondence: world to mind, and mind to world. And, like Burley, the notion of direction of fit is essential to Aquinas’ account. Aquinas writes, for example, that “truth means a proportion or a commensuration.”

Truth, in other words, is asymmetric; it is a matter of measurement, so that a thing is true insofar as it measures up to some standard. Moreover, they each articulate a similar generic structure of truth. With respect to world to mind fit, for example, both argue

97 Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones disputate de veritate*, 22/1:1a5, p. 18.

that we should distinguish between the fit that the world has to the human mind, and to the divine mind. Likewise, both argue that, with respect to mind to world fit, we should distinguish between simple mental activity, and complex mental activity. That is, both distinguish between the mind’s ability to think of something, and the mind’s ability to think that something. Consequently, while Burley never explicitly cites Aquinas when he articulates his own account of truth, it seems highly likely that Burley relies heavily on Aquinas when constructing that account.

However, even if Burley was influenced by Aquinas, his account differs in important ways from Aquinas’s own. In particular, Burley has a drastically different account of truth involving world to mind fit. For Aquinas, the distinction between world to mind and mind to world fit reflects a distinction between the work of practical and speculative intellect. Minds, Aquinas recognizes, have both beliefs and intentions, and, whereas beliefs aim to describe the world, intentions seek to shape it. Consequently, whereas beliefs are measured by the world, insofar as they accurately describe or represent it, intentions serve as measures of the world, or at least certain features of it, insofar as those features are effects of intentional activity. Because Aquinas distinguishes direction of fit by appeal to distinct faculties of the mind, however, he argues that what things a mind can measure are restricted to the thing that mind can make. Human minds serve as measures for artifacts, because artifacts are products of human intention. A knife, for example, is truly a knife insofar as it serves the end for which it is intended – namely, to cut. Human minds do not serve as the measure of natural things, however, because

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99 This view is also defended by Scotus. See John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissime super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis*, vol. 7, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vives, 1893), Lib. VI, q. 3, n.5, pp. 337–8).
natural things are not the products of intentional human activity. Rather, the natural
created order “is measured by the divine intellect,” so that something in the natural
created order “is said to be true [...] insofar as it fulfills the end to which it was ordained
by the divine intellect.”100 With respect to world to mind fit, then, truth is a matter of
doing what one was made to do – whether that is cutting a tree, hunting a gazelle, or
contemplating the divine nature.

In contrast to Aquinas, Burley articulates world to mind notions of fit wholly with
reference to the mind’s cognitive, rather than volitional, faculties. He writes that “truth is
the adequation of a thing to an intellect in the way that truth is a property of a thing which
is naturally suited to manifest itself to an intellect, so that it manifests itself to an intellect
so that it appears to the intellect just as it is.”101 World to mind fit, then, isn’t a matter of
something fulfilling the role that its maker intended. Rather, it is a matter of presenting
itself to an intellect as it is in fact. Of course, that might well involve acting in a way
intended by one’s maker, since acting in that way might be a means to presenting oneself
to an intellect as it is in fact. But truth itself doesn’t consisting in acting in that way;
rather it consists in how well or poorly the representations that it produces in the mind
represent it itself.

Because Burley has a very different conception of world to mind fit generally
when it comes to truth than Aquinas, his analysis both of the world’s fit to the divine
mind and to the human mind is quite different from Aquinas’s. First, with respect the
world’s fit to the divine mind, Burley argues that truth “is a certain common property

100 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de veritate, 22/1:1a2, p. 9.

accompanying each being (ens), because each being is naturally apt to manifest itself to the divine intellect just as it is."¹⁰² Unlike Aquinas, then, who takes a thing’s truth to consist in its fulfilling the sort of role set out of it by its creator, Burley argues that a thing’s truth consists in its natural aptitude to manifest what it actually is to the divine intellect. That natural aptitude is certainly a consequence of its being created by God. But that creative activity itself is only incidental to the truth of a thing. A thing is true to the divine mind, on Burley’s account, because that thing has being. That is has being by being created by God is important, of course, but truth itself doesn’t make reference to God’s creative activity.

Second, with respect to the world’s fit to the human mind, Burley’s account is far more permissive than Aquinas’s. For Burley, not just artificial things but natural things as well can be “adequated to,” or measured by, the human mind. “By taking truth in the second way, as, namely, the adequation of a thing to our intellect, truth is a property of a thing through which the thing is apt to bring about a true estimation about itself.”¹⁰³ This sort of truth, unlike the last, doesn’t necessarily follow from the being of the thing itself. Unlike in the divine case, then, thing’s needn’t manifest themselves just as they are to the human mind. But it does mean that everything, regardless of whether it is an artifact of human activity or not, can succeed or fail to be adequated to the human intellect.

These differences with Aquinas’s might seem trivial. But, first, I suggest that Burley’s account of the world’s fit to the human mind can better capture a certain range of linguistic practices, a range which, when taken literally at least, Aquinas’s account

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid., para. 1.23, p. 59.
doesn’t appear to accommodate. These include claims about false flags, for example, and false currency, which is Burley’s favored example, so that the notion of falsity that Burley has in mind with respect to falsity concerns deception. On Aquinas’s account, ‘false currency’, literally speaking, is currency that doesn’t meet the intentions of its creator; it is, in other words, defective currency. But ‘false currency’ can also be used to mean not defective currency but counterfeit currency. Counterfeit currency (if its convincing, at least) certainly measures up to the intentions of the counterfeiter, its creator. On Aquinas’s account, then, even false currency has a certain kind of truth to it. But Burley wants his account of truth to capture a different aspect that the counterfeit currency has, namely, its aptitude to presenting itself to the consuming public not as it is (i.e. counterfeit currency) but rather as it is not (i.e. genuine currency).

Second, however, these differences between Aquinas and Burley about the nature of world to mind fit more generally reflect, I think, an important transition in the way in which philosophers of the late medieval period approached issues of truth. Aquinas’s account of truth, though clearly Aristotelian in character, also allows Aquinas to situate his account within a tradition that predates the re-introduction of much of Aristotle’s corpus to the Latin West in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. That tradition is perhaps best represented by Anselm of Canterbury. For Anselm, truth is fundamentally a kind of rectitude, and the ultimate source of that rectitude is Truth itself. More than successful representation, then, truth is a matter of right action, of doing what one ought, given the

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104 One could also include here, for example, false friends, and perhaps also sticks “bent” in water.

sort of thing one has been created to be. Creatures, then, are true insofar as they meet that standard, that is, insofar as they live up to the ideal set for them by Truth Itself. Aquinas’s theory of truth retains elements of that tradition, since the truth of a thing depends not on that thing’s ability to manifest itself to the divine mind, but rather on its ability to live up to plan for it established in the divine mind.\textsuperscript{106} In fact, Aquinas’s attempt to connect his account with that earlier account of truth is explicit. He writes, for example, that “truth is properly and primarily in the divine intellect,” because “all things are true by means of one truth, the truth of the divine intellect.”\textsuperscript{107} For Aquinas, then, as for Anselm, there is a genealogy of truth. The ability to represent the world, or the world’s being a certain way, depends on the truth of the things which the mind represents, and the truth of those things depends on Truth Itself, so that all truth is truth derived from Truth Itself.

In contrast, the Platonic notion that all truth is derived from Truth itself is completely foreign to the theory of truth Burley defends. Rather, truth – or, at least, the truth of a thing – is derived from the natural tendency of each thing \textit{de se} to present itself to the speculative intellect as it is, where those natural abilities can be articulated either relative to a created intellect or relative to the divine intellect. Relative to whichever sort of intellect, however, the truth of a thing is not articulated in terms of its fulfillment of some standard set by its creator, but rather in terms of its ability to produce a certain accurate representation of it within some mind.

Burley, in this respect, exemplifies an important shift in view in the fourteenth century about the nature of truth. Burley clearly wants to hold onto elements of that


\textsuperscript{107} Thomas Aquinas, \textit{Quaestiones disputate de veritate}, 22/1:1a4, p. 13–4.
tradition; he links the ability of a thing to present itself to the human mind just as it is with the notion of rectitude.\textsuperscript{108} However, the effect of his alethic program generally is to depart significantly from that tradition. Truth is simply a matter of speculative mental representation, where that representation can either be what sets the standard (as in world to mind fit cases) or what is measured against some other standard (as in mind to world fit cases). Beginning a half generation after Burley, even pretentions of following an Anselmian tradition of truth will be dropped. Many in the nominalist tradition that Ockham inaugurates, for example, have a restrictive view of truth, where truth is merely a property of a sentence (in either natural or mental language) which successfully represents. In that respect, Burley represents an important transition in the history of alethic theory.

\textsuperscript{108} See Walter Burley, “Walter Burley’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Perihermeneias,” para. 1.23, p. 59. Note that Burley applies the notion of rectitude only with respect to the world’s fit to the created mind.
### APPENDIX A: A CHART OF THE USES OF ‘PROPOSITIO’ IN SELECTED WORKS OF BURLEY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Written Statement (Token)</th>
<th>Spoken Statement (Token)</th>
<th>Spoken Statement (Type)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quaes.Perih</strong></td>
<td>‘proposito in scripto’</td>
<td>‘proposito in voce’, ‘propositio in prolatione’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comm.Perih</strong></td>
<td>‘proposito in scripto’</td>
<td>‘proposito in voce’, ‘propositio in prolatione’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quaes.Post</strong></td>
<td>[None]</td>
<td>‘propositio proponens tantum’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exp.Praed</strong></td>
<td>‘proposito in scripto’</td>
<td>‘proposito in voce’, ‘propositio in prolatione’</td>
<td>‘propositio obiective in intellectu’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exp.Perih</strong></td>
<td>‘proposito in scripto’</td>
<td>‘proposito in voce’, ‘propositio in prolatione’</td>
<td>‘propositio obiective in mente’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Statement in Mental Language</th>
<th>Proposition</th>
<th>Truthmaker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quaes.Perih</strong></td>
<td>[None]</td>
<td>‘propositio in mente’; ‘enunciatio in mente’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comm.Perih</strong></td>
<td>[None]</td>
<td>‘propositio in mente’; ‘enunciatio in mente’; ‘oratio in mente’</td>
<td>‘propositio obiective in intellectu’; ‘propositio in re’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quaes.Post</strong></td>
<td>‘propositio proposita et proponens’</td>
<td>‘propositio in mente’; ‘propositio proposita tantum’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exp.Praed</strong></td>
<td>‘propositio in conceptu’; ’propositio subiective in mente’</td>
<td>‘propositio in re’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exp.Perih</strong></td>
<td>‘propositio subiective in mente’</td>
<td>‘propositio in re’</td>
<td>[None]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B: A CHRONOLOGY AND
BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WORKS OF BURLEY

1. CHRONOLOGY

De potentiis animae before 1301
Expositio vetus super librum Praedicamentorum c. 1300
Expositio vetus super librum Perihermeneias c. 1300
Expositio vetus super librum Porphyrii c. 1300
Quaestiones circa tertium De Anima c. 1300
Commentarius super librum Porphyrii c. 1300 - c. 1307
Expositio super libros Topicorum Aristotelis c. 1300 - c. 1307
Expositio super librum Posteriorum c. 1300 - c. 1307
Summa librorum Elenchorum, vel Tractatus fallaciarum c. 1300 - c. 1307
Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum c. 1300 - c. 1307
Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos c. 1300 - c. 1307
Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias 1301
De suppositionibus 1302
De obligationibus 1302
Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias 1302
Tractatus super Praedamenta Aristotelis before 1310
De syncategorematisbus 1310s
Expositio cum quaestionibus super libros Physicorum before 1316
Quaestiones super libros Physicorum before 1316
Expositio libri De Anima 1316
De puritate artis logicae. Tractatus brevior before 1324
Quaestiones octo super logicam in communi necnon super Porphyrii Isagogen probably after 1324
2. **A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SELECTED WORKS**

The list of Burley’s works above is not a complete list of Burley’s corpus. Rather, it indicates the chronology of works that bear in some important way on the topics raised in this dissertation – either because they contain discussions about the nature and function of the proposition proper, or because they contain discussions about topics that closely relate to it. Of those works, those most central to this dissertation are: the *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias* (*Quaes.Perih*), the *Commentarius in librum Perihermeneias* (*Comm.Perih*), the *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum* (*Quaes.Post*), and the *Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (*Art.Vet*), with special focus on the *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis* (*Exp.Praed*) and the *Expositio super librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis* (*Exp.Perih*) which are contained in it. All but the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* are commentaries on works contained within the old logic. Of the works that are most central to this dissertation, the first three were

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1. The “old logic” includes Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories and Aristotle’s Perihermeneias. Burley also includes a commentary in the old logic on a work from the twelfth century, likely by Gilbert of
written during Burley’s defense of his early account of the metaphysics of the proposition (see ch. 3, §3), whereas the Art.Vet (including the Exp.Praed and Exp.Perih) provides an articulation and defense of Burley’s late account of the metaphysics of the proposition (see idem).

Unsurprisingly, Burley’s various commentaries on the Perihermeneias are especially fruitful when it comes to understanding his account of the proposition. More surprising, perhaps, is the amount of discussion the proposition receives in his late commentary on the Categories. But Burley explicitly connects the subject matter of the Categories to the subject matter of the Perihermeneias in the Exp.Praed. Responding to the view that the Categories must be about signs rather than things, because the Categories deals with the parts of a statement, and a statement cannot be composed of anything except signs, Burley responds by recollecting the view he had defended in his earlier commentaries on the Perihermeneias, according to which a statement (propositio) can be composed of things just as much as it can be composed of signs of things. That response, then, allows Burley to address in the Categories what had up until the point been largely restricted to commentaries on the Perihermeneias. Finally, his questions commentary on the Posterior Analytics is important not only because it deals with the issue of the metaphysics of the proposition, but because Burley explicitly addresses in that work tensions between, on the one hand, his account of the proposition, and, on the other, his account of demonstrative science. Consequently, that work provides an account

Poitiers, that considers more fully the last six categories in Aristotle’s metaphysical system, namely place, time, position, possession, action, and passion.
– even if somewhat opaque – of the way in which Burley’s theory of the proposition figures into a larger account of knowledge and the nature of science.

Of the five works I mentioned above, it is important to highlight the relative chronology of two in particular: the Comm.Perih and the Quaes.Post. There is general consensus that both were written sometime during the first decade of the fourteenth century. But that does not settle whether the Comm.Perih was written before or after the Quaes.Post, and their relative chronology remains in dispute. That chronology matters, moreover, because we find very different accounts of the proposition (and related philosophical matters) in each.² Knowing the order of composition would thus allow us to be more certain about the evolution of Burley’s project, which in turn would help us better understand that project itself. Indeed, assumptions about their relative chronology already play a significant role in the scholarship. Laurent Cesalli, for example, relies on the thesis that the Quaes.Post predates the Comm.Perih in defense of his thesis that propositiones in re are composed of intentional rather than real objects.³

My own view is that Cesalli gets the dates the wrong way around, that the Comm.Perih was written before the Quaes.Post. My position relies mostly on philosophical evidence (e.g. the lack of Burley’s defense of a mental language in the Comm.Perih and his defense of it in the Quaes.Post, a defense that one finds in the later Art.Vet as well). But it must be admitted that the current philological and historical

² This opinion is not universally held. Alessandro Conti, for example, appears to assume that one finds the same account in the Quaes.Perih, the Comm.Perih, and the Quaes.Post. See Alessandro Conti, “Walter Burley,” Fall 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/burley/.

evidence leaves the issue underdetermined. Marta Vittorini, for example, argues that the *Comm.Perih* was written in 1302, noting that the text “may have arisen from Burley’s post-1301 teaching activity.” Moreover, Mary Sommers, who edited the *Quaes.Post*, argues that “[t]he most certain statement concerning the dating of these questions that can be made at present, therefore, is that they were composed between 1297 and 1307 during Walter Burley’s teaching career at Oxford, and probably after his inception as master (by 1301).” That leaves a full half-decade after the composition of the *Comm.Perih* in which the *Quaes.Post* could have been written. But the philological and historical evidence still leaves open the possibility that the *Quaes.Post* was written just before the *Comm.Perih*, in 1301 or 1302. None of this changes my own view, that the chronological relationship between the two can be settled reasonably well by turning to the philosophical content of each work, and that that evidence strongly suggests that the *Comm.Perih* was written before the *Quaes.Post*. But it is my hope that future research will allow us to muster additional evidence, beyond the content of the texts themselves, to more decisively settle the issue.

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APPENDIX C:
TRANSCRIPTION AND TRANSLATION OF
BURLEY’S LATE COMMENTARY ON THE CATEGORIES (SELECTIONS)¹

Expositio super Librum Praedicamentorum, Prologus et Capitulum 12
An Explanation of the Categories, Prologue and Chapter 12

Gualterus Burlaeus
Walter Burley

Ex ‘Super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis’, Venedig, 1497
From ‘Concerning the Old Logic of Aristotle and Porphyry’, Venice, 1497

<Prologus>
<Prologue>

Incipit liber praedicamentorum
Here begins the Categories.

Circa librum praedicamentorum <Aristotelis>² est sciemund quod subiectum contentivum totius scientiae traditae in libro
We need to know that the subject matter of the science provided in this book, the Categories, is non-complex,

¹ The base text for this appendix is the 1497 Venice edition of Burley’s late commentary on the old logic (i.e., the Super Artem Veterem). However, I also include disagreements in the sections I have translated between that text and two earlier manuscripts: Magdalen 146 (‘A’), written during the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, and Canon Misc 460 (‘B’), written during the fifteenth century. I indicate that one or more manuscripts omit a section of the text found in the 1497 edition with square brackets ([]), where anything within the brackets is found in the 1497 edition but is not found in the relevant manuscript(s). Occasionally, one manuscript will omit a word or phrase, while the other includes a variant. In that case, I include the variant in the footnote, indicating which manuscript contains the variant and which manuscript contains the omission. I indicate that one or more of the manuscripts includes text not found in the 1497 edition with corner brackets (<>), including within those brackets the text found in the relevant manuscript(s). When an omission is not at issue, I indicate a variation between one or more manuscripts and the 1497 edition with brace brackets ({}), placing the manuscript variant(s) in a footnote. I ignore mere differences in word order (e.g. ‘subiectum et praedicatum’ vs. ‘praedicatum et subiectum’) among the texts.
² B
praedicamentorum} est ens dicibile incomplexum, ordinabile in genere, intelligendo pro genus coordinationem praedicamentalem. Omne {nam} de quo per se determinatur in hoc libro est ens dicibile incomplexum ordinabile in coordinationem seu in linea praedicamentali. Et ita hoc commune ens dicibile est {praedicabile} de omnibus de quibus [hic] per se determinatur in hoc libro. <Multa tamen sunt particula subjecta de quibus {probatur} passiones et proprietates in hoc libro.> Utrum autem hic determinetur de rebus {an} de vocibus sunt opiniones. Boethius et Simplicius videntur dicere quod in hoc libro principaliter determinatur de vocibus. Dicit enim Boethius quod in hoc {libro} intentio philosophi est primis rerum nominibus et de vocibus significativibus res disputare. Et Simplicius dicit quod intentio in hoc {negocio} est de simplicibus et primis et generalibus vocibus secundum quod sunt significativae [rerum] determinare. Et siquis {velit} istam opinionem sustinere habet dicere quod hic determinatur de vocibus <de quibus> et expressible being, capable of being ordered in kind, by understanding for ‘kind’ categorical coordination. For everything about which per se is described in this book is a non-complex, expressible being, capable of being ordered in coordination or in a categorical line. And so ‘common being capable of being expressed’ can be predicated of everything about which per se is described in this book. But there are many particular subjects of which the properties and attributes described in this book are predicated. Opinions differ, moreover, on whether those subjects are things or utterances. Boethius and Simplicius seem to say that this book is principally about utterances. For Boethius says that Aristotle intends to have a discussion about the primary names of things and about utterances signifying things in this book. And Simplicius says that the purpose of this work is to describe simple and primary and general utterances that signify things. And if someone wants to maintain that opinion, he has to say that
in grammatica similiter <determinatur de vocibus>\textsuperscript{16}, sed aliter et aliter <quam in grammatica>\textsuperscript{17}, quia in grammatica determinatur de vocibus quantum ad proprietates \{causantes\}\textsuperscript{18} congruitatem \{vel\}\textsuperscript{19} incongruitatem in oratione, ostendendo quae vox est nomen [et]\textsuperscript{20} quae verbum [et cuius generis et]\textsuperscript{21} cuius casus <cuius modi, cuius numerii>\textsuperscript{22}, et sic de aliis propietatisbus \{causantibus\}\textsuperscript{23} congruitatem \{et\}\textsuperscript{24} incongruitatem in oratione. Sed in hoc libro <praedicamentorum>\textsuperscript{25} principaliter determinatur de vocibus secundum quod sunt significativae rerum. [Et]\textsuperscript{26} ideo in hoc libro determinatur tam de rebus quam de vocibus, principaliter tamen de vocibus. <Et>\textsuperscript{27} Haec est intentio Boethii et Simplicii, et \{multorum aliorum\}\textsuperscript{28}.

Alia est opinio Avicennae et Averroii, quam credo veriorem, quod in libro principaliter determinatur de rebus principaliter, et ex consequenti et secundario de vocibus. Dicit enim Avicenna, in prima parte suae logicae sic ad considerationem dictionum duxit nos necessitas. Logicus \{tantum ut

\textsuperscript{16} A
\textsuperscript{17} B
\textsuperscript{18} \textasciit{`constituentes'}: B
\textsuperscript{19} \{et\}: A, B
\textsuperscript{20} B
\textsuperscript{21} B
\textsuperscript{22} B
\textsuperscript{23} \{considerantibus\}: B
\textsuperscript{24} \{vel\}: A
\textsuperscript{25} A, B
\textsuperscript{26} B
\textsuperscript{27} A, B
\textsuperscript{28} \{multorum\}: A; \{aliorum multorum\}: B
logicus)\textsuperscript{29} non habet \textit{primo}\textsuperscript{30} occupari circa verba nisi quantum ad loquendum et discernendum [verum ab falso]\textsuperscript{31}. Si enim esset possibile \{solo\}\textsuperscript{32} \textit{per}\textsuperscript{33} intellectu \{dicere\}\textsuperscript{34}, non indigeremus verbis. Si enim doctor artis posset \{illud\}\textsuperscript{35} revelare \{id\}\textsuperscript{36} quod est in anima \{sua\}\textsuperscript{37} alio modo quam loquendo \{per voces\}\textsuperscript{38}, semper supersederet ab verbis. Unde si logica posset doceri alio modo quam per vocibus, ut puta per \{signa digitorum vel per nutum oculorum\}\textsuperscript{39}, logicus non indigeret vocibus. Quod autem \{logicus\}\textsuperscript{40} considerat de vocibus, hoc non est ex primaria intentione, sed secundaria et ex consequenti, \{secundum scientia logicalis non aliter commode doceri potest\}\textsuperscript{41}. Unde si \{aliquis\}\textsuperscript{42} surdus ab nativitate posset invenire artem syllogizandi et demonstrandi, tunc posset \{logicam sine cogitatione vocum habere\}\textsuperscript{43}. Sed hoc forte est possibile, scilicet quod \{surdus ab nativitate habens alios sensus potest invenire artem logicae, quia\}\textsuperscript{44} surdus ab nativitate habens alios sensus perfectos potest habere

\textit{that the necessity of logic lead us to a consideration of the expression}. Logic, insofar as it is logic, does not have to be concerned with words, except to the extent that it needs to be concerned with speaking and with distinguishing the true from the false. For if it were possible for the intellect to speak by itself, we would have no need for words. For if a teacher of an art were able to reveal that which is in his soul in way other than by speaking, he would always refrain from words. Therefore if logic could be taught in another way than through utterances (as for example through sign language or through blinking one’s eyes), logic would have no need for utterances. That the logician considers utterances, then, is not on account of a primary concern in logic, but due to a secondary and consequential one, because logic is not able to be taught conveniently in another way. Hence, if someone deaf from birth were able to discover the art of

\textsuperscript{29} ‘in hoc, quod est logicus’: A, B
\textsuperscript{30} B
\textsuperscript{31} A, B
\textsuperscript{32} ‘solus’: B
\textsuperscript{33} B
\textsuperscript{34} ‘discere’: A
\textsuperscript{35} B
\textsuperscript{36} B
\textsuperscript{37} ‘eius’: A, B
\textsuperscript{38} A
\textsuperscript{39} ‘signum vel nudus digitorum’: A, B
\textsuperscript{40} ‘logica’: B
\textsuperscript{41} ‘quia scilicet logica alter commode non doceretur’: A, B
\textsuperscript{42} ‘quis’: B
\textsuperscript{43} ‘habet logicam sine cogitatione vocum’: A, B
\textsuperscript{44} A, B
This is also the opinion of Averroes, who, in dividing up the chapters of this book, says that Aristotle, in the first chapter of this book, discusses certain definitions of being according to which they are signified through expressions, and so he claims that this book is principally concerned with beings, by distinguishing a being from an utterance. That clearly agrees with the plan of Aristotle, who describes in this book the properties and attributes of things – for example, the properties of substance, of quality, and syllogizing and demonstrating, then he would have logic without the cognition of an utterance. But this perhaps is possible, namely that a person deaf from birth can discover the art of logic, because a person deaf from birth who has other senses which work perfectly well can have some ordered concepts, and so can reason discursively from known premises to a conclusion, and he can discover that in such discursive reasoning there is no error, and consequently he can have logic through discovery. Consequently logic is not principally about utterances, because then someone could have some knowledge while being ignorant of what that knowledge is about, which is absurd.

45 ‘non est error’: A; ‘error non esset’: B
46 B
47 A
48 A, B
49 ‘haec’: B
50 A, B
51 ‘diffinitiones’: A, B
52 ‘in hoc libri, quia philosophus non determinat de proprietatibus et passionibus vocum, sed rerum’: B

Item iste liber principaliter est de \([\text{decem}]^{54}\) praedicamentis. Ergo si iste liber principaliter esset de vocibus, sequeretur quod decem praedicamenta essent \([\text{decem}]^{55}\) voces. Sed omnis vox est in genere qualitatis. [Ergo omnia decem praedicamenta sunt in genere qualitatis.]\(^{56}\) et sic non esset nisi unum genus generalissimum, scilicet qualitas. Dico ergo quod liber praedicamentorum est de rebus secundum quod eis insunt intentiones secundae, scilicet intentio generis generalissimi, et [generis]\(^{57}\) subalterni, et intentio speciei <specialissime>\(^{58}\), et sic de aliis.

Sed dubium est \([\text{hic}]^{59}\), quia videtur quod in libro praedicamentorum determinatur principaliter de partibus enunciationis de quibus determinatur in libro perihermeneias. Sed partes enunciationis non sunt res, sed voces vel conceptus. [Ergo et cetera.]\(^{60}\) Si \{\text{nam}\}\(^{61}\) enunciatio vel propositio of quantity. But now clearly a science is first and foremost about those things which possess the properties and attributes principally described in that science. But in this book the properties described are not those of utterances but of things. Therefore, etc.

Similarly, this book is principally about the ten categories. Therefore, if this book were principally about utterances, it would follows that the ten categories would be ten utterances. But every utterances is in the genus of quality. Therefore, all the ten categories are in the genus of quality, and so there would be only one most general genus, namely quality. Therefore, I say that the *Categories* is about things according to which second intentions are in them, namely the intention of a most general genus, and the intention of a subalternate genus, and an intention of a most specific species, and so on for the rest.

But there is a doubt here, because it seems that in the *Categories* the parts of a statement are principally described, which parts the *Perihermeneias* treats *qua* parts of a statement. But the parts of a statement are not things, but utterances or concepts. For if a statement were
componeretur ex rebus, sequeretur quod inter subjectum et praedicatum posset avis volare, et quod \{inter subjectum et praedicatum istius propositionis, ‘Parisius est Roma’, essent centum milaria\}. \^62 Item, sequeretur quod subjectum posset comedere praedicatum, quia subjectum istius propositionis, ‘Homo est \{panis\}’; posset \{comedere praedicatum, \{scilicet panem\}\}.\^65

Item sequitur quod homo esset propositio, quia omne compositum ex corpe et anima intellectiva est homo. Sed aliqua est propositio composita ex corpe et anima intellectiva, si res subiciuntur et praedicantur. Ergo aliqua esset propositio. Sed hoc consequens est falsum. Ergo est falsum dicere quod \{haec\} \^66 propositio compositur ex rebus, et per consequens in libri \{praedicamentorum\}\^67 in quo determinatur de partibus propositionis non determinatur de rebus.

\begin{itemize}
\item \{illud\}\^68
dubium recolo me dixisse et in scriptis reliquisse quod intellectus potest facere propositionem ex quibuscumque, \{quia\}\^69 intellectus potest asserere \[illa\]\^70 esse eadem vel composed of things, it would follow that a bird could fly between a subject and a predicate, or that between the subject and predicate of this statement, ‘Paris is Rome’, there would be 1000 miles. Likewise, it would follow that a subject could eat a predicate, because the subject of this statement, ‘A human is bread’, would be able to eat the predicate, namely, bread.

Likewise, it follows that a human would be a statement, because everything composed of a body and an intellective soul is a human. But something is a statement composed of body and intellective soul, if things can be made into subjects and predicates. Therefore, something would be a statement. But this consequent is false. Therefore, it is false to say that a statement is composed out of things, and consequently, the \textit{Categories}, in which the parts of a statement are described, is not about things.

To this doubt I recall myself to have said and to have put down in writing that the intellect can make a statement out of anything whatsoever, because the intellect can assert

\begin{itemize}
\item ‘\textit{enim}’: B
\item ‘\textit{inter subjectum et praedicatum essent centum milaria, quia inter subjectum huius propositionis, ‘parisius est roma’, et praedicatum eius sunt mille millaria}’: A
\item ‘\textit{panis}’: B
\item \textit{B}
\item ‘\textit{quaen potest comedere istud panem}’: A; ‘\textit{quaen homo potest comedere panem}’: B
\item \textit{B}
\item ‘praedicamentorum’': A
\item ‘\textit{hoc}’': B
\item ‘\textit{quaen}’': A
\end{itemize}
diversam, quia propositio non est aliud quam copulatio aliquorum \{per\}\(^{71}\) intellectum adinvicem, \{ut propositio affirmativa,\}\(^{72}\) aut divisio aliquorum abinvicem, \{ut propositio negativa\}\(^{73}\). Quaecumque ergo intellectus potest componere adinvicem aut dividere abinvicem \{ponent\}\(^{74}\) esse partes orationis, et per consequens esse subiecta vel praedicamenta. Sed intellectus potest adinvicem componere res asserendo illas esse easdem, et potest dividere res abinvicem asserendo illas non esse easdem. Potest etiam intellectus componere voces et conceptus adinvincem. Et ideo aliqua propositio componitur ex rebus extra animam, aliqua ex vocibus, aliqua ex conceptibus.

Quod \{atque\}\(^{75}\) propositio possit componi ex rebus \{probatur quattor modis\}\(^{76}\). Et primo sic. In omnibus significantibus et significatis \{et\}\(^{77}\) ordinatis in significando est devenire ad ultimatum significatum quod \{ita\}\(^{78}\) significatur quod \{alterius\}\(^{79}\) non \{significat\}\(^{80}\), aliter esset processus in

\[^{70}\]A  
\[^{71}\]‘secundum’: B  
\[^{72}\]‘affirmative vel negative’: B  
\[^{73}\]B  
\[^{74}\]‘possunt’: A, B  
\[^{75}\]‘autem’: A  
\[^{76}\]‘probo’: A; ‘probo scilicet quadrupliciter’: B  
\[^{77}\]A, B  
\[^{78}\]‘sic’: A, B  
\[^{79}\]‘ulterior’: A, B  
\[^{80}\]‘significatur’: A
infinitum essentialiter ordinatis, [contra philosophum]\(^{81}\). Sed propositio in scripto significat propositionem in voce, [propositio in voce]\(^{82}\) significat propositionem in \{conceptu\}\(^{83}\), scilicet propositionem compositam \[ex conceptibus\]\(^{84}\). Quaero tunc \{aut\}\(^{85}\) propositio composita ex conceptibus sit ultimum significatum, [scilicet]\(^{86}\) quod ulterius non \(<c4va>\) significat, aut significat aliquid ulterius. Non est dare primum, quia conceptus ex quibus propositio componitur in mente significant. Igitur tota propositio composita ex conceptibus significat. Cuius \{nam\}\(^{87}\) partes significant et ipsum totum significat.

Quaero tunc de \{illo\}\(^{88}\) quod significatur per propositionem in mente compositam ex conceptibus. Illud non potest esse simplex, quia \{partes propositionis significant incomplexae, et illud quod significatur per totam propositionem est complexum. Ergo illud est compositum. Aut ergo illud est compositum ex conceptibus aut ex rebus\}\(^{89}\). Si ex rebus, habeo propositum, scilicet quod propositio componitur ex rebus, \[et consequenter sequitur illud\]\(^{90}\) \{quod\}\(^{91}\) significatur per essentially ordered infinity would occur, contrary to what Aristotle claims. But a written statement signifies a spoken statement, a spoken statement signifies a statement in the mind, namely, a statement composed of concepts. I ask, then, whether a statement composed of concepts is a final significate, namely one which does not in turn signify something else, or whether it in turn does signify something else. It must not be the first, because the concepts from which a statement is composed in the mind signify. Therefore the whole statement composed of concepts signifies, for that the parts of which signify, also as a whole signifies.

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\(^{81}\) A, B
\(^{82}\) B
\(^{83}\) ‘mente’: A, B
\(^{84}\) A
\(^{85}\) ‘an’: A, B
\(^{86}\) A, B
\(^{87}\) ‘enim’: B
\(^{88}\) ‘isto’: A
\(^{89}\) ‘partes propositionis significant partes of illius quod significatur per totam propositem. Ergo illud est compositum. Aut ergo est compositum ex rebus aut ex conceptibus’: A; ‘per partes illius quod significatur per totam propositionem. Ergo illud est compositum de rebus aut de conceptibus’: B
\(^{90}\) B
\(^{91}\)
propositionem in mente esse complexum, et non est aliud complexum quam propositio. [Ergo, et cetera]\(^{92}\). Si sit compositum ex conceptibus, tune, [[cum]\(^{93}\) conceptus significant et]\(^{94}\) non sunt {ultimum significatum}\(^{95}\), quaerendum est de significatio illius compositionis [ex conceptibus]\(^{96}\) sicut prius. Et sic vel {procedendum est}\(^{97}\) in infinitum vel tandem {est devenire}\(^{98}\) ad aliquid compositum ex rebus quod est ultimum significatum propositionis in prolatione <et>\(^{99}\) in mente. Est {nam}\(^{100}\) talis ordo in significando {secundum}\(^{101}\) philosophum primo perihermeneias: litterae scriptae significant voces prolatas, et voces prolatae <significant>\(^{102}\) passiones animae, et passiones {animae}\(^{103}\), scilicet conceptus animae,\(\})\(^{104}\) significat res. Unde sicut in isto ordine est dare primum significans, scilicet litteram scriptam <vel scripturam>\(^{105}\), ita est dare ultimum significatum quod sic significatur ulterius non significat, et illud non potest esse conceptus. Ergo est res, distinguendo res

and consequently it follows that what is signified through a statement in the mind is complex, and is nothing other than a statement. If it were composed of concepts, then, since the concepts would signify and are not final significates, one must ask what that statement composed of concepts signifies, just as before. And so either one must proceed to infinity, or at last one must come to something composed of things, which is the final significate of a spoken statement and a mental statement. For such is the order in signifying, according to Aristotle in book 1 of the *Perihermeneias*: written words signify spoken utterances, and spoken utterances signify affections of the soul, and affections of the soul, namely concepts in the mind, signify things. Hence just as in this order there must be a thing signifying first, namely a written word, so there must be a final significate which is so signified that it does not signify another, and that cannot be a concept. Therefore, it is a
contra vocem et conceptum. Ergo in rebus est aliquid compositum cuius subjectum est res et praedicatum [similiter, quod dicitur propositio in re].


Et si dicitur quod quamvis {illae} voces, ‘homo lapis’, et ‘homo est lapis’ significent idem ex parte rei, tamen non significant eodem modo, [et ideo una significat falsum et alia non. Contra, quaero de illo modo quo {haec} vox ‘homo est lapis’ et haec vox ‘homo lapis’ significat ex quo non

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106 ‘re’: B
107 A
108 B
109 B
110 B
111 B
112 huius’: A, B
113 ‘sunt nisi isti termini, scilicet homo et lapis’: A
114 A
115 ‘omnino esset’: A
116 ‘hae’: B
117 ‘ista’: A
significant eodem modo]. Aut ille modus tenet se ex parte rei aut ex parte intellectus. Si {primo modo} cum res significatae per {dictas voces} sint <omnino> eaedam, nec ex parte rei {sit diversitas}; sequitur quod modus erit idem, quia non potest esse diversitas modi <ex parte rei> nisi sit aliqua diversitas ex parte rei. Si [autem] {ille} modus {tenet} se ex parte intellectus, aut sibi {correspondet} aliquid in re aut nihil. Si nihil ex parte rei sibi {correspondet}, tunc est quod ficticium, {et non} potest {aliquam diversitatem ponere}. Si vero sibi {correspondet aliquid} in re, cum ex parte rei sit identitas omnino, sequitur quod ex parte {modi} identitas omnino. Sic igitur inter illas orationes in comparatione ad sua significata <scilicet> ‘homo lapis’ et ‘homo est lapis’

‘A human is stone’ and this utterance ‘a human stone’ signify, on account of which they do not signify in the same way. Either that way holds itself on the part of reality or on the part of the intellect. If on the part of reality, since the things signified through both expressions will be the same, there will be no diversity on the part of reality, it follows that the way will be the same, because there cannot be diversity in a way unless there is some diversity on the part reality. Yet if that way holds itself on the part of the intellect, either something or nothing in reality corresponds to it. If nothing on the part of reality corresponds to it, then that is some made up way [ficticium], and it cannot produce any diversity. Yet if something in reality does correspond to it, since on the part of reality there is a complete identity,
non est alia diversitas, nec ex parte rei significatae, nec ex parte modi [significandi]. Unde istud argumentum [primum] quaerit de ultimo significato et adequato propositionis in prolatione {et} in mente. Tale {nam} significatum adequtum vel ultimatum non potest esse vox {vel} conceptus. Ergo est res extra animam {et per consequens aliquid complexum seu aliqua propositio extra animam componitur ex rebus tanquam ex subiecto et praedicato}.

Secundo <eadem> probatur conclusio principalis sic, ex eisdem componuntur propositiones de quibus {fiunt} quae questiones sunt de rebus extra animam. Ergo {et cetera}. Maior patet, quia quae primo sunt quesiones {postea {fiunt} conclusiones, per philosophum secundum Posteriorum}. Et ita oportet quod {conclusiones et

137 A, B
138 B
139 'vel': A
140 'enim': B
141 'nec': B
142 'composita ex rebus tanquam ex subiecto et praedicato, et per consequens est aliquid complexum extra animam, seu aliquam propositio composita, et cetera': B
143 A, B
144 'fiuent': A
145 'propositiones componitur de rebus extra animam': A, B
146 'sunt': A
147 'per philosophum duo Posteriorum postea fiunt conclusiones': B
quaestiones; de eisdem. Sed omnis conclusio est propositio. Igitur {est aliqua propositio ex rebus}. Et minor patet, nam si quaeritur utrum homo sit risibilis, vel utrum terra sit rotunda, istae quaestiones sunt de rebus et non de conceptibus. Ergo et cetera.


Huic forte dicitur quod demonstrationes in scientiis realibus non fiunt ex illis quae per se considerantur in [illa] scientia according to Aristotle in book 2 of the Posterior Analytics. So it is necessary that conclusions and questions are constructed from the same things. But every conclusion is a statement. Therefore statements are made of the same things which conclusions are made of. And the minor is clear, for if it were asked whether a human is capable of laughter, or whether the earth is round, those questions are about things and not about concepts. Therefore, etc.

Third, the same conclusion can be proven in this way: the real sciences, such as physics and metaphysics, principally examine things, not utterances or concepts. But practitioners of these sciences make their demonstrations from those things which they examine first and per se. Therefore, demonstrations in the real sciences are made from things. But demonstrations are composed of statements, namely of premises and a conclusion. Therefore, statements are composed of things.

Here perhaps it is said that demonstrations in the real sciences are not made out of those which are considered

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148 'propositiones et conclusiones': B
149 'sunt': A
150 'de eisdem sunt propositiones de quibus quaerunt conclusiones': A; 'de eisdem fiunt propositiones de quibus fiunt conclusiones': B
151 B; 'vel': A
152 'principaliter': A, B
153 A, B
154 B
155 'in scientiis realibus': A
156 'fiunt': A
157 A
sed ex vocibus vel conceptibus supponentibus pro illis quae per se considerantur in illa scientia. Contra, subjectum adequatum scientiae acquisitae per <unam>\textsuperscript{158} demonstrationem est conclusio illius demonstrationis, [quia conclusio demonstrationis scitur, et illud quod scitur est subjectum scientiae]\textsuperscript{159}. Quaero tunc an conclusio scita componatur ex rebus vel ex conceptibus vel ex vocibus. Si ex rebus, habeo propositum. Si ex vocibus vel conceptibus \{solum\}\textsuperscript{160} sequitur quod nihil scitur nisi <c4rb> vox vel conceptus, quod est inconveniens \{in scientiis realibus maxime\}\textsuperscript{161}. Unde arguitur sic. Omnis propositio est vox vel conceptus. Sed omne demonstrative scitum est propositio. Ergo omne demonstrative scitum est vox vel conceptus. Conclusio [est]\textsuperscript{162} falsam. [Ergo illud ex quo sequitur]\textsuperscript{163}, sed non minor. Ergo maior. Ergo sua contradictoria est vera, scilicet aliqua propositio non est vox \{vel\}\textsuperscript{164} conceptus. Sed omnis propositio <que est>\textsuperscript{165} composita ex vocibus vel conceptibus est vox vel conceptus. Ergo aliquid propositio est quae nec est composita ex vocibus nec ex conceptibus, et per consequens composita ex rebus. \{Ista ratio potest confirmari\}\textsuperscript{166} sic, de eisdem est omnino scientia nostra tradita de rebus naturalibus de quibus fuit scientia Aristotelis, quam nobis reliquit. Sed nec voces nec

\textit{per se} in that science, but out of utterances or concepts supposing for those which are considered \textit{per se} in that science. On the contrary, the adequate subject of knowledge acquired through demonstration is the conclusion of that demonstration, because the conclusion of a demonstration is known, and that which is known is the subject of a science. I ask, then, whether the conclusion of a science is composed out of things or out of concepts or out of utterances. If out of things, I have my claim. If they are composed out of utterances or out of concepts alone, it follows that nothing is known except an utterance or a concept. That is especially ill-suited to the real sciences. Hence it is argued in this way. Every statement is an utterance or a concept. But everything demonstratively known is a statement. Therefore, everything demonstratively known is an utterance or a concept. The conclusion is false, but not the minor premise. Therefore, the major is false. Therefore, its own contradictory is true, namely that some statement is not an utterance or a concept. But every statement composed out of utterances or out of concepts is an utterance or a concept. Therefore, there is some statement which is composed of neither

\textsuperscript{158} A, B
\textsuperscript{159} A
\textsuperscript{160} ‘tunc’:\ A, B
\textsuperscript{161} ‘maxime in scientiis realibus’: A, B
\textsuperscript{162} A
\textsuperscript{163} A; ‘alia praemissarum’: B
\textsuperscript{164} ‘neque’: B
\textsuperscript{165} B
\textsuperscript{166} ‘confirmatur ratio sic’: A; ‘confirmatur ratio’: B
conceptibus sunt idem apud nos et apud Aristotelem, qui erat graecus. Ergo scientia nostra de [rebus]167 naturalibus et scientia Aristotelis, quam nobis tradidit de eisdem, nec {est}168 de vocibus nec de conceptibus. Ergo {est}169 de rebus. Sed scientia est solius conclusionis demonstrationis. Ergo conclusio demonstrationis in scientia naturali nec est vox nec conceptus, et per consequens nec composita ex vocibus nec ex conceptibus <sed ex rebus>170.

Quarto potest [eadem conclusio]171 probari per auctoritates. Primo sic. Aristoteles {dicens}172 in libro praedicamentorum, tractatum primo, capitullo {secundo}173, quod quaedam praedicantur de subiecto et non in subiecto, ut subjectae secundae. Quaero tunc {quod}174 est illud quod praedicatur de subiecto et non in subiecto. Aut est res, {vox vel conceptus}175.

utterances nor concepts, and consequently it is composed of things. That account can be confirmed in this way: the knowledge handed down to us about the natural world is entirely about the same objects as those which Aristotle’s knowledge was about, a knowledge which he gave to us. But neither utterances nor concepts are the same with us and with Aristotle, who was Greek. Therefore, our knowledge of natural things, and the knowledge of Aristotle, which he handed down to us about those same things, is a knowledge neither of utterances nor of concepts. Therefore, it is of things. But knowledge is merely the conclusion of a demonstration. Therefore, the conclusion of a demonstration in natural science is neither an utterance nor a concept, and consequently is composed neither of utterances nor of concepts but rather of things.

Fourth, the same conclusion can be proved via philosophical authorities. First in this way: Aristotle says in the Categories, tract 1, chapter 2, that certain things are predicated of a subject and are not in a subject, such as secondary substances. I ask then what that is which is predicated of a subject but is not in a subject: is it a thing,

167 B
168 'sunt': A, B
169 'sunt': A, B
170 B
171 B
172 'dicit': A, B
173 'primo': A
174 'quia': A
175 'aut conceptus aut vox': A, B
Si sit res extra animam, habitur propositum, \{quia\} res extra animam praedicatur de subiecto, nec est dare quod illud sit vox vel conceptus, \{quia\} tam vox quam \<etiam>\ conceptus est in subiecto. Unde cum aliquid praedicetur de subiecto [et] non est in subiecto, et illud nec est vox vel conceptus, sequitur quod aliquid praedicetur [de subiecto], quod nec vox nec conceptus. \<Sequitur> ergo oportet quod illud sit res extra animam.

Item Aristoteles \{primo\} Perihermeneias, [caput de oratione], \{asserit\} de re praedicari, dicens \textit{Haec quidem rerum sunt universalia, illa vero singularia. Universale quidem de pluribus aptum natum est praedicari, ut homo quidem universale, Plato vero singulare}. Et illud totum exponit Boethius de rebus [et] non de vocibus, dicens quod cum Aristoteles \<de propositionibus> ageret tractatum suum \{continuavit\} ad an utterance, or a concept? If it is a thing outside the soul, I have my claim, because a thing outside the soul is predicated of a subject. Nor can it be that it is an utterance or a concept, because both an utterance and a concept are in a subject. Hence since something is predicated of a subject and is not in a subject, and that is neither an utterance nor a concept, it follows that something is predicated of a subject which is neither an utterance nor a concept. Therefore, it is necessary that it is a thing outside the soul.

Likewise, Aristotle, in the first chapter of the \textit{Perihermeneias}, in the chapter on sentences, says that a thing is predicated of a thing, saying \textit{Indeed these things are universals, but those singulars. A universal is naturally suited to be predicated, so that human indeed is universal, but Plato is singular}. And Boethius interprets that whole claim to be about things and not about utterances, saying that when Aristotle pushes on with his
res. Rerum {vero} \(^{188}\) quaedam praedicantur ut universalia, quaedam subiciuntur ut singulares.

Item philosophus in libro Perihermeneias [caput de verbo] \(^{189}\) dicit quod verbum est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur, [ubi Boethius dicit quod omne verbum est significativum eorum quae de altero praedicantur] \(^{190}\), et dico quod ‘currit’ significat [illud] \(^{191}\) quod de currente <cursus> \(^{192}\) praedicatur, ‘currit’ {vero} \(^{193}\) et ‘amat’ \(^{194}\) ad res tamen {designandas} \(^{195}\) inventa sunt. Cum ergo ‘currit’ {significat} \(^{196}\) illud quod de altero <currente> \(^{197}\) praedicatur, et <sic> \(^{198}\) ‘currit’ solum {significat} \(^{199}\) rem et non vocem secundum Boethius, sequitur [quod res de re praedicatur] \(^{200}\). Et credo quod illud indubitanter sit verum, quod in aliqua propositione praedicatur res de re, et in aliqua propositione conceptus de conceptu praedicatur, et in aliqua vox de voce praedicatur. Unde intellectus potest componere adinvicem omnia simplicia apprehensa per intellectum asserendo illa esse treatise, he links it to things. But certain things are predicated, like universals, others are made subjects, like singulars.

Likewise, Aristotle, in the Perihermeneias, in the chapter on verbs, says that a verb is a mark of those which are predicated of another, and I say that ‘runs’ signifies that which is predicated of some running individual, but ‘runs’ and ‘walks’ are found to designate things. Therefore, since ‘runs’ signifies that which is predicated of another, and ‘runs’ only signifies a thing and not an utterance, according to Boethius, it follows that a thing is predicated of a thing. And I believe that this is undoubtedly true, that in some statement a thing is predicated of a thing, and in some statement a concept is predicated of a concept, and in some statement an utterance is predicated of an utterance. Hence the intellect can put together every simple thing apprehended by the intellect, by asserting that they are the same or are not the same. Therefore, since the intellect is

\(^{188}\) ‘ergo’: A
\(^{189}\) A, B
\(^{190}\) A
\(^{191}\) A, B
\(^{192}\) B
\(^{193}\) ‘autem’: A
\(^{194}\) ‘ambulat’: B
\(^{195}\) ‘assignandas’: B
\(^{196}\) ‘significat’: A, B
\(^{197}\) B
\(^{198}\) A, B
\(^{199}\) ‘significat’: A, B
\(^{200}\) B
eadem vel non esse eadem. Cum {igitur} intellectus possit voces, conceptus et res, sequitur quod intellectus potest componere {propositionem tam de rebus quam de vocibus quam de conceptibus}.

Intelligenda sunt hic tria. Primo quod in omni propositione est materiale et formale. Formale in propositione est copula copulans praedicatum cum subiecto et illa copula est in intellectu, quia est compositio vel divisio intellectus. Materialia in propositione sunt subiectum et praedicatum. Dico ergo quod nulla {propositio} est composita ex rebus totaliter extra animam, quia formale in tali propositione est in mente vel in intellectu. Materialia autem sunt extra animam. {Unde} cum propositio sit triplex – quaedam in prolatione, quaedam in conceptu, et quaedam significata per propositionem in conceptu quae potest dici propositio in re – propositio primo modo dicta, scilicet propositio in prolatione, est totaliter extra animam, talis propositio totaliter componitur ex vocibus qui habent esse extra animam. {Propositio vero}

We must understand three things here. First, that in every statement there is something material and something formal. The formal element in a statement is the copula joining together the predicate with the subject, and that copula is in the intellect, because it is a composition or division of the intellect. Yet the material elements in a statement are the subject and the predicate. Therefore I say that no statement is composed of things completely outside the soul, because the formal element is such a statement is in the mind, that is, in the intellect, yet the material elements are outside of the mind. Hence, since a statement is of three sorts – a certain spoken one, a certain conceptual one, and a certain one signified through a conceptual statement which can be called a propositio in re – a statement spoken of in the first way, namely a spoken statement...
composita ex conceptibus est totaliter in intellectu. Et compositio composita ex rebus partim est in intellectu et partim extra intellectu, quantum ad suum formale est in intellectu {sed} 213 quantum ad materialia est totaliter extra intellectum.

Secundo scirebatur quod compositio est duplex, scilicet {realis et intellectualis} 214. Compositio intellectualis est <ut> 215 compositio qua intellectus componit {subjectum cum praedicato} 216. Compositio realis est ut compositio animae cum corpore, {et} 217 ut compositio domus ex lapidibus vel lignis.

Tertio scirebatur quod isti termini, ‘subjectum’ et ‘praedicatum’, sunt [termini] 218 equivoci, quia uno modo accipiuntur per subjecto vel praedicato in re, in alio modo pro subiecto vel praedicato in intellectu, in alio modo pro subiecto vel praedicato in voce.

Sed dubium est hic qualiter potest fieri unum compositum ex re existente in intellectu et {re} 219 existente extra animam. statement, is completely outside the soul, yet a statement composed of concepts is completely in the intellect, and a composition composed of things is partly in the intellect and partly outside the intellect. With respect to its formal element, a statement composed of things is in the intellect, but with respect to its material elements, it is completely outside of the intellect.

Second, we must know that there are two kinds of composition, namely real and intellectual. An intellectual composition is a composition in which the intellect puts together a subject with a predicate. A real composition is, for example, the composition of a soul with a body, or the composition of a house out of bricks or wood.

Third, we must know that these terms, ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’, are equivocal terms, because in one way they are taken for a subject or a predicate in reality, in another way for a subject or a predicate in the intellect, and in another way for a subject or predicate in speech.

But there is a doubt here: how, from a thing existing in the intellect and a thing existing outside the soul, can there

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213 'et': A
214 'intellectualis et realis': B
215 A
216 'praedicatum cum subjecto': A
217 'vel': A
218 B
219 'rebus': A
Dicendum quod ex 4va talibus potest fieri unum compositionem unum ens copulatum. It must be said that from such things there can come about one thing composed by a composition of the intellect, not by a real composition, and an such a composite can be called an ens copulatum, and an intellect but also through one's sense faculty, or through the intellect and through one's sense faculty. For Blessed Augustine says that attention couples a sense or the operation of a sense with a sensible object. For oftentimes attention couples an object, and yet we do not see them because we do not have our attention directed at them. Hence attention couples the act of seeing or sight with an object. For example, this utterance, 'seen stone', signifies a certain being composed out of stone which is

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220 A
221 A, B
222 A, B
223 'sive': A
224 'nam': A
225 'enim': B
226 'est praesens sensu, et': A, B
227 'vel intendit': B
228 A
229 'vel': A, B
230 'illa': A
231 A
232 'subiecto': B
233 'loquendo': A
234 'unum ens compositionem unum ens copulatum.'
outside the soul and the act of seeing which is in the eye, nor is it unfitting that from such things separated by place and subject there comes about an *ens copulatum*.

Here are responses to the reasons to the contrary. To the first, when it is said that if a statement were composed of things, it would follow that a bird would be able to fly between a subject and a predicate, one should respond to this objection by making a distinction concerning ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’, insofar as they can be taken to mean things, or utterances, or concepts. If they are taken to mean things, then that which has been deduced is not problematic.

To the other two following it, when it is said that between a subject and a predicate there could be 1000 miles, one ought to say that, by taking up ‘subject’ and ‘predicate’ for things, this is true.

To the other, when it is said that, if my position were correct, then some statement would be composed of body

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234 A, B
235 ‘tunc’: A, B
236 A, B
237 A, B
238 ‘vel’: A, B
239 ‘illud ad’: A, B
240 B
241 ‘centum’: A, B
242 A, B
243 ‘quando’: B
consequens\textsuperscript{245} aliqua propositio \{esse\}\textsuperscript{246} homo, quia aliqua\textsuperscript{247} propositio componitur ex corpore et anima intellectiva, dicendum quod ex hoc non sequitur quod aliqua propositio sit homo. Et \{cum\}\textsuperscript{248} dicitur \{quod\}\textsuperscript{249} omne \{quod\}\textsuperscript{250} componitur ex corpore et anima intellectiva est homo, dicendum quod omne compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva compositione reali est homo. Tamen non oportet omne compositum \{ex corpore et anima intellectiva compositione intellectuali\}\textsuperscript{251} sit homo.

Sed dubium est an ipsi copulae existenti in intellectu corrispondeat aliquid in re aut non. Dicendum \textit{<est>}\textsuperscript{252} quod copulae existenti in intellectu copulanti extremae propositionis \{vere\}\textsuperscript{253} adinvicem, \{correspondeat aliquid\}\textsuperscript{254} \{in re\}\textsuperscript{255} scilicet identitas \{extremorum vel identitas\}\textsuperscript{256} eorum pro quibus extrema \textit{<propositionis>}\textsuperscript{257} supponunt. Divisioni vero

and intelligible soul, and consequently some statement would be a human, because some statement is composed out of body and intelligible soul, one should say that from my position it does not follow that some statement is a human. And when it is said that everything which is composed of body and intelligible soul is a human, one should say that everything composed of body and intelligible soul \textit{by a real composition} is a human. Yet it is not necessary that everything composed out of body and intelligible soul \textit{by an intellectual composition} is a human.

But there is a doubt whether or not something in reality corresponds to a copula existing in the intellect. It must be said that to the copula existing in the intellect, truly copulating the extremes of a statement, there corresponds something in reality, namely the identity of the extremes or of those for which the extremes supposit. Moreover, to a
negationi copulæ in propositione negativa vera correspondet aliquid in re, scilicet diversitas extremorum vel illorum pro quibus extrema supponunt. {Sed} copulæ existentī in intellectu copulanti extrema propositionis falsae adinvicem nihil correspondent in re nisi ipsa extrema, ut patet de copula huius propositionis, 'homo est asinus'. Similiter nec divisioni negationi copulæ in propositione falsa negativa nihil correspondent in re nisi ipsa extrema. Et si quæratur a quo ergo movetur intellectus ad fabricandum huiusmodi copulam divisionem vel negationem copulæ, dicendum quod non movetur nisi ab ipsius extremis ipsis in propositione et a voluntate imperante intellectui ad copulandum extrema adinvicem vel ad dividendum extrema abinvicem [si propositio sit falsa].

division or to a negation of the copula in a true negative statement there corresponds something in reality, namely the diversity of the extremes or of those for which the extremes supposit. Likewise, to a division or to a negation of the copula in a false negative statement nothing corresponds in reality except those extremes, as is with respect to the copula in this statement, ‘A human is an ass’. Likewise, nothing corresponds to a division or to a negative copula in a false negative proposition except those extremes. And if one were to ask by what therefore is the intellect moved to creating a copula of this sort or a division or negation of the copula, it must be said that the intellect is only moved by those extremes in the statement and by the will commanding the intellect to put the extremes together or to divide them from one another.

<Capitulum 12: De Priore et Posteriore>

[...]

<g6ra>

[...]

258 'seu': A, B
259 'et': A
260 'nee': A, B
261 'seu': A, B
262 A
263 A, B
{Videtur autem praeter eos qui dicti sunt alter esse prioris modus. Eorum nam quae convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam quod alterum alteri quomodolibet causa est digne prius naturam dicitur, quia vero quaedam sunt huiusmodi palam est. Esse namque hominem convertitur secundum essentiae consequentiam ad veram de se orationem. Nam si homo est, vera est oratio qua dicitur, quia homo est, et homo convertitur oratio quia est, nam si vera est oratio qua dicitur, quia homo est, hominem esse necesse est. Est autem vera oratio nequaquam causa quod res sit. Verumtamen videtur res esse quodammodo causa, ut sit oratio vera. Dum nam res est vel res non est, vera oratio aut falsa dicatur necesse est. Ideoque secundum quinque modos prius alterum altero dicitur}²⁶⁴.

It seems however that there is another mode of the prior beyond those which were mentioned. For of those which are converted according to the consequence of essence, that which is in some way the cause of the other is rightly called prior by nature. That there are kinds of this sort is clear. For being a human is converted according to the consequence of essence to a true sentence about itself. For if a human is, the sentence by which it is said that a human is, is true, and a human is converted with a sentence, that he is. For if the sentence is true by which it is said that a human is, a human’s existing is necessary. However a true sentence is never the cause that a thing is. Yet it does seem that the thing’s being is in some way the cause that the sentence is true. For while a thing is or a thing is not, it is necessary that the sentence is called true or false. Therefore in five ways is one called prior to another.

Haec est quinta {particula}²⁶⁵ huius capituli in qua philosophus {addit}²⁶⁶ quinimum modum <prioris>²⁶⁷ dicens quod {praeter modos}²⁶⁸ qui dicti sunt est {unus alius}²⁶⁹, scilicet {quod}²⁷⁰ aliquas convertuntur secundum {naturam}²⁷¹, et unum illorum

²⁶⁴ ‘amplius praeter hos’: A, B
²⁶⁵ ‘pars’: A
²⁶⁶ ‘ponit’: A
²⁶⁷ B
²⁶⁸ ‘primi’: B
²⁶⁹ ‘unum’: B
²⁷⁰ ‘quando’: B; ‘quod quando’: A
²⁷¹ ‘consequentiam’: A, B
est causa alterius, tunc illud quod est causa [alterius] est prium natura quam illud cuius est causa. Verbi gratia, haec oratio, 'homo est', et {haec oratio, "homo est' est vera'} convertuntur. Nam hominem esse et hominem esse est vera convertuntur. {Nam sequitur, 'homo est, ergo haec est vera, 'homo est”, et converso, <scilicet> haec est vera, "homo est', ergo homo est’. Sed hominem esse est causa quare haec est vera, 'homo est', et non eonverso. {Unde quia homo est, haec oratio est vera quae dicit hominem esse}. Nam in eo quod res est vel non est, {est oratio} vera vel falsa, sed ista oratio, "homo est’ est vera’ non est causa {quare} homo est, et ideo hominem esse est prium {quam haec oratio, "homo est’} vera’}. Unde breviter quintus modus priorus est {quando} illud quod convertitur cum aliquo [et] est causa illius, est naturaliter prium {illo}. consequence, and one of those is the cause of the other, then that which is the cause of the other is prior in nature to that of which it is a cause. For example, this sentence, 'A human exists', and this sentence, ‘A human exists’ is true’, are convertible. For a human’s existing, and a human’s existing being true are convertible. For it follows: ‘A human exists, therefore this is true: ‘A human exists’’, and, conversely: ‘This is true, ‘A human exists’, therefore a human exists’. But a human’s existing is the cause by which this is true: ‘A human exists’, and not conversely. Hence, because a human exists, that sentence is true which says that a human exists. For if it is in this – that a thing exists or does not exist – that a sentence is true or false. But that sentence, ‘A human exists’ is true’, is not the cause by which a human exists, and therefore a human’s existing is prior by nature. Hence, briefly, the fifth mode of priority is when that which is convertible with another and is the cause of it, is naturally prior to it.

272 A
273 'oratio qui dicit, "homo est’ est vera oratio'; A, B
274 B
275 'quia': A
276 B
277 'Unde quod homo est, est causa quod haec est vera, 'homo est', ideo haec oratio est vera quae dicit hominem esse': B
278 'oratio dicitur': B
279 'quod': B
280 'sit': A
281 'natura': B
282 'quod': A, B
283 B
284 'alio': A
Circa istam partem sunt tria intelligenda. Primo quod ex dictis \{Aristotelis\} \textsuperscript{285} \{hic\} \textsuperscript{286} accipitur unum commune dictum antiquorum, scilicet quod omnis propositio convertitur cum \{vero\} \textsuperscript{287} enunciato de suo dicto, hoc est, omnis propositio convertitur cum \{alia\} \textsuperscript{288} propositione in qua verum praedicatur de dicto illius propositionis, et hoc [secundum quod] \textsuperscript{289} illud dictum supponit pro \{suppositione\} \textsuperscript{290} cuius est dictum.

Secundum est intelligendum quod cum dicitur \{ex\} \textsuperscript{291} eo quod res est vel non est, et cetera, philosophus <per 'rem'> \textsuperscript{292} non intelligit rem significatam per subiectum, nec rem significatam per praedicatum, quia de non ente vere praedicatur aliquid tanquam de subiecto, quia de non ente verum est dicere ipsum esse non ens, et ita propositio affirmativa potest esse vera quamvis res significata per praedicatum sit non ens, sed philosophus per 'rem' intelligit rem significatam per totam propositionem, et tunc intelligitur sic: \{ex\} \textsuperscript{293} eo quod res est, hoc est, ex eo quod ita est sicut <vera> \textsuperscript{294} propositio significat est propositio vera, [et ex eo quod non est ita sicut propositio significat est propositio falsa] \textsuperscript{295}. Et ex hoc patet \{quod per...

Concerning that part, we need to understand three things. First, that given these words Aristotle accepts here a general *dictum* of the old philosophers, namely that every statement is convertible with a true statement about its own *dictum*, that is, every statement is convertible with another statement in which ‘true’ is predicated of the *dictum* of that statement, and this is because that *dictum* supposits for the statement of which it is an *dictum*.

Second, we must understand that when it is said *on account of this that a thing exists or does not exist*, etc., Aristotle does not understand by ‘thing’ the thing signified through the subject, nor the thing signified through the predicate, because something is truly predicated of a non-being as a subject, because it is true to say of a non-being that it is not a being, and so an affirmative statement can be true although the thing signified through the predicate is not a being. Rather, by ‘thing’, Aristotle understands the thing signified through the whole statement, and then it is understood in this way: *on account of this that a thing exists*, that is, from the fact that it is just as the statement

\textsuperscript{285} 'philosophi': B
\textsuperscript{286} A
\textsuperscript{287} 'uno': B
\textsuperscript{288} 'alia': B
\textsuperscript{289} B
\textsuperscript{290} 'propositione': A
\textsuperscript{291} 'in': A, B
\textsuperscript{292} B
\textsuperscript{293} 'in': A, B
\textsuperscript{294} B
\textsuperscript{295} A
propositionem in voce et etiam in conceptu\textsuperscript{296} significatur aliqua res complexa quae non est proprie aliqua res \textsuperscript{297} significata [per subiectum, nec \textsuperscript{298} res significata \textsuperscript{299} per praedicatum, sed aggregatum ex his, \textsuperscript{300} illa res quae est ultimum et adaequatum significatum propositionis in voce et in conceptu est \textsuperscript{301} ens copulatum, et [propter hoc\textsuperscript{302} potest dici propositio in re, sicut declaratum est in principio \textsuperscript{303} libri.

Tertio est intelligendum quod cum dicitur aliquid est prius alio natura, per hoc non denotatur quod illud prius sit in aliqua mensura in qua non est posterius, ut si \(a\) sit prius natura quam \(b\), ex hoc non sequitur quod \(a\) sit aliquando quando non est \(b\), vel \{quod\}\textsuperscript{304} \(a\) fuit vel erit aliquando quando non fuit vel erit \(b\). Nec est dicere sicut quidam fingunt quod quaedam instantia naturae ita quod prius natura est in aliquo instanti in quo non est posterius natura, quia illud instans aut est substantia aut accidens. Non \textsuperscript{305} substantia, quia tunc cum Socrates sit

signifies, the statement is true. And from the fact that it is not as the statement signifies, the statement is false. And from this it is clear that through a statement in speech and also in concept some complex thing is signified which is not properly something precisely signified through the subject, nor is it a thing signified precisely through the predicate, but it is an aggregate of these, and that thing which is the final and adequate signify of a statement in speech and in concept is a certain \textit{ens copulatum}, and on account of this it can be called a \textit{propositio in re}, just as was stated in the prologue of this book.

Third, we must understand that when it is said that something is prior by nature to another, through this it is not denoted that the prior is in some measured amount in which the posterior is not. For example, if \(a\) is prior by nature to \(b\), from this it does not follow that \(a\) exists at some time that \(b\) does not exist, or that \(a\) existed or will exist at a time when \(b\) does not exist. Nor does it mean (just as certain individuals pretend) that a certain instance of nature is such that that which is prior by nature is in
prius natura suo accidente, Socrates in aliqua substantia, [scilicet]\textsuperscript{306} in Socrates, vel in aliqua parte \{Socrates\}\textsuperscript{307} esset prior suo accidente, quod non contigit dicere. Et si \{detur\}\textsuperscript{308} quod sit accidentis, cum Socrates sit prior natura omni suo accidente, sequitur quod Socrates in aliquo suo accidente sit prior omni suo accidente, quod est impossible. Et potest hoc argui de prima substantia quae est deus, quod non est prior \{naturaliter\}\textsuperscript{309} omni instanti naturae. Si tali instanti \{daretur\} ergo deus in aliquo instanti naturae esset prior omni instanti naturae. Significaretur igitur quod deus in aliquo instanti foret prior omni instanti quando illud instans non esset, quod est inconveniens}\textsuperscript{310}.

Item prius natura et posterius natura sunt in eodem instanti temporis, ut patet de subiecto et sua propria passione. Ergo si subiectum sit prius natura in aliquo instanti naturae in quo <instanti>\textsuperscript{311} sua passio non est, sequitur quod in eodem

some instance in which its posterior by nature is not, because that instance is either a substance or an accident. It is not a substance, because then, since Socrates is prior by nature to his accidents, Socrates would be prior to his accident in some substance (namely in Socrates or in some part of Socrates), which one is not able to say. And if it is said that that instance is an accident, since Socrates is prior by nature to all of his accidents, it follows that Socrates, in some accident of his, is prior to each of his accidents, which is impossible. And we can make this argument with respect to the first substance – God – that he is not naturally prior to every instance of nature. If instances of that sort were posited, therefore God would be in some instance of nature that is prior to every instance of nature, and so it would follow that God would be in some instance of nature and then God would be in some instance when that instance does not exist, which is problematic.

Likewise, prior by nature and posterior by nature are in the same instance of time, as is clear in the case of a subject and its proper attribute. Therefore, if a substance were prior by nature in some instance of nature in which its own

\textsuperscript{306} B
\textsuperscript{307} 'Socratis': A
\textsuperscript{308} 'dicatur': B
\textsuperscript{309} 'natura': B
\textsuperscript{310} 'ponantur, ergo deus in aliquo instanti naturae esset prior omni instanti naturae, et sic sequeretur quod deus in aliquo instanti esset et tunc deus esset in aliquo instanti quam illud instans non esset, quod est inconveniens': A; 'ponantur quod deus in aliquo instanti naturae esset prior omni instanti naturae, sequeretur quod deus in aliquo instanti foret prior omni instanti quam illud instans non esset, quod est inconveniens': B
\textsuperscript{311} A
instanti temporis in quo <suum>312 subiectum est sua passio non est, et sic repugnantia [et contradictoria]313 essent simul vera <et sic contradictoria essent vera>314 pro instanti eodem temporis, quod est impossible. Dicendum est ergo quod non magis debet poni instans naturae quando aliquid est prius [natura]315 alio quam debet poni instans <temporis>316 honoris vel perfectionis [quando aliquid est prius honore vel perfectione alio]317. Unde non est ponere aliud instans quam instans temporis, nec propter hoc quod aliquid ponitur prius alio {aliuorum}318 istorum modorum hic {positorum}319 debet poni instans vel mensura in qua prius est, <vel>320 fuit vel [erit]321, et in {illa posterius}322 non est, <vel>323 [non]324 fuit vel non erit, nisi solum quando aliquid est prius alio tempore, [quia]325 tunc {est verum}326 dicere quod prius est vel fuit vel erit <in>327 aliquo instante vel <in>328 aliquo tempore in quo posterius non est vel non fuit vel non erit.

attribute did not exist, it would follow that in the same instance of time in which a subject exists, its own attribute would not exist, and so opposites and contradictories would be true at once for the same instance of time, which is impossible. Therefore, we ought to say that we should not hold more highly an instance of nature when something is prior by nature from another, than we should hold an instance of honor or perfection when something is prior in honor or perfection than another. Hence we should not admit some instance other than an instance of time, nor on account of this, that something is regarded as prior to another, should we posit an instance or a measured amount in which the prior is, was, or will be, and in which the posterior is not, or was not, or will not be, in some of those modes here posited, except when something is prior to another in time, because then it is true to say that the prior

312 A, B
313 A
314 A
315 A
316 B
317 B
318 'aliquo': A
319 'praedicamentorum': B
320 A, B
321 A
322 'isto posteriori': A
323 A, B
324 B
325 A, B
326 'verum enim est': A, B
327 B
328 B
Pro quo sciendum est quod quoddam est prius in quo, et id est prius in quo prius tempore est vel fuit [vel erit] quam posterius. Quoddam est prius ex quo, et sic principia extrinsea rei sunt priora secundum naturam, quia ex eis sit ipsum principiatum, et sic materia et forma ex quibus sit substantia composita sunt priora quam ipsa substantia composita, et sic quoddam est prius a quo, et sic causa effectiva est prior suo effectu. Unde principium motus est prior naturaliter effectu qui sit ab ipso. Et quoddam est prius ad quod, et sic finis naturaliter est prius his quae sunt ad finem, quia ea quae sunt ad finem ordinantur et intenduntur propter finem. Unde finis est prior intentione quam ea quae ordinantur ad finem. Et quoddam est prius in quo, et sic tempus in quo est prius, est prius alio tempore in quo est posterius. Nam prius tempore est quando posterius tempore est non. Sic ergo patent quinque modi prioris, quam quaedam est prioritas secundum tempus, et quaedam secundum consequentiam, et

For which we need to know that a certain priority is priority in which, and a thing is prior in which it is, or was, or will be, at a time prior to its posterior. A certain priority is priority out of which, and in this way the extrinsic principles of a thing are prior to that of which they are principles by nature, because it is out of these that that thing of which they are principles comes about, and so matter and form from which composite substance comes about are prior to that composite substance. A certain priority is priority from which, and in this way an efficient cause is prior to its effect. Hence the principle of motion is naturally prior to the effect which is from it. A certain priority is priority to which, and in this way ends are naturally prior to those which are for an end, because those which are for an end are ordered and intended according to an end. Hence an end is prior in intention to those which are ordered to that end. And a certain priority is priority in which, and in this way the time in which something prior

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329 ‘illud’: A, B
330 B
331 ‘ipso principiato secundum naturam secundum naturam’: B
332 B
333 A
334 ‘creato’: B
335 ‘prior’: B
336 A
337 A, B
338 ‘Et sic species est prius in quo. Prius tempore est quando posterius tempore non est’: A, B
quaedam secundum ordinem doctrinae, et quaedam \{secundum honorem\}^{339}, et quaedam est prioritas secundum naturam, et talis est triplex: \{a quo, ex quo et ad quod\}^{340}.

Et sciendum \<est>^{341} quod in divinis una persona \{dicitur\}^{342} prior alia, et haec prioritas dicitur prioritas originis, \{quae prioritas est quando aliquid dicitur sic prius, quia est illud ex quo est alius, quia pater in divinis est prior filio\}^{343}, et illud quod sic est prius non est prius in quo, nec huic prioritati correspondet aliquid prius in quo, sed solum est ibi prius a quo, [vel ex quo]^{344}.

And we need to understand that in the divine being one person is prior to another, and this priority is called priority of origin. Priority of this sort is when something is prior because it is that out of which another exists. For in the divine being the father is prior to the son, and that which is prior in this way is not prior in which, nor to this priority does there correspond something prior in which, but in this case it can only be prior from which.

Circa \{istam partem\}^{345} dubitatur an omnis propositio convertatur cum \<una>^{346} propositione in qua verum exists, is prior to another time in which something posterior exists. For a prior time is when a posterior time does not exist. Therefore, in this way the five modes of priority are clear, as a certain kind is priority according to time, and a certain kind is priority according to consequence, and a certain kind is priority according to the order of teaching, and a certain kind is according to honor, and a certain kind is priority according to nature, and priority of this sort is of three kinds: from which, out of which, and to which.

Concerning this part, it is unclear whether every statement is convertible with a statement in which ‘true’ is affirmed.

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339 ‘est prioritas secundum honorem’: A  
340 ‘scilicet, ex quo, a quo, ad quod’: A, B  
341 B  
342 ‘est’: B  
343 ‘qua aliud dicitur prius, quia illud est ex quo est aliud, quomodo patrem divinis est prius filio’: A; ‘qua aliud dicitur prior quae est illud cum quo est aliud, quoniam pater in divinis est prior filio’: B  
344 A  
345 ‘istud’: A  
346 A

Item videtur quod non omnis propositio inferat propositionem in qua ‘verum’ {infertur vel affirmatur}\(^{356}\) de illa propositione, quia non sequitur, ‘deus est, ergo haec est vera, ‘deus est’’, quia possible est quod haec propositio non sit in rerum natura. of that statement. It does not seem so, because this does not follow: ‘A human is an ass’ is true, therefore a human is an ass’, because the antecedent is possible and the consequent is impossible. The possibility of the antecedent is clear, because this utterance, ‘human’, can be made to signify the same thing which the name ‘God’ signifies, and this utterance, ‘ass’, can signify the same thing that this utterance, ‘good’, signifies. Therefore, this can be true, ‘A human is an ass’, in just the way that this is true, ‘God is good’. Therefore, it is possible that this is true, ‘A human is an ass’. Yet it is impossible that a human is an ass. Therefore this consequence does not hold: ‘This is true, ‘A human is an ass’, therefore a human is an ass’, and so a statement in which ‘true’ is affirmed of some statement is not convertible with that statement, because it does not infer it.

Likewise, it seems that not every statement infers a statement in which ‘true’ is predicated of that statement, because this does not follow: ‘God is, therefore this is true: ‘God is’, because it is possible that this statement, ‘God is’,

\(^{347}\) A; ‘nam’: B
\(^{348}\) A
\(^{349}\) A
\(^{350}\) A
\(^{351}\) B
\(^{352}\) ‘possible’: A, B
\(^{353}\) ‘impossible’: A, B
\(^{354}\) A
\(^{355}\) ‘quia’: B
\(^{356}\) ‘emunciatur’: A, B
Isto posito adhuc deus est, et tamen haec est non vera, ‘deus est’, quia illud quod non est, non est verum nec falsum.

Item non sequitur, ‘nulla propositio est, ergo haec est vera, ‘nulla propositio est’’, quia aliquid sequitur ad consequens quod non sequitur ad antecedens. [Nam] haec est vera, ‘nulla propositio est’, ergo aliqua propositio est, quia antecedens est possible, et nullum possible infert suum propri contra
dictorium.

In oppositum est philosophus, <hic> dicens quod esse <namque> hominem convertitur secundum <essentiae> consequentiam ad veram {de se} orationem. Nam si homo est, vera est oratio [in] qua dicitur quod homo est, {et verum est ita esse}.

Ad istud dubium dicunt moderni, expresse contradicentes Aristotelis, quod non est necesse propositionem converti cum propositione in qua ‘verum’ {verificatur} de {ipso} vel de

does not exist. Having said that, it is still the case that God exists, and yet this is not true, ‘God is’, because that which does not exist, is neither true nor false.

Likewise, this does not follow: ‘No statement exists, therefore this is true: ‘No statement exists’’, because something follows from the consequent that does not follow from the antecedent. For this is true, ‘No statement exists’, therefore some statement exists, because the antecedent is possible, and nothing possible infers its own proper contradictory.

In opposition is Aristotle, who say that being a human is converted according to consequence to a true sentence about itself. For if a human exists, the sentence is true in which it is said that a human exists, and if a sentence which states that a human exists, is true, it is the case that a human exists.

To that doubt, the moderni, expressly contradicting Aristotle, say that it is not necessary that a statement is converted with a statement in which ‘true’ is predicated of

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357 A
358 A, B
359 A
360 B
361 ‘esse’: B
362 A, B
363 ‘et si vera est oratio qua dicit quod homo est, verum est etiam in esse’: A
364 ‘enunciatur’: A, B
365 ‘seipsam’: A
suo dicto. Unde dicunt quod non sequitur <consequentia>\textsuperscript{366} ‘homo est, ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’’, quia posito quod homo sit, et ista proposition, ‘homo est’, non {existat}\textsuperscript{367}, tunc consequens est falsum et antecedens non [est falsum]\textsuperscript{368}. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia quod non est, non est verum nec falsum. Ista tamen consequentia secundum eos est bona, ‘homo est, ergo ita est quod homo est [in re]\textsuperscript{369}, sed ex hoc non sequitur quod haec sit vera, ‘homo est’.

Haec {opinio}\textsuperscript{370} {fundatur super hoc}\textsuperscript{371}, quod nulla proposition est vera nisi quando existit <actualiter>\textsuperscript{372}. Sed quia haec opinio est expresse contra Aristotelem, arguo contra eam, et primo contra fundamentum [<falsum>\textsuperscript{373} super]\textsuperscript{374} quo fundatur. Et probo quod proposition est vera quando non existit actu. <Et>\textsuperscript{375} Probo sic. Haec consequentia est bona, ‘aliaque proposition est falsa, ergo sua contradictoria est vera’, sed possible est quod una proposition {est}\textsuperscript{376} falsa quando sua contradictoria non existit. Ergo si sequitur aliqua proposition est it or of its dictum. Hence they say that this does not follow, ‘A human exists, there this is true, ‘A human exists’’, because, given the claim that a human exists, and this statement, ‘A human exists’, does not exist, the consequence is false and the antecedent is not false. The falsity of the consequent is clear, because that which does not exist is neither true nor false. However, this consequence is good according to them: ‘A human exists, therefore it is the case that there is a human in reality’, but from this it does not follow that this is true, ‘A human exists’.

This position is founded on this principle, that no statement is true when it does not exist. But because this opinion expressly contradicts Aristotle, I argue against it, and first against the principle which that position assumes. And so I prove that a statement is true when it does not actually exist in this way. This consequence is good, ‘Some statement is false, therefore its contradictory is true’. But it is possible that one statement is false when its contradictory does not exist. Therefore if it follows that some statement is false,
falsa, ergo sua contradictoria est vera, [ergo]\(^{377}\) propositio potest esse vera quando non existit. Quod autem [haec]\(^{378}\) consequentia, ‘alia propositio est falsa, ergo sua contradictoria est vera’, sit bona, patet per philosophum quinque *Metaphysica*.

Item, probatur consequentia praedicta <sic>\(^{379}\). Si aliqua propositio est falsa, [ipsa]\(^{380}\) habet contradictorium, et si [aliaqua]\(^{381}\) propositio est falsa, non habet falsam contradictorium, quia sic contradictoria essent simul falsa, quod est impossible. Ergo si aliqua propositio est falsa, habet contradictorium verum, et per consequens, si aliqua sit falsa, {suum contradictorium est verum}\(^{382}\).

Et si dicatur quod non sequitur, ‘si aliqua propositio est falsa, ergo habet contradictorium, {{quam}\(^{383}\) suum contradictorium non existit}\(^{384}\). Contra, secundum hoc non posset aliquis {reduci ad contradicionem, alias ad redargutionem};\(^{385}\) quia si [primo]\(^{386}\) concedat istam, ‘omnia oppositorum eadem

therefore its contradictory is true. Therefore a statement can be true when it does not exist. But that this consequence – ‘Some statement is false, therefore its contradictory is true’ – is good, is clear from what Aristotle says in *Metaphysics 5*.

Likewise, the consequence previously mentioned is proved in this way. If some statement is false, it has a contradictory, and if some statement is false, it does not have a false contradictory, because otherwise contradictories would be false at the same time, which is impossible. Therefore, if some statement is false, it has a true contradictory, and consequently if some statement is false, its contradictory is true.

And if it is said that it does not follow, ‘If some statement is false, therefore it has a contradictory’, because it does not have a contradictory when its own contradictory does not exist. On the contrary, according to this someone could never be forced into a *reductio ad absurdam*, because if he

\(^{377}\) A, B
\(^{378}\) ‘ista’: A
\(^{379}\) A, B
\(^{380}\) B
\(^{381}\) A
\(^{382}\) ‘habet suum contradictorium verum’: B
\(^{383}\) ‘quia’: A
\(^{384}\) ‘quia non habet contradictorium non quando suum contradictorium existit’: B
\(^{385}\) ‘reduci ad argumentum’: A; ‘male respondere nec esse sibi conclusum’: B
\(^{386}\) A
first concedes this, ‘Of all opposites the subject matter is the same’, and later he concedes the opposite, he would not concede contradictories, because we stipulated that when an affirmative statement exists, that its negative does not, and conversely. Given that position, he will not concede contradictories, because neither will an affirmative statement have being when a negative has being, nor conversely, because whenever one of those has being, the other will not have being, and so there will never be contradictories, and so no one could be refuted.

Again, this response destroys all disputation, because according to that response a respondent could never respond to a statement proposed by an opponent, since he will respond either while the opponent proposes the statement, or before the opponent has proposed it, or after. He will not respond while the opponent is proposing the statement, because then the opponent and the respondent
valde, quamvis sic dicentes ita se habeant de facto, [quia] semper garrulant simul. Nec {opportet} respondere ad dictum opposuerit priusquam {proposuerit}, quia sic nesciret ad {quod} {responderet}, quia sic nescit quid opponens intendat proponere, nec {habet} respondere postquam opponens proposuerit, quia postquam {proposuerit} propositio prolata ab opponente non existit, et per consequens non est vera nec falsa, et sic respondens numquam haberet respondere ad propositionem veram {nec} falsam. Et si dicatur quod respondens {opportet} respondere ad unam propositionem quam concipit per dictum {opponentis et non ad dictum opponentis}, Contra, ista propositio quam concipit non est in intellectu respondentis, quia [si] sic, respondens responderet ad suas propositiones et non [ad <g6vb> propositiones] opponentis, et similiter secundum hoc intellectus opponentis et intellectus respondentis non ferrentur ad idem.

would need to speak at the same time all at once, which is exceedingly problematic (although those who defend this view [i.e., the moderni] conduct their own arguments in this way, because they are always pointlessly rambling on at the same time). Nor is it necessary to respond to the dictum of the opponent before he has proposed it, because in the case the respondent would not know what he is responding to, because he does not know what the opponent intends to propose. Nor does he have to respond after the opponent has proposed it, because after the statement spoken by the opponent is proposed, it does not exist, and consequently is neither true nor false. And in this way a respondent would never have to respond to a true or false statement. And if it is said that the respondent needs to respond to a statement which he conceives through the dictum of the opponent, and not to the dictum of the opponent itself. On the contrary, that statement which he conceives is not in the intellect of the respondent, because, if it were, the respondent would respond to his own statement and not to the statement of the opponent. Likewise according to this
position, the intellect of the opponent and the intellect of
the respondent would not be directed at the same thing.

Again, if a statement is not true except when it exists, all
these rules would be false – ‘The antecedent is true,
therefore also the consequent’, ‘The consequent is false,
therefore also the antecedent’ – because an antecedent can
be true when the consequent does not exist, and the
consequent can be false when the antecedent does not exist.

Likewise, it follows that no one would be able to express a
ttrue conditional, because when the antecedent is being
uttered, then the consequent is not being uttered, and
consequently then the consequent does not exist, and when
it does not exist, then it does not follow from the other.
Therefore when the antecedent is uttered, then the
consequence does not hold, because then the consequent
does not follow from the antecedent, nor is the conditional
et per consequens tunc antecedens non existit, [et] ex eo quod non existit non sequitur [ex] aliiquid. Ergo quando consequens profertur, tunc conditionalis non est vera, et per idem patet nulla conditionalis in {probatione} \(^{425}\) {esset} \(^{426}\) vera. Item, probo hanc consequentiam <aliter> \(^{427}\), ‘homo est, ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’, {quia} \(^{428}\) antedens nunquam potest esse verum sine consequente. <Nunquam nam potest haec esse vera, ‘homo est’, nisi haec sit vera, ‘homo est, haec est vera, ‘homo est’> \(^{429}\).

Item, de hoc quod dicunt quod haec consequentia est bona, ‘homo est, ergo ita est in re quod homo est’, quaero de {consequentiae} \(^{430}\) {consequentiae} \(^{431}\), cum sit propositio cathegorica, quid est ibi subiectum vel quid est ibi praedicatum? {Non potest dici nisi quod istud, scilicet quod ‘homo est’ sit subiectum, et {‘ita est in re’ est praedicatum} \(^{432}\), et tunc idem est dicere ‘{ita} \(^{433}\) est in re quod homo est’, et true, and likewise when the consequent is uttered, then the antecedent is not uttered, and consequently then the antecedent does not exist, and from the fact that it does not exist, nothing follows from it. Therefore when the consequent is uttered, then the conditional is not true, and through the same reasoning it is clear that no conditional in a proof is true. Likewise, I prove this consequence, ‘A human exists, therefore this is true, ‘A human exists’, because the antecedent can never be true without the consequent. For this can never be true, ‘A human exists’, unless this is true, ‘A human exists, therefore this is true, ‘A human exists’.

Likewise, from the fact that they say that this consequence is good, ‘A human exists, therefore so it is in reality, that a human exists’, I ask: what is its subject and what is its predicate of the consequent of this consequence (since it is a categorical statement)? Nothing except this can be said, namely that ‘human exists’ is the subject, and ‘so it is in reality’ is the predicate, and then it is the same thing to say

\(^{422}\) B  
\(^{423}\) B  
\(^{424}\) A  
\(^{425}\) ‘prolatione’: A, B  
\(^{426}\) ‘est’: A  
\(^{427}\) A  
\(^{428}\) ‘quam’: B  
\(^{429}\) A  
\(^{430}\) ‘existentia’: B  
\(^{431}\) ‘conditionalis’: B  
\(^{432}\) ‘illud praedicatum, scilicet ‘ita est in re’: A  
\(^{433}\) ‘idem’: A
dicere ‘verum est quod homo est’; quia Aristoteles, ut patet hic in textu, pro eodem habet esse verum et esse ita in re. Ergo, si sequitur, ‘homo est, ergo ita est in re quod homo est’, <ergo> sequitur eodem modo, ‘homo est, ergo verum est quod homo est’.

So it is in reality that a human exists’ and to say ‘It is true that a human exists’, because Aristotle, as is clear here in this text, has ‘being true’ and ‘being so in reality’ for the same thing. Therefore, if it follows, ‘A human exists, therefore so it is in reality that a human exists’, it follows in the same way, ‘A human exists, therefore it is true that a human exists’.

Therefore especially because of the dictum of Aristotle and because of my respect for the ancients, I say that a statement is converted with a statement in which ‘true’ is said of that statement, just as Aristotle says here, whose reason is that because a statement asserts it to be so in reality, so too the statement signifies a statement to be true, and therefore every statement asserts itself to be true.

And if it is said that these are not the same, that a statement is true and also that so it is in reality just as the statement

\textsuperscript{442} scilicet propositionem esse veram et ita esse in re sicut propositionio significat': B;
{sic dictum arguitur} 443, ita est in re quod homo est, haec est una propositio vera. Quero tunc quid est subjectum in ista. Aut {hoc} 444 quod dico, scilicet ‘homo est’, aut hoc quod dico, ‘ita est in re’. Si dicitur primum, tunc haec conditionalis est vera, ‘si verum est quod homo est, ita est in re [quod homo est]’ 445. Sed posito quod haec propositio non existat, [scilicet] 446 quod homo est’, de ipsa non affirmatur vere hoc, [scilicet] 447 quod homo est in re, quia eadem ratione posset verum affirmari pro ipsa. Et quicquid potest argui contra istam {quod homo est ita est in re, in hac propositione ‘ita est in re’ vere praedicatur de propositione non existente, sic ‘esse verum’ est praedicatur de propositione non existente} 448.

Si detur {quod ita est in re quod homo est, si dicis ‘quod homo est’ est ex parte praedicati} 449. {Contra} 450, in {sua} 451 conversa erit ex parte subiecti, et erit ista propositione vera, ‘quod homo est, ita est in re’, et sic de propositione non existente, sic ‘esse verum’ praedicatur de propositione non existente.

signifies. On the contrary, having said ‘So in reality that a human exists’, this is a true statement. I ask then what is the subject in it. Either it is this, ‘Human exists’, or this, ‘so it is in reality’. If the first is said to be the subject, then this conditional is true, ‘If it is true that a human exists, it is in reality that a human exists’. But given that this statement does not exist, namely ‘A human exists’, this is not truly affirmed of it, namely ‘so it is in reality’, because by the same account ‘true’ could be affirmed of it. And whatever can be argued against this, that a human exists is true’, can also be argued against this, that a human exists is so in reality. Therefore, just as ‘so it is in reality’ can be truly predicated of a statement which does not exist, so too ‘being true’ is predicated of a statement which does not exist.

If it is denied that in ‘It is so in reality that a human exists’, that which I say, ‘that a human exists’ is part of the predicate. On the contrary, in its converse it will be part of the subject, and this statement, ‘That a human exists, is so

\[\text{\{sic dicto\}}\text{A; \{sico\}B}\]
\[\text{\{quod huius modi\}B}\]
\[\text{\{Contra\}A, B}\]
\[\text{\{sua\}A, B}\]
\[\text{\{quod ‘homo est, est vera’, potest etiam argui contra illum, quod ‘homo est, ita est in re’, ergo sicut ‘ita est in re’ vere praedicatur de propositione non existente, sic ‘esse verum’ praedicatur de propositione non existente\}: A; ‘homo est, est vera’, potest etiam argui contra illum, ‘homo est, ita est in re’, quia nihil vere praedicatur de propositione non existente\}: B\]
\[\text{\{quod in ‘ita est in re quod homo est’, hoc quod dico, ‘quod homo est’, est ex parte praedicati\}: A; ‘secundum, scilicet quod hoc quod dico, quod homo est, sit praedicatum\}: B\]
\[\text{\{tunc\}A, B}\]
\[\text{\{una\}: B}\]
existente affirmatur aliquid, scilicet ‘ita est in re’, et eodem modo potest verum <vere> affirmari de propositione [non] existente.

Item probo hanc conditionalem, ‘si homo est, haec propositio, ‘homo est’, est vera’, quia haec est quaedam conditionalis, ergo habet antecedens et consequens et nihil est antecedens nisi propositio, et quicquid sequitur ex antecedente et consequente sequitur ex antecedente per se. Sed [ex antecedente per se] sequitur ‘homo est’, et ‘homo est’ est propositio. Ergo ‘homo est’ non est propositio falsa. [Modo ergo ex istis tribus sequitur quod ‘homo est’ est vera propositio. Sequitur enim ‘homo est’, et ‘homo est’ est propositio, et non est propositio falsa]. [Ergo est propositio vera, [et quicquid sequitur ex antecedente et suis consequentibus sequitur ex antecedente per se]. Ergo sequitur ‘homo est] , ergo ‘homo est’ est propositio vera’. 

in reality’ will be true, and so something is affirmed of a statement which does not exist, namely ‘is so in reality’, and in the same way ‘true’ can truly be affirmed of a statement which does not exist.

Likewise, I prove this conditional: ‘If a human exists, this statement, ‘A human exists’, is true’, because this is a certain conditional, therefore it has an antecedent and a consequent and nothing is an antecedent except a statement, and whatever follows from the antecedent and the consequent follows from the antecedent per se. But ‘A human exists’ follows from it, and ‘A human exists’ is a statement. Therefore, ‘A human exists’ is not a false statement. Therefore, in this way, from these three, it follows that ‘A human exists’ is a true statement. For ‘A human exists’ follows, and ‘A human exists’ is a statement, and it is not a false statement. Therefore it is a true statement, and whatever follows from an antecedent and its consequent follows from the antecedent per se. Therefore it follows, ‘A human exists, therefore ‘A human exists’ is a true statement’.
But if this conditional is denied: ‘If a human exists, ‘A human exists’ is a true statement’. On the contrary, that conditional cannot be false, because if that conditional is false, then the consequent of this conditional is true. Therefore the conditional is true ut nunc, because something true ut nunc follows from everything, and so the conditional can never be false, because if it is conceded that in some nunc it would be false, it follows that in the same nunc it would be true. Proof of the major: because if this conditional were false, then it has an antecedent from which the consequent does not follow. But nothing is an antecedent unless it is a statement. Therefore if the conditional is false, then the consequent of the conditional is a statement, and consequently if this conditional, ‘If a human exists, ‘A human exists’ is a statement’, is false, it follows that a human exists, because its antecedent is a statement. Therefore if the previously mentioned conditional is false, it follows that the consequent of the conditional is true, or at least it follows that it is so in
ergo haec est vera, ‘homo est’", sicut Aristoteles dicit.\textsuperscript{470}

Ad primum in contrarium, dico quod haec consequentia est bona, ‘haec est vera, ‘homo est asinus’, ergo homo est asinus’, et antecedens est impossible sicut consequens demonstrando istam, ‘homo est asinus’, [in]\textsuperscript{471} terminis sic significantibus sicut modo significant apud nos. Et quando dicitur quod isti termini possunt significare alia, scilicet deum et bonum, dico quod si istae voces imponuntur ad significandum alia, [illa]\textsuperscript{472} erit alia propositio quam modo est, quia propositio habet identitatem suam vel diversitatem ab identitate vel diversitate significatorum per terminos propositionis, quod patet per Aristotelem, primo Perihermeneias, qui dicit quod si ‘tunica’ imponatur ad significandum hominem et equum, ista oratio, ‘tunica est alba’, non est una oratio in una significacione et in alia, sed plures sunt orationes. Una quae significat quod homo est albus, et alia quae significat quod equus est albus. Et [ex]\textsuperscript{473} hoc arguo non minus est oratio diversa ex diversitate significatorum in diversis temporibus quam ex diversitate significatorum in eodem tempore, quia causa diversitatis semper manet eadem, scilicet diversitas significatorum. Cum ergo isti termini, ‘homo’ et ‘asinus’, non significant idem in reality just as the consequent signifies, and consequently the consequence is good. Therefore I say that this consequence is good, ‘A human exists, therefore this is true, ‘A human exists”, just as Aristotle says.

To the first argument to the contrary, I say that this consequence is good, ‘This is true, ‘A human is an ass”, therefore a human is an ass’, and the antecedent is impossible just as the consequent, by using this statement, ‘A human is an ass’, with the terms signifying in just the way they signify with us. And when it is said that those terms can signify other things, namely God and something good, I say that if those utterances are made to signify other things, then it will be a different statement than it is when the terms signify as they do for us now, because a statement has its identity or diversity from the identity or diversity of the things signified through the terms of the statement. This is clear from Aristotle, who says in the first book of the Perihermeneias that if ‘tunic’ is made to signify a human and a horse, this sentence, ‘A tunic is white’, is not one sentence with two different significates, but rather there are two sentences: one which signifies that a human is white, and another which signifies that a horse is white. And from this I argue that no less is a sentence diverse from the diversity of significates at different times than from the

\textsuperscript{470} A, B
\textsuperscript{471} A, B
\textsuperscript{472} A
\textsuperscript{473} A
eodem tempore, sed uterque vel aliter significet multa et diversa, sequitur quod \textit{haec} \textsuperscript{474} oratio non est una sed plures. Eodem modo si uterque illorum terminorum vel aliter significet diversa in diversis temporibus, non erit propositio una nec eadem \textit{propositio} \textsuperscript{475} nisi materialiter, sed altero \textit{<istorum>} \textsuperscript{476} terminorum vel utroque significante diversa in diversis temporibus erit alia et alia propositio in temporibus diversis in quibus unum \textit{significat} \textsuperscript{477} in uno tempore, et aliud in alio tempore, quamvis materialiter sint eadem.

Et si dicatur quod voces sunt eaedem, et oratio non est nisi vox, ergo oratio est eadem quantcumque termi significent diversa, dicendum \textit{est} \textsuperscript{478} quod vox est \{materiale\} \textsuperscript{479} in propositione prolata \{et\} \textsuperscript{480} respectus ad significatum per vocem est formale in propositione, et ideo si significata \{in propositione\} \textsuperscript{481} \{sint et\} \textsuperscript{482} \{fiant\} \textsuperscript{483} diversa \{respectus ad significata\} \textsuperscript{484}, erunt diversi \{propositiones\} \textsuperscript{485}, et sic non
diversity of signicates at the same time, because the cause of diversity always remains the same, namely the diversity of the signicates. Therefore since these terms, ‘human’ and ‘ass’, do not signify the same thing at the same time, but both or either signify many and diverse things, it follows that this sentence is not one but many. In the same way, if either or both of those terms signify diverse things at different times, it will not be one and the same statement except materially. For, by either of the terms or by both signifying diverse things at different times, there will be one statement signifying one thing at one time and another statement signifying another statement at another time, although materially they would be the same.

And if it is said that the utterances are the same, and that a sentence is nothing other than an utterance, therefore a sentence is the same, however much the terms signify diverse things, it must be said that an utterance is the material in a spoken statement and the \textit{respectus} to a significate through the utterance is the formal element in a statement, and therefore if the signicates are diverse, they

\footnotesize
\begin{enumerate}
  \item \textit{ista}: A
  \item \textit{uterque istorum}: A
  \item \textit{significatur}: A
  \item \textit{est}: A
  \item \textit{materiale}: A
  \item \textit{propositio}: A
  \item \textit{sunt}: A
  \item \textit{materialis}: A
  \item \textit{propositiones}: A
\end{enumerate}
manebit propositio eadem quantum ad suum formalem, \[\text{quamvis maneat eadem quantum ad suum materiale. Et propter hoc est dicendum} \]
that it does not remain the same with respect to its formal element, although it remains the same with respect to its material elements. And on account of this it must be said that this statement, 'A human is an ass', can never be true by indicating a statement in which this term, 'human', signifies a rational animal, and this term, 'ass', signifies an irrational animal. However, another statement composed to signify different significates, as was argued earlier. But that statement is not the same statement in which 'human' signifies a rational animal, and 'ass' signifies an irrational animal, except materially, as was said.

To that other reason, when it is proved that it does not follow, 'God exists, therefore this is true, 'God exists''., because it is possible that this statement, 'God exists', does not exist, and consequently it is possible that it is not true, it must be said that the consequence is good. 'God exists, therefore this is true, 'God exists'.' And I say that this does not follow: 'This statement does not exist, therefore it is
aliud quam <ipsam> significare, vel esse significativam, sicut in re. Sed haec propositio, ‘deus est’, terminis significantibus sicut {nunc} significant, semper significat sicut est <modo> in re, sive <haec> propositio sit sive non sit. Quod patet, quia si in disputatione opponens proponat ista, ‘deus est’, respondens habet istam concedere, si non obligetur ad oppositum. Sed non concedit istam quando profertur, quia tunc opponens et respondens {similiter habent} loqui, quod non est verum. Et quando non profertur, tunc non est. Ergo, habet concedere [illam] quando non est. Et {non} concedere non obligatur nisi verum. Ergo haec est {verum}, quando non est.

[Et] confirmatur. Nam postquam {ipsa} est prolata, <ipsam> est {obiecta} memoriae, quia aliter opponens non haberet nec habere posset memoriam de prolatis a respondente, quod est inconveniens, quia tunc nunquam bene posset respondere. Ergo quando propositio non est, potest esse not true’ – because for a statement to be true is nothing other than for it to signify, or to be significative, just as it is in reality. But this statement, ‘God exists’, its terms signifying just as they do now, always signifies just as it is in reality, whether that statement exists or not. That is clear, because if in a disputation the opponent utters this statement, ‘God exists’, the respondent has to concede it, if he is not obligated to the opposite. But he does not concede it when it is uttered, because then the opponent and respondent would have to speak at the same time, which is not true. And when it is not uttered, then it does not exist. Therefore, he has to concede the statement when it does not exist. And he is not obligated to concede it unless it is true. Therefore, it is true, when it does not exist.

This is confirmed. For after a statement is spoken, it is an object of memory, because otherwise the opponent would not have or be able to have a memory of the statement spoken by the respondent, which is problematic, because then the respondent would never be able to respond well.
Therefore, when a statement does not exist, it can be an object of memory, and consequently it can be an object for the intellect, and so when the statement does not exist, it signifies something to the intellect by which it is understood. Therefore, it signifies something true or something false. But this, ‘God exists’, does not signify something false. Therefore, ‘God exists’, when it does not exist, signifies something true. This is also clear, for assume that a respondent judges correctly about the things spoken by an opponent after they are spoken, whether they are true or false, and according to how he judges so he responds. Therefore that which is nothing except objectively in the intellect is judged to be true or false, and consequently is true or false.

Likewise, that which does not exist can signify something, as it clear, because oftentimes that which does not exist appears to one’s senses or intellect, and the intellect through a representation of it thinks about something, and so something which does not exist can be present to the

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506 ‘obiectam’: A, B
507 ‘ipsi intellectu’: A, B
508 A
509 A
510 A
511 ‘quaecumque’: B
512 ‘aliud’: B
513 ‘et’: A, B
514 ‘per praesentationem’: A; ‘per praesentationem’: B
515 ‘praesentare’: A
516 A
etiam\textsuperscript{517} in somnis in quibus aliquando videtur {somnianti}\textsuperscript{518} quod loquatur cum {mortuis}\textsuperscript{519}, vel [quod]\textsuperscript{520} videt montem aureum, et huiusmodi non entia apparentia intellectui in somno aliquid significat {somnianti}\textsuperscript{521}, et tamen non sunt in rerum natura. {Quia ergo propositio quae non existit in rerum natura, existens tamen in intellectu obiective, potest significare verum vel falsum, et per consequens aliiquid significare intellectui}\textsuperscript{522}. <Et quoniam intelligitur>\textsuperscript{523}, dico ergo quod propositio quae non est in rerum natura quae tamen {actualiter intellecta}\textsuperscript{524} significat {intellectui}\textsuperscript{525} verum vel falsum, et per consequens est vera vel falsa, quia propositio non est vera nisi quia est significativa veri.

Intelligendum quod possibile est intellectum intelligere propositionem quae significat deum esse, non intelligendo istam, ‘deus est’, quae fuit prolata a me, nec intelligendo illam quae fuit prolata ab alio, sed intelligendo unum commune abstractum per intellectum a {qualibus}\textsuperscript{526} propositione tali vel consimili. Unde licet universale non haberet esse existere extra animam, sicut dicunt moderni, tamen non est dubium quin intellect. This happens in sleep, where sometimes it seems to someone sleeping that he talks with the dead, or that he sees a golden mountain or other non-beings of this sort, appearing to the intellect in sleep, signify something to the person sleeping, and yet they do not in fact exist. Therefore because a statement which does not in fact exist, though existing in the intellect objectively, can signify something true or something false, and consequently can signify something to the intellect, I say that a statement which does not in fact exist, which yet actually is thought, signifies something true or something false to the intellect, and consequently is true or false, because a statement is not true unless because it is significative of something true.

\textsuperscript{517} B
\textsuperscript{518} ‘somnolento’: B
\textsuperscript{519} ‘mortuo’: A, B
\textsuperscript{520} A
\textsuperscript{521} ‘somnolento’: B
\textsuperscript{522} ‘quare ergo negetur propositio quae non existit in rerum natura non potest aliiquid significare intellectui et quomodo intellectur’: A; ‘quare igitur negatur propositio quae non existit in rerum natura aliud significare intellectui’: B
\textsuperscript{523} B
\textsuperscript{524} ‘est accidentaliter’: B
\textsuperscript{525} ‘intentioni’: B
\textsuperscript{526} ‘qualibet’: A
secundum {omnes} \textsuperscript{527} universale habet esse {obiective} \textsuperscript{528} in intellectu. Potest {nam} \textsuperscript{529} intellectus intelligere leonem vel elephantem [in universali, non intelligendo istum leonem \textit{animal} \textsuperscript{530} nec istum elephantem \textit{animal} \textsuperscript{531}] \textsuperscript{532}, et eodem modo potest intellectus intelligere unum commune cuilibet tali propositioni, scilicet huic, ‘deus est’, prolatae a me, et huic, ‘deus est’, prolatae a Socrate, et sic de aliis. Credo quod in {disputatione} \textsuperscript{533} opponens et respondens {fuerunt} \textsuperscript{534} intellectus suos ad talia communia omnibus propositionibus prolatis de quibus disputant, et {fuerunt} \textsuperscript{535} intellectus suos ad idem, et sic {patet} \textsuperscript{536} quod respondens potest redargui, quia potest idem concedere et negare \textit{scilicet} \textsuperscript{537} unum commune multis individuis propositionibus omnino similibus. Eadem tamen propositionem individuam non potest intellectus concedere et negare, quia idem individuum propositionis non potest bis proferri.

Conta hoc – quod dicitur quod propositio, quando non est, est vera vel falsa – potest argui quia si talis propositio quae non outside the soul, yet there is no doubt but that, according to them, a universal has subjective being in the intellect. For the intellect can think about a lion or an elephant in the universal, not by thinking this lion or this elephant. In the same way the intellect can think one thing common to each such statement, namely this, ‘God exists’, spoken by me, and this, ‘God exists’, spoken by Socrates, and so on for the rest. I believe that in a disputation the opponent and the respondent have directed their intellects to such a thing common to all the spoken statements about which they dispute, and they direct their intellects to the same thing, and so it is clear that a respondent can be refuted, because he is able to concede and to deny one thing common to many individual, completely similar statements. However, the intellect cannot concede and deny the very same particular statement, because the same particular statement cannot be uttered twice.

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{527} ‘eos’: B
\textsuperscript{528} ‘obiective’: A, B
\textsuperscript{529} ‘enim’: A, B
\textsuperscript{530} B
\textsuperscript{531} B
\textsuperscript{532} A
\textsuperscript{533} ‘disputationibus’: A
\textsuperscript{534} ‘fuerunt’: A, B
\textsuperscript{535} ‘fuerunt’: A, B
\textsuperscript{536} ‘potest salvari’: A
\textsuperscript{537} A
est, est vera [vel falsa]\(^{538}\), ergo est propositio, et per consequens oratio. Sed omnis oratio est vox, et omnis vox est qualitas. Ergo propositio quae non est, est qualitas, et per consequens propositio quae non est, est. Item veritas propositionis est accidens propositionis, et [omne]\(^{539}\) accidens est in subiecto existente. Ergo si veritas insit propositioni quae non est, {videtur}\(^{540}\) quod propositio quae non est, {existat}\(^{541}\).

Ad primum, {dico concedendo}\(^{542}\) quod propositio quae non est, est vera, et potest concedi quod est propositio, et etiam <quod est>\(^{543}\) oratio. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sit vox, sed {illa}\(^{544}\) descriptio {orationis}\(^{545}\), sciliet quod oratio est vox significativa, {et cetera} \(^{546}\), datur de oratione {actu}\(^{547}\) prolata, non autem competit orationi habenti solum esse {obiective}\(^{548}\) in intellectu, vel potest haec consequentia negari, 'propositio quae non est, est propositio, ergo est oratio', quia oratio solum <est>\(^{549}\) genus propositionis prolatae, et non which does not exist is true or false, therefore it is a statement, and consequently a sentence. But every sentence is an utterance, and every utterance is a quality. Therefore a statement which does not exist, is a quality, and consequently a statement which does not exist, exists. Likewise, the truth of a statement is an accident of the statement, and every accident is in an existing subject. Therefore, if truth is in a statement which does not exist, it seems that a statement which does not exist, exists.

To the first, I respond by conceding that a statement which does not exist is true, and it can be conceded that it is a statement, and even that it is a sentence, but from this it does not follow that it is an utterance. That description of a sentence, namely that a sentence is a significative utterance, etc., is said about a sentence actually spoken, but does not apply to a sentence having only objective being in the intellect. Or, alternatively, this consequence can be rejected, 'A statement which does not exist, is a
est genus propositionis habentis esse \{obiective\}\textsuperscript{550} [in intellectu tantum]\textsuperscript{551}.

Sciendum quod propositio habet esse \{quattuor\}\textsuperscript{552} modis, scilicet in scripto, in prolatione, et <etiam>\textsuperscript{553} in mente, et \{etiam in re\}\textsuperscript{554}, ut visum est \{superius in isto libro\}\textsuperscript{555}. <Et>\textsuperscript{556} propositio in mente est duplex, quia quaedam habet esse <solum>\textsuperscript{557} subiective in mente, et talis propositio componitur ex conceptibus, et quaedam est propositio habens esse \{obiective\}\textsuperscript{558} in intellectu, et huiusmodi propositio componitur solum secundum considerationem intellectus, [et]\textsuperscript{559} ex partibus habentibus solum esse obiective in intellectu, sive sint voces praeteritae sive futurae, \{et sic de aliis\}\textsuperscript{560}. Item propositio existens in sola consideratione intellectus significat intellectum verum vel falsum, et hoc est satis intelligibile omni intellectui bene disposito.

Ad aliud cum dicitur veritas propositionis est accidens statement, therefore it is a sentence’, because a sentence is only a genus of a spoken statement, and it is not a genus of a statement having only objective being in the intellect.

We must know that a statement has being in four ways, namely in writing, in speech, and in the mind, and also in reality, as was seen earlier in this book. A statement in the mind is of two kinds, because a certain kind has subjective being in the mind, and a statement of this sort is composed out of concepts, and a certain kind is a statement having objective being in the intellect, and a statement of this sort is composed solely according to the consideration of the intellect, and out of parts having only objective being in the intellect, whether those parts are utterances from the past or from the future, and so on for the rest. Likewise, a statement existing solely in the consideration of the intellect signifies a true or false intellect, and this is intelligible enough to each intellect with a keen disposition.

To the other, when it is said that the truth of a statement is

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{550} ‘subiective’: A, B
\textsuperscript{551} A
\textsuperscript{552} ‘quinque’: B
\textsuperscript{553} A
\textsuperscript{554} ‘quoddam’: A
\textsuperscript{555} ‘in principio illius libri’: A
\textsuperscript{556} A
\textsuperscript{557} B
\textsuperscript{558} ‘obiectivum’: A, B
\textsuperscript{559} A
\textsuperscript{560} ‘sive sunt fines (?) praeteritae sive futurae’: A
propositionis, dicendum quod quando propositio existit, tunc veritas propositionis est <actualis>\(^{561}\) accidentis eius, sed quando propositio est praeterita [vel]\(^{562}\) non existens in actu, tunc non est concedendum quod veritas propositionis illius sit accidentis, sed quod fuit accidentis.

\{Sed\}\(^{563}\) si dicatur quod \(<\text{si}>\)\(^{564}\) a sit verum, et sit \(<a>\)\(^{565}\) propositio quae non est, ergo veritas inest ipsi, a, sed accidentis \{esse est inesse\} \(^{566}\), ergo si veritas inest a, \{ita est\} \(^{567}\) quod illa veritas est, et per consequens suum subjectum est, \(<\text{est}>\)\(^{568}\) dicendum quod aliquid inesse aliqui potest esse dupliciter: vel tanquam praedicatum subjecto de quo praedicatur, vel tanquam accidentis subjecto cui inhaeret. Dico tunc quod bene sequitur, \(\text{‘a est verum, ergo veritas sive verum inest ipsi, a, tanquam praedicatum subjecto’}\). Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod illa veritas \{quae inest\} \(^{569}\) alciui tanquam praedicatum \{subjecto\} \(^{570}\) presupponat illud esse, \{nec\} \(^{571}\) sequitur \(\text{‘a est verum, ergo veritas inest ipsi, a, tanquam accidentis subjecto’}\).

But if it is said that \(a\) is true, and it is a statement which does not exist, therefore truth is in this, \(a\), but being an accident is being-in, therefore if truth is in \(a\), it is the case that that truth exists, and consequently its subject exists, it must be said that something can be in another in two ways: either as a predicate in the subject of which it is predicated, or as an accident in which it inheres. I say then that this rightly follows, \(\text{‘a is true, therefore truth or something true is in this, a, as a predicate in a subject’}\). But from this it does not follow that that truth which is in something as a predicate in a subject presupposes that it exists, nor does it follow, \(\text{‘a is true, therefore truth is in}\).
{Etiam} propter hoc non sequitur, ‘a est verum, ergo veritas ipsius, a, est’, nec etiam {quod a est, et cetera}.

this, a, as an accident in a subject’. Also, on account of this, this consequence does not follow, ‘a is true, therefore the truth of this, a, exists’, nor even that a exists, etc.

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572 ‘et’: A, B
573 ‘sequitur quod ipsum, a, est’: A
APPENDIX D: TRANScriPTION AND TRANSLATION OF BURLEY’S LATE COMMENTARY ON DE INTERPRETATIONE (SELECTIONS)\(^1\)

Expositio super Librum Perihermeneias, Capitula 1-3

Gualterus Burlaeus

From ‘Concerning the Old Logic of Aristotle and Porphyry’, Venice, 1497

<Capitulum 1: Prologus>

First it is necessary to establish what a noun is.

This book, which at present we intend to set out briefly, has as its subject the statement. But because Boethius says that

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\(^1\) The base text for this appendix is the 1497 Venice edition of Burley’s late commentary on the old logic (i.e., the Super Artem Veterem). However, I also include disagreements in the sections I have translated between that text and two earlier manuscripts: Magdalen 146 (‘A’), written during the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century, and Canon Misc 460 (‘B’), written during the fifteenth century. I indicate that one or more manuscripts omit a section of the text found in the 1497 edition with square brackets ([ ]), where anything within the brackets is found in the 1497 edition but is not found in the relevant manuscript(s). Occasionally, one manuscript will omit a word or phrase, while the other includes a variation. In that case, I include the variant in the footnote, indicating which manuscript contains the variant and which manuscript contains the omission. I indicate that one or more of the manuscripts includes text not found in the 1497 edition with corner brackets (<>), including within those brackets the text found in the relevant manuscript(s). When an omission is not at issue, I indicate a variation between one or more manuscripts and the 1497 edition with brace brackets ({}), placing the manuscript variant(s) in a footnote. I ignore mere differences in word order (e.g. ‘subjectum et praedicatum’ vs. ‘praedicatum et subjectum’) among the texts.

\(^2\) A; ‘primum oportet constituere’: B

\(^3\) ‘liber Perihermeneias’: A; ‘librum Perihermeneias’: B

\(^4\) A, B
Boethius dicit quod interpretatio est hic subiectum, {notandum est}⁷ quod interpretatio dicitur {triplex}⁸. Uno modo interpretatio est expositio unius linguae per aliam. Alio modo idem est quod vox significativa, et hoc sive sit⁹ vox complexa sive incomplexa, et <ideo>¹⁰ isto modo sic describitur – Interpretatio est vox litterata {cum interpretatione}¹¹ significandi prolata – et sic quaelibet vox {qui}¹² per se aliquid significat {ex impositione}¹³ sive sit complexa sive incomplexa dicitur interpretatio. Sed interiectiones, coniunctiones et huiusmodi <et>¹⁴ etiam voces naturaliter significantes {et}¹⁵ voces animalium brutorum non debent dici interpretationes. Tertio modo interpretatio idem est quod vox litterata verum vel falsum significans, et isto <tertio>¹⁶ modo sola enunciatio est interpretatio, et nomina et verba non sunt interpretationes, sed sunt [termini et]¹⁷ principia {interpretationis}¹⁸.

interpretation is the subject of this book, we need to note that interpretation is spoken of in three ways. In one way, an interpretation is the exposition of one tongue by another. In another way, an interpretation is the same as a significative utterance, regardless of whether it is a complex utterance or a non-complex utterance, and it is described in this way here: an interpretation is a written utterance signifying a spoken utterance, and so each utterance which per se signifies something by imposition is called an interpretation, whether it is complex or non-complex. But interjections, conjunctions and things of this sort (also utterances signifying naturally, such as the utterances of brute animals) ought not be called interpretations. In a third way, an interpretation is the same as a written utterance signifying something true or something false, and in this way a statement alone is an interpretation, and nouns and verbs are not interpretations, but are principles of interpretation.
Si ergo quaeratur quod est subiectum {huius} scientiae, dicendum <est> quod scientiae hic traditae est duplex subiectum, scilicet subiectum commune et subiectum speciale. Subiectum commune est illud quod continet omnia de quibus {in isto libro consideratur} Subiectum speciale est illud cuius cognitio principiter {inquiritur} in {isto} libro. Unde interpretatio secundum quod est communis ad quamlibet vocem significantem ad placitum sive sit complexa sive incomplexa est subiectum [commune] huius libri. Sed interpretatio tertio <modo> dicta <scilicet> secundum quod est idem quid enunciatio, est subiectum principale hic, et [est] speciale.

Iste liber continet duos libros {partiales}. In primo determinatur de principiis et speciebus enunciationis absolute. In secundo ibi: Quoniam <de capitulo> autem affirmatio, determinatur de enunciatione coniuncta {ad aliquod} sibi additum, [ut ad terminum modalem vel oppositionem].

Therefore if one asks what the subject of this science is, we must say that the subject of the science set out in this work is of two sorts, namely, a general subject and a specific subject. The general subject is that which contains everything which is per se defined in this science. The specific subject is that which the understanding principally inquires into in this book. Hence interpretation insofar as it is common to every conventionally significative utterance, whether it is complex or non-complex, is the general subject of this book. But interpretation stated in the third way, according to which it is the same as what a statement is, is the principal and specific subject of this work.


defines a statement absolutely, and in the second book he defines the quality and quality of a statement and then the contrariety of a statement, one after the other. The first book contains two tracts. In the first tract, Aristotle defines the principles of a statement and its species. In the second, which begins And yet not every statement, the statement and its species themselves are defined. The first tract contains three chapters. In the first chapter, Aristotle gives the introduction. In the second, he investigates certain things common to nouns and verbs, which are the integral parts of a statement. In the third, which begins A sentence is an utterance, Aristotle defines the sentence, which is the nearest genus of a statement. The first chapter contains three parts. In the first, Aristotle provides an introduction. In the second, which begins Therefore those are, he investigates a property common to a noun, a verb, and a

statement, which is to signify conventionally. And through this he investigates a remote genus of a statement, which is the conventionally significative utterance. In this third, which begins *Yet how is it*, Aristotle sets out how conventionally significant utterances – nouns, verbs, and statements – differ in the way in which they signify. Therefore, in the first part, he gives a prologue, in which he set out four notions that must be defined later. First, he sets out the integral parts of the subject of this science, which are the noun and the verb. Second, he sets out the subjective parts of the subject of this science, which are affirmation and negation, namely, an affirmative statement and a negative statement. Third, he sets out the subject itself which first and foremost he means to define, which is the statement. Fourth, he sets out the genus of the subject, which is a sentence. Hence for each of these it is necessary to establish what a noun is and what a verb is.
Notandum sunt hic tria. <Et> primo notandum est secundum Boethium {supra} predicamenta [et hic], quod philosophus in praedicamentis <et etiam hic> determinat de vocibus incomplexis <sed diversimode. In praedicamentis enim determinat de incomplexis> quae sunt nomina rerum, et hic determinat de incomplexis quae sunt nomina nominum, hoc est, quae sunt communia solum vocibus significationis ad placitum, cuiusmodi sunt nomen et verbum.

We need to note three things here. First, we need to note that, according to Boethius when he comments on the Categories, both in the Categories and here, Aristotle defines non-complex utterances, but in different ways. For, in the Categories, Aristotle defines non-complex utterances which are names of things, and in this work he defines non-complex utterances which are names of names, that is, which are only common to conventionally significative utterances, of which kinds are nouns and verbs.

Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum <secundum Boethium item> quod quaedam sunt nomina primae impositionis, et quaedam sunt nomina secundae impositionis. [Nam] nomina secundae impositionis sunt nomina <quae> solum <significant> communia signis ad placitum <k3rb> institutis vel eorum <propriis> accidentibus, cuiusmodi sunt ‘nomen’ et ‘verbum’. Ista {nam} solum sunt communia solum nomini et verbo significantibus ex institutione, et ideo sunt nomina secundae impositionis [vel intentionis]. Illa vero nomina

For evidence of this, we need to recognize that certain utterances are names of first imposition, and certain utterances are names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are names which signify things common only to signs instituted conventionally, or to accidents of them, of which sort are ‘noun’ and ‘verb’. For these are common only to a noun and a verb signifying by institution, and therefore they are names of second imposition. Yet those nouns which are common both to conventionally
quae sunt communia tam {vocibus} quos significativis ad placitum quam vocibus {significativis} non {dicetur} nomina secundae impositionis cujusmodi sunt {haec} nominum: ‘sonus’, [‘vox’,] et {cetera}. Utrum autem nomina <significantia> nomina secundae impositionis cuiusmodi sunt {haec} nominibus: ‘sonus’, ‘vox’, ‘casus’, et huiusmodi secundum de eis loquitur grammaticus, dubium est. Et potest dici quod sunt nomina secundae impositionis eo quod solum consequuntur nomina significativa ad placitum, {neque} imponuntur ad significandum antequam huiusmodi nomina quibus accidunt imponuntur ad significandum. Nomina primae impositionis sunt nomina rerum, accipiendio rem secundum quod distinguuntur ab signis ad placitum significantibus. Et dividitur {in nomen primae intentionis et nomen secundae intentionis}. Nomen primae intentionis est nomen rei quae non est nata esse signum pro {quod} {supponit} cujusmodi significative utterances and to naturally significative utterances (such as ‘sound’, ‘utterance’, etc.) are not called names of second imposition. But there is some doubt whether names signifying accidents of conventionally significantative utterances (of which sort are ‘number’, ‘figure’, ‘case’, and of the kind about which the grammarian discusses) are names of first imposition or second imposition. And it can be said that names of second imposition are those which only follow conventionally significantative nouns, nor are they imposed to signifying before nouns of that sort, by which they happen, are imposed to signifying. Names of first imposition are names of things, by taking ‘thing’ according to which it is distinguished from signs signifying conventionally. And a name of first imposition is divided, because, among names of first imposition, some are names of first intention, and some are names of second intention. A name of first

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72 ‘nominibus’: B
73 ‘significantibus’: A
74 ‘dicuntur’: B
75 ‘huiusmodi’: A
76 A
77 ‘huiusmodi’: B
78 B
79 ‘accidentia’: A, B
80 ‘significantibus’: A
81 ‘sunt’: A
82 ‘impositionis’: B
83 ‘nece’: A, B
84 ‘nomen primae impositionis, quia nominum primae impositionis, quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis et quaedam sunt nomina secundae intentionis’: A, B
85 ‘aliquo’: A, B
86 ‘supponens’: A, B
etiam nomina communia {his} sunt signa [ad placitum significantia], {ut sunt nomina} 
transcendentia ut ‘ens’, ‘unum’, ‘aliquid’ ut ‘res’ et huiusmodi sunt nomina primae intentionis. [Sed] ad placitum {nomina} 
secundae intentionis {sunt nomina} ad placitum {significantia} conceptum vel intentionem animae, vel [aliuid] commune {his} conceptibus ex quibus componitur propositio in anima, et huiusmodi nomina sunt ut ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘predicabile’, ‘subjectibile’ <et huiusmodi>. Et illud dico supposito quod universalia {sint} sole intentiones animae, ut plurum dicunt. Supposito tamen quod universalia sint res extra animam, {quod verius est}, dicendum quod nomen primae intentionis est nomen rei ut cadit sub primo conceptu intellectus. Et nomen secundae intentionis est nomen rei ut cadit sub secundario conceptu intellectus. Verbi gratia, hoc nomen, ‘homo’, significat rem extra ut concipitur absolute, et sic est sub primario conceptu intention is a name of a thing which is not suited to be a sign suppositing for something else, such as ‘human’, ‘animal’, ‘the white’, ‘the black’, and names of that sort. Moreover, names common both to things which are not conventional signs and to things which are conventional signs, such as transcendental names (for example, ‘being’, ‘one’, ‘something’ and names of that sort) are name of first intention. But a name of second intention is a name conventionally signifying a concept or intention of the mind, or something common to those concepts from which a statement in the soul is composed, and names of this sort are ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘predicable’, [and] ‘subjectible’. And whether one says that universals are only in the mind, as many say, or that universals are things outside the mind, which I believe is more likely, one should say that a name of first intention is a name of a thing as it falls under a primary concept of the intellect, and a name of second intention is a name of a thing as it falls under a secondary

87 ‘huiusmodi’: A
88 A, B
89 B
90 ‘et rebus quae sunt signa ad placitum, cuiusmodi sunt’: A, B
91 A, B
92 A, B
93 ‘nomen’: A, B
94 ‘est nomen’: A, B
95 ‘significans’: A, B
96 A
97 ‘huiusmodi’: A, B
98 A
99 ‘sunt’: A
100 ‘sicut verius credo’: A, B
intellectus. Et hoc nomen, ‘species’, significat rem ut comparatur ad [intellectum per]\(^{101}\) individua quibus est quod commune, et sic est nomen rei ut cedit sub secundario conceptum intellectus, et ideo est nomen secundae intentionis. Ex praedictis igitur appareat quod nomen distinguitur in nomen primae impositionis et \(<in>\)^{102} nomen secundae impositionis. Et nomen primae impositionis distinguatur in nomen primae intentionis et nomen secundae intentionis. Nomina secundae impositionis sunt nomina solum communia signis ad placitum institutis et eorum accentibus. Nomina primae impositionis sunt nomina communia rebus extra animam et conceptibus animae \(<ct>\)^{103} transcendentibus quae sunt communia rebus et signis ad placitum [significantibus]^{104}.

Secundo est notandum quod nomen accipitur dupliciter, scilicet communiter \({et stricte. Communiter accipitur}\)^{105} pro quaelibet voce significativa ad placitum et sic est commune cuilibet parti orationis, et sic accipitur in ista divisione \({quod aliquod}\)^{106} est nomen primae impositionis et quoddam \(<est

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\(^{101}\) A  
\(^{102}\) B  
\(^{103}\) A, B  
\(^{104}\) A, B  
\(^{105}\) B  
\(^{106}\) ‘quoddam’: A, B
nomen>\textsuperscript{107} secundae <impositionis>\textsuperscript{108}. Alio modo accipitur stricte secundum quod distinguitur contra alias partes orationis.

Tertio est notandum quod hic philosophus sub nomine comprehendit indifferenter nomen et pronomen. Diffinitio \{nam\}\textsuperscript{109} nominis hic data est communis tam nomini quam pronomi, et sub verbo comprehendit participium. Unde <quia>\textsuperscript{110} philosophus hic determinat de simplici enunciatione, sufficit ut de illis determinet ex quibus necessario \{constet\}\textsuperscript{111} enunciatio, et huiusmodi sunt nomen et pronomen, verbum et participium, et ideo magis de his determinat quam de aliis partibus \{orationis\}\textsuperscript{112}.

Third, we must note that, in this work, by ‘noun’, Aristotle includes indifferently nouns and pronouns. For the definition of a noun given in this work is common both to a noun and to a pronoun, and by ‘verb’, he includes the participle. Hence, in this work, Aristotle defines what suffices for a simple statement, so that he defines those in which a statement necessarily consists, and of this sort are the noun and the pronoun, the verb and the participle, and therefore he more so deals with those parts of speech than others.

Sunt ergo ea quae in voce \{earum sunt in anima passionum notae, et ea quae scribuntur eorum in voce\}\textsuperscript{113}.

Therefore those which are in an utterance are marks of affections in the soul, and those which are written of those in an utterance.

Haec est secunda pars huius capituli in qua philosophus investigat quoddam commune nomini et verbo et enunciationi, quod est significare ad placitum, et continet duas particulas. In prima ponit ordinem signorum in significando, scilicet \{eorum quae scribuntur et eorum quae proferuntur et passionum

\textsuperscript{107} B
\textsuperscript{108} B
\textsuperscript{109} ‘enim’: A, B
\textsuperscript{110} A
\textsuperscript{111} ‘constat’: A, B
\textsuperscript{112} ‘enunciationis’: A, B
\textsuperscript{113} A, B
signifying, namely, of written utterances, and of spoken utterances, and of affections of the soul, or concepts. In the second, which begins and how, he sets out a diversity of the categories of signs in signifying. Therefore, in the first part, Aristotle, by putting the claim in this way – Therefore those which are in speech are marks of passions which are in the soul – does not express the order by which they are acquired by us, but rather expresses the order in which they follow one another in succession. For it is because he sets for himself the task of describing the order in which signs follow one another that he says those which are in speech, etc. This can be explained in three ways. In one way, that nouns and verbs which are in speech are marks of affections of the soul in the way that inferiors are in their superiors. Second, it can be explained like this: nouns and verbs are artificial things made by the institution of man, and an utterance is a natural thing, and artificial things are

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114 'vocab scriptarum et vocum prolatarum et conceptuum animae': A, B
115 A, B
116 A
117 'dicit': A, B
118 'ea quae sunt in voce': A, B
119 'sequentiae': A, B
120 B
121 'enim': A, B
122 'praemisit': A, B
123 B
124 A, B
125 A
126 A, B
127 'sunt res artificiales factae ab institutione hominum, et vox est res naturalis, et res artificiales sunt in re naturali. Ideo dicit quod nomina et verba quae sunt in voce sicut res artificialis est in re naturali sunt notae passionum animae ': A, B
128 A, B
accipiendo 'vocem’ pro prolatione, [et] tunc est sensus: ea quae sunt in voce, scilicet nomina et verba quae habent esse in prolatione, hoc est nomina et verba prolata sunt notae passionum animae, et haec expositio magis concordat textui [Aristotelis].

Dicit igitur philosophus quod nomina et verba quae sunt in voce, hoc est, in prolatione sunt no nomina et verba prolata sunt notae passionum animae, et haec expositio magis concordat textui Aristotelis. Dicit igitur philosophus quod nomina et verba quae sunt in voce, hoc est, in prolatione sunt nomina et verba scripta, significant nomina et verba prolata, <hoc est, sunt notae rerum naturalium, scilicet, passionum>.

Talem igitur ordinem signorum signum Aristoteles, scilicet quod passiones animae, hoc est similitudines rerum existentium in anima significant res extra, et nomina et verba prolata significant passiones animae, <et nomina et verba scripta significant nomina et verba prolata> non solum est verum de nominibus et verbis quae sunt partes enunciationis, sed etiam verum de ipsa enunciatione. Nam enunciatio prolata significat orationem in mente quae est quaedam passio mentis, et enunciatio scripta significat enunciationem prolatam.

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129 'accipitum': B
130 B
131 A
132 A, B
133 B
134 A, B
135 'innuit': A, 'habuit': B
136 A, B
137 'istud': B
138 B
139 'enunciationem': A, B

in a natural thing. Therefore, Aristotle says that nouns and verbs which are in an utterance, just as artificial things are in a natural thing, are marks of affections of the soul. Third, this text can be explained by taking 'utterance' for speech, and then this is the sense: those which are in speech, namely, spoken nouns and verbs, are marks of affections of the soul, and this explanation fits better with the text of Aristotle. Therefore Aristotle says that nouns and verbs which are in an utterance, that is, in speech, are marks of affections of the soul, that is, concepts of the mind which are similitudes of things. And those which are written are signs of those which are in speech, that is, in written nouns and verbs signify spoken nouns and verbs. Therefore Aristotle here assigns an order of signs of this sort, namely, that affections of the soul, that is, similitudes of things existing in the soul, signify things outside the soul, and spoken nouns and verbs signify affections of the soul, and that is true not only about nouns and verbs which are parts of a statement, but also it is true about the statement itself. For a spoken statement signifies a sentence in the mind, which is a certain affection of the soul, and a written
Notandum est hic quod passio animae \( \text{potest dupliciter accipi} \)\(^{140} \), quantum ad \{praesens\}\(^{141} \) spectat. Uno modo pro affectione appetitus, et sic desiderium, amor, \( <\text{et}>^{142} \) concupiscentia, ira et huiusmodi dicuntur passiones animae. Alio modo accipitur pro dispositione intellectus, scilicet pro similitudine rei in intellectu representante rem extra \[animam]\(^{143} \), et sic accipitur in proposito.

Secundo est intelligendum quod nomen et verbum significare passiones animae dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo quod nomen et verbum \{significant\}\(^{144} \) passiones animae tanquam illa \{quae\}\(^{145} \) imponuntur primo ad significandum. Alio modo potest intelligi quod significant passiones animae tanquam illa mediantibus quibus imponuntur ad significandum. Primo \(<\text{modo}>^{146} \) non est necesse nomen et verbum significare passiones animae, quia ex quo nomen et verbum significant ad placitum, possunt indifferenter imponi ad significandum rem extra \[animam]\(^{147} \) et ad significandum passiones animae. Istud confirmatur, nam res extra per prius intelligitur quam passio quae est in anima quia res extra intelligitur directe et passio

statement signifies a spoken statement.

We must note here that ‘affection of the soul’ can be used in two ways, to the extent to which that expression bears on the present topic. In one way, ‘affection of the soul’ can mean an appetitive passion, and so grief, love, desire, hate, and things of that sort are called affections of the soul. In another way, it means a disposition of the intellect, namely, a similitude in the intellect of a thing, representing a thing outside the soul, and it is taken in this way in the passage.

Second, we must understand that **the noun and the verb signify affections of the soul** can be understood in two ways. In one way, that a noun and a verb signify affections of the soul as those which those nouns and verbs are primarily imposed to signify. In another way, it can be understood that nouns and verbs signify affections of the soul as those by whose mediation those nouns and verbs are imposed to signify. In the first way, it is not necessary that a noun and a verb signify affections of the soul, because, from the fact that a noun and a verb signify conventionally, they are able to be imposed indifferently to signify a thing outside the soul and to signify affections of the soul. This is

\(^{140}\) ‘dupliciter accipitur’: B
\(^{141}\) ‘propositum’: A, B
\(^{142}\) B
\(^{143}\) A
\(^{144}\) ‘significant’: A, B
\(^{145}\) ‘quibus’: A, B
\(^{146}\) A, B
\(^{147}\) A
animae indirecte & per reflexionem, et cognitio directa praecedit cognitionem indirectam {sive} reflexam. In {illo} intelligetur {seu} passio animae, potest intellectus imponere nomen rei extra cognitionem, quamvis non {imponatur} illud nomen {passionem} animae cum passio animae tunc {est} ignota et nomen non imponitur nisi [in] noto.

Item si nomen necessario imponeretur passioni, scilicet similitudini rei, haec esset vera, ‘homo est similitudo hominis existens in anima’, quoniam subjectum et praedicatum omnino idem {significant}, quia non est dubium quin haec vox, ‘similitudo hominis’, {significet} similitudinem hominis. <Si ergo hoc nomen, ‘homo’, significet similitudinem hominis,> sequitur quod istae voces, ‘homo’ et ‘similitudo hominis’, eidem imponerentur, et sic foret haec vera, ‘homo est confirmed. For a thing outside the soul is understood before an affection which is in the soul, because a thing outside the soul is understood directly and an affection of the soul is understood indirectly, through reflection, and direct cognition precedes indirect or reflective cognition. Therefore, in the first way in which a thing outside the soul or an affection of the soul is understood, the intellect can impose a name on a thing outside of its cognitive faculties, although that name is not imposed onto affection of the soul, since the affection of the soul is not then known, and a noun is not imposed except on what is known.

Likewise, if necessarily a noun were imposed onto an affection, namely onto a similitude of a thing, this would be true, ‘A human is a similitude existing in the mind of a human’, since the subject and the predicate signify the same thing entirely. For there is no doubt but that this utterance, ‘similitude of a human’ signifies a similitude of a human. Therefore if this noun, ‘human’, were to signify a similitude of a human, it follows that these utterances, ‘human’ and

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148 A, B
149 ‘seu’: A, B
150 ‘modo’: B
151 A, B
152 ‘et non’: A
153 ‘importat’: A
154 ‘passionem’: A, B
155 ‘sit’: A, B
156 A, B
157 ‘significant’: A
158 ‘significat’: A, B
159 A, B
similitudo hominis’, quod est falsum.

Secundo modo dico quod nomina et verba significant passiones animae, quia passio animae <est> illud mediante quo nomen significat rem extra, quia nomen non imponitur nisi rei notae, et res nota non est nisi {pro} similitudinem eius {existentem} in anima. Unde sicut in actu intelligendi se habent ista tria, <scilicet> intellectus, res intellecta, et similitudo rei in anima, <et> sic ista tria se habent in {modo} significandi, scilicet vox significans [rem significatam], res significata, et passio rei in anima. Unde sicut similitudo rei in anima non est illud quod primo intelligitur [per vocem tanquam illud cui vox primo imponitur sed illud est mediante quo res extra intelligitur], sic passio animae non est illud quod primo significatur per vocem tanquam illud cui vox imponitur <sed est illud mediante quo res extra significatur tanquam illud cui vox imponitur>. Et dico {illud} loquendo de nominibus primae intentionis quod illa non imponitur primo ad significandum passiones animae, ‘similitude of a human’, are imposed onto the same thing, and so this would be true, ‘A human is a similitude of a human’, which is false.

I say that nouns and verbs signify affections of the soul in the second way, because an affection of the soul is that by whose mediation a noun signifies a thing outside the soul, because a noun is not imposed except on a known thing, and a thing is not known unless by a similitude of it existing in the soul. Hence, just as in an act of thinking there are three elements – the intellect, the thing thought, and a similitude of the thing in the soul – so too there are three elements in an act of signifying, namely, an utterance signifying a signified thing, the thing signified, and an affection of the thing in the soul. Hence just as a similitude of a thing in the soul is not that which is primarily understood, so too an affection of the soul is not that which is primarily signified through an utterance, as that to which the utterance is imposed, but it is that by whose mediation the thing outside the soul is signified, as that onto which the utterance is imposed. And I say this speaking about names
bene tamen est possibile quod aliquod nomen significet passionem animae, ut nomina secundae intentionis et huiusmodi, ‘voces’, ‘passio animae’, ‘similitudo rei in anima’ et sic de similibus.

Boethius tamen dicit hic quod vox non significat primo rem extra sed aliquid in anima et ex consequenti significat rem extra. Sed credo quod non sic intelligitur quod vox non primo {imponitur} signifiet rem extra. Si vero primo {significat} aliquid in anima non est necesse quod significet illud {imponitur} tanquam illud cui imponitur primo, sed tanquam illud quod primo movet intellectum ad imponendum {nomen} rei intellectae.

However, Boethius says here that an utterance does not signify primarily a thing outside the soul but something in the soul, and signifies a thing outside the soul only as a consequence. But I believe that we should not believe that an utterance does not primarily signify a thing outside the soul as that to which it is imposed. Moreover, if an utterance were to primarily signify something in the soul, it is not necessary that it signifies as that to which it is imposed primarily, but as that which primarily moves the intellect to imposing a utterance on a thing which is thought.

Et quemadmodum nec litterae sunt omnibus eadem sic nec eadem voces.

Haec est secunda pars huius partis in quae philosophus ponit diversitatem praedicatorum signorum in significando, scilicet

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170 B
171 ‘significat rem extra tamquam illud cui imponitur’: A, B
172 ‘significat’: B
173 B
174 B
175 ‘vocem’: B
nominum et verborum prolatorum et scriptorum et passionum animae. Et intendit talem diversitatem quod nomina et verba prolata et scripta significant ad placitum et passiones animae naturaliter, et intendit hic probare istas conclusiones. Prima est quod nomina et verba prolata et scripta non significant apud omnes, sed nomina et verba prolata et scripta non significant apud omnes. Ergo, et cetera. De hac igitur ratione inuitur minor in littera cum dicitur quemadmodum nee littere, hoc est, quemadmodum litterae scriptae non significat apud omnes, sic voces prolatae non significat apud omnes. Unde latini graeci et hebraei habent diversas litteras et diversas nomina et verba prolata et scripta. Unde quod significatur per aliquod nomen scriptum vel prolatum apud graecos non significatur per idem apud latinos.

Quorum autem hae primorum sunt notae eaedem omnibus animae <k3vb>, passiones sunt et quorum hae similitudines res est eaedem. Hae est secunda conclusio quam intendit quae est secunda huius libri, scilicet quod passions animae significat ipsam res naturaliter, quae probatur sic. Illa quae significant idem apud omnes illud significat naturaliter. Sed passiones animae sunt omnibus eaedem, scilicet significat quod passions animae sunt omnibus eaedem. Ergo, et cetera. De ista ratione inuitur minor in textu cum dicitur quod passions animae sunt omnibus eaedem, scilicet res significat per passions animae eaedem apud omnes secundum species. Non nam sunt eaedem res numero apud...
immediate significant res quarum sunt similitudines, et nomina et verba non significant res immediate sed mediatibus passionibus animae, et haec expositio tertia videtur mihi melius.

De his quidem dictum est in his quae dicta sunt de anima. Alterius nam est negocii.

Excusat se a diligentiori horum consideratione, et dicit quod de his decem est in libro de anima, scilicet de passionibus animae qualiter significant res, et qualiter sunt similitudines rerum.

Dubitatur hic, quia non videtur quod passiones animae sunt eadem apud omnes sic dicit hic philosophus, quia diversi homines diversas sententias habent de eadem re, sed sententia seu opinio passio est animae. Ergo apud diversos sunt diversae passiones animae. Item per vocem equivocam prolatam potest unus concipere unum et alius alium. Ergo non sunt eadem conceptiones nec per consequens eadem passiones animae apud omnes.

Ad primum dicendum est quod philosophus per passiones animae intelligit similitudines rerum, scilicet simplices conceptus representantes res extra, et per passiones animae non intelligit sententiam vel opinionem quae est de complexo. Nunc autem propria similitudo rei de quae philosophus hic loquitur semper et apud omnes representat rem cuius est similitudo, sic si esset vera imago Caesaris, ista ubicumque representaret Caesarem, et non representaret in uno loco unum et in alio loco alium, et sic est de passionibus animae, scilicet
quod idem significant et representant apud omnes. Unde per passionem animae non intelligit philosophus opinionem, quia de eadem re diversi diversas opiniones habent, sed per passiones animae intelligit simplices similitudines rei. Unde Boethius vocat hic passiones animae simplices conceptus intellectus circa quos intellectus nunquam decepitur.

Ad secundam dicendum est quod philosophus non intelligit hic identitatem passionis seu conceptus respectum vocis significantis ita quod unius vocis sit una conceptio, quia certum est quod de una voce possunt esse diversae conceptiones, sed per hoc quod dicit passiones esse easdem, intelligit identitatem passionum per comparationem ad res quarum sunt passiones. Earundem nam rerum sunt easdem passiones apud omnes, et sic passiones sunt easdem ita res sunt easdem apud omnes omnes, sicut dicendum est superius.

Sciendum est quod intellectus philosophi est quod eadem passio, scilicet eadem similitudo rei apud quoscumque fuerit semper est eadem, et representat idem, tamen possibile est quod eiusdem rei sint plures passiones seu conceptus animae, sed qualem istorum conceptuum non representat idem apud omnes, quia de eadem re simplici possunt diversi homines haberi diversos conceptus, sed iste est intellectus philosophi quod idem et unus conceptus apud quoscumque fuerit semper idem representat. Unde idem conceptus proprius non est diversarum rerum, eadem tamen res possunt habere conceptus diversos. Sed illae passiones non significant diversa apud diversos cum significant naturaliter. Unde argumentum non plus concludit nisi per eiusdem rei possunt esse diversae passiones seu conceptus animae, et non concludit quod eadem passio diversa significat, sive apud diversos sive apud eundem, sive in eodem tempore, sive in temporis diversis.

Est autem quemadmodum [in anima aliquotiens quidem intellectus sine vero vel falso, aliquotiens autem cum iam necessae est horum alterum inesse, sic etiam in voce. Circa compositionem enim et divisionem est falsitas veritasque] 176.

Haec est tertia pars huius capitale in qua philosophus ostendit diversitatem in significando inter voces significantes ad placitum, cuiusmodi sunt nomen, verbum et enunciatio, et haec est diversitas, quod aliqua est vox significativa ad placitum

Just as in the soul sometimes a certain thought is neither true nor false, othertimes with necessity it is one of those, so also in speech. For falsity and truth have to do with composition and division.

This is the third part of this chapter, in which Aristotle sets out that, among utterances which signify conventionally (of which sort are nouns, verbs and statements), one sort is a conventionally significative utterance which is significative

176 A, B
[quae] est significativa veri vel falsi, et aliqua non. Primo igitur ostendit philosophus quod [aliaquae vox significativa ad placitum est significativa veri vel falsi, et] {aliaquae est vox significativa ad placitum quae non significat verum nec falsum}; et secundum hoc pars ista potest dividi in duas partes. [Secunda incipit] ibi: Nomina igitur ipsa. In prima igitur parte declarat et determinat philosophus quod vox aliqua significativa ad placitum est significativa veri vel falsi, et aliqua nec est significativa veri et falsi, et haec est tertia conclusio huius libri, [quae] probatur sic. Sicut in intellectu sic est in voce significante ad placitum conceptum intellectus. Hae propositio patet, [quia] signum dicitur conformari significato, sed voces impositae ad significandum formantur ad exprimendum conceptum mentis, et intellectus est quandoque sine vero et sine falso, et quandoque est cum vero et cum falso. Igitur sic est de voce, quia quaedam vox est significativa veri vel falsi, et quaedam non. Intellectus {nam} {quandoque} of something true or something false, and another is not. Therefore, Aristotle first sets out that some conventionally significative utterance does not signify something true or something false, and on account of this, that part can be divided into two parts. (The second begins in here: Those names, therefore). In the first part, Aristotle declares that some conventionally significative utterance is significative of something true or something false, and that some conventionally significative utterance is not significative of something true or something false, and this is the third conclusion of this book, which is proved in the following way. Just as is the case for the intellect, so too it is the case for an utterance conventionally signifying a concept of the intellect. This statement is clear, because a sign is said to be conformed to its significate, but utterances imposed to signifying are formed for expressing a concept of the mind, and the intellect is sometimes lacks something true or something false, and sometimes it possesses something true...
componit res adinvicem vel dividit <eas>\textsuperscript{189} abinvicem 
\textit{<est>}\textsuperscript{190} cum vero vel falso, [et quandoque \{non\} \textsuperscript{191} componit 
nec dividit <nec est>\textsuperscript{192} cum vero nec falso]\textsuperscript{193}. Nam circa 
compositionem et divisionem consistit veritas et falsitas, [ut 
dicit Aristoteles \{in praedicamentis et tertio de anima\} \textsuperscript{194}]\textsuperscript{195}.

We must know that this proof does not hold only from an 
argument from similarity, but also by arguing from cause to 
effect. For conceptions of the intellect are the cause of 
forming and imposing an utterance, for utterances are 
uttered for signifying concepts of the mind, and therefore 
from this, that conceptions of the mind sometimes are true 
or false, and sometimes not, it is also argued from cause to 
effect.

\textsuperscript{189} A, B  
\textsuperscript{190} A, B  
\textsuperscript{191} \textit{nec}: A  
\textsuperscript{192} A  
\textsuperscript{193} B  
\textsuperscript{194} \textit{super isto passu in libro isto perihermencias primo capitulo’}: B  
\textsuperscript{195} A, B  
\textsuperscript{196} A  
\textsuperscript{197} B  
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{conceptiones’}: A  
\textsuperscript{199} B
quandoque cum falso, et quandoque non, et arguitur a causa ad effectum.

Circa illud dictum philosophi, scilicet circa compositionem et divisionem consistit veritas et falsitas, est sciemendum quod veritas uno modo est adequatio rei ad virtutem cognoscentem, et alio modo est adequatio virtutis cognoscentis {ut} intellectus ad ipsum rem. Primo modo veritas est idem quod conformitas rei ad virtutem cognoscentem per quam manifestat vel nata manifestare se intellectui talem qualis est, et sic veritas non est aliud quam conformitas {apparentiae} rei ad suam existentiam. Et talis veritas est duplex, sicut virtus cognitiva est duplex, scilicet creata et increata. Veritas quae est conformitas rei apprehensae ad virtutem cognitiva increatam, scilicet ad intellectum divinum, est in omni ente tam complexo quam incomplexo, quia {qualibet} res est nata manifestare se intellectui divino talem qualis est, cum intellectus divinus non possit decipi, et verum quod derivatur a veritate sic accepta convertur cum ente, et de ista veritate dicit philosophus secundo metaphysicae, quod unumquoque ens sicut se habet ad

Concerning this *dictum* of Aristotle, namely *truth and falsity have to do with composition and division*, we must know that truth in one way is the adequation of a thing to the power of a cognitive agent, and in another way it is the adequation of the power of the cognitive agent, such as the intellect, to a thing. In the first way, truth is the same as the conformity of a thing to a cognizing power through which it manifests or is naturally suited to manifest itself that it is of such sort, and so truth is nothing other than the conformity of an appearance of a thing to its own existence. This sort of truth is of two sorts, just as a cognitive power is of two sorts, namely created and uncreated. Truth which is the conformity of a thing to the uncreated cognitive power, namely to the divine intellect, is in every being, regardless of whether it is complex or non-complex, because each thing is naturally suited to manifest itself the sort of thing that it is to the divine intellect, since the divine intellect cannot be deceived by anything, and a true thing which is
identitatem\textsuperscript{211}, ita se habet ad veritatem, et veritas sic accepta non habet falsum \{pro suo opposito\}\textsuperscript{212}. Veritas autem quae est adequatio rei ad virtutem cognitivam creatam, scilicet ad intellectum nostrum, est illud per quod res <est>\textsuperscript{213} nata de se facere veram estimationem, et isto modo denarius habens debitam formam et debitam materiam denarii dicitur verus denarius. Sed denarius habens debitam formam <denarii>\textsuperscript{214} et non debitam materiam dicitur falsus denarius, ut denarius cupreus [et aereus]\textsuperscript{215} vel plumbeus, quia de se natus est facere falsam estimationem. Nam unumquoque <k4rb> <quae>\textsuperscript{216} habens formam \{argenti\}\textsuperscript{217} natum est facere de se [veram]\textsuperscript{218} estimationem quod est argentum <sive denarius argenteus>\textsuperscript{219}, et ideo denarius habens \{veri\}\textsuperscript{220} denarii figuram <sive formam>\textsuperscript{221}, et non materiam debitam \{denarii\}\textsuperscript{222}, ut materiam plumeam et cupream, est falsus denarius, quia de se facit falsam estimationem. \{Haec\}\textsuperscript{223} autem falsitas est solum in compositis ex materia et forma, [et]\textsuperscript{224} ideo dicit

derived from truth understood in this way is convertible with being. Aristotle speaks about that sort of truth in the second book of the \textit{Metaphysics}, when he says that each and every being [\textit{ens}], just as it is related to being [\textit{entitas}], so too it is related to truth, and truth taken in this way does not have some false thing for its opposite. However, truth which is the adequation of a thing to a created cognitive power, namely to our intellect, is that through which a thing is naturally suited to produce a true estimation about itself, and in this way a coin having the form and due matter of a coin is called a true coin. But a coin having due form but not due matter, such as a copper or bronze or lead coin, is called a false coin, because it is suited to produce a false estimation of itself. For one and the same thing having the form of silver is naturally suited to produce a true estimation of itself that it is silver, and therefore a coin having the figure of a true coin but not the due matter of a

\textsuperscript{211}\textit{identitatem}': B
\textsuperscript{212}\textit{si bi oppositum}': A, B
\textsuperscript{213} A, B
\textsuperscript{214} A, B
\textsuperscript{215} A, B
\textsuperscript{216} B
\textsuperscript{217}\textit{denarii}': A, B
\textsuperscript{218} B
\textsuperscript{219} B
\textsuperscript{220}\textit{veram'}: A, B
\textsuperscript{221} B
\textsuperscript{222}\textit{denario'}: B
\textsuperscript{223}\textit{huiusmodi'}: B
\textsuperscript{224} A, B
philosophus [in] tertio de anima quod intellectus circa quod quid [est], scilicet circa simplicem quiditatem rerum semper est verus.

Veritas autem secundo modo dicta, scilicet {quae} est adekvatio virtutis cognoscentis <scilicet intellectus> ad rem cognoscitam, est in virtute cognoscente <scilicet in ipso intellectu> sicut in subjecto, et talis est duplex. <Quia> quaedam [est] complexa et quaedam [est] incomplexa. Veritas incomplexa est [illa] quae est adekvatio virtutis cognoscentis ad rem cognitam [quae] potest esse non solum in intellectu sed etiam in sensu, et ideo dicit philosophus in secundo de anima quod sensus respectu proprii objecti semper est verus, hoc est, in maior parte est verus, quia in maior parte sensus conformatur objecto suo proprio, et circa {illud} non decipitur. Veritas autem complexa solum est circa compositionem et divisionem intellectus, et de hac veritate

However, truth spoken of in the second way, namely that which is an adequation of a power of a cognitive agent to a cognized thing, is in the power of the cognitive agent, namely in the intellect, just as in a subject, and it is of two kinds. A certain one is complex, and a certain one is non-complex. Non-complex truth is the adequation of the power of a cognitive agent to a thing cognized, which can occur not only in the intellect but also in a sense. Therefore Aristotle says in the second book of the De Anima that a sense with respect to its proper object is always true, that is, in the greater part it is true, because in the greater part the sense is conformed to its proper object, and concerning that it is not deceived. However, complex truth alone is
loquitur <hic>\textsuperscript{236} philosophus cum dicit \textit{circa compositionem et divisionem}, et cetera. Ex hoc \{nam\}\textsuperscript{237} quod intellectus asserit aliqua esse eadem quae non sunt eadem vel \{aliqua non esse eadem quae sunt eadem\} \textsuperscript{238} est propositio falsa, quae hoc significat, \langle et hoc\rangle\textsuperscript{239} sive sit propositio in prolacione sive in mente.

Sed utrum sit aliqua propositio composita ex rebus extra animam <vel non>\textsuperscript{240} dictum est supra \{in principio\}\textsuperscript{241} libri praedicamentorum. \langle Notandum est quod veritas incomplexa quae est adaequatio apparentiae rei ad suam existentiam respectu virtutis cognitive separatur in rebus naturalibus inanimatis, in rebus artificialibus, in rebus animatis irrationalibus, in rebus animatis habentibus rationi, et eodem modo est falsitas. In rebus naturalibus inanimatis, veritas est conformitas accidentium naturalium ad rem naturalem in qua sunt. In rebus artificialibus est conformitas apparentiae formae ad materiam debitam tali formae, et etiam dicitur veritas in rebus artificialibus est conformitas facti ad debitum fieri. In rebus animatis irrationalibus, est conformitas apparentiae talis rei ad suam operationem. In rebus habentibus rationi, est conformitas dicti vel sermonis ad mente et ad opus. Et eisdem modis dicitur falsitas difformitas apparentiae ad...
existentiam>. Supposito vero quod non sit aliqua propositio in re <sit> composita ex rebus, ut communiter dicitur, est dubium quod ex parte rei {correspondeat} veritati et falsitati propositionis in mente et in prolacione. Oportet {nam} {ei} correspondeat aliquid in re {per quod} [tunc] dicamus {quod} verum est quod propositio in mente et in prolacione est vera, quia sic significat sicut est in re. Ad hoc igitur quod propositio sit vera, oportet quod <sic> sit in re sicut <ipsa> propositio significat, et per consequens veritati propositionis in mente et in voce et in scripto correspondet aliquid {proportionale}.

Dicendum [est], ut mihi videtur, [quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit verum oportet] quod veritati propositionis in mente, in prolacione et in scripto {correspondeat} <aliquid proportionale in re> identitas vel diversitas seu non identitas

We must say, as it seems to me, that to the truth of a statement in the mind, in speech and in writing there corresponds some propositional thing in reality, namely the identity or diversity (or non-identity) of those for which the
istorum pro quibus supponit subjectum et praedicatum. Unde veritati propositionis affirmative correspondet in re identitas illius pro quo supponit subjectum ad illud pro quo supponit praedicatum. Non {nam} 258 potest [alia] 259 propositio affirmativa cathegorematica <et> 260 in recto esse vera nisi subjectum {supponat pro eo pro quo supponit praedicatum, scilicet verificetur} 261, et si {supponat} 262 pro eodem tunc est affirmativa vera, et negativa cathegorematica {non est vera in recto} 263 si subjectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem, sed si supponant pro diversis <omnino [tunc] 264> 265 est negativa vera.

Et si dicatur quod est affirmativa vera quando non est talis identitas, quia haec est vera, ‘Caesar est Caesar’, et tamen non est aliqua identitas <Caesaris> 266. Similiter negativa potest esse vera sine [tali] 267 diversitate illorum pro quibus {supponit} 268 subjectum et praedicatum, ut patet, ista {nam} 269 est vera, ‘Caesar non est Plato’, et tamen Caesar et Plato non sunt diversa cum non sint entia, et idem et diversum sunt differentiae entis.

258 ‘enim’: A, B
259 A, B
260 A, B
261 ‘et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem’: A, B
262 ‘supponant’: A, B
263 ‘et in recto non est vera’: A, B
264 B
265 A
266 A
267 A, B
268 ‘supponunt’: B
269 ‘enim’: A, B

And if it is said that an affirmative statement is true when there is no such identity, because this is true, ‘Caesar is Caesar’, and yet there is not some identity, and likewise a negative statement can be true with a diversity of that sort of those for which the subject supposits and the predicate, as is clear, for this is true, ‘Caesar is Plato’, and yet Caesar and Plato are not diverse, since they are non-beings, and identity and diversity are differences of beings.
Dicendum quod Caesar corrupto identitas est Caesaris ad Caesarem, sed illa identitas non existit, [sed est identitas rationis\(^{270}\). {Et idem}\(^{271}\) {Caesarem}\(^{272}\) <est>\(^{273}\) idem Caesari identitate quae non est, nec oportet quod idem et diversum semper sint differentiae entis {maxime transcendentis quod scilicet est in intellectu}\(^{274}\). Unde [sic]\(^{275}\) potest dici quod <sicut>\(^{276}\) ens dicitur {dupliciter}\(^{277}\) – uno modo [ut]\(^{278}\) est commune omni intelligibili, alio modo idem [est]\(^{279}\) quod existens – sic idem et diversum dicitur <multipliciter>\(^{280}\) – unomodo ut [sunt differentiae entis transcendentis, alio modo ut]\(^{281}\) sunt differentiae entis in effectu, hoc est, in actu existentis, [et]\(^{282}\) per hoc patet responsio ad argumentum.

We must say in response that, Caesar have died, there is an identity of Caesar with Caesar, but that identity does not exist, but is rather an identity of reason. And, again, Caesar is the same as Caesar by an identity which does not exist, nor is it necessary that identity and difference are always differences of being in actuality, that is, of an existing being. Rather, they are differences of a being which is maximally transcendent, namely what is common to everything intelligible. Hence in this case it can be said that ‘being’ is said in two ways. In one way as it is common to all intelligible things, and in another way it is the same as an existing being. So identity and difference are spoken of in many ways – one way as they are differences of transcendent being, in another way as they are differences of being in effect, that is, in actual existence, and through this the response to the argument is clear.
Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consimilia sunt sine compositione vel divisione intellectui, ut homo vel album, quando non additur aliquid. Nam enim adhuc verum vel falsum est. Huius autem signum hoc est hircocervus enim significat aliquid sed quod nondum verum vel falsum sit. Si esse vel non esse non addatur, vel simpliciter vel secundum tempus.

Haec est secunda pars tertiae partis huius capitali in qua philosophus ostendit quae vox est significativa veri vel falsi et quae nec est significativa veri nec falsi, et probat quod nomina per se sumpta nec significent verum nec falsum, et haec est conclusio quarta huius libri, quae probatur sic. Primo ex dicto immediate praecedenti sic, circa compositionem et divisionem consistunt veritas et falsitas sed nomina et verba per se sumpta sunt sine compositione et divisione. Ergo nomina et verba per se sumpta nec significant verum nec falsum. Secundo probatur per quodam signum, et arguitur per locutionis cum a maiori sic. Si aliquod nomen et verbum significarent verum vel falsum, hoc maxime esset verum de nomine et verbo compositio, sed nomen nec verbum compositum per se sumptum sunt verum vel falsum. Igitur nullum nomen vel verbum compositum per se sumptum significat verum vel falsum. Maior patet, et minor declaratur per exemplum sic. Hircocervus est nomen compositum, et hoc nomen, ‘hircocervus’, per se sumptum non significat verum nec falsum. Unde si non addatur sibi verbum praesentis tempis aut praeteriti aut futuri non significat verum nec falsum.

Sed hic dubitatur. Videtur nam quod unum nomen per se sumptum sit verum vel falsum, quia nomina significant ad
placitum. Ergo possibile est imponere unum nomen ad significandum idem quod ista enunciatio, ‘homo est animal’, sed ista enunciatio significat verum vel falsum. Ergo multo fortius unum nomen compositum potest significare verum vel falsum. Antecedens patet, nam haec littera, a, potest imponi ad significandum idem quod haec enunciatio, ‘deus est’, significat.

Item si quaeratur quid legit in scholis, et respondeatur, ‘magister’, qui sic respondet dicit verum vel falsum, et non dicit nisi unum nomen per se sumptum. Igitur nomen per se sumptum significat verum vel falsum.


Dicendum est quod nec nomen nec verbum separatum, hoc est, seorsum acceptum, hoc est, per se acceptum, significat verum <vel> falsum complexe. Unde potest dici distinguiendo <nam> significare verum vel falsum est duplex, scilicet complexe et incomplexe. Illud significat verum vel falsum complexe cuius pars significat partem totius significati, ita quod sicut totum significat totum verum vel falsum, ita pars significat partem veri vel falsi, et sic nec nomen nec verbum per se sumptum significat verum vel falsum complexe, scilicet per modum complexi, quia nec pars nominis nec pars verbi significat aliquid per se, ut dicit philosophus, et per consequens nec significat partem illius quod significatur per totum. Et propter hoc dico quod nec nomen nec verbum per se sumptum significat verum vel falsum complexe sive per modum
complexi. Dico tamen quod unum nomen et unum verbum potest significare verum vel falsum incomplexe sive per modum incomplexi, et sic potest haec vox, \( a \), imponi ad significandum idem quod haec propositio, ‘deus est’, nec ex hoc sequitur quod illa vox, \( a \), sit propositio, quia <non> omne significans verum vel falsum est propositio, sed solum significans verum vel falsum per modum complexi est propositio. Ergo, et cetera. Si dicatur quod si, \( a \), significat idem quod ista propositio, ‘deus est’, tunc ista est vera, \( a \) est propositio, quia sequitur, ‘deus est’, est propositio. Ergo, \( a \) est propositio. Antecedens est verum. Ergo consequens. Consequentia patet, quia arguitur a convertibili ad suum convertibile.

Item nomina significant ad placitum. Si igitur verum est quod \( a \) significat distincte idem quod haec propositio, ‘deus est’, significat, et imponatur ad significandum distincte illud quod ista propositio significat, tunc sequitur quod \( a \) significat verum vel falsum.

Ad primum dicendum est quod haec est multiplex, ‘\( a \) est propositio’, eo quod ‘\( a \)’ potest supponere materialiter et significative. Si sumatur significative, sic haec est vera, ‘\( a \) est propositio’. Si autem materialiter sic est falsa, quia haec littera, \( a \), non est propositio, nec valet in isto sensu: ‘deus est’ est propositio, ergo \( a \) est propositio, nec valet consequentia a convertibili ad convertibile sumptis termis materialiter. Non nam sequitur: homo est bisyllabus, igitur risibile est bisyllabus, nec valet: homo est nomen substantivum, igitur risibile. Unde sumpto \( a \) materialiter non dicendum quod \( a \) sit propositio, quia si sic, haec foret bona consequentia: \( a \) est, ergo deus est, quod
est non verum. Unde a materialiter sumptum non potest esse antecedens nec consequens. Et si dicatur de significative sumpto verificatur quod est propositio, ergo potest esse quod sit antecedens, ergo sumpto a significative erit haec consequentia bona: Si a, deus est.

Dicendum quod sic dicendo ‘si a est a’, vel ‘si a est b’, non est consequentia, nec isti termini possunt sumi sic nisi materialiter, quamvis respectu alterius possint significative vel materialiter sumi indifferenter.

Ad aliam dicendum quod impossibile est quod a significet idem distincte quod ista propositio, ‘deus est’. Unde nomina significant ad placitum sic quod possunt imponi cuilibet rei indifferenter, modus tamen significandi rem distincte vel indistincte non est ad placitum. Unde quamvis omne illud quod intelligitur possit intelligitur distincte potest significari per unum nomen distincte, quia sic diffinitio potest constare diffinitum, et hoc est contra philosophum secundo metaphysica.

Ad primum principale quod videtur esse in contrarium, est dicendum, concedendo quod unum nomen potest idem significare, sed nec unum nomen nec una littera potest significare complexe idem quod haec propositio, ‘deus est’.

Ad <k4vb> aliud dicendum est quod si quaeratur quis legit in scholis, et respondeat ‘magister’, sic respondens de virtute sermonis, nec dicit verum nec falsum, de bonitate tamen intellectus potest per dictum suum intelligere verum vel falsum
subintelligendo verbum quod fuit interrogative positum. Unde hoc nomen, 'magister', non significat verum vel falsum, de virtute tamen interrogationis dat intelligere verum vel falsum.

Ad aliud dico quod verba quae sunt primae aut secundae personae sunt verba excellentis actionis, quia in eis intelligitur nominativus determinatus, et ideo in eis est implicita compositio. Unde huiusmodi verba significant verum vel falsum implicite. Melius tamen videtur esse dicendum quod huiusmodi verba primae et secundae personae, ut 'curro', 'curris', non significant verum vel falsum, quia idem significant 'curro' et 'currit', sed hoc verbum 'currit' non significant verum vel falsum, igitur nec 'curro'. Unde persona non est de significato verbi, sed est accidens verbi. Verum tamen est quod verbum primae et secundae personae dat intelligere verum vel falsum, et hoc verbum, 'curro', dat intelligere hoc pronomen, 'ego'. Non est tamen de significato huius verbi 'curro'. Unde intentio philosophi est haec, quod nec nomen nec verbum per se sumptum significant verum vel falsum, sed sola propositio significant verum vel falsum. Distincte tamen unum verbum primae et secundae personae dat intelligere verum vel falsum.

Sed contra hoc. Ista consequentia est bona: 'curro igitur moveor', et per consequens 'curro' est antecedens et 'moveor' consequens, et nihil potest esse antecedens sive consequens nisi propositio. Igitur 'curro' est propositio, igitur significant verum vel falsum.

Huic potest responderi dupliciter. Uno modo quod hic non est
aliqua consequentia: ‘curro, igitur moveor’, nec ex opposto sequitur oppositum quod potest esse antecedens vel consequens.


Et si dicatur, proferens hoc verbum ‘taceo’, dicit falsum, ergo hoc verbum ‘taceo’ significat falsum, dico quod proferens hoc verbum, ‘taceo’, de virtute sermonis nec dicit verum nec dicit falsum. Unde propter hoc dictum intelligitur verum vel falsum, sed hoc est ex communi usu loquendi, non ex virtute sermonis.

Alio modo potest dici quod haec consequentia est bona: ‘curro, igitur moveor’, et tunc esset dicendum quod antecedens esset propositio implicita, non ratione significati tamen sed ratione primae personae intellectae in curro, nec valet est propositio implicita, igitur significat verum vel falsum, sed sufficit quod
includit verum vel falsum. Prima tamen responsio magis concordat verbis et sententiae Aristotelis.

<Capitulum 2: De Nomine>

Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata.

Istud est secundum capitulum primi tractatus in quo determinatur de partibus integralibus enunciationis et continet duas partes principales. In prima determinatur de nomine. In secunda ibi, verbum est illud, determinatur de verbo. Prima pars continet duas partes in prima ponitur diffinitio nominis, et manifestatio partium diffinitionis. In secunda ibi, non homo vero, excludit philosophus quaedam a ratione nominis quae apparent esse nomina et non sunt nomina. Primo ergo philosophus ponit diffinitionem nominis, dicens quod nomen est vox significativa ad placitum sine temporis cuius nulla pars significat separata. In hac diffinitione ponuntur quinque differentiae per quas dicitur nomen ab aliis quae non sunt nomina. Per hoc nam quod nomen est vox differt nomen a sonis quae non sunt voces. Nam quidam sonus est vox, et quidam est non vox, et quaedam est vox significativa, per hanc particulam, ‘significativa’, differt nomen a voce non significativa, et quia vocum significativarum quaedam significant ad placitum, et quaedam naturaliter. Per hanc particulam, ‘ad placitum’, differt nomen a voce significativa naturaliter, et quia vocum significativarum ad placitum quaedam significant cum tempore, ut verbum et participium, et quaedam sine tempore. Per hanc particulam, ‘sine tempore’,
differt nomen a verbo et participio. Adhuc quia quaedam vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore habet partem quae per se aliquid significat, ut oratio. Ideo ad differentiam orationis ponitur ista particula, ‘cuius nulla pars per se significat’, et cetera. Unde quia per particulas positas in diffinitione ponuntur particulae illae. Ponitur nam vox tanquam genus et aliae particulae ponuntur tanquam differentiae.

In nomine enim quod est equiferus. Ferus nihil per se significat quemadmodum in oratione quae est equus ferus. At vero non quemadmodum in simplicibus nominibus sic se habet et in compositis. In illis enim nullo modo pars significativa est. In his autem vult quidem significativa esse sed nullius est separatim, ut in eo quod est equiferus.

Posita diffinitione nominis philosophus exequitur, declarando duas particulas positas in hac diffinitione, scilicet tertiam et ultimam. Nam duae particulae patent ex praecedentibus ex hoc quod ea quae sunt in voce sunt notae passionum animae. Quarta particula patebit capitula, de verbo. Primo ergo declarat particulam ultimam, quod nulla pars nominis est significativa separatim, et hic est conclusio quinta huius libri, qui probatur per locutio a maiori sic. Si aliqua pars nominis significat separati, hoc foret maxime verum de partibus nominis compositi, sed partes nominis compositi nihil significat separati. Igitur nulla pars nominis significativa separati. Maior patet. Minor declaratur, declaratione exemplari sic. Hoc nomen, ‘equiferus’, est nomen compositum, et nulla pars huius nominis secundum quod est pars significat aliquid per se, quia nec ‘equus’ nec ‘ferus’ significat aliquid secundum quod est
pars huius nominis, ‘equiferus’. Differunt tamen pars nominis compositi et pars nominis simplicis, quia pars nominis simplicis nec significat aliquid per se, nec apperet aliquid significare per se. Pars etiam nominis simplicis nec significat aliquid in toto cuius est pars nec extra totum, sed pars nominis compositi videtur significare aliquid, et si non significet aliquid in toto tamen extra totum significat per se.

Secundum vero placitum quam naturaliter nominum nihil est, sed quando sit nota.

Aliam particulam, scilicet quod nomen significat ad placitum, declarat philosophus, et hic est conclusio sexta huius libri, et probatur dupliciter. Primo ostensive. Secundo per ratione ducentem ad impossibile. Primo sic. Illud quod non significat nisi ex hoc quod sit nota alterius significat ad placitum, quia quod fiat nota hoc est ad placitum, sed nomen est huiusmodi. Ergo, et cetera.

Nam designant et illiterati soni vt ferarum. Quorum nihil est nomen.

Secundo probatur eadem conclusio per impossibile sic. Si nomen non esset vox significativa ad placitum, sequeretur quod quaecumque vox esset indifferenter nomen, et sic soni ferarum illiterati qui naturaliter significant essent nomina, sed hoc est impossible. Ergo solum vox significativa ad placitum est nomen. Unde quia voces significativae naturaliter non sunt nomina, cuiusmodi sunt soni ferarum illiterati, scilicet qui litteris non possunt scribi. Ex hoc concluditur quod illae voces
quae sunt nomina significant ad placitum.

Sed hic occurrunt quattuor dubiae. Primum est contra primam particularam definitionis nominis. Non nam videtur quod nomen sit vox, quia omnis vox est res naturalis, et nomen est res artificialis, cum sit factum per inventionem hominum et per artem, sed nulla res artificialis est res naturalis. Ergo hic est falsa, 'nomen est vox', sicut ista, 'Balneum est aqua'. Hic nam est falsa, sed ista est vera, 'Baleneum est aqueum'.

Item vox est materia nominis, igitur non praedicatur de nomine, quia pars materialis non praedicatur in recto de toto cuius est pars.

Item videtur quod non omne nomen significet ad placitum, quia gemitus et latratus et huiusmodi sunt nomina, et tamen naturaliter. Ergo in definitione nominis male ponitur haec particula, 'significativa ad placitum', cum non conveniat omni nominii.

Item non videtur quod omne nomen significet sine tempore, quia 'dies', 'nox' et 'annus' sunt nomina, et significant tempus, et per consequens non significant sine tempore, quia si significarent sine tempore, significarent sine suo significato, quod est impossibile.

Contra illam particulam, 'cuius nulla pars aliquid significat', arguitur sic. Aliquid nomen componitur ex multis nominibus et nomina significant, igitur pars nominis significant. Maior est vera, quia capio hoc nomen, 'respublica', partes istius nominis

Ad primum dicendum uno modo quod vox quae ponitur in definitione nominis est indifferens ad vocem significantem ad placitum et ad vocem significantem naturaliter, aliter frustra poneretur in definitione illa particula, ‘ad placitum’, et ita illa vox posita in definitione nec est res naturalis nec artificialis, sed indifferens ad utrumque, sicut in animal in cuius definitione sic dicitur, ‘subjecta animata sensibilis’, nec est homo nec asinus sed est indifferens ad utramque, scilicet ad omnem speciem et individui animalis, et sic vox quae ponitur in definitione nominis nec est res naturalis nec artificialis, sed est genus utrumque. Per hoc nam patet secundum dubium, quam vox quae ponitur in definitione nominis est communis ad nomen et ad materiam nominis, et non est materia nominis.

Aliter potest dici quod sicut hoc commune nomen quod hic definitur est res artificialis, quia sit per institutionem imponentis, ita hoc commune vox positum in definitione nominis est res artificialis, quia sit per intentionem hominis, et non sequitur quod res artificialis praedicetur de re naturali, sed praedicatur artificiali de artificiali.

Adhuc potest dici aliter, quod quamvis nomen sit nomen per institutionem imponentis, tamen non est res artificialis, quia per hoc quod institutitur ad significandum nulla res artificialis sibi inhaerens acquiritur. Res nam naturalis presupponita omni impositioni imponitur ad significandum. Unde sicut signum quod est res naturalis, puta circulus, potest instituti ad
significandum vinum in taberna, ita vox naturalis potest instituti ad significandum absque hoc, quod aliqua forma nova sibi acquiratur, et secundum hoc haec esset neganda, ‘nomen est res artificialis’. Si quis tamen velit dicere quod ex hoc quod vox imponitur ad significandum acquiritur voci quidam respectus ad significandum, ita quod nomen est quoddam aggregatum ex voce et ex respectum ad significandum, sic dicens habet dicere quod nomen est res artificialis, nec est inconveniens nomen rei naturalis praedicari in recto de nomine rei artificialis accepto in concreto. Subiectum vero accidentis praedicatur de accidente accepto in concreto, ut patet. Haece enim est vera, ‘simus est nasus concavus’, et quoddammodo potest concedi quod discus est lignum sic vel sic figuratum. Et quia haec diffinitio datur de nomine sumpto in concreto, ideo potest materia nominis, scilicet vox quae est res naturalis vere potest praedicari in recto de nominis quod est res artificialis.

Sed diceret forte aliquis quod nomen hic diffinitur est res naturalis, quia nomini praesupposito imponi competit haec diffinitio, ‘vox significativa ad placitum’, et quia illud quod praesupponitur imponi ad significandum est res naturalis, ergo et cetera. Dicendum quod vox significativa accipi potest pro materiali in tempore orationis quod quidem materiale praesupponitur imponi, vel potest accipi pro aggregato ex materiali nomine et respectu ad significandum. Primo modo praedicatur de voce quae est res naturalis, et sic non ponitur in diffinitione nominis, sed solum prout accipitur pro aggregato ex materiali in parte orationis et ex respectu ad significandum.

Ad tertium dubium dicendum quod gemitus, latratus et huiusmodi possunt accipi materialiter vel significative. Si

Ad aliud dubium dicendum quod illud dictum philosophi, nomen significat sine tempore, sic intelligitur quod nomen non significat suum significatum ut mensuratur aliqua certa mensura vel differentia temporis, et hoc est significare sine tempore tamquam sine suo consignificato, quia tempus non est consignificatum nominis cum non accidat nominis. Dico igitur quod ‘nox’ et ‘dies’ et huiusmodi significat tempus et non consignificant tempus. Nam ‘dies’ non significat suum significatum ut mensuratur aliqua certa mensura seu differentia temporis, sicut ‘currere’ significat cursum et mensuratorem tempore, sed ‘dies’ et ‘nox’ et huiusmodi sunt abstracta ab omni differentia temporis. Unde huiusmodi nomina significant tempus sed non significant cum tempore, et quando infertur tunc quod huiusmodi nomina significant sine suo significato, dico igitur quod secundum quod ‘sine’ privat solum consignificatum, sic concedo quod ‘dies’ significat sine suo significato tamquam sine suo accidente, quia significatum suum non est suum accidens.

Non homo vero non est nomen. At vero nec impositum nomen est ei quo illud oporteat appellari. Neque enim oratio aut negatio est, sed sit nomen infinitum.

Haec est secunda particula primae partis, in qua philosophus removet quaedam a ratione nominis quae apparent nomina et non sunt nomina, et hoc secundum quod dicit Boethius est ut integerrima diffinitio nominis habeatur et sunt duo quae removet a ratione nominis, scilicet nomen infinitum et nomen obliquum. Et primo removet nomen infinitum, dicens quod non homo non est nomen nec est nomen ei impositum quo oporteat illud appellari, nec est affirmatio nec negatio, sed sit nomen infinitum. Hoc est importa sibi et omnibus consimilibus nomen et vocetur nomen infinitum. Causam autem propter quam nomen infinitum non est nomen assignavit Boethius, dicens quod omne nomen unam rem significat determinatam, qui vero dicit non homo non hunc hominem quod talis significat nec quod illa significativa velit ostendere omni ratione non diffinit seu non ostendit. Haec igitur videtur causa
quam assignat Boethius quare nomen infinitum non est nomen, quia non significat rem determinatam, sed verificatur indifferenter pro omni ente et non ente, et de quolibet alio ab eo quod infinitur per negationem infinitantem. Dicit nam Boethius quod negatio infinitans praesentem naturam interimit cum additur negatio infinitans, infinitans alias derelinquit. Et ex hoc denotatur quod nomina transcendentia non ponunt infinitari, quia si infinitarentur nulla natura de relinqueretur. Unde accipiendo ens in sua maxima communitate, ut est commune ad omne intelligibile, sic non potest infinitari. Unde non ens, ut non cadit super ens communissimum nihil significat nec de aliquo verificatur sive praedicatur, nec est infinitum nec infinitum, sed est vox non significativa. Tamen ens existens quod solum verificatur de existentibus bene potest infinitari, quia ipso infinitato relinquuntur aliae naturae possibles, quamvis non relinquatur aliqua natura existens actu.

Catonis autem vel catoni et quaecumque talia sunt non sunt nomina sed casus nominum. Ratio autem eius in aliis quidem eadem est.

Secundo removet nomina aliqua a ratione nominis, dicens quod catonis et catonem non sunt nomina et similia, sed casus nominum. Ratio tamen nominis in aliis est eadem. Haec est diffinitio nominis superius posita est eadem in obliquis, quia competit nominibus obliquis.

Sed differunt quam cum est vel fuit vel erit adiunctum neque verum neque falsum est. Nomen vero semper ut catonis est vel non est. Nondum enim aliquis neque verum
neque dicit falsum.


Notandum quod philosophus signanter inducit exemplum de verbo substantivo cuiusmodi est hoc verbum, ‘est’, et sunt haec verba ‘fuit’ vel ‘erit’, quae sunt sua obliqua, quia sunt quaedam alia verba, scilicet impersonalia quae cum obliquis significant verum vel falsum, ut cum dicitur ‘Penitet me’, quia actus verbi intelligitur fieri super obliquum, ac si diceretur ‘Penitentia habet me’.

Hic occurunt quaedam dubia, quia primo videtur quod nomen infinitum, et nomen obliquum sunt nomina, quia eis competet diffinitio nominis superius posita, et hoc dicit philosophus expresse in textu de nominibus obliquis.

Item videtur quod ratio Boethii non valet per quam dicit quod
nomen infinitum non est nomen, quia si ratio sua valeret, scilicet quia non dicit aliquam rem determinatam, sequeretur quod nomina transcendentia quae non significant aliquam rem determinatam non essent nomina, quia communis et magis indeterminate significant quam nomen infinitum, ut quam non homo, sed huiusmodi transcendentia sunt nomina. Ergo ratio Boethii non valet per quam dicit quod nomen infinitum non est nomen, et cetera.

Item videtur quod ex nomine obliquo et ex hoc verbo, 'est', possit fieri oratio significans verum vel falsum, quia haec est vera, 'Catonis est genitivi casus', et haec est vera per philosophum, 'Catonis non est nomen', et tamen constituitur ista oratio ex nomine obliquo et verbo.

Item haec videtur vera vel falsa, 'Catonis est', quia sequitur, 'Catonis est asinus, igitur Catonis est ens', et antecedens est verum supposito quod Cato habeat asinum, et per consequens ex nomine obliquo et ex verbo, 'est', constituitur oratio verum et falsum significans.

Ad primum, dicendum secundum quod dicit Boethius quod diffinitio nominis superius posita non est completa assignata nec integra diffinitio nominis, et ideo ad completum diffinitionem nominis excludit philosophus a ratione nominis completa nomen infinitum et nomen obliquo, ut diffinitioni nominis dictae addantur istae particulae finita et recta, et istis particulis positis in diffinitione nominis ista diffinitio nominis in qua ponuntur istae particulae non competit nominis infinito, nec nomin obliquo.
Ad aliud, dicendum est quod haec sola non causa quare nomen infinitum non sit nomen, scilicet quia nomen significat aliquam rem determinatam seu specialem, sed quia nomen infinitum intermit unam naturam et non ponit aliam naturam determinatam, sed derelinquit infinitas alias a natura quam intermit. Unde ad hoc quod aliquid sit nomen infinitum requiruntur duae conditiones, scilicet quod interimat unam naturam et nullam ponat determinatam naturam, sed non sic est de nominibus transcendentibus, quia quamvis non ponant aliquam naturam, nullam tamen naturam intermit, sed non sic est de nomine infinito.

Aliqui dicunt quod nomen obliquum et nomen infinitum non sunt nomina principaliter, sed secundario et ex consequenti bene sunt nomina. Nam impositio sit in recto, et nomen infinitum principaliter imponitur ad significandum, et ex hoc quod nomen finitum et rectus principaliter imponuntur ad significandum, imponuntur et secundario nomen obliquum et nomen infinitum.

non potest ly 'Catonis' sumi materialiter, quia suppositione materiali, quando comparatur aliqua partis secundum suppositionem materialis, sicut illa quae est genitivi casus. Competit nam materialis secundaria et ideo terminus non supponit materialiter nisi quando comparatur aliqua parti secundum suppositionem materialis, et ideo in hac oratione, 'Catonis currit', non accipitur ly 'Catonois' materialiter sed personaliter. Ad aliud est dicendum quod haec est incongrua, 'Catonis est', quia hic nihil sequitur quod possit verbo reddere suppositum. 'Catonis est ens', ideo 'currit' non competet sibi secundum suppositionem materialis, et ideo in hac oratione, 'Catonis currit', non accipitur ly 'Catonois' materialiter sed personaliter.

Ad aliud est dicendum quod haec est incongrua, 'Catonis est', quia hic nihil sequitur quod possit verbo reddere suppositum. 'Catonis est ens', ideo 'currit' non competet sibi secundum suppositionem materialis, et ideo in hac oratione, 'Catonis currit', non accipitur ly 'Catonois' materialiter sed personaliter.

Verbum autem quod consignificat est tempus, cuius prorsus nihil sequitur quod possit verbo reddere suppositum. Hae est secunda pars principalis huius capituli, in qua philosophus determinat de verbo, et consequentem verum esse. In prima partie declaratur diffinitionem verbi. In secunda ibi, 'Non currit autem', excluit quaedam a ratione verbi quae non sunt verba libet apparenta verba. In tertia ibi, 'ipsa quaedam, point quaedam convenientiam quae est inter nomen et verbum.'
In prima igitur particula ponit diffinitionem verbi, dicens quod
verbum est illud quod consignificat tempus cuius pars extra
nihil significat, et semper est nota eorum quae de altero
praedicantur. In hac diffinitione non ponitur vox significativa
ad placitum, sed subintelligitur ex diffinitione nominis, quia
commune est nomini et verbo quod sit vox significativa ad
placitum. Unde philosophus breviter procedens relinquit ea
quae sunt commuia nomini et verbo intellectui legentis ex his
quae dixerat in diffinitione nominis. Aliam tamen particulam
nomini et verbo communem positam in diffinitione nominis,
cuius nulla pars, et cetera, ponit hic quamvis sit superius
posita in diffinitione nominis, cuius causa est quia verbum
maiorum habet convententiam cum oratione quam nomen, quia
verbum importat compositionem per quam perficitur et
constituitur oratio. Ideo magis videtur quod verbum sit oratio
et quod pars eius per se aliquid significat quam nomen, et ideo
hanc particulam ponit quae fuit prius postia in
diffinitione nominis.

Dico autem quod consignificat tempus, ut cursus quidem
nomen est. Currit vero est verbum. Consignificat enim
nunc esse.

Explanat hanc diffinitionem verbi, et primo declarat hanc
diffinitionem verbi, scilicet quod verbum consignificat tempus,
et haec est conclusio octo huius libri, quae probatur sic. Id
quod significat certam differentiam temporis consignificat
tempus. Verbum consignificat certam differentiam temporis.
Ergo, et cetera. Maior est nota, et minor declaratur per
differentiam inter nomen et verbum quae idem significat. Sed
different tamen in hoc, quod non idem consignificant, quia
verbum consignificat tempus, et nomen non consignificat tempus. Unde declaratur sic. Illud inest verbo per quod distinguitur a nomine, sed per consignificare certam differentiam temporis verbum distinguetur a nomine. Quod patet exemplariter sic. ‘Currit’ quod est verbum, et ‘cursus’ quod est nomen idem significant, sed differunt per hoc, quod ‘currit’ consignificat nunc esse quod est certa differentia temporis, et ‘cursus’ non consignificat nunc esse, nec consignificat aliquam differentiam temporis. ‘Currit’ nam significat talem motum animalis ut mensuratur tempore praesenti, sed ‘cursus’ significat huiusmodi motum non ut mensuratur aliqua differentia temporis, sed ut abstrahitur ab omni differentia temporis. Cum nam intelligo cursum, non magis intelligo cursum ut mensuratur tempore praesenti, scilicet ut nunc praesentaliter sit quam ut mensuratur tempore praeterito, scilicet ut fiebat, vel ut mensuratur tempore futuro, scilicet fiet in futuro. Per hoc patet quod ‘currit’ non significat tempus, sed cum tempore, quia ‘currit’ significat determinatum motum inesse animali, qui motus non est tempus, sed dat intelligere certam differentiam temporis mensurantem suum significatum, et huiusmodi motum. Patet etiam quod ‘dies’ et ‘nox’ non significat cum tempore, quamvis significant tempus, quia non significant sua significata prout mensurantur aliqua certa differentia temporis, sed prout abstrahuntur ab omni tempore. Potuit enim dies fieri vel nunc vel in futuro, et potuit fieri et fiebat in futuro.
Et semper eorum quae de altero dicuntur [nota [est, ut eorum quae dicuntur de subiecto vel in subiecto sunt]²⁸³]²⁸⁴.


Sciendum est²⁹¹ quod philosophus [pro]²⁹² *quaes dicuntur de subiecto* intelligit praedicata essentialia, et *pro*²⁹⁴ *ista*²⁹⁵ *quaes sunt in subiecto* intelligit praedicata accidentalia. Ex isto loco potest notari quod res extra animam sicut declaratum est supra principium libri praedicamentorum est praedicatum, et per consequens propositio componitur ex...

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And it is always a mark of those which are said of another, as of those which are said of a subject or are in a subject

Aristotle makes another point, namely that *a verb is always a mark of those which are said of another*, and this is the ninth conclusion of this book, which is proved in this way. A verb is always a mark of those which are said of another, namely of a subject, or of those which are in a subject. But just as those which are said of a subject are said of another, so too those which are in a subject are said of another. Therefore, etc.

One must known that by *those which are said of a subject* Aristotle means essential predicates, and by *those which are in a subject* he means accidental predicates. From this, it can be known that a thing outside the soul, as was stated above in the beginning of the *Categories*, is a predicate, and consequently a statement is composed out of things outside...
rebus extra animam <sicut declaratum est supra principium libri praedicamentorum>\textsuperscript{296}.\textsuperscript{296} Et\textsuperscript{297} istud tamen non est ad propositum, quia nota in proposito non accipitur pro signo, sed \textsuperscript{298} accipitur pro notificante, ut postea \{dicetur\}\textsuperscript{299}.\textsuperscript{299} \{Nam\}\textsuperscript{300} si verbum \{est\}\textsuperscript{301} nota eorum quae de altero predicantur, et [si]\textsuperscript{302} verbum non est nota nisi sui significati, sequitur quod significatum verbi predicatur, sed significatum verbi est res extra animam. Ergo videtur quod res extra animam praedicatur. Aliter dicunt aliqui, quod verbum in \{qualem\}\textsuperscript{303} propositione predicatur, et hoc dicunt propter \{istud\}\textsuperscript{304} dictum philosophi hic: \textit{verbum est semper nota eorum quae [de altero predicantur]}\textsuperscript{305}, et cetera, et etiam quia Aristoteles \textit{infra}\textsuperscript{306} in isto capitulo dicit quod verbum infinitum semper de aliquo est, sed non \textit{est}\textsuperscript{307} aliter de aliquo nisi \textit{qua}\textsuperscript{308} tanquam praedicatum de subiecto. Ergo verbum infinitum est praedicatum \<et eadem ratione vel maiori verbum finitum est praedicatum>\textsuperscript{309}. Unde sic dicentes dicunt the soul. However, that is not relevant to this particular claim, because a mark in a statement is not taken for a sign, but for a mark, as will be seen later. For if a verb is a mark of those which are predicated of another, and if a verb is not a mark of anything except its significate, it follows that the significate of a verb is predicated. But the significate of a verb is a thing outside the soul. Therefore, it seems that a thing outside the soul is predicated. Some say otherwise, that a verb in every statement is predicated, and they say this on account of that \textit{dictum} of Aristotle here: \textbf{a verb is always a mark of those which are predicated of another}, etc., and also because Aristotle in this chapter says that an infinitive verb is always of another, but to be of another is nothing for it be except as a predicate of a subject. Therefore, an infinitive verb is a predicate. Hence those who hold that position say that in this statement, ‘A human is an animal’, this whole thing, ‘is an animal’, is predicated.
Hence they say that in every statement, the verb is a predicate or is part of a predicate. That dictum of Aristotle from the second chapter of the Perihemeremeneias – when the predicate is a tertium adiacens – can be used by them, from which this verb, is’, can always be understood to be a predicate – either a secundum adiacens or a tertium adiacens. But without a doubt those who hold this position do not understand the logic of Aristotle, nor are they accustomed to speak about those things which follow from that logic. Aristotle, discussing at the beginning of the first book of the Prior Analytics those which are parts of a statement, from which syllogisms and conclusions composed of at their most basic, Aristotle define terms, saying I call a term that into which a statement is resolved, and immediately he sets out the division of a term, saying that a predicate and about which it is predicated, to those being or non-being is apposed or divided, through this thinking, as it seems from the clarity
subiectum <et praedicatum>\(^{325}\), et hoc verbum, ‘est’, affirmatum vel negatum. Unde praedicato et subiecto apponuntur esse vel non esse, hoc est, hoc verbum ‘est’ affirmatum vel negatum \({\text{est}}\)\(^{326}\) \(<\text{tertium}\>)\(^{327}\) appositum predicato et subiecto ad con\(<\text{orbit}\>\> stituendum \(<\text{rationem}\>\)^{328}. \(<\text{In}\>\)^{329} primo priorum ubi docet syllogizare, dicit quod medi\(u\)s terminus in prima figura est illud quod subicitur in maiori et praedicatur in minori, et in secunda figura <medium>\(^{330}\) praedicatur in utraque praemissarum, et in tertia figura [medium]\(^{331}\) subicitur in utraque praemissarum. Sed in prima figura hoc verbum, ‘est’, \({\text{ne}}\)\(^{332}\) est subiectum \({\text{ne}}\)\(^{333}\) est partes subiecti in maiori, sic syllogizando ‘omnis homo est animal, omne risibile est homo, ergo’ \({\text{et cetera}}\)^{334}, ergo in minori, \(<\text{scilicet in hac}\>\)^{335}, ‘omne risibile est homo’, hoc verbum ‘est’ \({\text{ne}}\)\(^{336}\) est praedicatum nec pars praedicati. Confirmatur, quia si hoc verbum ‘est’ esset pars praedicati <vel praedicatum>\(^{337}\), in omni bono syllogizmo variaretur of the words, that the parts of a statement are (1) the predicate and (2) that about which it is predicated, namely the subject, and (3) this verb, ‘is’, either as an affirmative or a negative. Hence being or non-being is apposed to the predicate and to the subject, that is, this verb, ‘is’, whether affirmative or negative, is apposed to the predicate and the subject, when establishing a statement. Likewise, in the first book of the Prior Analytics, where Aristotle teaches us to syllogize, he says that the middle term in the first figure is that which is the subject in the major and the predicate in the minor, and in the second figure it is the predicate in both of the premises, and in the third figure the middle is the subject in both premises. But in the first figure, this verb, ‘is’, is neither the subject nor is it part of the subject in the major premise, so by syllogizing ‘Every human is an animal, everything capable of laughter is a human, therefore’, etc., therefore in the minor (namely in this,
medium, [et]$^{338}$ quia aliud foret praedicatum in minori quam fuit subiectum in maior. In demonstratione {ergo}$^{339}$ potissima quae solum sit in prima figura esset fallacia accidentis, quod boni logici non solent dicere.

Item philosophus semper <in>$^{340}$ exemplificando de subiecto et praedicato {in capitulo}$^{341}$ ubi ostendit quod conjunctiones {sunt}$^{342}$ inutiles, ponit tales terminos ‘homo animal’, ‘equus animal’, ‘homo lapis’ et huiusmodi. Praedicatum ergo propositionis est huiusmodi terminus, animal vel homo, lapis, equus, et similia, et per consequens hoc verbum, ‘est’, non est praedicatum nec pars praedicati.

Item <in>$^{343}$ eodem primo priorum dicit conversionem in terminis esse quando {de subiecto sit praedicatum}$^{344}$ et everso, sed si verbum semper esset praedicatum vel pars praedicati nunquam fieret in conversione {de subiecto

‘Every human is an animal’), this verb, ‘is’, is neither the predicate nor part of the predicate. This is confirmed, because if this verb, ‘is’, were a part of the predicate, in every correctly-formed syllogism, the middle term would be varied, because something else would be the predicate in the minor premise than was the subject in the major premise. Therefore in a demonstration of the highest sort, which are only in the first figure, there would be a fallacy of accident, which any good logician would not make the mistake of saying.

Likewise, when discussing the subject and the predicate in the chapter [in the Rhetoric] where he mentions that conjunctions are pointless, Aristotle always indicates these sorts of terms: ‘human animal’, ‘horse animal’, ‘human stone’ and predicates of that sort. Therefore, a term of this sort, ‘animal’ or ‘human’, ‘stone’, ‘horse’ and so on is the predicate of a statement, and consequently this verb, ‘is’, is not a predicate nor part of a predicate.

Likewise, in the same first book of the Prior Analytics, he says that a conversion in terms is when the predicate is of a subject, and conversely, but if a verb were always a predicate or part of a predicate, then the predicate would

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338 A, B
339 ‘et sic’: A, B
340 A, B
341 ‘et medio’: A;
342 ‘essent’: B
343 B
344 ‘de praedicato sit subiectum’: A
praedicatum\}^{345} \text{[nec]}^{346} \text{ex converso}^{347}, \text{quia verbum non est subiectum \{nec\}^{348} \text{pars subiecti, et per consequens nunquam fieret conversio in terminis. Unde si ista propositio, ‘quidam homo est animal’, convertatur sic, ‘ergo quoddam animal est homo’, hic non est conversio in eisdem terminis, quia ‘homo’ subicitur in prima et ‘\text{est}’^{349} \text{animal’ praedicatur, in secunda ‘animal’ subicitur et ‘\text{est}’^{350} \text{homo’ praedicatur, et ita in hac conversione forent quattuor termini, [sic] \text{et}^{351} \text{‘homo’, ‘est animal’, ‘est homo’, ‘animal’. Confirmatur quia philosophus dividit terminum in subiectum et \text{in \text{prose}}^{352} \text{praedicatum. Conversio ergo in terminis est quando de subiecto sit praedicatum et e reverso.}\}

\text{Item secundum istam opinionem, nunquam praedicaretur per se superius de \[parte\]^{353} \text{inferiori. Nam in ista, ‘homo est animal’, praedicaretur ‘\text{est animal’}. Cum est animal non sit genus hominis, sequitur quod in ista non praedicatur per se superius de per se inferiori, et eadem ratione nec in aliqua alia.}\}

\text{never be converted into the subject, nor conversely, because the verb is not a subject nor part of the subject, and consequently there would never be a conversion in terms. Hence, if this statement, ‘A certain human is an animal’, is converted in this way, ‘Therefore a certain animal is human’, here there is not a conversion into the same terms, because ‘human’ is the subject in the first and ‘is animal’ is its predicate, and in the second ‘animal’ is the subject and ‘is human’ is the predicate, and so in this conversion there would be four terms, namely ‘human’, ‘is an animal’, ‘is human’, ‘animal’. This is confirmed, because Aristotle divides terms into the subject and the predicate. Therefore a conversion in terms is when a predicate is of a subject, and conversely.}\}

\text{Again, according to that opinion, a superior could never be predicated \text{per se} of its inferior. For in this, ‘A human is an animal’, ‘is an animal’ would be predicated. Since ‘is an animal’ is not the genus of human, it follows that in this case a superior \text{per se} is not predicated of an inferior \text{per se}, and by the same account not in any other case either.}\
Item quaero utrum genus possit praedicari de speciem vel non. Si sic, cum animal sit genus hominis, sequitur quod in aliqua propositione, [‘homo est animal’], animal potest esse praedicatum, et ita non semper est necessarium verbum praedicari. Si dicitur quod genus non per se praedicatur, sed cum verbo, ita quod verbum est pars praedicati, istud est contra scientiam quam tradit Aristotelis de praedicatis primo topica, ubi ponit quattuor esse praedicata, scilicet genus, differentia, proprium et accidens. Si hic opinio esset vera, nullum istorum praedicatum. Item istud est contra philosophum, primo posteriorum, ubi vult quod genus et differentia praedicantur per se de speciem et hoc in primo modo dicendi per se.

Again, I ask whether a genus can be predicated of a species or not. If it can, since animal is the genus of human, it follows that in this statement, ‘A human is an animal’, ‘animal’ can be the predicate, and it is not always necessary for the verb to be predicated. If it is said that a genus is not predicated per se, but with a verb, so that the verb is part of the predicate, that is contrary to scientific knowledge handed down from Aristotle, from the chapter on predicates from the first book of the Topics, where he claims that four things are predicated, namely a genus, a differentia, a proprium and an accident. If the present opinion were true, none of those would be a predicate. That is also contrary to what Aristotle says in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, where he means that a genus and a difference are predicated per se of a species, and this in the first mode of speaking per se.
Likewise, in the *Categories*, Aristotle says that *when one is predicated of another, whatever is predicated of the predicate is also predicated of the subject*. This concerns essential predication, such as if a human is an animal, and something is predicated of ‘animal’, it can be predicated of ‘human’. Therefore that which is predicated in this, ‘A human is an animal’, is a subject in this, ‘An animal is a substance’. Otherwise the rule would not hold if that which is predicated in an essential predication is not able to be a subject in another essential predication. But in this statement, ‘An animal is a substance’, nothing is the subject except this term, ‘animal’, and this is known *per se* by those who are experienced in logic. Nor need we delay anymore on this opinion, because, relative to the first principles of logic, it contains a clear error, thereby destroying the art of syllogizing and the art of demonstrating, and consequently the art of converting statements, without which we could not have any scientific knowledge.

If perhaps one of those ridiculous persons were to say that in a statement in which the predicate is a *tertium adiacens*,
there are two predicates, namely the total predicate and the partial predicate. The total predicate is the whole predicate aggregated from the verb and from the thing specifying the verb. The partial predicate is that which specifies the verb. Hence, in this, ‘A human is an animal’, ‘is an animal’ is the total predicate, and ‘animal’ is the partial predicate.

Contra, secundum hoc in omni propositione in qua {praedicatur} tertium adiacens, praedicarentur vel enunciarentur plura de uno vel plura de pluribus, quia certus est quod praedicatum enunciatur de subjecto, et per consequens si {sunt} plura predicata et unum subjectum, plura enunciantur de uno, et sic omnis propositionio in qua <praedicatum> {est} tertium adiacens foret plures, quod est inconveniens.

On the contrary, according to this position in every statement in which a tertium adiacens is predicated, many things would be predicated or said of one, or many of many, because it is certain that the predicate is said of the subject, and consequently if there are many predicates and one subject, many are said of one, and so every statement in which there is a tertium adiacens there would be many statements, which is problematic.

Likewise, the predicate and the subject are called the extremes of a statement, but they are two extremes of one division. Therefore, in one statement there is one subject and one predicate.

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379 A
380 ‘dupliciter’: B
381 B
382 B
383 B
384 ‘praedicatur’: B
385 A
386 ‘sint’: A
387 B
388 ‘praedicatur’: A
Item [si] praedicati {debet} dici praedicatum partiale, tunc litterae et syllabae quae sunt partes praedicati totalis forent praedicata partialia, et sic in omni propositione plura extrema {vel praedicata quam duo}. Dico ergo quod in omni propositione <k6va> cathegorica in qua praedicatum est tertium adiacens, illud quod specificat verbum quod est copula est praedicatum, et verbum quod est copula {nec} est praedicatum nec pars praedicati, nec est subjectum nec pars subiecti.

Likewise, if the parts of a predicate ought to be called a partial predicate, then letters and syllables which are parts of the total predicate would be partial predicates, and so in every statement there would be more than two predicates. Therefore I say that in every categorical statement in which the predicate is a tertium adiacens, that which specifies the verb is the predicate, and the verb (which is a copula) neither is the predicate not is part of the predicate, nor is it the subject nor part of the subject.

To the authoritative texts in contrast. To the first, when Aristotle says that a verb is mark of those, etc., we should say that from this authority the opposite of that opinion follows, because nothing is a mark of itself. Therefore if a verb is a mark of those which are said of another, it follows that a verb is not that which is said of another, and consequently the verb is not a predicate. Therefore I say that ‘mark’ is taken in many ways, but in this case ‘mark’ is taken for that which the verb marks. Also that which in every statement joins together the predicate with the subject

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389 B
390 ‘pars’: B
391 ‘debet’: A, B
392 ‘essent’: A
393 ‘quam duo praedicata’: A, B
394 ‘praedicatur’: A
395 ‘non’: B
396 ‘quam’: A, B
397 ‘est’: B
398 ‘et’: A
{etiam}\(^{399}\) quod in omni propositione copulat praedicatum cum subiecto notificat quod est praedicatum, quod manifeste patet in propositionibus in quibus ponuntur verba adjectiva.

Ad hoc {nam}\(^{400}\), quod cognoscamus {quod}\(^{401}\) est praedicatum in talibus propositionibus, resolvimus verbum adjectivum in hoc verbum \textless;\textquoteright\textit{sum}, \textgreater; \textit{es}, et\(^{402}\) \textit{est}, et in principium eiusdem temporis et eiusdem significationis, et facta resolutione cognoscimus {quod}\(^{403}\) est praedicatum, quia illud quod specificat {verbum}\(^{404}\) facta resolutione est praedicatum, et ita verbum notificat praedicatum.

Contra, si verbum sit nota solum quia notificat, [tunc]\(^{405}\) diffinitio verbi non competet omni verbo, quia non omne verbum notificat, sed solum verbum substantivum quod copulat {subiectum cum predicato}\(^{406}\). Sed hoc est inconvenies, quia diffinitio verbi \{debet\}\(^{407}\) omni verbi competere.

For from this, that we understand what is the predicate in statements with adjectival verbs, we resolve an adjectival verb into this verb, ‘is’, and into a participle of the same time and signification, and, having made that resolution, we understand that it is the predicate, because that which specifies the verb in the resolution is the predicate, and so the verb marks the predicate.

One might object that, if a verb is a mark only of what it marks, then the definition of a verb would not apply to all verbs, because not every verb marks, but only substantival verbs join together a subject with a predicate. But this is inconsistent, because the definition of a verb ought to apply to all verbs.

\(^{399}\) ‘enim’: B
\(^{400}\) ‘autem’: A
\(^{401}\) ‘quid’: A
\(^{402}\) B
\(^{403}\) ‘quid’: A
\(^{404}\) ‘hoc verbum, ‘est’, facta’: A
\(^{405}\) A
\(^{406}\) ‘praedicatum subiecto’: A
\(^{407}\) ‘deberet’: A
Item sicut per resolutionem verbi cognoscitur praedicatum, ita \{et\} subiectum. Ergo verbum non est magis nota praedicati quam subiecti, cuius oppositum videtur philosophus velle.

Ad primum istorum dicendum \[est\] quod omne verbum verberaliter sumptum est nota eorum quae de altero \{dicuntur\}, et hoc \[est\] vel secundum se ut verba substantiva, vel \{ratione inclusi in eis\} ut verba adiectiva <verbaliter sumpta>. Unde verba adiectiva verbaliter sumpta ratione verborum substantivorum eis inclusorum sunt notae praedicatorum et verba substantiva, ut haec verba ‘est’, ‘fuit’ \[et\] ‘erit’, sunt secundum se notae \[ipsorum\] praedicatorum <quia secundum se dicunt in cognitioni praedicamentorum>.

Ad aliud dico ut mihi videtur quod \{hoc verbum ‘est’ est ita\} principium notificandi subiectum sicut predicatum. \{Unde\} per hoc quod aliquid construitur cum verbo ex parte

Likewise, just as through the resolution of a verb the predicate is understood, so too the subject. Therefore, a verb is not more greatly a mark of the predicate than of the subject, which which seems to be the opposite of what Aristotle intends.

To the first of these, it must be said that every verb taken up verbally is a mark of those which are said of another, and this is either according to itself, as with a substantival verb, or by reason of its inclusion in them, as with an adjectival verb. Hence adjectival verbs taken verbally, by reason of the inclusion of substantival verbs in them, are marks of the predicates, so that these verbs – ‘is’, ‘was’ and ‘will be’ – are according to themselves marks of those predicates.

To the other, I say, as seems clear to me, that this verb, ‘is’, is a principle of marking the subject just as much as the predicate. Hence on account of this, that something is
ante cognoscitur quod illud est subjectum vel se tenens ex parte subjecti sicut per hoc quod aliquid construitur <cum verbo> a parte post cognoscitur quod illud est praedicatum vel se tenens ex parte praedicati. Et cum dicitur quod philosophus dicit quod verbum est nota praedicati et non subjecti, dico quod cum philosophus dicit *verbum esse notam eorum quae de altero dicuntur*, tangitur tam subjectum quam praedicatum, {quia si} dicitur *aliquid dici de altero* tanguntur duo, [sicilicet illud quod dicitur,] scilicet praedicatum, et illud de quo dicitur, sicilicet subjectum. Unde cum dicitur quod *verbum est nota eorum quae de altero dicuntur*, denotatur quod verbum est principium cognoscendi alterum de altero, sicilicet praedicatum de subjecto, et per consequens est principium cognoscendi tam subjectum quam praedicatum. Non enim potest cognosci aliquid dici de altero nisi cognoscatur tam illud quod dicitur quam illud de quo dicitur.

[Et] si quis quaereret utrum verbum magis se teneat ex parte subjecti quam ex parte praedicati, dico quod probabiliter dici potest quod verbum substantivum quod copulat subjectum cum praedicato non magis se tenet ex parte

construed with the verb as something coming before it, it is understood that that is a subject or holds itself from a part of the subject, just as on account of this, that something is construed with the verb as something coming after it, it is known that it is a predicate or holds itself from the part of the predicate. And when it is said that Aristotle says that a *verb is a mark of those which are said of another*, it attaches just as much to the subject as to the predicate, because if *something is said of another* it touches on two things, namely that which is said, namely the predicate, and that about which it is said, namely the subject. Hence when it is said that a *verb is a mark of those which are said of another*, it is denoted that a verb is a principle of thinking one of another, namely the predicate of the subject, and consequently it is a principle of thinking about the subject as much as about the predicate. For something cannot be thought to be said of another unless that about which it is said is thought just as that which is said.

And if someone were to ask whether the verb more greatly holds itself on the part of the subject or on the part of the predicate, I say that it probably can be said that a substantival verb which joins together a subject with a
subiecti quam ex parte praedicati, sed est medium inter illa, non magis conveniens cum uno quam cum {alio} \(^{427}\). Verba vero adiectiva quae resolubilia <sunt> \(^{428}\) in verbum substantivum et suum participium ratione participii {in eis inclusit} \(^{429}\) magis se tenent ex parte praedicati quam ex parte subiecti, quia participium tali verbi est praedicatum vel pars praedicati. Ratione tamen copulae non magis se tenet ex parte praedicati quam ex parte subiecti. Unde quod communiter dicitur, quod praedicatum se habet per modum formae et subiectum per modum materiae, est dictum magistrale non continens veritatem, quia subiectum et praedicatum in propositione cathegorema sunt partes materiales et verbum quod est copula est pars formalis, ubi alibi dicitur <ab eo quod propositio de inesse habet suam unitatem> \(^{430}\).

Quidam tamen dicunt quod quamvis verbum copulans praedicatum cum subiecto {nec} \(^{431}\) sit praedicatum nec pars praedicati, tamen magis se tenet ex parte praedicatum quam ex parte subiecti, quia verbum quod est copula inter praedicatum et subiectum est medium respiciens inter illa subiectum tanquam terminum a quo, <et> \(^{432}\) praedicatum tanquam terminum ad quem, sed medium inter terminum a quo et predicate does not hold itself more so on the part of the subject than on the part of the predicate, but it is a middle between them, no more suited to one than to the other. However, adjectival verbs, which are resolvable into a substantival verb and its own participle, by reason of the participle in it, hold more so on the part of the predicate than on the part of the subject, because the participle of such a verb is the predicate or part of the predicate. However, with respect to the copula included in it, it no more holds itself on the part of the predicate than on the part of the subject. Hence that which is commonly said, that the predicate holds itself through the mode of form, and the subject through the mode of matter, is a common doctrine which does not contain the truth, because the subject and the predicate in a categorical statement are the material parts and the verb, which is the copula, is the formal part, which is explained elsewhere.

However, some say that although the verb joining together the predicate with the subject is neither a predicate nor part of the predicate, still it more so holds itself on the part of the predicate than on the part of the subject, because a verb which is the copula between the predicate and the subject is a medium, aiming, between those, at the subject as its term from which, and at the predicate as its term to which. But

\(^{427}\) ‘reliquo’: A  
\(^{428}\) A, B  
\(^{429}\) ‘inclusi in eis’: A, B  
\(^{430}\) A  
\(^{431}\) ‘non’: B  
\(^{432}\) A
terminum ad quem magis se tenet ex parte termini ad quem quam ex parte termini a quo, ut patet ex quinque physica, ubi philosophus dicit quod motus qui est medium inter terminum a quo et terminum ad quem magis est de natura termini ad quem quam de natura termini a quo, et sic verbum quod est medium inter praedicatum et subjectum magis se tenet ex parte praedicati quam ex parte subjecti. Istud tamen nihil concludit, quia propositionis non est motus nec mutatio a subiecto in praedicatum.

Ad secundam auctoritatem philosophi dicentis quod verbum semper est de altero, dico quod istud est, sed non est semper de altero tanquam praedicatum de subjecto, sed quia verbum verbaliter sumptum secundum ordinem constructionis nunquam potest esse principium in ordine, sed semper praesupponit aliquid praecedens secundum ordinem constructionis. Unde verbum semper est de aliquo praecedente ipsum secundum constructionem, et sic intelligi istud dictum quod est commonly said, that a verb signifies through the mode of action and of going out from one and

433 A, B
434 A
435 ‘nec’: A, B
436 B
437 ‘oratione’: A
438 A
439 ‘ordinem’: B
440 ‘debet’: A, B
dictum\(^{441}\) quod communiter dicitur quod verbum significat per modum actionis et egredientis \(^{442}\) altero et inhaerentis alicui alteri. Hoc \(^{443}\) idem dicitur, \(^{444}\) quod semper praesupponit aliquid \(^{445}\) in oratione secundum ordinem constructionis non quia verbum realiter egrediatur vel realiter inhaeret, sed quia verbum praesupponit aliquod praecedens, sicut actio praesupponit agens et egrediens illud a quo egreditur, et inhaerens illud cui inheret. Et si \(^{446}\) quod verbum semper dicitur de altero ut de subiecto et per consequens est praedicatum, dicendum est quod in textu \(^{447}\) non invenitur quod verbum dicitur de altero ut de subiecto, sed quod est de altero. Si tamen inveniretur quod verbum dicitur de altero, ex hoc non sequeretur quod verbum esset praedicatum, quia esse vel dici de altero intelligatur dupliciter, scilicet immediante \(^{448}\) et sic verbum est de altero et dicitur de altero, alio modo mediante, scilicet mediante copula. Quod \(^{449}\) primo est vel dicitur de altero non est praedicatum, sed quod secundo modo dicitur de altero \(^{450}\), scilicet mediante verbo quod copulat praedicatum cum subiecto, \(^{451}\) illud est praedicatum.

\(^{441}\) 'illud': A, B  
\(^{442}\) 'de': A  
\(^{443}\) 'enim': A, B  
\(^{444}\) 'quod': B  
\(^{445}\) A, B  
\(^{446}\) 'allegaretur': B  
\(^{447}\) B  
\(^{448}\) B  
\(^{449}\) 'quia': B  
\(^{450}\) B  
\(^{451}\) B  
\(^{452}\) B

To the third authoritative text, when Aristotle says as the predicate is a tertium adiaciens, etc., that text needs to be explained according to the intention of Aristotle, because in that authoritative text, this verb, ‘is’, is held materially, and it is not held nominatively but datively. And the sense is that when the tertium adiaciens to this verb ‘is’, is the predicate, then apposites are spoken of in two ways, etc. Hence in the present case, this verb, ‘is’, does not assign the supposit predicated of this verb, but that which I call the tertium adiacens assigns the supposit to it, and this verb, ‘is’, is taken datively. Hence, when saying ‘A human is an animal’, this term, ‘animal’, is the tertium adiacens in that statement, and it adjoins and is adjoined to this verb ‘is’, and not only does the predicate adjoin the verb but the verb also adjoins the predicate. Hence, in this statement, ‘A human is an animal’, ‘animal’ adjoins this verb, ‘is’, and this verb, ‘is’, adjoins ‘animal’, because each is joined to

\[453 \text{B} \]
\[454 \text{B} \]
\[455 \text{‘ista’: A} \]
\[456 \text{‘quod li’: B} \]
\[457 \text{A} \]
\[458 \text{‘appositiones’: B} \]
\[459 \text{‘dicto’: A} \]
\[460 \text{‘ista’: A; B} \]
\[461 \text{‘additur’: B} \]
\[462 \text{‘additur animali’: B} \]
But still there is a doubt, because it does not seem true that a verb is always the mark of a predicate, because sometimes a verb is a subject, as is clear in this case, ‘To read is good’, or in this case, ‘Read is a verb’. It must be said that, in this case, by ‘To read is good’ or ‘Read is a verb’, ‘to read’ is not being used verbally, because it is not used through the mode of a verb but through the mode of the specification of a verb, since it is not used through the mode of going or flowing out from another, that is, through the mode of presupposing something according to the order of construction, but it is used for the significate of the verb. For it is the same thing to say ‘To read is good’ and ‘Reading is good’, though in this case, by saying ‘To read is good’, ‘to read’ is a verb and has the mode of specifying a verb, but it is not used as a verb. Also in this case, by saying ‘Runs is a verb’, ‘runs’ is a verb, but it is not used as
accipitur materialiter. Unde verbum acceptum \(\text{in}^{476}\) vi verbi semper est nota eorum quae de altero dicuntur vel secundum se vel ratione inclusi in eo, ut supra dictum est.

**Non currit autem et non laborat non verbum dico.** Consignificat quidem tempus et semper de aliquo est nota. **Differentiae autem huic nomen non est impositum, sed sit infinitum verbum.**

Haec est secunda particula secundae partis huius capituli in qua philosophus excludit quaedam a ratione verbi quae apparent esse verba et non sunt verba, et duo sunt quae excludit a ratione verbi, scilicet verbum infinitum et obliquum. Et primo excludit verbum infinitum a ratione verbi, narrans de verbo infinito cuius principium est quod verbum infinitum non est verbum. Secundum est quod duo superius posita in diffinitione verbi conveniunt verbo infinito, scilicet consignificare tempus, et esse nota eorum quae de altero dicuntur. Tertium est quod huiusmodi dictiones cuiusmodi sunt, ‘non curro’, ‘non laborat’, non sunt verba, et non est eis nomen impositum, sed eis nomen imponit, dicens sit nomen infinitum, hoc est, huiusmodi dictionibus, ‘non currit’, ‘non laborat’, imponitur hoc nomen commune, scilicet hoc nomen, ‘verbum infinitum’.

Hic dubitatur quia secundum iam dicta videtur quod verbum infinitum sit verbum, quia diffinitio verbi sibi competit, scilicet

\[476\] 'sub': B
consignificare tempus, et cetera. Dicendum quod diffinitio quod diffinitio verbi prius posita competit tam ver<11ra>bis infinitis quam verbis finitis, sed illa diffinitio non fuit propria et perfecta diffinitio verbi, sed est diffinitio communis verbo finito et infinito. In diffinitione perfecta debent poni istae particulae duae, finita et recta, et per has particulam differt verbum a verbo infinito, et a verbo obliquo.

Intelligendum quod verbum infinitum non significat passionem vel actionem, sed magis significat privationem actionis vel passionis, et ideo verbum infinitum consignificat tempus, et non solum actio vel passio mensurantur tempore, sed etiam privatio actionis et passionis mensurantur tempore, ut patet ex quattor physica, ubi dicit philosophus quod tempus non solum est mensura motus, sed et mensura tam motus quam quietis.

Sciendum est quod verbum infinitum est nota eorum quae de altero dicuntur ratione verbi substantivi subintellecti in verbo infinito. Unde idem est dicere ‘Socrates non currit’, secundum quod ‘non currit’ est verbum infinitum, quantum est dicere ‘Socrates est non currens’.

Quoniam similiter in quolibet est vel quod est vel quod non est.

Narratis praedictis de verbo infinito philosophus probat quod verbum infinitum non est verbum, et haec conclusio est decem huius libri, quae probatur sic. Illud quod equaliter inest ei vel illi quod est, et ei quod non est, non est verbum, sed verbum infinitum inest equaliter ei quod est, et ei quod non est. Ergo, et
cetera. De ista ratione ponitur minor in littera, maior declaratur sic. Omne verbum proprie sumptum significat actionem et passionem, vel per modum actionis et passionis, seu per modum fluxus et fieri eo modo quo dictum est. Sed huiusmodi non conveniunt non enti sed solum insunt enti. Et minor patet, nam ‘non currit’, quod est verbum infinitum, inest enti et non enti. Nam de Socrate sedente verum est dicere quod non currit, et de Caesare mortuo verum est dicere quod non currit. Haec nam est vera, ‘Caesar non currit’. Ex istis patet error istorum qui dicunt quod verbum infinitum non manet infinitum in oratione, sed in oratione positum est pure negativum et non infinitum, et haec dicuntur de intentione Boethii super hunc passum, qui dicit quod verbum infinitum positum in oratione non differt a verbo pure negativo. Istud tamen est manifestissime falsum, et contra intentionem philosophi et Boethius. Dicit nam philosophus quod verbum infinitum similiiter, hoc est, equaliter inest ei quod et ei quod non, sed non inest alio modo quam sicut praedicatum inest subiecto nisi in oratione. Non enim inest sicut accidentis inest subiecto, quia non enti nullum accidentis inest nec sicut praedicatum inest subiecto nisi in oratione. Ergo verbum infinitum in ratione manet infinitum. Similiiter dicit philosophus quod verbum infinitum semper est nota eorum quae de altero dicuntur, et dicit quod verbum infinitum semper est de aliquo sed non est de aliquo nec est nota eorum, quae dicuntur de aliquo nisi in oratione. Ergo omne verbum infinitum in oratione manet infinitum.

Item Boetius dicit quod verbum infinitum praedicatur de eo quod est et de eo quod non est, sed nihil praedicare nisi quod manet in oratione. Igitur verbum infinitum manet infinitum in
oratione.

Istud confirmatur per tres ratione. Primo sic. Participium infinitum potest manere infinitum in oratione, ut patet dicendo ‘Socrates est non curre\textsuperscript{s}’, sed verbum infinitum resolvitur sicut et quodlibet alius verbum in suum participium eiusdem temporis et eius de significationi tamquam in suo convertibili. Idem nam est dicere ‘Socrates non currit’, et [Socrates] est non currens’, secundum quod ‘non currit’ est verbum infinitum, sed ‘est non currens’ manet infinitum in oratione. Ergo ‘non currit’ secundum quod est verbum infinitum manet in oratione. Unde de quocumque dicitur unum convertibilium de eodem dicitur et reliquum, sed convertibile cum verbo infinito manet in oratione et vere attribuitur subiecto. Ergo infinitum verbum manet in oratione, et vere attribuitur subiecto cum suum convertibile vere attribuitur.


Et confirmatur, quia nisi verbum infinitum esset pars orationis sequeretur quod verbum infinitum ad nihil esset utile, quod est inconveniens. Concedo ergo quod verbum infinitum potest
manere verbum infinitum in oratione. Et ad illud quod dici
Boethius, quod verbum infinitum in oratione positum non
differt a verbo pure negativo, istud sic intelligo quod oratio in
qua ponitur verbum infinitum quantum ad veritatem et
falsitatem non differt ab oracione in qua ponitur verbum pure
negativum, et hoc patet in simplicibus secundum intellectum.
Verbi tam subjectum quam praedicatum est terminus simplex.
In illis nam negativa de praedicato infinito et affirmativa de
infinito convertuntur, ut patebit in primo secundi libri. In aliis
tamen, ut in compositis, quantum ad veritatem et falsitatem
differunt affirmativa de praeterito infinito et negativa de
praeterito finito. Ista nam est vera, ‘Chimera alba non currit’,
ut est pure negativa, et est falsa secundum quod non currit est
verbum infinitum, quia tunc est sensus quod chimera alba est
non currens, et haec est falsa propter affirmationem quam ponit
implicite, sed non est sic in negativis, quia pure negativae non
ponunt affirmationem.

Sed dubitatur quam ista propositio, ‘Socrates non currit’, vel
illa, ‘Chimera non currit’, non potest esse mere negativa, ut
videtur. Dicendum quod haec oratio, ‘Socrates non currit’, est
multiplex secundum accentum eo quo ‘non currit’ potest esse
una dictio vel plures dictiones. Primo est mere affirmativa,
quia sensus est iste, ‘Socrates est non currens’. Secundo modo
est mere negativa, quamvis de virtute sermonis non
distinguendum sit, et hoc quia quo ad veritatem et falsitatem
sensus non differunt in significationibus, ut dictum est.

Similiter autem curreat vel currebat non verbum est sed
casus verbi. Differt autem a verbo quam hoc praesens
significat tempus, illa vero quod complectitur.

Notandum est hic quod verbum variatur per tempora, modos, numeros, et personas. Variatio quae est secundum numerum et personam non constituit casus verbi, sed variatio secundum modos et tempora constituit casus verbi, cuius ratione est quam verbum proprie dictum constituit actionem et passionem in actu praesentaliter, quod simpliciter est agere et pati. Modo sola illa variatio quae est ex parte actionis vel passionis casum constituit. Ideo verbum praeteriti et futuri temporis, et similiter verbum imperativi et optativi modi dicuntur casus verbi, quia non significant actionem vel passionem fieri in praesenti. Sed
variatio ex parte actionis secundum numerum et personam non est ex parte actionis vel passionis sed ex parte subjicii, et ideo talis variatio non constituit casum verbi.

Ipsa quidem secundum se [dicta verba nomina sunt et significant aliquid. Constituit enim intellectum qui dicit et qui audit quiescit. Sed si est vel non est nondum significat].

Indeed those verbs spoken by themselves are names and signify something. For he who speaks establishes an understanding, and he who listens arrests his intellect. But it does not yet signify if it is or is not.

Haec est {secunda} particula secundae partis principalis, in qua philosophus ponit quaedam convenientiam quae est inter nomen et ver<11va>bum. <Et> primo narrat quod {nomen} et {verbum} habent convenientiam adinvicem, dicens quod ipsa, scilicet verba secundum se dicta, {scilicet} seorsum accepta, {sunt nomina, hoc est,} sunt similia nominibus. <Et isto narrato hoc ponit duas convenientias inter nomen et verbum. Prima est quod sicut nomen per se sumptum significat aliquid, {ita} verbum per se sumptum aliquid significat. Secunda convenientia est quod sicut nomen per se sumptum {nec} significat verum nec falsum, sic verbum per se sumptum {nec} significat verum nec falsum. Et istas convenientias probat, [et] primo probat quod verbum per se sumptum aliquid significat, et haec est

This is the second subpart of the second part of the first book, in which Aristotle sets out a certain feature common to nouns and verbs. First he tells us that nouns and verbs have a similarity with one another, saying that those, namely verbs spoken by themselves, that is, taken separately, are similar to nouns. Having told us this, Aristotle sets out two features common to both nouns and verbs. The first is that, just as nouns taken by themselves signify something, so too verbs taken by themselves signify something. The second common feature is that, just as nouns taken by themselves signify neither something true nor something false, so too verbs taken by themselves signify neither something true nor something false. And he proves that nouns and verbs share these features. He first
conclusio duodecim huius libri, [quae]\(^{489}\) probatur sic. Illud quod est per se sumptum et constituit intellectum per se significat aliquid, quod patet, quia de ratione vocis \(<\text{per se}\>\)^{490} significativa est constitutur intellectum. Sed verbum per se sumptum constituit intellectum. Quod patet, quia ille qui audit verbum per se sumptum proferri aliquid intelligit, quia intellectus eius quiescit, hoc est, constituitur. Quod intelligendum [est]\(^{491}\) quantum est ad primam operationem intellectus, quae est conceptio alicuius simplicis. [Unde intellectus \{qui audit\}\(^{492}\) verbum per se prolatam constituitur quantum ad primam operationem intellectus, quae est simplicium apprehensio]\(^{493}\), non autem quantum \{tertiam\}\(^{494}\) operationem intellectus, quae est compositio et divisio. Igitur verbum per se sumptum aliquid significat.

\{Neque enim \textit{esse} signum est rei vel \textit{non esse}, nec si hoc ipsum est purum dixeres; ipsum quidem nihil est, consignificat autem quamdam compositionem quam sine compositis non est intelligere\}\(^{495}\).

proves that the verb taken by itself signifies something, and this is conclusion twelve of this book, which is proved in this way. That which is taken by itself and establishes an understanding \textit{per se} signifies something, which is clear, because the account of a significative utterance is to establish an understanding. But a verb taken by itself establishes an understanding. This is clear, because he who hears a verb uttered by itself understands something, because his understanding rests, that is, is established. This has be understood with regard to the first operation of the intellect, which is simple apprehension, not however with regard to the second operation of the intellect, which is composition and division. Therefore a verb taken by itself signifies something.

For ‘to be’ or ‘to not be’ is not a sign of a thing, nor if you clearly say this, ‘is’. Indeed it is nothing, but it consignifies a certain composition which cannot be understood without its composites.

\(^{489}\) A
\(^{490}\) B
\(^{491}\) B
\(^{492}\) ‘audientis’: A
\(^{493}\) B
\(^{494}\) ‘secundam’: A, B
\(^{495}\) ‘si est vel non est’: A, B
Secunda convenientia {patet} \(496\), scilicet quod sicut nomen per se sumptum {nec} \(497\) significat verum vel falsum, {similiter et} \(498\) verbum <per se sumptum nec significat verum nec falsum> \(499\), et hoc probat philosophus, et est conclusio {tredecim} \(500\) huius libri, <scilicet> \(501\) quod verbum per se sumptum nec significat verum nec falsum. <Et haec est conclusio tredecim.> \(502\) Probatur per locum a maiori sic. Si aliquod verbum per se sumptum {significat} \(503\) verum vel falsum, hoc maxime foret verum de hoc verbo, ‘est’, quod est <verbum> \(504\) substantivum inclusum in omni verbo adiectivo. Sed hoc verbo, ‘est’, per se sumptum {nec} \(505\) significat verum nec falsum est, <Nam, ut dicit philosophus, si hoc verbum est purum dixeris neque verum neque falsum est,> \(506\) hoc est, si hoc verbum, ‘est’, proferatur {sine verbo adiectivo, et per se nec significat verum nec falsum} \(507\). Nam, ut dicit philosophus, <si> \(508\) hoc verbum, ‘est’, significat compositionem quamdam quam sine {extremis} \(509\) non est intelligere tamquam aliquid significans verum vel falsum. Unde hoc verbum, ‘est’, cum sit

The second common feature is clear, namely that just as the noun taken by itself signifies neither something true nor something false, likewise the verb taken by itself signifies neither something true or something false, and this is conclusion thirteen of this book: that the verb taken by itself neither signifies something true nor something false. This is proved through an argument from the greater, in this way. If some verb taken by itself signifies something true or something false, that would be true most of all for this verb, ‘is’, which is the substantive verb included in every adjectival verb. But this verb, ‘is’, taken by itself signifies neither something true nor something false, that is, if this verb, ‘is’, is uttered without an adjectival verb, it does not by itself signify something true or something false. For, as Aristotle says, this verb, ‘is’, signifies a certain composition which, without its composites, cannot be understood to be something signifying something true or something false. Hence this verb, ‘is’, since it is a verb,
verbum, aliquid significat <sed>\textsuperscript{510} sine extremis nec significat verum vel falsum. Boethius dicit hic quod \textit{philosophus dicit quod hoc verbum, ‘est’, significat quamdam compositionem}, et cetera, quia hoc verbum, ‘est’, non significat naturam alicuius rei sed solum significat compositionem extremorum, [et cetera]\textsuperscript{511}.

Notandum sunt hic tria. Primo quod si aliquid verbum \{significet\}\textsuperscript{512} verum vel falsum, hoc maxime \{foret\}\textsuperscript{513} verum de hoc verbo, ‘est’, quia circa compositionem vel divisionem consistit veritas \{vel\}\textsuperscript{514} falsitas. Sed hoc verbum, ‘est’, vel \[aliquid\]\textsuperscript{515} eius obliquum in omni propositione est compositio vel copula extremorum adinvicem, [et]\textsuperscript{516} ideo dicit philosophus omnem propositionem constare ex nomine et hoc verbo, ‘est’, \<vel aliquo eius obliquo. Cum enim in propositione de praesenti, hoc verbum, ‘est’, \>,\textsuperscript{517} in tertia persona vel in prima vel in secunda est copula, et in omni propositione de praeterito, hoc verbum, ‘fuit’, est copula, et in omni propositione de futuro hoc verbum, ‘erit’, est copula vel compositio. Et ideo philosophus probat quod [nomen et]\textsuperscript{518} verbum per se summptum non significat verum vel falsum per signifies something, but without the extremes it does not signify something true or something false. Boethius says here that \textit{Aristotle says that this verb, ‘is’, signifies a certain composition}, etc., because this verb, ‘is’, does not signify the nature of some thing but only signifies the composition of the extremes.

We need to know three things here. First, that if some verb were to signify something true or something false, this would be true most of all with respect to this verb, ‘is’, because truth or falsity concerns composition or division. But this verb, ‘is’, or some oblique form of it, is in every statement a composition or copula of the extremes, and therefore Aristotle says that every statement consists in a noun and this verb, ‘is’, or some oblique form of it. For in a present-tense statement, this verb, ‘is’, in either the first, or second, or third person, is the copula, and in every past-tense statement, this verb, ‘was’, is the copula, and in every future-tense statement, this verb, ‘will be’, is the copula or the composition. And therefore Aristotle proves that a verb taken by itself does not signify something true or something

\textsuperscript{510} A, B
\textsuperscript{511} A, B
\textsuperscript{512} ‘significat’: B
\textsuperscript{513} ‘esset’: A, B
\textsuperscript{514} ‘et’: A, B
\textsuperscript{515} B
\textsuperscript{516} A
\textsuperscript{517} A
\textsuperscript{518} A

Secundo [est] quod hoc verbum, ‘est’, {notandum} quod hoc verbum, ‘est’, {quandoque} est secundum adiacens in propositione, et quandoque tertium adiacens. Quando est secundum adiacens, tunc est categorematic, quia tunc per se significat aliquam naturam, scilicet esse existere, {et} quando {est} tertium adiacens, tunc est syncategorematic, nullam naturam per se significans {determinate}, et hoc est false through this, that this verb, ‘is’, since it is a composition in every statement, does not signify something true or something false. Yet that verb most of all among all the verbs seems to signify by itself something true or something false, because no other verb is a composition or a copula unless by virtue of this verb, ‘is’, included in it. By this verb, ‘is’, I understand indifferently a verb in the first, second or third person – ‘am’, ‘are’, and even ‘had been’ – and oblique verbs derived from this verb, ‘is’, such as past-tense and future-tense verbs.

Second, we need to know that this verb, ‘is’, sometimes is a secundum adiacens in a statement, and sometimes is a tertium adiacens. When it is a secundum adiacens, then is categorematic, because then it signifies by itself some nature, namely the being of existence, but when it is a tertium adiacens, then it is syncategorematic, signifying determinately no nature by itself,. And this is what we are

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\textsuperscript{519} ‘quod’: A, B
\textsuperscript{520} A, B
\textsuperscript{521} ‘modi’: B
\textsuperscript{522} A, B
\textsuperscript{523} A, B
\textsuperscript{524} A, B
\textsuperscript{525} B
\textsuperscript{526} ‘intelligendum’: A
\textsuperscript{527} ‘aliquando’: A, B
\textsuperscript{528} A
\textsuperscript{529} B
\textsuperscript{530} ‘sed’: B
\textsuperscript{531} ‘praedicatur’: A
\textsuperscript{532} ‘determinatam’: A, B
quod solet dici quod cum hoc verbum, 'est', <quando> praedicatur secundum adiacens, tunc est praedicatum quod in se est, sed quando {praedicatur} tertium adiacens, tunc {procedit praedicatum} quod in alio est. <Unde> quando hoc verbum, 'est', ponitur secundum [adiacens] in propositione, tunc praedicatur {id} quod {significatur} per hoc verbum, 'est', scilicet <esse et> existere vel ens existens, sed quando hoc verbum, 'est', ponit tertium [adiacens] in propositione, ita quod [illud quod] sequitur hoc verbum, 'est', [in propositione] significat aliquam determinatam naturam, tunc praedicatur illud quod in alio est, hoc est, tunc praedicatur {illud quod determinate est quod non includitur in hoc verbo, 'est'} ut cum dicitur, 'homo est animal'. Non {nam} hic praedicatur esse existere, sed animal praedicatur.

Ista autem distinctio de hoc verbo, 'est', prout accipitur hic a Boethio, <et> potest probari per rationem, scilicet quod accustomed to say, that, with this verb, 'is', when a secundum adiacens is predicated, then the verb is the predicate, but when a tertium adiacens is predicated, then what is in another is predicated. Hence when this verb, 'is', posits a secundum adiacens in a statement, then that which is signified through this verb, 'is', is predicated, namely existing or the being of existence, but when this verb, 'is', posits a tertium adiacens, so that that which follows this verb, 'is', in a statement signifies some determinate nature, then that which is in another is predicated, that is, then some determinate thing which is not included in this verb, 'is', is predicated, as when it is said, 'A human is an animal'. For the being of existence is not predicated in this case, but animal is predicated.

Moreover, that distinction about this verb, 'is', insofar as it is employed here by Boethius, can be proved through
[quando praedicatur tertium adiacens [in propositione, tunc]\(^{547}\) est syncategorematic expression, when a tertium adiacens is predicated in a statement, then it is syncategorematic expression, and quandocumque secundum adiacens est categorematic expression, when a secundum adiacens is predicated, then it is categorematic expression. For when this verb, ‘is’, is a secundum adiacens in a statement, then an understanding is established by a statement in which this verb, ‘is’, is posited, so that by such a statement having been spoken the understanding of the one who hears it rests. But when a tertium adiacens is predicated, then by uttering the subject term with this verb, ‘is’ alone, the understanding of the one who hears it neither rests nor is established, but it expects something else. This is clear in the case of someone inquiring about the being of a subject either as a secundum adiacens or as a tertium adiacens. For a question whether it is inquires about the being of the subject as a secundum adiacens, and question what it is inquires about the being of the subject as a tertium adiacens.

\(^{547}\) A
\(^{548}\) B
\(^{549}\) B
\(^{550}\) A
\(^{551}\) ‘est’: A
\(^{552}\) A, B
\(^{553}\) ‘ut’: B
\(^{554}\) A; ‘quia’: B
\(^{555}\) B
\(^{556}\) A
\(^{557}\) A
\(^{558}\) ‘enim’: A, B
\(^{559}\) ‘an’: A
\(^{560}\) ‘quaeritur’: B
\(^{561}\) ‘quaeritur’: B
Nunc autem si quaeratur utrum Caesar est vel non est, et respondeatur *<dicendi quod>* 'Caesar est', quaestio solvitur, et intellectus audientis constituitur {vel} quiescit. {Et} si quaeratur de Caesar <quaestio> quia est, ut si quaeratur qualis est Caesar, et {respondetur} <dicendi> quod Caesar est, [secundum adiacens,] quae est, et intellectus <audientis> quiescit, sed expectat tertium adiacens, scilicet album vel nigrum, bonum vel malum, ens vel non ens, <et similia> quo <expresse> quiescit intellectus audientis. <Si enim quaeratur qualis est Caesar, et {dicatur} quod Caesar est album, quiescit et constituitur intellectus audientis.> Et sic potest apparere quod hoc verbum, ‘est’, {quandoque} praedicatur [cathegorema, quia per se sine tertio adiacente [constituitur intellectus vel] constituit intellectum, sed quando praedicatur tertium adiacens non constituit intellectum sine tertio adiacente. Now if someone asks whether Caesar is or is not, and someone else responds to him that Caesar is, the question is resolved, and the understanding of the one who hears it is established and rests. But if someone asks what Caesar is, as if he were to ask what sort of thing Caesar is, and someone else responds that Caesar is, the question is not resolved nor does the understanding rest, but it expects a tertium adiacens, namely ‘pale’ or ‘dark’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, ‘being’ or ‘non-being’, by which the understanding of the one who hears it rests. And in this way it can seem that this verb, ‘is’, sometimes is predicated as a categorematic expression, because it establishes an understanding by itself, without a tertium adiacens, but when a tertium adiacens is predicated, an understanding is not established without a tertium adiacens.
Ista tamen {regula} fortassis patitur calummam, quia per eandem rationem 'animal' {est} syncategorema, {ut} si quaeatur quale animal est Socrates, et [si] repondeatur <dicendi>: 'Socrates est animal' [sine {alio determinante}], intellectus non quiescit <per hancresponsionem>, sed expectat <tertium adiacens> {aliud} determinans, scilicet rationale vel album vel nigrum, vel [aliud] huiusmodi. Dicendum est quod non est simile, quia sic {respondendo}, 'Socrates est animal', quamvis {expectat} aliud <aliquid> determinans ly 'animal', {tamen constituit oratio signifrac verum vel falsum}. Sed qui respondet ad quaeestionem {qualis est Socrates dicendo quod} Socrates est, non constituit intellectum <verum vel falsum> alcius propositionis. Non enim sic respondens

However, that rule is perhaps problematic, because by the same reasoning, ‘animal’ is a syncategorematic expression, because if someone were to ask what sort of animal Socrates is, and if one were to respond ‘Socrates is an animal’, without some further determination, an understanding is not established, but one expects some further determination, namely ‘rational’ or ‘pale’ or ‘dark’, or something else of that sort. It must be said that these two cases are not alike, because, by responding in this way, ‘Socrates is an animal’, although one expects something else determining ‘animal’, yet a sentence signifying something true or something false is still established. But he who responds to the question of what sort of thing Socrates is, by saying that Socrate is, does not establish an
constituit intellectum {istius propositionis}\textsuperscript{595}, ‘Socrates existit’, quia {{potest}\textsuperscript{596} tale esse praedicatum}\textsuperscript{597} {non}\textsuperscript{598} dando responsum ad haec\textsuperscript{599} {quod}\textsuperscript{599} {ponentur Socrates}\textsuperscript{560} existere, ut si respondeatur quod Socrates est \{operatus\}\textsuperscript{601} vel \{aliquid\}\textsuperscript{602} tale. Unde si quateratur \{si\}\textsuperscript{503} Socrates sit ens vel non ens, \textlt{et} respondens \textit{dicit}\textsuperscript{505} quod Socrates est, sine \{praedicatio\}\textsuperscript{606}, non constituit intellectum \{audientis in aliqua propositione\}\textsuperscript{607}, quia talis posset esse responsum quod ipsa non poneret Socrates esse. Si respondeatur quod Socrates est non ens, ex hoc non sequitur quod Socrates \{est ens\}\textsuperscript{608}. Unde \{hoc verbum, ‘est’, non est tertium adiacens, quia non expresso praedicato\}\textsuperscript{609} nihil significat, \textlt{quia}\textsuperscript{610} nec esse \{existentem\}\textsuperscript{611} nec esse specificum.

understanding of some statement. For the respondent does not establish an understanding of this statement, ‘Socrates exists’, because a predicate can be of such a sort in giving a response to this that Socrates is not indicated to exist, as if it were responded that Socrates is opiniable or something else of that sort. Hence if someone asks whether Socrates is a being or a non-being, and the respondent says that Socrates is, without anything else, he does not establish an understanding, because there could be a response which does not indicate that Socrates exists. If one were to respond that Socrates is a non-being, from this it does not follow that Socrates exists. Hence this verb, ‘is’, is not a \textit{tertium adiacens}, because it signifies nothing – neither the being of existence nor some specified being – without an expressed predicate.

Circa primum notabile dubitatur, quia [non] videtur quod hoc verbum, ‘est’, <non> sit copula in omni propositione, Third, we need to know that just as this verb, ‘is’, can be categorematic or syncategorematic, so also this participle, ‘being’, can be categorematic or syncategorematic. That is, this participle, ‘being’, derived from this verb, ‘is’, as it is a secundum adiacens, is categorematic, and it is the predicate in a statement in which this verb, ‘is’, is predicated as a secundum adiacens. Moreover, this participle, ‘being’, insofar as it is derived from this verb, ‘is’, as it is a tertium adiacens, is syncategorematic, and it is neither a predicate nor part of the predicate. Through this it is clear that this statement, ‘An animal is every human’, can be converted into this, ‘Being every human is an animal’, according to which ‘being’ is a syncategorematic expression, because the same term which is the predicate in the first, is the subject in the second, because ‘being’ derived from this verb, ‘is’, as it is a tertium adiacens, is a syncategorematic term, and is neither an extreme nor part of an extreme.

There is a notable doubt concerning the first objection, because it seems that this verb, ‘is’, is not the copula in

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612 A
613 enim': A, B
614 A
615 descendens': A; ‘ut descendit’: B
616 ‘ut’: A, B
617 est bona conclusio’: B
618 B
619 A, B
620 ‘neque’: B
621 B
622 B
sacerdos fit diaconus’, et huiusmodi {debent} converti, [et cetera. Et haec de verbo sufficiant] how this statement, ‘No priest becomes a deacon’, and statements of that sort, ought to be converted.

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636 ‘debeant’: B
637 A, B
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