‘ER HAT GESCHMACK’: SHIFTING CONNOTATIONS OF TASTE IN THE DISCOURSE SURROUNDING W. A. MOZART

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by
Katherine H. Walker
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On 14 February 1785 Leopold Mozart wrote to his daughter in Vienna: “On Saturday evening Herr Joseph Haydn and the two Barons Tindi came to see us and the new quartets were performed. ... Haydn said to me: ‘Before God and as an honest man, I tell you that your son is the greatest composer known to me either in person or by name. He has taste and, beyond that, the most profound knowledge of composition’.” Despite many interpretations of Haydn’s remark, no one has heretofore considered that it supports multiple, concurrent readings. There were three primary agents involved in the transmission of Haydn’s statement—Leopold Mozart, the addressee; Wolfgang Mozart, the subject; and Haydn, the speaker—and each adhered to a distinct set of ideas associated with the concept of taste. Viewed from the perspectives of its three respective agents, this single remark may be seen to ripple across many decades of the eighteenth century, highlighting the ideologies and tensions that characterized the concept of musical taste in this period.

Following a survey of major eighteenth-century texts devoted to musical taste (chapter one), chapter two uses Leopold Mozart’s frequent references to taste in his correspondence and treatise, Versuch einer gründlichen Violinschule (1752), to interrogate his over-articulated status as an arch-rationalist. Leopold’s concept of taste, which reflects the influence of his decade-long Jesuit education, identifies him as a neo-Renaissance humanist; one that promotes reason beyond rules—reason born of wisdom and experience and fitted to navigate uncertain situations that may defy a predetermined ideal. Chapter three situates Wolfgang Mozart’s concept of taste within the culture of sensibility. Drawing on recent literary critical theory, this chapter characterizes taste by a paradoxical emphasis on the “moment” and the “modern”: Wolfgang and his North German contemporaries,
Johann Quant and C. P. E. Bach, grappled with the tensions between immediacy of aesthetic response, on the one hand, and the importance of history and progress to emerging notions of modernity, on the other. Chapter four reads Haydn’s concepts of taste and knowledge through Alexander Gerard’s theories of genius and taste. Gerard’s system conflicts with the Young-driven Geniezeit, whose exponents subordinated creative process to an emphasis on unconscious, unmediated inspiration. Gerard’s emphasis on process defined alternative terms of value, transcending the cultish allegiance to the “idea” to explore how such ideas were treated in support of the Gestalt creation. The conclusion outlines directions for future research, emphasizing the need for a study of the role of gender in eighteenth-century concepts of musical taste.
Born in 1976 in Baltimore, Maryland, Katherine Walker attended Saint Mary's College of Maryland, where she graduated in 1999 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology. Turning her attention to music full time, Walker earned a performance certificate in double bass in 2001 from the François Rabbath Institute at the Nadia Boulanger Conservatoire de Paris, and spent 2003 studying music of African diasporas as a Rotary Ambassadorial Fellow in Cape Town, South Africa. She earned her second Bachelor of Arts degree in music from Stony Brook University, graduating magna cum laude in 2004. Walker began her graduate studies at Cornell University in 2006, where she worked with James Webster, Annette Richards, and Neil Saccamano. Her research interests include eighteenth-century musical aesthetics and intersections of race and popular music in the U. S. since 1920. Walker began a position as assistant professor of music at Hobart and William Smith Colleges (Geneva, NY) in the fall of 2013.
for my family
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The British author, William Somerset Maugham once wrote, “There are three rules for writing a novel. Unfortunately, no one knows what they are.” If Maugham’s statement is true of the novel, it is doubly true of the dissertation. I could never have completed this daunting project without the tremendous support that I received from mentors, friends, and family, only a few of whom I have the space to acknowledge here.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter One: Musical Taste in Eighteenth-Century Treatises</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Cerf de la Viéville</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johann Mattheson, Johann Scheibe, and Abbé Georg Joseph Vogler</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Adam Hiller, and Johann Georg Sulzer</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Two: Humanism and Taste in Leopold Mozart’s Writings about Music</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopold the Rationalist</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopold and the Limits of Reason</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The “Ausgleichsformel” Between Reason and Faith</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopold’s Humanist Education</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste and the Rule</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ethical Dimension of Taste</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderation as a Tenet of Taste</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste and the Classical Virtues of Style</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style and Substance in W. A. Mozart’s “Neoclassical” Die Entführung aus dem Serail</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Three: Sensibility and Taste in the Music and Writings of W. A. Mozart</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal Doubleness in the Culture of Sensibility</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolfgang Mozart in the Culture of Sensibility</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical Taste and the Moment</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical Taste and the “Modern”</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taste in Mechanical Modernity: W. A. Mozart’s Artificial Sentiment in K.616</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Four: Genius, Taste and the “Many-Headed Monster” in Haydn’s Music and Writings</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Geschmack und ... Compositionswissenschaft” in the Geniezeit</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Magician and the Architect: Young’s Subordination of Creative Process and its Bearing on W. A. Mozart’s Contemporary Reception</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The “Grand Architect”: Gerard’s Theory of Genius and Haydn’s Aesthetics of Process 205

Process and Taste 210
Genius, Taste, and the “Many-Headed Monster” 213
Framing the Diegesis: Genius, Individualism, and the “Multiple Audience” in W. A. Mozart’s Don Giovanni 220

Ball Scene 225
Supper Scene 233

Epilogue: Directions for Future Research 246

Bibliography 253
Introduction

On Saturday 12 February 1785, in Vienna, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart organized a private performance of the last three of his just-completed set of six string quartets, in the presence of his father Leopold (who was visiting from Salzburg) and Joseph Haydn, among others. On this occasion, according to Leopold (writing a couple of days later to Mozart’s sister Nannerl), Haydn enlisted the concept of taste in one of the most famous remarks in music history: “Before God and as an honest man, I tell you that your son is the greatest composer known to me either in person or by name. He has taste and, beyond that, the most profound knowledge of composition.”¹ There were three primary agents involved in the transmission of this remark: Leopold Mozart, the addressee; Wolfgang Mozart, the subject; and Haydn, the speaker (who later that year also functioned as dedicatee of these quartets, Mozart’s Opus 10). These three composers, owing to both their generational differences and their divergent aesthetic orientations and career paths, understood the concept of taste in different ways. The present study contextualizes Haydn’s ostensibly straightforward remark, by interpreting it three times, from the perspectives of its three central agents.² In doing so, this dissertation demonstrates that musical taste was inherently variable, depending on the user, his motivations, and the contexts in which it was employed. In the process, it sheds new light on a central canon of music and musical thought in the eighteenth century.


² This study does not call into question the authenticity of Haydn’s reported statement. Rather, it uses the quotation to launch a broader discussion of taste with respect to its three central agents. Nor does this study grapple with Haydn’s relative valuations of taste and knowledge. (One might speculate about why he stated taste first and how he—and others—regarded these two faculties in relation to each other.) Instead, this study focuses on connotative meanings of taste, and considers knowledge in so far as it pertains to the former.
Among the first known writers to use the metaphor of taste to characterize aesthetic experiences, judgments, and capacities of discrimination was the seventeenth-century Spanish philosopher Baltasar Gracián y Morales. His *el Heroe* (1637) expounds twenty attributes of a “hero,” which include religiosity, noble sympathy, humility, emotional reserve, and, not least, “exquisite taste.”³ Playfully negotiating literal and figurative meanings of taste, Gracián endowed the hero with “a palat to relish no ordinary things,” because “a Critical *Gusto*, and a palat hard to please, have something in them of noble and qualified; the most accomplisht objects live in aw of them, and the securest perfections are afraid of them.”⁴ Although Gracián’s specific determinations about taste (i.e., its identification with privilege and exclusivity) lost currency, his use of this term to characterize the pleasure gained in experiencing things of beauty, and the capacity for judging objects according to their value, assumed great importance in the subsequent century.

It may be no coincidence that aesthetic theory in the eighteenth century revolved around Gracián’s metaphor of taste. Sensorial taste excites an immediate, disinterested pleasure that parallels its aesthetic counterpart; it also—perhaps more importantly—contains pathways to broader aspects of cultural and social life in which eighteenth-century aesthetic theory was deeply invested. One of the earliest treatises to deal at length with musical taste, Le Cerf de la Vieville’s *Comparaison de la musique italienne et la musique Francoise* (1705-06), exhibits the analogical power of food for positioning art and art criticism in a cultural context:

> [W]ith whom would you prefer to live: a man who would serve you only pot roasts, pastries, ragouts, and conserves and who would offer you nothing but muscat wines and Eau de Cete or Eau du Pitrepite to drink; or with a man at whose table would be served only wine of Tonnerre or Sileri, excellent soups but hardly any consommés, white meats, each admirable of its kind, few entremets, but choice fruits and compotes?” … They [ragouts and piquant dishes] excite the taste more strongly but

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⁴ Ibid., 38.
less agreeably. They do not tease the palate so much as they set the mouth on fire, and it is only after one has spoiled the taste and has become overheated in getting accustomed to these foods that he finds them so delicious. ... Now as to the application. French music is balanced, harmonious, and natural, and only from time to time and at long intervals does it allow unusual keys and far-fetched embellishments. Italian music, on the other hand, always forced, always beyond the limits of nature, without connection, without coherence, rejects our sweet and harmonious embellishments. ... The fact is that they [the Italians] have spoiled their taste by continual use of their piquant and subtle harmonies. ... And as for use in works as lengthy as an opera, you must prefer French music to Italian as you prefer Avenai wine to Roffoli and white meat to ragouts.⁵

Le Cerf's analogy situates musical taste on at least two cultural axes. The first and most explicit concerns his cultural bias: wielding the language of food, Le Cerf set the noble simplicity and subtle agreeableness of French music against the perceived decadence of the Italian style. More subtly, his invocation of simple fruit and pheasant would have appealed to the taste of “l’honnête homme” at a period in which French musical life was being

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⁵ "... avec lequel aimeriez vous mieux vivre, ou d’un homme qui ne vous seroit manger que des daubes, de pâtisseries, des ragoûts, des confitures, & qui ne vous seroit boire que des Vins muscats de l’Eau de Cete & du Pitrepite: ou d’un autre à la table duquel on ne serviroit que du Vin de Tonnerre ou de Silleri, des Potages excellens; mais guères de consommés, de la viande blanche, admirable chacune en son genre, peu d’entremets, des plus beaux fruits & des compôtes? ... Ils piquent plus fortement; mais ils piquent moins agréablement. Ils ne nous chatouillent pas tant qu’ils nous mettent la bouche en feu, & ce n’est qu’après qu’on s’est gâté le goût, & qu’on s’est échauffé en s’accoutumant à ces mets-là, qu’on les trouve si délicieux. ... À l’application. La Musique Françoise est donc sage, unie & naturelle, & ne souffre que de temps en tems, & loin à loin les tons extraordinaires & les agrémens si recherchés: La Musique Italiene, au contraire, toûjours forçée, toûjours hors des bornes de la nature, sans liaison, sans suite, rejette nos agrémens doux & aisés. C’est qu’ils se sont gâté le goût par l’usage continuil de leurs accords piquans & rassinés. ... Et pour l’usage, pour des Pièces aussi étendues qu’un Opera, vous devez préférer la Musique Françoise à l’Italiene, comme vous préférez le Vin d’Avenai au Rossoli, & la viande blanche aux ragoûts." Jean Laurent Le Cerf de la Viéville, *Comparaison de la Musique Italiene et de la Musique Française* (Brussels, 1704); quoted from the 2nd ed., facs. repr. (Genève: Minkoff, 1993), 1:23-25; trans. Mary Beeson Ellison, “The *Comparaison de la musique italiene et de la musique française* of Lecerf de la Viéville: an Annotated Translation of the First Four Dialogues,” (PhD Dissertation, University of Miami, 1973), 56-58. The above translation does not include the “Traité du Bon Gout.”
gradually redirected from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie. This slippage between literal and metaphorical meanings of taste, which runs like a thread through eighteenth-century aesthetic theory and art criticism, defined a pathway between artistic expression and the most pressing concerns of eighteenth-century cultural and political life.

This is not to say that Le Cerf prioritized cultural and political meanings over aesthetic ones. On the contrary, taste often assumed a deep harmony between individual, immediate aesthetic pleasure and the moral, cultural and political framework in which it operated. Just as sensorial taste, though it begins on the tongue, permits almost-ininitely broad considerations related to food and food culture (e.g., nation, custom, subjectivity and discrimination, luxury, desire, consumption, class, propriety, domesticity and gender, and community), aesthetic pleasure, for all its immediacy, also links to a complex system of cultural and political meanings. Any consideration of taste must therefore engage the entire system, which extends from an individual aesthetic response to a given “we” (be it national, ideological, class, gender, religious, etc.). The challenge of such work is that both aspects of taste—aesthetic and cultural—were contingent, dynamic, and evolving. The aesthetic axis revolved around questions concerning the function of imitation as a model for artistic production, the relationship between (and relative importance of) intellectual and emotional responses to art, the importance of formal education to connoisseurship, and the roles of culture, language, and even climate in shaping aesthetic responses. The cultural axis raised a second set of questions that concerned nation, class, gender, education, progress, technology, and morality. Writers and critics created their own ideological constellations by connecting specific aesthetic values and priorities to cultural and political ones. Far from a stable foundation of eighteenth-century culture and aesthetics, taste was the very expression of its volatility. As such, references to taste must be scrupulously contextualized.

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6 Johann Mattheson probes many of these issues in his essay on taste. See the discussion of Mattheson and taste in chapter one. For a discussion of climate and taste, see Edmund Burke, “Observations on the influence of the different climates upon the polite arts…” in The Annual Register, or A View of the History, Politicks, and Literature for the Year 1765 (London: J. Dodsley, Pall-Mall, 1766), 250-253.
The failure to contextualize given references to taste accounts for pervasive misappropriations of the term in current musicological literature. The most common recent interpretation of taste, by far, relates to a broader concept of enlightenment musical thought as rational and imitative—as opposed to its long nineteenth-century counterpart, which is regarded as irrational and individualistic. Viewed as an emblem of the “age of reason and enlightenment” these interpretations of taste support the familiar dichotomy between “classical” and “romantic” artistic production. For instance, in calling for a performance practice of Mozart that approaches his music from a “romantic” aesthetic disposition as opposed to a “classical” one, Laurence Dreyfus juxtaposes Haydn’s “sober high praise of Mozart” with the effusive (if “exaggerated”) musings of Richard Wagner. Piqued by Haydn’s “dour restriction of Mozart’s talents to mere compositional dexterity and good taste,” Dreyfus concludes that Haydn, in his eighteenth-century aesthetic framework, failed to truly grasp the majesty and sublimity of Mozart’s music. His argument is predicated on a dichotomy between the supposed dictates of taste that operated in eighteenth-century music, on the one hand, and the unfettered imagination that supposedly guided Mozart’s music and romantic artistic production in general, on the other. Nineteenth-century critics themselves were less fickle; they wielded Haydn’s remark to support a fully romanticized notion of original genius, one that frustrates Dreyfus’s reading of an inherent incompatibility between taste and knowledge, on the one hand, and the romantic musical aesthetic, on the other. Nowhere is this breakdown more pronounced than in this anonymous critic’s use (or rather misuse) of Haydn’s appeal to Mozart’s “taste and knowledge” to authorize his consummate work of genius for the nineteenth century:

*Don Giovanni.*

After the performance of ‘Don Juan’ the great Haydn said to Mozart’s father: I say to you before God and as an honest man that I find your son the greatest composer of

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9 Ibid.

which I have ever heard; he has taste and beyond that the deepest knowledge of the art of composition.¹¹

The perceived affinity between Haydn’s remark and Mozart’s Don Giovanni—among the most celebrated products of his “many-sided genius”—¹² points to the further repurposing of these ever-fluid concepts; “taste” and “knowledge,” as they have been narrowly understood, are hardly adequate to commend a work of such artistic genius and psychological depth as Mozart’s Don Giovanni was believed to be in this period.

In a recent essay, Alan Davison interpreted a canonical portrait of Haydn by Thomas Hardy as providing an answer to a critical dialectic among rationalists and progressives in Haydn’s London reception in the 1780s and 1790s. According to Davison, Hardy’s portrait mitigated this dialectic by paradoxically uniting two disparate characterizations of Haydn. The portrait presents a version of Haydn that is at once “inspired and full of fire, capable of novelty and invention and yet controlled by taste and judgment,”¹³ thus appealing to progressives and rationalists alike. For Davison, “the portrait visualizes a conception of genius which was on the cusp of becoming fully romanticized, but which still held to enlightenment notions of learnedness and taste.”¹⁴ Davison’s reading of this portrait as mediating between positions on Haydn’s creative voice rests on a dichotomy between taste and genius that is not supported by his evidence. In fact, one of the few contemporary references to taste that Davison cites is by one of his “progressives,” Burney, who associates this term, not with the rationalist penchant for intelligibility and reason, but with the ability to apprehend the difficult, the irrational, the “exotic” on first hearing:

¹⁴ Ibid., 225.
[Music] is only understood and felt by such as can quit the plains of simplicity, penetrate the mazes of art and contrivance, climb mountains, dive into dells, or cross the seas in search of extraneous and exotic beauties with which the monotonous melody of popular Music has not yet embellished. What judgment and good taste admire at first hearing, makes no impression on the public in general, but by dint of repetition and habitude. ... The extraneous, and seemingly forced and affected modulation of the German composers of the present age, is only too much for us, because we have heard too little.15

In light of this, the distinction between “fire ... novelty and invention,” on the one hand, and “taste and judgment,” on the other, and the corresponding distinction between “progressives” and “rationalists” (on which Davison’s thesis rests) seem a bit too tidy. Rather than locating taste solely on one side of aesthetic debates among starkly defined ideological systems, changes in taste should be seen as voicing transitions in critical thought among aesthetic dispositions that were inevitably fluid and intertwined.

In his discussion of Mozart’s Idomeneo Nicholas Till creates a similar opposition between taste and expression: “Idomeneo is ... part of a calculated revolt against the conventions of Metastasian opera seria and rationalist tragédie philosophique, in which the rules of propriety and good taste were deliberately flouted in the quest for a drama of heightened expression and raw passions, rather than of logical argument.”16 The fallacy of this claim comes to light in an 1836 issue of the British journal The Analyst, in which the author proposed that Mozart’s Idomeneo be revived. This, he wrote, “would be a giant step in the progress of good taste; an admission of the principle that conventional forms ought invariably to be considered as subordinate to the ideas which they invest.”17 From this vantage point, Mozart’s “revolt against conventions” was not a revolt against taste (if it was a revolt at all). The notion implicit in all of these arguments, that the conditions and criteria of taste stand still while artistic values and priorities shift, cannot be supported.

Scholars whose projects involve large bodies of source material seem to have a harder time pinning down the concept of taste. In her 1997 *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century*, Mary Sue Morrow summarizes the critical vocabulary of the “review collective”—i.e., the collective voice of later eighteenth-century German language music critics and journalists—in terms of an “evolution” from an emphasis on rational to irrational aspects of creative achievement.\(^\text{18}\) She establishes four central categories: on the rational side are compositional correctness and order/unity; and on the irrational side are genius and expressivity. While she acknowledges the “irrational tinge” of taste (particularly in its association with intuition and feeling), she nevertheless positions it on the side of reason and creates an implicit opposition between taste, whose principal function was to temper “enthusiasm and imagination,” and genius, which was concomitant with imagination itself.\(^\text{19}\) Morrow’s evidence speaks to the mobility of taste, but ultimately she redresses the apparent contradiction of meanings and locates taste on the side of reason. In doing so, her study adheres to a broad historiographic trend. Current scholarship overwhelmingly adopts the same one-dimensional characterization of taste as rational and prescriptive, thus substantiating a narrow view of eighteenth-century music and an artificial dichotomy between enlightenment and romantic ideals of artistic production.

There is an aspect of taste in the eighteenth century that was relatively stable and differentiated, but that quality has little to do with rules, learnedness, or reason. Rather, it relates to the pursuit of a collective agreement about artistic value. Carl Dahlhaus addresses this “unambiguously social function” of taste in this period; that is, “the function of helping a group to cohere from within and to insulate itself from without. The taste a person had ... associated him with ‘his own kind’ and separated him from ‘others’.”\(^\text{20}\) Although Dahlhaus here reduces the enlightenment project of elevating society through the edifying influence of taste to social hierarchies alone, he nevertheless articulates a crucial distinction between the respective concepts of taste in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For Dahlhaus, and I agree, the nineteenth century, broadly speaking, developed a

\(^\text{18}\) Mary Sue Morrow, *German Music Criticism in the Late Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 71.

\(^\text{19}\) Ibid., 73.

notion of taste that was fundamentally individual in its nature and outlook;\(^{21}\) the earlier period, by contrast (and again, broadly speaking), positioned taste at the center of a civic ideal for enlightened society. The Scottish philosopher and lawyer Henry Home, Lord Kames, illustrated the latter view in his *Elements of Criticism*, first published in 1762 (and again in numerous editions throughout the subsequent decades). For Kames, “uniformity of taste and sentiment resulting from our conviction of a common standard” sharpens our collective sense of moral responsibility:

> Unhappy it would be for us did not uniformity prevail in morals; that our actions should uniformly be directed to what is good and against what is ill, is the greatest blessing in society; and in order to uniformity [*sic*] of action, uniformity of opinion and sentiment is indispensablenote\(^{22}\)

This sought-after agreement does not preclude its connotative mobility, for these aspects of taste exist along different axes. Rather, it illustrates how various, shifting meanings of taste coalesced—for some, at least—around a greater social agenda, one that defined the spirit of the enlightenment. In light of this, the most useful way to understand taste in the eighteenth century is not through the narrow equation with learnedness, reason, and rules, but through society’s pursuit of a collective taste and a collective voice.

Not all studies in eighteenth-century music associate taste with aesthetic rationalism. In fact, in a minority point of view, scholars equate the term and its concept with freedom and individuality. Though there is a place for such an interpretation in eighteenth-century musical thought, it is not to be found—as some suggest—in the literature on *notes inégales*, the eighteenth-century French performance practice of rendering equally notated notes unequal under certain conditions. Stephen Hefling, in the course of a meticulous study of nearly every known reference to inequality from 1550-1790, in which tables graphically prescribe when, where, and how much inequality to use according to various sources, periodically qualifies his arguments with remarks such as the following: “But as Saint-Lambert points out, taste provides ‘the freedom that musicians give

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Lord Henry Home Kames, *Elements of Criticism*, vol. 2, 7th ed. (Edinburgh: John Bell and William Creech, 1788), 495.
themselves to transgress their own rules,’”23 a statement that he reiterates almost verbatim at another point in the book: “... they [18th century French treatise authors] again remind us that, despite the relatively systematic approach of so many French writers, taste remained the ultimate touchstone in matters of rhythmic alteration; le bon gout provided ‘the freedom that musicians give themselves to transgress their own rules,’ as Saint-Lambert put it.”24 In fact, this is not how Saint-Lambert put it; “le bon gout” are Hefling’s words. The original sentiment is as follows:

I wish that musicians themselves would correct this imperfection in music which results in theory being belied by practice. But the liberty which musicians give themselves of transgressing their own rules goes even farther than I have just pointed out; it goes as far as not marking pieces with their true time signature 3 [in courantes]. ... However they intend it, this still goes against the rule, for if they want these pieces to be beaten in a quick three, they should cut the measures in half....25 Saint-Lambert was not prescribing that musicians should “transgress their own rules” with these words. On the contrary, he was condemning the inadequate notational conventions that permitted them to do so. Rebecca Harris-Warrick summarized this aspect of Saint-Lambert’s aesthetic ideology in the introduction to her translation of this treatise: “Beyond his qualities as a teacher, St. Lambert had a streak of the evangelist in him that manifested itself as a desire to systematize and simplify some of the notational practices of his fellow musicians.”26 Thus, while it is true that Saint-Lambert discussed taste in reference to the performer’s license, as in the following statements:

24 Ibid., 32.
26 Harris-Warrick, Principles, vii.
Every trained musician who plays a piece composed by someone else does not attempt so much to give the piece the tempo that the composer tried to indicate by the time signature he placed at the beginning, as to give it one which satisfies his own taste;\(^{27}\)

and:

One might find, for example, that I had given the major time signatures too slow a tempo, and another on the contrary would find it too lively, for everyone follows his own taste in these matters, as in many other things;\(^{28}\)

he did so, not in advocacy of such liberties, as Hefling implies, but in condemnation of the system that facilitated them. He did acknowledge the role of personal license, as in his excuse of Lully’s transgression of the rules of time signature because “his art permitted him to do so.”\(^{29}\) But, for Saint-Lambert, the notation should clearly reflect the composer’s intentions, so that they may be transmitted to the performer more accurately. When he wrote specifically of inequality, the notion of taste was independent of freedom, liberties, and privilege. The greater context of the treatise renders Saint-Lambert’s meaning clear: taste here refers to the performer’s ability to discern the correct contexts for the use of inequality, rather than an individually determined, subjective choice.

Discrepancies between the transmitted meanings of taste and the original ones pervade Hefling’s otherwise excellent book. His discussion of the French theorist and instrument maker Marie Dominique Joseph Engramelle, for example, contains analogous misappropriations of taste to those cited above: “Here Engramelle stresses that the extent of the inequality is most important for the proper expression of a piece, and notes that it often varies within the same piece ‘if one wishes to express certain passages in a more

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\(^{27}\) “Tout Homme du Métier qui joue la Pièce qu’un autre a compose, ne s’attache pas tant à donner à cette Pièce le mouvement que l’Auteur a voulu marquer par le Signe qu’il a mis au commencement, qu’à luy en donner un qui satisfasse son goût.” Saint Lambert, *Principes*, 24; trans. Harris-Warrick, *Principles*, 43-44.

\(^{28}\) “Tel pourroit trouver que j’aurois donné au Signe majeur par exemple un mouvement trop grave, & tel autre au contraire le trouveroit trop gay: car chacun suit son goût là-dessus, comme sur beaucoup d’autres choses.” Ibid.

interesting manner,' according to taste.”30 Again, “according to taste” are Hefling’s words, and they conflate Engramelle’s statement of “one’s wishes” with his own understanding of taste. Engramelle’s concept of taste has little to do with personal choice, as Hefling implies. On the contrary, as he states in the first chapter of his book La Tonotech

i

ie ou l’Art de Noter les Cylindres, taste is a gift, endowed by nature, which provides the musician with the necessary discernment to realize in performance the requisite effects of music, which are notated “only incompletely or not at all.”31 In this sense Engramelle continued where Hefling’s quotation leaves off: “Taste is able to assess these differences to some extent, but only a bit. Notage alone, which operates justly, will be able to find them in a precise and unequivocal manner.”32 For Engramelle, taste was not a matter of whim or personal choice, but of informed discrimination; it was the faculty of judgment that rendered an excellent musician capable of assessing the subtle affective requirements of the music. Engramelle rearticulated these points in another passage on inequality:

This inequality ought to vary according to the nature of the piece; in gay airs it should be more marked than in those that are gracious and of tender expression, more in marches than in minuets; however, there are a number of minuets of character in which the inequality is as marked as in marches. Taste, or rather the use of notage, will make this difference sensible.33

31 “Tout ce qui resulteroit sans l’oreille & le goût des meilleurs principes de la Musique, seroit froid, machinal, insipide & inanimé: au lieu qu’avec cette oreille & ce goût, on pourra toujours suppléer a ce que j’appelle l’habitude de l’exécution de la Musique. … Un Musicien contractant par l’usage & l’habitude de l’exécution, la facilité de rendre avec agrément une infinité de choses que les papier notes n’indiquent qu’imparfaitement ou même point du tout, desquelles cependant dépendent les effets qui donnent le caractère & l’expression, n’auroit aucun besoin de mes observations, auxquelles il peut suppléer sans y faire attention.” M.D.J. Engramelle, *La Tonotech

i

32 “Je conviens que le goût peut apprécier a peu près ces différences: mais ce n’est qu’a peu près: le notage seul qui opéra juste, saura les trouver d’une manière précise & sans équivoque.” Ibid., 33. *Notage* refers to a mechanical instrument that plays music by “reading” a particular configuration of pins on a rotating cylinder. See George Houle, *Meter in Music, 1600-1800: Performance, Perception, and Notation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 110ff.
33 “Cette inégalité doit varier suivant le genre d’expression de l’air; dans les airs gais, elle doit être plus marquée que dans les airs gracieux & d’une expression tender, dans les
For Engremelle (as for Saint Lambert), the use and degree of inequality were governed by the character of the piece at hand; taste, insofar as it concerned the faculty of artistic discernment, rendered the musician sensible of the circumstances that called for it.

Hefling’s misappropriation of taste informs his conclusions about this perennial performance practice issue. Indeed, at one point, he delegates rhythmic inequality to the “soloist’s prerogative,” and argues that a “performer’s taste would occasionally reject the use of inequality.” To be sure, Hefling’s assumptions about the role of taste are consistent with earlier scholarship on rhythmic alteration in French Baroque performance practices. Frederick Neumann concludes that allowances for taste rendered the degree of inequality “arbitrary,” and argues on this basis that its use was limited to solo and small ensemble situations. And in his remark “according to the character of the piece and the taste of the performer,” David Fuller implicitly dichotomizes these two notions, thus confounding an interpretation by which the demands of taste and those of the music were interdependent. A careful consideration of these treatises and their contexts reveals the error in characterizing taste in terms of arbitrary personal choice. The use of the phrase “taste of the performer” as a qualification and contradiction of expressive precepts of the music creates—in this context—a false dichotomy between the performance and the theory.

W. Dean Sutcliffe illustrates an alternative implication of “freedom” in his discussion of the performance practice of Domenico Scarlatti. One particularly vexing feature of Scarlatti’s written music concerns disagreements among variant sources about ornamentation. Because carefully notated ornaments are sometimes omitted from variant sources in Scarlatti’s manuscripts, it is left to the modern scholar to determine if the

34 Hefling, Rhythmic Alteration, 142.
omissions are a “copyist’s slip” or an intended alternative to the ornamented version.\textsuperscript{39} On the one hand, the omissions often seem wayward and idiosyncratic to the modern ear, such that Howard Schott found them to be “internally inconsistent within a composition and frequently at odds with the player’s musical feeling.”\textsuperscript{40} Sutcliffe, on the other hand, identifies a unique “ornamental aesthetic” in these idiosyncratic moments and invites us to celebrate their departure from conventional “ornamental practice.”\textsuperscript{41} For Sutcliffe, a stumbling block on the road to embracing these unique moments is the “eighteenth-century shibboleth of ‘good taste,’” which (for him) implies “freedom of choice,” a freedom that is consistently exercised through the universal “predilection for symmetry and ‘naturalness’.”\textsuperscript{42} A deeper probing of the rich expressive possibilities embodied in the eighteenth-century concepts of taste—as even this brief discussion has exhibited—might have yielded more convincing evidence for Scarlatti’s potential engagement with wit, surprise, asymmetry, and irony than speculation alone. Indeed, the Irish poet Francis Greville (presumably) included, in his \textit{Maxims, Characters, and Reflections}, a testament to the “enlarged taste” for “the unexpected note of a Scarlatti,” whom he associated, significantly, with Annibale Carracci, an Italian baroque painter whose “penchant for visual games and humor” was exercised foremost in the genre of caricature (of which he is credited as the inventor):\textsuperscript{43}

Parmenio’s \textit{contracted} taste is charmed with the piece of music when not a deviation from harmony offends his ear; with the high finished picture where each very hair is expressed; with the face where no one feature is out of proportion. Philemon’s \textit{enlarged} taste is charmed with the most unexpected note of a Scarlatti; with the single stroke of the pencil of a Carracci; with the grace and expression of beauty

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 257.
\textsuperscript{41} Sutcliffe, \textit{Keyboard Sonatas}, 257.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 258.
\textsuperscript{43} Clare Roberson and Catherine Whistler, \textit{Drawings by the Carracci from British Collections} (Oxford: Ashmolean Museum, 1997), 30.
wherever he finds it. The two tastes go on thus differing about all arts, all sciences, and all nature.”

As this passage suggests, taste constituted a much broader aesthetic arena in the eighteenth century than Suttcliffe here presumes.

The consequences of such misapplied interpretations of taste are significant. Dreyfus proposes to reinterpret the performance practice of Mozart from a romantic aesthetic disposition on the basis of his surface reading of Haydn’s reference to Mozart’s Geschnack. Hefling similarly draws sweeping conclusions about the French performance practice of notes inégales on the basis of his misleading conclusions about taste in early eighteenth-century French treatises. Davison and Morrow associate taste broadly with rationalism and learnedness, thus schematizing a highly complex and transitional period in musical-aesthetic thought into a dichotomy between rationalist and progressive (and enlightenment and romantic) sensibilities. Till positions the “rules of propriety and good taste” as foils for Mozart’s supposed aesthetic revolution; a revolution that could not have taken place if his Idomeneo were aligned with shifting ideals of good taste rather than precociously opposed to rigid ones. Discourses in the history, historiography, and performance practices of eighteenth-century music all suffer from a critical oversight in their engagements with taste. By defining taste narrowly and rigidly, mainstream scholarship denies the progressive tensions and dynamic energies that comprised eighteenth-century musical thought, for it was precisely the fluidity of this term that gave it its power.

Not all engagements with taste are so monolithic, but even when scholars present more “eclectic” characterizations of this term, they do so, on the whole, without sufficiently contextualizing its usage. Adena Portowitz, for instance, draws seemingly arbitrarily from the writings of Quantz, James Beattie, and Johann Kirnberger, to develop her own

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44 Fulke and Frances Greville, *Maxims, Characters, and Reflections, Critical, Satirical, and Moral*, 3rd ed. (London: T. Cadell, 1768), 168-169. The names Parmenio and Philemon most likely refer to two relatively contemporaneous figures of ancient Greece. Parmenio (c. 400 – 330 b. c.) was a general in the service of Phillip II while Philemon (born c. 360 b. c.) was a poet and playwright. Although Greville does not specify to which Scarlatti he refers, his reference to the “unexpected notes” in his music, the stylistic comparison with Carracci, and the date of the book’s publication (1756) all point to Domenico.
heterogeneous definition of taste as reflected in the “degree of variety admitted to an expressive content, the proportions allotted to each affect, and the means used to convey these sentiments.”\(^{45}\) Although Portowitz’s interest in taste is concretely centered on the points of view of Dittersdorf and Haydn (each of whom commented on Mozart’s excellent taste\(^{46}\)) and the aesthetic governing the composition of rondos in the 1770s, her discussion of taste is not grounded in those points of reference. John Irving grapples with Haydn’s same reference to Mozart’s *Geschmack*, but rather than turning to mid-century north-German music criticism and British moral philosophy for answers (as did Portowitz), he looks primarily to Kant in his exploration of three potential models for the relationship between taste and genius (i.e., one in which they are synonymous, one in which they are “equivalent” but “successive” stages of creative production, and one in which taste provides the late and final “finishing touches” on the work at hand).\(^{47}\) As one might expect, Irving’s different context for understanding taste yields different conclusions from those of Portowitz: for Irving, a perceived overlap among genius and taste is manifested in Mozart’s music as “‘freedom from the limitations of rules’”; one that confounds the perceived duality between the intuitive and rational stages of artistic creation (i.e., *inventio* and *dispositio*).\(^{48}\) In neither study was the context for characterizing taste sufficiently supported; as such, the two sets of conclusions remain as speculative as they are divergent.

This dissertation seeks to address this broad historiographical problem by examining diverse meanings supported by a single reference to W. A. Mozart’s taste. Chapter one sets the stage for an examination of Haydn’s remark by surveying key eighteenth-century texts devoted to musical taste: by Le Cerf de La Viéville, Johann Mattheson, Adolph Scheibe, Abbé Georg Joseph Vogler, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Adam Hiller, and Johann Georg Sulzer. Although this survey can only skim the surface of the

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\(^{46}\) See ibid., 129.


\(^{48}\) “‘befreit von der Beschränkung durch Regeln’,” Ibid., 9.
meanings contained in these texts, it nevertheless outlines the central terms of discourse of musical taste and charts its broad trajectory over the course of the century. In the process, this survey exhibits (1) that the meanings ascribed to taste reflect the ideological, geopolitical, economic, and religious points of view of their respective authors; and (2) that these points of view define taste in ways that are historically and geographically clustered, such that (3) individual connotative meanings coalesce around relatively systematic changes in musical thought over the course of the century and across its geopolitical divides.

Chapter two uses Leopold’s Mozart’s frequent references to taste in his correspondence and treatise, *Versuch einer gründlichen Violinschule* (1756), to interrogate his over-articulated status as an arch-rationalist, a label that fails to consider the role of his Catholic faith in shaping his aesthetic ideology. Although not all rationalists subscribed to the rigorous secularism promoted by Voltaire and the philosophes, Christian rationalists—in Germany as elsewhere—were nevertheless obliged to negotiate the perceived conflict between reason and faith that undergirded much enlightenment thought. They did so in ways that, when taken into account, reframe the supposedly monolithic secular enlightenment as a pluralistic web of ideologies, which informed and were informed by their advocates’ religious beliefs. Leopold’s investment in negotiating reason and faith distances him from prominent rationalist thinkers with whom he is traditionally associated, while pointing to an alternative influence: the humanist neoclassicism that formed the core of his decade-long Jesuit education. If Leopold, the rationalist, is expressed in his appeal to dogma and rules, Leopold, the humanist, resides foremost in his ideal of good taste. Leopold’s aesthetic ideal of taste, which emphasizes moderation, clarity, propriety, and expression, identifies him with (predominately Ciceronean) humanistic neoclassicism; it promotes reason beyond rules—reason born of wisdom and experience and fitted to navigate uncertain situations that may defy a predetermined ideal. Returning to Haydn’s reference to W. A. Mozart’s taste (read through Leopold’s point of view), this chapter concludes with a case study of connections between W. A. Mozart’s music and Leopold Mozart’s humanist concept of taste. Konstanze’s “Martern aller Arten” from Wolfgang’s 1782 *Die Entführung aus dem Serail*, though this aria conflicts with neoclassicism as it has been previously (narrowly) defined, exemplifies the
interdependence of aesthetic and ethical expressions of classical aesthetics that define Leopold’s humanistic concept of taste.

Chapter three locates Wolfgang Mozart’s concept of taste within the culture of sensibility. Drawing from Wolfgang’s correspondence, as well as theoretical writings of his North German contemporaries Johann Quantz and C. P. E. Bach, this chapter identifies four central principles of taste in the culture of sensibility: (1) the primacy of feelings and their transmission, (2) the reconception of correctness from extrinsic rules to the performer’s transmission of the composer’s thoughts and ideas, (3) the importance of song as a model for “sensible” musical production, and (4) the delimitation of taste in the culture of sensibility to specific styles (and aspects) of music. Composers’ allegiance to these central tenets of taste was nevertheless complicated by what James Noggle refers to as the “temporal doubleness of taste”: its dual expression in the culture of sensibility of the immediate and the sensual, on the one hand, and the progressive and modern, on the other.49 As religion complicated the discussion of taste in aesthetic rationalism in chapter two, the geopolitical landscape that defined “modernity” informed the aesthetics of taste in the culture of sensibility (chapter three). Sometimes these two temporal realms—one immediate and presentist, the other historically contingent—harmoniously coexisted (as in Mozart’s nationalistic claims that French critics and audiences had no “ears to hear, hearts to feel [or] ... measure of understanding of and taste for music,” wherein aesthetic sensibility and politics mutually reinforced one another50). At other times, however, they

50 Wolfgang, to his father, 5 April 1778: “If this [Paris] were a place where people had ears to hear, hearts to feel and some measure of understanding of and taste for music, these things would only make me laugh heartily; but, as it is (so far as music is concerned), I am surrounded by mere brute beasts. How can it be otherwise? For in all their actions, emotions, and passions, they are just the same [as beasts]. There is no place in the world like Paris. ... I shall thank Almighty God if I escape with my taste unspoiled.” (“wenn hier ein ort wäre, wo die leute ohren hätten, herz zum empfinden, und nur ein wenig etwas von der Musique verstünden, und gusto hätten, so würde ich von herzen zu allen diesen sachen lachen, aber so bin ich unter lauter vieher und bestien (was die Musique anbelangt) wie kann es aber anderst seyn, sie sind ja in allen ihren handlungen, leidenschaften und Paßionen auch nichts anders—es gibt ja kein ort in der welt wie Paris. ... Ich danck gott dem allmächtigen wenn ich mit gesunden gusto davon komme.”) Bauer and Deutsch, et. al., eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 346; trans., Anderson, Letters, 533.
butted uncomfortably against each other. Mozart’s andante for small mechanical organ, K. 616, presents a unique window into his musical negotiation of taste, as he conceived it, with the incompatible values of modern machine culture. Whereas Wolfgang’s other two works for mechanical organ clock, K. 608 and K. 584, may be seen to circumvent the expressive demands of sensibility through their engagement with the strict style (which could at times depart from the expressive arena of sensibility), K.616, with its delicate little pipes could not have so readily escaped sensible discourse. As I argue, rather than circumventing the expressive demands of taste, K. 616 ironizes them by setting its “lieblich” little trills and euphonious scale fragments in parallel thirds against a hybridized formal structure whose own mechanical movements underscore those of the medium that projects them.

Turning to Haydn’s point of view, chapter four identifies his reference to Mozart’s taste and knowledge as an outlier to the German Geniezeit. Spearheaded by the German reception of Edward Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition, the movement—exemplified in the writings of Hamann, Herder, and Bürger—promoted a quasi-primitivist system of aesthetic value in which the immediate, emotional charge of a work of genius (ideally) cut across cultural and socioeconomic divides to speak from and to the Volk. Haydn’s writings and music point to an alternative theory of genius, that of Alexander Gerard. Gerard’s theory of genius conflicts with the populist movement of the Young-driven Geniezeit, whose exponents subordinated creative process to an emphasis on unconscious, unmediated inspiration. Gerard’s emphasis on process defines alternative terms of value, transcending the cultish allegiance to the “idea” to explore how such ideas were treated in support of the Gestalt creation—the coherence of which depended, in large part, on the taste and knowledge of the composer. Crucial to Gerard’s system is the role of process in aesthetic education. Haydn enlisted Mozart’s music (and his own) in a cultural project that sought to elevate the public through active engagement with unfolding processes in the music. Concluding once again with a reading of Haydn’s remark in Wolfgang’s music, this chapter departs from the previous ones to emphasize tensions between Haydn’s idealistic concepts of taste and genius, on the one hand, and Wolfgang’s music, on the other. Whereas Haydn endeavored to unify the divided public through processual relations in music, born primarily of the composer’s knowledge and taste, Mozart viewed that division as rigid and
unmoving. Buttressed by Kierkegaard’s conflation of Mozart and the Don, this chapter concludes with a reading of diegetic music in Don Giovanni as containing a commentary on the irreconcilability of Mozart’s creative genius with a classist, politically minded public taste.

The Epilogue explores directions for future research, focusing on the need for a study of the role of gender in the eighteenth-century musical discourse of taste.
Chapter One
Musical Taste in Eighteenth-Century Treatises

Le Cerf de la Viéville

By far the most important and widely read study of musical taste in the first half of
the eighteenth century is the “Traité du bon gout” from Le Cerf de La Viéville’s Comparaison
de la musique italienne, et de la musique française. Le Cerf (1674-1707) was a French writer
on music whose training in philosophy and law is reflected in the style, scope, and
argumentation of the Comparaison. The work was composed as a response to (and
refutation of) François Raguenet’s 1702 Parallele des italiens et des François en ce qui
regarde la musique ... , which argues for the superiority of Italian musical style over that of
the French. Le Cerf was a staunch supporter of Lully and a promoter of French over Italian
music, the latter of which—“always forced, always beyond the limits of nature”—confounds the noble simplicity that true art possesses and true taste demands. This
passage is included in the 1704 edition, which comprises the first three of what would be
six fictional dialogues between a count and a chevalier (in the style of seventeenth-century
French poet and author, Charles Perrault). Raguenet quickly responded to Le Cerf’s
Comparaison with his 1705 Défense, which thus prompted the second edition of the former,
expanded to include three more dialogues and the “Traité du bon gout” (1705).

The transmission history of the Comparaison is labyrinthine. In addition to the three
Brussels editions produced by Le Cerf (1704, 1705, and 1706), it was included, without

51 “toûjours forcée, toûjours hors des bornes de la nature ...” Jean Laurent Le Cerf de la
Viéville, Comparaison de la Musique Italienne et de la Musique Française (Brussels, 1704);
quoted from the 2nd ed., facs. repr. (Genève: Minkoff, 1993), 1:25. For an English translation
of the first four dialogues of Le Cerf’s Comparaison (not including the “Traité du Bon Gout”),
see Mary Beeson Ellison, “The Comparaison de la musique italienne et de la musique
française of Lecerf de la Viéville: an Annotated Translation of the First Four Dialogues,” (Ph.
52 See Charles Perrault, Parallele des Anciens et des Modernes (1688-1692); cited with
respect to Le Cerf’s style in C.M. Girdlestone, “Le Cerf de la Viéville’s Comparaison: Its Non-
acknowledging its author, in reprint editions of Bonnet-Bourdelot’s L’Histoire de Musique ... published in Frankfurt and the Hague (1743) and in Amsterdam (1721, 1725, and 1726); and in German translation (with authorial credit) in Mattheson’s Critica Musica (1726). The “Traité du Bon Gout” was pirated by Nicolas Racot de Grandval and published in Paris in 1732 as Essai sur le bon goust en musique. That Paris edition was then translated into German by Marpurg and published (in weekly segments in 1749) in his Der Critische Musicus an der Spree as “Grandvalls Versuch über den guten Geschmack in der Musick.” Grandval’s monograph is further mentioned in Archibald Power’s London series, Historia Litteraria, or An Exact and Early Account of the Most Valuable Books ... (1732) and the anonymous The Present State of the Republick of Letters (1733). As its transmission history suggests, Le Cerf’s treatise, in its various guises, was a foundational document throughout continental Europe.

In many ways, the “Traité” is a distillation of the basic concepts that govern the Comparaison, whose purpose was twofold: to contest Raguenet’s Italianate aesthetic, and, in the process, to outline an alternative system based on Lully and French neoclassical aesthetics. The two agendas were inextricably linked. For Le Cerf, any discussion of beauty begins and ends with nature, which, when well expressed, “is the source and mark of all beauty.”54 Nature expresses itself in moderation and proportion—for, quoting Plato, “objects of unusual dimensions / are rare among human beings, / In nature are found / few giants and few dwarfs”—;55 in true and appropriate expression; and, above all, in simplicity, the “inseparable companion of nature.”56 For Le Cerf, Italian music—with its bizarre dissonances, forced modulations, untimely divisions, unusual keys, and far-fetched embellishments—can no more achieve a perfect and natural simplicity than can Italian food. French music (like its food) is “balanced, harmonious, and natural,” as opposed to its unnatural and affected Italian counterpart. On these points, Le Cerf is aligned with the

54 “La nature, bien exprimée, voila la source & la marquee de toutes les beautés.” (“Nature, well expressed, there is the source and mark of all beauty.”) Le Cerf, Comparaison, 1: 28-29.
56 “La simplicité est la compagne inseparable de la nature.” Ibid., 2: 54.
French neoclassical school of thought, wherein Aristotelian doctrines of *mimesis* and *ratio* were used to reconcile artistic expression with the Cartesian dichotomy between body and mind (or sense and reason) and the privileging of that mind’s intuitive and deductive reasoning over empirical observation as a source of knowledge.\(^{57}\)

For the “father of modern philosophy,” senses cannot perceive the nature and essence of a thing. Descartes demonstrated this in his 1641 *Meditations* by reflecting on the sensual properties of a piece of wax taken from a beehive. Holding the wax in his hand, Descartes described for the reader its texture, smell, temperature, color, shape—in short, “all of the attributes to make a body as distinctly known as possible.”\(^{58}\) He then placed it near a fire, whereby every one of the aforementioned properties was altered as the wax was transformed into a hot, odorless liquid. Because he now beheld the same lump of wax—though altered—he thus concluded that the wax “is” none of these properties; rather it is “a body that a little before appeared to me conspicuous under these forms, and which is now perceived under others.”\(^{59}\) Only when “I distinguish it from its exterior forms, and when, as if I had stripped it of its vestments, I consider it quite naked, it is certain ... that I cannot ... thus apprehend it without possessing a human mind.”\(^{60}\) In other words, only here, in recognition of the instability of sensory perception, do reason and intellect take hold, and the true essence of the object—in this case, an “extended, flexible, and moveable” physical form—reveal itself.

Eight years later, in his 1649 *Traité de Passions de l’Ame*, Descartes applied this principle of discrimination to aesthetics. For Descartes, our sensual feelings for the beautiful and the ugly, though they move us more violently and with greater conviction, are less true and valid than our feelings for the good and the bad, which can only be born of that “internal sense” called reason.\(^{61}\) “[A]nd so it is the case that, of all the feelings, those of

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59 Ibid., 83.
60 Ibid., 84.
the beautiful and the ugly [which are “represented by our exterior senses”] deceive the most and are those against which one must be the most on guard.”62 Descartes’ famous dictum cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) summarizes this foundational claim by locating subjectivity in reason and thought as opposed to feeling, sensory perception, and emotion.

As suggested, Aristotelian mimesis provided a rational expression of Descartes system as applied to art. In this system (consistent with Le Cerf), nature was the model for beauty, for nature was perceived as the source and greatest expression of the true.63 Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux, for example, intertwined reason and nature in his neoclassically-oriented treatise on French poetry, L’art Poétique (1674): “Love reason then” he wrote at the outset of the first canto, “and let what e’er you write, Borrow from her its beauty, force, and light.”64 As the treatise unfolds, this “light of reason” is revealed in nature herself: “You then, that would the comic laurels wear, To study nature be your only care.”65 In a later passage, he likewise cautioned the poet to guide the action “where reason leads it” and to “never diverge from nature.”66 Rene le Bossu’s contemporaneous treatise, Traité du Poème Épique (1675), begins with a similar claim: “Arts, as well as Sciences, are founded upon Reason, and in both we are to be guided by the Light of Nature.”67 For these

62 Ibid.
65 “Que la nature donc soit votre étude unique,” ibid., 28; trans. in Dryden, Miscellany, 35.
66 “Que l’action, marchant où la raison la guide”; “Jamais de la nature il ne faut s’écarter”; ibid., 31. These passages are translated by Dryden as “Your action still should Reason’s Rules obey,” and “The Passions must to nature be confin’d”; Dryden, Miscellany, 37.
authors, nature represented the “reality behind appearances” and it was thus the model for art that was grounded in reason. Reason and nature are similarly intertwined in Le Cerf’s system, which corresponds to the writings discussed above, granting, that is, one significant caveat. As the following discussion suggests, taste occupied a delicate balance point between mind and body, reason and sentiment, “rules” and “inner feeling” that bends the Cartesian system without, however, breaking it. Here—emblematic of the entire century—taste both expresses and circumscribes the voice of reason.

According to the “Traité,” one may discriminate between the good and the bad in two ways, on the grounds of “inner feeling” and rules. Inner feeling responds approvingly to that which “flatters the ear” and “stirs the heart” and disapprovingly to that which doesn’t, on the basis of which the listener estimates the value of a musical work or performance. Rules are precepts that scholars (“sçavans”) have established on the basis of their learned observations, and which too form the basis of distinguishing the good from the bad. Neither path of discrimination is entirely certain, for both stem from human judgment; and humans, by nature, may err. Inner feeling might have provided a surer path toward knowing “ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the true,” but experience “erodes the voice of good nature” that resides in all of us. Thus, right judgment stems from the combination of inner feeling and rules, such that each is bolstered and corrected by the other. These combined resources provide the foundation of good taste, which Le Cerf defined as “the most natural sentiment rectified or confirmed by the best rules,” through which one rightly judges, “by degrees, the good, the bad, the mediocre, the excellent, and the detestable.”

68 “le Sentiment interieur & les règles”; ibid., 6: 283.
69 “flatté l’oreille ... émû le Cœur”; ibid., 6: 299.
70 “idées du bon, du beau, du vrai”; ibid., 6: 284.
71 “... nous avons recû, depuis nôtre naissance, mille fausses impressions, mille préjugez dangereux, qui ont affoibli & qui étouffent en nous la voix de la bonne nature.” (“We have received, since our time of birth, a thousand false impressions, a thousand dangerous prejudices, which have weakened and eroded the voice of good nature in us.”) Ibid., 6: 284.
72 “... le bon goût est le sentiment le plus naturel, rectifié ou confirmé par les meilleures règles”; ibid., 6: 284.
73 “A distinguer juste par leurs degréz les bonnes choses & les mauvaises, les médiocres, les excéllentes & les détestables”; ibid., 6: 285.
From the outset, two capacities are necessary for achieving a "perfect taste" for music: good ears and an adequate knowledge of music.\textsuperscript{74} Regarding the former, there are two types of ears: those that hear tone relations and those that hear rhythmic relations. The ears for tone relations—which sense a true or consonant tone against the others—are given by nature and cannot be learned; the ears for rhythmic relations, on the other hand, can be improved with practice. The second capacity—an adequate knowledge of music—is necessary, for it comprises the component of "rules" that provides a basis of good taste. For Le Cerf, one must guard against the erroneous belief that the spirit supplies everything, for good taste is not achieved without "a bit of science."\textsuperscript{75} On the other hand, "bad teachers,"\textsuperscript{76} through which one learns false rules, can spoil one's taste beyond repair.

This "knowledge of music" to which Le Cerf refers concerns (learned) rules that govern the art of composition (such as the difference between major and minor thirds, which he deems paramount to all knowledge of music); but there are also more abstract rules; those that reflect the demands of inner feeling. Le Cerf refers to these two sets of rules as small and great, respectively, and turns at this point to the latter. According to the three great rules, music should be natural, expressive, and harmonious.\textsuperscript{77} "Natural" music is above all simple, because simplicity "is the first mark of the natural."\textsuperscript{78} Such music rejects all bizarre and extraordinary sounds and contains no more embellishment than is necessary. An expressive aria "convenes perfectly with the text" and awakens understanding in the listener; an expressive symphony effectively communicates its intended sentiment.\textsuperscript{79} Harmonious music (which he also calls "melodious" and "agreeable")\textsuperscript{80} pleases the listener and tickles the ears. While mistakes in the art of composition impinge on the quality of a musical work, errors with respect to these great

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 6: 291.
\textsuperscript{75} "un peu de science"; Ibid., 6: 293.
\textsuperscript{76} "Les mauvais Maîtres"; ibid., 6: 296.
\textsuperscript{77} "Une Musique doit être naturelle, expressive, harmonieuse." ("Music should be natural expressive, harmonious.") ibid., 6: 301.
\textsuperscript{78} "... car la simplicité est ... la première marque du naturel. ... " Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} "un air dont les tons conviennent parfaitement aux paroles, & une symphonie qui exprime parfaitement ce qu'elle veut exprimer"; ibid., 6: 302.
\textsuperscript{80} "En troisième lieu, harmonieuse, melodieuse, agreeable: choisissez." ("In the third place, harmonious, mélodious, agréable: you choose.") Ibid., 6: 301.
\end{footnotesize}
rules do irreparable damage, for “the pleasures of the heart outweigh the pleasures of the ears” alone.\(^{81}\) It is for this reason that while one may overlook some small mistakes in the art of composition, good taste will always condemn music that is “cold and forced.”\(^{82}\) Despite his great reverence for Lully, Le Cerf makes an example of him to prove his point. The aria “Que l’incertitude,” from the second act of \textit{Phaeton}, contains a melodious, pleasing tune that nevertheless contradicts the sentiment of the text and dramatic context, for Libie mourns over the uncertainty of her strength “in the tone of a gay aria.”\(^{83}\) On this basis, Le Cerf concludes that even a great master may err.

Nevertheless, when one’s inner feeling responds to a musical work, the reputation of the composer may validate that felt response: “One can perhaps say, my heart, my ears, all rules are unified to convince me that this aria is charming, It was composed by Lully, which thus provides further proof of the rightness of my taste. That aria does not move or amuse me; it is neither graceful nor expressive. It was composed by Charpentier; I believe that it is no good.”\(^{84}\) Reputation is indeed one of a number of secondary measures of the value of work through which one may confirm one’s personal judgment. Time, the “master of masters, the sovereign judge” is yet another:\(^{85}\) A work that falls into oblivion has thus received its just sentence “without appeal.”\(^{86}\) On the other hand, a judgment that endures the vicissitudes of time is a sure and certain one, for time alone “seals the reputation of a work.”\(^{87}\) Thirdly, the breadth of a music’s appeal and its ability to speak, not merely to connoisseurs, but to all honest people, confirms its value. For honest people—by whom he means those who attend the opera but have no knowledge of rules to ground their experience—trust in nature. There one finds “more ears and more eyes. Nature, which ...

\(^{81}\) “... les plaisirs du coeur étant au dessus de ceux des oreilles. ...” Ibid., 6: 319.
\(^{82}\) “froid et forcé”; ibid., 6: 319.
\(^{83}\) “... d’un ton, d’un mouvement gais.” Ibid., 6: 306.
\(^{84}\) “... mon coeur, mes oreilles, toutes les régles s’accordent à persuader que ... [c’]est un air charmant. Et il est de Lulli: nouveau gage de la justesse de mon goût. Cet autre air-ci ne me flatte ni ne me touche, il n’a ni douceur ni expression. Et il est de Charpentier: Oüi, j’en juge bien, il est méchant”; ibid., 6: 307.
\(^{85}\) “le maître des maîtres ... le Juge souverain”; ibid., 6: 317.
\(^{86}\) “sans appel”; ibid., 6: 317.
\(^{87}\) “... le temps met le sceau à la réputation des Ouvrages”; ibid., 6: 318.
speaks better than a thousand mouths—speaks to them more clearly and emphatically.”  

It is for this reason that, Le Cerf declares, “I affirm for you that which generally gets the admiration of the people ... without impressing the scholars” over that which impresses the scholars alone.  

Indeed, Le Cerf places the greatest value on the judgments of these honest people, after whom he looks to connoisseurs—those who respond with a mixture of feeling and knowledge and thus “mingle the best of the peuple and the scholars.”  

In the last place are scholars, whose “attachment to rules renders them subject to false ideas and actions.”

Although nature speaks in all of us, good taste requires good practice. One must thus surround oneself with the very best music and admire its glory. One must also constantly reflect on one’s own judgments, observe one’s errors; and seek to rectify them. Among the greatest risks of error comes from listening to a musical work only once; for “a music, which pleases the listener the third time more than the first time heard has a right to its just applause.”

Moreover, such focused listening sharpens our discrimination such that we can learn to judge by degrees:

To know whether an aria is good or bad is a mediocre skill; to identify more precisely how good or bad an aria is, and to say, “That is good, but this is still better; this is bad, but that is still worse,” this ... is the fruit of a long investigation. Hence, in order to arrive at this point we must seek to bring as much exactitude and insight as possible into practice.”

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88 “... plus d’oreilles, plus de coeurs. La nature qui ... parle plus haut, par mille bouches, que par dix.” Ibid., 324.
89 “Mais je vous soufisions ... que ce qui emporte généralement l’admiration du peuple ... sans emporter celle des Sçavans, est au dessus de ce qui emporte celle des Sçavans, sans toucher ce peuple-ci.” (“I affirm for you that that which generally gets the admiration of the people without touching the scholars is above that which impresses the scholars without touching the people.”) Ibid., 6: 322.
90 “... je compose un Connoisseur de l’assemblage rafiné de ce qu’ont de bon les Sçavans & le peuple.” (“I view a connoisseur as the refined assemblage of that which is good among the scholars and the people.”) Ibid., 6: 323.
91 “Sçavans les derniers, parce que ... leur attachement aux régles, les rendent sujets à des idées & à des préventions fausses.” Ibid., 6: 324.
92 “Mais une Musique qui plaît encore plus la troisième fois que la premiere à un Auditeur ... a droit de render son approbation bien assurée.” Ibid., 6: 314.
93 “Connoître qu’un air est bon ou mauvais, habileté médiocre: connoître précisément combien un air est bon ou mauvais, & dire celui- là est bon, mais celui-ci est encore
Similarly, a perfect taste distinguishes the worth of an aria from the worth of its text without confusing the two dimensions of a musical work. These are the characteristics of an “acuity of discernment” that few possess; when such a judgment coincides with those of composers and musicians; when it is based on “shrewd and unbiased musical understanding and knowledge”; when it agrees with those of honest people and the times; then such a judgment is assured, as is the judge’s good taste.

As suggested, Le Cerf’s two means of knowing the good, the beautiful, and the true—through inner sentiment and rules—reflect the dominant aesthetic ideology in turn-of-the-century France, by which sense is at once united to and circumscribed by reason. Inner sentiment is a form of a priori, intuited knowledge that speaks with the “voice of good nature.” That this “voice” speaks more clearly and emphatically in the peuple than in connoisseurs and scholars betrays Le Cerf’s transmission of the Platonic doctrine of innate or “natural” knowledge; knowledge that—though “felt”—is to be distinguished from extreme, unchecked sensibility. Indeed, for Le Cerf, Italian symphonies, which “affect the feelings, the imagination and the soul with so much strength that the violinists who play them cannot prevent themselves from being transported and seized with fury because of them ... like those possessed” would serve better were their “riches” spared, for a true taste responds above all to clarity, naturalness, and “appropriateness” of expression. Moments of heightened emotion in Lulli are marked, to be sure, but “without being extreme, without discarding the rules, without bizarre effects. ... That is what you call blending vivacity and good sense, strength and simplicity.” Rules, in Le Cerf’s system, represent a type of corrective for that intuited knowledge, which may be corrupted by prejudices and preferences born of life experience. Le Cerf’s appeal to rules reflects the scientific

meilleur; celui-là est mauvais, mais celui-ci est encore pire: finesse suprême de discernement. Elle ne sera que le fruit d’un long usage. Ainsi, pour y arriver, nous devons exercer le plus que nous pourrons nôtre exactitude & nôtre pénétration.” Ibid., 6: 320.
94 Ibid., 6: 341.
95 “finesse de discernement”; Ibid., 6: 342.
96 “... leur symphonies remuent avec tant de force les sense, l’imagination, & l’ame, que les Joüeurs de violon, qui les executent ne peuvent s’empêcher d’en être transportés, & d’en prendre la fureur ... commes des possédés ...”; ibid., 2: 55-58.
97 “... sans être outrée: sans sortir des règles, sans bizarrerie ... Cela s’appelle allier la vivacité & le bon sens, la force & la simplicité.” Ibid., 2: 60.
framework of the Cartesian epistemology and the blurring of science and philosophy that obtains in the French neoclassical school.

Le Cerf’s repeated appeal to nature and “natural simplicity” as the model for the good and the beautiful further situates his treatise within Cartesian ideology.98 Indeed, Le Cerf cites Descartes—that “illustrious philosopher” who “holds as a principle ... ‘that the most simple things are usually the most excellent’”— in support of this appeal.99 Even in the often-fantastic realm of opera, nature and verisimilitude reign supreme:

It is permitted him [the composer], it is commanded to him, to believe that there is nothing but the natural and nothing that does not have to be naturally expressed in what he puts to music. He must ... endeavor to express most naturally the things that are least natural, in order to give them a measure of verisimilitude through the artlessness of his music and to make spectators ... forget, if possible, that to sing things of this sort is to overstrain nature and verisimilitude. There ... is the supreme beauty of music and the great art of the musician.100

For Le Cerf, then, good taste is a two-phased recognition of a work's innate goodness, beauty, and truth, all of which are reflected in its adherence to nature and the “natural” principles of clarity, simplicity, and expressivity.

Johann Mattheson, Johann Scheibe, and Abbé Georg Joseph Vogler

As stated earlier, Le Cerf’s treatise circulated widely in England and on the continent. His location of musical taste within a predominately rationalist aesthetic and

98 That’s not to say that nature has no place in alternative aesthetic and philosophical traditions; however, as I go on to say, Le Cerf explicitly associates his ideal of “natural simplicity” with Descartes.
99 “Ecoutés Mr- Descartes, & ayés du respect pour un Philosophe si illustre. ... Il tеноit pour principe ... que les choses les plus simples sont d’ordinaire les plus excellentes.” Ibid., 2: 79.
100 “Il lui est permis, il lui est ordonné de croire qu’il n’y a rien que de naturel, & rien qui ne doive être naturellement exprimé dans ce qu’il met en Musique: & même il faut ... d’exprimer le plus naturellement les choses le moins naturelles, afin de leur donner une espece de vrai-semblance par la naïveté de son chant, & de faire oublier, s’il se peut, à des spectateurs ... que c’est forcer la nature & la vrai-semblance que de chanter ces fortes de choses. Voilà ... la beauté suprême de la Musique & le grand Art du Musicien.” Ibid., 1:31.
philosophical framework was assimilated and modified by many later writers, including, in Germany, Johann Mattheson, Johann Adolph Scheibe, and Abbé Vogler. The similarities and differences of their writings with Le Cerf’s treatise bear witness to a uniquely German form of rationalism—and sense of musical taste—in the eighteenth century. Admittedly, to identify Mattheson with the rationalist school of thought in Germany is to enter a time-honoured controversy over his aesthetic and philosophical beliefs.¹⁰¹ Dahlhaus, for instance, positioned Mattheson’s analogies between rhetoric and music squarely within the neoclassical tradition of the rationalist school,¹⁰² while other scholars emphasized the “sensist” or empiricist underpinning of his theoretical contributions.¹⁰³ His claim, for instance, that the interval of the fourth is either a consonance or a dissonance depending on context and the ears of the listener reflects a crucial departure from the rationalist emphasis on reason and innate truths as the source of knowledge.¹⁰⁴ Given the intellectual climate in Mattheson’s Germany, which was influenced by both French neoclassical texts and the British empiricism of John Locke, as well as the lack of clear alignment in his writings with any particular school, it is perhaps most useful to view his aesthetic orientation as eclectic. Nevertheless, his essay on musical taste—like those of Scheibe and Vogler—is oriented toward the German branch of rationalism associated with Leibniz and Wolff.

As suggested, the German rationalist school derives not primarily from Descartes, but from Leibniz, whose ideas were transmitted in Germany foremost through Christian Wolff. Although he eventually developed his own system in numerous writings on logic, metaphysics, ethics, and politics, Wolff developed no philosophy of art. Gottsched was the

¹⁰⁴ Johann Mattheson, Das Neu-Eröffnete Orchestre (Hamburg, 1713), 126-127.
first to apply the “Wolff-Leibniz” rationalism to poetry and, implicitly, to art in general, most notably in his *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen* (1730). This work transmits much of the practical and aesthetic theory of the French neoclassical school, emphasizing nature as the source of beauty (and verisimilitude as the model of perfection) and insisting on rules as the foundation of aesthetics. Gottsched’s characterization of good taste as that “which adheres to rules that reason has fixed beforehand, in all manner of things,” locates him squarely within the French neoclassical tradition. However, Gottsched (like Wolff before him) departs from the Cartesian model of the French neoclassical school in a crucial way that reflects Leibniz’s influence on the German aesthetic and philosophical tradition.

The central distinction between Leibniz’s system and that of Descartes, from this perspective, is the former’s rejection of the dichotomy between mind and body. Although, for Leibniz, each realm is governed independently by its own laws, they exist in predetermined harmony with one another, such that, in plain language, the body feels what only the mind can know. (To be sure, the mind’s reasoning still reigns supreme, as in Descartes’ system, but, for Leibniz, that reasoning corresponds to—and thus confirms—the body’s immediate sensory response.) Leibniz refers to these modes of accessing truth as efficient and final causes, respectively; and he describes their relationship by analogy with a pair of pendulums, which God wills into alignment. The result is a harmonious (yet hierarchical) relationship between sensible and intellectual knowledge that became the basis for a distinctly German form of aesthetic rationalism in the first half of the eighteenth century, as symbolized in Baumgarten’s foundational definition of aesthetics as “the science of sensible knowledge.”

The mind-body connection is immediately apparent in Mattheson’s claim that taste is the intellect’s “tongue”:


Taste, in its figurative sense, is that internal sensibility, selection, and judgment by which our intellect reveals itself in matters of feeling. If the tongue has its own intellect ... then so, too, the intellect has its own tongue, with which it tastes and examines its objects.107

This passage comprises the first sentence of Mattheson’s little-discussed essay, “Vom musikalischen Geschmack,” which was incorporated into his 1744 Die neueste Untersuchung der Singspiele. ... The larger project encompasses a defense of opera against (most notably) the prominent critique leveled by Gottsched in his Critische Dichtkunst. For Mattheson, opera was to be seen as no less than

a lofty school of many fine arts, in which architecture, scenic design, painting, machinery, dance, declamation, morality, history, poetry and above all music unite together in the most agreeable manner and continually explore new ideas for the pleasure and edification of a distinguished and intelligent audience.108

The failure of modern opera to achieve this ideal lay, for Mattheson, with “modern” musical tastes and trends. These trends form the basis of the often-ironic critique that pervades his “Geschmacksprobe.” Thus while Le Cerf’s concept of good taste was informed by his relative valuations of French and Italian music, Mattheson’s focus was a temporal-historical one, which placed the previous generation’s musical values above “modern taste.”

As in Le Cerf’s system, these failures of the “modern taste” exhibit the vulnerability of “internal sensibility” to error: “Though the taste examines and judges, it can never draw


final conclusions. It represents a convenient vehicle, as it were, to reach the proper purpose. Indeed, no matter how convenient a coach may be, it can still turn over.”¹⁰⁹ That “fluctuations of [musical] taste” are so great as to “turn around several times within the space of a hundred years” provides, for Mattheson, further proof of the fallibility of internal sensibility.¹¹⁰ For the true “cause of pleasure” is always the same: it is in “the pleasant movement and refined and judicious order of sounds.”¹¹¹ True taste is thus guided, not by current trends, but by nature, reason, and experience, for “there is infallibly to be found the sound basis of all knowledge.”¹¹² For Mattheson, then, one’s taste is “true” when the internal sensibility corresponds with reason, nature, and experience (such that, in Leibniz’s terms, the “efficient” and “final” causes are aligned).

These general aesthetic values are expressed in Mattheson’s system, as in Gottsched’s, through a comprehensive corpus of rules, whose ideology Mattheson defends at the outset: According to the “magnificent taste of our times,” he muses sarcastically, “a modern composer should not trouble himself to acquire the least formal education or knowledge of

¹⁰⁹ “Der Geschmack untersuchet und urtheilet zwar; aber endliche Schlüsse kann er nimmer machen. Er stellet gleichsam ein bequemes Fuhrwerk vor, zum rechten Zwecke zu gelangen. Doch wenn ein Wagen noch so gemäglich ist, kann er umwerfen.” Ibid., §3, 123.
¹¹⁰ “Zum voraus kann man jedoch leicht erachten, daß die Seele der Tonkunst nicht in einem solchen Wechselgeschmack bestehe, der sich etliche mal in hundert Jahren gerade ins Angesicht wiederspricht, ja, oft wohl in weniger Zeit; sondern in der Gleichförmigkeit, welche die Ton- und Zeitmaße mit den menschlichen Gemüthsbewegungen hat.” (“To begin with, it may simply be asserted that the soul of music is not founded in changeable taste, such as this that contradicts itself ... numerous times in 100 years, or even less time, but rather, of correspondences between measures of sound and time and human emotions.”) Ibid., §7, 124-125.
¹¹¹ “Indessen ist und bleibt hier die angenehme Bewegungsart, und die feine, verständige Ordnung der Klänge immer die eigentliche hauptursache des Wohlgefallens.” (“Still, the pleasant movement and the refined and judicious order of sounds are always the main cause of pleasure.”) Ibid., §8, 125.
¹¹² “Natur, Vernunft und Kunsterfahrung sind unsre Wegweiser. Wohin dieselbe uns gesammter hand führen, da ist jederzeit, mittelst des wahren Geschmacks, das Wohlgefallen anzutreffen; es findet sich daselbst unfehbar das gesunde Wesen aller Wissenschaften.” (“Nature, reason, and experience of art are our guides. Wherever these lead us hand in hand, we shall always encounter pleasure by means of true taste; there is infallibly to be found the sound basis of all knowledge.”) Ibid., §2, 123.
rules.” He later refers to the popular truism that “scholars paint poorly,” and that one need only the will to create in order to do so. Echoing Le Cerf’s admonishment against the belief that the “spirit provides all,” Mattheson makes an example of “Mr. Breadwinner,” who claims to have already acquired so much from nature that one can only wonder what would have happened had he studied math and literature. Mattheson’s ensuing list of abuses against the rules of proper composition—which concern, for instance, key relations, notational conventions, and various qualities of semi-tone intervals—is nevertheless to be distinguished from the rules of text setting that preoccupy “modish” composers. Mattheson condemns the slavish conformity to the poetic text; for, in fact, an element of counterpoint among the text and music creates interest and appeal. For example, a melodic Einschnitt that has no corresponding break in the poetry renders the effect even “more pleasing”; extended poetic syllables—such as “Va a a a a ter” and “Schö ö ö ö nheit”—which are dutifully avoided according to the modern taste, are perfectly natural as long as the phrase remains comprehensible; and syllables i, u, and e can be prolonged, despite current practice, which regards such effects as “unpleasant.” In short, and as a principle of good taste, the composer need not—indeed, should not—slavishly adhere to the syntax and meter of the text; on the contrary, one must takes painters as a guide, who portray a subject’s face without including every “spot, wart, mole, and scar.”

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113 “Solchemnach darf ein heutiger Componist sich nicht um den geringsten Besitz förmlicher Schulwissenschaften und Regeln bekümmern; sondern nur ein und andre allgemeine, practische Grundsätze annehmen. Das ist die Mode. Das ist ein Stück des herrlichen Geschmacks unsrer Zeiten.” (“Accordingly, a modern composer should not trouble himself to acquire the least formal education or knowledge of rules; rather he should only follow one or two general practical principles. This is the fashion. This is a sample of the magnificent taste of our times.”) Ibid., §9, 125.
114 “Man sagt doch im Sprüchwort: Gelehrte mahlen übel.” (“As the expression goes, scholars paint poorly.”) Ibid., §13, 127.
115 “Monsieur de pane lucrando,” Ibid., §17, 129.
116 “angenehmer,” Ibid., §40, 142.
117 Ibid., §48, 146.
118 “Selbst das e, (schreibt man unbedachtsamer Weise) wenn es zu lang gedehnet wird, fällt etwas unangenehm zu hören. Alles falsch!” (“Even the e, one writes in the same absurd manner, ‘when it is too long maintained, renders something unpleasant to hear’.”) Ibid., §50, 147.
Expression is of utmost concern to Mattheson’s system. Good taste condemns the modern ignorance of the expressive demands of genre, such that “sarabands, gigues, courantes, etc., are just right for performances of a Te Deum laudamus or of a Laudate Domino, as long as they are indicated by ‘fugue,’ ‘canon,’ ‘double counterpoint,’ etc.—in Italian, of course.” However, those “rules” of expression do not exist in a vacuum; nor should they be blindly transferred to music from poetry. For Mattheson, proper expression begins with deep learning in music, oratory, and poetry; and it is necessarily followed by adherence to rules born of reason and nature. The result of such good taste is music and poetry that are mutually enhancing and reinforcing. Nature and reason are thus appropriately intertwined in Mattheson’s system of good taste. However, while for Le Cerf nature was synonymous with simplicity, Mattheson shies away from this association. Instead, he emphasizes a music’s “purity,” which relates to its inherent and expressive truth.

If perhaps Mattheson’s admiration for musical values of the previous generations keeps him from emphasizing simplicity, then it is no wonder that this aesthetic tenet is restored in the writing of Johann Adolph Scheibe, whose condemnation of the music of J.S. Bach and his contemporaries was raised in the name of “natural simplicity.” For Scheibe, the music of Bach’s generation, which was founded on “aberrant and absurd ideas,” marked the

120 “Insonderheit schicken sich auch, bey der Aufführung eines Te Deum laudami, oder eines Laudate Domino, die Sarabanden, Giguen, Currenten, am allerbesten; wenn nur dabey geschrieben wird: Fuge, Canon, Doppelter Contrapunct u. d. g. aber doch alles auf italienisch.” (“In particular, sarabands, gigues, courantes, etc., are just right for performances of a Te Deum laudamus, or of a Laudate Domino, as long as they are indicated by ‘fugue,’ ‘canon,’ ‘double counterpoint,’ etc.—in Italian, of course.”) Ibid., §14, 128.
121 Ibid., §29 and §32.
122 “Dieser große Mann würde die Bewunderung ganzer Nationen seyn, wenn er mehr Annahmlichkeit hätte, und wenn er nicht seinen Stücken, durch ein schwüstiges und verworrenes Wesen das Natürliche entzöge, und ihre Schönheit durch allzugroße Kunst verdunkelte.” (“This great man would be the admiration of entire nations if he had more pleasantness, and if he did not allow a bombastic and confused style to suffocate naturalness in his pieces, or obscure their beauty through excessive artifice.”) Johann Adolph Scheibe, Critischer Musikus. Neue, vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage (Leipzig, 1745); facs. ed. (Hildesheim: Breitkopf & Härtel Wiesbaden, 1970), 62; trans. Fubini, Music and Culture, 272.
corruption of the good taste that shone so clearly in the music of the ancients.\textsuperscript{123} Scheibe’s essay “Abhandlung vom Urprunge, Wachstume, und von der Beschaffenheit des itzigen Geschmacks in der Musik,” which appeared in his Hamburg periodical, \textit{Der Critische Musicus} (named in accordance with Mattheson’s \textit{Critica Musica} and Gottsched’s \textit{Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst}\textsuperscript{124}), provides a clear account of his concept of taste. The essay begins with a diatribe against the “nearly uncountable” number of “wretched composers” in Scheibe’s time, whose ideas about the fine arts originate in “ignorance and foolishness” and thus hinder the intelligent reflection and insight that are so essential to good taste.\textsuperscript{125} This “dejected state” of music can be traced to the propagation of opera in the seventeenth century, wherein music came to lack “the natural beauty of a pleasing song and the moving expression of a harmony based on it ... which so left their mark on people.”\textsuperscript{126} For Scheibe, melody provides the primary basis of musical meaning, as attested by the music of ancient Greeks and Hebrews, whose “simple and natural songs” showed that “melody alone animated the art of their music.”\textsuperscript{127} To defile such pleasing and simple expressions with

\textsuperscript{123} “ungewöhnlichen und lächerlichen Begriffen,” Scheibe, “Abhandlung,” 750.
\textsuperscript{124} Dietrich Bartel, \textit{Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music} (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 149.
\textsuperscript{125} “Die Anzahl elender Componisten ist zu unsern Zeiten fast unzählabar. ... Vorurtheile und ungereimte Meynungen, die von der Einfalt und Dummheit entsprungen sind, von dem hochmuthe und von der Eigenliebe aber auferzogen und erhalten werden, sind es also, die diese seichten Köpfe eingenommen haben.” (“The number of wretched composers in our time is nearly uncountable. ... Prejudices and absurd notions, which originate in ignorance and foolishness, are nourished and maintained by arrogance and selfishness, and therefore have occupied these shallow mind.”) Scheibe, “Abhandlung,” 750-1.
\textsuperscript{126} “Damals, als man die Opera insonderheit auszubreiten anfing, befand sich die Musik in einem sehr betrübten Zustande. Es war nicht die natürliche Schönheit eines reizenden Gesanges, noch der rührende Ausdruck einer durch jenen erzeugten harmonie, was sie belebte, und den Gemüthern der Menschen einflößte.” (“Then, as one began to propagate especially opera, music was found in a very dejected state. It lacked the natural beauty of a pleasing song and the moving expression of a harmony based on it, which animated it and so left their mark on the people.”) Ibid., 752.
\textsuperscript{127} “Was war es aber, wodurch jene berühmte Alten ihre Gesänge so rührend machten, und wodurch sie der Tonkunst ein so hohes Ansehen erwarben? Ein einziger Blick in die Schriften derjenigen Scribenten, die Meibom gesammlet und herausgegeben, lehret uns so fort, daß es nichts anders, als der einfache und natürliche Gesang gewesen. ... Es war also bey den Griechen, und, wie es allerdings ganz sicher zu beweisen ist, auch bey den Ebräern, bloß allein die Melodie, was ihre Tonkunst belebte.” (But what was it, whereby those famous ancients made their songs so moving, and whereby they brought music to such a
bizarre affectation and ornamentations is to reject the ennobling “strength of order and the natural and unforced coherence that all true beauty possesses.”

Just as Mattheson intertwined sense and reason in his characterization of taste as the “intellect’s tongue,” Scheibe likewise defined taste as “the faculty of understanding through which to judge what the senses feel.” For Scheibe, taste comprises a two-phase process through which understanding ultimately judges what the senses communicate: “[G]ood taste necessitates both a healthy [faculty of] reason understanding and healthy senses. If the senses are corrupt, they will lead to false feeling, and the intellect will therefore falsely judge because it is misled by the senses. ... Ultimately, then, taste results from the abilities of the intellect,” though it is communicated through the senses. To be clear, the senses alone cannot judge:

A mere judgment of the senses without participation of the intellect is by no means good taste. ... Mere sensual taste in the arts and sciences would be ridiculous; but even more ridiculous would be the assertion that recognition of the good and the beautiful in the arts and sciences required no intellectual faculties, but a mere

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128 “... da wir dieses hingegen so fort der Ordnung und des natürlichen und ungezwungenen Zusammenhanges wegen, welches alles dem Ganzen eine wahre Schönheit verschaffet, erheben werden.” (There [in Ancient Greek and Hebrew music] in contrast [to music of our time] we will immediately admire the order and the natural and unforced coherence that all true beauty possesses.”) Ibid., 755.

129 “Der Geschmack ist eine Fähigkeit des Verstandes, dasjenige zu beurtheilen, was die Sinne empfinden.” (“Taste is the faculty of understanding through which to judge what the senses feel.”) Ibid., 767.

130 “... der gute Geschmack so wohl einen gesunden Verstand, als gesunde Sinne, erfordert. Sind die Sinne verdorben: so entsteht eine falsche Empfindung, und der Verstand wird also auch falsch urtheilen, weil er durch die Sinne verführt wird. ... Es ist also allerdings die Fähigkeit des Verstandes, worauf es in der Beschaffenheit des Geschmackes ankömmt.” Ibid., 769-70.
recording of the senses. But when we combine the intellectual faculties with the response of our senses, we will be able to call the judgment resulting from this, good taste.\textsuperscript{131}

For Scheibe, then, taste is the reason’s judgment of the listener’s sensory experience of music.

As his rationalist framework prescribes, taste is deemed inherently correct or incorrect according to properties in the music itself. The composer demonstrates the “good taste in his work” by arranging it such that “the ears and the intellect are equally pleased”; that is to say that it “lacks mistakes in the music as well as those that appeal to the intellect.”\textsuperscript{132} For Scheibe, such a composition is above all Regelmäßig and Scharfsinnig. Regelmäßig (lit. “orderly”) music is that in which “the principles of the science or art are adhered to.”\textsuperscript{133} A composer of tasteful music is thus “equipped with the rules of music,”\textsuperscript{134} which, however, are embedded in the greater laws of nature. “What is regelmäß is also natural.”\textsuperscript{135} for the rules of the fine arts in general, and thus those of music in specific, originate from nature. True art thus exists in the imitation (Nachahmung) of nature, though


\textsuperscript{132} “Derjenige Componist aber beweist den guten Geschmack in seinen Werken, welcher sie so einrichtet, daß sie dem Gehöre und dem Verstande zugleich gefallen; das ist, daß er darinnen weder Musikfehler, noch Verstandsfehler, begeht, überall aber eine gesunde und reife Urheilskraft zu erkennen giebt.” (But such a composer demonstrates the good taste in his work, which he arranges such that the ears and the intellect are equally pleased; that is to say, that he commits neither mistakes in the music nor those that appeal to the intellect, and thus exhibits a healthy and mature power of judgment.”) “Abhandlung,” 771.

\textsuperscript{133} “Regelmäßig ist also dasjenige, was den Grundsätzen einer Wissenschaft oder Kunst auf das genaueste gemäß ist, oder, was nach den Regeln derselben vollkommen eingerichtet ist.” (“Regelmäßig is therefore that which adheres most exactly to the principles of an art or science, or that which is arranged in exact accordance with those same rules.”) Ibid.

\textsuperscript{134} “Aus diesen Sätzen erhellet, daß ein Componist, wenn er dem guten Geschmacke folgen will, so wohl die Regeln der Tonkunst aufs genaueste verstehen, als auch mit einem scharfsinnigen Verstande begabt seyn muß.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{135} “Alles, was in der Musik regelmäßig seyn soll, ist auch natürlich.” Ibid.
not (here) in the mimetic sense. Scheibe’s insistence on the correspondence between nature and the rules of art locates those rules—which concern, for instance, observing appropriate stylistic levels and the laws of harmony and dissonance treatment—in an eternal natural truth. The mimetic aspect of Scheibe’s prescription for good taste in composition relates to his second rule, namely that music be scharfsinnig (lit. “penetrating” or “insightful”). Scharfsinn not only reveals the similarity of the expressed thing to the object portrayed, but also—and through that—an “inner knowledge” of its “hidden characteristics” and properties, through which “to awaken in us great, new, agreeable, or important ideas.” The mimetic likeness, therefore, “must bring [the concept or object portrayed] to our senses and imagination in a way that its conventional presentation could not.” The principles of poetry and rhetoric guide the composer to scharfsinnige expressions, such that, for Scheibe, just as music that is not natural cannot be regelmäßig, music that is not poetic cannot be scharfsinnig. As such, good taste resides in a musical work that, following the laws of nature and rhetoric, is both regelmäßig and scharfsinnig; while in a listener, good taste resides in the recognition—through the senses and by the intellect—of those properties in the music and the correct judgment on their basis.

Emerging later in the century, Abbé Georg Vogler’s writings on taste connect to and extend ideas presented by Mattheson and Scheibe. Vogler was active in nearly every aspect of musical production and criticism in the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany. He was a virtuoso performer, composer, pedagogue, theorist, critic, and even organ designer. Vogler’s Essay on musical taste, published in a 1778 issue of his monthly

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136 “Wenn nun das Scharfsinnige solche Aehnlichkeiten der ausgedruckten Dinge entdecket, auf die man nicht bey der allgemeinen, oder gewöhnlichen Betrachtung derselben würde gekommen seyn, und wenn es uns also auf solche verborgene Eigenschaften, sie mögen nun das innere Wesen, oder auch die Wirkungen, betreffen, führet: so ist es in einem sehr hohen Grade scharfsinnig. Das Scharfsinnige muß also auch in uns große, neue und angenehme, oder wichtige Begriffe erwecken. ...” (“When now the Scharfsinnige discovers such similarities of the expressed things, which one would not have found through a general or ordinary view, and when it thus leads us to such hidden characteristics, which may relate to the inner meaning or their properties: then it is to a very high degree scharfsinnig. The Scharfsinnige must therefore awaken in us great, new, agreeable, or important ideas.”) Ibid., 776.

137 “... folglich muß es unsern Sinnen und unserer Einbildungskraft solche Empfindungen verursachen, die man bey der gewöhnlichen Betrachtung der Dinge nicht würde empfunden haben.” Ibid.
Mannheim periodical, *Betrachtungen der Mannheimer Tonschule*, exhibits both his progressive tendencies and their foundation in the (now) traditional framework of German aesthetic rationalism. Vogler’s discussion of the “rules of beauty” provides an example of these two aspects of his system. On the one hand, he claims that “foundational rules for beauty would be impossible” to prescribe because, among other things, “beauty has its origin in variety and in order to ascertain all beauty, the fundamental rules of all combinations of the beautiful would have to be presupposed.”138 Similarly, one would have to account for various tastes in Germany, France, England, and Italy, and their numerous combinations as sources of beauty.139 Such possibilities are too manifold to chronicle, and therefore experience (rather than formal pedagogy alone) must guide the listener to an understanding of these matters. On the other hand, and although the rules cannot be presupposed, all beauty can be described and explained in accordance with the governing laws of “*Hauptschönheit,*”140 which include nature as a model, the laws of proportion, and the principle of unity and variety. These principles of *Hauptschönheit*—which apply to the work itself and identify beauty as intrinsic and objective—align Vogler with his predecessors in the German rationalist tradition, just as his resistance to codifying their various practical manifestations aligns him—as I shall argue—with later eighteenth-century British musical thought.

For Vogler—as for Mattheson and Scheibe—music is an imitative art, whose expressive point of reference is the accompanying text. Although Vogler’s system thus reveals a conventional bias toward vocal music, he does seek to account for instrumental music in his system. For although instrumental composers do not imitate nature, they

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138 “Alle Schönheiten der Musik, jene, die schon da sind, lassen sich bestimmen und erklären; Grundregeln aber anzugeben, wodurch die individuelle Schönheiten schon zum voraus bestimmt wären, sind unmöglich … weil die Schönheiten in der Abwechslung ihren Ursprung haben, und um alle Schönheiten zu bestimmen die Grundregel alle mögliche Combinationen schon müßte voraussetzen.” (“All beauties of music—those that are already there—can be defined and explained; but to specify foundational rules through which to determine individual beauties beforehand, would be impossible … because beauty has its origin in variety, and in order to ascertain all beauty the fundamental rules of all combinations of the beautiful would have to be presupposed.”) Abbé Georg Vogler, *Betrachtungen der Mannheimer Tonschule* (Mannheim, 1778), 280-1.
139 Ibid., 280.
140 Ibid., 276.
nevertheless use nature’s model as a guide in the construction of those “indeterminate” forms; forms that take shape “like soft wax in the hands of a sculptor.” Such music must possess a “well-ordered” structure and “flowing” ideas in order to adhere to nature and thus to satisfy the listener. Vogler characterizes an instrumental work by analogy with a generic landscape painting, which “corresponds to some landscape without the painter’s being aware of it.” Nevertheless, vocal music possesses a much greater range of expressive means than instrumental music alone because, for Vogler, all dimensions of music have intrinsic expressive properties that work collectively to communicate textual meaning. Vogler denotes expressive properties of timbre, key, and even note values, although the Liebhaber need not concern himself with such technical matters: “[One] need to remember only their sentiments, which are a hundred times more lively without this basic knowledge.” The expressive meaning of the musical materials is central, indeed, and must not be confused with purely aesthetic preferences; although “some like to hear the oboe; others like the flute; and the call of these instruments leads to such loud applause,” judgments of the ears alone without an understanding of their expressive meaning comprise “among of the greatest mistakes … that amateurs make.”

That is not to say that purely aesthetic considerations (i.e., those that are not dependent on affect and text expression) don’t have their place in Vogler’s system. On the contrary, variety—when combined with unity—is an essential principle of musical construction: “Unity and variety must always be combined with one another. … Variety

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141 “unbestimmt”; “wie das weiche Wachs in den Händen eines Modlers.” Ibid., 290.
142 “planmäßige Ordnung” and “fließende Reden” (lit. “flowing speech”). Ibid., 291.
143 “Solche instrumentalische Sinfonien … gleichen einer willkürlichlichen Landschaftsmalerei, die ohne Wissen des Erfinders einer gewissen Landschaft nahkommen kann.” Ibid., 290-1.
144 “Die Liebhaber brauchen nicht die Töne zu lernen, wir suchen sie nur an jene Empfindungen zu erinnern, die ohne dieser gründlichen Kenntniß hundertmal rege geworden, und noch alltäglich rege werden.” Ibid., 289.
145 “So hört mancher gern die Hoboen, jener gern die Flöten, und der Ruf dieser Töne preßt bei solchen bethörten Anbethern schon lauten Beifall aus. … Dies ist im kurzen einer der größten Fehler bei durchgängig musikliebenden Kunstrichtern.” Ibid., 290.
alone leads to confusion; unity, to dryness.”  

This—the “fundamental principle of music”—accords with that of oratory, poetry, and painting. Nevertheless, this principle must never conflict with nature, the sense of the words, or the subject of the expression. Thus a tension exists in Vogler’s system between the governing expressive principle—communication of the text—and the governing aesthetic one—unity and variety, whose balance point favors the expressive demands over the aesthetic ones. Indeed, music should not merely “tickle the ear”; it should paint a picture or a passion, thus pulling the listener into the experience itself. If the passion expressed is strong, then we, the listeners, take part in the joy or grief of the performer. If, however, the picture imitated is also true, then “we lose ourselves. The force of harmony elevates us into the spheres; we hear the angels sing; we sing with them, so that the brilliance of the Almighty shimmers.”

Harmony is crucial here. Whereas for Scheibe and Mattheson melody alone could communicate the expressive content of the music, Vogler argues fervently for the expressive meaning of harmony, which is sufficient to “portray the passions and communicate them to the human heart.” Indeed, for Vogler, harmony is to unmediated feelings as two times two is to four. This is the first of six general principles that conclude Vogler’s essay on musical taste. Secondly, for Vogler, the rules of music should guide the composer to the felicitous correspondence between the ears and the heart, for the aesthetic and expressive dimensions of the music should be compatible and mutually reinforcing.

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147 “die ersten Grundsätze”; ibid., 286.

148 “Eine Musik, die nur die Ohren küzelt, ist die geringste.” Ibid., 287.

149 “Wenn der Ausdruck der Leidenschaften auch stark ist: so nehmen wir Antheil an der Freude oder dem Leide des Schauspielers; ist aber das Gemälde richtig, werden die Bilder mit Tönen lebhaft geschildert: so finden wir nicht mehr unser. Die Gewalt der Harmonie erhebt uns in die Spähre, wir hören die Engel singen—wir singen mit—dort schimmert der Glanz des Allerhöchsten.” Ibid., 293.

150 Vogler does, however, acknowledge that further means are necessary for the formulation and communication of ideas: “Um die Leidenschaften zu schildern, um die Verfassung des meschlichen Herzens auszudrücken ist die Harmonie vor sich allein schon eher zu reichend; um aber alle nur eingebildete Ideen mit lebhaften Pinselzügen zu malen gehört noch mehr Mischung dazu.” (“In order to portray the passions, in order to convey the constitution of human hearts, harmony alone is sufficient. However, in order to paint all imagined ideas with lively brush strokes, greater means are necessary.”) Ibid., 288.
Thirdly, one should look to an experienced teacher for training in the practical rules of composition, which concern its structure, arrangement, and relations of the parts; for “certain success” can indeed be learned. Fourthly, and on the other hand, an original genius should be granted freedom from rules and conventions in the service of “flatter[ing] the variety-loving ears” of his listeners.151 Fifthly, works of great merit and repute should provide a model for students and a defense against the influence of base trends. Finally, the individual criteria for the beautiful cannot be isolated any more than can the various faculties of the judge; correct judgment speaks with all of the faculties of the listener and on the basis of the entirety of the work. Although Vogler doesn’t explicitly define good taste, one may infer its central properties on the basis of the content of his essay: good taste reflects the composer’s appropriate use of expressive means in music for the communication of the passions and the “picture” of a text; in combination with the appropriate use of aesthetic principles, governed by nature, which include the balanced combination of unity and variety, adherence to the laws of proportion, and the “orderly and flowing” progression of musical means.

These three essays coalesce around a distinctly German concept of taste that dominated early eighteenth-century musical thought and—as Vogler’s 1778 essay attests—operated in the later century as well. For these writers, taste referred to the creation and/or judgment of beauty through the combined resources of the senses and the intellect whereby the intellect’s judgment superseded the sensual impression alone. One’s judgment was either correct or incorrect (and following this, one’s taste was either good or bad), for beauty inheres in the work itself in proportion to its adherence to classical aesthetic principles. Those principles, which include clarity, proportionality, and unity in variety, are embodied in the greater laws of nature, which is the source of and model for all beauty. All of these texts give primacy to vocal music; however, there is a place in each system for the creation and judgment of instrumental music, which is regarded as a sort of abstract form of its vocal counterpart. The primacy of vocal music relates to the concept of music as an imitative art whose governing principle concerns the communication and enhancement of the passions and content embodied in the text. Nevertheless, with Vogler in particular, one

151 “dem Veränderung liebenden Gehöre zu schmeicheln.” Ibid., 311.
sees a heightened interest in the purely aesthetic properties of music, beyond their imitative and/or communicative functions. Vogler was surely influenced in this sense by new trends in musical thought that had germinated in Britain and came to dominate much continental aesthetic theory by the middle of the eighteenth century. These trends emphasize the sensory, empirical basis of beauty, the incalculability of its manifestations, and inter-subjectivity (as opposed to objectivity) as a source and model of correct judgment.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Adam Hiller, and Johann Georg Sulzer

As suggested, the empirical model of taste came to continental prominence by the middle of the eighteenth century; however, it was rooted in the much earlier philosophical and aesthetic theory of British writers Francis Bacon and, later, John Locke. Locke’s seminal Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) positioned itself in explicit counterpoint with Descartes’ rationalist system and, as such, suggests a surface binary in turn-of-the-century aesthetic thought. The central distinction between Descartes’ rationalist epistemology and Locke’s empiricism pertains to the relationship between experience and knowledge. While the rationalist maintained that innate ideas are independent of sensory experience, the empiricist denied that such innate ideas exist; from the empirical standpoint, the mind is a tabula rasa. Locke argued for the empirical foundation of knowledge in the second chapter of book I of his Essay, entitled, “No Innate Principles in the Mind,” where he set out to prove that all knowledge is born of perception and reflection. Locke began by defining the parameters of Cartesian rationalism: “It is an established opinion amongst some Men, That there are in the Understanding certain Innate Principles; some Primary Notions, Characters, as it were Stamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very first Being; and brings into the World with it.”

He then challenged this theory by claiming that such innate ideas must presuppose universality. Because there are no ideas, either speculative or practical, that are universally shared among not just well informed men but also children, savages, and idiots, there are thus no

innate ideas, per se. For Locke, all ideas are born of a two-fold process of perception—that is, experience—and reflection.

One of the most important thinkers to apply the Lockean epistemology to taste was David Hume. For Hume, in direct opposition to Descartes, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions.” In the last of his 1757, *Four Dissertations*, Hume applied this viewpoint to his theory of taste. The dissertation, entitled, “Of the Standard of Taste” begins

There is a species of philosophy, which ... represents the impossibility of ever attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is said, is very wide between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, wherever a man is conscious of it. But all determinations of the understanding are not right; because they have a reference to something beyond themselves, to wit, real matter of fact; and are not always conformable to that standard. ... Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. ... It is very natural, and even quite necessary, to extend this axiom to mental as well as bodily taste; and thus common sense, which is so often at variance with philosophy, especially with the skeptical kind, is found, in one instance at least, to agree in pronouncing the same decision.153

And yet—we learn—the supposed equality of tastes cannot account for the “palpable absurdity” of preferring, for instance, Ogilby (a Scottish translator of, primarily, classical literature, who suffered the notorious criticism of Dryden and, here, Hume) to Milton.154 “It appears then,” he concludes, “that, amidst all the variety and caprices of taste, there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all operations of the mind.”155 For Hume, then, although universality of taste cannot be presupposed, a standard of taste can and does exist, whose judgment reflects the collective voice of healthy and educated men. Such men are as free from physical deformities and

155 Ibid., 214.
social prejudices as they are rich in practice and understanding. As such, "[s]trong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true standard of taste and beauty."156

Although beauty exists in the mind, there are nevertheless “particular forms or qualities ... [that] are calculated to please ... [or] to displease.”157 And here, as in the rationalist school, nature reigns supreme. Hume’s reference to “la belle nature” in his essay of five years earlier, “Of Simplicity and Refinement in Writing,” draws attention to the two schools’ corresponding appeals to nature: “Nothing can please persons of taste, but nature drawn with all her graces and ornaments, la belle nature.”158 As one may expect, nature condemns excessive ornament—which “is a fault in every kind of production”—;

overabundant wit; “uncommon expressions”; similes; and epigrams, all of which—when used in excess—disfigure the work and distract from its essence.159 Nevertheless, for Hume, the “merely” natural in art will not affect “the mind with any pleasure” or prove “worthy of our attention.” La belle nature reflects the “just mixture of simplicity and refinement” which Hume regards as the primary source of beauty and, following this, the central the object of taste.160

Hume and his contemporaries in Britain, France, and Scotland defined an empirically based system of taste that resonated in continental musical thought from the middle of the century onward. Three later eighteenth-century writers to apply the empiricist framework to a discussion of musical taste were Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Adam Hiller, and Johann Georg Sulzer. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s political philosophy centered on the fraught relationship between individual freedom, on the one hand, and civic interdependence and hierarchical authority, on the other. His 1768 Dictionnaire de Musique, though substantively different, rests on the same philosophical and epistemological framework as his political writings. As opposed to the traditional

156 Ibid., 229.
157 Ibid., 214.
159 Ibid., 271.
160 Ibid., 272.
authority-based model for education in eighteenth-century France, for example, Rousseau called for a discovery based system in which the child’s experience of the world governed his development and growth.\textsuperscript{161} Experience and feelings, or more specifically, passions, dominated Rousseau’s view of human nature and aligned him with Hume and the Franco-British empiricists. Indeed, much of Rousseau’s brief article on musical goût echoes Hume’s earlier discourse.

Like Hume, Rousseau began by acknowledging that “each man has his peculiar taste, by which he gives to things, which he calls beautiful and excellent, an order which belongs to himself alone.”\textsuperscript{162} His explicitly “Humeian” explanation for this diversity emphasizes physical differences among the beholders’ sense organs, different sensibilities, and differences of age and sex. For Rousseau, however, such individual tastes are to be distinguished from “a general taste on which all organized people agree.”\textsuperscript{163}

Let a concert be heard by ears sufficiently exercised and men sufficiently instructed; the greatest number will generally agree on the judgment of the pieces, and on the order of preference convenient to them. Ask each one the reason of his judgment; there are things on which they will give an almost unanimous opinion. These are the things that may be submitted to rules, and this common judgment is that of the artist and the connoisseur. But among these things, which they agree to find good or ill, there are some one which they cannot authorize their judgment by any reason, solid and common, to the rest, and this last judgment belongs to the man of taste.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{161} Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile; ou de l’Éducation (Paris, 1762).
\textsuperscript{163} “Mais il y a aussi un Goût général sur lequel tous les gens bien organisés s’accordent.” Ibid; trans. Waring, 429.
\textsuperscript{164} “Faites entendre un Concert à des oreilles suffisamment exercés & à des hommes suffisamment instruits, le plus grand nombre s’accordera, pour l’ordinaire, sur le jugement des morceaux & sur l’ordre de préférence qui leur convient. Demandez à chacun raison de son jugement, il y a des choses sur lesquelles ils la rendront d’un avis presque unanime: ces choses sont celles qui se trouvent soumises aux règles; & ce jugement commun est alors celui de l’Artiste ou du Connoisseur. Mais de ces choses qu’ils s’accordent à trouver bonnes ou mauvaises, il y en a sur lesquelles il ne pourront autoriser leur jugement par aucune
Taste thus formed a category of discrimination that did not appeal to reason, but nevertheless possessed authority in its agreement with the judgments of other healthy, unprejudiced, and “sufficiently instructed” men.

However, just as Hume’s system prescribed the paradoxical union of naturalism and refinement in his appeal to la belle nature, Rousseau was careful to distinguish taste from pure sensibility. “Taste,” he wrote, “is by no means sensibility. We may have much taste with a frigid soul; and a man transported with things really passionate, is little touched with the pleasing. It seems that taste is more particularly connected with the smaller expressions and sensibility to the great.”

For Rousseau, taste was not a sheer emotional response to art. It was, more precisely, a gift of natural, refined discrimination, which served a two-fold function. On the one hand, taste “makes the composers catch the ideas of the poet … [and] the performer catch the ideas of the composer”; on the other hand, it “adorns and augments the subject matter,” for although “great things” can be created without taste, “it is taste alone that renders them interesting.”

Here, in this last segment, Rousseau walked a line between two concepts of the province of taste. On the one hand, taste functioned to communicate and translate expressive ideas; on the other hand, taste belonged to the sensual realm of beauty in that it “adorns,” “augments,” and renders great things “interesting.” In this latter sense, Rousseau anticipates the acknowledgement of beauty as a purely sensual realm, independent of expressive content and ideas. This independence of beauty from the expressive content to which it had been so deeply tied in earlier aesthetic thought is more fully expressed in the writing of Johann Adam Hiller.

Hiller’s writings on musical taste are limited to a brief essay in his journal Wöchentliche Nachrichten und Anmerkungen die Musik betreffend, which was published in weekly issues from 1766-1770. The essay on taste is so inexplicit that one might not be
able to place it ideologically were Hiller’s other writings not suggestive on matters concerning beauty and taste. His 1754 “Abhandlung über die Nachahmung der Natur in der Musik” wrestles with the very source of beauty that defines these various writers’ conceptions of musical taste.\textsuperscript{167} Rhetorically, at least, Hiller was a neoclassicist, subsuming all artistic production under the neoclassical principle of mimesis. Though founded on this aesthetic framework, Hiller’s own writings on beauty strained neoclassicism nearly to its breaking point. Hiller’s “nature,” as the object of imitation, is not, for example, Batteaux’s; i.e., that of concepts and ideas. Rather nature resides in the wide range of naturally felt sentiments, which are not communicated through tones as much as they are embodied in them; “a tone” for Hiller, “is feeling itself.”\textsuperscript{168} As such, music achieves its highest function, not merely when it imitates objects and ideas, but when the heart is moved by sentiments provided by nature,\textsuperscript{169} which are broadened in Hiller’s system to include the novel and the strange. In describing instrumental music, in specific, Hiller completely departed from his neoclassical exemplars: “The melody of a solo or concerto, if one can call it such, is not so much an imitation of the song of the passions and of the heart, as it is an artful combination of tones arranged according to the nature of the instruments that are played and judged as correct more in accordance with art than with nature.”\textsuperscript{170} Here, Hiller associated instrumental music not with verisimilitude but with the “wonderful,” an initially-marginal category that emphasized fantasy and invention, rather than nature and mimesis.\textsuperscript{171}

Given Hiller’s aesthetic ideology, it may be no wonder that the mimetic, referential aspects of music are all but absent from his concept of taste, which is defined as a

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\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 1: 523.

\textsuperscript{170} “Die Melodie des Solo oder Concerts, wenn man es allemal eine nennen kann, ist nicht so wohl ein nachgeahmter Gesang der Leidenschaften und des Herzens, als vielmehr eine nach der Beschaffenheit des Instruments, worauf gespielt wird, eingerichtete künstliche Verbindung der Töne, von deren Richtigkeit man mehr die Kunst als die Natur muss urtheilen lassen.” Ibid., 1: 537.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 1: 542.
“movement of the soul that impels us strongly and clearly with the various sentiments of nature.”  

Nature, we know from his “Abandlung,” is the “nature” of unmediated feeling. For Hiller, “no composition has a right to please if it is not made with taste,” for taste “beautifies the art, and gives it a truly noble character” through which to “inspire our admiration and invite our approval.” 

The properties of the tasteful musical work are sensualist, aesthetic properties as opposed to expressive, communicative ones: “Music cannot shine if it does not have a beautiful melody, pleasant phrasing, appropriately timed ornaments, beautiful modulations, [and] true and pure harmony,” for “in the sentiments of the heart,” where music resides, “one must seek these traits, which enchant us.”

Pleasure, enchantment, movement; these concepts define the province of taste for Hiller, who thus invoked the axiom narrowly associated with romanticism, “art for art’s sake.”

Hiller concluded his brief essay with a final assault on the neoclassical tradition: “One does not learn music through mathematical theories; still less does one achieve it thereby, as all the frigid composers demonstrate who persuade themselves that an arithmetic exactitude is the chief merit of a composer. The contempt for and decline of their compositions shows that the austerity of calculus is not the rule of taste.”

Hiller’s emphasis on the aesthetic properties of the music and the sentiments of the listener, which cannot be reduced to “arithmetic exactitude,” identifies him with later German writers, such as Johann Georg

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173 “Keine Composition hat ein Recht zu gefallen, wenn sie nicht mit Geschmack ist. Er verschönert die Künste, und giebt ihnen einen gewissen edlen Character, der unsere Bewunderung erregt, und unsern Beyfall auffordert.” Ibid.


175 “Man lernt sie nicht durch die mathematische Theorie der Musik kennen, noch weniger erreicht man sie durch dieselbe, wie alle die frostigen Componisten bezeugen können, die sich überreden, daß eine arithmetische Genauigkeit das vornehmeste Verdienst eines Componisten seyn. Die Verachtung und der Fall ihrer Compositionen zeigt ihnen sattsam, daß die Strenge des Calculs nicht die Regel des Geschmacks seyn.” Ibid.
Sulzer, who likewise dislodged beauty and taste from their neoclassical foundations in reason.

Sulzer’s ambitious, four-volume *Allgemeine Theorie de Schönes Künste*, which addresses a range of theoretical, aesthetic, and practical aspects of each of the fine arts, betrays his eclectic borrowings from the pietest, neoclassical, and empiricist intellectual thought that circulated in mid-century Berlin. Nevertheless, his characterization of taste, which was quoted in large part by Heinrich Koch in his 1802 *Musikalisches Lexikon*, is fundamentally sensualist and empirical. Indeed, at the very outset, taste is emphatically divorced from reason and morality: “Taste is really nothing other than the capacity to sense beauty, just as reason is the capacity to sense that which is true, perfect, and just, and morality, the capacity to feel that which is good.” Such beauty, which taste discerns, is independent of ideas of truth and goodness: “Beauty pleases us not because reason finds it perfect, or our moral sense finds it good, but because it flatters our imagination by presenting itself in an attractive, pleasing form. The inner sense by which we may enjoy this pleasure is taste.” Taste thus comprises no more or less than the experience of pleasure that is awakened by the perception of beauty. As Sulzer’s interest in compositional processes would suggest, taste is both a receptive and creative faculty. As

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177 Although Sulzer was not the sole author of the *Allgemeine Theorie*—The entries on music, for instance, were written by Johann Philipp Kirnberger and Johann Adolph Peter Schulz—the articles on aesthetics, including “Geschmack,” are believed to have been written by Sulzer. See ibid., 14.

178 Heinrich Christoph Koch, *Musikalisches Lexikon* (Frankfurt/Main, 1802); facs. ed. (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2001), 669-670.


180 “Also vergnügt das Schöne nicht deswegen, weil der Verstand es vollkommen, oder das sittliche Gefühl es gut findet, sondern weil es der Einbildungskraft schmeichelt, weil es sich in einer gefälligen, angenehmen Gestalt zeigt.” Ibid.

a creative tool, taste works in concert with genius and reason to produce works of truly fine art. “The artist’s understanding and genius ensure that his work possesses all parts necessary to its inner perfection. But taste is what makes it a work of fine art.”

Taste thus transforms a useful shelter into a work of fine architecture, or a true and complete speech into a work of eloquence. On the other hand, an object of superficial beauty that never touches our “understanding” or “heart,” will only appeal to that “superficial element of the human species,” the dilettante.

Sulzer’s concept of taste emphasizes form. In a speech, form presents itself as a “pleasing disposition of its parts,” to which is added “beautiful turns of phrase ... harmony, and other sensible manipulations of expressions.” Form in a work of architecture is suggested in the relationship of the parts of the whole such that the “whole has a pleasing appearance and every part ... has a decorous form appropriate to its function and place.”

As one may expect, nature is the precedent and the model for perfection, which itself “strives for beauty of form, pleasingness in color, or at least the conformity of form with the inner nature of the thing.” For Sulzer, “true beauty exists in pleasing forms.”

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182 “Der Verstand und das Genie des Künstlers geben seinem Werk alle wesentliche Theile, die zur innern Vollkommenheit gehören, der Geschmak aber macht es zu einem Werk der schönen Kunst.” Ibid., 372.

183 “Man trifft bisweilen Menschen an, deren Seelen bloß Phantasie, von Geschmak begleitet, find, und denen es am Verstande fehlet; Menschen, die nie auf etwas anders, als auf Schönheit sehen, die, durch das schöne Kleid völlig befriedigt, nie auf die bekleidete Sache Acht haben. Dieser Charakter macht die feinen und geschmacksvollen Tändler [lit., trifer] aus, dergleichen man in allen schönen Künsten hat. Sie sind die Zierrathen des menschlichen Geschlechts. Ihre Werke dringen nie durch die Phantasie hindurch, und lassen den Verstand und das Herz in völliger Ruhe.” Ibid.

184 “Die Rede, in welcher man alles sagt, was zum Endzwek dienet, wird durch eine gefällige Anordnung der Haupttheile, durch die schöne Wendung einzelner Gedanken, durch Harmonie und andre sinnliche Kraft des Ausdruks, zum Werk der Beredsamkeit.” Ibid., 372.

185 “Das Haus, in welchem alles, was zur Wohnung und zu den täglichen Verrichtungen dienet, vorhanden ist, wird dadurch, daß ein Mann von Geschmak alle diese Theile angenehm zusammen vereiniget, daß er dem Ganzen ein gefälliges Ansehen und jedem Theile, nach Maßgebung seines Ranges und Orts, eine schickliche Form giebt, zum Werk der schönen Baukunst.” Ibid.

186 “Der Künstler von Geschmak sucht jedem Gegenstand, den er bearbeitet eine gefällige, oder der Einbildungskraft sich lebhaft darstellende Form zu geben, und hat hierin die Natur zu seiner Vorgängerin, die nicht zufrieden ist, ihre Werke vollkommen und gut zu
concept of beauty can be broadened to incorporate truth, correctness and goodness; however, its perception then extends beyond taste to incorporate reason, imagination and heart. For Sulzer, then, taste is explicitly located in the realm of the aesthetically pleasing.

These latter three essays on musical taste reflect the influence of the British empirical model of aesthetic judgment. Whereas the rationalist tradition conflated beauty and truth and located taste in the objective realm of reason, the empiricist school emphasized the role of sensual impression, passions, and experience in the formation of ideas and judgments. Nevertheless, these essays are not so homogeneous as to suggest a uniform ideology. While for Rousseau, taste responds to both expressive truth and aesthetic pleasure, Hiller and—yet more—Sulzer divorced beauty from the associations with truth, emphasizing, to various degrees, melody, harmony, form, and phrasing as criteria for judgments of taste. (One may recall that even Vogler, for whom aesthetic principles of music were of independent interest, subsumed those sensual properties under the greater authority of textual expression.) The authors also diverge in their respective identifications with nature. Rousseau implicitly identified with Hume’s la belle nature in his claim that taste “adorns” and “augments” objects of greatness and truth; while Hiller extended the concept of nature to incorporate the novel and the strange. Sulzer, for whom beauty was “real,” transmitted the most neoclassically oriented concept of nature, which provides the model and basis of verisimilitude. Notwithstanding these important differences, the authors all (albeit tentatively) incorporate pleasure and imagination into their characterizations of taste. This broadened concept of taste both fuels and is fueled by

machen, sondern überall Schönheit der Formen, Annehmlichkeit der Farben, oder doch genaue Uebereinstimmung der Form mit dem innern Wesen der Dinge, zu erhalten sucht.” Ibid., 371.
187 “Es ist angemerkt worden, daß das eigentliche Schöne in der angenehmen Form bestehe.” Ibid., 373.
188 “Wenn die Schönheit, wie an seinem Orte bewiesen wird, etwas Würkliches ist, und nicht bloß in der Einbildung besteht, so ist auch der Geschmak ein in der Seele wirklich vorhandenes und von jedem andern unterschiedenes Vermögen, nämlich das Vermögen das Schöne anschauend zu erkennen, und vermittelst dieser Kenntniß Vergnügen daran zu empfinden.” (“If, as we have elsewhere shown, beauty is real and not just something imagined, then taste is also something real in our soul to be distinguished from other faculties; namely, [it is] the intuitive capacity to recognize beauty and something that aids us in enjoying this recognition.”) Ibid.
an awakening acknowledgement of the aesthetic value of instrumental music, which was seen to give pleasure, transmit the “wonderful,” and express beauty without directly imitating ideas and objects.

§

Although these broad ideological traditions—neoclassicism, aesthetic rationalism, and empiricism—provide a useful organizing principle for examining various characterizations of musical taste, none of these essays wholly adheres to the tradition with which it associates. To be sure, Descartes’ system—which completely rejects sensual beauty—could not form the basis of an aesthetic tradition without some modification. Although Le Cerf’s emphasis on reason, truth, and nature aligns with Descartes, his frequent appeals to the listener’s ears and heart necessarily undermine the model on which he based it. Vogler, Rousseau, Hiller, and Sulzer likewise combined elements from the neoclassic and empiricist systems. Thus while mainstream scholarship is correct in adducing a trend in eighteenth-century musical thought from rational to irrational aspects of artistic production and reception, that process of transformation was more fluid and irregular than usually portrayed. Moreover, these traditions themselves are not as clearly polarized—either terminologically or ideologically—as some contemporary accounts would have it. Nature, for instance, provides the model and basis for both the empiricist and rationalist concepts of beauty; and “inner sense,” which refers to intuition in the one school and perception-reflection in the other, provides the compass that guides both forms of aesthetic judgment. Leibniz’s adaptation of Descartes, which views sense and reason as synergistic, further blurs the lines between perception and intuition and, correspondingly, empiricism and rationalism. Nor are these traditions the only organizing principle or motivating factors in the authors’ characterizations of taste. Proto-nationalist agendas play a central role in the perspectives of many of these writers, creating a potentially circular relationship between aesthetic traditions and emerging ideologies. Similarly, the emphasis of nearly all of these essays on court opera puts a public (and implicitly political) stamp on their authors’ points of view.
Finally, not every meaning and mention of *taste* in eighteenth-century musical thought is included in this survey. For example, the Italian-born musician, composer, and theorist Francesco Geminiani wrote two treatises dealing with taste in music: *Rules for Playing in a true Taste on the Violin, German Flute, Violoncello, and Harpsichord* (1738) and *Treatise of Good Taste in the Art of Musick* (1749). Both treatises employ *taste* as a technical term for correct ornamental practice, such that “those who are Lovers of Musick may with more Ease and Certainty arrive at Perfection.” His 1751 *The Art of Playing on the Violin* does provide a few words of aesthetic justification for his rule-based system:

> [P]laying in good Taste doth not consist of frequent Passages, but in expressing with Strength and Delicacy the Intention of the Composer. This Expression is what every one should endeavour to acquire, and it may be easily obtained by any Person, who is not too fond of his own Opinion, and doth not obstinately resist the Force of true Evidence. … [C]ertain Rules of Art are necessary for a moderate Genius, and may improve and perfect a good one.189

However, the treatises themselves are technical in orientation and focus, thus comprising an additional dimension of *taste* in eighteenth-century musical thought.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, this survey of ideas about *taste* provides a valuable perspective on eighteenth-century musical aesthetics. In the most general terms, writings on musical taste were centralized in France and Germany. The French discourse began at the turn of the century; the German discourse, which was (initially) largely based on French models, in the 1720s. Writers on musical taste were in dialogue with broader philosophical traditions and developments in Britain, France, and Germany. Philosophers and critics of music incorporated foundational ideas of Descartes, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hume, Burke, Rousseau, and others into their reflections on music. Nevertheless, aesthetics of music had their own set of issues and debates that were sometimes only implicitly or secondarily related to broader philosophical questions.

Of central concern to musical taste was the relative merit of vocal and instrumental music. The primacy of vocal music in the first half of the century relates to music’s perceived function of facilitating and enhancing the expressive content of a text. Within this

rationalist ideological system, the value of art was explicitly tied to its expressive function and “truth value.” The gradual (and tentative) aesthetic justification for instrumental music from the mid-eighteenth century onward corresponded to the adoption of Franco-British empirical models in philosophy and aesthetics, which (again, gradually) relocated beauty from the paradigm of truth to that of pleasure. It is not clear whether a rise of instrumental music fostered interest in empirical aesthetic models or, conversely, if the adoption of those models thus paved (re-)new(ed) inroads for instrumental music. Nevertheless, it is perhaps telling that early aesthetic justifications for instrumental music were concentrated in German-speaking lands, where the long tradition of instrumental practice had been implicitly buttressed by the popular journalism of the aforementioned “review collective.”190 As Mary Sue Morrow writes, “the very existence of reviews treating instrumental pieces as objects suitable for aesthetic evaluation helped to undercut the notion of a purely functional role for instrumental music, thus preparing the public for its later, more exalted status.”191 In any case, the gradual aesthetic justification for instrumental music in Germany corresponded to an expansion of the province of taste, which now incorporated a range of human passions and emphasized imagination.

This expanded notion of taste was incompatible with the rationalist emphasis on rules and compositional correctness, thus making manifest a tension that had been latent earlier in the century. Indeed, the earliest essay on musical taste—Le Cerf’s 1704 Comparaison—defined the parameters of what would be a century-long debate over the aesthetic province of rules. On the one hand, Le Cerf argues for rules—both small and great—as the basis for correct and successful musical production, for little is achieved “without a bit of science.” This aspect of Le Cerf’s system resonates in Mattheson and Scheibe, who—in the tone and spirit of Gottsched’s Versuch einer Dichtkunst—promoted an explicitly rules-based system of aesthetic judgment. On the other hand, Le Cerf identified a potential schism between those rules of science and the “voice of good nature,” which guides the intuition to true and correct judgment. Although Le Cerf’s paradigm of beauty is fundamentally objective and rationalist, here he came tantalizingly close to identifying judgment with perception (and, implicitly, subjectivity), thus (nearly) subscribing to the

190 Morrow, German Music Criticism, 18.
191 Ibid.
empirical model of aesthetic judgment that defined rules as descriptive rather than prescriptive. This alternative model for the province of rules permitted the irrational aspects of creativity to surface and dominate music production and criticism in the second half of the eighteenth century.

There is one important respect in which Le Cerf’s discussion of rules did not anticipate future concerns and debates: his confining the rules of taste to the receptive properties of music. The ears to which Le Cerf referred were those of the listener, and the rules were likewise those of criticism. One of the most interesting findings of this survey—beyond the intrinsic value of these little-studied essays in their own right—is that, while in France, taste was regarded as a primarily receptive faculty, in Germany it was an explicitly creative faculty as well. This may be partly attributable to the authors’ respective orientations: Le Cerf, Grandval, and Rousseau were men of letters and connoisseurs of music, whereas Mattheson, Scheibe, and Vogler were composers, theorists, and critics. Nevertheless, Sulzer’s Allgemeine Theorie locates taste explicitly in both the receptive and the creative artistic realms, such that, regardless of how it emerged, the notion of taste as a creative faculty became a general feature of later eighteenth-century German aesthetic thought.
Chapter Two

Humanism and Taste in Leopold Mozart’s Writings about Music

Leopold the Rationalist

On 14 February 1785 Leopold Mozart wrote to his daughter in Vienna: “On Saturday evening Herr Joseph Haydn and the two Barons Tindi came to see us and the new quartets were performed. ... Haydn said to me: ‘Before God and as an honest man, I tell you that your son is the greatest composer known to me either in person or by name. He has taste and, beyond that, the most profound knowledge of composition.’”¹⁹² Not only did Leopold thus report the highest commendation of his son’s abilities, he also attributed it to one whose own standing in the public eye far surpassed that of his subject. One year earlier a British critic had reflected on “the universality of Haydn’s genius” as demonstrated by the “vast demand for his works all over Europe. There is not only a fashion,” he continued, “but also a rage for his musick; and he has continual commissions from France, England, Russia, Holland, &c.”¹⁹³ Nevertheless, Leopold was not content to relate the mere fact of Haydn’s admiring remark; he also reiterated its content and, with it, Haydn’s assertion of Wolfgang’s taste. It is reasonable to assume that Leopold placed particular value on these words, given the central role of taste in his own personal and professional writings.

Those writings have been interpreted in recent critical literature as representative of the Gottschedian branch of rationalism that dominated German aesthetic theory around


the middle of the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{194} Rationalism is indeed the key word of the writings on Leopold and is set in frequent counterpoint to Wolfgang’s perceived genius. Hermann Abert, for example, concludes that “[a]s a rationalist at heart, [Leopold] utterly failed to appreciate the true nature of genius, whose workings are influenced by no external aims.”\textsuperscript{195} In Alfred Einstein’s similar view, Leopold “is half rationalist, half ‘popular’, while Wolfgang is never rationalistic and never popular, but godlike, regal, and aristocratic.”\textsuperscript{196} More recently, Maynard Solomon reads the “patchwork absurdities ... plundered from myth” in \textit{Die Zauberflöte} as ultimately giving way to “the service of patriarchal imperatives that would have been very much to the liking of such rationalists as Don Alfonso, Sarastro, and Leopold Mozart.”\textsuperscript{197} For David Schroeder, Leopold’s \textit{Versuch} “expressed his own Gottschedian view about what the nature of the language of a manual of instruction should be, avoiding a high-flown style and emulating the clear and intelligible style of the original German”; a view that comes “very near to Gottsched’s ideals of ‘Natur and \textit{Vernunft}’ (nature and reason).”\textsuperscript{198} For these scholars, in the words of Piero Melograni, Leopold was “an Enlightenment man, rational and concrete.”\textsuperscript{199}

In his own day, too, Leopold’s professional outlook and activities were associated with reason and learning. Marpurg, for instance, recommended Leopold’s \textit{Versuch} to the “sound and skilled virtuoso, the rational and methodical teacher, the learned musician; [for] all of those qualities that make a man of worth are developed together here.”\textsuperscript{200} And

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\item[195] Herman Abert, \textit{W. A. Mozart} (Breitkopf & Härtel, 1923-4); trans. Stewart Spencer and ed. Cliff Eisen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 343; see also ibid., 8, 344, and 528.
\item[198] David Schroeder, \textit{Mozart in Revolt: Strategies of Resistance, Mischief, and Deception} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 51.
\item[200] “Der gründliche und geschickte Virtuose, der vernünftige und methodische Lehrmeister, der gelehrt Musikus, diese Eigenschaften, deren jede einzeln einen verdienten Mann macht, entwickeln sich allhier zusammen.” F.W. Marpurg, \textit{Historische-kritische Beiträge zur Tonkunst}, vol. 3 (Berlin, 1757), 160; trans. Alfred Einstein in the Preface to \textit{A Treatise on the}
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Dominikus Hagenauer’s sober praise upon Leopold’s death emphasized his “wit and wisdom,” traits associated with the Enlightenment man par excellence. This characterization reflects Leopold’s correspondence with the elder Hagenauer, in which both wit and wisdom were on display. In a 1768 letter to Lorenz Hagenauer, Leopold famously condemned the Viennese public, who “are not curious to see serious and rational [Vernünftige] things, of which they have little or no concept. They like nothing but foolish tricks, dancing, devils, spirits, magical spells, Hanswurst, Lipperl, Bernardon, witches, and apparitions—this is well known and their theater shows it every day.” This and Leopold’s numerous other allusions to Vernunft corroborate accounts from his own time to the present day; reason and learning were core elements of his worldview. His

202 The ability to both “edify and entertain” was granted the highest status in this period. Alexander Pope’s poetry, for example, was lauded by a contemporary reviewer for its interplay among “beauty, wit, and wisdom”: “The distinguishing perfections of his poetry are beauty, wit, and wisdom. If we are not elevated, we are charmed; if we are not transported, we are diverted and instructed”; and a dedicatory poem to “immortal” John Gay similarly emphasized his work’s rare combination of wit and wisdom: “I perceive, you want to look, / at leisure hours upon a book; / And such an one would gladly choose, / As may both profit, and amuse. / ... / Immortal Gay, sure, all must prize, / who merry makes us, and yet wise. / ... / Good poets are so wondrous scant, / we seldom meet with what we want. / Few rhyming authors (to be plain) / both edify and entertain. / But here, both wit and wisdom mix; / Here, sir, with lucky hand, you fix, / on one, a most by all confess’d / to be a most the very best.” “Memoirs of Alexander Pope,” The Literary and Biographical Magazine, and British Review, vol. 2 (London: J. Parsons, July 1793): 327, “I perceive you want to look. ... ” The London Magazine and Monthly Chronologer, vol. 6 (London: C. Ackers, 1737): 98.  
enthusiasm for Gottsched, Gellert, Fux, Mattheson, Scheibe, and Marpurg (all prominent exponents of the early German Enlightenment); his membership, from 1759, in the Berliner Gesellschaft der Musik; and his associations with Freemasonry all further identify him with enlightenment and reason. As Volkmar Braunbehrens concludes, “Leopold Mozart is a characteristic exponent of rationalistic Enlightenment: broadly educated, virtually universal in his interests, imbued with the idea that everything can be grasped and understood through proper application of the rational intellect, and possessed of an ability to convey his knowledge to others.”

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204 On Leopold’s views regarding Gottsched, see David Schroeder, Mozart In Revolt Strategies of Resistance, Mischief, and Deception (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 51; on Gellert, see ibid., 53-4, and specifically Schroeder’s discussion of Gellert’s response to Leopold’s (presumably) admiring lost letter, 1 April 1754, ibid., 54; on Fux, Mattheson, Scheibe, and Marpurg, see the introductory section of Leopold’s Versuch, entitled, “A Short History of Music,” where he refers to these and other authors as “men who by their writings on music have earned great credit in the scientific world.” “... die sich durch ihre Schriften um die Musik bey der gelehrten Welt ungem ein verdient gemacht haben.” Mozart, Versuch, 17; trans. Knocker, Treatise, 22. (Given translations here and throughout sometimes depart from the Knocker edition.)

205 Marpurg, in a public letter to Leopold Mozart, 23 June 1759: “... eine gewisse musikalische Gesellschaft hieselbst, deren Geheimschreiber ich zu seyn das Vergnügen habe, so eifrig in ihren Bemühungen ist, daß sie so gar ein musikalisches Wochenblatt schreiben will ... Die Gesellschaft ist Willens, ihre periodischen Aufsätze in Briefen herauszugeben, und sie wird sich die Freyheit nehmen, ihre Briefe an Personen von Verdienst, Einsicht und Geschmack zu richten. Konnte selbige bey diesem Vorsatze, mein herr, einen glücklichern Anfang machen, als mit Ihnen?” (“... a certain musical society here, whose secret correspondent I have the pleasure of being, wishes to produce a musical weekly. ... The society is minded to publish its periodical articles in the form of letters, and it proposes to take the liberty of addressing its letters to persons of merit, insight, and taste. Could the aforesaid, in this endeavour, Sir, make a more auspicious beginning than with you?”) Kritische Briefe Über die Tonkunst, in 2 Bänden (Berlin: Friedrich Wilhelm Birnstiel, 1760), 1: 1-2; trans., Branscombe, et. al., ADB, 11.

206 Daniel Heartz, Mozart, Haydn, and Early Beethoven, 1781-1802 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009), 65. Unfortunately (given the secret nature of the society) Leopold’s correspondence provides no documentation of his membership. According to Heartz, he was initiated into the order by Wolfgang upon his 1785 visit to Vienna. See ibid., 67-72; on the Mozarts and Freemasonry, see also Matheus Franciscus Maria Berk, The Magic Flute, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 413ff.

207 Volkmar Braunbehrens, “Väterlicher Freund, gehorsamster Sohn’. Leopold und Wolfgang A. Mozart,” in Väter und Söhne: zwölf biographische Porträts (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1996), 17; for an open-access translation, from which I depart, see Bruce Cooper Clarke, “Fatherly Friend, Most Obedient Son’: Leopold and Wolfgang Mozart,” Apropos Mozart,
As shown in the previous chapter, taste was a central component of aesthetic rationalism, and it was likewise a central feature of Leopold’s outlook. In (an admittedly formal) letter to Padre Martini, for example, he located taste squarely within a rationalist ideology that emphasized wisdom, learning, and civic morality:

We live in this world in order to learn industriously and, by interchanging our ideas, to enlighten one another and thus endeavour to promote the sciences and the fine arts. Oh, how often have I longed to be near you, most reverend Father, so that I might be able to talk to and have discussions with you. For I live in a country where music leads a struggling existence, though indeed apart from those who have left us, we still have excellent teachers and particularly composers of great wisdom, learning, and taste.208

From this perspective, Leopold’s concept of musical taste can be aligned with the rationalist formulations of Le Cerf, Mattheson, Scheibe, and (though to a lesser extent) Vogler, whose essays on taste reflect the same broad aesthetic ideology. However, although Leopold was in many respects a rationalist, other, less-examined aspects of his worldview conflicted with the so-called “doctrine of reason,”209 and thus call for a more


209 On the “doctrine of reason,” see Georg Friedrich Meier, Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Halle: J.J. Gebauer, 1752); Hermann Samuel Reimarus, Die Vernunftlehre (Hamburg, 1756); Hermann Samuel Reimarus, “Über Aufklärung, ob sie dem Staate—der Religion—oder überhaupt gefährlich sey und seyn könne? Ein Wort zur Beherzigung für Regenten, Staatsmänner und Priester.” (Berlin: Königliche Preussische Akademische Kunst- und Buchhandlung, 1788). Reimarus defined enlightenment as “nothing more than the effort of the human spirit to bring to light, according to principles of a pure doctrine of reason and for the promotion of utility, all the objects of the world of ideas, all human opinions and their consequences, and everything that has influence on humanity”; trans. Jane Kneller, “On Enlightenment: Is it and Could it be Dangerous to the State, to Religion, or Dangerous in General? A Word to be Heeded by Princes, Statesmen, and Clergy,” in What is
A nuanced characterization of his beliefs. Foremost among these conflicting aspects is Leopold's Catholic faith.

Leopold and the Limits of Reason

At the center of the pre-Kantian rationalistic Enlightenment were the writings of the philosophes, whose anti-religious posture undergirded nearly all critical and philosophical thought. This is not to suggest that rationalism was predicated on atheism. On the contrary, atheism was widely regarded even among the philosophes as equally fanatical and superstitious as orthodox Christianity. Nevertheless, a perceived tension between "the distinct provinces of reason and faith" informed the philosophes' worldview and the greater intellectual climate of the Enlightenment. Voltaire's definition of heresy, from his 1764 *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, ironically invokes "faible raison" precisely to illustrate its incompatibility with claims of orthodox religion:

> Without daring to scrutinize the ways of providence, which are impenetrable to the human mind, and merely consulting, as far as we are permitted, our feeble reason, it would seem that of so many [religious] opinions on so many articles, there would always exist one which must prevail, which was the orthodox, 'the right teaching'.

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210 For Peter Gay, the Philosophes were united by "the common experience of shedding their inherited Christian beliefs. ... They were by and large agreed that Christianity, in company with all other supernatural religions, was wrong, and that science, with its dependable results and its principled modesty before the eternal mysteries of mind and matter, was the way to truth and ... to happiness." *The Enlightenment: A Comprehensive Anthology* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), 17.

211 Diderot writes, "... l'athéisme est tout voisin d'une espéce de superstition presqu'aussi puérile que l'autre." ("... atheism is near to being a type of superstition almost as puerile as the other [type of superstition, namely, revealed religion].") *Correspondance*, ed. Georges Roth (Paris: Les Édition de Minuit, 1955-70), IX: 154.

The other societies … soon assumed that title also; but being the weaker parties, they had given to them the designation of ‘heretics’.” 213 Voltaire could well have concluded his remarks with Diderot’s pointed axiom: “When God, from whom we receive reason, demands its sacrifice, it is like a trickster who takes back what he has given.” 214 For Voltaire and Diderot, as for numerous other Enlightenment thinkers, reason and religious orthodoxy were contradictory notions.

Even in the more soundly Christian German-speaking regions, Enlightenment rationalists grappled with the relationship between reason and faith; although these thinkers more often accommodated Christian doctrine into their ideologies, the tensions between reason and “superstition” loomed over their efforts as well. In this regard, Lewis Beck identifies two German Enlightenments; one tending toward reason and the other toward faith. 215 Christian Wolff’s rational theology, which translated Leibniz’s Christian doctrine (through a proclaimed scientific method) into a “science of those things which are possible through God,” 216 was vehemently combated by Lutheran Pietists in mid-century Prussia, who rejected Wolff’s rationalist framework—with its dangerous liaisons with “pantheism” and “fatalism”—217 in favor of an emotionally driven, interior concept of

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214 “Lorsque Dieu, dont nous tenons la raison, en exige le sacrifice, c’est un faiseur de tours de gibecière qui escamote ce qu’il a donné.” *Oeuvres de Denis Diderot*, ed. Jacques-André Naigeon (Paris: Desray, rue Hautefeuille, 1798), §3, 269.


With Wolff’s disciple, Gottsched, the schism widened further; Gottsched departed from Wolff’s rationalized Christianity by decentralizing (rather than accommodating) faith itself. At the outset of his Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst ..., Gottsched notably rejected the theory that poetry had a sacred origin in man’s need to praise God:

In the foreword to his translation of Aristotle’s Art of Poetry, D’Acier opines that religion was the midwife of poetry; and that the first songs were created and sung merely for the praise of God. He has this in common with others of his compatriots, that, in a superstitious way, they want to give the sciences a holy origin. But why is it necessary to validate poetry through fables, when even without that it finds plenty of Liebhaber if it is directly derived from nature itself? In my opinion, one would never have thought to sing Lieder in praise of God if one were not already accustomed to singing. And I believe, rather, that through religious hymns, an otherwise indifferent thing is rendered sacred, than that through secular song a sacred thing is desecrated.

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For Gottsched, on the contrary, poetry is a natural form of expression, rooted in man’s desire to communicate his feelings.\textsuperscript{221} Having reduced Christianity to “a mere cultural phenomenon,”\textsuperscript{222} Gottsched thus concluded that reason, not faith, governs human morality and its expression in the arts.\textsuperscript{223} Although not all rationalists subscribed to Gottsched’s (or the philosophes’) philosophical and aesthetic secularism, Christian rationalists were nevertheless obliged to reconcile these incompatible aspects of their beliefs. When taken into account, these considerations reframe the supposedly monolithic rationalist enlightenment as a pluralistic web of ideologies, which informed and were informed by their advocates’ religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{224}

In light of this, it is no wonder that Leopold Mozart placed his allegiances elsewhere.\textsuperscript{225} Religion permeated nearly every aspect of his long life. His childhood family were active members of the congregation of the Assumption of the Holy Virgin (associated with the Marian Brotherhood in Augsburg); beginning in 1722, they lived in a house owned by the Jesuit Order (in the Jesuitengasse).\textsuperscript{226} His formal education, first at the Jesuit Gymnasium St. Salvator and then—though he withdrew after one year—at the corresponding Lyceum, emphasized theology, science, and rhetoric in preparation for his


\textsuperscript{221} “Sie [die Poesie] hat ihre erste Quelle in den Gemüthsneigungen des Menschen. So alt also diese sind, so alt ist auch die Poesie.” (It [poetry] has its first source in the notions of the minds of men. As old as these are, so also is poetry.) Gottsched, \textit{Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst}, 67, §1.

\textsuperscript{222} Döring, “Leibniz’s Critique,” 254.

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{225} 29 June 1778: “Voltaire ist nun auch Todt! und ist so gestorben, wie er war: das hätte er für seinen Nachruhm besser machen können.” (“So Voltaire is dead too! and died just as he lived; he ought to have done something better for the sake of his reputation with posterity.”) Bauer and Deutsch, eds., \textit{Briefe und Aufzeichnungen}, 2:386; trans., Anderson, \textit{Letters}, 556.

\textsuperscript{226} Solomon, \textit{Mozart: A Life}, 22.
would-be entrance into the priesthood.\textsuperscript{227} His godfather was a canon at St. Peter’s and a prominent churchman in the community.\textsuperscript{228} Following two failed academic terms, Leopold settled permanently in the predominately Catholic city of Salzburg, wherein he undertook his first professional position as chamberlain and musician to the Salzburg canon, Count Johann Baptist Thurn-Valassina and Taxis. Leopold’s daily devotional practices and strict observation of Catholic rites—as testified by his correspondence—identify him, in this sense at least, as an orthodox Catholic.\textsuperscript{229}

The contrast (and conflict) in this regard between the father and son is particularly pronounced in a series of letters spanning 1777-1779, the period during which Wolfgang undertook a professional tour; in his mother’s company, through Munich, Augsburg, Mannheim, and Paris. On Wolfgang’s approaching name-day, for example, Leopold urged his son to protect his soul and honour his duties as a “true Catholic Christian”:

I am to wish you happiness on your name-day! But what can I now wish you that I do not always wish you? And that is, the grace of God, that it may follow you everywhere, that it may never leave you. And this it will never do, if you are diligent in fulfilling the duties of a true Catholic Christian. You know me. I am no pedant and no praying Peter and still less am I a hypocrite. But surely you will not refuse the request of a father, that you should take thought for your soul’s welfare so that in the hour of his death you may cause him no anxiety, and that in that dread moment he may have no reason to reproach himself for not having watched over your soul’s salvation.\textsuperscript{230}

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.; see also, Gutman, \textit{Mozart: A Cultural Biography}, 13-14.
\textsuperscript{228} Solomon, \textit{Mozart: A Life}, 22; Abert, \textit{W.A. Mozart}, 2.
\textsuperscript{229} For a summary of Leopold’s religious beliefs and devotional activities, as exhibited in his correspondence, see Cliff Eisen and Simon P. Keefe, eds., \textit{The Cambridge Mozart Encyclopedia} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 324-5.
\textsuperscript{230} “Ich soll Dir zu Deinem Nahmenstage günck wünschen! aber was kann ich Dir itzt wünschen, was ich Dir nicht immer wünsche? Ich wünsche Dir die gnade gottes, die Dich aller Ort begleite, die Dich niemals verlassen wolle, und niemals verlassen wird, wenn Du die schuldigkeit eines wahren Catholischen Christen auszuüben beflissen bist. Du kennst mich. Ich bin kein Pedant, kein Betbruder, noch weniger ein scheinheiliger: allein Deinem vatter wirst Du wohl eine Bitte nicht abschlagen? Diese ist: daß Du für Deine Seele besorgt seyn wollest, das Du Deinem vatter keine Beängstigung in seiner Todesstunde verursachest, damit er in inem schweren augenblick sich keinen Vorwurff machen darf als
Though Leopold elsewhere claimed to sympathize with Wolfgang’s youthful disinclination to focus on his soul, he nevertheless admonished him to put God first: “From his hands we receive our temporal happiness; and at the same time we must think of our eternal salvation.” He thus implored his son to avoid all “dangers to [the] soul”; keep God and honour in his consciousness; and prevent the irrevocable—indeed, eternal—consequences of foolishness. When Wolfgang’s tour led him to the protestant city of Weilburg, Leopold urged his son not to linger there, for he would find no Catholic churches in which to attend mass. “Hold fast to God,” Leopold repeatedly urged his son, “who will see to everything.” If in his constant pleas and reminders Leopold was sometimes overbearing, he was at least not hypocritical. As his correspondence in this period testifies, Leopold attended numerous daily church services, prayed morning and night, and continued to devote himself to what he regarded as his primary Christian duty; that is, to see to the full development of his son’s God-granted gifts.

Leopold’s investment in accommodating faith into his rationalist aesthetic and pedagogical framework comes to light in the introduction to his Versuch. He begins the

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231 “junge Leute hörn dergleichen Sachen nicht gerne, ich weis es, ich war auch jung; allein gott sey Danck gesagt, ich kam doch bey allen meinen jugendlichen Narrenspossen immer wieder zu mir selbst, flohe alle Gefahren meiner Seele und hatte immer gott und meine Ehre, und die Folgen, die gefährlichen folgen vor Augen.” (‘Young people do not like to hear about these things, I know, for I was once young myself. But, thank God, in spite of all my youthful foolish pranks, I always pulled myself together. I avoided all dangers to my soul and ever kept God and my honour and the consequences, the very dangerous consequences of foolishness, before my eyes.’) Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2:188; trans. Anderson, Letters, 422.

232 “gott geht vor allem! von dem müssen wir unser zeitliches glück erwarten, und für das ewige immer Sorge tragen.” Ibid.


234 Ibid.


brief section entitled “A Short History of Music” with an unselfconscious appeal to mystical aspects of Christianity, including Creation, Adam, the Flood, and Noah’s ark:

God gave the first human being, soon after the Creation, every opportunity to invent the excellent science of music. Adam was able to distinguish the difference between human voices; he heard the song of various birds; he perceived the changes of the whistling of the wind through the trees, varying from high to a low pitch; and the tool for singing had been given to him from the beginning by the good Creator, planted in him by Nature. ... We cannot deny Jubal’s merit, for the Holy Scriptures themselves honour him with the title of Father of Music, and it is not improbable that music, either through Noah or one of his sons in the Ark, and after the Flood by means of instruction, came down to the Egyptians from whom later the Greeks ... learnt, and finally handed it on to the Romans and other peoples.237

When, however, his history extends beyond the scope of scripture, reasoned skepticism takes hold. In a footnote accompanying his reference to Orpheus and “the testimonies of the ancients” that this “wise and learned man” lived,238 Leopold assures the reader that this ancient character, though elevated to mythic caricature, was as mortal as any other man: “At the time these men lived, learned people were idolized. And this is the very reason why everything seems so fabulous. Who knows? Perchance the poets of future centuries may have cause enough to celebrate as gods our present-day virtuosi of song, for it really seems

237 “Gott hat dem ersten Menschen gleich nach der Erschaffung alle Gelegenheit an die hand gegeben, die vortreffliche Wissenschaft der Musik zu erfinden. Adam konnte den Unterschied der Töne an der menschlichen Stimme bemerken; er hörte den Gesang verschiedener Vögel; er vernahm eine abwechselnde Höhe und Tiefe durch das Gepfeife des zwischen die Bäume dringenden Windes: und der Werkzeug zum Singen war ihm ja von dem gütigen Erschaffer schon zum voraus in die Natur gepflanzt. ... Dem Jubal sind seine Verdienste nicht abzusprechen; denn die H. [heilige] Schrift selbst beehret ihn, mit dem Titel eines Musikvaters: und es ist nicht unwahrscheinlich, daß die Musik entweder durch den Noe selbst oder durch einen seiner Söhne in die Arche, und nach der Sündflut durch Unterweisung auf die Egyptier gekommen, von denen sie nachgehends die Griechen erlernet ... und solche endlich auf die Lateiner und andere Völker gebracht haben.” Mozart, Versuch, 13-14; trans., Knocker, Treatise, 19-20.
238 “die allermeisten Zegnisse der Alten” and “weiser und gelehrter”; Mozart, Versuch, 15; trans., Knocker, Treatise, 20.
as if old times might return.”239 This testimony could have come from the arch-rationalist Voltaire, who himself admonished the writer and statesman Sir William Temple for his naive and superstitious belief in the myth of Orpheus: “This enemy to his own times believed implicitly in the fable of Orpheus, and, it should seem, had never heard of the fine music of Italy, nor even of that of France, which do not charm serpents, it is true, but which do charm the ears of the connoisseur.”240 In this sense, at least, Leopold was a man of his times; a rationalist dispeller of myths who nevertheless observed the most orthodox rites and “superstitious” beliefs of his Catholic faith.241

The “Ausgleichsformel” Between Reason and Faith

A clue to Leopold’s negotiation of these incompatible ideologies is provided by Walter Kurt Kreyszig, who corrects what he sees as a crucial oversight in the literature on Leopold Mozart and his Versuch; namely, the failure to “comment on the ... solid anchoring [of] the work in the venerable tradition of musical humanism”:242

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239 “Zu jener Zeit als diese Männer lebeten, wurden die gelehrtten Leute vergöttert. Und eben dieses ist die Ursache, warum alles so fabelhaft läßt. Wer weis es? Vielleicht haben die Poeten der künstigen Jahrhunderte Stoff genug unsere heutigen Virtuosen als Götter zu besingen? Denn es scheint wirklich als wenn die alten Zeiten wieder kommen mochten.” Mozart, Versuch, 15 (note gg); trans. Knocker, Treatise, 20. Though on a finer point, Leopold and Voltaire may be seen to disagree—the former, denying the supernatural elements of the Orpheus myth, and the latter denying the myth altogether—they both focus their skepticism on the irrational and supernatural elements of the history.


Leopold developed a keen interest in humanist scholarship early in his training, a path of inquiry that is firmly manifested in the Violinschule. Unlike the other three mid-18th century treatises on performance practice, all of which focus on the venerable path of scholarship ... Leopold Mozart expands the horizons of his readers by including a short but important historic expose on string instruments in the introduction to his Violinschule, specifically focusing on their origin in the broad context surrounding the age old question of the origin of music—one that emulates humanist scholarship.243

Kreyszig follows with a meticulous survey of the historical and historiographical aspects of the treatise’s preface, which, for him, articulates a humanist concern for history and—in his ensuing discussion of the violin—progress. Kreyszig’s argument is persuasive, although he might have gone further in arguing for Leopold’s investment in musical humanism. Though his study is limited to key markers of humanist scholarship in the preface—namely, in the listing of important theorists, the referencing of prominent humanist scholars (such as Gaffurio), and the emphasis on the roles of Greek and Roman antiquity in his historical account—the rhetoric and ideology of humanism undergird the whole of Leopold’s Versuch and his other writings, providing insight into his aesthetic in general and concept of musical taste in specific.

Humanism is strongly oriented toward the classical humanities. This is not to say that all neoclassicism is humanist, for classical references are among the most ubiquitous and generic style markers of the Enlightenment. Latin phrase books provided eighteenth-century authors with the veneer of erudition, although, according to Peter Gay, the depth of engagement often ended there.244 It was indeed this superficial and excessive referencing of ancient authorities that Laurence Sterne burlesqued in the Life and Times of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman:

‘Tis either Plato, or Plutarch, or Seneca, or Xenophon, or Epictetus, or Theophrastus, or Lucian, —or some one perhaps of later date, —either Cardan, or Budaeus, or Petrarch, or Stella, —or, possibly, it may be some divine or father of the church; St. Austin, or St. Cyprian, or Barnard, who affirms, that it is an irresistible and natural passion to weep

243 Ibid., 56-57.
244 Gay, Enlightenment, 2:40.
for the loss of our friends or children: —and Seneca (I’m positive) tells us somewhere, that such griefs evacuate themselves best by that particular channel: and, accordingly, we find, that David wept for his son Absalom, Adrian or his Antinous, Niobe for her children, and that Apollodorus and Crito both shed tears for Socrates before his death.245

Even among the more probing engagements of the philosophes, classical references were selective (and sometimes distorted). This is because the philosophes, on the whole, narrowly equated classicism with paganism; above all, references to antiquity justified those philosophes’ distancing relationship to Christianity. Diderot, who was convinced of Cicero’s atheism despite all evidence to the contrary, dismissed his sacred references as political jargon,246 and Hume went so far as to cast doubt on his religious musings to his wife (emphasizing his willingness to appear devout):

If there ever was a nation or a time in which the public religion lost all authority over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in Rome, during the Ciceronian age, would openly have erected its throne, and that Cicero himself, in every speech and action, would have been its most declared abettor. But it appears, that, whatever sceptical liberties that great man might take, in his writings or in the philosophical conversation, he yet avoided, in the common conduct of life, the imputation of deism and profaneness. Even in his own family, and to his wife Terentia, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a devout religionist; and there remains a letter, addressed to her, in which he seriously desires her to offer sacrifices to Apollo and Aesculapius, in gratitude for the recovery of health.247

Although—like their eighteenth-century counterparts—Renaissance neoclassicists were criticized by some contemporaries as “pagan worshipers” and atheists, such claims were on

247 David Hume, Four Dissertations: I. The Natural History of Religion. II. Of the Passions. III. Of Tragedy. IV. Of the Standard of Taste (London: A. Miller, 1757), 81-82; cited in Gay, Enlightenment, 2:156
the whole unjustified. On the contrary, they sought to achieve what Aby Warburg refers to as a “plastische Ausgleichsformel” between Christian faith and classical values. Erasmus illustrated his deep investment in negotiating progressive epicurean values and Christian beliefs in his 1533 *The Epicurean*:

> If people who live agreeably are Epicureans, none are more truly Epicurean than the righteous and godly. And if it is names that bother us, no one better deserves the name of Epicurean than the revered founder and head of the Christian philosophy, Christ, for in Greek pikouros means ‘helper’. He alone, when the law of Nature was all but blotted out by sins, when the law of Moses incited to lists rather than cured them, when Satan ruled in the world unchallenged, brought timely aid to perishing humanity. Completely mistaken, therefore, are those who talk in their foolish fashion about Christ’s having been sad and gloomy in character and calling upon us to follow a dismal mode of life. On the contrary, he alone shows the most enjoyable life of all and the one most full of true pleasure.

Like Erasmus, most Renaissance humanists sought reform of religion, education, and society from within the Christian faith; their engagements with (and reconstitution of) classical values reflect this agenda. The *Ausgleichsformel* between human-centered values and faith-based values is, in the broadest sense, a feature of Renaissance humanism and a distinction between Renaissance and Enlightenment engagements with antiquity. From this perspective, Leopold’s particular shade of neoclassicism resonates with an earlier time;

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250 Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus, *The Epicurean* (1533); repr. in *Collected Works of Erasmus*, vol. 43 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 1086.

his decade-long Jesuit training had inculcated him with a humanist *Ausgleichsformel* between reason and faith that had defined the spirit of the Renaissance.

**Leopold’s Humanist Education**

Leopold’s neo-Renaissance humanism was rooted in his Jesuit education. Educational policy and reform are among the greatest legacies of the Jesuit order, the curriculum of which was detailed in a comprehensive manual, *Ratio Atque Institiutio Studiorum Societatis Jesu*, or *The Method and System of the Studies of the Society of Jesus*. This curriculum was completed in 1599 (following preliminary versions of 1586 and 1589), and its use was mandatory in Jesuit schools (with some regional variation permitted) until the temporary suppression of the society in 1773. The Jesuit curriculum is indebted to the progressive University of Paris (where St. Ignatius and the other founders of the Jesuit order studied) and the humanistic schools of the Netherlands (where they frequently travelled).²⁵² Humanism and Christianity were united in Jesuit educational philosophy, as clearly articulated in the 1586 *Ratio’s* statement of purpose:

> The Society of Jesus conducts schools first, because they supply man with many advantages for practical living; secondly, because they contribute to the right government of public affairs and to the proper making of laws; third, because they give ornament, splendor and perfection to the rational nature of man; and fourth,

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and what is most important, because they are the bulwark of religion and guide man most surely and easily to the achievement of his last end.  

In the succinct words of J. J. Chambliss, Jesuit education was thus designed to combine the “practical, the social, the humanistic, and the religious aims ... that flowed from the principles set down by Ignatius.”

The foundation of the Jesuit curriculum, as outlined in the Ratio, was the study of the ancient Greek and Roman texts. A founding Jesuit educator in Germany, James Pontanus, famously remarked, “Without classical education the other branches of study are cold, dumb, and dead; classical learning gives these other studies life, breath, motion, blood, and language.” As dictated by the Ratio, students progressed through a program in the Studia inferiora or humanities that emphasized grammar, eloquence, and rhetoric through careful and studied engagement with classical texts. Greek and Latin reading and comprehension were acquired through the study of Cicero, Caesar, Lucian, Virgil, and others, such that, upon completion of the third grammatical tier, students had thoroughly studied the poems of Ovid, fables of Aesop, dialogues of Lucian, and—through every stage of study—the epistles, orations, and other writings of Cicero. Cicero was indeed the focus of the entire classical training, and the centrality of his oeuvre became increasingly pronounced as students progressed beyond sheer grammar (though style and content were implicitly engaged through the material) and into the study of rhetoric. Cicero was supplemented by Quintilian, Aristotle, and—though to a lesser extent—vernacular authors on whom students could form erudition “derived from the history and manners of nations.”

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254 Ibid., 300.
255 From a memorandum extracted in Johannes Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, vol. 8 (Vienna: Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904), 100-103; cited and trans. in Schwickerath, Jesuit Education, 111.
257 Ibid.
Although here, as elsewhere, specific curricular components varied,\textsuperscript{258} Ciceronian classicism remained the staple of the entire Jesuit educational system. Leopold’s eight years at the Gymnasium (1727-1735) and his subsequent year at the adjoining Lyceum in Augsburg (not to mention his university studies at the Benedictine University of Salzburg, which, though not a Jesuit school, was based on Italian models and—particularly in Leopold’s chosen degree areas of philosophy and jurisprudence—would have provided further training in the classics\textsuperscript{259}) ensured that he received regular exposure to humanist-oriented neoclassicism during his formative educational years.

This is not to say that Leopold was a model student. On the contrary, the six-year course of study at Gymnasium took him eight years to complete (albeit \textit{magna cum laude}); though the reasons for his delay are unknown, an Augsburg schoolmate provides a picture of a disenchanted and/or rebellious youth.\textsuperscript{260} Franziskus Erasmus Freysinger’s diary reports of Leopold, “Ah, he was a great fellow. My father thought the world of him. And how he hoodwinked the clerics about becoming a priest!”\textsuperscript{261} His two subsequent failed academic pursuits, at the St. Salvator Lyceum, from which he withdrew before the end of his first year (upon the death of his father), and then at the University of Salzburg, where his poor attendance and apparent indifference to his studies led to his expulsion, rendered him, according to the rector at the latter university, “unworthy of the name of student.”\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{258} See, for example, Father Kropf’s regional plan for Jesuit schools in upper Germany, “Ratio et via,” \textit{Bibliothek der katholischen Pädagogik} 10 (1736): 340-348; cited in Schwickerath, \textit{Jesuit Education}, 121.


\textsuperscript{260} Solomon, \textit{Mozart}, 22-23.


\textsuperscript{262} “D. Johan. Georg Mozart August Suevus, qui abanni, civilis scilicet, initiovix una vel bina vicePhysicam frequentavit, et ideo se ipsum nomine studiosi indignum reddidit: fuitis paucis ant examen diebus citatus ad Magnificum, ubisententiam percepit, se non amplius in numero studiosorum habendum esse, quam sententiam nullis interpostis precibus, ac si hoec non curaret, acceptavit e discessit; qua de ratione neque ad examen amplius fuit.
Nor is this to say that Leopold’s Jesuit education rendered him a faithful member of the Jesuit order, for the few references to The Society of Jesus in his correspondence, though sympathetic, reveal no overt allegiances. When, for example, the suppression of the Jesuit order—which had been occurring in stages over the course of the previous two decades—was sanctioned by the Pope in a formal brief (August 1773), Leopold did no more than to weakly sympathize:

Now it is all up with the poor Jesuits! ... The Jesuit monastery Auf Dem Hof must be cleared out by September 16th. The church treasure, their wine cellars and, in fact, their entire property have already been sealed up, for the Jesuit Order has been suppressed. ... The public is very much distressed. I hear that a Papal Brief is to be published to the effect that on pain of excommunication no one is to write or even speak a word against their suppression. On the other hand, many good Catholics are of the opinion that except in matters of faith His Holiness the Pope has no right to command and that it may truly be said that they would not have been interfered with if they had been as poor as the poor Capuchins.²⁶³

Leopold’s self-proclaimed ill-temper in a subsequent letter could be attributed to either of the two pieces of news that he related to his wife, the first being that a friend and colleague was ill, and second, that... citatus.” (“Don Johann Georg Mozart, a Swabian of Augsburg, has from the beginning of the civil year hardly attended Natural Science more than once or twice, and has thereby rendered himself unworthy of the name of student. A few days before the examination he was called before the Dean and informed that henceforth he would no longer be numbered among the students. Having heard this sentence, he offered no appeals, accepted the sentence, and departed as if indifferent; therefore he was not called for further examination.”) cited in Latin and English in Erich Schenk, Mozart and his Times (Wien, 1975) ed. and trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 12. ²⁶³ 4 September 1773: “Nun ist es mit dem armen Jesuitern geschehen! ... Den 16ten dieses Monath muß das Jesuiter kloster auf dem Hof ausgelehrt sein. Ihr Kirchenschatz, ihre Keller mit Wein, kurz, ihr Vermögen ist bereits versiegelt, der Orden ist aufgehoben. ... Das Publicum ist sehr betrübt, und ich höre es soll ein Päbstliches Breve gedruckt werden, daß unterstrafe des Kirchenbahns niemand wider die Aufhebung der Jesuiter schreiben, ja nicht einmal reden solle. viele gute Cathol: Christen hingegen sind der Meynung, daß ihnen Sr Päbst: heiligkeit ausser den Glaubens Sachen nichts weiter zu befehlen haben, und daß sie gar wohl sagen können, daß man die Jesuiter in guter Ruhe gelassen hätte, wenn sie so arm als die armen Capuciner wären.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 1: 494; trans., Anderson, Letters, 241.
The Jesuits are beginning to leave their monasteries. The Court Fathers, those who preached in the Stefanskirche, and six confessors left yesterday and will perform their duties next Sunday as usual, but in lay priests’ clothes; for the order which has been issued to the higher Jesuits is that no one in the garb of a Jesuit may either hear confession or preach. Today I am too much out of humour and too stupid to write any more.

Be this ambiguity as it may, it is clear that from an early age Leopold’s formation was centered on humanistic studies and, specifically, classic Greek and Roman texts; the humanist Ausgleichsformel between reason and faith is reflected both in that training and in his own worldview; and, as such, his rationalist ideology in general and concept of taste in specific are best understood in terms of his internalization (and reappropriation) of humanist philosophy, aesthetics, and ethics. In what follows, I locate central aspects of Leopold’s concept of taste that emerge from his personal and professional writings within a (predominantly Ciceronian) humanist framework; one that both refines and complicates the conventional (and monolithic) attribution of rationalism.

Taste and the Rule

Good taste in Leopold’s system is, prima facie, the province of rules. In the preface to his Versuch, for example, he states emphatically that “[there] is still much to be dealt with. ... Such matters as belong only to the lighting of a beacon to guide the weak judgment of many a concert performer and, by means of rules of good taste, to form an intelligent soloist.”

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265 “Es ist noch vieles abzuhandeln übrig. ... Solche, die nur dazu gehören der schlechten Beurtheilungskraft manches Concertisten ein Licht anzuzünden, und durch Regeln des guten Geschmackes einen vernünftigen Solospieler zu bilden.” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, Vorbericht; Knocker, Treatise, 8.
One such rule concerns overdotting, which Leopold promotes in slow pieces to awaken an otherwise “sleepy” passage:266

Not only is the performance thereby enlivened, but hurrying—that almost universal fault—is thereby checked. ... It would be a good thing if this long retention of the dot were insisted on, and set down as a rule. I, at least, have often done so, and I have made clear my opinion of the right manner of performance by setting down two dots followed by a shortened one. It is true that at first it looks strange to the eye. But what matters this? The point has its reason and musical taste is promoted thereby.267

In his promotion of rules and his identification of rules with reason and taste, Leopold emerges—again, superficially—as a characteristic exponent of the early German Enlightenment. Indeed, the Wolff-Gottsched branch of rationalism discussed above featured such rigorism that the latter came under prominent attack from Bodmer and Breitinger, who, themselves rationalists, nevertheless criticized Gottsched’s deference to rules in the face of imagination, sensibility, and creativity.268 Nevertheless, the deep, mutual ties between reason and rules persisted in German philosophy and aesthetics to the end of

266 “schläferig”; Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 39; Knocker, Treatise, 41.
267 “Denn nicht nur wird dadurch der Vortrag lebhafter; sondern es wird auch dem Eilen, jenem fast allgemeinen Fehler, Einhalt gethan. ... Es wäre sehr gut, wenn diese längere Aushaltung des Puncts recht bestimmet und hingesetzet würde. Ich wenigstens habe es schon oft gethan, und meine Vortragsmeinung habe ich mit zweenen Punten nebst Abkürzung der darauf folgenden Note also zu Tage geletet. Es ist wahr, anfangs fällt es fremd in die Augen. Allein was verschlägt dieß? Der Satz hat seinen Grund; und der musikalische Geschmack wird dadurch beförderet.” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 39-40; Knocker, Treatise, 41-42.
the century.\textsuperscript{269} A rationalist promotion of rules permeates Leopold’s \textit{Versuch}, which presents an objective and exacting prescription for violin playing and, on the surface, a rule-based concept of good taste.\textsuperscript{270} However, upon closer examination, Leopold’s rationalism is far from rigorist; rather, he employs rules as one part of a system that emphasizes taste and judgment born of time and experience and equipped to manage various, indeterminate situations that may defy a single, predetermined ideal.

For Leopold, rules such as that concerning overdotting, cited above, do not alone render a performance successful,

\textit{[f]or not only must one observe exactly all that has been marked and prescribed and not play it otherwise than as written … one must throw oneself into the affect to be expressed and apply and execute in a certain good style all the ties, slides, accentuation of the notes, the \textit{forte} and \textit{piano}; in a word, whatever belongs to tasteful performance of a piece, which can only be learned from sound judgment and long experience.}\textsuperscript{271}

It is precisely this judgment that distinguishes the technically skilled soloist from the more versatile and better-equipped orchestral player. For Leopold (in opposition to conventional

\textsuperscript{269} In his \textit{Kritik der Reinen Vernunft} (1781), Kant positioned rules at the intersection between the “idea” and the “ideal,” the former of which “provides a rule” while the latter “serves as the archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy.” For Kant (and the German rationalist school) the rule comprises the concept of an object that contains or expresses its ideal nature and form, thus providing “reason with a standard, which enables it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to it. \textit{Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason}, trans., J.M.D. Meiklejohn (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1855), 351.

\textsuperscript{270} Kant did not extend his rule-based rationalism to judgments of taste. For Kant, “ideals of the imagination,” though they may serve as “models for … empirical intuitions,” cannot “furnish rules or standards for explanation or examination.” Ibid.

\textsuperscript{271} “Denn man muß nicht nur alles angemerkte und vorgeschriebene genau beobachten, und nicht anders, als wie es hingesetzt ist abspielen … man muß sich in den Affect setzen, der auszudrücken ist; und man muß alle die Züge, die Schleifer, das Abstofen der Noten, das Schwache und Starke, und, mit einem Worte, alles was immer zum schmackhaften Vortrage eines Stückes gehöret, auf eine gewisse gute Art anbringen und vortragen, die man nicht anders, als mit gensunder Beurtheilungskraft durch eine lange Erfahrung erlernet.” Leopold Mozart, \textit{Versuch}, 253; Knocker, \textit{Treatise}, 216.
wisdom\textsuperscript{272}, the former need only “get everything well in tune. ... A solo player can, without great understanding of music, usually play his concertos tolerably—yea, even with distinction—but a good orchestral violinist must have great insight into the whole art of musical composition and into the difference of the characteristics.”\textsuperscript{273} Such “understanding” and “insight” were not to be taken lightly, for although many “believe themselves to be doing well if they embellish and befrill a piece right foolishly out of their own heads, and who have no sensitiveness whatever for the affect that is to be expressed in the piece,”\textsuperscript{274} the “dexterity” and virtuosity that they may exhibit in an allegro can not compensate for the “ignorance and bad judgment in every bar” of a more expressively-demanding adagio.\textsuperscript{275} It thus follows that, for Leopold, perception and acuity born of “long experience and good judgment” are to be counted “among the chiefest perfections in the art of music.”\textsuperscript{276}

Taste, as a form of judgment that complements (rather than solely adhering to) the rules, pertains to several performance situations outlined in Leopold’s Versuch. Firstly, taste must compensate for inadequacies of contemporary notation—such as the determination of the “natural speed” of a phrase, which, though indicated with descriptive

\textsuperscript{272} Leopold’s preference for the orchestral player also speaks to his observance of the aesthetic-ethical tenet of moderation, which condemns grandiosity and excessive virtuosity.

\textsuperscript{273} “zu Hause üben um alles rein herauszubringen. ... Ein Solospieler kann ohne grosse Einsicht in die Musik überhaupt seine Concerte erträglich, ja auch mit Ruhme abspielen; wenn er nur einen reinen Vortrag hat; ein guter Orchestergeiger aber muß viele Einsicht in die ganze Musik, in die Setzkunst und in die Verschiedenheit der Characters.” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 254; Knocker, Treatise, 217.


\textsuperscript{275} “rechtschaffen”; “Unwissenheit und ihre schlechte Beurtheilungskraft in allen Täcten ...” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 252-253; trans., Knocker, Treatise, 215. Leopold’s comparison of orchestral and solo players also reflects his distrust of “empty virtuosity.” Knocker, Treatise, xxiv.

\textsuperscript{276} “lange Erfahrung, und eine gute Beurtheilungskraft”; “unter die ersten Vollkommenheiten der Tonkunst zähle.” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 30; trans., Knocker, Treatise, 33.
adjectives, is “impossible ... to describe in an exact manner.” Secondly, and even when precise notation is available, taste compensates for “would-be composers ... [who] either will not indicate the style of a good performance, or ‘put a patch by the side of the hole’.”

A third category of situations concerns expressive nuances of music (as described above), which require taste in the translation of verbal adjectives to sounding expressive effects. Fourthly, taste pertains to moments of implied or prescribed improvisation. With respect to the fermata, for example, “It is true that such sustaining is to be made according to fancy, but it must be neither too short nor too long, and made with sound judgment.” For Leopold, then, good taste resides not merely in adherence to accepted, predetermined rules, but further, in the ability to successfully fill the gaps between their verbal prescriptions and actualized music.

Even genius cannot compensate for the taste and judgment born of time, education, and experience. Leopold, while acknowledging his son’s God-granted gifts, nevertheless admonished Wolfgang thus:

It is better that whatever does you no honour, should not be given to the public.

That is the reason why I have not given any of your symphonies to be copied, because I suspect that when you are older and have more insight, you will be glad that no one has got hold of them, though at the time you composed them you were quite pleased with them. One gradually becomes more and more fastidious.

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277 “natürliche Bewegung”; “... so kann er doch unmöglich jene Art auf das genaueste bestimmen”; Leopold Mozart, _Versuch_, 30; trans., Knocker, _Treatise_, 33.
278 “… Halbcomponisten ... die selbst die Art eines guten Vortrags entweder nicht anzuzeigen wissen, oder den Fleck neben das Loch setzen.” Leopold Mozart, _Versuch_, 136; trans., Knocker, _Treatise_, 124.
Leopold’s meaning is clear. As he states elsewhere, good taste resides beyond the individual provinces of genius and theory (i.e., rules) alone, and “can only be learnt through sound judgment and long experience.”

This association of right judgment with acquired wisdom (rather than learned, extrinsic rules) was a fundamental tenet of Ciceronian humanism and likewise served as the foundation of Leopold’s Jesuit training. The three books of Cicero’s *De Oratore*, which are devoted to the attributes of the ideal orator, emphasize time and again the importance of acquiring knowledge and skills that transcend the narrow rules of the art form. It thus follows that the purpose of Cicero’s pedagogy is not to provide a rigid model of objective and correct practice, for, as with Leopold, rules cannot accommodate the more nuanced aspects of oratory. Its purpose is rather “to reveal ... the springs from which to drink and the approaches to them, not as one seeking to be myself your guide (an endless and superfluous task), but just indicating the road, and, in the usual way, pointing with my finger to the fountains.” As with Leopold, these subtler skills are born of time and experience, and thus elude one such as the young (and admittedly talented) Sulpicius:

And so, Catulus, to begin with our friend here, I first heard Sulpicius, when he was almost a boy, in a petty case: as to intonation, presence, bearing and the other essentials he was well fitted for this function we are investigating, but his delivery was rapid and impetuous—the result of his genius—his diction agitated and a little too exuberant, as was natural at his age. I did not underrate him, being well content that luxuriance should exalt itself in the youthful, for, as with vines it is easier to cut back the branches which have shot out too riotously than to produce new growths by cultivation from a feeble stock, even so in a young man I want something to prune, because the sap can never live long in anything which has ripened too early.

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283 Ibid., 1: 235.
284 Ibid., 1: 143.
285 Ibid., 1: 265.
Extending the agricultural metaphor, Cicero elsewhere claimed to require “talent which has been cultivated, soil, as it were, not of a single ploughing, but both broken and given a second ploughing so as to be capable of bearing better and more abundant produce. And the cultivation is practice, listening, reading and written composition.” Cicero reverberates in Leopold’s writings: good taste is a form of judgment that incorporates rules, to be sure, but complements them with wisdom born of time, education, and experience and fitted to navigate nuanced situations that theory alone cannot sufficiently address.

The Ethical Dimension of Taste

Leopold’s emphasis on acquired wisdom is rooted in the casuistical reasoning that formed the basis of Aristotle’s philosophy of ethics and emerged as a central feature of later Roman philosophy as well. For the Greek philosopher,

everything said on moral subjects ought to be said in outline, and not with exactness. ... But if the treatment of the subject generally is of this nature, still less does it admit of exactness in particulars; for it comes under no art or set of precepts, but is the duty of the agents themselves to look to the circumstances of the occasion, just as is the case in the arts of medicine and navigation.

Aristotle resounds in Cicero’s Rome, where skepticism, analysis, and dialogue were identified with a “rational way of life” and—implicitly—a healthy, productive society. Such reasoning, which undergirded Greco-Roman philosophy and aesthetics, reflects a so-called probabilistic worldview. In the broadest terms, probabilism asserts that “there is no absolutely certain knowledge, but that there may be sufficient probable grounds of

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286 Ibid., 1: 293.
belief,”\textsuperscript{289} and was promoted (in practice, though not in name) by progressive philosopher-statesmen of antiquity to protect the citizenry, through the use of their own sound judgment, from potentially corrupt and/or archaic legal and religious prescriptions.\textsuperscript{290} The Society of Jesus adopted probabilism over the course of the sixteenth century as a principle of moral theology that engaged casuistical reasoning in the resolution of matters of moral permissibility.\textsuperscript{291} Probabilism was distinguished from tutorism (also called rigorism), a moral-theological tenet of Jansenism that promoted deference to extrinsic religious authority. In the broadest terms, tutorism emphasized extrinsic rules while probabilism emphasized intrinsic rationalism and wisdom; tutorism likewise emphasized objective and external truth; probabilism engaged situationality and subjectivity.

A student of the Society of Jesus was thus “an honest and learned man [who] regards as surely probable an opinion that he has carefully examined, and which he believes to be true, or surely probable, for serious motives, when he judges it aside from all irregular passion.”\textsuperscript{292} Such judgment was not only dispassionate; it was also the product of highly developed skills of moral and intellectual reasoning, which formed a central component of the Jesuit educational system.\textsuperscript{293} For, as elsewhere, rules cannot accommodate all ethical situations; wisdom born of knowledge and experience thus constitutes—according to this system—the engine of reason and the basis of a practical, aesthetic, and civic ideal. Given the premium placed on acquired wisdom, it is fitting that after vowing purity of conscience, Jesuit students were asked “to keep firm and constant their resolution to apply themselves

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{291} Ibid., 88-100; 107; see also Renee Fulop-Miller, \textit{Power and Secret of the Jesuits} (New York: Viking Press, 1930).
\item \textsuperscript{292} Paul Bert, Jean Pierre Gury, J.G. Settler, and Pierre Rousselot, \textit{The Doctrine of the Jesuits} (Boston: B.F. Bradbury, 1880), 67.
\item \textsuperscript{293} See, for example, Maryks’s discussion of the lectures on Cases of Conscience as prescribed by the \textit{Ratio Studiorum}. Maryks, \textit{Saint Cicero}, 84-88.
\end{itemize}
as the Ratio attests, the act of studying, of molding the thinking mind, was not merely an intellectual pursuit; in its promise to produce men of wisdom and right judgment, it was also a moral, religious, and greater civic imperative of the Jesuit Catholic faith.

Leopold’s probabilistic rationalism, which promotes casuistical reasoning in the arbitration of uncertain or ill-defined performative situations, is likewise inflected towards a greater civic ideal. In the dedicatory letter to Prince Siegmund Christoph Schrattenbach, he associates his pedagogical aim—namely, the promotion of good taste in music—with the improvement of the citizenry and society as a whole:

How many young people, often endowed with the fairest gifts of Nature, would have grown to maturity, untended as the seedlings run wild in the forest, if your right fatherly help had not in good time brought them under the supervision of judicious persons for their upbringing. And how many would have had, in the increase of their years, to famish in want and poverty and to be a burden on the community as useless citizens of the world, if Your Grace had not graciously provided instruction for such, according to their talent and ability, in this or that path of knowledge?

Young people of both sexes and of all ranks can boast ... [that] the kindest of Princes grasped their great-grandfather by the arm and raised him to a position whereby through his knowledge he ... was able to help his fellow citizens and after his death still to be useful to his descendants. I may, therefore, surely venture to present to Your Grace in deepest loyalty, a book in which I have endeavoured, according to my poor powers, to pave a way for music-loving youth which shall guide them with certainty to good taste in music.295

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295 "Wie viele junge Leute welche oft die schönsten Natursgaben hatten würden gleich den im Walde verwilderten Reisern unbesorgt aufgewachsen seyn; wenn Dero recht väterliche hülfe sie nicht bey Zeiten unter die Aussicht vernünftiger Personen zur Erziehung gebracht hätte. Und wie viele müßten seiner Zeit bey dem Anwachse der Jahren vor Noth und Armuth darben und als unnütze Weltbürger der Gemeinde zur Beschwerniß seyn; wenn euer hochfürstl. Gnaden solche nicht nach dem Unterschied ihres Talents und ihrer Geschicklichkeit in dieser oder jener Wissenschaft hätten gnädigst unterweisen lassen. Die Jugend beyderley Geschlechtes und von allen Ständen hat sich dieser Gnade zu rühmen: ...
The taste and erudition to which Leopold so frequently alluded were acquired attributes that served an intellectual, as well as greater civic and humanistic, agenda.

This agenda comes to further light in Leopold’s correspondence. In an admittedly obscure remark to Lorenz Hagenauer, Leopold referred to his having “transformed beasts into men,”296 invoking a popular binary between instinctive/appetitive and cultivated/intellective concepts of taste. (Elsewhere, he was more direct, as in his remark that “two horses and a [brutish] postillion amount to three beasts.”297) The Comte de Buffon, Georges Louis LeClerc, was one of a number of eighteenth-century writers to give this binary fuller treatment:

The animals have only one mode for acquiring pleasure, the exercise of their sensations to gratify their desires. We also possess this faculty; but we are endowed with another source of pleasure, the exercise of the mind, the appetite of which is the desire of knowledge. ... Uninterrupted passion is madness; and madness is the death of the soul.298

As this passage testifies, much was at stake in claims of good taste; for the cultivation of the intellect was tied to the suppression of the instinct’s various appetites, wherein lurked

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296 “... habe ... Bestien in Menschen verwandelt.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 1: 260; trans., Anderson, Letters, 84.
madness and anarchy. The man of taste thus represented a civic ideal and a defense against an alternative—and, for many, frightening—social reality.

It may come as no surprise, then, that the frontispiece of Leopold’s *Versuch* comprises an engraved portrait of its author that melds the image of the artist to that of the man of cultivated taste (fig. 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Leopold Mozart (1719-1787), engraving by Jakob Andreas Friedrich, after Matthias Gottfried Eichler, 1756. Frontispiece to Leopold’s *Violinschule.*
The distinction that comes with age is subtly conveyed in his hair, complexion, and noble, grave expression. His knowledge and skill are emphasized in both the compositions of various types, strewn about, and the violin in his hands (whose diminutive size elevates his own relative stature). Achievement and success are suggested by his gentleman’s wardrobe and wig; and yet his presence—direct gaze, seated position, and partially unbuttoned vest—is unpretentious; unguarded and direct. This image thus recommends the work that it introduces by portraying its author as a man of age, knowledge, and achievement; and the two aspects of taste—the aesthetic and the greater social/civic—merge into one mutually reinforcing characterization. The Latin epigraph—playing, as it does, on the intersection between performative and social aspects of gesture—renders the portrait’s meaning explicit: “Therefore it is appropriate that there is neither conspicuous charm nor indecency in gesture lest we appear to be either actors or people who work for hire.” All of this evidence points to a concept of taste that incorporated aesthetic, social (and even political) dimensions; the cultivation of good taste went hand in hand with the cultivation of a society of virtuous, industrious, and upright citizens.

Moderation as a Tenet of Taste

Nowhere does the ethical subtext of Leopold’s aesthetic of taste surface more prominently than in his frequent references to moderation. For Leopold, good taste seeks the “middle ground” in nearly all performance situations. Of the trill that cues the end of a cadenza, for example, Leopold argues that

there is nothing in worse taste than in a cadenza, where one is not tied to strict time, to break off the trill so abruptly and unexpectedly that the ears of the listeners are more offended than entertained. In such a case the ear is bereft of something and one remains in consequence displeased, because a longer sustaining of the trill was expected; just as it surely hurts the listeners sorely if they are aware that a singer is short of breath. On

299 Convenit igitur ... in gestu nec venustatem conspicuam nec turpitudinem esse, ne Aut histriones aut operarii videamur esse.
the other hand, nothing is more laughable than a trill held beyond bounds. Therefore the middle road must be chosen, and a trill must be made which comes closest to good taste.\textsuperscript{300}

In his discussion of tempo indications, Leopold's allegiance to the middle ground reaches almost comic proportions.\textsuperscript{301} Though it is fitting that \textit{moderato} should indicate a tempo "neither too fast nor too slow,"\textsuperscript{302} \textit{Vivace}, \textit{Spiritoso}, and \textit{Animoso} also suggest "the mean between quick and slow,"\textsuperscript{303} and \textit{Tempo Commodo} and \textit{Tempo Guisto} likewise "tell us that we must play it neither too fast nor too slowly, but in a proper, convenient, and natural tempo."\textsuperscript{304} Even \textit{Allegro} suggests to Leopold a "cheerful, though not too hurried tempo."\textsuperscript{305}

This last passage addresses the larger aesthetic-ethical compass of moderation, which condemns hurrying, exaggeration, and inconsistency—markers of the irrationality and untempered passion that good taste (and good conduct) condemn. With respect to overdotting, Leopold would thus have the performer err on the side of restraint, holding the dot "rather too long than too briefly. In this manner hurrying is avoided and good taste

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{300} "Es ist auch nichts abgeschmackter, als wenn bey einer Cadenzte, wo man an das Zeitmaaß nicht gebunden ist, der Triller so schnell und unerwart abgebrochen wird, daß die Ohren der Zuhörer mehr beleidiget als belustiget werden. Es wird in solchem Falle dem Gehör etwas entrissen; und man bleibt eben deswegen unvergnügt, weil man noch eine längere Aushaltung erwartet hat; gleichwie es den Zuhörern gewiß ungemäen hart fällt, wenn sie den Mangel des Athems an einem Singer bemerken. Doch ist auch nichts lächerlicheres, als ein über die Maße langer Triller. Man gehe dennach den mittern Weeg, und mache einen solchen Triller, welcher dem guten Geschmacke am nächsten kömmt." Leopold Mozart, \textit{Versuch}, 221-2; trans., Knocker, \textit{Treatise}, 190.

\textsuperscript{301} Admittedly, performance indications referred as much to the character of a piece as its tempo; however, where tempo was a factor, other theorists permitted a variety that Leopold denied in the service of "the middle ground." For Mattheson, for example, the giga implied "extreme speed, volatility [in a] flowing, uninterrupted manner," ("äussersten Schnelligkeit oder Flüchtigkeit [in einer] fliessende und keine ungestümne Art.") Johann Mattheson, "Von den Gattungen und Abzeichen der Melodien," in \textit{Vollkommene Kapellmeister} (Hamburg, Christian Gerold, 1739), 227; cited and trans., Hans Lenneberg, "Johann Mattheson on Affect and Rhetoric in Music," \textit{Journal of Music Theory} 2, no. 1 (April 1958): 61.

\textsuperscript{302} "nicht zu geschwind und nicht zu langsam." Leopold Mozart, \textit{Versuch}, 49; trans., Knocker, \textit{Treatise}, 50.

\textsuperscript{303} "das Mittel zwischen dem Geschwinden und Langsamen." Ibid.

\textsuperscript{304} "... sagen uns daß wir das Stück weder zu geschwind weder zu langsam, sondern in dem eigentlichen, gelegenen un natürlichen Tempo spielen solen." Ibid.

\textsuperscript{305} "ein lustiges, doch ein nicht übereiltes Tempo." Ibid., 48; trans., ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
promoted.” Consistency—which moderates impulsiveness—is likewise incorporated into Leopold’s morally inflected concept of good taste. Of ensemble playing, he wrote, “[m]any who have no idea of taste never retain the evenness of tempo in the accompanying of a concerto part, but endeavour always to follow the solo part.” And of bowing a given passage, he wrote that

[n]ot a little is added to evenness and purity of tone if you know how to fit much into one bow. Yea, it goes against nature if you are constantly interrupting and changing. A singer who during every short phrase stopped, took a breath, and specially stressed first this note, then that note, would unfailingly move everyone to laughter. The human voice glides quite easily from one note to another; and a sensible singer will never make a break unless some special kind of expression, or the divisions or rests of the phrase demand one. And who is not aware that singing is at all times the aim of every instrumentalist; because one must always approximate to nature as nearly as possible.

As Leopold repeatedly emphasized, the performer who takes nature as his model and reason as his guide thus embodies the virtues of moderation—consistency, control, and restraint—and imbibes his music with the good taste that they impart. Such virtues were to be lauded where they are found—as in Michael Haydn’s “Hieronymus” mass in C major, which “flows along naturally ... the themes being most natural and without any exaggerated

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progressions or too sudden modulations”—309 and condemned where they were found to
be lacking, as with the violinist of poor taste, who piles appoggiaturas one on another,
toward an effect that "can surely never sound natural but only exaggerated and
confused.”310

Leopold’s aesthetic-ethical ideal of moderation casts him—in this regard, at least—as
the consummate neoclassicist. In his characteristic conflation of the ethical and the
aesthetic realms, Cicero likewise identified moderation with the beauty, consistency, and
order that are the virtues of his ideal humanistic society.311 Cicero was not alone among
the ancients in promoting moderation; on the contrary, he owed his own debt to Aristotle,
whose definition of stylistic excellence likewise seeks a balance between verbosity and
curtness; banality and excess:

For that the foregoing rules will cause it [style] to be pleasing is manifest, if indeed
excellence of style has been correctly defined: —for with a view to what must it be,
[according to our definition,] ‘clear and not mean, but in good taste?’ For should it
become prosing, it is no longer clear, neither if it should be too concise. But it is plain
that the mean is appropriate. And the foregoing precepts will cause its being
pleasing, should the ordinary expressions have been judiciously blended with the
foreign, and should rhythm [not be wanting], and the persuasive influence resulting
from good taste.312

Aristotle's suggestive invocation of good taste cements the bond between the classical
aesthetics of moderation and their neoclassical revival two millennia later.

309 1 November 1777: “Es geht alles natürlich fort ... die themata, und keine übertriebene
modulation oder zu gähe Ausweichung angebracht.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und
Aufzeichnungen, 2: 96; Anderson, Letters, 352.
310 “... nimmer natürlich, sondern schon übertrieben und verwirret läßt.” Leopold Mozart,
Versuch, 195; trans., Knocker, Treatise, 168.
311 Higginbotham, On Moral Obligation, 43; M.T. Cicero, in a letter to his brother, Quintus,
upon the duties of a magistrate, in M.T. Cicero, his Offices, or his Treatise concerning The
Moral Duties of Mankind, his Cato Major, concerning The Means of Making Old Age Happy, his
Laelius, concerning Friendship, his Moral Paradoxes, The Vision of Scipio, concerning A Future
State, his Letter concerning The Duties of a Magistrate, trans. William Guthrie, Esq. (London:
T. Waller, 1755), 378.
312 Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric, III: 12,6; trans., Theodore Buckley, B.A. (London: Henry
G. Bohn, 1857), 248-249.
Taste and the Classical Virtues of Style

Moderation is further suggested in the canonical four virtues of style, which grew out of Aristotle’s definition of stylistic excellence (above) and emerged as a central feature of classical aesthetics. The four virtues, correctness, clarity, ornamentation, and propriety, emerge in Leopold’s writings as a self-moderating system organized around two opposing dyads: clarity and ornamentation, on the one hand, and correctness and propriety, on the other. It is no coincidence that Leopold’s concept of taste incorporates these four virtues, for they comprise the foundation of ancient Roman aesthetics and further articulate the interdependence of ethical and aesthetic dimensions, so central to the Jesuit educational ideal.

Clarity and ornamentation. In classical aesthetics, oratorical ethics provided necessary defense against the charges associated with persuasively moving a listener. Indeed, the targeting of emotions and impulses was at the root of much criticism directed toward rhetoric from antiquity through (and beyond) the eighteenth century. This is why Cicero, for one, was so intent on grounding the orator’s persuasive efforts in deep moral and intellectual conviction. Oratory was not to be mere manipulation, for...

... it is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, unless all those emotions which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator are visibly stamped or rather branded on the advocate himself. Now if some feigned indignation had to be depicted, and that same kind of oratory afforded only what was counterfeit and produced by mimicry, some loftier art would perhaps be called for. ... I give you my word, I never tried by means of a speech, to arouse either indignation or compassion, either ill will or hatred, in the minds of a tribunal, without being really stirred myself, as I worked upon their minds, by the very feelings to which I was seeking to prompt them.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 1: 335.}

Sincerity thus marked the difference between communicative and manipulative forms of expression. Communication rests on genuine shared experience while manipulation reduces the speaker’s expressive vocabulary to tools and tricks; tricks that leave speeches...
so "muddled up and inverted that there is no head or tail to them."\textsuperscript{314} Through such means, "oratory, the proper function of which is to throw light on the facts, only contributes additional darkness."\textsuperscript{315}

One of Leopold's most striking charges of trickery concerns not music but fashion. He writes, "I really cannot tell you whether the women in Paris are fair; for they are painted so unnaturally, like the dolls of Berchtesgaden, that even a naturally beautiful woman on account of this detestable make-up is unbearable to the eyes of an honest German."\textsuperscript{316} In invoking honesty, Leopold articulated the Ciceronian line between persuasion and deception that informed not only his taste in fashion but in music as well. Indeed, the deception that he perceived in \textit{la mode} of Parisian fashion was nothing short of criminal when applied to music:

Many imagine themselves to have brought something wonderfully beautiful into the world if they befrill the notes of an \textit{Adagio Cantabile} thoroughly, and make out of one note a couple of dozen. Such note-murderers expose thereby their bad judgment to the light, and tremble when they have to sustain a long note or play only a few notes singingly, without inserting their usual preposterous and laughable frippery.\textsuperscript{317}

Such frippery cannot compete with the pure and clear sentiment expressed in, for example, a "beautiful" beggars’ duet in fifths.\textsuperscript{318} For Leopold, as for his classical exemplars, clarity

\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., 3: 41.
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{317} "Manche meynen was sie wunderschönes auf die Welt bringen, wenn sie in einem Adagio Cantabile die Noten rechtschaffen verkrüszen, und aus einer Note ein paar dutzend machen. Solche Notenwürger legen dadurch ihre schlechte Beurtheilungskraft zu Tage, und zittern, wenn sie eine lange Note aushalten oder nur ein paar Noten singbar abspielen sollten, ohne ihr angewöhntes, ungereimtes und lächerliches Fick Fack einzumischen."
\textsuperscript{318} "schönes." Bauer and Deutsch, eds., \textit{Brieﬂ;e und Aufzeichnungen}, 1: 407; trans., Anderson, \textit{Letters}, 173. 1 December 1770: "As we were leaving the house yesterday, we heard something which you will think incredible and which I never imagined that I should hear
was the primary defense against and antidote to the potential abuse of the persuasive arts; abuse that reduced their communicative properties to manipulation and deceit.

However, neither oratory nor music aims solely to communicate; both art forms speak above all to the passions in order to move the listener to persuasion. Cicero wrote to that effect:

Now nothing in oratory ... is more important than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgment or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love or lust or rage or sorrow or joy or hope or fear or illusion or some other inward emotion than by reality or authority or any legal standard or judicial precedent or statute.\textsuperscript{319}

Clarity, which is primarily intellectual, must therefore be complemented by the judicious use of ornamentation. Ornamentation comprises the expressive core of music, thereby elevating communication to art. To speak of art is not to suggest that there are no principles governing the use of ornamentation. On the contrary, Leopold repeatedly emphasized that the expressive properties of music are not, on the whole, subjective—though their specific realization may be—rather they inhere in the work itself. He thus commended Nannerl for playing Mozart’s “Mannheim sonata most excellently and with all the [necessary] expression.”\textsuperscript{320} He further encouraged the skilled violinist to “strive to find the desired affect” in a piece and to realize it “mit Vernunft.”\textsuperscript{321} Such common sense involved the appropriate use of expressive tools, such as outlined in the following passage:

Herr Esser gave a concert in the theatre today and actually made a profit of forty gulden. ... But what touched me and struck me at first as rather childish was his

\textsuperscript{319} Cicero, \textit{De Oratore}, 1: 325
\textsuperscript{321} “sich bemühet den Affect zu finden”; “mit Vernunft”; Leopold Mozart, \textit{Versuch}, 122; trans., Knocker, \textit{Treatise}, 114.
whistling. He whistles recitatives and arias as competently as any singer and with the most perfect expression, introducing portamento, flourishes, trills, and so forth, most admirably, and all the time accompanying himself pizzicato on the violin. And yet, though they are not subjective, principles of ornamentation are not strictly technical either. For example, Leopold commended Nannerl’s performance of Wolfgang’s sonata as having been played both “excellently and with great expression.” In his judgment of Reicha and Janitz—two well known violinists—Leopold was more specific in distinguishing aspects of technique from those of expression: “They [Reicha and Janitz] are both very fine players; they have an extraordinary facility and lightness in their bowing, sure intonation and a beautiful tone, and they play with the greatest expression.” Elsewhere, Leopold again distinguished expression from technique and further identified the former with tools of embellishment: “They play without method and without expression: piano and forte are not differentiated; the embellishments are in the wrong place, too overloaded, and mostly played in a confused manner; or often the notes are far too bare and one observes that the player knows not what he should do.” Reducible to neither mechanical technique nor improvisatory whimsy, ornamentation aptly defines the performatve sphere of taste.

Correctness and Propriety. Correctness is quickly dispensed with in Cicero’s discussion of the virtues of style, for this is the province of rules and is therefore easily

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322 “H: Esser Concert auf dem Theater. Es blieben ihm doch 40 fl. übrig. ... und was mich rührte und als eine anscheinende Kinderen frappierte, war sein Pfeifen mit dem Mund, wo er Recit: und Arie troz jedem singer mit aller Expreßion schleifer, Stossen, triller, etc. kurz zum verwundern pfeift, und sich selbst mit der violin pizzicato accompagniert.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 3: 51; trans., Anderson, Letters, 684.
325 “Sie spielen ohne Ordnung, und ohne Ausdruck; das Schwache und Starck wird nicht unterschieden; die Auszierungen sind am unrechten Orte, zu überhaupt, und meistens verwirrret angebracht; manchmal aber sind die Noten gar zu leer, und man merket daß der Spielende nicht weiß, was er thun solle.” Leopold Mozart, Versuch, 253; trans., Knocker, Treatise, 215-6.
“conveyed by books and by elementary education.”

Propriety, on the other hand—elsewhere expressed as appropriateness and suitability—defines oratory as fluid and therefore demands greater explication. Propriety relativizes correctness, for this virtue demands that style be appropriate to content and context. Although there is a place for the simplicity of the “popular style,” its use should be appropriate to the subject matter. Leopold thus admonished his son,

Perhaps you will get a contract to compose one [a German opera]. If you do, you know that I need not urge you to imitate the natural and popular style, which everyone easily understands. The grand and sublime style is suited to grand subjects. Everything in its place.

This is not to say that Leopold’s emphasis on the “popular style” was always aesthetically motivated, for he further recognized the potential for “light” music to appeal to a wide audience. Even with light music, however, the master distinguishes himself by creating a work that interests and pleases the connoisseur without alienating the Liebhaber:

Do you imagine that you would be doing work unworthy of you? If so, you are very much mistaken. Did [Joh. Christian] Bach, when he was in London, ever publish anything but similar trifles? What is light can still be great, if it is written in a natural, flowing, and easy style—and at the same time bears the marks of sound composition. Such works are more difficult to compose than all those harmonic progressions, which the majority of people cannot fathom, or pieces which have pleasing melodies, but which are difficult to perform. Did Bach lower himself by such work? Not at all. Good composition, sound construction, il filo—these distinguish the master from the bungler—even in trifles.

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326 Cicero, De Oratore, 2:31.
327 Cicero, De Oratore, 2:43.
As this passage testifies, propriety demands consideration of both the nature of the work and the given audience’s taste. However, these two points of reference (namely, the audience and the work itself) are not always compatible; the tensions between them identify taste as Janus-faced—fluid and dialogic, on the one hand, and fixed and unyielding, on the other. A true neoclassicist would reconcile this contradiction by yielding to the audience’s taste ultimately as a means to elevate that audience to a higher standard—in art and in life. Here, if nowhere else, Leopold departed from his idealistic exemplars to reveal more practical concerns. He thus advised Wolfgang, “when composing to consider not only the musical, but also the unmusical public. You must remember that to every ten real connoisseurs there are a hundred ignoramuses. So do not neglect the so called popular style, which tickles long ears”; 330 and elsewhere, “I assume that when composing your opera you will be guided by the French taste. If you can only win applause and get a decent sum of money, let the devil take the rest.” 331 With biting cynicism, Leopold reduced the dialogic aspect of art—so central to Cicero’s system—to sheer economics.

Humanism denotes not only an engagement with humanistic studies but, further, a belief in the power of those studies to engender certain cultural values. 332 This is why the Society of Jesus placed such a high premium on classical learning; for founding Jesuit educators, and in the spirit of humanism, Ciceronian classicism provided the foundation for an educational system that would meld the intellectual and aesthetic, on the one hand, to the ethical and religious, on the other, thus producing men of intellect, wisdom, faith, and

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moral uprightness. Wisdom, morality, and faith were the three central compass points of the Jesuit educational ideal, and they coalesce in Leopold’s writings around the concept of taste. Taste, itself frequently associated with dogma and rules, is here revealed as a counterpoint to them and a keystone to Leopold’s humanistic rationalism.

Style and Substance in W. A. Mozart’s “Neoclassical” Die Entführung aus dem Serail

This chapter has thus far identified Leopold Mozart’s concept of taste with the humanist neoclassicism that formed the foundation of his Jesuit education. The tenets of moderation, clarity, correctness, ornamentation, and propriety define the correspondence between Leopold’s usage of the term and the Ciceronian aesthetics that would have guided him to it. As suggested, however, this aesthetic ideal alone did not comprise good taste; taste also encompassed an ideal of conduct that melded classical aesthetics to Christian ethics. When Leopold considered his son’s good taste, as he would have upon hearing Haydn’s remark, he would likely have identified aspects of his son’s artistic output that articulated this combination of aesthetic and ethical realms. Returning to Haydn’s remark, this chapter concludes with a reading of Leopold’s taste in Wolfgang’s music.

On the surface, Wolfgang’s 1782 Die Entführung aus dem Serail might seem like an unlikely candidate for a case study of Leopold’s classically oriented concept of taste, for the literature on this Mozart/Stephanie Singspiel emphasizes the very features that Leopold’s taste proscribes. For a discussion of the dramatic and musical inconsistencies in Die Entführung, see Julian Rushton, "Entführung aus dem Serail, die." In The New Grove Dictionary of Opera, edited by Stanley Sadie. Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/0006411 (accessed December 11, 2009), par. 22; see also Edward Dent, who regarded Die Entführung as “an opera which is a succession of masterly and original numbers, but taken as a whole has no unity of style.” Edward Dent, Mozart’s Operas: A Critical Study, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), 73. In its own day the opera was subject to criticisms such as this one: “The score is too serious here and there for the subject of a comic opera; in many otherwise masterly passages it approaches too much the style of serious opera, and since other really comic numbers differ all too markedly from this, unity of style is consequently lacking.” Knigge, Adolf Freiherr von, Dramaturgische Blätter (Hanover, 1788-9), 23; cited
views *Die Entführung* as an incipient departure from the austere simplicity found in the operas of Gluck:

Neoclassicism is aggressively doctrinaire. ... In Gluck’s operas, the examples of classical virtue on which they are based ... are not only expressed, but literally illustrated by the chastity of the music itself: the refusal to permit vocal display, the absence of ornament, the endings of arias which leave no possibility for applause, the simplicity of the musical texture with contrapuntal enrichment reduced to the barest essentials. The austerity is not only a form of stoicism, a holding back from pleasure, but one of the main sources of pleasure in itself. The severity of much of his finest work is analogous to the box-like space and metallic colors of David, and the pure geometrical forms of Ledoux, all of which have a significance as much ethical as aesthetic.335

If neoclassicism is indeed box-like and austere, identified with the “simple and limited,” as implied by Goethe’s commendatory remarks on the opera in his 1787 *Italian Journey*,336 then the luxuriant *Die Entführung* cannot be characterized thus. Any tenuous claims to simplicity and moderation are undone by Constanze’s aria “Martern aller Arten,” which may be seen to upset the generic demands of dramatic development, situated, as this monumental musical event is, near the close of the second act. Even in its generically prescribed location, this aria would call (seemingly) undue attention to itself through its lengthy ritornello, extravagant virtuosity, and its curious position as the second of two consecutive arias sung by the same character. This aria doubtless contributed to Joseph II’s purported remark that the work contains “an extraordinary number of notes.”337


335 Ibid., 171.

336 “All our endeavor ... to confine ourselves to what is simple and limited was lost when Mozart appeared. *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* conquered all, and our own carefully written piece has never been so much as mentioned in theatrical circles.” Cited in Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven* (New York: Norton Press, 1997), 176

Immoderate as it may be in some respects, *Die Entführung* nevertheless adheres to central tenets of the humanist neoclassicism that defined Leopold’s concept of taste. Foremost among these tenets is propriety, which underpins the entire work and defines Mozart’s musical characterizations along lines of gender, race, and class. The three-act *Singspiel*, based on a libretto by Christoph Friedrich Bretzner (called *Belmonte und Constanze, oder Die Entführung aus dem Serail*) and adapted by Gottlieb Stephanie, recounts a conventional love and rescue tale whose urgency is premised on the predatory lust of the captors—Turkish pirates, whom Mozart caricatures through transparently comic musical devices. Osmin—servant to the Turkish noble, Selim Pasha—is rendered comic from his very first notes, which he sings from the depths of a cavernous bass voice. If his ensuing *lied*—“Wer ein Liebchen hat gefunden”—initially affects a certain sweetness (despite its register), it builds tension in step with Osmin’s increasing annoyance at Belmonte’s mild interjections. A jarring metric and tempo modulation square in the middle of the final couplet ultimately reveals sweetness as a foil for a flaring and uncontrolled temper (ex. 2.1\textsuperscript{338}).

When, at the close of this aria, Osmin acknowledges the source of his annoyance, he displays his marked imbecility with repeated inquiries of “eh,” after which he who “hat auch Verstand” unveils a confused litany of tortures that begins with death (“Solche hergelaufne Laffen”). In this—his second—aria, blunt, clipped phrases, whose cold, grammatical treatment (through static repetition or rigid sequential motion) lacks invention and refinery, pointedly depict his brutish persona. His rage, as Mozart boasted in
a letter to his father, is “rendered [doubly] comic through the use of Turkish music.”\textsuperscript{339} Including rigidly triadic motion interspersed with jutting chromatic distortions and jarring forte incursions with crashing bass drums and cymbals. While these features recall the Janissary military music that frames the opera, other moments convey a more generic sense of alterity. Consider the opening of this aria: the static, almost ritualistic repetition of F finds its only relief in a paradoxically menacing chromatic inflection that completes the phrase and, with it, the conflation of monotony and dissonance that so aptly depicts Osmin’s character (ex. 2.2).

Belmonte and Constanze, from this perspective, represent the European norm against which Osmin’s alterity is defined. They receive the only traditional recitative/aria numbers, and their cultured gentility is transmitted through mellifluous songs; songs that distinguish them from their Turkish captors and European servants alike. The opening of the quartet that concludes the second act provides one of numerous examples of the opera’s class-consciousness. In the opening dialogue, Belmonte and Constanze share the same melodic material, which begins with alternating statements by the two lovers of successive variations on a single, tuneful theme. The alternations then collapse, first into stretto imitation and then, as the singers lock into mellifluous thirds-relations, a unison conclusion. Pedrillo’s subsequent musical statement contrasts sharply with theirs—its short, clipped descending lines, divided by lengthy pauses, reconfigure the courtly realm into a popular one. Blonde follows in turn, echoing Pedrillo’s melody and vocal quality, and thus completing the delineation of the two couples along lines of class (fig. 2.3).

Example 2.2: W. A. Mozart, *Die Entführung*, “Solche hergelauf’ne Laffen,” 1-12
Example 2.3: W. A. Mozart, *Die Entführung*, “Ach Belmonte!” mm. 6-71
Leid, nach so viel Ten Leid.

BELMONTE

Weiche Wonne, dich zu
Un-ber-sagt, es wird nichts füh-ren,

die Mi-nu-ten-werd ich

Blaude

hun-den, um -chlag zwi-lfe und wir da, um Schlag zwilfe und wir da.
27

Konstanze

Endlich...

Bride

Endlich...
Implicit in Mozart’s vivid and unceasing musical demarcations along lines of race, gender, and class is a commentary on integrity and virtue; one that unites aesthetic and ethical purposes in an excellent expression of Ciceronian propriety. According to the latter, a speech should represent the moral character of the speaker, as stylistic argumentation “often prevails more than the merits of the cause,” itself.\textsuperscript{340}

\textsuperscript{340} Cicero, \textit{De Oratore}, 2: 351.
If such musical characterizations at times seem overwrought, then there was nevertheless a moderating impulse at work in their composition. In a much-cited letter regarding *Die Entführung*, Wolfgang declared his allegiance to classical ideals of clarity, correctness, and moderation:

But since passions, whether violent or not, must never be expressed to the point of exciting disgust, and as music, even in the most terrible situations, must never offend the ear, but must please the listener, or in other words must never cease to be music, so I have chosen a key [to express Osmin’s rage] foreign to F (in which the aria is written) but one related to it—not the nearest, D minor, but the more remote A minor.341

Clarity, correctness, propriety, and moderation—among the classical virtues of style—are indeed at work in this opera, albeit in luxuriant Mozartian guise. Even “Martern aller Arten,” in its way, adheres to principles of classical aesthetics. For the length of the dramatically static—and thus, for some, problematic—ritornello is justified by the proportional weight of the aria that it introduces; and, as I shall argue in what follows, the purported excessive virtuosity of the aria is justified by its dramatic import.

Perhaps more significant than these (primarily) aesthetic features is the moral “argument” of the work, which is transmitted using the Aristotelian principles of recognition and reversal. In the 11th book of *Poetics*, Aristotle identified recognition (*anagnôrisis*) as the “change from ignorance to knowledge” that underpins an effective dramatic plot.342 Recognition scenes, though they all turn on some significant discovery or realization, may be facilitated in diverse ways, including the use of signs, memory, reasoning, or revelation. (Aristotle exemplifies recognition by reasoning through Aeschylus’s *The Choëphori*: “Someone resembling me has come: no one resembles me but

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Orestes: therefore Orestes has come.”

For Aristotle, recognition is best when it is “coincident with a reversal of the situation.” Recognition and reversal (peripeteia) together dictate the fortune of the characters, inspire the desired response in the audience, and, through this, convey the moral argument that is the ultimate purpose of classical drama.

In her 2006 monograph Recognition in Mozart’s Operas, Jessica Waldoff finds the classical principles of recognition and reversal in Mozart’s operas, thereby highlighting the allegorical function of Mozart’s dramatic music and its participation in Enlightenment discourse. She identifies multiple recognition moments in Die Entführung, the most prominent of which is the discovery of Belmonte’s identity as the son of the commandant of Oran, the Pasha’s mortal enemy. For Waldoff though, the more significant recognition revolves around the Pasha’s surprising act of clemency, which involves the characters and audience in the recognition of enlightened benevolence. In the final scene, the Pasha releases his captives not in spite of but because of their connections to his enemy:

I hold your father in far too much contempt ever to follow in his footsteps. Take your freedom, take Constanze, return to your fatherland, and tell your father that you were in my power and that I set you free so that you could tell him that it is a greater pleasure to reward a suffered injustice with good deeds, than to repay vice with vice.

This scene bears further consideration in its departure from Bretzner’s libretto, in which the Pasha’s clemency is predicated on the discovery of his own blood relation to Belmonte. Waldoff explains the reworking of this scene in terms of Mozart and Stephanie’s self-conscious engagement with Enlightenment values: “The ending of Entführung reconfigures

343 Ibid., 31.
344 Ibid., 20.
recognition to dramatize the efficacy of the opera’s theme of enlightened benevolence.”

The Pasha’s act of clemency is dramatic, indeed; nevertheless, Mozart’s treatment of this pivotal moment is curiously anti-climactic. Waldoff’s cogent argument stops short of examining why Mozart and Stephanie chose to situate this scene—one that comprises both the plot’s dénouement and moral argument—in a spoken rather than sung context.

The explanation suggested by Martin Nedbal presumes an inherent (Gottschedian) incompatibility of text and music. In his dissertation on the aesthetics of morality in the Viennese Singspiel, Nedbal argues that Mozart and Stephanie employed the principles of Gottschedian moral theater by inserting generalized maxims into Die Entführung, which, abandoning the personal pronoun, spoke to the audience rather than the characters to whom they would otherwise be directed. One such instance in the finale comprises the moralizing refrain concluding, in turn, each character’s individual statement: “Wer so viel Huld vergessen kann / den seh’ man mit Verachtung an” (Anyone who could forget such great a favor should be regarded with contempt). However, for Gottsched, whose aesthetics rested on the primacy of language, music only confused and distracted from opera’s (more essential and primary) literary component. Nedbal’s analysis suggests that Die Entführung mitigates these tensions (between music as pure sensuality and theatre as pure morality) by employing repetition, unison textures, and musical signposts to enhance clarity and comprehensibility at moments of moral import. The Pasha’s central recognition, whose moral maxim is transmitted “unadulterated” by the accompaniment of music, seems to support Nedbal’s Gottschedian separation of morality and sensuality; text and music.

It does not, however, support Wolfgang’s much-cited claim, with respect to this opera, that poetry should be the “obedient daughter” of the music; nor does it support

347 Ibid., 64.
348 There is, of course, a generic precedent for such non-singing roles as The Pasha’s. Be this as it may, one expects the most important plot developments to be set off musically, especially, as I go on to argue, in a dramatic work of Mozart.
350 Ibid., 84ff.
the luxuriant musical language that dominates the rest of the opera. In what follows, I argue that an alternative moral aesthetics operates within the work; one that yields the expressive powers of music (in a Ciceronian coalescence of style and substance) rather than compensating for its supposed communicative inadequacies. Waldoff herself asks us to interpret Mozart through what she terms the *opera plot*; a plot that is not transmitted solely through the text (such that the music is merely sensual gloss), but is rather a composite of the “unique combination of text, action, and music.”

Building on Waldoff’s argument that recognition scenes reveal and emphasize the musical enactment of plot, the following analysis forges connections between the text-driven recognition of the Pasha’s transformation and the music that leads to it. As I shall argue, the Pasha’s crucial act of clemency, which brings about the captives’ release and, with it, the resolution of the central drama, is predicated on the music in “Martern aller Arten.” Mozart’s treatment of Turkish musical materials in this aria instantiates a dramatic link between Constanze’s virtue and the Pasha’s enlightened clemency; one that unites text and music in meaningful ways.

In his reading of “Martern aller Arten,” E. Thomas Glasow characterizes Constanze’s ecstatic outpouring in the allegorical terms of Christian martyrdom: A “heavenly aura” is invoked on “des Himmels Segen” as the music, having ascended to great heights, “float[s] gradually earthward to a B-natural below the staff over radiant, shimmering suspensions in the solo quartet.” I agree with this reading, especially given the textual reference to “heaven’s blessing”; however, Glasow overlooks the crucial fact that this “heavenly” descending line alludes to Osmin (and all of the associations that attend his character). As suggested, Osmin’s character is identified with the blunt major triad and march-like tempo and meter (borrowed from Janissary military music), neighbor-note dissonances, abrupt *forte/piano* alternation, distant and unprepared modulations, and a cavernous bass voice, which is explicitly featured in a chromatically-inflected descending motive, first set to the words “Bis du zu gehorchen mir schwörst” (until you swear to obey me) in “Ich gehe, doch rate ich dir.” (ex. 2.4).

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352 Waldoff, *Recognition*, 44.
This motive distinguishes itself on a number of grounds: its statement is accompanied by shifts in dynamic level (forte to piano), phrase rhythm, accompanimental figures; and melodic contour and character; it is set off by rests on the one side and a concluding fermata on the other; and perhaps most importantly, it is repeated, with slight permutation, first by Blonde in the same duet (ex. 2.5), and then again by Osmin in “Vivat Bachus, Bachus lebe” (ex. 2.6).
Example 2.5: W. A. Mozart, *Die Entführung*, “Ich gehe, doch rate ich dir,” mm. 44-49
Example 2.6: W. A. Mozart, *Die Entführung,* “Vivat Bachus,” mm. 30-44
Although key, meter, register, intervallic relations, accompanimental figures, and range vary among the three statements, the motive’s salient features remain consistent: each statement is characterized by prominent shifts in both tempo and dynamics (to piano), a descending scale comprising a combination of (chromatic and diatonic) tones and semitones and outlining a perfect interval, and a concluding (and, in “Frische zum Kampfe,” opening) fermata. Its register, chromaticism, and textual context all identify this motive with the negative, orientalist stereotypes that are imprinted on Osmin’s character.

As suggested, Constanze’s “heavenly descent” in “Martern aller Arten” transmutes into Osmin’s motive. The moment is set off by conspicuous shifts in note value (to whole notes), dynamic level (to piano), and accompaniment (to rising scalar figures); a descent beginning near the bottom of her tessitura—this, being the lowest note she will have sung—and reaching its low extreme (B3); and by its chromaticism. Although it does not conclude with a fermata (but rather breaks off), it outlines a perfect interval before doing so (i.e., the P4 from E, on “Him” of “Himmel” to B on “loh” of “belohne”, mm. 122-123) and thus identifies itself (if only by allusion) with Osmin’s characteristic motive (ex. 2.7).
Example 2.7: W. A. Mozart, *Die Entführung*, “Martern aller Arten,” mm. 103-132
By alluding to Osmin’s motive in her plea to the Pasha, Constanze may be seen to invoke the “Turkish” aspect of the Pasha’s ambivalent character, equating his malicious intent with the violence, savagery, and otherness that are imprinted on Osmin. And in singing this motive to the words “des Himmels Segen,” Constanze thus suggests a dialectic between her own Christian virtue and the Pasha’s (heretical) lust. What follows is an explicit representation of the transformative power of Constanze’s virtuous song. In its next iteration, Constanze literally transforms the motive by pulling the melodic line forcefully out of the depths into which it would descend, and replacing it on an extended high C, a dizzying two-plus octaves above its original pitch. There she remains for more than five full measures, lingering on the word “blessing” before submitting to a resolution; one that replaces Osmin’s chromatic inflection with pure diatonicism (ex. 2.8).
Example 2.8: W. A. Mozart, *Die Entführung*, “Martern aller Arten,” mm. 197-243
Virtue and virtuosity collapse into one; and the strength of Constanze’s virtue, expressed through virtuosic eloquence, renders the transformation of this motive and, metaphorically, of the Pasha himself.

If transformation is thus linked to the central plot line and moral of the opera, it is also identified with the operations of recognition. As Waldoff states, To recognize is to re-cognize, that is, to know again, but to do so in a way that involves a new understanding. It implies the recovery of something already known. Knowledge is therefore inherent in recognition: it lies concealed, deep within
memory, waiting to be brought to the surface. To the extent that recognitions depend on memory ... they involve a repetition of recollected events and thoughts.

The reworking of Osmin's motive in Constanze's bravura aria defines recognition as precisely re-cognition, and, in the process, exemplifies Waldoff's so-called operatic plot.

This self-consciously grandiose aria constitutes the musical climax of the work. In its culminating “recognition” of the Pasha's transformation and the bearing of that transformation on the central plotline, it may be seen as the dramatic climax as well. Read through “Martern aller Arten,” Die Entführung centers on the power of Constanze's Christian virtue, which renders the transformation that inspires the Pasha to his act of clemency. This interpretation makes sense of a Mozart opera in which a primary character has only a speaking role by locating the central dramatic and moral events in the musical climax of the work. It further—if subtly and only implicitly—identifies the Pasha's nobility with Christian and European-enlightened values. Through these means, Die Entführung exhibits the most fundamental tenet of Leopold's humanistic ideal of taste; namely, the interdependence of aesthetic and ethical dimensions of artistic expression. For as suggested by this reading, Mozart neither abjures nor even subdues sensual music at moments of moral import. On the contrary, he embraces the coalescence of style and substance that defined both Cicero's ideal orator and Leopold's man of taste.

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This reading of Die Entführung, which positions Leopold and Wolfgang in complementary artistic and ideological arenas, sits uncomfortably with the perceived ideological schism between them (as it does with the main line of the “endlessly controversial” periodization of eighteenth-century musical thought in general). That schism, though manifest, is overargued; Leopold's ongoing investment in his son's artistic,

354 Ibid., 6.
355 See, for example, David Schroeder, Mozart in Revolt: Strategies of Resistance, Mischief, and Deception (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
356 Michael Spitzer, Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven's Late Style (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 338, note 5.
intellectual, and moral/religious education is repaid, with interest, throughout Wolfgang’s oeuvre; and the neoclassicism in which it is rooted, itself plastic and mobile, underwrites nearly the entire eighteenth century in music as in other arts. Continuity and rupture paradoxically combined to shape the unique character of eighteenth-century musical thought. This consideration pertains not only to the preceding argument, but also to the one that follows; in distinct but related moments around the middle of the century in Britain, France, and Germany, a (surface) rupture emerged, pushing subjectivity into the foreground while, for some at least, the external wisdom of reason and faith receded into the background. Wolfgang’s concept of taste is bound up with this ideological moment, and thus reflects its values and terms. While his father’s aesthetic ideology unequivocally informed his creative voice, his own references to taste reflect his allegiance to an alternative one; one that locates him, centrally, in the culture of sensibility.357

357 Any attempt to historically locate the culture of sensibility belies the “long, slow, cumulative process[es]” that nourished its tendencies and values. G.J. Barker-Benfield identifies the eighteenth-century culture of sensibility with a “refined,” nostalgic form of suffering that was predicated on the gradual relief from its more palpable, elemental forms; as Barker-Benfield relates, the pre-industrial age in England witnessed the end of the Civil War (1651) and then of the plague (late 1660s), agricultural advances, economic growth and the (relative) democratization of wealth. The characteristic mood of the period may be seen to rest on gradual changes in Britain’s economic, political, and socio-cultural spheres. G.J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), xx-xxii.

which the body—as opposed to the mind alone—was enlisted in sensible experience.\textsuperscript{362} Sterne’s Yorick—an icon of sensibility—describes his emotional response to an encounter with a\textit{fille de chambre} in a hotel room in the physical terms of a "pleasing half guilty blush where the blood is more in fault than the man—‘tis sent impetuous from the heart, and virtue flies after it—not to call it back, but to make the sensation of it delicious to the nerves."\textsuperscript{363} As naturally fertile ground for sensible expression (turning, as it does, on immediacy and corporeality), music was inscribed with an earthy nobility that reflected the values of the culture. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (whose \textit{Dictionnaire de la Musique} circulated in English translation—in multiple editions—in the second half of the century, reflecting the wide dissemination of Rousseau’s philosophy in England\textsuperscript{364}) emphasized the capacity of


music to act on bodies both inanimate and organic. Just as a human voice may break a glass and a sounding organ may agitate a heavy stone, music’s vibrations may involuntarily draw laughter, tears, and, for one unfortunate listener to a bagpipe, even urine.\(^\text{365}\) In its highest purpose, however, music was seen to surpass the sheer physics of sound and vibration to incite a more interior movement, namely, that of the soul.\(^\text{366}\) “Imitative music”\(^\text{367}\) (i.e., dramatic music, which “carr[ies] its impressions” to the heart rather than solely to the ears\(^\text{368}\)) “expresses all the passions, paints every picture, renders every object, submits the whole of nature to its ingenious imitations, and, by this means, conveys to the soul of the man those sentiments proper for moving it.”\(^\text{369}\) For Rousseau, both the sentiments and the movements that they effected were predicated on sensibility, which he defined as the soul’s capacity to “inspire the composer with the lively ideas which he wants; the executant, with the lively idea of these same expressions; and the auditor, with the lively impression of the beauties and errors of music which he is made to hear.”\(^\text{370}\)

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\(^{366}\) Rousseau was careful to distinguish this “movement of the soul” from intellectual understanding. Elsewhere in the *Dictionnaire* he wrote that music is primarily the realm of musical (i.e., aesthetic) and pathetic (i.e., expressive) “accents.” Reason and grammar appeal primarily to the mind; music “is much more the language of the senses than of the mind. Give then a number of images, or sentiments, and few simple ideas, to be discussed by the musician, for it is the passions alone that sing, the understanding consists but in speech.” “... est plus le langage des senses que celui de l’esprit. Donnez donc au Musicien beaucoup d’images ou de sentiments & peu de simples idées à rendre, car il n’y a que les passions qui chantent; l’entendement ne fait que parler.” Rousseau, *Dictionnaire*, 5; trans. Waring, *Dictionary*, 6.


\(^{368}\) “La première, bornée au seul physique des Sons & n’agissant que sur le sens, ne porte point ses impressions jusqu’au coeur, & ne peut donner que des sensations plus ou moins agréables.” (The first [i.e., natural music], confined to the physic of the sounds only, and acting on the sense only, cannot carry its impressions to the heart, and gives sensations only more or less agreeable.) Rousseau, *Dictionnaire*, 310-311; trans. Waring, *Dictionary*, 258-259.


\(^{370}\) “... inspire au Compositeur les idées vives don’t il a besoin, à l’Exécutant la vive expression de ces mêmes idées, & à l’Auditeur la vive impression des beautés & des défauts
Taste took on a particular valence within the culture of sensibility. The notion of immediacy—though not unique to sensibility—came into focus as writers increasingly identified taste as a more direct means of judging than reason. Hannah More characterized taste as “an instantaneous decision of the mind, a sudden relish of what is beautiful, or disgust at what is defective, in an object, without waiting for the slower confirmation of the judgment.” John Gilbert Cooper likewise identified the effect of “a good TASTE” as “that instantaneous Glow of Pleasure which thrills thro’ our whole Frame, and seizes upon the Applause of the Heart, before the intellectual Power, Reason, can descend from the Throne of the Mind to ratify its Approbation.” Of course, not all writers viewed these two receptive domains as complementary. For some, however, taste’s very independence from reason justified its authority. Allan Ramsay argued against “the pains employed, by many authors from Plato down to Sir Harry Beaumont, in order to confound the objects of judgment with those of taste and feeling; than which nothing can be more vulgar and unphilosophical.” Robert Anderson similarly argued for a judgment of William Wilkie, “the Scottish Homer,” not on the basis of “abstracted rules of criticism,” but on the taste and feeling of the sympathetic and judicious reader. For it is sentiment only that can judge of sentiment. When the heart of the reader remains cold and unaffected, the most elaborate performance is defended in vain, by all the art of the most expert rhetorician. Anderson’s elevation of feeling over learning reflects a broader democratic impulse that informed the culture of sensibility, expressing itself most famously in Samuel Richardson's


371 This is not to suggest that the two concepts were synonymous, for writers frequently distinguished them according, for example, to the affective weight of the expression. See Rousseau, *Dictionnaire*, 236.


376 Ibid., xvi.
Pamela, or Virtue Rewarded. This is not to suggest that Pamela was without learning; on the contrary, the expression of her sentimentality was predicated on the "learning which her lady ... crowded upon her." Nor was that learning a mere apostrophe in the narrative. By virtue of her literacy, Richardson’s heroine was positioned to frustrate deeply entrenched ideas about education among the lower classes and, in the process, articulate values and aspirations of an emergent bourgeoisie.

Pamela’s sensibility speaks to an essential feature of taste in this period; namely, its dual function as an expression of individual subjectivity, on the one hand, and an index of modernity, on the other. As Pamela suggests, the individual judgments and immediate responses that defined taste in the culture of sensibility accommodated and often articulated notions about class, nation, history and customs, progress and industry, economy, politics—in short, the various dimensions of modern social, cultural, and political life. The text itself underwrites taste’s doubleness, as in the discussion between Pamela and Lady Davers over the merits of the seventeenth-century English poet Abraham Cowley. The latter states:

   But you must not think ill of my favourite Cowley, however; for I say, with a gentleman, whose judgment and good heart have hardly an equal [i.e., Mr. B], that though Cowley was going out of fashion with some, yet he should always suspect the head or the heart of him or her, who could not taste, and delight in, his beauties. Ever mobile, taste is here located on the palate itself, thus emphasizing the immediate, sensual gratification that a good taste for Cowley may enjoy. And yet, that sensible, indeed, sensual, moment of taste is situated in a larger context of the waning fashion for his work. The immediacy of taste is thus distinguished from the fickleness of fashion; and taste, though, like the tongue, it responds instantaneously and involuntarily, voices broader cultural trends and agendas.

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377 Samuel Richardson, Pamela, or, Virtue Rewarded (1741); cited from The Works of Samuel Richardson, vol. 3 (London: James Carpenter, 1811), 189.
379 Richardson, Pamela; cited in Works, vol. 3, 239.
In his recent *The Temporality of Taste in Eighteenth-Century British Writing*, James Noggle examines expressions of this doubleness in British literary and journalistic forms. As Noggle argues, “these two temporal poles—intense immediacy and the long process—govern the discourse of taste together, neither negating nor fully harmonizing with each other.”

> “Taste,” he writes, “is that region of the discourse that allows us to declare that this or that instantaneous feeling makes us truly modern, or British, or refined, high class, or manly or feminine.”

Noggle turns by example, not to Richardson’s *Pamela*, but prominently to the English landscape garden, which “proclaims the union of spontaneous pleasure and British destiny and thus powerfully performs taste’s ideological task” of locating individual tastes within broader cultural, specifically English ones.

Guidebooks and gardening manuals from this period indeed “dramatized” the experience of walking through the gardens, depicting each “remarkable Particular, as it severally and successively presents itself, in our progress,” in order to appeal to the reader’s sensibility. That sensibility, however, was conspicuously channeled toward propagandistic notions of British history and nationhood. For example, monuments to historical “British Worthies” proliferated in the gardens at Stowe (fig. 1), thus prompting “immediate” and “emotional” responses to an historical narrative that underwrote a specific view of “British modernity.”

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381 Ibid., 3.

382 Ibid., 64. Annette Richards connects music and musical time to the eighteenth-century English landscape garden in *The Free Fantasia*, esp. 1-32.


384 The Gardens at Stowe feature a “Temple of British Worthies,” which houses busts of 16 celebrated figures of British history.

385 Noggle, *Temporality*, 64.
William Mason's *Heroic Epistle to Sir William Chambers* speaks directly to this (proto-) nationalist agenda:

> [T]he reason why Taste in gardening was never discovered before the present Century, is that It was the result of all the happy combinations of an Empire of Freemen, an Empire formed by Trade, not by a military and conquering Spirit, maintained by the valour of independent Property, enjoying long tranquility after virtuous struggle, and employing its opulence and good Sense on the refinements of rational pleasure.\(^{386}\)

Mason, like his contemporaries, unselfconsciously identified the immediate, sensory appeal of the English landscape garden with the enlightened progress of constitutional Britain; visitors to the gardens were likewise invited to enjoy a sensible moment that was also

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progressively modern. Scholars of eighteenth-century music will immediately identify parallels between these aspects of the period’s musical and literary histories.387

Artists and writers in this period interrogated the cozy doubleness that taste accommodated; for example, pitting taste against a corrupt modernity, ironizing the relationship of taste to the modern machine culture, or, as in the passage from Pamela, problematizing the affinity between the immediacy of taste and the caprice of fashion. This chapter examines the temporal doubleness of musical taste in the eighteenth-century culture of sensibility, exploring each of these two temporal domains—the moment and the (historically underwritten) modern—before examining points of friction in the temporal doubleness of taste in the music and writings of W. A. Mozart.

Wolfgang Mozart and the Culture of Sensibility

“Sensible” poets and writers of (prominently) midcentury Britain lived a vibrant half-life in north German journals and periodicals from the 1760s to the near-end of the century.388 One such periodical, Frankfurter Gelehrte Anzeigen, states its orientation matter-of-factly: “For the connoisseur of English literature in particular one will see to it that no single article that is worthy of attention escapes notice.”389 The intellectual

387 Scholars have long observed the dual function of (much) eighteenth-century opera as “sensible” art and political propaganda. In Opera and Sovereignty: Transforming Myths in Eighteenth-Century Italy, Martha Feldman argues that the expressive powers of singers were understood to metaphorize the political powers of the monarch; and, likewise, that the individual, subjective responses of audience members coalesced around the “communal experience” of a collective social body. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 69-70; see also Gillen D’Arcy Wood, “Seward’s Handelmania,” in Romanticism and Music Culture in Britain, 1770-1840: Virtue and Virtuosity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20-52, which discusses the politicization (and romanticization) of late eighteenth-century performances of Handel’s oratorios in England.

388 Michael Maurer, Aufklärung und Anglophilie in Deutschland (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987).

389 “Besonders wird man für den Liebhaber der englischen Litteratur dahin sorgen, dass ihm kein einziger Artikel, der seiner Aufmerksamkeit würdig ist, entgehe.” Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen, 3 (3 January 1772): n. 1, p. 3. For an incomplete list of Anglocentric
authority of English language works in this period is suggested by the many number of original German works presented falsely as translations from English (not to mention the huge traffic in translations of English works, themselves). A 1781 letter from Johann von Müller to Johann Ludwig Gleim proposes to alter names of the German author Christian Liscow’s works and to publish them as English translations: “Germany would [thus] read him with delight.” Such deception is perhaps understandable, as north German readers in this period ardently consumed English literature, both eminent and obscure. Musicians and music connoisseurs identified no less with English literary trends; North German *empfindsamer Stil* (sensitive style), associated foremost with C. P. E. Bach, embodies the subjectivity, intimacy, and spontaneity that were hallmarks of the culture of sensibility. Its language—including fragmented melodic lines, rhythmic flexibility and variety, frequent tempo and dynamic changes, expressive dissonance and ornamentation, and ambiguous harmonies—combined unstructured immediacy of improvisation with expressive depth of recitative. Johann Abraham Peter Schulz found the keyboard sonatas of “the Hamburg Bach” to be so expressive indeed that “one believes he is perceiving not tones but an understandable language that sets and keeps our imagination and feelings in motion”; in other words, a language of the passions.

periodicals in eighteenth-century Germany, see Karl Elze, *Die Englische Sprache und Litteratur in Deutschland*, (Dresden: Louis Ehlermann, 1864).


For latter-day music historians, C. P. E. Bach resides at the center of a broad compass of German composers whose works reflect the culture and values of sensibility. Marpurg identified "the Grauns, Quantz, Bach, et al.,”—i.e., members of the so-called Berlin Lied School—with “impressive rhetorical and moving qualities,” which, though they “do not create as much stir” as the more international galant music with its “masses of embellishments,” “touch the heart more directly.”³⁹³ For Quantz, “to touch the heart” is “the true object of music, and the most difficult one.”³⁹⁴ Georg Benda,³⁹⁵ Christian Gottfried Krause,³⁹⁶ Johann Friedrich Reichardt,³⁹⁷ and Gottfried Müthel,³⁹⁸ all of whom maintained ties with Berlin and/or the Prussian court, likewise explored the dynamics of feeling in a way that participated in the critical project of their literary, philosophical, and scientific colleagues in Berlin. In part due to the breadth and volume of his creative work, in part due to its centuries-long anatomization, Wolfgang Mozart’s relationship to the culture of sensibility is, by contrast, the site of much controversy. On the one hand, Mozart’s music exhibits explicit and implicit connections to C. P. E. Bach and the north German aesthetics of sensibility.³⁹⁹ That he knew Bach’s music is decisive: His D Major piano concerto, K. 40, reworks Bach’s character piece, La Boehmer (H. 81), in the finale; and Nannerl’s study book,

³⁹⁴ “... das Herz rühren”; “... der wahre Endzweck, und das schwereste in der Musik ist.” Quantz, Versuch, 120; See also the standard English translation, from which I sometimes depart: Johann Joachim Quantz, On Playing the Flute, trans. Edward R. Reilly, 2nd ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1985),139.
which Wolfgang also used, includes a version of the variations from the *Musikalisches allerley von verschiedenen Tönkünstler.*\(^{400}\) That he internalized the north German style is also suggested in, for example, the adagio of the unfinished D Minor Fantasia (K. 397)—a genre well suited to sensibility—and his highly affecting A minor rondo (K. 511).\(^{401}\) On the other hand, Wolfgang is seen at times to have parodied the excesses that sensibility permits. Two of his best known dramatic works, *Le nozze di Figaro* and *Cosi fan tutte,* occupy ambiguous spaces in the culture of sensibility, as they are seen to accommodate both sentimental and anti-sentimental readings.\(^{402}\) Did C. P. E. Bach and the North German “cult of sensibility” indeed “loom large” over Wolfgang’s creative voice,\(^{403}\) or was this “passing fashion” merely an object of parody?\(^{404}\)

In fact, these two positions need not contradict each other; sensibility possessed internal contradictions that permitted and even invited artistic engagement. On the one hand, the expression of sensibility was seen (for some, at least) to belie its emotional impulse; as Hannah More suggested, true sensibility, “art can never seize / Nor affectation catch thy pow’r to please.”\(^{405}\) Yorick’s aforementioned encounter with the *fille de chambre* speaks to this problem in concluding with the ironic words, “But I won’t describe it.”\(^{406}\) In this pointed moment (having indeed just described it) Sterne presents a knowing wink at the problematics of sensibility as artistic—in this case, literary—expression. On the other hand (and just as the expression belied the experience) the experience of sensibility was seen to impinge on its expression. This is the central thesis of Diderot’s *Paradoxe sur le*

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\(^{401}\) Leonard Ratner organized the first movement exposition of Mozart’s late Eb major quartet, K. 614 into topically labeled sections, two of which are called ‘sensibility’. Leonard Ratner, *Classic Form: Expression, Form, and Style* (New York: Schirmer Books, 1980), 237-246.


\(^{404}\) Alfred Einstein, *Mozart: His Character, His Work,* 95.

\(^{405}\) More, “Sensibility, a Poem,” in *Sacred Dramas,* 282.

\(^{406}\) Sterne, *Sentimental Journey,* 93.
Comédien (written between 1773 and 1777 and published posthumously in 1830). For Diderot, actors must have “penetration, and no sensibility”;[407] for

[i]f the actor were full, really full of feeling, how could he play the same part twice running with the same spirit and success? Full of fire at the first performance, he would be worn out and cold as marble at the third. But take it that he is an attentive mimic and thoughtful disciple of Nature, then the first time he comes on the stage ... he will so prevail that his acting, far from losing in force, will gather strength with the new observations. ... He will increase or moderate his effects, and you will be more and more pleased with him.[408]

Thus while the actor of tranquility and self-command may “hover between nature and his sketch of it,” the “firey, extravagant, sensitive fellow, is forever on the boards.”[409] Artists and writers in this period consistently interrogated the gap between authenticity and performativity that is suggested by these writings; Wolfgang’s tendencies toward burlesque and irony, far from distancing him from the movement, actually mark his fluency in the language of sensibility.[410]

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[408] “Si le comédien était sensible, de bonne foi lui serait-il permis de jouer deux fois de suite un même rôle avec la même chaleur et le même succès? Très-chaud à la première représentation, il serait épuisé et froid comme un marbre à la troisième. Au lieu qu’imitateur attentif et disciple réfléchi de la nature, la première fois qu’il se présentera sur la scène ... copiste regoureuex de lui-même ou de ses études, et observateur continu de nos sensations ... loin de s’affaiblir, se fortifiera des réflexions nouvelles qu’il aura recueillies; il s’exaltera ou se tempéra, et vous en serez de plus en plus satisfait.” Diderot, Paradox, 7-8; trans., Pollock, Paradox, 8.
That fluency is further articulated in the work that defined the “mature” dramatist. The lavish, explicit sensibility that suffuses *Idomeneo, re di Creta*, K. 366, identifies his engagement with sensibility with the first expression of his mature dramatic voice.\(^{411}\) It is probably no coincidence that *Idomeneo* is imbued with the aesthetics of sensibility, for his correspondence testifies to his ideological allegiance to feeling: “I cannot write in verse, for I am no poet. I cannot arrange the parts of speech with such art as to produce effects of light and shade, for I am no painter. Even by signs and gestures I cannot express my thoughts and feelings, for I am no dancer. But I can do so by means of sounds, for I am a musician.”\(^{412}\) This eloquent testimony of Wolfgang’s orientation toward the expressive culture of sensibility—in which he defines the musician, not through an appeal to nature, but rather by his use of sounds to express his thoughts and feelings—is thus reflected in his training and experience, his music, and, as I shall argue, his concept of taste. The following section draws from Wolfgang’s correspondence and two standard texts in the musical discourse of sensibility that complement it—the North German treatises of C. P. E. Bach and Quantz, *Versuch über die wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen*, and *Versuch einer Anweisung die Flöte traversiere zu spielen*, respectively—in a textual analysis of musical taste in the German culture of sensibility.

Musical Taste and the Moment

*Taste and Transmission of Feelings.* Meretricious beauty has little place in music whose aim is to move the listener. Bach wrote in this regard of “teachers [who] try to make amends for a stiff left hand by teaching their students to favor the right and garnish adagio or expressive passages with a wealth of pretty little trills to the revulsion of good taste.”\(^{413}\)

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\(^{411}\) See Einstein, *W. A. Mozart*, 603-604; I am indebted to James Webster for bringing this point to my attention.


\(^{413}\) “Bey dieser Steife der lincken Hand, sucht der Meister es bey der rechten wieder einzubringen, indem er seine Schüler besonders die Adagio und rühendesten Stellen, dem
These,” he continued, “are often interchanged with senile, pedantic embellishments and fumbling, inept runs in the playing of which the fingers seem to grow choleric.” For Bach, even a technically adept player cannot fashion a performance from trills and runs alone, no matter how competently executed they may be:

Keyboardists whose chief asset is mere technique are clearly at a disadvantage. A performer may have the most agile fingers, be competent at single and double trills, master the art of fingering, read skillfully at sight regardless of the key, and transpose extemporaneously without the slightest difficulty, play tenths, even twelfths, or runs, cross the hands in every conceivable manner, and excel in other related matters; and yet he may be something less than a clear, pleasing, or stirring keyboardist. ... A mere technician ... can lay no claim to the rewards of him who sways in gentle undulation the ear rather than the eye, the heart rather than the ear, and lead it where they will.

Bach here defined an anatomy of feeling that privileged interior movement over exterior sensation and located both the dilettante’s trills and the technician’s runs in the superficial realm of the latter. Wolfgang articulated a similar sentimental corporeality in one of his several diatribes against Abbé Vogler. In a letter to his father about Vogler’s guten Geschmack zu noch mehrerem Eckel, aufs reichlichste mit lieblichen Trillerchen verbrämen lehret. ...” Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Versuch über die wahre art das Clavier zu spielen, mit Exempeln und achtzehn Probe Stücken in sechs Sonaten (Berlin: Christian Friedrich Henning, 1753), 6-7; See also the standard English translation, from which I sometimes depart: Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments, trans. William J. Mitchell (New York: W.W. Norton, 1949), 35.


415 “Es ist unstreitig ein Vorurtheil, als wenn die Stärcke eines Clavieristen in der blossen Geschwindigkeit bestände. Man kann die fertigsten Finger, einfache und doppelte Triller haben, die Applicatur verstehen, vom Blatte treffen, es mögen so viele Schlüssel im Lauffe des Stückes vorkommen als sie wollen, alles ohne viele Mühe aus dem Stegreif transponiren, Decimen, ja Duodecimen greifen, Läuffer und Kreuzsprünge von allerley Arten machen können, und was dergleichen mehr ist; und man kann bey dem allen noch nicht ein Deutlicher, ein gefälliger, ein rührender Clavieriste seyn. ... Es darf ... ein blosser Treffer wohl nicht auf die wahrhaften Verdienste desjenigen Ansprüche machen, der mehr das Ohr als das Gesicht, und mehr das Herz als das Ohr in eine sanfte Empfindung zu versetzen und dahin, wo er will, zu reissen vermögend ist.” Bach, Versuch, 115; trans. Mitchell, Essay, 147.
“prestississimo” performance of the Rondo from his C major keyboard concerto, K.246, a pace at which “the eyes cannot see the music, nor the hands perform it,” Wolfgang stated that “[t]hat kind of sight-reading and shitting are all one to me. The listeners (I mean those who deserve the name) can only say that they have seen music and piano playing. They hear, think and feel as little during the performance as the player himself.” For Wolfgang (in accordance with Bach), Vogler’s musical gymnastics operated on the superficial level of the eye; the maligne sensory organ in musical discourse, which defined the border between the external, physical world and the internal, emotional one. Vogler’s musical “shitting” situated him in the former realm, alongside a mechanical duck that ate and eliminated without “tasting” (or digesting) anything. Such a duck in fact existed; it was created by the French inventor Jacques de Vaucanson in 1739 (see fig. 2); just as its apparent functions were a mechanical trick, Vogler, the mere technician, was a “trickster.”

417 “... so ein Prima vista spielen, und schießen ist bey mir einerly. die zuhörer, ich meyne diejenigen, die würdig sind so genannt zu werden können nichts sagen, als daß sie Musique und Clavier spielen—gesehen haben. sie hören, dencken—und empfinden so wenig dabey—als er.” Ibid.
This is not to suggest that technique was considered insignificant, for, on the contrary, taste was dependent on it. As Bach attested, correct employment of the fingers was inseparably related to the art of performance. “More is lost through poor fingering than can be replaced by all conceivable artistry and good taste.”\textsuperscript{420} Quantz similarly railed against the “majority of fashionable modern composers” who “rely almost entirely upon instinct,” who consider “technical skill” to be “harmful pedantry that only hinders good taste and good melody.”\textsuperscript{421} “How,” he asked, “can good taste be preserved or perpetuated”

among such “untutored instinctive writers?” As these passages suggest, taste, though it was not defined by technique, was dependent on it. Technical facility provided the raw material for tasteful invention and performance, which rested—above all—on the performer’s ability to enter into the emotion that he sought to convey. Bach wrote eloquently to this effect:

A musician cannot move others unless he too is moved. He must of necessity feel all of the affects that he hopes to arouse in his audience, for the revealing of his own humor will stimulate a like humor in the listener. In languishing, sad passages, the performer must languish and grow sad. Thus will the expression of the piece be more clearly perceived by the audience. ... Similarly, in lively, joyous passages, the executant must again put himself into the appropriate mood. And so, constantly varying the passions, he will barely quiet one before he rouses another.

A mere “pedant,” by contrast, who “memorizes all of the rules and follows them mechanically,” cannot prevail upon the heart of his listener, for “something more is required”; namely, Bach continued, the effect of a “good taste.” These remarks, which oppose taste to mechanical contrivance, find a touchstone in Wolfgang’s much-cited diatribe against Muzio Clementi. In one of several remarks against his contemporary (and perceived rival), he wrote: “Clementi plays well, so far as execution with the right hand goes. His greatest strength lies in his passages in thirds. Apart from this, he has not a

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424 “Pedant”; “der die dazu gehörigen Regeln auswendig weiß und sie bloß mechanisch ausübt”; “Man verlangt etwas mehreres”; “guten Geschmack.” Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Versuch über die wahre art das Clavier zu spielen, zweiter Theil, in welchem die Lehre von dem Accompaniment und der freyen Fantasie abgehandelt wird (Berlin: George Ludewig Winter, 1762), 3; trans., Mitchell, Essay, 173. (In subsequent notes I refer to the first volume of the Versuch as “Versuch,” and the second, as “Versuch, zweiter Theil.”)

153
kreuzer’s worth of taste or feeling—in short, he is simply a mechanicus.” Wolfgang’s statement positions Clementi as an artificial copy of body and soul needed to feel and transmit feeling, and thus articulates the central tenet of good taste in the culture of sensibility.

*Correctness Reconceived.* Musical expression thus predicated on feeling would seem to contradict abstract notions of correctness and accuracy; yet Wolfgang consistently identified taste with “appropriateness,” “accuracy,” and “correctness.” In one of numerous examples, he boasted of the reception of his concert aria “Non so d’onde viene” (K.294), “everyone said that no aria had ever affected them as did this one.” His reasoning is pointed: “She sang it as it ought to be sung. ... I wish you also could have heard it, exactly as it was performed and sung there with that accuracy in taste, piano and forte.” Similarly, the effectiveness of Josef Mysliweck’s sonatas depended on his sister’s observance of “the proper precision”:

I should advise my sister, to whom I send my most humble greetings, to play them with plenty of expression, taste and fire, and to learn them by heart. For they are

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sonatas which are bound to please everyone, which are easy to memorize and very effective when played with the proper precision.\textsuperscript{428}

Taken out of context, such remarks may by misconstrued. In the culture of sensibility, appeals to “correctness” and “accuracy” identified taste with the transmission of the composer’s thoughts and feelings rather than pointing solely to generalized principles and abstract rules. Quantz remarked to this effect that “to play an Adagio well, you must enter as much as possible into a calm and almost melancholy mood, so that you execute what you have to play in the same state of mind as that in which the composer wrote it.”\textsuperscript{429} Wolfgang spoke even more directly to the importance of the composer’s intentions in his remarks on Vogler’s performance of his piano concerto in C Major, K.246. Here Wolfgang located taste squarely in the performer’s transmission of the composer’s expressive voice:

[I]t is much easier to play a thing quickly than slowly: in passagework you can leave out a few notes without anyone noticing it. But is that beautiful?—In rapid playing the right and left hands can be changed without anyone seeing or hearing it. But is that beautiful?—And wherein consists the art of playing prima vista? In this: in playing the piece in the time in which it ought to be played, and in playing all the notes, appoggiaturas and so forth, exactly as they are written and with the appropriate expression and taste, so that you might suppose that the performer had composed it himself.\textsuperscript{430}


\textsuperscript{429} “Um nun ein Adagio gut zu spielen, muß man sich, so viel als möglich ist, in einen gelassenen und fast traurigen Affect setzen, damit man dasjenige, so man zu spielen hat, in eben solcher Gemüthsverfassung vortrage, in welcher es der Componist gesetzt hat.” Quantz, \textit{Versuch}, 138; trans., Reilly, \textit{Flute}, 163.

This is not to say that taste yielded to no extrinsic authority; on the contrary, Bach identified the composer’s taste as the regulatory counterpoint to his (or her) fancy: “It is difficult to prescribe the correct context for every embellishment, for all composers are free to introduce their favorites where they will, so long as good taste is not thereby assailed.” Nevertheless, taste reflected above all on the transmission of the expressive intentions of the composer.

The performer’s “accurate” transmission of the composer’s expressive intentions emphasized the selection and execution of embellishments, which, Bach attested, “form a large part of good taste”:

[They] connect and enliven tones and impart stress and accent; they make music pleasing and awaken our close attention. Expression is heightened by them; let a piece be sad, joyful, or otherwise, and they will lend a fitting assistance. Embellishments provide opportunities for fine performance as well as much of its subject matter.

Concluding this elegant sermon, Bach stated that “it has [thus] always been better for composers to specify the proper embellishments unmistakably, instead of leaving their selection to the whims of unskilled performers.” Wolfgang was also attuned to the interpretive distance between a written music and its performance; his meticulous notation of embellishments speaks to his recognition of the considerable demands of

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431 “Es ist schwer, den Sitz jeder Manier so gar genau zu bestimmen, indem jeder Componist bey seinen Erfindungen, ohne daß er dem guten Geschmacke Gewalt thut, die Freyheit hat, an den meisten Oertern eine ihm beliebige Manier darbey zu setzen.” Bach, Versuch, 55; trans., Mitchell, Essay, 82.

432 Sie hängen die Noten zusammen; sie beleben sie; sie geben ihnen, wenn es nöthig ist, einen besonderen Nachdruck und Gewicht; sie machen sie gefällig, und erwecken folglich eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit; sie helfen ihren Inhalt erklären; es mag dieser traurig oder fröhlich oder sonst beschaffen seyn wie er will, so tragen sie allezeit das ihrige darzu bey; sie geben einen ansehnlichen Theil der Gelegenheit und Materie zum wahren Vortrage.” Bach, Versuch, 51; trans. Mitchell, Essay, 79.

taste. For, as suggested, good taste in the culture of sensibility resided not only the performer’s adherence to generalized principles and abstract rules, but also in his or her “accurate” transmission of the composer’s individualized, sometimes idiosyncratic thoughts and feelings.

*Taste Modeled on Song.* If expression was thus individualized in the musical culture of sensibility, it does not follow that there were no models for the formation and improvement of musical taste; here, as in other arenas, vocal music provided a consistent point of reference. Bach wrote of students who, “in listening to other music acquire a more discriminating taste” and are thus “revolted” by pedantic exercises, “seek refuge in arias which, when well set, and sung by reputable voices, are suitable for the development of good taste and the study of good performance but not for the development of the fingers.” Elsewhere, he wrote:

As a means of learning the essentials of good performance it is advisable to listen to accomplished musicians. ... Above all, lose no opportunity to hear artistic singing. In so doing, the keyboardist will learn to think in terms of song. Indeed, it is a good practice to sing instrumental melodies in order to reach an understanding of their correct performance.

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434 Rosen notes that “if an aria was to be ornamented, Mozart [may have] preferred to write out the ornaments himself.” Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*, 1971; cited from expanded ed. (New York: Norton, 1997), 102. Abert likewise states that “Mozart uses far fewer such signs than his predecessors and contemporaries, including even Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach and Joseph Haydn. He often writes out his ornaments in full, rather than using a contracted form, thereby announcing his wish to have them.” Hermann Abert, *W. A. Mozart*, trans. Stewart Spencer, ed. Cliff Eisen (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 889.


436 “... den guten Vortrag zu erlernen, die Besuchung guter Musicken vorgeschlagen. Wir fügen allhier noch hinzu, daß man keine Gelegenheit verabsäumen müsse, geschickte Sänger besonders zu hören: man lernet dadurch singend dencken, und wird man wohl
Quantz likewise promoted the development of a “singing taste,” even among instrumentalists. In this regard, he sought to “reveal to some extent the reason why present-day Italian instrumentalists, particularly violinists, have adopted a taste so contrary to good singing taste. ...” His answer was that although “some among them do not lack either knowledge of, or feeling for, that which pertains to good singing; yet they do not try to imitate it on their instruments, finding that which they hold excellent among the singers too poor and too slight upon their own instruments”; and “they do not seek to intermingle the passions as is customary in vocal music. In a word, they have altered the taste of their predecessors in instrumental music, but they have not improved it.” “It is a pity,” he concluded, “that the majority of their instrumentalists have for some time departed so far from the taste demanded by singing; in this way they have not only led astray many of the people who have tried to imitate them, but have also induced many singers to abandon good singing methods.”

Such allegiance to song was, in itself, nothing new. The primacy of song extends to antiquity; and mimetic theories of the early modern period (themselves modeled on ancient texts) identify song as the means best fitted to imitating nature in music. As with all mimetic expression, such imitation was born of a clear, rational mind. Nicolas Boileau—

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437 “... um einiger maßen den Ursprung zu entdecken, woher es gekommen ist, daß die heutigen welschen Instrumentisten, besonders aber die Violinisten, meysentheils einen besondern, der guten Singart so sehr entgegen stehenden Geschmack angenommen haben; da doch der wahre und gute Geschmack allgemein seyn sollte.” Quantz, Versuch, 311; trans. Reilly, Flute, 325.

438 “Einigen unter ihnen fehlet es zwar weder an der Erkenntniß, noch an der Empfindung dessen, was zum guten Singen gehört: dennoch suchen sie solches auf ihren Instrumenten nicht nachzuahmen: sondern, was sie bey den Sängern für was Vortreffliches halten, das finden sie auf dem Instrumente zu schlecht, und zu gering.” Ibid.


440 “Nur Schade, daß seit einiger Zeit, die meisten ihrer Instrumentisten allzuweit von dem Geschmacke des Singens abgegangen find: wodurch sie nicht nur viele, die ihnen nachzuahmen suchen verführen, sondern auch so gar manchen Sänger verleiten, die gute Singart zu verlassen.” Quantz, Versuch, 315; trans. Reilly, Flute, 328.
though writing specifically of poetry—spoke to processes that were seen to underwrite all (effective) artistic creation in the following much-cited passage:

There are certain minds whose somber thoughts 
Are by a thick cloud always blocked; 
The daylight of reason never could shine through. 
Thus before learning to write, learn to think.441

Over the course of the eighteenth century, song was gradually redirected from extrinsic nature and its idealized reproduction by the mind to intrinsic emotion and its natural expression by the body. No longer an artifact of idealized nature, song emerged as an unmediated expression of human emotion. A reflection of this general shift may be seen in later eighteenth-century writers’ rejection of the longstanding theory that “[t]he guiding stimuli to the invention of music” included “birdsong, for it is plausible that, in their idle hours, people wanted to reproduce it through mimicry.”442 Johann Abraham Peter Schulz summarized the increasingly prominent counterargument in (one of his contributing articles to) Johann Georg Sulzer’s Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste (1771-1774):

It is certainly doubtful that man learnt song simply through the imitation of songbirds. The individual sounds that comprise song are the expressions of animated sentiments, since man expresses pleasure, pain, or sadness through sounds, and the sentiments aroused demand to be expressed, even if against one’s will, by the sounds of song, not speech.443

442 Matthew Head, “Birdsong and the Origins of Music,” Journal of the Royal Musical Association 122 (1997): 3 Head rightly argues that this shift was not immediate or clearly delineated. Writers and musicians located music in “human nature” from antiquity, and arguments oriented toward birds and the wind persisted throughout the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, the “banishment of birdsong” was tied to aesthetic theory in the later eighteenth century. Ibid., 17.
443 “Ganz unwahrscheinlich ist es, daß der Mensch durch Nachahmung der singenden Vögel auf den Gesang gekommen sey. Die einzeln Töne, woraus der Gesang gebildet ist, sind Aeusserung lebhafter Empfindungen; denn der Mensch, der Vergnügen, Schmerz oder Traurigkeit durch Töne äußert, dergleichen die Empfindung, auch wider seinen Willen, von
In relocating the origin of music from “nature” to “human nature,”
song was thus refitted to the purposes of taste in the culture of sensibility.

In this context, Quantz suggests that vocal music possesses “advantages that
instrumental music must forgo,” for the words and human voice are naturally
expressive. As such—and by means of compensation—neither composers nor
performers of instrumental music “can have wooden souls.” Indeed, “inner feeling” was
the very “singing of the soul,” compelling the instrumentalist to his tune as the singer to his
song.

*Taste as Style.* Song was not, however, to be the model for all music. Bach’s
attribution of a “uniform, four- or more-voiced accompaniment” to “heavily scored music,
pieces in the learned style which feature counterpoint, and principally works that consist of
music alone, in which taste plays a minor role,” implicitly delimits the arena of taste to
music in the “free style.” Wolfgang, in considering the instructive needs of Baroness
Waldstätten, made an analogous distinction between music that demanded taste and music
that did not: “First of all, I must tell you that Finck would not be at all suitable for her, as
she wants to have someone for herself and not for her children. You see, therefore, that
what is important is that he should play with taste, feeling and brilliancy; and that a
knowledge of thoroughbass and extemporizing in the style of the organ would be of no use
to him whatever.”

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444 Head, “Birdsong,” 17.
446 Ibid.
447 “hölzerne Seelen haben.” Ibid.
448 “die innerliche Empfindung”; “das Singen der Seele.” Quantz, Versuch, 99; trans., Reilly, Flute, 117.
449 “Das durchaus vier und mehrstimmige Accompagnement gehört für starke Musiken, für
gearbeitete Sachen, Contrapuncte, Fugen u.s.w. und überhaupt für Stücke, wo nur Musik ist,
450 8 January 1783: “Erstens muß ich ihnen sagen daß finck sich gar nicht für Sie schickt;
denn, sie will einen Menschen für sich, und nicht für ihre kinder haben; da sehen sie nun,
daß es mehr auf geschmack, empfindung, und Brillante spiellart ankömmmt; und der general
granted—was set apart from the expressive arena of taste, which, in its most specific usage, denoted a style oriented toward melody, vocality, and expression.\footnote{I use “learned style” not as a synonym for counterpoint, but, as Koch used it, in reference to a style of composition and performance.} In his 1802 *Musikalisches Lexikon*, Heinrich Christoph Koch articulated the prevailing qualities associated with music in the free or “unbound” style,\footnote{“ungebundene”; Heinrich Christoph Koch, *Musikalisches Lexicon* (Frankfurt am Main: August Hermanndem Jüngern, 1802), column 1453.} which was oriented to music for the chamber and theatre: homophonic textures, freer dissonance treatment, broken, non-continuous melodies and phrases, and the presentation of successive, contrasting melodic ideas (as opposed to *Fortspinnung*).\footnote{Ibid., columns 1451-1455.}

Even with respect to the free style, writers distinguished between concerns of harmony and form, on the one hand, and those of taste, on the other. Quantz wrote emphatically that “[a] piece may in itself conform to good taste as well as to the rules of harmony and thus be considered well written, yet still remain unsuited to the instrument. On the other hand, a piece may conform to the instrument yet have no intrinsic value.”\footnote{“Es kann ein Stück, an und für sich, sowohl dem guten Geschmacke, als den Regeln der Composition gemäß, und also gut gesetzt seyn; dem Instrumente aber zuwider laufen. Im Gegentheile kann ein Stück dem Instrumente zwar gemäß, an sich selbst aber nichts nütze seyn.” Quantz, *Versuch*, 293-4; trans. Reilly, *Flute*, 310.} Bach also distinguished between the concerns of taste and the functions of harmony: “Our present taste has brought about an entirely new use of harmony. Our melodies, embellishments, and manner of performance often call for unusual chords.”\footnote{“Der heutige Geschmack hat einen ganz andern Gebrauch der Harmonie, als vordem, eingeführet. Unsre Melodien, Manieren und der Vortrag erfordern daher oft eine andere harmonie, als die gewöhnliche.” Bach, *Versuch*, zweiter Theil, 4; trans., Mitchell, *Essay*, 174.}

Delicacy was a consistent point of reference for writers concerned with the generic and stylistic limits of taste. Bach, for example, ascribed the dotted compound appoggiatura “only” to pieces “that are dependent on taste and affect, in which the accompaniment must

be especially delicate.” Quantz also identified taste with delicacy, if by means of its absence: "Yet it remains incontestable that, even if the double bass player has no need of great delicacy of taste, he must understand harmony, and must be no poor musician.”

Wolfgang similarly remarked in a letter to his father that Mlle von Auernhammer, though she “plays enchantingly ... in cantabile playing she has not got the real delicate singing taste.” That delicacy was tied to melody and song is no surprise, for, like song (as suggested in the preceding argument), delicacy related to matters of feeling. Hugh Blair’s famous Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres speaks to this point in its discussion of the two component elements of taste: delicacy and correctness. While correctness concerns “the improvement which that faculty receives through its connexion with the understanding”—i.e., the mind—delicacy, on the other hand, “leans more to feeling”:

Delicacy of taste respects principally the perfection of that natural sensibility on which Taste is founded. It implies those finer organs or powers which enable us to discover beauties that lie hid from a vulgar eye. One may have strong sensibility, and yet be deficient in delicate taste. He may be deeply impressed by such beauties as he perceives; but he perceives only what is in some degree coarse, what is bold and palpable; while chaster and simpler ornaments escape his notice. ... [A] person of delicate Taste both feels strongly, and feels accurately. He sees distinctions and differences where others see none; the most latent beauty does not escape him, and he is sensible of the smallest blemish. Delicacy of Taste is judged of the same marks that we use in judging the delicacy of an external sense. As the goodness of the palate is not tried by strong flavours, but by a mixture of ingredients, where, notwithstanding the confusion we remain sensible of each; in like manner delicacy

456 “nur”; “wo der Geschmack und der Affect den meisten Antheil haben, und wo also die Begleitung besonders fein seyn muß.” Bach, Versuch, zweiter Theil, 222; trans., Mitchell, Essay, 351.
457 "Es kann seyn, daß die meisten, welche zu diesem Instrumente gebrauchet werden, vielleicht nicht das gehörige Talent haben, sich auf andern Instrumenten, die sowohl Fertigkeit als Geschmack erfordern, hervor zu thun." Quantz, Versuch, 218; Trans. Reilly, Essay, 247.
of internal Taste appears, by a quick and lively sensibility to its finest, most compounded, or most latent objects.459

Delicacy, characterized here as deep and refined feeling, identifies taste with melodic, as opposed to harmonic dimensions of music, and with the free as opposed to strict style.

This is not to suggest that music located outside of these contexts was inherently “tasteless” or “indelicate”; on the contrary, writers in this period emphasized that good taste should govern all musical expression. Bach’s earnest appeal to music’s sensible essence implicitly favors the subtler, more delicate movements of taste over the stronger, but less affecting ones that are achieved by virtuosic machinations, independent of musical genre or style: “More often than not, one meets technicians, nimble keyboardists by profession, who possess all of these qualifications and indeed astound us with their prowess without ever touching our sensibilities. They overwhelm our hearing without satisfying it and stun the mind without moving it.”460 Wolfgang more explicitly identified taste with delicacy and its opposite with a “rough and laboured” touch: “He [Herr Richter] plays well so far as execution goes, but, as you will discover when you hear him, he is too rough and laboured and entirely devoid of taste and feeling.”461 Although delicacy points to generic and stylistic connotations of taste, the values encompassed by it extend to all musical expression; for all music was activated in performance, and performance—be it a mass or an aria—must be conducted with taste.

461 28 April 1784: “er spielt sehr viel, was Execution anbelangt—alleine—wie sie hören werden—zu grob—zu mühsam—und ohne allem geschmack und Empfindung.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Zufzeichnungen, 3: 312; trans., Anderson, Letters, 875.
Musical Taste and the “Modern”

The room sparkles with the dappled light from a prominent chandelier, which dances with the candles that illuminate the individual music stands. Frederick the Great stands in the chandelier’s warmest glow, contemplating the music resting on the stand before him. His body’s posture—legs crossed in mid-step, left foot raised as if ready to meet the right, fingers poised on his flute—suggests movement and energy, despite the stillness of the canvas. Though he is facing his standing attendees, they are visually remote, located beyond the music stand that dominates Frederick’s visual frame. Frederick, it seems, is attentive only to his music. This he shares with the listeners, who look, variously, toward the floor, the ceiling, the performers, and each other, each enjoying his own music-induced reverie. The grandeur of the room and formality of the attendees’ attire belie the intimacy of the occasion, which is reflected not least in the collapsed distance between performers and the listeners. Engraved in 1786, Johann Peter Haas’s *Friedrich II als Flötist bei einem abendlichen Konzert im Jahre 1750* (fig. 3) foregrounds many aspects of musical taste discussed in the previous section: intimacy, subjectivity, movement and corporeality; even the primacy of melody is suggested in the apparently homophonic texture in which Frederick’s melody stands apart.
Figure 3.3: Johann Peter Haas’s copperplate engraving of *Friedrich II als Flötist bei einem abendlichen Konzert im Jahre 1750*

However, this is not the only way to interpret this painting. An alternative reading positions the chandelier’s glow as a metaphor for the Enlightenment, and the central figure as emblematic, not of melody and song, but rather of enlightened absolutism. In this sense too, Haas’s painting foregrounds meanings of musical taste in the culture of sensibility; as suggested, the double-edged nature of taste in this period accommodates two sets of temporal readings. Writers and musicians likewise incorporated an historicized notion of taste into their writings; in the process, as Haas’s painting illustrates, the individual bodies and unique moments that defined taste in the culture of sensibility were unselfconsciously abstracted into broader claims about the German “cultural nation.”

Quantz (who was notoriously prejudiced against French musical culture) thus invoked the values of sensibility in his weighted comparison of French and Italian singing. While the French manner of singing is “simple,” “forced,” and “poor in taste and
expression,” the Italian manner, by contrast, “is profound and artful; it at once moves and excites admiration; it stimulates the musical intellect; it is pleasing, charming, expressive, rich in taste and expression, and transports the listener in an agreeable manner from one passion into another.” Movement, excitation, and transport—tenets of taste in sensible discourse—were divorced from the individual expressive and receptive bodies that gave them meaning and were instead identified with an abstract (culturally circumscribed) “manner” or style; one that reflected on singers, songs, and audiences without pointing to any specific ones. Wolfgang likewise mused that

[if this [Paris] were a place where people had ears to hear, hearts to feel and some measure of understanding of and taste for music, these things would only make me laugh heartily; but, as it is (so far as music is concerned), I am surrounded by mere brute beasts. How can it be otherwise? For in all their actions, emotions, and passions, they are just the same [as beasts]. There is no place in the world like Paris. ... I shall thank Almighty God if I escape with my taste unspoiled.

Here again, the “actions, emotions, and passions” that located taste in the subject’s body and soul were mapped onto broader cultural meanings, as taste was relocated from

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463 “... ist tiefensinnig, und künstlich; sie rühret, und setzet zugleich in Verwunderung; sie beschäftigt den musikalischen Verstand; sie ist gefällig; reizend, ausdrückend, rich im Geschmacke und Vortrage, und versetzt den Zuhörer, auf eine angenehme Art, aus einer Leidenschaft in die andere.” Ibid.
464 1 May 1778: “wenn hier ein ort wäre, wo die leute ohren hätten, herz zum empfinden, und nur ein wenig etwas von der Musique verstünden, und gusto hätten, so würde ich von herzen zu allen diesen sachen lachen, aber so bin ich unter lauter vieher und bestien (was die Musique anbelangt) wie kann es aber anderst seyn, sie sind ja in allen ihren handlungen, leidenschaften und Paßionen auch nichts anders—es giebt ja kein ort in der welt wie Paris. ... Ich danck gott dem allmächtigen wenn ich mit gesunden gusto davon komme.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 346; trans., Anderson, Letters, 533. David Schroeder, among others, cautions us to approach Wolfgang’s letters to his father with skepticism. To be sure, Leopold would have been pleased by Wolfgang’s distate for French music and French culture, as suggested in this (and in the following) remark. Of concern here is not so much the sincerity of his diatribe against France as his conception of taste vis-à-vis sensibility, on the one hand, and modernity, on the other. Mozart in Revolt: Strategies of Resistance, Mischief, and Deception (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
individual expressions and their responses to a generalized “place” and “people.”

(Wolfgang testified to the importance of place in his concluding suggestion that his good taste was threatened by his sheer presence in this city.)

In the process of abstraction and generalization, taste absorbed new, sometimes contradictory, meanings. Observe, for example, Wolfgang’s preceding discussion of musical taste in France. At the outset, he invoked an image of vacant individual bodies, unable to hear, feel or understand. Such a body, lacking external and internal senses, amounts to an automaton (or, as he deemed Clementi, a *mechanicus*); and (as suggested) taste is squarely located in the realm of sensibility. However, as the passage continues, Wolfgang’s argument turns from matters of sentience to those of *Bildung*, applicable to the French in general (as they are mere “beasts,” uneducated and untrained). A central tension within the discourse of taste emerges: While one person was distinguished from an unfeeling machine, a culture could (and should) evolve. Elsewhere, Wolfgang reflected on that (modest) evolution in taste among the French (and in implicit comparison with the Italians) in the following terms:

> our French gentlemen have only improved their gout to this extent that they can now listen to good stuff as well. But to expect them to realize that their own music is bad or at least to notice the difference—Heaven preserve us! And their singing! Good Lord! Let me never hear a French woman singing Italian arias. I can forgive her if she screeches out her French trash, but not if she ruins good music.”

Quantz similarly identified cultural taste with *Bildung*, while individual tastes centered around melody and feeling. His prescription for the improvement of German taste—though it incorporated an appeal to “healthy feeling”—nevertheless emphasized the practical acquisition of the best elements of each cultural nation. Quantz implored Germany’s “young

465 Ibid.
composers” to “take more pains” to “learn the rules,” to “exercise themselves” in various styles, and to “follow the [appropriate] models” in order to “acquire the mixed taste”;\textsuperscript{467} for If the German nation … take[s] as models the good manner of singing and those who play in a reasonable taste; if, furthermore, the Italians and the French imitate the Germans in their mixtures of tastes, as the Germans have imitated them in their tastes; if, I say, all these things are unanimously observed, in a time a good taste that is universal can be introduced in music. … For a taste of music that is received and approved by many peoples, and not just by a single land, a single province, or a particular nation, a taste of music that, for the above reasons, can only meet with approbation, must if it is also founded on sound judgment and healthy feeling, be the very best.\textsuperscript{468} Although Quantz claimed to promote a “universal taste ... formed and shaped through the mixture and through the reasonable choice of good ideas and good methods of playing from different nations,”\textsuperscript{469} in fact, for him such good taste was conspicuously, proudly German; and the path to good taste (though it expressed itself through one’s ability to move the listener) was (nevertheless) paved by German intellectualism. For Quantz identified the diligence and learning required for the assimilation of foreign musical styles as distinctly German attributes. The German tendency “to compose in an artful rather than pleasing

\textsuperscript{467} “neuangehenden Componisten”; “sich mehr ... befließigen”; “die Regeln ... zu erlernen”; “vermischeten Geschmacke ... zu erlernen.” Quantz, Versuch, 332; trans., Reilly, Flute, 342.
\textsuperscript{468} Wofern nun die Deutsche Nation ... die gute Singart, und diejenigen, welche in einem vernünftigen Geschmacke spielen, zum Muster nehmen; wenn ferner die Italiäner und die Franzosen den Deutschen in der Vermischung des Geschmackes so nachahmen wollten, wie die Deutschen ihnen im Geschmacke nachgeahmet haben; wenn dieses alles, sage ich, einmütig beobachtet würde: so könnte mit der Zeit ein allgemeiner guter Geschmack in der Musik eingeführet werden. ... Denn eine Musik, welche nicht in einem einzelnen Lande, oder in einer einzelnen Provinz, oder nur von dieser oder jener Nation allein, sondern von vielen Völkern angenommen und für gut erkannt wird, ja, aus den angeführten Ursachen, nicht anders als für gut erkannt werden kann, muß, wenn sie sich anders auf die Vernunft und eine gesunde Empfindung gründet, außer allem Streite, die beste seyn.” Quantz, Versuch, 334; trans. Reilly, Flute, 342.
\textsuperscript{469} “Der allgemeine gute Geschmack”; “... durch die Vermischung; und durch eine vernünftige Wahl guter Gedanken, und guter Arten zu spielen, von verschiedenen Nationen zusammen tragen, und bilden.” Quantz, Versuch, 97; trans., Reilly, Flute, 116.
manner, more for the eye than for the ear,”\(^{470}\) which in previous times rendered German music “flat, dry, meager, and paltry,”\(^ {471}\) was transformed into the very means of acquiring taste; for when a generation of scholars turned their intellectual energy to imitating the tasteful music of other cultures, German music would emerge as the most tasteful of all.

“Capability” and “knowledge” were the keystones:

> Even if it cannot be said that the Germans have produced an individual style entirely different from that of other nations, they are all the more capable in taking whatever they like from another style, and they know how to make use of the good things in all types of foreign music.\(^ {472}\)

Those peoples, on the other hand, that relied only on instinct could not sustain good taste in the long run. Thus Quantz’s Germanic bias toward learning framed his views on the musical vogue:

> Indeed, good natural ability is for many a detriment rather than an advantage. For convincing proof, consider the majority of fashionable modern composers. How many does one find who have learned the art of composition in accordance with principles? Do not the majority rely almost entirely upon instinct? With at most a slight understanding of thorough-bass, they believe that so profound a science as composition involves no more than the insight and ability to avoid forbidden fifths and octaves, and perhaps to make a drum bass and set to it one or two feeble middle parts; all the rest they consider harmful pedantry that only hinders good taste and good melody. ... Natural ability is innate, while technical skill is learned through good instruction and diligent inquiry, and both are necessary to a good composer ...

\(^{470}\) “mehr künstlich, als begreiflich und gefällig; mehr für das Gesicht, als für das Gehör zu setzen.” Quantz, *Versuch*, 325; trans., Reilly, *Flute*, 335.

\(^{471}\) “platt, trocken, mager, und einfältig gewesen”; Quantz, *Versuch*, 325; trans., Reilly, *Flute*, 335.

But if talent, technical skill, and experience are combined, they will form an almost inexhaustible source of tasteful invention.\textsuperscript{473}

Quantz’s narrative thus achieved a commendable negotiation of taste’s two temporal domains: instruction, diligent inquiry, technical skill, and experience, hallmarks of German culture as Quantz defined it, were positioned as the means of cultivating the immediate, expressive qualities of music that defined the culture of sensibility: invention, melody, and taste. The same dialectic undergirds Bach’s treatise; however, far from negotiating its tensions, Bach’s treatise underscores the complex, sometimes contradictory meanings encompassed by taste—feeling, nationalism, vogue, learning, and modernity. In a unique passage of his \textit{Versuch}, Bach’s characteristic eloquence unraveled as he grappled with taste’s contradictory demands:

Embellishments and their execution form a large part of good taste. Therefore the performer must not be inconstant and accept uncritically every new random ornament. Nor should he be so predisposed toward himself and his own taste that he is obstinately unwilling to accept anything strange. Certainly severe tests should precede the acceptance of the new, for it is possible that unnatural novelties might in time make good taste as rare as skill. However, while it is wise not to be the first, one should also not be the last to acknowledge new ornaments in order not to fall out of mode.\textsuperscript{474}

\textsuperscript{473} “Manchen gereichert das besonders gute Naturell mehr zum Schaden als zum Vortheile. Wer davon Beweis verlanget, der betrachte nur die meisten Componisten nach der Mode, itziger Zeit. Wie viele findet man unter ihnen: die die Setzkunst nach den Regeln erlernen haben? Sind nicht die meisten fast pure Naturalisten? Wenn es hoch kommt, so verstehen sie etwan den Generalbaß; und glauben es seyn in einer so tiefesinnigen Wissenschaft, als die Composition ist, nichts mehr zu wissen nöthig, als daß man nur so viel Einsicht besitze, verbothen Quinten und Octaven zu vermeiden, und etwan einen Trummelbaß, und zu demselben eine oder zwei magere Mittelstimmen dazu zu setzen: das übrige seyn eine schädliche Pedanteren, die nur am guten Geschmacke und am guten Gesange hindere. ... Das Naturell, wird mit angebohen; und die Wissenschaft wird durch gute Unterweisung, und durch fleißiges Nachforschen erlernen: beydes aber gehdres zu einem guten Componisten.” Quantz, \textit{Versuch}, 12-13; trans., Reilly, \textit{Flute}, 19-20.

\textsuperscript{474} “Da also die Manieren nebst der Art sie zu gebrauchen ein anseynliches zum seinen Geschmacke beutragen: so muß man weder so veränderlich seyn, und den Augenblick jede neue Manier, es mag sie vorbringen wer nur will, ohne weitere Untersuchung annehmen, noch auch so viel Vorurtheil für sich und seinen Geschmack besitzen, aus Eigensinn gar..."
Here, individual tastes butt uncomfortably against culturally defined ones, exposing tensions between the unnatural novelties of a superficial mode and the natural changes in taste that frame modernity. Bach struggled to locate taste in this fragile space between competing concepts of modernity as fickle and superficial, on the one hand, and progressive and evolving, on the other. As this tension is played out most fully in this period’s music, itself, the following section examines temporal dialectics in the music of Wolfgang Mozart and posits solutions in the notes for resolving them.

Taste in Mechanical Modernity: Wolfgang’s Artificial Sentiment in K.616

Wolfgang’s identification with the culture of sensibility is reflected perhaps most explicitly in his imputation of Clementi as “mechanicus” and his elevation of taste and feeling over the technical machinations of the virtuoso. The force behind Wolfgang’s words may be inferred from their reiteration, almost verbatim, in a subsequent letter:

Now a word about Clementi. He is an excellent cembalo-player, but that is all. He has great facility with his right hand. His star passages are thirds. Apart from this, he has not a farthing’s worth of taste or feeling; he is a mere mechanicus.475

Continuing, Wolfgang admonished his sister not to sacrifice her hands’ “natural lightness, flexibility, and smooth rapidity” to Clementi’s musical gymnastics, which, after great effort, promised to yield an “atrocious chopping effect.”476 Clementi’s “star passages” were thus reduced to the rude, mechanical movements that produced them; Wolfgang positioned

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476 Ibid.
himself squarely on one side of the broad cultural debate, operative in this period, between man and machine.

This is not to suggest that Wolfgang eschewed the mechanical; on the contrary, machines and their technologies were central to his musical life. Throughout his correspondence, Wolfgang reported to his father on the quality of instruments that he encountered and considered their mechanical workings to be factors in his (decidedly unmechanical) performances. His much-cited remark, “Give me the best clavier in Europe with an audience who ... do not feel with me in what I am playing, and I shall cease to feel any pleasure,” though it foregrounds the audience-performer relationship, also speaks to—indeed, takes for granted—the importance of his connection to his instrument. His remarks following an Augsburg visit to the instrument maker Johann Andreas Stein concerned precisely such a connection:

Now I’ll begin at once with Stein’s pianos. Before I had come across any of Stein’s make, Späth’s claviers had always been my favorites. But now I have to give first place to Stein’s because they damp ever so much better than the Regensburg instruments. When I strike hard, I can keep my finger on the note or raise it, but either way, the sound ceases the moment I have produced it. In whatever way I touch the keys, the tone is even. It never jars, it is never stronger or weaker or missing altogether; in a word, it is always even. ... His instruments have a special advantage over other makes in that they are made with escape action. Only one maker in a hundred bothers about this. But without an escapement you simply can’t avoid juddering and shuddering of the hammers after playing the keys. Stein’s hammers fall back in an instant once they have struck the strings, whether you hold the keys down or let go of them.478

477 1 May 1778: “geben sie mir das beste Clavier von Europa, und aber leüt zu zuhörer die nichts verstehen, oder die nichts verstehen wollen, und die mit mir nicht Empfinden was ich spiele, so werde ich alle freude verlieren.” Bauer and Deutsch, eds., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 2: 344; trans., Anderson, Letters, 532.
478 17 October 1777: “Nun muß ich gleich bey die steinischen Piano forte anfangen. Ehe ich noch vom stein seiner arbeit etwas gesehen habe, waren mir die spätischen Clavier die liebsten; Nun muß ich aber den steinischen den vorzug lassen; denn sie dämpfen noch viel besser, als die Regensburger. wenn ich starck anschlage, ich mag den finger liegen lassen, oder aufheben, so ist halt der ton in dem augenblick vorbey, da ich ihn hören ließ. ich mag
As this suggests, Wolfgang celebrated the values of machine culture—precision, predictability, and efficiency—in the service of his performative ends.

Machines were also central to opera production. The Freihaus Theater auf der Wieden, wherein premiered *Die Zauberflöte* in 1791, was generously technically equipped, as suggested by the specifications in the librettos of Emanuel Schikaneder, owner of the theater and librettist of *Die Zauberflöte*: “a mechanical stage with three trap doors, moveable flats and backdrops, and devices to accommodate flying machines, storms, sea battles, and similar effects.”479 The technical demands for *Die Zauberflöte* in specific were so extensive that the work, whose set cost a nearly unprecedented 7000 Gulden, came to be known, for better or worse, as a “Maschinenkomödie.”480 Such technical demands reflected the matter-of-fact acknowledgement that grand illusions of substance and affect, which framed opera in this period, rested in large part on the workings of cold, unfeeling machines. In a telling description of Act II, scene 28, from *Die Zauberflöte*, Schikaneder conflated his abstract artistic vision for the scene with technical considerations of its realization:

The scene changes to two great mountains. In one is a waterfall in which one hears rustling and splashing; the other spews fire. Each mountain has a fence with openings through which one can see the fire and water. Where there is fire, the


horizon must be bright red; black fog lies where there is water. The side flats are rocks. Each scene completed by an iron gate.481

For Schikaneder, as for Wolfgang, the various cranks, machines, and devices that shadowed the theater stage, lifeless in themselves, nevertheless gave life and meaning to the scene.

Machines were no less life-giving in the greater cultural arena,482 and Wolfgang could not have been insensitive to their role in the improved quality of life for Europeans over the course of the century. Nevertheless, anxieties loomed over these decidedly positive changes in pre-industrial Europe; the increasingly mechanized external world, in which the operations of man were conducted (and improved upon) by machines, supported the materialist subsumption of the independent soul within the machine-like body. L’Homme Machine, written in 1748 by the French materialist Julien Offrey de la Mettrie, presents among the best-known arguments for man’s mechanistic essence. La Mettrie’s man-machine operates, not through the will of an autonomous soul, but rather in accordance with the quality of its (i.e., the body’s) maintenance and fuel: “We think not, nay, we are not honest men, but as we are cheerful, or brave; all depends on the manner of winding up our machines.”483 Food, coffee, opium, even sleep, which calms the “motion of the blood” until a “soft soothing sense of peace and tranquility spreads itself over the whole machine,” act on the machine—its temperaments and emotions—in entirely predictable

ways.\textsuperscript{484} To be sure, the “weak reeds of divinity, of metaphysics, and nonsense of the schools,” who argue for the separation of body and soul—“two substances” for La Mettrie, “touching and moving each other without intermission”—took up his challenge to “dispute it” in testimonies such as this one, directed at La Mettrie’s disciple, Claude Helvétius:\textsuperscript{485}

In fine, our author’s doctrine is that ‘man is a machine’ which being put in motion by corporeal sensibility, ought to perform all it executes. It is the wheel, that moved by a torrent, raises the pistons, and with them the water designed to be thrown into the basin prepared to receive it. But neither is the assertion true or the allusion apt; if, by man’s being a machine, we adopt the ideas of the materialist. If man be considered as a machine, it should be rather as a spiritual than a material one. His principle of action is innate, and does not proceed from the external causes that excite his corporeal sensibility. ... Man is a self-moving wheel, possessed of an internal principle of motion; and not a wheel moved by an external torrent, as our author supposes. External causes, indeed, more powerful than his innate principle of action, may counteract and even over-power such principle: but they are not, therefore, the sole causes of his action. The voluntary motion of a man, in walking, may be checked; nay he may be involuntarily carried a contrary way, by the force of the wind, water, or other means: but are we, therefore, to conclude his voluntary motion equally mechanical? Surely not!\textsuperscript{486}

Kant more decisively, if less directly, answered la Mettrie’s challenge to refute his argument, stating at the conclusion of his essay, “What is Enlightenment,”

When nature has, under this hard shell, developed the seed for which she cares most tenderly—namely, the inclination and the vocation for \textit{free thinking}—this works back upon the character of the people (who thereby become more and more capable


\textsuperscript{486} W. Kenrick, LL. D., “Helvetius’s Treatise on Man,” in \textit{The London Review of English and Foreign Literature}, vol. 6, W. Kenrick, ed. (London: T. Evans, 1767), 343; see also Elie Luzac, \textit{L’homme plus que Machine: Ouvrage, qui sert à refuter les principaux argumens, sur lesquels onfonde le Materialism} (Gottingue, 1750).
of acting freely) and finally even on the principles of government, which finds it to its advantage to treat man, who is now more than a machine, in accordance with his dignity.\footnote{Wenn denn die Natur unter dieser harten Hülle den Keim, für den sie am zärtlichsten sorgt, nämlich den Hang und Beruf zu freiem Denken, ausgewickelt hat: so wirkt dieser allmählich zurück auf die Sinnesart des Volks, (wodurch dies der Freiheit zu handeln nach und nach fähiger wird), und endlich auch sogar auf die Grundsätze der Regierung, die es ihr selbst zuträglich findet, den Menschen, der nun mehr als Maschine ist, seiner Würde gemäß zu behandeln." Berlinische Monatsschrift 4 (September 30, 1784), 481; trans. as “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,” in What is Enlightenment: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, James Schmidt, ed. and trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 63.}

Although Kant framed Enlightenment in anti-materialist terms, his very need to de-mechanize humanity exhibits the strength and endurance of the materialist ideology.

La Mettrie and the materialist ideology cast an important light on the widespread fascination with automata and human-like machines that pervaded in the eighteenth century. Automata mediated anxieties over materialism, at once disproving the reduction of man to machine—for “puppets, and various automata made by men, have exhibited motions that do more nearly resemble those of a living creature than any of the phaenomena of electricity; yet none but fools and children ever imagine, that such automatas are endowed with life”—\footnote{James Lunn, “On the Future State, a Sermon,” in Essays and Sermons on Various Subjects Relative to the Deistical Controversy (Edinburgh, 1790), 98.} and nevertheless presenting increasingly realistic imitations of their actions and functions. The arguably macabre fascination with human-like machines shadows the history of the more diminutive and innocuous musical automata; although table-top clocks with little flute pipes that sounded a tune pinned to a rotating barrel were novelties of the wealthy aristocracy, these trifles nevertheless spoke to some of the most fraught aspects of man-machine problems. Indeed, the digesting duck, for all of the attention that it received, may be seen to deflect the more insidious problem contained in these charming little Flötenuhren; the duck imitated (or rather feigned to imitate) the sheer mechanical processes of the body, whereas the charming table-top organ operated in the domain of human expression; that of the soul.

Wolfgang’s exposure to musical automata began in his youth, in the form of large mechanical carillons and organs that sounded at regular intervals in his childhood town of
Salzburg. Cliff Eisen situates three such automata within earshot of Wolfgang’s home: the Salzburger Hornwerk in the Festen Hohensalzburg, which was refurbished in 1753 by Johann Rochus Egedacher; the Dutch Carillon, built in 1704 and located in the archbishop’s residence; and a “water organ” at Hellbrunn Castle.\(^{489}\) Of course, from the age of six, he was only sporadically home to hear them, as the prodigy was funneled to various courts and halls to display his unique powers. What attracted audiences across Germany and abroad were Wolfgang’s astounding technical capabilities, which he exhibited by playing blindfolded or on a “masked” keyboard,\(^{490}\) with “speed and accuracy” that so outpaced his growth that “[h]e skimmed the octave which his short little fingers could not span.”\(^{491}\) Wolfgang’s fervent argument for expression and distaste for “difficulties” must be set in context, not only of the cultural discourse of sensibility, but also of his childhood persona as a mechanical genius, a “little magician.”\(^{492}\)

These various threads inform the knotty history of Wolfgang’s three compositions for musical organ clocks, K.594, K.608, and K.616. All three were late works probably commissioned by Count Joseph Deym (previously Hofstatuarius Müller, before losing his aristocratic title in relation to an illegal duel) for his public Kunstkabinett. This eclectic museum and tourist shop contained such curiosities as plaster casts of ancient statues; wax figures of famous people; mechanical instruments, including an automatic piano, a musical pyramid, a mechanical canary, flute-playing Spanish children; a music-accompanied mausoleum, and a “Schlafgemach der Grazien,” which was described by a visitor as comprising “a sleeping figure lying on a bed, softly lit by alabaster lamps, with the most delightful music, specifically composed for the occasion, sounding from behind the figure.”\(^{493}\) Wolfgang’s associations with this shop and its proprietor were born of financial


\(^{491}\) Ibid., 5.


need. In a letter to his wife during the composition of one of these works (probably K. 616), he remarked dryly:

I have now made up my mind to compose at once the Adagio for the clockmaker and then to slip a few ducats into the hand of my dear little wife; and this I have done—but as it is the very kind of work which I detest, I have unfortunately not been able to finish it—I compose a bit of it every day—but I have to break off now and then, as I get bored. And indeed I would give the whole thing up, if I had not such an important reason to go on with it. But I still hope that I shall be able to force myself gradually to finish it. If it were for a large instrument and the work would sound like an organ piece, then I might get some fun out of it. But, as it is, the works consist solely of little pipes, which sound too high-pitched and too childish for my taste. Wolfgang’s distaste may be seen to reflect a contradiction felt between the high pipes, which signal delicacy of taste and expression, and the absence of an expressive outlet (i.e., a tasteful performer) to realize them. The “king of instruments,” on the other hand, need not necessarily invoke delicacy, for the organ operated in other expressive arenas as well.

Wolfgang acknowledged this fact, if implicitly, when asked by Herr Stein why he would “want to play on an instrument that has no douceur, no expression, neither piano nor forte, but goes on always the same”; Wolfgang did not deny but rather dismissed Stein’s arguments, stating, “But all that signifies nothing; in my eyes and ears the organ is nevertheless the king of instruments.”


496 “Das hat alles nichts zu bedeuten; die Orgel ist doch in meinen Augen und Ohren der König aller Instrumente.” Ibid.
In her essay, "Automatic Genius: Mozart and the Mechanical Sublime," Annette Richards interprets Wolfgang’s “Phantasie für eine Orgelwalze,” K. 608, in terms that accommodate this distinction between delicacy of taste and the grandeur of strict-style organ culture. K. 608 was composed to accompany a mausoleum display honoring Field Marshall Gideon Ernst Freiherr Baron von Laudon, who died in battle. The display (fig. 3.4) was advertised in the *Weiner Zeitung* as follows:

splendidly illuminated until ten o’clock at night ... the sight of it will not fail to surprise everyone who visits this mausoleum and thereby renews the memory of this great and meritorious man. ... The seats are arranged in the best possible way and each person pays 1 fl. for a first place and 30 kr. for a second; upon the stroke of each hour funeral music will be heard, and will be different every week. This week the composition is by Herr Kapellmeister Mozart.497

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The work’s “superhuman virtuosity,” which renders Clementi’s parallel sixths quaint by comparison, its celebration of artifice and intellectualism, its “self-conscious ... and flamboyant ... ” archaism thus “explores and draws attention to the very notion of the mechanical (ex. 1).”

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In the process, as Richards relates, it recuperates the humanness of learned counterpoint, through its invocation of the Kantian mathematical sublime, which "temporarily collapses the distinction between man and machine."\(^{499}\) Human it may thus be, but sentimental it is not. Even the andante, for all of its "lyrical sweetness,"\(^{500}\) presents the mechanical stasis of its variations as a foil for the developmental possibilities of the strict style. Richards alludes to this function of the andante in her reference to its "generic, if inspired, mechanical music, a reminder of the pretty decorum and facile virtuosity so characteristic of the medium (ex. 2)."\(^{501}\)

\(^{499}\) Ibid., 387.
\(^{500}\) Ibid., 367.
\(^{501}\) Ibid., 373.
It is indeed, as she states elsewhere, “a foil” for the “densely intellectual, and increasingly frenetic” fugues that enclose it.\textsuperscript{502} Einstein remarks, relatedly, that “the function of the polyphony [in K. 608] is a grandiose objectivity of expression, a monumental form of

\textsuperscript{502} Ibid., 367.
mourned that seeks to avoid the slightest trace of sentimentality.” Richards’s and Einstein’s analyses speak to Wolfgang’s successful negotiation of taste in this work with mechanical modernity; a composer of taste would not set in motion an artificial, mechanical expression of sentiment.

But what of K. 616? This piece may very well have inspired his complaint about childish little pipes, for it spans a range of only three octaves, descending only to F3. (All three staves are in the treble clef.) Wolfgang’s designation of the work in his own thematic catalogue as, “Andante for a cylinder in a small organ,” points to the diminutive scale of the instrument and, perhaps also, the work. (The other two mechanical organ pieces are entered as “A piece for an organ in a clock” and “An organ piece for a clock,” respectively.) Some scholars situate the piece in Deym’s “Schlafgemach der Grazien”; however, Einstein finds the music more nearly suited to “a magic music-box—the accompaniment for the dance of a tiny fairy princess.” Whereas K. 608 (like K. 584) may be seen to circumvent the expressive demands of taste through its engagement with the strict style (appropriate to the eulogistic function of the music), K. 616, with its delicate little flute pipes (possibly framing a bedroom scene) could not have so readily escaped sentimental discourse. Indeed, it doesn’t. Rather than circumventing the expressive demands of taste, K. 616 ironizes them by setting its “lieblich” little trills and euphonious scale fragments in parallel thirds against a hybridized formal structure whose own mechanical movements underscore those of the medium that projects them.

The rondo in F major begins with a tight-knit refrain, stated in a 16-measure antecedent-consequent period that concludes with a PAC to the tonic (ex. 3).

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503 Einstein, Mozart, 270.
504 “Andante für eine Walze in eine kleine Orgel.”
505 “Ein Stück für ein Orgelwerk in einer Uhr” and “Orgelstücke für eine Uhr.”
A brusque (and unmediated) modulation to the dominant initiates the first couplet, which confirms the new key in measure 24 (and more emphatically in measure 29) before turning efficiently back to the tonic and the main theme (m. 34). The second refrain is truncated to comprise only the first half of the refrain period (ex. 4), after which a new episode (perhaps better deemed a “development” than a “couplet”) develops the refrain’s material around
the key of D minor and prepares (by V of V and then vii of V) for the subsequent tonic key refrain.

Example 3.4: W. A. Mozart, K. 616, mm. 25-42

At this point, the refrain, first couplet, and second refrain are restated in turn, unmodified (beginning in m. 84). The second A—truncated in its previous statement—is “completed” with a consequent phrase in measures 125-131 (ex. 5). A brief coda in the tonic key concludes the piece.
Example 3.5: W. A. Mozart, K. 616, mm. 112-133
Despite the standard formal outline thus suggested, AB(A)CABA Coda, the movement adheres neither to the sonata-rondo form, nor to the less common (in this period) seven-part rondo form. The latter, as Caplin notes, expands the traditional five-part rondo with the addition of a contrasting third episode (to comprise ABACADA):508 the former, (along with what Hepokoski and Darcy call the “symmetrical seven-part rondo”) though it restates the first couplet as this piece does, prescribes its tonic transposition in the restatement. This rondo form, which incorporates a restatement of the first couplet, unaltered and untransposed into the third rotation, is unique in Mozart’s oeuvre and, possibly also, in the form as a whole. Mozart’s departure from standard formal procedures is significant; the unfolding of K. 616 undermines relationships that are intrinsic to the rondo, and from which its particular character emerges.

In its most elemental form, the rondo consists of two components, each with a distinct function: refrains repeat; episodes digress.509 The character of the rondo is predicated on this dialectical relationship between the refrain statements and the material that moves away from (and ultimately back to) them. Indeed, in the poetic form out of which the rondo grew and from which it probably gets its name, the meaning of a given refrain was gradually revealed through its accompanying strophes.510 Whether or not rondo episodes may be seen to cast light on their respective refrains, they nevertheless mark (tonal, melodic, and/or textural) contrast with and distance from them. In this context, Hepokoski and Darcy state that “[t]he rondo refrain is always a beginning. It always begins something new”:511 each refrain-couplet rotation brings new contrasts, dialogues, and shades of meaning. Even the final refrain (regardless of the presence of a coda) brings the suggestion of “something new” in the possibility of an ever-continuing

509 This is not to suggest that rondo refrains can’t have developmental characteristics, or that episodes can’t exhibit stability. Such aspects are nevertheless subsumed within the fundamental dialectic between (repeating) refrains and their intervening episodes.
pattern (ABACADA ...). Thus the rondo represents what Adorno calls an “open form,” one whose ending is non-contingent.\textsuperscript{512} In K. 616, the essential dialectic between refrains and episodes is compromised in the final rotation, as the first couplet is absorbed into the refrain’s repetition pattern. The dynamic relationship between stable refrains and digressive couplets is here transformed into a mechanical opposition between A and B, thus undermining the “openness” of the form and the suggestion of an afterlife in the listener’s imagination. Instead of bringing something dynamic and new, repetition promises to bring only more, increasingly static, repetition.

Because, as Caplin notes, the particular character of the rondo is predicated on the anticipation of return (rather than on the return itself), over the course of the eighteenth century, composers increasingly truncated or eliminated refrain sections in order to delay gratification and/or maintain forward motion. Caplin notes that in the seven-part rondo and sonata-rondo, Mozart “frequently omits the third refrain, beginning the restatement with the first couplet material”; “if he retains refrain 3 ... then he usually eliminates refrain 4.”\textsuperscript{513} This “familiarly Mozartian” procedure delays resolution of the tonic refrain;\textsuperscript{514} and, at the same time, moderates the “objective determination” and “inevitability” inherent to the form,\textsuperscript{515} by limiting the refrain statements to three. In K. 616, not only is the first large ternary section restated entirely without alteration, its second “incomplete” A is completed with a consequent phrase that expands rather than contracts the space occupied by refrain material. Whereas the truncated A launched a (relatively) dynamic development, the complete A has twice initiated the first episode (B) and the subsequent return of the refrain. As this rondo movement draws toward its conclusion, repetition closes in on itself, redefining the form from a continuous interplay of (relatively) stable refrains and (relatively) contrasting episodes, to the mechanical repetition of A and B. Even the coda, after a four-measure scalar passage, recalls, first B material (in the dotted figure in the

\textsuperscript{513} Caplin, Classical Form, 239.
\textsuperscript{514} Hepokoski and Darcy, Sonata Forms, 410.
soprano line, which resembles the main motive from the first couplet), and then, as the coda draws to a close, inevitably, A (ex. 6).

Example 3.6: W. A. Mozart, K. 616, mm. 135-end

As suggested, the third large section achieves not the resolution of an internal tension (as it would in the sonata-rondo and seven-part symmetrical rondo) nor continued developmental drive (as in the open form of the standard seven-part rondo); rather it subsumes these elements within the dominant structural repetition of A and B. This is not the conclusion of a dynamic journey but rather a pause that awaits the rewinding of the clock.

The piece, in the end, is successful, charming; as to how and why, I must side with Einstein, who argues that Mozart “allows the mechanical to perform its own function”; thus making a “game of its relations with tradition” because, after all, “mechanical music is only mechanical, and consequently inhuman.”\footnote{Einstein, \textit{Mozart}, 268.} The very structure of the rondo—its ceaseless repetition—lends itself to a critique of the mechanical medium that projects it. The
exaggerated repetition within this movement; the boxy, sectional unfolding, the reduction of dynamic tensions between stable refrains and digressive episodes to a mechanical alternation between A and B, all “make a game of its relations” not only with tradition, but with machines and mechanical modernity.

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Any reading of sentimental irony in this piece must contend with its late date. By 1791 (the date of composition), the cultural purchase of sensibility was on sharp decline. Mary Sue Morrow attributes this phenomenon—manifested in the decrease in references to expressivity among the German “review collective” in the 1780s—to the concomitant turn in critical attention toward values of invention, novelty, and original genius, in the face of which “little remained to explore the criterion of expressivity.”\textsuperscript{517} If sensibility was indeed edged out by emerging aesthetic values, the cultural and political climate of the revolutionary era must have played a part. A heightened consciousness of the excesses of sensibility informed the war-era discourse; although that consciousness may have underlain the ironic tinge of much sentimental literature, even at its height, both conservative and revolutionary agendas (in France and abroad\textsuperscript{518}) pushed that critical stance into the foreground in the final decades of the century.\textsuperscript{519} Novels such as \textit{The Illusions of Sentiment} and \textit{Errors of Sensibility} explored its tendencies toward hedonism, passivity, materialism, and fantasy—tendencies of which readers were acutely aware. A critic of the latter novel charged the protagonist with following “the impulse of his

\textsuperscript{517} Morrow, \textit{German Music Criticism}, 123.
\textsuperscript{518} G. J. Barker-Benfield positions gender at the center of both Jacobin and anti-Jacobin agendas in pre-revolutionary Britain, and identifies sensibility as a touchstone of British and continental politics in this period. \textit{The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 360-361.
passions,” which “lead him into difficulty and dangers” and “the commission of improper acts”; though his principles are good” those principles are no match for the “intemperance of his affections; and the violent acuteness of his ‘sensibility’.520 Without declaring primum movens, it is clear that aesthetic, cultural, and political conditions mutually reinforced the rise of the original genius and the relative fall of the man of feeling in mainstream literature and criticism. As the century drew to a close, references to expression, sentiment, and feeling—so prevalent in Wolfgang’s writings—receded into the periphery of a discourse now centered on invention, imagination, and fancy. The following chapter examines Haydn’s comment from the perspective of his own ideology, which accommodated, even as it frustrated, emerging values of the Geniezeit.

Chapter Four
Genius, Taste and the “Many-Headed Monster” in Joseph Haydn’s Music and Writings

“Geschmack und Compositions wissenschaft” in the Geniezeit

Viewed in context of the Geniezeit—a term denoting a set of ideas about originality and genius that dominated German aesthetic theory and criticism in the 1770s and 1780s—Haydn’s reference to Mozart’s “Geschmack und ... Compositions wissenschaft” seems entirely out of place. “Progressive” proponents of original genius had long since established tensions between knowledge, on the one hand, and the lawless workings of the imagination, on the other, as suggested by Joseph Addison’s 1713 discussion of the genius of Shakespeare, who yielded to no rule other than his own imagination:

Among the English, Shakespear has incomparably excelled all others. That noble extravagance of fancy, which he had in so great perfection, thoroughly qualified him to touch this weak superstitious part of his Reader’s imagination; and made him capable of succeeding, where he had nothing to support him besides the strength of his own genius. There is something so wild and yet so solemn in the speeches of his

ghosts, fairies, witches, and the like imaginary persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, though we have no rule by which to judge of them, and must confess, if there are such Beings in the World, it looks highly probable they should talk and act as he has represented them.522

Half a century later, Edward Young cast Addison’s viewpoint in a stronger light:523

“Learning we thank, Genius we revere; That gives pleasure, This gives us rapture; That informs, This inspires; and is itself inspired; for genius is from heaven, learning from man.”524 Dispensing with all ambiguity, Young continued:

[T]o neglect of learning, genius sometimes owes its greater glory. ... Who knows whether Shakespeare might not have thought less, if he had read more? ... For Genius may be compared to the Body’s natural strength; Learning to the superinduced Accoutrements of Arms: if the First is Equal to the proposed exploit, the Latter rather encumbers, than assists; rather retards, than promotes, the Victory.525

Young’s implication is clear: learning and knowledge rest on imitation by established rules, while genius, on the contrary, heeds only its own impulse. Denying the presumption of any intellectual inheritance, Young axiomatically concluded, “Shakespeare gave us Shakespeare.”526 Although Young’s weighted dichotomy between “Learning” and “Genius”

522 Joseph Addison, The Spectator, No. 419 (Tuesday, 1 July 1713); cited from The Works of the Right Honourable Joseph Addison, Esq., vol. 3 (London: Jacob Tonson, 1721), 513.
523 Addison defined two types of genius—the natural and the learned. (See previous note.) Although Addison granted these two kinds of genius equal value, his “concession” about the peculiar “greatness” of a natural genius such as Shakespeare anticipates Young’s bias toward nature and inspiration. See John Louis Kind, Edward Young in Germany: Historical Surveys, Influence Upon German Literature, Bibliography. ... (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1906), 8.
524 Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Composition in a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles Grandison (London: A. Millar, 1759), 36.
525 Ibid., 29-30. Young did grant a “Genius, which stands in need of Learning to make it shine”; namely “Infantine Genius; a Genius, which, like other Infants, must be nursed, and educated, or it will come to nought: Learning is its Nurse, and Tutor.” An “Adult Genius,” by contrast, “comes out of Nature’s hand, as Pallas out of Jove’s head, at full growth, and mature.” Ibid., 31-32.
526 Ibid., 78.
was not without its critics late in the century,\textsuperscript{527} the current of German aesthetic theory was already flowing in this direction, and “progressive” \textit{Stürmer und Dränger} like Johann Georg Hamann and Johann Gottfried Herder found much to agree with in Young’s theory of art.\textsuperscript{528} His \textit{Conjectures on Original Composition} was published twice in German translation in 1760 (nine months after its English-language release),\textsuperscript{529} and received overwhelmingly positive reviews in German-language periodicals throughout the subsequent two decades.\textsuperscript{530}

Young thus provided the dominant terms of discourse for the German \textit{Geniezeit}, but not the only ones. Drawing on recent critical literature by Elaine Sisman, James Webster, and others, Thomas Bauman concludes that Haydn’s consistent appeal to knowledge and learning pointed not away from the progressive discourse of genius but rather more

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\textsuperscript{527} Gottsched targeted Young’s \textit{Conjectures} in 1760, speaking for the “conservative” camp to which Haydn is sometimes seen to have belonged: “Young hätte lieber bei finstern Nachtgedanken seine Phantasie beschäftigen oder von Larven, Gespenstern und Hexenversammlungen dichten sollen, um Kinder zu erschrecken, als daß er sich in eine Abhandlung kritischer Materien gemischt hätte, denen er kein Licht anzuzünden im Stande war.” ("Young ought to have engaged his fantasy with dark \textit{Night Thoughts} [probably in reference to Young’s famous \textit{Klagen, oder Nachtgedanken}, of 1743], or written of Larvae, ghosts, and witches’ Sabbaths, to scare children, rather than mixing in critical material on which he could shed no light.”) Johann Christoph Gottsched, \textit{Das Neueste aus der Anmuthigen Gelehrsamkeit}, vol. 10, no. 9 (Autumn, 1760): 676-677; see also Matthew Wickman, “Imitating Eve Imitating Echo Imitating Originality: The Critical Reverberations of Sentimental Genius in the \textit{Conjectures on Original Composition},” \textit{English Literary History} 65 (1998): 920-21.

\textsuperscript{528} Herder wrote of Young’s \textit{Conjectures}: “der Youngische Geist drinn herrscht, der aus seinem Herzen gleichsam ins Herz; aus dem Genie in das Genie spricht; der wie der Elektrische Funke sich mittheilt.” ("The Youngian spirit rules within, which speaks from his own heart as if into another heart, out of the genius into another genius, imparting itself like the electric spark.”) Herder, \textit{Über die neuere Deutsche Litteratur: Eine Beilage zu den Briefen, die neueste Litteratur betreffend, Zwote Sammlung von Fragmenten} (1767); cited in Johann Jacob Rambach, ed., \textit{Schreiben über die Frage} (1771), 134-135. On the intellectual connection among Young, Hamann, and Herder, see Lawrence Marsden Price, \textit{The Reception of English Literature in Germany} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932), 291-293; Martin Steinke, \textit{Edward young’s ‘Conjectures on Original Composition’ in England and Germany: A Study in Literary Relations} (New York: F.C. Stechert, 1917), 21; Thomas Bauman, “Haydn and the Cult of Genius,” \textit{The Musical Quarterly} 87 (2004): 338.

\textsuperscript{529} Leipzig, 1760; Hamburg, 1760.

\textsuperscript{530} For a summary of the critical reception of Young’s \textit{Conjectures} in Germany, see Price, \textit{Reception}, 291.
narrowly away from that led by Young.\textsuperscript{531} He argues that Haydn rejected the dichotomy between innate and acquired faculties popularized by Young's \textit{Conjectures} in Germany and promoted by the young generation of \textit{Stürmer}, adhering instead to a process-oriented concept of genius that centralized (rather than subordinated) the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge underlies Haydn's (often mis-translated\textsuperscript{532}) statement that he had to "become original,"\textsuperscript{533} for it points not to any appeal to innate faculties, but rather to a series of compositional experiments that Haydn conducted in the relative aesthetic vacuum of Esterháza. Though the discourse of genius, particularly in Germany, centered on Young's \textit{Conjectures}, Bauman finds Haydn's aesthetic ideology most "congenial" to the alternative paradigm theorized by Alexander Gerard.\textsuperscript{534} Gerard's \textit{Essay on Genius}, which received favorable reviews in Germany (as \textit{Versuch über das Genie})\textsuperscript{535} rejects Young's weighted

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\item\textsuperscript{531} Bauman, "Becoming Original," 333-357.
\item\textsuperscript{532} See Ibid., 333-335.
\item\textsuperscript{533} "Wenn übrigens Haydns äussere Lage nichts weniger als glänzend war, so verschaffte sie ihm dagegen zur Ausbildung seines vielseitigen Talents die beste Gelegenheit. 'Mein Fürst war mit allen meinen Arbeiten zufrieden, ich erheilt Beyfall, ich konnte als Chef eines Orchesters Versuche machen, beobachten, was den Eindruck hervorbringt, und was ihn schwächt, also verbessern, zusetzen, wegschneiden, wagen; ich war von der Welt abgesondert, Niemand in meiner Nähe konnte mich an mir selbst irre machen und quälen, und so musste ich original werdern.' ("Although, moreover, Haydn's outward circumstance was anything but brilliant, it nevertheless provided him the best opportunity for the development of his many-sided talent. 'My Prince was content with all my works, I received approval, I could, as head of an orchestra, make experiments, observe what enhanced an effect, and what weakened it, thus improving, adding to, cutting away, and running risks. I was set apart from the world, there was nobody in my vicinity to confuse and annoy me in my course, and so I had to become original.") Georg August Griesinger, "Biographische Notizen über Joseph Haydn," \textit{Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung} 11 (19 July 1809): col. 662; cited and trans. in Bauman, "Becoming Original," 334.
\item\textsuperscript{534} Bauman, "Becoming Original," 349.
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dichotomy between nature and learning, adhering instead to a bifocal paradigm that incorporates both.

Haydn’s reference to Mozart’s taste and knowledge likewise points away from Young and toward Gerard, but not primarily for the reason that Bauman suggests (i.e., Haydn’s lifelong commitment to study and learning). For all of Young’s terminological focus on learning, his underlying agenda concerned the longstanding debate between ancients and moderns; namely, the question of whether contemporary authors should imitate classical models or create independently of them. (His clever injunction that “the less we copy the renowned Antients we shall resemble them the more” makes Young’s stance clear.536) As Bauman himself suggests, Haydn’s reference to “becoming” original is not really about the “tug of war” between imitation and originality,537 for Haydn was no more allied to the ancients than Young. Elaine Sisman’s “Haydn, Shakespeare, and the Rules of Originality” (to which Bauman refers) draws clear distinctions between the specific rules of imitation, which Haydn was prone to ignore, and the greater laws of nature and beauty, which he observed.538 A touchstone of Sisman’s argument is Griesinger’s claim that while “strict theoreticians ... found much to take exception to in Haydn’s compositions,” Haydn “soon convinced himself that a narrow adherence to the rules oftentimes yields works devoid of taste and feeling, that many things had arbitrarily taken on the stamp of rules, and that in music only what offends a discriminating ear is absolutely forbidden.”539 Haydn himself responded to a claim that all parallel fourths should be “banished from the purest style,” stating, “What does that mean? ... Art is free, and will be limited by no pedestrian

536 Young, Conjectures, 21. As suggested by this remark, Young was not anti-classical; rather, his allegiance to classicism was redirected from aesthetic to ideological (and, likewise mimetic to historically-contingent) values.
rules. The ear, assuming that it is trained, must decide, and I consider myself as competent as any to legislate here. Such affectations are worthless. I would rather someone tried to compose a really NEW minuet.”

For Haydn, training (or, by extension, knowledge), rather than stifling originality, provided independence from the “pedestrian rules” that governed imitative approaches to artistic creation. From this perspective, learning, in and of itself, does not point Haydn away from Young. Nor does it point him toward Gerard: The latter’s admission of “scientific genius” into his system, on the basis of which Bauman connects Haydn’s compositional experiments to his values, distinguishes scientific from artistic forms: the one pursues truth, the other, beauty; the one attends systematically to near relationships, the other, imaginatively to remote ones.

The more meaningful distinction between Young and Gerard (around which Bauman circles) concerns the relative attention in the two systems to the creative process. Gerard’s system centers on creative process, which relocates genius from the immediate expressive force dictated by Young to processual relations in a work of art between the parts and the whole; relations that emerge, in large part, from the taste and knowledge of the creator. From this perspective, Haydn’s reference to Mozart’s “Geschmack und ... Compositions­wissenschaft” speaks, not to Mozart’s fertility, which was taken for granted, but to his ability to weave those initial, inspired ideas into a meaningful, coherent whole. In emphasizing process, Haydn, in turn, modeled the active listener; one who, rather than the passive “victim” of the genius’s expressive thunderbolt, attends to the network of meanings that support the Gestalt creation. This ideological shift puts the onus on the

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542 Bauman distinguishes the two strands of the discourse on genius by the relative attention to process, stating that, in Gerard’s system, “what unifies various manifestations of genius in human affairs is not what genius produces but how it produces.” However, his focus on Haydn’s notion of “becoming original” inevitably steers him away from process, per se, toward matters of education and experimentation. Bauman, “Becoming Original,” 342.
listener to rise to works of genius that may not express themselves in Youngian terms. Read through Gerard, Haydn’s reference to Mozart’s taste and knowledge represents an alternative pathway to Mozart’s genius—one that challenges and elevates the audience (rather than pandering to it). This chapter reads Haydn’s remark through Gerard’s process-oriented concept of genius, positioning Haydn’s statement as a recuperation of a genius that resided on the fringe of the Young-influenced Geniezeit.

The Magician and the Architect: Young’s Subordination of Creative Process and its Bearing on Mozart’s Contemporary Reception

Young defined genius at the outset of his Conjectures as “the Power of accomplishing great things without the means generally reputed necessary to that end.” He distinguished a genius from a “good understanding” by analogy with a “Magician” and “a good Architect: that raises his structure by means invisible; this by the skilful use of common tools. Hence Genius has ever been supposed to partake of something Divine.” In his repeated allusions to magical powers, divine intervention, and inspiration, creative process was at once mystified and subordinated. Even Young’s much-cited vegetative analogy, which would seem to rest on inviolable laws and slow processes, emphasizes spontaneous and immediate growth: “An original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously, from the vital root of Genius, it grows, it is not made.” Nature, magic, and divinity, curiously intermixed, nevertheless collectively support Young’s subsumption of creative process into a collapsed moment of unintellectual, often

543 Haydn’s own music was seen to demand study and contemplation. For Burney, for example, “his compositions are in general so new to the player and hearer, that they are equally unable, at first, to keep pace with his inspiration. … What is new is of course difficult, and not only scholars but professors have it to learn. The first exclamation of an embarrassed performer and a bewildered hearer is, that the Music is very odd, or very comical; but the querness and comicality cease, when, by frequent repetition, the performer and hearer are at their ease.” Charles Burney, A General History of Music: From the Earliest Ages to the Present Period, vol. 4 (London: Payne and Son, 1789), 602.
544 Young, Conjectures, 26.
545 Ibid., 27.
546 Ibid., 12.
unconscious inspiration. From this point of view, as it rippled through British and continental aesthetic theory and criticism, the genius, whose ideas “all at once burst into full bloom,”\(^\text{547}\) acts spontaneously and rapturously, as if from divine inspiration. For William Hazlitt in the early nineteenth century, “those who have produced immortal works have done so without knowing how or why. ... Corregio, Michael Angelo, Rembrandt, did what they did without premeditation or effort—their works came from their minds as a natural birth.”\(^\text{548}\)

Hazlitt might well have included Mozart in his list of “natural” geniuses. Mozart’s prodigality reinforced the opposition between inspiration and skill (and the magician and the architect) that framed the Youngian ideology. Allusions to Mozart’s precocious abilities pervaded his contemporary reception, pointing, in some cases, to cultish aspects of the discourse. Burney marveled at Mozart’s “premature and almost supernatural talents, [which] so much astonished us in London a few years ago, when he had scarce quitted his infant state.”\(^\text{549}\) Even more vividly, Daines Barrington recalled his astonishing “powers” of invention, born from (a pseudo-mystical source) without rather than from any acquired competencies within:

Having been informed, however, that he was often visited with musical ideas, to which, even in the midst of the night, he would give utterance on his harpsichord; I told his father that I should be glad to hear some of his extemporary compositions. ... The father shook his head at this, saying, that it depended entirely upon his being, as it were, musically inspired, but that I might ask him whether he was in humour for such a composition. ... I said to the boy, that I should be glad to hear an extemporary Love Song. ... The boy ... looked back with much archness, and immediately began five or six lines of a jargon recitative proper to introduce a love

\(^{547}\) “... als wenn sie in der Zwischenzeit, wie eine Pflanze, unbemerkt fortgewachsen wären und nun auf einmal in ihrer völligen Entwicklung und Blüthe da stünden.” ("... as in that period in which plants germinate unnoticed and all at once burst into full bloom.") Johann George Sulzer, *Allgemeine Theorie*, 2:93; trans. Christensen and Baker, *Aesthetics*, 63.


\(^{549}\) Charles Burney, *The Present State of Music in France and Italy* (1771); cited from 2nd ed. (London: T. Becket, 1773), 236.
song. ... Finding that he was in humour, and as it were inspired, I then desired of him to compose a Song of Rage. ... The boy again looked back with much archness and began five or six lines of a jargon recitative proper to introduce a Song of Anger. ... This lasted about the same time as the Song of Love; and in the middle of it, he had worked himself up to such a pitch, that he beat his harpsichord like a person possessed, rising sometimes in his chair.

As suggested by these remarks, the Youngian terms of genius—which collapsed creative process into a two-pronged emphasis on natural expressions and supernatural visitations—found fertile ground in Mozart’s childhood image.

However, Young’s theory of genius could cut both ways. Spontaneity, immediacy, and the “natural”—the terms of Young’s collapsed process—took on a moral charge in the German Youngian tradition, defining a weighted dichotomy between the *Volk* and the educated elite. In the wake of Young’s German reception, Herder positioned the immediate, sensualist poetry of a “barbarous people” in opposition to the difficult and artificial productions of cultured (and educated) Europeans. His “Briefwechsel über Ossian und die Lieder alter Völker” (in *Von Deutscher Art und Kunst*, 1773) takes by example uncultured Scandinavians, who “tread[ing] on rock and ice and frozen earth,” thus contributed a folk poetry that was invigoratingly “wild” and “rude.” Such music—an enigma for the “book-learned”—does not live in the educated mind, but rather in “movement, melody, gesture, and mime.” “Savages” express themselves vigorously and clearly ... using their senses, feeling the purpose of the utterance immediately and exactly, not distracted by shadowy concepts, half-ideas, and symbolic letter-understanding ... still less corrupted by artifices, slavish.

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552 “wildes” and “rauheres”; Ibid.
553 “büchergelehrten”; Ibid., 13.
expectations, timid creeping politics, and confusing pre-meditation—blissfully ignorant of all these debilitations of the mind, they comprehend the thought as a whole with the whole word, and the word with the thought. Either they are silent, or they speak at the moment of involvement with an unpremeditated soundness, sureness, and beauty, which learned Europeans of all times could not but admire—and were bound to leave untouched.

Whereas Herder positioned folk peoples as valid creators, the Prussian poet Gottfried August Bürger elevated them, radically, to meaningful judges of artistic value. He argued that poetry should not be squandered on “flattering the ears and the hearts of the nobility,” but should rather “attune human nature to the beautiful and the good.”

Overturning the traditional “top-down” view of criticism and connoisseurship, Bürger claimed it to be “an incapacity or a lack of judgment if he [the poet] cannot acquit himself on the main street.” For Bürger, axiomatically, “the popularity of a poetic work is the seal of its perfection. Whoever betrays this principle in theory or practice leads the whole business of poetry astray and works against its true purpose.”

Herder and Bürger, along with Hamann and others, defined new terms of aesthetic value, which rippled through North German music criticism. The connoisseur and the Liebhaber were increasingly split, and both laid claim to genius.

557 “… der Menschennatur zum Anbau und Genuß des Schönen und Guten zu erhöhen.” Ibid.
558 “… Unvermögen oder Mangel an Urtheilkraft, wenn er sich nicht auf der Heerstraße halten kann.” Ibid., 274. Heerstraße (lit., military road), in this context, means “highroad,” or the surest path.
The democratic impulse of the German Youngian tradition provides an important context for examining Mozart's increasingly mixed critical and popular reception in the final decades of the century. Critics deemed him variously, "glorious—if here and there too artful"; "very learned, very difficult"; and "too difficult." In 1787 Cramer declared that Mozart was "the most skilful and best keyboard player" he had ever heard, regretting, however, that he "aims too high in his artful and truly beautiful compositions, in order to be a new creator, whereby it must be said that feeling and heart profit little; his new Quartets for two violins, viola, and bass, which he has dedicated to Haydn, may well be called too highly seasoned—and whose palate can endure this for long?" Dittersdorf likewise remarked that the Haydn Quartets, "because of their unrelenting, extreme artfulness ... are not everyone's purchase." For an unnamed critic in 1789, "The works of ... [Kozeluch] maintain themselves [in Vienna] and find access everywhere, whereas Mozart's works do not in general please quite so much. It is true, too, and his six quartets for violins, viola and bass dedicated to Haydn confirm it once again, that he has a decided leaning towards the difficult and the unusual. But then, what great and elevated ideas he has too, testifying to a

563 "fertigste, beste Clavierspieler"; “in seinem künstlichen und wirklich schönen Satz, um ein neuer Schöpfer zu werden, zu hoch versteigt, wobey freilich Empfindung und Herz wenig gewinnen, seine neuen Quartetten für 2 Violin, Viole und Baß, die er Haydn dedizirt hat, sind doch wohl zu stark gewürzt—und welcher Gaum kann das lange aushalten.” Carl Friedrich Cramer, ed., Magazin der Music (Hamburg, 23 April 1787), 2:1273; trans. in Deutsch, Documentary Biography, 290.
According to Constanze, Prince Anton Grassalkowitz was convinced that the Haydn set's many discords were not intended by the composer; and "when the late Artaria sent them [the quartets] to Italy, he received them back 'because the engraving was so very faulty'—that is, the many unfamiliar chords and dissonances were taken there for engraving errors." The censure of difficulty—which suffused contemporary criticism, not only of the Haydn set, but of much of his music from the 1770s onward—speaks to ways in which Mozart's music frustrated the terms of genius in the German Geniezeit.

Some critics spoke explicitly of Mozart’s alienation of popular audiences and popular aesthetics. Consider, for example, one critic’s account of a contemporary Viennese production of Figaro:

Herr Mozart’s music was generally admired by connoisseurs already at the first performance, if I except only those whose self-love and conceit will not allow them to find merit in anything not written by themselves. The public, however (and this often happens to the public) did not really know on the first day where it stood. It heard many a bravo from unbiased connoisseurs, but obstreperous louts in the uppermost storey exerted their hired lungs with all their might to deafen singers and audiences alike with their St! and Pst! and consequently opinions were divided at the end of the piece. Apart from that, it is true that the first performance was none of the best, owing to the difficulty of the composition. But now, after several

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565 “Die Arbeiten dieses Componisten erhalten sich und finden allenthalben Eingang, da hingegen Mozarts Werke durchgehends nicht so ganz gefallen. Wahr ist es auch, und seine Haydn dedizirten sechs Quartetten für Violinen, Bratsche und Baß, bestätigen es aufs neue, daß er einen entschiedenen Hang für das Schwere und Ungewöhnliche hat. Aber was hat er auch große und erhabene Gedanken, die einen kühnen Geist verrathen!” Carl Friedrich Cramer, ed., Magazin der Music, Copenhagen (July 1789); trans. in Deutsch, Documentary, 349.


performances, one would be subscribing either to the cabal or to tastelessness if one were to maintain that Herr Mozart’s music is anything but a masterpiece of art. It contains so many beauties, and such a wealth of ideas, as can be drawn only from the source of innate genius.568

Such divided opinions are perhaps to be expected, given Mozart’s own allegiances: When implored by his father not to “forget the so-called popular style, which tickles long ears,” because “for every ten real connoisseurs there are a hundred illiterates,”569 Mozart quipped, “concerning the so-called popular taste, do not worry about it, since there is music in my opera for all kinds of people—with the exception of long ears.”570 Mozart clearly did not hold his music’s reception “am Heerstraße” to be the “seal of its perfection.” Nor, as I shall argue, did Haydn.


570 To Leopold Mozart, 16 December 1780: “wegen dem sogenannten Popolare sorgen sie nichts, denn, in meiner Oper ist Musik für aller Gattung leute; —ausgenommen für lange ohren nicht.” Deutsch, et. al., Briefe und Aufzeichnungen, 3: 60; trans., Anderson, Letters, 690.
Haydn’s writings, biography, and music embody a system of aesthetic value alternative to that promoted by Young and the German *Sturm und Drang*, namely, that of Alexander Gerard.\footnote{Haydn presumably didn’t know Gerard’s writings—there is certainly no evidence that he did—and I therefore do not seek intertextual connections between them. Rather, I argue that Haydn’s ideology is compatible with Gerard’s philosophy, and that Haydn’s concept of taste can be meaningfully illuminated through the lens of Gerard’s system.} Whereas Young focused his theoretical attention on the “idea,” Gerard’s treatise is concerned with the process of developing that first inspired kernel into a meaningful whole. Thus (recalling Young’s antinomy between the magician and the architect) Gerard referred to the genius as the “grand Architect, which not only chuses the materials, but disposes them into a regular structure.”\footnote{Alexander Gerard, *Essay on Taste* (London: A. Miller, 1759), 176. It should be noted that Gerard’s system inverts the commonplace antimony between “form as architecture” and “form as process.” As Reinhold Brinkmann writes, “form as architecture is constructed symmetry, reference to a center, the figure of a circle, being-in-itself. Form as process is directedness, dynamic forward motion, the metaphor of the arrow, and an emphasis on the finality and goal orientedness of musical form.” Here, as suggested, architecture metaphorizes the dynamic relationships of the parts to the whole. Reinhold Brinkmann, “In the Time(s) of the ‘Eroica’,” trans., Irene Zedlacher, in *Beethoven and his World*, ed. Scott Burnham and Michael Steinberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 17.} To align Haydn with Gerard is not to deny his allegiance to “natural,” God-given aspects of genius, for Haydn characterized his own creative capacities in just such “natural” terms. In his autobiographical sketch, he offered the following explanation of his talents: “Almighty God (to whom alone I owe the most profound gratitude) endowed me, especially in music, with such proficiency that even in my 6th year I was able to sing some Masses in the choir-loft, and to play a little on the harpsichord and violin.”\footnote{“… Gott der allmächtige (welchen ich alleinig so unermessene gnade zu dancken) gab mir besonders in der Music so viele leichtigkeit, indem ich schon in meinen 6ten Jahr ganz}
His theoretical raisonnements were very simple: namely, a piece of music ought to have a fluent melody, coherent ideas, no superfluous ornaments, nothing overdone, no confusing accompaniment and so forth. How to satisfy these requirements? That, he confessed himself, cannot be learned by rules, and simply depends on natural talent and on the inspiration of inborn genius.575 Nevertheless, Haydn’s concept of genius did not stop at the “inspired” idea. In his famous remarks on his compositional processes, Haydn prioritized the treatment and development of ideas, rather than (solely) the ideas themselves:

Once I had seized upon an idea, my whole endeavor was to develop and sustain it in keeping with the rules of the art. ... This is what so many younger composers lack: they string one little idea after another; they break off when they have scarcely begun. Hence nothing remains in the heart after one has heard it.576

As a teacher too, Haydn concerned himself primarily with the student’s treatment of the first inspired idea. The Swedish diplomat and music-lover F. S. Silverstolpe reported:

Once when I visited Haydn, he was looking through a work of a student. As Haydn inspected the draft and noticed a long period in which the winds were silent, he made a pleasantry and said in a half-joking tone: ‘Rests are the hardest things of all to write; you have done well to keep in mind how effective long pianos can be.’ The longer he read, the darker became his expression. ‘I have nothing to criticize about the part-writing,’ he said, ‘it is correct. However, the proportions are not as I would


576 “Hatte ich eine Idee erhascht, so ging mein ganzes Bestreben dahin, sie den Regeln der Kunst gemäß auszuführen und zu souteniren. ... und das ist es, was so vielen unserer neuen Komponisten fehlt; sie reihen ein Stückchen an das andere, sie brechen ab, wenn sie kaum angefangen haben: aber es bleibt auch nichts im Herzen sitzen, wenn man es angehört hat.” Griesinger, Haydn, 114; trans., Gotwals, Haydn, 61.
wish. Look here: this idea is only half complete; it shouldn’t be abandoned so quickly. And this phrase is poorly related to the others. Try to give a proper balance to the whole; that can’t be too difficult, because the main idea is good.577

As suggested, the “idea” is one facet of Haydn’s broader focus on the treatment, balance, and development of materials that collectively support the Gestalt creation.

Haydn’s attention to process in these passages is further supported by a rich critical literature focusing on his music and working methods.578 Prominent among these writings


578 These processual aspects of Haydn’s music may be manifestations of his compositional priorities and procedures. Hollace Ann Schafer’s “A Wisely Ordered Phantasie: Joseph Haydn’s Creative Process from the Sketches and Drafts for Instrumental Music” reads into Haydn’s preliminary sketches a concerted emphasis on process, on interrelated and interlocking events that support long-range coherence. On the basis of Haydn’s sketches, Schafer identifies a three-phased compositional procedure involving, in turn, fantasizing, composing, and arranging. These terms, phantasieren, componieren, setzen, derive from Haydn’s own writings. [He references fantasizing in a passage quoted by Griesinger [Griesinger, Biographische Notizen, 78.]; he references composing and arranging in a letter of 1787, regarding Op. 50, Nos. 5 and 6. [See James Webster, “The Chronology of Haydn’s String Quartets,” Musical Quarterly 51 [1975], 27-28.] The three-stage compositional process suggested here in turn resonates with broader eighteenth-century concepts of artistic creation, such as those outlined by Koch: Anlage [layout], Ausführung [realization], and Ausarbeitung [elaboration]. [See Koch, Versuch, 52.] Whereas fantasizing generated the work’s central “ideas,” the second phase—resulting in a continuous, though incomplete, version of the work—created processual coherence and connections. Ink color, emplacement, and treatment at formal “joints,” as presented on these “continuity drafts,” suggest that, “before beginning to write, Haydn seemed already to have the interconnected building blocks for his piece well in mind.” From the perspective of these sketches, Haydn
is James Webster’s, *The Farewell Symphony and the Idea of the Classical Style*. The “Farewell Symphony” (No. 45, F# minor) is the touchstone of Webster’s comprehensive study of progressive and through-composed aspects of Haydn’s music, which instantiate a connection between his marginalized “early” output and some of the most frequently heralded aspects of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony and the romantic musical aesthetic. Webster emphasizes Haydn’s use of destabilizing effects, through which he “alters or manipulates conventional principles of construction, creating a tonal, gestural, or psychological progression across what would ordinarily function as a strong boundary.”

Although, as Webster cautions, an historiographical bias undergirds the (mis)conception of eighteenth-century music in general as supporting the “form as shape” model of musical meaning (as opposed to the “form-as-process” model associated with Beethoven and Romanticism), Haydn’s instrumental music emerges in Webster’s text as demonstrably process-oriented.


580 Ibid., 123. More recently, Karol Berger defines “the origins of musical modernity” by the shift in musical time, exhibited in the productions of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven, from “cycle” to “arrow”; that is, from a succession to a trajectory, in which the “experience of linear time” became “essential subject matter.” Karol Berger, *Bach’s Cycle, Mozart’s Arrow: An Essay on the Origins of Musical Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 6-9; quoted from pg. 9.

581 Webster’s study has informed much subsequent thinking about Haydn’s music and the notion of the “classical style.” For example, Pierpaolo Polzonetti draws on Webster’s study in his “Haydn and the *Metamorphoses* of Ovid” to argue that the ancient concept of *textus*, as defining independent stories woven into a cohesive discourse, applies both to Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* and, by analogy, Haydn’s treatment of large-scale form. For Polzonetti, both Haydn and Ovid cultivated in their works an “interlacing of a vertical and a horizontal series of threads, like a shuttling between weft and warp.” Although not explicitly concerned with process, Polzonetti’s reading emphasizes Haydn concerted attention to unfolding musical structure in a variety of instrumental genres. Pierpaolo Polzonetti, “Haydn and the Metamorphoses of Ovid,” in *Engaging Haydn: Culture, Context, and Criticism*, eds. Mary Hunter and Richard Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 211.
Compositional, narrative, tonal, and motivic processes are likewise prominent in Haydn’s vocal music. Even The Creation, a work whose “sublime strains” point to the German Youngian tradition, may be seen to transcend the sum of its raw stimuli to reveal movement and dynamism, as exemplified by the Chaos-Light sequence that initiates the work. For Webster (elsewhere), “The sublime effect depends on his integration of three separate movements—overture, recitative, chorus—into a single progression that moves from paradoxical disorder to triumphant order.” Webster locates the sublime beyond the paralyzing drama of its awesome performance forces; according to Wiebke Thörmalen, Haydn did as well. His participation in and promotion of numerous small-scale arrangements of The Creation suggest that he too reached beyond its capacity to stun and stupefy the listener, as it was poised to do in large-scale performance contexts. Even this brief survey exhibits the scholarly attention to processual meanings in Haydn’s music. Less understood is the connection between Haydn’s concern for process and the aesthetic and moral compass that guided his creative endeavors. This connection rests on an understanding of taste.

582 Gabriele von Baumberg’s conflation of the Creation with The Creation speaks best to the tendencies of its reception toward Young’s collapsed (and mystified) process. In a 1799 broadsheet at the Burgtheater premier, Baumberg wrote, “Now you have created your ‘Let there be!’ … The entire Creation for the second time. … Thus we pay tribute to … the omnipotence of your magic tones / And to you, the God of harmony.” cited in James Webster, “The Creation, Haydn’s Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Sublime,” in Haydn and his World, ed. Elaine Sisman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 96.

583 For Schenker, for example, “Music, as an art that unfolds through time, is well placed to represent Chaos: the first vibrations and movements, the first stirrings of dark forces, the coming into being, of giving birth, at last the light, the day, the creation. (… so ist denn die Musik als eine in der Zeit sich entfaltende Kunst sehr wohl in der Lage, das Chaos wiederzugeben: die ersten Erschütterungen und Bewegungen, das erste Wühlen dunkler Kräfte, das Werden, gebären, endlich das Licht, den Tag, die Schöpfung!)” Heinrich Schenker, “Haydn: Die Schöpfung: Die Vortstellung des Chaos,” in Das Meisterwerk in der Musik, vol. 2 (Munich: Dri Masken Verlag, 1926), 161; trans. as “The Representation of Chaos from Haydn’s Creation,” in The Masterwork in Music, vol. 2, ed. and trans. William Drabkin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 97.

584 James Webster, “The Creation, Haydn’s Late Vocal Music, and the Musical Sublime,” in Haydn and his World, ed. Elaine Sisman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 66; see also Table 2, which enumerates compound movements and movement-pairs in Haydn’s large-scale vocal music. Ibid., 67-68.

Process and Taste

As suggested, Haydn’s emphasis on process, the succession of interrelated events that serve a coherent end, resonates with the set of ideas about genius presented by Alexander Gerard. For Gerard, “[e]very work of genius is a whole, made up by the regular combination of different degrees of relation which the part bear to one another and to the end. ...” \[586\] For the imagination produces an abundance of glaring, brilliant thoughts; but not one being conducive to any fixt design, nor organized into one whole, they can be regarded only as an abortion of fancy, not as the legitimate progeny of genius. A multitude of ideas, collected by such an imagination, form a confused chaos, in which inconsistent conceptions are often mixt, conceptions so unsuitable and disproportioned, that they can no more be combined into one regular work, than a number of wheels taken from different watches, can be united into one machine. \[587\] The task of organizing and relating those “brilliant thoughts” into a coherent whole is that of judgment. In Gerard, judgment does not defer its decisions until the work is complete; rather, it is partnered with fancy to fulfill its operations:

In a man of genius, imagination can scarce take a single step, but judgment should attend it. ... As a rich soil produces not only the largest quantity of grain, but also the greatest profusion of such weeds as tend to choak it; so a fertile imagination, along with just and useful ideas, produces many trifling, false, and improper thoughts, which, if they be not immediately examined by reason, and speedily rejected, will over-run and obstruct the truth or the beauty which the others might have produced. \[588\]

For Gerard, there are in fact two species of judgment: “judgment of truth, and judgment of beauty. To the former, the name [judgment] is most commonly appropriated: the latter is called taste.” \[589\] Both forms of judgment are partnered with fancy to execute ideas; both are

\[586\] Gerard, Genius, 84.
\[587\] Ibid., 49.
\[588\] Ibid., 75-76.
\[589\] Ibid., 279.
central to the creative process that defines the work of genius. Taste is a faculty of imagination, which both checks and directs fancy's exertions; judgment is a faculty of reason, which perceives fancy's "rectitude or its errors, as it were scientifical; its decisions are founded on reflection, and produce a conviction of their justness." The former pursues beauty; the latter, truth. They are united "in their greatest strength" in productions of genius. Haydn's reference to Mozart's taste and knowledge corresponds to these two species of judgment, which define Mozart's genius, not only by the wealth of his ideas, but also their treatment and the relationships established between them.

Although both species of judgment contribute to the creative process, Gerard grants taste a unique role in works of artistic genius by stationing it in the imagination, itself. In the artist, taste exerts itself continually, restraining, regulating, and directing fancy; surveying the conceptions which that faculty has suggested, approving them when they are suitable to it, perceiving what is faulty, rejecting what is redundant, marking what is incomplete, correcting and perfecting the whole. Taste thus ensures the avoidance of the "foreign, useless, and superfluous conceptions, at the same time that none necessary or proper are passed by, which is always most perfect in the greatest geniuses." A lesser artist, "who throws out indigested notions, contradictory

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590 Ibid., 299.
591 Gerard explicitly locates taste in the imagination (and understanding in reason) and thus, significantly, elevates the former to an active, creative faculty: "They [genius and taste] must be connected in a considerable degree, since they both spring from imagination: but as it is differently exerted in each, their connection will not be perfectly accurate and uniform." Gerard, Essay on Taste, 177.
592 As Bauman argues, understanding is not comprised of the blind acquisition of rules; rather, it accumulates through observation, comparison, and reasoning. Each testimony of another is scrutinized according to the authority of the claim: "We consider the characters and the number of the witnesses … their opportunities of knowing the truth; and we estimate by these circumstances, the degree of credibility which belongs to their reports. We compare the subject of their testimony with our own experience, and give greater or less credit to it according to its probability." In this way, empirical knowledge, i.e., that "deduced from experience," provides the foundation for judgment. Gerard, Essay on Genius, 298.
593 Ibid., 86.
594 Ibid., 392.
595 Ibid., 47.
positions, trite and vulgar sentiments, or foolish whimsies, is not said to have invented them, but is rather blamed for not having avoided them.”

However, taste is no mere check on fancy; taste is rather the partner of invention, itself stemming from imagination. To be sure, “taste regulates fancy,” but it also “instigates it.” It works alongside and is coupled with fancy to fulfill the operations of genius.

Concluding, Gerard emphasizes the creative capacity of taste still further: “In most instances, it is taste alone, that directs and animates his observation of Nature, makes fancy retain a lively conception of it, and run into the view of every thing that can contribute to express it. … Without an impulse from taste, imagination could not begin to act.” Of course, taste, in equal measure, needs its impulse from fancy, “but if a person be possessed of this, nothing is necessary to make it blaze forth, but a high taste of some object adapted to it.”

By this means, “a person’s genius and his taste are correspondent. What he approves, and what he can produce, are of the same kind, and marked with the same character.”

As suggested, the integrity of a Gestalt creation depends on the regulating and directing impulse of taste. In these activities, taste as process comes into prominence. It assists fancy not only to introduce proper ideas, but also to connect the design of the whole with every idea that is introduced. When the design is steadily kept in view, and the mind so formed as to be strongly affected by that associating quality by which the design is related to the means of executing it, the imagination can scarce fail of being regular and correct. They [related concepts] will occur and be observed, while the rest never come into view, or, if they make their appearance, are rejected so quickly that we instantly forget our ever having thought of them. No sooner does the

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596 Ibid., 37.
597 Ibid., 392.
598 Ibid., 393.
599 Ibid., 395.
600 Ibid., 396.
601 Ibid., 399.
602 Young, Conjectures, 37. Even Young cautions against the “mere fancied Genius”; the “Fairland of Fancy” in which “Genius may wander wild”; where it abuses its “creative power,” “reign[ing] arbitrarily over its own empire of Chimeras.” Young, Conjectures, 37.
imagination, in a moment of wandering, suggest any idea not conducive to the
design, than the conception of this design breaks in of its own accord and, like an
antagonist muscle, counteracting the other association, draws us off to the view of a
more proper idea.\footnote{Gerard, \textit{Essay on Genius}, 46.}

If fancy marks the beginning and the end, taste lays the track for the journey,\footnote{Taste “gives ... fancy a direction”; and thus “gives genius its particular form and track.” \textit{Ibid.}, 397.} and thus (partnered with knowledge) defines the relationship of the parts to the whole. In Gerard, taste and knowledge are driving components of productions of genius.

Genius, Taste, and the “Many-Headed Monster”

A genius that expresses itself not only in the “ideas” but also in the treatment of and
collections between them requires an attentive and engaged ear to apprehend it:
The most conspicuous virtues will be at first perceived. Farther application will
discover such as lie too deep to strike a superficial eye; especially if we aid our own
acuteness by the observations of those, whose superior penetration, or more
accurate study has produced a genuine subtlety of taste. An able master or an
ingenious critic will point out to a novice, many qualities in the composition of
genius or the productions of art which, without such assistance, would have long
perhaps always remained undiscovered by him.\footnote{Gerard, \textit{Essay on Taste}, 126.}

Far from the passive listener or “distressed patient” of the Youngian school,\footnote{Young, \textit{Conjectures}, 85.} Gerard’s
listener actively pursues connections and meanings that lie beneath the surface of the
music. With the “master” as his guide, the listener becomes the agent of his own
experience—and, through “repeated discoveries of this kind ... [which] beget ... an habitual
refinement, a capacity of making similar ones, with facility and quickness”—\footnote{Gerard, \textit{Essay on Taste}, 127.} his own
improvement. For Gerard, these discoveries occur in the apprehension of the work’s

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\textsuperscript{603} Gerard, \textit{Essay on Genius}, 46.
\textsuperscript{604} Taste “gives ... fancy a direction”; and thus “gives genius its particular form and track.” \textit{Ibid.}, 397.
\textsuperscript{605} Gerard, \textit{Essay on Taste}, 126.
\textsuperscript{606} Young, \textit{Conjectures}, 85.
\textsuperscript{607} Gerard, \textit{Essay on Taste}, 127.
processual meanings; these, “being remote, and veiled ... give exercise to our faculties; and, 
by drawing out the vigour of the mind, continue to please, when the grosser and more 
palpable qualities have entirely palled upon the sense.”608 From this perspective, process 
emerges as a generating impulse in the listener’s aesthetic education.

Education should not be confused with rule-boundedness. As Gerard cautions, “Care 
however must be taken ... to avoid that scrupulous formality, often substituted for true 
correctness, which will allow no deviation from established rules. To disapprove a 
transgression of a general law, when the spirit is observed, and when the end is, perhaps 
more effectually, promoted, is not justness but servility and narrowness of taste.”609 
Servility is indeed a form of passivity, which “makes us unable to relish any thing, but what 
falls in with it, and thus perverts and prejudices our judgment. Hence generally proceeds 
the depravity of public taste, and the pernicious influence it has on public entertainments 
and dramatic works; and hence, in a great measure, the connection of the taste of a people 
with their morals.”610 Here, the broader implications of Gerard’s treatise come into focus. 
“False taste” may lead the public into depravity, not only in culture and aesthetics, but 
morally as well. For Gerard, active engagement with works of genius, their underlying 
processes and connections, supports the aesthetic education of the public and, through this, 
the improvement of the moral social body. In commending Mozart’s taste and knowledge, 
Haydn endowed him with faculties that supported this broad cultural agenda.

Perhaps this may explain why Haydn wished to convince “every friend of music” of 
Mozart’s great worth. When contemplating composing an opera buffa, Haydn felt that he 
should be risking a great deal, for scarcely any man can brook comparison with the 
great Mozart. If I could only impress on the soul of every friend of music, and on 
high personages in particular, how inimitable are Mozart’s works, how profound, 
how musically intelligent, how extraordinarily sensitive (for this is how I

608 Ibid., 122.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid., 145.
understand them, how I feel them) why then the nations would vie with each other to possess such a jewel.\textsuperscript{611}

In a letter to Johann Michael von Puchberg (best known as Mozart’s friend and benefactor) shortly after Mozart’s death, Haydn wrote, similarly,

> For some time I was beside myself about his death and I could not believe that Providence would so soon claim the life of such an indispensable man. I only regret that before his death he could not convince the English, who walk in darkness in this respect, of his greatness—a subject about which I have been sermonizing to them every day.\textsuperscript{612}

Whereas for Johann Friedrich Schink, “The beauty, greatness, and nobility of the music for Don Juan will never appeal anywhere to more than a handful of the elect,”\textsuperscript{613} Haydn sought to “convince the English” of—indeed, to “impress on the soul of every friend of music”—the great value of Mozart’s music. Though it demanded active engagement with its internal processes, it promised, in turn, pleasure, education, and moral improvement.

Haydn’s investment in the “general population” with respect to his own music is well documented. In a letter to a London publisher concerning a series of sacred orchestral pieces commissioned by Cádiz for performance during Holy Week, he specifically addressed the needs of the inexperienced listener:


\textsuperscript{612} “Ich war über seinen Tod eine geraume Zeit ganz außer mir und konnte es nicht glauben, dass die Vorsicht so schnell einen unersetzlichen Mann in die andere Welt fördern sollte, nur allein bedaure ich, daß Er nicht zuvor die noch dunkeln Engländer darin hat überzeugen können, wovon ich derselben täglich predige.” trans., Landon, \textit{CCLN}, 131.

Each sonata, or rather each setting of the text, is expressed only by instrumental music, but in such a way that it creates the most profound impression even on the most inexperienced listener. The whole work lasts a little more than one hour, but there is a bit of a pause after each sonata so that one can contemplate the following text.  

This attention to the abilities and limitations of the novice, though acknowledged, has been understood in recent critical literature as part of a complex juggling act with discrete, segmented audience spheres. Consider, prominently, Elaine Sisman’s “Haydn and the Idea of the Multiple Audience.” For Sisman, a touchstone of Haydn’s careful negotiation of disparate audience spheres is his set of sonatas dedicated to the Auenbrugger sisters (Hob. XVI, 35-39, 20). In a letter to Artaria in preparation of their publication, Haydn felt it necessary, in order to forestall the criticisms of any witlings, to print on the reverse side of the title page the following sentence, here underlined: **Among these 6 sonatas there are two single movements in which the same subject occurs through several bars: the author has done this intentionally, to show different methods of treatment. For of course I could have chosen a hundred other ideas instead of this one; but so that the whole opus will not be exposed to blame on account of this one intentional detail (which the critics and especially my enemies might interpret wrongly) I think that this advertisement or something like it must be appended, otherwise the sale might be hindered thereby.**
In Sisman’s reading, the overlapping material in Nos. 36 and 39 reflects the broader division of the work into two half sets, one for each sister, according to her abilities. The balanced, dilettantish first sonatas, 35, 36, and 37, would appeal to Katharina, while the more complex, connoisseurial ones, 38, 39, and 20, would suit Marianna. The repeated material highlights the symmetrical division of the set, as well its organization according to the players’ abilities. The published preface would, in turn, ward off “pesky critics” by explaining the necessity of two “types” of treatment, while speaking to a third category of audience, the connoisseurial critic.

The Auenbrugger letter and published preface indeed speak to an audience distinct from the domestic musician for whom the set was intended, thereby supporting Sisman’s reading of Haydn and the multiple audience. However, Haydn’s concern for processual meanings in the music signals a further dimension of that relationship, one that has received comparatively little attention. Active engagement with internal processes in the music elevated the *dilettante* to the level of understanding enjoyed by the connoisseur, supporting the unification—as opposed to the “mere” accommodation—of Haydn’s variegated audience. Returning to the Auenbrugger set, if the shared theme might be seen to reflect the distance between the two sonatas—i.e., their suitability for players of differing abilities—it may also be seen to signal a progressive continuity across the set. After all, the published preface states that Haydn repeated the theme intentionally, as a “continuation of the same sentiment” (*Continuazione del Sentimento medesimo*), although the authorship of this phrase is uncertain; and his notion, in his letter to Artaria, of “showing different treatments” of the theme suggests that the player would engage both treatments as well as the relationships between them. From this perspective, the paired movements present an instance of dialogue and continuity rather than division. That the set would not be played continuously suggests that the dialogue functioned, not for the

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listener (who may only hear one sonata), but for the player and (thus) student of the music. The set’s unfolding thus enacts “process as education,” as the player engages deeper meanings born of clearer, earlier ones. Whereas Sisman’s reading emphasizes Haydn’s dialogue with discrete audience spheres (in this case pointing to the different abilities of the two sisters), my reading, by extension, suggests his intention to transcend those distinctions through a progressive continuity across the set.

Melanie Lowe’s *Pleasure and Meaning in the Classical Symphony* presents another good example of the tendency to view Haydn’s music as encoding multiple, disparate meanings. For Lowe, Haydn’s late symphonies invited multiple, discrete interpretive responses that corresponded to the variegation within the late eighteenth century “public concert audience.” Social, cultural, and political forces contributed to the merging, but not necessarily the melding, of the *Kenner* and the *Liebhaber*, the commoner and the king; for Lowe, Haydn’s symphonies encoded meanings specifically intended for listeners from these disparate spheres. Lowe reads the minuet from Haydn’s Symphony No. 93 as presenting clear signifiers of the folk Deutscher, while retaining “hints of the minuet’s traditional nobility ... just beneath the surface”; the variegated audience chooses “whether the character defined here is a masquerading aristocrat, a commoner with a touch of ‘uncommon’ dignity, or even a ‘character at all,’” according (as her broader thesis suggests) to his own identification with those characters. Nevertheless, her constructed characters already defy the segregation on which her thesis rests, while pointing to another function of these interwoven musical signifiers—namely, the unification of disparate audience spheres and the elevation of the “general population” to the level of understanding enjoyed by the connoisseur.

David Schroeder identifies an even larger-scale progression through Haydn’s 12 London symphonies. For Schroeder, the increasing complexity of the symphonies

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618 Ibid.
619 Ibid.
620 Ibid.
(organized into four sets of three symphonies each) reflects Haydn’s sense of the need to “secure approbation” before making great “intellectual demands (and moral content, in the eighteenth-century sense).”\textsuperscript{622} Schroeder views “the extraordinary fusions of opposing ideas within small passages that occur in Nos. 102 and 103” as pointing “to one of the highest goals of the Enlightenment,” representing values of “unity,” “coexistence,” and the “need for tolerance.”\textsuperscript{623} Schroeder might have gone further to argue that this large-scale didactic progression—presented to what was likely a more diverse audience than Schroeder acknowledges—not only represented unity, but also sought to instantiate it by gradually elevating the inexperienced listener to the level of complexity enjoyed by the connoisseur. From the unfolding meanings in a three-note cell to the presentation of 12 symphonies over a four-year period, process is enlisted in Haydn’s pursuit of an elevated, enlightened, unified audience.\textsuperscript{624}

Not everyone would agree with Haydn (as I read him) that the “multiple audience” could be unified and elevated.\textsuperscript{625} Whereas Haydn’s aesthetic ideology, as reflected in his writings and his music, centered on the transcendence of these disparate audience spheres (such that active engagement with works of genius—their underlying processual meanings—supported the aesthetic education of the “general” public and, through this, the development of universal good taste), for Mozart, taste and tastes proved increasingly irreconcilable. Just as Haydn’s music “answers” the call for a unified voice, Mozart’s music voices his own—decidedly more cynical—stance. The following section explores Mozart’s

\textsuperscript{622} Ibid., 70.
\textsuperscript{623} Ibid., 70-71.
\textsuperscript{625} Pope’s 1737 epistle to Augustus II exhibits how entrenched and enduring the problem of the multiple audience was. For Pope, the pit wanted humour, the nobility wanted pomp, and if the playwright managed to provide these disparate, sometimes conflicting demands, his glory would nevertheless find “but short repose, / A breat revives him, or a breath o’erthrows.” Alexander Pope, \textit{The First Epistle of the Second Book of Horace, Imitated} (London: T. Cooper, 1737), 17-18.
expression of the tensions between his expressive voice and the multiple audience, as reflected in Don Giovanni.

Framing the Diegesis: Genius, Individualism, and the “multiple audience” in Don Giovanni

Many nineteenth-century critics declared Mozart’s Don Giovanni a work of genius; the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard came nearest to declaring it a work about genius. His “The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical Erotic,” published in the collection of essays entitled Either/Or, presents an argument for the “classicism” of Mozart’s Don Giovanni; not vis-à-vis antiquity, but rather, according to his own definition, as reflected in the deep harmony in the work between the subject matter and the form. Kierkegaard’s classicism thus redefined does, however, rest on an ancient view of cosmic order; a “ruling wisdom especially wonderful at uniting what belongs together, Axel with Valborg, Homer with the Trojan War, Raphael with Catholicism, Mozart with Don Juan.” Ultimately (and for all that it presents a paradox in his concept of classicism) Don Giovanni rises above these other examples; although all of these “classic works” unite content (i.e., subject matter) and form in perfect harmony, Don Giovanni unites them in an expression of

627 “In a classic work, good fortune—that which makes it classic and immortal—is the absolute correlation of the two forces. ... Only when the idea is brought to rest and transparency in a definite form can there be any question of a classic work, but then it will also be capable of withstanding the times. This unity, this mutual intimacy in each other, every classic work has.” Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, Part I, ed. and trans., Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 53-54.
628 Ibid., 47.
the purest aesthetic idea: the sensual.\textsuperscript{629} As an individual, Don Juan is antisocial and pathological; as music, he is the “infinitude of passion,”\textsuperscript{630} the “wild craving of desire,”\textsuperscript{631} a “force of nature,”\textsuperscript{632} hovering “between being idea—that is, power, life—and being an individual.”\textsuperscript{633} In Don Giovanni, the prescribed harmony (i.e., between content and form) is elevated to unity, as the subject matter and its expression collapse into a universal, abstract notion of sensuality. Don Giovanni, thematizing sensuality in both content (the Don’s erotic genius) and form (the inherent sensuality of music), is the most complete expression of the aesthetic idea: “The most abstract idea—sensuous genius—is only expressible in music. ... In the erotic-sensuous genius, music has its absolute object.”\textsuperscript{634} This abstraction of sensuality permits Kierkegaard to mirror affections felt for the don in his adulation of Mozart:

\begin{quote}
Immortal Mozart! Thou to whom I owe everything; to whom I owe the loss of my reason, the wonder that caused my soul to tremble, the fear that gripped my innermost being; you, who are the reason I did not go through life without there being something that could make me tremble; you, whom I thank for the fact that I shall not have died without having loved, even though my love was unhappy.\textsuperscript{635}
\end{quote}

The conspicuous symmetry between Kierkegaard’s (self-proclaimed feminizing) passion for Mozart and women’s passion for the Don was surely no coincidence; it reinforces the deep harmony between erotic and aesthetic sensualities that is the basis of his criticism of

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\textsuperscript{629} “The most abstract idea conceivable is the spirit of sensuality. But in what medium can it be represented? The medium farthest removed from language. It cannot be represented in sculpture, and it cannot be painted, for it cannot be grasped in fixed contours; it is an energy, a storm, impatience, passion, existing not in a single moment but in a succession of moments. Nor can it be represented in poetry. The only medium that can represent it is music. Music has an element of time in it yet it does not lapse in time except in an unimportant sense. We have the perfect unity of this idea and its corresponding form in Mozart’s Don Giovanni.” Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{630} Ibid., 107.
\textsuperscript{631} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{632} Ibid., 96.
\textsuperscript{633} Ibid., 92; “When he [Don Juan] is conceived in music, then I do not have the particular individual, then I have a force of nature, the demonic, which no more wearies of seducing or is through with seducing than the wind with blowing a gale, the sea with rocking, or a waterfall with plunging down from the heights.” Ibid.
\textsuperscript{634} Ibid., 85.
\textsuperscript{635} Ibid., 49.
\end{flushright}
the opera. It also, perhaps more importantly, raises provocative questions about the relationship between Mozart and the character that he brings to life.

In pointing to this feature of Kierkegaard’s system, my purpose is not to suggest that Mozart “is” the Don in any narrow sense, or that the work is autobiographical; rather, that Mozart exploits the analogical relationship between his and Giovanni’s respective arts of persuasion to invest the work with a commentary on his own genius; one that marks a schism between taste and tastes. My point of entry into this subtextual meaning of Don Giovanni is the role of diegesis in the work. Prominently identified with film theory, diegetic music refers to “music that (apparently) issues from a source within the narrative,” and thus distinguishes music that participates in the drama from that which interprets and/or enhances it. Recent scholarship has enlisted narratology—here referring to the Platonic distinction between mimesis and diegesis—in complex discussions of the operatic universe, its participants, and authors. In these discussions, voice emerges as the site of tension, ambiguity, and encoded meanings. A canonic, if cheeky, problematization of filmic voice occurs in Mel Brook’s satirical western comedy, Blazing Saddles. The apparently nondiegetic soundtrack accompanying Bart Gucci’s romantic canter through the desert is recast as diegetic as the camera pans to an absurd desert bandstand on which Count Basie and his orchestra conclude the tune that has been accompanying him. On one level, Brook’s gag highlights the fluidity of these spheres; however, in predicking that fluidity on an absurd narrative conceit, Brook also—paradoxically—underscores the

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637 This relatively straightforward opposition is complicated by terminological issues. Étienne Souriau repurposed classical terminology for narrative mode—Plato defined diegesis as pure narrative and is contrasted to mimetic representation, in which authorial voice is mediated by characters. If Platonic mimesis (rather than diegesis) seems better suited to contemporary usage, that needn’t concern us here. My purpose is simply to examine the music that presents itself within the fictive universe. Étienne Souriau, “La structure d’univers filmique et le vocabulaire de la filmologie,” *Revue International de Filmologie* 7, no. 8 (1951): 231-240.
distance between them. The desert bandstand bridges these realms, and, in the process, highlights the gap that it spans.⁶³⁹

Fluidity and tension likewise coextensively mark the movement between opera’s narrative spheres. To be sure, the inherent slipperiness between “song as speech” and “song as song” renders voice uniquely fluid in the operatic universe. In Act I, scene XIX of Don Giovanni, for example, a diegetic minuet melody emanates from inside the Don’s town house, continuing however, to frame and accompany the nondiegetic music sung by Leporello and the masked trio, Ottavio, Donna Anna, and Elvira. Although the diegetic passage is clearly segmented, the diegetic minuet and the nondiegetic singing conjoin to blur the differentiation of narrative spheres. Edward Cone identifies an analogous slippage between so-called realistic (i.e., diegetic) and operatic (i.e., non-diegetic, commentative) music in the colloquy between Alfredo and Violetta in Act I of La Traviata: Alfredo’s cantilena, “Un dí felice,” contains a passage of music and text that will subsequently cross the presumed-rigid boundaries of voice.⁶⁴⁰ As Cone illustrates, the motif appears on three occasions, assuming three distinct narrative functions along the diegetic continuum. Don Giovanni contains analogous slippage.⁶⁴¹ For Cone, this apparent slippage isn’t slippery at all. Drawing on the legacy of the Orpheus myth, Cone concludes that the operatic universe is comprised of composer-musicians; that operatic singers are aware that they are singing;

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⁶³⁹ For Robyn Stilwell, who coined the term “fantastical gap” to characterize this space with respect to film, the border territory between narrative spheres is critically important: “When the boundary between diegetic and nondiegetic is traversed, it does always mean. It is also hardly ever a single moment—one moment we’re in the diegetic realm and in the blink of an eye, like walking through Alice’s mirror, we are in the nondiegetic looking-glass world. The thickness of the glass, as it were, like any liminal space, is a space of power and transformation, of inversion and the uncanny, of making strange in order to make sense. That these transitions are sometimes transgressions only heightens that liminality.” Robynn J. Stilwell, “The Fantastical Gap Between the Diegetic and the Nondiegetic,” in Beyond the Soundtrack: Representing Music in Cinema, eds., Daniel Goldmark, Lawrence Kramer, and Richard D. Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 186.


⁶⁴¹ Although not concerned with narrative voice, Laurel Elizabeth Zeiss’s “Permeable Boundaries in Mozart’s ‘Don Giovanni’” examines analogous kinds of border crossing in the opera. Laurel Elizabeth Zeiss, “Permeable Boundaries in Mozart’s ‘Don Giovanni’,” Cambridge Opera Journal 13, no. 2 (July 2001): 115-139.
and, by consequence, that distinctions between “realistic” and “operatic” singing are not hard-and-fast.642

Whether or not they are always hard and fast, distinctions between diegetic and non-diegetic spheres maintain. For Carolyn Abbate, in Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century, such distinctions are critical: “heard music” (which she elsewhere refers to as “phenomenal music”) is an act of “performing narration”; narration that involves not only a story but also its telling and teller.643 For Abbate, such narrated moments define themselves “not by what [they] narrate, but rather by [their] audible flight from the continuum that embeds [them].”644 By extension, narration paradoxically points away from the story to call attention to it. Because opera rests on a suspension of disbelief of a fictive world in which singing is speaking, diegetic music may call attention to that fictive world. A car radio playing in a film may indeed “reinforce the realistic depiction of the mise en scene,”645 but a musical tableau in an opera may, by contrast, draw attention to the greater fiction of sung narrative. It operates analogously to the “story within a story,” of which Blazing Saddles presents yet another excellent example: the climactic fight scene bursts its own seams, penetrating a neighboring Warner Brothers set. In the process, it establishes two filmic universes: an interior film, where the plot operates, and the exterior film, that reveals its constructedness. Just as the film within a film draws attention to the various contraptions the support the fictive world, the “song within the sung narrative” invites contemplation of the role of music in the work, its authors and audiences. Don Giovanni contains two scenes that wield the diegesis to construct a meta-narrative about genius, authorship, and the “many-headed monster.”

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642 Ibid., 130-131.
644 Ibid., 29.
Ball Scene

The ball scene is the most often discussed segment of diegetic music in the opera (and in Mozart’s oeuvre as a whole) and with good reason. As is well known, this scene features three dances—a minuet, contredanse, and a Deutscher (folk allemande)—performed not in succession but simultaneously by three synchronized stage bands. An elegant minuet introduces the scene with two 16-bar double periods in 3/4, the second of which coincides, on its repetition, with the “tuning up” of orchestra two. Their music—which begins in earnest at the conclusion of the minuet’s second period—unfolds in 2/4, such that three bars of orchestra two equal two bars of orchestra one. Orchestra three likewise tunes for one period of the contradanse, and begins, astonishingly, in 3/8 at the point of the minuet’s seventh period. In impressive synchrony, the three orchestras maintain individual meters, phrasing, and melodic and harmonic characters (ex 3.1).

Example 4.1: W. A. Mozart, *Don Giovanni*, Menuetto, mm. 441-467
DONNA ELVIRA (a DONNA ANNA)

Finge-te, per piacere!

DON OTTAVIO (a DONNA ANNA)

Finge-te, per piacere!

(Es. ballare per forza MASSETTO)

balala

Eh balala, a-mi-co

vo-glio!
no no, non vo-glio!
461
463 (da li segui) 465
Leporello/ Masetto

Don Giovanni

Vie...si con me... mia vi...ta,

(Bella la Teinteh con MASETTO)

mi...o, fuc...cien quel di... al...tri... fa...

La... scia...m... ah

* la Teinteh = Sanna „alla tedesca“ („Donnerherz“).
ZERLINA

Oh Na - mil son tra - di - ta!

[Si cerca della porta di LENOBELLO a seguito di ZERLINA]

* In den Libretti P und Wu: (Rellendo condurc ZERLINA presso una porta e la fa ovevare quasi per forza.)
The ballroom scene unfolds, on the surface, like a “crescendo of comic activity.”

Certainly, Leporello’s invitation to Masetto to dance the Deutscher provides comic relief for the previous mounting dramatic energy. The Deutscher is a folk dance, and not only is Masetto rendered comic by the fact of his performing a close-contact dance with Leporello; the music itself, with its jaunty leaps and sprightly rhythms, places him at the bottom of the social stratum. (Zerlina and Giovanni dance the middle class contredanza, while Donna

———

Anna and Ottavia dance the stately, aristocratic minuet.) But the biggest joke, for some scholars, is the stage music, which is seen to represent and exaggerate the fact of multiple dance bands playing in adjacent rooms, or even opposite ends of the same room at Parisian public balls.648 Daniel Heartz and others link this scene to the generally chaotic circumstances of simultaneous balls, and thus identify it as a comic parody of relatively realistic circumstances.649 And yet, while one would expect such comedy to be projected onto the characters, there is in fact no evidence that they even hear the cacophony. As each couple dances to the music performed for it, a schism emerges—within the diegesis—between the experience of the characters and that of the audience members. For the latter group only, Mozart presents an impressionistic collage of the segmented and stratified musical arenas that comprised eighteenth-century public music life. The collage is inaudible to (or ignored by) the dancers (each of whom attends only to the music performed for him), and, bypassing them, thus supports a direct communication from Mozart to the audience.

Within the narrative, the ball is part of Giovanni’s machinations toward seducing Zerlina. The subtext of the scene is that Giovanni can provide necessary distractions for others in order to achieve his ends. He makes this explicit in the aria, “Finch’ han del vino,” in which he lays out his plan for “una gran festa” in which dances “senza alcun ordine” will feature a minuet, a folia, and an allemande. All of this he leaves to Leporello; his reasoning is clear: “Ed io frattanto dall’ altro canto / Con questa e quella vo’ amoreggiar. / Ah la mia lista doman mattina / D’ una decina devi aumentare.” (“In the meanwhile I shall have my own fun, making love to this or that girl. Ah, my list tomorrow morning shall have at least ten new entries.”) Donna Anna is as unlikely to dance a Deutscher as Masetto is a stately minuet; the different social registers are a necessary part of his plan. Giovanni’s “genius” lies in his ability to juggle three of his conquests (attempted and achieved, past and present) through simultaneous, individualized dances. Yet the aural dissonance within the diegesis (i.e., the discrepancy between the individual dances heard by the characters and

648 Ibid., 181.
the combination of them heard by the audience), simultaneously pulls the listener out of the narrative to another meaning: although Mozart can equally “persuade” multiple spheres of his audiences, he cannot do so with a single musical work. The moment exhibits the impossibility of pleasing the multiple audience. By composing disparate, individually tailored dances and performing them simultaneously, Mozart expresses at once his genius in accommodating different spheres, and the ultimate impossibility of achieving universal appeal through his music, which must accommodate different needs of different people. It’s almost as if he’s making fun of the need for different dances for different social classes; it comes off as ridiculous that these people, inhabiting this small space, should need three dances in three meters. It shows that the need for social hierarchy butts up against the supposed values of taste; there is an argument here that music cannot be universal where there is such stratification. There is something subversive in this moment; although the aristocracy may nod approvingly at the starkly hierarchical dancing, the chaos and unsustainability of this moment, and the impossibility of art and taste operating effectively in so stratified an arena, come instead to the fore.

### Supper Scene

In the supper scene that precedes the opera’s climax and *denouement*, Mozart takes another approach. He exploits the liminality of the diegesis—i.e., its paradoxical distancing from the narrative space—pulling the characters conspicuously out of the narrative to participate in the audience-inhabited reality. Giovanni’s evening meal is accompanied by on-stage musicians performing excerpted tunes from three popular operas: Vicente Martín y Soler’s “O quanto un si bel giubilo” from *Una cosa rara*; Giuseppe Sarti’s “Come un agnello” from *Fra l due litaganti*, and finally “Non piu andrai,” from Mozart’s *Le Nozze di...*
Figaro.651 For Daniel Heartz, a thematic thread links the three selections to the Don Giovanni plot, foreshadowing his impending doom.652 (The first opera is itself akin to a Don Giovanni story, and the selections from the latter two metaphorize damnation, as in “Come un agnello,” “Like a Lamb going to slaughter, you will go bleating through the city.”653) It is reasonable to assume that this thematic connection influenced the choice of songs, but the succession of puns and general comedy of the scene overshadow, if not negate, the importance of intertextual allusions to Giovanni’s imminent damnation. Rather, the scene unfolds like a comic interlude, and the dialogue surrounding quoted tunes pulls the characters momentarily out of the narrative to comment on themes of opera and its reception, authorship, and taste.

Each tune is paired with a dramatic vignette in such a way that brings issues of taste and authorship into the foreground. The first, “O quanto un si bel giubilo,” from Martín y Soler’s Una cosa rara, accompanies Giovanni as he gorges himself with a “barbaric appetite.” As Leporello states, “He eats like a giant; I think I’ll pass out.” Giovanni’s exhibition of barbaric taste accompanies music deemed equally tasteless.654 Indeed, when Soler’s “O quanto un si bel giubilo” begins, Giovanni asks Leporello what he thinks of the music, to which the latter replies, “It conforms to your merits.” The jab at Soler is unequivocal as Giovanni exhibits his indiscriminate appetite and tastelessness (Ex. 4.2).

652 Heartz, Mozart’s Operas, 169.
653 Ibid.

234
Example 4.2: W. A. Mozart, *Don Giovanni*, “Che ti par del bel concerto,” mm. 43-106
To the second tune, Giuseppe Sarti’s “Come un agnello” from *Fra I due litiganti*, Giovanni by contrast commends the “excellent wine.” The contrast between Giovanni’s gorging, on the one hand, and his epicurean appreciation of a good wine, on the other, paired so neatly with these two musical examples, further supports the parallel between gustatory and aesthetic taste suggested in this scene. In the midst of the second musical episode, Leporello enjoys Giovanni’s discarded pheasant. If gustatory and aesthetic tastes are still in parallel, one might conclude that while the Soler suits only a barbaric taste, the Sarti may please a general audience (as the don enjoys his wine and Leporello, his pheasant). Finally, as the tune changes to “Non piu andrai,” from Mozart’s own *Figaro*, Giovanni wittily
exposes Leporello’s deceit. (Leporello states lamely, “Pardon me. Excuse me. Your cook is so excellent, I wanted to taste some for myself.”) Continuing to track the connections between gustatory and aesthetic tastes, one may conclude that this, Figaro, is not music for a general audience. It is a superior music, which can only be enjoyed by the initiated (ex. 4.3).

Example 4.3: W. A. Mozart, Don Giovanni, “Che ti par del bel concerto,” mm. 114-150

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655 Heartz pulls out of this passage a pun on the word cook; kuchar is the Czech word for cook, and thus points to the orchestra’s harpsichord player, Jan Kritel Kuchar. Kuchar made keyboard reductions of Mozart’s operatic music (including this tune), and Heartz thus sees in him “a special kind of cook (Heartz, Mozart’s Operas, 169.)
In this scene, Mozart and DaPonte are depicting taste: the first dish represents the “barbaric” taste that comprises the indiscriminatory *Una Cosa Rara*; the wine and pheasant that accompany Sarti’s *Fra I due litiganti* render it generally pleasing; and the third, *Figaro*, though exquisite, is not for everyone. Taking a further step back, all three of these operas, one tasteless, one pleasing, and one exquisite, are reduced to table music for the appetitive desires of a boorish aristocrat. Here *Don Giovanni* indeed comes into focus, not as narrative, but as a Mozart opera, which like *Figaro* and these others, may too be reduced to *Tafelmusik*.

In these two scenes, Mozart exploits the inherent “self-consciousness” of the diegetic sphere in opera—which, by creating a layer of musical meaning beneath the operatic
universe of “song as speech,” thus calls attention to that universe, its authors and artifices—to comment on his artistic relationship to his public. If Haydn sought to transcend the boundaries of social hierarchy through processual meanings in the music, which elevate the novice to the level of understanding enjoyed by the connoisseur, Mozart here presents that hierarchy as rigid and unmoving. Although the specific meanings of these scenes differ, they both grapple with the relationship between Mozart's musical genius and the demands of a “multiple audience.” In the ball scene, Mozart puts his compositional genius on display, while nevertheless implicitly critiquing the stratified public that demands disparate musics. In the supper scene, Mozart depicts disparate musical tastes by pairing the don’s gustatory pleasures with musical examples. Although here he positions his music as select, not to be enjoyed by a general, diverse audience, he nevertheless frames all three examples as table music for an aristocratic meal, setting those disparate demands portrayed in the ball scene, in a still more cynical light. Indeed, if the ball scene critiques the socially stratified public arena, this scene exhibits how superficial that stratification is. Socially circumscribed tastes prove at once rigid and arbitrary; Mozart, like the Don, chooses not to yield to them.

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If it seems we've traveled a great distance from Haydn's reference to Mozart’s Geschmack, that distance exhibits how encompassing concept of taste was in the eighteenth century. As this dissertation argues, Haydn’s reference to Mozart’s taste takes on various shades of meaning as it passes through the perspectives of its central agents. For Leopold Mozart, taste negotiated aesthetic rationalism with his Jesuit Catholic faith; for Wolfgang, the culture of sensibility with emerging modernity; for Haydn, the inspiration of genius with the general public that must be guided to it. Equally importantly, these complex negotiations exist in both the writings and the music, which reflects the central debates and agendas of the time.
The date is 12 February 1785. Joseph Haydn responds to a hearing of Wolfgang Mozart's just-completed set of six string quartets with the exclamation, “He has taste, and beyond that, the most profound knowledge of composition.” He hears in Wolfgang’s music great seeds of invention, but he is more concerned with their treatment. He commends the taste and knowledge that guide the development of each new idea, weaving them into a comprehensive whole. He thinks of the audiences whose minds would be expanded by such careful listening to the treatment of materials in these quartets, and he silently laments the general public, who remain ignorant of Mozart’s great genius. Leopold Mozart, who is in Haydn’s company on this occasion, receives the commendation, and immediately agrees with its content. At 29 years of age, Wolfgang has acquired the good taste that can come only from time, experience, and the acquisition of knowledge. His taste derives from a rational approach to composition that is nevertheless not born of rules. It is rather the product of Wolfgang’s internalization of the classical values of moderation, clarity, propriety, expression, and ornamentation; values that reflect the interdependence of aesthetic and ethical dimensions of classical aesthetics. Leopold marvels at Wolfgang’s delicate balancing of tendentious and sometimes contradictory demands of taste (e.g., clarity and ornamentation), and he hopes that Wolfgang will find the material success and the much-deserved acclamation that have largely evaded him. A week passes. Wolfgang Mozart is drafting a letter to Haydn, and in it, he thanks him for the generous commendation of his new quartets, as reported by his father. He is pleased that Haydn perceived the deep learning that contributed to their beauty, but he is pleased still more by the commendation of taste. Wolfgang laid bare his thoughts and feelings, communicated them through interweaving lines and soaring melodies, which, when played exactly as written, were as expressive and natural as song. Of course he could have stuffed the movements with prestissimo passagework, but such technical artifice can serve only the
eyes and ears, while the heart remains empty and waiting. Haydn has heard his good taste; his thoughts and feelings communicated by wordless song.

The eighteenth century has been called the century of taste. It might better be deemed the century of tastes. As this dissertation exhibits, even a single quotation cannot be reduced to one connotative meaning of the term. Taste in the eighteenth century was the site of negotiation between emerging (and sometimes competing) aesthetic ideologies and pressing cultural, political, and religious values. It was, in this sense, at once public and private; both general and individual. In Leopold, taste negotiates reason with faith; in Wolfgang, sensibility with emerging modernity; in Haydn, the inspiration of genius with the general public that must be guided to it. No longer does it suffice to assume what was meant by a given reference to taste. One must scrupulously investigate the values of the speaker and the context of the speech.

Even this single quotation contains meanings not yet explored. Among the most pressing issues that remain uninvestigated in Haydn’s remark concern gender. In Gender and Aesthetics: an Introduction, Carolyn Korsmeyer charts the transference of the fundamental gender binary to other modes of thinking, a process that underwrites all known dimensions of historical thought, including beauty, genius, popularity, knowledge, etc. If we consider eighteenth-century aesthetics as centering on these issues, one can see how gender underlay nearly all intellectual thought in this period. Taste, a central mediator of enlightenment thought, expressed (and sometimes subverted) gendered binaries in implicit and explicit ways; between reason and emotion, mind and body, abstract and particular, objective and subjective.

The gustatory metaphor is particularly suited to “play” with traditional gendered meanings. There is an implicit division in western culture between “higher”—sight and hearing—and “lower”—touch, taste, and smell—senses. Sight and hearing provide the most concrete information about our external world, and are thus tied to cognition. (Korsmeyer points to the common expressions, “I see,” and “I hear you,” as references to cognitive—as

657 Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gender and Aesthetics: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2004),
opposed to sensorial—understanding.\textsuperscript{658} To identify taste as a “low” sense, one need only consider its relation to the body, gustatory pleasure, and domestic ritual, all of which are gendered feminine. For Socrates, sensorial taste is explicitly linked to the pleasures of the body and, by consequence, diverting the higher purposes of the mind.\textsuperscript{659} As suggested, sensorial taste points to bodily pleasure; aesthetic taste, the loftiest of aesthetic ideas in this period, transcends the humble tongue while nevertheless linking to its immediacy and corporeality.

The various themes explored in this study should be evaluated from the perspective of gender. There is in fact a place for a discussion in the narrative surrounding Haydn’s remark—Leopold wrote to Nannerl about Haydn’s remark, making her a recipient of the statement and a factor in its contemporary transmission. Nannerl can productively serve as a figurehead for a discussion of gender and musical taste in the eighteenth century; one that is conspicuously absent in this study. For example, Leopold Mozart links his values to gender in inscribing honesty to unadorned melodies and unadorned women,\textsuperscript{660} and Wolfgang’s designation of the organ as the “king of instruments” likewise invites a critique of gender.

Another important direction for future research concerns the romantic transmission of Haydn’s remark. If, as suggested in the introduction to this study, Haydn’s statement was used in the nineteenth century to authorize Mozart’s genius, it was also (more prominently) used to justify his supposed superiority over Haydn. In this critic’s remark, celebrity and genius are explicitly teased apart:

The most famous composer recognized the greatness of his [Mozart’s] genius and admired his work. Joseph Haydn, this darling of the graces, who in his old age still

\textsuperscript{658} Ibid., 86.
\textsuperscript{659} Ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{660} In a letter to Frau Maria Theresa Hagenauer, 1 February 1764: “I really cannot tell you whether the women in Paris are fair; for they are painted so unnaturally, like the dolls of Berchtesgaden, that even a naturally beautiful woman on account of this detestable make-up is unbearable to the eyes of an honest German.” (“Ob die Frauenzimmer in Paris schön sind, kann ich Ihnen mit Grund nicht sagen; daß sie sind wider alle Natur, wie die Berchtesgadner Docken, so gemahlt, daß auch eine von Natur schöne Person durch diese garstige Zierlichkeit den Augen eines ehrlichen Deutschen unerträglich wird.”) Bauer and Deutsch, eds., \textit{Briefe und Aufzeichnungen}, 1: 121; trans., Anderson, \textit{Letters}, 33-4.
exhibited the feeling of a youth, is known by all as a worthy and competent judge. His judgment is unbiased because he is known as an honest man, and Mozart’s bloom—the fame stood in the way of his own. Already in 1785, when Mozart’s father was still alive, he said to him: ...661

Woven into this comment are persistent features of Haydn’s posthumous image that contributed to his comparative marginalization in the nineteenth century. The first concerns his perceived youthful feeling. In his discussion of Haydn’s romantic reception, Leon Botstein emphasizes that Haydn was infantilized by some nineteenth-century commentators. For Botstein, the image of the child was projected on Haydn by (a false perception of) his music, which, “natural, full of joy, naïve, happy,” was, like a fortunate child, “untouched by the hardships of mature life.”662 (One might add that Haydn was also positioned as the metaphorical child—or first-youth—of the romantic musical aesthetic, which matured in Mozart and Beethoven.) In this case, however, Haydn’s “feeling of a youth” emerges in the context of his old age. Haydn was thus identified with the two ends of the life-cycle theory of human development (i.e., birth, growth, maturity, decline), while being excluded from the mature phase. In the romantic worldview, broadly speaking, the outer realms of the life cycle were implicitly asexual, androgynous, and impotent, while maturity was granted the vigor of prime manhood that defined genius. As such, Haydn was granted wisdom and calm, on the one hand, and innocence and naivety, on the other, without, however, potency, virility, or vigor.

His (double-edged) designation as “darling of the graces” in the aforementioned remark supports another dimension of Haydn’s romantic image in its allusion to birthright, privilege, and, by extension, aristocratic patronage. Haydn was no “neglected Romantic


"genius" in the nineteenth-century sense; while Mozart music was seen to conceal an "interior depth and secret melancholy," born, in part, of his conflict with his father and continual friction with the Viennese aristocracy, Haydn’s biography emphasized success, freedom, and material comfort. As Botstein argues, “there seemed to be an inner Mozart, but commentators either refused or failed to find significant subtexts in Haydn, a man who wore the Esterházy livery with apparent willingness.” And yet, while Haydn’s station was aristocratic, his music—for the nineteenth century, broadly speaking—was not. Some of Haydn’s music had a notoriously populist dimension (notwithstanding its sophistication), rendering him anti-romantic in a double sense: his was supposedly unaffected, populist music born of aristocratic privilege, whereas Mozart was seen as the composer of exclusive, aristocratic music born of the free, struggling artist.

In light of this, it is no surprise that critics and commentators consistently inscribed Haydn’s statement with a humility that is not historically justified. In a (fictionalized) account by Eduard Breier, a supplicant Haydn describes Mozart’s immortal greatness to his widow Constanze:

I remember [the six quartets, which he published with Artaria and dedicated to me]. ... I have still not forgotten about it at all. But for whom will such a composition not stay in their memory? A treasure of thoughts, as only a Mozart can discover it; they are a model of quartets for all time. Oh, I did not deceive myself when I said these words years ago, in my [comment] to the old man, your father-in-law: I say before God and as an honest man that your son is the greatest composer of whom I have ever heard; he has taste and beyond that, the deepest knowledge in the art of composition. 'Your remark, sir Haydn', said now the abbe, 'is very flattering for our friend, and yet he owed you, as he himself said, the dedication of these quartets; he affirmed that he first learned to write quartets from you. Haydn laughed good-naturedly and replied: It is possible that he learned it from me, but it is certain that he now does it better than I. By the way, I also learned something from Mozart, and

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663 Botstein, “Presumed Innocence,” 22.
664 Ibid.
when I am one day finished with my *Seasons*, then the connoisseur will ascertain it.

He who wants to engage with wind instruments, must look to Mozart.\textsuperscript{665}

Here, Mozart was rewritten as the master of quartets “for all time.” The conflict between Mozart’s perceived superiority and Haydn’s undeniable innovation is swiftly and consistently reconciled. Elsewhere, Haydn’s remark was similarly used to “explain” or justify Mozart’s superiority in genres “invented” by Haydn:

Haydn had developed the quartet form and invented the grand symphony. Mozart gave them a new spirit, and one sees his influence in all Haydn’s later works. That great master said to Leopold Mozart in 1785: ‘I tell you before God and as a man of honor, that I look upon your son as the greatest composer of whom I ever head; he has taste, and possesses the most thorough knowledge of composition.’ The symphony in C with the fugue is alone sufficient proof of the correctness of Haydn’s opinion; it is the greatest work of the kind ever written before Beethoven.\textsuperscript{666}

This author’s reference to Mozart’s “spirit” points to another comparative aspect of Haydn’s nineteenth-century reception; namely, the perception that Haydn’s music reflected abstract classical values of symmetry, proportion, balance, etc., while Mozart and Beethoven conveyed an “inner seriousness” and “spiritual importance.”\textsuperscript{667}


\textsuperscript{667} Botstein, “Presumed Innocence,” 4.
Much is to be gained by tracking this statement's transmission history into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; its uses and meanings provide insights into Haydn and Mozart's (comparative) nineteenth-century receptions, the respective places of taste and knowledge in romantic aesthetic theory and art criticism, and the historiographical legacy that shapes current scholarship.
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