

MEXICAN HOMETOWN ASSOCIATIONS: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION  
ANTECEDENT TO MIGRATION AND ECOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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## ABSTRACT

The bulk of quantitative research on hometown associations (HTAs) focuses on cross country comparisons. However, research has not sufficiently addressed the context of exit and variation across sending states in Mexico. Using the Latino National Survey (LNS), logistic regression, and multi-level modeling of Mexican census and survey data, this paper proceeds to fill this gap in the literature. Particularly, this thesis considers the influence of civic and political participation after migration, cross border activity, social, and household resources in the United States. Additionally, the uniqueness of the LNS will allow for testing political participation in Mexico, prior to migration, and perceptions of government on HTA participation. My initial findings confirm prior research that past experiences in Mexico matter. Additionally, they illuminate some important reasons that lead to variation of Mexican civic participation in the United States.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

The author was born in Mexico City, Mexico and raised in Los Angeles, California. After conferral of his Bachelor's Degree from UC Santa Cruz in Sociology and Latin American Latino/a Studies, he returned to Los Angeles and worked for several years in immigrant serving non-profit organizations.

I dedicate this thesis to my *abuelitas*. Carmelita, for her struggle and dedication to become a teacher in Mexico during the 1950s that deeply affected my family's affinity to education and my path in life more than I will ever understand. Epifania and Meche, the first in my family to migrate to *el Norte* to purchase and sell *fayuca* in Mexico; taught me compassion and respect.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EMIF	Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México
CATI	Computer Assisted Telephone Interview
COLEF	Colegio de la Frontera Norte de México
CONACYT	Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología
CONAPO	Consejo Nacional de Población
HLM	Hierarchical Linear Modeling
HTA	Hometown Association
ICC	Interclass correlation coefficient
INM	Instituto Nacional de Migración
LNS	Latino National Survey
LR	Likelihood ration
OFAM	Oficinas de Atención al Migrante
SES	Socio-economic status
SRE	Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
STPS	Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social

## PREFACE

In 2006 less than one in five Mexican migrants was a naturalized U.S. citizen. As a consequence, political participation in United States electoral politics remains out of reach for many Mexican migrants. However, this should not lead us to believe that Mexican migrants are not politically active, but rather that we broaden our understanding of political participation to include political practices such as participation in Mexican hometown associations (HTAs).

Social capital and immigration scholars have perceived HTAs with great skepticism because of their insular networks, cooptation by Mexican political institutions, and a singular orientation to towns of origin (Gonzalez 1999; Fitzgerald 2003). However, there is growing evidence that HTA orientations and interests are becoming much more amplified; moreover, what remains understated is their unique capacity to foster political capital amongst non-citizens (Voss and Bloemraad 2011). I argue that the widening of politics by HTAs raises important prospects for greater inclusion of Latino immigrants into U.S. politics.

Conversely, some social capital scholars posit that a negative relationship exists between ethnically diversified communities and social capital. In a 2006 lecture, Robert D. Putnam outlined a gloomy prospect for social capital in the U.S. due in part to a greater diversified populace in the United States (Putnam 2007). In summary, individuals who live in ethnically diverse communities will continue to “hunker down”, or exhibit lower in-group and out-group trust and we can expect to see reduced participation in affairs. In the medium to long run Putnam’s prognosis leaves room for small gains. For example, Putnam acknowledges the contributions made by

immigrants to culture, economy, and demographics. He posits that immigrant communities will offset social capital decline by novel and more encompassing identities.

What Putnam's analysis misses is that many forms of social capital migrate simultaneously with immigrants themselves. In a recent finding that looks at the relationship between population transference and social capital across MSA counties, the authors conclude that "social capital consists of facets that are not place based, so that migrants can be viewed as "taking their bowling balls with them" when they move (Lesage & Ha 2012:24) . Additionally, cross country analysis demonstrates that institutions and policy in receiving countries strongly mitigate the strength and direction of the relationship (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010).

Political capital is only one of various manifestations of social capital. A cursory exploration of history reminds us of various examples where migration to the United States positively influenced the polity, such as the Progressive Era. Henceforth, it is of no surprise that in previous waves of immigration the English brought with them a rich history of opposition and organizing against the British and Germans enriched U.S. civic culture through their associations know as "vereine"(Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001).

Thus, under certain circumstances, we can expect similarities between prior migration waves and contemporary migrants. In response to social capital scholars that singularly prioritize place based social capital in the United States, the project at hand exploits individual level data to evaluate and argue that immigrant political participation in HTAs can be thought of as transference of civic culture from Mexico

to the United States. However, place based social capital in sending countries needs to be included in our understanding of Latino politics. A relational understanding of civic culture across the migration process is necessary. As elaborated by Moya, “[t]o focus only on their experiences in the new land is to miss half the story. It treats immigrants as *tabula rasa* and can lead to over-environmentalist conclusions that miss possible continuities and adaptations”(2005).

### ***Pre-migration socialization and context of exit***

In her earlier work, Peggy Levitt elaborated on how migrants bring ideas, behavior, identities, and social capital to receiving countries where they are remolded and remitted to countries of origin (1998). Her analysis complements our understanding *context of exit* and *context of reception* which posits that migrant's individual characteristics shaped by country of origin context interact with opportunity structures in the receiving country (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). A great deal of research looks at receiving countries and political incorporation, but less is known about the effects of pre-migration political participation and the effect of sending countries on political incorporation; far less is known about its effects on HTA membership.

Logically, the effects of pre-migration political participation should be straight forward; politically active individuals in the home country continue to be active in the receiving country and possibly in home country politics. However, in practice several counterfactual examples exist primarily due to international relations and sending country context<sup>1</sup>. For example, amongst HTAs from Columbia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic; Colombian migrants in general were found less likely to participate in HTAs because of high levels of insecurity in Columbia and its debilitating effects on civic culture (Portes, Escobar et al. 2009). Early Cuban migration presents an extreme example where unfavorable US-Cuban relations, such as restricted travel and remittances, discouraged all forms of home country loyalty

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<sup>1</sup> For the effects of *capacity* and *desire* to remit see Carling, J., M. B. Erdal, et al. (2012). "How does Conflict in Migrants' Country of Origin Affect Remittance-Sending? Financial Priorities and Transnational Obligations Among Somalis and Pakistanis in Norway." International Migration Review 46(2): 283-309.

regardless of pre-migration undertakings. Eckstein notes the importance that *capacity* and *desire* exert on home country loyalties, none of which existed among early Cuban emigrants resulting in truncated HTAs exclusively focused in the United States (2009). However, her comparison to recent waves of Cuban migration demonstrates change in both *capacity* and *desire* and underscores their temporal dimension. A second method to evaluate home country loyalties is through a relational understanding that incorporates two axis of variation<sup>2</sup>: migrant characteristics, and characteristics of the interstate system (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). However, this view like other cross country comparisons bolsters the political landscape between countries at the expense of specific sending country considerations<sup>3</sup>.

When we incorporate home country context in our analysis of cross-border ties we introduce the ability of studying place based effects in Mexico on cross border ties. In this thesis, I argue that understanding HTA membership and Mexican ecological considerations requires the incorporation of subnational states. Inclusion of subnational provinces in our analysis is needed to account for the diverse migrant population in the United States driven by regionalized and changing migration patterns, as well as decentralization in Mexico. It is true that other units of analysis are better to able to measure the contextual contours of civic life before migration, such as municipalities or neighborhoods. Thus, sub-national states are not taken for granted as the most appropriate unit of analysis, but are used due to data limitations.

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<sup>2</sup> Both methods to evaluate home country loyalties acknowledge the importance of temporality; unfortunately, it is not included in this analysis due to methodological constraints.

<sup>3</sup> Some exceptions include Portes and collaborators who recently analyzed data from the Comparative Immigrant Organization Project (CIOP). Still the variety of independent variables and country selection used to analyze CIOP data suggest that different types of expatriate engagement vary by country and independent variables.

Some important criticisms for using states in our analysis include findings that suggest that 3x1 remittances are clustered around the central areas of municipalities and the understudied political mobilization taking place in sub-municipalities (Fox 2007). Secondly, we can not take “cross-border activities” or “engagement in home-country politics” at face value without differentiation between the various types of cross-border activities and their internal logic. Below I will elaborate on these two arguments.

A sizeable population of Mexicans live in the United States, about 11 million according to 2010 American Community Survey, or roughly 10 percent of Mexico’s total population. Hence, we should expect to see remarkable Mexican region of origin diversity in the United States. The regionalization of Mexican emigration is historically influenced by network-driven migration; leading to over-representation of certain states and regions in Mexico. Table 1 illustrates the regional origins of Mexican migrants in the United States according to two survey data sources and total regional population according to the Mexican Census. The table is included for two reasons. First, it allows us to compare region of origin by survey respondents to the population distribution in Mexico. Table 1 clearly shows over-representation of Mexican migrants from traditional states and under-representation of southeastern states<sup>4</sup>. Secondly, if we compare survey data sources to each other we find that some convergence in the regional origin of respondents. One exception is the lower percentage of migrants from the border region reported by the Matricula Consular Program (see footnote on page 23 for an explanation of *matriculas consulares*).

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<sup>4</sup> For a list of states by sending regions see table 3 on page 41.

However, because *matriculas* are processed in greater numbers in Mexican border states, it is possible that this might explain the low percentage of migrants who participated in the Matricula Consular Program. Thus, the convergence of the two survey data sources suggests the LNS is a reliable source of data.


Table 1. Regional Origins of Mexican Migrants: LNS, Matricula Consular Program, Mexican Census

Sending Region	INEGI-2005	LNS-2006	SRE-2006
Traditional	23%	45.3%	45.2%
Border	21%	21.9%	10.7%
Central	40%	27.8%	37.4%
Southeast	17%	05.0%	06.4%
TOTAL	101%	100%	99.7%

Source: INEGI Cuento de Poblacion Hombres-Mujeres por Entidad Federativa Segun Sexo. Latino National Survey (LNS), Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores de Mexico (SRE).


Until recently, *traditional* sending states have comprised the majority of migration flows from Mexico to the United States accounting for almost 70 percent of all US bound Mexican migration in the 1970s (Massey, Rugh et al. 2010). By the 1990s migration increased from both *central* and *southeast* regions. According to Figure 1, in 2006 gains as a percentage of total annual migration into the United States were made by non-traditional sending regions. Meanwhile overall declines were recorded by *traditional* and *northern* regions. Similarly, figure 2 demonstrates a notable peak in percentage change in 2002 and 2005 in the southeastern region.

Figure 1. Annual Migrations to United States by Mexican Region of Origin as Percentage of Total Migration



Source: Estimations by CONAPO based on CONAPO, STPS, INM, SRE y EL COLEF, Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF NORTE), 1995, 1999-2010.

Figure 2. Mexican Annual Migration to United States by Regional Percentage Change



Source: Estimations by CONAPO based on CONAPO, STPS, INM, SRE y EL COLEF, Encuesta sobre Migración en la Frontera Norte de México (EMIF NORTE), 1995, 1999-2010.

Little research accounts for regional and ecological considerations in cross-border activities. For example, Mexican HTA membership is most prevalent in rural communities with dense migration networks (Guarnizo, Sanchez et al. 1999).

Similarly, Salvadorian migrants from small towns and rural areas with low levels of personal and political insecurity are more likely to engage in cross-border activities (Portes 2003). However, less data and research has considered the role of decentralization in the co-production<sup>5</sup> of HTAs at the subnational level.

Since the 1990s, Mexico has been moving from a highly centralized and authoritarian state towards greater decentralization and democratization. Literature on the role of decentralization on democratization has proven inconclusive. However, experts on Mexican politics assert that decentralization benefits the ability of the state to respond more effectively through localized policy, decision making, and responsiveness to citizens<sup>6</sup> (Selee 2011). Decentralization and democratization unfold unevenly across Mexico resulting in different levels of institutionalization at the subnational level. For example, in 1993 Mexican state governments began to take charge of various emigrant affairs typically addressed by the Consular system through the newly created Offices of Emigrant Affairs (*Oficinas de Atencion Migrantes-OFAM*) at the state level. Various authors have studied the uneven co-production of sub-national state engagement with emigrants (Smith 2003; Vila Freyer 2007; Iskander 2010). The richness of these studies rest on comparative case studies between a few states. Incorporating quantitatively driven analysis in this area of

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<sup>5</sup> This term denotes symmetrical and unsymmetrical participation of migrants and Mexican state—via bureaucrats—in the making of civic activity and HTAs. Iskander elaborates the complexity of this process through the term *interpretative engagement*. This term denotes the discourse of policy created and re-created in a changing context be it contentious or collaborative leading to continual creative process of interpretation and creation (2010).

<sup>6</sup> Selee's understanding of decentralization is far more nuanced than elaborated above and incorporates greater agency and a relational understanding of informal power in the process of decentralization to include, but not limited to, political leaders, institutions, businesses, and civil society (2011).

inquiry can increase our understanding of HTA activity across many more states and regions and increase the ability to explore multiple dimensions of the co-production process<sup>7</sup>.

Secondly, researchers have taken “cross-border activities” and “engagement in home-country politics” at face value without differentiation; only recently have researchers begun to differentiate between the two (Waldinger 2009; Waldinger, Soehl et al. 2012). These authors demonstrate the primacy effect that pre-migration political participation in home countries have on the political interest and opinions of Mexican migrants in the United States. According to the authors pre-migration voting and organizational membership weigh more heavily than various measurements of cross border ties. These findings illustrate that cross border activities are not everything under the sun.

The project at hand partially fills the lacuna noted above in two important ways. First, I control for context of exit by incorporating within country variation between Mexican subnational states into my analysis. Secondly, in order to build on the existing literature of transnationalism and to provide greater specificity to the various types of cross border activities I limit my outcome variable to HTA membership for two important reasons.

To begin with, HTA membership denotes action and investment on the part of individuals—civic action—in contrast to thinner versions of politics such as political

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<sup>7</sup> Lanly and Valenzuela note that individual OFAM offices have had a variety of success in engagement with HTAs (2004). For example, pioneer states like Zacatecas have been the most successful while Oaxaca and Michoacán have been slow to engage emigrants. For a analysis on how state offices have various histories, budgets, and levels of organization leading to divergent forms of institutionalization see: Barbosa, G. Y. and R. Alarcon (2010). "Politica de emigracion y gobiernos estatales en Mexico." Migraciones Int. Migraciones Internacionales 5(4): 165-198. (2010).

belief, opinions, or interest in the sending country. Secondly, qualitative research on HTAs samples on the dependent variable to singularly include HTA members in their analysis<sup>8</sup>. Using HTA membership as an outcome variable in logistic regression analysis allows us to include both members and non-members alike. Below I cover some of the reasons that migrants join HTAs as well as elaborate why cross-border activities are different and as evidence for my choice of outcome variable.

### ***Conditions Influential to Migrant Civic Participation***

Various estimates put Mexican HTA participation somewhere between 4 to 14 percent<sup>9</sup>. However, this measurement begs the question of an adequate reference category to compare civic participation. Fox and Bada recommend that civic participation rates could be compared between individuals from Mexico of similar backgrounds to HTA participants in the United States (2011). Authors like Putnam might question what a 4 to 14 percent HTA participation rate means particularly when US civic participation was recently measured to be 36 percent<sup>10</sup> and arguably in decline. To complicate our comparison, Mexico consistently ranks lower than the United States in civic participation according to the Freedom House, World Values, and Polity IV survey (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). In fact, Mexican HTA participation in itself is a remarkable endeavor given the odds that Mexican migrants

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<sup>8</sup> For a recent exception see Santana, R. (2012). *The life and death of hometown associations*. The University of Chicago). *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses*, 249.

<sup>9</sup> In our sample the rate of civic participation amongst Mexican immigrants was 4 percent in comparison to 6 percent of Mexicans in the 2006 National Survey of Latinos. For Latinos in general it was 14 percent according to Suro (2005) and 10 percent according to a Hispanic Pew survey (Suro and Escobar: 2006). Interestingly, the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles survey found that less than 8 percent of the second generation was involved in civic groups from their parents hometown (Fox and Bada: 2008).

<sup>10</sup> See *the internet and Civic Engagement* by the Pew Internet, 2009.

face when it comes to political incorporation in the United States. However, we should also be reminded that HTA participation is the exception, rather than the rule amongst Mexican migrants and is rare.

Because HTA participation is exceptional, it would behoove us to understand the impetus by migrants towards collection action. Below I will outline some important works on civic participation broadly speaking to contextualize this thesis and elaborate how prior research has theorized and examined HTAs. Although, Segura et al. find that citizenship status, English ability, and socioeconomic status are negatively related to social capital and civic participation amongst Latinos, I argue that HTA membership follows a different logic (2001). For example, Ramakrishnan and Viramontes (2010) found that HTAs foster participation<sup>11</sup> amongst limited English and undocumented immigrants. In a survey of Mexican migrants, Suro and Escobar also found that 45 percent of HTA participants had a *Matricula Consular*<sup>12</sup> (2006). In terms of political ideology, Mexican political party affiliation amongst HTA members was measured to be about the same as the larger Mexican immigrant population (Suro and Escobar 2006). With regard to gender dynamics in HTAs, leadership in HTAs is limited to male participants and to a lesser degree membership in general is male dominated (Goldring: 2001). I argue that English proficiency and undocumented status, found elsewhere to be detrimental to wider forms of civic engagement for

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<sup>11</sup> Other forms of discrimination exist besides those put forward by Ramakrishnan (2008) that could plausibly lead to HTA activity. For example, employment based discrimination, reported by 17 percent of all interviewees in the LNS survey (Fraga et al: 2010)

<sup>12</sup> A *Matricula Consular* is a Mexican issued national identification card provided to Mexican nationals who may lack a form of identification in the United States. Because undocumented migrants are unable to obtain US issued identification cards, with the few exceptions of U.S. state-based drivers license, ownership of *Matriculas* is a close approximation for undocumented status.

Latinos, encourage membership in Mexican HTAs. Regrettably, aside from typical socio-economic status (SES) variables, the relationship between individual characteristics and HTA membership has escaped the purview of regression analysis for variety of reasons, chiefly due to the absence of survey data. This thesis extends this area of inquiry to provide greater understanding of individual participation in HTAs.

In a limited fashion, quantitative research has relegated HTA participation to a singular role as an independent variable of interest (DeSipio, Pachon et al. 2003). Earlier research was primarily interested in testing whether transnational ties were detrimental or complimentary to US political participation. HTA participation, along with other types of cross-border activities such as visits home, remittances, etc. were employed to test their effects on US political participation. Much ink has been spilled on this topic but the growing consensus is that participation in country of origin mutually reinforces participation in the receiving country, rather than a zero-sum relationship (DeSipio, Pachon et al. 2003; Pantoja 2005; Escobar 2006; Smith 2006; Portes, Escobar et al. 2009; Escobar 2010)<sup>13</sup>.

The decline of a zero-sum paradigm—the proposition that political and civic participation *can* only be directed to either country of destination or origin at the detriment of the other—has paved the way for a wave of authors to expand our understanding of the various causes of transnationalism and the interrogation of transnationalism itself. Three authors are noteworthy: Waldinger (2008), Soehl and

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<sup>13</sup> However, Tsuda points out some exceptions to the growing number of *positive reinforcing* cases, such as home country long-distance nationalism, to illustrate the importance that *simultaneity* must play in a transnational research agenda (2012).

Waldinger (2010); Waldinger, Soehl et al. (2012), and Felix (2010). Waldinger, a prominent critic of transnationalism, scrutinizes the usage and determinants of an all-encompassing definition of transnationalism to improve its conceptual clarity. He regresses on three major groupings of dependent variables: *cross-border exchange and activities*, *home country attachment and loyalties*, and *participation in U.S. politics* (2008). His findings suggest that transnational ties are uncommon, and differ across groups and forms of transnationalism. For example, recent migrants are more likely to remit; meanwhile, more established migrants are better able and likely to travel. Soehl and Waldinger (2010), build on prior findings, with data from the 2006 National Survey of Latinos, to formalize the types of ongoing cross-border activities, the length of time they are sustained, and the types of migrants that sustain them. The authors use various variables to regress on a three-prong classification of migrants (transmigrants, bordered, and connected) as well as *travel to home country*, *remittances*, and *telephone communication*. Their results support Waldinger's earlier findings but with a greater diversity of dependent variables. In the authors' own words "we find a bundle of discrete activities, each following its own logic, associated with specific migrant characteristics" (1509: 2010). In contrast to Waldinger's more expansive investigation of various forms of transnationalism, this thesis only considers HTA membership as a specific form of transnationalism, as an outcome variable, to elaborate on the effects of individual and group characteristics and their particular logic leading to HTA participation.

As noted above, there is little research on the effects of sub-national variation on HTA participation, however, there is a growing body of literature that focuses on

intra-group variation of Mexican migrants in the United States (Zuniga and Hernandez-Leon 2005; Waldinger, Lim et al. 2007; Vallejo 2009; Felix 2010; Jiménez 2010; Telles 2010). Of these authors only Felix analyzes Mexican HTAs by sub-national states of origin but uses HTA participation as an independent variable. Nonetheless by focusing on Mexican states, Felix is able to control for large intra-group variation in order to regress various variables on *political interest*, *government contact*, and *US organizational membership* (2010). Thus, following the groundwork laid by Waldinger and associates this paper continues to carry the baton to better define transnationalism, its practices, and actors as they pertain to Mexican HTAs.

Lastly, a recent and important contribution to the immigrant civic participation literature is the importance of family. For immigrants, the family is a central resource that determines among other things where people migrate, how much is remitted, and ultimately how successful individuals will integrate in the United States (Glick 2010). Notwithstanding the importance of family in the integration process, little has been written regarding the importance of immigrant families in the political socialization process. Some notable exceptions include Pallares and Flores-Gonzalez, who find greater politicization by protest marchers from mixed-status families and from youth who adhered to a wider and symbolic definition of family (2011). However, one line of research rest on the premise that thick family ties are a source of low social capital (Banfield 1958; Verba, Schlozman et al. 2005). This line of inquiry argues that strong family ties or leads to an increase in trust within families at the expense of trust in others outside the family, hypothesized to lead to low civic participation (Ljunge 2012).

A study by Alesina and Giuliano, used two surveys to test the significance of family ties on political trust, political participation, and trust of others outside the family within various countries among second generation immigrants (2011). For second generation immigrants, the authors find a converse relationship between family ties in parent's birth country and political interest as well as political activism in receiving country. However, in a separate study, Ljunge finds that stronger family ties lead to stronger civic virtues and civic virtues are negatively related to political participation (2011). Ljunge's findings resolve what might seem as contradictory results. In comparison to Alesina et al., Ljunge argues that family ties are complimentary to social capital, by way of civic virtues. For example, immigrants with strong family ties are much more likely to oppose exploiting others for individual gains, and believe it is more important that children learn respect for others. Ljunge speculates that those who are political active are likely moved by individual gains, a belief that is at odds with respondents with strong civic virtues (2012). The aforementioned studies primarily focus on the transmission of political culture to the second generation, however, research on HTAs suggests that membership declines in subsequent generations. Nonetheless, the research highlights the importance of families that foster civic virtue and participation, thus, the inclusion of household variables is important in evaluating HTA membership.

### ***Research Questions***

Below I pose five questions to address some gaps in the literature. Of these questions, I pay particular attention to the sending country concerning ecological and regional considerations, political and civic participation antecedent to migration. In addition, I

include questions common in the transnational literature but particularly attuned to HTAs; the influence of cross-border activities and U.S. civic participation that bolsters membership in them. Lastly, demographic characteristics and perceptions towards government are specified.

**Q1:** Traditional sending regions have a long and robust history of migration to the United States due to selectivity and network driven migration. Do traditional sending regions increase the likelihood of HTA membership? In other words, does a high proportion of migrants from specific sending regions drive HTA participation?

**H1:** I anticipate that migrants from this region will be more likely to participate in HTAs. As stated before, their long migration history, more established presence in the United States, and concentration suggest that HTA membership is more likely.

**Q2:** Does political and civic participation before migration increase the likelihood of HTA membership?

**H2:** Two prior studies using LNS data, report pre-migration civic and political participation are important determinants of thinner forms of cross-border activities, like opinion of expatriate voting, attention to Mexican politics, HTA membership, naturalization, and skepticism towards government (Jones-Correa 2008; Waldinger, Soehl et al. 2012). Thus, a positive relationship is expected between pre-migration civic and political participation and HTA membership, a thicker form of cross-border activity.

**Q3:** Which types of cross-border ties increase the chances of HTA membership?

**H3:** Waldinger argues that a particular set of cross-border activities follow a particular logic (2007). For HTA membership I posit that the following cross-border ties are conducive to HTA membership: visits to Mexico, remittances, and property ownership.

**Q4:** Does civic participation after migration increase participation in HTAs?

**H4:** Contemporary literature on transnationalism suggests that civic and political participation here and in the home-country are mutually reinforcing (DeSipio, Pachon et al. 2003; Pantoja 2005; Escobar 2006; Smith 2006; Portes, Escobar et al. 2009; Escobar 2010). Thus, I surmise that migrant's civic and political participation in the United States and towards the home country mutually and positively reinforce HTA participation.

**Q5:** Does the amount of socio-economic resources affect the likelihood of HTA membership?

**H5:** Transnational activity in general is most common amongst well-established migrants who have the economic resources to engage in two countries (Soehl and Waldinger 2010). However, less is known about the influence of individual and household level socio-economic resources on HTA participation in particular. Like other forms of transnationalism we expect that greater individual resources will increase HTA participation. Thus, higher levels of educational attainment are expected to increase the likelihood of HTA participation.

**H5<sub>2</sub>**: For households, given the importance of family on civic virtues and greater resources, noted above, I posit that dense households measured by the greater number of people who contribute to household income are more likely to hold HTA membership (Ljunge 2012). Households that receive government assistance and those with low household income with are hypothesized to be negatively related to HTA membership.

**Q5**: Does mistrust of government affect HTA membership?

**H5**: HTAs oftentimes replace local governments in the provision of amenities in local communities of origin. The lack of service provisions is a source of skepticism in Mexico, which has been found to positively influence democracy (Cleary and Stokes 2006). In contrast to research that suggests a negative relationship between trust and civic participation, I posit that skepticism among Mexican immigrants and members of HTAs is likely channeled to HTA membership (Chávez, Wampler et al. 2006). Thus, I expect that negative perceptions towards government may increase HTA membership.

### ***Data and Methodology***

Data for this paper derives from pooling the 2006 Latino National Survey and the 2007 Latino National Survey-New England. The former is composed of 8,634 interviews and is representative of 87.5 percent of the target universe of Latinos in the United States. The latter is comprised of 1,200 interviews that represent the Latino population in the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. State samples were stratified and selected based on their total Latino population. Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, and North Carolina were included in the sample to account for

changing and emerging Latino communities. Additionally, some states were internally sampled proportionally and non-proportionally to increase representation of smaller regions and enhance cross region comparisons respectively. The national margin of error was 1.05 percent.

Respondents were self-identified Latinos/as and interviews were conducted in Spanish and/or English. Interviews were conducted over the phone with the use of computer-assisted telephone interview (CATI) from November 2005 to August 2006 by Latin Force Group LLC.

For my purposes the LNS is an ideal data source. About 71 percent of all foreign-born respondents reported country of birth as Mexico. It contains 3,879 cases of Mexican immigrants by sub-national states of origin. I conducted mean imputations for date of arrival, birthdate, number supported by income, and number who contribute to income. After imputations I used listwise deletion to exclude missing data. I included “missing” and “don’t” know responses for categorical dependent variables in the regression equations to increase number of observations in all the models; leaving me with 3,726 cases for analysis (see Table 2 below). To my knowledge the National Survey of Latinos (2006), the Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles survey (2004), and the Survey of Mexican Workers (2005) are the only surveys that capture HTA membership, country of origin, and subnational states. Of these surveys, none covers the depth and breadth of political practices that the LNS capture. Most importantly, the LNS is the only survey to capture political behavior before and after migration. For these reasons, the LNS is a unique and ideal choice of data for the analysis at hand.

Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Mexican States by HTA Participation

	% Participation in HTAs		Total
	No	Yes	
Aguascalientes	0.01 (36)	0.03 (5)	0.01 (41)
Baja California Norte	0.01 (45)	0.03 (5)	0.01 (50)
Baja California Sur	0.00 (11)	0.01 (1)	0.00 (12)
Campeche	0.00 (3)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (3)
Coahuila	0.02 (82)	0.01 (2)	0.02 (84)
Colima	0.01 (30)	0.02 (3)	0.01 33
Chiapas	0.01 (36)	0.01 (2)	0.01 (38)
Chihuahua	0.09 (337)	0.06 (9)	0.09 (346)
Distrito Federal	(0.06) (228)	(0.03) (4)	(0.06) (232)
Durango	0.04 (162)	0.03 (4)	0.04 (166)
Guanajuato	0.08 (305)	0.08 (12)	0.08 (317)
Guerrero	0.05 (183)	0.06 (10)	0.05 (193)
Hidalgo	0.02 (84)	0.04 (6)	0.02 (90)
Jalisco	0.11 (394)	0.11 (17)	0.11 (411)
Estado de Mexico	0.04 (148)	0.04 (6)	0.04 (154)
Michoacan	0.11 (405)	0.09 (14)	0.11 (419)
Morelos	0.02 (75)	0.01 (2)	0.02 (77)
Nayarit	0.01 (38)	0.00 (0)	0.01 (38)
Nuevo Leon	0.02	0.01	0.02

	(69)	(1)	(70)
Oaxaca	0.02	0.06	0.02
	(87)	(9)	(96)
Puebla	0.04	0.06	0.04
	(141)	(10)	(151)
Queretaro	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(30)	(2)	(32)
Quintana Roo	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(3)	(1)	(4)
San Luis Potosi	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(93)	(7)	(100)
Sinaloa	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(58)	(1)	(59)
Sonora	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(100)	(7)	(107)
Tabasco	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(11)	(2)	(13)
Tamaulipas	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(92)	(1)	(93)
Tlaxcala	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(7)	(1)	(8)
Veracruz	0.03	0.02	0.03
	(117)	(3)	(120)
Yucatan	0.00	0.01	0.00
	(2)	(1)	(3)
Zacatecas	0.04	0.03	0.04
	(162)	(4)	(166)
DK/REF	0.03	0.04	0.03
	(118)	(7)	(125)
Total	1.00	1.00	1.00
N	(3692)	(159)	(3851)

Source: Latino National Survey 2006

However, some reservations of the data warrant closer attention. For example, consider the wording of the question utilized to measure pre-migration civic participation in the analysis:

M.17 Before you came to the United States, how active were you in a political party, a political organization, or in any type of organizations such as labor unions, student organizations or paramilitary organizations?

The question above aggregates five different types of civic and political participation into a single response. Moreover, the inclusion of membership in paramilitary organizations raises some doubts regarding response bias. For example the questions may lead to respondent satisficing, biased or incomplete reporting by survey subjects to provide a socially desirable response (Krosnick 1991). Similarly, questions dealing with sensitive information, such as admittance of membership in paramilitary organizations, can bias response out of concern of possible repercussions of divulging sensitive information (Tourangeau and Yan 2007). However, the accuracy of the question was tested by triangulating the rate of participation, elicited by the question above, with other civic participation measurements in Mexico. For instance, the 2005 World Survey found that 9.7 percent and 7.6 percent of all respondents were active participants in a political party and/or union respectively. Similarly, 9.1 percent of all LNS respondents reported active membership to the survey question under discussion. The percent of participants in the LNS aggregated variable falls between the two forms of participation measured in the World Survey, indicating some convergence and confidence that the LNS accurately represents pre-migration civic participation. Relatedly, it also raises concern that civic participation might not be selective on the migration process. That is, that migrants are no more likely to be civically active than non-migrants<sup>14</sup>.

A more general concern with pre-migration variables is recall bias. Described by Tourangeau et al. as the second of four steps in the cognitive process when

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<sup>14</sup> A more adequate research design for exploring selectivity of migration on civic participation would require a comparison between regions with high and low migration and between migrant and non-migrants from these regions.

answering survey questions (Tourangeau, Rips et al. 2000). Particularly, the second step pertains to the process in which respondents recall pertinent information from long-term memory to formulate a response. The length of time since occurrence of event is important given that the greater the time between interview and event can increase error. Error in general is expected, but the accuracy of responses from individuals who have spent a considerable amount of time in the United States since first migration is of most concern. For example, if we look at the 1,324 respondents who reported voting in Mexico before migration we find that 3 percent, 40 respondents, self-reported voting at age seventeen or younger<sup>15</sup>. It is entirely possible that the majority of error is due to misreporting of first date of migration. However, there is no way to distinguishing between those who misreported voting before migration and misreporting of first date of migration. In either case, the error is small enough to be negligible.

Preliminary logistic regressions show that various individual-level variables are important for explaining HTA membership. In order to account for regional variation and clustering, common in migrant populations, regional variables were tested in the logit model. The two regional variables were *migration and marginalization zones* and *migration sending regions*. However, this technique potentially ignores state level variance not accounted for by the aforementioned variables and poses logical and statistical problems (Gelman and Hill 2007).

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<sup>15</sup> In the preferred regression model this group of respondents was significant.

In the absence of a more complex model, logically, we may commit *ecological fallacy*<sup>16</sup> that is we incorrectly infer something about individuals from the groupings to which they belong. From a technical standpoint, when we take higher order variables and assign them to individual level variables for analysis, we violate the assumption of independence of observations (Raudenbush and Bryk: 2002:xx). In other words, because we have foreknowledge of where individual respondents come from, provincial states in Mexico, our individual observations may present clustering and not be independent of each other.

Alternatively, if we aggregate individual variables into second order variables and conduct analysis in the higher order we commit *atomic fallacy*, or the inference about groupings that is incorrectly obtained from individual-level observations. Statistically, this error can lead to aggregated variables that eliminate within group variation and stronger than usual relationships between the higher order variables and non-aggregated variables (Raudenbush and Bryk: 2002:xx).

To address some of these problems noted I use a hierarchical linear model (HLM) to test for state-level effects. All methodological reasons aside, HLMs are a powerful sociological tool to consider the influence of ecology on various forms of civic participation like HTA participation. The conceptual assumptions underlying the use of HLM are reminiscent of classical sociological theory and concepts like C. Wright Mill's *sociological imagination*. In Mill's seminal book, by the same title, he relates the importance of studying the various components of society. In his own words "[w]hat is specifically 'sociological' in the study or any particular feature of a

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For an elaborated evaluation of the term see Openshaw, S. (1984). "Ecological fallacies and the analysis of areal census data." *Environment and Planning A* **16**(1): 17-31.

total society is the continual effort to relate that feature to others, in order to gain a conception of the whole” (Mills 1959). Similarly, Mills criticized a sociology that espoused “abstracted empiricism”, or the limited theorization of individuals abstracted from their surroundings. In a limited fashion HLM allows for a fuller conceptualization of HTA participation.

Taking into account data availability some ecological considerations include analyzing states with greater NGO density to determine if it raises the effect of pre-migration civic participation and increases the likelihood of HTA participation<sup>17</sup>. Similarly, I may test if states with greater levels of internet access will increase the effect of attention paid to home-country politics and increase the likelihood of HTA participation. Or I can use comparable measurements to see if HTA membership is primarily driven by individual characteristics or state factors. For example, I can test if states with higher educational averages will increase the effect of individual-level education and increase the likelihood of HTA participation.

Methodologically speaking a HLM is appropriate for this project because it allows us to test the effects of higher order variables on lower order variables and partially address omitted variable bias (Luke 2004). Additionally, estimations of individual effects can be improved for data with few key observations of interest, such as HTA membership, by pooling data and weighting it (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Observations that are comparatively low in numbers with poor estimation can borrow strength from pooled units. Another advantage of HLM is to address possible omitted variable bias like unit heterogeneity. Unit heterogeneity can lead to different y-

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<sup>17</sup> See appendix for state-level regression tables

intercepts and different means. For example, a fixed effects HLM can address problems that arise by units with same slopes but varying intercepts (Snijders 1999).

The first step of HLM is to test if HLM is necessary in the first place. I began my analysis by testing for between-state and within-state variation. This required a null model and reduced model. The constrained, or null model, consisted of two variables, the Mexican state variable comprised of the thirty-one state provinces and Mexico City and the HTA participation variable. The former variable was designated as independent and the latter as dependent. To test for between-state variation the Mexican state variable was designated random effects. The interclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was obtained for this model from the output. Within state variance was 0.04 and between-state variation was 0.0002. In other words, only 0.0002 percent of HTA participation can be explained by variation between states.

Next, in order to verify the significance of between-states variation, I conducted a likelihood ratio test to compare the null model and a reduced model. The formula for the likelihood ratio (LR) test is:  $LR = -2(\text{Log}L_{Restricted} - \text{Log}L_{Full})$ . As can be expected a substantially smaller statistic for the reduced model is expected because of fewer parameters and less accuracy in fit of model. The null hypothesis states that the models are no different and the alternative hypothesis states that a significant difference exists and exceeds random chance. The test resembles a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of estimated parameters between the two models (Enders 2010). The null model statistic was 1500.854 and the reduced model was not much different (1497.909). The LR score was 2.945, well below the chi-square threshold of 3.841 with a probability of

0.05 with one degree of freedom. The results indicate that between-state variation is not significant and the introduction of random effects does not improve the model. Based on this finding, I limit my analysis to individual data from the LNS noted above<sup>18</sup>.

### ***Independent Variables***

#### **Pre and Post Political Membership and Action**

As previously stated, the effect of pre-migration civic and political capital on civic participation in the United States is understudied. The groupings of variables in this section serve to test if pre-migration political and civic participation necessarily translates to participation in HTAs in the United States post-migration. The LNS is unusually unique in that it captures pre-migration political and civic participation through two questions. The first question asks the following, “Before you came to the United States, how active were you in a political party, a political organization, or in any other type of organization such as labor unions, student organizations or paramilitary organizations?” This question is coded in a likert scale, ranging from *never joined* to *very active*, where *never joined* is the reference category. Similarly, *voted in Mexico before migration* captures electoral participation before migration, this variable is coded into “yes” “no” “DK” (don’t know) and “NA” (not applicable). Because HTAs may or may not be explicitly political organizations, including pre-migration civic and political participation variables is both possible and necessary.

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<sup>18</sup> In order to address within state correlation, for reasons outlined above, generalized estimation equations can be introduced in the model. This process is preferred because it is best suited for non-normal outcome variables, or logistic regression, and coefficients remain unchanged while improving standard error.

Post-migration political membership and actions in Mexico are included in the model to gauge continued interest and commitment to politics across the migration process. This grouping of variables is also important for determining whether pre-migration participation necessarily leads to post-migration participation. The four variables are coded into tripartite categories: “yes” “no” “DK” (don’t know) and “NA” (not applicable). The first variable measures social, cultural, and civic participation in the United States after migration labeled *membership in organization before arrival*. The remaining three variables measure continued interest in home politics by the following variables *voted in Mexico*, *contributed money to party/candidate in Mexico*, and *general attention to politics in Mexico*.

### **Cross-border Activity**

This grouping of variables is meant to test if cross border activities influence participation in HTAs? Mexican migrants are part and parcel of a wider network of cross-border activity, thus, we would expect that these connections reinforce HTA membership. The literature on transnationalism, outlined elsewhere in this paper, stipulates a deterritorialization of the nation, where fields like commodities, culture, affect, etc. supersede national borders and migrants create fields where they may live simultaneously in sending and receiving countries. Scholars of transnationalism posit that transnationalism grows through the strengthening of cross border fields and ties. The model measures these activities by including *visits*, *remittances*<sup>19</sup>, and *property*

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<sup>19</sup>Remittances in emigrant households in Mexico are predominantly used to offset everyday household expenditures, a smaller percent of migrants use remittances to build homes and home renovations, and fewer amounts are used for micro enterprises. The LNS does not disaggregate by types of remittances. Rather than assuming a specific functionality, a more generalized hypothesis is that greater amounts of remittances reflect a greater connection to Mexico.

*ownership in Mexico* to test if these variables have a positive relationship with the outcome variable.

### **Regional Variation**

Research on HTAs suggests that participation is driven primarily by numbers. This line of thinking suggests that sending states with a high proportion of migrants are most likely to have HTAs. For example, states like Zacatecas, Guanajuato, San Luis Potosi, Durango, Nayarit, and Michoacán have a greater proportion of established migrants in the United States, in comparison to states with a much younger history of migration that tend to be circular migrants and less established (Lanly and Valenzuela Varela 2004).

Using Durand and Massey's (2003) typology of sending regions I test the influence of regional variation on HTA participation. Massey's typology includes the following four distinct regions: *traditional*<sup>20</sup>, *central*, *southeastern*, and *border region*. Below, Table 3 list states by regions in Mexico. To test if HTA participation is primarily driven by sheer numbers, the reference category is the *southeast region* because this region is the least represented in LNS data (0.05 percent) and presumably the least likely to show HTA participation. I expect that more established regions--with large flows of migration--will have a greater likelihood of HTA participation. Thus, a positive relationship is expected between regions that have traditionally sent a large number of migrants and HTAs participation.

Table 3. Mexican Sending Regions

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<sup>20</sup> The term "historical region" proposed by Jorge Durand is synonymous to "traditional" sending region. The identification of this region dates back to work by Mexican Anthropologist Manuel Gamio.

Traditional	Border	Central	Southeast
Aguascalientes	Baja California	Distrito Federal	Campeche
Colima	Chihuahua	Guerrero	Chiapas
Durango	Coahuila	Hidalgo	Quintana Roo
Guanajuato	Nuevo Leon	Mexico	Tabasco
Jalisco	Sinaloa	Morelos	Veracruz
Michoacan	Sonora	Oaxaca	Yucatan
Nayarit	Tamaulipas	Puebla	
San Luis Potosi		Queretaro	
Zacatecas		Tlaxcala	

Source: Massey, D. S., J. S. Rugh, et al. (2010). "The Geography of Undocumented Mexican Migration." *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 26(1): 129-152.

A second variable is used in the model to account for regional variation based on the intensity of migration and marginalization. The migration and marginalization indices are individually created and made available by the Mexican National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion-CONAPO). The marginalization index is comprised of four structural measurements and nine indicators of exclusion at the municipal level from two data sources. Similarly, the migration intensity index is comprised of four measurements based on household level data from the bi-centennial census long form<sup>21</sup>. Replicating the typology used by Ruiz-Ochoa (2009), I merge the migration and marginalization index into one measurement comprised of four categories<sup>22</sup> to capture the variation of these two measurements for all Mexican states (see Table 4 below) .

Table 4. Migration and Marginalization Typologies

<sup>21</sup> The census asks whether respondents or any household member, friend, or someone they know has lived abroad. The four measurements of international migration include: 1) percent of households that receive remittances, 2) percent of one or more household members abroad, 3) percent who returned from abroad in the last five years and who originally left no more than five years ago, 4) and percent who have returned in the last five years and who originally left more than five years ago.

<sup>22</sup> A migration and marginalization index score is not available for Mexico City. Mexico City was entered as a fifth category in the migration and marginalization variable to test for influence and to maintain as many cases across model.

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1. Low Migration and Low Marginalization
  2. High Migration and Low Marginalization
  3. Low Migration and High Marginalization
  4. High Migration and High Marginalization

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Source Ruiz-Ochoa, W. (2009). "Valoracion de la Estrategia de Remeas Colectivas para Combatir la Marginacion en Mexico."

The migration index is an important measurement of US-Mexico migration and is included in the model to capture the relationship between migration flows and HTA membership. The index is ideal for measuring strength of networks since it incorporates both emigration, return migration, and circular migration (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010). Additionally, participation by HTAs in Mexico's 3x1 development program<sup>23</sup> is skewed towards regions with high migration and middle marginalization, as well as states with PAN governorship (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012).

The findings noted by the authors above provide us with two important reasons for utilizing the indices. First, they allow us to incorporate an ecological estimation of sending regions by simultaneously evaluating migration and marginalization. By including these indices we are provided the opportunity to triangulate and compare our results with Aparicio and Meseguer (2012). For instance, the aforementioned authors used a sample singularly restricted to HTAs enrolled in the 3x1 program. The LNS includes a wider type of HTA membership that theoretically includes those in the 3x1 as well as other types of HTAs. Findings from my analysis will illustrate some

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<sup>23</sup> The 3x1 program is a development scheme where Mexican emigrants pool remittances for development projects in their town of origin. The initial remittance is matched by state and federal governments to increase the amount available for development projects.

interesting differences and similarities between findings that only incorporate 3x1 HTAs and my own.

To assess the positive relationship between migration intensity and HTA participation the preferred reference category is low migration and low marginalization<sup>24</sup>.

### **Household Resources**

The literature on migrant civic participation illustrates that individual resources such as education and income reinforce civic membership. However, less is known about the effects of household resources on HTA participation. The regression enters *total household income* indexed in increments of 9,999 dollars starting at less than \$15,000 and ending at \$65,000 and above. *Received government assistance* and *number supported by income* captures households that could be resource constrained. *Number contributed to income* captures the number of individuals who contribute to household income and could be resource endowed households. For *received government assistance*, I use “never” as the omitted category to capture the positive relationship between household resource endowment and HTA participation. In accordance with the literature we expect a positive relationship between household resources and HTA participation. *Total household income* is an ordinal variable; the reference category is *below \$15,000*. The LNS does not measure family ties or civic virtues, however, I can test the relationship between family composition, *Number supported by income* and *number contributed to income*, and HTA membership; the two variables are continuous.

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<sup>24</sup> For a discussion regarding the nexus between poverty and migration see Aparicio (2012) and Fox & Bada (2008).

## **Perception of Government**

This set of variables captures migrant's perceptions of government. The grouping includes the following four variables: *government is run by a few big interests, I have no say in what government does, avoid contact with government, and trust government to do right*. The first three questions are coded in the affirmative and the latter in the negative to capture skepticism towards government. The first three variables are in Likert scale. The last variable includes four responses ranging from "never" to "just about always". The hypothesized relationship is a positive relationship between skepticism and HTA affiliation.

### ***Dependent Variable***

A Logistic regression model is used to estimate HTA participation. The dependent variable is coded zero for "no" and one for "yes" in response to "Do you participate in the activities of a club, association or federation connected to the town or province your family came from [Mexico]?" While this variable is not limited specifically to participation in HTAs, it operates as a close and meaningful approximation of HTA participation.

### ***Results***

Results of the logistic regression models are found below at the end of this section<sup>25</sup>. The six columns represent the six models entered additively to illustrate

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<sup>25</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Never joined is reference

<sup>b</sup> "No" is reference; <sup>c</sup> "No" is reference; <sup>d</sup> "No" is reference; <sup>e</sup> "No" is reference; <sup>l</sup> "No" is reference

<sup>f</sup> None is reference

<sup>g</sup> Never is reference ; <sup>m</sup> Never is reference ; <sup>q</sup> Never is reference

<sup>h</sup> Less than once a year or never is reference

<sup>j</sup> Southeastern is reference

increments in predictive power. The *demographics control* group is introduced simultaneously with all models to hold individual characteristics constant across models. This allows for greater distinction across models irrespective of individual characteristics known to influence HTA participation. The decreases in log likelihood scores immediately at bottom of the regression table indicate that all subsequent models add explanatory power. The various independent variables were significant across the models. *Sent money home, household income, government assistance, Spanish, age, no documents* and the entire *Perceptions of Government* variables were not significant in any of the models. If we direct our attention to the bottom of the table, we note that only some findings for *demographic controls* are consistent with prior findings.

Model one, represents one of the central themes of this paper, the role of pre-migration civic and political participation on HTA participation. I hypothesized that greater civic and political involvement before migration would encourage HTA affiliation. Only *civic participation before migration* was significant. This variable is significant across all models. Model two considered post-migration political and civic participation. Similar to model one, amongst the post-migration variables only *civic participation in the US* was significant but *voting in Mexico after arrival* was not significant. Holding all other variables constant, the odds of HTA membership by someone civically active before migration was almost three and a quarter (3.23) times

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<sup>k</sup> Low Migration and High Marginalization is reference

<sup>l</sup> Below \$15,000 is reference

<sup>n</sup> Strongly agree is reference ; <sup>o</sup> Strongly agree is reference ; <sup>p</sup> Strongly agree is reference

<sup>r</sup> Elementary or less is reference

<sup>s</sup> With documents is reference

grater than a migrant who never joined. Post-migration political ties to country of origin were important indicators of HTA activity. Among respondents who answered in the affirmative to having donated to parties or candidates and/or paid attention to home-country politics after migration, their odds of HTA membership were 3.61 and 3.40 respectively higher. Net of all variables, and in comparison to those who never donated and/or paid attention to politics in home country. Descriptive analysis demonstrates that pre-migration civic participation does not necessarily translate to post-migration participation. Of all respondents, only sixteen and thirty-four of them reported being very active and somewhat active, respectively, before and after migration. Together, these two groups represent about a third of all respondents who reported HTA membership. In fact, only eight respondents were civically active before, after, and HTA members. These numbers demonstrate that pre-migration civic participation does not necessarily translate to participation after migration.

Contrary to my third hypothesis—increase in cross border activities will increase HTA affiliation— model three variables contributed very little to explaining HTA membership. Only *property ownership in Mexico* was significant in this cluster. Net of all variables, the odds of HTA membership was 1.95.

My second hypothesis posited that traditional sending regions and zones with high-migration and high-marginalization drive HTA membership numbers up. Of the two variables measuring regional variation, in model four, only the *migration and marginalization zones* proved reliable and significant<sup>26</sup>. The results show that HTA

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<sup>26</sup>I tested for collinearity between the two regional variables. The Pearson correlation coefficient was 0.462 demonstrating some collinearity. Next, I ran model four twice, each time with only one regional variable. By itself, the *migration sending regions* variable in model four was not significant. However,

members from states in Mexico with low-levels of migration and high-levels of marginalization are 2.93 times more likely to be members than respondents from states with low-migration and low-marginalization.

In model five, with regards to resources, I expected a higher level of HTA membership due to a larger number of resources. In this cluster, only *number who contribute to income* was significant. The odds of HTA activity increase by almost one and quarter for every additional contributor in the household, net of all variables. Because income levels—*total household income*—are accounted for in the model, *number who contributes to income* indicates that household composition, independent of income, plays an important role in HTA participation.

Model four included four variables assessing perceptions of government. I hypothesized that negative beliefs towards government would increase HTA affiliation. Unexpectedly, the variables in this group did not seem to shed any light on HTA participation.

The control variables, entered in all models, were not significant with the exception of being *male*. Like Goldring, this finding corroborates prevalence of male membership in HTAs (2001). As predicted, the expected odds of males participating in HTAs were 1.64 times greater than the odds of females participating. Recency of migration, measured here as *proportion of time in US*, was hypothesized and confirmed to be negatively related to HTA membership early in the regression model but waned off towards the end. Surprisingly, *education* was only a slightly important indicator of HTA participation notwithstanding a general acceptance that HTA

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the *migration and marginalization zones* maintained significance at the .05 level but reduced the standardized coefficient from 2.93 to 1.96.

participants have higher than average levels of education. If we look at model one, the “some college or more” category is significant and indicates that net of all variables, an additional person to contribute to household income increases the odds of HTA membership by 1.83 times. This category loses significance in all models until the last model; model 6. This suggests that education is not an important indicator of HTA participation or a sampling artifact reflecting leaders and members of nascent HTAs

<sup>27</sup>.

Table 5. Regression of Select Variables on HTA Participation

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<sup>27</sup>Valenzuela Romo notes that newly formed and emerging HTAs are much more pluralist and inclusive with leadership comprised of mostly middle class members (2004).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5		Model 6	
	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β	B	β
<b>Pre-migration Participation</b>												
Civic participation before mig. <sup>a</sup>												
Very active	1.79	5.99 ***	1.25	3.50 ***	1.09	2.97 **	1.15	3.16 ***	1.11	3.04 **	1.17	3.23 ***
Somewhat active	1.02	2.77 ***	0.75	2.12 **	0.63	1.87 *	0.67	1.96 *	0.62	1.86 *	0.67	1.95 *
Member not active	0.65	1.92	0.37	1.45	0.35	1.41	0.44	1.55	0.37	1.45	0.41	1.50
Not active at all	0.17	1.18	0.10	1.11	0.07	1.08	0.07	1.08	0.07	1.07	0.11	1.11
Vote in Mexico before mig. <sup>b</sup>												
Yes	0.59	1.81 *	0.41	1.51	0.32	1.37	0.34	1.41	0.38	1.47	0.39	1.47
<=17@ arrive	0.72	2.05 *	0.71	2.03 *	0.77	2.16 **	0.75	2.13 *	0.72	2.05 *	0.71	2.04 *
<b>Post-migration Participation</b>												
Civic participation in US <sup>c</sup>												
Yes			0.72	2.06 ***	0.77	2.16 ***	0.80	2.23 ***	0.85	2.33 ***	0.88	2.42 ***
Voted in Mexico after arrival <sup>d</sup>												
Yes			0.71	2.03 *	0.55	1.74	0.58	1.78	0.53	1.71	0.60	1.83
Cont. money to party/candidate in MX <sup>e</sup>												
Yes			1.50	4.47 ***	1.44	4.24 ***	1.35	3.85 **	1.40	4.07 ***	1.28	3.61 **
Attention paid to politics in MX <sup>f</sup>												
A lot			1.35	3.85 ***	1.21	3.35 ***	1.19	3.28 ***	1.18	3.26 ***	1.22	3.40 ***
Some			0.66	1.94 *	0.59	1.81 *	0.57	1.77 *	0.59	1.81 *	0.66	1.94 *
Little			0.60	1.83 *	0.55	1.73 *	0.49	1.64	0.49	1.63	0.50	1.65
<b>Cross Border Activity</b>												
Times visited Mexico <sup>g</sup>												
Once a year or +					0.40	1.50	0.48	1.62	0.48	1.61	0.46	1.58
Once a year					-0.10	0.91	-0.08	0.92	-0.13	0.88	-0.15	0.86
Three years or +					0.16	1.18	0.12	1.13	0.09	1.10	0.10	1.11
Five years or +					0.14	1.15	0.14	1.15	0.18	1.20	0.14	1.15
Sent Money Home <sup>h</sup>												
Once a year					0.32	1.38	0.29	1.34	0.32	1.37	0.32	1.37
Once few months					0.48	1.61	0.43	1.54	0.43	1.54	0.40	1.50
Once a month or +					0.53	1.69	0.50	1.64	0.48	1.62	0.42	1.52
Property ownership in Mexico <sup>i</sup>												
Yes					0.65	1.91 ***	0.65	1.91 ***	0.63	1.88 ***	0.67	1.95 ***
Avg remittance					0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	-0.01	0.99	-0.01	0.99
<b>Regional Variation</b>												
Migration sending regions <sup>j</sup>												
historical							0.70	2.01	0.80	2.23	0.83	2.29
central							0.79	2.21	0.87	2.38	0.92	2.51 *
border							0.81	2.24	1.00	2.71	0.95	2.59
Migration and marginalization zones <sup>k</sup>												
High Mig / High Marg							0.34	1.41	0.46	1.59	0.41	1.50
High Mig / Low Marg							0.41	1.51	0.54	1.72	0.51	1.67
Low Mig / High Marg							0.99	2.69 *	1.13	3.09 *	1.08	2.93 *
<b>Household Resources</b>												
Household income <sup>l</sup>												
\$15,000-24,999									-0.13	0.87	-0.15	0.86
\$25,000-34,999									0.06	1.06	0.08	1.08
\$35,000-44,999									-0.69	0.50	-0.69	0.50
\$45,000-54,999									0.22	1.25	0.27	1.31
\$55,000-64,999									-0.05	0.95	-0.04	0.96
ABOVE \$65,000									-0.08	0.92	0.01	1.01
Government assistance <sup>m</sup>												
Current									-0.31	0.73	-0.31	0.73
Past									-0.25	0.78	-0.21	0.81
No. support by income									-0.06	0.95	-0.06	0.94
No. contribute to income									0.21	1.23 **	0.21	1.23 **
<b>Perceptions of Government</b>												
Government is run by a few big interest <sup>n</sup>												
Strongly disagree											0.26	1.29
Somewhat disagree											-0.04	0.96
Somewhat agree											-0.28	0.75
I have no say in what government does <sup>o</sup>												
Strongly disagree											0.07	1.07
Somewhat disagree											-0.03	0.97
Somewhat agree											-0.18	0.84
Avoid contact with government <sup>p</sup>												
Strongly disagree											-0.42	0.66
Somewhat disagree											-0.49	0.62
Somewhat agree											-0.24	0.79
Trust government to do right <sup>q</sup>												
Some of the time											0.18	1.19
Most of the time											0.03	1.03
Just about always											-0.03	0.97
<b>Demographic Controls</b>												
Male												
	0.76	2.13 ***	0.70	2.02 ***	0.58	1.79 **	0.58	1.79 **	0.52	1.68 **	0.49	1.64 *
Highest level of education <sup>r</sup>												
Some high school	0.24	1.27	0.15	1.16	0.12	1.13	0.19	1.20	0.21	1.23	0.25	1.29
Some college or +	0.61	1.83 *	0.37	1.45	0.35	1.42	0.48	1.61	0.52	1.68	0.62	1.85 *
Spanish	-0.41	0.67	-0.21	0.81	-0.33	0.72	-0.39	0.68	-0.39	0.68	-0.30	0.74
Age	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.01
No Documents <sup>s</sup>												
Other	-0.22	0.81	-0.24	0.78	-0.17	0.84	-0.21	0.81	-0.25	0.78	-0.26	0.77
Missing	0.16	1.18	0.10	1.10	0.20	1.22	0.20	1.22	0.18	1.19	0.17	1.18
No Documents	-0.47	0.63	-0.46	0.63	-0.45	0.64	-0.43	0.65	-0.38	0.69	-0.37	0.69
Proportion in US	-1.17	0.31 *	-1.25	0.29 *	-1.26	0.28 *	-1.26	0.28 *	-1.07	0.34	-0.99	0.37
Constant	-3.78	0.23 ***	-4.54	0.01 ***	-6.29	0.00 ***	-6.29	0.00 ***	-6.68	0.00 ***	-6.59	0.00 ***
-2 Log Likelihood	1217.53		1149.66		1121.19		1105.47		1088.10		1071.73	

Note. Source: 2006 Latino National Survey; B = odds ratio; β = exponential B; \* p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001

## *Discussion*

Civic participation is persistently significant before and after migration in explaining HTA membership, which conveys some transference of political and civic activity from sending to receiving country. However, if we compare the two forms of civic participation, the Wald test statistic and LR confirm that *membership in organization after arrival* is a significantly stronger predictor than pre-migration civic participation and it increases the model's ability to better explain variance in HTA membership<sup>28</sup>. From these results we can make two important conclusions.

Foremost, we find that civic society in sending countries matter. Escobar and Portes (2008) find that countries with a limited civil society, like Columbia, tend to develop HTAs that primarily focus on philanthropic issues. Unfortunately, the data used by Escobar and Portes does not contain individual level pre-migration variable to provide direct evidence. Thus, their conclusions are made through analytical cross-country comparisons. In contrast, our individual level data confirms that migrants, who are actively involved in Mexican civic society, are more likely to be involved in HTAs.

Additionally, voting in Mexico before and after migration is not an important predictor of HTA membership. Two points are noteworthy here. First, voting and civic participation are different types of political participation, thus, it is not at all surprising that participation in an organization or association in Mexico is a better cue for HTA membership in the United States. However, it is curious that voting in

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<sup>28</sup>The Wald test statistic for pre-migration civic participation was 10.86, smaller in comparison to post-migration civic participation (15.27). The LR statistic was 14.22, larger than the chi-square threshold of 5.99 with a probability of 0.05 with two degrees of freedom.

Mexico before migration, a more common form of political participation than civic participation had no effect HTA membership. Relatedly, a second finding is that expatriate voting also does not play an important role in determining whether individuals participate in HTAs or not. This distinction is important because transnationalism scholars regularly use both voting from abroad and HTA membership as measurements of attachment toward home country. Pairing of these two social phenomena indirectly leads to conflating two processes.

Two recent works stand out as pioneering accounts that shed more light on HTA and expatriate voting. The most recent findings by Leal et al. suggest that the prevalence of HTAs, measured as number of Mexican associations per one million adults of Mexican descent, is a significant predictor of expatriate voting, measured by number of voting ballot solicitations (2012). In her recent book, Chelius surveyed three groups<sup>29</sup> 1) *foot soldiers*, 2) *CONACYT fellows*, and 3) *promoters of expatriate voting* involved in the 2006 voting from abroad campaigns (2010). Chelius recounts that the Mexican Institute of Federal Elections (IFE) reached out to HTAs late in the game but still mobilized expatriate voting. The authors, along with findings from my model six, indicate that the relationship between HTAs and voting abroad is unidirectional. In other words, in 2006 the presence of HTAs helped expatriate voting, but the same relationship cannot be said of expatriate voting on HTA membership; voting from abroad does not translate to HTA participation.

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<sup>29</sup> *Foot soldiers* consisted of a sample of labor migrants in, *CONACYT fellows* was comprised of grad students abroad on Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONACYT) fellowships, and *promoters of expatriate voting* were individuals who helped to mobilize expatriate voting. See (Chelius 2010) page 20 to 23 and appendix for sampling selection and methodology.

Two overlapping explanations are in order. The first is the most obvious. The ability for Mexicans to vote from abroad is a misnomer; it is rather an inability to vote from abroad. As numerous scholars have elaborated, the procedures to vote from abroad are insurmountable. Secondly, as a consequence, voting from abroad is a highly selective endeavor. For example, Chelius reports that 65 percent of *CONACYT fellows*<sup>30</sup> voted from abroad, versus 16 percent of *foot soldiers*. When asked “do you plan to vote in future elections” 92 percent of *CONACYT fellows* and 68 percent of *foot soldiers* responded in the affirmative<sup>31</sup>. In summation, HTA membership and expatriate voting are generally circumscribed to different forms of cross-border participation and should be treated as such.

Yet, HTA membership is also highly selective. Unlike Aparicio (2011), our migration intensity and marginalization index in sending states can be generalized to a larger group of HTAs beyond those that participate in the 3x1 program. Our findings suggest that HTA members are more likely to come from regions in Mexico with low migration intensity and high marginalization. As we hypothesized, regions with higher levels of marginalization are in effect in greater need of group remittances and philanthropy. But why might HTAs cluster in areas with low migration? Two possible explanations are that 1) HTA activity is influenced more by marginalization intensity than migration intensity and 2) the migration index could be capturing areas with a nascent history of migration and exhibiting low levels of migration. The first

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<sup>30</sup> See table X. for distribution of expatriate voters in Mexico City. A large percentage came from the Álvaro Obregón borough. Because this borough is comprised of both wealthy and poor communities it is difficult to ascertain income composition.

<sup>31</sup> Suro (2006) also found that 87% of Mexicans surveyed responded yes to “If you could vote in the next Mexican elections from the U.S. would you?”

explanation was noted by Aparicio and Meseguer in their findings, but the jury is still out on the relationship between migration and poverty (2012). A future model should rigorously evaluate migration intensity and poverty as separate categories with raw data rather than the simplified typology used here.

Turning our attention to *cross border activity* my findings reflect those of other scholars like Waldinger (2011:24) who find that connections to home country are inconsistent predictors of political participation. For example, as noted by Waldinger certain types of connections are devoid of any sort of political participation, such as remittances that have increasingly become more and more effortless. The effects of *cross border activity* point to the direction that materially based connections hold more weight with respect to engagement in HTAs than other cross border activities. Of all related variables, only *property ownership in Mexico* was significant. This indicates that as a consequence of having a tangible stake in the home country, migrant's invested interest in land and property increases their likelihood to participate in HTAs. Data from the 3x1 program (2002-2007)<sup>32</sup> affirms HTA's convergence on land improvements. Consider the top three types of funded development projects: pavement and hydraulic cement (30 Percent), and lighting and sidewalks (21.4 percent), and electrification (12.7 percent) (Gonzalez Rodriguez 2011). A future model should include a greater number of connectivity variables based on material interest<sup>33</sup> to strengthen this finding.

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<sup>32</sup> The 3x1 data is derived from a sample of 150 projects for each of three states in Mexico: Jalisco, Oaxaca, and Zacatecas. Because these three states encompass three of the four sending regions the sample is a good enough approximation of most HTA projects in Mexico.

<sup>33</sup> A variable measuring whether respondents had children in Mexico was dropped for conceptual reasons and was not significant.

Similarly, the household resource group only contained one statistically significant variable. The importance of this variable posits the importance that larger number of people who contribute to household plays in collective action. The HTA literature suggests that at the organizational level HTAs, at least initially, are resource deprived and individually members have higher than average levels of education and income. One plausible explanation is the detection and prevalence of multi-generation dwelling, or multi-dweller families and living structures. For example, Portes et al. report that married men have a greater likelihood of participation<sup>34</sup>(2009). Alternatively, these households could be relatively new migrant households that are initially comprised of various related adults. These types of living arrangement are consistent with the literature concerning smaller HTA organizational structures that initiate at the household level later to include extended family members and fellow *paisanos*<sup>35</sup>. In summary these results indicate that in addition to thick migrant networks, dense family arrangements are important for HTA membership.

Lastly, the remaining set of variables—perceptions of government—found not to be significant<sup>36</sup>, emphasize the diminished role that political beliefs and perceptions have towards HTA membership in contrast to more concrete forms of politics, such as pre-migration voting.

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<sup>34</sup> Future research should incorporate marriage into model.

<sup>35</sup> In a survey of one hundred HTAs in Los Angeles and Chicago, Orozco (2003) finds that most organizations are aggregates of families that join together to engage in community projects in towns of origin.

<sup>36</sup> I post-tested the *perception of government* variable cluster by running a logistic model with only these variables as independent variables and HTA membership as the outcome variable. The results indicated similar results to the full model with no significance and no explanatory power.

## *Conclusion*

In conclusion, I posited the importance of HTA participation as a form of civic activity with important antecedents in Mexico and important implications in the United States. As such, my findings were both expected and surprising and illuminate important factors that influence HTA membership. Briefly returning to Putnam, this thesis demonstrates that civic participation must be understood as a transformative process based on sending and receiving communities, not strictly limited to place based social capital in receiving countries, but across the migration process. Future research should address the longevity of civic participation amongst migrants active before and after migration.

With regards to the general transnationalism literature, my results clarify some of the reasons individuals participate in HTAs. Firstly, materially driven actions increase the likelihood of HTA membership, such as property ownership in Mexico. Secondly, future quantitative analysis should use greater caution when pairing HTA participation and expatriate voting as similar representations of transnationalism. Thirdly, as reported elsewhere, civic and political participation in the sending and host country is not a zero sum relationship. Rather participation in either is complimentary to the other.

Additionally, some regional variation in HTA membership was expected. However, the low-migration and high-marginalization category was not anticipated to show significance. Criticisms aside, for using fixed categories rather than raw data, my findings reflect changing migration patterns from Mexico and note the prevalence

of participation of newer sending regions with low-migration and high-marginalization.

Unfortunately, HLM revealed that state level variation was not a significant factor in explaining HTA participation. Pre-migration political and civic participation are products of civic culture in Mexico, along with regional consideration, these topics should inform future work to more rigorously consider sending country ecological factors. Similarly, decentralization and democratization in Mexico has lead to various representations of state engagement that require additional data collection to approximate findings in previous case studies. Furthermore, as proposed by Anaya a comprehensive evaluation of HTAs requires a temporal dimension.

Low within-state variation was expected given the small number of cases within states. However, the low between-state variation was not anticipated given the literature on HTAs and ecological state variables demonstrated potential variation. One possible explanation for low between-state variation is that variation is clustered by sending regions<sup>37</sup> or some other entity not captured by states as units of analysis.

Future research should explore the spatial nature of the data, transitional probabilities, as well as variable interactions. Spatial analysis should include dissection to test for clustering suggested by the data itself or other analytically factors. Additionally, analysis such as spatial interpolation can be conducted to gain greater information concerning spatial relationships and spatial autocorrelation.

Another prospect is the inclusion of progression ratios in the model to account for transition possibilities (Treiman 2009). By including progression ratios the model

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<sup>37</sup> To test for clustering by migration sending regions I tested for between region variations without significant results.

can potentially measure the odds of HTA participation across the migration process. For example, if we can calculate the odds of respondents who were civically active before and after migration, then we may determine the odds of HTA participation and interactions.

Lastly, a more robust model should account for interactions among the independent variables. The following two thematic examples illustrate how interactions can benefit the model: institutionalism and return migration. As Kam and Franzese remind us institutions contain and shape politics but are never a sole determinant of outcomes (2007). For the model at hand, state institutions in Mexico mitigate or shape relationships between migration flows and HTA membership. One possible way to capture this is through an interaction using a dummy variable for Mexican state offices of emigrant affairs and the migration intensity index. A second example is an interaction between *member of org. before migration* and *visits* to test if return visits to Mexico mitigate the effects of pre-migration civic participation on HTA activity.

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## APPENDIX

### 1. List of Independent Variables: Names and Description

Variables	Description
<b>Pre-migration Participation</b>	
Civic participation before migration	Participate in various types of civic participation
Vote in Mexico before migration	Voted before first migration to US
<b>Post-migration Participation</b>	
Civic participation in US	Participates in civic/community organizations in US
Voted in Mexico after arrival	Voted in Mexico after Migrating to US
Contributed money to party/candidate in MX	Contributed money to party or candidate in Mexico
Attention paid to politics in MX	Pays attention to politics in Mexico
<b>Cross Border Activity</b>	
Times visited Mexico	Times visited Mexico
Sent Money Home	Times sent money to Mexico
Property ownership in Mexico	Owens property in Mexico
Avg remittance	Average amount of remittance sent
<b>Regional Variation</b>	
Migration sending regions	Sending regions according to Massey and Durand (2003)
Migration and marginalization zones	Typology of states with varying degrees of migration and marginalization intensity
<b>Socio-Economic Household Resources</b>	
Household income	Total earned household income in seven brackets
Government assistance	Prior, current, or never received government assistance
Number supported by income	Number of people who are supported by household income
Number contribute to income	Number of people who work to contribute to household income
<b>Perceptions of Government</b>	
Government is run by a few big interest	Government is run by a few big interest and not for public benefit
I have no say in what government does	People have no voice in government affairs
Avoid contact with government	Avoid contact with government
Trust government to do right	How often trust government
<b>Demographic Controls</b>	
Male	Gender of respondent
Highest level of education	Highest level of education achieved
Spanish	Language preferred during interview
Age	Age of respondent
No Documents	Immigration status of respondent
Proportion in US	number of years in US in relation to age

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey ; 2005 and 2010 Mexican census data is used for regional variables made available by the National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Poblacion-CONAPO)

## 2. Cross Tabulations of LNS Variables

	HTA Membership		
	Yes	No	Total
<u>Demographic Characteristics</u>			
1. Male (%)	66.4	45.4	46.3
2. Education (%)			
Elementary or <	23.7	34.1	33.7
Some H.S.	46.1	47.8	47.7
Some College	30.3	18.1	18.6
3. Spanish Pref. (%)	77.0	84.6	84.2
4. Reg. of Origin (%)			
Historic	43.4	45.5	45.4
Central	32.9	27.5	27.7
Southeast	5.9	4.8	4.9
Border	17.8	22.2	22.0
5. Migration and Marginalization (%)			
High Migration/High Marginalization	35.8	38.0	37.9
High Migration/Low Marginalization	20.9	20.8	20.8
Low Migration/High Marginalization	25.0	29.3	29.2
Low Migration/Low Marginalization	18.2	11.9	12.1
6. Rec. Gov. Asst. (%)			
Current	8.2	14.1	13.9
Past	12.2	15.8	15.6
Never	79.6	70.1	70.5
7. Year Arrived U.S. ( $\bar{x}$ )	1990	1989	1989
8. Age ( $\bar{x}$ )	37.5	38.0	38.0
9. Proportion lived in U.S. ( $\bar{x}$ )	0.41	0.43	0.43
10. No Documents (%)	17.2	22.5	22.3
11. Union Participation (%)	9.4	6.7	6.8
12. Household Income (%)			
< 15,000	22.2	24.2	24.1
15,000 – 24,999	23.8	28.9	28.6
25,000 – 34,999	22.2	20.7	20.7
35,000 – 44,999	7.1	11.5	11.3
45,000 – 54,999	9.5	5.5	5.7
55,000 – 64,999	5.6	4.0	4.1
> 65,000	9.5	5.2	5.4
13. Number of Workers in household ( $\bar{x}$ )	2.3	1.9	1.9
14. Number Supported by Income ( $\bar{x}$ )	3.6	3.7	3.7

	<u>HTA Membership</u>		
	Yes	No	Total
<u>Political Participation</u>			
15. Vote in Mexico Before Migration (%)	53.4	39.6	40.2
16. Attention to Politics in Mexico (%)			
A lot	32.9	11.4	12.3
Some	28.8	25.5	25.6
Little	21.9	25.3	25.5
None	16.4	37.7	36.9
17. Active in Organization before Migration (%)			
Very Active	10.1	1.9	2.3
Somewhat active	16.9	6.9	7.3
Member not active	3.4	1.9	2.0
Not active at all	24.3	28.5	28.3
Never joined	45.3	60.8	60.1
18. Donated to Party/Candidate after Migration (%)	6.9	0.9	1.1
19. Vote in Mexico after Migration (%)	11.6	2.9	3.3
<u>Transnational Ties</u>			
20. Property Ownership in Mexico (%)	57.2	32.2	33.0
21. Average Amount Remitted ( $\bar{x}$ )	504.4	400.6	412.3
22. Number of Times Visit Mexico (%)			
> Once a year	19.7	12.7	13.0
Once a year	21.1	21.7	21.7
< Once in 5 years	22.4	20.5	20.6
> 5 years ago	10.9	12.9	12.9
Never	25.9	32.1	31.9
23. Sent Money Home (%)			
Once month or more	53.1	37.2	37.8
Once few months	17.0	15.4	15.5
Once a year	6.1	7.9	7.8
< Once year or never	23.8	39.5	38.9
24. Citizen of U.S. (%)	33.6	26.1	26.4
<u>Skepticism in Government</u>			
25. Government is Run by Big Business (%)			
Strongly Disagree	23.0	16.1	16.4
Somewhat Disagree	16.5	17.9	17.8
Somewhat Agree	22.3	28.9	28.6
Strongly Agree	38.1	37.1	37.1

	<b>HTA Membership</b>		
	Yes	No	Total
26. No Say in Government Actions (%)			
Strongly Disagree	24.3	20.7	20.9
Somewhat Disagree	20.0	20.7	20.7
Somewhat Agree	21.4	25.2	25.0
Strongly Agree	34.3	33.4	33.4
27. Better off Avoiding Government (%)			
Strongly Disagree	38.8	34.5	34.7
Somewhat Disagree	19.4	25.8	25.5
Somewhat Agree	17.9	20.8	20.7
Strongly Agree	23.9	18.9	19.1
28. Trust in Government to do Right (%)			
Never	18.4	20.1	20.1
Some of the Time	50.7	49.1	49.2
Most of the Time	17.1	16.0	16.0
Just about Always	13.8	14.8	14.7

### 3. Various State-level Variables Regressed on Civic Engagement (ENCUP)

Variables	Std. Error	Std. Beta	t	Sig.	R-sq
Marginalization index	0.000	0.194	1.083	0.288	0.038
Migration index	0.000	-0.006	-0.035	0.972	0.000
PAN state party	0.001	0.019	0.103	0.919	0.000
Corruption index	0.000	0.142	0.784	0.439	0.020
Transparency in government	0.001	-0.266	-1.512	0.141	0.071
Efficiency public expenditure	0.000	0.076	0.420	0.678	0.006
Internet usage	0.000	-0.331	-1.924	0.064	0.110
NGO density per thousand	0.005	-0.359	-2.105	0.044	* 0.129
State office of emigrant affairs	0.001	-0.016	-0.086	0.932	0.000
State GDP	0.002	-0.289	-1.652	0.109	0.083
3x1 investment	0.000	0.180	0.916	0.368	0.032
3x1 average prjct amount	0.000	-0.283	-1.474	0.153	0.080

Source: 2008 Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Política y Practicas Ciudadanas. Collected and made available by INEGI

#### 4. Various State-level Variables Regressed on Civic Engagement (LNS)

Variable	Std. Error	Std. Beta	t	Sig.		R Sq
Migration index	0.004	0.489	3.072	0.004	**	0.239
Efficiency public expenditure	0.000	0.431	2.615	0.014	*	0.186
Internet usage	0.000	-0.266	-1.510	0.141		0.071
NGO density per thousands	0.068	-0.228	-1.283	0.209		0.052
State office of emigrant affairs	0.010	0.423	2.557	0.016	*	0.179
State GDP	0.019	-0.309	-1.778	0.086		0.095
3x1 average prjct amount	0.005	-0.479	-2.729	0.011	*	0.229

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey