WHEN STATES ‘COME OUT’: THE POLITICS OF VISIBILITY AND THE DIFFUSION OF SEXUAL MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE

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WHEN STATES ‘COME OUT’: THE POLITICS OF VISIBILITY AND THE DIFFUSION OF SEXUAL MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE

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This dissertation explains how the politics of visibility affect relations among states and the political power of marginalized people within them. I show that the key to understanding processes of social change lies in a closer examination of the ways in which—and the degree to which—marginalized groups make governments and societies see and interact with their ideas. Specifically, I explore the politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) visibility. For a group that many observers have referred to as “an invisible minority,” the newfound presence and influence of LGBT people in many different nation states offers fresh opportunities for the study of socio-political change and the diffusion of norms.

Despite similar international pressures, why are the trajectories of socio-legal recognition for marginalized groups so different across states? This question is not answered by conventional explanations of diffusion and social change focusing on differences in international pressures, the fit between domestic and international norms, modernization, or low implementation costs. Instead, specific transnational and international channels and domestic interest groups can make visible political issues that were hidden, and it is that visibility that creates the political resonance of international norms in domestic politics, and can lead to their gradual internalization.
A state’s openness to international organizations and information flows has demonstrable effects on norm diffusion. It affects the ability of new ideas to enter domestic discourse. Furthermore, the degree to which domestic actors are embedded in transnational advocacy networks illuminates the issue and shapes the speed and direction of diffusion. Visibility has engendered the interactions between movements and states that empower people—mobilizing actors to demand change, influencing the spread of new legal standards, and weaving new ideas into the fabrics of societies. It is this process of “coming out” that leads to the socio-political recognition of rights that alters the situation for such groups. Ultimately, the politics of visibility is located at the intersection of international relations and social movement politics.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Phillip Ayoub was born in Boston, MA. After three years in Boston and three years in Amman, Jordan, his parents (from Europe and the Middle East) immigrated to the United States permanently, and he was raised in the small town of Castle Rock, WA. He received a B.A. in international studies from the University of Washington at age 19. Thereafter, he opened a small coffee shop in his hometown, which he managed for a year and then sold to fund an M.A. degree in political science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. That degree took him to Berlin, where he worked as a tour guide and researcher at Linklaters Law Firm until he was 22. Despite this short foray into the legal field, he eagerly returned to academia, teaching at Lower Columbia College for two terms before starting his PhD coursework in the Department of Government at Cornell in 2007. In 2010 Phillip received a second M.A., and in 2013 a Ph.D., both in Government. As of summer 2013, he is Max-Weber Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In 2014 he will join the faculty at Drexel University’s Department of History and Politics as an assistant professor.
In memory of my father,

Anwar Fayez Ayoub
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For all the words in this dissertation, I could devote as much space to thanking the various people who have made it possible. It is only fitting that I begin these acknowledgements by formally thanking the members of my doctoral committee who, throughout my six years at Cornell, provided valued mentorship and invested long hours to guide this dissertation project. I can say, with some empirical certainty, that I benefited from unique support from my committee. I sent my advisors drafts titled “Version 3” and received detailed comments within the span of a few short weeks. In meeting their high demands, I received far more guidance than is typical or expected.

First, I thank the chair of my committee, Peter Katzenstein, for being an exceptional mentor. When I was deciding which PhD program’s offer to accept, my undergraduate advisor, Christine Ingebritsen, suggested Cornell because of Peter, who she described as the “most inspiring scholar I will ever meet.” She was right. Peter has a rare talent for keeping his students motivated, striking an effective balance between vigorously demanding “excellence” and voicing sincere encouragement and praise. His skill as an advisor is legendary, but I would argue that the legend is an understatement, as his work ethic and his commitment to his students—both in their professional development and in their personal lives—are truly remarkable. He replied to emails within minutes (whether at 7am or 11pm) and had me read Goethe when the going got tough. I have learned so much from him, both in terms of the kind of mentor and the quality of human being I aspire to become.

The phrase “standing on the shoulder of giants” has never been more appropriate. In addition to the excellent mentorship of Katzenstein, I am extremely
grateful for the guidance provided by the other members of this stellar committee. Sid Tarrow is a great intellectual to whom I owe an incredible debt of gratitude. Sid influenced this dissertation’s focus on contentious politics. Early on, he told me quite directly that I was in fact “writing about movements,” and left me little room after challenging me to explain to him how this might not be the case. He was, of course, correct. The breadth and richness of his insights—often going back to the French Revolution—and the plethora of time he has invested in my dissertation have made the outcome much better. Sid often told me not to worry so much about professional things, like straddling separate literatures: “Just present an idea, and do it well.” The ease with which he can think through important questions and problems has been, and will continue to be, an inspiration for me. It is an honor to also be a Tarrow student.

Matt Evangelista was enthusiastic about the subject of this dissertation from the start, and the combination of intellectual and moral support that he provided was of great importance to me as I conducted my research. LGBT politics are only now beginning to capture the attention of political scientists—still far too little attention, but more than when I stumbled into his office in 2007—but Matt encouraged the study from the start. Early on, he agreed to supervise an independent course of study that I had designed. I was concerned that my coursework was not covering much of the work specifically related to gender and LGBT politics, so every two weeks Matt and I went over such readings together, discussing each piece as I wrote my prospectus. In response to my later drafts, he always asked the difficult questions, while simultaneously showing excitement for my work. I doubt that my academic trajectory and dissertation topic would have developed without Matt’s early enthusiasm, and I know that the outcome would have been weaker without his input.
I do not know where to begin in terms of praise for Sarah Soule. She has offered brilliant comments on my various projects, while simultaneously helping me to navigate through many of the pragmatic elements of the profession. My first academic publication—which I would never have even presented absent her encouragement—is largely the result of her warm support. Her sense of the field (in sociology and politics) is astonishing, and she is gifted at helping students hone in on feasible projects and execute them. There is nothing minor about the role Sarah has played in the development of this dissertation. Even when I was based in Europe, I could schedule phone meetings with her to vet the first iteration of my ideas in brainstorming sessions. I have an extraordinary amount of respect for Sarah’s scholarship, kindness, and humility, and I am so grateful that I can call myself her student.

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At Cornell, I owe a special amount of gratitude to the dedication and advice offered to me by Tom Pepinsky, Peter Enns, Jessica Weeks, Chris Way, Jonathan Kirshner, and Syd van Morgen. Historian Holly Case, who so kindly served as my
external reader, has always encouraged and improved my work. Her East European Circle gave me an interdisciplinary platform to present and vet several ideas over the course of four years. Jay Barry at the Cornell Statistical Consulting Unit was willing to talk through my models from afar, over Skype.

Before Cornell, Christine Ingebritsen’s talent as a scholar and teacher is the reason I switched from pre-med to the social sciences. She also influenced my decision to apply to Cornell to work with her former advisors. As we say at the University of Washington, I will always be an “Ingebritsen protégé.” Also in Seattle, Sabine Lang was especially brilliant and greatly influential in making the field of academia so appealing to me as a career choice. At Chapel Hill, John Stephens and Christiane Lemke encouraged me to pursue a career in academia and wrote my letters of recommendation. I grasped the “science” part of the field after studying under Stephens. Many scholars from other campuses have commented on and encouraged me in this project, notably David Paternotte, Beth Kier, John McCarthy, Jeff Checkel, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Verta Taylor, and Agnès Chetaille.

For their intellectual feedback and for hosting me as a guest researcher during various trips to the field, I thank Michael Zürn, Ruud Koopmans, Martin Binder, and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt at the Wissenschafts Zentrum Berlin; Ingo Peters and Thomas Risse at Free University Berlin’s Center on Transnational Relations; and Martin Nagelschmidt at Humboldt University’s Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences. I thank Lena Renz for her able research assistance in transcribing interviews and helping to compile and clean my legislation dataset. I am especially grateful to the many unnamed people who gave me their precious time to interview them; their work and stories will motivate and inspire me for years to come. For my “second” offices, I
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I also benefited from valued friendship during my various stints in the field between 2008 and 2013. I want to thank Blanca Biosca, Olga Brzezinska, Brigid O’Shea, and Mikael Ronsmans for standing by me and comforting me whenever the
process felt difficult. They are the ones who put up with me as I tuned out of conversation to scribble a new idea into my notepad and who graciously accepted that I would always travel with my laptop. I thank Olly Hopwood for always being there, often quite literally visiting me in the most random fieldwork sites. Olaf Szymanski, Tomasz Koko, Aga Sadecka, Remo Kaufmann, Volker Hagen, the M18 crew, Markus Lubawinski, David Paternotte, Greg Czarnecki, Jordan Long, and Bruno Selun made me feel so at home in Poland, Germany, and Belgium. I thank the Alexander von Humboldt crew from China, Russia, and the United States, especially Emily Yates, Emilie Matheu, Sarah Kelly, Özge Guzelsu, Jack Gieseking, Johanna Schuster-Craig, Loni Gardner, and Friedrich von Maltzahn for the enriching experiences we shared as we trekked all over Germany (from coal mines to the Chancellery).

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Finally, this dissertation is for my father. Though he believed in me beyond any realistic measure of my capabilities, his motivation and encouragement are responsible for all of the better things I have achieved in life. This dissertation is one
of them, and I thank him for it. He passed away shortly before I defended, in what was (and continues to be) a very painful and difficult reality to accept: to say goodbye to a wonderful man who left us far too soon. Before he passed, I was able to show him a draft of the dedication page. In his typical style, he rejected any credit, saying: “It should be for your mother.” After some debate I was able to appease him by promising him my mother would get her due credit next time. And that was how he pushed me higher again. I now have to write a book, and it will be for both of them.

Phillip Ayoub

Berlin, Germany

July 2013
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CHAPTER 1
The Politics of Visibility and LGBT Rights in the European Union

“The tide of history only advances when people make themselves fully visible.”
—Anderson Cooper

This dissertation explains how the politics of visibility affect relations among states and the political power of marginalized people within them. I show that the key to understanding processes of social change lies in a closer examination of the ways in which—and the degree to which—marginalized groups make governments and societies see and interact with their ideas. It is this process of “coming out” that leads to the socio-political recognition of rights that alters the situation for such groups. The attainment of rights by Swedish women, for example, originated in their demand for nationally subsidized childcare—active labor market participation facilitated their political emancipation. German women achieved less (and much later), as they remained in their homes, relatively invisible to the larger political culture. Similarly, in 2006, the organizers of unprecedented episodes of immigrant collective action in the United States borrowed the term “coming out” to describe their mobilization. Fear of deportation had silenced undocumented immigrants for decades, but visibility gave them a voice as they began to engage political elites (Zepeda-Millan 2010). By contrast, invisibility has rendered marginalized groups weak in their efforts to demand

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1 Quoted in Stelter (2012). Thanks to Matt Evangelista for suggesting this epigraph.  
2 In the United States, Mary Katzenstein (1999) finds that women’s activism could influence even such staunchly traditional intuitions as the Catholic Church and the military. Rose (2012) finds that visibility for women in higher education has led to enhanced citizenship in terms of equitable treatment by the state, social inclusion, and political incorporation.
change. Poor people’s social movements in the United States, for example, were eventually silenced in the wake of widespread incarceration (Piven and Cloward 1977). To be sure, history is ripe with examples of “weak” groups influencing states, but only under conditions of visibility.

Visibility has engendered the interactions between movements and states that empower people—mobilizing actors to demand change, influencing the spread of new legal standards, and weaving new ideas into the fabrics of societies. For many marginalized groups, such visibility has its roots in both domestic and transnational sources. Specifically, this dissertation explores the politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) visibility. For a group that many observers have referred to as “an invisible minority,” the newfound presence and influence of LGBT people in many different nation states offers fresh opportunities for the study of socio-political change and the diffusion of norms. I use the LGBT case to explore how actors are mobilized across borders and explain why the outcome of their mobilization varies across national contexts.

3 Scholarship on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex and asexual (LGBTQIA) peoples defines its subjects in diverse ways. For simplicity, I use the terms “LGBT” and “sexual minority” to encompass all those peoples marginalized because of sexual relationships among consenting adults and/or gender identities that are deviant from the hetero-normative framework. More specifically, my organizational data refer to LGBT people and my policy and attitudinal data are often limited to LGB people. It should be noted that international norms of appropriate behavior concerning transgender peoples are far less established as those concerning lesbian and gay people. Unfortunately the scopes of the study did not collect data to extensively explore the situations of queer, questioning, intersex or asexual peoples. Historically, queer movements have focused less on institutional change (Eleftheriadis 2013).

BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Why, despite similar international pressures, has the social and legal recognition of minorities changed to such differing degrees and at such different rates across states? My answer is simple: I argue that differing degrees of visibility have, in large part, produced different outcomes for socio-political change across states. Building on theories of international relations and contentious politics that deal with international norm diffusion, my dissertation focuses on variation in the changed legal status and societal perceptions of sexual minorities. Put most broadly, this dissertation seeks to explain changing ideas among state and society in world politics, using the case of norms governing LGBT rights. It deals with the existential conflict between various actors and two sets of norms: the tension between new international ideas and rooted traditional ones that do not coexist harmoniously. As Alison Brysk (2000, 1) has noted, it is “from the clash of identities and social systems [that] we learn how worlds change;” the LGBT rights revolution provides an ideal platform from which to study such interaction.

To answer my question, I focus specifically on Europe, a region that exhibits great variety in the degree to which states adopt international norms governing LGBT rights. The fall of the Berlin Wall and European integration resulted in an

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5 I wish to note early on that I do not view domestic politics as passive and reactionary to “progressive” international norms. Seybert’s (2012) work made headway by contesting what she calls the false dichotomy between enlightened civil society and norm-violating governments. Looking across different types of particular and universal norms, she shows that these roles are often reversed. Similarly, this dissertation is about interactions between actors—both progressive and traditional—at both domestic and transnational levels. Norm politics are never a one-way street and many of the most forward thinking proponents of LGBT rights are domestic actors within target states who champion the issue, often seeking out transnational ties to further their cause. As Seybert argues, norm evolution does not stop once it reaches the international realm. By contrast, the process of norm evolution continues through interaction with domestic spheres. The idea of contemporary Europe as LGBT friendly, for example, is itself an evolutionary process. The link between LGBT rights and Europe has become
unprecedented exposure of former Communist Bloc states to norms and institutions developed in response to the early politicization of sexual identity in several ‘Western’ European states. The rapidly increased social and political interaction between new European Union (EU) member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) with older member states is a natural experiment for international norm diffusion theory, which stipulates that state and non-state actors spread ideas from areas where they are more accepted to areas where they are not. An international norm is “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (P. J. Katzenstein 1996, 5) that governments or NGOs wish to export (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891) or receiving actors feel they ought to adopt or emulate. By diffusion, I refer to the “political process in which actors at different levels use adoption and adaptation of foreign examples to make national and transnational claims and change institutional and legal settings, [as well as] build alliances and exert pressure” (Roggeband 2010, 19).

In Europe, a series of transnational actors—the EU institutions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and a transnational network of activists—have...
fostered change by propagating an international norm of LGBT rights and introducing, or at least amplifying, the issue in the domestic discourses of various European states (Kollman 2007). The norm that LGBT people are entitled to fundamental human rights, deserving of state recognition and protection, is clearly articulated in both the rhetoric and legal framework of the EU and Council of Europe (CoE) institutions.\textsuperscript{8} Despite strikingly similar exposure to European norms and regulations, however, newly admitted member states differ greatly in both societal attitudes and in the introduction of legal protections that states are willing to extend to sexual minorities. Figures 1.1 shows the mean value for attitudes toward homosexuality (by state) across three time points (1990, 2000 and 2010) in ten new EU member states. Figure 1.2 illustrates the variation in the adoption of pro-LGBT legislation across EU member-states.\textsuperscript{9} All states meet the EU’s requirements for membership (decriminalization of same-sex acts, employment non-discrimination and asylum on the basis of sexual orientation), but some go much further than others, for example, by introducing parenting and partnership rights.

\textsuperscript{8} Examples include Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, a 2000 Employment Anti-Discrimination Directive, the European Charter for Fundamental Rights, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, various European Parliament Resolutions (e.g. European Parliament Resolution on homophobia in Europe 2005/2666 and 2007/2543), official statements and ECtHR (e.g., Bąckowski and others v. Poland, 1543/06) and European Court of Justice (ECJ) (e.g., C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council) court rulings. See also the work of Kelly Kollman and David Paternotte on European norms governing same-sex unions (Paternotte and Kollman forthcoming).

\textsuperscript{9} The combined legislation score is a count of the following provisions: antidiscrimination in employment, goods and services, and constitutional recognition; hate crimes based on sexual orientation recognized as an aggravating circumstance and/or incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation prohibited; same-sex partnership recognized for cohabitation, registered partnership and marriage; same-sex couples’ parenting rights for joint adoption, second parent adoption, and fertility treatment; and sexual offenses provisions for equal age of consent and same-sex activity legal (cf. Table 3.2, Chapter 3).
Figure 1.1. Variation in Attitudes towards Homosexuality Across New EU Member States

Figure 1.2. Variation in LGBT-Friendly Legislation Adoption Across EU Member States
Previous research has emphasized differences in international pressures, the fit between domestic and international norms, modernization, or low implementation costs for successful diffusion and change in world politics. As a baseline, these theories are useful for understanding how and why norms change in a multitude of states. Most, though not all, societies find homosexuality more acceptable today than they did in 1989. From this baseline, existing theories cannot adequately explain, however, why the LGBT norm does not permeate different domestic contexts at similar rates. For example, why do some traditional Catholic countries blaze new ground on LGBT rights while some modern, wealthy democracies remain laggards? I find that these questions are not answered by traditional explanations. Instead, my research suggests that the degree to which international norms resonate in various states—and become internalized within them—depends on specific transnational channels and domestic interest groups that make political issues visible. I show that the extent of a state’s openness to international organizations and information flows (the exchange of ideas and images with other countries) has demonstrable effects on diffusion because it allows new ideas to enter the domestic discourse. These social and political channels prime a context for diffusion by making the issue visible. Furthermore, the degree to which domestic actors are embedded in transnational advocacy networks illuminates the issue and shapes the speed and direction of diffusion. These transnational actors mediate between the international and domestic norms to frame the message to fit locally, and to quell the perceptions of threat that some states assign to LGBT norms.
In building this argument, my findings suggest that norm visibility is a necessary requirement for diffusion—both to governments and publics—in world politics, since elites and publics within states do not always see or care about issues that first develop elsewhere. By norm visibility, I refer to the relative ability of publics and governments to see and interact with the ideas and images that define standards of appropriate behavior. By defining new standards of acceptability, these international sources of normative change introduce “new ways of understanding oneself” (Altman 1999, 563). Visibility is critical for mobilizing the necessary norm entrepreneurs, influencing the timing and likelihood of the diffusion of law, and determining the level of internalization in society.

A unique aspect of the LGBT rights norm is that it is inherently contentious in most societies, to the point that it is often portrayed as violating the moral foundation on which nationhood is structured (Stychin 1998). Even after the issue was initially politicized, first-mover states required decades to introduce legislation, such as antidiscrimination protections, akin to the legal protections won by other groups represented in the rights revolution. This calls into question why new EU member

10 Though Altman’s has been more concerned with economic globalization and HIV AIDS, his work has been path breaking in considering the international dimensions to queer politics.

11 I refer to the activists involved as norm entrepreneurs, because they attempt to “mobilize popular opinion and political support both within their host country and abroad,” ’stimulate and assist in the creation of likeminded organizations in other countries,’ and ’play a significant role in elevating their objectives beyond its identification with the national interests of their government’” (Acharya 2004, 248; Wolters 1999; Nadelmann 1990; Checkel 1998). This concept is related to the term “policy/issue entrepreneur” used in Americanist research on interest groups, which defines the efforts of actors who have a specific interest in getting specific policies adopted (Baumgartner and Jones 2009).

12 I consider LGBT rights to be part of the broader rights revolution. Both the 2006 Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and a couple UN resolutions have established LGBT rights firmly within discourses of the rights revolution. This marks a change from the 1960s and 1970s, when gays and lesbians were excluded from the rights discourse (Skrentny 2002). Their exclusion was a combination of failure on both sides, the discomfort among other groups in including LGBT people as part of their movements (with exceptions—for example, Heuy Newton's pioneering speech on the intersection of race and homosexuality), and the gay liberation movement's slow progress in connecting its experience to those
states have so quickly begun to digest this contentious issue at home—politically only recently—and respond to it within their legal and social structures. The visibility explanation presented here assumes that these states want to identify as part of ‘Europe.’ Europe perceives itself, on the macro-level, as adherent to the rights revolution—and LGBT rights as part of those rights—that has transformed world politics. Adopting the LGBT norm, then, is part of what it means to be a member of contemporary Europe.\textsuperscript{13} For this process to happen, however, states must be able to see that to which they are meant to conform. For new EU member states, their efforts to identify as members of this community have been a driving force behind making the issue visible.\textsuperscript{14} While much of the literature takes deliberation and learning for granted, I will argue that the norm needs to be made visible in the domestic context before actors can deliberate on it and internalize it. The felt intensity of a norm varies across cases, depending on its visibility.

Alternative Explanations

The argument builds on the foundations of a vast literature on diffusion and social change, but the spread of norms concerning the rights of sexual minorities also complicates existing explanations. First, the expectation that international norms diffuse successfully when they are congruent with domestic beliefs and understandings does not hold (Checkel 2001; Cortell and Davis 1996; Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998, 204; Legro 1997; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).

\textsuperscript{13} This conceptualization draws from John Meyer and colleagues (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997), who argue that states adopt standards to remain/become legitimate. My theory adds agency to process by arguing that deliberation, which comes with visibility, is a key mechanism for diffusion and change.
Despite the contentious element of the norm, surprising ‘misfits,’ such as more religious and less democratic states, do change. Among the states with the most rapid social and legal change in terms of embracing LGBT rights are Catholic Spain and Portugal, two of Europe’s most religious states (Casanova 2009, 209; Greeley 2004, 71). Furthermore, secularization theories do not explain why Estonia is more intolerant than the equally secular Czech Republic. Or why attitudes among more secular, former East Germans are not more favorable to LGBT people than they are in western Germany. Other types of misfits involve post-socialist success stories, like Poland, which despite strides in democratization and compliance with many costly EU regulations (Petrova 2012), has struggled with adopting basic measures to protect rights of LGBT minorities.

The diffusion of LGBT norms also challenges the widely held assumption that modernization correlates with the adoption of post-material values, such as accepting homosexuality (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart 1997). While the first states to expand LGBT rights were often the type of wealthy states that modernization theorists expect to change (e.g., the Nordic states), the condition of economic wealth does not hold for the LGBT norm’s diffusion to new adopters. Level of GDP is not a robust or reliable predictor of change as poorer states often adopt the norm before wealthier ones. Studies that combine data from dissimilar world regions in one model overemphasize the importance of economic wealth for social change (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Several of the field’s dominant explanations lose traction when we

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14 This argument applies more to new member states than it does to older ones, like Italy, which feel secure in their standing as European and have not adopted the European norm on LGBT rights. This interpretation has to do with a state’s self-perception in the social hierarchy of states (Towns 2011).
tightly the scope conditions to study a region bound by strong supranational institutional structures.

Contrary to common knowledge, I also find that universal low-cost norms do elicit powerful reactions from states and societies. Scholars have argued that states should always take low-cost moral action (Kaufman and Pape 1999), especially when such actions help facilitate access to the bundle of economic benefits that come with EU membership (Vachudova 2005). Since states can enhance their international reputations by recognizing and protecting sexual minorities without accruing direct monetary costs to the state or individuals in society, it raises the question of why some low-cost moral norms are difficult to transmit. Moreover, why does the same norm meet forceful resistance in some cases and not in others? The uneven rate of diffusion across states is puzzling in light of previous scholarship that cites human rights norms as the most successfully and uniformly adopted norms in the EU accession process (Checkel 1997, 480; Seybert 2012), especially since the EU exposes accession states to similar material incentives.

LGBT actors have also mobilized when domestic political opportunities are most closed, which contributes to our understanding of new multi-level opportunities.

15 Here low cost to the state or individuals is measured monetarily, but there may of course be political costs, or presumed political costs, to individual political leaders who stake their domestic reputations on recognizing and protecting sexual minorities (Putnam 1988). My research has found that some states, like Germany, have opposed a European Directives for LGBT people, even if their own domestic standards exceed those of the European requirements (i.e., the Directive involves no implementation costs).

16 Rational institutionalists attribute domestic change to the incentives that international organizations provide (Martin and Simmons 1998; Mastenbroek 2003). Constructivists focus on informal processes of transnational actors’ influence and argue that international norms define the contours of appropriate behavior and exert influence on states (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 1995; Legro 1997; Price 1998; Risse 2000).
in social movement theory. In Poland, for example, public assemblies by LGBT activists went forward—as they did when former Mayor Lech Kaczynski banned their public assembly in Warsaw—despite the lack of a domestic political opportunity. This constitutes an exception to what traditional conceptions of social movement theory—rooted in the nation state—would predict. Scholars of the political process approach have emphasized the importance of “1) the opening of access to participation for new actors; 2) the evidence of political realignment within the polity; 3) the appearance of influential allies; 4) emerging splits within the elite; and 5) a decline in the state’s capacity or will to repress dissent” (Kriesi 2004; McAdam 1999; Tarrow 1998, 76).

While these important insights apply, the multi-level structure of the European Union can shift the opportunities described by this approach to various levels (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Sikkink 2005).

Other explanations predict that states and societies will respond to the external environment in the same way, regardless of transnational channels or domestic differences. The world polity school in sociology posits that a global civil society, comprised of organized and rule-like models, is an institutional system that constitutes the capabilities and interrelationships of societal actors (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997). This global society advances general universal truths, rather than functional needs or actor interests, which lead to a global isomorphism in institutions and norms (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010; Soysal 1994). While this school has influenced my argument, its basic postulate requires refinement in order to explain the diffusion of the LGBT rights norm. This is because the postulate portrays global culture as secular and

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17 Scholars of LGBT mobilization have noted the “high risk” of mobilization in “culturally closed” contexts (Blumenfeld and Raymond 1988).
rational, slighting the tensions that derive from domestic norms when they are incompatible with international norms. Furthermore, the scholarship side-steps norm internalization (J. W. Meyer et al. 1997, 154) and under-specifies agency, making it difficult to explain the mechanisms of the diffusion processes. Too often, this literature explains how domestic politics bend in response to international pressure, but it struggles to explain varying outcomes across states. A visibility argument builds on the foundations that these scholars have laid, filling gaps where their explanations fall short.

**Research Questions and Dependent Variable**

I support my argument by explaining what accounts for differences in social attitudes and state laws toward sexual minorities across European states (Figures 1.1 and 1.2). Is change due to heightened exposure to individuals and groups in states that have previously adopted the norm? Under what domestic preconditions (of the recipient state) do international norms of sexual minority rights successfully spread? Who are the agents of change, and how are they mobilized? Finally, what are the transnational pathways of diffusion? My dependent variables tap into two dimensions of international norm diffusion: change in the behavior of the state, and change in the behavior of individuals within society. Academic research often overlooks the distinction between legal compliance and societal internalization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; J. W. Meyer et al. 1997), which are related but analytically separate processes.\(^{19}\) This omission is regrettable since legal protections do not necessarily

\(^{18}\) Other scholarship highlights geographic proximity to the norm holder to explain the diffusion of democratic ideals (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) and pro-EU attitudes (Berezin and Diez-Medrano 2008).

\(^{19}\) Lucia Seybert’s (2012) work, which makes a distinction between particular and universal norms, is a notable exception. By the term internalization, I refer to the internalization of constitutive identities, which is “the process by which the collective expectations of the members of an identity group come to
correlate highly with decreasing levels of social stigmatization. Furthermore, the commonly used dependent variable measure of the socialization of state elites (Checkel 1997) does not capture an attitudinal shift (or lack thereof) in the major part of a society.

My study looks at both indices of the norm diffusion—legal compliance and societal internalization—because “norms are about behavior, not directly about ideas” (Florini 1996, 364). Since norms are difficult to observe directly, I look to two behavioral measures to analyze consequences of changed norms. To measure change at the state level, I collected data on and analyzed the number of LGBT rights laws adopted by states. These include protective and equality laws that go beyond decriminalization. To capture change at the individual level, I look to survey data on social attitudes toward sexual minorities. Both measures focus on the years between 1970 and 2010.

As I demonstrate in the next section, the variation and causes of change I observe contribute to many of the established findings in mainstream international relations and social movement research. The next section presents my theory as to why and how visibility influences socio-legal change concerning sexual minorities. Thereafter, I describe the methods of inquiry I use to support my argument. I close the chapter with a brief overview of the dissertation.

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feel taken for granted by new members” (Abdelal et al. 2006, 697). My definition is not to be confused with the definition of internalization scholars of the transnational social movement literature, which uses it to mean the domestic internalization of transnational issues (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005b).

As Katzenstein and Byrnes (2006, 683) note, “[t]he behavioral dimension is shaped by the regulative and constitutive effects of rules that operate at the individual level through internalization and habituation and at the collective level through various sanctioning mechanisms.”
LGBT PEOPLES AND THE POLITICS OF (IN)VISIBILITY IN EUROPE

I define the core concept of norm visibility as the relative ability of governments and publics to see and interact with the ideas and images that define standards of appropriate behavior. Likewise, interpersonal relations and interactions with individuals are related to this broader diffusion of images and ideas. The premise that visibility leads to change is not new among LGBT rights activists, many of whom adopted San Francisco Supervisor Harvey Milk’s theory that gays and lesbians should publicly declare their orientation if they wished to see society accept them (Herek 2004, 14). Most of the activists I interviewed mentioned the centrality of (in)visibility to their work, because in many European contexts LGBT people find it difficult to show themselves openly. Being visible is a privilege (Bernstein and Reimann 2001, 10). Fearing rejection from family, friends, and employers, LGBT people conceal their sexuality, rendering part of themselves invisible. Thus, much of the LGBT identity has been built in safe spaces—such as, cafes, bars, and private homes—that remain secluded from society and state (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002, 726). While these spaces have been transformational by fostering an awareness of collective grievances and social solidarity, they lack the public dimension that scholars have found to be important for a group’s democratic participation (Evans and Boyte 1992). Private or designated safe spaces remain invisible to society at large, almost by definition, as they exist to shield the identity of LGBT people from out-group members. While invisibility can provide security, it stifles domestic movements for change, because

21 Stockdill (2003, 17) reminds us that “the transformation of collective consciousness is a crucial aspect of social movement development: people in marginalized groups must be able to see their situation as shared before they can collectively challenge both cultural and institutional symbols.”
there are few actors to mobilize in public and too few openly LGBT people for the nation to perceive the issue as local.\textsuperscript{23} While these fears exist in every EU member state, several interviewees claimed that it is more difficult to come out in a context like Poland’s, where surveys from 2000 found that only 10% of Poles claimed to have ever encountered a gay person (interview no. 9). Visibility can tap into the movement potential of these once clandestine groups (in abeyance) by triggering their ability to rise (Taylor 1989).\textsuperscript{24} In this sense, the concept also affects within-group dynamics by making members visible to each other.

The European context of social sanctions changes standards of conduct and connects LGBT actors across states with differing degrees of LGBT visibility. While the extent of change depends on both international and domestic normative structures, in states that have recently begun learning about the norm, widespread visibility depends especially on transnational interactions. This is because other European states have defined the issue earlier through developments that produced visibility, such as the 1960/70s sexual revolution and the politicization of the HIV-AIDS crisis in the 1980s (Chetaille 2011, 122–123; Owczarzak 2009). The EU furthers norm visibility by connecting states through channels of social information and political rules, as well as connecting LGBT actors across states to help broker and interpret the norm. Put

\textsuperscript{22} The movement’s increasingly public profile is represented in the change in movement goals. For example, the marriage equality movement has shifted a key movement goal from the attainment of individual rights to equality in a larger social construct typically occupied by heterosexual people.

\textsuperscript{23} Activists interviewed in Poland also described difficulty in recruiting activists at the turn of the century because of fears and discomfort associated with coming out to family members (interview nos. 8, 9, 129, 131, 139, and 140). According to one activist in Warsaw, “The problem in Poland at the time of EU accession was that no one was coming out—everyone stayed in their closets. In terms of socialization, there is a strong correlation between knowing a gay person and being agreeable towards gay rights” (interview no. 9). Many potential LGBT activists had to keep low profiles because they did not want their families to see them in the media. This is common in a country where the discourse is new.
simply, transnational and international channels of visibility provide for interaction among social actors that lead to a change of ideas. Through mechanisms of learning and deliberation, these ideational changes can influence the way the norm becomes adopted in the legal and social structures of the state. Other mechanisms of EU influence, such as pressures of competition and political sanction via hard law, also play a role, but the following analyses will demonstrate that these mechanisms are more limited in their ability to produce change. The mechanisms most central to this argument are framing, brokerage, deliberation, and learning.

Through social and political channels, European institutions play a role in socialization by linking the LGBT norm to membership in modern Europe by setting rules of compliance and by dispensing ideas and images about LGBT people that make them visible.

- **Framing**: the process of “presenting and packaging ideas” to fashion meanings for a given audience.

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24 Taylor (1989) has called such groups as movements in abeyance, because they have they have potential to mobilize under the right conditions, when new opportunities arise.

25 I use the customary definitions for transnational and international: I think of transnational relations as involving the cross-border activities of non-state actors. Non-state actors can include, for example, activists, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious actors, multinational corporations (MNCs), and terrorism rebels. International relations involve the activities between states or states and international institutions. While most the channels I refer to are transnational, they were often facilitated by processes of political internationalization (e.g., increased mobility via the EU’s Schengen Treaty) and continue to be supported by international channels between state and international institutions. For simplicity, I occasionally use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ to refer to both sets of transnational and international channels. I do this especially when I contrast the international/transnational from the domestic.

26 Checkel (2005) has noted that the ability to persuade is increased when “the socializing agency or individual is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong” (Checkel 2006, 364).

27 Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002, 10). On framing, see also Snow and Benford (1992), and Roggeband (2010).
• **Norm Brokers**: the actors, endowed with local knowledge, that mediate between often-divergent new international norms and domestic norms. They aid diffusion by framing the international elements of the norm—in a domestically familiar discourse—so that they resonate with the domestic traditions of the society. They also connect disparate actors across contexts to politicize and draw external attention to the domestic situations of LGBT people. 28

• **Deliberation**: the communicative and thought processes by which groups (sub-national, domestic, and transnational) weigh and debate conflicting norms after new norms become visible. 29

• **Learning**: the process by which communities reassess their fundamental beliefs, values and ways of doing things through interaction with new ideas and norms. 30

I find that under conditions of visibility, these mechanisms of socialization “can transform dominant behavior and institutions—including the state” (Brysk 2000, 29).

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28 The first part of my definition of brokerage is a slight variation of Tarrow’s (2005) emphasis on the brokers who connect actors in different contexts. In my conceptualization, brokers connect domestic LGBT organizations to a transnational network of actors and to European institutions. Thus, brokers are not only the umbrella organizations that connect disparate actors, they are also domestic LGBT groups and rooted cosmopolitans, that frame and graft international scripts to make them fit to specific domestic contexts.

29 My understanding of deliberation draws from Risse’s (2000) work on argumentation.

30 My broad definition of learning draws upon a vast literature on processes of learning, both individual and collective (Deutsch 1963; E. B. Haas 1991). Learning can refer both to the transfer of knowledge between and to international organizations, governments, societies, and individuals. It can also refer to simple learning, leading to instrumental change, and to complex learning, leading to change in beliefs change (Checkel 2005; Zito 2009).
To theorize that the visibility of international norms can lead to social and legal change, I draw from evidence in social psychology suggesting that engagement leads to a reduction in prejudice among individuals. This research makes clear that conditions of invisibility, such as those I described in pre-accession Poland, are not conducive to change. Studies have repeatedly found that respondents who know at least one person in their in-group with friendship ties to an out-group member report decreased levels of prejudice toward that out-group (Wright et al. 1997). Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis rested on this same idea: interactions among different groups could change inter-group relations by leading to positive perceptions of the other. A long tradition of research in social psychology largely finds support for the negative relationship between contact and prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Recent experiments show that even imagined interactions, if they are positive, can significantly reduce negative feelings toward unfamiliar out-groups (Crisp and Turner 2009; Mazziotta, Mummendey, and Wright 2011). These findings hold for studies of interactions between heterosexual and homosexual groups, with heterosexual participants displaying more positive attitudes and fewer stereotypes about gay people after imagining an interaction (Turner, Crisp, and Lambert 2007). Imagined contact is entirely cognitive, referring only to an image or story of interaction. While these studies usually measure change at the individual level, there is also some evidence for

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31 Another study of the Watts race riot in Los Angeles, by Jeffries and Ransford (1969), found that middle-class white respondents “who had prior interracial contacts were significantly less fearful of blacks, less punitive and less likely to view the riot as caused by outside agitators” (Pettigrew 1998, 70).
32 The finding is especially true under conditions of cooperation, common goals, equal social status, and institutional support. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) analyze 515 studies concerning contact theory in social psychology, concluding that the relationship between contact and lowered level of prejudice is, in general, a robust and significant finding in their field.
the understudied effect of contact on societal change (Dixon, Durrheim, and Tredoux 2005).

Both imagined and direct contact studies have found that a positive interaction is more likely to reduce prejudice than a neutral one (Stathi and Crisp 2008). Crisp and Turner (2009, 234) point out that “[a] positive tone is also important to guard against a possible negative tone, which might emerge if the participants are left to their own devices.” The authors go on to note that participants are left to their own devices under conditions of segregation, or arguably under conditions of invisibility. Anxiety about interaction, in which an in-group associates threat with the ‘other,’ “can arise when there has been minimal previous contact” (Crisp and Turner 2009, 235; Stephan and Stephan 1985). Yet, psychologists note that anxiety—or perceived threat—is likely to lessen after contact, “as [adopters] come to realize they have nothing to fear from such interactions” (Crisp and Turner 2009, 235). Learning through interaction is a central mechanism for change because it reduces the level of threat associated with the out-group.

While this psychological work provides evidence to support the general theory that visibility, through interaction, produces change, the argument here moves beyond cognitive mechanisms. Psychological studies are confined to labs, devoid of politics, and removed from the relational ties between actors across states. My argument also accounts for the fact that similar interventions, like the ones described in psychological experiments, mean different things in various contexts. As Crisp and Turner (2009, 232) suggest in their call for future research, “[C]ontact can only work where the opportunity for contact exists.” The support of institutions, law, or custom can have a strong effect on individual shifts in prejudice. According to Pettigrew
(1998, 79), under conditions of “explicit social sanction, intergroup contact is more readily accepted and has more positive effects. [Support by authorities] establishes norms of acceptance.”

Acknowledging that these norms are contested requires us to rethink the traditional set of mechanisms that drive diffusion processes. Constructivist scholars highlight the mechanisms of argument and persuasion to explain political and social outcomes. The first has to do with the ongoing discourse between norm entrepreneurs and followers, which fosters “shared understandings” (Risse 2000). The second has to do with the expectation to conform to international universalistic, liberal values—interactions with international society socialize states to alter policies and practices (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). I will argue that the effectiveness of these cognitive mechanisms of appropriateness is limited when transnationally embedded domestic LGBT organizations do not exist to make the issue visible and clearly interpret it. Deliberative mechanisms of diffusion are complicated when the moral hierarchy between contending norms is difficult for states and societies to establish. This dissertation deals with these shortcomings by bridging cognitive mechanisms (learning and deliberation) with relational ones (norm brokers and channels of visibility), and by theorizing negative cases of norm acceptance and contending norms.

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33 As Pettigrew (1998, 79) laments in his survey of the field, “Situations are embedded in social institutions and societies. Thus, institutional and societal norms structure the form and effects of contact situations… societal norms of discrimination [can] poison intergroup contact. [Referring to study during apartheid in South Africa, he notes that] even [there], modest improvements emerged in white attitudes toward their neighbors of color. Yet the larger social context constrained these effects. Alternatively, when a society embraces intergroup harmony, equal-status contact between groups is no longer subversive. Normative support makes attainment of other optimal conditions far easier.”

34 Socialization is “a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community;” it implies “that an agent switches from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness” (Checkel 2005, 804). One type of socialization is role-playing, whereby actors learn what is appropriate and behave accordingly. A second type involves actors adopting the interests and identity of the community—in such a case, “instrumental calculation has now been replaced by ‘taken-for-
The mechanisms presented in this section come together to prime the contexts for diffusion. They signal to society and state that they (as publics and governments) must react to the norm. For the LGBT norm to resonate in various states, the issue must be clearly associated with Europe and visible within the domestic contexts of the state. In this dimension, new member states vary in important ways. While European directives set a minimal hard law standard, I find the diffusion of the issue beyond these basic measures relies largely on both the extent to which transnational channels make the issue visible and on the effectiveness of transnational actors who identify the issue as one of singular importance to membership in modern Europe. Activists act as norm brokers to help the state and individuals in society give meaning to the issue—which constitutes a ‘new’ idea in many of the domestic spheres analyzed—by framing the LGBT norm as a ‘European’ value of human rights. The premise of a visibility argument is that, for states and societies to understand how to behave “appropriately,” they must see the norm and receive cues about how to interpret it.

Channels of Visibility and State Compliance

I posit that norm diffusion is a transnational process, first by specifying that LGBT rights diffuse to states in which channels of social transnationalization and political internationalization are most established and to states with transnational actors who have relational ties to leading states. Second, I will show that the ability of these channels to engender norm internalization is moderated by the degree to which people socialized within the receiving state perceive the norm as a threat. Drawing from the social movement literature, I argue that the nature of the channels between grantedness” (804).
the originator and the receiver of a social norm influences diffusion (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010; Soule 2004a; Tarrow 2005b). Channels can be relational (direct) or non-relational (indirect). Within direct channels, ideas diffuse most rapidly to new European states with domestic LGBT rights activists who are in close and frequent contact with their counterparts in leading European states (where the issue became visible earlier). Relational ties to transnational organizations provide domestic LGBT groups with credibility, funding, and expertise, legitimizing domestic political and social campaigns to make the issue visible in their respective domestic contexts. Transnational organizations provide resources that domestic actors are then able to use to enhance visibility by organizing demonstrations, engaging the press, lobbying government, and demanding outside intervention when necessary. In turn, transnational activism leads to deliberation and socialization in the target state.

The presence of local LGBT actors who are embedded in transnational networks makes the norm visible by sending signals to state and society. As shown in Figure 1.3, in contexts with transnationally embedded actors who send strong and clear signals on how to approach the issue, visibility is higher. On signal strength, Lohmann’s (1993, 1995) argument attributes political might to special interest groups

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35 It should be noted that European Union’s Directives on antidiscrimination reflect the late emergence of LGBT issues in the international rights revolution. EU antidiscrimination standards cover one category for gays and disabled persons (employment), three for women, and four for race.

36 Soule (2004) isolates four attributes required for diffusion: a transmitter, an adopter, an innovation, and a channel that passes the innovation from transmitter to adopter (Soule and Zylan 1997). In my case, the transmitters are transnational LGBT organizations in leading European states, the adopters are societies and states, the innovation is the LGBT rights norm, and the channels are networks of activists and channels of social transnationalization and political internationalization.

37 Channels of diffusion can be direct and personal, indirect and impersonal, or brokered by institutions or organizations (Tarrow 2005).

38 Powerful and resource rich transnational organizations can set the agenda around certain functional goals. As Carpenter (2011, 72) and Bob (2010) find, the endorsement of these powerful “gatekeeper” organizations is necessary for issues to get transnational traction.
that send disproportionately strong signals (Gillion 2013). She finds that political authorities respond to grievances most in cases where large protests fuel deliberation (Lohmann 1993). Fassiotto and Soule (2012) build on this work by focusing on the clarity of the signal. Like my emphasis on visibility, they show that social movement actors can help state authorities interpret messages. Especially when embedded in transnational networks, I find that European LGBT networks disperse guidelines and rules of best practice that converge to send clear and strong signals. In addition, transnational LGBT rights groups *mediate* diffusion when they act as brokers connecting disparate activists and grafting international ideas to domestic ones, which accelerates the diffusion of information and frames the message appropriately—especially when confronted with domestic resistance (Acharya 2004b; Tarrow 2005b). This is a necessary step, because when left to its own devices to interpret new contentious ideas, a society’s reactions will tend to be more negative (Pettigrew 1998, 79).

The visibility of the LGBT rights norm also diffuses through political and social channels (both relational and non-relational) between first-mover and target states. First, the extent of relational ties between the state and international

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39 In his recent book, Gillion (2012) also finds a strong connection between the signal strength of minorities and voting patterns in the United States Congress, as well as having effects on the other branches of American government.

40 O'Dwyer and Schwartz (2010) correctly privilege the influence the socialization mechanisms of Europeanization in the realm of LGBT rights in their case studies of Poland and Latvia. However, they are largely indifferent to the importance of transnational advocacy networks in this process. They briefly refer to the International Gay Lesbian Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA)-Europe as a “small” NGO in Brussels, side stepping its importance as an instigator of social change. As Chapter 2 demonstrates in detail, it is precisely the work of a wide network of norm entrepreneurs that help establish the mechanisms of social change that O'Dwyer and Schwartz find to be important.

41 Herek (2004, 13) notes a similar psychological process of grafting the issue to local contexts by “appeal[ing] to the values consistent with the self-concept of [out-group] individuals and supported by their important reference groups.”
organizations furthers norm visibility (political channels).\textsuperscript{42} Second, I also identify two mechanisms of indirect diffusion in Figure 1.3: (1) a sense of \textit{shared political identification} between adopter and transmitter can foster the transmission of an innovation; and (2) \textit{social information flows} can broadcast the actions of the transmitter to potential adopters, both of which lead to issue visibility (social channels) (Soule 2004a). These transnational and international channels prime the contexts by providing legitimacy and scripts for interpretation of the issue, both of which are critical for the transnational actors trying to make their case.\textsuperscript{43} Transnational actors are better able to mobilize and to credibly diffuse their arguments in an environment where the visibility of the issue has been fostered by these channels. It is under these conditions of \textit{visibility} that actors can harness ideas and adapt them to manufacture resonance in their domestic contexts, even when the ideas did not previously have appeal locally. A \textit{visibility} argument thus dovetails with research of social problems theorists, who emphasize that issue salience leads to public and social action (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988). The visibility of a problem—or the construction of LGBT rights as a problem—explains much about the timing of state actions to combat homophobia, despite the persistent marginalization of sexual minorities for past centuries.

\textsuperscript{42} These relational ties include state membership in international organizations, the signing of bi- and multi-lateral treaties (since 1945), the number of host embassies and high commissions, and involvement in UN peace missions (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009).

\textsuperscript{43} For simplicity, I often use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ to refer to both sets of transnational and international channels. I do this to avoid writing out ‘transnational and international channels.’ I do this when I contrast the \textit{international/transnational} from the \textit{domestic}. When I am referring specifically to international political channels, I use the term ‘international.’
In sum, direct and indirect channels of visibility prime the domestic contexts by introducing images and ideas about the LGBT norm to the state. If domestic LGBT organizations become transnationally linked to organizations in leading states, they fuel domestic norm visibility, in large part through engaging state and societal institutions (e.g., by lobbying the state, staging demonstrations, and attracting media attention). They act as brokers between the movement and the state, framing and interpreting the norm to make it fit locally. Varying degrees of visibility lead to diverse outcomes in regard to institutional recognition of the norm.
Perceived Threat and Internalization

What we know about mediated, direct and indirect channels of norm diffusion offers plausible concepts and mechanisms for understanding the spread of new ideas from one state to another, but the contentious element of the LGBT rights norm requires us to pay special attention to resistance in the domestic realm. My theoretical framework deals also with diffusion cases that fuel an active social opposition, such as the mobilization of resistance movements that challenge and externalize the positions endorsed by proponents of LGBT rights. To do this, the second element of my theory takes into consideration the domestic political and social contexts in which actors operate and how these contexts affect the diffusion and reception of ideas (Roggeband 2010). For example, how might the Catholic Polish context mediate the influence of a well-networked LGBT organization? Not all

44 Snow and Benford (1999) suggest four agential relationships: (1) reciprocation: cases of diffusion in which both the transmitter and the adopter favor the item being diffused; (2) adaptation: cases with an active/copying adopter and a passive transmitter; (3) accommodation: cases of diffusion in which the transmitter promotes the diffusion of a foreign practice by tailoring it to the needs of a passive adopter; and (4) simple contagion: cases in which neither party wants to diffuse the innovation. Often times the adopter is welcoming or passive. Above, I am also describing adopters, as larger social entities—who are in fact resistant to it. I am thus also interested in a relationship not suggested by Snow and Bedford: active transmitter, resistant adopter.

45 My argument requires expanding the pool of usual actors and rethinking what part of the domestic context matters for diffusing contentious norms. In particular, transnational actors are often conceptualized as “good” norm entrepreneurs, often overlooking contention in the domestic sphere. Instead, previous literature usually focuses on one type of transnational actor responsible for the emergence and diffusion of ideas across borders, such as intergovernmental organizations (Finnemore 1996), transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998), or epistemic communities of experts (Adler 1992; P. M. Haas 1992). At the domestic level, the actors are state elites and/or civil society organizations (Checkel 1997). This is incomplete. The actors most effective at engendering change in this case are domestic LGBT rights organizations that can command transnational resources from first mover states. At the domestic level, the relevant actors go far beyond state elites to include societal actors and counter movements. This project adds such a dimension by exploring the following agents of norm diffusion: (1) European institutions, (2) transnational and domestic LGBT rights advocacy groups, and (3) anti-LGBT rights groups.
societies will find the imported norm equally threatening, depending on the perception of social institutions within the domestic context.46

While states do nod to the LGBT norm by complying with some level of legislation, the process of internalization is more complex.47 The domestic context in which individuals are socialized mediates the ability of international norms to become internalized by society. Different societies associate different levels of threat with the LGBT norm, and threat perception facilitates the interaction between domestic and international norms. I define threat as the anticipation of danger to a set of values that define a group, and perception as the process of apprehending by means of the senses.48 It is important to note that this definition assumes that threat can have a symbolic value at the collective level, in that threat is socially constructed through discourse among political authorities and publics (C. O. Meyer 2009; Rousseau 2006; Stein forthcoming).49 This sociological interpretation of perceived threat stipulates that social understandings within the domestic realm define the way state actors respond to international pressures (Andrews 1975, 524–535).50 Thus, similarly strong channels of

46 By viewing states as “undifferentiated” rational actors, we ignore variety among states on a plethora of issues that are important to international security (P. J. Katzenstein 1995, 92). A better understanding is that “the identity of states emerges from their interaction with different social environments, both domestic and international” (93).
47 Internalization must also take into account a distinction between state and national identities. Whereas state identities “are primarily external; they describe the actions of governments in a society of states,” national identities “are primarily internal; they describe the processes by which mass publics acquire, modify, and forget their collective identities” (Katzenstein 1998, 20).
48 This IR definition can be related to the social movement literature’s definition of threat, where it denotes that “threat denotes the probability that existing benefits will be taken away or new harms inflicted if challenging groups fail to act collectively” (Almeida 2003).
49 Collective identity refers to the “shared sense of ‘we-ness’ or ‘one-ness’ anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences among those who comprise the collectivity and in relation or contrast to one or more actual or imagined sets of ‘others’” (Snow 2001, 2213).
50 Drawing on Schmitt’s (1996) 1932 thesis, Katzenstein (2003, 736) argues that “conceptions of identity, of self versus other, are always part of threat perceptions. The norms and identities that trigger different threat perceptions are not merely derivative of material capabilities … The threat perceptions of groups and states are embedded instead in systems of meaning that affect what is and what is not defined as a threat.”
LGBT visibility will have differing effects depending on the level of threat that societies attribute to the norm. I find that the degree to which the LGBT norm is perceived as a threat is at its highest in domestic contexts in which religion is deeply embedded in the national identity.\textsuperscript{51} Where this relationship exists, contending actors can better cast external LGBT rights norms as threatening.

At the domestic level, the strength and legitimacy of competing (traditionalist and LGBT rights) norms in distinct domestic environments explain the variation in the internalization of LGBT norms. Due to the religious and national basis of much LGBT rights denial, I expect anti-LGBT rights mobilization to be politically effective when narratives of nation hinge on religious identity, because sexual politics then become indirectly linked with nationalism. Take, for example, a 1927 quote from Roman Dmowski, an ideologue of modern Polish nationalism:

\begin{quote}
Catholicism is not an appendage to Polishness...it is embedded in its essence, and in a large measure it is its essence. To attempt to dissociate Catholicism from Polishness, and to separate the Polish nation from its religion and the Church, means to destroy the very essence of that nation (cited in O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010, 236).
\end{quote}

In this sense, societies and social groups define their domestic identity and use this identity to evaluate and determine which outside norms are acceptable to internalize (Rousseau 2006, 211). Not all societies will find the norm import equally threatening,

\textsuperscript{51} This concept builds on the notion that the institutional makeup of a nation—“the normative and organizational arrangements which form the ‘state,’ structure society, and link the two in the polity”—influences (a) the availability of channels for transnational actors to enter the political realm and (b) the ability of these actors to form winning coalitions that change policy (Evangelista 1999; Risse-Kappen 1995, 6). However, the emphasis here is on normative structures that facilitate legitimacy, as opposed to state structure, conceived of as central versus fragmented governance models. This is because evidence does not suggest that governance structure determines success for LGBT rights activists. Checkel has argued that norm diffusion is “more rapid when... a systemic norm... resonates with historically
depending on how domestic social institutions perceive the norm import. The EU’s standards of appropriate behavior on LGBT rights norms smack of outside imposition to some societies and of welcome modernity to others. I do not argue that all historically religious states will oppose the norm. By contrast, I find that traditionalist religious scripts are only legitimate—and subsequently effective—if they are tied to the popular nation.

Religious institutions—when they have mobilized to challenge EU pressures on behalf of LGBT rights—have varying degrees of social legitimacy in different states. By this, I mean that the constitutive effect of secularism and tradition varies across nations (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). In particular, the Vatican has framed these “external” norms as threatening to the national identity of the state (Ramet 2006).\footnote{IR theories of diffusion are largely silent about such counter-movements as an element of domestic and transnational opportunity structures, which hinders their ability to explain international norms that elicit active resistance. As one critic put it, much of the research “overestimate[s] diffusion to the domestic level and underestimate[s] possible domestic conflict between norms” (Landolt 2004, 585). Those scholars who are sensitive to the misfit between the international and domestic almost naturally assume non-contentious issues (Acharya 2004). However, it is almost always difficult to make LGBT rights norms congruent with the local beliefs (Manalansan 1995), which is why framing the issue as one of European standards becomes an attractive tool at the disposal of transnational activists. Finally, scholars of transnationalism generally address the “common good” (Risse-Kapp en 1995), which says little about the many transnational issues that deal with minority rights. This omission is critical because constructed domestic norms” (1998, 243).} Whereas in some Catholic cases, the Church has moral authority and has been successful in fueling resistance and framing a message of threat to resonate with popular beliefs (e.g., Poland, Lithuania, and Ireland), in other plausible cases it has not (e.g., Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain). In the latter cases, LGBT groups, using their European frames, found earlier success. To explain this difference, I employ case studies work to show that the Church’s moral authority depends on its history as a political actor in the domestic realm. In Poland, the Catholic Church, as a champion of
the Solidarity movement, created a role for itself as an autonomous, progressive moral entrepreneur with deep ties to the popular nation. In contrast, the Slovenes linked the Church to Nazi-German occupation, the Slovaks linked it to state socialism in Czechoslovakia, and Spaniards linked it to Franco’s regime in Spain. Strong resistance is less likely in states where the Church fell on the “wrong” side of democratic transition and lost its moral authority as a constitutive part of national identity.

In sum, state and societal responses to European norms concerning LGBT rights developed differently depending on levels of the LGBT norm’s visibility and on the different domestic perceptions of threat associated with the norm. Figures 1.4 (process) and 1.5 (outcomes) predict a set of internalization outcomes leading to norm visibility moderated by threat perception. Since norm visibility is a function of both transnational and domestic factors, one can anticipate an initial backlash in new states, where the issue is made more visible from the periphery.

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minorities, arguably more than others, have incentives to look beyond their states to join forces with those who share a common identity.
### Table 1.5: Internalization Outcomes based on Conditions of Threat and Channels of Visibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Perceived Threat</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Type I: Minimal Change, Following an Upward Regional Trend</td>
<td>Type II: Internalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Type III: Resistance</td>
<td>Type IV: Cautious Internalization after Phase of Resistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Type I:** Minimal change
- Few channels of visibility in states with low perceived threat will have little deliberation and minimal change.

**Type II:** Societal attitudes improve (internalization)
- The LGBT norm generates deliberation once visible; norm brokers illuminate historical narrations of LGBT people in their own respective countries.
- International ideas of democratic responsibility/human rights resonate; states conform to the standards of a community to which they belong.

**Type III:** Societal attitudes worsen (resistance)
- Intensification of anti-LGBT politics by some religious and nationalist sectors of society; few channels of visibility can let discourse of threat go unchecked.

**Type IV:** Societal attitudes improve post-resistance (cautious internalization)
- Transnationally embedded domestic actors call attention to resistance and transnational and international attention heightens, fueling even more visibility and active deliberation in target state. This process suggests a strategic relationship, where resistance leads to more visibility—but only if transnationally embedded domestic groups exist.
Figure 1.4 reaffirms the importance of strong transnationally connected domestic actors to broker and frame the message according to context. Whereas high levels of perceived threat foster active resistance, in the long run it is only effective if the presence of transnationally embedded LGBT groups in the domestic realm is weak. Where they have existed, transnational LGBT groups have channeled international EU attention that has led to the deployment of additional outside pressures on states for breaching appropriate standards. \(^{53}\) Ironically, the mobilization of anti-LGBT groups creates a type of visibility on its own, which in most cases has proved to be self-defeating. \(^{54}\) Chapter 5 presents the findings of my organizational survey, showing that the large majority of respondents described Type II or Type IV outcomes.

While my research gives credence to the optimism that proponents of LGBT rights express for change—even in hard cases, like Poland—it remains attuned to the struggle they describe in many facets of their work. Just as feminist scholarship has critiqued simple progress narratives, rigid and sequential theory is not well suited for explaining change related to LGBT rights. While broad societal visibility is indeed new and different in the time period that I analyze, history reminds us that previous advances for LGBT people were followed by repression. Germany is a key example: despite relative tolerance and path-breaking research on homosexuality in the 1890s,

\(^{53}\) In the case of LGBT rights, pro- and anti-LGBT groups are mutually constitutive because they exist partly on their own initiative, but also as a response to opposing actors (Fetner 2008). They compete to define the nation according to their perceptions of what is appropriate and legitimate in their particular society.

\(^{54}\) As will address in Chapter 5, the Church no longer monopolizes the anti-LGBT issue during phases of resistance, when the populist far-right adopts an anti-LGBT politics as its central issue in opposition to outside influences (e.g., Jobbik in Hungary, or the League of Polish Families and the All Polish Youth in Poland). Gradually, Church leaders become more careful not to associate themselves with the
Germany revised Paragraph 175 of its Criminal Code in 1935 to more broadly criminalize homosexuality, leading to the internment and deaths of thousands of gay men. Thus, both variation in threat perception and careful attention to particularities of the state are important moderating components of this argument. There are also institutional and regional scope conditions to my argument, which make certain aspects of the visibility theory work uniquely in this set of EU states. The introduction of an LGBT norm has fueled only resistance and no change in Ecuador, a state in which actors have struggled to frame the norm successfully in the local context—*globalization was seen as an external imposition*. In Europe transnational actors have an important frame at their disposal: “we are all European”—*there regionalization can at least sometimes be seen as self-reflection and internal learning, not external imposition*. Indeed, Estonians are both Estonians and Europeans, just as Swedes are both Swedes and Europeans. Finally, the interactive models above describe a framework for the processes involving the introduction of norms, both in terms of transnational channels and domestic structures. While the model suggests an analytic sequence, its focus remains on mechanisms of change, which do not depend on an empirical sequence.

**CASE SELECTION AND OPERATIONALIZATION**

I addressed my research questions by collecting data on (1) the set of post-2004 members of the EU (today these are 10 ex-Communist Bloc countries, plus Cyprus and Malta) and (2) the case studies of Germany, Poland, and Slovenia. Europe offers the ideal laboratory for testing and refining my theory due to the EU norm of protecting sexual minorities and the presence of states on both ends of the “gay far-right articulation of the issue, as discourse by extremists becomes unpalatable to the tastes of the
friendliness” spectrum. Furthermore, the EU is a likely case for diffusion (Checkel 1997, 480) because it provides the mechanisms that regularly function to constrain states to conform to international norms (P. J. Katzenstein 2005; Tarrow 2011).

The dissertation includes large-\(n\) analyses that use quantitative methods to test correlations between predictors in all EU member states and small-\(n\) analyses that use qualitative methods to trace channels of diffusion from Germany and the EU to Poland and Slovenia. Consistent with my theoretical proposition, I select the first set of states based on three criteria: all states were members of the Soviet Bloc, experienced greater exposure to advanced norms on homosexuality (originating in the EU, the United States, etc.) after 1989, and were successful in gaining membership to the EU. On average, these states score markedly lower on rates of acceptance of sexual minorities compared to the EU-15 (see Figures 1.6 and 1.7 in Appendix A). They emerged from transition having had little discourse on the LGBT rights issue prior to beginning the EU accession process, which subjected them to the only internationally recognized legal protections for sexual minorities in the world (Swiebel 2009). Even in the most secular of these states, discussion of homosexuality was rarely public (McCajor Hall 2009). In contrast, the 1960s sexual revolution and the 1980s HIV/AIDS epidemic politicized LGBT rights much earlier throughout several states in Western Europe.

The second set of states represents ideal cases for understanding the mechanisms by which ideas diffuse. I compare Poland and Slovenia on their different rates of change along both indicators of the dependent variable: social attitudes and average citizenry and anti-LGBT politics loses legitimacy.
laws toward sexual minorities (refer to Figure 1.1 and 1.2).\footnote{Consistent with case selection guidelines, I have variation on the dependent variable (Collier and Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990).} Poland’s 2004 accession challenged the power of EU leverage within national borders, as religion and national identity stood opposed to granting sexual minorities their social recognition. Despite some minimal institutional change, the Polish government showed itself resistant to European norms on LGBT rights and societal attitudes toward sexual minorities remained overwhelmingly negative (O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010; Amnesty International 2006). The Polish experience stands in contrast to that of Slovenia, where social attitudes and legislation have changed at a remarkably accelerated pace. In 2004, about 60\% of Poles felt homosexuality was never justifiable, while only about 20\% of Slovenes agreed (EVS). Slovenia, along with the Czech Republic, also extends the most far-reaching LGBT rights legislation in Central and Eastern Europe, including protections that surpass those of many older member states. The different outcomes in these two historically Catholic countries merit analysis (Chapter 5).

Germany represents the central “norm entrepreneur” case for the analysis (the norm also originates elsewhere, a fact I explore in the large-\(n\) analysis of channels to recipient states). In particular, the cases of Germany and Poland make explicit the connection between the “norm entrepreneur” and the “target state” by illustrating how ideas moved from Germany to Poland, a process in which actors based in Germany became involved in Poland leading up to accession in 2004. This involvement occurs in a type of activism similar to what Imig and Tarrow call “cooperative transnationalism,” in which the actors involved are transnational but the foreign target of contention is a state (2001, 17).\footnote{Collective transnationalism (cf. Imig and Tarrow 2001) is rare for LGBT rights groups. ILGA-Europe} For example, in 2005, the illegal gay rights march
in Warsaw was largely composed of German citizens (Chapter 2). In fact, a transnational group of activists at an LGBT rights organization in Germany organized the protest. Many of these activists were expatriate Poles—“rooted cosmopolitans”\(^{57}\)—who were empowered by resources available to them in Berlin. A year after the protest, the ECtHR decided in favor of the organizers in the case they brought against Poland (for prohibiting the protest), making similar parades legal in all Polish cities. Many analogous examples exist, making the involvement of groups within and across German borders a valuable case for the study of the transnationalization of activism concerning LGBT rights.

Finally, the LGBT norm lends itself to cross-national analysis because it applies to a minority that exists in all societies and often shares the same ethnic and cultural background of the rest of the society. The data suggest that individuals in society-at-large rarely take a middle-ground position on the issue\(^{58}\)—thus, there is little contention about specific content of the norm, which is an important precondition for norm implementation (Dimotrova and Rhinard 2005). In other words, people either embrace or reject equal rights for sexual minorities. On a scale of 1 to 10, respondents usually position themselves at the ends of the spectrum by answering that homosexuality is either “always” (1) or “never” (10) acceptable (EVS 1989-2010). LGBT rights are thus a case of a contentious norm at an early phase of development and a symbol of socio-cultural modernity (Carillo 2007) from which we can generate

\(^{57}\) Rooted cosmopolitans refer to “people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in regular activities that require their involvement in transnational networks of contacts and conflicts” (Tarrow and della Porta 2005, 237; Tarrow 2005, 35-71).

\(^{58}\) Using a different dataset by the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), a report by the William’s Institute finds a similar bimodal trend in attitudes towards homosexuality across the globe (T. W. Smith 2011).
theory to explain other contentious norms—for example, those concerning gender and immigrant politics.

*Operationalization—Overview of Research Methods and Data Collection*

I developed a research design through which I sought to understand diffusion processes by exploring both the transnational actors and transnational channels that carry international LGBT rights norms and the domestic structures that welcome or reject them. The dissertation employed an eclectic multi-method (quantitative and qualitative) approach to increase confidence in the findings. I followed guidelines for multi-method research using “nested analysis,” which begins with a large-\(n\) statistical test of correlation between variables and then, depending on the results, proceeds to either “model-testing small-\(n\) analysis,” or to “model-building small-\(n\) analysis” (Lieberman 2005, 436). Qualitative interviews allowed me to confirm or question the validity of the correlations I observed in the large-\(n\) analysis. They also allowed me to observe the mechanisms that connect the independent and dependent variables (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Data collection in Europe involved over two years of on-site fieldwork from July 2010 to August 2012, as well as several weeks of preliminarily fieldwork in 2008 and 2009. My methods included semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and/or archival research in Berlin, Bratislava, Brussels, Budapest, Cracow, the Hague (host of the 2010 ILGA-Europe Meeting), Madrid, Prague, Turin (host of the 2011 ILGA-Europe Meeting), and Warsaw. I also conducted an organizational survey of 291 transnationally linked LGBT organizations.

While the brunt of the qualitative research focused on my case studies (Germany, Poland, Slovenia, and the European institutions), I interviewed 82 actors
representing European institutions and the following states: Belgium, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Turkey. Interviews ranged between 45 minutes and 4 hours. Most interviewees were organizers at LGBT rights advocacy groups and policymakers that work with the issue at hand. These interviews investigated several questions: How is change stimulated and what are the various state responses to activism? Do actors use ad campaigns, lobby governments, and/or take to the streets in protest? Where does resistance originate? How much do actors rely on external aid and expertise? These questions shed light on the conditions that have led to divergent outcomes across the cases. My interviews explored the transnational ties between actors and the types of local obstacles that they face. I selected and interviewed organizers from the universe of transnational LGBT rights organizations in my cases. These interviews also helped me identify a sample of opposition groups and individual policymakers who oppose the introduction of LGBT rights norms, whom I approached for further interviews. The purpose of this set of interviews was to observe the strategy and rationale underlying the opposition towards liberalization and to supplement the information I obtained at LGBT rights organizations.

Archival research uncovered qualitative and quantitative data for all EU member and applicant states. This research allowed me to code LGBT legislation across states and by year (1970-2010), a count of LGBT free spaces across time in Poland and Germany, and a series of other rich contextual data relevant to the analysis. It also allowed me to identify the network ties of all LGBT rights NGOs in

59 The European branch of the International Gay Lesbian Bisexual Trans and Intersex Association.
Europe using membership lists and funding flows. To do this, I used a combination of online archives (e.g., those of ILGA, the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Fundamental Rights Agency), as well as on-site archives in LGBT museums, centers, and organizations.

Participant observation centered around two types of events. First, I attended LGBT strategic activist meetings and conferences, including the 2010 and 2011 ILGA-Europe Annual Meetings, the 2011 Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe Meeting, the 2010 Europride Warsaw conference, a 2013 US State Department international videoconference on transgender rights, and several activist workshops. Issues covered at these meetings included the tactics behind transnational LGBT activism in Europe—for example, sessions on strategic litigation, organizing demonstrations, and creating synergy in transnational cooperation. Transnational anti-LGBT rights activists also participated in order to voice their positions at some of the meetings I observed. This type of participant observation greatly informed my analysis by allowing me to listen to and interact with various representatives from states where I did not schedule formal interviews, providing additional valuable information to support the large-\( n \) analysis. Second, I invested time in attending countless political demonstrations for and against LGBT rights (both those that targeted their own states and those that drew attention to LGBT repression in foreign states\(^{60}\)), pride parades/marches for LGBT rights, and nationalist demonstrations. Participant observation took place in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland, beginning with the early inspiration for this project at Polish-German demonstrations in 2005.
Finally, I sent out a survey (using Qualtrics Survey Software) to one expert at each of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations that my research has identified in the 47 Council of Europe countries (cf. Appendix A for survey questions). By transnational LGBT organizations, I refer to domestic organizations that are members of transnational umbrella organizations (i.e., ILGA-Europe and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer Youth and Student Organization). Of the 291 organizations I surveyed, 180 responded, bringing the response rate to 62%. While there is no standard response rate, compared to previous research that employed organizational surveys, a 62% yield is substantially above the average yield (Baruch and Holtom 2008; Hager et al. 2003).

My original data collection, coupled with data derived from five existing databases, resulted in three new datasets: an original Europe-wide dataset of five different pieces of LGBT legislation across states and time, an original survey of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe, and an international survey of attitudes toward LGBT people. The quantitative large-n analysis compares diffusion across all EU member states using various statistical modeling techniques: ordered logistic, event history, and multilevel random intercept iterative generalized least squares (IGLS) regression models (Chapters 3 and 4). The qualitative component uses process-tracing techniques to study the change in carefully selected case studies described above (Chapters 2 and 5). This ‘analytically eclectic’ research design follows a pragmatic, problem-driven approach to scholarship, in which the pursuit of

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60 For example, a February 15, 2012 demonstration by LGBT activists and German parliamentarians at the Russian Embassy to protest an anti-LGBT propaganda law in St. Petersburg (group no. 208).

61 One study comparing 16 publications (that used organizational surveys) reported an average response rate of 42% (Hager et al. 2003). Another study, analyzing over 490 publications using survey research, found that organizational surveys yield a smaller response rate—35.7 % with a standard deviation of
understanding complex realities drives the selection of methods—even if they are rooted in ostensibly incompatible academic traditions (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a). Combined, the various methods I employ shed light on the processes behind the adoption of and resistance to LGBT rights norms in various domestic contexts.

PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

Chapter 2 sets the stage for the rest of the analysis by exploring how internationalization influences the mobilization of marginalized citizens. It focuses on the mobilization of norm entrepreneurs—the agents behind diffusion—building upon the theoretical concepts and background information introduced above. Specifically, the chapter addresses the question of how marginalized actors are mobilized across borders and introduces the mechanisms that these actors employ in their attempts to influence state and society. I use the cases of Germany and Poland, within the European institutions, to trace cross-border connections between norm entrepreneur and target state.

Chapters 3 and 4 then present the large-\(n\), cross-national empirical analyses and findings. Both chapters revolve around the central research questions. Respectively, they ask what accounts for differences in state laws and national attitudes toward sexual minorities across European states. Chapter 3 employs event history and ordered logit techniques to analyze the timing, rate, and adoption of various LGBT rights laws in EU states across 40 years. Chapter 4 uses multilevel random intercept IGLS models to explain the differences and to make inferences about the state’s contextual influence over individual attitudes towards homosexuality across three points in time.

18.8%—to that of individual-level surveys (Baruch and Holtom 2008).
Chapter 5 encompasses the second core qualitative component of the dissertation. Using the case studies of Poland and Slovenia, I compare differences in domestic norm reception and socio-legal outcomes for LGBT people across two target states, asking why resistance and acceptance of norms governing LGBT rights developed differently across those contexts. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of my findings and their implications for theory and practice in world politics. The chapter also outlines those elements of my argument that are limited to Europe, as well as those that are generalizable to issues of global change on sexual minority rights. It closes with reflection on the project’s importance in light of current events, both within the EU and in relation to those beyond Europe.

Throughout, I find that a politics of visibility is important for understanding how and when social and political systems change in response to the mobilization of “weak” groups. Several theories in international relations and comparative politics rest on the idea that social institutions and actors can transform the lived experience of marginalized peoples, but we know too little about why such groups have wielded power in some states while lacking power in others. In highlighting the importance of visibility for change in world politics, the following chapters help us to understand why the trajectories of socio-legal recognition for marginalized groups are remarkably dissimilar across states.
CHAPTER 2

Mobilizing Norm Brokers:

A ctors, Opportunities and Mechanisms Driving Transnational Activism

When the late Polish President and former Mayor of Warsaw, Lech Kaczynski, banned marches for LGBT equality in 2004 and 2005, LGBT organizations began generating press by contacting international authorities and media outlets to organize and hold the event illegally on June 11th, 2005. What was unique about illegal Parada Równości (Equality March), compared to similar gay pride events in other major cities where LGBT visibility has become common, was that a transnational group of activists organized the event from both Poland and neighboring Germany. Many of these activists were expatriate Poles who used resources made available to them in Berlin. Of the 5,000 illegal marchers in the streets of Warsaw almost half of those demanding the right of assembly for sexual minorities in Poland came from foreign contexts and included prominent European politicians (interview no. 125). In 2007, an expatriate Pole working from Berlin, and four other Polish-based activists, brought a case against Poland (for prohibiting the protest) before the European Court of Human Rights, which decided in his favor and made similar parades legal in all Polish cities. According to Tomasz Bączkowski, the activist who organized the march and later took the case to Strasbourg:

It was organized in Berlin because I lived there … I had a lot of experiences in Germany, I knew how to do this—or how one should do it—and I thought, in these times … it shouldn’t be a problem organizing from the outside.
Naturally, through the personal contacts with Claudia Roth and others, it was much easier for me to organize it from [Germany] then for Polish activists in Poland, where the environment in general is very hostile. In retrospect, these international political pressures were much more important than if I would have just done this in Poland (interview no. 124).^63

The illegal march provided the political opportunity to link the social situation of Polish sexual minorities to Poland’s recent accession to the EU through the frames of democratic values and human rights. Many activists remember it as one of the most important public assemblies for the rights of LGBT Poles and a turning point for Polish LGBT activism amidst an oppressive political environment.^64 Polish LGBT activism—one experience within a larger campaign for LGBT rights in Europe—illustrates the increasing influence that Europeanization has on the political mobilization of norm entrepreneurs and their tactics. This chapter reflects on transnational LGBT activism in Europe, emphasizing the role Europe plays in facilitating the mobilization of these actors. It also highlights the mechanisms that these actors engage in their attempt to impact both society and state. Highlighted throughout the dissertation, these socialization mechanisms include brokerage, framing, learning, and deliberation.

**INTRODUCTION**

To what extent do processes of Europeanization facilitate the political mobilization and influence the strategies of LGBT norm entrepreneurs in the European

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^62 An adapted version of this chapter will appear as a stand-alone article in the *European Political Science Review*.

^63 Translated from German by author.

^64 The Kultura dla Tolerancji 2004 and 2005 also generated attention. The Warsaw March was also banned in 2004, to which activists responded by organizing an illegal rally.
Union? The answer that this chapter proffers emphasizes that European integration changes the ramifications and tactics of LGBT activism by altering political opportunity structures for mobilization. As a result, transnational European networks of LGBT activists are formed, which in turn employ mechanisms of socialization to push for the social and legal visibility of LGBT people in various member states.

I analyze Europeanization by looking at both vertical opportunities provided by European institutions and horizontal ones provided by specific EU member states. The EU’s multi-level system offers a host of political opportunities for advocacy groups to mobilize around social issues. These opportunities, however, crucial as they are for an understanding of LGBT activism in the EU, are more complex than traditionally thought. I argue that the Europeanization of LGBT activism is facilitated by a vertical (top-down and bottom-up) interaction between domestic states and Brussels; it also functions horizontally by facilitating networks of actors across member states. I demonstrate this by focusing on the discrepancies in the opportunity for LGBT mobilization in two member states, one open to norm entrepreneurs and thus facilitating mobilization, the other a closed target state. This phenomenon occurs in a type of activism similar to what Imig and Tarrow (2001, 17) call “cooperative transnationalism;” the actors are transnational and the foreign target of contention is domestic. Furthermore, I contend that vertical and horizontal opportunities for mobilization bring together different types of actors who rely on mechanisms of socialization and frame their demands in a European discourse.

This chapter’s argument proceeds in three steps. First, I argue that the Europeanization of LGBT rights begins primarily as a vertical process in which the EU imposes formal rules on member states and builds the capacities of civil society
organizations to lobby domestic institutions. This engenders new domestic discourses and generates media attention around the LGBT issue which domestic groups then use to draw attention from external actors. Second, I make a case for looking at the Europeanization of LGBT mobilization horizontally. I argue that Europeanization facilitates transnational activism around LGBT issues through the free movement of peoples and through transnational advocacy networks, granting actors from the ‘new,’ target states access to important mobilizing structures in other member states. The abundance of social spaces and organizational resources in a ‘leading’ member state were very important for bringing together the main actors and empowering them with the resources for transnational activism in another. These factors provided the ingredients for mobilization that were not available in the target state. Third, in arguing that much LGBT activism is mobilized among member states, I show that mechanisms of socialization through EU-level frames and elites almost always accompany such mobilization. Employing socialization mechanisms that highlight appropriate behavior, actors frame their demands tactically in a European discourse by making the issue of LGBT acceptance one of human rights and democratic responsibilities as members of the EU community. They use these frames to broker the issue across various contexts.

In developing these arguments, I focus on the case of European transnational advocacy networks and cross-border German-Polish LGBT activism. As described in Chapter One, the EU provides an ideal setting for analysis because we observe a norm of protecting sexual minorities and the only internationally binding legal protections for such minorities (Swiebel 2009). At the same time, it houses states with differing levels of LGBT recognition. Hence the focus on the member states of Germany and
Poland: they make explicit the connections between a ‘leading’ and a ‘new’ state, with Polish and German activists—norm entrepreneurs—using resources available to them in Germany to mobilize in Poland. Next, Section 1 lays out the theoretical framework, argument and methods by engaging literatures on Europeanization and political opportunity structures for mobilization. Section 2 discusses the varying contextual settings of German and Polish gay life and how the resources and networks in Berlin were used to horizontally mobilize for the recognition of sexual minorities in Poland. In Section 3, I present the set of norm entrepreneurs involved in transnational European LGBT activism, using the case of Poland, and describe how they came together. The actors mobilized across member states are more numerous and different from those elite actors mobilized vertically with the support of the EU. Section 4 describes the tactics and processes behind transnational LGBT activism and reflects on how activists use EU-level discursive frames and mechanisms of socialization to achieve their goals. The chapter closes by reflecting on the strengths and limitations of Europeanization processes concerning LGBT mobilization, and sets the stage for analyzing the effect of such outcomes in the following chapters.

I. EUROPEANIZATION AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM

The Europeanization of a Norm

The aims of this chapter are both to introduce the relevant types of norm entrepreneurs and mechanisms central to this dissertation, and second, to contribute to the literature on Europeanization and political opportunities for transnational movements by looking at the mobilization of LGBT activists across borders in Europe. Scholars broadly define Europeanization as “processes of (a) construction, (b)
diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms, which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, political structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2004, cited in Krizsan and Popa 2010, 382). Most research emphasizes vertical interactions between Brussels and the member states, focusing on processes of formal institutional politics between elites at both levels. Theories based on both rational and sociological institutionalism are used to explain outcomes in policy changes across European member states. Rational institutionalism advances a logic of consequences, whereby domestic actors make cost-benefit calculations based on external incentives provided in Brussels. Sociological institutionalism purports a logic of appropriateness, according to which actors internalize EU norms and rules as part of their identity as members of an international society (Checkel 1997, 2005). Both mechanisms are top-down processes, with the EU facilitating change by imposing sanctions and/or through persuasion, capacity building and promotion of transnational cooperation.

Indeed, as in most other realms of European policy, both rational and sociological mechanisms are at play in furthering LGBT rights (Börzel and Risse 2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). A series of European actors—the EU institutions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and a transnational network of activists—have fostered change by propagating an international norm on LGBT rights and diffusing the issue into the domestic discourses of various European states. European institutions have actively championed the norm of protecting sexual minorities directly through accession requirements. Examples of this include Article 13 of the Amsterdam Treaty, the 2000 Employment Anti-Discrimination Directive, the
European Charter for Fundamental Rights, the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria for accession, and various official statements. While European institutions contribute to a minimum level policy change across all member states directly (i.e. decriminalization of adult same-sex relations, anti-discrimination in employment, and asylum), most other changes come about indirectly through the facilitation of transnational advocacy networks. As the expert survey results of European LGBT organizations in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show, the effect of European institutions is substantial, but leaves much to be explained, especially in terms of change in social attitudes (Figure 2.2). Figure 2.1 illustrates a strong direct link between European institutions and domestic LGBT politics and policy, with representatives of 138 (82%) LGBT organizations reporting “some” (53%) or “a lot” (29%) of influence. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that the direct nature of this link is less pronounced when the outcome concerns domestic attitudes toward LGBT people, with only (43%) reporting “some” (37%) or “a lot” (6%) of influence.

Figure 2.1: Organizational Responses to the Question: In your opinion, how much influence do European-level institutions – that is, institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on your country’s politics and policies related to the rights of LGBT people?\(^{65}\) (N=169)

\(^{65}\) This question is adapted from a question formulated by O’Dwyer (2010, 236–237), and used in his survey (N=28) of Polish activists and politicians.
As Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) make clear, Europeanization as a process is not always directly tied to the EU institutions. Instead, Europeanization leaves substantial room for a series of other indirect processes to affect change. In line with Krizsan and Popa’s (2010, 384) work on the Europeanization of policies against domestic violence, I observe “a logic of consequences [that] dominates before accession, while appropriateness becomes the predominant logic post-accession.” The EU does require states to make changes to accompany accession, but it becomes cautious about “embarrassing its own members” once they are in (interview nos. 15 and 138), bringing into question the successful implementation and promotion of new LGBT policies (O’Dwyer 2010).66 Instead, the brunt of the effort to induct “actors into the norms and rules of a given community… [so] that an agent switches from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness” (Checkel 2005, 804) is left to a transnational network of activists.

As scholars of the European woman’s movement have observed, transnational advocacy networks play a central role in Europeanization because EU competences in

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66 “The EU is most effective when it has a carrot to dangle” (interview no. 126).
sanctioning states for infringing upon the rights of LGBT peoples remain limited (Krizsan and Popa 2010; Roggeband 2010). “The formation of transnational advocacy networks links actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations in a way that can multiply the opportunities for marginalized groups to mobilize” (Montoya 2008, 360). A European network of LGBT activists exists, composed of transnationally linked domestic NGOs, international human rights NGOs and sympathetic policy elites. ILGA (International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Intersex Association) Europe—the largest and richest of ILGA International’s six regional organizations—connects 291 domestic and local organizations across the EU and Council of Europe member states. It “serves as a conduit for knowledge and best practice for national LGBT groups and, perhaps more importantly, lobbying European institutions to adopt decisions and policies that enhance the legal standing of LGBT people in European law and policy” (Kollman 2009, 42). With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Brussels-based organization became an official partner of the European Commission and has received its core funding from that EU institution since then (Paternotte 2012). Similarly, the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT rights grew out of the cooperation between ILGA-Europe and sympathetic members of the European Parliament (MEP), providing an elite EU response to LGBT issues around Europe. These networks share resources and pool information to develop tactics for promoting the visibility of LGBT people in Europe.

Such advocacy networks are brought together via new political opportunities provided by the EU’s multi-level framework. For LGBT mobilization, my understanding of Europeanization departs from the traditional literature above in some respects, as it is less concerned with elite-driven processes concerning (non-
compliance and policy outcomes. Most research has a top-down, vertical understanding of Europeanization, which neglects that fact that Europeanization also facilitates a space for horizontal interaction.\(^6^7\) By horizontal, I mean the pressures and actors mobilized across member states, using European frames. For LGBT actors, who have long relied on safe spaces to express their identity, such horizontal interaction is an important pre-condition for their mobilization because the EU does not directly offer such public spheres. Furthermore, despite the higher level of legitimacy that the EU often holds on the issue, some member states are more advanced than others in their experience and legal understanding of LGBT rights. A useful theoretical lens to think about horizontal and vertical processes of Europeanization is that of political opportunities, which social movement scholars have explored at various levels.

*Varied Political Opportunities in Leading and New States*

Political opportunity structures (POS) were traditionally defined as the circumstances surrounding a political system, in particular, the availability of alliances and the strength of opponents in a given context. Most opportunities, however, are not structural, but rather subject to attribution and situational in that they need to be both perceived and visible to potential actors (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 43). As Princen and Kerremans (2008, 1132) synthesize, “the actual effects of political opportunities on social movements depend on (1) the identification of those opportunities, (2) the existence of collective identities and frames that are favorable to specific forms of political activity, and (3) organizational resource and capabilities that allow social movements to take advantage of those opportunities.”

\(^6^7\) For important exceptions, cf. work on EU networks (Montoya 2008, 2009, 2010; Roggeband 2010), work on EU cooperation, scale shift and brokerage (Imig and Tarrow 2001; Tarrow 2005b), work on EU up-, down- and lateral-loading in the women’s movement (Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht 2003).
While the foundational social movement literature treats the nation state as its natural arena, Europeanization deals with the supranational level and therefore has implications for POS. Recent literature on transnational social movements suggests that social movement actors in one state increasingly have ties to those in another and that actors in one state can target another’s government (Della Porta, Kriesi, and Rucht 2009; J. Smith 1997; Tarrow 2005b). Furthermore, scholars have explored how the political opportunities and constraints provided by the EU affect movement mobilization and tactics at local, national and supranational levels (Imig and Tarrow, 2001; della Porta and Caiani 2007).

As with Europeanization literature, many of these studies are vertical in nature, exploring the presence (or absence) of transnational mobilization targeting Brussels. For LGBT activism, the assumption that “the growth of the EU as an important political center is likely to provoke political activities against it” does not hold (Marks and McAdam 1999, 251). By most accounts, the relationship between the EU and LGBT activists is harmonious, where activists see Brussels as an ally in a struggle against sometimes-hostile domestic governments. In line with earlier findings, LGBT activists use formal avenues of insider lobbying to address EU institutions rather than protest it (Marks and McAdam 1996). Indeed, the European Commission generously funds ILGA-Europe with the primary purpose of lobbying EU institutions. Europeanized opportunity structures become interesting for LGBT mobilization because they have an effect on the types of transnational and domestic actors

This type of contention—and the mechanisms of brokerage and diffusion that this dissertation highlights—is closely related to the social movement concept of “scale shift,” the “process through which contention at one level is transposed to a higher (or a lower) one” (Tarrow and McAdam 2005). See also Soule (2013).
mobilized at various levels and on the strategies these actors implement in various member states.

LGBT advocacy groups operate in an interactive environment that requires one to account for the openness of POS at domestic and international levels. Sikkink’s (2005) understanding of openness is receptiveness to NGO activity. For instance, when the domestic level is closed and interacting with an open international opportunity structure, she expects Boomerang or Spiral Model patterns, wherein domestic actors sidestep their governments to pressure from above (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). If both domestic and international levels are open (e.g. Germany), activists will “privilege domestic political change, but will keep international activism as a complementary and compensatory option” (Sikkink 2005, 165). This forms what she calls insider-outsider coalitions, where activists in an open domestic context can aid those in a closed one. Poland, Germany and the EU are all open to advocacy groups, and at first glance do not differ on the variable of openness that is key to Sikkink’s framework. Yet the framework remains useful if we think of openness in terms of the social and legal acceptance of LGBT people, where there is still considerable variance. The discrepancies in visibility for LGBT people across Europe have led other observers to re-conceptualize open and closed opportunity structures for LGBT people. Holzhacker (2012), for example, has argued that the openness such structures for LGBT mobilization should be measured in terms of a context’s legal standing toward LGBT people, and its societal and elite opinion of them. In turn, political opportunities for LGBT need to be re-conceptualized, since the group is often invisible and fears both social and political costs associated with mobilization.
Taking all the above considerations on Europeanization and POS into account, I pursue a twofold approach, according to which I explore both vertical and horizontal opportunities for the Europeanization of political mobilization by norm entrepreneurs. I will contend that horizontal and vertical Europeanization have differing effects on LGBT mobilization, but come together to make it effective. The former provides access to social spaces and organizational resources in open member states that mobilize LGBT publics (both elite and ordinary citizens) from one member state to another. Horizontal opportunities are particularly useful for non-institutionalized mobilization in a target state’s public sphere. Vertical opportunities provide the legitimacy and institutional clout to mobilize European political elites and socialize authorities in the target state as well as the frames and socialization mechanisms that activists use to make their message effective there.

For the purposes of this analysis, I conceive of the POS for LGBT mobilization around the time of Polish accession (2004) as closed in Poland and open in Germany and at the macro EU-level. Poland emerged from transition having had little discourse on the LGBT issue prior to beginning the EU accession process, during which the state was subjected to new EU standards on LGBT rights. In contrast, the 1960s sexual revolution and the 1980s HIV/AIDS epidemic politicized LGBT issues much earlier throughout the Federal Republic of Germany.

I use three measures based on Holzhacker (2012) to compare legal standing and societal and elite opinion in Germany and Poland. To measure legality at the state level, I collected data on the LGBT laws adopted in each state by 2005. These protective and equality laws go beyond decriminalization and score countries on six
measures of LGBT legal standing, such as the status of recognized partnerships, anti-discrimination protections, and adoption rights (cf. Table 3.2 in Appendix C). With all 27 EU states scoring between 2 and 12 points, Poland (2 points) scores comparatively low, and Germany (7.5) scores comparatively high, in the top-third.\(^{69}\) To compare the societal situation, I use available survey data on social attitudes toward sexual minorities (European Values Survey 1981–2008 2011).\(^{70}\) The percentage of Poles who approve of homosexuality (by selecting 1-5 on a scale of 1-10) was 15.63% in 2008, compared to 51.03% of Germans surveyed that same year (EVS).

For elite opinion, I rely on interviews with politicians and national LGBT experts in Poland, Germany and at the EU institutions. Here again I recognize discrepancies in elite opinion between Germany and Poland. In Germany, all five federal political parties have LGBT committees that represent LGBT constituencies. While some members of these parties clearly hold homo/trans-phobic views, a taboo exists against expressing them. In Poland the situation is changing, but all interviewees explicitly cite openly hostile rhetoric among political parties in 2005 (Bączkowski 2008). Political elites went so far as to propose a bill to remove homosexual schoolteachers from schools because of their supposed threat to children—this type of public discourse no longer has credibility among elites in Germany.

Since the EU, as an international organization, has different competences than nation states, the same measures do not apply. That said, there is evidence that the EU

\(^{69}\) In 2005, Poland had introduced anti-discrimination employment measures (2004) and equal sexual offenses provisions (1932); Germany had introduced the same, plus registered partnership (2001), second-parent adoption (2005) and anti-discrimination in goods and services (1992/2006)—furthermore, some German Länder (including Berlin) had introduced anti-discrimination measures into their constitutions (ILGA-Europe 2009; Waaldijk 2009).
is the most LGBT progressive organization of nation states, when compared to the United Nations (Swiebel 2009). As in Germany, a taboo against elite homophobic rhetoric exists—this was particularly evident in 2004, when the prospects of a favored Commission Presidential candidate were scuppered after he expressed religious views that conflicted with the acceptance of homosexuality. The EU institutions have a clear mandate to promote LGBT rights in member states and abroad. Table 2.1 provides a sketch of what will follow.

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70 The 2008 survey wave (4th) was selected because it is the wave closest to the 2005 Equality March.  
71 In her provocative work, Angelia Wilson (2012) also outlines the differences that make Europe stand apart from the United States in being LGBT-friendly, which she attributes primarily to Europe’s political economy of care.
| Table 2.1. Political Opportunity Structures for LGBT Mobilization, Mobilizing Structures, Types of Transnational Actors, and Tactics |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| **I. POS Type**                 | Poland          | Germany         | EU              |
| Legal Standing of LGBT People in 2005 (0-12) | Low (2)         | High (7.5)      | N/A             |
| Societal Opinion Approving of Homosexuality in 2008 | Low (15.63%)   | High (51.03%)   | N/A             |
| Elite Opinion Toward LGBT Equality in 2005 | Opposed/Split  | Supportive      | Supportive      |
| Closed (New Target State)       | Open (Leading Horizontal Norm Entrepreneur) | Open (Leading Vertical Norm Entrepreneur) |
| **II. Mobilizing Structures**   |                 |                 |                 |
| Social Spaces (Average # 1990-2005) | Low (5.5)       | High (117.5)    | N/A             |
| LGBT Organizational Resources (Average # 1990-2005) | Low (4.9)       | High (48.5)     | Resources for protest in the public sphere |
|                                 |                 |                 | High (EU Linked Umbrella Organizations) Resources for institutionalized lobbying of government |
| **III. Types of External Transnational Actors** | Horizontal | Vertical |
| Mobilization of Polish Expatriates/Rooted Cosmopolitans | +             |              |
| Mobilization of Foreign Political Elites | +             |              |
| Mobilization of the Foreign Publics | +             | -             |
| **IV. Mechanisms**              |                 |                 |                 |
| Norm Brokerage\(^1\)            | +              | -/+            | -              |
| Legitimate Frames for Deliberation in Target State | + | - | + |
| Legitimate Frames for Learning in Target State | + | - | + |

Note: \(^1\)Norm brokers connect the often-contrasting international norms and domestic traditions, to aid diffusion by framing norms—in a domestically familiar discourse—so they fit better locally. In this case study, they are local actors in Poland and specifically the Polish rooted cosmopolitans in Germany.

The research methods employed in this chapter include expert interviews, archival research and participant observation. Many of my 82 semi-structured interviews dealt specifically with key players in Polish LGBT activism in Germany, Poland, and Brussels. The interviews were primarily conducted with activists and...
politicians who were asked about their motivations and the strategies behind their mobilization, as well as their perception of the outcomes of that mobilization. Archival research uncovered organizational documents, mission statements, grant applications and press releases relating to transnational activism in Poland. Finally, participant observation at various LGBT marches, prides, street fairs, and strategic activist meetings in Poland and Germany since 2005 also informed this analysis.

II. MOBILIZING STRUCTURES IN LEADING STATES

Differing Opportunities for Gay Life in the EU and the Importance of Access to “Horizontal” Social Spaces and Organizational Capacities and Leading States

This section makes the case that the abundance of social spaces and organizational resources in neighboring Germany were critical variables for bringing together the main actors, defining their common identity, and empowering them with the necessary resources for transnational activism in Poland. By LGBT social spaces, I refer to the centers for gay life that make the community visible and serve as safe spaces where LGBT people can meet and express their identity. Social spaces facilitate ties “by demonstrating the co-presence of others, thus showing people that issues they thought taboo can be discussed, and strengthening collective identity by providing tangible evidence of the existence of a group” (Polletta 1999, 25). Social spaces can foster collective consciousness by making the issue visible to potential movement actors (Stockdill 2003). For LGBT people, these spaces traditionally exist

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72 Drawing on James C. Scott (1990, 118), Chris Zepeda-Millan (2010) notes “the importance of autonomous social spaces created by marginalized groups for the development of political action on their behalf. [Scott] asserts that ‘the practices and discourses of resistance’ cultivated by the oppressed cannot exist ‘without tacit or acknowledged coordination and communication within the subordinate group.’ For this interaction to occur, [Scott] says that ‘the subordinate group must carve out for itself social spaces insulated from control and surveillance from above.’” In the EU, insulated social spaces for activists can exist in foreign member states.
in the private sphere or take the form of cafes, bars and clubs (Kane 2003). Organizational capacity refers to the presence of LGBT organizations that endow LGBT communities with resources and capabilities, including “money, expertise, legitimacy, and (pre-) existing networks” (Princen and Kerremans 2008, 1131–1132). Organizational capacity also exists at the European level (e.g. ILGA-Europe), but it serves a different function, as these umbrella organizations are more likely to pursue formal lobbying than domestic organizations who are often devoted to public sphere work (Lang 2009, 2012). Social spaces and organizational capacity in open EU member states provided the mobilizing structures—which “include family units, friendship networks, voluntary associations, work units, and elements of the state structure itself” (McCarthy 1996)—that engendered a process not available in Poland.

The difficult social situation for LGBT Poles made headlines in Europe, as activists and media highlighted the paradox that Poland’s successfully democratizing state and society was struggling to recognize sexual minorities. Despite some institutional changes associated with accession, like passing the anti-discrimination in employment directive, Poland showed itself resistant to many protective policy measures, societal attitudes toward sexual minorities remained largely negative, and cases of state-sponsored discrimination abounded (Bączkowski 2008; O’Dwyer and Schwartz 2010). Several city governments violated the freedom of assembly for LGBT marches, despite the fact that the march has a long history within the tactical repertoire for expressing political grievances in Poland.73 Alongside more formal advocacy work, LGBT activists stress the importance of mobilization in the public

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73 Both those on the right and the left of the Polish political spectrum note the importance of public assembly in various stages of Polish history and its role in the Polish national tradition (interview no. 141).
sphere as an important type of Europeanization, because LGBT activism is geared
toward both society and state. While other EU countries (old and new) also
experienced troubles with recognizing sexual minorities, a homophobic government,
coupled with an emerging civil society and several engaged LGBT organizations made
Catholic Poland a prototype for improving the situation of sexual minorities in the EU
(Chetaille 2011; European Parliament Resolution on Homophobia in Europe 2006,
activists made progress in the three years leading up to accession by implementing
innovative campaigns and founding a new national LGBT organization, Kampania
Przeciw Homofobii (KPH).74 The euphoria associated with EU membership was not
long lived, however, as hostile political and social opposition began forming in
response (interview nos. 9 and 140). In large part, allies from abroad aided local Polish
activism by organizing demonstrations and placing demands on the Polish state from
foreign contexts during this time.

The topography of LGBT recognition—both socially and legally—is complex,
with stark variation from one state to another and within states from rural to urban
areas.75 In Europe, Europeanization processes facilitate the access to centers of gay
life through the free movement of people, goods and services, making established gay
communities, such as those in Berlin, more accessible to non-nationals. This creates
dense nodes of gay social spaces and activist kinships in specific national contexts and

74 According to the former President of KPH, the debate on homosexuality most visibly entered the
public realm leading up to EU accession (interview no. 8). In 2003, the Niech Nas Zobaczą [Let them
See Us] campaign—where 27 billboards funded substantially by the Swedish, Danish and Dutch
embassies showed same-sex couples holding hands—fueled national debate on the issue.
75 LGBT movements also consider legal recognition to be deeply intertwined with socio-cultural
recognition, which is more about the acceptance of specific identities and LGBT visibility in everyday
contexts.
urban areas that outpace their surroundings—for example, Amsterdam, London, and Berlin became known as “gay capitals” at various points in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. European integration accelerates access to such spaces, where openly gay populations and social spaces are more present. This is especially true for post-socialist countries, where social spaces and organizational resources are comparatively less developed. Thus, the political opportunities for transnational LGBT mobilization lie not only in Brussels, but also in member states’ centers of gay life.

In Germany, openly LGBT people have a long history as part of the state’s fabric—including both persecution and tolerance—which has resulted in long-term LGBT organizations and visibility in some parts of the public space in cities such as Berlin, Cologne and Hamburg. Berlin, in particular, became a hotbed for activism focused on Poland, providing a host of opportunities for mobilization absent in Poland that were also different from those available at the EU level. Berlin’s large Polish expatriate community, its geographic proximity to the Polish border, and its status as an LGBT-friendly European city (which endows the city with dozens of LGBT social spaces and organizations) provided fertile ground for transnational activism to take root there beginning in the late 1990s. First, a long history of immigration by Polish workers to Germany has left a visible mark on German demography. Berlin’s second largest immigrant group is Polish, numbering nearly 41,000 registered Polish citizens

76 “Gay capital” is a colloquial term used to describe cities that have a large visibly gay population and, in general, a society comparatively tolerant towards LGBT people. Amsterdam, London, Berlin, Madrid and Paris are examples of European “gay capitals.”

77 While I focus on Berlin and Warsaw here, similar connections exist between other cities in Germany and Poland. For example, the mayor of Nuremberg addressed the importance of LGBT rights as part of cooperation on a visit to Cracow—one of Nuremberg’s sister cities (interview no. 103). Activists from Cologne—another center of gay life with a large Polish community—were also engaged in Poland. Alongside Warsaw, targets included Cracow, Poznan and other cities with banned marches.

78 Similarly, the work of Binnie and Klesse (forthcoming) shows that Polish migration flows in other European countries have developed activist networks.
(Amt fuer Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg 2011). The estimated population of Berliners of Polish descent is estimated to be 130,000, counting both undocumented Polish immigrants and those who were born and raised in Poland but have since taken German citizenship. In particular, Berlin is appealing to Polish sexual minorities who seek it out as a destination to reside in and travel to because of the comparatively high level of LGBT visibility within the city (interview no. 5). A Polish presence—for example, flags, pamphlets, information booths—is renowned and visible at all of Berlin’s major LGBT events, including the annual Christopher St. Day Parade and the Gay-Lesbian Street Fair. Second, geographic proximity is a critical factor, since Berlin is just over 60 kilometers from the Polish border, and train connections such as the Berlin-Warszawa Express make travel between the two capitals quick and affordable—the 5.5-hour journey to Warsaw costs about 40 euros.

Alongside Berlin’s Polish population and geographic convenience, a third factor for LGBT mobilization is the city’s long history as a center of gay life. Magnus Hirschfeld’s Wissenschaftlich-humanitäre-Komitee (Scientific Humanitarian Committee) and the Weltliga für Sexualreform (World League for Sexual Reform)—founded in Berlin in 1897 and 1928, respectively—were the earliest precursors to modern LGBT organizations (Kollman and Waites 2009, 3). Even the first official American organization for homosexuals, the Society for Human Rights, was founded by Hirschfield protégé and Berliner Henry Gerber in Chicago in 1924 (Dececco and Bullough 2002, 25). Especially after German reunification, “Berlin has developed…into a gay Mecca in which the richness of ideas and diversity is hardly able to be surpassed” (Gmünder 2003, 323). In 2001, the newly elected mayor, Klaus Wowereit, ended speculation by saying, “Ich bin schwul und das ist auch gut so” (“I
am gay, and it’s alright that way”). In sum, the LGBT issue is highly visible, both socially and politically. The city’s gay history has led to an abundance of LGBT social spaces and organizations, which I will argue are mobilizing structures for local, national and transnational activism.

Compared to Warsaw, the center of gay life and activism in Poland, the differences in social spaces and organizational capacity are sharp (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). I use fifteen years of issues of Spartacus, an international gay travel guide, to measure the number of gay social spaces and organizations leading up to the 2005 Equality March (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). The Spartacus guides have appeared yearly since 1970 and provide a systematic way to measure the presence of gay life across cities in over 160 countries, because they use the same categories to list the presence of LGBT organizations and businesses. For Figure 2.3, I code “LGBT social spaces” by counting the presence of LGBT restaurants, cafes, bars and clubs in each city. For Figure 2.4, I code “LGBT Organizations” broadly by counting all political, religious and health/counseling LGBT organizations and groups in each city. 

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79 Thanks to David Frank for suggesting this method to me (2008).
80 While the comparison in Figure 2.4 is intended to highlight the discrepancy in the quantity of organizations between Berlin and Warsaw, it is also worth noting that the number of organizations in Berlin has declined over time. There are two reasons for this. The first is German reunification, which consolidated organizations and centers that had counterparts on the other side of the wall. The second is the general trend of mainstreaming gay culture and assimilation across Western gay capitals, which has led to a reduction in the amount of specifically LGBT spaces and organizations.
The figures show the cleft between two European member states—one leading, one new—in terms of potential for LGBT mobilization.\footnote{Spaces for LGBT activism and LGBT organizations certainly also existed in Poland (Chetaille 2011) but they existed in far smaller quantities than in Germany (and many other EU member states). Other EU member states had more resources, experience and openly LGBT publics that could be used to work}
it to highlight the stark difference in LGBT organizations and social spaces between Berlin and Warsaw. In the last 20 years, Europeanization has made this cleft between Warsaw and Berlin less relevant by increasing the mobility of European citizens and by providing new channels to access foreign contexts within the EU’s institutional framework. As a result, the above variables—available social spaces and organizational capacity in some member states—have established the necessary personal networks that brought together a new group of transnational actors involved in Polish LGBT activism.

III. THE ACTORS: TYPES OF NORM ENTREPRENEURS MOBILIZED

I define transnational activists “as individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and transnational resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they hold in common with transnational allies” (Tarrow 2005b, 8–9). While European institutions have established norms on LGBT rights, these norms do not diffuse freely, they need actors and channels to carry them (Soule 2004a). This section discusses the transnational activists that have aided this process across channels that function vertically and horizontally. Different channels mobilized different types of actors involved in the Equality March. First, it discusses those mobilized horizontally (primarily between Germany and Poland), which include expatriate Poles and German activists, celebrities, and ordinary citizens. Second, it discusses those who were mobilized both horizontally and vertically, which include European and German parliamentarians.

Especially among the non-political elite actors, the transnational activists interviewed cited the importance of horizontal spaces and resources since they connect with local activists in a closed context like Poland. Polish accession to the EU enabled access to these
European LGBT people, solidifying a transnational dimension of their identity. Binnie and Klesse (forthcoming) in particular, have argued that solidarity networks fuel the transnational engagement of LGBT people. This phenomenon aligns with a body of research that posits that many openly LGBT people share, at least in part, a common experience—such as ‘coming out’ to family—that connects them across borders (Altman 1996; Tremblay, Paternotte, and Johnson 2011). At times, this connection is stronger than national identity and can transcend class and race to connect otherwise disparate actors. For example, Allen (1996) argues that shared “life experiences and innate personality traits … connect gays more closely with gays from other countries than with … heterosexual citizens of their own country” (Allen 1996; Binnie 2004). According to Allen, an openly gay German may identify more with an openly gay Pole, than s/he does with a heterosexual German. However contested the social construction of identity across contexts may be, the horizontal opportunities described above are important for giving LGBT people, who remain invisible in many domestic contexts, a space for interaction.

In their excellent work, Binnie and Klesse critically explore notions of solidarity in network ties. While it is true that the activists mobilized refer to moral shock and solidarity as a motivation for their activism, such an explanation alone does not produce a mobilization outcome. The moral outrage associated with the Kaczynski Government’s treatment of LGBT Poles was widely publicized in Europe and resonated in with people in many contexts. Moral shock does not explain why some locals become more involved than others, which is why I privilege the social spaces and organizational resources that my interviewees cited in actually mobilizing those who felt connected to LGBT Poles in solidarity.

A large part of LGBT identity develops later in life in interaction with other LGBT people. Social spaces provide the foundation for such interactions to take root and for networks to form. In Europe they are important for LGBT people becoming politically active (interview nos. 5, 12, and 16).
Horizontal Mobilization of Domestic Actors and Rooted Cosmopolitans from Target States

Expatriate Polish activists discussed the strength they felt to become politically active after leaving Poland. According to one activist from the Fundacja Równości/Stiftung für Gleichberechtigung (Equality Foundation84), she now holds hands with her girlfriend when she visits Warsaw, which she attributes to socialization in Berlin and the comfort she takes in knowing that she can “escape” back to Berlin (interview no. 5). “When you leave a country, you suddenly feel more brave [pause] to show yourself” (5). Like her, many of the actors involved were expatriate Poles who used mobilizing structures available to them in Berlin. The role of expatriate Poles and their interactions with German allies is crucial because they provide a competent understanding of the Polish domestic context—through their personal experiences, language competence and associational ties to Polish activists—and draw attention to the Polish situation by putting it on the agenda of German LGBT organizations.

In line with the argument that horizontal opportunities mobilize a distinct type of actor, I use Tarrow’s definition of rooted cosmopolitans to elaborate that:

the special characteristic of these activists is … their relational links to their own societies, to other countries, and to international institutions … What is “rooted” in the concept … is that, as individuals move cognitively and physically outside their spatial origins, they continue to be linked to place, to the social networks that inhabit that space, and to the resources, experiences and opportunities that place provides them with … Most rely on domestic

84 It should be noted that the Fundacja Równości was funded by three domestic Polish organizations, whose presidents at times were at odds with Bączkowski leadership of it (interview no. 129).
resources and opportunities to launch their transnational activities and return home afterwards (Tarrow 2005a, 1–8, see also Hannerz 1996).

One such activist, Bączkowski, came to Berlin in the 1990s to continue his studies in economics, international relations, and European law. At this time, the NGO field in Poland was weak and offered little in terms of LGBT rights (interview no. 125). By contrast, the visibility of LGBT life in Berlin fueled his engagement there, with “the background thought that these skills can be … transported to Poland later” (interview no. 124). His partner, a volunteer at Maneo (a local Berlin LGBT organization that focuses primarily on community issues), introduced Bączkowski to the organization’s president. At this point in the late 1990s, Maneo’s president—who had previously worked as part of a transnational campaign to combat violence in Northern Ireland—was hoping to deepen the organization’s political cooperation abroad, and Bączkowski’s volunteer work brought Poland to the forefront of the discussion (interview no. 125). In 1998, Maneo organized its first roundtable meeting in Warsaw with Polish activists, establishing a lasting transnational network of LGBT organizations in five European capitals called Tolerantia.85

As Maneo expanded its realm of activities to address Poland-related issues, it acted as a magnet for the involvement of Berlin’s expatriate Poles. “Roughly 100,000 Poles live in Berlin and then, if roughly 5-10% are gay, there should be 5,000 to 10,000 gay Poles … as Maneo started having more contacts to Poland, expatriate

85 Around the same time, Maneo established ties to France, because of a Francophone colleague who was informed about the activist scene in Paris. Together, these ties have formed Tolerantia, which brings together organizations in Berlin (Maneo), Warsaw (Kampania Przeciw Homofobii and Lambda-Warszawa), Paris (SOS-Homophobie), Madrid (COGAM), and soon Dublin (interview no. 125). Their mission statement reads: “We unite our power for the building of a civil society in Europe … In the spirit of the European Human Rights convention we oppose hatred, violence and discrimination against social minorities … We want to fight against discrimination and isolation of homosexuals in a unified Europe” (Tolerantia Declaration 2010).
Poles approached us wanting to be involved” (interview no. 124). What emerged in 2005 was Tolerancja po Polsku/Toleranz auf Polnisch, a subsidiary of Maneo, which provided both a social space for expatriate Poles to gather and a mobilizing structure for using resources in Berlin to address LGBT politics in Poland. It encouraged “[g]ays and lesbians from both countries to meet regularly to cooperate against violence and discrimination towards homosexuals in Germany and Poland, and to exchange information and develop projects” (Maneo-Tolerancja 2005). Similar projects fostering transnational dialogue and cooperation between Germany and Poland have been organized since 1998. Alongside the personal and symbolic support provided by expatriate networks, they generate material support for transnational activism. Through Maneo’s organizational connections to Berlin’s Gay-Lesbian Street Fair, for example, Fundacja Równosci was given rent-free spaces to sell beverages and raise funds for the marches. This type of material support began in the 1990s and continues today.

Expatriate Poles were connected to allies in Germany. In 2006, an estimated 2,000 of the 5,000 participants at the Warsaw March were foreign nationals—of those, most were German (Bączkowski 2008, 37; interview nos. 124 and 125). In Berlin, personal networks garnered the involvement of various German celebrities who aided Polish activism, such as the Warschauerpakt (Warsaw Pact) organization. This group was founded in 2005 by German media personalities—Thomas Herrmanns, Georg Uecker, Wolfgang Macht and Holger Wicht—who knew the organizers through their personal networks and wanted to support their cause by increasing awareness and collecting material funds for Polish demonstrations. Their mission statement reads:
The Warschauerpakt is a consortium of convinced Europeans, who volunteer to support the Equality March in Warsaw. We stand for the emancipation of LGBT Poles, whose chartered rights are continually ignored by the Administration. Since 2005 we successfully support the Polish movement by building solid networks, which remain strong today. Through this network we foster the partnership and cooperative engagement of institutions between Germany and Poland (Warschauerpakt 2007).87

From 2006 to 2009, the group grew to include the support of over 300 German celebrities who sponsored activism in Poland through (1) press work in the German media, (2) fundraising for the Warsaw Marches, (3) organizing the participation of Germans at those marches, and (4) collecting signatures for various petitions of solidarity with LGBT Poles (Warschauerpakt 2007). These efforts included printing T-shirts and hosting concerts to generate funds, as well as organizing buses to take Berliners to attend Polish marches. They promoted their campaign to Berlin’s LGBT community. Posters calling for involvement in Poland were visible at many of the social spaces described above, including gay bars and clubs, LGBT health and social service centers, and at the yearly Gay-Lesbian Street Fair and the Christopher Street Day (CSD) Parade—where floats and information booths were adorned with flyers calling for action in Poland (interview no. 2, 4, 6, see Image 2.1 in Appendix B). Berlin’s LGBT community is also connected and accessible through free magazines, such as Die Siegessäule and Blu, which published interviews and press releases on the

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87 Translated from German by author.
Polish situation. Such press releases, framed in a language of European solidarity, are explicit in their call for action. For example:

On the occasion of President Kaczynski’s visit, we invite all brave and engaged persons who care about German-Polish relations and European solidarity in the struggle for equality for all, to come to Cracow and Warsaw with us. Polish NGOs are organizing CSDs and need international support. Marches will be held in Cracow on April 28th, 2006 and in Warsaw on June 10th, 2006 (Maneo-Tolerancja 2006).88

When asked what fueled the involvement of prominent Germans, and if they had connections to Poland, an organizer responded: “No, they were simply gay” (interview no. 124). Above, I emphasized that social spaces bring LGBT people together and can introduce a political dimension to LGBT identity. The remark on personal networks above supports this: “The most important role from my experiences are personal contacts, and in Poland they would not have been possible” (124). These personal contacts resulted in continued funding opportunities and organizational ties between Germany and Poland.

Vertical and Horizontal Mobilization of Outside Actors from Leading States

The organizers of the equality marches explained their connections to the prominent European politicians who supported them through networks of European LGBT organizations and friendships that were formed at social events in Germany (interview nos. 124 and 125). Connections to German politicians, such as Claudia Roth, Volker Beck, Renate Künast, and Klaus Wowereit, were established first because of their accessibility to the organizers, who were based in Berlin and Warsaw.
According to Beck, a German Green Party parliamentarian who attended Warsaw marches in 2005, 2006, and 2010, he first became involved in the Polish equality marches after a friend at the German Lesbian and Gay Union (LSVD) contacted him (interview nos. 1 and 127). Activists said shared ideas on LGBT rights brought them into contact with Beck and Roth: “We have similar political ideas. They knew what [we were] working on … We became friends over beers and dinner” (interview no. 124). They went on to describe the peculiar ease of such interactions, saying that “… it is very easy in Berlin to meet people…you get in all over, there is less security, gay parties are open. You can meet ministers in the street; this is very different in Poland” (124).

In turn, these politicians had connections to sympathetic colleagues at the European level and in other EU member states. Alongside the German parliamentarians, representatives from Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom attended the march. This support was organized through the contacts of German parliamentarians (Roth was active on LGBT issues as a member of the European Parliament from 1985-1998) and activists within the network of European LGBT organizations, such as ILGA-Europe’s umbrella network (interview no. 124). ILGA-Europe regularly writes letters to authorities in states where marches will take place, to “point out safety problems and to let them know they will be watched from the outside” (interview no. 143). The EU Parliament’s Intergroup, which has 115 members, can also financially support the attendance of some MEPs at LGBT marches (interview no. 126). While the efforts of groups connected to EU institutions primarily involve lobbying, they can be active in mobilizing a political elite—especially after

88 Translated from German by author.
the 2005 Equality March generated so much attention among domestic LGBT organizations. By 2006, 32 representatives from 15 different European parliaments attended the Warsaw Equality March (interview no. 124).

This section has shown that transnational actors involved in Polish LGBT activism are diverse. Where vertical EU networks provided elite political support, horizontal networks—in this case, primarily from Germany—mobilized expatriate Poles and a German public (activists, politicians, celebrities and ordinary citizens). This was possible because the EU provides the social spaces necessary to connect expatriate Poles and German allies. The transnational network of the above actors has created enduring transnational constellations. Domestic Polish organizations remain well connected in Europe, both horizontally and vertically. The majority of the funding for KPH (the largest Polish LGBT organization) is transnational, and foreign embassies in Poland fund many of the campaigns organized by local LGBT groups (interview no. 129).

IV: MECHANISMS:

EUROPEAN BROKERS, FRAMES AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE TARGET STATE

Transnational and local Polish activists rely heavily on European frames and mechanisms of European socialization to press for LGBT recognition in Poland. This section describes the tactical frames and socialization mechanisms used by the transnational activists and emphasizes that activists legitimized the LGBT issue through the constitutive effect of shared EU membership, not through their ties to advanced member states (even if their legal standing surpasses EU competences). The first half of the section discusses the discursive frame used by transnational actors at
the Polish LGBT events. The second half explores how the transnational LGBT mobilization, and the discourse it uses, begins processes of deliberation and learning that engage Polish state authorities and the domestic media.

*EU Framing and Norm Brokerage*

The actors involved in Polish LGBT activism had to develop innovative and appealing frames in order to deliver a coherent message on LGBT recognition to state and society (Kuhar 2011; Snow and Benford 1992). For Polish LGBT activists, my research shows that such appeal remains predominately with the EU and the values it disseminates on LGBT rights. The literature assumes it is possible to make frames resonate with dominant cultural values or to “graft” the new idea to pre-existing norms. While LGBT activists usually use agreed-upon human rights frames (Seckinelgin 2009; Waites 2009), finding resonance is exponentially more difficult for a norm that is for a large part of most societies unnatural and associated with disgust (Nussbaum 2010). This critical distinction alters the strategies that LGBT activists use to approach the issue, since they have to be highly cognizant of the domestic context. The process requires the presence of LGBT activists with deeply rooted local knowledge, working as brokers between the international and domestic ideas to make the norm fit locally.

Transnational activists involved in Poland faced a dual challenge. Because Polish nationalism is largely grounded in Catholic values and anti-German sentiment, Transnational activists play an important role in framing and disseminating the norm, persuading international organizations (IO) to endorse it, and shaming states into compliance, thereby fueling public deliberation and beginning the process of issue ownership (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Roggeband 2010). For an excellent nuanced analysis of LGBT frames cf. Kuhar 2011.
both sexual deviance and German influence resonate poorly in Poland. According to organizers, “In 2005 and 2006 we were afraid that too many Germans would come. And we would again have the same propaganda, that the Germans want to come here and destroy [Polish] values” (interview no. 124). A central concern for LGBT activists is that transnational demonstrations bring together a community that is accustomed to different types of expression in other member states, which can be counterproductive in societies where sexual minorities are largely invisible. According to the chairman of Lambda-Warszawa, local activists were worried that Germans would bring the same level of public sexual expression to Warsaw that they were accustomed to at the CSD in Berlin (interview no. 139). In Poland, she says, “we are not looking to throw a party, but a political demonstration” (Götsch 2006). Open expressions of sexuality are easily stigmatized by the right-wing opposition—from political parties, for example the League of Polish Families, and right-wing media, such as the Catholic Radio Maria (Ramet 2006)—and some Polish activists find them counterproductive to their goals, fuelling a debate about the effect of cultural misunderstandings between Poles and Germans (Götsch 2006).

Despite the usual right-wing critics, however, activists were able to successfully reframe the message as one of European responsibility, purposely shifting attention away from the fact that Germans were protesting for LGBT rights by highlighting that Europeans were protesting for democratic values. The idea of the EU does not carry the same type of historical baggage as bilateral relations between

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90 In comparison to the French Republican (which is anti-Christian) and Anglo-Saxon Republican traditions (which is liberal), Polish Republican tradition is uniquely linked to the Catholic Church. This is, in part, because there was no reformation in Poland and no social revolution against the Church. Instead the Church, during the last two centuries, adopted most functions of political organization. In
Poland and its neighbors; instead Poland’s “return to Europe” is often associated with security and independence from communist oppression and a role as a modern partner within the society of EU states. European regulations are clear about how European societies “should” think about LGBT issue. While the topic is often domestically opposed on the grounds of rejecting the imposition of foreign states’ values, Poland’s membership in the EU makes the issue less foreign. The ability to persuade is increased when “the socializing agency or individual is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the target belongs or wants to belong” (Checkel 2006, 364).

When the Polish Right criticized Beck’s involvement—as a German—his response was that Germany is a member of one of the most democratic clubs in the world and thus has an obligation to promulgate those values in a fellow EU member state (interview no. 127). Similarly, Roth says that conservative “governments [were] naturally critical of [her] traveling into their country to demonstrate for the equal treatment of LGBT people, which has … [involved her] being denied a visa from Russia to attend a march in 2006” (interview no. 128). Within the EU, however, her engagement is about responsibilities associated with EU membership: “this has nothing to do with the German-Polish friendship, among friends one must say what does not work, especially among member states of the EU” (128).

Framing LGBT activism in the language of “European” democratic values was employed because it resonated in Poland (interview no. 125). Examples of this frame include the t-shirts printed by the Warschauerpakt and worn at demonstrations, which

91 Similarly, psychologists have argued “common group memberships other than sexual orientation should be made salient (e.g., religious, social, ethnic, and political)” by LGBT actors to influence change among attitudes of the societal majority (Fiske and Taylor 1984; cited in Herek 1884, 14).
read “Europa = Tolerancja.” The Warsaw Marches’ themes also strategically used vertical Polish and European frames. For example, the 2007 and 2008 themes have biblical references: “Love your Neighbor” and “Culture of Love.” The 2006 and 2010 themes were European: “Culture of Diversity” and “Wolność, Równość, Tolerancja”/“Liberty, Equality, Tolerance” (alluding to the French Revolution). While European framing is effective in the Polish context, it should be noted that the frame is contingent on historically repeated phases of Euro-optimism/skepticism. Nonetheless, a vertical frame of LGBT issues as European, and thus indirectly also Polish, is evident.

In consultation with their Polish counterparts, the same frame is used in the norm entrepreneur states. Within Germany, the call for engagement was also framed in a language of human rights responsibilities based on European citizenship. Leading up to former President Lech Kaczynski’s visit to Berlin in March 2006, Tolerancja po Polsku called on Chancellor Merkel, Foreign Minister Steinmeier, and all representatives of Germany’s political parties to address the human rights situation in Poland, with the premise that the “EU is not only a federation of states, but also a community of citizens with equal rights” (Maneo-Tolerancja 2006). While only German politicians and citizens were addressed, their duties were always labeled as European: “For this reason it is imperative that all European politicians must protect and defend human and citizen rights—even if for those outside their national borders” (1). Local and Berlin-based Polish activists, in consultation with their foreign counterparts, predominantly called for mobilization of support and recognition of LGBT peoples in a language of European values and responsibilities. Aware of Polish historical sensibilities and domestic norms, they acted as norm brokers between
different domestic contexts—contexts that were accustomed to incongruous types of LGBT expression—, successfully framing the issue to manufacture local resonance.

EU Socialization: Learning and Deliberation

Framing LGBT issues in a European discourse is used as part of a socialization mechanism in processes of Europeanization. European socialization refers to the process of inducting actors to the norms of the EU community. In large part, the effort of mobilization is undertaken to generate a discourse about LGBT issues, which functions by introducing members to EU norms and establishing their appropriateness. European institutions champion the norm of protecting sexual minorities, but these norms do not flow freely. They require actors—and the channels that connect them—to mobilize and to validate the norms that need to be learned. According to Brake and Katzenstein (forthcoming), “We learn when we change our beliefs or alter the confidence we have in our beliefs because of new observations, interpretations, or repertoires of practice” (p. 36). The mobilization of actors in the EU framework—both horizontally and vertically—and their interaction with actors in the target state triggers the deliberation and learning mechanisms of socialization, which plays a key role in this process by introducing domestic actors to the LGBT issue. The remainder of the section explores the socialization engendered by the interaction between transnational actors and actors in the target state. In particular, I look at how the dialogue on LGBT issues engages Polish state authorities—politicians, police forces and foreign officers—and the media.

Polish Political Elites and Political Parties

Transnational mobilization aids the socialization of the Polish political elite through the presence of European colleagues and directly from the EU and the
representation of political parties in the European Parliament. The presence of European colleagues who promote the European norm on LGBT rights in Poland encouraged and supported the pioneering work of some Polish parliamentarians—such as early supporters, Kazimierz Kutz (non-partisan) and Izabela Jaruga-Nowacka (Unia Pracy)—because marching with other EU representatives legitimized their own involvement. A key example of socialization is the emerging support of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)—about 20 members of the party marched in the 2010 EuroPride. The SLD’s support is puzzling, because surveys show that supporters of the party—many of whom live in rural areas—are more homophobic than the constituents of the conservative Law and Justice party. Activists attribute the SLD position in part to EU socialization:

Outside influence [from institutions like the European Parliament] is motivational. These politicians read the outside stances of their parties, and whether or not they are convinced, they know what it means to be a Social Democrat [in Europe], which includes being open to LGBTs … [Polish political parties now] have to know about the topic not to embarrass themselves at international congresses (interview no. 124).

This marks a change from “the early 2000s, [when] it was obvious that Polish politicians did not know how to talk about it” (124; interview no. 8). Similarly, a new political party, Ruch Palikota—which garnered 10% of the vote in the October 2011 elections on a platform of representing “modern Poland”—made LGBT issues a central theme of its campaign (group no. 206).

92 While Jaruga-Nowacka was part of the Unia Pracy (not the SLD) she played an important role in Leszek Miller’s government and attended the illegal march in 2005 as a vice-prime minister.
Polish Police Forces

The presence of international diplomats—from member states or directly from the EU parliament—also attracts police protection for the protesters and international and domestic media attention. This was the case when the German parliamentarians attended the illegal Warsaw march in 2005. The Polish government’s secret service was obliged to protect the foreign parliamentarians, despite the fact that the illegal parade was originally denied any police protection. It should be noted that LGBT mobilizations often face violent attacks by counter-mobilizations.\footnote{Recently, in Central and Eastern Europe, marchers have been violently attacked to cause bodily injury. Volker Beck was physically assaulted at an LGBT March in Moscow. Even in the heavily policed events I have participated in during my fieldwork, participants were pelted with eggs, diary products (to smell in high temperatures), and in rare cases, feces.} The confirmed attendance of Beck, Roth, Künast, and others motivated the organizers because they knew “in advance that nothing terrible could happen” in terms of safety (interview nos. 124, 132), safety being a common reason for canceled attempts at LGBT mobilization. “The idea was having many parliamentarians there to protect [the March]…[and] because embassies were present, the Polish government had to react to prohibit attacks on foreign diplomats” (interview no. 125). Beck describes the same process when he marched in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia:

It is not just about creating media attention, but also about concrete support from the authorities. When the ambassadors from Sweden or France, for example, decide to join the march too—as was the case in Vilnius last year—the authorities at local level have to react differently. Then they authorize Pride marches and the police protect the participants instead of protecting counter-demonstrations organized by the extreme right. Of course the presence of
prominent international figures also help[s] to create media attention for the causes of the gay and lesbian movement (interview no. 127).

As authorities of the state, police protection bestows a shield of state legitimacy on LGBT mobilization. Horizontal socialization among European police forces—for example, the presence of London police forces at training sessions on how to protect demonstrators’ human rights in Warsaw—is an important outcome of cooperation that furthers future LGBT mobilization and visibility (interview no. 129).

**Polish Foreign Ministry**

Tactics of European socialization guided many of the decisions expatriate activists made outside Poland as well. Even demonstrations that took place in Germany were organized to create a diplomatic dialogue. In 2005, for example, *Tolerancja po Polsku* organized a demonstration in front of the Polish Embassy in Berlin to protest a repressed equality march in Poznan and call on the German government to condemn the Polish Government’s reaction to the march (Maneo-Tolerancja 2005). The idea behind the demonstration, however, was not to attract large crowds or employ confrontational tactics—only 20 to 30 peaceful protestors attended and the Polish Embassy was informed three weeks prior (interview no. 124). Instead, the strategy was to generate a dialogue about Poland among high-ranking German political authorities that would then provoke a response by the Polish Foreign Ministry; if pressure came from external diplomatic authorities, it would be more likely to provoke a Polish reaction (Bączkowski 2008, 36). Connections between LGBT organizations and LGBT-friendly politicians enabled a platform to make issues public when they arose. Berlin activists described the process, which began by
contacting their allies in the German government. “First the ones that you know personally... [who] formulate an official inquiry and send it to the party docket” (interview no. 124). Activists thought that the Polish administration would ignore grievances they themselves voiced, but if inquiries came from representatives of foreign governments, they would be obliged to react.

Alongside generating statements from some German parliamentarians, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin addressed the demonstration and the issue it promoted with the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw (124). Without an official protocol on the stance of the Polish government on LGBT public assembly, the Foreign Ministry had to formulate a response, and articulate its general commitment to human rights and democratic values (interview no. 133). “So from the back door, [the activists] reached [their] goal, which was that everyone would know about the demonstration,” even if the demonstration itself was unspectacular and ended with a friendly coffee invitation at the Polish embassy (interview no. 124). The central motivation of such demonstrations “was not to demonstrate, not to riot, but simply to create the right environment through dialogue” (124). Creating the right environment meant obliging the Polish Foreign Ministry to formulate a response, and transnational activists achieved this by involving the Polish Ambassador and German political authorities (interview no. 133).

**Polish Domestic Media**

Finally, the presence of guest marchers also generated media attention, which is effectual by making the issue visible. Domestically this engendered a discourse within Polish society and internationally it drew outside attention to the social

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94 In response to the police repression of a 500-person equality march in Poznan in November of 2005
situation of LGBT Poles (interview no. 128). Polish LGBT organizations confirm that the LGBT issue has become increasingly visible in Poland since a series of campaigns began at the turn of the century, when the issue was virtually invisible (interview nos. 8 and 9). According to the former President of KPH, even the left Polish media did not know how to write about homosexuality and the media response to early campaigns was largely negative (8). Across the political spectrum, newspapers responded with a naïve discourse that questioned the campaign’s break with traditional societal structures. This was “because there were no norms of conduct on the issue, there was no popular discussion of homosexuality before then” (8). After a 2003 gay pride in Warsaw, with an unprecedented 3,000 marchers, “the media largely ignored the event” (Pasek 2003). In the years following 2005, press reports have changed their discourse and media have become more objective (8).

Domestically, the equality marches started an internal dialogue that made LGBT issues visible. “In Poland, the parades are just a symbol. We know we won’t have a large [parade] in Poland. But we know that once a year we will have a discussion about tolerance, about homo-marriage” (interview no. 124). While this dialogue is often initially hostile—and some argue counter-productive as a result—Polish LGBT activists say that the Polish media’s reporting on LGBT issues has dramatically improved in the last ten years, in large part because of the visibility of the issue and the attention it generated in other EU member states. Internationally, press on the situation of LGBT Poles generates interest and heightens political pressure from the EU and other international institutions. It also increases awareness and further fuels the involvement of foreign LGBT persons, like those discussed above.

(resulting in over 100 arrests) (on police repression of protest in Europe cf. Ayoub 2010).
International press coverage rose from a few dozen articles after the 2005 march, to over 300 articles after the 2010 march—with coverage ranging from Gazeta Wyborcza to Al-Jazeera (Equality Foundation Archives). According to Beck, “In Poland…the debate on these issues has changed dramatically since 2005” (interview no. 127).

CONCLUSION

The transnational mobilization by and on behalf of LGBT people has become truly European in scope. After the 2005 Equality March, Bączkowski and four other Polish-based activists brought a case against Poland (for prohibiting the protest) before the Council of Europe’s Court of Human Rights. With the volunteer help of a network of lawyers in Berlin and Warsaw, and legal resources provided by the Warsaw office of the Helsinki Human Rights Foundation, they filed the bilingual 500-page complaint. The court decided in their favor, making LGBT demonstrations in Poland legal and obliging the state to provide police protection. While the ruling applies to all demonstrations—including the extreme right—activists see it as a fundamentally important step for democratization in Poland. The ruling has further transnational implications, because Russian LGBT activists filed a similar compliant in Strasbourg. They worked closely with Bączkowski, who says the group used the successful complaint, “simply changing names and locations” (interview no. 124). Based on Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe and the Polish precedent, Russian activists won a similar case in 2011, though ILGA activists point out that implementation will be arduous in Russia, which is not subject to the norms of EU membership (interview no. 143). This legal avenue for change, along with the socialization process described above, provide concrete examples of outcomes associated with the Europeanization of LGBT mobilization.
This chapter has described the transnational nature of European LGBT activism. It provides an empirical analysis of how Europeanization creates opportunities for mobilization by bringing together networks of distinct actors. The focus on the 2005 Warsaw Equality March and the use of extensive interview and archival data lend a more nuanced understanding to Europeanization and political opportunity structures. I argued that Europeanization offers both vertical and horizontal political opportunities for the political mobilization of transnational LGBT actors. Horizontal and vertical Europeanization provide differing types of mobilizing structures for LGBT mobilization, which come together to mobilize transnational actors to make claims for LGBT recognition in target states.

Since the geography of LGBT acceptance is so varied among leading and new states, the chapter has emphasized the importance of horizontal transnational mobilizing structures—social spaces and organizational resources—that were scarce in Poland and readily available in Germany. Horizontal opportunities are particularly useful for non-institutionalized mobilization in a target state’s public sphere and bring together a wide range of transnational actors, including expatriate Poles, politicians and celebrities, and ordinary LGBT publics and their allies. Vertical opportunities provide the legitimacy and institutional clout to mobilize European political elites to the target state. Alongside obliging governments to introduce some LGBT protection, they also provide the frames and socialization mechanisms that activists use to make their message resonate among state (i.e., Polish politicians and parties, police forces, and the foreign ministry) and media authorities in the target country.

In discussing tactical European frames and socialization mechanisms, the chapter described the complexity of transnational LGBT mobilization. It emphasized
that cooperative transnationalism comes with cultural misunderstandings that trigger hostile reactions from some domestic groups, who see such activism as outside imposition from historically unwelcome neighbor states. Despite Europeanization, archaic views on LGBT issues are still expressed in the state and social spheres (as they are elsewhere), and political action to oppose the recognition of LGBT minorities reoccurs. Local activists, who work as norm brokers, compensate by framing the issue as an inevitable process associated with “European” standards of acceptability.

While there is no rapid change associated with sexual minority rights in Poland as a result of transnational activism, the analysis here has highlighted the importance of European socialization on the tactical outcomes linked to transnational activism. These outcomes include gaining the support of some political elites, police protection for protestors, media visibility and international attention, and some domestic legal changes. However small these steps may be in repainting the broader picture, they are fundamentally important steps towards recognition nonetheless, and it is clear that the debate in Poland on sexual minorities is changing. It is worth noting that Poland recently elected Robert Biedroń and Anna Grodzka, its first openly LGBT parliamentarians—both activists and former presidents of Polish LGBT organizations (KPH and Trans-Fuzja). Anna Grodzka is only the third transgendered parliamentarian we know to have been elected in history, after former parliamentarians in New Zealand and Italy.

While the objective of the analysis in this chapter is not to draw a causal arrow between mobilization and broader social and legal developments in Poland, the following chapters do explore the link between mobilization and change. They investigate the effects of transnational channels, alongside a series of other domestic
conditions, on social-legal change across European states. Chapter 3 focuses on the diffusion of LGBT legislation in both the new EU 12 and old EU 15 member states. It draws on the transnational activist networks and mechanisms of change that were emphasized in this chapter.
CHAPTER 3
State Compliance: International Norms and the Diffusion of Pro-LGBT Legislation to New EU Member-States

“[G]ay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights”
— Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State

In 1948, Axel and Eigil Axgil and their colleagues founded Denmark’s first gay rights organization, Kredsen af 1948 (“The Circle of 1948”). Inspired by the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, homophile organizations like Kredsen af 1948 began a process of lobbying states for gay rights. For affluent democracies, the birth of the gay liberation movement and the dawn of the 1970s heralded a marked, albeit gradual, expansion in the forms of legal protections that states provided gay and lesbian minorities. By October 1, 1989, the first same-sex couples—including the Axgils, who celebrated four decades as a couple and as human rights activists—had entered into registered partnerships in Denmark. Although progress has been slow and has often provoked counter-movements intended to both block progressive legislation and to promote anti-LGBT policies, the proliferation of LGBT-friendly legislation has amplified the voice of a once politically invisible group and has become a recurrent theme in modern European politics.

The achievement of the legal recognition of LGBT minorities, however, varies greatly across European states. In this chapter, I explore LGBT norm diffusion by

95 Born Axel Lundahl-Madsen and Eigil Eskildsen, they adopted the surname “Axgil” to express their commitment to each other.
examining legislative changes across states. Similar to the discrepancies in the social acceptance of LBGT minorities (Chapter 4), Europe is distinctive in that it houses states on both ends of the global LGBT egalitarianism spectrum. While some states (e.g., Denmark) quickly became the world’s leading advocates for LGBT rights, providing the most extensive legal measures to their citizenry, others (e.g., Romania in 1996) have only recently decriminalized same-sex relations. Furthermore, some states in the region have introduced or proposed legislation that retrenches the rights of LGBT minorities, like bans on same-sex unions or “anti-gay propaganda bills.” Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the varied adoption of LGBT legislation over three decades in old and new member states, respectively—countries are listed in order of their standing in 2010. The 12-point LGBT legislation score reported in these figures is constructed as a count of various pieces of pro-LGBT legislation, described in detail in Table 3.2, Appendix C.\footnote{97}

\footnote{96 The United States also shows tremendous variation on social and legal measures across states.}

\footnote{97 The overall legislation score is a count of the following provisions: antidiscrimination in employment, goods and services, and constitutional recognition; hate crimes based on sexual orientation recognized as an aggravating circumstance and/or incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation prohibited; same-sex partnership recognized for cohabitation, registered partnership and marriage; same-sex couples’ parenting rights for joint adoption, second parent adoption, and fertility treatment; and sexual offenses provisions for equal age of consent and same-sex activity legal (cf. Table 3.2, Appendix C).}
Figure 3.1: Introduction of LGBT Legislation in Old EU Member States

Figure 3.2: Introduction of LGBT Legislation in New Member States
Transnational activists have long publicized this imbalance in legal recognition of LGBT minority rights as a central concern for those working to achieve social equality across Europe. The observed variation also raises important questions for scholars of international relations and social movements: What accounts for such different levels of legal recognition toward sexual minorities across European states? Is change due to heightened cooperation with individuals and groups in states that have previously adopted the legislation? Under what domestic preconditions (of the recipient state) do international norms regarding legal rights for sexual minorities proliferate? Finally, who are the agents by which these norms spread, and what are the channels of norm diffusion? The answers to these questions are theoretically and practically important for the study of politics and society. There are few norms that incite as much controversy in contemporary world politics as sexual minority rights, yet despite their contested nature, a growing number of states adopt these norms into their legal frameworks. Understanding the differential rates and timing of adoption illuminates the channels—both transnational and international\footnote{For simplicity, I often use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ to refer to both sets of transnational and international channels. I do this to avoid writing out ‘transnational and international}—and domestic conditions of diffusion. Furthermore, understanding how the state responds to contentious norms offers important insights on normative change in world politics.

This chapter examines why LGBT rights legislation is introduced sooner and with more frequency in some cases and less so in others. I focus on pieces of LGBT legislation because they constitute an observable consequence of norm diffusion, and one that is easily identifiable, clearly reported in the data, and evident (to varying degrees) in all of the cases studied. Building on the efforts of international relations,
social movements, and Europeanization scholars, I seek to explain the diffusion of LGBT rights policies by bridging theories of cognitive change among social actors and relational channels between states. I address calls for further research by systematically exploring the (non)diffusion of five categories of LGBT legislation (both protective and equality measures) in multiple domestic contexts and by specifying the transnational channels, domestic actors, and conditions responsible for change. Whereas previous research has focused largely on a small set of cases and on a particular type of policy provision, this chapter seeks to promote theoretical and empirical progress by integrating multiple theories and by testing the diffusion of a contentious norm in new contexts. To address the aforementioned questions, I employ a large-n, cross-national analysis of changed LGBT-rights legislation in Europe. I focus on the adoption of LGBT legislation in newly admitted European Union (EU) member states in Central and Eastern Europe, compared to the adoption patterns in long-standing EU member states.

This chapter’s central proposition is that transnational channels of visibility, tying new and old EU states, can accelerate the diffusion of LGBT norms in contexts where LGBT issues have only recently become politicized (i.e., the EU-12 states). These channels have the capacity to enhance the salience of norms. When they have transnational ties, domestic LGBT organizations catalyze the adoption of legislation. Not only do they help states and societies, more broadly, to interpret international information, they also help to frame that information in ways that resonate with local contexts. In the absence of these organizations, societies are more likely to perceive the LGBT norm as an external imposition. By contrast, in EU-15 states where the
norm was politicized earlier (through the Gay Liberation Movement of the 1970s and the HIV-AIDS Crisis of the 1980s), it seems likely that domestic factors have played a greater role in increasing the likelihood and speed of diffusion. I thus distinguish between domestic and transnational pathways to visibility, suggesting that their influence should vary across early and new adopters.

My analysis of LGBT policy adoption over 40 years reveals that the transnational embeddedness of a state’s LGBT advocacy organizations is the most powerful statistical explanation for successful policy diffusion to new EU member states, alongside other transnational channels that lead to LGBT visibility among society and state authorities. In addition to lending cross-national, empirical reinforcement to some of the theoretical expectations regarding the transnational sources of diffusion, the results of this analysis suggest variability in the determinants of LGBT policy adoption between leading EU-15 and lagging EU-12 states. Domestic factors, such as economic modernization, are more relevant for policy adoption in EU-15 states, whereas new EU member states display greater dependence on transnational actors and are more influenced by transnational channels. These findings also reveal variation in the domestic and transnational predictors for different pieces of LGBT legislation, which diffuse according to specific conditions.

This chapter proceeds in five parts. First, I elaborate on my argument of norm visibility and how it shapes the diffusion of legislation. Second, I consider previous literature and how scholars’ expectations regarding the diffusion of law might vary across first-mover EU-15 states and new EU-12 states. Then, I discuss the data and
methods used in this chapter and the results of the analysis; and I conclude by discussing the significance of my findings for the study of norm diffusion.

ARGUMENT

Existing explanations for norm diffusion characterize rights legislation as diffusing to states when authorities fear the costs associated with international pressure (i.e., political conditionality and economic incentives), when they become convinced of the norm’s appropriateness (typically via socialization), when their preexisting domestic norms resonate with an international norm (e.g., high levels of democracy, modernization), and when their advocacy organizations are embedded in transnational networks. Taken individually, the theoretical approaches are simplistic in that they ignore the multiple dimensions of diffusion in a complex, multi-level interactive environment. Following Sil and Katzenstein’s (2010b) call to move beyond grand narratives (see also Lloyd, Simmons, and Stewart 2012), I combine several of the above mechanisms and add insights from the contentious politics literature to make the case that domestic explanations should be more powerful in first-mover states, while transnational explanations should be more compelling in states where issues have been more recently politicized.

I argue that the achievement of norm visibility in new EU member states requires a specific set of actors and channels connecting the transnational and the domestic. The states most likely to adopt LGBT legislation are those that are the most porous in terms of political and social connectedness to other states. Furthermore, the adoption of such legislation is more likely when transnationally embedded LGBT organizations—norm brokers—exist to manufacture a narrative that can resonate with domestic norms. These actors help to interpret the norm, and send a clear signal to the
state that norm compliance is necessary to fulfilling its role in international society.\textsuperscript{99} Thus, my theoretical expectations here link back to the argument outlined in Chapter 1 and the mechanisms presented in Chapter 2, emphasizing the socialization processes created by visibility through the mechanisms of framing, brokerage, and social learning. We should also expect systematic differences between contexts in which the LGBT norm was politicized during the early phases of LGBT norm development in the 1970s (e.g., many EU-15 states) and contexts in which the issue only recently become visible (e.g., the EU-12 states). Drawing on the work of sociologists like Tolbert and Zucker (1983), Strang (1990), Soule (1997), the diffusion and institutionalization of norms is then a two-stage process. In this sense, the process may be more “internal” in a set of leading states, where local community responds to domestic political problems and then crystalizes as a norm, which other states adopt as they seek external legitimacy. In new EU member states, I expect greater norm diffusion as (1) domestic LGBT organizations become embedded in transnational networks and (2) states become more permeable to transnational and international influences.

Transnational LGBT Organizations as Norm Brokers

I suspect that domestic LGBT activist organizations will experience greater success in the EU-12 states when they have the benefit of external resources. This may be particularly true for minority movements, since they can gain valuable resources for mobilization if they look outside the state. Deemed radical in most societies, ties to transnational advocacy networks enhance the effectiveness of domestic LGBT

\textsuperscript{99} As elsewhere, many new member states have long and rich histories of LGBT life (Chetaille 2011; McCajor Hall 2009), but this identity was expressed less openly in public, compared to the earlier shift in many EU-15 states.
movements in channeling these grievances and in affecting policy. Transnational networks can multiply opportunities for the mobilization of marginalized people—who may not have sufficient resources at home—and increase their political potential by connecting groups across borders (Montoya 2009). As was demonstrated in Chapter 2, these ties with transnational networks can yield expertise, financing, and access to political actors who can apply pressure to state authorities.\(^{100}\) In the European context, with its varying levels of LGBT resources among states, the results of my Transnational LGBT Organizations Survey (described, in detail, in the Data and Methods section) suggest that resource-poor LGBT organizations in the EU-12 are far more reliant on external grants to finance their projects than are those in EU-15 states. External funding sources are broadly conceived and can refer to international organizations, the governments of other countries or foreign civil society organizations (cf. Question 13 of Survey Details in Appendix C).

\textbf{Table 3.1.} Descriptive Statistics of the European LGBT Organizations’ Reliance on External Funding Sources (N=140)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-12</th>
<th>EU-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part of budget comes from transnational and international sources</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority of budget comes from transnational and international sources</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entirely volunteer based</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s Transnational LGBT Organizations Survey (for questions, see Appendix C)

Alongside external resources, the local knowledge and life experiences of activists in local organizations provides actors with a valuable understanding of the domestic realm. This understanding allows them to act as brokers between the

\(^{100}\) Resource mobilization theorists have emphasized the importance of such resources, in terms of funds and coalitions with other organizations, for the mobilization and effectiveness of movement actors (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977).
international and domestic norm, framing the issue to resonate with the policymakers in their respective contexts (Tarrow 2005b). These actors actively select and adapt foreign ideas to local traditions and practices, and I suspect that this process explains success more than norm rejection based on the fit between international and domestic norms (Acharya 2004a; Seybert 2012). Thus, I look at domestic actors, who are also embedded in transnational networks of change, and how they target their own governments.

**Political and Social Channels of Visibility**

In addition to the presence of domestic organizations, I also expect social and political channels to influence norm diffusion, in that they prime the contexts within which activists function by making the LGBT rights issue visible. As Katzenstein (2005) has argued, the interaction of globalization and internationalization enhances the “porousness” of states. I adopt the terms internationalization—“as a process that refers to territorially based exchanges across borders” (22)\(^{101}\)—and transnationalization, the latter emphasizing the involvement of non-state actors in these exchanges. Countries with the highest levels of social transnationalization and political internationalization, which connect them to larger communities of states, are more likely to have channels of access to the LGBT issue. This, in turn, yields visibility. Political and social channels prime the context by allowing the aforementioned transnational actors to send a clear and legitimate signal to both society and the state. These actors can harness those ideas and adapt them, manufacturing resonance in their domestic contexts, even when they do not exist

\(^{101}\) Globalization refers to “a process that transcends space and compresses time” (Katzenstein 2005, 13). The process I describe falls somewhere in between internationalization and globalization. Since I
locally. The more porous the context, the easier it is for actors to frame the norm as legitimate.

These channels lead to elite and mass-level interactions between laggard and leading states that make the LGBT norm visible in domestic realms. Political internationalization creates channels of influence by embedding states in the international communities within which the LGBT issue receives more attention. Social transnationalization—particularly the flow of ideas and images—taps into the international awareness of the state’s society and its exposure to complex issues and norms that have preceded them in first-mover states. Social and political channels expose states to “the world out there,” and to the European norms on LGBT rights.¹⁰²

Mechanisms: Brokerage, Frames, and Learning

The primary mechanisms at work in this process of state-level change are brokerage, framing and social learning.¹⁰³ Transnational actors act as brokers between the international and the domestic norms, framing (or packaging and presenting) new ideas so that they resonate with a specific audience (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002; Tarrow 2005b). Once beliefs change, political channels lead to social interactions between elites that fuel a process of social learning (E. B. Haas 1991). These pathways for learning operate by sending a visible signal that promotes state support of the issue. Information flows provide visibility and give actors a framework with which to make their case. The arguments advanced by LGBT organizations tend

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¹⁰² I expect these channels to explain more than the direct impact of EU conditionality (associated with accession), which should only be effectual in the limited area within which it has competences.
¹⁰³ While the mechanism of deliberation also plays a role here, I find it to be more centrally connected to processes of societal change. The analyses in the following chapters address deliberation more centrally, especially in the relationship between proponents and opponents of LGBT rights.
to have greater currency in states that are more familiar with the images that represent and the ideas that are associated with LGBT rights. Even if this visibility is negatively perceived, it is still effectual by virtue of creating a discourse.

EXPLAINING THE DIFFUSION OF RIGHTS LEGISLATION: THE ARGUMENT AND HYPOTHESES IN RELATION TO THE LITERATURE

The argument outlined above builds on a vast literature that analyzes how and when states alter their positions in response to international ideas and norms. Previous scholarship explaining the international diffusion of social policies has generally fallen into one—or a combination—of three camps, wherein successful diffusion is linked to the presence of: (1) advocacy networks connecting the international and domestic politics, (2) transnational and international channels of socialization and/or sanctioning pressure, (3) and bottom-up domestic resonance. These frameworks inform the core hypotheses used in this analysis.

Transnational Advocacy Networks

International relations and social movement scholars have noted the importance of advocacy groups in influencing the international diffusion of rights legislation (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Krizsan and Popa 2010; Montoya 2009; Roggeband 2010). Social movement organizations are commonly theorized as the most experienced type of organization in channeling a social group’s grievances to the relevant authorities (Ayoub 2010; Soule and Earl 2005; Tarrow 1998, 137). In particular, Soule’s work on minority rights legislation offers substantial evidence that social movement activity affects the introduction and diffusion of rights and anti-discrimination legislation for various minorities, including LGBT groups, in the
United States (Soule and King 2006; Soule and Olzak 2004; Soule 2004b). Focusing particularly on LGBT rights, Paternotte and Kollman examine the diffusion of same-sex marriage policies in Austria, Belgium, Germany, and Spain (Paternotte and Kollman forthcoming). In addition to a series of domestic factors, they emphasize the centrality of advocacy networks, which organizations like the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) foster.

My analysis builds upon these theories, suggesting that such relational channels of diffusion have an effect on LGBT politics in new adopter states. I predict that the transnationalization of an EU-12 state’s LGBT organizations will provide the movement with resources that promote greater domestic visibility, in combination with the domestic movement’s knowledge that makes it possible to tailor the message to localities. These messages send a clear and appropriate signal to policymakers while supporting successful diffusion of the norm.

HYPOTHESIS 1a: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when domestic LGBT organizations become embedded in the transnational activist networks Europe provides.

Pressure and Socialization

For many international relations scholars, rights legislation diffuses to states when they are convinced of the norm’s social appropriateness (socialization) or when they fear the costs of international pressures (political conditionality and economic

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104 Social movement organizations are increasingly common in democracies; they link supporters, allies, and state authorities (Tarrow 1998, 137).
105 For non-European contexts see Barclay’s work (Barclay, Bernstein, and Marshall 2009; Barclay and Fisher 2003).
106 In particular, ILGA-Europe provides local groups with resources and examples of best practice, and it lobbies European institutions (Kollman 2009). The organization makes the issue visible by reporting movement activity and state-sponsored discrimination to the press. ILGA-Europe also contacts relevant European political authorities to address states when they deem their actions to be out of sync with EU standards.
incentives). These theories—one linked to socialization and the other to material incentives—posit logics of consequences and appropriateness, respectively.

World polity and constructivist scholars focus on informal processes of influence, arguing that international norms exert influence on states by defining the contours of appropriate behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ingebritsen 2002; Klotz 1995; Legro 1997; J. W. Meyer et al. 1997; Price 1998). Interactions among states in an international community lead to different cognitive understandings of what is acceptable. Heretofore, scholars have focused on mechanisms like learning and deliberation (Risse 2000). As described in Chapter 2, these indirect channels can engender change through socialization based on interactions across borders.

When states are members of international organizations their representatives are often required to confront the LGBT issue and take a stand. For example, when members of social democratic parties in laggard states interact with their party colleagues at the European Parliament, they must learn to speak about LGBT issues, because they are in the social democratic party platforms of many European states (interview no. 124). Consider the sharp media criticism that British Tories faced when they formed the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) with the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) in the European Parliament. While their cooperation was based on anti-federalist Euro-skepticism, the media criticized the Tories (at home and abroad) for cooperating with PiS because of the homophobic rhetoric espoused by many of its members (Day and Waterfield 2010; Helm 2010). The international media’s negative portrayal was so severe that some ECR members went to great lengths to prove that they were not homophobic, for example, by Tory politicians
attending gay pride parades in Warsaw. Other indirect channels of diffusion are social. For example, the import of television shows from cultural powers like the United States featuring gay characters has increased rapidly since the 1990s. Studies show that, in the United States, exposure to media with gay themes positively influences social attitudes and policymakers’ actions regarding LGBT issues (Cooley and Burkholder 2011; Garretson 2009). In Europe, social channels reconfigure the threat associated with minorities by making them familiar. Such channels of interaction lead to social learning, providing images and understandings of what it means to be a member of a European political and social community.

**HYPOTHESIS 2a:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when the state’s level of political porousness is higher.

**HYPOTHESIS 2b:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when the state’s level of social porousness is higher.

Rational institutionalists attribute domestic change to the incentives provided by international organizations and focus on the costs associated with norm adoption (Martin and Simmons 1998; Mastenbroek 2003). According to this perspective, political leaders weigh the costs and benefits of adopting a norm. In the EU, non-adoption of the LGBT norm can mean lost material benefits linked to economic and security cooperation at the European level. Scholars have emphasized the unique and direct role of EU conditionality in the adoption of new laws in the EU member-states, with sanctioning and competition representing the central mechanisms by which this

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107 There are several examples of political socialization. For example, foreign embassies have actively supported LGBT visibility in recent years by backing the campaigns of local activists with rhetorical and financial support, and organizing floats for LGBT pride parades and marches (interview no. 132). The British Embassy was accused of meddling in Polish internal affairs when it raised the rainbow flag in Warsaw in 2008 (interview no. 8).
There are reasons to expect that states will adopt LGBT rights legislation, in part, through these mechanisms. First, in the late 1990s the EU required applicant states to decriminalize homosexuality and to adopt employment anti-discrimination measures in their legal frameworks. Second, economic competition—in terms of attracting foreign investment—is increasingly impacted by a state’s position on LGBT rights. For example, in its Legalize Love Campaign targeting Asia and parts of Europe, Google has formed alliances with partners (e.g., Citigroup and Ernst & Young) to pressure states wishing to retain their business to make advances in LGBT rights (Cowley 2012). Google sharply criticized the ban on same-sex partnerships in Poland, where it has three offices. Similarly, in response to the Russian Duma’s proposal to extend St. Petersburg’s 2012 ‘Anti-Gay-Propaganda’ Law to the national level, one of Europe's largest theater companies, the Friedrichstadt Palast GmbH, severed ties with its Russian affiliates (interview no. 145). The company cancelled meetings, shows, and its cultural collaboration with Russia, until the Duma rejects the law. Numerous transnational and international currents of sanctioning and competition surround the LGBT issue.

HYPOTHESIS 2c: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when the state’s level of economic porousness is higher.

HYPOTHESIS 2d: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when a state accedes to join the EU.

Finally, while this analysis assumes that the adoption of LGBT policies is connected to diffusion, I also include a variable to measure diffusion related to emulation in the analyses of individual types of legislation. The rationale for this
inclusion is that policymakers will adopt laws if they feel compelled to do so and when they observe the trend in their society of states (Meyer et al. 1997).

**HYPOTHESIS 2e: The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when other EU member states pass similar laws.**

**Domestic Resonance**

Others have taken a ‘bottom up’ approach, emphasizing the domestic political and cultural variables that condition the reception of contentious new international ideas (Checkel 1997; Cortell and Davis 1996; Seybert 2012; Zürn and Checkel 2005). This literature focuses on the congruence between international norms and elements of the domestic context. Furthermore, diffusion scholars have argued that some adopters are more “susceptible” to the norm than others (Soule and Earl 2001; Soule 1997). In other words, certain state characteristics make them more amenable to the norm.

Previous research has outlined several domestic factors that may influence the receptivity of norms concerning social minorities. Post-materialists expect higher levels of democracy and affluence to correspond with a state’s readiness to legislate minority rights issues (Soule and Earl 2001; Soule 1997). Others have focused on domestic spaces for LGBT identities and culture, which may influence the reception of legal norms by making the context more hospitable. Various minority movements rely on “free” or “safe” spaces to form associational ties and to mobilize counter-hegemonic identities (Polletta 1999; Scott 1990; Zepeda-Millan 2010). Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel (1998, 344) argue, “individuals must be able to find a social space where they can develop lesbian and gay identities.” While Chapter 2 made the case that LGBT norm entrepreneurs gain access to social spaces in foreign contexts, my analysis also suggests the value of access to such spaces domestically. Similarly,
policymakers may be less likely to adopt LGBT legislation in domestic contexts where counter groups actively mobilize. I suspect that such domestic factors are more critical for compliance in first mover states than they are for new adopters.

**HYPOTHESIS 3a:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when social spaces for LGBT people exist.

**HYPOTHESIS 3b:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when a state is not predominantly Catholic or Orthodox.

**HYPOTHESIS 3c:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when a state’s level of democracy is higher.

**HYPOTHESIS 3d:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation increases when a state is wealthier.

**HYPOTHESIS 3e:** The likelihood of introducing LGBT legislation decreases when conservative and or nationalistic groups mobilize.

The following analysis tests these hypotheses to explore the statistical explanations for why the LGBT norm rapidly and abundantly diffuses to some states rather than others.

**DATA AND METHODS**

This chapter utilizes panel data that I have compiled to explore changes in the rate of LGBT legislation adoption across states over time. The dataset includes data on the passage of LGBT legislation in the 27 EU member states between 1970 and 2010.\(^\text{108}\) It combines data collected on LGBT legislation (DV) with other country contextual data by year (IVs). The data used for the independent variables were collected from (1) an original LGBT organizations survey, (2) organizational indicators on LGBT legislation in the EU, and to the various LGBT organizations that helped us clear up issues of discrepancy when the collected data were unclear. Among the sources used to compile the dataset: ILGA-Europe, ILGA State Homophobia,” ILGA-Europe: “ILGA Rainbow European Country Index 2011,” Fundamental Rights Agency Reports, Kees

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\(^{108}\) With special thanks to Lena Renz for her research assistance in building the dataset, to Kees Waaldijk for his pioneering research and indicators on LGBT legislation in the EU, and to the various LGBT organizations that helped us clear up issues of discrepancy when the collected data were unclear. Among the sources used to compile the dataset: ILGA-Europe, ILGA State Homophobia,” ILGA-Europe: “ILGA Rainbow European Country Index 2011,” Fundamental Rights Agency Reports, Kees
membership lists, and (3) five existing cross-national datasets containing information on levels of globalization (KOF Index of Globalization\textsuperscript{109}), democracy (Polity IV\textsuperscript{110}), GDP measures (Penn World Table\textsuperscript{111}), and LGBT social spaces.\textsuperscript{112} Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Appendix C provides information on coding and the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study.

The survey data came from an author-conducted online expert survey of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe (cf. Appendix A for Survey Questions). By transnational LGBT organizations, I refer to domestic groups that are members of transnational umbrella networks (i.e. ILGA-Europe and the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Youth and Student Organization). Data collection based on organizational surveys has a long history in both international relations and social movement scholarship (Hadden 2011). While the merits of this method are undisputed in the quantitative analysis of transnational activism, illuminating important patterns in movement dynamics, country contexts, and organizational characteristics, its limitations include low response rates and oversampling. In response to these concerns, I utilized features of the Qualtrics Survey Software to ensure that only invited respondents could take the survey and that each organization could respond only once (to prevent ballot box stuffing). Of the 291 organizations I identified and surveyed, 180 responded, bringing the response-rate to

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\textsuperscript{110} See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm for data (Gurr 2000; Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).

\textsuperscript{111} See http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php for data (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011).

\textsuperscript{112} With special thanks to David Frank (and his colleagues) for suggesting this measure for an early paper and for sharing their Spartacus Travel Guide data with me (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010).
62%. Compared to previous studies employing organizational surveys, 62% is substantially above the average yield (Baruch and Holtom 2008; Hager et al. 2003).\textsuperscript{113}

Consistent with the propositions of this research, I limit my analysis to: (1) the 27 states that joined the EU by 2010, since all states are embedded in the EU’s institutional structures, and (2) the years 1970-2010. I begin the analysis in 1970 because it roughly coincides with the time of the 1969 Stonewall Rebellion—the first broadly publicized instance of LGBT resistance—and the birth of the gay liberation movement, which began in the United States in 1965 and found its way to Europe by 1971 (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1998). As I will describe in greater detail below, I analyze new and old EU member states separately because they have differing political histories. As such, I expect that different conditions hold for these distinct subsets of states. The dataset includes 1,107 observations across 41 years in 27 countries.\textsuperscript{114} The following sections supplement the descriptive statistics with the substantive meaning behind the dependent and independent variables.

\textit{Dependent Variable}

Governments select from a set of equality and protective legislation measures that grant LGBT people state-sanctioned recognition in their respective states. This study focuses on five of these measures: anti-discrimination (employment, goods and services, constitution), criminal law (incitement to hatred prohibited), partnership (cohabitation, registered partnership, marriage equality), parenting rights (joint and second parent adoption, fertility), and equal sexual offense provisions (age of consent

\textsuperscript{113} One study comparing 16 publications (that used organizational surveys) reported an average response rate of 42% (Hager et al. 2003). Another study, analyzing more than 490 publications using survey research, found that organizational surveys yield a smaller response rate—35.7%—than do individual-level surveys (Baruch and Holtom 2008).
and legality of sex-same relations). First, the analysis uses a five-category LGBT legislation dependent variable, based on the key legislation components described above and in Table 3.2 (Appendix C). While other studies have focused on one category (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013; Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010), there are important theoretical justifications for thinking of the adoption of LGBT legislation on an ordered scale. Exploring only the legalization of sexual relations—which is linked to the global spread of individual rights (Frank et al. 2010)—tells us little about the extent of LGBT-friendly legislation achieved by states. Moreover, it fails to fully capture the impact of LGBT activism, which has a rich multi-issue agenda that extends beyond sodomy legislation. For example, Italy made same-sex activity legal in 1890 and Poland did so in 1932, yet this had little to do with concern for the well being of LGBT people. While both states are coded as successes in anti-sodomy datasets, they are laggards on other measures of LGBT legislation. Second, recognizing that unique pieces of LGBT legislation may diffuse differently, this study explores the various understudied categories of LGBT legislation separately. Doing so enables me to better examine the time to adoption, while observing the emulation of specific pieces of the understudied policy types across time provides a better measure of diffusion.

Observations for countries that have not existed continuously for 40 years, such as the Czech and Slovak Republics, will be coded as having missing data for the years prior to their formation.

While transgendered people are affected by some of the pieces of legislation mentioned above, my coding reflects a concern regarding the absence of legislation pertaining specifically to transgendered people. Though I had hoped to include this component in the analysis, developing a reliable and valid measure for trans-legislation that could be used across cases was problematic for several reasons. For example, some states that afford legal recognition to transgender persons require them to undergo compulsory sterilization or divorce, which many LGBT organizations view as a violation of individual rights. Such cases inform my decision to refrain from coding a uniform transgender rights measure across states. Since legal progress for transgender people is limited to a few recent cases, this regrettable omission should not affect the results of the analysis.
The dual measurement of the dependent variable is based on two questions: (1) What explains the extent to which states adopt LGBT-rights legislation? and (2) What explains the differential diffusion and timing of certain types of LGBT legislation? To answer these questions, I use ordered logit and discrete time logit regression models, respectively. The dependent variable in the ordered logit model is a combined indicator of the five categories of LGBT legislation, ranging from 0-5 (cf. Table 3.2 in Appendix C). In this case, the dependent variable is ordinal and consists of six categories. A state might score “0” in 1990, but it will score “2” in 1991 if two pieces of legislation, falling under two separate categories (e.g., adoption in the parenting category and civil unions in the partnership category), are passed that year. Next, the absence or presence of a particular type of LGBT legislation in a given year (e.g., partnership) represents the dependent variable in the discrete time logit model. Prior to a state’s passage of legislation in a particular category, each year is scored as a “0.” The year that a state passes legislation in that particular category, it is coded as “1”, and the state drops out of the risk set. Let us now turn to the operationalization of the independent variables derived from the aforementioned theoretical approaches (see Appendix C for descriptive statistics).

Independent Variables

Transnational and International Channels

A central variable in this analysis operationalizes the embeddedness of states’ LGBT organizations in transnational LGBT networks. The transnationalization of domestic LGBT organizations refers to the number of domestic organizations, which are members of transnational LGBT umbrella organizations in any given year. Using membership lists of ILGA-Europe and ILGA-International, I have collected data on all
of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe, including the year they joined the European LGBT umbrella organizations. The variable is coded in 4 categories, with countries having 0-3 transnational organizations.\(^{116}\)

Four additional variables operationalize the concepts of social, political, and economic channels, and the year of EU accession. The first three variables are based on the theory that porousness leads to LGBT norm visibility. Distinguishing between different forms of transnationalization and internationalization reflects Olzak’s (2011) call to differentiate between channels that differ in terms of who and what they bring into interaction across borders and the (in)direct nature of their effect. I also run the models using the overall globalization index, which serves as both a measure of robustness and a measure of the overall porousness of a state (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013).

The KOF Index of Globalization Dataset, compiled by Dreher and colleagues, provides measures for the concepts of “economic [transnationalization], characterized as long distance flows of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges; political [internationalization], characterized by a diffusion of government policies” (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008; “KOF Method 2012” 2012, 1).\(^{117}\) I also use a sub-index measure on information

\(^{116}\) For 87\% of the data points, it is true that countries have less than 4 organizations. Countries with more than 3 organizations were collapsed into the highest “3 organizations” category. There is no theoretical reason to expect that additional organizations will make a difference in the ability to signal to state authorities. While the current coding seems intuitively logical based on the distribution of the data, I have also—for good measure—coded this variable using different thresholds for categories (0,1; 0-5, etc), and the results are robust.

flows, which is, for conceptual reasons, most appropriate for the present analysis.\textsuperscript{118} The sub-index “is meant to measure the potential flow of ideas and images. It includes the number of internet hosts and users, cable television subscribers, number of radios (all per 1000 people), and international newspapers traded (in percent of GDP). All these variables to some extent proxy people’s potential for receiving news from other countries—they thus contribute to the global spread of ideas” (KOF Method 2012).\textsuperscript{119} Political internationalization measures the extent to which a country is a member of international organizations, has signed bi- and multi-lateral treaties (since 1945), hosts embassies and high commissions, and is involved in UN peace missions (KOF Method 2012).\textsuperscript{120} These measures should indicate a state’s self-perception as a member of the international community (KOF Method 2012).\textsuperscript{121} Economic transnationalization is measured as an index of actual economic flows (i.e., trade, FDI, and portfolio investment) and the breakdown of restrictions to trade and capital (e.g., revenues on tariffs) (KOF Method).\textsuperscript{122} I also include a dummy variable that

\textsuperscript{118} In addition to being a conceptual choice, the decision to use the information flows derives in part from my discomfort with the KOF’s measure of “cultural proximity” (another sub-index), which the researchers admit was “the dimension of globalization most difficult to grasp.” The way that it was coded does not correspond to the logic used here, as the lack of data on “English songs in national hit lists or movies shown in national cinemas that originated in Hollywood” forced researchers to instead use a series of measures reflecting “the domination of U.S. cultural products… [e.g.] the number of McDonald’s restaurants located in a country… In a similar vein, we also use the number of Ikea per country” (KOF Method 2012). While I do not consider the number of McDonald’s restaurants to be a valid measure of cultural proximity, I did include the full “social globalization” index in my ordered logit models, and they do not alter the findings.


\textsuperscript{122} This measure captures the concept of transnational pressure through mechanisms of sanction and competition. That said, John D’Emilio’s powerful work on capitalism and gay identity has attributed the development of gay and lesbian identities to spaces created by capitalism—because capitalism’s labor-system based on wages helps individualism to flourish, which subsequently allows for gay and lesbian identities to form. He has also suggested that homophobia is at the root of capitalism (D’Emilio 1983). Though the embeddedness of states in international markets also contributes to the spread of ideas, I
distinguishes the years before and after a state joins the EU. Finally, in the duration models, I include a diffusion variable to tap into the concept of emulation. This measure is a yearly count of the number of other EU states that have adopted the given policy.

While political and social channels should matter more for the spread of an idea, all variables are conceptually similar in that they measure a state’s connection to the international community. States with fewer channels are inherently less likely to have the LGBT norm become visible in their domestic contexts. As direct and indirect channels between transmitter and receiver increase, so should the diffusion of international norms (Soule 2004a).

**Domestic Conditions**

Next, a series of measures captures the concept of resonance in the domestic realm: the presence of domestic social spaces, the level of democracy, the level of state wealth, the type of religion, and the counter mobilization of anti-LGBT rights groups.

To capture the presence of domestic social spaces, I use the data and coding schema developed by David Frank and his colleagues (Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). Social spaces are scored on a six-point scale, ranging from zero (no activity) to five (widespread gay social life). These scores measure the presence of gay-friendly bars, clubs, organizations, restaurants, and cafes across cities in each country (cf. Table 3.2 in Appendix C). Research on the American context has used similar measures of LGBT spaces (using the Gayellow Pages) to identify pre-existing movement ties in the 50 states (Kane 2003, 320) or to study the inclusiveness of
constituent ties in 218 counties (Negro, Perretti, and Carroll Forthcoming, 15). I include additional domestic variables to account for a state’s level of democracy and wealth in a given year. The Polity IV Database provides a measure for the degree to which a state is a consolidated democracy, using a 21-point scale “that spans from fully institutionalized autocracies… to fully institutionalized democracies” (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010, 1). Next, I use the Penn World Table for the GDP measure, which I log to obtain a more normal distribution and to alleviate heteroskedasticity (Olzak 2011). Furthermore, I include a measure of the state religion, separating Catholic and Orthodox states from Protestant and mixed-religion states (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006).

A final domestic condition is the ability of opposition groups to counter-mobilize. Here, counter-mobilization is defined as the presence of anti-LGBT groups. The responses are drawn from the survey question: In your opinion, to what degree are opposition groups (domestic and foreign) active and effective in mobilizing in your country? The scores of organizations in each new EU member state were averaged to form this macro-level variable. Controls for state population and years are included in the analysis but are not reported in the tables.

Methods

I test my hypotheses using two statistical techniques. First, I employ ordered logit regression models (using ologit in STATA 11) to explore the determinants of successful passage of legislation when the dependent variable is ordinal. The analysis internationalization and social transnationalization.

123 The scores were generally uniform across each country, meaning that experts agreed on the level of counter mobilization. While this is the only systematic data on counter mobilization available, some may argue that this is a weak measure. As such, I limit my use of the variable to one of models below, to demonstrate that its inclusion does not change the signs or significance of the other variables.
assigns an ordered value according to the extent to which a state introduces LGBT legislation, taking into account that some states go much farther (e.g., legalizing LGBT partnerships) than others (e.g., decriminalizing same-sex sexual relations). Depending on the subset of states being analyzed, the models include between 306 and 560 yearly observations in 11 or 14 country clusters.¹²⁴

Second, I use a discrete time logit model, also known as a duration or event history model (using xtlogit in STATA 11), to explore change within states (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Lektzian and Souva 2001). Duration models are useful for analyzing a question of differential diffusion of policies across time and states and have been used, for example, to examine related questions concerning the decriminalization of sodomy laws and the introduction of hate crimes legislation in the United States (Kane 2003; Soule and Earl 2001). This type of estimation allows us to calculate a hazard rate, or the likelihood that an event occurs at a particular time. The analysis focuses on the duration of a particular condition, seeking to relate differences in duration “across units or over time to a vector of independent variables, which may or may not change during the period of observation” (Ulfelder 2005, 5). In my case, the units of analysis are states, time is measured in years, and the event that I observe is passage of LGBT legislation. When a state introduces a piece of LGBT legislation—for example, anti-discrimination—it drops out of the hazard set because it is no longer at risk for introducing anti-discrimination legislation.

¹²⁴ Data for Malta and Luxembourg are missing in the Polity IV Dataset, limiting the analysis to 11 of the new EU-12 states, and 14 of the old EU-15 states. Including Malta and Luxembourg by running the analysis without the PolityIV variable does not change the significance or sign of the other variables.
RESULTS

Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 present the results for the ordered logit and duration models. In each table, the models test the three sets of independent variables in relation to the dependent variables—an ordinal variable in Table 3.3 and a set of dichotomous dummy variables in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. Table 3.3 shows the results of the ordered logit models, which reflect the extent to which states adopt LGBT legislation. It divides results into two groups according to the subset of states: the 12 new EU member states (Models 1-4) and the 15 old EU member states (Models 5-7). All Models reported in Table 3.3 are run with either the economic or the social channels variables (Models 1, 2, 5, and 6). Following Olzak (2011), I separate these variables because they have a relatively high correlation coefficient at .78. Furthermore, Models 3 and 7 are re-run with the combined channels variable. Model 4 also includes the variable measuring the level of counter mobilization. Due to data limitations, this variable is limited to the EU-12 (Model 4).

Ordered Logit Regressions: Explaining the Extent to which States Adopt LGBT-Friendly Legislation

In analyzing the adoption of LGBT legislation in Europe, my models provide a measure of support for the hypothesis that social channels and combined channels influence the extent to which LGBT-Friendly policies diffuse into new adopter states (Table 3.3). Consistent with my expectations, the social channels and the combined variables

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125 To test for multicollinearity, I ran an OLS regression and calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for my independent variables. Here the mean VIF is low (2.65), and none of the variance inflation factors are above 5.21. To be confident that no predictors indicate multicollinearity, I generated a correlation matrix (see Appendix C). Using a scale of -1 to 1, the matrix suggests the correlation between all of the independent variables. In this test, two variables (economic and social transnationalization) appear to be highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of .78. I ran the regressions again, dropping one of these predictors to ensure that the signs of the coefficients of my other predictors did not change. To deal with this, I report the reduced models in the analysis.
channels variables are significant ($p \leq .05^{126}$) across contexts, controlling for all other variables in the models.\footnote{Following Ziliak and McCloskey (2008), I opt not to distinguish between the significance levels of .05, .01, and .001. I find little theoretical value in making a distinction between these levels of statistical significance, so I will report all of these significance levels as $p \leq .05$.} The results suggest that states are likely to pass LGBT legislation at higher rates if social channels and combined channels of visibility are more extensive.

\footnote{Henceforth, I will not specify that I am “controlling of all other variables in the model” and will assume that the reader is aware that the result of one predictor is contingent on the others.}
### Table 3.3. Ordered Logit Coefficients Predicting Pro-LGBT Legislation in Europe, 1970-2010 †

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Transnational and International Channels</th>
<th>Domestic Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU-12</td>
<td>EU-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational LGBT</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Organizations</td>
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<td>0.743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.21)*</td>
<td>(.40)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Channels</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Channels</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.02)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Channels</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.05)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Channels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Accession</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>0.864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT Social Spaces</td>
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<td>0.416</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(.56)</td>
<td>(.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic/Orthodox</td>
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<td>-1.21</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
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<td>Democracy Level</td>
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<td>-0.11</td>
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<td>(.10)</td>
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<td>-0.192</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.57)</td>
<td>(.49)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counter Mobilization</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clustered by Nation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Malta and Luxembourg not included (data limitations in PolityIV Dataset), Robust z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at < 5% level

Aside from these general findings, the results are more complex, supporting different theoretical approaches according to the subset of states analyzed. The EU-12 states (Models 1-4) provide a high measure of support for the influences of transnational activism and all transnational and international channels in the extent of the diffusion of LGBT-friendly policies. The variables transnational LGBT
organizations, social channels, political channels, economic channels, and combined channels are all significant at the .05 level. An examination of Models 1-4 in Table 3.3 indicates that, on average, as states have more transnationally embedded LGBT organizations, they are more likely to adopt LGBT-friendly policies and to do so at higher rates. The findings related to transnational channels are also in line with the hypothesis that diffusion depends on channels of visibility through mechanisms of socialization and political sanction. The EU accession variable fails to reach significance. As I demonstrate below, this is related to the fact that the EU’s direct pressure mechanism only encourages states to pass anti-discrimination legislation.

Contrary to common assumptions, the results do not show support for the influence of any of the domestic conditions variables—LGBT social spaces, Catholic/Orthodox religion, GDP wealth, democracy level, or counter mobilization—on higher levels of policy adoption in new EU member states.

Figure 3.3 visually shows the strong influence of transnational LGBT organizations on the adoption of LGBT laws in new EU States. The y-axis indicates the expected change in the predicted probability (in percent) that a state will reach different levels of LGBT legislation when transnational LGBT organizations exist. In the new EU states, 3 categories is the highest level of law that a state has passed. When transnational LGBT organizations exist, the expected change in the predicted probability of passing no laws decreases by 31%. When transnational organizations are present, the probability of reaching high categories of law—levels 2 and 3—increases by 22% and 28%, respectively. Interestingly, the probability that a state will introduce one category of law is about the same across the two groups. This reflects the finding by Frank et al. (2010), that the decriminalization of sex has spread without
the presence of movements. That said, my findings make clear that transnational LGBT organizations greatly influence the probability of moving beyond that minimal threshold of legal recognition.

**Figure 3.3.** Expected Change in the Predicted Probability of Legislation Outcomes when Norm Brokers Exist, in New EU Member States

The image is somewhat reversed for the EU-15 states (Models 5-7), many of which were early movers (leaders) in the global expansion of LGBT rights. For this subset of states, two measures of domestic conditions are significant ($p \leq .05$). The results indicate that economic wealth is positively associated with high levels of LGBT friendly policy. Substantively, the results suggest that the more affluent EU-15 states were particularly likely to adopt extensive LGBT legislation. Interestingly, the level of democracy is negatively correlated with greater levels of LGBT policy.
adoption. While we should note that this finding applies to one of the most democratic groups of states in the world—and the finding would likely be reversed if the analysis included states outside of Europe—it is interesting to show that among this group, the strongest democracies are not always the most successful LGBT rights adopters. This might be because states with strong democratic reputations need not worry about their international image to the extent that weaker democracies do (Towns 2010). For example, while the Danes were the first movers on registered partnership, they waited until 2012 to approve same sex marriage without international criticism. The weaker democracies of Spain and Portugal moved sooner and went further when it came to adopting various pieces of LGBT legislation, despite being followers on LGBT rights in early years (Denmark scores a perfect 10 in all 40 years of the analysis). France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the centers of European power, are among the early leaders that—confident in their democratic and human rights stature—no longer felt the same pressures to make advances. Of the transnational channels, only the aforementioned social and combined channels are significant and positively correlated with LGBT policy adoption, which suggests that social mechanisms are paramount to the diffusion of the LGBT norm.

Aside from the consistent findings concerning the effect of social and combined channels of diffusion, several explanations could account for the notable differences between the EU-12 and EU-15 states in the extent to which LGBT friendly policies diffuse. That domestic resonance matters more for diffusion in the EU-15 may have to do with the fact that LGBT visibility came earlier in this subset of states. The null effect for domestic LGBT social spaces does not necessarily diminish the

128 The Nordic States were the earliest first movers of issues of sexuality (Ingebritsen 2002; Paternotte
historical importance of these spaces in the development of the LGBT movement. Social spaces brought together an invisible group of people and helped to ferment a movement in first mover countries; but, for several reasons, these spaces matter less for the passage of LGBT legislation, which generally comes about much later. It may also reflect the fact that, as was suggested in Chapter 2, Europeanization gave actors greater access to established spaces in foreign contexts.

Similarly, while GDP levels remain important for the extent of diffusion in EU-15 states, affluent modernity is not a significant predictor of diffusion in EU-12 states. In line with modernization theory, wealth is associated with policy adoption, but only in the leading EU-15 states. It matters less for EU-12 adopters, where the diffusion of LGBT legislation is influenced by a host of transnational and international variables. The later timing of visibility—and the historically unprecedented magnitude of LGBT rights in contemporary politics—may also explain why EU-12 states are more susceptible to political and economic channels, while EU-15 states are not. The ideas and images that transnational channels carry today (and have carried since the 1990s) are strikingly different, in terms of LGBT content, than they were when the issue became visible in leading EU-15 countries.

The non-finding for the counter mobilization variable is also interesting, in light of studies predicting that greater counter mobilization can hurt movement effectiveness (Lipsky 1968). This coincides with the argument in Chapter 5, which suggests that counter movements are self-defeating, because they themselves make the issue visible. It also supports the organizational survey results presented in Chapter 5, which demonstrate that backlash can lead to tolerance. While I refrain from drawing

and Kollman forthcoming).
any conclusions on the non-significant finding here, it is worth noting that many of my interviewees claimed that right wing activism is counter-productive because their arguments verge on the extreme and are poorly constructed, which can result in public sympathy for the LGBT cause (McAdam and Su 2002; Minkoff 1994).

*Discrete Time Logit Models: Explaining the Introduction of Various Types of Legislation*

I now turn to the question of what—aside from change in sexual offenses, which has been studied more extensively (Asal, Sommer, and Harwood 2013; Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010)—predicts the introduction of various types of legislation. In Tables 3.4 and 3.5, I report the results of full and trimmed models for each type of legislation (anti-discrimination, criminal law, partnership, parenting, and sexual offenses). The models in both tables present the results of the discrete time logit regressions, which assess the relationships between the key explanatory predictors (the significant predictors in Table 3.3) and the adoption-specific types of legislation.\textsuperscript{129} In addition to the transnational and domestic predictors, full models (Models 2, 4, 6, and 8) in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 also include the regional diffusion variable. Table 3.4 is an analysis of the new EU-12 states. Here I omit ‘parenting legislation’ from the analysis because no EU-12 state passed this type legislation in the time frame considered.\textsuperscript{130} Table 3.5 focuses on the EU-15 states and includes all five legislation areas.

The diffusion variables perform strongly in all models across both sets of states, which suggests that states do emulate other states in the region. Aside from the spread of partnership legislation in the EU-12 states, the results for the other types of

\textsuperscript{129} In Table 3.4 I also include the *EU Accession* variable because there is strong reason to believe that this factor may play out differently on various pieces of LGBT legislation, since the EU has limited competency in this regard.
legislation and across all subsets of states indicate that the introduction of LGBT rights in European countries increases the probability that other countries will adopt similar legislation. In other words, positive action by states in the region does promote diffusion, as states look for cues on what types of policy to adopt.

\[130\] Slovenia became the first EU-12 state to introduce second-parent in 2011.
Table 3.4: EU-12, Discrete-Time Logit Models Predicting Pro-LGBT Legislation in Europe, 1970-2010 †
Determinants of Year Passing Anti-Discrimination, Criminal Law and Partnership Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anti-discrimination</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transnational LGBT</td>
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<td>-.65</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>8.56</td>
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<td>Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.41)*</td>
<td>(2.19)*</td>
<td>(1.91)</td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
<td>(3.05)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Channels</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.49)*</td>
<td>(.36)*</td>
<td>(.54)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.79)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Accession</td>
<td>20.25</td>
<td>27.49</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-11.86</td>
<td>-10.38</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(7.58)*</td>
<td>(5.92)</td>
<td>(4.34)</td>
<td>(5.42)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Democracy Level</td>
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<td>10.62</td>
<td>-.196</td>
<td>-.635</td>
<td>-5.03</td>
<td>-4.88</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(4.12)*</td>
<td>(.872)</td>
<td>(.941)</td>
<td>(1.67)*</td>
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<td>GDP (log)</td>
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<td>19.05</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(9.49)*</td>
<td>(9.22)</td>
<td>(6.77)*</td>
<td>(8.15)</td>
<td>(8.91)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Diffusion Anti-Discrimination</td>
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<td>(2.435)*</td>
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<td>(1.16)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffusion Partnership Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.692</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffusion Sexual Offenses</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-230.01</td>
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<td>-328.22</td>
<td>-327.91</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(77.39)*</td>
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<td>(53.60)</td>
<td>(90.19)*</td>
<td>(105.03)*</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†Malta and Luxembourg not included (data limitations in PolityIV Dataset), Robust z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at < 5% level
The results presented in Table 3.4 show that the effects of the focal predictors vary across legislation type in EU-12 countries. The data suggest that the *transnational LGBT organizations* and *combined channels* variables are significant, positive predictors of policy adoption in four of the six models. These variables have a positive effect on the passage of anti-discrimination and partnership legislation, but no effect for the passage of criminal law legislation. The results for the other variables are less uniform. The *EU accession variable* is a significant and positive predictor of anti-discrimination; but, in one of the partnership models, it runs in the opposite direction. The finding that only *EU accession* has a positive and significant relationship with the introduction of anti-discrimination legislation was expected, since the Article 13 of the Amsterdam treaty focused specifically on employment anti-discrimination as an accession requirement. The negative correlation between *EU accession* and partnership in one of the models (Model 5) may reflect the fact that some states responded to EU accession requirements by mounting strong opposition to same-sex marriage. For example, Poland opted out of the EU’s Charter on Fundamental Rights on the basis of a legally unwarranted fear that it might be compelled to accept same-sex partnerships and to legalize abortion (Barnard 2008). The *EU accession* finding connects back to the discussion surrounding Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, which emphasizes the limits to EU hard law. Furthermore, the results suggest that the initial introduction of partnership provisions is more likely to appear in countries that have lower democracy scores. The same surprising finding for democracy level that we saw in Table 3.3 (explained above) reappears in Models 5 and 6. In times where the American movement’s agenda has revolved around a marriage debate, states may see
partnership, in particular, as a way to signal to other states that they are modern, especially if they feel that their democratic reputation may be improved.
Table 3.5: EU-15, Discrete-Time Logit Models Predicting Pro-LGBT Legislation in Europe, 1970-2010 †
Determinants of Year Passing Anti-Discrimination, Criminal Law, Partnership and Parenting Legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anti-Discrimination</th>
<th>Criminal Law</th>
<th>Partnership</th>
<th>Parenting</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Transnational</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.314)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined Channels</td>
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<td>0.883*</td>
<td>0.541*</td>
<td>0.824*</td>
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<td>(0.419)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.661</td>
<td>-2.098</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5.106)</td>
<td>(4.248)</td>
<td>(6.197)</td>
<td>(4.625)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>147.6*</td>
<td>29.48*</td>
<td>21.24*</td>
<td>11.87*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.95)</td>
<td>(10.50)</td>
<td>(3.892)</td>
<td>(5.621)</td>
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<td>Diffusion Anti-Discrimination</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diffusion Criminal Law</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(222.2)</td>
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<td># of Countries</td>
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†Malta and Luxembourg not included (data limitations in PolityIV Dataset), Robust z-statistics in parentheses, * significant at < 5% level
Table 3.5 shows the regression results explaining the introduction of individual pieces of legislation in EU-15 countries. As was the case in the ordered analysis that appears in Table 3.3, GDP represents a significant predictor of the introduction of individual pieces of LGBT legislation. In seven of eight models, wealthier countries are more likely to pass LGBT legislation, regardless of legislation type. Likewise, the results indicate that combined channels represent a significant and positive predictor of policy adoption in seven of the eight models. Unlike the EU-12, transnational LGBT organizations are less influential for the initial introduction of legislation in the EU-15 states. Though indeterminate across models, Models 1 and 8 suggest that transnational mobilization may have slowed the initial introduction of anti-discrimination and parenting legislation. This may echo Yamasaki’s (2009) findings on high-profile issues, that in EU-15 contexts “highly mobilized social movements may dampen the chance of major policy changes,” but only in first mover states.

CONCLUSION

This analysis sought to contribute to, and to test, the theoretical explanations for diffusion of contentious pieces of legislation. Three dominant theoretical expectations informed this investigation: rights legislation diffuses to states when they fear the costs of external pressure (political conditionality via sanction, and economic incentives via competition), when they become convinced of the norm’s appropriateness (socialization through learning), when their preexisting domestic norms resonate with the international ones (high levels of democracy, modernization, and gay culture), and when their advocacy organizations are embedded in transnational networks (transnational LGBT organizations). I hypothesized that the presence of transnationally embedded LGBT organizations and other channels of
transnationalization would lead to diffusion in new adopter states because they make the issue visible in the domestic realm.

The results presented in this chapter suggest that transnational channels represent powerful explanations for the extent to which LGBT legislation diffuses to various domestic contexts. In particular, transnational channels of socialization (rather than political sanction) are the most powerful predictors of LGBT rights diffusion across cases. Surprisingly, countries with predominantly Catholic and Orthodox populations do not vary significantly from Protestant states in their likelihood of adopting LGBT legislation. Nor is the strength and rise of counter-movements in new EU member states statistically correlated with the passage of LGBT legislation.

Other predictors produce more complex results. A comparison between the EU-12 and EU-15 suggests different processes and mechanisms of diffusion and that mediated transnational channels of activism matter more in the context of new EU-12 member states. In particular, transnationally embedded activist organizations appear to be highly effective for diffusion in EU-12 states. All other channels—social, political and economic—also proved significant for diffusion in the EU-12 states. This finding coincides with my qualitative interviews, including those with opponents of the LGBT movement. When asked what could most erode values in Poland, one anti-LGBT activist responded, “Poland and the EU are in permanent moral confrontation concerning social issues. The only thing we fear could change that is the increasing outside imagery of this deviant [sexual] lifestyle as something common place, normal or even appealing for Poland” (interview no. 141).

Since some of the EU-15 states were first-movers in passing extensive LGBT rights legislation, they do not rely as heavily on transnational ties for influencing state
authorities on LGBT legislation. This is not to say that transnational channels did not impact diffusion in EU-15 states, as is made evident by the significance of social and combined channels of transnationalization on the process of LGBT rights diffusion. What is unique about the EU-15 states is the prominent role that that domestic variables, such as affluence and democracy level, play in predicting high rates of LGBT rights.

Another contribution of this analysis is that it tests dominant theoretical approaches across various pieces of LGBT legislation. While anti-discrimination in employment may be tied to EU conditionality, for example, it does not suggest that conditionality is the best predictor of diffusion for the introduction of various other pieces of LGBT legislation. By looking across four separate types of policies and comparing them to an overall scale of LGBT-friendly legislation, I can make inferences about when, where, and under what conditions rights legislation is most likely to diffuse. This analysis has revealed variation in the factors explaining the initial introduction of legislation (Tables 3.4 and 3.5) and the extent to which a state continues to pass LGBT legislation after the opportunity is created (Table 3.3).

In sum, this chapter expands upon previous case study research that has looked at LGBT mobilization by providing a systematic, large-n analysis of various national contexts, detailing the complexity of legislative diffusion across two sets of states and across various pieces of legislation. Large-n studies that look across the globe often overemphasize certain variables, such as the importance of state wealth for the introduction of LGBT rights, taking for granted that the LGBT issue remains invisible in many of the contexts under study (Inglehart and Norris 2003). This chapter attempts to get at the nuances of diffusion using stringent methodologically driven scope
conditions, and by closely examining a region that actively purports an LGBT norm but exhibits variation across member states. I want to emphasize that in other regions porousness to transnational channels may operate in the other direction. Europe is unique in that the systems of knowledge at the regional level privilege the issue of LGBT rights, and this posture toward LGBT rights is not yet necessarily global in orientation.

Finally, the results support the notion that state decision makers are drawn to internationally visible issues, even if the national debate concerning these issues is not resolved.\textsuperscript{131} States care about their image on the world stage and are willing to take risky policy decisions when they receive strong signals that their international community expects it of them. In the year since President Obama first expressed his support for same-sex marriage in May of 2012, five countries\textsuperscript{132} and six American states\textsuperscript{133} have passed such legislation. Even established democracies with the strong LGBT rights records felt compelled to address the issue further. It became a campaign issue in France—which passed same-sex marriage legislation in 2013—and in Germany. In Germany marriage had not traditionally been at the center of the LGBT agenda, but within days of President Obama’s announcement, transnational LGBT organizations like All Out staged protests in front of the Chancellery in Berlin referring to Germany—which has a better record than the United States—as a laggard on LGBT rights. Chancellor Merkel and her Union of Christian Democrats

\textsuperscript{131} The shifts we observe are also about historic time. Early adopters were in a much less connected world, but the game has changed now such that decisions can no longer be made in a vacuum. In the American context, recent research has similar findings for other types of policy diffusion across states (Karch 2012, 50).
\textsuperscript{132} The five countries are Denmark, Brazil, Uruguay, France and New Zealand. Nepal, Luxembourg, England, Whales, and Scotland have legislation in progress.
\textsuperscript{133} Washington, Maine, Rhode Island, Maryland, Minnesota, and Delaware.
(CDU/CSU) had to address the issue at their party congress. Opting not to make it a party platform issue at the time, the party was banned from the 2013 Christopher Street Day parade in Berlin—an event that the CDU has supported and contributed a float to for decades.\textsuperscript{134}

The following chapter explores the hypothesis that societies, like their state decision makers, are also aware of such international trends. According to Agata Chaber, a co-organizer of the Warsaw EuroPride in 2010—an international event with extensive media coverage—, the numbers (15,000 participants) spoke for themselves:

“But this is Poland! Normally we get 6,000 people, max. And it’s not just the foreigners. Because it’s EuroPride, more Poles are coming. They don’t want to be seen as homophobic” (Cragg 2010).

Chapter 4 elaborates on this discussion as it pertains to changed attitudes toward homosexuality in Europe.

\textsuperscript{134} The German Constitutional Court did expand civil unions to include second parent adoption in 2013.
CHAPTER 4

Societal Perceptions:
International Norms and Perceiving LGBT Minorities in the “New EU”

“Changing society required a revolution in thought.”
— Angelo Pezzana, Fuori, 2011

As with the diffusion of legislation to states, the fall of the Berlin Wall also engendered an unprecedented exposure of Central and Eastern European societies to norms concerning LGBT people that were developing more rapidly in other parts of Europe. Pathways for exchange of ideas opened tremendously as the continent again reexamined its understanding and meaning of Europe, and as increased transnational channels would supplement the internal dynamics that lead to such sticking changes in Central and Eastern Europe. While political scientists generally analyze the diffusion of policies across states, the abruptness and rapidity of European integration and its social mandate in the early 1990s is also a natural treatment of sorts for value internalization among and across societies. Indeed, international norm diffusion theory suggests that accepted ideas spread from areas of high concentration (usually powerful states) to areas of low concentration, which is at its essence about a change in behavior by social entities (Florini 1996). Change in attitudes toward homosexuality is thus a measure of norm internalization that goes beyond state compliance. A “revolution in thought,” as the Italian transnational activist Angelo

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135 Angelo Pezzana, cited in Film, Fuori! (Farinetti 2011).
Pezzana called it, is about fundamental shifts in behaviors, practices and understandings that change lived experiences for sexual minorities. Activists like Pezzana understood that for minorities—who are so often deemed radical in their own domestic contexts—such changes have both domestic and transnational sources.

In this chapter, I focus on international norm diffusion pertaining to changing attitudes and perceptions of sexual minorities in an integrating Europe. I should note from the outset that attitudes towards homosexuality are still negative in the majority of countries around the world, including much of Europe. It is only recently that we have observed more rapid shifts in the internalization of norms toward accepting homosexuality. In their “return to Europe,” newly admitted member states were exposed to similar European Union (EU) norms and regulation, yet stark variations in value shifts are evident across their societies (see Figure 4.1). For example, between the time of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and accession to the EU, Slovaks positively shifted their opinion on homosexuality by nearly 60%, while Hungarians saw no positive change at all.

\[136\] In 1989, at the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis, some states in Western Europe were exposed to the mobilization and visibility of non-heterosexual minorities substantially more compared to states east of the Iron Curtain.
Figure 4.1, Variation in Attitudes towards Homosexuality Across EU Member States

Source: European Values Study
Note: Excluding Cyprus due to missing data
Question in Survey: "Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card."
This chapter returns to one of the core questions posed in the dissertation: Why have societal attitudes towards lesbian and gay people changed differently across states? Are these changes due to heightened exposure to EU norms and institutions? Under what domestic and transnational preconditions do international norms on sexual minority rights successfully diffuse to new member states? I address these questions using data on the 27 EU member states from 1990 to 2009. As in Chapter 3, I also compare the trajectories of changed attitudes in the new EU-12 member states to those in the EU-15 states. The data are drawn from individual attitudes; individuals nested both in their domestic realm (societies) and in smaller sub-groups within their states (social groups).

The analysis expands upon norm diffusion literature by looking at societal dimensions of international relations theory. Societies and social groups do not respond to the external environment in the same way. I follow Rousseau (2006, 212) to “open up the black box of the state” by exploring how differences in the domestic realm—and its ties to the international community—influence norm diffusion among individuals. As I have argued throughout, I expect states to differ in the degree to which LGBT norms become visible. The transnational and international channels that have contributed to the visibility of LGBT norms should influence individual perceptions of LGBT people. Attitudinal change among individuals—nested both in

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137 Since cross-national attitudinal data going back to the 1980s is limited to questions dealing with “homosexuality” and not to other sexual minorities, the chapter's results unfortunately only speak to this narrow subgroup of sexual minorities. The question does tap into attitudes toward non-heteronormative sexual orientation, however, which may serve as a rough proxy of attitudes toward sexual minorities more generally.

138 Observing changes in patterns lived out by individuals is one avenue for analyzing the effect of international norms.

139 As previously mentioned, for simplicity, I often use the terms ‘transnational channels’ or ‘channels’ to refer to both sets of transnational and international channels. I do this to avoid writing out
societies and social groupings within the state—depends on the degree to which their societies are connected to the international community via channels of visibility. Furthermore, such change depends also on the perceptions of perceived threat that individuals’ social groups associate with the norm. Within the domestic sphere, social groups that are more religious and more nationalist should perceive LGBT norms as more threatening, based on the assumption that LGBT rights challenge national identity and tradition. In this sense, threat perceptions moderate the effectiveness of transnational channels and the diffusion of international norms to individuals.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. First, I survey the existing explanations for attitudinal change. From this baseline, I build my theoretical propositions for explaining the variation recognized across individuals. Second, I describe the model, data, and indicators with which I will test the postulated hypotheses. Third, I analyze the results of my findings in four subsections related to differing aspects of the analysis. In conclusion, I summarize the arguments and their implications for theory and future research.

**EXPLAINING CHANGE IN ATTITUDES**

Recent cross-national research has linked changing attitudes on homosexuality to various demographic variables, but less attention has been paid to transnational sources of such change (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Gerhards 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009; T. W. Smith 2011; Takács and Szalma 2011). Theoretically, the studies by Takács and Szalma (2011) and Andersen and Fetner (2008) make the farthest theoretical advances by enhancing our understanding of the nuances behind positive 'transnational and international channels' repeatedly. When I am referring specifically to international political channels, I make sure to use the term ‘international.’
and negative attitudes towards homosexuals. The former finds evidence that same-sex marriage legislation leads to increasingly favorable attitudes toward homosexuality. The Anderson and Fetner (2008) article is theoretically rooted within the post-materialist thesis, demonstrating that the effect of modernization on pro-LGBT attitudes is moderated by economic inequality. I draw on the above literature in discerning which variables, especially control variables, to include in the models. Alongside the commonly theorized demographic and modernization variables privileged in this literature, however, my theoretical foundation sets itself apart by examining the role of transnational channels—and the substantial variation across states in this regard—that shape how otherwise similar individuals might position themselves in relation to issues of homosexuality.

The research puzzle presented here focuses both on the transnational and internal domestic dynamics that enable the success or failure of international pressures. By viewing states as differentiated entities that require disaggregation, my argument takes into account that transnational channels vary in breadth and scope across states and their societies. First, I argue that differences in transnational channels of visibility linked to LGBT norms are powerful determinants of normative change across societies. Second, for questions of internalization we must also consider the differing potential that the social groups in which individuals are nested have for associating threat with LGBT norms. Threat perception can augment the thesis that norms diffuse through transnational channels and it plays an important role in the success or failure of norm internalization. By this, I suggest that individuals are socialized by norms constructed by groups within the domestic sphere that adhere to

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140 Gerhards (2011) finds evidence for both modernization and secular arguments associated with more
different threat perceptions of homosexuality, and that these norms can resist or facilitate the internalization of “imported” ones.¹⁴¹

Linking threat construction to the norm diffusion literature provides a useful starting point to gain leverage on the variation. The construction of threat differs across social groups, with domestic players competing to define “self” and “the other” according to their distinct perceptions of what is acceptable and what is threatening. My interviews with proponents of LGBT rights have emphasized that resistance movements found success when they recast LGBT identities as external and antithetical to domestic values and traditions. If LGBT rights norms are portrayed as inherently external, then the degrees to which individuals are socialized in their national identities and traditional values will influence reactions to the norm. Thus, not all individuals will find the imported norm equally threatening. Individuals embedded in groups where they will be socialized to perceive the LGBT norm as threatening—based on the logic that it challenges traditional values and national identity—will be more likely to reject it. The reverse is also true: individuals in groups less wedded to nation and tradition, will be more likely to incorporate a “framed” or “grafted” international norm. Within the domestic realm, the social underpinnings of individual attitudes are effectual in light of international norms.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ This dimension is neglected in the dominant IR literature. The results reinforce the theory that domestic identities are essential to understanding the variation in diffusion across states.
¹⁴² Especially after Gourevitch’s (1978) article, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics,” IR scholars responded to the rapid rise of international organizations by exploring their effect on domestic politics and society. Much of this literature explains how domestic politics bend in response to international pressure. Yet scholars of the European polity are equally attuned to the power of the domestic level, since Europeanists have learned that member states and their citizens often resist pressure from Brussels. My study benefits from this multi-level understanding of international pressures, while departing from the literature’s dominant focus on market compliance. Instead, I look at the social compliance dimension. This means that I disaggregate the “EU pressure” variable and focus only on EU norms that deal with accepting LGBT persons. This contrasts with the
In sum, my expectations in this chapter are twofold. First, I expect that transnational channels of visibility will shape outcomes in attitudes across societies. Second, I expect the effect of these channels will vary across the social groups in which individuals are nested depending on their level of threat perception. The causal argument is simple: (1) individuals nested in the societies of more porous states will be more likely to internalize the norm; (2) individuals embedded in social groups that are more nationalistic and religious will perceive norms associated with foreign contexts as external, and by definition “threatening.” Individuals in these “high-threat-perception” groups should be systematically less likely to internalize the international norms that their societies are adopting.

**DATA AND METHODS**

*Model*

I test theories of norm diffusion on both the transnational and domestic level. At the transnational level, EU stipulations on governments and contact between societies should change conceptualizations of the “self” and “the other” (Rousseau 2006, 211). Since the Acquis Communautaire and other EU conditions do not vary across my cases, I measure both the individual’s geographic proximity to, and the European identification with, first mover states. I also explore the extent of a state’s political, social and economic channels to the international community, as a test of compliance literature’s tendency to explain domestic responses to a package of European directives (Toshkov 2007, 2008), as if the domestic realm responds the same way to a vast variety of issues. Finally, I intend to move beyond the compliance literature’s focus on states complying with the minimum stipulations of the EU directives to a deeper analysis of societal transformation—as is stipulated in the diffusion literature. These steps will (1) add a disaggregated social dimension to the compliance literature and (2) add an empirical and a domestic focus to the IR literature on norm diffusion.
international norm diffusion. Furthermore, I look at characteristics of the individual that denote the levels of perceived threat they may associate with the norm.

Data

This chapter utilizes data collected by the European Values Survey (EVS) between 1990 and 2008 (EVS 2011). The EVS researchers surveyed over 43,000 respondents in my selected countries of interest during the designated time period, in three waves (1990-1991, 1999-2000, and 2008-2009). Research based on survey data has a long history in social science research. While the merits of this method are unrivaled in quantitative analysis of individual attitudes, the limitations of survey research include sampling bias and measurement error. The EVS researchers controlled for these limitations by using random selection\textsuperscript{143} and uniform measures.\textsuperscript{144} I am careful that the survey responses I use validly capture the concepts I put forth (this is demonstrated below). I also expand the EVS dataset using a series of state-level variables and by coding for the geographic proximity of individuals to Western Europe. For state-level variables, I use data from the \textit{KOF Globalization Index} (Dreher 2006, 2008) and my original legislation dataset.\textsuperscript{145} To measure geography, I corresponded the EVS regional codes in the EVS data with \textit{Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics} (NUTS) data, to add two proximity variables to the EVS dataset. These variables measure the distance from each individual’s residence in the new EU-

\textsuperscript{143} “… the process of assigning values to the explanatory variables is independent of the dependent variables, that selection bias… is absent, and that omitted variable bias is also absent” (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 94).

\textsuperscript{144} The researchers asked the same questions to all respondents, in the same way, and using the same response scale.

\textsuperscript{145} Both of these datasets are explained in depth in Chapter 3, under the “Data and Analysis” section.
These additional measures supplement the EVS data that I employ to demarcate change in attitudes.

The study explores the determinants of attitudes towards homosexuals in all 27 EU member states. In several models, I limit the analysis to the 12 member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Consistent with my theoretical proposition, I select these states on the basis of two criteria: all states (1) experienced greater exposure to more developed norms surrounding homosexuality after 1989, and (2) were successful in gaining membership to the EU. I also compare these EU-12 models to others limited to the EU-15 states. Tables 4.1 and 4.6 in Appendix D describe all variables and in detail.

**Dependent Variable: International Norm Diffusion and Attitudes toward Homosexuals**

The indicators for the dependent variable (DV) tap into the one dimension of norm internalization: change in the attitudes of individuals within society. The variable is constructed from responses to this EVS survey prompt: “Please tell me for each of the following whether you think [homosexuality] can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.” Responses were coded on a scale of one (never justifiable) to ten (always justifiable). Since the distribution of the data points on this

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146 This coding process was a large endeavor that involved able research assistance by Jakob Tesch and helpful communication with Dr. Inge Sieben, a researcher with the EVS study. We took the regional variable (x048) in the EVS dataset and corresponded the regions with Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) data. Because of coding discrepancies across different EVS waves, we needed to combine two different codes in the EVS. The codes underlying the x048 variable were not the same as the codes underlying the coding for the NUTS variables in the subsequent EVS waves, and the codes underlying the NUTS variables in the European Value Survey do not correspond to the NUTS codes used by the European Union. In the end, we managed to use NUTS3 data to code for most individuals in EVS Waves 3 and 4, but only for seven of twelve countries in Wave 2.

147 This includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta, Romania, and Bulgaria.

148 The differences in the variability of the independent variables between EU-12 and EU-15 are marginal; they have a similar spread in terms of range and mean.
variable is slightly skewed to the left, I transformed the variable using the natural logarithms.\(^{149}\)

The dependent variable indicator above has been used in the recent research on attitudes towards homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Takács and Szalma 2011), but general concerns about the use of single-item measures remain, in that such variables are more prone to measurement error.\(^{150}\) To address this concern, I also created a composite measure that integrates the DV data above with a question on unwanted neighbors. EVS respondents were also asked: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Among the 15 identified groups, respondents could select “homosexuals” as one of their unwanted neighbor groups. While the previous DV question on attitudes illuminates whether or not respondents feel homosexuality is acceptable, this second measure also might uncover respondents’ willingness to practice intolerance by placing themselves in a scenario in which they single out gay and lesbian people. In

\(^{149}\) I also run each model with the original variable, and the sign and significance levels of the predictors do not change.

\(^{150}\) Beyond the issues with single-measure survey items, there remain limits to using attitudinal survey data to capture norm internalization. A critical concern is that respondents might consciously moderate their actual positions on homosexuality when they respond to survey questions. This case has been made by research on symbolic racism in political psychology. McConahay and Hough (1976) and Sears (1988) have argued that opponents to black rights developed a language superficially distinct from racism to describe African Americans and their behavior. If this is true, we should expect respondents—aware of norms of conduct—to disguise and suppress overt racist positions, opting to express their racism covertly by supporting traditional and national values, for example. According to this idea, survey data may have serious limits as a measure of internalization for social issues like racism and homophobia, as negative feelings toward these groups remain unacknowledged. The bimodal nature of the survey responses used here—showing that respondents generally take extreme positions on either end of the spectrum, and with a majority still feeling comfortable in expressing negative feelings toward homosexuals—alleviates this concern somewhat, but I wish to instill a note of caution nonetheless. While this is the best data we have at our disposal to address the topic of this chapter, I have taken steps (described above) to improve on previous studies that use this data. I also wish to thank Anna Grzymala-Busse, who alerted me to the issues of single-measure survey items on social issues (email communication 2010).
any respect, the composite index serves as a robustness check of the findings using the original variable on homosexuality as justifiable.\textsuperscript{151}

*Independent Variables: Domestic Variation in Transnational Channels*

I use four variables to access my concept of transnational channels of diffusion. Returning to the indicators presented in Chapter 3, I again employ the measures of social, political, economic and combined transnational and international channels. These indicators are measured at the state level. Each respondent is thus linked to her state’s group-level score at the time of the survey. As presented in Chapter 3, these direct, indirect, and mediated channels of diffusion are theoretically important because they produce the transnational interactions that expose individuals to new norms, making them visible and open to deliberation in the domestic sphere.

If norms spread through channels of transnational interaction, then we might also expect that geographic proximity to the states west of the Iron Curtain—a context where homosexuality was politicized earlier—can predict successful diffusion. Social movement scholars of diffusion have highlighted geography as an indicator of a direct channel between transmitter and receiver of a norm (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010). Empirical applications by political scientists and sociologists find that distance is a politically and socially salient variable, for example, in explaining (1) the democratization and market-Europeanization of post-communist states (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) and (2) the positive attitudes of citizens toward the EU (Berezin and

\textsuperscript{151} In previous work, I have also tried to capture change between $T_1$ and $T_2$ by calculating the national means of the responses in $T_1$ and subtracting them from each of the individual responses in $T_2$. For example, I subtracted 1.85 (Polish mean score in $T_1$) from a Polish respondent’s score of 5 in 2008, giving that individual a *change* score of 3.15. While this measure produced results largely in line with my argument here, I do not employ it here because it does not reflect change in the same individuals over time—picking up country fixed effects instead. Ideally we will have panel data to study these types of questions in the future, but they do not exist cross-nationally over the time periods I analyze.
Diez-Medrano 2008). Following these scholars, I create two indicators of proximity to Western Europe. The first variable measures the distance to Vienna or Berlin, whichever lies closer: “These cities are chosen as important economic and cultural referents for the countries of the former communist world” because of the location along the Iron Curtain (Kopstein and Reilly 2000, 10). The second indicator measures the distance to Brussels, the political center of the EU and NATO (Berezin and Diez-Medrano 2008). However, I expand on both previously used distance measures, which either simply measured the distance from Central and Eastern European capital cities (Kopstein and Reilly 2000) or the distance in 10 intervals (Berezin and Diez-Medrano 2008). Instead, I measure the exact distance (in kilometers) between the residence of 14,910 individuals, in over 400 cities across Central and Eastern Europe, and their western counterparts (Berlin/Vienna or Brussels). If individual information flows and the spread of ideas constitute the goal, then we can assume that the citizens of Słubcie (historically connected to Frankfurt an der Oder) are more familiar with Germany than those in Warsaw. In this regard, my measure is more accurate and careful in capturing the propositions put forth in previous scholarship. The same logic should make the “Iron Curtain” variable more valid than the “Brussels” variable (which may be one of the EU capitals but is not necessarily tied to the embodiment of EU norms). I test both measures as a robustness check, but I only report the “Iron Curtain” measure in my tables. The unreported “distance to Brussels” variable produces nearly identical results in terms of sign and direction, though with a slightly larger coefficient size.

Finally, I include an individual measure of shared identification with the EU that constitutes an indirect channel of diffusion. My qualitative research has shown that proponents of LGBT rights in the EU consciously frame the LGBT norm as one
of European democratic values and responsibilities. The rights of sexual minorities are also clearly articulated in EU treaties (cf. Chapter 1). Thus, I expect that an individual’s shared identification with European institutions to establish an indirect channel of diffusion, in that these individuals have a shared identification with an institution that purports the norm (Givan, Roberts, and Soule 2010). I use an EVS (2011) survey question that asks how much confidence individuals have in the EU (a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all). Whether individuals are originally convinced of the content of the norm, if they have strong confidence in the values of the EU, then they may be more likely to embrace the norm as part of their European identity.

HYPOTHESIS 1a: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more porous to the international community (in/direct and mediated channels) (state level variable)

- Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more socially porous to the international community
- Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more politically porous to the international community
- Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the state is more economically porous to the international community

HYPOTHESIS 1b: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the individual is geographically closer to Western Europe (direct channel) (individual level variable)

HYPOTHESIS 1c: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality increase if the individual identifies with the EU (indirect channel) (individual level variable)

Independent Variable: Perceived Threat

The main variables of interest in this category of independent variables are related to religion and nationalism. Nationalism should matter for perceiving homosexuality as threatening because the anti-LGBT opposition almost always frames

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152 See also (Ayoub and Paternotte 2012; Beger 2009; Kuhar 2011; Stychin 1998).
LGBT norms as “external” and imposed by the periphery (cf. Chapter 5). Individuals who are deeply rooted in the imaginary of the nation will feel more vulnerable towards “external” LGBT norms, which they see as challenging their national identity. Churches also recognize international norms on homosexuality as threatening to important moral values. Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006) find the variation in type and strength of religion across Europe is an obstacle to EU integration (see also, Prochazka 1994). In post-socialist societies, Catholic and Orthodox Churches have been especially opposed to the import of EU standards on sexuality (Ramet 2006, 126). Finally, individuals who practice their religions are more exposed to the messages espoused by religious institutions and should be more likely to perceive imported EU norms as threatening to their values (Herek 1987).

I use four indicators—nationalism, religiosity, church authority, and religious affiliation—to distinguish individuals who have characteristics that I expect will lead them to perceive norms governing LGBT rights as threatening. People with these characteristics hold more traditional or national values that should be more likely to associate the LGBT norm as externally imposed. National pride is measured in four intervals, very proud (4) to not at all proud (1). Church authority is a dichotomous measure in response to the EVS question: “Generally speaking, do you think that [your church is giving/the churches are giving], in your country, adequate answers to the social problems facing our country today?” To measure religiosity and religious doctrine, I use the EVS data on religious affiliation and religious service attendance. I predict that more church attendance is negatively correlated with malleable attitudes to

153 Unlike the Catholic Church hierarchy, the Orthodox Church is decentralized across national contexts (Philpott 2007). That said, it takes a strongly uniform position when it comes to issues of homosexuality (Gerhards 2010, 16).
international norms. I remain ambivalent about whether religious doctrine should matter, since textual references to sexuality do not vary greatly. That said the structure and organization of religious organizations vary considerably, and Catholic and Orthodox hierarchies in Europe have been more vocally threatened by LGBT norms as a part of Europeanization (Ramet 2006), which is why I choose to include this measure. Religiosity is measured on an 8 point scale (1 = “never, practically never,” 8 = “more than once a week”)—and as religious denomination in four categories: (1) Protestant, (2) Catholic, (3) Orthodox, and (4) Other. These indicators tap into the likelihood that individuals will be embedded in groups where they will be socialized to perceive the LGBT norm as threatening: based on the logic that it challenges traditional values and national identity.

HYPOTHESIS 2a: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower among individuals who have higher levels of national pride (individual level variable)

HYPOTHESIS 2b: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower among individuals who believe churches have legitimate authority over answers to their state’s social problems (individual level variable)

HYPOTHESIS 2c: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower among individuals who attend religious services more frequently (individual level variable)

HYPOTHESIS 2d: Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will be lower among individuals who are Catholic or Orthodox (individual level variable)

Interactions

Furthermore, I expect that the effect of transnational channels will vary across individuals who are more or less likely to perceive the LGBT norm as threatening. In this sense, the state’s level of norm visibility and individual-level threat perception interact in their effects on norm internalization. Specifically, the differences between
individuals of low threat perception and high threat perception—in terms of religion and nationalism—should become more pronounced as the level of visibility increases.

**HYPOTHESIS 3a:** Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will increase as channels of visibility increase, but more sharply among individuals who are less religious.

**HYPOTHESIS 3b:** Positive attitudes toward homosexuality will increase as channels of visibility increase, but more sharply among individuals who are less nationalist.

*Control Variables*

The models also control for a series of additional variables that previous research has found to explain changed attitudes toward homosexuals. In particular, scholars who have worked with societal values find that modernity is an important predictor of value change. For example, Inglehart’s (1997) postmaterialist theory stipulates that societies invest in social issues when they have the luxury to do so—after industrialization, education, and wealth. To control for these factors, I use Inglehart and Norris’s (2003) 12-point “postmaterialist index” variable. I also include separate variables that control for gender, age and education. These controls derive from consistent and robust findings across previous studies, which show that younger generations, educated people, and women are generally more accepting of homosexuality (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Lamar and Kite 1998; Lax and Phillips 2009). Age is measured in years (beginning at 15) and education is measured years of schooling attended. Next, I include a variable that measures the more contested finding that residents of urban areas are more tolerant toward homosexuals (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Takács and Szalma 2011). Urbanity is measured by a variable that accounts for the size of the municipality in which the respondent lives. It is coded according to Andersen and Fetner’s (2008) four categories: (1) less than 5,000, (2)
5,000 to 49,999, (3) 50,000 to 499,999, (4) greater than 500,000. This control variable also serves as a measure of social isolationism, the theory being that people in isolated rural communities are less likely to have interpersonal relationships with LGBT people. Finally, I include year dummy variables to control for time differences across survey waves.

Methods

I test my hypotheses using multilevel random intercept regression. The multilevel structure of the research design drives the selection of the method, which combines data at the level of respondents (individual-level) and states (group-level). This means that my data consist of observations at two analytical levels where one unit of analysis (43,296 individuals) is nested in another (27 states) (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 98). Multilevel models are useful when the researcher believes that the individuals in his or her dataset are nested in unique groups that influence the outcome (Snijders and Bosker 1999, 43). The merits of this method include making inferences about the state’s contextual influence over individual attitudes (Anderson 2007). Indeed, people “form attitudes and make choices in variable [social and political] environments… that shape people’s interpretations and actions” (590). It also addresses some of the concerns associated with hierarchical data resulting from random variance, clustering, and underestimating standard errors (Anderson and Tverdova 2003, 98). To avoid these errors, I use statistical techniques developed for

\[154\] The statistical method captures the strength of the relationships among variables. The multilevel regression method assumes (similarly to ordinary regression) that data are derived from a representative sample (since the results are used to make inference about a broader population), variables are independent of one another and are linearly related, and error terms are homoscedastic, normally distributed and uncorrelated (Maas and Hox 2004, 428).
modeling data with a multilevel structure. The baseline model I develop in the following tables can be econometrically expressed as:

\[
\text{Attitudes towards Homosexuality} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Transnational and International Channels (State-Level)} + \beta_2 \text{Geographic Proximity} + \beta_3 \text{EU Identification} + \beta_4 \text{National Pride} + \beta_5 \text{Church Authority} + \beta_6 \text{Religiosity} + \beta_7 \text{Denomination} + \beta_8 \text{Controls} + \epsilon || \text{Country/Wave}
\]

My expectation is that transnational channels are predictors of more positive attitudes towards homosexuality. By contrast, I expect a significant and negative relationship between threat perception predictors and attitudes toward homosexuality. In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, I test how these expectations bear out across different contexts (EU-12 and EU-15 states). A subsequent analysis then adds interaction terms to the above models, to explore the role of individual threat perception in internalizing norms among citizens of new adopter states. In this analysis, my expectation is that transnational channels are moderated by the perceived threat variables in the model. If this is true we should see two trends in the margins plotted below (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). First, individuals in highly porous contexts should, on average, have more positive attitudes than people in low porous contexts. Second, we should also see that the effect of transnational channels plays out differently across groups, with individuals in low-threat perception groups exhibiting a more positive and profound response to increased transnational channels. Individuals in high-threat perception groups, by contrast, should exhibit both lower scores and more modest slopes of change in response to transnational channels. Finally, the analysis in Table 4.5, adds a state-level pro-LGBT legislation variable to the analysis. This serves the purpose of exploring the effect of legislation on attitudes—a finding in recent research.

\(^{155}\) In STATA 12.0, the statistician can constrain the degrees of freedom on the group-level variable using the `xtmixed` command. In STATA this is done using the `xtmixed` regression command and
RESULTS

Table 4.2 presents the results of the regression models for the state-level and individual predictors of tolerant attitudes toward homosexuals. For each of the three sets of states (EU-27, EU-12, and EU-15) in Table 4.2, I estimate two separate models. The first model for each subset of states uses the logged measure of attitudes toward homosexuality, which the second model then re-estimates using the index measure of the dependent variable. All of these models include a state-level variable measuring the combined transnational and international channels (social, political, and economic) that tie a state to the international community. The EU-12 analysis subset also includes a measure of geographic proximity to Western Europe; this variable does not apply to the other subsets of states and is thus missing from those models.156 Finally, the models throughout all of the Tables in this chapter include unreported year dummy variables—they are almost always insignificant across models.

In the sample of all individuals in the EU, my models provide a measure of support for both the transnational channels and domestic threat approaches. The signs of the coefficients take the expected directions: they are positive when channels of visibility are high and negative when individuals have characteristics that may associate homosexuality with threat. For the channels variables, all three measures are significant (p ≤ .05), controlling for all other variables in the model.157 At the state level, increases in channels of visibility are positively correlated with more tolerant attitudes on homosexuality. This is in line with the hypothesis that the political, social

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156 Including this geographic proximity variable in the EU-12 models does not change the sign and direction of the other predictors.
157 I only report significance levels at the p ≤ .05. Henceforth, I will no longer write out “controlling for all other variables in the model” when reporting the effects of specific predictors.
and economic embeddedness of the state in the international community facilitates successful norm internalization. The same is true for individuals who reside closer to the former Iron Curtain border and identify with the EU.
Table 4.2. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Tolerance toward Homosexuality in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>EU-12</th>
<th>EU-15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) DV(log)</td>
<td>(2) DV (Index)</td>
<td>(3) DV(log)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational and International Channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Channels (State)</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Identification</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat Perception</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Authority</td>
<td>-0.15*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.29*</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Materialism</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (5,000-49,999)</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (50,000-499,999)</td>
<td>0.15*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Estimate 1</td>
<td>Estimate 2</td>
<td>Estimate 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (500,000+)</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Women = 1)</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.03*</td>
<td>-2.31*</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.294)</td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
<td>(0.448)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>43,296</td>
<td>42,348</td>
<td>14,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, + p<0.1
Though they are difficult to calculate in a multi-level model with transformed dependent variables, the coefficient sizes are considerably large when taking into account that DV1 is on a scale of 0 to 2.3, and DV2 is on a scale of -1.2 to 1.5. When compared to individuals in countries with the lowest level of transnational channels, individuals in the countries with the highest level of transnational channels are, on average, expected to have more positive attitudes by 0.6 to 0.9 units (depending on the model). Similarly, the results support the hypothesis that individuals who identify with the EU generally hold more positive attitudes. Each unit increase in EU identification is associated with an increase in tolerant attitudes by roughly 0.03 units. Finally, geographic proximity is positively correlated with internalization, suggesting that the closer individuals live to the former Iron Curtain, the more likely they are to embrace the international norm. On average, every kilometer east decreases the rate of attitudinal change between 0.0001 and 0.0002 units, depending on the model and indicator used. In Model 3, a resident of Bucharest is expected to hold a position toward homosexuality 0.11 units lower than a resident of Bratislava. All of these findings lend support to the expectations of the diffusion hypothesis.

The regression results suggest that transnational channels influence the extent to which individuals internalize norms concerning homosexuality. To also demonstrate this visually, I present a scatter plot of the simple correlation with the fitted line of the slope. Correlations between aggregate-level variables are useful in visualizing this key relationship. Figure 4.2 plots the correlation between the primary predictor of state porousness (combined channels) and the dependent variable. The correlation indicates that, on average, EU-12 states—each state is shown at the three different time points—with more developed transnational channels correlate with successful norm
internalization (for the plot of all EU-27 states, see Figure 4.6 Appendix D). As is suggested in the qualitative chapters, these channels provided the foundation for a growing visibility of the homosexual community, fostering more comfortable self-expression on the part of homosexuals as well as some erosion of misperceptions on part of the society at large.

**Figure 4.2.** Correlation between Aggregate Attitudes and Combined Channels in EU-12 States

Across models, all of the perceived threat variables are also significant at the .05 level. Higher levels of national pride, church authority and religiosity are all negatively correlated with positive attitudes. The results indicate that, on average, individuals who have higher levels of national pride, who see the church as an authority on social problems and who attend religious services frequently are less likely to accept the norm. For example, the coefficient size of roughly 0.1 for each unit change on a 4-point scale of national pride in Models 5 and 6 is substantial.
Similarly, the findings suggest an average decrease of 0.04 with each unit increase in religious service attendance. This means that the relative rate of tolerance score for an individual who goes to church more than once a week will be 0.32 units lower than an individual who never goes to church. Finally, I should note that differences among denominations are more pronounced in EU-12 states, in which people of Catholic and Orthodox faith are on average (in increasing order) less tolerant of homosexuality than their Protestant peers. In EU-15 states I do not observe a statistically significant difference between Catholics and Protestants.

Although I do not discuss in depth the various control variables for the purposes of this analysis, they are consistent with previous findings on attitudes toward homosexuality: Attitudes are more tolerant among women and among those who are younger, more educated, and more likely to possess post-material values. Finally, attitudes become more positive as the size of the municipality increases. Urbanity is indeed a source of visibility, not only because LGBT people (who have the means to do so) often seek these places out, but also because these localities often offer a more diverse multitude of ideas.

The findings are consistent across models, regardless of the dependent variable I analyze. Reporting both indicators of the dependent variable in Table 4.2 was intended to give the reader additional confidence in the measures. In terms of significance level and sign, both dependent-variable measures produced nearly identical results, which holds true for the subsequent analyses presented here. Thus, I opt to report only the composite dependent variable hereafter. Moreover, in this section I report the calculated R-squared at two levels, using both the equations put forth by Snijders and Bosker (1999) and Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). Across models
the variance levels are quite substantial, and comparable to those reported in studies using a similar dependent variable (Gerhards 2010). For both dependent variables, the majority of the variance appears across states (about 70%). A smaller part of the variance occurs across individuals (about 30%).158

*Differences Between EU-12 and EU-15 States*

The models in Table 4.3 replace the combined-channels variable to examine the differences between social, political and economic channels among new adopter (EU-12) and first mover (EU-15) states. Social and economic channels are not run in the same model to avoid issues associated with multicollinearity.159 Since the substantive significance of the coefficient regressions are difficult to interpret, and are also addressed carefully in the previous analysis, I will limit this section to a brief non-substantive description of the findings. The findings that I highlight are the ones that differ between EU-12 and EU-15 states. As expected, the consistency of transnational channels as significant predictors of normative change is stronger among new EU-12 states. This corresponds to the notion that, on average, new adopters are more influenced by transnational variables than first mover states (Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Moreover, different types of transnational channels play distinct roles across contexts.

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158 I calculate the R-squared in STATA 12 using the “mltrsq” command. The results for the Raudenbush and Bryk test are slightly lower than the Snijders and Bosker test, but comparable enough to report here.  
159 I control for multicollinearity by evaluating the correlations among my predictors. To be confident that no predictors are multicollinear, I generate a correlation matrix (cf. Table 4.6, Appendix D). Using a scale of -1 to 1, the matrix suggests the correlation between all the independent variables. None of the predictors are multicollinear. I also ran an OLS regression and calculated the variance inflation factors (VIF) for my independent variables. When excluding the interaction terms, the mean VIF is low (1.1), and none of the variance inflation factors are above 1.18. In the VIF test that included interaction terms, two variables (economic and social channels) appear to be highly correlated, with a correlation coefficient of .66. This result is quite common when including interaction terms in the model. To deal with this, I report the reduced models in the analysis.
Table 4.3. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Tolerance toward Homosexuality in Europe in New Adopter versus First Mover States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>EU-12 DV (Index)</th>
<th>EU-12 DV (Index)</th>
<th>EU-15 DV (Index)</th>
<th>EU-15 DV (Index)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational and International Channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Channels (State)</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Channels (State)</td>
<td>0.01+</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Channels (State)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>0.0001*</td>
<td>0.0001*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Identification</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Threat Perception</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Authority</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.31*</td>
<td>-0.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
<td>-0.24*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Materialism</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (5,000-49,999)</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (50,000-499,999)</td>
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<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (500,000+)</td>
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<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Women = 1)</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.27*</td>
<td>0.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-2.47*</td>
<td>-1.07*</td>
<td>-1.30*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.568)</td>
<td>(0.481)</td>
<td>(0.320)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>14,060</td>
<td>27,976</td>
<td>27,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
In new adopters, all three transnational and international channels are statistically significant. The results suggest that individuals in EU-12 states who are more socially, politically and economically connected through such channels are on average more likely to adopt more tolerant attitudes toward homosexuality. Of the three channels, the softer social channels are the most robust across EU-12 models and have a larger coefficient size (.04) than the political (.01) or economic channels (.02). On average, individuals in more porous EU-12 countries evaluate homosexuality less negatively.

The picture is different among EU-15 countries, in which economic channels are the only significant sub-competent of state porousness. This finding not only reflects differences among diffusion to new adopters and first mover states (Soule 1997; Strang 1990; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), it also limits the economic narrative of homosexuality as linked to capitalism (D’Emilio 1983)—suggesting that this narrative may have currency for the development of homosexual identity in first movers, but is only one of several factors for its spread. Other notable differences in the predictors of attitudes between respondents in EU-12 and EU-15 states are the aforementioned null finding for Catholicism in EU-15 states. The data suggest that Catholics are distinct from Protestants in their attitudes toward homosexuality in EU-12 states but not in EU-15 states. Indeed, some Catholic countries are leaders in LGBT rights—as I show in Chapter 5, distant national experiences of church-society relations play a more fundamental role than denomination in predicting resistance to LGBT norms. Finally, while women are more likely than men to approve of homosexuality in both contexts, the difference in coefficient size between men and women is greater in EU-15 states.
(.27) than in EU-12 states (.14). As is the case with the previous section, the signs of the coefficients of the other variables take their expected directions.

**Perceived Social Group Threat Moderating Transnational Channels**

I now explore differences across differently situated individuals within and across countries. In particular, I expect the positive effect of visibility to be less pronounced among individuals who are prone to perceive LGBT individuals as threatening. In the models in Table 4.4 (Appendix D), I add interaction terms to test the hypothesis that individuals who are more inclined to perceive the norms as “an external threat” are likely to exhibit more gradual shifts in their attitudes, as channels increase. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 below illustrate that individuals in groups with “low threat” characteristics make more substantial changes in their attitudes as international visibility heightens. I report the untransformed dependent variables scores (on a scale of 1 to 10) for ease of interpretation. As expected, in low visibility contexts—contexts with few transnational channels—I do not observe substantial differences among groups of individuals. As channels heighten, the fitted lines representing the attitudes of individuals in low-threat groups show a strong upward trend. While this trend also exists among high-threat groups of individuals—reported here as individuals who are more religious, and who are more nationalistic—it is much less pronounced. For example, in Figure 4.3, individuals who attend religious services most avidly (lower third of the sample) changed their position marginally (from 2.6 to 4.1), while the individuals least likely to attend services changed their positions by over one point (from 2.4 to 5.2). In fact, the attitudes of the high-threat-perception group are initially more negative as channels increased from low to medium levels (from 2.6 to 2.4). By contrast, individuals who rarely attend religious services internalized norms of
tolerance toward homosexuals more rapidly. They are arguably also more likely to see added value in adopting norms of legitimate behavior according to international scripts, compared to their peers who perceive of international pressures as threatening.

A second threat perception variable, *national pride*, shows similar trends. Individuals that are less nationalistic improved their attitudes toward homosexuals more rapidly and more substantially than their peers in the highest-perceived threat group.

**Figure 4.3. Religiosity and Perceived Threat**

![The Predicted Effect of Channels on Attitudes](image)
LEGISLATION AS VISIBILITY

Finally, Table 4.5 adds another state-level variable to explore the effect of introducing pro-LGBT legislation on attitudes. This final step of the analysis thus ties back to Chapter 3 and contributes to previous studies by exploring the links between legislation—a commonly studied indicator of diffusion—and internalization at a societal level. Takács and Szalma’s (2011) work modeled this effect, finding that the introduction of partnership legislation correlated with positive change in attitudes. In Table 4.5, I use the five-category legislation index as a predictor to show that Takács and Szalma’s (2011) finding holds in first mover EU-15 states (Model 13). If I break down the analysis to explore its effect in new adopter states, however, I lose the positive effect of legislation on attitudes (Model 12).
Table 4.5. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting the Effect of Pro-LGBT Legislation on Tolerance toward Homosexuality in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>EU-27 (11)</th>
<th>EU-12 (12)</th>
<th>EU-15 (13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legislation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislation Score</td>
<td>0.18*</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational and International Channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Channels (State)</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0001*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Identification</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
<td>0.03*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceived Threat Perception</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>-0.08*</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
<td>-0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Authority</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
<td>-0.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>-0.12*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.18*</td>
<td>-0.25*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
<td>-0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Materialism</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>0.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (5,000-49,999)</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (50,000-499,999)</td>
<td>0.16*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.19*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size (500,000+)</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (Women = 1)</td>
<td>0.23*</td>
<td>0.14*</td>
<td>0.27*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.91*</td>
<td>-2.50*</td>
<td>-1.18*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
<td>(0.218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>42,348</td>
<td>14,060</td>
<td>27,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, + p<0.1
Based on survey results and my interviews, the effect of legislation on attitudes was always more pronounced in first mover states. While organizations in new adopter states all felt that legislation would ultimately help their cause, they qualified its effect, noting that it could be responsible for temporary “backlashes” in attitudes toward LGBT peoples—especially if it was “forcibly imposed” (interview no. 141). Hungarian activists all noted backlashes after their successful movement introduced legislation (interview nos. 109 and 123). A Latvian LGBT activist noted:

We want to pass legislation because it is good and creates a discussion, but [with discussions] suddenly the issue begins being talked about shamelessly; even in Parliament! Here shameless arguments are still [legitimate] that are [no longer acceptable] in other countries (interview no. 138; interview no. 106).

The answer to the same question with Spanish and Portuguese activists yielded far less cautious responses. For example, according to representatives from both countries, same-sex marriage (introduced in 2005 in Spain, and in 2010 in Portugal) came with rapid and dramatic increases in societal attitudes (interview nos. 100, 104, 135-137).

According to the president of ILGA-Portugal:

In 2010 we had a turning point, because same-sex marriage is the large, key issue that opens all types of doors or closes all types of doors. So in a sense we had an issue that the whole society is able to discuss or willing to discuss. It let in a lot of visibility and removed the silence that usually impedes LGBT-issues. In our case, Spain’s successful move on the issue in 2005 paved the way for a smooth transition delegitimizing opposition. Legislation had an important social impact. Since the start of the marriage campaign in 2005
[Portuguese] support for marriage has risen from 20% to 50%. (interview no. 100)

The null finding for the LGBT variable in EU-12 contexts, as opposed to the strong statistical significance present in the EU-15 states, supports the qualitative and organizational survey data presented in Figure 4.5.

In response to the question, “In your opinion, what has been the effect of your country introducing legislation that strengthens the rights and protection of LGBT people?,” the representatives of 46% of transnational LGBT organizations across EU-15 states felt that introducing LGBT legislation had a substantial positive influence on people’s attitudes in their country. Another 46% said it has some effect. Only 1% said it had a null or negative effect, respectively. The reaction of organizations in EU-12 states was far more tempered. While 71% said legislation had some effect on attitudes, no organizational representative ventured to say it had a substantial effect. Another 14% said it had no effect, and 5% felt it had a negative effect.
These findings qualify those of Takács and Szalma (2011), suggesting that legislation is an important source of deliberation, but its positive effect on internalization is often on a non-linear and extended time-horizon. In contexts with no prior widespread discourse surrounding LGBT people, the introduction of legislation can be perceived as imposition by large segments of society, and fuel a societal backlash—even if such backlash is temporary. Most importantly, it is the mechanism of deliberation behind the legislation that has the most effect. Juris Lavrikovs of the ILGA makes this clear when says: “As we see in many countries, only with openness … we can win the situation because the laws, however important they are, [are] only one particular element in changing public opinion. But it’s about being open[,] about speaking…” (“Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania Anti-gay Criticism” 2012).
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has described the responses of European societies to norms governing LGBT rights. The chapter supports theoretical and empirical progress by employing a rare approach of combining state-, group- and individual-level analyses and comparing their relative effects. Alongside the traditionally theorized variables at the individual level, such as gender and age, I have shown that relational and non-relational channels that connect the state to the international community also explain much of the variation in changed attitudes among people that live within those states. States with greater transnational channels differ from less porous ones in how their societies internalize norms.

These channels have differing effects on distinct subgroups of individuals, however. Individuals who perceive LGBT norms as threatening have more negative attitudes toward lesbian, gay and bisexual people, and they also alter their positions more gradually than their peers—and in some cases, the attitudes of individuals in high threat groups worsened in a phase of backlash—as the channels of visibility increase. Indeed, individuals who hold more nationalistic or traditional values are systematically less likely to internalize LGBT norms. Based on the qualitative research, which I elaborate on in the following chapter, the mechanism through which this functions is threat perception. Individuals who are nationally and traditionally oriented are more likely to think of LGBT norms as external and imposed.

Finally, the results do not suggest that internalization proceeds in a steady linear fashion. Instead, the basic descriptive statistics in Figure 4.1 show a common occurrence of small dips in attitudes that come with heightened resistance in response to outside norms—this is especially true in new adopter states. Levels of perceived
threat vary across context and across individuals and these variables can fuel resistances and slow internalization among societies. That said, in the twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, all societies in the EU have taken a more favorable position towards homosexuality as compared to 1990. Chapter 5 develops our understanding of perceived threat by exploring how it is fomented and how resistance is mobilized differently in two cases: Poland and Slovenia.
CHAPTER 5

With Arms Wide Shut: Threat Perceptions, Norm Reception and Mobilized Resistance in Two Catholic Countries

Braving sweltering summer temperatures, 15,000 people gathered in Warsaw to celebrate LGBT visibility on a July weekend in 2010. Everything about Warsaw—from the 90-degree temperatures to the parade of rainbow colors—seemed atypical about that weekend as marchers from Poland and beyond assembled for the annual EuroPride parade. Hosting the regional event was a first for Poland, and also for Central and Eastern Europe. The European Pride Organizers Association (EPOA), a group that included Tomasz Bączkowski, wanted the event to come to Warsaw after a favorable 2007 legal decision at the European Court of Human Rights that made it illegal to ban public assembly in Poland. This was a moment to reflect on the progress that domestic and transnational activism had made in Poland and for activists from across Europe to gather and discuss the achievements and obstacles ahead.

That same month, roughly 300 participants attended the tenth annual Ljubljana Pride, whose theme that year was “Enough Waiting on Equal Rights.” The Ljubljana Pride proceeded as usual. It received political endorsements from the President of the National Assembly, Pavel Ganta, and Ljubljana’s Mayor, Zoran Jankovič—who has attended in years since. The Minister of Interior, Katarina Kresal of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS) party, again marched alongside participants. Novel to the 2010 event was the attendance of several Slovenian

\(^{160}\) 300 is a common figure at the Ljubljana Pride, though it was exceeded more recently in 2012 when the parade was attended by around 500 to 600 participants (interview no. 154).
celebrities who expressed their support of expanding additional rights to the LGBT community. As had been the case every year since 2001, the Ljubljana Pride looked and felt like a celebration.161

The Warsaw and Ljubljana pride parades employed similar tactics and made related claims. Yet the striking difference between the events lies in the forms and extent of local resistance they provoked. While “there have never been large masses of counter-demonstrations at the Ljubljana Pride” (interview no. 154), an estimated eight counter-demonstrations took place alongside the EuroPride in Warsaw. Even the academic panels at the Warsaw “Pride House” in the week leading up to the event drew demonstrators. In Slovenia, political leaders were responsible for the public statements in reaction to the parade, but in Poland the stage was left open to religious leaders to respond. Although the EuroPride program included encouraging messages of support from mayors of other cities, like London and Berlin, Warsaw’s mayor, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party, remained silent. Instead the archbishop of Warsaw, Kazimierz Nycz, gave a statement echoing the sentiments of a vocal Polish opposition: “No one can force us to support, promote or sponsor this parade” (Cragg 2010).

Of the counter-demonstrations organized that week in Warsaw, the central theme commemorated the battle at Grunewald where Poles and Lithuanians defeated the Teutonic knights in the year 1410, exactly 600 years earlier. This nationalist frame harped on unwanted external influences—German Teutonic knights returning as European crusaders for “sexual deviance”—entering into the domestic sphere to destroy something sacred—Polish values as defined by the Roman Catholic Church.

161 Many thanks to Jasna Magic for several first hand accounts of the 2010 Pride.
According to Robert Winnicki, organizer of the *Marszu Grunwaldzkiego* (Grunewald March), “We feel that the situation today is similar [to the year 1410]... EuroPride is some kind of ideological aggression: the knights from the West want to force us to think that gayness is normal” (Cragg 2010). In defense of the Catholic nation, counter protesters waved flags, rallied, chanted, fired rockets and disseminated leaflets citing the wrongs of non-heterosexuality. Tomasz Andryszczyk, from the Warsaw City Hall, contextualized the reaction—so different to the one in Ljubljana—saying “You can point to the background in attitudes … the role of the church here is different; history is different ...” (Cragg 2010).

This chapter explores the varied nature of domestic responses—such as those typified by Poland and Slovenia—to new norms, and how these responses influence visibility. While previous chapters have highlighted the powerful effect of the transnational channels that make such norms visible, domestic understandings shape how these norms are received and interpreted by the public. The findings in the previous chapters raise three important questions for domestic and transnational mechanisms with regard to the relationship between politics and social change. First, how do the processes of Europeanization—so fundamental to the diffusion of LGBT rights in Europe—interact with domestic institutions and norms? Second, why does the same norm mobilize an active resistance in some cases and not others? Finally, how does resistance influence norm internalization? Using a paired comparison design, I answer these questions by tracing the different trajectories of norm reception in the two target state cases presented above, Poland and Slovenia.162 These cases

162 Like Chapter Two, this chapter relies on data from 82 semi-structured interviews, participant observation at LGBT and anti-LGBT events in Europe, and an expert survey of 291 transnational LGBT organizations.
show different rates of change on both indicators of the two dependent variables of interest: social attitudes and laws toward sexual minorities.

Specifically, different domestic perceptions of threat moderate the effect of transnational channels on norm internalization. The chapter’s core compares the link between national identity and religion in Poland and Slovenia, finding that the varied constitutive effects of secularism and tradition in different national contexts influence responses to norms concerning sexual minorities. I find that the historical antecedents of the essence of popular nation opened the path for religion in fueling the process of counter-mobilization. This is particularly relevant if we consider the varied roles played by the Catholic Churches and the related impact on the strength and longevity of the anti-LGBT response. In Slovenia, norm brokers could foster significant change in favor of LGBT people without a strong and domestically resonant resistance. In Poland, mobilized resistance to LGBT rights is routine. To explain this difference, I argue that religion matters for counter-mobilization in cases when its moral authority is historically embedded in the essence of the popular nation. In Poland, the Catholic Church created a role for itself as a moral entrepreneur. Here, domestic opposition actors succeeded in framing a narrative that linked LGBT rights to external forces that threaten national values. By contrast, the Catholic Church in Slovenia could neither maintain nor (re-) establish similarly strong ties to the popular nation after the Second World War (WWII). LGBT rights diffusion provokes a lesser resistance in states where the Church\textsuperscript{163} has lost its moral authority as a constitutive part of national identity.

\textsuperscript{163} By “Church,” I simply refer to the dominant religious institution, all of which happen to be Christian in the EU.
The argument—that norms governing LGBT rights diffuse according to transnational channels, but are moderated by conditions of domestic threat perception—is presented in four sections. Section 1 conceptualizes the differing perceptions of threat that derive from the ties between religion and nationalism in Europe. Section 2 traces these differences—both in LGBT visibility and in threat perception—in the cases of Poland and Slovenia. Section 3 explores the different trajectories of mobilized resistance that such threat produces in Poland and Slovenia. Section 4 then examines the effect of resistance on LGBT visibility to show that the mobilization and rhetoric of anti-LGBT resistance can backfire, actually heightening norm visibility. Indeed, the data show that strong resistance, produced in high threat contexts, can lead to greater visibility and international attention for LGBT-rights when domestic LGBT movements are transnationally linked.

I. DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT IN EUROPE

Threat Perceptions

A central premise of the proposed theoretical framework is that successful norm diffusion is moderated by differing perceptions of threat across national contexts. Sociologists of sexuality and queer theorists have long argued that new forms of sexuality are threatening to national identity because they destabilize the narrative of nation. This argument builds on the work of Stychin (1998), Binnie (2004) and others (A. M. Smith 1994), who trace a long history of national policies intended to categorize and repress non-reproductive forms of sexual intimacy; homosexuality being historically “linked to conspiracy, recruitment, opposition to the nation, and ultimately a threat to civilization” (Stychin 1998, 9). Sexuality, like gender, is
threatening to national narratives because it is not confined to national borders.\footnote{164} This is not to say, as Binnie (2004) also notes, that the relationship between national identity and sexuality is determined and unchangeable. National narratives of sexuality do change, for better or for worse, across time and place.

In the international relations literature, one understanding of national security is the “absence of threat to acquired values” (Bajpai 2000, 8). Indeed, some state actors do interpret the imposition of the EU’s norms on sexual minorities as a threat that requires “self-defense” (Cârstocea 2006, 216). This is especially true if our understanding of societal security “concerns the sustainability…of traditional patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity and custom” (Buzan 1990, 2).\footnote{166} Paradoxically, the security of LGBT individuals—who seek protection from the state and the social collective—is often framed as threatening to the security of nations.

\footnote{164} In the language of diffusion scholars, high threat contexts should be initially less susceptible to norm diffusion (Soule 1997).

\footnote{165} According to Conrad (2001, 125), “homosexuality in particular threatens the stability of the narrative of Nation: the very instability and specific historical contingency of the definition of homosexuality makes the category more fluid than most, and thus brings into question the fixity and coherence of all identity categories.” National narratives are related not only to sexual minorities but also to traditional gender roles and the status of women—often simultaneously.

\footnote{166} “We can best understand [social security] by studying the processes whereby a group comes to perceive its identity as threatened, when it starts to act in a security mode on this basis, and what behavior this triggers. Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity” (Weaver et al. 1993, 23).
Religion connects to nationalism, because national narratives often invoke a return to the purity of an imagined past, one that is rooted in religious tradition (Hayes 2000). In Europe, religion is still a defining feature of nation and it has a dominant authoritative voice on issues of sexuality and societal security. As previous chapters have shown, however, religion and modernization on their own do not explain the diffusion of norms concerning social issues. More secular states are not necessarily the first to adopt LGBT norms. Echoing those scholars that champion a complex understanding of religion’s effect on politics (Berger 1993; Casanova 1994), I show that religion plays a role in moderating the effect of international LGBT norms, but only in contexts where it has become linked to the popular nation.\textsuperscript{167} The role of religion not only varies across nation contexts, but it also varies across time, as the relationship between religion and nation changes, and as the LGBT issue becomes deliberated and co-opted by various social actors. These factors have shaped the discourse and the extent of the opposition to norms concerning LGBT rights.

In post-socialist European states, the link between religion and nation has been established in part by democratic transition, where “the Church” played vastly different roles across states. By looking at Poland and Slovenia, two Roman Catholic

\textsuperscript{167} Among the sociologists of religion that have challenged the secularization argument that modernity hampers the role of religion, Berger (1993) and Casanova (1994) offer a nuanced argument that explores the varied root factors of religious demise and revival across contexts. In international relations, realist and liberal perspectives, which are both rooted in rationalist thought, have too quickly accepted secularization theory to dismiss the role of religion as a variable in shaping and moderating outcomes in contemporary world politics (Byrnes and Katzenstein 2006). Yet, as Graff’s (2010, 601) eloquent article has demonstrated, the instrumentalization and politicization of homophobia in Poland is not just about religious morality, instead is about “a discourse of wounded pride characteristic of the postaccession period … At stake are not the actual attitudes of Poland’s citizens toward sexual freedom but the position of Poland as a state and a nation in Europe’s economic, geopolitical, and racial hierarchy.” In comparative perspective, O’Dwyer and Schwartz (2010) have also emphasized that illiberal LGBT politics are a product of nationalism in the Latvian and Polish contexts.
countries, I hold constant the separate effect that denomination could play—
notwithstanding the fact that religious scriptures on acts of sexually deviant behavior
do not vary greatly across doctrine—and because Catholicism is deeply transnational
in its institutional structure. Yet Philpott (2007, 506) has warned that despite this
transnational scope, "religions do not usually act singly or comprehensively in their
politics," which is true of the role religion plays in LGBT politics across states. As I
will demonstrate with the case of Roman Catholicism—a religion that is both
transnational and hierarchical—its influence on politics varies greatly across contexts,
depending on the intricacies of Church-society relations and its role in processes of
meaning-making concerning national identity. Poland and Slovenia demonstrate the
divergent trajectories of the Church’s political legitimacy and ties to national identity.

The historical ties between religious nationalism and LGBT rights in Poland
and Slovenia—which are presented as ideal types—reflect the general trends and
illuminate the diffusion processes of other states in the region:

We [new member states] are not so different, we all have the Post-Soviet
syndrome, lack of trust in social partners, are skeptic of NGOs, and often
homophobic and socially conservative. The difference [in processes of change]
is the ties between the Church and the nation. At any political event [in Poland], there are always 10 bishops in the first row. (interview no. 140).

We cannot blame it all on the communist past, which explains part of it, but clearly not all of it, if we compare [Poland] to other post-communist countries. It’s the role of Church nationalism mostly (interview no. 129).

The weak role of the Catholic Church in Slovenia is comparable to that of the Church in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, two states that have internalized the international norms governing LGBT rights at similar rates to Slovenia (cf. Figure 1.2, Chapter 1). In these cases, “[t]he unpopularity and weakness of the Cold War Czechoslovakian Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state date back to the Habsburg suppression of nationalist Protestant uprising during the Reformation era” (Philpott 2007, 508), which resulted in relatively few Church ties to democratic opposition groups in the 1980s (Ramet 1998). Similar dynamics also play out in earlier democratizers like Spain and Portugal, within which the Catholic Church had long and sustained ties to authoritarian rule, and their late role in democratization processes did little to restore the church’s authority (Manuel 2002; Philpott 2007, 509, 512). Czechs and Slovaks linked the Church to state socialism in Czechoslovakia, Spaniards linked it to Franco’s regime, and Portuguese to the Estado Novo (Second Republic) (interview nos. 100, 104, 135, 136, 137).

The main difference between Spain and Poland is Solidarity and the role the [Polish] Catholic Church played [during transition]. The Church collapsed with

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170 Spain has among the most far-reaching legal protections and rights for sexual minorities in all of Europe (including full marriage rights), and social attitudes have become more favorable since 1990 (over 60% positive change).
Franco in Spain. Here [in Poland] the Catholic Church gave people energy, strength (interview no. 140).

The authority the Catholic Church wields in Poland is most similar to that in Lithuania, where it also played an active civil-society role of resistance (Linz and Stepan 2011). In both cases, the Church maintained deep ties to the nation and remained autonomous from the socialist state (Philpott 2007, 511). In domestic responses to LGBT norms, Lithuania followed a similar trajectory to Poland. Likewise, the Protestant Church played the central role fueling civil-society opposition to the socialist state in Estonia, Latvia (mixed Christian) and East Germany (Philpott 2007, 514; Stepan 2000). Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland were among the laggards on furthering the rights of LGBT people. The East Germany (GDR) is a unique case because of the dynamic that a divided Germany produced between church and GDR-state—the result was a “church from below” that unexpectedly sheltered and supported the lesbian and gay movement (Hillhouse 1990; Kellogg 2001). Among the EU-15 states, cases like Greece, Italy, and Ireland have religious institutions with

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171 Most uniquely, the gay and lesbian movement in the GDR grew out of the Church, whose more than 20 lesbian and gay groups orchestrated most of the activism under the Church’s umbrella in the 1980s (focus group no. 205, interview nos. 19 and 20). There are two key reasons (one internal and the other external) for this development: the competition between the Church and the state in the GDR and the competition between the GDR and the FRG. The Church provided a general safe space to new social movements (e.g., pacifist, environmental, handicapped and LG groups) and used these ties to maintain their legitimacy and relevance with GDR society (Hillhouse 1990, 593). “The church, despite its long history of antipathy towards homosexuality, offered social services to gays and lesbians to increase church support” (Hillhouse 1990, 592). In response, the GDR state was troubled by the Church’s close ties to its protestant counterpart in the FRG and the outflow of gays and lesbians to the Federal Republic: “competition with West Germany also contributed to [some minimal] liberal government policies on homosexuality…These possibilities for freer expression of lifestyles led a disproportionate number of homosexuals to apply to leave the GDR. By ignoring the needs of some 700,000 to 800,000 citizens, the SED realized it was exasperating the emigration problem and it began addressing the needs of homosexuals” (Hillhouse 1990, 592). The unique role of divided Germany was the most fundamental to the special relationship between the lesbian and gay movement and the Church, which is evident when taking into consideration that only 10% of the GDR’s lesbian and gay groups under Church patronage identified as Christian, and that most of these groups severed their ties to the Church after reunification (Hillhouse 1990).
close ties to national identity.\textsuperscript{172} According to the co-president of the European Forum of LGBT Christian Groups,\textsuperscript{173} the historical ties between religion and nation that I trace in cases below also offer the predominant explanation in explaining resistance to the transnational movement for LGBT rights across Europe (interview no. 104).

II. POLAND AND SLOVENIA: LGBT VISIBILITY AND THREAT PERCEPTION

LGBT Visibility in Poland and Slovenia

Poland and Slovenia exemplify the importance of the differences in LGBT visibility described in the previous chapters, with Slovenia—despite its small size—developing deeper and more abundant transnational ties to first-mover states at an earlier time. As part of the emerging civil rights movement that helped topple communism in Yugoslavia, the Slovenian gay and lesbian organizations Magnus and Lesbian Group (ŠKUC-LL) were founded in 1984 and 1987, respectively. They were the first gay and lesbian groups in Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe (Greif 2005, 150). In Slovenia, the LGBT movement was transnationally oriented very early on, with three groups applying for membership in the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) by 1991,\textsuperscript{174} a relatively high number of transnationally linked LGBT organizations for a small country of two million people. The organizations maintained a healthy relationship with international bodies,

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{172} Wald emphasizes the powerful role of the Greek Orthodox Church in the both Greek state and nation, tracing its influence back to four centuries of Ottoman occupation (Wald 2013). LGBT activists referred to Italy as the “last bastion” of the Vatican (interview no. 104). Finally, the conflict sustains religion as a beacon of national identity in Ireland and N. Ireland, the result being initially sluggish protections toward sexual minorities (N. Ireland decriminalized homosexuality 15 years after Great Britain, and only after legal intervention based on ECtHR principles).

\textsuperscript{173} In 2010, the forum included 39 LGBT groups from 20 European countries. It has the double mission to represent a voice of Christians in the LGBT-world, and to represent an LGBT-voice among ecumenical communities.

\textsuperscript{174} Lesbian Group (ŠKUC-LL) joined in 1987, followed by Magnus and Roza Klub in 1991.
obtaining a large part of their annual budgets from transnational and international sources, along with support from the state and the city of Ljubljana. In 2010, external funding made up 60% and 80% of the annual budget for Magnus and Lesbian Group (ŠKUC-LL), respectively (Survey Data).\textsuperscript{175}

Poland has also established the channels that enhance the visibility of LGBT rights, but these changes came later. Poland’s movement started more slowly with fewer formal transnational ties. The presence of LGBT groups has grown rapidly since around the time of European Union (EU) accession, with six groups developing extensive transnational ties to EU-15 states and beyond by 2009.\textsuperscript{176} The “Let Them See Us” campaign and the Cracow March of Tolerance, in 2003 and 2004, were the earliest key moments for gay and lesbian visibility in Poland (Gruszczyńska 2007, 99).\textsuperscript{177} These events were primarily organized by the Kampania Przeciw Homofobi (KPH) (Campaign Against Homophobia), the largest and most transnationally connected group in Poland, which emerged in 2001 as a politically-oriented LGBT organization focused on attaining LGBT rights from the state. KPH joined ILGA-Europe in 2002, and 80% of its funding came from external sources in 2010 (Survey Data).

The data in Table 5.1 offer descriptive statistics on the differences in transnational channels of socialization and the presence of norm brokers (transnationally linked LGBT organizations). These channels contributed to the earlier politicization of LGBT rights in Slovenia. This correlation is supported by the results

\textsuperscript{175} According to an activist from the youth LGBT group, Legebitra, they are seen as lower priority for external funds now, because of their relative successes in past years (interview no. 107).
\textsuperscript{176} For example, the organizations ILGA-Europe, IGLYO, Soros Open Society Foundation, COC Netherlands, Maneo in Germany, RFSL Sweden, Homotopia in Britain, and the embassies of Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, and the United States (post-2008).
of my organizational survey, which asked experts to answer questions about LGBT visibility by selecting a year using a sliding bar from 1950 to 2011 (or select an option of “not applicable”) in response to the question: *Do you recall approximately when newspapers and other mass media started to cover stories related to the question of sexual minority rights?* The mean year selected by Slovenian and Polish experts was 1993 and 2004, respectively.

**Table 5.1.** Descriptive Statistics on Transnational Social Channels, and Norm Brokers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channels of Information (0-100)$^a$</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channels of Social Contact (0-100)$^a$</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnationally Linked LGBT Organizations$^b$</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: $^a$KOF Index, $^b$Transnational LGBT Organizations Dataset

The Polish experience with state-sponsored homophobia (Chapter 2) stands in contrast to that of Slovenia, where social attitudes and legislation have changed at an accelerated pace. In 2000, about 60% of Poles felt that homosexuality was never justifiable, while only about 20% of Slovenes agreed (EVS 2011). Slovenia also enacted some of the most far-reaching LGBT rights laws in Central and Eastern Europe, including protections that surpass those of many older EU member-states. Table 5.2 illustrates this difference in comparison to Poland.

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$^{177}$ Confer Chapter 2 for an expanded discussion on Poland.
Table 5.2. Legal Framework for LGBT people in Poland and Slovenia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex sexual activity legal /</td>
<td>Yes (1932)\textsuperscript{179}</td>
<td>Yes (1977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal age of consent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation can be a grounds</td>
<td>Yes (2007)</td>
<td>Yes (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for granting asylum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Rights</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partnership 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Assembly (no bans in last</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ten years)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination</td>
<td>No (Only employment</td>
<td>Yes (beginning in 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>passed in 2004)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The incitement of hatred, violence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (2008)\textsuperscript{181}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or discrimination on grounds of sex-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ual orientation is a criminal offence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homophobic intent is an aggravating</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>factor in common crimes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality body to address discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Rights</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (Second Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption 2011, but</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reversed by slight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>majority in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>referendum)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


These differences persist despite the fact that Poland and Slovenia are both Catholic societies, with 94.2\%\textsuperscript{182} of Slovenes (Conway 2009) and 92\% of Poles (Mizielińska 2010) self-identifying as Catholic in 1990. In both countries, the Catholic Church adheres to the Vatican’s moral opposition to non-heterosexual relations. Both

\textsuperscript{178} There are no states in this analysis where sexual minorities enjoy the same human and civil rights and privileges as citizens whose sexual orientations align better with hetero-normative social structures. There are differences, however, in the degree to which LGBT minorities have come to be incorporated into the frameworks of the state, which the cases of Poland and Slovenia demonstrate.

\textsuperscript{179} Homosexuality remained legal during the communist period, but police kept files on gays and lesbians and there were not registered LGBT organizations or press (Mizielińska 2010). Same-sex relations were first criminalized in Poland in the 19th century, under German, Russian and Austro-Hungarian laws.

\textsuperscript{180} Slovenia bans all forms of anti-gay discrimination, the most comprehensive legislation in new EU member states.

\textsuperscript{181} Article 297 of the Slovenian constitution refers explicitly to sexual orientation, criminal law provisions existed more generally since 1994 in Article 300 but were not always upheld for sexual minority cases. Thanks to Roman Kuhar for point this out to me.

\textsuperscript{182} It should be noted that beyond self-identification, Poles are far more likely to attend religious services. In 1990, 71\% of Slovenes considered themselves adherent to the Catholic faith. Before the Second World War 97\% of Slovenes identified as Catholic.
countries are also ethnically and linguistically homogenous relative to their European counterparts. Finally, the two post-communist countries attained independence at roughly the same time, joined the EU in May of 2004, and are among the countries ranked by Freedom House as having the most successful democratic transitions (Bunce 2003, 172). By virtue of their differences in outcomes, these two historically Catholic countries merit in-depth consideration. In what follows, I trace these differences back to different perceptions of threat in both contexts.

**Threat Perception in Poland**

In Poland, national identity is linked to a long history of being deprived of nationhood and the collective memory of foreign intrusion and oppression (Borowik 2002, 240). The accounts of the members of the anti-LGBT opposition I interviewed—conservative politicians, far-right nationalists, and religious figures—emphasized the overlap between national identity and Catholicism in Poland. The Polish Catholic Church “was a church that, through a century and a half of fending off invaders from Prussia, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had established a strong autonomy from the state, fortified by a deep identification with the popular nation” (Philpott 2007, 511). Not dismissing the prominent role that Catholicism played across European nations, opponents of LGBT rights insisted the role of Catholicism in Poland is special. In their view, Polish Republican tradition is uniquely linked to the Roman Catholic Church, unlike French Republican tradition (which is “anti-Christian”) and Anglo-Saxon Republican tradition (which is liberal) (interview no. 141). This is, in part, because Poland did not experience a reformation or social revolution against the Church and the monarchy to which it was tied, since the country
lost independence before the monarchy could be overthrown. Instead, the Church in the last two centuries adopted most functions of political organization. It “gave people faith and power to struggle against invaders: the Germans, the Russians, and the Austrians,” becoming a defining feature of the Polish nation and their identity (interview no. 141). In due course, the Church in Poland has wielded a tremendous influence in shaping the national narrative: “to root legitimation in the past ([the Church] always served the nation); to respond to any objections … [in the name of ‘the nation’]; [and] to affirm that nobody can teach the Church how to understand the nation, including the nation itself” (Borowik 2002, 248–249).

The German-Soviet occupation of Poland during the Second World War and the subsequent re-drawing of geographic borders and population transfer only strengthened the role of the Church in popular memory as a resister against external forces. During the post-war period, the WWII narrative of “bad” Germans was expanded in a “dualistic societal structure: ‘bad’ communists, associated with the Communist Party and its apparatus; and ‘good’ Poles, patriots, associated with the Roman Catholic Church” (Borowik 2002, 239–241). For Philpott (2007), Poland is the ideal type of a “high-differentiated” context, in which the Church was severed from the nondemocratic state for decades. Soured relations between Church and state date back to the internment of priests, including that of Primate of Poland Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, in response to Church resistance in the 1950s and 1960s (Philpott 2007, 511). In 1981, after the state imposed martial law and imprisoned Solidarity activists, the Church again assumed its role as “a shelter for truth against political censorship…[as] a symbol of freedom” (Borowik 2002, 241). It is important to note

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183 The Polish Catholic hierarchy fueled this narrative in part by linking unwanted external interventions
here that the Church not only became an increasingly important political actor in terms of its actions, but that it became a symbolic force equated with autonomy and democracy.

**The Polish Pope.** Before and after democratic transition, Karol Józef Wojtyła, later Pope John Paul II, also played an exceptional role in the Church’s relationship to Poland, to Europe, and to LGBT people. Born in Wadowice, he maintained close ties to the Polish nation through papal pilgrimages, commanding unparalleled respect from Polish society, and exercising great symbolic influence over Poland’s political role in Europe:

[The Pope] sought to use that seat of authority to advance his own distinctively Catholic reasons for wanting his native Poland and the other formerly communist states to be a part of the European Union. Eastern enlargement, in fact, was a crucial element of the Pope’s vision for the future of Europe, because he saw the institutional reunification of the continent as the historic occasion for a new evangelization flowing from East to West (Byrnes 2007, 3; P. J. Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006, 684).

As part of Poland’s special role in Europe he articulated strong views on non-heterosexuality. In 1986, Pope John Paul II issued his first official statement on the issue, written by Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (later Pope Benedict XVI):

[The homosexual inclination] is a more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; thus the inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder. Therefore special concern … should be directed to those who have this condition, lest they be led to believe that the living out of this orientation to other churches, for example, German Protestantism and Russian Orthodoxy.
in homosexual activity is a morally acceptable option. It is not. (Ratzinger 1986).\textsuperscript{184}

Polish LGBT activists regularly made reference to the influence that the “Polish Pope effect” exercised on society, even posthumously.\textsuperscript{185} A KPH activist lamented, “while Ireland and Spain, for instance, also had Catholics, the Poles had the Pope” (interview no. 9). She echoed the scholarship that has cited the Pope’s political vision for a “new East to West evangelism,” and the responsibility bestowed upon Polish society to maintain and spread Catholic values via their return to Europe. In her view, the obstacle behind this philosophy for the LGBT movement is that “saving the world’ is already a difficult enough task, and doing it with ‘fucks’ [LGBT people] is impossible, so you had to kick ‘fucks’ out of the country [to realize the Pope’s political role for Poland]” (interview no. 9). The ramifications of this philosophy played out politically when the socially conservative coalition of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defense of the Polish Republic (SRP) came to power in 2005. In 2007, then President of KPH, Robert Biedroń said to a reporter, “the brothers Kaczyński want to export their moral revolution to Europe, trapping us in the culture of death endorsed by Pope Wojtyła instead of a civilization.”\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{184} The Church hierarchy’s has remained relatively stagnant. In 2003, Cardinal Ratzinger articulated the Vatican’s position on same-sex unions and adoption: “There are absolutely no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar to or even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage and the family… Allowing children to be adopted by persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence to these children” (Colbert 2013). Before resigning as head of the Church in 2013, he again deplored the global diffusion of same-sex unions calling them a threat to “human dignity and the future of humanity itself” (Colbert 2013).

\textsuperscript{185} This effect was not limited to devout Catholics, “Even Polish atheists cried at the Pope’s funeral” (interview no. 8).

\textsuperscript{186} Translated from Polish.
The Polish Catholic Church and the EU. As Burns (2009) has noted, the Polish Church hierarchy found itself in a precarious position leading up to European accession. It worried that any identity shift among Poles toward Europe could threaten its own power, which rested on Polish national identity. Furthermore, while most of Polish society backed accession, the Church’s staunchly supportive agrarian constituency opposed the EU’s Common Agriculture Policy. But this national view stood in sharp contrast to pro-EU aspects of the Church, like the Church hierarchy’s traditional state-skepticism, the European Christian-democratic parties’ historically strong support of European integration, and the Pope’s own strategic plan187 for Poland in Europe (P. J. Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006, 682).188 By way of compromise, the Polish Church officially supported EU accession, but “church leaders at the highest levels peppered their public statements with caveats about Poland’s membership. From the pulpit, priest’s statements were even more skeptical—presenting scenarios of lost cultural identity…” (Burns 2009, 169). In this process, LGBT politics and abortion became an especially easy—even if materially insignificant—target with which to distinguish “Europe” from Poland. In sum, church leaders saw a role for Poland in Europe but greatly questioned the role of Europe in Poland.189 The Polish anti-LGBT opposition, which is almost always anti-EU, echoed these sentiments, claiming that EU institutions adhere to a liberal, left consensus that is inherently

187 According to Pope John Paul II, “The church in Poland can offer Europe as it grows in unity, her attachment to the faith, her tradition … and certainly many other values on the basis of which Europe can become a reality endowed not only with higher economic standards but also with a profound spiritual life” (Katzenstein and Byrnes 2006, 684).
188 Others took a more pragmatic stance: According to Archbishop Józef Życiński, “even if Poland remained outside EU structures the younger generations will seek patterns of living foreign to Christianity, following a life-style taken from the media or learned abroad” (KAI, 24 August 2000).
189 The frame of the LGBT actors was exactly the reverse. Take for example the fliers for a pride parade in Poznan in 2011, which read: “Equality in Europe, Equality in Poland.” In this sense, Europe is clearly present in Poland. This is very much in contrast to the opposition to LGBT rights, which has
incompatible with national values. In their view, “Europe” thus became synonymous with LGBT rights, framed as inseparable sides of the same coin. On social issues, Poland and Europe are in “permanent confrontation” (interview nos. 141).

Threat Perception in Slovenia

In stark contrast to Poland, the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia failed to become a consolidating social force either before or after democratic transition. The opportunity presented by a “return to Europe” did nothing to restore the political legitimacy of the Church; and Slovenes placed minimal emphasis on it as a vehicle for evangelizing the “West”:

Contrary to common sense expectations, … issues related to Slovenia’s national consciousness have not been dominant in the wake of the country’s international recognition in 1991. Thus, in all its intensive efforts to restore the power and prestige that has been taken from it over five decades of socialist rule, the Roman Catholic Church has not been able to draw on a widely accepted concept of nationalism (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 361).

Coming out of the Second World War, the state successfully attributed the early post-war tensions between itself and the Church—which involved the expropriation of church properties, prosecution of priests, and removal of religious curricula from schools—to the wider punishment for the Church’s collaboration with Nazi occupiers and failure to support the Resistance (Radeljić 2011, 179; Ramet 1982, 257). Societal skepticism of the Church thus dates back to this time, and contrasts itself with Polish collective memory, where the Church was heralded as the great

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focused on keeping Europe out of Poland.
resister to outside forces (Pollack 2003). In the Yugoslav context, the essence of nation did not depend on the Church as it entered the post-war period. Instead the state was successful, at least in part, in linking the Church—not LGBT norms—to external political powers. As one activist explained, “When it comes to the Church, it was really strong until WWII but then began a history of missteps and misfortune that came with the change of the system” (interview no. 108).

While the Church was generally suppressed under communism in Central and Eastern Europe, it is incorrect to paint the interactions between church and state, or the level of suppression as uniform across the Eastern Bloc. State suppression of the Catholic Church was substantially weaker in Yugoslavia than in other communist countries (Ramet 1998). Črnič and Lesjak (2003), for example, provide a series of incidents exemplifying what they call a tolerant relationship between the Church and the Yugoslav state—it was the only socialist country to sign a Protocol with the Vatican in 1966 and it reestablished relations with the Holy See in 1970—that did not win the Church popular sympathies after the regime changed. Because of this history, the Church does not have a social pull comparable to that in Poland. As one LGBT activist recalled, “We had a long communism, but it was not such a hard communism as in Poland. Today when people go to Church, they don’t listen” (interview no. 111).

During the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Slovenia was spared the process of political identification that homogenized all Serbs as Orthodox, Croatians as Catholic, and Kosovars as Muslim: “Despite the fact that most Slovenes were Catholic, this did not need to be a defining aspect to their identity qua Slovenes” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 350). Slovenia’s brief direct (ten day) involvement in the war did not cement

190 “Unlike the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, which was a pillar of resistance, the Roman Catholic
religion—which was used as an argument to differentiate the other republics and justify militarism against each other—with national philosophy.\footnote{This process was not mainly a phenomenon of the republics but of the nationality politics within Croatia, Serbia, and especially Bosnia. It was the war in Bosnia that forced religious identity to the fore, even when majorities were non-believers or from multiethnic families.} A Croatian LGBT activist confirmed the importance of this distinction for LGBT people, “Slovenia had an experience with war unlike the other republics. This was important [for the Slovenian movement] because then the nationalism and the religious fundamentalism did not become so developed there” (interview no. 102). The Church tried but failed to seize the opportunity to restore its role in politics in the 1990s,\footnote{“There were [also] no radical changes in the area of new religiosity after Slovene independence in the year 1991 … [which questions findings showing the] success of new religions after the democratic social changes of the early 1990s” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 358).} which LGBT activists say made it less of a factor for their work:

After Slovenia separated from Yugoslavia, the Church tried to become more visible in the 1990s, but they did not succeed in entering mainstream politics. The Church existed—and it was not necessarily a bad thing—but certainly not as a political institution. The government made sure to emphasize the separation between church and state, and the [societal] attitude is that the Church should not be involved in politics. If you asked the population, 90% would agree with that (interview no. 108).

Historical experiences had political consequences for Slovenians’ collective memory of church-state relations. Contrary to the widely accepted suppression narrative in Poland, Slovenes do not remember the Church as a victim of the socialist state. The results of the “Aufbruch” survey showed that 25% of respondents “believed that the Church was not persecuted at all during this [40-year socialist] period” and

Church in Slovenia leaned more towards collaboration” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 356).
another 45% said the Church was only occasionally persecuted during that time (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 357). Similarly, 84% of Slovenes believe that individual Catholics were not at all (43%) or only occasionally (41%) discriminated against (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 357). Historical legacy has diminished the role of the Church in its ability to influence societal thinking on LGBT politics: “People have a critical attitude towards the Church and they believe strongly in the separation of church and state. People do not take church messages seriously anymore” (interview no. 107).

By way of comparison, the descriptive statistics in Table 5.3 demonstrate the gap between Polish and Slovenian aggregate responses to the European Values Survey question on church legitimacy over social problems in each country. Church legitimacy dropped in both cases after transition, but more rapidly in Slovenia. While it is also decreasing in Poland—in large part through a process where it has entrenched itself (Berger 1993) by moving to a role as a “political institutional actor and simultaneously put[ing] itself outside of the discourse of civil society” (Borowik 2002, 251)—the difference remains clear. In 2008, the Polish score of .60 (compared to Slovenia’s .39 that year) is approximately what it was 17 years earlier in Slovenia at .64. The data also show differences in Polish and Slovenian perceptions of their national identity’s vulnerability.
Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics on church authority, answering the EVS question:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poland (N=3,587)</th>
<th>Slovenia (N=3,407)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When asked why Slovenia’s trajectory in accepting LGBT rights developed relatively more smoothly than in other new EU member states, one activist said:

Slovenia is somehow a strange country. I think it has to do with the fact that it’s a small country and that the nationalist movement and the nationalist mentality is not as influential or strong as in other countries. The intolerance and non-acceptance of differences is not so transparent. We were the first republic in former Yugoslavia to decriminalize homosexuality in ’77. We often have these types of extreme situations, like this year [2010] we elected the first Black mayor in Eastern Europe. I didn’t expect this, but this is Slovenia. Sometimes we are the first in good things, and as I see it, that is because we are a small country and we want to prove ourselves (interview no. 101).

A Polish activist responded similarly when I asked him if he could compare the two countries:
It is different than Slovenia. They are Catholic too but, unlike Poland, they are small and have experience living with diversity. They are far less ideological. I have never heard about a nationalist problem in Slovenia (interview no. 140)

Religious institutions gain the most political traction when their messages are used to define national identity in the popular discourse. Subsequently, norms governing LGBT rights meet the most resistance in countries where national identity hinges on religious scripts. The next section examines how these different degrees of threat perception influence the makeup and mobilization of the anti-LGBT resistance in both contexts, resulting in the varied discourses and frames of mobilization used by the opposition. In Poland, more than in Slovenia, heightened threat perception initially stifled the reception of LGBT norms, to which state and society responded with vigorous resistance.

III. THE MANIFESTATION OF THREAT: MOBILIZATION, FRAMES AND ARENAS OF OPPOSITION IN POLAND AND SLOVENIA

Dissimilar threat perceptions manifest themselves in the rhetoric and forms of resistance. Resistance to LGBT rights in Poland and Slovenia frames its grievances differently across contexts, and mobilizes in different public arenas. Like LGBT groups, opposition groups also package information for their respective audiences but

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193 Social movement scholars have paid ample attention to threat generated by social movements as perceived by state authorities, and when threat leads them to repress movements (Ayoub 2010; Davenport 1995; Earl and Soule 2006; Tilly 1978). Threat can also be conceived of as the flip side of opportunities for movement mobilization, as the “risks and costs of action or inaction” for movement actors (Tarrow 2011, 160). Almeida (2003) makes a distinction between political opportunities and threat, showing that both can take place to fuel more institutionalized or radical forms of mobilization, respectively. Still others have looked at how collective threat can create opportunities for group identity, and subsequently mobilization (Zepeda-Millan 2010), and how counter-movements interact with and play off of each other (Fetner 2008). Opening opportunities for one group (in this case LGBT actors) that offend influential actors may lead to counter protest. Here I look at domestic responses to the salience of LGBT norms, and demonstrate how domestic perceived threat to “external” norms
these messages vary greatly in theme and intensity. In both cases, their frames are initially grounded in morality and “the laws of nature,” which are then portrayed as a threat to the family, and thus also to the nation.

In Poland, the threat that non-heterosexuality poses to the nation begins with the family, but then makes a large leap to become associated with invasion, occupation, and repression of the nation by outside forces. I call it the “defend the nation” frame, because it is rooted in a philosophy of defensive moral nationalism. The frame is so potent because it harps on the idea that the nation is under attack. Thus, the threat is framed as external and presented in a way that suggests norms on sexuality can dismantle the many attributes of Polish identity. The Polish frame of resistance creates an artificial binary between Polish values and the imagined European queer periphery.

In Slovenia, non-heterosexuality is a framed as a threat to children and reproduction (“Institute for Family Life and Culture” 2013). Adopting Kuhar’s (2009) term, I use the wellbeing of children to define the Slovenian counter-movement’s frame. The frame links LGBT rights to societal frustrations with change in social structures, such as lower birthrates. While the wellbeing of children frame is also inherently about the nation, the argumentation is not extrapolated to threat via invasive external forces—the dominant frame used by the Polish opposition.194

In what follows, I explore how these frames were employed and the types of anti-LGBT actors who were mobilized in response to LGBT visibility in four arenas: conventional political debates, on the streets, in the media, and in the education
system. In Slovenia, the opposition has less public visibility and nationalist and religious groups do not use the same narrative. In Poland, the threat attributed to LGBT norms has sparked a vocal opposition and presence by groups that define themselves as both national and religious.

*Conventional Politics: The Roman Catholic Church(es)*

The European Fundamental Rights Agency’s reports on sexuality exemplify the different political roles that the Catholic Church plays across contexts:

**Slovenia:** The Church adheres to the Vatican’s moral condemnation of homosexuality. It stresses, however, its human standpoint toward homosexuals, and says that the Church is not going to turn its back on them, but they must purify themselves. Bishop Kramberger of Maribor stated in an interview with Radio Slovenia: ‘The Church cannot accept homosexuals, but it may never sentence them…’ (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 8; Kuhar 2006).

**Poland:** The Catholic Church has considerable cultural and political influence and actively takes part in the public debate regarding LGBT issues. Their stance is very much against granting LGBT persons equal rights...There are numerous incidents where Church officials have expressed homophobic hate speech ... For example, homosexuality has been called a disease, and/or a disorder, which needs to be cured and that homosexual persons need to be isolated from society. Similarly, it has been argued that homosexuality is in opposition to the ‘European civilization’ (European Fundamental Rights

194 Instead, Slovenian anti-LGBT activists often use the birth rate quotas of other EU states—even more
Slovenia. According to Slovenian LGBT activists, the Church did not play a politically pivotal role in movement opposition, and only entered the public debate on LGBT issues concerning registered partnership and adoption. The message broadcast by the Church revolved around the family. Even then, “some representatives of the Roman Catholic Church did not condemn the legal regulation of homosexual partnership… [but said it] should not be made equal to marriage” (Kuhar 2008). In opposition to the partnership legislation, “[the Church] held press conferences on this issue, saying that we are going to corrupt family values … But on the other side [LGBT organizations] formed a strong campaign which connected all existing LGBT-groups, called the ‘Campaign for All Families’” (interview no. 101). Activists are ambivalent about the Church’s effectiveness in public debates on sexuality:

Whenever it comes to something that conflicts with their values, they’ll issue a statement, but I am not sure how effective those statements are. They are not taken very seriously, and the media does not reflect on every statement. (interview no. 107).

Slovenian LGBT organizations began demanding partnership rights in 1997, achieving success in 2005. The eventual 2005 bill, which allows for registered partnerships, was drafted and passed following the 2004 election that brought the conservative Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS) to power. While activists were gay-friendly ones—as examples that Slovenia should aspire to.

195 LGBT activists recognized and reacted to the wellbeing of children frame. The 2012 Ljubljana Pride theme was called “Day of Families” and the logo showed the silhouettes of six children walking together.

196 Initially, three Slovenian LGBT organizations (SKUC, Magnus, and SKUC-LL) and other experts (academic, legal and psychiatric) brought the initiative to the government and established a working group for the draft law on registered partnership (interview no. 101).
disappointed with the inferiority of these partnerships to marriage (as in most cases where partnerships have been granted), it is worth noting that the governing SDS that passed the bill is the only party with ties to the Church.¹⁹⁷

The Church contributed to the public debate more actively later on, as activists demanded that the benefits of registered partnership be expanded. According to the president of one Slovenian LGBT organization, when asked if his organization faced an organized opposition, he said: “No not really. Until the Family Law there were no organized opposition groups” (interview no. 108). The “Family Law” refers to the Družinski zakonik (Family Code), which sought to expand the registered partnership legislation and give same-sex registered partnerships the same legal rights as those of heterosexual partnerships, including the right to second-parent adoption. In this case, the Catholic and the minority Islamic hierarchies in Slovenia spoke out against the Family Code together, exemplifying the Church’s willingness to use a frame that invoked a heterogeneous national identity. One LGBT activist noted the irony of the new union between Catholicism and Islam, “It was the first joint statement of the Christian Church and Muslims in Slovenia. After 2000 years of wars among themselves they finally united against gays ... I guess we brought them together” (interview no. 107).¹⁹⁸

Among the Slovenian opposition, the Institute for Family Life and Culture (KUL), founded in 2009, was the most vocal and organized. KUL’s campaign embodied the wellbeing of children frame, which activists linked to emulating the

¹⁹⁷ According to one of the activists who proposed the Bill originally, “We had waited and waited, but it was the conservative party in the government who made it happen. We had many negotiations with them, because we were not satisfied with how they drafted the bill. But they did what they wanted” (interview no. 101).
initially successful 2008 campaign by the Mormon Church against Proposition 8 in California (interview nos. 107 and 108).\textsuperscript{199} The organization cited social issues related to marriage, childbirth, abortion, suicide, alcoholism, and poverty as their rationales for opposing the Family Code. In an article by Tadej Strehovec (2012), KUL’s founder and secretary of the Commission for Justice and Peace at the Slovenian Bishops’ Conference, he ironically highlights birthrate successes in other EU countries (one’s that have same-sex unions) as grounds for preserving the traditional family in Slovenia. Despite Strehovec’s role as the most vocal opponent of the Family Code, his article revolves only around the societal structure of family and child, making no reference to unwanted outside forces or inherently Slovenian values.

The relationship between the Slovenian Church hierarchy and KUL also provides an interesting reflection into the backseat role of the Church. Despite ideological ties, the Church consistently denied its involvement with the institute, and the KUL claims it is privately funded. LGBT activists created some controversy, however, when they exposed a direct connection, linking KUL’s website directly to the server of the Church (interview nos. 107, 111, 151):\textsuperscript{200}

The Catholic Church was the most active party against the Family Law, but they did it quietly, setting up an independent lobbying group that says it’s separate from the Catholic Church. Yet, their website server can be traced back

\textsuperscript{198} In contrast, such collaboration did not occur in Poland as most members of the Polish opposition feared it would challenge their monopoly of the issue as a threat to the homogenous nation.
\textsuperscript{199} Proposition 8 was the California referendum that reversed the legalization of same-sex unions in 2008. It remains unclear whether there were any formal ties between the Mormon Church and the KUL, though the interviewees that mentioned the connection assume it was informal emulation.
\textsuperscript{200} To access photographic evidence of the link, see http://img148.imageshack.us/img148/5145/24kul.jpg (accessed February 1, 2013).
to the Church, and funds were funneled from the Church to [KUL] (interview no. 111).

**Poland.** Unlike Slovenia, the Church in Poland has not shied away from vocally trying to influence Polish politics throughout the debates on social issues. The Church maintains close ties with Polish political parties and parliamentarians, and the Episcopate has approached voters directly, sending them letters to support candidates who defend “the inviolable rights of man, and these in a natural life from conception to natural death” (Borownik 2002, 244). The 2005 campaign of former President Lech Kaczyński produced a document called “Catholic Poland in Christian Europe,” listing the 2004 and 2005 bans on the Warsaw Equality Marches as successes (Gruszczyńska 2007, 100). And Church leadership has been vocal in implementing political roadblock to public assembly by LGBT groups. The Cracow Old Town’s roughly 30 churches always posed an obstacle to the organizers of LGBT marches, since the city originally requested that march routes not pass in front of any church.\(^{201}\)

The same year Slovenian activists established a working group on same-sex unions with their government. In 1997, Article 18 of the Polish constitution defined marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Pope John Paul II’s visit to Poland in 1995 emphasized the type of role the Catholic Church should play in the new Polish politics, highlighting the key issues fundamental to nourishing the Christian nature of the state: opposition to abortion and same-sex partnerships (Burns 2009, 166). The visit was a direct attempt to “influence the new legal foundations being formulated by

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\(^{201}\) Outside of the formal political sphere, members of the clergy have occasionally protested LGBT demonstrations on the streets. Kubica (2009, 133) notes the presence of a Benedictine Monk at the 2004 Cracow Festival, who would appear from a Church on the march route to sign the cross. Apparently he was preforming an exorcism, but this was only made clear after Kubica’s student asked him to describe his performance—from the outside it appeared as though he were blessing the march (133).
the country, including the Polish Constitution” (Burns 2009, 166). Several LGBT activists ascribed the obstacles they face surrounding partnership and other movement goals to the role of the Church in politics:

Belgium is very Catholic, and the Church didn’t agree with [same-sex] marriages, and a year later they got it. In Poland it’s different, the Church is involved in different aspects of life, especially politics. They talk too much about politics. They have religion in schools and feel legitimate in telling politicians how to lead. Here the Church has a super position (interview no. 140).

With the support of 36 senators and various LGBT representatives, Senator Maria Szyszkowska submitted a motion to allow same-sex partnership to the Parliament in November 2003, but no legislative procedure was started and the draft bill was never sent to a parliamentary committee to take a final form (Mizielińska 2010, 331). It was in 2012, a year after electoral wins by former presidents of LGBT organizations, that a partnership bill had a real chance in Parliament, but then lost by 17 votes (228 to 211). Despite unleashing a typically harsh homophobic rhetoric in Parliament, the bill’s near passage exemplifies the remarkable shift LGBT politics have taken since domestic and transnational activism made the issue visible at the turn of the century. Compared to Slovenia, the ability of the Church to influence political responses to LGBT norms is far greater in Poland.

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202 “Article 25 of the constitution deals solely with church-state relations; in it, the constitution specifies that ‘relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church shall be determined by [the] international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by statute’” (Burns 2009, 167).

203 The Bill was inferior to marriage and in a language that also presented it as an alternative for heterosexual couples. The strongest backing came from the PO (146 of 206 votes) and two opposition parties, the anti-clerical RP and the left SLD, with 42 and 23 votes respectively. The other three parties, including 137 Law and Justice votes, were unanimously opposed.
**Resistance on the Streets**

The *well-being of children* frame in Slovenia has also not spurred public mobilization the way the *defend the nation* frame has in Poland. The Slovenian state has not banned freedom of assembly since independence in 1991, which is protected by Article 42 of the constitution (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 5). LGBT activists only note one incidence where the proprietor at the Ljubljana Castle terminated a rental contract to use the venue—to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the LGBT movement—when the nature of the event was exposed (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 6). Furthermore, as Table 5.4 shows “there is no record of demonstrations against tolerance of LGBT people” (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 6).

**Table 5.4.** Data on Slovenian Mobilization in the Public Sphere:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGBT demonstrations and parades</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># demonstrations against tolerance for LGBT people</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table Recreated from 2009 FRA Report (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b)

These data are in sharp contrast to the situation in Poland, where “various groups and politicians organize marches of normalcy, especially around the time of gay prides” (interview no. 129). Among the most active groups in mobilizing demonstrations is the *Stowarzyszenie Kultury Chrześcijańskiej im. Ks. Piotra Skargi* (Father Piotr Skarga Association for Christian Culture), founded in Cracow in 1999 (Mizielińska 2010, 333). They organized the *Marsz dla Życia i Rodziny* (March for Life and Family) from 2006 to 2008 and participants donned the typical Polish...
national symbols, crosses and banners, calling to “Stop Perversion” and that “Marriage is One Man, One Woman.” As is typical in Poland, these chants are often complemented with nationalist ones: “Lesbians and faggots are ideal citizens of the EU” and “Healthy Poles are not like that” (Gruszczyńska 2007, 100). The Skarga Association has published anti-homosexual propaganda leaflets and letters to citizens in Cracow, Poznan and Warsaw that encourage recipients to contact local authorities. It also disseminated a 50-page brochure called the “Hidden Problems of Homosexuality” to schools in 2006, which, among other things, linked homosexuality to pedophilia (Mizielińska 2010, 333; interview nos. 8 and 129). The group has ties to the American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP), a transnational Catholic organization, which activists suspect funds the “wealthy” organization’s fliers (interview nos. 129 and 139). The secretary at TFP confirmed the “sister-organization” status of the Skarga Association, but denies the transfer of funds to Poland (interview no. 147).

Another Catholic organization, the Fundacja Mamy i Taty (Foundation for Mothers and Fathers) is vocal in the public sphere and politically lobbies conservative politicians (interview nos. 129 and 141). Before the EuroPride in 2010, it paid for a full-page newspaper advertisement outlining homosexual threat, and together with the Catholic magazine Fronda, organized an online petition and counter protest (“Homoparady w Europie” 2010). All three groups

204 “[These demonstrations] are never very big, but they do happen and they have politicians marching with them, so it is not that niche” (interview no. 129).
205 According to the American TFP’s website, “The TFP is financed by a network of donors nationwide that give large, medium and small contributions. Many of these donate on a monthly basis while others give only periodically. Contributions are tax deductible. The TFP receives no government grants or support” (“American Society for the Defense of Tradition, Family, and Property” 2011).
206 He says that there are ample opportunities for networking and knowledge transfer (e.g., on organizing pro-life marches) at conferences but that cross-border financial transfer was strictly through private donations and would be minimal at best (interview no. 147).
have a Catholic mandate, but deploy a clearly nationalist discourse around the defense of uniquely Polish values.

Several activists identified their early opposition as *Młodzież Wszechpolska* (the All Polish Youth), a far-right nationalist and Catholic youth organization founded in 1922 and revived after independence in 1989. In response to Cracow’s Festival of Culture for Tolerance in 2004, the group formulated their “Declaration of Ideas” as follows: “The Nation is the most important worldly value. First, after God, service is deserved by our own nation…. [The Roman Catholic Church] creates and strengthens Polish national identity” (Kubica 2009, 130). A former president of the All Polish Youth justified the strong Polish opposition more broadly, based on three core Polish values that he felt were contrary to the goals of the LGBT movement: (1) power of country (sovereignty in law from international influences); (2) Christian values (a Christian concept of mankind and human dignity), and (3) the common good of the Polish Community (against modern individualism and liberalism) (interview no. 141). The organization, which had strong ties to the Law and Justice Party (PiS), was most active against LGBT mobilization from 2004 to 2007 but lost influence after the vocally anti-LGBT governing coalition of PiS, the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self-Defense of the Polish Republic (SRP) dissolved in 2007.

Other Polish nationalist groups also mobilized against LGBT rights, making LGBT politics the focus of their “defense of nation” rhetoric (see Figure 5.2, Appendix E). The *Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski* (NOP) (National Rebirth of Poland) describes their mission as “spiritually motivated” nationalism, with the first two points of their ten-point declaration specifically referencing the Christian faith: “We, the
Polish nationalists concentrated in the ranks of the NOP, contribute to the development of the Polish national community. Our actions will be based on the teachings of the Catholic Church” (“Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski” 2011). The organization’s logos include a series of religious, anti-EU, anti-American, and anti-gay symbols representative of the defend the nation frame (see Figure 5.3, Appendix E). The opposition at Polish LGBT marches commonly displays an anti-gay symbol, which depicts two stick figure men in a sexual position encircled by the phrase “Zakaz Pedałowania” (Ban Faggots). Similarly, the group Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny (ONR) (National Radical Camp) also lists “the development and revival of national and Catholic values” as their central objective, and takes an identical position vis-a-vis the LGBT movement. Finally, LGBT activists listed the informal fringe group that runs a website called Redwatch Polska among those that organize violent counter-protesters at LGBT events. The website also created an online list targeting individuals from leftist groups and LGBT and other minority groups.

In practice, these groups mobilize extremists from around the country to gather and block LGBT marches. Often these forms of recruitment are informal, for example, through soccer fan forums that bring together hooligans opposed to LGBT rights. In 2011, before the first LGBT pride march in the city of Lodz, organizers at KPH-Lodz created their own accounts on soccer fan forums to gain information on how the extremist opposition was organizing (interview nos. 130 and 131). Since nationalist

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207 Kubica’s (2009, 131) research on the organization concluded that “nationalist ideology together with Catholicism is the main reference point” for the organization.  
208 Translated from Polish  
209 Translated from Polish  
210 Redwatch Polska has links to other Redwatch websites in United Kingdom, Germany and New Zealand. The first Redwatch website was started by supporters of the British People’s Party.
groups often use violent tactics, organizers planned accordingly, informing themselves and the police about numbers and locations and potentially making alterations to the route (interview nos. 130 and 131). Describing the Lodz march, an LGBT activist that traveled in for the event from Warsaw, recalled:

We saw it clearly. We were on the road lined with police, and [the counter-protestors] were in the park. We had 150 people and they had plenty, around 400. They threw plastic bottles [filled] with water, potatoes, eggs, and tomatoes. Eggs and tomatoes are popular. They are very aggressive and shout ‘Go to the gas chambers.’ And alongside the nationalists we also see Church people, with crosses, with bibles, they throw holy water and say things like, ‘Oh, holy father bless them.’ They don’t come with the nationalists but they are there next to each other (interview no. 139).\footnote{212}

The recollection paints a vivid picture of the ties between religion and nationalism in the Polish counter-movement.

In contrast, Slovenian far-right groups remain unorganized. The two opposition groups that activists sometimes, though rarely, mentioned in interviews and surveys are Tukaj je Slovenija (Here is Slovenia) and the Slovenian branch of Blood and Honor. The former makes a reference to the Church on their website, but religion is not mentioned among their three fundamental goals, which include patriotism, bonds of friendship among Slovenians, and activism to draw attention to the Slovenian nation’s right to exist. The latter, Blood and Honor, is a group that promotes national

\footnote{211}{The three men responsible for coordinating the website were arrested and their website was blocked by the Polish government due to the illegal xenophobic content, to which the group responded by using an international server to make it accessible (interview no. 139).}

\footnote{212}{One of the organizers of the event listed the attendance figures as 200 for the LGBT activists, and 350-400 for the opposition (interview no. 131).}
socialist ideals through rock music concerts since 2001 (Mudde 2005, 231). Neither group has organized counter protests, but they are responsible for sporadic violence directed at individuals or vandalizing organizational facades. In 2010, for example, affiliates of Here is Slovenia attacked three men after the pride parade for which they were sentenced to a year and a half in prison.213 According to an activist from the LGBT-group, Legebitra:

The attacks after pride were not organized, they see someone on the street and say he’s a faggot, let’s kick him. They only organized after the arrests were made [to protest the sentence]. There was a protest of maybe 100 [people], dressed in black with masks, in front of the court. The [hate-crime] sentence was high, which they [found to be exaggerated] because a ‘kick is a kick, just a bit of fun.’214 Now they say they are not against the gays, but against the system. They graffitied the house of the judge that ruled in the case215 (interview no. 107).

The difference in public sphere opposition to the LGBT rights between Slovenia and Poland is that Slovenian “nationalist groups are anti-religious, and quite strongly anti-religious” (interview no. 108). In Poland, religious and nationalist groups both use the defend the nation frame.

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213 These attacks were also related to vandalizing Café Open, a popular gay-friendly Ljubljana café several times since 2009. Three perpetrators were found “guilty of a crime of incitement to hatred, violence and intolerance” (http://www.red-network.eu/?i=red-network.en.items&id=241). Such acts of “physical violence or interference by third parties with the rights of LGBT people has won severe and unanimous condemnation from the highest Slovenian officials” (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009b, 23).
214 Other sources referred to the reference as ‘a bump is a bump, fag!’ (http://www.red-network.eu/?i=red-network.en.items&id=241).
215 Coincidently, the judge is the spouse of the minister of justice.
Other Spheres of Opposition (Education and Media)

**Education.** The ramifications of threat perception are also apparent in other spheres of LGBT life, such as education and the media. In Poland, schools are among the most conservative elements of society. Either a religion or ethics course is mandatory and the overwhelming majority (around 90%) opt for religion because the priests, who are employed by the schools, encourage students to enroll and, in general, “being the ‘other’ is not popular for young people” (interview no. 130). The curriculum is also conservative. Sex education is limited and, in many cases, archaic biology textbooks are used that reference the need to cure homosexuality (Bączkowski 2010). The previous PiS/LPR/SRP government banned curricula addressing sexuality altogether and the “family life” curriculum only refers to traditional heterosexual families (Krzeminski 2008). In 2006, Roman Giertych, the Polish Minister of Education dismissed the director of the Service Teacher Training Centre (NTTC), Miroslaw Sielatycki, for promoting homosexuality (Biedroń and Abramowicz 2007; European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009a). Sielatycki had simply published the European Council’s recommended guidelines for teachers, *Compass – Education on Human Rights* (Biedroń and Abramowicz 2007; European

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216 The Church is also involved in curing homosexuality in the private sphere. Father Francis Blachnicki and *Ruchu Światło-Życie* (Light and Life Movement) founded the treatment center *Odwaga* (Courage) in Lublin. Supported by several Polish bishops and priests, the center uses controversial psychotherapy techniques with the objective “to help people with homosexual tendencies to achieve purity and rejection of the homosexual lifestyle” (“ODWAGA” 2012, translated from Polish). LGBT actors say financial ties to the Ex-Gay Watch and the American National Association for Research & Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH) brought at least two American speakers to Poland in the last ten years (interview nos. 8 and 129). In 2011, however, NARTH’s Joseph Nicolosi—“the chief engineer of modern reparative therapy”—was obliged to move the venue of his talk from a medical school in Poznan, after the *Gazeta Wyborcza* published a damning front-page critique of gay to straight therapy preceding the event (Rattigan 2012).
“Teachers are very reluctant to talk about homosexuality for fear of losing their jobs” (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009a). In 2010, the Polish Equality Minister, Elżbieta Radziszewska, argued that EU law allows for Catholic schools to discriminate against LGBT teachers and then asked that contrary opinions be censored, provoking startled and reproachful responses from members of the European Parliament (European Parliament 2010).

By contrast, the nine-year curriculum of the Slovenian education system requires 5th graders to learn about sexual diversity, and in some cases textbooks do mention sexual orientation and same-sex families (Kuhar 2008). While LGBT advocates argue that the issue deserves more prominence in the education system, there have been no state bans on discussing homosexuality, and LGBT activists have sent representatives to lecture at some public schools (Kuhar 2005, interview no. 111). In the Slovenian context, the state-sponsored homophobia in the education system found in Poland, is absent.

**Media.** As is the case with education, the domestic media uses two different narratives in the two states. Polish members of the LGBT movement highlight ultra-conservative Catholic media sources as a well-organized source of resistance. Prominent Catholic media sources, including Radio Maryja and the magazine Fronda, made homosexuality a household issue among clerical communities by tying issues of sexuality to the vast array of social topics they cover (see fronda.pl and radiomaryja.pl). Similarly, scholars have described Radio Maryja as its own social movement with an action frame that postulates: “Any attack on Polishness is

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217 A Warsaw district court later ruled that Sielatycki was discriminated against, and he was paid 5,700 euros in damages (Abramowicz 2007).
perceived as an attack on the Church and vice versa. In this perspective … the nation is not history’s but God’s creation” (Bylok and Pędziwiatr 2010). Both networks publicize LGBT demonstrations and call for people to oppose them. The Polish Catholic Church hierarchy has distanced itself from the extreme perspectives articulated by Radio Maryja, but their parallel deployment of the *defend the nation* frame has given them a strong influence in the national discourse against LGBT rights.\(^{219}\)

Other researchers also noted the “dubious quality” of Polish mainstream journalism on LGBT issues at the turn of the century (Kubica 2009, 134). Kubica (2009) gives examples from journalism across political leanings, all of which were naïve in their reporting of the 2004 Cracow Festival of Culture for Tolerance, an event that some have called the “Polish Stonewall” (Gruszczyńska 2007). She notes how these early events were generally mischaracterized in the press as a provocation. For example, using images of drag queens from the Berlin Love Parade—that would knowingly be perceived as radical in Polish society—instead of actual images from Polish LGBT events (Kubica 2009, 135). A public statement by a journalist from the *Gazeta Wyborcza*—an authority among the Polish press—exemplifies the media’s ignorance: “No newspapers, at least the important ones, wrote about [KPH] or about the festival, unjustly. They only portrayed the dominant Polish feelings” (Voxerbarnt 2004; cited in Kobica 2009, 135). On most occasions, reporting on “dominant Polish feelings” gave little or no voice to the supporters or organizers of LGBT events. While

\(^{218}\) “The editor of Fronda is very homophobic and has made it [a] central issue, including verbally attacking KPH and the events it organizes” (interview no. 129).

\(^{219}\) Radio Maryja claims that over 10% of Polish adults listen to their broadcasts on a daily basis. While these figures may be exaggerated, third parties have referenced their sizeable influence on “millions” of Polish adults (Walton 2002).
the Catholic media has not changed its tone, LGBT organizations’ ties to the mainstream media have improved considerably in Poland since 2007 (interview no. 8). Several activists also point to some working relationships with journalists of the mainstream media that result in a more “neutral” depiction of LGBT people (European Fundamental Rights Agency 2009a).

According to proponents of LGBT rights, the mainstream Slovenian media attained fluency on LGBT issues much earlier. Kuhar’s (2003) study on Slovenian print media concluded that the representation of homosexuality was favorable or neutral. The media also actively reports on hate crimes towards LGBT people (Kuhar 2008). LGBT activists cited partners and contact points in the media to whom they have access for fair reporting. By contrast, the opposing Institute for Family Life and Culture is motivated in large part by what they say is underrepresentation by the media: “[O]ur main purpose is to acquaint visitors with … the values that touch on family, culture, life, and solidarity that the mainstream Slovenian media ignore” (“Institute for Family Life and Culture” 2013). While activists did remark on the tendency to stereotype LGBT people in the media, their accounts differentiate themselves from the aggressive homophobia espoused by large segments of the Polish media.221

Across the board, in conventional politics and on the streets, Poland’s opposition has outpaced its Slovenian counterpart in degree and intensity. The Church

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220 Activists attribute this improvement to domestic activism and the transnational and international attention on the situation for LGBT Poles. These factors infused the discourse with new frames of reference and more complex, nuanced understandings of sexuality. While substantial minority contingents of Polish society had these understandings before outside attention, the domestic media often ignored it. Transnational visibility influenced the debate by giving such arguments legitimacy and credibility in the broader framework of modern European society.
in Poland sits confidently in its role of marginalizing LGBT people by branding them as a threat to the Polish nation and to European civilization. The *defend the nation* narrative in Poland has mobilized a fervent opposition to the rights of LGBT people, which are equated with an invasion of the domestic sphere. For observers at LGBT marches, this frame is easily evident in “that demonstrators [carry] mainly EU flags while their opponents [carry] only Polish ones” (Kubica 2009, 141). Polish mobilization unites a diverse group of actors under a narrative of nation. In Slovenia, perceived threat was lower, and the *wellbeing of children* frame could not mobilize or unite a fragmented and weak domestic opposition. Slovenian LGBT actors commanded a discourse that LGBT rights were part of what it meant to return to Europe, and the Church was not in a position to “adopt the powerful rhetoric of being a ‘traditional,’ ‘national’ or ‘state-Constitutional Church’” (Črnič and Lesjak 2003, 361).\(^{222}\)

**IV: RESISTANCE AS VISIBILITY?**

**RESISTANCE AND DELIBERATION IN THE DOMESTIC SPHERE**

Yet, what effect do the forms of resistance described above have on the ability of LGBT movements to generate social and political change in their respective contexts? Movements of resistance paradoxically also enhance the visibility of LGBT norms and can strengthen the chances of the LGBT movement success in contexts where strong transnational channels are established.\(^ {223}\) Through a process in which it

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\(^{221}\) Scholars also warn that “Although a slow tendency toward less sensational and more accurate reporting is visible throughout the 1990s, a high degree of ignorance about lesbianism and biased attitudes of journalists, loaded with homophobia, are still present” (Greif 2005, 158).

\(^{222}\) It is also worth noting that the two countries had different ambitions as European states, with Poland more able and willing to play the role of a large power, at least in terms of voting rights.

\(^{223}\) The argument here echoes an element of “radical flank theory,” that movements generate negative attention when they employ an extreme repertoire that can, in turn, cast the groups from which they are distinguishing themselves in a more favorable light (Cross and Snow 2011, 117; Haines 1984; Minkoff
fuels deliberation, resistance benefits the cause of the LGBT rights movement by making the issue more salient.

Data derived from the survey of transnationally connected LGBT rights organizations show that resistance is preferable to invisibility over time. Expert respondents from each organization described the effect of “visibility” on change, which I then coded according to 4 different processes depicted in Figure 5.5. Among the organizational representatives in new EU-12 states, 39% describe a non-linear process, where improvement followed an initial backlash. In this process, transnationally embedded domestic actors publicize resistance and international attention heightens, which in turn fuels increased visibility and active deliberation the in target state. This process suggests a strategic relationship where resistance leads to more international visibility, but only if transnationally embedded domestic groups exist. Another 22% of survey respondents said that visibility leads to a Type II process whereby the LGBT norm generates deliberation once visible, making it salient. In these cases, norm brokers illuminate historical narrations of LGBT people in their own respective countries, resistance is minimal and states conform to the standards of a community to which they belong. Of the respondents, another 11% described a Type III process that involved an intensification of anti-LGBT politics by religious and nationalist sectors of society. In these cases, the absence of activist networks and few

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1994). Radical flank theory usually looks at this process within one movement, in that one “flank” interacts with another. The insight that radicalization can make the opposition’s position seem more moderate, however, applies here as well. The issues embraced by social movements for LGBT rights are considered politically radical in most societies (Ayoub 2010; Earl and Soule 2006), but LGBT movements’ non-violent tactics may still be socially more palatable than the aggressive tactics—that often lead to bodily injury—used by some counter movements (Keck and Sikkink 1998). McAdam’s work, for example, has shown that disruptive counter-movement activity, including violence aimed at opposing demonstrators, can lead to favorable policy outcomes and enhance societal sympathies for the movement (McAdam and Su 2002; McAdam 1999). Tarrow and Dorf (forthcoming) show how the religious right in the United States created legal opportunity for the LGBT movement.
channels of transnational pressures fail to counter the arguments of the opposition. Finally, 17% of respondents described a Type I process. In these cases, no adequate levels of visibility had been reached and, thus, change had not occurred.

Among EU-12 states, an active resistance has occurred in half of the cases analyzed. The EU-15 states paint an optimistic picture, whereby over 90% of survey respondents described eventual improvement, even if an active resistance had mobilized in the past. A mobilized resistance in response to norm visibility is common; indeed, it precedes improvement in most EU cases. These results, both among EU-12 and EU-15 LGBT organizations, are quite staggering when taking into account the general precaution with which LGBT activists measure success.

**Figure 5.1.** Type of Process described by Respondents (in Percent), N=125 Organizations, DK=8

Source: Author’s Transnational LGBT Organizations Survey (2011)

The predominant theme in the survey and interview data suggests that resistance is partly self-defeating because it contributes to making the issue visible. I
substantiate these findings with a discussion of the deliberative process and discursive advantage that LGBT actors have in the European context. According to actors for and against LGBT rights, there are several plausible explanations for this phenomenon, all of which rest on the theme of visibility via deliberation. In general, the respondents’ explanations centered around two themes: (1) defend the nation frames used by anti-LGBT groups mobilize an extreme, sometimes violent demographic that eventually drifts out of sync with the sensibilities of the general populace, and (2) anti-LGBT movements have weaker ties to and lesser support from transnational contexts than the LGBT movements themselves.

**Radical Tactics.** According to LGBT activists, anti-LGBT activism often fails because it employs extreme arguments (emotional, rooted in the past, aggressive, and ideological), which can result in increased public sympathy for the LGBT cause. While Bob (2012) suggests that opposition movements construct compelling counter-arguments to LGBT movement claims (e.g., that LGBT rights are against natural design), opposition actors who are granted attention on streets and in the media generally use highly provocative anti-gay arguments. Especially in cases where the Church has issued a defend the nation response, the anti-gay arguments quickly spiral out of control when the far right appropriates them. These arguments, though they find receptive ears in most national contexts, do not fare well with European discourse. Resistance has made the issue visible to the general public because it provokes a strong reaction when there are LGBT groups who can publicize it in the European polity.

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224 Cycles of resistance can also reemerge, as we note in the strong mobilization by anti-marriage groups in France in 2013 (Paternotte 2013).
This was the case in Poland when the nationalist NOP trademarked a homophobic symbol (a red circle crossing out two male stick-figures in a sexual position) as their logo in 2011. While the use of the symbol by rightist counter protesters had not posed problems for the opposition at LGBT events in new EU member states for nearly a decade, the NOP’s decision to trademark it backfired when a subsequent court case prohibited its use, further legitimizing LGBT groups.\footnote{The symbol is also common in other contexts in Central and Eastern Europe, especially in Latvia.}

Before the court banned it, the trademark story was widely publicized by the Polish LGBT organizations and reported on by various European institutions and the Polish and international press. In another political arena, one interviewee referred to an instance in the Polish Parliament in the fall of 2011, where newly elected and openly gay parliamentarian Robert Biedroń was told he was “punching below the belt,” a reference to his sexuality that brought the Parliament, especially members of PiS and PO, to laughter. The disrespectful reaction drew the attention of European institutions and media sources. According to one of the activists who contributed to KPH’s press release following the incident: “My feeling is that after MPs were laughing at Robert, all media is feeling sympathetic with him. Now even the newspapers called it homophobic! The PO is embarrassed” (interview no. 140). Finally, at Ruch Palikota’s post-election party, which also celebrated Poland’s first gay and transgender parliamentarians, the policy coordinator at KPH jokingly whispered, “And what exactly am I going to tell our [international] sponsors now? Gross homophobia is definitely an easier sell for sympathy than the world’s only transgender parliamentarian” (no. 206).

\footnote{Because far-right movements have coopted the issue as their own, more moderate counter arguments often take a back seat.}
These examples suggest how LGBT actors can engage and strategically interact with counter-movement mobilization when they are well connected transnationally—even in a context of highly mobilized political homophobia. And this process is not limited to Poland; a Hungarian activist and academic described a similar process:

The right-wing has become very strong in the past four years. But I think there was a [favorable] shift in the public discourse in response. In 2008, when the Gay Pride happened it was very violent, and that was a bit too much for a lot of people … even for people who thought that Gay Pride shouldn’t happen. It was so violent and so aggressive and damaging—even to the road and to historical monuments! It was too much, you know. There were between 1000 and 2000 marchers and, like 5000 riot police. It was horrible. *But that horror made the whole thing more visible.* By the ‘whole thing’ I mean both extremist violence and gay people. And it was not the gay people anymore who were seen as violating public morals, but the extremists. In this case, the discourse created by left-wing intellectuals drew more sympathy (interview no. 123).

The bizarre group of (in)voluntary bedfellows, from xenophobic nationalists to traditional Catholics, results in a fractured and uncoordinated opposition that has little impact on the formation of a compelling frame or network beyond initial mobilization. For initial mobilization, frames resting on religion and nationalism were effective, but then became too radical to sustain. By contrast, LGBT groups have found a balance by using both local and European frames that connect the norm to democratic values and human right responsibilities in an international society of states. Pointing to other states in their club, they can also employ frames of inevitability that destabilize a
counter-movement if its members feel their chances of winning are low (Tarrow 2011). LGBT groups make the norm salient by connecting activists and grafting international ideas to domestic ones, thereby framing the message to fit locally—especially when confronted with domestic resistance (Chapter 2).

**Transnational Ties.** LGBT activists also have a critical advantage in that they are embedded both vertically and horizontally in enduring cross-border constellations through European institutions and networks of activists, both formal and informal. Conservative resistance movements fail to activate a similar identity or establish equivalent ties across borders since their philosophies are rooted in nationalism. Despite the Catholic Church’s transnational nature, for example, its opposition to non-heterosexual acts is often deeply rooted in a popular nationalism that precludes the use of transnational scripts and channels for legitimate meaning-making. This is in large part because the nationalist nature of the opposition worries that an external presence can diminish the dominant frame, which revolves around rejecting outside influences (interview no. 141, 150). The notion of collaboration between like-minded outsiders perplexed one member of the resistance: “You mean having some foreigners, like Germans, demonstrate? Why would we have Germans with us? We don’t want Germans here. We are doing this for Poland” (interview no. 150). Leftist groups dramatically outpace their opposition in transnational presence at these events—and not just LGBT groups. On Poland’s Independence Day in 2011, for example, 92 German anarchists and communists were arrested in Warsaw for protesting against a

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227 There is an intrinsic importance of solidarity in sexual identity that ties them across borders. The right has the disadvantage because they cannot activate this identity: they don’t want it.
demonstration organized by the All Polish Youth and the ONR (Polskie Radio 2011).  

Although transnational networks do exist for anti-LGBT groups, in most of the cases I analyzed they are non-enduring, infrequent and weak. Those LGBT actors that mentioned the opponents’ potential transnational ties admit that “they are not well organized and the coalition is weak. The only thing they have that unites them is ‘us’ [LGBT people]” (interview no. 140). In sum, LGBT and anti-LGBT groups differ in terms of material resources, the transmission of know-how, and human capital.

Does resistance change attitudes? Resistance can lead to backlash, but it can also produce a visibility of its own, making LGBT issues more salient than before. Slovenian attitudes, though they have far out-paced Poland’s, did not improve between 2000 and 2008. On the contrary, Poland continued making gains, however small, when surveyed in the year following an active period of aggressive resistance. In Poland, resistance helped activists make the issue “mainstream” (interview no. 140). The less-polarizing formal approach of opposition in Slovenia, grounded in pseudo-scientific rational language of protecting the child, proved more effective than Polish mobilization on the streets (interview no. 151). Slovenians narrowly rejected the

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228 "For years, the right-wing government and the Catholic Church have promoted a racist, anti-Semitic and homophobic atmosphere in Poland,’ the German web site antifa.de declares, adding that last year, Polish anti-fascists got “inspired” by the German left-wing blockade of a march in Dresden, an event that led to rioting and damage to public property” (Polskie Radio 2011).

229 For example, the NOP lists ties to groups in Italy (Forza Nuova), the United Kingdom (British National Party), Spain (Movimiento Social Republicano), Greece (Χρυσή Αυγή), Cyprus (Ethniko LAiko Metwpo E.LA.M.), and Sweden (Svenskarnas parti). LGBT activists claim that transnational ties to the right, mainly between evangelical communities in the USA, have been active in funding some campaigns, like the Skarga Association’s flyers linking homosexuality to pedophilia—but further research established that these transfers are minimal at best (interview no. 147). Transnational guests have been more present at some anti-LGBT demonstrations, like in Latvia, where American Evangelicals have spoken at counter demonstrations surrounding LGBT prides (interview no. 138, Film Baltic Pride) or at Polish conferences on reparative therapy. Stories like this are few and far between, however, and the ones we have and can track are visible precisely because pro-LGBT networks have actively ridiculed them in the international arena.
Family Law that Parliament approved in 2011, which granted same-sex couples the right to second-parent adoption in 2012. Popular resistance in Polish has contributed to the norm’s unprecedented degree of national and political attention.

In sum, resistance can be a pathway to LGBT visibility. As one activist noted: “Conservative backlashes have finally opened a possibility for a real dialog on an everyday level” (survey no. 80). In most cases, resistance follows the initial visibility of the LGBT norm, in a period of protracted discourse surrounding its legitimacy. While counter groups can craft competing claims in the domestic realm (Bob 2012), they nonetheless introduce a discourse that evokes a reaction from state authorities, as various sides of the electorate request it of them. When these authorities look to the international level for templates for responding to LGBT issues, the ones they will find in Europe generally align with those of the LGBT activists.

CONCLUSION

Six hundred meters from the 2010 EuroPride parade route in Warsaw another conflict brewed. Calling themselves the “Defenders of the Cross,” supporters of the late Polish President Kaczyński had placed a 13 foot high cross in front of the Polish Parliament and sparked a heated debated about the separation between church and state in Poland (Dempsey 2010). The two demonstrations—one of Poles with crosses and flags, and one of LGBT people with European flags—is symbolic of a conversation that society is having in Poland, which is reconsidering the place of the

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230 This setback needs to be contextualized. The Slovenians were voting on marriage and adoption privileges, which the publics of most states would reject in 2013.

231 While networks of homophobia do play a role globally (Bob 2012), most notoriously in the “kill the gays bill of Uganda,” they are often delegitimized in regions where the systems of knowledge have an LGBT rights mandate. According to the president of KPH, “Many American Christian groups are active in Africa and elsewhere, but in Europe I think they no longer believe [having an impact] is possible” (interview no. 140).
Church and of LGBT people within the nation. This continued debate is widespread across the state and the society. It includes an open letter by Polish university professors distancing themselves from the misuse of science in the January 2013 parliamentary debate on same-sex partnership, which they called degrading to all non-heterosexual and transgender people—“who also deserve the respect recommended by the Catechism of the Catholic Church’s principles on human rights.” It also includes remarks in March 2013 by former President and iconic Solidarity activist Lech Walesa, who boldly stated that Anna Grodzka and Robert Biedroń should “sit behind the wall[s]” of Parliament for being transgender and gay. The parliamentarians responded by sitting in the front row and Walesa’s son, another parliamentarian, publically distanced himself from his father’s statement. This discourse, despite its strong homophobic element, is an intrinsically important element of social change.

The chapter has explored the domestic responses to international norms governing LGBT rights in different contexts. I have suggested that different domestic contexts attach differing degrees of threat to an otherwise similar LGBT norm. Threat perception concerning LGBT norms depends largely on the degree to which the moral authority of religious institutions is tied to the histories of political transition and national identities. National interpretations of religion thus vary across context. Even the hierarchical and transnational Catholic Church takes different national forms in the way it connects to the popular nation. The argument thus goes beyond religious morality, to place importance on the situational politicization of religion in national

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232 Translated from Polish ("List Naukowców: Pawłowicz Wspiera Kłamstwa Na Temat Homoseksualistów" 2013)
233 Biedroń responded by saying, “Lech Walesa is an important symbol for us all and for the whole world. I respect him and I’d rather he used other words, words of acceptance and of respect for other people” (Associated Press 2013).
identity. It is the role of religion in people’s identities more fundamentally that matters for LGBT politics, which can result in distinctive political manifestations for LGBT resistance across states. In Poland, high levels of collective threat perception linked to the Church’s historically deep ties to the popular nation resulted in zealous resistance—one that could legitimately frame LGBT norms as an external threat to nation. In Slovenia, the damaged credibility of the Church hampered its ability to coalesce an opposition around a national and moral narrative, which in turn greatly limited its mobilizing potential against LGBT rights.

The goal of the analysis is not to paint Slovenia as a success story; the strong presence of homophobia in the everyday lives of Slovenian gays and lesbians is well documented by scholars (Greif 2005). Instead, the goal is to explore the relative accomplishments of two increasingly well-organized and well-connected LGBT movements, looking at factors that distinguish domestic responses to LGBT norms. In the analysis, threat perception based on popular religiosity and nationalism traveled further than alternative explanations, for example, ones rooted in political party power. While rightist parties have contributed to anti-LGBT mobilization, these patterns are not consistent across cases. In Poland, for example, the conservative PiS coalition years from 2005 to 2007 coincided with a heightened resistance in Poland—this was a time when the resistance felt particularly legitimized, during a phase of illiberal politics following EU accession. Yet resistance to LGBT rights had emerged earlier, following a series of events organized by LGBT activists that gave LGBT rights visibility leading up to EU accession. Furthermore, the explanation does not hold in Slovenia: no resistance movements mobilized after LGBT activists pushed same-sex
partnerships through Parliament in 2005, when the conservative SDS party governed. This phenomenon—of no mobilization when conservative parties are in power—is not unique to Slovenia; it is, for example, that center-right Cameron government in the United Kingdom that is pushing for same-sex marriage. In France, despite elite support for LGBT rights, a fierce mobilized resistance emerged with the election of socialist President Hollande and his government’s introduction of same-sex marriage (Paternotte 2013). Resistance (in degree and scope) depends on the context, and is deeply linked to societal threat perceptions based on religion and nationalism.

Whether resistance is effectual, however, is a separate question. The pathway to LGBT rights in Slovenia has been smoother, but the active resistance in Poland will not necessary yield successes for opponents of these rights. Seidman’s argument, that the “power of the state was mobilized to keep homosexuals socially invisible and publically scandalized,” (Seidman 2004, 247; Weeks 2000) was particularly true of the politics of the communist state (Chetaille 2011; Kubica 2009, 136). Yet, in contexts like post-Cold War Europe, invisibility is more detrimental to the objectives of the LGBT movement than active deliberation fueled by resistance. Instead of keeping the issue hidden, the mobilization of an anti-LGBT resistance indirectly puts it on the agenda as something that needs to be deliberated in terms of appropriateness. Paradoxically, resistance movements themselves reaffirm and cement the notion that being European is equivalent to respecting LGBT rights.

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234 Most prominently among them are issues of national identity, like the role of religion, that make a state more or less likely to associate ‘accepting LGBT rights’ with its role as an EU member-state.

235 While the French Revolution may have severed the Church from the state (and only 5% of the French population regularly attends Church), the state’s attempt to establish a single creed of nation cemented Catholicism in the nation (Zaretsky 2013). Zaretsky cites Tocqueville in his comparison of American pluralism to French nationalism, arguing that the Church is paradoxically more relevant for resistance to LGBT rights in France.
CHAPTER 6
Conclusion: A Politics of Visibility

“... [C]ome out, stand up and let that world know. That would do more to end prejudice overnight than anybody would imagine. I urge them to do that, urge them to come out. Only that way will we start to achieve our rights.”

—Harvey Milk, Gay Rights Activist and Politician, 1977

In the 1980s, activists of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) in New York coined the slogan “Silence = Death,” an expression that came to define much of the LGBT movement in that decade. In the spirit of Harvey Milk’s philosophy, which rejected what he called a “conspiracy of silence,” the activists were responding to the Reagan Administration’s silence on the HIV-AIDS epidemic that had brought the gay community to its knees. Above the words “Silence = Death,” activists added a pink triangle to their logo, symbolizing the patch that National Socialists in Europe forced gay concentration camp prisoners to wear during the Second World War. In its historical context, the symbol evoked the same theme of silence and death: in the 1940s, the silence of a nation and the silence of a social group resulted in death in the camps of Dachau, just as it did in the hospital beds of Chelsea in the 1980s. At various points during the 20th century, members of a marginalized group who had the unique ability to disguise their sexual orientation were compelled to come out, to act up, and to make themselves visible.

This dissertation has explored the effect of such visibility on the state and societal recognition of LGBT people across states in the European region. I set out to explain two broad questions: How do international norms spread? and Why do societies and states embrace change in some cases and not others? The overarching empirical conclusion of this analysis is simple, but consequential: norm visibility affects the political efficacy of marginalized groups and their ability to place demands on their societies and states. In a reverse logic similar to that of the “Silence = Death” campaign, it is this notion of visibility that has driven the primary explanation for the transnational diffusion of rights to minority groups. Visibility empowers social groups occupying the political margins, moving them to the center of political debate and public recognition and making it possible for them to obtain rights to which they have claim. Before the terms lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender can become politically salient identity markers, they must become visible. The interpersonal relationships that form among people who come to openly identify as LGB or T and the actors who are mobilized as a result of this process are a testament to the effect that visibility has on the ability of minority groups to assert themselves and to demand recognition from their societies and states. For the spread of human rights to new domestic contexts, visibility has its roots in both domestic and transnational sources. People become empowered to act because of the transnational channels that make such norms visible. This is particularly true for those hailing from contexts where LGBT rights are not part of the popular discourse.

Empirical evidence related to the LGBT movement has substantiated the visibility argument, demonstrating that differences in the transnational channels of visibility yielded differing degrees of LGBT recognition across states and societies.
Since there is an asymmetry in political will and information between first mover states—those in which norms developed earlier—and new adopters, these transnational channels of visibility have become critical for the diffusion of LGBT norms. When activated, direct, indirect, and brokered channels can make hidden political issues visible. Subsequently, it is that visibility which creates the political resonance of international norms in domestic politics that can lead to compliance and gradual internalization. The extent of a state’s openness to international organizations and social information flows has consistently demonstrable effects on diffusion because it enables new ideas to enter the domestic discourse, fueling deliberation and learning in the domestic sphere.

Furthermore, the degree to which domestic actors are embedded in transnational advocacy networks illuminates the issue and shapes the speed and direction of diffusion. These domestic LGBT advocates—or norm brokers—who connect new adopters to advocacy groups in first mover states are of central importance due to variability in domestic societal interpretations of new LGBT norms. Norm brokers make the norm salient by connecting activists and grafting international ideas to domestic ones, framing the message to fit locally. Not only do they redistribute resources and know-how across borders, they also connect with external elites that have the power to sanction states for noncompliance. My findings make a strong case for the effect that these transnational actors, and the movements they substantiate, have on the ability of norms to become visible and salient in the domestic discourse, especially when confronted with domestic resistance.

In sum, an international norm may exist, but its felt intensity varies across contexts due to (in)visibility. States differ in the degree to which norms become visible
depending in large part on the channels that connect the domestic sphere across borders. Indeed, for LGBT people in many closed and unresponsive domestic contexts, transnational venues provide the only real avenue for initial political influence at home. The transnational channels of LGBT visibility have been effective. Socio-political channels and the presence of local LGBT actors who are embedded in transnational networks have found success in making the norm visible by signaling to state and society that compliance with the norm is part of what it means to be a member of European society. These successes have occurred in the most unexpected of cases, as we witness a rapid, unmistakable shift in both attitudes toward and legislation concerning LGBT people across some parts of Europe, Latin America and North America.

Building off the idea that distinctive domestic contexts and social groups attach different degrees of perceived threat to external norms, this dissertation has also examined how perceived threat moderates norm reception. Thus, the diffusion of international norms is often non-linear, as threat perceptions play an important role in the success or failure of norm internalization. Norms that are perceived as having originated in external contexts meet the most resistance in states where societal identities are rooted in nationalism. In these cases, opponents frame their reasons for rejecting contentious norms as based on their objectionable challenges to national identity. This process reveals a great deal about resistance and backlash, with such outcomes being most likely in contexts of ostensible threat. Paradoxically, however, resistance is also a source of domestic visibility. LGBT movements have, in most cases, bounced back from heightened opposition to find successes following waves of resistance.
Interview accounts of proponents on both sides of the LGBT issue emphasized the importance of visibility—of “coming out” not just as individuals but as a collective—to the LGBT movement’s ability to influence change. Coming out is a process for making the invisible visible and, in the process, cashing in on the human rights and dignity movement that has marked European and world politics since 1945. While “coming out” is often associated with the LGBT experience, it is not limited to that domain. Visibility has been paramount to the recognition of other movements mounted by subordinate groups: consider an example from recent American history, when undocumented immigrants used the term “coming out” to mobilize the historic waves of immigrant protest. While fears of deportation had long silenced them, immigrant rights now occupy a prominent position on the policy agenda. Women’s entry into the paid labor force and out of the invisibility of the home provides another powerful example. It is this transnational process of “coming out” as a group that empowers marginalized people, mobilizing actors to demand change and influencing the spread of norms. Studying the LGBT movement is just one way to gain traction on this process.

Invisibility, by contrast, has either failed to awaken or effectively halted the path toward recognition for marginalized groups. We can observe a politics of invisibility in the “poor people’s movement” in the United States during the last 40 years, which has moved from regulating to disciplining and finally incarcerating the poor and thus making the poor and their grievances largely invisible (Alexander 2012; Piven and Cloward 1977; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). Similarly, scholars have argued that the disproportionate incarceration of Hispanic and African American men is a strategy to make these groups less visible and ultimately to control them (Pattillo,
Weiman, and Western 2004). Invisibility also tells us much about the differential power dynamics between subgroups within minority categories (Beltrán 2010; Strolovitch 2007). For example, Polish Parliamentarian, Anna Grodzka, describes the relative invisibility that transgender people continue to face as a group, both within society at large and within the LGBT movement:

… high visibility illustrates a strange paradox that we as transgender people experience daily. We are highly visible [physically]\textsuperscript{237} and yet almost invisible [politically] at the same time… as a social group our voice is rarely heard (Grodzka 2013).

While Grodzka alludes to the high day-to-day visibility of individuals who live out their identity as transgender people, her emphasis is on the vast invisibility that transgender people experience as a group. Such invisibility had muted the group’s ability to assert itself politically; it is only recently that the “T” has been added to the acronyms of many LGBT groups.\textsuperscript{238} The same dynamics of invisibility characterize the exclusion of LGBT people of color and LGBT immigrants, who remain targets of discrimination and who are often disproportionately powerless. For example, the popular perception that Muslim immigrant communities are more homophobic than white majorities in several European countries has rendered LGBT immigrants largely invisible (Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens 2010): if immigrants are painted as homophobes, there remains no space for LGBT immigrants to exist. Such processes of

\textsuperscript{237} She elaborates: “Individually you often can't miss us. On a bus or in the street many trans people stand out, even if we would like to pass as a woman or a man. And because we are easy to spot, we are easy to bully. I have lost count of the number of times I have been shouted at in the street or felt threatened by unwanted attention from drunk men who think it’s funny to ridicule someone who looks different from the norm. Most of my trans friends report similar treatment” (Grodzka 2013).

\textsuperscript{238} Similarly, the International Day Against Homophobia (IDAHO) only added “and Transphobia” (IDAHOT) in 2013.
invisibility have hampered the development of elements that are crucial to attaining rights, such as forming interpersonal relationships within societies, mobilizing actors for change, and establishing ties to the sympathetic elites who might help further a group’s cause. In the end, this dissertation has spoken to the politics of visibility and invisibility and how it can hasten or impede social change.

**LGBT RIGHTS AND THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF DIFFUSION**

More recently scholars have begun to thoroughly investigate the links between international norms and socio-political change in world politics. Yet studies that theorize both state-level norm compliance and societal-level internalization remain rare, as are multi-method studies that explore both correlation and mechanism across a multitude of cases. The empirical case of LGBT norms offers a unique platform from which to address many of these concerns. Not only do sexual minorities exist in all societies, the contemporary LGBT movement provides scholars with observable consequences of norm diffusion that can be systematically isolated and analyzed. The case of LGBT norms thus offers both theoretical and empirical novelties that further our understanding of change in world politics.

The empirical realities surrounding the spread of LGBT rights clearly challenge many of the theoretical accounts that exist in the literature. The questions I posed at the outset were not answered by traditional explanations for diffusion and social change, such as differences in international pressures, the fit between domestic and international norms, modernization, or low implementation costs. Although conventional explanations helped me to gain traction on the questions, they fell short of explaining the timing and patterns of diffusion I observed in the examined cases.
For instance, scholars of international relations have argued international norms diffuse when they fit with domestic norms. In a review of the field, Price (2003, 593) provocatively asked whether “transnational advocacy is likely to work best where it is needed the least.” This dissertation has shown that transnational advocacy can work where it is needed (see also, Evangelista 1999); despite the contentious element of the norm, highly surprising ‘misfits’ do change. We see this in success stories, such as Spain and Portugal, two religious Catholic countries that are among the world’s leaders on LGBT rights. Among equally secular countries where we might expect more rapid adoption, we observe drastically divergent outcomes—norm resistance in Latvia and norm internalization in the Czech Republic, for example. Other types of misfits involve strong democracies that have struggled to adopt basic measures to protect the rights of LGBT minorities, while lesser democracies have.

Rational institutional models rooted primarily in cost-benefit logic also fail to explain the variation in the spread of LGBT norms. The expectation that human rights norms are more easily transmitted when they come with carrots, such as access to the bundle of economic benefits accompanying EU membership, is clearly challenged by the active opposition that states have levied against formal EU demands to protect LGBT people. In one case, Poland boldly ‘opted-out’ of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights using a contrived rationale of protecting the state from having to implement same-sex unions. The Charter did not require any state to recognize same-sex unions. Finally, I did not observe the type of isomorphism around LGBT rights that world polity scholars would expect. While the insights of this theoretical framework buttress my own understanding of the phenomena I analyzed, the theory

239 A notable exception is the work by Seybert (2012).
itself cannot account for the extensive variation that I have charted, even in a region as receptive to transnationalism and norm diffusion as Europe.

By bridging insights from different fields of knowledge, which are often analyzed separately, the explanation offered here addresses many of these limitations and develops our theoretical understanding of diffusion processes and change. The shortcomings of the theoretical approaches described above largely reflect the omission of crucial concepts and mechanisms that the visibility argument uncovers. Sociological accounts of the world polity, for example, fail to theorize the agency of norm brokers or the mechanism of deliberation. International relations approaches often fail to theorize both relational and non-relational channels of diffusion. Frequently, both of these approaches overlook the internal domestic dynamics that moderate norm diffusion, such as the presence of LGBT advocates as norm brokers, resistance, backlash, and movement-countermovement relationships. Finally, there is a tendency among separate academic fields to explore only compliance or internalization, which limits the potential of any analysis of transnational change. International norms concerning marginalized people are clearly intended to influence both state and society.

This dissertation also makes an empirical contribution as the first systematic, multi-method analysis of both social and legal change concerning sexual minorities across multiple domestic contexts. The transnational mobilization of LGBT people and the development and spread of LGBT rights norms offer a unique platform from which to study processes of change in international relations and contentious politics, as it has truly “emerged at the heart of global political struggles over culture and identity” (Kollman and Waites 2009, 1). Despite the extensive research on
transnational activism and the human rights regime, however, few political scientists have studied the transnational LGBT movement or normative changes concerning sexual minorities. The existing studies on LGBT rights generally focus on a small set of cases using ethnographic or qualitative methodology. In cases where quantitative analysis has been employed, they are limited to one type of LGBT legislation or only explore attitudes towards homosexuality; and because their scope is too large and case studies are not employed, they generally sidestep the mechanisms behind the correlations they chart. Finally, the existing research on LGBT politics often leaves issues of resistance unexplored—a serious drawback, considering the contested nature of the norm and the backlash it commonly engenders.

Methodologically, the dissertation utilized an analytically eclectic approach, combining large-n quantitative analysis with in-depth qualitative analysis of key cases to examine the mechanisms linking the transnational diffusion of contentious norms to compliance and internalization. This included the analysis of three datasets: an original Europe-wide dataset on five different pieces of LGBT legislation, an original survey of the 291 transnational LGBT organizations in Europe, and an international survey of attitudes toward LGBT people. The qualitative chapters of this dissertation were based on 82 semi-structured interviews with proponents and opponents of LGBT rights, archival research, and close observation of LGBT and anti-LGBT movement activity. Moreover, this dissertation is unique because it combines state-, group- and individual-level analyses and compares their relative effects. Considering these levels of analysis in tandem with one another advances our understanding of the diffusion process. For example, by theorizing the way transnational diffusion is mediated

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240 A notable exception is the work of Tina Fetner (2008), who carefully explores the dynamic of
through attitudes of individuals organized in social groups, comparing that mediation to other mechanisms that scholars have identified (e.g., geographic distance or political sanction), and measuring the relative impact of such mechanisms. While the field has taken great strides in calling for multi-method research designs that explore both “why” and “how,” the application of designs that take both variables and mechanisms seriously is still relatively rare.

Having considered the contributions that this dissertation has sought to make, let us now turn to the various components of its central argument and its broader implications for scholarship in international relations, contentious politics, and comparative politics. Thereafter, I will explore the application of the argument beyond the European context and address several questions—both explicit and implicit—that the dissertation raises.

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE VISIBILITY ARGUMENT**

Taken together, the dissertation’s empirical chapters drive the core visibility argument, and its various nuances, across a set of cases. They explore variation in the presence of transnational channels (supply; Chapters 2-4), domestic resonance (demand; Chapter 5), and the mechanisms of norm brokerage, learning, framing, and deliberation (for and against the spread of LGBT rights; Chapters 2 and 5) that allow the transnational and domestic levels to intersect for successful diffusion. Not only do the findings chart the empirical developments related to the LGBT movement in Europe, they also have far-reaching implications for theory building related to key concepts in the field. This section reflects on fundamental aspects of the argument as contending movements surrounding LGBT mobilization in the United States.
they relate to Europeanization political opportunities, transnational actors, diffusion, state compliance, societal internalization, threat perceptions, and domestic resonance.

**Cooperative Transnationalism: Political Opportunities and Transnational Actors**

Chapter 2 explored how Europeanization impacts the mobilization of marginalized citizens. It shows how LGBT activism relies on transnational resources—primarily, social spaces and organizational capacity, which are scarce in many member-states but readily available in others—to mobilize. Cross-border mobility in Europe has largely given sexual minorities access to LGBT life in external contexts. Though LGBT expression and identity are rooted in distinct domestic experiences, some LGBT experiences travel. Horizontal opportunities among states, alongside top-down, vertical ones provided by Brussels, served as mobilizing structures that united distinct groups of transnational actors, mediating new transnational channels of visibility for LGBT rights. The key actors involved include the political elites often seen in studies of Europeanization, but also the rooted cosmopolitans and foreign publics that work with and engage local actors in target states. Horizontal opportunities are especially critical for fueling non-institutionalized and high-visibility activism that result in deliberation and learning in the target state.

There are several reasons why these claims apply to LGBT norm brokers. When domestic organizations join transnational LGBT networks, they become connected to actors in states with advanced resources. These networks are crucial, because they aid domestic organizations; channeling know-how, financial resources, avenues for political pressure, a voice with which to attract media attention, and
foreign publics that can be mobilized for action in various contexts.\textsuperscript{241} Marginalized groups have established ties to first mover contexts, and such transnational cooperation can open access to political opportunities outside of the nation state. The horizontal ties established by norm brokers are a theoretically neglected but empirically critical aspect of Europeanization in contemporary politics.

In addition to exploring the Europeanization of opportunities and actors, the chapter used interview accounts to explore the mechanisms by which transnational cooperation can influence outcomes. Transnational cooperation alters the tactics that transnational actors use when they engage authorities and society in the target state. In the case of Europe, norm brokers tactically framed their demands by fusing the issue of LGBT acceptance with the democratic responsibilities associated with membership in the European polity. Strategically packaging ideas for a given audience was imperative when taking into consideration the strongly held views in opposition to the LGBT norm. Having “European” frames at their disposal, norm brokers could borrow from international scripts and graft this highly contentious norm to the domestic context.

As this analysis has shown, Poland provides an illustrative case in which to observe change. It has rapidly attained a high-level of fluency on LGBT issues, despite

\textsuperscript{241} A recent example from Romania exhibits all of these trends, with norm brokers drawing international attention to LGBT discrimination, framing their opposition in a European discourse, and taking political action. In 2010, the ACCEPT Association, a transnationally-linked Romanian LGBT organization, brought a case against George Becali to the European Court of Justice (Berbec-Rostas 2013). Becali, a Romanian politician and owner of a soccer club, had made public statements opposing the transfer and employment of a rumored gay soccer player in his club. The Court’s ruling in favor of ACCEPT, placed Romania’s implementation of the EU’s anti-discrimination directive under scrutiny and has already had far-reaching implications. It placed LGBT rights on the agenda of the Romanian equality body and encouraged proposed amendments to the anti-discrimination act. The prominence of Becali’s figure has also spurred a societal discourse, with LGBT advocates hammering home a central message: “homophobia has no place in sports, has no place in employment, and has no place in a \textit{European} state” (Berbec-Rostas 2013; emphasis added).
the fact that domestic political opportunities were closed and the LGBT issue had minimal popular visibility at the turn of the century. According to the president of the Campaign Against Homophobia (KPH), even the Polish language signaled that invisibility: “My first activity with KPH in Krakow was producing a leaflet and distributing it in the main square. I realized only later that MSWord in Polish didn’t recognize the word ‘homophobia’ and auto-translated it incorrectly on every leaflet” (interview no. 140). The situation has changed remarkably in the ten years since transnational activism began to flourish, and increased visibility fomented deliberation in the domestic context. Similar dynamics play out across the region, as the LGBT issue moved from invisibility to visibility in some states. The way in which such change has emerged relies, in large part, on the activation of transnational channels.

In February 2013, a young organization of Balkan activists called Kampange Solidarnost hosted a meeting at the SchwuZ,\textsuperscript{242} one of Berlin’s social spaces that Polish activists had plastered with flyers calling for mobilization in Poland in 2005 (group no. 210). Like their Polish counterparts before them, the activists of Solidarnost gathered sympathetic ears to draw attention to the situation of LGBT people in the Balkans and to discuss how to move forward after the violent repression of the 2012 Belgrade Pride event. Solidarnost is one of many examples of a cooperative transnationalism that has helped to unite disparate actors and to facilitate a movement that thinks outside of national and geographic boundaries.

\textsuperscript{242} Short for SchwulenZentrum, or Gay Center, was founded in 1977. It grew out of an initiative to create a meeting place for communication by the Homosexuelle Aktion West-Berlin (HAW)—an organization symbolic of the birth of the German gay liberation movement in 1971.
Interpersonal Relationships

In addition to signaling to the states that accepting LGBT norms is associated with part of their membership in the international society, the visibility of LGBT people leads to the fundamentally important role of interpersonal relationships between societies and LGBT minorities. While these relationships vary tremendously across states—for example, 3% of Romanians report having interpersonal contact with LGBT people compared to 69% of the Dutch (Council of Europe 2011)—transnational processes can help such ties form, both relationally and non-relationally. First, they connect sexual minorities across borders. These include the rooted cosmopolitans who mobilize and organize in foreign contexts and return home to demand change. They also include LGBT people who are mobilized in solidarity to march in foreign contexts. For example, at the EuroPride in Warsaw, “visitors from abroad said they’d come specifically because they’d heard the situation for gays in Poland was bad. ‘I wouldn’t go on a gay pride march in Brussels,’ said [an attendee] from Belgium” (Cragg 2010). Second, international norms dispense ideas and images about novel identities that give people models to invoke when they come out in their own respective contexts. A member of Lambda Warsaw described a situation in Poland that echoes what representatives of LGBT organizations across many new adopter states expressed in interviews:

Individual level surveys have shown that knowing LGBT people has a tremendous effect on the political landscape for LGBT in the nation state: “It is quite stunning how potent an influence diversity in one’s social circle is upon attitudes to minorities... When rating out of 10 how comfortable (with 10 being completely comfortable) they would feel with an LGBT person attaining the highest elected office the land, those with LGBT friends gave an average rating of 8.5, while those without gave an average rating of 5.5—a significantly lower rating. This sort of finding is now consistent across three waves of this Eurobarometer study and is, no doubt, going to continue being so” (European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 317, “Discrimination in the EU”, 2009, p. 119).
Polish homosexuals live hidden and in fear. Our organization, however, wants our presence recognized in society, that we are here, we are sending a signal to gays and lesbians: you are visible and get used to it. It is the end of silence, the end of hiding in the closet (Voxerbrant 2004, cited in Kubica 2009, 136–137).

Third, heterosexual majorities who observe and experience different forms of acceptable sexual expression are also influenced by the visibility of LGBT people. The American ambassador to Albania, Alexander Arvizu, describes the importance of visibility for LGBT acceptance and how international involvement can be most effective in its role as a facilitator (as opposed to a sanctioning role):

Change in Albania, I believe, will come when families and friends are able to put faces to the term ‘LGBT.’ I am always impressed at how people’s impression of LGBT individuals changes, when they have an opportunity to get to know them, when they discover a good friend is gay or lesbian, or when they work with them. LGBT individuals in Albania are their own best ambassadors. We are looking merely for ways to support them and their message of tolerance (Pinderi 2013).

The visibility of norms governing LGBT rights provides the foundation for the interpersonal relationships that psychological and sociological studies have found to play an important role in tolerance for LGBT people.

_Compliance and Internalization: Socialization in International Relations_

Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated the universality of these processes by examining the effect that transnational channels have on legal and social change in cross-national statistical analyses. Beyond brokered channels, these chapters also tested the effects of other relational and non-relational channels—namely, political,
social, economic, geographic, and shared identification. Exploring the dynamics of socio-legal change for LGBT people across states, these chapters demonstrated that, when activated, a set of transnational channels fosters the visibility of international norms that can lead to compliance and eventual internalization in domestic politics. Some channels, however, are more effective than others, which should influence how we think about processes of compliance and internalization more broadly.

Throughout, the channels most effective in influencing change are those that function through mechanisms of socialization. Sanctioning mechanisms for change are also active, but their effects are generally more limited. In the case of LGBT rights, the latter are only strongly influential before accession; and they can spawn resistance and signify paternalism in domestic contexts where they find little resonance. By contrast, the social channels connecting transnational and domestic spheres are highly effective throughout the periods analyzed here. They empower local minority actors with legitimacy and resources (both discursive, human, and material). While activists note that “the influence of the EU is huge” (interview no. 138), they emphasize that it is transmitted through the social mechanisms of learning and deliberation. It also occurs indirectly via aid to domestic and transnational civil society. “What you get with the EU is dialogue,” a dialogue that is new in many of the contexts analyzed in this study (interview no. 126).

Specifically, Chapter 3 suggested that more porous states were more likely to adopt pro-LGBT legislation and also pointed to different processes of norm diffusion to first mover and to new adopter states. The findings demonstrated that first mover states relied less on transnational channels for adopting pro-LGBT legislation than did new adopter states. While only social transnational channels also had a strong effect in
first mover states, the domestic variables of democracy level and economic affluence were robust predictors of adopting pro-LGBT legislation there. For the diffusion of LGBT legislation to new adopter states, all transnational channels were beneficial to diffusion, while the domestic variables of religion, modernization, and level of democracy were not. The brokered ties between norm entrepreneurs were also particularly influential in the new adopter states.

More broadly, authorities—especially in new adopter states—seem to be attracted to internationally visible issues, even if the domestic debate concerning the LGBT rights norm remains unresolved. States care about their image on the world stage and are likely to make changes when their international society encourages them to do so. Since President Obama first expressed his support for same-sex marriage in 2012, for example, five countries\(^\text{244}\) have passed such legislation. For better or for worse, the visibility of the marriage issue has brought it to the fore of the political agenda, even in countries where LGBT movements did not include same-sex marriage among their top priorities. In sum, Chapter 3 showed that the visibility of LGBT people—even in external contexts—can translate into political salience that state authorities respond to in new adopting states.

Like state compliance with pro-LGBT laws, the results also suggest that the societal internalization of norms governing LGBT rights is largely rooted in a process of transnational socialization. For example, a 2012 survey in Ireland—another Catholic country with a legacy of intense opposition to LGBT rights—indicated that 75 percent of Irish citizens said that they would vote “yes” on a referendum to legalize

\(^{244}\) The five countries are Denmark, Brazil, Uruguay, France, and New Zealand. Nepal, Luxembourg, England, Whales, and Scotland have legislation in progress.
same-sex marriage (Kennedy 2013). Of those supporters, most used an international frame of reputation followed by a more general will to promote tolerance:

…two out of three people said they felt Ireland’s reputation as a modern society will be strengthened by allowing same-sex couples to have civil marriages, while three out of five people agree that allowing same-sex couples to have civil marriages will promote a more tolerant environment in Ireland (Kennedy 2013, emphasis added).

The findings in Chapter 4 supported these ideas. Evidence showed that societal majorities are aware of and respond to international cues of appropriateness concerning norms on minority rights. The channels of visibility that tie porous states to the international community explained much of the variation in changed societal attitudes toward gay and lesbian people. They also help to fuel processes of societal deliberation and learning in the domestic realm. According to the results of the statistical models presented in this chapter, roughly 70 percent of the variation is explained by these macro-level factors, as opposed to individual-level variation. However, transnational visibility influences various social groups differently. The chapter highlighted the important manner in which threat perceptions can hinder processes of norm internalization. Individuals embedded in groups that socialize them to perceive the norm as threatening—based on the logic that it challenges their religious and national identities—are consistently more reluctant to adopt favorable attitudes toward homosexuality. Among these “high threat perception” groups, change is more gradual, and increased transnational channels can lead to a phase of worsening attitudes toward homosexuals. In these times of heightened international visibility of LGBT people, we should expect more positive attitudes among societies in states that
are most closely tied to the international community. That said, we should see variation in the degree to which individuals will change their positions, based on the levels of perceived threat that their social groups ascribe to the norm.

Finally, a practical implication of the visibility argument is that laws like the proposed anti-gay propaganda law in Russia are an impediment to diffusion because they criminalize visibility, blocking both deliberation and learning. As an ILGA activist notes: “it’s about being open about speaking, and that’s why exactly these laws in Moldova, Ukraine and Russia are very dangerous because they would prevent the debate” (“Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania Anti-gay Criticism” 2012). Furthermore, if visibility matters for change and acceptance, then activism that targets the public sphere—like pride parades—should also be supported by proponents of LGBT rights, even when they initially produce a societal backlash. Proponents of LGBT rights should proceed carefully so as not to over-institutionalize LGBT activism and to, thus, avoid removing the issue from public debate.

*Threat Perceptions and Domestic Resistance*

The visibility argument required that I establish systematic differences between the degree of transnational channels—both relational and non-relational—and the diffusion of norms governing LGBT rights, which I demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4. The analysis also showed that states differ from one another in terms of their own internal responses to LGBT norms. Chapter 5 addressed and expanded upon this issue by exploring differences in threat perception across two contexts. In doing so, I explored the different domestic political dynamics that occur in reaction to new norms. There, I argued that transnational channels, even when they are strong, are moderated by differing perceptions of threat—which in the LGBT case is at the intersection of
national identity and religion—that produce different responses to international norms. Norms come to be perceived as more “external” in some cases, rather than in others. Using Poland and Slovenia as case studies, I compared differences in socio-legal outcomes for LGBT people and mobilized resistance against LGBT norms. I found that when religion is deeply rooted in national identity, resistance to outside norms is heightened. The history of the Catholic Church in Poland—including its close ties to the political apparatus of the state and its role in Polish democratization—have given the Church’s opposition much currency in Poland. In Slovenia, the Church is not closely linked to the popular nation and, thus, lacked the legitimacy to effectively reject LGBT norms.

Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 5 showed that domestic resistance to LGBT norms is an instigator of issue visibility and the political salience of norms. Resistance movements can ironically support the visibility of LGBT norms by fueling active deliberation in the domestic realm. As this deliberation begins, anti-LGBT movements have two critical handicaps when compared to their LGBT movement counterparts. First, resistance movements generally include a broad spectrum of societal actors, including ones violent in their approach. Second, the agendas of resistance movements are rooted in a nationalist philosophy that generally precludes any desire to establish transnational ties. Many members of the anti-LGBT resistance willingly dismiss the cross-border vertical and horizontal constellations that have done so much for channeling support and framing the arguments of LGBT movements.

In sum, these findings not only substantiate the importance of visibility for the spread of LGBT rights, they also highlight the often non-linear nature of policy change, which many studies of diffusion neglect. By looking at processes within the
state, I found additional evidence that the development of state and societal responses to international norms governing LGBT rights depended on levels of the norm’s visibility and on the nature of domestic perceptions of threat associated with the norm. The findings should, thus, encourage scholars of diffusion to attend to the internal domestic dynamics of the state: the norm brokers that tie the domestic and the transnational context, the differing levels of threat perception (defined in part by the unique relationships between the church, the state, and the nation), and the varying degrees of resistance in domestic realms and their relationships to the LGBT movement. The analogy of diffusion—from the field of biology—is problematic because it assumes that molecules diffuse into an empty space.²⁴⁵ For political scientists and sociologists, “empty spaces” do not exist in our objects of study, certainly not for the diffusion of contentious norms.

MOVING FORWARD

Beyond “Europe”: The Regional and Global Dynamics of Norm Diffusion

In describing and explaining norm diffusion, the findings related here have been primarily rooted in the European experience. I chose to conduct this study in Europe because it provides the ideal scope conditions for exploring broadly applicable causal relationships and associated mechanisms. As such, I hope that Europe offers a solid foundation for understanding more general processes as opposed to obscuring them. With the spread of various types of LGBT rights and increasingly evolved societal attitudes, we observe some similar dynamics at play across some parts of the globe. For example, since Denmark introduced same-sex civil unions in 1989, more than twenty states have followed suit. Furthermore, eleven countries now recognize

²⁴⁵ Thanks to Rahul Rao for this analogy.
same-sex marriage at the federal level.\textsuperscript{246} Perhaps most impressively, Latin America has made rapid and pronounced changes on several forms of LGBT rights in recent years (Kohut 2013). In this case, Friedman (2012) has demonstrated the successful role that Spanish LGBT actors have played—particularly, in Argentina—spreading ideas about how to promote LGBT rights and how to obtain the resources necessary to do it. She also taps into the dynamics of network ties and diffusion (between first movers and new adopters).

Any space devoted to considering avenues for future research, however, should reflect on parts of the argument that should remain limited to Europe, as well as those that might travel elsewhere. Uganda and Russia represent two cases that have attracted scholarly attention for reasons of a different dynamic—a heightened level of political homophobia via diffusion. I will turn to these difficult cases to discuss aspects of the visibility argument that hold in these contexts and to examine the issues they introduce which may lead to avenues for further study.

\textbf{Uganda.} The events surrounding Uganda’s “Kill the Gays Bill” and the murder of David Kato, a Ugandan LGBT activist, have placed Africa—and Uganda in particular—on the radar of LGBT activism and scholarship, most of which follows a narrative about the export of political homophobia. Scholars are correct to highlight what they see as a double-edged sword of diffusion: transnational homophobia is used to inhibit progress on LGBT rights even as some other parts of the globe experience

\textsuperscript{246} Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, South Africa, and Sweden. Furthermore, in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, some sub-national jurisdictions afford same-sex couples marriage rights. In Asia, some commentators expect that Vietnam may have the support of enough delegates to introduce same-sex marriage to the legislative agenda in 2014 (Maresca 2013). Some have attributed Vietnam’s receptiveness to LGBT norms—despite its generally poor human rights record—to the presence of established LGBT activist organizations and the muted influence of religion in Vietnamese politics (Maresca 2013).
one of the most rapid shifts toward the social and legal recognition of LGBT minorities in history.

Africa is distinct from Europe in that regional structures do not have a normative consensus on LGBT rights. The African Union institutions do not moderate this domestic debate the way that the European Union does. There is also a rational, historically rooted suspicion related to adopting “Western” ways of doing things. This provides the conservative opposition with strong ammunition with which to resist LGBT norms (even if the LGBT movement, itself, has a long history as a grassroots movement that has worked without the support of—and often in opposition to—powerful states of the Global North). While opposition to European norms highlights national frames invoked by the opposition in Europe, in Africa opposing forces also draw upon pan-regional frames that denounce meddling in African affairs. These are critical factors that dispel the unfounded notion that domestic politics are reactionary while transnational politics are progressive. Furthermore, they highlight the caution we must take in describing “global” successes of LGBT rights.

I suspect this dissertation has yielded important findings that contribute to the debate in contexts extending beyond Europe, including Africa. First, transnational diffusion—be it linked to homophobia or to LGBT norms—has strong transnational and domestic components. It is clear that the domestic developments made in these contexts cannot be separated from transnational processes. Just as scholars are correct to attribute the politicization of homophobia in Uganda to heightened transnational involvement by American conservatives (transnational), they would be wrong to ignore the numerous domestic roots of Ugandan homophobia. Second, a fundamental and overlooked reason why Uganda has captured scholarly and popular attention is
that channels tie an active and engaged Ugandan LGBT activist community to a transnational network of pro-LGBT groups. Mirroring the reasons why Poland became exemplar of LGBT oppression in Europe, despite the fact that other cases score equally poorly on measures of LGBT recognition, Ugandan norm brokers are well connected across borders. These actors may be equally—if not more—responsible for the issue’s visibility than are the American missionaries who involve themselves in Ugandan politics. Like their European counterparts, Ugandan and transnational LGBT activists (norm brokers) captured the world’s attention by publicizing the issue; however, scholarly and popular debates often overlook their agency and efficacy. Despite domestic repression, LGBT Ugandans are marching on the streets more than they did before (Okeowo 2012) and the “Kill the Gays Bill” was put on ice in part due to strong reprimands from various transnational actors, including the European Commission and Parliament. On the ground, observers note that “the dynamics of being gay in Uganda have changed” (Okeowo 2012). African LGBT politics highlight strong regional differences to Europe, yet they are similar in that a combination of domestic and transnational currents factor into new discourses on LGBT rights.

**Russia.** Russia is a case marred by low LGBT visibility—only 11% of Russians claim to have homosexual friends or relatives (“87% of Russians Oppose Same Sex Marriage and Gay Parades” 2013)—and high threat perception regarding LGBT norms. Like the tie between the Catholic Church and the notion of “Polishness” that heightened threat perception in Poland, “Russians today view [Orthodox] Church affiliation as a way to reaffirm their ‘Russianness’” (Khazan 2013). While rates of religiosity are strikingly low in global comparison, Russians “are still incredibly supportive of the Orthodox Church, which wields power both politically, as an ally of
the Putin government, and as a symbol of national pride in much of the population” (Khazan 2013). In 2006, 60% of Russians claimed to be “nationalists” (Rees 2013).

Russia differs from Poland in that transnational pressures have not wielded the same level of political success during its era of zealous, anti-LGBT backlash. In June 2013, the Russian Duma unanimously passed an anti-gay propaganda bill, which fines individuals or organizations up to $31,000 for promoting homosexuality (Khazan 2013). The federal legislation is an extension of various city ordinances banning LGBT “propaganda,” which aroused ample international attention in 2012. Yet the Russian government remains undaunted by international efforts, even sending provocative threats to France and the United Kingdom, “warning that both countries’ equal marriage plans will hinder the ability of their citizens to adopt Russian children” (Rees 2013). At the societal level, recent polls show similarly disapproving positions on LGBT people. For example, “16% of respondents thought that gay people should be isolated from society, 22% thought there should be compulsory treatment for them and 5% thought that homosexuals should be ‘liquidated’” (“87% of Russians Oppose Same Sex Marriage and Gay Parades” 2013). In terms of legal rights and public assembly, “85% of Russians opposed same-sex marriage, 80% felt same-sex couples should not be granted adoption rights and 87% said they did not want gay pride parades to take place in Russian cities,” (“87% of Russians Oppose Same Sex Marriage and Gay Parades” 2013; Sansalone 2013).

The response is partly unsurprising in the sense that resistance is common when LGBT issues are new. The more states perceive these issues to be “external,” the
more resistance they will provoke. Resistance does not suggest, however, that change is unattainable. Instead, it is part of the process of internalization, which involves deliberation and learning. Nevertheless key differences remain between the cases of Russia and those within the EU. While LGBT activists are well connected to their European counterparts—one of the few established channels of LGBT visibility—they have not had at their disposal in-group frames of being “European.” I suspect that Russia’s political isolation from first mover norm entrepreneurs has greatly limited the socialization mechanisms of norm diffusion. International condemnation and worldwide demonstrations against homophobia in Russia have had no effect (group no. 208). While Russian activists—who the state has formally labeled “foreign agents”—remain optimistic that this form of defiant visibility is better than silence, they have had far greater difficulty combating domestic resistance amidst a protracted opposition. These happenings in Russia underscore the importance of regional differences and the limits of globalization, highlighting the argument that being in an in-group is immensely important to the spread of such norms (Checkel 2005; Deutsch 1957).

How transnational channels play out in other world regions should perplex and fascinate scholars of world politics for years to come, as norms governing LGBT

247 As much of the dissertation has argued, LGBT norms are contentious, and the dominant discourses in all modern societies have, at one point, deemed these issues to be threatening to the moral and/or national order.
248 A key example is the case Russian activists filed, following Bączkowski and Others vs. Poland, to win their European Court of Human Rights case. While Strasbourg reined in Poland’s bans on LGBT assembly, in Russia St. Petersburg quickly introduced gay-propaganda bans, and the city of Moscow banned LGBT parades for precisely one century.
249 In 2013, a St. Petersburg court formally referred to the Russian LGBT Organizations, “Выход,” as a foreign agent (“Суд Петербурга Признал ЛГБТ-организацию Иностранным Агентом” 2013) [article translated by colleague].
250 Hypothetically and retrospectively, the inclusion of Russia in NATO by Western powers in the 1990s may have paved a different path for LGBT recognition later.
rights continue to spread and to meet resistance in various corners of the globe. The current happenings in cases like Uganda and Russia hold implications for future research, which needs to explore the effects of anti-gay transnational activism, acknowledging that standards of appropriate behavior concerning sexual minorities smack of outside imposition to some and welcome modernity to others. It also seems quite clear that strong regional currents are at play and that we should not expect any type of global homogenization of LGBT recognition. In this sense, a central task for future study to explore is how distinct regions—their institutional structures, domestic understandings and political histories—mediate the effects of transnational channels of visibility. Other questions related to the global frames for LGBT recognition arise. What is the effect of LGBT activists’ approach to framing the debate on the global level—for example, having Latin American states propose pro-LGBT resolutions at the United Nations to remove the “Western” tinge of LGBT rights? How do activists navigate this in contexts in which “Western” norms are especially suspicious and alternative frames for activists are few? Finally, what types of risks does visibility entail in contexts that have high threat domestically and that lack identification with international communities of first mover states? I suspect that states must be embedded in international systems of knowledge that support LGBT norms for visibility to lead to positive outcomes for norm diffusion. The level of consensus at the macro-level should impact how deliberation in the domestic realm proceeds. For the spread of LGBT rights, it is important that states are part of a larger community in which the issue is championed.
This dissertation also provides a point of departure for another area of study: investigating the relative (in)visibility of subgroups within the LGBT categories and, more generally, the question of who is left out in the transnational diffusion of LGBT norms. Theorists (Binnie 2004; Kulpa and Mizielińska 2011; Puar 2007) have begun tackling these questions: Are certain countries (e.g., Poland), religions (e.g., Islam), and groups (e.g., immigrants) “othered” and excluded as LGBT identities become recognized—and arguably “normalized”—by states? Do more radical queer forms of expression also diffuse or are they precluded from transnational debates and identity categories that travel across borders? These questions will be important for theory building in international relations and contentious politics alike.

In this dissertation, I have attempted to broaden the scope of research in international and contentious politics by looking closely at an often-invisible group and its transnational interactions. In doing so, I hoped this study might extend and integrate existing scholarly agendas, while also yielding important implications for the contemporary expansion of LGBT rights. All societies include a sizeable population of sexual minorities, and the study of their recognition has powerful analytical and practical implications. For a movement that has gained considerable momentum in the last decade—arguably unprecedented in speed and suddenness, when compared to other human rights movements—this study offers a timely contribution to debates both scholarly and popular.

Several of these scholarly and popular accounts have examined recent global trends with awe. Was Victor Hugo right in the nineteenth century when he said “[n]othing can stop an idea whose time has come”? And, what does the LGBT
movement tell us about Cesar Chavez’s optimism for the civil rights movement: “Once social change begins, it cannot be reversed.... You cannot humiliate the person who feels pride. You cannot oppress the people who are not afraid anymore.” At this historical moment for LGBT rights, these remarks ring true for some sexual minorities in some contexts. Looking at the world around us, it might be difficult not to end on a note of modest optimism, but I wish to emphasize that such modest optimism should not overshadow the persistent oppression of LGBT peoples across societies, the resistance and threat provoked by LGBT norms, and the limits of transnational advocacy in many corners of the globe. What sets this dissertation apart from the discussions above is its hope for a holistic understanding of how and why this phenomenon may occur and its acknowledgment that it does not always occur.

What do the findings of this dissertation suggest for the more general trends of LGBT norm diffusion across certain segments of the globe? By way of a linear trajectory and specific timeframe, very little. Instead, we know that visibility can provoke both recognition and resistance; in many cases resistance follows visibility and precedes recognition. Yet, while the process will play out differently across contexts—with smooth processes of norm internalization most likely in contexts with low threat perception—there is little question that the state and social recognition of LGBT people will continue to spread in some world regions. And when it spreads, it will extend first to contexts within which norm brokers are active and to places that are highly connected to the international community through channels of visibility.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Figures

Figure 1.6. Variation in Attitudes towards Homosexuality between New and Old EU-Member States

![Boxplot showing variation in attitudes](image1)

*Note: Excluding Cyprus due to missing data*

Figure 1.7. Variation in Objections towards Homosexual Neighbors between New and Old EU States

![Bar chart showing variation in objections](image2)

Source: European Values Survey
Question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? Answer: Homosexuals
Survey Details

Administered October to December 2011.

One survey sent to each of the 291 transnationally linked LGBT member organizations of European LGBT organizations.

The universe of organizations and contact information of organization president or next highest representative obtained from archival fieldwork at ILGA International and IGLYO, then cross-checked with the online archives of ILGA-Europe.

Survey Questions

1. How many paid employees work for your organization?
[Select: 0-99]

2. How many volunteers work for your organization?
[Select: 0-100]

3. In your opinion, how much influence do European-level institutions – that is, institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on your country’s politics and policies related to the rights of sexual minorities? (Question adapted from O’Dwyer 2010)\textsuperscript{251}

3 - A lot of influence  
2 - Some influence  
1 - Not much influence  
9 - No answer or don’t know

4. In your opinion, how much influence do European-level institutions – that is, institutions like the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, or the European Court of Human Rights – have on what people in your country think about the rights of sexual minorities?

3 - A lot of influence  
2 - Some influence  
1 - Not much influence  
9 - No answer or don’t know

5. Do you recall approximately when newspapers and other mass media started to cover stories related to the question of sexual minority rights?

\textsuperscript{251} This question is adapted from a question formulated by O’Dwyer (2010, 236–237), and used in his survey (N=28) of Polish activists and politicians.
6. In your opinion, what best explains why these stories started to be covered at that time?

a - EU Pressures or EU Accession
b - Other International Pressures
c - Domestic Activism
d - National legislation dealing with LGBT issues
e - Other [space for free recall]
9 - No answer or don’t know

7. In your opinion, what has been the effect of your country introducing legislation that strengthens the rights and protection of sexual minorities?

4 - Substantial improvement in peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT peoples
3 - Some improvement in peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT peoples
2 - No change in peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT people
1 - Worsened peoples’ attitudes toward LGBT people
9 - No answer or don’t know

8. Please briefly comment on your perception of the process of change in societal attitudes toward LGBT individuals. For example, did attitudes improve/worsen immediately after LGBT issues became visible? Or did improved attitudes follow an initial backlash in attitudes when the issue was first introduced?

9. In your opinion, how does the rate of social and political change that has occurred in your country over the last 20 years compare to that of neighboring European countries?

10. In your opinion, how well defined is the LGBT movement in your country, in terms of its organization and the clarity of its goals? (Question adapted from O’Dwyer 2010)\textsuperscript{252}

3 - Well defined movement with clear, shared goals
2 - Somewhat defined with some goals, but little consensus about them
1 - Not very well defined and no clear goals
9 - No answer or don’t know

\textsuperscript{252} This question is adapted from a question formulated by O’Dwyer (2010, 236–237), and used in his survey (N=28) of Polish activists and politicians.
11. How closely does your organization cooperate with other L,G,B and/or T organizations in your country?

4 - Very close cooperation and shared goals
3 - Some cooperation
2 - No active cooperation
1 - Disputes among organizations and contradictory goals
9 - No answer or don’t know

12. On average in the last five years, what has been your organization’s approximate annual budget in Euros (please include grant money in your estimation)?

1 - Under 5,000
2 - 5,001-15,000
3 - 15,001-30,000
4 - 30,001-50,000
5 - 50,001-100,000
6 - 100,001-200,000
7 - 200,001-300,000
8 - 300,001-500,000
9 - 500,001-1,000,000
10 - Over 1,000,000
No answer or don’t know

13. What percentage of your funding comes from international/foreign sources? (For example, from international organizations, the governments of other countries or foreign civil society organizations.) What percentage comes from domestic sources? (For example, from the national government or domestic civil society organizations.)

[Sliding bars for (1) International/Foreign Funding Sources and (2) Domestic Funding Sources. For example, if the respondent attributes 60% of funding to foreign sources, the survey software will automatically attribute the remaining percentage (40%) to the domestic funding source bar.]

14. Please name the top 5 organizations/institutions/states that provide funding for your organization:

[Five spaces for free recall]

15. What percentage of your organization’s activities involves cooperation with international organizations?

[Sliding bar ranging from 0 to 100%]

16. Please name the top 5 foreign civil society organizations with which you work most closely, in order from 1 (most) to 5.
17. What five groups would you say provide the strongest domestic opposition to the LGBT movement in your country? Please indicate whether any of the groups are religious or nationalist organizations as well as your perception of how well organized they are.

(For example, a domestic organization the organizations counter demonstrations at pride parades.)

18. Are there any foreign opposition groups to the LGBT movement active in your country? If so, which would you say provide the strongest source of foreign opposition? Please indicate whether they are religious or nationalist organizations as well as your perception of how well organized they are.

(For example, the financial support from an American Evangelical group to Polish organizations that disseminate school pamphlets linking homosexuality to paedophilia would qualify as a foreign opposition group.)

19. In your opinion, to what degree are opposition groups (domestic and foreign) mobilized in your country?

3 - Strong, well organized
2 - Somewhat organized
1 - Weak, unorganized
9 - No answer or don’t know
APPENDIX B

Image 2.1. German and Polish Flags Encircled by the EU Stars: “Gay Solidarity [in Polish]”

Note: Picture taken by author at Berlin’s Christopher Street Day Parade, June 27, 2009
APPENDIX C

Discrepancies Among Legislation Data Coding Sources and National Organization Cross-Check Source

1. Finland: For the time being there is no cohabitation in Finland (source: SETA).

2. Iceland: Confirmed cohabitation was introduced in Iceland in 1996 (see website of samtokin78.is, National Queer Organization).

3. Greece: Law 3769/2009 prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation in goods and services in Greece. Same-sex sexual relationships have been legal since 1950 (source: Greek organization).


5. Romania: Age limits for homosexual and heterosexual acts were indeed equalized in Romania in 2001 (source: Accept).

6. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Laws against discrimination with respect to employment and goods and services were confirmed to have come into effect in 2003 in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the state level (source: Udruzenje Q).


10. Germany: Brandenburg did set up a bill on anti-discrimination in the constitution in 1992, but it did not pass.
### Table 3.2. Dependent and Independent Variables Summarized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Coding, Notes or Examples</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined DV</td>
<td>0-5 Ordinal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Combination of the 5 Categories (see below)</td>
<td>Author’s Legislation Dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Discrimination Legislation Refers to</td>
<td>0,1 Dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td>One Point for any: Employment, Goods and Services, Constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Orientation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law Refers to Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>0,1 Dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation an Aggravating Circumstance AND/OR Incitement to Hatred Based on Sexual Orientation Prohibited</td>
<td>Author’s Legislation Dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Recognition of Same-Sex Couples</td>
<td>0,1 Dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td>One point for any: Cohabitation Rights, Registered Partnership, Marriage Equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parenting Rights of Same-Sex Couples</td>
<td>0,1 Dummy</td>
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<td>One Point for any: Joint Adoption, Second Parent Adoption, Fertility Treatment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Sexual Offenses Provisions</td>
<td>0,1 Dummy</td>
<td></td>
<td>One Point for any: Equal Age of Consent, Same-Sex Sexual Activity Legal</td>
<td></td>
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<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transnational and International Channels</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transnational LGBT Organizations</td>
<td>Brokerage,</td>
<td>Range 0-3</td>
<td># of domestic LGBT orgs with membership in transnational organization, by year</td>
<td>Author’s Network Membership Dataset</td>
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<td>Learning</td>
<td>Range 21-99</td>
<td>Information Flows: Internet Users (per 1000 people), Television (per 1000 people) and Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP)</td>
<td>KOF Index of Globalization</td>
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<td>Sanctioning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Channels</td>
<td>Competition,</td>
<td>Range 23-99</td>
<td>Actual Flows: Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio Investment, and Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (all as percent of GDP)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sanctioning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Restrictions: Hidden Import Barriers, Mean Tariff Rate, Taxes of International Trade, and Capital Restrictions</td>
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<td>Combined Channels</td>
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<td>Combined Index of Political, Economic, and Social Channels</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU Accession</td>
<td>Learning, Sanctioning</td>
<td>0,1 Dummy</td>
<td>Year state joined EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diffusion Variables</td>
<td>Emulation</td>
<td>Yearly measure of the number of other states that have previously adopted a given policy</td>
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<td>Domestic</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBT Social Spaces</td>
<td>Range 0-5</td>
<td>0 – Nothing Going On</td>
<td>1 – Mention of some activity but not explicitly gay or lesbian (e.g., bars, restaurants, cafes)</td>
<td>2 – Activity mentioned in one main city</td>
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<td>Catholic or Orthodox</td>
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<td>0-1 Protestant/Mixed 1- Catholic/Orthodox</td>
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<td>Counter Mobilization</td>
<td>Range 0-3</td>
<td>Average score reported in reference to domestic opposition in expert survey: In your opinion, to what degree are opposition groups (domestic and foreign) active and effective in mobilizing in your country? 1 - Weak, unorganized and ineffective 2 - Somewhat organized and somewhat effective 3 - Strong, well organized and very effective</td>
<td>LGBT Organizations Survey</td>
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<td>Level of Democracy</td>
<td>Range 0-10</td>
<td>Polity2 Measure (cf. Polity IV codebook)</td>
<td>Polity IV Data</td>
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<td>GDP (log)</td>
<td>Range 6-12</td>
<td>Real Gross Domestic Product per capita and components are obtained from an aggregation using price parities and domestic currency expenditures for consumption, investment and government.</td>
<td>Penn GDP Data</td>
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</table>

Note: Where there have been discrepancies between data sources, the results were crosschecked with national experts at the corresponding LGBT rights organizations (see Appendix C). *For Lesbian couples; refers to national law and/or a lack of laws banning fertilization; all points can be assumed to account for >2000, since they require legal recognition and an established use of IVF.*
<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
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<th>Max</th>
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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX D

### Table 4.1: Dependent and Independent Variables Summarized

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Coding, Notes, Sources or Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Attitudes</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>Question F118: “Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it [Homosexuality] can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.” Scale of 1 (never) to 10 (always). Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Attitudes (log)</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>As above, but scale 0 to 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Attitudes (Index)</td>
<td>Composite measure, Individual Level</td>
<td>Question F118 combined with Question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” Homosexuals (1). Scale: -1.2 to 1.5. Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transnational and International Channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Channels</td>
<td>State Level</td>
<td>Information Flows: Internet Users (per 1000 people), Television (per 1000 people) and Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP. Range 21 to 99. Source: KOF Index.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic Proximity</td>
<td>Interval variable measures distance in km, Individual Level</td>
<td>Distance is measured from respondent’s residence to Berlin or Vienna, which ever is closer. Range 0 to 2,599. Sources: EVS 2011 and NUTS Level 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared EU Identification</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>Question: “Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? The European Union” Scale of 1 (none at all) to 4 (great deal). Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>Question: “How proud are you to be a: [nationality]?” Very proud (4), quite proud (3), not very proud (2), not at all proud (1). Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Authority</td>
<td>Individual Level, Dummy</td>
<td>Question: “Generally speaking, do you think that [your church is giving/the churches are giving], in your country, adequate answers to the social problems facing our country today?” Scale of 0 (no) to 1 (yes). Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>Question: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” Scale of 1 (never) to 8 (more than once a week). Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Doctrine</td>
<td>Individual Level, Categorical Variable</td>
<td>Protestant (1/Reference), Catholic (2), Orthodox (3), Other (4). Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Status</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>State Level, Ordinal Variable</td>
<td>Combination of the 5 Categories (see below). Range 0 to 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Discrimination Legislation Refers to Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>One Point for any: Employment, Goods and Services, Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law Refers to Sexual Orientation</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>Hate Crimes Based on Sexual Orientation and Aggravating Circumstance AND/OR Incitement to Hatred Based on Sexual Orientation Prohibited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Recognition of Same-Sex Couples</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>One point for any: Cohabitation Rights, Registered Partnership, Marriage Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parenting Rights of Same-Sex Couples</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>One Point for any: Joint Adoption, Second Parent Adoption, Fertility Treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Sexual Offenses Provisions</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>One Point for any: Equal Age of Consent, Same-Sex Sexual Activity Legal</td>
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</table>

### Controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Post-Materialism</th>
<th>Individual Level</th>
<th>Inglehart and Norris 4-point index. Materialist (1), mixed (2), postmaterialist (3).</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>Question: &quot;What age did you complete your education?&quot; Range 0 (no formal education) – 96. Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town size</td>
<td>Individual Level</td>
<td>Size of town. 1 = less than 5,000, 2 = 5,000 to 49,999, 3 = 50,000 to 499,999, and 4 = 500,000 or greater. Source: EVS 2011, following Andersen and Fetner (2008) coding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Individual level</td>
<td>Range: 15-108. Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Individual level, Dummy</td>
<td>Women=1. Source: EVS 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Where there have been discrepancies between data sources, the results were crosschecked with national experts at the corresponding LGBT rights organizations (see Appendix C).*

---

253 For Lesbian couples; refers to national law and/or a lack of laws banning fertilization; all points can be assumed to account for >2000, since they require legal recognition and an established use of IVF.

254 This education measure is not ideal, but it is the only consistent measure of education across waves. According to Dr. Inge Sieben of the EVS, it is commonly used in studies based on the EVS dataset. Andersen and Fetner (2008) also based their education variable on this question.
Table 4.4. Estimates for Hierarchical Linear Models Predicting Tolerance toward Homosexuality in Europe, with Interaction Terms

<table>
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<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>EU-27</th>
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<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Religiosity x Channels</td>
<td>National Pride x Channels</td>
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<td>DV(untransformed)</td>
<td>DV(untransformed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction Terms</strong></td>
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<td>Low Religiosity (2)</td>
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<td>0.92*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.171)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity (3)</td>
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<td>1.61*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td>(0.639)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low National Pride (3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined Channels (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combined Channels (6)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Channels (7)</td>
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<td>Combined Channels (9)</td>
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<td>Combined Channels (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (5)</td>
<td>-1.40*</td>
<td>-1.40*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (6)</td>
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<td>-0.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.233)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (7)</td>
<td>-0.57*</td>
<td>-0.57*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity (2) x Combined Channels (8)</td>
<td>-0.47*</td>
<td>-0.47*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<td>(0.208)</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.241)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<td>Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (5)</td>
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<td>-1.81*</td>
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<td>(0.335)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<td>Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (6)</td>
<td>-0.79*</td>
<td>-0.79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.275)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<td>Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (7)</td>
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<td>-0.85*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<td>Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (8)</td>
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<td>-0.79*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<td>Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (9)</td>
<td>-0.45+</td>
<td>-0.45+</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(1.274)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Religiosity (3) x Combined Channels (10)</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
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</table>
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (5) & -0.93* (0.226) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (6) & -0.84* (0.196) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (7) & -0.60* (0.187) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (8) & -0.49* (0.178) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (9) & -0.56* (0.176) 
Low National Pride (2) x Combined Channels (10) & -0.34 (0.210) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (5) & -0.90 (0.840) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (6) & -0.53 (0.702) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (7) & -0.29 (0.665) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (8) & -0.55 (0.661) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (9) & -0.63 (0.659) 
Low National Pride (3) x Combined Channels (10) & -0.79 (0.706) 

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<td>-0.33</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
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<td>-0.47</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
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<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>(0.058)</td>
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<td>Orthodox</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.083)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Materialism</td>
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<td>0.50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.022)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>Town size (5,000-49,999)</td>
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<td>Town size (50,000-499,999)</td>
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<td>0.51</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Town size (500,000+)</td>
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<td>0.76</td>
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<td>(0.048)</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
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</table>
Gender (Women = 1)  
0.76*  
(0.026)  
Constant  
2.43*  
(1.200)  
Observations  
43,296  
Number of groups  
69  

Standard errors in parentheses  
* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Figure 4.6. EU-27 States
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
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<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
<th>(10)</th>
<th>(11)</th>
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<td>Attitudes (Log)</td>
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<td>0.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Social Channels</td>
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<td>12.91</td>
<td>21.61</td>
<td>99.02</td>
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<td>(2) Political Channels</td>
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<td>6.59</td>
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<td>(3) Economic Channels</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
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<td>98.88</td>
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<td>(4) Combined Channels</td>
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<td>13.75</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>92.84</td>
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<td>(6) National Pride</td>
<td>-1.72</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>(7) Church Authority</td>
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<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td>(8) Religiosity</td>
<td>-5.05</td>
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<td>-8</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>-0.09</td>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<td>108</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<td>-0.12</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
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APPENDIX E

Figure 5.2: Defend the Nation Frame

Translations: (left to right) “These are Fascists?,” “These are Poles?”
Source: (“Redwatch Polska” 2012)

Figure 5.3: NOP Symbols


Source (“Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski” 2011)
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