FROM RECIPIENTS TO DONORS:
NEW EUROPE SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Tsveta Atanasova Petrova
January 2011
FROM RECIPIENTS TO DONORS:
NEW EUROPE SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Tsveta Atanasova Petrova, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2011

Supporting the diffusion of democratic norms and practices around the globe has become a significant element of the security and foreign policies of many developed countries and of the operation of many international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Therefore, a better understanding of this phenomenon is important; yet much of our knowledge about it comes from studying the activities of a handful of established Western democracies. Would fledgling non-Western democracies support democratization abroad? What would motivate such efforts, and how would they be undertaken? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these young democracy promoters, and how do their efforts compare with the activities of the established Western democracy promoters? I answer these questions by unraveling the puzzle of the quick turnaround by the Eastern European members of the EU from being primarily recipients of democracy promotion in the 1990s to promoters of democracy in the 2000s. The dissertation examines the activities of the Eastern European governmental and non-governmental actors supporting democratization abroad both bilaterally and through the EU. I argue that the local civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region subsequently became the norm entrepreneurs who championed the incorporation of democracy promotion into their country’s foreign policy and then continued to advocate for keeping support for democracy abroad high on the agenda. I further find that the Eastern European civic
activists have been motivated by a normative commitment to democracy, while the Eastern European official efforts are best understood as strategic foreign policy commitments. Despite their reputation as “idealist donors,” the Eastern European governments have supported democracy abroad primarily to create a secure and stable international environment for their states. Moreover, both governmental and non-governmental approaches to supporting democratization abroad have been based on strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than the normative appropriateness) of their transition experiences to the recipients’ democratization needs. While Western donors are said to export models of democracy based on their domestic institutions, the Eastern European donors have promoted democratization recipes tested in their own recent transitions and selected to fit the needs of their recipients. In contrast to the Western one-size-fits-all and institution-centric approaches, the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion vary according to the regime type of the recipient and pay more attention to the process of liberalization. Therefore, although they are young donors, the Eastern European democracies represent a new generation of democracy promoters that have avoided some of the mistakes for which Western donors have been criticized.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Tsveta Atanasova Petrova spent the first 20 years of her life in Bulgaria. In 2000, she moved to the US to complete her BA in the Government Department at Cornell University. She graduated summa cum laude. Tsveta then also earned an MA in Public Administration from the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs. She specialized in International Development and participated in numerous service-learning opportunities at the Institute. For her PhD work, Tsveta enrolled in the Government Department at Cornell University. As a graduate student at Cornell, she has received two teaching and three research awards as well as numerous fellowships and grants. Tsveta has many conference presentations and several publications, including a recent article in *Comparative Political Studies*. Tsveta’s research agenda lies at the intersections of domestic politics and international relations, of democracy and authoritarianism, and of state and society relations.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The research in this dissertation was supported by grants from the Eurasia Program of the Social Sciences Research Council, with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State under the Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Title VIII); the East European Studies Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State under the Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (Title VIII); the World Politics Program at the Smith Richardson Foundation; the Predissertation Fellowships Program at the Council for European Studies; and the Peace Studies Program, the Institute for European Studies, the Government Department, and the Graduate School at Cornell University.

The author also wishes to express gratitude to her dissertation committee members, Valerie Bunce (chair), Matthew Evangelista, Sidney Tarrow; Nicholas van de Walle, who served as an external reviewer of her dissertation; Michael McFaul, Jeffrey Checkel, Tanja Borzel, Milada Vachudova, Thomas Carothers, Jeff Lovitt, Andrew Green, Joerg Forbrig, Carrie Manning, Paul Kubicek, Sharon Wolchik, Bela Greskovits, David Patel, Christopher Way, Aneta Spendzharova, and Brian Grodsky for fieldwork advice and/or their comments on drafts of the dissertation proposal or different dissertation chapters; the members of the Cornell Government Department dissertation colloquium for their support and feedback in the dissertation writing process; and the participants in the 2010 SGIR Pan-European International Relations Conference, in the 2010 annual Association for the Studies of Nationality conference, in the 2010 Council for European Studies meeting, in the 2010 Midwest Political Science Association meeting, and in the 2010 International Studies Association conference for their comments on different chapters.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH........................................................................................................ iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS........................................................................................................ iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................ v
LIST OF BOXES.................................................................................................................. viii
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................... ix
LIST OF TABLES................................................................................................................ x

CHAPTER 1: The Puzzle of Eastern European Democracy Promotion........................ 1
  1. Democracy Promotion in the 20th Century.............................................................. 3
  2. Research Agenda .................................................................................................... 7
  3. The Democracy Promotion Debate ...................................................................... 10
     3.1. Democracy Promotion as a Strategic Commitment: Peace, Stability, and
         Prosperity as Benefits of Having Democratic International Partners........... 12
     3.2. Democracy Promotion as a Normative Commitment: The Role of
         Domestic and International Democratic Norms ........................................... 16
  4. Democracy Promotion by the Eastern European Members of the EU:
     Research Design and Methods .......................................................................... 21
     4.1. Definitions and Data Collection .................................................................... 28
  5. Arguments .............................................................................................................. 32
     5.1. On the Motivations of Eastern European Democracy Promoters .............. 33
     5.2. On the Approaches to Democracy Promotion of the Eastern European
         Donors ............................................................................................................. 35
     5.3. On the Impact of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters .............. 37
     5.4. Contributions ................................................................................................. 38
  6. Structure of the Dissertation ................................................................................. 41

CHAPTER 2: Overview of Eastern European Democracy Promotion .......................... 43
  1. Overview of Eastern European Democracy Promotion ....................................... 44
     1.1. The Diplomacy of Eastern European Democracy Promotion .................. 44
     1.2. Eastern European Democracy Assistance ................................................. 51
     1.3. The Targets of Eastern European Democracy Promotion ...................... 60
  2. Explaining Eastern European Democracy Promotion .......................................... 65
     2.1. The Diversity of Eastern European Democracy Promotion ...................... 65
     2.2. Previous Explanations .................................................................................. 68
     2.2.1. Communist and Post-communist Experience ......................................... 69
     2.2.2. Foreign Policy Specialization ................................................................. 70
     2.2.3. Identity Concerns .................................................................................... 72
     2.2.4. International Expectations, Pressures, and Obligations ....................... 73
     2.3. Strategic Democracy Promotion with a Domestic Twist ............................ 75
     2.3.1. Explaining the Variation in the Level of Democracy Promotion
         Activism ......................................................................................................... 76
     2.3.2. Explaining the Variation in the Geographical Priorities of
         Eastern European Democracy Promotion ................................................... 81
CHAPTER 6: Conclusion................................................................. 216
  1. Summary of Findings about the Motivations of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters ................................................................. 218
  2. Summary of Findings about the Eastern European Approaches to Democracy Promotion ........................................................... 224
  3. The East, the West, and the International Democracy Promotion Community ............................................................................. 230
    4.1. On the Motivations of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters .................................................................................. 240
    4.2. On Approaches of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters .................................................................................. 243
      4.2.1. Nuanced Approaches ............................................................................. 245
      4.2.2. Local Knowledge ............................................................................. 246
      4.2.3. Recent Democratization Experience ............................................. 250
      4.2.4. Some Weaknesses ............................................................................ 253
  5. Theoretical Implications ........................................................................ 255
    5.1. Democracy Promotion ........................................................................ 255
    5.2. Social Movements and Transnational Activism ................................ 259
    5.2. Diffusion .......................................................................................... 262

APPENDIX 1: Rules for Coding the Democracy Promotion Activism Scores .... 267

APPENDIX 2: Overview of the Democracy Promotion Efforts of Individual Eastern European Members of the EU as an Explanation of Their Democracy Promotion Activism Scores ........................................ 270
  1. The Baltic Countries ............................................................................. 270
  2. Central Europe ..................................................................................... 275
  3. The Balkans .......................................................................................... 281

APPENDIX 3: Explanations of Polish Democracy Promotion by Polish Political Elites in Official Foreign Policy Documents and Speeches ................... 284

APPENDIX 4: Explanations of Slovak Democracy Promotion by Slovak Political Elites in Official Foreign Policy Documents and Speeches ................... 299

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................... 309
LIST OF BOXES

Box 4.1. Polish Involvement in the Orange Revolution............................................. 162

Box 6.1. Eastern and Western Sectoral Priorities for Democracy Promotion in Ukraine and Belarus ................................................................. 244
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1. A Political Map of Europe – 20 Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Bloc...................................................................................................................59

Figure 2.2. Correlation between Popular Satisfaction with Democracy and Official Democracy Promotion Activism .........................................................................................70

Figure 2.3. Correlation between the Size of the Civic Democracy Promotion Contingent and the Official Commitment to Democracy Promotion within the Group of Eastern European Donors.................................................................80
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1. Types of Accounts of Democracy Promotion and Their Observable Implications .................................................................21

Table 1.2. Paired Comparisons Design .........................................................................................................................22

Table 1.3. Democracy Promotion Efforts Studied ........................................................................................................29

Table 2.1. Democracy Assistance Project Funding (DAPF), Percent of Democracy Assistance Project Funding out of All Official Development Assistance (DAPF%ODA), and Percent of Democracy Assistance Project Funding out of All Development Assistance Project Funding (DAPF%PA) in 2006 € (Euros) by Country by Year ........................................................................53

Table 2.2. Number of Democracy Assistance Projects/ Number of All Development Assistance Projects, and Percent of Democracy Assistance Projects out of All Development Assistance Projects by Country by Year .....55

Table 2.3. Geographical Democracy Assistance Priorities by Donor Country ..........61

Table 2.4. Democracy Promotion Activism Scores By Donor Country .....................66

Table 2.5. Percent of Civic Democracy Promoters of All Members of the National Platform of International Development NGOs by Donor Country ..................79

Table 3.1. Democracy Promotion by Polish and Slovak NGOs by Target Country ..112

Table 3.2. Activities of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promoters: Percent of NGOs Using a Particular Instrument out of all Democracy Promoters from the National Platform for Development NGOs .....................................123

Table 3.3. Democracy Sectors Targeted by Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promoters:Percent of NGOs Targeting a Particular Sector out of all Democracy Promoters from the National Platform for Development NGOs .....................................................128

Table 4.1. PolishAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance to Ukraine by Targeted Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine for a Particular Year ........................................................................................................165

Table 4.2. PolishAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance to Belarus by Targeted Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Belarus and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All
PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Belarus for a Particular Year

Table 4.3. Polish Democracy Promotion Approach According to Regime Type

Table 5.1. SlovakAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance by Country by Targeted Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of SlovakAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and Belarus and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All SlovakAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and Belarus for a Particular Year

Table 5.2. Slovak Democracy Promotion Approach According to Regime Type
CHAPTER 1: THE PUZZLE OF EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Few authoritarian countries have avoided being swept up by the most recent global wave of democratization. That wave, which began during the 1970s, continues to spread, in part due to the efforts of transnational and international actors. Indeed, especially since the end of the Cold War, exporting democracy has become a significant element of the security and foreign policy of many developed countries and of the operation of many international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Much of our knowledge about such democracy promotion comes from studying the activities of a handful of established Western democracies. Yet, while the Western commitment to supporting the global spread of democracy began to wane in the early and mid-2000s, some of the newest recruits to the community of democracies – the Eastern European members of the European Union (EU) – have become increasingly involved in supporting democratization abroad. It is this group of little-studied but ardent democracy promoters that I examine in this dissertation.

It is both theoretically and empirically puzzling that young democracies such as the Eastern European ones began supporting the democratization of others often before even consolidating democracy at home and that they are becoming even more active at a time when established donors are becoming increasingly skeptical about democracy promotion. In this thesis, I resolve this puzzle by analyzing the transformation of the Eastern European members of the EU from being the targets of democracy promotion in the 1990s to becoming democracy promoters themselves in the 2000s. I discuss the efforts of the Eastern European governments and civil societies to promote democracy bilaterally and through the EU. I examine what motivates these actors, how they support democratization abroad, how successful they
are, and how their motivations, strategies, and impact compare to those of established (Western) donors.

I argue that democracy promotion was incorporated in the foreign policy of the Eastern EU members as a result of the advocacy of the civic norm entrepreneurs who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region. Despite its reputation as democracy promotion “idealism,” such official support for democratization abroad is best understood as a strategic response to the concerns dominating these countries’ foreign policies. Similarly, the approaches to democracy promotion of these new donors are based on a strategic export of their transformation experience, as it is appropriate to their recipients’ democratization needs. Thus, the Eastern European actors represent a new generation of democracy promoters who strive to avoid some of the mistakes for which Western donors have been criticized. While they may lack the resources and international standing of the majority of established Western donors, the Eastern European democracy promoters enjoy considerable credibility among recipients and bring to them more relevant and nuanced expertise.

This dissertation is well positioned to address several aspects of democracy promotion that have received insufficient attention in the literature. I define two distinct theoretical approaches to understanding the place of democracy promotion in the foreign-policy process – democracy promotion as a normative commitment and democracy promotion as a strategic commitment. I then use these approaches to examine the activities of a group of young, non-Western, and overlooked democracy promoters. I also analyze the efforts of state and non-state actors as well as their interactions in supporting democratization abroad. Finally, I also provide a mixed-methods account based on the triangulation of three different types of analysis: the origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the Eastern European democracy promoters.
1. Democracy Promotion in the 20th Century

During the 1990s, democracy promotion became an explicit goal of the foreign policy of many industrialized democracies and the work of many international and non-governmental organizations, even if this objective was pursued through inconsistent, ad hoc, and sometimes low-priority policies.¹ The collapse of the Soviet bloc eliminated the bargaining power of dictatorships. Democracy began enjoying an unrivaled position as an “ideology for humankind.”² Decreased ideological tensions facilitated the giving and taking of assistance.³ Moreover, political openings across Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and even parts of the Middle East presented opportunities for the West to promote democracy as elections became important and fledgling civic and political actors sought financing and advice.⁴ Such openings also produced a proliferation of hybrid regimes, which combined elements of dictatorship and democracy, and which thus became appealing targets for international interventions meant to tip the political balance towards democracy.⁵ Finally, there was a growing donor consensus that there

---

⁴ Burnell, Democracy Assistance.
is a virtuous cycle of democratization and development and that neither one of these requires rare and exacting pre-conditions that take a long time to materialize.\textsuperscript{6}

Thus, the 1990s became a decade of unprecedented democracy promotion in terms of the sense of purpose, the diversity of target countries, the number and variety of donors, the range of approaches and principal concerns, and the resources involved.\textsuperscript{7} Many developed countries and leading international organizations (IOs) actively supported new democracies through quiet diplomacy and pressure, positive and negative sanctions, assistance, and occasionally outright military occupation.\textsuperscript{8} Governmental and non-state actors provided direct material support and technical assistance (providing blueprints, sharing experiences, and giving advice) to assist in liberalizing and democratizing other countries. Democracy promoters did not shy away from re-writing recipient constitutions, designing their electoral systems, teaching their party members how to campaign, helping civil society organizations to lobby and human right groups to monitor the state, encouraging the work of trade unions, business and professional associations, assisting state agencies to set up forms


\textsuperscript{7} Burnell, \textit{Democracy Assistance}.

\textsuperscript{8} The northern industrialized democracies have emerged as the most prominent democracy promoters in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. A leader among them has been the US, which has since its founding more or less consistently pursued the projection of its political ideals abroad. Big European players such as Germany and former imperial powers – the UK and France – have also been active in the post-WWII era. Finally, middle powers such as the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark), the Netherlands, and Canada, too, have more recently sought to carve out a niche in the democracy promotion industry. Crucial for the mainstreaming of human rights and democracy has been the work of international organization such as the United Nations, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, EU, Organization of American States, the Commonwealth Association, etc. Also, quite a few multilateral banks such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian Development Bank have moved into activities relating to good (democratic) governance.
of (good) governance, and socializing individuals to “proper” civic values and behavior.\(^9\)

However, even though 106 countries gathered together in Warsaw in 2000 to discuss a common interest in advancing an international “community of democracies,” the commitment to spreading democracy around the globe began to wane in the early and mid-2000s.\(^10\) Democracy seemed to be in retreat in a number of the former Soviet Union republics and in many parts of Africa and Asia.\(^11\) Moreover, disappointment grew in the West, especially in the US, with the slow and mixed results of democracy promotion.\(^12\) At the same time, recipients complained that democracy promotion had produced an array of unintended consequences, which undermined the democratization of recipient countries.\(^13\)

Furthermore, the foreign policy of the Bush Administration in the Middle East had the unintended effect of discrediting the concept of democracy promotion in the West.\(^14\) In its war on terrorism, the United States closely cooperated with authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, Asia, and Eurasia. Even more damaging was the Administration’s inclusion of democracy promotion as an objective in the highly

\(^9\) Burnell, Democracy Assistance.
\(^10\) On the Community of Democracies, see http://www.community-democracies.org/
\(^12\) Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. It should be noted, however, that despite this disillusionment, US democracy assistance funding continued to grow steadily at least until 2005 but declined in the overall foreign aid budget. Azpuru de Cuestas et al., “What Has the United States Been Doing?” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 2 (April 2008), 150–59.
\(^13\) Some have pointed out that democracy assistance, for example, has often made political and civic elites in democratizing countries opportunistic as well as dependent on and accountable to external actors rather than to the publics they are to serve. See for example, Janine Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989–1998 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Nicolas van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Thomas Carothers, Revitalizing Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for National Peace, 2009).
controversial war in Iraq since 2003. Not only did the US seem to have lost credibility as a promoter of democratic values, but the domestic and international reactions to the military presence of the West in the Middle East divided the European NATO members and further tarnished democracy promotion. This happened at a moment when the Western European members of the EU were already beginning to suffer from post-enlargement democracy promotion fatigue. The eastern enlargement of the EU was understood to be the Union’s most ambitious exercise in democracy promotion to date. However, it was a massive, difficult, and controversial undertaking; it sent the EU into a period of deepening integration and internal reforms, meant to strengthen the Union institutions and address its own putative democratic deficit. So despite the democratization breakthroughs in some of the organization’s newest eastern neighbors in 2004-2005, the EU has been somewhat reluctantly involved in supporting the spreading of democracy further east.

Despite this growing “skepticism about democracy promotion” in the West, the new Eastern European members of the EU have recently emerged as ardent

17 Interview with P. T., July 11, 2007.
democracy promoters.\textsuperscript{19} On the one hand, they demonstrated a particular interest as well as some success in securing a greater place for democracy promotion on the agenda of the EU and other (Western) international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CoE).\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, especially following their EU accession, the Eastern European members have also stepped up bilateral diplomacy and assistance meant to strengthen democracy in the European “neighborhood” (especially, Ukraine and Belarus in the east and Serbia in the south) and beyond (for example, Cuba and Myanmar). Such official democracy promotion is supported and complemented by the efforts of a number of dynamic Eastern European non-governmental organizations (NGOs), working to spread democratic norms and practices around the globe. In sum, these new Eastern EU recruits to the community of democracies have now become some of the most insistent supporters of the diffusion of democracy around the world but especially in their backyards.

2. Research Agenda

Yet, much of our knowledge about democracy promotion comes from studying the activities of a handful of established Western democracies. What would motivate fledgling non-Western democracies to support democratization abroad and how would such efforts be undertaken? I answer these questions by studying the democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern European members of the EU in the first 20 years


\textsuperscript{20} Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
after the end of the Cold War (1989 to 2009). Their especially quick transformation from targets of democracy promotion in the 1990s to democracy promoters in the 2000s presents a puzzle. Theoretically, it is puzzling that given the high stakes and the complexities of a double – and in some Eastern European countries even triple – transitions, these young democracies began supporting the democratization of others before “consolidating” democracy at home. While most of the post-communist donors stepped up their democracy promotion efforts after their EU accession, many of the Eastern EU members became active shortly after their democratic breakthroughs. Thus, these countries were expending scarce political and financial capital to promote democratization abroad while working on not only political but also economic liberalization at home and in cases such as Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – on state building as well. Empirically, it is puzzling that these young donors are zealously promoting democracy when other established donors are losing optimism in the face of decreasing support for democracy promotion in donor and recipient societies and during what appears to be the end of a long wave of democratization. It is also surprising that the Eastern European countries have advocated for supporting the democratization of the European neighborhood through

---

21 On the complexities of the Eastern European transitions, see Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Claus Offe, *Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). Most regime change theories assume, explicitly or implicitly, that after a democratic breakthrough (collapse of the old regime and establishment of a democratic institutional structure), there is a period of democratic consolidation – “a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic ‘rules of the game.’” (Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 [2002]: 5–21.) While such “transition paradigms” have been criticized for being naively teleological, the core of this criticism is the understanding that democratization involves a multitude of usually chaotic processes of change “that go backwards and sideways as much as forward, and do not do so in any regular manner.” (Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” 15.) Therefore, both supporters and opponents of the transition paradigm accept that democratization is a long and complex project that requires much elite and societal investment and attention to ensure progress and avert derailment.
further EU and NATO enlargement, instead of seeking to consolidate their accession gains by preventing additional growth of these clubs.

In this thesis, I resolve this puzzle by answering several related questions: What motivates the democracy promotion activities of Eastern European actors? How is the spread of democracy supported (‘which actors,’ ‘doing what,’ ‘when,’ and ‘where’)? What are the resultant approaches to Eastern European democracy promotion as defined by the type of democracy promoted, the target countries, as well as the repertoire, standardization, and institutionalization of the deployed policy instruments (diplomacy, assistance, and conditionality)? Also, are these young democracies using strategies different from the ones used by established democracies? Finally, given their motivations and approaches to democracy promotion, what is the impact of the Eastern European members of the EU?

Answering those questions is important for several reasons. Theoretically, our understanding of democracy promotion by young non-Western democracies is very limited – are they socialized or perhaps even compelled by older donors into supporting the spread of democracy around the globe or are they investing in it with the recognition that a more democratic international environment can enhance the chances for survival of democracy at home?22 Empirically, focusing on the Eastern European democracy promoters offers valuable insight about and a snapshot of the

---

22 The former hypothesis is based on the understanding that democracy promotion is ultimately a primarily American project, which has been reproduced indirectly by the post-WWII liberal order created by the US as well as by direct, formal or informal, US pressure that its allies support the political liberalization of the developing world as well. (See, for example, Jurgen Ruland and Nikolaus Werz, “Germany’s hesitant role in promoting democracy,” in Peter J. Schraeder, ed., Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002], 73–88.) The second hypothesis is based on one of the most consistent findings of the works on democratic diffusion – that a regional environment of democratic neighbors appears to help prevent such democracies countries from failing, while an unpropitious regional political environment might work against their survival. See, for example, Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, “Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (August 2003): 490–519; and Scott Mainwaring and Anibal Perez-Linan, “Regional Effects and Region-wide Diffusion of Democracy” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2–5, 2004).
regional diffusion of democracy and the regional influences on democratization. These
dynamics have been documented in large-N quantitative studies but remain little
studied beyond the few works on the fourth wave of democratization. Moreover, the
Eastern European actors represent a new generation of democracy promoters whose
practices hold important lessons for the effectiveness of different democracy
assistance strategies. Unlike the activities of great and middle powers, the efforts of
young and small donors and their place in the international community supporting the
global spread of democracy are poorly understood. Moreover, the Eastern EU
members have excelled where the efforts of older Western donors have been found lacking: bringing local knowledge and first-hand democratization experience. Finally, a better understanding of the motivations and strategies of the Eastern EU actors helps solve the puzzle of their democracy promotion activism outlined above.

3. The Democracy Promotion Debate

Existing works on Western export of democracy have mostly shied away from
articulating competing theoretical propositions about “what might be called the ‘high
politics’ of international democracy promotion.” On the one hand, some previous
studies have presented a theoretical defense of democracy promotion as a “grand
strategy” without discussing in detail the policies through which this strategy has been
implemented. On the other hand, work on the democracy promotion policies of
various donors remains largely descriptive and mostly without an explicit theoretical
framework. Building on such previous analyses, this dissertation defines two distinct

---

23 For a discussion of this literature, see the Contributions section below.
24 Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad.
25 Criticism and quote by Peter Burnell and Peter Calvert, “Promoting Democracy Abroad,”
26 See, for example, Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, American Democracy
27 This critique is well articulated by Jonas Wolff and Iris Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External
Democracy Promotion? Approximations from the Perspective of International Relations Theories”
theoretical approaches to “the place of democracy promotion in the foreign-policy process,” including the motivations behind a country’s support for democracy abroad and its democracy promotion approach.\footnote{28}

Since democracies are generally thought to be peaceful, stable, and prosperous, some suggest that already democratic states see it in their interest to export democracy to volatile and/or poor countries whose socio-political developments affect the donor countries. In these types of accounts, democracy promotion is a\textit{ strategic commitment} – a means for creating a favorable international environment premised on the donor’s understanding of the benefits of having democratic international partners. However, others argue that there has emerged an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior and that in promoting democracy abroad, states follow a cultural script and/or taken-for-granted democratic values and practices. In these types of accounts, democracy promotion is a\textit{ normative commitment} that stems from the understanding of democracy as an emerging international norm and/or a constituent domestic practice.

\footnote{28 Quote from Richard Youngs, ed.,\textit{ Survey of European Democracy Promotion Policies 2000–2006} (Madrid: Fundacion parar las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2006), 8–9. The majority of previous works on democracy promotion come from the Liberal, the Constructivist, and the Marxist schools of thought. Most realists have argued that democracy promotion is at best a distraction or at worst a dangerous overweening moralistic zeal. See, for example, John Harper, “The Dream of the Democratic Peace,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 76, no. 3 (1997): 117–21.}
Both types of accounts acknowledge that the domestic experiences (history, norms, and/or institutions) that shape the donor’s democratic identity affect the motivations for and approaches to democracy promotion. However, in the accounts of democracy promotion as a strategic commitment, such domestic experiences inform “causal beliefs” about the benefits of having democratic international partners and about the domestic practices that produce such benefits. On the other hand, in the accounts of democracy promotion as a normative commitment, the domestic experiences produce “principled beliefs” about the rights and responsibilities of democratic states not only to observe the principles of democracy domestically but also to propagate them internationally. Therefore, neither approach to democracy promotion ignores the important role of ideas and identity in shaping foreign policy.

3.1. Democracy Promotion as a Strategic Commitment: Peace, Stability, and Prosperity as Benefits of Having Democratic International Partners

Some scholars and practitioners emphasize that democracy promotion reflects a pragmatic and evolving strategy, based on the realities of world affairs in the 20th century and meant to create a stable international political order. This so-called “national security liberalism” is founded on several interrelated beliefs: democratic states cooperate and rarely fight each other; international institutions constrain state

29 On causal and principled beliefs, see Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane, and Social Science Research Council (U.S.), eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Policy Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). Another useful way of distinguishing the two types of accounts of democracy promotion is by pointing that they loosely parallel the two logics of foreign policy action: “the logic of consequences” and “the logic of appropriateness.” On these logics, see James March and Johan Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 943–69.

30 Such accounts have been criticized by some realists who argue that democracy promotion is at best a distraction and at worst a dangerous, overweening moralistic zeal that is both theoretically dubious and practically dangerous. See, for example, Harper, “The Dream of the Democratic Peace.” On the other hand, radicals claim that US democracy promotion is just a façade masking the hard edge of US hegemony. Colin S. Cavell, Exporting “Made-in-America” Democracy: the National Endowment for Democracy & U.S. Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002); William Robinson, “Promoting Capitalist Polyarchy: The Case of Latin America” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 308–26.
conflict and promote cooperation; and trade and economic openness foster and benefit from international cooperation and democracy.\textsuperscript{31}

In support of such accounts, their proponents often point to the strategic calculations by political elites premised on the “democratic peace” idea that “democracies are peaceful to each other.”\textsuperscript{32} Often cited in these explanations is a long tradition of arguments in American diplomacy in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, if not since the Republic’s founding, that the US would get along better with other democracies.\textsuperscript{33} The most prominent advocates of this tradition were Presidents Woodrow Wilson and, in more recent history, President Bill Clinton, who claimed that since “democracies rarely wage war on one another”, “the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{34} Democracy promotion is thought to be a less expensive and perhaps even a more effective long-term solution to old-fashioned security threats than building up a country’s military force.\textsuperscript{35} Lastly, some authors bring up the political elites’ understanding of the value of

\textsuperscript{31} On the concept of national security liberalism, see Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). For a summary of the national security liberalism argument, see also John Ikenberry, “America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 103–27. However, the accounts of democracy promotion as strategic commitment should not be reduced to liberal and liberal institutionalism theories of international relations. Some Constructivist, Marxists and Realist approaches could be subsumed in this category as well because they too point to the security and economic benefits of having democratic international partners.


\textsuperscript{33} Goldman and Douglas argue that the US has been promoting its republican ideals abroad since the Union’s founding. Ralph M. Goldman and William A. Douglas, Promoting Democracy: Opportunities and Issues (New York: Praeger, 1988).


\textsuperscript{35} Burnell, Democracy Assistance.
common identity (community) in facilitating the establishment of a peaceful and
durable order through shared expectations.36

Proponents of this type of explanation of democracy promotion have remarked
on the conviction of many policy-makers that democracies make better international
partners because they both prefer and are well-suited to create and maintain stable,
rule-based, and institutionalized international institutions. For instance, democracies
develop relations based on the rule of law rather than on political expediency, and
democratic openness allows states to have more confidence in the international
commitments of politically liberal states.37 Furthermore, democracies are characterized
by systems of accountability, transparency, and rule of law, which are especially
important to international economic partners and development at home.38 In other
words, such accounts argue that many policy-makers have seen no tension but rather a
virtuous cycle among global order, market economics, and democracy.39

While such accounts agree that the domestic characteristics of other states are
very important to the security and material interests of their partners, democracy
promotion is understood to be primarily a means to these more central foreign policy
goals. From this perspective, the pursuit of political freedom abroad has often been
neither unconditional nor allowed to upset key (economic and security) alliances with

36 Clinton argues that states with similar political values and social purposes will be more likely to
understand each other and have shared expectations about how conflicts are to be resolved. Ikenberry,
“America’s Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-War Era,” in Cox,
Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion, 103–27.
37 Anne-Marie Burley, “Towards the Age of Liberal Nations,” Harvard International Law Journal 33,
Science Quarterly 104 (Fall 1989): 375–400; Kurt Gaubatz, “Democratic States and Commitment in
38 Michael Cox, “Wilsonianism Resurgent? The Clinton Administration and the Promotion of
Democracy,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American Democracy Promotion; Nelson and Eglington,
Encouraging Democracy.
111–27.
authoritarian regimes. Moreover, democracy promoters are thought to assist primarily those unstable and poor countries important to the donor’s security and/or economy. Stronger support for such important international partners as well as support to other countries is conditioned by perceptions about the prospects for success and especially for achieving tangible results in the short-term without incurring potential costs stemming from the democratization process itself.

According to such accounts, the approach to democracy promotion, especially the particular form of democracy promoted, reflects the overall character and purpose of a state’s foreign policy; for example, in the pursuit of security interests abroad, the emphasis might be on political liberalization but in the pursuit of economic interests abroad, the focus most likely would be on good governance. These authors also

40 Cox, *Wilsonianism Resurgent?* Wolff and Wurm also point out that since “the positive impact [of democracy promotion] on national security in the long-term implies that in particular situations, where the goal of democracy promotion clashes with directly tangible security interests, the latter prevail.” Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?,” 10.
42 On the utilitarian cost-benefit analyses implied in these strategic types of accounts, see Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” Wolff and Wurm also argue that “democracy promotion is rational only under very specific conditions: good and relatively short-term prospects of success, low risks, high asymmetries in relative power, and selective incentives or close international coordination” (p. 6). The last two factors are understood to inhibit democracy promotion free riders. However, it has already been established that donors choose their targets carefully and invest in their democratization even if others do the same, so that there is often over- rather than under-supply of aid in some countries. (On the first point see, Peter J. Schraeder, Steven W. Hook, and Bruce Taylor, “Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows,” *World Politics* 50, no. 2 [1998]: 294–323; on the second point, see Burnell, *Democracy Assistance*.) Accordingly, in this dissertation, I hypothesize that most strategic democracy promoters focus primarily on those unstable and poor countries important to the donor’s security and/or economy. The significance of high asymmetries in relative power has already been called into question by several empirical works on democracy promotion by the US: Lowenthal, for example, argues, that the capacity to nurture democratic politics abroad is thought the greatest in those countries where the donor is sufficiently involved to be influential but not so extensively engages as to warp the domestic fabric of social and political life (Abraham F. Lowenthal, *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991]). On the potential costs stemming from the democratization process itself such as increased incidence of intra- and inter-state conflict, see Jack L. Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).
43 For instance, surveying key democracy promoters among the northern industrial democracies, one study found “US emphasis on political liberalization in the pursuit of security interests [and] a German
suggest that since the primary objective of democracy promotion is to stabilize important international partners, the strategy used also tends to reflect such effectiveness calculations. In some cases, such calculations have been based on a donor’s understanding of its own success towards peace and prosperity and in other cases – on the donor’s understanding of its accomplishments as a democracy promoter.\textsuperscript{44} Such accounts also note donor sensitivity to the specific democratization needs of recipients, since those are critical to the promoter’s effectiveness.\textsuperscript{45}

3.2. Democracy Promotion as a Normative Commitment: The Role of Domestic and International Democratic Norms

Other scholars have argued that democracy promotion is a mission to advance democratic values for their own sake. In such accounts, democracy is not only a universal value that can be nurtured in all regions of the world but “the ‘normal’ form of government to which any nation is entitled – whether in Europe, America, Asia, or Africa.”\textsuperscript{46} Scholars in this tradition argue that democracy is “widely regarded as an ideal system of government […] with near-universal appeal among people of every ethnic group, every religion, and every region of the world,” so that even autocracies have come to claim that they are either already democratic – even if they are not (e.g., Russia and Iran) – or that they are moving “step by step” toward democracy (e.g.,

\begin{flushright}
and Japanese focus on economic liberalization as reflective of their economic interests abroad.”
\end{flushright}

Schraeder, \textit{Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality}, 231. See also Steven W. Hook, \textit{National Interest and Foreign Aid} (Boulder, CO; London: Lynne Rienner, 1995). Good governance here refers to effort to bolster the rule of law, transparency, and state capacity of a recipient country.

\textsuperscript{44} John G. Ralph, “‘High Stakes’ and ‘Low Intensity Democracy’: Understanding America’s Policy of Promotion Democracy,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, \textit{American Democracy Promotion}, 200–217; Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” \textit{Washington Quarterly} 29, no. 2 (2006): 85–98. For instance, the interwar period, the post-WWII reconstruction in Germany and Japan, the post-1989 assistance to the post-communist region, and the post-9/11 work in the Middle East and North Africa have all been suggested as such formative learning experiences.

\textsuperscript{45} Carothers, \textit{Aiding Democracy Abroad}.

As a result, the efforts of external actors to support the spread of democracy have grown in scope as well as in legitimacy. Proponents of this type of argument also claim that the idea that people around the globe have a right to democracy has already gained some expression in international law. Such accounts document that state and non-state actors from democratic countries have consequently often assumed the right and felt the responsibility to assist the democratizing world. As a result, external actors have intervened more often and more aggressively to promote democracy and especially to enforce human rights (thus even eroding the sanctity of state sovereignty as an international norm). That democracy promotion is an accepted and necessary component of international behavior is further argued to be evident from the fact that the normative burden has shifted to those not interested in advocating democracy promotion; these are the state leaders who must explain why they are not doing more to advance democracy’s cause worldwide.

Moreover, some have also pointed out that universal values, including democracy, are supported internationally in a way, which corresponds to one’s own domestic values. Such normative explanations emphasize national self-images, roles,

---

47 McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value.”
49 McFaul, *Democracy Promotion as a World Value*, 147–63. Such arguments have been contested by those who ask whether the developed world has the right to impose its version of good polity on the rest of the world. Radicals see in this drive an attempt to continue western hegemony through the supremacy of political ideals, while others worry that even the efforts well-meaning and dedicated democracy promoters have often backfired. Cavell, *Exporting ‘Made-in-America’ Democracy*; and Miyume Tanji and Stephanie Lawson, “‘Democratic Peace’ and ‘Asian Democracy’: A Universalist–Particularist Tension,” *Alternatives* 22, no. 2 (1997): 135–55; and Bunce, “Democracy and Diversity in the Developing World.”
50 This type of account of democracy promotion thus combines actor-centric and structural constructivist explanations. Democracy promotion is understood to be a regulative international norm, which creates permissive conditions for supporting democracy abroad. However, to the extent that the meaning of democracy is still contested at the international level, domestic values and norms nonetheless shape foreign policy decisions. Such domestic norms, which are both regulative and constitutive, not only reinforce the norm of universal right to democracy at present but also potentially
and identities, and foreign policy cultures to argue that democracies tend to externalize
their domestic norms. In these types of accounts of democracy promotion, it is a
“moral” mission embedded in the foreign policy culture of a particular democratic
state.

The implication of this normative understanding of democracy promotion for
the strategies states use is the argument that donors follow taken-for-granted domestic
practices and/or international scripts. Although there is no blueprint universally
recognized as the best way to promote democracy, some authors have pointed to a
certain degree of convergence in democracy promotion efforts; for example, there
seems to be somewhat of a consensus on the importance of promoting civil society
development and regular, free, and fair elections.

Still, the majority of authors in this tradition argue instead that most donors
follow taken-for-granted domestic practices based on core domestic democratic
values. Such values constitute the donor’s self-image, which influences how these

served to motivate democracy promotion even before the consolidation of the international norm
sanctioning democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal for states. Still, given the institutionalization
of a universal right to democracy, the normative account of democracy promotion defined in this
dissertation prioritizes this international norm over domestic values because it mandates support for
democracy abroad and thus creates a stronger and more legitimate obligation than the moral impetus to
support democratic forces abroad created by the domestic values of liberal states.

51 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?”; Thomas Risse-Kappen,
Argument,” European Journal of International Relations 1, no. 4 (1995): 491–517. It should be noted
that normative variants of the democratic peace that emphasize the benefits of having democratic
partners over moral imperatives as a motivation for supporting democracy abroad are considered in this
thesis part of the strategic accounts of democracy promotion.

52 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?”; Smith, America’s
Mission; and Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets. However, as Gaddis (2006: 225) reminds,
the foreign policy role of a given state is not just a product of the self-image of a society but primarily
of its interaction with the roles of other actors: “promoting democracy became the most visible way that
the Americans and their West European allies could differentiate themselves” from their opponents.

53 McFaul, Democracy Promotion as a World Value, 147–63; McFaul, Magen, and Risse, American
Versus European Approaches; Schraeder, Exporting Democracy, 231.

54 Richard Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of the European Union Strategy” (CEPS
Working Document No. 167, Brussels, 2001); Henry Nau, “America’s Identity, Democracy Promotion
and National Interests: Beyond Realism, Beyond Idealism,” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, American
Democracy Promotion, 127–51.
actors organize their own power and resources to pursue foreign affairs as well as how they perceive their international partners.\textsuperscript{55} Thus the domestic normative setting determines not only whether and to what extent a country promotes democracy but also defines the specific model of democracy that is to be supported and the appropriate policy instrument for such export.\textsuperscript{56} Many authors have remarked that individual donors have sought to export their ideals by promoting replicas of their domestic political institutions.\textsuperscript{57} The emphasis in such accounts is based on the fact that the domestic experiences inform the taken-for-granted meaning of democracy, rather than a calculation based on the performance of such institutions. In addition, the donor’s self-image as well as its international “actor-ship” have also been argued to inform the policy instruments considered appropriate for individual democracy promoters.\textsuperscript{58} Lastly, because they understand the approaches to democracy promotion to be based on core domestic values, authors in this is tradition expect that there would be variance in these approaches among different donors but not among the different recipients of the same donor and not even between support for a particular recipient over time.

Finally, these accounts argue that donors in principle promote democracy universally but in practice often focus on contexts where there is solidarity and/or similarity with the recipient country, especially through shared membership in a...
Moreover, such normative support for democracy abroad is especially strong where the partner country in transition shares the aim of “deepening” or “consolidating” democracy or in autocracies in which there are opposition forces struggling towards democracy and human rights.60

It should be noted that democracy promotion motivated by strategic considerations does not necessarily lead to a strategic approach to supporting democracy abroad. Similarly, normatively-motivated democracy promotion does not automatically lead to a normative approach to supporting democracy abroad. In fact, the two types of accounts of democracy promotion have often been combined. For instance, some have acknowledged the emergence of a universal right to democracy but have also suggested that donors seek effective strategies to enforce it.61 And another example – others have argued that democracy promotion has made it possible for the donors to square the circle between self-interested behavior abroad and attachment to democratic norms at home.62 US democracy promotion in particular is often thought of as being strategically motivated while at the same time implemented through an export of the domestic institutional models considered to be key to sustaining the American democratic order.

Moreover, the two types of accounts of democracy promotion are not necessarily strictly competing with each other in another sense as well: they can both be at work at the same time but at different levels (micro, meso, and macro). However, the real test of the commitment of a democracy promoter – and of the explanatory

60 Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?”
61 McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value.”
leverage of the two types of accounts of support for democracy abroad – is in situations in which the implications of principled support for democracy promotion come into conflict with the implications of strategic support for democracy abroad. If there is a clear trend in a democracy promoter’s record to privilege either principled or strategic considerations at such points, then it could be argued that one these two types of accounts is more useful in explaining (and perhaps even predicting the future) efforts of this particular democracy promoter. [For a summary of the observable implications of the strategic and the normative types of accounts of democracy promotion, see Table 1.1.]

Table 1.1. Types of Accounts of Democracy Promotion and Their Observable Implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observable Implications</th>
<th>Commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strategic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivations</td>
<td>1) Seek perceived benefits of having democratic partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Target partners perceived to be important but also unstable, unreliable, or underdeveloped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) Uphold universal right to democracy and/or export domestic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Target peoples with whom there is perceived solidarity (shared identity/community membership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>1) Export effective/best practices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Democracy Promotion by the Eastern European Members of the EU: Research Design and Methods

Previous works on democracy promotion suggest that a donor’s policies are shaped by the donor context and/or the recipient’s environment – a fact that reinforces the need for detailed scrutiny of individual cases. Accordingly, in studying the young Eastern European democracy promoters, I follow a two-tiered mixed-methods

research strategy: 1) I carry out a medium-N study, which examines the democracy promotion efforts of the 10 Eastern EU donors; and 2) I also conduct two sets of paired comparisons: one holding the recipient constant but varying the donor country and the other one – holding the donor constant but varying the recipient context. I compare Poland’s involvement in Ukraine and Belarus directly and through the EU to Slovakia’s engagement in Ukraine and Belarus directly and through the EU. [See Table 1.2.]

Table 1.2. Paired Comparisons Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Eastern European Wave of Democratization / Turnaround from Recipient to Donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>Poland in Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hybrid Regime/ Democracy</td>
<td>Poland in Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The medium-N study includes the whole population in the universe of cases of interest in this dissertation: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria. I describe some of the significant similarities and differences in the democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern EU members. I then examine several possible explanations of these trends to

64 Paired comparisons are an intermediate step between a single case study that suggests general relations and a multi-case analysis that tests or refines a theory. This method provides greater confidence in theory-testing and theory-building as well as greater analytical leverage in explaining patterns and outcomes than single case study analysis does. On paired comparisons, see Sidney Tarrow, “The Strategy of Paired Comparisons: Towards a Theory of Practice,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 2 (2010): 230–59.
65 The cases of interest in this dissertation are the Eastern EU member states. This is not to imply that there are no other democracy promoters in the post-communist space. For example, there is a strong core of Serbian NGOs supporting democratic breakthroughs abroad; however, Belgrade has demonstrated a lot less interest in democracy promotion. Much more importantly, the democratic credentials of Serbia, like those of many of the post-communist countries that are currently outside of the EU are still under question. Therefore, they were excluded from this study focusing on young democracies as democracy promoters.
single out the variable that best accounts for this variation. I further build on this
medium-N analysis with two sets of paired comparisons. They examine in detail the
explanation derived from the medium-N study for Eastern European support for
democracy abroad.  

On the donor side of the paired comparisons, the cases of Poland and Slovakia
are optimal ones for both theory-testing and theory-amending: Poland and Slovakia
not only represent and are typical of the two waves of recipient-to-donor
transformations in Eastern Europe but also feature two of the most pronounced such
turnarounds. There have been two waves of democratization among the Eastern
European members of the EU. In the first wave (1989-1991), these countries
overthrew communism; in the second wave (1996-98) – pro-democratic forces in the
countries that had gotten stuck in the gray zone between dictatorship and democracy
challenged post-communist leaders who had become authoritarian. Corresponding to
these two waves of democratization, there have also been two waves of democracy
promotion recipients that later became democracy promoters. Poland is a case
representative of the first wave of such transformations, Slovakia – of the second. The
democracy promotion activities of both countries are typical for the region in terms of
both their motivations and their approaches as well as in the factors shaping those.
Moreover, Poland and Slovakia have been among the most active democracy
exporters in the Eastern EU members group. Therefore, Poland and Slovakia represent

66 Combining qualitative and quantitative methods has several advantages. Abbas Tashakkori and
richness in detail, a dynamic view of actor interaction, and ability to capture social processes. On the
advantages of quantitative research, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing
Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1994). On the advantages of qualitative research, see Henry E. Brady and David Collier, eds.,
*Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004).

67 On typical cases with extreme values, see John Gerring, *Case Study Research* (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007). On Poland and Slovakia as typical cases, see Jonavicius, *The Democracy
Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States*, as well as Chapter 2 in this dissertation.
typical cases with extreme values on the dependent variable (democracy promotion) and thus illuminate the most about the Eastern European exporters of democracy.68

Additionally, having cases from two consecutive waves of recipient-to-donor transformations – one in the early 1990s and one in the late 1990s – is important when analyzing the motivations of the Eastern European democracy promoters. Since the international norm of universal right to democracy grew increasingly stronger over the course of the 1990s, the Poland-Slovakia comparison provides a lot of insight about the importance and power of this norm. Having donor cases from the two waves of democratization in the post-communist world is also important when examining the approaches to democracy promotion of the Eastern European donors. As mentioned above, each wave faced specific democratization challenges (defeating a long-standing authoritarian regime in the first wave vs challenging hybrid regimes in the second wave) and each wave overcame those challenges with particular innovations in democratization. Poland has been the leader in the post-1989 democratization processes in the region, whereas Slovakia was one of the laggards until the late 1990s when it became the front-runner in the second democratization wave in Eastern Europe. And the innovations of these early risers were then adopted by other latecomers in each wave of democratization.

However, when examining the diffusion of such innovations beyond these early risers’ initial waves of democratization, I hold the recipient constant while varying the donor country in one set of comparisons and in the other one, I hold the donor constant but vary the recipients. It should be noted, however, that when analyzing the motivations of the post-communist democracy promoters, I examine the

---

68 While the case studies focus on young democracies that have become democracy promoters (positive cases), my overview of the 10 Eastern European EU donors also includes cases of countries – most notably Bulgaria – that provide some minimal development assistance but no meaningful democracy support (negative cases). On selection bias such as selecting on the dependent variable, see David Collier and James Mahoney, “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research,” *World Politics* 49, no. 1 (1996): 56–91.
activities of Poland and Slovakia in general, that is, I do not focus on particular recipients since the targets of democracy promotion reveal much about why democratization abroad is supported.

On the recipient side of the paired comparisons, Ukraine and Belarus have comparable geopolitical locations and historical-political development; but the former is a hybrid regime with democratic prospects since 2004, whereas the latter is an autocracy. Pairing those two recipients allows me not only to compare how different types of donors export democracy in the same countries (Poland vs. Slovakia in Ukraine and Poland vs. Slovakia in Belarus) but also to differentiate between the democracy promotion strategies of those donors in receiving contexts with different regimes (Poland in Ukraine vs. Poland in Belarus and Slovakia in Ukraine vs. Slovakia in Belarus). Accordingly, I build on the democracy promotion literature by extending it to a set of previously unstudied donors and by illustrating some of the different challenges those donors face when working in recipient countries with different regime types.

To uncover the motivations and define the approaches of the Eastern European democracy promoters, I conduct an in-depth examination of their activities. The conclusions of each of the cases within the paired comparisons are based on a triangulation of three different types of analysis: I examine the origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the post-communist donors. Moreover, I study these different dimensions of democracy promotion by using three different research methods: process tracing, discourse analysis, and the qualitative comparative method.

---

69 Like the officials I study, I use the term of hybrid regime interchangeably with democratizing regimes and countries in transition.

70 Richard Youngs has advocated for and implemented such a distinction in some of his latest studies. See for example, Richard Youngs, The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment (FRIDE, 2010).
respectively. \textsuperscript{71} In each analysis, I use the observable implications of the strategic and normative accounts of democracy promotion (described in Section 2 of this chapter and summarized in Table 1.1):

	extit{On motivations:}

- Origins: How was democracy promotion incorporated into the foreign policy of the Eastern European democracy promoters?
  - Strategic Account: Did these donors recognize some benefit of having democratic international partners?
  - Normative Account: Were the Eastern European democracy promoters compelled by a perceived mission to export their domestic values and/or to uphold a universal right to democracy?

- Rhetoric: How have the post-communist donors talked about their democracy promotion efforts?
  - Strategic Account: Have they talked about the benefits of having democratic international partners?
  - Normative Account: Have they referred to their responsibility to spread democratic values?

- Practice: Which are the recipients of Eastern European support for democracy abroad?
  - Strategic Account: Are they traditional / important but undemocratic partners?

\textsuperscript{71} Since the motivations behind democracy promotion are notoriously difficult to uncover and the approaches to supporting democracy abroad are difficult to define, such triangulation affords me the opportunity to sidestep the limitations and to combine the strengths of all three types of analysis. On process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences} (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). On the qualitative comparative method, see Brady and Collier, \textit{Rethinking Social Inquiry}. On discourse analysis, see Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, \textit{The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present} (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
o Normative Account: Are they members in a community with which the donor feels solidarity or perceives important similarities in term of their domestic or international identity?

On approaches:

• Origins: What considerations informed the decisions of the Eastern European democracy promoters when choosing how to support democracy abroad?
  o Strategic Account: Have their approaches been informed by calculations based on the performance of certain institutions?
  o Normative Account: Have their approaches been informed by the normative appropriateness of certain practices?

• Rhetoric: How have the Eastern European democracy promoters described their approach to supporting democracy abroad?
  o Strategic Account: Have they talked about the effectiveness of particular processes and instruments?
  o Normative Account: Have they referred to institutions, processes, and policy instruments taken-for-granted at home or scripted by the international community?

• Practice: What instruments have the Eastern European democracy promoters used and which institutions have they supported in recipient countries?
  o Strategic Account: Have these donors varied their approach to most effectively democratize the target country?
  o Normative Account: Have these donors used a “cookie-cutter” or “one-size-fits-all” approach based on taken-for-granted practices?
4.1. Definitions and Data Collection

Following the consensus in the field, I define democracy promotion as purposeful actions meant to encourage a transition from dictatorship to democracy or to enhance the quality of democracy in regimes that have already moved towards democratic government. Democratic regimes have been understood as “having uncertain results (or electoral competition) but also having certain procedures (rules that make democratic rulers both responsive and effective).” Therefore, democracy promotion activities include support for regular, free, and fair elections and the development of the political and civic actors and local and national institutions that make political competition and representation meaningful. Democracy promotion efforts have tended to include three general categories of initiatives:

- Political Process: promoting regular, free, and fair elections as well as political party development;
- Governing Institutions: strengthening of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary at the national and local level as well as their checks and balances and the rule of law;
- Civil Society: support for civic groups and for individual non-state actors with important civic functions such as the media, educators, etc.

---

72 In recent years, the term “democracy promotion” has acquired a somewhat negative connotation. Some have expressed concern that “democracy promotion” implies that democracy can and should be advanced by external actors. Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. However, I use the term “democracy promotion” with the acknowledgement that “the primary force for democratization is and must be internal to the country in question.” (Quote by Burnell, Democracy Assistance.) Moreover, I use democracy promotion interchangeably with support for democracy or democratization abroad and with democracy import/export. The latter terms have also been criticized as implying a mechanistic transplantation of a set of political institutions. However, I use them to indicate the adoption/transmission of a diffusion item without loading these terms with any information about the degree of adaptation of such diffusion items.


In addition, these goals can be achieved through several more or less intrusive policy instruments:

- Diplomacy: persuasion and pressure;
- Foreign Aid: technical and financial assistance;
- Political Conditionality: incentives and sanctions;
- Intervention: covert or overt coercion.\(^7\)

### Table 1.3. Democracy Promotion Efforts Studied

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Actor</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Bilateral</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Polish &amp; Slovak official efforts in Ukraine &amp; Belarus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state</td>
<td>Polish &amp; Slovak NGO efforts in Ukraine &amp; Belarus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of this dissertation, I have identified two types of Eastern European democracy promoters working at two levels. [See Table 1.3.] There are state and non-governmental actors, where the latter include quasi-governmental institutes, think tanks, and monitoring and service-oriented groups. These two groups of actors can work directly in target countries as well as multilaterally by leveraging the resources of the EU (and other relevant international organizations). Previous studies have analyzed either governmental or civic democracy promoters and have overlooked the interactions of the two types of actors. Moreover, existing works have focused on bilateral democracy promotion and have given insufficient attention to the ways in which states seek to further their democracy promotion agenda through participation in multilateral organizations. Accordingly, I have built on the democracy promotion literature by examining the efforts of Eastern European governments as well as civil

---

\(^7\) Schraeder, *Exporting Democracy*, 231.
societies to promote democracy in neighboring post-communist countries bilaterally as well as through the EU.

When preparing the overview of the 10 Eastern European governmental and non-state democracy promoters, I relied primarily on secondary sources and on the online archives of their foreign ministries and their associations of NGOs working abroad. When preparing the case studies, I drew on in-depth interviews, participant observation, and archival research. I gathered documents and materials produced by governmental and non-governmental democracy promoters in the process of deciding on and implementing such assistance. In addition, I observed some aspects of their democracy promotion activities. Finally, I also conducted close to 100 interviews with Polish and Slovak civic activists and government officials as well as with knowledgeable observers of Polish and Slovak democracy promotion efforts, such as journalists, academics, policy analysts, other donors, and their recipients.\(^{76}\)

In Poland, I studied the work of various governmental foreign policy makers within the Department for Development Cooperation and the Department for Eastern Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency, the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, and the Sejm’s Foreign Affairs Committees. I interviewed officials at different levels in those institutions and obtained internal and external evaluations of their work. I collected public statements on Polish foreign policy in general and democracy promotion in particular. I further attended events organized by those institutions and relevant to Polish democracy promotion.

At the same time, I studied the work of Polish civic democracy promoters. I focused on the relevant members of Zagranica – the Polish association of NGOs working abroad, but I also studied the activities of other groups working in Ukraine and/or Belarus as well. I interviewed members of these NGOs and collected their

---

\(^{76}\) All interviews were conducted in confidentiality and the names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.
annual reports. Finally, I attended some of their ongoing democracy promotion events (conferences, training sessions, study tours, etc.) and collected the materials produced for such events.

In Slovakia, I collected data similarly but my focus was on foreign policy elites from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, SlovakAid, the Prime Minister’s Office, and Parliament. At the non-state level, I studied the efforts of the relevant members of MVRO – the Slovak coalition of development NGOs working abroad.

Lastly, in Brussels, I studied the work of the Permanent Representations of Slovakia and of Poland. I also followed the work of their representatives to the Eastern Policy and the Human Rights and Democracy Committees of the Council of Ministers. I further examined the activities of Polish and Slovak Members of European Parliament (MEPs) active on democracy promotion issues. Additionally, I talked to relevant EU-level NGOs, policy analysts, and other donors – I familiarized myself with the EU’s general democracy promotion efforts as well as the EU’s support for democracy in Ukraine and Belarus. I wanted to be able to situate Polish and Slovak effort in the context of the broader European initiatives. Finally, I investigated the EU-level activism of the other Eastern European state and non-governmental democracy promoters.

While participating in democracy promotion events at these research sites, I also met and interviewed an array of beneficiaries of Eastern European, and especially Polish and Slovak, democracy promotion efforts. Still, it should be noted that this dissertation is primarily donor-centric. Most previous studies have been primarily recipient-centric in that they have studied either the policies towards particular recipients or the impact of democracy promotion efforts on particular beneficiaries. I examine instead the decision-making process through which support for democracy
abroad is decided on and implemented through the lenses of the donors, not of the recipients.

5. Arguments

I argue that the Eastern EU countries have been investing in supporting democracy in their neighborhood in order to create a congenial international environment for the survival of their new democratic states. Democracy promotion became part of the foreign policy traditions of these countries as a result of the advocacy of the elites who prepared the democracy breakthroughs in the region. These elites were successful only in cases where civic voices in favor of democracy promotion were strong and they articulated compelling arguments about the importance of official democracy promotion. However, while civic democracy promotion has been motivated by a normative commitment to democracy and to assisting others on the road to democracy, official support for democracy abroad is best understood as a strategic response to these countries’ main foreign policy challenges. Still, both civic and governmental actors have strategic approaches to democracy promotion: they both export the “best practices” from their local transition to democracy that are perceived to fit the democratization needs of recipients. While such exports often include practices that were Western imports in support of the democratization of the Eastern EU members, there are still distinct national approaches to democracy promotion that differ according to the regime type of the recipient. Moreover, if the approaches of the established democracies are based on their domestic models of democracy, Eastern EU young democracies have sought to export their local models of democratization.
5.1. On the Motivations of Eastern European Democracy Promoters

Understanding the motivations behind Eastern European democracy promotion is important for several reasons: 1) it helps unravel the puzzle of post-communist investment in democratization abroad; 2) it speaks to the drivers of the foreign policy of these young democratizing states; and 3) it enhances the observer’s ability to understand and predict the democratization policies (targets, policy consistency and contradictions, etc.) as well as their development over time.

In the post-communist world, democracy promotion began with the efforts of and built on the normative commitments and transnational networks of the civic activists who brought democracy to the region. These activists report a moral obligation to help others in their struggle for democracy, the way the West had supported them. Such a duty has been felt most acutely by those with ties to other pro-democratic activists abroad and primarily towards other countries in the communist and post-communist space. It has been solidarity with these peoples that motivates civic democracy promotion.\(^{77}\) So with the support and encouragement of the West and primarily the US, many Eastern European activists maintained and further developed the regional (dissident or post-communist pro-democratic) civic networks put in place before the local breakthroughs to democracy.\(^{78}\) In the 1990s and 2000s, these networks continued to facilitate the flow of technical assistance and moral support among their members. Such non-governmental democracy promotion efforts flourished where the transnational civic networks were most active and dense, that is, between countries with traditionally close historic-cultural relations.

---

\(^{77}\) This solidarity has both a structural (network) and an ideational (shared identity) component, which reinforce one another.

\(^{78}\) Moreover, while those networks were primarily civic in nature they often included political activists as well or at least civic activists who moved between the state and civil society. Such transnational networks were not just bilateral organizational or even country contacts but often included multiple organizations from multiple countries, forming a web of contacts and collaboration within the post-communist space but also between Eastern Europe and the West.
The civic activists who brought democracy to the region have not only been supporting the diffusion of democratic norms and practices but have also have been advocating that their governments to do the same. In cases where such norm entrepreneurs represented strong contingents and articulated resonant arguments in favor of official support for democracy abroad, democracy promotion was incorporated into their country’s foreign policy. In Poland and the other Baltic countries, democracy promotion became an element of a geo-political strategy to create reliable partners in their eastern neighborhood and to deter Russian aggression. In Slovakia, as in some of the other Central and Southeastern European new democracies, democracy promotion became the solution to the political and economic destabilization as a result of the neighboring former Yugoslav and Soviet republics. And although local political elites would at times express personal and even official solidarity with other leaders and countries struggling on the road to democracy, when the implications of such principled support would come into conflict with perceived strategic objectives, the latter imperatives have been most frequently given priority.

The Eastern European civic democracy promoters have also been working to keep support for democracy abroad high on their state’s agenda and have participated in its realization by implementing projects under their country’s official development assistance system. In addition to such domestic players, Western and especially American actors too have played role in stimulating and reinforcing post-communist democracy promotion. Western donors quickly recognized that Eastern EU members have more relevant experience to share with countries further east and southeast than the expertise Western donors were bringing. Moreover, from the perspective of the West, post-communist democracy promotion was a continuation of their work and realization of their values. Consequently, the Western democracy promoters have encouraged and supported Eastern European democracy promotion, thus stimulating
and legitimizing such activism. Also by brokering the diffusion of the Eastern European transformation experience (within the space circumscribed by the domestically-negotiated logic of post-communist democracy promotion), the Western donors have shaped its reach. And to the extent that some of the best practices the Eastern European democracy promoters have exported abroad have included practices imported earlier in these countries by Western democracy promoters, the Western activists have further influenced how Eastern European democracy promotion has been implemented. Still, it would be a mistake to overlook the independent and organic Eastern European movements behind post-communist democracy promotion and to treat these movements as Western intermediaries in the European neighborhood and beyond.

5.2. On the Approaches to Democracy Promotion of the Eastern European Donors

A donor’s approach to supporting democracy abroad has important implications for the way this donor’s efforts are received by recipients and by other donors. Are the form of democracy supported abroad and the instruments used to that end grounded in the donor’s domestic practices and institutions, in an international script for democracy promotion or in the needs of recipients? Established democracies are said to have national, one-size-fits-all, approaches to democracy promotion because they export replicas of their domestic institutions, that is their domestic models of democracy.\(^79\) In contrast, the Eastern European approaches to supporting democracy abroad are based on a strategic export of the local transition experience as it fits recipient needs. Thus, there are distinct Eastern European national approaches to

---

\(^79\) On the US, see Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, and on the EU, see Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law” (paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 2004).
democracy promotion; however, they vary according to the regime type of the recipient and are based on these donors’ models of democratization.

Both governmental and civic Eastern European democracy promoters work on the intuition that sharing their transition experience with countries that have been historically close is pragmatically “helpful.” In fact, given their first-hand democratization experience, both types of actors are very consciously and purposefully passing along “lessons” they have learned about “what worked at home and what did not.”\textsuperscript{80} Such lessons are most often like “recipes” about defeating authoritarians (breakthrough) and achieving particular reform objectives (consolidation) such as decentralization or compliance with EU regional policy directives. Moreover, these lessons also often include best practices that were Western imports in support of the democratization of the Eastern EU members.

In supporting democracy abroad, Poland, for example, has been borrowing from its experience with a “negotiated transition” and Slovakia has drawn inspiration from its own model of “electoral breakthrough.” Such democratization models are usually about political liberalization based on a particular type of state-society interactions, which have produced a specific national repertoire of struggle against unchecked and concentrated state power and lack of political representation. It should also be noted that these state-society relations are often also transferred and reinforced through various other reform recipes for the period of “democratic consolidation.”

At the same time, however, out of all the democratic breakthrough strategies and the reform recipes they have, the Eastern European democracy promoters have tended to share those that they understand to fit the needs, that is, advance the democratization, of individual recipients. That is why there are differences in the approach between the practices of individual donors when they target hybrid regimes.

\textsuperscript{80} Interview with V. H., October 30, 2008.
and when they target autocracies. Poland and Slovakia, and all other Eastern European donors, base their approach to autocracies such as Belarus on their experience of struggling for democracy before their local breakthrough; similarly, these democracy promoters derive their approach to hybrid regimes such as Ukraine from the lessons they have learned about consolidating democracy at home in the period after the local breakthrough.

5.3. On the Impact of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters

Even though they are young donors and mostly small players compared to the other members of the international community supporting the development of democracy around the globe, the Eastern EU members have emerged as true champions of democracy promotion. Moreover, they have excelled where the efforts of older Western donors have been found lacking – the young democracy promoters have a nuanced approach, local knowledge, and recent democratization experience. As a result, the activities of the Eastern EU members have been generally appreciated by both recipients and other donors – a fact that has allowed these young donors to keep democracy high on the Euro-Atlantic agenda and to secure some democratization gains in the neighborhood. The Eastern European democracy promoters have had most impact in the hybrid democracies in the European space – the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova. Their bilateral democracy promotion and keeping the Euro-Atlantic IOs engaged in these countries have been very important in 1) helping pro-democratic forces there prepare democratic breakthroughs (the electoral revolutions in the 2000s\textsuperscript{81}) and continue pushing for reforms thereafter; and 2) in creating an

\textsuperscript{81} These revolutions were attempts to expose electoral fraud and to use mass protest in defense of the existing, democratic constitution in order to defeat the illiberal incumbent and after assuming power, to push the country in a decidedly more democratic direction. Such successful campaigns were organized in Croatia and Serbia in 2000, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Moldova in 2009–2010. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” Communist and Postcommunist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 283–304.
international environment that favors and supports the diffusion of democracy into the European neighborhood.

Moreover in joining the international community of democracy promoters, the Eastern EU members not only contributed to but also influence the activities of other players. First, individual countries have assumed leaderships of external efforts to support democracy in particular countries. Second, the Eastern European democracy promoters have often successfully advocated that certain countries of concern to them be prioritized by the international community as well as that the international community take a particular approach to supporting their democratization. Third, by re-granting Western aid and serving as consultants or subcontractors in Western projects, the Eastern European activists have also influenced how Western assistance has been implemented. In sum, by studying the efforts of the Eastern European democracy promoters, this dissertation suggests that what they lack in resources and international standing, small and young donors can make up in credibility and relevance of expertise.

5.4. Contributions

This dissertation contributes to previous work on democracy promotion theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. Empirically, the thesis examines the activities of a group of little-studied non-Western democracy promoters. Unlike previous works, this one also pays close attention to the state-societal interactions in which policies of both bilateral and multilateral democracy promotion are formulated and implemented. Methodologically, while a lot of the studies of democracy promotion either assume the motivations of the actors involved or confirm them deductively, this dissertation conducts an in-depth inductive examination of the motivations and strategies of the players on the ground. Moreover, it is a mixed-
method study, the qualitative part of which is based on the triangulation of three different types of analysis (of the origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the Eastern European democracy promoters) done through the use of three different research techniques (process tracing, discourse analysis, and the qualitative comparative method respectively).

Theoretically, the dissertation explores a corollary of the democratic peace literature – how and why policymakers might try to produce democratic peace. Moreover, unlike previous works, which have struggled to theorize the “high politics” of democracy promotion, this study builds on the existing literature to define two distinct theoretical approaches to understanding the place of democracy promotion in the foreign-policy process: democracy promotion as a normative commitment and democracy promotion as a strategic commitment. The thesis then improves on previous strategic types of explanations by suggesting that the benefits of having democratic international partners are not fixed and universal as previously assumed but rather domestically negotiated through the state-society interaction in which the policies of democracy promotion is produced and implemented. Moreover, the dissertation moves beyond the study of democracy promotion as a project of the Western economically developed and politically established democracies. The focus

---

82 Most of the democratic peace conversations, however, have defended liberalism against realist critiques and have therefore focused on the “objective” existence of democratic peace: whether democracies really do not go to war with each other, what constitutes “democracy” and what constitutes “war,” and what mechanisms underlie the democratic peace. (See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993]; Risse-Kappen, “Democratic Peace – Warlike Democracies?”; John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997]; and David Lake, “Peaceful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review 86 [March 1992]: 24–37. For a review of the democratic peace literature, see Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 [2003]: 585–602.) However, in answering these questions, the literature has neglected the on-the-ground direct investigation of which benefits of having democratic international partners matter to foreign policy-makers and how these statesmen adopt and use such ideas about democratic peace (their beliefs and decision-making processes). This is a gap my dissertation fills.

83 For a similar criticism of previous works on democracy promotions, see Wolff and Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?”
here is on the process of transition from recipient to donor country and on young instead of mature democracies as democracy promoters – both questions are still poorly understood. The theoretical payoff is a better understanding of the role of domestic actors in the institutionalization of support for democracy abroad.

Additionally, this dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to the diffusion literature and especially to the study of diffusion of democracy. Most previous works on this topic seek to establish that diffusion dynamics are at work behind the spatial and geographical clustering of democratic change or follow the spread of democratic practices from one location to another during the democratic breakthrough cycles in Eastern Europe in 1989-91 and 1996-98 and the early to mid 2000s. This study traces instead the diffusion of democracy within the post-communist space not just during democratization waves but also through the everyday political and social interactions within the region before and after such waves. In other words, I document the production of a “region” as well as the importance of regional factors in the process of democratization. Moreover, since most of the diffusion literature (in both comparative politics and international relations) is adopter-centric, this thesis improves on our understanding of regional / transnational diffusion by exploring instead the motivations of transmitters and how these motivations produce uneven diffusion of values and practices.


Finally, by focusing on two movements-participants in the transnational democracy advocacy network, this dissertation represents a case study of transnational activism. A novel finding here is that the normative and opportunistic motivations of various civic actors for participating in transnational activism might follow a cycle-like pattern: transnational movements develop around a core of normatively-motivated actors but as these movements grow and become established, available funding, legitimacy, prestige, etc. become a leading motivation for some of the latest recruits to the transnational democracy advocacy movement. Moreover, this dissertation further contributes to the overlooked question of social movement demobilization by suggesting that as some successful national pro-democratic movements demobilize, the transnational components of these movements become increasingly active; in brief, demobilization in some cases is accompanied by an upward scale shift to transnational democracy advocacy activism. Finally, in arguing that such norm entrepreneurs were successful if they represented a strong lobby for and compelling causal arguments in favor of official democracy promotion, the thesis documents an interesting interaction of movement resources and framing: organizational strength is perhaps crucial for frames based on causal ideas.


The next chapter, Chapter 2, surveys the democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern EU members and examines some of the possible explanations of the differences in the activities of these actors. It finds that the introduction, persistence, and logic of official post-communist democracy promotion are shaped by the efforts of the civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region. Chapter 3 then presents the similar transition of the Polish and the Slovak civil societies from being recipients of democracy assistance to becoming exporters of their transition
experience. The argument here is that such efforts have been normatively motivated but strategically pursued. Chapters 4 and 5 look respectively at the efforts of the Polish and the Slovak governments to support the diffusion of democracy in their neighborhood. These chapters suggest that such activities are best understood as a strategic commitment meant to create a favorable international environment for these new democratic states. Moreover, there are distinct national approaches to democracy promotion that vary according to the regime types of the recipient and are based on the local model of democratization. Chapter 6 concludes by summarizing the dissertation’s main findings and discussing their implications for some of the relevant International Relations and Comparative Politics debates.
CHAPTER 2:
OVERVIEW OF EASTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The recent post-communist recruits to the global community of democracies have now become some of the most ardent supporters of the spreading of democratic norms and practices. Some Eastern European countries began investing in the democratization of their neighborhood almost immediately after their own democratic breakthroughs and most of them joined the ranks of democracy promoters within the first decade after the beginning of their own democratic transformation. Democracy promotion became a priority for a majority of these new donors after their accession to NATO and especially to the EU (when their diplomacies were no longer overwhelmed by the requirements of these integration processes).

The young Eastern European democracies have worked to secure a greater place for democracy promotion on the agenda of a number of transatlantic international organizations such as the EU, NATO, OSCE and CoE. As countries that have the ear of their neighbors, the new post-communist donors have also built on their bilateral diplomacy in the region to strengthen democracy in the European neighborhood: they have served as models, criticized undemocratic practices, and advised and pressured transition laggards to make further progress towards democracy. Moreover, by the mid-2000s, a majority of these Eastern European democracy promoters had already begun the process of setting up their development aid systems, which prioritized the delivery of democracy assistance to the post-communist region. And even if somewhat reluctantly, all 10 current Eastern European members of the EU have joined the sanctions imposed by the international community on the regimes, which committed grave violations of human rights and democratic practices in the region – Serbia and Belarus.
This chapter briefly surveys the democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern EU members to suggest that supporting democracy in their neighborhood has become a significant element of their foreign policy. After noting some general trends, the chapter examines several possible explanations of the differences in geographical priorities and in levels of engagement among the Eastern EU members. The argument is that the introduction, the persistence, and the logic of the official post-communist democracy promotion were all a product of the efforts of the civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region. This chapter further argues that the democracy promotion approaches of the Eastern EU members have been primarily a conscious and strategic “export” of the “best practices” from their own transitions that fit the democratization needs of recipients.

1. Overview of Eastern European Democracy Promotion

Since these donors followed the lead of the international community on sanctioning violators of democracy and human rights, the overview of the activities of the Eastern European countries in this section focuses primarily on the diplomacy and assistance of post-communist democracy promotion. This review suggests that despite being small powers and young donors, the Eastern EU members have emerged as highly committed and relatively effective supporters of democracy abroad.

1.1. The Diplomacy of Eastern European Democracy Promotion

Bilaterally, many of the Eastern EU members have developed a variety of cooperation mechanisms to maintain friendly and good relations with their neighbors and other traditional international partners – an agenda, which has included supporting the democratization and where applicable the Euro-Atlantic integration of transition
laggards. Such political consultations occur primarily within the executive but also sometimes at the legislative or local (cross-border) level.

The transformation success stories from each wave of post-communist democratization have often served as models for their international partners still struggling to reform. Regional bilateral and multilateral ties have served to spread information – directly or indirectly – about how democratic institutions are set up and function in the democratization leaders in the region.\(^1\) More frequently in private but sometimes also in public, elites from these emerging democracy promoters have also tried to persuade their counterparts that democracy would be beneficial for them and for their nations.\(^2\) Moreover, elites from successfully democratizing countries have frequently shared how they had solved transition problems similar to the ones currently facing their partners in the region.\(^3\) And given how onerous EU integration requirements are, many of the new Eastern European members set up special cooperation mechanisms or programs to guide their partners’ efforts to move closer to Brussels. Furthermore, post-communist democracy promoters have frequently exerted peer pressure on their counterparts to keep up democratization reforms.\(^4\) The Eastern European democratization success stories have also regularly joined the international

---

\(^1\) Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., *Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement* (Prague: PASOS, 2008). Although countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have often been the democratization poster children, Slovakia has sought to demonstrate that even transition laggards can catch up on their democratization and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have tried to persuade their neighbors that post-Soviet transformation can be successful as well.


\(^3\) Interview with S. R., November 27, 2008; interview with M. V., November 27, 2008; interview with M. J., October 30, 2008; interview with M. S., October 28, 2008.

\(^4\) Interview with A. S., October 25, 2008; interview with T. L., October 28, 2008; interview with I. K., November 21, 2008.
community in criticizing regimes perpetrating electoral fraud and grave violations of human rights.⁵

Eastern European bilateral efforts were crucial in inspiring and preparing pro-democratic forces in the European neighborhood to push their countries in a decidedly democratic direction through the electoral revolutions in the 2000s.⁶ Despite its mundane character, such democracy promotion through everyday diplomacy has been particularly important in conveying the international and regional expectations of democratization laggards to their elites as well as in shaping the expectations of these elites about what is possible and beneficial for them and their nations when it comes to further reform. Given the first-hand democratization experience of the Eastern European democracy promoters and the social capital they have in the region, they have “had the ear” of their international partners.⁷ At the same time, however, considerations of democracy promotion have sometimes been accorded lower priority and even sacrificed for good neighborly relations or other political or economic considerations.

Multilaterally, the Eastern European countries have supported and in some cases sought to influence the foreign policy of key regional international organizations such as the EU, OSCE, CoE, and NATO to support democratization in the European neighborhood. Recognizing their own limitations as small and/or young states, the Eastern European countries have sought to involve post-communist democratization laggards in a web of regional cooperation as a way to anchor them in the transatlantic democratic community.⁸ At the same time, the Eastern European democracy

---

⁶ Interview with P. D., November 27, 2008.
⁷ Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010.
⁸ Only Poland and Romania could perhaps be considered middle powers; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia began building their state, including their foreign policy, apparatus only in the early 1990s. Open Society Institute, *Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc: The EU New Member States as Agenda*
promoters have also sought to keep democratization high on the agenda of such regional organizations. The post-communist democracies have been most active in the EU and to a lesser extent in NATO primarily because joining them carries numerous security, political, economic, and social benefits and because, as a result, these structures have the potential to exercise tremendous influence over their applicants.\(^9\)

Given the mainstreaming of support for democracy and human rights in the EU’s external relations, the Eastern members have actively lobbied for enhancing the Union’s cooperation with its eastern and southeastern neighbors.\(^10\) The post-communist members have argued for offering membership prospective to such countries in transition as well as for quickly moving forward towards trade and visa liberalization; these not only serve as incentives for further reform in the short term but also advance the diffusion of democratic norms and practices in the long run. Since the Western Balkans are on an enlargement track, the Central European and Balkan EU members have sought to speed up their accession.\(^11\) They successfully got Brussels to open accession negotiations with Croatia in 2005 and to give Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia visa-free travel, beginning in 2010. Because the EU grouped the “European” republics of the former Soviet Union with other countries in Eurasia and the Mediterranean without membership prospective, the post-communist

---


\(^10\) In recognition of the expertise and activism of the Eastern EU members in the eastern and southeastern neighborhood, their diplomats have received several relevant high-level posts: for example, EU’s enlargement and neighborhood policy commissioner, Chairman of the Delegation for Relations with Belarus at the European Parliament, Co-Chairman of the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, the Co-Chair of the EU-Moldova Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, the EU Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

\(^11\) Open Society Institute, *Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc*. 
members have emphasized the need for a special EU policy for the immediate eastern neighbors. Even before it was an EU member, Poland circulated a proposal – endorsed and presented through the Visegrad group and actively supported by the Baltic former USSR republics – for such enhanced cooperation that reinforces the Union’s support for the democratization of these countries. In 2006, Romania put forward its own proposal but focused more on the so-called Black Sea region. Moreover, Poland and also Lithuania have played a leading role in steering the EU’s response to the Ukrainian political crisis in 2004 and subsequently lobbied for offering a membership prospective to Kiev. However, it was only after the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 that the Eastern Partnership – a special cooperation mechanism for 6 of the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors – was passed and only after the 2010 presidential elections in Ukraine (seen by some as a step back in the country’s democratization) that Kiev was offered a membership prospective. However, whether other European Partnership countries such as Moldova would be put on an enlargement track and when other Western Balkans countries such as Macedonia and Serbia will be accepted into the Union still remain unclear despite pressure by the Eastern EU members for a closer cooperation between the Union and these eastern and southeastern countries.

Moreover, the Eastern EU states have also contributed to strengthening the EU’s response to undemocratic regimes in the immediate eastern neighborhood. Most importantly, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia have kept the

---

12 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008; and interview with A. D., July 27, 2007. The Visegrad group includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia.
13 Oana Mihaela Mocanu, “European Neighbourhood Policy – New Initiatives,” in Contribution of Romania, EIR Study Collection 23 (Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, 2009). The non-EU participants in the Black Sea Synergy are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey.
Belarusian question on the table. Not only has the European Council been taking notice of developments in Minsk since the EU’s eastern enlargement but Belarus has also become the country about which the most resolutions have been passed by the European parliament. Thus the Eastern EU countries have encouraged the EU to pay more attention to Minsk and to respond quickly and decisively to undemocratic practices in Belarus. However, if the post-communist members have significantly weakened the EU’s “Russia first” approach towards Eastern Europe, they have been less successful in strengthening the EU’s democratization agenda vis-à-vis Russia. Still, where Eastern European officials have not succeeded at the European Council level, Eastern European members of the European Parliament, especially from Poland and the other Baltic countries, have sought to make up with active involvement in questions relating not only to Russia but in other issues that have direct implications for EU-Russian relations, such as democratization in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.

Partly through such activism on the EU’s eastern and southeastern policy, the post-communist members have gained a reputation as active supporters of democracy promotion. This reputation has been further strengthened through the participation of the post-communist members in the debates about the EU’s general democracy promotion initiatives. Most active have been the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. The Eastern members (both at the governmental and the non-governmental
level) were particularly active during the 2006 reform of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. They successfully insisted on keeping a separate instrument for democracy and human rights programs and on making that instrument more flexible. Moreover, the post-communist members joined the UK in lobbying for the setting up of a European democracy assistance agency and politically and financially supported the establishment of the European Partnership for Democracy.\textsuperscript{23} However, since this idea was scrapped by the European Council, the Partnership has become just another NGO (with a strong contingent of Eastern European affiliates) that applies for EU grants and lobbies Brussels on issues of democracy promotion. Lastly, the Eastern members have also been very supportive of the UK initiative for a EU-wide Consensus on Democracy – a strategic framework for strengthening the EU’s contribution to democracy building around the world. The Czech Republic gave priority to working on the consensus during its EU presidency in 2009.

In addition to being actively engaged in EU democracy promotion, the Eastern European members have been supportive of the efforts of OSCE and the CoE in the neighborhood and of the UN in the field of human rights. The post-communist countries have frequently used their turn in the rotating leadership of these organizations to steer them towards supporting democratization in the European post-communist space. The Eastern EU members have also regularly contributed funds and experts to these organizations’ efforts in the region and have joined these organizations’ criticism of human rights and democratic abuses in the neighborhood. Moreover, the post-communist members have further lobbied for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia and the countries in the Western Balkans as an additional incentive for further democratization as well as a way to keep these countries in the Euro-Atlantic democratic community.

\textsuperscript{23} Interview with E. M.-S., February 16, 2009.
In sum, democracy promotion has become a true foreign policy priority for a majority of the Eastern EU members. The bilateral involvement of the Eastern European democracy promoters in their neighborhood has also been very important because it has allowed democratization laggards a glimpse of what democracy looks like close to home and has given them encouragement and know-how to move forward. Moreover, even as the West began showing signs of growing democracy promotion skepticism and/or fatigue in the early 2000s, the post-communist EU members continued to insist that support for democratization in their region (and beyond) remain high on the agenda of a variety of Euro-Atlantic organizations. Keeping such organizations engaged in the European neighborhood has been crucial to creating a generally congenial environment for the diffusion of democracy in that region. The Eastern European democracy promoters have had most impact in hybrid democracies in the European space – the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova – where these post-communist donors worked both bilaterally and multilaterally to help pro-democratic forces make some further reform gains through the electoral revolutions in the 2000s.24

1.2. Eastern European Democracy Assistance

In addition to providing diplomatic support for democratization in the neighborhood, the post-communist democracy promoters have also been offering democracy assistance. A lot of the Eastern EU members do not consider themselves “new donors;” the former COMECON members used to provide a not insignificant

amount of assistance to countries “on the road to socialism,” such as Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Yemen, Angola, Zambia, Ethiopia, and Iraq.\textsuperscript{25} As they restructured their economies in the post-communist period and entered clubs such as the OECD and later the EU, the Eastern European countries were required by these international organizations and increasingly encouraged by established donors such as the U.S. and the U.K. to begin providing development assistance once again.\textsuperscript{26} For example, the EU requires its members to have begun contributing at least 0.33% of their GDP as development aid by 2015. And very much as it did with Japan and Germany after WWII, the US has been exercising formal and informal pressure to get the Eastern EU and NATO members involved in providing development but especially democracy assistance.\textsuperscript{27} Faced with such expectations and obligations, the young post-communist democracies not only began setting up development aid systems but also given their pre-existing interest in democracy promotion, also decisively transformed such institutional frameworks into platforms for democracy assistance. Some countries began setting up these systems in the late 1990s but by the mid-2000s, they were already fully functional in all Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. The UN Development Program and Canadian International Development Agency have been most systematically engaged in building these countries’ capacities to provide

\textsuperscript{25} For example in the 1980s, Czechoslovakia allocated from 0.7% to 0.9% of its GDP as aid to 136 countries around the globe. Petr Halaxa and Petr Lebeda, “Mnohostranná rozvojová pomoc Česko-republiky,” \textit{Mezinárodní Politika} 4 (1998): 7–9. Hungary and Poland had similarly ambitious programs while Romania and Bulgaria provided more modest assistance (Adele Harmer and Lin Cotterrell, \textit{Diversity in Donorship: The Changing Landscape of Official Humanitarian Aid} [London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005]). Yugoslavia was a driving force in the Non-Aligned Movement, and contributed to development assistance, in particular through the Solidarity Fund for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries, created in 1974. (Mojmir Mrak, “Slovenia as a Donor Country: Where It Is and Where It Should Go?” [paper presented at the EADI Conference in Ljubljana, August 2002]). However, as the Eastern European countries began transitioning to market democracies and consequently experienced economic difficulties, development aid significantly declined and in some cases was reduced to some minimal debt relief. Lena Krichewsky, \textit{Development Policy in the Accession Countries} (Vienna: Trialogue, 2003).

\textsuperscript{26} Interview with K. V., November 19, 2008.

\textsuperscript{27} Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008.
development assistance. Platforms of development NGOs such as Trialogue and to a lesser degree Concord have done similar work at the non-state level.

### Table 2.1. Democracy Assistance Project Funding (DAPF), Percent of Democracy Assistance Project Funding out of All Official Development Assistance (DAPF%ODA), and Percent of Democracy Assistance Project Funding out of All Development Assistance Project Funding (DAPF%PA) in 2006 € (Euros) by Country by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6m</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>427k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>759k</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.6m</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.1m</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>208k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6m</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Country</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
<td>DAPF%PA</td>
<td>DAPF</td>
<td>DAPF%ODA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6m</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>427k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>759k</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.6m</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.1m</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>208k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.6m</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

**28** Interview with E. K., November 19, 2008; and interview with O. D., June 17, 2009.

**29** Interview with N. R., March 17, 2009.
Table 2.1 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Country</th>
<th>DAPF</th>
<th>ODA</th>
<th>DAPF%ODA</th>
<th>DAPF%PA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>06-08: 3.1m</td>
<td>378k</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>04-08: 9.4m</td>
<td>788k</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>PO&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>EE&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>LT&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19/27 70%</td>
<td>9/23 39%</td>
<td>3/5 60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>23/56 41%</td>
<td>10/25 40%</td>
<td>5/8 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>72/128 56%</td>
<td>8/29 32%</td>
<td>12/39 31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>44/110 40%</td>
<td>10/41 24%</td>
<td>34/105 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>33/107 31%</td>
<td>14/63 22%</td>
<td>38/152 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>04-08: 191/428</td>
<td>04-08: 51/181</td>
<td>04-08: 92/309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Annual Average</strong></td>
<td>04-08: 38/86</td>
<td>04-08: 10/36</td>
<td>04-08: 18/62</td>
<td>04-08: 11/23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Author’s calculations based on data published by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Organizacje,pozarzadowe,506.html

<sup>b</sup> Author’s calculations based on data published by the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/taxonomy/term/55

<sup>c</sup> Author’s calculations based on data published by the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.urn.lt/index.php?1809419855

<sup>d</sup> Author’s calculations based on data published by the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Attistibas-sadarbiba/valstis/

<sup>e</sup> Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., *Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement* (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 38. The data presented in this column is about the projects implemented by the Transition Ministry.

<sup>f</sup> Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions*. Author’s calculations based on data published by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_fejlesztes/

Moreover, because most of these countries are relatively small, the total democracy aid they have been providing amounts to “a tiny drop in the aid business.”

---

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.
For instance, in 2006, these donors together supplied about €12m in democracy assistance; compare this to the estimated €340m given in the same year by Sweden. However, the Eastern European rates of democracy to overall official development assistance are about average for the donor community. For example, the second least generous Eastern European donor, Hungary, spends 0.7% of its official development assistance on democracy, as does France. The most generous democracy promoter (according to this measure), Estonia, contributes 8% of its official development assistance to democracy projects and thus compares favorably to influential democracy promoters such as the US and UK both of which contribute about 7% and such as Germany, which contributes 9%. The majority of post-communist democracy promoters spend about 2%, which is also the EU’s democracy assistance rate. [See Table 2.1.] Still, the Eastern European donors lag behind some of the Nordic countries, such as Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden which spend respectively 12%, 13%, and 24% of their official development aid on assisting democracy abroad. If the Eastern European rates do not seem impressive at first glance it is because bilateral assistance projects, through which democracy aid is distributed, are only a small fraction of the official aid provided by the post-communist donors. Therefore, these average Eastern European rates of democracy to overall official development

---

33 Ibid.
35 A majority of the official development assistance provided by many of these (re-)emerging donors has been in the form of preferential (trade) credits, debt forgiveness, and scholarships. For instance, up to ¾ of Polish official assistance went to such aid (Ilona Ilowiecka-Tanska and Marta Pejda, “Poland Official Development Assistance and Peacebuilding,” Initiative for Peacebuilding, http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/Polski_Official_development_assistance_and_peacebuilding.pdf [accessed June 2009]). The remaining aid is often distributed among contributions to multilateral organizations such as OSCE, the World Bank, and the UN Funds, humanitarian aid, and then bilateral assistance projects. It is in that last category that democracy assistance falls. And while such aid is only a few percent of the overall official assistance provided, it is also the portion that is under direct and meaningful control of the foreign ministry (together with humanitarian assistance) (Interview with F. T., March 12, 2009). Since bilateral assistance projects have been the most meaningful foreign policy instrument of the emerging Eastern European donors, the analysis presented below is based on such aid.
assistance actually mask the higher than average donor contribution of the post-communist states to democracy assistance.

Even if bilateral assistance projects are only a small fraction of the official aid supplied by the Eastern European donors, a high proportion of such bilateral assistance projects are devoted to democratization support. The majority of the Eastern European donors regularly sponsor democracy assistance projects of about 30% of all development assistance projects.36 [See Table 2.2.] For some countries, such as Latvia and Poland, this number is as high as 46% and 45% respectively. Even the second least active donor, Hungary, funds democracy projects that are about a quarter of all development aid projects. Unfortunately similar data is not available for Western democracy promoters. However, recipients of international democracy assistance in Ukraine and Belarus report that a larger percent of the aid provided by the Eastern European donors goes to democracy than of the assistance offered by Western donors.37

The real generosity of the Eastern European democracy prompters is best captured by the amount of democracy assistance provided to their priority countries. For example, since the mid-2000s, Poland has been the second biggest democracy aid provider in Belarus.38 Similarly, Poland is one of the key donors in Ukraine, and the size of its democracy assistance to Ukraine rivals that of the leading European donors in the field: Poland was not only more generous than Sweden or the UK in terms of the percentage of development aid to Ukraine that was devoted to democracy assistance but its democracy assistance to Ukraine in 2006 was larger than the

---

36 The remaining projects usually tackle infrastructural, economic, social (especially education) and cultural issues.
38 Interview with M. S., October 13, 2008.
democracy aid given by Sweden and the UK combined.\textsuperscript{39} Another example: more Ukrainians receive scholarships funded by the Visegrad Four than by the rest of the EU put together.\textsuperscript{40} And a final comparison, in 2004-2006, 30\% of the EU assistance to Belarus and 26\% of the EU aid to Ukraine went to support democratization projects in these countries; at the same time, all of Slovakia’s aid to these countries was democracy assistance.\textsuperscript{41}

Lastly, as recipients of international democracy assistance have pointed out, it is often “not the amount of aid that matters” but the quality of the projects through which it is distributed.\textsuperscript{42} Recipients of Eastern European aid have often remarked on the usefulness of this assistance, which derives from the fact that the donors have just recently gone democratized themselves and have done so in relatively culturally and politically similar circumstances.\textsuperscript{43} Thus the local knowledge and the recent democratization experience of the Eastern European donors allow them to make an “important” contribution to strengthening democratic forces and promoting political reforms in their neighborhood as well as bringing it closer to the transatlantic community.\textsuperscript{44}

On the other hand, most of the limited democracy assistance provided by the Eastern European donors has been technical rather than financial and therefore sometimes derided by other donors and some recipients.\textsuperscript{45} Moreover, there has already been some additional criticism about the democracy assistance set up of the Eastern

\textsuperscript{40} Interview with O. S., February 2, 2010.
\textsuperscript{43} Interview with O. S., March 19, 2009; interview with M. S., October 21, 2008; interview with K. F., October 22, 2008.
European donors. For example, some have noted that the assistance institutions have been somewhat understaffed and underpaid.\textsuperscript{46} Others have pointed out that assistance has been project- rather than program-driven, therefore somewhat ad hoc (much as Western assistance has been).\textsuperscript{47} Yet others have observed that despite a significant convergence in priority countries, there has been little programmatic coordination and collaboration between these donors, leading to some overlapping and ineffectiveness.\textsuperscript{48}

\textbf{Figure 2.1. A Political Map of Europe – 20 Years After the Collapse of the Soviet Bloc}

In brief, while most Eastern European donors, even the re-emerging ones, are still working on developing their assistance capacities and on integrating with the

\textsuperscript{46} Interview with W. B., October 13, 2008; interview with E. D., December 10, 2008; and interview with B. B., October 27, 2008.
\textsuperscript{47} Development Strategies–IDC, \textit{The Consequences of Enlargement for Development Policy}.
\textsuperscript{48} Kucharczyk and Lovitt, \textit{Democracy’s New Champions}.
international donor community, they have already demonstrated a lot of potential to support the spread of democracy in the post-communist world.

1.3. The Targets of Eastern European Democracy Promotion

Which countries have been the targets of the post-communist democracy promoters? Most of the Eastern EU members are small countries whose foreign policy is focused on their immediate neighborhood. [For a political map of Europe, see Figure 2.1.] These foreign policy goals are reflected in the geographical priorities of Eastern European democracy promotion through their focus on the European eastern and southeastern regions. In terms of recipient priorities, there are two types of Eastern European democracy promoters: 1) Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, which support primarily the democratization of the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors and 2) Slovakia (the Czech Republic), Hungary, Romania, Slovenia (and Bulgaria), which support the democratization of the EU neighbors to the east but also and perhaps primarily to the southeast. The Czech Republic is somewhat exceptional because it has a meaningfully strong regional as well as global presence. Bulgaria on the other hand has invested very little in supporting democracy abroad. [Since the democracy assistance priorities of the Eastern European donors have tended to mirror and build on their diplomatic democracy promotion priorities, these priorities are presented in Table 2.3 as they were reflected in the official development aid data.]

---

49 Bulgaria and Romania’s development assistance systems have not yet been set up, so the priorities listed in this table are based on these countries’ diplomatic initiatives and declared development assistance priorities. However, since Bulgaria’s diplomatic efforts have also been minimal, determining Sofia’s democracy promotion priorities is very difficult.
Table 2.3. Geographical Democracy Assistance Priorities by Donor Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor Country</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>CZ</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>HU</th>
<th>SL</th>
<th>RO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Caucasus</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(&amp;Montenegro)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * Democracy Assistance Recipient (at least one project a year on average); ** Democracy Assistance Priority Recipient for the Donor.

a Hungary has not made public the complete list of its development assistance projects. Moreover, the recipient countries eligible for such assistance have changed somewhat over time. In 2003, Budapest declared its development assistance recipients as Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Palestinian Authority, Ethiopia, Yemen, Cambodia, Laos, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In 2008 they were Serbia, Belarus, Moldova, Albania, Cuba, Palestine Authority, and North Korea. Budapest’s diplomatic democracy promotion priorities have been Serbia, Ukraine, and Moldova but in the late 2000s, Hungary also maintained a human right dialogue with China and with Vietnam. Aron Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities,” in Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 51–81. The analysis here is based on a combination of the diplomatic and assistance democracy promotion priorities of Hungary.
b Slovenia has not published a list of projects, so the analysis here is based on the year in which a development cooperation partnership agreement was concluded with each country: Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in 2005, Moldova in 2007 and Albania in 2008. See http://www.mzz.gov.si/si/zunanja_politika/mednarodno_razvojno_sodelovanje_in_humanitarna_pomoc/
c Romania’s priorities here are derived by cross-referencing the list of declared future development assistance recipients and the list of actual diplomatic democracy promotion targets.

While Poland has demonstrated some ambitions for regional leadership within the post-communist space, its democracy promotion activities have been mostly
oriented towards the east. On the other hand, the Czech Republic’s ambitions to speak for dissidents (fighting communist and post-communist dictators) around the globe is the exception to the neighborhood attention span of the other Eastern European democracy promoters. However, if Budapest steps up its activities in general and continues to invest in the political liberalization of Asia (to build on its current programs in countries such as China and Vietnam), Hungary too might soon come to boast a truly global democracy promotion program. Lastly, as NATO members and “Atlanticists,” the Eastern European donors have taken part in the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq after the US interventions there after the turn of the century, partly in the name of democracy promotion. However, while most of the post-communist democracy promoters have provided some aid to Afghanistan and to a lesser degree to Iraq, such aid has been development rather than democracy assistance. The exception here is the Czech Republic, which has made Iraq a democracy assistance priority.

Although there has been little programmatic coordination or collaboration, there is something like a “gentlemen’s agreement” about the geographical division of labor among the Eastern European democracy promoters. Poland has taken the lead on supporting the democratization of Ukraine both bilaterally and through the EU, Lithuania – on Belarus, Estonia – on Georgia, Latvia but more recently also Romania – on Moldova, Slovakia – on the Western Balkans (Serbia), and the Czech Republic – on Cuba. It should be noted that the Eastern European democracy promoters have

50 Some have also suggested that Bucharest sees itself as representing the countries in the Black Sea region but its support for democracy abroad has been relatively low even compared to other Eastern European democracy promoters. Interview with K. R., March 6, 2009.
51 Interview with V. U., July 12, 2007.
52 There has been some coupling of enlargement and neighborhood policies at the EU level such that several Eastern European donors strive to include current neighborhood countries into the next wave of EU enlargement. However, given the structure of the EU’s external relations, there has been some growing divergence among the Eastern European democracy promoters at the EU level. The EU level divisions between the Black Sea Synergy and the new Eastern Partnership initiatives have prompted the Eastern European EU members to try to swing attention and resources towards “their part of the world.”
generally shied away from targeting Moscow and only Poland and Lithuania give some minimal democracy assistance to civic actors in Russia. On the other hand, although it does not qualify for development assistance, Croatia has received a lot of diplomatic support from Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic.

Croatia and Serbia in the southeast as well as Ukraine and Georgia in the east have demonstrated most interest in the democratization experience of the Eastern EU members and most commitment to joining the democratic and Euro-Atlantic club. This reciprocity has amplified the democracy promotion impact of the Eastern European actors in an important way because Serbia is understood to be a strategically pivotal state in the southeast, much like Ukraine is seen in the East and perhaps Georgia – in the Southern Caucasus. The democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern EU members have been unwelcome by the government in Minsk but have been generally appreciated by the citizenry and especially by civil society in Belarus, which is understood to be another strategic country in the Eastern neighborhood because it remains standing as the “last European dictatorship.”

Perhaps not surprisingly, it is exactly in these receptive hybrid democracies in the European space that the post-communist democracy promoters have had the largest impact. In a wave of “electoral breakthroughs,” countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently Moldova made radical breaks with their illiberal past. Moreover, they did so with much inspiration by and help from the Eastern EU members. The post-communist EU donors have had less success with

---

See Open Society Institute, *Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc.*

53 Open Society Institute, *Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc.*

54 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008; and interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.

55 Bunce and Wolchik, *Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy Assistance.* It should be noted, however, that there has been some democratic backsliding in Georgia especially following the Georgian-Russian war of August 2008. Daisy Sindelar, “Is the Bloom off the Rose in Georgia?” *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty,* http://www.rferl.org/content/Bloom_Off_Rose_In_Georgia/1351943.html (accessed December 2008).

56 Bunce and Wolchik, *Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy Assistance.*
regional autocracies such as Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan. The regional wave of
democratization suffered defeats in Belarus in 2001 and then 2006, in Azerbaijan in
these cases, authoritarian incumbents or their anointed successors won power despite
striking similarities between these elections and those that had resulted in a transfer of
power from authoritarians to democrats. Regime change was never attempted in
Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Mongolia. The successes of the
Eastern European democracy promoters in the so called “countries in transition”
compared to the difficulty experienced in working in authoritarian contexts parallels
the findings in previous works on the diffusion of democracy, which argue that
partially free countries appear to be more sensitive to diffusion effects than non-free
countries.57

To conclude, the democracy promotion activities of the Eastern European
countries deserve attention for several empirical reasons. First, despite being young
democracies and fledging donors, these EU members have emerged as true champions
of democracy promotion. Supporting democratization abroad has become a significant
element of their foreign policies pursued both bilaterally and multilaterally and
through both diplomatic and aid initiatives. Such efforts have been particularly
important because they have been gaining strength at a time when the West is showing
signs of growing democracy promotion skepticism and/or fatigue. Second, as donors,
these countries may not be the most influential or generous democracy promoters in
general but their assistance stands out in their priority recipient countries in terms of
its quantity (percent of democracy assistance to overall bilateral assistance projects or
funding in some cases as well as funding levels in other cases) and in terms of its

57 Harvey Starr and Christina Lindborg, “Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of
519.
quality (relevance of projects derived from local knowledge and first-hand democratization experience). Third, the bilateral diplomatic involvement of the Eastern European democracy promoters has not only helped strengthen pro-democratic forces in the neighborhood but has also demonstrated to illiberal actors the benefits of democracy for them and their countries. Moreover, such diplomatic engagement has allowed the Eastern EU members to provide much needed encouragement and support for further reform. Fourth, the Eastern European democracy promoters have managed to keep the transatlantic international organizations engaged in the European neighborhood, thus creating a pro-democratic international environment that has secured some further democratization gains in the post-communist space. In sum, the Eastern EU members have demonstrated commitment to supporting democracy abroad as well as some potential in influencing both the democratic developments in recipients and the democracy promotion efforts of other donors.

2. Explaining Eastern European Democracy Promotion

Having outlined some of the general trends in the diplomacy and assistance of Eastern European democracy promotion, this chapter proceeds by briefly noting some of the differences in the initiatives of individual countries. Then the discussion turns to the possible explanations of this variation.

2.1. The Diversity of Eastern European Democracy Promotion

There are two dimensions of important variation among the democracy promotion efforts of the Eastern EU members: differences in geographical priorities and in levels of engagement. First, as described in the previous section, the Baltic countries have targeted primarily the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors while the
Central European and Balkan donors have focused both on the EU’s southeastern and eastern fringes. Second, as suggested above, there are striking differences among the Eastern EU members in terms of their democracy promotion activism when the length, scope, and initiative of their diplomatic and assistance democracy promotion efforts are considered. I have examined and coded all three of these dimensions for the ten cases of interest in this dissertation to produce a score for the level of activism in democracy promotion of each Eastern EU member. [See Table 2.4 for the democracy promotion activism scores of individual countries as of 2009 and Appendix 1 for the coding scheme.]

Table 2.4. Democracy Promotion Activism Scores By Donor Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Country</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>CZ</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>HU</th>
<th>SL</th>
<th>BG</th>
<th>RO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diplomacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assistance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined Activism Score</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the Eastern European democracy promoters, there are countries such as Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Romania that have been slow to transition from being democracy promotion recipients to becoming donors that support democracy abroad. In this group, Bulgaria is the least active country – Sofia has yet to begin providing development, including democracy, assistance and to take diplomatic initiative to support democratization abroad. Ljubljana has supported the development of
democracy in its neighborhood primarily indirectly through advocating for stronger cooperation between the region and various European regional structures, especially the EU; moreover, not much of the development aid Slovenia has provided has gone to support democratization abroad. Despite its regional leadership ambitions, Romania has been slow to begin investing in strengthening democracy abroad and has not yet invested heavily in such efforts but it has at the same time already taken diplomatic initiative both bilaterally and multilaterally.

In contrast, other Eastern European countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia have quickly become true champions of democracy. Warsaw and Bratislava began actively promoting democracy diplomatically within a year of their own democratic breakthroughs by working directly with recipients and by leveraging the resources of various transatlantic international organizations. Prague began supporting democracy abroad diplomatically within the first five years of its independence and has done so very actively both regionally and globally especially by taking initiative multilaterally. All three countries have amongst the highest rates of democracy to overall official development assistance of all Eastern European donors and compare favorably to Western donors. Poland and the Czech Republic were also among the first donors in the region and the Czech Republic and Slovakia have respectively the most and the second most institutionalized system for democracy assistance provision.

Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia rank in between the least and the most active Eastern European democracy promoters. Budapest and Vilnius began supporting diplomatically democratization in their neighborhood early on and have taken both bilateral and multilateral initiative; however unlike Lithuania, which has been an active supporter of democracy abroad, Hungary’s investment in regional democratization beyond the protection of minority rights and cross-border cooperation.
has remained low. Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, started promoting democracy diplomatically mostly after their EU accession and have done so moderately and without taking initiative. The institutionalization of the democracy aid distribution in all these countries is relatively low and the democracy assistance provided by all of them but Estonia has been either belated or small. [For additional details on the democracy promotion record of the Eastern EU members, please see Appendix 2.]

2.2. Previous Explanations

How can this variation in the geographical priorities and in the level of activism of the Eastern European democracy promoters be explained? This section examines several existing accounts of these differences: the contrast between communism and post-communism as motivating support for democratization abroad, the foreign policy specialization of the Eastern EU members on neighborhood and democratization questions, the continuities between the Euro-Atlantic integration of Eastern European countries and their support for democracy in the post-communist region, and the pressures from various international actors – the EU, the US, and Russia. I find that while all of the factors put forth contribute to and positively reinforce the efforts of the post-communist donors, none of these previously suggested accounts adequately explain the observed variation in Eastern European democracy promotion. The limitations of the explanatory power of each factor are discussed primarily through crucial case studies.  

58 On crucial cases, see John Gerring, Case Study Research (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

the different alternative accounts, yet they do not. I use them to disconfirm these accounts.

2.2.1. Communist and Post-communist Experience

Some have suggested that the contrast between the experience of communism and the experience of post-communism has committed the more successfully democratized countries to helping those who are still lagging behind in the transition process. However, all Eastern EU members have experienced the contrast between life in an autocracy and life in a democracy. Moreover, all of these young donors have important international partners which have struggled to follow democratic norms and practices and to implement reforms and which have at some point expressed interest in the transformation experience of the Eastern EU members. Yet, not all of the post-communist EU members are interested in democracy promotion.

Of course, there are qualitative differences in the Eastern European experiences of communism and post-communism. There are at least two ways to capture the contrast between life in an autocracy and life in a democracy: the most commonly used measures are “satisfaction with the way democracy works” and “rejection of authoritarianism.” Neither of the two measures of approval of the recent post-communist transitions among the Eastern EU members correlates strongly with official democracy promotion activism. [For a graphical expression of these relationships, see Figure 2.2.]

62 The data for the correlation was compiled from the following sources: Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 8 (1997), available online at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion; Cologne: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (available at http://www.gesis.org/ZA/); Richard Rose, New Baltic Barometer III: A Survey Study (Studies in Public Policy No. 284, Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1997); Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer, New
2.2.2.Foreign Policy Specialization

On a similar note, some have argued that the Eastern EU members have found a “niche” in the EU’s division of foreign policy labor: on the one hand, they have

recent experience with democratization and on the other hand, they have unique regional expertise and good relations with the EU’s new neighbors. The Slovene and Bulgarian cases illustrate the limitations of such arguments well. Bulgaria was one of the early risers in the second wave of democratic breakthroughs in post-communist Europe. Slovenia is the only country in the Western Balkans to quickly join the ranks of market democracies. Thus although both Bulgaria and Slovenia have had unique democratization experience to share with their neighbors, these Eastern EU members are also the post-communist countries least interested in democracy promotion. Moreover, the case of Czech democracy promotion reveals another limitation of this argument. Prague has focused its efforts on Belarus, Iraq, and Cuba; yet, when it got involved in supporting democratization there, the Czech Republic had few special ties to the first two countries and little special expertise on any of them relative to other Eastern and Western EU donors.

Another related argument is that the Eastern EU members are invested in their neighborhood, where the democratization question is on the agenda. Consider the case of Hungary, however. Budapest has focused on developing good relations with all its neighbors, which are countries in transition. Still, Hungary has shied away from supporting their democratization (except for working towards mutual respect of minority rights).

Finally, some have pointed out that democracy promotion is a “continuation” of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Eastern EU and NATO members. Democracy promotion has been suggested to fill in a so-called foreign policy “action gap”, which emerged in the foreign policy agendas of the Eastern EU members after their Euro-

---

63 Open Society Institute, *Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc.*
64 Some have argued that this is especially the case after the US shifted its attention to other regions (Greater Middle East) and left democracy promotion in Eastern Europe in the hands of new EU (and other NATO) members. Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.”
Atlantic accessions. However, some countries such as Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia had begun to actively promote democracy abroad even before they joined the Euro-Atlantic international organizations. Also, while quite a few former EU enlargement bureaucrats have been reassigned to work on neighborhood policies, the personnel from the former applicants responsible for EU integration questions is now staffing primarily various EU-level position rather than development cooperation departments. Thus if there is a bureaucratic politics case to be made about the continuity between enlargement and neighborhood policies at the EU level, such a case would be a straw man at the level of the Eastern EU members.

2.2.3. Identity Concerns

Democracy promotion has been understood to be a continuation of the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Eastern EU and NATO members in another way as well. These emerging donors have recently undergone an “identity transformation” from “countries in transition” to “(democratic) European states.” A good opportunity to create and enhance this new identity is through supporting democracy not just at home but also abroad. The variation in the level of democracy promotion activism between Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria is instructive here. In the late 1990s, all three countries initially fell off of the fast track to EU and NATO accession and therefore needed to prove, consolidate, and project their new identity. Yet, the three countries have not been equally active in supporting democracy abroad. In fact, Slovakia was

---

65 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.”
67 Signaling their new identity as recognized, consolidated democracies – and new members of the EU – is a point made by Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy,” in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 189–215; and Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.”
the only one of the three countries to catch up with the first wave EU applicants, thus having its democratic credentials recognized. At the same time, Slovakia has been one of the most active democracy promoters in the post-communist region whereas Romania and Bulgaria have been among the least interested in supporting democracy abroad. Romania and Bulgaria were both left behind to advance in their own second wave of EU enlargement and thus fairly equally in need to project a democratic identity internationally but they are not both equally interested in supporting democracy abroad.

2.2.4. International Expectations, Pressures, and Obligations

Some have also pointed to the EU members’ obligations in the field of development cooperation of which democratization is a constituent element. Yet, only some of the Eastern EU countries have transformed these obligations into an opportunity to provide democracy assistance. Consider Slovenia: like all the other (re)/emerging post-communist donors, Ljubljana’s important international partners – the Western Balkan countries – are transition laggards which have expressed interest in its transformation experience. Slovenia, however, has provided development but not democracy assistance to them. At the same time, democracy assistance should not be understood to be substituting for poor development cooperation capacity either because the most active democracy promoters, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, also provide development aid throughout the neighborhood and beyond.

Similarly, some have argued that the US has been instrumental in turning former recipients of democracy assistance into donors supporting political liberalization abroad. In the 1990s, Washington invested heavily in supporting the democratization of the current Eastern EU and NATO countries and in getting them

---

68 Open Society Institute, Not Your Grandfather’s Eastern Bloc; and Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
into these Euro-Atlantic structures. As a result, these new members are seen to align themselves with US democracy promotion and to try to help others, as the US has helped them. Sofia is a good counter example for the suggested relationship between indebtedness to the US and official democracy promotion activism. In the 1990s, Bulgaria was the highest per capita recipient of US aid among the Eastern EU members. At the same time, Sofia is the least active democracy promoter.

The relationship is equally weak if one looks at subjective measures of indebtedness to external actors. A poll of the Visegad citizenry has found that the majority of Poles (62%) and Czechs (52%) think that they achieved democracy principally through their own efforts whereas a minority of Slovaks (40%) and Hungarians (35%) share this opinion. Such reports about the perceived external help these countries have received in the course of their democratic transitions, however, do not map in a meaningful way onto the democracy promotion activism ranking of the Visegrad countries: the Czech Republic (12), Poland (11), Slovakia (11) and then Hungary (9).

Moreover, despite largest perceived indebtedness to external actors, Hungary has been least willing among the Visegrad group to itself support the development of democracy abroad. Moreover, Budapest has shied away from democracy promotion despite US pressure to be active. With US encouragement, Budapest set up an International Centre for Democratic Transition as the Hungarian contribution to the Community of Democracies. However, Budapest is currently financing only the operation of the institute, which relies on external donors for individual project

---

69 Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate Countries.
72 Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008.
More generally, Hungary remains a reluctant/hesitant promoter of democracy abroad – democracy promotion has yet to become a real foreign policy priority for Budapest, which is clearly reflected in the following facts: 1) Hungary’s democracy aid is perhaps the most fragmented assistance program among the Eastern European donors; 2) Budapest’s activism on issues beyond minority rights is rather low; and 3) even minority rights have been pursued not in the framework of democracy promotion but within the framework of cross-border cooperation.

An alternative geopolitical argument offered is that democracy promotion is the new “battle” against Russia, which is considered a “threat” by “all new EU members.” However, one of the most active democracy promoters, Slovakia, has been defined as a “friendly pragmatist” when it comes to its relations with Russia because it sees little “threat” in Russia and seeks to maintain a relatively close relationship with it. Moreover, such accounts can not explain why the small Baltic nations, which do consider Russia a threat and until very recently were not included in the NATO defense plans, would risk and did indeed anger Russia with their democracy promotion efforts in the Russian “near abroad.”

### 2.3. Strategic Democracy Promotion with a Domestic Twist

So what explains the differences in geographical priorities and in levels of engagement among the Eastern European democracy promoters? This dissertation argues that the introduction, persistence, and logic of the official democracy promotion were all a product of the efforts of the civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region. Motivated by a normative commitment to

---

75 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.”
77 On Russian-Baltic relations, see Leonard and Popescu, *A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations.*
democracy, these activists not only continued working towards developing democracy at home but also laid the foundations for civic as well as for governmental democracy promotion: they have been supporting the diffusion of democratic norms and practices and have encouraged their governments to do the same. The advocacy of such civic norm entrepreneurs benefited from two facts: first, that in the 1990s democracy promotion became increasingly understood as an accepted and necessary component of the international behavior of states and second, that some of the former opposition allies of these entrepreneurs had assumed power and continued to pay attention to democracy issues at home and abroad. However, only in cases where these civic (and political) activists articulated strong and compelling arguments about the importance of official democracy promotion did support for democracy abroad become part of the foreign policy traditions of these new democratic post-communist states. Moreover, the stronger the civic voices in favor of democracy promotion, the more easily it was embraced by local political elites and the more attention was paid to it thereafter. And finally, the arguments about the importance of official democracy promotion shaped the logic of consequent state efforts to support democracy abroad.

2.3.1. Explaining the Variation in the Level of Democracy Promotion Activism

Consider the comparison of the Bulgarian and the Slovak case. The Bulgarian democratic breakthrough preceded the Slovak one by a little more than a year and was part of the same wave of democratization and Central and Southeastern Europe. A decade later, Slovakia is one of the most active democracy promoters in the region whereas Bulgaria has invested little in supporting democracy abroad. Thus a comparison of the turnaround of these two countries from democracy promotion recipients to donors is appropriate as well as instructive.
Both democratic breakthroughs produced a core of civic norm entrepreneurs who felt a moral responsibility to work towards developing democracy at home as well as abroad. Such Slovak and Bulgarian activists began sharing almost immediately the lessons they had learned during their democratic breakthrough struggles with other civic elites in the Western Balkans. Bulgarian civic support for the democratization of their neighbors was limited to a few mostly informal initiatives while Slovak civic democracy promotion flourished quickly and soon became internationally recognized. Consequently, the Slovak entrepreneurs approached their former opposition allies who were now in power in Bratislava and convinced them of the potential of the Slovak democratic breakthrough to serve as a model for defeating illiberal incumbents reigning over unstable “electoral democracies” throughout the neighborhood. The Slovak government quickly joined forces with the Slovak civic democracy promoters because their arguments resonated with the perceived political realities and needs in Slovakia. The Bulgarian civic norm entrepreneurs were less successful – they kept the Bulgarian cabinet staffed with their former opposition allies up to date on the civic initiatives in support of democratization in the Western Balkans. However, they failed in framing such democracy promotion activities as transcending transnational civic solidarity. In fact, during these conversations, the Bulgarian political elites in effect convinced the few civic democracy promoters in the country of the importance of official non-intervention – an argument rooted in Bulgaria’s history of tense relations with its neighbors.78 If the Slovak civic elites used the period before and after their country’s EU accession to consolidate the democracy promotion agenda introduced in the period immediately after the Slovak democratic breakthrough, their Bulgarian counterparts were not strong enough to even influence Bulgaria’s post-EU accession

78 The Slovak and Bulgarian accounts presented here are based on interviews with civic and political activists in the late 1990s. Most informative among more recent interviews have been the following conversations: Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008; interview with E. K., November 28, 2008; interview with R. S., October 22, 2009; interview with R. S., May 14, 2010.
foreign policy debate. The Slovak activists, on the other hand, have continued to wield the authority “to influence public opinion and the actions of the political elite” on Slovakia’s democracy promotion in the neighborhood it. Most impressively, they have kept democracy promotion on Bratislava’s diplomatic and assistance agenda even after the return to power of the only partially reformed left.

In sum, this comparison speaks 1) to the necessity of an effective (resonant) framing of democracy promotion and 2) to the importance of a strong contingent of civic activists advocating that democracy promotion be high on their state’s agenda and participating in its realization though implementing projects under their country’s official development assistance system. And the stronger the contingent of civic democracy promoters in a country, the bigger their influence over the practice of democracy promotion of their country over time. I use simple regression analysis as a quick initial test of the influence of civic democracy promoters on the official commitment to democracy promotion.

On the dependent variable side, I use the democracy promotion activism scores of the Eastern EU members. On the independent variable side, I use the proportion of NGOs involved in supporting democracy abroad out of all NGOs working abroad as a proxy for the strength of civic democracy promoters in each country. In all of the Eastern EU members, the most active non-state actors working internationally have organized themselves in Development-NGO platforms. Such umbrella organizations include groups, which work on humanitarian, cultural, social, economic, and political issues and which have come together to support each other’s efforts and to create better conditions for international development initiatives by influencing national governments and the EU. The umbrella structures themselves have been mostly

---

involved in participating in the development of each country’s assistance programs but
as national forums they have also facilitated the coordination of the efforts of the
organizations interested in influencing their country’s diplomatic support for
democracy abroad. Therefore, the proportion of democracy promoters within such
platforms could be said to be indicative of the importance democracy promotion to the
local civil society and thus, to be representative of the overall strength of civic support
for democratization abroad. [Please see Table 2.5 for the percent of civic democracy
promoters of all international development NGOs in individual countries as of
2009.]

Table 2.5. Percent of Civic Democracy Promoters of All Members of the National
Platform of International Development NGOs by Donor Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor Country</th>
<th>PO</th>
<th>EE</th>
<th>LT</th>
<th>LV</th>
<th>CZ</th>
<th>SK</th>
<th>HU</th>
<th>SL</th>
<th>RO</th>
<th>BG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Civic Democracy Promoters</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The simple regression analysis suggests a significant, positive, and potentially
strong relationship between the strength of Eastern European civic democracy
promoters and the democracy promotion activism of their governments. Within the
group of Eastern European donors, the size of a country’s civic democracy promotion
contingent seems to be a good predictor of that country’s official commitment to
democracy promotion. [For a graphical representation of this relationship, see Figure
2.3.] Moreover, there are no outliers in the group. And although the sample size is
small (n=10), the relationship appears to be meaningful and positive.

---

81 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008; and interview with V. U., July 12, 2007.
82 It should be noted that there has not been much flux in the membership of the national development
NGO platforms; therefore, their 2009 composition is representative of their average composition over
time.
Figure 2.3. Correlation between the Size of the Civic Democracy Promotion Contingent and the Official Commitment to Democracy Promotion within the Group of Eastern European Donors

Unfortunately, this analysis does not reveal much about the direction of causality or the mechanisms underlying this relationship.\textsuperscript{83} To examine those, I conduct two in-depth case studies, which I describe in the chapters that follow. These chapters set out to uncover the origins of official democracy promotion and the role of civic democracy promoters in the establishment of the foreign policy traditions of the Eastern EU members as well as the influence of civic democracy promoters in the persistence of democracy promotion over time.

\textsuperscript{83} Additionally, this analysis is further limited in that it ignores the impact of other possible explanatory variables and their relationship with the strength of Eastern European civic democracy promoters. As a result, the analysis most likely overstates the importance of the size of the civic democracy promotion contingent in a country to that country’s official commitment to democracy promotion.
2.3.2. Explaining the Variation in the Geographical Priorities of Eastern European Democracy Promotion

In addition to influencing the introduction and persistence of Eastern European official democracy promotion, the norm entrepreneurs who advocated for it also shaped the logic of the consequent state initiatives on this issue. The arguments that such elites put forward when making a case for the importance of official democracy promotion have influenced the geographical priorities of such state efforts. The Eastern European civic activists sought to embed democracy promotion into their country’s foreign policy by pointing to the answers that support for democracy abroad holds for improving the international environment of these young democratic states. Accordingly, for the countries in the Eastern European political space – Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, democracy promotion emerged as a strategic response to containing Russian imperialism. For the countries in the Central and Southeastern European political space – Slovakia (the Czech Republic), Hungary, Romania, Slovenia (and Bulgaria), democracy promotion emerged as a solution to the political and economic destabilization as a result of the disintegration of the eastern but especially the southeastern European fringes.

On the one hand, for the Baltic countries the struggle against communism was also a struggle against Russian imperialism, which had for centuries threatened the independence of these nations. Thus, containing Russian expansionism was deemed one of the most important foreign policy objectives of the new democratic Baltic states. Moscow’s “aggressive” stance throughout the 1990s and the 2000s – including economic and political pressure, opposition to Baltic membership in NATO, and interference on behalf of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia – only reinforced Baltic concerns about Russia’s intentions. The former Baltic dissidents saw independence and democracy as linked, as they had been in their own anti-communist
movements. Such civic norm entrepreneurs argued that if the former republics, especially the “European” ones that were the “founders” of the former Soviet Union, were independent and democratic, they would counter-balance Russia’s power, weakening Moscow’s temptation to take over the USSR’s imperial position. Thus these activists persuaded the local political elites that “shifts to democracy will decrease the influence of Russia in the countries of the former Soviet Union and may thus be considered as security guarantors” for the Baltic states. Therefore, official democracy promotion was incorporated into Baltic foreign policy as an element of a geo-political strategy for weakening the Russian sphere of influence and thus deterring Moscow’s aggression. This democracy promotion logic has led the Baltic countries to focus on the western former USSR republics and the South Caucuses and relative Baltic neglect of the Western Balkans.

On the other hand, the post-communist Central and Southeastern European countries, which were formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian and/or the Ottoman empires, quickly realized their vulnerability to spillover from outside shocks from neighboring former Yugoslavia and the former USSR such as political instability, capricious dictators, interethnic volatility, and weak states. Such volatility threatened not only the economic expansion in which these Eastern EU members have tended to be mostly interested but also political cooperation in the region on important issues such as minority issues and traditional alliances. The civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the Central and Southeastern European countries saw spreading democracy in the neighborhood as a “long-term investment in its

---

stability.”85 Therefore, official democracy promotion by these countries emerged as a response to autocratic nationalistic regimes, often reigning over weak states throughout the neighborhood. This democracy promotion logic has led most of these donors to prioritize recipients understood to influence their region such as Ukraine to the east and Serbia to the southeast as well as on traditional / important international partners for each individual democracy promoter.

It should be noted that Czech support for dissidents struggling against communist and post-communist regimes around the globe is the exception to the strategic logic behind Eastern European democracy promotion. While there has been some strategic Czech investment in the European post-communist region (Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova), there is also a lot of principled support for upholding human rights in countries where they are regularly and gravely violated, for example – Belarus, Cuba, and Burma. This dual commitment to democracy promotion is reflected in the Czech “transformation policy [which] is designed to motivate political processes leading towards long-term stability and prosperity and to help emancipate human rights defenders and civil society as key actors in sustainable democratic change.”86 Still, the logic of Czech democracy promotion much like other Eastern European support for democracy abroad is a product of the efforts and beliefs of the civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the country. The roots of the Czech democracy promotion dualism can be found in the competing political movements that succeeded the former Czech dissidents: the first is best articulated in Vaclav “Havel’s committed and distinctive belief in universal values” such as human rights and democracy and the second is best represented in Vaclav Klaus’ belief in

85 Quote from the Transition Promotion programme concept – the official strategy of Czech democracy assistance, cited in Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
86 Therefore, “the promotion of democracy in terms of the participation of citizens and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is a foreign policy priority [for the Central and Southern European EU countries] as it enhances security, stability and prosperity” in their immediate international environment. Czech Foreign Policy Annual Report 2007.
economic and political (neo-)liberalism and the special role of the Czech Republic in “reviving democracies and market economies in the post-communist world.”

2.4. Strategic Democracy Export with an International Twist

There are a lot of similarities between the thematic priorities and foreign policy instruments used by the young Eastern European democracy promoters. For example, all of them have a strong preference for technical assistance, which emphasizes – if to a different degree – strengthening civil society abroad. Still, there are also many differences. For instance, different donors emphasize different segments of civil society: Poland has uniquely invested in the development of local communities whereas Slovakia – in the development of media- and elections- monitoring groups. How can such variation be explained? The approaches to democracy promotion are impossible to analyze without an in-depth examination of the foreign policies of individual post-communist donors. Still, there are a few factors, which seem to have shaped the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion and which stand out even in a cursory review of these donors’ activities: the national transition expertise of these fledgling donors and the Western approaches to democracy promotion, which have shaped the democratization of the Eastern EU members, as well as the democratization needs of their recipients.

First, all the Eastern EU members have identified their recent transition experiences as a democracy promotion asset. They are thus very consciously “exporting” “best practices” from their own transformations. Such national exports have produced some distinctive thematic investments and unique preferences for particular policy instruments. For instance, Hungary prefers to implement democracy assistance projects with the consent of the host government and has emphasized

human and especially minority rights questions. The Czech Republic has distinctively championed rule of law through reformed state administrations and human and especially political rights such as freedom of expression. Prague has also supported financially and morally beleaguered opposition movements around the world and preferred to weaken their oppressors by international condemnation. And a final example – Estonia has shared its unique e-governance expertise (information policy and transparency) with nearby Euro-Atlantic applicants.

Second, while such differences in national transition expertise have produced a lot of differences in the post-communist donors’ approaches to democracy promotion, the fact that the Eastern European democratic breakthroughs occurred in two waves has produced some similarities among donors within each of the waves and some differences among the donors in the two waves. Consider the following example, the Czech Republic and Slovakia shared the same communist experience but emerged as young democracies respectively during the first and the second wave of democratization in Eastern Europe. Each of the waves presented different breakthrough challenges: the first wave – the need to defeat a communist state and the second wave – to push a hybrid regime in a more democratic direction. Consequently, Prague – much like Budapest and the Baltic capitals – has emphasized strengthening political and civic rights through state reform while empowering civil society to de-concentrate power in recipient societies. On the other hand, Slovakia (like Romania) has focused on building the capacity of politically active civil society to participate in policy debates and to hold elected officials accountable.

Third, since some of the best practices exported aboard were imported from various Western donors, there are a lot of similarities among the Eastern European

---

democracy promotion. In fact, one of the cited comparative advantages of the young post-communist donors is that they have all learned from both the EU and the US school of democracy promotion.\(^9^0\) The American and the European traditions have often been contrasted: US is said to be preoccupied with “civil and political society” in the process of “political liberalization and democratization” whereas European is seen to focus on “governance” and the “state” and generally on the more “technical” aspects of the “consolidation of democracy.”\(^9^1\) Thus all Eastern European democracy promoters combine, to a lesser or a greater extent, elements of both these approaches.

Fourth, another source of similarity in the democracy promotion approach of the Eastern European donors comes from the different democratization needs of recipients with different regime types, especially given the fact that most of them come from the same neighborhood. When working in dictatorships in the region, the Eastern European democracy promoters have worked almost exclusively with civil society and alternative leaders from the recipient citizenry to prepare them to act as agents of change. Alternatively, the post-communist democracy promoters have invested much more heavily in reforming the state in “countries in transition.” Moreover, since most of the Eastern EU priority recipients are seen as potential candidates for EU integration, relatively more attention has been paid to the Europeanization of their states.

\(^9^0\) Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions.*
3. Conclusion

This chapter suggested that the young Eastern European democracy promoters have already become some of the most ardent supporters of the idea that the benefits of democracy should be shared with others in the EU neighborhood. As a result, these (re-) emerging donors have invested a lot of diplomatic effort and not insignificant aid resources in supporting the democratization of a number of (communist and) post-communist countries. In terms of geographical priorities, the Baltic countries have tended to support primarily the democratization of the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors whereas the Central and Southeastern European donors have tended to support the democratization of the EU neighbors to the southeast as well as the east. Given the cultural similarities and historic-political linkages between donors and recipients and the activism of the Eastern European democracy promoters, their efforts have proven important in shaping the expectation of elites in transition laggards about what is possible and beneficial for them and their nations in terms of further reform. Eastern European democracy promotion activism has also been crucial in keeping democracy promotion in the EU neighborhood high on the agenda of various Euro-Atlantic regional structures. At the same time, however, because democracy promotion has represented a strategic investment by the post-communist donors in creating a congenial international environment, supporting democracy abroad has sometimes been prioritized under and even sacrificed for good relations with important international partners or other political or economic considerations.

Moreover, despite much similarity in the initiatives of the Eastern European democracy promoters, there have also been significant differences in the geographical priorities and in levels of engagement of these donors. This chapter argued that the introduction, the persistence, and the logic of the official post-communist democracy promotion were all a product of the efforts of the civic elites who prepared the
democratic breakthroughs in the region. The arguments these activists put forward in their advocacy in favor of official democracy promotion have shaped the logic of consequent state efforts, including the priority recipients of democratization support. However, such norm entrepreneurs have succeeded in incorporating democracy promotion in the foreign policies of their countries only where these activists articulated strong and compelling arguments about the benefits of supporting democracy abroad. Moreover, the stronger the civic voices in favor of democracy promotion, the more easily it was embraced by local political elites and the more attention was paid to it thereafter.

The next three chapters examine further the relationship between the strength of the civic democracy promotion contingent in a country and the official commitment to democracy promotion. They scrutinize the origins of official democracy promotion and the role of civic democracy promoters in the establishment of the foreign policy traditions of the Eastern EU members as well as the influence of civic democracy promoters in the persistence of democracy promotion over time. The focus of these chapters is the non-governmental and governmental efforts of the Polish and Slovak democracy promoters. As documented above, Poland and Slovakia are two of the three most active democracy promoters within the Eastern EU members group. Moreover, unlike the third most active player – the Czech Republic, Poland’s and Slovakia’s efforts are typical for the Eastern European donors: while Prague has offered both instrumental and principled support to autocracies and countries in transition around the globe, the democracy promotion efforts of Warsaw and Bratislava, much like the activities of the other Eastern EU capitals, are best understood as a strategic commitment to creating a stable, secure, and prosperous neighborhood. Finally, Poland and Slovakia also represent the two waves of turnaround from recipients to donors in Eastern Europe in two different international
environments both regionally and globally. This difference is additionally instructive for understanding the different post-communist approaches to supporting democracy abroad because the Eastern EU members have tended to export the expertise developed during their own transition to a capitalist democracy and each wave of such transformations has faced particular challenges and overcome those with particular democratization innovations. Building on this comparison, the next three chapters present an in-depth examination of the different factors shaping the various national official and non-governmental approaches to democracy promotion.
CHAPTER 3:
EASTERN EUROPEAN CIVIC DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

Much like official democracy promotion, Eastern European civic support for democratization abroad presents a puzzle: Why are these young civic groups, most of which are primarily active at home, developing international programs? Such initiatives divert resources abroad and need to overcome the significant costs of transnational activism.\(^1\) To unravel this puzzle, this chapter asks why and how have Polish and Slovak NGOs sought to advance democracy abroad. The argument here is that such efforts have been normatively motivated but strategically pursued.

2. Motivations behind Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion

Many of the previous works on transnational human rights and democracy advocacy networks emphasize “the centrality of principled ideas and values in motivating their formation.”\(^2\) Thus, these activists’ “strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community” – both domestic and international – is often implied or assumed to be motivating support for human rights and democracy abroad.\(^3\) However, some observers of Eastern European civil society have suggested a more opportunistic behavior on the part of a lot of the human rights and democracy advocacy groups in the post-communist region. Valuing their survival over their social

\(^1\) On costs of transnational activism, see Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith, *Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), who discuss four major obstacles to transnational activism: 1) cultural and political diversity, 2) distance, 3) economic barriers to the flow of people and information, and 4) varying political contexts.


mission and dependent on donor generosity, Eastern European NGOs have been criticized for focusing on “chasing funding” (frequently to the exclusion of pursuing local causes.)  

Thus, one could argue that as many of the international donors, which used to fund democracy work in Eastern Europe, began withdrawing from the countries that neared EU accession and moved further east and southeast where democracy was still at risk, the NGOs doing democracy work in the Eastern EU states followed the funding.

Understanding the motivation behind Eastern European civic democracy promotion is important for several reasons. First, it helps provide an answer to the puzzle described above. Second, to the extent that civic democracy promoters influence official support for democracy abroad, it is important to understand what drives such norm entrepreneurs – whether principled beliefs or opportunities for organizational survival and development. The availability of funding is, of course, a necessary condition for the operation of many Eastern European NGOs. However, the question here is whether pursuing funding opportunities is the leading cause for the international work of the Eastern European civil societies and whether civic democracy promotion is thus an extension of Western efforts or an Eastern European principled initiative that has become a part of the larger efforts of the Euro-Atlantic international community. Third, theoretically, it is valuable to understand how such motivations compete and interact with one another, as different motivations imply different patterns of activism. Fourth, since most of the diffusion literature (in both comparative politics and international relations) is adopter-centric, exploring the

---

motivations of the transmitters improves our understanding of the supply-side of diffusion.

In this section I look at the rhetoric, origins, and practice of Polish and Slovak non-governmental support for the spread of democracy abroad to uncover the motivations behind such initiatives. All three analyses suggest that Eastern European civic democracy promotion developed is a primarily normative commitment and the number of projects and organizations that are opportunistic, that is motivated by domestic and foreign funding, has remained relatively small.

2.1. The Origins of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion

What are the origins of civic democracy promotion in Poland and Slovakia? Was it championed by activists who shared a belief in a universal right to democracy and/or did it begin when the Western donors were pulling out of Poland and Slovakia in preparation for Warsaw’s and Bratislava’s EU accession? The argument here is that civic democracy promotion in both Poland and Slovakia built on the values and networks of the activists who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in these countries and who shared a commitment to democracy coupled with a perceived obligation to assist others on the road to democracy. This obligation was felt primarily towards other post-communist countries in Europe, where a strong sense of solidarity (both in terms of shared identity and transnational networks) had developed as a result of the shared experience of communism and post-communism.

2.1.1. Poland

In Poland, civic democracy promotion grew out of the dissident networks, which in the 1989 brought down the communist regime in the country. By the late 1970s, key Polish dissidents had embraced the idea that the Polish opposition had
much in common with opposition movements in the other nations in the Soviet bloc.\textsuperscript{5} This solidarity found expression in key articles in the underground press and in statements of opposition leaders. Moreover, since its first congress in 1981, the Solidarity labor union, around which the Polish anti-communist opposition movement grew, began more directly and openly encouraging and supporting other dissident groups in the Soviet bloc to “follow the Polish example” and fight for freedom and representation.\textsuperscript{6} And when Solidarity was crushed by the imposition of martial law in Poland in 1981, the movement took that as evidence that the Polish dissidents needed to make allies of the neighboring eastern and southern oppositions.\textsuperscript{7} Accordingly, the Polish underground broke the isolation of the nations within the Soviet bloc and initiated dialogue with dissidents throughout the Soviet bloc and most intensively with Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{8}

At about the same time, the international community – Christians, trade unionists, and Western communists, conservatives, liberals and socialists – was beginning to come together in support of the Polish Solidarity movement as the most massive and organized opposition in the communist world.\textsuperscript{9} Most active was the US government, which under President Reagan began openly providing technical and financial aid to the Polish underground.\textsuperscript{10} Washington supported the Polish


\textsuperscript{7} Snyder, \textit{The Reconstruction of Nations}.

\textsuperscript{8} Kenney argues that such dialogue made it harder for communism to contain dissent within national borders. Moreover, as stereotypes and fears that each nation had of others were dispelled, so that by the late 1980s, the events in one country could influence those across its borders. Kenney, \textit{A Carnival Revolution}.

\textsuperscript{9} Timothy Garton Ash, \textit{The Polish Revolution: Solidarity} (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

\textsuperscript{10} For example, between 1983 and 1988, the United States provided more than $5 million in cash assistance to Solidarity and other groups opposed to the Warsaw Government. Some of the money was openly appropriated by Congress, some of it was provided through the National Endowment for Democracy in consultation with the State Department, and some of the support was channeled surreptitiously through Polish émigré groups. This transition from secret American support for
underground publication network (with smuggled publications, printing machinery, radio equipment, and video cassettes) and sponsored the work of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty to provide the Polish citizenry with alternative-to-the-regime information. In turn, the Polish opposition quickly started supporting the development of other eastern European oppositions. Solidarity activists offered equipment, political literature, and most importantly a rich tradition of organizing anti-communist resistance and protest. The Polish underground was living its slogan “Fighting for your freedom and ours.”

In the years immediately after the collapse of communism, some of the groups that had operated either underground or semi-officially, such as the Polish-Czech-Slovak Solidarity Foundation and the Karta Center Foundation, not only legalized their activities at home but also continued their democratization efforts abroad. By the mid-1990s, some of these NGOs working abroad had made a conscious effort to develop and specialize their international democracy promotion activities. For instance, the Helsinki Committee was training human right activists, the Initiative for Democracy in Eastern Europe was supporting promoting civic pluralism, and the Center for Social and Economic Research was advising political and business leaders on the social, economic and political transformations towards market democracy. Moreover, those activities had moved beyond organizing occasional meetings with other Eastern European civic groups.

opposition groups in Communist countries through the Central Intelligence Agency to public grants was welcomed by Solidarity supporters, who saw the new openly provided assistance as more effective because it made them less vulnerable to charges of being tools of Western intelligence services. Gregory F. Domber, Supporting the Revolution: America, Democracy, and the End of the Cold War in Poland, 1981–1989 (PhD diss., George Washington University, 2008).

11 Kenney, A Carnival Revolution.
12 Interview with J. M., October 29, 2008.
13 Both organizations sought to promoting tolerance among and democracy in Poland and its southern and eastern neighbors respectively. For a history of the development of Polish civic democracy promotion in the 1990s, see Grazyna Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland (Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation, 2002).
14 Interview with A. B., October 28, 2008; and interview with P. K., October 19, 2008.
Additionally, a growing number of organizations, previously working mainly in Poland, were becoming active in the post-communist region. Most of these NGOs are led and/or founded by former dissidents such as the directors of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation and of the East European Democracy Center. Moreover, many of the younger civic recruits leading or staffing Polish NGOs supporting democracy abroad are either the children of Solidarity activists such as the founder of Free Belarus or graduates of the programs of the first dissident-led NGOs such as the director of the Pulaski Foundation. Such Polish civic leaders followed the dissident tradition of international solidarity – they maintained and further developed their personal and professional networks linking them to other pro-democratic actors with whom the Polish activists felt solidarity.

So even by the turn of the century about 1/5 of the 2500 largest Polish NGOs were involved abroad and international activity was a priority for 90 organizations. Some of these NGOs were working on social or economic issues but a lot of them focused on supporting the democratization of the region. And thanks to the number and diversity of NGOs working abroad, Polish civic democracy promotion was addressing a variety of problems of constructing the institutions of a democratic polity. Such initiatives were often sponsored by US donors but over time and especially after

---

15 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs. See also Paulina Pospieszna, “When Recipients Become Donors – Polish Democracy Assistance in Belarus and Ukraine” (paper prepared for presentation at the 2010 Midwest Political Science Association National Conference, April 22–25, 2010).
16 This second generation of civic activists has thus been socialized into accepting the former dissidents’ commitment to international solidarity. (Interview with J. M., October 28, 2008, and interview with A. K., October 21, 2008.)
17 Czubek, *Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland*.
18 NGOs working on international development issues have been building not only on the early international initiatives of the former dissidents but also on the movement about “discovery” and support of Poles living abroad as well as on the work of residents in borderland communities in laying the foundations of “neighborly” cooperation with Poland’s near and not so immediate neighbors. For instance, organizations such as the Pomost (Aid to Poles in the East) Society and Polish Community Association began seeking out Polish communities abroad to help support the revival of Polish national identity, education, and culture. Czubek, *Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland*.
the institutionalization of the Polish development assistance also increasingly by the Polish state.\textsuperscript{19}

Consider the following typical example.\textsuperscript{20} The Civil Society Development Foundation was set up in 1993 as part of a 2-year Rockefeller Brothers Fund program in Poland (and Hungary) to train local civic leaders to train and counsel other local activists about starting and running NGOs. A member of the Foundation recalls that “even as this program was running, the founders – [former union organizers] – were thinking that with time they should try to export what they’ve learned.”\textsuperscript{21} They asked the American trainers if they could invite some of their Ukrainian contacts to visit Poland and observe the sessions. These Polish activists report that they wanted to help their neighbors because they felt that as “the recipients of foreign assistance [they] have a debt to be repaid” and because “Ukraine is our most similar country with shared history and language.”\textsuperscript{22}

In sum, the fact that post-communist civic democracy promotion in Poland flourished before Western donors began pulling out of Poland at the turn of the century to focus on the more problematic transitions in the region suggests that the withdrawal of donor funding from Poland was not the driving factor behind Polish non-governmental support for democratization in the neighborhood. Instead, in the words of a prominent Polish civic democracy promoter, “The roots and motives underlying the foreign activities of Poland’s third sector can be found in the traditions of such social movements as the Solidarity Trade Union.”\textsuperscript{23} As organizational and/or ideological descendants of the Union, these civic democracy promoters inherited Solidarity’s commitment to democracy and to assisting others on the road to

\textsuperscript{19} Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs.
\textsuperscript{20} This example is based on an interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland}. 

96
democracy (the way that the West had supported Poland’s democratization).

Thus Polish civic democracy promotion grew around a core of normatively motivated individuals and NGOs acting in solidarity with others struggling for democracy abroad.

2.1.2. Slovakia

In Slovakia, civic democracy promotion grew out of the networks, which prepared the democratic breakthrough in the country – the OK 98 civic opposition to Vladimir Meciar. Meciar was the most influential Slovak politician in the 1990s: he participated in the Slovak anti-communist movement, led the first democratic government in the Slovak lands of Czechoslovakia, and later negotiated Slovak independence from the federation in 1993. However, by the middle of the decade, his nationalist populism and lack of tolerance for democratic practices had arrested the Slovak transition and undermined the country’s bid for membership in the Euro-Atlantic international organizations. Leading Slovak NGOs became concerned that the government would manipulate the forthcoming 1998 elections in order to remain in power and would then continue to reverse the democratization of the country and increase its international isolation. Such civic leaders began preparing an “open nonpartisan public initiative, designed to help ensure free and fair elections” – the OK 98 campaign. The Slovak civil society mobilized to create a popular mandate for a radical break with Meciar’s illiberal regime and push the country in a decidedly democratic (and pro-Western) direction.

24 The latter commitment was further reinforced in the post-communist era, when many of these Polish NGOs were again recipients of Western assistance for their efforts during Poland’s transition as well. Civic and political elites in the country acknowledge “re[ly]ing heavily on the aid and experience of Western NGOs” (Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland). Such aid is also believed to be “crucial” and “a major factor in the successful transition to full-fledged democrac[ies]” (Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions).

Despite Meciar’s attempts to silence independent voices in Slovakia, civil society in the country had continued to develop with foreign, and especially US, financial, technical, and political support.\textsuperscript{26} Since Western donors too were alarmed by Meciar’s autocratic inclinations, they decisively threw their support behind the political and civic leaders of the OK 98 campaign. Western donors set up a flexible funding system with simplified application procedures for financing and co-financing of projects supporting democracy in Slovakia: general civil society development as well as improving voter awareness and information about the 1998 vote, increasing turnout, and ensuring citizen oversight of the elections.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, several US governmental and non-governmental officials cooperated to connect key Slovak activists with civic leaders from Bulgaria and Romania, who lent their experience from similar campaigns in their countries in 1996-97.\textsuperscript{28} Lastly, Slovak civic society also invited Western politicians and experts, international institutions, and independent organizations to advise the OK 98 leaders on current developments in Slovakia and to prepare them to assume office in the future. The OK 98 civic mobilization not only forced the regime onto the defensive but also compelled the opposition parties to reject cooperation offers by Meciar, who won just 27 per cent of the 1998 vote.\textsuperscript{29} The election marked not only a turnover in power but also the formation of a national consensus about the Slovak international (European) and domestic (democratic) identity.

\textsuperscript{26} Long-term grant making programs were launched by the Open Society Foundation, the Democracy Network program of USAID, the Civil Society Development Foundation financed by the European Union’s PHARE Program, and many other international funders. Forbrig and Demes, \textit{Reclaiming Democracy}.

\textsuperscript{27} Such projects were funded by the United States Information Service, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, USAID, IRI, NDI, the NED, the Foundation for a Civil Society, the Jan Hus Educational Foundation, the British Know How Fund, the Fund of Canada, and others. Forbrig and Demes, \textit{Reclaiming Democracy}.

\textsuperscript{28} These included the American ambassadors to Slovakia and the Czech Republic and representatives of the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute, Freedom House, and the National Endowment for Democracy. Forbrig and Demes, \textit{Reclaiming Democracy}.

The potential of the OK 98 civic campaign to serve as a model for defeating illiberal incumbents reigning over “electoral democracies” was immediately recognized by the US donors and the Slovak and other democratic activists in the region.\(^{30}\) In late 1998, a US donor encouraged several of the key OK 98 organizers to prepare a seminar in Bratislava to share their campaign experience with interested representatives from Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus and Russia.\(^{31}\) At the request of civic and political oppositions throughout the region, prominent Slovak civic activists subsequently led a number of additional exchanges and seminars in Slovakia and abroad. Building on these early efforts of key OK 98 campaigners, around the turn of the century a number of Slovak NGOs began turning these consultancies into full-fledged democracy promotion programs.\(^{32}\) These efforts were often sponsored by US donors but the Slovak civic leaders also encouraged the new Slovak democratic government, staffed with their former political OK 98 allies, to support civic democracy promotion.\(^{33}\)

An example illustrates the development of Slovak civic democracy promotion well.\(^{34}\) Memo 98 is a media-monitoring group, which was set up in 1998 with assistance from the US National Democratic Institute and the US Embassy in Slovakia. The NGO played an important role in the OK 98 campaign and the subsequent improvement of the quality of Slovak democracy. In 1999 IREX introduced these Slovak activists to key Belarusian opposition leaders who wanted to

---

\(^{30}\) Bunce and Wolchik, *Democratizing Elections.*

\(^{31}\) The first seminar was suggested by a Freedom House official. (Interview with P. D., November 20, 2008.) Subsequently, Slovak NGO activists instructed a lot of other Eastern European activists in the strategies they used in OK 98 for political opposition unity, ambitious voter registration, get-out-the-vote drives, election monitoring and exit polling, as well as effectively informing the citizenry about the costs of the incumbents’ rule. Such Slovak training was successfully applied in Croatia in 1999, in Serbia in 2000, and in Ukraine in 2004 but did not help the Belarusian opposition in either 2001 or 2006. (Interview with P. D., November 20, 2008; interview with P. N., November 11, 2008; interview with M. M., July 27, 2007.)

\(^{32}\) Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008; and interview with I. K., November 21, 2008.

\(^{33}\) Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international development NGOs.

\(^{34}\) The description is based on an interview with M. M., July 27, 2007.
prepare a democratization campaign similar to the OK 98 in time for the underground 1999 presidential elections in Belarus.\textsuperscript{35} The Memo 98 leaders saw Lukashenko as pro-Russian dictator who had isolated Belarus and had restricted political and civic freedoms in the country much like Meciar had in Slovakia; Memo 98 decided the help the Belarusian opposition by advising them on media monitoring strategies for the election. After this consultancy, Memo 98 decided to share their expertise with the Serbian opposition because they felt “close” to it as well and they also disliked Milosevic, whose nationalistic autocracy was reminiscent of Meciar’s. Memo 98 convinced the US embassy in Slovakia to fund a project for setting up a media-monitoring group in Serbia. After the success of the Serbian opposition, Memo 98 continued their cooperation with their Serbian counterparts but also returned to Belarus in 2001 with the first of several projects and shortly thereafter began their work in Ukraine in time for the 2004 presidential elections there.\textsuperscript{36}

By the mid-2000s, the diversity and number of civic democracy promoters had grown even further. Slovakia had successfully caught up with the first wave of EU enlargement applicants, so a number of organizations such as Academia Ispolitana Nova and the Center for European Politics that had previously worked primarily at home began sharing their experience with the democratic transition as well as Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{37} Moreover, the institutionalization of the Slovak development

\textsuperscript{35} Lukashenko was elected as the president of Belarus in 1994 and according to the Belarusian constitution at that time, the next presidential election would be in 1999. However, Lukashenko manipulated a 1996 referendum to broaden his powers and extend his term in office. Following the referendum, he scheduled the next presidential elections for 2001. In protest, the Belarusian opposition decided to prepare an underground elections in 1999 but had to eventually give up as Lukashenko increased repression in the country. Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus,” in \textit{Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in Its Neighbourhood?}, ed. Richard Youngs (Madrid: FRIDE, 2008), 101–20.

\textsuperscript{36} Since then Memo 98 has also implemented media-monitoring projects in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iraq. (Memo 98 Organizational Archives. See also http://www.memo98.sk/en/.)

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with L. B., November 12, 2008; and interview with A. L., November 14, 2008.
assistance system provided additional and perhaps more easily obtainable funding for exporting democracy abroad.\textsuperscript{38}

In sum, Slovak civic democracy promotion began almost immediately after the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and had become institutionalized before Western donors began leaving Slovakia to support democratization further east and southeast.\textsuperscript{39} Moreover, the NGOs involved in democracy promotion were mostly the same NGOs that had prepared the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and had later worked for the consolidation of the Slovak democratic regime and which, as a result, shared a normative commitment to democracy.\textsuperscript{40} Additionally, having been assisted by external actors in their post-communist transition, the Slovak civic elites have been keenly aware of the importance of helping those on the road to democracy. Thus much like Polish civic democracy promotion, Slovak non-governmental support for democracy abroad has been motivated by the normative commitments to democracy and to assisting others while its scope has been defined by the demand of oppositions to hybrid and autocratic regimes in the European post-communist space and the solidarity of the Slovak civic activists with such pro-democratic forces.

2.2. The Rhetoric of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion

When talking about their work abroad, do Polish and Slovak civic activists discuss donor invitations and funding opportunities available for international work and/or do they refer to their responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy

\textsuperscript{38} Interview with B. B., November 27, 2008.
\textsuperscript{39} Western donors began withdrawing from Slovakia in the mid-2000s. For example, the USAID Mission to Slovakia initially closed in September 2000, as it did in the other Visegrad countries. However, it quickly became apparent that the country needed continued and targeted assistance to ensure the consolidation of political and economic reforms. The USAID Mission in Bratislava closed its doors for a second and final time in March 2003. (See USAID-Slovakia’s online archive at http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/sk/index.html)
\textsuperscript{40} Such leading civic democracy promoters included NGOs such as Memo 98, Civic Eye, Pontis Foundation, Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia, and the Institute for Public Affairs.
and their solidarity with their foreign partners? This section is based on interviews with representatives of the democracy promoters from the Polish national platform of NGOs working abroad – Zagranica and from the Slovak national platform of NGOs working abroad – PMVRO. When asked to describe their democracy promotion activities, a lot of the interviewees began answering by describing the reasons for their general support for democracy abroad or ended their responses to the question by discussing the “You may wonder why we would do this?” question.\footnote{Quote is from an interview with M. J., November 18, 2008.} If respondents did not volunteer this information by the end of the interview, they were asked “what factors influenced [their] decision to begin supporting democracy abroad.” The rhetoric of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters was almost exclusively about the moral obligations and solidarity with recipients these activists feel. Only a minority of these Polish and Slovak NGOs reported that available funding influenced their decision to launch a democracy promotion program.\footnote{Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international development NGOs. It should be noted that the NGOs that discussed funding-driven work did so with pride of the fact that their expertise was appreciated by Western donors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that they would feel little shame in disclosing such work.} Such discussions provide support for the explanation that Polish and Slovak NGOs supporting the spread of democracy abroad are normatively motivated.

2.2.1. Poland

When talking about supporting democratization efforts abroad Polish civic democracy promoters express a strongly felt normative “obligation” to “help others, as […] they themselves] were assisted from abroad” in their struggle for democracy.\footnote{Interview with M. P., October 10, 2008.} The first dimension of this commitment is a “sense of responsibility” towards other post-communist countries in transition in the region, where a strong “sense of solidarity” has developed as a result of the shared experience of communism and post-
communism and/or a shared aspirations to freedom. Some typical examples of the ways Polish civil democracy promoters describe their motivation to share their democratization experience include:

- “Democracy promotion is a kind of solidarity between us and our neighbors.”
- “We have suffered under communism and know how painful living under a dictatorship can be.”
- “Poles have many contacts with Ukrainians, so we can not pretend not to see that Ukraine has similar problems. Poles feel sharing their experience is a duty. We just can’t not share our experience with them.”
- “Poland has chosen freedom but with freedom comes responsibility. Having gone abroad [former Soviet Union] we saw that people there also want freedom as Poland did in the 1980s.”
- “We see that people are interested in freedom and we have solidarity for them, so we are helping them and encouraging them. We believe in freedom because it ensures respectful treatment of individuals. So we want that not just for Poland but for the region because we feel solidarity for those in the region and those struggling for freedom.”

In other words, Polish activists consider their own democratization experience as a positive development and they wish to help those they feel solidarity with to improve their situation as well. This perceived responsibility is further reinforced by

---

44 Interview with W. B., October 13, 2008; interview with A. M., October 8, 2008; and interview with K. S., October 25, 2008.
46 Interview with A. B., October 18, 2008.
47 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
48 Interview with A. K., October 21, 2008.
49 Interview with O. S., October 28, 2008.
these activists’ belief that “Poland has received aid for many years and it is time now to pay off the debt.” Consider some of the ways in which civic leaders discussed their democracy promotion initiatives:

- “As we got aid, it’s our duty to assist others.”
- “There is this feeling in Poland that we’re obliged for the strong assistance from abroad during the struggle against communism and so that Poland should help others too.”
- “Our founders think of themselves as recipients of Western assistance and thus with a debt to be repaid.”

In sum, rhetorical references to democracy promotion as a duty or responsibility or obligation felt primarily in contexts where there is some cultural similarity and shared identity suggest that civic support for democratization abroad is primarily normatively motivated. Very few organizations (11%) mentioned that “a donor invitation” influenced their decision to work abroad.

2.2.2. Slovakia

When talking about their support for democratization abroad, Slovak civic democracy promoters also express a strongly felt normative obligation, which is a result of the fact that they have received foreign assistance and that “there are still some culturally similar countries which are still authoritarian.” As a leading civic activist puts it succinctly and eloquently: “Promoting pluralistic democracy, rule of law, and free market is a constitutional obligation in Slovakia. We are a democracy and these values are not only anchored in our constitution but should be promoted and

---

50 Interview with J. M., October 27, 2008; interview with A. M., October 8, 2008; and interview with K. S., October 25, 2008.
51 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008.
52 Interview with M. P., October 10, 2008.
53 Interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.
54 Interview with O. G., November 26, 2008.
protected both in Slovakia and abroad. Second, there is not only a sense of constitutional obligation, a civic obligation, but also a moral obligation. Because when we were doing our transition, we were also helped by countries from abroad who financed civic programs and brought experts who helped us write legislation and prepare specific reforms.”

In addition to anchoring democracy promotion in the externalization of the values on which the Slovak domestic order is built, some civic activists also refer to the values around which the European and even the international community is organized: “We want to be part of the global community and we believe that we are part of the global community. We are part of the European community and we are already at the economic level that we can give. And I think this is our moral duty and our people [Slovak constituents] want us to do this and judging from the emails we receive, their people [recipient countries] want us to do this.”

Finally, in the rhetoric of Slovak civic democracy promoters, there are often references to the demands and needs of the recipients from countries “close and similar” to Slovakia. As one of the Slovak activists working abroad shares: “It’s nice to share our experience with people who need it and ask for it.” Similarly, another civic democracy promoter further notes their “satisfaction” in seeing their recipients “grow themselves and decide where they belong [civilizationally].”

In sum, Slovak civic rhetorical references to democracy promotion as a moral mission embedded in the constitutive values of the domestic and the larger transatlantic order to which Slovaks belong as well as a duty to respond to the demands of others living in culturally similar contexts suggest that civic support for democratization abroad is primarily normatively motivated. Few of the Slovak

55 Interview with M. J., November 18, 2008.
56 Interview with G. S., November 6, 2008.
57 Interview with L. B., November 11, 2008.
58 Interview with A. L., November 13, 2008.
activists interviewed (18%) mentioned that available funding for democracy promotion influenced their decision to work abroad: “our work abroad is both mission- and survival-driven.”\textsuperscript{59} For the majority of Slovak NGOs supporting the spread of democracy abroad, the normative commitment preceded and motivated the search for funding: “As we benefited form outside help, it’s important to give back. So we try to find donors who would cover our work abroad.”\textsuperscript{60}

\textbf{2.3. The Practice of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promotion}

This section looks at the individual international programs or projects of the democracy promoters from Zagranica and from PMVRO. The analysis of the practice of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion is based on interviews with representatives from these organizations as well as on an analysis of their annual reports. Depending on the scope of the international activity of the organization, for every country and/or project that was part of the democracy promotion activities of the NGO, I asked its representative how the organization began working in this country or on this project and then how these activities were funded. The information of interest in these narratives was the sequencing of searching for available funding and coming up with the idea for the democracy promotion program or project. Did an NGO become aware of a funding opportunity and then come up with a project to take advantage of it and/or alternatively did the organization come up with a project or program idea and then went looking for ways to fund it? The argument here is that a majority of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion programs started in solidarity with and because of demands by activists in the communist and post-communist space with pre-existing ties to the Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters. While donor invitations and funding did involve some organizations in

\textsuperscript{59} Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008.
\textsuperscript{60} Interview with B. S., November 28, 2008; and interview with P. D., November 26, 2008.
supporting democracy abroad, such more opportunistic activities have generally included few, episodic, and ad hoc projects rather than sustained democracy promotion programs. Typical case studies of such sequencing trends are presented below.

2.3.1. Poland

The international work of a majority of the Polish civic democracy promoters, and of all the leading ones, grew out of the transnational personal and professional connections of their leading activists. A lot of the former dissidents – whether they entered into electoral politics or remained in civil society – maintained formal or informal relations with opposition activists from other countries in the neighborhood. Moreover, a lot of the foreign donors supporting the spread of democracy in Poland and rest of the post-communist space had some regional networking component, which helped maintain and expand the transnational civic networks of pro-democratic activists. Therefore, a lot of post-communist NGOs inherited and sustained such networks. For example, the Eastern European Democracy Center is the leading Polish civic democracy promoter working in Belarus. The Center was born from the Belarusian Program of the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe, which began work in 1986 as an extension of the Committee in Support of Solidarity set up in 1981 to offer moral, material, and financial support to Poland’s underground Solidarity movement. After 1989, under the leadership of prominent former dissidents, the Institute focused on “dismantling communism’s legacy” in Poland and on countries

---

61 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs.
62 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008; and interview with J. B., October 9, 2008.
63 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008.
64 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008. The case study below is based on this interview and the organizational archives of the Eastern European Democracy Center.
“where the end of communism did not result in democratic transition.”

The Institute’s leaders’ ties to other dissidents in the post-communist world were thus developed and maintained through the international activities of the Institute. By the late 1990s, the Institute’s program on Belarus had expanded so much that it eventually became a separate and independent NGO – the Eastern European Democracy Center. The president of the Center himself first came to the Institute after working in the late 1980 and early 1990s to support the development of youth civic group in the Soviet bloc; most of his contacts were in Belarus and Ukraine – the two countries that have now become the leading recipients of the Center’s democracy promotion efforts.

Moreover, there were a few NGOs, such as Partners for Democratic Change – Poland or Amnesty International – Poland, that were set up as branches of an international network. A notable example here is Polish Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. The Helsinki Committee in Poland was organized during the period of martial law by a group of intellectuals. After 1989, the members of the Helsinki Committee in Poland established the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Given the ties of these activists to other Helsinki civic leaders from the former Soviet Union, Polish Helsinki Foundation “naturally” prioritized the former Soviet Union in its international activities by awarding small grants to human rights groups, organizing trainings for NGOs, journalists, and public officials, and monitoring the human rights observance there.

Through such transnational interactions Polish activists quickly “discovered” that their counterparts had similar problems and that the Polish experience might

---

66 Interview with I. T., October 23, 2008; and interview with W. M., October 16, 2008.
67 This case study is based on an interview with A. B., October 28, 2008.
68 Interview with A. B., October 18, 2008.
69 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
thus be useful to them. Moreover, the activists abroad would frequently ask for help with a particular problem that they saw to have been resolved in Poland. For instance, a Foundation in Support of Local Democracy member reported that a few Ukrainian and even some Belarusian local government leaders had noted the success of the Polish decentralization reforms and asked the Foundation for assistance. Polish civic and political elites too not only see the restructuring of local governance as crucial to the democratization process but also consider the Polish reforms in this sector as one of the successes of the Polish transition.

Consequently, the international work of Polish NGOs usually started in the countries with the densest ties to Poland – the other countries in the Eastern European political space. Since neighbors such as the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and then Slovakia made significant progress in democratization, the efforts of Polish civic democracy promoters focused increasingly and predominantly on Ukraine and Belarus and then Russia. As Polish civic activists explain, Poland, together with Lithuania, Ukraine, and Belarus, have had centuries of shared statehood beginning in the 16th century with the Republic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which included Belarusian subjects as part of Lithuania and Ukrainians under the Polish crown. Most recently, while Poland regained its own state in the early 20th century and Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians were included the USSR, all four republics were part of the communist bloc. This common history created multiple and very salient personal and professional ties between Poles and the other three nations. As a result, 93% of

---

70 Interview with L. S., October 11, 2008; interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with G. G., October 13, 2008; interview with K. S., October 25, 2008.
71 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008.
72 Interview with K. S., October 25, 2008.
73 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs.
74 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008. For example, half of Poland’s population has some sort of interaction with Ukrainians and millions of Ukrainians visit Poland each year; 4.8 millions Ukrainians visited Poland in 1998. Oleksandr Pavliuk, “The Ukrainian-Polish Strategic Partnership and Central European Geopolitics,” in Derek Muller, Kurt R. Spillman, and Andreas Wenger, eds., Between Russia
the current Zagranica members promoting democracy have had or currently have a significant project in Ukraine. In fact, Ukraine was the first international partner for a majority of those NGOs. The second most common recipient country has been Belarus. Despite the very hard working condition there, just 22% of the Zagranica democracy promoting members have not worked in Belarus. And finally, Russia – whose pro-democratic forces cooperated with the Polish ones before the collapse of communism and afterwards when Moscow’s commitment to democracy began to wane – was the third most popular recipient country with only 30% of the Zagranica democracy promoters not having been involved there. [For a list of Polish civic democracy promotion by target country see Table 3.1.]

Thus most of the big sustained Polish civic democracy promotion programs started in solidarity with and demands by activists in the communist and post-communist space with pre-existing ties to the Polish NGOs. Those ideas were then developed and proposed to different donors, which made such initiatives possible (in large numbers). It should be noted, however, that especially as the international work of Polish NGOs expanded in volume and geographical scope in the late 1990s the importance of direct ties seems to have diminished and with them the significance of the normative commitment of Polish civic democracy promoters as a driver of their efforts aboard. Especially towards the end of the 1990s, when Western donors began pulling out of Poland but still provided assistance further east and southeast, such available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some Polish

---

and the West: Foreign and Security Policy of Independent Ukraine (Bern, Zurich: Peter Lang, Center for Security Studies, ETH, 1999), 185–211.

75 For example, interview with L. S., October 11, 2008; and interview with K. S., October 8, 2008.

76 For many years, projects implemented by Polish NGOs in Eastern Europe were financed solely from foreign government support (USAID, the British Know How Fund, MATRA) or from private sources (the Ford Foundation, the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the National Endowment for Democracy or the Stefan Batory Foundation). Interview with M. P., October 8, 2008.
international projects in the outskirts of the post-communist region.\textsuperscript{77} 15\% of all the Zagranica democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/5 of which are donor driven. 26\% of all the Zagranica democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/4 of which are donor driven. 15\% of all the Zagranica democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/3 of which are donor driven.\textsuperscript{78}

Returning to the history of the Civil Society Development Foundation, one of the Foundation’s sponsors – USAID – hired the Polish civic trainers to implement the USAID’s “training for trainers” program idea in Croatia by “carefully adapting it to the local context.”\textsuperscript{79} Similarly, another of the Foundation’s donors, the East West Institute, invited the Polish activists to prepare a project in Kosovo; the Civil Society Development Foundation team decided to provide Kosovar civic leaders with technical assistance on fundraising. Likewise, the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy began its democracy promotion in the late 1990s in Ukraine and Belarus but soon moved to the Western Balkans because “they had started working on decentralization reforms and the Council of Europe had money for such projects.”\textsuperscript{80} It should also be noted that only some of such donor-driven project have turned into sustained programs; for example, the activities of the Civil Society Development Foundation in Croatia and Kosovo were not sustained beyond the end of each project whereas the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy has developed its activities in the Western Balkans and now has presence there.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{77} Such donors recognized that Polish NGOs have a more relevant experience to share with civil society further east and south than the expertise Western NGOs were bringing. Moreover, from the perspective of the foreign donors, such regional co-operation was a continuation of their work and realization of their values. So Polish groups were invited to participate in or to implement Western projects elsewhere in the post-communist region and/or funded to design their own initiatives.
\textsuperscript{78} Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs.
\textsuperscript{79} Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008.
\textsuperscript{80} Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008; and interview with K. M., October 7, 2008.
### Table 3.1. Democracy Promotion by Polish and Slovak NGOs by Target Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International Partner Country</th>
<th>Percent of NGOs Working in Country out of all Zagranica Democracy Promoters</th>
<th>Percent of NGOs Working in Country out of all PMVRO Democracy Promoters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America / Cuba</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Data from author calculations.

At the same time, however, not all democracy promotion engagements in the developing world have been funding driven. For example, media accounts of the Solidarity struggles encouraged oppositions from distant countries, such as Cuba,
Tibet, or Burma, to seek the expertise of Polish dissidents. For instance, after his presidency ended in 1995, the iconic Solidarity leader, Lech Walesa has tried to serve those “who need a ‘moral leader’.”\(^8^2\) In 2005 he was invited to a conference on the Cuban question where he met with a Cuban dissident who asked for his “organized” and “systematic” help. The next year, Walesa set up an initiative run by his foundation in order to support the Cuban struggle for freedom.

In sum, Polish civic democracy promotion is concentrated in countries in the post-communist region such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia where a strong sense of solidarity had developed as a result of the shared historical experience and consequent dense personal and professional ties. Most of these Polish efforts were normatively driven. However, the availability of funding was a sufficient condition to draw some Polish civic democracy promoters to work in contexts where they thought they could apply their expertise. Still, such opportunistic projects remain for the most part ad hoc and a fraction of the international activity of Polish NGOs supporting democracy abroad.

2.3.2. Slovakia

The activities of a majority of Slovak civic democracy promoters grew out of the transnational contacts of the elites who prepared the Slovak democratic breakthrough. Since these connections developed only in the late 1990s and since a lot of the leading Slovak NGOs were funded by US donors, who encouraged transnational cooperation, such donors were very influential in shaping the scope and direction of these transnational networks.\(^8^3\) For instance, USAID’s Democracy Network Program was set up in 1994 to encourage the development of civil society and citizen participation in policy-making in Eastern Europe; it had both in-country and regional

\(^8^2\) Interview with L. W., October 10, 2008.  
\(^8^3\) Interview with I. K., November 21, 2008.
components and served as a forum, where civic activists established contacts abroad and exchanged experiences. As a result, it was crucial in linking the Slovak and Serbian civil societies among others. This and other regional donor-sponsored programs showcased the distinctive expertise of Slovak NGOs and generated demand for it. At the same time, the solidarity that developed as result of such regional ties motivated Slovak NGOs to set up democracy promotion initiatives.

Consider the example of the Slovak election-monitoring group, Civic Eye. It was set up in 1998 with financial and technical assistance by the US International Republican Institute. Following its key role in the OK 98 campaign, the NGO was showcased in a Freedom House regional workshop and subsequently started receiving invitations and requests for cooperation. The first one came from Ukraine in connection with the 1999 elections. Given its limited funds, Civic Eye sent 20 observers to the Carpathian lands of Ukraine, which border Slovakia. And as a result of Civic Eye’s participation in OSCE’s regional forum for election observers, the Slovak experts were asked to help train Croat monitors and send Slovak monitors to Croatia’s presidential elections in 2000. The Slovak NGO “wanted to help similar groups,” so it approached the Freedom House to finance the training and signed up with OSCE to participate in its election observation mission to Croatia. Again solidarity with civic activist in the Western Balkans motivated Civic Eye to seek US funding to train election observers in and to send monitors to Serbia. Also in 2000,

---

84 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.
85 There were some Slovak NGOs, such as Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia and Transparency International – Slovakia, which were set up as branches of an international network. As a Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia member explains, when the Partners network was expanding east and southeast in the early 2000s and the members of the new branches needed to be trained, the Slovak Partners members were invited to instruct the new offices on issues with which the Slovak NGOs had successfully dealt. Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008.
86 This case study is based on the organizational archives of Civic Eye and an interview with P. N., November 11, 2008.
87 Interview with P. N., November 11, 2008.
Civic Eye approached the Slovak government to co-sponsor the election observers the Slovak NGO wanted to send to Bosnia and Kosovo.

Moreover, foreign donors not only created opportunities for transnational cooperation by sponsoring regional forums but also sometimes directly brokered the diffusion of the Slovak transition experience by introducing Slovak NGOs to other pro-democratic groups. Back to the Civic Eye example as early as 1999, a US donor introduced the NGO’s director to a group of activists from Belarus because the donor believed that “the OK 98 experience can be transferred and inspiring” to the Belarusian opposition. After this first meeting, Civic Eye – much like Memo 98 – wanted to help their counterparts, so the NGO developed and secured funding for a few subsequent projects in Belarus.

In other words, Civic Eye’s and most of the other big sustained Slovak civic democracy promotion programs started in solidarity with and demands by activists in the communist and post-communist space with pre-existing ties to the Slovak NGOs. Such cooperation proposals were then developed and submitted to different donors. Accordingly, Slovak civic democracy promoters have been most active in the countries with the densest historical ties to Slovakia – the democratization laggards amongst the descendants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.88 The solidarity that formed between the nations in the Empire underpinned their continuing cooperation through the Small Entente and then the “special ties” between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where the Slovak minorities enjoyed “a prestigious position.”89 Slovak civic democracy promoters consider the Western Balkans countries “similar” – “small nations” with “close mentality” but still struggling with nationalism, arrested transitions, and thus setbacks on the road to Euro-Atlantic integration.90

88 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international development NGOs.
89 Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008.
90 Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008.
PMVRO democracy promoters have had or currently have significant involvement in Serbia – the “closest” to Slovakia of the Western Balkans countries. Additionally, 43% worked in Kosovo, 36% in Macedonia, also 36% in Bosnia, and 14% in Croatia.

Slovak civic democracy promoters have also been very active in Ukraine and Belarus. While these two countries are both very big and traditionally part of the Polish/Lithuanian-Russian historical and cultural space, they also are – much like Slovakia – new European states, which emerged at the end of the Cold War and which initially made hesitant progress towards democracy and Europeanization. These similarities were articulated by US donors and opposition groups working in these countries and soon embraced by Slovak civic activists. As a result, 71% of PMVRO democracy promoters have had or currently have significant involvement in Ukraine and 57% – in Belarus. [For a list of Slovak civic democracy promotion by target country see Table 3.1.]

However, that available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Slovak NGOs promoting democracy abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the Slovak community of civic democracy promoters. For instance, the presence of Slovak NGOs in the Middle East was, according to their own accounts, mostly opportunistic. After Slovakia joined the US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, Afghanistan became a priority country for SlovakAid. Moreover, some US donors invited their former Slovak grantees to implement elections and civil society projects in the Middle East because the Slovak experience seemed more relevant and welcomed than the US expertise. For example,

---

91 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.
92 Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008.
93 The common experience of communism and post-communism expanded the circle of solidarity and thus the democracy promotion efforts of some Slovak NGOs to more distant countries in Eurasia, Central America (Cuba), and Asia (Burma and Tibet). Given the “special ties” between Cuba and Czechoslovakia during the communist era, Cuba is the country in the developing world, where the Slovak civic democracy promoters have the strongest presence.
94 Interview with O. G., November 26, 2008.
IVO – a think tank with “the aim of promoting the values of an open society and a democratic political culture in public policy and decision-making” – implemented a civic training project in Iraq at the invitation of the US International Republican Institute.\(^9^5\) However, much like other Slovak civic democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East, IVO’s activities were not sustained beyond the end of the project.\(^9^6\)

Still, donor-driven Slovak democracy promotion remains episodic and a small proportion of the activity of Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad. 36% of PMVRO democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/5 of which are donor driven. 9% of PMVRO democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/4 of which are donor driven. 18% of PMVRO democracy promoters have international programs up to 1/3 of which are donor driven.\(^9^7\) In sum, a majority of the Slovak civic democracy promotion has been normatively driven and thus concentrated in post-communist countries such as the Western Balkans and Ukraine and Belarus where a strong sense of solidarity had developed on the basis of shared historical experiences, reinforced through the transnational linkages fostered by domestic actors but primarily by Western (US) donors. Opportunistic democracy promotion remained mostly episodic and only a small fraction of the international activity of Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad.

*   *   *

To conclude, both the Polish and the Slovak civic movements promoting democracy abroad developed around a core of normatively motivated activists/ NGOs. Given their roots in the national democratization movements in these countries, these

\(^{9^5}\) Interview with G. M., July 26, 2007.
\(^{9^6}\) And another example: Transparency International – Bratislava decided to develop a project with Transparency International – Belgrade after the Slovak group saw the SlovakAid call for development projects proposals for Serbia. This partnership did not last beyond the end of the project either. Interview with E. B., November 28, 2008.
\(^{9^7}\) Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international development NGOs.
civic elites feel a commitment to democracy and a responsibility to assist others struggling for it, since they themselves appreciate the external support they have received. The transnational ties of these activists – whether pre-existing or donors initiated – have created, reinforced, and allowed Polish and Slovak NGOs to express solidarity with other pro-democratic activists abroad. However, as the Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion movements grew at the level of individual organizations and the country as a whole, the importance of pre-existing direct ties diminished and with them – the significance of the normative commitment of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters as a driver of their efforts abroad. Still, although available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Polish and Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the Polish and Slovak community of civic democracy promoters, such more opportunistic activities have generally included a relatively small number of primarily episodic and ad hoc projects rather than the majority of sustained democracy promotion programs.

However, it should be noted that even if Western donors have not been driving Polish and Slovak democracy promotion, the these donors’ expectations that the Eastern European NGOs would assist the region’s democratization laggards were in some cases formative (socializing and scope-defining) and in others – reinforced the obligation these post-communist elites felt to help others on the road to democracy. An early champion of the idea was the Open Society Institute, which created an East-East program for cooperation within the post-communist space.98 In Poland, the Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative created in the late 1990s also clearly illustrated the expectations of the US donors, as did informally the members of the Board of Directors of the Polish American Freedom Foundation.99 Similarly, in

98 Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008.
99 Interview with K. S., October 22, 2008; and interview with J. M., October 29, 2008
Slovakia, different donors would informally suggest to the local civic elites that the Slovak experience might be relevant in a particular context in the post-communist region and would introduce the Slovak activists to other recipients of US aid in the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{100} Such efforts were important, for example, in linking the Slovak and the Belarusian civil societies and thus helping develop the Slovak transnational networks on which Slovak civic democracy promotion would later build.\textsuperscript{101}

3. The Polish and Slovak Approach to Civic Democracy Promotion

What type of democracy the Polish and Slovak NGOs have been promoting abroad and what activities they have preferred. Are the approaches of such civic democracy promoters informed by taken-for-granted institutions and processes and/or by calculations based on the effectiveness of particular processes and activities? Are the roots of these approaches international, national, and/or recipient-specific? Analyses of the rhetoric and practice of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion reveal that the approach of these NGOs is best understood as a strategic export of the local experience with democratization as it is understood to be appropriate to the needs of recipients. And although such exports include practices imported by Western donors in the process of assisting the Polish and the Slovak transitions, there are still distinct Polish and Slovak national approaches to democracy promotion. These approaches, however, differ according to the regime type of the recipient society.

Just as in the previous section, the analysis here is based on the work of civic democracy promoters from Zagranica and from PMVRO. The statistics presented below are based on the annual reports of these NGOs and on their organizational profiles written up by officials from Zagranica or PMVRO.

\textsuperscript{100} Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008; and interview with E. K, November 19, 2008.
\textsuperscript{101} Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.
3.1. Rhetoric

Through their participation in various transnational networks, Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters realized that their post-communist counterparts throughout Eastern Europe and other partners around the world still living under communism or authoritarianism have similar problems and might benefit from the Polish/ Slovak experience.

As a prominent civic democracy promoter from Poland explained: “We discovered the similarities [with other post-communist countries], so we thought that what worked in Poland would work there as well.”102 Many other Polish activists also agreed that they “could not pretend” that other Eastern European countries do not have “similar” transition problems and that the Polish democratization experience would not be “useful” to them.103 Polish activists seem to genuinely believe that the lessons they have drawn from the Polish transition could serve as “an inspiration,” “a model,” “success,” or “example” to other countries in transition.104

Similarly, Slovak civic democracy promoters consider “the Slovak experience relevant there [the post-communist space] because their system is similar to the Slovak one.”105 Accordingly, many Slovak NGOs base “their programs abroad on the success of programs at home.”106 And if the Polish transition was extremely successful, it’s exactly overcoming the roadblocks on the Slovak road to democratization that Slovak NGOs see as “inspiring” and “interesting” “example” or “model” to other democratization laggards.107

102 Interview with A. K., October 21, 2008.
103 Interview with L. S., October 16, 2008; interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with G. G., October 13, 2008; interview with K. F., October 22, 2008; and interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
104 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008; interview with M. S., October 13, 2008; interview with M. P., October 8, 2008; interview with P. K., October 19, 2008.
105 Interview with E. B., November 28, 2008.
106 Interview with J. K., November 26, 2008.
Both Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters emphasized that they share with other activists abroad “what worked at home and what did not” and allow them to “adapt” such lessons learnt.\(^{108}\) Moreover, both Polish and Slovak NGOs pointed out that since they themselves participated in the democratic breakthrough and in the subsequent building of a democratic polity in their country, they offer their transnational partners a “recipe” for attaining those objectives. As a Polish activist succinctly described their approach – the emphasis in their various democracy promotion initiatives is on “demonstrating the progression from conceptualization to execution, the way solutions are developed – by way of example.”\(^{109}\)

In sum, the rhetoric of Polish and Slovak NGOs working abroad suggests that their democracy promotion efforts are based on a strategic calculation about the effectiveness of their own transition experience and therefore its strategic “usefulness” rather than normative appropriateness to others.

### 3.2. Origin and Practice

Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters have been organizing a variety of activities in order to “exchange experiences and knowledge about the [donor’s] political, economic and societal transformations.”\(^{110}\) Some initiatives have been designed to transfer technical knowledge, including conferences or forums, trainings or seminars, the publication of different manuals or of research summarizing the donor’s transition experience as well as some more experiential forms of technical assistance such as inviting recipients to observe or participate in ongoing Polish or Slovak projects at home or to visit Poland or Slovakia to study the working of

---

\(^{108}\) First quote from interview with V. H., October 30, 2008; second quote from interview with B. S., November 28, 2008; interview with K. M., November 5, 2008; and interview with T. I., November 28, 2008.

\(^{109}\) Czubek, *Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland*, 32.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., 31.
different democratic institutions (civil society, local governments, independent media, parliament, etc). Moreover, Slovak and Polish NGOs have also been engaging in a variety of more political activities such as educating, lobbying, and monitoring their own diplomats, the EU, and recipient governments as well as raising awareness at home and abroad. Lastly, a third group of initiatives includes a transfer of financial assistance in the form of grants or scholarships to recipients. A majority of the Polish and Slovak NGOs working abroad usually employ a combination of the three strategies but the goal is always to share tried and tested practices from their own experience. This attention to the effectiveness of particular processes and activities and the resultant differences of approach to supporting democracy in Ukraine and in Belarus suggests that Polish and Slovak activists have adopted a strategic approach to democracy promotion.

3.2.1. Poland
3.2.1.1. Instruments

The preferred democracy promotion activities of Polish NGOs have been trainings, study tours, and conferences. [See Table 3.2.] While 78% of Zagranica democracy promoters provide some instruction for their international partners (and 37% produce manuals/guides in the native language of the partners), 74% also organize study visits or exchanges to show their partners how democracy is practiced in Poland. A majority of Zagranica democracy promoters export their domestic programs abroad by coupling trainings with study visits. Additionally, 63% of Zagranica’s democracy promoters further put together regional conventions or meetings as forums for transferring the democratization experiences of a variety of Polish civic and political activists.
### Table 3.2. Activities of Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promoters: Percent of NGOs Using a Particular Instrument out of all Democracy Promoters from the National Platform for Development NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial/Material</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-granting</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study visits</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuals</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send volunteers</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conferences</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advise/Monitor Recipient Govt</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educate/Lobby/Monitor Donor Govt</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educate/Lobby/Monitor EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult/ Evaluate/ Monitor Recipient NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness Raising/ Debates in Recipient Country</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness Raising/ Debates in Donor Country</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Data from author calculations.

For example, the School for Leaders Association was set up (with foreign assistance) in 1994 to support the development of local communities in Poland by educating young people, civic elites, and local government officials about democracy and local development.\(^{111}\) As early as 1996, the Association opened a similar “school for leaders” in Ukraine and soon thereafter another one in Belarus (which disbanded after a few years as the political situation in Belarus worsened).\(^{112}\) The Association couples such training on how to start a civic group, how to apply for funding, how to

\(^{111}\) This case study is based on an interview with L. S., October 16, 2008.

\(^{112}\) Smaller similar programs were later also launched (but did not endure) in Moldova and Serbia.
involve businesses and NGOs in local government work, etc with study visits to Poland, so that foreign leaders can see in practice how local communities function in a cultural setting very similar to their own. Finally, the association also organizes regional conferences where domestic and foreign graduates of its programs can learn from each other and maintain and develop their contacts. And another example, the Institute for Strategic Studies (previously, International Center for Development of Democracy) builds on its research of Poland’s transition and foreign affairs to (publish various material on and) organize conferences and seminars for (Eastern) European politicians, scholars, journalists, NGOs and business people; the topics range from “Key Rules of Civil Society and Self-Government in Contemporary Democratic States” to “EU and NATO in the World Security System.”

In addition to technical assistance, 37% of Zagranica’s democracy promoters provide some financial support towards democratization abroad. Some Polish activists send money to allow weak civic actors/groups abroad to continue working or provide them with equipment such as fax machines, computers, and printers. For example, the EEDC awards grants to independent newspapers in Belarus and the Nowy Staw Foundation has equipped the “offices” of a few Belarusian activists. Additionally, a few Polish NGOs award scholarships or small grants: for instance, the Education Society of Malopolska funds civic education projects and the Center for International Relations awards scholarships to “young management staff from countries of Central and Eastern Europe.” Lastly, there is a group of Polish organizations that have been administering the programs of major foreign donors under which grants are allocated. For instance, the Education for Democracy Foundation administers the RITA program

---

113 Similarly, in addition to or in lieu of the exchanges, other Polish NGOs such as the Nowy Staw Foundation invite their foreign partners to observe or participate in the ongoing activities of the Polish organizations. Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
114 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
115 Interview with U. P., October 31, 2008.
of the Polish-American Freedom Foundation and PAUCI re-grants NED funding to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{116}

While most Polish civic democracy promoters participate in the formulation of Polish foreign policy – if not directly, then at least through their participation in Zagranica – a third of them prioritize educating, lobbying, and/or monitoring Warsaw’s efforts to support democracy abroad and a fifth of Zagranica democracy promoters seek to influence the broader democracy promotion debate in Poland.\textsuperscript{117} Additionally, a fourth of Zagranica democracy promoters consult, monitor, and publish research for the benefit of foreign states and a fifth – for foreign non-state actors. The Polish civic democracy promoters that employ such political instruments are mostly research centers such as College of Eastern Europe and think tanks such as the Center for International Relations, the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Institute for Public Affairs and the Batory Foundation. However, there are others too – for instance, the One World Association organizes annual public events (movies with discussions) on the state of freedom, human rights, and tolerance in Eastern Europe and beyond; the Polish Robert Shuman Foundation sponsors a yearly “Europe Day” celebrations meant to provide information about European integration to the Polish public and other Eastern European guests; the Foundation in Support of Local Democracy has advised the government of Kazakhstan on the development of local government; the Foundation for Civil Society Development evaluated the work of 13 NGO centers in Ukraine and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights monitored the presidential election held in Belarus in 2001.\textsuperscript{118}

It should be noted that in sharing their experience, Polish civic democracy promoters have often exported best practices that were initially imported into the work

\textsuperscript{116} Interview with A. K., October 15, 2008.
\textsuperscript{117} The NGOs that monitor the EU’s support for democratization in the neighborhood (19\%) and that actually seek to influence the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (7\%) are even fewer.
\textsuperscript{118} Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008; and interview with K. M., October 7, 2008.
of Polish NGOs by their Western partners. A good illustration of this dynamic is the Polish investment in youth houses. Shortly after the fall of communism, a number of youth meeting centers, such as the European Meeting Centre – Nowy Staw Foundation, were set up to foster contacts between young people residing in the border regions of Germany and Poland. Such initiatives were part of a larger movement to develop civil society while also strengthening values such as democracy, self-governance, tolerance and solidarity between these nations. The German partners of Nowy Staw organized a variety of study visits to Germany and a meeting/media center in Poland. As a member of the Foundation shares, “having learned a lot from them [German partners], we naturally did the same in Belarus, including literally opening meeting/media center.” Like Nowy Staw many of the Polish meeting centers soon moved east to Ukraine and in smaller numbers to Belarus. Moreover, as the Ukrainian centers strengthened, the Polish partners began suggesting that Ukraine export the practice to Russia. Equally fascinating is the fact that the tradition of the youth meeting centers began in Germany after WWII as a French reconciliation and democratization initiative.

3.2.1.2. Sectors

In terms of beneficiaries, Polish civic democracy promoters consider their strengths to include “supporting the development of local communities and promoting civic activity.” [See Table 3.3.] Indeed, Polish activists have prioritized working

---

119 This case study is based on an interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
120 During the first year of the programme, a total of 46,400 people (23,900 young Germans and 22,500 of their Polish peers) participated in 1,646 different projects. By 2000, this number had grown to 133,323 young people, roughly the same number from both countries, participating in 3,258 initiatives. In turn, the Polish civic democracy promoters involved 15,000 young leaders in 1999 alone. Czubek, *Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland*.
121 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
122 Interview with K. F., October 22, 2008.
123 Czubek, *Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland*, 32.
with organizations and individuals of civil society and to a lesser extent with local governments. A lot of the work of the Polish civic democracy promoters is about strengthening civil society abroad through activating local communities, educators, and youth. This is reflected in the relatively high proportion of Zagranica democracy promoters who work with youth – 74%, with educators – 41%, with community grassroots groups – 52%, and with local governments 37% in addition to working with various interest groups – 78%. Since the activities of the School for Leaders Association is a good example of Polish work with local communities abroad and the activities of the Nowy Staw Foundation is a good example of Polish work with young leaders in the neighborhood, consider the example of the Education for Democracy Foundation as an illustration of Polish work with educators in the post-communist region. The Foundation works with local communities throughout the former Soviet Union on civic education programs as well as on making schools truly participatory institutions as a way to encourage broader civic participation.124

All Polish civic democracy promoters work with civil society – either with interest or grassroots groups or with civic “multipliers” / “alternative leaders” – journalists, researchers, teachers, and young leaders, who embrace and in turn spread democratic norms in their home countries. Only a third of Zagranica democracy promoters target the recipient national-level governing institutions. Moreover, such work is almost exclusively with the individual political elites working in such institutions rather than with the institutions themselves as governing organizations. The example of the work of the Institute for Strategic Studies is an illustration of how politicians from the post-communist region are trained on to build democratic polities and join the Euro-Atlantic community and invited to participate in regional forums

124 Interview with A. K., October 25, 2008.
where they can learn from the civic and political actors who implemented or advised on the Polish transition.125

Table 3.3. Democracy Sectors Targeted by Polish and Slovak Civic Democracy Promoters: Percent of NGOs Targeting a Particular Sector out of all Democracy Promoters from the National Platform for Development NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Process</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Institutions</td>
<td>Executive &amp; Legislature</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Organized</td>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Grassroots Groups</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unorganized</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Educators</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Public</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Data from author calculations.

3.2.1.3. Different Approaches to Different Regimes?

Polish civic democracy promoters working in Ukraine but also other countries in transition such as Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans – have most actively supported the development of civil society as a platform for spreading democratic practices and values in these countries.126 Polish NGOs have invested in increasing the capacity of various interest groups and grassroots initiatives, which would allow the Ukrainian citizens to “take responsibility for their community and its problems.” 127

---

125 Interview with U. P., October 31, 2008.
126 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs.
127 Interview with K. S., October 9, 2008.
Moreover, the Polish civic democracy promoters have also further supported Ukraine’s systemic transformation by working with a number of national and local political elites to prepare them for implementing reforms in their country and for working in a European democratic polity. A common intersection of these two realms has been support for “civic and local self-government as a basic form of democracy.” And a lot of the Polish civic democracy promoters reported that as the capacity of their international counterparts improved, many of them were transformed from recipients into partners in new joint projects especially around EU integration/cooperation themes.

The approach of the Polish civic democracy promoters working in Belarus has been somewhat different – it has centered on investing in civil society and civic multipliers in order to generate public demand and support for democratization. In the mid and late 1990s, a lot of Polish NGOs worked with a number of civic groups and political elites from the democratic opposition to Lukashenko. However, the opposition weakness and its suppression by the regime constrained the work of some Polish NGOs and forced others to re-evaluate their approach. Since the early 2000s, the Polish civic democracy promoters working in Belarus have most actively supported the development of civil society as a bulwark against Lukashenko’s control of Belarusian society. Just as importantly, many Polish NGOs have also invested in working with civic multipliers such as journalists and young leaders as important agents of democratization. In general, the Polish activists have sought to engage the Belarusian society in general in an effort to develop “a culture of freedom” in the country, so that the citizenry can then demand democratization.

---

128 Interview with K. M., October 7, 2008.
129 Interview with A. M., October 8, 2008.
130 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Polish federation of international development NGOs.
131 Interview with P. K., October 19, 2008.
132 Interview with A. B., November 28, 2008.
democracy promoters have adopted similar approach to other dictatorships in the neighborhood such as Russia and the countries in Central Asia and the South Caucuses.

3.3. Slovakia

3.3.1. Instruments

The preferred democracy promotion instruments of Slovak NGOs have been trainings as well as monitoring the work of regimes in transition combined with public debates about the state of democracy in these countries and advocacy for keeping democracy promotion in these neighbors on Bratislava’s agenda. [See Table 3.2.] 69% of Slovak democracy promoters have provided some instruction for their international partners (and 46% coupled the trainings with study visits). Moreover, 62% of Slovak democracy promoters monitor the democratization track records of states in the neighborhood; 54% help organize public discussion in such countries about their regime’s performance and another 54% lobby the Slovak government to take steps to support democratization abroad. And much like their Polish colleagues, a majority of the Slovak democracy promoters often export their domestic programs abroad.

For instance, the Pontis Foundation is perhaps Slovakia’s leading democracy promoter. The Foundation was set up in 1997 with US assistance to contribute to the “building of civil society and democracy in Slovakia and abroad.”\(^{133}\) Pontis, which had organized an impressive youth voter-mobilization campaign for the Slovak 1998 elections, in 2000 began training several Belarusian youth organizations in various techniques for popular mobilization in time for the 2001 Belarusian presidential elections. Pontis soon realized that (unlike the OK 98 coalition) the Belarusian civil

\(^{133}\) Pontis is the successor to the Foundation for a Civil Society – the New York chapter of the Czechoslovak dissident initiative Chapter 77. This case study is based on an interview with M. S., November 13, 2008; an interview with J. K., November 27, 2008; and an interview with M. S., July 25, 2007.
society and political opposition are disconnected and neither was prepared for the reforms Belarus would need after a democratic breakthrough. So Pontis brought independent Belarusian experts to Bratislava to learn about the reforms Slovakia implemented after 1998. Pontis continued providing technical campaign assistance for the Belarusian civil and political opposition and focused on training them to apply opinion polls and focus groups to prepare an effective pre-election communication strategy (much like OK 98 had done with assistance from the US International Republican Institute). Moreover, Pontis not only helped the Belarusian opposition begin a public debate about the meaning of the 2006 election but also helped them package their agenda. The result of this consultation was the slogan “For Freedom” that replaced “For Democracy” (which implied regime change and was thus deemed more divisive and controversial by the Belarusian citizenry). Finally, Pontis has actively cooperated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Slovak Representation at the EU in an attempt to shape their policy towards Minsk. Pontis monitors the current situation in Belarus, regularly briefs both the Slovak Foreign Ministry and the European Council and European Parliament on it, and arranges meetings for representatives of the Belarusian opposition in Bratislava and Brussels. Pontis has also pressured Bratislava to come up with a policy on Belarus that goes beyond adhering to the common international sanctions and towards demanding specific reforms such as media and economic liberalization both bilaterally and through the EU.  

Not only have Slovak democracy promoters sought to influence the policies of the Slovak government and the EU but the Slovak NGOs have also worked to keep

134 Another good example of a Slovak civic democracy promoter that has sought to shape Bratislava’s and the EU’s policy on Ukraine is the work of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association which worked to elevate Ukraine to the status of Slovakia’s strategic partner and then argued for immediate sectoral economic integration between the EU and Ukraine (including free-trade and visa-free travel) as a stepping stone towards future accession. Interview with A. D., November 21, 2008.
democracy promotion on the agenda of the Slovak public. An example comes from the People in Peril Association, which is the leading Slovak civic advocate for humanitarian and human rights issues abroad.135 In addition to financially, technically, and morally assisting human rights activists abroad, the Association seeks to educate the Slovak public and government about the violations of human rights and democratic practices in countries such as Belarus, Moldova, Chechnya, Cuba, Burma, China, and North Korea. The Association’s activities range from organizing visits of dissidents to Slovakia and human rights conferences and school debates to sponsoring human rights movies festivals and marches in solidarity with victims of human rights abuse. Moreover, in addition to monitoring the democracy track record of a number of regimes in the region, quite a few Slovak civic democracy promoters have also been evaluating and consulting for non-state actors in the region and generally helping them expose and deal with undemocratic practices in their countries. In this group of Slovak NGOs, there are strong think-tanks, such as MESA 10, the Slovak Foreign Policy Associations, and the Institute for Public Affairs as well as groups, such as Civic Eye and Memo 98, that have earned international reputation in doing and training others to do election observation and media monitoring.136

Finally, about a third of the Slovak civic democracy promoters provide some financial or material assistance to their international partners. For instance, the People in Peril Association sends money to the families of Cuban political prisoners. Another example comes from the US German Marshall Fund in Bratislava, which awards grants “supporting the development of civil societies and democracy.”137

It should be noted that in sharing their experience abroad, Slovak civic democracy promoters – much like the Polish ones – have often exported best practices

---

135 This case study is based on an interview with M. O. and G. S., November 6, 2008.
137 Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008.
that were initially imported into the work of Slovak NGOs from their Western partners. A good illustration of this dynamic is the Slovak movement for civil society sustainability. In preparing Slovak NGOs to be sustainable and survive after EU accession and after they leave the country, US donors advised Slovak activist to campaign that a percentage of each citizen’s and each business’ paid income tax be assignable NGOs. Pontis was central to the success of this campaign, so after working with youth groups in Serbia in the context of elections, local community development, and EU integration and after the Serbian civil society had matured, Pontis began preparing its partners to be sustainable in the long run. Since 2005, Pontis has been working on building partnerships between Serbian NGOs, local authorities, and companies to develop corporate philanthropy in the country. Just like US NGOs trained Pontis to present their mission and values and offer volunteering services to businesses, so Pontis trained their Serbian partners.

3.3.2. Sectors

In terms of beneficiaries, Slovak civic democracy promoters consider their strengths to include “supporting the development of civil society and citizen participation in policy-making.”[138] Indeed, Slovak civic democracy promoters have prioritized working with a variety of civic organizations abroad – from interest groups, to community organizations, to think tanks. All Slovak civic democracy promoters have partnered with at least one of these groups of foreign non-governmental actors. 77% of Slovak civic democracy promoters partner with interest groups abroad, 46% of Slovak NGOs work with community organizations in the neighborhood and beyond, and 38% of Slovak activists cooperate with foreign think tanks. For example, Partners for Democratic Change – Slovakia assists “various

---

citizen groups but also [...] nonprofit organizations.”

Similarly, Pontis cooperates with both youth grassroots groups and think tanks in Belarus.

Moreover, many Slovak civic democracy promoters also emphasize cooperation between civic actors and the citizenry on the one hand and on the other – cooperation between civic actors and political elites. Accordingly, in addition to partnering with non-state actors abroad, 38% of Slovak non-governmental groups have targeted political process institutions and 46% have worked with foreign political elites at the national level. The international activities of organizations such as Civic Eye (election monitoring and corruption monitoring, for instance) are a good example here. Another example is People in Peril’s work with political dissidents in countries such as Cuba, Burma, and Belarus. It should be noted that while half of such Slovak NGOs focus on individual political elites, the other half target these institutions as organizations. At the same time, 69% of all Slovak civic democracy promoters have also worked with the general public or with civic multipliers in a range of dictatorships and countries in transition. For example, 46% of Slovak NGOs target the citizenry directly through organizing public discussion about various democracy-related topics such as the several rounds of debates in Ukraine about the country’s relations with the EU and NATO organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

3.3.3. Different Approaches to Different Regimes?

The Slovak civic democracy promoters have assisted both Ukrainian and Belarusian actors in organizing “electoral revolutions” in their countries through helping with voter mobilization (voter registration, get-out-the-vote campaigns, youth mobilization, and pre- and post-election debates) and media- and election-monitoring. After the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine and in other countries in

---

139 Interview with K. M., November 5, 2008.
transition in the post-communist region such as Croatia and Serbia, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have focused on building the capacity of civil society to serve as “the government’s partner in shaping public policy and accelerating Ukraine’s EU integration.” Slovak activists have focused primarily on cooperating with various Ukrainian public interest groups and further on organizing a number of public debates about the speeding up of the reform process in the country and about Ukraine’s relationship with the EU and NATO.

After the failed electoral revolution attempts in Belarus in 2001 and then again in 2006, the Slovak civic democracy promoters working in the country have continued to work with interest groups in the country but also stepped up their assistance to the political opposition and the think tanks producing alternative campaign and reform ideas to ready the opposition to taking and assuming office. Moreover, the Slovak activists invested also in strengthening a number of grassroots and youth groups in order to increase “democratic political competition in Belarus through the promotion of a democratic alternative” – a new and young political elite. The Slovak NGOs have further sought to use economic development as a non-contentious issue around which community development and citizen participation could be strengthened.

4. The Intersection of Civic and Official Democracy Promotion

Even before the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989, the Solidarity idea that Warsaw should support democratization in the neighborhood had gained acceptance among the elites and the citizenry alike. Given this commitment, both

---

135

141 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions.*
142 Author’s estimate based on interviews with the members of the Slovak federation of international development NGOs.
143 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.
144 Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.
145 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions.*
political and civic activists immediately began implementing the Polish democracy promotion agenda in their parallel spheres of activity. Moreover, the Polish activists continued to advocate – in the public sphere and in informal conversations with various public officials – that Warsaw keep democracy promotion a priority. Finally, at the end of the 1990s, the MFA signaled clearly (for the first time) its willingness to cooperate more systematically with the Polish civic democracy promoters, which in turn committed them to a close collaboration with each other as well as with the state.\textsuperscript{147} By 2001, the working group of internationally active Polish NGOs – Grupa Zagranica – was established.\textsuperscript{148} From the very beginning, the member NGOs played “an important role” in shaping the development assistance system in Poland.\textsuperscript{149} Polish NGOs working abroad have become the primary implementers of Polish aid projects. As a result, Zagranica not only advises the Polish MFA in the process of drafting laws, strategies, annual programs, etc but since 2006 it also monitors Warsaw’s foreign assistance activities. At the same time, through its development assistance system, the MFA provides a framework and funding for the international activities of Polish NGOs. Moreover, while Zagranica participates in Polish foreign policy-making mostly on assistance issues, there is also an informal group of experts from NGOs working in

\textsuperscript{147} In 1999, the Stefan Batory Foundation, in collaboration with the MFA, organized a conference “NATO, European Union, Central and Eastern Europe: NGOs in Poland’s Foreign Policy,” which gathered government officials and Polish NGOs working within the foreign policy field. The conference galvanized the leading NGOs working abroad to begin sharing information and experience more systematically and to move toward closer cooperation. They recognized that the scale of their commitment to democracy promotion and more traditionally development issues calls for institutional collaboration among NGOs and between NGOs and the state. Czubek, \textit{Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland}.

\textsuperscript{148} A working group from Zagranica prepared a document, “Partnership for Foreign Policy,” with recommendations to the MFA for the institutionalization of development assistance and the role of civil society in it. In 2002, the Stefan Batory Foundation organized a conference, “Social Diplomacy,” which gathered 70 NGOs working abroad and government officials responsible for Polish foreign policy to discuss the Partnership for Foreign Policy recommendations. The MFA, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, was very welcoming of the advice and initiative of the Polish NGOs working abroad. Czubek, \textit{Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland}.

the post-communist region who meets several times a year with representatives from different state institutions to discuss Poland’s and the EU’s Eastern policy, including democracy promotion within it. In general, the two types of Polish democracy promoters have continued to work more in parallel with each other, even if working towards similar objectives and even if they have complemented each other’s work and been supportive of each other’s efforts. This is perhaps not surprising given the strong consensus on Poland’s priorities at least in the immediate neighborhood and given Polish beliefs that civic society practices social diplomacy that is equally important to public diplomacy.150

Democracy promotion appeared on the Slovak foreign policy agenda only after the democratic breakthrough in the country. The civic elites, who prepared the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia and who quickly afterwards began supporting democratization abroad, not only successfully convinced their former political allies who were now in power to incorporate democracy promotion into the country’s foreign policy but also continued to advocate that the new democratic governments in the country keep democracy promotion high on the agenda. This advocacy was crucial in eventually expanding the scope of official Slovak democracy promotion and sustaining it through turnover in power, that is, in establishing it as a Slovak foreign policy tradition.151 The successes and external recognition the Slovak civic democracy promotion were immediately recognized by the Slovak political elites. This “appreciation” of the important role Slovak activists can play in fulfilling the foreign policy objectives of the young Slovak state has prompted Bratislava to frequently cooperate with, build on the work of, and delegate responsibilities to the Slovak civic democracy promoters. In fact, the NGO community has become “the main generator

150 Czubek, Social Diplomacy: The Case of Poland.
151 For example, see the discussion of Slovakia’s democracy promotion in Belarus after 2006: the Belarusian question remained on Bratislava’s agenda because of the advocacy of the Slovak civic democracy promoters. See Chapter 5 in this dissertation.
of ideas in the field of democracy assistance (topics, issues, methodology)” and has served “as the engine of the whole endeavor.” The Slovak NGOs have been receiving strong financial and political support for their democracy promotion efforts by the Slovak MFA and the Slovak embassy officials in countries such as Serbia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Additionally, the MFA has set up an ODA Co-ordination Committee as an expert advisory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs comprised of representatives of select central state administration organs and non-state actors operating in the field of development assistance. Finally, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have continued to wield the authority “to influence public opinion and the actions of the political elite” on Slovakia’s relations with countries in the neighborhood, including democracy promotion within it. The active participation of Slovak civic democracy promoters in public and policy debates about democracy promotion is perhaps not surprising given the tenuous national consensus on these issues and given the belief of many Slovak NGOs that official diplomacy should grow out of, further, and sometimes be delegated to civic diplomacy.

5. Conclusion

Both Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion grew out of the efforts of the activists who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in these countries and who shared a commitment to democracy coupled with a perceived obligation to assist others on the road to democracy. This obligation was felt primarily towards other post-communist countries in Europe, where a strong sense of solidarity had developed as a result of the shared experience of communism and post-communism. Consequently, this shared identity has shaped the scope and direction of post-communist civic

---

152 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
democracy promotion. Such solidarity has moved many Polish and Slovak NGOs to create funding opportunities – instead of just following the available ones – to help similar neighboring oppositions by seeking the sponsorship of the their government and former and current donors. Although Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion has developed around a core of normatively motivated projects and organizations, available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Polish and Slovak NGOs promoting democracy abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the Polish and Slovak community of civic democracy promoters. In other words, the normative and opportunistic motivations of various civic actors for participating in transnational activism might follow a cycle-like pattern: there are more opportunistic NGOs among the Eastern European late comers to the transnational democracy advocacy movement than among the early risers and even normatively-motivated NGOs are likely to run some opportunistic projects among their later programs.\textsuperscript{154} Still, it should be noted that the more opportunistic activities of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters have generally included a relatively small number of primarily episodic and ad hoc projects rather than the majority of sustained democracy promotion programs.

Despite these similarities between the Polish and Slovak democracy promoters, some differences emerge; those differences, however, reflect the roots of the Polish and Slovak democracy promotion movements. First, given their relatively late development (late 1990s), the Slovak transnational civic pro-democratic networks appear to have been shaped more by the donors working in Slovakia. While Western donors have influenced the scope and direction of these networks in Slovakia, these

external actors have not produced a significantly larger contingent of opportunistic Slovak civic democracy promoters. Second, as a regional leader and a champion of democracy in the post-communist space, Poland has traditionally felt a larger responsibility for the fate of the region. Slovakia’s civic democracy promotion, on the other hand, seems more driven by demand from their international partners and by the desire to project the values of the transatlantic community of democracies, which Slovakia strived but also struggled to join.

Returning to the two accounts of the motivations of Eastern European civic democracy promotion, it seems that there is less of a difference between Eastern and Western human rights and democracy activists than some of the more skeptical observers of post-communist civil society might suggest. What is more, the similarities with Western liberal activists do not stop with their similar motivations. A well-documented finding of the social movements literature is the “significant and enduring effect of [New Left] movement participation on the subsequent biographies of their subjects,” including the fact that former activists tended to remain politically active and leftist in their political orientation. The Eastern European civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their countries seem to have followed a similar trajectory; whether they went into electoral politics, remained active civically on domestic issues or chose to also support democracy abroad, such former activists seem to have remained sensitive to and interested in questions of human rights and democracy at least at home, if not also abroad.

And to the extent that post-communist democracy promotion is driven by actors with past pro-democratic mobilization experience and the normative commitments it produces, this dissertation suggests a new way to think about movement dynamics following democratization cycles of contentions. Such successful

---

155 See, for example, Ronald Aminzade et al., *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
movements have been observed to become politicized and demobilize as their mission and leaders are incorporated into the mission and leadership of the fledgling democratic political parties. However, some have noted that as the national movements demobilized, their sub-national components became increasingly active sites of political contention. This dissertation documents that national demobilization is accompanied in some cases by an upward scale shift to transnational democracy advocacy activism.

In terms of their approach, while the Polish and Slovak exports often include practices that had been Western imports to their countries, there still are distinct Polish and Slovak approaches to democracy promotion that differ according to the regime type of the recipient. Both Polish and Slovak civic democracy promotion is based on a strategic calculation about the effectiveness of their own transition experience and therefore its strategic “usefulness” rather than normative appropriateness to others. Because the Polish transition was extremely quick and successful and the Slovak one was full of roadblocks but still a success story, Polish and Slovak NGOs see their experience as “inspiring” and “interesting” “example” or “model” to democratization laggards in the communist and post-communist space. However, because the approach of these NGOs is best understood as a strategic export of the local experience with democratization, there are some important national differences. Most important is the

---


158 On “scale shift” in transnational contention, see Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism.
understanding of the role of civil society in the democratization and democratic consolidation of a polity. What distinguishes them from one another is Slovakia’s focus on more politically-oriented civil society compared to Polish emphasis on civil society as de-concentration of power away from the political center. Whereas Slovakia’s “electoral revolution” required and reinforced the work of NGOs involved in the political process (think tanks, watchdog groups, media and election monitors, etc.), the Polish transition involved empowering and mobilizing numerous local communities (both local governments and local grassroots groups).

The Slovak more political approach and the Polish more technical approach have both been reflected in both the instruments and the targets preferred by the Slovak and the Polish civic democracy promoters. On the one hand, the Polish activists have prioritized working with interest groups and grassroots organizations and individuals of civil society and to a lesser extent with local governments through activating local communities, educators, and youth. Moreover, the preferred democracy promotion instruments of Polish NGOs have been trainings, study tours, and conferences as educational forums. On the other hand, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have prioritized working with a variety of civic organizations abroad – from interest groups, to community organizations, to think tanks – as a bridge between the citizenry and political elites. Furthermore, the preferred democracy promotion instruments of Slovak NGOs have been trainings as well as monitoring the work of regimes in transition combined with public debates about the state of democracy in these countries and advocacy for keeping democracy promotion in these neighbors on Bratislava’s agenda.

Additionally, there are some differences between the Polish and the Slovak civic approaches to promoting democracy in countries in transition and in dictatorships. In repressive regimes such as Belarus, the Polish activists have more
actively supported the development of independent media as an alternative-to-the-
regime source of information in order to generate public demand and support for
democratization whereas the Slovak activists have instead invested in the development
of independent analytical centers so they can define a viable reform agenda, spread its
message to the Belarusian citizenry, and support the political opposition. Moreover, at
a time when the Polish civic democracy promoters are supporting primarily various
civic multipliers who to ready society to call for change, the Slovak civic democracy
promoters have stepped up their work with the Belarusian opposition and various
grassroots groups so they can continue to challenge the increasingly repressive
Lukashenko regime.

In democratizing states such as Ukraine, the Polish civic democracy promoters
have more actively supported the development of local democracy and have
accordingly paid more attention to local governments and grassroots groups in order to
nurture democracy from the bottom up. The Slovak civic democracy promoters, on the
other hand, have rather chosen to work on helping Ukraine catch up with the other
Eastern European EU and NATO candidates through supporting the reforms required
for Euro-Atlantic accession. The Slovak activists have emphasized cooperating with
think tanks generating reform proposals and organizing public discussion in order to
educate the citizenry about and generate support for the reforms ahead of Ukraine.
CHAPTER 4:
WARSAW PROMOTES DEMOCRACY IN THE EASTERN NEIGHBORHOOD

Previous work on Western democracy promotion has suggested two explanations of donors’ motivations and strategies: a strategic one that focuses on the benefits of having democratic international partners and a normative one, which emphasizes the emergence of a universal right to democracy. Since democracies are generally thought to be peaceful, stable, and prosperous, some suggest that states see it in their interest to export democracy to volatile and/or poor countries whose socio-political developments affect the donor countries. Others argue that there has emerged an international norm that considers democracy promotion to be an accepted and necessary component of international behavior and that in promoting democracy abroad, states follow a cultural script based on taken-for-granted democratic values and institutions. This chapter examines Polish foreign policy to uncover why and how Warsaw promotes democracy. The argument is that even before 1989 the Polish dissidents elites forged a national consensus around the strategic importance of democracy promotion as an element of a geo-political strategy to create reliable partners in the Polish eastern neighborhood and to deter Russian aggression. Moreover, Warsaw’s democracy promotion approach is a strategic export of the local experience with democratization, including some of the best practices of the Western actors that supported the Polish transition.

1. Democracy Promotion Motivations

Is Polish official democracy promotion a strategic or a normative foreign policy commitment? Chapter 1 identified two sets of observable implications – one for
each of these explanations. Using these observable implications, this section examines how Warsaw’s motivations are reflected in the origin, rhetoric, and practice of Warsaw’s democracy promotion. All three analyses suggest that Poland’s commitment to supporting democracy abroad is best understood as a strategic one.

1.1. The Origins of Polish Democracy Promotion

How was democracy promotion incorporated into Polish foreign policy? Did Polish elites discover benefits of having democratic partners, and/or were they compelled by an emerging international norm of a universal right to democracy? Polish democracy promotion grew out of the efforts of the Polish dissidents to translate their commitment to democracy into foreign policy by providing Polish society with a resonant answer to the question of Poland’s place in Europe.

Many Poles consider their country’s “Golden Age” to be the era of the Polish-dominated Republic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a powerful state in the center of Europe that included Belarusian subjects as part of Lithuania and Ukrainians under the Polish crown. The Commonwealth stood out as a bastion of “liberty and tolerance” in the darkest hour of European religious wars. Since its founding in the 16th century, the Republic was in constant conflict with what is now Russia until it was devoured in 1772 and then divided repeatedly over the next century among Prussia, Austria, and Russia. The Congress of Europe created a Kingdom of Poland, but this Polish state was dependent on Russia and included only a fraction of the Commonwealth’s territory; the eastern parts of the former Republic were incorporated directly into the Tzarist empire. Throughout the 19th c, the kingdom of Poland sought independence and strived for reunification with “its” eastern territories. Therefore, after gaining independence at the end of WWI, the Polish state sponsored the

---

Polonization of those territories that were however, already pursuing their own independence. During WWII, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Belarusian Popular Association purged those lands of many Poles; Poland saw this cleansing as an attack on their “natural” right to reclaim the eastern territories of the former Commonwealth. Moreover, that Poland was dismantled by Germany and Russia at the beginning of WWII and that the Polish borders were moved west by hundreds of kilometers after the country’s occupation by the Soviet Union at the end of WWII felt to many Poles as yet another injustice against the integrity of Poland.²

The post-WWII order on the Old Continent underscored to many Poles the importance of resolving the question of Poland’s place in Europe. Their inclination was to reclaim “Poland’s eastern” territories “stripped by Russia” and to reassert Polish superiority as the bearer of European culture in the east.³ However, in the 1970s, the Polish dissident circle in exile, Kultura, offered another solution – that Poland give up its past territorial claims and notions of superiority.⁴ According to Kultura, efforts to dominate the mutual Polish-Russian neighbors had brought centuries of bloody struggle in Eastern Europe. The circle advocated that Poland support the independence of the nations that lie between Russia and Poland and form a strategic alliance with them – something like a security community – in the heart of Europe.⁵ Such a strong bloc of independent countries between Germany and Russia would deter threats against and “colonization” of any one of them from the east or

⁵ Giedroyc envisioned a federation based on liberal values (freedom) bound by the shared identity produced through the common history of the Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples. Pomianowski, Jerzy Giedroyc 1906–2000.
from the west. Therefore, the circle argued that the best assurance of lasting Polish independence, peaceful Polish-Russian relations, and stability in the region and in Europe in general was supporting the “freedom” of Poland’s eastern neighbors.

Kultura’s ideas quickly spread among the Polish opposition because they resonated with important trends in Polish politics. The circle’s program did not contest the acceptance of Poland’s current borders by the country’s Communist regime. Kultura’s ideas also came at a time when uncensored (illegal) historiography works were questioning the entire tradition of Polish eastern expansion, and some Roman Catholic officials with ties to the secular intelligentsia were already speaking about the need for reconciliation with Poland’s eastern neighbors. Finally, the structure of the USSR – Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were political units that were a step away from statehood – allowed interwar nostalgia for the Commonwealth and aspirations for the creation of a federation united by Polish culture to be translated into solidarity with those nations and a “feeling of common fate under communist imperialist Russia.” This solidarity was crucial in allowing the Polish underground leaders, and later on Polish society in general, to accept the idea of giving up past territorial claims.

Kultura’s ideas shaped and refined the goals of the revolt that had been growing within the population of communist Poland. By the end of the 1970s, there already was a consensus in favor of the Kultura program among the Polish intellectuals, who would later play an important role in the Polish dissident movement, Solidarity. In 1980-1981, the organized opposition grew to a mass movement of ten million members, a third of whom were also members of the communist party. The extensive influence of this organized political opposition on Polish society thus provided a platform for sharing the elite consensus in favor of the Kultura program.

---

6 Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations.
7 Interview with P. W., October 21, 2008.
with Polish society as part of the program of national liberation. For Solidarity, the struggle against communism was also a struggle against Soviet imperialism. It was a “struggle for freedom” that was understood to have two mutually reinforcing dimensions – external freedom as independence but also internal freedom as democracy.

By the time communism collapsed in Poland in 1989, Kultura’s ideas had “gained universal acceptance and entered the canon of national common sense.” They were translated into policy by the post-Solidarity elites who came into power after 1989, but their broad acceptance ensured policy continuity even when power turned over. Much of the Polish right passed through Solidarity in the 1980s and took for granted Poland’s interest in the freedom of its eastern neighbors. But so did a number of key figures in the young elite, cultivated by the communist party to replace the 1980s leaders when the time was ripe for reform. Just as the transformation of the Polish communist party resulted from its competition with Solidarity in the 1980s, so Polish socialists continued the foreign policy of Solidarity governments in the 1990s.

When Warsaw’s eastern neighbors became independent in 1991, Poland had already confirmed its eastern border with Germany, now unified and committed to the EU; the potential of resurgent Russia loomed as the main security threat. Warsaw recognized the potential of “Europe” to stabilize “its” Eastern half as it had brought peace and prosperity to the Western half, so Kultura’s vision of a security community of the countries between Germany and Russia was substituted for these countries’ joining the West. Poland began seeking rapprochement and integration with the West.

10 Pomianowski, *Jerzy Giedroyc 1906–2000*. Giedroyc’s ideas were paraphrased by almost every single government and NGO official with whom I met.
and encouraged Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus to do the same. Warsaw believed that membership in institutions such as the EU and NATO not only represented a larger civilizational commitment to liberal values such as “democracy, human rights and rule of law” but also protected these countries’ sovereignty as liberal democracies. As a result, consecutive Polish governments have pursued what they believed to be in Warsaw’s (and its neighbors’) best interest: to support the democratic transitions in Ukraine and Belarus and ultimately to help bring them into “Europe.” The “democratic enlargement” policies of the West in the 1990s towards Eastern Europe, including Poland, only reinforced subsequent Polish democracy promotion.

In sum, democracy promotion was incorporated in the post-communist Polish foreign policy in response to Warsaw’s geopolitical security concerns. Polish democracy promotion has followed a certain counter-balancing logic; however, this logic has not been in the spirit of Realpolitik logic, as it has been traditionally understood by international relations scholars. Instead, it has built on the democratic commitment and the international solidarity of the Polish dissident society to redefine 1) Warsaw’s national interest as the survival of Poland as a liberal democracy and 2) the means of achieving this interest by giving up expansionism and instead taking advantage of the benefits of having democratic allies/neighbors to counter-balance and contain revisionist powers in Poland’s neighborhood. Moreover, to the extent that Polish official democracy promotion has favored but not prioritized democratizing Russia – the country that has been considered the main security threat to post-communist Poland, Warsaw’s commitment to democracy has also not followed the traditional Security Liberalism logic. The logic behind Poland’s commitment to democracy promotion is the result of the efforts of civil society to institutionalize its

---

commitment to liberal democracy by pointing not to a democratic entitlement but to the benefits of democracy for resolving the main Polish foreign policy challenges. Civic solidarity with those struggling for freedom and independence from Moscow focused Poland’s democracy promotion on the countries in the Russian sphere of influence and especially the mutual Russian-Polish neighbors. It is those domestically negotiated benefits of having certain international partners, constructed as important again domestically, be democracies that underlie the logic of Polish democracy promotion.

1.2. The Rhetoric of Warsaw’s Democracy Promotion

How do Polish foreign policy elites talk about their democracy promotion efforts? Do they refer to their responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy and/or do they talk about the benefits of having democratic international partners? The official democracy promotion rhetoric captured in the archive of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals some normative references as well as some discussions of the benefits of having democratic international partners. However, the fact that the latter are more frequent, especially in “domestic political conversations” about Polish foreign policy, provides further evidence to suggest that the Polish democracy promotion is best understood as a strategic commitment. 12 61% of the references of Polish diplomacy to their democracy promotion activism are strategic, 23% are normative and the rest combine both normative and strategic explanations. [For those references, please see Appendix 3.]

A lot of the Polish political elites from the left, the right, and the center passed through Solidarity in the 1980s and adopted the movement’s normative commitment to democracy. Traces of such a commitment – “democratic countries are duty-bound

---

12 I reviewed all official documents (such as statements, speeches, lectures, and annual reports) published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 2001 to the present.
not only to observe the principles of democracy and human rights at home, but also to propagate them elsewhere” – can be found in the speeches of various politicians on various occasions over time.\textsuperscript{13} Similarly, when assuring civic democracy promoters of the government’s support for their efforts, Polish foreign policy-makers also note that, “It is in Poland’s public interest that as many elements as possible of a civil society, a free and democratic state, and the rule of law be established in our immediate and not-so-immediate surroundings. This desire emanates not only from the commitment to certain values but also from the understanding of national interests: security, cooperation, and the existence of partners in other countries with whom we share similar goals and objectives.”\textsuperscript{14} However, such references to a universal right to democracy a more rare than discussions of the benefits of having democratic partners abroad. When explaining Warsaw’s foreign policies to and enlisting the support of Polish political elites, Polish diplomats frequently argue that democracy promotion “is not an old-new messianism, but a practical observation that strengthening liberty and democracy in our region also serves the interests of our Republic.”\textsuperscript{15} Finally, Warsaw has also sought to signal to its international partners that, “We believe that long-term security in the world depends on promoting values of democracy, modernized civilization and good governmental practice. We will contribute to that.”\textsuperscript{16} Discussions of democracy promotion by Polish diplomats are consistent over time and across governments.

And how have Polish foreign policy elites discussed their democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine and Belarus – considered to be the most similar Polish international partners and therefore most likely to evoke Warsaw’s solidarity with

\textsuperscript{13} Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “Poland – a Future Member of the European Union,” Address, Copenhagen, February 1, 2002.
\textsuperscript{14} Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, Statement, Social Diplomacy Conference, Warsaw, June 26–27, 2002.
\textsuperscript{16} Donald Tusk, Current President of the Council of Ministers of The Republic of Poland, Expose, Warsaw, November 23, 2007.
Ukraine and Belarus as well as Poland’s responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy there? Polish diplomats have frequently noted the importance of these two countries for Polish security and the benefits of democracy in creating a stable and congenial international environment in Warsaw’s neighborhood. Consecutive Polish governments have declared that “Ukraine, due to its geographical location, and the importance it has in maintaining stability and security in the region, remains to be a vital strategic partner for Poland. The development of democracy in Ukraine, its total sovereignty and co-operation with European and Atlantic institutions are of great importance and should be supported by Poland.”17 Likewise, Polish elites note that “the existence of democratic, sovereign and stable Belarus is in the interest of Europe.”18 Accordingly, “policy towards Belarus […] has been declared to be] guided by the objective of consolidating its independence and sovereignty in international relations, as well as supporting the structures of civic society.”19 Polish diplomats also have offered Belarus “Polish support as long as it respects human rights, the political rights of the opposition, dialogue, compromise, and openness towards Europe.”20 Thus even when discussing Warsaw’s support for democracy in the country’s kindred neighbors (Ukraine and Belarus), Polish political elites have tended to emphasize the benefits of having those important international partners be democracy.

1.3. The Practice of Warsaw’s Democracy Promotion

The democracy promotion motivations of the Polish government can also be gleaned from the geographical priorities of Warsaw’s efforts – has the Polish

---

17 PolishAid promotion materials available at http://www.polishaid.gov.pl/Why,We,Provide,Assistance,204.html
government been most active towards the most important non-democratic international partners and/or towards the most similar?

First, a good illustration of Warsaw’s priorities is the distribution of democracy aid through the Polish development assistance program. From 2004 to 2008 PolishAid sponsored 428 development assistance projects out of which 191 were in support of democratization abroad. Ukraine has consistently occupied the first position in the number of projects implemented – a total of 61 projects or 32% of all democracy assistance projects. Belarus has been the second democracy assistance priority of Warsaw. Poland has sponsored 49 democratization projects in Belarus and a total of 26% of all Polish democracy assistance projects have gone to Belarus. Moreover, Ukraine and Belarus have the third and the first highest rates of democracy to overall development assistance projects – respectively 46% and 70%. These proportions reflect the fact that as Ukraine was becoming more and more democratic after 2004 and Belarus remained the “last dictatorship in Europe,” the number of projects targeting Belarus has been steadily increasing and Warsaw sponsored a special 10-project “Competitive Media and Internet” Initiative for Belarus in time for the 2006 presidential elections in the country.

The bulk of the remaining democracy assistance projects were awarded to Georgia and Moldova – 17 and 16 projects respectively at a 55% and 41% democracy to overall development assistance projects respectively. Warsaw’s top democracy assistance priorities alone do not provide conclusive support for either the strategic or the normative explanation because Ukraine and Belarus are considered to be both the most strategically important as well as the most similar Polish international partners. However, the general focus on the “European” countries in the Russian sphere of influence and the lack of attention to the Western Balkans (which to Warsaw are not relevant to containing the possible resurgence of Russian imperialism) suggests that
Poland’s support for democracy in its neighborhood is best understood as a strategic commitment.

Second, the limitations and contradictions of Polish democracy promotion diplomacy tell a similar story. Warsaw’s first and foremost diplomatic democracy promotion priority has been the democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Belarus has been a close second priority and the attention Warsaw has paid to it has only grown over time. [For more details about the Polish initiatives in these two countries see sections 3.1 and 3.2 below.] Moreover, Warsaw has not only supported the development of “free” Ukraine and Belarus but has also generally favored the democratization of the post-communist region. And while Polish elites have by and large supported democratization/independence movements in the former USSR republics, these efforts have been less concerted and sometimes overridden by what are thought to be more immediate foreign policy concerns. For example, some NGOs have criticized the Polish government for recognizing as free and fair some of Kazakhstan’s elections questioned by OSCE election monitors (Kazakhstan is considered by Polish elites as an important energy partner).21 Similarly, development aid to those countries has included a lower share of democracy assistance projects compared to the share of such projects in Poland’s immediate eastern neighbors.22 At the same time, the more autocratic Russia became after 2000, the more Polish statesmen sought to pull the countries formerly in the “Russian sphere of influence” closer to the democratic West. For instance, Poland’s reaction to what was seen as a Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was to pressure the EU to rein in Russia and to implement the Eastern Partnership for closer cooperation with Georgia and five other post-communist republics in the European neighborhood. Similarly, Polish diplomats have often expressed their preference for “stable, prosperous and democratic Russia”

21 Interview with M. P., October 8, 2008.
22 Interview with M. S., October 11, 2008.
rather than a Russia that clings to “archaic, multi-polar ideas of ‘influence zones.’”

Still, Warsaw has been quite reluctant to express its disapproval of notorious breaches of democracy and human rights by Russia.

Even in Ukraine and Belarus, with which most solidarity has been professed by Polish political elites, democracy promotion has been prioritized below support for Ukrainian and Belarusian independence. Democracy and sovereignty are understood by many Poles to be the two (external and internal) manifestations of a society’s freedom. While external independence is thought to be an assurance that the government can act on the popular will, popular sovereignty is considered to be a guarantee that the state will act on the popular preference for international sovereignty. And although democracy promotion has been intertwined with support for Ukrainian and Belarusian independence, the Polish foreign policy priority in the east has been on the independence of and close relations with Ukraine and Belarus. “We keep supporting democratic movements but we do not want that support to clash with our efforts to improve our relations” is a candid statement by one of the staunchest Polish democracy promoters and a sentiment shared by the left, the center, and the right.

For example, despite the democratic reversal in Ukraine in the early 2000s, Poland continued to work closely with the regime there and even lobbied against Western sanctions against Kiev. Similarly, consecutive Polish governments have attracted accusations of opportunism and appeasement towards Belarus for the sake of

---

24 Democracy Coalition Project, “Poland,” Defending Democracy: A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992–2002 (Democracy Coalition Project Report, 2002). The exception is recent activism by some Polish MEPs who have been outspoken in demanding a tougher approach to Russia, in particular with regard to democracy, civil society and human rights.
maintaining good relations (as well as protecting the Polish minority there). In both cases, Warsaw warned against isolating the regime, which they saw as detrimental to the pro-Western (and therefore pro-democratic) development of those countries. The main concern of Polish diplomats, however, was that “if we do not talk to them, Moscow will.” This contradiction between support for the principle of democracy and support for democracy as a means to independence, stability, and security is yet another illustration that Polish democracy promotion has been a primarily strategic rather than a normative foreign policy commitment.

It should be noted that many Polish political elites, especially the Solidarity graduates, have a personal commitment to democracy and at the individual level have paid much attention to democracy promotion issues for primarily principled reasons. Even at the state level, Poland has on occasion supported democratization abroad without an immediate strategic reason but rather in solidarity with a neighboring country – for example, when Slovakia’s democratic record began worsening in the mid-1990s, Warsaw criticized Mečiar’s autocratic tendencies and after the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia assisted Bratislava in catching up with the first wave EU applicants. Still, for the most part, despite the personal and at times official solidarity that Polish elites have expressed with other democratizing countries in the region,

27 Interview with O. S., March 26, 2009. Consider another example: Poland, which was holding the OSCE Presidency at that time, did not condemn the government of Belarus in 1998 after it had expelled EU diplomats. (Vladimir Bilcik et al., Bigger EU, Wider CFSP, Stronger ESDP? The View from Central Europe (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, April 2002.)
28 Jarabik and Silitski, “Belarus,” in Is the European Union Supporting Democracy in its Neighbourhood?, ed. Richard Youngs (Madrid: FRIDE, 2008), 101–20. The timing of Polish calls for the EU to lift its sanctions against Belarus is also suggestive. For example, after the release of political prisoners in August 2008, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, proposed a lifting of sanctions, on the basis that Cuba had been given a reprieve, so Belarus should be treated similarly. The Polish proposal also coincided with pressure from Russia on the Belarusian leadership to support the Kremlin’s policies towards Georgia, including recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so an opportunity was deemed to have emerged to strengthen the EU orientation of the regime in the face of Russian pressure. Marian Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy,” in Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement, ed. Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (Prague: PASOS, 2008), 189–215.
when such solidarity has come into conflict with Warsaw’s perceived strategic objectives, the strategic imperatives have been most frequently prioritized. Therefore, Polish democracy promotion is best understood as a strategic commitment – a solution to Poland’s post-communist geopolitical security concerns but a solution motivated by Warsaw’s understanding of the benefits of democracy for creating a stable and congenial international environment for Poland as those contributions have been articulated by Polish civil society.

2. Democratization: “Made in Poland”?

What type of democracy has Poland been promoting abroad? And what policy instruments has Warsaw preferred? Is this Polish strategy informed by a set of taken-for-granted institutions, processes, and policy instruments and/or by calculations based on the performance of certain institutions and the effectiveness of particular processes and instruments? Analyses of the origin, rhetoric, and practice of Polish democracy promotion reveal that the Polish democracy promotion approach is best understood as a strategic export of the local experience with democratization as it fits recipient needs.

Poland’s current Minister of Foreign Affairs succinctly summarizes Warsaw’s strategy: “We live in a free, sovereign and democratic Poland. We are members of the European Union and NATO. All of us, therefore, have reason to feel satisfied and secure. No one gave this to us. We alone – though with the help of our friends – achieved this. Having done so, Poland […] has become the standard and model of transformation for our Eastern neighbors.”29 In other words, Polish democracy promotion in the country’s immediate neighborhood and also in the post-communist

---

region in general centers on “encouraging” the “emulation” of Poland’s
democratization and Europeanization by others.\textsuperscript{30}

Warsaw considers Poland’s post-communist experience helpful to others in the
region facing similar transition objectives. Warsaw’s strategy is about exporting a
process; it is about encouraging and supporting others to “travel the Polish path.”\textsuperscript{31}
However, it is not that Poland’s domestic experiences inform a taken-for-granted-
meaning of democratization. Rather, as the quotation above illustrates, this export is
offered to others because democratization “worked so well” for Poland in creating
security and prosperity in the country.\textsuperscript{32} Polish democracy promotion is thus based on
a strategic calculation about the effectiveness of the Polish experience and therefore its
“usefulness” to others. As the promotional materials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) explain, “Poland has a lot to offer to its closer and further neighbors. This
includes, above all, experiences from its successful political transformation, which are
extremely useful for the countries of our region.”\textsuperscript{33}

Still, Warsaw recognizes the specific needs of recipients with different regime
types. It has adopted different approaches to supporting the democratization of
autocracies and to improving the quality of democracy in countries in transition. The
comparison of Poland’s approach in Ukraine to its approach in Belarus document this
difference well.

\textbf{2.1. Warsaw’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Ukraine}

Since Ukraine’s independence in 1991, close Polish-Ukrainian relations were
seen as a means to and mostly conditioned on Ukraine’s development into a stable and


\textsuperscript{31} Statement by Ivan Drach, the leader of the Ukrainian Rukh (Parliament). Cited in Snyder, \textit{The Reconstruction of Nations}, 263.

\textsuperscript{32} Interview with M. M., October 17, 2008; interview with G. B., October 24, 2008.

\textsuperscript{33} PolishAid promotional materials.
independent liberal democracy. Throughout the 1990s, the emphasis of Polish
democracy promotion in Ukraine was on the creation and extension of the political
consultation mechanisms, which were meant to not only facilitate the cooperation
between Poland and Ukraine but also to exercise a democratization pull on Ukraine.
As Kiev embarked on reforms in the mid-1990s, embraced EU integration as a
strategic goal, and softened its negative stance on NATO, the Polish-Ukrainian
Presidential Consultative Committee, established in 1993, became an especially active
forum. Three additional forums were also created: a Ukrainian-Polish Forum for the
two countries’ parliamentarians; a Polish-Ukrainian Social Forum for non-
governmental actors from the two nations; and a Polish-Ukrainian Self-Government
Forum that links local governments from the two neighbors. In addition, a Polish-
Ukrainian European Conference began work as a forum for exchanging European
integration experience. Moreover, Poland actively worked to embed Ukraine into the
Euro-Atlantic international organizations, in which Warsaw was a member. Poland
lobbied successfully for Ukrainian admission into the Council of Europe in 1995 and
to the Central European Initiative in 1996 and actively supported a Ukraine-NATO
partnership. 34

By the end of the 1990s, Poland was already providing democracy assistance
to Ukraine. The Polish government began implementing “twinning” consultancy and
training programs for the central Ukrainian institutions responsible for the structural
transformation and European integration of Ukraine. 35 In addition, a trilateral
governmental Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative was born to fund the
sharing of “best practices” from Poland’s “successful transition” to a “liberal, market-
oriented democracy” with Ukraine. 36 In the late 1990s, the MFA development

---

34 Interview with L. A., October 20, 2008.
35 Ryszard Zieba, “The ‘Strategic Partnership’ between Poland and Ukraine,” Polish Foreign Affairs
36 PAUCI (Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation) website, http://www.pauci.org/en/about/history/
assistance program was created and immediately started supporting Ukraine’s transition and the activities of the Polish non-governmental organizations supporting the democratization of Ukraine.37

After Poland concluded accession negotiations with the EU in 2002, the EU became another ‘‘ ‘tool’ for Polish Eastern policy.’’38 Poland stepped up its efforts to intensify the EU-Ukraine cooperation and to eventually lock Kiev into this union of European democracies. Poland began campaigning for “strengthening and invigorating EU cooperation with its neighbors, in particular the Eastern ones, through the establishment of a [special] Eastern Dimension of the EU policy.”39 In co-operation with Polish NGOs, the Polish foreign ministry prepared a proposal for such a dimension; it would cover Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia, but only the first three countries would be perceived as prospective EU members. Recognizing that it needs allies at the EU level, Poland successfully argued that these eastern neighbors should be a common priority for all the Visegrad countries, which consequently sponsored the development of an “Eastern Dimension” proposal.40 The European Neighborhood Policy (developed without consultation with the Eastern European applicants and) launched in 2003, however, targeted both the east and the south. Looking for an influential ally within the EU, Poland approached Germany, which had active (especially economic) interests in Ukraine. In October 2004, Poland and Germany presented a joint proposal for a new and enhanced agreement between the

37 Interview with T. K., March 24, 2009.
40 The proposal (in the form of a non-paper or a discussion paper) was developed by 4 Visegrad think tanks, close to their governments. It contained several concrete proposals including a membership perspective for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, the upgrading of existing partnership and cooperation agreements to the standard EU association agreements, and the establishment of a European Democracy Fund to manage the implementation of NGO projects in the east. Interview with J. M., November 27, 2008.
EU and Ukraine. However, in exchange for its support, the German side struck down the membership prospective the proposal offered to Ukraine.\textsuperscript{41}

The Polish-German proposal was publicized in the midst of a momentous presidential campaign in Ukraine to replace the outgoing president whose regime had grown corrupt and violent and suppressed the media and the political opposition. The Polish elites recognized that this succession crisis presented a historic opportunity to pull Ukraine in a pro-democratic and pro-Western direction. Polish politicians (parliamentarians, the MFA, and some Polish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) appealed to the Ukrainian authorities to abide by all democratic standards for the election and to the EU to express “support for democratic Ukraine’s European aspirations.”\textsuperscript{42} When domestic and international observers reported gross election irregularities, the Ukrainian opposition campaign mobilized hundreds of thousands to protest. Both the opposition leader and the outgoing Ukrainian president invited the Polish president to mediate the conflict in Kiev. The Polish President, who had participated in the 1989 Polish roundtable, developed a roundtable plan for Ukraine but, wanting to act “on behalf of Europe,” he sought to involve both the Lithuanian President and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.\textsuperscript{43} The roundtable committed to a rerun of the election and ended the crisis while avoiding the use of force and working within Ukrainian law. The second runoff was a much more fair election, which sealed the victory of the opposition. The mediators’ engagement helped launch, sustain, and speed up the negotiating process while keeping it peaceful. By many accounts, the Polish President made the most significant

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with P. W., October 16, 2010.
\textsuperscript{42} During the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the European Parliament played an exceptionally strong role, largely thanks to the activity of the representatives of Poland (and of other new member states). The European Parliament adopted three resolutions on the situation in the country and sent in three delegations. Centre for Eastern Studies, \textit{The Orange Ribbon: A Calendar of the Political Crisis in Ukraine, Autumn 2004} (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2005).
\textsuperscript{43} Centre for Eastern Studies, \textit{The Orange Ribbon}. 

161
contributions of the international mediators and was critical in securing EU participation in the mediation. [For a more detailed account of Poland’s involvement in this so-called Ukrainian Orange (Electoral) Revolution, see Box 4.1.]

**Box 4.1. Polish Involvement in the Orange Revolution**

Competing to replace the outgoing president Leonid Kuchma in the 2006 presidential elections in Ukraine were his anointed pro-Russian successor, Victor Yanukovych, and the pro-Western opposition leader, Victor Yushchenko. The Ukrainian regime had grown corrupt and violent in suppressing the media and the opposition; the government mobilized the state administrative resources to support Yanukovych and poisoned Yushchenko, who almost died.

The Polish elites recognized the democratization opportunity presented by this election. Before the election, the Polish political and civic elites appealed publicly to the Ukrainian authorities to abide by all democratic standards for the upcoming election. The Sejm offered to share Poland’s experience in organizing and conducting elections, while a few Polish NGOs sent election observers to Ukraine. In addition, Polish diplomats and Polish MEPs worked to keep European leaders informed and involved. After the first round of the presidential election on October 31, 2004, Polish politicians continued to insist and to pressure Western leaders to insist that the Ukrainian authorities refrain from electoral manipulations. The Polish MFA convinced the European Council to appeal to Ukraine for a free and fair second round of the election. Polish MEPs also worked toward a European Parliament (EP) resolution that expressed “support for democratic Ukraine’s European aspirations.” They only received a letter to that effect from the leadership of the European People’s Party, while the European Parliament resolution, passed in November 2004, only “recognized” these aspirations.

On the eve of the runoff election, Yushchenko expressed publicly his concerns that the election would be fixed and asked Poland to “speak out on behalf of democracy in Ukraine.” The Polish Prime Minister sent a delegation to Ukraine, and the Polish MFA, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, went to Kiev to meet with both camps in his capacity as the Chairman of the Council of Europe. In the meantime, Polish NGOs and students around the country began organizing to express “solidarity for a democratic Ukraine” and to pressure the Polish government to remain actively involved. Students in Warsaw began a series of pickets in front of the Ukrainian embassy that would continue until the resolution of the crisis in Ukraine.

---

44 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007.
As polling came to a close for the second round of the election on November 21, 2004, domestic and international observers reported gross election irregularities. The Yushchenko campaign quickly mobilized its supporters to protest. This political crisis posed the threat of precipitating a street confrontation between the authorities and the opposition. Russian President, Vladimir Putin, who had visited Ukraine on the eve of the first and second ballots to campaign on Yanukovych’s behalf, congratulated him on his victory. Western capitals began to react publicly, too, with the US and the EU denouncing the results. Polish MEPs from the EP election observation mission co-edited many of the EP’s statements about the election to ensure “that sufficiently firm language” was used. The Polish MFA, Prime Minister, and the Polish President also expressed concern about the course of the election and its implications for the “Euro-Atlantic” aspirations of Ukraine. Yushchenko invited former Polish president Lech Walesa and current Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski to Kiev to help. On the second day after the second round, Kuchma also called the Polish President and “asked for help.” Kwasniewski, who had participated in the 1989 Polish roundtable, had the MFA develop a roundtable plan for Ukraine and dispatch a team of Polish experts to talk to local actors and prepare the government-opposition talks. However, the Polish president did not want Polish involvement to be interpreted as Polish imperialism or for the crisis to turn into a Polish-Russian dispute. Kwasniewski invited Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus to help mediate and sought to involve the European Union, “a very important institution” that most Ukrainian political elites “agreed they would like to be a part of.” Kwasniewski urged the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to join the mediation, ensuring that it had sufficient EU backing.

The three meetings of the roundtable took place amidst growing protests throughout Ukraine. Tens of thousands of Poles also went to the Polish streets “in solidarity with Ukrainians” and in favor of Polish diplomatic activity in Ukraine. Organized by Polish NGOs or on their own, a lot of Poles crossed the border to participate in Ukrainian demonstrations and collected supplies to send to the Ukrainian demonstrators. Prominent Polish political leaders, including Lech Walesa, also went to Kiev to support the political agenda championed by “orange” opposition. At the negotiation table, Kwasniewski insisted on a rerun of the second round, while avoiding the use of force and working within Ukrainian law. In the end, the roundtable committed to a rerun of the election, which ended the crisis.

In preparation for the rerun, Polish civic groups sent more than 3,000 election observers to Ukraine. The second runoff on December 26, 2004 was a much more fair election and sealed the victory of the opposition. Immediately after Yushchenko was declared the winner, some Polish MEPs called upon European and American donors to “effectively support Ukrainian democracy.” Additionally, Warsaw organized a council at the Polish MFA with Yushchenko’s team to develop a package of proposals concerning Ukraine’s relations with the US, EU, and NATO.
The Orange Revolution was a critical juncture in Ukraine’s post-communist transition. It pushed the country in a decidedly more democratic direction and closer to the West. In that, the intervention of Polish political and civic elites and regular citizens alike played an important role. While non-state actors and some politicians were more openly supportive of the pro-democratic and pro-Western Orange forces, Polish diplomats sought to act “on behalf of Europe” and to ensure adherence to democratic procedures.

After the 2004 democratic breakthrough in Ukraine, Warsaw’s democracy promotion efforts increasingly focused on supporting the European integration of Ukraine. Warsaw not only lobbied the EU for a membership prospective for Kiev but also supported Ukraine in assuming the obligations of EU membership by means of assistance, pressure, and persuasion. Frequent contacts between Ukrainian and Polish officials on different levels intensified. Poland enhanced its bilateral democracy assistance, as well. The government continued to increase the funding for Polish NGOs working in Ukraine and supported numerous projects. They mostly targeted civil society, youth, and local governments but as those actors matured over time, PolishAid projects increasingly focused on supporting Ukraine’s integration into the EU. [For a summary of the evolution of the distribution of Polish assistance to Ukraine by sector, see Table 4.1.] Many central and local state agencies also implemented various projects in Ukraine, including offering expert advice to the Ukrainian parliament, providing internships and training for local government officials, contributing judicial reforms, and enhancing the role of unions in economic policymaking. In addition, in 2006 the Prime Minister set up a special Ukraine team within the Polish Committee (Ministry) of European Integration. By supplying advice and

---

47 Interview with M. S., October 13, 2008.
trainings, the unit has been sharing the Polish experience of EU integration with Ukrainian cabinet ministers and mid-level officials as well as local governments.48

Table 4.1. PolishAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance to Ukraine by Targeted Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine for a Particular Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Process</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governing Institutions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Groups</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unorganized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educators</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Public</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Data from author calculations.

In addition, Polish elites recognized that Poland’s role during the Orange Revolution strengthened its position in the European Union and enhanced the credibility of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Moreover, Warsaw believed that the Orange Revolution invalidated the stereotype of the EU’s eastern neighbors being unable to meet Western standards in the fields of democracy and

---

48 The Unit was formalized in 2008, but there was an informal team running such programs for 1–2 years beforehand. The unit now also runs a few programs specializing in agriculture – the least political and most tangible benefits, which may be necessary because integration is a slow gradual process of low-level synchronization of standards. Interview with A. K., October 23, 2008.
human rights. Poland used all diplomatic channels (MFA participation in the European Council; Polish representatives to the European Parliament; bilateral and multilateral meetings between Polish and European diplomats) to push the EU to define clear conditions and precise dates for beginning accession negotiations with Ukraine. In January 2005, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in which it called upon the European Council and the European Commission to redefine the policy towards Ukraine, reminding these institutions that the Union should remain open to all European countries that meet the relevant membership criteria and requirements, including Ukraine. However, the EU was not yet ready to commit to Ukraine. Moreover, the increasingly unstable political situation in Ukraine, as well as its ambivalence towards Europe, made it even more difficult for Poland to promote its eastern neighbor in the EU. Finally, the 2004 enlargement of the Union focused its attention on internal reforms meant to deepen democracy and institutional effectiveness at the supra-national level. Thus, after 2005-2006, Poland increasingly focused on keeping the Ukrainian question on the EU agenda and on achieving beneficial provisions in the Ukraine-EU agreement, which was scheduled to be signed in 2008.

In preparation for the negotiations of the 2008 EU-Ukraine agreement, Warsaw unveiled The Eastern Partnership – an initiative “designed to facilitate the [gradual] approximation and integration of six Eastern European countries with the European

---

49 Interview with J. S.-W., February 25, 2009.
50 Poland argued that a new cooperation agreement be signed to reflect the new situation in Ukraine to resemble the association agreements signed with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and reiterate “European prospects” for Ukraine. Rotfeld, “On Poland’s Foreign Policy.”
51 Yushchenko’s administration did not launch the expected ambitious reforms and did not undertake consistent actions towards a rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic structures. Instead, Ukrainians focused on restoring regular relations with Russia following the 2006 January gas crisis. After the post-election political chaos in the country, an “anti-crisis coalition” was led by Yanukovych, who allowed Ukraine’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures to vanish in the background.
Union.” Poland partnered with Sweden, which was known for its interest in democracy promotion and in Eastern Europe. In May 2008, Warsaw and Stockholm presented a joint proposal to the EU. The partnership covered Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and featured regional and bilateral cooperation. The Georgian-Russian war in August 2008 accelerated the EU’s consideration of the Eastern Partnership. Pressured by some of the Eastern European EU member states, including Poland, the EU moved to pull those countries closer to the West to enhance stability in the region. The Eastern Partnership was approved in March 2009 and launched in May 2009.

### 2.2. Warsaw’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Belarus

Initially, Polish democracy promotion in Belarus was similar to the Polish policies towards Ukraine in that Warsaw focused on the creation of bilateral political consultation mechanisms and on supporting the embedding of Belarus in cooperation schemes within regional (European) institutions, such as the Council of Europe, OSCE, and the EU. However, such Polish efforts were undermined by the tenuous appeal within Belarus for Belarusian independence and Belarusian affiliation with the West.

In 1994, Alexander Lukashenko was elected president of Belarus. He began a “dictatorship of integration with Russia.” Polish relations with Belarus started progressively deteriorating, limiting Warsaw’s democracy promotion options and impact. In 1996, Lukashenko manipulated a referendum to reform the constitution to

---

53 Interview with K. R., March 6, 2009.
55 Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations.*
expand his powers. The Polish elites unanimously condemned Lukashenko’s actions, downgraded diplomatic relations with Minsk, and tried, unsuccessfully, to establish a common regional policy toward supporting democratization in Belarus with Ukraine and Lithuania.56 Hoping to restore some degree of dialogue within the country, Poland made several attempts to organize a roundtable in Belarus to bring the government and opposition together with the assistance of Polish mediators.57 Recognizing that it lacked the close contacts necessary to exert peer pressure and to persuade Minsk to commit to democratization, Warsaw reoriented its policy to actively engage the Belarusian political and civic opposition. Warsaw sponsored informal contacts between the Belarusian opposition and Polish NGOs led by former Solidarity activists. Moreover, the Polish parliament offered even greater unambiguous and public support to the Belarusian opposition politicians and social activists.58 Polish deputies did not suspend inter-parliamentary contacts and hosted numerous visits by Belarusian parliamentarians to demonstrate the benefits of and to socialize them in the practices of democracy. In addition, Polish parliamentarians joined Polish NGOs working in Belarus in supporting and training political leaders, civil society, and journalists.59

The 2001 presidential election in Belarus gave Warsaw the opportunity to express publicly and openly its support for the Belarusian democratic opposition.60 Lukashenko’s challenger was welcomed in Poland, signaling Warsaw’s support for the pro-reform and pro-Western presidential candidate. Warsaw also informally supported the work of some Polish NGOs, which were helping to train and organize the

56 Relations began to be coordinated at the level of under-secretary of state and to be limited to resolving the challenges resulting from the fact that the two countries are neighbors (mainly economic, cultural and cross-border issues). Interview with R. D., October 19, 20088.
57 Bronislaw Geremek, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, “Main Lines of Polish Foreign Policy,” Expose to the Diet of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw, March 5, 1998.
58 Balmaceda, Clem, and Tarlow, Independent Belarus.
59 Ibid.
60 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008.
Belarusian opposition, which was preparing an electoral revolution. The opposition, however, was unsuccessful in defeating Lukashenko. Polish elites began worrying that while the isolation of Belarus had not harmed Lukashenko, it had slowed down the development of parties and democratic NGOs in Belarus. After 2001, Polish foreign policy and democracy promotion focused on preventing the complete isolation of Belarus, while more actively supporting the Belarusian opposition directly and indirectly through Polish NGOs.

After the 1996 referendum, most Western countries had downgraded their contacts with Minsk and later imposed travel bans on the high-ranking Belarusian officials who were directly implicated in the political repression wave of 1999. Moreover, the EU suspended the majority of its funding for Belarus, except for a few humanitarian and democracy promotion programs. The referendum had also cost Belarus the ratification of its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and the country’s membership in the Council of Europe. At the turn of the century, the OSCE was the only European international organization that was working with Minsk; its mission in Belarus was tasked by the West with supporting a three-way dialogue among the regime, its opposition, and the international community. Poland too sought to engage the Lukashenko regime in limited, unofficial, and often non-political ways. While Polish elites at various levels continued to criticize the autocratic practices in Belarus and to support the sanctions against top Belarusian officials, the Polish elites

---

61 The German OSCE Mission Chief, Hans-Georg Wieck, worked closely with the US Ambassador, Michael Kozak, to help the Belarusian opposition emulate the Serbian electoral revolution of 2000. The US funded key organizers of the electoral revolutions in Serbia and Slovakia to share their experience and train the Belarusian opposition. In addition, the OSCE mission in Belarus offered seminars, conferences, and training for both government and state institutions as well as parties and associations outside the government framework. In the end, the opposition could not mobilize enough public support to protest the electoral fraud it claimed Lukashenko had organized. http://www.diplomatshandbook.org/

also tried to convince political elites in Belarus that “democracy is well worthwhile.”

Warsaw also made efforts to point out to Minsk that there are “forms and areas of co-operation [with the EU such as economy and culture] that can be developed in the present political reality in Belarus.” In attempting to convince Belarus to begin working with the EU, Polish elites were happy to point to the many benefits of Poland’s own integration with the EU. At the same time, in many bilateral and multilateral meetings with other European officials, Polish statesmen argued that the EU should “build a dialogue with Belarus so as to overcome its isolation in the European arena and thereby stimulate the development of democracy and the civil society in that country.” Accordingly, Belarus was included in the 2002 Polish proposal for a special Eastern Dimension of the EU policy.

After Minsk forced the closure of the OSCE mission in Belarus in 2002 (because of the OSCE’s support to the opposition around the 2001 presidential elections), the EU proposed a scheme for a step-by-step normalization of relations with Minsk. Each further step in the process was conditional on substantial improvements in the protection of democratic principles and human rights in Belarus. However, the Union excluded the country from the European Neighborhood Policy in 2003. And after Lukashenko orchestrated a referendum abolishing the term limit of the presidency in 2004, the EU strengthened its sanctions against Belarus by freezing the assets of key political figures in Minsk. Still, given the insistence of a number of new

64 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of Poland, and Mikhail Khvastov, Foreign Minister of Belarus (declaration after an unofficial meeting held in Bialystok, March 10, 2002); Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, statement at a meeting with journalists to Valdas Adamkus, President of the Republic of Lithuania, during a working visit to Poland, Warsaw, January 3, 2003.
member states (mostly Lithuania, but also Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic) after 2004, the EU refashioned and reinforced its existing policy into a two-pronged approach, which mirrored the approach of these Eastern European countries towards Belarus: 1) trying to work with Belarusian bureaucrats through on-going aid programs with approval from Minsk while still being critical of the regime’s undemocratic policies, and 2) widening contacts with opposition figures and assisting civil society development through aid when government approval is not required.66

The efforts of the representatives of the Polish government at the EU level were supported by the work of the Polish MEPs. They have been especially active in keeping the issue of Belarus on the EU agenda and making sure that the voices of the Belarusian opposition and civil society are heard in Brussels. Polish MEPs have also been crucial in organizing the EP to not only respond to violations of democratic procedures and human rights by Minsk but also to lending support and legitimacy to the opposition. For instance, since 2004 the EP has passed more resolutions on Belarus than on any other country. And another example: the prestigious Sakharov (Human Rights) Prize was bestowed to Belarusian nationals twice: in 2004 to the Belarusian Association of Journalists and in 2006 to the opposition candidate in the presidential elections. Finally, with their Eastern European colleagues, Polish MEPs, NGOs, and diplomats have successfully steered the reforms of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights to include supporting the Belarusian opposition and to increase aid to Belarus.67

---

66 Jarabik and Silitski, “Belarus.”
67 The EU was pressed by member states and NGOs to increase aid from €10 million annually to around €12 million for 2005 and 2006. The extra funding was made available through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and divided between the needs of the population and direct support to democratization and civil society at 70 to 30 percent. Interview with K. P., March 27, 2008.
Table 4.2. PolishAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance to Belarus by Targeted Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Belarus and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All PolishAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Belarus for a Particular Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Process</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unorganized</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educators</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Public</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from author calculations.

The Polish democracy promotion efforts at the EU level became even more important after 2005 when an open diplomatic conflict erupted around Lukashenko’s efforts to subordinate the organization of the Polish minority in Belarus and the Polish ambassador was recalled to Warsaw for 2 years.68 Polish political and civic elites mobilized to strengthen the political and civic opposition in Belarus in time for the 2006 presidential elections. On multiple occasions, Polish elites welcomed Lukashenko’s challenger and introduced him to leaders and high-level politicians in

68 Interview with R. D., October 19, 2008.
several other European capitals. The Polish government also wanted to assure “those who would like to become involved in opposition activity, that in the case of being repressed by the authorities they will not be left without help.” The Polish MFA set up a scholarship program to fund up annually to 300 (politically active) Belarusian students to attend Polish universities while the Polish Prime Minister launched a traineeship for young working Belarusians to learn “how democracy functions in action.” The Polish government also decided to “temporarily employ” some people who had lost their jobs in Belarus for political reasons. In addition, Warsaw continued supporting Polish NGOs training the opposition and sending election observation missions to Belarus. Lastly, Polish diplomats and MEPs, together with their Lithuanian counterparts, played an instrumental role in uniting the EU to condemn the conduct witnessed in the 2006 presidential election. However, the second electoral revolution attempt in Belarus failed, as well.

Polish elites recognized that the Belarusian opposition was not only weak and fragmented but also isolated from Belarusian society. After 2006, Warsaw continued to work against the isolation of the country and refashioned and reinforced its assistance to target not just Belarusian NGOs but also to reach out to Belarusian society more systematically. Poland increased its bilateral assistance to Belarus and in 2007, Belarus became the single largest recipient of Polish MFA-funded assistance projects. [For a summary of the evolution of the distribution of Polish assistance to Belarus by sector, see Table 4.2.] Warsaw launched two state-run media projects – “Radio Racyja” and the “Belsat” TV channel for Belarus – to provide alternatives to the official line in Belarus. Moreover, PolishAid continued to fund Polish NGOs

69 Interview with M. J., October 27, 2008.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
developing the institutional capacity of Belarusian civil society, independent media, and alternative leaders. At the insistence of Polish (and other Eastern European) officials, the EU also increased its support for civil society and people-to-people contacts with Belarus. The Union also launched a campaign to inform Belarusians “What the European Union Could Bring to Belarus” and outlined proposals for economic, educational, environmental, and humanitarian cooperation and aid, conditioned on the fulfillment of twelve demands for improvements in the protection of democratic principles and human rights in Belarus. At the same time, the EU expanded and enlarged the targeted sanctions imposed after the 2004 referendum. While Poland supported the sanctions, it opposed the EU decision to withdraw its Generalized System of Preferences for Belarusian goods. The withdrawal coincided with the energy conflict between Belarus and Russia and Lukashenko’s subsequent turn to the West. Poland sought to seize the moment and included Belarus in its Eastern Partnership proposal. The Russian-Georgian war in the summer of 2008 pushed the EU to accept the few signs of liberalization in Belarus – the release of political prisoners and greater freedom of assembly and press in the fall of 2008 – to admit Belarus into the Eastern Partnership.

2.3. The Origins of Warsaw’s Democracy Promotion Approach

Warsaw has not adopted the kind of “cookie-cutter” or “one-size-fits-all” approach to democracy promotion that is often ascribed to Western donors exporting a taken-for-granted set of domestic institutions. Instead, Poland exported its transition

73 These economic sanctions were opposed by those with close economic ties with Belarus, including Poland, Lithuania, Latvia (all of which voted against), and the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both of which abstained).
74 On the US, see Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), and on the EU, see Tanja Borzel and Thomas Risse, “One Size Fits All! EU Policies for the Promotion of Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law” (paper prepared for the Workshop on Democracy Promotion, Stanford University, 2004).
experience while also tailoring its approach to the democratization needs of the target. [For a summary of Warsaw’s approaches to democracy promotion in Ukraine and in Belarus, see Table 4.3.] Such effectiveness considerations reveal that the Polish approach to democracy promotion is based on strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than normatively appropriateness) of Warsaw’s strategies in different recipient countries.

Table 4.3. Polish Democracy Promotion Approach According to Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instruments &amp; Sectors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ukraine (Hybrid/Democracy)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diplomacy</strong>: Governing Institutions &gt; Civil Society &gt; Political Process</td>
<td><strong>Assistance</strong>: Civil Society &gt; Political Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cooperation networks for state actors but also some for civil society</td>
<td>• for the civic and political opposition and later for society in general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assistance</strong>: Governing Institutions &gt; Civil Society &gt; Political Process</td>
<td><strong>Diplomacy</strong>: Political Process &gt; Governing Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• for state actors and for civil society</td>
<td>• “critical dialogue” with regime and support for the opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanctions</strong>: Governing Institutions</td>
<td><strong>Sanctions</strong>: Governing Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• downgraded ties and sanctions against key regime officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarize, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Polish elites have been working to create a dense institutional network of cooperation to induct various Ukrainian state officials and some civic actors into the practices and to demonstrate to them the benefits of democracy, in addition to exerting peer pressure and persuading these Ukrainian leaders to keep up the democratization reforms. Such consultation and cooperation mechanisms involved primarily state actors but included civil society as

---

* Warsaw has provided strong support for the EU integration efforts of Ukraine and by its very nature this process is very state-centric; however, close to half of the rest of the Polish assistance projects implemented in Ukraine have also focused on the Ukrainian state by providing support for administrative and local government reforms in the country. Therefore, Polish democracy assistance to Ukraine is most accurately described as privileging the state over society.*
well. Moreover, these networks were not just bilateral in nature. Poland has sought to
lock Ukraine in the club of liberal democracies in Europe by lobbying for the
country’s membership in various regional international organizations, especially the
EU. If diplomacy has been Poland’s most preferred democracy promotion instrument,
assistance has been the second most used one. By the late 1990s, the Polish state also
began increasingly funding Polish NGOs working in Ukraine and implementing its
own programs to share the lessons of the Polish transition and European accession
process with Kiev.

In autocratic Belarus, Polish democracy promotion efforts have relied most
heavily on technical and some financial assistance to the political and civil opposition
to Lukashenko’s regime. Recognizing the weakness of these dissidents, Warsaw has
also sought and encouraged others to reach out to and engage Belarusian society in
general. At the same time, Poland has been one of the key proponents of “critical
dialogue” with Lukashenko – criticizing the regime without isolating it while also
morally and politically supporting the democratic opposition. With diplomacy being
the second most used democracy promotion policy instrument, conditionality was the
third – Poland has, somewhat reluctantly, participated in the international sanction
against Belarus.

Thus, in Belarus, Warsaw focused on sharing the lessons learned during the
pre-1989 Polish struggle against communism; in Ukraine, Poland sought to transfer
mostly the post-1989 experience of developing the institutions and actors that make
and guarantee a democracy. Some of the exported practices have been Polish
“democratization inventions.” For example, recognizing the success of the Polish 1989
roundtable in bringing together the illiberal regime and its opposition to agree to
commit to democratization, Polish policy makers have over the years offered to help
organize several roundtables to precipitate democratic breakthroughs abroad; some of
these offers were never accepted (Belarus in the late 1990s), but where Polish mediation was welcomed, it has met great success in pushing the recipient in a decidedly more democratic direction (Ukraine in 2004).

However, sometimes the practices shared abroad have also included some of the Western imports in Poland from the 1990s when the country was itself still mostly a target of democracy promotion. For example, a lot of the political cooperation forums and the twinning assistance programs that Warsaw has used to support the democratization of Ukraine took a page from Poland’s post-1989 inclusion in an array of overlapping Western (and predominantly European) multilateral institutions and their various cooperation schemes and assistance programs. Another example is the concept of a “critical dialogue” with an autocracy, which was the West’s (especially the US’) approach to pre-1989 Poland and to the Soviet Union in general. Thus, to the extent that the Polish transition successes are a product of domestic and external efforts (as the MFA quote above suggests), Warsaw’s approach also refracts and integrates the democracy promotion approaches of the Western donors from both sides of the Atlantic working in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

3. Conclusion

The normative commitment of the former Solidarity activists to the spread of democracy in the post-communist region became the foundation of not just non-governmental but also governmental democracy promotion. Polish civil society groups sought to translate their international solidarity into foreign policy. To do so the civic activists appealed to the benefits of democracy for resolving the main Polish foreign policy challenges centered on the question of Poland’s place in Europe. It is those domestically negotiated benefits of having certain international partners be

---

75 Interview with A. B., October 18, 2008.
democracies that underlie the logic of Polish democracy promotion. Accordingly, Polish democracy promotion has been a strategic response to Warsaw’s post-communist geopolitical security concerns about deterring Russian aggression and creating reliable partners in the Polish eastern neighborhood. As a result, every Polish government since 1989 has supported – at least tacitly if not also actively – the development of free (independent and democratic) Ukraine and Belarus and has favored the general democratization of the post-communist region.

Warsaw’s democracy promotion strategy has been the strategic export of what are understood to be the successes of the Polish transition. It has been about exporting a process – the Polish path to market democracy, which is believed to have worked very well for Poland and to therefore be useful to other countries in the post-communist region. With autocracies, such as Belarus, Poland has focused on sharing its pre-1989 experience and the lessons learnt during the Solidarity struggle against the Polish military dictatorship from 1981-1989. With hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine, Warsaw has sought to transfer mostly its post-1989 experience of developing the institutions and actors that make and guarantee a democracy. Moreover, since a variety of American and European democracy promoters supported the Polish transition, the lessons from it also borrow some of the lessons of these most effective Western democracy promotion efforts.
CHAPTER 5:
BRATISLAVA PROMOTES DEMOCRACY IN THE EAST AND SOUTHEAST

Having analyzed the motivations and approaches of Polish official democracy promotion, this dissertation proceeds by examining why and how Bratislava has championed democratization in the neighborhood. Like chapter 4, this chapter too uses the observable implications of the two types of accounts of democracy promotion – democracy promotion as a strategic commitment and democracy promotion as a normative commitment – to uncover the motivations and approaches to Bratislava’s support for democracy abroad. The argument is that the civic activists who prepared the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia sought to involve the Slovak state in supporting the democratization of the eastern but especially the southeastern neighborhood as a solution to the political and economic destabilization in these European regions. Moreover, the chapter further argues that Bratislava’s democracy promotion approach is a strategic export of the local experience with democratization, which differed according to the recipient regime type and included some of the best practices of the Western actors that supported the Slovak transition.

1. Democracy Promotion Motivations

Is Slovak official democracy promotion a means to creating a favorable international environment premised on the donor’s understanding of the benefits of having democratic international partners? And/Or is Slovak official democracy promotion a principled commitment that stems from the understanding of democracy as an emerging international norm? Using the observable implications of these two types of accounts, this section examines how Bratislava’s motivations are reflected in
the origin, rhetoric, and practice of Slovak official democracy promotion. All three analyses suggest that Slovakia’s commitment to supporting democracy abroad is best understood as a strategic one.

### 1.1. The Origins of Slovak Democracy Promotion

How was democracy promotion incorporated into Slovak foreign policy? Did Slovak foreign policy-makers discover some benefits of having democratic partners and/or were they compelled by an emerging international norm of a universal right to democracy? The origins of Slovak democracy promotion can be found in the efforts of the Slovak civic activists who prepared the democratic breakthrough in the country to persuade Bratislava to build on their democracy promotion initiatives as a way to stabilize the neighborhood, thus creating a favorable international environment for Slovakia and also earning Slovak membership in the EU and NATO.

Slovakia’s road to joining the democratic (and Euro-Atlantic) community was longer and more full of twists and turns than the journeys of the other Visegrad countries. After the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Slovakia’s transition was complicated by Meciar’s nationalist populism and lack of tolerance for democratic practices. Civil society began mobilizing to fight the “temptations of authoritarian rule.”¹ The OK 98 campaign for “open nonpartisan public initiative, designed to help ensure free and fair elections” coupled with Euro-Atlantic carrots (membership prospective) and sticks (pressure to reform) pushed Slovakia in a decidedly democratic and pro-Western direction.² The success of the campaign did not just lead to turnover in power; it also created a popular mandate for a radical break with the previous illiberal regime.

---

² Forbrig and Demes, *Reclaiming Democracy*. The OK 98 campaign was awarded a prestigious Democracy and Governance Award by USAID in 1999.
Many OK 98 activists felt “a duty to share their experience” with other pro-democratic forces in Eastern Europe. In 1999 these Slovak civic leaders were already assisting activists preparing for the presidential elections in Ukraine and Belarus scheduled for the same year and for the parliamentary elections in Serbia and in Croatia scheduled for 2000. Given the “special ties” between Slovakia and Serbia, the democratic commitments and activism of the Slovak political figures interested and working in Serbia, and the democratization challenges in Serbia – one of the most illiberal and war-torn countries in the post-communist region, the Slovak NGOs working with the opposition groups in Serbia approached their former political OK 98 allies who were now in power in Bratislava. The civic democracy promoters pointed to the potential of the OK 98 civic campaign to serve as a model for defeating illiberal incumbents reigning over unstable “electoral democracies” throughout the neighborhood.

The Slovak government quickly joined forces with the Slovak civic democracy promoters because their arguments resonated with political realities perceived as important in Slovakia. After gaining independence, post-communist Slovakia found itself a vulnerable country faced with the numerous and complex challenges of a quadruple transition: establishing a democratic polity, setting up a market economy, building state institutions (including a modern defense and foreign policy apparatus), and defining priorities and strategies for participating in international relations.

---

3 Interview with P. D., November 26, 2008. Also, several foreign parliamentary delegations showed interest in visits to Slovakia during 1999 and 2000.
4 The vote in Belarus was organized by the underground and eventually canceled, the elections in Ukraine were fraudulent and reaffirmed the status quo, but the ones in Croatia provided an opportunity for regime change since they followed the death of the long-serving Croatian dictator, Franjo Tudjman. The relationship that formed between the nations in the Austro-Hungarian Empire underpinned their continuing cooperation through the Small Entente and then the communist era “special ties” between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where the Slovak minorities enjoyed “a prestigious position.” Slovak political elites have come to consider the Western Balkans countries “important partners” to Slovakia and Serbia – the “closest” especially after the late 1990s. Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008.
6 Interview with E. K., November 28, 2008.
7 Interview with E. K., November 28, 2008.
Slovakia’s transition was complicated by the new regime’s nationalist populism and lack of tolerance for democratic practices, which also strained Bratislava’s relations with the West. Security-wise, Slovakia found itself a young state in the neighborhood of the unstable and failing European fringes. Economically, as “a little country with economy deeply depending on its ability to export and with a long-term negative trade balance,” Slovakia was in a need of access to markets. Thus, 1998 democratic breakthrough in Slovakia was also a foreign policy critical juncture for the country, which committed to Euro-Atlantic integration to address its security and economic concerns as much as to acquire a new “civilizational” democratic home in the international system in the long run.

In this context, democracy promotion emerged as a response to the security threats Bratislava identified but a response that was very much in line with the broader foreign policy goals of Slovakia. Since democratization (and EU integration) were the Slovak solution to nationalist authoritarianism, Bratislava saw it in its “interest” to support the democratizations of the Western Balkans in order to ensure the

---

8 In the late 1990s Slovak political elites understood the two main security risks for Slovakia to be the country’s exclusion from Euro-Atlantic integration and the disintegration and instability in the European east and southeast. Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 1999: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 1998/1999), 167–96. Also, Slovakia’s security strategy of that period states that “Slovakia simply cannot be left out [of the EU and NATO]” and that the “fundamental and long-term threats to the stability and prosperity of Slovakia” “result from the social and economic underdevelopment of certain states, deficits of human rights and democratic principles, as well as from persistent ethnic and religious intolerance.” Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic (Bratislava, 2001). Last, in the words of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, Jozef Magish, “The NATO membership is not an aim, but a way to the extension and ensuring regional security in the scope of a new developing security system in Central Europe from which Slovakia simply cannot be left out. The European Union does not automatically equal with a better standard of living, but it is an inevitable condition for reaching it… The NATO and EU memberships are manifestations of stability and guarantee for positive future development. The NATO and EU memberships mean security for foreign investors.” Jozef Magish, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2000 (Bratislava, 2001).

9 Peter Weiss, “Presentations the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2002 (Bratislava, 2003).
stabilization, security, and even economic prosperity of this region. Moreover, since the EU and NATO had themselves identified political and economic instability as a security threat to the Euro-Atlantic community, Slovakia saw a chance to contribute to the work of these organizations and earn its membership in them by working for the stabilization of the European fringes. Having fallen off the fast track to Euro-Atlantic integration in the mid-1990s, Slovakia needed to demonstrate that it is a reliable member that does not just seek to benefit from but also contributes to the security of the continent. Western encouragement and support for Slovak civic democracy promotion in the neighborhood were an important signal about the perceived potential for Slovak contribution in the region.

Slovak diplomats and NGOs together successfully mobilized major European international multilateral organizations (Council of Europe, OSCE, EU), Southeastern European regional international initiatives (Southeast European Cooperative Initiative and Stability Pact) and international foundations (the East West Institute, the Fund for an Open Society, the Rockefeller Foundation, the German Marshall Fund of the United States) to support political change in former Yugoslavia. In July 1999, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the East-West Institute launched the so-called Bratislava Process. It had two goals: 1) to enable dialogue and joint action among members of different pro-democracy (and pro-European) forces in Serbia and 2) to enable their cooperation with and thus legitimation by organizations from the international community. A Donors’ Forum, similar to the one working in Slovakia, was proposed by Bratislava and set up by the international community to ensure a flow of Western and regional technical and financial assistance in order to consolidate

10 Ibid. Also interview with I. B., November 26, 2008: “We have some interested in democratization abroad.”
11 Interview with K. V., November 19, 2008.
12 Interview with M. V., November 27, 2008.
the Serbian civil society as an engine for “renovation of the democratic life in Serbia.” Moreover, the Slovak embassy in Belgrade worked hard to unite the anti-Milosevic opposition and provided political and logistical support to the Slovak activist training their Serbian counterparts.

In 2000, Serbia voted in a new president in the name of the democratization and Europeanization of the country. However, the Bratislava Process cooperation forum and training seminars continued into 2002. By then, Slovakia was accepted into OECD, which has development assistance requirements for member states. Bratislava complied by following up on the Process and setting up a special Bratislava-Belgrade Fund for the implementation of development – including democracy – assistance projects in Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. (Another fund was also established to provide aid to all other countries and the two funds merged in 2007). Democracy assistance became one of the three priorities of the Slovak development aid.

Moreover, at about the same time diplomatic democracy promotion was also beginning to gain prominence in Slovakia’s eastern policy. When Bratislava negotiated its membership in the EU and NATO, the very immediate Slovak security concerns diminished significantly but the still unstable European neighborhood continued to pose some threats. At the suggestion of the Slovak civic democracy promoters, Slovakia continued to use democracy promotion to participate in the EU’s external relations and to stabilize the southeast but also increasingly the east as well.

---

15 “Kostunica was born in the Slovak Embassy in Belgrade.” Interview with M. S., July 25, 2007.
16 In Croatia, the turnover in power was a symbolic achievement, since real power is vested in parliament, but it was an achievement, which was cemented by the return of the opposition coalition to power in parliament three years later. Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy Assistance (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
17 Interview with K. V., November 19, 2008.
since the democratization of countries on that EU border were increasingly slowed down and even reversed. In the east, Slovakia focused on Ukraine, which is both a neighbor, a significant trade partner and strategic energy supplier, and perceived as “an important factor of European security.” It should also be noted that democracy promotion in the “European” parts of the post-communist world became increasingly synonymous with and offered in the form of support for Euro-Atlantic integration.

In sum, the success of the Bratislava Process in helping the Serbian opposition to defeat one of the most-authoritarian regimes in the post-communist world demonstrated to Slovak democratic actors the potential of democracy promotion to transform the regional international environment and provided the young Slovak state with a foreign policy agenda, which allowed Bratislava to (politically and economically) stabilize its southeastern and eastern neighborhood while also earning Slovak membership in the Euro-Atlantic club. As in the Polish case, many of the political OK 98 elites have a personal commitment to democracy, which has influenced their receptivity to the arguments of their OK 98 civic partners for incorporating democracy promotion into Slovakia’s foreign policy and later on for keeping democracy promotion issues high on Bratislava’s agenda. Moreover, the notion of taking “responsibility in Europe” also resonates with the individual principled beliefs of some Slovak politicians about “good European citizenship.” However, it was exactly the strategic importance of Slovakia’s democracy promotion agenda that would allow it to be sustained over time at the state level and to survive turnover in power.

---

19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, The Main Aims and Interests of Slovakia in Relations with Ukraine (Bratislava, 2001).
1.1.1. The Rhetoric of Bratislava’s Official Democracy Promotion

How do Slovak foreign policy elites talk about their democracy promotion efforts? Do they refer to their responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy and/or do they talk about the benefits of having democratic international partners? The argument here is that even though Slovak political elites have been divided in their personal beliefs about and support for democratization abroad, there has been some convergence around the understanding of the strategic significance of democracy promotion.

The official democracy promotion rhetoric reflects the facts that Slovak political elites have different levels of personal commitment to democracy and accordingly to democracy promotion as well. On the left, there are those few who turn a blind eye to authoritarian practices, declaring they are not “aware of any democratic deficit” or who advocate that “special stances” be taken towards violations of human rights and democratic principles in states such as Ukraine, Cuba, Belarus, and Russia. On the right, there are those who consider dissidents “brave, responsible and courageous citizens who deserve our highest respect, because they are a conscience of their nation” and use the Slovak diplomatic podium to express solidarity with and support those fighting for freedom around the world. However, the majority of the Slovak policy-makers converge rhetorically around the strategic importance of democracy promotion and Euro-Atlantic integration of the European post-communist countries. 16% of the references of Slovak diplomacy to their democracy promotion

---


activism are normative, 64% are strategic and the rest combine both normative and strategic explanations. [For those references, please see Appendix 4.]

When discussing democracy promotion, most Slovak diplomats talk about a direct link between democracy and security. For example, the Slovak foreign minister from 1998 to 2006, Eduard Kukan, points out that democracy is an “important prerequisite for stability of any region”\textsuperscript{22} and the Speaker of the Slovak parliament from 2002 to 2006, Pavol Hrusovsky maintains that “spreading of democracy in the world is an issue directly connected to the issue of peace and worldwide security.”\textsuperscript{23} Slovak diplomats also frequently argue that “democracy and stability in the immediate neighborhood of the EU is in the best interest of all of us.”\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, Slovak official development assistance promotion materials explain that one of the Slovak aid aims is to “ensure global peace and security, in particular by enhancing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance in developing countries.”\textsuperscript{25}

Slovak diplomats further link democracy promotion with their contribution to the success of the Euro-Atlantic structures. In the words of a Slovak member to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly: “Slovakia must ask itself a basic question – where can it best help to strengthen the EU and the NATO so that it is respected and so that its contributions get reciprocity.”\textsuperscript{26} The response of former foreign minister Kukan is:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Intervention by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, H. E. Mr. Eduard Kukan at NATO HQ Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council December 15, 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic,” n.p.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Magdalena Vasaryova, “Lessons Learned from Building a Civil Society in Slovakia – Spreading Democracy and Stability in Central and Eastern Europe” (Round Table at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London, November 9, 2005). Also, interview with I. B., November 26, 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Jozef Banas, “Slovakia and its Elites in Global Environment,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, \textit{Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic} 2003, n.p. Another good example, here, is the cabinet’s discussion of the Slovak involvement in “the reconstruction of south-eastern Europe, and peace and security in that part of Europe and, as a result, on the continent as a whole”: “Although it does not represent a direct and automatic road to NATO for Slovakia, since invitations are political decisions, we expect that our progress in our preparation [to contribute to security in the Western Balkans] will be the decisive impetus for the necessary political decision in our favor.” Ministry of
“Due to its enlargement, the EU became a neighbor of regions that are potentially unstable. We do not wish for their isolation. On the contrary, we chose the Balkans and Ukraine as the priority regions of Slovak foreign policy. Our contribution was and remains the sharing of our experience on the way to stability and democracy and through the help of our non-governmental organizations.”27 In this context, it’s also relevant to note that most Slovak foreign policy strategic documents understand Euro-Atlantic integration to be “an instrument for expanding the space of stability and democracy.”28

In sum, having democratic partners is considered important by a majority of the Slovak political elites because undemocratic partners are “unstable” politically and economically, which makes them “untrustworthy” (capricious and non-transparent) partners and causes of regional instability.29 Moreover, not only has democracy promotion been considered a “responsible” and “long-term” foreign policy choice in that it represents an investment in securing neighborhoods whose development affects Slovakia,30 but democracy promotion has also been deemed an investment in earning and saving Slovakia its place in the Euro-Atlantic structures. It should be noted, however, that the right governments have emphasized democracy promotion more, whereas the left governments have preferred to talk more about European integration, which implies democratization among other things.
And how have the Slovak foreign policy elites discussed their democracy promotion efforts in Bratislava’s democracy promotion priority countries – the Western Balkans (Serbia) and Ukraine? Serbia is a crucial case for understanding the motivations behind Slovak support for democratization abroad through Bratislava’s rhetoric because Serbia is considered to be the most similar Slovak international partner and therefore most likely to evoke Bratislava’s solidarity as well as its responsibility to uphold a universal right to democracy. Yet, the former (right) governments mostly note the importance of “peace and security in that part of Europe and, as a result, on the continent as a whole. […] Slovakia is ready to continue its contribution to the recovery of stability and regional security in the Western Balkans and the future prosperity of this region within European and Euroatlantic structures.”\(^31\)

Similarly, the current (left) cabinet has also declared that “The significant impact of the situation in the Western Balkans on the stability and development in Central Europe and the historic links make this region a priority of Slovakia’s foreign policy.”\(^32\)

Likewise, the former governments talked about the “special significance of Ukraine” for Bratislava’s foreign policy: “It is its largest neighbor that has traditional social, economic and cultural ties with Slovakia, and reciprocal presence of minorities. […] Slovakia supports the efforts at building a democratic, economically strong and stable Ukraine and its integration into the European structures.”\(^33\) And the current cabinet has agreed that “With respect to Ukraine as a neighboring country the main objective of Slovakia will be supporting the development of the country, its democratic institutions and the development of good neighborhood. Continuation of

\(^{31}\) Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2000.
\(^{32}\) Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2007.
\(^{33}\) Slovak Government, “Slovakia’s Key Goals and Interests as regards Ukraine.”
European and Euro-Atlantic orientation of Ukraine and a pro-integration direction of Ukrainian foreign policy is the strategic interest of Slovakia.\textsuperscript{34}

1.2.1. The Practice of Bratislava’s Official Democracy Promotion

The motivation behind Slovak democracy promotion can also be gleaned from the territorial focus of Bratislava’s efforts. Has Slovak diplomacy been most active towards the most important non-democratic international partners or towards the international partners Slovakia considers to be most similar to it and therefore an object of solidarity? The argument here is that the fact that Slovakia has been most involved in democracy promotion in the European neighborhood countries defined domestically and at the EU level to be of strategic importance for the continent’s security suggests that Bratislava had sought to use the benefits of having democratic international partners to create a stable and prosperous international environment for Slovakia.

First, the best illustration of these priorities is the distribution of democracy assistance through the Slovak development aid program because they reflect Bratislava’s diplomatic priorities as well.\textsuperscript{35} From 2004 to 2007, Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo attracted 47% of all the official democracy assistance projects sponsored through SlovakAid.\textsuperscript{36} Bratislava’s second and third priorities were Ukraine and Belarus respectively with 16% and 12% of Slovakia’s democracy aid. In

\textsuperscript{34} Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2007.

\textsuperscript{35} The exception is Croatia, which is not eligible for development assistance but whose democratization has been diplomatically supported by Slovakia. After the democratic breakthrough in Croatia (carried out with some assistance by leading Slovak civic democracy promoters), Bratislava has strongly backed Zagreb’s EU bid. In fact, Slovakia supported the EU integration of Croatia when Poland and Czech Republic blocked it because of Croatia’s poor cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. Such support for democracy as a means to stability and prosperity rather than support for the principle of democracy suggests that Slovak democracy promotion has been a primarily strategic rather than a normative foreign policy commitment.

\textsuperscript{36} Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008).
addition to SlovakAid, in 2006 Bratislava launched a pilot program for small grants projects chosen by Slovakia’s embassy in Ukraine.37 And while serving as a NATO contact point in Ukraine, Bratislava funded some additional projects relevant to the goals of its mandate; similarly, when presiding the Council of Europe, Bratislava focused on Belarus as a territorial priority and provided assistance to Belarus for enhancing its relations with the international organization.38

The choice of Serbia as the top priority for Slovak democracy assistance alone does not provide conclusive support for either the strategic or the normative explanation because Serbia is claimed by Slovak policy-makers to be the most culturally similar international partner.39 Similarly, Bratislava’s second priority Ukraine is the neighbor in the east where there are the most “traditional social, economic and cultural ties with Slovakia, including similarities of languages and religions, and reciprocal presence of minorities.”40 Still, as a democracy promotion priority, Ukraine is ranked higher than other Western Balkan nations which are considered to be more “similar” and perhaps “closer” to Slovakia.41 Moreover, there is no special solidarity between Slovakia and Belarus at the state level. On the other hand, as the last dictatorship in Europe, Belarus is not only understood to be “problem” neighbor for Brussels but has also been targeted by the leading Slovak civic democracy promoters. As a result, the Slovak state, interested in contributing to European security but with limited foreign policy capacity, has supported, cooperated

37 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
39 Most SlovakAid assistance to the Western Balkans went to Serbia; still, Slovakia is looking to gradually expand the coverage of its aid to include the other descendants of Former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the second country in the Western Balkans closest to Slovakia – Croatia – has been actively supported by Bratislava by diplomatic means. As former Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda notes, Slovakia has sought to be one of the most vocal advocates of Croatia’s accelerated accession to the EU.
40 Slovak Government, “Slovakia’s Key Goals and Interests as regards Ukraine.”
actively with, and delegated some responsibility to prominent Slovak NGOs working on supporting the democratization of Belarus.

Further evidence of the strategic logic behind the SlovakAid democracy assistance distribution comes from the Slovak support for the democratization of Afghanistan and (the lack of aid to) Cuba. Slovaks speak of “special ties” between Czechoslovakia and Cuba during the Cold War. Moreover, there are Slovak politicians and civic activists among the elites who prepared the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia who feel solidarity with the Cuban dissidents and who, as a result, provide political, moral, technical, and financial support to the Cuban opposition both bilaterally and through the EU. However, there is no political majority behind democracy promotion in Cuba because the Cuban problem lacks strategic immediacy; thus, no official assistance provided to Cuba. On the other hand, Slovakia, like many other Eastern European NATO members, supported the US efforts in Afghanistan. Given the general and security instability in the country, Bratislava sought to involve the Slovak civic sector in implementing democracy assistance as an investment in the stability and securitization of the region. Half the SlovakAid projects implemented in Afghanistan supported the development of civil society and democratic procedures in the country (the other half focused on infrastructure rebuilding).

After power turned over to the left, there was a lot of domestic and international concern over the inclusion of pre-1998 ruling elite in the new left governing coalition. Moreover the new prime minister had as recently as 2005

---

42 Interview with M. H., November 14, 2008.
43 Interview with G. S., November 6, 2008.
44 Moreover, the new prime minister had as recently as 2005 criticized what he called Slovakia’s one-sided orientation towards the US administration and its neglect of relations with Russia and had also called for “special stances” to be taken towards states such as Ukraine, Cuba, Belarus and Vietnam. Juraj Marusiak et al. “Foreign Policy – Main Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation,” in Slovakia 2006: Global Report on the State of Society. Institute for Public Affairs, (Bratislava, 2006)
criticized what he called Slovakia’s one-sided orientation towards the West and neglect of relations with Russia and had also called for “special stances” to be taken towards states such as Ukraine, Cuba, Belarus and Vietnam. At the same time, there were other left leaders and politicians who actively supported Slovakia’s commitment to democracy promotion. To allay concerns about the new coalition’s commitment to democracy at home and abroad and to pull the ranks together behind a single foreign policy line, the ruling parties signed a foreign policy priorities agreement that committed the new cabinet to the priorities followed by the previous right governments. Moreover, the government appointed a foreign minister with experience in various European regional organizations and personal and professional commitment to European values (including democracy). Still, on 2006 Human Rights Day, a group of civic activists, intellectuals and former politicians signed and presented to the cabinet an Appeal to Preserve Slovakia’s Democratic Solidarity, calling on the government to follow the existing national foreign policy consensus, part of which was democratization support to various actors in countries in transition around the world. The new Deputy Foreign Minister responded by officially committing the ministry to continuity in support for democratic processes in Eastern Europe.

Indeed, the left coalition has emphasized strengthening the economic dimension of diplomacy and was therefore more interested in creating economic stability abroad through some democracy promotion but mostly through European

---

47 Jan Kubis had served as secretary general of the OSCE (1999–2005) and was crucial to involving the OSCE in the mediation between the warring Ukrainian parties during the 2004 Orange Revolution. Kubis later served as the special EU representative for Central Asia. He was succeeded by another internationally recognized career diplomat with experience in the democratization and stabilization of the Western Balkans, Miroslav Lajčak. Lajčak was the EU supervisor for the 2006 Montenegrin independence referendum and the EU’s Special Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2007–2009.
integration for the existing and potential important Slovak trading partners. Moreover, while the new government continued to cooperate with Slovak civic democracy promoters, the cabinet has relied much more on leveraging the resources of various international organizations such as the UN, EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe to support democratization in the post-communist region. The share of democracy assistance within SlovAid (implemented by Slovak NGOs) declined a bit to allow the share of infrastructural development projects carried out by Slovak firms abroad to grow. There was a decline of democracy assistance funding within total SlovAid from 48% to 14% for project in Serbia and Montenegro but growth of the share of democracy aid for the rest of the priority countries from 26% to 32%. However, diplomatically Bratislava continued to support the democratization and EU integration of the Western Balkans and even stepped up Slovak efforts in Ukraine and Belarus. Yet, outside of such (consensus) priority countries for democracy promotion, Slovak official democracy promotion has been uneven and often undermined by more immediate (economic) interests. The Prime Minister has sought to deepen economic ties with autocratic countries such as Russia, China, and Libya without concern for the violation of human rights and democratic practices by regimes. So the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is often reduced to explaining the positions of the Prime Minister or

49 Bratislva’s initiatives within the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe are described in section 2, so a word on the Slovak priorities within the UN is in order. Slovakia’s main concerns when serving as a non-permanent member of the Security Council were the West Balkans (above all the future status of Kosovo), Cyprus, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Slovakia also ran and was elected a Member of the UN Human Rights Council for 2008–2011. Together with Slovakia’s agenda for its chairmanship of the Council of Europe, Bratislava’s initiative within the UN “sighed the beginning of a period in which Slovakia started to focus on human rights on an institutional basis within its foreign policy. Slovakia continues to do so both intensively and systematically.” Martina Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy 2008: 51–61.

50 There was a decline of democracy assistance funding within total SlovAid from 48% to 14% for project in Serbia and Montenegro but growth of the share of democracy aid for the rest of the priority countries from 26% to 32%. Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.

51 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.

the Chairmen of other coalition parties while also trying to maintain continuity in the priority areas of Slovakia’s foreign policy.53

2. Democratization: “Made in Slovakia”?

What type of democracy has Slovakia been promoting abroad? And what policy instruments has Bratislava preferred? Is this Slovak strategy informed by a set of taken-for-granted institutions, processes, and policy instruments, and/or by a calculation based on the performance of certain institutions and the effectiveness of particular processes and instruments? The Slovak approach to democracy promotion is best understood as a strategic export of the local experience with democratization as it fits the democratization needs of recipients.

Like many other Slovak politicians, Slovakia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1998 to 2006 recognizes Slovakia’s transition successes: “It is not a long time ago when Slovakia by its own mistakes put itself into a position of isolation. Only recently we had to face demarches and we were considered a black sheep of the European family or enfant terrible of Central Europe. […] The enfant terrible has become a Tatra tiger. […] Today nobody put into questions that Slovakia is one of the most dynamically developing, democratic, stable, and pro-reform countries of the old continent.”54 As the 2003 Slovak development assistance strategy notes, this is “a particular experience not shared with the traditional [Western] donors.”55 Moreover,

53 For example, there were differences in the positions of both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the President, on the one hand, and on the other, the Prime Minister who has sought to align Slovak with Russian stances about crucial international issues such as the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, the deployment of a national missile defense system by the US in the Czech Republic and Poland, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, and the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas conflict at the beginning of 2009. Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008.”
54 Kukan, “Presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2004. “Tatra Tiger” is a nickname that refers to the Slovak economy following the ascendance of a right-wing coalition in September 2002 which engaged in a program of liberal economic reforms.
this Slovak experience is considered by Bratislava an “inspiration” or at least “not an improbable role model” for post-communist hybrid regimes.56

In other words, the Slovak export of its transition experience is based on a strategic calculation about the effectiveness of the Slovak democratization practices and of “how fast Slovakia achieved European integration after having to catch up” with the other Eastern European applicants to the EU and NATO.57 Much like Poland, Slovakia is promoting, not a set of institutions, but rather a “journey”58 – a set of processes related to turning a transition laggard into a “success story.”59 Moreover, rather than informing a taken-for-granted route to democratization, the sharing of Slovakia’s transition experience is understood as “the means in which to practically achieve and more effectively implement this [Slovak foreign policy] interest [of supporting democratization in the European neighborhood].”60 And finally, like Poland, Slovakia has adopted different approaches to supporting the democratization of autocracies and to improving the quality of democracy in countries in transition.

2.1. Bratislava’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Ukraine

Slovakia and Ukraine were both born in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Even though they became neighbors, these countries played a fairly minor role in each other’s foreign and domestic policy (at least initially).61 In the period between the

---

56 First quote by Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.” Second quote by Lajcak, “Slovak Foreign Policy in 2008 through the Eyes of the Slovak Foreign Minister.”
57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Foreign Policy in 2007 (Bratislava, Slovakia).
58 Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004).
60 Ibid.
61 Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 2004: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2004). While there are few historic disputes, which could become the source of bilateral conflicts, the national stereotypes across the Slovak-Ukrainian border are not always positive. Many Slovak myths about Ukraine include imagery of the “Ukrainian mafia,” organized crime, a cheap labor force, and unreliable business.
breakup of Czechoslovakia and the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia in 1998, Bratislava related to Ukraine as a “gate to Russia” (or at least Russian markets and energy supplies) rather than a partner worthy of direct Slovak attention.\(^62\) After 1998, Slovakia began pursuing a pro-Western foreign policy and consequently, sought to conduct a “more balanced” eastern policy, including enhanced cooperation with Ukraine. However, bilateral relations continued to be cold for some time because Bratislava was preoccupied with (and somewhat overwhelmed by the demands of) bringing the country closer to membership in the Euro-Atlantic club; moreover, Slovakia did not want to be associated with a transition laggard such as Ukraine for fear of being put on a slower accession track. Finally, the accumulation of several unresolved problems (visas, energy security, Ukrainian debt, minority rights, and competition for a UN Security Council Seat) significantly strained Slovak-Ukrainian relations in the late 1990s.\(^63\)

Relations between Kiev and Bratislava intensified and improved in 2001 when compromises were reached on some of those issues and as Ukraine was becoming more interested in close relations with the EU. Slovak diplomats recognized the need to “support the building of Ukraine as a politically and economically stable and prosperous country with transparent market economy and advanced democracy […] and] in reaching its declared objective of cooperation with the developed Europe.”\(^64\) Slovakia readily invested in the further liberalization of mutual trade by improving partners. On the other hand, many Ukrainians portray Slovaks as too nationalistic and inward looking, uninterested in Ukraine and preferring relations with Russia or scarifying Ukraine because of Slovakia’s ambitions for Euro-Atlantic integration. Interview with E. W. I., April 30, 2009.


\(^64\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, *The Main Aims and Interests of Slovakia in Relations with Ukraine* (Bratislava, 2001).
regional and cross-border cooperation with Ukraine and by supporting Kiev’s integration in regional and global economic regimes such as the WTO and CEFTA.65

However, Slovak foreign policy-makers (the government and the presidency in particular) were not consistent and united in structuring Bratislava’s political relations with Ukraine. On the one hand, even though the Slovak president was criticized by other Slovak diplomats as well as by some Slovak civic experts and journalists about his indulgence of Kiev’s authoritarian practices, there were frequent and warm official and unofficial meetings between Slovak and the Ukrainian presidents.66 On the other hand, during bilateral and multilateral events, the Slovak government expressed publicly its support for the “democratic development of Ukraine” and “its direction to a [European] community on a similar journey as did we in Slovakia.”67 Moreover, during some of their visits to Ukraine, the Slovak delegations (even ones in which the Slovak president participated) met with representatives of the Ukrainian regime as well as with opposition leaders.68

65 Duleba, “Relations with Ukraine as Slovakia’s Foreign Policy Priority.”

66 Against the background of rising Western criticism of Kuchma’s undemocratic methods, power abuse, and his restriction of media freedom in Ukraine, the Slovak president announced that he was not aware of any democratic deficit in Ukraine and that he saw no similarity between the democratically-elected Kuchma and Belarus’ Lukashenko, who had shown himself to be antidemocratic. Similarly, when the Ukraine president visited Slovakia in 2003, it was precisely at the moment that the Ukraine opposition, in a big demonstration in Kiev, was commemorating the events of March 9, 2001, when the Ukraine police had brutally put down an anti–presidential demonstration. The Ukraine press dubbed Kuchma’s stay in Slovakia a “flight to safety.” Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 2003: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2003).

67 Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.” It should also be noted that beginning in 2001–02, Poland, which had very actively assisted Slovakia in catching up with the first wave of Eastern European EU applicants, began encouraging Bratislava to more actively support the Ukrainian transition. Warsaw argued for the strategic importance of Ukraine for “peace in Europe” as well as for Central European “responsibilities towards the East,” given the support Central Europe received from the West after 1989. Moreover, since three of the four Visegrad countries were direct Ukrainian neighbors, the Visegrad Group became a platform for cooperation on assisting Kiev’s European integration. Juraj Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovakia 2002: Global Report on the State of Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2002).

A new phase in Bratislava-Kiev relations began in 2004 when the outline of Slovakia’s post-EU accession foreign policy priorities began to emerge. Following a conversation with representatives of civil society, the Slovak government declared Ukraine (together with the Western Balkans) to be Slovakia’s strategic partners.\(^69\) This consensus and turnover in the Slovak presidency improved the coherence and consistency of Slovakia’s eastern policy. Bratislava began supporting more openly and actively the democratization and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine by stepping up its assistance and diplomatic efforts.

Bratislava recognized the historic opportunity to pull Ukraine in a pro-Western and pro-democratic direction through political and civic popular mobilization on occasion of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections. So in the summer of 2004, the Slovak prime minister visited Ukraine to offer Bratislava’s help in improving Ukraine’s relations with NATO and the EU. Moreover, since Bratislava was in the process of setting up an official development assistance system, the Slovak delegation presented Bratislava’s draft program for assistance to Ukraine. It included a number of projects, implemented by Slovak NGOs in cooperation with Ukrainian civic groups but also with some Ukrainian state actors as well; these projects were meant to share the “lessons” leant from Slovakia’s transition experience with Ukraine.\(^70\) The Slovak prime minister also expressed support of the pro-democratic forces in Ukraine by receiving leading opposition figures to discuss “democratization in Ukraine and the [upcoming] presidential elections.”\(^71\) At the request of the challenger, the Slovak prime minister promised to (and subsequently did) provide election-monitoring assistance to Ukraine.\(^72\) Additionally at multilateral and bilateral events before the

---

\(^69\) Interview with A. D., July 27, 2007.
\(^71\) Ibid.
elections, Bratislava called on the outgoing Ukrainian president to launch democratic reforms and guarantee free and fair presidential elections.\footnote{Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” 2004. The Slovak NGO, Civic Eye, which sent the 108 observers, sponsored by the Slovak government, also trained, organized, and dispatched 160 Slovak observers within the mission of the OSCE and the ENEMO (a federation of 17 NGOs from Central and Eastern Europe). Additionally, several Slovak civic activists were working as advisers to the Ukrainian opposition and as experts in media monitoring for OSCE. Most notably, the German Marshall Fund’s office in Bratislava acted as the principal consultant for PORA, a civic movement in Ukraine, regarding the communication strategy for and preparation of a civic campaign, and MEMO 98 worked in Kiev until the end of 2004 as an OSCE expert in the field of media analyses. Marusiak et al., “The Foreign Policy and National Security of the Slovak Republic,” 2004.}

Then, during the election struggle over the character and nature of the political regime in Ukraine, the foreign ministry released a statement and the Slovak parliament adopted a resolution condemning the fraud during the presidential elections in Ukraine and expressing support for democratic practices and pro-democratic forces in Ukraine.\footnote{Hrusovsky, “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.”} Additionally, a Slovak diplomat serving as the OSCE Secretary General at the time steered the OSCE to participate in the mediation efforts between the warring parties – despite the hesitation of the Chairman-in-Office; the Slovak diplomat is recognized as having “contributed to the peaceful and just outcome to the crisis.”\footnote{Prepared Statement of the Honorable Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, United States Department of State. “Kubis’s presence was valuable in that it signaled OSCE interest in developments in Ukraine and brought in the institution’s reputation for supporting democratic norms. OSCE’s broader membership could have been an advantage in the mediation effort; while the European Union was regarded as a ‘Western’ institution, OSCE had a much more balanced East-West membership. This broader membership, however, also posed an institutional constraint. […] Given the wide differences among the member-states, Kubis could not engage in a more pointed way.” Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007. Still, Kubis maintained a busy schedule, holding his own bilateral meetings with the warring parties.}

After the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine in 2004, Slovakia intensified its assistance to Ukraine as well as its advocacy on behalf of Ukraine in front of the EU and NATO. Bratislava leveraged its official development aid system to continue to contribute to the strengthening of civil society in Ukraine. [See Table 5.1.] Moreover, Bratislava began supporting reform implementation in Ukraine by sponsoring the sharing of “best practices” in legislation and institutional reform from the EU.
integration process of various Slovak institutions with their Ukrainian counterparts. In 2005, Bratislava began running annual programs, “Slovak Aid in the Implementation of the Action Plan EU-Ukraine.” They have included dozens of trainings, study visits, consultations, and information seminars by various Slovak governmental and non-governmental actors working to further Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration and improve state-society cooperation in this process. At the EU level, Slovak diplomats supported the (Polish/ Visegrad Four) initiatives in the European Parliament and the European Council to commit the EU to defining clear conditions and precise dates for beginning accession negotiations with Ukraine. And even when the EU membership prospective for Ukraine became a distant reality, Bratislava continued to prepare Kiev for it.

When power turned over in Slovakia in 2006, the new government followed the priorities of the previous cabinet and kept actively supporting Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Slovak-Ukrainian cooperation on deepening of the democratic transition and on fulfilling the annual Ukraine-EU action plans continued and the Slovak parliament launched a complementary parliament-to-parliament initiative. Slovak diplomats also supported a number of new Slovak civic efforts to shape the EU’s eastern policy. And from the Visegrad presidency, Slovakia put forth ideas for and presented at various EU level meetings a common Visegrad proposal for strengthening the bilateral and regional eastern dimension of the European

76 After the first such program, Ukrainian Prime Minister at the time, Viktor Yanukovych, shared: “Several countries offered assistance to Ukraine in implementing the Action Plan. The proposal of Slovakia is the best though.” H Treteckyj, “V Jevropu – razom iz Slovcynoju” [Towards Europe together with Slovakia], Den 18 (February 2006).

77 Also, the foreign ministry and Slovak civil society organized an international conference, “Ukraine on Its Path to the EU: Expectations, Possibilities and Limits.”

78 A notable example is the international conference “Strategic Framework for the EU’s Eastern Policy: Seeking a New Approach,” organized by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, which brought together European think-tank experts and European and EU diplomats and argued for immediate sectoral economic integration with Ukraine (including free-trade and visa-free travel) as a stepping stone towards future membership when Ukraine meets the EU’s criteria.
Neighborhood Policy. Slovakia also initiated a series of consultations and negotiations between the Visegrad and the former USSR Baltic republic, the Visegrad countries and the European Commission, and the Visegrad countries and individual EU neighbors such as Ukraine about formulating a more ambitious eastern policy; the process culminated (under the Czech Visegrad presidency) with the presentation of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership proposal. Slovak diplomats then promoted the proposal until its adoption at the end of 2008.79

Bratislava also continued to lobby for NATO membership for Ukraine and successfully ran for the Slovak embassy in Kiev to gain the status of a NATO contact embassy for 2007 – 2008.80 Slovakia’s mission was to support the dialogue between Ukraine and the Alliance. Bratislava worked with media, civil society, and political elites throughout Ukraine to “contribute to the build up of transparency and trust between Ukraine and NATO.” 81 To that end, Slovakia sought to improve Ukrainian public awareness about the Alliance and about Slovakia’s accession experiences as well as to enhancing the cooperation and communication on the Ukrainian question within NATO and between the Alliance and the Ukrainian central and regional authorities. Slovakia’s flagship project was the preparation and opening of a NATO Information Centre at the Uzhgorod National University in 2008.82 Moreover, at Kiev’s request, the Slovak embassy administered a special grant scheme that awarded small grants to Ukrainian organizations participating in the public debate on Ukraine’s

80 Slovak diplomats argued, “we have good knowledge of Ukraine’s situation and bilateral relations without any conflicts, which in connection with our recent accession process and membership experience, gives our statements additional authority. In the dimension of NATO-Ukraine relations we are considered a friendly country, with a similar language and culture and a similar historical experience, which has already made its decision in favor of the European and transatlantic community and unambiguously supports the integration ambitions of Ukraine to the extent to which Ukraine itself is prepared. That is why we are a trustworthy source of information and experience from NATO for many in Ukraine.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007.
NATO membership and the necessary political and defense reforms. In addition, the Slovak foreign ministry supported additional projects in this domain.

Table 5.1. SlovakAid Bilateral Democracy Assistance by Country by Targeted Sector, 2004-2008: Percent of SlovakAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and Belarus and Targeting a Particular Sector out of All SlovakAid Democracy Assistance Projects Implemented in Ukraine and Belarus for a Particular Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Belarus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties</td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Institutions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive</td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government</td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Organized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grassroots Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think Tanks</td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unorganized</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educators</td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Public</td>
<td></td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Data from author calculations.

The 2009 natural gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia and the resultant interruption of supply to Slovakia for two weeks tested Slovak-Ukrainian relations. The Slovak prime minister took Russia’s side and threatened to withdraw Slovak

83 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
support for Ukraine’s EU integration. 84 However, even if the dispute cooled off bilateral ties, Bratislava took no concrete steps to change its approach towards Kiev.

In sum, Slovak support for Ukraine’s democratization emerged slowly, fairly late, and after a period of inconsistent and contradictory diplomacy in this direction. However, by the mid-2000 Slovakia had launched an ambitious assistance program to support the development of civil society in Ukraine and the implementation of the reforms necessary for the country’s democratic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, Slovakia has become increasingly active in its diplomatic advocacy on behalf of Ukraine in front of the EU and NATO.

2.2. Bratislava’s Approach to Democracy Promotion in Belarus

Throughout the 1990s, Slovakia’s political relations with Belarus were weak. Slovakia does not share a common border with Belarus and the bilateral trade between the two countries has remained negligible. A Slovak Embassy to the Republic of Belarus was opened only in 2001. 85 Moreover, like Ukraine, Belarus too remained in the “shadow of Russia” in the period between the breakup of Czechoslovakia and the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia in 1998. 86 Bratislava’s foreign policy after 1998 was shaped by Slovakia’s aspirations to join the EU and NATO. This priority guided not only Slovakia’s western policy but also its eastern policy. 87 Since Brussels downgraded its contacts with Belarus after the authoritarian turn in the country in 1996-97, Bratislava’s political relations with Minsk after 1998 were limited to

---

85 Previously Slovakia was represented in Minsk on the level of the Consulate General only.
meetings during multilateral events. At the same time, the Slovak government has
dedicated a substantial part of its activities in Belarus to supporting Slovak NGOs
promoting civil society and democratic reforms in this last dictatorship in Europe.

Slovak civic activists from the OK 98 campaign were invited to Belarus by the
Belarusian opposition and their US sponsors as early as 1999. With support from the
US, the OSCE, and the Slovak government, several Slovak NGOs played key roles in
training the Belarusian opposition to prepare an “electoral revolution” modeled after
the OK 98 campaign (and the 2000 campaign in Serbia). Following the 2001
presidential elections in Belarus and especially after Slovakia had negotiated its entry
into the EU and NATO, the Slovak government in cooperation with Slovak NGOs got
“significantly involved” in supporting the Belarusian opposition. Bratislava began
more openly providing political and moral support as well as foreign assistance to the
civic and political democratic forces in Belarus. Slovak diplomats and
parliamentarians invited Belarusian opposition leaders to Bratislava in the months
preceding the 2004 parliamentary elections in Belarus, which were scheduled together
with a referendum abolishing the term limit of the Belarusian presidency. At the
request of the Belarusian opposition, Bratislava worked with the Slovak NGOs to send
international observers to monitor the election. And after Lukashenko manipulated the
vote, representatives of the Belarusian opposition were again received in Bratislava at

88 The Slovak priority for bilateral relations with Belarus was improving Slovak exports and settling the
Belarusian debts towards Slovakia. Between 1998 and 2008, only 5 agreements were concluded: on
promotion and reciprocal protection of investment in 2001 and then again in 2005; on plant quarantine
in 2001 and on cooperation in veterinary medicine in 2001; and on the liquidation of the Belarusian
debt in 2002.
89 Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008.”
90 Interview with J. K., November 26, 2008.
Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2001). Juraj Marusiak et al., Foreign Policy – Main
Trends, Bilateral Relations, Regional Cooperation, in Slovakia 2004: Global Report on the State of
Society (Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs, 2004). Belarus became Bratislava’s third democracy-
promotion priority after the Western Balkans and Ukraine. Moreover, a Slovak diplomat was serving as
the OSCE Secretary General during the organization’s intense involvement in Belarus (1999–2001),
which allowed Slovak democracy promoters some additional influence.
92 Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008.
the highest level as recognition of their legitimacy and struggle. The Slovak policymakers committed to also support the Belarusian democratic forces on international stage and especially at the EU level. Slovak diplomats together with other Eastern European diplomats successfully lobbied for a refashioned and reinforced critical dialogue between the EU and Belarus. Together with Slovak civic activists, Slovak diplomats also worked to organize the EP to not only respond to violations of democratic procedures and human rights by Minsk but also to lend support and legitimacy to the Belarusian opposition.

By 2004, the Slovak system for official development assistance was institutionalized and Bratislava began providing democratization aid to Belarus more systematically. In addition to continued support for various elections projects, the Slovak assistance focused on strengthening civic actors and public debate in non-political areas such as local environmental, education, and economic development as well as developing the capacity of independent think tanks to formulate viable reform strategies for the post-Lukashenko era. [See Table 5.1.] With SlovakAid support, Slovak NGOs also continued preparing the Belarusian opposition for the March 2006 presidential elections. When Lukashenko again manipulated the vote to remain in power, the Slovak government criticized the undemocratic practices of the Belarusian

---

94 Interview with T. K., March 18, 2009.
95 Until 2003 Slovakia’s interest in Belarus was minimal but the Slovak NGOs working there convinced the government that Slovakia could make a contribution there because of the similarities between Slovakia and Belarus – both nations had no state of their own for a long time, had rural populations and problems with their national identity and post-communist authoritarians. Slovakia was the first Visegrad country to open its aid mechanism to Belarus in 2003. Lukashenka has not welcomed Slovak activism in Belarus, but Bratislava-Minsk relations are not bad because there are no historical problems between the two countries and Slovakia’s relations with Russia are good. Interview with J. K., November 27, 2008.
authorities and worked with Slovak civic activists to shape the EU’s response to the direction of political developments in Belarus.96

Even though Lukashenko remained in control, there was turnover in power in Slovakia shortly thereafter. Despite the tension between the Slovak civic democracy promoters and the new Slovak coalition in power, the NGOs continued to wield the authority “to influence public opinion and the actions of the political elite.”97 A coalition of civic groups working in Belarus prepared in Belarusian a manual *Slovak Hope: the Experience of Democratic Transformation* to share Slovakia’s reform experience with the Belarusian opposition and to get them ready to assume office. The Slovak NGOs invited the challenger in the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus to receive the manual at a ceremony in Slovakia on Human Rights Day. He was received at the highest level. Moreover, the Slovak parliament condemned the persecution of the political opposition in Belarus. The Slovak MFA further passed the *Slovak Hope* manual to Belarusian officials via diplomatic channels. The visit was crucial in reviving the Slovak debate on Belarus and “helped strengthen the consensus between government and opposition parties on ‘the Belarus question’.”98

With its emphasis on economic diplomacy, the new Slovak governing coalition sought to improve the trade and investment climate between Bratislava and Minsk but did so at the expert and working levels.99 Slovak diplomats argued that “human rights are not for sale. Slovakia is convinced that developing economic relations and supporting human rights in Belarus are compatible, and therefore, supports the

---

96 The chairman of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee, Laszlo Nagy, and Communist Party MP, Dagmar Bollova, also took part in Belarus elections. While the chairman of the parliamentary Human Rights Committee, Laszlo Nagy, who took part in the Slovak short-term election observation group condemned the results, Communist Party MP Dagmar Bollova gave an interview on Belarus TV in support of the regime of President Lukashenko. Also while the future Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, avoided explicitly condemning Lukashenko’s behavior, other leaders in the future governing coalition declared support for the Belarus opposition (Euractiv.sk, October 27, 2005).
98 Ibid.
participation of Belarus in both the Eastern Partnership project and in the activities of the Council of Europe, providing that Belarus adopts certain specific measures.
Abandoning the human rights angle, especially at a time when Belarus is displaying a pressing interest in cooperating more closely with the EU, would be pointless and counterproductive.”

Moreover, Slovakia managed to profile as one of the main agents of the European policy towards Belarus on the European level. Bratislava continued to cooperate with Slovak NGOs not just in its bilateral diplomacy towards Belarus but also in an attempt to influence the policies of various European international organizations towards Belarus. In 2007 Slovakia began organizing bi-annual briefings in the European Parliament and the European Council with the participation of Belarusian experts (from the civic and political opposition). And while presiding the Visegrad Four group, Bratislava participated in the preparation and promotion of a concept for the strengthening of the eastern dimension of the ENP, including relations with Belarus. The same year, Portugal asked Slovakia to exercise the EU presidency in Belarus in recognition of Bratislava’s “significant expertise and experience in relations with Belarus” and lack of historical tension between Slovakia and Belarus.

---

100 Hvorlova, “Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.” As a member of the EU, Slovakia joined the international sanctions against Belarus, although Bratislava was not convinced that they would work. Many Slovak politicians believe that if Slovakia’s international isolation had continued in the late 1990s and Bratislava was excluded from the EU enlargement negotiations, it would have been much more difficult to defeat Meciar’s illiberal agenda. Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008. However, Slovakia has been less openly against the sanctions than Poland. Similarly, after the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia met with the Belarusian MFA during an unofficial working-level visit; Slovakia did not join them but focused on improving the economic relations between the two countries. Duleba, “Slovakia’s Relations with Its Eastern Neighbors in 2008.”

101 Interview with T. K., March 18, 2009.

102 On behalf of the V4 the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the SR, Jan Kubis, presented the Joint Political Statement of the V4 countries on the Strengthening of the European Neighborhood Policy at the January 2007 session of the GAERC and then presented a common document of the V4 including particular concepts of the V4 countries on the realization of the reinforced ENP on the informal meeting of the EU foreign ministers in March 2007 in Bremen, Germany. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Annual Report 2007.

The Slovak embassy in Minsk presented EU positions to relevant institutions in Belarus, coordinated the cooperation and contacts of the EU with Belarusian regions, and cooperated with the democratic forces and the citizenry in Belarus. It also formulated and coordinated the preparation of basic documents and EU positions towards Belarus. Slovakia effectively mobilized “the embassies of member states and increased EU pressure, issuing 15 official statements in six months, and organizing several regional visits and press conferences.”

Moreover, Slovakia organized the EU’s campaign *What the EU Can Bring to Belarus*. It was also during the Slovak presidency that Minsk agreed on the opening of a EU Delegation in Belarus as a precondition for the deeper involvement of Belarus in the ENP.

When Slovakia assumed the Presidency in the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in late 2007, Belarus became the geographical priority while human and minority rights – the thematic one. Bratislava worked to bring Belarus closer to membership in the Council of Europe. The establishment of a Council of Europe Information Centre in Minsk was negotiated to promote the advantages of membership in the Council for the both the state (security) and civil society (human rights).

Slovakia also organized an international expert seminar on the “Use of International Instruments for Protecting Individual Rights, Freedoms and Legitimate Interest through National Legislation and the Right to Legal Defense in Belarus – Challenges and Outlook.” More than 200 representatives of political and cultural life in Belarus, including the opposition, attended the event. Slovak diplomats “emphasized the aspects of Slovakia’s history which became the cornerstones of modern statehood and

---

105 Interview with M. H., November 14, 2008.
democratic development in Slovakia, with a clear message for Belarus today.”

Similarly, the Slovak MFA called on the Belarusian authorities to “respect international obligations regarding freedom of expression and to stop the unjustified violation of human rights and civic freedoms of the Belarusian citizens.”

Even though the political reality in Belarus did not favor a change in the EU and the CoE positions towards Minsk, the perceived geopolitical shifts as a result of the Russian-Georgian conflict of August 2008 earned Belarus its inclusion in the Eastern Partnership. Since the Partnership’s objectives is to assist the countries of Eastern Europe in implementing reforms in compliance with EU standards, it was seen by Slovak diplomats to open up new opportunities for the development of Slovak-Belarusian relations.

Over the year, Bratislava has criticized the authoritarian practices of Minsk and has provided significant political, moral, and technical support to the civic and political democratic forces in Belarus. Additionally, consecutive Slovak governments have also actively supported Slovak NGOs promoting civil society and democratic reforms in Belarus. And lastly, Bratislava has actively steered various European international organization towards an enhanced cooperation with the Belarusian state and citizenry.

2.3. The Origins of Slovakia’s Democracy Promotion

Much like Warsaw, Bratislava did not adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to democracy promotion but exported its own transition experience to the extent that it fit the democratization needs of recipients. [For a summary of Slovakia’s approaches to democracy promotion in Ukraine and in Belarus, see Table 5.2.] Such effectiveness

---

considerations reveal that the Slovak approach to democracy promotion is based on strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than normative appropriateness) of Bratislava’s strategies.

Table 5.2. Slovak Democracy Promotion Approach According to Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments &amp; Sectors</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Ukraine (Hybrid/Democracy)</th>
<th>Belarus (Autocracy)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assistance:</strong> Civil Society &gt; Governing Institutions &gt; Political Process</td>
<td>Diplomacy: Civil Society &gt; Governing Institutions</td>
<td>• for civil society development and civic participation in and debate about EU/NATO accession and for state actors towards Euro-Atlantic integration and reforms</td>
<td>• efforts to enhance the cooperation between the international community and the society and state in Belarus, criticism of the regime, and support for the opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• for civil society development and civic participation in and debate about EU/NATO accession and for state actors towards Euro-Atlantic integration and reforms</td>
<td><strong>Assistance:</strong> Civil Society &gt; Political Process</td>
<td>• advocacy on behalf of Ukraine in front of the EU and NATO</td>
<td>• for civil society and free elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diplomacy:</strong> Governing Institutions &gt; Political Process</td>
<td><strong>Sanctions:</strong> Governing Institutions</td>
<td>• advocacy on behalf of Ukraine in front of the EU and NATO</td>
<td>• downgraded ties and sanctions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarize, Slovak democracy promotion in Ukraine has relied most heavily on assistance to state and non-state actors. Bratislava’s aid has focused on the development of civil society in Ukraine and on the implementation of the reforms necessary for the country’s democratic consolidation and Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, Slovakia has also lobbied the EU and NATO to intensify their cooperation with Kiev and to eventually to accept Ukraine as a member. In autocratic Belarus, Bratislava has preferred to demonstrate its support for the opposition and to criticize

---

*SlovakAid projects in Ukraine and the projects implemented by the Slovak Embassy in Kiev have targeted primarily the non-state sector in Ukraine. On the other hand, Slovak support for the implementation of the annual Ukraine-EU action plans have - because of the character of the EU integration process - targeted primarily the Ukrainian state institutions. It should be noted however, that even in these project, there has been a strong emphasis on the cooperation between state and society in Ukraine. Thus, even though there are three times as many projects in support of the EU integration of Ukraine than there are development assistance projects, the Slovak democracy assistance to Ukraine is most accurately described as privileging civil society over the state.
the regime around key elections. Slovakia has also advocated ending the isolation of Belarus as a way to strengthen the pro-democratic forces in the country. The second most preferred democracy promotion instrument of Slovak diplomats has been assistance to Belarusian civic actors for strengthening the non-state sector as a reservoir of resistance against the regime.

The Slovak “democratization invention” has been investment in the development of politically-oriented civil society (think tanks, watchdog groups, media and election monitors, etc.). As former State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia, Magdalena Vasaryova, explains: “Slovakia’s story from ‘black hole on a map of Central Europe’ (as former Secretary of State Madeline Albright once said) to successful ‘Tatra Tiger’ started sometime in 1996. […] The successful creation of a democratic civil society, built upon involvement of a relatively large group of civic activists and strong and politically independent civic communities and associations, is what is now known as the Slovak story. […] The Slovak story is very popular. […] We hope that this model of co-operation between state and non-state players in the transformation of an autocratic regime into a democratic one will also prove practical in the long run in Ukraine (the Pora movement) or Serbia (the Otpor movement).”

Moreover, this Slovak approach was also tested through Slovakia’s help for the democratization of Serbia. As former foreign minister Kukan reflected on Bratislava’s accomplishments as a democracy promoter: “Recent experience of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia [with its electoral revolution modeled on the OK 98

---

campaign] showed that civic society is capable of building elements of stability and democratic principles.”

Not only has Bratislava been investing civic development abroad but it has also frequently cooperated with and built on the work of the actors with the experience and expertise in building democracy – Slovak civic democracy promoters. Thus Slovakia has “utilized the potential of the [Slovak] non-governmental sector in achieving the foreign policy goals of the Slovak Republic” by allowing it to both generate ideas (topics, issues, methodology) as well as to implement them. Such cooperation and delegation has centered around political and technical support for target civil society and around Slovak efforts to influence the eastern policy of various European international organizations. Here Bratislava has taken a page from Western democracy promotion in Slovakia. The country’s political and civic elites understand external financial and technical assistance to have been important to the development of a strong civic sector, which not only prepared the Slovak democratic breakthrough in 1998 but then also contributed to the consolidation of democracy in the country.

Similarly, having recognized the importance of Euro-Atlantic accession as powerful incentive for successful democratization (and economic successes) in Slovakia’s own transition experience, Bratislava argued against the isolation of autocratic Belarus and assisted Ukraine in its preparation for EU integration, the way Warsaw and Prague assisted Slovakia when it was trying to catch up with the Czech Republic and Poland – by sharing best practices in legislation and institutional reform. Thus, much like the Polish approach to democracy promotion, the Slovak one refracts and integrates the democracy promotion approaches of the Western as well as Eastern donors working in the Eastern European hybrid regimes of the 1990s.

---

110 Intervention by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, H. E. Mr. Eduard Kukan at NATO HQ Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, December 15, 2000.
111 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions*.
112 Forbrig and Demes, *Reclaiming Democracy*. 

213
3. Conclusion

The Slovak civic activists who prepared the democratic breakthrough in the country in the late 1990s and who soon afterwards began assisting other pro-democratic forces challenging nationalist electoral autocrats in the neighborhood also sought to convince the new Slovak democratic government to build on their democracy promotion efforts. These Slovak activists appealed not to the democratic entitlement that motivated their efforts but to the benefits of democracy for resolving the main Slovak foreign policy goals – creating a secure and prosperous international environment for Slovakia and also earning Slovak membership in the EU and NATO. Accordingly, democracy promotion has been a response to instability in the southeastern and eastern European fringes. Moreover, Bratislava has targeted the European neighborhood countries defined domestically and at the EU level to be of strategic importance for the continent’s security. Therefore, if the Polish case points to the domestic sources of the perceived benefits of having democratic international partners, the Slovak case suggests that such domestic constructions can build on and be further defined by their interaction with the security agenda of the international community.

Lastly, Bratislava’s democracy promotion strategy has been the strategic export of what are understood to be the successes of the Slovak transition – the invention of the electoral breakthrough and the feat of catching up with Euro-Atlantic integration. This export has been about sharing a set of experiences – the Slovak journey to the Euro-Atlantic community of democracies. Still, Bratislava has pursued a differential approach depending on the regime type of the recipient. With autocracies, such as Belarus, Bratislava has focused on sharing its pre-1998 experience and the lessons learnt in preparation of the country’s electoral breakthrough. With hybrid regimes, such as Ukraine, Slovakia has sought to transfer mostly its post-1998
experience of developing the institutions and actors that make and guarantee a democracy and catching up with EU and NATO accession. Again, as the Polish case, the Slovak democracy promoters have borrowed some of the lessons of the Western and Eastern democracy promoters that had worked to support Slovakia’s transition.
Supporting the spread of democratic norms and practices around the globe has become a significant element of the security and foreign policy of many developed countries and of the operation of many international governmental and non-governmental organizations. Therefore, a better understanding of this phenomenon is important; yet much of our knowledge about it comes from studying the activities of a handful of established Western democracies. Would fledgling non-Western democracies support democratization abroad? What would motivate such efforts and how would they be undertaken?

I answered these questions empirically by unraveling the puzzle of the quick turnaround of the Eastern European members of the EU from being primarily democracy promotion targets in the 1990s to democracy promoters in the 2000s. To that end, the dissertation examined the motivations of the Eastern European governmental and non-state actors supporting democratization abroad and their distinctive approaches to such democracy promotion. The dissertation argued that the local civic elites who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in the region subsequently became the norm entrepreneurs who championed the incorporation of democracy promotion into their country’s foreign policy and then continued to advocate for keeping support for democracy abroad high on the agenda. The dissertation further maintained that the Eastern European civic activists have been motivated by a normative commitment to democracy while the Eastern European official efforts are best understood as strategic foreign policy commitments; still, both governmental and non-governmental approaches to supporting democratization abroad have been based on strategic calculations about the pragmatic usefulness (rather than
normatively appropriateness) of the transition experiences these actors have exported. As a result, there are distinct national approaches to democracy promotion that are based on the local model of democratization but vary according to the regime types of the recipient.

This chapter summarizes the dissertation’s main arguments about the motivations of the Eastern European governmental and non-state actors supporting democratization abroad and their distinctive approaches to such democracy promotion. The efforts of the Eastern European democracy promoters are then situated among the activities of other actors supporting the spread of democracy abroad. The chapter also discusses some of the key strengths and weaknesses of the Eastern European democracy promoters to argue that they represent a new generation of donors: they might not be assistance “heavy hitters” but their first-hand democratization experience and local knowledge and connections give them important assets. These include credibility, allow them to tailor their approach to the needs of recipients, and make them resolute in their support for democratization abroad. Lastly, the chapter assesses the theoretical contributions of this dissertation to three debates in work on comparative and international politics: democracy promotion, social movements, and transnational diffusion.

One such contribution is that the dissertation articulated two distinct theoretical approaches to democracy promotion: democracy promotion as a strategic commitment and democracy promotion as a normative commitment. The thesis further applied them to studying the activities of non-Western young democracy promoters through an in-depth inductive analysis of their motivations and strategies. As a result, this study pointed to the importance of civic advocacy in favor of spreading democracy abroad and explored the interaction between the strength of social movements and the advocacy frames. The thesis also documented that as some successful national pro-
democratic movements demobilize, the transnational components of these movements become increasingly active, that is, demobilization in some cases is accompanied by an upward scale shift to transnational democracy advocacy activism. A final set of contributions of the dissertation is tracing the diffusion of democracy and its regional quality through everyday political and social interactions in one such region – the post-communist European space. As a result, the thesis illustrates why and how regional effects exist and matter. Lastly, looking at diffusion by focusing on the transmitter allowed this study to suggest that the perceived success of certain practices and their fit with recipient needs privileged them for diffusion over other practices in cases when both the transmitter and the adopter are interested in the exchange of experience.

1. Summary of Findings about the Motivations of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters

Why would the Eastern European actors invest in supporting democratization abroad as they are consolidating democracy at home? As Chapter 3 argued, Slovak, Polish, and in general, Eastern European civic support for democratization abroad emerged from and built on the normative commitments and the transnational networks of the activists who brought democracy to the region. Leaders such as Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Pavol Demes, Vytautas Landsbergis and their fellow activists have a deep personal commitment not just to democracy but also to assisting others fighting for it. The moral obligation to help those struggling for democracy, as the West had assisted them, was felt most acutely by the civic elites with ties to activists in other countries in the neighborhood. In the context of the shared experience of communism and post-communism, such contacts produced solidarity. It motivated activists from successfully democratizing countries to help activists in transition laggards. So with
the support and encouragement of the West and primarily the US, many Eastern European activists maintained and further developed the pro-democratic regional networks put in place before the local breakthroughs to democracy. Moral, technical, and even financial assistance continued to flow through such networks. And the solidarity that produces and is produced and reinforced within this web of contacts has shaped the scope of such civic democracy promotion.

Thus, the Eastern European civic movements promoting democracy abroad developed around a core of normatively motivated activists/NGOs, rooted in the movements that prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their country and linked to other pro-democratic actors in the neighborhood. However, as support for democracy abroad grew at the level of individual organizations and the country as a whole, the importance of pre-existing direct ties diminished and with them – the significance of the normative commitment of Polish and Slovak civic democracy promoters as a driver of their efforts abroad. Still, although available funding and subcontracting became a leading motivation for some of the latest programs of the Polish and Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad as well as for some of the latest recruits to the Polish and Slovak community of civic democracy promoters, such more opportunistic activities have generally included a relatively small number of primarily episodic and ad hoc projects rather than the majority of sustained democracy promotion programs. By uncovering this combination of normative and opportunistic motivations for civic support for the diffusion of democracy around the globe, this dissertation improves on previous accounts of transnational advocacy coalitions and on existing works on democracy promotion. The theoretical implication here is that normative and opportunistic motivations of transnational activism might interact in a cycle-like fashion: there are more opportunistic NGOs among the late comers to a transnational movement than among the early risers and even for normatively-motivated NGOs later

Moreover, their normative commitment to democracy and solidarity with others struggling for democracy compelled the Eastern European civic democracy promoters not only to take steps to support democratization aboard but also to advocate that democracy promotion become an important element in their country’s foreign policy. The latter civic efforts benefited from the fact that in the 1990s democracy promotion was increasingly seen as an accepted and necessary component of the international behavior of states. Moreover, some of the former opposition allies of these civic norm entrepreneurs had entered electoral politics and continued to pay attention to issues of democracy at home and broad. However, as Chapter 3 argued, only in cases where these civic (and political) activists articulated strong and compelling arguments about the answers democracy promotion provided to the important external relations questions facing these young democracies, did support for democracy abroad become part of their foreign policy traditions. Moreover, the stronger the civic voices in favor of democracy promotion, the more easily it was embraced by local political elites. Following such victories, civic supporters of democratization abroad continued to advocate that democracy promotion remain high on their state’s agenda and began participating in its realization though implementing
projects under their country’s official development assistance system.\(^2\) The interaction between movement strength and framing documented here suggests that some types of resources are more important to some types of frames – in this case, the introduction of causal ideas benefited from the strength of the movement championing these ideas.

Thus official democracy promotion emerged as a solution to the main foreign policy concerns of the Eastern European countries, which invested in supporting democratization of their neighborhood to improve the international environment and thus the stability and the survival chances of their young democratic orders. Many of the Polish, Slovak, and other Eastern European political elites, especially the ones who prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their countries, have a personal normative commitment to democracy. It has often compelled them to pay attention to democracy promotion issues for principled reasons. It has also made them supportive of civic democracy promotion by local activists as well as receptive to the arguments of civic norm entrepreneurs for incorporating democracy promotion into their country’s foreign policy and later on for maintaining an active policy of official support for democracy abroad. However, for the most part, despite the personal and at times official solidarity that Eastern European political elites have expressed with other countries in the region, when such solidarity has come into conflict with their country’s perceived strategic objectives, the strategic imperatives have most frequently received priority. Moreover, it was exactly the strategic importance of their

\(^2\) Civic advocacy in favor of democracy promotion has been especially important in cases such as the Slovak one, where democracy promotion was introduced after a critical foreign policy juncture such as the OK 98 campaign in the Slovak case. While the Polish democracy promotion agenda was embedded in the Polish program of national liberation before 1989, the Slovak democracy promotion agenda was incorporated into Slovak foreign policy after the democratic breakthrough in the country. Consequently, there has been much more continuity and consistency in Polish democracy promotion efforts. Additionally, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have had to continuously and actively advocate that democracy promotion remain high on their government’s agenda, especially in times when power has been in the hands of the only partially reformed left. Accordingly, the Polish governmental and civic democracy promoters have worked more in parallel with each other, even if working towards similar objectives. In contrast, the Slovak civic democracy promoters have sought to have Slovak diplomacy cooperated with, built on the work of, and delegate responsibilities to Slovak NGOs supporting democracy abroad.
country’s democracy promotion agenda that would allow it to be sustained over time at the state level and to survive turnover in power. Therefore, as Chapters 4 and 5 argue, Eastern European democracy promotion is best understood as a strategic commitment.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Poland and the other Baltic countries deem containing Russian imperialism, which had for centuries threatened the independence of these nations, one of the most important foreign policy objectives in the post-communist period. The former Baltic dissidents persuaded their country’s political elites that democratizing the nations of the former USSR, especially the founding ones, would counter-balance Russia’s power and weaken Moscow’s temptation to revive the Soviet imperial order. For Slovakia and the other Central and Southeastern European countries, some of the most important foreign policy challenges stemmed from their vulnerability to spillover from and outside shocks such as political instability, capricious dictators, interethnic volatility, and weak states in the Western Balkans but also the former Soviet republics. The Central and Southeastern European civic elites pointed to the potential of democratic rules and practices to stabilize the neighborhood and improve economic and political cooperation in it.

In other words, there are two different types of strategic logics underpinning Eastern European democracy promotion: 1) a geo-political strategy to create reliable partners in the Russian “sphere of influence” and to thus deter Russian aggression and 2) a solution to the political and economic destabilization as a result of the disintegration of the eastern but especially the southeastern European fringes. This finding suggests that the benefits of having democratic international partners, which underlie the logic of the Eastern European strategic commitment to democracy promotion, are negotiated domestically. In other words, this dissertation improves on previous accounts of democracy promotion as a strategic commitment by arguing that
the benefits of having democratic international partners should be investigated rather than assumed. Moreover, this insight speaks to the value of studying democracy promotion by paying attention to state-society relations in foreign policy-making.

Finally, Poland and Slovakia emerged as donors in two consecutive waves of turnaround from recipients to donors. However, even though the international norm of universal right to democracy was much stronger when Slovakia began promoting democracy, Bratislava’s motivations are no more normative and no less strategic than Warsaw’s. Still, the strength and scope of the democracy promotion industry, which had contributed to the consolidation of the universal right to democracy, was greater in the late 1990s. This has had several consequences for Slovakia. First, the Slovak civic and political activists joined and extended the Euro-Atlantic transnational pro-democracy networks of the donors working in Slovakia; in contrast, the Polish civic and political activists developed their own Eastern European transnational pro-democracy network, which was later incorporated into and extended by the donors working in Poland. However, while Western donors had more influence over the reach of the Slovak networks, these Western donors did not have more influence over the motivations of the Slovak activists in these networks – there is not a significantly larger contingent of opportunistic Slovak civic democracy promoters or a significantly larger number of principled Slovak official democracy promotion efforts. At the same time, however, the democracy promotion advocacy of the Slovak civic democracy promoters drew in logic from the efforts of Western democracy promoters and in strength from their approval.
2. Summary of Findings about the Eastern European Approaches to Democracy Promotion

What are the roots of the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion – are they international, national, and/or recipient-specific? Each of the Eastern EU members has a distinct national approach to democracy promotion that varies according to the regime type of the recipients and is based on the local model of democratization. Having recently prepared democratic breakthroughs in their own countries and then participated in the political transformations at home, both governmental and non-governmental actors are consciously and purposefully passing along their “best practices” and the “transition lessons” they learned on the road to democracy and to the Euro-Atlantic community. Given the shared donor-recipient experience with communism and/or post-communism, the Eastern European democracy promoters work on the assumption that the strategies that were effective at home would also be useful abroad, especially in countries with similar authoritarian legacies. At the same time, however, out of all the democratic breakthrough strategies and the reform “recipes” they have, both types of actors share those that they understand to fit the needs, that is, advance the democratization, of individual recipients.

That is why, for example, Polish activists working in authoritarian Belarus propose tactics they understand to have worked in the years when communist Poland was under martial law whereas the activists working in the more democratic Ukraine suggest practices that come from Poland’s post-1989 transition experience. Accordingly, Polish civic activists supporting the democratization of Belarus have aided the development of independent media as an alternative-to-the-regime source of information in order to generate public demand and support for democratization. They have also worked to socialize various civic multipliers (such as youth and educators).
into embracing democratic values and norms in order to ready society to call for change. The Polish NGOs have further assisted the strengthening of civil society so it can resist the concentration of power in the state and mobilize society to create a popular mandate for change. Warsaw’s approach to supporting the democratization of Belarus has been very similar but has also included upholding the international sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime as well as advocacy against isolating the country. On the other hand, Polish civic democracy promoters working in Ukraine have assisted the development of civil society and local democracy and to a lesser extent various civic multipliers; the goal of the Polish activists has been to nurture consolidation of the fragile Ukrainian democracy from the bottom up. The efforts of the Polish state to support the development of democracy in Ukraine have paralleled the activities of the Polish civic democracy promoters. Additionally, Warsaw has lobbied for Ukrainian membership in the Euro-Atlantic community institutions and has provided assistance and diplomatic support for reforming the Ukrainian state in line with democratic practices and especially EU membership requirements.

The Slovak approaches to supporting the development of democracy in Ukraine and in Belarus are different as well. For instance, Slovak civic activists working in Belarus have invested in the strengthening of civil society in general. In particular, they have assisted the development of interest and grassroots groups so they can work with the political opposition to continue challenging the regime. The Slovak civic democracy promoters have also supported the growth of independent analytical centers so they can define a viable reform agenda, work with other civic groups to spread its message to the Belarusian citizenry, and thus support the strengthening of the Belarusian political opposition. Bratislava’s approach to promoting democracy in Belarus has been very similar to the efforts of the Slovak non-governmental activists. Moreover, much like Warsaw, Bratislava has upheld the international sanctions
against Minsk and has advocated that regional European structures not isolate Belarus. On the other hand, Slovak NGOs supporting the democratization of Ukraine have worked on helping the country catch up with the other Eastern European EU and NATO candidates through supporting the reforms required for Euro-Atlantic accession. To that end, the Slovak non-governmental activists have been cooperating with think tanks generating reform proposals and with interest groups organizing public discussion in order to educate the citizenry about and generate support for the reforms ahead of Ukraine. The official Slovak approach to supporting the democratization in Ukraine has additionally included preparing the Ukrainian state to apply to the EU and NATO and advocating for Ukrainian membership in these organizations.

Thus, there are distinct national approaches to Eastern European democracy promotion: governmental and non-governmental democracy promoters from the same donor country use many of the same instruments and target many of the same beneficiaries abroad. This finding parallels the trends documented in studies of Western support for the development of democracy around the globe.3 Such national approaches have been explained by the fact that Western democracy promoters often export replicas of their own political institutions. Similarly, the emergence of Eastern European national approaches to democracy promotion is a consequence of the fact that both political and civic activists from each post-communist donor are borrowing best practices from their country’s democratization experience. However, mature donors are criticized for “one-size-fits-all” approaches, whereas, as discussed above,

---

the Eastern European national approaches vary according to the regime type of the recipient.

Moreover, while established democracies are said to often export their national democracy models, the young democracies seek to export their national democratization models. These democratization models are often more like recipes about defeating authoritarians (breakthrough) and achieving particular reform objectives (consolidation) rather than full-blown, explicit, and well-articulated models of what democracy is or how democratization unfolds. Such democratization models are based on a particular type of state-society interactions, which have produced a particular national repertoire of struggle against unchecked and concentrated state power and lack of political representation. Such national repertoires are further embedded in the repertoires of the wave of democratization in which the country’s transition begins. The repertoires of Poland and of the other first wave of Eastern European democratization countries reflect the general strategies, tactics, and practices designed in the struggle against communism; the Polish repertoire further and uniquely is grounded in the Polish “negotiated transition.” The repertoires of Slovakia and the other first wave of Eastern European democratization countries is based on their struggle to transform hybrid democracies into truly competitive liberal orders; also, the Slovak repertoire additionally and distinctly includes the specific innovations of the Slovak “electoral breakthrough” in 1998. Such breakthrough repertoires are further developed and strengthened through various reform recipes, strategies, and sequences in the period of “democratic consolidation.”


5 The Eastern European donors have not limited themselves to working with recipients whose level of political repression corresponds to the circumstances in which these donors’ national democratization repertoires were invented. Still, some recipients have asked for and been especially receptive to advice from donors whose national democratization repertoires are understood to have emerged in periods with
For example, Slovakia’s electoral revolution required and reinforced the work of NGOs involved in the political process (think tanks, watchdog groups, media and election monitors, etc.), whereas the Polish transition involved empowering and mobilizing numerous local communities (including local governments and grassroots groups and civic leaders). Since Eastern European democracy promotion is about sharing a donor’s democratization experience from the periods before and after the country’s democratic breakthrough, Slovak democracy promoters have supported the capacity of civil society to do political work by serving as a bridge between the public and political elites; Polish democracy promoters, on the other hand, have invested in civil society development as a means to de-concentration of power away from the political center. Similarly in terms of instruments used for democracy promotion, given the role of civil society in demanding compliance with democratic rules and practices in the Slovak model, Bratislava has relied heavily on democracy assistance and as a result has one of the strongest and most developed aid systems. In contrast, the Polish model accords great importance to having the ruling elites be at the negotiating table ready to embrace political liberalization and follow through afterwards. Accordingly, Warsaw has worked on creating a dense institutional network of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to demonstrate the benefits of democracy and induct recipients to its practices.6

Lastly, some of the best practices the Eastern European democracy promoters have shared with their recipients have included practices imported to these countries levels of repression similar to those in these recipients’ countries. For example, the Polish rather than the Slovak democratization repertoire has been of interest to some Russian activists because these activists see Russia to be much more of an autocracy than a hybrid regime.

6 These trends are further replicated through the actors implementing Slovak and Polish democracy assistance: all of the Slovak projects in Ukraine and Belarus have been implemented by Slovak NGOs, whereas 47% of Polish aid has been implemented through the Polish public administration, 13% of Polish projects have been channeled through the Polish Embassies in these countries, and 40% of Polish assistance has been administered by Polish NGOs. Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008).
earlier by Western democracy promoters. For example, in supporting the development of independent media in Belarus, Polish democracy promoters took a page from the work of US democracy promoters who provided technical and financial assistance to the Polish underground media in the 1980s. Similarly, the emphasis on election monitoring by Slovak democracy promoters has its roots in the work of the US International Republican Institute in Slovakia. And a final example of East-East-East diffusion: some of Slovakia’s efforts to Ukraine prepare its EU integration homework include some of the activities Poland and the Czech Republic used to help Bratislava catch up with the first wave of EU accession candidates. Such democracy promotion imports that later become exports are perhaps even more abundant among the Eastern European civic supporters of democracy abroad. These NGOs tend to help their international partners run projects very similar to the ones these democracy promoting groups have at home; such domestic programs, however, had frequently been set up with help and standard operating procedures from the West. In this way, the Eastern European democracy promoters have contributed to the convergence of best practices among democracy promoters around the globe.

In sum, there are some important differences between the approaches of established and young donors. Established donors are said to seek to export replicas of their domestic institutions. New donors, given their recent democratization experience, seek to export transition recipes. Moreover, they choose best practices that they understand as appropriate to the democratization level of their recipients. The result is the export of “breakthrough” and “consolidation” models / strategies that vary according to the regime types of the beneficiaries. Consider the contrast of such nuanced approaches with the one-size-fits-all approaches of Western donors. Such distinct characteristics of the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion suggest that young donors should not be overlooked in future studies of democracy promotion.
assistance. Lastly, although the Eastern European approaches to democracy promotion are based on distinct national repertoires of struggles against authoritarianism, some of their constituent practices were initially imported to these post-communist countries by Western democracy promoters. This is not to suggest that the Eastern European actors are agents or clones of the Western players but that their work presents a unique snapshot of and thus a valuable opportunity to study multi-stage diffusion as well as the success of Western democracy promotion efforts.

3. The East, the West, and the International Democracy Promotion Community

In transitioning from being predominantly targets of democracy promotion in the 1990s to being primarily democracy promoters in the 2000s, the Eastern European members of the EU have joined a donor community of governmental and non-governmental actors linked in a complex and dynamic system of transnational, transgovernmental, and international networks. Such networks are not just bilateral, organizational or even country, contacts but often include multiple organizations from multiple countries, forming a web of competition and collaboration within the transatlantic space. These networks gravitate around influential donors and

---

7 In the work of scholars of transnational relations, such “interactive networks of state, non-state and international actors who gravitate around both national and international institutions” have been defined as instances of “complex internationalism.” Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

8 As a result of this embeddedness of the Eastern European actors, several older members of the democracy promotion community – Western NGOs, aid agencies, quasi-governmental and private foundations, party federations, labor unions, and international organizations – starred in some of the case studies and illustrations of the Eastern European efforts described in the previous chapters. For example, aid agencies such as CIDA and USAID trained and cooperated with Eastern European aid agencies; quasi-governmental foundations such as the NED, the IRI, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy assisted pro-democratic political and civic leaders in the post-communist region and then encouraged them to themselves start supporting democracy abroad; private foundations such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the Open Society Institute funded Eastern European NGOs and then partnered with them to support democratization further east and southeast; Western NGOs such as the Freedom House and the German youth meeting houses worked and opened branches in Eastern Europe; and international organizations such as the EU, OSCE, CoE, UNDP, and NATO supported the democratization of the Eastern European actors and later became platforms through which these actors could implement their own democracy promotion agenda.
international organizations and are further uneven in that the links between some countries and types of actors are denser than those between others. Lastly, only a few recipient countries have galvanized the development of these networks of formal and informal transnational contacts into coalitions or advocacy campaigns, which additionally involve coordinated tactics and popular mobilization respectively.\(^9\)

The advocacy campaign of the democracy promotion community active in Belarus illustrates these points well. There are a number of countries, which actively support the democratization of Belarus – the US, the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Additionally, there are a number of European regional organizations, which also seek to spread democratic norms and practices in Belarus – the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe. Representatives of these governments and international organizations convene frequently to coordinate formally and informally their policies towards Belarus. Experts on Belarus note that especially after the imposition of international sanctions against Minsk, there has been a “bad cop – good cop” division of labor between the US and Europe.\(^10\) Also, within Europe, the EU avoided all but low-level contacts with the Belarusian regime in the late 1990s and early 2000 while the OSCE maintained structured formal dialogue with both the regime and the opposition. On the other hand, the Eastern European EU members – if to varying degrees – have been the most vocal supporters of engagement with Belarus bilaterally and within/through the EU and have coordinated their positions towards Minsk through the Visegrad Group and

---


\(^10\) Interview with W. B., October 13, 2008.
several Visegrad + Baltic forums. Lastly, there are also informal annual meetings of donors working in Belarus.\textsuperscript{11}

Moreover, these governmental actors are also partners with and targets of the civic actors seeking to influence national and transatlantic policies towards Minsk and to implement assistance in Belarus. Such NGOs interested in supporting the democratization of Belarus (and often also active in other democratizing countries as well) are in turn connected not just to their Belarusian recipients but also to each other. In Poland for instance they “help each other” through forums such as the national development NGO umbrella group Zagranica and such as the informal caucus of democracy promoters interested in Belarus.\textsuperscript{12} At the international level, these civic activists are connected through the European-level NGO federations (such as Trialogue) as well as through various donor networks (such as the Open Society East-East Program and the US DemNet programs). Also, while rare, there have been some trilateral – for example, Polish-Czech and Polish-Slovak – civic initiatives as well. At the same time, at both the governmental and the civic level, contacts between Poland and Belarus have been much more dense than the contacts between Sweden and Belarus. Similarly, the cooperation between Poland and Lithuania on the ground and in the context of putting Belarus on the EU agenda has been much stronger than the cooperation on the Belarus question between Poland and Slovakia, for instance.

Both governmental and civic democracy promoters working in Belarus have gravitated towards the EU – which is understood to have the most tangible and intangible carrots and sticks to offer to the elites and the citizenry of Belarus. Again, both governmental and civic activists have become particularly active around elections


\textsuperscript{12} Interview with G. G., October 13, 2008. The caucus leader reported that activists not only discuss their strategies but also advise each other on how to best navigate the dangerous work in this repressive state.
in Belarus. For instance, Poland launched not one but two big state-run “Independent Media” initiatives and approved a special “Independent Media” PolishAid appropriation before the 2006 elections in Belarus. Similarly, elections have served as focal points for popular mobilization against the Minsk regime as well. For example, in an award-winning 2005 campaign “Freedom of Speech in Belarus,” Amnesty International-Poland organized hundreds of thousands letters written by Poles and sent to Belarusian President Lukashenko in protest of human rights abuses by Minsk. In general, the work of the Eastern European democracy promoters has encountered little domestic resistance and much support from the citizenry and other non-state groups.

Lastly, while there has been some coordination of efforts on the part of the international community as well as a lot of parallel work, there has also been some competition: for example, there are two foreign radios broadcasting in Belarus from abroad – one supported by Poland, the US, and the UK and another one supported by the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the EU. There has been further competition between the transnational democracy advocacy networks working in Belarus and other regional networks pulling the country towards Russia and its model of “competitive authoritarianism.” Each democratic breakthrough in the former Soviet Union in the 2000s has strengthened the pro-democratic forces in other countries through both demonstration and diffusion effects but it has also allowed dictators in the neighborhood to learn from the mistakes of their fallen counterparts in order to strengthen their grip on society.

---

14 The US initially supported the Polish-run radio but later began financing the EU-sponsored radio instead. Interview with K. S., August 18, 2010.
16 Vitali Silitski, “Contagion Deterred: Preemptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the Case of Belarus),” in Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World, ed. Valerie Bunce,
Thus, the Eastern European democracy promoters have been working among, have been seeking and have been mostly benefiting from the support and partnership of other Eastern and Western actors. And as the chapter discussed earlier, the actors who joined the democracy promotion community early on – as Polish activists did – quickly began building on their dissident networks, which were incorporated and extended by the networks of other donors working in the region and beyond. On the other hand, the actors who became members of the democracy promotion community later on – as Slovak activists did – joined and extended the networks of other donors in the post-communist space and eventually further afield. In general, as latecomers to the democracy promotion industry, the eastern European actors have tried to maximally utilize their “comparative advantages [as democracy promoters] arising from the [ir] transformation experience” and from their good relations with certain non-democratic countries by focusing on the (global) post-communist space and by further establishing some informal division of labor within it.17

For the most part, the Eastern European democracy promoters have been supportive of each other’s bilateral and multilateral initiatives and each other’s efforts on the ground. Trilateral projects have been rare because of the different national approaches to democracy promotion and because of the logistical difficulties of implementing such activities.18 At the state level, there have been some joint efforts, for instance, the Visegrad Fund Scholarship program for Ukraine and Belarus and some coordination of activities both bilaterally – for example Poland and Slovakia on policies towards Ukraine – and multilaterally at forums such as the Visegrad group

Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Bunce and Wolchik, Democratizing Elections, Diffusion and Democracy.
17 Quote from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, National Programme of the Official Development Assistance for 2009 (Bratislava, 2009), 20. There is some reference to Slovakia’s comparative advantages as a democracy promoter in all such national aid programs. Similarly, most of the other donors also discuss their comparative advantages in the programmatic official development assistance documents as well.
18 Interview with M. S., November 13, 2008.
and Visegrad + Baltic meetings.\textsuperscript{19} At the EU level, the Eastern European actors have been able to count on each other for support for their democracy promotion initiatives. For instance, all the Eastern members lined up behind the Eastern Partnership. Even when the issue at stake has been not a major initiative but, for example, a simple European Parliament resolution criticizing the undemocratic practices in Belarus, the Eastern representatives have usually successfully mobilized the support of their post-communist colleagues.\textsuperscript{20} It should be mentioned, however, that there has been some competition between the Czech Republic and Poland about Eastern European leadership on democracy promotion questions as well as some competition between post-communist countries interested developing the Black Sea Synergy and ones eager to develop the Eastern Partnership.\textsuperscript{21}

The older members of the democracy promotion community have also generally welcomed the new Eastern European recruits. Western donors recognized that Eastern EU members have valuable experience that is often more relevant to countries further east and south than the expertise Western donors bring.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the West has seen post-communist democracy promotion as a continuation of their work and further diffusion of their values.\textsuperscript{23} As a result, Western and especially American donors have played an important role in stimulating and strengthening post-communist democracy promotion. They have formally and informally conveyed their expectation that Eastern European democratization success stories should assist democratization laggards in the region (and beyond). Joint ventures such as the Polish-

\textsuperscript{20} Interview with J. S.-W., February 25, 2008.
\textsuperscript{22} Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008.
\textsuperscript{23} Interview with M. G, April 12, 2009, and interview with B. H., April 18, 2009.
American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative or CIDA’s institutional partnership with the young Eastern European aid departments speak just as loudly as Western donors’ suggestions that the Eastern European actors “should not ignore the pro-democracy desires” of other countries in the region. In some cases, Western democracy promoters have also directly brokered the diffusion of the Eastern European transition experience – for example, US donors introduced Slovak to Belarusian activists. In other cases, Western actors have let out work on sub-contract to their former eastern recipients, allowed them to re-grant Western aid, hired former recipients as consultants, and funded their work partially or in full. And finally, Western donors further indirectly encouraged and supported the democracy promotion activism of the Eastern European players by sponsoring regional civic and governmental forums (such as the Political Academy for Central and Eastern Europe organized by the IRI), which created at once demand for democratization expertise of the Eastern EU members and solidarity among them and other civic and governmental activists in the region.

Although the West has played a formative role in the development of the young Eastern European democracy promoters, it would be a mistake to overlook the independent and organic Eastern European movements behind post-communist democracy promotion and to treat these movements as Western intermediaries or agents in the European neighborhood and beyond. The independence of the Eastern European initiatives is most clearly demonstrated by the domestic logic underpinning

---

25 On brokerage as a “route” within “scale shift” from national to transnational mobilization, see Tarrow, The New Transnational Activism.
26 It should be noted, however, that the support of the Western democracy promoters has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, their activities have created an international environment in which supporting democracy around the globe has become a legitimate undertaking, which has further facilitated and validated the activities of the Eastern players as well. On the other hand, disillusionment and disappointment with the activities of the Western democracy promoters has made their work and the work of their younger Eastern European counterparts somewhat more difficult.
such efforts. As a result, democracy promotion in the countries that are of concern to the West but not to the East has not been prioritized by the post-communist actors, if it has taken off at all. A good example here is Eastern European involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are a development assistance priority for a lot of the post-communist donors but a democracy promotion priority for just one – the Czech Republic has invested both aid and diplomatic efforts in supporting the democratization of Iraq. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 2, despite the encouragement of Western donors, some Eastern EU members such as Hungary have mostly shied away from supporting democracy even in their neighborhood.

Moreover, the Eastern European actors have left their mark on Western democracy promotion as well. The transnational democracy advocacy networks not only expanded when the Eastern Europe joined the international democracy promotion community but they also changed in important ways. To continue with the Belarusian example, two facts illustrate this point well. First, the West and especially the EU used to pay relatively little attention to Belarus because of the Western European “Russia-first” approach to the eastern neighborhood and because autocratic Belarus has been relatively stable. However, the advocacy of the Eastern EU members has put Belarus much higher on the EU’s agenda. Second, while the West has traditionally responded to grave human rights and democracy abuses by imposing sanctions against violating regimes – and has done so in the Belarusian case in 1999 – the Eastern democracy promoters have been proponents of “critical dialogue;” they convinced the EU to adopt this approach by including Belarus in the Eastern Partnership. In this

---

27 Balazs Jarabik and Vitali Silitski, “Belarus.”
29 It should be mentioned that there is a debate within the democracy assistance community in Washington and some other Western capitals on how to deal with the Belarusian dictatorship. The Eastern EU democracy assistance community, however, speaks in one voice in favor of engagement and argues for it using examples from their recent democratization experience.
sense, the Eastern European democracy promoters have influenced both the scope and the instruments of Western democracy promotion.

Just as importantly, some Eastern European donors have – usually successfully – sought to assume leadership of the international community’s efforts in particular countries – for example, Poland has taken the lead on the Ukrainian question. Such championship ambitions of the Eastern EU democracy promoters have emerged at a time of Western skepticism about the advisability of exporting democratic norms and practices. These ambitions have also developed at a time when the democracy promotion leader, the US, has shifted its attention to regions other than the ones of interest to the Eastern European actors. And even though these activists have faced some competition from Western European big players interested in the east and southeast such as Germany and from ardent democracy promoters such as the Nordic countries, the expertise and zeal of the Eastern Europeans has helped make their voices heard.30

In sum, with joining the complex and dynamic system of transnational democracy advocacy networks, the Eastern European actors have both contributed to and been influenced by the activities of other players within those networks. In general, there have been a lot of parallel efforts and more coordination and cooperation than competition among the Eastern and Western players in these networks. The Eastern European actors have not only collectively shaped the geographical reach of these networks and the instruments used to promote democracy in the recipients of concern to the post-communist donors but have also individually assumed leaderships of external efforts to support democracy in particular countries. Additionally, by re-granting Western aid and serving as consultants or subcontractors in Western projects, the Eastern European activists have also influenced how Western

assistance has been implemented. The Western democracy promoters have in turn encouraged and supported Eastern European democracy promotion, thus stimulating and legitimizing such activism. The West has also shaped the reach of Eastern European democracy promotion through brokering the diffusion of the their transformation experience (within the space dictated by the domestic logic of post-communist democracy promotion). Additionally, to the extent that some of the best practices the Eastern European democracy promoters have exported abroad have included practices imported earlier in these countries by Western democracy promoters, the Western activists have further influenced how Eastern European democracy promotion has been implemented. Still, the general independence and organic development of the Eastern European movements behind post-communist democracy promotion should not be underestimated.

4. A New Generation of Democracy Promoters?

An important question, a detailed answer to which is well beyond the scope of this dissertation, is how the Eastern European democracy promoters compare to other (Western) democracy promoters in terms of their motivations, their approaches, and their overall effectiveness as supporters of the diffusion of democracy around the globe? Have the Eastern democracy promoters managed to avoid the mistakes for which they have criticized their donors? The efforts of the Eastern European actors surveyed in this dissertation suggest that these players represent a new generation of democracy promoters. They are not the richest or the most influential donors in the international democracy promotion community but they do stand out in their priority countries. There, the Eastern European donors have earned a “good reputation” and have had “considerable” impact in strengthening recipient democratic practices.
because of their local knowledge, unique and highly relevant expertise in and nuanced approach to democracy promotion.31

4.1. On the Motivations of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters

In terms of motivations, the democratic commitments of the Eastern European civic activists and the “idealistic” reputation of the Eastern EU member states have by and large made their support for democratization in the neighborhood welcomed and even appreciated. Still, the strategic motivations behind Eastern European official democracy promotion have at times compromised their support for democracy abroad. 

The normative commitment to democracy of the Eastern European civic activists stands in contrast with criticism of the perceived opportunism of Western consultants working in the post-communist region in the 1990s. For example, these Western activists came to be known colloquially in Poland as the “Marriott brigades,” after the name of the expensive hotel at which they preferred to stay.32 In contrast, with words and with deeds, the Eastern European democracy promoters working in their neighborhood spoke the language of solidarity. As mentioned before, many of these Eastern European NGOs were founded and/or run by participants in the democratization movements in their countries. Through the international activities of those movements, many of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters had ties to other pro-democratic forces in the region. They thus had little reason to doubt commitment of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters to democracy and to assisting others on the road to democracy. According to recipients, this “genuine

31 Quotes from Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 192, 205.
32 So great was the Eastern misperception and Western criticism of the motivations of these actors that some observers felt compelled to explicitly comment on their normative motivations – “These NGOs […] “from the United States, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe”] are motivated mainly by ideals, not profits.” Sarah E. Mendelson, “Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure,” International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001): 68–106. “Marriott Brigades” reference from Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe, 1989–1998 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
interest” in their country’s democratization predisposed them positively towards working with the Eastern European civic democracy promoters.33

At the state level, Western donors have been harshly criticized for the fact that democracy promotion has for the most part remained an ad hoc and low priority policy relative to other conflicting but more “traditional foreign policy goals.”34 What is interesting about the Eastern European donor states is that despite their strategic motivations for supporting democratization in the neighborhood, they have gotten a reputation of democracy promotion “idealists.”35 This reputation is in part a result of the fact that a lot of these political activists prepared the democratic breakthroughs in their countries and do have a personal normative commitment to democracy. The reputation is also partly based on the fact the Eastern European officials emphasize that they are pursuing a “value-oriented diplomacy.”36 Indeed, the Eastern EU members generally pay a lot more attention and act more resolutely to support the spread of democracy in their neighborhood than many of the other major Western European players such as Germany, France, Spain, and often even the UK.37 Both the Eastern European donors and their recipients acknowledge that this reputation has increased the receptivity of beneficiaries and thus improved the impact of the Eastern democracy promoters.38

It should be noted, however, that even if their assistance has generally been well received, there have been questions raised about the motivations of the Eastern

35 David Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate Countries (Prague: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, June 2005).
36 Quote from Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 29.
37 Interview with E. S.-M., February 16, 2009.
European democracy prompters. At the state level, Poland’s activities in Ukraine and Belarus and Romania’s efforts during the Moldovan political crisis of 2009 have also raised some suspicion in certain recipient circles. When civic riots erupted against the repressive and corrupt regime of the former communists in Moldova, their leaders claimed that Romania was behind the unrest.\textsuperscript{39} These accusations, however, did not gain wide acceptance and did not prevent the regime from losing power in favor of the pro-democratic and pro-Western (including pro-Romanian) forces.

Similarly, the notion of “Polish imperialism” vis-à-vis Ukraine and Belarus came up in a few of the narratives of Polish activists and their recipients.\textsuperscript{40} Such notions are based on the shared history of the Polish-Ukrainian-Belarusian-Lithuania state under the Polish crown and the current ambitions of Warsaw to become the regional leader. Recipients of the assistance of Polish NGOs brought the issue up as a criticism of the sometimes-paternalistic attitude of Polish activists (rather than a sense of threat to their identity and national political project). At the same time, the Ukrainian recipients were mostly grateful for the Polish help.\textsuperscript{41} At the state level, Ukraine has also been most welcoming of Polish advice, advocacy, and assistance.\textsuperscript{42} This is well illustrated by the fact that during the Orange Revolution, both the regime and the opposition invited independently Polish mediation of the crisis.

In Belarus, Lukashenko has been understandably hostile to Polish efforts to support the opposition against him. The regime in Minsk has pointed to the fact that some of the activities of the Eastern European NGOs are funded by the US to discredit


\textsuperscript{40} Interview with K. F., October 22, 2008; Radoslaw Sikorski, current Minister of Foreign Affairs, “On the Republic of Poland’s Foreign Policy for 2008,” Address to the Polish Parliament, Warsaw, February 17, 2008.

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with U. U., March 18, 2009.

them by arguing that they represent US interests. Moreover, a few of the key Polish civic activists working in Belarus have been “blacklisted” and denied entry visas. That said, the majority of the civic groups supporting the democratization of Belarus report that their activities in Belarus have not been threatened by Lukashenko and are valued by the general population.

Even if the Eastern European democracy promotion efforts in the neighborhood have generally been welcomed and appreciated by most recipients (despite representing a strategic commitment on the part of the Eastern EU member states), the motivations of the Eastern donors might have compromised their impact in other ways. First, the Eastern European diplomats have tended to be lenient towards countries in transition and to criticize their reform record mostly in private. Second, Eastern European support for democratization in the neighborhood has sometimes been prioritized under and even sacrificed for good neighborly relations or other political or economic considerations. Therefore, the effect of such democracy promotion compromises in the name of higher strategic goals on the impact of such efforts deserve further detailed scrutiny.

4.2. On Approaches of the Eastern European Democracy Promoters

In terms of approaches, the established Western donors have attracted most criticism for their “one-size-fits-all” approaches and ignorance about local
conditions. Not only have the Eastern European supporters of democracy around the globe avoided making these mistakes but their recent democratization experience has provided them with an additional advantage in better supporting democratization in their neighborhood. Thus, while the priorities of the Eastern and the Western democracy promoters do not differ much, the implementation of these priorities has been improved by the contributions of post-communist actors as a result of their attention to the needs of their recipients, better knowledge of their beneficiaries, and their ready-to-use transition experience. [For a comparison of the Eastern and Western sectoral priorities, see Box 6.1.]

**Box 6.1. Eastern and Western Sectoral Priorities for Democracy Promotion in Ukraine and Belarus**

Except for a few distinct and innovative practices – such as Slovak attention to think tanks in Belarus, Polish work with the Ukrainian youth or Hungary’s human rights dialogue in China – the democracy promotion priorities of the Eastern European actors do not differ much from those of Western players. For instance, like all Western actor, the Eastern European ones support the civic opposition in Belarus. Moreover, Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance, also support the development of independent media, much like the US, the EU, the UK, and Denmark. Also, Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia support the socialization of youth leaders into a number of civic and democratic values, as do the US and the EU. The Czech Republic further focuses on human rights issues; so does Sweden. And finally, the US, Germany, and the UK assist the opposition party development in Belarus but so do, even if to a lesser extent, Slovakia, Poland and Lithuania.

---

Box 6.1 (Continued)

Similarly in Ukraine, civil society, and especially interest groups, are supported by all Eastern and Western donors. The development of Ukraine’s political parties is the focus of US, Germany, the UK. The US, the UK, the EU, Sweden, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic countries direct assistance to strengthening public administration. Local government is emphasized by the US, Poland, Hungary and the Netherlands. The US, the EU, the UK support the establishment of an independent judiciary and rule of law. The US, the EU, and the Czech Republic work with journalists in Ukraine and Poland – with the youth. Lastly, human rights issues are a special concern to the US, the EU, the UK, and Sweden.

4.2.1. Nuanced Approaches

Although they have tended to export best practices from their own transition experience, the Eastern European democracy promoters have at least somewhat tailored their efforts to the democratization needs of the recipients. Western donors are said to support the global spread of democratic norms through activities that are suitable to promote either regime change or stabilize countries that have had a democratic breakthrough but rarely both. The Eastern European donors, however, have demonstrated a fairly nuanced democracy promotion approach, which differs according to regime type. As the previous chapters documented, the Polish and the Slovak approaches to supporting democracy in Ukraine have been respectively different from the Polish and the Slovak approaches to supporting democracy in Belarus. Moreover, given the progressive entrenchment of the Belarusian regime, the approaches of Poland and Slovakia have also evolved over time. For instance, Warsaw moved beyond support for the political and civic opposition and toward also

48 “The EU democracy-promotion strategy is that it is designed more to stabilize countries that are already democratic whereas the US one – to promote “regime change” in nondemocracies.” (Jeffrey Kopstein, “The Transatlantic Divide over Democracy Promotion,” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 [2006]: 85–98.) However, there are also those who point to convergence and learning among different actors as well as sub-national variation in strategy. See, for example, Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Assistance: Political vs Developmental?” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 1 (January 2009): 5–19.
strengthening much more actively the independent media and the democratic commitments of various Belarusian civic multipliers.

Similarly, there are some differences between the Eastern European approaches to countries in the same regime category. For example, Slovakia has actively worked with both Ukraine and Serbia shortly before and especially after the democratic breakthroughs in each country. After the opening of the EU Association Agreement process with Serbia, Slovak NGOs continued assisting civic groups, think tanks, and journalists advocating for the benefits of EU membership but also started working with parliamentarians and local officials to increase their competence and capacity to meet the Union’s requirements and to gain from membership in it. In Ukraine (where there is still some ambivalence towards the EU), the Slovak civic approach has emphasized training interest group and think tank trainings as well as organizing public debates to educate Ukrainians about the requirements and benefits of membership in the Union.

In other words, unlike their Western counterparts, the Eastern European donors seem to have improved on the “general discrepancy between the fairly coherent and unified agenda [of their established Western counterparts] and the diversity of objectives and working methods among the recipients.” And this stronger link between recipient needs and assistance is understood by beneficiaries to constitute a “big part” of the “value” of Eastern European support.

4.2.2. Local Knowledge

As the previous chapters documented, the post-communist donors have tended to work in their neighborhood and especially in countries with which they have

---

49 Schmitter and Brower, “Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection.”
50 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.”
historical and political ties. As a result, the Eastern European democracy promoters not only know their counterparts better but have a lot more knowledge about their recipients’ cultural traditions, authoritarian practices or legacies, and local power relations than most of the Western donors working in the same countries. Both recipients and Western donors pointed to such local knowledge and personal relationships as an important advantage of the Eastern European democracy promoters.51

For example, Western and Ukrainian political actors involved in responding to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 note that “Kwasniewski was the most active of the mediators” and “made the most creative contributions” because of his “relationships with key Ukrainian players,” “his knowledge of the situation on the ground,” and the fact that he “was best prepared” and “could draw upon his own experience as a participant in the 1989 Polish roundtable negotiations.”52 Also, while the institutional presence of the European Union “carried great weight,” pre-existing personal relationships appear to have nonetheless been “more important” to the credibility of the mediators: according to Western and Ukrainian observers, Kwasniewski’s success as a moderator seems to have been based on the fact that he sought to speak for and involve the EU but much more importantly that the two camps “knew” and had “confidence” in him.53

Western donors value the importance of the local knowledge and social capital of the Eastern European democracy promoters not just during democratic breakthrough interventions but also in the context of day-to-day diplomacy and assistance work in the post-communist neighborhood. A good illustration of this

51 Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010; interview with R. P., October 19, 2008; interview with L. S., February 19, 2009; and interview with R. S., March 19, 2009.
52 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007.
53 Interview with S. P., June 20, 2007. Among the mediators, Kwasniewski had the closest relationship with Kuchma, whom he had known since 1996. He had also dealt previously with both Yushchenko and Yanukovych.
appreciation is the fact that the functions of most of the NATO contact points in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are delegated to Eastern European embassies in these countries.\footnote{For example, NATO is represented by Lithuania’s embassy in Belarus and Moldova, by the Slovak embassy in Ukraine, by the Czech embassy in Serbia, the Hungarian embassy in Montenegro, the Latvian embassy in Georgia, the Polish embassy in Turkmenistan, and the Romanian embassy in Azerbaijan.} And as discussed earlier in this chapter, there are a number of institutional partnerships between Eastern and Western donors and even more numerous cases of funding and sub-contracting of Eastern European activists by Western democracy promoters as well as consulting and re-granting by post-communist actors for Western players.

Recipients of Eastern European democracy promotion efforts have also expressed appreciation for the local knowledge and connections of their post-communist counterparts. For example, unlike some Western donors, the Eastern European actors have a good understanding of the “current situation facing their counterparts” and do not require their Belarusian partners to interact with state authorities, to keep a paper trail of their activities, to co-finance joint projects, or to have an official bank account.\footnote{Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy.”} Also, because of their better understanding of the situation on the ground, Eastern European players have not been “afraid” to fund and partner with “small and sometimes unknown” NGOs and NGOs “outside the capital city.”\footnote{Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95.} Similarly, because of their previous “trust-based dialogue” with recipients, the Eastern European activists have been able to broach “areas that can be very tricky for post-Soviet societies, such as combating corruption or engaging NGOs in the policymaking process.”\footnote{Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.”} What is more, criticism coming from the Eastern European actors has been felt more like peer pressure and has thus been accepted “much more patiently” in hybrid regimes in the neighborhood than criticism coming from Brussels.

---

\footnote{For example, NATO is represented by Lithuania’s embassy in Belarus and Moldova, by the Slovak embassy in Ukraine, by the Czech embassy in Serbia, the Hungarian embassy in Montenegro, the Latvian embassy in Georgia, the Polish embassy in Turkmenistan, and the Romanian embassy in Azerbaijan.} \footnote{Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy.”} \footnote{Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95.} \footnote{Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.”}
or other EU-15 capitals. And especially at the civic level, recipient NGOs report feeling “ownership” as they were able to help shape the “objectives, activities, target audience” of projects as equals to their Eastern European partners thus also ensuring that assistance reflects better the needs of beneficiaries. All these advantages contribute positively and greatly to the impact of the Eastern European donors.

Moreover, the Eastern European actors supporting democracy abroad have tended to export best practices from their own transition experience thus improving the fit between recipient and promoted practices given the general donor-recipient similarities. For instance, not only do Poland and Ukraine have a shared recent experience of communism but they also have centuries of shared statehood and history in the same Eastern European political space. Therefore, the model of the Polish local government reform, for example, is much more applicable to the Ukrainian social and political realities than the model of the US intergovernmental system. Such fit between recipient and promoted practices is consistently found by scholars of transnational advocacy networks and students of diffusion as one of the most important factors for the success of the norm adoption by recipients.

---

59 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.” It is important to mention that representatives of the Polish foreign ministry hold consultations on the assistance priorities with representatives of the Ukrainian government and NGOs, the Belarusian civic and political opposition, as well as the international donor community active in Ukraine and Belarus. On lack of sense of ownership of practices promoted by Western donors, see Schmitter and Brower, “Conceptualizing, Researching and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection.”
4.2.3. Recent Democratization Experience

Another advantage of the Eastern European democracy promoters comes from the fact that they are all recent democratization graduates themselves. The personal experience as the architects and construction workers of their country’s transition to a market democracy gives the Eastern European democracy promoters’ determination to act, credibility, as well as a set of tried breakthrough and reform “recipes.”

First, having lived under and struggled against authoritarian regimes, the Eastern European democracy promoters are more resolute in their support for democracy. Not only are they more sensitive to the hardship incurred on the population by authoritarian regimes but also to the international threats posed by capricious dictators.61 As a result, the Eastern European activists were also much more sensitive to the need to support democracy abroad resolutely and confident that such democracy promotion endeavors could be as successful as they were in their home countries. Consequently, these post-communist democracy promoters have acted quickly and decisively in moments of crisis while also recognizing much more that democratization is a process full of twists and turns and therefore requires long-term commitment and a dynamic and evolving approach. For example, when Georgia’s war with Russia erupted, presidents from Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine quickly flew to Tbilisi to stand “in support of the Georgian people” and “for European values such as democracy” (despite the risks of angering Russia that such gesture unnecessarily entailed).62 And since the evolving approach to supporting democracy in

---

61 A lot of my Slovak interviewees talked about the fact that Meciar made an unreliable international partner who would change his stance and domestic rules unpredictably and thus thwarted Western investment in and political cooperation with Slovakia; they further reasoned that other dictators cannot be trusted either. A lot of my Polish interviewees talked about the fact that if the citizenry has a voice, they would not chose to be subservient to a foreign power and further argued that for that reason democracies in the Russian sphere of influence reduce the pull of the former empire and make the region safe.

the neighborhood in the long term was discussed above, consider the following commitment contrast between the work of Western and Eastern civic democracy promoters: recipients note that the efforts of the first group of players have an ad hoc nature and limited scope whereas the initiatives of the second group often started from small projects and rolled over to bigger initiatives better tailored to recipient needs.63

Second, the recent democratization experience of the Eastern European activists who support democratization in the neighborhood provides them with tested breakthrough and consolidation recipes. As discussed above, while established democracies are said to often export replicas of their own political institutions, the young democracies seek to export not democracy models but rather democratization models.64 An anecdote from my interviews illustrates this point well. A group of Ukrainian officials were invited for a study visit to the German stock exchange to help them in the process of setting up a similar marketplace. The Ukrainians reported being in awe of how great the German stock exchange worked and strongly wishing they could set up one just like it. However, while they felt confident that they knew what the marketplace should look like and work like, they were far less certain what steps to take to make that happen. They got the help they needed from their Polish colleagues who had had to set up the Polish stock exchange not that long ago and who related the process through which they themselves established their own stock exchange.65 In sum, the West is prepared to export certain democratic outcomes but the East offers the process of getting there. And as both the Eastern European democracy promoters and their beneficiaries note, the democratization models of their post-communist

63 Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.” See also Chapter 3 in this dissertation.
64 On West, Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad.
65 Interview with K. F., October 22, 2008.
counterparts are more “immediately” and “readily applicable” to recipients in the European neighborhood.66

Third, the Eastern European actors who support the spreading of democracy in their region command a lot of respect in part because of their domestic democratization work. As a Western donor representative who funded a Polish project for a study visit of Georgian politicians in Warsaw recalls, the Polish officials “had the ear” of the Georgians because many of these same Polish officials had successfully implemented similar reforms in similar (post-communist) circumstances just a decade ago. Moreover, the same donor representative remembers having many subsequent conversations with the Georgian officials taking part in this study visit, in which they would refer to what they saw and heard in Poland.67 Another example: my interviews with a Belarusian opposition group, which had just recently worked with both a Western and an Eastern NGO, revealed a similar picture – when talking about their day-to-day activities, representatives of the Belarusian group made 3 times more references to lessons they learned from their Eastern counterpart than to lessons they learned from their Western counterpart. What seemed to have impressed the Belarusians about the Eastern NGO was that it found ways to “get things done” in the “dysfunctional” post-communist region.68 The importance of the credibility of the Eastern European democracy promoters can hardly be overstated since the authority of

66 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions, 267–95; interview with K. F., October 22, 2010. Western donors have been criticized for lack of cultural sensitivity because by exporting democracy models they expect that their recipients’ democratic institutions will look like their own. (Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad). From this perspective exporting democratization rather than democracy models might offer the additional advantage of allowing recipients the much-valued opportunity not to look like their donors. Moreover, even if the mature donors could share how democracy developed in their countries decades and in some cases centuries ago, would their experience be still relevant to today’s world?

67 Interview with L. M., April 1, 2010.

68 Interview with O. S., March 18, 2010.
transnational advocates has consistently found by scholars of transnational advocacy networks as “the key sources of influence” of norm promoters.\(^6^9\)

4.2.4. Some Weaknesses

Despite significantly improving on the practices of established donors, the Eastern European democracy promoters have some limitations as well. First, they still provide modest (if growing) funds. Such funding is usually absorbed by donor country actors rather than directly by the beneficiaries because it goes mostly towards project implementation rather than towards recipient institutional development.\(^7^0\) Second, the administrative capacity of the young Eastern European donors to provide aid is still rather underdeveloped, especially at the embassy level. As previously discussed, most of the EU member states do not even have independent aid agencies but provide democracy assistance through development cooperation departments within their foreign ministries. Moreover, most of these aid departments have only been set up within the last 5 years and still do not systematically support multi-annual or multilateral programs. And while some of the Eastern European embassies in the neighborhood do provide small grants, funds distributed through them have been reduced since 2008 because of “lack of administrative capacity.”\(^7^1\) Third, much like their Western counterparts, the Eastern European donors coordinate aid priorities and funds poorly, so there is some overlap and some gaps in the assistance they provide. An exception here are the joint multilateral activities of the Visegrad Group towards

---


\(^7^0\) Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions*: 267–95.

\(^7^1\) Kucharczyk and Lovitt, *Democracy’s New Champions*: 267–95.
Belarus and Ukraine in general and in particular in the case of the International Visegrad Fund’s scholarship program, which has also filled a niche not serviced by the Western donors. At the civic level, transnational contacts between NGOs working abroad are seldom transformed into direct co-operation in implementing joint projects in the neighborhood.72

In sum, despite their limitations (little funding, underdeveloped assistance capacity and poor donor coordination), their advantages – nuanced approach, local knowledge, credibility, and recent democratization experience – have earned the Eastern European democracy promoters a “good reputation” among their beneficiaries and among other donors.73 Moreover, Western donors have also acknowledged that the Eastern European actors “have the ear” of their partners in the neighborhood and have had “the most impact” in a lot of these cases.74 Finally, recipients assessed the impact of the Eastern European democracy promoters as “important,” “considerable,” “tremendous,” and “crucial” not only in strengthening democratic forces in recipients and/or pushing for political reforms but also in bringing these countries closer to the EU.75

To take stock: As Chapter 2 discussed the Eastern European donors are not the most influential and generous donors but they stand out in the recipient countries of concern to them, especially since a high percent of their bilateral projects assistance goes to supporting democracy in these countries. Moreover, the day-to-day bilateral

72 The biggest and most influential civic democracy promoters, however, are the exception here. For instance, the Belarus Public Policy Fund programme of the Pontis Foundation in Slovakia, whose activities were co-financed by the Transition Promotion unit of the Czech MFA; Pontis has also implemented Slovak-Hungarian projects in Serbia. Another example is the co-operation between People in Need (PIN), which is focused on supporting local activists, and Poland’s East European Democracy Center. Both organizations regularly arrange visits of Belarusian opposition activists to Poland and the Czech Republic.
73 Kowalski, “Belarus: Next Generation Democracy.”
74 Interview with R. P., October 19, 2008.
75 For example, the number of advocacy activities in support of Ukraine’s accession, organized in Brussels and other EU member states’ capitals by Eastern European civic democracy promoters greatly outnumbers the activities of Ukrainian NGOs in this area. Shapovalova and Shumylo, “Ukraine: Supporting Elusive Consolidation.”
diplomatic involvement of the Eastern European democracy promoters in their neighborhood – from cooperation at the highest political levels to daily people-to-people contacts – has also been very important (and perhaps more significant than the amount of democracy assistance) because it has allowed democratization laggards a glimpse of what democracy looks like close to home combined with peer pressure and support for making progress with further reforms. In addition, keeping transatlantic international organizations engaged in the European neighborhood has been very important in helping pro-democratic forces in the region make some further reform gains through the electoral revolutions in the early 2000s and in providing a generally congenial environment for the diffusion of democracy. And it is exactly in those cases of hybrid democracies in the European space – the Western Balkans, Ukraine, and Moldova – that the Eastern European democracy promoters have had most impact.76

5. Theoretical Implications

This study lies at the intersection of several political science research agendas – democracy promotion including democracy assistance, the role of ideas and of domestic social forces in foreign policy, transnational activism and social movements, diffusion (of democracy), and the role of external actors in regime change and survival. This section discusses the contribution of this thesis to these debates.

5.1. Democracy Promotion

This dissertation contributes to the study of democracy promotion theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. Democracy promotion has previously been examined primarily as a project of the Western economically

76 This finding parallels works on the diffusion of democracy that find that partially free countries appear to be more sensitive to diffusion effects than non-free countries. Harvey Starr, and Christina Lindborg, “Democratic Dominoes Revisited: The Hazards of Governmental Transitions, 1974–1996,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (August 2003), 490–519.
developed and politically established democracies. Moreover, in these studies “closely informed analysis of what might be called the ‘high politics’ of international democracy promotion [that is, “the place of democracy promotion in the foreign-policy process”] seems to have lagged behind.” Systematizing previous accounts, this dissertation defined two distinct theoretical approaches to analyzing support for the diffusion of democratic norms – democracy promotions as a normative commitment and democracy promotion as a strategic commitment. In doing so, this study has explored the theoretical corollaries of the democratic peace literature – how and why policymakers might try to produce democratic peace.

Not only have the arguments in this dissertation been vetted against theoretically alternative accounts but they have also been developed on the basis of methodological triangulation. While most studies of democracy promotion either

---


79 Research on transnational advocacy networks has been criticized for forgoing rigorous assessment of alternative theoretical approaches by Richard M. Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics”; and research on democracy promotion has been criticized by Jonas Wolff and Iris Wurm, “Towards a Theory of External Democracy Promotion?” On the benefits of triangulation, see for example, Sidney Tarrow, “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide,” in Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 171–81.
assume the motivations of the actors involved or derive them deductively, this dissertation treated motivations (and strategies) as a question to be answered inductively. To that end, three different types of analysis are used. The dissertation studies the origin, the rhetoric, and the practice of the post-communist democracy promoters. Additionally, these different dimensions of democracy promotion are examined through three different research techniques: process tracing, discourse analysis, and the qualitative comparative method. Such triangulation of analyses allows not only for a multifaceted presentation of the democracy promotion initiatives of various Eastern European actors but also for highlighting the theoretical approach that is most useful in explaining the motivations behind their efforts.

This dissertation also looks at the activities of young non-Western democracies as democracy promoters. The efforts of the Eastern European actors pointed to the importance of state-society interactions to the origins, the logic, and level of official democracy promotion. Attention to the domestic politics of democracy promotion is not completely new. For example, some have looked at domestic public and elite ambivalence towards supporting democracy abroad as factors, which compromise commitment to and funding for official democracy promotion efforts.80 Others have examined the bureaucratic context from which democracy promotion emerges to explain the incoherent US strategies on the ground.81 And finally, some Foucauldian takes on democracy promotion have emphasized not only that such efforts have been

---


hegemonic but also that they have sought to protect an economic program favored domestically.\textsuperscript{82}

Much less attention, however, has been paid to civic advocacy in favor of spreading democracy abroad. On the one hand, this is not surprising since democracy promotion has often been linked to the security agenda of the donor countries and conventional wisdom assumes that such high politics is where the state ought to be the most autonomous from society.\textsuperscript{83} On the other hand, the transnational democracy advocacy networks have in many ways been successors of the transnational human rights movement, non-governmental organizations from which have been found to be “influential in introducing human rights ideas and reinforcing human rights policies” by serving as “a key carrier of human rights ideas and a lobby for human rights policies.”\textsuperscript{84} This dissertation parallels such accounts: some Eastern European civic democracy promoters, in cooperation with their political allies and with the encouragement and support of Western democracy promoters, have successfully incorporated support for democracy abroad within the foreign policies of their states.

\textsuperscript{82} Steve Smith, “US Democracy Promotion: Critical Questions,” Ralph, “‘High Stakes’ and ‘Low Intensity Democracy’: Understanding America’s Policy of Promoting Democracy,” and Holsti, “Promotion of Democracy as a Popular Demand?” in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, \textit{American Democracy Promotion}, 63–82, 200–217, 151–80. These accounts point out that there is some tension between the expansion of freedom worldwide and the economic program favored by the US, a program which is broader that the interests of the American corporate class. This economic program is argued to have limited the US’s democracy export to a particularly narrow version of democracy.

\textsuperscript{83} For a review on this issue, see Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics.”

\textsuperscript{84} Kathryn Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Social Science Research Council (U.S.) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 139–73. It should be noted, however, that the efforts of human rights advocacy groups resulted in the incorporation of human rights concerns in the foreign policies of the West for primarily principled reasons. Underlying the US human rights policy was a concern that their observance was a “necessary and legitimate” factor in foreign policy. Similarly, underlying the Western European human rights policy was an effort to codify and unify the moral standards and practices on which the European project was based as well as the rights that Western countries guaranteed their people. See Sikkink, “The Power of Principled Ideas.” However, even though the transnational human rights movement became the precursor of the transnational democracy advocacy movement, the efforts of the normatively motivated civic democracy promoters in Eastern Europe have resulted in the incorporation of democracy promotion in the foreign policies of the post-communist EU countries as a strategic commitment rather than a normative commitment.
Moreover, the dissertation also argued that the Eastern European civic democracy promoters have influenced not just the introduction and level of official support for democracy abroad but also the logic behind such state initiatives. Therefore, this study improves on previous strategic explanations of democracy promotion by suggesting that the perceived benefits of having democratic international partners are not fixed and universal but negotiated domestically as democracy promotion is incorporated in the country’s foreign policy tradition.

More generally, this dissertation suggests the primacy of state-society interactions in the negotiation of national security interests and practices through ideational change. Traditionally, liberal international theory has emphasized the causal importance of state-society relations. However, many of its variants have privileged preexisting domestic preferences as decisive drivers of the process of foreign policy formation. What this dissertation suggests instead (like other studies of transnational activism) is that such domestic preferences are often formed at the international level and in the case of the Eastern European civic democracy promoters – through their interaction with other regional actors, solidarity with whom motivates the Eastern EU civic advocacy for official support for democracy abroad.

5.2. Social Movements and Transnational Activism

This dissertation also builds on the literature on social movement outcomes. Scholars within this tradition have identified three general groups of factors that contribute to the impact of social movements on states: strong organizations, effective


86 For an example of other studies of transnational activism that makes a similar argument, see Jutta Joachim. “Framing Issues and Seizing Opportunities: The UN, NGOs, and Women’s Rights,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 2 (2003): 247–74.
claim-making frames, and favorable political opportunities. Indeed, the Eastern European civic democracy promotion advocates did benefit from the fact that a lot of the activists who helped prepare the local democratic breakthrough then moved into electoral politics and were sympathetic to the idea of incorporating democracy promotion on their country’s foreign policy. The Eastern EU norm entrepreneurs also exploited critical junctures in their countries’ external relations (the period immediate before and after the democratic breakthrough or before and after EU accession) to introduce and consolidate democracy promotion as part of their states’ foreign policy agendas. Moreover, the Eastern European civic democracy promoters themselves emerged from the movements that brought democracy to their country and thus benefited from their resources, including the strong organizations-successors of these movements. Finally, the framing of democracy promotion as a solution to the main foreign policy challenges in Eastern Europe was also very important to the successful institutionalization of post-communist support for democracy abroad.

As chapter 2 discussed, there were political activists with personal commitments to democracy in all of the Eastern European cases, even the ones least active in supporting democracy abroad. What distinguished the states most active in promoting democracy was a combination of 1) a strong contingent of civic advocates for supporting democracy abroad and 2) their effective framing of their principled

---


88 Thus this dissertation adds to the works that document strategic framing of moral causes and thus illustrate the interweaving of strategic and principled actions by different sets of actors at different levels and at different stages of the policy process. For example, it has been noted that challengers seeking support outside their home states to confront powerful opponents enhance their appeals by strategically framing their demands to match the agendas, missions, and needs of such international and transnational actors. Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media, and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
beliefs into causal ideas. Because causal ideas “derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites,” the more civic democracy promotion advocates, the more they have been able to get their state to pay attention to supporting democratization in the neighborhood.\textsuperscript{89} In other words, the organizational strength of these movements has been particularly important for the incorporation of causal foreign policy ideas at the state level. The dissertation thus documents an interesting interaction of movement resources and framing: some types of frames (relying on causal ideas) more so than others (relying on principled or worldview ideas) are more effective when used by strong movements.

Additionally, the fact that a majority of the civic democracy promoters have emerged from the movements that prepared the democratic breakthroughs in Eastern Europe has some important implications for the literature on social movement demobilization. The demobilization phase of the development of social movements is perhaps the least studied one.\textsuperscript{90} Successful pro-democratic movements have been observed to become politicized and demobilize as their mission and leaders are incorporated into the mission and leadership of the fledgling democratic political parties.\textsuperscript{91} However, some have also noted that while national pro-democratic movements demobilized, sub-national components of these movements became

\textsuperscript{89} Quote from Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy.


increasingly active sites of political contention.\textsuperscript{92} This thesis documents that in addition to or perhaps instead of such a downward “scale shift” to the local level, some movements opt for an upward “scale shift” by mobilizing transnationally to support democratization abroad.\textsuperscript{93} Moreover, by tracing this process, the dissertation also adds to the works on transnational activism that argue that a lot of such efforts are actually deeply rooted in domestic political conflicts, including the transposition – rather than the transformation – of frames, networks, and forms of collective action to the international level without a corresponding liquidation of the conflicts and claims that gave rise to them in their arenas of origin.\textsuperscript{94} Lastly, this study builds on previous works on the motivations behind such upward scale shifts. The argument here is that normative and opportunistic motivations for transnational activism might interact in a cycle-like fashion: there are more opportunistic NGOs among the late comers to a transnational movement than among the early risers and even for normatively-motivated NGOs later projects are more likely to be opportunistic than early programs.

5.2. Diffusion

This dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to the diffusion literature and especially to study of diffusion of democracy. The temporal and spatial clustering of democracy and democratization in several waves, which have produced political processes and institutions specific to different political regions, have led students of comparative politics to suggest that intraregional demonstration and

\textsuperscript{92} Jennifer Johnson, “When Movements ‘Sub-Emerge’: Evidence for Rethinking Movement Demobilization following Democratic Transition” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, August 16, 2003).

\textsuperscript{93} On “scale shift” in transnational contention, see Tarrow, \textit{The New Transnational Activism}.

diffusion effects are often at work. However, much of the diffusion work has been “pattern finding” – it is limited to demonstrating that the structures of covariance and temporal/geographic ordering are generally consistent with diffusion dynamics. Additionally, much of the “process tracing” work, which follows the spread of democratic practices from one location to another, has focused on rare and spectacular events such as the democratic breakthrough cycles in Eastern Europe in 1989-91 and the “color revolutions” in the region in the early to mid 2000s. Therefore, this dissertation fills a gap in the literature on comparative democratization and diffusion works within it: the study traces the diffusion of democratization strategies within the post-communist space not just during democratization waves but also through the

---


everyday political and social interactions within the region before and after such waves. This is an important empirical contribution because of previous work suggesting that not only neighboring transitions to democracy but also the democracy status of a country’s neighbors have an effect at the time of that country’s own transition.98 More generally, this thesis also contributes to previous studies of democratization, which – with the exception of the studies of the waves of democratization – have focused almost exclusively on global actors and have ignored the role of regional players when examining the influence of external factors in the process of democratization.99

Moreover, this study adds to a growing body of works documenting the regional aspects to many political processes and institutions.100 However, while there has been some recognition that “regions” are symbolic constructions, there has not been much work documenting their production. This is a gap that this work fills: it illustrates how transnational and transgovernmental networks are produced by and create and reinforce the solidarity that defines the “boundaries” of a region. This study also described how day-to-day interactions as well as dramatic events serve to (re-)construct certain political contexts as similar in particular ways and therefore facilitate intra-regional diffusion.

This analysis also suggests some ways in which “pattern finding” studies can be improved. A lot of these models of regional diffusion test for “neighbor emulation.”101 However, as some critics of this approach have pointed out, “space is

99 For example, studies on the external players contributing to supporting the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe has almost exclusively focused on the role of the EU and to a lesser extent to the role of the US. For instance, see Jan Zielonka, Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, vol. 2 of Oxford Studies in Democratization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sanford, Building Democracy?: The International Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
100 On the debate about cross-regional comparisons, see Bunce, “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?”
101 See for example, Brinks and Coppedge, “Diffusion Is No Illusion.”
more than geography. This dissertation too points to the importance of networks not based on geographical proximity but on shared regional “colonial”, cultural, economic, or political ties. Just as a reminder, Slovakia’s democracy promotion priority has been Serbia, to which Slovakia was linked through their participation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Danube River trade route, a political relationship building on the Small Entente and the special Czechoslovak – Yugoslav ties during the communist era. A next generation of diffusion work has developed around the concept of dependence networks – a set of partner states with which a country regularly engages in exchanges of valued goods, which would be costly to break; such dependence has been measured by an index composed of the unweighted average of that state’s trade partners, security alliance partners, and international organization partners. Through the prism of this thesis such improvements appear as two steps forward and one step back – unlike some previous work on diffusion, studies of dependence networks do not distinguish between regional and extra-regional dependence. As this dissertation and other works have demonstrated regional interactions, especially in the democratization domain, are qualitatively different from global ones. Thus, regional networks’ dependence should perhaps be weighed differently than extra-regional ones. Alternatively, just as the democracy status of global leaders has been included in some diffusion models, so the inclusion of the


103 Here the dissertation confirms Most and Starr’s expectation that “we might expect countries that interact more frequently to have a greater influence on each other, and neighbors do not always have a great deal of interaction.” Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, “Theoretical and Logical Issues in the Study of International Diffusion,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2, no. 4 (1990): 391–412.


105 An example of previous work that distinguish between regional and global diffusion is Wejnert, “Diffusion, Development, and Democracy, 1800–1999.”
democracy status of regional and/or sub-regional leaders makes both theoretical and empirical sense.

Lastly, most of the diffusion studies (in both political science and sociology) focus primarily on the diffusion channels and the adoption/adaptation of the diffused social practice from the perspective of the recipient. This dissertation examines the diffusion process through the perspective of the “transmitter.” Therefore, the dissertation sheds some light on important questions not previously studied such as why certain innovations diffuse over others. The argument made here is that in cases of reciprocal diffusion – that is, where both the donor and the recipient are interested in the sharing of democratization experience – the perceived success of the practice developed by the donors as well as the needs of the recipient (which are in turn partly shaped by the repressiveness of the recipient state) play an important role in determining which practices get exported. As argued above, the Eastern European democracy promoters consciously and purposefully sought to share their “best practice” as those were appropriate to the recipient’s democratization needs.

107 A call for answering this question was made by Sarah A. Soule, in “Diffusion Processes Within and Across Movements.”
APPENDIX 1:
RULES FOR CODING THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVISM
SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
<th>CODING RULES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diplomacy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Start</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initiative</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**ACTIVITIES** | **CODING RULES**
--- | ---
  | were given a score of 2. The level of engagement is based on 18 interviews with democracy promotion experts in the international donor community and international policy think tanks and non-governmental organizations.

**Assistance** | **Start**
--- | ---
 | Countries that started providing democracy assistance before their EU accession were given a score of 2. Countries that began providing democracy assistance within a year (by 2005 and 2008 for each of the two enlargement waves respectively) of their EU accession were given a score of 1. Countries that have yet to start providing democracy assistance were given a score of 0.

**Institutionalization** | **Countries that delegated democracy assistance provision to a department within the foreign ministry were given a score of 1. Countries that had created a special implementation agency in addition to their development cooperation department within the foreign ministry were given a score of 2. Countries that created a special ministry for democracy assistance provision were given a score of 3. Countries, which had not yet started providing democracy assistance, were given a score of 0.**

**Level** | **I used three measures of the importance of democracy promotion relative to the overall official assistance provided: the percent of democracy assistance out of overall official development assistance; the percent of democracy assistance out of all bilateral project assistance; and the percent of the number of democracy assistance projects out of all development assistance projects. These data are presented in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.**

- Countries that provided democracy assistance, which was less than 1% of their official development assistance, were given a score of 1. Countries that provided democracy assistance, which was between 1% and 2% of their official development assistance, were given a score of 2. Countries that provided democracy assistance, which was more than 2% of their official development assistance, were given a score of 3.
development assistance, were given a score of 3.

- Countries that provided democracy assistance, which was less than 20% of all bilateral project assistance, were given a score of 1. Countries that provided democracy assistance, which was between 20% and 30% of all bilateral project assistance, were given a score of 2. Countries that provided democracy assistance, which was more than 30% of all bilateral project assistance, were given a score of 3.

- Countries that sponsored democracy assistance projects, which were less than 30% of the number of all development assistance projects, were given a score of 1. Countries that sponsored democracy assistance projects, which were between 30% and 40% of the number of all development assistance projects, were given a score of 2. Countries that sponsored democracy assistance projects, which were more than 40% of the number of all development assistance projects, were given a score of 3.

These scores were added up and averaged as follows: Countries that scored between 0 and 3 points were given an overall assistance level score of 0. Countries that scored between 4 and 6 points were given an overall assistance level score of 1. Countries that scored more than 6 points were given an overall assistance level score of 2.

Data was missing for 2 of the 3 Lithuanian measures, so the country’s average score was the score for the only dimension on which Vilnius provided information. Data was also missing for Slovenia; given the country’s general low level of democracy assistance offered, Slovenia was an overall assistance level score of 0.
APPENDIX 2:
OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS OF
INDIVIDUAL EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE EU AS AN
EXPLANATION OF THEIR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ACTIVISM
SCORES

1. The Baltic Countries

Post-communist Poland not only sought to make quick progress on its own
transition to a market democracy but also prioritized fairly early on support to other
democratizing countries in the region. By the early 1990s, Polish diplomacy had
already started working on developing close diplomatic contacts with Warsaw’s
neighbors (especially to the east) in part to encourage, pressure, and assist them to
keep up with democratization reforms.1 At the same time, Polish political elites have
frequently and publicly criticized leaders who did not respect human rights and
democratic procedures: for example, in Belarus from the mid-1990s to present,
Slovakia in the mid-1990s, Yugoslavia in the mid- to late 1990s, and Ukraine in the
early 2000s.2 Moreover, by the late 1990s, Warsaw had already started providing
democracy assistance to these and other countries.3 In addition to a special fund for
transition assistance to Ukraine and another one for the post-communist region in
general, the foreign ministry began offering additional aid through the newly set up
development cooperation system.4

In addition to such bilateral initiatives, Warsaw has also actively promoted
democracy thought its participation in a number of multilateral fora. As Poland began
integrating into the international structures of Euro-Atlantic democracies in the early
and mid-1990s, it began encouraging its international partners to do the same, again in
part to further strengthen their reform progress.5 Poland has not only lobbied for the
inclusion of many post-communist democratization laggards in various regional
cooperation frameworks such as the OSCE and Council of Europe but has also
supported (with experts, funds, and advice) the efforts of such international

2 Poland’s foreign ministry, for example, has issued statements condemning coups d’etat around the
world and supported sanctions imposed on the offending regimes by the EU, UN, and other
organizations; however, no unilateral action was pursued or any initiative taken. Democracy Coalition
(Democracy Coalition Project Report, 2002).
4 Although development and humanitarian needs (not democracy promotion) are the main priorities in
the development assistance recipients outside of Eastern Europe, this broad geographical range of
Poland’s external actions is increasingly significant because since 2007 democracy promotion has been
mainstreamed – all development projects are to contain a democratization element. Interview with M.
P., October 8, 2008.
5 Interview with A. K., October 23, 2008.
organizations in Eastern Europe. Most important has been Warsaw’s activism within the EU and NATO. Membership in these structures has been understood by Polish elites to especially anchor reforms by providing the incentive of EU/ NATO accession as well as to lock such applicants in the club of market democracies. So Warsaw lobbied for a membership prospective for Slovakia in the 1990s and in the 2000s – for Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, Moldova, and Georgia and even for autocratic Belarus conditional on its democratization. At the same time, bilaterally, Poland has also devoted a lot of diplomatic resources and given much aid to helping these countries prepare for Euro-Atlantic integration.

Most of Warsaw’s assistance and diplomatic democracy promotion efforts have targeted the former Soviet Union republics, especially Ukraine and Belarus and more recently also Georgia and Moldova. Diplomatic and assistance support for the democratization of other countries in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have been less concerted. Poland also invested in assisting Bratislava with catching up with the first wave of EU accession candidates as well as implemented some democratization projects under the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and under its development assistance system. In general, however, with the notable exception of hosting the inaugural Community of Democracies meeting, the focus of Polish democracy promotion has been largely limited to the post-communist region in Eastern Europe and primarily to its eastern neighborhood.

Polish diplomacy has received recognition for its mediation during the democratic breakthrough in Ukraine in 2004 and for getting the EU to participate in the resolution of the crisis and to bring Ukraine closer in the following years. Warsaw succeeded in mobilizing support within the EU for its proposal for a special cooperation mechanism for 6 of the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors – the so-called Eastern Partnership – as well as for offering Ukraine a membership prospective. Since Poland has only reluctantly supported international sanction against the regime in neighboring Belarus, Warsaw also considers a success the EU inclusion of Belarus in the Eastern Partnership in the general spirit of engaging with the authorities in Minsk (without disengaging with the Belarusian opposition). However, Poland was criticized by some for having acted not out concern for democratization in Belarus. Moreover, Poland is further criticized for having been quite reluctant to express its disapproval of notorious breaches of democracy and human rights in powerful countries such as China and Russia and even of undemocratic practices in smaller but important partners such as Kazakhstan.

After declaring independence in 1990, Lithuania prioritized rapprochement with and later integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures while also working to normalize relations with Russia and to maintain good relations with other neighboring states – a “strategic” partnership with Poland, “friendly” relations with Latvia and

---

6 Interview with B. O., March 26, 2009.
7 Interview with P. W., October 16, 2008.
8 Democracy Coalition Project, “Poland.”
9 Interview with R. D., October 22, 2008.
11 Democracy Coalition Project, “Poland.”
Estonia, and “moderate” policies toward Belarus. Thus much of the early democracy promotion efforts of Vilnius focused on Minsk. Lithuanian elites recognized that “the internal political situation in Belarus is sufficiently stable” but even early on insisted (more behind closed doors than in public) that “problems in Belarus be decided according to the universally recognized principles of democracy and a legitimate state, strictly adhering to the principles of human rights and freedoms.” Additionally, Vilnius supported the EU, OSCE, and the CoE in condemning democratic abuses by Minsk but has only reluctantly upheld the international sanctions against Belarus. Moreover, Lithuania tried to maintain as broad as possible ties with Belarusian NGOs, youth groups, independent media, and the Belarusian community in Lithuania. However, elites in Vilnius have been more reluctant and slow to begin supporting the Belarusian political opposition and official contacts with leading opposition figures were established only in the late 1990s. Moreover, this early on, Lithuania also tried to avoid too controversial democracy promotion projects.

After negotiating its EU and NATO accession, Vilnius became more active in supporting democratization abroad and broadened its geographical priorities. Lithuania has lobbied for a proactive EU policy aimed at bringing the new Eastern neighbors closer to the union and has tried to organize consultations among member states with similar interests in the East. Vilnius also continued to actively cooperate with local governments, civil society, and the political opposition from Belarus and provided shelter for a significant number opposition groups repressed by Minsk – a notable example is the European Humanities University closed by the Belarusian authorities in 2004, which was re-launched in Vilnius with support from the Lithuanian government and the EU. Additionally, Lithuania assumed an active role in developing EU-Russia relations but has been less critical of Moscow’s democratic record than the other Eastern European Baltic states. Moreover, beginning in the early 2000s, Vilnius (with encouragement from Warsaw) began building on its traditionally good relations with Kiev to enhance the institutional cooperation between

---

14 Interview with L. S., March 20, 2009.
16 For example, the Lithuanian parliament distanced itself from the initiative of a prominent member of parliament to launch an independent radio broadcasting into Belarus, and the cabinet chose to try working out an agreement with the regime in Minsk for state cross-border broadcasts. Margarita M. Balmaceda, James I. Clem, and Lisbeth L. Tarlow, eds., *Independent Belarus: Domestic Determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
17 Such EU member states included Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden. (Grzegorz Gromadzki, Raimundas Lopata, and Kristi Raik, *Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish Perspectives on the EU’s policy towards Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova* [FIIA Report No. 12. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2005].) Lithuania has also supported the activities of international and regional organizations in preventing and combating human rights violations but has not yet taken initiative in this field.
19 Gromadzki, Lopata, and Raik, *Friends or Family?: Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish Perspectives.*
the two countries in part to push Ukraine in a more democratic direction. As a result, like Warsaw, Vilnius was invited to mediate during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Lithuania subsequently lobbied for a membership prospective for Kiev in both the EU and NATO. Vilnius has also supported the EU integration of Moldova and lobbied for a NATO membership prospective for Georgia and for the inclusion of the South Caucasus in Eastern Partnership while also helping these countries move closer to the Euro-Atlantic space.

While Lithuania has been fairly active diplomatically, it was slow to begin providing democracy assistance. In 2002 Vilnius began providing modest development and democracy aid but only in 2006 did the development aid system become fully institutionalized and the number of projects – meaningful. Priority has been given to Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia but other countries in Eastern Europe (Moldova and Russia) and in the South Caucasus (Armenia and Azerbaijan) received some modest assistance as well. Since the mid-2000s Lithuanian leaders have also frequently spoken of the need to spread democracy further east into Central Asia but they have yet to implement such ambitions.

**Estonia** re-established its statehood in 1991 and immediately sought to leave the Russian “sphere of influence.” Euro-Atlantic integration soon became the main goal of Estonia’s foreign policy to be “achieved through friendly and sound bilateral relations.” Estonia cooperated mostly with the other Eastern and Western European Baltic countries and to a much lesser extent with some of the “European” former Soviet Republics. Thus even though Estonia was supportive of OSCE’s security and democracy promotion missions in the post-communist region (for instance, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and later Yugoslavia), Tallinn rarely took the initiative on democracy promotion questions there. By 1998 Estonia had started allocating development aid and – through it – some democracy assistance to democratizing countries in the neighborhood. When the development aid system became fully institutionalized in 2001 and especially after Tallinn negotiated its entry into the EU and NATO, good governance, human rights, democracy and the rule of law have emerged as thematic priorities for Estonia’s development cooperation, and Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova as the geographic priorities for Tallinn’s democracy aid. However, Estonia – often in cooperation with Western donors – has also been organizing trainings for some additional countries in the post-communist region from Kosovo and Macedonia to Armenia and Uzbekistan.

---

20 From “Lithuania’s New Foreign Policy,” a speech delivered by H. E. Mr. Arturas Paulauskas, Acting President of the Republic of Lithuania, at Vilnius University, May 24, 2004.
21 Interview with L. S., March 20, 2009.

273
However, “being a small state, Estonia considers countries where the environment for cooperation is friendlier to be more important from the point of view of the neighborhood policy and development cooperation. This explains why Estonia does not concern itself so much with Belarus”\textsuperscript{28} and why Tallinn began developing contacts with the Western Balkans but much more importantly significantly improved relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova after the democratic breakthroughs in these countries and the resultant “internal political stabilization and fast economic development.”\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, Estonia has seen its EU membership as “a chance to opt out of external affairs, delegate its competencies to the EU level.”\textsuperscript{30} At the same time, Estonia has focused on keeping human rights as a priority on the EU (and the Council of Europe’s) agenda (for example, by encouraging a more critical stance on Russia) and has also sought to serve as a representative of the EU on human rights issues with third countries.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, Tallinn has been supportive of closer cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries as a way to encourage their democratization.\textsuperscript{32} Tallinn has also enhanced its bilateral diplomatic relations with the EU’s immediate eastern neighbors, which has allowed Estonia to encourage and advise neighbors on further democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration.\textsuperscript{33} However, although democracy promotion in Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova has become one of Tallinn’s main post-accession priorities, Estonian diplomacy has kept “a rather low profile” in relation to Russia and has shown “less activity and enthusiasm as regards the EU’s policy towards the new neighbors than the two other Baltic states, apart from being the most active supporter of Georgian reforms.”\textsuperscript{34}

Since the restoration of its independence, Latvia’s key foreign policy objectives were withdrawing from the sphere of Russian political and economic influence, while at the same time rapproaching and later integrating into the Euro-Atlantic structures.\textsuperscript{35} Of all Baltic countries, Latvia is the host of the largest unassimilated Russian minority, so Russia caused much trouble for Riga when settling the issue of borders (the treaty is still not ratified), troop withdrawal, and minority politics in the context of Latvia’s membership in regional organizations such as the OSCE, CoE, and the UN.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, the tense relations with Russia largely consumed Latvia’s early post-communist eastern policy and democracy promotion

\begin{itemize}
\item Laurynas Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States” (working paper, Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior, 2008).
\item Estonian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2001.
\item Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.”
\item Tallinn has been supportive politically and financially of the UN’s activities in the field of human rights but has taken no initiative. Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/9141.
\item Vahur Made, Foreign Policy of the Post-Enlargement European Union: Russian Dimension (Research Report No. 1, Tallinn: Estonian School of Diplomacy, 2004).
\item On Latvian-Russian relations, see, for example, Gundar J. King and David E. McNabb, “Crossroads Dynamics in Foreign Policy: The Case of Latvia,” Problems of Post-Communism 56, no. 3 (June 2009): 29–41.
\end{itemize}
became a real part of Riga’s foreign policy agenda only after Latvia’s accession into the EU and NATO in the mid-2000s.

On the one hand, Riga has been keen to see the EU and NATO encourage the democratization of Russia. Latvia has also been one of the main critics of Russia’s reversion towards more authoritarian practices and has tried to convince these organizations to take a more critical stand on Moscow’s undemocratic practices. On the other hand, Latvia has sought to encourage reform in and even the European integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Latvia has lobbied the EU and NATO that a membership prospective be provided to these states and has been supportive of the OSCE and the CoE’s democracy promotion efforts in the post-communist region. However, Riga has had a difficult time integrating into the often loose and disjointed NATO and EU foreign policy agenda and in general has not taken the initiative on questions of multilateral democracy promotion. Bilaterally, Latvia takes part in regular political dialogue, ministerial cooperation and cooperation with other state institutions in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine about administrative reform and support for Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, since the setting up of its system for development cooperation in 2005 and especially since its full institutionalization in 2007, Riga has also provided democracy assistance to Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus, focusing on the last two but especially on Moldova.

2. Central Europe

The early post-communist foreign policy of the Czech Republic was geared mostly towards one central goal – gaining EU and NATO membership as quickly as possible. However, when several transitions in post-communist Europe (Slovakia, Belarus, and Ukraine) were slowed down and even reversed, Prague vocally and strongly criticized the electoral irregularities and the concentration of power in these countries. The Czech Republic also supported UN and EU criticism of and sanctions against other regimes that violated human rights and democratic principles both in the neighborhood and further field and in 1999, Prague began taking the initiative by sponsoring a UN resolution condemning human right abuse in Cuba and then

37 Galbreath, “Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement.”
40 Galbreath, “Latvian Foreign Policy after Enlargement.”
41 European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development Cooperation Program for New Member States.
42 The establishment of an official development policy started in 1999, but it was fully set up and running only in 2005. In the early stages, the priority countries for democracy promotion were Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in the Western Balkans and Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine in the former Soviet Union. European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development Cooperation Program for New Member States, and Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/lv/Attistibas-sadarbiba/valstis/.
volunteering to serve on the steering committee of the Community of Democracies set up in 2000.44

After the democratic breakthrough in Slovakia, Prague began investing bilaterally in Bratislava’s EU and NATO accessions.45 Soon thereafter, the Czech government also began working to help the countries in the former Yugoslavia build democratic institutions and prepare for EU integration in the context of various regional initiatives such as the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and the Central European Initiative.46 Thus since the later 1990s, the Czech diplomacy had moved beyond democracy promotion that was primarily diplomatic and mostly exercised in the form of criticism of offending states in bilateral and especially multilateral forums. Prague began assisting the post-communist transformations of several of its traditional international partners and since the late 1990s and especially after 2000 when the development aid system was set up, the Czech government began providing democracy assistance as well.47 In 2004, Prague additionally set up a special Human Rights and Transition Promotion Department within the foreign ministry to administer funds allocated specifically to democracy assistance.48 In order of funding allocated, the priority countries have been: Belarus, Iraq, Serbia, Ukraine, Burma, Moldova, Cuba, and Georgia.

Consecutive Czech governments also stepped up their diplomatic democracy promotion. Democratization and human rights issues figured prominently in the regional foreign policies of the Czech Republic, which in the early 2000s began focusing not only on the South-East European region but also increasingly in the former Soviet republics on the EU border as well.49 Moreover, Prague lobbied for EU enlargements towards the Western Balkans and for a special Eastern Partnership-like initiative.50 The Czech government was also the first EU government to pledge funding to the European Partnership for Democracy (€ 100,000 for activities in the post-Soviet space).51 And more generally, the Czech diplomacy was one of they key

44 Prague supported the actions of the international community not only in Serbia and Belarus but also in developing countries such as Pakistan, North Korea and Cote d’Ivoire. Democracy Coalition Project, “Czech Republic.”
45 Slovakia remained perhaps the only country in which Prague prioritized bilateral democracy promotion over acting through multilateral channels. Interview with J. M., November 26, 2008.
47 European Parliament Committee on Development, The Challenge of the EU Development Cooperation Program for New Member States.
48 The unit was initially established in 2004 to manage the implementation of € 376,000 worth of democracy assistance projects in Iraq. However, after the positive experience there and strong lobbying from the NGO sector, the government decided in February 2005 to extend the application of transition promotion also to other countries and increased its funding for the year 2005 to € 470,000. Moreover, some development assistance, which covers good governance issues, is additionally provided through the Czech UNDP Trust Fund. Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt, eds., Democracy’s New Champions: European Democracy Assistance after EU Enlargement (Prague: PASOS, 2008).
49 Izabela Albrycht, ed., The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighborhood Policy and V4 Agenda (Krakow; Brussels: Kosciuszko Institute, 2009).
50 The Czech Republic used its presidency of the EU to officially launch the Eastern Partnership and to organize accompanying activities intended to push substance into the framework. Interview with K. P., March 27, 2009; and interview with K. C., March 3, 2009.
51 Kucharczyk and Lovitt, Democracy’s New Champions.
supporters of the so-called “European Consensus on Democracy” – an initiative to commit the EU to a stronger, long-term focus on democracy promotion as well as of strengthening the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.52

More uniquely, Prague has sought to emerge as a defender of dissidents around the globe, specializing on Belarus and Cuba and to a lesser extent on Burma. Czech diplomacy not only continued to criticize these regimes about their human right records and to lend political and moral support to the democratic oppositions against them but also actively sought to shape the EU’s policies towards these countries. In the case of Belarus, the Czech diplomacy argued that the EU should “offer Belarus a “road to Europe” [. . . ] on the condition, however, that the Belarus political leadership genuinely adopts democratic principles.”53 In the case of Cuba, Prague threatened to veto any decision of the European Council that did not make restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba conditional on further improvements in the situation of the dissidents there.54 Prague was successful in getting the EU to adopt a tougher stance towards Havana and to include Belarus in the Eastern Partnership.

It should be noted that Czech support for dissidents around the globe has in some cases continued even in the face of resistance of the offending regimes conveyed through expulsion of diplomats and downgrading of relations by the authorities in Cuba, Belarus, and North Korea.55 Similarly, Czech criticism of the Beijing human rights record and support for the Dalai Lama persisted despite costly losses in trade with China.56 At the same time, however, Tibet was not included in the geographic priorities of the Czech Transition Promotion Department and the Czech government has been happy to welcome Chinese trade delegations to Prague.57 Similarly, the Czech government decided not to argue for multilateral sanctions on Russia for human rights violations in Chechnya, even though the issue was raised in the Czech Senate.58

After the break up of Czechoslovakia, Slovakia set out to complete the transition to a market democracy and to (re-)integrate with the Euro-Atlantic structures. However, the slow pace and even reversal of reforms in Slovakia took Bratislava off the fast track to EU and NATO accession. Thus the main foreign policy priority of Slovakia after the democratic breakthrough in the country in 1998 was Euro-Atlantic integration.59 Still, almost immediately Slovakia also began supporting the democratization of other transition laggards. At the end of the 1990s and the

---

52 Prague successfully pushed for reforms, which facilitated and increased funding for EU assistance to unregistered and illegal opposition groups working against very repressive regimes. Interview with K. P., March 27, 2009; and interview with K. C., March 3, 2009.
54 David Kral, Enlarging EU Foreign Policy: The Role of New EU Member States and Candidate Countries (Prague: EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, June 2005).
57 Ibid.
58 Fawn, “Reconstituting a National Identity.”
59 Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 1998 (Bratislava, 1999).
beginning of the 2000s, Bratislava invested in the democratization of the Western Balkans (especially Serbia and Croatia). Slovak diplomacy criticized undemocratic practices in the region and through the so-called Bratislava Process organized the international community to and itself did provide assistance and political support to the Serbian opposition. Such efforts continued after the democratic breakthrough in Serbia in 2000 and when Bratislava set up its development assistance system in 2004, democracy assistance to Serbia was stepped up and expanded in scope to cover other countries in the Western Balkans.

Having negotiated its EU and NATO membership, Bratislava identified democracy promotion in the Western Balkans and Ukraine as one of its post-accession foreign policy priorities. Slovakia has not only provided assistance to such democratizing states but has also emphasized the benefits of democracy in its bilateral relations with other post-communist countries and provided advice to their elites about catching up on their transitions. Moreover, Slovakia has leveraged its membership in various international organizations by prioritizing its democracy promotion agenda when occupying key posts in regional frameworks. For example, it was Slovak activism that got the OSCE involved in the mediations during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and that steered the CoE to work on convincing Belarus to implement the necessary political reforms to join the organization. Slovakia has also lobbied for EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, has been supportive of Ukraine’s membership aspirations, and has worked to keep the Belarusian question on the EU agenda.

Slovak diplomats have criticized regimes, which do not respect democratic procedures (for example, Yugoslavia in the late 1990s and Belarus to present) but have reluctantly joined sanctions against them. In some cases, such as Ukraine in the early 2000s, Slovak diplomacy was even willing to look the other way. More recently, Slovakia has pursued good relations with autocratic regimes such as Russia and Cuba.

In the 1990s, post-communist Hungary pursued three foreign policy goals: 1) Euro-Atlantic integration; 2) protection and representation of the more than three million ethnic Hungarians living abroad; and 3) establishing good relations with the country’s neighbors, many of which either hosted these Hungarian minorities or were new states that emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In its relations with its neighbors, Budapest adopted a cautious approach by emphasizing economic cooperation while at the same time seeking to

---

62 Belarus has ranked as Slovakia’s third priority in its support for democratization abroad. Slovak Foreign Policy Association, *Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2004* (Bratislava, 2005).
63 Interview with E. K., November 28, 2008.
64 Interview with M. H., November 14, 2008.
65 Interview with T. K., March 18, 2009.
commit these countries to the protection of minorities. Thus by the mid-1990s, Hungary had signed agreements on the mutual protection of minorities with Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Croatia, and Slovenia.\(^6^9\) Moreover, beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hungary also began lobbying for the Euro-Atlantic integration of its neighbors to ensure protection of the Hungarian minorities there.\(^7^0\)

At the same time, Budapest has tended to avoid outright condemnation of nearby states that violate human rights and democracy abroad (such as Slovakia and Serbia in the 1990s, Ukraine in early 2000s and Belarus from the mid-1990s to present) and instead has preferred to join with regional or global organizations when criticizing such regimes.\(^7^1\) Consequently, Hungary has supported efforts to protect human rights undertaken by the international organizations to which it belongs. For example, Hungary sent observer missions to the Western Balkans through OSCE, played a major role in the 2005 resurrection of the minority expert group within the Council of Europe, and initiated resolutions within the UN Human Rights Council in 2008: one related to the independence of the judiciary and another dealing with the protection of human rights defenders co-operating with UN human rights bodies.\(^7^2\)

Hungary’s expertise in the area of human (minority) rights has been recognized and already in demand. China, which has seen Hungary as a good example of a democratic transition, invited Budapest to present the evolution and functioning of its key democratic institutions, such as the Constitutional Court or the Ombudsman’s Office. In April 2000, a Human Rights dialogue was launched in Beijing between Hungary and China. Building on its success, a similar Human Rights dialogue was launched between Hungary and Vietnam in 2009.\(^7^3\)

If Hungary’s agenda for diplomatic democracy promotion has been somewhat ad hoc and rather narrow (that is, limited mostly to questions of minority rights), Hungary’s democracy assistance has been rather fragmented and also ad hoc.\(^7^4\) In 1999, the Hungarian government launched the so-called Szeged Process within the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Similarly, in 2003, Budapest also launched the so-called “Nyíregyháza Initiative” as a “part of Hungary’s contribution” to the


\(^7^0\) Additionally, Budapest has emphasized the minority issue within the EU and participated actively in forming the related policies: the visa policy; establishment of the principles of cross-border co-operation; establishment of a system for ‘cross-border trade.’


\(^7^3\) It should be noted, however, that a fraction of the activities under these dialogues have been about human rights. For example, Hungary trained not only Vietnamese parliamentarians but also statisticians and auditors. Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_fejleszetes/.

\(^7^4\) Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities.”
EU’s eastern neighborhood policy. Both the Process and the Initiative focused on cross-border local government cooperation with a democratization dimension. In addition to the democracy assistance provided through the Szeged Process and the Nyíregyháza Initiative and the aid offered through the Chinese and Vietnamese Human Rights dialogues, the Hungarian government has provided some additional support through its development aid system. However, a clear strategy defining the priority areas, countries, and objectives of Hungarian democracy assistance is still missing. In 2005, Budapest also set up an International Centre for Democratic Transition as the Hungarian contribution to the Community of Democracies and is currently financing the operation of the institute, which, however, relies on external donors for funding of individual projects. Lastly, in 2007, the Hungarian government authorized a Promotion of Democratic Transition Fund appropriation.

Lastly, like many other Eastern European democracy promoters, Hungary has indirectly supported the democratization of the EU neighbors to the east and southeast by arguing in favor of their Euro-Atlantic integration. Budapest has been most active in speeding Croatia’s accession and the integration of the other countries in the Western Balkans. However, Hungary has also been generally supportive of bringing Ukraine but also Moldova and Belarus closer to the EU. As a result, Hungary participated in the elaboration of the EU’s Eastern Partnership concept and argued for the inclusion of Belarus in the partnership. Still, Hungary continued to “see the Eastern neighborhood region through the general debate that is held at the EU-level.”

The Process was meant to strengthen the pro-democratic forces in Serbia and prepare the region for Euro-Atlantic integration through creating sister-municipality relationships between Hungarian local governments and Serbian opposition-governed municipalities as well as by linking Serbian independent media and NGOs with similar Hungarian organizations. The Initiative focused on cross-border municipal cooperation, education, and support for small and medium businesses primarily in the Ukrainian lands bordering Hungary and hosting Hungarian minorities. However, to the extent that the Initiative sought to further Ukraine’s European integration through some civic society and public administration capacity building, the Initiative had some democracy promotion significance as well. Hungary also proposed the establishment of the so-called Budapest Forum through which the Visegrad Countries, Austria, and Slovenia transfer their transition and European integration experience to the countries of the former Yugoslavia; however, within the Forum, Budapest chose to be responsible for the Internal Affairs and Justice Co-operation cooperation. Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities.”

Horvath, “Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities.” For example, Hungary’s declared priority countries kept changing throughout the 2000s.


“Hungary is well aware of the limitations of her size, economic and political power, if compared either to the Eastern Partnership region or to the EU in general.” As a result, Moldova is the only country in the Eastern Partnership region, where Hungary ambitions a real policy-making role and holds important individual EU-positions related to Moldova. However, the democracy promotion dimension of this interest is minor. Albrecht, The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighborhood Policy and V4 Agenda: 38.

Jonavičius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” (Moreover, in 2008, Budapest opened an embassy in Minsk and tasked it with “promoting dialogue
3. The Balkans

Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania are the least experienced democracy promoters in the region. In the 1990s, all three countries sought to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and if Slovenia was among the applicant frontrunners, Sofia’s and Bucharest’s efforts were hindered by the slow pace of reforms in these countries. Still, all three countries have been slow to transition from being democracy promotion recipients to becoming donors supporting democratization abroad.

Having emerged from crumbling Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenia recognized that its national security and economic development depend, among other things, on the security, democratic development, and economic stability of its neighbors. However, Slovenian diplomacy has prioritized economic integration with Western Europe and similarly economic cooperation with the Western Balkans. Slovenia participated in the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, including its democratization component and supported the efforts of other regional frameworks such as CoE and OSCE to further political liberalization in southeastern Europe. Slovenia has also been one of the most active advocate of the Euro-Atlantic ambitions of the other countries in former Yugoslavia – Slovenia made EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans a centerpiece of its EU presidency in 2008 – and thus further indirectly supported the democratization of the region.

Much of the official foreign assistance Slovenia provided in the late 1990s and early 2000s, including a number of human right projects, was executed in the framework of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. Slovenia has been rather slow to establish a development cooperation system – a development cooperation department was set up in 2004 but a strategy for its operation emerged only in 2006. Slovenia has signed bilateral development cooperation agreements with a number of countries in the region: Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in 2005, Moldova in 2007 and Albania in 2008, and Kosovo and Ukraine (still to be ratified). However such bilateral aid has prioritized strengthening trade and investment possibilities, international disputes conciliation, assisting conflict

---

between the regime and civil society (and fostering economic cooperation between Belarus and Hungary).” Ibid., 11.

81 Albrycht, The Eastern Partnership in the Context of the European Neighborhood Policy and V4 Agenda.

82 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.” Slovenia has very modest (Moldova and Ukraine) and in some cases even non-existent (Belarus, Southern Caucusus, Central Asia) policies towards the former Soviet Union states.


victims, energy cooperation, and migration; still, some aid has also been provided to assisting countries in drawing closer to Euro-Atlantic structures. At the time of its democratic breakthrough in the mid-1990s, three of Romania’s five neighbors were democratization laggards and two of them in the midst of a frozen and a hot ethnic conflict. Romania has actively supported OCSE’s conflict resolution efforts as well as minority rights and election-monitoring missions in these and other countries in the Western Balkans, the Southern Caucasus, and even Central Asia. And especially since it negotiated its own NATO and the EU accession, Bucharest has also actively lobbied these organizations to open their doors to Bucharest’s three non-EU neighbors – Moldova, Serbia, and Ukraine and a traditional partner from the Black Sea region – Georgia. However, Bucharest has yet to put together programs with concrete measures to help bring these countries closer to Europe.

The most important target of Romanian democracy promotion is perhaps Moldova. Although Bucharest-Chisinau relations were at times rather strained, by the mid-2000s the Romanian political elites had achieved a political consensus around the importance of building diplomatic relations with Moldova based on the Euro-Atlantic integration of both countries. Romania has actively advocated for enhancing NATO’s Partnership with Moldova “with the purpose of supporting its democratic development and its European vocation.” Additionally, Romania (unsuccessfully) insisted on the inclusion of Moldova in the Western Balkan group of countries that were promised EU accession. Perhaps most successfully, Romania was also generally supportive of the pro-Western and pro-democratic forces, which in 2009 attempted to organize an electoral revolution and eventually gained power to push the country in a more democratic and pro-European direction.

Romania has also demonstrated some initiative at the EU level in shaping the Brussels’ broader eastern agenda. In 2006 Romania prepared an informal proposal (“non-paper”) for a special policy towards the Union’s immediate neighbors to the east. Bucharest was also active in subsequent discussion of what later became the Eastern Partnership and lobbied for the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus in it. Moreover, Bucharest although not active, has been supportive of the involvement of various European regional organizations in Belarus. And perhaps most impressively, Bucharest was an active founder of the Community of Democratic Choice – an organization of the countries between the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas that are interested in promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in that region.

Just as Bucharest has been rather slow to develop specific bilateral democracy promotion programs, it has also taken a long time to begin providing democracy assistance. Romania is still setting up its development cooperation system but the concept developed for it by the government includes good governance among the

87 Ibid.
88 Jonavicius, “The Democracy Promotion Policies of Central and Eastern European States.”
90 However, Bucharest’s involvement was complicated by the fact that in the midst of the crisis the Romanian government changed its citizenship requirements to allow foreigners who had ancestors who had Romanian citizenship (including most Moldovans) to gain Romanian citizenship.
country’s priorities. Bucharest also intends to support the EU aspirations – and thus the democratization – of countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia, and Georgia.

For the moment, Bulgaria is perhaps least interested in democracy promotion. Support for democratization abroad has not been mentioned in Bulgaria’s foreign policy priorities and rarely comes up in the rhetoric of the country’s diplomats. Bulgaria is still setting up its development cooperation system but the concept developed for it by the government does not include democracy promotion (or activities that might fall under the rubric of democracy promotion) among the country’s priorities. In general, Bulgaria avoided being involved in the conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s and has pursued the intensification of economic cooperation in this region as well as in the Black Sea area in the 2000s. Bulgaria has only indirectly supported the democratization of these two regions by actively participating in the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and later by supporting the EU integration of the countries in both areas but especially in the Western Balkans, “provided that they carry out the required reforms and not before they fully meet the criteria for membership.” Bulgaria has also supported the OSCE and Council of Europe democracy promotion efforts in both areas but more towards conflict prevention than towards their democratization. Bulgarian diplomacy believes that the country’s “traditional tolerant attitude towards the representatives of minority groups and the successes in their equal integration into society are the foundation of the Bulgarian national model of interethnic relations”; yet the country’s elites have done little to share this model abroad.

93 Sofia also claims to have been supportive of “further boosting the importance of the effective protection and promotion of human rights within the UN system” but has taken no initiative in this policy area. http://www.mfa.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7960&Itemid=386
APPENDIX 3:

EXPLANATIONS OF POLISH DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY POLISH POLITICAL ELITES IN OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS AND SPEECHES

Strategic References:

1. All *Europe needs* a democratic and stable Russia.
   
   Leszek Miller, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, address at the 10th Poland-Germany Forum Warsaw, January 26, 2002.

2. The leading idea of integration cannot be shutting oneself up either in an exclusive club or in a fortress. Everything that fosters openness and cooperation is *in Europe’s interest*. The future Union even more than before should to promote democratic and economic changes in the states outside its institutions.
   

3. Even with all of the difficulties, we do not wish to leave out another one of our neighbors, Belarus. Poland is conducting something like a “critical dialogue” with that state – to use a term that was coined in Germany, although it applied to a different country. I believe that it is in the *long-range interest of the Union* community to overcome the isolation of Belarus in the European arena and thereby to stimulate the development of democracy and the civil society in that country.
   
   Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, “Poland and Germany – Partners in United Europe,” lecture at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Berlin, March 6, 2002.

4. I would like to make some observations now about the eastern policy of the European Union. Poland, *due to its location*, is particularly interested in making an input to that policy as a member state. Let me note here that Poland is developing good-neighborly relations with all its eastern neighbors. We have a rich experience in transforming the economic and political system, building a democratic state with a market economy, and adapting to the Union’s standards. We are willing to share that experience with states to the east of the enlarged EU, to facilitate their adaptation to being neighbors of the Union. We
wish to develop co-operation with the border states and regions of the enlarged European Union – Russia (Kaliningrad District and the north-western parts of the Russian Federation), with Ukraine and Belarus.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, “Poland on the Road to the European Union,” address to the Nobel Institute, Oslo, March 8, 2002.

5. Poland, due to its location, is particularly interested in making an input to that policy [the eastern policy of the European Union] as a member state. [ . . . ] We have a rich experience in transforming the economic and political system, building a democratic state with a market economy, and adapting to the Union’s standards. [ . . . ] Special attention is due to development of relations with Ukraine – considering the geopolitical significance of that country for the stability and security of our region.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the opening of the conference “Strengthening Stability in Eastern Europe,” Warsaw, March 11, 2002.

6. Central-Eastern Europe is an area of stability, mutual trust and predictability. Poland has a considerable share in this work. Thanks to our common accomplishments [“our victories of freedom and democracy”], all Europe has benefited – it is more stable and secure, it is better. Here, in our region of the continent, where conflicts once raged and many wars were waged, there now is a strong pillar of Europe’s success. This is also vital for the world order.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the opening of the conference “Strengthening Stability in Eastern Europe” Warsaw, March 11, 2002.

7. Out of concern for ensuring the world peace and security, it is becoming ever more clearer that Europe needs to be united on the basis of respect for the cultural identity and spiritual heritage of each nation. Poland wishes to make its contribution not only to the creation of a common economic space on our continent but also to strengthening the values of democracy and solidarity in a united Europe.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, telegram of congratulations to Pope John Paul II on the occasion of his 82nd birthday, Warsaw, May 18, 2002.

8. The United States and Poland share an interest in encouraging the aspirations of the people of Ukraine to prepare for a future in Europe. We agreed to work together to support Ukraine’s efforts to implement needed economic and
democratic reforms. Our two nations urge Belarus to join its neighbors in seeking a democratic and free market future.


9. We are a democratic country, politically and economically stable. We are a country that shares its success and experience with others to make the whole Central, Eastern and Southern Europe the area of close cooperation and secure development.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the official welcoming ceremony, Washington, July 17, 2002.

10. We are convinced that Ukraine will maintain its significant role in the geopolitics of the 21st century; that not only geographical position, not only the size of its population, but the importance of tradition and the role that Ukraine could play in the future will make it an important participant of European processes today and in the future. We are convinced that Europe will look different with a democratic, developing Ukraine than if such a Ukraine were missing. We are convinced that precisely here the important battle is being waged for the future of a secure, democratic Europe of the 21st century based on these same values.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the opening of the conference “Ukraine in Europe,” Warsaw, October 15, 2002.

11. In Poland’s interest is the development of Russia as a modern, democratic and law-abiding state with a healthy market economy, actively and constructively working together with other states in the international arena. Poland believes that the strengthening of ties between Russia and European institutions is a process that is beneficial for all of Europe. No one can dictate to Russia how it is supposed to carry out the transformation. But we are convinced that Russia’s “European choice” lies in the strategic interest of all of us.

Marek Borowski, Diet Speaker of the Republic of Poland, “Poles and Russians in a Common Europe,” lecture delivered to students of Michael Lomonosov, Moscow University, December 9, 2002.

12. Our relations with Belarus are guided by the principle of good-neighbourliness. We fully share the premises that underpinned the restrictions of the European Union and the USA towards the members of the Byelorussia leadership. Our specific neighbourly contacts have called for a different
approach and it was understood properly. Our goal is to promote, despite obvious obstacles, Byelorussia independence, democracy, economic reforms and pro-European tendencies. [. . . ] The fact that democracy is in short supply, the existence of persecutions, and the absence of respect for human rights, corruption and bad governance are a source of tensions and problems [in the world today].


13. I believe there is a logic to this policy [NATO enlargement], and there is a strategic goal behind it. It is, however, not to build a new international security institution. It is to support the domestic democratic transformation. [. . . ] This quest for democracy is not an ideological crusade. NATO does not promote democracy just for the sake of doing it. We do it because it is a tested mechanism for ensuring lasting domestic stability, and – by extension – also international stability and peace. In simple words, democracies do not fight each other. They rather trade and co-operate with each other.


14. It is in our interest to have as our neighbors countries which share our values, which are stable, democratic, well governed and prosperous, which are partners for the EU in solving common problems as well as problems of a broader nature. Therefore, we need a strong consensus in the Union over its future Eastern Policy.


15. The safest guarantee of peace is respect for the law in each country, a democratic structure of government, freedom of speech and conscience. What was very important for Poland was the fact that the United States and Western Europe never lost the conviction that the societies locked behind the Iron Curtain are able to build a democratic state of the rule of law.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, “How to Win the Peace in the Contemporary World,” lecture delivered to the Nobel Institute during his official visit to the Kingdom of Norway, Oslo, September 16, 2003.
16. Respect for democracy and human rights are important weapons in the fight against terrorism, because promotion of the rule of law, freedoms and democracy will deprive terrorism of its life-giving nature.

Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting of the OSCE, Warsaw, October 6, 2003.

17. The main threats to peace in the world today are terrorism and aggressive dictatorships.

Marek Borowski, Diet Speaker of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the 1st Session of the Polish-Ukrainian Parliamentary Assembly, Kiev, October 13, 2003.

18. On the road to democratisation and the building of a health free-market economy Poland gathered and it’s still gathering many valuable experiences, which it will willingly share with its neighbours. The development of friendly relations with Moldova will play an important role in the project of regional collaboration. We support the aspirations of your country to build a civil society, democratic institutions and stable state structures.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during a sitting of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova Chisinau, October 23, 2003.

19. It is imperative for all of us to prevent the potential negative consequences that may result from the growing modernization gap between the EU and its eastern neighbors. [ . . . ] Poland – situated on the border of the European Union – would be the first to feel the impact of those negative consequences. Therefore, Poland believes that promoting the modernization of Eastern Europe on the basis of the EU standards of democracy, a market economy, the rule of law and social justice should remain a priority in the EU approach to that area. [ . . . ] We have no illusions about how far away we are at present from accomplishing this vision. The main source of our concerns today is the deepening deficit of democracy in the majority of our eastern neighbors.


20. Our states have a special role to play in the Union. On account of geographical position we can do a lot to develop the good-neighbor policy of the EU with states of our immediate surroundings. Poland and Portugal can bring them valuable help in developing stable democracies and strengthening the principles of a law-abiding state and mechanisms of a free-market economy.
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, toast
delivered during the official dinner given in his honor by Mr. Jose Manuel
Durao Barroso, Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic, Lisbon, July 1,
2004.

21. [. . . ] both NATO and the EU play an immensely important role in the
building of stability and security in the world. Not only in the strictly formal
sense, by creating military structures that offer mutual assistance and guarantee
that no threat is ignored if it concerns the member states. The EU and NATO
are above all factors of stability owing to their role of transferring institutions
of the values that are the bases of security and stability. As long as NATO and
the EU above all defend democracy, freedom, sovereignty of states, human
rights, and require from their members tolerance for national minorities,
observance of the rule of law and civilian control over the armed forces – each
new member will extend the area of security and stability in Europe and the
world. That is why the decision on enlarging the EU by another 10 states was
so important.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address
delivered at the meeting of the 14th Economic Forum, Krynica, September

22. Helplessness in view of the authoritarian system in Belarus. All those who
would like to see Belarus as a democratic, stable state are disappointed and
deeply concerned about the situation in that country. [. . . ]We resort to the
instruments of influence that are legally accessible and sometimes, we have to
admit, we fail to reach fundamental, final goals, at least in the desired period of
time. Nevertheless we maintain our ability to cooperate with these authorities
as far as it is required from the point of view of economic and neighborly
interests as well as the interests of scores of thousands of Poles living in
Belarus.

Wlodzmierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland,
statement in connection with Sejm debate on no-confidence vote on

23. Poland may enormously benefit from its EU entry. This relates not only to
economic and financial issues, structural funds, it also relates to out political
position. Poland as the European Union member could incomparably more
actively and more effectively act for the sake of Ukrainian democracy than it
could being out of the European Union. Poland can be today a factor of
stability export, the agreement of the whole Central and Eastern Europe,
because it is a European Union member, and at the same time shows some
extraordinary abilities and knowledge in this sphere.
24. As a full EU member Poland is actively involved in co-shaping the Union’s image. We feel co-responsible for the EU’s fate in coming years and believe that all initiatives designed to spread fundamental and just European values like democracy and respect for human rights enhance the building of *a brighter common future*. It was in this belief that we decided to mediate during the recent social and political tension in Ukraine.

Longin Pastusiak, Senate Speaker, address delivered at a New Year meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, Warsaw, January 25, 2005.

25. I am also convinced that the EU further enlargement to include new countries, but mainly Ukraine the European and Christian nature of which cannot be questioned, can enrich Europe not only with a significant country, with 50 million people and with *an important geographical position* but that it can also *broaden the zone of stability*, cooperation of the same democratic standards further to the East. I do not have to explain to anyone here that this lies in the interest of Poland and central Europe. The point is to prove this to our partners in the West.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, statement delivered at the Annual Debate of Polish Ambassadors, Warsaw, June 27, 2005.

26. Poland is the only state in Europe to have changed all her neighbors in results of political changes. The GDR ceased to exist, Czechoslovakia broke up into two independent states and several of them appeared in the East when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Regaining her sovereignty Poland was able to reach agreement with all neighbors in a spirit of *reconciliation and partnership*, although the history of our mutual relations was often dominated more by rivalry and conflict rather than *co-operation and peace*. [. . .] The Polish experience of the last dozen-or-so years leads to the crucial conclusion: we must not forget about our neighbors. We must be loyal to them and support them in times of change and transition. From the very beginning they should be involved in partnership-based co-operation, stimulated to undertake essential reforms and transformation and supported on this difficult track. Above all however – we must have confidence in them and believe in a common future in united Europe. And if one can hear questions being asked today as to what we, the Poles can contribute to the EU’s Eastern policy, we can answer: the trust that our Eastern partners have in us, the experience in co-operation and the knowledge and understanding of changes going on in these countries. One of the greatest challenges facing the enlarged European Union
and NATO is building friendly neighborly relations with Russia. The question about relations between the Union, Poland included, and Russia is to a significant extent a question to Russia itself – what is its vision of the future, how Russia defines her place in the future world. Does it intend to follow the path of partnership and co-operation with countries of the Western hemisphere or will she attempt to create some sort of imperial policy. The Kremlin’s approach to events in Georgia and the Ukraine or with respect to Belarus shows that Russia may strive to rebuild and strengthen her influence in countries arisen after the disintegration of the USSR. This is why a good co-operation of America, the European Union and the Russian Federation is so much needed. It is necessary to support those forces in Moscow, which aspire to modernize and democratize the state, to build a civic society and partnership-based relations with neighbors.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, lecture delivered at the Aspen Institute, Washington, DC, September 14, 2005.

27. Poland is vitally interested in stability beyond our eastern frontiers. From our own experience we know that stability is ensured above all by democracy and a free market. We shall therefore continue to support our eastern partners and societies in the job of reform, in the building of a democratic and law-abiding state and a citizens’ society.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered to the inaugural sitting of the newly elected Sejm, Warsaw, October 19, 2005.

28. I believe that Russia is an important participant in the regional cooperation. It is in the interest of Europe, the Baltic Sea region and Russia to clear up all question marks and doubts concerning democracy development in Russia. [...] We are watching the development of situation in Belarus with real worry. The existence in our direct neighborhood of a political regime, broadly considered to be dictatorship, poses a threat for the stability of the region and a challenge for democratic community.

Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, statement delivered during a plenary meeting of prime ministers of the Council of Baltic Sea States, Reykjavik, June 8, 2006.

29. We would like to have the best relations with our eastern neighbors. We keep supporting democratic movements but we do not want that support to clash with our efforts to improve our relations. But let me assure you that there is no other area where hastiness, and sometimes even hysteria, is as damaging as here.
Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, remarks delivered to Sejm expose, Warsaw, July 19, 2006.

30. Democracy can only develop in a favorable international environment, otherwise it will be destroyed, as the Polish historical experience shows. This is why after the year 1989, when Poland rebuilt the foundations of its democratic statehood, it also became a propagator of democratic development in the international arena. Poland decided that support for democracy on an international scale was important for the security of its own democratic development.

Bogdan Borusewicz, Senate Speaker, address at the conference “Promotion of Democracy: Stronger Role for Parliamentary Diplomacy,” during his visit to Georgia, November 30–December 1, 2006.

31. That which the Piasts’ lacked several centuries ago – integration with the main current of European civilization – we have accomplished today in the blink of an eye. No one gave this to us. We alone, though with the help of our friends, achieved this. Having done so, Poland, just as 600 years ago, has become the standard and model of transformation for our Eastern neighbors, in particular for the kindred nation of Ukraine. Then, in the Jagiellonian era, the Republic spread examples of noble liberty and tolerance, become the cohesive force that over subsequent centuries kept together the multiethnic mosaic of elites in our region. It is for this reason that we believe that the mandate of the Lublin Union will be fulfilled only when our Eastern European brothers find themselves within the European Union. This is not an old-new messianism, but a practical observation that strengthening liberty and democracy in our region also serves the interests of our Republic.

Radoslaw Sikorski, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, address delivered to the Sejm, Warsaw, May 7, 2008.

Combined Strategic and Normative References:

1. Poland strongly supports Slovakia’s bid for membership in NATO. It is not only affection for a neighbor but also a matter of common interests. For us in Poland, it is important that the zone of stability and security in Europe in the region of Central Europe be expanded. It is extremely important for the gains of freedom and democracy to be strengthened.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered at Komensky University, Bratislava, April 26, 2002.

2. We also have similar painful experiences from the recent past, which to this day arouse many controversies and disputes. Our countries went through a
period when our people were not able to enjoy full liberty, when many of our citizens were persecuted. That time taught Poles great respect for democratic values and human rights that are inseparably connected with them. For us they are a *universal and supreme value*. We are aware that only the observation of these values can ensure the *harmonious development of nations and a bright future* for the world.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered before a joint session of the Parliament of Chile, Valparaiso, April 11, 2002.

3. It is also *in our interest and in the interest of all Europe* that after our entry into the European Union the eastern border of our countries would not become for decades a line dividing our continent. [. . .] Our region – and this is the great responsibility of Poland and Slovakia – cannot permit the Union to turn its back on those partners in the east who will not be members of the Union. To prevent this from happening we must strengthen democratic processes, economic reforms and advances in civilization that are taking place in the countries of our eastern neighbors. Contacts must be developed, dialogue strengthened, and co-operation promoted. Just as for all of the post-war decades we counted on the solidarity of the western societies, so now we have moral obligations to the countries of Eastern Europe with whom we shared a *common fate*.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered at Komensky University, Bratislava, April 26, 2002.

4. Poland’s engagement has recently reached far away. Being convinced that international *security was at stake*, that this was about *combating evil*, about regaining freedom and establishing *justice* in place of a bloody dictatorship – Poland took part in the military action in Iraq. Now we want to contribute to stabilization of the country, to appointment of democratic authorities by the Iraqi people, to reconstruction and economic development.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered at the III Forum of the Foreign Policy with the attendance of the President of Ireland, Mary McAleese, Warsaw, June 3, 2003.

5. It lies in our *common interest* to strengthen the zones of stability, democracy and rule of law in the East. Poland has special obligations to its neighbours. It also pins special hopes on them. In formulating these obligations and hopes we are guided by the principle of *solidarity*, for we share a similar and often the same fate.

293
Leszek Miller, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the plenary session “Enlargement of the European Union: First or Last Stage of Integration?,” during the XIII Economic Forum, Krynica, September 6, 2003.

6. Credit for the triumph of democracy in Ukraine reached by peaceful means should be given to millions of Ukrainians. It is also our, Polish success. Mediation of President Aleksander Kwasniewski and the fact that we managed to gain for the cause representatives of the European Union, the involvement of a number of Polish politicians, operations of Polish parliamentarians acting above all party divisions, engagement of Polish members of the European Parliament and thousands of young observers of the elections – all these actions contributed to the successful solution of the crisis and are a serious investment in the future. Mass solidarity of Poles with the democratic Ukraine is a good springboard for a breakthrough in relations between our societies. Relations at the level of presidents are important but the future of our nations will be decided by the nations. In those weeks and months Ukrainian and Poles gave a proof of political maturity and a proper comprehension of the reason of state. [...] The state of affairs in Belarus arouses understandable concern in Poland as we share a common border. We support democratic and Europe-oriented aspirations of that country. Jointly with our European and cross-Atlantic partners we try to co-create the Western policy in such a way so as to provide full support for democratic and freedom-oriented movements in Belarus.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, presenting a government report on Poland’s foreign policy at a Sejm meeting, Warsaw, January 21, 2005.

7. We are concerned with the situation in Belarus and this can be well-understood. We have not only a common border but also ties of historic, cultural and inter-human nature. We support democratic and Europe-oriented aspirations of the considerable part of the Ukrainian society. However they have been brutally thwarted by the regime of Aleksandr Lukaszenko, who readily abuses the authority resorting to different type of pressures and repressions. It is our intention to persuade the Belarussian authorities to respect the rules of the law. Jointly with our European and cross-Atlantic partners we try to co-create the Western policy in such a way so that democratic forces and freedom-oriented tendencies in Belarus could meet with understanding, solidarity and support. We deeply believe that future belongs to them.

8. The United Nations today is facing an unprecedented challenge to provide the humanity with a new hope to build the 21st century’s civilization on a solid foundation of *universal values*: freedom, security, democracy and solidarity. [. . . ] The principle of solidarity remains inextricably linked to that of freedom. For many, freedom is still an unfulfilled dream. On different continents, people are deprived of their basic rights. [. . . ] I hope that recently established Democracy Fund, which Poland supports and is ready to contribute to it, would offer a genuine assistance for those who uphold and aspire for freedom and solidarity. [. . . ] We cannot build a *secure and just* world without a strong commitment to act together through the United Nations. Freedom, security, democracy, and solidarity must be the key guidelines that will lead the Organization in the 21st century.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, speech summing up the debates of the 2nd round table of the High Level Meeting at the United Nations, New York, September 16, 2005.

**Normative References:**

1. We *sympathize* with all of the countries of Eastern Europe that are taking up the challenge of transformations.

   Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, during a meeting with the Diplomatic Corps, Warsaw, January 9, 2002.

2. The democratic form of government and observance of the highest standards of human rights is a *norm in Europe*. [. . . ] Therefore, democratic countries are *duty-bound* not only to observe the principles of democracy and human rights at home, but also to propagate them elsewhere. For obvious historical and geographical reasons, in Poland we attach particular importance to the development of relations with our Eastern neighbors. I have in mind at this point first of all Ukraine, where democracy is not yet firmly established, and Belarus, which will need much more time and effort to achieve democracy. Poland is also making every effort to develop the best possible political and economic relations with Russia. I am confident that following our accession to the EU, and with the Union’s full backing, we shall be even more successful in this field of endeavor.

   Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Poland, address, Copenhagen, February 1, 2002.

3. A *new international order* is taking shape before our eyes, one that renders obsolete the hitherto prevailing doctrine of spheres of influence and paves the way towards a new security system rooted in the “open door” philosophy. We
are striving to build a system based on adherence to a shared set of values: freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the deliberations of the VI Stockholm Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Baltic Region, Stockholm, April 24, 2002.

4. Poland is especially pleased that seven new countries have been invited to join the Alliance. We shared a common fate behind the Iron Curtain. Together we dreamed of freedom. Together we spoke up for it and entered onto the road of independence, democracy and the rule of law. The North Atlantic Alliance in the most fundamental sense is a community of values. That is why when Poland entered NATO, I said: “We are returning to where our place is.” We think the same of the aspirations of the Baltic peoples and the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Poland always has been in favour of NATO’s “open door” policy and the enlargement of the zone of common security in Europe and the complete healing of the wounds after the disgraceful Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the post-Yalta divisions. We have supported you in solidarity and have shared our experiences with you.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the ceremonies connected with invitation of the Baltic countries to NATO, Vilnius, November 23, 2002.

5. In our view, the future international order should not be defined by the number of poles. The concept of multipolarity, sometimes used in other European capitals to criticize the U.S, is not appealing. It brings back the memories of spheres of influences or zones of domination. For us, the new order should be based on solid values and principles, including democracy, human rights, democratic governance, and social justice.


6. every capital of Central and Eastern Europe which went along the road of transformations over the recent years should be asked if we still want and know how to show solidarity. Poland and I myself have taken upon ourselves a mission of goodwill. [. . . ] We are taking part in the mediations because of one reason. Ukrainians should be given the opportunity to decide their own affairs in a free, honest and transparent way during the elections. And this is it. [. . . ] We cannot be indifferent to situations in which democratic rules and human rights are broken anywhere, and also behind our eastern border.
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during a working visit to Poland by President of the Republic of Austria Heinz Fisher, Warsaw, December 10, 2004.

7. The development of local democracy and trans-border co-operation – is of very special importance for Poland. We should be all aware that effective trans-border cooperation and developed local democracy are the main factors strengthening *European unity* based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law at the lowest – local level. Poland has gathered a rich experience in this field that can be shared with other partners, especially with those with the ongoing process of political transformation.

Adam D. Rotfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, address delivered during the Parliamentary Assembly Session in Strasbourg, April 28, 2005.

8. As it was mentioned in many speeches during this Summit, we are especially concerned about the situation in Belarus. Notorious violations of all the basic democratic principles and human rights in Belarus are *unacceptable*. The Belarusian people have for centuries been part of European civilization, making an important contribution to it in cultural terms, and they fully deserve to live in freedom, democracy and justice. We are looking forward to the moment when Belarus will join the family of Council of Europe Member States, so that we may work together to translate the European values into practice.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, address delivered at the concluding session of the Third Summit of the Council of Europe, Warsaw, May 17, 2005.

9. The freedom awaited for so long has come at last. We have been enjoying it in Poland and passing the test for 16 years now. Here in Ukraine the voice calling for freedom of the nation and dignity of people, for truth and democracy came from the Maydan last November and December. And *Poland heard the call* from Ukraine. At the request of both sides of the conflict, we initiated, together with European mediators, a ‘roundtable’ meeting during which the crisis was settled by political means. Ukraine has made its own sovereign decisions. We welcome your success and we are very proud of it. The road you have chosen is not an easy one. But we want to assure you that *you are not alone*. Poland wants to be with you and will be with you and your strivings. And we believe there will come a moment when we welcome you in the family of European Union nations!
Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of the Republic of Poland, statement delivered during a gala opening of the Polish pre-war military cemetery in Lvov, June 24, 2005.

10. We give much attention to the developments to the east of our borders. We are in solidarity with the efforts the Ukrainian civic society that awoke during the days of the ‘Orange Revolution’ and wants to see Ukraine in the family of democratic states that share European standards and values.

Marek Belka, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, address broadcast on television, October 18, 2005.

11. On the way to the implementation of the foreign policy agenda 2006-2010 and beyond we should not forget about our most like-minded international partners. Cooperation in the area of democracy promotion should remain one of the most vital pillars of the transatlantic dialogue. US and Europe should continue spreading their common values, like: democracy, human rights, market economy.


12. The Polish Nation view the achievements of the American People with profound respect. We appreciate and share their love of peace, freedom and democracy. Our participation in stability operations world-wide serves as a means to defend those very values and ideals, and in this regard we continue to be an active ally of the United States of America.

Lech Kaczynski, President of the Republic of Poland, message of congratulations to Barack Obama, January 21, 2009.
APPENDIX 4:
EXPLANATIONS OF SLOVAK DEMOCRACY PROMOTION BY SLOVAK
POLITICAL ELITES IN OFFICIAL FOREIGN POLICY DOCUMENTS AND
SPEECHES

Strategic References:

1. Slovakia will continue to develop good and fair neighborly relations with Ukraine, which is an important element of the European security architecture. Slovakia will support Ukraine’s efforts to gradually integrate into the group of democratic and market-oriented European states, including regional and sub-regional organizations, in particular CEFTA

   Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Orientation of the Slovak Republic’s Foreign Policy for 2000 (Bratislava, 1999).

2. Bitter lessons of conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus and in Central Asia have more than ever manifested that security is closely connected with regional stability and trust. [ . . . ] Democracy, fair treatment of minorities and good neighborly relations are important prerequisites for the stability of any region. When one element of this triangle is missing, the security of a region is vulnerable. Isolated, authoritarian, and xenophobic regimes have a large potential of projecting instability to the whole region. [ . . . ] Continuation of the Alliance’s enlargement policy has to be regarded also as a process of widening of the zone of stability and establishing reinforced relations between new democracies.


3. Our relations to our neighbors are of tremendous importance of our foreign policy. [ . . . ] the value of our house would increase with the value of the house of our neighbors. This – and also for pragmatic reasons – is why we are extremely interested in outstanding and even better and better neighborhood relations. From the European participation viewpoint there are two dominating vectors present where Slovakia wants to contribute and will contribute – first of all it is the Western Balkans and Ukraine. [ . . . ] Russia is a vital and key element of stability in Europe, but also in a wider, more global scale. This is why we will contribute to democratic development of Russia, with plurality and still strengthening civic society.
4. Ukraine is not only a neighbor of the Slovak Republic, but it also became a neighbor of the European Union. [...] We do care very much about democratic and perspective development of Ukraine, about its direction to a community on a similar journey as did we in Slovakia. Russia is a vital and one of the key elements of stability in Europe, but also in a wider, more global scale. This is why we will contribute to democratic development of Russia, with plurality and still strengthening civic society.

Mikulas Dzurinda, “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic,” in Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003 (Bratislava, 2004, n.p.).

5. Slovak Republic will continue to develop good neighborly and fair relations with Ukraine. In this context, the Slovak Republic will actively promote concrete steps aimed at Ukraine’s gradual integration into the community of democratic and market-oriented European countries, including regional and subregional organizations.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Focus of the Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic for 2003 (Bratislava, 2002).

6. The Slovak Republic has a particular experience that traditional donors don’t have. This experience is rooted in the transformation process after 1989. Slovakia underwent changes in all sectors of society (politics, economy, social sphere, etc.) The transfer of this experience to countries currently undergoing their own transformations will consolidate the political and economic ties of Slovakia with these countries.


7. Due to its enlargement, the EU became a neighbor of regions that are potentially unstable. We do not wish for their isolation. On the contrary, we chose the Balkans and Ukraine as the priority regions of Slovak foreign policy. Our contribution was and remains the sharing of our experience on the way to stability and democracy and through the help of our non-governmental organizations.

8. Slovakia has a long-standing interest in a stable and balanced democratic development in Ukraine, which belongs to the permanent priorities of Slovak foreign policy. Through the development of intensive cooperation in various areas, Slovakia has supported the efforts of Ukraine to gradually move towards Euro-Atlantic structures.


9. Unresolved conflicts beyond the boundaries of the enlarged European Union continue to be accompanied by organized crime, illegal migration, terrorism, and the ever-present risk of proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction. These phenomena represent long-term threats to the stability and prosperity of Slovakia. These threats result from social and economic underdevelopment of certain states, from the deficits of human rights and democratic principles, and from persistent ethnic and religious intolerance. Comprehensive resolutions must therefore be focused also on preventive elimination of their causes, not only towards fighting individual negative phenomena. [. . . ] The strategic objective of foreign policy of the Slovak Republic is the development of the country within a stable and predictable international environment. The Slovak Republic will promote the expansion of the area of freedom, stability, peace and prosperity in Europe and elsewhere in the world.


10. The Commonwealth of Independent States is, due to specific historical and social reasons, in the natural sphere of interest of Slovakia’s foreign policy. Slovakia’s relations with the Commonwealth also affect Slovakia’s strategic interest in stability in that space, which has a direct impact on the safety of the Slovak Republic. Finally, the Commonwealth area is strategically important one for Slovakia, given the link between the energy needs of Slovakia and the energy supply by the Commonwealth countries. [. . . ] Slovakia will pay particular attention to the development of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and the building of civil society [in the Commonwealth]. [. . . ] Slovakia has the ambition to be an active participant in promoting democratic reforms and economic transformation in Russia. Support for strengthening the security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe remains one of the primary objectives of the Slovak security and defense policy and the political developments in Russia is a key factor in this regard.

12. Ukraine is also high on the list of the Slovak foreign policy priorities. We are convinced that this country deserves a clear Euro-Atlantic perspective. Democracy and stability in the immediate neighborhood of the EU is in the best interest of all of us.


14. Slovakia will continue to develop good neighborly and fair relations with Ukraine, which it considers an integral part of the security architecture of Europe. In this context, Slovakia will actively promote concrete steps aimed at Ukraine’s gradual integration into the community of democratic and market-oriented European countries, including regional, subregional and global organizations (WTO) and Ukraine closer to NATO and the EU.


15. Slovak Republic will act as a trusted partner who delivers on its commitments in relation to its allies, partners, and international organizations and will contribute the consolidation of world peace, developing democracy and protecting human rights.


16. In the past year, the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe remained foreign policy priorities of the Slovak Republic for bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Historical ties those regions of Europe, the existence of Slovakian diasporas in these countries, and the strong effects of developments in these regions on the stability and security in the whole continent compel us to assist the transformation processes in the relevant countries and the development of democracy, rule of law, market economy and civil society, which are prerequisites for the Euro-Atlantic integration prospects of these countries.
Slovakia’s transition experience is our value added to the international efforts to achieve the above objectives.


17. The *stability and prosperity* of the European continent depend significantly on the situation in Eastern Europe. Slovakia is a direct neighbor of this region and therefore Bratislava will continue to actively participate in the shaping of the “Eastern” policy of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. [. . .] Slovakia will continue to support further enlargement of the EU because it significantly contributes to the extension of the zone of democracy, stability and prosperity in Europe. Slovakia is interested in developing a stable and prospering neighborhood, and therefore Slovakia will support the EU steps aimed at fostering relations with the countries of the European Neighborhood Policy and Russia as a strategic partner of the European Union. [. . .] Slovakia is ready to share its experience gained from the reform and transformation processes with the countries in the ENP framework. With respect to Ukraine as a neighboring country, the main objective of Slovakia will be supporting the development of the country, its democratic institutions, and the development of a good neighborhood. The European and Euroatlantic orientation of Ukraine and the pro-integration direction of Ukrainian foreign policy are in the *strategic interest* of Slovakia. [. . .] Slovakia will continue to support the democratic forces in Belarus in their struggle for human and political rights. [. . .] The significant impact of the situation in the Western Balkans on the *stability and development* in Central Europe and the historic links make this region a priority of Slovakia’s foreign policy. [. . .] Slovakia is ready to continue its contribution to the recovery of stability and regional security in the Western Balkans and the future prosperity of this region within European and Euroatlantic structures. In order to achieve these goals, Slovakia will further promote continuing the integration process of the countries of the region into the EU [. . . and] will also support Euroatlantic ambitions of the Western Balkans and maintaining the principle of NATO open door policy.


18. The South Caucasus are an exceptionally *politically unstable region* where territorial disputes affect the political and social life of each country. [. . .] It is necessary to develop the EU’s efforts to improve the security situation, human rights and democracy [in the South Caucasus].

19. In the long run, it is in the *interest* of the Slovak Republic to support democratic forces and associations in the Republic of Belarus, which seek to change conditions in the country; to contribute to the efforts of the international community to support democratic development, economic transformation to a market economy and stabilization of the Republic of Belarus and its integration into European and global cooperation; to support the efforts and steps that lead to the democratization of the Belarusian society in all spheres of social life.


20. The Slovak Republic and its citizens are an integral part of the democratic world by their own decision. It is in their *vital interest* that this world will not only be secure, but that the zone of democracy and security will continue to spread with a perspective of sustainable development.


21. In their dialogue with various Council of Europe representatives, Slovak diplomats strive to support activities, aimed at supporting the expansion of the area of the secure and democratic world, especially in the regions of *geographical and political priority* to us.


22. These [“fundamental and long-term threats to the stability and prosperity of Slovakia”] threats result from the social and economic underdevelopment of certain states, deficits of human rights and democratic principles, as well as from persistent ethnic and religious intolerance.


23. One of the Slovak official development assistance goals is: Ensuring global *peace and security*, in particular by enhancing democracy, the rules of law, human rights and good governance in developing countries.

Combined Strategic and Normative References:

1. [ . . . ] the geopolitical position of Ukraine, situated along the North-South and East-West axes, its geographical size and the number of inhabitants, its key importance for the region, as well as shared values and common interests that are important for enhancing peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. Ukraine has special significance for the Slovak Republic. It is its largest neighbor that has traditional social, economic and cultural ties with Slovakia, including similarities of languages and religions, and reciprocal presence of minorities. [ . . . ] Slovakia supports the efforts at building a democratic, economically strong and stable Ukraine and its integration into the European structures. Independence and sovereignty of Ukraine is an important security factor for the Slovak Republic as well.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, *Slovakia’s Key Goals and Interests as Regards to Ukraine* (Bratislava, 2001).

2. Europe that was for centuries tossed around by wars and social unrest is now a place of peace, stability and prosperity. The Western Balkans is our common task in the nearest future. [ . . . ] We are a part of today’s world, so to hide in isolation and false neutrality under a mask of stability, security and prosperity of current Europe would be irresponsible and shortsighted. Responsible foreign policy always looks to future, anticipates possible development and tries to find answers. Integration is such an answer. [ . . . ] Integration brings enlargement of the zone of freedom and self-realization for states as well as for individuals.


3. Interest in freedom and rights of others is not useless idealism. I believe that interest in these problems is a part of every sound foreign policy and it is also a visiting card of maturity of a nation. [ . . . ] An issue of spreading of democracy in the world is an issue directly connected to the issue of peace and worldwide security. Not to talk about the moral aspects of both issues mentioned.


4. Slovakia will devote special attention to such key issues as the fight against terrorism, arms control, respect for human rights and freedoms, development cooperation, effective state administration and sustainable development. The Slovak Republic considers active approach to these issues in both close and
remote parts of the world not only as a *moral imperative*, but also as an *investment* into the future growth and prosperity of the world community.


5. In 2004, Slovakia will join the EU and NATO. Slovakia is committed to the spreading of the *principles* and values of the Euro-Atlantic community to the outside world. After 2004, democracy and stability, market economy, human rights standards will become vectors determining our foreign policy towards other countries – especially in the broader Euro-Atlantic area. [. . .] Slovakia will take steps to] continue the dialogue on spreading stability and supporting the Euro-Atlantic integration of countries into the so-called “Wider Europe,” i.e. the Western Balkans, the South Caucasus and the future neighbors on the eastern borders of the EU. Slovakia will share its best reform practices and thus the path to stability and development of a democratic and prosperous society.


6. These are the consequences of our undertaking a wider responsibility for development in important regions neighboring Europe. It is also an expansion of a willingness to look beyond short-term and local issues. This is because *our problems are linked with the problems of other countries*. It also relates to national security, not only because today we are members of the EU and NATO, not only because our *moral* sense prevents us from gazing passively at the suffering of others, but also because of a principle dictated by political responsibility and providence. We must be interested in spreading liberty around the world. In places where open relations exist among nations, where governments are under control of the opposition, the chances for war are diminished and the chances for *peace and prosperity* are higher. [. . .] our interest in human rights and spreading democracy in not an expression of idealistic dreams. it is a realistic part of a sound policy.


7. Respect for *universal* human rights norms and the fundamental attributes of a functioning democratic society are also one of the essential conditions for *peaceful* coexistence among nations. [. . .] Slovakia continues to fulfill its *obligations* in the protection of human rights and promote the universal ratification of international human rights conventions.

**Normative References:**

1. Someone might find our foreign policy not “realistic” enough; because it does not directly concern felt national interests. Nevertheless is has a specific urgency. It concerns our relation to people in parts of the world where democracy has not started the writing of its history; yet, there live people striving for it. If we dedicate our attention to their situation even for only a moment, we may comprehend the trifling nature of many problems we see at home as so immense. . . . But situation of dissidents in restricting countries in many points even into details resembles our own recent history.


2. Our decision making was much more sensitive and emotional because there are many Slovaks living in Serbia, and the Balkans are traditionally and historically a very close region for us. [We had to decide] whether we will behave on principle, with perspective and correctly, with values or not [. . .].


3. Interests and values should not be in contradiction. [. . .] I am convinced that the solidarity is of Slovakia’s interest. Human rights must be the part of our foreign policy.


4. In 2003, Slovakia was actively involved in a number of international activities to promote human rights and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. Particularly in the area of multilateral relations, we were among the countries whose aim is to strive for democratization and human rights in all countries of the international community. Moreover, we have adopted a number of international treaties on human rights, which are now a part of our domestic law. In this context, we support the efforts of the international community to strengthen and reform the human-rights mechanisms, including effective
functioning of treaty monitoring bodies and bodies to report to the consistent implementation of the idea human rights documents at the national level.


5. The Slovak Republic recognizes, asserts and protects democracy, the principle of the rule of law, and the observance of basic human rights and freedoms in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the Organization of the United Nations and other international documents.


6. *Human rights are not for sale.* Slovakia is convinced that developing economic relations and supporting human rights in Belarus are compatible, and therefore, supports the participation of Belarus in both the Eastern Partnership project and in the activities of the Council of Europe, providing that Belarus adopts certain specific [liberalization] measures.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.


Migas, Jozef. “Presentation of the Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.” In Slovak Institute for International Studies, Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2000, 7–12.


