EFFECTS OF AN AMERICA CUE ON INTERGROUP ATTITUDES, BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIOR

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EFFECTS OF AN AMERICA CUE ON INTERGROUP ATTITUDES, BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIOR

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Each day, the citizens of the United States of America are likely to be reminded of their nation in any number of subtle ways. What are the effects of this reminding? In the present work, sixteen experiments are reported in which there is converging evidence that a subtle reminder of America leads to bias against outgroups despite that Americans, in general, and in the present study, appear to associate America with egalitarianism. Evidence for bias was found on both implicit and explicit attitudes measures, and was directed toward the outgroup at both the group and individual level. Moreover, the consequences of these attitudes included feelings of psychological distance from the outgroup, reduced support for an African-American political candidate, and poorer ratings for an African-American job candidate. The potential mechanisms for both explicit and implicit effects of a reminder of America are discussed.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Shanette Porter was born and raised in Buffalo, New York. She received her Bachelor of Arts in psychology from Yale University and her Master of Arts in industrial-organizational psychology from Michigan State University. After a brief summer break, she came to Cornell University to pursue a PhD in social psychology. She will continue social psychological research in a post-doctoral position in the Department of Psychology at Northwestern University.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Just as citizens shape a nation, the national ethos, traditions, values, and history associated with a nation influence its citizens. The impact of a nation’s values, ideals, and traditions on individuals has been empirically documented only sparingly (for exceptions, see Bannister & Saunders, 1978; Hong, Benet-Martinez, Chiu, & Morris, 2003). Anecdotally, however, it is not difficult to think of examples in which national values and ideals influence attitudes and behavior. A politician might cite his belief in the national ethos as the impetus for service to the government; a soldier’s decision to fight, and even die, for her country, is likely to be rooted in her understanding of, and support for, national values; and lawyers practice everyday to protect these same ideals. Indeed, individuals know the traditions, values, ideals, and history of their nation, and this information undoubtedly affects them. As noted, the nature of that influence has not been widely studied, but drawing from relevant social cognitive research, it is contended here that it depends on at least two factors. First, the nature of the influence will depend on what available associations people have with their nation that are relevant for a particular domain, which could include information about the types of characterizations and practices they associate with their nation (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Wilson, 2002). Second, the influence of a nation on its citizens might depend on whether one is consciously, deliberately thinking about their nation, or alternatively, subtly reminded of their nation, perhaps without even being aware of the reminding (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Wilson, 2002). In the following, these factors are considered in the context of intergroup relations.

Intergroup relations is a domain for which citizens of many nations seem to have relevant, ready associations with their nation. The United States of America is no exception to this rule. The nation is commonly referred to as a melting pot, though
Historians, psychologists, and sociologists have contended that rather than a melting pot, America idealistically represents something better described as a salad bowl: a place where multiple, distinct groups harmoniously coexist, variously referred to as cultural pluralism and multiculturalism (e.g., Milton, 1964; Glazer, 1970; Adams & Adams, 2001). In many ways, America has lived up to these characterizations, with the wide array of races, ethnicities, and religions, coexisting within its borders. There are over 300 languages spoken in the U.S., it is one of the most racially and ethnically heterogeneous nations, and its religious diversity distinguishes it from the world (United States Census 2000; Jones, Doty, Grammich, Horsch, Houseal, Lynn, Marcum, Sanchagrin, & Taylor, 2002). But, America stands for something more than basic multiplicity. As noted by many scholars, America is now, and has always been, associated with equitable, and equal, treatment of its people. In fact, the centrality of egalitarianism to America has been clear since its inception—it is prominent among the values highlighted and celebrated in many of the founding documents (Lipset, 1996; McCloskey & Zaller, 1984; Myrdal, 1944; Sears, Henry, & Kosterman, 2000). Both the United States Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights, for example, make direct reference to the equality of American people, and their freedom to choose their lifestyles without persecution. More to the point, Americans recognize and support the importance of egalitarianism to both America and their everyday lives. For example, Americans cite equal access to opportunities and treating all people equally as quintessential to being American, and endorse diversity in their personal lives (Cullen, 2004; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997).

It may be unsurprising then, that there is evidence that reminding Americans of their nation can lead them to act in a more egalitarian way. Research in cognitive and social psychology has demonstrated that the cognitive activation of a concept in memory can influence individuals’ momentary beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.
Current models of memory posit that when a concept, or rather its cognitive representation, is activated through some form of priming, information that is associated with that concept will also become activated (Devine, 1989, Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Bargh, 1997; Bargh, 2007). Some or all activated information, in turn, shapes subsequent attention, beliefs, and attitudes, and effects behavior. Conceivably, given America’s founding principles, egalitarianism is one type of information that is likely to become activated when the concept, America, is activated. And indeed, there is evidence both that egalitarianism is activated when the concept of America is made accessible, and that its activation influences individuals in predictable ways. As mentioned earlier, for example, asking people explicitly about their American-related attitudes results in strong self-reported support for egalitarianism (Devos & Banaji, 2005). Likewise, Butz, Plant, and Doerr (2007) found that considering intergroup attitudes while in front of a large American flag, versus in the absence of the American flag, led to less hostile attitudes toward a non-White ethnic group.

Despite a strongly endorsed commitment to egalitarianism, however, America possesses a sordid history of intergroup conflict among various racial, ethnic, and religious groups. Several well-known supporters of abolition have made reference to this inconsistency, including Martin Luther King, Jr., Abraham Lincoln, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and perhaps most famously, Thomas Day, who in noting that many of the signers of the Declaration of Independence owned slaves, wrote, “If there be an object truly ridiculous in nature, it is an American patriot, signing resolutions of independency with the one hand, and with the other brandishing a whip over his affrighted slaves” (Armitage, 2007). In spite of a philosophical endorsement of equality, then, America has often embraced discriminatory social practices. At one time or another, many ethnic and religious groups, such as the Irish, Polish, Italian,
Japanese, Catholic, and Jewish have faced bigotry in the United States, usually peaking at times of war or mass immigration, and eventually waning (Boyer, Clark, Hawley, Kett, & Rieser, 2000; Fetzer, 2000). More recently, bias against people of Arab and Mexican descent has become increasingly aggressive, perhaps similarly attributable to current socio-political conditions, such as the Iraq War, and the immigration of Mexicans to America during an economic recession. Arguably, however, no other group has been subjected to prejudice for as long, or as extremely, as people of African descent. Since the arrival of Europeans to the land that would later become America, people of African descent have faced vile forms of discrimination (e.g., Hine, Hine, & Harrold, 2000; Kusmer & Trotter, 2009). Initially, the mistreatment of Africans was only normatively accepted, but within a short time, restrictions on the rights of Africans, and even the enslavement of Africans, became a part of law (e.g., the Naturalization Act of 1790, the Three-fifths compromise and the Jim Crow laws). The 1860s and 1870s brought the Civil War and the emancipation of the slaves, and with these changes, an end to legalized discrimination, largely in recognition of the contradiction between discriminatory laws and the documented principles upon which the country was founded. Nevertheless, still today, prejudice against many groups, including African-Americans, is pervasive. Sociological and psychological studies on education, access to resources, and intergroup behaviors, beliefs and attitudes suggest that bias against Blacks and other non-White groups still exists, though expressed in a more covert manner than it once was (Quilian, 2006; McConahay, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003).

Thus, on the one hand, there is evidence that America is associated with fairness, and more specifically, the impartial treatment of all its citizens. On the other hand, a history of prejudice, both overt and covert, and both official and informal, also
may be closely tied to America. Given these two types of conflicting information potentially associated with America—egalitarianism and discrimination—how might reminding Americans of their nation influence them, particularly in regard to their attitudes and behaviors toward diverse groups? Thus far, evidence from the limited literature on this topic has suggested that priming America results in egalitarian attitudes, however, this work has not examined the effect of priming America in a subtler manner (for exceptions, see Hong et al., 2003; Wong & Hong, 2005; Ferguson & Hassin, 2007). Research in social cognition, and specifically work on dual process models, suggests that how a given stimulus, in this case, our nation, affects us can depend on its level of processing (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Wilson, 2002). In short, priming a particular concept can result in a dissociation, such that one set of effects is observed when that concept is subject to nonconscious, shallow, or superficial processing, while an entirely different set of effects is observed when it is consciously, deliberately considered.

Given research on dissociations, then, there are two possibilities for how a subtle, versus a blatant reminder of America might affect individuals. One possibility is that both subtle and blatant America primes lead to egalitarianism toward diverse groups. Indeed, that an egalitarianism effect is found when one is consciously, explicitly processing America, suggests that there is an associative link between America and egalitarianism that could produce egalitarianism when shallowly processing the stimulus (e.g., Bargh, 2007). Alternatively, shallow processing could lead to distinct effects, perhaps even the opposite of those that have emerged from more blatant priming (e.g., Bargh, 2007).

Work in social cognition has illustrated both that subtle exposure to stimuli can have large, sometimes surprising effects on behavior, attitudes, and beliefs, and that these effects can differ significantly from those resulting from blatant exposure to the
same stimuli (e.g., Bargh, 2007). In the case of an America prime, that subtle and blatant exposure might produce conflicting effects is a viable possibility, particularly given the long history of prejudice in America, underlining the potential for an associative link between prejudice and America. Empirically, such a link has not yet been demonstrated, however, recent research by Devos and Banaji (2005) is consistent with this idea. In their studies, the researchers found that White and Asian Americans associated America with Caucasian more than with other ethnicities, but only when this association was measured implicitly. One potential implication of these findings is that the link between America and White is indicative of an implicit evaluative link between these two concepts, such that America is associated with positivity toward Whites and negativity toward non-White groups—that is, essentially, a link between America and prejudice. If this is true, then a subtle reminder of America could lead to bias toward non-White groups, despite that an explicit reminder seems to lead to egalitarianism (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005). This prediction is examined in further detail in the next sections. In addition, the potential boundary conditions and mechanisms of this predicted effect are discussed.

*Implicit effects of America cues on bias*

It is predicted that a subtle, implicitly processed, reminder of America will lead to bias against non-White groups, and in particular, African-Americans. Bias and prejudice are used interchangeably in this dissertation and refer to negative attitudes toward, or evaluations of, groups or individuals (Allport, 1954; Billig, 1976; Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Banaji, 2001). A large body of research accumulated over the last few decades, suggests that our cognitions, feeling, and behaviors can all be triggered by stimuli in our environment. The effects of stimuli presented in this manner can occur without our conscious attention, awareness, control, or effort—that is, they can occur automatically (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The descriptive terms for this type of automatic processing of stimuli depend upon the theory, but include the following: implicit, nonconscious, and shallow (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). In an experimental context, conditions are often introduced that are meant to mimic this subtle environmental triggering. For example, a stimulus could be presented parafoveally, in a subtle or ostensibly unrelated manner, or even below the conscious threshold of visual or auditory perception. While these experimental methods may seem contrived, consider for a moment how one encounters most of the world. Of the many stimuli to which one is exposed each day, how many are thoroughly, consciously processed? It is likely that few make it to conscious attention, and even less get deliberately processed. A reminder of America is likely to be encountered in a similar manner: passing an American flag, attaching a stamp with an American emblem to an envelope, or even hearing the national anthem as one impatiently, distractedly waits for a sporting event to begin on television.

A number of dual process models have made distinctions between implicit processing and conscious, or explicit, processing. The precise details of what distinguishes implicit from explicit processing varies to some extent by theory, however, there are some distinctions that exist across most models. For one, most models describe some difference in the speed and depth of processing, with implicit processing being quicker and more shallow than explicit processing (e.g., Bargh 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Second, for a process of a stimulus or the effects of a stimulus to be considered implicit, these models contend that the processing must occur without attention, awareness, control, or effort (e.g., Bargh 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Sloman, 1996; Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Recent models of dual cognitive processes have suggested that implicit
and explicit (or controlled) processes are not mutually exclusive, but rather that both processes occur simultaneously (e.g., Sun, 2002; Payne 2001; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008; Payne, Lambert, & Jacoby, 2002). Thus, differences in outcomes are due to the degree of relative influence of one versus the other type of processing, which is calculated using process dissociation analyses. These models, though positing more dynamic processing, still largely preserve the distinctions outlined earlier—that is, relatively more implicit versus controlled processing tends to take on the characteristics of implicit processing described earlier, and relatively more controlled versus implicit processing takes on the characteristics of explicit processing. The distinctions between implicit and explicit processing will be further considered in the Mechanisms section, however, for the remainder of this section, the discussion will focus exclusively on implicit processing, and in particular, why implicitly priming America might lead to bias toward outgroups. It is suggested here that context-dependent activation could underlie such an effect, to which this discussion turns next.

Context-dependent activation, also termed pattern activation, is a phenomenon that arises from the fact that representations of concepts are flexible and reconstructed online (versus static) (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1998; McClelland, Rumelhart, & Hinton, 1998; Barsalou, 1982). That a concept is flexible means that new links to different associated concepts can be added and that links between established associations can be weakened or strengthened. That a concept is reconstructed online implies that, within some constraints, a change in the context in which a concept is activated—that is, a change in the other concept(s) activated simultaneously—can influence the momentary representation of that concept (itself, a pattern of activations). A detailed discussion of this stable-but-malleable view of representations is beyond the scope of the current discussion (though, see Mitchell,
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Blair, 2002; for an alternative view, see Smith, 1996). For now, it is important to note that flexibility and online reconstruction of representations allow for even novel situations to have substantial impacts on what is selectively accessible at a given time. Moreover, and central to the current discussion, habitual representations within a particular context can result in an association between the representation and the context, such that when that context is encountered in the future, the associated representation will become automatically accessible. A concrete example may help to make the point clearer. Consider, for example, a pool. Often, a pool might be simultaneously activated with say, your home (the context) and leisure. Over time, if pool continued to be paired with home and leisure, an increasingly stronger link would be built between these concepts. Thus, when you saw or thought about your pool at home, you might feel relaxed. Now, imagine that there was a pool at your gym that you reluctantly used, despite that you feel insecure about being in a bathing suit in public. The concept of pool might then begin to be associated with public (the context) and insecurity, and when you encountered a pool in this situation, you would tend to feel anxious. In this way, the concept of pool would become associated with conflicting or inconsistent memories and what would ultimately be activated—what you would feel or think, and how you would behave upon thinking about or seeing a pool—would be determined by the context (i.e., home or public). This modulation of activation by situation or context is what researchers have referred to as context-dependent activation, with context referring to physical places, psychological situations, categories of people, and even abstract concepts (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2003; Blair, 2002; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Schwarz, Groves, & Schuman, 1998).

Context-dependent activation has relevance for predicting plausible effects of an implicit America reminder. That is, it has been suggested here, and later evidence
will be provided, that America is associated with conflicting information (i.e., both egalitarianism and prejudice). Then, what might determine the content of what is activated when one is reminded of America is the context in which that priming happens. While discrimination against many groups has occurred in the U.S., by and large bias tends to be perpetrated against non-White groups, and perhaps in particular, Blacks. Thus, over time, one might build associations between America and egalitarianism that are qualified by associations between America and prejudice in the context of intergroup relations with Blacks and other non-White groups. The argument, then, is that when the concepts of America and African-Americans are simultaneously, or closely sequentially, primed, prejudice might be selectively activated from among the available associated memories. As discussed earlier, currently activated representations shape attitudes and behavior (e.g., Bargh, 1994; 2007), and thus, it is likely that the co-activation of Blacks and America would result in negative attitudes toward, and bias against, Blacks, which is precisely what is predicted.

*Generality of the implicit effects of America cues on bias*

There are several conditions under which a subtle America cue might be more or less likely to cause bias toward non-White ethnic groups. Variables that might impact the effect include the type of measure used, the level of evaluation at which prejudice is measured, and which targets are evaluated.

*Implicit versus explicit measures.* Implicit measures of attitudes and beliefs use methods that were developed to measure implicit processes and their outcomes (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). The Implicit Association Test (IAT), for example, is a tool that is intended to measure attitudes that are either introspectively unavailable to a person (i.e., a person is unaware that they exist) or that a person may be reluctant to admit to harboring, such as attitudes that
violate socially accepted views. Attitudes that are measured in this way are commonly referred to as implicit attitudes. It is worth mentioning here that the “implicit” in “implicit attitudes” has often been used as a description of the attitude itself, or the process(es) that produced that attitude, however, more accurately refers to a method of measurement that is meant to capture implicit processes, as opposed to either of the former (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2008). Alternatively, explicit attitudes are those attitudes that are measured explicitly, that is, using measures in which people self-report their attitudes. The disadvantages of explicit attitudes measurements include what is mentioned above, that individuals may not be aware of their attitudes, or else they may be unwilling to report their feelings or attitudes. In other words, explicit measures tend to be subject to a greater amount of controlled, versus impulsive or nonconscious, responding (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Payne, 2008). Given this implicit versus explicit distinction in measurement, it may seem as if capturing an effect of a subtle American prime would be easiest with an implicit measure. On the other hand, research has shown that bias can be captured on explicit measures, particularly those that reduce the potential for reactivity in controlled responding (e.g., Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Moreover, some work has found a strong correlation between implicit and explicit measures of prejudice (e.g., Nosek et al., 2007). In short, based on this literature, it is unclear whether explicit measurement of outcomes can be used to assess bias that results from an America cue; it is an open research question (though, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).

Prejudice directed at the group versus the individual. Another potential boundary condition worth investigating is the extent to which the effect of an America cue on prejudice might be directed at an individual, as opposed to the group level. There is a large body of evidence suggesting that a strong predictor of attitudes and behaviors toward individuals is, in fact, attitudes toward the group (e.g., McConnell &
Leibold, 2001; Ashburn-Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Hebl & Dovidio, 2005; Dovidio & Hebl, 2005; for a review, see Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). To take just one example, McConnell and Leibold (2001) found that Whites’ attitudes on the IAT predicted the quality of their interactions with Black experimenters. This work suggests that if attitudes toward the group shift, one should expect a complementary shift in attitudes and behavior toward individual representatives of that group. There is other research, however, suggesting that a distinction between these two levels of attitudes can exist (e.g., Minard, 1952; Olson & Fazio, 2003). In short, this work has found that a person who holds a negative attitude toward a given group, may not hold negative attitudes toward particular members of that group.

As one might have guessed, people tend to hold especially positive attitudes toward well-liked or familiar individuals, regardless of their attitudes toward those individuals’ groups (Mitchell et al., 2003; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). In fact, reminding people of well-liked exemplars of a group can improve their momentary attitudes toward the entire group (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003; Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001). For example, Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) found that presenting participants with what were considered positive exemplars of African-Americans, such as Denzel Washington, lead to a temporary boost in positive evaluations of Blacks as a group on the IAT. Coupled with earlier work, this study is suggestive of a dissociation between attitudes at the group and individual level. All of this evidence together provides a rather mixed bag; on the one hand, group attitudes influence attitudes and behavior toward the group and on the other, this correlation is imperfect, and perhaps particularly so for well-liked, familiar individuals. If an America cue increases bias toward African-Americans as a group, it is unclear whether that bias will be directed at individuals, or instead, exist only at the
group level. In the absence of strong evidence either in favor or against the potential for an America cue to increase bias against individuals, it remains an open question, though it is worth noting that 1) presumably attitudes toward individuals, whether well-liked or not, are malleable just as group attitudes are malleable, and 2) even if attitudes toward well-liked individuals tend to be more static than other attitudes (and again, there is little evidence that they are), the attitudes literature in general suggests that even strongly endorsed attitudes are not impervious to contextual changes (e.g., Wilson & Hodges, 1992).

*Breadth of prejudice effect.* A final potential boundary condition to investigate is breadth of the expected bias effect—that is, the extent to which the effect of America on bias might be evidenced in ethnic groups besides Black Americans, as well as the extent to which this prejudice could result from a reminder of any nation. As noted earlier, many groups in America have been subjected to prejudice and discrimination. Arguably, however, it is non-White groups that have been largely at the receiving end of such treatment, while historically, discrimination against other groups has tended to wax, then eventually fade (e.g., Chin, 2004; Hall, 2010). If this depiction of prejudice in America is accurate, then prejudice and America might be cognitively associated for all non-White groups. That is, given the discussion above regarding context-dependent activation, it is likely that when America is activated in the context of non-White ethnic groups, prejudice will also be activated, and behavioral and attitudinal prejudice might then ensue. Furthermore, if a connection can be drawn between what Devos and Banaji (2005) have termed the “America=White” effect—that is, the effect in which America is more closely cognitively associated with Whites than any other groups—and the current, predicted effect, there is further reason to believe that a reminder of America could increase prejudice and negative attitudes toward non-White groups.
Mechanisms of the effect of a subtle America reminder on bias

There are several potential mechanisms that might explain how a reminder of America could increase bias against non-White groups. For one, there are potential cognitive-affective mechanisms for the predicted effect. At least one of these mechanisms has been discussed at length, namely, the context-dependent activation of prejudice when America is primed. There are other possible cognitive-affective mechanisms, for example, the spontaneous activation of negative stereotypes. A cognitive-motivational mechanism is also plausible. Intergroups research, for example, has found both that motivation is a contributing factor in prejudice, and that certain conditions can increase prejudice-related motives, which in turn, increase bias (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979). Note, that the different mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive, and in fact, likely work in concert to produce the predicted outcome.

Cognitive-affective mechanisms. Here, the term cognitive-affective mechanism refers to mechanisms that involve the direct influence of cognitive associations on attitudes and behavior. To some degree, this is a misnomer, as developing theory suggests that the effect of associations on behavior and attitudes involves a motivational, or goal-related, component—and, at best, the relationship between behavior (or attitudes) and motivation is still unclear (e.g., Bargh, 2007; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Cesario, Plaks, & Higgins, 2006). Nevertheless, the term cognitive-affective will be used here in order to ease discussion when comparing and contrasting with the cognitive-motivational mechanisms proposed shortly.

There is a long history in empirical research connecting stereotyping to attitudes and prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). A stereotype is a belief about a group of people. That these beliefs are typically positively or negatively valenced (e.g., lazy, weak) has lead researchers to hypothesize, and later empirically support, the relationship between stereotypes and
prejudice (though, see Amodio & Devine, 2006). Studies have found, for example, that the ratio of positive to negative stereotypes is correlated with one’s evaluation of a group, with higher ratios corresponding with more positive evaluations (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989). Moreover, priming negative stereotypes associated with a group can lead to less favorable evaluations of that individual as well as his or her group, regardless of one’s general level of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; Payne, 2005; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Blair, 2001). Thus, the automatic activation of stereotypes is one potential cognitive-affective mechanism of the predicted effect of an America cue on prejudice. If priming America and diverse groups selectively activates negative stereotypical conceptualizations of the outgroup (e.g., violent Black Americans), or negative stereotypical exemplars of that group, then one may be more likely to feel negatively toward that group. One way in which America might become associated with stereotypical versions of groups is through the media (e.g., Entman & Rojecki, 2001; Humphrey & Schuman, 1984). If that is the origin of a connection between negative stereotypes and America, then one might expect the effect of an America reminder on prejudice to be stronger for those who watch more television and have limited contact with Blacks in their personal lives. Each of these hypotheses is tested.

Another potential cognitive affective mechanism has been discussed at length, namely, the activation of prejudice when America and Black (or other non-White) Americans are simultaneously activated. Added to that is the prediction that egalitarianism will be activated when America and Caucasian Americans are simultaneously activated. According to Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006), when a concept like America is primed subtly, it will be largely implicitly processed (also see Payne, 2008). According to this view, and implied in similar views, implicit processing depends upon associative processes that operate without regard to
subjective truth (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). It is worth emphasizing that there two important points here: 1) the reliance on associative processes, that is, a reliance on the associations between concepts in order to produce a response, and 2) the operation of these processes without any endorsement of the associations. Alternatively, when a stimulus can be processed more consciously and explicitly, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) contend that individuals engage in rule-based processing. For example, if one feels that they dislike a particular group or object (e.g., “I dislike insects”), they will compare that feeling to other feelings or beliefs relevant to producing a response (“I like nature,” “Insects are a part of nature”, “Insects are a necessary part of the ecosystem”). In this way, individuals engage in proposition validity testing in which they determine whether a particular proposition is true by comparing it to other, relevant propositions that hold some degree of subjective validity, a key difference between associative and rule-based processes.

Given a distinction between associative and rule-based processes in implicit versus explicit processing, it is predicted that only a subtle, but not a blatant America prime will lead to prejudice toward non-White ethnic groups. If America primes prejudice in the context of non-White groups, this should produce a negative evaluation (“I dislike African-Americans”), and thus, the prediction for implicit priming. When one is processing America explicitly, however, other propositions should be considered in conjunction with this evaluation. One influential source of other relevant propositions is knowledge about others’ beliefs, that is, social norms and expectations (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006). Most Americans know, for example, that America has an espoused commitment to egalitarianism (e.g., Devos and Banaji, 2005). Thus, a plausible way in which people might engage in rule-based processes is something like the following: an initial evaluation based on a negative
feeling (“I dislike African-Americans”), is followed by testing of that proposition against other salient, informational, and apparently relevant propositions (“Americans are egalitarian”, “I am an American”, “I believe all people should be treated equally”), resulting in a rejection of the initial proposition, and perhaps even assimilation with the perceived norm or expectation. That is, one might expect more egalitarianism toward all ethnic groups when individuals are blatantly primed with America.

One nuance predicted by the distinction in processing outlined here is that in this case, the manner in which one responds to an implicit America prime (i.e., on an implicit versus explicit measure) should be less important than the manner in which one processes the American stimulus. That is, one could argue that a subtle, implicitly processed reminder of America should be expected to produce bias on implicit, but not explicit measures. The Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) model contends, however, that the default response is to accept one’s initial evaluation (“I dislike Blacks”). Given that individuals should be largely unaware of an America reminder when they are subtly primed, they will be absent further America-relevant information (i.e., an egalitarian norm relevant to America) against which they could test their initial proposition, and thus their initial judgment should carry even on explicit self-report measures. To the extent that individuals test their initial proposition against other judgment-relevant, but America-irrelevant, information (“I like all people”, “Prejudice is wrong”), one might expect a relatively smaller prejudice effect on explicit versus implicit measures.

Cognitive-motivational mechanisms. Many theories of modern prejudice and its expression suggest that intergroup bias is motivated (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Brown & Turner, 1979; Crandall & Eshleman, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Devine, 1989). Self-categorization theory, born out of social identity theory, posits that individuals categorize themselves into social groups or
categories, which can include established, well-known social groups, such as an ethnic group or gender, or can be based on seemingly arbitrary distinctions, such as when people are randomly divided into teams (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Tajfel, 1982). This mere categorization of people into groups plants the seed for intergroup bias, in that one’s sense of belonging, and therefore, self-esteem becomes tied to the group, creating an ingroup protection motive (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Highlighting a particular identity, or making it salient, can activate the ingroup protection motive, and thus increase the likelihood of prejudice against the outgroup. In this view, then, prejudice serves as a means for protecting one’s ingroup, which is ultimately in the service of maintaining or enhancing one’s self-esteem.

Tajfel (1982) proposed that once people are categorized into groups, the salience of their own identity in the presence of outgroup members can activate the ingroup protection motive. He reasoned that this is because the comforting social consensus on beliefs and values that an ingroup provides becomes psychologically challenged by even implicit awareness of other, potentially contradictory beliefs and values (i.e., those held by outgroup members). Several factors contributing to the salience of an identity have been empirically identified, including perceived similarity within the group, perceived differentiation between the groups, and perceived extant or sudden threatening conflict between the groups; being a part of a group can increase the likelihood that one perceives or exaggerates the existence of these factors (e.g., Turner et al., 1987; Tajfel, 1982). Moreover, anything that increases either the perceived need for in-group protection, or the value of outgroup discrimination, also increases the potential for the expression of prejudice (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979).

Social identity and self-categorization theories provide two ways in which a reminder of America could lead to prejudice. One prediction that follows from these theories is that a reminder of America in an intergroup context could increase
prejudice if that reminder threatens one’s ingroup (e.g, White), by, for example, reminding individuals of intergroup conflict. That is, America may be cognitively associated with intergroup strife, and priming America and diverse groups simultaneously might selectively activate such associations, leading to the salience of one’s identity in a context that already presumes conflict. A second prediction based upon social identity theory is that a subtle reminder of America does not make one’s identity salient via a reminder of a conflict-related threat, but rather through America’s cognitive link with being White. Devos and Banaji (2005) have indeed found that for White and Asian Americans, America is closely linked with whiteness. In other words, for a subset of the American population, priming America could serve to prime their social group identity, making it salient. As noted above, the salience of this identity might then activate an ingroup protection motive, and induce prejudice.

Outline of the current research

Sixteen experiments are reported demonstrating the effects of processing an America cue on attitudes and behavior toward non-White ethnic groups, and in particular, African-Americans. In the second chapter, the effects of implicitly processing an America cue are demonstrated using a variety of implicit measures of attitudes and prejudice. In the third chapter, the boundary conditions of this effect are explored, including the degree to which bias resulting from implicitly processing a reminder of America can be captured on explicit measures, whether bias is directed only at the most general level, or also will be targeted at individuals, and the degree to which bias is found toward various social groups. The fourth chapter includes an investigation of possible mechanisms of the effect, highlighting why bias might be produced when an America cue is implicitly, but not explicitly, processed. The final chapter discusses the implications and limitations of the findings, and suggests future directions for the research program.
CHAPTER TWO

IMPLICIT EFFECTS OF AMERICA CUES ON BIAS

In this chapter, I report three studies testing the prediction that subtle, implicitly processed America cues lead to affective bias toward African-Americans for White and Asian Americans native to the United States. I used two different cues, an American flag (Studies 1A, 1B & 2), chosen for its pervasive use as a symbol of America, and the letters USA (Study 1B), to test whether the effect was specific to particular cues. In all studies, participants were implicitly primed using a computer task in which the cues were flashed below conscious threshold. Participants’ awareness of the priming cues was assessed after the experiment. I employed two implicit measures of bias, an attitudes Implicit Association Test (IAT) and an evaluative stereotyping IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). Finally, I test the extent to which the effect might be moderated by individual differences, such as gender, nationalism, patriotism, news following, or political affiliation.

Study 1A

There is some evidence that explicit processing of an America cue results in egalitarianism (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Butz et al., 2007), however, it is possible that implicit processing of the same cues could lead to different, even opposite effects, such as bias. These sorts of dissociations have been reported in many social cognitive literatures, including the persuasion, decision-making, and attitudes literatures (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Fitzsimons & Williams, 2000; Fazio et al., 1995). One reason to believe that implicitly processing America cues might lead to bias is that America could be associated with a long history of intergroup strife and discrimination between Whites and non-White groups.
Method

Participants

Thirty-eight White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control prime) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

In the first part of the study, participants completed a decision-making computer task ostensibly testing their decision-making ability. In the task, they were implicitly primed with a black and white picture of either an American flag (implicit America prime condition; Figure 1) or a flag image that did not resemble any nation’s flag (control prime condition; Figure 2). Participants completed 32 trials of the computer task. Each trial began with an American flag [control] prime presented for 17ms, followed by a mask presented for 38ms, then a randomly selected target image that contained both an A and an L, unequal in size. Participants were asked to respond to the target image by pressing either the a or l key on their keyboards as quickly as they could to indicate which letter they believed was larger.

IAT measure. All participants then were informed that they would begin a second, unrelated experiment in which they would complete another computer task, the Black-White attitudes IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; see Appendix A for the list of stimuli). In the IAT, participants were given two categories (White and Black) placed at the top of the computer screen, on opposites sides of the screen, then asked to categorize words into one of those categories (e.g., Jamal). In the second block of trials, participants were given two attributes (positive and negative) and asked to complete a similar categorization task with positive and negative words (e.g., pleasure). In the third block, the categories and attributes were paired together (e.g., White and positive on one side and Black and negative on the other). Participants
were asked to categorize words from any of the categories or attributes that appear in the center of the screen as quickly as possible; words were presented one at a time in random order. In the final two blocks, the pairings were switched and participants were asked to complete the categorization task once more, first in practice trials, then in real trials. The extent to which one was quicker to categorize words when White-positive and Black-negative were paired, relative to the reverse pairing represented a measure of pro-White, and anti-Black bias. The IAT was presented in one of two orders, randomly assigned between participants. In one order, White-positive and Black-negative were paired first, and in the other, they were paired second. There was no effect of order ($F<0.60$).

Figure 1. The American flag stimulus used during the implicit priming task.

![American Flag](image)

Figure 2. The control stimulus used during the implicit priming task.

Self-report measures. Prior to the start of the IAT, but on the computer, participants completed a measure of their mood on the 7-point Positive and Negative Affective State (PANAS) scale. After completing the IAT, participants were asked to respond to individual difference items, including their gender, age, ethnicity, grade point average (GPA), and political group affiliation. Finally, participants completed a measure of political news following, given recent findings in which news following was an
important, moderating factor in the effects of an America prime (Ferguson & Hassin, 2007). Participants reported their political party affiliation on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (Republican) to 7 (Democrat) and reported how often they followed political news on 7-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (Rarely) to 7 (Very often). Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion.

Results

I found that implicitly processing an America cue, in this case, the American flag, increased bias toward African-Americans on an implicit measure, relative to a control condition. On the IAT, a D’ score is calculated, representing an index of the relative speed with which participants perform the categorizations during one versus the other set of pairings. D’ also accounts for error rates, task engagement, and individual differences in response rate tendencies. Participants who were primed with the American flag evidenced greater bias against African-Americans ($M=.67$) than those in the control condition ($M=.37$), with higher scores reflecting greater ease in categorizing when White-positive and Black-negative were paired relative to the alternative pairing $t(36)=2.36, p=.02, d=.78$. Mood did not differ by condition $[t(36)=0.42, \text{ ns}]$ and did not interact with the effect of the priming condition on bias $[F(1, 34)=0.01, \text{ ns}]$. Political news following did not moderate the main effect ($F<.11$). No other individual difference factor modulated the main effect (all $Fs<.56$).

No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of the American flag. No participant in either condition guessed the hypotheses of the experiment, nor did anyone accurately connect the first priming task with the second evaluation task.

Discussion

This study represents an initial test of the hypothesis that an implicitly processed America cue will lead to prejudice. The results support this hypothesis,
with White and Asian American participants expressing greater prejudice towards Blacks after being implicitly primed with the American flag. There are some limitations to this design. For example, given the features of the IAT task, it is not possible to know whether outgroup denigration, ingroup positivity, or both increased. These possibilities are investigated in later studies.

The next study addresses a concern regarding the nature of the manipulation. Namely, it could be that the American flag carries with it specific associations. If that were true, rather than priming America, the experimental task could be priming some subset of America associations specific to the American flag, or alternatively, unique associations that do not overlap with America associations. To test the possibility that the American flag, rather than America, causes bias, a third condition is added in Study 1B in which participants are primed with the letters, USA.

Study 1B

There are a number of symbols used to represent America; it is possible that while these symbols are associated with America, they do not activate the same representation as a more general America prime. The Statue of Liberty may be particularly associated with freedom and plurality, for example. While the prevalence of the flag as a symbol of America, across situations, implies a strong overlap in the representations primed by the flag versus America, there is still a possibility that they differ in a meaningful way. This potential issue with using a symbol to prime America is addressed empirically in this study.

Method

Participants

One hundred thirty-four White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (implicit
American flag prime, implicit USA prime, or control prime) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

The procedure for Study 1B was nearly identical to that used for Study 1A, with two exceptions. First, a third condition was added in which participants were primed with the letters, USA. Second, there were new stimuli used in the prime task. In this experiment, participants responded to target images of either trees or plants and were asked to indicate whether the target picture was a tree or a plant by pressing the t or p key, respectively, on their keyboards. All other aspects of the computer tasks and procedure of this study were the same as those described in Study 1A.

Results

The order in which the IAT was administered did not influence the results ($F < 1.45$). As in Study 1A, priming participants with an America cue, whether the American flag or USA, increased bias toward African-Americans as measured by the IAT, $F(2, 132)=4.51, p=.01$. A $D'$ score was calculated for each condition. The American flag condition ($M=.57$) did not differ from the USA condition ($M=.57$) [$t(89)=.11$, ns], however, the control condition ($M=.37$) significantly differed from both the American flag condition [$t(89)=2.85, p<.01$] and the USA condition [$t(86)=2.32, p<.05$]. Mood did not differ by condition ($F<.70$) and did not interact with the effect of the priming condition on bias ($F=.78$). None of the individual difference variables moderated the effects (all $F$s<.128).

None of the participants primed with an America cue reported awareness of having been exposed to an America cue. Moreover, no participant in any condition correctly identified the true nature of the experiment, or the connection between the tasks.
Discussion

Together with Study 1A, these results offer evidence that White and Asian American participants exhibit greater prejudice on an implicit measure toward Blacks after implicitly processing America-related cues. Prejudice, so far, has been demonstrated on an attitudes IAT. In the next study, bias is measured using an evaluative stereotyping IAT.

Study 2

Prejudice is an affective, evaluative judgment that might also be captured in individuals’ stereotyping. Evaluative stereotyping, in particular, is correlated with prejudice, because as its name implies, it is closely tied with affect (e.g., Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). Nevertheless, there is evidence that evaluative stereotyping is a distinct construct. For example, in one study, both the attitudes IAT and the evaluative stereotype IAT predicted self-reported feelings and moderate and nonverbal behaviors, however, only the evaluative stereotype IAT predicted unique variance in overt biased behavior (e.g., the use of slurs) after controlling for explicit attitudes (Rudman & Ashmore, 2007). In other words, if the effect of the American flag on bias is evidenced on an evaluative stereotyping measure, it would 1) demonstrate that the effect extends to evaluative stereotyping, and 2) expand the scope of the type of behavioral bias one could expect to be induced by an implicit America reminder.

Method

Participants

Thirty-one White American and Asian American at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control prime) in a between-participants design.
Stimuli and Procedure

In the first part of the experiment, participants completed the same computer priming task described in Study 1B, in which participants were asked to categorize pictures as plants or trees. The task was used as a cover in order to prime participants with either the American flag (implicit flag prime condition) or generic flag (control prime condition).

*IAT measure.* All participants then completed an evaluative stereotyping IAT as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment (Rudman et al., 2001; see Appendix B for the list of stimuli). The procedure in the Black-White evaluative stereotyping IAT is nearly identical to that used for the Black-White attitudes IAT, using the same category and attribute labels, but different target words. The target words in the evaluative stereotyping IAT include only negative Black, and positive White, stereotypes.

*Self-report measures.* After completing the IAT, participants were asked to respond to the same individual difference items as presented in Studies 1A and 1B, including gender, age, ethnicity, grade point average (GPA), political group affiliation, and political news following. Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion.

Results

The order in which the IAT was presented did not impact the results (F<.70). Implicitly processing the America cue increased evaluative stereotyping of African-Americans relative to the control condition. Participants who were primed with the American flag demonstrated greater evaluative stereotyping of African-Americans ($M=.55$) than those in the control condition ($M=.31$), with higher scores reflecting greater ease in categorizing words when White-positive and Black-negative were paired relative to the alternative pairing, $t(29)=2.25, p<.05, d=.85$. No individual difference variables moderated the effect of prime condition on bias (all $Fs<.92$).
No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of the American flag. No participants correctly guessed the relationship between the tasks, nor did anyone accurately predict the results.

Discussion

Taken with Studies 1A and 1B, these results suggest that the effect of implicitly processing America on bias is robust, at least on implicit measures. Study 1A established that an effect of subtly priming America on bias exists, and that it differs from the effects previously demonstrated using more blatant America reminders (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Butz et al., 2007). The prejudice effect found here is consistent with the contention that the effect of America on bias is context—that is, group—dependent, though is not conclusive given that the social groups were presented within-group, rather than between-group. Study 1B replicated the implicit effect of America on bias and demonstrated that the effect in Study 1A was not an artifact of using the American flag to prime America. In this study, the effect on bias was the same whether an American flag prime, or a more pure America prime, was used. Study 2 extended the findings of the previous two studies by demonstrating that an America cue also influenced evaluative stereotyping. Though the evaluative stereotyping measure has some overlap with the attitudes measure used in the first two studies, research has shown that evaluative stereotyping is a distinct construct, with differential predictive value for behaviors.

In the next chapter, I explore the generality of the America reminder effect, this time investigating whether explicit attitudes will be affected by a subtle America reminder, as well as whether features of the target influence the presence or magnitude of the effect.
CHAPTER THREE

GENERALITY

Five studies are reported in this chapter, each investigating the generality of the implicit effects of America cues on bias demonstrated in the last chapter. Generality, here, refers to the range of empirical (and by implication, real life) conditions under which the implicit effect of America on bias might be found. For example, while implicitly processing an America cue seems to increase bias on implicit measures, whether that bias will be captured on explicit measures is an open question. A variety of self-report measures are used to address just this question, including measures of attitudes and beliefs (Studies 3 and 7), interpersonal closeness (Study 4), and behavioral intentions (Studies 5 and 6). In addition, these studies employ a new method of implicit priming in which the American cue is visible, but subtle, testing the degree to which perception of the stimulus is important. If the effect is unchanged by this manipulation, it would point to the ecological validity of this effect, given that one is likely to encounter America cues in a visible, but subtle manner.

In addition, this chapter investigates the extent to which attitudes toward the individual, in addition to the group, are affected by an America cue (Study 5). It could be that attitudes toward the abstract outgroup become more negative after implicitly processing a reminder of America, but attitudes toward the individual remain unchanged. Some studies have found that a discrepancy between group and individual attitudes exists (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2003), while others identify a strong relationship between group and individual attitudes (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Even if group level attitudes are predictive of individual level attitudes, features of the target, such as familiarity and favorability, could attenuate the relationship. Some work is suggestive of this possibility, and it is directly tested in Study 6, using a quite famous and well-liked exemplar, President Barack Obama.
Finally, tests of the breadth of the effect are included. In Study 7, I examine which social groups are affected by a subtle America reminder. If the effect is based on the associations one has made between America and prejudice, it is likely that bias will be directed toward many non-White groups. As noted earlier, however, the prototypical example of bias in America is that directed toward Blacks, and as such, the effects could be specific to that group. In Study 8, I test whether the effects are specific to America, or whether alternatively, being reminded of any nation would render these effects.

Study 3

In the next studies, I examine the effect of an implicit America reminder on explicit measures of attitudes. On the one hand, there is evidence that implicit and explicit measures diverge on their ability to capture existing bias given that implicit measures are largely immune to the issues with explicit measures, such as a reluctance to admit bias (e.g., Payne, 2008; Blair, 2001; Fazio et al., 1995). On the other hand, scores on implicit measures are strong predictors of responses on explicit measures (e.g., Rudman & Ashmore, 2001, Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Moreover, according to recent theory in this area, controlled, explicit responses are the result of propositional reasoning. In many cases, this sort of reasoning can result in a rejection of one’s initial affective reaction based upon a comparison of the validity of that evaluation with other contradictory, subjectively valid propositions. In the present case, however, a feeling of negativity toward Blacks when primed with an American flag might be tested against propositions relating to one’s general feelings about prejudice, but given the subtly of the America prime, and the presumed unawareness of its presence or effects, one should not engage in validity testing against propositions relating to the flag (for further discussion of issues surrounding correction of controlled response also see, Wilson & Brekke, 1994).
Method

Participants

Sixty-one White American, Asian American, and Latino American students at the University of Ohio were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and dependent measure. Each of the surveys began with a page titled “Geography and Daylight”, which contained four black and white pictures of various scenes (Appendix C). In the implicit flag prime condition, two of the four pictures included American flags as part of the scene. In addition, all subsequent pages of the surveys contained .4 x .6 inch American flag icons in the upper left-hand corner. In the control condition, the flags were digitally removed from the “Geography and Daylight” page, and no flag icons appeared on any page of the survey. Participants were asked to identify the time during which the scenes were photographed, which served as the cover task for the manipulation.

Immediately following the “Geography and Daylight” task, participants’ explicit attitudes were measured using the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (Brigham, 1977; Appendix D). The scale was presented in a fixed order. Participants indicated their agreement with a number of statements about their attitudes toward, and beliefs about, African-Americans on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Items were reverse scored if necessary such that higher scores indicated more negativity toward Blacks.

Participants again completed individual difference items, including their gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political news watching, and political group affiliation. In addition, participants were asked how proud they were of being American and how
much they identified with being American, on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Participants were asked to report on 7-point Likert scales how many Blacks they knew, how much contact they had with Blacks when they were younger (both ranging from 1 (None) to 7 (A lot)), and how well they knew their Black acquaintances, on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very well).

**Results**

As predicted, implicit processing of the American flag resulted in more biased reactions toward African-Americans ($M=2.57$) compared with those in the control condition ($M=2.10$), $t(59)=2.13$, $p=.04$, $d=.55$. There were no moderating effects of gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political news following, or political group affiliation (all $Fs<1.61$). Pride about, and identification with, the United States did not influence the results, nor did endorsement of African-American stereotypes predict, or interact with, the effect of the American flag on explicit attitudes. In each of the studies using this measure, the Black contact items were highly correlated (all $rs>0.45$), justifying the creation of the composite score in which the amount of contact with Blacks was calculated by averaging the scores of the three questions about contact with Blacks. Contact with Blacks did not moderate the stated results ($F<.97$).

**Discussion**

The results of this experiment suggest that an implicit reminder of America does, in fact, influence bias on explicit measures. The smaller effect size in this study relative to the first three studies could suggest that people are engaging in controlled responding (though, uninfluenced by America-related factors). It could also suggest something about the explicit measure itself, or could simply be the product of chance. In the next experiment, one’s feelings of interpersonal closeness with Blacks versus Whites are measured. This study again examines whether bias will be reported on explicit measures and also identifies a possible behavioral consequence of this effect.
In addition, unlike the former studies in which a relative effect was reported (Studies 1A, 1B, 2) or attitudes toward only Blacks were reported (Study 3), the next study independently assesses reactions toward Whites.

Study 4

Method

Participants

Sixty White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and dependent measure. In the experimental condition, a .4 x .6 inch American flag icon appeared in the upper left-hand corner. In the control condition, no flags were present on the survey. Participants were approached on campus and asked to complete a short, one page survey. The scale of Perceived Interpersonal Closeness (Appendix E; Popovic, Milne, & Barrett, 2003) appeared on the front page of the survey. In the task, there were six concentric circles, with the following labels listed from the outer most circle to the inner most circle: Distant, Neither Close Nor Distant, A Little Bit Close, Moderately Close, Very Close, Fully Close, and Self. Participants were asked to indicate how close they felt at that moment to African-Americans and White-Americans by writing AA and WA, respectively, within one of the circles. Responses closer to the center of the circle indicated greater feelings of closeness. Participants were also asked to report their gender, age, ethnicity, and GPA.

Results

The subtle America cue decreased feelings of closeness toward African-Americans, but not White Americans, relative to a control condition. In the following
analyses, lower values on the Perceived Interpersonal Closeness scale represent greater feelings of closeness. There was a main effect of race [$F(1, 58)=41.64$, $p<.001$] that was qualified by a condition x race interaction [$F(1, 58)=6.88$, $p=.01$; Figure 3]. Feelings of closeness toward Blacks were significantly less in the implicit prime condition ($M=3.32$) than the control condition ([($M=2.56$); $t(58)=2.30$, $p<.05$]. Feelings of closeness toward Whites did not significantly differ by prime condition ($t(58)=.93$, ns). There were no moderating effects of gender, age, ethnicity, or GPA (all $Fs<1.61$).

![Figure 3](image)

**Figure 3.** Feelings of interpersonal closeness with Whites and Blacks. Lower values represent greater feelings of closeness to the self.

**Discussion**

Taken together, the results of Studies 3 and 4 suggest that an implicit reminder of America can influence bias on explicit measures. Study 4 adds another possible consequence of these feelings of negativity: feelings of distance between oneself and
another group. These feelings of distance from other social groups have been noted in prejudice and stereotyping literature, representing a tendency to avoid (as opposed to approach) outgroups (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2006). They are also consistent with social identity theory’s predictions of differentiation after self-categorization into social groups, though one might also expect increased feelings of closeness with one’s ingroup based on that theory (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979). One possible explanation is that there is a ceiling effect for White reactions in this study. Other studies will again address the possibility of an effect on attitudes toward Whites. For now, I turn to examining the extent to which attitudes toward Blacks as a group will be reflected in attitudes and behaviors toward individual members of that group.

Study 5

Will the implicit effects of America on attitudes extend to attitudes and behaviors toward the individual? Research on attitudes is mixed, with some evidence suggesting that attitudes at an abstract, or general, level do not predict behavior at the concrete, or specific level (Weigel & Neuman, 1976; Regan & Fazio, 1977; for a review, see Kraus, 1995). Moreover, Olson and Fazio (2003) concluded that the IAT, in particular, measures attitudes toward the group, but not the individual (though, see Mitchell et al., 2003). Alternatively, there is a large body of evidence finding that attitudes toward a group are a strong predictor of intergroup attitudes and behavior at the individual level (e.g., McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2003; Dovidio & Hebl, 2005). This question is tested directly in the next study.

Method

Participants

Ninety-nine White and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (implicit America prime versus control) x 2 (White versus Black) between-groups design.
Stimuli and Procedure

All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and dependent measures. Participants in all conditions read about a new peer counseling program started in Ithaca, New York, as well as the desired qualifications to join the program. They then read a transcript from an interview with a candidate for a position in the peer counseling program. The materials were designed to closely match the “ambiguous qualifications” condition in Dovidio and Gaertner (2000), in which a candidate is qualified, but not a perfect match for the position. Ambiguous qualifications allow for more subjectivity when evaluating a candidate. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) reasoned in their aversive racism theory that it is only in ambiguous situations that individuals will feel the liberty to act on their (nonconscious or conscious) bias. Evaluating a well-qualified person poorly, especially, would violate most individuals desire to appear unbiased.

The candidate in the interview was either a White male or a Black male, and a picture was included so that the participants could identify the candidate’s race. The name of the candidate was Alexander Jones across race conditions. In the implicit prime condition, two .4 x .6 in American flags surrounded the heading “Peer Counselor Study” on the top of the page. In the control condition, the heading appeared alone.

After reading the description of the program and interview excerpt, participants were then asked to evaluate the candidate on several dimensions. Participants indicated how qualified and desirable they believed the candidate to be on 10-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Extremely). Next, they made a decision about whether to recommend the candidate for the position, and then indicated the strength of their preference on a 10-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very Strong). Participants were asked to respond to several
questions about the candidate, including, the candidate’s perceived mood on a 10-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Negative) to 10 (Positive), the perceived attractiveness of the candidate, on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not Attractive) to 10 (Very Attractive), and finally, the perceived age of the candidate.

Results

The results showed that bias induced by an implicit America cue can be directed at individuals. A composite score was created for the qualification and desirability ratings of the candidate, \( r(99)=.89, p<.001 \). There was a significant prime \( \times \) race condition interaction in the prediction of this composite, \( F(1, 95)=5.31, p<.05 \) (Figure 4). Participants rated the Black candidate as significantly less qualified and desirable in the implicit cue condition (\( M=4.88 \)) than in the control condition \( (M=6.10; t(48)=2.19, p<.05) \). Ratings of the White candidate’s qualifications and desirability did not vary by prime condition, \( t(47)=.95, ns \). Participants hiring decisions differed by prime condition for Blacks \( \chi^2=3.8, p<.05 \), though no individual cell reached significance (all \( z\)s<1.1, ns). No such preferences were observed for decisions to hire White candidates across prime condition \( \chi^2=.001, ns \). There was a marginal race \( \times \) prime condition interaction for recommendation strength \( F(1, 95)=2.83, p=.10 \), though this trend disappeared if only those choosing to hire the candidate were considered \( F(1, 56)=1.26, ns \). There were no main effects or interactions involving ratings of mood, attractiveness, or age of the candidate \( (F's<2.1, ns) \). Likewise, controlling for these variables did not affect the results of the study.
Study 5 provides initial evidence that the influence of an America cue on bias is found at both the group and individual level. Here, participants were asked to evaluate a candidate and make a hiring decision based on those evaluations. An incidental flag in the corner of their response sheets influenced the extent to which they found the Black, but not White, candidate to be a good fit for the position, as well as their ultimate decision to hire the candidate or not. This finding speaks to the impact of such a subtle change in environment on important, significant decisions. This study again finds that there is negligible impact on attitudes about, and behaviors directed toward, Whites, despite that in the present study, there was no potential for a ceiling effect, given that average ratings for Caucasians on the desirability and qualification composite score were just above the mid-range on the scale ($M=6.55$).

Figure 4. Ratings of perceived degree of qualification and desirability of a White and Black peer counselor job candidate.

Discussion

Study 5 provides initial evidence that the influence of an America cue on bias is found at both the group and individual level. Here, participants were asked to evaluate a candidate and make a hiring decision based on those evaluations. An incidental flag in the corner of their response sheets influenced the extent to which they found the Black, but not White, candidate to be a good fit for the position, as well as their ultimate decision to hire the candidate or not. This finding speaks to the impact of such a subtle change in environment on important, significant decisions. This study again finds that there is negligible impact on attitudes about, and behaviors directed toward, Whites, despite that in the present study, there was no potential for a ceiling effect, given that average ratings for Caucasians on the desirability and qualification composite score were just above the mid-range on the scale ($M=6.55$).
The effects found here were not explained by perceptions of mood or attraction. Thus, an America prime does not seem to change perceptions of these features of targets. In the following study, I examine whether a non-physical feature of a target influences these effects.

Study 6

In Study 6, I sought to investigate whether evaluating a familiar and well-liked individual would eliminate the effect of an implicit America cue on attitudes. There are at least two reasons to believe that the present effect would be attenuated when evaluating a well-liked individual. For one, people tend to hold positive attitudes toward familiar, popular individuals, even if they hold affectively negative attitudes toward the individual’s group as a whole (Mitchell et al., 2003; Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Moreover, simply reminding individuals of a well-liked exemplar can affect attitudes toward the whole group, suggesting that there may be a competing, positive force in evaluations of well-like and familiar targets (e.g., Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). There is evidence, however, that even well-known, well-liked individuals will be evaluated negatively if one has negative attitudes toward the group (e.g., DeHouwer, 2001). In the following study, participants evaluated one of the most famous African-American males, President Barack Obama. At the time when the study was conducted, the now president was a candidate for the Democratic Party in the national election. During this time, his rapid rise to fame was met with an equally rapid rise in liking and popularity among voters. Thus, using President Barack Obama as the target for evaluation posed an especially strong test of this question. Rather than evaluating liking, participants reported their support for presidential nominees.

Method

Participants

One hundred seventy-eight White American, Asian American, and Latino
American students at the University of Ohio were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control no prime) in a between-participants design.

**Stimuli and Procedure**

All participants completed surveys measuring voting intentions. In the implicit America prime condition, each page of the survey contained a .4 x .6 inch American flag in the upper left-hand corner of the first page of the survey, while the control condition surveys did not contain any American flags. This study was conducted in the final months of 2008, during which time President Barack Obama and Senator John McCain were both nominees for their respective parties in the United States presidential elections. On the first page, participants indicated their support for each of the candidates on an 8-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (Do not support) to 7 (Strongly support).

Next, participants reported their age, gender, ethnicity, and GPA. They also reported their political identification as a Republican, Democrat, independent, conservative, and liberal on individual 8-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 (None) to 7 (Strong identification), their personal endorsement of socialism versus capitalism on a 10-point scale, ranging from 1 (Support socialism) to 10 (Support capitalism), and their religiosity on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 10 (Very strong).

**Results**

Using a repeated measures analysis, I found a significant priming condition x candidate interaction, $F(1,176)=6.02$, $p<.05$. Despite the popularity of President Barack Obama, the American flag still significantly decreased support for him in the implicit America prime condition ($M=3.49$), compared with the control condition [$M=4.21$; $t(177)=2.05$, $p=.04$, $d=.31$]. Moreover, those who were implicitly primed
with the American flag reported more support for Senator John McCain ($M=3.95$), than those in the control condition, [$M=3.05; t(176)=2.50, p=.01, d=.38$]. There were no moderating effects of any of the individual difference variables (all $Fs<2.96$).

**Discussion**

The results demonstrated that relative to a control condition, support for a Black candidate, Barack Obama, decreased when participants were implicitly primed with an America cue. There was a smaller effect size in this study relative to other studies reported, most likely at least partially due to the explicit nature of the response measure, but perhaps also due to the influence of familiarity and liking on attitudes, and here, support. One potential question to be addressed by future research is the extent to which personally knowing an individual could dampen the bias effect found here.

Support for a White candidate, John McCain, also increased when implicitly primed with an America cue relative to the control condition. This effect for White Americans, whether evaluating individuals or the group, is not found in any other study reported in this research program. One viable explanation is that in the context of politics, an America reminder could be uniquely influential. For example, a reminder of America could influence other relevant beliefs in this context, like one’s support for conservative beliefs, for which Senator McCain might stand. Note, that if this were true, participants in the prime condition should have been more likely to support conservatism than those in the control condition, or alternatively, conservative participants might be especially like to increase support for John McCain in the flag condition; neither of these related predictions were supported by the data. Another possible explanation is that Senator John McCain was more closely associated with America, especially during the election, when his service to the country was spotlighted, and words like “real American” were strategically used to distinguish
members of the Republican Party from members of the Democratic Party. If so, processing Senator John McCain could have been more fluent—that is more cognitively easy to process—which has been shown to lead to more positivity. Processing fluency indeed influences similar types of affective judgments (for a review, see Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003).

While there are still some questions about effects at the group versus individual level, Studies 5 and 6 collectively demonstrated that the implicit effects of an America reminder impacted individuals, even if they were familiar and popular. In the final studies in this chapter, the breadth of the effect is examined.

Study 7

In the next study, I consider the breadth of the implicit effects of an America reminder in two ways. That is, I examine whether, and if so, which, other social groups will be evaluated more negatively after a reminder of America. Many different non-White and White groups have been subjected to prejudice in the United States (e.g., Chin, 2004). It is argued here that while Black-White strife might be the prototypical example of bigotry in the United States, other groups, and in particular, non-White groups have endured discrimination in the U.S. To the extent that this effect may be largely based in the phenomenon of pattern activation, and that non-White social groups provide a context in which America is associated with prejudice, the America cue should result in bias toward these groups.

Method

Participants

One hundred nine White and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control) in a between-groups design.
Stimuli and Procedure

All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and dependent measures. In the implicit prime condition, a .4 x .6in American flag was placed in the upper left-hand corner of the page, while no flags appeared on the control version of the survey. Participants were asked to complete a Feelings Thermometer, on which they indicated how warmly they felt toward a diverse set of social groups, on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all warm) to 100 (Extremely warm). There were ethnic social groups (White, Mexican, Black, Arab) and non-ethnic social groups (teachers, lawyers, models, athletes, Harvard Students, Cornell Students) included on the survey. After indicating feelings toward each group, participants responded to demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political ideologies, political news watching, American pride, and American identification.

Results

Using a repeated measures analysis, the main effect of social group was significant \[ F(9, 91)=19.89, p<.001 \], and a marginal race x prime condition interaction approached significance [Figure 5; \( F(9, 91)=1.75, p=.09 \)]. There were significant effects for each of the non-White ethnic groups, such that feelings of warmth were depressed in the implicit America condition, but not the control condition. Thus, for Blacks, evaluations were more negative in the implicit flag condition (\( M=63.00 \)) than the control condition [\( M=72.50; t(99)=2.37, p<.05 \)]. The same was true for Mexicans in the implicit flag condition (\( M=61.67 \)), as compared to the control condition [\( M=70.83; t(101)=2.13, p<.05 \)]. The lowest feelings of warmth were for Arabs in the implicit prime condition (\( M=58.27 \)), though they were evaluated significantly less negatively in the control condition [\( M=68.17; t(99)=2.31, p<.05 \)]. Feelings of warmth did not differ across conditions for any other social group, including Whites (all
Including individual difference variables in the analyses did not change the results (all $F$s < 1.2).

Figure 5. Feelings of warmth toward various social groups reported on a Feelings Thermometer.

Discussion

Study 7 finds support for the prediction that implicit effects of America on bias will be evidenced for non-White social groups. This prediction extends from the earlier argument that implicit effects of America could be due to context-dependent activation—and in particular, that priming America while simultaneously priming non-White ethnic groups could selectively activate prejudice. These findings also suggest some specificity. While ethnic outgroups were affected by an America prime, another social outgroup (Harvard Students) was not. This finding resonates with intuition: if there is a distinct history of bias for or against Harvard students in America, it is not clearly connected to American Cornell students, it is not well-
known, and it does not feel as readily available as the history of interethnic conflict in America. This finding is also consistent with two possible explanations of the effect. That is, according to social identity theory (e.g., Tajfel, 1982), reminding students that they are Cornellians should impact their overall ratings of a relevant outgroup (Harvard students) but there is no reason why this effect should be influenced by exposure to an America cue. In terms of a cognitive-affective explanation, priming America in the context of Harvard students should not activate prejudice given that bias related to Harvard students is unlikely to be associated with America.

Study 8

The final study in this chapter investigates whether the effects reported thus far are specific to America, or whether instead, priming any nation would result in prejudice toward particular groups. There is a small possibility, for example, that rather than priming something specific to America, an America cue is priming “nation”, in which case, priming any nation will produce the same results. In the following study, a condition is added in which Canada, another well-known nation, is primed.

Method

Participants

Seventy-five White and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (implicit American flag prime, implicit Canadian flag prime, or control) in a between-groups design.

Stimuli and Procedure

All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and dependent measures. In the implicit America prime condition, a .4 x .6 in. American flag was placed in the upper left-hand corner of the page; in the implicit Canada prime condition, a .4 x .6 in. Canadian flag was placed in the upper left-hand corner of the
page. No flags appeared on the control version of the questionnaire. Participants were asked to complete a Feelings Thermometer, on which they indicated how warmly they felt toward Whites and Blacks on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at all warm) to 100 (Extremely warm). After indicating feelings toward each group, participants responded to demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political ideologies, political news watching, American pride, American identification, contact with Whites and contact with Blacks.

Results

An interaction between prime condition and ethnicity emerged, $F(2, 72)=5.30$, $p<.01$. Attitudes toward Blacks varied by condition [$F(2, 72)=3.04$, $p=.05$], while attitudes toward Whites did not [$F(2, 72)=.59$, ns]. In particular, attitudes toward Blacks in the implicit America prime condition ($M=58.77$) were marginally more negative than in the control condition [$M=73.73$; $t(50)=1.91$, $p=.06$], and significantly more negative than in the implicit Canadian prime condition [$M=74.74$; $t(47)=2.01$, $p=.05$]. Attitudes toward Blacks in the control condition did not differ from attitudes toward Blacks in the implicit Canada prime condition, $t(47)=.17$, ns. A composite score was created for the Black and White contact items (all $r>.49$). Neither contact composite score moderated the effects. Likewise, no individual difference or demographic items influenced the results of the study (all $F<1.49$). Five participants spontaneously expressed suspicion about the Canadian flag prime; leaving these participants in the analyses did not change the results of the study.

Discussion

The results of this study offer some evidence that priming America, rather than any nation, produces a bias effect. A variety of other control conditions could have been used, however, this study provides at least initial evidence that the effects found so far have been specific to an America prime. This finding is important because it
establishes a precondition for the proposed mechanisms. In particular, it is proposed that the effect is dependent upon prejudice and “White” associations specific to America.

Taken together, the studies in this chapter suggest that the implicit effects of America on attitudes are robust, can be found under a variety of conditions, and can affect a number of groups. In this way, this chapter addresses both the generality of the effect—that is, the empirical and real life conditions under which the effect is likely to be found—and the generalizability of the findings—the extent to which the effect can be expected to occur in other situations, for other groups, in everyday life. Each of the studies expanded upon the types of behaviors that an implicit America prime could affect. For example, explicit attitude measures (Studies 3) are correlated with open, and verbal prejudice measures (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995). Likewise, a variety of other explicit outcomes were affected, including interpersonal closeness and feelings (Studies 4, 7 and 8), evaluations and hiring decisions (Study 5), and support and liking (Study 6), suggesting that real life behavior could be impacted in a wide variety of situations in which one might encounter diversity. Moreover, a new method of priming was included that likely reproduced, in a face valid way, the method in which one is likely to encounter a reminder of America in real life.

Studies 5 and 6 found that group level and individual level attitudes were influenced by an implicit America cue, even if the targets of evaluation were familiar and well-liked. In Study 7, I found that non-White ethnic groups, but no other social groups, were affected by an implicit America prime and in Study 8, I found that priming America, but not Canada influenced evaluations of African-Americans. Thus, Studies 7 and 8 shed light on the specificity of the effect. It is worth mentioning that Studies 7 and 8 are consistent with both cognitive-affective and cognitive-motivational explanations of the effect. In the next chapter, these mechanisms are directly tested.
CHAPTER FOUR
MECHANISMS

In this chapter, the potential mechanisms of the implicit effect of America on bias are examined. In particular, cognitive-affective mechanisms (Studies 9-12) and cognitive-motivational mechanisms (Studies 13 and 14) are discussed. In terms of cognitive-affective mechanisms, one clear place to start the search is stereotyping, a phenomenon tightly related to prejudice. As noted in Study 2, stereotyping shares some predictive overlap with prejudice—that is, stereotyping is a distinct construct, though prejudice and stereotyping share some of the same antecedents and outcomes (e.g., Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Rudman & Ashmore, 2007; Amodio & Devine, 2006). The complex relationship between prejudice and stereotyping will not be fully discussed here, however, it is noted that the constructs themselves share a bidirectional relationship, such that prejudice can lead to stereotyping, and stereotyping can lead to prejudice (e.g., Rudman & Glick, 2001; Scott & Brown, 2006). This latter possibility is tested in Study 9 as a potential explanation of the implicit America prime effects reported here. That is, I test whether priming America activates a stereotypical representations of outgroups, which then leads to prejudice.

A second cognitive-affective explanation is that prejudice itself is directly activated as a result of implicitly priming America and diverse groups simultaneously or in close succession. Context-dependent priming, or pattern activation, suggest that a momentary representation of a concept is partly determined by stable associations, but is also influenced by the context in which that representation is activated. Here, it is argued that implicitly priming America and non-White groups could selectively activate prejudice. America is also associated with egalitarianism, which might be specifically activated when implicitly priming America and Caucasians. These ideas are tested in studies in which accessibility after an implicit America prime is measured.
directly (Studies 10A and 10B) and indirectly (Studies 11 and 12). The latter studies also investigate the differential activation resulting from implicit versus explicit processing of an America reminder.

A cognitive-motivational mechanism is also tested. Social identity theory contends that the mere self-categorization of people into social groups can lead to prejudice when an identity is made salient (e.g., Brown & Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel, 1982). Several factors can increase the salience of a given identity, such as perceived differentiation between groups and real or perceived conflict between one’s ingroup and outgroup. Tajfel (1982) hypothesized that the reason why identity salience results in prejudice is because one’s ingroup is intimately tied to one’s identity, meaning that when one’s ingroup is challenged, one’s self-esteem becomes threatened. One way of reducing this threat is through prejudice. The predictions that derive from this model of motivated prejudice (as they are related to the effect of interest) are tested in Studies 13 and 14. Specifically, if America reminds one of a threat, especially one relevant to their ingroup-outgroup context, an America cue could lead to prejudice (Study 13), and if one’s identity is made salient because that identity is associated with America, then that identity could cause prejudice (Study 14). The chapter ends with a brief discussion of how cognitive-affective and cognitive-motivational mechanisms might collectively result in the implicit America cue effect demonstrated in this and other chapters.

Study 9

The effects of an implicit America cue on evaluative stereotyping were shown in Study 2. In the present study, less evaluative and more cognitive form of prejudice is examined. Amodio and Devine (2006) found that stereotyping and prejudice can be distinguished by their semantic versus affective antecedents. Some research has blurred the line between prejudice and stereotyping by tapping into affective, rather
than cognitive associations. For example, the evaluative stereotyping measure used in Study 2 confounded valence (that is, affect) and stereotypes, such that all the possible stereotypes associated with African-Americans were negative and all stereotypes associated with White Americans were positive. Amodio and Devine (2006) proposed that the overlap between stereotype-related and prejudice-related outcomes is largely due to this sort of confounding.

While these researchers’ claim is well-supported, it should not be over-interpreted: even studies investigating stereotypes in other ways have found a close relationship between the constructs, and stereotypes that are not overtly negative (e.g., athletic) likely acquire affective positivity or negativity in some situations simply by virtue of being associated with a liked or disliked group (e.g., Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 2006). The point here is that it is unclear whether stereotyping is ever fully void of affect, and even when affective stereotyping is measured, it appears to be its own construct, with distinct predictive value. To the researchers’ point, however, evaluative stereotype based measures leave more ambiguity in terms of whether a stereotype is activated or whether affective negativity is induced. Thus, using a tool that measures both evaluative and non-evaluative stereotypes may help to pinpoint whether a stereotypical representation of group members is activated when diverse groups are co-activated with America, or whether an affective judgment is made even without the spontaneous activation of a stereotypical representation of groups. The following study uses a measure that assesses both non-evaluative and evaluative stereotypes to try to disentangle these possibilities.
Method

Participants

Thirty-four White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control prime) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

In the first part of the experiment, participants completed a computer task similar to that described in Studies 1A, 1B, and 2. Briefly, participants were primed with either the letters USA (implicit America prime condition) or VMH (control prime) for 32ms, followed by a letter-string mask for 38ms, and then were presented with either a plant or tree, which they were to categorize using the t or p on their keyboard to indicate whether they believed that the image was a tree or plant, respectively. Participants completed 32 trials of this task.

LDT measure. All participants then completed a lexical decision task (LDT) as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment (see Appendix F for the list of word stimuli). This tool is used to measure currently activated concepts. Each trial of the LDT began with a cross-hatch (+), followed by either a Black or White face for 80ms, then a target word or nonword letter-string, presented for up to 3 seconds. Participants were asked to categorize the targets as either words or nonwords as quickly as possible. The LDT included positive words, negative words, neutral words, nonwords, athletic Black stereotypes, musical Black stereotypes, and negative Black stereotypes. The participants completed 112 trials, in which Black and White faces were paired twice with musical stereotypes, twice with athletic stereotypes (collectively, Black non-evaluative stereotypes), four times with Black negative stereotypes, eight times with positive, negative, and neutral words, and twenty-four times with nonwords. The presentation of targets was randomly determined by the
computer. The rate at which one could correctly categorize a particular type of word after a given prime was a measure of how much the first concept (here, an ethnicity) made the second concept more accessible (here, stereotypes, positivity, and so on). In the present study, I wanted to see if priming America, made stereotypical Black Americans more accessible, and thus, I measured the degree to which activating Black made Black stereotypes accessible, either after an America prime or a control prime.

Self-report measures. After completing the LDT, participants were asked to respond to the following demographic and individual difference items: gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political group affiliation, and political news following. Participants also completed a nationalism scale (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) in which they were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with 20 items (e.g., “Although at times I may not agree with the government, my commitment to the U.S. always remains strong”). Participants responded on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion.

Results

These results were assessed in two ways. In the first set of analyses, a difference score was calculated for each type of word by subtracting the average reaction times (RT) for each type of word, from the average RTs for neutral words (e.g., neutral words minus positive words). This creation of difference scores was done separately for words primed by Black and words primed by White, yielding two sets of difference scores (Black primed and White primed). For each word type (positive, etc.), the White primed difference score was subtracted from the Black primed difference score. This set of calculations resulted in scores for each of four types of words (positive, negative, non-evaluative Black stereotypes, evaluative Black stereotypes). Each score indicated the degree to which “Black” primed the associated concept, with more positive scores corresponding to more facilitation of activation. In
the second set of analyses, no difference scores were created, but Black primed words and White primed words were entered in a repeated measures analysis, controlling for neutral words. No significant or marginal effects emerged for either set of analyses (all $F$s<1.97, ns). Thus, implicitly processing the American flag did not increase stereotyping on this measure.

Moreover, entering self-reported nationalism into interaction analyses did not affect the results, nor did any other effects emerge with the other individual difference and demographic variables measured (all $F$s<.21). No participants correctly guessed the relationship between the tasks, or the predicted results, however, eight participants reported seeing the prime in the implicit prime condition. Removing these participants from the analyses did not change the results.

Discussion

The lack of an effect for non-evaluative stereotyping suggests that the implicit America cue effect on prejudice may be bypassing stereotypical representations on the way to negative affective judgments. The only effect trending toward significance was a condition difference on negative words [$F(1, 32)=1.97, p=.17$], in which negative words presented after Black faces were more accessible in the implicit America prime condition than the control condition, again suggesting an evaluative effect. It is possible that there were issues with the methodology of the study, for example, many people noticed the America prime—though, notably, no one was able to predict the hypotheses of the study. That an effect was not found for Black negative stereotypes seems inconsistent with earlier findings, particularly Study 2, in which evaluative stereotyping was measured and Study 3, in which some of the individual items on the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale for which there were significant effects, involved explicit endorsement of negative Black stereotypes.

In order to address the concern that there was an issue with the LDT measure,
another study was done using a paper-and-pencil measure, and only one negative Black stereotype, aggressiveness. This study also failed to produce any significant results for stereotyping of Blacks (all ts<1.03, ns). It is not entirely clear why these two studies failed to produce even evaluative stereotyping after an implicit America prime. It is possible that the methods and specific tasks used failed to capture an effect that exists, however, there are no obvious reasons why that would be the case. Future research is needed to illuminate the seeming inconsistency in stereotyping findings.

Given the unsuccessful attempts at producing an effect on stereotyping, a new line of cognitive-affective research was begun, this time assessing whether associations specific to America were responsible for the implicit effect of America on attitudes toward different social groups, and if so, which ones.

Study 10A and Study 10B

In the following study, associations with America were measured using an LDT. According to the literature, I expected that when an America cue was implicitly processed, egalitarianism would be activated (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005). I also tested whether prejudice was automatically activated after implicit exposure to an America cue. A strong prediction is not warranted given the limited literature, however, work by Devos and Banaji (2005) in which the researchers found an implicit link between America and whiteness, could indicate that an evaluative link exists between those two concepts. Even if an evaluative link exists, however, the accessibility of prejudice might only be heightened when outgroups are present. Study 10B addresses that issue. In Studies 10A and 10B, associations with America in the absence of an intergroup context are assessed.
Method

Participants

Twenty-nine (Study 10A) and twenty-one (Study 10B) White and Asian students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control prime) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

Study 10A and Study 10B use identical procedures, but an LDT testing for the accessibility of egalitarianism was used in the former and an LDT testing for the accessibility of prejudice was used in the latter. In the first part of the experiment, participants were asked to complete the priming computer task first described in Study 1B.

LDT measure. All participants completed a lexical decision task (LDT) as part of an ostensibly unrelated experiment. The LDTs in these studies used a procedure similar to the one described in Study 8, in which each trial began with a cross-hatch (+), followed by either the word USA or the letter-string VMH, and ending with the presentation of a target word or nonword letter-string. Participants were asked to categorize the targets as either words or nonwords as quickly as possible. LDTs in both studies included positive words, negative words, neutral words, and nonwords. In addition, the LDT in Study 10A included egalitarian-related words (egalitarian, equality, tolerance, fair), and the LDT in Study 10B included prejudice-related words (prejudice, discrimination, racism, bias). The participants completed 64 trials, in which USA and VMH were paired sixteen times with a nonword, and four times with each type of word (egalitarian/prejudice, positive, negative, neutral). The presentation of targets was randomly determined by the computer.

Self-report measures. After completing the LDT, participants were asked to respond to the following demographic and individual difference items: gender, age,
ethnicity, GPA, political group affiliation, and political news following. Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion.

Results

Before analyzing the results of the LDT, a difference score was calculated for each type of word by subtracting the average RTs for each type of word, from the average RTs for neutral words (e.g., neutral words minus positive words). This creation of difference scores was done separately for words primed in the LDT by USA versus VMH, yielding two sets of difference scores (USA primed and VMH primed) for each of three types of words (positive, negative, egalitarian/prejudice). Each score indicated the degree to which USA or VMH primed the associated concept, with more positive scores corresponding to more facilitation by the respective prime. In a second set of analyses, no difference scores were created, but instead USA primed egalitarian (or prejudice), and VMH primed egalitarian (or prejudice), words were entered into a repeated measures analysis, controlling for positive, negative, and neutral words. Both sets of analyses produced the same results, and thus, only the first set is presented here. For Study 10A, in which the LDT contained egalitarian-related words, there was a main effect of condition on egalitarian words, controlling for positive and negative word difference scores, $F(1, 25)=4.14, p=.05$ (Figure 6). For Study 10B, in which the LDT contained prejudice-related words, there was a main effect of condition on prejudice words, controlling for positive and negative words, $F(1, 18)=7.32, p=.01$ (Figure 6). No effects were found for words primed with VMH, and the individual difference and demographic variables did not interact with the results in either study (all $Fs<.41$).
Figure 6. The accessibility of egalitarian-related words (Study 10A) and prejudice-related words (Study 10B) after an implicit America prime versus control prime. The dependent measure was a lexical decision task. Reaction times to egalitarian and prejudice words are reported in milliseconds and control for average reaction times to neutral, positive, and negative words.

Discussion

Consistent with other work (e.g. Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sears, et al., 2000), this study offers support for the hypothesis that egalitarianism is associated with America (Study 10A). When implicitly primed with USA, prejudice also became more accessible (Study 10B). If America is associated with both prejudice and egalitarianism, then the next question becomes, when will the prime lead to egalitarianism and when will it lead to prejudice? This question is addressed in the
next two studies. Taking into account both the literature and the present findings, it is plausible that when America is implicitly processed, it will lead to prejudice toward outgroups, while when explicitly processed, it will lead to egalitarianism toward all groups. There are several studies presented here that have demonstrated the former effect; the latter effect is examined in the next study.

Study 11

Having established that America is cognitively associated with both egalitarianism and prejudice, the following study seeks to clarify when egalitarianism versus prejudice might be activated. The work presented here so far suggests that prejudice is activated when America is implicitly primed in the context of diverse groups or group members. The limited available literature, however, suggests that when America is processed explicitly, egalitarianism is activated, even in the presence of diverse groups (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Sears, et al., 2000). Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) offer a plausible explanation for this discrepancy. They suggest that implicit processing relies on associative processes. Thus, if America is primed subtly or nonconsciously, and implicitly processed, the other concepts that become activated due to this implicit exposure will determine one’s behavior and attitudes.

Study 12 will examine context-dependent activations when America is implicitly primed. On the other hand, when one engages in explicit processing, Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) suggest that propositional, or rule-based processing occurring. Thus, if America is explicitly processes—that is, if one is able to consciously, deliberately process an America cue—the initial affective evaluation that likely results from an America cue in the context of diverse groups, is subjected to validity testing. In validity, or truth, testing, current attitudes are framed as propositions (e.g., “I dislike African-Americans”), and then tested for validity against other propositions that are thought to be relevant and hold subjective validity. One source of relevant
propositions is norms, or shared beliefs, values, and expectations. Thus, in the present case, when America is activated in the context of diverse groups, an initial negative evaluation of outgroups might be tested against known shared beliefs about America (e.g., “Americans are egalitarian”) and beliefs about oneself relevant to America (e.g., “I am American”, “I believe all people should be treated equally”). This validity testing could plausibly result in the rejection of one’s initial negative evaluation of outgroups.

In the present study, rather than directly assessing activated concepts, I measured attitudes after implicit and explicit exposure to America. Research suggests that currently activated representations guide attitudes and behavior. While it is the case that some activated concepts are not revealed in measured attitudes or behavior (due to controlled processes and judgments of applicability), a strong case can be made (and has) that whatever behaviors and attitudes are revealed on measures, are a result of what is momentarily activated in memory (e.g., Bargh, 1994, 1997, 2007). In other words, our behaviors are accurate, if not precise, indications of what is currently accessible. Now that the associations with America (of interest) have been narrowed to prejudice and egalitarianism, one indirect method of assessing concepts associated with America in different contexts is by measuring one’s attitudes in those contexts. That is exactly what is done in the following study.

**Method**

**Participants**

One hundred fifty-one White American, Asian American, and Latino American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (implicit America prime, explicit America prime, or control no prime) in a between-participants design.
Stimuli and Procedure

All participants completed surveys containing both the manipulation and dependent measures. Participants in each condition first completed the “Geography and Daylight” page described in Study 3. In the implicit America prime condition, the “Geography and Daylight” task was identical to the one used in the implicit America prime condition described in Study 2. In both the control condition and explicit America prime condition, participants completed the control version of the “Geography and Daylight” page as described in Study 2. The dependent measure followed directly after the “Geography and Daylight” task. Participants completed a Feelings Thermometer in which they were asked to “Please rate the extent to which you feel warm toward [Blacks/Whites]” on a scale ranging from 1 (Not at All Warm) to 100 (Extremely Warm). In the explicit America prime condition, the aforementioned statement was preceded by the words “As an American”. This small change in wording was the only difference between the control and explicit America prime conditions.

Participants completed demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political party affiliation, political news following, contact with Blacks and contact with Whites. Participants were probed for suspicion after all other tasks.

Results

An interaction emerged between race and prime condition. Using a repeated measures analysis, the interaction between race and prime condition was significant, $F(2, 147)=6.42, p<.01$ (Figure 7). Participants’ warm feelings toward African-Americans varied significantly by priming condition, $F(2, 148)=8.49, p=.001$. Those in the implicit priming condition reported significantly less warmth toward African-Americans ($M=69.00$) than those in the control condition [$M=78.37$; $t(87)=2.58$, $p=.01$].
Those in the explicit condition, however, reported marginally more warmth toward African-Americans ($M=83.66$) than those in the control condition, $t(114)=1.73$, $p=.09$, and significantly more warmth than those in the implicit America prime condition, $t(95)=4.06$, $p=.001$. Participants’ feelings toward Whites did not vary significantly by priming condition, $F(2, 147)=1.47$, ns.

![Figure 7. Feelings of warmth toward Whites and Blacks reported on a Feelings Thermometer.](image)

A composite score was created for White and Black contact items ($r>.58$). Black versus White contact was calculated as a difference score in which the contact with Whites composite score was subtracted from the contact with Blacks composite score, such that higher scores reflected greater contact with Blacks. In this experiment, Black versus White contact differed by condition significantly [$F(2, 148)=7.97$, $p=.01$], with the least relative contact with Blacks, relative to Whites, reported in the implicit America prime condition ($M=-2.53$), followed by the control condition ($M=-$-
2.01), followed by the explicit America prime condition ($M=-0.98$). Controlling for the contact difference score variable, however, did not change the results of the experiment, $F(2, 144)=5.73, p=.01$. The results of this experiment were not moderated by any other measured variable (all $F$s<1.07).

Two participants in the explicit reminder condition were excluded from analyses due to their suspicion that the experiment was about prejudice and patriotism. The results of the experiment do not change if they are included in the analyses. No other participants correctly identified the true purpose of the experiment, connected any of the tasks to one another, nor reported awareness of the America-related prime in the implicit America prime condition.

Discussion

These results demonstrate that when White and Asian Americans are implicitly primed with an American cue, their attitudes toward African-Americans, but not Whites become significantly less positive. When participants were explicitly primed with America, their attitudes did not reflect prejudice, and instead they showed marginally more positivity relative to a control condition. These findings were conceptually replicated using a large, standard size, hanging America flag as the explicit prime of America. These studies are both taken as evidence that when implicitly primed with America in the context of diverse groups, prejudice is activated, but when explicitly primed with America in the context of diverse groups, egalitarianism is activated. The next study offers a replication of the current study using a different dependent measure that better approximates egalitarianism versus prejudice (as opposed to affect) and adds a condition in which America is implicitly primed in the context of only White Americans.
Study 12

The following study uses a behavioral measure developed by Tajfel (e.g., 1982) in order to further examine the associations primed by America in different contexts. As demonstrated, America is implicitly linked with prejudice (e.g., Study 10B), however, based on the reasoning that America is associated with prejudice due to a history of discrimination against non-White groups, it seems unlikely that this alternative set of associations will be activated upon exposure to America and Whites. Thus, it is predicted that, because America is a symbol representing equality, and because historically this equality may be particularly associated with Whites, there will be evidence for activation of egalitarianism when individuals are given an opportunity to engage in relevant behaviors.

In addition to conceptually replicating Study 11, this study includes a condition in which America is implicitly primed in the context of White Americans only and importantly, participants perform a task in which they are given the opportunity to engage in differing degrees of egalitarianism. In past experiments, it is possible that a positive bias toward Whites was not found (except in Study 6) because participants may not necessarily feel more positively toward Whites, but would, if given the opportunity, be more egalitarian toward that group (that is, egalitarianism, specifically is activated).

Participants

Ninety-seven White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to condition in a 3 (implicit America prime, explicit America prime, or control prime) x 2 (White teammate versus Black teammate) between-participants design.
Stimuli and Procedure

In the first part of the study, participants completed a computer task that contained both the manipulation and the dependent variable measure. The manipulation was included in the instructions for the experiment. Namely, participants in the implicit prime condition were asked to help calibrate the screen for the computer task that would take place later. Participants were asked to respond to a number of seemingly innocuous items (e.g., re-type a word that was presented in many different fonts), followed by personal questions (e.g., which of the following represents a goal of yours), the last of which asked about the person’s nationality (“What is your nationality?”). Participants were asked to type in their response to the nationality item. Next, they were taken to a screen that informed them that the screen had been successfully calibrated, and that the next task would begin shortly. During this time (fifteen seconds), the question about nationality faded to gray, but remained on the screen. In the explicit America prime condition, the participants followed this same procedure, except after they were asked to type in their nationality, they were asked to consider their national identity and keep it in mind when responding in the next task. After fifteen seconds, the dependent measure task began. Finally, in the control condition, participants completed all steps except they did not answer a question about the nationality. After they responded to the last calibration item, they were informed that the screen had been calibrated; after thirty seconds, the dependent measure task began.

Rewards Allocation Matrices. The dependent measure was adapted from the rewards allocation matrices paradigm (e.g., Tajfel, 1982). In this paradigm, participants are 1) given the task of dividing a set of real rewards (i.e., the experimenter pays out whatever money is awarded) between two other participants: a team member and a member of another team, and 2) told that other participants in the
experiment would award money to them in the same way. In the present experiment, participants were also told that they had been randomly divided into two teams of three people: Team Square and Team Triangle. The participant’s team was always Team Triangle and their teammate was always named Joel. The member of the other team was either Alexander (White condition) or Lamar (Black condition). In order to designate rewards, participants were shown six different matrices (Appendix G) with thirteen different options for allocating rewards in each matrix. The reward options were listed in two rows (divided into thirteen columns), with the top row always listing the teammate’s (Joel’s) allotment, and the bottom row always listing the other team member’s potential allotment (Alexander or Lamar). The only stipulation for assigning rewards was that allotments had to be chosen from the same column, such that if one desired to give a certain amount to the teammate, the member of the other team received whatever value was directly below the one chose for the teammate. The matrices flashed on the computer screen in random order, and participants were asked to indicate the matrix and their corresponding responses on an answer sheet. Participants were also asked to indicate their team name at the top of the answer sheet.

After completing the matrices task, participants were asked to respond to individual difference items, including their gender, age, ethnicity, grade point average (GPA), political news following and political group affiliation. Lastly, participants were probed for suspicion.

Results

Pull scores were calculated for each participant on each of the matrices. Pull scores reflect the relative strength, that is pull, of six possible strategies individuals could use to assign rewards: maximization of ingroup profits (MIP), maximization of differences between groups (MD), maximization of ingroup profits plus the maximization of differences between groups (ingroup favoritism, or FAV), the
maximization of joint profits (MJP), the maximization of ingroup profits plus the maximization of joint profits (MIP + MJP), and parity (P). Each matrix pitted two of these strategies against one another. Matrix type A pitted FAV against MJP, and the pull of FAV on MJP was calculated. In the obverse of matrix type A, MJP was pitted against FAV, and the pull of MJP on FAV was measured. For matrix type B, the pull of MD on MIP + MJP was calculated; the pull of MIP + MJP on MD was calculated for the obverse of matrix type B. For matrix type C, the pull of P on FAV was calculated; the pull of FAV on P was calculated using the obverse of matrix type C. No significant results were found for matrix type B or its obverse.

An interaction emerged such that the pull of FAV on MJP (matrix type A), was influenced by both race condition and prime condition, $F(2, 89)=3.25$, $p<.05$ (Figure 8). Consistent with predictions, allocations of rewards to a Black person were affected by prime condition [$F(2, 45)=12.01$, $p<.001$], such that the most ingroup favoritism was shown in the implicit prime condition ($M=10.00$), followed by the control condition ($M=8.38$), followed by the explicit prime condition ($M=2.00$). Contrary to previous findings, the implicit prime condition did not differ from the control condition [$t(31)=.11$, ns], however, the explicit prime condition differed significantly from both the control condition [$t(29)=3.83$, $p=.001$] and the implicit prime condition [$t(30)=4.98$, $p<.001$]. Also contrary to expectations, behavior toward a White target did not vary by condition.
Figure 8. The relative pull of the FAV strategy on the MJP strategy (matrix type A) in the rewards allocation matrices task. Higher scores reflect greater pull of FAV on MJP.

The obverse of matrix type A, the pull of MJP on FAV, also produced significant results. An interaction between race and prime condition emerged, $F(2, 88)=4.25$, $p<.05$ (Figure 9). The modulation of allocations of rewards to a Black person by condition trended toward significance, $F(2, 44)=1.89$, $p=.16$. Allocation of rewards to a White person varied significantly [$F(2, 44)=5.03$, $p=.01$], such that the MJP strategy (relative to the FAV strategy) was employed least in the control condition ($M=-1.69$), followed by the implicit prime condition ($M=.94$), followed by the explicit prime condition ($M=1.80$). This effect was driven by the difference in allocations to White targets in the explicit prime condition versus the control condition, $t(30)=2.98$, $p<.01$. 
Figure 9. The relative pull of the MJP strategy on the FAV strategy (the obverse of matrix type A) in the rewards allocation matrices task. Higher scores reflect greater pull of MJP on FAV.

The interaction between race and condition was significant for the pull of P on FAV, matrix type C, $F(2, 90)=3.30$, $p<.05$ (Figure 10). Allocations of rewards differed by condition when participants were assigning rewards to Blacks, but not Whites [$F(2, 45)=5.05$, $p=.01$], such that the most parity was shown toward Blacks in the explicit condition ($M=-2.13$), followed by the control condition ($M=-6.25$), followed by the implicit prime condition ($M=-8.71$). While this is the pattern of behavior predicted, only the implicit and explicit prime conditions significantly differed, $t(30)=3.26$, $p<.01$. 
An interaction between race and condition was also found for the pull of FAV on P, the obverse of matrix type C, $F(2, 90)=4.69, p=.01$ (Figure 11). Allocations of rewards again differed by condition when participants were assigning rewards to Blacks, but not Whites [$F(2, 45)=4.36, p<.05$], such that the most parity (least ingroup favoritism) was shown toward Blacks in the explicit condition ($M=-7.07$), followed by the control condition ($M=-5.13$), followed by the implicit prime condition ($M=-1.88$). The implicit prime versus control prime difference was found, [$t(31)=2.03, p=.05$], as was a difference between the implicit and explicit prime conditions [$t(30)=3.05, p<.01$], though the control prime and explicit prime conditions did not significantly differ.
Figure 11. The relative pull of the FAV strategy on the P strategy (obverse of matrix type C) in the rewards allocation matrices task. Higher scores reflect greater pull of FAV on P.

No individual difference factor moderated these findings (all $Fs < .65$). No participant in any condition guessed the hypotheses of the experiment. One participant was excluded due to a belief that the experimenter was a team member in the experiment, though including this participant in the analyses did not change the results.

Discussion

This study offered mixed support for the predictions. For the matrices in which two methods for showing ingroup favoritism were pitted against one another (i.e., maximizing ingroup profit and maximizing differences between groups), no significant effects emerged. If participants varied in which strategy they choose, rather than on average choosing one strategy over the other, then these null effects are
explainable. That is, prejudice may have been present, but because pull scores measure the preference of one strategy over another, an inconsistency in average strategy use would result in the null effect found for matrix type B and its obverse.

On the remaining matrices, the expected patterns emerged for allocations of rewards to a Black target, however, there was a failure to replicate the implicit prime versus control condition difference for all but one of the calculated pull scores. Nevertheless, in most cases, behavioral prejudice (or ingroup favoritism) was illustrated in individuals’ strategy choices most in the implicit prime condition, followed by the control condition, then the explicit prime condition. Given the pattern that was found, it is plausible that if the sample size were larger, these trends would yield significant effects.

The effects predicted for Whites by and large did not emerge. One viable explanation is that the competing motivation to support one’s team member, rather than to be egalitarian toward Whites, more generally, outweighed the egalitarianism effect; this might also contribute to the failure of differences to reach significance between the control prime and explicit America prime condition in the allocation of rewards to Blacks. Indeed, minimal groups paradigms—in which people are split into groups based on a frivolous or arbitrary distinction—have produced strong ingroup favoritism effects on these matrices (e.g., Tajfel, 1971). Though participants were explicitly told that they were randomly assigned to a team, that creation of groups is often enough to produce ingroup-outgroup effects. Of course, this explanation cannot account for why allocations for Blacks varied by condition more often, and more extremely than those toward Whites. It may be that an egalitarian strategy is deemed particularly applicable when there are clear differences between individuals or groups (i.e., when assigning awards to Blacks and Whites), versus when there do not seem to be any obvious differences between recipients of the awards (i.e., when assigning
rewards to two White individuals). This point is further discussed in the final chapter in a section dealing specifically with the effects (or lack thereof) of an America cue on attitudes and behaviors toward Whites.

Taken with Studies 10A, 10B, and 11, there is evidence that prejudice is activated when America is implicitly primed either alone, or in the context of African-Americans. As has been demonstrated, this activation can have many negative consequences for Blacks and other non-White groups. When America is explicitly primed, whether alone or in the context of African-Americans, egalitarianism is activated. Regardless of how America is primed, there has been little evidence that the activation of America has an impact on attitudes or behaviors toward Whites. These null effects could be due to problems with restriction of range on measurement tools, or features of the task.

In the next two experiments, the possible explanation for why many of the predictions in the present study were not supported—that is, self-categorization processes—is examined as a potential explanation for the implicit America reminder effects reported in many of the studies so far (that is, increased prejudice against non-White groups).

Study 13

Social identity and self-categorization theories provide a potential explanation for why implicitly processing an America cue leads to prejudice. America’s history of strife, and current issues, between Blacks and Whites could become accessible to those implicitly primed with America. If that were the case, a reminder of America in the context of Blacks may actually activate a conflict ridden, threatening situation. Thinking about a threatening context for one’s ingroup, could make one’s identity salient, which could activate an ingroup protection motive (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979). An ingroup protection motive is ultimately in the service of protecting one’s
self-esteem. As many theories of prejudice predict, threats to self-esteem can cause one to lash out against an available outgroup, likely due to a need to restore one’s self-worth and self-integrity (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979; Fein & Spencer, 1997). Denigrating outgroup members, it is theorized, also undermines outgroup members’ views, beliefs, and values, which is one viable and attractive method for affirming one’s own views, beliefs and values (e.g., Brown & Turner, 1979; Fein & Spencer, 1997).

In the present study, I examined the extent to which an America prime acted as other threats to self-esteem have been shown to act. That is, if America is activating a threat to self-esteem, it should act as another known threat to self-esteem: poor performance in a self-relevant and subjectively important domain. In addition, theory regarding self-affirmation has suggested that while a threat to one’s ingroup promotes prejudice, an affirmation prior to experiencing a threat, should protect one’s self-esteem, and thus, the potential for prejudicial behaviors should be reduced. I also tested this possibility.

I chose to use performance on an “IQ test” in the present study given the prevalence of this manipulation in the literature, as well as the likelihood that college students would feel that performance in the domain of intelligence was both self-relevant and important. Participants experienced either success or failure on the test, then were primed with America or not. The reasoning here is that if America is activating a threat, which then results in prejudice, the effects of prejudice should be reduced if one is affirmed first, and perhaps unaffected or exaggerated when one receives the additional threat of poor performance on an IQ test.
Participants

Seventy-five White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (implicit America prime versus control prime) by 3 (success, no test, or failure) between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

Participants in the success and failure conditions first completed a Remote Associates Test that was used to either affirm or threaten their self-esteem. Participants in the no test condition did not complete this task. After the test in the success and failure conditions, and as the first task in the control condition, the research assistant came to set up the dependent measure computer task, deliberately closing the Remote Associates Test in the success and failure conditions so that the desktop wallpaper would be shown for 2-3 seconds. In the implicit prime condition, the desktop wallpaper was an American flag, stretched to fit the screen of the computer. In the control condition, the wallpaper was solid blue. The research assistant then opened a program containing the Black-White attitudes IAT described in Study 1A. Participants in all conditions completed the IAT, then completed demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political news following, and political group affiliation. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion.

Remote Associates Test. The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick & Mednick, 1962) was used to manipulate self-esteem in the domain of intellectual performance. In the RAT, each item contained three words, and participants were asked to identify a fourth word that was associated with each of the other three words. For example, one of the twelve items given on one of the tests was falling, actor, dust, and the correct response was star. Participants in the success (or self-esteem affirmation) and failure (or self-esteem threat) condition completed a version of the
RAT. All participants who took the test were told that it was a valid measure of IQ. A hard and easy version of the test was pretested, and on average, participants got 25% of the items on the hard test correct, and 75% of the items on the easy test correct. In addition, after the participants completed the test, participants in the easy condition were told that their test score fell in the 95\textsuperscript{th} percentile of Cornell students who had taken that test, while participants in the hard condition were told that their test scores fell in the 33\textsuperscript{rd} percentile.

**Results**

A significant prime condition by test condition interaction emerged [Figure 12; \(F(2, 71)=3.32, p<.05\)], however many of the predictions were not unsupported. A main effect of test condition on prejudice measured by the IAT, within the control (no flag) condition, suggested that the known modulator of self-esteem, did indeed influence prejudice in the expected manner, \(F(2, 33)=5.32, p<.05\). That is, the least bias was found when participants were affirmed in the success condition (\(M=.07\)), followed by the no test condition (\(M=.29\)), followed by the failure condition (\(M=.56\)). Within the implicit America prime condition, there appeared to be no effect of the test manipulation, \(F(2, 38)=.35, \text{ ns}\). Instead, the implicit prime resulted in high amounts of prejudice across test conditions. Given that the success condition reduced bias when America was not primed, this resulted in a significant effect of prime condition within the success condition \([t(22)=3.30, p<.01]\), wherein there was greater bias in the implicit prime condition (\(M=.68\)) than the control no prime condition. There was also a marginal effect of prime condition within the no test condition, replicating the established implicit effect of an America cue on bias effect that has been presented \([t(26)=1.71, p=.10]\), wherein prejudice was higher in the flag condition (\(M=.56\)) relative to the control no prime condition. No other significant effects emerged, including within the analyses that included individual difference and demographic
variables.

No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of the desktop wallpaper. No participants in any condition guessed the hypotheses of the experiment, nor did anyone correctly guess the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable.

Figure 12. Prejudice as a function of test condition and prime condition. Bias was measured using the IAT, where higher $D'$ scores (bias) reflect a greater ease of pairing White-positive and Black-negative than the reverse pairing.

Discussion

The results of this study do not support the hypothesis that America acts as a social identity threat. Alternatively, an established method of manipulating self-esteem (poor versus strong performance on an IQ test) did have the predicted effects on self-esteem. That is, doing poorly on the IQ test increased prejudice on the IAT, while doing well buffered one’s self-esteem, and thus, reduced prejudice. These
findings are consistent with the literature and suggest that there was not a problem with the tool used to measure prejudice—that is, if prejudice was present, then it likely would have been captured on the IAT. Likewise, there was a marginal effect of the desktop wallpaper prime on prejudice in the no test condition, and in fact, the prime increased prejudice in across all test conditions (though not significantly in the failure test condition). These findings suggest that the desktop wallpaper prime, though a novel method of priming America, did appear to increase prejudice like other America primes.

It is not entirely clear what to make of these findings. It is possible that America is, in fact, a reminder of a threatening situation in which Blacks are the relevant outgroup, but that the effect is too powerful to be buffered by the affirmation used in the experiment. Perhaps an experiment that used an alternative method of affirming individuals would find support for the hypotheses, however, there are no theoretical reasons to predict situational differences in the effectiveness of different methods of affirmation. The next study re-examines the possibility that social identity processes are at the root of the implicit America cue findings.

Study 14

Despite the results of Study 13, recent studies hint at the possibility that self-categorization and social identity processes might play a role in the effect of an America cue on bias. For example, in one study, when nationality was framed as sharing a set of common attributes and heritage, but not when it was framed as sharing a common goal, patriotism and nationalism were negatively correlated with tolerance for cultural diversity (Li & Brewer, 2004). Likewise, asking White Americans to imagine a threat common to all American citizens (across ethnicities) resulted in more positive attitudes toward Blacks (Dovidio, ten Vergert, Stewart, Gaertner, Johnson, Esses, Riek, & Pearson, 2004). Dovidio et al. (2004) suggested that one explanation
for this finding was that the threat to America highlighted the shared set of circumstances and goals common to all Americans, thus diminishing the boundaries between ethnic groups. It is true that this intervention may have reduced bias simply through the explicit, versus, implicit processing of an America cue. Nevertheless, these studies, and particularly the former, imply that a national identity can be both divisive and inclusive. Li and Brewer (2004) explicitly induced different construals of American identity with their manipulation, but what if simply implicitly priming America in the context of diverse groups resulted in the activation of an exclusionary national identity (one based on an obvious set of shared attributes and heritage)?

Devos and Banaji (2005) indeed found that implicitly, America was more closely associated with being White than any other ethnicity for White and Asian Americans. In other words, priming America, an ostensibly shared identity among ethnic groups, might instead make White American salient, an identity not shared with other ethnicities. If this were true, then according to self-categorization theory, several ingroup-outgroup processes might ensue, such as accentuation of similarity within groups and differentiation between groups, increased affective positivity toward the ingroup, increased perception of conflict between groups, and as has been found in the current work, increased negativity toward the outgroup. The next study examines the extent to which the America=White effect reported in Devos and Banaji (2005) moderates the implicit effect of America on bias. If the America=White effect acts as a moderator, it will be taken as initial evidence that the implicit effects of America on bias are intricately linked to the extent to which one implicitly associates America and being White, perhaps suggesting a role for social identity in explaining these implicit effects.
Participants

Forty-eight White American and Asian American students at Cornell University were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (implicit America prime versus control prime) in a between-participants design.

Stimuli and Procedure

Participants first completed a survey that contained the manipulation and one of the dependent measures. They were told that the survey was part of an unrelated pilot study. The surveys contained the Geography and Daylight task described in Study 3. The implicit America prime condition had American flags in the pictures of the task as well as on subsequent pages of the survey. No flags appeared on the control version of the survey. The dependent measure of attitudes appeared on the second page of the survey, and consisted of the Feelings Thermometer described first in Study 7. Following the Feelings Thermometer, participants responded to a number of filler questions.

All participants then completed the America=White IAT (Devos & Banaji, 2005) described below. After completion of the IAT, participants completed measures of demographic and individual difference items, including gender, age, ethnicity, GPA, political news following, and political group affiliation. Finally, participants were probed for suspicion.

America=White IAT. The America=White IAT in this study used the same stimuli, and followed the same procedure, as the one described in Devos and Banaji (2005). The categories were White Am. and African Am. and the attributes were American and foreign. Half the time, White Am.-American and African Am.-foreign were paired first, and half the time African Am.-American and White Am.-foreign were paired first. There was no effect of the order of the IAT \(F(1,43)=.22\), ns. Participants were asked to categorize Black faces, White faces, foreign objects (e.g., a
foreign bill) and American objects (e.g., the dollar bill) as quickly as they could. In the following analyses, higher scores on the America=White IAT represent a greater association between American and White (and Black and foreign) than the reverse set of pairings.

*Results*

The predicted interaction between race and condition emerged \[F(1, 43) = 5.85, p<.05\], though attitudes toward neither group differed significantly by condition.

Notably, however, attitudes toward Whites (\(M=77.92\)) and Blacks (\(M=72.17\)) significantly differed in the implicit flag prime condition \([t(23) = 3.44, p<.01]\), but not in the control condition \([t(23) = .85, \text{ ns}]\). A significant three-way interaction among race, prime condition, and America=White scores also emerged, \(F(1, 43) = 4.29, p<.05\) (Figure 13 and Figure 14). This interaction was driven by the interaction between race and condition for those with a strong America and White association, \(F(1, 17) = 5.79, p<.05\). No such interaction emerged for those with a weak America and White association, \(F(1, 26) = .11, \text{ ns}\). For those with a strong America and White association, attitudes toward neither Whites nor Blacks differed significantly across condition. In the implicit America prime condition, however, attitudes toward Whites (\(M=72.50\)) differed from attitudes toward Blacks \([M=63.33; t(11) = 3.53, p<.01]\), while there was no difference in attitudes between races in the control condition \([t(6) = 0, \text{ ns}]\).

No participants in the implicit America prime condition reported awareness of the America prime. Likewise, no participants in either condition guessed the hypotheses of the experiment, or the relationships among the tasks.
Figure 13 and Figure 14. The interaction between race and prime condition in the prediction of feelings of warmth toward Whites and Blacks for individuals with a weak (Figure 13) and strong (Figure 14) America-White association.

Discussion

These results offer initial evidence that it is only for those with a strong association between White and America that an America prime leads to negativity toward Blacks and other non-White groups. So, how might this explain the effect of an implicit reminder of America on attitudes toward outgroups? Given the strong association between White and America, one might expect that when individuals are primed with America in the context of diverse groups, their own ethnic identity is made salient (that is, activated). A study testing this hypothesis directly should be done. A large body of social identity and self-categorization literature would suggest that activating “White American” should then lead to a number of self-categorization processes, such as negativity toward a relevant outgroup, like Black Americans. Again, a study should be done to test this mediational explanation directly.

The explanation given here can easily be merged with the cognitive-affective mechanisms discussed earlier for a more complete mechanistic picture. In short, the association between prejudice and America that is found even in the absence of diverse groups likely underlies the divisive, versus inclusive, sort of American identity
that is hypothesized to be activated in the context of diverse groups. One could imagine that if America were only associated with the unity and egalitarianism that many Americans explicitly endorse, then activating America would likely activate a shared, inclusive identity in place of the exclusionary one that could be explaining the effects reported here. Likewise, as suggested in the present study, the self-categorization processes that are hypothesized to result from the salience of a White American identity, ought to make prejudice more accessible, and thus more likely to be evidenced in attitudes, beliefs and behavior.

This is a provocative explanation for the results, however, note that here, it is only for those with strong associations between White and America that there was an effect of an implicit reminder on America. One critical question is: to what extent do people, on average, associate White and America? In the present study, the overall association between White and America for participants was $M=0.29$, on par with that found by Devos and Banaji (2005) in their work ($M=0.34$), and significantly different from zero, $t(46)=7.03$, $p<.001$. Moreover, a strong negative (and linear) correlation between warmth toward Blacks and D’ in the implicit prime condition [$r(24)=-.57$, $p<.01$], but not the control condition [$r(23)=-.20$, ns], suggests that the effect may be linear—that is, the more one associates America and White, the more one will show a prejudice effect when implicitly primed with America—rather than binary (i.e., present or not).

Finally, if the salience of one’s identity and subsequent self-categorization processes explain the implicit effects of America on bias, then what should be made of the results of Study 13? Those results are difficult to reconcile with the present explanation. Whether implicit priming of America highlights White identity because it is a reminder of ingroup-outgroup conflict, or because of a cognitive association with whiteness, the predictions for the effect of a self-affirmation prior to exposure to
an America cue are the same: prejudice should be reduced. Future research is needed to explain this inconsistency. If an alternate method of affirming the self, breaking down barriers between groups, or highlighting a shared identity work to reduce prejudice induced by an implicit America prime, an explanation will be needed to explicate the situational dependence of these affirmations.

There is another possibility. While the results of Study 14 are consistent with a cognitive-motivational explanation, in general, and an explanation rooted in social identity theory, more specifically, the results do not preclude a cognitive-affective—that is, association-based—explanation, in which one’s identity could be largely inconsequential. These possibilities are discussed in detail in the final chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
GENERAL DISCUSSION

Across sixteen studies, there is strong evidence that an implicit America prime leads to prejudice against non-White outgroups. Overall, White and Asian American participants responded negatively toward Blacks and other non-White groups when reminded of America in a subtle, or nonconscious manner, but responded relatively positively toward these same groups when reminded of America in a blatant, or conscious manner. The implicit effect is robust. Evidence for the implicit effects of America was found using different types of America cues, and using both visible (e.g., Studies 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8) and subliminal (e.g., Studies 1A, 1B, and 2) implicit priming methods. Conceivably, these methods of implicit priming approximate the way in which one is unknowingly, but often, reminded of one’s nation (e.g., Billig, 1976). Moreover, the prejudice effects occurred regardless of whether one was evaluating a social group (e.g., studies 1A and 1B) or an individual member of that social group (Studies 5 & 6).

The present research primarily investigated the influence of an implicit reminder of America on attitudes (Studies 1A, 1B, 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14), however, given the correlation of attitudes with behavior and beliefs, for example, the present research also tested whether an implicit reminder of America would have an equal impact on other outcomes. And indeed, priming participants with an implicit America cue had consequences for evaluative stereotyping (Study 2), stereotypical beliefs (Study 3), behavioral intentions (Studies 4, 5, and 6), and behavior (Study 12). While further work is needed to determine the exact mechanisms underlying the effect, there is evidence that both prejudice and egalitarianism are implicitly associated with America (Studies 10A and 10B), and that the accessibility of those concepts when America is primed depends upon the context in which the priming occurs and whether one is
explicitly or implicitly processing the America prime. In particular, when one is exposed to America implicitly, and in the context of non-White groups, prejudice is selectively more accessible (Studies 11 and 12); when an America cue is explicitly processed, there is some evidence that egalitarianism is activated, and particularly so in the context of non-White groups (Studies 11 and 12). Furthermore, in the case of implicit priming, the patterns of activation that were empirically supported here could be due to the salience of one’s exclusive, rather than inclusive, American identity when reminded of America (Study 14).

There were some potential limitations and unanswered questions in the current research. Many were discussed in earlier chapters. In this section, two are highlighted: 1) Why are attitudes toward Whites seemingly unaffected by both an implicit and explicit reminder of America, and 2) To what extent is the effect of an implicit reminder of America driven by priming cognitive associations with America versus American identity, and are these distinguishable effects?

*Attitudes toward Whites.* Though there was a reliable effect of an America cue on attitudes toward non-White groups, an America cue had a negligible impact on attitudes toward Whites, with only a couple exceptions. There are at least two reasons to expect that exposure to an America cue would produce more positive attitudes toward Whites. First, an implicit reminder of America is proposed to make one’s identity salient, which then leads to self-categorization processes. Theoretically, favoritism toward the ingroup could result from the same self-categorization processes that produce prejudice.

In the present research, there actually is some reason to believe that ingroup favoritism was affected by an implicit prime. A point to consider is that the largest effects were on the IAT, a measure that combines across ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Certainly, the effect sizes could be due to the sensitivity of the
instrument, but it could also be that the IAT captured both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation pooled together, producing an especially large effect. Although, given this reasoning, one might also expect larger effects on the rewards allocation task than were reported. That is, the rewards allocation matrices task distinguished between ingroup favoritism and other, more impartial methods of divvying rewards, but not between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation, given that the strategies covaried in the matrices. That is, a person who was not feeling particularly warmly toward the ingroup, but was feeling quite negatively toward the outgroup, would likely have chosen the same set of allocations as someone who was feeling more warmly toward their ingroup than they were feeling negatively toward the outgroup. Thus, if ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation produce an additive effect, it ought to have been evidenced on the rewards allocation matrices. As discussed earlier, while some effects emerged on the matrices, they were not large effects, and in fact, were often trends rather than statistically significant effects.

There is some question about the extent to which the covariation of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation is inherent to self-categorization processes versus an issue with measurement, however, to the extent that ingroup favoritism is distinguishable from outgroup derogation, both conceptually and in measurement, it is likely that ingroup favoritism precedes outgroup derogation (e.g., Otten & Wentura, 1999; Perdue et al., 1990). Moreover, there is work to suggest that ingroup favoritism is the primary and preferred strategy in self-categorization outcomes, because it is milder, more covert, and more socially acceptable (see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Thus, outgroup derogation is only likely to emerge when prejudice against the outgroup can be delivered in a subtle or disguisable manner, and/or when emotions toward outgroups reach an extreme, such as anger or contempt, versus disgust or aversion (e.g. Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Hewstone et
Then, perhaps what is needed is a reconceptualized understanding of the findings. Note, that in the control conditions of many of the studies, identity was made salient by nature of the dependent measurements. That is, one is asked to report their attitudes toward their ingroup and outgroups (e.g., Studies 4, 7, 8, 11). Thus, the small, but consistent (though, admittedly, typically statistically insignificant) difference between attitudes toward ingroups and outgroups reported in the control condition might reflect self-categorization processes of the milder sort, namely, ingroup favoritism.

Alternatively, priming with an America cue could heighten the salience of one’s identity, thus increasing the degree of negativity toward the outgroup (especially because America might be linked in memory to not just intergroup differences, but also intergroup conflict). In such cases, outgroup negativity is more likely to reach an emotional extreme, and prejudice against the outgroup may be shown when it is an available strategy, even if it is socially uncouth. Testing this new conceptualization of the findings could prove difficult. A different control group could be used in which attitudes toward Whites and Blacks are measured without first making one’s ingroup salient. One could use an implicit measure that assesses attitudes toward Whites and Blacks separately and primes ingroup subliminally, although it is unlikely that measurement has reached a level of precision that would allow an observed difference between long-standing, stable warmth toward one’s group and the type of ingroup favoritism that arises from the mere mention of one’s ingroup. Moreover, identity can be made salient implicitly, blurring the lines between stable ingroup warmth and increases in ingroup warmth due to identity salience, and making it perhaps impossible to measure such a distinction. Minimal groups paradigms control for these issues, by allowing measurement of attitudes before groups emerge, directly after a group is formed, and later, in the face of competition.
for resources or other sorts of conflict, however it is unclear how such issues could be resolved using the present paradigm and groups.

The second reason to expect that an implicit or explicit reminder of America might lead to more positive attitudes toward Whites is that America is associated with egalitarianism both implicitly and explicitly. Perhaps the expectation here, however, should not be one of positivity, but of increased parity when one is implicitly or explicitly primed with America. Only one study measured true egalitarianism (Study 12), and in that study, participants were faced with a competing motivation to favor their contrived, and perhaps more salient, ingroup. On the other hand, egalitarianism toward Blacks was increased in the explicit America prime condition, suggesting that even if there was a conflicting motivation, egalitarianism might still be evidenced—and indeed, egalitarianism, by definition, involves applying an equal rule to groups, rather than favoring one group (even your own group) over another. That Blacks were shown egalitarianism, but Whites were not seems surprising, and may be informative. Indeed, it could be that in this scenario, the tension between helping one’s ingroup versus helping one’s outgroup may have been more obvious when it involved a White and Black person than when it involved two seemingly similar White people. That is, the contexts in which application of egalitarianism, particularly as it relates to America, seems most relevant are likely those that involve some real or perceived disparity between groups, and thus the script for acting egalitarian will only be enacted (and perhaps only activated) in those contexts. Note, that while the ‘fair treatment for all’ statements that were written into many of the early American documents may have been intended specifically to refer to Whites, they were still prescribed for differences among groups (in beliefs, values, religion, heritage), otherwise such statements likely would have been deemed unnecessary. To that end, highlighting some difference between the two recipients of awards in the rewards allocation study might have
encouraged the application of an egalitarian strategy. A study in which differential
nationalities, heritages, religions, or even universities are varied orthogonally to race
could test this hypothesis. Consistent with this reasoning is a recent study that
examined when priming Chinese Americans with Chinese cues would result in
increased senses of interdependence and community (Wong & Hong, 2005). The
researchers found that, relative to a control condition, after being primed with Chinese
cues, Chinese Americans showed more cooperation during the prisoner’s dilemma
game when playing with friends (the expected effect), but not with strangers. In other
words, in contexts in which a sense of community seemed particularly relevant,
cooperation strategies were activated and applied, however in contexts in which
interdependence was not subjectively relevant or its applicability was not obvious,
there was no evidence of cooperative behavior, and such behavior was likely not even
activated.

*American and White or America and White.* The suggested mechanisms of the
effect of an implicit reminder of America on attitudes toward Blacks and non-White
groups include the automatic activation of cognitive associations with America in the
context of non-White groups, followed by self-categorization processes spawned by
the salience of one’s identity. The data strongly support the first explanation, and
certainly suggest that the second mechanism could be working in concert with the first
in order to produce the outcomes. Note, that the findings here—increased prejudice
toward non-White outgroups when implicitly primed with America—do not require a
self-categorization explanation. Bargh (1997; 2007) for example, suggests that the
activation of concepts can lead directly to behavior. In one study, for example,
priming participants with elderly-related words led them to walk more slowly down a
hallway (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). The activation-behavior relationship is
likely dependent on motivation, but need not be mediated by endorsement. For
example, work on the shooter bias, has found that one’s knowledge of the stereotypical association between African-Americans and violence, but not their attitudes toward Blacks, is correlated with their bias for shooting unarmed African-Americans during an interactive video game set up by the experimenters (for a full description of the shooter bias, see Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). Moreover, Blacks demonstrated a shooter bias at levels similar to those of other groups. All of these experiments point to the potential for the implicit effects of an America cue to depend on one’s known associations with America, rather than one’s social identity or even stable attitudes, but of course, as mentioned earlier, an association-based and an identity-based account are not mutually exclusive. Thus, the question is, in addition to the accessibility of prejudice and White, is social identity an integral part of how implicit America cues affect attitudes and behavior toward outgroups—in other words, are the implicit effects of an America cue on attitudes toward outgroups due only to the associations between White and America, or are they also dependent upon whether these associations are linked with the self (i.e., an association among White, America, and self)?

One obvious place to start addressing this question is to examine the extent to which individuals of different identities show the effects and to what degree. In particular, it is useful to consider identities about which the two explanations would make different predictions. For example, Blacks do not offer much informative value as both cognitive-affective and cognitive-motivational models would predict that Blacks would not demonstrate the effect. Briefly, from a cognitive-affective standpoint, unlike in the shooter bias example, the present effect represents an attitudinal shift, and there is little evidence to suggest that knowledge of negative Black-related information influences African-American’s implicit and explicit attitudes toward their ingroup (Hewstone et al., 2002; though, see Livingston, 2002).
Thus, there would not be a prediction that attitudes toward Blacks would be depressed. Moreover, though Blacks might share the same associations between America and prejudice as Whites, the script that might be activated would likely differ, and thus, it is more likely that negativity toward Whites would increase. Likewise, social identity theory would predict that if America highlighted identity for African-Americans, it would likely result in reduced warmth toward Whites, not Blacks. At first blush, an examination of an implicit reminder on Asians seem more informative—that is, it seems like a cognitive-affective, but not a cognitive-motivational explanation might predict that Asians would show the same effects as Whites. And, as noted many times, both White and Asian participants were included in the analyses presented in the present research—and Whites and Asians do not differ in the magnitude of the effect shown toward outgroups. These findings seem to undermine a cognitive-motivational, social identity explanation, however, at second glance they may not. There is some work to suggest that Asian-Americans tend to identify with the majority group, that is, Whites, on matters relating to intergroup processes and outcomes (e.g., Pyke & Dang, 2003). To that end, Asian-Americans may tend to have a strong America and White association (Devos & Banaji, 2005), and importantly, the activation of America in the context of diverse groups might make salient White American identity, which in this domain could be tied to their own self-concept. As in the case of White Americans, then, differentiation from the outgroup(s) and other self-categorization processes (in which Asians are aligned with Whites), could lead to prejudice.

There are some better ways to discriminate between the two explanations of the effects reported. For one, if the effects truly are due to one’s social identity, then the effects ought to depend on the importance of a White American identity to the self. This, too, has issues as even weakly identified individuals can show large effects of
self-categorization (consider minimal groups paradigms, for example; see Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moreover, it is not clear that identification with a White American identity is as important as the sense that that identity is exclusive. To that end, one might measure the dependence of the implicit America reminder effects on one’s stable view of American identity, such as whether it is racially exclusive or inclusive, or whether one endorses a shared culture or shared goal perspective on national identity. Perhaps the best way to determine the importance of social identity, however, is to not measure identity at all, but rather focus more closely on outcomes predicted by social identity. In particular, Mummendey & Schreiber (1983) found that discrimination based on social identity is much less likely to occur if one is able to evaluate the ingroup and outgroup on different dimensions—the cognitive-affective mechanism would predict no such nuance.

In terms of mechanism, the bottom line is that future research is necessary. The mechanism of the effect is important for theoretical purposes, but also for undermining the effects of an implicit America cue, which as have been discussed, are both robust and extensive. The final section briefly discusses how the consequences of an implicit reminder of America have impact for the real world.

Conclusions. Across many of the experiments reported, a subtle reminder of America ultimately lead to prejudice against non-White outgroups, representing a dissociation between what people report when explicitly, consciously, thinking about America and their behaviors and attitudes when implicitly reminded of America. The effects reported across these studies have relevance for many domains, but perhaps most pertinently, the political world. Consider the ubiquity of flags at polling stations, for example—in one of the reported studies, the mere unintentional processing of an America cue significantly reduced support for President Barack Obama. Political strategists might take note of the perhaps counterintuitive effect of subtle America
cues. An implicit America cue could also have effects on policy support—and the
effects might be heightened when there is a real or symbolic competition for
resources, such as with perceived zero-sum outcomes. To that end, the framing of
affirmative action as an American resolution could serve to reduce Whites’ and
Asians’ support for the policy, for example.

Theoretically, these results are consistent with the current literature on
cognitive dissociations, and expand on it by examining the effects of a national cue.
They also offer up a lesson recurrent in social psychological research: subtle
environmental factors can trigger considerable, and often surprising, effects.
### APPENDIX A

Category and Attribute Stimuli used in the Black-White IAT

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>White</strong></td>
<td><strong>Good</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brad</td>
<td>Gift</td>
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<td>Chip</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter</td>
<td>Laughter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ralph</td>
<td>Rainbow</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bad</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tyrone</td>
<td>Slime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leroy</td>
<td>Cancer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamal</td>
<td>Cockroach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malik</td>
<td>Vomit</td>
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### APPENDIX B

Category and Attribute Stimuli used in the Evaluative Stereotyping IAT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Positive White Stereotypes</strong></th>
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<td><strong>White</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brad</td>
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<td>Lawful</td>
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<td>Ambitious</td>
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<td>Ralph</td>
<td>Trustworthy</td>
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<td><strong>Black</strong></td>
<td><strong>Negative Black Stereotypes</strong></td>
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<td>Tyrone</td>
<td>Lazy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leroy</td>
<td>Dangerous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamal</td>
<td>Violent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

The implicit flag prime condition version of the “Geography and Daylight” task.

Geography and Daylight

During what time of day was this picture taken?

a. Morning
b. Afternoon
c. Evening

During what time of day was this picture taken?

a. Morning
b. Afternoon
c. Evening

During what time of day was this picture taken?

a. Morning
b. Afternoon
c. Evening

During what time of day was this picture taken?

a. Morning
b. Afternoon
c. Evening
The control condition version of the “Geography and Daylight” task.

**Geography and Daylight**

During what time of day was this picture taken?
- e. Morning
- f. Afternoon
- g. Evening

During what time of day was this picture taken?
- d. Morning
- e. Afternoon
- f. Evening

During what time of day was this picture taken?
- d. Morning
- e. Afternoon
- f. Evening
Items from the *Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale* (Brigham, 1977) were presented in the following fixed order.

1. If a Black person were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from him or her.

2. If I had a chance to introduce Black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be pleased to do so.

3. I would rather not have Blacks live in the same apartment building I live in.

4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a Black person in a public place.

5. I would not mind it at all if a Black family, with about the same income and education as me, moved in next door.

6. I think that Black people look more similar to each other than White people do.

7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion that the children produced by interracial marriage feel.

8. I get very upset when I hear a White person make a prejudicial remark about Blacks.

9. I favor housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods.

10. It would not bother me if my new roommate were Black.

11. It is likely that Blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in.

12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive.

13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices Blacks suffer at the hands of local authorities.

14. Black and White people are inherently equal.

15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights.
16. Whites should support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination and segregation.

17. Generally, Blacks are not as smart as Whites.

18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members.

19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both Whites and Blacks.

20. Some Blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them.
APPENDIX E

The Scale of Perceived Interpersonal Closeness (Popovic, Milne, & Barrett, 2003).
### APPENDIX F

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stereotype</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
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<td>Selfish</td>
<td>Bulb</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kind</td>
<td>Awful</td>
<td>Register</td>
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<td>Foolish</td>
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<td>Computer</td>
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<td>Dance</td>
<td>Appealing</td>
<td>Rotten</td>
<td>Airplane</td>
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APPENDIX G

The Rewards Allocation task matrices (e.g., Tajfel, 1982).

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REFERENCES


