COUNTRIES WITH BORDERS - MARKETS WITH OPPORTUNITIES:
DUTCH TRADING NETWORKS IN EARLY NORTH AMERICA,
1624-1750

A Dissertation
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by
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Examining the Dutch in early America only through the prism of New Netherland is too limiting. The historiography inevitably follows a trajectory that leads to English takeover. This work explores how Dutch merchants fostered and nurtured trade with early American colonies at all levels and stages – from ship owners to supercargos to financiers – and over the varied geographical and political terrains in which early American commodities were grown, hunted, harvested, and traded. Chapters are organized geographically and chronologically and survey how Dutch trading networks played out in each of early America’s three major regions – New England, the Middle Colonies, and the Chesapeake and later the Lower South from 1624 through 1750.

Chronicling Dutch trade also serves to emphasize that participants in early America were rooted in global – as well as in local, regional, and imperial – landscapes. Accordingly, while each of the chapters of this work is regional, they are also integrated into something larger. In the end, this is a study that thinks across the Atlantic world yet explores various commodities or individual merchants to understand markets and networks.

This narrative also demonstrates how profoundly Dutch capital, merchants, and
goods affected early America. It confirms stereotypes about the intimacy of the Dutch with commerce or capital, about the character of Dutch merchants who thrived in a competitive commercial atmosphere, about the proliferation of Dutch trade throughout the Atlantic world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By examining Dutch trade, we develop a more nuanced and vivid understanding of commerce in early America.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kim Todt received her B.A. in History and Government from Cornell University. She attained an M.A. with High Honors in History from Yale University in 2005. She received her M.A. and Ph.D. in History from Cornell University in 2009 and 2012, respectively.
To

Ewan
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Introduction

Too often historians have viewed early American history exclusively through Anglo eyes, when in fact it had multiple temporalities and narratives, many of them beginning in Europe. My dissertation seeks to recapture the parameters of cross-cultural trading networks in early America originating with Dutch merchants. It is a history sensitive to the multiple experiences of the marketplace and will strive to show how the global mercantile culture of the Dutch Republic, with its laws and customs, coexisted with highly localized and segmented social and legal trading arrangements in early America. It focuses less on the concept of identity than on social networks, power, and institutions. It is concerned with intertwined networks of communities, partial acculturation, and cultural accommodation.

Examining the Dutch in early America only through the prism of New Netherland is too limiting. The historiography inevitably follows a trajectory that leads to English takeover. Instead, I adopt a circum-Atlantic approach to probe how Dutch merchants interacted with the early American colonies across an extended chronological period.

This study focuses on Dutch trading networks in early North America from 1624 to 1750. I examine three geographical regions, New England, the Middle Colonies, the Chesapeake/Carolinas, over two chronological periods, 1624 to 1664 and 1664 to 1750, to reveal the commercial, political, and social interconnectedness of Dutch and English merchants in early America.

The pursuit of profit was a powerful means of bringing merchants into contact, making them familiar to one another, and sometimes turning them into reliable business
allies. And yet neither the day-to-day commercial relations nor the government policies that encouraged business interaction among the Dutch and English in the American colonies has ever been examined beyond predictable geopolitical boundaries. Nor has any examination gone beyond a cursory inclusiveness of activities in Europe.

What new insights are generated by a history of Dutch trading networks in early America and, as a consequence, an altered lens through which to view transatlantic commerce? I propose several answers to this question. By thinking about the Dutch we develop a more nuanced and vivid understanding of commerce in early America. This history is crucial, complicated, and unexpected. One of the more striking aspects of the story of commerce in early America is the visibility and influence of Dutch merchants to the very survival of English colonies during key periods. This finding is surprising partly because it has not commanded the attention of scholars of English colonialism or the Atlantic world and partly because of its conspicuousness for the historical actors involved. Yet attention to Dutch merchants’ involvement in trading networks in early America demonstrates how commerce was achieved on the quotidian and individual level.

A history of Dutch trading networks in early America may move us away from the tropes that have framed, unified, and chronologically structured early American commercial history – the themes of commodity pricing and economic policies and labor costs. I am interested in circumventing such themes. In their place, I point to an alternative historical path: one that integrates the understanding of commercial history in a manner that more accurately reflects how it occurred in the first place.
**Historiographical Context**

The influence of Dutch merchants on early American commerce and early American merchants remains largely unstudied. There are some exceptions, however, that have provided important insight into how Dutch merchants traded in New Netherland and in the context of the broader Atlantic World.

Some previous scholars have viewed Dutch commercial endeavors in North America and focused specifically on New Netherland, and later, New York. Thomas Condon in *New York Beginnings: The Commercial Origins of New Netherland* focused on the activities of the private traders, the West India Company, and the colonial settlers of New Netherland. Condon undertook a narrative that had not previously been written – one that restricted itself to the study of the commercial influence of New Netherland rather than a history of the colony. By doing so, he reoriented historians to the endeavors of the West India Company, rather than the traditional trope of the Company’s neglect of the colony. As well, he stressed how early settlers viewed the colony as a place for quick profit, rather than long-term investment.

While Condon provided foundational work for understanding trade and commerce in New Netherland, he also created the impression that the Dutch colony was no more than an isolated phase in American history, leaving no discernable traces subsequent to the English takeover in 1664. This thesis takes issue with Condon’s impression about the Dutch mercantile endeavors leaving no discernable trace after 1664. Rather, I argue, the Dutch never left early America and were invaluable for the economic survival of individual colonies through the eighteenth century.

To understand the commercial history of New Netherland from both the
perspective of the West India Company and from private traders, historians have considered Oliver A. Rink’s *Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York* the standard text. Rink discussed the institutional framework of the company and described rivalries in the Dutch Republic as they related to trade and colonization. He then capitalized on the notarial records in Amsterdam to understand the commercial ventures of traders in Holland who, he argued, came to dominate traffic with New Netherland. Rink rightly contended that the last twenty years of the colony’s existence as a Dutch possession witnessed not only a growing population, but also a rising trade in provisions, fur, hides, tobacco, and timber. Centered on his analysis of voyages to New Netherland (based on 129 bottomry bonds drawn up by notaries in Amsterdam), Rink maintained that the trade to New Netherland was dominated by a small number of merchants in Amsterdam, who allowed no room for indigenous colonial traders. The merchants of Amsterdam controlled the transoceanic traffic, set prices for European goods sold in the colony, and exploited the colonists. Once the English took over New Amsterdam, according to Rink, their acts regulating trade and shipping eliminated Amsterdam competitors from the carrying trade.

My research also uses the Amsterdam notarial archives. However, rather than focusing on such a selective group of notarial records, I looked at thousands of records associated with North American trade by the Dutch over a longer chronological period. My conclusions contradict many of Rink’s assertions. There were many Dutch merchants who traded to New Netherland and not just from Amsterdam. As well, many merchants combined voyages to the West Indies with an additional trading expedition to the Chesapeake, New Netherland, or New England. Additionally, depending on the
commodity and the time period, merchants from Amsterdam did not always control transoceanic traffic between the Dutch Republic and New Netherland. Finally, and importantly, once the English took over New Netherland, they did not eliminate Amsterdam competitors from the carrying trade. In fact, Dutch merchants remained a strong and vital presence in many colonial economies causing concern for English policymakers for decades to come.

The literature on early American merchants usually focuses on the richest and most successful merchants and concentrates on the years from 1750 to the Revolutionary Period. Cathy Matson, in *Merchants and Empire: Trading in Colonial New York*, examined the entire New York merchant community across the entire colonial period. This was an important development in understanding not only merchant behavior, but also in understanding how merchant networks transcended artificial chronological markers often used by historians. Matson, much like her merchants, left the geographical barriers of New York to understand the development of the West Indian trade and the lucrative dry goods trade with London. She also used merchant correspondence and account books extensively to understand the key contributions made by them to New York’s ideological development by rejecting the dichotomy between free trade and mercantilism in favor of a mercantilism controlled locally rather than in London, and thus more responsive to their interests. Of course, many of the merchants about whom Matson wrote were of Dutch ancestry.

Matson’s work provided a model for my own – to leave the geographical confines of New Netherland/New York and to look at merchant behavior over a long chronological period. By doing so, I have been able, much like Matson, to understand
the contributions made by Dutch merchants, both living in early and colonial America and in *patria* to the commercial framework of various colonies and merchant behavior.¹

Even less understood are the trading networks Dutch merchants developed with commercial trading partners in England’s North American colonies.

When Bernard Bailyn published *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* his work established the bar for future historians in providing a comprehensive picture of the multifarious activities of the men who founded the New England mercantile empire. Bailyn sought to picture the merchants in relation to the whole society in which they lived. Thus, Bailyn presented a concise and lucid account of the beginnings of New England commerce: the early and futile concentration on the fur trade, the attempts to establish some kind of local manufactures, the beginnings of the all-important trade in English manufactured goods, and the eventual emergence of an export trade in agricultural provisions, fish, and lumber products sent to the West Indies and the Wine Islands in the Atlantic to help to pay for imports from England.

Nevertheless, Bailyn only gave passing mention to Dutch merchants.² In fact, no study exists examining Dutch trading activities in New England. Yet, my research, particularly in Dutch archives, suggests that without Dutch shipping, credit, and consumer goods, particularly during the seventeenth century, New England would have suffered stunted economic growth. The Dutch Republic was an important trading

entrepôt for New England merchants and, likewise, Dutch merchants were normally welcomed at New England’s ports. This thesis pays particular attention to Dutch trading activity outside of New Netherland and New York to provide a comprehensive understanding of the importance of Dutch commerce to early America.

April Lee Hatfield, the author of *Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth Century*, sought to recreate the intercolonial, international, and transatlantic connections that constituted the Atlantic world, one that emerged around the movement of goods. Hatfield chose to emphasize the activities of intercolonial boundary crossers, particularly those between the Chesapeake and New Netherland. She noted, in particular, how merchants had scant regard for the political boundaries in North America that had been drawn up in Europe. This marked in important step in the historiography of the Dutch in early America.

But Hatfield’s merchants are insular and she downplayed the importance of merchants who cultivated and maintained commercial connections with Europe. In part, this was because she worked from the documentary perspective of Virginia records and did not include archived material in the Netherlands.³ My thesis argues that in order to have a comprehensive understanding of Dutch trade in early America trade must be viewed from a circum-Atlantic perspective. That is, commercial networks flowed in more than one direction and it is vital to recognize and follow their movements.

As the field of Atlantic world history has developed, historians’ perspectives have enlarged and understood the broader scope of commercial activity by seventeenth and eighteenth century merchants. Christian Koot, the author of *Empire at the Periphery:*

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British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713, argued against the standard presentation of competing empires, and instead focuses on the degree to which the Dutch played a key role within the new British empire. In part, he suggests, this role arose from their conquest and incorporation of Dutch colonies, notably New Amsterdam, which became New York. Koot also contends that the Dutch and British worlds became closely integrated in the late seventeenth century, notably as a result of the Glorious Revolution and the accession of William III to the English throne. He concludes that the profound Dutch influence on the development of the British Atlantic appeared in the commercial culture of the colonists, one that clashed with the attempt by officials to focus on metropolitan interests, particularly the Navigation Acts.4

While Koot’s work took a macro perspective on merchants’ behavior within empires, my thesis seeks to understand the quotidian commercial behavior of seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch merchants in North America. By doing so, I believe we will have a better understanding of how the earliest commercial activities of Dutch merchants in early America impacted the development of commercial institutions, norms, and practices for years to come.

While early American scholarship has touched upon the importance of Dutch merchants and Dutch commercial ideology to the colonies of North America, scholarship has not linked Dutch activity in North America with the broader Dutch Atlantic world. While it is generally recognized that the Dutch played a prominent part in the world economy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, most studies of Dutch long-distance shipping and trade have focused on Asia and neglected the Atlantic region.

Recently, edited volumes and journal articles have begun to address this topic, albeit with limited focus. For instance, in *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817*, edited by Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven, numerous chapters demonstrate that Dutch trade in the Atlantic was far more extensive and valuable than has generally been assumed, and exceeded the trade with Asia at that time.5

Historians have failed to recognize the continuing presence of Dutch merchants in early America beyond the seventeenth century. In fact, the metanarrative of American history suggests that once the Dutch lost New Netherland in 1664, they distanced themselves from the American colonies until Dutch merchants provided clandestine or indirect aid to Americans during the American Revolution.

Our understanding of Dutch merchants trading throughout the North American colonies also has been tempered by colonial leaders’ histories. More political than social or economic, such histories reflected an elitist perspective of men in power establishing their own legacies. Because historians, for instance, have relied so heavily on William Bradford’s narrative of early Plymouth, often taking his account virtually at face value, they generally have missed or ignored the relationship of Plymouth colonists to Dutch culture. But, Bradford’s *Of Plymouth Plantation*, is defensively dismissive of Dutch culture and the Pilgrims’ relationship to it.

One of the reasons why Dutch merchants such as Isaac Allerton, who lived in various early American colonies, have been seen largely as peripheral figures in early America is closely related to this dismissiveness. Allerton adapted to the shifting global

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geography of trade as early American commerce transformed and his personal position was altered. He, like many other Dutch merchants, ignored political boundaries and forged commercial relationships and alliances in the various colonies. Allerton’s endeavored to transfer his skills to the trans-Atlantic market, thereby capitalizing on Dutch trading networks. In so doing, Allerton bridged the three contexts explored in this work – New England, the Middle Colonies, and the Chesapeake and Lower South – at the same time facilitating alliances in the West Indies and across the Atlantic in London and Amsterdam.⁶

Because early American history has traditionally been colony-centered and because Allerton lived in so many different colonies (Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts Bay Colony, New Netherland, and New Haven Colony), it is difficult to see clearly the dimensions of his relationship with a particular colony. Once Allerton left a certain colony, historians have lost sight of his continued trading activities. Yet, Allerton’s mobility, like that of other Dutch merchants trading to North America, is also a marker of interpretive opportunity. Accordingly, the experience of an individual like Isaac Allerton provides an entrance point from which to investigate this long-understudied area of early modern European and American history – in other words – approaching trading networks in early America from an Atlantic world perspective.

Historiographic conventions have made Dutch trading networks irrelevant. First,

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historians of early American trade have privileged the relationship between England and its colonies. The binary nature of this paradigm obscures the extended and extensive trading networks that developed between colonial merchants in each of the English colonies and with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. A study of a single nation’s relationship to early American trade falls in the as yet untheorized interstices of early American commercial history and early modern Dutch commercial history. Historians have paid attention to the agricultural developments and marketing of commodities such as tobacco or rice. Yet, they have failed to interrogate the involvement of non-English or non-British trading communities or diasporas in the shaping of individual commodity chains. Historians of early American commerce and its relationship to the Atlantic world, for their part, have neglected Dutch trading networks as a category of analysis.

By interrogating the connections between the Dutch and their commercial activity in North American colonies we may develop a more textured sense of how individuals arbitrated transatlantic trade and on a quotidian level. To produce precise historical insights about the Dutch and early American commerce, we must dispel the continued associations linking the Dutch only with New Netherland and to a limited chronological period.

This approach presents an alternative rather than an additive to the history of early American commerce, highlighting as it does the centrality of a particular nation and mercantile group in transatlantic trade. In certain moments and commercial contexts, “being Dutch” functioned as the glue that bound together regional and inter-regional markets that transcended national borders. The term “being Dutch” refers to many of the
acknowledged clichés of Dutch merchants of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – the lust for profit, opportunistic, and speculative. Yet the same clichéd characteristics of Dutch merchants brought them to early America to trade and provide vital commercial services.

**Dutch Merchants**

The story of Dutch merchants’ participation in early American trade is not the same story one would tell about their relationship to commerce generally, or in another geographical region or commercial niche more specifically. The scale of commerce in early America required Dutch merchants to conduct business in new regions, with new partners including indigenous peoples, and in distinctive manners. The interaction of colonial governments and merchants with individual Dutch merchants and their commercial networks proved crucial to the shaping of interdependent colonial economies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The Dutch also brought certain elements of human capital to trade with early American colonies: practical skills acquired through education and training; backgrounds in industries such as tobacco and the fur trade; contacts of familial and non-familial trading networks within and across diasporas and political and oceanic boundaries; supportive economic policies from state authorities within the Dutch Republic; shared languages with trading partners; responsive relationships with colonial authorities who recognized the need for Dutch merchants in their local economy; geographic mobility; and, no less important, economic perseverance. Such factors rendered Dutch merchants available to pursue commercial activities in the colonies and, in turn, they proved crucial
to the expansion and profitability of early America as a whole. Because Dutch traders were not part of English economic protectionist policy, they brought the economic realities of global commodity chains to early America.

Colonization afforded the Dutch a vibrant cultural network in New Netherland. It also facilitated Dutch involvement in intercolonial and trans-regional commerce. It allowed Dutch merchants to rely on mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, or cousins, with whom they shared a language as well as familial or commercial ties, to participate as business partners in Amsterdam, New Amsterdam/New York, London, and other urban centers. Dutch success in early American trade also depended on the exchange of bodies and capital between Europe and colonial America. The Dutch wrote letters back home, sent trade goods to family members, and visited - sometimes permanently returning to the Dutch Republic. The resulting movements created business opportunities for Dutch merchants throughout colonial America.

The Dutch were masters of discovering or creating trade opportunities. Their commercial involvement in early America was no different – rarely did they allow religion, nationality, or ethnicity to dissuade them from commercial pursuits or creating new links in trading networks. Although the notion of Dutch merchants willing to trade with anyone else is a trope created by historians and in literature, it is also true. More than the English, French, or Spanish in early America, Dutch merchants traded with merchants of any religion, nationality, or ethnicity. Good trade transcended any such cultural or social boundaries.

Amsterdam was a commercial bridge between Europe and the early American colonies. More specifically, Amsterdam was New Netherland’s principal trading partner,
and by extension, a significant trading partner for all of England’s colonies. Early American merchants, regardless of English legislative proscriptions, looked to the city’s shipping, markets, and capital investment to support their businesses.

No trade or commodity ever remains unchanged. Dutch merchants, for the most part, responded to developments fluidly: by segueing into new trading niches, by moving to production sources to manage harvests, and by providing capital rather than carriage. Strikingly, the merchants’ reactions were enabled by the commercial skills and diasporic contacts the Dutch possessed. Commercial diversification was prudent in times of success and a necessity when a single commodity’s appeal waned.

Dutch merchants, indeed, traded throughout all of the early American colonies and across a broad range of commodities. To many observers, Dutch trading activities were threatening or conspiratorial, rather than a result of historical conditions or commercial competitiveness. For instance, some in the New England colonies saw Dutch trade with local Indians as possibly creating the means for uprisings against English settlers. In their reports, however, Dutch merchants emphasized that their commercial advantage in English colonies arose not from dishonest practices, but from knowledge of local customs, languages, and commercial practices. Then, too, the Dutch, more often than not, offered higher rates for commodities from planters and lower fees for shipping.

**The Forms of Dutch Cross-Cultural Trade in Early America**

There were two distinct forms of cross-cultural trade by Dutch merchants in early America. While the founding of New Netherland was based on commerce and only later

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accommodated Dutch settlement, the colony provided a physical presence for the Dutch in North America. Additionally, Dutch merchants established trading networks with merchants throughout the English colonies of New England, the Chesapeake, and, later, the Lower South.

The Dutch were a nation of traders, not settlers. Characteristically, they chose to follow that same paradigm with New Netherland. The trading posts in New Netherland were meant as sites at which Native Americans could bring their peltries to trade with the Dutch. But the physical presence of English settlements to the north and south of New Netherland, jurisdictional disputes about the entire area, and the promise of lucrative trade from the colony, compelled the establishment of a more permanent settlement. Here, Dutch merchants settled and not only learned the languages, the customs, and the commercial ways of their primary trading partners in the region – Native Americans – but their settlements became cross-cultural trading centers encouraging trade among the Dutch, Native Americans, English, and others who moved along trade routes.

Although the States General hoped the establishment of the West India Company would follow similar successes as the tightly controlled trade diaspora of its East India Company, eventually the costs of colonizing became too high. The West India Company was forced to relinquish its fur trading monopoly in North America and the Company’s grip on trade in North America never recovered. As a consequence, hundreds of independent Dutch merchants operating out of Amsterdam and other Dutch urban centers would ply the Atlantic in search of commercial opportunities in the North American

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8 Generally, it was difficult to encourage Dutch emigration from patria. Colonizing entities, whether the government or trading companies, had to offer land, transportation, and reduced taxes to encourage settlement. One notable exception in Dutch colonization was South Africa, which was settled in 1652. For more Dutch men were willing to take employment aboard ships than to embark from them and establish farms or practice occupations in another land.
colonies.

Dutch settlements in New Netherland, and particularly that of New Amsterdam, became a new radial for merchants to add to their trade networks. The result was a loosely related set of commercial communities forming the Dutch trading network in the West Indies and North America.9

As New Amsterdam became an early American entrepôt, it drew merchants of various nationalities. What once was a commercial bridge to Amsterdam between kinsmen or trusted fellow-countrymen acting as agents, subsequently saw a variety of other agents become available. Cross-cultural commercial differences disappeared, as did cross-cultural brokers.

With the takeover of New Netherland by the English in 1664, Amsterdam dropped out of the political hierarchy for its former colony. Yet, for both its former colony and the other English colonies, it still remained at the top of the economic hierarchy for some decades to come. Dutch merchants residing in New Netherland did not withdraw to the Dutch Republic subsequent to 1664. This, too, was a reason that Amsterdam retained its economic importance to early America as trading networks continued without disruption. Merchants of Dutch ancestry in the renamed colony of New York accepted English citizenship, became founding members of the newly instituted political establishments, and continued their trading activities with patria. Additionally, becoming English citizens allowed the same merchants to legally trade with

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9 It would be difficult to call this a “trading diaspora” under the more traditional use of the term. The term “trading diaspora” originated with the anthropologist Abner Cohen, who defined it as “a nation of socially interdependent, but spatially dispersed communities.” Most Dutch colonies did not exhibit social interdependence. Rather, they seemed independent of each other, and often of the Dutch Republic itself. See Abner Cohen, “Cultural Strategies in the Organization of Trading Diasporas,” in Claude Meillassoux, ed., The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa (Oxford: International African Institute, 1971), 267.
English merchants and to access English ports with their own vessels.

Notaries and the Dutch Notarial Archives

My research on trade and trading networks has examined Dutch notarial documents. One significant reason for such an approach is the wealth of information contained in notarial minutes about commercial transactions and networks. They have been an underutilized source in understanding early American commercial history.

By the late sixteenth century, commercial letter books (or copy books) had developed as a popular form for preserving outgoing and inward correspondence connected to trade. Ledger books, accounts, and commercial journals were also well established in commercial practice to evidence trade and business networks. Nevertheless, the difficulty with correspondence and other business ledgers was how they were subsequently preserved. Such material had an ephemeral quality that rarely exceeded beyond the lives of the merchants who produced them. Consequently, much of

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10 Notarial protocols, or ledgers, became part of the historical record of various Dutch cities through practice and then through official decree. Prior to 1656, there was no requirement of notaries to submit protocols to the city clerk. In 1656, it became mandatory for the heirs of a notary to deliver the deceased notary's protocols to the clerk's office. In 1675, legislation required the protocols of deceased notaries in the possession of other notaries to be delivered to the clerk's office. See A. I. Bosma, Repertorium van Notarissen: Residerende in Amsterdam Amstelland, Ambachtsheerlijkheden en Geannexeerde Gemeenten (Amsterdam: Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, 1998), 20-1.

11 Notaries enjoyed a special relationship to the truth. They were expected to witness acts and then to shape the specifics of each event into the proper form to be committed truthfully to the page. The most routine transactions are full of formulaic professions of the notary's faithfulness and appeal to the notion that he was there – present at the scene, a trustworthy eyewitness – properly equipped to register what mattered. We, more often than not, accept notaries' words without inquiring into the practices and relationships that shaped the records on which we rely. For purposes of my work, I have relied upon the notarial records to research commercial relationships between individual merchants, to piece together the extent of their trading networks, and to understand the manner in which they ignored political boundaries to pursue trade. Under such parameters, I have assumed the validity of the recorded information. A typical notarial record included the name of the notary, a specific date, the name of the parties, the title of the document, and the signatures of the parties to the document. Depending on the type of document, some were preprinted and specific information filled in by hand by the notary – date, name of parties, values, etc. Other documents required the notary to write the parties' agreement or testimony.
the material directly generated by early modern merchants has been lost through the centuries.\textsuperscript{12}

The same cannot be said about notarial documents. Notaries made a living by producing such records and held various degrees of proprietary rights over them. In their role as a notary, they combined aspects of public officials and self-employed professionals. Subsequent legislation required notarial records to be turned over to city officials upon the death of a notary. As a consequence, preservation of such documents left the control of individuals and became institutionalized. Dutch notarial records have been lost due to fire, flooding, or military conflict.\textsuperscript{13} Yet, such records have survived in more substantial quantities than those retained by individuals and their heirs.

\textit{Notaries}

By the mid-fifteenth century, individuals engaged notaries from a range of commercial and personal matters. In 1524, the Dutch government began to exert greater control over notaries. Officials in cities throughout Holland and West Friesland received complaints about the competency of notaries. As a consequence, in an edict of Charles V of 1524, it was determined that in every city \emph{scheepenen} and \emph{burgemeesters} – local officials – would appoint notaries. A person wishing to become a notary made an application, provided character references, underwent an examination, swore an oath, and became registered by the specific locale. The edict banned all others exercising the functions of a notary without proper registration.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{13}Bosma, \textit{Repertorium van Notarissen}, 23.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 4-8.
Upon admission, the notary promised to perform his office honestly and faithfully conform to the law. If he failed in this, he and his petitioners (community members who had put forth his name as a notary) paid damages to any party suffering prejudice, the amount determined by local officials. He also swore to allow inspection of his books. Finally, the notary agreed that his heirs and executors would surrender his books to the clerk within sixty days of his death.\(^\text{15}\)

Over time, the number of notaries increased. For instance, in 1682 Amsterdam had 76 notaries. This reflected the volume of commercial activity conducted in the city. In the seventeenth century, notarial activity underwent increasing professionalization.\(^\text{16}\) Amsterdam city officials recognized that notaries required commercial and empirical acumen beyond the examination requirement. As early as 1664, officials established a minimum age of 25 to become a notary.\(^\text{17}\)

*Merchants’ Use of Notaries*

Notaries originated in medieval Europe in nations such as Italy where commerce developed rapidly alongside the expansion of Roman law.\(^\text{18}\) As commerce advanced, a new appreciation of written evidence, which included the use of notaries, was fostered under civil law. Contrary to common law, in civil law written evidence prevailed over oral evidence. Thus, if a document provided support to a claim, the judge would accept

\(^\text{15}\)Ibid., 10-12.
the document into evidence as “testimony.” While notaries never became fundamental to the common law system in England or its North American colonies, the same cannot be said of notaries in New Netherland.19 The Dutch brought over their civil law system to their North American colony.20

Did every transaction require a notary? The short answer is no, not every commercial matter required a notary. Though, parties to a business transaction often availed themselves of a notary to create documentation to which they might have recourse should the occasion arise. The parties did not necessarily want to leave a record of their particular transaction. As was often the case in business transactions, the knowledge, and often secrecy, associated with a particular transaction (e.g., a new location for trade or a better quality of a type of good) were a means by which commercial power and profit was gained and maintained. Rather, they were interested in being able to prove, should it become necessary, for instance, that they had the right to enforce certain terms: to collect on a bottomry loan, to receive a specified amount of a commodity, to be paid a stipulated sum for the sale of a ship. Without physical evidence, such as documentation, a merchant might not have been able to receive what was due to him. Merchants wanted records from a notary that anticipated litigation.21

Parties may also have gone to a notary because of new commercial relationships.


21 By providing a record, independent of other records such as court records, notarial records, in some cases, have preserved information where the court record itself has not survived.
Early modern trading partners were often related through family, religion, or nationality. Through such groups, individual merchants developed reputations for trustworthiness. If a merchant’s reputation was damaged because of actions deemed unacceptable to fellow merchants, he would suffer economic loss. Thus, honest and ethical behavior was considered profitable behavior.\textsuperscript{22} Still, the Atlantic World provided opportunities for new trading partners, outside of traditional trading groups. One means of providing some security to a new trading relationship was to use a notary who would memorialize the terms of trade. Perhaps it would only require one or two transactions with a new trading partner until that merchant was deemed trustworthy and the use of a notary was no longer required.

It is difficult to estimate how much trade was conducted between parties without the use of notaries. What is often seen in notarial records is a commercial transaction that has failed for some reason and one or both parties seek the assistance of a notary to create a record of the events leading up to the dispute. Nevertheless, the “failed” transactions provide an invaluable glimpse into early modern trade.

\textit{Notarial Procedures}

If a notary drafted a document, it was done in duplicate. One copy went to the parties involved and was termed the average. The duplicate remained at the notary, and was called the minute. All the minutes together formed the protocol, the archives of the notary. A notary made a chronological arrangement of all the documents he created on

behalf of others, subsequently providing a code, which entailed a description of the records and the numbers assigned.

Notaries undertook a variety of functions. They were competent to draft and execute legal documents. They recorded depositions of individuals for later use in court. Additionally, they often made copies of writings or legal documents. Notaries undertook their work in their own writing chambers, in their dwelling houses, and in private houses. Generally, however, mobility was a major advantage for the notary and he recorded business in a wide range of places.

There were many types of instruments. Some commercial examples included: attestation or declaration (attestatie of verklaring); lease (pacht); estate inventory (boedelinventaris); will (testament); interrogation (ondervraging); contract (contract); protested foreign bills of exchange that had been dishonored (wisselprotest); chartering agreement (bevrachting overeenkomst); bills of sale (koopbrieven); bottomry bonds for vessels (bottomerij obligaties), bills of lading (cognossementen), powers of attorney for merchants in foreign trade (volmachten), and ship protests which detailed the circumstances under which a ship or its cargo had been damaged (schip protesten).

As men with the acknowledged ability to write, notaries were employed simply for that reason alone. But notaries, as independent public officials, were also able to attest a range of facts and to fulfill a number of social needs. The notary might similarly be equated with a recording device. The evidence from protocol books indicates the range of circumstances in which a notary might be needed.

Amsterdam was the commercial center for Europe. Whether through administrative decree or recognition of opportunity, Amsterdam notaries were able to
offer their services in a variety of languages including English. From the English colonies, merchants and ships’ captains from New England most often used the services of an English speaking/literate notary. Merchants from New Netherland, later New York, the middle colonies, and the Chesapeake region most often used and had minutes written in Dutch.

**Documentary Interruptions**

My dissertation covers the chronological period of 1624 through 1750. The notarial archives provide extensive resources with which to provide an analysis of Dutch trading networks in early America. Yet, the archives of the Dutch Republic, and later the Netherlands, have suffered many losses, some accidental due to bombardments and resulting fires, other quite deliberate.

The Dutch Republic was not immune to events in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession

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23 For the period of 1624 through 1750, numerous minutes were drafted by notaries proficient in English including Joseph Steijns (1626-1652); Benedictus Baddel (1630-1658); Johannes d’Amour (1647-1692); Pieter Schabaelje (1692-1732); Mr. Willem Jan van Midlum (1701-1733); Philippe de Marolles (1708-1737); Adriaan Baars Jansz. (1715-1741); Jan Barels de jonge (1716-1753); Hermanus de Wolff (1717-1763); Isaac Costerus (1728-1743); and, Daniel van den Brink (1734-1785).

24 The Nine Years’ War (1689-97) remains somewhat obscure, especially outside of Europe. It took place shortly before the more prominent War of the Spanish Succession. Some of the unresolved issues from the Nine Years’ War motivated the Succession wars. The Nine Years’ War was quite large, quite deadly, and had a global reach, including King William’s War/La Première Guerre intercoloniale in North America between the English, the French, and their local allies, ranging in area from modern-day Massachusetts to Quebec. It also included the Williamite/Jacobite War, clashes between the French and the Anglo-Dutch alliance at several locations in India, and numerous battles in the Caribbean. See Milja van Tielhof, *The Mother of All Trades: The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late 16th to the Early 19th Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 234.

25 The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–14) was fought among several European powers, including a divided Spain, over the possible unification of the Kingdoms of Spain and France under one Bourbon monarch. Unification would have altered the European balance of power. Forces supporting the unification, the Spanish loyal to Philip V, France, and the Electorate of Bavaria fought against those opposing unification, the Spanish loyal to Archduke Charles, the Holy Roman Empire,
severely interrupted Dutch trade. Additionally, the Great Northern War dislocated regional and international trading networks.\textsuperscript{26} The wars stimulated some sectors of the European international economy, temporarily annihilated others, and distorted or re-directed still others. For historians, this is most evident in the dearth of archival material evidencing trade, particularly notarial documents, available for the period 1695 through 1710. Certainly, there are commercial records available through the 1690s suggesting a continued trade with the North American colonies. Nevertheless, the number of records available is significantly less than the preceding decade. From approximately 1695 through 1710, documents evidencing trade by Dutch merchants with the English colonies are lacking in the Amsterdam archives.

The only exception to the deficiency of notarial records is the colony of New York. Existing trade networks continued to operate and ships traveled between Amsterdam and New York. Nevertheless, whether because of the risks of war, the lack of vessels available, or associated costs versus anticipated profits, trade between the two ports diminished as well.

Despite the diminution of Dutch trade to the English colonies in this period, trade continued to flourish in the various Caribbean Dutch entrepôts. Characteristically, the region often became a neutral ground for commercial rivals, particularly when there was disruption because of war. Merchants from the English colonies, in ships built in the

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\textsuperscript{26}The Great Northern War (1700-1721) broke out as Russia’s Peter the Great attacked Sweden (with assistance from Poland and Denmark) in his quest to establish a Russian trading port on the Baltic during the reign of Charles XII on the Swedish throne. During this series of conflicts, Sweden lost much of the territories it had originally controlled around the southern and eastern Baltic shores. For most of the war, the Dutch Republic tried to stay out of the conflicts in the Baltic, but from 1710 onwards, Dutch shipping was nevertheless hindered by the war. See Jaap R. Bruijn, \textit{De Nederlandse Oorlogsvoet in de Zeventiende en Achttiende Eeuw} (Amsterdam: Batans, 1998), 125.
colonies and thus not requisitioned for European conflicts, utilized such vessels for the furtherance of trade.  

Dissertation Summary

This study aims to understand one critical aspect of the commercial growth of early America – how Dutch merchants, from Europe and in America, established cross-cultural trading networks, integrated geographically their own business operations, and shaped their commercial environment by their presence and activities. In doing so, such merchants actively abetted what Adam Smith called America’s rise to “wealth and greatness,” even as they enriched themselves.

To uncover the story of the Dutch trade in early America, we – like the merchants whose courses we follow – must move back and forth through colonial and transatlantic landscapes. This work explores how Dutch merchants fostered and nurtured trade with early American colonies at all levels and stages – from ship owners to [supercargos] to financiers – and over the varied geographical and political terrains in which early American commodities were grown, hunted, and harvested. Chapters are organized geographically and chronologically and explore how Dutch trading networks played out in each of early America’s three major regions – New England, the Middle Colonies, and the Chesapeake and later the Lower South.


28 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: George Routledge & Sons, Limited, 1893), 150. Smith wrote, “Were the Americans, either by combination, or by any other sort of violence, to stop the importation of European manufactures, and, by thus giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufacture the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this employment, they would retard, instead of accelerating, the further increase in the value of their annual produce, and would obstruct, instead of promoting, the progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness.”
This narrative also serves to emphasize that participants in early America were rooted in global – as well as in local, regional, and imperial – landscapes. Accordingly, while each of the chapters of this work is regional, they are also integrated into something larger. In the end, this is a study that thinks across the Atlantic world yet explores various commodities or individual merchants to understand markets and networks.

This narrative also demonstrates how profoundly Dutch capital, merchants, and goods affected early America. It confirms stereotypes about the intimacy of the Dutch with commerce or capital, about the character of Dutch merchants who thrived in a competitive commercial atmosphere, about the proliferation of Dutch trade throughout the Atlantic world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is also a story about how elusive – and historically contingent – profit and commercial dominance was.

This study is divided into two parts. Part One (Chapters One through Three) examines the initial period of European settlement and commercial beginnings in early America through 1664. Part Two (Chapters Four through Six) chronicles Dutch commercial activity in early America until 1750 as political boundaries changed, populations increased, and the Atlantic economy continued to strengthen. None of the chapters stands alone. Readers will encounter many of the same individuals in multiple chapters. Throughout is the continued unfolding of Dutch trading networks in early America.

Chapter One identifies the trade and commercial networks that developed between merchants in New England and Dutch merchants from their earliest contact with each other through 1664. New England’s nascent economies needed to facilitate
commerce and they encouraged and accommodated trade with the Dutch. For seventeenth century merchants in New England, trade with the Dutch Republic and New Netherland supplied necessary sustenance, expanded merchant networks, and presented opportunities for profit.

Chapter Two acknowledges the importance of trade to the founding and continued existence of New Netherland. In the writings concerning New Netherland’s economy, historians have placed emphasis on the colony’s economic significance for the Dutch Republic. This chapter contends that the colony had an equal, if not greater significance for early America. The colony and, in particular, New Amsterdam, became the export and import center for early America. And, because merchants in the Dutch Republic and their agents in New Netherland maintained a close correspondence with each other about commodities, supply and demand, prices, and political events, the colony became a valued transshipment point for information. In addition, commercial practices, long established in the Dutch Republic, were transplanted to New Netherland and subsequently became part of early America’s commercial behavior.

Long considered the exclusive domain of the English, Dutch merchants established a foothold in the Chesapeake that they never quite relinquished. Chapter Three describes the willingness of Dutch merchants to pay high prices for tobacco, the need of Chesapeake planters to have economical and available shipping, and the partnerships that developed between Dutch and English merchants in London and Rotterdam, as well as the immigration and assimilation of Dutch men and women into the planter culture of the Chesapeake. Dutch men and women immigrated to the Chesapeake to protect plantation investments and to establish additional radials in Dutch commercial
trading networks.

Following the English Restoration in 1660, King Charles II sought to streamline the administration of the New England colonies and began a process that brought a number of the colonies under direct crown control. One reason for the policymaking was the cost of administration of individual colonies; another significant reason was the regulation of trade. Chapter 4, chronicling the period 1664 through 1750, examines how New England coped with the passage of the various Navigation Acts to regulate the trade of the colonies. Colonists resisted the laws, particularly in Massachusetts and the other New England colonies. The English colonies had established significant trading networks not only with other English colonies, but also with the Dutch. The laws made some existing New England practices illegal (effectively turning merchants into smugglers), and the payment of additional duties would have significantly increased their shipping costs. Despite the illegality of trade with the Dutch, merchants continued to do business with established networks and to form new trading networks. The disastrous Dominion of New England and an agitated merchant population only served to reinforce trading patterns with the Dutch. The demise of the Dominion saw a return to trade with Dutch merchants who continued to provide goods, credit, and capital to New England throughout the period.

The takeover of New Netherland by the English in 1664 did not result in an exodus of Dutch-speaking peoples from the region. Rather, they acquiesced politically by becoming English citizens, but continued to maintain familiar trading networks with family and business associates in the Dutch Republic. Chapter 5 examines the continuation of trading networks through 1750, as well as Dutch commercial forays into
the newly established colonies of Pennsylvania and the Jerseys.

Finally, Chapter Six undertakes the continued examination of Dutch trading activity in Virginia and Maryland until the mid-eighteenth century. In addition, with the establishment of English colonies in the Carolinas, Dutch merchants reconnected with former Caribbean plantation owners and established new trading networks despite institution of the Navigation Acts.
Chapter 1

“Their Private Business Let Them Agree, the Dutch for Him, the Englishman for Me”: Trade Networks between New England and the Dutch, 1624-1664

Tracing the movements of early American merchants usually suggests ascertaining their primary residence. Historians have assumed an allegiance that tied a merchant to a particular colony throughout their trading careers. Thus, a merchant’s importance in any particular colony would seem clear. Men and women who traded to several different colonies tend to fall out of a study devoted to a single settlement upon leaving a community. But what if we look beyond a particular colony for commercial relationships by the same individual merchants in other colonies? Would the dimensions of their relationship with any one particular colony be less clear? Or, would a merchant’s mobility offer an interpretive opportunity about how he or she actually conducted trade and a broader perspective about inter-colonial relationships?

Isaac Allerton exemplifies one early American merchant unfettered by the political and cultural boundaries of New England. Because Allerton lived in so many different colonies, it is more difficult to see clearly the dimensions of his relationship with a particular colony. Yet, Allerton’s mobility, like other Dutch merchants trading to North America, is also a marker of interpretive opportunity. The difference between the wide-ranging entrepreneurial Allerton and his more restricted English colleagues provides a window into the commercial world of Dutch merchants trading to early

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29 The title of this chapter is taken from a play entitled Amboyna, or the Cruelties of the Dutch to the English Merchants written by John Dryden in 1673 about the massacre of Englishmen by the Dutch that took place on Ambon Island in 1623.
Allerton was born in England in 1586. He separated from the Church of England as a young adult and moved to Leiden joining fellow Separatists. He married and began raising a family in the Dutch city. Life in Leiden provided employment and religious freedom, but as immigrants the Separatists faced ongoing economic difficulties. William Bradford later wrote of the community’s struggles:

For these & other reasons they removed to Leyden, a fair & bewtifull citie, and of a sweete situation, but made more famous by ye universitie wherwith it is adorned, in which of late had been so many learned man. But wanting that traffike by sea which Amsterdam injoyes, it was not so beneficail for their outward means of living & estats. But being now hear pitchet they fell to such trads & imployments as they best could; valewing peace & their spirituall conforte above any other riches whatsoever. And at length they came to raise a competente & conforteable living, but with hard and continuall labor.

As well, the religious community’s leadership felt continued exposure to Dutch culture jeopardized their own children’s English identity, language, and culture.

Allerton, like many Separatists, chose to leave the Dutch Republic to establish a new settlement in North America in 1620. Histories of the Pilgrim community in New England reflect the leadership roles Allerton assumed. He served as assistant to Governor William Bradford during the colony’s first decade. He returned to England and the Dutch Republic on the colony’s behalf at least four times – obtaining an enlarged colony patent to Kennebeck River land in Maine, renegotiating the Colony’s indebtedness to London merchants, bringing additional settlers from Leiden to Plymouth.

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30 It is easy to stereotype Dutch merchants. But even the English were admiring of Dutch merchants and their entrepreneurial approach. The English economist, Sir Josiah Child, attributed the superiority of the Dutch in trade to a wide range of customs, institutions, and patterns of economic behavior and laws, particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Child argued the English had not achieved the same level of superiority during the same period. See Josiah Child, *A New Discourse of Trade* (1751), xxi.


Colony, and provisioning Massachusetts Bay Company settlers. Allerton acted as Plymouth Colony’s agent in England. In addition, Allerton founded a cod-fishing enterprise in Marblehead, Massachusetts in 1631.33

The former tailor began to create a trading network that eventually reached from Nova Scotia to the Caribbean. Allerton’s activities came under scrutiny by others, including William Bradford, within the colony. Perhaps he had assimilated many aspects of Dutch culture, particularly the aspects relating to trade and cultural accommodation of trading partners.

In 1637, Edward Winslow reported to John Winthrop about Allerton’s trading activities. He criticized his “old neighbor Isaac, whose head is always full of such projects, and hath too great familiarity with our common adversaries.”34 The adversaries to whom Winslow referred were the French and Dutch.35 It is unknown whether Allerton, like Winslow and Winthrop, had political concerns about either the French or the Dutch and their activities in North America. Still, Allerton’s trading activities suggest that he saw commercial opportunities in engaging with individual merchants from New France or New Netherland, as well as English merchants trading in the New World.36

35 In 1630, Emmanuel Downing wrote to William Bradford of Allerton's exploration of surrounding regions. He described Allerton's journey to New Netherland, "If yt be trew that Mr. Allerton's reports of Hudson's river, there is noe place comparable to yt for a plantačion, and t'will quitt cost for you to remove thither, though all be lost in the place where you are, for he sayth that Hudsons river goes into Canada and those 2 make New England an lland..." See William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, ed., W.C. Ford (Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1912), 2:63-4.
By the mid-1630’s, Allerton’s extensive commercial activities in New Netherland, along with disputes with the leadership in New Plymouth, provided an incentive to relocate from New England. But Allerton’s receptivity to trade with the Dutch, despite the anxiety expressed by others in New England, provided a necessary commercial nexus for all of the New England colonies in the years to come.

In time, others would expand the networks Allerton created and reimagine new opportunities between the Dutch and New England colonies. Writing in 1655, Adriaen van der Donck noted, “Canada and New England are within brief sailing time along coastal waterways. New Netherland already trades with those territories, and in time, and with a growing population, trade can expand still more.”

The archival materials relating to trade between the Dutch, both in patria and New Netherland, and between the New England colonies reveal the existence of a lively, steady commerce. While the fur trade with Europe preoccupied the attention of many merchants and provided substantial profits, trade among Dutch and English traders in North America was, nevertheless, considerable in volume and diversified in content.

The first part of this chapter reviews the initial commercial contacts of New England’s colonies with the Dutch Republic and New Netherland. Rather than rebuking contact, the English expressed interest in trading arrangements. The English colonists lacked substantial support from their home country. As well, the Dutch had the capital infrastructure the English sought. While the Dutch had a smaller geographical presence

the Dutch are explored in Chapter 2. For Allerton's trade with the English at Pemaquid, Maine, see Winthrop, Journal of John Winthrop, 172.

37 Adriaen van der Donck, A Description of New Netherland, eds. Charles T. Gehring and William A. Starna, trans. Diederik Willem Goedhuyys (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 140. Van der Donck held the position of schout (a combination of sheriff and prosecutor) for the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck. He also became involved in petitioning the Dutch West India Company for a more liberal form of government for New Netherland.
and fewer inhabitants than the English in North America, in the seventeenth century the Dutch were the world’s greatest trading nation. As such, the Dutch could provide certain commercial opportunities to New England’s colonies with respect to trade.

The second portion of this chapter examines trade during the 1640s through the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652 – 1654) between New England’s colonies and Dutch merchants both in patria and New Netherland. The colonies of each nation were more firmly established and trading networks had formed. While individual colonies occasionally suspended or threatened Dutch trading networks, colonial leaders in New England never lost sight of the importance to their respective economies of their commercial arrangements with the Dutch. So, despite disputes over geographical boundaries, tariffs and duties, and Dutch sales of guns to Indians, trade continued.

Finally, the third section of the chapter continues an examination of the commercial relationship between the Dutch and New England from the conclusion of the First Anglo-Dutch War through the events of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665 – 1667). During this period, substantial trade occurred despite the fact the Dutch lost their political presence on the North American mainland after the English takeover New Netherland in 1664.

Meeting Your Neighbor: New Netherland as the Focal Point of Trade

Early in English Settlement

Early records reveal trading activities of an inter-colonial nature. In 1622, Emmauel Altham wrote to his brother describing the general prospects for profit in Plymouth Colony. He described a planned voyage “southward into Hudson’s River,
where the Dutchmen have all their skins of the savages. We hope there to get good store of beaver’s, otter’s and martin’s skins, as also fox skins and raccoon skins – all of which will yield money good store in England.  

The planned voyage most likely traveled to Fort Nassau (site of present day Albany, New York) and the trading post there.

In New Netherland, Isaac de Rasière, secretary of the colony, was a shrewd analyst of trade and market conditions in the New World. In imagining a commercial center for the fur trade, he envisioned New Amsterdam at the nucleus drawing in French Indians and spoiling the trade of other nations. In constructing such a design for New Amsterdam, De Rasière suspected competing trade interests from the English, even from the small Puritan settlement’s inhabitants in Plymouth. In 1626, De Rasière wrote of his plans to spoil the trade of the “Brownists of New Plymouth” by “outbidding them with duffels or hatches, in order that they themselves would have to come to us to get wampum.”

Peter Minuit tried a more conciliatory tack in 1627 when he suggested in a letter to Governor William Bradford that the two colonies establish regular trade. The letter reaffirmed Anglo-Dutch friendship “against our common enemy the Spaniard.”

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38 See Sydney V. James, Jr., ed., Three Visitors to Early Plymouth: Letters about the Pilgrim Settlement in New England During Its First Seven Years (Bedford, Mass.: Applewood Books, 1997), 26 (Altham complained in 1623/4 after a trip to the southward of New England that there “are great store of furs which now the Dutchmen get because our Company of New England have not sent by us so good trucking stuff as they should have, and so have disappointed themselves much.” Ibid., 36.

However, the remainder of the letter more directly got to the point of trade. The Dutch offered “any goods that comes to our hands from our native countrie, [which] may be serviceable unto you, we shall take ourselves bound to help and accomadate you ther with.” If the Dutch lacked commodities of interest to the Plymouth colonists, the Dutch would purchase “if you please to sell us any beaver, or otter, or such like comodities as may be usefull for us, for ready money…we shall depute one to deale with you, at such place as you shall appointe.”

Bradford soon responded with thankfulness for the “good and curteous entreaty which we have found in your countrie” and for the prospect of future trade. He agreed that “we doubte not but in short time we may have profitable comerce & trade together.” Nevertheless, Bradford replied that the colony had sufficient supplies of all necessaries, but he suspected that the colonies could trade with each other if the Dutch had “reasonable” rates. Shrewdly, Bradford queried as to the terms of trade: “And therefore when you please to send to us againe by any of yours, we desire to know how you will take beaver, by ye pounds, & otters, by ye skine; and how you will deale per cent. for other comodities, and what you can furnishe us with. And likewise what other commodities from us may be acceptable unto you, as tobacco, fish, corne, or other things, and what prises you will give, &c.”

Bradford reported the correspondence between himself and De Rasière/Minuit to Plymouth Colony’s English investors. In conciliatory language, Bradford explained how the Dutch had initiated the contact and how he had informed the Dutch that the Manhattan plantation stood on territory belonging to England. Bradford’s

41 Ibid.
correspondence in 1627 sought to reassure the investors that the colony’s commercial allegiances (and any profits) were still with them, rather than being siphoned off to the Dutch. Bradford wrote:

We well knew likewise, that this dealing and friendship with the Dutch (though it was wholly sought of themselves) yet it would procure us envy from others in the land, and that at one time or other, our enemies would take occasion to raise slanders and frame accusations against us for it; therefore, to prevent their malice, as also to shew the sincerity of our dealing and our loyal and dutiful respect to his Majesty and the Honourable Council for New England; we sent their first letter (with our answer thereto and their reply to the same) unto the Council as may appear more particularly by our letters following.\(^42\)

Bradford’s formal correspondence belies the fact that the Plymouth colonists had extensive contact with the Dutch while living in the Dutch Republic and that the Dutch had traded along the North American coastline since establishing trading posts in New Netherland subsequent to 1609.\(^43\)

Bradford’s caution soon eased and the two colonies developed commercial networks. Bradford admitted in his History that the colonists “traded profitably together for several years, till other things interrupted it.”\(^44\) Traders in Plymouth supplied the Dutch with various skins, along with corn, wheat, fish, and the first efforts of a much hoped for tobacco industry. In return, the Dutch traded a variety of exports from the Dutch Republic and Europe, including sugar, clothe, arms, and ammunition. De Rasière never realized his ambitions to spoil the trade of the Brownists of New Plymouth. Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Chesapeake colonies soon politically and economically overshadowed Plymouth and the Dutch turned their attention to the opportunities there.

\(^{42}\)Ibid., 34-5.  
\(^{43}\)Ibid., 224-5.  
As well, it was the Dutch who introduced the Plymouth colonists to the use of wampum, or sewant, in the Indian trade. Bradford’s acknowledgement perhaps lacked sufficient recognition for the importance of this introduction to the economic survival of Plymouth Colony. The Dutch received their supply of wampum from the Narragansets and the Pequots. De Rasière sold a supply of wampum to the Plymouth colonists for £50 intending that the Dutch would supply the Plymouth colonists with wampum. De Rasière wanted to exclude them from directly engaging in trade with the Narragansets and Pequots and entering the fur trade of Long Island Sound. Instead, the ever-conniving De Rasière suggested that the Plymouth colonists should enter the fur trade at Kennebec (Maine) diverting their attention away from Long Island Sound. He convinced them that without the use of wampum, the Plymouth colony would not have a substantial means to engage in trade and increase their limited supply of trading goods. Once in possession of wampum supplied by the Dutch, the Plymouth colonists could engage in the fur trade, particularly on the Kennebec and on the Penobscot in Maine. A supply of beaver was in itself currency to trade with London merchants or the Dutch at New Amsterdam for required commodities.

*Trading Basics*

It was perhaps fortunate for the New England colonies that the Dutch colony of New Netherland was in relative close proximity and that it so openly welcomed trading relationships with each New England colony. Certainly, England’s North American colonies could not count on England for economic support. The earliest English settlements proved that. The idea of colonizing the New World turned out to be more
difficult than just claiming land on behalf of the English crown to create an empire. It required operating capital that the crown and the various sponsoring trading companies were not yet prepared, or perhaps even able, to provide. But the Dutch were different. They possessed a commercial toolbox for the establishment of a successful trading entrepôt. Time after time, the Dutch had established burgeoning commercial marketplaces remote from patria. Although the Dutch could not claim that its North American trading center, New Netherland, had a commercial viability similar to many Dutch East India Company trading posts, it was better equipped than the New England colonies to survive economically. New Netherland could rely upon the commercial institutions in, and stability of, Amsterdam. The Dutch Republic’s vast trading empire meant that Amsterdam, as its commercial center, was better prepared to temper the storms of uneven profits associated with new trading ventures. Amsterdam had banks that developed the easy transfer of bank credits, a bourse (stock exchange) that engaged in the speculative trade in shares, a leading shipping center, an established insurance market, vast commercial warehouses, and a distribution network that helped to distribute colonial American products throughout Europe.

The Dutch establishment of New Amsterdam as a trading entrepôt interested New England’s merchants. The settlement had commodities and trading networks

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45 One of the earliest historians to examine capitalism in the Dutch Republic, Violet Barbour noted while “the great merchant houses preferred an empire of trade, snug monopolies, and the expectation of quick profits to the unpredictable, uncontrollable returns from colonization,” Dutch merchants still sought new commercial ventures and opportunities. Violet Barbour, Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950), 139.

46 The other significant trading center in New Netherland was Beverwijck. Janny Venema maintains New England traders sought opportunities there during the trading season. Janny Venema, Beverwijck: A Dutch Village on the American Frontier, 1652-1664 (Albany: State of New York University Press, 2003), 99, 177. Donna Merwick suggests Beverwijck could draw non-Dutch traders because of the sophistication of its commercial structures, particularly third-party debt. Merwick also suggests that Beverwijck's New England trading networks were created by former Dutch West
unavailable to them. In addition to European goods, New Netherland provided subsistence commodities and other raw materials. The colony also became the leading market for New England merchants to trade their own goods.47

New England merchants pursued trade in New Netherland because the colony offered an opportunity for profit and minimal barriers of entry to conduct trade. A successful trading entrepôt had political, commercial, and legal infrastructures that recognized the importance of trade to its economy. Dutch colonists had transplanted such infrastructures for commercial transactions from the Dutch Republic to New Netherland, while New England’s colonies lacked them or had not yet developed them extensively.48

The incorporation of the laws and ordinances of the states of Holland and access to Amsterdam capital allowed New Netherland’s merchants to create a local credit system that did not discriminate based on nationality.49 The immediate incorporation of Dutch

India Company soldiers of English and Scottish origin who remained in the colony and “who established mercantile ties with New England more readily than Dutch-speaking burghers.” Donna Merwick, Possessing Albany, 1630-1710: The Dutch and English Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 128. While I agree that former soldiers established mercantile ties, I disagree that they established them more easily than Dutch-speaking burghers did. The Dutch never let language interfere with trading opportunities.

47 New Netherland occasionally turned to New England for foodstuffs. See, e.g., A.J.F. van Laer, ed., New York Historical Manuscripts: Dutch: Council Minutes, 1638-1649 (Baltimore: Genealogical Pub. Co., 1974), 4:203. On accommodating New England merchants, David Peterson de Vries noted in his journal that Director-General Willem Kieft “told me that he had now had a fine inn...in order to accommodate the English who daily passed with their vessels from New England to Virginia...and who might now lodge in the tavern.” David Peterson de Vries, Voyages from Holland to America, 1632-1644, trans. Henry C. Murphy (New York, 1853), 36.

48 Bills of lading, charter contracts, insurance contracts and the like, all had pre-existing formats in the Dutch Republic adopted by merchants and notaries in New Netherland, particularly after the Dutch West India Company in 1640 permitted private individuals to engage in commercial and maritime activities between Europe and New Netherland, including the fur trade. Of necessity the legal and political systems of the Dutch Republic were quickly transported to New Netherland. See, Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 136-7. In contrast, Rhode Island, as late as 1647, had to legislate to impose some sort of regulation on commercial transactions. John Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, in New England (Providence: A.C. Greene and Brother, 1856), 1:176.

49 Like other North American colonies, New Netherland suffered from limited amounts of hard currency and merchants used money substitutes including beaver skins, tobacco, or wampum in
laws and ordinances in the colony provided a familiar framework for merchants, both merchants residing in the colony and their counterparts trading from patria. Traditional commercial practices such as the use of resident notaries public recorded commercial arrangements between parties. Further, a stable and impartial court system existed that allowed commercial disputes to be resolved.

Commercial practices in New Netherland influenced how merchants conducted inter-colonial trade. Receipts, bills of lading, accounts, daybooks, and acknowledgements had become standardized in language and, in certain instances, were available in pre-printed formats. Certainly, a seventeenth century Amsterdam court would have expressed surprise had a merchant demanded payment without any of the requisite documentation to prove a contract or delivery of goods. Courts in New Netherland were no less surprised. The commercial behavior required in New Netherland filtered throughout the English colonies in North America. English merchants recognized that to have a viable claim in a New Netherland court, they would have to come prepared with appropriate documentation. In time, commercial practices in New England changed to reflect this common usage.

To facilitate further trade, New Amsterdam’s council in 1656 appointed a “Broker to the Merchants” who spoke both Dutch and English. Jan Peecq was to “regulate himself by the laudable custom of our Fatherland’s City of Amsterdam, in force in the

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50 Aspinwall, Aspinwall Notarial Records, April 3, 1646, 58; June 13, 1646, 66; July 28, 1647, 68.

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Traditionally, merchants in the Dutch Republic sought out brokers because of the brokers’ networks and independence, rather than their knowledge of specific commodities or goods. As intermediaries, they created opportunities for merchants by moving commodities between parties. New Amsterdam’s council adapted the traditional use of this post as a means to bring together parties that, because of language differences, may not otherwise have transacted business together.52

Commercial infrastructures also afforded ancillary or supplemental services essential to merchants. To illustrate, New Amsterdam became a point of brokerage, repair, and provisioning for ships. Numerous contractual actions involving New England merchants found their way to the courts, including the matter brought by Jan Evance [John Evans], a merchant in New Haven, who demanded delivery of the ship Abigael according to the terms of his contract with Jan Wilcocx.53 An earlier case saw Jan Schepmoes and Claes Veringh request a declaration from the former owner of a sloop, Captain Teyler [Taylor], that “there is no one in New England who has any claim on the aforesaid sloop.”54 Governor-General Stuyvesant sold a former Dutch West India Company ship to Thomas Broughton of Boston in 1647. A 1659 dispute in the Colony of New Haven involved a ship, The Black Eagle, which Richard Raymond of Salem had purchased in New Amsterdam. In October 1662, Manhattan burgher Dirk Jansen of Oldenburgh sold his sloop, the Hoop, to Deliverance Lamberton, an English merchant of

51 Fernow, ed., Records of New Amsterdam, 2:45.
52 For a general discussion about brokering in Amsterdam, see Th. Stuart, De Amsterdamsche makelaardij, bijdrage tot de Geschiedenis onzer handelswetgeving (Amsterdam: C.A. Spin & Zoon, 1879).
New Haven, for 2000 lbs of tobacco. Dutch ship owners also hired out their vessels to merchants and captains from New England. One New England captain noted, “being at Stamford, he hired a Duch vessel.” The ease with which merchants in the area engaged Dutch ships suggests a commonplace occurrence that was mutually beneficial to the parties.

As well as providing the infrastructure to undertake private trade, New Amsterdam, like many early modern cities, established a weekly market day and an annual market. The Council opened the market to both foreigners and inhabitants and provided stalls for merchants to sell goods using Dutch weights and measures. In 1656, Governor-General Stuyvesant and the Council established a second market in New Amsterdam held on Saturdays devoted exclusively to farm products. Stuyvesant instituted semiannual fairs at New Amsterdam in 1658, one for lean cattle throughout the month of May and another for fattened cattle in autumn. Additionally, to encourage the importation of livestock, the Burgomasters authorized placards in English sent to towns

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56 Hoadly, Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May, 1653, to the Union, 334-6 (February 1659).

57 It is important to define “private trade” in relationship to New Netherland. During the 1620s and 1630s, the Dutch West India Company sought to control the New Netherland fur trade and to prohibit private traders at Fort Orange and throughout the colony. In 1639, the Company opened the trade to private individuals provided that they pay a duty on all goods brought into or taken out of the colony. Thus, private trade came to be understood as any trade not with the Company. See, e.g., Oliver A. Rink, “Company Management or Private Trade: The Two Patroonship Plans for New Netherland,” New York History, 59 (1978), 5-26.

in Connecticut, New Haven, and Long Island to advertise the fairs.\textsuperscript{59}

Considerable evidence suggests that trade in New Amsterdam influenced regional prices for commodities. Nevertheless, how did merchants determine prices? We know legislation set the price for some commodities, such as bread and beer. We are also aware of the existence of price courants in Amsterdam during this period and courts referencing the same.\textsuperscript{60} The price courant provided merchants with average prices on a vast array of commodities exchanged on the Amsterdam market. It is likely, given the regular shipping between the Dutch Republic and New Amsterdam, the courts and merchants accepted price courants from the Dutch Republic as evidence of current commodity pricing, or at the very least, a benchmark upon which to base local value.

The notarial records also recognized the commercial links that tied New England to New Amsterdam through currency pricing. Because of a lack of coinage, beaver became a standard form of currency used in commercial transactions. As such, this currency needed some form of regulation. New Amsterdam’s market price informally determined the value of beaver for the region. For example, in 1648 John Cromwell admitted his indebtedness to Jonathan Brewster of Connecticut according to “the price as comonly it goes at Manhatas” for “Bever mooskins & some deere skins.” Massachusetts passed a special act to regulate the currency of the Dutch coin in 1643. The General Court noted “the oft occasions wee have of trading w’th the Hollanders at the Dutch

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., 251, 364. \textit{Records of New Amsterdam form 1653-1674}, 7:215-6. An earlier fair for cattle had been established in 1641. O’Callaghan, \textit{Laws & Ordinances of New Netherland}, 29. It appears that “smaller animals, such as mutton, veal, goats’ flesh, &c., had been sold from the baskets of the producers, at the Market-Place at the Strand.” See Thomas F. De Voe, \textit{The Market Book: Containing a Historical Account of the Public Markets in the Cities of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Brooklyn} (New York: 1862), 1:44.

\textsuperscript{60}Fernow, ed., \textit{Records of New Amsterdam}, 2:36. Price courants provided a comparative view of the market by their differentiation of major commodities according to origin, quality, etc. See Nicolaas Wilhelmus Posthumus, \textit{Inquiry into the History of Price in Holland} (Leiden, 1946), volume 1.
plantation & otherwise, do therefore order, that the Hollander ducatour, worth 3 gilders, shalbee currant at 6s in all paymts wth in o jurisdiction, & the rix dollar, being 2 ½ gilders, shalbee likewise currant at 5s, & ryall of 8 shalbee also currant at 5s.”

New Amsterdam’s favorable commercial infrastructure even attracted the settlement of New England merchants. Numerous English merchants began their lives or careers in an English colony, only to subsequently move to New Amsterdam to conduct trade. Many merchants relocated permanently. Other merchants chose to maintain a residence in New Amsterdam as well as one in an English colony. Merchants from New England colonies, who came to New Amsterdam only to trade, but not to settle, did not need to become burghers. Yet, if a merchant chose to remain in New Amsterdam, he was required to apply for the burgher right to engage legally in trade.

Commercial infrastructure provided the framework to impose governmental fiscal policy as a means to raise revenue. In addition, one of the most vexing issues in any “free trade” port in the seventeenth century was the imposition of duty. Although early legislation embodied an open door policy to trade with foreign merchants, New Netherland struggled with the issue of duties. Both the West India Company and New Netherland’s council imposed customs duty as an indirect tax on goods of international trade. Import and export taxes were levied on consignments regardless of point of origin.

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63 Aside from disputes in Connecticut and Long Island, there were attempts by New England colonies to impinge upon New Netherland’s territory and ignore its trade laws and regulations. See Adrian van der Donck, The Representation of New Netherland Concerning its Location, Productiveness, and Poor Condition, ed., Henry C. Murphy (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1849), 23.

64 O’Callaghan, Laws & Ordinances of New Netherland, 88.
Thus, while free to engage in trade in New Netherland, local laws required all merchants, regardless of nationality, to comply with the Dutch colonial government’s tax assessment.

For instance, in 1642, New Netherland levied an import duty of ten percent upon all goods for which a merchant had not paid an import duty in the Dutch Republic. This included goods brought in to New Netherland by English merchants. Governor-General Stuyvesant, an astute and commercially minded administrator, sought to continue this policy established by his predecessor. Despite the fact that English merchants paid eight percent less in import duty than their Dutch counterparts did, English merchants complained to Stuyvesant about the excessiveness of the import duty. Stuyvesant responded in 1649 by suspending all duties paid by English merchants conducting trade in New Netherland. Dutch merchants promptly complained of special treatment accorded to English merchants and asked for exemptions. In reply, the Dutch West India Company’s directors imposed an import duty of sixteen percent on goods brought in by merchants from New England and Virginia but removed the export duty on goods from New Netherland to New England. Further amendments reduced the import duty on goods from patria to New Netherland from sixteen percent to ten percent, placed provisions and other raw goods from New England on the duty-free list at New Amsterdam, and implemented an additional reduction of the duty upon other merchandise

65 Prudent fiscal policy recognized that to tax a foreign merchant on goods brought into the Dutch Republic, and most likely shipped on a Dutch bottom, and to then tax those same goods in New Netherland was neither wise nor commercially prudent. Thus, if a merchant could show payment of an import duty in the Dutch Republic, he was exempt from paying the import duty in New Netherland on the same goods.
from New England.\textsuperscript{66} In the end, Dutch administrators recognized the value of trade with New England to the overall economy of New Netherland and made fiscal concessions to ensure continued commercial activity.

And, again, demonstrating the importance of trade with its New England neighbors and responsiveness by the New Netherland government, in 1656, a group of English traders petitioned the Burgomasters and Schepens “concerning the export duty now imposed on wine and beer.” The Burgomasters and Schepens resolved to present the petition to the Director-General and Council. What is significant is that English traders were allowed to petition a foreign government and their petition was given consideration at the highest levels of New Netherland’s administration.\textsuperscript{67}

New Netherland’s fiscal policy included licensing as a means to monitor and regulate the traffic in certain commodities traded with New England. Thus, officials in New Amsterdam granted Thomas James, a Maryland trader, a license in 1639 “to export corn and trade with the New England colonies.” Isaac Allerton agreed not to sell duffels cloth received from the Dutch West India Company “to any English people or inhabitants of New England except Indians.” In September 1647, Govert Aertsen requested permission to go to New Haven to purchase goods from a newly arrived ship and to sell them in New Netherland, on which he promised to pay sixteen percent duty.\textsuperscript{68} The council particularly monitored the import and export of foodstuffs. Especially in its earliest years, New Netherland was cautious about any sort of dependency pertaining to


\textsuperscript{67} Fernow, ed., Records of New Amsterdam, 2:94.

grains or other provisions. Requiring a license to export corn, for instance, meant the colony could review stockpiles of a vital commodity, and deny a license, if necessary, to ensure enough food for its own inhabitants. The council also closely monitored trade goods for the fur trade brought over by the West India Company. If the council allowed the sale of trade goods to English colonists, it would deplete the wares available for the Dutch to trade. As well, it would provide English colonists with valuable commodities of their own to barter with the Indians to the detriment of the West India Company. Moreover, requiring a license to import goods was a means to track the arrival of commodities, oversee the collection of duty, and minimize smuggling. While New Netherland’s officials encouraged free trade, certain limitations existed to protect the colony’s grain supply and economic foundations.

Even with significant compliance in payment of duties and requests for licenses, New Netherland’s government could not ignore smuggling, particularly the export of furs, by either its own inhabitants or “those of other nations.” In a 1647 proclamation, officials argued that smugglers had defrauded the colony of export duties on furs and import duties on English goods and merchandise. The Director-General and Council thus commanded “that no one of them shall presume to sell, barter, trade, or remove, or ship, or export…without due entry being first made of such merchandise.” Any furs had to be marked or stamped to demonstrate the payment of export duty before the furs could be sent to “New England, or to the Swedes in the south, to Virginia, or to the fatherland.” Failure to comply meant forfeiture of the goods and the imposition of a fine.69 In spite of the diversified trade and its continued growth, colonial officials fixated on the fur trade

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69 Van Laer, New York Historical Manuscripts, 4:386. The government also prosecuted for illegal smuggling of other commodities. Ibid., 204-5, 501.
and how that trade constituted New Netherland’s \textit{raison d’etre}.  

Although England sought to impose trade restrictions on its colonies, merchants from New England often ignored them. They continued to carry Virginia tobacco to New Amsterdam in ever-increasing quantities.\textsuperscript{70} Even the Navigation Act of 1660 and its list of enumerated products that included tobacco only temporarily curtailed tobacco shipments to New Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{71} The Court of Burgemasters and Schepens heard several actions in which a New England merchant admitted his obligation to deliver tobacco to New Amsterdam, but sought amendment to the terms of the agreement.\textsuperscript{72} With the complicity of New Netherland’s courts, in order to simultaneously fulfill their contractual obligations with a particular Dutch merchant and nominally comply with English law, New England merchants would carry tobacco from the Chesapeake to a New England port, or a Long Island port under English jurisdiction, and from there to New Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{73} For New England’s merchants, trading opportunities with the Dutch were worth the additional expense and time.  

Along with its commercial infrastructure, New Netherland had a legal infrastructure that reinforced commercial transactions, delivered speedy and impartial  

judgments, and sought to accommodate foreign merchants. Numerous cases from New Netherland’s legal records convey a sense of the porousness between the colonies regarding trade. For instance, Eduard Leake, an English merchant living in New Amsterdam, brought an action against Ritzert Airy in 1661 for the payment of monies owed when Airy hired Leake’s ship, Providence. The parties had entered into the original contract in Boston. The Burgomasters and Schepens denied Airy’s subsequent request to try the matter in New England. Leake also sought redress against Nicolas Boot, who had agreed to pay the freight on twenty to thirty hogsheads of tobacco from Virginia to New Amsterdam. Leake accompanied the ship to Virginia and back in 1662. After he disembarked from the ship in New Amsterdam, Boot decided to risk sailing to New England for the prospect of higher profits. Unfortunately, not only didBoot fail to sell the tobacco, but also the ship ran aground on its return from Boston and the tobacco was ruined.

In another example, Hatton Atkins, a Boston merchant, demanded delivery of tobacco and hides held by Jan Kulpeper. Kulpeper claimed Jan Foort of Boston shipped the goods to him. Atkins alleged that the case was more properly settled in Boston and offered security for what Foort owed Kulpeper. The court determined that Kulpeper could not establish that the tobacco and hides shipped to him by Foort actually belonged to him and ordered the tobacco and hides turned over to Atkins. As long as the court

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74 While the commercial and legal infrastructure was initially established to support the Dutch West India Company's fur trade, all trade was protected by the infrastructures brought over from the Dutch Republic.
could derive a legal nexus with New Netherland (that is, either one of the parties was resident in New Netherland or the good were located in the colony), it undertook to render an impartial decision on disputes as a commercial tribunal, that is, as an institution equipped with an understanding of the mercantile world.

Given the amount of trade that occurred between the colonies of different nations, how did colonies ensure that commercial and legal chaos did not ensue? Long before the issue of legal reciprocity, or comity, was formally recognized, the Dutch colony of New Netherland and the English colonies of New England acknowledged the need to accept and be bound by legal judgments made in another jurisdiction. To not do so would have jeopardized the trading networks and dependencies that had developed between the colonies. In 1649, New Haven’s Governor Eaton wrote to Governor-General Stuyvesant about a cow condemned by an English court and the dispute that arose between a resident of New Netherland and a resident of New Haven. While the dispute concerning the cow was of immediate concern, Eaton asked, “how justice may have a due course hereafter in these neighbour jurisdictions, without disturbance & offence, is of higher consideration then the vallew of the debt or price of the cowe.” The answer, of course, was through the acknowledgement of and respect accorded to each colony’s laws and judicial decisions.

Aside from contracts, one of the most common legal instruments that received the recognition of reciprocity was wills. Wills often provided direction to executors about the testator’s trading debts. As a result, executors would initiate suit in court to claim

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78 The seventeenth century Dutch jurist, Ulrich Huber, first proposed the principle of legal comity. Comity refers to legal reciprocity—the legal principle that one jurisdiction will extend certain courtesies to other nations (or other jurisdictions within the same nation), particularly by recognizing the validity and effect of their executive, legislative, and judicial acts. The term refers to the idea that courts should not act in a way that demeans the jurisdiction, laws, or judicial decisions of another jurisdiction. Part of the presumption of comity was reciprocity - that other jurisdictions will reciprocate the courtesy shown to them.
payment. Wills also provided direction to executors about the trading debts owed to an estate. For instance, Claes Cater, a resident of New Amsterdam, directed his executors to collect debts owed to him in New Haven and Milford. Despite geographical boundaries, executors would pursue monies owed an estate and sue if necessary either in New Amsterdam or in the colony where the other party was resident.79

Merchants conducting business in New Netherland also favored resolving disputes through arbitration. With the court’s approval, disputing parties chose senior members of the community, often merchants themselves, to act as arbitrators. When a commercial dispute involved non-Dutch residents, effort was made to include non-Dutch residents as arbitrators.80 As an example, in a long-standing matter between Cornelis Steenwyck and James Mills for payment of debt, Steenwyck demanded “that s’d Mills be ordered to chuse three men from the Virginias, also three men from New England, before whom he shall render due a/c [account] and explanation of his estate and effects.”81 The Burgomasters and Schepens granted the request. Whether the court granted the request out of fairness to the non-Dutch residents or because substantive procedural differences existed between the colonies in account keeping, in a colony populated with people of dissimilar nationalities, the court’s inclusiveness more likely bound the parties to any

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79 Hoadly, Records of the Colony and Plantation of New Haven form 1638 to 1649, 532; This type of comity or legal reciprocity occurred frequently between the New England colonies and New Netherland. Contracts made in one jurisdiction were recognized by the other jurisdiction. This speaks to the importance of trade between the colonies. Otherwise, without this recognition, all trade would have broken down.

80 April Lee Hatfield has observed, “The court attempted to chose arbitrators who included at least one countryman of any foreign seaman involved.” April Lee Hatfield, “Mariners, Merchants, and Colonists in Seventeenth-Century English America,” in Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas, eds., The Creation of the British Atlantic World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 154. The same held true for any trade disputes between parties from English and Dutch colonies.

ultimate resolution.

New England merchants were free to trade in New Netherland and with the West India Company, as long as they paid duties and sought any requisite permission. Nevertheless, they were not relieved of any financial obligations to private individuals or the West India Company if they left the colony. The Company engaged agents residing in English colonies to pursue debtors and, if necessary, initiate actions in court. So, too, did individual merchants. Cornelis Steenwyck trusted “his loving friend” Joseph Swett, a Boston mariner, to collect debts in tobacco owed to him by Samuel Smith, also of Boston. Dutch merchants were in trade to make a profit. As long as a means existed to receive payment on a debt owed, they would pursue such means.

The numerous legal actions and matters between residents of the different colonies obscure the question of how merchant-litigants communicated with each other given the language differences. Did litigants from outside New Netherland have confidence that such differences would not prohibit a fair decision? The key to communication lay with the notaries public. Certainly, in the Dutch Republic, some notaries were known for their abilities in a particular language. The bi-lingual or multi-lingual competence of notaries to translate declarations and testimony from English into Dutch carried over to New Netherland. Further, communication between merchants in

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various colonies, whether directly or through intermediaries such as translators, seems to have been common both to initiate trade and to resolve differences through arbitration or in court. Such imperceptible cross-cultural interactions between merchants shared Dutch commercial ideas and business practices with English colonial culture and were assimilated through the works of translators.

New England merchants entered a sophisticated trading world when they chose to trade with merchants from New Netherland. Lawsuits, arbitration, commercial documentation, and price courants were all part of daily life of New Netherland. Though political disputes existed between the governments of New Netherland and the English colonies of New England, such disputes little interfered with trade and the commercial networks that developed between merchants from New Netherland and New England. Through trade with New Netherland, New England engaged in more regional commerce. It tapped in to a well-established maritime commercial system.

*The Proximity of Trading Partners*

Despite boundary disputes with Connecticut, merchants in Connecticut found opportunities for trade with the Dutch and the records of Connecticut contain numerous references to commercial transactions involving the Dutch from New Netherland or the Dutch Republic. As well, Connecticut’s merchants looked for new plantation locations, in part, on locations best situated “on the coast for trade with the Indians and the Dutch.” Connecticut merchants created zones of trading opportunity along Long Island.

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85 In a rare instance in which the New Netherland government prohibited trade, the Director and Council passed an ordinance in 1642 prohibiting the purchase of produce raised near Fort Hope because of English usurpation of Dutch-claimed territory in the area. See O'Callaghan, *Laws and*
Sound.

Not to be outdone by their male counterparts, trade to Connecticut offered opportunities for New Netherland’s women. They, too, were not constrained by geographical boundaries of trade. Women in New Netherland engaged in inter-colonial trade to the New England colonies often involving complex multilateral trading networks. For instance, Maritie Jans Joncke, widow of Cornelis van Langevelde, had trading ventures in Connecticut. In childbed and ill with chickenpox in 1663, she declared an inventory of debt owed to her before the notary public, Walewyn van der Veen. She stated Jan Koopal, the younger, “living in Stamfort in New England” owed her for half a yacht valued at fifty pounds sterling “payable in New England value on which is paid a tub of butter of about 56 lbs., English weight, and 5 bushels of maize.” Nathaniel Mason, the miller, “at Narrewack [Norwich] in New England,” owed her twelve bushels of maize. Moreover, from her partnership with Albert Albertsen, she expected to receive a hogshead of prunes, bushels of maize, and butter, allocated in “Stamfort.”

While New Amsterdam’s merchants often plied the waters of Long Island Sound, merchants from Beverwijck ventured down the Hudson and into the Sound as well. The court records of an extraordinary session held at Fort Orange in 1658 tell of one such trading trip along the Connecticut River. We learn of the journey only because one

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86 Fernow, Minutes of the Orphan Masters Court of New Amsterdam, 2:34-6. Women’s trading activities in the Dutch Republic were well known to the English. Roger Coke noted in 1670, “The Dutch generally breed their youth of both Sexes in the Studies of Geometry and numbers, especially more than the English do.” These subjects being some of the foundational tools, in his opinion, for success in trade. See Roger Coke, A Discourse of Trade (London: Printed for H. Brome and R. Horne, 1670). Dutch society legally acknowledged women’s roles in trade. See, e.g., Danielle van den Heuvel, Women & Entrepreneurship: Female Traders in the Northern Netherlands, c. 1580-1815 (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2007). For a fuller examination of women’s trading activities and legal rights in New Netherland, see Martha Dickinson Shattuck, “A Civil Society: Court and Community in Beverwijck, New Netherland, 1652-1664” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 1993).
member of the journey sued another for defamation. Ida Claessen brought the action against Dirck Carstensen alleging that Carstensen called her a thief. The seven Beverwijck traders had traded beaver pelts and goods across the Sound and into the Connecticut River. The court found for Claessen. Given the Dutch attitude toward women in trade, the court had no difficulty with Claessen’s trading.87

The Bay Colony also sought to encourage foreign vessels to trade at Boston. Winthrop was a keen observer of the arrival of foreign ships laden with goods for trade. There was a particular need for subsistence commodities early in the colony’s existence. The Dutch accommodated this need. In 1631, a Dutch pinnace brought Virginian corn to Salem. A Dutch ship in 1632, again from Virginia, brought two thousand bushels of corn, “which was sold at four shillings sixpence the bushel.” In May 1633, a Dutch pink arrived in Boston that had been trading southward. A Dutch ship of one hundred and sixty tons arrived at Marblehead in May 1635 carrying 140 tons of salt and “ten thousand weight of tobacco.” The ship had come from St. Christopher Island, an English colony. In June of that year, two Dutch ships arrived with livestock. They carried “twenty-seven Flaners mares, at £34 a mare, and three horses; sixty-three heifers, at £12 the beast; and eight-eight sheep, at 50s. the sheep. They came from the Tessel [Texel] in five weeks three days, and lost not one beast or sheep.” Winthrop wrote in 1636 “Divers of the

87 Van Laer, Minutes of the Court of Fort Orange and Beverwyck, 2:146-8. Given the number of women trading in New Netherland and elsewhere, it is fair to say that the Dutch attitude toward trade was that good trade transcended gender. The Englishman Josiah Child wrote that one of the things that increased the wealth of the Northern Netherlands, was “the education of their Children, as well Daughters as Sons; all which, be they of never so great quality or estate, they always take care to bring up to write perfect good hands, and to have the full knowledge and use of Arithmetick and Merchant-Accounts.” Dutch children grew up to have “an ability for Commerce of all kinds.” According to Child, in the Netherlands, parents raised both sons and daughters to be able to run a business, even in the lower strata of society. Josiah Child, A new discourse of trade: wherein is recommended several weighty points relating to companies of merchants, etc. (London, 1693), 4. The processes of trading in the Dutch Republic were repeated in New Netherland, supported by the laws, and society’s acceptance that enabled women to engage in trade.
ships this spring, both out of the Downs and from Holland, came in five weeks.”

As time passed, the demand for subsistence commodities subsided and the Dutch brought commodities to satisfy consumer demands.

Trade between the Dutch and the New Haven colony both prospered because of proximity and suffered because of political disputes over territorial boundaries. Court records provide evidence of Dutch merchants who traded in the New Haven colony from its earliest days, as well as Dutchmen who settled there.

When Theophilus Eaton in 1638 purchased land from local Indians in order to settle what would become the New Haven colony, the Dutch protested that the settlers were “violators of the Rights of his Lords for being soe bould as to meddle att Newhaven within the Limitts of New Netherland.” The English argued that the Dutch had failed to people and plant the land and, therefore, did not have any claim to the land. Political disputes and geographical boundaries failed to deter Dutch traders from trading in New Haven. Trade saw a welcome reception from most New Haven residents and governmental figures. Certainly, some New Haven colonists had previous contact with the Dutch in patria.

The Dutch were early travelers to Rhode Island as well. After exploring Long Island Sound, the Housatonic River, and the Connecticut River in 1614, the Dutch

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88 Hosmer, ed., Winthrop’s Journal, 1:56 (Salem corn), 76 (Virginia ship with corn), 102 (Dutch pink), 151 (St. Christopher Island ship), 152 (livestock ship).
89 David Peterson de Vries wrote in 1639 about meeting the governor of the English fort at Fresh River [Connecticut River], Lion Gardiner, “who had had a Netherland wife from Worden, and he himself had formerly been an engineer and working-baas in Holland. De Vries, Voyages from Holland to America, 125. Some of the first settlers of New Haven had lived in the Dutch Republic as well.
90 The name “Rhode Island” is said to be derived from the Dutch “Roode Eylandt” or “Red Island” because of the color of its cliffs as noted by Adriaen Block. Others attribute the name to Giovanni da Verrazzano, the sixteenth century Italian explorer, who noted similarities to the Island of Rhodes. See, e.g., Capers Jones, The History and Future of Narragansett Bay (Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 2006), 81.
explorer Adriaen Block left the Sound and charted Block Island, which is named after him, and Narragansett Bay. Block’s activities in the Hudson River area and in Long Island Sound opened the areas to Dutch traders.\textsuperscript{91}

For the Dutch, the lucrative fur trade with the Narragansetts was the initial interest in trade in the region of what would become Rhode Island. The Dutch West India Company developed this trade prior to English settlement, supplying trading ornaments and firearms to the Indians. Despite protests by the Pilgrims in Plymouth, the Dutch traded at Manomet, at the head of Buzzard’s Bay. By 1636/7, the Dutch West India Company had gained title from the Narragansetts and established a trading post on Quotenis Island in Narragansett Bay. A Company employee, Abraham Pietersen, supervised operations there. Pietersen also obtained title to another island lying near the Pequot (later Thames) River. Even after English settlement, Rhode Island continued to be known as “Dutchman’s Island” or “Dutch Island.” The trading post of Dutchman’s island provided a ready catchment for trade with the Narragansetts, including European goods, cloths, implements, and liquors for the Indians’ furs. As well, it was a place for the Rhode Islanders to trade and obtain suitable trade goods for their own use and for their trade with the Narragansetts.\textsuperscript{92} By the mid-1650s, it was intolerable to English residents of Rhode Island to have the Dutch so close. A consortium of approximately one hundred buyers purchased Dutch Island and reserved it for common use. We can only

\textsuperscript{91} Simon Hart, \textit{The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company} (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959), 48-52.

\textsuperscript{92} Moloney, \textit{Traders of the Narragansett Country}, 40-2. The early years of the Dutch fur trade in Narragansett Bay saw annual returns of approximately £20,000. See also, Arnold, \textit{History of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations}, (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1859), 1:82; Brodhead, \textit{History of New York}, 1:268. Pietersen, also referred to as Abraham Pietersen van Deursen, had come to New Netherland from Haarlem. By 1638, he is referred to as the first miller in New Amsterdam and later serves on the colony’s council.
surmise about the extent of trade conducted at Dutchman’s Island as the transactional nature of the trade is lost to history and, typically, there are no surviving accounts for the trading post.

*The Strengthening of Trade: New England and the Dutch, c. 1640-1652*

**Developing Trade**

The notarial records in Amsterdam, as well as the Aspinwall Notarial Records from Boston, suggest that merchants in the Dutch Republic saw Boston as an important trading center. From pipes of wine from Madeira, to the consignment of furs and tobacco by an English merchant to a Dutch agent, or a Boston merchant to an English agent in the Dutch Republic, to an agreement regarding insurance on a voyage to Boston, to a ship’s charter contract for a trading voyage from Amsterdam to Boston, merchant correspondence, notarial records, and court cases demonstrate how merchants in Amsterdam ignored the Dutch West India Company’s monopoly in North America and merchants in Boston ignored the English Navigation Acts.93

As well, the Aspinwall Notarial Records are filled with insight into the trading networks that developed between Boston and New Netherland. From appointments as

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93 See SAA, Notarial no. 5075/2278 III, June 14, 1650, 56-8; SAA, Notarial no. 5075/1097, June 7, 1651, 162, 162v, 169; Aspinwall Notarial Records, August 1645, 16; SAA, Notarial no. 5075/900, September 2, 1651, 795; SAA, Notarial no. 5075/1539, June 13, 1658, 196. Notarial records were also a means to record amendments to agreements. See, e.g., Aspinwall, *Aspinwall Notarial Records*, October 6, 1649, 243 (Christopher Johnson [Christoffel Jensen], master of the *Orangetree* from Amsterdam, and a charter agreement to Virginia). For the period 1644 to 1652, William Aspinwall was the notary public for Boston. Aspinwall had immigrated to Massachusetts with the Winthrop Fleet. Although not a notary public, Thomas Lechford kept a letter book filled with commercial documents. For an instance of Boston merchants ignoring the Navigation Acts see Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., *Curacao Papers, 1640-1665* (Interlaken, N.Y.: Heart of the Lakes Pub., 1987), 167 (March 4, 1660, the ship *Den Bloesem* coming out of New England under Captain John Alen carried sugar, peas, cod, tobacco, salted meat, bacon which were all sold to the Dutch at Fort Amsterdam, Curacao.).
attorney to seeking recovery of debts owed to a deceased’s estate, to the
acknowledgement of debts owed by a New Netherland trader to Boston merchants, to
articles of agreement between a captain and a ship’s owner, the notarial records recorded
the most mundane of transactions to the transactions of a more complex nature.\footnote{Aspinwall, Aspinwall Notarial Records, April 3, 1646, 58 (appointment of attorney for deceased’s estate); June 13, 1646, 66 (acknowledgement of debt); July 28, 1647, 68 (ship’s articles of agreement).} Nevertheless, the key word is “record.” The parties recognized the need for some type of written memorialization that would serve not only as a reminder of the terms of the transaction, but if a dispute arose, the notarial record could be presented in a court of law as evidence. The notary typically drafted a document that set out the terms of agreement between the parties. The parties signed the document, had it witnessed, and the notary kept a copy in his register that became part of a colony’s public record. Some notarial records were in the form of testimony about an event or dispute.\footnote{While we may never know the true extent of commerce between Massachusetts and New Netherland (or, for that matter, between any other New England colony and New Netherland), the Aspinwall Notarial Records let us look at transactions closer to the point of origin, so to speak, rather than through the prism of a court record. One reason we may never know the full extent of commerce between the colonies is because so many of the transactions did not warrant seeking a notary or other documentation. If a transaction failed, a merchant’s reputation was locally impacted.}

Like New Amsterdam, Boston became a trading center attracting merchants from various colonies. It also had a commercial infrastructure that allowed merchants to acknowledge the terms of their agreements. For instance, in 1649, Jacob Haey of “Monhatoes in the New Netherlands” agreed to pay Edmund Leach of New Haven “the summe of foure hundd & fourty guilders in good merchantable bever in coate at six guilders the pound, or skin at four guilders the pound.” Adam Mott, also “of Manhatoes,” similarly acknowledged his indebtedness to Edmund Leach for 535 guilders under similar terms. In addition, Peter Anderson, alias Scoftepheger, acknowledged his
debt to Edmund Leach to be paid “at the Manhatas” for two pipes of wine. In this instance, the parties agreed more detailed payment terms that included “the summe of fyve hundd & fifty guilders to be paid in good merchantable Bevers at eight guilders the skin at or before the 15th day of May next, or also fyve hundd guilders for the said wine in pound bever, in skin bever at foure guilders the pound, or els in Coate bever at six guilders the pound.”

The notarial records also recognized the commercial links that tied Boston to New Amsterdam through currency pricing. Because of a lack of coinage, beaver became a standard form of currency used in transactions. Nevertheless, currency needed some form of regulation. Although there was no formal acknowledgement that New Amsterdam determined the value of beaver against a specified coinage, there does seem some tacit acknowledgement by other colonies.

Inter-colonial commercial transactions in the seventeenth century were conducted either in person or via correspondence. Yet, when it came time to collect for debts outstanding, merchants sought to ensure payment by appointing attorneys to collect their debts. Attorneys were often family members, friends, or business associates who the creditor could rely upon to fully advance a creditor’s interests. The creditor gave his attorney all the powers he held to collect the debt including bringing an action in court.

The notarial records in Boston have several instances of powers of attorney given to

96 Aspinwall, Aspinwall Notarial Records, August 19, 1649, 218 (Haey); September 15, 1649, 217 (Mott); July 24, 1649, 218 (Anderson).
97 In 1648, John Cromwell admitted his indebtedness to Jonathan Brewster according to “the price as comunly it goes at Manhatas” for “Bever mooskins & some deere skins.” The colony also passed a special act to regulate the currency of Dutch coin in 1643. The General Court noted “the oft occasions wee have of trading with the Hollanders at the Dutch plantation & otherwise, do therefore order, that the Hollander ducatour, worth 3 gilders, shalbee currant at 6s in all payments within our jurisdiction, & the rix dollar, being 2 ½ gilders, shalbee likewise currant at 5s, & the ryall of 8 shalbee also currant at 5s. Ibid., October 28, 1647, 154; Shurtleff, ed., Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 2:29.
collect debts in New Amsterdam for transactions between Boston merchants and Dutch merchants resident in New Netherland.\textsuperscript{98}

Fiscal policy also encouraged foreign vessels to trade at Boston. Parliament in 1642 removed any custom or duty for merchandise carried either inward or outward from England to New England. This would have encouraged English goods to be shipped in Dutch bottoms. By 1645, the colony collected a tax of 6d per ton on all foreign vessels who had sold merchandise, as well as a 10s fee for defence of the harbor (6s 8d for foreign ships under 200 tons). English ships paid no customs or impost, but only a fee for defence of the harbor. Political extingencies also dictated how open Boston’s port would be to foreign vessels.

Given the correspondence between Massachusetts and New Netherland, Massachusetts made provision for a Dutch translator. In 1660, the General Court formally recognized the efforts of Mr. Symon Lynde and “his redines from tyme to tyme to attend to the Court & serve them therein, as neede maybe.” The Court granted Lynde two hundred acres of land. But, importantly, administrators in Massachusetts recognized the advantages that would incur to local merchants in providing a Dutch translator.\textsuperscript{99}

As shipbuilding developed as a means of producing revenue for the colony, Dutch travelers availed themselves of the ship carpenters in Boston. During his second voyage to America, David Peterson de Vries asked New Netherland’s director-general, Wouter

\textsuperscript{98} Aspinwall, \textit{Aspinwall Notarial Records}, August 21, 1647, 67 (Thomas Broughton gives a power of attorney to William Paddy of New Plymouth); 1647, 68 (Adam Winthrop constitutes Isaac Allerton of New Haven his attorney); 1650, 250 (Thomas Broughton grants a power of attorney to Thomas Willet of Plymouth). See also Thomas Lechford, \textit{Note-Book Kept by Thomas Lechford, Esq., Lawyer, in Boston, Massachusetts from 1638-1641} (Cambridge: John Wilson & Sons, 1885), 60 (Peter Garland granted a power of attorney in 1638 to Isaac Allerton of New England to collect debts owed to him at the Dutch Plantation).

van Twiller, whether carpenters were available to repair De Vries’s ship. De Vries’s ship had sustained damage and he had been unable to repair it in the English Virginias. De Vries told Van Twiller that if carpenters were not available “I would sail to New England.” Whether because of labor or supply costs, Boston became financially attractive to facilitate ship repairs.100

In an effort to create industries that would generate revenue and to compensate for a loss of iron products from England, Massachusetts encouraged the discovery of mines and numerous residents invested in an ironworks at Saugus in 1646. The production and availability of iron products generated interest throughout the region. One resident of New Amsterdam, David Provoost, had twenty-five bars shipped from Boston in 1649. The iron bars were most probably sued for ballast in ships.101

The records of New Haven and New Netherland provide glimpses of merchants who evaded political and geographical disputes between the colonies to engage in trade. The disputes failed to interfere with, for example, the agreement made between Jan Harmensen of Manados (Manhattan) with Pieter Anthony “an inhabitant and trader here (New Netherland) to obtain from the New Haven, Conn., magistrates three pipes of brandy” and ship them to New Amsterdam in 1649. Nor did disagreement between the colonial ruling powers deter Richard Lord “living on the Connecticut River” from shipping a cargo of fresh pork for the Dutch West India Company in 1647. In exchange,

100 De Vries, Voyages from Holland, 109.
101 The ironworks at Saugus developed out of necessity. As fewer ships came to New England from England, iron products became scarcer and more expensive. John Winthrop, Jr., was at the forefront of developing the iron industry in Massachusetts. Along with encouraging investment legislation regarding mineral deposits, Winthrop also sailed to England seeking investors in his “Company of Undertakers of the Iron Works in New England.” For the legislation encouraging the discovery of mines, see Shurtleff, Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1:327. For Provoost’s purchase, see New York Historical Manuscripts, 3:116, 202-3.
Lord received salt – half of it to be delivered to Lord and the other half to Boston. Robert Martin brought suit in New Haven against Thomas Baxter of Manadoes for a debt of nine pounds, which Baxter was to pay in merchantable winter beaver. John Evanc, another inter-colonial trader, testified to giving Baxter notice of his debt.\(^\text{102}\)

The Dutch also provided ships to New Haven merchants. Peter Stuyvesant sold the West India Company ship, the *Swol*, in 1647 to Stephen Goodyear, deputy governor of New Haven, for nine thousand guilders to be paid in provisions and wampum.\(^\text{103}\) Dutch vessels were also available for hire regardless of nationality. One captain noted, “being at Stamford, he hired a Dutch vessel.” The ease with which merchants in the area were able to engage Dutch ships suggests a commonplace occurrence that was mutually beneficial to the parties.\(^\text{104}\)

In a unique series of letters between Governor-General Peter Stuyvesant and New Haven’s Governor Theophilus Eaton and Deputy Governor Stephen Goodyear, we learn about various trade concerns and practical transactions of commodities between the colonies. Despite occasional differences, the officials transacted trade between New Haven and New Netherland. In an undated letter, but around October 1647, Goodyear wrote to Stuyvesant “to send me 50 or 100 skipples of salte, and to fetch your beeffe and porke.” In return, Goodyear promised to send more wheat once men were found for thrashing. New Haven also provided opportunity for Stuyvesant to source cattle and other provisions for the colony and for Curacao. In a letter dated 1647, Goodyear explained that he was obliged to furnish cattle he had set aside for trade with Barbados to

\(^\text{103}\) Van Laer, ed., *New York Historical Manuscripts*, 4:140.
\(^\text{104}\) Hoadly, *Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May 1663 to the Union*, 334-6.
fulfill an agreement he had made with Stuyvesant. Perhaps the Dutch market offered a better price or more demand. Later in 1651/52, Goodyear wrote about Stuyvesant’s desire for some provisions “(and my owne desire being to settle a trade with you if I might upon a Just & equall way of dealing) If you please to write a few lynes of what you desire I hope I shall furnish you with such a quantity.”

Governor Eaton sought confirmation, and perhaps expressed some anxiety, about English traders’ ability to trade at Manhattan. He acknowledged “Wee know wee have as full libertie to trade with Dutch merchants within our harbors & to admit Dutch inhabitants into our plantacions as you the English.” In a subsequent letter, he stated “All in the English collonies may anchor where they themselves see good, in reference to theyre safetie and convenience, whence I conceive that in all respects they shall finde the Manhataes, both in theyre trade there, & in theyre passage to and froe, as open & free as the English harbours have hitherto bynne to the Dutch.” Stuyvesant’s reply attempted to relive Eaton’s anxieties. He asserted “although upon request I never denyde any of your countriemen libertie to anchor where they pleased after they shewne theyre obedience to the said order.” As a means to encourage trade, Stuyvesant informed Easton that he had suspended the ten percent duty previously demanded of English merchants wishing to trade in New Netherland.

It was a pressing issue for Easton and one that suggests how valuable trade with New Amsterdam had become for New Haven. To Stuyvesant’s letter regarding the

105 Hoadly, Records of the Colony and Plantation of New Haven from 1638 to 1649 (Hartford: Case, Tiffany and Company, 1857), 511-2, 517. Fernow, Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York, 14:158-9, 184. Goodyear offered pork and beef, and had already loaded malt and bran. He was awaiting wheat and peas to send along to Stuyvesant.

106 Stuyvesant tried to accommodate the concerns of English traders wishing to trade in New Netherland. While he had suspended the ten percent duty, it did not mean that English traders could ignore New Netherland’s laws and tariffs.
suspension of duties, Eaton asked “Wheather the English in there trading att the Manhataes, and in theyre passing by to and from Deleware, Virginia &c. may expect a full freedome from all recognition, imposition or charge, by what name soeuer called, both for goods imported and exported, or what duties, restraints or confiscations they must paye and submit unto, & upon what grownds, that the merchant seing his waye, may walke safelie.” Somewhat exasperated, Stuyvesant replied to Easton “Whereas yow write to me concerning your counriemens trading heere, and passing to and from Virginia and Delware, &c. I have alreadly written & graunted as much as I can or dare doe, untill I have further order from my souereignes and masters, and am not to be responsible to any but them, nor regulated by any but them.”

The correspondence demonstrates the unique position of both men. Each was charged with the administration of a colony and answerable to a government thousands of miles away. At the same time, each man was cognizant of his colony’s need for trade and the demands of merchants who he governed.

Rhode Island also saw advantages of trade with the Dutch. On September 19, 1642, the General Court meeting in Newport ordered the establishment of a regular trade with the Dutch in New Amsterdam. The General Court decreed, “the Governour and Deputie shall treat with the Governour of the Dutch to supply us with necessaries, and to take our commodities at such rates as may be suitable.” Rhode Island’s leaders felt compelled to open up trade with the Dutch for because of the outbreak of the English Civil War and the curtailing of commercial shipping to the colonies.

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Trade Disputes

Despite the trading relationships that developed between merchants in the New England colonies and their Dutch counterparts, disputes did arise. One dispute that carried through this period concerned the Dutch sale of guns and ammunition to Indians.

The earliest dispute arose with the colonists of Plymouth, who despite the Dutch provision of needed commodities, attempted to protect their trade with the Indians residing within their jurisdiction and prohibited the Dutch from engaging in trade with them. This protectionist attitude had only limited success. In the initial exchange with De Rasière, Bradford asked that the people of New Netherland “would forebear to trade with the natives in this bay, and river of Narragansett…which is (as it were) at our doors.”

A cause of vexation for Connecticut was the sale of firearms by the Dutch to Indians residing within the colony. As early as 1642, Connecticut prohibited the sale of firearms to Indians by any persons. This did not appear to have stopped prominent New Amsterdam merchant Govert Loockermans from engaging in trade with the Indians for such items. In May 1649, Loockermans failed to appear at a court in Hartford to answer charges of illegal trading and forfeited his substantial recognizance bond. Loockermans later appeared in court that September professing “his innocency in not selling any powder or shott to Indians, but onely the quantity of a pound w’ch hee once

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110 The prohibition arose because of a concern about Indian uprisings against European settlers. While the Dutch were often targeted as the perpetrators for the sale of firearms to local tribes in exchange for furs, this particular provision did not specify the Dutch or French, and, thus, applied to any sale of a firearm by any person, regardless of nationality, to Indians.
gave to a Sachem….”\textsuperscript{111}

Despite court proceedings against Loockermans, Dutch merchants continued to ply the waters of Long Island Sound to trade with the Indians. By 1649, Connecticut restricted all trade with the Indians, by specifically excluding “any Frenchman, Dutchman or person of any other forraigne nation, or any English living amongste them or under the government of them or any of them.” A General Court meeting in 1650 then prohibited for one year all trade by foreigners within Connecticut and by any Connecticut resident selling goods belonging to a foreigner. In 1651, Augustine Herriman (to the Dutch known as “Herman”), a Dutch merchant from New Amsterdam, forfeited both his vessel and goods in contravention of the law. Herriman had engaged in trading coats with Indians near Seabrooke (Saybrook).\textsuperscript{112} The pursuit of profit outweighed the risk of seizure. How many commercial ventures succeeded in trading with the Indians we will never know. It is certainly not something that a prudent merchant would have committed to correspondence or discussed beyond his most intimate of associates.

Like Connecticut, trade with the Indians by the French and Dutch became a point of contention for the Bay Colony. In 1650, the General Court prohibited any person of any foreign nation, or any Englishman living in a foreign nation, to trade with the


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 197, 207, 218-220. Augustine Herman had arrived in New Amsterdam in 1644. Believed to have been born in Prague in 1621, Herman acted initially as agent for the Amsterdam merchants Peter Gabry and Sons. Along with his trading activities, Herman held both leadership and diplomatic roles in New Netherland.
Indians. Should they be found guilty of trading with the Indians within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, they would have their goods and vessels confiscated.\textsuperscript{113} The records do not disclose any prosecution of a resident of New Netherland or the Dutch Republic for trading with the Indians.

Rhode Island enacted similar prohibitions about trade with the Indians by the Dutch. By 1647, the General Court imposed trading barriers on the Dutch and other European nations trading in Rhode Island. Merchants from such nations, including “any Englishman inhabiting among them,” had to pay customs and duties “as we doe among them.” The only imported commodity excluded from the legislation was beaver. Nor were merchants from such nations allowed to trade with the Indians within Rhode Island “upon paine of forfeiture of Shipp and Goods.” The order further decreed that a letter should be written to the Dutch governor conveying this information.\textsuperscript{114} While Rhode Islanders had established trade inland with the Indians for furs, the real intention of the act was to curtail the extensive coastal trading by the Dutch, which continued as late as 1647 with the Dutch occupation of Dutchman’s Island.\textsuperscript{115} Despite the prohibition on trading with Indians, Govert Loockermans faced accusations of trading powder and lead with Rhode Island Indians as well.\textsuperscript{116} For the Dutch, the acquisition of furs merited the

\textsuperscript{114} Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 153.
\textsuperscript{115} Moloney, 44-5. Dutchman’s Island provided a place where “the natives could lay in a supply of strong waters sufficient to keep an Indian village in an uproar,” as well as purchasing firearms despite efforts of Rhode Island to legislate against this.
\textsuperscript{116} Council Minutes of New Netherland, May 2, 1648. Govert Loockermans represented the Amsterdam merchant house of Seth and Gillis Verbrugge. Loockermans’s trading activities provided difficulties for another of New Netherland’s merchants trading in Rhode Island. Govert Aertsen faced threatened imprisonment in Rhode Island because of a case of mistaken identity with Loockermans. In 1648, Aertsen “requested a certificate of the honorable director general and council, to be shown to the magistrates in New England, that his name is Govert Aertsz and not Govert Loockmans.” The council granted a certificate of identity to Aertsen. Van Laer, \textit{New York Historical Manuscripts}, 4:519-20.
risk of forfeiture.

Dutch aggression in continued trading with the Indians prompted a further order from the General Court of Rhode Island in May 1652. In an order specifically directed at the Dutch, the Court legislated, “that all Dutchmen, except inhabitants amongst us, are prohibited to trade with the Indians in this Collonie.” Forfeiture of goods and vessels was the penalty to be imposed for any transgression. What differentiated this legislation from similar legislation in Connecticut and Massachusetts was the exclusion of Dutch inhabitants living in Rhode Island. Did they provide a vital link to New Netherland and trade goods there? Again, the “Dutch Governor of the Menadoes [Manhattan]” was to be given notice about the prohibition of trade with the Indians.

Aside from trade restrictions that arose in time of war and the constraints with respect to Indians, Plymouth and Massachusetts imposed general trade restrictions. Plymouth imposed trade restrictions because of its poor agricultural prospects. The General Court ordered in 1626 that no corn, beans, or peas could be sold out of the colony without the governor and assistants’ permission. In 1633, the Court declared that “no sheep be sold out of the colony, under penalty of forfeiting their due value.” This later expanded to include livestock. The colonial government’s attempt to regulate and control all aspects of the colony’s economy thereby inhibited economic growth. The Court had to acknowledge its disparity with regard to the other English colonies when in 1644/45 “a motion is made this Court for a genall trade w\textsuperscript{th} the other governments in confederacon w\textsuperscript{th} us, wee do thankfully acknowledge their love and respect to us therein; but we conceive such a disproportion in our estates to theirs, and so many thousands

117 Bartlett, Records of the Colony of Rhode Island, 243.
118 Ibid., 244.
required therein, the w\textsuperscript{ch} wee are not able to reach unto….\textsuperscript{119} The trade restrictions certainly curtailed the ordinary trade that the Dutch would have undertaken with Plymouth Colony.

While Massachusetts investors were building industries, the General Court there attempted to control many facets of the local economy, particularly during the 1630s. It ordered the rate to be paid for beaver, prohibited the purchase from any trading vessel of corn or any other provision or merchantable commodity without prior permission of the Governor or an Assistant, regulated the assignment of debts, and prohibited the removal of money or beaver from the colony without the Governor’s permission. The General Court also sought to prevent “the loss of time, and drunkenness…and the excessive prices of commodities” when merchant ships entered port to trade. It ordered the appointment of one person from each town to purchase for the entire community who would then sell his purchases within twenty days. Winthrop stated the measure was a failure.\textsuperscript{120} In essence, the colony wanted to control the free trade aspects of commercial behavior. Though, the regulations did not put off the Dutch from trade with Massachusetts.

Aside from trade disputes, of all the New England colonies, Connecticut had the most contentious relationship with the Dutch of New Netherland. Disputes between the colonies over geographical boundaries took place on Long Island’s north shore, the South River, and on the Connecticut River. The political dispute between Connecticut and New Netherland affected trade relations. The issue of the lucrative fur trade reached a climax in 1650. Prohibition of fur trade participation by the Dutch or French, prompted Stuyvesant to attend a conference in Hartford to meet the Commissioners of the United

Colonies and settle their differences. The Treaty of Hartford, which resulted from the conference, settled the boundary between New England and the Dutch territories, but did not concede the Dutch any trading privileges that had been prohibited in 1649.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{The First Anglo-Dutch War}

War is disruptive, even if it being fought thousands of miles away. Reaction to the First Anglo-Dutch War among the various colonies in North America was varied.

When news of the Anglo-Dutch war reached the shores of North America, the Massachusetts General Court issued orders prohibiting trade with the Dutch. Any person within Massachusetts was prohibited from “carrying provissions, as corne, beepe, pease, bread, or porke.” If convicted, the offender would pay treble the value of the traded items. A special warning was given to all ships and smaller vessels to comply with the order. They were required to give a caution, or bond, to the secretary to ensure compliance with the order. In the wake of legislation prohibiting trade with the Dutch, prosecutions were made and the government confiscated vessels and goods. In May 1654, Captain Jacobson was accused of trading with the Dutch and not giving caution to the secretary. Pursuant to the law, his bark was forfeited. Within three months after the conclusion of the war in 1654, the Court repealed the law prohibiting trade with the Dutch.\textsuperscript{122}

In New Haven, the Anglo-Dutch War brought about discussions by the New

England Confederation about whether to engage in war on New Netherland.\textsuperscript{123} The proposal disrupted trade and subjected New Haven merchants to scrutiny with regard to their own trading activities. Joshua Atwater, a merchant in New Haven, “was complained of for tradeing with the Duch jurisdiction.” Atwater confessed he had traded with another merchant at Hempsted [Long Island] for sugar, liquor, and candles. Others were reported, including Lieutenant Robert Seely and Sergeant Thomas Jeffery. Moreover, reports came in from outlying towns about Dutchmen who “knew our order had traded at Stamford.” Officials sought guidance from the court about how to proceed.\textsuperscript{124} Complaint was also made against Captain John Manning, who was accused of trading with “the Dutch at the Munnadoes this last winter.” Officials in Milford made the initial examinations in which Manning denied any trade with the Dutch. In a lengthy examination, Manning later admitted to the New Haven authorities that he had been to Manhattan to sell provisions to the Dutch and had carried tobacco from Virginia to Manhattan as well for them. He did so, he confessed to the court privately, as part of a plot devised in England and known to the Virginians to “make discovery at and of the Munnadoes, that he might take advantage to surprise it.” The court did not believe

\textsuperscript{123} Established in 1643, the New England Confederation was a political and military alliance of Massachusetts, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven. Rhode Island was excluded from membership. Despite discussions about war against New Netherland, and some preparation, Massachusetts declined to participate. Dexter, \textit{Ancient Records}, 1:181, 185. Town meetings at Stamford and Fairfield, voted to “raise volunteers to goe against the Duch.” What caused this aggression toward the Dutch in New Netherland, particularly given trading relationships, e.g., private traders, weekly markets in New Amsterdam? Hoadly, \textit{Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May 1653 to the Union}, 47-8.

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 200. Hoadly, \textit{Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May 1653 to the Union}, 43. Perhaps Seely had established Dutch contacts in an earlier incident. Seely, in 1651, was one of a group of approximately fifty men who sailed from New Haven Colony to the Delaware region to establish a colony. When Stuyvesant heard of the proposed peopling by New Haven colonists, he threatened to use force against any English who should invade Dutch territory. When Seely and the others landed at New Amsterdam, Stuyvesant had them arrested and only released them when they promised to abandon the undertaking. Concerning the Dutch trade at Stamford, the Court took a mitigating approach offering the parties the opportunity to “excuse or mitigate the offence” and apply to the court of magistrates for a hearing.
Manning and ordered the sale of his vessel.\textsuperscript{125}

Like other English colonies in this period, New Haven prohibited trade with the Dutch until 1653 until further notice.\textsuperscript{126} Stuyvesant expressed concern about the disruption in trade between the colonies and sought to maintain “that love & peace & friendlie Compliance” with his New Haven neighbors. The Court noted that there continued to be “free course at the Manhatoes to paye debts belonging to those in this jurisdiction” and agreed that “just debts” owed by New Haven residents in New Amsterdam could be paid so long as debts were paid to New Haven residents as well. Thus, both colonies attempted to secure payment for debts already incurred.\textsuperscript{127} By July 1654, with peace concluded between the Dutch Republic and England, New Haven repealed its laws and orders prohibiting trade with the Dutch.

While some trade existed between New Haven and the Dutch during the war, trading relationships between Rhode Island and the Dutch caused tension in the English colony. With news of England’s declaration of war against the Dutch Republic in July 1652, by October of 1652 the intolerance toward the Dutch trading in Rhode Island had worsened. The General Assembly ordered that “no forinner, Dutch, French, or of any other nation, shall bee received as a free inhabitant in any of the Townes of our Collonie, or to have any trade with the Indians,” except through general consent granted.\textsuperscript{128} Regardless of mounting tensions between the Dutch and English, Rhode Island courts

\textsuperscript{125} Hoadly, \textit{Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May 1653 to the Union}, 68-75.

\textsuperscript{126} The open-endedness of the prohibition is interesting. It suggested recognition of the latest geopolitical dispute between England and, in this case, the Dutch Republic, but that trade would be reinstated between the North American colonies once such differences elsewhere were resolved. In the end, that was exactly what occurred.

\textsuperscript{127} Fernow, \textit{Documents Relative to the Colonial History of New York}, 14:179-80; Hoadly, \textit{Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May 1653 to the Union}, 25.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., 245-6.
maintained impartiality in a dispute originating in Warwick. A Dutch vessel had arrived in January of 1652 on a trading voyage. The crew, including merchant Jan Gerardy, resided with John Warner, one of the magistrates of Warwick. Gerardy and Warner were related through marriage. They stored their trading goods at his house. A dispute arose after settling their accounts and the parties attempted to settle the dispute by arbitration. Gerardy appealed to the General Court and the Court held a special session. Warner defaulted in the matter and the jury assessed damages for Gerardy. As a result of Warner’s conduct in this matter, the General Court both degraded Warner from office and disfranchised him. Later charges of “insufferable treachery against the town” saw Warner’s house and lands attached. The court’s actions suggest the importance of maintaining unprejudiced judgment in actions involving trading relationships with other colonies.

Perhaps in response to the Battle of Dungeness in November 1652 and the disappointing news received about England’s efforts during the First Anglo-Dutch War, Rhode Island raised forts to defend itself against the Dutch. The Commissioners ordered in May 1653 “no provisions bee transported out of this Collonie for the supply of the Dutch, upon forfeiture of the double valew.” Further, “no man within the limits of this Collonie presume to take vessells or goods from the Dutch” without the express permission of the General Court. The citizens of Providence raised objections to the

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129 Arnold, History of the State of Rhode Island, 241. Warner and his family left Rhode Island for England shortly after this incident. Jan Gerardy had become a resident of Warwick prior to 1648, having previously lived in New Amsterdam with his family. An incident in 1652 involving Gerardy and others drew the wrath of Narragansett sachems and Roger Williams remarked that “the Dutchman’s goods and debts” were attached until he satisfied the Sachem’s charges. Nevertheless, Gerardy conducted substantial trade with both colonies.

130 The First Anglo-Dutch War was the first war to be fought entirely at sea, with no operations aimed at landing or supporting troops on shore. The war did not extend beyond European waters.
prohibition asserting they “knew not for what reasons” the trade was stopped.\textsuperscript{131}

The colony appeared divided in 1653 with respect to how to treat any potential threat from their Dutch neighbors and to defend Englishmen living on Long Island.\textsuperscript{132} The towns of Portsmouth and Newport granted commissions to certain persons to go against the Dutch to which the town of Providence and Warwick objected.\textsuperscript{133} While news of the war had not yet reached Rhode Island, the General Assembly in May 1654 examined Giles Glover about his trading activities with the Dutch in New Netherland. Glover admitted to traveling there twice. On the second occasion, he went with John Garioud who also traded there. The men “brought howes, gunnes and powder.”\textsuperscript{134} Garioud’s parents lived in New Amsterdam and Glover said “he traded with some that weare not his Father and Mother.” Robert Westkote, also of Rhode Island, was in New Amsterdam to purchase beavers and liquor, but Glover admitted that he did not know whether Westkote purchased the items, but he did know he purchased howes on Garioud’s account. Glover concluded his testimony by indicating that Garioud also

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[131] Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 261.
\item[132] The General Court authorized cannon, smaller arms, and twenty volunteers to aid the English, as well as appointing a Court of Admiralty for the trial of prizes. Arnold, \textit{History of the State of Rhode Island}, 246.
\item[133] On May 26, 1653, the towns of Portsmouth and Newport proposed “that we judge it to be our dutie to afford our countremen on Long Island, what helpe we can safely doe, by virtue of our comission from ye Right Honorable ye Councell of State, either for defendinge themselves against ye Dutch, ye enemies of ye Commonwealth, or for offendinge them as by us shall be thought necessarie.” Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 265-67. In early June 1653, the General Assembly [states] “notwithstandinge al our aforesayd endeavours to re-unite the sayd two Townes of Portsmouth and Newport unto us,...the inhabitants of the sayd two Townes have, as we are informed, in the name or by the authoritie of the Collonie of Providence Plantations, granted and given unto John Underhill, Edward Hull and William Dyre, a commission or commissions tending to war, which is like, for aught we see, to set all New England on fire, for the event of war is various and uncertaine; and although the honoured councill of State’s direction to us, videlicet, to offend the Dutch as we shall think necessary, yet we know not for what reason, or for what cause the sayd inhabitants of the Island have given forth the sayd commission....”Ibid., 270. The Assembly subsequently ordered “that those inhabitants of this Collonie that doe owne the Commission which wee heare is granted... in the name of Providence Plantations, shall have henceforth no liberty to act in Government untill they have given satisfaction to the respective Townes of Prividence and Warwicke.”Ibid., 271.
\item[134] A howe was a mattock or pickax.
\end{itemize}
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purchased some deer skins, some of which were from his mother.\footnote{Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 274.}

By September of 1654, news of the Treaty of Westminster\footnote{Signed on May 8, 1654, the treaty’s terms required the Dutch Republic to recognize England’s Navigation Acts requiring imports from England to be carried English ships. Roger Williams, President of Providence Colony wrote to the General Court of Massachusetts in 1654, voicing his displeasure at the waste and loss of life associated the war against the Dutch. See Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 294-295.} had reached North America, and the Dutch could once again openly trade with Rhode Island’s merchants. But not, it seems, were they, along with the French, allowed to trade with the Indians living within Rhode Island’s jurisdiction. That trade was reserved exclusively for Rhode Island merchants.\footnote{Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 279.} Rhode Island endeavored to prohibit the Dutch-Indian trade because of the concern the Dutch supplied guns to the Indians.\footnote{In a letter to the General Court of Massachusetts in 1656, Providence Plantations sought to purchase barrels of powder and artillery from Massachusetts merchants on an annual basis “considering our hazardous frontier situation to these barbarians [Indians], who, from their abundant supply of arms from the Dutch … are full of artillery, which hath rendered them exceedingly insolent, provoking and threatening…” Bartlett, \textit{Records of the Colony of Rhode Island}, 344.} A further act in 1657 by the General Court of Commissioners, reconfirmed the lifting of trade restrictions with the Dutch noting, “that the Dutch may have lawfull commerce with the English in this Collony, correspondent to the peace in beinge betweene the two nations.”\footnote{Ibid., 356.} Despite the cessation of hostilities between the nations, the General Court in 1658 disavowed any unsanctioned privateering done by individuals against the Dutch in Narragansett Bay. The General Court warned of “the bad effects that may ensue if such uncommissionated and idle worthles persons should putt such thinges in practice in this Collony…” and any persons seizing Dutch goods and vessels pretending commissions from Rhode Island would be charged with a felony.\footnote{Ibid., 389-90; Arnold, \textit{History of the State of Rhode Island}, 267.} The “bad effects” of which the General Court warned would be an interruption of trade with the Dutch, a trade vital to Rhode Island’s nascent
Obstacles and Continuity: Trade Between New England and the Dutch, c. 1655-1664

Trade between the New England colonies and the Dutch resumed after the war. Trading networks were reestablished and new ones were formed. The Second Anglo-Dutch War had even less impact on trading relationships in America between the Dutch and the New England colonies than the events of 1650.

Throughout the region, merchants weighed which market would be the best for their goods. For instance, in 1659, Richard van Rensselaer wrote to his brother, Jeremias, from Amsterdam. He had sent some guns over to Rensselaerswyck for his brother to sell and was seeking information about whether Jeremias had sold the guns. He wrote, “As to my guns, be pleased to sell them for what you can get for them and if you can find no purchaser, send them back at the first opportunity, as I understand from brother Jan Baptista that there is no demand there for such rare things, which I had not thought. If you had an opportunity to send them to [New] England by some acquaintance of yours, I believe that they would sell better there, as there are more people there.” For the Dutch in New Netherland and Amsterdam, Boston had become not only a commercial market for the sale of bulk commodities such as sugar and linen, but for the sale of “rare things” as well.\footnote{Van Rensselaer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 148.}

Jeremias van Rensselaer traveled to Boston and reported on conditions there in 1669. He wrote his mother about the demand for commodities and the lack of supply. He
remarked “As to letting you know any news, there is none, except, as I advised you in my last letter, that at present one can not get any return cargo for anything that is produced here in the colony. Last summer, as an experiment, I made a trip to Boston with three lasts of wheat, for which I got 17 stivers Holland money net per schepel; one can not get anything like that here. We have chartered a sloop to make another voyage thither in the spring with some grain and to exchange that for some goods which can be sold here for beavers.”

A shrewd merchant, Van Rensselaer, and others from New Netherland, would have taken advantage of the demand for basic commodities like wheat particularly if the cost of labor and transportation were so easily covered by the profit made from the sale.

There was a vibrant trade between New Netherland and Massachusetts. Despite concerns about a just price and price controls, there certainly was ambivalence, at least among Boston’s merchants, concerning government regulation of trade with foreign nations. New Netherland’s merchants would have bridled under regulations they would have considered unfair and unworkable. Boston’s merchants, instead, traded with the Dutch of New Netherland and the Dutch Republic.

And despite the difficulties that had arisen between Rhode Island and the Dutch during the war, trade with the Dutch resumed and New Amsterdam’s merchants included Rhode Island as part of their inter-colonial trading network that often began in Virginia with the purchasing of tobacco and concluded in New England or continued across the

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142 Van Rensselaer, *Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer*, 416 (dated 1669). Some explanation of the weights of measurement and monetary units as used by New Netherland’s merchants is warranted. A “last of wheat” was 82.512 bushels. A schepel was 0.764 bushel (wheat). A stuiver was 1/20 of a gulden. See A. J. F. van Laer, trans. and ed., *Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts* (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1909), 849, 847.
Atlantic to the Dutch Republic. Extant merchant correspondence for this period in North America is scarce. Nevertheless, the continuing anxiety about the Dutch is reflected in the correspondence of Peleg Sanford, a merchant in Newport. His letterbook provides an interesting individual reflection of both the need for Dutch trade and the animosity against an enemy in times of war. It is through his activities handling the family’s export business in Rhode Island that we see the dual persona of a merchant struggling with government policy and the often times contrasting pressure for commercial gain. Associated with the prosperous Hutchinson family, Peleg arranged for the export of livestock and provisions to the West Indies, which his brothers exchanged for sugar and cotton. In London, ships carrying the sugar and cotton were then sold for credit with London merchants. Although correspondence contained in his letter book occurs after the English takeover of New Netherland in 1666, it offers reflection of one English colonial merchant’s attitude about the Dutch in this period.

In June 1666, Sanford wrote to one of his brothers both with concern about perceived impending danger and with instructions in how to continue conducting business. “Brothr Henry Beare is not yeet arived which causes great Feares of his welfare if it please god that he arives in Safty: yo may Exspect to have him Returne unto yo wth horses: Jno Beare is discoradged in Respect of the dangerfulnes of the times and So fare as I Cann understand intends to lay up his vessell Brothr I would desiere in Respects of the dangr tht now is: that yo would Send me Sume thing in Every vessell that is Bound for this place: but not much in one vessell: we are in dayly Exspectation of the

143 Records of New Amsterdam from 1653-1674, Vol. 4, 198.
144 Sanford, Letterbook of Peleg Sanford. Peleg participated in Rhode Island politics sitting on the governor’s council, serving as governor, and [serving] as a member of the Andros council.
Enimy…”¹⁴⁵ The enemy Sanford referred to was the Dutch. Yet again, mercantilist issues had become an important part of the political agenda in both the Dutch Republic and England. The outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War in 1664, after years of increasing tensions, had important consequences for merchants like Sanford.¹⁴⁶ The Dutch were both trading partners and rivals to English merchants in North American markets. While the naval confrontations that took place between the nations in the North Sea are well known, the war had an impact on North American trade.

By late 1666, Sanford was happy to take advantage of a “duch Sloope” trading in Newport to correspond with a business associate.¹⁴⁷ Despite the war between nations, commercial necessity prevailed and the “enemy” provided useful opportunity to correspond with his trading network elsewhere in New England.

Conclusion

How do we interpret the previously underestimated trading activities between the New England colonies and the Dutch? The activities challenge traditional assumptions

¹⁴⁵ Sanford, Letterbook of Peleg Sanford, June 27 1666, p. 10
¹⁴⁷ Sanford wrote: “but this/operty/happily presenting it Self: I have with Joye Imbraced it.” Sanford, Letterbook of Peleg Sanford, December 7, 1666, p. 17.
about the seventeenth century that each colony within England’s imperial bounds operated as a largely self-contained entity that interacted with other colonies only indirectly. Rather, a regional economy tied the New England colonies to New Netherland and the Dutch Republic. For the New England colonies, such ties significantly influenced their individual commercial development. As well, the New England colonies developed trading networks outside of traditional English trading networks through their trade with merchants in the Dutch Republic.

Trading networks are only as good as how individual merchants are treated in foreign nations. New Netherland welcomed foreign merchants into both the trading community and the overall society. Like Amsterdam, New Amsterdam welcomed diasporas of merchants. Administrators knew that in order for the colony to thrive, it would require peopling it with traders who would bring revenue to the colony and continue to create a center of trade.

The New England colonies often reflected the suspicions early modern people tended to have of merchants, particularly foreign merchants. The English colonies of New England had to undergo a transformation with respect to how they viewed trade and how they viewed foreigners. For some colonies, commerce was an unpleasant vocation. The fact that it was practiced by foreigners added to the suspicion. Nevertheless, when settling in New England, and the harsh realities of economic survival became apparent particularly with the lack of basic foodstuffs, societies slowly underwent transformations. That is what happened between the New England colonies and New Netherland and the merchants that traded between them. They were agents of change, particularly in the New England colonies. Despite the political conflicts overseas and its appearance in the
New World, in the end, trade won out and each of the colonies accepted its importance to their survival.

As well, the Dutch provided needed capital infrastructure the English sought in order to finance their trading endeavors throughout the region. Merchants in the Dutch Republic and in New Netherland were part of the world’s greatest trading nation. As a consequence, the Dutch could offer New England’s merchants access to greater markets both regionally and in Europe via Amsterdam.

Although the First Anglo-Dutch War provided political and economic challenges to trading relationships between New England merchants and Dutch merchants, both in New Netherland and in the Dutch Republic, commerce continued. Despite suspension or the threat of suspension of trade by New England colonies with foreign merchants, trade continued or resumed shortly after the war’s conclusion. To their credit, colonial leaders in New England never lost sight of the importance to their respective economies of the commercial arrangements with the Dutch. So, despite disputes over geographical boundaries, retributive and inconsistent tariffs and duties, and controversial sales of guns to Indians by Dutch merchants, trade continued.

Finally, although the Dutch lost their political presence on the North American mainland after the English takeover of New Netherland in 1664, Dutch merchants remained a substantial trading partner for English colonial merchants throughout New England. Dutch merchants provided commodities that New England consumers wanted and offered favorable trade for New England’s raw materials and other commodities. Merchants in New England and from the Dutch Republic or of Dutch ancestry in New York ignored political boundaries and conducted business as if they had no country.
Chapter 2

“Men work there as in Holland; one trades, upwards, southwards and northwards”148.
Trade Networks between New Netherland and the Dutch Republic, 1624 to 1664

Isaac Allerton was no stranger to New Netherland and its staple port of New Amsterdam. He had traded there while living in New England since at least 1630.149 But what must he have felt when he once again needed to turn to the Dutch for sanctuary? As noted in Chapter 1, Allerton had left England as early as 1609 and joined Pastor John Robinson and his congregation who sought refuge in Leiden. Like many English Separatists living in Leiden at the time, he joined the group on the Mayflower to leave behind the difficult life they faced in the Dutch Republic.

Despite Allerton’s contributions to the fledgling Plymouth colony, disputes arose between Allerton and Governor William Bradford about numerous commercial ventures Allerton had undertaken both individually and on behalf of the colony. Bradford accused Allerton of “playing his own game and [running] a course not only to the great wrong and detriment of the Plantation who employed and trusted him, but abused them in England….”150 Bradford wrote with great passion about the wrongs committed by Allerton. A man of reticence, Bradford’s life revolved around his church and the

149 In a letter dated December 8, 1630, Massachusetts Bay leader Emmanuel Downing wrote: “if yt be trew that Mr. Allerton’s reports of Hudson’s river, there is noe place comparable to yt for a plantaçon, and t’will quit cost for you to remove thither, though all be lost in the place where you are, for he sayth that Hudsons river goes into Canada and those 2 make New England an Iland...” See William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647, W.C. Ford, editor (Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1912), II: 63-4, edit. fn.
leadership of Plymouth Plantation. As a devout Christian, Bradford viewed Allerton and his commercial activities with suspicion. When later writing about Allerton, Bradford quoted 1 Timothy:

‘They that will be rich fall into many temptations and snares,’ etc., ‘and pierce themselves through with many sorrows,’ etc.; ‘for the love of money is the root of all evil,’...God give him to see the evil in his failings, that he may find mercy by repentance, for the wrongs he hath done to any and this poor Plantation in special. They that do such things do not only bring themselves into snares and sorrows, but many with them, though in another kind, as lamentable experience shows, and is too manifest in this business. 151

Bradford and Allerton were on a personal and public collision course. One man’s views were protective and insular; the other man’s views embraced risk and looked beyond boundaries. Bradford was not the only colonial leader who had adverse sensitivities to Allerton’s commercial practices. Edward Winslow complained bitterly about Allerton’s growing commercial networks outside Plymouth and linked them to his untrustworthiness, claiming that anyone who dealt with Allerton was destined to be deceived. In 1637, after Allerton had settled in New Amsterdam, Winslow wrote to John Winthrop in Boston: “But were he as well knowned to yours as us, they would rather have kept him heer then any way have incouraged his going over: but what I write I would not have made publick; but the truth is he loveth neither you nor us.” 152

When the time came for Allerton to leave Plymouth Colony and his recently founded cod-fishing endeavors in Marblehead, Massachusetts, it seemed to come without

151 Ibid, 239-40. See also Cynthia J. Van Zandt, Brothers among Nations: The Pursuit of Intercultural Alliances in Early America, 1580-1660 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 87-101. Van Zandt pays close attention to the tensions between Bradford and Allerton concerning their respective attitudes toward colonization, trade, and inter-cultural contact.
interruption to his cumulative trading activities.\textsuperscript{153} It is uncertain whether he was able to make plans ahead of time or whether he arrived in New Netherland ready to begin anew and subsequently concluded outstanding business arrangements in Plymouth Colony and Marblehead from the Dutch colony. Nevertheless, Allerton was like hundreds of Dutch and foreign merchants who saw New Netherland as a place of opportunity with commercial infrastructure in place to facilitate and encourage trade.\textsuperscript{154}

The rise of New Netherland as an early American commercial center did not occur without several false steps. Yet, when various administrative misjudgments were rectified, New Netherland, and its staple port, New Amsterdam, established the foundation for subsequent commercial activities in early America.

The first part of this chapter examines the evolving historical context of Dutch trade in New Netherland. The Dutch attempted various institutional models to stimulate and sustain trade to and within in New Netherland. Each had varying degrees of success. Subsequent to Hudson’s discovery of the region in his failure to find a passage to India, reports of abundant furs provided temptation to Dutch merchants. As early as 1611, Amsterdam merchants assembled plans to sail to the region and engage in trade. Merchants such as Arnout Vogels had early successes with profitable trading voyages. However, trade in the region by Dutch merchants became volatile in the competition for furs from Indians. Soon, groups of merchants formed companies in an effort to regulate

\textsuperscript{153} On May 6, 1635, the Massachusetts Bay General Court noted that “Mr. Ollerton hath given to Moses Maveracke, his son-in-law, all his houses, buildings, & stages, that he hath at Marble head, to enjoy to him & his heirs forever.” See \textit{Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, 1628-1686}, ed. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, (Boston: W. White, 1853) 1:147.

themselves without interference by the States General. They did seek, however, exclusive trading privileges within set boundaries. Aside from furs, little else attracted the attention of Dutch merchants, as the English not yet established themselves economically in North America. The establishment of trading posts allowed lesser merchants, not formally associated with Dutch trading companies, to undertake trading ventures to New Netherland.

The second portion of this chapter considers the formation of the Dutch West India Company modeled after the highly successful Dutch East India Company. Understanding the vast wealth available in New Netherland, the Company sought to secure its monopoly and only allowed private trade with the Company’s consent. This was not a successful model for achieving profits for shareholders. As well, private merchants from the Dutch Republic were hesitant to seek permission to trade in New Netherland. From the private merchants’ perspective, the most lucrative aspect of trade to New Netherland, the fur trade, was secured by the West India Company.

The third section of this chapter surveys the patroonship model proposed by the Company in 1628 as a means of encouraging settlement in the colony and to protect the existing resources contained within the colony for the benefit of the Dutch Republic. As with other colonial and economic models, this model, too, had difficulties. There were few merchants interested in the proposed model of 1628 and the plan underwent modification in 1629. The new plan allowed for private trade with New England and Virginia. The most prominent and successful merchant who subscribed to the new plan was Killian van Rensselaer.

Finally, the fourth division of this chapter discusses the free trade period of New
Netherland’s history from approximately 1640 onwards and the opposition to free trade. Ex-company employees were recruited as agents for Amsterdam merchant houses. A renewed interest of trade developed from patria. Soon, New Amsterdam became a port that merchants from Amsterdam called upon when trading to the Caribbean or the Chesapeake. The renewed interest encouraged lesser merchants from the Dutch Republic to reassess their interest of trading to New Netherland and to take portions of cargo holds in which to ship merchandise in return for the lucrative furs of the New World. Although the free trade policy originated with the States General, it soon met opposition from many within New Netherland, including the Governor General Peter Stuyvesant.

In essence, the Dutch Republic and the Dutch West India Company attempted to impose economic models for trade in New Netherland without a substantial administrative infrastructure to oversee the Republic’s interest in the collection of taxes. Once the Republic and directors of the Dutch West India Company agreed to jettison unsustainable colonial models and revert to free trade, the colony became the commercial entrepôt for early America.

**Beyond Hudson’s Discovery – Commercial Beginnings**

Approximately twenty-five years before Allerton arrived in New Amsterdam to establish his residence, Henry Hudson approached the Dutch about a northern passage to the East and he received a welcoming reception for his proposal. While the Dutch had successfully challenged the Portuguese domination of the trade routes through the Straits of Magellan and around the Cape of Good Hope, the routes were still fraught with peril. If a northern route to the East did indeed exist, so the directors of the Dutch East India
Company reasoned, they should be the ones to control it. To this end, the States General in the Dutch Republic offered a prize of twenty-five thousand guilders to the explorer who discovered the way.

Money more than pride had driven the Dutch to seek the passage. For fifty years a nasty and bloody war against the domination of the Spanish and the Catholic Church had burned up the resources of the seven northern provinces (Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Groningen, Friesland, and Overijssel), but now both sides were deep in deliberations that resulted in the Twelve Years’ Truce. The coming peace would give the merchants of the Dutch East India Company the opportunity to make money; Henry Hudson’s plan to find a northern passage would give them a chance to make it faster.

Henry Hudson’s fabled voyage in 1609 on behalf of the Dutch East India Company to find an easterly passage to Asia resulted in the discovery of the river that bears his name. It is likely that he first believed he had discovered the elusive passage to India. Hudson happened upon the river by chance – ice blocked the designated route around Norway the directors of the Company had instructed Hudson to follow. Instead, Hudson sailed westward, something the directors had forbidden him to do, to find a passage through North America.

The record of his journey up the river sets Hudson apart from others who preceded him. His trip gained fame from three chroniclers: Emanuel van Meteren of Amsterdam, who had been in England when Hudson arrived from America, published a brief account in 1610, in the last edition of his History of Nederlanders. An officer on the voyage, Robert Juet, published a day-by-day account of the exploration of the river probably no later than the spring of 1610. Finally, Johannes de Laet included portions of
Hudson’s own journal in his *New World, or Description of Dutch West-India*, published in 1625.\(^{155}\) To the directors of the Dutch East India Company, and to other Amsterdam merchants forever watchful for new investment opportunities, Hudson’s failure to find a passage to the East suggested, nevertheless, the discovery of a new land, abundant in “good skin and furs…. to be got at a very low price.”\(^{156}\)

Armed with the inevitable rumors surrounding Hudson’s voyage, various published accounts, and capital to invest, enterprising Dutch merchants sought to explore what opportunities existed in the New World, particularly if the supply of beaver there could supplement the diminishing sources for pelttries in Europe. While the directors of the Dutch East India Company reacted with measured action toward Hudson’s voyage, various Amsterdam merchants initiated steps for voyages to undertake trade as early as 1611. For example, Arnout Vogels chartered the *St. Pieter* in partnership with the Pelgrom brothers, Leonard and Francoys. In the charter contract filed before an Amsterdam notary the ship’s destination was listed simply as Terra Nova.\(^{157}\) On board were victuals for a seventeen-month voyage, but it is only Vogel’s prominent participation in numerous later voyages to New Netherland that suggests the 1611 voyage of the *St. Pieter* was the first trading expedition to the area of Hudson’s discovery.

In 1612, Vogels sent the *Fortuyn* twice to New Netherland. The 1612 expedition had been a financial success for him and his partners. In a letter written by Francoys Pelgrom shortly after the *Fortuyn’s* return to Amsterdam, Vogel’s chief partner informed

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\(^{156}\) *Van Meteren, On Hudson's Voyage*, 7

\(^{157}\) Stadsarchief Amsterdam (hereinafter cited as SAA), Notarial no. 125/64v-65v.
his wife that their investment had paid off. He wrote, “Further, dearest love, I cannot help telling you in this letter about the successful arrival of our ship under master Adriaen Block and our nephew Jan Kin for which God be praised. Both are in good health and made a good voyage, yes, a better voyage even than last year.”\footnote{158}

Vogels’s ship had encountered another Dutch vessel on the river, the Jonge Tobias, captained by Thijs Volckertsz Mossel.\footnote{159} The competition between various merchant groups not only generated civil suits back in Amsterdam, but also alerted other merchants to the profitability of trade in New Netherland. Amsterdam’s merchants were not foolish; they recognized that the volatile trade during 1613-14 threatened investments in trading goods, ships, and lives.\footnote{160} Most importantly, violence between competing syndicates on the Hudson threatened future profits.

\footnote{158} SAA, Notarial no. 373 (Letterbook of Francoys Pelgroms Geerartsen, merchant at Amsterdam). Pelgrom wrote his wife the next month “…Further, dearest love, I could only find an opportunity to send you this short letter, for which I can hardly find any time, because I am so hard at work sending Adriaen Block out again to the same place from where he returned. We shall now send two ships thither and obtained a charter, so that no one but us is allowed to sail there. Will you please keep this a secret so that no one will know and hear about it…” Ibid. Aside from Arnout Vogels, Pelgrom’s other partners included Leonard, Paulus, and Steffen Pelgrom, Hans Hunger, and Lambert van Tweenhuysen. This group of merchants is referred to as the “Van Tweenhuysen Syndicate.”

\footnote{159} SAA, Notarial no. 197/614v-615. Members of the syndicate financing Mossel’s voyage included Hans Claesz., Barent Sweers, Arnout van Liebergen, Wessel Schenck, Jan Holscher, and Jacob Bontenos. This group is referred to as the “Hans Claesz. Company.” See, SAA, Notarial no. 37/511-512v; SAA, Notarial no. 38/468v-470; SAA, Notarial no. 39/257, 258, 414, 416; SAA, Notarial no. 456/394-394v; SAA, Notarial no. 431/152, 153. The declarations of members of Block’s and Mossel’s crews told of the confrontation between competing trading vessels while on the river of New Virginia (i.e., the Hudson River). Mossel and his supercargo were accused of trying “to spoil the trade” of Block. “They made Block suspicious partly because they gave or supplied twice as many goods of the same quality and quantity for a heavier as Block gave before they arrived there…” As well, Jan Rodrigues, “a mulatto born in St. Domingo,” who was a member of Mossel’s crew, stayed ashore with trading goods he had received as payment of wages. Mossel and his supercargo declared the Spaniard had run away from the ship without their permission. They also testified that Block’s crew ought to have killed him. See SAA, Notarial no. 197/614v-615.

\footnote{160} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 198/99-101v (regarding the Ortrust); SAA, Notarial no. 611/45 (regarding De Nachttegael); SAA, Notarial no. 137/130-130v (regarding the Fortuyn); SAA, Notarial no. 198/269v (regarding De Nachttegael). For a general discussion about this period and early commercial activity in New Netherland, see Simon Hart, The Prehistory of the New Netherland Company (Amsterdam: City of Amsterdam Press, 1959), 22-33; Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 33-44.
Fearing trading disputes would draw the attention of the States General and restrict private commercial activity, and because the competing syndicates failed to come to an agreement with each other, a group of merchants decided to form the New Netherland Company. On October 11, 1614, four syndicates of merchants successfully petitioned the States General for a charter of trading privileges.\footnote{The syndicates comprising the New Netherland Company were: the Van Tweenhuysen Company, the Hans Claesz Company, Witsen’s Company, and a company from Hoorn.} Wisely setting aside most of their differences to maximize profits, the group of predominately Amsterdam merchants was given the right to trade without restriction to North America between the 40\textsuperscript{th} and 45\textsuperscript{th} parallels for a period of three years commencing January 1, 1615.\footnote{The 40\textsuperscript{th} parallel north corresponds to the present day city of Philadelphia and the 45\textsuperscript{th} parallel north corresponds to the present day border between the Canadian province of Quebec and U.S. states of New York and Vermont. The location was chosen to avoid confrontation with the English further south.} Many of the founders of the company were leading Amsterdam merchants including Gerrit Jacobz Witsen, Jonas Witsen, Simon Morissen, Hans Hongers, Paulus Pelgrom, Lambrecht van Tweenhuysen, Arnolt van Lybergen, Wessel Schenck, Hans Claessen, and Berent Sweertssen. Additionally, some leading merchants from Hoorn, a prosperous trading port in North Holland, became founders, including Peter Clementsen Brouwer, John Clementsen Kies, and Cornelis Volckertsen.\footnote{Simon van Brakel, \textit{De Hollandsche Handelscompagnieën der Zeventiende Eeuw} (‘s-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1908), 29-31.}

The company was moderately successful. It organized the fur trade through annual spring voyages, a total of four in all, and erected a few trading posts in the area. But its exclusive focus was on the fur trade with Native Americans and their trading requirements. Aside from the fisheries area off the coast of Newfoundland, there were no other commodities, or trading partners, available to the Dutch in North America – the
English had yet to establish viable ventures that attracted the Dutch. Over the next five years, this would change.

When the grant to the New Netherland Company expired in 1618, despite a request by company directors to extend the trading license, Dutch merchants continued to engage in the fur trade in the region. Discussions for the formation of a state-sponsored Dutch West India Company were well advanced. The directors of the New Netherland Company made only a half-hearted effort to continue their operations. Between 1618 and 1621, the company sponsored annual voyages, which included modest exploration of the coastline, but gave up any effort to exploit the region by establishing permanent trading posts. While trading voyages made profits, the lure of profits in the East through investment in the Dutch East India Company and the ever-dependable Baltic trade siphoned off substantial investment capital by merchants. This allowed other

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164 The Schilpad, whose voyage was organized by a group of merchants separate from the New Netherland Company, sailed to North America in 1618. Merchants from this syndicate sought permission of the States General and Prince Maurice, before undertaking the voyage. The captain and crew of De Swarte Beer, a New Netherland Company vessel, were advised not to interfere with the trade conducted by the Schilpad. See SAA, Notarial no. 154/176v, 177, 177v. Not all trading endeavors were successful. The voyage of De Witte Duyf in 1620 portrayed the risks associated with inter-cultural trade and lack of effective communication. Members of the crew testified as to the danger of trade with Native Americans with "bad intentions." SAA, Notarial no. 200/625-626v. See also, SAA, Notarial no. 463/493-495v.

165 Lambert van Tweenhuysen, Paulus and Steven Pelgrums, and Aert Vogels, equipped De Swarte Beer to sail to New Netherland in 1619. Of interest is the investment of a widow, Lourens Boudens, in the voyage. See SAA, Notarial no. 159/127-128. De Swarte Beer was attacked by Native Americans while off of Manhattan (“in de rivere van Virginia genaemt Rio de Montagne”) and few aboard survived. Some weeks later, a Dutch vessel arrived to trade in the area and, somewhat in hospitably, used De Swarte Beer for its own trading venture. For the ensuing litigation see SAA, Notarial no. 645/36v-37; SAA, Notarial no. 645/21-21v; SAA, Notarial no. 691/29v-30v. The captain’s widow, Marritgen Wouters, later sought compensation for her husband’s missing personal effects. In 1620, the company sought naval protection from the Dutch government to bring settlers from Leiden and England to New Netherland with free transport and provide each family with cattle and other economic support. The Stad General denied the request. The English Pilgrims turned elsewhere for transport. See William Bradford, History of Plymouth Plantation, 1620-1647 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912).1:99.

166 See, e.g., Mijla van Tielhof. The ‘Mother of all Trades’: The Baltic Grain Trade in Amsterdam from the Late Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Oscar Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse kooplieden en de opkomst van de Amsterdamse stapalmarkt, 1578-1630 (Hilversum:
merchants, not associated with the syndicates forming the company, to enter the trade as the once dominant company broke up into ad hoc partnerships and informal cartels.\footnote{167}

\textit{The Dutch West India Company}

The moderate success of the New Netherland Company did not fail to attract the attention of the States General. The States General, in 1621, drew up a charter for a West India Company (“WIC”), granting it a monopoly of all the Dutch Atlantic trade with West Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, and North America. Modeled on the phenomenal success of the Dutch East India Company (“VOC”) established in 1602, the States General declared that the welfare and happiness of the country depended mainly upon foreign trade and navigation and, for a period of twenty-four years, such interests could be properly encouraged only by the strength and unified character of a general incorporated company.\footnote{168} As a joint-stock venture, both government finance and private investment contributed to a capitalization of more than seven million guilders. Like its East Indian counterpart, the shareholders who met in five regional chambers – Amsterdam, Middleburg, Rotterdam, Enkhuizen, and Groningen, managed it. A board of directors, the Heren Negentien (Heren XIX), governed the Company’s affairs, responsible only to the States General. Representation on the Council reflected both

\footnote{167} For instance, the Van Tweenhuysen group of merchants in 1620 sought to prohibit any trade by other Amsterdam merchants in areas contiguous to the New Netherland Company's former patent. See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 164/72v-73v. Trading disputes were submitted to arbitration in Amsterdam. See SAA, Notarial no. 691/28.

\footnote{168} For a copy of the Charter of the West India Company, amplifications to the charter, and agreements between the directors and major participants in the Company through 1623, see A.J.F. van Laer, trans. and ed., \textit{Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts} (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), 86-135.
regional capital investment in the Company and the predominance of merchants within geographical areas. So, for instance, eight council members came from the Chamber at Amsterdam, four from Zealand, two from the Maeze, two from North Holland, and two from Friesland and Groningen. One delegate represented the States General.169

Private trade could not occur in any of the enumerated geographical regions – West Africa, Brazil, the Caribbean, North America - including New Netherland, except in the Company’s name or by its consent. To engage in trade without the Company’s permission subjected both a ship and cargo to forfeiture to the Company.170 When the Company finally closed share subscriptions and began operations in 1623, directors and shareholders anticipated healthy dividends. For the first five years, the Company obtained substantial profits from its monopoly of the Dutch trade on the African coast and from the plunder its captains seized from Spanish treasure ships. As well, the takeover of existing property and commercial enterprises in the Atlantic region was significant for the Company, but the chief objective was expansion of the Dutch presence in the South Atlantic. Mismanagement soon placed it in a precarious financial condition, and by the 1640’s it was bankrupt.171 Over the course of its existence, the Company provided New Netherland with little more than token assistance.


171 Den Heijer, De Geschiedenis van de WIC, 83 (“In de jaren 1624-1625 werd naar schatting 100.000 gulden aan kolonisatie uitgegeven, een bedrag dat niet door de opbrengsten van de bonthandel kon worden gedekt.” - In the years 1624-1625, it was estimated that 100,000 guilders had been spent on colonization [in New Netherland], an amount that the proceeds of the fur trade could not cover.)
Private merchants in the Dutch Republic seemed hesitant to trade in New Netherland throughout the 1620’s. Whether the process of receiving consent from the Company seemed too burdensome, or the commercial and personal risks associated with trade to New Netherland appeared too great, or the opportunity for profits elsewhere enticed merchants to invest their capital there, merchants did not engage in trade to New Netherland in significant numbers. Additionally, the Company regulated the most lucrative aspect of trade in New Netherland, the fur trade. Merchants from patria who purchased furs from Native Americans, or from residents in New Netherland, had to sell the furs to the Company at stipulated prices. This, of course, minimized profits for merchants. It is unclear what enforcement mechanisms were used to compel compliance with Company regulations. Reports of conspicuous smuggling reached Amsterdam.

Rising costs associated with the New Netherland colony, a collapsing share price for Company stock, and misadventures by the Company elsewhere in the Atlantic opened

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172 From 1620 through 1629, I was able to confirm in the Stadsarchief Amsterdam a total of four voyages from the Dutch Republic to New Netherland by private merchant ventures. For the same period, six private merchant ventures sailed from New Netherland to the Dutch Republic. Voyages undertaken by the WIC during the same period included nineteen ships from the Dutch Republic to New Netherland and eighteen from New Netherland to the Dutch Republic. See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 200/625-626v (voyage of De Witte Duyf); SAA, Notarial no. 1580/1114 (voyage of De Purmerlanderkerk); SAA, Notarial no. 291/15v (voyage of Den Samuel); SAA, Notarial no. 631/80, 159 (voyage of De Coninck David); SAA, Notarial no. 742/13-15 (voyage of De Witte Paert); SAA, Notarial no. 256/182v (voyage of De Roode Duyf); SAA, Notarial no. 226/63v-64v (voyages of De Griifoen, Het Zwarte Paard, and Het Schap); SAA, Notarial no. 652/11v (voyage of De Ruijter); SAA, Notarial no. 469/567 (voyage of ’t Wapen van Amsterdam); SAA, Notarial no. 767/172 (voyage of De Eendracht); SAA, Notarial no. 443/16 (voyage of De Naerden).

173 Isaac de Rasière, secretary to the colony’s council, found in 1626 that it was not easy to make the colonists sell the pelts to him, especially as they had other options. For instance, Ondercommisses Gerrit Fongersz. offered the colonists a higher price than De Rasière was prepared to pay on behalf of the Company. Fongersz. planned to ship the beavers to the Dutch Republic for his own account, a plan that De Rasière opposed. The extent to which employees of the WIC and colonists were permitted to take beaver pelts back to the Dutch Republic is not completely clear. It is probable that, as with the Dutch East India Company, a limited amount of private trading was accepted. Many participants in the fur trade may not have sought the Company's permission. F.C. Wieder, De Stichting van New York in juli 1625: Reconstructies en nieuwe gegevens ontleend aan de Van Rappard documenten (Zutphen, The Netherlands: Walburg Pers, 2009), 114, 130, 167, 171-2.

174 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 758/210 ("een partij vellen voor de som van F. 300.". A quantity of beaver pelts worth 300 guldens was smuggled aboard ship in a sailor's chest.)
the Heren XIX to criticism about the Company’s colonial policy. Recognizing the problems associated with the administrative and commercial framework of the colony, the merchants from the Amsterdam Chamber proposed alternatives.

The Patroons and Trade

The Company soon discovered the expenses associated with establishing and expanding a new colony were considerable. In order to increase their profit margin the Company sought to find means to share the risk of colonization. The first attempt at partnerships was the patroonship plan, first conceived in 1628 as a way to attract more settlers without increasing Company expenses.175 Under the plan, a patroon would be granted a large tract of land and given the rights to the land as well as legal rights to settle all non-capital cases, quite similar to a manorial lord. In return, the patroon would agree to bring over settlers and colonize the land without reimbursement by the Company for such expenses. No merchant accepted a patroonship under such conditions because the lucrative fur and fishing trades were left as a monopoly of the Company.

One of the most prominent Amsterdam merchants and a principal shareholder in the Dutch West India Company, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, had the plan modified.176 He argued, along with a number of associates, that the Company’s shortsighted policy of restrictive trade negatively impacted any hope for New Netherland’s success. They

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175 This plan was entitled “Freedoms and Exemptions for the Patroons and Masters or Private Persons who would plant a colony and cattle in New Netherland.” Algemeen Rijksarchief Aanwinsten: Kopie van de Vrijheden en Exemptieen voor maart 10, 1628, Jaarboek Register voor 1895.
176 Van Rensselaer had traded to New Netherland as early as 1625. See SAA, Notarial no. 652/11v (naming Van Rensselaer, Cors Bicker, Samuel Godijn, and Gommer Sprangers as charterers of the ship De Ruijter).
complained that Company management had not allowed reasonable profits to private traders. Their opponents argued that generous incentives for private trade had already been given. In the revised plan issued on June 7, 1629, the terms were much more favorable to Van Rensselaer’s faction: colonization requirements were less stringent, the allocation of land to the patroons was larger and there were broad jurisdictional rights over the colonists. Additionally, private traders were allowed to trade with New England and Virginia and, most importantly, they were allowed to engage in both the fur trade, subject to a company tax of one guilder per pelt, and in the fish trade.177

In 1630, with the more favorable terms in place, Kiliaen van Rensselaer, Samuel Godijn, Samuel Blommaert, Michael Pauw, and Albert Burgh all filed claims for patroonships in various sites around New Netherland. Van Rensselaer became patroon to the largest and most lucrative fur trading area in New Netherland, that is, the area along the Hudson River near Fort Orange (present day Albany), which he named the colony of Rensselaerswyck. The other patroons experienced less success and relinquished their holdings by 1636.178

After taking on the patroonship of Rensselaerswyck, Van Rensselaer also took part in several New Netherland trading ventures. Kiliaen remained in Amsterdam using local New Netherland merchants as his agents and conducting joint ventures with the


178 Burgh, Blommaert, and Pauw either abandoned or sold back their holdings to the Company. Godijn entered into a partnership with David de Vries. Their tract was on the Delaware River and named the Zwaanendael Colony. Efforts to establish a settlement there met with tragedy when Indians attacked in 1631, leaving no survivors among the Walloon refugees brought to settle the colony. Godijn and his partners accepted an offer by the Company to repurchase the patroonship. See Charles McKew Parr, The Voyages of David de Vries, Navigator and Adventurer (New York: Crowell, 1969), 109-30.
Verbrugge and de Wolff families.\textsuperscript{179} As well, the other current and former patroons took advantage of opportunities presented to them to establish trading networks to New Netherland. While primarily focused on the fur trade, they also traded for other commodities.\textsuperscript{180}

Nevertheless, the patroonship conformation did not create a free trade system. Limitations still existed on commodities, particularly the fur trade, and on private shipping. By 1638, the States General recognized that the colony of New Netherland would be lost to the encroaching English unless the Company undertook drastic reform measures. The Amsterdam Chamber developed a set of “Articles and Conditions” to encourage population growth and a broader economic foundation. The States General rejected the reform measures arguing that the measures were too cautious. Revising the plan in 1639, the Amsterdam Chamber expanded colonists’ trade privileges to encompass a virtual free trade in all commodities. The fur trade would be opened to all citizens of the Dutch Republic, not just residents of New Netherland. Private shipping would be permitted to and from the colony, provided a Company supercargo was on board.\textsuperscript{181} The States General approved the revisions and the Company issued a revised set of Freedoms

\textsuperscript{179} Although the directors of the Company had given permission for Company ships to be used to transport settlers and trade goods to the patroonships, the conflict of 1629 between competing factions of the Amsterdam Chamber had not been forgotten and few Company ships made the journey to New Netherland. As a consequence, Van Rensselaer became even more reliant on chartering ships or purchasing a controlling interest in a ship including: 1636 (Rensselaerswijk); 1638 (Wapen van Noorwegen); 1639 (Aker); 1640 (Wapen van Leeuwarden); 1641 (Aker); 1641 (Witte Valck); 1641 (Koning David); 1642 (Koning David); 1643 (Wapen van Rensselaerswijk). See, e.g., Van Laer, Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts, 355, 405, 580, 602; Rink, Holland on the Hudson, 198.

\textsuperscript{180} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 1534/173; SAA, Notarial no. 2279III/74-75; SAA, Notarial no. 1820/270.

\textsuperscript{181} A supercargo was a representative of the ship’s owner(s) or merchants who had contracted for space aboard a ship. The supercargo was responsible for overseeing the cargo and its sale upon arrival at its destination.
Finally, after over fifteen years of commercial missteps, the opportunity existed to develop and expand trading networks and connect New Netherland as a radius to the greater Amsterdam commercial center.

**Free Trade – Commercial Networks with the Dutch Republic**

Merchants from the Dutch Republic chose to trade with New Netherland neither because of any patriotic ties nor because of any particular fiscal inducements by the government or Company. They chose to trade there with the hope of making money.

Contemporary chronicles noted an entrepreneurial spirit among the colonists of New Netherland. In an account of his 1643 visit, Father Isaac Jogues observed, “Trade is free to all; this gives the Indians all things cheap, each of the Hollanders outbidding his neighbor, and being satisfied provided he can gain some little profit.” Given what actions the Heren XIX had undertaken in 1638 with the passage of the Articles and Conditions and in 1640 with the passage of the Freedoms and Exemptions, Jogue’s comments may have reflected a renewal of commercial interest.

Ex-Company employees were first to take advantage of the elimination of the Company’s monopoly. They began to act as agents for large Dutch merchant firms and also to trade on their own. Former employees such as Govert Loockermans and

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182 See O’Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 1:105 (Summons to the various chambers about ways to improve named colonies); 1:106-7 (report on the condition of New Netherland); 1:110-4 (proposed articles for the colonization and trade of New Netherland); 1:115 (States General rejecting proposed improvements); 1:119-23 (proposed freedoms and exemptions for New Netherland – 1640).

Augustine Heermans are prominent examples. Loockermans was a WIC employee from 1633-1639 who became the local agent for the powerful Verbrugge family in Amsterdam. Heermans first came to New Netherland in 1633 as a Company surveyor in the Delaware region. In 1643, he moved to New Amsterdam, where he acted as an agent for the Dutch firm of Gabry and Company and also worked for himself in the fur and tobacco trade. Other WIC employees such as Oloff Stevenson van Cortlandt, who had come over in 1637 as a WIC soldier, rose within the Company. He was awarded the job of commissary, supervising the arrival and storage of provisions. In this position he made numerous business contacts and joined in various trading ventures with partners in New Netherland and the Dutch Republic. Another early independent merchant was Arnoldus van Hardenburg, from an Amsterdam merchant family, who came over to make his fortune. Some English colonists who also took advantage of the new trading

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184 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 1341/25v; SAA, Notarial no. 1346/20-20v; SAA, Notarial no. 1113/22; SAA, Notarial no. 1359/83; SAA, Notarial no. 1363/73v-74. See also, Hugo Rau, "Govert Loockermans, een Turnhoutenaar in Amsterdam, Nieuw-Amsterdam en New York (1617-1671)." Taxandria, NR 62 (1990): 5-12. The correspondence between Loockermans and the Verbrugge family illustrates the demand for information between merchants and their factors and the frustrating aspects of early modern transatlantic trade. Loockermans's employer reprimanded him because he failed to include sufficient information about the trade he was engaged in on their behalf: "In your honor's letter your honor writes us one-and-half page full of news, such as [the journey of] our little ship to the north [New England] and further about the situation of the land, which is unnecessary as we learn that sufficiently orally from the captain and the passengers, but the trade, that really concerns us….Your honor will please realize that it is not like France or other places, to which mail carriers go every week, but it will take a whole year before we get further tidings, which time will hang very heavy on our hands." New York Historical Society, Stuyvesant-Rutherford Papers, 3-2 (1648).

185 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 1946/16; SAA, Notarial no. 1946/22; SAA, Notarial no. 1619/2050; SAA, Notarial no. 1686B/2089; SAA, Notarial no. 993/12; SAA, Notarial no. 1817/973; SAA, 2278V/30-31; SAA, Notarial no. 1819/245; SAA, Notarial no. 1819/385.

186 See, e.g., A.J.F. van Laer, trans. and ed., Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 1651-1674 (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1932), 48, 50, 154, 166, 253, 276, 292, 293, 303, 370, 383, 397. Van Cortlandt's daughter, Maria, married Jeremias van Rensselaer, son of the patroon Kiliaen van Rensselaer, joining each family through marriage and establishing commercial ties with each other. See also, Jacob Judd, ed., The Van Cortlandt Family Papers (Tarrytown, NY: Sleepy Hollow Restorations, Inc., 1976), 1-5.

privileges included Isaac Allerton, Thomas Willet of Plymouth (who often worked with Allerton), and Thomas Hall.

Dutch trading firms and individual merchants engaged in trade from patria to New Netherland with renewed interest. Along with Kiliaen van Rensselaer, major firms that traded to New Netherland included Gilles and Seth Verbrugge, Dirck and Abel de Wolff, and Gillis van Hoornbeeck.\textsuperscript{188}

Gilles Verbrugge and his son Seth participated in at least 27 voyages to New Netherland and at least 14 to Virginia, and additionally co-sponsored voyages in partnership with English merchants who had dual citizenship in Virginia and New Netherland.\textsuperscript{189}

Dirck de Wolff was twice elected as a member of the board of directors for the Broker's Guild in Amsterdam and became supervisor of grain prices, setting the daily rates for wheat and rye as well as overseeing imports and exports. Dirck and his son Abel joined with Gerit Jansz Cuyper to trade in New Netherland. Cuyper had married Abel's sister Geertruyd and had previously worked in New Netherland for the Verbrugge family. Cuyper and his wife moved to New Amsterdam, shipping furs, lumber and tobacco to Abel, who sold the products in Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{188} Oliver Rink argued that these four firms worked together to control most of the profits from the New Netherland trade. While he acknowledged that other Dutch merchants entered the market, particularly when there was no threat of war, he maintained that none kept up the sustained business of the other firms. While I do not disagree with Rink about the volume of trade engaged in by the four firms, I would suggest that because Rink did not look at Dutch trade throughout the North American region, he did not have a comprehensive conceptualization of the extent of activity by a broader segment of Dutch merchants.

\textsuperscript{189} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 1346/20-21; SAA, Notarial no. 1355/42-43; SAA, Notarial no. 2196/470-471; SAA, Notarial no. 2138/231.

\textsuperscript{190} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 2189/624; SAA, Notarial no. 1300/46v; SAA, Notarial no. 1443A/63; SAA, Notarial no. 1306/162v; SAA, Notarial no. 2614/167; SAA, Notarial no. 2459/79; SAA, Notarial
Up to 1651, Dutch merchants could trade with New England and Virginia as well as New Netherland. Once the British instituted the Navigation Acts of 1651, however, non-English ships were no longer allowed to transport goods to or from English ports. That forced the Verbrugge family to rely on English intermediaries for their Virginia trade, which they chose to cease in 1656. The Verbrugge family owned their boats and therefore suffered financial losses due to the Navigation Acts. In 1662, they sold off most of their New Netherland assets, including land, warehouse space, and ships. The de Wolff family had rented ship space rather than own their own ships and therefore were not as affected by the acts. Also, they had a more diversified operation with profits from the trading of Baltic grain, French wine, and African slaves. The family continued to operate in America until about the mid 1670’s, when they abandoned the market entirely for the more profitable slave trade, although Dirck de Wolff’s son-in-law, Gerit Cuyper, continued to trade in America until his death in 1679.

The fourth major Dutch merchant family predominant in the New Netherland trade was the firm of Gillis van Hoornbeeck. Van Hoornbeeck entered the market late, first trading in New Netherland in 1656. He had worked closely with the Verbrugge family and was their largest creditor. In fact, he served as the executor of the Verbrugge estate when Gilles and Seth both died in 1663. Van Hoornbeeck stepped in as the Verbrugges were leaving their New Netherland commercial ventures. During the ten-year period from 1656-1666 his firm was second only to the Van Rensselears’ in volume of

no. 1364/60; SAA, 1603Z/29v (A sampling of notarial documents exhibiting, for example, assurance on various trading voyages, payment terms for a loan, sailing directions for a ship’s captain and supercargo).
Van Hoornbeeck continued to trade in America during the English period, but found it prohibitively expensive. Rather than abandon the area, he continued trading as a client of various English merchants. When Gillis van Hoornbeeck died in 1688 his family liquidated their American holdings and concentrated on the slave trade supplying Africans to Dutch Suriname. 

Unlike New England, the individuals largely responsible for exploiting New Netherland's resources were merchants of the home country. Secure in their Amsterdam counting houses, the merchants grasped control of the colony's lifeline to Holland and held fast. Profits from their enterprises flowed into coffers in Amsterdam. Not only larger, more established merchants engaged in trade with New Netherland. Numerous smaller Dutch merchants took advantage of the opportunity to trade in the Americas and many found their starting point with trade to New Netherland.

In 1656, Talckjen, maid to Jeremias van Rensselaer’s mother, Anna van Rensselaer, sent Jeremias, from the Dutch Republic, six silver spoons valued at thirty guilders and a pair of silk stockings worth ten guilders. Nicolaes van Rensselaer, Jeremias’s brother, had convinced Talckjen that her chances of making a profit in New Netherland were good, and she invested in this consignment not only her savings, but also some borrowed capital. Six months later, Jeremias answered his mother’s queries...

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191 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 15576/1251; SAA, Notarial no. 1119/209; SAA, Notarial no. 1595/424; SAA, Notarial no. 2859/228; SAA, Notarial no. 2858/504; SAA, Notarial no. 1124/271v; SAA, Notarial no. 1125/93-93v; SAA, Notarial no. 2860/200. Various transactions regarding trade to New Netherland evidenced before the notary including a dispute regarding a voyage, an assurance, a contract for trade, a receipt of a bill payable and its terms, multiple directions to a captain regarding trade to New Netherland, and a declaration by a captain about damage to his ship during a hurricane on a voyage undertaken for Van Hoornbeeck.

about the goods that he thought the silver spoons would yield a beaver each, and he had already received a bid of sixty guilders about which he was still negotiating. In the meantime, the silk stockings had been sold for twenty guilders. A couple of weeks later, he shipped to patria five and a half beavers for the spoons and two and a half beavers for the silk stockings. He wrote his mother that the beavers were a partial advance, as the silver spoons had still not been sold. In the meantime, the proceeds from the stockings turned out to be an insufficient return on Talckjen’s investment. Anna van Rensselaer reported to him in 1658 that Talckjen made a loss of one guilder on them; and the advance for the spoons was too high. Jeremias could not sell them for any more than five beavers, and ultimately decided to keep them himself at that price.193

While Talckjen was not a merchant, her experience is representative of the opportunities Dutch merchants foresaw in New Netherland. Capital was available for borrowing, goods were available for purchase, and opportunities existed, however tenuous, to tap into existing trading networks to New Netherland. New Netherland’s markets represented both a hope and reality for lesser merchants in the Dutch Republic who, prior to the opening of trade in New Netherland to private traders, could neither afford to invest in the Dutch West India Company nor partner with merchant houses with extensive capitalization who neither required nor wanted additional partners. As shipping increased to New Netherland, lesser merchants could purchase space in a cargo hold at reduced costs than previously and could disperse consignments of trading goods amongst different ships. Talckjen’s dream of riches was not to be achieved and instead she

193 Van Laer, Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 1651-1674, 36, 52, 57, 90, 201, 168. Jeremia’s brother, Jan Baptist, later wrote in 1659, “The goods sent to you by brother Nicolaes belong to [our] servant girl. That rascal (dien bengel) has made the maid believe a good deal, so that she has borrowed some money for that purpose on which interest must be paid. This for your information.” Ibid., 201.
experienced disappointment that her goods brought little profit. Dutch law and culture allowed her to enter the market, but market forces of supply and demand still applied.

Take for instance, Jan Hendriksz Sijbingh who traveled to New Netherland from Amsterdam to trade in the late 1640’s and early 1650’s. Sijbingh arrived in Beverwijck as a tailor, purchased a house in Fort Orange with Gerrit Jansz Cuyper, and sold the cloth, duffels, and blankets he had taken along with him from patria. Returning to Amsterdam permanently, Sijbingh established a wholesaler’s business in cloth, De Gulden Fortuyn, which primarily served the New Netherland market. He most likely obtained his duffels, popular in trade with Native Americans, from the textile centers of Kampen and Leiden. Along with trading directly to New Netherland, Sijbingh supplied the merchant houses of the Verbrugges and the De Wolffs with cloth goods. As Sijbingh’s experience with the New Netherland trade developed and he accumulated his own capital, in 1660 he entered into business with Pieter Hartgers, Stoffel Jansz Abeel, and his brother, Jacob Sijbingh. Their agreement specified a limited term for the partnership’s existence – two years – after which the partnership would be dissolved and the profits distributed to each partner. Trade to New Netherland was successful for the partnership, as it was not extinguished until 1668. Overseeing the partnership’s trading interests in New Netherland was Abeel, who traveled with the partnership’s goods and conducted trade on behalf of his partners.194

The Sijbingh partnership also provides a glimpse of further involvement by women in the trade with New Netherland. Abeel’s wife, Neeltie, seemed to know much

194 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial no. 2459/121-122; SAA, Notarial no. 1369/78; SAA, Notarial no. 2787/776-777. Abeel and his wife Neeltie immigrated to New Netherland in 1660 and, thus, could directly oversee trade for the partnership as well as correspond with partners in Amsterdam about the commodities that could receive a good price at any particular time.
about textiles, as she was sometimes asked to appraise the value of clothes. While Neeltie did not become a partner with her husband and his associates in this venture, she was, nevertheless, involved in the trade and most likely traded on her own account.

For merchants with less capital, or commitment to New Netherland, opportunism and commercial reality drove trade decisions. The Varlet family demonstrates the trans-Atlantic nature of this period. Caspar Varlet was born in Cologne in 1593 and later moved to Utrecht. There, he married and began his textile business. Along with textiles, he ventured into supplying cannon fuses to the Dutch government. In 1625, Varlet moved his textile factory, along with his family and employees, to Amsterdam.

Caspar and his brother, Daniel, ventured into the Virginia tobacco trade. In 1636, for instance, the brothers had provided 1200 guilders for a tenth part ownership stake in the vessel *Rensselaerswyck* bound for New Netherland and Virginia. In 1639, the brothers had invested in cargo to be sold in New Netherland aboard *de Wapen van Leeuwarden*. The opportunity to own a significant area of land and to produce commodities for sale within and outside of the colony of New Netherland must have been attractive to Caspar. He and his wife, Judith Tentenier, immigrated to New Netherland late in 1650 and eventually lived in Hartford, on the eastern most border of New Netherland. And, while, Caspar and his wife remained in New Netherland until their deaths sometime in the early 1660’s, some of their children stayed in Amsterdam, engaged in trade, and provided a center from which the family’s Atlantic activities could be based. Caspar’s son, Abraham, continued the trade his father and uncles had begun to

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196 SAA, Notarial no. 1500/13-17; SAA, Notarial no. 1500/26-27; SAA, Notarial no. 1555/1059; SAA, Notarial no. 1500/35.
Brazil. The Dutch in 1630 had decided to invade several sugar producing cities in Brazil, including Salvador and Natal. From 1630 to 1654, they took control of Recife and Olinda, making Recife the new capital of Dutch Brazil, the city of Mauritsstad. The Varlets had traded to Brazil as early as 1635 and by 1638, with the implementation of free trade in Brazil (and the other regions claimed by the Dutch West India Company), trade flourished.\footnote{See Wim Klooster, \textit{Illicit Riches: Dutch Trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795} (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998), 18, 22, 24; SAA, Notarial no. 412/248-248vo.} The family continued to trade for sugar in Brazil until 1650.\footnote{SAA, Notarial no. 1947/513-517.}

When trade in Brazil no longer proved profitable or safe for Dutch merchants, the Varlet family continued to trade to New Netherland, but also found additional avenues for trade with Curaçao and the Baltic region.

\textit{Free Trade – Colonial Opposition}

While the States General and the Heren XIX developed policies and mandates for trade in New Netherland, the administration and merchants in New Netherland reacted accordingly. As the colony developed, particularly after Peter Stuyvesant assumed the director-generalship in 1647, the colony’s administration became more vocal in opposition to certain policies and in creating policies relevant to the colony.

The West India Company’s opposition to price controls arose as a result of the conviction that a new colony owned by a bankrupt company could prosper only when the inhabitants were given the widest possible latitude in economic affairs. The Company was not able to make a profit from New Netherland in the years immediately after the colony’s establishment, and the directors were convinced that this situation would continue until some way was found to make the colony more attractive to settlers. As a
result of such considerations, in 1639 the fur trade with the Indians, which had been previously reserved to the Company, was thrown free and open to everybody.\textsuperscript{199} When traders who took advantage of this policy sought to evade the payment of taxes to the Company, the Director General and Council adopted an ordinance that provided for the inspection of books and stores of merchants suspected of smuggling. But the Amsterdam chamber of the Company stated that the ordinance was “directly contrary to the course of Free Trade, which provisionally is granted by this Chamber to all Traders, for the reason that this Chamber is as yet unable to retain the trade to itself, but must content itself with the Duty, for the present, until more favorable circumstances.”\textsuperscript{200}

The authorities in Amsterdam and in New Amsterdam were never able to work out a mutually satisfactory plan for the organization of the colonial economy. Officials in \textit{patria} were repeatedly compelled to remind their subordinates in America that interference with individual enterprise should always be kept at a minimum. If merchants viewed New Netherland as a restrictive trading environment, then trade would decline and tax revenues, payable to the Dutch government, would decrease. When Stuyvesant announced that he intended to restrain traders who went “several miles into the interior to meet the savages bringing down peltries and thus run up the price of the goods,” his superiors in the Netherlands replied that “it has been and still is the usual argument in our Department, that the trade should be open to everybody,” and that any interference by the Director General would result in “only a new form of restricted trade.”\textsuperscript{201} On another occasion, when the Director General and Council imposed an “internal duty of four

\textsuperscript{200} O’Callaghan, \textit{Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland}, 68.
\textsuperscript{201} O’Callaghan, \textit{New York Colonial Documents}, 14: 84.
stivers...in addition to the 8 per cent [export duty] on each merchantable beaver,” the Amsterdam chamber disallowed the law on the ground that “it is better to proceed in this matter with modesty, that commerce, just at present threatened by many dangers, may not be discouraged and people disgusted with it, which apparently would cause a depopulation of the country and deprive us of the means to bring emigrants over there.”

The same issue arose again following Stuyvesant’s order in 1653 prohibiting traders from selling “their Merchandizes and Goods (Indian trade only excepted) any higher than one hundred per cent advance above the value of the Goods as entered in the Invoice.” This ordinance was no more acceptable to the directors than were other forms of price regulation.

This is an Ordinance, indeed, [they wrote Stuyvesant] as impracticable as injurious in the highest degree to that State, being a sure means not only to banish Trade and, at the same time to deprive the Company of a great population and agriculture. For who is there but knows that the expectation of gain is the greatest spur to induce people to go thither, as experience hath already sufficiently demonstrated. On the contrary, the dread of small and uncertain profit discourages and deters people, as would, certainly, be the case whenever they arrived there with their cargoes on these terms. For, they would incur great danger that their wares would be bought up on which the heaviest expenses fall, among which are included those that pay sixty guilders and more per cent in freight, duty, convoy, &c., exclusive of insurance and the dangers of the seas. What profit such merchants would derive, can easily be calculated. We would here adduce other and more cogent reasons, but as we are of opinion that Trade

202 Ibid., 194.
203 O’Callaghan, Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland, 149. Stuyvesant was a strict Calvinist and the son of a minister. Calvinism had prohibitions against usury and enforced the notion of a just price that prevented merchants from charging more in times of scarcity. But Stuyvesant’s views were not reflective of company directors who made their way in the world by separating religion from their businesses. The tension between religious piety and business practice was disappearing in the Dutch Republic and may never have existed in New Netherland. See, e.g., Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century; Mark Valeri, Heavenly Merchandise: How Religion Shaped Commerce in Puritan America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

204 Ibid., 149-50.
cannot be subjected to the least constraint or limitation, but must be free and unshackled, as is the practice among all Nations and peoples, so we have judged such [a law] to be unnecessary. And it is not to be doubted that the exceedingly high prices will, with the increase of Trade, and importation of every thing in abundance, also cease and disappear in time.\textsuperscript{204}

The insistence of the Amsterdam chamber of the West India Company on free trade put them in the paradoxical position of opposing monopoly while they themselves enjoyed a monopoly. But they saw nothing inconsistent in their attitude, for not only had they relinquished their monopoly of New Netherland’s trade, but they also maintained that economic freedom was essential to the development of a frontier economy. But the Director General and Council in New Amsterdam believed that monopoly grants to individuals provided a feasible method for both obtaining revenue and guaranteeing the production of certain products. When Stuyvesant granted three monopolies (“one to establish an ashery, one to make tiles and bricks and the third to put up salt works”) to “some private parties,” the directors not only disallowed the ordinances in question, but they also ordered him not to grant any more monopolies in the future. In explaining their opposition to such grants, they wrote:

we believe it [the granting of monopolies] to be very pernicious and impracticable, especially in a new country, which begins only to develop, and must be peopled and made prosperous by general benefits and liberties to be granted to everybody, who desires to settle there with this or that profession or handicraft: that encourages people to remove thither, while on the contrary they are deterred and consequently all trades and business banished, if such monopolies and privileges are given only to a few favored private individuals, the advancement of whose interests must not be purchased at the expense of the general welfare. As the promotion of the latter depends mostly upon the growth of a country, we have concluded to recommend to you to act in this matter always on such theories, that increase of population, advancement of agriculture and advantages to the common welfare may result from it; then the Company too may at last reap some long expected benefits from this territory purchased so

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 149-50.
The Amsterdam and New Amsterdam authorities could not reach accommodation over economic policies. The protracted controversy over the right of the so-called “Scots” – or small traders from other regions – to carry on business in New Amsterdam and in other parts of the province provides another illustration of administrative conflict. The dispute was precipitated by a New Netherland ordinance of 1648, which was directed against the

Scottish merchants and small traders, who from time to time come over in the ships from the Fatherland, do not nor intend to do anything else, but to injure trade with their underselling, by selling their goods quickly, and having sold out returning in the ships, on which they came in the same year, without any benefit to the country, to the injury of the inhabitants, having houses and lots and bearing all burdens.

In an attempt “to prevent such injury to the trade,” the Director General and Council ordered, that henceforth all merchants, Scots and small traders, who come over in the ships from the Fatherland and intend to trade here, be it with Christians or with heathens, in retail or wholesale, shall not be allowed to do any business in the country, unless they remain here in New Netherland for three consecutive years and besides build here, in the City of New Amsterdam, a decent burghers dwelling house, each according to his means.

This ordinance, like the medieval restrictions on the activities of “strangers,” was based on the assumption that it was the function of the local government to reserve to the members of the community all economic privileges. As such it ran directly counter to the

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208 Ibid.
company’s free-trade policies. Still, it is important to note the ordinance was not a limitation on “foreign” merchants from New England or the Chesapeake, for instance. They could continue to trade freely. This was a protectionist scheme to maintain economic control on the fur trade, and substantial economic benefits, within New Netherland. It seemed to be a variation of mercantilism – ordinarily colonies existed to serve the mother country – whereby the mother country, or its traders, existed to serve the colony.

Although the directors objected to the ordinance regulating the “Scots,” they did not immediately veto it. In 1654, however, they wrote that a similar ordinance was “impracticable…principally in the infancy of a newly opened country, whose growth must be promoted rather by encouraging and unlimited privileges, than by prohibitions and restrictions.” In the opinion of the directors, the conditions laid down by Stuyvesant were “repugnant” and would make traders settling in the province “servile and slavish.” As an alternative to the Director General’s plan, they proposed that anyone who maintained a public store in New Amsterdam be given the right to trade in the province. This suggestion was incorporated in an ordinance of 1657 that stated that traders who did not live in New Amsterdam had to keep “an open Store within the gates and walls of this City.” In addition, the Scots, like any inhabitant of New Amsterdam who wished to establish a business, were required to purchase the small burgherright, at a cost of twenty guilders. The ordinance of 1657 was reissued by the Director General and Council in 1660 and by the burgomasters and Schepens in 1660 and 1661. The hostility

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209 In January, 1649, the directors wrote that they, like Stuyvesant, opposed “all these private extortioners,” but they also advised him to “temporize on all these points until more favorable circumstances.” O’Callaghan, Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland, 92.

210 O’Callaghan, New York Colonial Documents, XIV, 252.
to the Scots, however, remained, and each successive enactment of the ordinance contained a preamble that accused nonresident traders of paying too little and making too much.211

The Jews, like the Scots, precipitated a controversy that clearly illustrated the basic differences in the economic views of the Amsterdam and New Amsterdam authorities. Twenty-three Jews from the Company’s former colony in Brazil joined Jacob Barsimson, who was the first Jew to settle in New Amsterdam, in 1654.212 Stuyvesant, who looked on the Jews and on those who arrived in subsequent years with undisguised antagonism, predicted to the Amsterdam Chamber of the West India Company they would be come a “charge” to the community, accused them of “their customary usury and deceitful trading with the Christians,” and noted he had “deemed it useful to require them in a friendly way to depart.”213 Knowledge of Stuyvesant’s letter reached the Jewish community in Amsterdam, who rejoined by appealing to the Company’s directors. Along with discussing the reasons for the relocation of Jews from Brazil to New Amsterdam, the letter noted how trade would increase if the Brazilian refugee Jews could remain in the under populated and financially struggling colony.214

The Amsterdam department, after accusing the Director General of being

214 Ibid, 2-4. For instance, Asser Levy, a resident in New Amsterdam and awarded the burgher right in 1657, continued to travel to Amsterdam and various locations in Europe to trade with his commercial network. See SAA, Notarial no. 2443/479-480; SAA, Notarial no. 2443/761.
“unreasonable and unfair,” decided that Jews not only settle in New Amsterdam, but that they also had the right “to sail to and trade in New Netherland...provided the poor among them shall not become a burden to the Company or the community.” The department’s officials were not necessarily more altruistic than Stuyvesant, but they did have a firsthand knowledge of the relatively liberal treatment accorded the Jews of Amsterdam, and they were in a position where they could not afford to ignore the fact that Jews had invested a “large amount of capital...in shares of this Company.”

Stuyvesant, however, remained unconvinced, for he prevented Jews from buying real estate in New Amsterdam, forbade them “to trade to Fort Orange and the South [Delaware] River,” and argued that “to give liberty to the Jews will be very detrimental...because the Christians...will not be able at the same time to do business.” Finally, after two years of evasion and outright insubordination, Stuyvesant in 1656 accepted his superiors’ order that the Jews should be allowed “to ship and trade to and in New Netherland and to live and reside there and to enjoy the same liberty as other inhabitants.” Throughout this controversy, burgomasters and Schepens, who complained of the difficulties of conducting a business in a community in which “Jews and Foreigners are as much encouraged as a Burgher or Citizen”, supported the Director General. In this instance, as in so many others, it was the local officials who wished to maintain a closed economy, while Company officials and policy makers in Amsterdam

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216 See Veersteeg and Shattuck, New Netherland Papers, c. 1650-1660, 28, 37.
218 Fernow, Records of New Amsterdam, 2:63.
demanded a competitive society that would be open to all comers.

The running dispute between the authorities in Amsterdam and their colleagues in New Amsterdam was the product of a basic disagreement over the nature of an economy at the outskirts of a more developed economy. Stuyvesant, the members of his Council, and the burgomasters and Schepens were legislating for a “sustenance” economy. As a consequence, their major objective was to provide for the production and equitable distribution of necessities. Living on the edge of the wilderness, in a community dependent on the outside world for many essential commodities, they were obsessed by the threat of scarcities. Their problem was not how to produce more, but how to exist on what was already available. Under the circumstances, they were inclined to view economic institutions as static, rather than changing, and to rely on a system of controls that had developed during the late Middle Ages and which was still very much a part of the Europe in which they had recently lived.

In contrast to New Amsterdam’s officials, Company officials in patria looked on the New World as the proverbial land of opportunity for individuals with the requisite amount of initiative. To Stuyvesant’s arguments in favor of regulation, they replied with talk of individual freedom, and, for his static society endangered by shortages, they substituted the picture of an expanding economy in which the pursuit of the individual’s self-interest would redound to the benefit of all – and particularly to the benefit of the

\(^{219}\) O’Callaghan, *Laws and Ordinances of New Netherland*, 150. The Director General and Council appraised various common goods and established price points for the sale of such goods. These included: a pair of men’s shoes from 8 @ 12 size, 3 florins, 5 stuivers; a pair of Iceland stockings, 36 stuivers; a firkin of Soap at 20 guilders; a can of salad oil, 1 florin, 10 stuivers; a pound of candles, 12 stuivers; an anker of distilled liquor, 32 florins; an anker of Vinegar at, 16 florins; an ell of Duffel cloth to be sold to Christians no higher than, 3 florins, 10 stuivers; one hundred lbs. of nails, 30 florins; an anker of Spanish Wine at, 40 florins; an anker of Brandy at, 44 florins; a hogshead of French Wine at, 110 florins.
Company. The reasoning of the Company’s directors was relatively simple. In their opinion, the colony had failed to prosper because it had not attracted new settlers – especially farmers who could produce necessities for themselves and the other inhabitants. The unattractiveness of the colony to potential settlers, in turn, was the direct result of the regulations that curbed economic freedom. The obvious solution was to reverse the process by removing the regulations.

**Conclusion**

By the end of the 1630s, after nearly twenty years of Dutch claim to the region, New Netherland remained under-populated and dangerously dependent upon its trade lifeline with the Dutch Republic. The promise of Hudson’s discovery was in economic danger. Although some profitable trade had been undertaken by individual merchants and chartered companies prior to the institution of the Dutch West India Company, the region in the earliest years after Hudson’s discovery failed to draw sufficient numbers of merchants or companies.

With the establishment of the Dutch West India Company in 1621, subscribers to the Company were optimistic that they too, like their fellow shareholders in the Dutch East India Company would soon enjoy substantial dividends from the bounty of natural resources and commodities to be generated from New Netherland and other regions under the Company’s auspices. Yet, the Company put too restrictive impositions on private trade, thus severely curtailing interest, much less activity, by Dutch merchants in the region. As well, the Company retained the fur trade monopoly; the only profitable game in town as far as Dutch merchants were concerned. As a consequence, Dutch merchants
put their trading capital in ventures in Europe and Asia.

Finally, the Company fabricated one last plan in 1638. The grandiose plan to establish Dutch fiefdoms on American soil had not gone as planned, and only the struggling Rensselaerswyck remained as testimony to a decade’s efforts. To be sure, the patroons had wrenched important concessions from the Company during 1628 and 1629. Yet, encumbrances to investment remained. The Company required merchants to use Company ships, to engage Company supercargoes, and to pay the Company an assortment of fees. Gradually, but always grudgingly, the Company directors were forced by financial insolvency to abandon their trade monopoly altogether in exchange for a regulatory role in private trade within the geographical areas to which they laid claim. The surrender of monopoly privileges, however, was not a victory for the patroons. It came too late, long after they had lost their bid for supremacy in the colony’s trade. Private merchants with fewer ties to the colony would exploit free trade from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Europe, and within the British North American colonies.

It was the private merchants, however, who established New Amsterdam as the trading center of early America subsequent to 1640. In seventeenth century Amsterdam, trade was largely consigned to “personalized” rather than anonymous capitalism.220 The same would hold true for New Amsterdam and the larger colony of New Netherland. Free trade allowed the establishment of transatlantic trading relationships between merchants in the Dutch Republic and merchants in New Netherland. Many of the networks that developed were sustained throughout the seventeenth century.

By describing the process in this chapter by which the Dutch West India Company struggled to finally come to a free trade structure within New Netherland, the chapter provided the historical background for the subsequent economic growth of New Amsterdam and, ultimately, New York. By the 1640’s and onwards, Dutch merchants rapidly diversified their trade and expanded their regional connections to New Netherland and the English North American colonies. Supported by access to abundant Amsterdam capital and markets, smaller Dutch merchants demonstrated an aggressive and flexible quality of entrepreneurship when they entered the North American trade. Such commercial experiences would facilitate their rapid adjustment to the advent of jurisdiction changes in early America well into the eighteenth century.
Chapter 3
Dutch Masters of Another Sort:
The Chesapeake and its Tobacco
1620 - 1664

Tobacco – sweet tasting, putrid, abundant, addicting. That “moste abominable and noxious weede,” as King James I referred to it, was also a profitable weed. And if anyone could smell a profit, up the eastern seaboard or across the Atlantic, a Dutch merchant could.

Of course, some Dutch merchants, such as Isaac Allerton, did need not to cross the Atlantic to engage in the tobacco trade. They needed only to sail their fluyts southward from New Amsterdam along the coastal waters and travel up the various waterways flowing into the Chesapeake to isolated plantations. There, they purchased tobacco. In return, the Virginians received much needed English and European goods, as well as the opportunity to become a radial, however, minor, in the webs of commercial networks forming between Dutch merchants and English planters.

Once again, Allerton exemplified the permeability of seventeenth-century America. While still living in Plymouth, Allerton began trading in Virginia tobacco. Allerton, in fact, had extensive trade with the Chesapeake throughout his commercial life.

221 James I, in an anonymously published pamphlet, branded smoking “a custome loathsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, daungerous to the Lungs,” and imposed a significant import duty on it. A Counter-Blaste to Tobacco (London: R.B., 1604). In addition to James’s moral bias against tobacco smoking, tobacco cultivation and importation ran counter to prevailing economic thought that emphasized “desirable commodities” and diversification. As late as 1680, early modern English policy makers viewed tobacco as a costly, nonessential luxury. See Richard Hakluyt (the younger), Discourse of Western Planting (1584). See also Peter C. Mancall, Envisioning America: English Plans for the Colonization of North America (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1995), 11-5.
and he, subsequently, established his eldest son in Virginia to act as his trade representative. Allerton joined the many Dutch merchants who were drawn to the Chesapeake tobacco trade.

This chapter considers the development and importance of Dutch trading networks to the Chesapeake region during the period from 1620 to 1664. The story of the quest for a profitable commodity from the Chesapeake is well known. After years of struggle, tobacco emerged as the commodity that both grew well and satisfied a consumer demand (or perhaps served to create one) in Europe. Less well known is that the Dutch were integral to Chesapeake merchants and the region’s tobacco trade.

The first part of this chapter examines the basis and development of Dutch trade to the Chesapeake. That the Dutch were interested in tobacco is undisputed. But they did not set out to acquire tobacco from Chesapeake planters in a coordinated manner as part of a broader Dutch state policy. The success in tobacco cultivation brought economic prosperity to the region’s planters. Such prosperity brought Dutch merchants who came laden with goods and promises of extended credit. The English Civil War threatened the region’s increasing fortunes by diminishing the ships available for trade. Nevertheless, the Dutch continued to trade with Chesapeake planters and ensured the region’s economic survival. English colonial officials in Virginia encouraged Dutch trade and made conditions favorable for trade. The passage of the Navigation Acts in 1650 triggered concern among Virginia planters and Dutch merchants. Despite economic and political hurdles, trade between Chesapeake planters and Dutch merchants persisted from 1620 through 1664.

The second portion of this chapter considers the rise of Rotterdam with the Chesapeake trade. The merchants in Rotterdam and Amsterdam developed trading networks to the Chesapeake that were mostly Dutch in ethnicity in Europe, but both Dutch and English in the Chesapeake. Rotterdam merchants partnered with English merchants resident in Rotterdam and, together, they engaged in a brisk and competitive trade with both Dutch and English Chesapeake planters. The disruptions of the English Civil War allowed for the formation of trading partnerships between Dutch and English merchants and English plantation owners. Using Dutch bottoms and Dutch finance, new markets opened in Europe for Chesapeake tobacco that bypassed traditional London intermediaries. Virginia merchants traveled to Rotterdam to trade and the Dutch accommodated them with English-speaking notaries. For Rotterdam merchants, Virginia became a destination for trade, not just a peripheral stop on a return voyage from the Caribbean.

The third section analyzes the trade between Amsterdam merchants and Chesapeake tobacco planters. After establishing the earliest formation of such trade and its development through the 1620s, I provide evidence of how Dutch merchants integrated the Chesapeake tobacco trade with the New Netherland fur trade.

Finally, the fourth section of this chapter surveys immigration to the Chesapeake by the Dutch. Dutch merchants who settled on the Eastern Shore enhanced or extended their commercial endeavors with resident tobacco planters and provided additional links for the Dutch tobacco trade as factors for merchants in New Netherland or the Dutch Republic. Some Dutch immigration resulted from default on a debt by an English plantation owner to a Dutch merchant. As well, Dutch women residing in the Chesapeake
participated in the tobacco trade during the seventeenth century.

**The Rise of Chesapeake Tobacco and European Demand**

The Chesapeake’s early economy was a notable series of missteps. When the Virginia Company of London was chartered in 1606, its investors hoped for profits from glass manufacture, pitch and tar production, silkworm farming, the harvesting of timber, and a much anticipated trove of gold. It soon became clear to settlers and investors that the region’s economic future was foundering. The settlers produced negligible trading commodities from the exploitation of available raw materials. Attempts at producing glass, pitch, tar, and potash yielded insignificant profits. Such commodities could be produced in England, sold less expensively to consumers, and still yield satisfactory profits. And, disappointingly, no gold had been extricated.\(^{223}\)

When John Rolfe in 1612 ascertained that West Indian tobacco grew well in Virginia and would sell profitably in England, he could not have known then that the economic future of the Chesapeake had changed course. After the first shipments to England in 1617, the potential cash value of tobacco quickly captivated the colonists’ imaginations. By 1622, as English tastes for Virginia tobacco intensified and the production of tobacco increased, tobacco became the currency for the Chesapeake that allowed its residents to participate in the nascent economy of the Atlantic World as economic agents.

Tobacco growing became widespread. The lure of wealth to be made as a

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plantation owner even became the target of seventeenth-century satirists. One wrote:

The Pagen weed was our hope  
In Leafe, Pricke, Role, Ball, Pudding, Pipe, or Rope,  
Brasseele, Varina, Meavis, Trinidadado,  
Saint Christophers, Virginia, or Barvado;  
Bermudas, Providentia, Shallowcongo,  
And the most part of all the rest (Mundungo).  
That Patent, with a whiffe is spent and broke,  
And all our hopes (in fumo) turn’d to smoake.  

Despite the varieties of tobacco available for a satirist’s wit, only two types of tobacco were well-suited to early settlers in the Chesapeake: Oronoco and sweet-scented. Oronoco was grown all around the Bay and was stronger in flavor. Sweet-scented was grown on the banks of the James, York, Rappahannock, and Potomac rivers and had a milder taste. Sweet-scented tobacco was considered the best tobacco in the world and as a result it brought a better price than Oronoco. Still, Oronoco, which was thought to be too strong for Englishmen, was in great demand throughout Europe, particularly the Dutch Republic. Oronoco had a broader commercial market than sweet-scented, and proved more profitable to planters.  

Certainly, the success of tobacco cultivation brought a singular level of economic prosperity to Chesapeake tobacco planters throughout much of the first half of the seventeenth century. Arguably, without tobacco, Chesapeake colonists would have engaged in subsistence farming and animal husbandry and had little, if any, opportunity for economic growth independent of England. Nevertheless, successful tobacco cultivation also drew the attention of Dutch merchants who sought out trading opportunities.

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The Dutch offered Chesapeake tobacco planters many commercially alluring services. The availability of Dutch bottoms in which to ship tobacco and the quantity of tobacco that could be economically shipped in a Dutch fluyt attracted English tobacco planters to Dutch merchants. As well, the Dutch expressed interest in the strong-flavored Virginian tobacco. Dutch tobacco processors and manufacturers understood that their upmarket for resale, German and Central European consumers, clamored for a stronger tobacco blend. Dutch merchants and shipping offered vital access to markets for Chesapeake planters when the English experienced political and commercial upheaval during the 1640s. Importantly, Dutch merchants extended credit and offered attractive goods and merchandise in trade for tobacco. Further, the Dutch often paid higher prices for tobacco and provided shipping at a more reasonable rate than merchants of other nations, including the English. All of this made sense to a Chesapeake tobacco planter who sought to maximize profitability. The Dutch expressed less concern about following the letter of the law – e.g., the Navigation Acts or pesky impost/export rules, than they had about bringing a sought after product to the European market. In a geographical region that lacked a trading entrepôt and realistic administrative enforcement mechanisms, this worked out well for all concerned.

During the English Civil War, the volume of commercial shipping between the Chesapeake and the Dutch Republic greatly increased. Out of necessity, the region depended on Dutch trade for its economic survival. Recognizing the practical importance of a trade policy that did not inhibit trade or trading partners, and responding to a petition from Dutch merchants, Virginia’s Governor Sir William Berkeley introduced legislation in March 1642/43 to widen commercial access to Dutch merchants and further his free
trade policy. The final act allowed “any merchant, factors, or other of the Dutch nation to import wares and merchandizes and to trade or traffique for the commoditys of the collony in any shipp or shipps of their owne or belonging to the Netherlands.” As well, the act rescinded the requirement of bonds to be procured in Virginia and held as security for the payment of customs duty in London. Instead, Dutch merchants needed only to present letters of credit from a London merchant to the governor in order for their cargos to be cleared for sailing.  

For the first time, Virginia gave statutory recognition to the Dutch as trading partners and, arguably, loosened the administrative reins for legally procuring tobacco.

English planters and local officials recognized the importance of Dutch shipping to their region’s economic profitability. And, numerous commercial and maritime commentators throughout the seventeenth century remarked upon the cost-effective operation of Dutch merchant ships. An efficient ship design, economical shipbuilding costs, and moderate voyage costs created a substantial demand for Dutch shipping services. Lawrence Harper estimated that when Dutch shipping services were

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227 The *fluyt* was first designed in the late sixteenth century. With a round stern and noted pear shape, it was particularly suited to commercial shipping by the limited number of crew required to sail a vessel, its shallow draft allowing for ease of access outside of deep harbors, its speed and stability, and that it could carry more payload. See Nicolaes Witsen, *Aeloude en Hedendaegsche Scheeps-Bouw en Bestier* (Amsterdam, 1671), 159-60.

Shipbuilding costs reflected the Dutch Republic’s lower costs for imports of building materials (timber, hemp, flax, etc.). And with respect to building, Witsen noted the lack of innovation by English shipbuilders. He wrote, “It is surprising that foreigners, though they may have studied economical building in the dockyards of this country, can never practice it in their own land...unless he should find a way to inculcate in his workmen the thrifty and neat disposition of the Hollander, which is impossible.” (“Te verwonderen is’t dat alle uytlanders, schoon zy op Timmer-werven hier te lant de zuynigheyt bevlijtigen, in haer eygen lant gekomen, nimmer zulks na konnen volgen...’t en waer hy kans zag den aerd zijns volks, waer mede hy arbeyden moet, den zuynig en zindelijken hollantschen in borst gelyck te maken, ’t geen niet doenlijck.” Ibid. See also Roger Coke, *A Discourse of Trade* (London, 1670), 56.
unhampered by armed conflicts with other nations, England carried only one third of her own trade.\textsuperscript{228}

Despite the importance of Dutch shipping to colonial American economies during the English Civil War, the 1650s saw renewed concerns in England about the reliance of the English colonial economy on foreign shipping. Although the States General adopted a neutralist position, with respect to the English Civil War, both political sides in England were alienated from the Dutch Republic and attacked Dutch ships. Nevertheless, England’s Council of State regarded the Protestant Dutch Republic as a natural ally of the English Commonwealth. A diplomatic team, headed by Oliver St. John, sent to The Hague in October 1650, had instructions to negotiate an alliance. The Dutch proposed a free trade agreement while the English suggested something akin to a political union that partitioned certain geographical regions.\textsuperscript{229} Dutch republicans were in favor of an alliance, but supporters of the House of Orange distrusted this arrangement. With the failure of his diplomatic mission, St. John returned to England and drafted the provocative Navigation Act of October 1651.\textsuperscript{230}

Parliament adopted the Navigation Act in 1651, reinforcing a longstanding


principle of government policy that English trade should be carried in English vessels.\textsuperscript{231} The events in England caused concern for both English tobacco planters in the Chesapeake and Dutch shippers servicing their tobacco trading networks. When prominent Dutch trading families faced exclusion from American colonial trade by English authorities in 1650, the Dutch merchants petitioned the States General to intercede on a diplomatic level. They maintained they had traded with Virginia and the Caribbean Islands for over twenty years “by which commerce, the aforesaid places have from very humble beginnings . . . so improved from time to time, and been brought to such condition as to be at present a source of astonishment to the whole world.” The merchants expressed astonishment that “regardless of what they had contributed to their prosperity,” the merchants were to be excluded from further trade. And, wisely, they outlined the impact trade restrictions would have on the domestic economy of the Dutch Republic. The petition stated,

For, independent of the profit accruing from ship-building and what is connected therewith, our cargoes, which are exported thither to the value yearly of several millions, consist not of gold, silver, or any description of coin, but exclusively of all sorts of domestic manufactures, brewed beer, linen cloth, brandies, or other distilled liquors, duffels, coarse cloth, and other articles suitable for food and raiment for the people inhabiting those places, in return for which are imported all sorts of eastern commodities…affording extensive trade by the exportation of said wares to countries far and near; contributing to the support of several thousand people, independent of the profit of common stock.\textsuperscript{232}

Both Dutch and English merchants requested the Dutch government to apply diplomatic

\textsuperscript{231} The Navigation Act of 1651 targeted the Dutch. The Dutch dominated European trade and much of England’s coastal shipping. Because trade between England and the Dutch was competitive, the English viewed exclusionary measures as the only solution. Had trade been complementary – the two countries exchanged commodities – the draconian measures would not have been necessary. See, e.g., Charles Wilson, \textit{Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars} (London, 1957); J.E. Farnell, “The Navigation Act of 1651, the First Dutch War and the London Merchant Community,” in \textit{Economic History Review}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Series, 16, no. 3 (1964): 440.

pressure on England. They sought either rescission of the Act or, at the very least, more time to conclude colonial trading arrangements prior to the Act’s commencement. The parties reached an accord in the Treaty of Westminster in 1654. In reality, the Act had little influence on Dutch trade in Europe or in North America. In fact, despite European political events and various discriminatory English economic policies, trade between the English Chesapeake colonies and New Netherland and the Dutch Republic persisted throughout the period from 1620 to 1664. The records of New Netherland, Virginia, Maryland, England, and the Dutch Republic attest to that point. And the records reflect only a small portion of the trade that existed between the Dutch and the Chesapeake colonies.

The New Netherland/Chesapeake Trade

Dutch traders arriving from patria and colonial traders, both English and Dutch, from the Chesapeake converged on New Netherland’s port of New Amsterdam. While New Netherland’s political leaders and officials of the West India Company had hoped that New Netherland’s farmers could successfully grow tobacco to compete with the Chesapeake and supply the ever-increasing appetite of Europeans for tobacco, in reality, the colony’s farmers achieved only minimal success.²³³

Instead, New Netherland provided a commercial infrastructure to Chesapeake merchants – one that offered markets for trade, credit for expansion, and a variety of

²³³ While tobacco was grown in New Netherland, tobacco grown in the Chesapeake was of a higher quality and produced in significantly greater quantities. The West India Company and various patroons had plans to make tobacco a substantial export commodity from the colony. However, the lack of a sufficient work force, climatic conditions, and the higher quality of Chesapeake tobacco soon pushed aside such designs.
services well suited to an English merchant/planter. And the extended hands of commercial hospitality reached from the Chesapeake as well, at least as it related to trade with Dutch merchants resident in New Netherland.

**Trade between Rotterdam and Virginia**

When thinking about trading centers in the seventeenth century Dutch Republic, one is immediately inclined to think of Amsterdam. The city on the IJ, along with its merchants and financiers, dominated the Dutch Republic’s economic and political affairs. Nevertheless, Rotterdam’s economic growth in the seventeenth, and to a greater extent in the eighteenth century, came about because of the establishment of British trading houses in the city. As a consequence of becoming “Little London,” Rotterdam became involved in trade with the Chesapeake.

Herring in the sixteenth century and the wine trade of the seventeenth century underpinned Rotterdam’s economy. Rotterdam’s merchants focused their attention geographically on England, Scotland, and France. Trade with England increased during

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234 The Directors of the West India Company kept abreast of relations between New Netherland and the Chesapeake. In 1652, the directors wrote to Stuyvesant about the English colonies in America. “We have been pleased to learn,” they remarked, “that so far you have not had any troubles with the English there and hope you will not have any, but use all honest and fair means to continue the former harmony and keep up your commercial relations, especially with Virginia. That will most likely make the Manhattans flourish and increase in population; this increase will necessitate the fitting out of more ships....” Berthold Fernow, *Documents Relating to the History of the Early Colonial Settlements* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, 1883), 14:194-5

235 Rotterdam had been first termed “Little London” during the Reformation, when it hosted a sizeable English community. In the late sixteenth century, when the Dutch Republic became an English protectorate, 6,000 English troops were quartered outside of Rotterdam. During the seventeenth century, Rotterdam’s improved harbor, economic inducements such as exemption from taxes and a bank of exchange, and regional trading system, attracted English and Scottish merchants. See P.W. Klein, “‘Little London’: British Merchants in Rotterdam During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in *Enterprise and History: Essays in Honour of Charles Wilson*, D.C. Coleman and Peter Mathias, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); M.R. Doorman and R. Vroom, “‘Little London’, Engelse kooplieden te Rotterdam in de achttiende en het begin van de negentiende eeuw’, Rotterdams Jaarboekje, series 9, 3 (1985), 197-218.
the seventeenth century. The Court of Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers, an English association of merchants which was authorized to trade English woolen draperies, as well as a number of other English merchants, settled in Rotterdam. Municipal authorities gave the English merchants special privileges. A church was allotted to them to have their own services. That colony of English merchants might have been an important advantage in 1651 when English laws banned all trade to England with non-English vessels. English citizens living in Rotterdam could partner with Dutch merchants to comply with the law. Rotterdam’s trade was in all probability not as badly affected as other cities by this law because the English settlers were able to continue their business without the risk of seizure.236

The Dutch West India Company had several chambers in various cities and provinces of the Dutch Republic. Each chamber had a particular geographical monopoly on trade.237 When the chamber of which Rotterdam was a part lost its monopoly on trade with Brazil, the trade moved to the Caribbean, where Curaçao became the most important harbor for slaves. In the Rotterdam Municipal Archives, numerous notarial records reveal a trade in tobacco that developed between merchants in Rotterdam and merchants in various locations including Tobago, St. Kitts, Brazil, and other regions of the Caribbean and South America. Nevertheless, the notarial records lack any mention of a journey from Rotterdam to Virginia for the specific purpose of trading in tobacco during

the 1620s and the greater part of the 1630s. This is understandable because the Rotterdam chamber had activities on numerous geographical fronts. Also, journeys may have been undertaken to Virginia as part of a captain’s general instructions to voyage to the “West Indies.”

By 1638, the Rotterdam archives first indicate that merchants in Rotterdam had developed a trade with Chesapeake tobacco growers. Two English tobacco merchants operating from Rotterdam, Francoys Gorling and William Atkinson, and their Dutch partner, Cornelis Franssen van Santvoort, appeared before a Rotterdam notary. They attested to import duties levied on barrels of tobacco they had previously received from Virginia. James Yates, also an English merchant trading in Rotterdam, had been the original recipient of the tobacco. The parties appeared before the notary and had a declaration drawn up, all in expectation of a dispute with an additional partner participating in the trade, Adriaen Willemsen Wortel. Such commercial and legal actions of the English and Dutch merchants trading from Rotterdam to the Chesapeake suggest that by 1638, they had already long-established commercial relations with Virginia’s tobacco planters.

By the 1640s, extensive commercial activity developed between Rotterdam and Virginia. Along with Dutch merchants, English merchants resident in Rotterdam engaged in trade with Virginia. The ties between the city of Rotterdam and England seem

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238 While prudent to memorialize commercial agreements with notary publics, Dutch merchants and investors exercised caution when disclosing precise locations of trading voyages. For instance, there may well have been trade between Rotterdam merchants and Chesapeake tobacco growers prior to 1638. The Gemeentearchief Rotterdam notes numerous voyages between Rotterdam and the West Indies during the 1620s and 1630s. While the Dutch often referred to North America as the West Indies, the parties might have intentionally worded documentation with a vague geographical reference to the region, or, intended to give the captain and/or supercargo broad discretionary powers to solicit trade. The Gemeentarchief Rotterdam has hundreds of commercial documents referencing tobacco prior to 1638 and some may relate to trade with Virginia.
to have grown closer especially during the first half of the seventeenth century, when Rotterdam succeeded in connecting its regional trading system to the general upsurge of the Dutch economy. The bond was confirmed and invigorated in 1635 at the official establishment of the Court of Merchant Adventurers in Rotterdam.

Although the Civil War in England interfered with traditional European regional trade routes, investigation of Rotterdam and American colonial archives reveals that commercial opportunities arose for both Dutch and English merchants to examine new trade routes and to perhaps engage in new trading partnerships. One such opportunity arose in the Chesapeake. The Chesapeake tobacco trade allowed English merchants located in Rotterdam to utilize Dutch bottoms for carrying tobacco, employ Dutch finance to purchase trade goods and extend credit for the acquisition of tobacco, and develop English commercial networks with Chesapeake planters. For Dutch partners, the direct trade with Chesapeake planters provided a new market to fuel the Dutch tobacco industry. Previously, trade had come through English intermediaries, which increased the cost for tobacco.

Virginia merchants and planters of English origin arrived in Rotterdam to trade tobacco. Joseph Sanders, an English merchant in Virginia, had recently come from the Chesapeake in 1639, but in the opinion of Jan Lambertsz and Joost van Overmeer, the

239 Bijlsma, Rotterdams welvaren; Z.W. Sneller, Geschiedenis van de steenkolenhandel van Rotterdam (Groningen, 1946), 92-108.
241 P.W. Klein suggests that the English merchant community in Rotterdam suffered the same divisiveness that engulfed England and split into Royalists and Parliamentarians. See P.W. Klein, “‘Little London,’” 120. How this division within the Rotterdam English merchant community ultimately played out in commercial relationships with Dutch trading partners is presently unknown.
tobacco Sanders brought with him was of poor quality and could not be taken on account.\textsuperscript{242} In 1642, Samuel Fernnidt (or Fermundt) of Virginia authorized English merchants in Rotterdam to deliver barrels of tobacco to another English merchant, Abraham Scheppert (Sheperd), who had paid for them.\textsuperscript{243}

The archives evidence the fluidity of residency that English tobacco merchants experienced in pursuit of their trade. In 1643, Ysaack Lyte, an English merchant in Rotterdam, attested to the ownership of the tobacco on the ship \textit{Franciscus}, a ship which had arrived in Delfshaven from Virginia. Aside from an English captain, on board was Tomas Pers, co-owner of the tobacco and an English merchant living in Virginia. The other co-owners of the tobacco lived partly in England and Virginia. All of the tobacco was to be delivered to Lyte in Rotterdam.\textsuperscript{244} Other Virginia merchants, such as Thomas Pierce, Walter Chiles, and Richard Lee, all travelled with their cargos of tobacco to Rotterdam to do business with English and Dutch tobacco merchants.\textsuperscript{245} What such examples underscore were the commercial relationships that developed between early American, English, and Dutch merchants during the mid-seventeenth century and the willingness on each of the parties’ behalf to undertake and participate in such relationships.

The Rotterdam Archives reflect a range of commercial activities between Rotterdam merchants and Chesapeake tobacco growers. Realistically, Rotterdam and Amsterdam merchants focused on the West Indies trade. Trade with Virginia constituted

\textsuperscript{242} Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Not. Jacob Duyfhuysen, February 22, 1639, no. 199 (1/1).
\textsuperscript{243} Ibid., Not. Willem van Aller, April 18, 1642, no. 473 (84/134).
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid., Not. Jacob Duyfhuysen, July 26, 1643, no. 204 (288/435).
\textsuperscript{245} For Thomas Pierce, see Ibid., Not. Adriaan Kieboom, August 29, 1643, no. 152 (647/957). For Walter Chiles, see DLFS Delfshaven, Not. Kornelis Kleyen, August 20, 1649, no. 3838 (201/696); and Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Not. Adriaan Kieboom, August 15, 1650, no. 154 (466/750). For Richard Lee, see Ibid., Not. Balthasar Bazius, September 24, 1649, no. 441 (55/73).
only a lesser subdivision of the West Indies trade. Nevertheless, numerous ship charter
party agreements do specifically mention Virginia. For example, Cornelis Coninck,
Adriaen Ambrosius, Isaac and Jacob du Castel, Francoys Vermande, Jacob Rentier, and
Adriaen Albertsz, prominent Rotterdam merchants, entered into a charter agreement with
Reyer Pietersen, skipper of the *Fortuyn*, in November 1644. They contracted for the ship
to voyage to the West Indies and “surrounding countries.” Despite the fact that the
agreement did not specifically mention Virginia, there were indications the ship did sail
to Virginia for tobacco. First, many of the merchants listed in the agreement were
important Virginia tobacco importers. Also, the parties agreed to a price and length for
the journey that were uncharacteristic for a trading voyage simply to the West Indies. The
parties agreed to pay the captain 99 guilders per month for at least seven months
suggesting the ship would lay over for an extended period, characteristic of the tobacco
trade. Finally, the parties agreed that the ship would carry a disproportionate amount of
armament on board, again intimating Virginia was one of the ship’s destinations.

In 1647, Robert Eaton engaged Cornelis van Hoyten, the skipper of the *Snoeck* of
Rotterdam, to sail to Virginia. The agreement did not the specific trading goods to
accompany Van Hoyten. But, it was apparent Eaton expected tobacco in return as he
promised Van Hoyten a load for the return journey of at least 20 barrels of tobacco with a
maximum of 70 to 80 barrels. As well, the parties agreed that Jan Eaton, Robert Eaton’s
son, would accompany Van Hoyten to learn the tobacco trade. Thomas Lee, a
Rotterdam merchant, also contracted for cargo space on the same voyage. His charter

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246 A charter party agreement was a contract between a ship owner and a merchant by which a ship
was hired for the conveyance of goods on a specified voyage, or for a defined period.
248 Ibid., Not. Johan Troost, August 6, 1647.
agreement with Van Hoyten provided more details about the trade. He joined the ship to trade for tobacco in the James, York, and Elizabeth Rivers. He agreed to provide a return cargo of at least 40 barrels, but not to exceed 70 barrels. Lee had either previously undertaken voyages to Virginia or had had commercial correspondence for an order of goods, as he required that the goods he brought to Virginia had to be unloaded at the wharf of Mathew Philips, living on the Elizabeth River. Lee agreed to pay 32 guilders for each oxhead of tobacco for the return journey. As well, Lee paid 500 pounds of good Virginia tobacco packed in cases for the transport of twelve male passengers. The charter agreement does not list the nationality of the passengers accompanying Lee. Finally, the captain required Lee to pay caution money.\textsuperscript{249} Though the reasons for the required caution money were not stated, Lee may have previously defaulted on a contract or debt and the caution money was a means to ensure his performance and to rehabilitate his commercial reputation.

The tobacco trade to Virginia during the 1640s was not without risk. Certainly, the traditional concerns of mariners about weather, sailing conditions, and durability of their vessels were prevalent. But the period also included privateers from the warring factions of the English Civil War - Roundheads and Cavaliers – as well as privateers from Dunkirk and Oostend. All of them preyed on shipping from any nation traversing the English Channel and North Sea. For instance, in 1646, Captain Roosemont and

\textsuperscript{249}Ibid. Mathew Philips became the administrator of Henry Sewell’s estate in 1644. Sewell was a prominent tobacco planter and a member of the Virginia House of Burgesses. Thomas Lee was “put in charge of his kinsman, Henry Sewell, the younger” by 1649. Whether the younger Sewell accompanied Lee on this voyage is not disclosed. See Joshua Dorsey Warfield, \textit{Founders of Anne Arundel and Howard Counties, Maryland: A Genealogical and Biographical Review from Wills, Deeds, and Church Records} (Kohn & Pollock, 1905). “Caution money” was an amount of money paid by someone who has a contract with someone else to make certain that they do what the contract says they must do. In this instance, Lee was guaranteeing his performance.
Corstiaen Solas of Dunkirk laid claim to the Dutch ship, the *Planter*, which sailed to Virginia. In 1647, Oostend privateers captured the *Liefde* captained by Pieter Symonsz Overzee and owned by Albrecht Cox and partners in Rotterdam. Jacob Gerritsen Blenck who sailed often to the Caribbean later recovered the ship. Also in 1647, Captain Thomas Gonsalex de Renolledo seized the St. Pieter, captained by Maerten Gerbrantsen. De Renolledo brought the Dutch ship to St. Sebastian in Spain. Symon Overzee, of Rotterdam, had contracted the ship to sail for “the Virginies.” Upon payment for the return of the vessel, the ship was returned to Rotterdam with extensive damage. Later, on a journey to Virginia in 1653, the same ship had to return to Holland because of heavy seas and storms that separated her from the convoy in which she was sailing.

In addition, Dutch ships sailing around the Chesapeake could be subject to attack. In 1645, Captain Gabriel Cox attested to the voyage of the *Spiegel*, which had sailed to Virginia in the fall of 1643. Cox confirmed the contents of the vessel – a full load of tobacco – and described how the ship was anchored in one of Maryland’s numerous bays when the captain and crew had been surprised and captured by the *Reformation*, captained by Richard Engel. Nevertheless, while privateering threatened Dutch ships trading in the area, Rotterdam’s tobacco trade with Virginia increased in volume owing to the continuing demand for Virginia tobacco in the Dutch Republic and in Europe.

As in Amsterdam, the Rotterdam merchant community, particularly the contingent of English merchants residing in “Little London,” required notaries who could

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250 The term “Virginies” was a geographically inclusive term encompassing the Chesapeake region and occasionally the eastern seaboard. As time went on, it meant the English colony of Virginia.
252 Ibid., Not. Jan van Aller, Sept. 23, 1645, nos. 95-95v. The *Spiegel’s* owners sold the ship to a group of Dutch merchants “as is” in London during 1646. Most likely, the English government considered her capture a mistake. Not. A. Kieboom, Jan 8, 1646, no. 344.
both speak and write in English. Dutch authorities accommodated their English speaking resident merchants. For example, Pieter de Paus (alias Pope), an Englishman, served an apprenticeship with a Dutch notary. Subsequently, he established himself in Rotterdam as a duly certified notary and serviced numerous English-speaking merchants. In 1650, when James de Hem and Thomas Rogerson, both English merchants of Rotterdam, contracted the ship *Het Huys te Buren* to take merchandise to Virginia and return with a cargo of tobacco, they appeared before De Paus to memorialize the terms of their charter party agreement. Notaries such as De Paus attended to the commercial pursuits of the many English-speaking merchants who arrived or lived in Rotterdam. Robert Eaton and his son, Jan, also appeared before De Paus. In 1650, the Eatons negotiated a charter party agreement with Captain Pieter Symonsz of the ship *De Vergulde Eenhoorn*. Symonsz agreed to transport merchandise and passengers to Virginia, unload the goods and passengers in the Pocohen [sp], and return with oxheads of tobacco. Symonsz charged 28 guilders for each oxhead of tobacco was 28 guilders. Soon after De Paus established his notary office, another English-speaking notary in Rotterdam, Jan Grimes, began offering his services at Rotterdam’s *bourse.*

The growth of Rotterdam’s trade in the seventeenth century was tied to the growth of the Chesapeake tobacco trade. Dutch and English merchants joined together and created successful financial and commercial partnerships that bypassed traditional trading networks.

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253 Ibid., Not. Pieter de Paus, August 19, 1650; August 24, 1651; Ibid., Not. Pieter de Paus, June 20, 1650; Ibid., Not. J. Grimes, August 12, 1664; July 14, 1664.
Trade from Amsterdam to Virginia

Like the smoke arising from a clay pipe, tobacco whispered to Dutch merchants. Amsterdam merchants were attracted to the potential for profit that Chesapeake tobacco offered, just as their merchant brethren in Rotterdam. Trade with the Chesapeake offered another location for commercial activity in the West Indies circuit. Then too, the region offered a commodity that Amsterdam merchants knew well – tobacco. Along the lines of other European nations, the Dutch Republic exploited tobacco’s profitable properties and recognized that the plant was a source of income for the government through taxation, a source of income for the planters that grew it, and a source of income for the merchants and shippers that promoted and carried it. As the popularity of tobacco rose in Europe, Amsterdam became a regional processing and distribution center.

A dispute over price generated the oldest extant notarial act in Amsterdam regarding Virginia’s tobacco trade. In May 1621, differences arose between Jan Jansen, an Amsterdam tobacco merchant, and Edward de Rousing, an English captain. De Rousing had sailed into Middelburg with a substantial quantity of Virginia tobacco. The captain had already sold 1000 pounds of the tobacco to Jansen. The dispute arose when De Rousing declined to deliver further quantities of tobacco to Jansen until De Rousing

\[254\] The second mate of the ship, De Blauwe Haan, declared in 1644, that this ship made regular journeys from Brazil to St. Kitts, and New Netherland, and from there to Holland. Along the way, the captain took two slaves and two horses in Brazil apparently for his private trade. In St. Kitts, Spanish wine was taken on board for New Netherland where guns were traded for furs. In the Dutch colony, some Virginia tobacco was taken on board. The second mate testified that, in his opinion, the captain focused more on his private trade and neglected the affairs of the West India Company for which he sailed. Ibid., Not. J. Steyns, no. 1861/462/463, October 21, 1644.

received a better price. While the notarial act does not record why De Rousing held back for a higher sale price, it was most likely reflective of current market conditions that De Rousing became aware of upon mooring at Middelburg’s port. The simple economic theory of supply and demand probably came into play.

A Dutch merchant and explorer more familiar to American historians was David Pietersz de Vries. De Vries wrote of his journeys to North America. Long before his voyages to North America in 1633, De Vries was acquainted with the Virginia tobacco trade. The West India Company initiated action against De Vries for the non-payment of taxes on tobacco he had previously imported. By 1636, de Vries began carrying tobacco to Amsterdam from the Chesapeake, including a shipment for the account of Jan Bicker, the former member of the Amsterdam Chamber of the West India Company and a partner of Kiliaen van Rensselaer, patroon of Rensselaerswyck. De Vries was again in Virginia by 1638 and purchased tobacco there, as well as furs from New Netherland, for Abraham van Peene, a director of the Middelburg Chamber of the West India Company. We learn of his activities through declarations made before a notary, not for non-delivery of the goods, but rather for non-payment of taxes to the West India Company. In the declarations, Company representatives sought payment of importation duties. As Virginia came under the territory were the Company claimed sole trading rights, according to the Company’s charter, importation of raw materials or goods from the territory by a merchant were subject to importation duties in the Dutch Republic. The geographical

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256 Stadsarchief Amsterdam, Not. Archives, Not. F. van Banchem, no. 286, fs. 237v-238; 241-241v. May 4, 1621; May 5, 1621. From references in various individual notarial documents, it appears that Middelburg was, at the time, the import harbor for Chesapeake tobacco because delivery after personal inspection would take place in Middelburg. However, the complete loss of the Middelburg archives in World War II makes verification historically impossible.


258 Ibid., Not. C. Touw, no. 1420, f. 100v III, May 8, 1638.
proximity of New Netherland to the Chesapeake and the demand in Europe for both furs and tobacco aligned both regions for collaborative trading voyages. Tobacco could be used as payment for furs in New Netherland or could fill a ship’s hold when an insufficient number of furs were available.

One example of how the tobacco trade became partnered with the fur trade of New Netherland involved Dirck Corssen Stam. Kiliaen van Rensselaer had appointed Stam as supercargo on a voyage of the Rensselaerswyck in 1636. During the voyage, while in New Netherland and in Virginia, traded on his own account. Prior to leaving Virginia, Stam stored 16,000 pounds of tobacco in Virginia. And, when the ship landed in London, he had another 16,000 pounds of tobacco transferred to a warehouse there under his own account. In 1637, still on the return voyage, he brought a sizable quantity of furs and tobacco to Holland. A dispute arose between Stam and Van Rensselaer. After his dismissal from Van Rensselaer’s service, he formed a partnership with the Verleth (Varlet) and Verbrugge brothers, Amsterdam merchants recognized for their active engagement in the Virginia tobacco trade. Stam’s brother, Arendt served as the newly formed partnership’s agent in Virginia. While in Virginia, Dirck began to establish his own network of significant Virginia planters including John Galler, John Hill, Nathaniel Littleton, and Jan Coustaer.

In 1638, after his return from New Netherland, Stam refused to hand over to Van Rensselaer several obligations contracted by New Netherland colonists in the fur trade unless Van Rensselaer paid Stam his wages, a portion of the return freight of his ship, and a part of the proceeds of the sale of the same ship. Van Rensselaer’s refusal led to a legal
process before the courts of Holland lasting for many years.\textsuperscript{259} While the lawsuit was a reflection of a commercial relationship that had not succeeded, it provided a look into the temptation and power of Virginia tobacco for merchants and crewmembers on all levels.

That temptation of profits from Virginia tobacco and New Netherland furs extended down to the lowest reaches of a vessel’s crew. A custom had developed aboard vessels sailing to North America that allowed crew members, regardless of rank, to bring merchandise with them for their own private trade. First originating in the Newfoundland trade, the practice prevailed in the New Netherland fur trade and the Virginia tobacco trade among Dutch ships. The practice arose for a number of reasons: sailing to North American bore certain risks greater than plying the regional waters of Europe, the journeys were longer, the wages remained on the lower end, and it provided a certain incentive for the crew. For instance, in 1644, Daniel van den Enden of Egmont op den Hoeff testified that his captain aboard \textit{de Blaeuwen Haen}, during the course of the voyage around the West Indies, including New Netherland, traded for slaves, horses, Spanish weights, pipes of Spanish wine, guns, knives, axes, and Virginia tobacco.\textsuperscript{260} While a crew member’s rank determined how many trading goods he could bring aboard ship, his profits were determined by his own mercantile skills.

Additional Dutch ships from Amsterdam traded in Chesapeake Bay and its rivers. Declarations and charter agreements in the Amsterdam archives note other ships, including \textit{Het Wapen van Leeuwarden} and \textit{Vergulden Aecker}. They, like so many ships,


\textsuperscript{260} Stadsarchief Amsterdam, Not. J. Steyns, no. 1861/462-63, October 21, 1644.
often anchored in the James River waiting for other ships to complete loading to return in convoy as protection against Ooostend and Dunkirk privateers. In 1644, the supercargo of the *De Swarte Raven* testified about the regularity of Dutch ships in the Chesapeake. He declared

that he has been with the said ship *De Swarte Raven* on her latest journey in New Netherland as well as in the Yorck River in Virginia, and arrived last April 2 in the Jamestown River down stream near a certain village called Kicketan where he, witness, was informed that higher up in the same Jamestown River were laying and loading three Dutch ships with another one who was said to be of Hamburg and whose skipper was Paulus Hoep. *De Swarte Raven* joined the three Dutch ship in the River of Jamestown at Kicketan on April 23. The three ships were *de See Robbe*, skipper Symen Dircksz and supercargo a certain Silvester; *De Weyman’s Geneucht* of Rotterdam, skipper Pieter Symonsz; the *Medea*, skipper Jan Claesz van Ly, and supercargo Abraham Yzebenraet, who with the said Silvester remained ashore in Virginia.261

From the testimony given by George Armstrong, aboard *De Swarte Raven* as a free passenger returning to Holland, it appears many of the Dutch skippers spoke English and had familiarity with the topography of Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries.262

Trading partners might have been able to overcome language barriers to undertake their commercial activities. Nevertheless, Amsterdam’s more established credit

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262 Ibid. Armstrong’s passage raises an interesting point about Dutch vessels. The vessels were not exclusive to the carrying of cargo. In fact, there was much demand for skilled workers in the Chesapeake region and Virginia planters, as they accumulated wealth, contracted to bring workers over. In 1634, Martin Becker of Virginia entered into a contract with Dutch two carpenters who were hired to build a water mill in Virginia. Upon the conclusion of their two-year contract with Becker, the carpenters were free to work for anyone else or to return to the Dutch Republic. Becker agreed to pay his men 500 guilders a year and 25 pounds of tobacco, room and board, with all payments to start from the moment they left Holland until they returned. Becker’s recourse to hire tradesmen in the Dutch Republic demonstrated the fierce competition for craftsmen in early Virginia. It also suggested the close commercial connection between the Dutch Republic and Virginia before 1634. Becker had no difficulty finding in Amsterdam tradesmen who were willing to contract as bondsmen for the payment of wages and tobacco. See Ibid., Not. Jan Warnaerts, no. 701, August 7, 1634. This situation was confirmed by the experience of a ship’s carpenter who in 1638 was occupied with the repair of his ship in Virginia. During the time he could not work on the ship, several colonists employed him and paid him 36 pounds of tobacco a day including room and board. Ibid., Not. Pieter Carels, no. 732/745-745v, September 13, 1642.
market offered more favorable credit terms and, thus, removed additional barriers of trade. More Virginians sought credit in Amsterdam than in Rotterdam, most probably because there was more credit available in the Dutch capital, which during the seventeenth century had already become the heart of world trade.

Despite occasions when Dutch merchants sought to cheat the West India Company out of recognition duties on goods, including tobacco, upon entering the Dutch Republic, declarations before notaries made mention of English export duties paid in Virginia on tobacco transshipped to the Netherlands. In 1644, Pieter Pietersz of Amsterdam brought his ship, *de See Robbe*, laden with 150 oxheads of tobacco. Pietersz appeared before a notary to make a declaration. What is noteworthy about his declaration was the information about Virginia custom duty of half a stuyver for each pound of tobacco exported from the colony, in this instance “305 guilders and 12 shillings.”

While the various contracts in the archives demonstrated that the governors of Virginia were anxious to give Dutch skippers and merchants their cooperation, as colonial officials representing the Crown, they could not ignore payment of export duties without suffering retribution from London. In essence, colonial officials treaded carefully by encouraging foreign trade, though prohibited, to stimulate economic activity, while at the same time, collecting duty on all commodities leaving the colony.

Because English merchants readily extended credit to Chesapeake planters, Dutch merchants needed to compete on the same commercial level and thus granted long-term credit to Virginia planters. Occasionally, a Virginia planter would default on his payment.

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263 See, e.g., Ibid., Not. J. Steyns, no. 848, September 13, 1644. There is one instance where the parties agreed to transfer a non-payment of English duty on tobacco to another party. So important was payment to Dutch merchants that even an obligation to pay could be transferred to preserve trading rights.
obligations to his Dutch creditor. Possession of Virginia tobacco cargoes was quite often
taken over by some Amsterdam merchants upon their arrival in Amsterdam. For
example, Justus Baack, in 1647, claimed part of a cargo of Virginia tobacco, 35 barrels,
brought by the *Pop* and destined for Richard Glover of Rotterdam to satisfy Glover’s
existing debts to Baack. But the consequences for non-payment of debt could befall
anybody, even an English merchant. One consequence included imprisonment. Of
course, imprisonment had to be seen as a last resort by the parties. It meant that the
merchant owed a debt had sought all other legal redress, including sale of the indebted
merchant’s property, before finally availing himself of the recourse of prison. By
imprisoning a debtor, it necessitated removing that person from employment and the
ability to repay any debt. Edward Moor, of Virginia, suffered imprisonment in
Amsterdam in 1647 for debts contracted during preceding years. In order to secure his
freedom, he entered into a legal agreement with his Dutch creditors to ship all of his
tobacco from his Virginia plantation in the ship *de Hoop* for the next two years until
payment of his debts in full. For his Dutch creditors, this was a harsh, but necessary
measure, not only to collect the debts owed to them by Moor, but to emphasize the
significance of commercial dealings.

By the mid-1640s, notable merchants, Abraham Grevenraet, Mathys Kessen,
Justus Baack, and Charles Gabry, had become the principal importers of tobacco from
Virginia in Amsterdam. Charles Gabry also provided important financial backing of the
free traders of furs in New Netherland, often supplying them with shiploads of
merchandise. Virginia planters sought out financing and commercial linkages with Dutch

264 Ibid., Not. J. van den Ven, no. 1076/27v-28, August 14, 1645; Not. J. van den Ven, no. 1080/86-86v,
September 7, 1646; Not. J. van den Ven, no. 1081/196-196v, August 8, 1647; Not. F. Uytenbogaert,
no. 1882/165-166, October 4, 1647.
merchants. In 1645, a notarial act memorialized the debts of John Gibbs, William Laurear, Richard Kemp, William Russen, John Gerby, Thomas Bourbage, and George Ardarsort, all Virginia planters. Together, they owed several thousand pounds of tobacco to Grevenraet of Amsterdam. The planters had contracted the debts during 1644 when they accepted Dutch and European merchandise on credit from the captain of the *Medea* who had traded the goods for the promise of Virginia tobacco.²⁶⁵

Along with Amsterdam merchant houses, free traders felt the lure of Virginia tobacco and contracted to engage ships and trading goods. The owners of the *Princess Royal* contracted with Knut Mathysen, a free trader from Aalborg in Denmark. The 1649 charter agreement sent Mathysen with a cargo of 1500 guilders worth of merchandise to Virginia to trade for tobacco. The owners required Mathysen to return with at least 30 oxheads of tobacco, but not more than 50 oxheads. He was to pay 30 guilders for each barrel of tobacco.²⁶⁶ A separate charter party for the same journey bound the owners of the ship and Borchert Scholten, a free trader of Amsterdam, who took merchandise valued at 1300 guilders. For the return journey, he promised at least 20 oxheads to a maximum of 50. The cost for each oxhead of tobacco was also 30 guilders.²⁶⁷ The owners of the *Princess Royal* took advantage of market conditions and the ability of Dutch and European free traders to pursue opportunities in Virginia.

The 1649 voyage of the *Princess Royal* must have successfully and safely concluded. In 1650, Jan Pletersen Ettes, a merchant of Medemblick, entered into a charter party agreement with the *Princess Royal’s* captain for a journey to Virginia. Ettes retained Jacobus Arbrhamsz Carponnel and Wybrandt Jansen Ruyter as supercargos for

²⁶⁵ Ibid., Not. J. van de Ven, no 1076/27v-28, August 14, 1645.
²⁶⁶ Ibid., Not. H. Schaef, no. 1343/76v-77, August 31, 1649.
²⁶⁷ Ibid., Not. H. Schaef, no. 1343/81v-82, September 17, 1649.
the voyage. They took merchandise valued at approximately 1600 guilders to trade for tobacco. The agreement required that the minimum return freight was 40 oxheads, the maximum being allowed was 80 barrels. Marcus Hooft van Aacken, a cabinetmaker in Amsterdam, also contracted for space in the cargo hold of the *Princess Royal*. He loaded merchandise aboard equal to approximately 1200 guilders for trade of Virginia tobacco. In return, he agreed to ship back at least 20 oxheads of tobacco up to a maximum of 30 oxheads. The shipments aboard the *Princess Royal* attest to the fact that lesser merchants began to seek opportunities for trade in Virginia tobacco and could afford the risk to take partial ship’s holds with the hope of profitable voyages.

Such free traders exemplify the opportunity that was available for non-specialist traders, and non-traders as well, to enter the tobacco market with the hope of amassing substantial profits on a single voyage. Whether they achieved success, and what they subsequently did with the profits, is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain from the notarial records. But the barriers to trade were minimal (raising sufficient capital for trading goods) and the potential for some sort of profit was high. It is no wonder that the archives are full of free traders investing in the tobacco trade.

None of the success of the Dutch in the tobacco trade in Virginia would have occurred without the active participation of elite members of Virginian society, both politically and economically. For instance, Argoll Yeardley became an important ally for Dutch merchants. The eldest son of a former governor-general, Yeardley eased into politics at an early age, joining the council in 1639 while still in his twenties. An active merchant-planter, he found much of his livelihood in commerce with the Dutch. His

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second wife, Ann Custis, tightened his bonds to the Netherlands even more. She belonged to an Anglo-Dutch family from Rotterdam. Blood ties and common business interests reinforced Yeardley’s loose alliance with like-minded merchant-planters, who linked the Eastern Shore and the lower James River basin to the Holland trade. Besides Yeardley, the group included Nathaniel Littleton, Thomas Willoughby, Richard Kemp, Richard Lee, Edmund Scarburgh, Yeardley’s brother Francis, and Adam Thoroughgood, a Lower Norfolk County justice, whose daughter Sarah had married a Dutch trader, Simon Overzee. Overzee later wed Willoughby’s daughter Elizabeth. The network connected to Amsterdam via Governor Berkeley through Richard Glover. Another of the Anglo-Dutch merchants with Virginia interests, Glover trucked mainly around Jamestown and along the York River. The Berkeley-Glover link drew into the mix councilors George Ludlow, Bridges Freemen, and Ralph Wormeley; burgesses Robert Holt and Stephen Gill; and numerous well-heeled independent merchant-planters.

Yeardley was also instrumental in bringing his brother-in-law John Custis to the governor’s attention. Custis had settled in Northampton County about the time of his sister’s marriage. His fluency in the Dutch tongue proved the asset that attracted Berkeley, who used him as a translator on more than one occasion. Their association sparked a lifelong intimacy between the two men and profited Custis handsomely. He gained lands, preferments, and the heights of Virginia politics. The question then becomes how, and to what degree, Virginian merchant/politicians attempt to sway public policy to accept foreign traders, particularly the Dutch. For a substantial number of merchant/politicians, trading with the Dutch arose because of familial networks. But the familial networks quickly expanded to incorporate English merchant/politicians without
any previous ties to the Dutch Republic. To them, trade with the Dutch provided profit. The political winds in London during the 1640s and 1650s made public support for Dutch trade problematic for pragmatic and susceptible colonial politicians. In the end, many Virginian merchant/politicians managed to sustain trade with the Dutch. How “Dutch” a vessel appeared figuratively when it came to trade in Chesapeake waters and how “Dutch” it was in fact, were two different matters.

The Dutch in Maryland

On October 8, 1659, Augustine Herrman and an embassy sent from New Netherland dined in Simon Overzee’s home with Philip Calvert, Lord Baltimore’s younger brother. Herrman and his fellow ambassador, Resolved Waldron, had been dispatched by Director-General Peter Stuyvesant to meet with Maryland’s Governor and the Council of Maryland to seek settlement of a boundary dispute for territory both colonies claimed along Delaware River. Journeying overland, once in Maryland they sought out the hospitality of a fellow countryman who could provide introductions to the political elite of Maryland. Overzee, a successful tobacco merchant of Dutch ancestry, acted as a cultural liaison to the parties.

Like Overzee, Augustine Herrman must have been impressed with the commercial and financial opportunities that Maryland could yield to him. Best known for his efforts as a diplomat and early cartographer of the Chesapeake, Augustine Herrman exemplified another Dutch merchant unfettered by political boundaries and he would soon acquire property in Maryland to engage in the tobacco trade.

Although Dutch trade with Maryland began later than did that with Virginia, there
is reason to believe, in view of certain differences between the two colonies, that the Dutch trade with Maryland planters was more geographically concentrated. Maryland was founded as a political and a geographical entity in 1634, twenty-seven years after the founding of Virginia. Like the latter, it was established by Englishmen and had a plantation society devoted largely to the production of tobacco and so, presumably, had much the same economic pattern as Virginia. In at least one important particular, however, Maryland differed from the latter colony. Founded as a proprietary government, it was not dependent economically or politically on either a monopolistic company or the British government.

In 1632 Charles I conferred to George Calvert, first Lord Baltimore, a charter that gave Maryland, from the beginning, a degree of freedom in its trading affairs that had not existed in Virginia. The Crown gave Calvert as proprietor “the right to constitute ports of entry and departure…and to levy duties and tolls upon ships and merchandise exported and imported.” The Crown also made an “express covenant” with the proprietor that no “tax or custom be imposed…upon any merchandise to be laden or unladen within the province.” From the founding of Maryland in 1634 until the beheading of Charles I in 1649, events in England conspired to preserve this right for the Maryland planters. And, in view of what is known about the extent of Dutch trade in Virginia under less favorable circumstances, there can be no doubt that when the Dutch found so open a market in Maryland, they took full advantage of it.

Tobacco production was underway almost immediately in Maryland and by 1639 tobacco had become a vital medium of commercial exchange for Maryland.
Dutch Settlement in the Chesapeake

The desire by Dutch merchants to trade for tobacco in the Chesapeake raised important logistical issues. In frustration, after eight months in 1635 trying to fill his hold with tobacco, David Pietersz DeVries urged “those who wish to trade here must keep a house here, and continue all the year, that he may be prepared, when the tobacco comes from the field, to seize it, if he would obtain his debts. It is thus the English do among themselves; so that there is no trade for us, unless there be an overplus of tobacco, or few English ships.” Although DeVries’s account of his voyages was not published until 1655, his sentiments about the tobacco trade for non-English merchants may have been common to other Dutch merchants.

Not all of the Dutch who settled in New Netherland chose to remain. For many, the lure of tobacco in the Chesapeake motivated many to leave the Dutch colony and reestablish themselves in Virginia. Their aspirations focused more on the possibility of profit than loyalty to a colony. Nevertheless, the move to an English colony did not sever commercial or personal ties to the Dutch Republic or to New Netherland.

Consider Dirck and Arendt Corssen (or Corszen) Stam. The brothers came to New Netherland and served with the West India Company. Dirck arrived sometime around 1628, remaining in New Netherland until at least 1633. Certainly, while residing in New Netherland, Dirck witnessed the trade in Virginia tobacco. As a

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269 Part of De Vries’s frustration was due to circumstances beyond his control. Little tobacco had been cured prior to his arrival and disease had ravaged the English settlers. David Peterson De Vries, Voyages from Holland to America, A.D. 1632 to 1644, ed. and trans. Hency C. Murphy (New York, 1853), 112. He reiterated his point in May 1636 and wrote “The English Virginias are an unfit place for our nation to trade, unless they continue the trade through all the year.” Ibid., 113-4.

270 Dirck served as a Commissary of Stores in 1628, as a Vice Commissary of Wares or Cargoes in 1633, and as a councilor of New Netherland. See E.B. O’Callaghan, The Register of New Netherland, 1626 to 1674 (Albany: J. Munsell, 1865), 30; Stadsarchief Amsterdam, Notarial Archives, inv. Nr. 1285, fol. 114, notary Hendrick Schaeff (13 July 1641).
consequence of his appointment in 1636 as supercargo aboard Kiliaen van Rensselaer’s ship *Rensselaerswyck*, he might have seen for the first time the richness of all that the Chesapeake offered. The *Rensselaerswyck* began its journey in Amsterdam laden with settlers and provisions. After discharging settlers and supplies at both New Amsterdam and Fort Orange, the ship sailed back down the Noord River (the Hudson River) and continued along the coastline until it reached Virginia’s Eastern Shore and engaged in trade.\(^{271}\)

Arendt Corssen Stam is first noted in New Netherland’s records in 1633. On behalf of the West India Company, he purchased land from Native American peoples to establish a trading post to restrain the perceived encroachments of the Swedes from the South. The Swedes sought to monopolize the fur trade in the region with the Native Americans. Arendt became Commissary of Fort Nassau on the South River (now Delaware River) in 1633.\(^{272}\)

When the Privy Council in 1634 ended almost ten years of uncertainty regarding land patents, the brothers took advantage of land that became available for settlement and tobacco production. In 1638, the Stams obtained two land patents in Virginia. The first was for 860 acres in Elizabeth City County on the James River, and bounded on the west by Newport News Creek. The second parcel was on James Island, measuring “10 po. in breadth & 8 po. in length.” In 1640, Arendt took advantage of the headright system and


received 250 acres of land for importing three other persons. Additionally, Arendt also sought land on Virginia’s Eastern Shore and subsequently leased land from Nathaniel Littleton, a member of the Virginia Council and fellow tobacco planter. Over the ensuing years, Arendt engaged in various legal and commercial activities in Virginia, many of which involved his trade in tobacco.

But what is important about Arendt and Dirck Corssen Stam is how Arendt’s immigration to Virginia and Dirck’s residence in the Dutch Republic linked together Virginia, New Netherland, London, and the Dutch Republic through property ownership, advantageous marriage, and a commercial network that took advantage of available credit, personal prestige, and political stability. Arendt’s property ownership in Virginia was key to establishing a permanent settlement and integrating himself into the English plantation community. Becoming part of the community then permitted Arendt to

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introduce and integrate his own commercial network into the greater community. For instance, in 1639, Dirck boasted having 16,000 pounds of tobacco in London and another 16,000 pounds in Virginia. And, in 1640, Arendt, in conjunction with his brother Dirck, shipped 60,000 pounds of Virginia tobacco to the Dutch Republic aboard De Vergulde Aecke. An additional 20,000 pounds remained in Virginia awaiting subsequent shipment.275 The brothers were then handling significant quantities of tobacco. And in return for shipments of tobacco, Dirck imported into the colony blankets, boots, horses, fancy Leyden tiles, bricks, grindstones for water and windmills and many other articles for trade. Nevertheless, the brothers could not have shipped such quantities of tobacco without being part of a commercial network. For the Stam brothers, one such network involved the Verbrugge Company.

The Verbrugge Company of Amsterdam, founded by Gillis and Seth Verbrugge, traded extensively with merchants in New Netherland. And, they did not limit their activities to the Dutch colony. The company also relied on family networks to gain entry into other North American markets, in particular Virginia.276 Arendt Stam provided a

275 For the 1639 shipment, see Stadsarchief Amsterdam, Notarial Archives, Notary J. de Graeff, no. 1621, December 19, 1639. The details of the 1640 shipment were memorialized for insurance purposes. Dirck Stam’s ship was attacked by privateers from Dunkirk in 1640 and he appeared before an Amsterdam notary in 1641 to attest to the events surrounding the loss of his ship as well as to the cargo he carried aboard. See SAA, Notarial Archives, Notary J. Warnaerts, 696/93, July 8, 1641. The volume of their trade that year greatly exceeded that of any single London importer of Virginia tobacco. See John R. Pagan, “Growth of the Tobacco Trade between London and Virginia, 1614-40,” Guildhall Studies in London History, Vol. 3, No. 4 (April 1979): 262 n. 92. Pagan notes the top ten percent of Virginia tobacco importers in England. The highest individual importer of Virginia tobacco for that year was John Bradley with 47,557 pounds.

276 Oliver Rink noted that the father-son partnership of the Verbrugges resulted in approximately 14 voyages to English Virginia, based on his examination of notarial records in the Stadsarchief Amsterdam. Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economic and Social History of Dutch New York (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 177. However, Rink did not connect the Verbrugges's voyages to the kinship relationship with Arendt Stam, who resided in Virginia. Arendt and Dirck Corssen Stam were Gillis Verbrugge's nephews and Seth Verbrugge's first cousins. The father of Arendt and Dirck, Cors Stam, was the brother of Gillis's wife, Jannetje. Govert Loockermans was also related by marriage to the Stams and Verbrugges.
direct entré for the Verbrugge Company to trade in Virginia for tobacco acting as a factor and trading partner for the company beginning at least by 1639.\textsuperscript{277} Arendt could provide shipping with noted Amsterdam merchants to his fellow tobacco growers in Virginia without waiting the chance of whatever ship happened by.\textsuperscript{278}

There are other examples of Dutch merchants who emigrated from New Netherland (or from the Delaware region) to the Chesapeake to undertake tobacco production or to conduct trade with English and Dutch tobacco planters. These included: Nicolas Boot, William Westerhouse, and the Varlets. Each merchant bound his or her commercial and familial networks to the Chesapeake economy.

Like their countrymen, Dutch women could also perceive a profit in tobacco. Anna Varlet was a dynamic and talented individual. Her father and uncle, Caspar and Pieter Varlet of Amsterdam, were involved with the Dutch West India Company and in the silk business, having been engaged in the Virginia tobacco trade from Amsterdam since the 1630’s.\textsuperscript{279} Anna and her husband, George Hack, immigrated to the Eastern Shore of Virginia in 1651.\textsuperscript{280} There, Anna engaged in the tobacco trade. Anna and

\textsuperscript{277} A dispute between arising in 1639 Casper and Daniel Verleth had Arendt Corsten Stam arrested in Amsterdam alleging he was attempting to remove himself from the jurisdiction of the magistrates during a pending matter. The notary, in an attempt to find Arendt, called at the residences of Dirck and Gillis Verbrugge and served notice on them. See Stadsarchief Amsterdam, Notarial Archives, Notary Jan Volkaertsz Olj, No. 1409/179-80, December 28, 1639.

\textsuperscript{278} David Pietersen De Vries wrote of his second voyage to America that in October 1635 he “began to sail up and down the river [the James River].” De Vries, Voyages from Holland to America, 112. Speculative trading voyages with the hope of filling a ship’s hold with tobacco in a timely manner seemed to be the norm for the Virginia trade. See Philip Alexander Bruce, Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Peter Smith, 1935), Vol. II, 363-4.

\textsuperscript{279} Caspar Varlet and his brother, Daniel, provided 1200 carolus guilders to Dirck Corssen Stam, for a tenth part of the vessel Rensseelaerswyck bound for New Netherland and Virginia. Some of these funds were for cargo and equipment. SAA, Notarial Archives, 414/173, dd 26-8-1636. In December 1639, both Caspar and Daniel were plaintiffs in a legal dispute over their share in a cargo of merchandise sent to Virginia aboard the Wapen van Leeuwarden that was traded for tobacco.

\textsuperscript{280} It is uncertain whether Anna emigrated from the Dutch Republic to New Netherland with her parents, Caspar Varlet and Judith Tentenier, and her siblings, aboard the Fortuyn in 1650, or whether
George owned a nine hundred acre plantation at Hack’s Point on Pungoteague Creek, two nearby islands totaling another hundred acres, and a four hundred acre plantation along Matchotank Creek. Each of the Virginia plantations had frontage on Chesapeake Bay. Here they were neighbors with some of the largest planters of the region, and in the company of other Dutch settlers, such as Willem Westerhouse and Hendrick Waggaman, both also former Amsterdam residents. Additionally, George Hack received a grant in 1658 of a four hundred acre track further up the bay, in Cecil County, Maryland. This plantation, called Anna Catharina Neck, was on the south side of the Bohemia River, across from Augustine Herman’s on the other side.281

As a colonial merchant trading between Holland, the West Indies, New Amsterdam, and Virginia, Anna Hack dealt in tobacco, furs, grain, manufactured goods such as furniture and cloth, and African slaves. In the family business dealings, both before and after the death of George, Anna herself purchased or had ships built for her, equipped and maintained them, and represented most of her own legal interests in court proceedings.282 Like the Stam brothers, operating her own ship based out of two locations on Chesapeake Bay reduced shipping costs, gave her the ability to collect from numerous

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282 For instance, in August 1652, “Mrs. Anna Varlet the wife of George Hacke dwelling in Var.” purchased the pinnace “Fortune” from the Dutch skipper, Juriaen Blanck, probably taking delivery in Virginia. In New Amsterdam, her father and her brother, Nicholas, stood security for her; her brother, William, delivered the payment there to Blanck. Purchase on 9 August 1652. Jeurien Blanck filed a notarial act in New Amsterdam by Dirck Schelluyne, recorded in Northampton County, Virginia on 13 October 1652.
tobacco growers all around the region as soon as the latest crops were ready, and, in turn, market her imported merchandise directly to Virginia and Maryland buyers. Her family’s connections in Amsterdam and their longstanding association with transatlantic merchant-shipper families such as the Bestevaers of Graft, Holland, undoubtedly gave her a competitive edge in the Dutch Republic as well. She was most likely was educated as Dutch women were of the day, able to read, write, and understand accounts.  

But two other factors would have contributed to her success as a merchant in the Chesapeake. The first was naturalization as an English subject. Anna and her husband became English subjects almost immediately upon moving to Virginia. In Northampton court on March 25, 1651, George Hacke signed an oath of allegiance to the commonwealth of England, then under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell. Their allegiance to England allowed the Hack-Varlet family to legally trade within the tightened rules imposed by the English Navigation Act of 1651, restricting trade with England to English ships with English crews. And because the family owned plantations in both Virginia and Maryland, the couple sought naturalization in

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284 Northampton (later Accomack) County, Virginia, March 25, 1651. With the advent of the Anglo-Dutch war in 1652, business interests and landholdings of Dutch residents in English colonies were in jeopardy. Several Dutch ships had been captured in Virginia waters during the Anglo-Dutch War of 1652-54, yet Virginians and Marylanders depended on Dutch trade. So, despite the fact that George Hack’s family lived in Amsterdam from the time he was a small boy, on March 28, 1653, George Hack declared in court that he was “a high German both by presents and birth born in the city of Cologyn,” – thus declaring to the world that he was not Dutch. The court then “ordered by the effect these lines be record that all persons whom it may concern take notice thereof.” In the March 1657/58 session of the Virginia House of Burgesses, George Hack was made a denizen of Virginia Colony, which gave him the full power to purchase, own, and sell lands, and to trade “to all intents and purposes as if he had been an Englishman borne.” Laws of Virginia, March 1657/8
Maryland. As a naturalized citizen, Anna could operate vessels in the Chesapeake, take on tobacco from English and Dutch tobacco planters, and transport the tobacco to England to satisfy the letter of the law.

And, arguably, the other factor for Anna’s success as a merchant in the Chesapeake was her commercial and familial association with Augustine Herrman. Herrman had married Anna’s sister, Jannetje, in New Amsterdam.

But if Anna became a naturalized English subject, how did she conduct business in Virginia in her own name during a time when women’s commercial activities were constrained by marriage? Anna had less difficulty conducting trade with merchants of Dutch origin, who may well have been the bulk of her trading partners. In such case, their cultural acceptance of women would not have been a barrier to trade. As well, Anna availed herself of New Netherland’s courts when required, a place where she need not worry that her gender would prohibit her from representing herself in court.

Occasionally, a Dutch merchant was compelled to immigrate to Virginia to

285 In a session of the Maryland Assembly on September 17th, 1663, it was ordered that “an Acte of Naturalizacon be prepared for Augustine Herman, and his Children and his brother in Lawe George Hack and his wife and Children.” But George died before the Maryland naturalizations were enacted, and in the spring of 1666, naturalizations of “Anna Hak George & Peter her Sonnes” along with the Augustine Herman family, were finalized. MSA 1: 462 “Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly January 1637/8 – September 1664”; MSA 2: 144, “Assembly Proceedings, April/May 1666.”

286 For instance, in 1652, Anna made several appearances in New Netherland’s court. She was sued by the alleged assignees of Augustine Herrman for a quantity of tobacco, brought by Anna to New Amsterdam, which the assignees claimed was sent in payment for a debt Herrman owed them. Anna replied that Herrman’s debt to the assignees had been paid and the tobacco she carried was her private property sent to her by her husband. Charles T. Gehring, trans. and ed., New York Historical Manuscripts, Volume V, Council Minutes, 1652-1654 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., Inc., 1983), 50. Anna was also a defendant in a matter by additional assignees of Augustine Herrman. The plaintiffs sought payment “for boards, a horse and a negro, sent to Virginia by Heerman before he absconded.” Anna denied the debts, except for the slave, and asked to be free from attachment. The court ordered Anna’s tobacco to be placed in the public store for security. Ibid., 45-6. Additionally, Anna had purchased slaves from Capt. Geurt Tyssen that Tyssen later sold to others. Anna sued Tyssen for the return of her slaves or their purchase price. The director and council referred the matter to arbitration. Ibid., 37, 41, 53-4. At no point in any of the legal activities she undertook for herself or in representing Herrman did any one question her authority as a woman to appear in court.
protect his investment or an investment of which he was a part. In 1649, Symon Overzee, of Rotterdam, received a power of attorney from Jan Jacobsen Palm, Francois Vermande, Jan de Colonia, Ysbrandt Vethuysen and Jacob Gerritsen Blenck, all merchants of Rotterdam. The power of attorney required Overzee to travel to Virginia and sell the merchants’ tobacco plantation in Kicketan.\(^{287}\) By November of 1652, Overzee’s son had been put in charge of the Virginia plantation. The exact reason for this was unknown. It might have been for a lack of purchasers for the plantation. Alternatively, the merchants might have received offers that were insufficient to cover the contracted debt owed on the plantation\(^{288}\) As the English Navigation Acts were in effect, the Rotterdam merchants may have seen ownership of a Virginia plantation as a means to evade English trade restrictions on Virginia tobacco. This course of action was hinted at by a sailor’s declaration in 1652. He stated that in 1650 he was in Virginia aboard a Dutch ship Witte Paard, captained by Dirck Wittepaard. Colonel Francis Erlyn and Simon Overzee, Jr., both residents of Virginia, purchased the ship soon after its arrival in Virginia. They

\(^{287}\) Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Not. V. Mustelius, Sept. 18, 1649. Overzee had participated in the Virginia tobacco trade for some time. In 1647, Ysbrant van Houten of Rotterdam contracted Captain Pieter Revertsen van der Swiep to take malt, beans and "other grains belonging to the brewers' business" to New Netherland. The fact that the contract ended in the Dutch colony and that the supercargo was Symon Overzee indicated that it was a journey, in actuality, for Virginia. Ibid., Not. V. Mustelius, August 26, 1647 and Ibid., Not. J. Delphius, nos. 139-139v, June 11, 1647. When Overzee senior may have left the Chesapeake is unknown. A Simon Overzee is mentioned in a contract of 1650 when Pieter Claessen residing in Warenscreek Bay in Virginia acknowledged to have received from this Rotterdam merchant the sum of 100 guilders on bottomry on all such goods the former had loaded in the ship De Stroo Yoncker of 200 tons. The return cargo was to be 25 oxheads of tobacco and one passenger. Ibid., Not. V. Mustelius, September 3, 1650. The charter party of the Stroo Yonker may be found in Ibid., Not. V. Mustelius, dd, September 3 and August 19, 1650.

\(^{288}\) There appears to be some confusion among historians about Simon Overzee. Historians such as Pagen assumed “Cornelis Symoasz Overzee” and “Simon Overzee” were the same individual. Later historians, such as Hatfield, repeated this mistake. However, Cornelis Symoasz Overzee was the individual granted a power of attorney by a group of Rotterdam merchants to manage a tobacco plantation at Kicketan. He subsequently left his son in Virginia, Simon, approximately 23 years old at the time, in his stead. Simon, the son, actively traded between Virginia and Rotterdam and along the Eastern seaboard. As well, he married into elite Virginian families. His first wife was Sarah Thoroughgood and his second wife was Elizabeth Willoughby (who would later take Isaac Allerton, Jr., as her third husband). Simon died in 1660 in Virginia.
rechristened her *The Merchant of Virginia* and sailed for New England in the spring of 1651.\(^{289}\) Of course, the voyage from Virginia to New England, under English territorial claims was from one English territory to another, and thus fell within the constraints of the English Navigation Acts. We would not have been informed about this journey and transfer of the ship, however, had she not subsequently been shipwrecked on the New England coast, resulting in an insurance claim on the Dutch insurance market.

Dutch settlement in the Chesapeake during the seventeenth century was for opportunistic reasons. It was a chance to secure tobacco directly from planters, whether Dutch or English, and to ship the tobacco directly to *patria* or to England. Often, a Dutch planter or merchant living in the Chesapeake would ship tobacco on his own *fluyt*. But, as often, the tobacco would be secured in a warehouse awaiting ships contracted as part of a commercial network of planters, merchants, shippers, and buyers – all related or well known to each other. Immigration to the Chesapeake by Dutch merchants, either from another early American colony or from the Dutch Republic, did not seem to meet with publicized hostility from English residents. While correspondence and legislation reflected geo-political concerns about Dutch trading activities in the Chesapeake, particularly during period of European conflict, once settled there, Dutch immigrants did not seem to encounter opposition. In fact, the overwhelming presence of the Dutch in the region had significant importance for English residents of the Chesapeake and their own personal financial well being. Dutch immigrants filled commercial voids in the Chesapeake.

\(^{289}\) Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, Not. B. de Gruyter, November 16, 1652.
Conclusion

What this chapter has surveyed was the development and the persistence of the tobacco trade that existed between Chesapeake plantation owners and Dutch merchants throughout the period of 1620 through 1664. The rise of tobacco as the engine that fueled the Chesapeake economy soon brought Dutch merchants to the Eastern Shore. With them, Dutch merchants brought Dutch and European goods for trade as well as needed credit to finance purchases associated with tobacco production.

By the time of the English Civil War, Dutch merchants had established themselves as integral to the Chesapeake tobacco trade. It was fortunate for the plantation owners. Arguably, without Dutch bottoms for shipping, access to European markets, and Dutch credit, the Chesapeake economy would have suffered tremendously during a period when the armed conflicts and political machinations between Parliamentarians and Royalists preoccupied English shipping. Such was the dependency on and loyalism to Dutch merchants and shipping, that when the Navigation Acts were passed in 1650 both Virginia planters and Dutch merchants expressed concern about the economic logic of such policy and various interest groups sought diplomatic intervention.

Dutch trade to the Chesapeake was not just undertaken from one Dutch staple port such as New Amsterdam or Rotterdam. Rather, large trading houses, partnerships, and individuals throughout the Dutch trading communities of the Atlantic World engaged in the Chesapeake tobacco trade. Additionally, English tobacco planters and merchants sought out Dutch merchants and by doing so created inter-colonial commercial networks.

Dutch colonial merchants, resident in New Netherland, found additional partners for trade among English tobacco planters in the Chesapeake. The inter-colonial trade
between New Netherland and the Chesapeake brought welcomed and frequent trade between the colonies not dependent on trans-Atlantic voyages. Like merchants from New England, Dutch authorities accommodated Chesapeake planters. As well, many Dutch chose to re-settle in the Chesapeake from New Netherland. Whether as merchants or as planters, cultural accommodation provided them access to Chesapeake society and additional commercial ties.

The relinquishment by the Dutch of New Netherland to England in 1664 did not curtail Dutch involvement in the tobacco trade. Rather, because trading networks between the Chesapeake and Amsterdam and Rotterdam had existed for decades, commercial relationships were well defined. Trading partners accommodated the changed circumstances.
Chapter 4

Yankee and Janneke
The Continuing Trade between
New England and Dutch Merchants,
1664-1750

Introduction

In March 1671, John Willoughby, captain of The Hopewell, made his final preparations for his return voyage to Boston from Amsterdam. As Amsterdam was the leading commercial center in Europe, the fifty-ton vessel was loaded with European goods. He made sure that his insurance premium reflected the value of his costly cargo should he suffer a loss along the way.

Willoughby accepted the terms of the Amsterdam insurance market. He received 2200 guilders from George Gotfright of Rotterdam as bodemerij, or bottomry. When a ship’s owner or captain took out a bottomry loan the loan was only repaid if the vessel or merchandise arrived safely at the destination port. Yet, this method of transferring risk was not purely an insurance contract. Willoughby agreed to pay a premium for the bottomry (known as opgelt). In this instance, Willoughby paid a twenty per cent buyer’s premium on the loan’s value, or roughly 440 guilders. Additionally, the bottomry loan was repayable to Gotfright within ten months in either Amsterdam or Rotterdam after the successful completion of the voyage.

290 British etymologist, Michael Quinion, asserts that the origin of the term Yankee, "most likely ... came from a nickname, Janke, a diminutive form of Jan, the Dutch equivalent to John." Janke is not only a nickname, but also a surname. In New Netherland, Janke, alongside Jan, Janneke, Jankin, and several other variants, was a common surname. After the British ousted the Dutch administration in 1664, Dutch families began to spell their names with Y- instead of J- in English-speaking contexts. Even today, families spelling their name Yanke are found in the Hudson Valley alongside others using the more traditional spelling Janke. This was used as a nickname for a Dutch-speaking American in colonial times. See Michael Quinion, Ballyhoo, Buckaroo, and Spuds: Ingenious Tales of Words and Their Origins (Washington, D.C.: Penguin Books, 2004), 270.
Typical of this particular circum-Atlantic trading network, Willoughby had begun his voyage in Boston, sailed along the eastern seaboard of the American colonies to the Chesapeake. Once there, he traded with the local planters living along the waterways feeding into the Chesapeake. He loaded his ship with tobacco and sailed across the Atlantic to Amsterdam. As he passed Texel, interested parties in Amsterdam would have heard the news of the arrival of another tobacco ship before he moored. Willoughby would have unloaded his ship with Dutch tobacco merchants waiting at the pier.

As it was March, Willoughby would have been anxious to set sail again. Boston’s harbor would be free of ice and the Atlantic crossing would be easier on both his crew and his ship. The journey across the Atlantic would have brought him into Boston’s harbor sometime in April or May. Then after unloading his cargo and making any necessary repairs to his ship, he would set sail again for the Chesapeake arriving in the autumn as the slaves harvested the tobacco crop. He and his crew would stay through winter to finish all of their trading. In the spring, the cycle would begin again, and Willoughby would journey back to Amsterdam with a load of tobacco.291

For Willoughby, and his trading partners, his actions were customary. Despite two recent wars between England and the Dutch Republic, and one looming on the horizon, Willoughby was free to trade in Amsterdam, enter into contracts, and confirm his trading relationships. His trade was welcomed. So, too, were the European goods he brought to Boston. And, when he called on tobacco planters in the Chesapeake, they knew he travelled directly to the Dutch Republic to sell their tobacco. And, yet, nearly all of Willoughby’s actions disregarded the Navigation Acts and the economic policy of

291 See SAA, Notarial No. 3206/251 (1671).
mercantilism. I would assert, that despite widely publicized regulations, intermittent enforcement, and the best intentions, English merchants and their Dutch trading partners, until well into the eighteenth century, derided England’s Navigation Acts and economic policies.

This chapter surveys the continued trade between the Dutch Republic and New England merchants during the period of 1664 through 1750. It was a period beset with wars in Europe and aggression that reached North American shores. Throughout it all, merchants in the New England colonies sustained and renewed trading networks with their Dutch colleagues.

The first part of this chapter evaluates the conflict over trade that existed between England and the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century. The Navigation Acts looked good on paper and English policymakers intended the laws to eliminate or significantly curtail Dutch trade competition with the English. But the laws failed to resonate with American colonists who did not abandon their transatlantic trading behavior. For any merchant, trade was about profit. And consumerism, even at this nascent stage of development, was about supplying goods the consumer wanted at a price the consumer was willing to pay. Enforcement of the Navigation Acts during most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was sketchy at best and New England and Dutch merchants continued to trade with each other.

The next portion of this chapter assesses New England’s reaction to the Navigation Acts. Colonial officials urged that the Acts not have application to America stressing how the Acts would discourage trade. Of course, part of their concern related to their trading relationship with the Dutch. The importance of the trading relationship with
the Dutch for New England merchants should not be underestimated. Commerce with merchants in the Dutch Republic offered New Englanders minimal barriers of entry, acculturated commercial institutions, and less restrictive taxation policies. New England’s ships carried regional goods to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. New England merchants used Dutch bottoms for shipping. The notarial records reveal how New Englanders understood and applied Dutch legal and commercial procedures to their advantage, as well as how these same colonists ignored the Navigation Acts.

The third section considers the response by the English government to the continued foreign trade undertaken by New England merchants after the passage of the Navigation Acts. English colonial officials, such as Edward Randolph, take notice of the persistent commercial activity of foreign ships, including Dutch bottoms, in Boston’s harbor laden with non-English goods in contravention of the Navigation Acts. As representatives of the English government, and mostly unsympathetic with colonial rational about the Navigation Acts, administrators from England urged more stringent enforcement. While some enforcement of the restricting legislation did occur, it was never enough to deter New England’s trade with the Dutch.

The next division of this chapter discusses the involvement of the Hope family with New England merchants. The Hopes had established merchant houses in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and would later develop into one of the largest banking houses in Europe. By 1730, the family began to institute commercial links with New England merchants. These links were strengthened with the arrival of a son, Henry, who lived in Boston and established bonds with the elite level of New England merchants and, in turn, expanded their networks of trade through his family’s merchant house. It was a
unique relationship that should not have existed in New England because of the Navigation Acts, but did so because the Dutch commercial house saw an opportunity for trade in New England.

As the eighteenth century continued, so, too, did Dutch trade with New England. The next portion of this chapter explores individual Dutch merchants and the trade with New England colonies. Various New England ports developed specialties of trade which Dutch merchants recognized and encouraged. Dutch smuggling increased during this period, particularly for commodities such as tea, which Dutch merchants could supply directly to New England and for less expense than their English counterparts. New England merchants were willing participants in the smuggling activities. While it has been argued that New England merchants symbolically protested English policies as part of the lead up to the American Revolution, it is here in the 1730s and 1740s that American consumers protested by knowingly purchasing contraband tea in contravention to the despised Navigation Acts.

Finally, the last part of this chapter assesses Dutch military aggression in North America during the Third-Anglo Dutch War. A privateering commission issued by the Dutch to a Dutch sea captain turned into taking physical possession of Acadia in New France. New England colonial officials expressed no concern about the Dutch physical presence to their north and, indeed, sent ships to trade with the Dutch. However, when the Dutch privateers started attacking New England trading ships, events took a markedly different turn. The incident, nevertheless, suggests a familiarity and comfort by New England officials with the Dutch over the French, particularly if it founded increased trading opportunities. While the Dutch presence in Acadia was eliminated, and the
English government had had no time to respond to events, it does imply a certain mentalité by New Englanders of what the Dutch could offer to New England.

The Conflict over Trade

In 1670, England and the Dutch Republic were between wars. Between 1665 and 1667, the two nations had fought each other at sea and in Europe during the conflict known as the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The physical hostilities concluded in 1667 with the signing of the Treaty of Breda.

That conflict, much like the First Anglo-Dutch War, centered on mercantile competition. The English sought to take over Dutch trade routes and colonies while excluding the Dutch from England’s colonial possessions. Merchants had engaged in shipping from English colonies in America and Surinam for a decade, in contradiction of the Navigation Acts, thus cheating the nation of critical tax revenues, or so argued English administrators. But the Acts had fundamental flaws from their inception.

From 1664 through 1750, the concept of the Navigation Acts looked good on paper. English administrators intended that the legislation would eliminate Dutch and other competitors in the carrying trade to and from the American colonies. One historian has contended that,

removing the Dutch and incorporating the English colonies’ trade fully within the empire would not be as simple as conquering Dutch colonies (of which there were few) and passing restrictive laws. Instead, it would require changing the commercial habits and culture of colonists. That is, officials could not extend

292 The Navigation Acts enacted by Parliament in 1651, 1660 and 1663, were pieces of legislation intended to work in conjunction with English economic policies emphasizing mercantilism. Generally, the acts reserved for England the right to trade with its colonies and prohibited the import of goods of non-European origin unless transported in ships flying the English flag.
their fiscal-military state across the Atlantic until locals eschewed their cross-national, flexible origins and chose to conform to new imperial standards. The years between 1624 and 1713 were distinguished, therefore, both by new expressions of state power and by the greater realization that mercantilism rested on individual behavior. It would be the willingness of colonists to abandon an earlier cross-national Atlantic community and accept membership in the British Empire, presumably on the same terms as those in the metropole, which would ultimately make a mercantilist empire possible.\textsuperscript{293}

But the reality was that individuals did not have such willingness and sought opportunity and profit outside of England’s legal strictures. The enumerated goods, considered valued American products, always had ready markets outside of England or its colonies. Taking the time to ship goods through England and pay English import duties was both costly and time consuming to many profit-conscious merchants.\textsuperscript{294} Occasionally, merchants were caught and brought to trial.\textsuperscript{295} But they were willing to take such a risk because enforcement mechanisms in the form of human capital were scarce. Additionally, profit drove merchant’s individual behavior to evade existing enforcement.

Commercial border crossing continued because buyers and sellers paid little notice to nationality.\textsuperscript{296} On an individual, quotidian level, merchants sought opportunity

\textsuperscript{293} Christian J. Koot, Empire at the Periphery: British Colonists, Anglo-Dutch Trade, and the Development of the British Atlantic, 1621-1713 (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 5. Koot examines New York, Barbados, and the English Leeward Islands. His geographical selectivity is problematic, particularly when looking at the West Indies. Most voyages in this period visited multiple ports in the West Indies and frequently traded along the North American coast. As well, Koot asserts that colonists shifted away from Dutch trade. My archival research in Amsterdam and Rotterdam contradicts his assertions.

\textsuperscript{294} The list of enumerated goods initially included wool, sugar, tobacco, indigo, ginger, and dyes. Later, rice, naval stores, copper, and furs were added to the list.

\textsuperscript{295} As late as 1682, merchants who had been accused of violating the acts successfully evaded prosecution on the grounds that ‘those Acts are not the Laws of this Colony, because not sufficiently published as required in Law Book.’ See Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, ed. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, 6 vols. (1854; Boston, 1968), 4: 73 and 5:155, 211. In 1663, the General Court had made arrangements for collecting bonds in accordance with the Act of 1660, but did not alter the laws and liberties to include them.

\textsuperscript{296} John Locke advocated an early description of supply and demand and their relationship. In this description demand is rent: “The price of any commodity rises or falls by the proportion of the number of buyer and sellers” and “that which regulates the price... [of goods] is nothing else but their
and profit and nationality was a barrier easily overcome. Concerned, the English government attempted to provoke compliance by lowering duties. The government’s efforts occasionally worked and stemmed non-compliant trading patterns. Nevertheless, trade in the Atlantic world still depended on trust. To become a participant in an established merchant network, a merchant needed to have an excellent reputation, to subscribe to uniform principles including honesty, and to have access to a formal legal system (contracts, courts, law). Colonial merchants participated in a more multi-faceted and multi-layered institutional reality than the Navigation Acts, other reform measures, and English economic policy took into account. Dutch trading partners offered American colonists a commercial realm with minimal barriers of entry, acculturated commercial institutions, and less restrictive taxation policies. They purchased raw materials and agricultural products at higher prices than their English counterparts without any additional legal or administrative impediments.

In England, pamphlets vilified Dutch traders. Details about the commercial behavior of Dutch merchants might not all have been accurate, but promoters calculated that the tracts would excite much anger at the Dutch among the English. For that reason, whenever the exigencies of a diplomatic situation between the Dutch and English

quantity in proportion to their rent.” See John Locke, Some Considerations on the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the Raising of the Value of Money (1691).

necessitated a rekindling of public resentment against the Dutch, pamphlets became useful propaganda tools. English officials utilized pamphlets prior to the onset of the Second Anglo-Dutch War. A pamphlet entitled “The Character of Holland,” originally published in 1653, was reprinted repeatedly during the early 1660’s. It encouraged Englishmen to view Holland as “This indigested vomit of the Sea/Fell to the Dutch by just Propriety.”

Seeking to wrest commercial supremacy away from the Dutch, the English went on a series of geo-political conquests. From 1663, with the capture of Dutch trading posts and colonies in West Africa by Robert Holmes, in the service of the Royal African Company, to the 1664 takeover of New Netherland in North America, the English sought to suppress Dutch trade in regions of commercial importance to the English. By 1665, the nations were again at war. The war was costly to the English. And disaster struck domestically as plague and fire devastated London.

Despite, or perhaps because of, England’s defeat in the Second Anglo-Dutch War, contemporaneous political instability, and commercial upheaval in London resulting from the Great Fire, Dutch merchants found a welcome reception in New England. Certainly, the economic importance of the North American colonies lacked consensus in England. England needed to regroup politically and economically. The existing commercial void was not lost on Dutch merchants.

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English mercantilist policies encouraged its colonies to concentrate on the production of crops that were profitable for England in world trade. Nevertheless, focusing on one distinct staple rendered the individual colonies susceptible to the vagaries of demand for particular staples. Before long, the economy of many individual colonies became almost entirely dependent upon the production of a single product. For instance, Virginia and Maryland were dependent on tobacco; South Carolina on rice; and North Carolina on naval stores.  

New England colonists learned early on that the region’s wealth would not be based on farming. That forced colonists living in the region to look for export commodities attractive to markets in England, Europe, and the West Indies. New England turned to a diverse array of activities that evolved over time in response to emerging opportunities and challenges including: ship building, shipping, fishing, producing livestock for export, harvesting forests, and whaling. The result was a more complex and more productive economy than colonies with one or two dominant products such as sugar or tobacco. Single staple colonies tended to remain dependent on their dominant product, failing to develop the web of activities that contributed to growth in New England.

Dutch merchants were there, of course, to provide England’s colonies with valuable trade goods from England and Europe and to provide shipping for agricultural

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300 John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607-1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 29-32 (discussion on the staple approach to colonial economic development); 91-111 (New England); 189-208 (the Middle Colonies); 117-143 (the Chesapeake).

301 Ibid.

products and natural resources found in America. Colonial merchants and governments understood the importance of Dutch commercial networks and shipping to their overall economies. And, unlike during the period of England’s Civil War when colonists were just finding their economic footing, English colonists in this subsequent period 1664 through 1750, felt the direct effects of mercantilism.303

New England and Dutch Trade

New Englanders were pleased with neither mercantilism nor the Navigation Acts. In 1678, the Massachusetts General Court urged England’s Attorney General:

That for the Acts in for trade and passed in Parljament for incouraging trade and navigation, wee humbly conceive, according to the usual sayings of the learned in the lawe, that the lawes of England are bounded within the fower seas and doe not reach America.304

The Court further advised the Attorney General that the Acts were “a discouragement to trade, and a great damage to his Majesty’s plantation.”305

Throughout most of this period, when merchants and colonial officials in Massachusetts wrote in terms of mercantilism, it had a distinctively inward perspective. It was focused on the welfare of Massachusetts Bay, rather than that of the British Empire. As it turned to trade, New England began to take advantage of the burgeoning Atlantic economy. New England merchants joined Dutch trading networks in one of

303 Mercantilism was the prevailing economic theory in England. Its focus upon the national welfare may have been a thinly veiled rationalization of the merchant class seeking wider markets for its goods. The policy privileged exports from England and established protectionist provisions against competition from imported goods. England endeavored to provide its citizens with a monopoly of the resources and trade outlets of its colonies. Trade between New England and Dutch merchants was never going to be viewed favorably by English economic policy makers. See, e.g., E.A.J. Johnson, “Some Evidence of Mercantilism in the Massachusetts-Bay,” New England Quarterly, 1 (1928): 371-95; Wesley Frank Craven, The Colonies in Transition, 1660-1713 (New York: Harper Collins, 1968).
305 Ibid.
several manners. When Dutch ships came into New England’s ports, merchants arranged for shipping aboard the vessels. Additionally, New England ships carried regional commodities to Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Bernard Bailyn has asserted about New England’s economy, “Despite acts of navigation, large increases in population, and changes in both the quantity and types of supply and demand, the character of the economic system as it emerged” between 1640 and 1660 “remained essentially the same until just before the American Revolution.”

He further maintained that

Commercial contacts in seventeenth-century New England were relationships between individuals whose personal lives played important roles in their economic activities. The creation of new ties was less an impersonal economic transaction than the actual coming together of men interested in similar types of enterprises. Innovations in New England commerce, therefore, depended to a large extent on the movements of men. And since commercial relation with the English-speaking world had been outlined by the first generation of merchants, new types of contacts tended to link New England to England’s main rival in the colonial world, France. The men who introduced New England to this alien world included not only immigrants with different backgrounds from those of the first settlers, but French freebooters, merchants, and commercial agents as well.

I would concur with Bailyn’s perception, but for reasons significantly different from his. There is no doubt that New England had critical economic ties to England from the founding of individual colonies. New England also had economic ties with other nations including the Dutch Republic and France. New England merchants had commercial relationships with Dutch merchants, both on the continent and in New Netherland, beginning in the 1620’s. “The character of the economic system as it

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307 Ibid., 144.
308 Recent scholarly work in the field of French Atlantic History has emphasized the importance of illegal contraband trade between New England and the French colonies. See, e.g., James S. Pritchard, *In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Pritchard has argued that contraband was much more important than legal commerce. Additionally, New England merchants actively traded to the French West Indies.
emerged” between 1640 and 1660 did remain the same – New Englanders established valued trading networks with individual Dutch merchants and trading houses both before and during that period; and trading relationships with the Dutch continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Bailyn also asserted, “The creation of new ties was less an impersonal economic transaction than the actual coming together of men interested in similar types of enterprises.” New commercial ties between New Englanders and the Dutch existed on both a personal and an impersonal level. Both Dutch traders from New York and New England traders plying the coastal trade had personal economic transactions and established continued networks of exchange. Nevertheless, Dutch ships from the continent were also welcome in New England’s ports. Some might have come directly from the Dutch Republic with specific cargos known to trade well in the English colonies. Others might have called at ports in the West Indies, the Chesapeake, and at New York, before mooring in New London, Rhode Island ports, or Boston. In such instances, ship’s captains acted as commercial intermediaries or supercargos in transporting goods, most often, to the Dutch Republic and selling them on behalf of a particular merchant.

As Bailyn suggested, New England merchants traded with France.309 However, the most significant trading nation of the period was the Dutch Republic and archival sources reveal that merchants from the Dutch Republic and New England maintained strong commercial ties with each other. Like France, the Dutch Republic and England had experienced an extended rivalry. Although the Dutch Republic was no longer a

309 Bailyn does not make a distinction between French Catholic or Huguenot merchants. Given the religious make-up of New England’s merchant class, this trade was most likely with French Huguenot merchants.
political threat on the North American continent after 1675, the two nations maintained a bitter global rivalry over contested commercial expansion. Mercantilism was still the predominant economic theory of the day and dominated English political policy.

New England merchants consistently ignored the terms of the Navigation Acts and not only encouraged Dutch ships to anchor in port, but prepared their own goods for shipment on Dutch vessels or arranged for the transportation of goods on New England ships directly to the Dutch Republic. The Dutch offered New Englanders a variety of wares, expanded business markets throughout Europe, reliable credit, and they traditionally paid higher prices than the English for the merchant’s goods.

The trade that occurred between New England merchants and their Dutch colleagues from 1664 through 1750 had a certainly familiarity to it. Merchant networks formed with a distinctive Atlantic focus. The same networks expanded or contracted as necessary. Often, trading voyages would include the West Indies, but that was not a prerequisite. New England merchants and ship captains appeared before English-speaking notaries in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Notaries recorded their declarations, contracts, and instructions and made them available for subsequent legal action, if any.


313 Many, but not all, notarial acts were recorded in English. Some were not recorded in English because the particular New England merchant involved may have been able to read Dutch. However, some savvy New England merchants may have chosen to keep written declarations or contracts in Dutch to avert knowledge by competing parties or the English government.
Such procedures were accepted by New England merchants and formed part of the ordinary course of commercial transactions with Dutch merchants.

In what sort of business did New England merchants and their Dutch counterparts engage? Often, notaries recorded insurance agreements, *bodemerij* contracts, or bottomry bonds on ships. The masters of ships declared where ships were traveling and the parties insuring the ships and/or its contents were noted along with the terms of the agreements.\(^{314}\) Or, notaries recorded the complaints of ordinary sailors particularly with respect to pay disputes or conditions aboard ship.\(^{315}\)

The notarial records offer glimpses of individuals going about their trade with the benefit of historical knowledge about what fate awaits them. In 1675, Jacob Leisler was an ordinary merchant, building what would become a substantial colonial fortune. By 1688, the English Revolution had divided the people of New York into two well-defined factions. In general, the small shopkeepers, small farmers, sailors, poor traders and artisans allied against the patroons, rich fur-traders, merchants, lawyers, and crown officers. The former were led by Leisler, the latter by Peter Schuyler, Nicholas Bayard, Stephen Van Cortlandt, William Nicolls and other representatives of the aristocratic Hudson Valley families. But that lay in the future and Leisler’s trading activities included appearances before Amsterdam notaries and memorialized trading relationships

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\(^{314}\) See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 3206/251 (1671), in which the master of the *Hopewell* sailing to New England from Amsterdam received financial underwriting for the voyage and for *bodemerij* from George Gotfrith of Rotterdam.

\(^{315}\) See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 3222/319 (1675), in which New England sailors declared the custom of their region that all hired sailors received one third of their monthly payment in cash and the remaining two thirds in goods. The ship had come from New England, picked up tobacco in Virginia, and voyaged to Amsterdam. It was set to return to New England. However, it seemed the sailors aboard wanted to take advantage of selling their portion of wages in the Amsterdam market; see also SAA, Notarial No. 2560/828-829 (1675) where New England sailors demanded to be dismissed from service because the captain had changed the ports to which the ship would be traveling and the ship would not be returning to Boston.
with New England merchants. In one instance, Leisler contracted to ship 25 to 30 tons of merchandise to Boston with Captain Nicolas Skimer aboard The Dove out of Boston. They agreed on a freight price of three pounds sterling per ton and that extra lay days spent in Amsterdam loading the merchandise would incur a 30-shilling per day charge.\textsuperscript{316} Leisler used Amsterdam as a commercial center not only to purchase merchandise for another market other than his own, but also to find an appropriate vessel to ship the merchandise.

Occasionally, pirates would attack a ship bound to or coming from New England. The captain, ordinary sailors, and any merchants traveling with the ship would appear before a notary to provide statements about events. The statements were particularly important if the ship owner and merchants sending cargo aboard had taken insurance out on the voyage.\textsuperscript{317}

New England ship owners often availed themselves of ready buyers in Amsterdam and sold their ships, or parts therein, to merchants. Notaries recorded the terms of the agreement between the parties. John Osborne, a captain out of New England, sold a three quarter interest in his ship The Hopewel in Amsterdam in 1676. Elisser Makernes and his principals were the purchasers of the majority interest in the ship for 600 guilders.\textsuperscript{318} As well, New England merchants felt free to purchase vessels in Amsterdam when the opportunity arose. In 1677 Jan Willemsen Ongeluck and the other co-owners of the ship de Witte Duijf sold their interests in the fluit to Pieter Dartjaque and Samuel Shrimpton, merchants from Boston. Dartjaque and Shrimpton renamed the ship

\textsuperscript{316} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 3222/387 (1675), involving the ship The Dove.  
\textsuperscript{317} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 4304/227 (1676) in which the captain and sailors aboard The Elisabeth bound for Boston from Amsterdam encountered a pirate ship.  
\textsuperscript{318} SAA, Notarial No. 4777 (1676).
Samuel en de Jan and took a 15/16 interest in the vessel. Jan de Bast [John Bast], a citizen of Limerick, Ireland undertook the ship’s command for a 1/16 ownership interest.319

Response by the English Government

Representatives of the English government did take notice of New England’s merchants’ behavior. Take Edward Randolph, for example. An English colonial administrator, Randolph was best known for provoking significant changes in the structure of the England's North American colonies during the late seventeenth century. His reports to the Lords of Trade convinced King Charles II to revoke the charter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1684. As secretary of the unpopular Dominion of New England, Randolph argued for tighter crown control over proprietary and charter colonies that previously lacked such oversight.320 Given the difficult task of enforcing England's Navigation Acts, he faced local popular and political resistance. His actions contributed

319 SAA, Notarial No. 3041/46 (1677). For minutes record the parties’ preparation of the ship for a voyage. See SAA, Notarial No. 4777/434 (1677) (bodermanij for the ship as well as sailing plans); SAA, Notarial No. 2159/229 (1677) (John Bast, the ship’s captain, acknowledged receipt of monies form Dartjaque and Shrimpton for repair costs to the vessel and foodstuffs for the voyage); SAA, Notarial No. 2159/237 (1677) (acknowledgement by Thomas Whiting of Amsterdam to provide a bill to Dartjaque when Dartjaque arrived in Drontem [Drontheim], Norway); SAA, Notarial No. 2159/242 (1677) (acknowledgement by Peter Dartjque that the ship lay at Texel ready for its voyage to the West Indies with the last port being Hispaniola); SAA, Notarial No. 2159/244 (1677) (promise between Peter Dartjaque and John Bast that in the event of the death of either on the voyage, the other will complete the voyage. Possible administrators of estates also appointed).
320 The English government established the Dominion of New England (1686–89) as an administrative union of its New England colonies. The dominion was ultimately a failure because the area it encompassed, composed of present-day Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, was too large for a single governor to manage. Its governor, Sir Edmund Andros, was highly unpopular, and had engaged in actions that offended significant segments of the New England population. After news of the Glorious Revolution in England reached Boston in 1689, the local citizenry arrested Andros and his officers. Leisler's Rebellion in New York City deposed the dominion’s lieutenant governor, Francis Nicholson. See, e.g., David S. Lovejoy, The Glorious Revolution in America (Middleton: Wesleyan University Press, 1987), 179-219.
to the development of England's colonial administrative infrastructure, but he remained unpopular in the Dominion. During the 1689 Boston revolt, which deposed Andros and overthrew the Dominion, he was jailed. In writing to the Privy Council in 1690, Randolph intimated that the “chief ends of their Imprisoning me were to Restore to themselves a free Trade for their Vessels to all parts of Europe…To make Boston a Store and Magazine to supply their Matys Plantations with all sorts of European Commodities.”

Randolph observed what was happening in the colonial harbors. In 1689, he provided an “An Accot of Severall Ships & Vessells Trading Irregularly” in New England. Randolph’s narrative described harbors teeming with activity, with ships arriving from and departing for various locations in the Atlantic world. He witnessed numerous Dutch ships, or colonial American ships recently returned from Holland, all having ignored the ports of England and all in contravention of the Navigation Acts. For instance, Randolph wrote about numerous vessels coming from Holland including: “The Bark Elizabeth of Boston Caleb Lamb Mar directly from Holland to New Haven in Connecticut Colony he unlished part there and the remainder at Boston” (September 25); “A Ship of 150 Tuns directly from Holland unlished her Loading at New London in Connecticut Colony loaded Lumber, Thirty horses and took in some of her Hollands Goods and saild to Barbados” (October 10); “The Brigantine Mary of Boston Thomas Carter Mar from Holland directly with Holland Commodities, John Borland a Scotchman Merchant” (November 28); “The Ketch Jonathan of Salem Stephen Robins Mar arrived at

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Salem with Goods directly from Holland” (December 13); “Christopher Clarke Mate to Capt Bant lately gon to Holland to sail from Amsterdam in a Hol-land Vessell to Boston “ (December 13). 322 He urged the Privy Council to send over an officer duly qualified to uphold the Acts of Trade and dependent on no one other than the Lords of the Treasury.

Perhaps Randolph lived long enough to see prosecutions undertaken against inter-imperial trade in contravention to the Navigation Acts. In 1703, John Borland, a prominent Scots merchant based in Boston, was tried by the English High Court of Admiralty on a charge of exporting goods from Boston via Curaçao to Amsterdam in contravention of the Navigation Acts. 323 Randolph had earlier drawn attention to Borland’s arrival in Boston from Holland. The Amsterdam archives provide numerous examples of Borland’s trading activities with the Dutch. For instance, in September 1688, Borland appeared before a notary acknowledging his indebtedness to assorted Dutch merchants for providing goods on credit – iron pots and kettles from Wolfert Beeltsnijder, 55 rolls of Holland canvas from Gerrit Blaeu, undisclosed goods from Pieter Reijn, and fancy articles from Messrs. Boucheret and John Soijer. Each of the merchants assumed the risk of sale and gave him credit terms of twelve months in which repay the specified sum. Delay beyond the one-year term required Borland to pay interest on the principal sum of six percent. 324 Nor was there mention in the notarial records of

322 See Randolph, Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, 231.
324 See SAA, Notarial no. 5255 (1688).
Borland’s goods passing through a port in England in compliance with the Navigation Acts.\textsuperscript{325}

Borland’s trading ventures frequently included Hero Moij of Amsterdam, who had commercial networks throughout the Atlantic world.\textsuperscript{326} Although Moij more commonly traded to New York, the Chesapeake, or Surinam in the West Indies, he did occasionally have business interests in New England.\textsuperscript{327} Moij entrusted Borland in 1696 and 1699 with powers of attorney “for all his business there to observe,” which suggests something more substantial than the occasional foray in to New England.\textsuperscript{328}

Borland was one of the few colonial merchants trading with the Dutch that was prosecuted pursuant to regulations enacted under the Navigation Acts. Still, Borland’s prosecution did not curtail trading activity between New England and Dutch merchants.

**The Hope Family and New England**

As New England’s economy matured, additional Dutch merchants took notice of the continuing opportunities for profit. As early as 1730, merchants who would found, arguably, the most famous Dutch bank over the next two centuries, Hope & Co., began to

\textsuperscript{325} Borland wrote to Andrew Russell in Rotterdam about their cargoes being scrutinized by customs agents in Amsterdam for “not touching in England.” See John Borland to Andrew Russell, 11/21 August 1686, RH 15/106/583/1, National Archives of Scotland; John Borland to Andrew Russell, July-August 1688, RH 15/106/643/2-6, National Archives of Scotland.

\textsuperscript{326} See Andrew Russell Papers, GD 1/885, RH 15/106, RH 801, National Archives of Scotland. The Moij (or Mooij) family were prominent merchants in seventeenth and early eighteenth century Amsterdam.

\textsuperscript{327} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 5851 (1694); SAA, Notarial No. 5852/177 (1694) in which Moij had cargo aboard a ship filled with Virginia tobacco and goods from Boston that suffered more than 3000 gilders worth of damage from a storm near Boston.

\textsuperscript{328} See SAA, Notarial No. 5856/265 (1696); SAA, Notarial No. 5871/376 (1699). Upon Moij’s death, his widow, Catherine de Vlieger, continued the family’s commercial networks with New England. Henry Mackintosh, of Bristol, Rhode Island, appointed her his Amsterdam agent. Mackintosh owned a plantation named “Bristol” in Suriname and Catherine collected annual rents from his tenants. See SAA, Notarial No. 7969II/21 (1715); SAA, Notarial No.7975II/24 (1717).
establish commercial links with New England merchants.\textsuperscript{329}

Originally from Scotland, the Hope family settled in Rotterdam at the end of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{330} Archibald Hope and his sons established merchant houses in Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Boston.\textsuperscript{331} They offered services in shipping, storage, insurance, and credit in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In 1720, the family merchant house barely survived the financial crisis that shook European finance on a commercial and personal level.\textsuperscript{332} Many merchants and bankers in the Dutch Republic experienced bankruptcy. For the Hope family, the economic crisis had the greatest impact on Archibald’s son, Henry, who subsequently left Rotterdam in 1730 for America and established a radial for the family’s trading network in Boston.

\textsuperscript{329} See SAA, Notarial No.8659/166 (1730).
\textsuperscript{331} Henry Hope, Archibald’s father, lived in Rotterdam by the 1660’s, having emigrated from Scotland, most likely expressing resistance to perceived Stuart tyranny. Henry and his wife Anna had Archibald christened in the Scottish church in Rotterdam in 1664. On the migration of Scots to Rotterdam see Douglas Catterall, Community without Borders: Scots Migrants and the Changing Face of Power in the Dutch Republic, c. 1600-1700 (Leiden: Brill, 2002) and Douglas Catterall, “Fortress Rotterdam: Rotterdam’s Scots Community and the Covenanter Cause, 1638-1688 in David Worthington, ed., British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 87-106. In the 1680’s, as a consequence of a decline in business, Henry removed his family and business from Rotterdam to London. Although Henry died in England, Archibald returned to Rotterdam as a merchant. There, Archibald married the daughter of a wealthy Amsterdam button-maker, Anna Claus, who, like Archibald, was a Quaker. The family’s Quaker beliefs connected them with other Quaker merchants throughout Europe and North America. Archibald and Anna’s sons who engaged in trade included Archibald Jr. (1698–1734), Isaac, Zachary, Henry, Thomas (1704–1779), and Adrian (1709–1781). All of their children were born in Rotterdam.
\textsuperscript{332} Three financial bubbles - French, British, and Dutch - began at different times, but all burst around September 1720. The South Sea Bubble, named after the British South Sea Company, lasted from January to September 1720. The Mississippi Bubble, named after the Mississippi Company in France, had begun earlier, in 1719. The Dutch bubble started in March 1720 and derived from the other two bubbles. Dutch investors invested later, in the spring and summer of 1720. They mostly ignored Mississippi shares, but eagerly went after South Sea shares when they hit the market. Investors and promoters referred to the trade as "Wind-Handel" and "Wind-Negotie," (both meaning Wind-Trade), because the trader often did not own the shares. Dutch companies formed in the Bubble tended to be associated with specific cities. See F.P. Groeneveld, De economische crisis van het jaar 1720 (Groningen: Noordhoff 1940); C.H. Slechte, “De Maatschappij van Assurantie, Disonteering en Beleening der stad Rotterdam van 1720, bekeken naar haar produktiefactoren over de periode 1720-1874,” Rotterdams jaarboekje 7th series, 8 (1970): 252-310
Of the remaining sons, Archibald, Jr., and Thomas would establish offices for the family in Amsterdam, later joined by brother Adrian in 1734. Isaac and Zachary inherited the Rotterdam business, specializing in trafficking German migrants from the Rhineland to Pennsylvania. The house of Thomas & Adrian Hope was renowned for its consistent policy of covering risks and for the high degree of continuity in its commodity trading in the face of changing political circumstances. Despite the risks, the Hopes engaged in commodity trading on a widespread scale. They had originally concentrated on trade with England, but by the 1730’s, their activities embraced the size and dynamics of the Atlantic trade and extended to incorporate the whole of Europe, North America, and the West Indies.

Henry Hope became the family’s commercial link in America. The family followed a recognized commercial practice that established branches in different trade or financial capitals or geographic regions with family members. While neither blood ties nor a common religion guaranteed commercial proficiency, it did facilitate bonds of trust among merchants. Thus, Henry’s brothers in Amsterdam and Rotterdam could rely upon Henry to serve the family’s commercial interests in Boston.

333 The title of the Amsterdam merchant house was changed to Thomas & Adrian Hope. See SAA, Notarial no. 8613/1726 (1734).
334 From the 1720's through the 1760's, the Hope brothers organized passage for Quakers out of Rotterdam to Pennsylvania. The City of Rotterdam and the local Baptist church paid for the transports since the Quakers had no money and the city needed to do something about the refugees. See, e.g., SAA, Brants Archives, 1638. See also Marianne Wokeck, Trade in Strangers: The Beginnings of Mass Migration to North America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), 69-73.
335 Arguably, as the family’s success grew, other Dutch merchant houses looked at their commercial practices and established branches in North America.
336 In time, Henry’s son, Henry (1735-1811), left America for schooling in London. In 1754, he became apprenticed to the well-known banking firm, Gurnell, Hoare, & Harman. Henry Hope the younger is usually referred to as Scottish, though he was born in America and immigrated to the Dutch Republic to join the family business in 1762. Upon his joining, the name of the merchant house was formally changed to Hope & Co. Henry was the driving force behind the company in the eighteenth century. While continuing as merchants, under Henry’s leadership, the firm started to
Henry served the family well, establishing a commercial relationship with Charles Apthorp. Apthorp came to New England from England prior to 1726 and became one of the most distinguished merchants of Boston. At his death, he was eulogized as the “greatest and most noble merchant on the continent.” Apthorp conducted his business on Merchants Row in Boston, known as a location for many of the city’s best-connected importers. He traded in a variety of goods, including English and European commodities, munitions, ships, and slaves. His political connections within the British government and reputation for business acumen facilitated his appointment as paymaster and commissary of His Majesty’s land and naval forces quartered in Boston. He delivered the gold and silver coins the military needed to pay its men and, out of each shipment of the army’s money, Apthorp received a 2.5 percent commission. Given the conflicts between the British and French for much of the mid-1700s, Apthorp had steady work.

His Majesty’s servant availed himself of the facilities offered by Archibald and Thomas Hope in Amsterdam on numerous occasions. For instance, in December 1733, an October bill of exchange was presented on Archibald and Thomas Hope in Amsterdam. The terms of the bill provided for payment to Charles Apthorp thirty days

focus on the financing of commercial transactions, particularly the issue of loans to princes and governments in Sweden, Poland, Russia, Portugal, Spain, France, and America. See, e.g., J.C. Riley, International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1740-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

Apthorp was born in 1698 in England and educated at Eton. He married Grisselda "Grizzel" Eastwick in 1726 in Boston. See James Henry Stark, The Loyalists of Massachusetts and the Other Side of the American Revolution (Salem: Salem Press, 1910), 351.

See Boston Gazette, November 7, 1726.


See James Henry Stark, The Loyalists of Massachusetts and the Other Side of the Revolution (Boston: W.B. Clarke, 1907), 351-2.
after the arrival of the ship *Don Carlos* in Cadiz, Spain, or Lisbon, Portugal. Henry Hope drew up the bill for payment in Apthorp’s favor for the value of the cargo and ship’s equipment at sale. John Bouwman, a merchant in Amsterdam, presented the bill of exchange for £2400 to the Hopes. The Hopes refused the bill of exchange because they were awaiting further advice from the drawer – their brother, Henry Hope. They sought confirmation that the ship had actually arrived in Cadiz or Lisbon. Prudently, they recorded their refusal, along with information presented to them on the bill of exchange, with a notary.\footnote{See SAA, Notarial No. 8708/2533 (1733); SAA, Notarial No. 8708/2534 (1733).}

Any merchant house's ultimate security was in the goods themselves, and most houses required the goods to be shipped and sold through their own networks. In this instance, the goods appeared to have been transported through Henry Hope’s network to Spain and Portugal. The Hopes in Amsterdam were being asked to cover the bill without the security of the specific goods in their warehouse. If, in fact, the ship had been lost at sea through storm or if it had been taken by piracy, and word of such event had not yet been received in Amsterdam or through their information networks, payment on the bill would have left the Hopes without recourse.

There was every likelihood that Charles Apthorp, having arranged shipment of cargo through Henry Hope to Cadiz or Lisbon, and instructed the sale of the cargo, wished to purchase goods in Amsterdam. The bill was drawn on the Hopes’ merchant banking house in Amsterdam, in expectation that they would honor the bill when it was presented. Since the drawer, Henry Hope, issued the bill, he was invoking the credit of the merchant house on which the bill was drawn. Many trading companies, like the
Hopes, were familial-based. If the drawer of a bill was part of the same family that the bill was drawn on, the drawee was more likely to believe that the credit was good.

Without further information, and subject to the vagaries of information transfer in the eighteenth century, Archibald and Thomas Hope issued powers of attorney on December 24, 1733, to merchants in Portugal and Spain: Gaburrij en Galiij, merchants in Cadiz, Sterling and Poutz, merchants in Lisbon, and Pedro Beekvelt, merchant in Bilbao.342 Using their established trading networks, the Hopes sought information about the ship carrying Apthorp’s cargo and into which port it had arrived. The powers of attorney authorized the merchant to “arrest” goods and effects belong to Henry Hope of Boston. The actions of the Hopes in December suggest that they felt compelled to honor the bill presented to them on behalf of Apthorp by John Bouwman, but they wanted to ensure they had some sort of security for the payment they would be releasing.

Again, this time in February 1734, John Bouwman presented a bill of exchange on Archibald and Thomas Hope on behalf of Charles Apthorp for £600. The Hopes denied the request, citing a lack of proof of the ship’s arrival in Cadiz or Lisbon. Bouwman filed a protest before the notary about the non-payment of the bills presented.343 In mid-month, Bouwman requested payment from the Hopes on a bill drawn on Apthorp for £2194. Again, the Hopes denied the bill, noting they still awaited advice from the drawer.344 In March 1734, the parties were again before a notary. Bouwman presented correspondence from the ship’s captain, James Sterling

342 See SAA, Notarial No. 8708/2565 (Cadiz merchants); SAA, Notarial No. 8708/2566 (Lisbon merchants); SAA, Notarial No. 8708/2569 (Bilbao merchant).
343 SAA, Notarial No. 8710/239. On the same day, Bouwman requested the acceptance of a second draft, this one in the amount of £665, regarding fitting out the ship. The Hopes denied this request again citing the lack of proof of the ship’s arrival in port. See SAA, Notarial No. 8710/247.
344 SAA, Notarial No. 8710/272.
that the ship, *Don Carlos*, had safely arrived in Cadiz on February 8. The Hopes again refused payment on the bill, stating they were awaiting word from the Spanish consulate about the ship’s arrival in Cadiz.345

The archives reveal no further documentation about this particular transaction. Nor is there surviving correspondence about the matter. The lack of subsequent record about the transaction might suggest that the Hopes ultimately paid the bill. Yet, the difficulties associated with acceptance of this bill also underscore the importance of reputation and trust in trading networks. From 1733 through 1734, four separate bills were presented to the Hopes and in each instance they refused payment on the bills. While they expressed continued concern about the arrival of the ship in either Cadiz or Lisbon, they might have sought information about John Bouwman.346

Henry Hope also introduced Thomas Hancock to the sprawling network established by the Hope family.347 In 1741, Hancock included Amsterdam as a port of call for his commercial activities, preparing his ships for trade among Boston, the Caribbean, and Amsterdam. In Amsterdam, Hancock established commercial ties with Thomas and Adrian Hope. Usually, Hancock sent one or more vessels south from Boston in the fall, loaded with fish, almost certainly servicing the slave-based economies of the West Indies. Hancock’s captains were ordered to consult his factor, Martin du Broy Godet, on the island of St. Eustatius for the best West Indian markets. Typically, the

345 SAA, Notarial No. 8711/568.
346 The War of the Polish Succession had just begun in 1733 and, given both Spain and Portugal’s involvement in the conflict, the Hopes might have prudently awaited the most current information about the ship’s safe arrival.
347 A central figure of colonial Boston’s wealthy merchant class, Thomas Hancock successfully engaged in paper manufacturing; exported various commodities including codfish, whale oil, logwood, and potash; supplied rum, molasses, and other supplies to the Newfoundland fishing fleet; and controlled a group of fishing vessels. One activity that contributed to his ample wealth was his participation in smuggling.
captains could receive bills of exchange, payable in London or Amsterdam, or valuable commodities on the European markets such as logwood, indigo, or molasses. Additionally, Hancock directed that any unused capacity in a ship’s cargo hold be filled with freight, such as sugar, attractive to the European market. In Amsterdam, the Hope brothers facilitated the handling of Hancock’s cargoes. They, in return, provided European wares attractive to the New England market. When the ships arrived off Cape Cod or Cape Ann, the captains sent word to trusted men ashore, and the contraband goods were smuggled away discreetly into Hancock’s warehouses.348

The firm of Thomas and Adrian Hope maintained a commercial relationship with Hancock for over two decades. Throughout, the Hopes filled Hancock’s orders for various commodities, including tea and paper. Their ventures were not always successful, particularly when the Spanish seized a vessel carrying goods for Hancock from the Hopes en route to Boston in 1748. The Hopes’ correspondence with Hancock was typical for the period; they relayed information about specific voyages, reported on current European political or military news, and conveyed information about commodity prices in Amsterdam.349

349 See, e.g., Massachusetts Historical Society, microfilm edition of the Hancock Family Papers, 1728-1885, Reel 2: letter dated June 18, 1748, from Thomas and Adrian Hope to Thomas Hancock regarding shipment of tea and paper on board the Young Jacob; letter dated October 1748, from Thomas and Adrian Hope to Thomas Hancock about the seizure of the sloop Young Jacob; letter dated August 28, 1765, from Thomas and Adrian Hope to Thomas Hancock, William Tyler, and Captain Joseph Frost about news of the fall of Flanders, with copies of letters relating to commodity prices, the capture of their vessel, Three Friends, and the arrival of Captain Forsyth in Amsterdam.
Dutch Trade with New England – The Eighteenth Century

While some Dutch merchants often focused on one colony and its merchants with whom to develop trading networks, other Dutch merchants acquired multiple geographic radials in their trading networks with the American colonies. Daniel Crommelin, an Amsterdam merchant who had diverse trading relationships with merchants in New York from early in the eighteenth century, was part of an extended group of Dutch merchants who traded with Rhode Island.\(^{350}\) Although the Dutch continually traded with Rhode Island merchants from the colony’s founding in 1636, trade activity increased during the War of Jenkins’ Ear, which lasted from 1739 to 1748.\(^{351}\) With British ships occupied against Spain, Dutch shipping filled the increase in demand for goods from England and Europe.

Merchants such as Jeremiah Clark sent ships from Rhode Island to Amsterdam loaded with goods. In 1739, one of Clark’s vessels, *The Two Josephs*, met with unfortunate weather in the Atlantic. In the event of loss or damage, insurers required evidence. The vessel’s owners would require the captain and crew to give declarations before a notary. Such declarations afford a glimpse into trading activities. From this particular voyage, the ship’s captain, Solomon van Heynen, and two sailors, Joseph Bull

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\(^{350}\) Crommelin was born in 1707 in New York. His father, Charles Crommelin, the descendant of an old Dutch family that had taken refuge in France during the Spanish domination, emigrated to New York around 1696. After his father's failed copper mining endeavors in Connecticut, Daniel left the "New World" and immigrated to Europe in 1724 to live among relatives in Amsterdam. One source mentions that the father, Charles, had started the Holland Trading Company in New York in 1720. It could be, therefore, that Daniel was sent overseas as soon as possible to establish himself as the firm's primary European contact. See Virginia D. Harrington, *The New York Merchant on the Eve of the Revolution* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1964), 199. Daniel became a successful merchant in Amsterdam as founder of the merchant house, Daniel Crommelin & Sons, which continued on for several generations. His firm made large loans to the United States shortly after the American Revolution. Some records of Crommelin’s trade with Rhode Island can be found in SAA, Notarial No. 8892/304(1750); SAA, Notarial No. 8893/569 (1750).

and John Joho, provided an account of the vessel’s journey and goods aboard. The ship had been loaded in Amsterdam and was bound for either Rhode Island or New London. Storms forced the ship to seek shelter on Voorne-Putten Island in the western Netherlands, in the province of South Holland. The ship encountered poor weather while crossing the Atlantic and the captain decided to divert to St. Eustatius in December. The ship continued its voyage to New England once securing repairs. Seemingly encountering every storm in the Atlantic that season, the ship ran aground near Block Island. Local residents rescued the crew and salvaged some of the cargo and ship’s rigging. Because Clark’s vessel had been insured in Amsterdam, Van Heynen attested to the value received for both the cargo and the ship’s salvage.  

The unfortunate series of incidents associated with this voyage was not typical. Nevertheless, the voyage illustrates the ease with which transatlantic merchant cooperation took place. Clark secured a cargo in Amsterdam for himself and the co-owners of the vessel and had the cargo insured in the Amsterdam insurance market. Despite more rigorous enforcement of the Navigation Acts, and Clark’s residency in the colonies, he faced no obstacles in obtaining insurance coverage, or in securing a captain and crew for the voyage. As well, the attestation about the damage sustained to the cargo and the salvage of the vessel was considered routine. Nationality was never a factor.

Later in 1740, Van Heyman again appeared before a notary to declare the value of a shipload of merchandise he was transporting to Rhode Island aboard The Phenix. In addition, Van Heyman’s wife, Maria Jackson, and his brother Pieter Fredrik van Heynen, a merchant in Amsterdam, provided declarations as to the value of the goods for

352 SAA, Notarial No. 8952/659.
insurance purposes.\textsuperscript{353} The brothers’ relationship must have taken a disagreeable turn. In March 1742, Pieter gave a power of attorney to another Rhode Island merchant, Henry Collins, to collect goods and money owed to Pieter by Solomon, who resided in Bristol.\textsuperscript{354}

Despite captains like Solomon van Heinen, many voyages between Rhode Island and Amsterdam seemed to occur without incident. Parties appeared before notaries in Amsterdam for a variety of purposes: to register agreements for the hiring of ships to trade in Rhode Island; to record orders given to ship’s captains and/or supercargos about where to trade, how long to remain in port, and what commodities to return with; and, to issue powers of attorney to collect outstanding debts from Rhode Island merchants.\textsuperscript{355} Many other trading voyages from Amsterdam included Rhode Island as part of a larger trans-Atlantic/Caribbean undertaking engaging in multiple exchanges over a broad geographical context before returning to Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{356}

Dutch merchants seized opportunities for trade in North America. When George II authorized privateering against Spain in a 1739 proclamation, Americans responded

\textsuperscript{353} SAA, Notarial No. 10218/542.

\textsuperscript{354} SAA, Notarial No. 10222/122. See also SAA, Notarial No. 10233/709 (1745) when Pieter gave another power of attorney to Collins to collect from Solomon and his wife, as well as a power of attorney to William Belan in Boston to undertake the same. Solomon’s troubles continued. He was co-owner of The New Revenge, a vessel that in 1742 became stranded and perished on the Vlie, a seaway between the Dutch islands of Vlieland and Terschelling. It is one of the entrances for the Zuiderzee that leads to the port of Amsterdam. The vessel was coming from Newport, Rhode Island, with a cargo hold of goods, including furs. For the power of attorney given by an Amsterdam merchant to a third party to recover, if possible, five barrels of furs from the distressed vessel see SAA, Notarial No. 11279/79. It is unusual to see furs as part of a cargo coming from Rhode Island at this point in the eighteenth century. Archival sources do not reveal the origin of the furs, which might have come from northern New York or Canada. Solomon had the captain of the ship provide a declaration as to the events surrounding the loss of the ship. See SAA, Notarial No. 10224/454. In addition, he gave powers of attorney to individuals to conduct salvage operations. See SAA, Notarial No. 10223/456.

\textsuperscript{355} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 10248/440; SAA, Notarial No. 10251/112; SAA, Notarial No. 10251/148; SAA, Notarial No. 10415/910.

\textsuperscript{356} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 5834/… (1727); SAA, Notarial No. 8771/1731 (1738); SAA, Notarial No. 8775/7 (1739); SAA, Notarial No. 11253/96 (1739).
enthusiastically to the prospects. Soon, Boston ships carried logwood back to New England, where it was re-exported to England to counter the trade imbalance with the mother country. With equal enthusiasm, Dutch merchants contracted with their Boston commercial networks to secure quantities of logwood. Like the English, Dutch textile manufacturers used the dye during the production of cloth and piece goods. Dutch ships, before long, gathered in Boston’s harbor to secure logwood shipments.

During the War of Jenkins’ Ear, Boston’s warehouses became depositories for logwood captured on privateering voyages. American privateers, including those from Boston, operated principally in the Caribbean during the war. The attraction of Spanish merchantmen carrying the lucrative agricultural staples of the West Indies made the area a magnet for the Americans. The first half of the war was particularly detrimental to Spanish shipping and, as a result, lucrative in compiling logwood. In addition to seeking financial gains, Americans wanted to retaliate for Spanish destruction of British shipping.

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357 See Michael J. Jarvis, In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 223. Notably, logwood could be carried to European ports as the Privy Council "had ruled in 1701 that these direct exports did not violate the Navigation Acts." Ibid.

358 Logwood is a generic term referring to any number of varieties of hardwoods that were used for dye making. The logwood that grows in what is now the modern Mexican state of Campeche, is a variety native to that region exclusively, often referred to as Campeachy wood. The tinting properties of logwood, or as the Dutch referred to it campechehout, was known from the first millennium by the Aztecs. After the invasion of Central America by Spain, Europe started to use this dyewood in huge quantities, replacing the domestic vegetable dyes – dyer's woad and indigo –both of which produced blue dye. One reason given for the War of Jenkins’ Ear was the recession that was allegedly provoked in the English conventional dye market because of the use of logwood. Since the English takeover of Jamaica, however, English men and ships regularly had been cutting logwood near modern-day Champotón, an area they claimed was uninhabited by any Spanish and distant from Hispanic settlement. The Spaniards protested this activity, because they considered logwood as “produce” of the Spanish colonies, thereby granting them exclusive rights to that resource, an understanding shared by European nations influenced by mercantilist policy and thought. See David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 177.

359 On privateering generally during the war, see Carl E. Swanson, “American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748,” William and Mary Quarterly, 42 (Jul., 1985), 357-82.
Despite the usage of American vessels by Dutch merchants for shipping logwood, claims still arose. The wood was a valued commodity and saltwater damage diminished its value and usage. Insurance claims were often brought for reputed damage. For instance, *The Charming Molly* arrived in Amsterdam with cargo that weighed less than when it had left Boston. Amid accusations of theft, in August 1741, at the request of Captain James Morris, the mate, boatswain, and a sailor on *The Charming Molly*, provided testimony about the state of a shipment of logwood that left Boston aboard ship in April. The crew attested to the seaworthiness of the vessel and declared that during the voyage the ship maintained good momentum. Instead, they suggested that if the cargo sustained damage, the parties contracting for the wood should examine the ship’s design. In an ensuing declaration, the crew further elaborated about the voyage, suggesting the wood was wet and filled with ice when it was loaded into the hold.\(^\text{360}\) This, they urged, accounted for the wood’s increased weight. When the wood dried during the voyage, the weight of the load decreased. The crew adamantly proclaimed that the diminution in the load’s weight was not due to theft by the crew.\(^\text{361}\) Not only were the crew’s explanations important for the insurance claim, but they also addressed the issue of reliability of American shippers for Dutch merchants.

The goods that entered the New England colonies through the Dutch trade fit comfortably into the flow of North Atlantic commerce. For example Adrian and Thomas

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\(^{360}\) The Dutch phrasing is “met ijs bezet.” The ship was loaded during April and the wood might have been stored outside during the winter months. This would account for the declarations that the wood was filled with ice. Campeche wood was grown in great quantities in the Bay of Campeche, in the southern bight of the Gulf of Mexico. There, the English cut it, and sent it to Jamaica. It is there that Boston merchants would trade for the wood. See, e.g., Henry Barham, *Hortus Americanus: Containing an Account of the Trees, Shrubs, and other Vegetable Productions of South America and the West India Islands and Particularly of the Island of Jamaica* (Kingston, Jamaica: Alexander Aikman, 1794), 91–2.

\(^{361}\) See SAA, Notarial no. 10220/400; SAA, Notarial No. 10220/410; SAA, Notarial No. 10220/412.
Hope in Amsterdam and Herman van Yzendoorn in Rotterdam did a large business in tea, which undercut England’s East India Company. In Boston, from 1700 through 1824, a building known as the "triangular warehouse" dominated Merchant’s Row. In the nineteenth century, Nathaniel Dearborn speculated it was built "probably by Dutch tea merchants, as they had been in the habit of supplying the inhabitants with teas, at a less price since 1660, than could be afforded by the London East India Company, as most of the Teas from Holland were smuggled into this market." The warehouse was "taken down in 1824, to make room for the City Market improvements."362

While of humble beginnings and, ultimately, to attain the highest pinnacles of finance during the eighteenth century, Hope & Co. maintained trading networks throughout colonial America. While it was commonplace for merchant houses to send family members as representatives to the various commercial centers in Europe, it was unusual for a representative to be sent to America. Normally, factors or agents would be appointed. Here, Henry Hope’s presence in Boston allowed Hope & Co. to form trade linkages with some of colonial Massachusetts most prominent and wealthiest merchants, siphoning off their trade from England.

Trade Wars

While Dutch activities in and with New England during the period of 1664 through 1750 were mostly centered on trade, one event in the 1670’s threatened to undermine established commercial relationships. The early 1670’s saw Dutch military and naval aggression in North America on a scale not previously seen. Commercial

362 Nathaniel Dearborn, Dearborn's Reminiscences of Boston: and Guide through the City and Environs. (Boston: 1851),118-19.
ambitions drove hostile activity up and down the eastern seaboard. The region had been animated with unrest during the latest military conflicts between the Dutch and English and news soon reached Curaçao that the Dutch had regained physical and political control of New York.\textsuperscript{363}

In the summer of 1674, the governor of Curaçao, Jan Doncker, directed Jurriaen Aernoutsz to New York. Aernoutsz commanded the frigate, \textit{Vliegende Paert}, based in the West Indies. Doncker ordered Aernoutsz to conduct hostilities against France and England in the North Atlantic, specifically to “to take, plunder, spoil and possess any of the ships, persons or estates.” When Aernoutsz arrived in New York, he learned that the Dutch and English had resolved their extant hostilities and had become parties to the Treaty of Westminster.

The resolution of hostilities between England and the Dutch Republic meant that Aernoutsz’s privateering commission, as issued by Governor Doncker, only had validity against the French. Thus, the treaty had denied Aernoutsz the opportunity for commercial plunder against the English. As background, Aernoutsz also would have had knowledge of the recent military aggression undertaken by the Dutch in North America. The Dutch fleet had invaded Chesapeake Bay, captured or destroyed nearly 200 English and French vessels, virtually wiped out the English Newfoundland fisheries, and restored New York, New Jersey, and Delaware to the Dutch. Against this context, what Aernoutsz subsequently became involved with was driven by commercial opportunity.

\textsuperscript{363} The Anglo-Dutch War began in 1672 after French king Louis XIV invaded Holland, and England, committed to a secret alliance with France, found itself in another naval war with the Dutch Republic. The Dutch were victorious in the major naval engagements, but, when the treaty of peace was signed in 1674, the Dutch acknowledged that New York was an English possession, while England ended its treaty of alliance with France. See Gijs Rommelse, \textit{The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667): Rainson D'état, Mercantilism, and Maritime Strife} (Hilversum, The Netherlands: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2006), 198.
and the recent Dutch military offensive against the English colonies.

Upon mooring in New York, Aernoutsz met a sea captain, John Rhoades, from Boston. Rhoades spoke of the lucrative fur trade along the coasts of Maine and Acadia, territory contested by England and France. Before Aernoutsz could finalize his plans to attack French fishing grounds further north, he became enticed by Rhoades’s descriptions of the French forts and their weakened defenses. Rhoades suggested that if Aernoutsz took the forts by surprise it would be an easy conquest for Aernoutsz and the Dutch. Such a raid fit perfectly with Aernoutsz’s diminished commission. As this was a privateering voyage, Aernoutsz sought the approval of his officers and crew. With their endorsement in hand, Aernoutsz recruited Rhoades, who took the oath of allegiance to the Prince of Orange. Aernoutsz appointed Rhoades the chief pilot of the Vliegende Paert.

Aernoutsz seized the area quickly, conquering the fort at Pentagouet on the Penobscot River in two hours. Aernoutsz destroyed Pentagouet and pillaged all the French posts along the west shore of the Bay of Fundy, capturing both the governor of Acadia and his lieutenant. Aernoutsz spent a month in the region, taking formal possession of the region, which he called “New Holland.” He then sailed to Boston where he disposed of his plunder, even selling the cannon from Fort Pentagouet to the Massachusetts government. Some time in October 1674 he sailed for Curaçao, but left his prisoners and a number of his ship’s company in Boston, including John Rhoades.

Aernoutsz ordered John Rhoades and his other men left in Boston to return to the newly conquered region and maintain possession of the coastal towns along the shores of Maine and New Brunswick, the area’s two forts, and the former French military headquarters. Aernoutsz knew that maintaining continuous possession was necessary to
provide strength to the conquest he made on behalf of the Dutch Republic. The monotony of maintaining possession of the territory, however, offered few rewards to the men who sought greater financial reward than sentry duty. They soon began to seize New England vessels arriving along the coast to engage in the fur trade with the Indians.

It had been one thing for the Dutch privateer to oust the French from the area and quite another to seize New England vessels. Despite previous tacit acquiescence to the Dutch privateer’s actions, the governor of Massachusetts, Governor John Leverett, could not allow the confiscation of New England vessels. He sent armed vessels from the colony against Rhoades. Defeated in a naval fight in the Bay of Fundy, Rhoades and his companions were taken prisoner to Boston and tried as pirates. The court convicted all but two of them for either piracy or theft and condemned Rhoades to death. The court postponed his execution because of King Philip’s war. He was released in October 1675 on the condition that he left Massachusetts forever.

In September 1676 the Dutch West India Company made a belated effort to capitalize on Aernoutsz’s conquest by granting Rhoades a commission to reside and trade in Acadia and by appointing Cornelis van Steenwijck, a prominent Dutch merchant in New York, as governor of Acadia. Rhoades attempted to exercise his commission, but a lieutenant of Governor Andros’s arrested him on the St. George River for trespassing on the Duke of York’s territory. He was returned to New York, but released after a brief imprisonment. In the Treaty of Nimwegen (1678), ending the war between France and Holland, the Dutch conquest of Acadia was not even mentioned.364

364 I came upon this incident through a notarial minute in the Amsterdam archives. In it, John Rhoades gave a statement about his participation in the events. He expressed dismay at the rouse the English perpetrated upon those occupying the fort. He noted that the British in Boston were jealous of them and four ships under the command of Samuel Mosely were sent to the forts. The
The Dutch takeover of Acadia raises more questions than answers. Why did Aernoutsz feel this was an important military move when his commission spoke of destroying estates, not seizing them on behalf of the Republic? Was this a military action against just the French, or did he envision further eventual encroachment southward against the English? Certainly, the Dutch had a penchant for commercial opportunity. Again, Aernoutsz was permitted to take ships or other property and he did so. But did he suppose that merchants in 

\textit{patria} would welcome the commercial opportunities in the fur trade available there after the earlier loss of New Netherland? Was the purchase of the plunder taken from the French opportunistic on the part of Boston merchants and the Massachusetts government or were they hoping to create some sort of trading relationship should the Dutch actually sustain rights to the area? Did they envision some sort of cooperation with the Dutch? Why did the Massachusetts government not pursue any earlier action against the Dutch residing in Maine/Acadia until Rhoades and his men seized New England vessels? Why did the Dutch West India Company delay their reaction to the situation? Why appoint a prominent merchant such as Steenwijck in the role as governor?

Despite the unanswered questions about the Maine/Acadia attack, the incident does suggest that notwithstanding military action and political agreements in Europe, and economic policies in England that legislated against trade with merchants from foreign

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Dutch within the forts believed they came as friends. However, they acted as enemies taking all of the beavers, otters, artillery and other looted goods and bringing them to Boston for sale there. Rhoades also noted that Aernoutsz provided Governor Leverett with a copy of his commission and the governor deemed it appropriate. See SAA, Notarial No. 3225/269-270v (1676).

nations, New England merchants continued to trade with Dutch merchants as we have seen. They maintained existing trading networks, in addition to establishing new commercial contacts.

**Conclusion**

The relationship between Dutch and New England merchants transformed over time. During the period of 1664 through 1750, New England shipping became more reliable. New England merchants extended their voyages beyond the eastern seaboard and West Indies and ventured into the Atlantic. The notarial minutes reflect New England merchants and ships’ captains contracting with Dutch merchants in Amsterdam. They accepted and agreed to trade under the terms of Dutch law.

This sense of ordinariness of Dutch trade in early America has been lost to history. Dutch merchants trading in New England or New England merchants trading in Amsterdam and Rotterdam were accepted commercial activities throughout this period. The notarial minutes provide a fuller understanding of how substantial the trade was and how ineffectual economic policies, such as the Navigation Acts, were to ordinary people.

New England merchants previously had seen the devastating effects of England’s economic policies and political events on local and personal economies during the mid-seventeenth century. Trading with the Dutch provided profitable outlays for regional commodities and markets in which to purchase goods. Additionally, Dutch merchants paid well for New England commodities, provided needed credit on favorable terms, and had low barriers of entry to trade, that is, taxation duties were not prohibitive or punitive in nature. In many respects, Amsterdam and Rotterdam provided the training ground in
which New England’s merchants could engage in trade on a global level.

Certainly, there was direct trade between New England and the Dutch Republic. As well, New England merchants developed a circum-Atlantic route that linked New England with the Chesapeake and Amsterdam. This filled transport vacuums left when Dutch shipping was curtailed because of European and domestic political events.

The commercial relationships that developed between New England and Dutch merchants provided the foundation for later activities. Merchant houses such as Hope and Company would continue to trade with colonial merchants and invest in the new nation well into the nineteenth century.365 It was no accident that John Adams sought loans on behalf of the American government from the Dutch during the American Revolution. While the Dutch had provided financing for other nations’ military efforts or domestic needs, the footing to provide such loans for America had been established over a century previously with colonial merchants that cautiously, then ardently, ventured into international trade.

365 The growth of Hope & Co. seemingly paralleled and participated in the growth of the English colonies in North America and, then, the new nation. The merchant house went from a small, family-run partnership to one of the premiere banks in Europe. It provided several loans to the American government, the most notable was assistance with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. See, e.g., Buist, At Spes Non Fracta, 188-90.
Chapter 5

Found in Translation: Dutch Trade with the Colony of New York, 1664-1750

Introduction

In October 1664, Jeremias van Rensselaer wrote a letter to his brother, Jan Baptist van Rensselaer, in Amsterdam. The brothers often exchanged correspondence concerning the business management of Rensselaerswyck. This particular letter was different. In it, Jeremias casually noted that he was sending his letter by one of the English frigates departing for London. The English frigates of which he wrote were the same ships that had recently captured New Netherland for the English.

Jeremias also remarked,

How it will go with our colony, I do not yet know, but I have been summoned by Governor Richard Nicolls to come down to show him our patents and what right we have to the colony. You know how few documents thereof with seals we have here, so that I shall have to appeal to his Royal Majesty of England, of which I shall advise you more at length, please God, in my next letter.366

The colony about which Jeremias wrote was the patroonship granted to the Van Rensselaer family by the Dutch West India Company in 1628.367 Jeremias expressed

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366 See A.J.F. van Laer, trans. and ed., Correspondence of Jeremias van Rensselaer, 1651-1674 (Albany: The University of the State of New York, 1932), 361. Sometime after this letter, Jeremias told Jan Baptist “that I showed to the English governor our patent, to wit, our leen Brief [letters patent], from the lords States General, which he accepted, but he told us that we must have a new one from the Duke of York. I agreed with him that you would try to procure that within the year, so that I recommend this matter to you, otherwise they may easily run away with the bacon (sullen licht met het hachgie doorgaen). [I shall] try to agree about the limits and the annual [quitrent].” Disputes about Rensselaerswyck would continue for years after the English takeover, including legitimizing ownership under English rule and succession issues within the Van Rensselaer family.

concern, but his correspondence never reflected a sense of despair or forthcoming loss. He ended his letter with the date and the location of “New York,” rather than “New Netherland.”

If Jeremias had concerns about the transition of trade between the former New Netherland and patria, he need not have worried. Rather, it was the English government that worried for the next century about the Dutch and their proclivity for sustaining their trading networks between Europe and New York.

By 1670, Jeremias was corresponding with the English governor, Francis Lovelace, about matters concerning the colony. Lovelace had made inquiry “Concerning the three hundred schepel of wheate you agreed with my Predecessor Col. Nicolls the last yeare to pay, I thought good to put you in mind of it, To the End it may bee in a readinesse...” Lovelace also sought information about “what number of Horse may bee risen about you, if they amount to a competent number, sufficient to compose a Troope, I shall give you the Command of it, if you’l accept thereof.” Indeed, the reliance of the English governor on his subjects of Dutch ancestry would be significant. Rather than ostracizing those of Dutch ancestry, it created a pattern of acceptance and accommodation that ultimately undermined English trade policies in their newly acquired colony.

The trade between New York and Amsterdam was capacious during the period 1664 to 1750. On one hand, that was understandable. Extensive and profitable trading networks had developed between the Dutch merchants of New Netherland and Amsterdam. New Amsterdam became one of several ports a Dutch ship would call at

368 Ibid. It is instructive that Lovelace had already adapted to Dutch terminology. A schepel was 0.764 of a bushel of wheat. See A.J.F. van Laer, Van Rensselaer Bowier Manuscripts (Albany: University of the State of New York, 1908), 849.
when it made its circuitous route through the Atlantic world. Severing such networks would be difficult, particularly as many were based on family or religious ties. On the other hand, the English takeover in 1664 and subsequent political and economic appropriation of Dutch institutions should have had a stronger presence by the start of the eighteenth century and a greater impact on Dutch trade. Dutch notarial archives reflect something much different. The archives reflected the continuation of previous trading networks and the establishment of new networks with both English residents and merchants of Dutch ancestry. There was little regard for following the precepts of the Navigation Acts. Rarely did the archives acknowledge payment of tariffs or imposts in a New York or Great Britain.

The first part of this chapter studies women and trade in the colony of New York. The legal status and cultural acceptance of Dutch women trading in New Netherland was beyond dispute. Yet, what was the status of women of Dutch ancestry residing and trading in New York after 1664? In 1664, a significant number of women residing in New York had been born in the Dutch Republic or had been raised by mothers who had been born there. But what accounts for the later generations of women residing in New York who were further removed from a direct nexus with the legal norms and cultural mores of the Dutch Republic? What we discover is that good trade transcended gender boundaries and English men readily traded with women of Dutch ancestry. This upends historiographic notions of gender division. The evidence, however, demonstrates how women merchants continued to trade in New York well into the eighteenth century. As well, women from the Dutch Republic actively traded in New York whether in person or through agents. There was no evidence questioning or disputing trade by a Dutch woman
with an English colonist in New York.

The second portion of this chapter examines Jacob Leisler as representative of a merchant in New York of Dutch ancestry who did not publicly object to the English takeover of New Netherland. Leisler readily accepted English citizenship and used his new citizenship to his advantage. In particular, he exercised his rights as an Englishman to conceal his actual trading activities to the Dutch Republic and other locations in Europe.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, England had had political control of New York for nearly forty years. Yet, as the third section of this chapter demonstrates, merchants from the Dutch Republic were still actively trading in New York including merchants from many of the large Amsterdam merchant houses. Circumvention of the English Navigation Acts was commonplace.

Finally, over the eighty-year period of this chapter, something else happened as well. There was a transition on the part of merchants. A certain sense of professionalism came into their actions. Certainly, earlier commercial developments from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries such as improvements in accounting, the introduction of credit instruments, and the standardized language of common documents contributed to the competence and proficiency of merchants. But during this period, merchants created written records documenting events and relationships with other merchants. While personal relationships were at the center of many business transactions, merchants increasingly formalized such relationships and relied on the use of notaries to do so. Daniel Crommelin, who had been born in New York but immigrated to the Dutch Republic, represented this type of new, professional merchant. During the course of his
commercial activity, he established important trading networks for New York merchants in Amsterdam, effectively used the Dutch legal system in anticipation of litigation, and instituted the importance of New York City as an active and significant trading port for European trade. Crommelin’s importance to colonial America resonated for over one hundred years as his trading house grew in stature while maintaining its linkages to American merchants.

**Don’t Tell the English Ladies – Dutch Women and Trade to New York**

Examining New York in this period allows for consideration of trade by women. Because the Dutch, when settling New Netherland, brought both their culture and legal system, women residing in the colony continued to trade as if in patria. By the time of the political transition to New York in 1664, trade by women was as much ingrained in the colony, as it was back in the Dutch Republic.

The legal status of women to trade as merchants was well settled under Dutch law. However, the legal status of women in New York had been reduced as a consequence of the English takeover of New Netherland in 1664. Was there an issue with women from the Dutch Republic trading in New York? The notarial records do not disclose any hesitation or refusal to trade with a Dutch woman who was a merchant. Arguably, good trade was not gender specific. Nevertheless, there might have been instances when a Dutch woman needed to recede into the background and let a kinsman interact with the tentative “foreign” merchant.

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369 See Linda Briggs Biemer, *Women and Property in Colonial New York: The Transition from Dutch to English Law, 1643-1727* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1983), 1-9. Biemer correctly describes how the laws changed from Roman-Dutch law to common law and the impact on women and their legal activities. However, she does not take into account the cultural aspects of both men and women’s behavior as it related to trade.
Historians have identified the wide-ranging role of Dutch merchants in transatlantic trade. Nevertheless, most have disregarded women’s participation in trade, at any level. Early modern Dutch women, whether trading to New York or at home in patria, did not need, implicitly or explicitly, to challenge traditional gender expectations. Thus, women moved freely about in transacting their business.

The number of women in the Dutch Republic trading as merchants is difficult to estimate as not everyone required the use of notaries or engaged in trade in a manner that otherwise effected a written record. Dutch laws provided the opportunity for women to take part in trade and Dutch cultural attitudes encouraged parents to bring their daughters up to participate in the nation’s commercial and trading society. Under such circumstances, it was not surprising that a vigorous participation by women in commercial enterprises existed, one that included trade to New York.

Dutch women received the education and training to comprehensively participate in trade. Daughters received instruction at home in the family’s business. Daughters could also receive a formal education by attending school to learn reading, writing, and ciphering. Josiah Child, an English economist and merchant, asserted that one of the basis for the increased wealth of the Northern Netherlands was “the education of their Children, as well Daughters as Sons” who grew up to have “an ability for Commerce of

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all kinds.”  

Despite social acceptance of women as merchants and sufficient education and training for them to engage in trade, neither factor alone would account for the success and extent to which Dutch women participated in commerce. The Dutch legal system allowed single and widowed women the same rights as men – except for political rights. In other words, at the legal age of twenty they could administer their own property, carry out legal transactions, enter into contracts, and appear before a court on their own.  

Marriage would seem at first to offer little in the way of rights. Most common was the marriage of community goods, whereby the goods held by both parties were joined, including properties.  
Still, the law considered a husband as his wife’s guardian. A wife could not institute an action or defend herself in court on her own or trade without her

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373 Josiah Child, A new discourse of trade: wherein is recommended several weighty points relating to companies of merchants, etc. (London, 1693), 4. Earlier, Roger Coke noted “The Dutch generally breed their youth of both Sexes in the Studies of Geometry and numbers, especially more than the English do.” Such subjects being one of the foundational tools, in his opinion, for success in trade. See Roger Coke, A Discourse of Trade (London: Printed for H. Brome and R. Horne, 1670). See also De Vries and Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815, 596-603.

374 For instance, Sherrin Marshall suggests that gentry widows were slow to remarry, preferring instead to enjoy their autonomy. She asserts that “The protection of their rights by law and custom gave them a great deal of independence...In short, they were individuals and not ciphers, and their behavior exemplifies a society where women had considerable autonomy.” Sherrin Marshall, The Dutch Gentry, 1500-1650: Family, Faith and Fortune (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), 164. Martha Dickinson Shattuck maintains that, “Since women could inherit as well as dispose of her goods by will, many women came to their marriages with real and personal belongings. Furthermore, single women enjoyed considerable freedom under the law, which allowed them to run their own businesses or be involved in commerce and trade, investments that they brought to the marriage. Therefore, if they chose, women so endowed could keep any or all of their holdings out of the common estate by an antenuptial contract.” Martha Dickinson Shattuck, “A Civil Society: Court and Community in Beverwijck, New Netherland, 1652-1664” (PhD diss., Boston University, 1993), 157. The reference to the “legal age of twenty” for women is the age at which a woman could marry without parental permission. Such age of majority opened a world of legal and economic opportunity for women. In order to understand the laws of the Dutch Republic, Hugo Grotius’s work provides foundational material on all aspects of Roman-Dutch Law. See Hugo Grotius, The Jurisprudence of Holland, trans. R.W. Lee (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926), l:v:15.

husband’s authorization. As there is no reference in the works of Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, regarding a written procedure to follow to acknowledge this authorization, it might well have been acceptable for a husband to provide verbal authority.

Dutch law recognized the prerequisites of a successful commercial society and the utility of integrating women into commercial activities. Thus, a wife as the domestic marital manager supervised not only the household expenses, which included making contracts related to the expenses that would bind both her and her husband, but also the buying and selling of material germane to her husband’s business. What was important in marriage involving the community of goods was the fact that women could, and did, appear in court for themselves and their husbands; write promissory notes; enact bonds and contracts; give and receive powers of attorney; buy, sell, and lease property; and trade, as long as they had their husband’s consent.

Dutch society did not discourage trade as an occupation or as a part-time activity for women. As with so many of early modern women’s activities, documentation about women in trade can prove problematic. The women of the Dutch Republic participated through the whole stratum of trade practiced by merchants, both in relation to the nature of goods traded and the geographical boundaries of trade. While Dutch women actively traded for goods and commodities from the English colonies in North America, they were most active in New York. Our window into their world is opened through the notarial records.

Some women in the Dutch Republic had extensive commercial activity over a significant period. Their active participation in trade represented a lifelong career in

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376 Ibid., Chapter I: v, 17-23.
377 Ibid.
commerce, similar to any man’s participation. For instance, Alida Reinders successfully traded to New York and other transatlantic ports. She co-owned a ship and had established commercial networks. She began trading to New York as early as 1693 and gave a power of attorney to Rombout Philips in New York to collect from her debtors there. In 1700, she received a power of attorney from her brother, Barent Reinders, a merchant in New York, to represent his commercial interests in the Dutch Republic, including his interests with respect to ships, trading goods, and monetary demands. As a man raised within the Dutch culture, a culture that respected women’s roles in business, Reinders respected his sister’s proficiency as a merchant. Her brother continued to think in a “Dutch” manner. As late as 1711, Alida still traded as a merchant and still acted for her brother under his power of attorney.

Women traders, reminiscent of their male counterparts, often relied on kinship networks. The networks included both family and friends who provided reliable and trustworthy trading partners locally, regionally, and internationally. Such associations had marked importance for women during their reproductive years. They also were particularly useful for a woman who had just begun her trading operations. In either situation, they provided a trusted network of individuals upon whom a woman could rely. This network of social relations, often referred to as “social capital,” was also important for men.

379 See SAA, Notarial No. 4905/308 (1693).
380 SAA, Notarial No. 5876/26 (1700); SAA, Notarial No. 5876/35 (1700). Alida had transatlantic trading networks herself.
381 See SAA, Notarial No. 5921 (1711).
All early modern merchants required a variety of factors to achieve success—commercial kinship ties, marriages that broadened commercial networks, and an association of business colleagues. Women frequently participated in informal merchant networks consisting of immediate family or friends. Nevertheless, an increasingly impersonal trading world developed during the early modern period. Often, a woman residing in the Dutch Republic might not know everyone in her distribution chain in Europe or New York.

Kinship networks were particularly important for women when they gave another merchant a power of attorney. The reasons for granting a power of attorney were numerous. A woman might have been incapable of traveling a great distance because of pregnancy or childcare obligations. Or her household or other business responsibilities prohibited her from doing so. In any event, granting a power of attorney was an effective means of having some other trusted person represent or act on one’s behalf in business, or some other legal matter.

The notarial records most often recorded powers of attorney being given by women merchants who were seeking to recover a debt from another merchant or customer who lived in New York. Occasionally, the document referred to the relationship between the female merchant in the Dutch Republic and the person receiving...
the power. In most instances, however, the relationship was not given.\textsuperscript{383} Sometimes, the notarial records noted a husband’s agreement with the authorization, although that was not required.\textsuperscript{384}

From time to time, a woman would grant power of attorney to another woman in the Dutch Republic while she traveled to New York to conduct business. In 1680, Magdaleentje Wolsen granted a power of attorney to Anneke Webbers. Magdaleentje requested that Anneke observe the goods she would be sending over from New York at Magdaleentje’s business. She asked Anneke to sell such goods as they arrived, to pay the freight charged for shipment, and not to accept any goods damaged in transit.\textsuperscript{385}

Similarly, Helen Tellers granted powers of attorney to Abel de Wolff and to Cornelis Jacobs Moy to oversee her business in the Dutch Republic when she traveled to New York.\textsuperscript{386} She requested from Moy additional undertakings: that he would collect 300 guilders owing on a bodemerijbrief and that he would sell a piece of land for her.\textsuperscript{387}

Often, the notarial records provide an indication of protracted negotiations over bills of exchange. In 1680, Elsie van Hardenbroeck, a merchant in Amsterdam, conducted extended negotiations over an exchange protest with Tobias Hoornbeeck, an Amsterdam merchant, acting under power of attorney for his uncle, Jilles van Hoornbeeck, a merchant in New York. After six months, the parties finally resolved their issues and came to an agreement about a settlement.\textsuperscript{388}

Merchants required financial capital to establish operations. How did women gain

\textsuperscript{383} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 4508/472 (1679); SAA, Notarial No. 4508/514 (1679); SAA, Notarial No. 3938/425 (1679); SAA, Notarial No. 2515/833 (1682).
\textsuperscript{384} See, SAA, Notarial No. 3020/275 (1680).
\textsuperscript{385} SAA, Notarial No. 3799/757 (1680).
\textsuperscript{386} SAA, Notarial No. 2515/825 (1682).
\textsuperscript{387} SAA, Notarial No. 2515/821 (1682).
\textsuperscript{388} See, SAA, Notarial No. 2315/607-609 (1680); SAA, Notarial No. 2315/606-609 (1680).
access to capital for trade and did they face impediments in doing so? A woman who inherited money, or goods that she could easily sell, had one means by which she could enter trading activities. Perhaps a woman traded goods for others as an agent and brokered a commission for herself. Kinship networks might have provided start-up capital to begin trading. Unfortunately, it is seldom clear, or stated, how a woman obtained her original capital to buy goods. Arguably, the lower the investment costs to partake in trade, the more women participated in a certain type of trade.

Yet, in other instances, gender was irrelevant. For example, when Alida Reinders became co-owner of a ship, her purchase and subsequent use of the ship was legal under Dutch law. Nevertheless, the Navigation Acts prohibited her, on the basis of her citizenship, from engaging in trade with the English colonies or her “English” brother. Like her male counterparts, she chose to undermine the law and trade contrary to its provisions.

Trade was a primary component of the commercial society of the Dutch Republic and, likewise, with New Netherland. Women were an accepted part of that society, supported, as we have seen, by the legal system that allowed them to participate in trade. Society’s acceptance of their position in trades large and small, and the underpinning of the Dutch legal system, were transferred to and embedded in the colony of New Netherland. Given these rights, women received no special treatment, but were treated the same as men in court and in notarial proceedings. This included the extensive trade of women living in New York and trade from women in the Dutch Republic. Such women, even at a modest level, had commercial acumen and so-called commercial

389 The drafters of the Navigation Acts most likely never considered prohibitions about gender. For them, the concern was about nationality and one nation in particular.
complexities presented few problems for Dutch women, such capable entrepreneurs, in this age.

Jacob Leisler as a Merchant

On May 16, 1691, a large crowd stood in Manhattan’s drizzling rain to witness the beheading of Jacob Leisler and his son-in-law, Jacob Milborne. As the ax fell, the “shrieks of the people,” fainting women, and tumultuous jostling for “pieces of his garments” and strands of Leisler's hair, as “for a martyr,” gripped the crowd with hysteria.\textsuperscript{390}

Before the events that took his life in 1691, Jacob Leisler was a prosperous New York merchant who had an extensive trade network with Dutch merchants. He is representative not only of the type of trade conducted, but also the manner in which the trade was conducted.

Leisler joined the Dutch West India Company in 1659 and in 1660 he was sent to New Netherland. Shortly after arriving in New Amsterdam, Leisler entered into the fur and tobacco trades. As commercial opportunities presented themselves, he later added salt, grain products, fish, whale oil, and horses to his export trade and spices, human cargoes (indentured and slave), finished clothe, and trade goods to his import business.\textsuperscript{391}

\textsuperscript{390} See Robert C. Ritchie, \textit{The Duke's Province: A Study of New York Politics and Society, 1664-1691} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977), 198-231. The Amsterdam archives contain numerous notarial minutes from individuals making declarations in support of Leisler's actions. The declarations were made for presentation before a court of inquest in the Dutch Republic, which subsequently applied pressure on the English government concerning Leisler’s and Milborne's execution. See SAA, Notarial No. 4752/79 (1691); SAA, Notarial No. 4752/394 (1691); SAA, Notarial No. 4752/84 (1691); SAA, Notarial No. 4753/135 (1691); SAA, Notarial No. 4753/203 (1691).

\textsuperscript{391} See Claudia Schnurmann, “Merchants, Ministers and the Van Rensselaer-Leisler Controversy of 1676 as a Dress Rehearsal for 1689,” in \textit{Jacob Leisler's Atlantic World in the Later Seventeenth Century}.
Leisler’s trading activities provided wealth and social position making him a prominent member of the New York community. In August 1664, he was among the residents of New Netherland urging Governor-General Petrus Stuyvesant to surrender the colony to the invading English, and a month later he was one of the first to swear allegiance to the new regime.\(^{392}\) Becoming an English citizen only broadened the commercial opportunities available to him by incorporating multiple national claims (German, Dutch, and English), privileges (Dutch and English), and options in his widening Atlantic network.

As early as 1674, Leisler had increased his transatlantic trading connections and began chartering ships and cargo space for voyages between New York and Amsterdam. In 1674, for instance, Leisler worked in cooperation with other New York merchants to buy shares of freight on the ship *St. Michiel*, for a voyage from New York to Amsterdam. Leisler shipped 14 otters, 4 wolf skins, 9 foxes, 84 hams, and 13 deerskins to Amsterdam merchant Cornelis Moij.\(^{393}\) In addition to Leisler, other New York merchants, including the Van Rensselaers and Gabriel Minvielle, undertook the illicit trade with merchants in Amsterdam. In 1675, he had 160 hogsheads of Virginia tobacco that he wished to sell to two Amsterdam merchants. Of course, the direct shipments from New York to

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\(^{392}\) The articles of capitulation were the terms by which the colony was surrendered and that established the rights of Dutch settlers under English rule. Among the 24 articles were provisions that guaranteed certain permanent rights, including liberty of conscience in divine worship and church discipline, the possession of property rights, and the right of the Dutch to follow their own customs with regard to inheritance. See E.B. O’Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Company, 1856), 2:248-50.

\(^{393}\) SAA, Notarial No. 2629 (1676). Moij would be the merchant with whom Leisler interacted most frequently. See SAA, Notarial No. 3808/557-8 (1682); SAA, Notarial No. 3266/62 (1683); SAA, Notarial No. 3270/113 (1684); SAA, Notarial No. 5515/97 (1687).
Amsterdam were in contravention of the Navigation Acts.394

Leisler’s successes in chartering ships allowed him to expand his business options by purchasing his own vessel. He purchased the Neptune and the Susannah of New Yorke. Both vessels were for the transatlantic trade, particularly trade with the Dutch Republic.395 A shrewd merchant, Leisler tried to find ambiguities in the various provisions regulating trade by English merchants. His captains were instructed to call dutifully at English ports, but then continue to Dutch ports with contraband such as tobacco and to return directly to the American colonies without stopping at English ports as required by law.

Leisler’s career as a merchant is often overlooked. Nevertheless, he is representative of the type of transatlantic trade that continued between the Dutch Republic and New York subsequent to 1670. Newly naturalized English merchants from the former New Netherland took advantage of the particular opportunity trade under the Navigation Acts presented to them. That is, they maintained the well-established trading networks with Amsterdam merchants while utilizing their English citizenship to effectively conceal their trading activities from local officials and evade taxation obligations such as duty. Playing both sides was for Dutch merchants part of the ordinary course of business.

394 See, SAA, Notarial No. 3897/72 (1675). The sale of tobacco was to Amsterdam merchants Cornelis Moy and Jan Hendrick Sibingh.
395 Leisler had less success with ship ownership than he had by simply purchasing space on vessels. The ship, Susannah of New Yorke, sailed in 1677 from Maryland to Dover, England. North African corsairs captured the vessel as it sailed either to or from Amsterdam. Leisler and his crew were imprisoned and taken to Algeria from where they were eventually ransomed. See David W. Voorhees, “Captured: The Turkish Slavery of the Susannah,” in Seaport Magazine, 3 (1997): 6-11. In the meantime, his wife, Elsie, was responsible for his business. See SAA, Notarial No. 3631B/347 (1678) (denying a bill of exchange). See also Claudia Schnurmann, Atlantische Welten: Engländere und Niederländer im amerikanisch-atlantischen Raum 1648-1713 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag GmbH & Cie, 1998).
The Eighteenth Century Begins: 1700-1750

Nearly forty years of English political rule in New York did not diminish the persistence of trade between Dutch merchants and their New York colleagues. Several Amsterdam merchant houses, including John de Neufville & Zoon, John Hodshon, Daniel Crommelin & Zoon, Levinus Clarkson, and Thomas and Adrian Hope continued to build their trading networks and engaged additional agents and factors in New York, particularly for financial transactions such as discounting bills of exchange and making money transfers. Agents also sought out trade to fill the ships sailing to New York from the Dutch Republic with European goods. Even after nearly one hundred years of English political rule in New York, Lewis Morris, Judge-Commissary of the New York Vice-Court of Admiralty would complain bitterly in 1750: “The [Dutch] are known to be the cheapest carriers in the world.”

At the end of the seventeenth century, after an influx of English merchants, the New York Colonial Assembly passed legislation that taxed exports and imports, and forbade foreign vessels at New York City. The legislation could be viewed as an offshoot of the Navigation Acts in an attempt to curb Dutch trade specifically. The Assembly also more vigorously regulated New York’s commerce with New England and Philadelphia in an attempt to curtail the notorious illicit activities of Amsterdam merchants from previous

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396 Despite being of Dutch ancestry, Morris was known for his animosity against the Dutch. He acquired knowledge about Dutch trading patterns and the duplicity contained within ships’ papers. He condemned nearly every Dutch ship brought to his court as a prize. Morris criticized the Dutch as being "public factors for the enemy." See Michael Watson, “Lewis Morris Jr.: British American Officeholder,” in The Human Tradition in Colonial America, ed. Ian K. Steele, Nancy L. Rhoden (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999), 181-96.
decades.\textsuperscript{397}

The legislation passed, despite the fact that several assemblymen were of Dutch ancestry and actively engaged in trade and, most probably, many other assemblymen of non-Dutch ancestry were reliant on trade that included Amsterdam and Dutch merchants. Before 1690, trade to Amsterdam was dynamic and New York merchants had extensive shares in vessels to Amsterdam. After that, trade began to diminish, but not because of a lack of interest or persistence.

Rather, Dutch merchants had faced their own difficulties with wars waging throughout Europe at the turn of the century. Trading networks were disrupted and shipping lanes blocked by belligerent nations. Nevertheless, trade continued although in a more muted manner. And by the second decade of the century, trading patterns returned to pre-war levels.

One reason trading patterns from the Dutch Republic to the English colonies resumed was that the barriers to entry were low for merchants. Barriers to entry were anything that made it difficult for a new entrant to break into a market. Capital costs were often a key barrier to entry where the investment that needed to be made in fixed assets (such as ships) by a start-up was high relative to the sales and profits such assets would generate. Yet, a middling merchant from the Dutch Republic could secure space on a ship sailing to New York with ease. There was no need for a substantial capital investment of purchasing a ship. Certainly, shipping costs were higher during periods of war. However, when such periods concluded or even waned, the market for middling merchants opened because shipping costs did not have the added premium of war

\textsuperscript{397} The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (Albany: J.B. Lyon, 1894), 1:518-526.
associated risk. At that point, middling merchants found trade with New York again enticing and suggestive of profits.

Often, networks could be a substantial barrier to entry. Typically, any merchants first at a geographical location had certain advantages over merchants who arrived later. As time progressed, such barriers to entry became stronger. That was not the case with trade to New York. Although there were established trading networks, the networks seemed to encourage and accept new trading partners.

What should have been a significant barrier to entry with trade to New York or any English colony in North America was mostly ignored. The English government’s attempt to create a legal barrier to entry through the Navigation Acts was easily evaded. Once middling merchants perceived the evasion taking place, they, too, could participate in trade from the Dutch Republic.

Merchants such as Barent Reinders of New York, son-in-law of Jacob Leisler, saw opportunity. In 1700, Reinders bought the *Nieuw Jork Pinck* in Rotterdam. He engaged as captain Nicolaas Gerritse, a New Yorker experienced in the Amsterdam-New York route. In Amsterdam, Reinders explained his method of circumventing English laws. His method permitted the ship, *New York Pink*, to set sail for the West Indies and other places at his direction. He also declared that he owned the ship’s freight and that the captain and crew understood he owned the ship and its freight. All commercial transactions were done in his name so as to enjoy English liberties and the liberties extended to the English plantations. In reality, his sister, Alida Reinders, widow of Jan van Grift, and herself a merchant in Amsterdam, owned one-half of the ship; his brother, Jan Reinders, an Amsterdam merchant, owned one quarter of the ship; and, Michiel
Haulsey owned one quarter of the ship.  

This particular notarial record is one of the most transparent records that recorded how merchants in the Dutch Republic and the English colonies avoided the provisions of the English Navigation Acts. Confident that English officials did not have access to notarial minutes, parties made declarations that evidenced commercial obligations and were, nevertheless, illegal. It was as if two commercial realities existed: one for appearances before English officials and the other actual.  

The New York Pink arrived in New York without incident in September 1700. It brought Dutch commodities from Amsterdam to New York for the account of Jacob van Cortlandt. The ship continued sailing between New York and Amsterdam through 1704. Reinders, often in partnership with Van Cortlandt, supplied American commodities to Amsterdam merchants. Reinders persisted in trade with partners in Amsterdam at least through 1715.  

More than one family of Dutch ancestry in New York sent sons to Amsterdam and to London to secure commercial opportunities and to act as agents in their respective cities. By 1718, the three Clarkson brothers, David, Levinus, and Matthew were

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398 SAA, Notarial No. 5876/32. Alida paid 2912 guilders for her one-half share; Jan Reinders paid 1456 for his quarter share; and Michiel Haulseij paid 937 for his quarter share.  
399 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 5878/132 (1700). This particular record noted the loss of a vessel, de Hoopewell, off the coast of England. The ship was sailing from New York to Amsterdam. A number of prominent Amsterdam merchants executed a power of attorney in favor of Adolphus Philipse, a Dutch citizen of English ancestry, living in New York, to journey to England to retain their interests in any goods salvaged from the ship. The intention was for Philipse, as an English citizen, to direct attention away from the Dutch ownership of the goods and claim ownership himself. The Amsterdam merchants involved included: Hero Moij, Livinus van Schaik, Anthonij Kops, Willem Bancken, Pieter van Dijck, Jeronimo Coesaart, Johannes Lepper, Steven Melony, Bernardus Hothuijzen, and Reinier and Jan Dijkhuysen.  
400 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 5884 (1702).  
401 See SAA, Notarial No. 5934 (1715).
established merchants in London, Amsterdam, and New York respectively. David would return from London after six years, but Levinus remained in Amsterdam and provided a valuable nexus in the family’s trading network until at least 1745.

In turn, Levinus became the focal point for trade that extended familial trade beyond New York to Suriname, Curaçao, Hamburg, and Rotterdam. He collected freight charges on behalf of ship’s captains and handled damage claims. He arranged for the captain and sailors to make declarations about a vessel laden with Campeche wood and taken by Spanish privateers in Honduras. The ship originated from New York and Levinus had an interest in the cargo. He provided payment for colonial merchants pursuant to bills of exchange presented to him and extended credit.

And, in an uncommon situation, Levinus contracted to make transport arrangements for Ashkenazi Jews, both in the Dutch Republic and in Germany, for relocation to New York. Several hundred people were put in his care and transported. Government officials required Levinus to post a bond as there was concern about the “damage” the people could do and that one or more would remain and take up begging. Levinus’s trading networks in New York included Jews and he might have undertaken such arrangements to solidify his commercial relationships.

402 David was born in 1694, Levinus in 1696, and Matthew in 1699. Their father was English, Matthew Clarkson, and their mother was of Dutch ancestry, Catharina van Schaick. Catharina died while her sons were still small boys. Her sister, Margrieta van Schaick undertook their care. Perhaps this is where they received their commercial training as it was reputed that Margrieta “engaged in mercantile adventures and conducted a profitable trade with foreign countries. She became very wealthy and was the owner of considerable real estate in the city.” See The Clarksons of New York: A Sketch (New York: Bradstreet Press, 1875), 1:144.
403 SAA, Notarial No. 8619/1340 (1726).
404 SAA, Notarial No. 8700/1107 (1733).
405 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8723/252 (1735); SAA, Notarial No. 8723/261 (1735); SAA, Notarial No. 8745/2172 (1736); SAA, Notarial No. 8748/2574 (1736); SAA, Notarial No. 10374/1594 (1745).
406 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8935/2229 (1736); SAA, Notarial No. 7671/346 (1736); SAA, Notarial No. 10305/339 (1737); SAA, Notarial No. 10310/402 (1738).
Levinus was a middling merchant in Amsterdam. So, too, was Abraham ter Borch. He represented Andrew Fresneau, a prominent New York merchant, in the Dutch Republic. Over a seven year period, Ter Borch accepted and denied bills of exchange on behalf of Fresneau, exposed information relating to the loss of a ship, and contracted with *bergwerkers* (literally, mountain workers or miners) on behalf of Fresneau in New York.

Ter Borch arranged only one trading voyage on behalf of Fresneau. Nicolas Timmote, captain of *The Henry and Margret*, took a load of European goods to New York with instructions to unload the same, load the ship with trading goods for Virginia, trade such goods for hogsheads of tobacco, and return to Amsterdam. Additionally, Ter Borch arrested a ship on Fresneau’s behalf. Fresneau asserted that Rosewel and

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408 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 6451/278 (1725); SAA, Notarial No. 8611/842 (1725).

409 SAA, Notarial No. 8612/1181 (1725).

410 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 6440/559 (1720); SAA, Notarial No. 6442/210 (1721); SAA, Notarial No. 6443/454 (1721); SAA, Notarial No. 6443/455 (1721); SAA, Notarial No. 6443/475 (1721). In each of these contracts, Ter Borch engaged workers from Germany for Andrew Fresneau for specific terms of service. The project was one in which Fresneau partnered with Charles Crommelin (father of Daniel Crommelin, see below) for a copper mining venture in Simsbury, Connecticut (north of Hartford). Ter Borch contracted with an *Opperste Bergwerker* (Supreme Mountain Worker); a copper smelter; a carpenter; ordinary laborers; mountain workers (miners); and a superintendent of the miners. For further details on the Simsbury mine, see Effie Mae Pickett, *Connecticut Archives, Industry, 1708-1789* (Hartford: 1921). As well, Benelle en Compagnie, also merchants in Amsterdam, and agents for Charles Crommelin, contracted with German miners to travel to New York for a term of years to work at the copper mine. See, SAA, Notarial No. 8565 (1718).

411 SAA, Notarial No. 6110A (1718).

412 “Arresting” a vessel was a legal procedure well established in English maritime law. As the name implies, the vessel in question was legally prevented from moving or trading pending the resolution of a court action in which more often than not the vessel to be arrested was the subject of a claim. The arrest was undertaken in conjunction with a claim rather than an arrest for its own sake. In simple terms, a party who wished to take action against another on a claim wanted to know that, should they be successful in court, there was be something that could be sold to recover what the judgment had determined. A court could determine which party was at fault, but did not intervene to recover damages on the successful litigant’s behalf. On the assumption there was a right to arrest, the vessel became the security and the ultimate sanction was that a court would order the vessel sold to satisfy the claim. The ship could be released quickly and was able to make money for the owner. In
Monteneij, merchants in Madeira, owed him 1000 guilders and instructed Ter Borch to act on his behalf when a ship linked with Rosewel and Monteneij was next in Amsterdam’s port.413

The relationship with Fresneau seemed to be the only trading relationship Ter Borch had with merchants in colonial America. There is no indication of why Ter Borch decided against trading to North America again, but he and his sons did establish trading networks with, among others, Irish merchants.414

Levinus Clarkson and Abraham ter Borch, not unlike many Amsterdam merchants, had trading activity with New York merchants over several years, which may be traced through the notarial records. Still, there are glimpses of other Amsterdam merchants and their trade with New York only because of damage occurring to cargos through storms or alleged theft. It is through the loss of a vessel or cargo, or both, that the extent and type of trade from Amsterdam and New York in this period becomes apparent.

For instance, the Anna, sailing from New York to Amsterdam in 1701, encountered several storms on its voyage. Members of the crew provided declarations about the state of the cargo in New York and the concerns they had about potentially losing the vessel due to the storms. On board was a shipment of Brazilian wood (Braziliehout) and furs.415 While the furs were obtained through trading networks with Indians in New York or Canada, the Brazilian wood most likely came through Caribbean

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413 See, SAA, Notarial No. 6110A (1718).
415 SAA, Notarial No. 3350/594 (1701).
Similarly, the cargo of *The Dragon* sustained storm damage and members of her crew affirmed that the damage was not as a result of theft. This ship carried from New York to Amsterdam a variety of goods including sugar, cotton, wool, cocoa, furs, and Campeche wood.\(^\text{416}\) Comparable damage occurred to *The Sarah* and her crew attested to the storms encountered from New York to Amsterdam. The spoiled cargo aboard included rice, Campeche wood, red wood, tobacco, and other goods from New York.\(^\text{417}\) Aside from the furs, none of the goods aboard the *Anna*, *The Dragon*, or *The Sarah* would have been grown or produced in New York. Yet, the shipments suggest the continuing importance of New York as an entrepôt and transshipment point for trading networks between New York and Amsterdam.

Spanish and English privateers wreaked havoc for merchants regardless of their prominence. The difference was that wealthier merchants nearly always insured their vessels, could distribute their goods among several ships departing for the same location, and could absorb limited financial losses. Small to middling merchants who participated in transatlantic trade did not always insure their cargos due to cost considerations, could not necessarily distribute smaller cargos among several vessels, and could rarely sustain financial losses. But seizures by privateers also provided inventories of goods aboard ships, most often used for insurance purposes, which originated in New York. For instance, the crew aboard the *Little Strength* explained at the request of the ship’s owners that a Spanish privateer, *The Esperance*, seized the entire cargo west of the Scilly Isles on a voyage from New York to Amsterdam. The ship was laden with Campeche wood,

\(^{416}\) SAA, Notarial No. 5939 (1716).
\(^{417}\) SAA, Notarial No. 10361/1291 (1744).
hides, wax and any number of other goods.\textsuperscript{418}

And Willem van Brienen, a merchant in Amsterdam, was forced to give a power of attorney to merchants in London when English privateers took his vessel, \textit{The Arnold and John Gally}, in 1746 off the coast of New York. Van Brienen requested the London merchants to appeal to the King of England or whomever it may be appropriate the decision made by the judges in New York. He asked that the vessel’s confiscation be withdrawn and both the vessel and cargo be returned to him. The vessel carried a cargo hold full of European goods for the New York market that provides an opportunity to see what was thought to trade well.\textsuperscript{419}

Despite incidents of privateering, lapsed payments, or damaged vessels, Dutch merchants in Amsterdam continued to trade with New York merchants. Trading networks were too entangled and the promise of new opportunities was too great for Dutch merchants to consider abandoning the region.

\textbf{Daniel Crommelin – The Emergence of a Modern Merchant}

Of French Huguenot origins, Daniel Crommelin was born in a British New York and immigrated to the Dutch Republic in 1724.\textsuperscript{420} Evidence suggests that he was sent over to Amsterdam to receive commercial training and to represent his father’s trading interests there. The Atlantic world was for Crommelin the backdrop by which he

\textsuperscript{418} SAA, Notarial No. 9403/12158 (1744).
\textsuperscript{419} See, SAA, Notarial No. 10236/420 (1746); SAA, Notarial No. 12789/205 (1746). Lewis Morris, noted previously, served as one of the judges upholding the seizure of the vessel and approving its sale.
\textsuperscript{420} The oldest sources about the family go back to the beginning of the twelfth century when they were located near Lisseweg in the vicinity of Bruges. Later, they were part of the patricians of Ghent and Kortrijk. As early as the fifteenth century, the family operated as a linen manufacturer in Kortrijk. French intolerance of Huguenots forced the Crommelin family, along with many others, to emigrate from France. The Crommelins immigrated to the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century.
established his thriving and formidable banking and commercial house. And while Crommelin traded throughout the British colonies in North America, he had a particularly significant commercial network in New York.

From 1724 through 1750, Crommelin laid the foundations for his trading network. As early as 1739, Crommelin had pieced together transatlantic trading linkages. In a notarial record, he noted that he was an agent for Joan [Jan] van Sevenhoven of New York. He gave a power of attorney to Johannes Specht Nicolaasz, a merchant in Rotterdam, to act on Van Sevenhoven’s behalf. The record indicates that Crommelin maintained commercial contact with merchants in New York. The records suggest that Crommelin’s business had not yet become large enough to have a family member or other trusted merchant in his employment residing in Rotterdam. As a consequence, he was forced to appoint another merchant to act on his behalf.

Crommelin represented New York merchant Gulian Verplanck in Amsterdam by 1740. Not only did Crommelin and Verplanck have close familial ties (Verplanck had married Crommelin’s sister), but also their families were of French Huguenot ancestry and immigrated to New Netherland several generations earlier. As Verplanck’s commercial representative, Crommelin undertook on Verplanck’s behalf to ascertain the proceeds from the sale of flour, butter, and milk biscuits to Edward Tothill in Suriname. Crommelin enlisted the aid of Isaac de la Croix for an account from Tothill of the goods

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421 The Stadsarchief Amsterdam has extensive materials on the family and the family's commercial archives from the eighteenth century through the twentieth century. The archive is known under the title “Daniel Crommelin and Soonen.”
423 See SAA, Notarial No. 11248/103 (1739).
that had arrived aboard the *Joanna*.\footnote{Tothill was a Boston lawyer who had invested in a plantation in Suriname. De la Croix was also of Huguenot ancestry. De la Croix later built a coffee plantation in 1745 on the Commewijnerivier in the district Commewijne in Suriname. See SAA, Notarial No. 8950/20 (1740).} Either through direct business dealings or through familial connections, Crommelin was able to secure a representative in Suriname, thus providing linkages for his trading network.

The brothers-in-law relied on each other for commercial and personal matters.\footnote{Crommelin appointed Verplanck as representative for his underage brother, Charles, in an inheritance matter. Crommelin’s grandmother, Mary Sinclair, widow of Robert Sinclair, had bequeathed a life estate in several houses, land, and other property to her daughter, Crommelin’s mother, Hanna. The co-executors of the estate asked to be relieved of the administration of the property and to allow Hanna the administration as long as she did not remarry. Crommelin had already received the bulk of his inheritance from his father, but sought to protect his brother’s interests. See SAA, Notarial No. 8952/792 (1740). Crommelin had his own difficulties administering his father’s estate. He gave powers of attorney to various merchants to collect on debts owed his father’s estate. See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8954/334 (1741) (account owed from St. Domingue); SAA, Notarial No. 8954/614 (1741) (account owed from St Thomas in the Danish West Indies).} In 1740, Crommelin provided a power of attorney to Verplanck to sell his plantation *Watereiland* [Water Island], including the buildings, slaves, and tools, on Pointe Pasquereau in Guadeloupe. Crommelin had inherited the plantation from Pierre le Surrurier and his father, Charles Crommelin.\footnote{See SAA, Notarial No. 8950/263 (1740). Crommelin’s father, Charles, had transported from Africa the slaves that worked the plantation.} This suggests that Verplanck had a stronger commercial network in the French Caribbean than Crommelin.

And while Crommelin had numerous commercial transactions with New York merchants, he occasionally was forced to seek legal recourse against some. In 1742, Crommelin gave a power of attorney to John Peter Blaquire, a noted London merchant and attorney, to arrest a ship named *Albany*, captained by James Clark. Three New York merchants, Henry Cuyler, James Alexander, and Robert Livingston, and a London merchant, Samuel Storke, owned the ship. All four men were prominent merchants in
their respective cities. Cuyler was of Dutch ancestry and a leading fur trader.427 James Alexander, a native of Scotland, immigrated to New York in his youth. Most well known for his work as an attorney, he was also a businessman.428 Livingston, also a Scot by birth, was the New York agent for his brother, Philip, the second lord of Livingston manor and one of the largest wholesalers of Indian trade goods in Albany.429 Storke had founded one of the largest London mercantile houses engaged in transatlantic commerce in the eighteenth century.430 Crommelin alleged that the merchants owed him 1182 guilders plus interest and he ordered Blaquire to search the ship once it was under arrest.431

Crommelin’s actions were tactically risky. On the one hand, while he was becoming a leading merchant in Amsterdam, he risked the ire not only of the provincial merchants – Cuyler, Alexander, and Livingston – but of a well-respected London merchant as well. Each of the merchants had substantial trading networks that could have effectively impaired any future trade by Crommelin in New York. While the notarial

428 See Edmund B. O’Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1853-1887), Volumes 4-6. Alexander founded the New-York Weekly Journal and was one of John Peter Zenger’s defense attorneys. His wife, Mary Spratt Provoost, was really the merchant in the family. She ran a New York based importing company that was considered one of the major mercantile firms of the Colonial era. See Joan N. Burstyn, Past and Promise: Lives of New Jersey Women (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997). Her father was a merchant who had been born in Scotland and her mother was the descendant of prominent Dutch merchants (the DePeyster family).
431 Cuyler, Livingston, and Storke owned the vessel form 1728. Ibid., 151. Due to the decline of trade between London and New York, in 1741, the partners sent the vessel to Honduras for logwood with instructions to sell the logwood in Amsterdam. There, Storke tried unsuccessfully to sell his share. In a dispute with his partners, Storke lost his ¼ share in the Albany to pay his share of the crew’s wages. Ibid., 168.
records do not note what sort of discussion the parties had prior to Crommelin’s actions, it should be assumed that he did not act hastily. On the other hand, if Crommelin had not acted against the other merchants with regard to this particular debt, his reputation would have suffered.

Throughout the 1740’s, numerous ships sailed directly from New York to Crommelin’s Amsterdam warehouses carrying goods in contravention of the Navigation Acts. The notarial records were effectively closed to British authorities and, consequently, illicit trading activities come to light through various insurance claims, charter agreements, and general disputes.

Often, notaries were employed in anticipation of, or to thwart, litigation. Crommelin used them regularly for such purposes. In 1745-1746, Crommelin, over a four-month period, appeared before a notary about the voyage of a ship named Jane. The ship was sailing from New York to Amsterdam. Crommelin received notice that the ship had come into difficulty at Terschelling and some of the cargo needed to be unloaded there. In October, Crommelin gave power of attorney to a local resident to make arrangements to convey his cargo with the ship or another vessel.

The following month, Crommelin requested that crewmembers appear before a notary to give a description of events on the voyage. The mate, carpenter, and sailors described how the ship was laden with sugar, hides, and other cargo from New York. Near Kampen, the ship encountered heavy storms. The crew managed to reach Terschelling, but once there, they described how local residents who had been hired to

432 Terschelling is an island in the northern Netherlands, one of the West Frisian Islands.
433 See SAA, Notarial No. 10375/1896 (1745).
434 Kampen is a town on the island Sylt, in the district of Nordfriesland, in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany.
load the cargo caused damage to the cargo.\footnote{See SAA, Notarial No. 10376/2146 (1745).}

Shrewdly, Crommelin had utilized a notary to establish a record of his actions, first by requesting transshipment of the cargo from Terschelling and then by having crewmembers give a recent account of events. Later, in January 1746, the captain of the Jane, John Bill, appeared before a notary. Bill stated, on behalf of the ship’s owners in New York, that he was required to start a protest against Crommelin if the ship had not unloaded its cargo within 23 days. Bill noted that the unloading delay was neither his fault nor Crommelin’s as the ship had suffered damage. Inspectors for the insurance board delayed matters, and there was heavy frost suspending loading of the cargo.\footnote{See SAA, Notarial No. 10378/30 (1746).} Thus, Bill, most probably at Crommelin’s urging, provided a description of events that absolved both himself and Crommelin. It was a skillful use by Crommelin of notarial records to excuse himself from liability and preserve a commercial relationship with the New York ship owners.

In the late 1740’s, privateers took a number of Crommelin’s ships. The War of the Austrian Succession threatened traditional shipping lanes between New York and Amsterdam.\footnote{The War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48), including King George’s War in North America, the War of Jenkins’ Ear, and two of the three Silesian wars, involved most of the powers of Europe over the question of Maria Theresa’s succession to the realms of the House of Habsburg. Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, the traditional enemies of France, as well as the Kingdom of Sardinia and Saxony supported Austria. France and Prussia were allied with the Electorate of Bavaria and later Spain.} New York was Crommelin’s primary North American port for trade. In November 1746, The John, a ship in which Crommelin had an interest, was sailing from New York to Amsterdam. Christiaan van der Kroon, an Amsterdam resident aboard the ship, recounted that a French frigate under the command of the Duke d’Anville took the ship. Van der Kroon, the captain, and some of the passengers were transferred to the
frigate while *The John* was taken to Rochelle.438

In May 1747, Crommelin appeared before a notary regarding the ship *Aurora*. The vessel was sailing from New York to Amsterdam and had been previously insured earlier in the year.439 Crommelin received word that a French vessel had taken the *Aurora* as a prize. In the notarial record, Crommelin listed all of the Amsterdam-based insurers and the New York merchants who would be affected by the news.440 Two months later, Crommelin affirmed the French had taken another ship, on which goods were consigned to him. He also confirmed that two insurance polices totaling 8650 guilders were in effect for the consigned items. Crommelin also included information in his declaration that the English had retaken the vessel but the vessel had perished off the Scottish coast.441

Yet, again, in 1748, Crommelin reported the loss of goods aboard a ship taken by the French. *The Susanna* was sailing from New York to Amsterdam when two French ships seized it off the eastern coast of Scotland, one commanded by Jean Baptiste de Cock and the other by Jean Pierre. The captain of *The Susanna* offered £500 to £1,500 as ransom money (*ransoengeld*), but the privateers refused the offer. The ship and its cargo were taken to Bergen, Norway. Crommelin’s account of the goods aboard ship included the ship’s equipment, white French sugar, indigo, wood, tar, and rice. He also declared that he had no other insurance on the ship or goods aboard than that stated.442

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438 SAA, Notarial No. 10396/1572 (1747).
439 See SAA, Notarial No. 10390/98 (1747). Abeleven & Comp., merchants in Amsterdam, assured Crommelin they would subscribe for insurance coverage of 1500 guilders for goods carried by the vessel. Abeleven had not done so and Crommelin put them on notice that Abeleven would be liable for the damage.
440 SAA, Notarial No. 10393/709 (1747).
441 SAA, Notarial No. 10398/1840 (1747).
442 See SAA, Notarial No. 10404/1155 (1748); SAA, Notarial No. 10404/1156 (1748).
Despite the disruption of war to Crommelin’s trade, he continued to engage ships to transport goods to the Dutch Republic. He did so because trade with New York was financially profitable and he had developed trade networks with family and non-family members. Had he curtailed his activities during the war, he might not have been able to regain the trade. Crommelin was also diligent in securing insurance on each cargo. Although he paid a higher premium during the war to account for the elevated risks of transport, it seemed that engaging in trade without insurance was untenable for Crommelin.

Crommelin made astute use of notaries. When he anticipated difficulty, he engaged a notary’s services to create a written record of events and, in particular, his actions or reactions to such occurrence. He also put other parties before a notary to chronicle their eyewitness account of an event. Crommelin had such accounts prepared soon after an individual returned to Amsterdam as if he was preserving the freshness of their testimony. He created a paper trail for insurers and adversaries that would have been difficult to dispute.

While Crommelin’s employment of a notary occurred mostly in anticipation of the loss of cargo or a ship, he also used notaries in the ordinary course of business, including charter agreements,\textsuperscript{443} denial of a bill of exchange,\textsuperscript{444} and powers of attorney.\textsuperscript{445}

\textsuperscript{443} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8893/600 (1750) (charter of ship \textit{The Samuel and Judith} to St. John (Danish) and then to New York, returning to Amsterdam); SAA, Notarial No. 8893/653 (1750) (charter of ship \textit{The Dragon} to St. John and New York, returning to Amsterdam).

\textsuperscript{444} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 10395/1343 (1747); SAA, Notarial No. 10395/1344 (1747); SAA, Notarial No. 10416/1136 (1749).

\textsuperscript{445} See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 12667/68 (1749) (power of attorney given by ship’s captain to Crommelin to defend all matters concerning the ship that had arrived from New York); SAA, Notarial No. 10414/653 (1749) (power of attorney given to Crommelin by Margareta van Bulderen to settle the inheritance for her children of her deceased husband’s estate in New York); SAA, Notarial No. 10416/971 (1749) (power of attorney given to Crommelin by the ship’s captain to collect monies for delivered goods).
Crommelin can be characterized as a merchant who exploited the available commercial resources offered to him, developed extensive trade networks not solely dependent on kinship or religious requisites, diversified his trading networks and activities geographically, and shrewdly continued to trade during times of war.

**Conclusion**

The examples documented in this chapter prove a general trend: English laws did not destroy Dutch participation in transatlantic trade. Merchants in the Dutch Republic and in New York, such as Jacob Leisler, used available resources and creative subterfuges to establish lucrative niches and trading networks with each other after 1664 and well into the eighteenth century.

Additionally, women of Dutch ancestry resident in New York continued to trade as merchants well into the eighteenth century. Dutch cultural acceptance of women involved in commercial enterprises trumped any attempt to impose English norms for women’s participation outside of the domestic sphere on these women. Women succeeded in trade because they were commercially astute, educated, and offered good trade that disregarded gender divisions.

Despite nearly forty years of physical possession of the colony of New York, English colonial administrators could do little to upend disregard for the Navigation Acts by their colonial subjects. Nor did political boundaries mean much to the Dutch merchants who arrived from Europe to ply New York’s waters for trade. Smuggling was just another means of engaging in trade, albeit with some additional risk involved.

Daniel Crommelin’s activities as a merchant reflected the continuously evolving role of Dutch merchants trading to the British colonies in North America during the mid-
eighteenth century. Many such merchants transitioned from only providing trade goods in exchange for a particular commodity to merchants who became bankers and provided the financing to acquire trade goods. And, there were Dutch merchants, such as Daniel Crommelin and Sons and Hope & Company, who developed into substantial banking houses. They furnished financial support for the war efforts of the soon-to-be newly independent nation, as well as providing subsequent funds for large-scale public works projects and land purchases such as Erie Canal, the Holland Land Purchase, and the Louisiana Purchase to enable America to grow economically. While historians have characterized Dutch merchants as commercially astute and tenacious, it is here, at the mid-point of the eighteenth century, that we recognize the modern businessperson and the ability to use all available resources – knowledge, institutional, economic – to engage in profitable trade.
Chapter 6

“They had English Faces but Dutch Harts”: Tobacco, Rice, and Dutch Merchants in the Chesapeake and South Carolina, 1664-1750

Introduction

In June 1742, Robert Pringle, a Scottish-born merchant who immigrated to Charleston, South Carolina in his youth, wrote his brother in London. In a typical exchanges between the two men, Robert would apprise his brother about the arrival of ships in Charleston’s harbor, the prices of various commodities, the progress of the rice crop for the year, requests for merchandise, and sundry items about his family.

In this particular letter, he requested his brother to obtain insurance in the London market on a sloop; he told of the receipt of a consignment of New England rum by a Mr. Thomas Hutchinson of Boston (who Robert had heard bore “a good Character there”); and he reported the arrival in Charleston’s port of a Spanish privateer who had allegedly cut Captain Jenkins’s ear some years ago, which subsequently caused disruption to trade. And there, in its midst, the letter contained a criticism. Quite simply, Robert wrote, “Those Dutch have gott too much into this trade.” That trade was the only one that mattered to a South Carolina merchant who wished to rise to prominence in this period – the rice trade. Robert’s comment suggests animosity toward the Dutch. For what reason,

446 The remark was made about the merchants in Virginia and their proclivity toward and protection of foreign traders in this period. Frank Walczyk, ed., Northampton County, VA Orders, Deeds & Wills, 1651-1654 (Coram, NY: Peter's Row, 1998) 4: 163.
447 Much of Robert Pringle’s early life is unknown. His brother, Andrew, was a sea captain who became a merchant and established his own trading house in London. The two brothers assisted each other, but did not operate as a formal partnership. Walter B. Edgar, ed., The Letterbook of Robert Pringle (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1972), I: 381-2.
is unknown. He might have experienced a difficult trade with a Dutch merchant. He might have felt that the Dutch carrying trade interceded into the English trade, to the detriment of his and his brother’s profits. In any event, Robert noted his dissatisfaction about Dutch involvement in the rice trade.

The historiography concerning trade in the Chesapeake and Lower South during the period of 1664 to 1750 almost exclusively speaks about the vital partnerships of local colonial planters with English and Scots merchants. If another nation is mentioned, it is a passing reference, almost as if a ship had blown off course and arrived along the James River or the harbors of Charleston or Savannah by happenstance. Nevertheless, the archival records and merchant correspondence belie the historiography and demonstrate the continuing and robust presence of Dutch merchants, shipping, and financing in the region.

The Dutch competed with the English for trade throughout the Atlantic, and particularly in colonial North America. As has been contended throughout this work, the Dutch effectively disregarded political boundaries and often ignored administrative and fiscal exigencies. Instead, they established trading networks with English planters and merchants by offering lower transaction costs, timely shipping of staples, and access to extensive European and Caribbean markets. Their English partners were willing participants. There was little English officials could do either within the colonies or elsewhere to enforce Navigation Acts regulations. But, later during the mid-eighteenth century, as the British government allocated more resources to enforcement, particularly in the collection of duties, traders from other nations could not overtly disregard policies and regulations effecting trade in the British colonies.
The first part of this chapter picks up the story of tobacco previously discussed in Chapter 3. European demand for tobacco began to wane in this period, particularly as the quality of Chesapeake tobacco diminished. Nevertheless, Dutch merchants continued to trade for tobacco in the Chesapeake and new commercial networks replaced old. For the Dutch, tobacco was the most important commodity shipped to the Dutch Republic from North America. As the tobacco trade evolved in the Chesapeake, so, too, did processing centers transform in Holland. From Middelburg, to Rotterdam, and then to Amsterdam, each city held the distinction of being the center of tobacco processing in the Dutch Republic. And each processing center added some sort of innovation to the tobacco trade.

Dutch merchants and English planters still engaged in subterfuge to hide Dutch national identities from English authorities. Though, because tobacco was such an important colonial export to England, colonial officials paid closer regard to Dutch activities in the region. Attention by officials eased off during the 1690’s and early 1700’s when the Dutch Republic was at war with France and Dutch shipping was otherwise employed in the war efforts. Although Amsterdam remained dominant in the tobacco market, trade never returns to previous activity levels.

The second section of this chapter examines the development of the rice trade in South Carolina and the entry of Dutch merchants. The colony of South Carolina initially struggled to find a commodity suitable for production and export. When it finally landed upon rice, Dutch merchants expressed immediate interest because rice was such a valued staple in Europe. English policymakers soon listed rice as an enumerated commodity that could only be shipped to England. After years of protest, and much to the relief of Dutch
merchants, in 1730 South Carolina planters succeeded in convincing Parliament to allow the shipment of rice directly to Europe.

Despite the fact that rice was listed as an enumerated commodity, Dutch ships mostly ignored such petty bureaucracy and initiated trade directly with South Carolina planters. Soon trading networks flourished. As early as 1711, Dutch merchants were investing in South Carolina rice plantations. Through the 1720’s and 1730’s, Dutch shipping of South Carolina rice increased dramatically. Even the largest merchant houses in Amsterdam became involved in the trade. Although Dutch merchants made half-hearted attempts to comply with the Navigation Acts, the lure of meeting market demands often persuaded them to sail directly to the Dutch Republic.

Sailing for Tobacco Road – Continued Profits

Tobacco fueled the economy of the Chesapeake region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The single staple of the Chesapeake was the source of constant concern for planters, colonial officials, and merchants.

Despite the substantial growth in tobacco production in the Chesapeake, problems in price stability and quality existed. In 1660, when English and Dutch markets became glutted with tobacco, prices fell so low Chesapeake planters faced an economic crisis. Facing a loss of income without a means to offset losses, planters mixed other organic material with tobacco to increase the quantity of tobacco shipped overseas. The immediate effect was to resolve short-term cash flow issues based on the increased quantity of tobacco shipped. Still, overproduction and a deterioration of the tobacco’s

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quality had serious consequences.  

European demand for Chesapeake tobacco declined, but did not completely diminish, as the staple’s quality was compromised. Colonial authorities stepped in and took corrective measures. During the last half of the seventeenth century through the early part of the eighteenth century, authorities implemented three solutions. First, they reduced the amount of tobacco produced annually. Second, they standardized the size of a tobacco hogshead and prohibited shipments of bulk tobacco. Finally, they prevented the exportation of tobacco mixed with any other substances. Yet because there was no practical way to enforce the regulations, the measures were initially ineffective. Not until 1730, when the Virginia Inspection Acts were passed, did one colonial government have a means by which to fully enforce tobacco trade laws.

The Inspection Acts transformed tobacco regulation becoming a permanent feature of the tobacco trade until the American Revolution. The Inspection Acts established public warehouses with official inspectors and required planters to transport every hogshead of tobacco in the colony to a warehouse for inspection. Colonial inspectors were empowered to break open any hogshead, remove and burn any trash, and issue tobacco notes to the owner specifying the weight and kind of tobacco.

Despite the difficulties with the quality of Chesapeake tobacco, Dutch merchants

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continued to trade with established networks and to forge new networks. From the latter half of the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, tobacco was the most important North American commodity shipped to the Dutch Republic. From its earliest cultivation, Virginia tobacco arrived in considerable quantities in the Dutch Republic to be processed into spun tobacco and snuff tobacco. Over time, different processing and production centers arose within the country to handle tobacco. Each was associated with a port and reflected the relative importance of the port as a commercial center in the Dutch Republic. During the first decades of the seventeenth century, Middelburg was the hub for Virginia tobacco. Around 1650, Amsterdam took over this position becoming known as the tobacco capital of the world. Later, in the eighteenth century, the manufacturing of tobacco products shifted once again, this time to Rotterdam. During the period, between thirty and fifty percent of all Chesapeake tobacco was shipped to the Dutch Republic, this despite being an enumerated commodity. While some tobacco did go through England, a significant amount did not and was shipped directly from the Chesapeake to Europe.


453 For a quantitative look at Virginia tobacco arriving in the Dutch Republic, see Nicolaas Posthumus, *Nederlandsche Prijsgeschiedenis* (Leiden, 1943-64), 1:202-8; H.K. Roessingh, *Inlandse Tabak: Expansie en Contractie van een Handelgewas in de 17e en 18e Eeuw in Nederland* (Zutphen: De Walburg Pers, 1976), 516-55. Producing spun or roll cut tobacco for pipe smoking began by putting cut tobacco in a tube and putting it under direct pressure. When the rod of pressed tobacco was removed from the tube, it was then wrapped with other tobaccos. The end product was sliced into disks, usually referred to as coins, for easy handling by the consumer. The coins normally had a core that was visually different than the outer layers. Snuff is a generic term for fine-ground smokeless tobacco products.
Throughout the latter part of the seventeenth century, Dutch merchants availed themselves of established trading networks with trusted commercial partners in the Dutch Republic, London, New York, and Virginia. Merchants of Dutch ancestry throughout the former New Netherland and elsewhere in the British colonies continued to trade with each other and with their networks in England and Europe.\textsuperscript{454} As late as 1698, the noted merchant and economic theorist, Sir Josiah Child, published objections to the transport of Virginia tobacco to Amsterdam merchants via New York City: “The Dutch, under pretence of trading to and from New-York, carry great quantities of Virginia Tobacco directly for Holland.”\textsuperscript{455} For instance, Anthony Brockholls, deputy governor of New York, owned the \textit{Susan}, a vessel that in 1687 sailed from New York to Virginia and then to Rotterdam laden with tobacco. As well as the \textit{Susan}, Brockholls held an interest in at least one other vessel, \textit{The Happy Return}, seized for trading in violation of the Navigation Acts.\textsuperscript{456}

In addition, ships sailing from the Dutch Republic often acquired an English identity, through their captain, en route to Virginia. By the time the vessels arrived in the Chesapeake, the Dutch ships had become English, or at least appeared to be English. The Amsterdam archives reveal the continuing magnitude of Dutch trade for Virginia tobacco


\textsuperscript{455} Sir Josiah Child, \textit{A New Discourse of Trade}, (London: T. Sowle, 1693).

during the 1670s.  

In 1673, the Dutch recaptured New York and held it for over a year before losing it again to the English. The Dutch also raided Chesapeake Bay, burned numerous English ships containing tobacco lying in the Bay, and seized many others as prizes of war. Despite the temporary hostilities between the Dutch and English in the British colonies and general aggression between the two states in Europe, the English rarely enforced the Navigation Acts at the time and throughout the 1680s, trade continued between Amsterdam and the Chesapeake.

Daniel Petit, English consul in Amsterdam, corresponding with James II’s secretary of state, the Earl of Middleton, complained frequently about the Dutch and their underlying disregard for the English. In particular, Petit noted that Dutch merchants failed to pay duties required under the Navigation Acts. In August 1688, Petit detained the *Vriendschap*, under Captain Niclas Madder, which arrived in Amsterdam. Petit wrote Middleton: “I [Petit] have this morning arrested the ship Freindship, Nicolas Madder, master, lately arrive here from Virginia, without having payed...duties in England.” The ship was

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457 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 3496/12 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 3496 II/46 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 2233/34-36 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 2902/1061 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 3204/119 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 1983/386 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 3496 II/101 (1670); SAA, Notarial No. 3772/326 (1671); SAA, Notarial No. 3774/241-43 (1672).


459 For the burning of the tobacco fleet in 1673, see Warren M. Billings, ed., *The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606-1689* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 319-23. The Dutch also exhibited similar aggression to the tobacco fleet lying in the Chesapeake in 1667. See “Attacks by the Dutch on the Virginia Fleet in Hampton Roads in 1667,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 4 (January 1897), 229-45.

460 See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 2259/86-7 (1680); SAA, Notarial No. 3249/72 (1680); SAA, Notarial No. 3254/248 (1681); SAA, Notarial No. 3257/121 (1682); SAA, Notarial No. 4960/208 (1682); SAA, Notarial No. 5129/312 (1683); SAA, Notarial No. 4814/ (1683); SAA, Notarial No. 3271/8 (1684); SAA, Notarial No. 5242A/ (1685); SAA, Notarial No. 3293/234 (1688).
abt 90 tunns, and was, as Madder told me, entered by him in Virginia upon his owne name and called the Society, he sayd also that one [John] Michael, who came in the ship from Virginia, is her true owner, and that he was but mate when he made entry of her there. One John Bornall [John Borland] a Scotsman living att Boston in New England is also come in her, as supercargo or merchant of the tobacco.\footnote{461}

Petit would have been supportive of the efforts of Francis Howard, governor of Virginia, who established a type of state-sponsored coast guard to patrol the Chesapeake to dissuade Dutch shipping. One of the commanders, Thomas Allen, noted in 1684

The Virginians are very angry that I stay here because I won’t let them cheat the King, they say I spoile their trade, and the best words I can get from them is old rogue and old dog, and when they see the ketch they say here comes the divells’ ketch, and this is the best language I can get from them behind my back...[T]hey have hired some small vessels to come when I am gone to one end of the country to fetch their Tobacco and carry it to New York or Newfoundland and from thence bring French brandy and the Tobacco they ship away for Holland, and soe cheat the King of his due.\footnote{462}

Despite Allen’s efforts, trade continued between Dutch merchants and Virginian plantation owners.

During the early 1690’s, Dutch merchants continued their commercial activities with Virginia. George Baron, an Amsterdam merchant, and James Frend, captain of Het Land van Beloften, recounted before a notary the price of Virginia tobacco over the years. They noted fourteen voyages to the Chesapeake in partnership together. They declared they had never purchased 100 pounds of tobacco for more than 8, 9, or 10 shillings and never for 12 shillings. They also explained that they had never sold tobacco for more than 10 shillings per 100 pounds.\footnote{463} The notarial document did not disclose the purpose for which depositions were made, but the information gained about continued trade and

\footnote{461 See MS A 41816, Petit to Middleton, Amsterdam, August 1688, British Library, London. John Borland had significant ties with New York merchants, including, Philip Livingston.}
\footnote{462 See Allen to Howard, June 1684, CO 1/63, ff. 278-81, The National Archives, Kew.}
\footnote{463 SAA, Notarial No. 5842/ (1691).}
amount received for the commodity in Amsterdam is noteworthy.

William Darvall, a merchant in New York, was particularly active during this period and is an example of a colonial merchant with commercial ties in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Operating as Darvall and Company, William both shipped cargos and owned vessels that transported Virginia tobacco directly to Europe.\textsuperscript{464}

Trade and commercial relationships between the Chesapeake and the Dutch Republic was severely disrupted by war with France during the late 1690’s.\textsuperscript{465} In 1698, a French privateer captured Joseph Lord, skipper of \textit{De Swaen}, on his journey from Virginia. He provided a power of attorney to an Amsterdam merchant who represented the vessel’s owners and the merchants with interests in the cargo of tobacco.\textsuperscript{466} Notarial declarations were non-existent during the war era and, thus, there are no further notarial references to trade between the Dutch Republic and the Chesapeake region until 1714.

A once porous and diverse Atlantic trade between merchants of various nations was subsequently relegated to state protection and control by the British government.\textsuperscript{467} Yet, some time before 1718, the Dutch resumed direct trade with the Chesapeake.\textsuperscript{468}

Certainly, trade did not return to the previous levels experienced in the seventeenth century. Europeans continued to demand tobacco and previous trading networks and

\textsuperscript{464} SAA, Notarial No. 5843/ (1692); SAA, Notarial No. 5844/ (1692); SAA, Notarial No. 5850/135 (1694).

\textsuperscript{465} The Chesapeake economy faced severe disruption from the 1690s to the 1710s. King William's War, as it was known in the colonies, was part of the War of the League of Augsburg (Nine Years’ War) (1688-97), in which Louis XIV's France fought against the Duchy of Savoy, the Dutch Republic, England, the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and Scotland. It ended with the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. Queen Anne's War, as it was known in the colonies, was the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13), fought over the crown of Spain between supporters of Philip V, which included France and Bavaria, and supporters of Archduke Charles, which included the possessions of the Austrian Hapsburgs, the Dutch Republic, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, and Savoy. The Treaty of Utrecht resolved it in 1713.

\textsuperscript{466} SAA, Notarial No. 5868/324 (1698).

\textsuperscript{467} See Douglas Bradburn, “The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715,” in \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly} 68 (July 2011), 361-86.

\textsuperscript{468} SAA, Notarial No. 8565/ (1718).
practices resumed.

Despite changes in Virginia and London, Amsterdam remained the dominant tobacco market. Dutch traders availed themselves of the rise in domestic tobacco production and continued to import from England as well as from Virginia.

Ties between the Chesapeake and the Dutch Republic dated to the colony’s earliest days. The tobacco trade created a significant symbiotic relationship between Chesapeake plantation owners and Dutch merchants. The Navigation Acts endeavored to transform the Dutch role in trade with the British colonies in North America. Persistent, and drawn to the lucrative tobacco trade, the Dutch found the means necessary to continue trade in the Chesapeake. Trade prospered subsequent to the implementation of the Navigation Acts. Although war late in the seventeenth century interrupted a well-defined trading relationship, trade continued throughout the eighteenth century because it was profitable for parties to continue such trading networks.

New Profits on the Horizon - South Carolina and the Rice Trade

Land, as in all of the mainland colonies, was abundant in the Carolinas. Early settlers faced the same questions that settlers in other colonies had faced – what could be profitably exported from the colony to launch an economy? Samuel Wilson, an early promoter of the colony, wrote of such concerns in 1682:

I have here, as I take it, described a pleasant & fertile Country, abounding in health and pleasure, and with all things necessary for the sustenance of mankind, and wherein I think I have written nothing but truth, sure I am I have inserted no wilful falshood: I have also told you how men are to have Land, what shall I doe with it? What Comoditys shall I be able to produce that will yeild me mony in other Countrys, that I may be inabled to buy Negro slaves (without which a Planter can never do any great matter and purchase other things for my
pleasure and convenience, that Carolina doth not produce.\footnote{469}

Wilson suggested a number of commodities for production, any number of which achieved modest success in the early years. His list included: livestock, deerskins, pitch, tar, silk, and sassafras.\footnote{470} In the colony’s early years, settlers used the expanding slave population to produce meat exports for the West Indies and to produce naval stores.\footnote{471}

The initial commercial investments in livestock and production facilities for naval stores encountered tangible and economic hurdles. Once allied with the British, the Yamasee peoples confronted encroachment on their lands by colonists and difficulty in obtaining the two most important items in their trading relationship with the British – deerskins and Indian slaves. The Yamasee War, waged from 1715 to 1717, had a considerable impact on the colony’s economy. The livestock industry, responsible for meat exports, was devastated. Yamasee war parties destroyed colonists’ livestock in such numbers that the meat trade with the West Indies faced disruption for years.\footnote{472} In addition to the local war, the British bounty on naval stores lapsed in 1724 and thus reduced income to colonists.\footnote{473} Thus, the war and withdrawal of fiscal aid heightened interest and concentration in rice cultivation.\footnote{474}

\footnote{469} Samuel Wilson, An Account of the Province of Carolina in America, Together with an Abstract of the Patent, and Several other Necessary and Useful Particulars, to Such as Have Thoughts of Transporting Themselves Thither (London: G. Larkin for Francis Smith, 1682), 27.

\footnote{470} Ibid.

\footnote{471} Peter Wood, Black Majority, 55, 144.


\footnote{474} For a general discussion about the development of South Carolina’s economy, including the cultivation of indigo, see Robert M. Weir, Colonial South Carolina: A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997).
As the early settlers in South Carolina cast about for profitable economic opportunities, amazing arrays of organic substances were put to the test. The settlers tried various cultigens such as sugar, tobacco, indigo, cotton, and rice – all commodities associated with climates similar to South Carolina’s. Rice - a plant that can be grown virtually anywhere – was a crop that settlers returned to on several occasions.475

The first mention of rice and its production in Carolina appeared in an article entitled “A Description of Carolana by a Well-willer” in 1649 in The Modern Intelligencer.476 Nevertheless, early efforts to establish a settlement there failed. In 1663, King Charles II granted eight members of the English nobility a charter to establish the colony of Carolina. Known as the Lords Proprietors of Carolina, the cohort were the colony’s ruling landlords. The Duke of Albemarle wrote to Lord Willoughby of Parham, explaining that their initial plans for the colony were to produce such commodities “as the Kinge hath not yet within his Terrytories in quantity, although his people consume much of them to the exhausting wealth of the kingdome, the commodityes I meane are wine, oyle, reasons, currants, rice, silke &c.”477 The crop required skill and experience, however, for commercial success not yet possessed by planters. Again, in the 1680s and 1690s, planters reintroduced the crop with seeds brought from Africa and the East Indies. Yet, the colonists still lacked the agricultural skill set to make the crop commercially

viable. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonists had acquired the requisite components enabling South Carolina to become a leading rice exporter.

The colony possessed a number of geological, climatic, and economic advantages that help to explain why rice proved successful there at that particular time. Certainly, the physical environment of the lower coastal plain of both South Carolina was conducive to rice production. The region’s humid subtropical climate, abundant precipitation, seemingly inexhaustible surface water resources, and loamy red clay soil provided advantageous growing conditions.

Additionally, over time the colonists established an ample and technologically skilled enslaved African and creole labor force. Rice had been grown on the West African coast south of the Sahara, especially along the Windward Coast in present-day Ghana and Sierra Leone. Rice plantation owners made a concerted effort to purchase slaves from this area assuming a familiarity with rice cultivation.

A powerful class of planters and merchants, eager for profits, had shown itself capable of organizing production, particularly the planters and merchants who had had

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479 Reports on the increase of rice production in South Carolina abounded. Edward Randolph, Collector of Customs wrote in 1700: "They have now found out the true way of raising and husking Rice. There have been above 300 Tons shipped this year to England besides about 30 Tons more to the Islands." See Edward Randolph, “Letter of Edward Randolph to the Board of Trade,” in *Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650-1708*, edited by Alexander S. Salley, Jr. (New York: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1911), 204-10. In fact, so productive were the Carolina plantations that the Lords Proprietors wrote that the colony “hath made more rice ye Last Cropp then we have Ships to Transport. See Alexander S. Salley, Jr., ed., *Commissions And Instructions From The Lords Proprietors Of Carolina To Public Officials Of South Carolina: 1685-1715* (Columbia: The State Co., 1916), 131-2.

previous plantation management experience in Barbados.\textsuperscript{481} The infusion of European and American merchant capital into various plantation enterprises greatly facilitated long-distance trade.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, relatively stable transport costs, timely market information about lapses in European grain production, and a degree of integration, of what was still a nascent Atlantic economy, favored this region over several other rice-producing areas both within the Atlantic world and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{482}

**Dynamics of the Dutch Rice Trade with South Carolina**

During the first decades of the eighteenth century rice cultivation in South Carolina drew the attention of numerous Amsterdam and Rotterdam merchants, including some leading Dutch trading houses. With substantial preexisting trade networks in the West Indies and in Virginia, the Dutch were aware of South Carolina’s colonization by English settlers from Barbados and Virginia, and later French Huguenot refugees. Individuals forming such networks brought the attention of Dutch merchants to the newly cultivated staple.

The Dutch also took cognizance of the agricultural experiments with rice cultivation by Carolina colonists, because rice was a valued staple in northern European diets. Contemporaneous histories, though, have debated about the reasons for rice’s


There are two leading explanations as to why demand for South Carolina rice increased so substantially during the eighteenth century. The first suggests that rice was an inferior grain that could replace other small grains in the European diet. This view of the commodity was held by the British and colonial merchants who organized the trade, and who consistently argued that the poorer urban classes consumed Carolina rice as a substitute for cheap bread cereals.483

In that context, the critical determinant of demand was therefore thought to be the level of European harvests. Poor harvests forced up the price of inferior cereals, which opened the market for rice. In some decades, poor harvests occurred frequently in Western Europe, causing severe shortages in countries with advanced agriculture like Holland.484 High cereal prices then triggered demand on the rice market where prices rose sharply. The chief suppliers of rice to the growing market were initially the eastern Mediterranean and northern Italy.485

Historians too have often characterized rice as poverty crop, a grain that was boiled with vegetables to make broth, or ground into meal and mixed with millet or flour to make a cheap breadstuff. In such forms, it was habitually eaten by the urban and institutionalized poor, as well as providing in famine years a more widely used emergency substitute.486

A second explanation for the demand for South Carolina rice hinges on a contention put forth by Peter Coclanis, who asserts that the basis of colonial export expansion in 1650-1750 was economic growth in Western Europe. Growth created higher incomes and a changed structure of demand, as consumption in Europe shifted from basic items to goods with high and positive income elasticities, such as non-essential foodstuffs and manufactured goods. The shift in demand was paralleled by shifts in supply. Resources were reallocated in an international setting: the proportion of resources devoted to basic agricultural production in western Europe declined, while surplus capital and labor were exported to America, where they were concentrated in the production of a number of agricultural staples, including rice. Rice harvested in America found ready markets in European urban centers that no longer had a proximate and ready supply available.

A significant percentage of the rice exported from South Carolina ended up in Holland and Germany. The remainder of exported rice went to southern Europe, mainly to Spain and Portugal, and to the West Indies to feed slave populations. The significance of such countries in the rice trade can be seen in one Charleston merchant’s comments in 1752 that the Dutch were “the most considerable buyers” and that they

\[\text{Economic Life and Death in the South Carolina Low Country, 1670-1920 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 133-4.}\]


ruled the market.”

The continuing successes of rice production for commercial purposes caught the attention of the Board of Trade in London. In 1704, the Board of Trade put rice on the enumerated list of commodities that could be shipped only to England. Although many London merchants transshipped sundry American products to Europe, rice was sold almost exclusively to European market centers in the Dutch Republic, Scandinavia, Spain, Portugal, and various German states. Had the English population’s dietary preferences favored rice over other grains, the outcry from South Carolina planters over the Board’s actions that put rice on the enumerated list of commodities might have been muted. But English consumers ate rice in a dessert format, rather than as a staple and, as a consequence, the commodity was subject to dietary substitution.

As a consequence, the 1704 protectionist provisions required South Carolina planters to follow complex legal procedures, identical with other enumerated commodities. Planters shipped their rice to England first and paid duties to the English government before having the rice reshipped to a destination in Europe. While a certain percentage of the duty would be reimbursed upon transshipment out of England, South

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490 The 1660 Navigation Act enumerated several colonial commodities that could only be sold to English buyers and exported to English ports in English ships with English crews. Tobacco, sugar, cotton, indigo, ginger, fustic, and other dying woods were subject to the restrictions pronounced in 1660. The legislation of 1704, along with adding rice to the list, also included naval stores, molasses, and copper to the list of goods. See Lawrence A. Harper, The English Navigation Laws (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); I.K. Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy: The Board of Trade in Colonial Administration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).

491 Carole Shammas, The Pre-Industrial Consumer in England and America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 140-44. See also, Robert May, The accomplisht cook, or The art and mystery of cookery (London: N. Brooke, 1660). May mentioned eight recipes for rice, most of them being puddings.
Carolina merchants expressed little disapproval about the payment of imposts.\textsuperscript{492} Rather, they called attention to the time and effort of rice production and dreaded the delaying effect a double voyage and assorted administrative measures would have on a crop harvested in the fall. The delaying effect was twofold: first, it could lessen the quality of the crop and its fitness for subsequent consumption; and, second, it could diminish the available markets for rice.\textsuperscript{493}

The South Carolina Assembly accordingly began to petition the British government as early as 1714 to remove rice as an enumerated commodity and to allow payment of any duty in America, with direct shipment from South Carolina to European nations. Unfortunately, Parliament was unresponsive to such petitions and others over the ensuing years.\textsuperscript{494} Finally, in 1730, Parliament yielded to lobbying asserted by South Carolina’s special interest group of plantation owners, colonial officials, and London rice merchants, permitting colonial rice thereafter to be shipped directly to European ports south of Cape Finisterre, Spain.\textsuperscript{495}

Despite eliminating the requirement that ships carrying rice alight in England prior to embarking for Europe, the new legislation established additional administrative procedures. Colonial customs officials required ships’ captains to secure an export

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{493} A.S. Salley, ed., \textit{Journal of the Commons House of Assembly of South Carolina, 1692-1765}, (Columbia: State Company, 1907-1949), 16:287-8. Along with a double voyage, the second voyage required added insurance. As well, if South Carolina rice was not available expeditiously for the regions celebrating Lent, South Carolina planters expressed concern that merchants in Italy and the Levant would supply rice instead.
\end{itemize}
license for loading and carrying the rice and to give a financial bond for the cargo’s value
upon issuance of the license. Before leaving South Carolina, a captain had to show the
certificate of bond and the license to the colonial tax collector. Upon arrival in a
European port, before the captain or supercargo could sell his cargo, he needed to verify
the landing of the rice in the foreign port. To do so, the 1704 provisions required him to
obtain the signature of either a British consul assigned to that nation or two known
British merchants who transacted business from the port, who affirmed the rice’s arrival.
On returning to England, the captain was to submit the certificate of landing supported by
the signatures of the consul or merchants and the license endorsed by the colonial officer
in South Carolina. The act subjected the rice to a duty equivalent to the net amount owed
if the merchant had shipped the rice directly to Britain and then re-exported it.496 Hence,
while the act eliminated the expense of a double voyage and genuine possibility of delay
to market, it instead required a captain to return to England upon the sale of his cargo,
and to submit documentation for the release of the bond posted in South Carolina. No
doubt, the changing regulations had their disadvantages.

Eventually, the Board of Trade accommodated mercantile entreaties and the
revisions only applied to rice shipments made to ports south of Cape Finisterre.
Shipments of rice to European ports north of Cape Finisterre still required a vessel to
touch at a British port and to pay duty on the cargo.497 But, acknowledging landing at a

496 Leo Francis Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North
History of Agriculture in the Southern United States, I, 284-87.
497 As late as 1763, merchants continued to petition for the removal of rice as an enumerated good.
Their appeals failed to convince the Treasury Department who argued for the revenue raised from
the duty on rice, the Board of Trade, who saw rice as part of British economic policy, and Parliament
who had concerns about colonial demands. Thus, rice remained as an enumerated good. An act in
1765 attempted to minimize delays. It allowed vessels with rice arriving at specified British ports
with the intention to sail immediately to Europe to pay half the duty on the cargo's value. However,
British port was the exception rather than the rule by Dutch merchants. In fact, it appears that most Dutch ships sailing from South Carolina sailed directly to Europe, bypassing the complicated and burdensome administrative rules and admonitions of the English government. As a consequence, evasion of the Navigation Acts occurred with the sale of rice to non-English merchants who chose not to comply with provisions of the Acts.

As early as 1711, there is evidence of Dutch investment in South Carolina rice. Hero Moij, a prominent Amsterdam merchant, contracted for the delivery of rice from the Charleston merchants, William Gibbon and Andrew Allen. The rice was loaded into The Dorothe and transported to London. Moij insured the cargo for 5000 guilders and assumed the additional risk for 1000 guilders himself.498 Given the proclivity for transshipment of rice cargoes, there was every likelihood that the cargo was eventually shipped to Europe from London.

Throughout the 1720’s and 1730’s, as the quality and quantity of rice from South Carolina improved and increased, the Dutch availed themselves of the opportunity for profit the commodity presented. Typical of voyages in this period was the York. The York appeared to have gone to South Carolina on speculation seeking a cargo of rice, rather than having contracted a charter between a Dutch merchant and a plantation owner or factor in Charleston acting on behalf of a plantation owner. Dutch merchants sent out speculative voyages usually before Christmas, when demand was high in Europe and reports suggested that prices in South Carolina were reasonable. Captains or supercargos

498 SAA, Notarial No. 7361/2714 (1713).
aboard a speculative voyage attempted to attract business by offering low freight rates to plantation owners or their factors, which were crucial to competitive trade. 499

Transatlantic connections and business organization sustained the commerce in rice. There was substantial interplay between international cooperation and competition in the shipping of a staple commodity sent largely from Charleston. For instance, in August of 1730, Archibald and Thomas Hope, noteworthy merchants in Amsterdam, received 484 cases of Carolina rice aboard The Homans. William Jeffrijs [Jeffreys] of Bristol had consigned the cargo to the Hope brothers. Upon inspection, the Hopes determined the rice’s quality inferior. Most probably, in anticipation of the arrival of the consignment, the Hope brothers would have had a customer or customers ready to receive the rice. Instead, because of its poor quality, the brothers chose to auction it off rather than returning the consignment to Jeffrijs. 500 The Hopes mitigated what might otherwise have been a greater loss. The situation demonstrated the flexibility, initiative, and cooperation on the part of merchants, shippers, correspondents, and factors necessary to cope with elaborate legal practices, complex shipping patterns, rapid price fluctuations, shifting demand, and the varied uses of rice in different markets.

Further evidence of the dominance of Dutch shipping and international cooperation is revealed through Robert Pringle’s correspondence to a business associate, William Hicks, in Hamburg. Pringle wrote in August 1740 of existing prices for rice and

499 See SAA, Notarial No. 8629/984 (1727). The parties, in this instance, appeared before a notary to give evidence about damage to the rice because of rats and the seaworthiness of the vessel. See also Robert Pringle to Thomas Burrill, Pringle Letterbook, I, 107; II, 433.

500 SAA, Notarial No. 8667/1474 (1730). It was important for merchants to demonstrate their proficiency and competence in the handling of rice. Often, merchants appeared before a notary to have sailors, captains, or carriers declare as to the state of barrels or crates of merchandise upon mooring in Amsterdam, particularly if there was damage to the contents. Most often, containers were sighted as being at fault. See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8751/1629 (1737) (description of the condition of rice contained within barrels noted as damp from the outside, suggesting leakage).
shipping in Charleston and currency exchange rates. He also conveyed his concerns about the uncertainty of shipping available in Charleston and suggested that Hicks should order your Friends in London or Amsterdam to Charter there for you what Vessells you may have occasion for to send here and which you may hire on much easier Terms than to hire or take up Vessells here on Freight as it has accordingly happen’d this Last Crop. Ships have Come Charter’d in Ballast from London & Amsterdam to go back to Holland or Hamburg at £4 per ton Freight when at Same time what Ships Come here from New England, &c. obtain’d £4.15/ to £5 per ton for your parts. London & Amsterdam are the most Likely places for Freighting Ships on Easier Terms for our Plantations than any where Else I know.\footnote{Edgar, ed., Letterbook of Robert Pringle, I:236.}

Pringle thus displayed commercial expediency and not any sort of adherence to colonial trade policies. In Charleston, commercial practices saw English and Dutch merchants employing factors or commercial correspondents. The arrangement proved more flexible and less costly than to send supercargoes aboard ship or maintain storekeepers in Charleston.\footnote{This was contrary to established commercial dealings in tobacco in the Chesapeake by English and Dutch merchant houses.} As a consequence, Pringle’s correspondence not only sought future custom from Hicks, but also sought to establish Pringle’s reputation for reliable and cost-effective information, factors important in establishing trust in trading networks.

Dutch merchants and English shipowners often cooperated with each other to provide the necessary financing for a commercial voyage. Rice planters in South Carolina rarely shipped anything on their own accounts except through necessity. In 1732, Robert Reaves, from London and captain of \textit{D’Experiment Galey}, appeared before an Amsterdam notary acknowledging receipt of 8000 guilders from Cornelis van Eijk, an Amsterdam merchant. Van Eijk provided the \textit{bodemrerij}, or bottomry bond, for the voyage.
The *bodemerij* was a loan agreement in which a financial institution or individual provided a sum of money to the owner of a ship or the shipper. The ship, or ship’s cargo, was taken as security for the loan. When the voyage concluded, the premium was paid back with interest. Should the voyage meet mishap, the insured party was not required to refund the value of the *bodemerij*. In this instance, Reaves was to sail the ship from Amsterdam to New York and then to South Carolina for a cargo of rice. Upon his return to Amsterdam, the agreement required Reaves to repay the *bodemerij* within eight days.\(^{503}\)

The involvement of firms, including Archibald and Thomas Hope in Amsterdam, in widely scattered ports throughout England and northern Europe in financing rice shipments underscores the decentralized nature of the rice trade and highlights attempts by Charleston merchants to expand their commission business by attracting consignments.\(^{504}\) In 1736, Nicholas Fremijn and Louis Fremijn, merchant brokers in Amsterdam, sold 368 barrels of Carolina rice at 20 ½ shillings per 100 pounds to Samuel Cardose Nunes, a merchant in Amsterdam. They also had received a consignment of 132 barrels of Carolina rice, which they again sold to Nunes at 20 shillings per 100 ¼ pounds. The consignment of 132 barrels of rice (weighing 55,900 pounds) was damaged during the Atlantic crossing aboard *The Hannah*.\(^{505}\) Appearing before the notary permitted the parties to memorialize any potential claims against the other parties.

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\(^{503}\) SAA, Notarial No. 8689/1207 (1732). For additional *bodemerij* s given as part of the South Carolina rice trade see SAA, Notarial No. 8712/733 (1734) (Levinius Clarkson, merchant in Amsterdam sought payment of a *bodemerij* letter to Cornelis van Eijk, also a merchant in Amsterdam regarding the ship *D’Experiment*); SAA, Notarial No. 8713/824 (1734) (appointment of arbitrators resulting from Van Eijk’s refusal to pay *bodemerij* letter).

\(^{504}\) With financing of the rice trade also came the refusal by parties in South Carolina to pay indebted amounts. See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8701/1362 (1733); SAA, Notarial No. 8708/2502 (1733).

\(^{505}\) See SAA, Notarial No. 8740/1059 (1736).
Prominent merchants such as Thomas and Adriaen Hope could employ brokers to locate rice for customers. In 1736, brokers Waijenburgh and Dabenet of Amsterdam located 8 vaten (or drums) of rice for the Hope brothers on behalf of their customer, Sander van Leuvenigh, an Amsterdam merchant. Some urgency was associated with the undertaking as the rice was to be delivered within twenty-four hours at the Waag, weigh house in Nieuwmarkt Square in Amsterdam.506

Dutch capital nevertheless still underwrote rice sales. South Carolinian merchants remitted proceeds from transactions to Dutch firms to pay for goods shipped to them on credit. Along with English merchants, Dutch commercial houses played an important role in the chartering, outfitting, and insuring of ships in the rice trade. Both Dutch and London merchant houses (who sometimes represented British firms in Amsterdam) obtained shipping on better terms than their Charleston counterparts.507

Most rice from South Carolina was exported overseas. The concentration of rice production in the South Carolina low country made Charleston an important commercial center. Occasionally, rice shipments went from Savannah, Georgia, and from Beaufort and Georgetown, two small South Carolina ports. As a consequence, minor commercial centers arose in such ports as well and they too had business dealings with Amsterdam.

506 SAA, Notarial No. 8744/1976 (1736).
507 For instance, Amsterdam's marine insurance market was Europe's leading insurance market with a well-defined institutional framework to insure voyages and cope with any subsequent losses. The only marine insurance available in South Carolina, if at all, would have been insurance provided by an individual. Given the reticence of South Carolina's rice planters/merchants to take on risk in shipment of cargos, it is unlikely these same merchants would have agreed to privately insure ships. For comprehensive discussions of marine insurance in Amsterdam see Frank C. Spooner, Risks at Sea: Amsterdam Insurance and Maritime Europe, 1766-1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Sabine Go, Marine Insurance in the Netherlands, 1600-1870: A Comparative Institutional Approach (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009). On how one particular rice cargo had been insured, lost at sea, and the insurance claims handled, see SAA, Notarial No. 8719/2164 (1734) (Dutch merchants with an interest in a shipment of rice from South Carolina and the loss of the vessel off the coast of Cape Faire [now Cape Fear, North Carolina], 200 miles from Charleston. The insurers paid the sum insured to the insured and received all rights of salvage. A power of attorney was given to named merchants in Charleston to initiate a lawsuit there). See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8755/1492 (1737).
merchants. Amsterdam merchants had less direct contact with rice merchants located in
the other commercial centers. Subsequently, established trading networks based on trust,
reliability, or familiarity were lacking. When bills of exchange\textsuperscript{508} were presented from
the lesser known centers to a Dutch merchant in Amsterdam, the merchant often denied
them.\textsuperscript{509} The Dutch term for this was \textit{wisselprotest}.\textsuperscript{510}

Like any commodity, rice needed proper handling and storage. Warehousing
entailed storage and cooperage expenses, but also risked loss in weight, leakage, bursting
casks, exposure to rats, weevil, and worm, and the possibility of destruction by fire in
wooden storehouses. Rice did not keep well. By summer, leftovers from the previous
year’s crop acquired a discoloring dust, leaving it musty and moldy and therefore
unsuitable for sale. Rice kept aboard ship for some time after arriving in a port suffered
similar difficulties and could incur losses for all concerned in the transaction before even
arriving on shore.\textsuperscript{511}

Rice was thus a relatively inexpensive, bulky, recurrent, and perishable product,
subject to wide price variations. Correspondents in South Carolina and in the Dutch

\textsuperscript{508}A bill of exchange is essentially an order made by one person to another to pay money to a third
person. A bill of exchange requires in its inception three parties—the drawer, the drawee, and the
payee. The person who draws the bill is called the drawer. He gives the order to pay money to the
third party. The party upon whom the bill is drawn is called the drawee. He is the person to whom
the bill is addressed and who is ordered to pay. He becomes an acceptor when he indicates his
willingness to pay the bill. The party in whose favor the bill is drawn or is payable is called the payee.
A bill of exchange may be endorsed by the payee in favor of a third party, who may in turn endorse it
to a fourth, and so on indefinitely. The "holder in due course" may claim the amount of the bill against
the drawee and all previous endorsers, regardless of any counterclaims that may have disabled the
previous payee or endorser from doing so. This is what saying that a bill is negotiable means.

\textsuperscript{509}See, e.g., SAA, Notarial No. 8059/21 (1736) in which a bill of exchange originating in Savannah,
Georgia was denied by the Amsterdam merchant Bernard van der Grift.

\textsuperscript{510}A \textit{wisselprotest} is an official statement that the payment of a bill of exchange is denied. These
statements were filed with a notary to create a written record.

\textsuperscript{511}See SAA, Notarial No. 10314/300 (1739) (Captain John Reed of \textit{De Faulcon} with 637 barrels of rice
filed notice against an Amsterdam merchant, Willem van Maurik demanding that Van Maurik make
provision for unloading the vessel).
Republic worked in tandem to make critical commercial decisions about purchasing, transporting, and storing the staple. For instance, in 1739, Robert Pringle asked William Hodshon in London to forward correspondence to his brother, Theodorus Hodshon, a merchant in Amsterdam. Pringle’s letter conveyed the current price for rice in Charleston, Pringle’s opinion that the price was unlikely to go lower that season, the amount that remained available for export from the colony, and the prospects for the coming year’s crop.\footnote{512 Edgar, ed., \textit{Letterbook of Robert Pringle}, I:104.} Theodorus Hodshon, and other merchants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, might have corresponded with several merchants in Charleston and London in order to make commercial decisions based on current information.

Prices published in the Amsterdam \textit{Courant} also reflected information received about rice production in South Carolina and the supply available for export. Supply also influenced shipping charge expenses. Low prices and a plentiful supply of rice led to high freight rates; high prices and a short crop to low rates. Prices were therefore hard to predict, as anxious comments by merchants reveal. High prices for rice also raised concerns about theft – particularly theft at the time of loading a cargo or aboard ship. In 1741, Jan Anthony Corp alleged that the captain of \textit{The Dispatch}, William Oswald, underreported the amount of rice brought aboard his ship. The cargo was subsequently off-loaded from the ship and stored in a warehouse awaiting inspection by two arbitrators and the captain in order to settle the matter.\footnote{513 Robert Pringle considered that rice varied ‘very much in price & during the Whole Season I have known it at a Different price very week’” Ibid. I, 3, 90, 423; II, 453, 483]. See SAA, Notarial No. 10334/398 (1741). Inspection by rice brokers, or arbitrators in a matter, could bar the subsequent sale of the rice in marketable form. Instead, the rice could be sold as damaged and priced accordingly. See SAA, Notarial No. 11267/2 (1741) (inspection by rice brokers who inspected a portion of a Carolina rice shipment in a merchant’s warehouse, determined it was musty smelling, and announced it could not be sold for full market price).}
As has been noted, rice prices in South Carolina varied with changes in the size of the annual rice crop, news about market trends and business conditions in Europe, and, the demand for shipping. Unpredictable price conditions added to the worries of South Carolina merchants. Merchants kept a wary eye on Charleston’s harbor, assessing the ships, their cargos, and their destinations. In June 1740, Robert Pringle wrote his brother Andrew “Most of the Shipping that are here at present are bound for Cowes and Holland, & beleive all the Ships here that will Sail after Capt. Greig are entirely bound for Holland which will make a Glutt.”514 In Pringle’s mind, a surfeit of a single commodity in any port meant lower net returns.

Compliance with the Navigation Acts?

Occasionally, the Dutch made half-hearted attempts to comply with the Navigation Acts. The archives reveal a number of instances when notarial acts acknowledged a Dutch ship carrying rice arriving at a British port. As noted above, South Carolina planters, to comply with the Navigation Acts, instructed captains to touch at a British port when shipments were bound for European ports north of Cape Finisterre. Cowes, on the Isle of Wight, was the most favored. Cowes had a customs house, but lacked harbor facilities or anything other than a roadstead, or a partly sheltered stretch of water near the shore in which ships could ride at anchor. Nevertheless, the Isle of Wight’s position midway along the English Channel made for convenient transshipment of rice to northern Europe. Sir Richard Worsley acknowledged the importance of the rice trade to the local economy and wrote in 1781:

Before the defection of the American colonies, from thirty to fifty vessels loaded with rice annually arrived at Cowes, from South Carolina and Georgia; their cargoes were from twenty-two thousand to thirty-five thousand barrels, or from five thousand to eight thousand tons of that grain.... The rice, after being landed, opened, skreened, and re-packed, was generally re-shipped on board the vessel in which it came, and carried to Holland, Germany, or some of the French ports in the Channel. This was a beneficial branch of business to the port of Cowes...

The rice trade was the one major branch of transatlantic commerce that involved Cowes. Its location meant that ships could not only avoid the time-consuming journey up the Thames to London, but also the overcrowded docks and customs delays associated with London. Captains carrying rice from America expected orders to be lodged by their principals at such places, with instructions about destinations. “England may be considered as a great Inn, on the road from America to the Northern parts of Europe,” Richard Champion remarked, “where the Americans may repose themselves, till they procure knowledge of the best market to send their goods.” Customs officers at Cowes checked rice cargoes carefully to ensure that the quantity on board vessels agreed with the plantation certificates. Delays occurred during transshipment whenever fraud was suspected.

As early as 1727, Dutch merchants landed at Cowes in compliance with the requisite provisions of the Navigation Acts requiring vessels to touch at a British port. A dispute arising over freight costs, the distribution of profits, and other gains of the ship The Good Intent, captained by Walter Kippin, brought parties before an Amsterdam notary to avoid litigation and appoint arbitrators. Both Kippin and the owners of the

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vessel were English. However, the merchants contracting the vessel and the parties receiving the rice were all Dutch citizens. The voyage was an example of how English citizens of Dutch ancestry in New York, in this instance the owners of the vessel, maintained trading networks with Dutch merchants. Their citizenship provided the means by which Dutch merchants could so easily comply with the Navigation Acts.

The Amsterdam notarial records remain silent about further landings at Cowes until 1740. Then, through 1746, a number of records reference the port. In 1740, Bernard van der Grift entered into a charter agreement for the ship *The London*, captained by John Burleigh. The charter instructed the captain to take merchandise from Amsterdam to Cowes, to unload and reload the merchandise, to proceed to Charleston and to unload merchandise there and reload with rice. The vessel was to proceed back through England to London, Amsterdam, Hamburg, or Bremen. In 1743, *The Merchant of Danzigh* was laden with rice and sassafras from South Carolina bound for Amsterdam. Because of a dispute about property allegedly stolen in Cowes, we know that the vessel landed there to have its cargo weighed and reloaded before proceeding to

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517 Kippin was made a freeman of New York on February 15, 1726. See New York Historical Society, Collections of the New York Historical Society (New York: Trow & Smith, 1868), 107. Kippin is noted as the captain of record on a number of voyages in various American ports. See, e.g., *The American Weekly Mercury*, March 7th to 14th, 1722/23, Customs House New York, Kippin as captain of the Albons bound for Barbados (March 11th); *The American Weekly Mercury*, April 14th to 21st, 1726, Perth Amboy, Kippin as captain of the Good Intent bound for Lisbon (April 16th). The owners of the vessel were Abraham van Horne, David Provoost, and Benjamin d'Harietten. They were born in either New Jersey or New York and were of Dutch ancestry.

518 SAA, Notarial No. 8655/1373 (1729). Archibald and Thomas Hope, merchants in Amsterdam, were agents for Archibald, John, and Isaac Hope, merchants of Rotterdam. Mark de Jong, Bernhard van der Grift, and William White contracted for the cargo of rice. De Jong and Van der Grift (a well known Amsterdam diamond merchant) were Jewish merchants. This particular transaction is suggestive of the types of transactions invested in by merchants, as well as the porosity of merchant networks that ignored religious boundaries. The arbitrators in this matter, Christiaan van Boneval and Pieter van der Heijde, both of Amsterdam, failed to bring the parties to a satisfactory conclusion and further declarations were sought about the seaworthiness of the vessel. For further notarial material on this particular voyage, see SAA, Notarial No. 8652/886 (1729) and SAA, Notarial No. 8652/920 (1729).

519 See SAA, Notarial No. 8784/197 (1740).
Amsterdam. Also in 1743, *The Richard of London* reported damage to a cargo of rice due to heavy storms they had experienced off the coast of Florida after leaving South Carolina. The ship arrived in Cowes for the obligatory unloading and weighing of its cargo for payment of duty before proceeding to Amsterdam.

Similar notarial articles reference incidents occurring aboard vessels loaded with rice from South Carolina bound for Amsterdam, including damage to rice due to poor weather experienced by *The Vernon* in 1744; a dispute about unloading of the vessel *The Dorothe* in 1744; damage to the cargo aboard *The Catherine* (also in 1744); and a dispute about the weight of rice and sassafras upon the arrival of *The Providence* in Amsterdam in 1744. Each of the vessels made port in Cowes and departed after payment of the requisite duties.

After 1744, there are no further references in the notarial records to Cowes and ships loaded with rice bound for Amsterdam. Amsterdam did continue to be a significant market for rice from South Carolina and Cowes remained the main entrepôt port for rice shipments between South Carolina and the rest of Europe until the American Revolution. But the cessation of references to Cowes in the Amsterdam archives suggests that transatlantic trade by Dutch merchants from South Carolina either was rerouted to another English port or Dutch merchants ceased submission to the Navigation Acts altogether. Probably the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) disrupted the administration of compliance with the Navigation Acts during this period, and the Dutch took full advantage of the distraction. Trade in rice from South Carolina continued to

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520 SAA, Notarial No. 10226/411 (1743).
521 SAA, Notarial No. 10350/1268 (1743).
522 For *The Vernon* see SAA, Notarial No. 10359/955 (1744); for *The Dorothe* see SAA, Notarial No. 10361/1387 (1744); for *The Catherine* see SAA, Notarial No. 10363/1616 (1744); and for *The Providence* see SAA, Notarial No. 10230/991 (1744).
Amsterdam. The impediment of English duties, however, made the trade all that more lucrative for Dutch merchants.

**Conclusion**

Rice and tobacco, two plantation staples grown in the colonial south, shared any number of similarities. Both had substantial commercial development as part of the Atlantic economy during this period. The evolution of each industry depended on growing consumer demand. Such demand was generated in re-export to European markets rather than the domestic market of England. The main re-export markets for each staple were in France, Germany, and the Low Countries.

From 1664 through 1750, the Dutch responded to the opportunities for trade in the Chesapeake and Lower South. By 1664, the Dutch had established substantial trading networks with Chesapeake tobacco growers. Through 1750, the Dutch maintained existing networks and developed additional networks with planters. Strong linkages between the Chesapeake and both Amsterdam and Rotterdam ensured ready markets for tobacco and low operating costs for Dutch traders.

While trading networks for tobacco between Dutch merchants and Chesapeake planters altered with the passage of time, so, too, did the manner in which processing centers in the Dutch Republic change. The initial center of processing had been in Middelburg, but soon Rotterdam, with its larger harbor and thriving English immigrant merchant population, displaced the smaller, devoutly Calvinist town. In time, Rotterdam lost its supremacy to Amsterdam, which had the allure of the stock exchange, banks, the insurance market, and scores of merchants anxious to invest in the noxious weed.
Always keen to pursue an opportunity, Dutch merchants provided shipping and financial assistance to South Carolina’s rice producers from its initial successful mass production. As rice production increased exponentially, Dutch shipping provided direct access to northern European ports, most often bypassing English administrative procedures and duties. It was a welcome arrangement for both parties.

The involvement of some of Amsterdam’s largest merchant houses in the rice trade meant that South Carolina rice producers had far greater exposure to southern European cultures than the producers of other commodities in North America. The populations of Spain, Portugal, and Italy considered rice a staple of their diet. As a consequence, the trading networks that developed between South Carolina and those European countries as a result of Dutch carriage of rice meant that South Carolina rice producers became attuned to the demands for rice that followed religious calendars, rather than seasonal production.
CONCLUSION

In 1766, Alexander Gillon, a Dutch resident, immigrated to South Carolina and settled in Charleston. For over a century, Dutch residents, particularly persons linked to trade, had immigrated to various North American colonies. Like many of his fellow countrymen, Gillon was also a merchant.

As the events of the late 1760’s and 1770’s unfolded, he became an ardent South Carolina patriot, loyal to the concerns being expressed by some colonists against the British government. When the royal government collapsed in South Carolina in the summer of 1775, Gillon served in the colony’s provincial congress. On behalf of the new nation, he undertook covert military activities in Europe to secure vessels from the French.

In early 1780, he returned to the Netherlands where he sought financing for America’s war efforts. No doubt, he utilized his trading networks to secure introductions and the promise of funds. From there he sent military provisions to the Continental Army. He also procured the frigate *South Carolina*, built at Amsterdam’s Admiraliteits Werf, the largest warship under any American’s command during the War of Independence.

Gillon represented the evolving relationship between the new nation and the Dutch Republic. On the one hand, Gillon was a traditional merchant, concerned about crop yields, shipping rates, and the demand for commodities in Europe from the English colonies. His counterparts within his trading networks in the Dutch Republic had similar concerns. Then, along came an event such as the American Revolution.
Suddenly, traditional trading roles changed and Gillon used his skills as a merchant in an alternative manner for his adopted country. In many respects, his commercial life parallels the transformation that commerce between the Dutch Republic and the North American colonies underwent.

The primary goal of this thesis is to understand the significance of Dutch trade in the North American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The North American colonies were just one part of the Atlantic World in which European nations competed for territory, wealth, trade, commodities, and, ultimately, power. The Atlantic World spanned four continents: Europe, Africa, North America, and South America. The initiatives and conquests of Europeans brought into contact diverse groups of formerly isolated peoples throughout this Atlantic World and forever changed the history of the world.

So often, early American historians speculate on what might have been had New Netherland not fallen to the English or whether the Dutch Atlantic Empire might have been more formidable, with a larger amount of territory under its control, if the West India Company had decided to devote its resources to founding colonies in the Caribbean or been more aggressive on the North American mainland. The conjecture about what might have been is endless.

Instead, I have focused on the commercial realities that existed for Dutch merchants trading in the North America colonies. During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the Dutch staple market functioned as a warehouse for the Western world, where commodities from almost every corner of the globe were sold, including
goods manufactured in the Dutch Republic and commodities received in trade from the North American colonies. The Dutch Republic and the various American colonies were, almost inevitably, economically linked to each other: each had relatively free markets for commodities; each also had agricultural productivity to sustain labor; and, each had a political structure which guaranteed property rights and enforcement of contracts. But most importantly, merchants from the Dutch Republic could offer shipping, commodities, and credit to colonial merchants in North America.

Long before the America Revolution, several distinct trades developed between the North American colonies and the Dutch Republic. This dissertation has followed the growth in trade within the various colonies and the relationships that developed with Dutch merchants. As colonies were founded and their leadership sought marketable commodities, it inevitably followed that Dutch merchants arrived soon after receiving notification of merchantable goods in sufficient quantities to warrant sending a ship to investigate.

The fur trade first lured the Dutch to North America in the seventeenth century and prompted a reassessment of their economic and colonial policies. The attempt at various institutional models to stimulate and sustain trade in New Netherland seemed uncharacteristic for the Dutch. Already in the seventeenth century, the Dutch were global leaders in trade. Yet, here, in North America, they stumbled. They searched for an economic model that would maximize the amount of revenue to the government while at the same time generate the commercial activity required to do so. The early models offered little to either the government or Dutch merchants. When finally, out of desperation, the government and West India Company assented to a colonial model based
on settlement and free trade rather than sparsely inhabited trading posts, the result changed the course for future Dutch commercial activities in North America.

While the Dutch were busy trying to establish New Netherland, the English were in the Chesapeake and faltering as well. Finally, the success of tobacco cultivation brought economic prosperity to Chesapeake tobacco planters. Arguably, without tobacco, Chesapeake colonists would have engaged in subsistence farming and animal husbandry and the colony may well not have survived without some sort of economic viability to satisfy investors and the English government.

Nevertheless, successful tobacco cultivation also drew the attention of Dutch merchants who sought out trading opportunities. From 1616, Virginia tobacco arrived in large quantities in the Dutch Republic and was processed into spun tobacco and snuff tobacco. In succession Middleburg, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam acquired the title of tobacco capital of the world based on the importation and manufacturing of Chesapeake tobacco in Dutch commercial centers. And while the importation of tobacco would wane during periods of warfare, the importation of tobacco was important for many Dutch traders and the Dutch economy.

Tobacco and furs became the mainstay of Dutch trade during the mid portion of the seventeenth century in North America. Not only were Dutch merchants who resided in North America engaging in trade for both commodities, but merchants from the Dutch Republic altered their trading routes to the West Indies to incorporate stops in the Chesapeake and New Netherland. A circuitous route developed that enveloped the Atlantic World and Dutch merchants in contact with English colonies.

The founding of South Carolina caused consternation for its leadership.
Numerous attempts at growing agricultural products sufficiently in demand in the market had failed. When finally it was determined that rice could grow in sufficient quantities in the colony and that there was ample demand for it as a commodity, the colony of South Carolina had found its staple product. The demand for rice was, surprisingly, not in England. Rather, South Carolina’s planters exported millions of pounds of rice to the Dutch Republic and Europe annually. Dutch ships soon arrived at Charleston’s wharfs and the merchants aboard were eager to establish their trading networks. Some of the rice leaving South Carolina on Dutch bottoms was legally transported via England, but much of it was shipped illegally, in contravention to the Navigation Acts. The significance of the Dutch Republic in the Carolina rice trade can be seen in one merchant’s comment in 1752 that the Dutch were “the most considerable buyers” and that they “ruled the market.” This was particularly true in the years just before the American Revolution.

Along with the substantial fur, tobacco, and rice trades, Dutch merchants engaged in trade for all manner of commodities produced in North America. These included logwood, timber, timber products, ships, fish, grains, iron, and other agricultural produce. And with each commodity, Dutch merchants reacted with established patterns of trade – the ability to provide inexpensive and efficient shipping for the commodity, the admission to numerous European markets, the reputation for paying more than their English competitors, the provision of finance, a willingness to ignore onerous taxes and regulations, and the ability for that North American merchant to become part of a commercial network that opened the Dutch trading world to them.

And in each of the trades, Dutch commercial networks reached out to North America and embraced local merchants, regardless of nationality. The networks
provided information, resources, shipping, markets, and opportunity to all of the participants. In the decades before the growth of private companies, business networks became the catalyst for unification of commercial practices.

This work has incorporated individuals such as Isaac Allerton, Alexander Gillon, Anna Hack, Jacob Leisler, and countless other merchants based in the various colonies of North America into a wider setting beyond local relationships. As a consequence, their commercial actions lose their provincialism – they become part of a broader picture. More specifically, they highlight trading networks whose centers more likely than not, were based in Amsterdam. There, merchant houses arose and began establishing radials beyond the Dutch Republic and Europe. North American merchants with trading networks to the Dutch Republic became connected to something much larger. By reconstructing the networks in which merchants operated during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we have a much broader understanding of the scope of trade in early America. As well, the prominence and predominance of English trade, so often characterized in the historiography of early American trade, diminishes with the knowledge that Dutch merchants actively and aggressively transgressed national, ethnic, and religious boundaries associated with trade.

**From 1750 and Onwards**

The dominant role, which the Amsterdam staple market had played in European trade in the seventeenth century and first half of the eighteenth century, could not be maintained. Amsterdam had profited as an entrepôt of trade goods. But, commercial traffic, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, tended to proceed directly from the
supply source to the point of distribution for consumption, bypassing Amsterdam. Nor was Amsterdam any longer on its own able to regulate prices, freight charges, and exchange rates. London and, increasingly, Hamburg offered competition as commercial centers. The situation which had allowed Amsterdam to draw commodities to its staple market because of both its advantageous geographical situation and its wealth of shipping, was undercut by the development of direct trade and by growing competition from English, French, and German merchants. Dutch merchants had profited because Amsterdam had offered a ready market for the goods of international commerce and because financial techniques in use in Amsterdam were sophisticated enough to support commercial transactions based upon credit extended for several months. Dutch commission agents advanced money, arranged insurance, discounted bills of exchange, and maintained the most elaborate channels of information about supply and demand, all of which had enabled Amsterdam in this period to fill an indispensable role in the exchange of products.  

When other European nations reached a certain level of commercial development, they, too, became attractive for merchants.

As Amsterdam lost its focal position as a center of trade, the same Dutch commercial firms which were already involved in active trade moved into the commission business, dealing in bills of exchange, both on the basis of the commodity trade and as a separate branch of business. Thus, many Dutch merchants became bankers, with the understanding that their banking functions did not include the acceptance of deposits, the lending of money on security, or other transactions beyond

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the range of the bill of exchange. Negotiating loans, however, did fall within the scope of the merchant-banker.\textsuperscript{524}

All was not lost for ordinary Dutch merchants who traded in commodities and provided shipping to their American colleagues. War once again interceded and Dutch merchants made enormous profits during the American Revolution by running supplies to the revolutionary army from the Caribbean island of St. Eustatius.

Nevertheless, the war could not be won only by trading surplus commodities in exchange for a few arms and some ammunition. The rebellious colonial governments in North America, faced with expenditures that they were unprepared to match with available sources of revenue, turned naturally to the Amsterdam capital market as a source of long-term credit. The same Dutch firms which had been unprepared to extend long-term credit to American merchants were willing, after initial hesitation, to extend such credit to the national government and to some of the states.

Throughout the eighteenth century, the Amsterdam capital market had been a source of loans for many European states and principalities. As the Dutch staple market faltered, the capital market and the techniques associated with extending credit developed even further and merchant/bankers turned to the service of foreign governments, among others the new American Republic.\textsuperscript{525}

The credit of the United States proved better than expected. It was thus easy to float new American loans on the Amsterdam market. The American government paid interest regularly on its debts to Dutch lenders. And, a policy of regular redemption was practiced by the American Treasury to bolster its credit even more.

\textsuperscript{524} E.E. de Jong-Keesing, De Economische Crisis van 1763 te Amsterdam (Amsterdam, 1939), 69.
\textsuperscript{525} Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce & Finance, 119f.
After the American Revolution, the new nation began to attract the particularly vigorous attention of Dutch investors. Merchant/banking houses sent agents to America to investigate and explore every practical possibility for investment and profit making. Dutch merchants had three aims: to speculate on rising values; to search for profitable long-term investments; and to make Amsterdam the center of America’s credit requirements.

Before long, Dutch merchants were speculating in bank shares, industrial pursuits, and internal improvements including bridges, roadways, and canals. Soon, land speculation in upstate New York brought about the formation of the Holland Land Company. The Dutch assisted with the financing for the Louisiana Purchase. And, when plans were formulated for the Erie Canal and the introduction of railways, the Dutch provided financing for such projects as well.

Unhampered by legislative constraints such as the Navigation Acts which were meant to implement economic polices, trade between Dutch and American merchants flourished. Trading networks extended beyond Europe and the Caribbean to include locations in Asia.

It is arguable that the subsequent participation by Dutch merchants and financiers in the new nation would have occurred regardless of previously established networks and commercial activity in New Netherland and the English colonies. Dutch commercial culture would not have permitted such business opportunities to be taken up by another nation. Nevertheless, numerous trading networks did build up over the decades between Dutch merchants and, in chronological order, New Netherland merchants, English colonial merchants, and, finally, American merchants. The nationality of such merchants
physically located in North America might have changed over the years, but the commercial relationships with Dutch trading partners endured for, quite literally, centuries.
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