IN THE STRUGGLE:
PEDAGOGIES OF POLITICALLY ENGAGED SCHOLARSHIP
IN THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY OF CALIFORNIA

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by
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A handful of scholars conducted research and advocated for change in the San Joaquin Valley of California during twentieth century. Six social scientists, who I refer to as “politically engaged scholars,” engaged in struggles for social justice, economic equity and democratic governance, both as scholars who produced knowledge and constructed theory and as political actors who aimed to advance particular interests and ends. In the Valley’s adversarial contexts, they varied their roles as scholars by leading strikes, organizing underserved communities, founding community development programs, creating non-profit institutions, in addition to working as traditional social scientists. Their intellectual work illustrated the political dimensions of social science and the educational praxis of engaged scholarship as the scholars deviated from the conventional role of detached observers into active participants in highly charged debates.

The concept of pedagogy frames my research because it allows an alternative understanding of these scholars who entered research settings as change agents and openly admitted values into their scholarship. Since social scientists produce knowledge for cultural and professional consumption, and sometimes explicitly for public purposes, their work occupies an educational nexus between the academy and the broader society where research findings and academic knowledge are produced,
disseminated and represented in particular ways. In order to understand their pedagogical practice, I use a narrative structure comprised of the scholar’s first person stories and my interpretation of a variety of texts including their academic papers.

The resulting narrative informs pedagogies of political engagement through scholarship. The scholars’ experiences, values and findings blend together as the harassment they experienced and politicization of their scientific findings become subplots in larger struggles for economic justice and the defense of democracy in the San Joaquin Valley. Their stories and this narrative find that democracy is fundamentally linked to a just, sustaining and egalitarian economic system.
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Born in Los Angeles and raised in southern California, Daniel O’Connell attended the University of California, San Diego, where he received a B.A. in History. He then worked in alternative education with street kids and later was a Peace Corps Regional Youth Officer with the Government of Namibia. Returning from Africa, he completed a M.S. in International Agricultural Development at the University of California, Davis. His thesis, a critical ethnography, was titled, “Aqui Somos Pobres, Alla Somos Ricos. Language, Education and Social Segregation: Neocolonial Strategies in the Reproduction of Inequality.” The study was situated in a rural farmworker community in the Central Valley through a Cooperative Extension collaboration. It documented multiple forms of social segregation and institutional racism operating in the small town’s public institutions and community spaces.

Further questions arose after finishing his first graduate program, particularly around the potential for politically engaged scholarship and over the role universities should play in society. This dissertation is a product of that inquiry and his search for effective, relevant problem solving.
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Finally, I wanted to acknowledge the sacrifices that my family has endured while I worked on this research. In particular, I want to let my son, Aidan Bertrand O’Connell, know that he is always with me and that this work is for him and his future.
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“The whole trend in education is to put the scholar into the actual work of the world”
Liberty Hyde Bailey (1909)

“The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an adviser. The Project, tactics and
goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellectual
can do is provide the instruments, and at the present time this is the historian’s
essential role. What’s effectively needed is a ramified, penetrative perception of the
present . . . a topological and geological survey of the battlefield – that is the
intellectual’s role.”
Michel Foucault (1980)
 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION – THE PAST IS PROLOGUE

The history of politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley informs upon the multiple roles, democratic purposes and pedagogical intentions of scholars who worked in the region. Six social scientists, who I refer to as “politically engaged scholars,” conducted research and advocated for change in the region during the industrialization of the valley’s rural agricultural economy. These changes resulted in increased control over natural resources, monopolized concentrations of wealth and the erosion of civic life. Most significant, industrial-scale agribusiness threatened democracy, which was a fundamental value and process motivating the politically engaged scholars who went to the Valley. The six scholars include: Paul Taylor (1895-1984), Ernesto Galarza (1905-1984), and Walter Goldschmidt (1913-2010); and three living scholars: Dean MacCannell, Don Villarejo, and Isao Fujimoto. Their collective journey is a narrative of struggle – a fighters saga – more than a romanticized heroes’ story. In their decades-long war, many battles were lost, but the importance of their democratic commitments and personal sacrifice offers lessons to those called to continue their work.

These scholars understood the contexts that they entered were volatile and adversarial. In their papers, they used martial analogies of being “baptized by fire,” “engaging in struggle,” or “going into battle.” Their intellectual work in polarized settings illustrated the political dimensions of social science and the educational practice of engaged scholarship as they deviated from the conventional role of detached observers.
into active participants in highly charged debates. As the struggle ensued, they assumed adaptive roles as scholars, which enabled them to be more effective as they led strikes, organized underserved communities, founded community development programs, created non-profit institutions, in addition to working as traditional social scientists.

A narrative historical interpretation of the social science and pedagogical practice of these Valley scholars contributes to the ongoing, ideologically rich conversation regarding the politics of intellectual work (Bauman 1987; Bender 1993; Boggs 1993; Flyvbjerg 2003; Furner 1975; Gilmore 2005; Greenwood 2008; Hale 2008; Hammersley 2000; Leonard 1996; Mannheim 1968; Said 1996). As their academic and informal texts include some of the most influential studies in the field of rural sociology, they inform upon the little recognized or appreciated pedagogical praxis of engaged scholars seeking practical, on the ground solutions to structural economic problems. My research questions therefore are sociological and educational as they investigate the roles of scholars and the purposes of their work.

In Social Science in the Crucible, Mark Smith examined the debate over the roles of social scientists and purpose of their scholarship in the United States between 1918 and 1941. His study identified some of the central problems and dilemmas within the paradigm of social science:

What is the proper role of the social scientist in relation to his or her knowledge of society? In other words, how should social scientists use their knowledge, and indeed, should they have any say at all in its utilization? Should the correct role of the social scientist be that of a technical expert who provides information and advice to whomever requests it? Or should the social scientist go beyond understanding and analyzing society and use scientifically derived information consciously and personally to help create a better society more suited to humankind’s basic needs and desires . . . Indeed, is it reasonable for social scientists to
play any pedagogical role in complex societies? (Smith 1994: 6; italics added).

These questions, and particularly the last one suggesting a pedagogical role for social scientists, express the core concerns in my study. By defining social science as a refined method of meaning making, knowledge sharing, scholarly interpretation and applied learning, and examining it in that light, I seek to understand intellectual engagement directed at locally situated problems in highly politicized arenas and pressured by threatening social terrains. The concept of “pedagogy” then frames my narrative, allowing an alternative understanding of scholars who entered research settings as change agents and openly admitted values into their scholarship.

Since social scientists produce knowledge for cultural and professional consumption, and sometimes explicitly for public purposes, their work occupies an educational nexus between the academy and the broader society where research findings and academic knowledge are produced, disseminated and represented in particular ways. This work implies a pedagogical intention – an intent to effect change – which is not well researched or understood. In my study, I use a narrative structure, comprised of first-person stories and interpretation of a variety of texts, to understand the pedagogical practice and intellectual work of the six valley scholars.

While the politically engaged scholarship of the San Joaquin Valley illustrates academically influential and publicly significant intellectual work, it also represents an approach to social science which has been critiqued. Hammersley (2000: 116-117) argues:

Some of those who insist on the political character of research also want it to be directed towards practical goals of one kind or another. For instance, some critical theorists and feminists argue that social science research
should be directly, and exclusively, concerned with an egalitarian and democratic transformation of society . . . I do not believe that they should be the goals of research. This is because, as Weber recognized, research cannot play the commanding role that is required of it in such struggles, and the attempt to make it do so will undermine its capacity to fulfill the task of producing knowledge.

With Weber’s qualification that “research cannot play the commanding role,” Hammersley’s sentiment invites inquiry into the roles and purposes of scholarship. If not a commanding role, what contributing roles should scholars play in the social contexts they seek to understand, inform upon and affect? Are there political aspects of research? If so, how do we account for them? Should researchers strive for practical outcomes?

While Hammersley goes on to reject the whole idea of doing research for political goals, the setting of the Valley, its history of political conflict, and the narrative of these scholars responds to his assertions through their actual stories. These scholars were engaged in scholarship that offered no refuge away from politics.

Since California’s statehood, the San Joaquin Valley has been one of the most politically charged, economically polarized and socially segregated places in the United States. Periods of outright political violence have continually boiled over in the process of consolidation of the region’s rural economy, privatization of its natural resources, and importation and exploitation of foreign workers. These processes became more acute over the time period of my study during the twentieth century. Concurrently, local communities and their allies organized resistance (particularly over workers rights), which included early twentieth century IWW campaigns, communist-inspired organizing during the 1930’s, post-war AFL-CIO supported farm labor unions, and the UFW in the 1960’s. Brutal violence erupted from these disputes. And while victories were won by workers, injustice and poverty continued to characterize the region. The Valley, uniquely
associated with political violence and endemic poverty, was also the most productive agricultural region in the United States.

From early Californian statehood, fortunes were amassed by vertically integrating agricultural production. Igler (2001) found that monopolized ownership of land in the state, while exacerbated by the acquisition of Mexican land grants, was primarily the result of the corruption of local and state political systems and manipulation of federal and state land laws. The California State Board of Agriculture’s 1872 report detailed that one hundred individuals owned 5,465,206 acres. The worst inequities existed in the San Joaquin Valley where less than one percent of San Joaquin’s landowners owned almost 25% of the taxable property and were non-residents. A series of severe economic recessions during the 1870’s further exacerbated the consolidation of landholdings, driving out farmers who did not have the liquidity to ride out the economic shocks. As California’s agriculture industrialized, it became characterized by increasing amounts of investment capital, vertical chains of production and marketing, unequal distribution of wealth and discrimination against an ethnically segregated labor force (Galarza 1964, 1970; Igler 2001; McWilliams 1939; Walker 2005).

The adverse outcomes of economic consolidation continue to be evident in the region today. On July 17, 2008, the lead article of the Fresno Bee “Worse than Appalachia” identified California’s 20th Congressional District as ranking last in the entire country using the “human development index” of health, education and income. (This is an index traditionally used to assess development in countries of the Global South, but is here applied to congressional districts throughout the United States in a comparative study.) Half of the residents in this district earned less than $16,767 and
only 6.5% had graduated from college. Yet, the geographic outline of this district—roughly western Fresno, Kings and north-central Kern counties—delineates the most productive agricultural region in the world. According to the 2007 agricultural commissioner reports of the region’s four counties, the gross value of all agricultural crops and products in the southern San Joaquin Valley (Fresno, Tulare, Kings and Kern) totaled more than $16 billion in farm gate receipts for that year.¹ For many years, Fresno has been the number one agricultural producing county in the entire United States, with Tulare number two and Kern just down the list.

The Valley’s paradoxes raised moral and academic questions that drew scholars to its fields. Social scientists and educators who were willing to challenge academic demands for neutrality and admit that values grounded their research demonstrated that the ideal of scientific “neutrality” was hampered by the educational prerogative of engagement. In 1999, the Kellogg Commission published _Returning to our Roots: The Engaged Institution_ to promote academics engaging in partnerships in local communities and discourage them from simply disseminating their “expert” information. The Kellogg model suggested that universities integrate “service into research and teaching” while remaining “accessible and relatively neutral” (Kellogg 1999: 13). The qualifying concept of remaining “relatively neutral” suggests the difficulty that social scientists and their institutions have in engaging with people who are simultaneously possible research subjects and recipients, even consumers, of their intellectual work. The commission pondered:

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¹ Jerry Prieto, the ex-Agricultural Commissioner for Fresno County, identifies an economic multiplier effect of agriculture for the local economy of 3.5 times the product value of the crops.
The question we need to ask ourselves here is whether outreach maintains the university in the role of neutral facilitator and source of information, when public policy issues, particularly contentious ones, are at stake (12).

The Kellogg Commission recognized that engagement implied position, direction and the promotion of some interests over others, which eroded claims of neutrality. When problems are contentious, the need for analysis increases as do the implications of involvement. Taken far enough, purists may speculate, engagement could threaten the framework of credentialed scientific expertise.

The framing of scientific knowledge as objective is central to locating scholars upon the discursive terrain of the modern university and within society. However, the concept of objectivity is one of the most contested in social science (Furner 1975; Hammersley 2000; Novick 1988; Rosaldo 1989). Feminist scholars have been among the most critical of objective science (Collins 2000; Haraway 1988). Dorothy Smith (2005: 43) considered objectivity “a distinctive form of that social organization of knowledge in which the presence of the subject is suspended or displaced and ‘knowledge’ is constituted as standing over individual subjects and subjectivities.” Drawing out positivist logic, if social scientists were purely objective, then questions of their roles and purposes would be irrelevant. Their work would be prescribed by what Cervero and Wilson (2006: 256) critiqued as “rationalist agency” under which context would not significantly influence positionality, scientific observation or scholarly interpretation. Conversely, as activist oriented and participatory scholars have been undermined by claims of being unscientific or biased, rarely does the counter claim hold sway that theoretical, campus-based scholarship “be viewed as speculation” or conjecture since it is too distanced from real world practice (Greenwood 2008: 328).
The social scientists examined in this study worked as scholars to produce knowledge and construct theory but they did so as political actors who aimed to advance particular interests and ends. Their academic texts and oral testimonies offered opportunities for others to learn not only from the roles they adopted and the purposes that motivated them, but how they acted as change agents. Many of the study’s scholars both critiqued the concept of neutrality in social science while explicitly claiming democratic values as foundational standards supporting their scholarship of rural California and its richest agricultural lands.

Democratic values (and the threat posed to them by capitalist market domination) were central to understanding the motivations and purposes of the politically engaged scholars who confronted Californian agribusiness. The most significant of these values was what Macpherson (1977: 62-63) considered the “underlying contradiction” and “fundamental incompatibility” between capitalist markets and the potential for democracy. A similar link emerged within my narrative; a connection not limited to the scholar’s theoretical dispositions, but also empirically substantiated through their personal experiences and research findings.

In the parlance of U.S. history, a number of the Valley scholars identified this position as “Jeffersonian” democracy. While perhaps over simplified, Jefferson did emphasize the right to sustenance over the rights of property:

Whenever there are in any country uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to violate a natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for man to labor and live on. If for the encouragement of industry, we allow it to be appropriated, we must take care that other employment be provided to those excluded from the appropriation. If we do not, the fundamental right to labor the earth returns to the unemployed (Vogeler 1981: 39).
For Jefferson, the “natural right” was one that privileged the right to live, while “the laws of property” tended toward a utilitarianism that undermined those unwilling or unable to grab a piece of the communal right.

The idea was that an equitable economic system was a necessary and corresponding social structure needed to create and maintain a democratic culture. “A fully democratic society requires democratic political control over the uses to which the amassed capital and the remaining natural resources of the society are put” (Macpherson 1977: 111). The San Joaquin Valley represented a region that had the opposite orientation, one in which an economic oligopoly inevitably influenced political governance on even a national level to re-direct public goods to private interests. To reclaim participatory democracy, Macpherson (1977: 99-100) identified two prerequisites: (1) citizens had to be producers (“acting as exerers”) rather than passive consumers in creating their social structures and political institutions, and (2) a “great reduction of social and economic inequality” needed to break the cycle of disempowerment which lead to and reinforced disenfranchisement. My story of scholars working in the Valley is comprised of their own narratives including how they scientifically verified the skewed relationships between economics and politics in the region. More importantly, these scholars actively worked to foster an equitable society and invigorate democratic processes.

These six politically engaged scholars made prophetic allusions that underscored their respective pedagogical intentions, political purposes and efforts to defend democracy. Most obvious, in this regard, was the title of Goldschmidt’s *As You Sow* study, which evoked the biblical warning, “so you shall reap.” His message to society
was clear: if we do not listen to the scientific findings of his study and implement appropriate changes, we will bear costs. The Shakespearean reference “what’s past is prologue” was also used by a number of these scholars. While conventionally serving as a similar warning for those unprepared to learn from history, this phrase could also be interpreted as the past framing context for future action. In the dramatic context of the San Joaquin Valley, the prologue of misappropriated resources, economic poverty and social injustice created a need and justification for political resistance. During the twentieth century, some of this resistance was fostered by multi-dimensional scholars working with local communities to create democratic change.

I structured this study to teach and inform. It narrates a unique history of social justice struggle that focuses on the contributions of a handful of citizen scholars who were directly involved in the messy and acrimonious political slugfests over worker rights, control of natural resources, access to public subsidies and the direction of political institutions. After this introduction, I review academic literature pertaining to politically engaged scholarship. I follow that with the methods section and six narrative chapters devoted to each of the study’s scholars through a roughly chronological timeline. In the tenth chapter I discuss three prominent themes distilled from the narrative: the democratic theory developed by the valley’s scholars, an explanation of the pedagogical practices illustrated through their intellectual and political engagement, and finally a discussion of the scholar’s agentic role as a change agent acting in the public’s interest. I conclude with a few last lessons.
CHAPTER 2

POLITICALLY ENGAGED SCHOLARSHIP

Research into the multifaceted identities of scholars and the sometimes conflicting purposes of their work in the San Joaquin Valley opens opportunities for understanding the interplay of knowledge production in the interest of localities. How did a specific community of social scientists, working in a divisive setting, understand their professional intellectual and civic responsibilities? In simultaneously producing academic knowledge and promoting social change, what roles did they use? What were the purposes of their intellectual and educational work? Previous scholars have analyzed the work of adult educators, intellectuals and scholars (Fink 1997; Gilbert 2001; Hamilton 1990, 1991; Novick 1988; Peters et al. 2005; Peters 2006, 2010; Smith 1994). Fink (1997), for example, studied “democratic intellectuals” during the Progressive Era. In my research I adapt Fink’s case study of scholars, but rather than focus on the scholarship associated with a particular historical epoch of national scale, I examine intellectual engagement in a specific geographic region over more than half a century.

The San Joaquin Valley has drawn an eclectic array of politically engaged scholars. Historical research into their scholarship holds the promise of understanding two different but related pedagogical aspects of politically engaged scholarship as it represents (1) an academic stance from which educational theory can be derived and (2) intellectual work involving political praxis that can be learned from, re-imagined, altered and applied into other contemporary social contexts and scientific studies. The philosophy and practice of politically engaged scholarship, when illustrated through the
first person narratives and interpretation of historical texts, allows us to develop a normative understanding of this multidimensional academic work (which some would consider to transgress from traditional scientific standards that emphasize unbiased objectivity). I frame my narrative and its scholar’s stories as educational praxis where the production of scientific knowledge and dissemination of research findings help explicate the pedagogical roles and political purposes of some prominent scholars in the region during the twentieth century. In this chapter, I rely upon Flyvbjerg (2003) to theoretically flesh out how social science differs from normative concepts of positivist science, then contextualize the concept of politically engaged scholarship, specifically through Antonio Gramsci and C. Wright Mills. Finally, I introduce public scholarship as educational practice and theory which informs upon politically engaged scholarship.

Educational praxis is fundamental to social science scholarship, though its importance is seldom made explicit. While rarely framed as central to the scientific process, the production and dissemination of knowledge are core components for informing why we seek “truth” for social purposes rather than for instrumental control. In Making Social Science Matter, Flyvbjerg (2003) clarifies the differences between the social and natural (positivist) sciences. He finds social science to be adept in areas that positivist methods alone are unable to effectively inform and resolve. Rather than emulating the predictive theory of natural science, Flyvbjerg finds that social science must engage in values and admit concepts of power into research designs, including scholars’ reflexive experiences and intent to create social change. Phronesis, the Aristotelian concept of practical thought toward creating change, is adapted by Flyvbjerg to re-imagine social sciences, redefining them so that knowledge is understood to be
connected to practice, power is admitted to influence scholarship, and these two concepts are interwoven in pragmatic approaches to producing knowledge.

The goal is to help restore social science to its classical position as a practical, intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks, and possibilities we face as humans and societies, and at contributing to social and political praxis (Flyvbjerg 2003: 4).

Flyvbjerg contends that social scientists should reorient their intellectual work away from emulating natural science and toward acknowledging, even emphasizing, its differences.

There are differing ways of doing science and producing knowledge. Flyvbjerg finds that “normal science” is based upon an ideal where context is irrelevant and knowledge can be generalized (Flyvbjerg 2003: 48). He suggests that positivist, predictive theory “does not work in practice for social science” and this, as a goal, cannot likely be achieved. Phronetic researchers, conversely, explicitly rely upon context in “anchoring their research” and use “sociality” and specific histories to ground their knowledge claims (Flyvbjerg 2003: 132, 130). Knowledge production, through phronesis “designs problem-solving actions through collaborative knowledge construction with the legitimate stakeholders in the problem” (Greenwood 2008: 327). Under this approach, research scholarship evolves through alternate interpretations.

If a better interpretation demonstrates the previous interpretation to be “merely” interpretation, this new interpretation remains valid until another, still better interpretation is produced which can reduce the previous interpretation to “merely” interpretation. (Flyvbjerg 2003: 131).

This form of research scholarship and educational practice is practical and pragmatic. If the goal of phronetic research “is to produce input to the ongoing social dialogue and praxis in a society” (Flyvbjerg 2003: 131), change-oriented pedagogies, like politically
engaged scholarship, offer new insights to adult educational theory and academic positions regarding the purpose of social science.

While a number of emerging academic fields illustrate the themes of politically engaged scholarship, including public scholarship (Peters et al. 2005; Peters 2009, 2010), engaged and activist scholarship (Gilmore 2005, 2008; Hale 2008), participatory action research (Grossi 1980; Kemmis 2006; McTaggart 1991), action research (Greenwood and Levin 1998; Reason and Bradbury 2001) and feminist poststructural ethnography (Lather 1991; Naples 2003; St. Pierre and Pillow 2000), in my argument I acknowledge that all academic knowledge is situated within (and, therefore, tainted by) subjectivities and values. Though disciplinary imperatives of scientific objectivity and epistemological distance weigh upon all scientists, tensions and contradictions related to these standards are most acute for social scientists who interact directly with human subjects and more so those who work with their “subjects” to promote change. The politically engaged scholarship of the San Joaquin Valley therefore introduces an alternative set of normative practices that invites comparison to the more prominent and accepted understandings of social scientific theory and method.

Politically engaged scholarship integrates educational praxis into social science scholarship. The academic discipline of adult education (particularly in its critical traditions), has articulated methods and technologies for directly participating in political struggles. Freire (2000, 2003) positioned his pedagogy and adult education with the disenfranchised, the poor, the illiterate and the oppressed. Educational praxis, for Freire (2000: 49), emphasized the “radical posture” of entering into “the situation of those with whom one is in solidarity.” His literacy campaigns were based among the oppressed and
integrated lessons of empowerment and structural critique. Cervero and Wilson (2001: 13) went further to contend that “every adult educator is a social activist, regardless of his or her particular vision of society.” If knowledge is not neutral, their statement raised a consequent question for all scholars to reflexively ask: for whose benefit is this social science produced and disseminated? Politically engaged scholarship suggests an agentic possibility for scholars and the people they collaborate with in fostering change. Through educational praxis and pedagogies (of which social science scholarship should be more fully recognized), the promise of community engagement links scholars to relevant scholarship in which they actively seek solutions to social and political problems.

The educational potential of politically engaged scholarship places the scholar directly into the political and economic life of society. Reminiscent of the later Ernesto Galarza, Antonio Gramsci was a critical educator, political organizer and engaged scholar who worked in Italy during the 1920’s and 1930’s. He believed that all people were potentially intellectuals though not everyone went on to perform that social function. Each person, in their own unique way, contributed new ways of constructing the world. Gramsci (1971: 10) argued that scholars should take “an active participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, ‘permanent persuader’ and not just a simple orator;” one who would become “directive” rather than “specialized” as sociological work marshaled forces of change already present in community.

Gramsci distinguished between two categories of scholar: traditional and organic intellectuals. Traditional intellectuals were professional scientists or literary scholars who appear neutral and without class affiliation, but ultimately were aligned (though concealed) with dominant class interests. On the other hand, organic intellectuals
emerged out of the class to which they belong, out of community. Organic intellectuals were a product of social relations and thus were able to build social cohesion and articulate the world for their communities because they were embedded into specific places and situated positions.

A committed Marxist, Gramsci articulated and theorized the problems confronting the Italy’s working class as an organic intellectual. A testament to the relevance of his scholarship was seen in how Mussolini’s dictatorship reacted to Gramsci’s critique. At his trial, the state’s prosecutor concluded: “we must stop this brain from working for twenty years!” (1971: xviii). His work as an organic intellectual motivated the fascist government to silence him, due to fears about its relevance and resonance within Italian society. While incarcerated, Gramsci wrote (somewhat cryptically to get past the censors) on many topics including the role of the intellectual in society. These papers were eventually edited into his “prison notebook” that continues to be influential in academic literature. Never a university-based scholar, Gramsci’s life and work as an organic intellectual illustrated the importance of engagement, yet how does politically engaged scholarship historically relate to social scientists?

C. Wright Mills offered a theory of political engagement through scholarship from a social scientist’s perspective. The social scientist, for Mills (1959), needed to be concerned with “liberating education.” Within this pedagogical mission, a sociologist had two goals:

What he ought to do for the individual is to turn personal troubles and concerns into social issues and problems open to reason – his aim is to help the individual become a self educating man . . . What he ought to do for the society is to combat all those forces which are destroying genuine publics and creating a mass society – or, put as a positive goal, his aim is to help build and to strengthen self-cultivating publics (Mills 1959: 186).
The first goal was pedagogical – to make social issues understandable to individuals; in effect, to translate the complexities of modern life into stories and theories that enabled individuals to join together in building solutions without the ongoing assistance of the scholar. Once a counter-narrative was discursively accepted in society, then social mobilization for change became a possibility. Mills’ second goal was a recommendation to the scholar to open spaces for people to conceive of possibility and action. And here, again, his key turn and “positive goal” was educational – to “strengthen self-cultivating publics” meant to combat forces of economic monopoly, social stratification and political reaction through the production of scientific knowledge. The purpose of Mills’ sociological work was to guarantee democratic governance.

Social science, Mills acknowledged, was inherently political. From his intellectual context of the 1950’s, Mills (1959: 99) believed that American social scientists have seldom, if ever, been politically engaged in any large way; the trend toward the technician’s role has strengthened their a-political involvement, and often, by disuse, their ability even to grasp political problems. That is one reason why one often encounters journalists who are more politically alert and knowledgeable than sociologists, economists, and especially, I am sorry to say, political scientists. The American University system seldom if ever provides political education; it seldom teaches how to gauge what is going on in the general struggle for power in modern society. Most social scientists have had little or no sustained contacts with such sections of the community to have been insurgent . . . .

The crux of Mills’ social science was political as it involved struggles over power and necessitated engagement rather than putative “a-political” distance. In linking “political education” to the intellectual work of social scientists, Mills connected social science to
the world’s contentious socioeconomic problems not squirreled away in academic journals or comfortably debated in seminars.

In *The Sociological Imagination*, Mills’ tone was didactic as he offered advice to other social scientists. He cautioned as an instructor:

> Do not allow public issues as they are officially formulated, or troubles as they are privately felt, to determine the problems that you take up for study. Above all, do not give up your moral and political autonomy by accepting in somebody else’s terms the illiberal practicality of the bureaucratic ethos or the liberal practicality of the moral scatter” (Mills 1959: 226).

Two types of pressure, borne by social scientists, were identified. One was technical, “bureaucratic” pressure pushing scholars away from critical objects of inquiry. This practical course was mainstream and uncontroversial, a pathway to tenure; but “illiberal” because it tacked away from relevant research. The other pressure was subjective and emotive, the “privately felt” personal purposes that motivated a politically engaged scholar, yet threatened to undermine objectivity or “scatter” analytic focus.

For Mills, the purpose of scholarship involved a complex mix of personal motivations and professional standards. In the first case, Mills (1959: 177) observed, “There is no way in which any social scientist can avoid assuming choices of value . . . Increasingly, research is used, and social scientists are used, for bureaucratic and ideological purposes.” In acknowledging “values” in social science, Mills separated from the academic over-emphasis on neutrality. Like Flyvberg, he called for social scientists to practically engage in problem solving, which necessitated employing an educational theory that included concepts of power, politics and “ideological purpose.” Yet, Mills (1959: 192) also considered “the role of reason,” which necessitated restraint. Rather than “hit the pavement, take the next plane to the scene of the current crisis, . . . go
among the poor, [and] set up a soap box,” he felt that these practices, though admirable, went beyond the “normal activities” appropriate for social scientists and could result in the abdication of that role (Mills 1959:192). Ever the contradiction, biographies of Mills show that he did, however, personally partner with labor unions and engage in direct political action.

By situating politically engaged scholarship within the academic field of education, and naming this intellectual work “pedagogical,” I argue that social science is framed by social values and situated in contexts that subtly orient research toward broadly accepted outcomes. In this sense, social science cannot be cleanly framed as objective or neutral. Edward Said (1996: 21) posed, “Politics is everywhere; there can be no escape into . . . the realm of disinterested objectivity or transcendental theory. Intellectuals are of their time.” To which, we can also add place: social science is interwoven into particular contexts and settings. Adult education theory is helpful for understanding the importance of pedagogy to social science, particularly with respect to public scholarship.

Social scientists can be involved in promoting specific ends with communities and beyond universities through their academic work (Peters 2005). Peters (2009: 43) locates the practice of public scholarship at the intersection of action research and community-based research, defining it as creative intellectual work that is conducted in the context of public settings and relationships, facilitating social learning and producing knowledge, theory, technologies, and other kinds of products that advance both public and academic interests and ends. Its results are communicated to, and validated by, peers, including but not limited to peers in scholars’ academic fields. Scholars who practice public scholarship seek to advance the academy’s teaching and research missions in ways that hold both academic and public value.
Such scholarship is undertaken “with specific publics,” whose practitioners ground their practice in particular places, beyond the academy, and aimed toward renewing civic life and democracy (Peters 2005:14). Public scholars work in local contexts, face-to-face, in real time. In contrast to “public intellectuals” who address public issues from both relational and professional distance and mostly speak to national audiences, public scholars work with communities in addressing specific problems (Peters 2010).

The concept of “engagement” is important for public scholars as they work in discrete places with particular publics. Peters, myself and others (2006) have researched the processes of academic engagement among New York Cooperative Extension Specialists and university-based, land grant scholars at Cornell University (Peters 2010), many trained as natural scientists. These scientific experts and academic professionals evolved as adult educators to serve as conduits, facilitators and catalysts for civic change. Learning and education became especially important for their work as they developed pedagogies and educational methods through their professional interaction with local communities. Though these adult educators did not consider themselves to be public scholars (nor perhaps even educators in some instances), their professional transformations from scientists to community development specialists illustrated a gradual evolution and professional development resulting from their reflexive engagement with local groups over time.

Public scholarship, shaped by educational theory and intellectual practice, melds the often disparate methods, purposes and epistemological positions that partition the roles of social scientists and other scholars in their work. This educational theory calls for academic engagement both in the production of scientific knowledge and its goal of
improving the lives of people in particular places and for society in general. Peters (2005: 3; italics in original) describes how various forms of community engagement can be a scholarly activity that draws upon both academic and local knowledge and expertise in ways that facilitate and/or produce significant learning and discovery aimed at addressing a wide range of ‘real world’ problems and issues.

Such problems are often socially complex and politically sensitive, involving conflicting constituencies and disputes where win-win solutions are difficult to facilitate and broker.

Perhaps the most fundamental point of social science is its generally avowed purpose: to produce theory that can be applied to resolve social problems. The pedagogical intent to communicate, cause change and instigate actions, hinges upon the application of knowledge in social and political contexts (often the same places in which that knowledge was generated). Public scholars admit and investigate the complex intersection of scientific knowledge production as they strive to solve real world problems. Since aspects of the scientific method are intended to maintain epistemological distance from any object being studied, educational theory is needed to understand this intellectual work.

In Democracy and Higher Education, Peters (2010) theorizes that the engaged and political work of scholars is integral to their role as scientists participating in and contributing to democratic processes. Peters (2010: 40; italics added) notes that the professional role and work of extension agents in land grant universities were not (and are not today) charged with the exclusive and narrow task of handing out scientific facts and information. As originally conceived, they were to function as both teachers and organizers, bringing land-grant faculty and community members together in public work projects that included but also ranged well beyond technical problem-solving. The
extension work of land-grant colleges . . . was supposed to be aimed at encouraging and organizing specific behavioral, social, and cultural changes.

The relational, site-specific work of extension agents is increasingly marginalized within land grant universities, but their methods and approaches to academic engagement and community development should be adopted and diffused back to the campus. Though professional acknowledgement and academic culture currently favor campus-based, research-oriented scholars, these scientists could learn from the pedagogical practice of their “county agents.”

To understand the challenge to politically engaged scholars, the pedagogical practice occurring in their multifaceted roles and professional purposes needs to be theorized differently. Recently, London (2010: 21) acknowledged that “many of the problems of public life are not technical . . . and therefore can’t be solved by expert knowledge. They are not based on conflicting information so much as conflicting values and convictions.” If the problems now facing society are value-based rather than technical, how should they be answered and addressed? By considering politically engaged scholarship from a pedagogical perspective, I understand scholars as epistemologically positioned and socially situated – their production of academic texts aligns with particular standpoints and their intentions to create change.

While the postmodern era has destabilized conceptions of universal, apolitical and unbiased scientific knowledge, it has opened rationales for politically engaged scholarship. Theoretical debates over objectivity and epistemological positions introduced more refined concepts of power that re-imagined subjectivity, including the identities of social scientists. Villenas (1996: 712) acknowledged that “rethinking the
political and personal subjectivities of the researcher” has “pushed the boundaries of theorizing about the multiple identities of the researcher within the research context of power and privilege.” By reconsidering the identities of scholars, a broader array of outcomes can be suggested from social science. Gilmore (2008: 55; italics in original) considered:

How does the practice of engaged scholarship necessarily and ethically change the ideological and material field of struggle? If the fact that observation produces reality (not merely afterwards, as a representational artifact, but during, as a lived dimension of the field itself), then there are various kinds of work that a scholar might undertake in the mix.

When scholars include themselves in their research, by shifting away from an omniscient viewpoint toward a discrete standpoint, they allow their narratives to enter the active and the positioned. Usher, Bryant and Johnson (1997: 210-211) suggested:

To do research in a postmodern way is to take a critical stance towards the practice of sense-making and sense-taking which we call research. What it focuses on, however, is not the world which is constructed and investigated by research but the way in which that world is written into the text.

In my study, the politically engaged scholars of the Valley took care in crafting their texts to particular audiences for specific strategic ends. I chose a narrative method that fosters feeling-rich texts that simultaneously interpret their historic research while also utilizing their first person voice to encourage multiple access points to the political and scientific arguments that the politically engaged scholars were making through their research, community organizing and educational praxis.
Stories situate our lives. Through them, we know ourselves and imagine our identities. They carry our truths. Some stories, like academic papers, are uniquely stylized and formatted for particular audiences. Even statistics tell stories. Others may only be echoes, almost silent, but still resonating within social memory. Like art, story is an artifact of social remembrance; but it also resignifies cultural memory into new words, symbols and forms, retrieving them from nearly forgotten events and nameless discourses. Sometimes stories can build into powerful flows that sweep away seemingly immovable formations.

Storytellers hold knowledge, which they interpret and share. Among them, writers have been at the forefront of telling stories about the San Joaquin Valley. W.C. Morrow’s (1882) Blood-Money and Frank Norris’ (1901) The Octopus told of early rancher resistance to railroad monopolies in Kings County. Subsequent books were stories of later battles. John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath and In Dubious Battle are examples. In The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck (2002: 325) described the role, and hinted at the purpose, of storytelling:

And it came about in the camps along the roads, on the ditch banks beside the streams, under the sycamores, that the story teller grew into being, so that the people gathered in the low firelight to hear the gifted ones. And they listened while the tales were told, and their participation made the stories great . . . The story tellers, gathering attention into their tales, spoke in great rhythms, spoke in great words because the tales were great, and the listeners became great through them.
These stories narrated the conditions of rural California’s agriculture, its harsh injustices and the bitter resistance.

While the valley’s history has been depicted in fiction, it was also reported by journalists and scientifically studied. Journalists and scholars wrote stories so “truths” could be remembered, taught and applied to future problems. Some early journalists and later scholars were intellectuals who educated the public on the macro-economic structure of California, particularly with respect to land ownership. Sometimes these two roles blurred. Henry George, in the late nineteenth century, was among the first to articulate the state’s skewed land ownership and property distribution. Through journalism and political campaigns George connected the speculative increase of land values to economic poverty in society. With little formal education, he developed complex political and economic analyses that vied with Marxism as an alternative philosophy of political economy in the late nineteenth century.

A later journalist-intellectual, Carey McWilliams, was among the first to articulate the system of industrialized agriculture in California. His classic book, *Factories in the Field*, described the “hidden history” of Californian agriculture, “a story of theft, fraud, violence and exploitation” (McWilliams 1939: 4, 7). He began the book, as later social scientists prefaced their work, with a prophetic warning:

> California, in these critical times, should be the subject of close scrutiny. Here the mechanism of fascist control has been carried to further lengths than elsewhere in America; and both the reasons for this development, and the possibility of its still further extension, are, I believe, set forth in the following pages (9).

Traveling through the San Joaquin Valley in 1935, Williams (1939: 4) called the region “an empire in itself” where he witnessed
orchards that seem literally measureless and gaze upon vast tracts of farm land stretching away on either side of the road to the distant foothills, yet, curiously enough, there seem to be no farms in the accepted sense. One looks in vain for the incidents of rural life; the schoolhouse on the hilltop, the comfortable homes, the compact and easy indolence of the countryside. Where are the farms? Where are the farmhouses? . . . The impression gained is one of vast agricultural domains, huge orchards and garden estates, without permanent occupants.

Only a few years later, a group of social scientists went further than simply describing the extraordinary imperial nature of the valley, they used the tools of science to investigate the effects of economic consolidation on the social structures and political systems of the region. Six scholars – Paul Taylor, Ernesto Galarza, Walter Goldschmidt, Dean MacCannell, Don Villarejo and Isao Fujimoto stand out; their scientifically-informed stories were embedded within larger historical narratives as their intellectual work documented the region’s social segregation, economic inequality and political corruption.2 The narratives of these six scholars, presented in the chapters that follow, are based on their texts, including lectures, interviews, correspondences, academic papers and scientific literature. By including first-person accounts describing their research methods, theory building, personal values, teaching techniques, public advocacy, behind-the-scenes lobbying and community organizing, I strive to retell the scholars’ collective story.

As I seek to understand how social scientists used their knowledge to affect change, I bring to the fore a commonly unacknowledged pedagogical intent that underlies most social science, one which is particularly apparent in divisive social contexts like the

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2 Trudy Wischemann, a potential seventh scholar to include in my research, was difficult to include within the context of the story. She had been one of Paul Taylor’s last research assistants as well as a close personal friend to Walter Goldschmidt and Merrill Goodall. Later, she worked in both Dean MacCannell’s Macrosocial Accounting “shop” and Don Villarejo’s California Institute for Rural Studies. Over the years, as I became friends with her, she continually resisted being identified as a “scholar.” Though I wanted to include her in the narrative, her barometer of “scholar” was Paul Taylor (a standard that few lettered social scientists were likely to match). Trudy described herself as a “rural advocate” rather than a scholar.
San Joaquin Valley. How did the valley’s politically engaged scholars disseminate information, work as educators, lead community organizing efforts and promote their research findings? To elucidate how each of these scholars negotiated the tensions between the demands of their roles as intellectuals and the agentic purposes of their research, I join each scholar’s first person narratives together with their academic texts. For example, how did they identify their research problems or respond to political pressure on their scientific studies? By defending public policies and promoting the enactment of laws that were contrary to the economic interests of large landowners, these scientists’ roles as politically engaged scholars become apparent. At the same time, the previously hidden political manipulation and coercion by agribusiness interests aimed at curbing the scholar’s autonomy – an important professional guarantee and social protection for intellectuals and scientists – is brought to light and made public.

I use narrative inquiry to understand the region’s politically engaged scholarship. Since narrative inquiry is concerned with understanding people’s experience (Clandinin and Connelly 2000, Pinnegar and Daynes 2007), it is well suited for my study of the practices of social scientists in California’s San Joaquin Valley. I combine interview techniques used with urban planners and adult educators (Chase 1995; Forester et. al. 2005; Forester 2006) with my personal experience in editing and drafting profiles of adult educators and applied scholars (Peters et al. 2006, Peters 2010). Originally based upon a three part interview protocol developed over fifteen years (Forester et al. 2005; Forester 2006), I add ethnographic detail and personal observations to construct a narrative analysis for each scholar. Then, stories from each scholar are integrated into an overarching history of the valley’s politically engaged scholarship. In my study, the
scholars’ narratives not only inform their object of inquiry (broadly defined as industrial agriculture), their narratives show how each constructed their roles as scholars confronting agribusiness. Their stories provide opportunities to learn not only about their professional practices and influential findings, but also their purposes, values and motivations.

Narrative inquiry involves the telling of detailed stories (rather than the reporting of events) to facilitate learning and scholarship (Chase 1995). The characteristics of narrative inquiry identified by Pinnegar and Daynes (2007) include: (1) the relationship between researcher and research subject is relational; (2) interpretation rather than statistics are emphasized as data in the stories’ social interaction; (3) the particular is preferred over the general; and (4) there is a wider acceptance of alternative epistemologies. As a research method, narrative inquiry is not designed to create predictive models as much as to understand, learn from, inform upon and potentially apply particular practices. Forester (2006: 574) describes narrative approaches as eliciting the “fine-grained, historically situated, experientially vivid accounts of thoughtful, sensitive, politically astute work,” which is precisely the type of analysis needed to understand the pedagogical practices of social scientists working in highly politicized contexts like the San Joaquin Valley. Broadly, narrative research (Berger and Quinny 2005; Clandinin 2007; Clandinin and Connelly 2000; Josselson and Lieblich 1995; Polkinghorne 1988) is designed to analytically inquire and empirically illustrate unique personal experience and professional practice.

One of the challenges to narrative research involves how to script texts that illustrate professional experiences, like those of social scientists. The San Joaquin Valley
scholars themselves faced similar problems; namely, how to connect with broader publics in practical ways? Many simply adopted less formal academic language. A short, handwritten note from Walter Goldschmidt to Paul Taylor on November 27, 1978 offers an example. Goldschmidt’s instinct is to use an accessible voice and “journalistic” approach to engage broader audiences, however the demands of an academic editor force him to alter his text:

Dear Paul,

Enclosed are a few copies of my latest contributions to the rural sociology field. The correlation is written in hyper-academese because the editor insisted upon it. I hope somebody will take the data and give it journalistic treatment.

The note’s tone conveys the tension between his role as a social scientist and educational responsibility to inform the public. Politically engaged scholars, speaking to both public forums, policy makers and academic communities, face the challenge of communicating with multiple audiences through their texts.

This challenge is clarified by considering what Forester (2006) identifies as two kinds of knowledge: generalized, testable propositions and embodied practical judgments. Forester (2006: 573) writes that “we are likely to learn less from recipes and general rules for all times and places, and more from vivid examples of real work, exemplars of sensitive and astute-contextual judgment in families of messy and complex cases.” One reason we learn more from narrative is the depth and nuance of its material – emotion, desire, hope and aspiration – represented through personal experience. Story can inspire action. On the other hand, to create general rules and predictive theory, data needs to be flattened to describe the broadest possible categories. Statistics seem to strip
humanness from the story they seek to represent, making it more difficult to identify with their narrative themes.

My narrative of politically engaged scholarship in the valley is roughly chronological, though for presentation I structured it in chapters based around the experiences and research of the representative scholars. The six scholars come from two different cultural eras. Paul Taylor, Ernesto Galarza and Walter Goldschmidt were progressive-era scholars influenced by turn-of-the-century socialism. Their early professional experience was set during the crises of the Depression and Second World War, then they turned to the post-war expansion of agricultural industrialization. While their scholarship and organizing in the valley began in the 1930’s, 40’s and 50’s, they each continued to engage in the region and its problems for the rest of their lives. By the time I began my study, Taylor and Galarza were deceased. Walter Goldschmidt passed away in 2010, but, before he died, he had helped to instigate this study by giving me his research files relating to California’s Central Valley and industrial agriculture in the United States. The second group of scholars – Dean MacCannell, Don Villarejo and Isao Fujimoto – were influenced by the counterculture movement of the 1960’s. As students and later as intellectuals, these scholars’ shared cultural experiences, particularly with respect to the anti-war and civil rights movements. This later generation of scholars, all still alive, actively participated in the development of my research and their narratives.

Within each scholar’s chapter, I framed two different sections: first person narratives titled “Profiles of Practice” and interpretive discussions called “Scholarship in the Struggle.” The data used to narrate the practice profiles varied. I interviewed and corresponded with all of the scholars except Taylor and Galarza. For these two earlier
scholars, I used the transcripts of historical interviews that both scholars had compiled into books: Taylor’s (1973a, 1973b, 1973c) three-volume collection titled *Paul Schuster Taylor – California Social Scientist* and Galarza’s (1982) *The Burning Light: Action and Organizing in the Mexican Community in California*. For Goldschmidt, though I had met him a few years before his death, his interviews were not detailed enough to edit into profile sections (in some respects, this problem presented an opportunity since it necessitated a more ethnographic account of our meetings and interactions). I met with all of the remaining contemporary scholars on numerous occasions. Both Villarejo and MacCannell gave detailed interviews, which generated strong profile narratives that were similar in structure to previous work I had done. Fujimoto, the only valley scholar I knew before starting the research, corresponded with me via email throughout my dissertation project (even helping to name and frame my topic). Like Galarza, portions of his practice profiles were edited from a transcribed lecture in an academic setting.

The editing of scholar’s profiles was a painstaking process involving the editing of interviews (which themselves took significant time to transcribe). The drafting of the profile sections involved editing each interview so that the voice of the interviewer was eliminated from the text in addition to redundant phrases, digressions and verbal tics of the research subject. I edited repetitions and recurrent topics brought up by profile participants in an effort to foster a cohesive narrative. This editing process was akin to combing the data by repeatedly reading and re-reading through the narrative to match the respective scholar’s voice to their topic and to maintain a consistent flow within the storyline.
After drafting a living scholar’s chapter, I sent it to them for fact-checking and feedback. Mostly they corrected minor points. In only one case did a scholar ask me to redraft in a substantial way. MacCannell emailed:

> The first long quote you attribute to me appears to be a pastiche pulled together from several of our conversations. Because the gaps and transitions are not indicated, and you have represented it as if I spoke thus continuously, it does not sound like me. Under the circumstances, I think it would be much better if you re-wrote this in your own voice perhaps with a few short quotes. But it should be represented as your recounting of our conversations, not my voice.
> I have no similar problem with the other long quotes. They read as continuous or near continuous dialogue.

The “long quotes” are the practice profiles of his chapter. MacCannell’s feedback is a reminder that these texts are not always full, continuous quotes; rather, as he notes, they sometimes represent a pastiche brought together from a number of conversations into a practice profile. This technique encourages a pedagogical effect, with my goal being to have the scholars teach us through their own voices.

In the profiles of practice, I strive to allow the scholars to speak to us in their own voices, from their own experiences, communicating their feelings, hopes, frustrations and aspirations. The profiles are constructed to represent a teaching voice where the various scholars speak, in effect, directly to the reader. For emphasis, I italicize and single-space the scholar’s first-person stories in an effort to create feeling-rich texts resonant with their voices. Paul Taylor (1983) used this same approach in one of his last books. Here are some examples from interviews he did in the 1930’s (and how he represented them in text) with landowning growers:

> I would rather have Mexican tenants than either Negroes or whites. You can’t tell the whites so well what to do. They think they are on an equality with you and they want to live in a house about like you do. They are always wanting better clothes and more provisions. The Mexicans have
bigger families and more labor to get out a big crop. If the Mexicans
learn English they don’t work so well; if they get educated a little they
don’t make such good farm hands.

Landowner, 700 acres of cotton
(Taylor 1983: 2; italics in original)

If they were miserable or unhappy, I would say, “All right; Mr. Educator,
do you damndest.” But the Mexicans are a happy people, happier than we
are; they don’t want responsibility, they want just to float along, sing
songs, smoke cigarettes. Education doesn’t make them happier; most of
them continue the same sort of work at the same wages as if they had
never attended school. It only makes them dissatisfied, and teaches them
to read the wrong kind of literature (IWW) and listen to the wrong kind of
talk.

Imperial Valley farm manager
(Taylor 1983: 9; italics in original)

Perhaps I’m talking to the wrong man; if you are from the North you
won’t understand. The Mexican is getting paid about four bits too much.
He should get about $1 a day . . . What a Mexican should be paid is just
enough to live on, with maybe a dollar or two to spend. That’s all he
deserves. If he is paid any more he won’t work so much or when we need
him he’s able to wait around until we have to raise the price above what’s
legitimate.

Southwestern onion grower
(Taylor 1983: 14; italics in original)

Taylor’s technique of italicized text accentuates the growers’ discursive framing of
farmworkers. His approach highlights their voice, creating text that reverberated with
landowner discourses of oppression, bigotry and racism. Taylor utilized this method
throughout his book, even when using text from sources like newspapers. I borrow his
technique, not only to cue the reader to an upcoming change in voice, but to also make
the point that texts are not stable, they can be redeployed and continue to carry meaning
when we evoke them in later contexts.

In addition to the practice profiles of each scholar’s chapter, I include interpretive
sections titled “Scholarship in the Struggle” that complement their first person narratives
by interpreting the scholar’s key texts, some of which took years to research and write.
These sections present the scientific findings of the valley scholars and inform us of their professional practice. Not only are the academic texts public records of these scholars analyses of the economic structure and social problems associated with industrialized agriculture, they also represent expressions of the scholar’s methods, values and motivations.

In the paragraphs that follow I provide an overview of the academic work of each of the six scholars. While some of the valley’s scholars were more prolific than others, all produced academic texts that I use to complement my broader narrative storyline of how they engaged California agribusiness. Goldschmidt’s (1978a) *As You Sow*, first published in 1947, is our starting point. One of the best known studies in the field of rural sociology, this comparative case study of two rural valley communities was explicitly designed to elucidate the social effects of large scale landholdings and economic consolidation on rural communities. As Paul Durrenberger and Kendall Thu describe in their 2010 Goldschmidt obituary, his research was “a model of quantifiable empirical social science research that bears on public policy.” This was Goldschmidt’s explicit purpose when he designed it to assess the social and economic impacts of the Central Valley Project for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

Goldschmidt’s conclusion was that large-scale agricultural landholdings were detrimental to rural communities. Yet, instead of implementing reclamation law (which would have instituted mild land reform measures for property owners receiving publicly subsidized water) or creating public policy to mitigate the negative outcomes shown in the research findings, the federal government (which funded the research) censored the study. The study’s treatment, as Goldschmidt noted, not only told us about the
socioeconomic effects of a monopolized agricultural economy, it illustrated that economic concentrations erode democratic governance, particularly in the form of scientific inquiry and public process. Once this was clear, the lesson of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis shifted from one of informing public policy to rallying a defense of democratic process. Not only was this a lesson that Goldschmidt learned through his politically engaged scholarship in the region, it was a trend that recurred throughout the experience of the other scholars in my study.

Goldschmidt’s iconic study, however, does not represent the chronological beginning of politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley; that rests with his mentor, Paul Taylor. Beginning in the 1930’s, I turn to his texts related to rural California’s socioeconomic structure and farm labor. Taylor’s writing illustrates his willingness and ability to vary the form of his text to address different audiences. One example, written in 1939 with his wife Dorothea Lange, is *An American Exodus*. A collaborative effort, more journalistic than scholarly, the book represents a plea to public officials to act to help the Dust Bowl refugees and displaced tenant farmers. Taylor uses a sparse, poetic style for its written text that mirrors the stark and haunting images of Lange’s accompanying photographs. Another Taylor text I refer to is *On the Ground in the Thirties*, a book written in 1983, just before his death. It brings forward primary source material like an anthology of voice. A heavily quoted text documenting a farmworker strike shows Taylor in perhaps most his most comfortable setting – battle. I believe this book manifests Taylor’s need to present unfiltered data that he considered too significant to risk being forgotten. Just as Goldschmidt later did by handing his Central
Valley files to me, Taylor’s motivation may have been to push data forward into public spheres.

A central focus of Taylor’s scholarship in the valley over four decades of engagement was his defense of reclamation law (the same law that Goldschmidt’s study was designed to evaluate) through law review articles. I review these articles in detail because they offer some of his most thoroughly researched arguments and are poignant examples of Taylor’s commitment to economic justice and his defense of democracy. His law review articles, which he later compiled into one book, *Essays on Land, Water and the Law in California* (1979), systematically lay out the constitutional arguments, historical precedents and political significance of the Reclamation Law’s 160-acre limit. Like signposts along a path, his empirical evidence and legal arguments point to an educational purpose; Taylor wanted to make these reviews easily accessible to future scholars and citizens.

Ernesto Galarza is the only scholar who has offered a comprehensive, integrated overview of his intellectual engagement against California agribusiness (which he explicitly names in the title of his book). Similar to Taylor (1979), he wrote *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California, 1947-1960* as a synthesis of his previous writing and political engagement. Written in 1977, the book represents an evolution in his learning and of his thinking, which began with *Strangers in our Fields* (1956), followed by *Merchants of Labor* (1964) and finally *Spiders in the House and Workers in the Fields* (1970). Taylor’s approach literally bound all of his published law review articles in a single volume, whereas Galarza’s (1977) book represents an original narrative of his politically engaged scholarship. Both Taylor (1979) and Galarza’s (1977)
books illustrate a reflexive awareness and educational understanding that their scholarship needed to be brought into the public domain for the purpose of instigating political change. Another benefit of their approach was that it simplified later excavations by scholars who were seeking to understand this history.

Galarza’s three preceding books on agribusiness each represent stand-alone contributions to the history of the politically engaged scholarship in California. His first, *Strangers in our Fields*, was written in 1956 when he was still a farm labor organizer. The booklet was designed to instigate a confrontation over the Public Law 78 (authorizing the braceros program). The detailed pamphlet also was intended to pressure policy makers by publicizing the illegality, inconsistencies and excesses of this federally subsidized system of labor importation. After being pushed out of the union movement around 1960, Galarza wrote two historical books as he transitioned into his new, primary role as a scholar. In *Merchants of Labor* (1964), he interpreted the history of the braceros program. This book was not only different in form from his previous, more subjective narrative in *Strangers*; its multi-sourced analysis also was an overview of Galarza’s strategic ten-year engagement in the struggle that eventually succeeded in overturning the braceros’ authorizing legislation. In his next book, *Spiders in the House and Workers in the Fields*, he went even further using a similar historical approach. Published in 1970, it was Galarza’s most intricate and dramatic research project as it charted twenty years of legal battles against DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation, one of the largest, mid-century corporations in the United States. This book positions Galarza as one of the subjects of the study (using a third person voice), and follows a long series of confrontations between the union and the corporation from the initial labor strikes through decades of
litigation, depositions and investigation. Each of these his books (culminating in Farm Workers and Agri-business in California, 1947-1960) layered more context, detail and theory upon the previous texts as Galarza looked back on his experiences.

Dean MacCannell’s texts were among the most contested, yet they were also the most quantitative. In the simplest sense, MacCannell’s body of statistical research represented retests of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis and his findings overwhelmingly substantiated the original findings of the Arvin-Dinuba case study. In his chapter, I review published and unpublished papers by MacCannell and his students. These data sets and findings bring together the strongest examples from his Goldschmidt retests as the empirical and scientific evidence is stacked as a formidable formation against the counter-position that there was community benefit to consolidating economic wealth and ownership of natural resources in agricultural regions.

MacCannell participated in dramatic confrontations while bringing his research forward to government bureaucracies and in academic settings, but less evident at the time was the shift from Goldschmidt’s democratic position toward economistic discourses and policies in academic literatures. I explore these contested democratic and economistic positions by comparing MacCannell’s research with that of Cornell sociologist Fred Buttel. In the 1980’s, their diverging positions were illustrated in chapters they published in two books: Land Reform American Style (Geisler and Popper 1984) and Agriculture and Community Change in the U.S.: The Congressional Research Reports (Swanson 1988). Through their texts, the rapid erosion of Buttel’s original democratic position into an economistic discourse is compared to MacCannell’s as he maintains his stand in support of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis and his own empirical data.
Don Villarejo’s scholarship represents a publicly-oriented scholarship, less concerned with the demands of the academy; instead, his work primarily emphasized promoting social justice and economic equity in California. I review key reports he published through the California Institute for Rural Studies investigating the structure and effects of agribusiness: *Getting Bigger: Large Scale Farming in California* (Villarejo 1980a), *New Lands for Agriculture: The California State Water Project* (Villarejo, Chrisfield and White 1981), *How Much Is Enough?* (Villarejo 1986), and *Missed Opportunities, Squandered Resources: Why Prosperity Brought by Water Doesn’t Trickle Down in California’s Central Valley* (Villarejo and Redmond 1988). Of their many contributions, Villarejo’s research helps to re-situate the region’s politically engaged scholarship after the 1982 neutering of reclamation law. The law’s revision marks a decisive turning point for the region’s scholarship as its provisions had been a focal point of previous scholarship and the strategic linchpin that had rallied scholars for a generation. At this crucial juncture, Villarejo picked up the democratic mantle and continued the critique.

Educational texts, primarily teaching the ethics and methods of applied social science, are the final body of scholarship reviewed in my study. While scholars like Goldschmidt and MacCannell undoubtedly taught research methods in their classes, I turn to Villarejo and Fujimoto to understand how specific pedagogical texts were written to confront agribusiness. Three readers are most exemplary of this pedagogy: *Research for Action: A Guidebook to Public Records Investigation* (Villarejo 1980b), *Getting the Straight Dope: A Handbook for Action-Research in the Community* (Davis Motion of the Ocean Super Collective 1973) and *Perspectives on Community* (Fujimoto and Helfant
These texts were designed for students, journalists and activist scholars to learn public records search strategies and anthropological methods. They are texts suited to training investigative journalists or undercover detectives as much as cultivating politically engaged scholars. Themes of transparency and access are prominent in them as they show how to utilize legally sanctioned records requests to understand the ownership and operations of corporations and public bureaucracies.

The final scholar in my study, Isao Fujimoto, is a personal mentor and the one I have known the longest time, yet his chapter was the most difficult for me to gather into a narrative. While agreeing to a number of formal interviews, meeting many times, exchanging frequent email and sending me his War Stories videotape, I sat before his data as if it were a puzzle. Similarly perplexing was locating his published material, even the authorship of his texts were difficult to cite as they were multi-authored compilations.

Fujimoto’s story, like him as a person, seemed in constant movement. At a certain point, I capitulated to my original goal of wrestling each of the scholar’s stories into a boilerplate template almost solely composed of their first-person voice. Rather, each of their chapters varied depending on the material before me and how the stories emerged as I analyzed the scholars’ texts. In Fujimoto’s case, by including email correspondence over the time period of my fieldwork in the Valley, his chapter brought the narrative up and into the present as he encouraged me and gently guided my study.

One challenge I encountered in drafting each scholar’s chapter resulted from differences in data and my intent to echo their voices and express their personalities. Eventually, after many re-drafts, I would see the scholar’s personality emerge from the data. Some were more systematic and strategic, others mobile and tactical. They all
shared, to some degree, taking the long view. Engagement involved time periods beyond their own lifetimes as they compiled comprehensive literatures, passed on important data, archived primary source materials and continued to teach both students and the general public long after their formal retirements.

As my narrative of valley scholarship moved forward in time, it also became more ethnographic as I met and personally knew Walter Goldschmidt, Dean MacCannell, Don Villarejo and Isao Fujimoto. Trained as an ethnographer (O’Connell 2002), I gravitated to this approach when a storyline became unclear or gaps in the data required further detail or explanation. I also came to see writing this dissertation as a political act in which I participated as a scholar engaged in a reflexive and iterative learning process; a process which Wolcott (2005) described as an artistic challenge to convey social complexity.

Ethnographic research involves creativity. Just as some research approaches can be designed while doing them (Becker 1993), ethnography involves a recursive engagement within a research setting. Freed from an overemphasis on hypothesis testing, ethnography involves processes of continual discovery that do not necessarily have resolutions (Villenas 1996). In this sense, Wolcott (2005: 22; italics in original) understands ethnographic fieldworkers as resisting the demands of scientific rigor in that they do not primarily propose to control locations of inquiry and learning:

surveys are fine when the objective is to know how everybody does or thinks about something: frequencies, distributions, average or “typical” behavior. Fieldwork ought to inform us about how – and to some extent why – somebody does it.

Within ethnographic research, a moving set of questions emerge and change in dialogue with local contexts, evolving events and increased researcher understanding of the setting
of study. Since subtle epiphanies emerging from social interaction require an ethnographer to “revise the question until lessening surprises or diminishing returns indicate a stopping point” (Rosaldo 1989: 7), the idea of hypothesis testing is shifted from empirically examining a categorized problem to an agentic act considering the utility of practical and theoretical approaches within situated locations. More than most academic methods, anthropological ethnography is situated within and engaged in research settings such that both research problems and empirical answers develop relationally through social interaction. Research in this sense is “designed” for engagement with the presence of the scholar reflexively present in text and actively involved in the research settings.

My scholarship occurs before panoramic backdrops of historic social movements and geographic change, yet I also explore the nuances of social science scholarship and political intrigues involving powerful institutions in California. My narrative bridges multiple contexts and representations as I integrate the scholar’s texts (scientific fact and personal experience) into a generational story of resistance that includes the nuance of feelings and passionate defense of values being violated. In this context, Marcus’ (1998: 50; italics in original) concept of a multi-sited research imaginary is helpful as it:

calls for a collapsing of the macro-micro distinction itself; a particular kind of ethnography that is places-, rather than place-focused. An ethnography of complex connections, itself, becomes the means of producing a narrative that is both macro and micro, and neither one particularly. Some sort of ethnographic practice of research and writing that portrays chunks, cross-sections, bits (an appropriate label for this kind of circumscription of the ethnography does not yet exist) in its simultaneity and intimacy is central to fulfilling the kind of representation of an emergent world.
Just as novelists or journalists create and report representations through texts, so do scholars who describe and analyze social contexts. In such efforts, the pedagogical need to convey meaning adds yet another layer (which includes values and purpose) around the task of offering portrayals of the observed world. The history of politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley offers opportunities to empirically explore what has been a largely theoretical debate involving how and why social scientists should produce knowledge.

Within narrative research, how do we account for the multi-dimensionality of story? How can we produce teaching texts meaningful to our local communities and perhaps broader societies? A multi-sited research imaginary considers a scholar’s role as circumstantial activist:

The conventional “how-to” methodological questions of social science seem to be thoroughly embedded in or merged with the political-ethical discourse of self-identification developed by the ethnographer in multi-sited research. The movement among sites (and levels of society) lends a character of activism to such an investigation . . . it is activism quite specific and circumstantial to the conditions of doing multi-sited research itself (Marcus 1998: 98).

Thus, Marcus’ scholar activist is not a conventional leftist advocate, but rather a creator of repeatedly renegotiated identities in the multiple contexts. These contexts are the locations – and the scholar must often change roles to work in them – where education can facilitate the building of community.
In *Every Farm a Factory*, Fitzgerald (2003: 7-8) traces the “first generation” of industrial agriculture and large-scale farming to the era between 1918 and 1930. This was a period when an “industrial logic” was applied to agriculture in the United States. Some proponents of this new system were college-educated agricultural experts – agricultural engineers and agricultural economists – who applied science to analyze farming. As “agricultural promoters” these scientists used manufacturing as a “template for agricultural industrialism” that emphasized: (1) large-scale production, (2) specialized machines, (3) standardization of processes and products, (4) reliance on managerial expertise, and (5) mandating efficiency in production (Fitzgerald 2003: 22-23). A decade later, this applied logic had taken hold in certain regions of the United States, especially in California’s Central Valley.

Two institutional trends from this era stand out as indicative of the effort to industrialize agriculture in California through higher education. The first was the close collaboration between the University of California’s Cooperative Extension and the California Farm Bureau Federation (CFBF). Why didn’t the University of California partner with and invigorate the already existing, populist-inspired Grange movement? Scheuring (1995) notes that the relationship between Cooperative Extension and the CFBF was so controversial that a Congressional investigation was held to examine it; yet the CFBF headquarters remained at UC Berkeley for almost twenty years. The second
perplexing anomaly from the University of California was the absence of a department of rural sociology at its land grant campuses. Almost all prestigious land grant colleges and universities had robust research programs in rural sociology, yet the anomaly, with its history of labor strife and rural inequality, was California.

While institutional actors turned toward promoting an “industrial logic” in the food system, a handful of scholars countered these trends by promoting democracy, economic equity and social justice. With the agriculture consolidation underway, and marginal institutional support for their work (even opposition to it), a series of politically engaged scholars began research into Californian agribusiness and the state’s impoverished rural communities. The first among these were Paul Taylor and Ernesto Galarza. Both entered the valley during periods of desperate crises and extraordinary conditions. Taylor began a research program in agricultural labor economics during the Depression and Dust Bowl. Galarza, only a few years later, chose to work as the director of education and research for the some of the first formal farmworker unions in California during the 1940’s and 50’s.

As politically engaged scholars, neither Taylor nor Galarza had formal methodological training for researching the contexts they were about to enter and the scale of the problems that they sought to understand and answer. Similarly, the pedagogical approaches that developed over their decades-long engagement against agribusiness were unique products of their personalities and the divisive social environments they navigated. As scholars, with knowledge as their primary tool (and sometimes a weapon), they utilized multiple roles and educational approaches to achieve their democratic purposes and realize egalitarian values.
Who was Paul Schuster Taylor? What was he teaching through his social science? Though it is impossible to capture an identity, to encompass a person in words, in this chapter I seek to understand and interpret his work as a politically engaged scholar confronting California’s industrializing food system and the pedagogies he utilized to achieve his purposes as a citizen and scholar.

Taylor’s life work roughly spanned the time period of this dissertation and anchored subsequent scholarship. To understand his work and commitments, I will begin by framing Taylor’s disposition, documenting his military experience as a marine officer in World War I and training as a young scholar. Next, I discuss his early scholarship of and during the Great Depression and Dust Bowl migrations including his partnership with Dorothea Lange. The subsequent section explains Taylor’s research on agribusiness, the Arvin-Dinuba case study and his law review articles. I then segue into an analysis of Taylor’s scholarship of the “excess land law” and relationship with Cornell professor Paul Wallace Gates. The final section details Taylor’s research strategies, McCarthy era political pressure, and the values motivating his politically engaged scholarship.

Profile of Practice: Military Training, Education and Early Scholarship

Taylor was easy to underestimate, particularly for his adversaries. A portly economics professor, his sedate, low-key demeanor camouflaged a tenacious and deliberate disposition more akin to a soldier than a scholar. In an autobiographical oral history, Taylor (1973a: 329-335) included an appendix titled “With the Marines at Chateau Thierry – Written in the Convalescent Hospital at Biarritz, France, Sept. 22, 1918.” A letter written by Taylor as a 23 year old Marine Corps Lieutenant during World War I introduces his overall identity and complex mix of personality traits. Excerpts from his letter illustrate a part of his history, one that informs upon his disposition and strategic thinking under pressure:

_I’m going to try to do tonight what I couldn’t bring myself to do before – tell you about my experiences during our last trip to the front. Of course, things are a bit vague because of necessary omissions to keep within the censorship. Also, of course I can’t say much about casualties, for that’s a forbidden subject. Don’t think that the things I say in regard to the conditions are in a spirit of complaint, for of course they aren’t. Suppose that I adopt a diary form; it may help me to get the details in the right places._

_June 5. Leave Paris and go to Meaux by train, - from there to Regimental Headquarters by truck. The woods behind the front are full of batteries. A Boche plane comes over and sends one of our observation balloons down in flames. We reach Herman’s regiment first. He (Lt. Zischke) gets off there. I go on to mine. Sleep all night in the open under the stars. Our batteries are firing heavily – probably preparing for an attack. Our last night to be spent in comfort for some time. Slept in my bedding roll and didn’t lose any slept over the noise either._

_June 6. The Colonel give us guides to take our battalions. At Battalion Headquarters in a woods I find runners from my company which is in the front line. I get one of them to take me forward. We go across open fields and finally reach a farm (Triangle) about 150 yds. behind my company. The way beyond this is exposed to snipers and machine-gun fire. I send the runner back as there’s no use going out while all is quiet in the middle of the day. A machine-gun Lieutenant is at the farm and_
gives me some bread, some honey the men found, and a cup of milk from one of the cows left by the refugees in their hurried flight. The machine-gun Lieutenant gets orders to prepare a Marine attack. I decide its time to join my company, so I go out, partly crawling, and find my men in little rifle pits, dug in a hay field on the military crest (exposed slope) of the field. The Captain comes back from a conference at Battalion Headquarters at about half past three in the afternoon. My battalion is to advance and take Bouresches. My company is to hold and to advance under certain circumstances (which do not arise).

The Boches start to shell us. Lieutenant Sellers comes in from our first platoon to report that his platoon is being gassed. A sniper shoots him on the way but he gets to the hole where the Captain and I are. Stretcher-bearers and the Hospital man take him to the dressing station at La Cense Farm. Later comes more shelling from the Boches. I look westward out of my hole and over in the valley opposite Bouresches I can see Marines attacking – running at top speed through a hail of machine gun bullets. I can see the bullets spray the dirt, but the Marines only keep on and never slacken; some stagger and fall. I use my field glasses and can see them try to crawl away from the bullets to the shelter of a slight fold in the ground. Most of them reach it; some never do. An interval, – and another wave rushes across that same bullet swept area. This time there are more streams of bullets spraying them. The Boches saw them and they are ready. They start across. Some get through; the rest falter, – and then break for any shelter they can find. Human beings can’t go through it. They throw away their packs, and thus lightened, work on by less storm-swept routes . . . During the evening we learn that the town was taken.

And so it goes for eight days when Taylor’s letter ends:

June 14. At 1:30 a.m. we are suddenly aroused, roll our packs and march forward, almost at double time. The Boches are trying to break our line and we must be ready to meet them if they come through. Moving forward, we go through a gas and shrapnel barrage. There are some pretty sad sights of wounded men. We move up into a wood and wait. No food of course and we are very, very hungry. Soon we are sent a kilometer across open fields in broad daylight and into another wood opposite Bouresches. Why the Boche observation balloons aren’t up I don’t know. Every other day at this time I could count 7 or 8 of them. Had they been there we would have been blown to bits by the Boche artillery.

When we reach the wood we are well forward. The shelling is extremely heavy. Some huge gun is shelling a point close by at the edge of Belleau Wood at monotonously regular intervals. Fragments from each burst come spinning into us. Our batteries are silent. The Boches send over more and more. One can anticipate the fall of those big shells with
such accuracy that it is almost nerve-wracking. We are getting shelled along the line. I bury a Marine, Harvey Dial, killed in the June 6 attack. As we stand at the open grave, an Austrian 88 shell clips by just over our heads and bursts a few yards beyond. The concussion is like a fierce slap in the face. Another and another follow. We finish our task hastily and leave that particular spot. Night is falling. All we have had to eat is a small can of "monkey meat" (Argentine beef) to two men, and a box of hard bread (something like Uneedas) to three men. No water unless we had it in our canteens before. Most of us did as we knew how valuable it was. The shelling is steadily increasing in volume. The gas alarm has already been given in some places. The bombardment reaches a crescendo. Just then the order comes to me to take my platoon out of the woods. Through the barrage we must pass. I have every man hang onto the pack of the man ahead of him. It’s pitch dark in the wood. There are no paths. They are throwing over big stuff, little stuff, gas shells, shrapnel, high explosive. The woods are torn to pieces. It is almost impossible to walk because of the fallen branches. If we are to get out I must see, so off comes the mask. I try to keep the mouthpiece in so as to breathe purely. I have to take it out to call to keep the platoon together and following. There are stragglers of other platoons to be rounded up. The runner sent to guide me is lost and so excited he’s almost crazy. I finally shut him up to keep him from demoralizing everyone. I stumble along over everything, fallen men, logs, etc. I try to note where the shells are thickest and pick the holes where there is the best chance of getting through. At last I find the Captain and get my men, most of them, out to where he is, but we are still in a bad place. I have my men lie on their stomachs, packs on their backs, to give maximum protection against shrapnel. We are still in the gas. It’s a strong pungent odor. We are still being shelled terribly. Cries for aid and I can’t aid. Only the hospital men can go about. They do wonderful work.

I get my men completely out of the woods once, but under orders take them back in. A long delay in the midst of the gas and bursting shells. The line of men is broken, the Captain gone, so I gather my men and take them back the only way I know. I find a doctor who cares for those who need attention and evacuates them. Pretty soon I begin to feel the effects of the gas. My eyes begin to smart and some other unpleasant (vomiting) symptoms assert themselves. I get into an ambulance and am carried to the field hospital. By that time I am completely blind and see no more to relate.

I’ve met two officers since, who saw the wood next day, and am more thankful than ever that so many of us are still alive. My eyes are as good as ever now.

It was terrible, but not so hard to endure then as it was all over – and even reliving it now, almost.

Lt. P.S. Taylor 78th Company 6th Regiment Marines
Later, in an “Editorial note” by Taylor dated July 1973, he added:

*During the Bouresches-Belleau Wood action Marine casualties, on a brigade strength of 7,200, were 5,711. They may have been more; my own gassing was not reported to my family until January 1919 because not earlier reported to the Marine Corps. My own estimate of the casualties of the 78th Marine Company during a single night was around 90 percent, overwhelmingly from gas, mostly "mustard" with some phosgene.*

Taylor was not someone easily intimidated. Once directed or resolved, he could commit himself fully to a task. As a politically engaged scholar, he undertook such a campaign, utilizing the methods of a scholar rather than a soldier, to confront agribusiness and large landowners in California and specifically in the San Joaquin Valley.

Born in 1895, Taylor grew up in Sioux City, Iowa but his family roots were in Wisconsin. The most significant event from his early life was the loss of his father in 1902 at the age of seven. His Midwestern demeanor, historical orientation and cultural background deeply influenced the direction of his life:

*Our family were deeply rooted in Wisconsin. My grandfather pioneered there and my parents made their way through the University. As their children, there was drive behind our going to Wisconsin. I can remember my mother saying, “Now, you can go to Harvard if you want to.” But the twig had been already bent, it was just not possible for me to be flexible and objective in choosing where to go. I have no regret, because going to Wisconsin gave the bent to my whole life.*

*Wisconsin professors shaped the lives of many of us. In the 1930’s, the students of John R. Commons staffed a lot of the New Deal agencies. The government suddenly expanded into areas that had no administration before, for example, unemployment compensation. I worked in the Resettlement Administration and Social Security Board, concerned with migrant agricultural laborers. There was no background of previous concern for them in government administration, except to guide wheat harvesters to the fields as the wheat ripened. Commons had been concerned with problems of that kind when I went to Wisconsin before World War I.*

*It was after World War I that Commons went into economic theory and institutional economics. He did his best work when studying the problems of the day and seeking application of solutions to them. That was much more valuable than his entrance into the field of economic theory. When Commons wrote “Legal Foundations of Capitalism,” he dealt with institutional tangibles. His historical, legal, and public administration studies were more fruitful and enduringly useful than his elaborate*
theories. He was one of the great figures. Students who were two and three years ahead of you would talk to you about the excitement of being a student of Commons. You might say he created the field of labor economics. Commons always was concerned with the application of knowledge. The question behind studying was always, “What do you do about those problems?” He took us out into the world. His students branched out and did all kinds of important things after they left the University!

If you wanted to know where to send your son to get a vigorous contact with the problems of the day, Wisconsin was one of the places to think of first. There was a minimum of mathematics and statistics. Wisconsin labor economists were not mathematical economists, nor am I. Besides labor economics, Wisconsin was known for a number of fields. Labor and Conservation were in the air. The divisions between the fields didn’t make so much difference in those days as they seem to now. You didn’t say to yourself, “I am an economist, that means this is my area, not that specialty.” Van Hise, the geologist, wrote one of the earliest books on conservation. Geologists got interested in the lumber industry, in mining, in conservation generally. You had the feeling that if you studied them, something could be done to meet our problems. We talked about them outside of class. There was no question of “relevance” or “boredom” then.

When I came back from France, I decided that I would give law a serious try. I went to summer school in 1919, taking all law, no economics. I had good professors, but the law didn’t quite grip me. I asked advice of some of my older professor friends. In particular, E.A. Ross, a leading sociologist of his generation, responded. “If you go into law, within a reasonable time you will probably be in one of the best legal firms in the country, perhaps in New York, and by the time you are in your forties, some case will come along on which you will work that will really grip your attention and your faculties and your interests. It will go to the United States Supreme Court. It will be an important case. If you go into economics, from the time you start, you can choose the subjects into which you wish to inquire, do your research, make your studies. You can do that throughout your professional career.” I remember that as the decisive point that clarified the issue in my mind. Right from the start I could work on what I thought was important. Shortly afterward, I came out to California.

In California I could feed my Wisconsin-nourished interests in a fresh field, so in that sense I felt at home in California. Here I could go out into it and study it as I did as a youth in the Middle West. The things I like to do – was encouraged to do – to go out and get the facts of a situation, that eventually I was able to do here in California. For my first four years after my 1922 doctorate, I was up to my neck teaching with no opportunity for research. I wanted to get out into the field, as we were encouraged to do at Wisconsin, to get into situations. But I was needed for teaching and without financial support I couldn’t go into the field. Professor Commons had received Carnegie Foundation support. With $25,000, which was money in those days, he turned out a four-volume unique history of labor in the United States. I wanted to do something comparable on agricultural labor to what Commons had done on industrial labor. I wanted to do it with both historical and contemporary emphasis on the west coast because this agricultural labor situation was so peculiar, so unique. I wanted to start something new but I had no resources to pay salary and costs of field work.
California agriculture is not American agriculture at all in the Northern and Middle Western sense! This is plantation agriculture, more in the Southern than in the Northern tradition. It is a totally different situation from the Middle West and a shock for a middle westerner to learn from it. I’ve been up against it, studying it and trying to change it, all of my life through my agricultural labor and my water studies. This has meant exploring land and water monopolies, and the power structure of California. California agriculture is based upon the monopolization of the large Spanish land grants, not on the homestead land pattern. One way or another, these lands were all gobbled up by a few owners in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. First they grabbed most of the land. Then, when they knew the water would come, they grabbed the rest of the land. Every acre of it that they hadn’t grabbed already! Speculation on a gigantic scale! Since then, they’ve been working to pump the money out of the Treasury to pay the costs of bringing the public’s water to their private land, and so reap the harvest that they’ve been after for a hundred years. This is the corporate takeover of land and water resources. Now they’re working to permanently rivet their power over land and water.4

At Wisconsin, Taylor was encouraged by mentors to pursue a field of economics that in many respects, no longer exists – an economics of people before statistics – which Clark Kerr later described as economic anthropology. Taylor’s methods were as unconventional as his disposition in the field of economics:

My method of field work was just like going into a swimming pool by plunging in. I got myself a rough-riding used Dodge roadster, so that I had a car and I could go down the road and stop at a farmhouse anywhere I wanted. If I saw a group of laborers I could stop, stay as long as I wanted and go on when I wanted. That was the way I did it. I would try to sample officials, teachers, Americans who had contacts with the Mexicans – get all the information I could from them – their wages, migrations, experiences, problems, history.

My method developed by the doing of it. I don’t know any model that I was following. I had no training at all in either anthropological or sociological methods. What I did was choose (for the most part) a variety of locations where Mexican labor was important. That’s why the Imperial Valley interested me. While I was there I studied a good deal about the structure of agriculture, which was a strong contrast to the structure of Middle Western agriculture.

I combined a historical and a contemporary interest. I wanted a cross-section of conditions they encountered in the United States, which explains why I went to places as diverse as Imperial Valley, Colorado, South Texas, Chicago, the Calumet industrial

center, and finally the steel and coke works of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Later I went into Mexico to some of the origins of this migration.  

In California, Taylor found an ideal context to explore what he saw as a significant new direction in the scholarship of his field (one almost completely undocumented in academic literature). Even the topic of agricultural labor was relatively unexamined when Taylor began to research it as a graduate student. Yet, in the context of Western agribusiness, this interest combined with his Midwestern upbringing to open a new research focus – the industrialization of agriculture. Technologies and policies were just being put in place to achieve control of inputs like farm labor, the commodification of natural resources such as water, and the capitalization of the most modern components of the agricultural economy. As a scholar, Taylor confronted California’s power structure at a critical juncture in its evolution. In order to understand this process, he wanted to be in the field and away from campus.

As a politically engaged scholar, Taylor faced numerous barriers among them funding and pressures from within his academic discipline:

Edith Abbott, chairman of the Committee on Scientific Aspects of Human Migration of the newly formed Social Science Research Council wanted contemporary Mexican immigration studied. Since Mexican laborers were employed overwhelmingly in agriculture, her interests merged with mine. The outcome was that I spent three continuous years in the field, not teaching at all, with Social Science Research Council support. I went all over the United States. It led to an invitation from the Guggenheim Foundation to begin a scholarly interchange with Latin-America. I went down into Mexico and studied a community of origin for much emigration. I went there in 1931 and 1932 deep into field research for a total of six months. I got to meet and talk with people on their own ground.

After I was out a couple years, I encountered some criticism from my senior colleagues. One of them said to me, “Now it is time for you to come back to the campus

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and be a professor.” You see, I’d been doing something else that wasn’t being a professor!

My chairman said it to me this way: “Now is it time for you to come back to the center of your field.”

I replied, “What is the center of my field?

He said, “Something like workman’s compensation.” Going out to study Mexican labor wasn’t working in the center of my labor economics field. It didn’t look like the field of “labor economics” to faculty. I researched extensively and was gone from campus teaching too long. I don’t know that there are many who want to do what I did though anthropologists like to get out in the field. People in economics don’t generally feel the urge to do that now. I was peculiar in that respect, partly inheriting the John R. Commons tradition from the University of Wisconsin. I was extravagant in my devotion to research – not moderate.

I also published extensively for a young man. I never heard the phrase “publish or perish” until many years later, but over quite a few years, publishing did not bring a reward to academic advancement. In fact, I was publishing too much. I was putting out one monograph after another. Very quickly I was drawing an inordinate amount of the limited funds assigned by the University to finance publications. Absorbing so much of the publication funds, I became competitive with others on the faculty who had less publications, but wanted access to financial support.

There were other pressures and objections made to my work. University President Campbell blocked me from asking for $1,000 under the Purnell Act, which financed rural sociological research. I probably would have got it. Dean Merrill of the College of Agriculture had told me about the funds and believed we could get them. I suggested studying migratory children with the funds. About a week or two later, he called me over and said, “I’m sorry, we can’t do it. The President won’t allow it.” Due to these pressures, as a young instructor, I thought, “What future have I here? If I were in Wisconsin, I would have academic freedom. Will I have it here?” My salary advances were held up while I was doing those Mexican labor field researches. I hit a salary ceiling and stayed right there, while colleagues who were with or even behind me passed on ahead. I hold the record in economics for being an associate professor for the longest period – nine years. I never felt any pressure to resign though.

I have not been popular down the Valley, you can be sure of that. Pressure came from there too. Clark Kerr told me that when he was Chancellor under Sproul, and wanted to appoint me to the Industrial Relations Institute advisory committee, Sproul said, “Well, they don’t like him very well down in the Valley.

Clark said, “I know it, but I want him anyway,” and I was appointed.

I knew from my Wisconsin days that if I went into this labor field I would encounter opposition. It was part of what I took on by choosing labor economics. Commons was under fire repeatedly. What I wanted to know here at California was, would I be supported with the freedom necessary to do the work. I knew that E.A. Ross was canned from Stanford for some of the things that he said as a sociologist.6

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Perhaps more than political and institutional pressure, it was changes in the field of economics that impacted Taylor’s career. In particular, he was not able to bring up a coterie of younger scholars who would follow and continue his work.

You can see today, my field of labor economics has suffered greatly within the department. When I was there, it had two of us. Now it has one, who is really there part-time. The theoretical and the statistical and the econometrics – those interests pretty much define the prime interests of the department.

Shortly after World War II the University definition of the field of economics altered and changed emphasis. Mathematical requirements for doctoral candidates stiffened markedly. Graduate students interested in farm labor, acreage limitation or land tenure generally found minimum use for mathematically-oriented economic theory. It imposed additional burdens upon these economics candidates. They found greater relevance in a broadened conception of research, one devoted to following the problem in hand wherever it might lead. This implied entering the fields of history, law, political science, anthropology wherever this promised to be useful in throwing light upon the problem under study. The field of economics has narrowed, with greater concern for mathematics and less concern for non-mathematical study of economic and political institutions. Remember that originally our field was called Political Economy. Charles A. Beard once remarked to me that splitting it into political science and economics was a mistake. I concur in that view.

If I were young today, just entering the academic profession, I wouldn’t go into economics. I would go into something else. I would find the place most hospitable to my interests. The opening of opportunity for my interests, under new titles, is the silver lining to the cloud. As we said earlier, people in various fields are beginning to see a necessity for coming together. But I assure you, there are losses while the processes of readjustment are going on.

Earlier, the twenties and the Depression were wonderful times from the point of view of my labor interests. Especially during the Depression, my seminars were always filled. I had many first-rate graduate students. Later I suffered from lack of good students when the new, mathematically oriented regime came into power in the late forties and early fifties. As they began to impose more and more theoretical and mathematical requirements for all candidates for the Ph.D., this cut down on people of the kind who would choose to come to see me.

But in my very closing years, for whatever reason, there was apparently a return of student interest toward my field. In my last year before retirement, I had two very good students who completed doctorates with me on land reform. But during the 1960s, the kind of student who wanted my work was increasingly screened out of economics by the imposition of requirements which my kind of student didn’t want to accept.

I had an opportunity to teach in a field of my real interest. I gave a course in rural sociology in the Department of Agricultural Economics in the College of

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of the University of California. pgs: 100, 110-111. His three volumes of interviews were conducted, edited and printed as part of the Earl Warren Oral History Project.
Agriculture from 1936 to 1962. That opportunity came to me due to the Depression. Carl Alsberg, the director of the Giannini who came from Stanford, said that they needed rural sociology to balance the emphasis on marketing. So he asked me to come over and give rural sociology – the invitation was a blessing to me. I had interesting classes with students drawn from many parts of the University. I did work in fields that overlapped – economics and sociology, economics and history, economics and law, economics and political science, economics and public administration, economics and business administration. The work that I taught is now given to a degree in all those fields, and even in engineering where time and motion studies are given.

I tried in labor economics or whatever I was teaching to have in mind the problems of the day that would seem vital to the students. I would bring to bear everything that I could through history or law. I encouraged my students to take up contemporary questions in their class reports and theses. Some chose to study a particular trade union. Many studied particular strikes, especially agricultural labor strikes where the students went into their history and conduct. There were lots of those in the 1930s. In so doing they learned a great deal about the structure of their society, and the location and exercise of power.

I had some good students. Clark Kerr has had the most distinguished academic career. He became President of the University but was kicked out when Governor Reagan came into power. Then, Arthur M. Ross, a vice president of the University of Michigan, who died just within the last two weeks. Also, Walter Goldschmidt, professor of anthropology at UCLA and author of the famous Arvin-Dinuba study of 1946 comparing the effects on rural society of large-scale and family size farms. With cooperation from the Anthropology Department, and serving as a member of his doctoral committee, I was de facto in charge of and responsible for Goldschmidt’s doctoral dissertation. Goldschmidt was doing social anthropology. He was comparing the structure of two communities in the Valley, one surrounded by large-scale farms, and the other built upon smaller family farms.

The KRON-TV man who came to my office yesterday, looking at my shelves, he said, “Oh, there is that book by Walter Goldschmidt which I just got a hold of; As You Sow.” The man is going down into the Valley, so for his background he got Walter Goldschmidt’s doctoral dissertation published in 1947. If you choose the right subject for research, it has a date but doesn’t die.

One of the most significant partners with Taylor was Dorothea Lange. Their relationship was more than a marriage: it was a collaboration that encompassed their lives. They were vested in similar struggles for human rights and public assistance to the

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dislocated farmworkers. Both were innovators of representational method (whether artistic or academic) and passionately devoted to promoting the public interest.

Taylor described their fieldwork together, the roles and methods they shared and his admiration for his life partner:

In general Dorothea and I would just go up and start talking to laborers and people. Sometimes, after I would ask a series of questions, they would suddenly change and begin to wonder why this fellow was asking all those questions, and they would start to question me. Then I would explain my role. I was either from the University of California or an emissary of the government come out to get from them their conditions at first hand. Those roles covered Dorothea too. Her method was often to just saunter up to the people and look around, and then when she saw something that she wanted to photograph, to quietly take her camera and look at it; if she saw that they objected, she would close it up and not take a photograph. She sometimes waited until they were used to her. Then she would take the photograph, sometimes talking with them. She used to say that she covered herself with a “cloak of invisibility.” It made her feel that she could go up and do things which otherwise seemed to be intruding on their privacy. It gave her a feeling of confidence in working with the camera.

When I was with her, I would often go up to the people and start talking. Out of the corner of my eye I would see that she had got out her camera. I had their attention so I would just keep the talk going. Keeping out of range generally wasn’t a problem. She worked pretty close to them for the most part. If I thought I was interfering I would just sidle out of her way as inconspicuously as possible, talking to them all the while. My purpose was to make it a natural relationship and take their attention, leaving her the maximum freedom to do what she wanted. I am sure that I helped her, but she didn’t need my help.

Our marriage took place on December 6, 1935. There were two divorces, mine and hers. There was cooperation in both respects. Both Maynard, and my first wife, went through the legal processes in Nevada. When Dorothea and I went to Albuquerque in early December, we were married there. On the afternoon of the same day she went out and photographed. And our work went on from then, together.

Dorothea was centered right here, on her family and on her work, on what she was trying to do. Her thoughts were not wandering around somewhere. When she was present, it was that magical presence. She would come down that stairs, and go by there, her presence was simply marvelous. But she didn’t command it, she didn’t demand it. You just felt it. Never “Look at me!” No, no! She was just right in the situation, in the finest sense.

It was marvelous to live with her, morning, noon and night. She was so vital. Never petty, always thoughtful of others. Always thinking ahead. Thoughtful of me, thoughtful of the children – my children, her children – thoughtful of everything. Planning to make things work out right, making them work out right. Nothing was too ordinary or common – shopping for groceries, coming down the walk with her arms filled with the paper sacks of groceries, like the ones that she photographed at the 6th Street
Market. She held one’s attention, one’s thoughts, one’s feelings just almost as a magnet. But never, never did she make you feel, “I am a photographer, I am an artist, I am an extraordinary person.” Never. But she was all of these.8

Lange’s concept of a “cloak of invisibility” was relevant to social science. Linked to her artistic method, the phrase described how she utilized disinterestedness to close the space between her and her subjects. This positional perspective allowed access and trust by accentuating a shared commonality. For a social scientist, such a cloak could be used not only to gain access to research subjects but to address issues of bias and objectivity necessary to validate the production of scientific knowledge. The ideal psychological position of invisibility theoretically opened possibilities for disinterested engagement. In this particular case, Taylor described how this position operated in the field as artistic methodological practice developed over time.

One of the foremost examples of the Lange-Taylor collaboration was An American Exodus, which was one way for them to draw attention to, and lobby support for, Dust Bowl refugees. A hybrid of artistic, journalistic and scholarly forms, it had a practical and political purpose. As a form of art, it visually represented a political message, like Picasso’s Guernica; journalistically, it sought immediacy and access to describe a humanitarian crisis; and as social science, it contextualized an academic deliberation about the sociological and economic effects of agricultural changes occurring in the country. Rather than illustrating and accentuating distance, its black-and-white photographs and simple prose represented an emotional plea, a feeling-rich text. The book aimed to pull the reader in close, teach them about real human subjects and compel them to act.

Dorothea wanted to do *An American Exodus*. You see from her work how she operated in the field, how she documented what she saw, how effective technically and visually the work was. She did not, as some photographers might, have foremost in her mind, “How am I going to make a beautiful photograph that will be shown on a museum wall?” She thought of the immediate, specific purpose, and served that purpose. You can see it in her photographs.

We experimented with different reports. Formal ones with text and photographs to support a program to construct camps went through to my Division chief at the Relief Commission in San Francisco. We also made some informational reports. One series we called, “Reports from the Field.” Its style was to carry a small notation, a paragraph, perhaps a page, in words by me. Opposite the text was a relevant photograph.

We wanted to bring conditions into the offices and to the officials. We got our first two camps started in May or June. The camps were started after Dorothea and I took Lowry Nelson and his wife into the field with us in my station wagon down as far as Yuma, Arizona. Many thousands of Dust Bowl families entered the Imperial Valley and California here. Nelson, from Utah, was regional representative of Rural Rehabilitation in the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA).

The Washington FERA had allocated $20,000 to a project out here but decided not to go ahead. Nelson wired Washington recommending that California FERA be allowed to keep the $20,000 to enable us to start two camps. Washington said OK. Those $20,000 were given in a quick, emergency decision. We were able to start the camps. If Nelson hadn’t nailed down that $20,000, I don’t know if we would have got our camps started. There was unease over the camp program in Washington and grower opposition. The growers feared that if you brought migrants together in government camps, that they would agitate, organize and strike. But they did not want that any more than they want it today. Critics would come to me in my government office and kick about the camps. They didn’t like what I was doing. I got inquiries from everybody, from growers to the American Civil Liberties Union. The one was fearful that the field laborers would organize, and the other was fearful that in the camps they wouldn’t be given the opportunity to organize. There were precedents for state housing but never yet on a federal level. Our proposal for migrant housing turned out to be the first federal public housing in the United States.

When I undertook to prepare my researches, my idea was not just to study the conditions, but to use the studies to get something done. We had to find out first what it made sense to do, and after that how to get it done within the internal bureaucracy of the government. We had to answer the questions the bureaucracy raised as to why it was proper for the Relief Administration to build camps for migrants.9

The purpose was clear: to understand the problem and to impact it, to address and change it, even to solve it. A dimension of the political work was in putting knowledge

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9 Taylor’s first person accounts for this profile are compiled from: Taylor, P. (1973a). *Paul Schuster Taylor: California Social Scientist. Volume I: Education, Field Research and Family*. Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California. pgs: 139, 140-142, 146-147, 217. His three volumes of interviews were conducted, edited and printed as part of the Earl Warren Oral History Project.
to work by strategizing to attain it, to write it and to distribute it. Choosing an audience depended upon the problem; it was not constrained only to other scholars. Taylor’s politically engaged scholarship often resembled community development (another field of expertise for him) or even conflict mediation.

Take, for example, the Taylor’s experience in the 1933 San Joaquin Valley Cotton Strike:

The cotton strike in the early autumn of 1933 was the culmination of a whole succession of summer strikes that followed the harvesting of the crops. It was, and is, the most extensive strike in agriculture in the history of the United States. The picking of cotton was shut down very effectively from one end of the San Joaquin Valley to the other. I was invited to go down into the Valley as an aide to the commission by Monroe Deutsch, Provost of the University. I assume the reasons I was asked to go were (1) that my field was “labor economics,” and (2) that I had recently been studying Mexican labor in agriculture. Also I had visited the strike area only a week or two earlier, after the strike had broken out. I asked if I could take with me my graduate student, Clark Kerr, and the answer was yes.

I instructed Clark to keep close to the strikers and their spokesman, and to report to me on the temper of the strikers at least a couple of times a day; also to form his own estimate of about what terms it would take to settle the strike. The strikers were asking a dollar a hundred pounds for picking; the growers were offering 60¢ a hundred. I stayed close to the commissioners, the hearings, the growers, and the newspapermen at headquarters. That’s the way we continued to divide our work until the end.

I drove Ira Cross home from Visalia in my car, and he asked me en route what I thought it would take to settle the strike. From my own and Clark’s estimates, I replied, “Seventy-five cents a hundred.” The commission, when it reconvened informally in Creel’s office in San Francisco, proposed 75¢ a hundred, and that figure did in fact settle the strike.

There was Communist leadership in the strike. That doesn’t mean the strikers were Communists. But there was a handful of leaders who took charge and were effective in maintaining a unified course of action among the strikers. My use of the word Communist is broad. But I am convinced that the leadership was largely Communist; especially at the higher levels. I have no doubt of that. The first leader, Pat Chambers, I visited in the Visalia jail on an earlier trip into the Valley. I also visited the jailed growers, half a dozen of them, who were charged with manslaughter of strikers at Pixley. After Chambers was jailed, the leadership was taken over by Caroline Decker, an effective speaker before any audience whether among strikers, before a commission, or on the Berkeley campus after the strike. The large growers assisted unwittingly in concentrating the strikers within easy reach of the strike leaders by evicting them from their company camps.
Nobody was hostile to either my presence or to Clark Kerr’s. We were both experienced in talking to people on all social and economic levels. The situation was wide open. The lid was off. I have never known the Valley to be so open. The newspapers gave the fullest documentation to that social situation of any California strike that I know. People in the Valley were just taken aback, almost aghast, wondering what had hit them. The newspapers were the freest in reporting both the growers and the strikers of any time in my experience. That is one reason we wanted to document that particular strike, either orally or in print, as fully and freely as was possible then.

The strike impact was fresh, it was a “first.” It caught everyone by surprise. Unions of farm workers were virtually unknown. Now there’s more organized opposition to unionization. Cesar Chávez faces highly organized opposition today. He has not been able to conduct a strike on anything like the 1933 scale. His operations are more through use of the boycott. He has appealed to people in the markets outside of the producing area, rather than to people and their interests within the area.¹⁰

After this strike, the Associated Farmers was organized in California. Taylor frames their appearance within agricultural labor history.

The Associated Farmers was a natural, if excessive, response from the employers’ side to labor’s feeling that unionization was necessary to protect its interests. This phase had, and to a lesser degree still has, the violent aspects of some of the early efforts of labor to organize in coal mines, the steel industry, and others, where there were serious losses of life. This parallel came along in California’s agricultural setting in a familiar chain of labor history.

In California, farming is in a different position than in the middle western states where land ownership is more widely diffused. Industry and agriculture are blended here in California as they have not been in the Middle West and Northeast, certainly not until recently. Farming, very early, was regarded here as an industry, rather than as a way of life for families on the land. That view has persisted to the present time; currently called agribusiness rather than corporate agriculture.

The Associated Farmers sought to unite the larger agricultural interests with the Chamber of Commerce, which elsewhere represented urban interests. Here, in California, they were blurred; they were blended – the pattern of employment, and the attitudes that go with it, are an industrial pattern. The laborer on the land is not the farmer owning his own land, but the man employed by somebody else to do the work. The division between the landowner and laborer on the land came extremely early in California. That is one reason why the remedies have taken on the aspect of industrial readjustments; for example, unionization of workers met by employer resistance to

¹⁰ Taylor’s first person accounts for this profile are compiled from: Taylor, P. (1973b). *Paul Schuster Taylor - California Social Scientist. Volume II: California Water and Agricultural Labor.* Berkeley: The Regents of the University of California. pgs: 1, 4. His three volumes of interviews were conducted, edited and printed as part of the Earl Warren Oral History Project.
Taylor’s politically engaged scholarship was well suited for the series of national crises in the 1930’s – applied research toward direct problem solving requiring immediate attention.

Scholarship in the Struggle: The Dust Bowl and Great Depression

From his early fieldwork in 1927 at the University of Wisconsin, influenced by mentors like Commons, Taylor’s approach to the field of economics was uniquely influenced by his military experience. The concurrent crises of the Dust Bowl and Depression were contexts where Taylor’s penchant for innovative methods combined with his tolerance of diverse venues to distribute his findings. Two purposes animated his early engagement: to utilize research methods to viscerally connect with readers and usher findings forward quickly to policy makers. Examples of Taylor’s approaches to scholarship in these crises include (1) his focus on farmworker livelihoods and agricultural labor conditions, (2) his use of photography sociologically and (3) Taylor’s collaboration with Clark Kerr to record the 1933 Cotton Strike in the San Joaquin Valley.

Just like a Marine officer, Taylor entered difficult research settings (like those found in the 1930’s or San Joaquin Valley) as if planning a battle strategy – close reconnaissance, prolonged field observation, coordinated efforts, communication up a chain of command, then attack as quickly as possible. A 1934 “emergency” research

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proposal on agricultural labor to the Rockefeller Foundation exemplified his approach.

Taylor suggested:

a series of reconnaissance studies of regions likely to be most affected in the near future seems the most appropriate line of attack. These studies should cover not simply observations as to current or impending disturbances, but so far as possible include relevant information on the region as to labor demand and supply, seasonal mobility, labor relations, racial aspects, attitudes of various elements in the community, etc. Reports based upon field investigation, and frequently sent from the field, should be of conspicuous features of execution of the project. Liaison should be maintained between investigators in different areas, and with administrators in Washington and in the field, to the end that knowledge of field conditions can be mobilized as rapidly as possible for the benefit of permanent officials, temporary mediators, arbitrators, et. al. who may be obliged to deal with particular situations12.

This strategy lays out how to bring findings from fieldwork directly to sources that would be capable of addressing them.

Photographs offered another mechanism to bring the story of destitute Dust Bowl refuges or homeless Southern tenant farmers directly into the imagination of his reader. Pictures told stories with nuance and immediacy – two characteristics critical to bringing his research subjects forward in his text. Once that connection fostered empathy, it could leverage demands for public resource expenditure and appropriate government policy response. Taylor developed methods using photography sociologically (Street 2008), an approach that was strengthened by his marriage and partnership to Lange. In An American Exodus, they describe their work as

neither a book of photographs nor an illustrated book, in the traditional sense. Its particular form is the result of our use of techniques in proportions and relations designed to convey understanding easily, clearly, and vividly. We use the camera as a tool of research. Upon a tripod of

photographs, captions, and text we rest themes evolved out of long
observations in the field . . . .

We show you what is happening in selected regions of limited
area. Something is lost by this method, for it fails to show fully the wide
extent and the many variations of rural changes which we describe. But
we believe that the gain in sharpness of focus reveals better the nature of
the changes themselves (Lange and Taylor 1939: 1-2).

During these years, Taylor’s research and Lange’s photography represented a plea not to
turn aside from the crisis. They wanted to bring forward the humanity of their subjects,
which required a “sharpness of focus” revealed in a forlorn look or migrant mother
breastfeeding a child. Their subjects’ representations inscribed a political project into the
book’s narrative.

Taylor was interested in the present and organizing to change it. His projects had
a palpable urgency. This was illustrated in 1933 when the largest agricultural strike in
the history of the United States occurred in the cotton belt around Corcoran, California.

Taylor instructed Clark Kerr\textsuperscript{13}, his graduate student, to document the event, which was
presented in a book chapter titled “Documentary History of the Strike of the Cotton
recollected:

Paul never gave me but two instructions: (1) to record what people
said in their own words; and (2) to send him my notes as soon as possible.
The reward was that he read these notes carefully and enjoyed them
immensely.

I did not then fully realize to the extent I do now how rare a professor
Paul really was. He has belonged to a very unusual breed of what might
be called economic anthropologists with an interest in labor problems.

Taylor’s research has been associated with institutional economics and John R. Commons
(1934), but Kerr situated his approach with scholars like Carleton Parker, Stanley

\textsuperscript{13} Later, he became chancellor of the University of California, Berkeley then president of the University of
California.
Mathewson and E. Wight Bakke (Kerr 1983: vii). These academics directly connected with the marginalized of the labor force. Parker’s (1920) *The Casual Laborer and other Stories* includes a psychological study of the IWW, while both Mathewson’s (1931) *Restriction of Output among Unorganized Workers* and Bakke’s (1940) *The Unemployed Worker* sought input directly from workers as part of their research designs.

When the Dust Bowl, Great Depression and industrializing agricultural economy devastated the livelihoods of millions of farmers, Taylor sought to engage the problem in the field. His brand of insurgent applied economics was unconventional as it valued implementing solutions as much as understanding problems:

> My method in the field is to observe, then to select. But some of my statistician friends demand numbers. When I tell them in detail what happened to a farm family I saw displaced in the Cotton Belt, they are likely to say, “What’s that to us if you can’t tell how many that has happened to?”

> Perhaps I can’t, and I answer, “By the time you statisticians know the numbers, what I’m trying to tell you about in advance will be history, and you’ll be too late.”

> …My statistician friends seem to love averages, and to be dissatisfied with my description if it doesn’t strike them as “average” for the county, state, or perhaps the nation; if it isn’t average it isn’t typical, and its only the typical that counts.

> Average of what? I ask myself. Typical of what? Aren’t there many averages and many types? And if the average reveals, doesn’t it by the same token conceal? Besides, maybe I’m not interested for the moment in averages. Maybe I’m looking for trends, and don’t want to cancel out the very item where I think I see the “future” foreshadowed by “history,” by averaging it with another where the “future” has not yet struck (Taylor 1983: 233).

Taylor’s stories were applicable to local context, in this case a violent farmworker strike. His work had to evoke sympathy and invite solidarity; otherwise he risked being “too late” to affect the unfolding history of the moment.
Profile of Practice: Confronting Californian Agribusiness

What is the purpose of politically engaged research? Taylor understood that there are some “fundamental political issues” that were difficult for “civic-minded persons” or ordinary citizens to understand and change, particularly with respect to confronting institutions of significant scope or authority. Taylor sought to “play a role” as “an informed citizen.” From that modest position, aiming to be effective, he confronted some of the most powerful political and economic interests in California.

At Wisconsin, we’d always debate some public question, like the Sherman Anti-Trust Act seeking to control monopoly. You see how that same question of monopoly – including the attempt of acreage limitation to control water monopoly – permeates our life today. Look at the enormous growth of the power of corporations. The title of one of the recent books by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, is The Corporation Takeover. People are only mildly aware of what is happening to us, and how the power of corporations permeates our lives.

Corporations perform many valuable services, but they also affect our daily lives in less useful, even damaging, ways. The questionable aspect is the power that goes with corporations and government bureaucracies. Those organizations have enlarging power over economic and political matters. One result is that “civic-minded persons” tend to shy away from the more fundamental political issues, and instead go into good “civic works” that avoid the deeper political questions. In this way they keep out of the way of issues where the pressures are too great. I recall one young man – Richard L. Boke – who was driven out of his post as Regional Director of Reclamation because he was devoted to my position in support of the acreage limitation law and tried to enforce it. In addition before that, Sheridan Downey, the Democratic U.S. Senator, manipulated Congress to the point where he was able to cut Dick Boke off of the federal payroll on the pretext that he was not an engineer. Boke was off the payroll for seven months not knowing whether he would ever get back on. On these issues the boys sometimes play rough. He and others – a stream of them – were driven from their government positions because they supported the basic law. One day Boke asked, “How are you able to keep your position at the University?”

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I was able to keep it because the University of California under President Sproul cushioned and rejected the pressures. Don’t think I haven’t been the object of pressures, most of which never reached me personally; the administration shielded me. Yet, my belief is that the administration has plenty of pressure upon it because of my views and what I had done in harmony with those views. Now that I am retired, I am, if anything, freer than ever. What are they going to do about it if they don’t like what I do? They can’t cut off my retirement pay. I assure you that there are very powerful interests in this state that don’t like me. Since Governor Culbert Olson left office in 1942, I have received no state appointments, as I did before.

I became involved in the water subject in 1943. It has been intermittently in the public interest ever since. It was hot in Congress in the mid-1940s, at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s. Now, it is very hot in the courts. For many years few paid attention to the subject of western reclamation or understood why I studied it so hard and wrote about it professionally. But now people whom I don’t know come to my study door to ask me about the subject. They want to draw upon the knowledge I have gained working on reclamation during the past twenty-five years. In between times, hardly anybody was interested in the subject or came to my door. Over many years my friends who knew of my interest in water and the acreage limitation provisions of reclamation law were satisfied that my position was right because they had confidence in me, but they didn’t really understand what the issue was about or make great effort to find out. Now people coming to my door seek to understand and put to use the information they get. That’s how it is – the subject is hot and everybody wants to know all about it. So people come to me. The rest of the time nobody wants to know and I am left alone. You see what the historical cycles in public interest and apathy can mean to me.

People have asked me – Dorothea used to ask me too: “Are you going to end up writing the history of your defeat on the water issue?” I never was able to answer that question with certainty. All I could say was, “They haven’t defeated me, they’ve nicked me.” I’ve had some “non-victories.” It wouldn’t be an issue in the courts and Congress today if I, with the people who supported me, had not worked at it. It is an issue today because we had enough victories to make it an issue.

Do you want to hear about the ways of getting things done? You see, on the one hand you have the issue as an abstract political issue; on the other hand, is the participant. I have been a participant; I’ve played a role. Some things wouldn’t have happened if I hadn’t happened to be at a certain place at a certain time. Like Dorothea, who happened by “chance,” as the San Francisco News said, to be at Nipomo so she could photograph the “migrant mother.” Was my participation by “chance?” I do not know how many “chances” I missed. But some I did not miss.

How do you take hold of a public issue and get something done about it? There are these two ways of looking at that 160-acre water problem, for example, or the agricultural labor problem. One is to discuss the problem – this aspect of it, that aspect of it. The other way is to play an active role as a person, as a citizen, as a professor. I’ve played a role, seeking to get something done, namely, enforcement of the acreage limitation law. I haven’t been content simply to record what happened, although I have done that, too.

I have learned, as an informed citizen, how to be effective. I have also learned some of the limitations facing a citizen trying to be effective. I’ve run up against the
obstacles, but I think that subject might be an interesting phase which wouldn’t come out if one said only, “The 160-acre limitation, let’s discuss its meaning, how it originated and whether changing times have changed its usefulness.”

You see? Analysis and action, altogether related, are two different things.

In commenting on the effective-citizen aspect of my work, I’d like to begin by dredging up memories of my studies of Mexican immigration. Both questions I have studied most intensively – agricultural labor and water – were public, political issues, and still are. I was not attracted to make my studies of Mexican labor because it was a public issue. After commencing work I soon learned, however, that it was becoming one, and I avoided direct personal participation. At the time I thought participation might make study and analysis more difficult, block sources of information, and possibly interfere with the objectivity of my inquiries. Toward the close I did furnish the Department of State, upon request, my view on the adequacy of farm labor supplies in the Southwest.

As Research Director of the Rural Rehabilitation Division of the State Emergency Relief Administration in 1935, I came closer to politics by recommending a program to establish camps for migrants, but the recommendation was to administrative superiors with power of decision, not to Congress. I learned quickly through experience the importance of public relations to the success of a program, but I did not learn this through direct political participation in the decision-making process.

Taking up the water issue, it was not long before I found myself very aware of, and active in, the political process. Did I get into this position by “accident” or by “chance?” If I had to generalize, I do not know how, at the moment of its occurrence, to surely identify an important event, an important decision, and to distinguish it from what is unimportant. In perspective, the important event or decision may stand out clearly, but important things at the time often don’t appear to be important. It’s afterwards that they can turn out to be enormously important and recognized. I’m not sure I am making myself clear. I’ll be more specific and perhaps my meaning will become plain.

In 1934 I was in Washington D.C. studying self-help cooperatives among the unemployed on a Rockefeller grant. I found my way into the office of Jacob Baker, one of Harry Hopkins’ assistants. It was in the midst of the severe 1934 drought. He said, “I am going out tomorrow to North Dakota. We are fanning out all over the Great Plains, and I am to reconnoiter North Dakota to see what needs to be done. If you will go I’ll put you on as a dollar-a-year man. You won’t get any salary, but I’ll pay your train fare and expenses. So I went to North Dakota. On the train was Arthur Goldschmidt, whose most recent position was United Nations Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, under L.B.J. – ousted, of course, when Nixon came in. In 1934 he was a young fellow, just getting married. We reconnoitered North Dakota together. That was a first step.

A second step came in 1943. Goldschmidt was now head of Power Division in the office of Secretary of the Interior Harold L Ickes. Construction of Central Valley Project had begun and the Bureau of Reclamation was setting up a series of studies of 24 Problems related to the project. They organized committees, or what today we call “task forces.” Most of those would meet in California. Stationed in Washington, Goldschmidt remembered me and said, “You’re out in California. Will you represent me on a half-dozen of these committees, as a part-time consultant!” I said, “Yes, I would.”
One of the Problems, No. 19, was acreage limitation. The question: what to do about the 160-acre law. That is how, by a series of “accidents,” I found myself in the middle of the water issue where I’ve been ever since. I had learned only a year or two before that there was such a thing as an acreage limitation law. That fact had been largely kept in the dark, smothered. Walter Packard, my friend and neighbor, with whom I had served in the Farm Security Administration, told me.

“They should limit the land-owners to water for 160 acres.”

I said, “You meant that is what they ought to do?”

“No,” he said, “that’s the law.”

“Do you mean that that is the law now? That a landowner is not to get water for more than 160?”

He said, “Yes. That is the law now.”

That is how I found out about it. When Arthur Goldschmidt took me on as a consultant I began to talk with people who might properly serve on the study of Problem 19. I was in favor of that law. I watched as attention to the problem began to come to a focus. Soon it became clear that the large land-owning interests opposed to it had adopted a tactic of silence on the issue, in which they were generally joined by the Bureau of Reclamation engineers.

The Bureau of Reclamation administrators found that professionals from the Bureau of Agricultural Economics who were invited to participate in the studies – in fact they were even paid by the Bureau of Reclamation to do it – shared my view. “Why should the water be monopolized by a handful of big land-owners?” We met and we talked about it together, and with others, among them Father Charles Phillips, of Oakland, who had been active earlier in the Depression in encouraging farmers around Santa Rosa to resist foreclosures on their farms. Observing that word of the law’s existence was spreading, its opponents got the Irrigation Districts Association to adopt a resolution asking Congress to exempt the Central Valley from this “unreasonable” law. With that, the issue began coming out into the political open.

I saw this. I didn’t know how fast they would move, but they moved within a few months. Their tactic was to avoid any publicity on the issue that might mobilize supporters of the law. At House of Representatives hearings concerned with the project, they waited until hearings were over then slipped through with no advance warning what is called a “committee amendment” proposing exemption of Central Valley Project from acreage limitation law. So no witnesses likely to oppose exemption were aware that such a proposal was going to be made. The exemption amendment was learned by Bureau officials about 8 o’clock on the morning of the day when it was going to come to the floor in the afternoon. That gave no chance to rally forces to block exemption. The exemption successfully obtained by Congressman Elliott from Kern and Tulare counties, slipped through the House on March 22, 1944, in about 20 minutes. By grapevine I heard that opponents of the law then expected to have their exemption through the Senate within three weeks. Well, they never got it. They didn’t get it because the Senate had to hold public hearings on the bill including the exemption.

Do you want me to tell you what I did, from which I learned something of the importance of citizen participation? The Senate Commerce Subcommittee hearings on HB 3961 were held in May of 1944. I talked with friends who shared my views; some were in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Washington, notably Marion Clawson,
and did their part in spreading word of the importance of the acreage limitation issue. I went to the AFL. I said, “Here is what is proposed; is this what you want?” “Oh, no, that isn’t what we want.” Before that, I had been to the AFL in San Francisco, and had told Secretary C. J. Haggerty the situation. He responded immediately. The labor people in San Francisco told the AFL in Washington that they didn’t want the exemption. So, when I went to the Washington AFL and said, “The hearings are going to be held soon. Do you want that exemption to go through?” The response was immediate: “No, we don’t want it to go through!” So, a representative of the AFL was at the hearings. I went likewise to the separate CIO, to Robert Lamb, an economist whom I had met a few years earlier in Senator LaFollette’s office. So, there was also a CIO spokesman at the hearings. I had met James G. Patton, the president of the Farmer’s Union, when he was in Berkeley. So I went to the Farmer’s Union, and also to the National Grange. The Grange, the National Farmer’s Union, the AFL, were all there to testify against exempting Central Valley from the acreage limitation law. All that was necessary was that they be informed.

It was during the war and I went to veterans’ organizations – Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion. Their representatives testified against an exemption. You see, if irrigated land was to be opened to settlement, they wanted veterans to have opportunity to get land. That was the historic position of the government; veterans had a preference. So they wanted no exemption. Church organizations, too, were alerted. I didn’t do all this informing in Washington. Some I did during the preceding weeks and months in California after I learned about the acreage limitation issue. It was like punching a button. The technique of participation was simple. I wanted to speak to somebody, I knew what his attitude was, and I would say, “Is this what you want? Do you want them to exempt that project from the 160-acre law?” The response was, “No.” “All right, be there at the hearings.” They went. Of course, I was not the only person who alerted opponents of exemption.

The California Grange Master, George Sehlmeyer, moved because one local grange, the Farmersville Grange, down in the Valley, passed a resolution to support the acreage limitation. Robert W. Pontius, with Farm Security Administration experience, pushed the right button down there, and as a result of that Sehlmeyer took his strong stand for acreage limitation, and the National Grange testified. It was during the war, and the National Grange representative asked the Senate Committee, “Who ever heard of a man shouldering his musket for his boarding house?” He’d shoulder his musket for his farm, but not for his boarding house. That was his idea. You punch the right button and (snap!) like that comes the response. Legislative representatives of national organizations didn’t know about the acreage limitation issue in Congress until they were told about it. But as soon as they were told, they acted. So the Senate Commerce Subcommittee killed the exemption, and passed the Rivers and Harbors bill without it.

Democratic Senator Sheridan Downey undertook to do in the Senate what Congressman Elliott had done in the House, notwithstanding that the exemption had been struck from the Senate bill. Still thinking he could win an exemption, he obtained authority under S. Res. 295 to hold hearings in California in July. But these largely blew up in his face. Witnesses favoring exemption spoke, but the surprise was the number of California witnesses who opposed exemption. Many people participated then. It was far beyond the early phase when two or three of us were the informed key people getting it
started. It just fanned out and was picked up by many others, and they just snowed Downey under at those hearings!

What I'm telling you is that action came because of what somebody did. For my own part, I can feel the heat of the Washington pavement yet. There is a place that when I go back there I still remember that building and how hot it was that day. But that's the way you get things done! The net result, as I mentioned, was that the Senate Commerce Subcommittee rejected the exempting clause in the Rivers and Harbors bill, and the Senate did the same. But interests favoring the exempting clause were strong enough to have it restored in conference. So the fate of the exemption was tied to the fate of the entire bill filled with flood control and harbor appropriations for many places throughout the United States. The issue had reached its critical point – all appropriations and exemption, or no appropriations. LaFollette then forced Downey to back down. 15

The Central Valley Project was poised to place dams in the Sierra Nevada and canals on the valley floor, yet the farmland that would receive the water was consolidated into large landholdings. Since an acreage limitation and residency were required under reclamation law, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics needed to determine if the law would be applied to the project. If so, the law promised to break up the region’s monopolized land ownership pattern and undermine some of the most powerful interests in California. The subsequent Bureau of Agricultural Economics study – Goldschmidt’s Arvin-Dinuba comparison – was one of the most renowned and controversial studies of its era. Taylor was at the crux of its conceptualization and mentored Walter Goldschmidt, the young anthropologist conducted the study in the early 1940’s.

I had nothing, directly, officially, to do with the Arvin-Dinuba study. Of course, I was deeply involved in the water fight over the acreage limitation. Marion Clawson of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and Walter Goldschmidt of his staff were concerned with it and they talked with me about it. They looked over the field and I looked over the field. They chose Arvin and Dinuba. I recommended they choose Firebaugh or Mendota on the west side, rather than Arvin. Their objection I think mainly was that Mendota or Firebaugh might be criticized as too extreme as examples of big farming, which meant that it would show the contrast with a community dependent on smaller farms even more sharply than Arvin. I still believe that. But for whatever reasons they didn’t want to take such an extreme contrast as I thought would be good.

The contrast between Dinuba and Arvin, nevertheless, was sufficiently extreme to reveal the issue.

Walter Goldschmidt carried out the study. At the time of the study he was employed by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. His doctoral dissertation, which he wrote under me, grew out of this study. He took his degree in anthropology, but I was a member of his committee. Professor Robert H. Lowie, his chairman, asked me to take charge of the thesis because I had more familiarity with the general conditions of rural California than he did. His thesis was an outgrowth of the Arvin-Dinuba study, and is called “As You Sow.” Most people know that what follows in the Bible is “so ye shall reap.”

The study was attacked bitterly while it was in process. Alfred J. Elliott attacked it on the ground (among other things) that they were asking crazy, irrelevant questions. The study was started in wartime and was also attacked as a waste of gas and rubber. Sheridan Downey attacked it in his book, They Would Rule the Valley. Senator Paul Douglas told me that one day he said to Senator Downey, “Sheridan, who would rule the Valley?” and Downey answered, “Yes, that’s the question.” A perfectly true answer if you knew what was behind it – the public through government or the big landowners. Downey objected to the New Deal officials who had New Deal conceptions of a good society, and favored the giant landholding interests.

In 1946 Mary Montgomery and Marion Clawson came out with their History of Legislation and Policy Formation of the Central Valley Project Studies. It was produced in multilith form by the BAE, but never reached print. Not long after that the personnel of the regional office of the BAE began to shrink. I have no documentation for what I am about to say. I have not heard it from anybody inside the BAE. But I remember thinking at the time, and I continue to think now, that there were pressures upon Washington to keep these BAE people out of regional political issues. It was too hot and the pressures too great. I believe there were changes in personnel in the Department of Agriculture in the higher echelons unsympathetic to the position on acreage limitation taken by Clawson and the other members of his staff. They were under the influence of the large landowners and the regional offices were shrunk – it got into hot political questions. They were doing an excellent service in getting into those questions, in my opinion.16

Goldschmidt’s findings were a warning about the effects of economic consolidation on community life and democratic governance. Later tendencies of political pressure on scientific research, alluded to by Taylor, became characteristic treatment of valley scholarship that challenged Californian agribusiness.

The historical precedents and legal points of the 1902 Reclamation law required that any acreage above 160 acres must be sold after ten years if the landowner was receiving federal water through a project constructed under this mandate. Many of the dams, aqueducts and canals in the western United States, including those in the California’s Central Valley, were built under these regulations. Taylor fought to get the law “enforced” by the federal government. The trend of nonenforcement had foreboding consequences. If a government cannot implement its own laws, or does not have the political power to do so, then its authority is corrupted and may continue to be abused.

As Taylor began to examine these problems, he identified and experienced political pressure and his questions turned toward understanding the “power structure” of California. He considered whether the law was within the people’s control.

A heavy price is paid both within the academic world and outside because instead of emphasizing foresight to avoid problems, we wait until the problems hit us in the face and then try to figure out what to do. I don’t know whether we’ll ever make it or whether they are going to rivet on us this monopoly of land perpetuated with a monopoly of water. It is going to be very bad if that program goes clear through to the end.

If we were discussing the water situation – reclamation – I would read to you right now what Theodore Roosevelt said in 1911 before the Commonwealth Club. He warned the “very wealthy men” he was addressing of the “ruin that they would bring upon themselves” if they pursued on exactly the course they are pursuing today.

The land monopolists have controlled the enforcement of reclamation law and torn the law to ribbons. What bothers them is that controls over speculation and monopoly still are the law. They haven’t been able to wipe them off the statute books yet; so they know they are in an uncertain, perhaps even precarious position violating the law. They know it but they keep the knowledge from spreading widely to the public.

I’ve exposed this in writing. The law journals are full of my articles on it. The Bay Guardian prints it – 30,000 circulation, an underground sheet, they call it. I fill the congressional hearings, year after year, with my testimony exposing and documenting what they are doing. But nothing happened. What I say is buried in print. That is my frustration.

By administrative ruling, the excess landowner is obliged to sell the excess within ten years, and if he doesn’t do that, then the Secretary of the Interior can sell them. That was the story of the DiGiorgio divestiture. They signed contracts in ’52 and they did not sell by ’62. So then the secretary of the interior undertook to pressure them into selling. It was a grand mess. Although the law says the sale price is to be the pre-project price of
the Bureau of Reclamation approved a sale price so high it was above current market value. DiGiorgio couldn’t get anybody to buy at that price.

The law goes unenforced. The residency requirement has been unenforced for fifty-five years. A visiting federal district judge from Montana, sitting in San Diego, said, “You cannot invalidate a valid law by administrative inaction. Residency does apply.” But where have the administrators been all this time? They allowed DiGiorgio to sell 160 excess acres to a shipping magnate and his wife living in San Francisco – legally ineligible by reason of residence to buy it. This law is torn to shreds by its administrators. The public doesn’t know what’s being done. They don’t understand its full meaning and the repercussions from nonenforcement. It’s easy to fool the public. You can manipulate people quite easily if you set your brain to it and if you have control of the media.

It’s hard to make the average person understand what the issue has to do with him. It’s so fundamental to the society in which he lives, yet it’s hard to tell a Californian who runs California, and what giant landholdings have to do with it. As a Californian walks down the street and breathes the fresh air (when it’s fresh) the question doesn’t occur to him. He takes it all for granted without examining it. He doesn’t understand the power structure that’s been built up, nor on what it rests. Just try to tell even a University colleague that the drive to escape acreage limitation by creating the costly State Water Project is a big factor behind the cutting of the education budget, and a factor in imposing student tuition. They shed it off like water off a duck’s back. With most of them there’s no use talking. Just try to tell the students why they’re socked two hundred dollars a quarter in tuition.

Today California is increasingly urbanized, and the urban-raised generation thinks the family farm belongs to history, that efforts to save or revive it are “fuddy-duddy.” Down in the Valley, family farmers still don’t think the family farm is dead, although they know it is under heavy pressure. But the city people fall for the argument that a farm has got to be bigger and more efficient. They swallow that propaganda. Today, you’ve got to punch different buttons than in the forties. Although with some persons the “family farm” slogan still works, it doesn’t work with most citified liberals who don’t know what a farm is anyway.

Now the buttons that you punch are called “conservation,” “environment,” “stop the urban sprawl,” “preserve open space.” Then you go to the educators and you say, “Under Abraham Lincoln you had land grants for education. How about water grants for education?” Educators rise to it and approve, but educators are not action people. Labor has been consistent in its support for acreage limitation all through. Their battle against land monopoly in California dates from the 1870’s.17

Taylor pursued this reasoning further – he began to lobby a coalition and implement a concept of “water grants for education.” His idea was written into a bill in the House of Representatives:

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Long ago, Senator Paul Douglas told me that we wouldn’t really get effective enforcement of the acreage limitation until the government bought the land. He also spoke of the land grants for education. After a long while working the idea over, I got draftsmen to help on the bill. Then I brought people together from the fields of education, conservation, open space planning and labor to support it. The bill, HR 5236, was introduced in Congress through the combined personal efforts of representatives of the Sierra Club, the AFL-CIO, and the National Farmers Union.

The law says that the excess landowners are obliged to sell the excess at the pre-water price. Some people think that the government will have to provide millions of dollars to buy the land. I prefer to put it another way: If the government really followed the law, it could add millions upon millions of dollars to the United States treasury. We’d bail out the treasury from a lot of its indebtedness and we’d make possible public planning and we’d finance public education in the land grant tradition. The windfall profits, or what Henry George called the “unearned increment” would go into the United States treasury instead of into the pockets of large private landowners. We’re giving away the water now, not only for nothing, because it also costs to store and to move the water to private lands. Of course, the excess landowners’ spokesmen tell it just the opposite, they say we want to take their lands away from them. They avoid talk about the subsidy or about the taking of the public water for private lands.

The government could either rent or sell, and receive those funds for the national treasury. I personally think it would be highly advantageous to lease the lands in the manner of present leasing of grazing land. Of course, there would be continuing pressure on the part of the renters to keep the rental prices down, as they have done with the grazing lands, but there would also be balancing pressures of benefiting education to keep the rentals up to something approximately market value. So Congress should have no trouble at all seeing the advantage to the public of government purchase of the excess lands if the condition of the public treasury represents the true public interest of the government in this. It would mean money in the treasury – a lot of it. But that isn’t the interest of people who want money in their own pockets and see the treasury is a good source out of which to get it.

Western landed interests have put their spokesmen onto the Interior committees. They want the water and the money. They load the Interior committees with spokesmen for the hopeful recipients of the largesse from the national treasury. These spokesmen then have control of what goes through the committees, and what hearings are held by the committee, and also what hearings are not held, or not printed if held. The political reality obliges persons of my persuasion or sympathetic interests to get our publicity otherwise than through the Interior committees.

Now, I can’t tell you just how it will come out, but I’ve given you something on the episode in the long struggle. Government purchase of excess lands is the guts of bills in Congress today. What government purchase means is this: the government buys the excess lands above 160 acres per owner at the pre-water price prescribed as the sale price in present law.18

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In defense of reclamation law, Taylor produced numerous law review articles that he published in some of the most prestigious journals in the country. As prophesied early in his career by E.A. Ross, Taylor did “argue” an important case before the Supreme Court, only he did it as a legal scholar rather than as a litigating advocate.

I wrote a series of articles in law journals. They fine-tooth-combed the subject of land and water issues. They were done on my own time, researching my field in the University tradition. I was playing the game according to the rules.

I knew all the time that the motivation was – and is – great private economic interest. They would just write the law the way they want to. If you have the interest and the power you get the law written the way you want it to be written. It conforms to the long history of the disposal of the public lands in this country. The record is not a good one; it’s a very bad one. It’s a very bad one right here in California, and the tactic was first to grab the water, then the money to get the water to the land.

I wanted to zero in for those law journal articles. Instead of a scatter gun I wanted to hit a bull’s eye. Then I stopped writing for the law journals and began to write for American West and Bay Guardian. Law journal articles are excellent vehicles for a certain type of work. The style is to document to a gnat’s eyebrow what you want to document. From that solid base you can build in whatever direction you choose when action is what you want. Law journal articles themselves don’t do the active job, but they provide the foundation and they make a lot of trouble for officials who sometimes when they’re called to account to meet what you say.

I was well rewarded for the Yale Journal article – particularly well rewarded – the United States Supreme Court cited it. Then, last November 23, in the favorable decision in the San Diego federal court on the Imperial Valley, Judge Murray cited it in that decision too. So I’ve had commendation at the very top in ’58, and now again in ’71, at the very bottom of the federal judiciary hierarchy. That’s a reward, both of them good decisions.

I had to conform to lawyer’s standards. At the University of Wisconsin I went half way through law school, so I had the grounding in legal thinking. You document everything you say, right back to the source. After 1965, I felt that I wasn’t tactically getting anywhere further writing law journal articles. Though I still write for law journals when I think there may be a practical result from it and may serve as a foundation supporting my side of the law in the courts.19

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Taylor’s law review articles lay out the foundation for the defense of acreage limitation, often referred to by him as the “excess land law,” under reclamation law. His scholarship was embedded with longstanding narratives of American democracy including Jefferson’s agrarian ideal, legislative precedents like the Homestead Act under Lincoln’s presidency, and the 1902 Reclamation Act under Theodore Roosevelt. The history held lessons that Taylor was teaching. Again and again, returning to favorite quotes and restating arguments, he emphasized and constructed a logic for policy makers, legislators and members of the judiciary to follow. His research also provides an introductory framework to the struggles over social science in the region.

Scholarship in the Struggle: Cornell Collaboration – Paul W. Gates

Defending the reclamation law was Taylor’s last devotion. His scholarship of the “excess land law” was dense; in his words, he “fine-tooth-combed the subject” through numerous quotes and detailed citation. The articles had historical breadth to contextualize arguments within longstanding traditions of the United States. In this section, I will begin with Paul Wallace Gates, a Cornell scholar who worked with Taylor for decades on issues of national land policy. I use Gate’s prefatory introduction and a series of shared letters to introduce the duration and issues of the struggle. The Gates-Taylor relationship (fruitful through decades of political engagement in defense of reclamation law in the West) also began an institutional dialogue between Cornell and the University of California on California’s Central Valley. Next, Taylor’s legal articles emphasize narratives Gates accentuated and deployed during his most prominent
campaign in defense of the excess land law and resistance to economic monopoly and political manipulation.

Paul Wallace Gates, like Taylor, was a renowned scholar of American land policy and history. His scholarship of the San Joaquin Valley (Gates 1942, 1991) was part of a broader research agenda focused on American land policy. Taylor used an Introduction by Gates a number of times, including two of his oral history books (Taylor 1973b, 1973c) and later in the compilation of his legal articles (Taylor 1979). Gates’ piece framed the scope of Taylor’s scholarship and its historical significance:

I have known Paul Taylor through an irregular correspondence and a number of exciting meetings with him during the last twenty-four years, in which he had needled me to be more active in urging colleagues, associates and members of Congress to take a stand in behalf of the enforcement of the excess lands provision of the reclamation laws of the United States and alerted me to the corrupting influence of the utility, banking, real estate and water interests in California. But more, I have come to know the depth of his humanitarian feelings, his concern for the health of minorities and the underprivileged.

The classic treatment of the devastating effects on workers in the southern cotton fields of the Great Depression of the thirties that led to the swift elimination of sharecroppers and their desperate search for homes and jobs was presented in pictures and simple prose by Dorothea Lange and Paul Taylor in 1939 in An American Exodus: A Record of Human Erosion in the Thirties. Rarely have photographs and simple words so admirably documented a tragic story. It was the culmination of work he had done on migratory labor and problems related to minority groups that had been published between 1928-1934. His Mexican Labor in the United States, which has been called by a recent authority “an invaluable storehouse of information on … Mexican migrant labor,” and his An American Frontier: Nueces County, Texas that led to his being called upon for surveys and studies by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Social Security Board, the famous LaFollette committee investigating Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, the latter with special reference to California, and by the equally well known and much quoted Temporary National Economic Committee Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power.

Paul Taylor’s ability to get to the heart of a question, to marshal the facts, and to draw conclusions clearly based on the most careful and detailed examination made him a most valuable public servant, very
different from the conventional picture of the scholar removed from public issues and isolated in his ivory tower. The extent of his investigations is truly amazing. They carried him to Cuba, Haiti, India, Pakistan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Egypt, Iran, Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Jamaica and Columbia, where he surveyed the impact of land, water and population problems on peoples of these developing countries. Not only was he rendering valuable services to these countries but he must have been enriching his teaching by sharing with his students at Berkeley many of his experiences.

Paul Taylor’s testimony frequently given before congressional committees and his many contacts with people in related fields of endeavor made him a well-known and highly respected scholar and one not at all hesitant to advance his views even though they might not be favorably regarded by powerful interests in California. The tenacity with which he pursued his independent course, the courage he displayed, and the fervor of his convictions have been constantly demonstrated and deeply admired.

Along the way Paul Taylor became deeply disturbed by the efforts of large land and water owners in California, as well as in other western states, to prevent the enforcement of the 160-acre excess land limitation in the Federal reclamation laws. Where farmers’ organizations like the Grange had stood strongly for the single family farm, owner operated, and had believed with Liberty Hyde Bailey that agriculture was a way of life, some, like the American Farm Bureau, were to line up with the reactionary forces fighting the battle of the great landowners against those favoring improvement in the lot of migratory workers. More immediately, they opposed the implementation of the excess lands provision and sought in every possible way to assure Federally provided water of the Central Valley Project should be available to owners of thousands of acres of rich land; thus giving them a rich gratuity at government expense and making a mockery of the principal of small family farms. With business interests – land, utility, banking and transportation – lined up with the Farm Bureau and with leaders of both major parties abjectly following or afraid to give public support to the enforcement of the excess lands provision, there seemed at times little possibility of the advocates of the family farm making government obey the law. But Paul Taylor was not one to take this nullification of Federal law for the benefit of a small group of great landowners and corporations.

In 1949 his “Central Valley Project: Water and Land” was published in The Western Political Quarterly, in which he reviewed the history of irrigation in California and the West, showed how the Army Engineers had horned in on federal irrigation development in California to the advantage of large land owners and described other efforts in Congress to break down the fundamental objective of the reclamation legislation. He followed this up with a second article in the same journal in 1950, in which he showed the various ways administrators within the Department
of the Interior and the Bureau of Reclamation were permitting the breakdown of enforcement of the excess lands provision. Then followed closely reasoned articles primarily in western law journals with meaningful titles that illustrate well the struggle he and others working with and through him were carrying on in behalf of the enforcement of the law:

“Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy”
“Destruction of Federal Reclamation Policy? The Ivanhoe Case”
“Excess Land Law on the Kern”
“The Excess Land Law: Legislative Erosion of Public Policy”
“The Excess Land Law: Pressure vs. Principle”
“Excess Land Law: Secretary’s Decision? A Study in Administration of Federal-State Regulations”
“Excess Land Law: Calculated Circumvention”
“Water, Land, and Environment, Imperial Valley: Law Caught in the Winds of Politics”

These essays reveal penetrating insight into complex legal and engineering problems and clearly show how powerful economic interests have succeeded in subverting and to a very considerable degree setting aside a carefully drafted policy that is still prescribed in the statute books. As an example of how well Paul Taylor succeeded in setting forth his analysis, the United States Supreme Court cited “Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy” in its landmark 8-0 decision upholding the validity of the 160-acre limitation law (Ivanhoe vs McCracken, 1958).

Meantime, Paul Taylor was working with representatives of organizations that believed that farming is something more than inputs and production: the Grange, the AFL-CIO, Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Catholic Rural Life Conference. These and other church groups tried to exert pressure on Congress, on the state legislature and on the news media in behalf of the enforcement of the excess lands provision. Time after time Paul Taylor marshaled support before Senate and House Committees and himself testified in detail about the breakdown of enforcement. His trenchant writings and his testimony laid bare the illegalities that had been permitted, but by the sixties he was fighting an enormously powerful combination of economic interests who were benefiting from the “Calculated Circumvention.”

It is still too early to judge how far these economic interests may carry their circumvention of the law and how effective the delaying and preventative actions resulting from Paul Taylor’s work have been. He has set an example for scholars to have the courage of their convictions, to delve deeply into major social and economic questions of their times, to present the facts, no matter how unpopular this may make them with self serving politicians who play the game of greedy economic interests attempting to monopolize natural resources made valuable and available at public expense.
Beginning in the 1940’s, over years of correspondence, a series of letters between Gates and Taylor illustrated their collaboration. They were later compiled by Taylor in Berkeley’s archive.20 The first letter from Gates to Taylor was dated August 15, 1949.

Their relationship appeared more formal in this early correspondence:

Dear Professor Taylor,

Thank you very much for sending me your article on “Central Valley Project: Water and Land”. I have been very much interested in this Central Valley Project since I was in the old Land Policy Section of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and have read everything which has come my way on it. Your article presents the project in a clearer and better balanced way than anything, I believe, I have seen on it. It is distinctly worthwhile and should be very useful in strengthening those elements that hope to assure the widest possible use of the land which will be watered by the Project.

Cordially yours,
Paul W. Gates

A later letter from Taylor to Gates dated March 14, 1960 has Taylor’s characteristic martial analogies and tone. Taylor also taps another theme – the cyclical nature of historical struggle – into which he places their scholarship and educational organizing efforts:

Dear Paul Gates,

The history with which you deal comes to life again, periodically, as you know. The sowing of the harvest of political battles of today was in the period and happenings that you studied long ago. The latest battle is on right now. Any day, H.R. 7155, a bill authorizing the San Luis Project, California, will reach the floor of the House. The battle will not be over the project itself, but over the attempt to exempt a so-called “State service area” from the excess lands law; i.e. to permit California to become an exception from federal reclamation law in this respect. Section 7 proposes the exemption.

The Senate killed the exemption in May, 1959, after four days of debate (May 5,7,11,12). Nevertheless, the pressure from large landholding interests is so strong that the House bill retains the exemption that the Senate refused to grant.

The House of Representatives Report 399 (on H.R.7155) drew a division within the Committee. Congressman Al Ullman of Oregon, a member of the Committee, is leading a fight when the bill reaches the floor, to remove section 7.

If you are willing to wield your pen again in this battle, I hope you will want to write to one or more members of the House, including perhaps Speaker Sam Rayburn, telling him why this exemption should not be granted to California.

The California delegation is divided; my own Congressman, Hon. Jeffrey Cohelan, is doing fine work to kill the exemption. The California Labor Federation is working very hard to preserve federal law. And so are many others.

Best personal regards to you and Mrs. Gates.

Sincerely yours,
Paul S. Taylor

P.S. Am sure you received August 1959 California Law Review in which I told the story of San Luis, and more.

The San Luis Project that Taylor refers to includes the Westlands Water District and the western side of the San Joaquin Valley – a focal point of later politically engaged scholarship. The letter illustrated that Taylor and Gates lobbied the highest levels of government, yet they were positioned above the fray, as distant allies providing information promoting the democratic cause.

A short note, nine months later, from Gates to Taylor dated December 1, 1960 responds to one of Taylor’s requests to lobby politicians:

Dear Paul,

I have fired off a letter to the Attorney General, copy of which is enclosed. More power to you in your fight. You have a marvelous grasp of the problems involved in the effort to make ineffective the excess land limitation.

Cordially,
Paul W. Gates.
A decade later, another letter from Gates to Taylor dated June 25, 1970 showed that Taylor was also lobbying within Cornell and the University of California and not just the federal government. The request below references the “water grants for education” concept that Taylor was pushing Congress to pass:

Dear Paul,

[Skipped first paragraph re: slavery and southern agriculture]

It was quite impossible for me to do anything about getting a faculty stand in support of the University of California resolution in behalf of government purchase of excess lands for the benefit of public education. Frankly, Cornell has a very conservative faculty, many of the members of which are more attuned to the views of Senators Murphy and Tower and I could get nowhere in persuading them to support anything liberal. In fact, I could do nothing on the matter with my own department.

[Skipped last paragraph]

Cordially,
Paul W. Gates

A letter from Gates to Taylor dated January 27, 1972 illustrated how deeply involved Gates was in the politics of the valley. Similar to Taylor, he was boring down into the regional and state power structure:

Dear Paul,

Teaching at the University of Kansas this year has been a delightful experience but with one major handicap. I did not bring with me notes that I need for some writing. Currently I am finishing an article showing how the Kern County Land Company and the Tejon Ranch Company acquired their land through the use of dummy entrymen with Desert Land and Homestead entries, the use of rare forms of scrip and soldiers additional homestead rights that could be entered on unsurveyed lands and other features.

I want to link this up with tables I have seen showing other large land ownerships in California but I do not have those tables here. If you can put your hand on them without too much trouble I should like to have them. I have just been through the CR figures on Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation payments and wish I had information as to the ownership of land by those drawing the highest payments.

How much land does J.G. Bosworth [Boswell] have, whose payments were $4,091,818 in 1968. Also what is the Rancho San Antonio in Fresno County which received $2,863,668 in the same year. These and
many other payees of Kern, Fresno, Tulare and Imperial counties intrigue me.

I hope you had an opportunity to appear before Adlai Stevenson’s Subcommittee when it held hearings in California.

Sincerely,
Paul W. Gates

A March 10, 1973 letter from Gates to Taylor evoked Cornell’s Liberty Hyde Bailey and the Country Life Commission as historical precedents to the political effort that both men were engaged in:

Dear Paul,

I have the greatest respect for you and your fight against the elimination by interpretation or repeal of the 160 acre limitation in the reclamation law, as well as for many other things you have done in your long career. Your testimony before the National Water Commission is beautifully done and should be widely read.

Harry Hogan sent me a copy of his “Acreage Limitation” some parts of which I like, particularly where he advocates ending the subsidy or subsidies in reclamation farming and making the beneficiaries pay the cost, that is the full cost of the water they use, but when it comes to the acreage limitation and his argument that we should get away from the myth of the family farm I draw the line strongly. I am trying to get one of our rural sociologists to bring out a new edition of the report of the Country Life Commission presented to TR thinking it might revive interest in Liberty Hyde Bailey’s ideas of family farms.

There are so many phases of public land history that are still unexplored, particularly those that might show in greater detail the major beneficiaries of public policy. One of the proposals I shall make is that looking to a detailed investigation of the transfer of the semi-arid lands before and after 1902. I cannot understand why western students are not attracted to such questions.

We had a great time with Ralph Nadar on the Cornell campus the other evening. The largest hall in town was jammed. Unfortunately, the people who need most to hear him, faculty, students and townspeople, were not there.

Cordially,
Paul W. Gates

Academic institutional tensions, particularly with agricultural economists, were illustrated in a letter from Gates to Taylor dated November 1, 1977:

Dear Paul,
In reading Jim Shidler’s review of the Conrat’s AMERICAN FARM I was amused that he says “The authors accept the Paul W. Gates and Paul S. Taylor view that ‘wealthy investors and speculators’ have plagued the yeoman farmer…” Anyone who has done any research in the literature of farmers in the West, whether in their journals, newspapers, manuscripts, etc. ought to know that farmers did realize that the capitalist who intruded between them and the government in the acquisition of land was doing them no favor. Jim Shideler has done some very good work as Editor of AGRICULTURAL HISTORY but he has been corrupted by his associations with the agricultural economists at Davis who, like those at Cornell, are only interested in the benefits that large scale efficiency is supposed to produce. As Mary Young says in her excellent review of Swierenga’s PIONEERS AND PROFITS, she remained “puzzled as was Henry George about how making land more expensive to those who use it constitutes a contribution to economic development.” In any case I am proud to be linked in this way with you.

[Continued]

Cordially,
Paul W. Gates

The last point, referencing Henry George, engaged a central issue for scholarship in the valley – the economic issues that confronted farmers opened questions of what natural resources should be allowed in speculative commodity markets. What if the short-term value of the farmland was of such high value that it developed into housing for example. The society would then lose a critically important long-term resource for short-term personal enrichment.

The fight over the excess land law drew to a close in the late 70’s and early 80’s. The Supreme Court, yet again, upheld the law and noted its non-enforcement. This precipitated a final push to overturn the most onerous aspects of the law for large landowners and corporate agriculture. Taylor’s letter to Gates, dated “April Fool’s Day, 1979,” assessed grower “tactics” in that struggle:

Dear Paul,

To bring you up to date on one recent item in a field in which you have devoted years to bring us all up to date –
Our victories in the judiciary which has decided that Tulare Lake – Kings – Kern area and Imperial Valley are in violation of reclamation law, has triggered a run to Congress by large landowning interests to gut acreage limitation and residency requirements.

The tactics are (1) raise the acreage limitation to, say 1280 acres, (2) abolish acreage limitation and residency, and/or/exempt Imperial and Tulare and wherever else,

Senator Frank Church of Idaho chaired hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy and Natural Resources on March 22nd. I understand that opponents of reclamation law piled in, and only National Land for People testified on the side of the law, in person . . . Ben Yellen sent in a statement for the record, emphasizing Imperial Valley. I also sent a statement requesting that it be printed. (It has been suggested to me by informed sources that the large landowners may have overdone their presentation.)

Included in my statement is the draft of an article entitled “Water Policy and Law: Whirligig on the Colorado River in Southern California.” Its focus is nonenforcement of law in Imperial Valley, all served with water from the Boulder Canyon Project.

[Continues regarding articles and book publishing]

Sincerely,
Paul S. Taylor

A week later, on April 7, 1979, Gates writes:

Dear Paul,

The National Land for People, especially George Ballis has been after me to write in opposition to efforts to ease the excess lands provision but I did not have sufficient information to do so until your letter came. I have written both N.Y. senators and at the same time have asked them to provide me with some documents I need. Javits will probably oppose, if he is sufficiently alerted but I am not so sure of Moynihan.

[Continued on local issues, book publishing]

It has been a great pleasure to me to have relations with you. I cherish my correspondence with you and was happy to have an opportunity to write a bit about you. You are one of the great figures of academic life. I hope this finds you in the best of health.

Cordially,
Paul W. Gates

The final letter I have included was from Taylor to Gates dated June 5, 1979. After his earlier, prestigious legal article, published in the Yale Law Review and cited in a unanimous Supreme Court decision, Taylor commented on his last article submitted to
the California Western Law Review rejected over preference for a student’s paper. The
fight in defense of acreage limitation was all but exhausted:

Dear Paul:

Any word indicating the expected time of issuance of my reprinted writings in the book?

As I think you know, Senator Frank Church held Senate Natural Resources and Energy hearings on March 22. Apparently all the witnesses except one wanted to remove the acreage limitation and residency law. The last witness allowed to speak was George Ballis of National Land for People.

I have not heard whether the hearings have been reprinted, but believe they have not. I submitted a statement, including a paper on Imperial, Coachella, and Orange County receivers of Colorado River water. It was prepared on invitation of the California Western Law Review and submitted. With compliments on my documentation and writing it was not printed by the Review, on the ground that a student’s paper on related subjects deserved priority because she was a student. It happened that among the Patrons of the Review was the law firm counseling the Imperial Valley Irrigation District and the student’s paper recommended turning the issue over to Congress.

I am informed that my statement will be made part of the record of the hearing. The message did not say whether it will be printed.

And so it goes. Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Paul S. Taylor

Taylor utilized law review articles as a primary tactic in the fight to defend reclamation law. Beginning with publication in the most prestigious journals and cited by the Supreme Court, in the end he was being rejected for a student’s paper by peripheral journals. Still, his use of these venues was instrumental in forestalling the subversion (and demanding enforcement) of the law. His effort had merit but more importantly it represented a method of resistance. How did Taylor use these articles? What do they teach us?

Scholarship in the Struggle: Law Reviews on Reclamation, Land and Water
During almost a half century of non-enforcement, Taylor laid out ammunition for the defense of reclamation law by publishing articles in law journals. This body of scholarship, bound and reprinted in *Essays on Land, Water and the Law in California* (Taylor 1979), was comprehensive.\(^{21}\) The articles taken together offer an overview to the water fight. Each represent a specific maneuver by Taylor in the struggle. In the book’s introduction, Taylor (1979: 3) again used martial language in describing an overview of the project:

> The present book is not a single, integrated historical treatise on reclamation law. Instead it is a series of thirteen articles spread over twenty-two years, each focused on a particular attack or tactic threatening the law at the time. This has some disadvantage from necessary repetition of the law’s history and background. On the other hand, it has the advantage of presenting a series of battlegrounds, each written at a time of white heat and designed to reveal the situation as under a magnifying glass.

Throughout the pieces, Taylor returned to prominent themes while providing specific details on particular issues.

A significant article within the set was the 1955 Yale Law Journal piece titled “The Excess Land Law: Execution of a Public Policy.” This article cited by the U.S.

Supreme Court in its unanimous Ivanhoe vs McCracken decision in 1958 upheld the acreage limitation and residency requirements of reclamation law. The title exhibits Taylor’s ironic humor with the double meaning of “execution.” The heavily quoted article delves into the historical congressional deliberations supporting the legislation. Taylor (1955: 484) derived from this record that the reclamation bill’s Congressional sponsors “presented their measure as one drawn with unusual care to prevent monopoly of water on reclaimed public lands and to break up existing monopoly on private land by denying water to it.” Its recurrent theme, presented in quotation after quotation, is that land and water must either be retained as primarily public resources or equitably divided and shared to ensure a viable republic. Most important, these resources needed to be protected from monopolistic control and the subsequent drift toward the breakdown of democratic governance.

Reclamation law, with its ties to land reform, water rights and resistance to neofeudalism returned over the next fifty years as a focal point of the valley’s politically engaged scholarship. So, rather than chronologically analyze each subsequent law article, I will detail a number of Taylor’s prominent and recurrent themes involving the concept of property (including its unequal allocation and distribution) and non-enforcement of the law.

“Reclamation creates property values; that is one of its chief purposes,” Taylor (1957: 92) observed in identifying one of its benefits. Value accrued both through capital appreciation and savings. By introducing water to arid land, the land’s value would markedly increase as delivery of publicly subsidized water results in substantial savings
to their farm operations.²² More significant, though less often emphasized in Taylor’s research, was that reclamation created “property” itself from natural and public resources – namely water – which reside in the public domain. “Appropriation, by customary California law, marks the beginning of a right to water, use is its basis, and disuse is its end” (Taylor 1957: 82; italics in original). Taylor cited a 1936 Harvard Law Review article by Wiel and added italics to emphasize how water was temporarily commodified from a common resource into private property:

The title or interest that one may acquire in the waters of a stream is entirely different to that which may be acquired in lands. Running water, so long as it continues to flow in its natural course, *is not and cannot be the subject of private ownership* . . . This interest is *dependent upon user* and *it may be lost* when the owner ceases to make avail of the same . . . . It is the use of the water merely to which they may acquire an interest and not to the water itself.

Since “ownership” was contingent upon use, it was also therefore provisional. The infrastructure provided by the federal government, such as dams and canals under reclamation projects, facilitated the use of water, in turn making a public resource into a transitory commodity. Infrastructures like the Central Valley Project therefore bookend the extraction of profit from a natural resource originally obtained from the public

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²² Taylor (1957: 92-93) detailed these benefits and savings. He found that “Between 1941 and the first half of 1946 the difference in average selling price between irrigated and nonirrigated land rose from $160 to $477 per acre, in Tulare County in the Central Valley of California…a full reclamation project water supply creates incremental values of between $16,000 and $41,280 for 160 acres, the amount for which federal water is permitted to an individual, even though he may be an excess land owner. For man and wife these minimum and maximum estimates can be doubled.” Similarly, “reclamation law for $3.50 an acre-foot brings water to private landholders along Friant-Kern canal in Central Valley that would cost them $14.00 if they had to obtain it without the subsidies and other benefits of reclamation law. The differential…means an annual saving of $1,600 to landowners with 160 acres using only one acre-foot of supplemental water. Federal reclamation brings an annual saving of $4,000 to the same landowner using a full water supply of two and one-half acre-feet.” Again, these values double for a man and wife eligible for 320 acres as interpreted under that law.

These benefits were the obvious ones that Taylor wanted to emphasize at the time, and which increased in subsequent years. As Farmland Conservation Director, I generally found irrigated prime farmland values appraised in the region at between $10,000 and $14,000 per acre in 2007. This would mean values of between $1,600,000 and $2,240,000 for 160 acres (values doubled for a man and a wife owning 320 acres of farmland under reclamation law) today.
domain, which is then expunged as waste (in “disuse”) into the underground aquifer, sediment ponds or waterways – back into the public domain, often as a liability and responsibility. In the San Joaquin Valley, after agricultural use, water can be saturated with nitrates, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, salts and other pollutants. The costs of treating this toxic waste, after its use, is passed back to the public.

Property was a critically important facet of the reclamation battles. Taylor’s (1959: 500) democratic theory was based on his belief that “. . . our entire society, like the law, rests on a principle of wide distribution of property.” He recognized that concentrations of property in California were already perverting democratic governance:

the excess land owners are sufficiently concerned over possible application of the excess land provision to resist it strongly . . . it is appropriate to point out that an extraordinary concentration of ownership exists in the San Joaquin Valley, of a kind that has influenced Congress. (Taylor 1957: 95).

He continued by noting that in 1947 the Bureau of Reclamation “told Congress that thirty-four corporations and individuals in the ‘probable present and future San Joaquin Valley service areas of the Central Valley Project’ owned close to three-quarters of a million acres.” These entities were not easily going to divest themselves of their land at the precise moment when its speculative value was poised to dramatically increase at public expense.

As the years passed, it was apparent that the law was being systematically violated. Taylor (1958: 154, 180) placed some early blame on the Executive branch of the federal government for failing to “insist on enforcement” which resulted in reclamation law
being strangled by confused, irresponsible, and unsympathetic administration in the executive branch of government. The ultimate end of such a course, if permitted to continue, is outright violation of the law.

Eventually, Taylor was put in the position of a citizen petitioning, with increasing vehemence, the government to follow its own law. In the 1959 California Law Review, he expanded his criticism of government, implicating all branches of government in undermining the law: “This Article continues a series analyzing the excess land law and the successive attacks upon the law through the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government. It brings simultaneous pressures in all branches, and at all levels, at the close of the 1950’s, into a single focus” Taylor (1959: 501). But in actuality, the location of the subterfuge became more difficult to identify. The target was becoming more expansive and less defined.

By 1964, in a subsequent California Law Review paper, Taylor wrote of the “calculated circumvention” of reclamation law in the valley.

In the long and tortuous course of circumvention of excess land law, words have been emptied of their meaning, statutes of their content, procedures of their certainty, parties of their principles, and constitutional functions of their integrity (Taylor 1964: 1012).

As the struggle continued, Taylor slowly witnessed an erosion of support for his position from multiple bureaucracies and constituencies. His tone began to express frustration and fatigue as the law was continuously “being violated through official nonenforcement” (Taylor 1964: 986). Rather than pinpointing responsible parties, he broadly identified “concentrated and powerful opposition operating upon the law-making and law-enforcing mechanisms” as amorphous perpetrators (Taylor 1964: 1007).

His later research continued to bore down into the most highly pertinent contexts, specifically the Federal San Luis Service Area with its 600,000 acre Westlands Water
District. Areas like this exemplified precisely the characteristics of monopoly and consolidated landholdings that reclamation law was designed to reform. Taylor (1964: 982) mentioned that “seventy percent of the lands in the Federal San Luis Service Area are ineligible under the excess land law to receive project water because they are held in ownerships exceeding 160 acres and their owners have not executed recordable contracts to make them eligible. A single owner, the Southern Pacific, holds nearly 120,000 acres.” Circumvention of the law was conducted in the interest of large landowners and agribusiness in the San Joaquin Valley. Their political lobbying and legal maneuvers skewed traditional democratic governance and economics. The issue, as Paul Gates mentioned in his Introduction, and an economic strategy of agribusiness was “to monopolize natural resources made valuable and available at public expense.” Re-phrased, this was strategy boiled down to a simple axiom: privatize profits and socialize costs.23 Taylor attempted to use his research as a firewall against this movement toward monopoly.

So, at the end of his career and for the rest of his life, Taylor settled down into a long war of attrition against a formidable foe – California agribusiness. He fought in defense of the 160-acre water limitation constituted under the U.S. Bureau of Reclamations 1902 statute. While this appeared to be an obscure cause to devote his life to, for Taylor, it was equivalent to defending democracy. In this sense, his work evolved from the battles of crisis management to a sustained campaign against the emergence of

23 This statement is an inverse of the socialist sentiment: “from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.”
modern latifundia. As early as *American Exodus* this awareness was evident for Lange and Taylor:

> In our concern over the visible and acute distress of dislocated people, we must not lose sight of the permanent farming organization which is being laid down. This grave question arises: After the sweep of mechanization, how shall our best lands be used – our southern plains, prairies, deltas, and our irrigated valleys of the West? Shall factory agriculture – our modern latifundia – prevail with its absentee owners, managers, day laborers, landless migrants, and recurrent strife? Or shall other patterns be sought for the relation of man to the land?

A very old American ideal, crystallized in the Homestead Act of 1862, holds that our land shall be farmed by working owners. But history has made serious inroads on this ideal. By 1935, tenancy had risen to 42 percent of all farms, and stood above 60 percent in many of the cotton states. Wage labor, standing at 26 percent of all persons gainfully employed in agriculture in 1930, reached 53 percent in Arizona and 57 percent in California. In order to preserve what we can of a national ideal,

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24 The concept and use of the term “latifundia” in the context of the San Joaquin Valley needs further definition. The Roman republic had been built around the vitality of small farmers, yet as the republic expanded, gaining land and wealth, its institutions gradually became more centralized and consolidated as the society arced from republic to empire. Latifundium is a Latin word derived from “latus” meaning broad or spacious and “fundus” meaning farm or estate.

The system originated in the Second century B.C. as lands were seized through conquest. By the First century A.D., latifundium had largely replaced the small farms on the Italian peninsula (Hammond 1946). The system evolved from a change in the methods of imperialism. Prior to 200 B.C., campaigns were short, close to home and fought in the summers (Rosenstien 2004). Yet, Roman victories meant campaigns were longer and further from the soldier’s farms. Soon the farmers, who comprised the first Roman legions, were no longer on the land. Victories enriched the upper classes who invested their wealth in land, which small farmers were finding difficult to retain (Brunt 1988; Rosenstien 2004). Latifundium continued to expand to become enormous landholdings. Rosenstien (2004: 5) referred to Roman “plantation agriculture” which was “much larger, run almost entirely with slave labor, and geared primarily toward producing cash crops.” Hammond (1946: 67) described the system of large estates as it existed under the empire was economically unsound.

Where such estates had existed previously, they were owned locally and what profit came out of them was either accumulated or spent locally. Under the Roman Empire, rich senators acquired properties widely spread throughout the provinces and the profits from these estates were drawn off for luxurious living. Hammond concluded that economic stagnation resulted within the Roman Empire from profits being drawn off from local communities.

Roman farmers were unable to “hold their own in the marketplace against greater efficiencies of large scale production, slave labor and cheap grain imported from abroad” (Rosenstien 2004: 5). As farmers were pushed off of the land, they joined the legions and empowered the “great generals of the late republic” who ultimately became monarchs (Brunt 1971; Rosenstien 2004). When Caesar seized power, he quickly passed agrarian laws giving land to veterans and poor citizens; who were largely his constituency. “Lands were distributed to soldiers only in defiance of senatorial opposition” (Blunt 1971: 312). The empire was born, in some measure, through populist outcry. Roman society had bifurcated to the point where the independent farmer and citizen of the republic was marginalized into a position where the potential loss of political rights was compromised for the possibility of economic stability.
new patterns, we believe, must be developed. (Lange and Taylor 1939: 155)

This agrarian democratic tradition has a long history in the United States. Taylor and Goldschmidt situated their democratic theory within Thomas Jefferson’s agrarianism, one that recognized land as a primarily public resource. Wendell Berry (1977: 7) restated this ideal: “The standard of the exploiter is efficiency, the standard of the nurturer is care. The exploiter’s goal is money, profit; the nurturer’s goal is health – his land’s health, his own, his family’s, his community’s, and his country’s.” Few places in the United States were as characteristic of this scenario as the San Joaquin Valley. The valley was an ideal and apt location for land reform such as that imposed by reclamation law.

The foundations of reclamation law not only relied upon cultural and historic precedents, but also legal ones. Both the Pre-emption Act of 1841 and the Homestead Act of 1860 limited the amount of land a family could claim to 160 acre parcels in order to favor “actual settlers against monopolists and speculators of that day” (Taylor 1950: 435). The first director of the Reclamation Service explained that its main purpose was: not so much to irrigate the land, as it is to make homes . . . It is not to irrigate the land which now belongs to large corporations, or even to small ones; it is not to make these men wealthy, but it is to bring about a condition whereby the man with a family can get enough good land to support that family, to become a good citizen, and to have all the comforts and necessities which rightfully belong to an American citizen (Jamieson et. al. 1974: 211).

In 1902, the House Committee on Arid Lands, responsible for the Reclamation bill stated, “It has been our time-honored policy to provide for the settlement of our public lands in small tracts to actual home builders” (Taylor 1979: 239). Congressman Mondell, chairman of that Committee during the 1902 debate, specified that
in order that no such lands may be held in large quantities or by non-resident owners, it is provided that no water right for more than 160 acres shall be sold to any landowner, who must also be a resident or occupant of his land. This provision was drawn with a view to breaking up any large land holdings which might exist in the vicinity of government works and to insure occupancy by the owner of the land reclaimed” (Taylor 1979: 240; italics in original).

A later 1924 fact finding report to the Secretary of the Interior found that

The main purpose of the reclamation act was to provide opportunities for homestead making for rural-minded people. Making a homestead, a place able to support a family and desirable for family life, must remain the central thought for every activity connected with Federal reclamation.

It was hoped that the homesteader under the Federal irrigation works would settle upon the land with a strong determination to subdue the soil, to build a home, and to add another rural farmstead to the thousands which form the stable foundation of our Republic (Taylor 1950: 436).

Congress specifically designated the Reclamation Service not to subsidize water to large landholders and especially speculators of the sort characterized by Californian agriculture (Billington et al. 2005; Taylor 1979). Acreage limitations on government subsidized land and resource policies were conceived as a way of thwarting land speculation and aiding the broadest portion of the citizenry with the benefits of public resources (Fuller 1949, Taylor 1950). At its heart, it was an egalitarian policy identified with some of the foundational principals of democracy in the United States.

Large-scale and corporate farmers acquiescence to federal government involvement in building the dams and water delivery infrastructure in California – the Central Valley Project – was the result of the economic dislocations of the Depression. Previously, large growers and farmers with secure water privileges resisted the introduction of the federal government, and its accompanying restrictions, into what had historically been the state’s jurisdiction. The Central Valley Project was created under
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937, which specifically authorized that “provisions of the reclamation law shall govern the repayment of the expenditures” (Billington et al. 2005). Large growers tried a number of different ways to undermine and circumvent the acreage limitation statute of the reclamation law including an effort in the 1950’s to buy back the Central Valley Project from the federal government. Kotz (1976: 50) acknowledged that the reclamation law had never been enforced and “in California alone, corporate landholders continue to occupy and benefit from more than one million acres subject to the 160-acre limitation.”

Legal enforcement was allowed to atrophy from the beginning. By 1958, under *Ivanhoe vs McCracken*, the U.S. Supreme court acted in support of reclamation law:

> It is reasonable classification to limit the amount of project water available to each individual in order that benefits may be distributed in accordance with the greatest good to the greatest number of individuals. The limitation [160 acres per person] insures that this enormous expenditure will not go in disproportionate share to a few individuals with large land holdings. Moreover, it prevents the use of federal reclamation service for speculative purposes. In short, the excess acreage provision acts as a ceiling, imposed equally on all participants, on the federal subsidy that is being bestowed (Vogeler 1981: 58; MacCannell and White 1984: 38).

Yet, court decisions seemed immune to forcing compliance and arresting law breakers. Taylor (1950) found that in order to effectively realize its objectives of land reform toward redistribution from industrial scale agribusinesses to family farms, reclamation contracts needed to be secured from irrigation districts and large landholders prior to construction of the project. Meanwhile, decades passed without compliance.

What was the purpose of Taylor’s defense of acreage limitation? Throughout the struggle, in his academic articles and oral history, Taylor returned to favored quotations. One of the most prominent of these was from Theodore Roosevelt, who signed the
Reclamation Law in 1902. In a 1911 speech to the Commonwealth Club of California, Roosevelt addressed potential opposition. Near the speech’s end, Roosevelt warned the wealthy patrons of the club:

Now I have struck the crux of my appeal. I wish to save the very wealthy men of this country and their advocates and upholders from the ruin that they would bring upon themselves if they were permitted to have their way. It is because I am against revolution; it is because I am against the doctrines of the Extremists, of the Socialists; it is because I wish to see this country of ours continued as a genuine democracy; it is because I distrust violence and disbelieve in it; it is because I wish to secure this country against ever seeing a time when the ‘have-nots’ shall rise against the ‘haves’; it is because I wish to secure for our children and our grandchildren and for their children’s children the same freedom of opportunity, the same peace and order and justice that we have had in the past; it is because of that, that I wish to see the state – wherever the state has the power and the duty – and the nation – wherever the nation has the power and the duty – step in and conserve our national resources, and to part with them only on such terms as will secure, so far as it is possible to secure, a general participation by all of the people in the benefits arising from them, and to prevent their being monopolized by a few men of enormous wealth who would use them for their own selfish gratification in the present and to build up their power in the present, and who in doing so would create a spirit of unrest and anger and murderous discontent which in the end might result in an upheaval that would not only bring them down but bring down the whole fabric of the Republic in an unjust effort to undo the effects of past injustice. (Taylor 1959: 499; Taylor 1973d; Star 2004: 13-14).

The reason Taylor turned to this quote so often as a reference was that it encapsulated his values with respect to democracy and economics. Without social values guiding economic practice, the erosion of civic life and democratic government became more likely. The academic discipline of economics, by the 1950’s, tended toward emphasizing short-term and individual speculation over long-term, public-benefit investment. Moreover, as the treatment of social science in the San Joaquin Valley illustrated, the concentrations of property began to pervert political governance and civil institutions like
universities. Let’s turn to Taylor’s experience of political pressure and his strategies to
defend himself and his values.

Profile of Practice: Political Pressure and Making Change

What would Taylor teach us after engaging in his struggle? If he could inform us about his strategies, what would he tell us? How did he defend himself when wrongly accused? His oral history offered an opportunity to have him speak and teach us from his experience:

What I say to the young generation is this: Study your targets. Study what buttons to push and when to push them. Then push them, and you will get results. Young students are likely to pick the wrong targets. They have elevated Governor Reagan, I am afraid, to re-election – to a senatorial or even presidential possibility – exactly the wrong result. Why don’t they take him on, for example, on my issue? They could tear Governor Reagan apart on the water issue; it would expose him. But, they don’t do it! They get rocks and throw them through the glass doors, they “reconstitute” the University, put posters all over the place, all of that! Governor Reagan loves it. The more the mess at the university, the surer he is of re-election. I say they don’t know what buttons to push.

If you want to break it down, there are really two answers. There are people who don’t want to deal from within – the outright revolutionaries. They want a mess! Their saying is, “Things have got to get worse before they get better. Get everybody in a mess!”

I say they pick the wrong targets.

They say, “It doesn’t make any difference – the students are here, so the University is the target.” In effect, they say, “Reagan? Yeah, sure we may be re-electing him now, but that will make things still worse and that is what has got to happen before we have a revolution.”

From a different premise, I say, “Work within the system and knock Reagan out. Tell people the truth about water issues and about economic and political aspects of this. This is the guts of the power structure in California. This is how this place is run. Giant

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landholdings, giant corporations, now they want the water in addition to the land.” This is a century-old development.\textsuperscript{26}

Taylor’s strategy characteristically drew from his military training and was elemental in its simplicity:

\begin{quote}
I have a couple of causes about which I felt very strongly, very deeply, and I wasn’t going to have them jeopardized by anything else, if I could help it. I wanted to deal with those issues on my ground, and not on their ground. That is one of the first things that you learn in minor military tactics. As platoon commander in World War I, what did I learn? To make the enemy fight you on your ground, not fight him on his. The issues are mine, and I want the fight to be on the issue.

Of the 160-acre limitation issue, what is their ground? Their ground is that 1902 is long time ago; the law is archaic, belongs to a past era, and it is time to modernize it in the interest of operating efficiently. That is their ground. They spread that view all over. Since they largely control the means of public communication, most people swallow it since they don’t hear the other side. They’ve been taken for a ride! People are slowly beginning to wake up – take the state water project. Most of them still don’t know that the state is paying for a water project primarily to enable big landowners to escape the federal law intended to distribute reclamation benefits according to the “greatest good to the greatest numbers,” as the Supreme Court describes it.

The California Department of Water Resources has that project because these large landowners and speculators didn’t want the 160-acre limitation provisions of federal law to be applied to them. The big landowners, like Kern County Land Company and others, wanted a state project as means of escape from the federal acreage limitation. They aim to capture unlimited, unearned increment from public development of public water. Can you tell people that? It takes quite a while to get around to tell anybody that. But if you can get on the same platform with them, then you can tell the audiences, and then you can expose them!

So, in my lifetime, I have had a couple of issues to which I have really devoted myself. I put years into them. I didn’t want to scatter my shots, or expose myself unnecessarily, when it was so easy to throw brickbats and raise clouds of suspicion and so to make proof of anything unnecessary.

I remember saying to one of the FBI men referring to the battle over the 160-acre limitation, “I am not going to stop fighting for what I believe in on that issue. That is a gigantic scandal to capture hundreds of millions of dollars contrary to law. I don’t care what, I am not going to stop the fight on that issue!” I do not recall the comment by the FBI man, but you can imagine the type of questions that prodded me to come out and say that! He must have been inquiring into my position on various things.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}


Taylor was a scholar during the McCarthy era when loyalty oaths and false innuendo were part of the academic landscape. All of the early scholars in this study – Taylor, Galarza and Goldschmidt – had to deal with these McCarthy-style tactics.

Goldschmidt told me a story of going to Taylor and asking his advice on whether to sign the university’s loyalty oath. What was Taylor going to do? He was going to sign it and maintain his focus on the larger issue. He was not going to “scatter” his energy, but rather bring focused force to bear on his target:

*I was not prepared to make the loyalty oath my battle, not to the bitter, bitter end. There were those who took it to the end and won the case. I was for them and contributed financially. I was always with that group, but it was just not my battle. I never “scattered” my efforts and my energies for all the causes that I believed in, nor any large fraction of them. I’ve concentrated on one or two at a time. They have been, in general, lone battles. They have been my causes. The program of camps and other improvements for the migratory laborers, the water issue – I thought those issues were fundamental and closely interrelated. I still believe that to be true. I still am interested in both.*

*While I am not the only person who has made these his causes, I have in a sense, made them mine from the 1920s to 1970s. I have been unwilling to take on other causes, in part for tactical reasons. The easiest way for your opponent to undercut you, to defeat you, is on his ground rather than on your ground. If he wants to defeat you on, say, a water issue, if he can find something utterly irrelevant with which to discredit you, building on people’s prejudices, impugning your patriotism, that is the ground on which your opponent would love to fight you. I have been unwilling to offer them any openings that I could avoid.*

*You can see what they were doing in the McCarthy era. Anybody who associated with anybody of that ilk was himself suspect. What does “associating” mean? In 1945, I was Democratic Club president and there were members who were “activists” and a handful of probable Communists. Does that mean that I was “associating” with them? You just didn’t know. No open charges, just innuendos.*

*One of my own Rural Rehabilitation staff, in 1935, working under my orders, had gone around to others on the staff – whether to my superiors or not I don’t know – and said he suspected I was “common-ist.” That was the way he phrased it. I was told of it by those who rejected his suspicion, but that was the atmosphere in which we worked. Any charge of “communism” was a deadly weapon; proof was hardly necessary. The question, at that time, was not, “Is he standing for something that is good, right and proper?” but, “Is he a ‘common-ist’?” Guilt by association.*

*This will give you another example of the atmosphere. Back in the ’20s, for 90¢, I had bought a paperback, The ABC of Communism. But as the atmosphere heated up*
from the Dies Committee era into the McCarthy era, I remember thinking, “Should I take that book off my shelves? If they come in here and see that, will that cause any trouble?” But I did not take it off my shelf.

As a matter of fact, I never read The ABC of Communism (an official Communist manual), until 1967, when for the second time I went over to Vietnam to study land tenure on an SRI contract. It struck me then that the situation there fit to Communist doctrine with respect to tenants on the land. So for the first time I read parts of The ABC of Communism. It had exactly what I needed to determine official doctrine with respect to land tenure. It was the authoritative source; it was like going to the Bible!

But you see how prevailing atmosphere can touch one’s work? Without anyone ever saying to me, “You’ve got The ABC of Communism on your shelf,” I, seeing the winds of suspicion blowing up, thought, “Do I leave that there, or do I take it away?” Well, I didn’t! At some point, you draw the line. Even I draw the line somewhere, not at the U.C. oath, but I wasn’t going to take that source book off of my shelf. These apparently insubstantial things give you a clue to what the McCarthy era could do to freedom of teaching, freedom of speech, freedom of learning. Freedom just shrivels, you see, with hardly a touch.

This is related to the McCarthy era. I hadn’t thought of it until this moment. How would you like to walk in to your study in South Hall after lunch on a Saturday to find a man standing there with his hat on his head looking around, you don’t know doing what? I had a lot of photographs, 8 x 10s, probably Dorothea’s photographs, out on the floor. He was standing right in the middle of them. I tried to get him to sit down, to tell me what it was he wanted to know but he was very anxious to get out.

“Oh, you are busy now.”

“No,” I said, “I’ve just finished my lunch at the Faculty Club and here I am, right ready. We can sit down. What is it that you want to know?

He was embarrassed, professing that his departure was out of consideration for me, but I wouldn’t allow him to leave out of “consideration” for me. I told him to sit right down and tell me what it was he was interested in, and what he wanted to know. He wriggled and wriggled and wriggled and goes out making all sorts of crazy apologies.

As he went down the steps, I said, “What is your name?”

He said, “Everett Brown.” Whether that was his name, I haven’t the foggiest notion. But I don’t think it was.28

It was not a happy experience to have your patriotism called into question, and to have those inquiries. I have a whole series of experiences – didn’t you know that I had a full field investigation? I’ve been investigated from stem to stem. I have the final documents only. That investigation went on for maybe a couple of years. There were no charges made.

A political friend of mine – the Director of the California State Department of Agriculture when I was a member of the advisory board – told me that FBI agents came to him about me when he was on a trip in Minnesota. How many others asked about me, I don’t know. But you can see how they prowled around. There is one phase of the investigation where I suspect that the FBI was being used to try to “get” me.

28 Taylor tells this story on at least three separate occasions. He does so in detail each time, for example, twice commenting that the man left his hat on his head inside or quoting from this one-time conversation, even remembering the man’s name.
They kept coming back. They called me one evening and asked if they could see me the next morning at ten-thirty. I suppose they’d pick up something, somewhere, that somebody would say about me, then they’d come and ask about it. I have the papers, their letter and my response, on campus. After the investigations, the next step in procedure was to give the results of the investigation to the agency of the government to which I was consultant, that is to the Department of the Interior.

I got a letter delivered by the postman as I sat in the garden. The letter ran something like this: “You are given the opportunity herewith, should you so desire, to reply to the following questions, under oath, at any time within the next fourteen days.” Question number one was substantially this: “Is it true that you wrote a letter of recommendation to a government position for Gregory Silvermaster?”

He became a famous case. They hounded him out of government employment everywhere. Well, he wasn’t my student, but he had received a Ph.D. from my department, so in 1935 I wrote a letter of recommendation for him. The second question I answered under oath was, “Do you have any information concerning or explanation of a report that you have contributed to the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, which has been designated by the attorney general as being within the purview of paragraph ‘f’, section 2, part V, of Executive Order 9835?” The answer was “yes.”

Since they asked the questions, I undertook very carefully to document the answer. I read the draft of my answer to the Silvermaster question to Mary Drew, the department secretary who had asked me to write the letter of recommendation in the first place, and stated in my reply that I had shown this answer to Mary Drew, and she assured me that according to her recollections what I had said was correct. Then I went to Sacramento to the regional solicitor of the Bureau of Reclamation, where I was a consultant, and showed him my answer. He went over it with me and was helpful in strengthening it. Then I sent it in. The Loyalty Board cleared me. To have this sort of inquiry going on was not pleasant, you may be sure. It happened all over the country. Remember the devastating attack on the China Branch of our State Department? Isn’t it only fairly recently that John Service was finally cleared and allowed to go back to China?

There is an example where I suspect that somebody who didn’t like what I was doing in the Central Valley tipped the FBI off to question me. I’ll give you a little account of the meeting with two FBI agents in my study Room 310 South Hall, if you want it. It was preceded by the visit of a young FBI fellow. He said he was an accountant, this was a rare time that they didn’t come in pairs. I cannot remember anything specific, but I had the impression that this was a particularly suspicious guy. Maybe he thought that I would be a find, helpful to him to go up the FBI ladder.

Following the young man’s visit, after a time, there came this “accountant” and an older man, I presume a lawyer. Let’s see if I can recreate that interview. They asked me some exploratory questions, which apparently had nothing to do with where they were going to put the knife in. I couldn’t figure out just what it was they were probing for. Then the lawyer said, “Have you ever been to Chico or Eureka?”

I said, “Yes, I’ve been in Chico and Eureka. Let’s answer Eureka first.” I said I was there in 1939 or 1940 on a government assignment as a consultant to the Social Security Board. I arrived shortly before noon with Dorothea and had lunch there. We talked with the waitress where we had our lunch. After lunch I bought gasoline and I
talked with the attendant at the gasoline station. I spent perhaps twenty minutes slowly
driving around the community to become familiar with it, as it was the first time I had
ever been there. Then I went on. That’s Eureka.

Then Chico. “Yes,” I said. “I’ve been in Chico, twice. The first occasion I
described was going through Chico with Dorothea when I was consultant. We stayed
overnight at a hotel in Chico and then went on. Then I was there a second time.

“Who asked me to go there? On whose invitation did I go there?” came the
question.

I said, “I don’t really know. A man attached to one of the foundation-supported
agencies of the University of California, like an institution – he asked me would I go to
Chico and speak at the inauguration of President Kimble of Chico State. I said I would,
if asked by someone at Chico State. So a little while later I got a letter from someone at
Chico State inviting me to speak.”

The FBI lawyer asked me, “Did I go for the University?”

I said, “I don’t know. I was furnished a University car to drive up and back. I
don’t know whether Chico State paid for it, or the University paid for it; I never was
asked to pay, and I never asked who did. I stayed at the local hotel, and I don’t know
who paid the bill. I know only that when I came to pay the bill at the time of departure,
the clerk said it had been taken care of for me. I suppose Chico State did it.”

Then I said, “I spoke on the college program.” I turned to the older agent and
said, “Do you want to know what I said? It is over there in a drawer of the steel filing
cabinet. If you want to know, there it is. I’ll show it to you.”

At that point the older man got up and said, “No, no, no. We’ve no more interest
in this. It is a University matter. That’s all.” They got up and left and that is the last
time the FBI agents ever came. You see, the older man took over all the questioning from
the younger man. Pretty clearly I satisfied him, because he left at that point.

Now, why should the FBI be concerned in the first place with an address that I
gave at Chico State? I’ll tell you – it was about the Central Valley Project, issues of
water and power, the 160-acre limitation and public power preference provisions of the
law. My address was carried over the local student radio station and it crossed my mind
that somebody opposed to my views and to these laws may have thought, “We’ll sic the
FBI onto him.” I think somebody did. I cannot think of any other reason for questioning
me about my presence at Chico. That older FBI man tried to trap me – as if my presence
in Chico was questionable. He asked leading questions so skillfully.

That was the most acute, personally-experienced situation, which bears out, shall
I say justifies, to me, my traditional position that when I have a cause I regard as
important I don’t pick up a whole slew of other causes, which might make it easier to
throw stones at me without going into my cause at all, i.e., knocking me out on totally
other grounds. There are plenty of people around here – perhaps even now – who would
like to have seen me out of the way. I am prepared to believe that. Who did this, of
course, I don’t know, but if my suspicion is true it would be either big land-owners, or big
private power.

It was not my connection to the University, but my connection to the government
that gave the ground initially for making the investigation under broad presidential
order. The McCarthyites made trouble throughout the government, and all over the
world. These little McCarthy era incidents that cross my mind were tactics that impact
sensitive people who have causes that in the daylight are perfectly respectable causes. They were the tactics of throwing dust and dirt.\textsuperscript{29}

Opposed to subterfuge, suspicion and innuendo, Taylor in his scholarship sought to clarify democratic public policy, empower citizens through education, and equitable distribute of property:

\begin{quote}
It is my belief in the desirability of holding people on the land in the status of owner-workers, avoiding two things: the split which we see in such extreme form in this state between landowners and their workers, and the sweeping of people off the land and into the cities. They kick about crowding the ghettos, but seldom ask what created the ghettos? The sweeping of people off the land with no severance pay created the ghettos. How are we going to use the land is a really big question. Is the only criterion to be the advantage of big machinery to big land owners?

In California we have a pattern of land ownership comparable to the southern plantation. I call it streamlined plantation agriculture because of the modern mechanization. Its behavior with respect to labor is like the plantations in the South, where you have got to have labor to get the job done and that is what labor means to the planters. The fact that the laborers are human beings, citizens like yourself is an afterthought. The political instability of our day is related to mechanization and displacement of people from the land. The distribution of property is no longer equal or equitable.

There were studies made in agricultural economics that point to advantages of three hundred or even up to six hundred acres. But that depends on your crucial criterion. How much difference would it make whether the acreage were six hundred for a family or one hundred sixty? How much difference in the unit cost of production? With some crops it might matter, with others it wouldn’t. What are your criteria? Is it the unit cost alone or is it the kind of society that you’re building when you’re doing it? A family farmer tends to get more crop production from his land per acre than the larger operator. Well, do you want more production per acre? Or do you want the unit cost to be the lowest possible? How important are those things? Look at the kind of society that you get when you go to a big-farming community. You no longer have a homogenous community. It’s gone. You don’t have the basis for a democratic society.

That’s the conclusion from the Arvin-Dinuba study. That’s why interest in that is being revived, even in Congress. That’s why within about the last two weeks, Senator Gaylord Nelson asked Walter Goldschmidt, who made that study in ’46, to come back and talk to his committee about a repetition of that study. That’s why you have editorials in the New York Times about the agricultural revolution and what it’s doing to destroy our rural communities. Now, how much more weight do you attach to that or is unit cost to the producer more important? How much of the cutting of the unit cost goes to the
\end{quote}

consumer? The producer? The producer gets it if you let him monopolize. He’ll control how much is marketed.

Interests and values are more involved than unit costs of production. Look at Imperial Valley. It’s a polarized society, a lot of landless people and a handful of landowners, largely corporate. It’s the base of an egalitarian democratic society that is at stake. It is interesting that the praise of large operations that you get from certain quarters on the economic side fits with the Communist argument. They’re both for the big-scale operation. Well, you don’t get a democratic society out of it there, and I don’t think you do here, either.

Our Agricultural Extension Service and our Department of Agriculture assist those who are most alert in grabbing the assistance offered. As for the rest, let the devil take the hindmost. We are seeing the obliteration of our rural societies because of an overemphasis in the way we spread improvement in technology. The inscription on Hilgard Hall, “To rescue for human society the native values of rural life” has had minimal emphasis, whether in California or over the United States, generally. So we’re seeing land and technology in the hands of a few, and a polarization of our society.30 Valley scholars fighting for “an egalitarian, democratic society” emphasized “interests and values” in determining the theoretical position of their scholarship; however, to be effective political actors, their research needed to generate empirical evidence in order to produce action.

In the Fall of 1947, in the Journal of Social Issues, I wrote, “One may build from facts to principles, but the attempt to reason first from the principle to the facts is likely to prove ineffective in producing action.”

I still stand behind what I wrote. It’s facts that have weight rather than principles. You don’t fail to relate them to principles, but it’s the facts that carry the weight. I got the migrant labor camp program started by bringing the facts to the decision makers, visually as well as in text – making those reports and Dorothea’s photographs. They were showing field conditions. They couldn’t dodge them. What were they going to do about it? It’s not enough to say, “There are an awful lot of people out there in the greatest distress. They really need some help. They ought to have a place where they can at least wash up, and where their kids can have some kind of stability and care.” If you amass the facts – words, numbers, maps, graphs, photographs – then they’re uncomfortable if they don’t do something about it.

That’s the basis of your pressure. If you want to get something done, the best way is for somebody to say something to somebody else at the right time and place. Present

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them with the facts and make a personal contact. Most people just say, “Oh, my,” and
wring their hands, “Why isn’t something done?” But things happen because somebody
does something. And those somebodys, if they know what to do and when to do it – those
somebodys can be the kind of people that often are considered nobodys. Most people
haven’t the faintest appreciation of the potential power they have if only they would use
it.

In that article’s last paragraph, on pages 55 and 56, I write: “The profession of
social scientists can contribute much to make political decision intelligent, and its
potential power is very great. If that power is ever to be exerted fully, the profession will
have to come closer to grips with the processes of decision, in order to understand the
rules of the game, and to know the obstacles to acceptance of its professional services.
Its members will have to find the many ways, informal as well as formal, personal as well
as official, by which our capacities to gather facts, analyze and interpret them, can be
used to clarify issues and to raise intelligent alternative courses of action to the level of
practical politics in those arenas where decisions are made.”

Now most of our professional social scientists don’t do that. They’ll talk about
the situation without going to the decision-making process. They will accept the
decisions of those who make the decisions without trying to influence them. But if you
want to change the decisions, you’ve got to do something. I should be satisfied that I’ve
helped to keep the 160-acre issue alive in the halls of government. Had we not been able
to do battle on this issue from the New Deal of FDR and the Fair Deal of Harry Truman,
the monopolists and speculators would have had the law wiped off the statute books.31

In 1982, the Reagan administration signed legislation passed by a Democrat-
controlled Congress that increased the acreage limitation to 960 acres per individual.
Growers also no longer had to be residents on their farms to receive the subsidy.
Coupled with loopholes for even larger parcel owners, the issues of egalitarian
distribution of land and democratic governance were decided in favor of agribusiness.
Taylor died two years later.

The struggle that he had helped to initiate, however, was just beginning.

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31 Taylor’s first person accounts for this profile are compiled from: Taylor, P. (1973c). Paul Schuster
Regents of the University of California. pgs: 500-501, 504. His three volumes of interviews were
conducted, edited and printed as part of the Earl Warren Oral History Project.
Ernesto Galarza was in constant movement throughout his life and career. Born in Mexico in 1905, his family moved to the United States a few years later due to the revolution. As a child he worked as a hop picker near Sacramento. At that time, he recalled, “I became a leader of the Mexican community at the age of eight for the simple reason that I knew perhaps two dozen words of English” (Galarza 1982: 1). Later, he took jobs as a newsboy, cannery and packingshed laborer, social work aide, interpreter, Boys Club organizer, elementary school teacher, co-director of a progressive elementary school and education specialist with the Pan American Union. He received his B.A. from Occidental College, M.A. from Stanford University and Ph.D. from Columbia University. He taught at a number of prestigious universities including the John Marshall School of Law, University of Denver, Claremont University, Notre Dame, San Jose State University, U.C. San Diego, U.C. Santa Cruz and the Harvard Graduate School of Education. In 1979, Galarza was nominated for the Nobel Peace prize.

Galarza, even more than Taylor, strove to close the distance between his work as a scholar and the reality in the fields. Though both of these contemporary scholars challenged California agribusiness, they did not closely collaborate. They did however complement each other. While Taylor remained in the academy, Galarza continually resisted becoming institutionalized at a particular university. His scholarship took him
into the labor camps and barrios. A 1949 Galarza pamphlet titled *Common Ground* concluded with his “Program for Action”:\(^{32}\)

On this and other aspects of the changing context of the problem of the Mexican minority in the United States, an abundant literature has developed. This literature runs all the way from the serious, compact, and sustained scholarship of Dr. Paul Taylor’s studies to the articles, newspaper accounts, and books of the ‘protest’ type. In between are the shelves of catalogued masters’ and doctoral theses, government reports, case studies, and monographs numbering thousands of items. Bibliographically, at least, the Mexican minority has come of age.

By now the time has come for this minority to find the connection between the library card index and life. In the living and working conditions of this group certain problems have been isolated, defined, studied, and analyzed. Now they must be resolved.

Galarza set out on this task as he accepted a position with the National Farm Labor Union rather than take his Ivy League doctoral degree into an academic career.

*Scholarship in the Struggle: Union Organizing Against Agribusiness*

Between 1947 and 1959, Galarza worked as the Director of Research and Education for the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) and National Agricultural Workers Union (NAWU), both affiliated with the AFL-CIO. He participated in “probably twenty strikes” mostly in California but also in Florida, Texas and Arizona (Galarza 1982: 16). From his position in the fields with the workers, he identified the central issues not only confronting union organizing against particular farming operations but those necessary to understand the broader, strategic issues and policy impediments facing farmworkers in California. London and Anderson (1970) discussed Galarza’s strategy for attacking the “alliance” between agribusiness and government bureaucracies,

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\(^{32}\) Stanford University Library, Special Collection, Ernesto Galarza Papers MO224, Box 1, Folder 8: Articles 1944-1959, *Common Ground*, pp. 28-29.
while introducing innovative approaches to labor organizing in the fields. With only a
modicum of union support and financial backing, Galarza battled agribusiness for over a
decade:

His weapons were highly personal: the shield of research and analytic
thought, the sword of the written and spoken word. His basic tactic was to
document the flouting of laws, the abuses, the corruption, the debasement,
the scandals inherent in the Braceros system and to publicize his findings
as broadly as possible (123).

By standing on the ground and looking up through the legal and political structures that
hindered the farm labor movement, he identified specific objects for politically engaged
scholarship, most notably DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation and Public Law 78.

The consistent target of his organizing and scholarship was large scale agriculture
or agribusiness. Exemplary to this stance was an August 12, 1960 statement to the
President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, prepared for the National Farm Labor
Union. Galarza began by acknowledging California’s agricultural system as an
“empire”:

*The California Agricultural Code is careful to slight this
connection. At Chapter 4, Section 1190, the Code says: ‘It is here
recognized that agriculture is characterized by individual production in
contrast to the group or factory system that characterizes other forms of
individual production.’

The Code, in this respect, is as out of date as the crowns and
scepters with which the pageantry of California’s ‘agricultural empire’ is
adorned. In 1945, slightly more than 102,000 Class A farms, out of a total
of some 5,850,000 farms in the nation, produced 20% of all farm products
and hired over one-half of its hired labor. Over 17,000 of these farm
factories were in California, and they produced over 65% of the value of
all products sold.

In a recent survey of land ownership in the West by the
Department of Agriculture it was stated that corporation ownership and
control have become a dominant characteristic of agriculture in this
section of the country . . . .

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33 Stanford University Library, Special Collection, Ernesto Galarza Papers MO224, Box 1, Folder 8:
If the Commission were to call the roll of some of the outstanding ‘farmers’ of this state, who would answer? The Standard Oil Company, with 54,000 acres in the San Joaquin Valley; Tidewater Associated Oil Company; Southern Pacific Company; Shell Oil Company; Kern County Land Company; Van Glaahn Lake Land Company; California Packing Corporation; DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation; Anderson-Clayton Company; J.G. Boswell Company; W.B. Camp Company; Boston Investment Company; General Petroleum Corporation.

Anderson-Clayton owns 40 percent of the cotton gins in the Central Valley. It owns three of the Valley’s nine cottonseed oil mills and three of its eight compresses. Its tributary, the San Joaquin Cotton Oil Company, is the dominant force in the state’s cotton industry.

The Russell Giffen Enterprises are known better as ‘land developers’ than as ‘farmers.’ In 1949 it had an investment of nearly $7,000,000 in land, pumps, buildings, and equipment; and according to FORTUNE magazine, the business was expected to yield close to $3,000,000 before taxes, or enough to pay off capital investment in three years at that rate of profit. In 1949, Giffen sold a parcel of his land to an Omaha corporation for $4,800,000. Previously Giffen Enterprises had sold another parcel to Anderson-Clayton for the sum of $7,000,000. The sale of the 1949 cotton crop by Giffen Enterprises set a new record in the industry – nearly $6,000,000 for 40,000 bales.

A few more random facts will enable the Commission to focus properly on the economic and managerial structure of California’s farm industry, the employer of the people whose conditions the Commission is here to study.

The DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation is a nationwide organization with plants or offices in seven states. Its ranch near Arvin measures 19 miles along its boundaries. The Kern County Land Company had a net income after taxes in 1948 of $11,292,854. It operated some 8700 acres in cotton, 3300 acres in potatoes and 1300 acres in sugar beets. Its current assets stood at $36,676,075. When its Board of Directors recently toured the company’s holdings, they traveled by special bus for two days. One of the directors had to come from his home in England for the inspection.

This is the ‘corporation agriculture’, the ‘finance farming’ with which anyone who wants to appraise the human and social problems that have arisen in the rural areas of this State must be familiar.

As Director of Research and Education at the union, Galarza took it upon himself to detail structures of oppression and discrimination. His role as a scholar offered a platform from which to battle the power elite of California.
Galarza worked from multiple locations but his foremost was among the farmworkers. His scholarship was enhanced by living within the context of the research problem and using social science as one among many tactics. He calibrated scientific analysis to strategic objectives in writing four books on the issues of farm labor and agribusiness in California: *Strangers in Our Fields* (1956), *Merchants of Labor* (1964), *Spiders in the House and Workers in the Field* (1970), and *Farm Workers and Agribusiness in California, 1947-1960* (1977). Only the first book was written while Galarza worked for the union.

*Strangers in Our Fields* (1956), more pamphlet than book, had the educational and political purpose to undermine Public Law 78. This law authorized the “braceros” program, an international farm labor infrastructure funneling workers to the United States from Mexico. It resulted in the exploitation of these bi-national laborers while increasing the profitability for large scale agriculture in the United States. Particularly important for Galarza was the fact that braceros were consistently used as strikebreakers. It was a system that brought the United States farm labor market to levels reminiscent of some regions in Mexico.

The book began as an effort to survey the reach of the braceros program in the United States. As the work evolved, it documented the problems with Public Law 78 through accessible language, graphic photographs, simple statistics and direct quotes from the braceros. Galarza (1977: 251) later admitted that the book was purposely provocative: “Presented with the experiences of the braceros in their own language, it was possible that the growers and government agencies would elect to challenge the material and thus bring the issue into the open.” As planned, its publication did instigate
virulent industry blowback. A resolution by the California State Board of Agriculture made numerous charges that *Strangers in Our Fields* contained: “derogatory statements,” “unfounded statements,” “inaccurate statements,” “untrue, disparaging, or otherwise damaging statements,” “erroneous statements and impressions created by said publication are unjustifiably unfavorable,” and that the report was published “without independent investigation and evaluation of the reliability of the research methods and statements of findings, or of possible motives for bias.”

A October 1, 1956 letter from the San Diego County Farmers, Inc. found:

*The pamphlet entitled ‘Strangers in our Fields’ by Ernesto Galarza, made possible through a grant-in-aid from The Fund for the Republic (Ford Foundation) contains a viscous group of false insinuations, and accusations. Its author, Ernesto Galarza, is well known in California for his active participation and leadership in creating labor disputes and social unrest. The convictions, and inferences recorded in this publication signify the author’s contempt for the honest efforts of faithful representatives of the U.S. and Mexico governments. It appears to be a biased, prejudiced, one-sided opinion by one whose interest and leanings could be questioned.*

Agribusiness representatives tried to impugn Galarza’s integrity and his research. Rarely in his life did he allow such a challenge to go unanswered.

Due to this backlash, the Department of Labor refused to publish the report. The U.S. section of the Joint United States – Mexico Trade Union Committee, which did publish it, agreed to investigate any discrepancies within the research. It later found no need for substantial revisions or corrections. Galarza (1956: iv) responded in the second edition’s preface:

*We remind those who previously denounced “Strangers in our Fields” and attempted to suppress it, that truth thrives on controversy and that mere*
denunciation never altered a fact. Censorship in a democracy is never
called for except by those who fear the truth. On behalf of the trade union
movement in both the United States and Mexico we pledge that organized
labor will never cease its efforts in this area until abuses and exploitation
of these Mexican workers as reported in this pamphlet are ended.

The goal of eliciting a challenge, of baiting agribusiness and its allies, had been
successful.

The straightforward booklet was a comprehensive, personalized account of the
program’s effects from the farmworker’s perspective and voice. Its chapter headings
illustrated the concise, simple presentation of its data:

I. Who They Are
II. How It All Began
III. Their Rights
IV. As They See It
V. Housing
VI. What They Earn
VII. Food
VIII. Records and Deductions
IX. Transportation
X. Insurance
XI. Intermediaries
XII. Administration and Enforcement
XIII. Worker Representation
XIV. The Bracero Himself

These chapters give an account of daily life within the bracero’s bureaucratized lives,
smothering counterarguments in a barrage of detailed, first-person accounts. These
included dilapidated housing; insufficient, or outright theft of wages; oversupplying labor
markets causing depressed wages; overcharging for substandard food; inaccurate record
keeping and inappropriate pay deductions; unsafe transportation; health insurance
premium deductions for inadequate or non-existent coverage; use of the farm labor
padrone system; lax enforcement of program regulations; and poor worker representation
at all institutional levels. The braceros were inherently vulnerable and exploitable within
this labor system. One said, “These things have to be tolerated in silence because there is no one to defend our guarantees. In a strange country you feel timid – like a chicken in another rooster’s yard” (Galarza 1957: 75). Unknown to many of these workers, Galarza and his union were attempting to fill this role through their documentary evidence and publication of empirically-based findings.

A four month survey enabled Galarza to collect first-hand accounts from braceros. He visited camps and worksites where he conducted interviews. Photographs emphasized his descriptions of housing and living conditions. *Strangers in the Fields* (1956: 1) began with a Mexican farmworker saying, “In this camp we have no names. We are called only by numbers.” From this statement, Galarza proceeded to ethnographically document the conditions of the braceros experience in the United States spanning the trans-border migration from recruitment in Mexican villages to work conditions in the fields. His account remained close to its research subjects and reader, who were metaphorically placed in the fields and work camps. From this first inflammatory pamphlet, Galarza followed with increasingly analytic scholarship.

Congress terminated Public Law 78 on May 29, 1963. *Merchants of Labor* was published the next year. It would be a requiem to a deceased institution. It was also, therefore, a victory for Galarza who had committed ten years to achieving the demise of the law. The elimination of the braceros program had been a goal dating back to the DiGiorgio strike in 1947. With subsidized, braceros labor (also used as strikebreakers) cleared from the market, the United Farmworker Union found traction and collective bargaining success upon the defeat of Public Law 78, vindicating Galarza’s strategy and objective.
*Merchants of Labor*, subtitled “An account of the managed migration of Mexican farm workers in California 1942-1960,” expanded research based on the preceding *Strangers in our Fields* and fleshed out the evolving template for Galarza’s later scholarship. This research model altered his previous mix of source material, expanding it to include academic literature; international, federal and state documents such as laws, committee reports, policy briefs, hearings, surveys, and meeting minutes; newspaper and magazine articles; case law; popular literature; and publications from non-profits, unions and advocacy groups. Onto this array of sources, Galarza wove a lyrical narrative reminiscent of a dramatic novel. His scholarship, linear and dense, weighted like a mace, was a heavy weapon for farmworker advocates. The book marked the beginning of a period of writing and scholarship for Galarza; a turn from explicit advocacy through labor organizing to research and pedagogy through social science scholarship.

One difference between *Strangers* in 1956 and Galarza’s later scholarship on agribusiness was a shift in his position and professional purpose. The earlier work was propagandistic, more visceral and subjective than scientifically distant and objective. The reader felt the heat of the fields, squalor in the work camps and the grift of a society cheating its most vulnerable. *Strangers* wasn’t contextualized in social science literatures but within the struggle for existence among Mexican farmworkers. It was reminiscent of how Lange and Taylor’s *An American Exodus* differed from Taylor’s academic writing, for it evoked empathy and dared an ambivalent reader to avert their gaze at moral cost. Drawing from previous experience, Galarza broadened his analysis bringing in a variety of source material that added to the scope of his own experience.
*Merchants of Labor* was a detailed overview of Public Law 78, a topic that Galarza had engaged in for many years. With this perspective, and limiting the study up to 1960, he began with a series of rhetorical questions framing his inquiry:

In these pages the analysis of the bracero system is not carried out beyond the end of 1960. The perspective suggested in Part VI suspends but does not conclude the bracero story. Others may pick it up with the sudden termination of Public Law 78 by the House of Representatives on May 29, 1963, and the panic in paradise that followed this stunning news. It would be a tale of East-of-Eden shaking as from an earthquake, the publicity mills of the agricultural corporations foretelling disasters: entire crops being lost, the price of food doubling, banks closing, canneries going bankrupt, family farming ruined, and communism erupting in Mexico.

Scholars will no doubt in good time weigh the truth of these matters. Then, also, questions not examined here will be raised: Are Mexican braceros, man for man, more productive than domestic laborers? Does the employment of braceros keep down prices of California products to consumers? Is the state’s agribusiness so competitive that its very survival requires a permanent alien contract labor force? Is this indentured alien – an almost perfect model of the economic man, an ‘input factor’ stripped of the political and social attributes that liberal democracy likes to ascribe to all human beings ideally – is this bracero the prototype of the production man of the future? (Galarza 1964: 16)

These research questions were left to unknown future scholars, yet this pedagogical trait of presenting lines of inquiry for others to follow became a characteristic of Galarza’s scholarship. In the first paragraph, Galarza referenced “others may pick it up…” and the entire second paragraph beginning with “Scholars will no doubt in good time weigh the truth…,” which laid out future research directions. In his research, he then supported his arguments with linearly structure and densely supported empirical evidence.

The scope of *Merchants* utilized and expanded Galarza’s previous experience with the braceros program. Its breadth now incorporated increased historical and analytic context and drew less from the personalized accounts of the workers. The chapters increased attention on agribusiness and the collusion of institutions – national labor
unions, the federal government and others – in the facilitation of or acquiescence to industrial consolidation and the marginalization of farm workers. Section and chapter titles structured the presentation of Galarza’s argument:

Part I. Backgrounds, 1880-1942
Chapter 1. Mexico – Folks with Plenty of Nothing
Chapter 2. California, the Uncommonwealth
Chapter 3. Migration by Drift
Chapter 4. The Pooling of Labor
Chapter 5. The Manpower Crisis of World War II

Part II. From Drift to Administered Migration
Chapter 6. The Braceros, 1941-1951
Chapter 7. Wetback Obbligato, 1948-1954

Part III. Administered Migration
Chapter 8. The Braceros, 1951-1960
Chapter 9. How the Braceros Were Used
Chapter 10. Agribusiness Comes of Age

Part IV. The Structure of Control
Chapter 11. Consultation, Negotiation and Contracting
Chapter 12. The Creation of Labor Shortages
Chapter 13. The Prevailing Wage – Fact and Fiction
Chapter 14. Administered Wages
Chapter 15. Domination – Jobs and Procedures
Chapter 16. The Manipulation of Bracero Pools

Part V. Adverse Effects
Chapter 17. The Braceros and Their Discontents
Chapter 18. Defeat of the Domestics
Chapter 19. The Failure of Countervailance
Chapter 20. The Public Image of Public Law 78

Part VI. Perspective
Chapter 21. Alternatives to the Bracero
Chapter 22. Administered Migration – An Estimate

Repeatedly, Galarza used this pedagogical practice – akin to signposting – when he laid out his argument. In this case, he framed his case regarding the “administered migration” of braceros.
In Part I, Galarza’s framing of rural Californian land ownership as the “uncommonwealth” was reminiscent of McWilliams’ (1939) *Factories in the Field*. The valley had been characterized by enormous landholdings since European settlement. Using Paul Taylor’s 1960 testimony from the Cobey Committee, Galarza noted that by 1889 large scale farms in California were already illustrating monopolistic power with one-sixth of them producing more than two-thirds of crop value. Other contemporary sources have acknowledged California’s early consolidation of agricultural landholdings including Igler’s (2001) *Industrial Cowboys* and Arax and Wartzman’s (2003) *The King of California*. Galarza revisited this history to frame his context and leverage his argument.

A crux of this argument was that the bracero program’s initiation, cost sharing, implementation and daily operations were borne at public expense. The first three years, from 1942 to 1945, all program costs, estimated at $55 million, were covered by the Federal government. After 1951, while employers covered transportation and subsistence costs, the government still paid $17.7 million from 1952 to 1959 for compliance and administration. In addition, the Farm Placement Service provided for certification and other program duties that were paid from federal unemployment taxes, which commercial farmers did not pay. This was an arrangement of public subsidy of the industrialization of agriculture that found parallels in other areas like water and technology.

In Chapter 10, the managed migration of Mexican farm labor was linked to the maintenance and development of agribusiness.

Of California’s agriculture in the century that ended in 1960 it could well be said that the more it changed the more it became the same thing, for change in this case was but fulfillment, ever on a larger scale, of the original endowment.
The holding and management of land was increasingly dominated by large units as the small, multiple-crop family farms withered. Corporations set the pace in technology and organization. Wealth production increased enormously. Productivity outran the national average. Competition was successfully met in markets 3,000 miles away. Specialized cropping took over. Field labor was assured through an improving system of administered migration which acted as the cost cushion of the industry. These factors, mainly, brought agribusiness to its maturity.

As the sprawling land grants of the Spanish and Mexican periods were appropriated the amount of land under cultivation increased. Though in size the new ranches could not compare with those of the pre-American epoch bigness remained predominant. By 1959, California had 36,887,000 acres of farmland and of these 30,099,000 acres were in farms of 500 acres or more. Between 1950 and 1960 the acreage in farms of up to 49 acres decreased by 431,000 acres to a remainder of 925,000 acres only. The combined increase for farms with more than 500 acres during the same period was 2,097,000 acres. In the period from 1934 to 1954 farms with less than 1,000 acres decreased by 15 per cent while farms with more increased by 48 per cent (Galarza 1964: 107; citing the California Census of Agriculture).

Requisite for these trends was the subsidy of braceros labor, which combined with other public financed benefits such as subsidizing irrigation infrastructure. Large grower associations were formed to assist in the deliver of braceros, with Imperial Valley Farmers Association and the San Joaquin Farm Production Association hiring the most braceros. These two regions were most representative of industrial-scale agriculture in the state. Overall, while the Department of Labor benefited from having to contract with fewer entities by using the associations; in turn, the growers purchased labor in bulk, much to their advantage (Galarza 1964: 112, 114).

The Farm Placement Service was integral to this system as it certified the need for braceros and justified those certifications under the rules laid down by the Department of Labor. These rules grew out of the methods and techniques which had been worked out for establishing the validity of need by the Extension Service of the University of California during World War II. These methods did not change noticeably in the following twenty years. They proved ingenious, or perhaps ingenuous,
enough to give statistical prestige to the imponderables, unpredictables and unknowns of labor shortage forecasting (Galarza 1964: 232).

A debate needed to occur. Could agribusiness have been initiated (and was it economically viable) without public subsidy? Were economies of scale eventually going to bankrupt smaller producers and what socioeconomic effects would such change bring to local communities? Galarza also asked a different question: what were the ethics of offering public subsidies to a system that harms people and undermines the economic standing of a broad base of workers and residents? Government institutions, including the University of California, were conducting their own experiments on rural California in real time without understanding the repercussions of the changes that were being instigated and encouraged.

At this juncture, Galarza moved into a new period of his life. His work with the National Agricultural Workers Union drew to a close, though he was reticent to leave. Letters from that period illustrate his inclination to continue to work on farm labor issues and desire to stay in California. A Christmas Eve letter dated December 24, 1960 to Congressman John F. Shelley was written just months after leaving the union.35

Dear Jack,

Without any doubt you have many more pressing matters to deal with than a letter from a non-constituent suggesting a job for himself. I am prompted to write you anyway, because my request lies in an area with which you have had a good deal to do, and so effectively. Since October 22 I have been out of work. That was the date on which the Amalgamated Meat Cutters' terminated me from their payroll. They did have work for me in places distant from California, but I declined to leave. I would be interested in working on the staff of some House Committee with proper jurisdiction to investigate the Mexican labor program, if I would be assigned to California.

35 Stanford University Library, Special Collection, Ernesto Galarza Papers MO224, Box 1, Folder 3: Correspondence 1938-1980.
Considering the fact that Public Law 78 will be an issue in the 1961 session of Congress, and the further fact that operation of this program has never been examined by Congress at its sources, I would suppose that some agency of the House would be interested in making careful preparations.

Now a second point.

It is not considered smear in a letter of application or exploration for a job to set forth your disabilities, if they be such. One which I am in all frankness bound to mention is that I am suing the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation for libel in the sum of $2,000,000. I hope this would be no obstacle if there is a job somewhere of the type I have indicated.

Best wishes
Ernesto Galarza

Months later, on May 14, 1961, another letter finds Galarza excluded from the labor movement and unsuccessful at soliciting government employment. If he could not organize and educate with the workers, his default was scholarship.36

Dear Fay,

After several months of trying, I am beginning to think the labor movement in California has no place for me. Government agencies who deal in farm labor do not respond to my inquires either.

I have decided to try the Foundations for a grant to write narratively and analytically about the events of the last ten years.

Will you comb your contacts among such institutions and see if you can turn up one that will spend $3500.00 on me for such purpose. I estimate that I will need about 18 months to complete the research and write the first book – a little ahead of the next extension of Public Law 78.

With great expectations,
Ernesto Galarza

While Merchants of Labor was the book he referred to in this letter (it was finished after the law’s extension was suddenly denied). Galarza was already engaged as a scholar – producing empirically-based knowledge – to a greater extent than when he was working for the union.

Just as Galarza had written about his decade-long engagement on Public Law 78 for Merchants of Labor, he now revisited and referenced another of his decades-long

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36 Stanford University Library, Special Collection, Ernesto Galarza Papers MO224, Box 1, Folder 3: Correspondence 1938-1980.
political struggles in *Spiders in the House and Workers in the Field* (1970). This book detailed a series of strikes and lawsuits involving one of the largest corporations in the United States – the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation. In the 1920’s, DiGiorgio purchased more than twenty thousand acres in Kern County around Arvin and Delano, which were only part of its larger business interests and landholdings. By 1968, the corporation had $81,869,000 in assets and more than $100,000,000 in sales volume – ninth among the nation’s top corporations (Galarza 1970: 243).

*Spiders* examined the strategic and tactical moves between DiGiorgio and its opponents, including Galarza himself playing a central role as participant and narrator.\(^{37}\) The study encompassed the history of Galarza’s union organizing with the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU). It moved from Kern County picket lines to Californian courtrooms and Congressional proceedings in Washington D.C. The analogy of a spider web was used to describe the intrigues and complex weave of traps set by DiGiorgio – the spider – while the corporation attempted to eliminate its opponents in organized labor, including unions and newspapers. A number of intricate “webs” described congressional procedure and protocol, the legal basis of libel and defamation, corporate structures and relationships, and defining the legitimacy of government reports such as the *Congressional Record*.

The first webs were constructed around a NFLU strike on DiGiorgio’s farms. During that union action, a film titled “Poverty in the Valley of Plenty” was produced by the Hollywood Film Council (affiliated with the A.F. of L.). Portions of the film were deemed to have blurred the line between generalizations on agribusiness and DiGiorgio’s specific agribusiness. Two initial lawsuits reinterpreted legal rulings of defamation and

\(^{37}\) In the book, Galarza refers to himself in the third person, as “Galarza.”
suggested that a case for libel could be made against the union, film makers and their representative leaders. Decades of legal complaints over libel followed in a protracted, subterranean war:

4) DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation v. AFL-CIO, Norman Smith, United Packinghouse Workers AWOC et. al. filed September 13, 1960.

The cases were acts in an economic drama playing out in post-war California between labor and the emerging agricultural industry. At stake was the political sanction and legal leverage to gain superior position in that struggle.

During the series of lawsuits, over many years, the object of inquiry shifted. Originally it was the “Poverty” film and its mischaracterizations. In later cases though the object of litigation would turn to a central document generated during the first lawsuits – Congressman Werdel’s Extension of Remarks to the House of Representatives. This document, later characterized as a “majority report,” was vested with the authority of Congress and therefore had legal standing in court, which Galarza (1970: 51) characterized as “borrowed dignity.” A portion of the report stated, “The processes of the Congress of the United States have been perverted and misused by the National Farm Labor Union in order to furnish a sounding board for its claims” (Galarza 1970: 53). It was signed by three Congressmen serving on that subcommittee: Richard Nixon,
Thruston Morton and Tom Steed (Werdel was not serving on this subcommittee but was the Representative from DiGiorgio’s district near Arvin and Bakersfield). Ironically, as illustrated over the next decades, it was the Werdel document that was a defamatory misrepresentation. Upon initial release, however, it was “the perfect web” and highly damaging to the union’s court case and existence. By the end of this period of lawsuits, the object of litigation ultimately had shifted to the U.S. Congress, its procedures, and how information was legitimized as public documents with legal authority.

The Werdel report was substantiated through the findings of the initial court proceedings. Thereafter, its evidence and precedents were repeatedly deployed by the corporation in later lawsuits, newspaper reporting and other propagandistic purposes. It made four libelous charges against union officials: bearing false witness, making false statements for financial gain, collecting money for a nonexistent strike, and perverting the process of the U.S. Congress. Recorded statements, such as Werdel’s Extension of Remarks, were a common and insignificant practice in the Congress. Yet, Galarza (1970: 57-58; italics in original) noted that the deliberate misrepresentation of them in this case became

by all appearances, no less than a congressional arraignment issued in the printed pages of the Congressional Record. No common jury of ordinary citizens had spoken, or a judge sitting on a superior court bench in any one of three thousand counties. It was Federal power, in whose name congressional committees wielded what Edmund Burke called, “the thunder of the state.” The Corporation could not desire more political advantage than this.

In fact, Galarza (1970: 143) was arguing that when the report was used in court it represented three “paper witnesses” who had the reputations of the three congressmen who said they signed the document. This report, which came to be referred to as the
Nixon-Morton-Steed report, after the three politicians, was utilized for “multiple uses” which Galarza (1970: 124-125) elaborately detailed as:

judicial, in that it was a finding upon matters of fact and of law as to the guilt of notorious persons identified with the labor movement; evidential, in that it proved the fraudulence of their works; juridical, in that it ruled upon its own credibility and allowed its own admission as evidence; adversary, in that it pleaded the case for the Corporation and against the union; legislative, in that it clothed itself with all the prestige of a deliberative action of Congress; inquisitional, in that it was a sentence pronounced after a thorough investigation and study by a subcommittee of the House; publicitarian, in that it was always certain to gain widespread attention in the press; constitutional, in that it uncovered a perversion of the processes of the Congress; and prophetic, in that it intimated that Congress would never abandon the agricultural industry to the rapacity of farm workers by granting them the protection of Federal law.

Because one of the charges in the Werdel document included that the union had “perverted and misused” Congressional processes, Galarza (1970: 59) was aware that in its context of McCarthyism, these claims could potentially be construed as “subversion” and “abuse” and lead to even worse outcomes for the defendants.

Werdel’s Extension of Remarks were catastrophic for the union. Within sixty days of the publication of the Congressional document the strike was defeated, picketing stopped, the union confessed to defamation and the film was discredited with all copies destroyed. The corporation did not allow striking workers to return, a dispossession that cast 1,000 of them out of work and home. In addition, the State Federation of Labor withdrew its support for the NFLU, in effect, permanently crippling it (it was reconstituted as the National Agricultural Workers Union). This first legal action and use of the Werdel report wove “the perfect web” as “a mesh of decisions, legal actions, deployments, understandings and moves that were calculated to prevent unionization” (Galarza 1970: 66, 69).
The bitter conflict between the union and DiGiorgio was not finished. A decade after its first showing, the corporation heard that the “Poverty” film was again being shown in the valley. The Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC), unaware of the previous lawsuit’s settlement, was using it illegally in an organizing effort. DiGiorgio rushed into legal proceedings on May 18, 1960 after only verifying that the film had been shown on May 13. It chose to ignore stipulations from the previous libel settlement under which it was supposed to give a thirty-day notice before suing other parties. In May of 1960, DiGiorgio was also unaware that both Mitchell and Galarza were no longer working for AWOC, so the corporation unwittingly named them in the suit as well. Meanwhile, AWOC had walked into a web waiting to snare them.

Galarza (1970:149-150), writing about himself, describes the game play and tactical moves that occurred between himself and DiGiorgio in the summer of 1960:

In a hurry there was little time to weigh other considerations, among them how Galarza might react to the charges in the complaint and particularly those in the press release. This defendant was in some respects in a worse position than Smith and his associates. He, and not the others, was accused of failure to perform the terms of an agreement and of deliberately flouting (the press release said “flaunting”) a court order. Against him and Mitchell [both of whom previously worked for NFLU] in particular were again arrayed the indictments published by Werdel, Nixon, Morton and Steed. Among these was the charge of perversion of the constitutional processes of Congress, not precisely an accusation of treason but faintly suggesting it . . . As Galarza gave thought to these matters, Murray [Galarza’s attorney] proceeded to instruct the Corporation and its attorneys on the unfortunate misstatements and contradictions in the press release. The short educational course was tendered at no cost to DiGiorgio on the supposition that upon discovering the truth, the Corporation would publicly disavow those portions of the release and dismiss Galarza from the suit.

On September 13, the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation did dismiss the suit against Galarza and Mitchell but did not retract its unfounded assertions or explain its reasons for
bringing legal action against these men. Two days later, on September 15, 1960, Galarza issued a complaint for libel against the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation for malicious prosecution and publishing false news stories.

This lawsuit, and the intervening years since the first complaints of libel, had allowed Galarza and Murray to better understand the Werdel’s Congressional report as central to the case. They bore down into this document contesting the legitimacy incorrectly afforded it in earlier trials. For their inquiry they utilized the legal mechanisms open to them through their lawsuit – subpoenas, interrogatories, depositions and requests for admission. They called thirteen deponents including: Robert DiGiorgio, Executive Vice President of the corporation; Bruce Sanborn, another DiGiorgio Vice President; Malcolm Dungan, a partner of DiGiorgio’s law firm; Albert O’Dea, DiGiorgio’s publicity agent; William Callan, from the Associated Farmers who had investigated the 1960 “Poverty” showings; Congressman Werdel; Congressman Steed; Edward Hayes of the Farm Placement Service; Congressman Gubser; and finally Vice-President Nixon, who had been a congressman when he supported the Werdel report. Through the lawsuit, Galarza was able to make inquires and elicit new details through sworn depositions in which false testimony could be perjurious.

Galarza focused on disentangling the web behind the previous four DiGiorgio lawsuits. The main points being: who were the authors of the Werdel report; was the report considered a record of official proceedings of the House; what communications and connections were there between Congressman Werdel and the corporation before the drafting of the report; was the corporation involved in drafting the Werdel report; and was there a connection between the corporations legal actions with union busting and the
undermining of labor organizing efforts (Galarza 1970). During the trial, Galarza and his lawyer established, through the use of expert testimony, that the same typewriter from DiGiorgio’s law firm had been used to prepare legal documents in the 1949 court case and Werdel’s Congressional report, which was supposed to have been written in Washington, D.C. A strong case had been made. The jury returned a split verdict finding some of DiGiorgio’s actions were untrue yet without malice. No monetary damages were awarded. The trial had taken four years – it had been a battle of attrition contesting representations of the truth.

By the mid-1950’s Galarza was the only NAWU staff member in California. He participated in a number of strikes, including the Imperial Valley melon and Delano grape strikes of July 1952 and the Los Banos cantaloupe strike later that same summer. After he left the union, he had an opportunity to devote himself to scholarship and writing. DiGiorgio sued a few other newspapers for libel in 1964 and 1965, starting with George Ballis’ Valley Labor Citizen, but the contest was spent. In his “conclusion without an end” after decades of grappling with DiGiorgio over libel and truth, Galarza (1970: 273) contemplated:

So men make the choice how they will use the compelling exercise of mind they cannot avoid while they live. The true deceivers are faced with competition from truth searchers, who are even fewer in number . . . Given time and opportunity [the human mind] can find its way through the mists of possible truth and possible fiction that spread in all directions from a given fixed point of fact.

After writing two books on Public Law 78 and another on the DiGiorgio strike and court battles (Galarza 1956, 1964, 1970), Galarza’s last book on farm labor and agribusiness encompassed a comprehensive historical overview of his work.
In 1977, *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California, 1947-1960* examined California’s “agri-businessland” that Galarza challenged as a union organizer, educator and scholar. The book was a three-part history of (1) the union’s “intense, widespread organizational activity . . . into the structure of the agricultural industry,” which primarily involved a series of strikes, between 1947 and 1952; (2) the period of “action research” between 1952 and 1959 where the union engaged “corporate agriculture” bureaucratically through legal appeals and propaganda focused on government programs colluding with agribusiness by not following the agreements codified in Public Law 78 and its braceros program; and (3) reflections upon the dismantling of the union in 1960 and strategic decisions throughout its decades-long campaign. Both Galarza (1977) and Taylor (1979) compiled overviews of their valley scholarship in single books; while Taylor’s *Essays on Land, Water and the Law in California* compiled previously written law reviews focused on reclamation policy and land reform, Galarza’s *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California, 1947-1960* offered an comprehensive overview of union activity, farm labor politics and contesting agribusiness. They both laid out their scholarship, compiled in books or placing primary source material in accessible and protected public spaces like university archives.

The chapters of Galarza’s books were particularly significant. He recognized them as scaffolding for future inquiry. This list for *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California, 1947-1960* was comprehensive:

I. Introduction
II. Agri-businessland
These chapter titles represented some of Galarza’s last published scholarship on farm labor and agribusiness in California. He had entered the fray, often alone, against formidable foes. This narrative alone was interesting; but it appeared quixotic in the context of Californian agriculture with the gargantuan scale of its economic interests, their willingness only a few years earlier to use vigilante and political violence against unions and the added weight of state and federal bureaucracies aligned against labor’s position and interests.

Galarza’s presentation of these issues, because of his unique position in the research, required a different scholarly approach:
In my encounters with those who administered the bracero system out of public view, the workers had no opportunity to act. In such situations I was often the only adversary, and I see no practical method of reporting these incidents otherwise. If this style suggests a certain nonobjectivity of the narrative, so much the better. The ultimate compass of what men say and write and do are values, which cannot be found anywhere save in their conscience, reflected in every choice of behavior self-servingly characterized as “objective.”

The academically minded may find the suggested readings too thin. A solid appendix of published references with a ballast of footnotes will no doubt be provided in time by those who might consider this text insufficient. For the convenience of such, I have given the Stanford University Library all the papers that I and my fellow-unionists collected during the years of action (Galarza 1977: xiii).

His clarification invited another question: what qualifies knowledge as scholarly? As Galarza addressed potential criticism from campus-based scholars, he challenged their literature-based knowledge claims with his personal and extensive experience in the setting itself. Though they may know the literature, they were not in the fields. As a scholar and an organizer, Galarza was at once a legitimate research subject (he suggests that there may not be anyone else who knows the information he does); an expert in the field of farm labor, agriculture and immigration; and a scholar recording these events into a body of academic literature.38

In this last book on Californian agriculture, Galarza examined some of the pedagogical and research aspects of his union activities. His “action research” at the time was an “analysis of existing social power.” It involved a process where

the union’s small but active cadres wrenched from corporation agriculture a picture of the bracero system, the mesh of American society – government, the universities, the rural press, diplomacy – was revealed. The accounts from the fields profiled the structure of power which the bracero system manifested (Galarza 1977: xii-xiii).

When initiating the farm labor union in California, its leaders took time to research their target – agribusiness. The organizing campaign was “a period of continuous forced entry and discovery in the face of great odds” (Galarza 1977: 352).

In combining roles of teacher, organizer and scholar, Galarza was a potent adversary. Though initially under the radar, he prepared the groundwork for later labor upheavals by expanding leadership capacity, increasing worker education and using participatory methods of gathering information to write newspaper and other articles for the union. He sought to translate analysis of “California’s rural social structure,” which appeared impenetrable and indomitable, into language that farmworkers could understand, adapt and adopt (Galarza 1970: 83). His pedagogy of the oppressed, utilized during his union organizing, described aspects of his worker-based education and research:

At this core of organization, with Galarza in charge as director of education and research, the Union maintained a program of information, discussion, analysis, and techniques of group action suitable to the requirements of the strike. There was a strong mental appetite among many of the members to understand the social forces that for all their concealment by the mists of “high edgication” were bearing down on Local 218. Into these dim, outer margins, the Union laid a course of guidance and instruction. The curriculum was not the facts of work and life, which the workers knew better than the Union officials. It was the meanings of these facts when related to one another in patterns that had not been noticed before . . . . Taught to appreciate the meaning of routine details in the daily work experience, the members of the Union became the eyes and ears of a research operation such as agribusiness had never been exposed to. However remote the places where agribusiness planned its strategies to manipulate the labor market, in the end these strategies took concrete shape in Wetback pools, bracero crews and the hundred ways in which the domestic workers were harassed and displaced. Union intelligence was simple. It consisted of listening to the members, checking their reports, assembling these in outlines for discussion by study groups, and equipping the members to look more closely and carefully and to report again and again. These were the sources of the press releases and reports that the
Union issued in its nationwide propaganda which provided a protective shield for Local 218 (Galarza 1970: 75).

The three-year DiGiorgio organizing campaign’s successes, for Galarza, were attributable to diversity and equity. He noted the ethnic diversity of the workers – Filipinos, Mexicans and southern whites – where “the mingling of the races did not reduce the distance between them that contractors and employers encouraged. In the Union meetings this distance was shortened by a deliberate effort to overcome the barriers of prejudice and language.” In addition, Galarza (1970: 74) continued, men and women took roles of leadership with “a shambling reluctance and a shy speech to the effect that ‘I hadn’t oughta do it fer I ain’t got no high edgication’.” Though unsuccessful, the campaign had illustrated that a sustained organizing effort could be undertaken against the most powerful economic interests by the most vulnerable workers.

By 1952, it had become apparent to Galarza that the action research had not been successful, especially against the DiGiorgio corporation. It did however overturn Public Law 78, which had been one of its primary goals.

The attack on Public Law 78 rested entirely on the vigilance of the local volunteers, their training in what the law, the contracts, and the international agreements provided as to the rights of both domestics and braceros. . . . The increasing capability of the volunteers to confront the agents of the Farm Placement Service at any level drove them to concealment and hole-in-corner intrigues. When the records of the Department of Employment were finally opened for local inspection, the volunteers quickly became familiar with them and used them effectively. Grievances brought by braceros were attended by the volunteers, who became adept at using the work contracts to press the complaints and add to the union’s knowledge on that score (Galarza 1977: 355).

This statement of the union’s work illustrated the educational outreach and development necessary to build volunteer capacity until they were trained enough to argue the fine points of bureaucratic legislation and international labor agreements to the very
government authorities charged with their oversight and implementation. It was understandable why Galarza would refer to this work as “action research” since the volunteers are acting as an applied research team. In addition, through this process of engagement, the NAWU’s and volunteer’s knowledge continued to expand and refine.

Galarza needed to teach these volunteers, and the broader public, but he also needed to empower them to act. He needed to demystify the imposing figure of corporate agriculture. In introducing the “Agri-businessland” section, Galarza discussed research related to social systems. He focused on the object of 12 years of labor organizing and much of his scholarship to this point, seeking to disrupt this “immovable social institution” so that it can be seen as a process, in play, at present:

There is a deceptiveness about social systems that beguiles those who view them, because of fondness, interest, or perversity, as a product exclusively, ignoring them as a process. The present is only the front end of a culture. On its surface it is possible to trace boundaries, categories, types, classes, and settlements that can be isolated for semantic treatment to the delight of scholars and the advantage of politicians. It is like viewing a kaleidoscope clamped firmly in a vice so it will not turn even slightly and scatter the charmingly frozen image. There is a certain peace of mind in peering at such images, as there is in gazing at seemingly immovable social institutions.

From a distant perspective, Agri-businessland had that look when the Southern Tenant Farmers Union under its new name, the National Farm Workers Union, went west. It came upon one of those cultural artifacts fashioned over time by the winners of the West, the agri-businessmen. They had worked diligently, appropriating, discarding, adapting, inventing, shaping, sharpening, and remolding the many facets of a new economy and a new polity. Each of these was a component of the long process originally propelled by the self-interests of particular actors, none of whom had a grand design, all of whom had license to hunt freely in a perpetual open season the resources of the West. In time they became cunningly articulated, more abundant in the human debris they left behind them, more efficiently integrated, upward and crosswise. What they had in common was a prowling search to simplify, articulate, discard, and combine more and more until a multifaceted agri-business would look like the model of the multinational corporation. Abstracting them for a closer view, these components can be identified (Galarza 1977: 20).
Galarza broke down the “components,” referenced in the chapter headings, including examples like “The Land”, “Family Farms” and “Academia and the Rural Poor.” These were representations of the rural Californian social system that were researched. But how to affect change in and through them?

While history framed strategy, empowerment involved resolve. In this case, agribusiness presented itself as an all-powerful institution, creating a discursive aura of invulnerability. Galarza referred to this “social power” at various points. His task was not only to educate volunteers on the technical aspects of law; he also needed to motivate them through their own values and commitments. The past was being written in the present – and everyone contributed to its story.

The past can be a compost pile of recollections of the disasters of the many and the triumphs of the few. In it anyone may dig out of curiosity to uncover some missing piece of lore, to fertilize a silting nostalgia, or to settle with faded chronicles a scholarly controversy. History practiced in this way can satisfy those who view the past as residue, as a postmortem of successive epochs in which most men appear as subjects of history, not as its agents.

The past can also be prologue to those who are willing to learn from it. But to what purpose? To offer such minds a place and a role at the forward edge of the search for meaning where time, space, nature, culture, men and their conflicting interests and even disasters mingle to resolve their never-ending tensions.

Even more important is the sense and the will that, once a historical process is understood, a choice can be made as to one’s place in its next moment, and the realization that the best history is that in which one has had an effective part. A mind placed at the forward edge of events and guided by knowledge uses the past, affects the present, and possibly helps form the future.

The action is where people are, and a place among them is the crux of everyman’s search. Human society is an organized complex of settlements, among which men sort themselves into universes of commitment and communication and cooperation reduced to the human scale in which a man’s grasp can equal his reach, physically and intellectually and emotionally. But in time these settlements become the foundations of social power. Gradually they reach out, absorb, integrate,
merge, and acculturate other less vigorous settlements and distort if not
destroy their human scale (Galarza 1977: 350).

Galarza was trying to instigate a break in the social power of discourses of his day
and relegate agribusiness to history. Much of this work, for him, was educational
– a pedagogy of empowerment with volunteer activists, citizens, government
bureaucracies and citizens at large.

Profile of Practice: Experiencing Terror as Education

As much as Galarza was a labor organizer and research scholar, he was also a
teacher. By crafting profile excerpts from The Burning Light: Action and Organizing in the Mexican Community in California (Galarza 1982), I have drawn forward his voice with reference to his pedagogical practice. The book was an autobiographical oral history presented in a series of interviews and conversations recorded between 1977 and 1981. In his scholarship, Galarza often referred to himself in the third person – as “Galarza” – but through these historical transcripts we are offered his unfiltered, first-person voice as he gave lessons near the end of his life.

One of these examples occurred on April 20, 1977 when Galarza was asked to
give a talk to UC Berkeley’s Chicano Studies students. Much of it was a reflection on his organizing work and practice of politically engaged scholarship:

The subject or theme that I was asked to think about out loud this morning is the role of the Chicano graduate student on campus and in society . . . of the opportunities for maintaining a connection between the scholar and, for want of a better phrase, the people who are outside the campus (Galarza 1982: 28).
For Galarza, scholarship did not directly equate with having a position in an academic institution. In fact, he spurned these opportunities when they arose. He referred to himself as a “migrant” – constantly moving, staying abreast of issues, in step with his community:

“We have to take a closer look at the academic world itself. I guess I have taught in a half a dozen universities in California. I’m now teaching a course in the politics of bilingual education at UC Santa Cruz. So I’ve had an opportunity – really I’m something of an intellectual migrant – to look at the establishment in all of these places. At first I wasn’t aware that I was a professional intellectual migrant, and really the circumstances of my personal life were such that I just couldn’t sink roots on any campus. But those circumstances gradually led me to look at the establishment in which I was working temporarily with a much more critical eye, and gradually I developed an attitude. And the attitude, which I expressed to a couple of my colleagues at Santa Cruz, was this: I am there temporarily filling a slot, holding it for another person who will be coming in the fall as a permanent faculty member. And the talk was whether or not I would consider applying myself for that slot. It pays well, tenure to start with, nice campus, a maximum of maybe two courses a week, two lectures a week. I said no. They asked, “What is your reason?” My answer was maybe a little disrespectful, but I meant it.

I said, “If I stay here much longer than three quarters I’ll feel that I am sinking roots into a cemetery.” I really mean that. The intellectual fervor at campus, the ferment of ideas and that kind of recklessness that comes early in your life when you discover the possibilities of following an idea through and down and over until you are on top of it and can speak about it with authority and with honesty – that is going on in the Santa Cruz campus, not among the faculty, but among the students. So if I could invent some way by which I could maintain my relationship with the students and take them off campus with me a couple of times a week and do things in the community, I’d accept that job. But those weren’t the terms which I was offered. So I’m again about to move my tent to some other campus (Galarza 1982: 34).

While understanding students’ constraints, he also spoke of the student’s responsibilities to the Chicano community and of continuing with their education:

Most of the students that have been coming to me for the last ten years have given up, have abandoned the idea of doing any research that interests them and has some relationship to the community, to California, or the southwest. A few hang on. But if they hang on they run into a different set of problems. Those problems have to do with the Chicano experience of the sixties. That experience brought to a peak all sorts of awareness, one of them being the role of the university, the role of the campus Chicano, in the affairs of the community.

I have had this experience at San Jose State University. I taught one seminar in the School of Social Work for two semesters. We began by a discussion of theoretical
foundations of community organization, and we ended by my seminar being discontinued because during the middle of the year we split up into teams to examine what was going on in the various barrios of San Jose. We assigned ourselves tasks of very serious, hard research to find out what was going on. So that seminar was not cancelled, it was not suppressed, it was not discontinued, it just fumore – it disappeared as so much smoke and fog.

You Chicano scholars who are here now today must recognize this drastic change on the American campus, and begin to ask yourselves, must we abandon what’s here for us? This campus contains immeasurable treasures for all of us. Here is an accumulation of experience that should be open to us for each one of us to analyze and evaluate and put to our own uses. And you can’t get it off campus – these magnificent libraries and research facilities. These are public facilities. This is public wealth organized and set up here for your use. Please think very carefully before you abandon this place because of certain difficulties that you’re having. The thing to remember is that the training, the capability in the law, in sociology, in whatever these disciplines may be called, is available only here. Unfortunately, it is under the control, under the vigilance of people who don’t share your motivation. But that is no reason why you should abandon your claim to these resources. You do have a claim to them.

The point of view that I’m asking you to consider, of course, is not an easy one to carry out. One of the difficulties that we as Chicanos and Mexicans have always faced is that our universe in the university is so unfamiliar and so distant from the community from which we come. It’s awfully hard to explain to your families and to your neighbors – neighborhoods that are constantly in turmoil and in the process of change – what it is you’re up to, what you’re doing, what your difficulties are. There’s a gradual alienation between us on campuses and those in the community. I contend that the solution or the effort to overcome that alienation is ours and not the community’s. We understand what causes it. We know why we are victimized by it. We know why the community itself is victimized. But you cannot ask a person who has not had your opportunities to become mentally critical and professionally competent to dig at, to go at the fact that you need to establish a thesis. (Galarza 1982: 36-37).

An intense dedication to bring public resources to his community was indicative of Galarza’s disposition throughout his career. It was as if his career wasn’t his own but rather part of his community. He was frustrated repeatedly by difficulties in bringing the university to the people.

In his lecture, he also explained research fieldwork – its process, practice and design. Just as he used his table of contents in a number of his books to direct students toward following his line of inquiry. A similar sentiment was inferred as he offered a view into the practice of community-based research – its relational, personal connections;
the necessity for persistent determination to find information; the gritty resolve needed to confront injustice. Here is Galarza as mentor:

I’m often asked about these books that I have written, how long it took me to do them. I’ll tell you how long it took. Spiders in the House, the research on that began in 1952 and ended in 1974. This book that is to be published by the Notre Dame University Press, Farm Workers and Agribusiness in California, 1947-1960, [1977], the research began in 1947 and it ended two years ago. If you want to compare the discipline, the persistence, the diligence that’s required to do a piece of research in the field of social science, you will find that if your subject is important – more than that, if it’s vital – and if it does not fit in the mood of these times and these days, it’s going to take you a long time to do it. You have to determine that it is an important subject. To me, this was an important subject, and after twenty-two years of researching it, I wrote it. And it was important to me because the structure of California politics and its very society have been molded by agribusiness. You can’t touch any part of California society that you don’t put your finger on some aspect of this structure of power. I thought it was important. My own satisfaction, my own curiosity was being driven to get that answer, and I think I have a part of it here. But only a part of it.

I want you people in this room to remember as graduate students that when you read the table of contents of this book, it’s really an outline for your research. There are some forty-five important topics in this table of contents. I have dealt with each one of those, first because it was important to my story; but secondly because I wanted to put enough facts into that particular section so that others might come along and say, “Look, this is not the complete story. There’s a lot that he’s left out of here. Where is the rest of it?” That’s what I’m hoping this book will be – a directory, a guide, a list, a topical list of the research that needs to be done to tell us what’s happened to us in the last fifty years in California. The time that it takes you to do a research job in whatever discipline is only one of the difficulties. Where are the materials? Where do you get the data in these areas of our social experience that nobody has bothered to look at before?

I happen to think that this is precisely the aspect that brings out the best possible qualities of scholarship. I’ve been told so many times that there is no information on this, but my response is, if it happened in human experience somewhere there must be some evidence of it. And if I’ve got to go out myself and look at it, eyeball to eyeball, that’s what I’ll do. As time goes on you’ll find that the pieces begin to fall together. You find evidence in the most extraordinary places. One of the best documents in this book is a memorandum that I found in the wastebasket of a farm labor placement officer in Modesto. He was receiving every week a pile of stuff from the central office in San Francisco, and he’d look at it and throw it in the wastebasket. One day I was visiting him to help with a bit of trouble he was having and the conversation brought us to the wastebasket.

He said, “I’ve just thrown away a document that maybe helps me understand what’s happening.” He had been canned by the regional director of the Bureau of Employment Security because he had been enforcing the bracero law. Probably the only enforcement officer in California who was doing it. And for that, he was canned. In his wastebasket were some routine papers about his job.
So I said, “Well, let me look at them.” We turned the wastebasket upside down on a table and I ploughed through that, and there was one document – some twelve pages – entitled ‘Minutes of the Regional Farm Labor Operations Committee.’ Never heard of it before. I said, ‘Bill, what is this?’ He said, ‘Oh, that’s some outfit that meets now and then. They have dinner and talk about a lot of things. These are their minutes.’ I said, ‘Well, let me have it. Damé. Aca."

I read the document that night, and I discovered that there was in California at that time a kitchen cabinet of about twenty agri-businessmen and politicians who met every two or three months with the top officer of the Department of Labor here in San Francisco or in Sacramento or elsewhere, and that is where bracero policy was made. In those minutes there was a statement from the director of the regional office and the [U.S.] Department of Labor promising – whether he did that on his knees or not, I don’t know – but he promised at that meeting that he would never issue a regulation before clearing it with the presidents and the officers of the Associated Farmers and the local associations. Now, that was Minutes #7. They’d had six meetings before, and maybe they’d had another three of four afterwards. So I wrote Mr. Brockway in San Francisco asking for a set of all the minutes. ‘Minutes of what? Minutes of what? Don’t know what you’re talking about.’ So I started a pilgrimage around the state of California, emptying wastebaskets. By the time I got through, I had all the minutes, the complete set. And if any of you ever want to go into this special feature, go to the Stanford Library and ask for the minutes of the RFLOAC. And you will be able to expand this chapter and point out things which I have no knowledge of because I didn’t follow up on them (Galarza 1982: 38-48).

Galarza invited the students to follow his work. Research was presented as a process, not a product; one reliant upon long term engagement, implying the need for a succession of scholars to engage intractable or inaccessible problems.

At the end of the presentation, he took questions from the students:

**Student:** What do you see happening to graduate students or any Chicano that goes into higher education? You mentioned some people that are now in the hierarchy, the power base; it had a bad effect on the community . . . Is it that we have to stay in the institution, try to change the institution to our perspective of what we have to do?

**Galarza:** I don’t think so. What I’ve been driving at all this morning, is that if you stay in an institution – I dislike the thing that happens to your mind – you become institutionalized. But if you stay within it and try to come to terms, or rather accept its terms, for your survival, you will have to become one of the Chicanos who will become a fixture on the totem pole. And from that time on, his assignment is to make it easy for the institution to turn its face away from reality.
**Student:** What does a student do that’s caught up in that thing now? Would it be a solution to try to set up parallel institutions, a people’s college of the law or apprenticeship programs?

**Galarza:** No, I don’t think so. Because these parallel institutions, if you look at them closely, have a lot of similarity with their prototypes. I think the only way to go is for students who have the luck to survive four or five or six years in an institution, is to milk it. Get all you can, all the techniques, all the skill – you have to become as articulate as the best of them. But don’t lose sight of the fact that politically you are a sitting pigeon, if that’s where you’re going to stay.

**Student:** What percentage of people do you think will go into an institution of higher education and be able to maintain the ability not to get brainwashed?

**Galarza:** How do you maintain an attitude and a value? You maintain it by keeping in touch with those people who represent that value. That is to say, you know something about bilingual education, you know it’s going sour, you know it’s not doing what it should be doing – then you make, and maintain and keep, contact with people in the community who are affected by that problem. You get to know them. You win their trust and their confidence, and over time, you become their advisor, their fellow worker, and their participant in action.

**Student:** I believe I agree with you, that probably one of the greatest concerns that affects us now at the university is the production of intellectuals, who in clothing and in speech speak radically, but who have in essence become this bulwark or beachhead for traditional and even reactionary ideas. We see it here at Berkeley, among a lot of the students, a lot of the professors. What are some of the reasons for that? I’d appreciate an elaboration.

**Galarza:** Yes, I think the main reason for that situation is that there is a vested interest in the past, and the way it views intellectual endeavor. And the degree to which it accepts it, I call the pigeonhole mentality. Pigeonhole mentality is the division of intellectual interests into disciplines. You become an attorney, an anthropologist, and sociologist, an economist – and so on. Now, in my judgment, that is an inevitable sort of necessary evil, because the field of knowledge is vast. And you want to organize it provisionally, so that you can make some sense out of the field that you have selected as your interest.

I say provisionally, because, in my opinion, the usefulness of a discipline is the degree and the way in which it becomes useful to society. And so we have, for instance, the problem of Alviso. First thing I did was to set up a team of seven of us – you would have described it as an interdisciplinary team . . . We joined our forces because we had skills – in the law, in economics, in research – but the purpose of it was to get to the bottom of what was happening in Alviso. Because our aim was to save that town! That was the focus of our endeavor. We were all, I think, fairly qualified technicians in our respective fields, but the object of our getting together was to save this little town. And we did save it.
In the American university, I think if you look at it closely you’ll find that the departments have their vested interests. They want to turn you all into illustrious anthropologists, and after that you can talk about nothing but anthropology, but you won’t know that in East San Jose we have some very crucial problems that require anthropological brains to help us! That’s the choice you have to make. Find those people in the community who can use anthropological counsel (call it whatever you will; but it’s the discipline from which you’re coming), apply it to a situation that is urgent – and it’s important because these people are losing their homes and their jobs. And you’re there to help them. So, my suggestion is to think in terms of a structure that brings you from the academic campus, a community group and some legal support together and go to work on something that is real and pressing and urgent to all of us (Galarza 1982: 46-48).

More than a year and a half later, at his San Jose home on December 7, 1978, Galarza did another interview. As part of the discussion, he offered a “personal manifesto”:

Galarza: There is a limit to what you can ask one individual to do, and I think that limit has been reached with me. Fortunately, we have taken the precaution of leaving a record in various places – in Alviso, in San Francisco, Berkeley, Santa Cruz. So I don’t feel that these are blank pages that still have to be written by me.

In fact, the whole theory on which I operated for years is that if I wrote books in detail, with documentation listed, and bibliographies, that that would be my contribution to the history of my time. But I keep getting calls from people who keep saying to me, “Come and teach. Come and give us a lecture. Teach us this. Fill in these gaps.”

With all the young Chicanos who are in this now, who are taking courses, who are going into graduate school, who are looking for things to do, I’m saying to them, “The system is still there. If you’re young and energetic and if you agree that something’s got to be done, go do it! You have enough of a background in the records I’ve left behind to give you a start.”

But this is a tough assignment! The idea of reading the past in order to do something about the present and the future, is not something that you learn in institutions.

Interviewer: The kind of energy and dedication you’ve put in it is probably a little terrifying to some people who haven’t . . . .

Galarza: That’s right, and I want to keep them terrified.

Interviewer: They may wonder if they can put in it what you have.

Galarza: That’s right. Experiencing that terror is part of their education. Because it is a terrible thing to have spent most of your life working with people . . . and to be forced by circumstances to realistically analyze a social system that’s there in front of you – it’s
terrible! It takes a kind of grit that the schools of education – graduate schools – don’t tell you anything about.

You have to experience the awfulness of a stratified social system that will not become human.

Interviewer: Even though it’s made up of individual human beings.

Galarza: That’s right.

Interviewer: Is it terrifying to look at a social system and see that it’s rigidified and needs change, from the aspect of how do you make a start?

Galarza: I made a start. In my case, my life is well enough known to a number of people through my books, my writing, my letters, in the documentation I’ve left behind. You see, I’ve always had this concern for thirty-four years that this might be significant to people who follow me.

I’m not in the position that most people are who talk into your microphone. What I say into your mike is really a fringe benefit because the people who have left a record in oral history are not people who have written their course. They’re not. I know many of them. And they’re glad of the opportunity to live in oral history because they haven’t taken the time nor had the interest nor the skill nor the opportunity to leave a record of documents and papers behind them. I have. And they are in archives.

In time, if these issues remain alive, it will not be difficult for them – for my successors – to find out from me, from what I’ve written, what happened and my views of what happened – my appraisal, my analysis – it’s all there. Some of it is still too scattered, I’m afraid – but it’s there (Galarza 1982: 107-108).

Scholarship was clearly a process for Galarza. One where “successors” were to pick up the cause and carry it forward. He literally was writing for a future audience. He reflexively engaged in the political struggle through his role as a scholar by producing text, getting his research published in books, then vouchsafing the data and stories in archives. He juxtaposed two locations where a scholar can learn: institutions like “schools of education – graduate schools” or within the actual work of engagement. In order to understand the issues and have access to the most pertinent data, he chose to stay in community, in the research setting, rather than primarily reside on university campuses.
Galarza’s unrelenting resolve offered little refuge for the less committed. For him, a politically engaged scholar made “terrifying” commitments to disrupt mechanisms of injustice. His scholarship was systematically pedagogical. As he wrote, he left a line of bread crumbs, a detective’s trail of clues and the unfinished explorations of increasingly complex and entrenched structure of oppression to assist later researchers in understanding a yet unsolved problem. He invited them to take up the cause through a theory of scholarship that implied a community of researchers sometimes working across generations, sharing purpose and information.

Engagement, particularly in solidarity with the oppressed, offered rich sources of research material. This research method and process was also rife with pedagogical opportunity – for the scholar, for fellow citizens, for future students, and for the community of scholars. An aspect of Galarza’s politically engaged scholarship was illustrated through his work on the braceros program in *Strangers in Our Fields*, where purposeful provocation elicited responses. These in turn made visible the processes of agribusiness and the political alliances acting against the farmworkers. Scholarship then became a tactic, rather than an end product, in the struggle for social and economic justice.

At the most basic level, this research process clarified the object of the inquiry. An “enemy” that could be engaged:

*I reacted with intense interest to a remark that was made this morning that one of the difficulties of the Mexican-American community is that it has not pinpointed the enemy . . . I ought to tell you that some fifteen or twenty years ago, more than that, perhaps, I asked myself the very same question. I had been working and living with farm laborers in this state, and I had moved with them up and down the state for many years, coming at last to the conclusion that one of our difficulties was that we had not defined the target: who was the enemy? So I spent some ten years of my life in an experiment. What happens to a Mexican-American community and those who presume to lead it when...*
they do pinpoint the enemy? And we did. I helped to organize some twenty locals of farmworkers in this state from Yuba City to the Mexican border. It was our continuous effort not only to organize the farmworkers, but to try to help them to understand where the enemy was. I think we succeeded. In fact, the best evidence that we did succeed is that we were so thoroughly destroyed.

In some ten years of what I like to call dynamic research (and someone will tell me if somebody else has thought of this before) – and by this I mean in areas of social experience where information is awfully hard to get because it’s very closely guarded; the only way to get it is to go out and not ask for the information, but to challenge those who are keeping it to themselves – in California it became obvious to me that the way to get at the understanding of why farm labor was so exploited and lived so miserably in a hundred hamlets in this state, the way to do that was to engage the enemy!

So we organized with the purpose of taking down a peg or two the power of the Associated Farmers of California, of the banks and insurance companies who have very high investments in agriculture, of other institutions that carry a role in the background as investors and as manipulators of wealth. Step by step, in a series of strikes, we challenged that power. We named institutions and we named persons. We named places. Through the years, the picture unfolded. But to the degree that we did define the opposition, the opposition grew in strength, in determination to destroy the union, and it did destroy the union.

I want to warn every Mexican American who thinks of himself as a leader. Before he puts together an organization of any kind that is going after specific targets of power, I want to warn him: he’s asking for some pretty rough treatment. One of the things we found out, for instance, was that the agencies of government – and they are not Mexican-American agencies; they’re not inventions of the Mexican peasant to come to this country – the agencies of state and federal power were conniving, collaborating and conspiring with the economic power structure to destroy the union. And they did!

Now the story of how that destruction was accomplished is a very important story. I’ve written a couple of chapters of it and I commend it to you with no sense of immodesty, because it not only describes a specific instance of the destruction of a growing community among the farmworkers in this country, but it describes how that destruction was accomplished. I think that any challenge to power in these democratic United States is going to, as of now, run into the same kinds of difficulties (Galarza 1982: 4-5).

In effect, this was a lesson in the defense of democracy through engaged scholarship with a warning caveat – it will be a brutal learning experience and may take years of work. Galarza used himself as bait in a test of institutional power in the United States. He warns that this brand of “dynamic research” involves directly challenging governments on the state and federal levels in addition to the most powerful economic interests in the country. The barometer of success in this experiment was measured in
what was learned from the reaction of these powerful interests. This was not scholarship for the weak-willed.

Here was the organizing strategy to overturn the “power structure”: 39

We had been in it, the union was out here since ’46. The big strike was the DiGiorgio strike which started in October of ’47 and the efforts to organize continued to the end of 1959. During those thirteen or fourteen years (to make a long story short), those ten years, ’50 to ’60, were years in which there was no hope we could organize farmworkers.

All we could do was to build our own knowledge of the bracero system and keep hitting at it till we could reach a stage where public opinion was so convinced that the arguments of growers was a fraud. And when that climate had been created we could then move into the lobbying stage in Washington and gain enough support from friends of the union and those who were seeing the truth and that only then could we hope to repeal the bracero law. That we did in ’63 but our union was out of business in 1960; and we had to disband because we were not, from the point of view of the labor leadership in the U.S., an orthodox union. We were constantly stepping on the toes of growers and bankers and others who had their own understanding with certain other portions of the labor movement.

So we were a threat to the way in which power was put together in this state. And I never made any bones about it. I always said to our members and to whoever would listen to me that if our union lasted thirty years we would change the power structure of California. That was our goal. And this was by no means a part of the philosophy of organized labor in California. So we lost ground until 1960, and then we were faced with this dilemma. The State Federation of Labor had long cut off any financial support. I think at the top of our record the State Federation of Labor was giving us $2500 a year.

We started out with four organizers in California. We each had areas of the state. And by 1955 we were down to one and that was myself. Now obviously with one organizer servicing seventeen locals from Mexicali to the Oregon border that’s no labor movement. So part of the answer is that the growers wore us out. I was hospitalized for three months in 1959. I couldn’t move. Just fatigue. The other reason was that by 1960 the leadership of the labor movement had made up its mind that we weren’t a good bet. And so the word got around that we were inefficient. Here we’d been in the fields fifteen years and we had no contracts. We hadn’t reduced any grower to terms. What kind of nonsense is this?

All during those ten years I doubt that we were getting more than $300 or $400 a month from organized labor, but even so we had proved to be incompetent; and by 1959 the suggestion came down from Walter Reuther to us that the best thing for us to do was to turn in our charter and give it to the Packinghouse Workers. And I told Walter to go to hell.

My advice to our president was, give the charter back to me; and he can do what he wants with it but we’re not going to be ordered by anybody. So by 1959 we were in the worst possible shape: no money, no organizers, no support and all these suggestions

39 On May 7, 1974, during a talk at the United Farmworkers Boycott Office in San Jose.
coming to us to get lost quick. So from September of ’59 to May of 1960 the liquidation process just went fast (Galarza 1982: 19-20).

The stakes were high. His goal to “change the power structure in California” was daunting.

Galarza spoke of “anthropomorphic education” that interrogated the institutions and systems within his democratic society, which nonetheless were so underfunded or corrupted that they withered. At a conference presentation at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara, Galarza (1982: 11-12) concluded:

And that brings me to the concluding two points. I’ve said before that in my judgment the War on Poverty at this stage is a mere skirmish. I don’t think it’s going to become a war until the amount of money appropriated by Congress enables us to mount a massive attack on the problem of unemployment. I mean by that not just the problem of creating jobs, I mean the basic decisions that our society is continuously making; such as, for instance, the allocation of resources: where money in vast quantities shall be invested, and how it shall be spent. This is what creates jobs.

To those decisions the poor are not parties. I suggest we have got to keep battling for what I call anthropomorphic education. It’s a terrible phrase. What I mean to emphasize there is that we can’t stop pressing the schools to teach us as if they were teaching children and not systems. Do you know that in certain parts of Los Angeles many people have made a wonderful discovery? They’ve discovered that one teacher with fifteen children and an expert assistant can do a better job than one teacher with no assistance and forty kids. The question is no longer discovery and demonstration, the question is now: can we hold the line so that ratio of one teacher to fifteen children can become universal? I hope that we don’t give one inch. And I trust that the restructuring of educational methods, the downgrading of status and authority where it now is in the upper strata of administration will be accelerated. I hope the time comes when the greatest prestige, the largest salary, the most attractive emoluments in a public school system will be those of the kindergarten teacher. In reverse process, when we get to the superintendent of schools, he will be a guy who’s around to be called on when he’s needed.

I want to conclude by saying that, again, I haven’t been talking of fundamentals really. Not until this economy provides all men with sufficient income – I’m not talking of the income of a day or a week; I’m talking about the income of a year – so that their wives and the mothers of their children can stay home and take care of the families; obliterate the slums and make it possible for other slums not to take their places; until we reconsider such things as urban development so that they become other than weapons for displacing these doughnut communities from what part of the landscape to another, I don’t think the job will have begun. I close with the question: Are the Mexican
Americans ready? That I don’t know. But I think some of us in this room intend to find out.
PART II: BUILDING DEMOCRATIC THEORY

The United States government and land grant universities have a long history of engagement with rural communities and small farmers, much of it linked to foundational democratic values in the country. In 1862, federal legislation passed to promote living standards and rural development including the Homestead Act and the establishment of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). In the same year, the Morrill Act founded the land grant colleges, which were often referred to as “people’s universities.” These public investments were supposed to promote broad-based citizen welfare and education. The Homestead Act for example incorporated the 160 acre limit to insure public benefit and prevent speculation.

Later, in 1914, the Smith-Lever Act initiated the Cooperative Extension system throughout the United States “to aid in diffusing among the people of the United States useful and practical information on subjects related to agriculture and home economics” (USDA & ALGCU 1948: 6). For many, education was the crux of extension work. Historically, the family farm and rural communities were named as the primary constituents of the Cooperative Extension. Farm families were acknowledged to have “first claim on Extension’s services and [were] those who received the most intensive assistance” (ECOP 1958: 4). They were the nominal “clientele” of the system such that “no one can legitimately question that Extension’s first responsibility is to farm families” (ECOP 1958: 13). Ideally, rural communities were to be revitalized.
Between 1860 and 1935, the number of farmers in the country grew by 5 million aided by the technical assistance and organizational support of public institutions like government bureaucracies and land grant colleges.

Table 1. Farms, Land in Farms, and Average Acres Per Farm (1850-1997)

However, starting in the mid-1930’s, family farmers began to be far less numerous on the rural landscape. Statistics from the U.S. Department of Agriculture illustrated the combined trends of the decreasing cumulative number of farms in conjunction with an increase in their size. In 1940 there were 6,096,799 farms in the United States using 1,060,852,000 acres (USDA 1948). The average farm size was 174 acres. By 2005, there were only 2,044,077 farms with 933,400,000 acres in cultivation and range (USDA 2005). The size of the average farm had increased to 444 acres (a statistic padded by the inclusion of very small “point” farms making less than $1000) or having five or more horses. Currently, approximately fifty percent of the farms in the United States make less than $10,000 a year with receipts that are only 1.5% of the total sales for the country (Lyson 2002). The only category of farm size that has increased are those making more than $250,000 a year with the greatest increase in this category coming from farms
making in excess of $500,000 (USDA 2005). Only 1% percent of farms have sales over 
$1,000,000 a year and account for almost 42% of the total sales in the United States. The 
largest one tenth of 1% of farms sell over $5 million and account for 20.5% of all sales 
(Lyson 2002). In other words, 2% of farms grow half of the agricultural produce in the 
United States, while the average family farm earns only 14% of its income from farming 
(McMichael 2003). The trend had dramatic demographic effect: in 1900, 42% of the 
population of the United States worked on farms, by 1990 that percentage had decreased 
to just 2% (Castle 1998).

The “demise” of the family farm roughly occurred between 1940 and 1975 (Buttel 
1984). Prior to this era mechanization had contributed to farm consolidation as Harper 
(2001) illustrated for upstate New York, but the overall post-war economy was retooled 
in ways that significantly contributed to industrializing the food system. One example 
was the adaptation the use of ammonia nitrate from World War II munitions production 
into synthetic fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and organophosphates (Merrill 1976; 
Lyson 2004; Pollan 2006). Simultaneously, public institutions that had previously served 
and supported small-scale family farmers were being dismantled and underfunded. The 
progressive Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), which had done research 
throughout the rural United States since 1919, had its mission constrained and funding 
decreased beginning in the 1940’s (Larson and Zimmerman 2003). In particular, Walter 
Goldschmidt’s Arvin-Dinuba study, “would stir up the agricultural organizations, cause 
them to lobby against Federal interference in California agriculture, and ultimately 
contribute to the elimination of social research activities from the BAE’s charter” (Fiske 
1979: 255). All BAE funds for conducting cultural surveys and maintaining regional
offices were cut in 1947; its director Howard Tolley, a proponent of “economic
democracy,” was also forced out at this time. The Farm Security Administration (which
focused on alleviating rural poverty by funding projects that included both Taylor’s
California agricultural labor camps and Lange’s photography) was abolished in 1946, the
BAE followed in 1953. Post-war political policy and institutional positions shifted away
from the family farm toward an industrial agricultural system.

In concert with federal level investments and policy support, California’s Central
Valley was a testing ground for the application of university-based, scientific, technical
and mechanical innovation; genetic and agronomic advances; and capitalist
macroeconomic theory. The construction of the Central Valley Project, one of the most
extensive water projects in the world, coincided with federal regulations that the water
subsidy be delivered to resident farmers of 160 acres or less. Walter Goldschmidt’s
Arvin-Dinuba research validated the promise of this equitable and democratic policy.
Forty years after Goldschmidt’s BAE case study forewarned of the negative effects of
agricultural industrialization and large landholdings, Dean MacCannell conducted retests
of the original hypothesis and extended the outlines of Goldschmidt’s theory connecting
localized economics, an enriched civic life and democratic governance in rural
agricultural regions. Despite this, the political clout necessary for implementation and
enforcement of acreage limitation under Reclamation law was never achieved.

The trend toward industrializing agriculture was in fact spreading to other areas of
the United States – just as Taylor had warned. MacCannell (1988: 20) sounded alarms
that the “system has broken down” in the Sunbelt where the wealthiest agricultural
regions had poverty rates as high as fifty percent. While the San Joaquin Valley had
industrialized first, now large parts of Texas, Florida, Arizona and California were now similarly consolidating. The “most modern, rational and economically profitable” regions were found to have the worst socioeconomic conditions (MacCannell 1988: 17), and the “largest farm operators in the Sunbelt were able to exploit their natural, historical and political advantages by combining government support programs, irrigation systems built at public expense, new technologies and unorganized foreign labor” (MacCannell 1988: 21). MacCannell advocated structural changes to address the human and environmental problems associated with the industrialization of agriculture.

Exacerbating the crisis and realizing the warnings of previous scholars, industrial agriculture rapidly became the dominant producer form in food system in the country.

A theory of democracy emerged from within the valley research over these decades. Goldschmidt had documented how consolidation of economic activity and monopolized land ownership negatively affected civic life. Implicit in his findings was that the loss of local problem solving and civic capacity undermined democratic life. While this may have been difficult to discern in the time frame of his study, the trends became pronounced over the next decades. During these years, political attacks on the social scientists and their research illustrated how concentrations of economic wealth pushed back to corrupt public process and democratic governance. The social science of Goldschmidt and MacCannell, separated by almost thirty years and differences in academic training and personal disposition, illustrated two different pedagogical approaches used to inform upon the same research question – did concentrations of wealth and concentrated ownership of natural resources affect civic life, social conditions and democracy in rural communities?
In the early 1940’s, Walter Goldschmidt (1978a) conducted research in the southern San Joaquin Valley examining the effects of industrial agriculture on the social and economic structure of rural communities. Previously, Tetreau (1938; 1940) had examined the effects of irrigation on farm scale and industrialization in Arizona but Goldschmidt’s scholarship was situated in the heart of this economic system at precisely the time that its regional landowners were seeking millions of dollars in public investment for irrigation from the federal government. Reclamation regulations associated with these government subsidies, as Taylor (1979) documented, threatened to break up the extraordinary landholdings of the southern valley. At the minimum, the availability of water resources through the construction of federal reclamation projects mandated that the majority of its benefits be allocated to small family farmers, who were already prevalent along the east side of the valley around the communities of Sanger, Reedley, Dinuba, Visalia, Farmersville and Exeter.

Goldschmidt’s work evolved out of his theoretical positions but also in reaction to suppression and censorship of his government funded study. This chapter has three primary sections. In the first, I describe and review Goldschmidt’s influential research of three San Joaquin Valley towns – Wasco, Arvin and Dinuba. In particular, the comparison of the later two in the context of California water politics instigated a decades-long confrontation between contrasting visions of rural society and its agricultural production. Next, I narrate my personal interaction with Goldschmidt as he
promoted my dissertation study. Finally, I discuss the politics of the BAE’s Arvin-Dinuba study both as it related to academic scholarship, social “values” and democratic governance. The initial use and later defense of this scholarship represent a longstanding pedagogical stance not only by Goldschmidt himself, but of subsequent scholars who have defended and carried on his theory of democracy and rural life.

**Scholarship in the Struggle: As You Sow**

A few months prior to beginning his dissertation research in Wasco, California, Walter Goldschmidt wrote to Paul Taylor from the Midwest on May 14, 1940:40

> Dear Paul:
> I spent Saturday with Hanson, the Coordinator for the Southern Great Plains area and spent Monday afternoon with Bonnen and Magee. I wish that you and Dorothea could have been present, as a lot of interesting facts were brought out.
> Hanson is with us 100 per cent. He understands the problems and sees the solution as we do. He wants me to return to Ark. to take part in a week’s school, covering problems of the Great Plains. He will have the local planning committees in from all over the area and wants me to “give ‘em the works.”

> Both Bonnen and Magee were new to the concepts which I presented but they rose to them in a most gratifying way. They are anxious to cooperate in some studies which I proposed and would like very much to have a good Casa Grande demonstration in the High Plains area.

> Bonnen was quite worked up over a modern “enclosure movement” which he believes is disemploying men in many sections, faster than the tractor . . . [by] putting land back into pasture, letting the tenants go, and then returning cattle on the land. This goes on in connection with consolidation of farms. In one case which he cited, 18 farms, each formerly supporting a family, are now in one large holding under a single family management, with cattle replacing cotton. He is very much concerned about this situation. Rural schools are being closed

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down and towns affected by this forced exodus of former tenants. The land owner can make more net money out of cattle than one of tenants. The common saying is “I just can’t keep on supporting those tenants.”

Grapes of Wrath, has made Texas and Okl. very conscious of the migrant problem. Hanson says that the thinking of the local planning committees has expanded astonishingly recently. He feels that they are about ready to follow the ideas which I express in my book. He says that in two or three years the ideas are apt to be a part of their everyday thinking.

I’ll be in Little Rock tomorrow and in Washington on Sunday.

Sincerely yours,
Walter

In this early correspondence, Goldschmidt appeared more an organizer than a scholar. In collaboration with Taylor, he promoted a political project among farmers and rural communities throughout the country and his position in favor of family-scale landholdings was apparent. References to the “enclosure movement” and “consolidation of farms” identified a defense of a shared democratic ideal where Taylor and Goldschmidt together contested monopolies that excluded people from the land. Later that same year, Taylor took a trip through the region and noted the “revolutionary” changes wrought by the “march of mechanization” and “industrialization of agriculture” that result in “bigger farmers and fewer men” (Goldschmidt 1978a: 244).41 Only a few months later, Goldschmidt would begin his studies in the San Joaquin Valley of California.

Goldschmidt’s San Joaquin Valley research involved both dissertation work he did in Wasco and a subsequent study conducted for the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) in Arvin and Dinuba. A third and broader study of 25 communities in the region had been planned but was disallowed by federal government officials. His Wasco research occurred over eight months beginning in the Fall of 1940. It was

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influenced by the Lynd’s (1929, 1937) holistic studies of community, an approach that familiarized Goldschmidt with the region, preparing him for the subsequent Arvin-Dinuba study in the spring of 1944 where data collection took him and two assistants (one of whom was his wife) only one month in each community.

In a February 1972 letter to Paul Taylor, Goldschmidt included a draft of Congressional testimony where he described the background to his valley research projects and the politics underlying his experience. Goldschmidt mentioned in the same correspondence, “In order to impress upon you the importance of undertaking such a study, it will be necessary for me to present some of the details of the events and the character of the conclusions surrounding the earlier work. I will have to be somewhat autobiographical.” In other words, the story was stronger in the first person and pedagogically he turned to it when he was about to deliver one of the most important lessons before the United States Congress.

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42 Holistic studies of community were richly detailed descriptions and observations of community life in towns and small cities. Holistic approaches examined the entire community as the object of the study. They were broad in scope and emphasized descriptive details. Analysis sought to be value neutral and tended to be under-theorized. These studies wanted their data to speak for itself. Robert and Helen Lynd’s *Middletown* (1929) was the most influential holistic research study of a community. Even the pseudonym of “Middletown” for Muncie, Indiana exemplifies the amorphous disposition of the research. The year and a half study in 1924 and 1925 predominantly used anthropological approaches including participant observation, historical records and interviews. The research set out “to record observed phenomena” rather than “prove any thesis” (Lynd 1929: 3). It explicitly stated that attempts to make value statements about Middletown were “obviously, irrelevant to the purpose of the study” (1929: 496). Only seven pages of a voluminous 500 page work are devoted to discussing the “processes of social change” in the book’s conclusion.

On March 1, 1972, Goldschmidt gave the following statement on agribusiness before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business in the United States Senate:

> I am an anthropologist; while still a graduate student I became interested in the possibility of using the techniques and the theories of anthropology for the study of modern American community. I was supported in my dissertation by a fund made available by M. L. Wilson, then Director of the Extension Service, to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A. My study of Wasco, a town in the San Joaquin Valley, was completed in 1941. It served as the dissertation that was required for the Ph.D. degree which I received in 1942 from the University of California, Berkeley, by which time I was on the regular staff of the BAE. This study of Wasco showed that the industrialized farming that characterizes San Joaquin Valley resulted in an urbanized rural life.

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Shortly after the completion of this study, I was seconded to a task force engaged in research on the Central Valley Project under the general direction of Dr. Marion Clawson, funding for which was provided by the Department of Interior. The Central Valley Project Studies consisted of a collaborative effort to provide answers to a number of basic policy questions resulting from the engineering plans then underway. One of these dealt with the problems attendant upon the so-called acreage limitation law and the implications for the application of that law to lands supplied by waters developed under the giant reclamation project in California. This question read, in part, as follows: What effects will this project have on agricultural economy and rural life in the Central Valley?

The Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) was responsible for answering 24 policy related questions related to the Central Valley Project (Fiske 1979). Two of these would prove to be the most controversial: Problem 19 dealing with the 160-acre limitation and Problem 24 relating to the project’s effects on local communities in the valley.  

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44 Fiske (1979: 261) specifies these two problems:

Problem 19: “What modifications, if any, of the existing statutory limit to the size of land holdings that can receive water from irrigation works constructed by the Bureau of Reclamation should be recommended with respect to the Central Valley Project?”

Problem 24: “What effect will the project have on agricultural economy and rural life in the Central Valley?...What effects on urban and industrial patterns and functions? Which prospective effects will tend to promote the public welfare? Which will tend to impair the public welfare?...How, in short, can the project be made to serve the best interests of the public, in the Valley, the State as a whole, and the Nation at Large?”
Goldschmidt was uniquely qualified to answer these questions on the industrialization of rural California because of his previous dissertation topic, academic training and connections with California scholars including Paul Taylor, Carey McWilliams and BAE staff.\(^{45}\)

The case study’s anthropological methods adapted techniques from community studies that were used in Goldschmidt’s Wasco dissertation. He later described his research method and design for the BAE study:\(^{46}\)

> In each of the two communities we examined public records, interviewed community leaders, and ordinary citizens, and took a questionnaire from a scientifically constructed random sample of the population. This questionnaire was designed to give us the following information: (1) household composition, occupation, nature of farm enterprise (for farm operators) and the like; (2) social participation in community affairs, (3) economic status and participation and (4) level of living. In addition to the information that I and my team assembled in the field, we had accurate information provided by others on the following items: (1) the limits of the community as determined by a team of rural sociologists, (2) the size of farms by two measures obtained from the records of the Agricultural Adjustment Agency by economists equipped to analyze such data, (3) the total value of agricultural products from the previous year obtained in the same manner and from the same source, and (4) the value of retail sales by major categories of business enterprise obtained from the state sales tax records.

Overall, the study compared two small towns of similar composition, economic productivity and demographic size within roughly the same geographic region. A primary difference was that Dinuba had grown in a region of predominantly small family farms while Arvin was surrounded by mostly large agricultural growers. Goldschmidt

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\(^{45}\) Goldschmidt and Carey Taylor at the BAE were aware that his Arvin-Dinuba case study could bolster the significance of rural sociology in the United States (Fiske 1979: 262). Paul Taylor had advised Goldschmidt on his dissertation, together with Carey McWilliams and Dorothea Lange, and mentored Goldschmidt on aspects California’s agricultural “industrialization” and “urbanization” (Kirkendall 1964: 197-198).

understood that the BAE’s questions were “amenable to direct empirical investigation” and a research design could be “formulated on strict scientific principles of controlled comparison.”

Even while doing his fieldwork, Goldschmidt found the results “overwhelming,” noting that they “are apparent to the casual visitor and become greater and greater as more information is made available” (Kirkendall 1964: 198). He determined that the scale of agricultural businesses in Arvin skewed the occupancy structure resulting in the predominance of wage labor. This lead to “direct effects upon the social conditions in the community” including poor housing, poverty, the existence of “slum conditions” and limited capacity to address these problems on a community level (Goldschmidt 1978a: 416). A highly transitory labor pool with few resources and little time to participate in local civic life resulted from the seasonality of agricultural production. Arvin’s few wealthy large landowners, among them the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation, were oriented to urban centers away from the rural towns where they owned the land and natural resources. Goldschmidt identified their lack of residency, mobility and outward orientation as a cause of “social poverty” (1978a: 416).

Goldschmidt’s findings were conclusive in answering the BAE’s research questions:

The differences between the communities were impressive; they were set forth in my assembly of findings and should perhaps be placed in record here:

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(1) The small farm community supported 62 separate business establishments, to but 35 in the large-farm community; a ratio in favor of the small-farm community of nearly 2:1.

(2) The volume of retail sales in the small-farm community during the 12 month period analyzed was $4,383,000 as against only $2,535,000 in the large-farm community. Retail trade in the small-farm community was greater by 61 percent.

(3) The expenditure for household supplies and building equipment was over three times as great in the small-farm community as is was in the large-farm community.

The investigation disclosed other vast differences in the economic and social life of the two communities, and affords strong support for the belief that small farms provide the basis for a richer community life, and a greater sum of those values for which American stands, than do industrialized farms of the usual type.

It was found that-

(4) The small farm supports in the local community a larger number of people per dollar volume of agricultural production than an area devoted to larger-scale enterprises, a difference in its favor of about 20 percent.

(5) Notwithstanding their greater numbers, people in the small-farm community have a better average standard of living than those living in the community of large-scale farms.

(6) Over half of the breadwinners in the small farm community are independently employed businessmen, persons in white-collar employment, or farmers, in the large-farm community the proportion is less than one-fifth.

(7) Less than one-third of the breadwinners in the small-farm community are agricultural wage laborers (characteristically landless, and with low and insecure income) while the proportion of persons in this position reaches the astonishing figure of nearly two-thirds of all persons gainfully employed in large-farm community.

(8) Physical facilities for community living – paved streets, sidewalks, garbage disposal, sewage disposal, and other public services – are far greater in the small-farm community; indeed, in the industrial farm community some of these facilities are entirely wanting.

(9) Schools are more plentiful and offer broader services in the small-farm community, which is provided with four elementary schools and one high school; the large-farm community has but a single elementary school.

(10) The small-farm community is provided with three parks for recreation; the large-farm community has a single playground, loaned by a corporation.
The small-farm town has more than twice the number of organizations for civic improvement and social recreation than its large-farm counterpart. 

Provision for public recreation centers, Boy Scout troops, and similar facilities for enriching the lives of the inhabitants is proportionate in the two communities in the same general way, favoring the small-farm community. 

The small-farm community supports two newspapers, each with many times the news space carried in the single paper of the industrialized-farm community. 

Churches bear the ration of 2:1 between the communities, with the greater number of churches and churchgoers in the small-farm community. 

Facilities for making decisions on community welfare through local popular elections are available to people in the small-farm community; in the large-farm community such decisions are in the hands of officials of the county. 

In the above 15 comparisons, Goldschmidt quantified the economic and civic conditions of the two towns, then associated the findings to their “strong support for . . . those values for which America stands.” What are those values? What was Goldschmidt trying to teaching this Congressional committee? Where was he leading them?

What economic structure is most appropriate for democracy? The presence of economic inequality in Arvin affected the social and civic life in that community and its retail economy of Arvin was dependent on the narrow economic base of migrant farmworkers who lacked sufficient demand to sustain a vibrant small business sector. Consumers simply did not have the money to spend in local stores. Farmers in Dinuba, and similar communities with broad distributions of wealth, circulated income within their communities; in Arvin the farmers took their profits to urban or national centers. Goldschmidt suggested that the resulting lack of small businesses undermined community development. There was no multiplier effect from small farmers (which are also small businesses) in purchasing goods and services within their rural towns. Without
a middle class, civic institutions and political structures atrophied. He described a
“continuative effect” where the lack of civic structures, such as a diversity of churches
and competent schools, reinforced a problematical perception of communities like Arvin.
People with the means to choose avoided these communities because they were not
secure, enriching places to live and to raise a family.

The Goldschmidt hypothesis clearly linked these deleterious effects to large scale
farming.

Large scale farm operation is immediately seen to take an important part
in the creation of the conditions found in Arvin. Its direct causative effect
is to create a community made up [of] a few persons of high economic
position, and a mass of individuals whose economic status and whose
security and stability are low, and who are economically dependent
directly on the few. In the framework of American culture, more
particularly that of industrialized farming, this creates immediately a
situation where community participation and leadership, economic well-
being, and business activities are relatively impoverished (Goldschmidt
1978a: 420; italics added).

In conditions where land ownership was consolidated into large holdings, a
corresponding effect created conditions characterized by economic poverty, a labor
system based on non-professional positions, low wages, dilapidated civic institutions and
a breakdown in democratic political structure. He found that these communities became
de facto “company towns” (Goldschmidt 1978a: 421). Mills and Ulmer (1946) had
similar conclusions from increased economic concentration in small manufacturing
communities. They illustrated that cities with bases of small businesses provided
foundations for a sounder, more balanced economic life than cities dominated by big
business.

In 1977, the Small Farm Viability Project revisited Arvin and Dinuba to conduct a
re-test of the original study and reconfirmed the original findings. Though some research
found mixed findings (Barnes and Blevins 1992; Buttel et. al. 1988; Gilles and Dalecki 1988; Van Es et al. 1988). Numerous other studies and academic papers have validated, supported or substantiated Goldschmidt’s conclusions (Buttel 1980, 1983; Crowley and Roseigno 2004; Deller 2003; Durrenberger and Thu 1996; Flora and Flora 1988; Fujimoto 1977; Goldman et al. 1977; Heady and Sonka 1974; Heffernan 1972, 1982; LaRose 1972; Lobao 1990; Lyson et al. 2001; MacCannell 1983, 1986, 1988; MacCannell and Dolber-Smith 1988; MacCannell and White 1981, 1984; Martinson et al. 1976; Poole 1981; Rodefeld 1974; Smithers et al. 2004; Theodoropoulos 1990; Thu and Durrenberger 1998). Heffernan (1982: 340) later summarized that “all relevant research to date suggests that a corporate type of agriculture results in a reduction in the quality of [community] life for at least some people, especially the hired workers in rural communities.” Buttel (1983: 151) testifying before Congress would similarly conclude that body of scholarship is “sufficiently solid and consistent so as to justify a most crucial conclusion: Larger-than-family tends to be associated with adverse social and economic conditions in agricultural communities.” He continued:

The research literature on farm structure and quality of life in agricultural communities has generally revolved around the following conclusions relating to the impacts of larger-than-family farming and large-scale agriculture. Large-scale agriculture has been found to be associated with (1) high proportions of the community population at or below the poverty level, (2) low levels of community service availability, (3) low community cohesiveness (e.g., lack of participation in community organizations), and (4) a low number and diversity of retail sales outlets (Buttel 1983: 152).

More recently, the emergence of confined animal feeding operations (CAFO’s) located throughout agricultural communities generate similar socioeconomic contexts. Here again a body of scholarship has arisen in which the economic concentration and vertical integration of these rural business enterprises with their corresponding effects on
communities is critiqued (see, e.g., NCRCRD 1990; Schiffman et al. 1998; Thu and Durrenberg 1998; Wilson et al. 2002; Wing and Wolf 2000). These studies corresponded to broader academic literatures such as Paul Wallace Gates’ (1942) examination of land policy where he found that large local landholders retarded the development of local institutions including libraries and churches.

The logic of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis resonated beyond academic circles. Wendell Berry (1977: 172) has made almost identical observations as Goldschmidt:

In rural communities dominated by very large firms, the settlement and housing patterns reflect the increasingly transient nature of the labor force. The symbol of the large corporate farm becomes the trailer house. Community institutions suffer from lack of leadership, and from the lack of a sense of commitment on the part of the labor force to long-run community welfare. Those institutions, that survive take on a dependent character, reflecting the paternalistic role of the dominant firms. Income levels may stabilize, but at the expense of a decline in local capacity for risk-taking, decision-making, and investment of family labor in farms and local businesses.

No matter how convincing the conventional wisdom, conclusive the research findings or persuasive the theories, they went against the interests of powerful economic interests, which reacted politically to academic critique.

**Scholarship in the Struggle: Scientific Study and Political Outcomes**

Political outcomes from Goldschmidt’s work had many mired in controversy for decades. Early in the fight, Californian Congressman Elliott had submitted an amendment to exempt the Central Valley Project from acreage limitation. His political move heated the controversy since many BAE scientists saw the amendment as a dismissal of reclamation precedent and scientific findings. After Goldschmidt’s study
was completed and forwarded up the BAE’s chain of command, its findings were
criticized as “subjective.” Eventually, the Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson, in
support of the BAE’s new chief O.V. Wells, simply refused to release the final study.

Though Goldschmidt’s study was attacked, it substantiated the rationale for the
Central Valley Project’s acreage limitation. Taylor (1976: 137) later recognized that for
“friends of the family farm” the study was useful “as a weapon of resistance.” An April
1947 *Business Week* article found the Arvin-Dinuba study to be “one of the heaviest
pieces of artillery that they have added to their arsenal in years” noting it would be used
“as a weapon to keep the big farmers thirsty” (Kirkendall 1964: 208). However, the
Arvin-Dinuba study was also the likely “killing blow” for the BAE (Kirkendall 1964:
206), as it was associated with the Bureau’s eventual elimination (Goldschmidt 1978a;

Given the power exercised by agribusiness interests, the on-the-ground reality of
the valley, with its skewed ownership patterns and incumbent injustices, persisted.
Government bureaucracies were unable to implement reclamation regulations. In this
context, Goldschmidt’s second-phase of the BAE study, a broader analysis of 25 towns in
the region, was increasingly significant to substantiate the political positions of small
farm advocates and supporters of agrarian democracy. The 25 community study
promised to scientifically inform upon debate about reclamation in Congress. Yet, as the
original BAE findings were suppressed, the follow up study was disallowed:

*Using the differentials between Arvin and Dinuba, we intended to develop
something like an index of community quality. This index (or the several
items analyzed separately) would be based upon the salient differences
found between Arvin and Dinuba, but consisting of items that could
readily be obtained either from published sources, by direct inquiry, or by
direct observation. We had in mind such things as: The number of*
churches, civic organizations and extra-curricular school clubs such as Boy Scouts; acreage in public parks; number and kind of retail outlets locally available; the existence of such important local enterprises as newspapers and banks; the number of teachers residing in the community and their average length of tenure. Once we formulated such an index it would be possible to plot the values obtained against the farm size of each of the 25 communities in the San Joaquin Valley, as listed on table 1 of our report. I believe you can readily see that this would have been a powerful tool for the study of the relationship that I, as a public servant, had been asked to establish. It would, incidentally, have had another effect; de-emphasis of attention to the two towns as such. (I have always felt that it was a matter of some unfairness that so much emphasis was placed upon the town as an individual social entity; I certainly had neither the desire nor the intent to cast aspersions upon the citizenry of a community.)

At the 1978 Rural Sociology Society (RSS) conference, thirty years after his original study, Goldschmidt (1978b) gave a panel presentation with Phil Leveen, Jerry Moles and Isao Fujimoto titled “California Agriculture and Rural Communities: Past, Present and Future.” In his presentation, Goldschmidt explained the successive “sabotage” and “suppression” of the study, followed by political “attack” and “retaliation” against the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Senator Sheridan Downey of California played a key role in this political pressure. After self-publishing They Would Rule the Valley in 1947 as a counterargument to Goldschmidt’s findings, Downey actively sought to undermine the BAE by having specific language added to the Agricultural Appropriations Act for 1949 stating that “no part of funds herein appropriated or made available to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics under the heading ‘Economic Investigation’ shall be used for state or county planning, for

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conducting cultural surveys or for the maintenance of regional offices.”

Goldschmidt told the RSS conference that this language was included in each appropriations act until the BAE was disbanded “ending New Deal liberalism in agriculture once and for all and with it came the decline of investigation into the character of rural life.”

Goldschmidt learned political lessons from his experience:

I should say that we were never satisfied with the idea of making a comparison of two towns only and we had from the outset planned a second-phase of the study, but we were prevented from doing this. The story of why we were so prevented is perhaps more revealing of the problems derived from large-scale operations than would have been the results of such an endeavor and I must therefore review, these events briefly.

I was ordered by the bureau chief in Washington not to undertake the second phase of the study. He did so in response to a build-up of pressure from politically powerful circles.

I am not indulging in these reminiscences merely to explain why the second phase was eliminated from our research; but rather to suggest that there are interests in this country – or that there were at the time – which did not want the evidence of the effect of corporate farming brought forward. They wanted to suppress the study, to defame it, to discredit it.

It seems clear that efforts to suppress, discredit, and answer the study were inspired and fostered by those who did not want this data known. I believe that similar efforts will be made in respect to any endeavor to replicate the study, in California or elsewhere. It is for this reason that it is of the greatest importance, not only that the study be updated, expanded, and brought to bear on areas such as your own state of Wisconsin and elsewhere in the farming heartland, but that it be done with the sponsorship and support of this vital Committee of the United States Senate.

What did the treatment of Goldschmidt’s research tell us about social science and its pedagogy? It clearly illustrated that Californian agribusiness had substantial influence on...
federal bureaucracies and legislation. No longer was industrial agriculture an anomaly of California, but an active force in national politics. The BAE study was conducted for the government and to address public issues, so actions taken against this work represented an attempt to shape the public sphere. Goldschmidt’s lesson (learned after his initial scientific studies) was that well-organized and powerful economic interests were not only corrosive to rural life but also threatened national democratic governance.

Goldschmidt was adamant about the need for further study:

Let me return to the social consequences of the incursion of agribusiness into the rural landscape by reiterating the hope that you will find the means to reexamine this problem along the lines of my earlier study. As your Committee is fully aware, the number of family-sized farms is rapidly dwindling throughout the United States and this change is taking place as a result of the incursion of large-scale corporations into the business of producing food and fiber. I am convinced that this development has been largely a product of policies of the United States Government – particularly policies with respect to agricultural support and with respect to farm labor. Even if it is a product of “natural causes” this does not mean either that it is inevitable or that it is progressive. If, as my earlier investigation indicated for California, it is deleterious to community life, then certainly we should know this fact and undertake the formulation of policies which will stop the trend that has been taking place. It is important to determine whether, in fact, these deleterious effects are recurrent.

I am sure there are other local factors that have to be taken into account, but those who have worked in the Midwest and South are in better position than I to determine this. There also have been improvements in the technology of research, and I am certain that the modern sociologist would be able to devise a better questionnaire than the one I formulated in 1944. But those are details; the basic idea of making a comparison of two towns within the context of similar economic and productive processes, differing only in the scale of operation is a sound method. The second phase, which I so regretfully was unable to prosecute, is also one that should most emphatically be pursued.

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Only a few years later, the second phase of scholarship would be conducted by a team of scholars at UC Davis’ new Applied Behavioral Studies Department under the guidance of Dean MacCannell.

*Scholarship in the Struggle: A Baptism by Fire*

The censorship and suppression of the BAE conducted studies became as important an issue for social science scholarship as the determination that large scale agribusiness damaged rural community life. Taylor (1976) had called Goldschmidt’s entry into the San Joaquin Valley’s politics and social science a “baptism by fire,” and the treatment of Goldschmidt’s BAE study was indicative of later political pressure on San Joaquin Valley scholars.

What does the political treatment of the study – and Goldschmidt’s response – teach us? Goldschmidt (1978a: 487; italics in original) reflected that

Wasco, Arvin and Dinuba tell us what industrialized agriculture does to the local community and how corporate agricultural operations exacerbate the disadvantages in this industrial system. The examination of the treatment of the Arvin-Dinuba study, however, tells us what this industrialized agriculture does to our national life.

The story of the suppression of scientific findings, part of the larger drama of widespread and well-known lawbreaking and non-compliance regarding the reclamation law, was also a lesson in the pedagogical work of social scientists as they re-positioned themselves to defend research based upon, and supportive of, democratic principles. The suppression of Goldschmidt’s study was an indicator of political corruption that threatened fundamental social values.
What was the political purpose (and perhaps moral cause) that social scientists such as Taylor, Goldschmidt, and others were fighting for? Though they positioned themselves as objective scholars in the field, they also had positions on social values and politics that informed their choice of research topics, methods of gathering data and interpretation of their findings. Goldschmidt’s 1972 testimony before Congress described the political standard underlying the his scholarship:

> there are few who doubt that the nature of rural land tenure is intimately related to the character of the social order. Since the dawn of civilization, when intensive agriculture became the means by which man supplied his basic wants, the control of land has been a basic element in forming the character of society. By and large, where democratic conditions prevail, the man who tilled the soil was a free holder and in control of his enterprise. Where, on the other hand, the farming lands are owned and controlled in the urban centers, and the men engaged in production are merely peasants, serfs, or hired laborers, democratic institutions do not prevail. Those who framed our constitution and set the course of American history believed that this relationship was paramount. It lay behind Jeffersonian democracy; it lay behind the homestead act, and it lay behind the extension of the homestead principles in the development of irrigation under the Reclamation Act as formulated at the beginning of the century (Goldschmidt 1978a: 487; Taylor 1976: 138).

This was the reason why Taylor and Goldschmidt fought until they died to defend and uphold reclamation law in the valley – for them, to let go was equated to abandoning democracy.

The suppression of scientific findings, particularly those paid for and conducted by the government, became a prominent aspect to understanding the pedagogical process of social science in the valley. What had been a backstory, hidden in subtle shifts of policy, was brought to the front stage of the public arena. Goldschmidt described the

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54 Taylor’s citation: 188 Congressional Record 17946. 1972. Goldschmidt concludes As You Sow with this quote.
political pressure his research team endured even while he was in the field conducting the study:55

I could regale this Committee beyond its endurance with stories about this public pressure – as for instance our small team (myself and two enumerators one of whom was my wife) listened to ourselves being vilified on the radio each noon, as we ate our lunch in Dinuba’s pleasant little park, by the newscasters sponsored by the Associated Farmers of California. This regular entertainment was brought to a close only after I took advantage of an equal time provision and answered his charges on radio time paid for by the Associated Farmers themselves. The columnist, Sokolsky, devoted a column to us at least once, the commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr., devoted a half-hour broadcast to us, while the urban presses of San Francisco and Los Angeles (hardly disinterested parties to the issue themselves) made repeated attacks and the conservative agriculture press carried on a constant barrage of complaint about what they called our “dirty rug questionnaire.” This was the visible part of the pressure.

You do not have to take my word for this. Twenty years after the study was made, an agricultural historian gave the incident a full, heavily footnoted treatment; which was published in the California Historical Society Quarterly, and which sets forth rather fully the efforts to discredit the work.

This 1964 article by Kirkendall, titled “Social Science in the Central Valley of California: An Episode,” documented the suppression of Goldschmidt’s study and its political blowback on the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The article compared the democratic values of the social scientists working for the BAE and universities versus the profit-oriented agricultural interests of the valley. “Of crucial significance in the episode were the facts that the social scientists who conducted the test were influenced more by the democratic than the business side of the farm tradition and reached conclusions that favored application of the [acreage limitation] principle” (Kirkendall 1964: 196). The article acknowledged that the research was conducted to inform government policy, namely the acreage limitation and residency requirements of Reclamation law that were

based upon longstanding American agrarian traditions. On the other side, the Associated Farmers and influential growers like DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation, were anxious that the use of the Arvin-Dinuba study would “promote harmony between the social system of the valley and the small farm ideology” (200). It was a setting ripe for conflict.

Since the politics in the valley were so divisive, there was limited space for social scientists to claim neutrality. Kirkendall (1964: 195) framed this scientific work as interest laden and value oriented:

A social scientist employed by the government frequently finds himself in the midst of a political battle, the object of harsh criticism by some groups and warm praise by others. All of this results chiefly from the large role of values in his work. People with a point of view that conflicts with his own treat him in a rough fashion, while other groups who evaluate the situation as he does see him as an ally. And, try as he might to escape by assuming a neutral pose and insisting that as a scientist he is above the battle, the conflicting groups bar the door. His values determine his relations to other people, draw him into a fight and keep him there.

The BAE’s Arvin-Dinuba study was such a fight. Kirkendall used the story to explore how the values and politics of social scientists influenced this research. In this case, he differentiated between two values, the “democratic” and “business” positions, which were represented on land grant campuses in the academic fields of rural sociology and agricultural economics. Kirkendall (1964: 210) described how

Goldschmidt’s and Clawson’s values pushed them into battle. Having been influenced by the democratic side of the agricultural tradition, they thought first in terms of the democratic, rather than the business implications of the farm program. With such values, these social scientists found it difficult to stay out of the thick of the fight and impossible to avoid infuriating some people and pleasing others.

After prompting the ire of powerful interests and having their research threatened, the BAE scholars and their allies pushed back in defense of their scientific work and its democratic principles, sometimes using their scientific credentials to do so.
Eight years after Kirkendall’s article was published, Goldschmidt commented on the contradictory nature of values with respect to science:56

*There is one matter with respect to this study [Arvin-Dinuba] that must be brought into the foreground of our thought, because it is very important that we understand it. This is the matter of values. It is often said that science is value free, and this is true. Often it is said that this means that values do not enter into the scientific study, but this is quite another matter, for values do not and must not enter into scientific study. The President’s current all-out effort to analyze the causes of cancer operates on the assumption that cancer is bad and that therefore a cure for cancer is good. These are values that all of us accept. When an economist analyzes the profitability of an enterprise, he takes for granted that it is good to make a profit. Nothing the scientist does validates the assumption that cancer is bad and profits are good; what the scientist does is to determine the causes and conditions under which good or evil will prevail. Now my research was made under similar conditions. It cannot prove that democratic, egalitarian communities with high levels of social participation and stability of population are good. This is a value that we share; it is a matter of commitment of faith, if you wish. What my research did was to assume the values to be real and to demonstrate the conditions in which they flourished or languished. Now most social scientists have shied away from anything involved with values; they hold that they must remain value-neutral. It is a confusion I deplore, and it is one that has led, I think to the dullness and irrelevance of much of sociological research. They forget that most science takes basic values for granted. In the Arvin-Dinuba study we were examining the conditions that support or destroy these traditional values. It was then merely a matter of asking the right questions and following the basic tenets of scientific study to test this basic question against the realities as they existed.*

Goldschmidt appears to contradict himself in defending his position by subtly shifting his roles, even as he was giving his presentation. As a scientist by maintaining that “values do not and must not enter into scientific study;” he was explicit that “science is value free.” Yet, as a citizen of a democracy, Goldschmidt evokes taken-for-granted “values that we all of us accept.” While values representing personal bias were corrosive to scientific findings, the social values were integral to orienting inquiry. Scientific work

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was based upon the “commitment of faith” that “the causes and conditions under which good or evil will prevail” precedes and frames research questions; they were not outcomes to be discovered. Goldschmidt was clear that theory framed empirical findings; ethics and social standards directed research methods and interpretation. The assumption underlying Goldschmidt’s moral claim was that his values were made “real” because they were shared and accepted not only by the academic community, but by society at large.

What if assumptions were not shared? Goldschmidt, used the medical example of finding a cure for cancer and an economic one of analyzing business profits to define his point. In social sciences like agricultural economics and rural sociology, differing theoretical assumptions could result in dramatically varying interpretations. Even if a scholar took a neutral stance, epistemologically their claims were suspect if not unethical. Social scientists who take the “value-free” stance, were positioning themselves above other people by accepting a value position above all others – they produced a unique, socially validated form of truth.

The short note, which Goldschmidt wrote to Paul Taylor accompanying his draft congressional testimony illustrates this point:57

Dear Paul,

Would you look over this statement – a rough of what I intend to present to Gaylord Nelson’s Committee, and give me your comments – not only with respect to specifics, but also matters of tone, stance, etc.

Thanks

Wally

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His requested feedback on “tone, stance, etc.” underscored a pedagogical intent. He asked for feedback from a mentor on how best to educate and influence Congress. The text he proposed incorporated values-based statements which he either hoped that his Congressional audience would share or which he aimed to convince them to adopt.

The valley’s social science was unmasked in this episode just as much as was the political machinations of agribusiness. While explicitly arguing that neutral positions framed their work, valley scholars were implicated in promoting a political position supporting agrarian democracy. Initially, the BAE’s administration was supportive of Goldschmidt’s research, but its administrators became increasingly apprehensive that it would be seen as biased. The director of economic information cautioned Clawson, the project’s director:

I think you should impress on Dr. Goldschmidt that even though we are interested in publicizing our work on the Central Valley project, we are interested primarily in getting out our findings, not in evangelizing on the basis of what those findings reveal. (Kirkendall 1964: 205)

The fine distinction between “publicizing our work,” “getting out our findings” and “evangelizing” illustrated the nuanced politics involved with disseminating scientific findings on the valley’s agribusiness. As part of a pedagogical practice to inform the broader public of the policy decisions being decided in the valley, Goldschmidt had wanted to publish his findings in Harper’s magazine, a popular magazine. At this point, BAE administrators raised concerns about his “eagerness for controversy” and even Paul Taylor, while supportive, cautioned that an early manuscript was presented “in terms of a lawyer’s argument, maximizing data which prove his [Goldschmidt’s] point of view” (Kirkendall 1964; 206).
As described above, the Arvin-Dinuba research study publication was censored. Yet the bureaucratic decision to stop Goldschmidt’s “second phase of the study” placed him in a position to defend the public’s right to have access to his scientific information:58

Kirkendall has shown some of the lengths to which the opponents of the acreage limitation law went in their efforts to discredit the study, but he does not tell the full story, despite his rather over done use of references. He takes no note of the fact that I was not permitted to carry out the second phase of the study, though there must certainly have been something in the record on that too. He notes that I do not represent the Department of Agriculture, but he is unaware as to why. Here, I think, there probably was no written record. Actually, Kirkendall does not seem fully aware of the issues, for he thinks of the Dinuba farms as marginal operations, which is not the case. But my most important criticism is that, by trying to remain above the issues and deal with the matter in an unpartisan way, and chiding me for my “eagerness” and “passion,” to use his words, in presenting the case, he overlooks the fact that efforts were being made to suppress the facts and to deny this discussion, that is, censorship was operating. He quotes some of the BAE personnel in saying that I had disregarded contrary evidence, but he does not say what contrary evidence – for the fact of the matter is that there was none. He brings up the argument that Arvin was a younger community as an alternate explanation, but he does not acknowledge that the text of the report shows that this argument simply does not hold. There was passion in my response to the actions to suppress the Arvin-Dinuba findings, but this was not the passion to propagandize as he implies, but rather it was the passionate belief in the right to make the investigation and the right to report its results. It was a sentiment that led me to believe that if the BAE could not do these things, then its demise would be no tragedy. It was this sentiment which was largely responsible for my leaving governmental research for University teaching at no small financial sacrifice.

Goldschmidt’s prerogative to teach – through investigating and reporting results – had been violated, which motivated him to strengthen his role as an educator, even to the point of being “passionate” in communicating censored truths.

The political context of the valley muddled the role of scientist. As deeply vested, economic interests became objects of scientific inquiry that exposed their subterranean activities and benefits, they “pushed back” on the scientists and their universities. This compelled the scientists to defend themselves, pulling them away from their ostensibly neutral positions and bringing them into the political fray. Goldschmidt’s valley scholarship not only unmasked agribusiness, it also illustrated the pedagogical and political character of critical social science that had been represented as objective.

In the late 1970’s, Goldschmidt’s *As You Sow* became perhaps the seminal work in the field of American rural sociology. The book had a relentless, systematic tone, progressing like a long march, pacing off innumerable steps that inevitably delivered its conclusion. The empirical evidence was stacked and linked together into an argument that industrialized agriculture was corrosive to the civic and economic life of its rural communities. No other single piece of research in the valley was as virulently contested over a longer period of time than this work. The scholarship laid out clear prescriptions of detrimental outcomes resulting from the economic trends in the San Joaquin Valley; alongside Goldschmidt’s “As You Sow” was the implicit forewarning “so you shall reap.” Though the valley had already experienced tumultuous decades, the problems were in their infancy. Scientific engagement and inquiry proceeded as the problems of the Valley persisted.

*Profile of Practice: Visiting Goldschmidt*
My fieldwork began in the summer of 2006. I was awarded a small dissertation research grant from Cornell’s Education Department and spent July in the southern San Joaquin Valley. As I prepared for the visit, I contacted many of the region’s community leaders, organizers, scholars and agricultural organizations.

Walter Goldschmidt was one of the scholars I contacted. On June 5, 2006, I sent my first email to him:

Professor Goldschmidt,

I am currently a doctoral student at Cornell in the Education Department. This summer I will be visiting the southern San Joaquin valley to look into doing ethnographic work regarding issues of inequality and power, specifically relating to water and land.

I have read about you and your work quite often. Isao Fujimoto and others at UC Davis has talked of you while I did research toward a masters degree there. Also, here at Cornell, you are mentioned often, sometimes just the word “Goldschmidt” is used to make a point regarding issues of scale in agriculture.

I would be honored to have an opportunity to talk with you about your work, and even the work of Paul Taylor, regarding the Central Valley. (I was a Peace Corps volunteer in Africa and may find your work there interesting as well though I am not as familiar with it.) Also, I would like any advice you might have in researching in the Valley.

I hope we have an opportunity to meet. I fly into the Bay Area on July 3rd and leave from Southern California on July 31st. Most of the time I will be in Visalia staying at the Visalia Friends (Quaker) Meetinghouse.

Sincerely,
Daniel O’Connell

An hour later, I received a reply:

Dear Daniel, I will be glad to meet with you and am delighted that somebody is looking into what is happening. I expect to be here all summer and if you let me know in advance, we can plan a meal together.

Warmest regards, Walter.

The next day, I emailed some available dates and we scheduled a meeting for July 28th.

After a month in the valley, the drive to Goldschmidt’s home was one of contrasts. As I passed through Bakersfield in late summer, a dense haze obscured the
surrounding mountains. Days earlier, I drove across Lake Tulare, once the largest west of the Mississippi, now the seemingly endless, laser-leveled fields worked by house-sized tractors. I contemplated such a complete upending of an ecosystem and way of life as I climbed the Grapevine driving south to Los Angeles.

Goldschmidt’s home was in Brentwood Hills near Bel Air. I drove up the hillside streets, rising above the city. At this first visit, I refrained from taking extensive notes, preferring to get to know him as a person rather than a research subject. After the meeting, however I jotted the following entry into my fieldnotes:

7/28/06 – Observational Notes: Brentwood Hills, Los Angeles CA
Walter Goldschmidt’s House (978 Norman Place)

I arrived a half an hour early at 3:30pm. I had an early start just in case there was traffic. I exited the 405 at Sunset, up Bundy into the hills. I began to realize that Goldschmidt wasn’t a poor professor.

The gate was open at the end of a long driveway. The house was quiet in the way an unpeopled house is, weeks of stillness settled into the landscape. Up the garden stairs to the main house. All the doors wide open.

The front door was open too. I called a greeting . . . heard the shower running and decided to wait outside. Walked down to the study. Sat in the garden. Peaceful. A Buddhist themed study was over the garage next to the swimming pool. The pool was designed to look like a pond, set in brick between the study and the house. The property on a hillside. Waterfalls fell through the gardens feeding a koi pond and swimming pool.

Goldschmidt came out of the shower. “Caught me with my pants down,” he said. He had on only a pair of shorts, waddling out from the bathroom. Later he would refer to himself as “cherubic” at 93 years old. It was a fairly accurate description. He walked slowly but he was sharp mentally. Later he mentioned a time when Isao Fujimoto, Dean MacCannell and Trudy Wischemann were working on putting an article together for the journal Science.

After talking in the living room, he asked if I wanted a beer. Our conversations ranged for the next seven hours. He said that he had fallen the night before. He had turned out the light. Evening had come quickly, it was dark and he had to take a piss – “now.” He set off for the toilet. “I don’t know if the misstep or piss occurred first, but I fell and pissed.” We had a long laugh over it. He said he had hoped some television show had filmed his blooper.

It was hot. He asked if I wanted to take a swim. I asked if he minded if I had another beer, “Of course not and bring one for me.” He was unsteady as he walked. It would have been highly precarious if he tried to get into the pool on his own. I helped him in, taking both his hands to get him into the water. I suggested hand rails. He swam
back and forth in the small pool. The water was cool. Leaves and pine needles fell into it from the overhanging trees. A waterfall fell into the pool from the shallow end. We talked about Africa.

Later we sat on the deck that surrounded his study. He said that the garden and study were designed by a Japanese guy. He and his wife used to have parties in the garden.

Earlier he had asked if I would help him move some things in the study. The deck had been painted black the day before, but it was dry. He asked me to lay out some carpets on the floor and bring up a small table from the garage.

In the study, there was a large pile of papers with a note saying “for Dan” on top. I hadn’t noticed them previously though he had mentioned that he had some papers for me. Now I realized that he was giving me his files on the Central Valley. They were straightforward, uncluttered of extraneous information (as Dorothea Lange had advised him as a young man) – published articles, a number of correspondences (many with Trudy), newspaper articles, transcripts, . . . .

Later in the evening he would mention how research was a process. His work had followed on Taylor, Taylor had followed on John Commons. Since he had finished, Isao, Dean MacCannell and others had continued it, particularly Trudy. He was inviting and encouraging. This giving of files (which Geisler at Cornell also did by loaning his to me) is one of the greatest honors an academic can bestow on a fellow scholar. There is a high degree of trust, camaraderie, respect and mentoring in the act. It is a passing on of your work and yourself.

We changed into dry clothes. Amy, his Filipino cook who comes on Tuesdays and Fridays (hence the Friday invitation) had arrived. They went back and forth like an old married couple throughout the evening.

We barbequed steak. I helped prepare the charcoal old-school style within a long metal cylinder with mesh holding the brickets and newspaper beneath to fire them. Goldschmidt asked if I wanted a whiskey. He had a bottle of Jim Beam.

We sat in the yard above the pool. Sunset through the large trees. Up the hill, just above us, was the Getty museum. His backyard fence was the museum’s perimeter. “I used to walk the dog up there,” pointing to the hill above us where the museum stood.

It was a visit filled with drinking, laughter, stories and remembrances. A mix of many traits: he was charming, refreshingly vulgar, and intellectually challenging, but more than anything a welcoming host. I felt accepted.

There were a few times that I could not help but jot down quotes. After I asked about what Dorothea Lange was like, he told of when she had taken him out to photograph the asparagus harvest. She had also given him advice:

1. “Don’t fill your files with needless information…she didn’t take a picture if it wasn’t right.”
2. “Make taking a picture a non-event. Forget that the camera is there.”

Since then I have pondered how her advice related to research: maintain a patient focus on your object over time and, with your subjects, treat the research process as everyday work. Goldschmidt had his opinions (“There is too much emphasis on competition and conflict, not enough on cooperation.”) and eloquence (“The community is the echo chamber of the soul.”) Well into evening, armful of paper in hand, I said good night.

After this first month in the south valley and visit with Goldschmidt, I still had not settled on a set of research questions to investigate. I wanted the valley to speak them back to me. What was pertinent now for both the local people and academic community? What remained unexplored or needed to be clarified?

On August 8, 2006, after a series of emails, Goldschmidt wrote to me:

Dear Dan,

Your email of Aug 3 just surfaced in the kitchen midden that covers my desk and I thought it needed a reply. You have a lot of ideas running through your head, any one of which would be good, I am sure. But you need to find a focus and plan your research around it – something specific and clear to you which then you could find a means of tackling in a finite span of time. First of all, forget about what I did more than sixty years ago and don’t expect anyone to have heard of it. (They could hardly be expected to remember it!)

Of the suggestions in your letter, I think the more important and politically volatile is to uncover institutional restraints and road-blocks to efforts at local improvement. A comparison might be interesting but that would be hard to do if you are trying to work along with the group. You must read the studies made on water districts by the guy who was at Claremont [Goodall] and whose name I am blocking on. Ask Trudy; he was one of her heroes. You have to think through the process: what kinds of measures aside from participant observation you are going to use, how you will relate to the community; if it is largely Spanish-speaking, is your Spanish up to the task?

When you have these ducks in a row let me see if I can knock them over.

Good luck, Walter
His advice to seek the “politically volatile” in identifying “institutional restraints”
resonated with me, though I was still determining a precise focus for my study.

That winter, back in Ithaca, I went over Goldschmidt’s files. My fieldnote entry
read:

1/3/07 – Reflective Observation

Last night I finished a cursory review of Goldschmidt’s papers. I have had them
since the summer but let them sit for a while – ruminate and build. Now returning to
California, and perhaps meeting with him again, I went over them.

MacCannell stands out in the academic documents. There is an interesting
jousting match with Refugio Rochin during an extended court proceeding. The lawyers
sent the transcripts of the academics reporting under oath – being examined and cross-
examined by lawyers.

Trudy Wischemann sent Goldschmidt numerous letters that illustrate her
negotiating higher education. They show a very different perspective as she “feels” her
way to and through the problems seen in the Central Valley.

Isao Fujimoto has a couple of pieces in the papers, but isn’t represented much in
an academic sense. But I know that he had a tremendous impact on the academic
community, particularly the students, at Davis. MacCannell, early on recognizes Isao in
a preface to some papers and reports, but since Isao was not publishing his findings in
academic journals, it is highly difficult to cite his work formally, in a way that the
academy and higher education can acknowledge.

Following this entry, I catalogued all of the papers that Goldschmidt had given me.

Without realizing it at the time, the possession of these papers – the access they allowed
to the backstory of valley scholarship and his unspoken sanction to explore this history –
drew me into the history of the valley’s scholarship.

In December 2006, Goldschmidt emailed that he had undergone an operation and
had been moved to a “assisted living” facility in Pasadena. It had been something with
his brain, perhaps cerebral bleeding.

On June 29, 2007, I emailed:

Professor Goldschmidt,

How have you been? I will be in southern California for a week,
from July 2 to 9th to visit my family in Orange County. I was thinking of
stopping by for a visit one morning or afternoon. Are you around and up for visiting?

I will be taking my qualifying exams in September, then moving west shortly thereafter. I will likely move to Visalia to conduct my research.

The other day I took a look at Paul Taylor’s work that is catalogued in a special collection in Berkeley’s Bancroft Library. Incredible correspondence . . . letters read like a who’s who of the 1950’s to the 1970’s. I hope to get up there to take another look this year sometime.

Next week we will host the Facilitating Sustainable Agriculture Education conference here at Cornell. A group of about 7 graduate students and one post-doc (among them myself) pulled off the planning for this. Hopefully it may present itself as a potential alternative to Big Ag in the Land Grants and other universities.

Hope all is well.

Best,

Dan

Two days later, Goldschmidt replied:

Congratulations on the conference. Watch out behind you, for if you really get something going, it will end up in the corporations pockets. I will be in all week; call me so we can set up a date, Walter.

On July 7, 2007, I drove up to Villa Gardens in Pasadena. As far as care facilities went, it was a quality place. Goldschmidt had a first floor room, not far from the lobby and a short walk to the dining room. He squeezed a house-full of material into a one-bedroom apartment without clutter or crowding. He had slowed and bowed a bit more.

There were names he struggled to remember. Yet still he remained deeply vested in the valley at 94 years old.

Goldschmidt wanted to talk while he lay down in bed, so I sat next to the bed while he spoke. I asked, “Heading into the valley . . . how would you go about research today?”

“Well, in the first place, its been sixty years since I did that . . . it’s so hard to know. No one thinks about communities the way we thought in those days. Or rather, the only people who think of community are the laborers. I haven’t been in the valley. Last time, I was talking to anthropology students at Bakersfield State and they had not heard of my study.”

“If they were sociology students perhaps . . . ?” I offered.
“The first thing I would do, is try to get in touch with Wischemann.”

“I know her, Trudy. She hangs out with the Quakers.” Trudy Wischemann had been Paul Taylor’s last research assistant. After that, she worked for both Dean MacCannell at UC Davis’ Macrosocial Accounting “shop” and Don Villarejo at the California Institute for Rural Studies. When I met her in the valley the year before, she handed me a self-printed business card. It identified her as “Rural Advocate.” She lived in Lindsay and worked various jobs, including as a journalist with a local paper.

Goldschmidt continued, “She is a sentimental kind of person but she knows the valley better than anyone else and you are asking practical questions on how to reach these people. Her religious identifications are pragmatic.” He laughed, “They keep her in touch with the people . . . whatever maximizes that. She is a hero.”

Turning to his research, I asked, “So you did the Wasco work first?”

“The Depression was giving way to the war, neither of them were friendly to traditional anthropology. I was looking for something to do my dissertation on. I had already written enough for two dissertations but they were not submitted as being doctoral dissertations. I was trying to test ideas I had about the nature of society. I thought, ‘What the hell, why don’t I do a community study. I could use a town just as well as a tribe.’ So my wife and I drove up and down the valley and picked the town of Wasco for a community study. Paul was very excited about it. I had gone to a seminar in Paul’s home – he had a wonderful, big house – and got to know him through that. He was interested in anthropology. He was on the edge. He had married Dorothea Lange, the photographer.”

“Why Wasco? You are considering looking at a community . . .”

“I wanted a community of a certain size and a certain independence from other communities and away from the highway. The 99 goes through the Central Valley. It is too much of an influence on community. My goal was to try to see how individuals were to advance their status, their family status, in a community?

“Did you pick Wasco because of the agricultural setting, because there were large farms . . .?”

“No, as a matter of fact the questions that animated my book emerged out of the Wasco research. Before that I did not know enough about it, I didn’t have the experience. After I had had the experience, I realized that the growers . . . the capital . . . they had the land.”

“So you finished up there . . .”

“. . . I finished in Wasco and it was just a month or two before we got into the war. My wife got pregnant in Wasco, she was working so god-damn hard and she was three months pregnant before I got her to see a doctor. My son was born on November 11 and December 7 was the war. I guess we finished a month or two before that.

“So you were married and she helped with the Wasco study?”

“She helped me . . . she did. Through all of it. She liked it.”

The conversation shifted to his work with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE). “By then I had gotten to know the BAE people. They had a regional office in Berkeley and the only social research agency in the whole Department of Agriculture. They even had a sociology sector. They called a meeting. They wanted a sociologist. As an undergraduate I took courses in economics, biology, and mostly in anthropology. No philosophy. No sociology. There was no sociology at Berkeley at the time.”
Eventually, though, Goldschmidt was hired at the BAE. “At the Berkeley regional office, I became friends with Rod Fisher and with Rodney Fuller, who had written an interesting book on the importation of labor. It was a book to give you a sense of what was going on in labor relations and minority relations. And there was also a guy named MacIntyre, an agricultural economist. The four of us became a bunch of social science analysts without any real authority in the hierarchy, not section heads. Though I guess MacIntyre was a section head. We were all guys together. All the same age. The four of us got to be good friends.”

“About ’43, I guess it was, there came into being a new federal project called the ‘Central Valley Project.’ One of the biggest projects ever to have been done in the United States at the time, comparable in size and scope to the Tennessee Valley Authority. We set up an interdisciplinary, interagency research program. One of the problems was with the acreage limitation law. Do you know about the acreage limitation law?”

“The 1902 Reclamation Law.”
“That is right.”
“. . . which Paul Taylor cared about. You once said that his needle was stuck on that at the end.”
“He had gotten to be a little bit . . . I shouldn’t have said it because Paul was a wonderful man. Absolutely devoted.”
“It is a good thing to fight about.”
“Damn right! As a matter of fact, I had a guilty conscience because of him when I left the fight. He was my conscious or else I would be waning now, rapidly waning.” I realized that Goldschmidt had never left the fight or its cause. Decades after Taylor’s death, he seemed still with him in the struggle, reticent to let go, unwilling to give up. Had the fight kept him alive these last years?

Goldschmidt returned to the BAE study and acreage limitation. “One of the questions was: should the acreage limitation law be applied to this project and if so would it be good or bad? And there I was having just finished a community study on Wasco. That is where I recognized that industrial agriculture was conducive to an urbanized labor. So when the question was put to me, I said to make a comparative study on large farms and small farms. My plan was to do the comparative study and then to follow it up with twenty five towns. Something you could do by just taking data. You wouldn’t have to do a survey of the people, but count the number of churches, the teacher turnover, the ratio of bars to other enterprises – whatever you could think of that you could just count – acreage in parks or miles in parks. I was stopped from doing that and called back to Berkeley.”

“The Central Valley Project was multidisciplinary, multiagency” he continued. “Marian Clawson was the BAE liaison. I don’t know if he was directing the entire question, but I was working for him and he became my boss. Marian was a Jack Mormon, a really good guy. Incredible. He wrote a biography called “From Sagebrush to Sage.” He was a Cornell philosophical type. His mind was in the right place.
“What do you mean when you say, ’his mind was in the right place’?”
“He was supportive of my research. He was more or less for small farming. I was pretty much left alone. I was the guy who thought up the plan and did the work. My study was almost independently mine except the economists and others had supplied me
with useful estimates of the annual value of the crop. It is something that I could not even have thought of doing, but it was important for me because the thing to know was that the value of the crop in Arvin was exactly the same as Dinuba. You see, if you had looked at those towns in that time, you would say that Arvin was a poor town and Dinuba is a rich town, all things relative.

“So you went ahead with the case study?”

“We were four weeks in Arvin, four weeks in Dinuba. We had driven down from Berkeley late afternoon in April. We arrived on a Sunday and we were tired. I hired a gal from Bakersfield named Darryl Straw. She was a good gal. She and my wife took the questionnaires. One of the first things I did was go to the manager of big DiGiorgio Farms. It was big big. I wasn’t going to trespass on their property. I am quite sure that the moment that I walked out of that DiGiorgio office, he immediately called the Associated Farmer’s PR man in Fresno because the Argots mentioned that he was in town that week and he had my questionnaire.

“Word got out?”

“Yeah. I had also written a letter to all the graduates in the social sciences trying to get sources of information. I had gotten no answers. But one of those letters went to the daughter of the president who was an Associated Farmer. So everybody knew about the study. There was a radio program on every day about the weather, the price of potatoes or corn, and other things. The PR man spent a lot of time talking about Dr. Goldschmidt on the radio and he could say the word ‘doctor’ just like it was ‘bastard.’ It didn’t sound like it phonetically but had that connotation the way he said it.”

“That was a fun welcome for you.”

“Yeah, Bob Franklin, the PR man, got a copy of the questionnaire and started reading the questionnaire and talking about ‘what Dr. Goldschmidt wanted to know.’ He referred to it as a ‘dirty rug questionnaire’ because I asked about status of living questions.”

Goldschmidt went on, “Then, I was called in to Berkeley and was told two things. (1) I was to finish what I was doing and (2), I was to make a response on radio to Bob Franklin. No one had talked to him before. Also, I was not to do the second phase. That was crippling. Really. Somebody was fairly smart to see that the second phase was going to be the killer. I was ready to do regression curves to show how town inequality and farm size by acreage, by its productive value, were related to one another. All done by economists.”

Back in the valley, Goldschmidt went to the radio station. “Franklin had a radio program and did public relations for the Associated Farmers. He may have had other jobs. I went in and sat down. I was in the waiting area and I see him coming. I get up and introduce myself to him. I didn’t fit his image at all. No little bent over Jewish guy with a briefcase and spectacles. I was young, moderately good looking, and looked like a fraternity boy. I mean we could have been playing tennis together just as well. We chatted and he told me with great pride of the great tragedy of his life – the great tragedy was that he had arranged the burning of The Grapes of Wrath. It was all ready to go and he was upstaged by Hitler, because he had planned it for the day that Hitler had marched on Poland. He didn’t see the irony in that at all. I think the burning took place but he didn’t get any press for it, which is what the burning was for.”
Switching topics, Goldschmidt then offered advice to me on how to do research, “You have to illustrate the obvious. I illustrated the obvious too, but it was the obvious being denied. Anybody who looked at Arvin and Dinuba – Arvin was a piece of shit compared to Dinuba – but the point was that Arvin was not a poor town. The poorness was imposed by the system.”

The conversation moved toward my research. I was still not sure of my research topic. I had suggested a few possibilities, including the idea of studying the history of social science scholarship in the valley. “I am in education. I am interested in how researchers looked at this problem. Taylor, yourself, MacCannell, on down the line. As power and wealth has concentrated in this region, how have researchers looked at the problem methodologically and theoretically? How they tried to address it and worked with community in articulating the problem, for the community and for our society? All of you have gone about the problem in unique ways and I think you were uniquely situated to the problems.”

Goldschmidt commented, “You have moved around from one thing to another. You are going to end up living in a particular place because you are just one person and you don’t have instant mobility. You may live in two places or something like that. I think you have to find your focus.”

Then he asked, “Have you read Carey McWilliams?”

“I have picked it up and I have plans to read it.”

“He has done it as good as anybody. There is a new book out. Something written by two guys whose names I can never remember . . . the biggest agricultural producer in California . . .”

“The King of California.”

“Yeah, that’s right.”

“I read it. Bozwell. It is interesting. They are journalists.”

He contemplated favorably, “They are journalists. Carey was a journalist too.”

He went back to discussing research, “That project is perfectly okay, so far as I am concerned. But it is nothing that I would be able to help you to resolve because that is following an intellectual history and I don’t know anything about doing research in that. Research is about trying to transform observations, which are incidents that you make in the field, into sets of finite organized data and establish a future proposition. That is the kind of thing I can help you on.”

I asked, “How much should an anthropologist have identified their research question before they go in to do their research?”

“Well, I don’t know. If you are going out to Ugabuga, you can’t really know what you are going to find. When I came back from my fieldwork the first time I said ‘I don’t understand these people. I don’t have any sense of how to put it together.’ Then I went back, project in mind, which is the way you should do the research. I got it out of being there. This is the same history that I had out of Arvin and Dinuba. It was second phase of what I had done.”

I commented, “You are always moving on assumptions . . . what were the reasons that you choose the community? There are always different ways to view the world.”

“I don’t think you have to know going in but when you are doing something relating to social and political issues, and you know from the start you are doing it for those reasons, it helps. Wasco didn’t solve any political issues though I was aware that
there were political issues. The Okies were very much in mind and there were pitched battles. People were killed over unionization. Heads were certainly bashed in. The owners were breaking the unions. The Okies weren’t well unionized but the Communist Party had gotten enough of them to get them unionized. That is doing what communists would do, as everyone else doesn’t. Well, they ended up with a very good active union with Cesar Chávez. He didn’t make that union though. It is kind of godfather to the whole union movement.”

Goldschmidt mentioned that the problems in California had been looked at since the founding of the state, back to the Spanish land grants. Then he tried to remember, “I am blocking on the name of the guy who studied water districts. . . .”

“Goodall. Merrill Goodall.”

“Yeah.”

“Did you like his work?” I asked.

“Yes, I thought he was very good. I thought Merrill’s problem was that he didn’t take the extra step of making it propaganda amenable. He kept it on the academic side, whether he was shy or unsure of himself or that he was working for an institution that . . . .” Goldschmidt began laughing.

I followed up, “So researchers, academics have a role in propagandizing, of putting their work out in a public arena.”

“Well,” he paused, doubting, “his research was so potentially inflammable, it ought to just make people get angry.”

Regrettably, I did not continue to probe this line of questioning. Goldschmidt seemed to be saying that scholars were responsible for not only disseminating their findings but also picking the appropriate audience to affect, inform or antagonize.

Previously when I asked about the repercussions of the BAE after the Arvin-Dinuba study, Goldschmidt answered, “They were terrible.”

Now I returned to that topic to ask, “What happened with the Bureau of Ag Economics after your study?

“A senator from California named Sheridan Downey, who rode into the Democratic Senate on the shirt tails of Upton Sinclair apparently got into the pockets of the Associated Farmers.”

“He wrote a book, right?”

“Yeah, he wrote a crazy book: They Would Rule The Valley. ‘They’ being the communists and in part me. Downey was just like a Doberman gnawing a bone, he just wouldn’t give up until he killed all social research in the Department of Agriculture. He did it by cutting off the funding. It happened fairly fast.”

“ I think it was telling you that you are doing something right.”

“Yeah. That too. But I didn’t want to continue. I could have had a meteoric career in rural sociology, but that’s not what I wanted to do with my life. I didn’t like social research. I didn’t want a team of people taking out questionnaires. I don’t really believe in questionnaires. I used them but I never rested my case on them. I just don’t like the sociologist’s definition of the problem. I shy away from power like I shy away from illness.” Yet, Goldschmidt had chosen a highly controversial topic in a politicized context and when pressured his tendency was to face and confront opposing forces.

Laughing, he continued, “Democrats tend to be conservative in a teacherish way. When I was being investigated, I would tell people that I was a card carrying member of
the Jeffersonian democracy. It was an unassailable answer. I was being clever sounding like I was an awful person, then I ended up with Jeffersonian democracy. You can’t fault it as a philosophy, even if you don’t believe it.”

We had moved through some of the core stories and moved away from Goldschmidt’s early work. Before leaving I had some incidental questions.

“Before I go, what was Dorothea Lange like?”

“She was kind of a flower child before they existed. A lot of mystic in her. She was modest. Very liberal and very sweet and very conscientious. I liked her very much. One time she had a hanging on the wall. A strange looking thing made out of wires and stuff. I thought, ‘Where the hell had she gotten that dumb thing?’ She said, ‘I took it out of the fireplace.’ It was some decorations that had gotten burned up. She thought it was beautiful. That was the kind of person she was. She was also one of the most famous photographers in the United States.”

“Did you go out taking photos with her?”

“She took me out with her once. It was a very interesting experience. She had polio as a girl, so she had a gimp walk. She wanted to get pictures of asparagus pickers in the delta area, in particular pictures that showed the relationship between the housing and the fields. She started pausing, then asked me to stop. She climbed out on top of the station wagon. She had me back up and position the car. Pretty soon, she came back to the car. I said, ‘You didn’t take any pictures?’ She answered, ‘They weren’t any good.’ And I said, ‘It is the best you are going to get.’ ‘It doesn’t matter. It’s not any good. No use cluttering up your files with them’.”

“Then we went around and came to where a group of pickers worked. It was early in the morning. This one guy was coming up with a trot that I can’t imitate. It was a trot in which the legs were always bent. In one hand he had this knife where the blade ended in a fishtail. It was poked into the ground for the white part of the asparagus. He was poking the individual stalks and catching them in the other hand. When he had a handful, he put them down. He was singing. We parked at the end of the row. He hadn’t seen her and just as he came at a distance that she wanted she said ‘Hi.’ He looked up and she clicked, did a little salute and got back in the car. I said, ‘Aren’t you even going to say thank you to these people?’ She said, ‘You have got to think of the camera as not even being there.’ I have to say that I did not follow either of those good pieces of advice, not that I thought that they were bad advice, but they don’t work when you are doing ethnographic things.”

Remembering my first meeting with Goldschmidt, he had condensed these two stories and lessons of advice from Lange.

Looking at his bookshelf, packing my bag, I observed, “I see you have Carlos Castenada’s stuff here. Did you take any heat for that? How was he viewed? He had a broad impact, yet I wonder how he was received in academic circles?”

“I helped him because his books are valuable.”

“You helped him when he was at UCLA?”

“Well, I did one thing. I was on the editorial committee of the department. I was handed a manuscript. I talked to a number of my colleagues and a half a dozen were very positive about it. They were a mixed bag: the archeologist who he went out with when he first ‘met’ Don Juan, an anthropological student of mine that I had a high regard for, a linguist, a sociologist, and I think there was one other. I was charmed by it,
but I could never get into it. He had been in my undergraduate class. I was also chairman of . . ."

Goldschmidt trailed off, then mentioned a dialogue with Castenada. “I called him in and asked him to show me his notes. He said, ‘Okay, I will bring them in.’ And the next time I saw him I said, ‘You haven’t brought the notes.’ He said, ‘Oh, I am sorry. I haven’t gotten around to it. I will get them to you.’ Of course I never saw any because there aren’t any. Or he never showed me there aren’t any.”

I suspected that Goldschmidt was chairman of Castenada’s dissertation committee, but did not ask.

“Was there really a Don Juan?”

“I doubt it. I think there was a model for it maybe.”

“It is funny that something that doesn’t have empirical backing resonated so much with the culture at the time.”

“Yeah, it was exactly the right thing at the right time in the history of the United States youth.”

In August 2009, Goldschmidt sent an email to his friends and colleagues with a link to a blog he has started (http://waltergoldschmidt.wordpress.com). He had hired an amanuensis to help him with writing and posts. I kept in contact that year. On my last visit, he told me “If you want to interview me again, you better do it now. I’m not going to last much longer.” He was 96 years old. Rather than do an interview though, I visited and talked. I did not have a tape recorder and he was increasingly difficult to understand, even when I was sitting with him. He seemed concerned that I was not moving forward with the study. He even suggested that I was afraid.

I was emphatic that it would be finished. Months before he died, I phoned him – I was writing the study.
CHAPTER 7
DEAN MACCANNELL – THE POETRY OF STATISTICS

In the 1960’s, a new phalanx of critical social scientists arrived in the valley working both outside of the academy but also, for the first time, within California’s land grant complex, including its flagship campus at Davis. In the history of the University of California, there had never been a rural sociology program or department. In fact, as far as known, there had not been a rural sociologist hired by the U.C. system. Why? What purpose was served by having the state’s premier public universities disallow an entire line of inquiry on an issue of fundamental importance? And what effect would this have on its educational role and mission?

What occurred when the first rural sociologists did arrive? What repercussions resulted from their work? Dean MacCannell, the first rural sociologist with a doctoral degree, hired by California’s land grant colleges in institutional memory, illustrated this academic work. Upon arriving at Davis, he immediately set out upon the most important task – the Goldschmidt retest. This was a pedagogical, as well as a scientific, endeavor. The retests were to answer an outstanding issue of public policy, educational value, and unanswered scientific research.

A complete scholar with respect to the breadth of research methods and applied theory he used, MacCannell was an adept statistician also versed in continental philosophy and semiotics. Of all the scholars in this study, MacCannell was the most quantitative. Perhaps because he relied upon positivist methods, his pedagogical practice

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59 California has three campuses for its land grant – UC Berkeley, UC Davis and UC Riverside.
60 Dean and Juliet Flower MacCannell, his wife, were Co-Editors of The American Journal of Semiotics from 1983-1995. He was also Executive Director of the Semiotic Society of America from 1985-1992.
was the most difficult to discern as it was masked in the role of a neutral scientist and positions dependent upon objectivity. Since his work was closest to normative ideas of what a scientist should be, his primary role as a traditional social scientist was central to understanding all of the multifaceted roles of politically engaged scholars. While positivism has been problematized, in MacCannell’s case it was critically utilized and effectively deployed against California’s agribusiness.

When I asked about the seeming contradictions between his positivist and semiotic approaches, MacCannell commented:

_I approached doing the empirical work and the more critical, theoretical stuff with equal enthusiasm. In the early days, I wasn’t as split up or schitzoid as it would seem in retrospect because there were these figures that were trying to put the picture together in an American way similar to what happened in France._

_Kenneth Burke, who said the poetic is just another word for statistical, ties everybody – Goffman, Frank Young – together. He developed a framework or paradigm of reference that was necessary to analyze anything dramatic. It initially had to do with stage productions. Goffman took this to heart in Presentation of Self and subsequent things. He called it a dramaturgical frame of reference and openly references Burke. In his hands, it dealt with everyday life. Young did similar things._

_Burke said a dramatic frame can put together the whole picture of how meaning is generated by describing act, scene, agent, agency and motive. He goes into quite a bit of detail in terms of these concepts._

Later, referencing Burke, MacCannell told me that there was an artistic poetry within statistics. While adept at multiple research methods and theoretical frames, it was MacCannell’s statistical research in the San Joaquin Valley which posed the gravest threat to the region’s oligarchy and caused their most virulent reactions.

An exemplary young scholar educated in some of the most prestigious American universities and mentored by renowned scholars of his day, there was no apparent aspect of MacCannell’s preparation that had been overlooked. The son of a sociologist, he conducted graduate level research as an undergraduate. His mentors included Frank
Young and Erving Goffman. By 1975, he was hired at the University of California, Davis as a professor in its new department of Applied Behavior Studies. In order to understand his scholarship and its pedagogical importance, I will highlight MacCannell’s valley scholarship by focusing on four areas: (1) his use of macrosocial accounting as a research method, (2) the retest of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis that industrial agriculture negatively impacts rural community life, (3) MacCannell’s experience as a scholar during an era of counterculture movement and upheaval, and (4) the political intrigues and dramatic events surrounding the end of the reclamation fight. Not only did MacCannell substantiate Goldschmidt’s original findings, he improved upon the research methods to document the social costs associated with industrial agriculture as well as extending the theoretical implications four decades after the original studies were conducted.

Profile of Practice: Becoming a Scholar

In June 2006, I emailed Dean MacCannell, just as I had Walter Goldschmidt, to introduce myself and my intent to conduct research in the valley.

Professor MacCannell,

I am currently a doctoral student at Cornell in their Adult Education and Extension Program. I attended UC Davis from 2000 to 2002 getting a M.S. degree in International Agricultural Development. During that time, I got to know Isao Fujimoto and his work in the Central Valley.

Simultaneously, I worked with Cooperative Extension in Knights Landing for two years under an RAship and conducted a critical ethnography of social segregation in public institutions, in particular schools but also housing, churches and local political bodies like the area’s water district.

While researching broadly around the question of the reproduction of inequality, I became familiar with Walter Goldschmidt’s work. Though I did not emphasize it at the time, I have since continued to be troubled by
the extent of the poverty and environmental problems within a context of such wealth.

This July, I will be going to the southern San Joaquin Valley to explore research collaborations with various community groups in the region. Before I head down there, I will be visiting Davis between July 7 and 11th and would value any advice you have on approaching the research topic. I have read some of your work on the topic, specifically around the Westlands, and the general context of the social and economic repercussions of industrial agriculture. Cornell Professors Lyson and Geisler refer to you regarding this topic.

I hope you have time to meet.

Thank you,
Dan O’Connell

On June 30, 2006, MacCannell responded:

Dear Daniel,

Thank you for the note. I’m always interested in supporting further research on the valley.

I am in Europe lecturing right now, and will not return until July 9. I have no plans to go to Davis (I live in the Bay Area) during the dates of your stay.

Depending on your schedule, we could meet in Berkeley on the 10th or 11th.

Best wishes and good luck with this important research,
Dean MacC

In the summer of 2006, I met both Dean and Juliet, his wife, for breakfast at Saul’s Deli in Berkeley. Without seeing it at the time, they immersed me in story; most of the time with humor, occasionally indignant, they began to tell me their journey. It was apparent from the start that it was one that they had traveled together.

Rather than begin MacCannell’s story in childhood, I will start with his development as a scholar:

My history with Frank Young goes way back. My father was a professor of sociology at San Diego State where Frank Young had his first academic appointment and I began school before transferring to Berkeley. He started in my freshman year. Frank Young was my first anthropology professor. He taught me Anthro 1.

His history was interesting. He had gotten his PhD in Anthro from Cornell. They treated him as a bad boy in Letters and Sciences, but he wanted to be hired there.
He had an aura which surrounded him when he arrived at San Diego State. My father would have been senior to him and part of his hire because Soc and Anthro were together at San Diego State. So I was able to hear the faculty gossip. It was provincial, like “He is too big for us. He is an Ivy League PhD. Ordinarily we don’t get anybody like that around here.” So Frank arrived with a lot of drum rolling. He acted like that too.

Frank was working on a book, a cross-cultural study of male initiation. He came into the first classes and said, “I just discovered that there are no graduate students here, and I have to have a research team. So I am going to give an examination. The top tier of students on the exam, even though you are undergraduates and you are not supposed to be doing this, will be a part of my research team. You will get out of all work for the class. You don’t have to write term papers or take any of the other exams. You are only going to be graded on the quality of your ability to take orders and do the research.” I was up for that! I became a part of Frank’s research team as an undergraduate at San Diego State. I did coding and made tables for that study of male initiation ceremonies.

All of this was happening as I shifted from San Diego State to Berkeley. I was a five year undergraduate because not all of my credits transferred. My Berkeley faculty in Anthropology were horrible as far as teaching was concerned. There was nothing that resembled a Frank Young. They were old. Opinionated. It was supposed to be the best Anthropology Department in the world but it was a freaking disaster from an undergraduate student’s standpoint. Del Himes, the linguist, was just incredible. He gave these brilliant lectures but he mumbled. You could only understand him if you were sitting directly in front of him. All the students were trying to grab that seat. He never looked at the class even once. He would look at the upper far corner of the classroom. If you could get what he said down on a piece of paper and read it afterwards, it was “Wow, this is fabulous stuff!” But the classroom was, again, just plain miserable. Laura Nadar was good. Robert Murphy was good. Goffman was in Sociology. I did take Introduction to Sociology from Erving Goffman as a junior. I couldn’t take Sociology at San Diego State because it would have been taught by my father or a close family friend.

I was determined to get back to Frank Young, or something like Frank Young, for graduate study. They wanted me to stay at Berkeley in Sociology but I went to Rural Sociology at Cornell exactly when Frank was in his complete ascendancy. All graduate students had Frank on their committee. If you were really lucky, and part of the elite, he was the chair of your committee. He was putting together his Frank Young paradigm. Assembling it, in seminars, piece by piece, so we watched his thinking process as he created his three systemic structural variables of differentiation, solidarity and centrality.

Frank was a structuralist. He was in the process of building a mega-theory, like the Talcott Parsons. Though structuralism was coming in Europe, he was doing it over here independently – totally American. It came out at the same moment as what was happening in Europe. He was the only guy in the United States that was doing a rigorous, theoretically deductive, structural model for analyzing the ways that communities or regions undergo change and development. It is still potentially interesting; if it still existed today. It is still teachable. It could still be useful; but it died somewhere along the line. It just lacks any kind of human life. It’s like Frank – too arid.

Frank was at the top of the heap with graduate students. There is a good reason for that because there was something creative going on. There was a very high energy. We know what the unknowns are. Here are the areas we have to go into to clear up this
matter and to figure out the next step. Rostow was happening at that same time – the stages of economic development. For those of us at Frank’s shop at Cornell, all of that didn’t seem smart, the way we were. We had much stronger way of forming hypotheses. They were testable. They weren’t all broad stroke and ideologically driven. The students were attracted to it, not because it was to the left, but because it wasn’t all saturated with ideology. Harvard and Yale and other schools of development were, “It’s all about capitalism. What you need to do is fund a bunch of entrepreneurs and everything is going to come out ok.” This was much tougher than that. Frank shopped out the variables – differentiation, solidarity and centrality – to the dissertation students. I was actually known in graduate school as “differentiation man” because that was the variable that I was going to be working on for Frank. This was the way he had everybody going.

Though I always have had a troubled relationship with Frank, we got along fine. He was the chair for my dissertation. Signed it off. He nominated me for Rural Sociology Society’s “Dissertation of the Year” award and I got it. He had to write that letter. We’ve never had a break.

As I drafted the first MacCannell profile section, I saw that he situated himself into a history of scholarship. He was mentored by some of the most prominent social scientists of his generation. These relationships not only informed his training, but validated his standing in the community of scholars.

While I was at Cornell, I also corresponded with Goffman, who I had studied with before. He was on sabbatical at Harvard in ’65, the year that we got married – he really liked Juliet. We traded manuscripts. I got to read several of things he was working on while he was working on them. He generously incorporated some of the things I wrote back to him into footnotes in several books while I was in graduate school.

Goffman favored me in the bizarre way that Goffman could favor somebody. He invited us, for instance, to come up and visit him on Christmas day. Goffman would do this, seeing if you were a Christian or not. In sociology he was famous for having this quirky and difficult personality where he never brooks any crap from anybody. And he didn’t. He would call you on anything if he detected if it was slightly inflated or insufficiently thought through. He would pounce on you, and not in polite ways. Not gently. He would say, “You really believe that! What is wrong with you anyway?” Very tough. Nobody liked him; or rather, everyone was afraid of him. They ran when he started coming their way, but we were fine. I took a seminar from him postdoc in Philadelphia after this. He was one of the best classroom teachers I ever saw in action, but not nearly as good an undergraduate instructor as in a graduate seminar.

I was writing about tourism as a graduate student. I was interested in doing a dissertation on bordertowns and tourism. I had sent my proposal to Goffman. He really liked it and sent me back good comments on it. After I had sent it to Goffman, I gave the same proposal to Frank Young. The committee huddled, then concluded out of my presence that they would not accept the proposal. They were nice. They said, “It’s a
great proposal. It will be a great book. But you are on completely uncharted territory here. It will take you probably ten years to do it, if you do it the way you want to do it. We don’t want you around here for that long, so just propose something a little more conventional and get the hell out of here.” Goffman was infuriated. He practically went straight through the roof. Later, he said the most wonderful thing, “In Chicago (in his graduate school days) we left the empirical stuff to the people who were actually challenged by it. If you were smart, you did ethnography.”

I did the dissertation that Frank and the committee wanted, but there were two things that were wrong with it from a Frank Young perspective. First, it was done in the United States. He wanted all of his students to be working in Third World settings. He was irritated with that. And second, I chose Ruth Young’s variable of rigidity to test against his variable of differentiation. Frank was always in a heated rivalry with his wife. They eventually divorced but not until much later. They had screaming domestic fights with each other that just shut down the department. Fights about theory and methods. She was bright and creative, in many ways more creative than Frank. They just didn’t tolerate each other on any level. Those were the two anti-Frank Young gestures in it, but it was perfectly acceptable to him. The dissertation was theoretically high wire, the most methodologically sophisticated thing you could do at the time in a positivist mode. I did it, just the way they told me.

MacCannell’s dissertation method was ultimately coined “macrosocial accounting.”

(Later, it was the primary statistical method used to retest Goldschmidt’s hypotheses at UC Davis.)

My dissertation method was macrosocial accounting. The development of macrosocial accounting, the term and the idea, was Frank Young. I was the first person hired at Cornell to be the head its Macrosocial Accounting Project. Like everything with Frank, it was a little ahead of its time. Today, it would be perfect with computing the way we have it. Back then it was massive data archives on villages in developing areas of the world trying to create a big system. We had to review if these studies were of sufficient quality so that we could recode things and actually compare the level of differentiation. Meanwhile, the one computer on campus occupied the entire building of Rand Hall and it had less computing capacity than a laptop today.

The method was too cumbersome to really be achieved at the time. Frank was envisioning having files on all these different countries. This is a place where we had a parting of the ways, he wanted to be able to create an ideal model for a dissertation that could be done anywhere – in Brazil or the Philippines or Taiwan. Everyone would go off and do their dissertation and come back to Cornell with information on this and this and this. If you wanted a chapter on your interests, fine; but basically dissertations would be coordinated and comparable to each other within the Young paradigmatic framework. He got funding for this whole idea.

I disagreed with this dissertation model. I didn’t think people should be handed a model for their dissertation. Now, I see this was naïve. That’s the way it is done in science. I didn’t know. I now know that every laboratory in every big research type
institution is run that way. The major professor hands the graduate student a task and says you measure this and this and this and check the relationships and that will be your dissertation. But I came from some idealistic, ancient philosophical tradition – I thought that I was supposed to have the idea.

I finished in ’68 and had this nifty job as a Senior Research Associate to start up and coordinate Cornell’s Macrosocial Accounting Program. I had all of the perks and salary of an Assistant Professor. I was teaching a seminar. I even taught Frank’s methods course when he was on sabbatical at Stanford. It was clear that my status would have been converted as soon as a faculty position opened up. But we knew that there were not going to be two positions in Ithaca for us. We agreed that if Juliet could get a faculty position in either Boston or Philadelphia, I would go to Boston and study with Chomsky or Philadelphia and study with Goffman. Even if I didn’t have a prospect, I would go. My main goal was to take a year and write The Tourist. When Juliet got a position at Haverford College, I quit.

Today, everything we did in macrosocial accounting in the valley, and probably everything that Young ever did using it in Mexico, would be done in GIS. Let’s say macrosocial accounting never existed and Frank Young was an Associate Professor at Cornell and I was a beginning graduate student, GIS would be the method. But we would not be doing it in a kind of a brutish, empiricist, inductive way. Sometimes geographers using GIS don’t have an idea in their head or they will chase something really low level and find things by accident. We would never do that, we would have theory. We don’t find things by accident. We would be harnessing GIS to the theory in order to try to have this powerful method to illustrate conceptual relations.

We would be taking exactly the same sets of variables, like Young’s variables – differentiation, solidarity, rigidity – or others and attempt to see how they can predict such things as poverty and what have you. Since everything that we did was laid out in space, connected to geographic entities like towns, it would be the perfect matrix for us to just grab a hold of and use its robust capacities for handling data.

Macrosocial accounting was originally conceived as these giant repositories or archives of data at the community level that we could then examine for relationships that existed within the data sets. That’s the GIS system. As long as your unit of analysis is a geographic entity, which ours were – always towns or counties or whatever – it would be perfect.

**Scholarship in the Struggle: Macrosocial Accounting**

Macrosocial accounting was a quantitative research method that investigated community and regional structures, described local economics, assessed civic participation and measured community well-being. MacCannell was among the first to
adapt and apply this tool to agricultural regions most indicative of monopolized industrialization. In this section, I briefly track Frank Young and his students development of macrosocial accounting, then conclude with MacCannell’s 1978 overview of the method written as it was being applied in California.

Macrosocial accounting utilized research methods similar to agricultural economics (Young 1972, MacCannell 1988, Theodoropoulos 1990). The primary difference was that its level of analysis was broader as it was used in sociological analysis. MacCannell (1988: 15-16) commented,

The difference between MSA (macrosocial accounting) and economic approaches is the level of analysis and the types of models which are made. Economic analysis of agricultural systems focuses on the integration of business enterprises in markets, and it models costs and benefits of different policies and practices at the level of the firm. As its name implies, the goal of MSA is to describe regional social structure.

Since positivist statistics bolstered the method’s academic credentials its findings were rigorously scientific.

Originally, macrosocial accounting was developed at Cornell by Frank Young with his graduate students. In an early article, Young (1964: 40) fleshed out this method’s evolving themes and framed them as “sociometric” as they described the connectivity between multiple layers of society – the state, regional affiliations, intervillage networks, villages, and individual informants. These “inter-system relationships” were linked to “variables of community structure” (Young 1964: 36) that could be quantified. A year later, Young and Fujimoto (1965: 344-346) “suggest the possibility that communities can be ordered on a single dimension of complexity and differentiation” and an emerging model, using “community as a unit of analysis,” took
form. By 1967, Young and MacCannell had standardized a model stable enough to measure across geographic, social and cultural contexts. They argued:

The concept of structural differentiation applies to the whole of any system. Therefore it should be possible to construct a general scale, one that incorporates as items information from all institutional sectors and yet is still a single dimension” (Young and MacCannell 1967: 336).

By 1972, Young’s method was being applied in the field. In “Macrosocial Accounting in Developing Countries,” Young (1972: 288) specifically noted that “social solutions must supercede, or at least temper economic and technical perspectives.” Macrosocial accounting led to “routinized causal analysis,” a generalizable approach later used to describe and assess California’s industrial agricultural regions. Young (1972: 297-298) explained:

A step beyond trends is the correlational analysis of variables at any one point of time, which generates ‘cross-sectional’ pictures of social organization. But once two points in time have been captured, the temptation to think in causal terms is irresistible. Such analysis can be carried on with simple cross tabulations or with regressions and simultaneous equations in the manner of econometricians, but whatever the approach, it is obvious that the investigator can learn more with a baseline than he can without it. Practically speaking, however, it will probably be advisable to standardize certain statistical packages for such analyses and diffuse them along with the general approach to social accounting.

The regression method, once considered by Goldschmidt for his second multi-community study two decades before, was now in place ready to be applied.

The possible applications of macrosocial accounting were substantial. If data banks covering a region or even a country established its “general structural dimension,” any changes (like the introduction of a school or library) could be tracked, compared and assessed over time; such “institutional innovations” could then inform upon further

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61 MacCannell (1978: 32) acknowledged that macrosocial accounting was used for 50 dissertations and monographs in addition to over 100 published research reports between 1963 and 1978.
program investments (Young 1972: 299-300). Another use of the method was in uncovering “latent secrets” (facts that remained dormant or had been suppressed), which often resulted in a “contradiction between facts and policy” and “become troublesome to one or more interests” (Young 1972: 300). Some research findings from the San Joaquin Valley represented such suppressed knowledge and macrosocial accounting at the Davis campus promised to bring to light these findings and resolve longstanding academic disputes, including continued scientific disagreement over Goldschmidt’s hypothesis.

A key description of macrosocial accounting, written by MacCannell in 1978 for a layperson’s understanding, was titled “The Elementary Structures of Community: Macrosocial Accounting as a Methodology for Theory Building and Policy Formation.” MacCannell (1978: 32-33) explained that macrosocial accounting described “the structure and behavior of entire communities” by relying upon the three themes of differentiation, centrality, and solidarity. These three themes were designed to be inclusive of almost all aspects of community life, MacCannell (1978: 43; italics in original) defined them:

the notions of community “spirit” or a “sense of community” are aspects of *solidarity*. A community’s “isolation” or, alternatively, its “importance” are functions of its *centrality*. And *differentiation* incorporates what we ordinarily think of as level of economic or social development.

Differentiation, in particular, was useful in codifying institutions and groupings of community in order to construct a baseline to make comparisons over time or with other locations:

Once analysis of component groups was begun, it became quite clear that communities are only expressions of underlying structural codes similar in some respects to the genetic code or to a grammar of a language (MacCannell 1978: 34).
These variables of community included such institutions as churches, schools, hospitals, libraries, unions or newspapers; the presence of services like public transportation, taxis, recreation, water supply or electrification; and facilities like types of housing, number of roads or other types of infrastructure. Once counted, they could be compared.

Social structure differentiation, expressed in community variables, was seen as interconnected rather than random. The institutions and services of community formed a network reliant upon each other in a reciprocating structural system. This hypothesis opened the door to changes in community development theory, potential policy adjustments and real world applications. If associations within this structure could be determined – like increasing the number of schools to promote long term economic development, for example – then investments and programs could be directed to maximize beneficial outcomes. The applications and utility of determining structural differentiation seemed accessible and unlimited.

Macrosocial accounting, as the article’s title suggested, was for theory building and policy formation. In his conclusion, MacCannell (1978: 46; italics in original) emphasized the method as a “naturally occurring process” where he assumed that “social change occurs independent of the programs and policies” created by planners, community organizers or even revolutionaries. Since,

from the standpoint of macrosocial accounting, they do not stand outside social structure where they exert independent, causal influence on the change process. They are fully caught up in the process. In short, it is possible to “track” revolutionaries or even mundane items such as comprehensive community plans (i.e., to line up the structural characteristics of the communities in a system and pinpoint the areas that are ripe for revolution or ready for rational planning).

It is the hope of macrosocial accountants that a recognition of the inevitability of the recent appearance in social systems all around the
world of “change agents,” the Peace Corps, radical organizers, and the like will clear aside some of the romantic notions surrounding such roles and pave the way for a rational analytic of structural change. One of the first tasks of a rational “change agent” would be to obtain measures of the characteristics of the target system (MacCannell 1978: 46).

Macrosocial accounting created scientific knowledge. MacCannell’s confidence, illustrated in these concluding remarks, was epistemologically consistent with the positivist grounding of his method. The article, a theoretical discussion, does not close the door on agentic potential, though it does take “some of the magic out of community work” in providing a “true assessment of community change efforts” (MacCannell 1978: 47). While this theory imposed theoretical constraints upon change agents, it would prove to be a potent tool when used to analyze the social affects of Californian agriculture.

Profile of Practice: Scholarship in the Era of Counterculture

Things were really going nuts and we were pregnant. We had no idea about how long the war and protests were going to go on or how it was going to alter geopolitics. We were of the opinion that we wanted our child to be born outside of the United States against future contingencies and considered moving out of the country.

We were also afraid that we were among the unindicted co-conspirators for the Scranton 8 or whatever they were. There was one of those dramatic trials that came to naught for the government. After they put on their case against the conspirators, the defense just stood up and said, “The defense rests.” The defense didn’t have to put on any case because there was nothing – everybody was found innocent. But before this happened (while we were living in Europe), the government said, “These eight are the core of the case but there are additional unindicted co-conspirators (a big number like 42) who we are going to go after when we convict the eight.” We were scared since we knew several of the principals, people like the Berrigan brothers.

During our first year in Philadelphia, when all hell was breaking loose in the country, I decided to put my vita in at a couple of colleges so I could teach freshman sociology and have a little spending money – something to do, you just can’t write a book every moment. I put in at Temple University and they said to come back in a week. After a week passed, and school had started, I called them up and asked them if anything was
happening. It was the first day of classes. I got the secretary and asked if I was supposed to be teaching.

She said, “Oh, you will be teaching a graduate seminar in Social Theory at 6 in the evening and American Society at 2 in the afternoon and two sections of Introductory . . .”

I said, “What is going on here? I applied to teach an introductory section.”

She said, “No, we have hired you as a tenure track professor.”

“It is not exactly what I had in mind,” I said, but I agreed to do it. It was only a short time after that that Juliet got the news that hers was only a one-year position. We were stuck with it.

At that time, Temple University had what we call “revolving doors assistant professorships” which were a little bit more humane that Juliet’s situation. They hired on one-year renewable contracts. If you could get three one-year contracts in a row, which in practice actually proved to be virtually impossible, then you would be up for a three-year contract. At the end of the three-year contract you would be up for tenure. There were a lot of opportunities to be kicked out of the system. They would hire eight or ten assistant professors every year, throw most of them out, then hire another batch.

I made the first round. They re-hired me and a couple of other people, and let go of the rest. I looked at the group they retained and the group they let go and thought if I had power of this decision I would have made the exact opposite decision. I would have kept the people they let go and let go the people they kept, so there can’t be much of a future for me here.

Eventually, I left too. We had saved one of our paychecks the whole year. So we had a year, and we took a year. That was The Tourist year because I couldn’t do a lot while teaching full time at Temple. We packed up everything. We got on the SS France, went to Paris and found an apartment. I didn’t have a job, but have always been employed since I was 12 years old.

We went to some center for international professors to find an apartment and they asked, “You’re a sociologist?”

“Yeah.”

“Well, the British professor who teaches at the American College in Paris just got tuberculosis and they need somebody desperately to teach sociology starting tomorrow.

About half way through the year, we begin thinking, “Our money is going to run out. We’re not trust fund kids by any stretch. What are we going to do?”

There was a huge recession in the United States. The dollar was being devalued horrendously. I wrote a couple of letters to schools in the U.S. but of course they wouldn’t even think to bring somebody from Paris for a job interview. They were starting the job retrenchment especially in Sociology as the social sciences were defunded.

Nixon believed that sociology graduate students caused the dissent against the war. In fact, a lot of us had spearheaded Vietnam Summer, which was what turned public opinion. We figured out that the public opinion on the war had been shaped by the way that the big polls, Gallup and others, had been asking the questions. In Vietnam Summer, university students in the country got together and made a questionnaire that had the right kinds of questions on it, set at about the level of casualty rates they were suffering at the time. Questions like, "Would you continue to support the war if the
casualty rate would be 100 Americans a day in perpetuity?” There was a whole series of
questions that were countering the main stream polling questions. We reproduced
millions of these questions and gave them out to college students who went door to door
and did the survey. There was never any intent to gather and analyze the data.

We were involved in ginning up the discussions on how to make this happen. No
money for it and no real point to it as far as we were concerned. The main thing that we
wanted to do was to knock on every door in America and ask people these questions.
Public opinion turned on a dime. It went from 70% support for the war to 70% against
it, just like that and from that point on.

The killing of the students at Kent State was effective though. It dampened down
the protests enormously causing people to say, “I don’t know if we should go on this
march because I might get shot by the National Guard.” It was rough. The National
Guard would have its riot exercises on college campuses. They would say, “On Saturday
be prepared. There is going to be a bunch of military guys and tanks driving around
your campus.”

Just when we were in the depths of despair with the money running out, I got a
letter from the Chair of the Department of Sociology at Temple. It just came out of the
blue. I hadn’t solicited it. It said, “The Dean of the College and I have decided that we
are not going to accept your resignation from the faculty. We have given you a year’s
leave of absence without pay and we are expecting you back in the classroom in
September.” It was amazing.

We returned to Philadelphia. It was great because Goffman, Juliet and I were
there together and visited. The Center for Urban Ethnography had just been started.
Students were doing ethnographies in the ghettos. Around 1971, I taught the first
graduate course in the United States called “Semiotics, Ethnomethodology and Social
Change” at Temple. I survived all the cuts from one-year to three-year. Then, mid-way
through the third year, Isao called and engineered the move to UC Davis.

Isao Fujimoto was my graduate student office mate at Cornell. Frank Young was
his major professor too. We were close. He was ahead of me by a couple of years and I
was assigned to him as his little brother. He was my graduate student pal to get me
through the first year. They did that back then. Every incoming graduate student was
given somebody who had been there a year or two to advise them. They housed us
together with two graduate students per office in the basement of Warren Hall. They put
me in with Isao. He was my guy. He was as activist then as he is now. Everything was
starting up; the war, the African American studies thing, everything. We were all off
protesting together as often as doing all the graduate student stuff.

The grounding that Young gave us in social analysis using empirical indicators
was equally influential for Isao and myself but neither of us were slavish Youngians. We
both used macrosocial accounting. Isao was an innovative user of it, in his hands it got
embroidered upon. Still, we were probably the least likely of Young’s students to follow
him right down the road and do exactly what he told us to do, which doesn’t diminish the
importance of Young’s teaching for both of us. It was crucial. Young was very
innovative with social indicators. He wasn’t interested in just grabbing the standard set
of demographic indicators. He was constantly teaching us that everything was a social
indicator. You just have to figure out how to quantify it.
The paint on the side of a house was a social indicator. Was it pealing? Was it new? The depth of tire treads was a social indicator. He was poetical in his application of empiricism, if he let that side of himself go more. One of his first published articles was done up in Canada on a small community. It was called “Tombstones and Social Structure.” He went into graveyards and weighed the tombstones. He took the years off of them to chart the community’s economic cycles for the last century by measuring the average aggregate weight of the tombstones by year. He had all sorts of ways of analyzing the cemetery. How were family sizes fluctuating during different eras by looking at children’s tombstones? What was the average age of death for the people? He was able to paint this detailed picture of the life of that community for the last 100 years in quite imaginative ways. He had his antennas out for that kind of stuff. It was that Young, who was most appealing to Isao when Isao came to Davis.

Isao was one of the first rural sociologists to come out to Davis. They hired him after he had been in the field to do his dissertation but he hadn’t really started writing it yet. We were coming out of the Ivy League. If you were hired as an Assistant Professor at Cornell back then, you would have no teaching responsibilities for a year, but he was teaching a full load. Isao took every responsibility Davis handed him very seriously. He didn’t say no to anything. I could see that he was being used up. Every time they needed anybody who was a little bit different for anything – to be a public face, to start a program, to work with a student who was different, whatever – it was always his job. They overused him. Overload. There was no way he could have finished his dissertation.

They brought him to Davis at a moment when everything was in ferment and turmoil. The Chancellor, Jim Meyer, had students laying down on the railroad tracks in Davis to stop the munitions train from going to the weapons station. The students weren’t going to classes. They were holding rallies all the time. Education stopped. Meyer personally told me a story where he called in the students. They demanded “relevancy” and gave him a cafeteria menu of recommendations. So he said, “I went to Sociology and Anthropology and Economics. I asked them if they would be willing to accommodate within their curriculum some courses that the students would regard as ‘relevant.’ They all slammed the door in my face saying that under no circumstances would the curriculum of their august sciences be shaped by some hair-brained, spur of the moment, student demand.” It was a shut out.

Meyer had been the Dean of the College of Agriculture. Up until about ten years ago that was the only stepping stone to being the Chancellor at Davis. It was automatic – you were the Dean of the College of Ag, then you were the Chancellor. He still had good contacts back in Ag since he had anointed the next Dean. So he went back to his old college and laid out the problem. They said, “No problem. We will just start a whole new division here. It will be the ‘relevant’ division.” That is how Applied Behavioral Science was born with Orville Thompson as the head. It had Native American Studies, Asian American Studies, International Ag Development, Human Development, Child Development, Community Development, and Landscape Architecture and Design.

Orville had been a Cornell Education guy. He was an astute institutional creator who managed to nurture that impossible entity into a fairly powerhouse department that was hated by almost everybody on campus. One of the first hires that Orville made was Isao. As I mentioned, Isao got overextended right way because he got put in charge of everything relevant. We were waiting, hoping and praying, back at Cornell that Isao
would be submitting his dissertation any time. But events just conspired against him. There were too many things for him to be doing in California and at Davis.

Around this time, when I was at Temple, Isao called and said that Applied Behavioral Sciences was taking a lot of heat from the conventional social sciences and humanities, even the science sciences, on campus. It was a hot bed of activism. They were doing things like laying out the bicycle paths, starting the farmer’s market, getting the free clinic going, protesting the war. Isao said “Look, we have to have someone on our side who can lend an aura of legitimacy to this thing.” By this time, The Tourist had been accepted for publication and a couple of other things, so the administration could see me as one of their kind of players. They brought me out for an interview and I got the job. When I arrived at Davis, Isao had been there for five or seven years. We drove straight to his house. We were that close. We didn’t go to the university. We didn’t go to find a realtor. We went straight to Isao’s house on Linden Lane.

I was perfect because all of the enemies of Applied Behavior Sciences said, “This guy would never do anything with Ag – The Tourist, structuralism, semiotics. Absolutely. Ideal!” I got a complete pass! Not only a pass but an enthusiastic welcome. Charlie Hess, the Dean, called me into his office and said, “I am sorry I have to tell you this, but as far as I’m concerned, you are a flower growing out of a dung heap!” The dung heap was Applied Behavioral Sciences.

After arriving, I immediately got funding from a device the legislature had started up. The legislature was interested in trying to shape UC research programs so that they would in fact address some of the real problems of that moment. It was a nutsy time. David Saxon was President of the University after being fired for not signing the loyalty oath years before. Jerry Brown was Governor. Carter was President.

The legislature was on our side. They were offering $50,000 grants to UC faculty that would propose to do something that would be relevant and geared to the current crises. They were called “policy seminars” or “Legislative Grants for UC Policy Seminars.” I immediately got the first one – straight into old Behavioral Sciences, the dung heap. It was for the “California Agricultural Policy Seminar.”

I pulled together a consortium of people on several campuses. I went out and found people in the state doing alternative research to ag business – Frank Cancian at Irvine, Bill Friedland at Santa Cruz and a couple of guys at Berkeley. I was able to put a little money into their research programs and got a publications series going off of that support. Charlie Hess and the people at Davis were quick to match the money that I brought in. They said, “Yeah, for your own research, if you are doing all this, we will make sure you will be able to do your part.”

My part was to do the Goldschmidt retest.

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Scholarship in the Struggle: The Goldschmidt Retests
There was no mystery to retesting Goldschmidt’s hypothesis. For MacCannell, it amounted to a technical problem for which he had all of the tools at hand to answer it – testable theory, sound research design, previously implemented methods, access to data, improved computers. It was a straightforward research project. After years of recalcitrance, even California’s land grant establishment, specifically at UC Davis, seemed prepared to stand aside and allow the science to tell its truth. The academic controversies that surrounded Goldschmidt’s Arvin-Dinuba study had not abated however. Certainly, the problems in the San Joaquin Valley had persisted and in many respects worsened. In fact, they appeared to be spreading to other agricultural regions of the United States. Those problems continued to be scientifically investigated in research questions examining the relationship between agricultural structure and community conditions.

In this section, I look at MacCannell’s retests of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis. Did the test affirm Goldschmidt? How did MacCannell harness the statistical methods of agricultural economics onto theory from rural sociology? What new theoretical insights evolved from these continued studies? There are four academic papers I reviewed related to MacCannell’s scholarship in retesting Goldschmidt’s hypothesis. They varied in geographic scope including towns, counties, regions and states with the object of inquiry focused on rural community quality of life. I began by reviewing an unpublished research paper by MacCannell and White (1981) titled “On the Relationship of Agriculture to Rural Community Conditions in California.” This “final report” used macrosocial accounting on 83 rural California communities in an explicit retest of
Goldschmidt’s findings, even referencing his disallowed second study.⁶² Second, I looked at MacCannell and White’s (1984) book chapter, “The Social Costs of Large-Scale Agriculture: The Prospects of Land Reform in California.” Originally part of a federal government inquiry into the social effects of funding the San Luis portion of the Central Valley Project, this research focused on the Westlands Water District on the western side of the San Joaquin Valley. The third paper was the 1990 dissertation “The Effects of Agriculture and Ethnicity of Residents on the Social Conditions of Rural Communities in San Joaquin Valley, California” by Helen Theodoropoulos supervised by MacCannell as her major professor. Similar in design to MacCannell and White’s (1981) more comprehensive but unpublished article, this explicit retest was modeled after Goldschmidt’s disallowed BAE design. The fourth research paper, “Industrial Agriculture and Rural Community Degradation” was a MacCannell (1988) book chapter that expands the scope of the study to rural communities in four states: California, Arizona, Texas and Florida. Not only were its findings a demonstration that industrialized agriculture was spreading throughout the country, MacCannell’s rhetoric was also noteworthy for its emotional appeal and immediacy. The study looked at the “sunbelt” states but was conducted against the backdrop of the Midwestern farm crisis of the 1980’s. Together, this body of research conclusively illustrated the social costs and conditions that existed in regions most characteristic of industrialized agriculture.

When MacCannell arrived at UC Davis, he found an ideal context to apply macrosocial accounting – California’s San Joaquin Valley. While Young’s method had been designed for international contexts, the valley represented many characteristics of a

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⁶² This unpublished manuscript is cited in Buttel’s (1983) literature review on farm structure and quality of life in agricultural communities, which he prepared for the Congressional Research Service Library.
“developing” country. MacCannell simply began by using statistical regressions measuring variables of social conditions (poverty, substandard housing, education levels, etc) against variables of industrialized agriculture (farm size, residency, types of crops, chemical use, etc.). For the next decade, this research design was repeated in various forms and with increasingly nuanced interpretive theory. Goldschmidt’s original findings were consistently supported and affirmed throughout the retests.

The first sentence of MacCannell and White’s (1981:1) research acknowledged that it “was conceived as a retest of Walter Goldschmidt’s study.” In conducting the retest, the authors framed their work from a neutral political stance:

While we have been compelled by historical circumstances to undertake our research in the context of this debate, our concern with Goldschmidt’s work was not motivated by political interest in the farm size question. We became interested in the original study for methodological and theoretical reasons (MacCannell and White 1981:3).

The message: this was science, not ideology. The previous study had been “couched in a framework of liberal values that fit easily (apparently all too easily) within mainstream political debates” (MacCannell and White 1981: 8). The aside “apparently all too easily” alluded to the degree that the original studies ignited political firestorms in the federal government, and perhaps veered from an objective disposition (Kirkendall 1964). While many scholars perhaps envy attention, they also seem slightly uncomfortable with wholehearted entry into the political sphere. MacCannell’s experience illustrated tensions in the role of the social scientist where a need to address contemporary socioeconomic problems needed to balance with the maintenance of epistemological distance. Goldschmidt had assumed an almost opposite disposition, tacking into controversy, setting a skirmish line, fashioning provocative research designs toward
political ends (he worked for a government agency at the time), and advocating findings in non-academic magazines.

Were scholars political actors? MacCannell and White (perhaps for political reasons) emphasized the Goldschmidt retest as a scientific study. No more, no less. But they likely knew better, and the particular care they took in situating their study back into the realm of scientific inquiry hints at this purpose. Listen to how they emphasized their use of theory and distanced themselves from positions of advocacy:

We began our research with the assumption that the endless moralistic jabber that goes on in political circles is only a sign that the debating parties have not discovered the heart of the matter – that they have agreed to disagree about something (i.e., ideal farm size) that is beside the point. We could not accept the idea of Goldschmidt and his critics that farm size is, in and of itself, the cause of any community social conditions, good or bad. We felt that farm size, however we might define it, is simply two sociologically imprecise for us to hang explanations on. Farm size implies social class relations but does not suggest or establish any analytical boundaries around class relations at the community level. It implies organizational differences associated with scale, but, again, no analytical boundaries that are meaningful in community terms are drawn. The way farm size was measured by Goldschmidt and Reclamation (i.e., in terms of acres as opposed to production levels, profits, etc.) is also deficient even on pre-sociological, merely technical grounds. Is 300 acres of unirrigated wheat really larger than 40 acres of citrus? Clearly not from an economic standpoint. We were prepared to discover that farm size, measured in acres, is associated with community social conditions in some way, either positively or negatively, but only as a part of a larger structural pattern, not as an independent cause (MacCannell and White 1981: 9-10; underline in original).

The study would be about discovery, not right and wrong. It would be based in and tested from sociological theory, albeit theory that corresponded to Goldschmidt’s hypothesis. Their retest would take the original premise, expand the number of variables, apply statistical regression and make sociologically grounded interpretations of the data.
The retest improved on the original Arvin-Dinuba research design. A significant weakness, even noted by Goldschmidt, was the uncomfortable possibility of error inherent in a matched pair case study; simply put, the two towns could have been anomalies or other contributing factors may have been associated with their differences. A retest needed to insulated its findings against this possibility of error. To this end, and similar to Goldschmidt’s suggested retest using 25 San Joaquin Valley farm towns, MacCannell and White’s (1981) retest analyzed 83 towns surrounded by irrigated agriculture throughout the Central Valley of California. Their research was broader in scope and complexity by quantified variables of community and adding variable to describe industrial agriculture. Rather than simple averages gathered through surveys and cursory ethnographic observation over a handful of weeks, macrosocial accounting was provided statistically quantified and measurable data to be interpreted.63

The macrosocial concept of rigidity set a framework to test additional variables beyond just farm size (SIZE ACRES) and residency (ABSENTEE). The definition of “social structural rigidity” was given:

a set of institutional arrangements which protect and maintain the privilege of groups or individuals who already hold positions of dominance or authority . . . The typical forms of rigidity are dualized class structure, large holdings of land and real properties, domination of the community by a single basic industry, inflexible markets and technical routines,

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63 A straight line is one of the most basic relationships between two variables and statistics can examine variation from an average pattern like a line. A regression line is usually calculated by the “least sum of squared errors” between dependent variables (response variables, outcome variables) and independent variables (explanatory variables, predictor variables). This line “minimizes the sum of squared prediction errors for the observed data set” (Utts and Heckard 2007: 163). Regression analysis can be used to quantify the strength of this relationship or to aid in prediction. Since a presumption is made that the independent variables influence the dependent variables, correlation can indicate the strength and direction this relationship (though it does not directly imply causation). This is represented in the correlation coefficient (r), which lies between -1 and +1 (a correlation is linear if it is either -1 or +1). Another way to illustrate the strength of the relationship is by squaring the correlation coefficient (r²); this “proportion of variation explained by x” is the square between the outcome and the values being used for prediction. It is a measure, from 0 to 1 , of how good a predictor or “fit” the values are to the linear model (1 would be a perfect fit). It is often expressed as a percentage.
nondemocratic forms of government, and stereotypical relations between ethnic groups with people of color falling to the bottom of the class system (MacCannell and White 1981: 10).

Four additional variables were therefore added to broaden the analysis of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis including (1) the size of the adjacent or surrounding water district as measured by its annual operating revenue (H₂O DISTRICT $), (2) whether the governing structure of the water district was democratic or undemocratic (NONDEMO/H₂O), (3) was the farmland in “committed crops” like citrus or grapevines (CITRUS and VINES), and (4) how diverse were the crops grown in the region immediately surrounding the town (CROP DIVERSITY). Dependent variables were run against these independent variables in a test to validate the measure of agricultural rigidity. MacCannell and White’s (1981) variables measured:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Validators of Agricultural Rigidity:</strong> Percent of Labor Force Classed as Farmworkers; Percent of Total Population Hispanics; Proportion of Population in a Different City in 1965.</td>
<td>ABSENTEE SIZE ACRES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General Economic Well Being:</strong> Median Family Income; Percent of Families below Median Family Income; Percent of Adult Males Unemployed; Percent of Families Below Federal Poverty Standard; Proportion of Unrelated Individuals Below Poverty; Proportion of Total Farm Labor Force Below Poverty.</td>
<td>SIZE ACRES SQ NONDEMO/H₂O H₂O DISTRICT $</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong> Proportion of Adult Males with Less than High School Education; Proportion of Adult Make Hispanics with Less than High School Education; Proportion of Adult Female White Population with Less than High School Education; Proportion of Adult Female Hispanic Population with less than High School Education.</td>
<td>CITRUS VINES DIVERSITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing:</strong> Percent of Total Housing Stock Owner Occupied; Percent of Hispanic Owner Occupied Housing; Percent of Total Housing Stock Renter Occupied; Percent Hispanic Renter Occupied; Percent of Housing with Greater than .75 Persons/Rm; Percent of Hispanic Occupied Rental Property w/</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Greater than .75 Persons/Rm; Percent of Housing Build after 1960; Percent of Housing without Air Conditioning or Desert Cooler; Percent of Housing without Stove, Sink or Refrigerator; Percent of Hispanic Occupied Housing without a Stove, Sink or Refrigerator; Percent of Households without Access to a Telephone.

**Social Inequality:** Difference in Pay Men vs. Women for Selected Skilled Occupations; Difference in Median Years of Schooling White vs. Hispanic Adult Males.

**Social and Community Service Professionals:** Percent of Population Employed in Public Administration; Percent of Population Employed in Banking; Percent of Population Employed as Social Workers; School Teachers for 1000 Population

**Medical Professions:** Doctors and Dentists for 1000 Population; Percent of Population Employed in Hospitals; Proportion of Population Employed in Medical Service Delivery;

**Business and Retail Trade:** Percent of Population Self Employed; Percent of Population Self Employed in Retail Trade; Percent of Population in Retail Grocery Trade; Proportion of Population Employed in Food Service.

Overall, the results favored Goldschmidt’s hypothesis and the goals of the original Reclamation Policy of 1902 for both limiting landholdings and mandating residency. Interestingly, residency was shown to be a more important factor in “community deterioration” than acreage concentration (MacCannell and White 1981: 35). Also, the study found that size of the closest water district correlated closely with adverse social conditions in nearby communities; a somewhat ironic finding since institutions like water districts were supposed to partner in achieving the more egalitarian goals of the reclamation policy.
The conclusion interpreted the statistics. Particularly important was its discussion of correlation and causation:

The regressions reveal a consistent pattern of correlation between the structure of agriculture and social conditions in California’s central valley communities. Between 20 and 50 percent of the variation in social conditions between the 83 communities can be accounted for by differences in the surrounding agriculture. We think it is unlikely that any single other system of practices (e.g., industry, retail trade, communications, etc.) could be shown to account for the unexplained variation, although there is certainly an implied challenge to social and economic science here. Until proven otherwise, on the basis of our research, we suggest that agricultural structure is the single most important determinant of social conditions in California’s central valley communities. We specifically hypothesize that the unexplained variation is divided among numerous other factors, including as yet unmeasured dimensions of agricultural structure.

While it is usually difficult ultimately to draw causal arrows in social scientific research, we think it is less difficult in the present case. Where there is a correlation between A and B, either A causes B or B causes A, or both are caused by a superordinate third variable I. We think it is not likely that a third variable will ever be found that has the power to subsume both our dependent and independent variables. The community measures were drawn from aggregate statistics covering the entire community and many institutional sectors within the community. And agricultural variables covered diverse aspects of agricultural structure extending their influence several miles out into the countryside surrounding the communities. There is little room here for the operation of a powerful complex of variation that could subsume both the town and country within its framework . . . This leaves only the possibility that community conditions are causing the variations in agricultural structure and vice versa. We think it is highly unlikely, and it would be absurd to suggest, that the deterioration of a town’s housing stock or increasing unemployment has the effect of driving up the operating revenues of the nearby water district, etc. However, there are several reasonable explanations for the reverse relationship based on theories of institutional dominance, etc. We conclude, then, that agricultural rigidity causes rural community deteriorization (MacCannell and White 1981: 32-33).

This study should have substantially resolved the research question of how industrial agriculture effects rural community life in the San Joaquin Valley (or entire Central Valley), however it was not published. More studies followed.
The next retest, published in 1984, examined the Westlands Water District. The scene for this research was the controversial backdrop of the San Luis Unit’s funding and construction (the final piece of the Central Valley Project). The Westlands, a 600,000 acre special district, was a focal point of controversy, reclamation policy contradictions, and academic analysis in the 1970’s and 80’s. MacCannell and White’s (1984) Westlands’ chapter, titled “The Social Costs of Large-Scale Agriculture and the Prospects for Land Reform in California,” was concise. The numbers told the story as the western side of the San Joaquin Valley was most characteristic of industrial agriculture. Recall that Taylor had proposed that Mendota, not Arvin, be used in Goldschmidt’s original BAE study. Mendota, immediately adjacent to the Westlands, wasn’t chosen because it would have been too dramatic for comparison with Dinuba. The Westlands distilled the arguments – pro and con – regarding industrial agriculture. By focusing on this water district, MacCannell and White aimed at a place that was likely to be the most expressive in highlighting the social and economic outcomes of highly concentrated wealth and landholdings. Only the Imperial Valley compared with the Westlands.

In making “The Westlands Case,” MacCannell and White contextualized the region by comparing it to the rest of Fresno County and the United States as a whole. Westlands was within Fresno County, which was already one of the most economically impoverished counties in California (and the richest agricultural county in the United States). Not only did MacCannell and White choose a region highly characteristic of industrial scale agriculture, they also looked at its most vulnerable residents to understand the social costs of its agricultural economy. Some of their statistical variables specifically documented Mexican-Americans who largely comprised the region’s labor
force. Their chapter focused on the five census tracks that overlapped the Westlands Water District with particular attention to the largest town in each of these tracks—Coalinga, Firebaugh, Huron, Mendota, and San Joaquin / Tranquility. The U.S. Bureau of the Census research data established some key findings:

(1) The growers in the Westlands were not (and had not been) compliant with reclamation law.64 There was not a single 160 acre farm in the entire service area and only twenty percent of the farmland owners, individuals or corporations, had addresses in or near the district. The average size of a farm in the water district was 2,200 acres. MacCannell and White (1984: 39) noted, “the current operating scale, residency patterns, and social conditions are precisely those the [reclamation] act was passed to prevent.”

(2) Substantial public subsidy and investment had been allocated and spent in the region. The author’s found that of the $600 million total project cost, $265 million was from the federal government amounting to a $1,540 per acre subsidy or over $3 million for a 2,000 acre farm. These expenditures artificially inflated indicators for employment and infrastructure changes for this sparsely populated area over the time period of the research.

(3) In the twenty years since the water infrastructure was constructed, it was apparent that opposite policy outcomes had resulted from public investments through reclamation in the region. MacCannell and White (1984: 35) stated that the “peculiar way that the Reclamation Act has been interpreted in the Westlands has contributed to the great local disparity between the rich and the poor.”

The economic outcomes for residents of the Westlands was detailed through six categories: housing conditions; poverty and inequality; income, employment and affluence; education; and infrastructure changes from 1958-1978.

The results were dramatic:

- **Housing Conditions.** There was an overall reduction in the amount of housing (an explicit goal of reclamation was to construct rural farmsteads and towns), and many of the existing housing facilities were substandard. MacCannell and White (1984: 43) found: “Ten percent of the homes in the Westlands lacked plumbing in 1970, as compared with 3.4 percent for other rural and small town areas of Fresno County. Almost 20 percent of the homes in the rural area around Firebaugh lacked plumbing.” Overcrowding also characterized accommodations. “Over 18 percent of the Mexican-American population lived in homes with more than 1.5

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64 The original paper was probably written before the Reclamation law was changed and when some contracts were still within their initial ten-year waiver period.
persons per room, and the figures were as high as 43 percent in the Coalinga tract.”

- **Poverty and Inequality.** In the Westlands, MacCannell and White (1984: 45) established, “In some census tracts the proportion of the Mexican-American population living below the federal poverty standard in 1970 ran as high as 35 to 53.7 percent. Almost 84 percent of the Mexican-American population in the rural Firebaugh tract lived at or below 1.5 times the federal poverty standard . . . [Mexican-American] families were subsisting on about $3,000 a year. Less than half of them were receiving any form of public assistance.” The region exhibited an odd characteristic juxtaposing high levels of employment (which usually improved the lives of working families) with economic destitution.

- **Income, Employment, and Affluence.** MacCannell and White (1984:46) used the 1970 U.S. Bureau of the Census statistics in finding that “Median family income for the rural areas of Fresno County was about $4,000 lower than for the rest of the state, and income in the Westlands was about $2,500 lower than for the rest of rural Fresno County. The family income of the Mexican-American population of the Westlands was another $1,000 lower.”

- **Education.** Seemingly contrary to other findings and difficult to interpret, residents of the Westlands (for most census tracts) had more median years of education than people in other rural areas of Fresno County.

- **Infrastructure Changes, 1958-1978.** Under this heading, MacCannell and White measured macrosocial differentiation by collecting data from telephone directories for 1958, 1968 and 1978. During those two decades notable declines including the loss of five doctors, four local newspapers and four taxi services. The findings in this category were uneven however. Some sectors experienced growth, for example, banking or government services such as welfare.

The MacCannell and White chapter appeared in the book, *Land Reform, American Style*, an appropriate title for their study because a function of reclamation law was to implement gradual land reform in regions like the Westlands. In review, the Supreme Court’s 1958 *Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken* decision reconfirmed that reclamation law was to serve the “greatest good to the greatest number of individuals” and prevent the federal subsidy from being used for “speculative purposes.” MacCannell and White (1984: 37-38) quoted two Congressmen referring to the application of reclamation law to the Westlands’ San Luis Unit in 1959. Since it was a year after this court decision, their expectations that the law would be applied seemed warranted:
The people of Illinois are paying taxes, and have paid taxes, to build these CVP (Central Valley Project) dams, reservoirs, conduits, and irrigation systems. They have paid taxes against their own economic interests, because they believed it was in the national interest; and are ready to continue to do so, but on condition that the money which we contribute shall be used to maintain agrarian democracy, and not huge agrarian estates. We are willing to have money spent for a democratic . . . farm system, but we do not want to have it spent to build up the power and strength of huge landowners . . . We do not want a system with a big manor house on the hill, and farm laborers living in hovels. We want a system in which the owner is the cultivator. That is the basis of American agrarian democracy.

- Senator Paul Douglass of Illinois

It was ironic that this region, an anathema to the concept of “agrarian democracy,” would be the recipient of such substantial public largesse, yet the promise of land reform and improved lives for rural people won legislative support. If the law had been enforced, the society could have been different as this California Congressman envisioned in 1959:

If the San Luis Unit is built . . . the present population of the area will almost quadruple . . . Why will this land support four times as many people if this project is built? Because it is inevitable and historic that under the impact of reclamation laws, as well as the economics of farm management and operation, these lands will break down into family-sized units, each cultivated by individual owners and their families . . . We are seeking to make our greatest land resources available to provide more and better living for more people. This, I believe, is the real and ultimate goal of the reclamation policy laid down by Congress more than a half-century ago – not merely to irrigate land and produce crops.

- Congressman Sisk

Writing a quarter of a century later, MacCannell and White’s (1984:38) research was more than a survey of lost opportunities, it documented infringement upon the law:

Every petition of the large Western growers for relief from the Reclamation Act has been denied, and yet there has never been a scale-down of agricultural operations to the level required by law.

As if for emphasis, their last words echoed Paul Taylor’s persistent concern that there was ongoing “failure to enforce the law” (MacCannell and White 1984: 53).
Helen Theodoropoulos’ (1990) dissertation, like MacCannell and White’s (1981) unpublished academic article, was another explicit retest of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis. Its research design was similar to Goldschmidt’s disallowed second BAE study but took a broader sample size than Goldschmidt’s originally 25 towns and utilized more refined theory and sophisticated statistics – a characteristic of MacCannell’s scholarship and likely influence on his student’s work. The study began with this paragraph:

Walter Goldschmidt in his original work As You Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness found by using a matched pair ethnographic comparison that the social deterioration of rural communities in California is associated with the large farm size. Since that work was published, a heated controversy ensued and many researchers attempted to prove or disprove Goldschmidt’s original hypothesis. The objective of the present study, which stems from Goldschmidt’s work, was to examine the effects of agricultural characteristics and ethnicity of residents on the social conditions of rural communities in the San Joaquin Valley of California. In contrast to Goldschmidt’s ethnographic comparison, in the present study a linear regression model was used to describe the causal effects of agricultural characteristics and ethnicity of residents on the social conditions of 71 rural communities in the San Joaquin Valley (Theodoropoulos 1990: 75).

The research expanded the analysis of industrialized agriculture by adding more variables than just farm size and residency in addition to testing “culture of poverty” arguments by included data specific to the ethnicity of residents. 65 The findings supported Goldschmidt’s hypothesis that the structure of the agricultural economy of the San Joaquin Valley negatively impacted rural community life. Theodoropoulos (1990: 81) found:

In conclusion, the social conditions of rural communities in San Joaquin Valley are determined by a series of agricultural characteristics variables except the Farm size originally proposed by Goldschmidt. The agricultural characteristics variables which are associated with the deteriorated social conditions of rural communities are those which describe the pattern of large land holdings worked by a large low-paid

65 Theodoropoulos cites Oscar Lewis’ (1966) article “The Culture of Poverty” from Scientific America.
unskilled farm labor force. This exploitation of the farm workers by the few big land owners is the cause which should be blamed for the deteriorating conditions of rural communities in San Joaquin Valley and not their ethnicity or Culture of Poverty.

The agricultural characteristics tested were, in order of importance, the ratio of farm owners to farm laborers, the size of nearby irrigation district, the proportion of landowners who live within 15 miles of the farm, and the percentage of agricultural land in row crops having uniform labor requirements.

While the agricultural characteristics of industrialization were significant, farm size alone did not statistically appear to affect the social conditions. Theodoropoulos (1990: 78) suggested, “This result does not mean that Goldschmidt was entirely wrong. On the contrary, agricultural characteristics do determine the social conditions of rural communities . . . Goldschmidt might have been attributing to Farm size what is a characteristic of an entire industrial agriculture system.” She considered whether measuring farm size in profits or other economic measures. Also, an important methodological note, in defining the Farm size variable Theodoropoulos (1990: 32) acknowledged the study’s “underestimates” of actual farm size because farms owned by different people at different addresses but actually operating as a single enterprise “could not be distinguished.” Also, it was not feasible to find all addition landholdings in the region or state owned by identified farmers or agricultural operations. And finally, leased farmland was not added to the Farm size variable.

Theodoropoulos used regression analysis to test six hypotheses. The hypotheses were that social conditions of rural communities deteriorate as a result of (1) the size of surrounding farms, (2) number of absentee farm owners, (3) size of the nearest irrigation district, (4) proportion of agricultural land used for field crops, (5) ratio of farm owners to
farm laborers and (6) number of Hispanic residents. The first two, as mentioned, were Goldschmidt’s original variables. Numbers three through five tested new potential indicators that large-scale agriculture was detrimental to rural communities. Finally, the number of Hispanic residents was tested as an independent variable potentially effecting dependent variables like rural poverty and living conditions. Linear regression examined the “direct effects of agricultural characteristics and ethnicity (dependent variables) on the social conditions of rural communities in the San Joaquin Valley (independent variables)” (Theodoropoulos 1990: 34). The hypothesized causal direction of these variables was laid out in a simple illustration:

The agricultural economy was clearly seen as contributing to poverty and lower standards of living.

Perhaps what stands out most from Theodoropolous’ dissertation was its formulaic writing style. The statistics seemed to strip away the texture of the geographic place they sought to understand so, while confirming the hypothesis, it was difficult to

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66 It is theoretically possible to have the number of Hispanic residents as a dependent variable since their presence may be attributed to work on large-scale farms.
emotionally connect with what the findings revealed about the lives of people in the region. In contrast, MacCannell’s (1988) “Sunbelt” study quantitatively and rhetorically compelled the reader to look at, if not act upon, the problems associated with industrialized agriculture.

MacCannell’s (1988) last published “retest” incorporated a much larger geographic four-state region and sample size than just California’s Central Valley. It also presented the information in prophetic terms applicable to policymakers, scholars and the general public who were witnessing the mid-1980’s agricultural crisis bankrupting the Midwestern farmbelt of the United States. Originally a government report (MacCannell and Dolber-Smith 1986), the retest study was published in an edited book, Agriculture and Community Change in the U.S.: The Congressional Research Reports.

As he had done previously, MacCannell aimed at the locations that were expressive of the trends he sought to understand and study. His sample was from 98 counties in the four sunbelt states of California, Arizona, Florida and Texas. Forty-three counties were among the top 100 counties in agricultural sales for the United States. An additional 83 counties were included because they had high sales relative to their populations (26 Texas cattle counties were eventually excluded due to their very small populations). Nine indicators of agricultural industrialization were used to predict regional social outcomes:

- The percent of the farms in the county organized as corporations
- Farm size in acres
- The percent of the farms in the county with more than $40,000 in sales
- The percent of farms with full-time hired labor
- The cost of hired labor per farm
- The cost of contract labor per farm
- The value of machinery per farm
- The cost of fertilizers per farm
The costs of other chemicals (including herbicides and pesticides) per farm
Industrialization was no longer a regional phenomenon, agricultural production and rural economies were consolidating across the country, and again the social conditions in communities where industrial agriculture was practiced were much worse off at statistically significant levels than other comparable places in each state.

Poverty statistics provided some of the best representations reaffirming the social and economic structure of these communities. Rural communities surrounded by large farms had “bimodal income distribution” between the wealthy landowners and poor farmworkers (MacCannell 1988: 44). Poverty in urban areas of these four sunbelt states averaged 8 percent and was 10-12 percent in rural tracts with moderate-to-family-sized farms. Yet, in these same states, rural tracts dominated by large scale agribusiness had poverty rates beyond all normal thresholds. In Arizona, the agribusiness tracts had poverty rates around 20 percent. In Texas’ agribusiness tracts the rates were 5 to 40 percent above the national average. Looking exclusively at Spanish surname families, the poverty rates were additionally higher by 5 to 20 percentage points in all tracts. All told for the 98 counties, over 40 percent of the increase in poverty was “directly attributable to farm size” with “the greatest increases associated with the largest farm sizes” (MacCannell 1988: 55).

These findings showed a social system transformed beyond Goldschmidt’s observations or warnings. In the 1940’s, many of the farmworkers Goldschmidt encountered were Dust Bowl refugees who were United States citizens. In contrast, MacCannell (1988: 45) found communities dominated by immigrant laborers who were hired at low wages with little job security and limited work benefits. These changes
resulted in a “simulacrum of a Third World economy” being established within the United States (MacCannell 1988: 42). In many places the immigrant workers were numerous enough to alter the social and cultural identity of many places. At the other end of the spectrum, the landowners were even more divorced from the geographic communities where their fields were located. Following and going beyond Goldschmidt, MacCannell (1988: 35) considered:

Even under conditions where the industrial farmer is a person rather than a board of directors, and even when he actually lives on or near one of his holdings, his unprecedented wealth and primarily urban orientation, combined with modern transportation and communication technologies, permit him to operate outside of the local community in all of his social, economic, political and cultural affairs, with the single exception of his need to obtain a steady supply of inexpensive labor. And even in this latter regard, international law and relationships are the ultimate determining factors in shaping local community and labor relations.

Strikingly, the middle class were mostly absent from these communities, and this both affected the civic capacity of the rural towns and limited economic demand by reducing local purchasing.

After a decade of retest studies, MacCannell had a body of empirical evidence to support a more refined “industrialization – degradation hypothesis,” one that extended Goldschmidt’s conclusions. Scientifically, the retests had unambiguously upheld the original findings for the San Joaquin Valley; however, the sunbelt study in 1988 established this agri-system as a national trend not limited to California’s agricultural valleys. As the evidence became more conclusive, the spread of the industrialization problem accelerated and became more pronounced:

A convergence of social, geographical, technical and political factors have permitted the development of a new form of industrial-scale agribusiness which is now powerful enough to operate mainly outside the constraints of
nature, national policy, moral and ethical norms, and local markets (MacCannell 1988: 26).

While reaffirming previous findings that “rural community stagnates or declines in the context of increasing agricultural productivity” (MacCannell 1988: 45), the theory had evolved with the increasing complexity of an industrializing and consolidating food system throughout the country.

MacCannell’s particular talent at research design became evident through his retest studies. He constructed research studies that presupposed critiques; answering them by bounding specific geographic areas that would best explicate theory. Take, for example, his Sunbelt study conclusion:

With some qualification, the relationship of agricultural structure to rural community conditions throughout the study area supports the industrial – degradation hypothesis: as the degree of agricultural industrialization increases social conditions in the rural communities become worse. This test of the hypothesis can be considered rigorous because (1) it measures social impacts of agricultural structure at the county level where any such impacts are weakened by other economic and sociodemographic factors, (2) it tests for the relationship across four states, 98 counties and over five million people, and (3) it is restricted to rather small variations between counties preselected to represent only the highest levels of industrialization and intensiveness of agriculture found in the U.S. today. All of these factors would tend to obscure the strength of the relationship between agricultural industrialization and community conditions. Nevertheless, many such relationships have been found at statistically acceptable levels of significance. Repeated tests have consistently shown that increasing farm size, mechanization, and gross sales significantly predict declining community conditions not merely at the local agricultural community level, but in the entire county (MacCannell 1988: 62-63).

Notice the pedagogical tone and purpose with which MacCannell presented his findings. His primary audience was the scientific community, which was why he emphasized the “rigor” of his research. He was outmaneuvering potential critics.
One final point on MacCannell’s later research was that it tolerated a more politically positioned role beyond the strict scientific neutrality of his earlier valley scholarship. He expanded his rhetorical range to include advocacy, policy suggestions, and predictive warnings:

It is probably not an exaggeration to suggest that what happened near the southern borders of the United States in the last three decades will prove to be as important during the next 200 years as the pioneer experience was during the last 200 (MacCannell 1988: 42).

MacCannell’s forewarning was similar to that of previous valley scholars. Perhaps the best example of this turn was found in the paper’s first prefatory words:

This is a report on social conditions in rural communities of four Sunbelt states: California, Arizona, Texas and Florida. There are two main findings: (1) an advanced industrial type of agriculture is now fully established on a regional base in the U.S. Sunbelt, and (2) there is evidence for substantial deterioration of human communities and living conditions associated with the new form of agriculture. These findings will require careful consideration as they challenge widely held assumptions about the generalized beneficial effects of economic development. The people of the U.S. must prepare themselves to consider either structural or community development solutions to the problems described here. Specifically, it may be necessary to enact legislation that will have the effect of reducing the size of the nations’ largest farms. Alternatively we will have to create costly new social and environmental programs to repair the damage to human life and the environment which is endemic to the unrestrained industrialization of agriculture (MacCannell 1988: 15).

In referencing “the people of the U.S.,” MacCannell appealed directly to the public beyond the academic community and policymakers. He had shifted his position from only answering research questions on industrial agriculture and its socioeconomic problems to also advocating intervention in ameliorating the costs associated with the “industrialization – degradation” of rural communities.
Profile of Practice: The Goldschmidt Retest

When MacCannell arrived at UC Davis, he was aware of the peculiar historic absence of rural sociology from California’s land grant universities. One afternoon, he discussed how this omission.

I have this wording in my head that after Goldschmidt and Taylor, the state legislature, with pressure from the Ag guys, passed a law saying, “It is forbidden to use state money or facilities to conduct social surveys in rural areas.” It would be interesting if it is apocryphal because even if it doesn’t exist, the University of California is the only land grant institution in the entire U.S. that did not have a department of rural sociology. What happened to produce a situation in which the UC felt that it was inadvisable to establish a department of rural sociology? I feel fairly certain that there is a law. There has to be. I don’t think that the University of California would have uniquely turned its back on rural sociology unless there was more than “we don’t like your kind around here.”

Coming out to an Ag School, I arrived asking, “Where is the rural sociology?” For the first few years, I was the only PhD rural sociologist in the state. Isao was really the first but they tripped him. He had given me a report on how crazy things were so I was somewhat prepared for the turmoil. I arrived with this strong sense that some of my research program, not all of it, ought to be on rural and ag issues. I felt that it was my responsibility to stir that particular pot since I was the first guy the university hired to do that stuff.

I was naturally drawn to the controversy, aware that that was a good way of becoming visible inside the university and beyond. But I also wanted to go to the Ag School because I knew what was going to happen to the social sciences on the general campuses after the Vietnam War. They were going to croak – sociology had been a big, robust, important, socially discussed, Op. Ed.-present field in the 50’s and 60’s. I knew that given the things that I wanted to do I had to have a stronger institutional base. I was interested in an Ag School because otherwise I would never survive an academic career.

So, MacCannell set out to conduct the retest. His background, education, credentials, academic training and disposition positioned him for the task.

I never once tried to formulate an alternative theory of ag and social conditions. I did everything as a retest. I used Goldschmidt – a very simple and clear frame – to put my efforts around from the first day. I conducted research that would demonstrate conclusively whether or not Goldschmidt was correct in the way that he analyzed those relationships.

My position was clear, “I don’t care how this comes out. I really don’t care how this comes out. I am going to set the research up in such a fashion that we will have a
definitive answer to the question – what is the relationship between farm size and capitalization and community conditions? I’m going to win either way, “I am a young, brash Assistant Professor. I am going to prove Goldschmidt was wrong, and that will be fine; or I will prove that he was right, and that would be fine.”

The leftist kids inside the program were really sitting on the edge of their seats. Some of Isao’s students were really angry. They said, “What if it comes out the wrong way?”

I said, “If it comes out the wrong way, I confess it will sadden me personally, but I am okay either way as a scientist. Either I find that Goldschmidt was mainly correct, maybe even more correct than he thought he was, or I find that Goldschmidt was never correct. I will come forward with it no matter how it comes out.” I set this thing up in such a way that the chips will fall. I do confess that I am happier that it came out the way it did.

In some cases, 80% of the variation of the type of things that Goldschmidt was concerned about – quality of life issues using his causal variables of farm size, absentee ownership, etc. – were in his direction. Bear in mind that the big farmers would argue the exact opposite, “Our huge, robust, marvelous farms are actually beneficial to these communities because of trickle down economics. Without us they would be much, much worse off.” They would argue in the opposite direction.

After testimony before a House Committee in D.C. in the immediate aftermath of the Westlands study, their in-house technical advisors remarked that the design was such that had this not been the case it would certainly come out in the research. If large farms were beneficial socially, these technical advisors in the House Committee said that that would have come up.

In another conversation with the MacCannell’s, I asked about the Goldschmidt retest. MacCannell had mentioned that he had a macrosocial accounting “shop” at Davis and had received the policy seminar money from the California legislature to conduct the retest.

“So what happened with the Goldschmidt stuff? You have a cohort of graduate students. You have money. You are going to pound the numbers and they are going to come out heads or tails?”

“. . . and they come out heads. I mean basically every result we got . . .”

Juliet adds, “Everyone was on tenderhooks waiting, waiting for Dean to present the findings at the Rural Sociology meetings. You could hear a pin drop at the meetings. Dean came out and said the results. The whole place erupted – Goldschmidt was right!”

“Where did you present?”

“The first presentation was at the Rural Sociology meetings in San Francisco . . .”

“. . . because I was there.” The Bay Area conference made it accessible for Juliet.

“In what year?”
Juliet guesses, “It could have been the late 70’s, the early 80’s . . . .”
“We came here in ‘74.”
“‘75” Juliet corrects him.
Dean agrees, “‘75 . . . it was probably ’78 or ’79.”
“And where did you publish these findings?”
“These findings have not been published and are apparently not publishable
because every time I send them out – that set and similar ones . . . ” Earlier, Dean had
printed out the data tables for me. He now hands them to me. “. . . I get really, really
hostile turndowns from Rural Sociology and anybody else. There will be somebody that
gets worked up, that gets really furious. Every time I have sent this stuff out, someone
who is clearly Big Ag oriented has gotten their hands on it and screamed bloody murder
about something that is fairly minor.
At about the time I should turn around to send this out to New Left Review or
something, I’ve been off doing other things.

After having the article rejected by Rural Sociology, MacCannell sent it around
campus to get feedback and advice.

“I had it vetted by a engineering colleague at Davis. He took a look at my
numbers for the retest article. They use the same methodologies. He is very quantitative
– a hydrolics engineer and editor of a journal called Water Policy. He analyzes the
stress points on dams, mostly pipes and tubes.”

He said, “This is great. I’m sure we can publish it in Water Policy.”
At the same time that the Rural Soc people were saying that the methodology is
way off base, I was getting a review from an even more quantitative person saying, “No,
its fine.”
“I don’t know why I didn’t follow up on it. Water Policy seemed to be so over
there some place.”

What critiques did the reviewers make? Dean mentioned that one suggested
reversing the dependent and independent variables. Dean then explained that this doesn’t
logically make sense – for instance, the number of school children on free lunches
doesn’t cause there to be mega-farms surrounding their small towns.

Dean returned with the data tables.
“Do you read regression tables?”
“I just finished a stats class but it’s an art form that I am not good at . . . ”
“In the end, you can see there were at least 14 tables in this. They all go to
Goldschmidt’s variables. The independent variables were the index of crop diversity,
absentee ownership, the acreages greater than 320 acres, and the ratio of farmowners to
laborers in the community which goes to the absence of family owned farms. If there
were no family owned farms, then you get this huge ratio there.”
Dean points to the statistic. “We have run this same set of four Goldschmidt variables against every imaginable social condition. I will get you the narrative. The narrative makes it quite clear. It does a . . . it does a . . . but you know . . .”

He is struggling to find words affirming his findings.

“I believe you . . . .”

“. . . you believe me.” Dean chuckles, and continues joking, “What happens is you get these guys who are ideologically opposed and they burrow in and come up with minor complaints and I am busy writing about Marilyn Monroe. Well, Marilyn Monroe wins over that other stuff.”

I am reading table titles aloud, “Table on Agriculture and Median Family Income; Table #9 – Agriculture and the Percent of Hispanic Adults with Four Year College Degrees; Table #5 – Agriculture and the Percent of Adult Female Workers who Work Full-time and Year-around; Table #14 – Agriculture and the Percent of Occupied Housing Units with more than 1.5 Persons per Room, all heading towards . . . there are no discrepancies?”

“No, there is not a single one. There is weak support for a couple.”

I continue reading table titles, “Agriculture and the Percent of General Population below Poverty . . . .”

“Yeah . . . .” Dean trails off. “There is relatively weak support on a few of these,” Dean’s referring to the paper. “I am looking at Table 21. A handful of them. But, for most of them, the r-squares come out in what any social scientist would consider to be a dream world of strength of association. In several instances, I am explaining over 80% of the variation of the dependent variable in the Goldschmidt direction.”

Handing me the tables, Dean says, “You can have those. I also want to make sure you get the narrative at some point before you leave.”

Dean leaves the room to search for the paper’s narrative returning with a paper titled “The Social Costs of California’s Industrial Agriculture: An Update.” It was written around the late 90’s.

Sitting in the living room chair, he straightens the paper, tapping its end on the table. He explains, “The best thing done out of this kind of research was this last piece with Bill Blake where everything came together. It is an unpublished paper. I have a wonderful series of regressions and a wonderful series of rejection slips. If I had been fully dependent on this line of research, this would be published. This piece is a really great summation of the work and constitutes the strongest and most comprehensive piece of work that we did using macrosocial accounting methods. I don’t know to what extent it is ‘timeless’ but maybe some day it is something you would want.”

The retests were completed (something I did not realize when I first met MacCannell). Particularly helpful were the explicit retests, the ones that modeled the proposed second BAE study. Some of this research was published in book chapters or government documents, but none were in the more accessible academic journals. In addition, while I was at UC Davis’ library, I tried to find Theodoropoulos’ dissertation
(another explicit retest) to review. It had been removed or misplaced, though her similar Masters thesis was there. The librarian did not know where to locate the manuscript. Theodoropoulos eventually sent me a copy.

One final story that stands out in this retest history involved a Science magazine article that had come out critiquing some of Goldschmidt’s ideas and the viability of small farms. MacCannell remembered:

In the middle of the 80’s, Goldschmidt came up to Davis for four or five days of hard work. Everybody who was working for me at the time gathered around the table. It was an interesting moment. He had a real bee in his bonnet. He wanted to counter an article written in Science by writing a rebuttal using our data. He was aware of our research but didn’t have data of his own.

It might have worked, but he had an alien working style from me and my students. He’d say, “OK, we’re going to write an article. Here’s what we are going to do. Paragraph one – what should we say in paragraph one?” Everyone goes around the table and agrees for a while. “Can we get agreement on what will be written in paragraph one?”

From the first moment I knew nothing was going to come of it, but I went through it with him. I thought, “I have great respect for Dr. Goldschmidt. He was a mythic character. He was a senior faculty member when we were in graduate school.” It was a four day charade though.

I told him, “Look, you will be the senior author. You can take this thing. Shape it. I will make recommendations on any final manuscript. Take it away. Send it in.” It didn’t amount to anything. We came away with something that I don’t think anyone would publish.

A series of correspondence and rough drafts, saved by Goldschmidt, marked this collaborative effort. In the first letter from MacCannell to Goldschmidt, note a tension (and effort to achieve balance) between their varying quantitative and qualitative approaches.

Walter Goldschmidt
978 Norman Place
Los Angeles, CA 90049

67 This article was likely Luther Tweeten’s Science article “The Economics of Small Farms” dated March 4, 1983.
August 3, 1987

Dear Wally:

Thank you for taking the initiative with our paper. I am circulating your letter to everyone with instructions to do their part. Trudy has been on vacation for about 10 days but she will return on Friday, and her responsibilities now seem to be minor in any case.

In some ways it is hard for me to respond to your concerns about the 83 town study and the OTA report. Of course the raw data exist. In the case of the OTA study, most of it was reported in the original, in tables A2 A through H. I think you have these tables, but I am sending a second set in case you do not. These data provide some of the detail that you want, but never as vivid as the ethnographer’s data. Still you are correct in noting that it is this kind of information that gets the message across to the non-specialist public. It was these tables which were excerpted and given greatest play in the California Farmer and the Phoenix newspaper accounts of our work.

But this documentation of negative conditions associated with industrial agriculture has never been the main point of what I have been trying to accomplish in this work. You did that already. My effort has always been to set up a research design which permits us to confirm (or disconfirm) a relationship between agribusiness development and community underdevelopment. The reason I have been working on this is to be able to answer assertions to the effect that the inferior conditions found in some industrial agricultural communities are random and incidental, that small farming communities are just as likely to be poor as large farm communities. This whole line of research suffers from the claims that the people who have studied social differences associated with small vs. large farms have been politically motivated, their research designs are weak, and their selection of cases is not random, but purposeful: i.e., intentionally biased to support erroneous beliefs about the “goodness” of small farms. Simply put, I have been irritated that your critics have felt no need to engage in research of their own. They criticize your research design or procedures and consider your findings to have been “destroyed.”

Our work in the Macrosocial Accounting Project has been to test the strength of the relationship of industrial agricultural development to community underdevelopment in such a way as to maximize the possibility of disconfirmation of your original findings. By dealing with 83 towns or 100 counties, selected at random, we loose ethnographic detail, but we gain the power to test the assertion that small farming communities are just as likely to be poor as large farming communities. What is important in our work is not the tables of descriptive statistics but the regression equations in which farm structures characteristics appear as independent variables used to predict differences in community conditions. As you
know, all the tests we have conducted along these lines, in which a significant relationship appears, either supports, or at least does not disconfirm, the relationship you originally described: i.e., the industrial agricultural development—community underdevelopment hypothesis. Some of these tests have provided very dramatic support for the hypothesis. For example, we were able to predict 31 percent of the variation in the growth in family income for all families in 100 agricultural counties during the 1970s using farm structure variables alone, with slow growth or negative growth associated with the largest farms. This is highly significant when considered in the light of all the other factors known to affect family income. [This was the finding singled out for a special note (p. 226) in the OTA final report to Congress on their technology study.] Now the question for the critics is, Can they still believe that small farms communities are just as likely to have slow income growth as large farm communities? The answer is Yes, of course. But they cannot dismiss our finding on the ground of case selection. If they want to hold to their position, the must do research, using essentially the same design, in which they introduce new variables and demonstrate that the farm structure—community conditions relationship we have discovered is spurious. Any lesser response will reveal the criticism to be politically motivated. We have not yet moved to this stage in the debate. Olmstead and others are just waking up to the fact that the Macrosocial Accounting Project studies cannot be classified and criticized as being a “small-farm-community-large-farm-community” comparison. And, of course, to the extent that they have relied on common sense assertions, “small farm communities aren’t really that different, things are tough all over,” etc., the critics have enjoyed 40 years of the luxury of not having to come up with a well-formed alternative hypothesis. Now the ball is in their court.

Anyway, the simple point I am trying to make is that the descriptive MSA findings are not as important as the analytical findings, and it is the latter which should be emphasized in any summary. I suggest that in addition to any descriptive data you want to highlight from tables A2 A-H, we reproduce two or perhaps three of the regression equations from the OTA study and report the existence of a series of similar equations with proper referencing. If this [is] agreeable to you, Ed and I will make the selection, have the tables prepared in publishable form and write a brief summary of what they show.

We hope your Catholic Conference went well and are looking forward to hearing from you.

All our best,

Dean

MacCannell, positioned here as a statistician, was teaching Goldschmidt the ethnographer the scientific process from a positivist perspective; in particular how the regressions insulate this article from the charges of political bias that were leveled against previous work in the genre. The ability to apply this leverage however was contingent upon publishing the scientific data in academic journals or other peer reviewed venues.

Goldschmidt’s response came ten days later:

August 13, 1987

Professor Dean MacCannell
Department of Biobehavioral Sciences
University of California
Davis, CA 95616

Dear Dean,

I was pleased to get your letter of August 3, indicating that you are inspiring everybody to get going on the materials that I asked for.

I am responding because I want to hasten to add that my comments about the number crunching did not mean that I was opposed to them or did not recognize that they are absolutely essential for the purposes of validating hypotheses. Certainly all of your statistical analyses and the regression curves you speak of should be included in the paper we are preparing. After all, as you know, I had intended doing that very kind of thing for the Upper San Joaquin Valley in 1944 but was stopped from doing it; a lot of other people realized that a statistical analysis of 25 cases would be much more effective than a comparative examination of two.

The conference in Minnesota went very well. I found it extremely interesting to be among a group of unfrocked (not defrocked) priests and unhabituated nuns; seeing them in slacks and jeans respectively came as a shock to me, but it enabled me to find that there are real human beings with real problems among the clergy as well as among the laity. What was particularly interesting was the pressures upon these liberal clergymen and women by the powers that be endeavoring to keep them from speaking out on issues of small farms. There is a very active concern among church people over the farming issues of the day.

I look forward to hearing from you and your co-workers in due course and hope that we can get this thing off our hands.
In the end, the Science rebuttal article was left incomplete. Outlines and early drafts from its collaborating scholars (Dean MacCannell, Jerry White, Isao Fujimoto, Trudy Wischemann, Joan Randall and Walter Goldschmidt) were retained by Goldschmidt in his files.

In the end, the Goldschmidt retest encountered political sensitivities from both inside and outside of the university. However, for the most part, the University of California had allowed and enabled these macrosocial studies to progress. Historically, valley scholars had seen their scholarship attacked, systematically undermined and denied a place in public forums. While the original study was conducted by the USDA, then denied publication by that federal agency; MacCannell’s retests, often researched during later policy controversies, threatened prominent economic interests, which made these retests politically charged. While political pressure was directly used to suppress the scientific data; it also moved discursively in academic institutions (in the rejection of research articles with statistically significant data from academic journals, for example), which made it difficult to locate in shifting narratives and various discourses. In order to illustrate these more subtle movements, I refer to scholarship and academic texts by Cornell rural sociologist, Frederick Buttel.

_Scholarship in the Struggle: Recognizing Counternarrative_
Scholars collaborate and compete. They cite each others work, review articles from colleagues and attend conferences together. They form communities. Earlier a decades-long partnership between Paul Gates at Cornell and Paul Taylor at Berkeley proved effective in forestalling legislative and legal encroachment on reclamation law. In comparison, at a critical junction in the 1980’s, Cornell rural sociologist Frederick Buttel submitted academic papers often in the same venues as Dean MacCannell. Buttel’s texts of that time offer an opportunity to view the defense and later collapse of the “small family farm” narrative; an act that coincided with a national farm crisis and the extension of industrial agriculture into the Midwestern heartland, the historic home of agrarian democracy.

By the 1980’s, rural sociological research was overwhelmingly in support of Goldschmidt’s findings, which Buttel readily acknowledged. However, rather than a political alignment similar to the Gates-Taylor collaboration, the Buttel-MacCannell political and policy narratives skewed and uncoupled at this important juncture when tens of thousands of small to medium family farms were going bankrupt. To illustrate this narrative drift, I looked at three of Buttel’s texts: (1) a 1980 article placed in a European rural sociology journal which supported small farm policy, (2) later congressional testimony that Buttel offered in 1983 where he abandoned the feasibility of agricultural policy in support of family farms and (3) Buttel’s chapter that immediately following MacCannell’s in Geisler and Popper’s (1984) Land Reform, American Style where the small farms narrative continued to be undermined.

The 1980’s should have been an era of mobilization on the part of America’s land grant institutions in response to the era’s farm crisis, and while some of that work did
occur, it was arguably ineffectual to thwarting the loss of millions of agriculturally-based livelihoods. At this same time, both MacCannell and Buttel knew each other’s scholarship and were in general agreement with social science findings confirming that large scale agriculture was detrimental to rural community life. In a *Sociologia Ruralis* article titled “Agricultural Structure and Rural Ecology: Toward a Political Economy of Rural Development,” Buttel (1980: 48) affirmed that structural changes toward large scale agriculture and increased farm size “suggest that the trajectory of agricultural development in the U.S.A. has had decidedly adverse impacts on the socioeconomic fabric of rural communities and regions.” Buttel attributed rural underdevelopment and environmental problems directly to state and federal agricultural policy. For this article, he actively promoted neo-Marxist policy solutions to thwart the commercialization of farming in the United States:

> The kinds of changes necessary to enhance rural environmental quality and achieve a more beneficient course of rural economic development entail alterations in the control over and distribution of resources that must necessarily lead to heightened levels of class antagonism (Buttel 1980: 55).

To this end, Buttel (1980: 56-57) promoted a “social class alliance” where:

> significant structural changes (beginning along the lines of encouraging a small farm system, localism in the food system, and the emergence of worker-controlled enterprises in rural areas) are required to redress the fundamental problems faced by rural people and communities.

Buttel suggested broad changes in support of sustainable agriculture in the country.

> By 1983, however, Buttel gave conflicting testimony before the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives in a presentation entitled, “Farm Structure and the Quality of Life in Agricultural Communities: A Review of Literature and a Look
Toward the Future.” His policy recommendations were contrary to the research literature and his previous 1980 position.

I will begin my remarks on the question of farm structure and its relationships with the well-being of agricultural communities by making what will appear to be two contradictory arguments. On the one hand, there exists a relatively convincing body of research indicating substantial interrelations between agricultural structure, and community structure and quality of life. This research is sufficiently solid and consistent so as to justify a most crucial conclusion: Larger-than-family farming tends to be associated with adverse social and economic conditions in agricultural communities . . . research methods employed in the multiple studies that converge on the conclusion that large-scale agriculture and larger-than-family farming is associated with adverse community socioeconomic conditions have been adequate to identify the direction of the statistical association, but have been limited in understanding the strength of and the processes that underlie the relationship.

These unambiguous findings would appear to be a clear guide for public policy: Agricultural and related policies that would restrain or reverse the expansion of larger-than-family farms would, all other things being equal, enhance service delivery, employment, income, retail access, and the quality of life in agricultural communities. Unfortunately, as I will expand upon below, the character of the research that has been conducted has been inadequate to specify either the level or the spatial distribution of the gains that would be experienced by agricultural communities. Moreover, it is unclear whether all other things would be equal. For example, would policies that restrain larger-than-family farming have adverse or positive impacts on net farm income, and with what impacts on agricultural communities (Buttel 1983: 151-152)?

Scientific findings suggested a clear policy direction to “restrain or reverse the expansion of larger-than-family farms,” which could, as Goldschmidt and MacCannell suggested, improve rural agricultural community life. However, Buttel exhibited a practical anxiety or lack of resolve at considering policies in favor of the democratic agrarian tradition. An economistic discourse began to dilute, even contradict, his sociological analysis.

Rather than continue to promote ameliorative policy solutions or more vigorous political mobilizations, Buttel showed a heightened concern for “costs” such as net farm income over potential “gains.” A realpolitik calculation, among other institutional
pressures, somehow came to bear on his position. This turn resulted in his policy frame becoming “fragmentary,” even “impotent,” because these policies would only likely be achieved outside of “normal politics.”

I began this paper by noting that existing research on farm structure and the quality of life in agricultural communities is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the rise of larger-than-family farming has tended to result in low levels of community quality of life . . . Unfortunately, one nagging dilemma haunts the efforts of those, including myself, (Buttel 1980), who have advocated farm structural change as a lever for rural community development: There exists only a fragmentary picture of the costs (or, alternatively, the potential parallel gains) that would be accompanied by reduction of the role of larger-than-family farming in the U.S. agriculture . . . In sum, what has intellectually been an unusually satisfying literature because of the consistency of its empirical findings is quite impotent from a policy perspective.

The impotence of this literature for policy purposes probably is of little consequence at the present time (or more than likely for the foreseeable future), however. The prognosis for the types of policies that would effectively restrain larger-than-family farming is not good. My own view has been that the policies that would be required would be relatively drastic in the context of U.S. political institutions. Changes would clearly be extremely difficult to achieve in the context of “normal politics.” They would be opposed not only by the privileged farm operators and absentee owners, but would be resisted by farmers generally – including the small- and medium-sized family farmers who are their intended beneficiaries – as well as by those nonfarmers who have vested interests in tax subsidies to capital-intensive investments and real estate speculation and who disfavor government regulation (Buttel 1983: 166-168).

Congress had overturned the 1902 Reclamation law only a year earlier. Perhaps Buttel was accepting a consolidated food system as political reality and delivered what the audience wanted to hear. It still amounted to a reversal in his position and symbolized forfeiture of practical engagement, on a federal level, at protecting farming as a vigorous small business enterprise throughout the country.

Portions of Buttel’s testimony also undermined methodologies that MacCannell was utilizing in California. He criticized “methodological monism” that “employ
regression, linear programming, or analogous technique” (Buttel 1983: 160). In the same Congressional testimony he also promoted case studies similar to Arvin-Dinuba:

…it is ironic that the now-classic study of Goldschmidt that serves as the exemplar for much of this research utilized a quasi-ethnographic community study technique which could be profitably employed to address many empirical problems in the field (Buttel 1983: 160).

Similar to his policy recommendations, these methodological points are muddled and difficult to discern. As pointed out by both MacCannell and Goldschmidt, community case studies posed empirical problems for developing public policy and scientific theory (the method’s usefulness was in its use of narrative and thorough cataloguing of specific local conditions). The limited scope of case studies increased their potential for error. While the data can be descriptively rich, its perceived academic rigor would be undermined for someone trained in quantitative methods. In another reversal, Buttel (1983: 157) testified to “theoretical limitations” against “the Goldschmidt tradition” because “it tends to ignore how community structure may affect farm structure.” This same critique was leveled at MacCannell on his rejected retest research (which Buttel had coincidentally reviewed since he cited MacCannell and White (1981) in this congressional testimony). Such a stipulation, for the most part, goes against theoretical logic, not with it. As discussed previously, research findings demonstrated that the scale of agriculture was affecting the rural community in detrimental ways by encouraging the use of undocumented labor, degrading groundwater, paying low wages, tolerating substandard housing, etc.; one possible example in the opposite direction would be found in organized labor strikes, but even in that case the economic structure can be attributed a degree of causal relationship in that the community is organizing against unjust socioeconomic conditions connected to the industrial agricultural structure. Then the
presence of organized labor may be an indicator – an outcome or dependent variable – of industrialization. In any case, Buttel’s suggestion was theoretically more difficult to make – do church group meetings or the number of rural doctors affect the scale of industrial farming?

The last Buttel research text was interestingly juxtaposed to MacCannell’s Westlands article in the Geisler and Popper (1984) land reform book. It immediately followed MacCannell’s chapter. Buttel’s article followed similar themes to his 1983 congressional testimony:

American family farming is still predominant, but family or household production in agriculture in the advanced industrial societies is probably destined for slow but certain extinction. Economies of scale and the inexorable laws of capitalist development – the concentration and centralization of capital – may make family farming an anachronism. Family farming would therefore give way to industrial or corporate farming based primarily on hired labor . . . Accordingly, protecting a class of independent household producers destined for extinction would be a waste of reformist energy (Buttel 1984: 56).

Rhetorically, in this chapter, the same economistic discourse acknowledging “economies of scale and the inexorable laws of capitalist development” as inevitable and immutable forces became even more prevalent while the “anachronism” of the family farm was relegated to eventual “extinction.”

Buttel’s texts illustrated how the discourse of agricultural economics had subsumed that of rural sociology in his texts, from a neo-Marxist defense of rural community based upon a “political economy of rural development” to a presumption that agriculture was a “production sector” rather than an institution contributing to the democratic, civic and economic life of the country. Even his object of inquiry subtly
shifted to align more closely with a unit of analysis of many agricultural economists – the business firm or corporation:

If agriculture is conceived primarily as a production sector, our attention should probably be confined to the 200,000 largest farms. They account for roughly two-thirds of American agricultural production, but less than ten percent of American farms (Buttel 1984: 57).

Production concerns, mostly economic but also perhaps agronomic, appear to trump democratic or sociological emphases.

At this point, Buttel (1984: 66) actively engaged in a critique of the agrarian democratic tradition represented by Jim Hightower’s (1973) influential writing:

Hightower’s argument is a historical half-truth, an invitation to cling to imagined past utopias. The family farm in advanced capitalism, even in a politically supportive setting, faces serious problems. We must therefore consider alternatives to large-scale, nonfamily production which do not depend on returning to small farms.

Those alternatives, for Buttel (1984), were not any more politically feasible than returning to small farms. They included adjusting tax policy to prevent agricultural consolidation, advocated intervention in rural land markets through community land trusts, and improved the bargaining position of agricultural labor. In fact, the defense of family farms and their role as small business seemed potentially achievable in that they aligned so closely with historical narratives and discourses in American society.

Buttel’s congressional testimony and journal articles represented a unique form of social knowledge since he was an acknowledged scholar. Therefore, his texts were political documents; explicitly, in their potential to influence bureaucratic policy, but also by undermining the institutional discursive position of other scholars actively writing in defense of democratic civic life and a diversified local economy. The erosion of this national cause and theoretical position occurred just as the University of California was
finally institutionalizing its first department to look at issues of community development and rural sociology (though still lacking doctoral graduate programs in these fields). The discursive headwinds acting upon scholars, particularly underrepresented scholars, at UC Davis’ new Applied Behavioral Sciences Department represented another facet of the struggle.

**Profile of Practice: The Ag School at Davis**

The high, waspy environment of the Ag School was foreign to people like Isao who had come from different backgrounds. The Native Americans were in our department too. Every year, it would be time for merits and promotions and they would be making their cases. In their culture, which is perfectly legitimate, they would stand there and testify about all the wrongs that had been done to them and all the times they had been passed over for promotion. All the times they had been discriminated against. It was this cryfest.

When I became the chair, I took a couple of the big ones aside. I said, “Look you guys, I am really sorry to have to report this to you but when you sit there in this faculty meeting and go through this litany of wrongs that you have received every one of those old white bastards who is sitting around there listening to you have had exactly the same set of experiences that you are describing has been done to you. There isn’t a single one of them who hasn’t suffered at the hands of their colleagues and peers. There is a big difference – they would never in a million years admit it, not even to their wives. That’s the culture. “What! You want me to look like a loser to somebody?” They would never confess that anything bad had been done to them because it would make them look lesser.

I don’t know exactly what the administration had in mind in criticizing ABS. It was as if a combination of a perceived low productivity and ethnicity was a poisonous combination. A white guy could probably get by with the same level of productivity and not get hit. It was a tough place. The administration thought I was the great white hope. I was going to come in and crush Isao. I got the message from them loud and clear. When I didn’t, they acted like, “What’s going on with you?” They thought I was going to do everything that they wanted to have done.

There was a controversy, in those years, when a high level administrator from the Ag School, who lived on Linden Lane, had profound objections to Isao growing vegetables in his front yard. He went to the city council and tried to get them to pass ordinances against it. He made complaints all the time saying “You can’t grow vegetables.” He even brought out the policemen but there was no rule against it. It was as if he had this vendetta going against Isao.
In the midst of all this somebody from the City Council called me for a suggestion on someone who had made humanistic contributions to the community. I said, “It has to be Isao Fujimoto!” They thought it was a great idea and recognized him. So right in the middle of this he got this big, high honor. Eventually Isao got them to change it so it was ok to grow vegetables in your front yard.

Isao and I have always been close friends but we never sat down and tried to work together on things. That is the university. If we had not been in the university, we would have worked much more closely together. The university is almost perfectly designed to keep people from collaborating with each other. It does this with the rewards system. The minute you collaborate, your publication is worth half. There are all sorts of structural reasons to not really get together.

Our most fruitful collaborations have been through students. A student would take a course from me and take a course from Isao and that is the way they got their education. It was in the difference and the convergence where they could detect something bigger. They see two guys are completely different from each other, who teach completely different things, but they can be connected up. That was where the most powerful collaboration was to me.

I was put in a position where I had to evaluate Isao every other year in that department because I was more senior than he was in the system. I was perceived by the university to be the closest thing he had to a peer. As a result, every time he had a merit, every promotion he ever had – I wrote the primary letters. I wrote him like he could go to heaven. He never got a raise or a promotion that I hadn’t argued for all the way through. It is another area where there was significant connections.

The most important meeting in Isao’s life from the standpoint of his work was his tenure decision meeting. They brought me in to referee. I didn’t know it until I walked into the room. I was very junior but they put me right in the middle of it. At that meeting, a seven member faculty commission at the highest level went through everything. It was not a difficult meeting. If there was one of them that came to the meeting opposed, I would be surprised. We basically said, “How do we keep him without harming him in any way?”

We said “Isao’s value is as an instructor, as a lecturer. It’s incorrect for us to have Isao on the professorial series.” Isao never quite got this. He was in an environment where it was hard to get that message through. When we made that decision, we were saying, “Isao, we don’t want you to have to publish.” So we pushed him off the ladder into the lecturer series after a long discussion that this was not less than a professorial series. I was standing there saying, “We have to keep Isao, but I am not going to be party to turning him into a second class citizen. Will this harm him economically? Does the university put its money where its mouth is and say that these are very special people?”

I checked to make sure that Lecturer was exactly equivalent money wise. In other words, we weren’t going to be harming him economically. If he made normal merits and promotions through the lecturer series he would be exactly in lock step with anybody who was an Assistant, Associate, or Full professor. It was only after they had brought down the books and showed me that the Lecturer was the same that I saw that it was considered an even greater honor to be a Lecturer. It meant that the university was saying, “This guy is so valuable that we can throw out the publication standard in order
to keep him." We talked about it. The manuals told us that this could only be done under the most extraordinary of circumstances. Where you have a human being who was never going to be able to be advanced through their publications, who is so valuable and so important, as a lecturer, as a scholar, as a presence in the university, as a colleague, that we are going to keep him anyway, and we are going to reward him exactly the same as if he were promoted to an Associate Professor and was working through the ranks. He did have to teach one extra class over what a minor faculty would have to teach but he could never be held accountable again for lack of publication.

Try to find another Lecturer at UC Davis. There is probably eight or ten of them. The way it works is that you are a Lecturer with Security, the minute you get “Lecturer with Security,” that is exactly the same salary as being promoted to being Associate Professor. You can’t be fired. Your contribution is your visibility in the state. What you have done for the people of California and for your students and for your colleagues. You work hard, become visible, do the kinds of things that Isao does, and five to seven years later progress through the Lecturer ranks. Now you’re eligible to become Senior Lecturer. When you are promoted to Senior Lecturer – and I wrote that letter for Isao too – that is the salary of a Full Professor. This track would be used, for example, if you have a poet. If you had a nationally visible poet, who maybe only publishes three or four books over the course of a lifetime, you’d use that to keep them. His tenure was different from anybody else’s tenure. We couldn’t have done that for anyone else except Isao. If we tried to do that for Susie Smith who failed to publish, we would have been laughed out of the room. It actually sailed through.

He didn’t understand any of this and I couldn’t get it across to him. Isao came to me a year or so after we did this and said, “Do you think I should leave?” I had a fit. I said, “Isao!” But the campus culture is so strong and unless you were there at the meeting, you wouldn’t know. We actually had to make them bring up all the pay schedules, all the stuff, the apparatus of the university, and poured over it like a bunch of lawyers to make sure that we were not doing anything that could possibly be construed as negative.

Profile of Practice: Westlands Water District

The pedagogical lesson that valley social scientists were teaching was that economic monopoly and consolidated ownership of natural resources had drastically negative effects on the quality of life and democratic governance of rural communities. Nowhere was this lesson more apparent than in the Westlands Water District, which was the last to receive reclamation water under the Central Valley Project. The coup de grâce
was that this project’s construction – the San Luis Unit – coincided with the last battles
that overturned the reclamation law’s acreage limitation and residence requirements.

In the early 80’s, Congress decided to amend the acreage limitation law toward
the receipt of federally subsidized irrigation water. They were under pressure from all
sides – small farm and big ag interests. The law at the time was 160 acres maximum for
a farm receiving federally subsidized irrigation water. Small farm advocates had been
lobbying to enforce the law and the big guys wanted it to be changed so they would not
be in violation of it. Their position was then, and continues to be, that they were never in
violation of the law because the federal government delivered water to them therefore
making them innocent of any wrongdoing since the very government whose law it was,
was giving them water. Apparently there is a legal basis for that claim. Still, they were
uncomfortable with laws that were on the books that restricted it to 160 acres (literal
interpretation 320 acres, for a husband and wife farming together).

There was no farm in the Westlands Water District that was compliant and the
Westlands Water District was the greatest recipient of federal largesse in terms of water
subsidy with the building of the Central Valley Project canals. The legislation eventually
went through. The big, westside farmers who early in the process thought there was a
good chance of prevailing with their plan of removing all acreage constraints on farms
getting subsidized water, ended up with legislation that basically lifted the 320, or the
160/320 rule, to 960. 960 acres – leaving them still non-compliant.

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a research organ of the US
Congress, was charged with the responsibility of preparing an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) on the effects of changing the limitation law. Its task was to estimate
probable impacts of varying scenarios of changing the law. One scenario would be
enforcing the existing law. The other scenario would be the removal of all restrictions.
And the third scenario would be to set a higher limit, somewhere above 320 acres. OTA
outsourced its research to Harbridge House Incorporated, a global consulting firm that
started out in Boston by faculty from Harvard. The Harbridge people were told by OTA,
even though they outsourced the work, to include certain OTA-named scientists on the
research team. I was one of the OTA-named people.

Harbridge House did in fact hire me to work with them on preparing this EIS. I
was in charge of the social component of the EIS. We decided that we would focus our
energies on the Westlands Water District as a test case. It would not be the only area
affected by the law; however it would be the area most likely to be affected by changes in
the law. The Westlands Water District was thought to be similar enough to other areas
where large-scale agriculture was occurring that it would give us the conditions in other
areas in the American West covered by the limitation law. There were people who were
looking at every aspect of it; things like environmental impacts, soil compaction, water
drawdowns, all of the technical aspects.

My group was responsible for the social issues component of the report. What
would be the social impacts of the three scenarios? It was in that context where the
indications appeared again that very large farms, as Goldschmidt had shown earlier, do
have a range of negative impacts on local communities and populations. We used the
best available methodologies to look closely on the Westlands, and eventually at the
whole Sunbelt, especially on California, Arizona, Florida and Texas. This work went on for a couple of years. Eventually, two published studies came out. The EIS was eventually published by Geisler and Popper. The Lou Swanson volume is various work that was done for OTA but not connected to the acreage limitation series of studies.

When I submitted it to Harbridge House and the Office of Technology assessment, I was worried that some of the things that I was saying would be anathema to Coors. He was on the board of Harbridge House or at least had some cozy relationship with them. I was concerned that by the time my raw reports got through the vetting process, the impact of the findings would be blunted in the editing. I will confess to it – I don’t think it was illegal, but it was probably unethical – I did send the draft to the National Farmers Union. They were concerned about these same issues. Wendell Berry was on their board and I admired some of the activists they had working for them.

The National Farmers Union immediately reproduced the report and sent it to all of the Congress. I did not know they were going to do that but I did not ask them to retain confidentiality, so technically I did not care. By that time I guess I knew enough about the politics of this stuff that I wasn’t under any illusions; if it was useful to somebody that had it in their hands, they would make maximum use of it. I didn’t know that they would go that far and give it to everybody in Congress. It was apparently read with interest.

The people at Harbridge House got royally pissed. I was called down to Washington D.C. but somebody in the Office of Technology Assessment got back to Harbridge House and told them that under no circumstances could they fire me. In the end, versions were published in the Congressional record. Harbridge House and OTA did not suppress anything that I did but they cut it up in these bite size chunks and distributed it through the massive report in such a way that you were never able to get the focus of it back. It had no singular impact.

It was politically effective to send the EIS draft to Congress. By the time the finished product finally arrived, the ball was already rolling. Soon after, I got into trouble with John Harris and the Westside Farmers Association. The valley farmers found out when Mrs. Harris visited her Congressmen at the time. She was a lobbyist for the Westside Farmers Association. He gave her a copy of my report and asked her what she thought. She read it and wept, literally wept. Not from the pathos of my report, but from the new difficulty it had introduced into her role as lobbyist. She told me, “I used to enjoy going to Washington D.C. I’d go up to Washington once a month and used to enjoy my trips. I really liked dropping in on my Congressmen and on my Senators. We always enjoyed our conversations together. But now when I go to the door of their office, they hand me this.” She burst into tears in front of me. “It’s not fun anymore.” Basically “this” was more or less what got published in the Geisler and Popper volume. It was a well documented analysis of levels of poverty and income inequalities of the four or five towns that are inside the Westlands Water District – places like Huron, Mendota, Five Points, Tranquility.

When the EIS came out, the Westside Farmers Association made a phone tree. They were calling the Chancellor’s office, the Dean’s office, my department and our house, ever hour, all day and into the evening to complain about what I had done. At my house, it was just vituperative and ended in the evening; to the Chancellor it was “you have to get rid of him.” The Chancellor’s office had to set up a sub-department with two
or three secretaries who answered the “MacCannell complaints” trying to do it in a way that would not violate me, but also in a way that would calm down their biggest research donors. It was headed by a professor of ag econ who directed their activities. John Harris is on record saying that he would withdraw a million dollars in funding to the University, or that he would actually give a million dollars of funding, if they could successfully get rid of me.

I was chair of my department at the time. When they called and asked to speak to the chair, they would get me. So my conversations were somewhat stymied because they were calling prepared to complain to my chair about what a rotten person I was and how I really shouldn’t be allowed to teach impressionable young kids.

I would say, “I will take that under advisement but you are speaking to Dean MacCannell.”

“Oh!” a deep voice on other side of phone would reply.

One that sticks in my mind was a guy who was yelling at me, “This study is completely biased, you can’t have possibly interviewed everybody down here.”

I said, “Well, no, we didn’t, actually it is a sample.”

“Well, you didn’t sample anybody like me – I’m rich!”

Right in the middle of this, John Harris, speaking for the Westside Farmers Association, called the Chancellor and asked him to send me down there to answer their questions about what I had done in the EIS. The Chancellor, who was still Jim Meyer, had asked me to keep him informed of every aspect of this thing. Shortly afterward, I went to the Chancellor,

“Harris has offered to send a plane, pick me up and fly me down” I said. “I really don’t want to do this. If anything happens in this meeting, where I do decide that I have to soften what I’ve written – perhaps they show me something I needed to know that I didn’t know before – it may look like my taking an airplane ride with them had influenced me. I want to keep my options open.”

The Chancellor said, “Under no circumstances get into that plane, they would think of nothing of wasting a plane and a pilot on you.” We drove down.

The stance of the Charles Hess, the Ag Dean, was completely supportive of me at this time. They had reviewed the work. What could they say. Hess sent Bill Weir, an Associate Dean, with me, literally as a bodyguard. Nearing retirement, Bill was older, respected and staunch.

But the Chancellor was clear. He told me, “Look, I don’t like what you are doing! I really wish you would stop what you are doing! You are costing us plenty of money. My great preference would be for you to cease and desist. But I can’t order you to do that. There is no way. I am aware of that.” He was sort of like “Please?”

So there was a lot of drama surrounding my visit to the valley. Everyone was worried, “Should I even go at all? Won’t they assassinate me?” When we got down there it was a big public affair, a roast with speakers like Mrs. Harris taking turns. The only purpose of the meeting was to insult me. That was the only purpose of it! First of all for him to try to buy me off. Second of all to intimidate me. And finally to just yell at me. They were venting.

Before the lunch and the big public meeting, I met with Harris privately. I was led into his study; it was separate from the main house. In fact, it was in a building that was probably 200 or 300 yards from the house, and it was a house. The study was a
They opened it up and the first thing he said was “This is lovely... We are still pretty far apart on these numbers.”

He’s referring to the data on poverty and other statistics in the report. This opening gambit is like we’re doing a real estate deal and I have made him an offer or something – “we are still pretty far apart on the numbers.” I explained to him that there was nothing I could do about that because they are mostly from public record like the census.

His next gambit was, “Well, what will it take to get you to change these numbers?”

“It can’t be done because it is public record. Even if I wanted to, and I have no desire to, any undergraduate in ag econ would be able to take a quick pass through the data and say, ‘Something is fishy here’.”

So then he said, “What would it take from us for you to recant your report?”

I said, “I don’t do stuff like that. It isn’t my style. You’re talking to the wrong guy.” They would clearly do anything. Later, they sent letters to the Fresno Bee signed by me that made me sound like a total crazy man. The paper called me up to verify and reads me these letters and saying, “Did you write this letter?”

“Well, no!”

We were then taken to a foreman’s house for lunch (I was judged to be too low class to be a guest in one of their homes). They sat at least 75 people down to lunch in the dining room and no one was bumping asses with anybody in the foreman’s house! This is where they tried to poison me. Everyone was being seated when a woman came up with a tray and a cocktail on it.

She said, “This one is just for you.” There was something about the way she said it that made me wonder. I stuck my tongue in it, just the tip of my tongue, and my entire tongue went to sleep. I set that one aside, so I was able to jump over that particular little hedge.

Afterward, he put me in a car with a couple of thugs. They really had to struggle to engineer a separation because Bill Weir was very protective. (I was told I was never to be separated from Bill.) They drove me out into the country. I really thought this is it, but all they did was act tough. Talk tough. They weren’t physical. They were just saying things like, “How long do you think you can get by with pulling crap like this with us!” Verbally intimidating stuff like that, which has never bothered me just as long as that is as far as it goes.

Then they drove me back to the lunch where everyone stood up to testify against me, including Mrs. Harris. They were all saying what a horrible person I was. Bill then told them they just had to accept it. He said, “Look guys, you are going to have to get used to this. We have been doing research for the last century that you have benefited from enormously in terms of new varieties, new practices, new machines. Now, for the first time, we are starting to do ‘human research’ into the human factors involved, which as far as we are concerned is just part of our mission. You were willing to receive the results of our previous research – now we do this as well. Live with it!”

I have zero complaints. They were tough guys. Even though they are in the back pockets of these big farmers and all of the R&D is for them, I discovered that there was secret liberal in some of those production ag people. Many of them had grown up on small family farms. They were doing research that was building these mega-farms and a
lot of them did have a guilty conscience about it. They were perfectly happy that
someone else was in front of the bayonet, but they weren’t yelling at me all the time, as
one may have expected.

On a different occasion, but similar context, I was asked to attend a meeting with
Fazio, farmers, researchers from the University, entrepreneurs and others. They were
asking what we could do to stimulate the agricultural sector’s economy. Everyone was
talking about how time’s were tough. This was in the early 80’s. Everything was bad at
the same time - regulations, acreage limitation law, things like that. Fazio is taking it all
in, listening to everybody.

Then, the conversation drifted. They were talking about how difficult, even
impossible, it was these days to make a new millionaire.

“It used to be easy we just pick out one of the brightest young guys from high
school or junior college. We give him a $10,000 loan and let him start sharecropping out
here on some acreage. In three of four years he would be a millionaire. We just can’t do
that anymore. It’s just out of the question!”

Then this old Extension agent said [gruff voice], “I’m sorry. I disagree. I think it
is still possible to make ‘em millionaires. It’s not by any means impossible. I just won’t
be a party to this saying it can’t be done. It just takes a whole hell of a lot more poor
people to make one millionaire today than it used to.” That was said in the positive.
They just assumed I would be in complete agreement.

Around this time, I also had a mole in my shop who was being paid by the
westside farmers to produce findings that countered mine, which he was doing. He had
been a professor at Oregon and his wife had been hired by Extension here. He was a
Cornellian. Out of pity, I said, “Well, he has a Phd in rural sociology from Cornell.
He’s got skills.” Shortly after I hired him, he got bought off by these guys.

Then things started to happen. One time, we were sitting at dinner and somebody
knocks on the door. He was well dressed, probably a lawyer. “I’m the man from across
the park and I am a part of the Save the Bay Coalition. We have this report from your
research organization at Davis. I just can’t believe that you wrote this?” On the SARE
letterhead there is: “Dean MacCannell, SARE.” And it’s a total concoction. A complete
fabrication. It had been circulated to this attorney for Save the Bay probably because it
was water related. It recanted all of my findings.

I went to Orville and I said, “Hey, this guy has been taking money, writing
reports on our letterhead with my name on them and sending them to the westside
farmers. I’ve got to get rid of him.” It was perfectly in my perview to simply fire the guy
since I was the head of the Macrosocial Accounting Project. He was my employee and
wasn’t protected in any way.

But Orville said, “Isao and I both have to be there when you tell him what you are
going to tell him.” Orville was so cool about it. At the time, I thought, “What are they
going to say – that I can’t fire him?” I invited all three of them. I never quite understood
that, perhaps it was to shame him. His name was Doug Gwynn. Last I heard he was
working for the westside farmers trying to do consulting work. They let Gwynn’s stuff
into the record and it was garbage. The science was bad. Later, I was brought in to
refute it and, since he had been using my letterhead, to let them know that it wasn’t done
under my auspices.
Late in the story, Gwynn was indeed working for agribusiness interests by producing research and testifying in court proceedings. Goldschmidt’s files included transcriptions of official testimony before the California State Water Board where a contest of dueling scholars cast MacCannell against Doug Gwynn and Refugio Rochin.

During one of my visits with the MacCannell’s, they shared recollections of this dramatic scene.

Remembering, Juliet said, “. . . and then we got involved with all of the Congress meetings studies. They did allow him to testify once. It took years and years, because the lawyers for the Westlands farmers would never let him come up to just say anything at one of these Congressional or State . . . What do they call those? They aren’t inquests. They were like hearings.”

She posed the question more to Dean than to me but he did not hear her from the other room. She continued, ‘Well, they wouldn’t do it. This story was amazing. Every time people were working against him. Very pernicious interests. They would say, “Okay, we want you to be appearing in Fresno” and he would go down. Then the lawyer on the other side would say, “We are barring your testimony.” Finally, they let him to testify in Sacramento. I don’t remember what year. It was a huge auditorium in the State offices in Sacramento where, for the first time, I saw reporters use laptops. They were kind of tall and had these reddish screens. It was a long time ago and late in the game.”

As Dean returned to the room, Juliet asked him “When did you finally get to testify in the hearings in Sacramento?” Dean was slow to respond, so Juliet continued her train of thought, “Anyway, the moment he began to speak you could have heard a pin drop in the entire auditorium. Everyone was poised . . .”

Later, I asked Dean about his this testimony. He said, “They fought for an hour over having me speak. They raised objections. It was one challenge after another. Everyone was waiting. All it did was make it all the more dramatic.”

“I didn’t recognize it at the time, but it was structured as dueling reports – mine and one from Gwynn, long after he was severed from me. He had done a restudy of his own in which he found no relationship between farm size and capitalization and social conditions. Their lawyers somehow did not have enough social science background and our lawyers were actually letting him get by with it up to this moment - arguing from non-correlation! In other words, he had no correlation so he was claiming no relationship. He had a whole raft of non-correlations.”

“So, as part of my testimony, I had to do Research Methods 101, ‘Do not argue from non-correlation. There is a host of reasons why a correlation doesn’t come out, such as your measurement is wrong. We are instructed in graduate school that this is not publishable and you cannot base any argument pro or con on it. You can only base argument on statistically significant relationships. And there is one statistically significant relationship in the Gwynn report – and it is in the Goldschmidt direction!’
The lawyers for his side spun to him and I heard a chorus of “Is that true?!?” Gwynn could only sit there.

The fights over the Central Valley Project water and reclamation law were drawing to a close. Agribusiness interests had successfully maneuvered to get the water without following the law even though government funded research studies (including Goldschmidt’s BAE research and MacCannell’s OTA studies) concluded that without implementation of the law, there would be substantial, negative social and economic outcomes for the communities of the San Joaquin Valley. Even worse, California Water Districts, like the Westlands Water District, were structured undemocratically with voting based on property ownership rather than the traditional standard of one-person-one-vote (Goodall 1978; Hobbs 1979; Jamieson et al. 1974).69

69 In California Water, A New Political Economy, Merrill Goodall (1978: 5) described special districts as “legally constituted government entities.” (Hobbs (1979: 48) later called them “invisible governments.”) Special districts are endowed with public sanction and responsibilities including the right to sue and be sued, acquire real and personal property, hire employees, enter into contracts, use eminent domain, levy user fees and tax (Hobbs 1979; Jamieson et al. 1974; Phelps et al. 1978). Essentially special districts have the same powers as city or county governments. As a special district, California Water Districts stand out with their undemocratic, property-based system of representation as they are formed through a petition of landowners representing the majority of the area of the proposed district followed by a vote of landowners in an election. Voting landowners are given one vote for each $100 of assessed land value (Jamieson et al. 1974: 41). Due to this system, it is possible for a few large landowners to propose, elect and then control a California Water District.

Since California Water Districts, were enabled under statutes that restricted voting by requiring a property qualification, they appear to be unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States … nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Even more explicit the California Constitution ensures, “No property qualifications shall ever be required for any person to vote or hold office.” State and federal courts have however supported the undemocratic nature of special districts. In 1972, the California Supreme Court ruled in Slayer Land Co. et al v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District that a limited franchise was permissible to only landlords who had “a direct, primary and substantial interest in its governance” (Jamieson et al. 1974: 165). This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court which found, using circular logic, that “the voter qualification statutes for California water storage district elections are rationally based, and therefore do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.” Justice Douglas, in his dissent, said the abuses of corporate voting were “unthinkable in terms of the American traditions that corporations should be admitted to the franchise . . . The result is a corporate political Kingdom undreamed of by those who wrote our Constitution” (Jamieson et al. 1974: 166).
Other lessons were being learned. Pedagogically, scholars discerned that previous assumptions about their roles and the purposes of their scientific research in the context of Californian agriculture were incorrect. Political manipulation was hampering dissemination and implementation of their findings. Contemporary and subsequent research moved toward actively organizing resistance more than producing pure science; it also triggered a reassessment of how taken for granted expectations of democratic process needed to be changed. Agribusiness consolidation was corrupting democratic processes, including subverting federal law or suppressing scientific research. Democratic institutions were being transformed and manipulated for the benefit of large-scale landowners.
PART III: ORGANIZING COMMUNITY THROUGH EDUCATION

The 1960’s and 70’s posed new challenges and opportunities for integrated approaches to politically engaged scholarship. Social movements – feminist, peace, civil rights, indigenous and countercultural – affected student demands on campuses for more relevant education. In response, the University of California at Davis created a department with a mission aligned with the fields of rural sociology, community development and ethnic studies. At the same time, community-based institutions outside of the university were also filling the historic void at California’s land grant universities in the form of research-focused non-profit organizations. In the valley, the state and country however industrial agriculture was entrenched and strengthening, consolidating its control of the nation’s food system.

In his dissertation, *The College and Its Constituency: Rural and Community Development at the University of California 1875-1978*, Emmett Fiske (1979) chronicled the evolution of critical social science scholarship at California’s land grant system. During this time period, there were contentious debates about university-community involvement and the democratic tradition in scholarship. After a century of neglect and disregard by the University of California, during Dean Alex McCalla’s tenure (1970 to 1977), research programs were initiated for the first time to serve broader “constituencies” (Fiske 1979: 440). As a result, scholars worked in concert with valley-based groups like the United Farmworkers Union and National Land for the People in local struggles over farm labor, pesticide use, agricultural mechanization and rural poverty.
At the same time, as the university was opening up to a broader clientele, non-profit research institutions were being established to fulfill the purpose of understanding and altering the unjust rural structure of the state. A prominent example, the California Institute for Rural Studies (CIRS), opened its doors just a couple of blocks from the UC Davis campus. Its pedagogical mission involved what should have been the scholarship of rural sociology and community development departments on that campus had they served a public purpose. Villarejo (1980b) quoted an early CIRS mission statement:

1. Conducting research on the problems and characteristics of rural California, and
2. Gathering information for public dissemination and education on topics including, but not limited to:
   a. Social and economic problems of rural California;
   b. The effect of land tenure on the social structures of rural communities, the environment and migration of rural people to urban areas;
   c. Approaches toward strengthening the role of private enterprise in the form of small farmers and resident entrepreneurs;
   d. The development of alternative methods of landholding including, but not limited to, producer and landholding co-operatives; and
   e. The effect of government policies and programs on landholding patterns.

Perhaps an advantage of CIRS’s initiative and development outside of California’s land grant universities was that had the political “space” to align its public purpose with the most pressing needs of the marginalized family farmers and destitute farmworkers. Land reform, small business enterprise, social justice and the defense of democratic governance were values explicitly framing the work of the organization.

In this era, a politically engaged scholarship developed that combined action research, adult education and community organizing. New approaches, reminiscent of those of Galarza, occurred in spite of, and possibly as a result of, institutional opposition
of critical scholarship at the University of California. Scholars like Don Villarejo and Isao Fujimoto were foremost among the innovators blurring the roles of social scientists and educational organizers practicing pedagogical scholarship. They closed the distance between scientific study and on-the-ground problem solving. In some respects, their work shifted away from proving the negative – r.e., that there were social costs associated with industrial agriculture – to learning and practicing methods of action research and political engagement to confront, even transform, unjust structures. It was an era when the scholars and their students went into the fields.
Don Villarejo was an unconventional social scientist. Originally trained as a physicist at the University of Chicago and raised by a single mom who had been a communist organizer. Villarejo worked in-between spaces, interstitially connective, pulling together institutions and purposes (like land grant services and farm labor needs) so distant they appeared to be opposing each other. His background, disposition and pedagogical practice offer unique perspectives on politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley as he integrated empirical scientific study, adult education and community organizing. Villarejo was a founder of the California Institute for Rural Studies and was its first Executive Director. He contributed numerous research studies over the coming decades. His broad and eclectic research topics included agricultural structure and production (Barnett et al. 1978, Redmond and Villarejo 1987; Villarejo 1980a, Villarejo 1989a; Villarejo and Runsten 1993), rural communities (Villarejo 1989b), research methods (Villarejo 1980b), water policy (Villarejo et al. 1981, Villarejo and Mandel 1986; Villarejo 1986; Villarejo and Redmond 1988) and other areas such as pesticide use, immigration policy and farmworker health.

In this chapter, I begin with Villarejo’s upbringing, education and early scholarship as an activist-scholar during the 1960’s. The next section describes his entry into the politics and issues of rural California during the heat of UFW union organizing, an effort that culminated in the creation of a two non-profit research organizations. The following section analyzes Villarejo’s primary research method of public records
investigation, followed by an examination of how he used this approach to study California agribusiness. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of Villarejo’s community-based research and organizing approaches.

Profile of Practice: Chicago Upbringing and Education

My mom was a complicated person. She was Ingrid Bergman looking with a Swedish, German, Irish background. An orphan at twelve, she went to live with an aunt after her mom died. She never went to college. In the midst of the Great Depression, in 1930, at age seventeen, she went off on her own to carve out a life for herself. From that time on she was on her own and self supporting. She became a labor leader and union organizer in the Milwaukee area, eventually joining the Communist Party, then leaving the party. She never told me why, but my understanding was that it was around the Hitler-Stalin Pact, that nobody shakes the hand of Adolf Hitler. She also felt belittled as a woman in the party. My mother had a strong background as a union leader and community activist. She was a brilliant community leader and organizer around issues that mattered. So on both an intellectual and a personal level, I was exposed to a whole range of thinking about how you work in the world.

My mother and father divorced when I was one year old. I was never part of my father’s life. His family was from Cuba. At about 5’6 and weighing 130, he was described as “swarthy” which is the way they talked about brown people in those days. He was conscious of his Spanish descent, refusing to talk about any Indian blood in their family. His father was a cigar maker and founded a cigar making business. They got to Tampa and discovered that there were 1,000 or 2,000 cigar makers and they looked for Plan B. So they picked a place and went, and it happened to be Milwaukee where they became its first cigar makers. They found that the biggest venue for the cigars was the German beer halls. When Prohibition hit, their main source of income went away.

My mother was always supportive of the idea that I should have a skill that could always earn a living as opposed to her career path which caused her a lot of personal grief and survival hardship over the years. While I always had a range of interests included politics, economics, sociology, and science, at a relatively young age I learned that I had talent in mathematics. Throughout my education, mathematics was always the strongest subject in school. In 1955, I graduated from Hyde Park High School in the Southside of Chicago. At the time, there was a great interest in the nation’s scientific workforce. I decided I could make a living using my skills in mathematics. The question was how should I do that? I thought about physics.

In high school, I had a physics teacher who was poorly educated. He did not know science well but discovered that I was really good at it. So he decided to have me help him. He was going back to get a Master’s degree at Illinois Tech. At his insistence,
I went with him one evening to take the mid-term. It was an elementary class, like analytic geometry and calculus. Though not enrolled in the class, I had the highest score while he had a poor score. After that, he decided that I would do his homework in class while he continued to do a poor job presenting what he knew about physics. It became apparent to me that my talent was good enough that I could try anything. So I took on physics at the University of Chicago, which was supported by the family. It was clearly a path that I could do.

It was much more difficult than I had ever expected but I liked that challenge. The first day of physics class at the University of Chicago they said, "Look to the left of you, look to your right - the purpose of this class is that only one of the three of you will be here in the end." How's that for encouragement! I took it as a challenge and managed to graduate in the middle of the class; not the top, but certainly not near the bottom either – good enough to be admitted into the graduate program and good enough to pass the candidacy exam for the Ph.D. on the first try. Only about a third of the people entering that graduate school program passed on the first try. You had two tries for the candidacy exam. It was notoriously difficult – three successive days of written tests then an oral presentation before a committee where Nobel Prize winners questioned you. It was tough but I got through it. I decided that I wasn’t good enough to do theory because all of the people I had met who were interested in theory were smarter than I was. Though I still had an interest in theory, I decided to do experimental physics instead. Eventually I got a Ph.D. at Chicago in Experimental Physics. My career path seemed clear.

As it happened during that period, there were other things happening in the world that were of interest to me. I became active politically at the University of Chicago as an undergraduate student in '56. There were qualities I had, as a personality and as a scholar, that were attractive to this rag-tag bunch of social science and humanities majors. Hot issues were things like Strontium 90 and nuclear radiation fallout from testing of nuclear weapons. People who didn’t have a clue about that found it wonderful that I could write coherently and explain in lay terms what this was all about and why it was important. I did some writing and speaking about that and it led to other things. Eventually, when Vietnam became important, I became heavily involved in the anti-war movement.

Along the way, some colleagues and I created a magazine called New University Thought. It was one of the first of what became known as the New Left. We had no idea that we were going to be “New Left” then. The London Times reviewed our first issue in 1960 and cast it as a “breath of fresh air from the States” in terms of the political thinking of the country. Young scholars, mostly at the University of Chicago but also from other places, brought it together as a combination of scholarship, political awareness and action. Out of this political work, we hooked up with young folks at the historically black colleges and universities of the south. Some of the first leaders of the sit-in movement came through Chicago, into Madison, and eventually as far as Berkeley to spread the word. Before the major media had made much of it, we were raising money, awareness and recruiting students to go south. The sit-ins were started by people we had previously worked with politically.

The first thing I wrote in New University Thought was about Cuba. As it happened, we started the magazine just when the Castro revolution succeeded. I’ve
always had an interest in structures of power and relationships in society. I felt that Americans knew little about Cuban life and the role of American imperialism in the sugar and nickel mining industries. So I wrote about that in an article called, “American Investment in Cuba.” It’s in the inaugural issue of New University Thought. The next big piece that I wrote was on stock ownership and control of corporations.

That period was so fruitful in terms of political education and action. We rented a house as New University Thought on the southside of Chicago near the campus. The acronym of course for New University Thought was “NUT,” so it became known as the “Nuthouse.” In the Nuthouse, there were weekly meetings. Meetings ranged from people organizing anti-war demonstrations in Chicago to people from northern parts of the world – Minnesota, Wisconsin, the Dakotas – coming through, having a place to stay on their way south. It was all a natural part of what I saw to be life.

I was also productive in physics at that time. I published about six articles in a two-year period in physics journals. I found physics to be engaging as a problem solving exercise, but it was compartmentalized. It was separate from this other life. There were people who were even unaware of the other life. My thesis advisor, after becoming aware of it, was shocked and distressed.

During this period from 1958 to 1968, I got an opportunity to become more engaged on political work. There were times that I just focused on physics, when I said, “I can’t come to meetings, this is what I’ve got to do.” Then there were times when somebody was in town for a day – like SNCC leader John Lewis – you don’t pass that up. I also met people connected with the Weather Underground but never worked with them. I knew Bill Ayers. I knew Katherine and several other people. I felt they were romantics. They had a fantasy world that had nothing to do with the world of real working people. As far as I was concerned, you start in the understanding that real working people have a lot more at stake if they stand up politically than people who come from affluent comfortable backgrounds.

Later, while doing anti-war organizing at UCLA, there was another crazy faction saying “it’s time to pick up the gun.” I said, “I am supporting an end to the war because I want the National Liberation Front to win. I want them to persist and throw out western imperialism. They fought the French; they are fighting the Americans. That’s what it’s about. They have fifteen divisions. They’ve got tanks. They’ve got howitzers. What have you guys got?” We’re not trying to hold ourselves out as the carrier of the guns. What we’re really trying to do is to educate folks who have a lot more at stake and help them to understand how they can take effective action. That’s the only way to get change in the long run.

The person I learned the most from during that period in Chicago was Otto Feinstien. He was Viennese and Jewish, having escaped from Nazi Germany with his family. He was not a professor, but more than a peer. He was probably eight years older than me. Otto was an activist and organizer. He was a serious scholar of international relations who exposed me to a whole world that I had no knowledge about. He had the experience of the old world. When the “Three Penny Opera” became popular during that time, Otto played it for me in German and explained to me what it meant. All kinds of stuff, like Israeli folk music, and other folk music, from all over the world. My mother did not speak any foreign languages and was not highly educated. Though she read a lot, she did not have much knowledge about Europe or the world of
scholarship. She was a skilled orator and writer. Her grammar was perfect, but she didn’t know about that world at all.

Otto and I eventually became roommates. We would go out and eat at this really low cost Chinese restaurant that was in a black neighborhood. It was the world of bohemian students. He helped me to learn things about the world that I didn’t know anything about. He was also meticulous with his scholarship. Any political work that I did, that he saw me doing, he would carefully review and say, “Is this true or not? How do you know it’s true? What is the evidence?” He was very thorough, but at the same time open to trying to promote change.

Profile of Practice: An Unconventional Scholar

I finished my Ph.D. in ’68 and went to UCLA. I had a faculty position as Assistant Professor of Physics. My wife told me that she had envisioned me wearing a tweed jacket with leather patches holding a pipe and saying nice things. She had a Ph.D. in Biochemistry from Chicago, but did not have a position. She is precocious and, in many ways, smarter in science than I am. She is a very good scientist, but at that time, for women in science, it was difficult. Particularly since we had young kids. Eventually she was hired using the old boy network, the Chair of the Biochemistry Department at Chicago called on a former student from Chicago who was then on the faculty of UCLA med-school telling him to hire her. It was an opening for her to keep her publication record active and continue to be a part of biochemistry research. It paid off later when the Physics Department at UCLA found me growing my hair long, doing all kinds of weird things that they didn’t think were appropriate for a physicist.

The Physics Department faculty were unhappy with me, they had wanted this high level scientist. They got something they didn’t expect - a person who had a wide range of interests, who was unconventional but appeared to be conventional. When I went out to interview at UCLA, I gave a seminar. I had spoken at several meetings of physics. They had seen my publication record and I had good recommendations. Later, while there as a professor, I was recognized as an outstanding physics teacher. On the other hand, I did not aggressively pursue grants, as I was expected to. I did not publish, as I was expected to. I devoted my energy to teaching.

There was an unusual faculty committee called the Committee for Educational Development (CED) that I agreed to serve on. It was the only one on the whole nine campuses of the University of California that had the power to grant credit and hire faculty for experimental classes without any additional faculty review. We had 11 FTE to play with. This was won as a result of student demonstrations and combat on the campus demanding other kinds of alternatives to mammoth classrooms filled with automotons.

The students called for more socially relevant classes. I remember a clever set of photographs from the UCLA student newspaper. The photographs were taken from behind the faculty member looking out onto the class. The first picture has several hundred students sitting in this amphitheater-like structure. At the front of the room
there was a faculty member talking and all of the students looked bored with nothing happening. The next picture showed a portable radio cassette player in front of the bored students instead of a faculty member. The final picture of the sequence had a whole bunch of tape recorders sitting where the students had been, in front of the tape player of the faculty recording. The caption said, “This is what we have become.” The students wanted something different.

When I agreed to serve on the CED committee during my third year it was an opportunity to do all kinds of interesting things. Together with colleagues, I created a whole program for community work. Students would volunteer to work at a free clinic, an afterschool program, a trade union or for the ACLU. It was a twelve unit, three quarter long sequence. As the faculty sponsor, in my view, I had responsibility for being an equal participant in the activities except for the field placement. I didn’t have time to do that since this work was in addition to my regular teaching load. Sixty students were doing this. We had weekly meetings with the students placed at the different locations. I was responsible for health and science with students working in places like free clinics. They would do twenty hours a week of volunteer work. Readings were collectively agreed on. Everyone had to keep a journal. We had men’s and women’s groups for consciousness raising - the Physics Department faculty had thought that I had lost my mind. It was great fun and important for me to explore ways of learning and teaching that were not possible within the Physics Department.

After the Cambodian invasion in 1970, the student’s response shut down the whole campus. I had become a well-known speaker against the war. I had short hair and was a traditional physics teacher in some respects but students would also turn to me for advice asking what they should do. I said, “There are a lot of things you need to do. You need to organize yourselves. I can help with that but you have to do it.” They decided they needed a communications center to communicate with campuses all over the United States. The question was where they could get access to a phone. I said, “My office is a great place – go for it guys.” So my office became the phone communications center. Those characters even got the inside line to the White House somehow. They were unbelievable.

The next thing was crafted by Arnie Kaufman, who was a political science professor at UCLA. Arnie saw that we needed to go off campus to talk to the whole Los Angeles community about the war. He helped to design a precinct walking operation involving thousands of UCLA students. They generated the materials in the Political Science Department. Then they went to over 1,500 precincts in the Los Angeles County with presentable students going door-to-door talking about their concerns. Unfortunately, Arnie passed away in a plane accident during that period. This was a real, ground-level political action and political education program.

The Physics Department was very concerned about all of it. They questioned, “What are you doing?”

I said, “The students are not throwing rocks. We have been doing something they believe in. It’s totally nonviolent. They’re learning something. The community is learning something. I have a bunch of people sitting on a phone all day. What the hell do you want?”

In the midst of that, the television people wanted interviews. I got selected to speak at a convocation called by the UCLA Chancellor at Pauley Pavilion where the
UCLA basketball team plays. The entire university, 20,000 people, were given official time off by the university from their regular employment to attend the event. The media selected me to be a spokesperson along with student leaders and the faculty spokesperson. I gave a one-minute rap that made national television and brought down the house. Everybody was jumping up and down applauding. The theme of my message was that the whole nation should go on strike to stop this war.

My wife was so upset that she fell on the stairs at Pauley Pavilion. She cut her leg bad enough to require some medical attention. She goes back to her office to fill out a worker’s compensation form and listed “the invasion of Cambodia” as the cause of the accident. She was also upset because her department chair had spent twenty minutes at the doorway of her small office, not even coming in her room, yelling at her about her husband’s behavior. I was seen as a lightening rod for faculty who were supportive of the war, who were pro-military, who were conservative Republicans. They saw what I was doing as damaging to not only the nation but also to UCLA. It was one of the most trying times of our marriage. I didn’t back off but we also reached certain understandings about what I would do and would not do.

After six years, the Physics Department met with me. They said, “This is not working. This is not a good fit. You are a talented person but it’s time you considered working somewhere else.” They gave me a terminal contract, which was the right decision given their value system and what they were trying to accomplish. I did not fit given my interests and what I had become. It was a relief for me. I felt an exhilaration saying, “Physics is over. What am I going to do next?” It occurred to me that I ought to find a way to (A) support myself and my family and (B) find out how I could do that in a different way in a different context.

Then a miracle happened when Merna, my wife, was offered a position in Biochemistry and Biophysics here at Davis. It saved our family financially. At the end of that one-year terminal contract, what did I have? I had nothing - no job. I wasn’t stressed because I had been self supporting since nineteen. I had worked in factories to help put myself through school. I knew I could get work, but I didn’t know what. So she and I reached an understanding that she would become the primary breadwinner.

We both wanted to work in the same community. I would take primary responsibility for the household and the kids. She would develop her career full bore and have an opportunity to develop herself not only as a scientist but as a professional in the world. We did that and moved to Davis in the August of ’75. We made strategic moves financially in order to be able to get this house, right before the inflation in housing costs, by taking my pension savings from UCLA in a lump sum for the down payment. Then we figured out how to move from there.

Shortly after we moved to Davis, I met Isao Fujimoto in early ’76. He is one of our local heroes in terms of his commitment, his dedication, his teaching. There was a birthday celebration for him. I had not previously met him nor had I known of his work, but some of the activists that I was involved with at that time said, “There is going to be a birthday party for Isao. You really have to be there.” I couldn’t get there at the start of the party because I was responsible for the kids. When I walked into his house on Linden Lane, there were 40 or 50 young people sitting on the floor. They completely covered the floor. I was at least twice as old as they were.
Isao was sitting in a chair. Each person spoke. When they were done, somebody else would stand up and speak. Each of them would talk about what they were now doing in the world with their lives. Somebody had started a food coop someplace. Somebody else had started a community cannery. This was their birthday present to Isao. These were his students. It was the most moving experience to understanding Isao’s importance and influence here – that as a teacher he had inspired and taught all of these young people and they had came back. It was beautiful. That is Isao.

Here’s the other side of Isao. I think he would not want to talk about it but you have to really know this. When he came here from Cornell, he was seen as one of the outstanding rural sociologists of his generation. His obligations were to complete his Ph.D. thesis and to publish in this field. He was given a great deal of latitude in terms of what he could and was able to do. He did neither. He never completed his thesis. He never published a thing in a peer-reviewed journal. I don’t know Isao’s thinking at that time. My impression is that he felt alienated and isolated in the institution. He likely felt, as I did, that this could have been a mistake. I’m sure he still feels alienated as far as the institution. But not publishing was a fatal mistake in terms of what he could have contributed and should have been able to contribute.

When he came up for tenure, there was a fight. Who could give him tenure based on zero? That’s not going to happen in the University of California. What they did was make him a Lecturer with Security of employment. That meant he had to teach twice as many courses as his colleagues and he would not get zip in the form of any support for research. Despite his inspiring role in so many people’s life’s, it was a sad story because he had important insights and still does.

Recently, however, Isao – as the oldest recipient – was awarded a Ph.D. from Cornell. His theses was on his work in the Central Valley over the last twenty years.

**Profile of Practice: Organizing Farmworkers, Creating Institutions**

I was able to get half-time lectureship at the Physics Department at Davis. Then I went to work on some political campaigns up here that lead to becoming a volunteer with the United Farmworkers Union. While I was at La Paz, the UFW and Chávez became aware that I knew a lot and could run a computer. I had done Fortran programming and had published journal articles based in theoretical physics. They had an IBM 360, which they did not know how to run. They didn’t even know how to turn it on. They were interested in having somebody who could run it, but I couldn’t because I had family responsibilities and commitments at Davis.

In my view, they had an even greater need for a research department. People who could understand agricultural trends, who were knowledgeable about agricultural economics. People who could help to develop the skills needed when you sat at the table and bargained with a business. The UFW was bargaining with businesses that have thousands of employees and hundreds of millions of dollars at stake. They have economic decisions they make. If you aren’t at that same level, how the hell are you
going to argue in favor of something. There was a disagreement around this in the Fall of '76. César didn’t see the need to have a research department. I was rather impudent in what I said and unhappy with what César said. When this possibility ended I continued to maintain that it was something that was clearly needed though I was not sure about how to go about filling that need.

Several of the people I met on the Prop 14 campaign, including Paul Barnett and Katherine Bertolucci, knew there was a need for research. Paul had been active in the UFW previously, working in their legal department. He had come to Davis to get a degree in Plant Science because he felt that was where he could contribute best. He was active around all the farmworker stuff and a knowledgeable guy. Katherine had a Master’s in Library Science from the University of Chicago. She knew how to organize information. She had heard me speak on the radio and called me at home asking to be a volunteer. The three of us had conversations about the need for research. I learned in the campaign that there is a real need for serious scholarship in the area of farm labor and agricultural economics in California from a progressive standpoint. The three of us decided to give it a shot.

The California Institute for Rural Studies was started in 1977 by Paul Barnett, Katherine Bertolucci and myself. Since the union did not want a research department, (but were interested in that work), we agreed to explore starting a research organization that focused on agriculture, farm labor, water policy, reclamation law and rural issues in California. As part of that exploration, we traveled around the state and met with key people regarding the following questions:

1. Was there a need for such an organization?
2. Would it compete with any existing organization?
3. What would be the key topics that the organization would focus on?

We spent six months answering those questions. We didn’t want to go out and start a serious organization, and compete for funds, if there were other groups who were doing the same work. Then there’s no point. During these six months, we met with knowledgeable people around California to see if there was a real need and purpose for a research organization.

The first place we go – Paul Taylor. We spent two days meeting with Paul Taylor in 1977. It was fabulous. Can you imagine what it was like to ask Paul Taylor everything you ever wanted to know? It was very special. The time with him was limited to maybe 3 or 4 hours a day. He was ill. He was walking with kind of a shuffle, but he was prompt. Right on time. Just full of life despite the physical limitations. He would tell us things like, “You ought to work on the reclamation issue. Did you know what they did in the Sacramento Valley? They used as the basis for the annual yield the highest value ever measured in the flow of the Sacramento River. Then they used that as the base for the amount of water that they should be allocated. I have an article on it!” His office was a total catastrophe. There were piles everywhere. He said, “Now I’m going to find that article.” And by God, he got up, went to some pile and pulled it out. “Here’s this article. I want you to read this.” He was a great mind.

Taylor was generous in sharing documents with us. He referred us to published papers and other materials with a focus on the acreage limitation law and what he considered to be the systematic violation of the intent of the 1902 Reclamation Act. We took that to heart and made it one of the principal focuses of our initial year’s work. He
gave clear instructions on where to find papers and field notes in the Bancroft library. We went to the Bancroft and spent several more days in his uncatalogued cartons. It was a fabulous treasure hunt, like kids in a candy store going through and finding all of these materials.

We discovered from our conversations with Paul Taylor and others that there was a great and real need for a research organization focused on agriculture and farm labor. The University of California was not adequately addressing these issues. And there was no other institution that was adequately addressing them. Labor unions have their own purpose and would not likely be interested in doing the work that we thought would be interesting as I learned with the UFW.

George Ballis was another person we visited. Since we were trying to create an organization that would do research on farm labor, rural poverty, agriculture, land use, reclamation policy, he was knowledgeable and experienced in these broader topics. Reclamation policy, however, was the only thing he was working on at that time. It was his thing and anything that we could do to help him would be great, but there wasn’t a chance of him helping with other stuff that we were interested in. Collaboration wasn’t possible because he was a total controller of everything that he did. I thought he was very effective in what he was doing but you either did his agenda or you didn’t work with him.

As an unexpected coincidence, the National Land for the People lawsuit against the Department of the Interior was won that same year in 1977. It led to the promulgation, for the first time, of regulations to implement reclamation law. George had an office in downtown Fresno and was living on the western edge of the city. He was kind enough to put us up. We had no money. We slept wherever we could find a place to sleep. I remember him saying, “OK, you guys can sleep out there.” There was this old bus that he used for his tours of the valley. We had our sleeping bags. I slept on the roof of the bus in George’s backyard.

The lawsuit was NLP vs. Andrus, who was then Secretary of the Interior in 1977. The federal court ruled in favor of National Land for People (NLP). It said that Interior had failed to promulgate regulations to enforce the reclamation law and that the absent regulations led to demonstrable harm. The demonstrable harm were the folks who were individuals named as plaintiffs in the lawsuit. These were farmers unable to get access to land in the Westlands or who otherwise demonstrated harm caused by the production and competition.

NLP had standing in court because George had recruited people who had some evidence of demonstrable harm caused by Westlands. The charge was a simple one – the government and landowners never complied with the damn law. The reason they hadn’t complied with the law is that Interior had never made regulations and therefore had never enforced any regulations. It was a brilliant lawsuit. It won in 1977. The federal court ruled in favor. We were all celebrating but were eventually outwitted by an alliance of the farmers and by the environmentalists around the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act.

We made reclamation policy and the 1977 court decision our initial focus. The NLP’s federal court case was mainly that the government had failed to promulgate regulations for the implementation of the 1902 Act with respect to the 160 acre limit so regulations would be promulgated as a consequence of the federal process. There were
hearings, a review period and a comment period. We made that process one of the first important focuses of our work. I remember coming to a huge meeting in the Sacramento fairgrounds. There were hundreds of farmers and advocates against the 160 acre limit. Three or four of us were on the other side. As happenstance would have it, I was the first one called to speak in support of the regulations.

My basic argument was that there were sound policy reasons why the benefits of federal water policy were intended to be shared as widely as possible. It would be improper from a public policy point of view to allow large landowners to gain the lion’s share of the benefits. In fact, small holders would be disadvantaged in the long run if the old policy was allowed to stand. Then I turned around and said, “Everybody who has looked at it indicates that under the proposed regulations people will be able to do just fine. The question is, how much greed will dictate what people decide to do? If you don’t like the rules, you don’t have to take the water! Nobody’s forcing you. You can get your own damn water.” You can imagine what that was like, the place went crazy. It was a chaotic scene. People were yelling and screaming. There was a total uproar in the hall when I spoke. It was unbelievable. That was our initially foray into this field.

After moving to Davis I also worked on the consequence of the widespread adoption of the second generation tomato harvesters. This led to a change in the industry. Crews of 16 to 20 workers were replaced by crews of 3 to 5 workers. People got stranded in ’75 and ’76. I became aware of this through the work in Woodland and the work with the union. In order to help set up a response I began to work collaboratively with the people who had a longer history than I working with tomato workers in the region. Part of the response was to set up a Farmworker’s Service Center in Woodland that was run by laid off workers. We mostly raised funds for it in Davis. We raised food. We raised clothing. Thanksgiving door-to-door – can you give? We raised one ton of food in one day that way. You do all of that stuff and you build relationships.

The Yolo Friends of the Farmworkers was an organization independent of CIRS, before CIRS, but CIRS was in our minds. Some of the people who were involved in it, people like Dick Johnston and Paul Barnett, saw the wisdom of continuing that work, but in a new way. We created a 501(c)4 membership organization, that would be a non-profit but not tax exempt, as a political organization to express the political demands that came out of responding to that situation. You have the tomato strike in ’74. In ’75, a few growers respond with the first trial of the new generation of tomato harvester – they work. ’76 they are widespread adopted. By ’77, the whole industry up here has got them. I don’t know how many workers were displaced; some say 10,000, other people say 20,000. We don’t know.

The response was already building in terms of what we were doing though: first, the Yolo Friends of the Farmworkers, then California Agrarian Action Project. The California Agrarian Action Project was created under the 501(c)4 structure – membership; monthly meetings; Spanish and English; with workers, students and other folk like me involved. Then, parallel to that, is the idea of the Institute for Rural Studies that formally gets incorporated in 1977 as a 501(c)3. The vision was two separate organizations; one a political action organization, the other a think tank and a research institute.
I was adamant in saying that if we are going to do this in the atmosphere of Reaganomics, and the politics of that time, it had to be totally clean. In other words, there could be paid staff at one organization, but they could not work as paid staff with the other organization. The Boards of Directors had to have no overlap whatsoever. They could not have any cross subsidies of any kind. If anything, the political organization could support the non-political one but not the other way around. Paul and I agreed on that. I became the “Executive Director” for the California Institute for Rural Studies and he became the staff person for the California Agrarian Action Project.

Then two miracles happened. One was a woman by the name of Billie Boukas, who was a land owner. I never knew her actual, given first name. I only knew her as Billie. A landowner with a couple of thousand acres of sheep ranch. She had a complicated financial problem, a tax problem. She wanted to find out if I could come up with a suggestion of how to help her tax problem, which essentially involved her making a tax exempt donation.

I don’t know the whole story. She had all kinds of other resources and was in her sixties. I told her that we’d started this California Institute for Rural Studies. It’s a non-profit, tax-exempt, dedicated to working on social justice and farm labor issues. She said, “I’d like to donate to the California Institute for Rural Studies. I will have my bankers call you.”

So I get this call from the trust department of Wells Fargo. This gentleman says, “The California Institute for Rural Studies has been gifted 100 shares of stock in the Wells Fargo Bank and 100 shares of stock in United Technologies,” a big defense contractor.

And I said, “What to you mean?”

“Well, what do you want to do?”

“Sell! Give us the money.” We got $25,000! $25,000 appeared just like that, like magic. It just came.

Independent of that, Paul had put together a grant proposal to a branch of the Department of Labor in a program under job training or job displacement. Paul found it in the federal register and decided that the displacement of workers due to agricultural technology would qualify and that there should be a study of the problem. He put it in a proposal, submitted by the California Institute for Rural Studies, to do this study. What do you know, we got the grant. It was another $12,000, I don’t remember, maybe it was $15,000. We got the damn grant to do the work, unlike the Boukas deal which was “do whatever you want.”

We divided the work up and eventually published “Labor’s Dwindling Harvest,” which was a lengthy document. It is the first publication of CIRS. I have a copy but it’s not available on the internet. We did the research and published it. One of my goals is to get everything that is not available up and on the website. Hence “How much is enough?” is now there. There will be more.

I was volunteer staff nearly all of that time. I was earning money teaching physics at UCD. The CIRS money was for Paul and Katherine. Both of them were working for CIRS on the research projects. For the period of time that there was money for the (c)4, Paul worked only for the (c)4. After that money ran out, we got the grant from the Department of Labor, then he went over to CIRS as staff and volunteers at California Agrarian Action Project. Katherine, first time hired at CIRS, on the
Department of Labor deal, is a volunteer at the Agrarian Action Project. During that
time I worked as a volunteer at both places. They kept timesheets. Every day they had to
fill out the timesheet, otherwise no check. Exactly what did you do? When did you start
work? When did you end work? How many hours? All very meticulous. That is how
CIRS got started. The first time I decided to get paid was for a study of large scale
farming in California that became the publication “Getting Bigger.” I used 1/3 of the
Boukas money, about $8,000, for one year on the payroll to do that.

Another important event early on was the ’74 tomato strike. It was largest single
labor action in the history of the Sacramento Valley agriculture. I became involved in
the UFW because of people I met here in the community who had been active in the 1974
tomato strike, like Al Rojas, one of the strike leaders. All of the tomato production was
shut down and it was not initiated by the United Farmworkers Union. It was initiated as
a spontaneous labor action in the summer by folks from Michoacán in Stockton, who
worked in the fresh tomato harvest, primarily in the San Joaquin Valley. They were
supportive of the UFW but they were not under UFW leadership or direction. The people
in processing tomatoes up here heard about it or knew people who were involved in it
and they decided to act. Before you knew it, the center of the processing tomato industry
in California was all on strike - Sutter County, Solano County, Yolo County, Sacramento
County, all the way up through Colusa and southern Glenn County. At one point, there
were 1,000 people on the Yolo-Sacramento Bypass levee holding banners – the black
eagle on red banner – waving them to people driving by. Within a few days, the UFW
came in and began to give shape and leadership to the strike by trying to get contracts.

With the strike just over, this is when I began to do work in Woodland rather than
Davis. I met leaders of the Hispanic community in Woodland. Then in ’76, the UFW
launched its campaign for Proposition 14 to put the California Labor Relations Act into
the California Constitution. This would make it politically invulnerable to changes from
the Legislature. The reason that was initiated was that funding for the Agricultural
Labor Relations Board (ALRB) had been insufficient to operate it even for a year. When
funding ran out and the Legislature refused to give additional money, the ALRB offices
were closed. All of the pending union representation elections were shut down. All of the
unfair labor practices cases were suspended because of the lack of ALRB staff. Nothing
was happening. It was an impasse. So this initiative was a brilliant move by César. I
became a spokesperson for the campaign in Northern California - on radio, on television,
public debates - because of the relationships I’d built and the connections with the UFW.
I also did trainings in agricultural economics at the UFW headquarters in La Paz. In
Marshall Ganz’s book, you’ll read an acknowledgement to me for teaching agricultural
economics because they didn’t have anybody on staff at that time who knew it.

Just before the election, the campaign succeeded in getting the Legislature to re-
fund the elections and get things going again. The conservatives relented and granted
Legislative funding. But this undermined the whole argument that we were making. We
were saying everything had stopped and we needed to take this out of the political
process. The UFW had also overreached in the campaign. They put things into the
Constitutional proposal that were never in the original bill, which was foolish because it
made it harder to defend. Prop 14 was defeated overwhelmingly by the voters but at
least things at the ALRB were going again.
After Prop 14, our focus became the local displacement of all of these workers due to the widespread adoption of the second generation tomato harvest machine. The question was what should be done about it. So we started the Farmworkers Service Center in Woodland to provide direct assistance to displaced workers, and we were doing a lot of political work. Then the California Rural Legal Assistance got interested. Ralph Abascal, one of the CRLA founders and the guru of that organization, had always been interested in the land grant university question.

The research priorities lawsuit was Ralph’s idea. He felt that this was an opportunity to leverage the land grant university in the direction of serving these populations. CRLA didn’t do the lawsuit by themselves because they saw our organization having the best mix of ideas. We’re talking about organic farming. We’re talking about sustainable agriculture, though not by that name. We’re talking about farm labor. We’re talking about rural poverty. We’re talking about land ownership.

He said to me, “This is an opportunity to push some levers. Let’s see how far we can go.”

I said, “We can’t do anything in litigation unless our members, who are Spanish-and English-speaking, agree. We have monthly meetings. You have to talk about it with them.”

CRLA, to their credit, came to the meeting. Ralph with two CRLA lawyers – I don’t recall who came with him, but it might have been Bill Hoerger and Cynthia Rice. Ralph is of Hispanic origin himself and speaks Spanish so the meeting went well. This was probably in ’78. At the meeting they presented what they wanted to do, which was a lawsuit against the University of California for failure to serve the needs of small-scale farmers, farm laborers and the rural poor.

The workers asked, “Are you going to get money?”

I said, “No, there will be no money for me. I will not be getting money from working on this lawsuit.” Other people said the same.

Then they said, “Will we get money?”

We said, “No, this is not about money for people. It’s about changing the way the government works so that workers will be treated better, so that farmers will be able to continue to farm in a way that is good for everyone.” The workers were looking everybody over. Another of the workers’ demands was to have the ability to farm themselves. Later, we found some land where they could farm. They eventually got it under a lease agreement with a state agency that we identified. In the end, they agreed.

The lawsuit was filed January 17, 1979. The California Agrarian Action Project became the principal plaintiff of the litigation. CRLA found 13 individual farmworkers through their own networks of client services who agreed to sign on as individual plaintiffs. Paul Barnett eventually went to work for CRLA as the legal worker to help prepare the lawsuit. The trial was in Alameda Superior Court. We prevailed. It was a great publicized victory. We go to Appeals Court in the State of California, because the University appealed. We won in Appeals Court, which was not hailed as a big victory; it’s just the way it went. Then we go to the California State Supreme Court. Meanwhile, and this is a ten-year process, the California State Supreme Court has been packed by Reagan and the conservatives. They throw it out and there was no real basis for appeal beyond that. The lawsuit cost a million dollars.
We had clear demands. These demands were not an end to mechanization, which is how the university characterized it. Rather, it was about the workers sharing in the benefits of the improved technology, if there was going to be mechanization. We pointed to the ILGWU (longshore workers) mechanization agreement. When the longshore industry mechanized, some of the profits were earmarked to serve workers for retraining and for other needs. That’s what we wanted. There were patents, increased profits and lower costs. Workers should get a share of that. That’s all we asked; not an end to mechanization but a sharing of the benefits. Second, if mechanization research went forward, we wanted the university to serve the actual needs of workers, farmers, the rural poor, and especially the small farmers.

Along the way, in the ten year period of the litigation, what happened at the university? The Small Farm Center, the Sustainable Agriculture and Education Program, more attention to community needs as the university describes it, and all mechanization research stopped. The university was frightened by what we were doing.

Scholarship in the Struggle: Research for Action

One of the earliest works produced by Villarejo and CIRS was a booklet titled Research for Action in 1980. This method of public records inquiry was reminiscent of how private detectives or investigative journalists researched a case or story. A “guidebook” for activists, it highlighted a method that was time consuming, meticulous and explicitly sought social change as its goal. Just as Villarejo may have argued with Cesar Chávez, the booklet’s introduction made the case for the approach:

This guidebook is intended to help activists who are working for social change. Community based organizations often find that they need basic information about the interests of individuals or businesses who are involved in a particular dispute. In many cases, the needed information is available but it is not used because of a lack of familiarity with where to look or what to ask for . . . .

The experience represented in the material presented in this guidebook includes certain general conclusions about how information can be used to promote social change. One of the lessons is that effective action is enhanced by the clear identification of the different, conflicting interests in a particular struggle.
The material presented in this guidebook is designed to acquaint activists with the techniques used in public records investigations (Villarejo 1980b: iii).

The pedagogical intent – to create change for social justice in political struggle – was explicit, perhaps because Villarejo’s scholarship was conducted for CIRS, outside of the nominally neutral political positions of a research university. Villarejo went further, unlike Taylor, Goldschmidt and MacCannell, but similar to Galarza, his scholarship was not a product for institutional consumption but was applied social science and tool for citizen action. He did not assume that public institutions like universities, federal bureaucracies or the court system would alone realize the research findings:

> It is vital to realize that information, no matter how accurate, will not, by itself produce social change. Only the action of hundreds, or thousands, of informed people acting together has the potential to transform societies. Investigation helps to clarify the real interests of different parties in a particular dispute. But organized groups of people are needed if one hopes to challenge the existing power structure in a community. (Villarejo 1980b: iii)

Villarejo’s premise was that scientific “truth” alone does not create change, people utilizing and breathing life into findings did. Similarly, the booklet itself was a product of “collective” political engagement, which Villarejo (1980b: iv) summarized as an approach to research:

> First, in every issue that comes up, try to determine who will benefit if each possible outcome were to occur. It is a lesson of experience that behind every controversy there are conflicting interests. One purpose of investigative work is to pinpoint those interests and educate the community about their nature.
> Second, document your statements before going public.
> Third, try to determine if any of the interests involved in a controversy are among the types of businesses regulated by government agencies. These reports are usually the most complete sources of information.
> Fourth, use the information uncovered to organize people.
The purpose of his scholarship was designed to mobilize and empower people.

The table of contents in *Research for Action* represented the multiple facets of this investigative approach. It began with a number of actual case studies that illustrated how to use the method, then moved into the various processes needed to acquire public information from various bureaucracies and agencies.

Chapter 1  Research for Action: Case Studies

Land for Farmworkers  
Keeping Yolo General Hospital Open  
Organizing Farmworkers at Paloma Ranch  
Do Public Funds Build Privately Owned Nuclear Power Plants?  
Agricultural Holdings of University of California Regents

Chapter 2  Disclosure Statements Filed with Government Agencies

Federal Agencies
[Securities and Exchange Commission; Federal Energy Regulatory Commission; Federal Communications Commission; Interstate Commerce Commission]  

State Agencies
[Secretary of State; Department of Corporations; Public Utilities Commission; State Department of Insurance; Department of Real Estate; Local Agencies; County Recorder; County Clerk; County Tax Assessor; City Clerk]

Chapter 3  How to Investigate Corporations, Partnerships and Sole Proprietorships

[Corporations; Partnerships; Sole Proprietorships]

Chapter 4  Types of Businesses Required to Make Special Disclosure Reports

[Air Line operating companies; Banks (commercial); Broadcast companies, including parent companies; Charitable organizations; Farmers; Farm land owners (domestic); Farm land owners (foreign); Foundations; Insurance companies; Livestock grazing permit holders (government lands); Natural Gas Pipe Line companies (interstate); Newspaper and periodical publishing companies; Public Utility holding companies (electric and gas); Public Utility operating companies (interstate); Railroad Operating companies; Real estate sales personnel and brokers; Real estate subdividers; Telephone and telegraph operating companies; Trucking companies (interstate); Trust companies.]

Chapter 5  Real Estate

[Ownership and Transfer of Property; Mortgages and Deeds of Trust; Mineral Rights; Lease Agreements; Legal Descriptions of Real Property; Title Search]

Chapter 6  Public Officials and Lobbyists

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Just as MacCannell’s macrosocial accounting could still be useful, so Villarejo’s public records searches could be; however, both scholars mentioned that technological advances, such as GIS or internet searches, have rendered them obsolete by providing new ways to get the information.

**Profile of Practice: Real Political Education - On The Ground**

_The structure of California agriculture always interested me. This was conceptually similar to my early work on stock ownership and who owned Cuba. We really did not have good knowledge of this industry. There was a lot of rhetoric - George Ballis was the master of the rhetoric - some of which was true, but much of it was a stretch. A lot of it, like the land ownership study that the Nadar people did in California, “Power and Land in California,” by R.L. Fellmuth (1971) talks about data, but much of the data in there is from 40 years earlier. Never verified, a lot of it rumor. I realized that there was this gigantic hole – here was an industry, several times bigger than the movie industry, but undocumented in terms of its structure. I set about trying to craft a more accurate description of the structure of California agriculture with a focus on large-scale farming._

_I found an error in the Census of Ag, which was an opportunity to make a more substantial contribution. If you read that paper, you will find out about the error and the correction, which really changes the picture. I also found something that was a surprise for me and changed some of the discourse about California agriculture. I found that among the two hundred largest farm operations in the state, very few were outside, non-agricultural businesses investing in California agriculture. Most of the large-scale businesses were multi-generational farm families that had settled here and had become successful and had purchased more land over time or leased land and had expanded._

_Among the biggest farm in Yolo County, for example, were Heidrick Farms with about 21,000 irrigated acres. They were descendants of German immigrants. I tracked them in some detail. They started out with relatively small plots of land. They had_
figured out how to do tomato and rice farming and successfully expanded those businesses here, mostly on leased land. The biggest one was Anderson Farms. John Anderson’s dad was from a family that had settled here from Europe. They started out with 80 acres. He figured out how to put together limited partnerships with investments from urban folk but for which he or his corporations were the general partner. He leased those lands and used those leases to go get tomato machines. He became the biggest tomato farmer in Yolo County. Real Horatio Alger stories.

They were astute business people, who were not representative of the Dole Food Company or Conagra, the big bad guys. It was a shocker because quite a few of the environmental activists or other folks who had some claim on agricultural policy were just uninformed. What they were throwing out there as rhetoric was not substantiated by the facts. There were some non-agricultural businesses that had owned and operated farming businesses here, but relatively few. Many of those who had come in had gone out because they found that they couldn’t do it. In fact, some of them had had to change their practices as a result of what they learned about how to do farming here. Tennaco is a good example of that. They just couldn’t pull it off. Today even Dole recognizes it. They partner with family farmers because they want people who are willing to walk the rows and really care.

They structure the operations so that their partners share 50/50 in the profits and 50/50 if there are loses. They are profit incentive managers similar to the guys on Wall Street who sell stocks and bonds. They share the profits. Dole has 21 different lettuce growers in California with whom they partner. Dole does the marketing and selling. They also send in crews who do the harvesting, packing and shipping, dealing with the big labor end of the deal. But they want somebody who really cares about the plants, who makes sure that everything is alright. Nobody likes that understanding.

In “Getting Bigger” I went to every county in the state where there is any agriculture at all and spent several days doing public records searches. I got everybody who was participating in the USDA programs. I wrote on cards that showed how much was owned and how much was leased. The whole operation, name and address - everything. It was tough data collection. I ended up with 55,000 cards. I managed to persuade my wife that I could do this and keep track of the household. It all worked in the end as I went around the state. When I published it, John Anderson, one of the biggest farmers in this region, thought it was great. He bought fifty copies at face value. The Farm Bureau were pleased. They thought that it contradicted the rhetoric from the critics of Big Agriculture. They had me on their radio and television programs. Farm Bureau had me speak at various places, which I was happy to do because the work was the first accurate information on the topic. It named names of the 200 biggest farms. Who they were. What kind of structure – corporation, partnerships, sole proprietorship - all the basics.

These farms were primarily in places like Kern County, the Salinas Valley, some in the Imperial Valley area, but also some surprising ones like up here. Nobody knew about the big farms up here. 21,000 irrigated acres, that’s a lot. Anderson, at that time, was up to about 56,000 acres, not just in Yolo but in other places. These were very large businesses and nobody had ever heard about them.

Some funny things happened. I sent a form out to each farm to fill out asking about whether the information was accurate or not. Most of them never sent anything
back, but a few did. I did that for the sake of accuracy. It was important to ask the businesses that I was naming whether the information about them was accurate. Since it was intended to be published, I felt that they should have an opportunity to rebut or correct it.

So Joe Gallo’s wife calls me. He is the youngest of the Gallo brothers, who got shut out of the inheritance, but he started his own business, Gallo Cheese. So, the wife calls me and says, “Your numbers are just not right!”

And I say, “I apologize. Please correct them.”

“Well, it’s way too small. Let me tell you about all the stuff we’ve got.” She gives me a complete rundown of everything, which of course I put in. There was a little bit of this ego thing. They wanted to show how big they really were.

It was a real surprise to me how that was received. It was the best selling CIRS publication in that whole period. We printed 500 copies and it was gone overnight. It went fast and got a great deal of attention. It clarified some perceptions of agriculture. Now, some of the information in there wasn’t quite right and some of it was dead wrong. But, by and large, the error in the census was a true error and I figured out how to correct it, and then the identification of the 200 biggest was mostly right. A couple of errors, not many. The full question of who are these businesses got discussed in a whole new way and changed the discourse.

Later, the CIRS report “New Lands for Agriculture” came out in the context of the fight around the peripheral canal, I think it was ’78 or ’79. It came out because of all this work that I’d been doing on structure of agriculture. Various groups, including church groups, got interested in the California Institute for Rural Studies. Several of them had me speak at their annual meetings. They asked, “Is there something you can do that would be supportive of family farming that would be worthy of some small support?” We aren’t talking about major money, just a couple of thousand dollars. I said I’d think about it.

Then I happened to learn, through the investigative work I’d done for “Getting Bigger,” about Prudential Insurance setting up this huge tract of olive groves in western Kern County. Five thousand acres of olive groves. I immediately looked at the olive production – they were going to break the price, basically that is what they were going to do. I then looked around for other places where olives were being grown. The main area was up in Corning where there are a lot of small olive producers - 2, 3, 4 acres, 6 acres.

Soon, I heard about this guy who was speaking about this terrible water deal that was going on. I went up and talked to him at his place. He was Italian with about ten acres. He started telling me all about what was going on, the whole story of olive business. I said, “Let’s figure out who they are getting the water from.” We found that they were getting the water in Kern County from the State Water Project. I knew, “This is it! This is the deal.”

A couple of work study students working at the Institute for Rural Studies constructed all of the detailed records of landownership in the water districts that were getting state water. They did all that work and put together great data. Then this student, Jude Chrisfield, got interested in it. She turned out to be a film maker and put together a film interviewing some of the people we had found. We went down and filmed in front of the big olive groves, then over to the Early California Industries olive
processing plant. Then I discovered a special deal in reading through the SEC filings for the companies. Prudential had made a deal with Early California Industries to be their sole processor. All kinds of detail. It was classic investigative reporting. The “New Lands for Agriculture” piece became the way in which that information got disseminated.

This scholarship is a different level of investigative reporting. I’m an empiricist. I’ve got to start with the factual information. Some investigative reporting starts with the discovery that something has happened then they find a cause as to why it happened. In other words, what is the causal relationship? They look for the cause, then develop the investigation around finding more information to support their idea. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. The reason it sometimes doesn’t work is that instead of looking at the entire picture to inductively derive from the available information, they begin with an allegation and pursue that, like an attorney, looking for the evidence that supports that link. That is a shortcoming in some investigative reporting. It leads to mistakes. Probably one of the biggest that we know about in Ag was the allegations that Alar caused illnesses among workers and children. That wasn’t happening, certainly not in the way it was represented on national television. There was a misrepresentation and the advocates didn’t care. They did horrible damage to the apple industry. It took years to recover.

Being an empiricist means that you look for facts on the ground. You talk to everybody on all sides of an issue. You look for all available evidence on an issue. Then you try to extract from that a version of the truth, what you are able to gather and see. You put that out as a hypothesis to test and see where it leads. That is the only way rigorous science can proceed. The physics training I got as a scientist is what has been the guiding set of rules by which I’ve done work outside of physics - look at the evidence and move from there. If you look at the study of stock ownership and the control of corporations that’s what that is all about. You look for the piece on Cuba, that’s what that’s all about. You look at “New Lands for Agriculture,” that’s what that is all about. If you look at “Getting Bigger,” that’s what that is all about.

In training activists, I tried to convey this in a publication called “Research for Action.” How do you find the evidence? If the evidence is not objective, can you find other evidence that bears on it. It’s got to be rigorous. This publication is pre-internet; it’s obsolete now, but the theory there is exactly the same. Is the evidence objective? One of my labor-organizer friends said it best. He came to me and asked me for help some months ago. I was glad to give it. He said, “We always go to Don because he will do anything for the labor movement except lie.” It was a nice compliment – a measure of how I am viewed by people who know that there are skills that they can avail themselves of. They wanted me to do this because they knew there would be a level of credibility that went with it that was important for their purpose.

Recently, I got a call from people in New York who are trying to get the state’s labor law changed to have an Agricultural Labor Relations Act type legislation. This is with a group called Rural and Migrant Ministry. Apparently they have been pushing in the legislature this last session to put agriculture under the existing labor laws of the state. They asked if I would be willing to testify. I had them explain to me exactly what they wanted and who was behind them. I thought that conversation went well. They then contacted me to say that they had spoken to the chair of the committee about my being able to testify. For whatever reason, the chair of the committee decided that I should not
testify. It is an ag committee and a pro-ag guy is chair of the committee. So they asked me to write something up.

I said, “By the way, why did you decide that I should come and testify?”

“We checked with the United Farmworkers Union. They said you are the best guy in terms of being able to give objective, accurate information about what is going on.” Now, I have been critical of the UFW, even publicly. We’ve had some spats. But that is their view. It was interesting that even in New York State, when they wanted somebody to come in with accurate information about the impact of an Agricultural Labor Relations Act in California, and what that meant in terms of the industry, that they turned to me to get reliable, accurate information, which was even endorsed by the UFW.

I later wrote a paper called, “How Much Is Enough?” It is now available on the CIRS website. This paper was supported by the Ford Foundation, published in ’85 or ’86. It was a study of land ownership, focused primarily on the ’82 regulations and whether they were being complied with.

The 1982 Reclamation Reform Act was the undoing of the regulations and a brilliant move by the other side, perhaps it was the J.G. Boswell Company lawyers. You can probably find out more in the excellent book “The King of California.” They figured out that federal CEQA [California Environmental Quality Act] could be used to require an Environmental Impact Study on the consequences of the proposed regulations. So they went to court right after the NLP won the case and invoked federal CEQA, the Federal Environmental Quality Act, to require that there be an Environmental Impact Statement prepared around the possible implementation of these regulations. It put a hold on the regulations until the Environmental Impact was completed. It resulted in no action being taken by the federal government for several years.70

The origins of the ’82 law are in the regulations that were promulgated, the unfortunate conclusions of the Environmental Impact Statement and a decision made by both the big farm interests and the environmental folks, like the Natural Resources Defense Council, to join together to support the ’82 law. The environmentalists wanted higher prices for water to decrease water use. Their other agenda was to take water away from agriculture because agriculture is wasting water. The big farm interests wanted the higher the limit the better. The ’82 law was a compromise crafted with the support of Democrats and Republicans.

What did the ’82 law do? The ’82 law said that you could choose to remain under the original 1902 law or you could elect to go under the new law. If you elect to go under the new law, there were new rules. First, they got the compromise of 960 acres. If you had land ownership in excess of 960 acres, you are going to have to pay full cost for the water on the excess land. You aren’t going to be forced to sell it, which had been the rules of the prior law. Second, if you elect to go under the ’82 law, then you are absolved from all obligations under prior law, including the residency requirement. Those obligations for Boswell and all the other big landowners were the sale of their land on a recordable contract. Prior to the ’82 law, they had entered into recordable contracts that obligated them to sell excess land at pre-irrigation prices within 10 years of the date of that contract. This obligation was given away under the ’82 law in order to protect the interests of these big landowners. Third, the hammer clause said if you lease

70 This request likely instigated the OTA studies that Harbridge House conducted and on which MacCannell was hired as a research consultant.
more than 160 acres then you have to pay full price on the excess land that you lease but leasing is unlimited. The lease of land up to 160 acres at subsidized prices was in addition to the 960. You also don’t have to own any land at all – you can lease as much as you want, but only the first 160 will get subsidized water.

So it was possible to get 1,120 acres of fully subsidized water but there are other loopholes in the law. If you created a trust – a fiduciary agreement that basically allows for land to be held in parcels of any size - reclamation law would apply only to the proportionate share of each beneficiary. Under the new law, this meant eligibility was allocated not to the trust as a whole but to the individual beneficiaries of the trust. So, if you, Paul Taylor, Trudy and I form a trust to hold 3,000 acres, then each of us, with a quarter share, would have 750 acres. The Boswell’s had the Westhaven Trust, which owned all the land in what was known as the Boston Ranch, 23,000 acres, and guess what, the largest single landholding in terms of the beneficiary ownership was . . . 960 acres! J. G. Boswell the second and each of the beneficiaries had 960 acres or less. My goodness! What a coincidence.

I talked to Dan Beard, who became the guy who was responsible for enforcement. He told me, these are not his exact words but it is pretty damn close, he said, “We got snookered by a bunch of country lawyers. We never knew.” George Miller said the same thing to me. When I talked to Rick Wartzman, for his book on the Bozwell Company, he said, “It was a done deal. The people who were at the table, negotiating for ‘the good guys,’ were not George Ballis. It was not the people who really knew how it worked. It was people who didn’t know anything about agriculture and who had not had much direct experience with the way in which agriculture really works.”

The passing of the ’82 law was a crushing defeat for George. He never expected it. If you ever get a chance, look for a documentary film called “The Battle of Westlands,” which tells the story from his point of view. Sandra Nichols did it. It was on CBS. Anyway, the ’82 law was a total surprise to George. It gets passed by Congress. He’s crushed. His whole raison d’être was gone. So what did he do? He persuaded the foundation that supported him over the years on this fight to give him enough money to start this place up in the hills. He went up there and grows weeds. I don’t know what the hell else he’s doing. I think he was totally crushed. It’s hard to lose.

All the good things he was doing in terms of political education about land ownership and how the system really works have been lost unfortunately. He used to do these tours, what he called “reality tours.” He would get city people to come out and pay $25 and he would give an all day tour of the whole west side of the valley. Then take them over to the east side and talk with them about what was really going on in agriculture in California. It was real political education – on the ground. You’d meet workers. You’d meet farmers. You’d see barren land – as far as you could see - nothing going on. Or maybe cotton – as far as you could see. Then he would go to Mas Masamoto’s place or someone like that and see a family farm. George knew all of the players. He knew the valley well.

I didn’t know much about agriculture going in but I knew enough to know that the UFW didn’t know enough. Paul Barnett agreed. He had been part of the legal department that had been dismantled ultimately by César, which is all explained in Miriam Pawel’s book, “The Union of Their Dreams.” Things were going bad. After the loss of the grape contracts, the pitched battles around the lettuce contracts, the loss of
Prop 14, and the political struggles around control of the Board, César became paranoid. I guess that is the best way to describe it, with some justification, since there were threats against his life.

Part of that meant he wanted to take more individual control over everyone – every aspect of the organization. Some of the control questions had come from the fights that had occurred in the Salinas Valley where independent farmworker leadership had evolved and were in disagreement with César. Those folks were expelled from the union. Then other things happened, like when Philip Vera Cruz, the last remaining top leader of the Filipinos in the UFW, verbally attacked César for going to the Philippines to embrace Marcos. César called him “My brother.” It was really ugly. Philip was then expelled from the UFW. Philip Vera Cruz was expelled from the UFW! Can you imagine what an insult?

A lot of bad things were happening. The UFW’s legal department was led by Jerry Cohn, one of the most able labor lawyers in the United States in the late 70’s. He had built up a strong legal department based in Salinas. They were terrific. They had a number of lawyers and legal workers like Paul and others who were smart, capable people. But César said, “Instead of being salaried employees, you are going to become volunteers for $5 a week plus room and board. And you are all going to move to La Paz. We will feed you. We will house you. We will cloth you. We will provide medical. But you are going to become volunteers like everyone else. We cannot have people who are highly educated white people having privileges that the rest of the volunteers don’t have.”

Jerry said, “César, you’re an idiot. You have probably the highest paid legal help in terms of value that has ever been put together for a labor organization and you are paying us a penny on the dollar in terms of the real cost to you. Now you want to bust that up? We are not moving.”

And César says, “If you’re not moving, then there’s no more legal department.”

Jerry then said, “If that’s the way you want it, that’s the way it’s going to be. I will see through the cases we are now carrying. I will let people know. Then we will fade away. We are not going to make a public spectacle about it because it is not worth it, both for the workers nor for you. It is out of respect for the workers and for you that we will just go quietly into the night.” And they did.

By ’79, the whole legal department was gone. There were no lawyers working for the UFW. When the ’79 strike happens, they had to go to LA to get lawyers from the Chicano political networks to come work on the strikes that were going on in lettuce. It was a catastrophe.

Scholarship in the Struggle: Investigating California Agribusiness

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71 Villarejo notes that the quotes from this conversation are paraphrasing his understanding of these historic conversations.
Even if the UFW did not see the need for a research department, Villarejo and others were undeterred in promoting the role scholars would play in the valley’s continued political struggles over rural community life. The lack of interest of the union and barriers to working with universities necessitated the creation of an independent institution for scholarship. The California Institute for Rural Studies was such an institution, a non-profit designed to understand rural society and agricultural economics for the benefit of politically engaged citizens and community organizers. Its mission evolved into this later statement:

CIRS is the only non-profit organization in California with a mission to conduct public interest research that strengthens social justice and increases the sustainability of California’s rural communities. Our research informs public policy and action for social change while providing a fact-based foundation for organizations and individuals working to ameliorate rural injustice. While our commitment to the scientific method is at the foundation of our credibility, we recognize that inescapable role that values play in shaping the fundamental questions that researchers pose. Our philosophy of sciences is therefore based on the principle that scientific inquiry should consciously serve the long-term public interest.72

The purpose is inherently educational, linking policy and action for those “working to ameliorate rural injustice.” Just as Villarejo’s (1980b) study of research methods made clear, this scholarship would be research for action. The knowledge that CIRS produced was meant to be directly pertinent to changing Californian society. By expanding the duration and scope of its purpose over “the long-term public interest” and basing its research on a “fact-based foundation” and the scientific method, CIRS was insulated to some degree from charges of bias or propagandizing while protecting its public purpose and the validity of its work.

Since the social science conducted at CIRS was explicitly designed to affect powerful economic interests by promoting the livelihoods of the state’s most destitute residents, its methods were different than those of many qualitative scholars. These methods were based on empirical social science, yet had the critical tone of investigative journalism. Villarejo’s pedagogy was therefore perhaps more apparent than MacCannell’s macrosocial accounting because the purpose of his scholarship was more explicit and specific. Knowledge production was not global in scope, but a tool for organizing. CIRS studies were usually not published in academic journals, so they were not hindered by the high rhetoric of particular academic disciplines. Rather, the studies were sometimes referred to as “reports” that fulfilled the requirements of their various funding sources but also were designed as accessible and affordable scholarship conducted in public interest. These studies were posted free of charge on the CIRS website (www.cirsinc.org) and marketed directly at the CIRS office or through the mail.

To explicate the lessons of this research, I will review three CIRS studies that Villarejo wrote or co-authored: New Lands for Agriculture (Villarejo, Crisfield and White 1981), How Much Is Enough? (Villarejo 1986) and Missed Opportunities – Squandered Resources (Villarejo and Redmond 1988). All three involve themes that the other scholars included in this study researched, including California’s water policy, landholding patterns and the industrialization of agriculture. Of particular importance, Villarejo detailed a stage set beyond 1982 and the reform of reclamation law. Though the loss of this law’s land reform statutes crippled a leverage point used to defend democracy and equity in California, CIRS scholarship continued the political engagement in rural areas, though from an even more eroded legal and discursive foundation.
New Lands For Agriculture, written by Villarejo with Jude Crisfield and Phyllis White (1981), was a report on effects of the California State Water Project (SWP) on small farmers. The report illustrated different pedagogical approaches than work by university-based scholars. On the first page, Villarejo, Crisfield and White (1986) identified church group’s as the project’s funders. In addition, CIRS sold the report. They were scrupulous enough to even request the California sales tax. The organization had an entrepreneurial disposition since it could not rely upon public resources. This, in turn, made CIRS more responsive to immediate funding opportunities and community-identified needs.

The New Lands study compared how State Water Project (SWP) water supplies impacted California agriculture. Family farmers such as Les Melvill, a small olive farmer with a 48 acre grove, were compared with large-scale agribusiness like the 5,000 acre McCarthy olive ranch owned by Prudential Insurance Company. SWP water was moved from northern California, near the Sacramento Valley, to southern California’s cities and the San Joaquin Valley. This water transfer represented the differing agricultural systems in the Central Valley where small-scale farming was more indicative of the north and east, while large-scale agriculture occurred in the south and western areas. It was a double loss for the north of the state as a natural resources was exported to the economic detriment of its small scale family farmers.

The State Water Project was passed by the legislature in 1959, a year after the U.S. Supreme Court’s Ivanhoe vs McCracken decision threatened to impose reclamation acreage limitations and residency requirements on agribusiness operations. Recall that Paul Taylor directly attributed SWP passage to the court decision and its threat to
agribusiness interests. A general election vote ratified the sale of bonds to fund the project, including construction of the Oroville Dam and the California Aqueduct. The *New Lands* report pointed out that water deliveries started in 1968 with 63% going to the San Joaquin Valley. While only 24% of water deliveries went to Southern California, these urban centers bore 70% of SWP payments. The San Joaquin Valley, subsidized at public expense, made only 13.5% of project payments.

Water from the SWP went to some of the most concentrated, industrialized farms in California. Sixty two percent of the water deliveries went to five water districts on the west side and southern end of the valley (Villarejo et. al. 1981). The CIRS report identified 479 owners in the five water districts whose land parcels were 20 acres or more. Eight of these landowners owned 59% of the land or 227,545 acres. Characteristic of Villarejo’s research, these “Big Eight” were identified:

- Chevron USA, Inc., which was a subsidiary of Standard Oil Co. of California.
- Tejon Ranch Co., whose largest stockholder, with 25% ownership interest, was the Times Mirror Co., owner of the Los Angeles Times (a leading proponent of the SWP).
- Getty Oil Co., which leased most of its holdings to independent farm operations.
- Shell Oil Co. (none of its farmland in the area would be productive without SWP water deliveries).
- McCarthy Joint Venture A, a partnership with Prudential Insurance Co. of America, which owned 75% on the company.
- Blackwell Land Co., a company formed by international bankers and owned by multinational companies from England (Midhurst Corp., a subsidiary of S. Pearson and Son), Switzerland (Les Fils Dreyfus), Luxemburg (Unifin, a subsidiary of IFI Int’l), and Japan (Mitsubishi Corp.).
- Tenneco, Inc., with its landholdings owned by its subsidiary, Tennaco West, Inc.
- Southern Pacific Land Co., which was the state’s biggest private landowner and leased farmland to independent farming operations.

Of the remaining landowners, besides the eight largest, many were not completely separate enterprises, for example 35 landowners of 14,000 acres shared the same business
address. In essence, the report found that SWP water primarily flowed to the largest agribusinesses in the state.

There were multiple financial dividends to landowners from SWP water deliveries, particularly for the larger operations. The most evident was the increase in land values, which went from $50 per acre prior to water deliveries to an average of $2,000 per acre after eight years of SWP water (Villarejo et al. 1981). Water deliveries also necessitated infrastructure investments, which negatively affected small scale producers in the San Joaquin Valley who needed access to capital for these improvements. The Department of Water Resources found that smaller producers were forced into “liquidating and disposing of their properties” as lending institutions resisted loaning money to them during this time (Villarejo et al. 1981: 12). Thus, the investments needed to farm high value crops remained largely out of reach to smaller farmers.

The report also used a case study from the olive industry to assess the effects of SWP water supplies to southern Californian agriculture. The study integrated the opening story of Les Melvill into the complex web of land ownership and subsidized water delivery in California. In this case, the introduction of SWP water directly affected the economics of California’s olive industry:

Prior to the development of the SWP, the California olive industry was dominated by small-scale producers. At the end of the 1960s, the state’s olive groves totaled 27,000 acres with an average of 26 acres per farm. As a result of the availability of state supplied water, more than 6,000 acres of new orchards were planted in western Kings and Kern counties during 1970 and 1971. These new plantings had a tree density of 100 trees to the acre as compared with an average of 48 to 50 trees per acre in older established orchards. (Villarejo et al. 1981: 10)
The doubling of olive production oversupplied the market, which decreased olive prices and profits. Smaller producers, working from more limited lines of credit and tighter profit margins where squeezed from the agricultural sector. The CIRS report found:

quote

the state of California has used its great power, represented by the State Water Project, to tip the economic scale to the advantage of large-scale agricultural interests. Unlike Federal water projects, there is no acreage limitation on the amount of land that can be irrigated with SWP water.

(Villarejo et. al. 1981: 12)

end quote

Through public records and other research, the study uncovered a long-term contract between McCarthy Farming and Prudential with an olive processor named Early California Industries. Under the contract, Early Cal agreed to purchase all McCarthy olives. In exchange, they agreed to defer $1,000,000 in payments for the crop. This amounted to “an interest-free loan of $1,000,000 while McCarthy and Prudential are assured of a market for their olive crop.” Since 53% of Early Cal’s pack came from McCarthy ranch, they could set a price that would undercut the smaller operators like Les Melvill.

The New Lands study illustrated a pedagogical technique that Villarejo would use repeatedly in his scholarship. He named names. More than that, since agribusiness’ access to public coffers and the complex bureaucratic mechanisms used in the business partnerships were rarely seen or understood outside of the ag industry itself, Villarejo named these business operations and corporations in the report. He illustrated how deals were orchestrated with the expenditure public dollars for those least in need of economic assistance. He made hidden relationships public.

Subsequent Villarejo agribusiness studies were important in the context of Goldschmidt’s hypothesis as well as understanding the Westlands Water District and the
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. The two Ford Foundation-funded reports – *How Big Is Enough?* and *Missed Opportunities -- Squandered Resources* – were thorough and specific. The data in these studies were heavy with dense empirical detail and the dire implications of their findings.

In 1986, *How Much Is Enough?* investigated California agriculture after the Reclamation Reform Act (RRA) of 1982. This study represented a postmortem of Taylor’s reclamation struggle. A significant amount of academic study and political mobilization regarding the scale of agriculture in California abated after the reform. Recall Taylor’s comment that

*land monopolists have controlled the enforcement of reclamation law and torn the law to ribbons. What bothers them is that controls over speculation and monopoly still are the law. They haven’t been able to wipe them off the statute books yet; so they know they are in an uncertain, perhaps even precarious position violating the law.*

That battle was now lost and it was as if a collective shy of relief occurred from large landowners. Villarejo (1986, 1988) showed how quickly these once clandestine enterprises restructured to become compliant with the new reclamation requirements.

The article’s chapters broadly show the structure of Villarejo’s argument:

- **Chapter 1** Expansion of California Agriculture
- **Chapter 2** Agricultural Land Ownership and Operation in Ten California Water Districts
- **Chapter 3** Agricultural Land Ownership and Operation, District by District Analysis
- **Chapter 4** Land Ownership in the Upper San Joaquin Valley

The focus of this article was on how irrigation infrastructure affected land ownership in Californian agriculture. In particular, Villarejo’s research assessed and analyzed the
Reclamation Reform Act (RRA) of 1982. Remember, the RRA was the act that overturned both the 160 acre limit and residency requirement to receive subsidized public water. To emphasize the effects and changes in the southern San Joaquin Valley, I focused on the core findings from Chapter 2, the description of the Westlands Water District in Chapter 3, and the longitudinal comparison of Kern, Kings and Tulare counties landownership in Chapter 4.

The change in reclamation acreage limitation signaled acceptance on local, state and federal levels that industrial agriculture would be the primary food production system in California, if not the country. The 1982 RRA limited eligible acreage receiving federal water to 960 acres, Villarejo (1986: ii) noted:

This report documents the size distribution of farm operators and, separately, of land ownership in ten Central California water districts eligible to receive Federal water. Of the 1,791 farms operating in the ten districts, just 229 (13%) have holdings of 961 acres or more. However, these 229 hold at least 62% of the combined 1,020,000 acres eligible to receive Federal water in the ten districts. Farm operators eligible for Federal water deliveries in the districts have substantial holdings in other parts of the state, amounting to an additional 857,000 acres. Farms receiving the Federal water subsidy in California have an average holding of 1,048 irrigable acres. This holding is 7.2 times larger than the average holding of a California irrigated farm. Thus, the Federal water subsidy has preferentially benefited the state’s largest farm businesses.

The statewide focus of the report did not limit analysis of agribusiness to a specific farm, town or region. Since acreage limitation was a fundamental criteria for reclamation water, how many acres did these large scale operations own? How were their businesses structured to obscure additional landholdings?

_How Much Is Enough?_ illustrated that water deliveries from public infrastructure projects increased land consolidation and intensified farming practices. Between 1944 to 1982, California’s irrigable land increased by seventy-one percent. The California State
Water Project and Federal Central Valley Project were responsible for much of this increase. In fact, the three San Joaquin Valley counties of Fresno, Tulare and Kern accounted for a net addition of 1,377,810 or 37% of the state’s total increase. Villarejo (1986: 1-3) noted that “it is not just a coincidence that these three counties are, at present, the top three counties in the nation in terms of annual cash receipts from crop and livestock marketings.” Water deliveries also changed farming practices and crop yields, particularly fruit and nut production.

The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 was the new backdrop for the evolving drama of industrial agriculture in the valley. The RRA illustrated that California agribusiness interests affected national governance. Acknowledging the change in reclamation law and principle, Villarejo (1986: 7) calculated the per capita public subsidy going to California’s largest agricultural landowners at about $150,000 per year and that 90% of land in excess the new 960 acre limit was in the state. In all, of the 415 mega-farms in the 17 western states that were above the RRA limit, 399 were in California. Since many industrial scale operations leased farmland, Villarejo suggested that the RRA “hammer clause,” (which stipulated that leased agricultural land in excess of 160 acres must pay full price for federal water) would be applicable to many of the these agribusinesses since 49% of California farmland was leased.

Using public records, Villarejo then looked at ten water districts throughout the Central Valley (four in the Sacramento Valley and six in the San Joaquin Valley) to analyze both landowner and farm operator patterns on irrigated farmland.73 The distribution of farm sizes in these ten districts were presented in a graph.

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73 These districts were: Arvin-Edison Water Storage District (Kern County), Delano-Earlimart Irrigation District (Kern & Tulare Counties), Feather Water District (Sutter County), Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District.
Table 2. Farm Size Distribution, Irrigable Lands
Ten California Districts (1985)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class</th>
<th>Number (of farms)</th>
<th>Irrigable Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 acres or less</td>
<td>534 farms</td>
<td>20,632 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-160 acres</td>
<td>284 farms</td>
<td>37,042 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-320 acres</td>
<td>317 farms</td>
<td>77,924 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-640 acres</td>
<td>282 farms</td>
<td>133,047 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641-960 acres</td>
<td>145 farms</td>
<td>117,207 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>961-1,280 acres</td>
<td>64 farms</td>
<td>70,611 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,281-2,560 acres</td>
<td>94 farms</td>
<td>167,971 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561-5,120 acres</td>
<td>44 farms</td>
<td>153,539 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,121 acres or more</td>
<td>27 farms</td>
<td>241,900 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,797 farms</td>
<td>1,019,873 acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Villarejo 1986: 19)

Villarejo’s findings documented a continued failure to achieve the goals of reclamation investment. With reference to the 160 acre standard, only 57,647 acres or 5.7% of the farmland met the historic criterion. Agribusiness monopolies were so extensive that 62% of landholdings could not even meet the new RRA 960 acre limit. Villarejo also emphasized that the figures were an underestimate of farm concentration because many of the agribusinesses had unaccounted for interlocking relationships and were not truly independent of each other.

In Chapter 3, Villarejo investigated the ten Central Valley water districts in greater detail. Graphs and data were compiled on farm size, farms with more than 960 acres and landowners with more than 960 acres. The distinction between the last two categories were important because it asked a question – what constituted a farm? Was a farm determined by parcel size or the amount of land owned by a particular agribusiness?

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(Glenn & Colusa Counties), Kern-Tulare Water District (Kern & Tulare Counties), Lower Tule River Irrigation District (Tulare County), Orland-Artois Water District (Glenn County), Reclamation District No. 108 (Colusa & Yolo Counties), San Luis Water District (Fresno & Merced Counties), and Westlands Water District (Fresno & Kings Counties).
Villarejo lined out an argument that the total acreage of particular landowners needed to be assessed cumulatively.

Each water district had unique characteristics and history that Villarejo described in addition to the primary objective of identifying farmland receiving subsidized water. The presentation of data maintained a tone insistent upon transparency. His emphasis was on the empirical data, yet his critical stance bore down into the subject like investigative reporting. Questionable public-private relationships were openly explored and stated. Names were given. For each district, the mega-farms larger than 5,121 acres were identified as if to invite further inquiry or grassroots action. The public records research used business addresses to help determine which farmers were local residents in addition to aiding in identifying farmland in other parts of the state that used the same office location.

Of the ten water districts, the Westlands Water District (WWD) stood out from all others as it represented an anomaly with the scale of its landholdings. Just as with the other nine water districts, Villarejo (1986: 71) graphed the WWD businesses receiving federal water by farm size in acres:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class</th>
<th>Number (of farms)</th>
<th>Irrigable Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 acres or less</td>
<td>9 farms</td>
<td>375 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-160 acres</td>
<td>33 farms</td>
<td>4,734 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-320 acres</td>
<td>39 farms</td>
<td>10,337 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-640 acres</td>
<td>43 farms</td>
<td>22,072 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641-960 acres</td>
<td>50 farms</td>
<td>42,079 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>961-1,280 acres</td>
<td>20 farms</td>
<td>22,458 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,281-2,560 acres</td>
<td>50 farms</td>
<td>91,397 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561-5,120 acres</td>
<td>30 farms</td>
<td>104,934 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,121 acres or more</td>
<td>24 farms</td>
<td>215,637 acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Eight-five percent of the eligible farmland was above the 960 acre limit. The average farm size, 1,725 acres, was three time larger than any other district in the study. And this number is a significant underestimate. Since each legal entity was treated as distinct farm operations, multi-entity structures (where, for example, multiple entities share ownership of farmland) were not included. In addition, Villarejo did not include WWD farmland that relied upon private water supplies or was located outside of the district but owned by the same agricultural business entity.

When California-wide landholdings were applied to the 298 WWD farms, the following corrections were made to the district’s farm size graph:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class</th>
<th>Number (of farms)</th>
<th>Irrigable Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 acres or less</td>
<td>7 farms</td>
<td>226 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-160 acres</td>
<td>26 farms</td>
<td>3,696 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-320 acres</td>
<td>25 farms</td>
<td>6,510 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-640 acres</td>
<td>34 farms</td>
<td>17,544 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641-960 acres</td>
<td>48 farms</td>
<td>40,374 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>961-1,280 acres</td>
<td>20 farms</td>
<td>22,326 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,281-2,560 acres</td>
<td>67 farms</td>
<td>123,513 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561-5,120 acres</td>
<td>33 farms</td>
<td>116,216 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,121 acres or more</td>
<td>38 farms</td>
<td>714,880 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>298 farms</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,045,285 acres</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The revised average WWD farmsize was 3,508 acres. Ninety-three and a half percent of the WWD farmland eligible for federal water was above the 960 acre limit. In comparison, the average California irrigated farm was 145 acres.

In Chapter 4, Villarejo shifted to an analysis of the Tulare Lake Basin to understand its land tenure patterns over four decades. This three county region (Kern,
Kings and Tulare counties) was well suited for study because it had gained 1,134,220 acres of irrigated farmland between 1944 and 1982 (the period of time when the Central Valley Project was constructed and its water deliveries began to flow to the valley’s farmland). Villarejo identified every parcel over 20 acres in size within the region. This amounted to 55,000 parcels totaling 5,285,690 acres. Information on each of these parcels (owner’s name, land use code, assessor parcel number, acreage and county) was coded and entered into a data base.

Similar to earlier graphs, farm size distribution helped explain land ownership in the three county region:

Table 5. Farm Size Distribution, Irrigable Lands
Kern, Kings and Tulare Counties (1981-1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class</th>
<th>Number (of farms)</th>
<th>Irrigable Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 acres or less</td>
<td>5,766 farms</td>
<td>243,622 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-160 acres</td>
<td>1,782 farms</td>
<td>228,058 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-320 acres</td>
<td>1,024 farms</td>
<td>265,895 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-480 acres</td>
<td>397 farms</td>
<td>157,289 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481-640 acres</td>
<td>226 farms</td>
<td>128,678 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641-1,280 acres</td>
<td>247 farms</td>
<td>216,617 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,281-2,560 acres</td>
<td>93 farms</td>
<td>166,012 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561-5,120 acres</td>
<td>29 farms</td>
<td>100,724 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,121 acres or more</td>
<td>26 farms</td>
<td>646,785 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,590 farms</td>
<td>2,153,644 acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Villarejo 1986: 101)

One quarter of one percent (.27%) of “farmers” owned 646,785 irrigated acres – over 1,000 square miles – of the region. Villarejo showed the extraordinary concentrations of regional land consolidation where more than half the irrigated farmland was owned by only 4% of the growers. Consistent with his approach of identifying landowners owning more than 5,121 acres, the top five included: J.G. Boswell Co. (125,645 acres), Tennaco West, Inc. (94,819 acres), Getty Oil Co. (40,761 acres), Chevron USA, Inc. (40,406 acres).
acres) and Southern Pacific Land Co. (38,057 acres).\textsuperscript{74} Forty years of reclamation water had not facilitated the small farm ideal or catalyzed land reform, rather it had exacerbated longstanding social and economic inequality due to non-enforcement of federal law.

One of the reasons Villarejo chose the Tulare Lake Basin was because Wilson and Clawson (1945) had previously compiled land ownership data from Kern and Tulare counties in 1940.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{Table 7. Farm Size Distribution, Irrigable Lands Kern & Tulare Counties (1940)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class</th>
<th>Number (of farms)</th>
<th>Irrigable Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 acres or less</td>
<td>8,386 farms</td>
<td>254,600 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-160 acres</td>
<td>1,353 farms</td>
<td>162,000 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-320 acres</td>
<td>741 farms</td>
<td>164,000 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-480 acres</td>
<td>189 farms</td>
<td>72,100 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481-640 acres</td>
<td>93 farms</td>
<td>51,400 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641-1,280 acres</td>
<td>132 farms</td>
<td>107,500 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,281-2,560 acres</td>
<td>39 farms</td>
<td>67,100 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561-5,120 acres</td>
<td>9 farms</td>
<td>22,600 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,121 acres or more</td>
<td>14 farms</td>
<td>276,100 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,065 farms</td>
<td>1,177,400 acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Villarejo 1986: 105; citing Wilson and Clawson)

Four percent of the farmers in 1940 already owned more than half of the acreage in the two counties. Wilson and Clawson suggested that this could be expected from non-irrigated farming such as grazing or dry land wheat production, but expected CVP water to change production practices and decrease the size of farms. However, Villarejo (1986: 106) found that the introduction of irrigation and more intensive crop production did not result in the predicted smaller farms.

\textsuperscript{74} Several of these corporations and agribusinesses own more land outside of the three county region.

\textsuperscript{75} Marion Clawson, who co-authored the study, worked closely with Walter Goldschmidt in devising and conducting the Arvin-Dinuba case study around the same period of time.
Table 7. Farm Size Distribution, Irrigable Lands
Kern & Tulare Counties (1981-1982)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size Class</th>
<th>Number (of farms)</th>
<th>Irrigable Land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>80 acres or less</td>
<td>4,943 farms</td>
<td>206,167 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-160 acres</td>
<td>1,484 farms</td>
<td>189,413 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-320 acres</td>
<td>847 farms</td>
<td>224,238 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>321-480 acres</td>
<td>333 farms</td>
<td>131,830 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>481-640 acres</td>
<td>188 farms</td>
<td>106,841 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>641-1,280 acres</td>
<td>200 farms</td>
<td>174,387 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,281-2,560 acres</td>
<td>73 farms</td>
<td>129,850 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,561-5,120 acres</td>
<td>23 farms</td>
<td>80,509 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,121 acres or more</td>
<td>15 farms</td>
<td>309,975 acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,106 farms</td>
<td>1,553,210 acres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This comparative study illustrated increased land consolidation after forty years of water infrastructure investment and non-enforcement of reclamation policies. There were 1,959 fewer farmers on hundreds of thousands of additional acres of farmland. The region had grown by 32% so concentration of land was likely even more dramatic.

At the end of the study, Villarejo reiterated the valley’s characteristic for economic poverty amid its cornucopia of production. What was easy to see by walking through the region’s rural communities was also demonstrated in federal statistics. Villarejo noted that in a national comparison, six of the ten cities with the highest percentages of people on welfare were in the Central Valley. He concluded that “multi-billion dollar public investment” had transformed the valley into the world’s most agriculturally productive region while simultaneously making it into the most impoverished place in the United States.

In 1988, Villarejo and Redmond’s *Missed Opportunities -- Squandered Resources* studied the changes on the structure of Westlands agribusinesses after the RRA in 1982.
industrial agriculture, complied with the regulations? If so, how had the final promulgation of federal law affected the structure of agriculture in this water district?

Villarejo and Redmond (1988: iii) framed the report’s findings in the study’s abstract:

This study found that large landholders have been representing themselves as several smaller units even though their land was being managed as one operation. In fact, comparison of documents from different agencies showed that large farm operations often told WWD that they were many small units, while registering at other agencies as one farm. These schemes involved 49% of the land in the WWD operated under the RRA by only 50 different operations.

This research uncovered a pervasive pattern involving considerable effort on the part of large operations to comply with the technical requirements of RRA in order to receive low-cost water while circumventing the RRA goal of assisting family-scale farms . . . Although these schemes may appear unscrupulous, and indeed do not reflect the intent of Congress, it is the current policy of the Bureau of Reclamation to encourage them. Ultimately, it is the Bureau, not the farmers, that must be held accountable for these massive violations of its legal mandate and of the public interest.

The nominal economic structure of Westlands agribusiness adjusted under the RRA, but the social structure of the region remained polarized.

The study’s subtitle, “Why Prosperity Brought By Water Doesn’t Trickle Down In The California Central Valley,” similar to How Much Is Enough?, was framed as a question. While presenting evidence to citizens and policy makers, Villarejo and Redmond’s query was a pedagogical hook to draw the reader into the study. It also mimicked the economic discourse of Reagan-era “trickle down” economics, which suggested that deregulation, tax breaks and incentives to the wealthy would benefit the entire society. It was an analogy apt for the contradictions in the Westlands Water District.

The Missed Opportunities study restated and affirmed previous research by Goldschmidt and MacCannell connecting farm structure to regional social conditions.
Yet, the study’s primary contribution to extending this body of research was in defining the RRA’s salient points and documenting its implementation six years after being passed by Congress. The RRA stipulated that full water costs would be paid for farms larger than 960 acres in the 17 western states receiving water from federal irrigation projects (previously the law had applied per water district). Corporations were held to 640 acres if they had more than 25 stockholders. The 960 acre limit included all landholdings as a single farm irregardless of the number of people or legal entities on the title. Villarejo and Redmond (1988: 44) recognized that the RRA’s acreage limitation identification shifted from “land ownership” to “landholding” thereby including lease agreements.\textsuperscript{76}

The residency requirement was eliminated under the RRA.

Questionable political processes occurred in the drafting of the law as loopholes were placed into the RRA. Villarejo and Redmond (1988) found that there were substantial changes made between the drafts distributed for public comment and those that were passed into law. The worst of these involved the 960 acre limit:

No restriction was placed on the number of 960-acre tracts that could be farmed together as one unit by a management company; no provision prohibited members of a farm’s controlling body from acting as manager of a farm operation. Thus, a few individuals could retain control over a large farming operation simply by “restructuring” it into 960-acre pieces, and then forming a management company to farm the entire operation as one piece. (Villarejo and Redmond 1988: 12)

The report observed that many agribusinesses formed into trusts which “broke” the farm up into 960 acre parcels or less. The new farms could be placed in a trust where a child or other confidant controlled the property on paper but the original owner was trustee.

\textsuperscript{76} Due to the new distinction between land ownership and landholding, Villarejo (1986) and Villarejo and Redmond (1988) began to use the term “ownership unit” to describe the extended and non-local nature of land use in California agriculture.
For the Westlands Water District, the change in reclamation law created restructuring on paper but not in actual business operations. Villarejo and Redmond (1988) referred to these new business entities “water user clusters” or “clusters” that often shared the same phone number, address and contact information. They found instances where separate clusters were listed together on loan applications, agricultural permits or registration under USDA programs. Since the federal definition of a farm involved an entity that puts capital at risk, Villarejo and Redmond determined that the water user clusters fit this definition and therefore should not have multiple 960 acre parcels eligible for subsidized federal water.

After years of non-compliance, Villarejo and Redmond (1988) also found that while WWD landowners reorganized under the RRA, irregular regulatory oversight at the Bureau of Reclamation allowed landholders to escape the 960 acre limitation:

The Bureau of Reclamation is now allowing landholders who had entered into contracts to sell excess land irrigated with project water to redistribute their holdings in order to retain ownership and control. **Sales of large tracts of excess land, as approved by the Bureau, are being made to persons who are already owners of large amounts of land receiving project water.** In some instances the total holdings are now in excess of the new ownership limit. (Villarejo and Redmond 1988: 48; bolded in the original)

These practices were consistent with a history connecting industry interests with the manipulation of law making, lax bureaucratic oversight and slack regulation implementation.

The scholarship that Villarejo contributed to understanding agribusiness, specifically after the 1982 RRA, contributed to understanding the continued monopolized structure of landholding in California. However, his work did not solely comprise critical social science. Through CIRS, Villarejo integrated adult education and community
organizing with his scientific study of rural life in the state. His community-based
research and education illustrated a different conception of power – it was the people (the
“folk”), not the experts who were to lead the struggle.

Profile of Practice: Community-based Research

When I listened to Don Villarejo, I remembered Ernesto Galarza. Not that their
paths were identical, but they faced similar constraints and worked from similar
positions. Both were fired from universities and both affiliated with farm labor
movements that failed to fully recognize their contributions. Most compelling was that
they worked from the margins; in precarious and insecure spaces between formal
institutions and the struggling workers in the fields. Their positions as politically
engaged scholars integrated research, education and organizing.

Villarejo’s California Institute for Rural Studies embodied multifaceted
approaches. Its mission and work were not constrained by an academic discipline. Rural
sociology departments were not usually directly involved in farm labor organizing and
community-based education. Nor did they often have the courage to confront and
challenge the most powerful economic interests in their states.

This profile section will discuss community organizing as Villarejo described how
to make change. Because of his unique position and history as a politically engaged
scholar, listen to Villarejo’s theory of power woven into the character and approach of his
work. His goal was empowerment, so his position as scholar was not framed as leader,
knower or expert but rather facilitator, catalyst, and educator.
Change is brought about by social organization of people who are affected by a problem. Only through the organization of those folks is real change going to come about that benefits them. Power is based on effective people standing up for what it is that they see as the need to have change to fix their problem. Unless you have that, I don’t see how change happens. Change does not happen by information alone. We’re talking about a political process. A political process is about power. And power is based on political or social organization that pushes for change.

My life has really been about trying to link what I do with those forces in the society that I think represent the political or social organization that is pushing for change. I’ve worked for the United Farmworkers Union. I’m working for them right now. I’ve worked for California Rural Legal Assistance. I’m working for them right now. And when this other organization, the Teamsters, came to me about the food processing industry and wanted me to do some work for them. Yeah, I’m there to help. I’m there to do it right, to make sure that it’s done accurately and scientifically.

I will give you an example of how that works. In 1993, I got a call from Rufino Dominguez, the leader of an organization of Mixteco speaking folk from Oaxaca living in the Fresno-Madera area. They wanted to do a congresso and needed a free, large meeting space with a kitchen. So I call up Steve Sutter at Fresno County Cooperative Extension and say “These guys would like to have an opportunity to get together to meet. I know it’s unconventional, but you’ve been trying to work with workers as well as farmers in your area. Is it possible to get a meeting place at the Coop Extension office in Fresno?” I would take responsibility and CIRS would sign on for liability if necessary.

He said he’d look into it and gets back to me. I asked for a Sunday, when the offices would be vacant and the Oaxacans can meet because they typically work six days a week. He said, “OK, you’ve got it. This is a personal favor to you. You have to understand that I will be there to make sure that things are going to be alright and you have to be there too. ”

I said, “Of course, they’ve already asked me to participate.”

So the meeting happens. Starting at about 7:30 in the morning all kinds of vertically challenged people start arriving. Women, children, men, kids. All kinds. They are carrying in big pots of food. Pretty soon the whole place is filled with interesting flavors and odors and kids running up and down the hall.

Sutter corners me and says, “What is this!”

“This is a village meeting, Steve. It’s going to be okay. They’ll be responsible. They will be careful. We will see to it that everything is done right. There will be a gathering at some time, they haven’t told me exactly when, but there will be a meeting. We will all come in and sit down and have an opportunity to learn.” Steve went back to his office a little nervous about what was going on. Maybe around one o’clock, the food was ready. The most fantastic mole that I have ever had in my life. These women, maybe around 4’6” – one of them was pregnant out to here – carrying these big pots of food. All the men sat down and ate. It’s a different world, a cultural experience.

After that, Rufino stands up and we go to the other room where the meeting was being held. We were in the front and introduced in a flowery, elaborate way individually by name. Then Rufino reads papers that he has prepared and people begin to comment. Suddenly, the back door bursts open and in come another bunch of guys who had not
been there for the meal. They had driven from Oaxaca to come to this meeting. They unfurl this giant banner, which says in Spanish, “500 years of resistance!”

Sutter turns around, “What’s this? Who are these people?”

“They aren’t carrying any weapons, Steve. It’s okay. If they have any, they left them at home.” Afterward everybody cleaned up and they all went away.

At the end, to his credit, Steve indicated, “It’s okay.”

I said, “This is how it is Steve if you want to do community work with this population of farmworkers in middle of the Central Valley of California. This is how it is.”

When you think about it, could the university initiate an activity that would engage this population? I don’t think so. These folks aren’t going to come to a university directly. They aren’t going to respond to the way in which universities operate. The university would have all kinds of insurance problems and liability questions. It is a nightmare to think about doing that kind of an event on the University of California campus or even Fresno State. Steve to his everlasting credit put himself on the line and got a lot of credibility among that population for having done so. He later became more sensitive to the different indigenous groups that were in Fresno. He became a positive force. This opening the facility was, for him, a giant first step. It opened up avenues that he would have never been aware of.

This was just a few days out of my life but it is representative of what this scholarship requires if you want to have an ongoing relationship at the community level with folks. In other words, to do this kind of scholarship this is what you have to do to get access to the community, be able to get the interviews you need and be trusted enough at a certain level.

There’s another example that is probably even more difficult for a university to figure out how to handle. I met a gentleman named Filemon López, leader of La Asociación Cívica “Benito Juárez,” another Mixtec migrant group in Fresno. I met him at a safehouse that his organization operates in a residential neighborhood. Fresno is an entry point, a hub, for a lot of folks now because immigration is cumulative.

In the room there are two young men probably sixteen years old. They just got there the previous day from Oaxaca. They are talking about whether it is better to go to Pennsylvania to work in the mushrooms because the work is steady, year-around work or to go to North Carolina to work in poultry, which is also steady, year-around work but is much more physically demanding. They’ve also heard that it is difficult to get the jobs in Pennsylvania. I am thinking, if I had parachuted into say, Siberia, without any knowledge of Russian, and I had to go find work, would I have any clue about where there even might be work? Yet, here these undocumented guys in a safe house debating this fairly sophisticated question of agricultural economics.

After Filemon and I chat about family, where he’s from, his community; he says to me, “Don, you get foundation grants?”

“Yes, we do.”

He said, “We need a foundation grant. It’s important that you help us.”

Over the next six months, we worked with Vanguard Foundation, a San Francisco foundation, proud of their social change work. Luis Magaña, who was working for the Institute for Rural Studies, personally took them to San Francisco where they’d never been. Luis interpreted since the Vanguard Foundation didn’t have any Spanish-speaking
staff available for the meeting. Eventually, they got a grant. It was to pay the rent for the next year on the safe house. Can you do that through the University of California? I don’t think so.

Ideally you would want institutions like the Cooperative Extension Service to be able to work with communities. This reminds me of when the Kellogg Foundation approached us about Coop Extension in ’91. The first Hispanic program officer at the Kellogg Foundation wanted to change the university by serving Spanish-speaking people in the Southwest, which they should have been doing all along. He came to me asking advice.

I said, “We should make sure that the University of California puts into place Extension officers who are labor advisors; not farm advisors, labor advisors.”

He said, “Where would you like to do that?”

“Let’s start with the San Joaquin Valley, maybe the Salinas Valley and other places. How about five? Let’s shoot for five.”

And he says, “Ok, if you can get the University of California to agree to that. We will make a grant of – I won’t say the number but it was very large, really huge – we’ll make a grant of X dollars to the California Institute for Rural Studies. You will get the University of California to be a contractor of the California Institute for Rural Studies for a five-year period to implement this program.

I spent eight months of my life traveling around talking to all of the local county Agricultural Extension Directors and the four statewide Regional Directors, who I got on board early on. I talked to all of the San Joaquin County, Salinas Valley and Imperial Valley directors. Some were on board and some were not. I got a whole bunch of faculty on board as well.

We were going to hire five folks to become labor advisors. Each of them in one of the Coop Extension offices. They would have a salary paid for by this grant. They would have their overhead at U.C. Coop Extension covered including insurance, travel expenses, and all of the goodies that come to a Coop Extension farm advisor. The program would collaborate with the farm advisors and the Agricultural Personnel Management Program so that they could become integrated into the whole system. The funding would come from Kellogg through CIRS, but the people to be hired would be employees of the University of California.

We would not play any direct role in the hiring process other than to outline what the criteria should be for a labor advisor. There had to be agreement with Coop Extension that they would use the criteria in the hiring process. They could hire anybody they want just so long as they were a native Spanish speaker; they had extensive experience either as an employee or as a supervisor working in farm labor in California; and a few other things. They had to be not only bilingual but also biliterate.

So I spent eight months going around talking to all these people, then a meeting gets pulled together in Oakland at the University of California headquarters. Lowell Lewis, who was the Chief Assistant to the Vice President for Agricultural Science, chaired the meeting. All these faculty, Coop Extension people and me are in the room. Without anything else in the room happening, Lowell Lewis looks at me, and says, “Don, you have to understand that the University of California is not a democracy.”

I knew right away that it wasn’t going to happen, and that’s what happened. He said, “You have all these people supporting you but we’re unclear whether this is a good
move for the University at this time. There would be a lot of antagonism to trying to do this. We are especially concerned about the focus on labor. Now, we would be supportive of people doing community development work. We would be supportive of work associated with social services, teaching people how to access social services better, but this is too close to labor organizing.”77

I said, “I appreciate all of your effort and input.” I went back to Kellogg and told them the bad news. It didn’t go anywhere. It is a shame.

The meaningful statement that the university “is not a democracy” was an interesting admission. The University of California is a public institution and the land grant college of the state, so its purpose and mission are directly linked to public resources and arguably the promotion of democracy. As Fiske’s (1979) dissertation illustrated for the University of California, and described elsewhere by Hightower (1973) and Berry (1977), the land grant universities have actively participated in the industrialization of agriculture, but typically avoided promoting farmworker rights or the organic and sustainable agriculture movements. Remember Galarza in Merchants of Labor noted that the U.C. Cooperative Extension service created a system to assess labor needs to agribusiness for the Braceros program. Yet in this case, they were reticent to accept five labor advisors.78

Politically engaged scholars need to accept that conflicting interests will be an ongoing tension and component of their work, even if they are not employees of universities. If a scholar chooses to remain outside of public institutions, they will likely have more latitude, but less financial security and economic resources, to accomplish their objectives.

77 Villarejo is paraphrasing the conversation.
78 Villarejo’s Kellogg story was similar to one that arose from a profile I wrote with Tom Lyson at Cornell University (Peter 2010: 184-186). In that case, Dean David Call nixed a $750,000 Kellogg grant to fund a collaborative sustainable agriculture initiative that involved sustainable ag groups from around the state through that university’s Farming Alternatives Program (FAP). Within a few years, the FAP program was discontinued for lack of funding. While framed as neutral institutions, there were and are political interests at play in public universities.
Change organizations have a different agenda than the world of scholarship. Being outside of the academic system has a number of advantages in terms of your ability to choose what it is you want to do and how you’re going to do it. It even offers the opportunity to do things that the system would find difficult to tolerate including working in a collaborative fashion with other change organizations.

I remember talking to a farm labor union and I asked them what kind of research would help them in their work. They said, “Nothing.” I didn’t share that view but it reflected the distance, the gap, between scholarship and the world of organizing. It is hard to overcome that gap from our side of the table. At the same time, I could have done things differently that would have been conducive to sustaining a larger scale scholarship enterprise outside of the system. For example, I did very little publishing in the peer reviewed, academic literature.

It was an inadvertent choice. My responsibility for fundraising to keep 13 people fed was just too demanding. I also had to have a certain kind of visibility in the media and in the world of scholarship and in the world of organizing and at the community level which entails a whole lot of travel. Part of this is responding to requests from folks that want you to appear and sanction their thing. Though there were talented people who made commitments to publish, they failed to publish even when pushed on it. I didn’t push hard enough in retrospect. I should have made it a condition of continued employment.

Over the last several years, I have been getting into the peer-reviewed academic literature with the stuff that is still current enough to be interesting to people. The latest one from March in the American Journal of Industrial Medicine, one of the leading journals of occupational safety and health. They had a special issue in migration and health. I did a scientific article on farm labor health from the California Agricultural Worker’s Health Survey. Those findings had not been in the academic literature though they are ten years old. I did everything that the reviewers wanted and it was accepted. It is a good article and is going to cause a lot of interest. I had another article in the Journal of Agricultural Safety and Health and a farm labor housing piece in a rural sociology book that is coming out this year.

My wife, who is a scholar, pointed out that there is important and valuable material that was developed during that California Institute for Rural Studies time that will be lost and needs to be available more widely. If we had published during the period of the Institute for Rural Studies, I think funding would have been more stable. It would even have been possible to go to some of the foundation’s and get endowment grants to make a much more stable organization.

The educational and organizing components of politically engaged scholarship are highly relational and communicative. The distance, between scholar and subject, is diminished as are differences in status. Perhaps because of this, the distance between the social problem and creation of a solution is also narrowed. Learning and engagement become, in some ways, linked and interwoven.
There is a mantra in community organizing. When you’re born, you’re neutral; then you discover there is injustice. So you become a liberal and you try to fix things through liberal mechanisms. You find that that doesn’t work, and you become a radical. Then the question is, what kind of a radical should you be? Should you be a Marxist, anarchist, progressive labor, social democrat? Pretty soon you are in a group of two ready to split over some fine point of doctrine. You think you are really getting somewhere, refining your ideas and zeroing in on the real problem. Whereas, in fact, you have become more distant from people, from the “folk.”

So there are two ways to go about clarifying your understanding of the world and clarifying your thinking, either go into academia or go take a bath among the people. If you really want to purify yourself, you take a bath among the people. That’s how to purify yourself. You talk to everybody. You listen. You learn. That’s how you learn what the real world is all about. Trudy does that. As intellectuals, as scholars, as people with knowledge that often folks in the community don’t have, I’ve always felt that part of our obligation in the community setting is to figure out how to connect with folks to make at least some of that available without charge, without any preconditions, without any agenda.

Trudy did this when she put together a series of community poetry meetings and narrative readings. One of them was in Parlier with Mas Masumoto, Gerry Haslam and Luis Omar Salinas. We put up the photo essay with photographs from Bill Gillette and some narrative. Here in the middle of winter, Saturday night in Parlier, the library was packed with people listening to the readings from these three valley writers. All of that was free. No charge. She saw that as part of her mission, in the context of the folk, to be able to bring those resources into the community.

In another setting, at a meeting with the leaders of the Oaxacan self-help groups, the whole question of non-profit organizations and philanthropy arose. These folks were initially against incorporating as a 501(c)3 because that would limit their ability to do politics. We talked at length about how, at the Institute for Rural Studies, we created both structures. We started the (c)3 but also the (c)4, the Californian Agrarian Action Project where you can engage in any kind of grassroots lobbying and political work except work for a candidate. For example, it was our (c)4 which sued the University of California around the research priorities lawsuit. Similar models have been used by every sophisticated progressive organization in the country, like Planned Parenthood. Fifteen years later, the self help groups all have (c)3’s by the way. They get foundation money.

We did that for free because we know about these things that many people in the community don’t know and don’t even know what they don’t know. If they are thinking about building organization in this country, these are things they have to know. These communities are deprived in terms of intellectual resources. They don’t even know how much they are missing.

In community-based research, I want to put together a representative body of what I call “the folks.” I don’t want professional advocates. I don’t want labor union leaders. I don’t want people who are experienced speakers with an agenda. I want folks.

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79 Trudy Wischemann was a Research Assistant for Paul Taylor, friend of Walter Goldschmidt, graduate assistant with Dean MacCannell and worked for Don Villarejo at the California Institute of Rural Studies. She is a “rural advocate” today in Tulare County, California.
When we did the health study in 1999, in seven communities, I put together an advisory committee of eight current farmworkers; not former farmworkers, current – four men and four women. We met for three months before I wrote down anything about what we were going to do. We had great conversations.

In another setting, we tried to put together informal discussions among the Oaxacan village self help efforts. The Oaxacans were competing with one another and we wanted to see if they could exchange views and cooperate with one another. The meetings were originally open. We had open meetings in places like Visalia and Merced. The CRLA community workers and people from the unions would show up. They are very experienced! They get up and speak and that’s it. They are going to talk the whole damn meeting.

The “folks,” even the leaders of the self-help committees, are not experienced public speakers by and large. They are not comfortable in these kinds of settings where you have, as they call it “the Chicanos,” doing all of the speaking. We were alarmed that the way we were doing it was a total mistake. What we did was to talk to these village self-help members and say, “We think we would like to get together and discuss some conversations without the formal organizations. We feel that it is important that it is a closed meeting and that we not include the professional advocates.” They all agreed. The whole way the meeting happened changed.

That was the basis for my decision on the advisory committee for the health study. The advocates are valuable and crucial. They really sharpen what it is all about and bring forth valuable information on the one hand. But on the other hand, if you think what you need to say when you knock on somebody’s door, someone who is just trying to get through this life by doing farm work, they are not as helpful as folks who are actually living that life.

The advocates play a critical role. You’ve got to have them, but in terms of trying to design scholarship to understand how to bring indigenous people together, I don’t want the advocates in the room. I felt that the non-advocate folks had to speak. Otherwise, the advocacy agenda could take over the meeting and distort an accurate reflection of what the folks themselves are saying. It is a subtle thing and sometimes people are offended by it, particularly my friends at CRLA and the union. But my experience tells me that this is the only way.

If Villarejo represented an educational organizer working outside of formal academic institutions, Isao Fujimoto illustrated the pressures put upon a politically engaged scholar (who was also helped to start Ethnic Studies departments on campus) working within California’s most notable land grant university.
Isao Fujimoto was raised on the Yakima Indian reservation because his Japanese family could not vote or own property in the western United States under the Alien Land laws. Later, as a young man, his family and community were forced into a concentration camps. Without the opportunities of a fully vested citizen, walled off from public institutions and services, he was denied the social and political spaces (along with numerous other Asian Americans) in which to thrive.

Fujimoto’s life and work were woven into historical narratives of oppression and resistance in Californian agriculture and American society. Like the voice of a persistent conscience, his work as an educator followed these discourses, tapping narratives promoting the “family farm” and farmworker rights while speaking truth to power against “agribusiness” and economic monopoly. Fujimoto arrived at UC Davis during, in his words, an “age of accountability.” Though lacking robust institutional support, he leveraged open spaces of possibility where people of different ethnic and racial backgrounds could learn, contribute their knowledge and participate in social change. Later, he simply advocated “access” as a fundamental democratic quality, particularly in the context of education. His initiatives held the university “to be accountable to the larger public” rather than serve groups “selected by nature of their manipulative advantages and concentrating of power and money” (Fujimoto 1973b: 37; cited in Fiske 1979: 424). In this respect, for Fujimoto, the land grant university represented a structure
to be investigated, challenged and transformed as well as an institution to educate students, conduct scientific study and partner with California communities.

On June 22, 1973, five years after arriving at UC Davis, Fujimoto organized a one-day conference “to initiate the redirection of the priorities for University research.” The event drew “various ‘publics’ not traditionally served by the Agricultural Experiment Station” (Fiske 1970: 433), and it represented the nucleus of a future sustainable agriculture movement including small farmers, organic producers, consumer groups and environmental organizations. Fiske (1979: 434) quoted Fujimoto from his speech at the end of the conference:

The over-riding concern is that the University cannot continue to allocate such a high proportion of its resources in the name of growth and efficiency, to tackle priorities for the benefits of limited audiences as those involved in production and corporate agriculture – without eventually reaping serious societal consequences.

Just as Goldschmidt had warned that consequences would be realized in rural Californian society if the agricultural system was encouraged to economically consolidate, Fujimoto later cautioned his land grant university about those same industrial forces and its implication in facilitating the growth of agribusiness.

In this chapter I document Fujimoto’s scholarship and teaching at UC Davis. Beginning with Fujimoto’s upbringing, education and “war stories,” I then describe the newly formed Applied Behavior Sciences (ABS) department at UC Davis. ABS courses, as taught by Fujimoto, integrated rural sociology, community development theory and educational praxis. The following section describes Fujimoto’s use of networks and institutions outside of the campus when he became frustrated with progress at the university. Next, Fujimoto’s classroom and community-based teaching are seen through
two course readers he prepared with his students. These materials help us to understand his educational praxis with undergraduate students engaged in applied social science research. Finally, in the last section, selected emails between Fujimoto and myself illustrate his assistance and the development of my dissertation research.

Profile of Practice: Upbringing, Internment and Education

On April 13, 2007, Fujimoto gave a lecture to UC Davis graduate students and faculty called, “War Stories I Have Lived to Tell: 40 Years Of Encounters With Community Development And Sustainable Agriculture at UCD.” During this lecture, he discussed his upbringing and education:

I will briefly mention my own background. I grew up on an Indian reservation. The reason I was on that Indian reservation was because of the Alien Land Laws. The Alien Land Laws were passed in 17 states. They were directed against Japanese farmers who were very efficient. The law denied Asians citizenship and the right to lease or buy land. No Asian could become a citizen of this country until 1952 that meant Chinese, Filipinos, East Asians and others.

The Indian lands were under federal jurisdiction and the Alien Land Laws were state laws, so the Yakima Indians rented land to the 125 Japanese immigrants on the their reservation. That is where I was born. I grew up there. I learned insights into isolation there.

We got yanked out of the reservation when the war started. We were sent to the concentration camps. My introduction to California was the Tule Lake concentration camp in Modok County. People came to California for a lot of different reasons. I came via the camp.

When we got out of camp. People started to scratch for a living again. One of the common routes was to be a share farmer and that is what we ended up doing. We became share farmers and grew strawberries. After about four years, we were ready to become independent. We started renting our own land.

Then I left to go to Cal. The town that I was living in was called Coyote, population 150. All I had to do was go out on the road and wave to stop the Greyhound bus. When I got to Berkeley, I tried doing the same thing. It didn’t work – I didn’t even know about bus stops. My first class was Chem 1A – 350 people. It was double the number of people in Coyote! So that is the background that I came out of.

80 This lecture was filmed by Human and Community Development Department.
Two other things were important. I got drafted and sent to Korea where I was a US Army correspondent. When I was there, Russia sent up Sputnik into space. The people in this country were scared. They were saying, “What are we going to do to beat the Russians?” The answer was to beef up our high school science programs. I was teaching Chemistry in high school at that time and got all of these pamphlets encouraging high school teachers to go back to college. You could go to all kinds of places.

It was 1960, only six years since Brown vs the Board of Education said segregated schools were illegal. The Montgomery boycott was just a few years before. People from minority backgrounds could sense something going on. I said, “That’s a wake up call. There is this science revolution going on, but there is also a civil rights movement. I can learn both!” So I went to Howard, a black school. Howard is one of a hundred black colleges in the country. All of my classmates were black, except for two nuns from Chicago. I learned about what challenges we were up against talking to these people.

Later, when I left teaching in San Jose, I went to Cornell where I did work in biology for a year. After I took a group of people down to Honduras on a literacy project, I decided to stick it out at Cornell as T.A. for biology. Then I started my rural sociology program and did my field work in the Philippines. Before I finished, my chairman said, “Look, the Davis people are interested in having you come.” So I came here.

This is the story.

Profile of Practice: War Stories

It is said that if we are going to make any sense of what we are doing, we have to know what story are we in. I am going to talk about stories and the story that we are all in together because we have a lot in common.

I came here and started teaching about 40 years ago in the Spring of 1967. I was brought here from Cornell to help start a department from what was called Agricultural Education. One of my first instructions was to change some of the courses. UC Davis had been a place where people came to become agricultural teachers for vocational education in high school, but introductory courses like Agricultural Education 10 were getting less and less people. We needed to turn it around.

I looked around campus and found many departments that were split. The Psych Department in Young Hall was split and not communicating. The first floor was bare, but the second had all of these psychedelic drawings. I thought, “Maybe that is what we should teach students. What are the biases in every discipline? What are the revolutions going on?” So instead of Ag. Education 10, I started a course called “Scientific Bias and Social Myth.” The course just took off! We put it in the Experimental College at first. The first year we had 18 students, the second year we had 118 and the third year we had 325 students. I was also brought here to teach a rural society course. The rural society
course was not in the College of Agriculture; it was in Arts and Science, in Sociology. I had a joint appointment there. They said to boost the course enrollment, so the first year I had 11 students, second year 55 and the third year 125. I did that. But instead of getting credit, I started getting negative feedback. It had to do with another assignment. The Department changed its name from Ag Education to Applied Behavioral Science. They then got some money to look at farm labor. The department had never gotten this kind money. They were going to look at the real life situation instead of the supply and demand side. I put two people out in the fields as workers. They went out from Day Hall at 4 o’clock in the morning to record everything they saw. They found out things from the point of view of the worker. How they are getting scammed. The sheriff’s department arrested people, put them in jail, and then had them work for free for people. We realized that something wasn’t right here and it’s not just a matter of getting at the truth.

Let me get you going with double decker bus story. When I first came to Davis, I went to see my friends Juanita and Jerry Brown. They were finishing up their PhD’s in Anthropology and were working with the United Farm Workers. Jerry was the research director for the UFW. I went down there to a strike going on at Giamurra Farms. Right away Dolores Huerta gave me a sign. So I start picking, going around and talking to Jerry and Juanita. Word got out. When I came back, I got a call from a union organizer up in the Marysville area named Pancho Botelho.

He said, “Hey, perhaps you can help us out?
“What is the situation?”
“The county has stopped the bus services from the migrant labor camp. Our kids have to walk to school. It’s dangerous. Can you do something?”
I said, “Give me some time, I will look around.”

In 1967 and ’68, Bob Black was the student-body president and the vice president was Richard Kleker. These guys came up with an idea to start a public transport system here. They wrote to London to get some used double-decker buses and got ten of them! They were sitting out in the garage.

So I asked, “Hey, Bob, what is the chance of getting a bus to help some kids get to school?”

He said, “Sure.”

There was a guy named Glen Burch from University Extension who was interested in rural community development. He gave me some money and I hired Molly Freedman as a research assistant. I knew the bus driver too, a guy named Bud Johnson.

Bud said, “Look, I need some help because these buses are high. I don’t want to go on the highway and I don’t want to go anyplace there may be high wires. Can somebody come with me?”

I said, “OK, Molly will go with you.” So Molly went with Bud and they drove that double-decker bus. Can you imagine going 50 miles up the backroads to Marysville, Yuba City, and Live Oak. It attracted a lot of attention! They took the kids to school. People started to ask, “What is going on?” They started calling into a talk show in Yuba City and the talk show host located Molly.

He said, “Can you come on the show and answer some questions?”

Molly got on the talk show and talked about why they were there. “We respond to somebody needing help, so we are here. We got the buses for free.”
People started calling in who were critical. Word got back to Mrak Hall. It wasn’t called Mrak, because Mrak was still alive. It was the administration building. Mrak really got upset.

He said, “Who is responsible for all of that?” He found out that Molly was hired with money given by Glen Burch and told him to get rid of her.

Glen had no choice. He called me up, “I’ve got to fire Molly.”

Molly didn’t take it laying down. She started firing back. She got her friends and started picketing the administration building. They attracted a lot of attention. They were saying, “What is the administration doing? Picking against farmworker kids! Why aren’t we helping them out?”

I told Molly, “Maybe there is a cooler way to handle this. Why don’t we organize a discussion?” So we had a big debate at Wyatt Pavilion on the social responsibilities of research in the College of Agriculture. About 200 Ag College professors were there. It had Roy Bainer, the Chairman of Ag Engineering, Molly and myself. (Bainer has a building named after him. All of these people have buildings named after them. Mrak has a building named after him too.)

The ag press picked up on this debate and the next thing you know, I start getting feedback. The classic one was a letter from the Director of Extension in San Joaquin County saying, “You are persona non grata. Do not come here!”

I figured, “This is going to be kinda tough working here.”

A Fujimoto lecture was a performance. Over the years, I have seen many, and most offered similar information, like a stump speech. Yet, each was differently inspiring because no matter how the world had beat me up (and I was always aware that Isao’s ride had been rougher), I left feeling uplifted.

When Fujimoto taught (a more appropriate word may be “shared”), he emanated optimistic energy. I marveled that he could consistently deliver tales of horrific injustice and monumental challenge, yet be smiling and laughing throughout his talks. Though I have not included most of them in this profile translation, Fujimoto often said, “Alright” and “Okay” in his lectures (sometimes tinged as questions: “Alright?” and “Okay?”) As if saying, are you with me?). He offered affirmation, always uplift, as he sent us, his students, off to do what Ella Baker once called “spadework.”

If you think I am exaggerating, and these are not war stories, you tell me later on. But I call them war stories because felt I was in a real battle here. One of the reasons is that this area, the Central Valley of California, is unique. The Central Valley is very
special. It is the richest agricultural area not just in California, not just in America, not just in the world. It is the richest agricultural region in the history of the world!

The public image of the Central Valley is that the wealth is in agricultural productivity. But I would say that the wealth is really in all of the people that are here. Tremendously diverse. We don’t have time to talk about the diversity but you could go around the world by just staying in the Central Valley. There are Hmong, Mixtec, Zapotec . . . .

Now take a look at this map. I plotted the median income of the wealth of the top 50 and the bottom 50 out of the 480 cities in California. Look where 430 to 480 are. Where are 1 to 50? Look where they are! All the wealth is on the coast: San Francisco, the Bay Area, L.A., San Diego, Orange County. And were are the poor ones? They are in the interior of California, pretty much all in the Central Valley. And the poorest ones? The bottom five are all in Fresno and Tulare counties.

There are about 3,000 counties in the country. If you ranked them according to agricultural productivity, the top ten usually have almost all the San Joaquin Valley counties. Numbers 1, 2, 3 for the last fifty years has been Fresno, Tulare and Kern county. Yet you have on the map towns like Huron and Mendota in Fresno County, the richest agricultural county in the whole country. The poorest cities in California are also there. That’s called a contradiction, to have poverty and wealth in one place. This is why it is very important to really start examining these kinds of questions.

Usually this work is done by rural sociologists because they raise questions about the humanistic side of any issue. I found out that there was no other rural sociologists in California at all, not just at UC Davis. The UC System has three ag schools - Berkeley, Riverside and Davis, but there were no rural sociologists. I discovered I was alone and said, “Where are the other rural sociologists?”

After the debate at Wyatt Pavilion, I started doing some digging. I said, “God, what constitutes this climate?” Then I came across this article by Richard Kirkendall, published in 1964, in the California Historical Society Quarterly. It was called “Social Science in the Central Valley of California.” Hot dog! I read it and what it was about. It was a story of the Goldschmidt study.

Walter Goldschmidt was an anthropologist at the University of California at Los Angeles. In the 40’s he did a study of two towns, Arvin and Dinuba. What he was interested in was, “Does the scale of farming impact the quality of life in a rural community?” Everything was the same except for the fact that Arvin was surrounded by big land ownership patterns and Dinuba had a lot of small family farmers. He was finding all kinds of differences between them but as the study started getting known, people began to take sides. People like the Republican Party and big landowners said, “Don’t do it. You have no business asking these kinds of questions!” Other people, like the Democratic Party, Catholic Charities, the liberal press, started saying Goldschmidt should do the study, that it was an important question. He got accused of all kinds of things. What Kirkendall did was to analyze the study. All of this communication between the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Goldschmidt and Paul Taylor, who was an ag economist at Berkeley.

I read through all of the footnotes and found one footnote that said, “The California Farm Bureau passed a resolution saying there should be no rural sociology taught in California.” Ah, ha! So, as a result, here’s California, the largest agricultural
state in the country and no rural sociology. You go to places like Cornell, Wisconsin, Missouri, Illinois, they are all land grant schools, big ag schools that have big rural sociology departments.

I came across some other articles. One was by Gregor, who taught geography here. He wrote an article called “The Plantation System of Farming in California.” Zounds, I realized he was right. He pointed out the contrasts between the west side and the east side of the valley and how you can tell the difference between family farm operations and large corporate scale operations. Earlier, I had read another amazing book by Thomas Kuhn called The Structure of Scientific Revolutions because I was thinking what it was going to take to change the mentality and atmosphere here. The book commented on the major changes in science and what it took to change them. For instance, Galileo was a guy that said the Sun doesn’t go around the Earth, the Earth was only one of its satellites. We are going around the Sun. Boy the people in Church attacked him. He got blasted. So the question was, “What did it take for the people to come around and say Galileo was right?” Kuhn analyzed all of this. I read that and got more of a sense of the reality of working here.

I felt like I better get some advice. I went to see three people who had been identified with doing work to improve the quality of life in rural areas, especially rural California. These were Paul Taylor, Henry Anderson and Ernesto Galarza. Paul Taylor was on the faculty at UC Berkeley. He was married to Dorothea Lange, who was the one who did all the great documentation during the Depression. He used photographs to convince the state to help out the Dust Bowl immigrants, coming in from Oklahoma and Arkansas. They were being mistreated and needed to get housing and social services. I thought he would be a good person to talk to. Then, Henry Anderson had been working on one of the first union efforts in 1960 before Chávez started moving on UFOC and UFW. He had a regular program on KPFA on farm labor. The third guy was Ernesto Galarza. Ernesto Galarza was a historian with a PhD. But in the 1940’s he was very concerned about poverty in California. He started organizing workers. Eventually he lost his job. Stanford fired him. Then the University of Santa Clara fired him. I went to see these people. I told them, “I’m new to UC Davis. I’m doing work on rural poverty but I am getting a lot of flack. Could you give me some advice on how to approach this? What is the best way to do work here?” They were very kind. They all talked to me. Ernesto was in San Jose. Henry and Paul Taylor were both in Berkeley.

They all gave me the same advice! Everyone said the same thing summarized in two words – get tenure! Everybody said, “You better figure out how to survive.” They told me the reality I was up against. It was a real education.

All of this was happening very fast. The whole thing about the debate and Wyatt Pavilion, that all happened within the first year that I was here. I wondered to myself, “God, how are you going to move on this?” Fortunately, when I was at Cornell, I met Bill Friedland. Bill Friedland was a former union organizer for the United Auto Workers. Then he went back to school and got a PhD. He was teaching at the Labor School at Cornell. He wrote me when I got here and said, “Hey, I’m going to take a sabbatic. You need to help me out.”

I said, “Sure.”

He came out to California to do some work on farm labor and went back. The next year, he said, “I am going to move to UC Santa Cruz.”
I said, “Great!” We started to collaborate and work together because I couldn’t find people here that I could talk with. In fact, they would not talk. I said, “We ought to start to look at what is going on with ag. The year that I came, people started using the tomato harvester. The tomato harvester had a big impact! It changed the labor force completely. You had all of these field workers, but they cut that down. The workforce also changed from men to women. They started using women to sort tomatoes.

Friedland and I figured out a strategy on how we should move on this. First of all, we needed some money. So we met in Berkeley and talked to the Vice President for Agriculture for the university.

Before we went in I said, “What do you want to ask for?”

“Why don’t we ask for 1% of the budget for research.” Then we went in and talked to him.

“What do you guys want?”

“1% of budget.”

He almost flipped because 1% of the budget came to several million dollars. We only needed about $10,000 and we did get some money. It came to me and I started a project called “The Social Implications of Research.” We were able to pull together a conference. I invited all kinds of people, including the fledging organic farm movement and family farmers. I had a whole bunch of students working with me. We had this conference in 1973. I remember 1973 because ’73 was the time when Nixon is getting attacked. There was Watergate hearings. It was a dramatic time.

Profile of Practice: Applied Behavioral Science

After the Wyatt debate, Alex McCalla became the Dean of the College of Agriculture. He was sympathetic. He said, “I’ll get money and we’ll put in three positions to get the Community Development Program going.” I started bringing people together and had these courses for undergraduates.

It was a three series course. 151 was Research. I taught people how to go to any town and look at a plot of land, like a gas station, and find out who they bought it from, who they owed money to, if they had any lawsuits against them, etc., and do that without talking to anybody. You do that by going to county offices. You go to the assessor’s office, the recorder’s office, look at fictitious names and all that. You can find all this out. When you do this, you can start learning about ownership, power, corporate control, which was the whole purpose of that. The second course was Community Development to learn how you do things. Alright. What kind of things are going on? How do you solve problems? The third one was Internship. Go out in the field - don’t stay in Davis. Go away for a quarter. I put people out in Appalachia. I put people out on the Navaho reservation. They struck out into the Central Valley. They did great stuff! Here they are undergraduates doing all kinds of stuff about who owns what.

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81 Alex McCalla was Dean and Associate Director of the California Agricultural Experiment Station from 1970 to 1975.
Eventually we started a graduate program here. Alex really came through. We were able to hire three people: Wilbur Sheen, Dean MacCannell and Miriam Wells. They came on board and we started the graduate program. Before they came, I designed courses. Here is what I did. Rather than say, “Here is a course on research or theory.” I asked, “What kind of questions do we want people to be able to answer by the time they get out of here?”

These were the questions behind each of the courses:

1. How can I make sense of the world and explain what is going on around me? You do that by studying theory but also learning research methodology. Good theory helps you to make sense of what is going on. For me, people like Erving Goffman, Saul Alinsky, Pablo Freire have been helpful. Everybody comes up with their own and that is the reason for a theory course on community development.
2. Another was, “How can I get people to work together to solve problems?” That is the essence of community development.
3. The third one was, “How do I find out what works? Where and how? You do that by going out in the field, by being an intern with both grasstips and grassroots. There is a big difference between those two as well as different agencies. Everyone has different approaches. So that was the idea about getting the internship program within the grad program.
4. We also wanted everyone to be confident about their skills and their passions. We encouraged people to pick courses that would help them pursue their own interests. You could specialize through doing a thesis. The question was, “What can I contribute that draws on my particular skills, passions and interests?”
5. The last one was about skills. Any work with people needs more than knowledge. It is also how to get along? How to inspire people? How to conduct meetings? The other thing was, how do you keep your sanity? You are going to be under a lot of pressure, I know a lot about that stuff after my first several years here. How do you do work that allows you go home energized? A lot of people go home from work and they are pooped out. This other work is where you feel high.

If you can answer these questions, you can get your degree next week. This was the idea behind the graduate courses in community development.

Another war story was later, after setting up the department and courses, when I was about to get fired in my tenth year. As things started picking up, I was getting even more flack. They were trying to redo the different units at Davis. The Applied Behavioral Science Department had a reputation of having two kinds of students: the most creative on campus and the most lost. We had all these courses that used to attract a lot of people. Ethnic, Native American and Asian American Studies were in the Department also. The move was on to get rid of these programs. They were going to axe about four people. I was also with Asian American Studies, so I was getting the double whammy.

I wasn’t going to stick around trying to save my own skin when I could be doing other good things. So I went to NCAT in 1977. NCAT stands for the National Center for Appropriate Technology. Get this – it was an effort to figure out how this country could save on energy. Get alternative sources of energy. Use solar power. Use geothermal.
You hear that today? Right. But that was 30 years ago! We started the program in Butte, Montana. The reason it was Butte, Montana was because Mike Mansfield, the Senator from Montana said “I will get the money for you from the War on Poverty provided you locate it in my home state because we want more jobs. So, in 1977 I became Associate Director at NCAT. I was in touch with all the CAA’s, the Community Action Agencies. There were a thousand of them in the country. I was in communication with them all. One of the things I worked on was on farming and agriculture. There is a lot of energy use there. I found people in Missouri that were interested in energy conservation and stopping the use of pesticides. I began to communicate with them. That eventually became something called ATTRA.

At the same time, instead of people in the university, we got a group in the community raising questions about social responsibility called the California Agrarian Action Project. It’s now called CAFF located out on Road 31. They started working on the health problems related to the use of pesticides. Then they found that a Chairman of the Regents, who was a lawyer, was helping a foreign corporation located in one of those ABC islands in South America. This company was incorporated there and he was helping them buy land in the Delta, a couple of thousand acres. CAFF said, “Hey, what’s wrong here? How come the university, including the Regents, are willing to help out large entities but they are doing so little for family farmers or workers?” They sued the university. It brought about more change.

At this time, I was still getting all this flack. We had a retreat and I asked Glen Hawkes who was in Child Development, but also an Associate Dean for the College of Ag, “Hey, Glen, maybe you can help me out. Why have I been getting all this flack all these years?”

You know what he says to me? He was very frank. He says, “Well, first of all, you are a social scientist. The College of Agriculture doesn’t have social scientists (usually its in a rural sociology department). Secondly, you’re a minority.”

I should tell you something about the climate in Davis. When I first came here in ’67, there were very few minority professors here. There were a number of Asians. Some Mexican-American students came up to me and asked if I could be the advisor for their club. There were no Latino professors here at all. No black students could get a haircut in Davis. They had to go to Sacramento. This is 1967. When he said I was a minority he meant that people don’t like the idea that a small minority guy asking questions about social responsibility. That didn’t go over too well.

Profile of Practice: Building Community, Using Networks

I found myself working more and more with groups outside the campus. I got involved with many grassroots organizations. My home became a headquarters for five of them. The person who started the Farmer’s Market, who built the Food Coop, and became mayor later on was Martin Barnes. He was also instrumental in starting the EcoAg Conference. The first EcoAg Conference in Winters had about 75 farmers. It
grows every year. Today, 1,000 people interested in ecological and organic farming come to Asilomar. These are the people who had their offices in my house. My house had all the records of the Farmer’s Market.

We were trying to put into practice doing appropriate technology. I had people living in the house and they had a workshop making a solar-attached greenhouse. We were raising bees and chickens in the backyard. I dug up the front lawn and we were planting herbs there. The classic one was the rooster cock-a-doodle-doing at 6 o’clock in the morning. We also had a grand opening for the Alternative Resource Center with a bluegrass band in the front yard at the same time. We invited the neighbors but some got concerned that not only was their property value going to go down because the lawn was dug up, but we had all this noise and traffic. So I got invited to the Planning Commission. When I walked into the Planning Commission meeting, I thought, “Hey, this isn’t going to be bad at all.” Four of the seven Planning Commissioners were my former students. There’s a lesson there about the network.

At that time, other people in the world start coming to Davis because of this work. I remember meeting with Bill Mollison from Tazmania. He started permaculture. A person with IFOAM, (International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement) came to meet with me. Henry Esbenshade stayed with me. While he was living with me, he started the Davis Farmers Market. Here are all of these people coming and visiting. We had Schumacher, who wrote “Small is Beautiful,” come. He completely filled Freeborn Hall. They propelled appropriate technology, sustainable agriculture and all these movements.

I wanted to mention the importance of connecting up with other people. If you are going to do things in the community, get to know your community. Let them in on it. You can’t just go ahead and do things. Community development seems like you are stuck in one place. It’s not that way at all. If you do work with community, you are working with all kinds of people.

One of the things we do in this department is sponsor the Rural Development Leadership Institute. We have been doing it since 1985. The RDLI recognizes that there are lots of people working in rural areas with minority backgrounds who never got a chance to finish their education. They stopped or wanted to do grad work and they couldn’t do it. So the Institute developed a three way partnership. The institute starts at UC Davis. People then go home and find a mentor in a nearby university to sponsor their research project or other project that will help in the community. Antioch College grants them their degrees. That was the three way deal.

We have done this since 1985. I have a map that shows where these fellows live. It is color coded by ethnicity. Red are Native Americans. Purple are African Americans. Light blue are Latinos, and so on. This is a good way to get a sense of what is going on in rural areas all over the country. They come here every couple of years. The Institute is also a chance for grad students to meet these people. They are board members and fellows. Middle age people of minority backgrounds who are doing a lot of very good work. They are sponsored by groups like the Federation of Southern Coops or the Appalachian Collective. They come here and get a chance to finish their Bachelor’s or Master’s degree then go back and work in their community. They work on projects that are helpful to the community where they came from. This is one important network that’s right here.
Another network I have been working with is the Central Valley Partnership for
Citizenship. We work with emerging immigrant organizations. The valley is rich with
diverse peoples. We follow up with the “Civic Action Network” of 150 emerging groups
from all kinds of ethnic backgrounds. We bring together people so they can network.
Here is a GIS map referring to all of the 18 Central Valley counties. It is really an
organizing tool because if you look at the map, it is colored but it also has a lot of
different symbols. By looking at it you encourage people to connect with other people.
You can find people with the same ethnicity or the same language. For example, a star
represents people working on preserving the traditions of a culture or the arts. Blue is
Spanish speaking. Yellow is the Hmong speaking. Orange is other southeast Asians.
There is a real diversity. We take these to a meeting and say, “Look, see if you can find
people to hook up with and name some of these groups. This is another kind of network.

Profile of Practice: Advice and Answers

I just want to end up with a couple of statements here. When you are at the
university, you are really busy studying, but don’t neglect your avocations and your
interests because a lot of those may pay off just as much as your degree. I got my first
job after finishing at Berkeley as a San Mateo County Probation Officer because I had
been on the judo and wrestling teams. Many of the things you do in addition to your
studies are important.

I also want to mention something about what we are doing here. You are
involved in work called building community. What does that involve? Max Lehrner, who
wrote American is a Civilization, was once asked, “Can you summarize your book in one
word? What is American in one word?” He said, “Access.” That is the job of
community developers too. You want to improve access for everybody. You don’t want
to split community. You want all people to have opportunity and be able to fulfil their
skills and their talents. You are trying to bridge communication.

How do you do this? One of the things that I learned was from my wrestling
coach, Henry Stone, at Berkeley. He was the U.S. Olympic coach at the 1932 games in
Los Angeles. He started the season saying, “There are three kinds of people. There are
those who work with their hands; they are called laborers. Others work with their hands
and their head; they are called a craftsmen. Another person works with their hands,
their head and their heart, that is the artist.” I want all of you to be artists. I think that
applies no matter what you do and especially if you are in community development. That
is how you want to operate.

So I told you a bunch of stories. It is important to put yourself in the context of
stories we come from. That is why I think that it is important to see all of this here.

After the lecture, Isao took some question from the graduate students and faculty.
Student: Isao, one of the things you mention is the importance of land tenure. What would you call the most urgent land tenure issue with regards to social justice in the Central Valley?

Fujimoto: Paul Taylor was working for land reform in California from the ‘30’s on. The U.S. government had an interesting policy under Theodore Roosevelt in 1902 called the Reclamation Act. This was after the Homestead Act and related to the west side of the San Joaquin Valley. The idea was, “How can we use the west side and really build communities there?” The way to build communities was to get people small plots of land but they couldn’t do it without water. No private interests had the money. So the government said, “We’ll put in the water provided you follow three basic guidelines: (1) We’ll bring government water, but the government water will be limited to up to farms of 160 acres. If you use more than that you have to pay for it. (2) If you are going to use the land, you are going to have to live on the land. No absentee ownerships. (3) If you are going to sell the land, you have to sell it at pre-water prices.”

Well, all that land was really owned by groups like Southern Pacific Railroad, the oil companies and so on. After the water, their land value was going to increase. The pre-water price would have been $100 an acre, with well water $500, open water $1,000 an acre. Paul Taylor recognized that and tried to stop it.

There was also a group called National Land for the People who tried to deal with the issue of land reform. When I was training interns, I sent two people to work for National Land for the People. They documented the ownership of the entire valley. Who owned what plots of land? Who was getting what subsidies? All of these people were getting money not to grow crops. The point is to know the reality of the valley. Who owns what? Who can benefit from all of this?

Your question is complicated because there are many ways to attack this issue, but the whole idea of equity and fairness really comes into this. A lot of decisions are based on economics alone, and that’s not enough. That is why it is valuable to have social scientists involved in these discussions. You can’t just have technical discussions.

Faculty: So you got that advice from Paul Taylor and company, I wonder what kind of advice you would give new graduate students coming up to become faculty members or new people coming into the field. What is your advice now?

Fujimoto: I went in naïve and I did what I thought was the right thing to do. I have a more pragmatic approach now. Follow the truth. Concentrate on that first, then be cognizant of the rules of the institution that you are in. You are in a university. The university has certain expectations on you as do your peers. The expectation is for you create new knowledge, write it up and get it published. You have to do that but nothing should prevent you from picking topics that really interest you.

Help people to understand your language, not just your colleagues. One of the main problems that we have is a big language barrier. It’s a gap. It is completely different, even if it is in English. The reason why you have introductory courses – Soc. 1, Anthro 1 so on – is to learn the language of that discipline. If you don’t do that, you are going to completely miss out by the time you get up to the graduate level. By then, you
may as well be speaking Plutonian or some other language because people will not understand you.

So, I would say, be practical. Be realistic. The key word they don’t teach at the academy, and the reality you should know, is the reality of politics. Do your work. Use the scientific method, but the reality is politics. Politics makes things go. You got to know who makes the decisions? What is the power situation? How do people really get along? I didn’t realize that the university is a very political place! So is the church. Politics is the reality of life.

**Student:** You made some really unorthodox decisions, like going to Howard. I was wondering about your parents and your family and the people you grew up with, like the 150 people in your town. How did they receive that when you came back to them and communicated what you were doing?

**Fujimoto:** I come out of a culture which stresses community and people who really didn’t have much opportunity. Things were blocked off. So anything that the new generation could do to start moving ahead was supported. If some of us could go to the university, all well and to the good.

I have seen some real value changes though. One thing in understanding ethnic community, not just the language or the culture, is the difference in the generations. There is a big difference between the first, second, third generations in the Japanese community. The first generation’s main value was: “Let’s survive. Let’s try to figure out how to make our family healthy so they can move ahead.” The second generation said, “We have a chance to go to school but whatever we do, we want to make sure the whole community gets credit. Don’t get in trouble. If you get in trouble, it’s going to look bad on everybody. Do well and give credit to everybody.” The third generation is all “Me.” You don’t worry about your community. You think, “I’ve got to get ahead.” And that is, I think, a societal value now too. Everybody is taught to be very individualistic, “Think about yourself. Think about getting ahead.” There is a big difference here.

My father was born in Japan. My mother was born in Seattle, but she was brought up in Japan. I grew up with a powerful value system of work hard, be honest and don’t brag. In other words, “Don’t promote yourself.” That can get you in some real trouble when you are in a university. The university expects you to promote yourself. You write a year end summary. All of the things you did. I didn’t add any of those things I did there. I looked at other people’s annual reviews, what they wrote down, and said, “You don’t get credit for that!” This worked against me.

Fujimoto waited for the next question. None came. The class was over.

Professor Frank Hirtz came up and thanked him. The department video operator kept recording as the audience bustled out of the room. With the microphone was still on, the camera focused on Fujimoto before his powerpoint and lecture materials. He says to himself, “Alright . . . okay.”
The University of California had distinguished Fujimoto as a Lecturer, valuing him as a teacher. How did he structure and teach his courses? His ABS community development courses and internship were examples of his pedagogy and its purpose. These classes integrated rural sociology, community development and adult education into applied, experiential learning. They taught educational praxis. When Fujimoto arrived at Davis, the university asked him to get the students (who were demanding “relevant” instruction and education from the administration), back into the classrooms during the turbulence of the late 1960’s. To some degree, the university relied upon Fujimoto to design curriculum and courses in response to student demands but also to salvage the legitimacy of their institutions in the eyes of their most valued customers – the students. He accomplished that task, however, with great cost and personal sacrifice.

The ABS course series that Fujimoto built was similar to courses that both Galarza and Villarejo taught in the 1960’s and 70’s at other University of California campuses. These courses emphasized direct engagement and applied learning in community-base settings over extended periods of time. Internship and fieldwork experiences were supported by classroom instruction in social science methods and academic theory. Undergraduate students learned to be politically engaged scholars as they confronted social injustice and economic inequality while attending public universities.
Two course readers written and compiled by Fujimoto and his students during that era illustrated the purpose and values taught in his ABS community development courses. The first was titled *Perspectives on Community*. Its first edition was compiled in 1970 with Fujimoto as the sole author. It was followed by a second edition in 1977 by “The Perspectives Collective.” The third edition, which I reference in this chapter, was by Fujimoto and David Benaroya Helfant in 1978. The other reader was called *Getting the Straight Dope*, a collaborative project written by Fujimoto and undergraduate students who had returned from internships in the Central Valley.

In describing an “activist, grass-roots approach,” *Perspectives in Community* combined many facets of applied community development theory and practice with demands for social change. It included articles by Mao Tse-tung, Bobby Seale, Cesar Chávez, Walter Goldschmidt and Ballis’ National Land for People but it also had lessons and reflections directly from ABS 151 students. It had seven sections:

I. What’s the Problem?
II. Before We Start: Checking Biases and Assumptions
III. Getting Information
IV. What Research Can Reveal
V. Strategies for Social Change
VI. Experiences Of Organizing For Change
VII. Keeping Centered

The 156-page reader had thirty-four articles thematically placed in these sections. As a whole, the reader was a compact toolbox emphasizing the theory of applied research in community.

The *Perspectives* reader prepared undergraduate students for community-based internships with underserved communities. In the introduction, Fujimoto and Helfant
(1978: iv) described how its purpose and design was different than other community
development material:

This reader is different from most current textbooks on community
development because of our activist, grass-roots approach. We believe
that a better society will be created only through the efforts of ordinary
people working for change in their own communities. This contrasts with
the planning model in community development, in which the emphasis is
on the power of the professional instead of on the community members.
Social change must be accomplished by the people, not for the people.

An important message to pick up is that information is power, and
that no research, especially community research, exists in a political
vacuum. We can choose to study oppressed people – and either directly,
or indirectly, help maintain their oppression. Or we can study the “power
structure,” those powerful corporations, institutions, and families that have
great impact on community welfare. Through information and organizing,
we can take power from these narrow interests and assert control to
improve our lives.

Another message here is an emphasis on actual experience in the
community. Education is a process in which we participate in the
community, not just study it as if it existed in a textbook or in a test tube
for student experimentation. We are the community, and our education
comes from our action. By doing we learn and as we learn we gain
confidence. As we gain confidence we build strength, and power!

One of the reasons this collection is called Perspectives on
Community is in recognition that we each bring our unique point of view
to a community situation. This is beneficial because it provides a variety
of ideas when we work together, but it also makes it necessary to be aware
of racist, sexist, ageist, or class biases within each of us.

The reader was premised on the idea that ordinary people will create the popular
movements for social change; not scholars, politicians, planners, organizers or other
leaders or experts. Education, therefore, was needed to empower people through
participatory methods, a praxis of change. Through action, informed by scientific
information, both learning and social change fed each other.

The biases and assumptions of social science was highlighted in Fujimoto’s
instruction. Fujimoto warned that research was imbued with power, which could
facilitate community building but also could be unethical and destructive. His one-page
“How Do We Relate Our Research to the Community” in the *Perspectives* reader discussed the values and purposes which related “one’s inquiry to the needs and sensitivities of the community” while also protecting the community from “being exploited” (Fujimoto 1978: 28). Fujimoto pointed out that exploitation had resulted from scientific study as he warned that “ethnic communities have become increasingly sensitive to exploitation -- both commercial and intellectual.” The issue of who benefits from the research was central to Fujimoto’s lesson and the basis for determining a study’s relevance for both “the researcher and the resident.”

The difficulty of balancing the roles and purposes of scientific study were emphasized in the reader, particularly the tensions between the ostensible neutral position of scientists and the unavoidable intrusion of values into their research. Fujimoto (1978: 28) suggested a research approach that bridged some of the seemingly contradictory roles in applied social science:

Objectivity need not mean sacrificing of sensitivity. If the researcher has a commitment to a community as well as to his scholarship, then being objective and sensitive need not be polar opposites. In working in a community, the key word is “with” -- to work with rather than on the community. Knowledge, if meaningful, is best shared. The test of its relevance comes in the form of its use to the community as well as in the generating of new knowledge on how people, communities, and society can change constructively. (Fujimoto 1978: 28)

This scholarship necessitated a balance between “being objective and sensitive.” Fujimoto’s lesson for his students involved concepts of space and distance, which he distinguished by the prepositions “with” and “on” to teach positionality in the role of scholars. The preposition “with” evoked discourses of inclusiveness and togetherness with community partners; conversely, “on” suggested hierarchy and distance above an object of study.
Fujimoto went further by stating that “meaningful” knowledge was “best shared.” His matter-of-fact comment likely referred to the dissemination of applicable research findings in a “form” useful to the community. Another aspect of shared knowledge was illustrated in Fujimoto’s co-authorship of academic papers. He empowered his students (rather than promote himself through singular authorship) through their shared production of classroom learning materials. His self-effacing disposition strayed from an academic culture that emphasizes claiming credit and self-promotion. While Fujimoto’s collaborative character led to low academic measures of his productivity, it was a successful practice for teaching undergraduates and facilitating community development in rural California.

Another part of Fujimoto’s educational approach was to construct applied research and experiential learning that cultivated student capabilities over time through reflexive assignments and group interaction. These tasks helped them build identities as social scientists. One example, included in the Perspectives reader, was a paper titled “Journal Critique of ABS 151” from an anonymous Native American student (1978: 29-31). This student had been a community activist before coming to UC Davis:

Many of the Indian students have had a great deal of experience in the community. I am twenty-five and have been active in my own community, as well as in other Indian communities. I have been to jail with two hundred other Indians, watched my friends get kicked to death by the police, had guns pointed at me and had experience with county records. So I don’t feel that I need the awareness of problems of the community.

Due in part to his background, the student had not been comfortable with the group of primarily white middle class students he was assigned to work with and who had not been exposed to the life experiences he had endured. These economic and ethnic
tensions were brought into the class through group work, and from this student’s perspective, detracted from his ability to learn.

Fujimoto incorporated student feedback into future course material. In this case, he put the journal entry into a later edition of the reader. This Native American student’s journal concluded:

I know my community does not need people like my group members to solve problems. We need people with knowledge and a feeling for the problems, not do-gooders. I don’t recommend this class for anyone with a background similar to mine as he will be wasting his time. This class is fine for the beginner. It is geared to make white kids feel good.

Imagine including this paper in a future syllabus of that class. What does it say about Fujimoto? What would it tell his future students? Many instructors would refrain from using critiques of their own class in later course readers of that same class; yet pedagogically, by doing so here, the problem is confronted and turned into a learning opportunity. Future Native American students would perhaps see that their experiences were going to be valued, while white students were introduced into the critical perspectives not just in documenting oppressive structures, but of their own class bias in classroom and community interactions. In his next reader, Fujimoto went even further in incorporating his student’s learning as a central component of course material and pedagogy.

The 1973 action research handbook *Getting the Straight Dope* was a collective project between Fujimoto and his students developed from their ABS 159 internship experiences. Mostly written by students, it was accessible to them. The handbook was copyrighted by the “Davis Motion of the Ocean Super Collective,” and as the name implied, the booklet interjected youth culture and humor, even using cartoons, to
illustrate some of its themes. Its title page was a handwritten drawing with cursive writing rather than formally designed and typed.

The handbook’s table of contents framed fieldwork preparation considered most useful by students who had just completed assignments in Central Valley towns. Its chapters and appendix sections, written by different authors, included:

Why This Handbook?
Some Guiding Assumptions

Chapters
1. Starting Out
2. Getting a Feel for the Community
3. Recognizing Issues
4. How to do Research
5. Women as Community Researchers
6. Coming Across
7. What Do I Do With All This Stuff?
8. Before Leaving the Community

Appendix
I. Survival
II. Ethics
III. Tips on Finding Foundation Money
IV. Resources

The handbook described how community-based researchers of the era entered the field, viewed the purpose of their work, interacted with community groups, encountered research subjects and literally survived during field work in difficult settings. Some of the advice in the handbook was more suited to SNCC organizers in Mississippi; for example, there were “survival” tips for “living in a car,” finding food, depression and isolation, and “making money.” Compared with the Perspectives reader which was mostly theoretical, Getting the Straight Dope was practical advice straight from seasoned student scholars.
The introductory chapter was titled “Why This Handbook?” It distinguished differences between the roles of “action researchers” and “organizers.” The role of the action researcher was to build usable knowledge, whereas the organizer applied the information to make change. It was a murky distinction because this action research relied upon the scholar being an actor in the setting:

We are university students involved in community development emphasizing social action research. We received academic credit for our field work and hope this type of program can be instituted in other colleges as well. Thus, this book is intended for other college students who want to broaden their experiences and work for change in society. This type of experience is specifically for students who can devote a limited amount of time with community groups. This philosophy coincides with the intention of the university to extend itself into the community and aid those populations which, in the past, have been disenfranchised.

This is a set of guidelines for action researchers, not an organizer’s manual. The researcher’s role is less visible, but vital to the whole organizing process. Researching an issue yields information to base action. An organizer needs accurate and useful information on an issue to build a group and to formulate solutions. This handbook comes from the research experiences of eight of us in varied California Valley towns. Although the particular circumstances of our work in communities will differ from others, we hope to share some ideas for doing effective action research and living day-to-day in a new community. (DMOSP 1973: i)

These scholars were not claiming neutral research positions (they wanted to change society) as they described their “less visible, but vital” roles played through participatory research.

In a one-page piece titled “Some Guiding Assumptions,” Fujimoto (1973: ii; underlined in original) framed undergraduate field research. His instruction bounded the difficult field work that characterized ABS internships. His first lesson to the often idealistic student scholars was to be reflexive, strategic and critical in their fieldwork:

It is not enough to recognize the situation and get angry. Getting something done means expressing anger intelligently and also being
conscious of why the homework is being done. This means being alert to asking questions that do not stop at doing something about the flaws we see, but get at systemic causes for the existence of these flaws. It is one thing to be angered by the use of child labor in the fields and to direct energies to developing summer schools and day care centers and another to ask questions about the nature of agribusiness – the corporate welfare system, tax policies and subsidy programs – that are the sources of the manifested flaws.

Fujimoto’s concept of “homework” framed this applied research as an assignment like any other, though internships lasted months, required living in unfamiliar settings and enduring some hardship. The young scholars were then instructed through a critical sociological frame to examine, understand and communicate the “systemic causes” of economic control like agribusinesses and monopolized property ownership.

The second assumption re-emphasized a critical research orientation, the politics of scholarship and the concept of power:

Another assumption is that information is power and this means being acquainted with every resource around. Knowing and using the system is therefore, a must. By itself, information is a neutral resource, but as with all resources in a competitive, materialistic society, the decisions concerning how information is generated, how it is used, and for whom, are very political. Academics and scholars who profess value-neutrality and refuse to recognize the social context out of which they work too often become “part of the problem rather than part of the solution.”

Fujimoto engaged the students in a political project. He was clear: they were in a “social context” and could not claim neutrality within their research without transgressing into ethical dilemmas.

In the third assumption, while maintaining a sustained critical tone reminiscent of Nadar’s (1972) “studying up,” Fujimoto discussed the purpose of scholarship. He critiqued conventional social science research and offered the possibility of agency to scholars involved in the “study of change” for those in the most need of assistance.
Thirdly, we assume that those involved in doing community research, or any kind of social research for that matter, must be able to answer the question, “Whose side am I on?” Community research does not mean mindlessly getting information or doing surveys and getting information on people, who often become the very victims of the information they gave out unwillingly or unwittingly. We have too many examples of research being done on people rather than for them. Considering the nature of power in the society and the role of the University as a closed corporation, this outcome should not be surprising. Invariably, information is gathered on those who are powerless or who challenge the power structure. Such information becomes a very important arsenal in the maintenance of the status quo. What compounds this is that American social science stresses the study of structure and functions of things as they are. Under this orientation, the study of change becomes one of examining flaws rather than the structural and institutional context out of which flaws originate.

To insulate his students’ applied research from exploiting research subjects, Fujimoto directed their gaze to a horizon beyond the immediate setting, with its given assumptions and simple narratives. If knowledge was power, then how it was produced needed to be interrogated, including the conditions of the university and the processes of scientific inquiry. This instruction promoted reflexivity by the student scholars. The students were to reflect upon their experience and analyze their own conduct and presuppositions within the study.

The last assumption began with a point that he mentioned at the conclusion of his third assumption: choose significant problems to study by focusing on social structural, not psychological, explanations. Rather than be the subject of a study, many of the working class and immigrant groups that the undergraduates worked with needed social scientists who could help them orient, engage and counter oppressive aspects of California’s socioeconomic system:

And fourth, we assume that community oriented research groups need to select priorities. Not every question, interesting and exotic as it may seem, has an equal amount of payoff. It is those questions that will
provide further insights into the structural constraints as to why things are so screwed up that demand attention. Work on attitudes, individual problems or psychological explanations that put the attention on the flaws, do not contribute much to pointing out the contradictions and places in the structure that need changing. The role of grassroots research and analysis is to point out systemic causes and to put the results together in a way that is understandable and usable to enable social change groups to move ahead. It is in attention to problems pointed out by community groups rather than what the establishment wants done, to structural problems, rather than psychological ones, that we see as the major area of work.

If community groups were to access the scientific data and analysis, the scholars’ text needed to be “understandable and usable.” Politically engaged scholars needed to coherently translate social science to the community-based groups on their own terms and for their own needs.

Profile of Practice: Keep Moving Ahead

From 2000 to 2002, I did ethnographic research for an M.S. thesis at Davis. My study sought to understand why white parents had removed their children from a rural California town’s only elementary school. While doing the research, I learned of Goldschmidt’s study and the history of the Human and Community Development Department (previously Applied Behavioral Sciences). Orville Thompson (an emeritus professor who had originally founded the department) had an office down the hall from me in Hart Hall and I would stop by to hear stories of the department. Isao, though retired, still worked with students, including helping to advise me on my thesis research. Without realizing it, at this early stage, I was being introduced to my dissertation topic.

A few years later, I returned to graduate school at Cornell for a doctoral degree, influenced by what I had learned earlier. The problems in the valley had persisted over
the decades of both academic analysis, science-based policy recommendations, legal action and community activism. If these approaches (and others) had not resolved the region’s problems, what would? What should be the next steps to continue the struggle?

As my dissertation project developed, I once again turned to Isao for advice. On May 27, 2006, I emailed Isao before my first site visit to the San Joaquin Valley:

Isao,

Hope all has been well. Since I saw you last at the Sust. Ag and Higher Ed. Conference in California, I have been working with Mark Van Horn and others to try to start a national organization and perhaps co-host a second conference with Penn St. and Cornell. (I am in a doctoral program at Cornell, just finishing my first year.)

I received enough money to fly out to California and head down to the southern San Joaquin Valley this summer. I am exploring the idea of revisiting Goldschmidt some 70 years later - in addition to your work, MacCannell’s . . . I will be coming through Davis in the first week of July and likely staying at the Domes. Will you be around?

It would be nice to catch up and get some advice on how to move forward. I am considering doing a public records search, a power structure analysis of sorts, similar to the work you used to have students do for your class. I have been looking at Don Villarejo’s "Research for Action" guidebook for advice.

Are you in town around July 7 through 11th? Could you spare some time?

Hope to see you,
Daniel O’Connell

We were not able to meet that summer as Isao was teaching in Japan. I emailed back to saying I planned to move to Visalia the following year and network through American Friends Service Committee projects. I also asked about “Getting the Straight Dope” as a research approach.

Later the same day, Isao responded:

Hi Daniel,

Visalia has a small but very fine Friends Meeting. People associated with that meeting have made major contributions to improving the quality of life in the south San Joaquin Valley – from organizing Self Help Housing to helping kick off the United Farm Workers to preserving
Allensworth. Proyecto Campesino started out over 50 years ago and some of the key people are still alive.

The booklet you mention came out of a class that I taught which put undergraduates out in the community for the entire quarter interning in Appalachia, the Navajo reservation, the United Farm Workers, etc. It got revived as Rural Research Access Project which organized the first Eco Ag conference with 75 people in the Winters firehouse but now brings in 1000+ to Asilomar. Martin Barnes revived it in the late 70s and with it came a number of spin offs such as the Alternative Agricultural Resources Project, Winds of Change newspaper featuring the drawings of R Crumb (who used to live in Winters and now is in France along with Martin Barnes). Barnes was here on Wednesday for the 30th anniversary of the Farmer's Market which had its records kept in the back room of my house.

Isao

Many of Isao’s emails, like this one, were about networks and connections, introductions and suggestions. He laid out multiple potential paths of inquiry and encouraged me as I felt my way forward.

On January 15, 2008, I emailed news of our arrival in the San Joaquin Valley. At that time, I continued to explore doing an ethnographic, community-based study:

Hi Isao,

We moved into a home in Visalia this weekend. Good to be back. I am situating myself. Much of the time I have found the AFSC/Proyecto Campesino office as the best fit. I really enjoy working and commiserating with Graciela, the director.

There are so many community efforts going on, it feels like Peace Corps with a bit more resources. I honestly feel more at home here than in academic settings. My time at Davis and Cornell was important and refreshing, but I like getting my hands dirty a little bit more often.

I am considering looking at the intersection of rural governance and community organizing particularly in unincorporated areas.

I hope all is well and we can meet up soon.

Best,

Dan

Hours later, Isao replied:

Hi Dan,

Welcome back to California! I was in on a conference call with Graciela this morning.
I just completed the draft of a manuscript on the work of the Central Valley Partnership. Tom Lyson was my chair and after he died, Charles Geisler took over. David Holmberg in Anthropology and Ron Mize are the other two on my committee.

I have some material you can look at as you search for a focus on the Valley.

Isao

The next day, I emailed:

Hi Isao,

I was in the adjoining office when Graciela was on the conference call. I think the world of her and am so pleased to be able to spend time with her.

I am glad to hear that Chuck took over for Tom on the committee. Chuck was very helpful with me my first year at Cornell (He had kept all of the newsletters of George "Elfie" Ballis' National Land For the People — an interesting journey through history for me).

By the way, I don't know if I previously mentioned it, but I met with Walter Goldschmidt a couple of months ago. Feisty as ever. He is now in an assisted living center in Los Angeles but doing well. I am going to try to meet up with him again soon to hear some of his stories about Paul Taylor and Dorothea Lange. (Last time we talked about As You Sow).

Hope to see you in a couple of weeks.

Best,

Dan

Isao replied the following day:

Hi Dan,

Good to get an update on your plans and interests. George Ballis is still very active. He's made 100s of short documentaries on all kinds of social justice issues as you may have see on his web site. Good to know you are in Visalia and focusing on the movements in the Valley. This is an important topic with a long trail of events and sporadic writing so pulling it together with a current analysis would be a great contribution. Many of the post WWII players are still around.

Good to know about Walter. One of the books from his library that he passed on to me to keep or donate to UC Davis is a gem called Labor Unionism in American Agriculture. It details all the movements in California and especially in the Central Valley prior to WWII. It was written by Stuart Jamison and published by the US Dept of Labor when Frances Perkins was Secretary of Labor in Roosevelt's cabinet.

Last spring I gave a talk to the CD grad students titled: “War Stories I lived to tell from 40 years of encounters with community development and sustainable agriculture at UC Davis.” I don't recall
mentioning this to you. If you're interested, I can send you a powerpoint that outlines the talk. The talk is available on a CD.

The time period you are considering for a visit to Davis fits in with my being here. So let me know when your plans firm up.

Isao

By 2008, I was considering comparing the valley’s history of social science scholarship and with its history of community organizing as a dissertation project. I had previously discussed with Isao the six scholars (including himself) for the study.

That Spring I emailed:

Hi Isao,

I wanted to check in with you since I will be coming though Davis on Saturday, April 5th. I hope to discuss your work and experience as a scholar working within the context of the Central Valley. There appears to be a history of political pressure in which social research has been conducted in the region; a history that belies the narrative of scholars being able to do there work from neutral positions and without outside pressure.

Are there others scholars I should be thinking of by the way? Perhaps Angus Wright or William Friedland?

Look forward to hopefully seeing you.

Best,

Dan

In his March 19, 2008 response, Fujimoto suggested what would become a central facet of my study. He also continued to connect me with literature and contacts:

Hi Dan,

Looks like you're on to a topic “the politics of academic research in the Central Valley of California” or if you go on to something else, at least you'll have the realistic foundation on which to proceed. The title I gave is a take off on the Kirkendall article about Goldschmidt's experience. This is mentioned in the power point I sent you. I would recommend all the items there. The Hardin book recommended by Larry Busch who recommended it to me has a lot about the battles researchers had to wage (and lost) taking on issues in Land Grant colleges of agriculture.

Yes, talk to both Angus and Bill Friedland. They can tell you
plenty. Another person to see is Bill Lacy, now Vice Provost for outreach and Intl Affairs for UC Davis. He and Busch studied all aspects of the social implications of agricultural research and probably a good source on the politics of research. Another person is Bill Liebhardt. He was at Rodale before he came to Davis as director of SAREP and you may know him. He had his share of battles here showing that the presence of a sustainable ag and small farm center didn't mean acceptance of a broader perspective. The current and newly appointed director of Sustainable Ag programs is another person to see.

I finished the dissertation on the Central Valley Partnership and just sent it to Chuck Geisler for his review. I'm attaching the front pages, title sheet, table of contents, figures and the preface to give you an idea of what I worked on. If you're interested in reading the 7 chapters I can send you a CD which you can drag the icons on to your computer and use the tracking system on Microsoft Word to inject any questions or comments you want to make. Send me a snail mail address if you want to see it or if you prefer to pick it up when you get here in April.

Isao

A short time later, Isao passed his B exams at Cornell earning his dissertation 40 years after leaving to work at UC Davis.

In November 2009, I emailed Isao before Thanksgiving:

Hi Isao,

I am finally trying to finish my dissertation after working for a year and a half as Farmland Conservation Director for the southern San Joaquin Valley.

The focus of the study is the historical scholarship that has occurred in the valley by highlighting the social science and educational practice of Paul Taylor, Walter Goldschmidt, Ernesto Galarza, Dean MacCannell, Don Villarejo and yourself. In the next week I will visit Stanford's and Berkeley's libraries to research Taylor's and Galarza's papers.

I had wanted to compare how Quakers and scholars have organized and worked in the valley, but my committee suggested that I focus on the scholars only.

Hope all is well and I look forward to catching up.

Best regards,

Dan

Late November, Isao emailed news that had already crossed the valley – Elfie Ballis was dying.
Hi Dan,

There's been a number of events that relate to the topic of your dissertation. Last week, there was a farewell gathering for George Ballis at his home at Sun Mountain in Prather. All the movement people going back to SNCC and UFW organizing days that Ballis documented with his photographs plus current activists arrived to enliven Ballis' final days. He hasn't long to live and expressed a desire to see everyone while he was still alive. George got trained in photo documentation from Dorothea Lange and carried forth Paul Taylor's work in land reform in California through National Land for People.

Keep me posted on how things are developing for you.

Isao

In March 2010, I had fully engaged in writing my dissertation. Isao continued to receive recognition for completing his own dissertation:

Hello Isao,

It is great that your achievement is receiving the public recognition it deserves. Recently I have turned toward completing my dissertation as well. For the last two years I have been deeply engaged in various community development, non-violence and non-profit projects in the southern San Joaquin Valley. Now, I am putting those on hold in order to finish my research.

My committee recently signed off on my proposal. As you know, I will be looking at the work of scholars in the valley. I am currently outlining and framing this history. For your work, I thought about focusing on your organizing and educating students. Pamphlets like "Perspectives on Community" and "Getting the Straight Dope" will be ideal for understanding this work. A couple of years ago, you gave me a syllabus for AB 151 that I also thought would be interesting to delve into. I seem to recall that much of it reminded me of Hunter's (1963) community power structure research and analysis. Was that the case?

How does this sound to you? Since my dissertation will be examining what I call "pedagogies of scholarship" to look at the intersection of knowledge production and its dissemination, your work and educational practice may be some of the strongest examples of this in the valley.

Again, I am so happy that you have completed the degree as are many others. Hopefully I will be finishing mine soon too.

Best regards,

Dan

Later that day, Isao emailed:
Hi Dan,

Good to hear from you. I'll be glad to discuss and respond to any questions you have regarding your dissertation topic. In addition to the materials you mentioned, I set up a 12 unit field course (formerly ABS 159) which was the third leg of the Community Research (ABS 151) and Community Development (ABS 152) classes. The 12 unit placement (no longer offered) placed students as research interns with various community organizations to apply what they learned. The three courses mentioned are still on the books but not in the research for action approach they originally took.

An example is the research done on who owns the land in the Central Valley. The posters summarizing all the landowners were used by National Land for People calling for the enforcement of the 160 acre limitation law that would encourage the development of family farms on the westside of the Valley (but never happened due to the continuing control of corporate land ownership and water use).

In addition to working with students at UC Davis, a team of us - George Ballis, Chuck Gardiner from the Visalia AFSC office and I ran workshops on how to research community power and use it for community organizing. We did this through University Extension training hundreds of War on Poverty workers over a four year period in the early 70s. In the UC Davis faculty archives, there's an interview I conducted with Jim Grieshop that comments on some of these projects. Emmitt Fiske's dissertation can also be applicable to your dissertation.

I'm planning to come to Ithaca for the graduation ceremonies in late May and again in Mid June for a reunion of Cornell students who were part of the CURW sponsored Cornell-Honduras projects that ran from 1961-65.

Isao

On March 24, 2010, I emailed Isao after watching the “War Stories” video. I asked him about the ABS 159 student interns who went to work for NLP and George Ballis.

Later that day, Isao emailed me back. His message illustrated the long-term outcomes of his networking approach to education and community development. The ABS undergraduates went on to continue his work in many different ways:

Hi Dan,

Among the students who worked on land ownership issues in the Central Valley via the full quarter internship included Judy Whalley,
Garrett Starmer and Marie Jobling. Judy went on to law school and work with the US Dept of Justice that broke up the AT&T monopoly. Gary became a minister and Marie was a full time community organizer in San Francisco. She was an associate of Mike Miller, director of the Organizer Training Center and author of A Community Organizer's Tale: People and Power in San Francisco, a story of the rise and fall of people power in San Francisco's Mission District. Garrett and another intern spent an entire quarter working with George Ballis, documenting who owned what land in the westside of the San Joaquin Valley. This was used to push for the enforcement of the 160 acre limitation law which was meant to open up the Valley to small scale farming and build communities on the West side of the San Joaquin Valley owned mainly by corporations and huge landowners. George made a slide show that included the detailed work showing who owned what. This was used as an organizing tool for public meetings. Judy Whalley did something similar, showing corporate interlocks on the power brokers in Shasta County where corporations like PG&E took the land belonging to the Pit River Indians for 12 cents an acre. This became the subject of an earlier Ballis film called "The Dispossessed." Marie worked with the Filipino community in Stockton, turning the at large voting system to one district. This enabled minority communities to have candidates represented on the school board and city governments. If you have a copy of Getting the Straight Dope, look at the authors who contributed to the various sections. Most are still around.

I'm coming to Cornell for the commencement. I've been asked to be the Degree Marshall leading the procession from the Arts quad to Schoellkopf stadium.

Isao

As I wrote my dissertation, I emailed chapters to Isao to review as he continued offering advice and encouragement through the process.

Nearing the end of my research in early March 2011, I stopped by UC Davis. I walked over to Hart Hall to meet Isao. The hallway was dark. Most doors shut and the offices empty. Budget cuts had prevented the replacement of retiring professors.

It was the usual visit with Isao, like a reverse interview Isao was asking what I had been doing. What have my interests been lately? What projects am I doing? He typed the information straight into his computer along with names of people and, organizations I mentioned. We also caught up on campus news and old friends. At one
point, he mentioned a lesson from his experience working as a professor, “Most people wait until they get tenure [to become politically active], but when they do that they get sandpapered. They learn to be cautious and can’t get back to their roots.” Later, he further in describing what the disposition of a scholar should be: “Play down the ego. Develop contacts in the community.” Simple advice that was hard to follow. Meetings with Isao were always educational for me; he was teaching, always teaching.
What did this narrative teach us about the pedagogies of the politically engaged scholarship that occurred in the San Joaquin Valley? This history offered lessons not only about the politics of California but also the practices, techniques and methods of scholars producing knowledge within divisive political settings. The story of their work spans multiple places and spaces, weaving across personal perspectives and decades of time.

In review I draw upon three themes from the story. First, I revisit the core social science findings of the narrative by discussing Goldschmidt’s hypothesis and MacCannell’s retests in light of developing a theory of democracy. Second, I broadly review the pedagogical lessons of politically engaged scholarship in the valley. What can we learn about pedagogy from these scholars’ life stories, teaching experiences and academic work? Finally, I discuss the potential for agency within narrative, by turning to Kenneth Burke’s “dramatism” and Rancière’s “emancipated spectator.” How can we become effective actors, not solely as scholars but also as citizens, in promoting social justice, economic equity, ecological stewardship and democratic process?

**Toward a Theory of Democracy**

Let’s begin by taking care of some old business – Goldschmidt’s study, MacCannell’s scientific retests and what their results tell us about the social structure of rural society where industrial agriculture dominates the landscape.
After his passing, Goldschmidt’s lament lingered with me. We had been discussing the Central Valley Project, reclamation law and Paul Taylor’s devotion to the acreage limit when Goldschmidt, thinking of Taylor, drifted, “I had a guilty conscience because of him when I left the fight. He was my conscience or else I would be waning now, rapidly waning.” Perhaps out of friendship or devotion, Goldschmidt, well into his nineties, had not stopped caring either for his mentor or their shared purpose.

Goldschmidt’s hypothesis, his cause and purpose, fit with conventional wisdom. According to Goldschmidt, social, civic and political costs were associated with concentrations of economic wealth and control of natural resources. Economic dominance by enormous, concentrated, vertically integrated businesses atrophied civic life, increased material poverty and eroded democratic governance. Based on the findings of his study, industrial interests should have been the last to receive public subsidies and government investments, like water from the Central Valley Project, cheap labor through Public Law 78, or technical assistance and scientific innovations from land grant universities. Yet, these interests benefited above all other constituencies, including family-scale farmers and farmworkers.

A theoretical question underlay Goldschmidt’s line of inquiry – what economic structure was appropriate for democracy? In 1972, Goldschmidt noted before Congress that “democratic, egalitarian communities with high levels of social participation and stability of population are good.” That was a foundational value for him, one which shaped his scholarship. He perceived this democratic and egalitarian principle as a “shared value” held by the general public and a basic cultural narrative in the country’s

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history. He also deplored claims of “value-neutrality” in science because he thought this undermined these “traditional values.” Explicitly positioning himself as a “public servant” and a scholar in this congressional appearance, he evoked the strongest possible discourses in arguing, through his empirically-based findings, for democracy.

Later, MacCannell’s macrosocial studies statistically validated Goldschmidt’s original research. His studies technically accomplished the retests by constructing a “research design which permits us to confirm (or disconfirm) a relationship between agribusiness development and community underdevelopment.” An important point was that MacCannell constructed a quantitative research design that could be scientifically replicated. Recall MacCannell’s April 1987 letter to Goldschmidt where he emphasized the scientific process:

*Now the question for the critics is, Can they still believe that small farms communities are just as likely to have slow income growth as large farm communities? The answer is Yes, of course. But they cannot dismiss our finding on the ground of case selection. If they want to hold to their position, they must do research, using essentially the same design, in which they introduce new variables and demonstrate that the farm structure—community conditions relationship we have discovered is spurious. Any lesser response will reveal the criticism to be politically motivated. We have not yet moved to this stage in the debate . . . the critics have enjoyed 40 years of the luxury of not having to come up with a well-formed alternative hypothesis. Now the ball is in their court.*

This challenge still stands: send a fleet of agricultural economists to the Westlands or the Valley as a whole to conduct studies replicable to MacCannell’s retests. Otherwise the rational choice would be to change public policy to support an economy that builds democracy, sustains community and supports families. Given the power arrangements, scholars have a pedagogical imperative of scientific and moral responsibility not to allow Goldschmidt and MacCannell’s work to be dismissed or ignored.
Broader social questions continue to mount. Is it ethical to have farmworkers instead of farmers? Does it make economic sense in the long term? What happens to a society where low wage employees (who often are not citizens with voting or labor rights) work for multi-billion dollar international conglomerates? Are farmworkers working at Paramount Farms able to negotiate in any meaningful way their employment benefits and standard of living? What are the social, environmental and political costs of economic inequality? Goldschmidt’s hypothesis, MacCannell’s retests and the context of the San Joaquin Valley inform these questions.

The history of their politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley came to center upon the character (and maybe even the possibility) of democracy in a capitalist economy. MacCannell (1988: 25) pondered:

Can American democratic institutions survive the death of the family farm, the last important economic activity not already concentrated in two or three international corporations whose board and management are neither representative of the general population nor accountable to it? Or is democracy itself like the family farm, an archaic concept, already an illusion that is artificially maintained by government programs?

Democracy rooted and grew with equity and vested interest. The alternative – injustice, corruption, and misgovernment – thrived where people were too exhausted from overwork, stressed by poverty and lacked the skills to effectively engage their civic responsibilities and political institutions. Remember Senator Douglass’ belief that the “basis of American agrarian democracy” was a rural society “where the owner is the cultivator.”

The backstory of the valley’s scholarship, and in particular Goldschmidt and MacCannell’s experiences, illustrated the corrosive effects of industrial agriculture on public institutions like universities and legislatures. The resources possessed by
industrial agribusiness and other capitalist interests influenced the direction of research at public universities and the legislative process, all to the benefit of these interests and to the disadvantage of other sectors of society. What does it mean for society’s ability to understand itself and make institutional change when its mechanisms for asking questions and seeking answers are influenced and corrupted? With the completion of these studies, scientific research had demonstrated that industrial agriculture had an assortment of negative outcomes for the rural communities situated near industrial-scale enterprises. In this case, however, the “truth” of science did not displace the power of interests. An expanded educational approach was necessary to create change.

Pedagogies of Politically Engaged Scholarship

When I began graduate school more than a decade ago, I wanted to understand the potential for creating social change through activist scholarship and of integrating the roles of organizer, educator and scholar. I first explored this possibility as an ethnographer in a farmworker town where I detailed processes of social segregation and institutional racism (O’Connell 2002; see also Prins 2007). Later, in this dissertation, I undertook investigating this history of the politically engaged scholars who confronted Californian agribusiness.

The idea that scholars would promote beneficial change in their communities should be common sense. Though assumed rather than explicit, values of community benefit and well-being legitimate scientific inquiry and its application. The knowledge

83 The social construct of “community benefit” refers to meeting the needs of people (food, shelter, education, health care, etc. as well as fostering democratic participation.
that these Valley scholars produced, and lessons they taught, were not neutral. In fact, the tacit expectation was that their work would produce change.

These scholars explicitly studied, taught and organized. In the process, they transgressed undelineated borders in contested territories. The narrative of their work offered lessons in the political struggles over the economic and social structure not only in the San Joaquin Valley, but in society as a whole. Some of the lessons for political engagement from these scholars can be summarized:

- Practice supercedes theory.
- Hybridize roles and shift positions as necessary.
- Engage problems directly over extended time periods.
- Hold, carry and share truth.
- Expect political reaction.
- Pressure indicates relevance.
- Persevere through adversities.
- Leverage legal precedent and public process.
- Design research to interrogate social problems.
- Produce texts for varied constituencies.
- Enable social movements.

Let’s look at these in more depth.

The basic idea was that the role of social scientist in society should not be limited to scientific discovery, publishing in academic journals and teaching on campus. Instead, these politically engaged scholars accepted a complex set of roles that varied with the needs of community (including scientific communities). Their willingness to deviate from traditional approaches can be attributed to both their personal dispositions, and the highly politicized contexts they worked in as social scientists. Many of the valley’s early scholars created their own unique research methods as they undertook new fields of academic study (some of which became institutional programs). In this sense, the construction of theory best occurred in relation to the evolving social problems.
Scientific and educational praxis informed upon the development of critical theories that resulted from scholarly engagement.

Community needs and pertinent research topics were best identified by these scholars through direct engagement and close proximity to research problems and objects of study. If the resolution of problems relied upon access to their setting, the valley’s scholars adapted roles to fit into the context of their research and explore the potential solutions that emerged from their work. They worked, for example, as community developers, labor organizers, government researchers, non-profit directors, and lecturers because relevant research and critical pedagogies were most effective within the social context of research problems. With relevance as a goal, these scholars closed the gap between their intellectual work and the lives of people they wanted to learn from and to assist. When political pressure was exerted on the scholars and their organizations it revealed pertinent vulnerabilities in the political and discursive formations they encountered and studied.

In each case, effective engagement to create social and political change often took decades. In some respects, this narrative of valley scholarship is a story of intergenerational intellectual work by a succession of scholars. A small community of social scientists engaged in researching problems that spanned social movements and historical epochs. Over time, as their understanding matured, they improved tactics, innovated strategies and refined theory. In these contests over truth, scholars (just as all people) were obligated to hold their positions until they were socially accepted or convinced otherwise. In their endeavors, they sacrificed, perhaps even suffered, for the truth.
Political reaction to their research findings and academic engagement often involved direct manipulation of scientific inquiry, attempts to hinder discovery and efforts to block the dissemination of findings. While some scholars like Galarza tactically invited attack by baiting their opponents; more often than not, powerful economic interests weighed in on the scientific process attempting to intimidate scholars and muddle or falsify results. Some examples included: FBI investigations of Taylor, agribusiness reactions to *Strangers in the Fields*, USDA censorship of *As You Sow*, John Harris pressuring MacCannell’s scientific inquiry, the University of California refusing to accept Cooperative Extension Farm Labor specialists paid for by the Kellogg Foundation, and Molly’s firing for trying to bring farmworker kids to school on a double-decker bus. In many of these examples, political pressure indicated to the scholars that they were hitting their mark. If the valley scholars had identified a meaningful target and there was political reaction, it was because a worthwhile vulnerability had been breached. Reactions would not likely have been elicited from a distance and without direct engagement because they would not have been seen as threats. A future lesson for politically engaged scholars is to expect political pressure and to prepare for, in Galarza’s words, “some pretty rough treatment.”

Over the course of this narrative, an erosion of legal precedent occurred in maintenance of democratic public life. Law breaking by large landowners and major corporate interests became more blatant over time. Early in the struggle, scholars like Taylor and Galarza appealed to legal precedent and public process as a strategic maneuver. In Taylor’s case, the efficacy of his defense of reclamation law was buttressed by the inability of agribusiness to easily violate the law’s mandate. Given this
circumstance, his tactic of writing law reviews was an obvious strategic choice. Galarza’s strategy in the case of the braceros was different – his goal was to overturn an unjust law rather than encourage enforcement of an enacted, democratic one like Taylor. Public Law 78 undermined wages and working conditions for farmworkers. In effect, it was a grower subsidy (though consumers may have benefited from less expensive produce) where the costs were born by the most vulnerable and exploited laborers in the economy. Over a decade, Galarza used scholarship combined with direct action (popular education, litigation and strikes) as pedagogies and strategies to improve social justice through ending the law. Other scholars made similar appeals with less strategic success later in the century. Ultimately, the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act illustrated the strategic limitations of appealing to the legal system for fostering change. For politically engaged scholars, however, the abandonment of legal and public precedents or public institutions, like land grant universities, was an untenable option – democratic principles had to be invigorated and threats to them contested.

In the field, the valley scholars’ research designs were sociologically framed but methodologically adaptable. Rather than follow strict research protocols, their problem solving approaches included many strategic decisions on how, where and why knowledge should be created and deployed. Questions included: Who was the audience? And what outcome was expected? For decades, Taylor was innovative in his use of photography and willingness to use qualitative methods in writing law reviews. Galarza’s scholarship chronicled his experience as a labor organizer. *Spiders in the House and Workers in the Field* described decades of intellectual engagement that incorporated a multi-sited study of strikes, strategic use of legal process, involvement with Congressional proceedings and
political intrigue. Goldschmidt’s Arvin-Dinuba study centered on the most important (and controversial) reclamation questions relating to how monopolies in landownership and economic consolidation affect rural communities. MacCannell, using regression analysis, validated Goldschmidt’s findings and extended its budding theory of democracy. Villarejo, aligned with the critical disposition of his era, utilized investigative methods while partnering with social movement groups. Fujimoto integrated politically engaged research in his classroom pedagogy while incorporating extensive undergraduate fieldwork into his community studies curriculum.

While there were numerous pedagogical methods used by valley scholars, their most conventional was to disseminate their findings through published texts and they did this in multiple venues. Taylor, Galarza and Goldschmidt all published books. The first two, Taylor (1979) and Galarza (1977), also compiled comprehensive reviews of their valley work and research near the end of their lives. Goldschmidt and MacCannell published in professional journals and other traditional academic venues, while Villarejo and Fujimoto utilized alternative spaces like non-profits reports or classroom readers which were disseminated as educational, how-to publications emphasizing action research. Of all the scholars, Villarejo’s work was the most accessible to the general public as it was later posted on the CIRS website. On the other hand, not everything was easily accessible. Archived papers (Taylor and Galarza) and government reports (Taylor, Goldschmidt, MacCannell and Fujimoto), important as they were, were often difficult for the public and others to locate and access.

The valley’s scholars strategically varied the form and voice of their texts. Fujimoto’s class readers, often co-written with students, adopted the voice of his
audience – “Getting the Straight Dope” was the title of one of these readers. These documents emphasized access and relevance for the pedagogical purpose of instructing students and informing politically active citizens. Villarejo published semi-formal research reports in non-academic venues, often with staff and interns as co-authors. Both Taylor and Galarza published books, e.g., *An American Exodus* and *Strangers in our Fields*, which were designed for policy makers or the public at large rather than for academics. Depending on the immediacy of a particular threat or what they deemed to be strategically useful, these scholars produced non-academic texts in styles that potentially undermined their credibility among social scientists. These scholars’ values and orientation led them to pursue work that was “with the people” rather than for professional advancement. Many of them were community development specialists or outright community organizers. Late in my narrative, action research became a prominent method available to politically engaged scholars who participated in and contributed to fostering social movements.

In addition to these points from the scholars’ experiences, I wanted to add two others from my own thinking based on my project:

- Language matters.
- Re-imagine power.

Each time we create text, we evoke ourselves. When we speak, write or think, we are offered an opportunity to find and center ourselves yet draw meaning from social worlds. If people know themselves through language, that knowledge is housed in community because the meaning of words as symbols is held outside of ourselves. A word or expression in effect involves the speaker borrowing meaning, and in so doing slightly altering it to the social context and the intent of the speaker. While sometimes
nearly imperceptible and apparently inconsequential, our reflexive awareness in producing text allows us to be present (and therefore empowered) in our thoughtwords moment to moment. Creation of text is an ongoing, ever-present way to create change as it offers access to public space while obligating us to look at the moral value of our thoughts. This subtle and minute form of agency (which is also ever present and always accessible) is then an ongoing possibility in the text we produce; not only for scholars, but as citizen-subjects. Since we ideally inhabit each word that we speak, we are invited into an ethical engagement akin to an ongoing meditative practice within our enunciation of thought. In this sense, through reflexive thought, power can be understood as available and productive rather than limited and repressive; it is epistemological rather than solely institutional.

Agency within Narrative

If agency is our capacity to make choices and act with these choices as a goal, then how can we understand these scholars’ work as change agents through narrative? In this study, I have shown how politically engaged scholars have evoked agency in acting to promote agrarian democracy and to challenge agribusiness monopolies. Through their stories and texts derived from first person recollections, university lectures, interview transcripts, research files, personal correspondence in letters and emails, unpublished manuscripts, academic articles, books, etc. – we have listened. They teach across time because their work still is relevant to, and resonates with, the problems we confront today.
These were scholars whose values motivated them to address the injustices they saw in the Valley, which they addressed using scientific tools and their personal resources. A prevalent theme framing this narrative was that these scholars were in a struggle, a series of battles in a long war. Many of their pedagogies can be seen as tactics in that fight. As the valley beckoned to fighters seeking worthy battlefields, a handful of scholars answered the call.

How do we understand this odd juxtaposition of scholars in political struggle, engaged in a slow motion war that utilized knowledge rather than artillery? One clue can be found in a letter written fifty years ago, when Taylor enlisted Paul Gates at Cornell into battle, “The history with which you deal comes to life again, periodically, as you know. The sowing of the harvest of political battles of today was in the period and happenings that you studied long ago . . . The latest battle is on right now.” Taylor goes on to ask Gates, “if you are willing to wield your pen again in this battle,” as he deployed his allies. Taylor, the former frontline military officer, did not use violent weapons nor did he look like a heroic action figure. He was not outwardly aggressive nor boisterous. Instead, he was subdued and systematic, rational and strategic, patient and focused. His foremost weapon was knowledge deployed through his pedagogies, which he used to fight “lone battles.”

And after all, Fujimoto reminded us, these were “war” stories. In that lecture at UC Davis, Fujimoto began, “if we are going to make any sense of what we are doing, we have to know what story are we in.” His “war stories” lecture was a reminiscence in which he offered advice to younger scholars. He ended the lecture with an invitation for the students to see themselves in the narrative, “it is very important to put yourself in the
context of the kind of stories we come from.” Context was key. Just as Fujimoto had sought out scholars like Taylor and Galarza who had come before him in his work, he was encouraging the students to frame their work in history through story. In fact, subtly, he invited the students to the struggle through the story’s he presented to them. Fujimoto’s exhortation was not as much about being reflexive as it was about situating themselves, who they were, their unfolding and evolving identities, in a social movement within society.

The scholars in this narrative shared their stories about themselves and their work because they wanted their cause, their purpose and truth, to remain real, alive and active. In 1977, when Galarza gave his lecture to Berkeley graduate students, he told them to interrogate his research. Speaking of himself in the third person, he invited them: “Look, this is not the complete story. There’s a lot that he’s left out of here. Where is the rest of it?” His point was that the rest of the story was for them – for us, too, – to write and realize. By writing this dissident story, I entered into its ongoing narrative; one that has been previously censored and suppressed. In an almost forgotten history I searched for my voice by experiencing its spaces and contexts – in land grant universities and farmworker towns, through regression statistics and iconic photographs, within historic public policy and disregarded laws. During the process, I learned from the valley’s scholars as research subjects and as mentors.

In one of those lessons, MacCannell told me of Kenneth Burke who had “developed a framework or paradigm of reference that was necessary to analyze anything dramatic.” Burke had influenced Frank Young, who MacCannell said was “poetical in his application of empiricism” and Erving Goffman, who had used Burke’s
“dramaturgical frame of reference.” On my next visit, MacCannell showed me Burke’s 1945 book *A Grammar of Motives*. I opened to the first page, which had been heavily underlined in pencil, and read, “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it?” Burke continued:

We shall use five terms as generating principle of our investigation. They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names the place, in thought and deed), and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. Men may violently disagree about the purposes behind a given act, or about the character of the person who did it, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these five questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose).

Burke called his method, in this early book, “dramatism” where he “treats language and thought primarily as modes of action” (xxii). His dramaturgical frame seemed ideal for my dissertation study.

Let’s reference Burke’s dramatistic frame for this narrative of politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley. The act was use of social science scholarship on rural community life and agribusiness consolidation to promote democratic theory and public processes. The scene was, in Marcus’ (1998) words, a “multi-sited research imaginary” inhabiting many geographic places (San Joaquin Valley towns, land grant universities, farmworker strikes, etc.) and discursive spaces (scientific knowledge production, federal laws, discourses of democracy, etc.). The agents were the scholars and citizens, who I am joining, who produced a narrative history of their politically engaged scholarship. Their agency was manifested in their strategic pedagogies, in the
texts they produced to educate students and organize communities. Finally, the purpose of the work was to defend democratic traditions, promote civil rights, foster economic equity, and guarantee social justice.

As I followed Burke’s influence on the scholars and his contribution to interpreting my own research data, I saw his theory influencing some scholars’ texts in the narrative. One example was from 1968, when Fujimoto, through Goffman, used Burke’s framework to describe Californian agribusiness and rural life:

What has been described, suggests a dramaturgical framework in which to view California agriculture, farm labor, and rural society. On stage is a picture of productivity, technological advancement, efficiency and growth. Backstage, but nevertheless essential to the productivity of the daily drama, are hidden, like a giant iceberg, such intertwining factors as corporate control, rural poverty, ethnic isolation and a plantation system of agriculture. From time to time farm labor has paraded on stage before audiences of concerned citizens and investigating commissions.

Farm labor is certainly on stage today. In the past, response has been mainly in the form of rhetoric. The current drama provides cues too loud to avoid for they prompt attention to the social structure of agriculture and of American society which is the context for understanding farm labor (Fujimoto 1968; citation in Fiske 1979: 389-390).

Even in this study, borrowing Fujimoto’s analogy, I began to see how the politics had been backstage and needed to be brought forward into the lights, before the audience and into the public. For the valley’s politically engaged scholars, politics was shrouded in prerogatives ostensibly favoring neutrality and objectivity, and social science research was characterized by cloaked values, professional detachment, and imperatives not to “propagandize.” On the other hand, agribusiness interests manipulated scientific inquiry, disdained public process, subverted of federal laws, and evaded civic responsibilities, actions that were brought front stage in the narrative. The scholars and the communities in which they worked created a subjective and public space to respond to past allegations,
explicate their historic experiences, and instigate renewed public engagement. Just as Villarejo had stressed transparency and Fujimoto spoke of access as a goals of their scholarship, I came to understand that “truth” was best revealed before us, tangibly in the light.

Near the end of my research, while visiting Karen Watson Gegeo, a friend, mentor and UC Davis anthropologist, I suggested using Burke in my research. She smiled, got up and brought me her 1973 article published in the American Anthropologist titled, “A Rhetorical and Sociolinguistic Model for the Analysis of Narrative” where she wrote “Burke’s theory of symbolic action is also a theory of drama, for drama is a means of transforming – e.g., separating, incorporating, defining – identity” (Watson 1973: 248-249). Literary or verbal acts were a form of action for Burke, which Watson (250) argued, “affect the audience at the sociocultural level.” Language, a medium of exchange and dialogue through shared cultural symbols, involved re-defining self while evoking mutual understanding from those reading or listening to a text. At this point, I felt compelled read Burke myself.

In his books, I found that Burke offered a way of understanding agency within narrative. In Permanence and Change, written in 1954, Burke (1984: 176) directly commented on the work of scholars:

Scientists attempted to make a neutral vocabulary in the interests of more effective action. They learned that by ‘suspending judgment,’ by inventing a non-moral vocabulary for the study of cosmic and human processes, they could get a much clearer idea as to how these processes work, and could establish a more efficient system of control over them . . . But speech in its essence is not neutral. Far from aiming at suspended judgment, the spontaneous speech of a people is loaded with judgments. It is intensely moral – its names for objects contain the emotional overtones which give us the cues as to how we should act toward these objects.
Burke was developing conceptual ideas that would later influence scholars working through critical and postmodern traditions. For instance, overtones of Habermas can be discerned in Burke’s (1984: 163) belief that a “sound communicative medium arises out of cooperative enterprises. And the mind, so largely a linguistic product, is constructed of the combined cooperative and communicative materials.” Burke was connecting language to a theory of individual agency and social action.

By 1966, in *Language as Symbolic Action*, Burke had refined his theory, articulated earlier in *A Grammar of Motives*. He described, “the distinction between a ‘scientistic’ and a ‘dramatistic’ approach to the nature of language. A ‘scientistic’ approach begins with questions of naming, or definition.” In this sense, scientistic language appeared static and structural. On the other hand, Burke (1966 :44) thought language could be “developed” through its use. His “dramatistic” approach emphasized “language as an aspect of ‘action,’ that is, as ‘symbolic action’.” This action represented a form of agency.

While Burke’s theory was compelling, I sought a contemporary theorist to bring the discussion into the present. For Christmas, my brother-in-law (who was also getting a doctoral degree in adult education in Europe), gave me Jacques Rancière’s *The Emancipated Spectator*. In this “critique of the spectacle”, Rancière (2009: 6) wanted to unite theater with community “as a way of occupying a place and a time, as the body in action as opposed to a mere apparatus of laws.” If traditional theater positioned the audience as passive observers of artistic production rather than as engaged agents of community action; then I considered whether an analogy could associate these spectators to the audience of scientific scholarship – students, policy makers and the general public.
– who were also largely passive before the spectacle (even one as dramatic as the San Joaquin Valley).

The role of audience to actors mirrored that of students to teacher (or citizens to scholar) in many pedagogical contexts. For Rancière (2009: 8), the pedagogical logic of the relationship not only framed the teacher as knower but the student as someone who “does not know what she does not know or how to know it.” The teacher, like the scholar, was socially positioned and technically trained to be able to create objects of knowledge; an action that was not discursively sanctioned for a student or citizen.

However, emancipatory learning began:

when we challenge the opposition between viewing and acting; when we understand that the self-evident facts that structure the relations between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure of domination and subjection (13).

Just as Howard Zinn (1980: 583) recognized that the “lives and activities of ordinary people” contributed to his research, suggesting a collective journey; so Rancière entertained an epistemological project of empowerment by encouraging people to challenge the discursive taken-for-granted oppression where they were positioned as spectators rather than actors. A postmodern reality called for “stories of boundaries to cross, and the distribution of roles to be blurred” so that researchers, like artists, could access “a hybridization of artistic means” (Rancière 2009: 21). Rather than leaving power with the nominal producer of text, however, Rancière (2009: 22) proposed a new idiom requiring “spectators who play the role of active interpreters, who develop their own translation in order to appropriate the ‘story’ and make it their own story.”

Intellectual emancipation then became a counter-pose where the passive recipient of messages became a poetic translator of signs. The distance between speaker and
listener, student and teacher, citizen and scholar was then reflexively altered and mediated by all participants. Similar to Burke who derived analogies and theory from theatrical performance, Rancière referenced the artistic tolerance of transgression as an analogy that translated to other cultural mediums incorporating discursively positioned passive audiences like schooling. Following Rancière (2009: 22), citizens and students may then be re-positioned in research scholarship as “a community of narrators and translators.”

Everyone produces text because any interaction is a communicative act. It requires an active sifting of the scene through one’s values and perspective, a process which also draws meaning from the social world. Text is constantly reproduced and Rancière’s invitation was to be present in that new narration, so that every situation can be cracked open from the inside, reconfigured in a different regime of perception and signification. To reconfigure the landscape of what can be seen and what can be thought is to alter the field of the possible and the distribution of capacities and incapacities . . . This is what a process of political subjectivation consists in: in the action of uncounted capacities that crack open the unity of the given and the obviousness of the visible, in order to sketch a new topography of the possible (49).

An awareness of perspective in story allows active participation in all narratives so that performance is always permissible and the dichotomies framing structured roles like scholar from student, director from audience, artist from viewer can be violated at any moment. The composition of story is always active, in the present, with all voices welcome.
In the San Joaquin Valley, during the twentieth century, politically engaged scholars worked to change the economic and political structure of California. They did this through a number of methods and approaches – which I label as pedagogies – designed to actively engage and politically contest the region’s sociological problems and economic injustices. Some of these pedagogies involved the traditional approaches of social scientists who generate scientific knowledge, publish their findings and teach students on college campuses. At other times, however, the valley scholars educated farmworkers, partnered with activists, advocated policy changes or organized communities.

These scholars entered into struggles with local communities during an era when the rural agricultural economy was being transformed in ways that undermined both community well-being and governance by democratic principles. When traditional routes were blocked or ineffective before exacerbating threats, these scholars switched roles and strategies to continue their intellectual work. My three part narrative explored this unique intellectual history. It opened with Taylor and Galarza entering the setting and directly engaging the problem with the workers on the ground. Both of these early scholars targeted the “power structure” of California (which they located in the state’s large landowning agribusinesses) as harmful to society. The second part of the narrative occurred over forty years of scientific research. Goldschmidt’s government-funded study tested a hypothesis and proposed a theory, which MacCannell’s statistical studies
retested, affirmed and extended. When these studies findings failed to motivate implementation of laws or adequately influence public policy, later scholars like Villarejo and Fujimoto innovated methods for engaging in educational organizing projects with marginalized constituencies in rural areas and students seeking relevant learning experiences.

The stories from this narrative affirm Smith’s (1994) query, quoted at the beginning of this dissertation, as these scholars did play pedagogical roles in society. In the most basic sense, their educational practices meant that they were participants (rather than solely observers) who used their social science knowledge and tools to make a case and educate people so that they challenged the region’s dominant political and economic interests. Their pedagogical strategies included:

- positioning legal arguments for enforcing laws.
- making processes of public decision-making transparent.
- empowering communities through action research and adult education
- instigating change through organizing and activism
- creating and participating in alternative institutions.
- innovating teaching within the bureaucracy of higher education.
- invigorating democratic discourses through language and text.

The scholars in the study leveraged legal precedent to promote their values and ground their positions. Taylor’s extraordinary example was to defend and attempt to force the government to implement reclamation law. Laws, however, were only one form of public process that these scholars made transparent. Galarza, Villarejo and Fujimoto integrated investigatory methods and action research into a pedagogy of resistance taught to students, workers and activists. Corporate structures, public disclosure obligations, even Congressional procedure was mapped, explained and placed into public spaces.
Their pedagogies literally taught citizens how to learn about the governing processes that regulated their lives and society.

The region’s politically engaged scholars created innovative educational approaches on many levels. In their classroom instruction, their coursework and assignments matched research scholarship with student demands for relevancy. Students were brought from the universities into agricultural fields and urban ghettos. In another strategic move, when these scholars were confronted with institutional barriers, they demonstrated a willingness to create their own educational structures and research institutions. Some of these included Galarza’s union-based action research, the Applied Behavior Studies Department at UC Davis, MacCannell’s Macrosocial Accounting shop, Villarejo’s California Institute for Rural Studies, and Fujimoto’s community development curriculum and coursework.

I emphasized language and text in my study of these scholars as fundamental tools of teaching and organizing. Informal and formal texts – from first person profiles and lectures to law reviews and academic papers – presented the various methods and situationally specific voices used by these scholars to convey meaning and present arguments. I brought forward these texts in a narrative analysis to illustrate differing pedagogical approaches used to evoke truths and instigate change.

The academic disciplinary basis of politically engaged scholarship in the San Joaquin Valley change over time (Fig. 2, pg. 370). Taylor’s academic field of agricultural labor economics ultimately atrophied and disappeared, orphaning him without doctoral students or sympathetic colleagues; on the other hand, Galarza’s integration of applied scholarship, adult education and community organizing defied
adequate academic theorizing or never received institutional support. Progressing into the narrative, all of the study’s politically engaged scholars were situated within the academic fields of rural sociology or community development at some point in their careers. Yet, rural sociology and community development have waned as disciplines or are being transformed into emerging fields like development studies or sustainable agriculture. Other fields, resulting from the countercultural movements of the 1960’s, influenced universities to formally create academic programs like ethnic studies and accept methodological approaches such as action research. However, the long term viability of these spaces remains tenuous.
Fig. 2. Development of Academic Disciplines and Engagement in the San Joaquin Valley

Journalism
(Henry George, Carey MacWilliams)

Agricultural Labor Economics
(Paul Taylor)

Labor Organizing and Adult Education
(Ernesto Galarza)

Rural Sociology
(Paul Taylor, Ernesto Galarza, Walter Goldschmidt, Dean MacCannell, Don Villarejo, Isao Fujimoto)

Community Development
(Paul Taylor, Ernesto Galarza, Isao Fujimoto, Don Villarejo, Dean MacCannell)

Ethnic Studies
(Ernesto Galarza, Isao Fujimoto, Don Villarejo)

Action Research
(Ernesto Galarza, Isao Fujimoto, Don Villarejo)

Sustainability Studies and Environmental Justice
(Don Villarejo, Isao Fujimoto)

Educational Organizing
(Ernesto Galarza, Isao Fujimoto, Don Villarejo)

Journalism
(Mark Arax, Michael Pollan, Trudy Wischemann)
Future scholarship, like that discussed so far, appears likely since effective policy responses have not addressed the problems of a consolidating food system and economically depressed rural geography. Since scientific findings alone seem inadequate to motivate officials to implement laws or politicians to promote adequate public policy, future intellectual engagement will likely require political movements to press for change. Social movements that include politically engaged scholarship offer the potential to integrate scientific knowledge and community action. Scholars still have important roles to play, especially through participatory and interdisciplinary studies that illustrate and directly engage the complexity and severity of problems.

This narrative informs pedagogies of political engagement through scholarship. Its scholars’ stories and voices teach across time calling for us not to walk away from their cause. Ultimately, it is difficult to disassociate their motivating values from the findings of their research. Their cause and findings blend together as the treatment of these scholars and politicization of their scientific findings become sub-plots in the large struggle for economic justice and the defense of democracy. A portion of a Goldschmidt letter of support for Taylor reminds us of these values:

> I was in Paul’s seminar when Robert Lynd’s Knowledge of What? appeared and from which he read with great approval. Paul always knew what knowledge was for and he devoted his life to its utilization. He knew there were moral issues that underlie all social relationships and he knew that it was necessary to relate scholarship to them in order to preserve a democratic social order. If the independent farm survives, it will be largely because of Paul’s singular contributions.

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Taylor had once noted that politics and economics (originally the academic field of political economy) should not have been split apart. This narrative illustrates why this remains true as its stories illustrate that democracy is inextricably linked to a just, sustaining and egalitarian economic system. We are left to reap the past.

The struggle continues because the problems of the Valley and many other places were not addressed, scientific findings were ignored in making and implementing policy, and important democratic and social justice values remain unrealized. In preparation for future battles, let us turn to Fujimoto for our last lesson. Near the end of his War Stories presentation, a powerpoint slide read “Lessons for Action.” Fujimoto offered parting advice in everyday language to the students and faculty in the seminar:

- Don’t let three strikes stop you – catcher might drop the ball – so keep moving, keep going.
- Reflect on what you do: Experience is not what you did or what happened to you. Experience is what you do with what you did or what happened to you.
- If you’re looking for something, look in your own backyard.
- Test question for any project: Does it build community?
- Give it your all.

The scholars in this study have taught us from their texts, through first-person narratives, personal correspondence and scientific research. Their case and findings are clear. The remaining question is: what do we do now?85

85 This question was the last message that Taylor sent to Wischemann (after the passage of the 1982 Reclamation Reform).
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