REGIMES AT WORK: THE NONPROLIFERATION ORDER AND INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
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May 2006
REGIMES AT WORK: THE NONPROLIFERATION ORDER AND INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

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Cornell University 2006

This thesis claims that by constituting a certain range of possible identities for countries, the nuclear nonproliferation regime facilitated India’s forging of non-weaponized nuclear deterrence and its decision to go ‘formally nuclear’ in 1998. The regime’s definition of the nuclear problem and its categorization of states into Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) structured the threat environment facing India. India responded with a deterrence posture that both violated and employed the regime’s norms. Its 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ for instance, played on the regime’s identification of a nuclear test with the possession of weapons, while challenging its attempt to restrict nuclear knowledge. The regime also served as a resource for actors within India who were advocates for the nuclear program. In 1974, domestic and international audiences were reminded of the developmental promise of nuclear power. By the end of the century, the strategic space that India had occupied between the categories of NWS and NNWS was rapidly shrinking. Perceiving a window of opportunity, India resorted once again to nuclear testing in May 1998 in order to move closer to NWS status.

This work investigates the ways in which the nonproliferation regime impacted on India’s nuclear policy, with France and South Africa as secondary cases. It situates itself at the intersection of the domestic and the international spheres, while
challenging the separation between the two. It focuses on the processes through which international norms constitute national identity, thereby defining national interest and molding national policies. While the project stems from dissatisfaction with theories of nuclear proliferation, the argument should extend to several issue-areas. By the end of the twentieth century, terrorism had emerged as a threat to rival nuclear peril. The evolution of an international counter-terrorism regime was accelerated. This work tries to draw out lessons from the career of the nonproliferation regime for the counter-terrorism regime.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Karthika Sasikumar was born in Hyderabad in South India in 1975. She attended St. Ann’s High School, followed by St. Francis’ College for Women where she obtained a BA in Economics, Political Science and Public Administration. In 1995 Karthika left Hyderabad for New Delhi to begin a Master’s in Politics (with specialization in International Relations) at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU).

JNU, named for India’s first Prime Minister, is a rambling campus on the arid Aravali hills that run across North India. It was here that Karthika plunged into graduate training. She also completed a Master’s Degree in French at this time. In the summer of 1998, Karthika was trying to find a research topic for her MPhil dissertation, which she obtained a year later. In May the BJP-led government set off five nuclear tests in the Rajasthan desert. Over the weeks of intense discussion and diplomacy that followed, Karthika realized that she had found a topic not just for her dissertation “Pokhran I and II: A Comparative Study” but for a lifetime of research.

In the fall of 1999, Karthika arrived in Ithaca, home to Cornell University to start a PhD program in the Government Department. She found a small, progressive town and a huge university with immense resources. Over the next three years Karthika was able to take seminars with professors that she had never believed she could meet in the flesh. She also expanded her mental boundaries by taking courses in Political Theory, and even taught a course of her own. Although she was inspired by many of the scholars she came across, in the end the Indian nuclear weapons issue was what captured her imagination.
In 2002, Karthika returned to India for a year of fieldwork, conducting interviews and gathering primary sources in New Delhi. Both exhilarating and frustrating, the year away from Cornell helped her fashion a framework for the dissertation. After returning to Ithaca, she began the slow process of putting words on the framework. In 2004, she moved to California on a predoctoral fellowship from the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. The fellowship relieved her of teaching responsibilities and placed her in a community of extremely smart people interested in nuclear weapons.

Currently, Karthika holds the first Simons Postdoctoral Fellowship in Disarmament and Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems, at the University of British Columbia. She lives in the beautiful city of Vancouver on the west coast of Canada.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My life has been shaped by a series of charismatic and brilliant teachers, and my hope is that the next few decades will give me a chance to emulate them. I would like to first acknowledge my parents Jaya and Sasikumar, who instilled in me a love of learning, allowed me to make mistakes, and always told me to “look it up in the dictionary” instead of giving me the answer. My first mentor, Kanti P. Bajpai, opened my eyes to the theoretical bedrock of every aspect of social life. He inspired me with his hard-working example and his refusal to follow the mainstream of public opinion on nuclear issues.

At Cornell, I had the great and undeserved fortune of becoming an advisee of Peter Katzenstein’s. I soon found out that all the legends about him were true—his reserve, his genuine interest in his students’ lives, his quiet but unflagging kindness. Over the years he has come to identify the dissertation writer who needs a diet of sustained tolerance, incisive criticism and the occasional well-timed push. I was one of those students and I’m profoundly thankful for his guidance. Mary Katzenstein was a warm and gracious figure. This work has been greatly improved by her stimulating criticisms and her knowledge of Indian politics. Christopher Way gave me my first course on methods, and has helped me find my way ever since. He was the most careful reader of every draft (myself included). Chris asked all the tough questions and helped me figure out the answers as well. Dietram Scheufele took me on when I was still floundering around in my own argument. Although he was not from my department, he gave generously of his time and attention. Without Dietram, I would not have
undertaken a quantitative analysis, and without his help I certainly would not have integrated it into my argument.

In the small and collegial Government department at Cornell I also greatly benefited from conversations with other faculty members—especially Matthew Evangelista and Ronald Herring. Prof. Evangelista’s comments on this dissertation that he read at short notice were astute and thought-provoking. My colleagues gave me a safe yet stimulating environment to gradually distill my arguments. I’m particularly grateful to Mark Anner, Lauren Aronson, Greg Dinsmore, Barak Mendelsohn and Emmanuel Teitelbaum for many hours of patient and active listening. Outside the department, I benefited from conversations on South Asia and nuclear issues with Chris Chyba, Paul Kapur and Latha Varadarajan. My friend, fellow-scholar and research assistant, Sandip Mishra, helped me immensely even as he worked on his own research in India.

I am grateful for the financial and academic support of the American Institute for Indian Studies. A generous AIIS fellowship enabled me to carry out fieldwork in India in 2002-03. The staff at Teen Murti Library in New Delhi was considerate and helpful. At the Simons Centre at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Wade Huntley and Elaine Hynes helped reduce the stress of the last few months.

I benefited greatly from the opportunity to carry out my last year of dissertation work at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. I’m thankful to Scott Sagan for encouraging me to confront his arguments, and for his generosity in treating mine with respect. Lynn Eden was a tower of strength and a fount of good advice. And to 2004-05 fellows, Helen Kinsella, Lien-Hang Nguyen, Tonya Putnam and Rebecca Slayton: four heartfelt ‘thank you’s’. 
Two very special friends have seen me through all the physical and emotional moves of the last fifteen years—Natasha Menon and Shibani Shah. Alex Montgomery, fellow student of nonproliferation, read my work, loaned me software, and supported this project from the start. My sister Malavika has been an unfailing source of humor and affirmation. Shyamala Das, ever generous, stepped in to copy-edit my drafts and greatly improved them. For their gifts of friendship, encouragement, and irreverence, I thank Ned Bertz, Kelly Dietz, Avijit Ghosh, Purnima Menon, Anupam Pandey, Myriam Rasiwala, Shantanu Roy, Sharmila Sarkar, and Brian Sink. For making many homes for me on three continents, I would like to thank the Čuk, Das, Gunashekar, Menon and Pejović families. For unwavering love, uncomplaining support, and unreasoning faith, I thank my husband, Matija Čuk.
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<th>Description</th>
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<td>AEB</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Board (South Africa)</td>
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<td>AEC</td>
<td>Atomic Energy Commission (India)</td>
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<td>AEDPA</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act</td>
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<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<td>ANWFZ</td>
<td>African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone</td>
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<td>BARC</td>
<td>Bhabha Atomic Research Centre</td>
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<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
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<td>CEA</td>
<td>Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAE</td>
<td>Department of Atomic Energy (India)</td>
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<td>DRDO</td>
<td>Defence Research and Development Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENDC</td>
<td>Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission</td>
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<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FEDN</td>
<td>Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale</td>
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<td>FMCT</td>
<td>Fissile Material Control Treaty</td>
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<td>G-8</td>
<td>Group of 8</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GEAR</td>
<td>Growth Employment and Redistribution</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEU</td>
<td>High-Enriched Uranium</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICOC</td>
<td>International Code of Conduct (Ballistic Missiles)</td>
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<td>IFRI</td>
<td>Institut Français de Relations Internationales</td>
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<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>LoC</td>
<td>Line of Control</td>
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<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>Nuclear Command Authority</td>
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<td>NFU</td>
<td>No First Use</td>
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<td>NNWS</td>
<td>Non-Nuclear Weapon State</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NPTREC</td>
<td>NPT Review and Extension Conference</td>
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<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NWD</td>
<td>Non-Weaponized Deterrence</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>Nuclear Weapon State</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosion</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoK</td>
<td>Pakistan Occupied Kashmir</td>
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<td>POTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
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<td>PTBT</td>
<td>Partial Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<td>RSS</td>
<td>Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANWFZ</td>
<td>South Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNEPP</td>
<td>Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>US Dollars</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The devastating display in 1945, of the destructive power of the atom, convinced many that ‘world government’ was imminent and inevitable. Only such an authority could avert the annihilation of humanity and harness atomic power. Albert Einstein was prompted to write: “A world government with powers adequate to guarantee security is not a remote ideal for the distant future. It is an urgent necessity if our civilization is to survive” (Einstein and Calaprice 1996, 125). Six decades later the international system remains anarchic—it lacks a central authority—but nuclear weapons are not as widely diffused as was once feared. Cooperation among states to create the nuclear nonproliferation regime seems to have been valuable.

Both regime theory and studies of nuclear proliferation have flourished in the discipline of International Relations. However, in scholarly treatments of the effect of the nonproliferation regime on state policies, the regime is seen solely as a (more or less compelling) constraint. India’s 1998 nuclear test series, followed by its declaration of Nuclear Weapon State status, thus becomes a symbol of the regime’s failure.

This thesis claims that by constituting a certain range of possible identities for countries, the nuclear nonproliferation regime facilitated India’s forging of non-weaponized nuclear deterrence and its decision to go ‘formally nuclear’ in 1998. The regime’s definition of the nuclear problem and its categorization of states into Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) structured the threat environment facing India. India responded with a deterrence posture that both violated
and employed the regime’s norms. Its 1974 ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ for instance, played on the regime’s identification of a nuclear test with the possession of weapons, while challenging its attempt to restrict nuclear knowledge. The regime also served as a resource for actors within India who were advocates for the nuclear program. In 1974, domestic and international audiences were reminded of the developmental promise of nuclear power. By the end of the century, the strategic space that India had occupied between the categories of NWS and NNWS was rapidly shrinking. Perceiving a window of opportunity, India resorted once again to nuclear testing in May 1998 in order to move closer to NWS status.

This work investigates the ways in which the nonproliferation regime impacted on India’s nuclear policy, with France and South Africa as secondary cases. It situates itself at the intersection of the domestic and the international spheres, while challenging the separation between the two. It focuses on the processes through which international norms constitute national identity, thereby defining national interest and molding national policies. While the project stems from a dissatisfaction with theories of nuclear proliferation, the argument should extend to several issue-areas. By the end of the twentieth century, terrorism had emerged as a threat to rival nuclear peril. The evolution of an international counter-terrorism regime was accelerated. The career of the nonproliferation regime holds out lessons for the counter-terrorism regime. These will be taken up in the last chapter.

In this chapter’s first section, I present the theoretical argument. Section Two defines the major terms that I employ. The next section introduces alternative explanations of India’s interactions with the nonproliferation regime that illustrate the limitations of the current treatment of norms and of the theoretical separation of the domestic and
international spheres. Section Four deals specifically with the strengths and weaknesses of one major theoretical perspective—Constructivism. In Section Five, I set out my rationales for case selection. In the two concluding sections I take up issues of methodology and explain the specific methods that I use in the dissertation.

Section One: Regimes at Work

As I show below in my discussion of alternative explanations in the International Relations (IR) literature, India’s nuclear behavior is puzzling. The security model finds it difficult to explain restraint (for instance, why India did not undertake a full-fledged nuclear program in the late 1960s). The domestic politics model cannot account for the power that nuclear advocates command (for example, how a small group of scientists and technocrats persuaded politicians of different stripes to test). The norms model cannot explain shifts in the precedence given to certain norms (why India promoted disarmament in the 1950s and nonproliferation in the 1990s, describing both stances as proof of its independence in external affairs). In the above explanations, the international regime is viewed as a constraint on India’s actions. This conception underestimates the influence of the regime as it precludes a grasp of its generative or enabling power. My contribution, which studies the constitutive aspects of the international regime, enables us to explain policy outcomes as well as resolve the puzzles that are laid out above.

I argue that the regime was not merely a limitation that Indian decision-makers strained against, nor solely an aggregation of states’ incentives. The nonproliferation regime ‘made possible’ (rather than directly caused) key decisions in the nuclear program in India. My focus will be on this function of the regime—creating the
conditions of possibility of nuclear decisions. I argue against the rigid separation of the three models (security, domestic politics and norms) and for the detailed study of their interconnections. For instance, instead of counterposing security and norms, we can study how a commitment to independence and non-alignment ruled out options other than an indigenous nuclear response to the Chinese bomb.

The stakes are not merely theoretical. India is a huge and growing power and its nuclear decisions are worthy of study in their own right. Further, countries that are tempted by the nuclear option are also taking heed of the manner in which the international community reacts to India. This case study of a regime and its effects on one country should offer us insights into the functioning of other regimes and the policies of other countries.

The constitutive power of regimes

How do regimes actually work? That is, in what ways do they affect states’ policies? Haas suggests that we focus on notions of process in answering this question (Haas 1983, 29). I propose that regimes affect state behavior through four basic processes: definition, categorization, institutionalization, and enforcement. The first two processes are constitutive, and the last two regulative. Regulation directly affects the interest calculations of a country’s decision-makers, while constitution has an indirect effect through its effects on the construction of national identity. While in practice constitution and regulation are not easily separated, I distinguish them here for analytical purposes.

In its constitutive avatar, the regime names the issue that it sets out to tackle. For instance, the international human rights regime aims to secure certain basic rights for
individuals in all countries, and the regime on climate change defines global warming as the problem. Regimes also *divide international actors* into different categories, assigning them identities.

These processes put into place certain material and non-material costs and benefits. For instance, a country that is termed a violator of human rights may face concrete sanctions and/or international ostracism. Defining ‘human rights’ in terms of individual rights empowers some actors and marginalizes others. Decision-makers in states are aware of the cost-benefit calculus institutionalized by the regime. They attempt to influence regime definitions when they perceive the opportunity to change them to their benefit. States modify their behavior in order to establish and maintain their preferred identities, that is to be placed in the right category. Thus, regimes affect identity construction. As Tannenwald puts it: “Compliance with the appropriate nuclear norms reinforces the identity of states and their status as legitimate members of the international community and/or as a certain kind of state (responsible/civilized) etc.” (Tannenwald 1996, 142).

In this process of identity construction states draw on internal and external normative resources. As they try to construct a particular identity they may incur short-term costs. They may be obliged to change domestic aspects of national identity. Even the states that initiated regimes, or those that rejected them, may come to be bound by regime norms. Definition and categorization shape state behavior by setting up standards for appropriate, responsible and just behavior. They also shape the regulative processes of institutionalization and enforcement. In the next chapter I describe in more detail the four processes by which the nonproliferation regime affects state behavior.
Section Two: Key definitions

In this section I discuss the main terms that I will be using. While accepting the definition of regime proposed by Stephen Krasner, I elaborate it in the context of the nonproliferation regime. In the next section I propose a description of the ‘regime at work,’ a dynamic conception. In recent years, the International Relations (IR) literature has come to an appreciation of the importance of norms in explaining outcomes. At the same time the term has been employed in a variety of contradictory ways. In what sense do I use the term and how does it relate to my conception of regime? I begin with a definition and three characteristics central to my conception of norms. I then explain the relationship between norms and regimes.

Nonproliferation regime

According to Krasner’s canonical definition from his 1983 volume, *International Regimes*, a regime is: “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1983, 1). Harald Müller has described the nonproliferation regime in terms of this definition. He identifies its four foundational principles: one, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons leads to a higher chance of nuclear war; two, that the civilian use of atomic energy can coexist with nonproliferation; three, that horizontal and vertical proliferation are linked; four, that verification is essential. Müller lists nine norms that guide state behavior, such as the obligation of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to refrain from producing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons, and the obligation of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to pursue disarmament. Rules follow from these norms—though these vary in specificity and strength. Finally, there are procedures such as those for NPT review (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, 9-10).
In my analysis I take the “nonproliferation regime” to mean the complex of formal and informal agreements among states to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to new actors. The regime includes both formal treaties and the prevalent shared understandings in the international system about nuclear technology and the roles and responsibilities of member-states. Some members have a special role. In Finnemore and Sikkink’s terminology the US has the identity of ‘norm leader’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895).

The nonproliferation regime has both formal (treaties and international institutions) and informal components (intergovernmental cooperation and norm leader initiatives). The 1968 NPT is the most important of the treaties. Other multilateral treaties include the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) which prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) which limits the yield of underground nuclear tests. Bilateral treaties are also part of the regime, for instance the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the US and Russia (1991). International institutions include the UN which serves as the main venue for negotiations, mostly undertaken at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Another important international organization under the UN is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) set up in 1957.

Arrangements for intergovernmental cooperation without formal treaties have increasingly become significant in the regime. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was set up in response to the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974. The NSG aims to tighten export controls on nuclear and dual-use technologies in order to prevent non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring military nuclear capabilities. Its guidelines are
implemented by participating governments in accordance with national laws and practices. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was started by the US in 2003 to coordinate the efforts of governments to interdict transfers of nuclear and delivery system parts and technology.¹

Some norm leader initiatives, although unilateral, are included in the regime since they affect all countries. The American Atoms for Peace program opened up a new world of nuclear collaboration in the 1950s. The December 1993 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was the first formal policy change in US strategy after the end of the Cold War. The most recent and controversial US initiative on nonproliferation was the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Norm leader initiatives can also lead to formal institutions. In March 1963, President Kennedy expressed American fears about proliferation: “[P]ersonally I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.” This momentum against the spread of nuclear weapons culminated in the NPT.

Table 1.1: Components of the nonproliferation regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal components</th>
<th>Multilateral treaties</th>
<th>NPT</th>
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<td></td>
<td>International organizations</td>
<td>IAEA</td>
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<td>Informal components</td>
<td>Multilateral coordination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Norm leader initiatives</td>
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¹ The PSI has two complementary components—the Container Security Initiative and the Marine Security Initiative but all three are usually referred to as PSI.
International norms

In this work, I use the term ‘norm’ to refer to both beliefs and standards. By ‘norm’ I mean “the dominant accepted standard of behavior in a particular issue-area.” A more precise definition of norm specifies that it sets up “collective expectations about the proper behavior for a given identity” (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 54). That is, norms are closely linked to identities. What is appropriate for a certain type of state is inappropriate for another. However, since there are certain norms that are applicable to all countries, I use ‘norm’ more loosely.

Many norms claim to be grounded in, and to derive their power from, ethical imperatives. Especially in the international arena, such claims are contested. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, for example, claims that the US is using nonproliferation to destroy the North Korean civilian nuclear industry and the socialist project. By demonstrating contestation I try to denaturalize norms. Their ethical content will be seen purely as a resource that is deployed strategically. To put it differently, the substantive content of the norm which may be ‘good,’ either in deontological or consequentialist terms, is outside the scope of my study.

The IR literature has tended to treat realpolitik behavior as the null hypothesis. Consequently, all behavior that does not contradict the predictions of Realist theories is treated as confirming such theories—although they may stem from other sources (Johnston 1996, 228). If norms are understood to be primarily regulative, then their net effect can be gauged only in opposition to other factors influencing decision-makers. Norms would be seen as competing with power and interest. I argue that since norms inform and ground the choices of national elites, this approach underestimates the value of norms. In the nuclear debate, notions of national destiny and uniqueness are
not easily separable from ‘pure’ security arguments. Discerning the former in the French debate, Sagan classifies the French nuclear program as ‘norm-driven.’ Yet Camille Grand claims that destiny and uniqueness are perfectly compatible with the security model (Grand 1998b, 5).

Accounts of national identity tend to view it as produced by domestic social, economic and political forces. National identity is formed in a social setting; just as an individual’s behavior cannot be fully understood outside her social context. International norms give meaning to the actions of states. A state’s relation to the international is essential to its identity. National identity is neither ‘given’ nor ‘essential’ nor solely derived from domestic politics. States construct their identities through practice—the policies they adopt. Therefore, their aspirations towards particular identities in the international sphere delineate the boundaries of policy choices. Though national identity is not monolithic there has to be some coherence across various aspects of a country’s behavior.

While international norms do alter the costs and benefits of alternative policies, they primarily shape national decision-making by constructing social categories (such as ‘strong,’ ‘modern,’ ‘civilized,’ ‘rogue’ or ‘Great Power’). States internalize, resist and revise norms that constitute them in these positions. That is, a state can conduct itself so as to maintain its identity, contest the prevailing categorization, or seek to change prevailing norms. For example, China decided to join the nonproliferation regime in the 1990s to obtain status benefits. However, the sensitivity to image and status itself comes from an “emerging identity” in which international institutions are valued (Johnston 2003, 183-85).
Figure 1:  Effects of international regimes on policies

_The constitutive role of norms in regimes_

In Krasner’s conception, norms follow upon the principles of a regime. He defines principles as “beliefs about fact, causation and rectitude” and norms as “standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and duties.” In current IR terminology, however,
‘principles’ are subsumed by norms. Krasner gives the first two components of his regime--norms and principles--more fundamental functions than rules and decision-making procedures. In Krasner’s conception, when norms and principles change, it amounts to a change of regime. Change in rules and decision-making procedures is change in regime (Krasner 1983, 2-3). Clearly, though Krasner does not use that language, norms and principles for him are constitutive of rules and procedures.

Most studies of regimes have focused on their regulative effects, i.e., they examine cases where they have encouraged states to choose or reject a certain policy. Constructivists take into account both regulative and constitutive effects. By constitutive effects we mean the creation or definition of forms of behavior, roles and identities (Tannenwald 1999, 437). Regulation directly affects interest calculations while constitutive norms have an indirect effect through their construction of identity. In my analysis ‘identity’ means the dominant conception(s) among elites as to the present and the desired characteristics of their country, as well as its role in the international system. I treat national identity as an intermediate variable, which is constituted by international norms.

Since constitutive norms make possible and also render natural, they are very powerful. Mutimer explains: “Once we have subjects and objects, it takes very little to produce interests—they are embedded within the representations that produce objects and identities” (Mutimer 2000b, 157). Constitutive norms are hard to study because their effects on policy are indirect. They are slower to change and are not explicitly documented. Moreover, the constitutive aspects of norms are not easily captured by the methods used to study causal questions (Wendt 1999, 86). However, constitutive theories do involve “inferences from observable events to broader patterns.” They do
have to stand the test of evidence, as their implications are compared to those of other theories (Wendt 1999, 87-88).

Section Three: Alternative explanations--Three Models in Search of A Bomb

It has become standard for IR scholars to follow the tripartite categorization of theories established by Martin Wight (Wight 1991). The first focuses on power, the second on interests and the third on norms. These correspond to the three major schools of thought in IR today: Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. Thus Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger classify approaches to international regimes into power-based, interest-based and knowledge-based; Scott Sagan classifies explanations of nuclear proliferation—that is, non-compliance with the international regime—into three models: security, domestic politics and norms.

The three-part classification works well with answers to the question: why did states build bombs? The question, “How were they affected by the international regime?”, though of course closely related, refers to a five-decade-long process of interaction between states and international institutions. A full account of this interaction would have to consider both levels—state and systemic. By studying the constitution of a state by the regime—that is, the process by which it is assigned an identity, which it then contests or accepts—we can give both the domestic and international levels their due. The conventional security and domestic politics models, however, end up privileging one of the two levels of analysis, depending on their underlying assumptions. ‘The domestic’ and ‘the international’ in these explanations are envisioned as separate impenetrable spheres that bounce off each other. This division
has impeded a full account of the processes through which regimes impact on states. The ‘level of analysis problem’ infringes on a full understanding of regime functioning in all paradigms/perspectives. Since my approach is closest to Constructivism, I devote the next section entirely to the Constructivist approach to regimes and the norms model, and deal with the security and domestic politics models in the section on alternative explanations in the Conclusion. By showing that even Constructivism, which emphasizes the study of processes of identity formation, has to overcome the ‘level of analysis’ problem, I establish the contribution of my study of the process of constitution.

Here I wish to flag two implications of the security model which has been the common sense view of nuclear policy. One, Realism was to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy: American leaders believed that India would inevitably acquire nuclear weapons and that they could do little about it (Perkovich 1999, 194). As a result, the US did not intervene forcefully to stop India’s nuclear progress. Two, a critique of the security model and a focus on domestic factors has political and normative implications. Indian decision-makers insist that their programs were impelled by security threats; they see no reason why deterrence should not work in South Asia as elsewhere.² In a self-help system, where security rationales have some degree of legitimacy, they endeavor to refute theories emphasizing ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘symbolic’ motivations. Scholars have pointed out that the presumed contrast between democratic, responsible Western states that require nuclear arsenals for security reasons and their ‘others’—fanatical, irrational Third World leaders, is based on an Orientalist binary (Gusterson 1999). Haider Nizamani claims that Western analyses

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² Jasjit Singh writes: “…logically, the reasons for possessing nuclear arsenals by one state” cannot be different from those of others (Singh 1998a, 5). Also see the arguments of B. R. Nayar (Nayar 2001, 14-16).
tend to explain national security decisions in countries like India with reference to political and parochial variables. He calls this ‘security orientalism’—the non-Western ‘other’ is seen to have a different, inferior, rationality (Nizamani 2000, 10).

Section Four: Norms in Constructivism

While Realist/security models are associated with power, and Liberal theories focus on the determination of interest, the issue of norms is seen as the natural province of Constructivism. In this section I discuss the basic principles of Constructivism, showing how they can be modified to assess the full impact of regimes. I take up the ‘norms model’ from Sagan’s tripartite classification, critiquing the existing explanations within that model and tracing their inadequacies to the ‘level of analysis’ problem.

Constructivism: key principles

While we note fierce debates around the definition of Constructivism (Hopf 1998), we can identify key Constructivist principles:

- intersubjectivity (shared contextual beliefs drive human action)
- co-constitution (agents and structures are mutually determined)
- the importance of identity (which is determined by, and determines, the field of political action)

Constructivists claim that their work breaks down the artificial divisions between the international and the domestic, straddling the boundaries of Comparative Politics and International Relations. However, Constructivism runs into problems when it theorizes the systemic-national link. In this section I will discuss some of these problems and show that the solution lies in including national identity in the analysis.
Constructivism prides itself on being a dynamic theory. Sans a non-systemic source of state identity, it cannot account for change (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 268; Ringmar 1997, 276). The domestic space acts as a circuit breaker preventing dominant norms from reproducing themselves. Further, one of the core claims of constructivism is that it treats identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context, that is, as a dependent variable rather than a given. Therefore Constructivists study domestic processes closely. As an analytical perspective, Constructivism differs from Domestic Politics in that it attributes power to *intersubjective beliefs*—shared by all in a particular context—rather than the subjective perceptions of individuals or small groups (which in turn derive from relative economic positions or psychological traits).

Constructivists believe that agents (states or other actors) and structures (the international system) are mutually determined or co-constituted. As discussed above, however, due to the centrality of identity in their explanations, Constructivist scholars tend to be situated firmly at the domestic level. Moreover, although Constructivism holds co-constitution to be fundamental, this process is difficult to make visible. In practice, empirical Constructivist work takes social structure and agents in turn as ‘temporarily given’ to show the effects of the other (Wendt 1987, 365) and tends to privilege the domestic.

Wendt is the only Constructivist who attempts a systemic theory; however, he claims that he avoids the pitfalls of the systemic approach by treating the international system as both a dependent and independent variable—i.e. he is interested both in how the current structure evolved from the interactions of its units, as well as in the causal powers of this structure (Wendt 1999, 11). Wendt makes a useful distinction between
the *social identity* of the state (the state in relation to other units in the international system) and its *corporate identity* (the glue that holds it together). Actors will resist social identities that militate against their “ontologically prior” identities exogenous to the international system. Thus, corporate identity acts as a “material constraint” on social identity (Wendt 1999, 328). In a parallel movement, the international system selects for system-sustaining changes among unit-level changes (Wendt 1999, 319). In this manner, change in domestic identity produces structural change at the macro-level (Wendt 1999, 339).

This is an unsatisfactory conception of the relationship between identity at the national and international levels (Pasic 1996; Zehfuss 2001). No human action takes place in a pre-social space (Wind 1997, 250). The international arena is not asocial. Since nations are imagined communities, domestic elites construct identities that reflect actual and potential national positions in the international system. A country that aims to secure NATO membership, for instance, may foster democratic national institutions for reasons that cannot remain instrumental. Even studies of national identity have increasingly emphasized the role of the external. India’s nationalist movement, for instance, cannot be understood outside of the social and ideological framework of colonial capitalist modernity that sustained it, and which it modified and challenged (Chatterjee 1993).

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We cannot fully explain domestic change if we leave out the international dimension (Risse-Kappen and Ropp 1999, 273). In the particular field I analyze, the characteristics of the technology also necessitate an extra-domestic perspective. We find certain common features among states dealing with nuclear technology, which derive from the imperatives of technology and the constraints it imposes on the agencies (Hilgartner, Bell, and O'Connor 1982; Sagan 1993; Weart 1988). One prominent feature is relative isolation from the national political and economic mainstream. Conclusions from policy analysis in other issue-areas are rarely applicable. For instance, the issue of cost, salient in other policy decisions in India, seems less important on the nuclear issue. Further, the nuclear field boasts an exceptional degree of technological sophistication and international orientation. Enclave development fosters similar trajectories among states with very different political systems. The nuclear taboo and international controls on technology contribute to this.

The characteristics of developing and post-colonial states also preclude a focus on the domestic. We cannot separate the mission of gaining internal legitimacy from the security imperative (Ayoob 1995). This has two implications. We need to study domestic politics to understand decisions in the security sphere, and the contribution of security decisions to domestic legitimacy as part of the nation-building project (Khattak 1996). Studying the relation of the nuclear project to identity can help us explain why domestic actors were able to use the nuclear policy to advance their own interests. Finally, explanations focusing solely on the domestic can lead to cultural reductionism: explaining state decisions without paying attention to systemic factors leads to a conception of the domestic political situation as deterministic. In terms of
normative evaluation, this could either rationalize and justify state policies or exempt international forces from blame (Mamdani 2000).

Hopf criticizes Constructivist theories for paying insufficient attention to the domestic; and for buying into consequentialist logic, disregarding “the logics of thinkability and imaginability.” Indebted to the ‘systemic’ idea that interaction at the international level shapes state identities, they tend to take up a particular norm and then investigate how it came to be adopted or rejected. He calls for normative work to provide a “picture of the discursive terrain of a society” to show why it adopts certain norms and not others (Hopf 2002, 278, 81).

*Regimes in the norms model*

In the mainstream literature the term ‘norm’ sometimes refers to domestic politics, national culture and identity. At other times, it refers to the complex of international norms governing state identities. For instance, in his seminal article, when Sagan refers to norms in his France case-study he cites domestic politics aimed at obtaining international respect and maintaining internal cohesion. In discussing the Ukraine case where domestic opinion is less important, he uses the term to stand for the nonproliferation regime’s prohibition of new nuclear powers (Sagan 1996/97, 79-82).

The domestic strand of the norms model focuses on the beliefs of powerful individuals and groups because nuclear policy decisions are made by a small number of people. Jacques Hymans’ recent innovative work studies Indian leaders’ identity “as Indians” and argues that the dominant variant of Indian identity which was “oppositional” and “nationalist” predisposed leaders to acquire weapons (Hymans 2001). Bajpai claims that in the post-Cold War world neoliberals are on the ascendant in determining
foreign and security policy in India (Bajpai 2002a, 245, 90). This strand of analysis does not go far enough in tracing the sources of ideas.

Vanaik believes that “elite self-perceptions have been a much more likely determinant [than external security factors] of possible change in India’s nuclear posture from 1974 to 1998…and precisely because such self-perceptions are more easily subject to change from purely internal development…” (Vanaik 2002b, 324). However, even “purely internal” causes of changed self-perceptions may derive from an external source. Vanaik himself argues elsewhere that Indian strategic elites have bought into the Western doctrine of deterrence. They have (almost) always been Realists (Vanaik 1995, 2) and with the end of the Cold War challenges to Realism became weaker (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 197, n.1).

Other scholars agree that in the 1990s the content of Indian national identity underwent dramatic changes. Disillusionment with the Nehruvian development model was coupled with resentment of the allegedly special treatment of minorities in Nehruvian secularism. The BJP’s dramatic rise to power was both a symptom and a cause of hyper-nationalism. Vanaik traces the rise of a more aggressive and self-centred elite nationalism to neoliberalism and Hindutva (Vanaik 2004). Such accounts cannot satisfactorily explain change, since middle class politics in India has exhibited these traits for some time. In fact, it is claimed that the middle class has always been pro-bomb (Smith 1994, 185). Vanaik’s explanation also draws an unexplained causal linkage between growing embourgeoisement and a particular conception of national interest.
Norms model explanations at the domestic level are often presented within the ‘strategic culture’ rubric. For instance, Ziemke constructs the concept of “national myth” to explain Iran’s nuclear decisions. “National myth presents an “exaggerated view of the strengths, virtues, triumphs, and traumas that make up a state’s collective self-image and provides the blueprint for its strategic personality: how it sees its relationship to the outside world, assesses its options and national interests, and makes decisions…” Her study finds the forces behind Iranian security policy in its history (including the ancient Persian empire), its civic philosophy and culture (Ziemke 2000, 89). Similarly, Andrew Latham finds the determinants of India’s stance at CTBT negotiations in the country’s history and culture. He identifies as influential the Kautilyan paradigm--which paints the external domain as an inherently conflictual site, a sense of vulnerability stemming from repeated foreign invasions, and a reaction to the 1962 defeat at the hands of China (Latham 1998).

‘Strategic culture’ is not well-adapted to theorizing change in policy, since its roots are in unvarying history. Further, these explanations founder in the face of similar decisions on nuclear weapons by countries that are considerably culturally distant—such as India and Iran. At their worst, they can be blatantly reductionist. Samuel Huntington saw the May 1998 tests by India and Pakistan as confirming his thesis that the clash between civilizations – in this case Islam and Hinduism – has replaced ideological confrontation as the main source of conflict (Gardels and Huntington 1998, 8). Darren Zook sees the 1998 test series as a manifestation of Hindu nationalist chauvinism (Zook 2000).

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Works by Itty Abraham, Steven Flank and David Mutimer can be classified under the systemic norms model. Abraham makes a real effort to situate his analysis of the Indian nuclear program in “a field of action that is larger than the national” (Abraham 1998, 70). Since development was always to be measured in relation to other nations, it became assimilated into the concept of national security—a combination that sustained the nuclear program (Abraham 1998, 9-12). By pointing to the institutionalization of this duality which is inherent to modernity in the Indian program, Abraham is able to explain the conflicted character of the program. This duality cannot be explained by, say, Bidwai and Vanaik who in the same paragraph claim that India’s program was “conceived originally as a purely civilian effort”, and that it had a “built-in dual character” (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 212). Abraham’s argument makes the conjunction of developmentalism and post-coloniality the crucial foundation for India’s attraction for nuclear power. However, there are scores of post-colonial countries in Asia and Africa, who did not choose the nuclear option. We also have the example of ex-colony France, where, as I show in Chapter 5, modernity and independence were crucial determinants of nuclear policy. Clearly, nuclear weapons/capability can be presented as optimal solutions only when a security problem—which Abraham leaves unanalyzed—can be shown to exist.

Steven Flank sees the international regime as providing resources to Indian actors who were advocating the nuclear program. He writes: “When Indian scientists argue that electrical utilities should use nuclear power stations, that Indian universities should have departments of nuclear engineering and physics or that nuclear weapons will deter Pakistani and Chinese attacks, they use the global nuclear network as the anchor for their still unstable systems” (Flank 1993, 279). Flank correctly identifies the
resource-providing role of the international regime. However, he does not take into account change in international norms.

David Mutimer sees the regime as an unfair bargain shaped by the concerns of the powerful. For instance, India rejected the CTBT because it was no longer the same treaty that it had called for: India was aiming for an instrument of disarmament but this 1996 treaty was a tool of nonproliferation (Mutimer 2000b, 124). Mutimer is sensitive to the shifts in international norms. However, he takes Indian declarations at face value, writing that for over twenty years India refrained from declaring itself a NWS, because it was committed to ending the arms race (Mutimer 2000a, 13).

Does the transmission of ideas from the regime to different countries have to involve change in national identity? Adler describes convergence on arms control to manage deterrence in the Cold War, and claims that it took place sans change in domestic culture in the USSR (Adler 1992, 102). Yet even if identity in its entirety is not affected, national elites do have to reconceptualize the roles of their weapons—in the Soviet case, from tools to overthrow the capitalist order to instruments of survival. This requires a rethinking of state purpose, thus affecting identity. Jabko and Weber, discussing the case of France’s embrace of the nonproliferation regime refute the idea that this was ‘convergence’ resulting from regime-building or adoption of the best ‘ideas’. France’s identity itself had changed (Jabko and Weber 1998).
Figure 2: Determinants of national identity

International forces
1. Nonproliferation regime
2. Security threats
3. Broader international norms
4. Alliances

National identity

Domestic forces
1. Political parties
2. Economic structure
3. Organizations (atomic energy, military, diplomatic)
Norms model explanations need to pay attention to the intersection of the domestic and the international. That is, they should treat national identity as an intermediate variable between international norms and national/security interest formulation. Constructivist explanations are best suited to do this as they take norms seriously; however, they too need to overcome the level of analysis problem.

Section Five: Case selection

In political science we are used to treating events as the unit of analysis and countries as actors. For instance, the question can be asked—why did India test nuclear weapons in 1998? However, such questions privilege proximate, tangible causes over deeper, ideational processes. Wesley Salmon has argued that we should view processes rather than events as basic causal entities (Bennett 1999). Parsimonious accounts may be able to answer ‘why’ questions, not ‘how’ questions. Process is important in studying the effects of a regime. This project seeks to answer the question about the 1998 tests by situating it within the symbolic field of evolving international norms. As a case study, it is better suited for assessing whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome than how much it mattered (George and Bennett 2005, 25).

India’s 1998 tests represent a puzzle both for theories of proliferation and regime effectiveness. While defying international norms by openly going nuclear, India consistently adhered to certain principles of the nonproliferation regime such as the non-dissemination of sensitive technologies. Its advocacy of nuclear disarmament continued. One cannot view the regime merely as a constraint around the Indian program, which the country strains against with varying degrees of force. Theorists of proliferation have classified India under each of the three main explanations for
proliferation—Realist (security threat), Pluralist-Institutionalist (domestic interests and/or ineffective regime) and Constructivist (identity and norms). This contested status makes it theoretically interesting. The contest also has obvious policy implications. India, the second-most populous country in the world, is involved in a violent enduring rivalry with Pakistan—the two are the only nuclear-endowed countries to have engaged in war. India is a rising power that is an opinion leader in world politics. Thus, investigating how the regime dealt with India and what responses it elicited, would help frame better policy especially in the US.

My knowledge of the Indian case and my access to sources there make this the best case to develop my theory. For purposes of a “parallel demonstration of theory” (Skocpol and Somers 1980) I turn to two countries where we saw strikingly different outcomes in the post-Cold War world—France and South Africa. At some level, India and France are ‘most different’ cases where we observe similar outcomes in that both decided that nuclear weapons were essential to their security but moved towards accommodation with the nonproliferation regime. India and South Africa are rising middle powers (possibly ‘most similar’ cases with differing outcomes) but while India formally adopted nuclear weapons for defense in the 1990s, South Africa renounced its capability.

However, the great number of differences in domestic politics and international status mean that neither of these cases is amenable to controlled comparison with India using the Millian logic of elimination. These two cases have been included for purposes of theory-testing and extension (to observe the effect of the independent variable—systemic norms—on other cases). The objective is to find the conditions under which
different patterns occur—conditional generalizations rather than frequency distributions (Bennett and George 1997).

In France, the disappearance of its target—the USSR—led to a subdued debate about the value of the nuclear arsenal. As is well known, the government decided to retain the arsenal although it made substantial cuts in force structure. However, France also decided to join the NPT—which it had criticized for three decades, and became an advocate of the CTBT (although it did conduct controversial tests in 1995). Why did France make this public affirmation of its nuclear status? France is usually seen as defying international norms, but I will show that this is only half the story.

The South African program was developed enough to produce actual weapons; in the 1990s, the government destroyed its assets and submitted to international and regional safeguards. South Africa is a ‘hard case’ for an approach emphasizing the importance of international norms since, like Brazil and Argentina, it is usually depicted as giving up nuclear weapons under the influence of democratization. My hypothesis is that denuclearization was prompted not by some logic inherent to democratization, but by elite decisions—shaped by decades of marginalization and conflict with the international community—to opt for alternative national identities.

While I do not aim to formulate a comprehensive theory of regimes, I am interested in the extent to which processes are generalizable. There are few comparisons of regimes in different issue-areas in the literature. Among the exceptions are a comparison of the human rights and nonproliferation regimes, and ‘war on drugs’ to the ‘war on terror’ (Caulkins, Kleiman, and Reuter 2003; Wrage and Quester 1993). In the last two decades, the international community has been trying to institutionalize cooperation
among states against terrorism. Are findings from the nuclear nonproliferation regime transferable to this evolving counter-terrorism regime? Do we observe similarities in their formative periods in spite of differences in power distribution and norms? What can we predict about the unexpected and undesirable effects of the current efforts to fashion an international regime against terrorism?

Section Six: Regimes, their normative effects, and language

Ernst Haas’ contribution to the Krasner volume on regimes claimed: ‘words can hurt you’ (Haas 1983). In this section I explain my choice of discourse analysis to reveal regimes ‘at work.’

Discourse: visible field or actor in its own right?
Security studies scholars have not paid much attention to the use of language by actors, although studies of nuclear weapons strategy take statements seriously because they recognize that rhetoric is of utmost significance when physical jousting is rendered impossible. However, while analysts may not consider language important, political actors do. Politicians and diplomats spend a lot of time on preparing and interpreting statements. This is because they recognize that each “speech-act”—which Austin defines as doing things with words—creates some associations and weakens others. Talk is not cheap, each iteration carries an opportunity cost in that it makes some future course(s) of action less likely. Even if a particular norm is adopted for instrumental reasons, it leads to change in identity. This is documented in the literature on human rights issues (Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Contemporary
discourse makes some policy options ‘unthinkable’ and facilitates others. Does this mean discourse has autonomous power?

Post-structuralism attributes independent power to discourse.\(^4\) Gunther Kress describes discourse as organizing and structuring the manner in which a particular object or process is to be discussed, by providing rules, descriptions, permissions and prohibitions of individual and social action (Fowler 1991, 68). Language is not a neutral medium of communication; objective truth or knowledge is therefore impossible (Edkins 1999, 15). But positing discourse in itself as a causal factor may obscure the role of strategic action by elites in choosing among scripts for national identity construction (Fearon and Laitin 2000, 865). In postmodern analyses discourse “submerges” agency (Checkel 1998). This may lead to a disempowering view of politics (Krishna 1993).

Most Constructivists, while recognizing the constraints of language, hold that objective reality exists outside of our attempts to know it, that is, outside language. They work on the sociolinguistic construction of subjects and objects in world politics (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 268). My methodology will follow Kratochwil and Ruggie’s “third path”—infusing positivist epistemology with interpretive strains (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 766). In terms of the Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger classification, this work falls into the category of “strong cognitivism” since it holds that knowledge is manufactured in an international society, and not only

\(^4\) Though post-structuralists point out that “The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition...What is denied is not that [such] objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 108).
informs state preferences but also constitutes state identity (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 138).

I see discourse as an arena where the complex relationships among material factors, institutions and ideas is played out. Policy makers, though bound by discourse, retain agency. They can use discourse in instrumental ways, and when these attempts are iterated over time, discourse changes. Discourse is a dynamic concept. Recognizing its power, policy-makers draw on resources in the discourse to justify their choices. Taking discourse seriously does not mean taking actors’ statements at face value. Discourse is often employed strategically. Governments that violate human rights in the Third World are seen to engage in anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and nationalist discourse (Risse-Kappen and Ropp 1999, 251). In the Indian nuclear program, allegations of unsafe practices were dismissed by the establishment and attributed to vested interests.

Studying discourse does not imply assuming the irrelevance of material factors. We cannot speak of ideational versus structurally-derived models of strategic choice, Johnston points out, as there are no interests at the state level that are not ideationally based (Johnston 1995, 62). Power may be the ability to afford not to learn (Wendt 1999, 331). Not all actors are equally susceptible to intersubjective understandings. Discursive power is “almost always” undergirded by material power (Hopf 1998, 179).

We must also consider the role of relative power in discourse. Not all actors are equally able to ‘speak’ and not all are authorized to draw upon the same resources. Some countries are ‘reality-makers’, others are ‘reality-takers’ (Jervis 1985, 3) We
need not assume the clean space of argumentative rationality (Risse 2000). Tracing the development of concepts over time helps us identify the workings of power and reveal the contending forces behind definitions. David Mutimer’s genealogy of ‘proliferation’ shows the debates over its interpretation, but also that the terms used in those debates shaped actual policies. For instance, the association of proliferation with instability/imbalance meant that it was situated firmly within the dyadic, statist arms control agenda, to be countered through technology denial (Mutimer 2000b).

**Identifying norms**

Scientific realism believes that we have access to reality, though we may need to posit certain ‘unobservables’ to explain it (Kosso 1992). Norms are a good example of powerful unobservables. Even violations of norms, if justified as divergent but authentic interpretations rather than frontal challenges, or if triggering severe punishment, testify to the continued operation of the norm (Ruggie 1988, 97).

My dependent or outcome variable is a specific understanding of foreign policy, one might say, a subset of it. I want to explain that part of Indian foreign policy which is known to its practitioners as ‘disarmament diplomacy.’ That is, the position that India adopts towards the various components of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Unlike most studies of foreign policy which focus on concrete or ‘real’ steps such as a decision to move troops, to establish diplomatic relations, my outcomes are mainly rhetorical. I cannot measure behavioral change by concrete but hidden actions in laboratories and secret strategy documents. Similarly, my independent variables refer to dominant international norms, not quantifiable variables such as relative military capabilities or GDP. With regard to nuclear weapons, it encompasses the dominant
understandings about the possession and use of nuclear weapons among the main players in world politics. This raises certain issues for my analysis.

First, norms have to be identified in the numerous rhetorical productions by states and international organizations—that is, in the discourse. Second, many scholars have warned against the tautology involved in ‘proving’ that a norm exists by pointing to a certain policy, and then claiming that the norm causes the policy. It is important to operationalize the norm in a way that is distinct from the behavior it is designed to explain (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 892). However, the outcomes that I am explaining are choices among norms themselves. Third, I will have to distinguish between identity and strategy. Since I argue that identities are not given, but are chosen by elites (from a limited menu), there is a strategic element to identity. However, earlier choices about which norms to support constrain later choices about which identity to assume; similarly if a country has adopted an identity as a result of a particular understanding of international forces, it is constrained in the types of norms it can espouse.

*Analyzing changes in norms—a discourse approach*

By discourse I mean the documented expression of ideas and opinions. This is a neutral definition, agnostic about whether ideas or material forces are the ultimate, “uncaused cause” behind the discourse. However, it does attribute what Albert Yee calls “quasi-causal” power to the ideas expressed in the discourse. Drawing on Yee’s theory, I argue that ideas are ontologically prior to, and account for, statistical regularities. Discourses “authorize or restrict, as well as prioritize and distribute, the ideas and beliefs that policymakers can think and in so doing partly delimit the policies they can pursue” (Yee 1996, 95).
What sort of evidence can be presented to prove that constitution is occurring? Since the process is ongoing and fundamental, this is a difficult task. In the preceding section I argued that the study of national discourse can be useful to this end. I approach the study of discourse in three steps. First, I gather data from quantitative content analysis, parliamentary debates and interviews. Second, I note the changes in the salience and associations of various key terms in the data and draw conclusions as to the boundaries of the discourse—that is, what is permitted and what is not. Third, I take a fresh look at the major decisions in nuclear policy in light of these conclusions and show how these decisions become ‘natural’ or ‘inevitable’ in the context of these discursive boundaries.

Since documentation of important security policy decisions is often unavailable or non-existent, scholars have always worked with public statements as source material. So there is nothing new in using discourse except that I attempt to study it systematically and verifiably. In the next section I discuss more fully the methodology of quantitative content analysis. Please see Appendix One for a discussion of the precise procedures adopted.

My choice of methods responds to the usual objections to the study of language: how do we know that this evidence is authentic, representative and valid? How do we know it is not taken out of context and edited, or that the conclusions it draws are flatly contradicted by dozens of other statements? Instead of using the archive of texts as a resource for selective citations in support of the theory, I will have a greater role for the elements in the discourse in the formulation of the theory itself. Focusing on discourse to ‘excavate’ norms will avoid the circularity problem which occurs when
they are inferred from behavior. Also, reading texts allows me to note changes in the salience of various norms (non-events). Moreover, discourse grounds all three models (security, interest and normative) and studying it allows for tests of their relative significance. Using public documents allows others to trace my arguments; moreover, Foucault claims that the genealogist will find the meanings of things, not in the mysterious depths but in surface practices (Ryan 1989, 80).

Section Seven: Methodology—the systematic analysis of language

Language is extremely important in the study of International Relations. Authors in the Realist, Neoliberal and Constructivist traditions all use texts as sources for decision-makers’ descriptions and justifications. Those more sensitive to the importance of language might also examine a large corpus of texts to retrieve the meanings of specific terms—actors’ or analysts’ categories. Fearon, for example, calls for analysis of ordinary language to discover exactly what identity means (Fearon 1999, 41). More recently, game theorists have incorporated a notion of linguistic competence to deal with indeterminacy (Johnson 1993). However, a systematic focus on texts is most characteristic of Constructivists, who take language seriously and do not dismiss statements as mere rhetoric, as ‘cheap’ (costless) talk. Constructivists note that elements of discourse function as resources for actors who want to frame and justify policies. Once institutionalized, they also constrain policy.

Quantitative content analysis

Lack of access to the archives, time and cost factors and unfamiliarity with techniques have ensured that textual analysis is not a widely used method in political science.
Political science is among the few social disciplines in which discourse analysis has remained virtually unknown (van Dijk 2001, 360). However, analysis of discourse is ideal for locating intersubjective understandings. As opposed to the study of individual utterances (say, speeches) which are the product of personal and subjective factors, discourse analysis is based on the idea that sense-making processes are carried out by the whole community.

Various approaches often termed as content analysis (Holsti 1969), dialogical analysis (Duffy 1998), or narrative analysis (Mattern 1998) essentially involve close reading and linking themes across texts. Quantitative operations make this a considerably more rigorous process as it forces the author to be specific about the sample, the statistical results and their generalizability. Quantitative content analysis is the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules, and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, in order to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 1998, 20). Quantification makes it possible to reduce large sets of data to manageable form, and to characterize the variation in the data with summary statistics (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 1998, 26).

While the usual critiques of quantitative methods in the social science can be leveled against this type of content analysis, they are even more valid because these analyses claim to represent content or meaning. If one adopts an individualist ontology, taking a political text as the “expression of the mind of a political actor” would mean removing it both from the context of its interaction with an audience, and from the community of
meaning in which it is produced (Chilton 1996, 28) (though this criticism does not
apply only to quantitative methods). Moreover, quantitative methods cannot get at
latent meaning (given by the reader). Quantitative analysis cannot take into account
figures of speech, polysemie and ambiguity, and cross-referentiality with other texts.
This loss of nuance within texts is also true of the sample—quantitative analysis is
unable to identify crucial texts.

In general, we can say that the quantitative-qualitative choice is a trade-off between
reliability and validity. Reliability requires that different coders applying the same
classification rules to the same content will assign the same numbers. Validity requires
that the assignment of numbers is reliable and that it accurately represents the abstract
concept being studied (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 1998, 54). Quantitative methods are less
valid than qualitative ones. For instance, a human coder would know that the term
‘White House’ or a reference to ‘Uncle Sam’ is used to represent the US, however, the
quantitative program can be made to account for this only with some work. However,
they are more reliable. After reading several texts using certain similarities among
categories, coders may start unconsciously making those associations in a sort of
‘instrument decay.’

Quantitative content analysis can be carried out using human coders; however, the
time and expense involved in such an endeavor severely restricts the size of the
sample. Since this project deals with a long time period and seeks to capture a broad
public conception of identity and interest, I decided to use a computer program and a
large-N. The sample could include transcripts of audio-visual media, articles in the
print media, public statements by ruling party and major opposition politicians, and

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5 I am grateful to Dietram Scheufele for this point.
official government statements. In my sample construction I have used only public documents. Since I use a simple random sample, I need to define a population that is representative of informed public discourse, appears at regular intervals and can be easily accessed. Newspapers are ideal for this analysis. I chose to sample from one major national newspaper in English--The Hindu. The sample was assembled through ‘reconstructing’ a sample week. The texts thus retrieved were then analyzed using the software CATPAC (Woelfel nd).

In this study, I will perform two types of quantitative operations. First, the salience of various themes in the texts will be noted on the basis of word counts and placement within texts (thematic analysis). Which themes occur in a set of texts, and how often? Second, semantic analysis focusing on the sentence or sense group, encodes relations among concepts (Popping 2000, 26-29). I also carry out qualitative discourse analysis on texts selected on a subjective basis for their importance, reading them in relation to broader ideational themes.

Parliamentary debates
Although parliamentary debates can be a rich source of elite views on nuclear issues, they have not been systematically studied. As in any parliamentary system, India’s Houses of Parliament function as forums for the intense exchange of views on the burning issues of the day. There are two houses of Parliament—the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya Sabha (House of States), somewhat analogous to the House of Representatives and the Senate in the American system. The Lok Sabha has over 500 representatives from different political parties and convenes for approximately 75 days in three sessions over the year (budget, monsoon and winter).
In this analysis I only include debates from discussions in the more representative Lok Sabha.  

*Interviews*

During my field research in India from September 2002 to August 2003, I interviewed over thirty decision-makers and astute observers of the political scene. I am aware that my interviewees are constrained by rules of secrecy. Moreover, their views on policy are often remarkably congruent with the official narrative (Abraham 1998, 4). My questions did not aim at eliciting secret information, but treated the responses as elements of discourse. The elites that I interviewed fall into four groups: politicians, government officials, strategic analysts and journalists. Interviews will be used primarily to help with process-tracing, and tend to focus more on recent developments in nuclear policy.

*Illustration*

To illustrate the discourse approach, I examine two key speeches that were made by Prime Ministers in 1974 and 1998 on the occasion of the two tests that neatly divide up India’s nuclear history. Both speeches were delivered to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, roughly a month after the tests (Parliament is not in session in May). The first was made by Indira Gandhi of the Congress (I) and the second by Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Bharatiya Janata Party.

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6 All data here has been obtained by looking through the indices of the Lok Sabha Debates. From 1991 onwards some debates are available online and this is a work in progress. Hindi and English are the two languages used in the debates. All translations from Hindi are mine. I have used only the date to refer to the debates obtained online, all others are identified by the date and/or volume and column number. Since Parliamentary debates are episodic and have not been indexed systematically they were not subject to quantitative analysis.
The 1974 text is titled *Statement re. Underground Nuclear Explosion Experiment.* The Prime Minister informed the House that the Atomic Energy Commission had carried out this explosion, as part of the research and development the Commission had been “carrying on in pursuance of our national objective of harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes.” Thus the explosion at Pokhran formed part of a natural progression of a technological quest, a quest undertaken in the name of the people towards a national goal. The paragraphs that followed also situated the explosion in the realm of scientific experimentation, as the PM reminded members of her past declarations regarding the utilization of nuclear energy. She gave details of the nature and scientific study of the consequences of the test, and referred extensively to the global enthusiasm for applying nuclear technology in the solution of the energy problem. India declared its willingness to share the fruits of research in nuclear technology with other countries.

The Prime Minister went on to affirm that all the material, equipment and personnel in the project were “totally Indian”. Discussing the reactions from different countries took up considerable time, with special emphasis on the reactions from Islamabad and Ottawa. The general conclusion was that countries that have criticised the test were misinformed as to the intentions of the Indian government. These intentions were laid

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7 Lok Sabha Debates, 22 July 1974, cols. 264-9. The other document worth examining is the text of Indira Gandhi’s letter to her Pakistani counterpart Z. A. Bhutto (Kaul 1974, 24). Like the statement above, the letter was a part of the effort to shift the discourse from the terrain of security and confrontation to that of development and collaboration. The development of “indigenous resources” was held to be the right of every country. Especially at a time of world crisis in energy resources, it was important to exploit atomic energy, described as a “ray of hope for mankind.” Thus, atomic energy is represented as another valuable natural resource. The PM mentions that India is collaborating with other developing countries in this field. The letter goes on to acknowledge that in the general imagination, conditioned as it is by the misuse of atomic energy, a nuclear explosion evokes violence. This nuclear test is different, Mrs. Gandhi seems to imply: “There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test”. She expresses surprise that in spite of categorical declarations by India, Pakistan perceives a security threat. She writes that there was no reason to give up bilateral co-operation set in motion by the Shimla Agreement, “merely because we have conducted a test.”
out in the section dealing with the Canadian reaction: “I have repeatedly reaffirmed our policy of using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have specifically stated that we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons.” It is important to note two things: first, the statement is presented as a continuation of policy of eschewing military use. Secondly, the declaration does not promise that nuclear capability would not be used for enhancing security or defence preparedness, specifically that nuclear weapons would not be developed. The reaction of Pakistan to the blast was discussed next. The government clarified that it is willing to share nuclear technology with Pakistan, and assured that country of its peaceful intentions.

The concluding part of the statement was: “No technology is evil in itself; it is the use that nations make of technology that determines its character. India does not accept the principle of apartheid in any matter and technology is no exception”. Here India simultaneously criticizes the double standards of the nations which have ‘misused’ nuclear technology and affirms that its own ‘use’ is of a different order. India’s technological efforts were an integral part of its challenge to the unequal international system.

The first full-length official statement after the 1998 tests was titled The Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy (Anon 1998d). It began by declaring that “India had successfully carried out” three tests. While the 1974 statement named the Atomic Energy Commission as the actor carrying out the tests, here tests are presented as undertakings of the government, even the nation, not simply ‘scientific research’ by a specific agency. After furnishing some technical details about the tests, the paper begins by situating Indian nuclear policy in a global context. When India became independent, it says, “the nuclear age had already dawned. Our leaders then took the
crucial decision to opt for self-reliance, and freedom of thought and action.” The central place of independence as a characteristic of foreign policy is highlighted and explicitly linked to the idea of self-reliance in technology. Specifically, non-alignment “required” building up national strength, for which the development of science and of the “scientific spirit” was crucial, the statement says.

The importance of disarmament is then reaffirmed. One rationale for India’s advocacy of disarmament is ethical: it is the natural course for a country that had achieved independence through non-violent struggle. Another is furnished in the paragraph that follows: a nuclear weapon free world would enhance the security of all nations. Here India’s participation in disarmament diplomacy is explicitly linked to its security needs. The sort of disarmament that was aimed for was, specifically, “universal and non-discriminatory”. The same paragraph extols the significance of sovereignty, and the right it grants to each nation to take decisions on the basis of its supreme national interests. It also offers an insight into why nuclear technology was so privileged in India. This technology, it states, offers developing countries the means to “leap across the technological gaps created by long years of colonial exploitation”. Next, a substantial portion of the paper is devoted to listing the initiatives that India put forward in the field of nuclear disarmament.

By this point in the paper, two main strands have been established as part of the nuclear security discourse: deterioration in the strategic environment and commitment to disarmament. Keeping the option open was a policy that reconciled the imperatives of both security and disarmament. The document states that successive governments have been “safeguarding the option”. This statement also serves to reinforce the idea of continuity in the nuclear policy and the irrelevance of ‘political’ considerations.
Referring to the 1974 test, the paper says that India “demonstrated” its nuclear capability. The concept of demonstrating capability to establish and sustain deterrence is implicitly invoked. Yet in the sentences that follow, further references to the enhancement of this capability are conspicuously absent, reflecting the lack of open development. India’s refusal to sign the CTBT is also explained in terms of both security and disarmament. On the one hand, it would limit India’s “potential” at an unacceptably low level; “also”, it did not carry forward the nuclear disarmament process.

The regional security environment is mentioned at this point. The abruptness of the reference to this variable in a discourse that has centred around abstract values until this point does not pass unnoticed in the paper. “Meanwhile”, it says, the last two decades have witnessed increasing insecurity in the neighborhood. Without mentioning names, the document summarizes India’s security threats: nuclear and missile proliferation, partly through clandestine procedures, and the support of terrorism (“clandestine war”) by neighboring states. The next paragraph asserts that the end of the Cold War did not assuage the country’s anxieties. Instead, the compulsions of the post-Cold War international system that “left India with little choice” but to go nuclear are listed—the lack of progress towards disarmament, and the legitimization of destructive technology in NWS arsenals.

India had to ensure that its nuclear option did not “erode by a voluntary self-imposed restraint”. The paper does not explain why the option which had been safeguarded for so long would have eroded at this juncture; or in its own language, why at this point, “the chosen path had reached a fork and the decision had to be made”. The rationale for the tests is coded in terms of the imperatives of technological development. In order to
ensure that “skills remain contemporary” and that “scientists and engineers are able to build on the work done by their predecessors”, data had to be obtained. The test was motivated by the need to reassure the Indian people about their security and to convey the government’s determination to “safeguard national security interests”.

The remainder of the paper deals with the future of Indian nuclear policy. Whereas capability has been enhanced, intentions remain unchanged: “our policies towards our neighbours and other countries too have not changed.” India’s policy is described as “issue-based bilateral negotiation” and “promotion of peace with stability.” By implication, enhanced capability is meant to deter external intervention in bilateral disputes and challenges to India’s regional predominance.

“India is a Nuclear Weapons State”, the paper proclaims. This status is “India’s due”, “the right of one-sixth of humanity”, and “not a conferment that others are to grant.” Thus NWS status is privileged, and the possession of nuclear weapons seen as an attribute of a Great Power. Nuclear weapons are for self-defence, to ensure that “India is not subjected to nuclear threats or coercion”. Clearly, the deterrent role extends to nuclear blackmail and not just direct attack. The uniqueness of India’s doctrine, marked by both “restraint and striving for [disarmament]”, is highlighted by vows not to follow the destructive nuclear doctrines of the NWS. India “shall not subscribe [to] or reinvent Cold War doctrines” and will avoid an arms race.

Worries about costs and instability are refuted in two ways. First, a list of recent Indian arms control proposals is put forward. The traditional commitment to international institutions is reiterated. India’s closer links with the world economy as a result of liberalization are mentioned as further bases of interdependence. These serve
as reminders that India is not a ‘rogue state’. Next, the theme of “the tradition of restraint” is taken up. For 24 years, India did not test. But restraint “has to arise from strength. It cannot be based on indecision or doubt”. The necessity for the demonstration of capability in maintaining deterrence by convincing a potential adversary about the nature and scope of response is implicit here. India’s willingness to negotiate various arms control measures is presented as proof of restraint. The admission that comprehensive disarmament has been and is likely to remain an utopian ideal, opens up the possibility that India would be amenable to settling for modifications in the regime.

The claim that there is absolute consensus on the policy: the people have, “with one voice, spoken in favour of the Government’s action…”, contributes to the marginalization of dissent. The paper ends with a quote from the Gita (one of the Hindu scriptures) exalting restraint. It says that while action undertaken to attain the goal of stability and peace may be seen as disruptive, this particular objective will be attained only through controlled and goal-oriented action. Indian tradition is invoked to substantiate the dictum that preparations for war are essential for peace.

The two speeches were converted into machine-readable form and analyzed with CATPAC. The 1974 speech was 1291 words long (out of which CATPAC found 200 words after elimination of the terms entered in the exclude file). Similarly in 1998, the PM’s speech was 3319 words and CATPAC analyzed 376 words.
Table 1.3: CATPAC Analysis of 1974 speech

TOTAL WORDS: 200
TOTAL UNIQUE WORDS: 25 (Only 14 reported here)
TOTAL EPISODES: 194
TOTAL LINES: 95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORD</th>
<th>FREQ</th>
<th>PCNT</th>
<th>FREQ*</th>
<th>PCNT*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INDIA</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUCLEAR</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>53.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENERGY</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERIMENT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOVERNMENT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATOMIC</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEACEFUL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMISSION</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNOLOGY</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLOSION</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARRIED</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRIES</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLOSIONS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAKISTAN</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CATPAC works by passing a window of a predetermined size through blocks of text. In this analysis the default size of 7 was used. Changing the size of the window did not significantly alter the results. As it passes through the text, ‘neurons’ are activated either by being in a window or by being connected to another activated neuron. Finally the neurons are summed and if they exceed a threshold, they are reported. Each update is called a cycle. The default threshold is zero. By lowering the threshold, we make it more likely that neurons will be activated.

While FREQ and PCNT refer to the number and percentage of times a word was used in the text, FREQ* and PCNT* indicate the total number of windows in which a word was used, and the percentage of windows that contain a particular word. Unique words
refer to the words that were analyzed (not excluded), and the number of episodes is the number of windows used in the text.

In terms of salience, we see that in 1974 the most salient terms are *India, nuclear, energy, experiment, government*. In 1998 the top five terms were: *nuclear, India, weapons, security, tests*. The shift of emphasis is encapsulated in the substitution of weapons and security for energy and experiment. In fact in the 1974 speech the word *energy* appears only twice, once in a reference to an Act passed in the 1950s and the other time in a quote by Nehru, also from that era. Clearly security has replaced energy as the most important word. It is also notable that the event is being named as *tests* rather than *experiment*, since the former is more associated with weapon systems and the latter with scientific research.

Moving on to the clusters, we find that the clusters in 1974 were (not listed in any particular order):

A. radioactive, explosions, radioactivity, oil
B. Canada, Pakistan, technology, will, countries
C. government, India
D. purposes, international, stated, regard, research
E. underground, nuclear, explosion, atomic, energy, commission, carried, peaceful
In 1998 the clusters were:

A. international, negotiations, Indian
B. restraint, action, decision
C. countries, disarmament, weapons, weapon
D. security, tests, government, nuclear, India
E. capability, years

What do the clusters tell us about the discourse in 1974? In cluster E we see that the AEC carried out an underground nuclear explosion in 1974. In cluster B, Canada and

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8 Log transformed to make clusters more visible
Pakistan are named as the countries that are connected to technology—in the former case as a supplier and in the latter as a potential sharer of nuclear technology. As we would expect, *oil* appears in the ‘scientific’ cluster A along with ‘*radioactivity*’ and ‘*radioactive*’, since the explosion was ostensibly carried out to find new energy sources. The clusters in 1998, on the other hand, do not have any references to technology. This means that in 1998 although science, technology and research were mentioned a few times in the speech, they were not well connected to the rest of the discourse. *Security* is closely associated with *tests*, a *nuclear* capability and the *Indian government*.

Although the two speeches together are almost 5000 words long the quantitative analysis was performed in a matter of seconds. The qualitative analysis took much longer and is almost 1700 words by itself. Since these are key speeches, however, they benefited from careful analysis of transitions, word choice and allusions. My qualitative analysis also embeds the two speeches in the larger context of nuclear policy. Thus a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods is ideal for content analysis.
Conclusion

In the literature, divergent accounts of nuclear policy-making emphasize national security, organizational interest or normative considerations. This work assumes that Indian policy makers are interested in maximizing the country’s security and global status, as well as personal and organizational interests. However, their conceptions of what these goals mean in concrete terms are constituted by changing global norms. In the chapters that follow, I discuss the making of Indian policy over five decades to illustrate this process of constitution.

In Chapter 2 I provide brief histories of the nonproliferation regime as well as Indian security and nuclear policy. I discuss the four fundamental processes by which the former influenced the latter. In Chapters 3 and 4 I attempt to reconstruct India’s policies as responses to changes in the nonproliferation regime. Chapter 3 shows how the nonproliferation regime, by attempting to constitute India as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State, also constituted distinct security problems for the country. This chapter describes India’s security problematique, stressing that threats were always perceived within the rubric of international norms concerning the possession of nuclear capability. Chapter 4 deals with domestic politics and demonstrates the processes by which the international regime empowered some actors within India with rhetorical resources. The chapter also describes the direct effect of international norms on national identity. That is, it asks both, “who gets to decide what security is?” and the more fundamental question: “whose security are we talking about?”

The next two chapters attempt to introduce some comparative examples. In Chapter 5 I focus on the nuclear programs of France and South Africa and in Chapter 6, I study
the evolution of the counter-terrorism regime. In both chapters I explain the limitations of the comparison and draw out explicit parallels and discordances. The Conclusion, Chapter 7, draws out implications for International Relations theory from the case of Indian (and French and South African) nuclear policy, and the mini-case study of counter-terrorism. It also hazards some predictions about the behavior of leaders in other countries of proliferation concern such as North Korea and Iran, and offers suggestions to policy-makers responsible for strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime and dealing with these countries. The chapter concludes with a discussion of prospects for future research on these issues of global importance.
CHAPTER 2

INDIA AND THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

In this chapter in the first two sections I first describe the four processes by which the nonproliferation regime affects state behavior and summarize the developments in the regime over the last fifty years. In Section Three I discuss the importance of deterrence in the nonproliferation regime. Next, I briefly discuss India’s security problematic and the history of its nuclear program in Sections Four and Five.

Section One: Regimes at work

Here I describe the four processes by which regimes affect national decisions. The first two, definition and categorization, are constitutive processes while the last two, institutionalization and enforcement, are regulative.

Definition

In international politics, half the battle is won when one’s definition of a term becomes hegemonic. Recognizing this, states strive to influence the formulation of the problem that the regime is designed to confront. Hegemons not only solve problems but create them—that is, they frame something as a problem. Contrary to functionalist logic, there are no ‘objective problems’ (Goertz 2003, 173).

Proliferation today has an accepted meaning: we think of it as the acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the ability to produce them at short notice. Tracing the battles over the definition of proliferation reminds us of its constitutive power. The now-
hegemonic definition of proliferation encountered several challenges in the 1950s and 1960s. First, there was the question of nuclear weapons that were manufactured by one country and housed or controlled by others. The Eisenhower administration planned to give nuclear technology to certain allies (Trachtenberg 1999, 146-7, 58). This was termed ‘nuclear sharing’ (Wohlstetter 1961, 356). The term ‘proliferation’, in contrast, had negative connotations because of its resonances with disease (Mandelbaum 1981, 162). Further, there was the issue of nuclear arms owned by the US but stationed on the territory of NATO allies. Theoretically, Americans were supposed to be in control of these weapons, but recent research has shown that the policy was for them to relinquish control for some period (Trachtenberg 1999, 194). These arrangements with allies were not included within the ambit of ‘proliferation’, in spite of efforts by the Soviet Union and non-aligned countries such as India. In 1966, at a Congressional Hearing, Secretary of State Rusk claimed that NATO arrangements had “nothing to do with proliferation,” dismissing the Soviet objection as simply irrelevant (Anon 1966a).

Another unsuccessful attempt to broaden the definition of proliferation originated in what was then called the Third World. These countries wanted ‘vertical’ proliferation—quantitative and qualitative increases in existing nuclear arsenals—to be included in the definition of proliferation along with ‘horizontal’ proliferation—the acquisition of capability by new countries. The NPT’s Article VI, which obliges the NWS to pursue disarmament in good faith, is intended to address this concern. The lack of progress in fulfilling this obligation is a source of leverage for the NPT parties not possessing nuclear weapons (albeit one that has become moot with the 1995 indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty).1 The accepted definition of proliferation today is that of an increase in the geographical dispersion of weapons

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1 The goal of “general and complete disarmament” referred to in Article VI, which would include also conventional disarmament, has faded without trace from the discourse.
(outside NWS control), rather than an increase in the number of weapons that NWS possess. In fact, some scholars claim, the present arrangement is better described as a ‘nondissemination’ rather than a nonproliferation regime (Keeley 1990, 104).

While the NPT narrowed the definition of proliferation in some ways, it broadened it in others. The treaty’s Articles I and II set up curbs on all nuclear explosive devices whether they were intended for use in peaceful civilian applications or not. NNWS were not allowed to carry out nuclear explosions, since the data could also be used for military purposes. Instead, the NWS pledged to share with them, for peaceful purposes, the know-how obtainable from such experiments.

Countries like India and Brazil, interested in the civilian uses of nuclear explosives, and/or in keeping the weapons option open, protested this definition, arguing that all nations should be free to take advantage of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs). They claimed that PNEs were so vital for development that no country could afford to rely on international aid for this technology. (India was willing to accept nondiscriminatory and universal safeguards to ensure that PNEs were not misused (Epstein 1976, 74). However, as we will see, the distinction between a PNE and a weapons test is not technical but political.)

India was not alone in wanting to restrict the definition of nuclear weapons. Within the US government, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) lobbied to expand the definition of nuclear weapon to include all nuclear explosions, the Atomic Energy Commission protested. The former carried the day. As Schelling wrote, “The decisive argument against PNEs was that

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2 Speaking at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) on 12 March 1964, the Indian representative said that safeguards should be imposed on the extraction of enriched uranium and plutonium and not on uranium mining, fuel fabrication, power plants, or “equipment and devices which in themselves serve no military purpose” (emphasis mine).
they would accustom the world to nuclear explosions, undermining the belief that nuclear explosions were inherently evil and reducing inhibitions on using nuclear weapons” (Tannenwald 2005, 30).

In the 1990s we note another significant redefinition of the problem. Revelations about Iraq’s nuclear program crystallized a growing conviction that the nuclear danger stemmed not only from actual weapons but also the capability to manufacture them. The inclusion of all countries with nuclear reactors in the list of obligatory signatories for the CTBT symbolizes this broadening of the definition of the problem.

Categorization
Regimes define the problem to be confronted, and also define categories of states (usually but not always their members) with corresponding rights and responsibilities. Mandelbaum describes this as a primary function of the NPT: “The treaty clarifies and publicizes which states have the bomb and which do not” (Mandelbaum 1995, 162). As per article IX of the NPT, countries that exploded a nuclear device before 1 January 1967 are NWS and all other states are NNWS. Thus, a nuclear explosion is chosen to be the symbol through which a NWS is identified. Though the treaty does not explicitly state this, this categorization had the effect of legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons by the five NWS—the US, the USSR, the UK, France and China.

The NPT thus codified the convention that only a country that had tested a nuclear device could even put forward its claim to be a NWS. Does this imply that any country that had tested nuclear devices should be treated as a NWS? This question became important in 1974 when India, a non-NPT party, tested a device in what it described as a PNE. India did not claim NWS status at this time and insisted that the test had no
military implications. However, as we will see, the link that had been established between testing and the possession of weapons helped India to maintain opaque deterrence over the next quarter-century.

Is nuclear testing today necessary or sufficient for NWS status? North Korea declared (privately in 2003 and publicly in 2005) that it had nuclear weapons and withdrew from the NPT (Kerr 2003). Although it is assumed that North Korea has not tested, the country is treated as possessing nuclear weapons, yet it does not have NWS status and is unlikely to obtain it. The same is the case for Israel. Even India and Pakistan are resigned to not being formally acknowledged as NWS. We can conclude that testing is insufficient but necessary for acquiring NWS status. However, 1998 shows us that testing may be necessary—if not for formal NWS status, at least for regularization of nuclear possession.

Categorization by the nonproliferation regime assigns each state an identity. Why do states care about categorization? While national identity is not determined by categorization by one international regime, the more legitimate or hegemonic the regime becomes, the more likely it is that its categorization of a country will become the dominant constitution. That is, it will make the country what it ‘is’ to the other members of the international community. The very survival of the state will then depend on how it is categorized. Here security derives from the identity the state bears. While the term ‘identity’ is usually used to refer to the sense of nationhood, derived from domestic sources, that a state projects, I use it here to mean that which distinguishes the state among other states.
The most vivid and recent example of the importance of identity is that of Iraq. In 1991, the UN passed Resolution 687 depriving it of all WMD and facilities to manufacture and deliver them. Over the next twelve years, various measures to ensure the enforcement of this resolution led to increasingly stringent sanctions on Iraq. These resolutions named Iraq’s non-compliance a threat to international peace and security. They reminded the world that nuclear weapons could be owned only by the five countries identified in the NPT. Admittedly, Iraq had been acquiring weapons capabilities before its invasion of Kuwait (while the world turned a blind eye); other states like Iran and North Korea were also engaged in this quest and did not face similar punishment. Yet it was Iraq’s naming as a threat to international peace, as a NNWS that was acquiring nuclear weapons, that made international action against it—however contested—possible.

The German case is a less dramatic example of the effects of identity. The Paris Treaty of 1954 restored full sovereignty to the FRG and lifted restrictions on its civilian nuclear program on condition that the country would never manufacture WMD. This was not enough to reassure Germany’s traditional rivals. Britain and France were keen to curb the FRG’s nuclear development. One way was to include the country in the NPT as a NNWS. The permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons codified in an international treaty reminded many in the FRG of postwar humiliations (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 10, 194). They perceived an attempt to cut Germany down to size by keeping it out of the NWS category forever. A major concern was that as a NNWS its civilian program would be hobbled (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 183). This would turn it into a “toothless agrarian country” (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 188). The German association of NWS status with military and economic might was not mistaken. Western diplomats of the time fretted at the possibility that if even India
acquired nuclear weapons they would fail to convince an industrialized country like the FRG to refrain from following suit (Schrafstetter 2002, 88).

At the same time, the identity effects of NNWS status were also appreciated by some in Germany. German scientists supported NPT accession in their quest to overcome the stigma of their association with Hitler’s projects (Kotter and Muller 1990, 18). Germany insisted on a public confirmation of the US security guarantee in return for signing the NPT (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 184). Realizing that they were not in a position to influence the treaty, Germany’s leaders feared that they would be blamed for blocking progress if they insisted on linking the treaty to disarmament (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 95, 189). They also felt unable to counter the hostility from the USSR that would follow on a German rejection of the treaty. Thus Germany signed the NPT in 1969. Similarly, Yugoslavia signed the NPT as a NNWS because it was worried about possible Soviet aggression (Jha 1983, 303). Here the NPT is being used as a signaling device by countries trying to mitigate their security dilemmas (Sasikumar and Way 2005).

Institutionalization and enforcement

International institutions represent a concentration of technical and organizational resources devoted to an issue-area. Their services include standardization, dispute settlement, and facilitation of discussion. Enforcement includes both positive incentives (inducements) and negative incentives (sanctions). On the one hand, states’ interests are determined by their identity choices, and the processes of definition and categorization have already established the range of possible identities. On the other hand, institutionalization and enforcement do reinforce definition and categorization, and they form the most visible parts of the regime.
The Conference on Disarmament and the IAEA are among the institutions of the nonproliferation regime. While the term institution has sometimes been used as a description of patterns of behavior or a synonym for norm, I employ it to refer to formal or informal international organizations. Institutions are the locus of the concrete activity of a regime. Consequently, they are often the focus of scholars studying ‘what the regime does.’ A focus on formal and concrete organizations obscures some of the power of the regime. Since my goal is to illuminate constitutive processes, I often treat institutions in a simplistic fashion, taking them as ‘given’ and ‘monolithic.’ While I accept the inevitable limitations, this was necessary to avoid an unwieldy project.

Enforcement in the nonproliferation regime is controversial. Non-compliance, though rare, is not easy to deal with. Violators of the NPT can be referred to the U.N. Security Council. During the Cold War this provision was never invoked although several countries such as India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa were known to be working on nuclear programs. In these cases, geopolitical considerations prevailed over concerns about proliferation, while commercial interests seemed to trump them in the cases of Brazil and Argentina.

After the Cold War the Security Council became more effective as vetoes were used less frequently and other UN bodies received mandates supporting enforcement. Inspections after the First Gulf War revealed that Iraq had been conducting programs to develop its own uranium enrichment programs, make atomic and hydrogen bombs, and develop delivery systems. The international community imposed sanctions to prevent the resumption of the program. Yet even in 2003, American doubts as to the
effectiveness of multilateral inspections and the complete elimination of Iraqi WMD capabilities were invoked as justification for another war. Recently when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT the international community was paralyzed. Since enforcement is a complicated issue I will deal with it in the following chapters only as far as it affected India’s policy.

Section Two: Changing international norms on nonproliferation

The nonproliferation regime developed concurrently with the post-World War Two order. It bears the marks of the political climates it passed through. There are several excellent studies of the politics of the regime (Chafetz 1995; Epstein 1976; Mutimer 2000b; Ungerer and Hanson 2001). As I clarified in Chapter 1, while I recognize that international norms are produced by highly political maneuvers, I bracket this process for the most part. Here I summarize the shifts in international norms without delving into their causes.

1950s
The early years were marked by intense optimism about the power of the atom, yet the notion of having created a Frankenstein-ian power remained strong (Ungar 1992, 60,65). The US emerged as the most advanced state in the military and civilian uses of nuclear power, and not coincidentally, as the norm leader in arms control. In the 1950s the newly-established UN manifested a genuine tide of world opinion against nuclear weapons. The very first UNGA called for proposals for the elimination of atomic weapons.

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3 Under Article X a party has the “right” to withdraw from the treaty, but this right is not unconditional. In addition to providing three months’ notice of its intention to withdraw, the state must also provide the Security Council with a statement of the “extraordinary events” that would make continuation in the treaty injurious to its “supreme interests.”
weapons and all other major weapons “adaptable to mass destruction” (Tannenwald 2004, 3). The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) became, in 1961, the main negotiating body. In the war-weary climate of the age, the superpowers felt obliged to participate in disarmament negotiations, unwillingly furthering the anti-nuclear weapon discourse (Tannenwald 2005, 19). The idea that sovereign state privilege would have to compete with the imperatives of international peace when it came to nuclear weapons gained ground.

The IAEA was set up with the dual tasks of promoting nuclear technology in development and restricting its military uses. Conflicting mandates may be responsible for the organization’s failure to predict and contain proliferation, but they reflect the linked beliefs of its founders—that nuclear power was vital and transformative, and that its destructive uses would be controlled. In 1953 Eisenhower gave a famous speech to the UN proferring the ‘commercial option.’ He admitted: “If at one time the US possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago…the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others” (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 49). The Atoms for Peace program was an attempt by the norm leader to attract other states to a framework to channel nuclear knowledge into peaceful uses (Nye 1981, 17).

In 1957 the US Atomic Energy Commission started Project Plowshare to study nuclear explosions in mining and other civilian uses (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 173). American firms had cornered the market and commercial interests were reinforced by scientific laboratories who had an interest in keeping all options for testing open. 200,000 copies of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech were sent out by
US firms in their foreign mail. The US Information Agency also propagated the message (Titus 1986, 77). Other Western countries also were interested in the opportunities for profit. As a result, there was competition among nuclear suppliers for markets. This implied that any supply-side regime faced a collective-action problem: while it was in the larger interest of all to prevent the diffusion of weapon technology, individual suppliers found safeguards to be barriers in negotiating nuclear deals with developing countries.

*1960s*

The decade of the 1960s was marked by nuclear testing—by France in 1960 and China in 1964. The Chinese program greatly worried the US as well as the USSR, which had initially aided China. The perceived need to seal the door to the nuclear club hastened the negotiation of the NPT. This decade also saw the establishment of a strategic stalemate between the US and the USSR, as the latter developed missiles capable of targeting the US. The idea of deterrence became the common sense of the age.

We note the gradual erosion of the belief that nuclear weapons could be completely eliminated (Poulouse 1996, 69; Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 5). Tests by five countries had shown that know-how was too diffused for the nuclear genie to be returned to the bottle. The enmity between the superpowers rendered impossible the task of creating trust between the parties to eventual disarmament. While international forums saw frequent calls for disarmament, these were often issued by the nonaligned and developing nations, identifying disarmament as a demand of the weak. As disarmament became increasingly implausible, arms control became more acceptable.

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4 Thomas Schelling contrasted the “serious and businesslike prospects for realistic negotiations in 1969” with the “fantasy and pretense about general and comprehensive disarmament” a decade earlier (Mutimer 2000b, 34).
especially after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The very first treaty negotiated under UN auspices was the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) prohibiting nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space. Originally devised as part of a comprehensive disarmament plan, the link between disarmament and testing was dropped in 1959, turning the PTBT into an arms control measure (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 121).

The NPT, which opened for signatures in 1968, became the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. The NPT was the product of an unprecedented agreement between the superpowers. The Johnson administration (in contrast to the Kennedy and Nixon administrations) put its weight behind nonproliferation. The two primary targets—the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan—were persuaded by this support on the part of norm leader, to accede to the NPT and thereby acquire the status of “virtuous” countries (Gavin 2004/5, 135). The Italian foreign ministry once described the NPT as the first unequal treaty of the 20th century. Over time, though, most countries came to accept this infringement of sovereignty and the double standard of the treaty in the belief that it was the most reasonable way to avoid a nuclear conflagration (Quester 1979, 546).

1970s
The 1970s saw a thaw in the Cold War symbolized by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that produced a successful treaty in 1972. In that year the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty also came into effect. By limiting their ability to defend important territories, the latter institutionalized the mutual vulnerability of the two superpowers, thus strengthening deterrence. Détente, brought about by several structural and domestic factors, represented the acceptance of the international order by the powers that
mattered. The NPT was gradually growing in strength as a treaty. In the first three
years, over 40\% of eligible states acceded to it (and expanded in a linear fashion after
that) (Sasikumar and Way 2005, 13).

The 1974 PNE by India was the first event that destabilized the regime, providing a
vivid demonstration of the need to ensure that nuclear exports were safeguarded.
Although the explosion fitted the definition of proliferation in the NPT, India was not
a party to the NPT and had not broken any formal international commitments. While
the Zangger Committee had already been formed in 1971 in recognition of the
inadequacies of the NPT, the Indian test triggered the creation of the NSG which
mandated safeguards on *all* nuclear facilities and later, on dual-use technologies also.
The NSG allowed for the inclusion of France—a nuclear exporter, yet not an NPT
member—in export control. India did face sanctions after 1974, although these were
never as severe as nonproliferation advocates wished. One observer commented:
“…India has succeeded in becoming a nuclear power with astonishingly little adverse
comment. India seems to have ‘pulled it off’ at very little, if any, cost in terms of
world opinion” (Epstein 1976, 229).

Nuclear technology came under greater scrutiny. The Symington and Glenn
Amendments to the US Foreign Assistance Act implied an expanded definition of
proliferation, covering not only the detonation of a device but also the acquisition of
the capability of producing fissile material (Scheinman 1987, 184). Writing in 1977,
Fred Iklé of ACDA named Atoms for Peace as the main culprit for proliferation
(Poulose 1996, 109). In July 1974, the US announced suspension of long-term
uranium enrichment contracts (Brenner 1981, 14). Washington ended funding for its
own PNE program in 1970 (Reiss 1995, 230). After the 1979 accident at the Three
Mile Island plant in Pennsylvania, no new nuclear reactors were built in the US. The USSR continued to conduct PNEs till 1988.

President Carter adopted a ‘countervailing’ strategy for national defense, that some claimed, made nuclear use more probable by making it more thinkable. At the same time, his administration adopted the most activist position of any US administration to that point on proliferation—exemplified by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act which put stringent and retroactive conditions on nuclear fuel supplied by the US. However, other suppliers like France and Germany were engaging in unsafeguarded nuclear commerce. The most flagrant example was the 1975 Germany-Brazil agreement on the supply of eight nuclear power reactors.

1980s

The nonproliferation regime entered the 1980s battered but not broken. By the early 1980s, 97% of all nuclear plants in the NNWS were under IAEA safeguards. Inspections were also on the rise: from 180 inspections in 1970, to 1100 by 1980, and 1820 by 1984 (Scheinman 1987, 150). Anti-nuclear movements demanded that the superpowers do more to curb the nuclear danger. The ‘freeze’ movement—calling for a bilateral moratorium on testing and production—was a response to the US failure to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II agreement. The re-freezing of the Cold War, as symbolized by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, stymied any possibility of arms control. Ronald Reagan came to power promising to end the impotence that was a result of nuclear deterrence. His administration saw the discussion of warfighting doctrines at the highest levels. On proliferation, it declared itself more sympathetic to countries’ security and economic imperatives, reversing many Carter decisions (Tate 1990, 401).
This decade saw increasing concern about the possibility that terrorists would acquire nuclear materials, and the Vienna convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials was enacted. Nuclear programs in Israel, India and Pakistan were tacitly acknowledged but in the absence of an overt crossing of the nuclear threshold, they did not face penalties. Joseph Nye advocated that once a country is capable of building nuclear weapons, all others could do was to persuade it not to produce or deploy them (Nye 1989-90, 60). By the late 1980s, other military technologies such as missiles had also begun to be ‘imagined’ in terms of proliferation (Mutimer 2000b, 66).

Radical change was possible only with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev on the world scene. The deceleration of the nuclear arms race proceeded apace with Gorbachev-initiated internal change in the Soviet Union. These shifts were to lead to the peaceful end of the four-decades-long Cold War in the eventful years 1989-1991. During the Cold War strategic compulsions had frequently prevailed over nonproliferation (Smith and Cobban 1989). At a lecture on 6 May 2005 at Stanford, Hans Blix, former head of the IAEA, characterized the start of the 1990s as “euphoric.” Supporters of the UN believed that the Security Council could now effectively ensure collective security in the absence of obstructive vetoes, and that there would be dramatic cuts in the arsenals of the NWS, as well as an extension of the nonproliferation regime to the few holdouts, of which India was one.

1990s
The US did trim its arsenal in response to the fading of the Soviet threat. In September 1991 President Bush issued a directive that halved the number of warheads. Russia also decided to eliminate the bulk of the nuclear weapons it had inherited. Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine chose to give up their nuclear arms under international pressure and acceded to the NPT. In Latin America, traditional rivals Brazil and Argentina engaged in a peace process and gave up their arsenals. They even dropped their common antagonism to the NPT and signed it in 1997 and 1995 respectively. In 1991 the USSR announced a test moratorium, and this was followed by a French moratorium in 1992 (France resumed testing for a few months in 1995) and a US moratorium in 1993. In December 1996 dozens of retired military officers from across the world joined to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Yet, nuclear weapons continue to structure the global order. Russia still has 8200 nuclear warheads, most targeted at the US. The Americans maintain 7000 offensive strategic warheads. Each of these has roughly 20 times the destructive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima (McNamara and Caldicott 2004). The People’s Republic of China maintained its arsenal and improved delivery systems. The UK and France also chose to retain their arsenals, although they made cuts. The 1991 Gulf War allowed the US to conflate WMD and ‘rogue states’ in order to justify the modernization of nuclear arsenals and doctrines of nuclear deterrence (Alley 2001, 57). The end of the bipolar competition only reinforced the perception of NWS as mature and advanced states responsible for international stability through their deft wielding of the instruments of deterrence.

The IAEA, originally a forum for technical discussion, began to host discussions with overt political hues. Delegations to the IAEA began to comprise more diplomats than scientists (Ramanna 1991, 85). The post-Gulf War revelations about Iraqi preparations to build weapons damaged the institution’s credibility. US and British leaders routinely denigrated its capabilities for inspection and export control (Spector 1998,
They increasingly preferred informal multilateral agreements such as the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to multilateral treaties under UN auspices.

In this climate, the NPT Review Conference (NPTREC) was held in 1995. As per the treaty’s provisions, the conference would decide whether to extend its life. The US Ambassador to the NPTREC called it the “most important multilateral arms control conference in history” (Williams 2005). NNWS, intent on extracting concessions, pointed to the glaring failure of the NWS to attempt in good faith to eliminate nuclear weapons as required by Article VI. They threatened to grant only a limited extension conditional on progress towards disarmament. The NWS exerted intense pressure for an indefinite and unconditional extension. Finally, the NPTREC approved “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament” a document recommitting nations to the goal of nuclear disarmament, as part of the bargain that NNWS extracted in return for indefinite extension.

By the late 1950s the cessation of tests had emerged as an integral and often the most salient component of the UN's disarmament agenda (Reisman 1999b, 477). The early conclusion of a CTBT was another promise that the NWS made at the NPTREC. Yet the CTBT was not a disarmament measure. The NWS had conducted thousands of nuclear tests and had the ability to use the data thus obtained for simulations. The Clinton administration, in attempting to convince the Senate to ratify the CTBT, assured Americans that the treaty would “lock in a technological status quo that protects us without threatening others” (Leaver 2001, 125). Similar statements are to be found in the discourse in the UK (Calvert and Gourlay 1995). Countries like India, low on the nuclear learning curve, saw themselves as the treaty’s targets.
Tannenwald writes that with the end of the Cold War the major debates in arms control were no longer on the East-West axis but on the North-South axis (Tannenwald 2004, 3). However, the 1995 Review Conference highlighted the fissures among the Third World and the non-aligned. After the Cold War, the regime began to shed its ‘Western’ and ‘neo-imperialist’ connotations and could more easily be seen as providing a common good. If Atoms for Peace had helped unleash the atomic genie, the US is now trying to put it back in the bottle. President G. W. Bush currently argues for disallowing the universal right to acquire enrichment technology. Countries already enriching uranium would be exempt from the ban, and would supply nuclear fuel for power reactors to others. In March 2005 he reiterated that this was the only way to close the loopholes in the regime (Sanger 2005). The Bush administration is thus pushing for a tighter definition of proliferation under which all uranium enrichment would be controlled.

Section Three: Deterrence—identity and performance

The previous section highlighted the shifts in priority given to nuclear norms over time. Constructivists would recognize deterrence as another international norm (Farrell and Lambert 2001, 310). While the practice has no basis in international law, it has been so fundamental since 1945 that it was recognized by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as an exception or possible justification for states’ retaining nuclear weapons.
The concept of deterrence

Deterrence is a military strategy where the threat of reprisal is used to forestall an attack by the adversary. The concept of credibility allows this mainly psychological concept to be treated within a rational utilitarian calculus. However, credibility simultaneously allows for a great deal of latitude in the estimation of the requirements of deterrence (Falk 1989, 64). Since deterrence is based on rationality it is universally applicable. It is said that ‘nuclear weapons concentrate the mind wonderfully.’ That is, since the cost of aggression is so stark, differences in individual psychology, culture or national values are evened-out and irrelevant to actors’ cost-benefit calculations. In effect, deterrence is culture-proof.

The literature contains many attacks on this conception of deterrence—from psychology (Green 1966; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989), ethics (Shue 1989b), and organizational theory (Sagan 1993). Others have shown that the non-use of nuclear weapons after 1945 cannot be explained without reference to a nuclear taboo—an unreasoning avoidance of nuclear use. Yet while the taboo and deterrence are competing explanations for nuclear nonuse, the taboo has also strengthened and legitimized nuclear deterrence by making nuclear use less likely (Tannenwald 2005, 41). Nuclear warfighting doctrines were disparaged as making nuclear use more probable by making it more thinkable; we can say that by making nuclear use more unthinkable, deterrence made nuclear arsenals more acceptable.

In the security model, deterrence is portrayed as a matter of acquiring a certain capability against given threats. Yet identity is vital for threat assessment. Nuclear weapons take on different meanings depending on whether they are held by friend or foe. As Constructivists are fond of pointing out, nuclear-tipped missiles are not
figments of the imagination, but their targeting is a function of what a country imagines the possessors of other missiles might do (Lipschutz 1995, 10). Deterrence games, interestingly, recognize the importance of identity. One must know at the decision node what type of opponent (Wimp or Tough Guy) one faces, since that determines one’s payoffs.

Deterrence turns on establishing in the adversary’s mind a certain perception of one’s capability and intentions—fundamentally an intersubjective understanding. Success depends on the communication of credible messages about capability and the willingness to use it, rather than on actual possession. McCanles describes this as the “circular validation of text by force and force by text” (McCanles 1984, 12). This process has to be constantly reinforced, lest it lead to the “progressive entropy of the threat”—the threatening text may be read as a “mere threat” (McCanles 1984, 15). Thus, there is a constant need for louder threats and more visible capabilities.

Stability depends on ensuring the right balance between capabilities and intention. A country makes itself vulnerable to attack if the adversary perceives that its capabilities are inadequate; if those capabilities are seen as exceeding the limit of sufficiency, the adversary will pre-empt on the assumption that they are intended for offensive purposes. While the manifest function of nuclear weapons is to make massive explosions, their latent function is to circulate “as complex signs of national will, capability and determination… communicat[ing] the direction of particular national policies and goals” (Luke 1989, 219). Recognizing that deterrence is not a ‘fact’ but a process needing constant reinforcement, implies also recognizing that the discourse of policy-makers is part of the package of deterrence.
Deterrence theory recognizes that the process of communicating credible messages is perilous. Thomas Schelling writes: “Communication is often neither entirely impossible nor entirely reliable; while certain evidence of one's commitment can be communicated directly, other evidence must travel by newspaper or hearsay or be demonstrated by actions” (Schelling 1960, 39). Methods of communication include statements by leaders, acquisition of equipment, and demonstrations of resolve in other conflicts. For instance, the Nuclear Posture Review (2002) expresses concern about rogue states, and reveals that the US is considering using nuclear-tipped tactical missiles and resuming nuclear testing (Gordon 2002).

By presenting nuclear policy as determined by technical-strategic considerations, deterrence strengthens the state-centric view of the world, and the idea that states are rational actors (Falk 1989, 66). In France, it reinforced de Gaulle’s statism (Gordon 1999, 226). Deterrence allows the government to reconcile pacifist traditions or war-weariness with a buildup of atomic arms. It creates a radical divorce between the value-in-use of nuclear weapons and their value-in-exchange in deterrence (der Derian 1998, 119). The end of bipolar rivalry led to an even greater appreciation of nuclear deterrence for its ‘freezing effect’ on the Cold War (Gaddis 1986, 127). The ICJ in July 1996 reaffirmed its legitimacy: “… the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a state in an extreme circumstance of self-defense in which its very survival would be at stake” (Reisman 1999b, 485). In 1998, Shimon Peres described Israel’s nuclear option as the basis for peace in the region: “We have built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima, but to have an Oslo” (Anon 1998m).

5 The award of the Hero of the Soviet Union medals to submarine personnel was interpreted by Western analysts as a sign that Russia had developed Polaris-type missiles that could be launched by submarines (Anon 1962).
Deterrence in the nonproliferation regime

Few scholars have pointed out the centrality of deterrence in the nonproliferation regime’s normative core. This is because of two reasons: first, the regime is usually viewed as resting on an economic tradeoff: facilitation of civilian uses in return for renunciation of military uses (Smith 1990, 258). Second, deterrence, defense, and disarmament are seen as three discrete ways in which states protect themselves against the diffusion of nuclear weapons. The nonproliferation regime is, in fact, an amalgam of all three strategies, not an instantiation of disarmament. India and other nonaligned countries had called for “an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear powers” in UNGA Resolution 2028 (1965). The 1968 draft of the NPT did not embody this balance.

At first glance, deterrence and the nonproliferation regime are at cross-purposes; the former depends on the brandishing of nuclear threats while the latter aims to reduce the threat from nuclear weapons. Yet, at the core of nonproliferation is the idea, shared with deterrence, that nuclear weapons are essential to world peace, provided they are handled exclusively and responsibly by the NWS. The spread of nuclear weapons, however, would raise the possibility of nuclear use simply by increasing the number of weapons and drawing Great Powers into conflicts. Moreover, deterrence is predicted to be too unstable among new nuclear powers; it is unlikely to work in emotionally charged mass polities in which rage and religious hatred drive decisions (Bracken 1999, 113). Instability could also derive from the small size of new nuclear forces, encouraging pre-emption. The association of proliferation with instability/imbalance meant that it was situated firmly within the dyadic, statist arms control agenda, and countered through technology denial (Mutimer 2000b). This is the basis for the claim
that the underlying logic of the regime would be weakened if the big powers renounced or cut their arsenals dramatically (Scoblic 2001, 77; Smith 1990, 258).

Deterrence grounds the nonproliferation regime in three ways: first, NWS deter each other, thus preserving the balance of power among the big powers. The regime institutionalizes one solution to their security problems. After the end of the Cold War the deterrence of ‘rogues’ has also been accepted as the legitimate basis for the continuation of nonproliferation. Second, by prohibiting proliferation, the regime reinforces the hierarchical relationship between NWS and other states. In this function, deterrence shades into coercion. The Indian analyst Jasjit Singh lists 47 incidents of nuclear coercion between 1946 and 1996 (Singh 1998c, 12-13). The regime does not offer formal protection to states against the NWS. NNWS attempted to gain some measure of security by demanding negative security guarantees (where NWS promise not to use nuclear weapons against them). Instead, Resolution 255 of the UN Security Council (1968) was only able to offer a positive security guarantee: a NNWS that faced a nuclear threat would receive Council assistance. Since the NWS had veto powers in the Council this guarantee did not mean much. Although just before the NPT Extension Conference, NWS declared through Resolution 984 that they would not use nuclear weapons against NNWS that were members of the NPT, this declaration fell short of a legally-binding assurance.

Third, the nonproliferation regime facilitates the strategy of hedging. Ariel Levite has shown that several countries that have ostensibly given up nuclear weapons, are actually engaged in a strategy of nuclear hedging. He defines this as a “strategy of

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6 One could of course argue that this is a reasonable price to pay for a world with fewer nuclear powers, and that seems to be the calculation made by most states.
maintaining, or…appearing to, a viable option for the relatively rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, based on an indigenous technical capability to produce them within a relatively short time-frame” (Levite 2002/03, 69-70). This is facilitated by the NPT’s Article IV which allows members to develop nuclear programs as long as they adhere to international safeguards.⁷ During NPT negotiations, NNWS (in particular, Germany) prevented the inclusion of safeguards with the potential to curb economic activity or sovereignty—such as the ability to search at any time and place for undeclared weapons (Fischer 2000, 13). The right to develop nuclear energy coupled with such non-intrusive safeguards ensures that NPT parties can make use of ambiguity. Japan, for instance, currently possesses approximately five tons of plutonium, sufficient to manufacture hundreds of nuclear weapons (Campbell and Sunohara 2004, 243). Occasional statements by Japanese leaders reinforce the policy of hedging (Levite 2002/03, 71).⁸

Section Five: India’s security problematic

This section provides a brief discussion of the four phases in the history of India’s security and foreign policy.

The First Phase: 1947-1964

India attained independence from the British on 15 August 1947 and Jawaharlal Nehru became the first Prime Minister (PM). Nehruvian security strategy was based on a holistic idea of security, informed by the needs of development, disarmament and...
defense. In all three spheres, gains for India were not seen as incompatible with greater security for the rest of the world. Though this strategy was discredited by the unexpected conflict with China in 1962, the core elements of it remained influential for decades.

In his first decade at the helm of affairs, Nehru made a concerted effort to reach out to China. He supported Chinese admission into the UN and tried to foster Asian unity between the two countries. This phase of foreign policy was known as ‘Hindi-Chini bhai bhai’ (Indians and Chinese are brothers). The India-Pakistan enduring rivalry began ‘at birth’ in 1948 when the two countries went to war over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The war ended in a ceasefire, which left Pakistan occupying almost two-thirds of this territory. The roots of the enduring rivalry are deep. While India saw itself as a secular nation bound by freely-given allegiance, Pakistan saw itself as the homeland of Muslims in the region.

There was no clear strategic impetus for developing a nuclear capability in this phase. India appeared to have cordial relations with China and the superpowers and the threat from Pakistan was not seen as meriting a nuclear response. The Ministry of Defence in fact, holding that the Chinese and Pakistani threats were based on conventional weapons, opposed the diversion of resources to a nuclear force (Moshaver 1991, 36). Consequently, India refrained from constructing a visible military nuclear infrastructure. Ending the development and production of nuclear weapons was repeatedly stated to be one of the major aims of Indian foreign policy.

At the same time, by establishing a technological base that could be used for a military program, the option of nuclear weaponization was kept open. As Homi Bhabha, the
first put it in 1948, “India will have an atomic research centre comparable with those in the most advanced countries” (Moshaver 1991, 31). No expense was spared—the foremost scientists and engineers of Indian origin were offered incentives to join the AEC, and foreign scientists and agencies were approached for collaboration (Sharma 1983, 82). The Department of Atomic Energy received exceptional support and autonomy from the Central government (Sharma 1983, 119). No other field of science in India has received such consistent attention (Chopra 1974, 38).

Yet even the atomic energy establishment did not openly advocate a weapons program. Homi Bhabha, the first Chairman of the AEC, strove to ‘keep the option open,’ and, given the personal relationship he enjoyed with the Prime Minister, this was a significant influence on the direction of Indian nuclear policy. On hearing about the reported Chinese attempt to build a bomb, Bhabha announced at a press conference that Indian technology had advanced to a point where it could produce a bomb within 18 months. This statement, whether by design or default, put great pressure on the government to change its no-weapons policy (Moshaver 1991, 37). By 1960, when the 40 MW CIRUS reactor went into operation, Nehru was able to tell the National Development Council, “We are now approaching a stage when it is possible for us…to make atomic weapons” (Chellaney 1993a, 33).

The Second Phase: 1964-1974

Coming as it did after the war with China in 1962, the 1964 Lop Nor test by China seriously jeopardized the Nehruvian security strategy. India noted that even the Afro-Asian countries could not be persuaded to condemn the Chinese test (Moshaver 1991, 40). The lack of international support during the war with China was also cause for worry. In 1965, Pakistan was defeated by India after a short war in the Rann of Kutch.
At the global level, the negotiations towards the NPT made plain the impossibility of attaining India’s self-declared goal of general and comprehensive disarmament. The political elite suffered a loss of faith in the UN over the Kashmir issue. A 1965 symposium in the influential journal *Seminar* came to the conclusion that the existing approach to nuclear policy was unable to meet India’s security needs, and that foreign nuclear guarantees would not suffice. In 1966, a survey on nuclear policy was conducted. 70% of those surveyed held that atomic weapons were needed for defense against China and Pakistan, to withstand blackmail and to enhance national prestige (Kapur 1976b, 179). When a survey was carried out in 1968, on whether or not to develop nuclear weapons, a sizeable majority was shown to favour the development of an *independent* nuclear capability (Bhatia 1979, 117). The results of a 1970 survey showed that two-thirds of the sample wanted India to have an independent nuclear deterrent, while a quarter favored a nuclear umbrella (Moshaver 1991, 52). The first collective demand for the bomb in fact came from the ruling party, at the All India Congress Committee session of November 1964, though this position did not prevail in the final resolution (Moshaver 1991, 38).

As Soviet-US détente deepened in the 1970s, it was feared that Indian interests were in danger of being sidelined (Kapur 1976b, 205). The separation of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, was midwived by India in 1971, the occasion for a third war. The sending of the nuclear-armed warship the *USS Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal during this conflict, appeared as the most visible symbol of superpower intervention in South Asia.
In May 1974, India surprised the world by conducting a nuclear explosion in the Pokhran desert in Rajasthan. Since it was not an NPT signatory, this test did not violate any formal legal commitments. Still, the Indian government insisted on naming the test a PNE and disavowed any military implications. However, India began to be considered as having some claim to possessing a military nuclear capability after 1974. The test can be taken to mark the beginning of a new phase in security policy.

*The Third Phase: 1975-1990*

The euphoria that the first Pokhran test generated proved ephemeral. A year after the PNE, the unpopularity of the Indira Gandhi regime necessitated the imposition of an Emergency. In 1977, the first non-Congress government came to power in New Delhi. Although the new leaders had criticized the tilt of India’s nonalignment policy towards the Soviet Union, they did not do much to reverse this tendency in their short tenure in office. The 1980s saw the return of the Congress party to power. Successive Prime Ministers Indira and Rajiv Gandhi were noted to be pursuing more confident—or aggressive—foreign policies, especially in the South Asian region. India became embroiled in the civil conflict in Sri Lanka, making a major military commitment in the form of an ill-fated peacekeeping force. Military expenditure rose to cross 4% of GDP for the first time (Gupta 1995, 5).

Though India’s program was initially responding to China’s nuclear progress, by the mid-1970s Pakistan was making strides on the nuclear path. Pakistani PM Bhutto initiated work on the bomb in 1972 (Chakma 2002, 887). Pakistan first becomes salient in the analysis in 1975 and remains salient at a 4% level through most of the years until 1984. A small-scale Indian military operation (Brasstacks) in 1986-87, and the reported Pakistani nuclear response to it, made Indian leaders realize that Pakistan
was destabilizingly close to having a nuclear capability (Anon 1987). By the late 1980s, India’s threat perception was focused on Pakistan although Sino-Pakistani collaboration was noted (Giles and Doyle 1996, 137; Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 19).

The analysis of Lok Sabha Debates shows that in the 1960s, the Chinese bomb dominated the discussion, with 24 references to it in that decade (a potential Pakistani bomb is mentioned only twice). By contrast, all through the 1980s, there are many questions as to how far Pakistan has progressed in its quest for the bomb and what the government is doing in response (the reply is always that the government is concerned and that the nuclear policy is under constant review). There are a few questions about China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration, but none about China as a threat itself. India was also put on guard by the US President’s refusal, starting in 1991, to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb (Anon 1998b). Indian diplomats continued to demand, in international forums, various disarmament measures that were politely ignored by the rest of the world.

*The Fourth Phase: 1991-2000*

The end of the Cold War forced India to re-evaluate its foreign policy as well as its economic strategy. The Soviet Union disappeared, and it was unclear that its successor, Russia, was willing and able to provide military collaboration and diplomatic support. A Congress government was forced by a foreign exchange crisis in 1991 to initiate wide-ranging liberalizing policies. The new economic strategy contributed to a gradual but steady rise in growth rates.

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9 In 1985, the US Congress adopted the Pressler Amendment, specifying that the President had to certify annually that Pakistan was not making a bomb. For the first five years, the President did issue this certification but with the end of the Cold War and increased sensitivity to proliferation, this was discontinued.
India’s performance still lagged behind that of China which had begun to open up its economy almost a decade earlier. China’s growing economic and political clout was noted with concern in India. On the other hand, Pakistan was a source of worry because of its support of militancy in India, particularly in Kashmir. After a lull in separatist activity in Kashmir in the 1970s, Pakistan started fomenting trouble again in the late 1980s. Taking advantage of the disillusionment among Kashmiris after the rigging of the state elections in 1987, Pakistan started what Zia called the ‘war of the thousand cuts’ where India would be bled to death slowly.  

It was the nuclear issue that dominated the security debate in the 1990s. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 over India’s protests highlighted the weakness of Third World solidarity and the resolve of the sole superpower to push its nonproliferation agenda through. During the Cold War, the US had turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear activities in return for the latter’s support in the containment of the Soviet Union (Singh 1998c, 24). As we shall see, the US did not pressure India to give up its emerging military capability either. With the end of the Cold War, the US “suddenly changed gear” and tried to disarm both India and Pakistan (Nayar 2001, 37). At the same time, some Indian leaders detected a new US strategy of befriending Pakistan to get access to Central Asian resources (Jha 1998). They also feared that the US was deterred by Chinese nuclear capability and economic power from intervening in Asia.

The series of five nuclear tests in May 1998 marked the end of this phase of Indian security policy. India declared itself a NWS and firmly resisted international appeals to sign away its nuclear capability. Within weeks, Pakistan also conducted a series of tests.

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10 Author’s interview, E. Rammohan, 23 April 2003, Delhi.
nuclear tests. Indian officials and analysts insisted that the new nuclear situation in the subcontinent would make for more stability. Yet the two countries were at war again in 1999 in the Kargil sector of the Himalayas—the first full-fledged war between two nuclear-armed states.

**Section Six: India’s nuclear program: a brief history**

The foundations of the India nuclear program were laid even before India became independent. The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research was set up in 1944. On the first anniversary of India’s independence, a three-person Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was set up (Abraham 1998, 60). In 1948 Prime Minister Nehru wrote to his Defence Minister: “The future belongs to those who produce atomic energy. That is going to be the chief national power of the future. Of course, defence is intimately concerned with this. Even the political consequences are worthwhile” (Chengappa 2000, 71).

In January 1957, Jawaharlal Nehru made a statement amounting to the public renunciation of the military use of nuclear technology: “On behalf of my government, and I think I can say with some assurance, on behalf of any future governments of India, that whatever might happen, whatever the circumstances, we shall never use this atomic energy for evil purposes. There is no condition attached to this assurance, because once a condition is attached, the value of such an assurance does not go very far” (Subrahmanyam 1990, 121).

The literature sometimes refers to the ‘atomic energy complex’ or ‘nuclear estate.’ The Indian state firmly controls nuclear activities through the Department of Atomic
Energy (DAE). Unlike other government departments, the DAE is located in Mumbai, not in the capital. It is not part of a ministry, but under the direct charge of the Prime Minister.\footnote{The Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR), also in Mumbai, is the only laboratory engaged in fundamental research in atomic science. Though managed by a trust, the TIFR works closely with the DAE. Several research centers—such as the Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research and the Variable Energy Cyclotron Center, and production units—such as the Heavy Water Board (HBW) and the Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL), work under the DAE. The most important constituents are the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) located in Trombay near Mumbai, and the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad, which produces fuel bundles for reactors.} The DAE is guided by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).\footnote{It has been a tradition for several years to have as members of the AEC, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Secretary, the Finance Secretary, the Chairman of the Nuclear Power Corporation, and the Director, BARC.}

The very first achievement of the DAE was the construction of the first research reactor in Asia, APSARA. In 1956 this 1 Megawatt (MW) ‘swimming pool type’ reactor went critical—a self-sustaining chain reaction was initiated. This was followed, four years later, by a 40 MW reactor called CIRUS (Canadian Indian Reactor-US). The name of the reactor acknowledged that it was built with Canadian assistance while the heavy water came from the US (Chellaney 1993a, 5). Since CIRUS produced plutonium as a by-product, it allowed India to acquire its first stocks of fissile material. Canada had pressed for formal safeguards over spent fuel rods. At this time the IAEA had not been set up, and there were no formal procedures for safeguards. The Indian government merely pledged that CIRUS by-products would be “employed for peaceful purposes only.” A similar pledge was given to the US Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 (Chellaney 1993a, 6).

Plans for a reprocessing plant that was capable of extracting plutonium from fuel rods were initiated in 1958 and Phoenix was formally inaugurated in 1965 in Tarapur. CIRUS started producing plutonium in 1958 at the rate of 8 kgs per year. In 1964 a plutonium separation plant was completed. This was designed to process the spent fuel
from the CIRUS reactor (Lefever 1979, 33). In 1965, with the approval of Prime Minister Shastri who succeeded Nehru in 1964, Bhabha initiated a project called the Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP). By 1967, both men were dead, and Bhabha’s successor Vikram Sarabhai terminated the project (Chengappa 2000, 104). A known opponent of nuclear weapons, Sarabhai accelerated the Indian rocket and space programs. Sarabhai’s marginalization of nuclear research was not challenged by the higher authorities.

The delicate balance of forces between the traditional, pro-disarmament school and those who advocated some kind of nuclear capability was tipped in favour of the latter in the summer of 1974. At 8.05 a.m. on 18 May 1974, a nuclear explosion of a magnitude between 10 and 15 kilotons was triggered 100 metres beneath the Rajasthan desert. India had conducted its first nuclear test, officially termed a PNE.

The 1980s were dominated by disagreements with suppliers. As India was suspected of building up its nuclear capability, the international community started restricting its access to material. The 1963 India-US agreement on nuclear cooperation imposed safeguards on the Tarapur plant and was accepted by India with great reluctance. Apparently this was motivated by US domestic interests keen to exploit the Indian civilian nuclear power market (Chellaney 1993a, 22-4). Indian policy-makers believed that US rights to insist on safeguards in Tarapur came from the supply of fissile material and not from the imported reactors. Therefore, they claimed, once American fuel supplies had stopped, the US had no more rights over what happened in Tarapur. The US insisted that India’s obligations under the agreement were binding (Chellaney 1993b, 28-29).
During the 1990s, as we noted above, India’s nuclear capability came under increasing scrutiny. Denuclearization in South Africa and Latin America encouraged the international community to put pressure on India to roll back its nuclear ambitions. India’s refusal to sign the CTBT signaled its resolve not to oblige. The advent of the BJP to power at the head of a multi-party coalition revived fears that India would cross the line and conduct a nuclear test. These fears were not unfounded. In May 1998 at the Pokhran testing range, India carried out a series of five nuclear tests.

The first three tests took place in the afternoon of 11 May 1998. Two days later two more tests were carried out. The first test was of a thermonuclear boosted fission device (where the explosion of the fission bomb releases heat and energy leading to the fusion of hydrogen isotopes). The second explosion featured a lighter but more high-yielding version of the 1974 Pokhran device. The third, the low-yield bomb is meant for smaller explosions in the battlefield situations. The last two tests were sub-critical: the nuclear device is tested without the explosive release, and therefore fall outside the purview of the CTBT (Chengappa and Joshi 1998a, 34). The official statement delivered by the Prime Minister’s Principal Secretary noted that these tests “have established that India has a proven capability for a weaponised nuclear programme” (Joshi 1999a, 1469).
CHAPTER 3

THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN NUCLEAR DETERRENT

In this chapter I discuss the ways in which the nonproliferation regime constituted India’s security problematique, and the ways in which India used regime norms to construct a nuclear deterrent. Through its definition and categorization of India (and other countries), the nonproliferation regime sustained a particular power constellation. It also tried to fit India into the NNWS category through (inconsistent) application of its enforcement mechanisms. India, in its turn, was attempting to ensure national security through nuclear deterrence. The effective performance of deterrence requires a constant re-creation of identity, which means that we cannot easily separate security imperatives and identity construction in explaining Indian policy. India adopted five strategies to construct its nuclear identity—nuclear development, statements by authorities, nuclear testing, selectively playing by the regime’s rules, and crisis behavior.

In Section One I describe the operation of two mechanisms of the regime—definition and categorization—with respect to India. This section is a portrait of the regime at work. In the next section, Section Two, I describe various stages in India’s efforts to establish deterrence. Section Three considers the nature of India’s power as an agent, as it uses the regime to construct its deterrent identity. I devote Section Four to the 1998 nuclear tests, which symbolized both the success and failure of the nonproliferation regime. In Section Five I present examples of the persistent influence
of certain ideational associations, showing that identity is more than a strategic response to changing power relations.

Section One: The regime at work-- defining and classifying India

Indian nuclear development has been constrained by certain formal and informal mechanisms of the nonproliferation regime. The regime’s effect in the first instance, however, is through the constitutive processes of definition and categorization. Threats derived from the power constellation that the regime was shoring up, and from the regime’s efforts to make India assume a certain position. The nonproliferation regime constituted a particular global and regional hierarchy, buttressed with nuclear weapons, thus delineating the adversaries that India would have to deal with. It attempted to incorporate India as a state without nuclear weapons, which would have rendered deterrence against those adversaries almost impossible. Finally, since deterrence was an integral principle of the regime itself, stability through nuclear deterrence was established as a legitimate goal.

Constituting world order and the universe of threats

Chapter Two described the process through which a certain definition of proliferation as the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five NWS, became enshrined as a global norm. India was acutely aware of the inequality of this nuclear order. During the negotiations on the draft of the NPT, Indian diplomats tried to broaden the definition of proliferation to include growth in NWS arsenals and curb the manufacture, stockpiling and sophistication of weapons by the NWS (Husain 1968, 742). A world that was not structured by nuclear weapons would be safer for India as well as for other states.
Indians saw the NPT as *ipso facto* a victory for China, which thereby acquired NWS status. The *Indian Express*, extrapolating from Dean Rusk’s statement that the NPT precluded any US security guarantees, claimed that India now had no protection against nuclear blackmail by China. Similarly, the *Times of India* saw the treaty removing potential nuclear challenges to the PRC (Williams 1969, 33-36). The threat from China was intensified by its recognition as a NWS by the nonproliferation regime. ‘China’ first appears as salient in 1956, but is most salient in 1967, when it became obvious that it would gain NWS status. In this year it attained a high of 9.2% of the sampled texts and it never returned to this height again. Even in 1998, the term was mentioned less than 2% of the time.

At the same time, India wanted to restrict the definition of proliferation to exclude explosions of nuclear devices for civilian research. NNWS would become dependent on NWS if barred from conducting such “explosive experiments” which were vital to the full utilization of nuclear technology (Trivedi 1965, 595). It is clear that India perceived the nonproliferation order as doubly threatening—both strategic freedom and development were at stake. Even in 1998, an Indian official responded to the demand to sign the NPT with the statement: “Tell us what we are and we will tell you whether we can sign…Guarantee to us that technology controls, which you apply to us as though we were a non-nuclear weapon state, will be removed” (Ram 1998).

The content analysis shows us that in the 1950s, the international realm was frequently mentioned in the discourse. In the period 1950-1962, references to three external

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1 Consequently, India also objected to IAEA safeguards because these were not universally applied. Obviously, it was preparing the ground for a test at this point. Yet, that India could credibly make this argument is important.
actors—the US, USSR and the UN, add up to an average of 15% a year. From 1965 to 1975, by contrast, this figure is less than 5%. In the decade leading up to 1998, we see a somewhat higher awareness, with international referents (references to foreign countries or their leaders, except Pakistan and China) amounting to just over 6.5%. In 1995 and 1996, two international treaties—the NPT and the CTBT—are among the 5 most salient terms. We can conclude that the relative importance of the international referents in the 1950s and the 1990s was eclipsed in the intervening decades by regional referents—China and Pakistan. This is congruent with my argument that India was most active in the early years in trying to influence the formation of the regime, and at the end of the century was trying to enter it.

*Casting India: a security threat*

Since India had not tested by 1967, the regime made available only one identity—that of a NNWS, an identity it could not accept since it was engaged in establishing deterrence with China and Pakistan. One of the indicators of a regime’s strength is the extension of its scope, including to those countries that resist its formal components. As the regime became hegemonic, Indian elites realized, the country be pressured to conform to the behavior expected of a NNWS. Thus, the growing power of the regime became a security issue for India. Through the 1970s and the 1980s, India tried to escape being categorized either as a NNWS (by testing a nuclear device) or as a NWS (by imputing peaceful purposes to the 1974 test).

China took advantage of the regime’s categorization, refusing to enter into bilateral discussions with India on nuclear issues on the grounds that as a non-nuclear weapon state India should raise them only in multilateral disarmament fora (Singh 2003, 153). For instance, in 1988 Indian analysts asked Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister,
about the possibility of a ‘No First Use’ agreement between the two countries. Qian quipped that since India claimed it had no nuclear weapons, such an agreement would be meaningless (Parthasarathy 2004). Worryingly, there were indications from China that its nuclear no first-use and non-use pledges would not be applicable to India as a non-party to the NPT (Parthasarathy 2001). India ‘learned’ from the Chinese attitude that it would be taken seriously only when its nuclear status was unambiguous. K. Subrahmanyanam, the dean of Indian strategists, maintained that a nuclear bomb would enable India to talk to China as an equal (Thomas 1986, 47). Perkovich also reports a 1995 conversation with a senior Indian official who claimed that India had to deploy ballistic missiles “with enough capability” not to guard against a Chinese threat, but to compel China to negotiate seriously (Anon 1995a, 127).

India’s 1998 test series was followed by a declaration by the PM that India was a NWS: “This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant…it is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind” (Anon 1998d). Nationalist rhetoric notwithstanding, India cannot simply declare itself a NWS on fulfilling certain technical requirements. This status is intersubjective and is enforced through particular procedures. The official US response to India’s self-declaration was: “We do not and will not concede even by implication that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapon states under the NPT” (Talbott 1998).  

‘Self-declared’, ‘statutory’, and ‘de facto’ are used as qualifiers before ‘NWS’ when referring to these countries. India has also been called a ‘nuclear state’ or a ‘possessor state.’

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2 This was reiterated by the Geneva meeting of the permanent members of the UNSC (P-5) on 4 June 1998, and, shortly afterwards, the Group of 8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting and a Joint American-Chinese declaration.
In 2000, India’s Minister for External Affairs declared in Parliament:

India is a nuclear weapon state. Though not a party to the NPT, India's policies have been consistent with the key provisions of NPT that apply to nuclear weapon states...Article I obliges a nuclear weapon state not to transfer nuclear weapons to any other country or assist any other country to acquire them and India’s record on non-proliferation has been impeccable. Article III requires a party to the treaty to provide nuclear materials and related equipment to any other country only under safeguards; India’s exports of such materials have always been under safeguards. Article VI commits the parties to pursue negotiations to bring about eventual global nuclear disarmament... India today is the only nuclear weapon state that remains committed to commencing negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention in order to bring about a nuclear-weapons-free world, the very objective envisaged in Article VI of the NPT (Ministry of External Affairs 2000).

Here the government again tries to show that it has satisfied all the conditions for accession to the NPT as a NWS. Clearly, India is not ready to abandon the search for more formal acknowledgement of its status and considers this an important security goal. While my interviewees conceded that is unlikely that the NPT will be amended to include India as a NWS, some were hopeful that ‘other means’ could be found to give India the status of a nuclear power. One way would be for India to sign a regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone pact as a nuclear power (Taksal 1999).

Section Two: India’s performance of deterrence

Deterrence is not a possession, or a state of affairs. It is an intricate social-psychological drama in which each player has to perform various routines. In Chapter 2 I discussed this aspect of deterrence, and its relationship with the nonproliferation regime. In this section I interpret several of India’s key nuclear decisions as part of the performance of deterrence. By situating them in a deterrence frame, some puzzling
decisions become comprehensible. I take up the quest for a security guarantee against
the Chinese bomb, the presentation of the 1974 nuclear explosion as peaceful, the
covert weaponization of the 1980s, and finally the 1998 nuclear test.

Security guarantees

India’s 1960s attempt to secure guarantees is often viewed as a missed opportunity for
the international community: it is assumed that had India been assured of protection
against the Chinese threat, it would have given up the effort to acquire an independent
nuclear capability (Power 1979, 577). In fact, India’s strategic position at the time
would not have permitted it to make the concessions that would have made a
promise credible. The norms of foreign policy would not allow India to give up its
independence. We can understand the failure of the search for security guarantees and
the choice of non-weaponized deterrence (NWD) only in terms of the norms that
Indian identity was based on. As R. K. Nehru put it, it was “natural” for the
government to choose nuclear deterrence over giving up non-alignment and seeking
Western protection (Nehru 1965, 5-6). Moreover, India did not want to align too
closely with one superpower and incur the wrath of the other.

India originally demanded negative security guarantees for all non-nuclear states
(Anon 1965c).³ It preferred a guarantee under UN auspices to getting under a Western
or Soviet nuclear umbrella (Anon 1965a). However, India was willing to settle for a
joint guarantee by all NWS, in order to avoid repercussions on its nonaligned
credentials (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 169). Indian officials must have known

³ Security guarantees may be positive or negative. The former consist of assurances that the parties
would come to each other’s aid in the case of an attack. Negative security assurances indicate that one
party will not attack the other, in this case, with nuclear weapons. In fact, in 1966 Soviet Premier
Kosygin proposed to include in the NPT a ban on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
parties that had no nuclear weapons on their territories. The West rejected this on the grounds that it
would be impossible to verify and would disadvantage NATO members “hosting” nuclear weapons
(Epstein 1976).
that such a proposal would be a non-starter, yet they were intransigent on the issue of independence. Finally, Indian diplomats declared they were giving up the search for guarantees since ‘going it alone’ was more consistent with nonalignment (Bunn 1997, 13, n.27). The Indian delegate’s speech to the ENDC in February 1966 indicates this: “It is not the armaments of other nations, in any case, which can be a perpetual guarantor of a nation’s integrity and independence” (Trivedi 1966, 615). The PM also admitted that the effectiveness of a guarantee would “depend on the vital and national interests of the giver” (Williams 1969, 52).

India recognized, as did France around the same time, that extended deterrence suffers from a credibility issue.\(^4\) No guarantee can be automatic, and no government would embark on nuclear war with another’s hand on the trigger, wrote one commentator (Gopal 1968, 60). The US had specified that its response to an attack, even on a European country, would not be automatic (Williams 1969, 17). The Johnson administration did not want to make an explicit commitment to India (Gavin 2004/5, 118). Neither did Harold Wilson’s government in the UK (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 168). Chellaney correctly describes the idea of a guarantee as “romantic” and “idealistic” because India did not have the ties to either superpower that would make it credible.\(^5\) Another clue that India was not completely serious comes from the fact that the government’s emissary, L. K. Jha had no ideas about how the guarantee would work in practice (Noorani 1967, 500). Documents that have now become available show that Jha specifically rejected the notion of a formal alliance with the US, which he was told was a pre-requisite for a security guarantee (Anon 1966b).

\(^4\) In fact, PM Indira Gandhi in 1967 referred to France’s distrust of guarantees (Noorani 1967, 499).

\(^5\) Author’s interview with Brahma Chellaney, 30 April 2003, New Delhi.
What then was the impetus behind India’s search for a guarantee? It seems that this diplomatic activity was intended to draw attention to India’s security predicament, and to signal the determination to combat it. India’s disarmament diplomacy at this time had a complementary goal. Homi Bhabha, head of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), in a 1964 radio broadcast issued a veiled challenge to the world to create a “climate favorable to countries which have the capability of making atomic weapons but have voluntarily refrained from doing so” (Chengappa 2000, 94). B. N. Chakravarty told the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC) on 4 May 1965: “I must point out the danger that some countries may find it necessary…to acquire nuclear weapons if proliferation is allowed to go on” (Chopra 1984, 154).

The lack of credibility also applies to the supposed Soviet nuclear umbrella that India ‘lost’ in the 1990s. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in August 1971. The Soviet motivation was to use India to counter China, while India aimed to deter Chinese or US intervention in a seemingly inevitable war with Pakistan (Singh 1986, 88-89). Article VIII of the treaty precluded either party from entering into military alliances directed against the other, and Article IX banned them from assisting a third party in armed conflict if the other was the target. It also said that the parties would enter mutual consultations to deal with such conflicts. Does this treaty amount to a security guarantee? K. Subrahmanyam warned against thinking of the USSR as a security guarantor (Subrahmanyam 1987, 5).

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6 The war officially began on 3 December 1971, and ended with Pakistan’s surrender on 16 December 1971.
7 The alliance coding from the Correlates of War dataset counts only defense pacts as providing guarantees.
8 It is unclear that a Soviet umbrella would have been in India’s interest anyway. On 15 December 1971, at the tail end of the Bangladesh war, a nuclear-armed warship, the USS Enterprise (part of the US Army’s Seventh Fleet), appeared in the Bay of Bengal. Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor to the President, admitted that this was an attempt at nuclear coercion. He had two goals: to prevent a victorious Indian army from taking over West Pakistan and to shield the PRC from being coerced by Soviet blackmail, into not aiding Pakistan (Kissinger 1979, 905). India is supposed to have
foreign policy did tilt towards the Soviet Union, it is hard to imagine that the latter extended a nuclear umbrella.

A peaceful nuclear explosion

On 18 May 1974 the AEC exploded a nuclear device at the Pokhran test site in the Rajasthan desert, describing it as a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), “an experiment for purely scientific investigation.” The government declared that it did not intend to produce nuclear weapons and reaffirmed its opposition to any military use of nuclear explosions (Anon 1974e). The Defense Minister reiterated: “Our armed forces know that this is not for their use” (Anon 1974b). In a letter to her Pakistani counterpart, PM Indira Gandhi wrote: “There are no political or foreign policy implications of this test” (Kaul 1974).

Why did India test? The PM’s response was simply: “We had to do it to demonstrate our independent capability” (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 219). Carrying out a test less than five years after the NPT had come into force demonstrated capability and signaled intention—that India reserved the right to develop weapons. The test was an indicator of achievement and resolve—and not just in nuclear capability. Commentators predicted after the test that India would no longer be seen as an insignificant jumble of feuding factions (MKD 1974). India would not allow itself to

learned two lessons from 1971—that it would be abandoned in times of need, and that it could become a target for nuclear blackmail by the superpowers. In fact, the Soviet Union did come out in support of India, sending four of its ships into the area after the entry of the Enterprise (Singh 1986, 96). Moscow also exercised its veto in the Security Council three times in India’s favor during this crisis (Horn 1987, 213). In fact, it was the alliance with an NWS that exposed India to nuclear blackmail. It is somewhat implausible that India wanted to take over and colonize West Pakistan, therefore coercion really applied only to the US attempt to deter the USSR. We cannot argue that India’s acquiring a fledgling nuclear capacity would have helped it to deter the US in future conflicts of this kind. Yet the Enterprise incident has taken on a mythic significance in the nuclear debate, a shorthand reference to the perfidy of the NWS. Arundhati Ghose, in her interview referred to it as a formative influence. She was, as a young officer, assigned to track the ship.
be treated as a second-rate country (Dutt 1974). K. Subrahmanyam warned against any attempt to institutionalize the pledge of peaceful use, for example, through a constitutional amendment, for fear it would imperil the country’s “new bargaining leverage” in international politics (Anon 1974k).

An American author had suggested that India could maintain its prestige as a nation “capable of but not willing to go nuclear” (Williams 1969, 33). He pointed out that refraining from a test might encourage India’s adversaries to follow suit, and could bring it aid and arms exports (Williams 1969, 41). However, Indian security elites felt the need to validate the text of deterrence with a demonstration: “It is only when we are prepared to take determined steps in the protection of vital Indian interests that our diplomatic postures will be meaningful. In this game of blackmail nothing that is said must be taken at face value” (Kaul 1974, 153).

Thus, while security is driving the decision to test, it is not security in the conventional sense of response to an external threat. The 1971 war conclusively demonstrated India’s conventional superiority, therefore it is hard to believe that the 1974 test was needed to deter Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan only appears 5.1% of the time in the 1974 oversample, as opposed to 8.2% in 1998. As for China, it is true that there is a breakpoint in the content analysis in 1965 after the Chinese test. So far the most salient terms have related to negotiations between the US, the Soviet Union and other major powers on arms control. In 1965 the term ‘India’ becomes salient for the first time. In the years that follow, the term ‘China’ remains among the top 5 most frequent terms until 1972. Clearly, the Chinese nuclear program is a big concern for India, yet instead of following the ‘logical’ path of seeking a guarantor or developing a weapon, India tries to strengthen deterrence.
While deterrence considerations help us understand why India chose to test, they are not well-suited to explaining why the test was camouflaged as a PNE. We have to pay attention to the boundaries of the discourse at the time that the test was carried out. Vikram Sarabhai, AEC Chairman from 1966 to 1971, pointed out that undertaking a nuclear weapons project was a massive endeavor. The decision to do so was a political one and would have to take into account the sacrifices the country would have to make. He expressed himself against prototype bombs, calling them paper tigers (Anon 1965b). Sarabhai’s viewpoint represented the mainstream opinion among informed elites at the time. The Nehruvian consensus that the top priority should be state-directed economic development still held sway. Moreover, almost two decades after Gandhi’s death, Gandhian principles received ritual obeisance. Plunging the country into an overt nuclear program would have been divisive. On the international front, the superpowers seemed determined to stem overt proliferation. Even the hawkish Karnad admits that India would have suffered isolation had it followed the Chinese path of single-mindedly pursuing nuclear weapons (Karnad 2002b, 218).

**A rare bird: covert nuclear activity in the 1980s**

In 1974, Nihal Singh described India as a rare bird: neither a “nuclear Power” nor a “non-nuclear Power” (Singh 1974a). India’s post-1974 deterrent has been termed opaque, virtual, ambiguous or existential. I prefer the term ‘non-weaponized deterrence’ (NWD), a type of deterrence where the parties tacitly acknowledge, and are deterred by each others’ *capability to manufacture* weapons, rather than the weapons themselves.
India performed its deterrent identity within the ‘breathing space’ that the regime offered it. The results of the content analysis do not show a breakpoint in 1974, although in Chapter 2 I indicated that year as the start of a new phase in policy. The most salient terms continue to come from the semantic field of civil uses of atomic power. For instance, in 1976 the most salient terms are ‘nuclear’, ‘power’, ‘plants’, ‘scientists’ adding up to 36% of the yearly sample. In the four years that follow, the most salient terms relate to negotiations over nuclear fuel with the US.

The question of why India did not ‘nuclearize’ after 1974 raises endless debate. Whatever the reason, India chose the “prudent and less costly path” of keeping the nuclear weapons option open (Lefever 1979, 41). Some have claimed that India could not have weaponized because 1974 was a mere symbolic gesture and useless as the basis for an arsenal. However, even a single test can provide some data for the engineering effort to turn the device into a deliverable warhead. Albright and Hibbs report that the 1974 explosion could have provided data sufficient for miniaturization (Gordon 1994, 670). India may have wanted to avoid the financial costs of manufacturing warheads and delivery systems (Kaul 1998). It also realized that a formal declaration would attract a level of hostility (for instance, being included in the targeting plans of the US and China) that it would be incapable of countering. Hagerty suggests that the avoidance of overt development was intended to send a message of nuclear equivalence to China while reassuring Pakistan, but this obviously did not work (Hagerty 1998, 45).

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9 Peter Lavoy calls it a ‘physics experiment.’ Personal communication, 7 April 2005.
10 Hisham Zerrifi, personal communication, 17 April 2005.
11 In 1965, Pakistan’s PM Bhutto famously vowed that his countrymen would “eat grass” if needed in order to build nuclear weapons once India did.
Was it sanctions that stopped India after 1974? The US did not really pressure India on the nuclear issue during the Cold War (Rathjens 1998, 27). While the US government, as mandated, voted against aid to India from the International Development Association in 1974, the flow of aid did not stop (Balachandran 2002, 239-40). The Nixon administration held that its predecessor had sacrificed US interests on the altar of nonproliferation (Nye 1988, 344). Kissinger privately sought and received assurances that India would be proliferation-conscious in exports and would not pursue a weapons program (Singh 1986, 124). 12 One scholar described the post-1974 sanctions as a headache rather than an impediment (Foran 1999, 42).

However, sanctions did curtail fuel supply for the Tarapur and Rajasthan power stations. India also faced restrictions on dual-use items. For instance, in the 1980s the US refused to allow the export of a supercomputer from the Cray corporation (potentially used in warhead design) and in the early 1990s, opposed the transfer of cryogenic engine technology from Russia (potentially used in missiles). Although the IAEA had members who were not NPT signatories, India accused the institution of implementing NPT standards (Scheinman 1987, 242). For instance, the organization’s annual funding for power projects was partly dependent on NPT membership (Scheinman 1987, 253).

Did NWD work? There are indications that Pakistan acknowledged this form of deterrence. Cohen reports that Gen. Zia, the Pakistani leader in the 1980s, claimed that India and Pakistan had achieved deterrence stability (Cohen 1992, 209). The two

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12 One way to explain the tepid US reaction--"The US has always been against nuclear proliferation for the adverse impact it will have on world stability"—is as part of a strategy to downplay the event. Apparently Kissinger did not want to "endow" a "crude nuclear device" with great intrinsic value (Brenner 1981, 68-69).
countries adopted in 1988 an agreement prohibiting attacks on each other’s “nuclear facilities.”\textsuperscript{13} A nuclear Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between two undeclared nuclear powers, it served to buttress the idea that deterrence was at work. This belief is essentially non-falsifiable. On the one hand, there were no full-scale wars between India and Pakistan or China after 1971. Paul Kapur, on the other hand, finds that conventional conflict—as measured by militarized interstate disputes (MIDs)—between India and Pakistan was over five times as frequent from 1990 through 2002, at .82 disputes per year, compared to the non-nuclear period from 1972 through 1989 (Kapur 2006). Those who argue that deterrence was ‘keeping the peace’ are using a very restrictive definition of peace. Yet it seems that Indian leaders retained their faith in deterrence.\textsuperscript{14}

By \textit{not} demanding NWS status after the 1974 test, India was also attempting to establish a deterrent relationship with the \textit{regime itself}.\textsuperscript{15} NWD was a tacit bargain that India would not test, disseminate, or deploy weapons as long as it was allowed to maintain its ostensibly civilian program. The policies of the US, as norm leader, were particularly important. Studies published by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institute, the Carnegie Foundation and the Asia Society in the 1990s advised the government that proliferation should not be \textit{primus inter pares} in dealing with India (Cohen 2000b, 15; Harrison and Kemp 1993). Mitchell Reiss suggested the creation of a full-scope safeguards regime in South Asia on the Latin American model.

\textsuperscript{13} This agreement bound the two parties not to cause destruction or damage to each other’s nuclear installations or facilities, including nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, as well as establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials. Each party had to declare the exact location of its installations and facilities.

\textsuperscript{14} Almost all my interviewees agreed that deterrence was vital to prevent Pakistani aggression, they were divided on its effect on Chinese calculations.

\textsuperscript{15} I am grateful to Gregory Dinsmore for suggesting this argument.
and allowing India to “preserve” its option (Reiss 1993, 1113-15). The 1990s American policy of hiving off the contentious nonproliferation issue in bilateral relations was read in India as “indirect acknowledgement of the correctness of India’s nuclear policy” (Kampani 2001a).

1998: an explosion for peace

If NWD was the optimum policy, why did it not serve as equilibrium? That is, why did India decide to test again? On 11 May 1998 the AEC set off three nuclear explosions at the Pokhran test site and followed two days later with smaller tests. This series had two motivations: to shore up deterrence against adversaries and to clarify its position vis-à-vis the regime.

Who were the adversaries that India was trying to deter? Operation Brasstacks in 1986-87, and the reported Pakistani nuclear response to it, made Indian leaders realize that Pakistan was destabilizingly close to having a nuclear capability (Anon 1987). India was also put on guard by the US President’s refusal, starting in 1991, to certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb (Anon 1998b). By the late 1980s, India’s threat perception was focused on Pakistan although Sino-Pakistani collaboration was noted, as we saw above (Giles and Doyle 1996, 137; Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 19). Pakistan becomes increasingly salient in the discourse, appearing among the top 5

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16 Steve Fetter was an early critic of this approach (Fetter 1996).
17 In 1985, the US Congress adopted the Pressler Amendment, specifying that the President had to certify annually that Pakistan was not making a bomb. For the first five years, the President did issue this certification but with the end of the Cold War and increased sensitivity to proliferation, this was discontinued.
18 The analysis of Lok Sabha Debates shows that in the 1960s, the Chinese bomb dominated the discussion, with 24 references to it in that decade (a potential Pakistani bomb is mentioned only twice). By contrast, all through the 1980s, there are many questions as to how far Pakistan has progressed in its quest for the bomb and what the government is doing in response (the reply is always that the government is concerned and that the nuclear policy is under constant review). There are a few questions about China-Pakistan nuclear collaboration, but none about China as a threat itself.
terms in each year after 1993, and is associated with the terms ‘nuclear’, ‘military’, ‘India’ and ‘weapons.’ The US, the superpower that was able to influence Pakistan, turned a blind eye to its nuclear activities in return for the latter’s support in the containment of the Soviet Union (Singh 1998c, 24). With the end of the Cold War, the US “suddenly changed gear” and tried to disarm both India and Pakistan (Nayar 2001, 37). On the other hand, some Indian leaders detected a new US strategy of befriending Pakistan to get access to Central Asian resources (Jha 1998).

Shortly after the May 1998 tests, the Indian PM penned a missive to US President Clinton (soon ‘leaked’ to the New York Times). This letter created a storm because of its identification of China as the threat motivating India’s nuclear tests, as it stated:

> We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved…an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust, that country has materially helped another neighbour of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state (Anon 1998i).

Combined with the statement a few weeks earlier by the Defense Minister to the effect that China was India’s ‘enemy number one’ this was taken as a huge policy shift (Chengappa and Joshi 1998b, 30). India was for the first time naming a particular country as the object of its program.

The puzzle for security model explanations is: why was China named as a threat when relations were on the upswing? A look at the Militarized Interstate Rivalry data for India and China shows a dying rivalry. Before the 1970s, apart from the 1962 war, we note around 15 disputes involving force; Chinese involvement on the side of Pakistan
in the wars in 1965 and 1971; and three sharp incidents lasting one day each. The last standoff was on the border from 1985-87. The Reports of India’s Ministry of External Affairs for the years 1996 to 1998 state that while relations with China show steady improvement, Pakistan’s adversarial and confrontationist approach was impeding the normalization of relations (Ministry of External Affairs 1996, vii, viii; Ministry of External Affairs 1997, 2, 3). Sino-Indian talks were extremely successful in the 1990s. After the historic visit of PM Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988, India quietly put the border dispute on the back burner and was concentrating on strengthening bilateral economic relations. In fact, when France expressed its inability to supply enriched uranium to the Tarapur power plant after its accession to the NPT, China stepped in to supply the nuclear fuel. Observers also allege that India’s fears of Beijing’s military capabilities are exaggerated (Karp 1998; Shirk 2004).

We cannot understand the naming of China as a threat without situating it in the context of international norms. China, as a rising power, presents a worthy security justification for a nuclear program. It was more credible to evoke the Chinese threat to justify testing, since the Indian and Pakistani arsenals were already seen as balancing each other. An interesting finding is that in 1998 although China was the ‘official’ justification for the tests, Pakistan appeared much more frequently in the public discourse as noted in the oversample for this year (2.9% versus 8.2%). In the oversample for 1998, China is the 12th most common term (Pakistan is the 3rd most common, followed by the US). Moreover, China is not associated with any cluster in

19 The title of an article by prominent politician Krishan Kant, who ended his career as Vice-President of the country, says it all: “Should India Place Itself in the Position of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia and Determine its Role?” (Kant 1982).

20 As explained in Appendix One, I oversampled from 1974 and 1998—14 days a month instead of 21 days a year.
particular in this sample, which indicates at least that it was not consistently perceived as a threat.

I argue that it is precisely because relations with China were improving, that India could risk this test and the naming of China. The 1998 test was not a revisionist attack on China, but a warning flag. Already in the summer of 1998, Indian diplomats were scrambling to undo the damage to Sino-Indian relations. Engagement resumed in December 1998 (Shirk 2004, 84). Deft diplomacy averted military escalation on the border where India remains vulnerable. After the nuclear assertion of independence, as the Chinese leadership was forced to take India seriously, it became easier for Indian politicians to extend the hand of friendship. The flurry of diplomatic activity in 1999 would not have taken place without the 1998 tests (Frazier 2004, 297). In June 2003, PM Vajpayee made a historic visit to Beijing. He was able to sign a border agreement on Sikkim while avoiding accusations that he was caving in to the Chinese.  

Jaswant Singh, the main spokesman on nuclear issues in the ruling party at the time, clarified that demonstration was the real objective of the 1998 tests: “The tests of May 11 and 13 were not directed against any country. They were intended to reassure the people of India about their own security” (Singh 1999, 333). If deterrence is inherently difficult to maintain, the non-weaponized version is even trickier. The ‘need’ for tests can be assessed only in terms of requirements of size and sophistication which in turn depend on the deterrent’s targets. Some analysts wrote that testing was not needed for simple fission weapons, only for thermonuclear (Mark 1988, 34). Some felt that the data from the 1974 test were adequate to maintain a

21 Author’s interview. Indian official at the Embassy of India in Beijing, July 2003.
22 Senior BJP leader M. M. Joshi said that he does not blame adversaries for demanding that India demonstrate its “confidence”, and that Pokhran was a demonstration of confidence (Joshi 1999b).
deterrent against Pakistan but not against China (Chari 1995, 74). Others advocated testing (Balachandran 1996; Subrahmanyam 1996). R. Chidambaram, head of the AEC from 1993, claimed that testing was needed to build up a database for simulations (Ramana 2003, 238). Walker points out that moving from latent to actual nuclear power need not involve testing (Walker 1996, 65). France, already a NWS, accepted a US offer to share the results of simulations before it declared a moratorium on testing. The rules of the regime prevented the transfer of such data to a NNWS like India. There are rumors that India availed of American simulation data after its 1998 tests (Mutimer 2000b, 153).

Indian policy-makers in 1998 were striving to reduce ambiguity about capability (Paranjpe 2000, 53). They found it increasingly tricky to communicate capability and intention. The deterrent lacked credibility because there were no operational forces, and no signs that the government was willing to use them (Kampani 2001a). The armed forces in particular were not convinced that deterrence was operating (Giles and Doyle 1996, 138; Jha 1998; Menon 2000, 172; Roychowdhury 2002, 281). By the early 1990s, Gen. Sundarji was saying openly that ambiguity made mutual deterrence fragile (Giles and Doyle 1996, 140-43). In 1996 J. N. Dixit, just retired as Foreign Secretary, wrote: “We must provide concrete proof that our potentialities are…operational realities” (Dixit 1996, 374). A frank nuclear dialogue was not possible since the ambiguous deterrent posture depended on uncertainty. Further, talks would contradict the official line that India had no nuclear weapons (Chari 1996, 75). Secrecy “was written into the fabric of the atomic energy program” (Abraham 1998,

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23 Weaponization requires data that can be acquired in three ways: by testing, obtaining a tested design from a NWS, or with computerized simulations based on test data.
However, the continual entropy of deterrence demands an inexorable pulling back of the veil.\textsuperscript{24}

Testing is not \textit{sufficient} to acquire NWS status, and has to be followed up with other measures. While the test in 1974 amounted to a crossing of the threshold, statements by Indian leaders since that date and the lack of further testing were considered to put India back into the class of NNWS (Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 17). Clearly, the test as a claim to NWS status was of temporary utility. Hence, predictions that India would be tempted to test and join the NPT as a NWS before categorization was further solidified by the 1995 NPTREC (Thomas 1993, 76).

The decision to describe 1974 as a PNE reinforced the image of India as a “soft state” and denied it the privileges of a NWS (Singh 1998d, 4). According to Karnad, while nuclear weapons have political utility, a mere nuclear capability does not inspire the same respect (Karnad 2002b, 225). Bhabani Sen Gupta described the 1974 test as earning India “the status of a nuclear power without nuclear teeth” (Kapur 1993, 316). Doubts about India’s resolve were damaging to deterrence, plus, on a more rhetorical level, it was deprived of the intangible powerful benefits of declared NWS status.

At the end of the Cold War nuclear deterrence was acknowledged as the basis of international stability, although the identity of the ‘deterree’ changed from the Soviet Empire to a motley collection of ‘rogue’ states. Deterrence was reaffirmed as a performance for civilized and mature states. The Indian elite noted signs such as the justifications advanced in NWS depositions to the International Court of Justice in the

\textsuperscript{24} The termination of NWD in weaponization is not inevitable in all cases. I deal with these in the conclusion.
Nuclear Weapons case, the NPT extension and the pressure put on India to sign the CTBT (Anon 1999b).

India used the annual ritual of the Pakistani resolution on the South Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone as an index of its support. In 1992 it was found that the abstentions had dwindled from 43 in 1976 (and a high of 46 in 1982), to 13. The votes in favor of the Pakistani resolution went up from 91 in 1976, to 144 in 1992. The US also changed its vote from abstention to affirmation after 1977 (Murthy 1993, 122-23). In addition, India’s old patron, the USSR/Russia, began following the US lead, voting with the US on the Pakistan-sponsored NWFZ resolution in 1990-91 (Thornton 1992, 1065). After its rapprochement with the nonproliferation regime in the 1990s, China had begun to use regime norms against India. China called on India to sign the NPT and insisted on India’s accession as a condition for the entry-in-force of the CTBT (Nayar 2001, 141).

India increasingly found itself on the other side of the table from its comrades in the nonaligned and ‘developing country’ camps on arms control. The most dramatic proof of this came during the CTBT negotiations, as Indian positions became more and more distant from the consensus draft. Indian diplomats had almost no experience with dealing with such isolation, as they were used to leading the principled opposition against the five NWS and their allies. The chief negotiator then asked the government, then headed by P.V. Narasimha Rao, what the delegation was ultimately striving for. The government was forced to engage in debate about the future of the deterrent. Instructions were issued to block the treaty. The final vote on the CTBT in the UN General Assembly was 158-3 in favor. India found itself isolated, with only Libya and

25 Author’s interview with Arundhati Ghose, New Delhi, 1 August 2003.
Bhutan (its client state) for company. In the 1990s, the content analysis features a rise in the salience of arms control terms such as ‘treaty’ and ‘amendment’. In fact, after 1989, these terms never drop below the first ten most significant words. It is clear that Indians were recognizing that their options were being delineated by these international efforts.

Anti-CTBT rhetoric blended with injunctions to exercise the option before it was too late. This urgency stemmed from Article XIV of the treaty, which provided for measures to ensure India’s adherence to be decided at a review conference in September 1999. It was also an acknowledgement of the global shift towards nonproliferation. At the height of the CTBT debate, T. T. Poulose, a known opponent of nuclear weapons wrote: “It is no longer possible for India to avoid taking some hard decisions…India can also decide to come out openly and declare that she is a NWS and face the economic, political, and strategic consequences…Otherwise India can go on living with the nuclear option and face the fury of all those nations which are waiting to punish India” (Poulose 1996, 225). India’s middle ground provides no security dividends, analysts pointed out (Thomas 1998, 292).

The first-ever UN Security Council Summit had declared proliferation to be a threat to international peace and security, invoking the authority of the Council to respond under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Rajamohan 2003a, 82). Post-war revelations about Iraqi capability impelled the regime’s institutions to closely monitor states with the technical capability to produce a nuclear weapon—whether they had actually done so or not. The problem was constituted as one of inevitable technological diffusion.

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26 India had refused to allow the draft to be adopted as a consensus document by the CD and instead it was sent to the General Assembly.
(Mutimer 1998, 115). India’s nuclear capability became a problematic asset in this context. As definitions were broadened, enforcement mechanisms were fortified with military options. There was a greater focus on the dangers of regional proliferation, which had been of interest during the Cold War only because of the potential for superpower involvement. In 1993 the US Central Intelligence Agency Director James Woolsey testified that the India-Pakistan arms race “poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction” (Hagerty 1998, 5).

The strategic space that India had occupied between the categories of NWS and NNWS was rapidly shrinking. There was a rush among countries to clarify their ambiguous relations with the regime, with Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, along with three states that inherited nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine), formally giving up their nuclear capabilities. France and China reversed their traditional antipathy to the regime and became staunch supporters. India was a member of the regime with undefined status. Although its engagement with the US-led global community was qualitatively and quantitatively improving, there was a sense that this would only increase pressure on the nuclear program.  

India perceived a small window of opportunity which it could use to move closer to NWS status, again resorting to nuclear testing. In the event, Realists were right in predicting that testing would actually reduce the pressures on India’s program (Kapur 2001, 6).

Using the regime for deterrence

In this section I will discuss how India used understandings introduced by the nonproliferation regime to enact its deterrent identity; and in the next section I will

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27 Author’s interview with Arundhati Ghose, 1 August 2003, New Delhi.
take up the related idea that Indian decision-makers too were constrained by ideational forces that may initially have been deployed strategically.

**Deterrence through nuclear development**

We have seen that the nonproliferation regime facilitates the development of nuclear capabilities short of weaponization, that countries then employ in ‘hedging.’ In the 1960s, the US tried to reduce the lure of the weapons option by affirming the power potential of civilian programs. A State Department telegram advises American diplomats that the term “civil nuclear power” should be used to describe a state that has the potential to employ advanced nuclear technology for weapons but has decided against it (Department of State 1966).

India’s deterrence strategy rested on conveying the idea that it was capable of ‘going nuclear’ by crossing acknowledged thresholds. It too plays on the inherent dual-use characteristics of nuclear technology. India was initially able to garner nuclear materials and technology on the basis of its developmental plans. The Indian government had pledged that fissile materials produced in the process of the operation of CIRUS would be “employed for peaceful purposes only.” A similar pledge was given to the US Atomic Energy Commission in 1956 (Chellaney 1993b, 6). A senior policy-maker hinted that available fissile material was moved from civilian to military uses. He said that India had to choose between using its limited “precious” [fissile] material for civil applications or for weapons.28 The Indian government initiated dozens of programs under different organizations like the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which, taken together resemble a

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28 Author’s interview with K. Santhanam, 13 June 2003, New Delhi.
full-fledged deterrent program (Chellaney 1991, 63). Karnad claims that by the late 1980s India had a “fairly sophisticated arsenal” (Karnad 2002b, 267). India also began a missile program in 1970 to build delivery vehicles for its nuclear warheads. Indira Gandhi was aware of the signaling function of the program, observing that there was no point in making threats unless one had something to back them (Chengappa 2000, 129). In 1989 we saw the first test of the delivery vehicle, which was termed a ‘technology demonstrator.’

India’s deployment of capability was an instrument of nuclear strategy just like deterrence, threat, or use (Subrahmanyam 1974b). In 1974, the Statesman predicted that other countries would disregard statements about peaceful uses and focus on capability: “Whatever the declared policy may be, the production of actual weapons is just another step forward should a political decision be taken to that effect” (Anon 1974f). Subrahmanyam clarified: “The same range of tests needed to perfect the use of the bomb for peaceful purposes will be needed for making weapons” (Anon 1974d). India would be entitled to use her knowledge for peaceful purposes, “or otherwise as the situation might demand” (Dasgupta 1974). India’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament made sure to inform that body that “all countries developing uses of nuclear energy are nuclear powers, those which develop or possess nuclear weapons are nuclear weapon powers” (Anon 1974c, emphasis mine).

Statements by authorities

Politicians, military leaders, scientists and diplomats hinted at nuclear progress. In February 1961 Homi Bhabha, the head of the AEC, claimed publicly that a bomb

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**29** 1998 did not obviate the need for development, and the testing of the Agni-II missile in April 1999 for instance was described by the government as a demonstration that India would resist pressure on security issues (Anon 1999d).
could be ready in two years (Perkovich 1999, 38). In 1964, the Information Minister said it would take 18 months (Jain 1974, vol.1, 80). Replying to a question in Parliament about India’s knowledge of atomic bomb production, PM Shastri said: “the general principles are well-known but we have not acquired the detailed knowhow as we have not worked towards this end. It would take about a year to develop the detailed knowhow if a decision to do so were taken.” In 1967, Foreign Minister Chagla declared that India could explode a nuclear device within a year (Williams 1969, 40).

In June 1985, PM Rajiv Gandhi declared that if India decided to become a nuclear power it would take only a few weeks or months (Spector 1985, 83). In 1988, the Defense Minister announced that the Indian armed forces “would not be at a disadvantage” in the face of a nuclear attack by Pakistan (Smith 1994, 191). Statements often reiterated the commitment to peaceful uses but stressed policy mutability. Soon after the Chinese test, PM Shastri told Parliament that he could not say that the policy of not developing nuclear weapons was deep-rooted (Sundarji 1995, 139, emphases mine). Responding to calls for an arsenal in 1970, Mrs. Gandhi declared that although the policy was to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, it was “under constant review taking into account the needs of our national defense and security.”

Parliamentary statements were often used in enacting deterrence. In 1984, the Pakistani nuclear program was brought up for discussion in Parliament. Narasimha Rao, then Foreign Minister (later PM) responded that the government was “not

30 Lok Sabha Debates, 14 September 1964.
31 Lok Sabha Debates, 5 March 1970.
unaware” of developments in the neighborhood: “Our scientists are continuing with their research. What else can one say?” On being asked specifically whether the nuclear option was open he read out a bland statement: “Indian scientists are keeping abreast of all aspects of research and development connected with modern relevant technologies.” When the questioner then demanded to know what this statement really meant, Rao retorted that any intelligent person would understand its meaning. Instead of nuclear testing, PM Gujral used missile testing, and even the awarding of India’s highest civilian honor (the Bharat Ratna) to Abdul Kalam (known as the father of India’s bomb, now President) to establish his and the country’s resolve (Chengappa 2000, 406, 09).

**Testing**

The literature has focused on the timing of tests. Scholars search for security ‘triggers’ (in 1974, Nixon’s visit to China via Pakistan; in 1998, Pakistan’s testing of a missile in April). Finding these insufficient, scholars seek explanations in domestic politics (in 1974 Mrs. Gandhi’s bid to win public support, in 1998 the BJP’s attempt to build consensus). I believe that the question of timing is relatively unimportant and becoming less relevant: the program was advanced enough that it could produce an explosive device with some notice—approximately 18 months for the first test and a few weeks for the second. I focus on what the government was attempting to ‘do’ with the test. Why should an explosion make a country more secure? This can only be

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33 There are reports that a test was planned in 1982 (canceled for reasons unknown) (Chengappa 2000, 260; Perkovich 1999, 242). Another test was attempted in late 1995/early 1996, but international pressure forced the government to draw back (Joeck 1997, 42). When the BJP was in power for 13 days in May 1996 it reportedly authorized a test. Unconfirmed reports suggest that PM Deve Gowda, who formed the government in 1996, planned to carry out a test in the summer of 1997 to shore up his political position (Chengappa 2000, 402).
understood in the context of the understanding that a nuclear explosion stands for the capability to make weapons.

First, *nuclear tests are vital steps in establishing deterrence*, creating confidence within and outside the country. In the collective consciousness of weapons scientists the experimental demonstration of the reliability of nuclear weapons is associated with the reliability of nuclear deterrence itself (Gusterson 1996, 152). ‘Reliability’ has been shown to be a constructed concept (Montgomery 1999; Pinch 1993, 33). Yet it is not only scientists who place their faith in tests. The US had conducted around 1000 nuclear tests by 1987 (Anon 2002d). Yet it initially rejected negotiations on a CTBT on the grounds that such a treaty would harm deterrence efforts (Mutimer 2000b, 121).34

Second, as I showed in my discussion of categorization, *testing is necessary* to establish a state as a NWS. The international community is simply unable to recognize the development of arsenals if they are not tested (Chafetz 1995, 755). India used the link that had been established between testing and the possession of weapons to maintain opaque deterrence. Third, testing demonstrates a country’s *commitment* to developing its arsenal. The 1974 test put paid to the idea that the Soviet Union was able to restrain Indian nuclear ambitions (Anon 1974a).

Fourth, testing by states that are *not* NWS represents a public blow to the regime. The international community strives to avert testing where it cannot stem proliferation, making significant concessions to this end. India’s interlocutors counseled restraint

34 Around eight years later, thanks to political concessions and technological advances the American government was able to convince laboratories to support the CTBT.
and presented suggestions for stabilizing deterrence (Lavoy 1995). The goal was apparently to prevent testing, which would symbolize an overt failure of the regime. This preoccupation with averting a test facilitated India’s adoption of a particular kind of deterrence.

India’s tests exploited the link established in the regime between testing and acquisition of nuclear weapons, inherent in the Article IX definition of a NWS. After 1974 India had to be considered as sharing some of the qualities of a NWS, challenging the binary NWS-NNWS distinction resting on the controlled explosion of a nuclear device. India was not eligible for NWS status, and claimed not to want it. Yet it wanted to reap the deterrence benefits of the intersubjective understanding that the explosion proved India’s capability to make weapons. It is unclear that India actually had this capability in 1974.

Playing by the rules: disarmament, arms control and signaling

India maintained its deterrence posture by picking and choosing its disarmament commitments. As we have seen the advocacy of general and comprehensive disarmament (GCD) was in fact an integral part of security strategy (Dubey 1998b, 3). The underlying assumption was that India, like other nations, would be most secure in a disarmed world. The idea that security would be best assured in a nuclear weapon-free world was congruent with commitments to development and nonalignment (Chopra 1984, 6-10). Realists, however, believe that India promoted GCD because it was so manifestly unachievable that it would never constrain its own

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35 GCD was rarely and divergently defined. In one of the more radical formulations: “So far as India was concerned, disarmament meant elimination of all national military forces, leaving each country with nothing more than the domestic police or militia…applied to conventional, nuclear and other weapons of warfare, it included all kinds of armed forces and all nations” (Chopra 1984, 15).
options (Karnad 2002b, 218). At various points India presented the world with a choice: either efforts towards disarmament were speeded up, or India would solve its security problems by acquiring weapons. Presenting his three-stage plan to the UN in 1988, Rajiv Gandhi condemned the doctrine of deterrence, yet his speech contained a veiled threat: “Left to ourselves, we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But when tactical considerations, in the passing play of great power rivalries, are allowed to take precedence over the imperatives of nuclear nonproliferation, with what leeway are we left?” (Gandhi 1988, 1152).

India’s refusal to sign the NPT was the first clear signal of its intention to keep the option open, that it was “aiming at acquiring basic nuclear weapons capabilities” to be operationalized according to the security environment (Dixit 1998a, 421). However, because of the regime’s norms, it was able to modulate this signal. India could frame its opposition in terms of an anti-(neo) colonial, developmentalist, and principled stance. Apartheid and racial discrimination dominated the international discourse in the 1950s and the 1960s; India drew on them to critique the NPT (Biswas 2001). It could continue to advocate disarmament measures and harangue the nuclear powers. The benefits were not purely symbolic. India’s position as a leader of the Third World and the nonaligned movement was strengthened, insulating it somewhat from pressure from the superpowers. India had to be invited to UN bodies debating disarmament, although it had repudiated the most prominent treaty, and could continue to influence the formulation of the regime.

The regime’s bargain exalts the importance of nuclear technology for developmental purposes. States are persuaded to trade off potential military uses for technical assistance. India made use of this understanding—obviously one that weakened as the
initial promise of nuclear technology faded by the 1980s—to create a credible ideational base for its NWD. The claim that the data from the PNE would not be used for military purposes was meant to demonstrate that the militarization of nuclear energy was a *political* choice, thus reversible.

But disarmament was never followed blindly. Observers noted a change in India’s disarmament activism in the late 1960s as it began to worry about China. Its goal shifted from world peace through disarmament, to reciprocity—nuclear renunciation by some in return for disarmament by others (Chopra 1984, 154; Epstein 1976, 65). India’s rejection of regional arms control in the form of the proposed South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ) is an example of its careful choices in disarmament diplomacy.\(^{36}\) The SANFWZ was introduced into the debate by Pakistan after the tests in 1974. The draft resolution slyly referred to India’s support for Nuclear Free Zones in Latin America and Africa (Murthy 1993, 110). For eighteen years (1974-92) Pakistan reintroduced the resolution in every General Assembly session with the purpose of embarrassing India (Murthy 1993, 120). India often used support for general principles to evade regional measures. For instance, it rejected a Pakistani proposal for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities on the grounds that joint inspection would “detract from our principled stand that any safeguard on the use of nuclear energy should be non-discriminatory and have universal applicability”.\(^{37}\)

India’s refusal to enter into bilateral disarmament signaled its resistance to the definition of its security problem with respect to Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan becomes

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\(^{36}\) Reflecting the more accommodationist mood, Amitabh Mattoo suggested after the 1998 tests that India should work toward a Nuclear Safety, Assistance and Collaboration Zone (NSACZ) rather than a NFZ (Mattoo 1998b, 25).

\(^{37}\) Minister of External Affairs, Reply to Question, Lok Sabha Debates, 28 April 1983, col. 110.
salient in the content analysis only in 1976. Studying the terms that cluster with it in that year we find that they all relate to the proposed NWFZ (weapon, region, India, south, asia and free). The feeling was that American analysts, working within the “analytical straitjacket” of bipolar competition, did not give adequate importance to the China factor in Indian calculations. Their definition of South Asia excluded China (Chellaney 1991, 51). India insists that China is part of the region (Cohen 1992, 211). Since China as a NWS could not be asked to disarm, India’s need for a nuclear deterrent was thrown into relief as a result of this tactic. India also pointed to the nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific. It used this opportunity to reiterate that “due to its global implications there can be no bilateral or regional solution to…proliferation”. This was a direct refutation of the opinion of the nonproliferation community, as expressed by Michael Krepon: "The root of the problem in South Asia is in South Asia. It's not in Washington, it's not in Beijing” (Anon 1995b).

The 1974 test could be framed as directed against the NPT (Kapur 1976b, 205). The test had made it impossible for the NPT’s sponsors to claim victory (Subrahmanyam 1974b). Some claimed the treaty would be replaced with a fairer one (Sawhney 1974, 9). The PNE label also allowed India to retain the benefits of its role as disarmament advocate fighting the unjust international system. By refusing to declare itself a NWS, India could portray its actions as promoting disarmament, rather than hurting that cause. The test gave “special force, credence, and meaning” to India’s disarmament efforts, according to V.P.Singh, later PM (Singh 1974b). Presenting the test in a

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38 Minister of External Affairs, Reply to question, Lok Sabha Debates, 8 January 1976, cols. 76-77.
manner that denuded it of military implications let India elude responsibility for triggering further proliferation (Anon 1974i).  

India skillfully constructed its identity to distinguish itself from other nuclear aspirants, with selective adherence to certain norms. One method by which India established its nuclear identity was adherence to norms of technology diffusion. It was remarkably conscientious in controlling the exports of sensitive materials and technology. Apparently in 1978 India rejected a Libyan offer to pay off its entire foreign debt in return for the sale of nuclear weapons (Anon 2005e). India’s nuclear deals in the 1970s also followed NSG guidelines (Power 1979, 578). Indian diplomats played up the fact that although it is not a member of supplier groups or the NPT, India’s record is better than China’s, and even more starkly, Pakistan’s.  

\[\text{Crisis behavior}\]

Like the other measures listed in this section, behavior during security crises is also designed to emphasize India’s restraint and responsible conduct in order to establish its legitimate claim to possess nuclear weapons. This demonstration of restraint was most recently seen during the Kargil war in 1999 and the 2001-02 border standoff. In both these cases, India issued nuclear threats against its nuclear-armed rival, Pakistan. Yet Indian diplomats were able to emphasize the restraint it imposed on itself, in order

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40 During the discussion on the 1974 tests, V.P. Singh says that a country building nuclear weapons is following the example set in Hiroshima, not in Pokhran. Lok Sabha Debates, 8 August 1974, col. 210. The External Affairs Minister castigates Pakistan for postponing the Shimla negotiations using the PNE as a pretext, Lok Sabha Debates, 25 July 1974, col. 151-52.  
41 India also refused, partly due to US pressure, an offer from Iran to buy a research reactor in 1991 (Montgomery 2005, 182).  
42 Every time India expresses concern about proliferation from Pakistan, it is reinforcing the idea that proliferation involves buying or stealing materials and technology as opposed to an indigenous bomb program.
to draw global condemnation on Pakistan. Since this strategy draws on the norms of the emerging counter-terrorism regime, it is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6.

**Pokhran-II: The 1998 tests and their aftermath**

According to Scheinman, a norm precluding PNEs had not yet emerged in 1974 (Scheinman 1987, 199, n.4). However, by 1999, a politically binding norm against testing had been established (Bunn 1999, 21). It seems paradoxical to claim that India’s violations of global norms by testing and declaring itself a NWS were aimed at insinuating itself into the regime. Yet May 1998 featured both violations and, obscured by the furore, a reversal of the principles of five decades of Indian disarmament diplomacy. India laid claim to several of the resources that the nonproliferation regime itself used to assign positive identities to its members.

**Crashing the nonproliferation regime**

First, with all the fervor of the newly-converted, India pledged responsible deterrence. The Prime Minister declared: “Our intentions were, are, and always will be peaceful, but we do not want to cover our action with a veil of needless ambiguity” (Chawla 1998, 39). The declaration that India would be content with a “minimum” nuclear deterrent was the cornerstone of India’s post-test identity construction.

The Prime Minister must leave no room for any doubt that India is now a nuclear weapon state…must insist that there can be no negotiation about weaponisation or deployment of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously India must convey that it will strain every nerve to ensure that its nuclear force structure will be built on maximum possible restraint…must signal…that India has no desire to engage in an open-ended nuclear arms race (Rajamohan 1998d).
The PM promised that India, unlike “other nuclear weapon powers,” did not intend to build a large arsenal or create an elaborate command and control system (Chengappa 1998, 58). India would induct nuclear weapons into the armed forces only if necessary and there was no time frame in which this process would be completed (Anon 1998k). It is precisely with the help of nuclear deterrence, which does not depend on matching weapon to weapon, that India would avoid an arms race (Singh 1998b).

Moving away from the traditional goal of general and comprehensive disarmament, India began advocating clearly incremental measures such as a draft resolution on reducing the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, and a global NFU pact (Anon 1998n). In 2002 India joined the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Most importantly, the government proclaimed its willingness to sign the CTBT and enter negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). India objected to the NPT because it did not touch the weapons already existing in NWS arsenals, but is now ready to sign an FMCT which only restricts further production of fissile material and does not operate with retroactive effect to reduce stockpiles of material owned by nuclear nations.

The PM announced that India, “as a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons” was tightening export controls (Rajamohan 1998c). Another significant shift in policy appeared in India’s willingness to discuss nuclear issues with the US. Strobe Talbott and Jaswant Singh, special envoys of their countries, began a dialogue in 1998, one which Talbott admitted went in India’s favor (Haniffa 2004).43 Even in the famous

43 "In eight rounds of talks with Strobe Talbott, Jaswant Singh has skilfully brought India back from the edge of being declared a rogue state to the verge of rejoining the global community as a recognised, de facto nuclear power” (Jha 1999).
post-test letter to President Clinton, India pledged to continue working with the US on arms control (Anon 1998i). Bilateral arms control became the principal vehicle of reassurance as to the ability of South Asians to pursue responsible policies (Rajamohan 1999a). Since the relationship between India and Pakistan was considered a nuclear flashpoint, India attempted to prove its non-aggressive intentions with a package of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). A No First Use (NFU) guarantee to Pakistan was the most important of these. India also proposed the extension of the hotline between national leaders, advance notification of missile tests of over 200 km range, extension of the agreement on non-attack to population and economic centers, and measures to end hostile propaganda (Baruah 1998).

Rajamohan emphasised that Asian states needed convincing that India is not North Korea (Rajamohan 1999b). India was not Pyongyang nor Baghdad, indulging in nuclear blackmail (Anon 1998a; Anon 1998c). The signals from New Delhi needed to reflect the mind of a mature, self-assured nation, not those of a defensive, jingoistic establishment (Gupta 1998a). The strength of giants is to be used with care, and India should present itself as a responsible country (George 1998c). Aside from active participation in the global economy and international institutions, particularly those relating to arms control, India also strategically deployed its democratic form of government (Bhagwati 1998, 32; Talbott 2004, 13, 121)—because it implies civilian control of nuclear weapons. In his Parliament speech on the nuclear tests, the PM reiterated India’s commitment to international institutions, and mentioned growing links with the world economy consequent on economic liberalization.

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44 India’s enthusiastic endorsement of the Bush administration’s missile defense project, and its participation in the Container/Proliferation Security Initiatives have signaled its acceptance of US leadership in arms control, anathema to Indian diplomats before the 1990s.
45 The separation of regulatory authority for civilian and military plants was done following the US model (Gopalakrishnan 2000; Subramaniam 2000).
After the initial hand-wringing, the dominant powers decided that India’s newly-acquired capability did not upset the balance of deterrence that was at the core of the regime. The ‘norm leader’ gave the cue (Arms Control Association 2001; Council on Foreign Relations 2003). In July, October and November 1998 the impact of American sanctions was periodically and substantially diluted. The US lifted all remaining sanctions against India in September 2001 acknowledging it as a valuable ally in the war on terrorism; other countries followed suit. The adverse repercussions of the 1998 tests, as Indian decision-makers had predicted, were not long-lasting. Now India’s nuclear status is routinely referred to among its qualifications to be a great power, for instance, in its campaign to secure a permanent seat on the Security Council. Seven years of quiet diplomacy since then have consolidated India’s position.

*The fruit of nuclear diplomacy*

In July 2005 India and the US signed a historic agreement in Washington DC. It declared that “as a *responsible state with advanced nuclear technology*, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states” (Office of the Press Secretary 2005 emphasis mine). An American spokesman clarified: “By taking this decision, we are not recognizing India as a nuclear weapons state” (Burns 2005). Yet the logic of the US approach to India only holds if India is seen as a NWS. How can one, for example, assert that India is a NNWS while recognizing that it has civilian and military nuclear fuel cycles? How can one make an exemption from the NSG Guidelines for a NNWS? (Stansfield 2005). Several scholars of nonproliferation see this deal as indirectly conferring on India the status of a NWS by giving it many of the

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46 In July 1998, the farm lobby pressured the government to exclude export credits for farm products. Three months later, Congress gave the President omnibus powers to waive sanctions against India and Pakistan for one year, except for sanctions on arms sales. On 7 November 1998 President Clinton removed all sanctions against two countries except for arms sales and certain technology transfers, which were then removed after the September 2001 attacks and the ‘war on terror.’
same rights and responsibilities. The Additional Protocol agreement that India would negotiate with the IAEA would resemble that body’s agreements with an NWS. India will voluntarily accept full-scope international safeguards to be administered on the civilian portion of its nuclear estate. Unlike the NPT parties who are NNWS, India thus has the right to choose which facilities it will designate as civilian. This would allow India to exclude military-related facilities and even portions of civilian facilities on ‘national security’ grounds (Kimball 2005).

India promised to set in place a wall of separation between the military and civilian parts of its nuclear program. The country also voluntarily accepted full-scope safeguards administered by the IAEA on its civilian nuclear reactors, pledged to incorporate international export controls into domestic legislation to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear technology out of India, and agreed to continue its voluntary moratorium on testing. The US in turn agreed to commence trade in fissile material and related technologies for civilian uses. On 26 September 2005, Canada and India also came to an agreement whereby trade in dual-use technology to India would be facilitated.

The deal weakens the credibility of the nonproliferation regime since India will now be able to avail of the economic advantages of NPT membership without its constraints (Einhorn 2005; Krepon 2005; Talbott 2005). On the other hand, some Indian leaders were unhappy with the manner in which India had been identified. Former PM Vajpayee was quick to point out that the deal recognizes India merely “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”, not as a “legitimate and responsible nuclear weapons state” (Vajpayee 2005). The Communist Party of India (Marxist) also criticized the government for accepting “junior partnership of the
United States in return for a de facto recognition as a nuclear weapon state without acquiring a *legitimate* position in the nuclear club” (Anon 2005demphasis mine).

A few months after the 1998 tests, we note already suggestions that India should be enticed with civilian technology to adhere to nonproliferation norms (Christopher, Hamburg, and Perry 1999, 51; Rajamohan 1998a). Its membership in formal arms control mechanisms was a lower priority. Questioned about India’s accession to the CTBT in 2001, a State Department spokesman responded that the US was mainly concerned with preventing further testing (Arms Control Association 2001). US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that his country and “other interested countries” should encourage India and Pakistan to “learn that is it possible to live with nuclear weapons and not to use them.” He hoped that the India-Pakistan relationship could become as stable as the Cold War rivalry (Arms Control Association 2001).

The seven rounds of talks between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott in 2001 and 2002 can be viewed as a way to cautiously institutionalize India into the dominant order of global governance (Muppidi 2004, 289). In January 2003 the Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission met with the AEC Chairman to discuss the possibility of bilateral cooperation (Harrison 2002). Elements of the July 2005 deal were foreshadowed in a Carnegie report released earlier that year, *India as a New Global Power* (Tellis 2005). A month earlier, India and the US had signed a ten-year defense agreement (“New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship”) paving the way for joint weapons production and cooperation on missile defense (US Embassy 2005).

47 When asked if Rumsfeld’s remarks indicated a policy change on South Asia, the Pentagon refused to comment.
The importance of discourse

We have seen that the construction of a deterrent identity was the basis of India’s security strategy. I also attempted to demonstrate that the principles of the nonproliferation regime can be exploited in ways that were not intended by their originators. Here I explain why it is important to pay attention to the constraining and enabling power of elements in the discourse. First, I ask how deterrence came to function as a ‘natural’ goal of strategy. I find that there were four factors that contributed to its incorporation into the discourse—its association with peace, a middle path in world affairs and a comprehensive conception of national security, and the influence of external actors. Second, I will present some evidence for the claim that discourse remains powerful even when structural conditions change.

How deterrence prevailed

Colin Gray once said that just as everyone supports peace, everybody is for deterrence (Williams 1992, 68). This does not hold true in India. India initially opposed the very concept of deterrence because it relies on the conditional use of nuclear weapons (Menon 1954). Subrahmanyam denounced the very idea of deterrence as immoral and unworkable (Subrahmanyam 1981). As late as 1995, PM Narasimha Rao told the UNGA that deterrence was a ‘false belief’. Since the possession of nuclear weapons by some prompts other countries to acquire them, the idea of a permanent number of nuclear weapon states is unrealistic and self-defeating. This critique cuts at the core of the nonproliferation regime. He appealed for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, possibly as per the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (Rao 1995). No doubt the realization that it could not afford to erect a credible deterrent strengthened this
aversion. How, then, did deterrence become hegemonic to the extent that Indian analysts branded as racist suggestions that it would not work in South Asia? (Giles and Doyle 1996, 143; Subrahmanyam 1986b, 286; Sundarji 1995, 159).

It is important to note that deterrence gained ground slowly. Itty Abraham claims that the 1974 test moved India from a “mythic space of nonalignment and peaceful co-existence into an everyday realm of naturalized fear, threat, danger and insecurity…Finally, in 1998, the state’s rhetoric caught up when India conducted a new round of tests and officially announced it was a NWS” (Abraham 1998, 165). Varadarajan correctly questions whether a single act could constitute a fall from grace in this way (Varadarajan 2004a, 334). In fact, there was no stark demarcation. The evolution of policy, taking India from being a staunch opponent of nuclear weapons to its current position as the newest entrant to the club, also took place at a tectonic pace.

Arming for peace

The doctrine owes its acceptability in great part to the ease with which it can be presented as a path to peace. Adopting deterrence allows a country to think of itself as peaceful and concerned only with self-defense, yet powerful and capable of ensuring its own security—that is, deterrence allows the country to ‘have it both ways’ (Shue 1989a). Deterrence allowed India to escape a debate about the country’s commitment to peace, its Gandhian ethos and military expenditure, while making a nuclear capability possible. For instance, D. K. Palit responded to such objections by citing deterrence theory to the effect that nuclear weapons reduce the risk and scale of violence (Palit 1971, 13). According to Jasjit Singh, if 1974 was a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, the 1998 explosion was an “explosion for peace” (Sethi 1998, 84).
Peace has been the axis of India’s declarations on nuclear policy. The particular type of deterrence, i.e., NWD, was cited as an example of self-control and ethical norms (Rajan 1999, 8; Sethi 1998, 90). In 1974 ‘peaceful’ meant that nuclear power would be used for non-military purposes. Frequent references to nuclear capability and peaceful purposes shaded into nuclear weapons and peaceful intentions. The inherent unreliability of NWD coupled with changing global norms, made it natural for security elites to demand a hardening of the option. It is no wonder that in 1998 advocates of ‘ambiguity’ or ‘keeping the option open’ easily switched to a strident defense of enhancing the arsenal (Vanaik 2004). The term ‘peaceful uses’ was gradually broadened to include national defense, thus paving the way for deterrence without weapons in the 1980s, and ‘keeping the option open’ in the 1990s. It was almost inevitable that existential, non-weaponized deterrence hardened into ‘minimum deterrence’. By the 1990s the government adopted the more assertive posture of recessed deterrence, keeping the components of operational devices in readiness at separate locations (Banerjee 1998, 289; Muralidharan and Cherian 1998, 4).

According to Tellis, Indian decision-makers hold the mechanistic conception that deterrence, like the invisible hand in economics, operates thanks to the essential characteristics of nuclear weapons themselves. India's traditional antagonism to deterrence made it imperative for analysts to strip the nuclear weapons of military implications and present them as purely 'political' instruments (Tellis 2001, 280-81). Rajesh Basrur’s interviews with members of the strategic elite in India showed him that most of them think of nuclear weapons as sources of bargaining power, not necessarily guarantors of a net positive effect on security (Basrur 2006, 68). By delinking the deterrent from relative balance-of-power calculations India also escaped some of the costs of an arms race (Tellis 2001, 293).
Staying on the golden mean

While the association of deterrence and peace can be observed in many countries, it was well-suited to the tendency of Indian government policies, from foreign affairs to economic restructuring, to stick to the ‘middle path’. Nehru once said about foreign policy formulation: “Any attempt on our part to go too far in one direction would create difficulties in our own country” (cited in Kapur 1976b, 14). Non-weaponization allowed successive Indian PMs to make the literally correct statement that India did not have nuclear weapons. It also allowed the construction of a rationale for seeming inaction (Menon 2000, 176, n.38). In this way, the hawks were also pacified. 69% of the respondents of a survey of academics specializing in IR claimed there was no conflict between the PNE and India’s peaceful intentions in world affairs (Misra and Gandhi 1975, 349).

Another route through which the terminology of deterrence entered India was the translation of India’s development-centered discourse to the dominant discourse. In a broader sense, self-reliance translated into self-help. The Times of India editorial claimed that the 1974 test showed that India takes its own decisions. Another claimed that the Enterprise incident had strengthened the case for self-reliance (Bhattacharya 1974). Answering a question as to whether India had the capability to make a nuclear weapon, the Prime Minister said: “We have demonstrated, time and again, that we have always been extremely restrained…but for a country of India’s size, we simply cannot be technologically dependent on other countries” (Anon 1974g, 7). In the 1990s the focus of the regime expanded to include restriction of technological capability, and ‘peaceful uses’ became suspect. India’s claims about the developmental uses of nuclear technology no longer passed muster and were given up.
In his first interview after the 1998 tests, PM Vajpayee stated: “You would have noted that neither my own statement of May 11 nor the longer official text…has characterized the nuclear tests as ‘peaceful nuclear tests’…India is now a nuclear weapons state” (Chawla 1998). Here the authorities are anxious to denude the tests of all developmental significance and situate them firmly in the security discourse. Yet we can discern the operation of the economic progress-nuclear technology association, in the support for the tests in two economic constituencies.

Some were concerned about the effects of nuclear and dual-use technology denial to an India unrecognized as a NWS. These actors still believed in the promise of nuclear technology, particularly the ‘new-generation reactors’. Among the effects of non-recognition as a NWS was the denial of nuclear technology and fissile materials via the rules of the NSG. The tightening of the regime, as manifested in the NSG’s 1992 guidelines on dual-use technology made it impossible for India’s unsafeguarded plants to receive fissile material. Others—the globalizers—supported economic openness and calculated that a NWS India would perform better in the world economy. Deterrence signals have always blended with economic ones, and this has eased their acceptability. Developmental aspirations, piggybacking on nuclear power, merged into security concerns.

Lost in translation

Because India was such a ‘rare bird,’ its stratagems fell on ears more accustomed to hearing the terminology of power and deterrence. Since the nonproliferation regime reinforced the idea that the possession of nuclear weapons solely for deterrence was legitimate and stabilizing, Indian elites needed deterrence arguments to convince
international and domestic audiences that they were entitled to nuclear weapons because of ‘genuine’ security reasons. India’s arguments were gradually fitted into these categories. For instance, George Quester ‘translated’ India’s insistence on ‘peaceful uses’ as equivalent to a No First Use (NFU) Declaration (Quester 1981, 226). In 1997, K. Subrahmanyam made a similar interpretation (Joshi 1998a, 45). Since the Cold War represents the only model for rivalry, the Indian strategic community borrowed from it, while criticizing it at the same time.  

Indian strategists, even those who were not trained in the IR discipline, found inspiration in Western texts on deterrence. Many of my interviewees were either trained in the US, or sought out American texts. K. Subrahmanyam cites his meetings with American strategists like Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie among others, as very influential on his thinking. The soldier-scholar, D. K. Palit, draws “one clear lesson from twenty-five years of nuclear confrontation”—that the chance of large-scale violence is minimized in strategic nuclear rivalry (Palit 1974). Ravi Kaul advocates nuclear deterrence extrapolating from the views of André Beaufre, while Sundarji cites Waltz (Kaul 1974, 110; Sundarji 1994).

Starting in the late 1980s, nonproliferation diplomacy by US-based thinktanks such as Carnegie and Rockefeller, encouraged a new generation of Indian analysts to shift from disarmament to arms control thinking.  

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49 Author’s interview with K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi.
50 Author’s interviews with C.Rajamohan, 21 June 2003, New Delhi; Brahma Chellaney, 30 July 2003, New Delhi.
ideas from transnational sources (Evangelista 1999, 19). In the realm of nuclear policy, India’s decisions are in fact made by a small and closed group of decision makers. Western scholars argued that, with NWD, India had arrived at a way of performing deterrence that was less dangerous and expensive (Perkovich 1993; Quester 1992). (It must be noted that Realist scholars and practitioners dismiss the notion of transmission of ideas.) US government officials were also influential in this process. In 1995 Secretary of Defense William Perry became convinced after a visit to South Asia, that its leaders would never reverse their nuclear course. The official US policy at this time was to “cap, rollback and eliminate” the nuclear capability of non-NPT states (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment 1993, 103). Perry advocated that the US give up on ‘rolling back’ and ‘eliminating’ nuclear arsenals in India and Pakistan and concentrate on ‘capping’. He also touted the virtues of CBMs to South Asian leaders, tacitly getting them to assume the responsibilities of owning nuclear weapons.

**Disarming logic: an obstacle to changing course**

Disarmament diplomacy started out as an integral part of security strategy (Dubey 1998b, 3). Realists claim that policy-makers did not acquire nuclear weapons at the ‘right time’ because disarmament had “calcified as dogma” (Karnad 2002b, 72). In its semi-official national security doctrine and leaders’ pronouncements, India keeps reiterating its commitment to disarmament. The goal of a nuclear weapon free world is always present (Anon 1998e; Rajamohan 1999c; Singh 1998b). Even after 1998 we

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51 Author’s interview with Ashley Tellis, August 2005, Washington DC.
52 Author’s interview with William Perry, 23 March 2005, Palo Alto, CA.
53 Jasjit Singh regrets that he did not write enough about the security benefits of disarmament—“many of us forgot the original motivation.” Author’s interview, 24 July 2003.
observed Raja Ramanna advocating that weaponization should not be the priority and that nuclear energy should be used for peaceful purposes (Ramanna 1998).

After the 1998 tests the government announced that it was ready to sign the CTBT now that scientists had gained all the knowledge necessary for weaponization. Since the CTBT was then the most prominent treaty and was seen as targeting Indian capabilities in particular, this concession was essential to establishing India’s credentials as a status quoist member of the club. The political elite reacted with skepticism, not least because doubts were raised about the AEC’s claims about yields recorded during the tests (Anon 2000a; Iyengar 2000; Sibal 1999). More importantly, it was accustomed to seeing the CTBT portrayed as discriminatory and harmful to disarmament. The government was severely criticized for even considering becoming party to the treaty and opposition leaders made it clear that they would be closely monitoring any movements in that direction.\textsuperscript{54} Arundhati Ghose, formerly India’s representative to the Conference on Disarmament, claimed that endorsing the CTBT would be “tantamount to joining the inequitable regime we have fought so long against…to joining the pyramidal international power structure with the US at its apex.” She argued for preserving the tradition of dissidence pointing out that its “contrariness” had permitted India to preserve its option (Ghose 1999). The longer India went without signing (whether the NPT or the CTBT) the harder it was to reverse that stand which was presented in the interim as independent and principled. A domestic campaign to “de-demonize the CTBT” is clearly a necessary first step for accession (Talbott 2004, 98).\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{54} Author’s interviews with Natwar Singh, 2 August 2003; and I.K. Gujral, 5 August 2003, New Delhi. 
\textsuperscript{55} By 2005, the CTBT had 176 signatories (out of 194 states) and 126 of them have ratified it (the US has not yet ratified). However, it cannot enter into force as long as India and Pakistan among others do not sign it.
Opposition to ‘hegemonic’ arms control which had been a staple of the Indian discourse, uniting Left and Right, continues to inform the debate. In the parliamentary debate over the 1998 tests, Communist leader (and nuclear opponent) Indrajit Gupta questioned why the government had declared a unilateral moratorium on testing. He accused the government of bringing CTBT conditionalities in through the back door.\(^{56}\)

The new breed of strategic analyst may condemn “nuclear Talibanism,” that is, dogmatic adherence to an anti-systemic program (Rajamohan 1998b). He may preach that the goal of diplomacy is no longer “soaring rhetoric on disarmament” but “managing the nuclear dynamic in a responsible fashion” (Rajamohan 1998f). However, the associations of nonproliferation with discrimination, hegemony, and sanctions, prevent India from reversing course with ease.

Although long-term strategic goals were posited as impelling the tests, the threat from Pakistan was inevitably linked with terrorism. The temptation to use the newly declared capability to solve issues of internal stability, blurs the boundary between nuclear war-fighting and deterrence. In the same speech where he assured an audience that India would use nuclear weapons only for self-defence, Vajpayee announced his resolve to combat those meddling in India’s internal affairs (Anon 1998j). When, in the week after the 1998 tests, Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani warned Pakistan to expect a more proactive Indian policy on Kashmir (and another Minister challenged it to a fourth round of war), analysts claimed that these statements were designed merely to taunt Pakistan into testing. However, over the next few years, the concept of

\(^{56}\) Lok Sabha Debates, 27 May 1998.
minimum deterrence was severely strained. Basrur claims that Kargil in fact saw the abandonment of minimum deterrence (Basrur 2003, 53).\footnote{During the border standoff between India and Pakistan in early January 2000, the Chief of Army Staff declared that in a future confrontation India might have to cross the Line of Control with Pakistan (Ganguly 2002, 126). The Chief of Naval Staff proclaimed that India could survive a nuclear strike and continue fighting (Anon 1999c). Hindu nationalists called on the PM to carry out a nuclear strike on Pakistan.}

The ‘minimum’ can be quantified only with reference to the purpose of the deterrent. Is it intended to strengthen India’s position vis-à-vis the sole superpower and rectify “asymmetry”? If yes, a minimum cannot be much lower than the capabilities of the NWS (Singh 1998c, 13). Is nuclear capability to be used as insurance against any future threat to India’s vital interests from the region (Anon 1998o; Fernandes 1998, 14)? If yes, China’s capability and intentions provide the benchmark. Keeping all these factors in mind, Muchkund Dubey counsels that India should not accept any “strategic restraints.” The nuclear option should be kept open, not only to meet security needs, but to “serve wider objectives”, he declares (Dubey 1998c; Dubey 1998d).\footnote{Some of those opposing the July 2005 deal are anxious about its implications for the deterrent’s size. The separation of civilian and military facilities would impact on the ability to make the stockpile as big as India needs for a minimum deterrent (Bhatt 2005; Vajpayee 2005).}

**Conclusion**

Through its definition of proliferation and categorization of member-states the regime determined the security needs of a country like India which was actively contesting that hierarchy. However, a focus on the regime’s power obscures an interesting phenomenon—once the regime’s normative resources have been deployed they can be appropriated and ‘misused’ by states. India also used the nonproliferation regime in its
quest for deterrence. At one level, May 1998 was the latest act in the performance of deterrence. At another level, the *manner* in which the tests were carried out and presented to the international community, tells us that the performance was also aimed at the regime itself. India’s overt defiance was aimed at crashing the country into the regime, a goal that is slowly being achieved. By the 1990s, the security/deterrence motive and the need for recognition by the regime had become intertwined. Therefore, one cannot see 1998 as a victory for security/deterrence *over* the norms of the regime.
CHAPTER 4

THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME AND INDIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS

In the literature on the Indian nuclear program, domestic-level explanations rival Realist or security-based accounts in popularity. In the previous chapter I showed that the constitutive powers of the international regime delineated the boundaries of the field of action for national policy makers. In this chapter, I will attempt to reveal the constitutive role of international norms in the domestic sphere.

The first five sections of the chapter deal with the main actors in nuclear policy and the political and economic context they come from. Scholars often comment that security, domestic forces and norms all influenced decisions on nuclear policy (Ganguly 2002, 101). Yet the precise mechanisms of the interaction of these three remain unstudied. The first section analyzes the characteristics of nuclear policy-making in India. While revealing the importance of the particular characteristics of the national policy-making process, I rebut arguments that hold the ‘strategic enclave’ responsible for the nuclear program. Section Two takes up, in turn, the bureaucracy supporting nuclear development, the community of security analysts, and the military. Section Three deals with the imperatives driving political parties’ decisions on nuclear weapons. In Section Four I show how the nuclear program was supported at various stages of economic development in India’s history. Section Five uses the example of the 1974 ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ to show how these divergent forces came together to generate the impetus for a nuclear test and to legitimize it both for internal and external audiences.
The second main part of the chapter studies international norms and their effect on national identity and the indirect effect on security and nuclear policies. While national security is partly determined by domestic forces as shown in the earlier sections, its ultimate goal is preserving national identity. National identity in turn, can be understood simply as the product of those domestic social, political and economic forces. Yet this would be an incomplete understanding, since identity is always formed within an international society with its own norms about statehood, security and nuclear power. Identity formation as a response to international norms is the focus in this part. While in the earlier half of the chapter I pose the question—*who decides what security is?*—here I ask a more complicated question—*whose security are we talking about?* In Section Six I show why it is important to consider questions of identity when discussing nuclear policy. In the next section I discuss international norms both as resources and as constraints on decision-makers.

*Domestic politics and nuclear security*

Who decides what security needs are? What are the characteristics of the decision-making process on nuclear issues in India? In this section I first deal with the particular features of policy formulation on the nuclear issue. It is made by a small, secretive and personalized group of individuals, that presents policy to the public and generates opinion in favor of it. At the same time, public opinion is opposed to nuclear reversal. Decision-makers are thus predisposed towards at least maintaining the status quo—usually termed ‘retaining the nuclear option.’ The three other sub-sections deal with the three major groups of decision-makers on the nuclear issue: nuclear scientists and the military, politicians, and economic actors.
Nuclear policy-making in India

The characteristics of policy-making on the nuclear issue are exaggerated reflections of the characteristics of foreign policy formulation in India. In his study of India’s evolving stance on international environmental regimes Rajan finds that policy is formulated by small groups of bureaucrats, ensuring continuity across administrations. These groups also had substantial autonomy, with little external input owing to concerns about secrecy (Rajan 1997, 242-52). Decisions on the nuclear issue are handled by a small number of officials, scientists and politicians who enjoy unquestioned authority.

It is important to remember that these characteristics of nuclear policy are not unique to India. Nuclear technology is fundamentally undemocratic both within and among countries (Chatterjee 1998, 1438). At the same time, India’s democracy enabled the state’s legitimization of the nuclear program. In my discussion of the 1974 test below, I show that the democratic credentials of the government forestalled criticism of the test; in 1998, the democratic history was invoked to establish the program’s legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

It is worth pointing out here that in the content analysis the term government appeared as the 10th most significant term overall in the entire sample. This is even more impressive when we consider that it appears in sixth place if the terms nuclear and atomic are removed from the list. No non-government organization, whether economic association, political party or non-governmental organization (NGO) gained salience in any of the years examined. The Indian discourse is very much dominated by the state. Since nuclear policy is associated with the state and not with a particular political faction it is considered to also be above public debate.
Often, it is impossible to find traces of governmental deliberations on the nuclear issue. George Perkovich, finding no evidence of the orderly processes of security policy-making around major decisions, claims that this absence reveals that domestic imperatives (rather than security) were paramount (Perkovich 1999, 177, 412). In fact, India’s oral tradition may have obliterated the paper trail. More importantly, government confabulation, especially on nuclear issues, was immensely secretive. Finally, in the context of the commonly-held mechanistic conception of deterrence discussed in the previous chapter, the absence of discussion is less surprising.

Prime Ministers, who have by convention held the Atomic Energy portfolio in the Cabinet, have exercised disproportionate influence on the subject. Nehru’s successor revealed that the nuclear question had never been discussed in the Cabinet (Brecher 1968, 234). One specific instance where the absence of discussion is striking is the momentous decision to stay out of the NPT. A note on the legal and diplomatic repercussions of rejecting the treaty was sent to the PM with comments by the Defence Ministry and the DAE. At the Cabinet meeting called to consider the issue, Mrs. Gandhi, “in the style of a headmistress” listened to the discussion and concluded it abruptly with the declaration, “We are in favor of disarmament but this Treaty would permit the five states that have these weapons to make more and more of them. I take it we are all against signing it. But we need not campaign against it” (Jaipal 1991, 131).¹

¹ Ashok Kapur indicates there was a debate in the Cabinet but also states that the Cabinet was unanimously against the treaty (Kapur 1976a, 196). In Chengappa’s version of the discussion, the PM remained silent till the end and ended by saying simply that while she admitted there were arguments against it, India should go ahead with the test (Chengappa 2000, 57).
In India, as in other modernizing societies, traditional and personal ties influence even ‘high politics.’ The most important decision-makers on an issue are often not those formally responsible. Indira Gandhi’s ‘kitchen cabinet’ in her first stint as PM consisted of men who held no important official positions.\(^2\) According to Karnad, in India where you stand is shaped not by where you sit, as Graham Allison would have it, but by who you know. Influential personalities like Raja Ramanna, K. Santhanam, and K. Subrahmanym were convinced of the importance of nuclear weapons not because of their institutional affiliations but because of personal experiences and beliefs.\(^3\)

Public opinion can be expected to be a major determinant of public policy in a functioning democracy. Using an approach analyzing both institutional structure and coalition-building processes, Risse-Kappen comes up with four types of domestic structures among democracies. India is closest to his description of France—with a centralized political system, weak and heterogenous organizations in society, and a state-dominated policy network. Under these conditions, we would not expect public opinion to exercise much influence over foreign policy (Risse-Kappen 1991).

We note also a general lack of knowledge about nuclear weapons and the consequences of their use. The nuclear weapon is perceived as just another weapon. India’s policy is always presented in the discourse as peaceful, thanks to the doctrine of deterrence. Additionally, the issue is often portrayed as one where India is in confrontation with the world. This presentation in terms of oppositional nationalism

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\(^2\) In the kitchen cabinet were Ashok Mehta, Romesh Thapar, Dinesh Singh, Mohan Kumaramangalam and I. K. Gujral (later to be Prime Minister himself).

\(^3\) Interview with Bharat Karnad, New Delhi, 18 July 2003.
makes people more likely to support the government’s stand. Content analysis shows that the word ‘two’ appears at times when oppositional nationalism is at its peak on the nuclear issue. This word becomes salient in 1972, 1974, 1998 and 1999.4

Interestingly, in India the nuclear issue becomes salient in public discourse only when the government considers a change in policy. This can be observed by looking at the average number of articles on the nuclear issue in the sample. In the 1960s, the Hindu featured an average of 15 articles per year on the issue (in the 1950s, the number of articles was much higher—over 20, but this was because the paper at that time subscribed to a style with very small articles, sometimes less than 250 words). In the 1990s, by contrast, as the government came under international pressure to sign international treaties, the coverage went up dramatically, with an average of 22 articles (this is only partly due to the larger size of the entire newspaper).

Public opinion surveys have shown that although citizens give nuclear policy low priority in their list of concerns, there is a fairly strong sentiment against giving up the capability. In one of the few systematic polls in 1994, only 6% of the respondents considered the nuclear issue to be the first or second most important national issue, yet only 8% of those surveyed would support nuclear renunciation (Mattoo and Cortright 1996). The numbers in support of weaponization, however, have been on the rise—from 53% in 1987 to 60% in 1992 and to 65% by 1995 (Mattoo 1998a, 11-12). Public opinion erects a barrier to any downward revision of nuclear ambitions and tends to accept ‘progress.’ In June 1978, PM Morarji Desai pledged at the UN that India would never make nuclear weapons, even if the rest of the world did so. His moral opposition to nuclear arms was well-known. A month later Desai was forced to declare, quite

4 Of course, two can be associated with bilateral cooperation as well—in this particular sample, it is not.
mystifyingly, that he was opposed to nuclear ‘explosions’ rather than ‘blasts’ (Singh 1980, 118). He clarified that he was not advocating unilateral disarmament, merely reductions conditional on others reducing their arsenals (Chengappa 2000, 224). Even official justifications of policy shifts paint them as continuations of tradition and enhancements of existing capability. After the 1998 tests, for instance, many advocates of the status quo position of ‘ambiguity’ or ‘keeping the option open’ began stridently defending testing and strengthening the arsenal (Vanaik 2004).

Parliament has remained relatively silent on nuclear policy, as with foreign and defense issues in general. Most studies describe Parliament as uninterested in these issues except during salient events such as the nuclear test. There are two reasons for this. Structurally, the Indian constitution vests enormous power in the executive branch with regard to foreign policy; conferring on it the right to conclude international treaties without the need for legislative ratification. The main form of control that Parliament exercises is financial, specifically, the power to reject the budgetary demands of the Ministries of External Affairs or Defense. However, rejection of a budget demand is tantamount to a vote of no-confidence in the government. The second reason for Parliament’s inability to control foreign policy is the technical nature of the subject and its low salience in public concerns. Since most political parties believe it is unpatriotic to suggest reductions in the demands of the Defense Ministry, the discussion on grants is a mere formality (Jain 1984, 130). Parliament has Consultative Committees on Defense and on External Affairs, however, the executive uses them mainly to disseminate its point of view and receive feedback on prospective legislation (Jain 1984, 132).5

5 Members of the two houses of Parliament are elected to these committees which are chaired by the Defense and Foreign Ministers. Ex-officio members are the Ministers of State in these ministries.
The term ‘strategic enclave’ was first used by Itty Abraham to denote the nuclear and missile programs, which he saw as a subset of the military-security complex (Abraham 1992, 233). The ‘strategic enclave’ has been accused of championing the nuclear program for its parochial ends. I define the strategic enclave as ‘technocrats and bureaucrats working for nuclear agencies in India.’ The existing literature does not answer two elementary questions about the strategic enclave: how did its members come to acquire a remarkable degree of power? How did these powerful actors come to define their interests?

A purely materialist interpretation fails to answer two important questions. What motivated the actors in the strategic enclave, and how were they in turn able to influence the political leadership? The statist bureaucratic atomic complex can be reasonably expected to be interested in shielding its privileges and material rewards (salaries, security of tenure, and so on). Yet if scientists were putting in relentless efforts on behalf of the program, the rewards that materialized seem rather inadequate. For instance, Perkovich asserts that the 1998 tests served the exclusive interests of “the weaponeers”— and goes on to detail the awards received by prominent officials soon afterwards (Perkovich 1999, 439).6

The choices of members of the strategic enclave are not entirely explainable by the motives of personal and organizational advancement. The insistent statism of Indian defense, particularly in the atomic sector, prevented the formation of a military-

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6 The scientific teams received awards of Rs. 10 lakh each (approximately $23,000) (Anon 1999a).
industrial complex as we understand the term.\(^7\) Since nuclear research, development and production have been entirely concentrated in a few wholly state-owned organizations, the profit motive was absent. As for the military, as shown below, it was kept away from nuclear policy. In the content analysis the armed forces do not attain salience in any year, not even in 1999 when the country was fighting on a nuclear battlefield with Pakistan in the Kargil sector. Interestingly, the atomic bureaucracy does not figure prominently in the discourse and does not attain salience in the content analysis.

Scientists could have been trying to get more resources from the government for their own projects. It is unclear why they had to choose the military path to this end. If military uses had been eschewed, the lifting of restrictions on scientific exchange and technology transfer would have benefited technocrats more than any other elite group—as seen in Brazil and Argentina, where they supported nuclear reversal for this reason. Consequently, we cannot point to material incentives significant enough to account for the preferences of nuclear advocates and we must find the sources of their ideas in larger social forces. The scientific community has shrunk from political engagement even on the nuclear issue where it has some authority because of material (the governmental monopoly of employment) and cultural (hierarchical nature of academic institutions) reasons (Anon 1998q; Sharma 1998).

Another resource that the enclave drew upon was the secrecy inherent in the strategy of nonweaponized deterrence. Abraham has argued that secrecy had the function of designating that which was ‘secret’ as valuable (Abraham 1998, 140). In a more

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\(^7\) Interestingly, now that it is a WTO member, India, taking advantage of the ‘security exemption’ for subsidies, is opening up the defense sector to private participation and creating a military-industrial complex (Koshy 2001).
practical way, secrecy was also important for deterrence. The lack of clarity about the size of the fissile material stockpile, the resources available to the AEC and the extent of cooperation with the military served to enhance the opacity of deterrence. Thus, while keeping the military out of the decision-making loop for the most part, domestic actors have used the military imperative towards secrecy to shield their projects from scrutiny. For instance, questions about the safety record of reactors and uranium mining have been roughly put aside (Ramana 2000b). 8

Security analysts
The nuclear issue has become more important over the years. However, it has never occupied center stage on the national agenda for long. India has not had a broad-based popular movement advocating a nuclear arsenal (Tellis 2001, 106). The discourse on the nuclear issue in India is controlled almost entirely by those justifying official policy (Mattoo 1996, 30; Poulose 1996, 230). The debate in the public realm is rather narrow, and is almost always supportive of government policy. The direction of communication is top-down. The government nurtures certain experts, authorizing them to speak for the nation (Vanaik 2004).

Members of the very small group of Indian security analysts have strong links across professional lines. They work in English, and often trained in the West. They are almost always based in New Delhi. They are located in the government, thinktanks (such as the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, the Centre for Policy Research and the Indian Council for World Affairs), universities (Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University), and the national (mainly English) media. A substantial number

8 Jaduguda in Jharkhand (formerly Bihar) is the country’s biggest uranium mine. Recently another mine in Narwapahar, close to Jadguda, has begun operations.
are retired from the civil, foreign or military services. Many of these appear in my sample, which is only expected since the Hindu is a studiedly middle of the road newspaper. One factor which testifies to the increasing professionalization of security analysis (and journalism) in India is that while almost none of the articles before 1984 have ‘bylines’, over 30% of all articles in the sample after that are written by easily identifiable ‘experts’—like K. Subrahmanyam, C. Rajamohan and so on.

Kanti Bajpai provides a comprehensive classification of India’s ‘security intellectuals.’ He divides them into Nehruvians, neoliberals and hyperrealists. Nehruvians, who believe that states can establish just and durable social rules among themselves if minimum defense is assured, dominated Indian policy-making for the first two decades. Neoliberals, currently on the ascendant, advocate accommodation with the international order. They are both suspicious of, and pragmatic about, international institutions. Hyperrealists are those who wish India to follow the principles of realpolitik closely (Bajpai 2002a). Based on their preferred nuclear policies, elites can be divided into rejectionists, pragmatists and maximalists. Maximalists (hyperrealists or hypernationalists of the religious kind) demand more tests, a large arsenal, and a proactive employment policy. Rejectionists continue to believe that disarmament is feasible and desirable while the pragmatists, who tend to be neoliberals, feel that India’s security interests can be best taken care of within the current nuclear order. Though both categories are moderate on the nuclear issue, their motivations are different (Bajpai 2000b). Bharat Karnad and Brahma Chellaney could be classified as maximalists, C. Rajamohan, Sanjaya Baru and Amitabh Mattoo as pragmatists, and Arundhati Ghose and N. Ram as rejectionists.

Civil-military relations
India’s civilian control of the nuclear program is in keeping with the general isolation of the military from defense policy. The military has historically lacked influence in policy formulation, ‘contained’ as it is by the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Defence (Cohen 1988, 116; Roychowdhury 2002). Politicians were averse to allowing any military input in security strategy making (Dasgupta 2001, 93). Former Vice-Admiral K. K. Nayyar disclosed that when he had advised Indira Gandhi to exercise the nuclear option, he was told that the issue was none of his business (Khan 2002, 84). The armed forces themselves have a strong ‘professional’ identity, which involves an acceptance of civilian control. This ethos has been credited with making the prospect of a military coup improbable in India (Kundu 1998).9

Aside from this general reluctance to interfere in the civilian realm, the armed forces were less than enthusiastic about nuclear weapons for fear that they would increase civilian interference, or reduce allocations for conventional weapons and salaries. A nuclear capability may not have been seen as effective against the concrete threats that the military cared about (Sahni 1996, 89). In the context of fierce inter-service rivalry, it also may have been a strategic decision to put the program on hold.

However, there are important exceptions to this rule. General K. Sundarji, Chief of Army Staff wrote and spoke extensively on nuclear issues. Sundarji advocated a minimum deterrent and delineated the doctrine behind it—his evocative phrase was “more is not better if less is enough” (Joshi 1998b, 22). In the 1990s he was among those who urged the world to accept India’s arsenal and strengthen its safety and

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9 Sumona Dasgupta points out that while the isolation of the military from strategic decision-making has prevented the politicization of the military, in the 1980s the military and paramilitary forces were frequently used in the service of political objectives—both to quell internal unrest and for operations in the region. She terms this the ‘militarization of politics’ (Dasgupta 1998).
security (Sundarji 1992, 53). Another former Chief of Army Staff writes that mid-level army officers after 1974 were determined to maintain the impetus of the test and develop a credible nuclear deterrent as early as possible (Roychowdhury 2002, 281).

During the period of non-weaponized deterrence, senior military leaders were pressed into service to issue vague threats from time to time, but their exclusion from any role in command, control, and doctrine obviously limited the potential military utility of India’s nuclear capability (Perkovich 1999, 450-51; Tellis 2001, 287). This arrangement made sense within the mechanistic conception of deterrence that was prevalent in India. However, as the Indian government comes under pressure internally and externally to ‘declare’ its doctrine, the role of the military is enhanced. Since the doctrine specifies the conditions under which nuclear weapons will be used, the military must come up with credible plans for those contingencies to ensure that opponents will be deterred. Given the organizational preferences of militaries, this is likely to push towards deployment of nuclear arms.  

Politics, ideology and the bomb

Scholars who highlight the role of political parties in nuclear policy rely—sometimes simultaneously—on two different logics (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001; Das 2003b; Jha 1998; Ram 1999; Zook 2000). The ideological explanation focuses on Hindutva, the BJP’s ideology, as a cause for the 1998 tests. In the instrumental logic the compulsions of electoral politics are driving policy. I argue that neither a purely electoral/instrumental approach nor an ideological one can explain the role of nuclear policy in domestic politics. This issue is sporadically salient among a small but influential elite; however, it makes strong appeals to consensus in the name of national

10 Author’s interview with M.V. Ramana, Vancouver, 23 November 2005.
security and nationalism. Politicians who wish to reap the benefits of nuclear decisions must kowtow to a pre-existing consensus and share the credit. Often, the remaining electoral benefit is easily wiped out by other factors.

The ideological approach holds Hindutva responsible for the subversion of a peaceful and independent nuclear program. Hindutva is an ersatz term that literally means no more than ‘Hinduness.’ In contemporary Indian politics it stands for a brand of politics espoused by the ‘Sangh Parivar’ (organizational family) of which the BJP is the political wing. In the ideological approach the BJP is viewed not simply as an interest-maximizing political party, but also as a vehicle for the aspirations of a powerful and rising class: the prosperous, educated middle class that is impatient with the image of India as a peace-loving, idealistic nation. While the ideological analysis is powerful, it needs elaboration and refinement. Hindutva is both broader than support for nuclear challenge (it is a complete social, economic and political philosophy) and narrower (since not all nuclear supporters are adherents of Hindutva).

The ideological affinity between Hindutva and the acquisition of nuclear weapons comes from its militaristic, hyper-masculinist and Manichean worldview. The international roots of the diffused social anxiety that supports Hindutva are dealt with in the next section.

The ideological argument is plausible in the first place because the BJP has been a consistently pro-bomb party. A study of BJP election manifestos shows an increasingly overt trajectory on nuclear issues: they promise to give nuclear teeth to defenses (1991), to re-evaluate nuclear policy and induct nuclear weapons and

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11 The Sangh Parivar itself is the subject of countless academic works but I shall examine its ideology only with respect to the implications for nuclear policy.
missiles (1996), to review the nuclear policy and exercise the option and develop ballistic missiles (1998). The Jan Sangh, the previous avatar of the BJP, first called for a bomb in the 1960s.

However, on other controversial issues the BJP has never been so ideologically driven as to be impervious to electoral considerations (Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998). Situating the nuclear issue within the party’s strategy will help us understand the conditions that make the decision possible. In 1998, the BJP was trying to broaden its “moral hegemony”, acquiring legitimacy among the widest possible swathe of citizens (Bhargava 2002, 84; Hewitt 2000). This was the strategy that had allowed it to increase its tally in Parliament from 2 seats in 1984 to 174 in 1998. Traditionally, the BJP’s support base consisted of rich peasants, small urban traders and was concentrated in North India. The new BJP voter, however, was on average upwardly mobile and well educated (Yadav 2003).

The BJP used toughness on defense to bridge its twin avatars as social movement and centrist political party (Basu 2000, 176), to reconcile its sectarian and nationalist aspects (Katzenstein, Kothari, and Mehta 2001, 244). Three nationwide surveys conducted on the same sample for the three Lok Sabha elections in 1996, 1998 and 1999 show that the BJP, versus the Congress, enjoyed more support from men, urban areas, younger people, more educated voters and those with 'higher occupational status' (Singh 2004, 312-21). The BJP was seen by urban, middle class India as a well-organized political force that promised order and efficiency and projected a coherent worldview in the fast-changing post-Cold War world (Bajpai 2006). Once in power,

12 Controversial issues include building a temple at a disputed site in Ayodhya, imposition of a uniform civil code on all Indians, and revocation of the special status of Kashmir.
the party replaced the ‘threat to Hinduism’ with national security, an issue whose appeal is “equally emotional but more diffused” (Kantha 1999, 353). Presenting the tests as a symbol of defiance to the domestic audience, the BJP also laid claim to the high ground of anti-imperialism and the mantle of Indian nationalism (Ahmed 1998). Contrary to popular wisdom, the BJP’s test was not intended to demonstrate its radical credentials, but rather to move squarely into the mainstream and lay claim to the identity of the ‘party of national security.’

However, by 1998 all major political parties were in favor of at least maintaining India’s nuclear capability (Thakur 1998). We now know that opposition parties had also seriously contemplated undertaking tests. The fact that nuclear policy was the only item on the BJP’s agenda that also made it on to the 1998 National Agenda for Governance binding on its coalition partners, tells us about the centrality of the issue in politics. It is precisely this grounding in widely-accepted notions of the national interest that induced the BJP to play the nuclear card.

The BJP manifesto for the February 1998 general election promised that the party would “re-evaluate the country’s nuclear policy” and “exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons”, and this was repeated by party members (Guruswamy 1998). By this time, ambiguity and nuance in nuclear diplomacy were so pervasive that this statement did not serve as warning that India would test once the BJP came to power.13 It was also reassuring that at an early press conference, the new PM Vajpayee said that no timeframe had been set for inducting nuclear weapons. Observers both in

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13 Senator Patrick Moynihan made the famous and unfair comment that since the BJP had announced its intentions to test, the events of May 1998 could have been predicted if US analysts had learned to read (Moynihan 1998).
India and the US had understood the manifesto to be a piece of campaign rhetoric, quite in keeping with the tradition of ‘keeping the option open’ (Burns 1998).

The BJP-led government claimed in 1998 that the decision to test arose from a pre-existing, apolitical, national consensus (Chawla 1998). What Aijaz Ahmed calls the “indecent haste” of the opposition, especially the Congress, to share credit for the tests reinforced this impression (Ahmed 1998). While this strategy helped paint critics of the test with an anti-national brush, it also decreased the political mileage that the BJP could derive from the tests.

This brings us to the instrumental explanation linking domestic politics to nuclear weapons: decisions to ramp up the nuclear program were taken in expectation of popular support, translating into votes. While most accounts deal with the BJP in 1998, this argument also extends to other parties including the Congress in 1974 (Ganguly 2002, 104; Kux 1993, 315; Sidhu 1997, 29). There are three main problems with the ‘instrumental’ argument. First, it is unclear whether in fact nuclear policy contributes to success at the polls. There has been no systematic study of the link between elections and nuclear policy in India, but larger surveys cast doubt on the relevance of ‘diversionary’ foreign policy in developing societies. Historically, foreign policy and defense issues have not been significant election issues (Mattoo 1998b; Yadav, Heath, and Saha 1999). The 1974 test generated some ephemeral support but barely a year later, Indira Gandhi’s regime became so unpopular that she was compelled to impose an Emergency.

The nuclear afterglow seems not to have lasted in 1998 either. A poll conducted less than 24 hours after the first tests on 12 May 1998 in 6 metros found that 91% of the
respondents approved of the tests and only 7% disapproved. 82% advocated that nuclear weapons should be built, and 78% felt more secure after the tests (Mattoo 1998a, 11). However, six months later another survey reported that 47% of the respondents had not heard of the tests, although a majority of those who were aware of the tests approved of them (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 273). More mundane concerns were important to the Indian voter. There was an upsurge in food prices from May to November 1998 (a 20% rise in the Consumer Price Index) (Acharya 2001). This is widely held to have ensured the BJP’s defeat in crucial state elections in Delhi, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh in December 1998.\footnote{The BJP also lost in the small northeastern state of Mizoram.} In early 1999 the central government was forced to resign after losing the support of certain regional parties in Parliament.

Second, if ‘bomb votes’ were available to governments who took the final step of testing, why did only two leaders take that step? Here we cannot ignore the importance of personality and party politics. Third, we still have the task of accounting for pro-bomb votes, or at least the perception by political parties that they will be forthcoming. This expectation presupposes that a consensus exists on the need for nuclear weapons and spurs us to study the sources of that consensus.

What can we conclude about the role that nuclear policy plays in domestic politics? It acts as a cement between actors on different ends of the political spectrum, allowing a rare occasion for unity and for displaying a party’s nationalist colors. No political parties are salient in the content analysis. Even in the oversampling for 1998, the term BJP did not attain salience (that is, it was mentioned less than 1.9% of the time in 43,759 lines of text). The Left parties opposed arms control treaties on the grounds that...
they symbolised superpower hegemony, while the Right saw them as assaulting sovereignty. This pre-existing consensus allows bolder parties and individuals to attempt to capture the mantle of national security by testing, but does not guarantee that their attempts will translate into votes. One can hypothesize that toughness on the nuclear issue contributes indirectly to electoral success, but in the absence of more systematic polling data this cannot be proven. There is some indication that the BJP benefited marginally in the 1999 elections from India’s victory over Pakistan in the Kargil conflict that summer, and the general reputation for toughness from Pokhran could have contributed to its reputation as the party of national security (Dasgupta 1999; Yadav, Heath, and Saha 1999).

Governments who did not test, however, also supported the program and had to preserve the image of safeguarding the progress already made. As Perkovich points out, domestic pressure has rarely compelled politicians to advance nuclear capabilities since it was never that salient an issue for the general population. Leaders were worried about the impact that accepting controls on the further development of capabilities would have on popularity. Thus, political pressure served to maintain the option (Perkovich 1999, 438). We saw that by the end of the 1970s Morarji Desai, despite his distaste for nuclear weapons, could not reverse the direction of the program. While the instrumental and ideological explanations are both focused on testing, we must also appreciate the strength of the domestic political imperative to maintain nuclear assets.

Economics and the bomb

The level of economic development is usually viewed as a constraint on states’ nuclear ambitions. Yet constraints have not always been decisive. China’s bomb was
developed during the dislocation and famine of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s. Nuclear programs took resources away from the cash-strapped post-World War II economies of France and Britain. An analysis of the relationship between economics and the nuclear project in India leads to two surprising conclusions: economic weakness initially buttressed the dual-use nuclear program; but economic liberalization and accelerated growth in the 1990s also promoted the military program.

How could economic backwardness have encouraged India on the nuclear path? The perceived causes of backwardness and the policies adopted to overcome it rest on certain arguments which made a nuclear program more plausible. There are three ways in which this happened: first, as we saw in the previous chapter, it was feared that India’s progress would be retarded if the country was facing coercion from other (possibly nuclear-armed) states. Nuclear weapons were in this understanding, essential in securing an environment for development. Second, once the fixed costs of setting up a relatively indigenous nuclear infrastructure had been incurred, taking the step of weapons acquisition became more reasonable (Cohen 2001, 177). The electricity and space programs subsidized the cost of the nuclear program (Reddy 1998a). It should be noted that there are no accurate estimates of the financial costs of the nuclear program. This is true of both the civilian and the weapons components.

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15 Dismissing the economic argument in the Lok Sabha after the 1974 test, Congress MP V. P. Singh (later Prime Minister) said that including the sunk costs of the program in the costs of the test would be like computing the expenses of a daughter’s marriage to include the costs of her education and upbringing. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 8 August 1974, col. 211.

16 Explanations of the problems of cost estimation, and descriptions of various attempts at it are available (Reddy 1998a; Reddy 1998b; Tellis 2001, 107-11).

17 Most of India’s nuclear power plants have been running at levels much lower than their capacity, making it difficult to evaluate their cost-effectiveness. Since after five decades of investment, they contribute around 3% to national electricity generation, they cannot be described as commercial successes.
Most importantly, development was not seen as distinct from, or competing with defense, especially with reference to the dual-use nuclear program. Thus, perceived opportunity costs were also lower. In 1974, K. Subrahmanyam answered critics who pointed to India’s poverty by claiming that the test did not divert resources away from development “but was itself a splice-off from a steady development programme over 25 years” (Subrahmanyam 1974a, 5). The 1974 test was also a significant step towards self-reliance. The Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre declared that India would no longer have to rely on foreign-trained personnel in the nuclear program (Anon 1974j).

Economic reforms were initiated in India in the late 1980s after decades of semi-autarkic and slow growth. A Balance of Payments crisis in 1991 triggered comprehensive liberalization: privatization of state-owned enterprises, reversal of the reservation of certain sectors for small-scale industries, lifting of restrictions on ownership and production, and deregulation to promote entrepreneurship. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was eagerly solicited, even in sectors that had been reserved for Indian business. Export promotion became an important goal, India joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and rewrote national legislation to adhere to international standards on free trade and property rights.18 The reforms had a significant effect on the economy. Between 1992-93 and 1997-98, average annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate (constant prices) rose to 6.9% (compared to 5.5% for the previous decade) (Anon 2003f). Indian exports were rising at a faster rate than the global average, and contributing a steadily increasing share of GDP.

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18 While the mechanism enforcing nuclear restraint is economic integration or globalization rather than liberalization in general, the two are not divorced in practice as countries almost never implement one without the other.
Table 4.1: Export growth rates\textsuperscript{19}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export growth rate (world)</th>
<th>Export growth rate (India)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>19.67</td>
<td>22.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>(-1.63)</td>
<td>(-4.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>8.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>16.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: India’s exports as percentage of GDP (market prices)\textsuperscript{20}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports/GDP (%)</th>
<th>Exports/GDP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-93</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-98</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{19} Medium-Term Export Strategy 2002-07 Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.
\textsuperscript{20} Economic Survey, Government of India, 2002-03, Table 6.3.
A straightforward Realist expectation would be that increasing prosperity fuels nuclear ambitions. One study finds that up to a certain threshold of growth (roughly $7700 in 1996 USD) countries are more likely to develop a military nuclear capability with increases in GDP (Singh and Way 2004, 876-77). There are in fact indications that this process was playing out in 1990s India. Opponents of the nuclear program had put forward economic arguments (Jain 1974, 143; Perkovich 1999, 157-58). The new perception of prosperity now made it possible to argue that India could afford the direct and opportunity costs of weapons (Kapur 2002, 243).²¹ ‘More bang for the buck’ arguments presented nuclear weapons as ideal for upwardly mobile states trying to keep up with the Revolution in Military Affairs (Karnad 1998; Rajamohan 1998e). However, increased prosperity has not inevitably led to nuclear acquisition in every country. Increasing growth could have made a ‘trading state’ strategy more attractive. Giving up the nuclear option could have provided India access to cheap energy, critical technologies, and diplomatic rewards—possibly even the much-coveted seat on the Security Council.²²

As countries get more integrated into the global economy, we would expect that decision-makers become more sensitive to the international regime’s response to their nuclear decisions. Thus, economic integration should lead to nuclear restraint rather than a more aggressive policy as Realists would predict. Etel Solingen’s pluralist account invokes the policy preferences of powerful economic actors. Her core assumption is that their conceptions of national interest are derived at least partly from

²¹ Tellingly, Jasjit Singh commences his discussion of the 1998 tests celebrating the end of the ‘ship-to-mouth’ existence of the 1950s (Singh 1998c, 10).
²² Frank Wisner, the US Ambassador to India from 1994-97 is supposed to have offered a deal to New Delhi known as the ‘three Nos’: no pressure on India to sign the CTBT, no blocking of the treaty by India, and no testing. In return India would receive American support for its bid to have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Interview with Uday Bhaskar, 21 July 2003, New Delhi.
their economic interests (Solingen 1994, 136). The initial economic strategy of import substitution fostered ideological opposition to the nonproliferation regime and created a “technical and entrepreneurial military-industrial complex.” A brief period of liberalization and nuclear rollback in the early 1990s under a Congress government was torpedoed by the advent of the “radical-confessional Hindu BJP” representing import-competing economic actors, and consequently hostile to “Western” regimes (Solingen 1994, 145-48). In the previous section I have shown that the BJP was not dominated by anti-Western religious fundamentalists when it was in power in 1998 and was in fact trying to cultivate its new educated urban middle class constituency that backed economic reforms.

In the 1990s, the international community began to expect that stronger economic relationships would inhibit India’s nuclear ambitions (Council on Foreign Relations 1997; Hagerty 1998, 188). If the nuclear program were accelerated, the country would be ostracized internationally, harming the interests of the growing middle class, especially the urban groups in the BJP's core constituency (Feaver, Sagan, and Karl 1996/97, 206, n.12). Yet, in this period there were numerous attempts to test. In 1995 premature discovery and subsequent pressure allegedly from the US and the pro-liberalization faction headed by the Finance Minister, persuaded PM Narasimha Rao to halt test preparations (Nayar 1998). Whether this was true or not, the test was merely postponed. In 1997 a short-lived BJP government tried to test before it lost the confidence of Parliament. Again, in May 1998, the greatest support for the overt nuclear declaration came from the educated middle classes, who had the most to lose under economic integration logic. How can we explain this? Latha Varadarajan points out the need for an account of identity that is sensitive to the history of the nation’s

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23 Apparently similar pressure was applied on PM Deve Gowda in 1996 (Chengappa 2000, 398).
relationship with the global economy. However, analyses that view India’s 1998 tests as an attempt to regain the self-esteem that was wounded by liberalization tell only one side of the story (Khare 1998; Varadarajan 2004a). India’s new economic policy actually facilitated the turn in nuclear policy.

The costs of overtly going nuclear were reduced by three factors. First, globalization meant that constituencies in sanctioning countries had a stake in mitigating the effects of sanctions since they were aware of the competition for the Indian market. Although actual trade value in 1998 was low, its reputation as a Big Emerging Market made potential partners wary of alienating India. Moreover, although India was not a major trading partner in quantitative terms, it was vital to certain politically important constituencies in the US. It was due to pressure from farmers that the American government exempted export credits for farm products from sanctions for one year in July 1998. In October and November 1998 the impact of American sanctions was further diluted. The US being the norm leader in the regime, other countries also lifted their sanctions soon after. Membership in international economic institutions also insulated India from ‘revenge’ sanctions. Restrictions on imports for political reasons were deterred because they could have been challenged under WTO rules (Kapur 2002, 241).

Second, in the context of the close associations between security, technology and development, the requirements of the nonproliferation regime were viewed as attacks on sovereignty. Influential sections of the nuclear elite—scientists and bureaucrats—

24 In October 1998 the US Congress gave President Clinton omnibus powers to waive sanctions against India and Pakistan for one year, except for sanctions on arms sales. On 7 November 1998 he removed all sanctions except those on arms sales and certain technology transfers. All sanctions were lifted in September 2001.
were particularly alienated (Kapur 2002, 247-48). Since the rules of the nonproliferation regime were already causing delays and difficulties in technology transfer negotiations, in a framework where technology denial was seen as a national security threat, the costs of going nuclear were perceived as lower. The third factor reducing costs was the estimate that the regime was not serious about sanctioning countries that did not seriously challenge it. *Sanctions* are salient in only one year in the analysis—in 1998. They are discussed 2.6% of the time in that year. In comparison, *weapons* are discussed 3% of the time in that year.

Further, testing promised economic *benefits*. Liberalizers hoped for a positive economic fallout from testing. First, they claimed that as a nuclear power and open economy India could deal with the world “on an equal footing” (Baru 1999, 49). A soft state that compromises on security issues cannot project the image of a strong negotiator on trade and commerce issues (Chellaney 1997; Jetley 1998). The ‘Made in India’ label would acquire brand equity when the country openly joined the major powers as a strategic player (Nalapat 1999). An Indian representative at the UN or the WTO would be heard with respect (Gurumurthy 1998). India’s “wavering” had cost it patent rights as well as the benefits of being a nuclear power (Joshi 1998c). Second, testing would attest to technological prowess and stimulate exports (George 1998b). Third, the inevitable sanctions would stimulate self-sufficiency and nationalism (Jetley 1998; Mahajan 1998; Pillai 1998; Sehgal 1998). Finally, liberalizers called on the government to use the euphoria generated by the tests to push unpopular, cost-cutting reforms (Bhagwati 1998, 52; Lal 1998a; Nair 1998).

Aside from costs and benefits, the shift in discourse with economic liberalization facilitated the test. As the state withdrew from its developmental role its regulatory
role became more prominent. There was a dramatic reversal in official state discourse. India was seen as having finally become a ‘normal state’: simultaneously participating in the global market and putting national security first. Just as the Rao government had “put the clock back on Nehruvian economics”, Vajpayee had consigned Nehruvian strategy to the archives, wrote one editor (Gupta 1998a). This aspiration towards ‘normalcy’ led decision-makers to be more supportive of the global status quo on nuclear weapons, just as they were disrupting it. The language of liberalization shattered residual populism (Sarkar 1998, 1729).

The country’s shift towards ‘normalcy’ helped reassure the world about the behavior of a nuclear India. In his important statement on the evolution of nuclear policy in Parliament in May 1998 PM Vajpayee cited globalization to bolster the case for treating India not as a rogue state, but as a responsible member of the international community: “The policies of economic liberalisation introduced in recent years have increased our regional and global linkages and the Government shall deepen and strengthen these ties” (Anon 1998d). While liberalizers celebrated the fact that the test helped globalize India by making it imperative for the government to attract foreign investment (Aiyar 1998), others lamented that the BJP was forced to make concessions to foreign interests in order to keep its new dangerous toy (Sarkar 1998, 1725).

On the flip side, responsible nuclear behavior served to reassure investors and lenders that India’s economy was stable. J. N. Dixit wrote that sanctions would be mitigated after a year if India’s behavior was seen to be rational and responsible (Dixit 1998b).

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25 Manmohan Singh, currently PM and the chief architect of the 1991 liberalization had been the Chairman of the South Commission. Gyanendra Pandey points out that in a significant but unremarked break with tradition the Union Budget of 1992 did not even mention ‘poverty’ (Pandey 1993, 7).
Liberals encouraged the government to pursue policies of accommodation with the nonproliferation regime and abandon the traditional disarmament rhetoric in favor of arms control. It is no coincidence that the advocates of a pragmatic stance on arms control tend to be liberals (Bajpai 2002a, 233). While they are ideologically committed to free markets, it is true that they recognize that economic strength can be used to project national power. Thus they are suspicious of international institutions—which means that there is a disjuncture between liberalism and institutionalism in the Indian discourse. However, the economistic logic of their view of world politics ultimately leads them to support order-building (Bajpai 2000a, 254-57).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic openness</th>
<th>Nuclear status</th>
<th>Stance on nuclear order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s-1970s</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s-1990s</td>
<td>Growing</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indian decision-makers were keenly observing the operation of the regime, and they estimated that the costs of sanctions would not damage the economy. First, sanctions in the nonproliferation regime are rare. Sanctions had been imposed only 24 times and of these only 7 led to negotiations between the sending and targeted country (Speier, Chow, and Starr 2001, 11). Liberalizers judged that India could win concessions on security regime issues by proffering economic gains—popularly known as “doing a China” (Bajpai 2002a, 269). Second, sanctioning countries did not appear to be uniformly committed to nonproliferation. Advocates of ‘crossing the nuclear

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26 A different coding of sanctions lists nine major cases of economic sanctions for infringement of the nonproliferation regime, with three coded as successes (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 1990).
threshold’ predicted that India would be able to pry apart the coalition of sanctioning countries before sanctions began to hurt (Balachandran 1996; Balachandran 1999; Mattoo 1994). France and Russia opposed the imposition of sanctions, with the latter signing an agreement to build nuclear reactors days after the tests (Nayar 2001, 81). On economic sanctions, Germany officially followed the G-8 line, but in practice its stand was softer and occasionally it remained neutral in the voting on aid proposals (Nayar 2001, 98). Within the US too there was opposition to an emphasis on nonproliferation at the expense of other economic and strategic objectives (Independent Task Force 1998). 27

Third, sanctions are intended to signal sending countries’ commitment to enforcing a certain normative order; in order to maintain the strength of the signal, the impact of sanctions may need to be diluted. The yearly cost of sanctions to the Indian economy was equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, while it amounted to 1% of Pakistan’s GDP. The presence of nuclear weapons obviously raised the stakes in ensuring stability. To prevent Pakistan’s economic collapse, the US decided not to veto its loan from the International Monetary Fund. Since removing sanctions on Pakistan alone would invite charges that sanctions were motivated by strategic (as opposed to nonproliferation concerns), India rightly predicted that sanctions on both countries were unsustainable.

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27 Madeleine Albright also criticized the sanctions, mandated by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, as being too inflexible: “all sticks and no carrot” (Rydell 1999, 10).
**Alliances and the production of legitimacy**

I argued in the previous chapter that testing should be read as a device in the performance of nuclear deterrence. A test is also evidence of a successful alliance among various pro-nuclear constituencies. In this sub-section I use the 1974 test to demonstrate the convergence of various forces (for reasons of space I do not show this for 1998). These multiple sources of support enabled the Indian state to present the nuclear program as legitimate to both internal and external audiences.

Pressure for nuclear testing from the scientists has been somewhat of a constant in Indian policy circles. In India scientists demanded tests through the 1970s and the 1980s. According to former PM Gujral, the file calling for a nuclear test was on the table of every single Prime Minister.\(^{28}\) We know from the US experience with the CTBT that weapons laboratories protested the replacement of testing by simulations (Goldblat and Cox 1988, 8).

How did scientists garner the support needed for a testing program? Unlike in other countries, in India the military was not the partner of choice. Had the nuclear program been explicitly conceived with military applications, scientists would have come under more pressure to produce results (Perkovich 1999, 448). It was only when technocrats found themselves unable to establish stable alliances with foreign scientists or domestic industry that they turned to the military (Flank 1993, 272). Former Army Chief Shankar Roychowdhury reports that he started persuaded the Defense Ministry to test after senior scientists informed him in 1994 that the country had a “working prototype” of a bomb which required further testing (Roychowdhury 2002, 278). The

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\(^{28}\) Author’s interview with Inder Kumar Gujral, 5 August 2003, New Delhi.
military may also have pushed for testing in this period owing to its predisposition to distrust civilian claims about weapons system performance. However, a test could occur only with the consent of the political elite, which in turn was concerned about repercussions on popularity.

PM Lal Bahadur Shastri faced a difficult situation after the Chinese test in 1964. India’s top nuclear scientist Homi Bhabha had publicly declared that India could afford the bomb and should acquire it as a deterrent.\(^{29}\) The right-wing Jan Sangh and members of his own Congress party were pressuring him to authorize weapons development. In September 1965, 86 MPs across party lines signed a resolution to that effect (Chopra 1984, 73). Shastri’s personal faith in non-violence and his misgivings about costs biased him against this option. Shastri stated that despite the continued threat from China, India would follow the path of peace by renouncing its right to manufacture nuclear weapons. He also reiterated India’s resolve to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1966, 109). As a compromise, he promised to consider carrying out a PNE. He declared that the AEC would “progress and improve upon” nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.\(^{30}\) In May 1965, Shastri approved a research project “Study of Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes” which laid the groundwork for a PNE. Indira Gandhi inherited this program when she became PM.

Soon after her triumph in Bangladesh in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi was besieged by political opposition from several quarters. A student agitation against corruption and

\(^{29}\) In this famous radio speech on 24 October 1964 (on the occasion of UN Day), Bhabha claimed that atomic explosives were 20 times cheaper and thermonuclear ones 500 times cheaper than conventional explosives. He also warned that India would have to reckon with a number of nuclear nations within the next 5-10 years. Nuclear disarmament, he declared, should be conditional on general disarmament.

\(^{30}\) Lok Sabha Debates, 27 November 1964, col. 2291.
unemployment, economic crisis triggered by runaway inflation and industrial action (including a massive railway strike in 1974) culminated in the ‘Total Revolution’ movement. India was listed by the US among the 28 economies that had been worst hit by food and fuel price rises as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. The politician’s insecurity coincided with the scientists’ desire to strengthen their position with a demonstration of technology. Abraham claims that 1974 was a fetishized demonstration to divert attention from the AEC’s failure to achieve its targets (Abraham 1998, 164).

The test was seen as legitimate and necessary because of two factors. First, the decision to test was taken by a democratically elected government—Indira Gandhi’s Congress-R had won 44% of the vote in 1971 in parliamentary elections. The program had been sustained by similarly democratic governments to that point. Thus it was not tainted with associations with military juntas or dictators. Second, the nuclear program was able to unify opinions on the Left and the Right. The former saw the NPT and other arms control measures as instruments of neo-imperial hegemony, while the latter believed in a strong national defense. Similarly, traditional Gandhian types rejected nuclear weapons but shared skepticism about international arms control, while the young socialists in Indira Gandhi’s camp were enthusiastic about the benefits of nuclear power. In 1974 sociologist Ashis Nandy conducted a survey of 80 elites on nuclear issues. Given that a majority of the respondents in his survey opposed both the NPT and nuclear weapons, he concluded that consensus could only be created by flouting the NPT with a PNE, all the while paying homage to a pacific tradition by stressing peaceful uses and pledging not to produce nuclear armaments (Nandy 1974, 931). Indeed, the test laid the foundation of the policy of ambiguity.

31 Hindustan Times, 4 August 1974.
Domestic politics, national and international norms

In the sections above I have demonstrated the influence of organizational, political and economic forces within the country on the determination of India’s national security interests. An independent nuclear policy became a locus for the convergence of these forces and nuclear tests, in particular, served to cement alliances. In the discussion, I emphasized the importance of dominant ideas in the national discourse. The ability of the nuclear enclave to attract resources, the expectation of political reward by certain parties, and the welcoming of a declaration of NWS status by economic liberalizers—all these stem from certain unquestioned understandings about the nuclear program. In the next sections, I show how international norms shaped national identity, which indirectly shaped nuclear policy.

National identity: who or what is to be secured?

In the first half of this chapter I posed the question—who decides what security is? Here I ask a more complicated question—whose security are we talking about? So far I have viewed domestic politics as the matrix of various dynamic forces of class, technology and religion. Here I adopt a more holistic approach as I describe the characteristics of ‘that which is to be defended’ with nuclear weapons.

In India, as in other fledgling nation-states, claims to national security draw on the rhetorical resources invested in the concept of nation as well as state (Khattak 1996, 341). To the extent that the force of nationalism is invested in a national security enterprise such as the making of a bomb, it becomes more difficult to challenge or
change. Even within the security model, as we saw, national will is a crucial component in making nuclear deterrence work. Thus, a discussion of Indian nuclear policy would remain incomplete without a study of nation-building.

State-building and nation-building are parallel and simultaneous processes within a developing economy. These immense pressures lead to what Ayoob called the ‘security predicament’ of the Third World state (Ayoob 1995). For such a state, security could not be limited to order, it had to include welfare and freedom (Khilnani 1998, 33). To put it differently, the state’s duties included protecting citizens from invasion or annihilation (security), making them independent of the external world for sustenance (self-reliance) and in foreign policy (nonalignment). K. Subrahmanyam writes: “National security does not merely mean safeguarding territorial integrity. It means also ensuring that the country is industrialized rapidly and has a cohesive egalitarian and technological society. Anything that comes in the way of this development internally or externally is a threat to [India’s] security” (Subrahmanyam 1972, vii). Such a comprehensive conception of security does not necessarily contribute to a more peaceful world. It is precisely because all aspects of national security are viewed as inter-related, that the nuclear program is able to overcome objections on the basis of cost or morality.

Identity: persistent effects on nuclear policy

Why should analyses of nuclear policy take national identity into account? By reinforcing certain linkages, national identity molds the paths of future policies, and therefore it is important to study it. The importance of consensus in Indian politics makes this particularly important.
The ‘middle path’ has long characterized the Indian state. Secularism is interpreted as equal respect for all religions, nonalignment as equidistance from contending blocs, and the mixed economy is a compromise between socialism and the free market. Nehru once said; “any attempt on our part to go too far in one direction [in foreign policy] would create difficulties in our own country” (Kapur 1976b, 14). Political parties have learned to moderate their rhetoric and bureaucrats have avoided radical shifts. The BJP, for all its radicalism, has reinterpreted founding principles, referring to its opponents as ‘pseudo-secular’. During the 1970s when it briefly had control of the Foreign Ministry, the party’s motto was ‘genuine’ nonalignment (countering the tilt towards the Soviet Union). The BJP even managed to sell the idea that ‘swadeshi’ (indigeneity, an ideal of national self-reliance) should be reinterpreted as national competitiveness (Lakha 2002, 88). Here I present two examples of continuity in the nuclear program.

The 1990s saw a conscious redefinition of identity, security needs, and strategic worldview in India. Centralized planning, self-reliance and autarkic development, shaped by the environment of the post-World War II world, were no longer considered appropriate (Subrahmanyam 1992, 375). Yet, the concept of the security-integrity-prosperity triad had become institutionalized. Liberalizers drew on themes which had a deep resonance with established principles of grand strategy. In the words of Sanjaya Baru, then head of the Economic Security Group of the National Security Advisory Board: “In the past self-reliance was defined as liberation from external dependence; henceforth it will have to be viewed in terms of ensuring interdependence through economic engagement” (Baru 1999, 14). If there had been a sharp break away from self-reliance and the role of the state in infrastructure-building, the nuclear program
may have been perceived as a white elephant. However, an understanding of the links between economic and military security prevented elites from calling for a reassessment of the nuclear complex. Instead, economic integration was framed as a “necessary element of India’s pursuit of a larger global role for itself, including a declared nuclear power status and a larger voice in global economic and political forums, like the UN” (Baru 1999, 16, n.7, emphasis mine).

As we have seen in the rejection of security guarantees, independence was another important trope in nuclear policy. India originally declared its independence by refusing to shelter under a nuclear umbrella. The 1974 test was a symbol of India’s independent stance. India’s decision not to use the data obtained from the explosion for military purposes, would demonstrate that the militarisation of nuclear energy was a political choice and thus reversible. India’s restraint would symbolise the constructive use of a technology misused by the NWS. After 1974, keeping the option open began to symbolise independence in the face of a discriminatory nonproliferation agenda. Is this manifested in the content analysis? Unfortunately we run up against the problem that quantitative methods do not map latent meaning. On including independent, independence, autonomous and sovereign in CATPAC’s “include file”, I noted that these words together made up less than 0.5% of the entire sample.

“‘We have to maintain our independence’, said future PM Vajpayee in the discussion of the PNE in Parliament. India has been consistently pointing out that the NPT confers a special status on the five Nuclear Weapons States, entitling them to retain and modernize their arsenals indefinitely. On grounds of discrimination, the country also opposed other multilateral arms control measures, most recently the CTBT.

Refusing to sign the treaty, PM Gujral declared that the alternative to defiance was for India to bend and crawl. India must be willing to face isolation which was the price for asserting itself (Mansingh 1998, 37-38).

Whereas India’s defiance of global norms at first was expressed by a refusal to manufacture nuclear weapons, it was restated in 1998. India’s decision to weaponize its capability was now a mark of its independence. The invocation of the unfettered sovereign right of a country to take decisions in its national interest was repeated in the discussion of the tests in 1974 and 1998. Although the purpose of this rhetoric was quite different, its emotive power in pitching a principled and solitary India against the rest of the world was still in evidence. Since in the current dataset words characterizing independence occur so rarely, it is not easy to find clusters.

*International norms constitute national identity*

So far we have discussed how national identity constitutes a certain conception of security and how that molds interest and therefore policy. A view of national identity as a purely domestic product is rather a narrow one. For purposes of clarity I have been employing an artificial distinction to isolate the internal sources of national identity. In this section, however, I discuss how international norms, specifically nuclear norms, molded national identity. Regulations imposed by international regimes obviously bound the activities of domestic actors. But it is also possible to see how their interests are defined by international norms. In other words, do international norms *create and sustain* certain ‘nuclear actors’ in India? Acknowledging this does not mean that we dismiss the role of domestic actors, merely asking where they ‘learned’ what their interests were and how they managed to achieve them.
Compared to civilizations in Europe and Asia, India was depicted in colonial scholarship as singularly lacking in political unity, and consequently history and even rationality (Inden 1990, 8, 17). One response to colonialism was to embrace a kind of hyper-masculinity, which would enable Indians to be construed as a people just as “manly” as the British (Lal 1998b). Feminist analyses have discerned in nuclear rhetoric the need to prove masculinity (Das 2003a; Kishwar 1998; Patwardhan 2002). Another response to colonialism was an investment in a particular kind of ‘catching up’ development. Since development was always to be measured in relation to other nations, it was assimilated into the concept of national security (Abraham 1998, 9-12). The quest to catch up engenders both insecurity and imitation in post-colonial nationalism. Nuclear technology and nuclear weapons are symbols of modernity that do not threaten the internal power structure.

The dual attraction of nuclear power was immediately obvious to Indians, as it was over the world. The coincidence of Indian independence with the discovery of the atom’s power made nuclear technology even more appealing (Abraham 1998, 7). Abraham emphasizes that because of the split character of science, the Indian program’s military aspect was not a diversion or mutation of an original civilian intent; both potentialities were inherent in it. He points to Nehru’s revealing admission during the Constituent Assembly debates, when asked why both civilian and defense uses of nuclear energy had to be controlled: “I do not know how to distinguish between the two.” When Bhabha quipped, "There is no power as expensive as no power" his listeners concluded he meant both military and industrial power (Anderson 1983, 42).
A third strand in modern nationalism attempts to redress the perceived lack of strategic culture. In this view, the insular mindset of Indians both prevented them from seeking power outside the region, and obliged a fatalistic acceptance of extra-regional invasions (Karnad 1999, 3-4; Subrahmanyam 1999). Jaswant Singh blames “excessive, and at times ersatz pacifism” for crippling the state itself (Singh 1999, 13). These beliefs about a cultural inadequacy on security are shared by Hindutva supporters and liberal secular Indians (Cohen 2001, 168). Witness the wave of concern triggered by the assertion in a RAND study by George Tanham that India lacked a tradition of strategic thinking (Bajpai and Mattoo 1996).33

Nandy describes the ‘modern Indian’ as a gatekeeper between India and the outside world, scanning, assessing and adapting to the latter’s demands. The self-perception is that he or she stands between the wolves in the global nation-state system and the vulnerable sheep in the form of the irrational, uninformed majority of ordinary Indians who cannot fathom the dirty, hard-eyed, masculine game of realpolitik (Nandy 2003). There is a sociological root to this mindset. Most security elites are extremely outward-oriented—concerned with India’s position in the world. Since most do not have parochial constituencies, they are intellectually and emotionally committed to the Indian nation-state (Cohen 2001).

The nuclear program functions as a way of overcoming this societal inferiority complex in response to international norms. Fears that India is perceived as a ‘soft

33 The Hindu concept of time and destiny, the agricultural nature of the economy, the hierarchical character of society and bureaucratic traditions made for what Tanham called “passivity in military affairs” (Tanham 1992).
Thus, calls for national unity on nuclear and security issues abound. On the other hand, traditions of non-aggression are also cited in claims for Indian nuclear exceptionalism— that India would use nuclear weapons only for peaceful and defensive purposes (Chengappa 2000, 8, 416). The Chief of Army Staff said that India’s defence policy is “defensive in nature.” He claimed that since India has never crossed the boundaries of her territory to invade other countries, nuclear policy too would be defensive in nature (Kumar 1999).

The BJP’s foreign policy orientation has always been more aggressive than its competitors’. This is primarily because of its ideological roots. The most famous Hindutva ideologue Veer Savarkar exhorted his followers to ‘Hinduize the nation and militarize Hinduism.’ However, Hindutva is also a response to international norms privileging nation-states that are internally unchallenged and externally independent. It is an extreme extension of the post-colonial attempt to overcome the paralysis of a ‘soft state’ that is unconcerned with material power. Nuclear weapons are for Hindutva followers the ultimate symbol of the centralized power of the strong state (Nandy 1995, 62).

*International norms as resources*

State institutions charged with foreign policy construct representations of self and other. This process is called articulation (building meaning out of cultural resources) (Weldes 1996, 281-87). Among the resources that powerful actors and institutions use to construct Indian identity (and interest) are international norms. Indian nuclear

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34 A phrase used originally by Gunnar Myrdal to denote the inability of the state to establish itself as the primary value, it is now used to denote all manner of failings by the state machinery. The term appeared frequently in the context of the post-1998 test debate.
advocates were consumers of international norms valorizing the double-edged power of the atom and also users of these norms, deploying them in the domestic arena to counter those who opposed nuclear power on ethical, economic or strategic grounds.

First, international norms valorizing nuclear technology were deployed in domestic debates by scientists, technocrats and their allies. Second, Indian actors, in demanding resources from the global community, invoked the international norm that this monumental technology had to be shared for peaceful purposes. Indian politicians, diplomats, and other public figures used the norms of sovereignty and free peaceful use to defend the existence of an Indian nuclear program both internally and externally. Third, as the international community came to accept India’s nuclear capabilities, dialogues between (mainly American) strategic thinkers and their Indian counterparts allowed the latter to rebut arguments by traditional disarmament supporters. Finally, certain norms of responsible nuclear conduct were used by India to construct its preferred nuclear identity and indirectly to clip Pakistan’s wings.

How did pro-nuclear actors in India draw on international norms to bolster their arguments? Nehruvians held India’s technological backwardness responsible for its subjugation (Bajpai 1998b, 160). But India’s choice of technological autonomy and self-sufficiency in economic strategy stems not only from its history, but also from the ideology of ‘developmentalism’ prevalent in Asian, African and Latin American countries in the 1950s and 1960s (Adler 1987). Developmentalism provided “captivating social metaphors” (Sikkink 1991). It encouraged leaders to establish a centralized state committed to import-substituting industrialization (ISI) with the goal of self-reliance.
There are several reasons why such a state would be attracted to nuclear power. Faith in the leapfrogging potential of nuclear power meant that disproportionate resources were devoted to it. Interestingly the AEC itself remained a meritocratic enclave unhindered by bureaucratic obstacles. Nuclear technology required a high initial investment that could be made only by the state, but that was common in all types of infrastructure-building. Moreover, self-sufficiency was the watchword. If nuclear technology was so crucial, other nations would be reluctant to part with it. Thus Bhabha argued in the press for indigenous nuclear research on the grounds that “in the present international situation [India] was unlikely to obtain the information from the countries which are the most advanced in the field” (Abraham 1998, 77). For post-colonial and developing economies, this fitted in with a generally confrontational attitude towards developed countries.

In addition, creating a nuclear capability benefited the very sectors of the economy that ISI treasured—high-technology research and development, engineering and electrical power. The nuclear program clearly was a good fit with the ideology of developmentalism. The first industrial revolution passed India by, Parliament was told after the PNE, but “we have no intention of letting the same thing happen in the technological revolution in this century.” The content analysis of the 1950s is instructive here. India is not mentioned until 1965 in connection with nuclear issues. Yet there is an average of 15 articles dealing with atomic power and with disarmament measures among the Big Two—the USA, USSR and to some extent, Britain, Canada and European countries also feature.

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35 Lok Sabha Debates 8 August 1974, emphasis mine.
Since nuclear power was such a crucial, prestigious and risky undertaking, it had to be guided by scientific elites free from public interference. India’s nuclear activities had to be kept secret and monopolized by the state. In 1958, the government issued a new constitution for the AEC giving it unprecedented powers. The official resolution said that these changes were driven by “the newness of the field, the strategic nature of its activities, and its international and political significance” (Abraham 1998, 97).

How did Indian elites use norms as resources in the international sphere? I present two examples, one political and the other economic. India’s democratic status, we have seen, gave its nuclear policy an amount of legitimacy domestically. It also served to strengthen its international legitimacy. During the Cold War, for instance, the US felt constrained from intervening forcefully against the largest democracy in the world. After the end of the Cold War, as democracy became even more important in assessing state identities, India worked hard to play this to its advantage. In 2006 a US State Department spokesman said: “We treat India, a democratic, peaceful friend, differently than we treat Iran and North Korea and we’re very happy to say that…India is playing by the rules. Iran is not. If that’s a system of double standards, we’re very proud to establish that double standard on behalf of a democratic friend” (Ruppe 2006).

Indian elites used the global euphoria over the potential of atomic energy to bolster claims that their program was aimed at developmental uses. The Indian delegate’s speech at the 18th IAEA session cited that organization’s declarations acknowledging the benefits of PNEs. It did not escape India’s notice that US scientists too were contemplating PNEs, and that 6.3% of the energy supply in that country came from

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nuclear power. Until the US conducted nuclear blasts under its Plowshare program in 1957 PNEs had not entered the global discourse on nuclear power (Epstein 1976, 172). In the years immediately preceding India’s test the IAEA sponsored three technical conferences on PNEs. By May 1974, the US had detonated 41 PNEs and the USSR 31 (Reiss 1995, 230). The NPT itself affirms the importance of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The American Atoms for Peace program unleashed a flood of propaganda promoting nuclear technology in the mid-1950s (Weart 1988, 155-65). Policymakers were inspired by US efforts promoting commercial nuclear projects (Barletta 2001). The Soviet Union had its own version of Atoms for Peace. 

The Indian elite even claimed the role of spokesperson for developing nations eager to utilize it. Homi Bhabha was elected the President of the first UN Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in 1955. After the 1974 test, one article said: “For years, we have been sitting at the feet of the superpowers, being shown their films and their achievements in the harnessing of nuclear power…for development, India needs that sort of capability” (Anon 1974h). Scholars have also traced the initial enthusiasm for nuclear energy in Pakistan to Atoms for Peace (Chakma 2002, 874).

The sharing of nuclear technology became a sign of good faith. Canada’s provision of the natural uranium-fueled Canada Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactor was effected under the Colombo Plan for development in South and Southeast Asia (Chellaney 1993b, 6). Thousands of Indian scientists received training at the Argonne National Laboratories in the US (Weiss 2003). Later, Indians bought enrichment equipment from foreign suppliers, sent scientists abroad to be trained to handle

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38 Author’s interview with David Holloway, Stanford, CA, January 2005.
uranium and plutonium, and based their missile designs on American and Soviet designs (although the incorporation of indigenous components made the missiles heavier and not as accurate). The Apsara research reactor that went critical in 1956 had design components from the UK (Mian and Ramana 2005). However, the atomic energy establishment laid great stress on its technological achievements and indigeneity. Apsara was proudly presented as the first reactor in Asia.

How were international norms transmitted? Interactions with security analysts played a major role. K. Subrahmanyam points out that even movements like Pugwash were not pacifist and their members believed in deterrence. In the early 1990s, the arms control community (concentrated in the US) gradually came to the realization that India was not likely to renounce the nuclear capability it had already acquired (Chari 2003a, 38; Tellis 2002b, 30). Members of this community, such as Thomas Graham, Selig Harrison, George Perkovich, William Perry, George Quester, Scott Sagan and Ashley Tellis urged the government to move away from the tired and futile insistence on nuclear reversal. Concerned about the vulnerability of arsenals in South Asia, they suggested that dialogue should focus on ensuring nuclear restraint, preventing destabilizing horizontal and vertical proliferation and assuring the physical safety of weapons. This more pragmatic approach strengthened Indian planners’ faith in deterrence and signaled an acceptance of India’s existing capability by the norm leader.

39 Alisa Carrigan, personal communication, 8 November 2005.
40 Author’s interview with K. Subrahmanyam, New Delhi, 20 July 2003.
41 Most of these analysts were aware that the Indians could be learning the ‘wrong’ lesson from their dialogues, however, they felt that it was counterproductive to press for accession to the NPT, and that the US had a responsibility to provide resources that could lower the likelihood of nuclear war in South Asia.
In terms of domestic politics, this development was important because it strengthened certain factions among Indian decision-makers. For the first time arguments about deterrence fell on receptive ears in India (Krepon 2003, 9). The end of the Cold War, the fall of Communist regimes and ideology, economic liberalization in India and a rapid change of governments in India rendered Indian elites anxious and eager to learn from the US. American strategic discourse, no doubt molded by the Cold War experience, emphasized the importance of second-strike capability to make the arsenal survivable and ensure deterrence stability.\(^{42}\)

In India, the proponents of ambiguity and opaqueness in deterrence were led to reassess their stances in light of these concepts. Consequently, calls for testing and against accession to the CTBT increased. On the specific issue of testing, members of the strategic enclave drew upon the international experience to put pressure on the government to authorize tests. Perkovich draws our attention to an important but ignored interview by R. Chidambaram (then AEC Chairman) in March 1998. On being asked whether tests were essential for the program, he responded simply that some countries had undertaken over 2000 explosions, demonstrating that computer simulations were useful only when a large database from actual testing had been built up (Perkovich 1999, 407). These transnational contacts encouraged the strategic community to see arms control as part of security policy, not a constraint on it (Rajamohan 2003a, 19). According to Rajamohan, the mental shift from disarmament to arms control occurred almost a decade before 1998, and was mainly the result of interaction with American scholars.\(^{43}\) After 1998 Indian strategists were suddenly in demand for discussions on nuclear issues and this process was further intensified.\(^{44}\)

\(^{42}\) Interview with Scott Sagan, Stanford, CA, 4 May 2005.
\(^{43}\) Interview with C. Rajamohan, New Delhi, 21 June 2003.
\(^{44}\) Interview with Bharat Karnad, New Delhi, 18 July 2003
International norms can go beyond influencing policy to creating the conditions under which national identity is formed. Shampa Biswas points out that the Indian elites use ‘nuclear apartheid’ arguments to gain advantages in international negotiations. Such arguments make it possible for Indians to imagine themselves as a community of resistance, and simultaneously bring into being an India which excludes enemies of the state (in the BJP’s version, ‘anti-national Muslims’) (Biswas 2001, 508). Certain domestic political institutions such as civilian control of the military, democracy and secularism are vital for India’s membership in the right category in the regime. India wins the right to be categorized as a responsible nuclear state because its domestic politics conform to global norms of civilized and proper states.

Domestically, this changes the power balance among the factions attempting to construct national identity. As we saw after the 1998 tests, the more radical and overtly religious factions of the Sangh Parivar were tightly leashed. The Prime Minister vetoed all celebrations by his party to celebrate the event, and refused permission for the construction of a temple at the Pokhran range, and for the ceremonial distribution of radioactive dust from the site. The Government was advised not to let the tests get hijacked by the “lunatic fringe” (George 1998d; Misra 1998; Singh 1998e). It is true that pro-bomb religious nationalists incorporate references to Hindu mythology in their rhetoric (Ramana 2000a). They do not, however, represent the mainstream although they are more visible and dramatic in the international media and public opinion.
Democracy is also an important resource that allows India to be categorized as a responsible nuclear state. The Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) created by the Indian government in January 2003 vests control of the nuclear arsenal in the Political Council headed by the PM. (However, the announcement of the NCA also includes a reference to “alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities” (Rajamohan 2003c). The published doctrine does not specify at what point authority over nuclear weapons is delegated to the armed forces in these alternate chains). After 1998 the military’s role has been expanding. Although the armed forces are not involved in the design or certification of nuclear weapons they are increasingly being brought in as ‘operators’. The world is reassured that weapons are not controlled by the military in India and this helps establish India as a responsible power.\(^\text{45}\)

There is an imperative to maintain coherence between various aspects of national identity. Thus international alliances also constitute national identity. As we have seen, if India had accepted a nuclear umbrella as a solution to the Chinese threat in the 1960s, it could no longer have maintained either a nonaligned stance in foreign policy or a middle-path in domestic economic and social policy. Aware of this effect, Indian leaders chose not to make these substantial adjustments. The acquisition of an indigenous nuclear capability became the logical choice. During the Cold War, countries in NAM pressed for disarmament at various international forums. This advocacy bolstered India’s stance but greatly increased the costs of breaking out and talking about security interests.\(^\text{46}\) It is only in 1997 that the term *security* enters the top 8 list of salience (even taking into account its synonyms such as *defense* used earlier).

\(^{45}\) Interview with Ashley Tellis, Washington DC, 25 August 2005.

\(^{46}\) Interview with Jasjit Singh, New Delhi, 24 July 2003.
International norms can directly affect policies by creating the imperative to maintain coherence between domestic and external rhetoric. Even when state leaders declare their support for international norms for purely strategic purposes to external audiences, their utterances can be used by others to push certain policies. Social movement theorists have been sensitive to the power of international norms on national policies, and have shown how American declarations of commitment to norms of equality and freedom in foreign policy helped bring about domestic social reform (Dudziak 2000; Klinkner and Smith 1999). Even on high security issues like nuclear weapons, rhetoric can be used in this way. During the Cold War, transnational activists were able to point to the frequent reiterations of the purely defensive role of nuclear weapons by the USSR to push for reductions in the Soviet arsenal (Evangelista 1999, 384).

In the Indian context, however, we do not see this process. Indian disarmament activists were unable to wield the rhetoric of peace to restrain government policy because the arsenal was unacknowledged. In fact several arguments made by the peace movement in other countries were coopted by the state into the language of official diplomacy. Until the 1990s, the state’s nuclear scientists effectively defanged a potential indigenous peace/nuclear disarmament movement by profferring their ‘scientific’ credentials as proof of their peaceful intentions. Disarmament rhetoric, radical elsewhere, was part of the official discourse in India and was “almost dull” (Sarkar 1998, 1727). In the 1990s a slick and sophisticated nuclear discourse was imported from the West (Ray 1998, 1637). Ironically, at roughly the same time,

47 Indian diplomats were calling for a nuclear freeze, castigating the NWS for not complying with the obligation to consider disarming, pointing out the financial and environmental costs of nuclear weapons—just as anti-nuclear activists did in the West.
arguments presented by India (in particular those of Nehru) on disarmament inspired Mikhail Gorbachev’s unilateral moves to end the bipolar arms race (Evangelista 1999, 377).

**Conclusion**

The Indian case does not fit within a pluralist understanding of politics where power is dispersed among competing groups with prior interests and identities. We would benefit from sociological studies of the bureaucratic corps and strategic analysts, especially as India opens up to inputs from nongovernment sources. Pro-nuclear elements in these groups advanced their policies because they operated within a framework where the nuclear program is central to security, development and national identity. Nuclear testing was part of strategy to build truly national support for both Indira Gandhi and the BJP. The nuclear issue was chosen by these very different governments because it could unify several important constituencies. While ideology played a role in the BJP’s 1998 decision to call for nuclear tests—but it was not a radical Hindu nationalist ideology, rather a more unifying consensus that motivated it. A comprehensive conception of security facilitated the advance of the nuclear program, endowing it with developmental implications that strengthened domestic support, and furnished a critique of the discriminatory nuclear order. Unlike Realist accounts which pit economic factors against security imperatives, my account demonstrates the ways in which they can reinforce each other.

While national identity is the source of national interest and therefore policy, foreign policy (including nuclear policy) also helps create national identity. Especially in a ‘new’ nation-state the project of nation-building cannot be divorced from the country’s self-presentation to the world. In fact it is the very proof of its existence, as shown in
Nehru’s 1949 statement: “What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy.” A certain degree of coherence between domestic and foreign policy is essential. The first three decades of Indian policy saw the mutual reinforcement of mixed economy and self-reliance in economic strategy, nonalignment in foreign policy, and multinationalism on the question of representation and internal order.
CHAPTER 5
FRANCE AND SOUTH AFRICA: FACING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

In the preceding chapters, I have analyzed India’s nuclear policy in the context of the international nonproliferation regime. In this chapter I present analyses of French and South African policies towards the regime, demonstrating the varying impacts of the international regime on different polities. I find that while variance is clearly due in some measure to differences in domestic structure, the international regime lays down the conditions of possibility within which choices are made.

What do we gain from a comparison of India with France and South Africa? India and France are ‘most different’ cases where we observe similar outcomes, in that both decided that nuclear weapons were essential to their security while moving towards accommodation with the nonproliferation regime. On the other hand, India and South Africa are both rising middle powers, yet in the 1990s, India formally adopted nuclear weapons for defense while South Africa renounced its capability. These are possibly ‘most similar’ cases with differing outcomes.

This chapter deals with France and South Africa in two different sections. In each section, I begin with a brief history of the nuclear program, with special emphasis on the changes in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. In the second subsection, I present explanations for these changes from the security, norms and domestic politics models. My focus in the third sub-section is on the actual operation of deterrence. How were nuclear weapons or nuclear capability pressed into the
security project? How did the characteristics of deterrence as a practice shape policy in the 1990s?

I find that both France’s ‘limited deterrence’ without a fixed target, and South Africa’s ‘catalytic’ and ‘ambiguous’ deterrence were based on modest capabilities. Consequently, the affirmation and reaffirmation of intentions were even more important for the institution of deterrence in these two countries than in other nuclear states. France’s apparent defiance of the nonproliferation order was meant to reinforce its intentions and its independence.

South Africa’s strategy, on the other hand, aimed at maintaining an identity of interest with the West. So the country had to convey its capability and intentions without crossing the nuclear Rubicon with a test. At the end of the Cold War, France’s deterrent was repositioned, South Africa’s given up. The characteristics of deterrence in the two countries shaped these divergent outcomes. The French ‘tous azimuts’ deterrent could accommodate a larger range of targets. The South African nuclear arsenal had the sole aim of keeping the West involved in its security. Further, it was tainted by the association with apartheid—it had never been a national project as in France.

The final sub-sections investigate the constitutive role of international norms in France and in South Africa. How did the processes of definition and categorization shape nuclear choices in the 1990s? Deterrence practices were premised on certain international norms during the Cold War in both France and South Africa. In the new world order, the nuclear capabilities of states unrecognized as NWS became suspect. France therefore reaffirmed its position as a legitimate possessor of nuclear weapons, a
NWS, and South Africa gave up its capability, declaring itself a NNWS. New regional alliances in Europe and Africa fostered changes in the role of nuclear weapons. France and South Africa also found it desirable to assume the identity of ‘champions of disarmament.’ I conclude with a comparison of the trajectories of France, India and South Africa.

I find in all three countries, careful attention to international nonproliferation norms on the part of a small nuclear elite. These norms are of course refracted through different lenses in each country. As an influence on nuclear policy, domestic political change is most important in South Africa and least important in France. Security threats are most salient in India and least in South Africa. However, for each country, the pressure to define itself in terms of the nuclear regime became intense in the 1990s. While I do not deny the importance of defense and domestic political imperatives, the effects of international norms should also be taken into account.

France is a puzzle for theories of nuclear policy. The ability of the small French deterrent to counter the USSR was always in doubt. In addition, French disarmament diplomacy was disconcertingly similar to that of a NNWS, in that it often brought up themes of fairness and non-discrimination. However, France moved closer to the mainstream NWS position over time, and in the 1990s made important changes that placed it firmly in that mainstream. Here, I first briefly describe the program and its re-evaluation in the 1990s. Then, I discuss the operation of deterrence in French strategy and show its relation to the recasting of the deterrent in a post-Cold War era. In the next section I link the constitutive power of international norms to France’s changing position.
History

The 1960 nuclear test, in Reggane in colonial Algeria, marked the beginning of a modest French nuclear force, one that has been staunchly defended by successive governments. The function of the French arsenal in the Cold War was, in Charles de Gaulle’s words “to exert at least some influence upon the intentions of a potential aggressor” (Gordon 1993, 59). According to the 1994 White Paper, the Livre Blanc, which was the last formal presentation of French doctrine, the deterrent serves to protect the country and its allies from a major threat to Western Europe and to support French intervention in regional conflicts. This latter, it admits, is the likelier scenario (1994).¹

1954 is often cited as the beginning of the French nuclear program. In this year, the Mendes-France government initiated a secret study to examine the military applications of nuclear energy, although the decision to develop a weapon was taken in the spring of 1957 (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 209). Charles de Gaulle, who took charge of the Fourth Republic in 1958, is most closely identified with the French bomb. In the first year of his Presidency he ordered preparations for a nuclear test (Duval and Mongin 1993, 42). His legacy has been described as “lasting, clearly definable and highly consequential” (Gordon 1993, 6). French government publications assert blandly that nuclear policy rests on Gaullist principles. Such textual salutes appeared even during the d’Estaing administration, when doctrinal concepts were redefined and practices were changing—for instance, France joined suppliers’ groups (Heuser 1998, 80).

¹ All translations from French in this chapter are mine unless otherwise indicated.
De Gaulle’s insistence on an indigenous nuclear capability and his refusal to share control of it led to France’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joint defense planning mechanisms in 1966.\(^2\) Obviously, this was a great strain on inter-alliance and Franco-American relations. In practice, the French deterrent was perforce a complement to NATO nuclear forces. French strategists claimed their country’s deterrent would “complicate the calculations” of NATO’s adversaries (Gregory 2000, 142).

**Change and continuity in the 1990s**

There were several reasons to expect radical change, even renunciation of the nuclear arsenal in the 1990s. First, the threat from the Soviet Union had dissolved into thin air. France would have benefited immensely from closer cooperation with the sole hegemon, the US. Second, nuclear weapons lost some of their value as international currency with the collapse of the nuclear-armed USSR. Economic issues came to the fore in France as in other countries, and the nuclear program was one of the most expensive components of the defense budget. Third, this period also saw European integration picking up speed. France intended to be a leader in that process, in which its distinct nuclear identity could only be an irritant. Fourth, the credibility of the deterrent was being reduced by the apparent public distaste for nuclear weapons. In a 1980 opinion poll, 57% of the respondents declared that the government should not use nuclear weapons even if France was being invaded; in 1991 this figure went up to 72% (Heuser 1998, 89). In February 1991 President Mitterrand made a significant declaration eschewing any use of French nuclear weapons in the ongoing Gulf War (Yost 1995, 67).

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\(^2\) The development of indigenous bombers by this time made it possible for France to withdraw from the integrated NATO structure (Heuser 1998, 143).
The French government did initiate some paring down of nuclear forces, moves which were primarily seen as responding to financial constraints. Currently France’s arsenal adds up to less than 5% of American and Russian forces (Grand 1998a, 49). In July 1991 Mitterand canceled the S-45 missile program, and in June 1992 announced that the peacetime nuclear alert level and the number of SSBNs at sea would be scaled down (Yost 1995, 21). France’s arsenal was originally deployed on a triad mirroring force structures in Russia and the United States.\(^3\) In February 1996, President Chirac announced his intention to eliminate land-based missiles. France would concentrate on the modernization of its sea-based deterrent.

Yet, the question of whether *France should have nuclear weapons* in the first place was not debated. The nuclear doctrine was “only slightly adapted” to the new security environment (Grand 1998c, 530). Dramatic changes *did* occur—not in the arsenal, but in France’s relation to the nonproliferation regime. In the last fifteen years France has reinvented itself as a ‘champion of disarmament’—a phrase that Chirac employed in February 1996 (Grand 1998a, 49). In 1991 France announced it would sign the NPT, and in the same year began applying full-scope safeguards to its exports (which were in practice more consequential than NPT adherence).\(^4\) In 1992 France declared its support for an unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT (Yost 1995, 35). France is now a prominent advocate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Materials Control Treaty (FMCT). However, this acceptance of arms control is contingent on the retention of its arsenal.\(^5\) Discussing the CTBT in 1994,

\(^3\) The *Mirage 2000N* is France’s nuclear-armable bomber. Its combat range is around 1450 kms. In 2005, the French Navy and Air Force introduced the nuclear-capable *Rafales*. There are currently five French SSBNs—*Le Vigilant* was the last to be commissioned, in 2004.

\(^4\) The accession to the NPT was ratified by the French Parliament in August 1992.

\(^5\) France also became a member of two Nuclear Weapon Free Zones—the African NWFZ and the South Pacific NWFZ in 1996 and has expressed its readiness to sign the South East Asian NWFZ. It had already ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a NWFZ in Latin America.
Prime Minister Balladur said that the treaty “must not in any way envisage the elimination of nuclear weapons or seek to undermine the status of the nuclear powers” (Jabko and Weber 1998, 145).

Explanations for the French bomb (and its persistence)

Here I briefly present the three major explanations for why France decided to acquire nuclear weapons. Although the question of its revised policy towards the regime has not figured prominently in the literature, I extrapolate from the logics of the three models to construct explanations of policy reversal.

The security model attributes the French nuclear program to the failure of extended deterrence. After the launch of Sputnik in 1957 it became clear that the USSR could threaten the US mainland with intercontinental missiles, and that France could no longer count on an American shield against Soviet threats. It has also been suggested that the American refusal to issue nuclear threats in support of French forces at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 contributed to the French government’s desire to acquire its own nuclear capability (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 90). The joint Anglo-American tests in 1962 contributed to a loss of faith in the US nuclear umbrella (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 112). France required its own arsenal for security reasons. In this model, France’s 1990s embrace of nonproliferation stems from its recognition of new security threats, such as revelations of Iraq’s nuclear development and ‘loose nukes’ from the ex-USSR (Duval and Mongin 1993, 105).

The domestic politics and norms models are in fact more conventional than security explanations in the literature on the French bomb (as for the British). It does seem
incredible that the USSR (assuming it had an interest in attacking France) could be deterred by the small French capability. According to the domestic politics model, France’s powerful atomic enclave pushed for the acquisition and retention of the deterrent. French nuclear policy has indeed been made by a handful of political leaders and officials (Tertrais 1999, 4). Most major decisions are taken in the Defense Council chaired by the President, where the military has a very small role (Tertrais 1999, 5). The nodal agency is the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA), the first of its kind in the world when it was set up in 1945. The CEA’s military branch is influential in policy-making (Muller 1990, 3).

One should also note that the civil nuclear industry has considerable political clout in France. There is a high degree of circulation of elites between the CEA and private nuclear industry (Muller 1990, 8). Roughly 76% of France’s electricity is generated in 58 nuclear plants (Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique 2002). France is also a major nuclear exporter. Since 1975, 45% of world reactor orders have gone to France (Muller 1990, 3). This puts France in a very different category from the other nuclear weapon powers. Any international constraints would have commercial as well as security ramifications. France’s determination to keep away from multilateral arms control could be related to its fear of compromising its commercial interests. The nuclear industry would have worried about the effects of safeguards on nuclear exports, as well as the potential for international inspections to open the door to industrial espionage.

While I have not come across ‘domestic politics model’ accounts of change in French policy, one could reconstruct such an account, wherein payoffs such as promises of continued funding for domestic actors were offered to the nuclear estate in return for
their acceptance of certain international restrictions. One can also surmise that to the political leadership, the advantages of signing the NPT had begun to outweigh the domestic political costs of such restrictions.

The supporters of the norms model point out that the nuclear program helped France to regain Great Power status *externally* and provided a national symbol to unite a broad spectrum of political ideologies *internally* (Heuser 2000; Kolodziej 1994, 168; Perkovich 1998, 16; Sagan 1996/97). One scholar writes:

> France found a formula to reconcile the country’s need for security, its demoted position internationally, and its need to rehabilitate a self-image of grandeur. Nuclear weapons were simultaneously a means to ensure that France could never again be occupied, and an expression of being a nation of the first rank... The national declaration of independence helped the country to overcome its debilitating internal divisions and undertake the modernization that de Gaulle also saw as the prerequisite to the nation’s future grandeur (Flynn 1995, 9).

As per this model, France’s acceptance of the nonproliferation regime in the 1990s could be attributed to its changing national identity influenced by international norms.

In response, supporters of the French arsenal insist that threat perceptions motivated the program. To better understand this seemingly unresolvable dispute, I examine the actual role that nuclear weapons played in France’s security strategy. In the next section I take up the following questions: how was the relatively small nuclear arsenal positioned so that France could reap the maximum benefits in security and prestige? How did these positions shape the French response to the post-Cold War world?

*‘La dissuasion’ and its elements*
In this section I discuss the role of deterrence in the French security discourse. Formulations of deterrence in the Cold War period, I show, facilitated the retention of the arsenal and the adoption of new roles. I end with an analysis of the 1994 White Paper that illustrates these themes.

At the height of the Euromissile controversy, as European allies of the US debated whether to allow the deployment of intermediate-range missiles on their territories, in a speech to the German Bundestag, President Mitterand laid out a succinct and forceful analysis of the centrality of nuclear deterrence to French (and European) security. He declared that the nuclear weapon—whether one applauds or deplores it—remains the sole guarantee of peace and of a balance of power. Peaceful co-existence, as evidenced in détente, the Helsinki accords and Ostpolitik, rested on this nuclear basis (Mitterand 1989, 257).

_In deterrence we trust_

There were two main reasons for France’s consistent public declarations of its commitment to deterrence. Its arsenal was relatively tiny, and its deterrent effect depended entirely on the enemy’s perception that it would be, _inevitably_ and _solely_, used to defend France. France in the 1960s had no invulnerable nuclear submarines and did not widely disperse its missiles. Neither did it have tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore the nuclear arsenal’s function was to deter a first strike from a much stronger opponent—deterrence of the strong by the weak (_dissuasion du faible au fort_). The accompanying deterrence rhetoric (declaration of intention) had to persuade a potential attacker that any weapons surviving a first strike would be turned on it with a vengeance. Expressions of fidelity to the arsenal were important also to ward off pressure from Atlantic allies bent on compromising the independence of French
forces. Therefore, French declarations of intention were essential complements to its limited capability.

Deterrence also had domestic political uses. A broad pro-nuclear consensus was established in France in the late 1970s, replacing the substantial initial opposition to nuclear weapons. What did this consensus rest upon? “…[p]art of the answer is the success of consecutive French governments in describing their nuclear arsenal as a deterrent which will definitely work (i.e. deter aggression) and will therefore never be used” (Heuser 1998, 92). David Yost writes that France had the strongest consensus in favor of deterrence among NWS, and this was in great measure thanks to the absence of public discussion of actual use contingencies (Yost 1990, 493). Thus by the 1970s, the Parti Socialiste which had been the political voice of the anti-nuclearists was no longer demanding disarmament, merely reductions in the arsenal (Heuser 1998, 95).

New threats and new cuts
At the end of the Cold War, French security intellectuals realized that the program would have to justify itself anew to the world and to the French people. The existence of the arsenal had to be justified in terms of new threats, although cuts in the size of the force were anticipated. Pascal Boniface wrote in 1999:

> Possession of a nuclear arsenal can no longer be justifiable, in the eyes of others, by appeals to the ‘grandeur’ of France or the need to safeguard the country's rank in the international hierarchy. Such appeals are guaranteed to generate scorn and rejection. Only the appeal to security can have any meaning, provided it is complemented by an attitude of co-operation and embedded in the discourse of a general interest (Boniface).

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6 This consensus is unusual in Europe (Delpech 2004, 132).
The 1992 draft military program law discussed the expanded range of threats (Yost 1995, 30). The ‘loose nukes’ problem apparent at the collapse of the Soviet Union was cited as a cause for concern (Delpech 1998, 209). Other threats mentioned include the growing capabilities of Algeria, Libya, Iran, and at one time, Iraq. The need to maintain a position of strength vis-à-vis the countries of the ‘South’ is frequently cited as a reason to keep the arsenal (Yost 1995, 69). Here ‘dissuasion du faible au fort’ has been neatly reversed—now it is the uncertainty stemming from the weak ‘South’ that strong French deterrence aims to counter. In recent years various French leaders have even gestured towards contributing to a European nuclear deterrent (Koster 2000).

How was it possible for French deterrence to expand its scope so seamlessly?

French doctrine has always held that it is uncertainty that underlies successful deterrence (Beaufre 1985/1965, 73). The size of the French arsenal relative to other nuclear powers is less important. This is the theory of ‘proportional deterrence’ that Pierre Gallois disseminated in his famous work *Balance of Terror* (which Raymond Aron described as “the fragment of truth that Gallois stretches to absurdity” (Aron 1965, 141)). General Ailleret’s *tous azimuts* doctrine, announced in 1967, posited that the French deterrent must counter nuclear coercion from all directions (Ailleret 1967).\(^7\)

The concept of uncertainty reconciled the arsenal’s small size with its warning to all countries and made possible the deterrence of the strong by the weak. Consequently, in the 1990s, expanding the role of the deterrent while implementing budget cuts did

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\(^7\)“Our independent force, intrinsically as powerful as possible, should also—since we cannot anticipate from which part of the world the threat to future generations will come—not be oriented only in one direction, that of the a priori enemy, but be capable of intervening everywhere, or as we say in our military jargon, at every point of the compass” (Ailleret 1967, 42).
not appear illogical. However, although the doctrine disregards size as a factor, most French experts today believe that the nuclear force has been cut down to the lowest possible level, that is, to a point below which reductions would render it non-viable (Delpech 2004, 141).

In addition, the original broad definition of enemy in the *tous azimuts* formula, and the general refusal to name the USSR as the ‘deterree’ in the early years, facilitated the shift to other enemies in the discursive terrain of nuclear policy. Although the stated rationale for the French nuclear arsenal was countering the USSR, another core function of the *force de frappe* was to challenge US predominance (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 166).⁸ “The deterrent force is not only made to deter an aggressor. It is also made to deter an abusive protector. That is the reason it has to be an all-*azimuts* one,” proclaimed de Gaulle somewhat elliptically (Tertrais 1998, 10, n.9). In a sense, the French deterrent was aimed both at the USSR and indirectly, at superpower hegemony. Since its primary function was to protect national independence, the disappearance of the Soviet threat did not render it irrelevant. Thus, in response to President Yeltsin’s announcement that Russian missiles would no longer target France, Mitterand declared that the French deterrent was intended to safeguard France’s independence and was not directed against a particular country (Yost 1995, 24). Indeed, Pierre Joxe, Defense Minister from 1991 to 1993, suggested that the concept of *tous azimuts* was most meaningful in the post-Soviet era (Yost 1995, 25).⁹

*Re-reading the White Paper*

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⁸ Khrushchev told the French that he believed that their atomic force was created to annoy the Americans (Heuser 1998, 120).

⁹ The *tous azimuts* doctrine is essentially the same as current NWS doctrine—no specific targets, but aimed against all threats (Delpech 2004, 132).
The White Paper was commissioned by the Balladur government. It performed the functions of the Bottom-Up Review, the Roles and Missions Commission, and the Nuclear Posture Review in the U.S. (Tertrais 1999, 2). This text refers to France as a country with global responsibilities ("un pays à responsabilités mondiales") (Anon 1994, 254). Here it must be noted that in a 1991 poll by L’Express 72% of the respondents stated that France was a great power and just as many claimed that the nuclear arsenal facilitated this status (Gordon 1993, 185). The White Paper also warns that hasty disarmament would create new disequilibria (80), and that while the Cold War had ended, the nuclear age continues (96). It describes the Cold War period as one of ‘rationality’ (21) whereas the post-Cold War era is one of uncertainty and instability (13).

The White Paper begins with the acknowledgement that for the first time in history France faces no territorial military threat (21). This is a time where France could conceivably adopt a “fallback position”; but such a defense strategy resting on the “sanctuarisation” of the national territory would imply a renunciation of France’s “mission and role”. At the same time, if French defense were to be oriented only towards global peace-keeping, it would become dependent on NATO guarantees, contrary to the principle of strategic autonomy (91).

In this paragraph the foundation is laid for the military nuclear option as a reasonable middle path that will protect France’s global role as well as national independence. “The possession of an independent nuclear arsenal…will remain an essential means

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10 In February 1996, based on the Livre Blanc recommendations, President Chirac put forward a major military reform which would be completed only in 2015. The main features were a reduction of civilian defense service, restructuring of the nuclear deterrent, development of military projection capabilities, and a focus on internal security (Mathieu 1996, 56).
11 Further references to this text will have the page numbers in brackets.
for the strategic space for maneuver that France needs to defend its interests (93).”

While the text defines ‘vital interest’ in terms of survival, it quickly denies the possibility of distinguishing between vital and strategic interests. In order for the state to retain liberty of action this boundary cannot be specified, it states frankly (49). We note that this refusal to draw boundaries enables the slippage of the arsenal’s meaning—from guarantor of national independence to a capacity that allows the country to assist allies and join a European defense entity (6). As Balladur reaffirms in his introduction to the White Paper, a nuclear deterrent that is credible and constantly adapting to evolving threats, is a requirement for a defensive yet independent strategy.

*International nuclear norms and the French deterrent*

In earlier chapters, we have seen how Indian policy-makers employed the norms of the world nuclear order to maintain deterrence, even while openly defying them. Did the limited French deterrent also rest on similar practices? In this sub-section I analyze two policies that apparently illustrate French disregard for international norms: France’s refusal to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and its deeply unpopular 1995-96 tests after it had moved into the nuclear mainstream. In both cases, I argue, although French actions did push against international norms, they also acknowledged the power of these norms. They were both intended to maintain the credibility of deterrence among the NWS, the cornerstone of the regime. Additionally, both policies were justified as upholding the spirit of the regime.

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12 “La detention d’un armément nucleaire indépendent…demeurera un moyen essentiel pour la France de disposer de la marge de liberté dont elle a besoin pour défendre ses intérêts.”
France’s position on the PTBT is mirrored in India’s evaluation of the CTBT three decades later. De Gaulle made his refusal to sign the PTBT a symbol of France’s determination to stay on the nuclear path, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to deterrence. As he put it, it was easy for countries that could not make the bomb to accede to the treaty, just as it was easy for people to declare they had no intention of going to the moon. France, however, would be hindered in its program by signing. Since the treaty favored countries that had already acquired sufficient data from testing, it did not contribute to disarmament, he claimed (Yost 1995, 33).

On the other hand, why did France refuse to sign the NPT a few years later? The NPT’s definition of proliferation did not disadvantage France, nor was its categorization of states into NWS and NNWS. Here the influence of an individual’s personality cannot be disregarded. De Gaulle had his reasons for refusing to sign, and these may have included a wish to mark out a distinctive national position and a desire to weaken the treaty. However, no political party dared take the risk of questioning Gaullist dogma for two decades afterwards. By signing the NPT, the government would have greatly reduced the value of the deterrent to the nation as a symbol of independence, thereby focusing attention on its dubious security benefits. Thus, revisiting the NPT decision would not only have been politically difficult for political parties, it would have weakened the ‘deterrent’ by bringing into the open a discussion of its true role and abilities.

France’s nuclear tests have always been carried out in a defiant atmosphere. Its very first test in 1960 was condemned by a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution (with a two-thirds majority). The first four tests were conducted at a time of rising international concern about testing in the atmosphere (Yost 1995, 73). As these tests
were conducted in Africa, PTBT negotiations took on a distinct anticolonial tinge (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 122). France, for reasons discussed above, refused to sign the PTBT which banned above-ground nuclear testing. However, in 1966 tests were shifted to the Pacific (Thakur 1996, 467). Between 1966 and 1996 France carried out 192 underground tests in the region (Anon 2002d; Johnston 2005).

France’s final test series came at a time when the CTBT was being negotiated in Geneva. Six tests were conducted between September 1995 and January 1996. The 1990s tests again angered ex-colonies in the South Pacific and strengthened the worldwide view that they were anachronistic. French decision-makers were taken aback at the intensity of opposition to the test series. Although the tests did not violate any international treaty they were seen as contrary to the spirit of the CTBT. The Chinese and French tests reinforced each other (Thakur 1996, 475). Many Asian governments were upset that the French tests had taken the pressure off China, and encouraged India and Pakistan to harden their stances on the CTBT (Thakur 1996, 485).

President Chirac claimed that this last test series was motivated solely by technical compulsions (Tertrais 1998, 31). However, by this point France had already carried out 204 tests. It had also entered into a deal with the US government to receive data from computer simulations of weapons tests carried out in American nuclear laboratories (Smith 1996). Clearly, domestic political factors played a role in this new test series: the tests could have been a concession to the technologists in the nuclear complex.

However, Chirac’s justification of the tests is worth noting:

This ambitious program of adaptation and modernization of our defense shows the will of France to continue to guarantee its ultimate security in any circumstances. Based on deterrence, the French nuclear strategy remains, *ne variatur*, a defensive one. Nevertheless any aggressor who would want to strike our vital interests must remain convinced of our capacity and resolution to preserve them (Grand 1998c, 534).

The government had demonstrated that it would not compromise when survival was at stake, thus strengthening the deterrence strategy (Grand 1998a, 43; Tertrais 1998, 32).

It is tempting to view the test series as a throwback to France’s adversarial stance towards the nuclear regime. In fact, testing was presented as a requisite for France to *comply* with the regime. The French Ambassador said in Geneva that the tests were necessary so France could “embark determinedly on a policy of using simulation in order to guarantee the safety and reliability of its weapons” (Johnson 1995). Other French strategists claimed that the French tests had triggered progress in the CTBT negotiations (Delpech 1995). Most significantly, the unprecedented negative global reaction demonstrated the strength of the unwritten norm against testing.

France’s nuclear test sites were finally formally closed down in 1997 (Delpech 2004, 136). France now strongly backs the FMCT. It closed down the Marcoule reprocessing plant and the Pierrelatte enrichment facility in 1998 (Delpech 2004, 135). In the future, some have suggested, missile testing may substitute for the testing of nuclear devices to maintain deterrence (Yost 1995, 73). By signing the NPT, an international treaty, the French government could signal to potential adversaries (possibly in the
Arab world) that it was serious about combating weapons of mass destruction without singling out a group of countries (Jabko and Weber 1998, 142).

**Constitutive norms and the French program**

France was not particularly disadvantaged by the definition and categorization processes of the nonproliferation regime, yet felt alienated from the regime because it was dissatisfied with simply being one of five NWS. France’s leaders aspired to an identity that can be termed ‘NWS plus’, which would allow more space for maneuver. Consequently, they had to adhere to some of the regime’s strictures. Regime requirements on the issue of nuclear exports were somewhat problematic for France, as illustrated in the history of Franco-Indian nuclear relations. There is also the issue of the influence of the broader norms of modernity and European integration on French policy. I will deal with these at the end of the section.

**France: de jure NWS by default**

The other victors of World War II did not view the French bomb with satisfaction. France was excluded from the international arms control talks in Washington DC in November 1945, mainly as a result of the Communist sympathies of French scientists like Frédéric Joliot-Curie, founder of the CEA (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 23). Later, France was sidelined in disarmament negotiations as a result of its political instability and economic weakness. Interestingly, France’s lack of progress towards a bomb helped deny it a place at the negotiating table (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 209).

According to one American writer, it was the advent of “nuclear upstarts” such as France that made the US intensify nonproliferation efforts (Williams 1969, 2).
Naturally, de Gaulle saw nonproliferation as a strategy of ‘les deux grands’—the two superpowers—intended to preserve their nuclear monopoly. De Gaulle’s successors found it hard to reverse his policy of staying out of multilateral arms control. Once the inevitability of the French bomb had sunk in, however, the big powers were willing to accommodate it in the nuclear club (as they did in the case of China). At the 1962 Nassau conference President Kennedy indicated he was "willing to draw the line after France" (Trachtenberg 1999, 366).

France thus reaped the benefits of NWS status, being defined as such by the NPT, sans legally binding responsibilities. Muller therefore terms it a ‘free rider’ with respect to the regime (Muller 1990, 3). This is not entirely accurate. France recognized that its default NWS identity depended on adherence to the regime. De Gaulle’s refusal to sign the NPT was accompanied by the declaration that France would adhere to the NPT’s provisions, and for the next two decades, France’s policies were implemented ‘as if’ it had signed that treaty (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 175). Similarly, since 1974 France conducted all its tests underground, thereby adhering to the PTBT (a treaty that it never signed) (Yost 1995, 33). Over the years other countries acknowledged France’s de facto adherence. Even NATO made its peace with the French deterrent. The 1974 NATO Ottawa Foreign Ministers declaration formally recognized the contribution of French (and British) nuclear forces to alliance stability (Ullman 1989, 8).

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France and nonproliferation

France’s oppositional attitude to arms control agreements was a reflection of its resolute independence in defense. However, as we have noted, France’s behavior was not inconsistent with the constitutive principles of the regime. The rest of this section shows the evolution of France’s position on the nonproliferation regime. France refused to sign the PTBT, the NPT, or the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Its ‘empty chair’ at arms control negotiations served as a symbol of its resistance to superpower oligopoly. This fitted perfectly with France’s general style in world affairs which was described as the “diplomacy of discontent” (Harrison 1987).

France was fond of throwing the goal of disarmament in the face of nonproliferation advocates. Although categorized as a NWS, France’s diplomacy therefore had more in common with that of the NNWS. French delegates in the 1950s and 1960s put forward disarmament proposals that far exceeded in scope those proposed by other nuclear states (Grand 1998b, 36). They argued that arms control was a method of maintaining superpower duopoly (Grand 1998a, 47). In 1983, speaking at the UNGA, Mitterand set forth three preconditions for participation in arms control talks: correction of the discrepancy between the two major powers’ arsenals and those of the others, multilateral conventions banning chemical and biological weapons, and an end to escalation in missiles, anti-submarine weapons, and anti-satellite weapons (Babu 1992, 4). France remained pointedly indifferent to US-USSR arms negotiations, and often called on the superpowers to reduce their own arsenals before persuading other countries to do so (Duval and Mongin 1993, 101).

However, at the 1995 NPT conference there was no trace of disarmament rhetoric in the French delegation’s texts. Like other Western countries, France eschewed it in
favor of the principles of realism (Grand and Richard 1996, 82). By this point, France, interested in consolidating its position within the NWS category, had recognized the disjuncture between its NWS status and its oppositional rhetoric.

Until the 1990s France was perceived as considerably more lax than other NWS with regard to safeguards on nuclear transfers, although it is unclear that this was the case in practice (Yost 1995, 36-37). The French also claimed that they did not insist on IAEA safeguards because they recognized, and were sympathetic to, the problems of developing nations. France is suspected of having contributed to programs in Iraq, Israel, South Africa, South Korea and Taiwan (Babu 1992, 12; Muller 1990, 9; Reiss 1995, 190). It was observed that "defiance as a motivation was certainly not absent from a few of France's early export dealings" (Muller 1990, 2).

Until the 1980s the issue of proliferation occasioned little concern, and leaders were fond of citing Gallois on the stabilizing consequences of proliferation (Heuser 1998, 101). Raymond Aron also dismisses the dangers of proliferation (Aron 1965, 237). France did not even criticize the first Chinese test in 1964 (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 167). However, French leaders changed their stance, ostensibly as information about the diffusion of nuclear technology and differing attitudes to nuclear use became available. Apparently, France stopped helping countries like Iraq with their nuclear programs when it became clear that they were open to the actual use of weapons and did not share France's culture of deterrence (Morel 1995, 109). Chirac expressed the fear that new nuclear countries did not share the same rationality as the older ones (Chirac 1992, 90).
Changing international norms had also changed commercial incentives to abide by the nonproliferation regime. By the 1990s it had become important for countries serious about business in the civilian nuclear industry to follow international regulations. Trade opportunities outside the NPT regime had narrowed (Babu 1992, 14). Already in 1986 William Walker was speculating that, in order to enhance its global competitiveness, the French nuclear industry would put pressure on the government to accede to the NPT (Muller 1990, 13). At the 1987 UN Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, France went along with other Western countries in demanding nonproliferation assurances in exchange for nuclear supplies—to the great disappointment of Argentina, Brazil and India (Muller 1990, 7). The cancellation of a reactor sale to Pakistan in 1990 illustrates the change in France’s attitude (Yost 1995, 53). We must also take into account changes in the economics of the nuclear power industry that reduced incentives for staying out of regimes. Nuclear exports in general were depressed. Also, France realized that it was more lucrative to sell fuel cycle services performed in France than to export them (Jabko and Weber 1998, 143).

In July 1991, the influential Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI) and the Fondation pour les Études de Défense Nationale (FEDN) jointly organized a symposium on the perils of proliferation. This was a significant and unprecedented step since these institutions had never addressed the issue of proliferation before this (Richard 1993, 83). Another revolution in policy, a national plan to curb sales of conventional and WMD technology, was unveiled in June 1991, a week before France announced the decision to sign the NPT (Richard 1993, 84). In the mid-1990s, the Directorate of Strategic Affairs and Disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a subdirectory of nonproliferation (Grand and Richard 1996, 65).
The story of Franco-India nuclear cooperation perfectly illustrates changing French attitudes and the international transmission of nuclear ideas. In 1951 the CEA and the Indian Atomic Energy Commission embarked on a historic joint project (ultimately abandoned for technical reasons) to develop a line of beryllium-moderated nuclear reactors (Soubbaramayer 2002, 515). The CEA sent a congratulatory note to its Indian counterpart after the ‘Peaceful Nuclear Explosion’ in May 1974, complimenting it on “the crossing of a new and difficult step towards the mastery of nuclear techniques (Findlay 1990, 207). In 1976 Jacques Chirac, on a Prime Ministerial visit, made it clear that France would continue nuclear cooperation with India notwithstanding the furore over 1974. He reiterated that France would not sign the NPT because it was a discriminatory treaty, and called on the Great Powers to disarm to the level of other states as a precondition to universal disarmament. He also stated that the French bomb was necessary to maintain an independent defense (Anon 1976).

French nuclear policy was “followed with interest” in India, and French strategists even discerned a ‘Gaullist’ insistence on strategic autonomy in Indian declarations (Racine 1998, 159,65). Analyzing the 1974 test and the possible acquisition of a military capacity by India, Pierre Gallois remained sanguine about proliferation. India’s critics are confusing two very different things, he wrote, nuclear weapons for deterrence and for coercion (Gallois 1975, 296). For coercive capability against a nuclear power a country needs a first-strike capable of destroying all the adversary’s

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15 France was the unsuccessful competitor of General Electric for the Tarapur project as well. In the 1960s, Indian scientists visited the French nuclear complex at Saclay, although there was no formal transfer of nuclear know-how (Chengappa 2000, 85).

16 André Giraud, the CEA Chairman in 1974, directed Bertrand Goldschmidt to draft this telegram. In Giraud’s view, the first draft was not sufficiently effusive, so a second draft was produced, and sent to India without the knowledge of the Quai d’Orsay (Reiss 1995, 327-28, n.65).
weapons (Gallois 1975, 297). While the Americans and Russians had such capabilities, the British, French and Chinese arsenals were designed with the sole purpose of deterring an adversary. If India were to build weapons, it would also take the passive, non-belligerent route of deterrence (Gallois 1975, 300). K. Subrahmanyam praised Gallois’ ideas about the size of the nuclear arsenal, as a viable, cheaper alternative to US-centric doctrines based on the strategic triad (Subrahmanyam 1986a, 276-77). Gallois’ theory was even brought up in the Indian Parliament to buttress the argument that India should have its own nuclear capability.

France in 1998 did react with more sympathy to Pokhran-II than other Western countries did (Anon 1998g; Anon 1998p; Mulye 1998). The influential scholar Bruno Tertrais wrote that it would be counterproductive to lecture India on the NPT and advocated nuclear cooperation (Tertrais 2003, 52, 57). Cabinet Secretary Brajesh Mishra’s June 1998 Paris visit was a big step in India’s rehabilitation in the post-Pokhran II period. For all its understanding of India’s compulsions, however, France was not about to break ranks with the other NWS. It informed India that given its commitments to the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) it could not export nuclear reactors to India (George 1998a). France’s 1991 decision to require full-scope safeguards on nuclear exports had already forced the termination of its supply of uranium fuel to the Tarapur plant.

Modernity and nuclear power

The French nuclear program has often been viewed as a substitute for military victory and colonial possessions. For a country recovering from Nazi occupation, facing

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17 Gallois’ statements about the need for India to have its own nuclear arms were noted and discussed in the Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha Debates, 28 June 1971, col. 18)
18 Lok Sabha Debates, 28 June 1971, col. 18.
economic crisis and political instability as well as the inevitable loss of empire, the advent of the nuclear program provided a tangible reminder of past scientific achievement and a hope for future development. In that sense, France, though a ‘colonizer’, conforms to the post-colonial framework laid out by Itty Abraham. Nuclear power became a symbol of the ‘radiance’ of France, as Gabrielle Hecht puts it. Hecht’s work shows that ideas of the ‘national interest’ justified particular forms of technological development, while technological prowess simultaneously defined the French nation. For instance, while national interest justified manufacturing weapons-grade plutonium before the government had decided to build a bomb, that decision strengthened the idea that national interest warranted extracting plutonium from reactors (Hecht 1998, 330-31).

Just as Indians re-reading the colonial period learned to value technological superiority, the recently liberated French were re-assessing their past. Mendes-France’s “passion de la modernité” stemmed from memories of France’s technical unpreparedness in the 1930s (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 214). This Presidential passion became a great impetus for the nuclear program. Hecht also mentions anxieties about keeping up with modern states (Hecht 1998, 44). Just as in India, the French technical intelligentsia wished to distinguish itself from power-hungry politicians. Under its guidance, policies were expected to emerge from rational rather than ideological choices (Hecht 1998, 35-36). It is also worth noting that the CEA’s writ explicitly included “national defense” (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 22). This

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19 Raoul Dutry, Minister for Reconstruction and Urbanism in the provisional post-WW II Government, was instrumental in touting the virtues of nuclear power and its possible uses in defense (Duval and Mongin 1993, 12).

20 Interestingly, the proponents of large-scale technological systems in both countries placed them in direct historical lineage with past national achievements. While Nehru referred to dams as the temples of modern India, nuclear reactors were called the heirs of the Eiffel tower (Hecht 1998, 13).
was in keeping with the ‘étatisme’ of post-war France, with its ‘indicative’ central planning for private and state-owned enterprises.

By the 1990s, nuclear power shone less brightly as a symbol of technological achievement. Markets for French nuclear exports were depressed. Nuclear arsenals now contributed to national prestige in so far as they were pressed into the service of international stability; only rogues and proto-rogues followed steadfastly independent paths in nuclear affairs. France’s modernity was now best expressed by reinforcing the stabilizing role of nuclear weapons. Being a ‘champion of disarmament’ became an alternative way of exercising leadership. Critics of French nuclear policies have long been calling on the government to take a leading role in arms control initiatives—that it should be a leading role was never questioned (Heuser 1998, 103). Today, "the empty chair of the de Gaulle era has been replaced by...musical chairs, where the music never stops as French negotiators shuttle between different arms control and disarmament forums, some organized by the French themselves, to address an ever-expanding agenda of security problems" (Kolodziej 1994, 189).

Towards a European identity

The question of Europe has been a crucial factor in nuclear policy. Guy Mollet, who succeeded Pierre Mendes-France as PM, was not convinced of the need to develop nuclear weapons (Schrafstetter and Twigge 2004, 215). The socialist Mollet and the businessman Jean Monnet became allies on the strength of their distaste for nationalism. This alliance implied that the defeat of the ‘European lobby’ on the issue of the European Defense Community facilitated the nuclear military program (Duval and Mongin 1993, 31; Hymans 2002, 147).
France was for many years the only European non-signatory of the NPT. French independence on nuclear policy gradually became a barrier to cementing relationships with European countries. This imposed its own security costs. French grand strategy aimed to bind traditional rivals Germany and Britain with European ties. European integration became the main multiplier of French power both in Europe and on the international stage (Bozo 1995, 218). In a Eurobarometer poll in March 1987, 72% of the French respondents saw European unity as a way of defending French national identity and interests (Feldblum 1999, 108).

France’s peculiar nuclear status, however, made it difficult for it to participate in formulating common European policies on nuclear issues. For instance, in 1985 France would not allow the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) to attend the NPT Review Conference as an observer. The European Political Cooperation Group could not be used to form a common Western European position for that conference. In 1988 West Germany came up with a plan to get South Africa to accede to the NPT. Restrictions on nuclear supply contracts would be lifted, and in return, the European Community would block South Africa’s suspension from the IAEA. France’s unenthusiastic participation in these negotiations gave its partners the feeling that it resisted any kind of involvement with the NPT (Muller 1990, 10). On the eve of the 1992 NPT Review Conference the twelve countries of the European Union made a joint statement—this had the effect of associating France with a treaty that the country had not formally signed.

France’s refusal to formally join the regime became not only incongruous and inconvenient, but harmful. Its nuclear identity was in contradiction with its European identity. Some even claim that the embrace of the NPT was not motivated by a
recognition of the dangers of proliferation, rather, it was a political victory for the supporters of European integration (Morel 1995, 114). French analysts started arguing that France was ‘bound’ by its European ties to follow multilateral arms control rules (Petit 1994, 245). NPT adherence was also seen as helping France reinforce its identity as a permanent member of the UNSC (Yost 1995, 59). While France obtained permanent membership much before it had a nuclear capability, the intimate association between possession of military nuclear power and P-5 membership was obviously noted and internalized.

France is noted for its insistence on maintaining an independent stance in world politics. Was this merely a vainglorious national vanity project for Charles de Gaulle and his successors? Or an ingenious strategy by a beleaguered nation to face the Soviet threat? Or a brave attempt to cover up the country’s inadequacies and assure it a place at the high table? In the discussion above we see that in fact the three imperatives of security, domestic politics and norms are irretrivably tangled in France, as they were shown to be in the Indian case. An independent stance was necessary to convince the Soviets that adventurism would be surely punished. Thus France refused to sign any agreements that could bring about the impression that it was restricting itself. Deterrence was also predicated on a domestic consensus which moved the nuclear issue out of the arena of contentious politics and elevated it to a national symbol. In the 1990s, new security imperatives ‘appeared’ that made it ‘natural’ for France to join the order it had once combated without damaging its national amour-propre or inciting political criticism. Again, as in the Indian case, French policy towards the international nonproliferation regime both made use of its defining and categorizing powers, and was constrained by them.
Around the time that France was gradually sloughing off its opposition to the nonproliferation regime, South Africa made dramatic strides in its acceptance of that regime. In this part of the chapter I aim to show that although the case is often cited as an example of the importance of domestic politics, international norms played a significant role in shaping South African nuclear renunciation. As in the case of India, South African security strategy in the Cold War period hinged on *hovering over the nuclear threshold*. Thus, its complex relationship with the nonproliferation order played into its defense capabilities and into maintaining a certain domestic political order.

South Africa was a rogue state before the term. Steve Chan and Richard Betts called it a ‘pariah’ in their discussions of nuclear proliferation in the 1970s (Betts 1977; Chan 1980). A repressive and undemocratic state founded on racial discrimination, it unlawfully occupied contiguous territory (Namibia) and funded guerilla movements in other neighbors (Zimbabwe). It also sought out WMD.\(^{21}\) I first briefly describe the progress of the South African military nuclear program, and its swift and puzzling dismantling.

In the section “Theories of nuclear acquisition and rollback”, I present the major existing answers to this puzzle. In the security model, South Africa’s weapons are intended for ‘catalytic deterrence’, and are rendered unnecessary with the end of the Cold War. Explanations at the domestic level attribute the program to ideologies and bureaucratic interests in a South Africa isolated by apartheid. Here, it is not so much the end of the Cold War as the transfer of power to a black-majority government that

\(^{21}\) Project Coast, the CBW program, was initiated in the late 1970s. Within a few years the country had come frighteningly close to acquiring offensive capabilities, including genetically-engineered bioweapons targeting Africans.
brings about disarmament. Can these explanations, privileging power and norms respectively, co-exist?

In order to identify ways in which these explanations could complement each other, I look for questions to which neither provides completely satisfactory answers—for instance, what was the role of nuclear weapons in apartheid South Africa’s defense strategy? Why did the new South African government give up the nuclear infrastructure without discussion? I find that South African decision-makers, both during the apartheid era and afterwards, based their policies on the anticipated reactions of the international community. The very success of deterrence depended upon international nuclear norms; similarly, the renunciation of the nuclear option was an important building block in the reconstruction of the country’s identity in the 1990s.

**History**

Upon winning independence from the British, South Africa held its first election in 1948. The National Party, dedicated to serving the interests of the Afrikaners, won that election. The cruel and pernicious system of apartheid was put into practice soon after. Black South Africans were forcefully relocated to ‘homelands’ (amounting to merely 13% of the country’s land area, although they made up four-fifths of the population), and were removed from common voters’ rolls. The state resorted to increasing levels of brutality to keep this system in place.

In the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa emerged as a major supplier of yellowcake uranium. As such, it was long suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions. The Atomic
Energy Board (AEB) which began its career in 1948, began researching Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs) in 1969, and by the mid-1970s the infrastructure for an explosion was in place.\textsuperscript{22} In 1977 preparations for a nuclear test in the Kalahari desert were discovered. Bowing to external pressure from both superpowers, the Vorster government stopped short of testing (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 44). The first nuclear bomb was completed in 1979, a year after indigenously produced high-enriched uranium (HEU) became available (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, 100). There is an unconfirmed suspicion that South Africa tested a weapon in 1979.\textsuperscript{23} By the 1990s, scholars believed that the country had a fairly well-developed military nuclear capability (although the declaration that six actual gun-type devices had been manufactured came as a surprise).\textsuperscript{24} The delivery vehicles would have been Canberra and Buccaneer aircraft (and possibly Jericho missiles imported from Israel) (Paul 2000, 114). South African scientists and engineers were also working on a space-launch vehicle, which could easily have been transformed into a multi-stage long-range missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

\textit{Reversal}

In September 1985 President Botha reconfirmed the political directive to build seven nuclear devices (Stumpf 1996, 7). Exactly four years later, at a meeting with senior political aides, Botha’s successor F. W. de Klerk put forward his belief that it was

\textsuperscript{22} By 1977 the US government had reports from several analysts predicting that South Africa could conduct a test within four years at the latest (Reiss 1995, 186).

\textsuperscript{23} A ‘double flash’ characteristic of a nuclear explosion was noted by a US Vela satellite over the South Pacific on September 22, 1977. It is alleged that Israel, and perhaps Taiwan, collaborated with South Africa on this test. A commission set up by the Carter administration later concluded that there was not enough evidence to confirm a test.

\textsuperscript{24} Pauline Baker suggests that the constructive engagement of the 1980s would not have been possible if the world had known of the extent to which the nuclear weapons program had developed (Baker 2000, 114).
imperative to end South Africa's isolation from the international community, and that this would require the dismantling both of apartheid, and of the nuclear weapons program. The first part of the new national strategy was implemented with dispatch. Within a few months, the government unbanned the African National Congress (ANC)—which had emerged as the standard-bearer of the opposition—and the Communist Party. Nelson Mandela, the world’s most famous political prisoner, was freed from his Robbens Island prison in 1990. Four years later, Mandela became South Africa’s President at the head of a multi-racial coalition led by the ANC.

The dismantling of the military nuclear infrastructure also proceeded speedily, if secretly, and was essentially complete by June 1991. South Africa formally acceded to the NPT in 1991. Already in February 1990, de Klerk had ordered the physical destruction of the atomic infrastructure. In September 1991, nuclear facilities were opened up to international inspections, and two years later the IAEA declared the program entirely dismantled. This announcement satisfied those who were unsure that NPT accession would defang the program (Pabian 1995, 1). However, it was only in March 1993 that President de Klerk formally acknowledged the existence of the nuclear program in a speech to Parliament, and admitted that South Africa had manufactured six devices. Two months later, he also announced the termination of the space-launch vehicle project (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 133).

The regime change in South Africa took only two years to complete. It was no ordinary event. Immanuel Wallerstein writes of the “...the miracle of South Africa, providing a glow of bright light in this dismal world scene. It is time out of joint. It is the 1960s triumph of national liberation movements all over again, and it occurred in the place everyone had always said had the worst situation and the most intractable”
(Wallerstein 1999, 29). Since this change was so radically transformative, it is easy (and not incorrect) to cite it as the force behind denuclearization. I will show, however, that policy change was made possible and natural in view of South Africa’s relation to the international nonproliferation regime.

**Theories of nuclear acquisition and rollback**

The perceived lack of an ‘objective’ or ‘reasonable’ security threat means that the South African program is often cited by proponents of the domestic politics and norms models. Purkitt and Burgess write: “The remoteness of any threat to its survival demonstrates that the South African case is explained less by neorealism theory than any other case involving WMD, and points to other models, especially those that draw from political psychology and organizational and domestic politics” (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 209). Norms’ explanations point to the effects of the remarkable isolation that apartheid South Africa faced. They also trace the program to the cultural characteristics of the ruling elite. Richard Betts, one of the foremost analysts of the South African program, saw its roots in the ‘laager’ mentality of the Afrikaners.

**Security model explanations**

The South African nuclear bomb posed a puzzle for this model. It seemed illogical that a country with no peer competitor on the continent would risk exacerbating its isolation from the international community with a bomb program. Scholars like Benjamin Frankel, Peter Liberman, Mitchell Reiss, and Bradley Thayer characterize

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25 By 1981 South Africa had formal diplomatic relations with only 15 states (Reiss 1995, 179).
26 The term ‘laager’ means a defensive formation of wagons, and comes from the Afrikaners’ treks into South Africa. It is used to describe a defensive attitude towards the world.
South African security concerns as implausible (Frankel 1993; Liberman 2001; Reiss 1995; Thayer 1998). In their search for a threat that only nuclear arms could deter, certain security model explanations seize on Soviet involvement in proxy wars in the neighborhood. In the 1970s, the USSR was giving military support to Angola both directly, and indirectly through Cuba. It was also supporting the Matabele in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (Fischer 1993, 277). However, the idea that the USSR would be deterred by this relatively insignificant nuclear capability being somewhat incredible, security model accounts also claim that the immediate target of South African deterrence was the Western bloc.

South Africa’s nuclear strategy was thus similar to the Israeli ‘Samson Option’. If South African leaders judged that their survival was endangered, they would demand that their allies in the West—the US and the UK in particular—come to their rescue, or else they would detonate a nuclear device. This explosion could be expected to spur an exodus of African countries from the NPT. Spurred by fears of a nuclear holocaust in Africa and fearful of the breaching of the nuclear taboo, Western governments would commit their troops and resources to the beleaguered South Africans. Howlett and Simpson characterize this use of nuclear weapons as "catalytic deterrence." The small size of the arsenal is thus explained, since the weapons were not meant to be employed in conflict, or even to survive a first strike (although admittedly size could have been a function of manufacturing constraints (Howlett and Simpson 1993, 158-59)). Betts thus describes the South African nuclear weapon as a “diplomatic bomb” (Betts 1979).  

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27 Some suggest that US intervention in the 1973 Yom Kippur war on Israel’s side encouraged South Africans to believe in catalytic deterrence (Liberman 2001, 63).

28 Interestingly, Pik Botha, the South African PM described the nuclear weapon as a “diplomatic weapon to defend South Africa” (Liberman 2001, 60). Other possible uses of the weapon listed by Betts were dissuading neighboring African states from harboring insurgents, compelling them to engage in
The credibility of this novel twist on deterrence remains doubtful. Firstly, it is hard to believe that the West would have allowed the Soviet Union to gain a foothold on the continent by invading South Africa (Fischer 1993, 279). South Africa was of immense strategic value in the Cold War. In fact, Walters described it as “an unofficial NATO proxy state” (Walters 1987, 142). Secondly, if the USSR was not deterred from invading in the first place by South Africa’s own nuclear capability, would it be deterred by Western extended deterrence? That is, would the Soviets believe that the US and its allies would risk a nuclear exchange for South Africa’s sake? Further, it is not clear that Moscow planned to go further than lending opportunistic support to guerillas (Reiss 1995, 199). Finally, if Western countries were uninclined to intervene before the country was overrun, a nuclear demonstration violating international norms on the part of South Africa would reduce their incentive to face down the USSR.

Security models do an even less satisfactory job of explaining nuclear rollback. Neil Joeck writes that the reversal was a response to the amelioration of the security environment, but that the white-majority government’s reluctance to hand the atomic crown jewels over to the ANC was a contributing factor (Joeck 1998, 124-5). David Albright credits the easing of Cold War tensions, which made possible the American brokering of a comprehensive peace settlement in Southern Africa in the late 1980s, with putting to rest fears of a Communist onslaught. Yet on the next page, he states that the Marxist enemy had provided an “excuse” for the apartheid regime’s nuclear program (Albright 1998, 81-82).

greater economic and diplomatic interaction with South Africa, thus reducing its isolation (Reiss 1995, 193). These seem even more implausible.
Domestic level explanations

Domestic politics explanations focus on the growth of a powerful atomic enclave within this isolated nation. Nuclear reversal in South Africa appears to fit neatly into the domestic politics model. Explanations for reversal cite democratization (the transfer of power to a non-racial government) or re-integration into the global economy, or both (Liberman 2001, 45-86; Sagan 1996/97, 71; Solingen 1998, 159-62). Arguments about democratization have to explain *both* why the de Klerk government decided to give up the bomb, and why its successors acquiesced in that decision.

Nuclear reversal in South Africa was an entirely top-down, elite-driven and secretive process. Since de Klerk in 1990 did not inform the general public or opposition leaders that he was dismantling the nuclear program, his intended audience must have been Western leaders. De Klerk wished to convey to them that scrapping the arsenal was only one in a complete reversal of national and international policies including the abolition of apartheid, and the replacement of regional destabilization with cooperation (Fischer 1993, 281). It has been suggested that de Klerk was using nuclear renunciation to buy insurance from Western governments against the explosive consequences of his revolutionary dismantling of apartheid (Cho 2004, 36). Western support for nuclear rollback was a power resource that he drew on in the negotiations on a new constitutional order (Liberman 2001, 81). Strategic decisions were “fueled by the overarching need of the National Party to reposition itself within a changing domestic political environment and maintain its dominant position in government” (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 131). At a personal level, de Klerk “assured his role in
history” with these decisions (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman 2002, 126). In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.

The second important domestic factor is the ANC’s attitude towards nuclear weapons. The ANC’s ideological predisposition towards pacifism had two sources. First, anti-apartheid activists familiar with the regime’s reliance on military force to crush internal dissent, developed an alternative human-centered concept of security.29 Second, the global linkages of the anti-apartheid struggle were with peace groups, disarmament campaigns and the non-aligned movement. Expatriate activists, in particular Abdul Minty and Kader Asmal, were outspoken critics of WMD, forcibly bringing the apartheid regime’s nuclear activities to the attention of Western governments and publics in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s these activists became the leading lights of the Military Research Group established to formulate ANC foreign and defense policy (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 184). As the party struggled to steer the country through turbulent times, these respected individuals played crucial roles. By 1994, the few ‘Africanists’ in the party who had put forward the case for the ‘black bomb’ had been banished to the fringes (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 185).30

The Liberal strand of the domestic politics model focuses on the economic structure of the ruling elite. The nuclear enclave used the benefits of prestige and secrecy to become powerful (Liberman 2001, 63). The South African military and the cabinet were not kept informed of developments in the nuclear program (Liberman 2001, 64-65). The ‘securocrats’ as they came to be called, entrenched themselves in ARMSCOR, a state-owned corporation set up specifically to attain self-sufficiency in

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29 In 1961 the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Chief Albert Luthuli, the ANC’s President-General.
military equipment. Positioning themselves against the international regime, they promised the politicians that they could deliver security. The date on which the UN imposed mandatory arms sanctions on South Africa (November 4, 1977) was celebrated as the birthday of the country’s military-industrial complex (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 225).

This enclave development was in consonance with the National Party’s economic policy. The party represented the interests of old-school Afrikaners and supported import-substituting industrialization (Liberman 2001, 71). However, the party’s support base became more liberal and outward-oriented in the 1990s (Liberman 2001, 82). A significant change in trade policy in 1989 allowed a new elite to come up. In the process of democratization, de Klerk was able to combat the dominance of the military and 'securocrats' in government (Albright 1998, 83).

However, there is little or no actual evidence that liberalizing economic coalitions, democratic institutions, academics or opposition groups challenged the state’s nuclear decisions and provided the impetus for denuclearization (Long and Grillot 2000, 28). The rejection of nuclear weapons in fact found unlikely support in the staunchly nationalist South African Defense Forces (who saw it as an opportunity for cost-cutting). De Klerk’s replacement of securocrats was not motivated by the need to please a liberal constituency (Purkitt, Burgess, and Liberman 2002). Even Liberman admits that policy participants believe that the degree of statism/liberalism did not influence nuclear policy (Liberman 2001, 84).

Explanations from the norms model are centred around the political ideologies of the Afrikaner nationalists and (by contrast) the pacific African elite. For reasons of space I
do not treat them here, except to point out that they make assumptions that need to be explained—why did the Afrikaner government in the last years of apartheid, under immense international pressure, not ‘circle the wagons’? Why was nuclear renunciation part of the transfer of power? What accounts for the anti-nuclear sentiment of the ANC, an organization which refused to unconditionally criticize violence against apartheid? These are all issues that I will take up below.

**Deterrence and security**

As detailed above, scholars find the security rationale for the South African bomb unconvincing. However, as Walters points out, such analyses do not take into account South African decision-makers’ own subjective assessments of the threats they faced (Walters 1987, 63). They felt encircled by black African states and faced a majority hostile population internally. International isolation added to the fear factor and impressed on South Africans the absolute necessity of self-help. Patrick Garrity points out that their security strategy was remarkably sophisticated and complex; of course, if leaders had paid this sort of attention to domestic reform, there would have been no need to face isolation (Garrity 1980, 29). In this section I take the security justification seriously—that is, I assume that policy-makers did adopt nuclear deterrence in response to threat perceptions. I ask how nuclear deterrence operated, and how its characteristics shaped nuclear reversal.

**South Africa’s unique deterrent**

South African defense was premised on the existence of buffer states. The elimination of this *cordon sanitaire* as Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola and

31 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe have borders with South Africa. These ‘frontline states’ were accused of providing shelter to anti-apartheid fighters and to Communists.
Zimbabwe became independent created external insecurity, as it increased the likelihood that South African territory would be encroached on gradually by African guerilla forces (Walters 1987, 12-14). Internally, instability and opposition were triggered by the reprehensible practices of apartheid. The ‘total onslaught doctrine’, which guided military planning from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, envisaged a defense against joint invasion by the USSR, Cuba, and South Africa’s black-majority neighbors (Dunn 1991, 12).

An important formulation of the security dilemma that South Africa faced is found in an article co-written by a former head of the nuclear program, an ANC defense analyst, and an American scholar. It states that the 1978 decision to manufacture weapons can best be understood in terms of the country’s “international standing” at the time—that is, isolation (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, 101). For South Africa, the security problematique was not distinct from the moral opprobrium that it faced. Security rested ultimately on ensuring that the country had allies who would intervene in the worst-case scenario of invasion; however, internal repression turned international opinion against the state and reduced incentives for the West to come to its aid.

Historically, South Africa had seen itself as part of the West. During the Cold War, elites employed the specter of communism to maintain this identity of interests. The country’s most valuable resource was the West’s perception of cultural commonality and strategic interest. This perception was somewhat tenuous even when apartheid had not yet become a liability, as Western countries came to realize that the Soviet Union was unlikely to engage in dangerous adventurism on the tip of the African continent. The 1955 Simonstown agreement giving the British Navy access to the
Southern African coast featured disappointingly vague security commitments by the UK (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 33-34).

South Africa then had to draw on another global norm to ensure its security—the need to contain nuclear proliferation. It adopted a three-step deterrent strategy based on a plausible nuclear capability, which is sometimes known as ‘catalytic deterrence.’ In the first phase—“strategic uncertainty” the government would neither acknowledge nor deny the existence of “nuclear capability”. If this ambiguous deterrence failed and the country was invaded, in Phase Two, the existence of a bomb would be secretly disclosed to certain Western governments. If even this implicit threat to use nuclear weapons did not work, a device would be tested as a “demonstration” (Stumpf 1996, 5).^{32}

**Operating catalytic deterrence**

How did this form of deterrence operate in practice? In order to be catalytic, it had to be ambiguous, as the intended targets were likely to punish South Africa for openly crossing the nuclear threshold. South Africa practised the same methods of maintaining ambiguous deterrence as India.

Some practices that we can easily recognize:

- speaking with many voices
- affirming its determination to defend itself with all means
- assuring the world of its interest in maintaining stability
- periodically informing the world of its progress in nuclear technology

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^{32} The next two stages, according to another source, were exploding a nuclear device over the Indian Ocean at a height of 1000 kms, and using nuclear weapons on the battlefield (Liberman 2001, 57).
expressing a fervent interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear power

In February 1977 a South African official stated that “no rules [would] apply at all” if the country were attacked (Walters 1987, 1). In 1977, Minister for the Interior Mulder declared that his country would “use all means” at its disposal to defend itself. He added that it was true that South Africa had commissioned a pilot enrichment plant employing “very advanced technology” and reminded the world that it had “major uranium resources” (Forge and Myhra 1995).

In December 1968 the South African Army Chief of Staff stated that both nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles were on the nation’s agenda (Reiss 1995, 187). Speaking to Parliament in July 1970, Prime Minister Vorster announced that the country’s research and development program was “directed entirely towards peaceful purposes”. Officials then announced that the country had come up with a new, unique process of uranium enrichment, and that a pilot plant capable of an annual production of 50 kilograms of HEU would be set up to serve as a model for this process (Fischer 1993, 273-74). Vorster noted that this plant would not be subject to IAEA safeguards, and while emphasizing peaceful aims, hinted that the country was not restricted to those aims (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 40). Reacting to the 1974 Pokhran explosion, A. J. A. Roux, then AEB Chairman, said that although government policy was to use enriched uranium for peaceful purposes, the new uranium enrichment process placed South Africa “in a position to make its own nuclear weapons” (Reiss 1995, 187).

While the ‘catalytic’ function of the deterrence was never tested, there have been some claims as to the international advantages it secured. In 1988 under US auspices, a tripartite agreement was signed among South Africa, Cuba, and Angola, ending the
Angolan civil war. Did the nuclear deterrent get South Africa a better deal than it would have otherwise, thus strengthening the case for maintaining the arsenal? Various accounts answer in the affirmative (Hibbs 1993; Liberman 2001, 61; Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 81). During negotiations, satellite surveillance detected the construction of a 100m long hangar at the Kalahari test site. The Foreign Minister at this time made a statement to the effect that his country could make a bomb if it wanted to. This led to widespread concern in the world’s capitals. ARMSCOR officials claimed that the activity at the test site was designed to strengthen the South African bargaining position (Howlett and Simpson 1993, 162). Similarly, there is speculation that the August 1977 Kalahari affair (where apparently US and Soviet satellites detected preparations for the test of a nuclear device) was engineered by the South African government. These ‘preparations’ were initiated at a time when a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa was being debated at the UN.

Deterrence and the nonproliferation regime

‘Catalytic deterrence’, ironically, rests on the international community’s desire to prevent proliferation. South African deterrence depended on the very international norm it was cautiously violating. South Africa had to maintain a fine balance between establishing the credibility of its deterrent and respecting certain nuclear thresholds. Robert Harkavy predicted in 1981 that South Africa would “continue to keep the world guessing about its capabilities in order to provide itself with the maximum leverage in warding off further pressures about racial liberalization” (Harkavy 1981).

33 South African engineers had extensive experience with deep-level mining, so it is unclear why they would make the preparations above ground, permitting detection by satellites. It is also suggested that the country had not produced enough HEU for a test in 1977.
It is interesting to note that the formal argument put forward by South African leaders in rejecting the NPT was similar to the Indian and French critiques of the treaty. It included criticism of the lack of provisions for superpower nuclear disarmament, discrimination against NNWS, and the absence of guarantees on PNEs and international nuclear cooperation (Masiza and Landsberg 1996, 33; Reiss 1995, 188). International inspections, it was stated, would compromise the unique uranium-enrichment process (Liberman 2001, 51).

Signing the NPT would have meant compromising deterrence. As in the Indian case, not signing the treaty was a way of signaling South Africa’s nuclear intentions. In the spring of 1981 an African-American lobby obtained a classified memo from the US Secretary of State, which presented the South African case. Its main argument was that the South African nuclear deterrent was aimed at the USSR and signing the NPT would signal that the deterrent was ineffective (Walters 1987, 102-03). In 1976, in an interview to Newsweek, the South African PM declared that while his country was only interested in the peaceful applications of nuclear power, it had “the capability” to make nuclear weapons. He made it a point to remind the world that South Africa had not signed the NPT (Betts 1979, 92).

South Africa, being the African country with the most developed nuclear capability, was accorded a permanent position on the Board of Governors of the IAEA at its inception. In fact South Africa was among the first countries to sign the IAEA treaty in 1957. In 1963 Ghana tried unsuccessfully to oust it from this position. In 1976, as a result of protracted campaigns by the recently decolonized countries in conjunction with the anti-apartheid movement, South Africa had to give up the right to automatic inclusion on the board (although it was not expelled from the IAEA).
policies of the apartheid regime were deemed incompatible with “the objectives of the Agency to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2001).

Some scholars have claimed that such sanctions were a response to apartheid rather than to nuclear activities (Scheinman 1987, 211). But in fact, the nonproliferation regime assessed countries’ nuclear programs based on their national identities, and in this case apartheid was integral to South African identity. Some evidence comes from the contrast with India. South African officials could not fail to note that while they were denied participation in the 1979 IAEA General Conference through a resolution that also urged them to sign the NPT, that Conference was held in India, which did not face this type of pressure after its PNE (Pabian 1995, 5; Stumpf 1996, 5). In fact, South African officials were surprised that the two superpowers went to great lengths to avert their 1977 test, considering the tepid reaction to India’s 1974 test, which they had observed closely (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 11; Reiss 1995, 9-10).\textsuperscript{34} Events such as this made South Africa painfully aware that simply signing the NPT without making domestic changes would not lead to the lifting of sanctions on the nuclear program (Liberman 2001, 50; Stumpf 1996, 6). Nor would giving up the nuclear program mitigate sanctions if apartheid continued (Liberman 2001, 70).

\textit{The constitutive role of international norms}

That \textit{both} the apartheid regime in its dying days and the new ANC government renounced the nuclear option indicates that international norms played an important

\textsuperscript{34} A month after the 1974 Pokhran explosion, the US signed an agreement on nuclear transfer with South Africa. It is no wonder the South Africans were not convinced of the strength of American commitment to nonproliferation (Cho 2004, 10-11).
role in their decisions. de Villiers et al. write that towards the end of the 1980s, “South Africa saw clearly that the nuclear deterrent was becoming superfluous” as the USSR collapsed and Cuban troops withdrew from Angola (de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, 102). The direct Soviet threat was eliminated and this was a crucial factor in giving up nuclear weapons. However, unlike in France, the arsenal did not swivel around to face new targets. The reason was that nuclear weapons had always been intended to trigger Western help in case of attack--but the attitude of the West changed in the late 1980s. In this section I explain how the apartheid government dealt with new attitudes, and how the ANC’s attitudes towards nuclear weapons were formed in an international context.

Apartheid South Africa and the international community

While rogue states are generally viewed as being ‘outside’ the scope of norms, no country escapes the influence of international social forces. Analysts have pointed out that South Africa’s elite drew on global norms such as national self-determination (for the White nation) and racist views of Africa for the very legitimacy of the state (Klotz 1995, 170-71).

The nuclear program itself was very much a product of international collaboration (Fig 1999; Patnaik 1993; Rajamohan 1980; Reiss 1995, 182). Cooperation with Israel (a missiles-uranium swap) is well documented. The country also had links with Germany and France—an important market for South African uranium and a supplier of power technology (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 36). US-South African nuclear cooperation began during World War II when South African uranium supplies were crucial. In

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35 In the late 1980s there were also concerns in the US about possible nuclear cooperation between South Africa and Iran. See Secret Cable 11288, July 29 1987, “Nuclear News from South Africa”, National Security Archive Item SA02378.
1957 the US and South Africa signed an agreement on cooperation in the civilian uses of atomic power. South Africa was able to purchase a weapons-grade Oak Ridge-type experimental power reactor at a heavily subsidized price (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 36). The US provided the research reactor SAFARI-1 (commissioned in 1965), trained scientists, and supplied the HEU fuel (Pabian 1995, 2).

In the face of growing pressure from other countries—especially post-colonial states—and African-American and liberal groups at home, successive US governments continued to support South Africa and tolerate its nuclear ambitions. The US and its allies justified their support citing the strategic imperatives of anti-Communism. Clearly, the hegemon privileged nonproliferation only in so far as it contributed to stability. Nuclear programs that did not cross the proliferation threshold with an explosion would be tolerated unless they threatened stability. In the late 1970s, partly as a result of the Indian tests, the US started withdrawing from nuclear cooperation. South Africa then turned to Western Europe and to China (Fig 1999, 94).

By maintaining a civilian atomic power program South Africa was able to justify its nuclear technology imports (Fig 1999, 89). The civilian program was also useful to dilute international pressure. For instance, a November 1977 UNSC resolution declared that “all states shall refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.” However, since no state would admit to cooperation in weapons manufacture, this resolution was not very effective. A month earlier, a triple Western veto had killed a potentially more effective resolution, introduced by African states, calling on states to refrain from any cooperation in the nuclear field (Minty 1994, 226). US officials continued to claim they were trying to convince South Africa to sign the NPT and that their influence had
induced South Africa to adhere to NSG guidelines and resume negotiations with the IAEA on nuclear safeguards.\(^{36}\)

South African officials modified their behavior in response to changing norms. They have stated that American programs like Plowshare inspired them to plan for PNEs. However, by the late 1970s, the international tide of opinion was turning against PNEs. Recognizing this, the South African government ordered that plans for a PNE be kept secret (Stumpf 1996, 4). In 1984 South African officials pledged that they would act in a “manner that is in line with the spirit, principles and goals of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group” (Albright and Hibbs 1993, 37). In this way they recognize the strengthened norm prohibiting nuclear transfers and simultaneously reaffirm South Africa’s pretensions to responsibility.

**Reconstructing South Africa’s identity: the apartheid government**

Revisiting his decisions on nuclear reversal, de Klerk wrote: "[…] I expected that the reform policies which I intended to introduce would help to end confrontation with our neighbors in southern Africa and the international community. Under these circumstances, the retention of a nuclear capability made no sense." (de Klerk 1999, 274). It is clear that the ending of apartheid was part of a larger identity reconstruction project that would ultimately ensure the security of the white South African rulers. In 1977, an influential paper titled “The Deterrent Strategy of Nuclear Weapons” advocated an arsenal on the grounds that since the country was already an outcast, nuclear acquisition would not necessarily isolate it any further (Pabian 1995, 3). Yet

\(^{36}\) Memo from Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 17 1985, National Security Archive Item SA01795.
by the late 1980s, de Klerk was estimating that if his country was no longer a pariah it could depend on allies against future threats (Liberman 2001, 76).

The process by which rehabilitated ‘rogues’ regain good standing makes visible the power of international norms. Nuclear renunciation was one of the strategies South Africa employed to ‘come back in from the cold.’ South Africa knew it was important to escape the fate of being placed in the ‘rogue state’ category. Unlike India, which accomplished the task by declaring NWS status, South Africa chose to slide gradually out of the category of states that had potential, formally undeclared nuclear programs. In 1991 the government did not reveal that it had manufactured six devices (this was announced in April 1993 by de Klerk). In 1991, South Africa was afraid that it would face the same fate as Iraq (although South Africa had violated no treaties) (Stumpf 1996, 7).

The government perceived increasing hostility to nuclear weapons in the international community (Albright 1998, 83). Starting in the mid-1980s South African diplomacy aimed to project an image of a flexible government dismantling apartheid and at peace with its neighbors (Makinda 1992, 174). Sanctions during the apartheid era had created a sense that South Africa was out of step with the world. Kate Manzo points out the significance of the term used by Afrikaner elites to describe de Klerk’s policies—‘normalization’ (Manzo 1992, 23). The de Klerk regime’s goal was to became more acceptable to the West, not merely because of the need for foreign

37 Although they may retain their legal identities, such states are, in a sense, learning the rules of the system. This moment is analogous to a ‘breaching experiment’ in social psychology, which reveals deep, commonly held understandings.
capital, but also to maintain its membership in the club of ‘civilized nations’ (Manzo 1992, 33).

Waldo Stumpf’s recollection of the fateful 1989 meeting with de Klerk, when the Prime Minister announced the policy of nuclear reversal is instructive for its juxtaposition of choices. According to Stumpf, de Klerk said: “I have one vision in my term of office. I want to make this country once again a respected member of the international community, and we’ll have to turn around the politics, and we’ll have to terminate this program, turn it around and accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty” (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 124).

The ANC’s nuclear policy: fitting in with the international community

The pacific tradition is an important reason for the victory of the anti-nuclear activists in South Africa. However, it is important to note that this tradition was nourished over the years in a global context where the apartheid regime was intimately identified with militarism and immoral alliances with NWS (the UK and the US), while the ANC strove to expose that project.

Material factors undoubtedly bolstered the new South Africa’s nuclear policy. In the 1990s, it initiated a neoliberal economic strategy—Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). Key economic actors were the old white business interests, the black bourgeoisie and the ANC’s policy-makers (Taylor 2001, 4). They did perceive and receive benefits from nuclear renunciation. One of South Africa's conditions for joining the NPT was the lifting of the embargo on its uranium exports

38 Klotz quotes de Klerk as justifying reforms by characterizing apartheid as “evidently unjust, in conflict with the Christian values to which we profess to aspire, contrary to internationally acceptable norms, and a certain recipe for revolt, revolution and civil war” (Klotz 1995, 157, emphasis Klotz’s).
(Goldblat and Lomas 1989, 20). Yet these actors are also aware of less tangible, long-term benefits. One scholar writes that in transitional South Africa, “…the industry and the scientific community [saw] that renewing international ties requires eliminating proliferation concerns, leading them to dissolve their alliance with nuclear weapons” (Flank 1994, 276). Both South African politicians and businesspeople were only too aware of the need to consolidate a positive identity and maintain their status at the national and global levels (Stanley 2001, 185).

There was hardly any domestic opposition to nuclear renunciation because the arsenal had become tainted by its role in protecting repressive Afrikaner rule. The ANC had good reasons to demand that the nuclear program be handed over to the new government. Building on the existing infrastructure, South Africa could develop its uranium exports and civilian nuclear technology. Already in 1993, officials from the old regime had expressed fears that an ANC government would sell nuclear technology to countries like Iran or Libya, or even to the Palestine Liberation Organization in consideration of their past support, but the ANC dismissed this as nonsense (Albright and Hibbs 1993, 38; de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, 106). In fact, in 1992 the ANC (which was at that point putting together a multiparty national government) demanded that the former rulers come clean about the nuclear program, a demand that was partly responsible for the April 1993 de Klerk confession (Howlett and Simpson 1993, 163).

Drawing on the moral capital of the successful anti-apartheid struggle, as personified by Nelson Mandela, the new South Africa chose to fit in with the international order. Overcoming the earlier externally-imposed identity of rogue state, it began working towards securing a new identity. Among these roles are ‘symbol of hope for Africa’
and ‘rising middle power in international affairs.’ At the 1998 Durban NAM summit South Africa presented, to a surprised audience, the virtues of economic globalization (Taylor 2001, 145).

The Draft White Paper on Defense (1995) begins by declaring that the country was no longer at war with its own people and with neighbors:

After two and a half decades of isolation, South Africa has been welcomed back into the international community and has joined a host of important regional and international bodies. The country’s foreign relations have been transformed from an adversarial mode to bilateral and multilateral cooperation… A fundamentally different approach is required in a democracy and the prevailing South African situation. Security policy is no longer a predominantly military problem but has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters… South Africa is committed to the international cause of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction” (Ministry of Defence 1995).

The ANC’s foreign policy was based on strengthening economic ties with Southern African countries, and possessing nuclear weapons was seen as incompatible with this strategy (Beri 1998, 90; Mandela 1993). Signing the NPT could be a way to offer reassurance to potential partners. This signaling function of treaty accession has been observed in other cases (Sasikumar and Way 2005). New alliances constrained South Africa in multiple ways. Joining the community of African states and assuming a leadership role implied that the new South African government had to work towards the goals of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). While this organization was focused on economic cooperation in the region, its security agenda gave pride of place to peacekeeping and to the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa. The
OAU’s demand for an African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ANWFZ) dates back to, and was aimed at, the South African nuclear program (Dunn 1991, 12).

Mandela’s foreign policy manifesto stated that his government would implement policies “necessary to take South Africa into the new world order as a responsible global citizen” (Mandela 1993, 86-87). It declared that South Africa would accede to the major arms control regimes (Mandela 1993, 89). The upholding of international agreements and conventions, especially in relation to WMD, is fundamental to South Africa's achievement of respected international status (Gutteridge 1997, 3).

Like India in the 1950s, South Africa attempted to gain influence by taking up the cause of disarmament. South Africa consciously chose the role of “bridge-builder” in the nuclear regime (Stumpf 1996, 7). It entered into new alliances with other ‘middle powers’, joining Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden in a New Agenda Coalition on the nuclear issue. This group issued some statements linking nonproliferation and disarmament (Anon 2004c). On the whole, though, they represent moderate NNWS, calling for incremental progress in arms control.

South Africa’s new role as mediator was most dramatically demonstrated at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. Many non-aligned nations were taken by surprise at the sight of South Africa advocating indefinite extension rather than a rolling extension. At the Plenary session, Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo declared that his country would support an indefinite extension without any conditions. The official justification was that since the NPT is the only legal instrument to bind NWS and promote cooperation

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39 South Africa had made its signing of the NPT conditional on the accession of Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, and this demand was satisfied in the late 1980s.
in nuclear technology, it was not worth endangering by linking extension to other treaties or commitments (Masiza and Landsberg 1996, 23). The South African delegation presented a paper of 23 *principles* for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament which would serve as yardsticks to judge whether states-parties were keeping to their commitments; it avoided the term ‘conditions’. This document was widely considered to be a watered-down version of NNWS demands on NWS (Liebert 1995). Mandela’s personal appeals to support indefinite extension helped to ensure that there was no recorded vote on the issue (Purkitt and Burgess 2005, 122).

It is widely believed that South Africa’s identity among developing countries, stemming from its leadership of Africa and the moral standing of its leaders, as well as from its recent renunciation of nuclear weapons facilitated extension. However, Masiza and Landsberg find no evidence for the claim (or accusation) that the South African delegation ‘secured’ the indefinite extension, noting that the non-aligned bloc did not have a common position at the start of the conference (Masiza and Landsberg 1996, 26, 29).

South Africa’s government has committed itself to a policy of nonproliferation and arms control which covers all WMD and extends to conventional weapons proliferation. A primary goal of this policy is to reinforce and promote South Africa as a responsible producer, possessor and trader of advanced technologies in the nuclear, biological, chemical and conventional arms fields (Department of Foreign Affairs 1996). In 1993, an “Act on the Control of Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” was passed. In the same year a new Nuclear Energy Act was passed which incorporates into domestic law the obligations entailed by accession to the NPT and the signing of an IAEA safeguards agreement (Stumpf 1996, 7).
Comparing France, India and South Africa

As stated in the introduction to the chapter, France and India can be considered as ‘most different cases’ (in terms of intensity of security threat and national politics) with a similar outcome (reaffirmation of nuclear status). South Africa and India are similar in many ways, but chose two different nuclear paths in the 1990s. However, the great number of differences in domestic politics and international status mean that neither of these cases is amenable to controlled comparison with India according to the Millian logic of elimination. These two mini-case studies have been included for purposes of theory-testing and extension, to demonstrate the effect of the independent variable—international norms—on two cases besides India. My objective is to identify the conditions under which different patterns of nuclear policy occur, that is to arrive at conditional generalizations rather than frequency distributions. In this final section I draw out explicit comparisons between the cases treated in this chapter and the Indian case.

India and France

Both India and France experienced definitional pressure to clarify their identities in the post-Cold War world. France’s entry into the NWS category was, however, a much smoother process than India’s attempt since it was already defined as a NWS by the NPT irrespective of its accession to the treaty. A set of formal signatures was all that was needed. There was no major domestic opposition, nor was the international system startled by this development. However, it is worth underlining that both India and France desired membership in the same NWS category.
We find that in France, as in India, there are no stark lines between development and security. Some of the ‘postcolonial’ attributes of Indian nuclear policy are observed in France’s stance. This leads me to hypothesize that in the nuclear field the race to ‘catch up’ is not restricted to former colonies. We also find that although India and France are very different in terms of general political culture, they are characterized by the same sort of nuclear-political culture. There is a small enclave of technocrats formulating policy and a few interested politicians. The coming to power in the 1990s of a new generation of analysts who found the old anti-hegemonic rhetoric anachronistic must have been an important factor in change in nonproliferation policy in both France and India. The need to maintain independence in nuclear policy has been shown in the previous chapters to be a hallmark of Indian diplomacy. Similarly, France eschewed rewards from formal NPT membership for a long time for fear of its effect on domestic politics.

India and South Africa
Regime change has been shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient for nuclear renunciation. However, in South Africa, the end of apartheid was the context in which nuclear capability was given up. Thus, the key question for this analysis is: why did regime change in South Africa lead to a decision to reject nuclear capability?

Taken to its extreme in apartheid-era South Africa, a holistic conception of security produced three fusions: of peace with war, of threats to territorial integrity with internal threats to the established order; and of the military’s defense and national security roles, so that the maintenance of the existing government became part of the military’s mandate (Johnston 1991, 152). As in India and France, nuclear power became a polyvalent symbol intertwined with the political, diplomatic and economic
aspects of security. In the 1990s South Africa also experienced the pressure to define its nuclear identity. Unlike India, which accomplished the task by declaring NWS status, South Africa chose to slide gradually out of the category of states that had potential, formally undeclared nuclear programs.

Both India and South Africa are leaders in their regions and in the nonaligned movement, have developing economies and turbulent internal politics. How then do we account for their differing paths? The answer lies to some extent in the differences in security threats and internal politics in these countries. South Africa did not face nuclear-armed neighbors, unlike India. In the last days of the apartheid regime, the nuclear complex was scaled back and ANC leaders wanted to mark their ideological difference from their predecessors by jettisoning nuclear ambitions. However, acknowledging the role of security and domestic politics does not reduce the relevance of international norms to this account. Security strategy was predicated on the powerful norm that states that gave up their nuclear weapons would not be targeted and that the international community had a special responsibility toward them. Again, both sets of political actors (apartheid leaders and the ANC) were driven not by internal political ideology or ethical beliefs but by global norms. The former wagered on nuclear renunciation to make themselves more acceptable, the latter’s policy was shaped by decades of interaction with disarmament activists.

**Conclusion**

Thérèse Delpech writes of the French deterrent that its political role overshadowed its military role (Delpech 2004, 131-32). In a sense, this is true of all nuclear arsenals. In this chapter I have tried to show that France and South Africa used nuclear weapons to assure their security by reinterpreting the concept of deterrence. The manner in which
deterrence was practised in these two countries accounts for the change (or lack of it) in the 1990s when the structure of the international system changed. I also show that international norms about nuclear weapons shaped both countries’ security perceptions and the balance of power among different elite factions. Thus, the international and the domestic cannot be separated, just as security and norms merge together in states’ nuclear decisions.
Nuclear proliferation and terrorism are often identified as the most critical threats to international security, and states are cooperating extensively in combating them. In this chapter I present some preliminary hypotheses about the career of the counter-terrorism regime, extrapolating from the working of the nuclear nonproliferation regime over the last six decades. I suggest that international efforts against terrorism will follow a path similar to that of the nuclear nonproliferation regime: initially, there will be bitter struggles over definition and categorization; states will adopt parallel (and sometimes contradictory) multilateral and unilateral strategies and deploy the regime’s own normative resources to secure membership in the right category; constitutive norms will shape the regime’s regulatory processes as well as domestic and external state behavior.

In order to fully understand how the regime works we must observe developments both at the global and state levels. This chapter lays out the four main operations of the regime and presents illustrations from India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy of states’ responses to these. Currently, the dominant powers are trying to ‘identify’ terrorism as the pre-eminent threat to the sovereign state system and one that can be defeated only by inter-governmental cooperation. Opposing this effort is an idea expressed in the cliché: one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter. Decision-makers in the world’s capitals are calculating the implications for their own policies. The conventional wisdom holds that weaker states have no choice but to follow the lead of the more powerful; they merely make virtue out of necessity by echoing the normative rhetoric. My study of India’s evolving position on international efforts against
terrorism challenges this idea. Indian policy-makers are both *constrained* by the international power structure, and *transforming* it by drawing on an under-rated source of power—international norms, thus blurring the lines between virtue and necessity.

The chapter begins with a short introductory section where I explain the validity and utility of comparing the nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes. The second section deals with the effects of the regime on states with different domestic political systems. Section Three outlines the four basic mechanisms through which regimes affect state behavior—definition, categorization, institutionalization and enforcement. For each, I present illustrations from the Indian case. In Section Four, I illustrate the power of norms—how they are used instrumentally to bolster India’s role in counter-terrorism, and how they in turn affect India’s domestic politics. In the concluding section I briefly discuss the counter-terrorism regime in the context of other international regimes, with special attention to the implications of the close linkage in the discourse today between terrorism and nuclear weapons.

*Comparing the nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes*

Krasner’s canonical definition of a regime as: “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area” (Krasner 1983, 1). Of these, principles and norms are more fundamental or ‘constitutive’ than rules and procedures, and these constitutive powers have been the focus of my attention in the preceding chapters.

Can we describe current efforts at the global level against terrorism in these terms? To put it differently, is there an international regime against terrorism? One analyst
depicts cooperation among security institutions as weak, unstructured and unlikely to grow in the medium term (Tardy 2004, 121). I argue that a regime exists, although it is still evolving. We can identify the following principles: one, terrorism is a threat to all states, regardless of ideology, civilizational identity or level of development; two, terrorism should not be employed as a weapon of statecraft; three, terrorism is a transnational threat and can be tackled only by cooperation among nations.

Table 6.1: Nonproliferation and counter-terrorism regimes compared

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<th>Nonproliferation</th>
<th>Counter-terrorism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles</strong></td>
<td>More is not better</td>
<td>Terrorism threatens all states</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Norms</strong></td>
<td>NNWS should not seek nuclear weapons</td>
<td>WMD more dangerous with terrorists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rules</strong></td>
<td>International safeguards</td>
<td>Monitoring of money transfers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Procedures</strong></td>
<td>Review of NPT</td>
<td>Intelligence sharing</td>
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Among the norms of this regime are the ideas that terrorists, having less to lose, are more likely than states to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); that states can and should deter and punish terrorists, possibly with the help of international organizations. The most debated norm is the claim that countries have the right and responsibility to intervene, if the ‘host country’ is unable or unwilling to tackle terrorism. The rules of the counter-terrorism regime are slowly evolving. One notable success has been in the area of interdiction of terrorist financing. The procedures of
counter-terrorism cooperation are in fact more developed than the foundational components of the regime. Quiet, functional cooperation among intelligence and police bureaucracies has been ongoing.

The nonproliferation regime consists of formal treaties (the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements) and informal elements (declaratory statements regarding doctrine by state leaders). Similarly, the counter-terrorism regime has both formal and informal components: treaties such as the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (1999) and informal information exchanges among governments.

Table 6.2: Nonproliferation and Counter-terrorism Regimes: Components

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<th>Nonproliferation</th>
<th>Counter-terrorism</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Treaties</strong></td>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Terrorist Financing Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>International institutions</strong></td>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>Interpol</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intergovernmental cooperation</strong></td>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Joint Working Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Norm leader initiatives</strong></td>
<td>Export controls</td>
<td>US State Dept ‘watch list’</td>
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Because of its military and economic strength the US has the role of ‘norm leader’ in the regime. Much of the literature addressing international cooperation on terrorism is a response to 9/11, and is focused on US policy. It is important not to confuse the international regime with the US-led ‘war on terror.’ It is often argued that the selective multilateral approach of the US in Iraq and elsewhere hinders the growth of
an effective international regime against terrorism. However, I have defined international norms as practices that are generally accepted by the international community and justified in terms of principles. Therefore, I will look at American actions as part of the regime and study their impact on the regime. After all, even US strategy combines military intervention with more multilateral (but less visible) efforts such as promoting a comprehensive convention. As the 9/11 Commission Report said: “Practically every aspect of US counterterrorism strategy relies on international cooperation” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 371).

If we compare the reasonably robust and well-articulated nonproliferation regime of today to the contemporary counter-terrorism regime, the latter does appear feeble. However, there are many similarities between the latter and the early stage of the former. First, we witness similar debates over the definition of the problem and categorization of members. Second, we note a tug of war between multilateral and unilateral initiatives. Third, the role of the US as norm leader is prominent in both. Fourth, in both cases the nature of the threat is international. Aware that nuclear research was an international endeavor in the 1930s and 1940s, the victorious powers of World War II tried to draw national boundaries tighter. But they soon realized the futility of their attempts and initiated multilateral efforts to control nuclear technology.

There are of course important differences between the two regimes. First, the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world has no obvious sharp ideological divide unlike the post-World War II world. Thanks to technology and globalization the international community is far more cohesive today (yet more vulnerable to international terrorism). Second, terrorism is extremely difficult to detect and defuse, especially in
democracies. Nuclear technology, by contrast, is sophisticated enough that it can easily be brought under state control (although this assumption is being questioned by the revelations about the A. Q. Khan network). Third, enforcing a regime of nuclear nonproliferation does not have the same far-ranging implications for domestic politics as counter-terrorism, which affects the very relation between the nation-state and the citizen. The counter-terrorism regime is at a formative moment, propitious for revealing the operation of contending forces. This is an opportunity to study the operation of the processes I have identified in the nonproliferation regime in a different issue-area and time period.

**At the international-domestic intersection**

States feel the impact of the counter-terrorism regime in two ways. First, the regime obliges and permits them to make changes in their internal policies on civil rights, intelligence, financial flows and so on. Second, they are required to cooperate with other countries according to the regime’s principles. Thus the regime influences their foreign policies, not only on issues relating directly to terrorism (such as extradition) but also their alliances, membership of international organizations, and so on.

In order to closely examine the effects of the regime on national policies, I have chosen the country that I have been studying for the last few years. As it strives to create a cohesive nation-state, India faces challenges—varying in intensity—based on regional, religious, linguistic, and/or class identities. We observe a three-tiered state response to these challenges: first, a political order based on liberal constitutionalism, state-backed secular nationalism and state-led social economic development; second, power-sharing in terms of group rights and devolution of authority; and as the last
resort—coercion and force (Bajpai 1997, 33). Here I restrict myself to the foreign policy dimension of India’s response to these challenges.

Indian diplomacy has shifted from opposing even a definition of terrorism by the international community, to authoring the draft comprehensive convention against terrorism that the UN is currently debating. The conclusions from this close examination of the Indian case should apply to other regimes and countries. India is not alone in its efforts to use counter-terrorism to garner rewards from the international system. The Chinese government demanded “reciprocity and mutual benefit” in counter-terrorism cooperation with the US (Suryanarayana 2002a). Putin used counter-terrorism rhetoric to justify repression in Chechnya (Lapidus 2002). President Musharraf of Pakistan sought $700 million in American aid and consolidated his political position (Anon 2002e; Rajghatta 2002a).

Faced with a similar threat from terrorism, countries choose different strategies that are determined by their distinctive conceptions of legitimate authority, internal power structure, and their relations to the international sphere. For instance, Germany’s strategy is high-technology and state-centered, whereas Japan chose an informal strategy centered on police-society networks (Katzenstein 1993). Naturally, states’ participation in international cooperation against terrorism will also depend on their domestic politics. History, domestic forces and geopolitical considerations make the European response to the terrorist threat significantly different from the North American (Delpech 2002).

The French political class views terrorism as a permanent and inevitable part of national life. The attempt is to control and minimize it, an approach that differs greatly
from the American concept of a ‘war’ on terrorism (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 89). A centralized state and greater tolerance for police monitoring shape French strategy (Shapiro and Suzan 2003, 88). France has one of the world's most comprehensive judicial arsenals against terrorism (Bigo 2002, 82). Counter-terrorist work is based on human intelligence and a strong legal and political framework. Investigative magistracies, a uniquely French institution, are used to good effect. Effective inter-agency, and to a lesser extent international, cooperation is valued (Gregory 2003, 143). Police cooperation is considered the most crucial of all forms of international endeavor (Guillaume 1993, 133). Germany’s view, clearly influenced by its domestic strategy, was that terrorism should be countered with careful police work and international legal proceedings (Katzenstein 2003). Terrorism was already a source of tension between US and Europe in the 1990s (von Hippel 2004, 106). The 9/11 attacks shone a bright light on these fissures.

Yet, as countries try to establish their identities in an international regime, they are obliged to make changes in domestic politics. Norms such as democracy and human rights become ways to identify oneself as belonging to a particular category of states (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 9). Consider the case of France. Its approach was conditioned by its historically high degree of tolerance for political violence, as well as a Gaullist determination to play an independent role. Resistance to political persecution fostered attitudes favorable to liberal political asylum (Chalk 1996, 118-19). The French Left has traditionally opposed the extradition of political offenders, and one of the first acts of the Mitterand government was to stop the extradition of an ETA member to Spain (Lodge and Freestone 1982, 83). In January 1978, a suspect in the 1972 Munich Olympics attack was arrested in France on an Interpol warrant. Although France was a signatory to the 1977 European Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism, he was released by a French court instead of being extradited to Germany. Shortly afterwards, France signed a big Mirage aircraft deal with Egypt (Wilkinson 1978, 13).

France’s policy of negotiating with terrorists complicated its relations with its neighbors. As France became enmeshed in the structures of European integration its commitment to a European identity necessitated acceptance of institutional rules. The requirements of the 1995 Schengen agreement easing border controls among several European states brought France closer to the mainstream, as did its membership in Europol, the support service for European law enforcement agencies, and Eurojust, which coordinates domestic judiciaries on criminal justice issues. In June 2002 the European Arrest Warrant was formalized superseding extradition procedures. Undoubtedly, as France increasingly became a target for Islamic terrorism, security considerations also forced a hard line on terrorism.

Countries that could be accused of being state sponsors of terrorism face drastic consequences, including even pre-emptive invasion. States today have strong incentives to dissociate themselves from any associations with terrorist groups. The international regime is establishing the principle that countries have obligations to weed out terrorism domestically, and prevent the export of terrorism to other states. Such obligations put enormous pressure on multi-ethnic and weak states. In the former the delicate balance of power is upset by demands to bring terrorists to justice; the latter may not have the wherewithal to root out terrorist organizations. These effects are not mutually exclusive; Pakistan, for instance, is a weak multi-ethnic state.
The most dramatic illustration of the perversion of counter-terrorism norms to secure international support was seen in Macedonia. In March 2002 seven South Asians were gunned down by the Macedonian police, who later claimed that they had intended to bomb vital installations and Western embassies. Two years later, a new government in Skopje admitted that these were in fact illegal immigrants trying to cross into Greece. The shootings had been staged to show the world that the government was serious about participating in the war on terror: “It was a monstrous fabrication to get the attention of the international community” (Anon 2004b). The Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boshkovski, who was facing strong opposition, attempted through these murders to establish the reputation of being tough on terrorism among Western governments (Alagjozovski 2002).

**Theoretical predictions for the counter-terrorism regime**

What sort of international activity should we expect to see in this formative moment in the regime? Realists point out that the structure of international politics has not been transformed by the 2001 attacks, or even by terrorism as a phenomenon. Consequently, “although a mile wide, the anti-terrorist coalition is only an inch deep” (Waltz 2002, 353). Many believe that there can be no real allies in this ‘uncivil war’ (Marwah 1995, 363). Realists predict that counter-terrorism norms would serve as a cover for hegemonic US designs, and would be violated whenever convenient.

Realists, however, would expect to see states taking advantage of the hegemon’s changing priorities. In the mid-1980s, Pakistan took the separatist movement in Kashmir under the wing of its covert agency, Inter Services Intelligence. American funding for Islamic militants in Afghanistan was diverted to the cause of Kashmir.
Pakistan was among the opportunistic actors who used the overarching discourse of Communist containment discourse to paint the Taliban and associated Kashmiri groups as freedom fighters and US allies. India, in turn, today uses the larger counter-terrorism discourse to its advantage.

In a Structural Realist perspective, the counter-terrorism regime emerges from the threat perceptions of powerful states; a country such as India can only attempt to negotiate the best deal possible within the evolving framework. Statist Realists predict that foreign policy will strive to bring the force of international cooperation to bear on states’ domestic challenges. The mid-1980s saw a quantitative and qualitative change in the nature of India’s terrorism threat. Official figures in 2001 stated that in the past fifteen years 61,000 civilians and 8,500 security personnel were killed in terrorist activity (Anon 2001c). Pakistan’s involvement in Kashmiri militancy remains India’s most significant terrorist threat, though recent events indicate foreign-supported militancy was responsible for violence all over the country. As foreign actors became more active in internal violence, India changed its stance on terrorism.

While both these approaches lead to plausible accounts of Indian policy, they ignore the potential for agency, just as they see regimes as constraining or regulative. India, relatively powerless, is only an object of international regimes. An examination of structure-agency interaction shows that while structure can constrain actors’ choices, actors can shape structure. In fact while India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy is

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1 The government of India currently claims that nearly half the militants in Kashmir are Pakistani nationals. Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, 14 May 2003, New Delhi. India also accused Pakistan of fomenting Sikh militancy in Punjab in the 1980s. Pakistan blames India for supporting insurgencies in Sindh and other provinces. India has also blamed China in the past for aiding secessionists in the Northeastern states of India, and Maoist groups in other states.
structured by regime norms, it simultaneously seizes an influential location at this formative moment in the regime’s evolution.

Liberal Institutionalism would predict the use of international agreements to ‘bind’ powerful states. Currently, although counter-terrorism is meagerly institutionalized, weaker states do draw on normative resources to achieve similar effects. Liberal theories do not adequately take this into account. Moreover, they do not consider the domestic effects of the deployment of international norms. My account shows that while Indian elites use the intangible power of international norms invoked against terrorism, they become constrained by the normative forces they deploy. Domestic Politics explanations emphasize the importance of varying domestic structures and ideologies. They predict that the same structural imperatives would be experienced and responded to differently. While these fine-grained accounts add depth to our understanding of the regime’s functioning, they tend to ignore the gradual transformation of national identity in the crucible of the regime. This is a ‘blind spot’ that domestic politics models share with Systemic Constructivist accounts, which, as discussed in Chapter 1, separate and counterpose the state’s social identity (the state in relation to other units in the international system) from its “corporate identity” (the glue that holds the state together). This analysis studies the effects of regime norms on national identity.

It extends Constructivist work in two other ways. First, it focuses on the strategic use of norms. Constructivists are concerned with showing that norms are not simply instruments of the powerful. However, states do use norms in strategic ways. It is important to study such behavior which in fact testifies to the power of the norm. Even if hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue, we can only identify what
standards of virtue by observing how nations—hypocritical or not—portray themselves. Second, my work discusses how norms matter. While Constructivists seek to establish that norms matter as independent variables, their analyses lack empirical documentation of how agent properties are changed (Checkel 2001). My account is firmly focused on process. This implies also that I remain agnostic about the ‘real’ or ‘deep’ causes of strategic change—which may well include variables from Realist and Liberal paradigms described above. That is, I do not deny the element of necessity but seek to study its implications.

**Regimes at work—four processes**

The counter-terrorism regime defines terrorism and categorizes states accordingly. These two constitutive processes create rights and responsibilities that are enforced by states and international institutions. Definition and categorization shape state behavior by setting up standards for appropriate, responsible and just behavior. They also shape the regulative processes of institutionalization and enforcement. While the account below of their evolution illustrates that they are contingent on power, it also shows that once certain norms have been established in the global public, they take on a life of their own and structure the actions of dominant powers. India, a relatively powerless state, strengthens this aspect of constitutive power by citing international norms in support of its actions.

**Definition**

In Chapter 2 I discussed debates over the definition of proliferation. The definition of terrorism is similarly revealing of power politics. A study in the 1980s found 109 definitions of terrorism (Schmid 1983). Ajai Sahni, of the Institute for Conflict
Management (India’s foremost thinktank on terrorism) admits that terrorism is an inherently contested concept: “Every victim state has an interest in defining terrorism more widely, every state supporting terrorism wants a narrower definition.”

From a lawyer’s perspective, “terrorism is a term without legal significance...at once a shorthand to allude to a variety of problems with some common elements, and a method of indicating community condemnation for the conduct concerned” (Higgins 1997, 28).

Following UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 3034, triggered by a spate of terrorist incidents, an Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism was created in 1972. However, the Committee’s deliberations were hampered by a sharp division in approach between Western countries and developing nations. The former favored practical cooperative efforts, while the latter stressed the importance of first defining terrorism such that it distinguished *terrorists from freedom fighters*. This second group also reminded the international community that the *root causes* of terrorism (in poverty, colonial occupation, racism) had to be addressed (Perera 1997, 49; Reisman 1999a, 23). I will call these the ‘definitional’ and ‘root causes’ arguments. Only a year after the Ad Hoc Committee was set up, one scholar-diplomat described a sense of déjà vu as each delegation remained wedded to its position (Hoveyda 1977, 81).

The 1972 Ad Hoc Committee’s mandate itself included not only “measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes

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2 Author’s interview with Ajai Sahni, New Delhi, 11 April 2003.

3 The Annex to the Ad Hoc Committee’s Report features the demands of the Nonaligned Group of 14 of which India was a leading member. GAOR: 28th Session, Supplement #28 (A/9028), United Nations, NY, 1973.
fundamental freedoms” but also a “study of the underlying causes which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair, and which causes some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to affect radical changes.” The UNGA seemed to be at least as interested in understanding and rationalizing terrorism as in ending it (Luck 2004a, 98; Schoenberg 2003, 22). The 1979 Hostage Convention, for instance, included a clause stating that it did not apply to wars of self-determination (Schoenberg 2003, 40).

During this period, several conventions were formulated to dealing with specific threats in what came to be known as the ‘piecemeal approach.’ The ‘comprehensive approach’, on the other hand, became identified with endless ideological debate. It was favored by nonaligned and post-colonial countries, trying to safeguard the legitimacy of self-determination movements. The cases of Palestine and Namibia were of particular concern (Perera 1997, 10). In fact the Arab group pulled off a political feat by linking the liberation struggles in Southern Africa to the question of Palestine (Schoenberg 2003, 31). The Political Declaration at the Seventh Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi (1983) emphasizes that each case of terrorism is different (Misra 1987, 47). The declaration suggests that it is impossible to define terrorism, and highlights the issue of ‘state’ terrorism.

By the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet alternative, the adoption of terrorist tactics by movements everywhere, and the increased vulnerability of societies, the tide...

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of world opinion had turned. UNGA Resolution 44/29 of December 1989 exemplifies this conflict of norms. The phrase “not justifiable” and “criminal...whenever and by whoever committed” in the Resolution follows a perambulator clause that reiterates the right of self-determination. The implication of the order of these phrases was taken to mean that the right to self-determination, which continues to be an important part of UN policy, cannot justify acts of terror (Obote-Odora 1999). Peterson’s study of the titles and the preambles of UNGA resolutions and declarations also records a shift in the early 1990s (Peterson 2004, 175-76). The 1991 UNGA resolution further defined freedom fighters as “those who struggle legimately” against oppression (emphasis mine). The rate of ratification of multilateral conventions against terrorism also increased significantly (Peterson 2004, 181, 89). The 1994 UNGA Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism was the strongest expression of states’ determination to tackle terrorism, omitting references to liberation movements, state terrorism, or understanding for the offender (Reisman 1999a, 25).

Thus, even before the 2001 attacks on the US, the world community had increasingly taken a hard line on terrorism. However, UNSC Resolution 1373 (UNSC 1373), passed soon after 9/11, completely rejected ideological justifications for terrorism. Its objective is to ensure that states cannot be used by terrorists as safe havens. Although UNSC 1373 does not explicitly define terrorism, it has definitional effects. Terrorism

\[\text{Resistance to this definition persists, including within the UN. For instance, see the storm over the Report on Human Rights and Terrorism by the UN Special Rapporteur (Koufa 1999).}\]

\[\text{It has been suggested that UNSC 1373’s lack of a definition of terrorism was vital to its promulgation. However, in 2004, the UNSC quietly came close to defining terrorism in Resolution 1566 as follows: “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to} \]

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is described as non-political, in that it targets all members of the state system—like the pirate, the terrorist is the enemy of all mankind (*hostis humanis generis*). This is a direct refutation of ‘one man’s terrorist…’ logic.

Such a definition empty of all references to ideology provides a lowest common denominator for agreement among states. In political terms, it has the effect of polarizing attitudes towards a host of movements—from secular self-determination struggles, to indigenous rights movements, to religious militancy; and delegitimates all of them once they resort to violence against the state. Supporters of this approach admit that there will be some ‘hard cases’, but believe that the distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists can be made on a case-by-case basis (Brown 2004, 53). As Richard Price puts it, the international community has decided that it knows terrorism when it sees it (Price 2004, 270). Countries that earlier raised objections to definitions of terrorism are now coming up with their own definitions. For instance, the Organization of Islamic Countries in 1999 produced the Burkina Faso draft (Organisation of Islamic Countries 1999). The April 2002 meeting of this organization declared its opposition to intervention in any Islamic state. Delegates wanted to include state terrorism (in a clear reference to Israel) and distinguish acts of terror from legitimate resistance by people in occupied lands. However, they also praised US efforts to combat terror and rejected an Iraqi suggestion to use oil as a weapon (Sussex 2001, 32). The ‘root causes’ argument has been similarly discredited. Critics claim that it gives aid and comfort to terrorists, pointing to inconsistent correlations between terrorism and a ‘root cause’ such as poverty (Dershowitz 2002, 24-25).


ensure that such acts are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature.”
The UN Secretary-General appealed to the Arab League in 2005 to come to a consensus on a definition of terrorism, claiming that the lack of an agreed-upon definition hindered efforts against terrorism. Scholars also claim that cooperation is thinner than it should be because governments do not agree on what is prohibited (Bosco 2006). Is this drive towards definition motivated only by functionalism? Governments are already cooperating against terrorism on an informal basis under current laws and treaties. Definition seems to matter for defining and fixing state identities.

**India and definition**

In the 1970s when terrorism appeared on the agenda of the international community, India was maintaining its identity as leader of the Third World; consequently, it opposed Western resolutions and supported the definitional and root causes arguments. However, as it set out to influence the global consensus against terrorism traditional positions were diluted. Indian diplomats now oppose definitional and root causes arguments, suggesting that they are politically motivated and “weaken the ongoing global fight against terrorism” (Suryanarayana 2002b). The position is that international legal mechanisms cannot and should not concern themselves with root causes: “Terrorism can only be defined with reference to the act and its consequences, not by a description of the perpetrators of the act and ascribing labels to them. Terrorists are criminals and therefore, alibis or rationalizations advanced by the advocates of the ‘root causes’ cannot absolve terrorists from their culpability” (Permanent Mission of India to the UN 2003). PM Vajpayee said in his address to the UNGA: “We must firmly rebuff any ideological, political or religious justification for

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7 The Annex to the Ad Hoc Committee’s Report features the demands of the Nonaligned Group of 14 of which India was a member. GAOR: 28th Session, Supplement #28 (A/9028), United Nations, NY, 1973.
terrorism. We should reject self-serving arguments seeking to classify terrorism according to its root causes, and therefore justifying terrorist action somewhere while condemning it elsewhere. Those that advance these arguments should explain what the root causes of the brutal acts of September 11 were” (2001).

Just as the international community was accepting the need for a broader approach to terrorism, India presented it with a draft comprehensive convention in 1996 (Embassy of India nd). Indian diplomats do fear the UN as a forum where ‘sponsored’ NGOs rake up the country’s human rights record (Ghose 2001). However, they realized that a draft would give India an enormous first-mover advantage. India seems to have learned from its experience in disarmament negotiations where non-participation led to its isolation. Moving away from its preference for large councils with majority voting, India expresses caution about the utility of convening an international conference to arrive at a consensus definition of terrorism (Asian African Legal Consultative Committee 2001, 9, 11).

India today attempts to broaden the definition of terrorism to include all types of internal challenges, and narrow it to exclude states as perpetrators of terrorism. Article 2 of India’s draft covers “any means” used in a terrorist act, defined as one intended to intimidate a population or to compel a government or international organization. Article 5 states that the offenses can under no circumstances be justified by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or similar nature. Thus, while terrorism is separated from common crime by reference to political motivations, it cannot be justified by such motivations. India holds that ‘state terrorism’ can be dealt with under the rubric of ‘state responsibility’ in international law; instead, it emphasizes ‘state sponsorship’. UNSC 1373 became a rallying point
for ‘victim states’ like India (2001a). Indian leaders pointed out that under this resolution, *all forms* of support to terrorists were proscribed. Therefore, even Pakistan’s claim that it was only giving moral or political support to militants in Kashmir rendered it culpable (Abdullah 2001).

The Indian draft is meant to plug gaps in the existing sectoral conventions; to target countries that provide support and safe havens; and to deal with terrorist acts that are multi-dimensional. It covers violence by any means or any device; includes damage to property, installations and communication facilities, apart from loss of life and injuries inflicted by terrorist acts. Hence it is described as ‘comprehensive’ (Ministry of External Affairs 2001). Various international groupings have come out in support of such an act. While acts of terrorism are illegal under various piecemeal conventions, there is no single law under which countries can be sanctioned for supporting or tolerating terrorism. For instance, because it does not address the state-sponsorship of perpetrators, Western countries chose not to use the Montreal Convention on Civil Aviation in the trial relating to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103, (Higgins 1997, 23).

The UNGA Sixth Committee formed an Ad Hoc Committee, which in turn created a Working Group to conduct negotiations on the Indian draft. The article defining terrorism has been a sticking point, as expected. The Organization of Islamic Countries introduced an amendment asking for an exemption for attacks on occupying

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forces (this was intended to legitimize Palestinian actions). Israel and the US opposed this amendment (Varadarajan 2002).  

Categorization

Regimes define the problem to be confronted, and they also define categories of members with corresponding rights and responsibilities. The current definition has the effect of conclusively sidelining the issue of state terrorism—colonial or neo-colonial exploitation of other countries or the use of excessive force against a state’s own citizens. Instead, states are sought to be held responsible for sponsorship of terrorism. Sponsorship includes the supply of territorial sanctuary, money, arms, training or intelligence to terrorists operating in another country, even international diplomatic assistance. The actions listed are offenses against the sovereignty of the target state, and therefore already illegal under international law (Obote-Odora 1999). However, by linking them to the emotive issue of terrorism, state culpability for these offenses becomes even more pronounced in the court of public opinion. Sponsorship is what renders states ‘terrorist.’ In this vein, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called North Korea a “terrorist state” and a “terrorist regime” (Rumsfeld 2003) and President Bush referred to Afghanistan before 2001 as a “terrorist state” (Bush 2004).

If terrorism by definition is directed against the state, states can have two identities: victims of terrorism, or state ‘sponsors’ of terrorism. The question of ‘state terrorism’ has been removed from the agenda.  


10 Achin Vanaik discusses the differences between the sponsorship, organization and execution of terrorism by states (Vanaik 2002a).
actors. Violence directed by the state against its own citizens cannot be called terrorism. In response to charges that this definition is regressive and denies the reality that states are often the gravest threats to human security, it is asserted that state behavior is regulated by other international conventions.

Unlike the nonproliferation regime where the NPT formally names categories of states, in the counter-terrorism regime states can declare themselves victims of terrorism. In the absence of an authority to adjudicate the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism the US as norm leader performs this function. The US Export Administration Act in 1979 began the practice of requiring the State Department to come up with a list of countries supporting terrorism. This has since been established as a reporting requirement (Rochefort 2005). Now various countries call upon the US government to designate others as state sponsors. Currently there are six state sponsors of terrorism on the list: Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Syria and Sudan (Iraq was removed from the list in 2004). Being on this list has consequences not only for trade and travel with the US, but with the international arena as a whole.\(^\text{11}\)

The State Department reports, originally called *Patterns of Terrorism* were recently renamed *Country Reports* and became less statistical in content. The US government presents these reports as objective and scientific.\(^\text{12}\) These are also cited by foreign political actors for their own ends. For instance, “the geographical shift of the locus of

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\(^{11}\) Penalties include political sanctions, suspension of military sales and foreign aid, bans on financial transactions, granting of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and second-order bans on other countries or commercial organizations doing business with those states. In 1989 the US Antiterrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act updated this statute by providing for the immediate imposition of sanctions on state sponsors of terrorism. In 1996 the US Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) made it illegal for defense-related items to be sold to listed countries.

\(^{12}\) In February 2003, when Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was asked about the escalatory effects of his naming of North Korea as a terrorist state, he claimed that he was stating a ‘fact’ since North Korea had been on the ‘terrorist state’ list for several years (Rumsfeld 2003).
terror from the Middle East to South Asia” highlighted in Patterns of Global Terrorism (1999) played into the hands of the Indian government. The objectivity of the definitions and measurements employed in these reports has been questioned (Krueger and Laitin 2004; Rochefort 2005). The 9/11 Commission’s investigations revealed an instance of the politics of the state sponsors list. In 1998, Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of State, decided not to include Pakistan on the list. She worried that since relations with Pakistan after its nuclear tests in the summer were fragile, such a move would destroy any influence that the US had in Pakistani affairs (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004, 123).

India and categorization

India deploys its secular and democratic credentials to assure itself of the benefits of membership in the more desirable ‘victim of terrorism’ category (Krishnaswami 2000). In fact, the claim is that there is no other country as affected by terrorism as India. India has demanded that the US declare Pakistan a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’. However, I could not find any serious diplomatic efforts pursuing this goal. Presenting itself as threatened specifically by Islamic terrorism allows India to position itself as a victim beside Western states and argue for the privileges they exercise in dealing with that threat (Chellaney 2001/02, 98; Tellis 2001, 55). However, at times India’s identification of a global Islamic threat collides with its attribution of responsibility to the Pakistani government—for instance when the latter

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13 In fact, the discovery of significant statistical errors (with political ramifications) in the 2002 Patterns of Terrorism led the State Department to move to the more descriptive Country Reports.
14 Author’s interview with Surendra Arora, BJP Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, 28 July 2003, New Delhi.
15 In July 1993 Pakistan was taken off the watchlist of state sponsors of terrorism (Raman 2000, 61). It has been alleged that in order to escape being categorized as a state sponsor, Pakistan moved terrorist training camps from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Afghanistan in 1994 (Sood and Sawhney 2003, 34).
16 It has been suggested that India’s Ministry of External Affairs, influenced by the American discourse, is more eager to cite ‘global Islamic terrorism’ than the Ministries of Home and Defence, which see Pakistan as directly culpable for terrorism in India (Prasannan 1999).
claimed it had no authority over the Kargil infiltrators. Positioning itself in this category also allows India to cement alliances, for instance, with Russia (Guha 1999b; Gupta 2005, 13).

India uses counter-terrorism as the foundation for bilateral collaboration, including military-to-military ties that would otherwise be controversial. India, which had refused to allow the Soviet Union to use bases on its territory during the Cold War, offered the US bases, airfields and intelligence for the Afghanistan campaign (Chellaney 2001/02, 99). India and the US set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism in 2000 (Boucher 2002b). This was the first time that the American government had joined such a group (Black 2003). In this less formal setting the US can discuss issues ranging from strategies against Al Qaeda to border surveillance technology to financial laws. The Indian Army, experienced in counter-insurgency, now provides training for US soldiers (Mazumdar 2005).

India did not have diplomatic relations with Israel until 1992 and was a stalwart supporter of the Palestinian cause. India’s large Muslim population constrains the government from adopting a pro-Israeli stance, but counter-terrorism is more acceptable as basis for cooperation. Close relationships in procurement, training and military exchange have been initiated (Anon 2000b; Harman 2000; Mago 2003; Paz 2000). The official communiqué at the end of the 2002 meeting of the India-Israel Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism stated that the dialogue was undertaken in the context of international counter-terrorism, and specifically in light of UNSC 1373 (Ministry of External Affairs 2002).

17 Author’s interview with Ashley Tellis, Washington DC, 25 August 2005.
Institutionalization

International institutions represent a concentration of technical and organizational resources devoted to an issue-area. Their services include standardization, dispute settlement, and facilitation of discussion. The debate in the current literature, responding to the ‘war on terrorism’, revolves around the issue of unilateralism. As in nonproliferation, in counter-terrorism the perception is that the US is imposing unilateral dictates, while the rest of the world (including America’s European allies) favors multilateralism. I suggest here that the multilateral-unilateral distinction is not so stark. Multilateral institutions are influenced by definition and categorization. A paradoxical consequence is that they can furnish justifications for unilateralist actions. In this section and the next, I attempt to show how definition and categorization determine the type of institutions and the manner of enforcement in the counter-terrorism regime.

The first effect of the constitutive processes discussed above is to delineate the identities that countries can aspire to. Traditional groupings such as ‘nonaligned’ and ‘Islamic’ are fractured as their members realize the importance of being placed in the ‘right’ category by the counter-terrorism regime. Countries like Pakistan, Cuba, Libya, and Syria still employ the definitional and root causes arguments, but find themselves viewed with increasing suspicion by the international community. In this manner, institutional challenges to the hegemonic definition of terrorism are weakened.

Within the UN, which was the arena for the terrorism debate, multilateral entities now operate within the parameters set by constitutive processes. The UNSC, which has taken a more activist stance on terrorism than the General Assembly, set up a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor implementation of UNSC 1373. The Committee’s
goal is to bring about convergence among member-states on financing, policing, and other counter-terrorism measures. We note a remarkably quick pace of compliance with UNSC 1373 as measured by the reports submitted by countries to the Committee (Rosand 2003, 337-38). This testifies to the importance that states are giving to the counter-terrorism regime.

The UN has served as the forum for far-reaching international legislation aimed at terrorism. The negotiation of the Terrorist Financing Convention in 1999 is an often-overlooked success. As per the Convention “states must make the provision of such funding a criminal offense under their domestic laws and confiscate assets allocated for terrorist purposes.” In April 2005 the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was adopted by the UNGA and opened for signature (Welsh 2005b).

However, the US and its allies are still wary of multilateral bodies based on their experience in the Cold War period described above. Mirroring trends in the nonproliferation regime, informal intergovernmental networks are being favored over formal bodies under UN auspices. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), especially the container security component, has become palatable to governments that are formally opposed to the nonproliferation regime. The US-led PSI is presented as a “broad partnership” of countries which, “using their own laws and resources”, will “coordinate their actions” to halt shipments of dangerous technologies among states and non-state actors of proliferation concern (Rajamohan 2003b). Similarly, in the counter-terrorism regime the Financial Action Task Force, established in 1989, functions as a standards-setting body. Membership in this body is conditional on
implementing specific measures to restrict transnational flows to formal financial institutions. Thus it targets networks such as South Asia’s hawala system.

**Enforcement**

Enforcement includes both positive incentives (inducements) and negative incentives (sanctions). States’ interests are determined by their identity choices, and the processes of definition and categorization have established the range of possible identities. However, enforcement is still important in that it reinforces definition and categorization. The counter-terrorism regime, as we have seen, excludes the issue of ‘demand’—that is, the question of why individuals or groups would resort to terrorist tactics. Enforcement seeks international cooperation to restrict supply (of weapons, especially those capable of ‘mass destruction’, finance, and other important resources such as territory). The focus is on the supply to terrorists, not the supply of terrorists. The definitions of terrorism and the support of it, allow powerful actors to violate other norms of international society in their enforcement of counter-terrorism.

None of the existing anti-terrorism conventions has specific enforcement measures to ensure that states abide by treaty obligations (International Bar Association’s Task Force on International Terrorism 2003, 6). The 1994 UNGA Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism enjoins a ‘soft law’ positive obligation on states to secure the non-use of their territory by terrorists. Can a country be attacked for supporting terrorism? Some international lawyers argue that military intervention would violate the principles of necessity and proportionality (Kirgis 1998). Others

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18 The issue of the supply of small arms and light weapons, which are by far the most common terrorist weapons, is one of the eloquent ‘silences’ of the current counter-terrorism regime.
retort that such a restrictive interpretation is inappropriate for a world menaced by terrorism (Roberts 1987).

By designating terrorism “a threat to international peace and security” the UNSC in fact paved the way for a military approach to terrorism (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 158). In particular, Resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001, in response to the attacks on the US, legitimizes unilateral military action. The resolution did not call for collective action, and instead declaring that the right to national self-defense was applicable against terrorists (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 160).

The UNSC also imposed sanctions against terrorism in 1992 against Libya, in 1996 against Sudan, and in 1999 against the Taliban (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 151). In 1993 the Clinton administration authorized a cruise missile strike on Iraqi intelligence services headquarters in response to an attempted assassination of the previous president. It asserted in the UNSC that this action was undertaken in self-defense as per Article 51 (Luck 2004b, 92). Moreover, the UNSC did not condemn the 1998 ‘anti-terrorist’ strikes by the US on Afghanistan and Sudan. These acts appear to support the American argument that non-compliance with Resolution 1373 amounts to a just cause for the use of military force (de Jonge Oudraat 2004, 165).

The US intervention in Iraq is obviously the major event in norm creation since one of the justifications given was that Iraq was sponsoring terrorism (the others being failure to comply with UN disarmament resolutions and later, internal oppression). Recent studies have shown that the Bush administration took advantage of (rather than created) a linkage in the public mind between the Islamist terrorism of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s government (Althaus and Largio 2004).
On the one hand, the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq forcing ‘regime change’ struck a massive blow to the legal, diplomatic efforts of the counter-terrorism regime. On the other hand, we note that the US was *forced in some ways* to pay obeisance to regime norms. Some scholars have argued that the global debate leading up to the war in Iraq signals widespread support for existing international norms. Most states continue to see force as a last resort, properly subject to multilateral control in all but the most urgent cases of self-defense. The nature of American diplomatic maneuverings in the United Nations and the public statements of high-level officials suggest that even the US recognizes the importance of these norms.

The US did make an initial concerted effort to get UN approval. The President in September 2002 assured the General Assembly that his administration would work with the UNSC for the necessary resolutions to intervene in Iraq, though he warned that it was ready to proceed sans authorization. The next month, the US Congress gave the President the authority to use force in Iraq without such approval. In November 2002, the US managed to get the UNSC to pass Resolution 1441, which finds Iraq in material breach of earlier resolutions and warns it of serious consequences if it did not cooperate with the UN. Whether this resolution *automatically* authorizes the use of force by member-states (without further authorization by the UNSC) has been a point of contention. At least one country in the US-led coalition of the willing has argued that it does, thereby justifying its participation in the Iraq campaign. As is now well known, in March 2003 France, Russia and China announced they would veto any new ‘use of force resolution’ and the US commenced its campaign outside the UN.

It may seem that the international norm that intervention should be multilateral has not mitigated US behavior. However, the concept of the ‘coalition of the willing’ does
acknowledge the multilateralist norm. Moreover, on account of framing the issue as one of ‘civilization’ against terrorism, the US is obliged to at least rhetorically support each country when it declares itself menaced by terrorism (or resort unconvincingly to American exceptionalism), whether or not that is in the American interest. I will explore in more detail the consequences of this constraint in the analysis of US policy in South Asia.

India: institutions and enforcement

India has used international forums to reinforce its role in counter-terrorism for some years now, working to influence their resolutions and agreements to reflect its preferred norms. For instance, in June 1993 as states debated the Declaration and Program of Action at the World Conference on Human Rights in Geneva, the Indian delegation worked to include language to the effect that terrorism constituted violation of human rights. The leader of the delegation claimed that for the first time there was no qualifier in the declaration distinguishing terrorism from struggles for self-determination (Kunadi 1995, 91). While these multilateral efforts help India consolidate its identity in the global counter-terrorism regime, at the regional level India practises the sort of selective multilateralism that is associated with the US.

At the Tenth Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Summit in Jakarta India successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a clause in the Final Declaration calling upon member-states to “fulfill their obligations to international law and refrain from organizing, instigating and assisting” terrorism in other countries (Misra 1993, 171). A decade later, the negotiation of the final declaration at the Twelfth NAM Summit in Kuala Lumpur was the arena for an illustrative encounter between these two opposing approaches. India moved an amendment condemning state-sponsored terrorism.
Pakistan submitted an alternative text condemning attempts to portray self-determination movements as terrorism (2003g). Pakistani leader Musharraf declared that struggles for self-determination in places such as Kashmir and Palestine should not be confused with terrorism. Responding to India’s repeated references to UNSC 1373, he condemned the “selective approach to UN resolutions.” Vajpayee’s speech struck back citing the main themes of Indian counter-terrorist diplomacy: “Does [Musharraf] go into the root causes of sectarian terrorism in his country? Or does he take stern action against the perpetrators of that terrorism? He talks of the oppressed people of Kashmir. These same people very recently cast their ballots in an election universally recognized as free and fair” (Pillai 2003, 40-41).

As the pre-eminent power in South Asia, India resorts to bilateral diplomacy whenever possible at the regional level. At its first summit in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a regional grouping that the Indian government has at times been wary of, issued a declaration on terrorism and set up a study group. India was uncomfortable with this development (Perera 1997, 113-14). In fact, citing its commitment to NAM and national self-determination movements, India argued that the state should have the discretion to determine the *bona fide* character of an extradition request. Remarkably, India even refused to allow the mention of cross-boundary terrorism claiming it had no relevance to the region (Perera 1997, 122-26).

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19 Ultimately the NAM Final Declaration referred neither to state sponsorship of terrorism, nor to the distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters. The former was in Pakistan’s favor, and the latter India’s (Ved 2003).
21 Similarly when an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked to Pakistan by alleged Kashmiri terrorists in 1971, the India government rejected the Montreal Convention and international mediation in favor of bilateral debate (Lok Sabha Debates, March 29, 1971, 23-30).
India also uses bilateral treaties to reinforce its reputation as a country that is serious about combating terrorism. These are of three types: framework agreements to facilitate the exchange of operational information, extradition treaties, and mutual legal assistance agreements in criminal matters (searching persons and property, locating fugitives and property, transfer of witnesses) (Fair 2004, 80). A treaty is neither necessary nor sufficient since extradition is primarily a political decision. Yet India signed 13 extradition treaties in 2000 alone. The Deputy PM declared that India was trying to conclude as many extradition treaties as possible (2003b).

Like the US, India rejects the International Criminal Court (ICC), which could potentially evolve into a prosecutor of international terrorist crimes. The US is in fact constructing a network of bilateral ‘non-extradition’ treaties prohibiting parties from producing each other’s nationals before the ICC, thus undermining its effectiveness. In 2002, India signed such a treaty with the US (Baruah 2002b). “As strong, vibrant democracies both India and the US share concerns about the possible conflict between robust, national judicial processes and international tribunals as also the impact of such tribunals on national sovereignty,” an Indian spokesperson said (Koshy 2004).

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22 India has such agreements with Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Egypt, Italy, Oman, Romania, and Russia.
23 India has concluded extradition treaties with Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, Hong Kong, Nepal, Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and the United States. Treaties have been signed (but not exchanged) with Germany, Mongolia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. India has also entered into extradition agreements with Australia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, and Thailand.
24 India has signed such agreements with Canada, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan and has signed (but not exchanged) agreements with France, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, and the United States.
25 Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, MEA, 14 May 2003, New Delhi.


Weapons of the weak: Norms as resources in India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy

In the paragraphs above I have described India’s strategy: to influence the formulation of international norms, cite them in its foreign policy justifications, and increase its space for strategic maneuver. In this section I describe the normative resources that India draws upon to implement this strategy: extrapolation from international practice, international good citizenship, democracy, the nuclear taboo, nuclear restraint and nonproliferation, and balancing of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. I also show that this normative discourse reflects back on India and constrains it, even in ‘purely internal’ matters.

Extrapolation from international practice

The very first battle for the Indian state—and one in which it has succeeded—is to get the international community to define acts of violence against Indian citizens and/or the government as ‘terrorism’—as opposed to terms such as ‘ethnic violence, ‘civil strife’ or ‘radical movements’. The December 2002 Report of the National Security Advisory Board suggested the government use the term terrorist for various outlawed groups operating in Maharashtra, Assam, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar rather than terms such as ultras, militants, or insurgents (Anon 2003a).

For example, in an interview on CNN, the Indian Foreign Minister sharply corrected a reference to “militant groups” in Kashmir, insisting that these were “terrorist organizations” supported by the Pakistani regime (Singh 2001).\(^{26}\) Similarly, criticizing Western analysts for making a distinction between global and local terrorism, Varun Sahni writes that such a classification was based not on causes but on consequences.

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\(^{26}\) Also see his interview with El Mundo, 17 February 2002, where he asserts that Kashmir is not an ethnic conflict but an instance of terrorism (Singh 2002).
“…[i]f the victims are Americans or other citizens of the ‘democratic core’ that forms the Western security community, the terrorist act is ‘global’ and has systemic consequences. All other terrorist acts can then safely be deemed to be ‘local’, the bloody result of ‘ancient hatreds’ that characterize politics outside the democratic core” (Sahni 2003, 99-100, n.6).27

The most important theme in India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy is indeed the international nature of terrorism (Anon 2002b; Chellaney 2001/02, 109; Sharma 2001; Suryanarayana 2003a). Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal, in a veiled reference to the US ‘war on terror’ said:

International terrorism is our common challenge today and how we deal with it holds out common prospects for us all. Political expediency, short term gains, considerations of geopolitics, the difficulties in making a choice between one’s own immediate priorities and the global good, nurturing of old constituencies, faulty analysis, double standards, all these and other reasons unfortunately blur the moral clarity and political focus on how this terrorism should be dealt with (Nadkarni 2005).

India campaigns against the “segmented approach.” 28 That is, it claims that no compromises should be made with terrorist groups or with governments sponsoring terrorism. A year before 9/11 the Indian Prime Minister warned the US that distance would not always insulate Americans from terror (Suryanarayana 2003b). The 2002 Delhi Declaration by Russia and India, in what was called a “pointed reference to

27 The Council of Foreign Relations’ website furnishes a good example of India’s success. In answer to the question: “Who commits acts of terrorism in Kashmir?” it provided this answer: “ Mostly Islamists from outside Kashmir, affiliated with groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Some attacks have been linked to local pro-Pakistan and pro-independence groups”. The answer to the question: “Who commits acts of political violence in Kashmir?” was “Indian security forces, Islamist militants, and other separatist groups” (Council on Foreign Relations 2002).
28 Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, 14 May 2003, New Delhi.
Western – and particularly American – vacillation” stated: “The fight against terrorism must not admit of any double standards…” (Sahni 2002).

India presents terrorism as a global threat, and it also makes a claim about the nature of that threat. Though Indian leaders, mindful of domestic imperatives, often do not directly name Islamists as the enemy, their statements portray a secular India besieged by the forces of anti-modernism and fundamentalism. C. Rajamohan, for instance, presents India’s challenge as one of “…universalizing Enlightenment values amidst renewed resistance from obscurantist and orthodox forces” (Rajamohan 2002a, 204). Indian diplomatic strategy is sought to be recalibrated to show the roots of the Islamic terror network in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Sondhi and Kapur 2002, 12). To this end, Indian elites point out links between the individuals and groups involved in attacks on Western targets and those in India (Chellaney 2001/02, 98).

American reluctance to come to the aid of India can easily be cited as evidence of softness or hypocrisy on the issue of terrorism. The US is careful to clarify that it can only assist in India-Pakistan dialogue. Yet, thanks to American portrayal of terrorism as a threat to all states, India can maintain that it has a responsibility to tackle Pakistan. On this point Robert Jervis wrote: “Politically and rhetorically convenient in the short run, Bush's answer to the question of what terrorists we are at war with may prove troublesome over the long run. It might have been more straightforward and honorable to declare that it was only terrorists who could menace American assets and allies that were our target” (Jervis 2002). As terrorist violence and cross-border infiltration in Kashmir continued, the US began to be censured for not exerting enough pressure on Pakistan (Dixit 2002b; Sood and Sawhney 2003, 26). The role of US Deputy Secretary Armitage in conveying Musharraf’s promise of a “permanent end”
to support for militancy in Kashmir had the effect of making the US a guarantor (Winner and Yoshihara 2002, 75).

India drew upon the symbolic resources that the US deployed in Iraq against those urging it to enter into dialogue with Pakistan. In his first address to the nation after the Parliament attack, as the country prepared for troop mobilization, PM Vajpayee declared that the battle against terrorism had entered its final phase (Anon 2001g). Comparing Pakistan and Iraq, the Foreign Minister said in Parliament: “I genuinely believe if the possession of WMD, absence of democracy and export of terrorism are the criteria, then no country deserves more than Pakistan to be tackled…”29 He proposed that Pakistan be included in the ‘axis of evil’ (Suroor 2002). He declared that India had a better case for initiating pre-emptive action against Pakistan, than the US had against Iraq. The US was forced to explain, somewhat unconvincingly, that the cases could not be equated (Anon 2003d; Haqqani 2003). Opposition politicians and the media also took up the equation of Iraq and Pakistan (Anon 1999e).

Participation in international organizations
Since independence India has played a prominent role in international politics, a role quite out of proportion to its military or economic strength. Recognizing that norm-oriented diplomacy could strengthen its position, India negotiated significant successes on issues such as decolonization, foreign aid, and international trade. India is signatory to nearly all the major conventions in international law. It is widely acknowledged as a leader of the Third World and the Non-aligned Movement (although now it seeks to distance itself from these roles). India has been an enthusiastic participant in international organizations ranging from the UN, to the

Commonwealth, to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It is the third-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Thus it has built up an image as a full and conscientious member of the international community. As described in the section above on institutions, the Indian government brings up the terrorism issue at international venues whenever possible (Anon 2005a).

**Record of democracy**

Just as democracy was used to legitimize the nuclear program, it is deployed to legitimize India’s actions against terrorism (a strategy also followed by Israel) (Rajghatta 2002b). Indian elites make two parallel claims: first, that the availability of legal recourse for discontented groups delegitimizes terrorism on Indian soil; second, that non-democratic polities like Pakistan have no right to criticize India (Chellaney 2001/02, 97; Gupta 1994, 75). India also highlights its secular credentials, such as constitutional protections for minority rights. Even the religious-nationalist BJP government did not openly reject secularism. In fact, it engaged in the “othering” of fundamentalism and implicitly associated religious extremism and terrorism with threats to Indian and global security (Biswas 2001, 505). The *Kargil Review Committee Report* makes this clear: “Pakistan for its part has become the fount of religious extremism and international terrorism and a patron of the global narcotics traffic. Decades of misgovernance and military rule have prevented the democratic tradition from taking firm root…Pakistan poses a threat not only to India…[T]errorists have carried out murderous assaults in the US and East Africa” (Tellis 2002a, 51).

30 Similarly, US officials said they would not “rush to judgement” on Chechnya since Russia was operating in a democratic context (Evangelista 1999, 372).

31 Author’s interviews with V. S. Mani, New Delhi 17 February 2003; Meera Shankar, 14 May 2003; Ajai Sahni, Institute of Conflict Management, 11 April 2003.
Such arguments are particularly resonant in the face of ‘blowback’ from America’s Cold War alliances.

Indian leaders use democracy as a common denominator in establishing alliances.\(^{32}\) The Indian Prime Minister’s November 2001 meeting with President Bush concluded with a declaration where “as leaders of the two largest multi-pluralistic democracies they emphasized that those who equate terrorism with any religion are wrong, as are those who invoke its name to commit, support or justify terrorist acts” (2001f, emphasis mine). In June 2005, the US and India announced a joint Global Democracy Initiative (Office of the Press Secretary 2005).

**Nuclear escalation, international coercion, and the power of restraint**

The nuclearization of the subcontinent, which was formalized in May 1998, renders terrorist attacks doubly dangerous since they may lead via various escalatory steps to nuclear war. India used its newly acquired overt nuclear status to draw the attention of the world to cross-border terrorism. Playing on the world’s fears of a nuclear exchange, it tried to bring pressure on Pakistan to cease its support of cross-border terrorism. India also highlighted its ‘restrained’ use of its nuclear capability in crises with Pakistan.

In May 1999, the Indian army detected intrusions in the Kargil sector on the border with Pakistan. India successfully made the case to the international community that Pakistan had supported a terrorist incursion to the extent of sending Pakistani military regulars across the border. Over the next two months, the battle raged on the

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\(^{32}\) See also the invocation of democracy and pluralism in the Joint Declaration with the EU (Anon 2001b).
Himalayan peaks. India managed to clear the sector of all intruders at the cost of over a thousand lives. Pakistan’s greatest defeat, however, was the near-universal condemnation of its role. The US, marking a dramatic departure from its traditional tilt towards Pakistan, pressured it to rein in the insurgents.

Similarly, the attack on Parliament in New Delhi on 13 December 2001 by militants allegedly supported by Pakistan triggered a military response on the Indian side, followed by Pakistani mobilization. This border standoff is usually referred to as the 2001-02 crisis. The two armies faced off across the border until June 2002. As in 1999, India was more successful than Pakistan in gaining world sympathy, especially as the assault came a few months after the al-Qaeda attacks on the US. American officials extracted promises from Musharraf to crack down on cross-border movement and religious mobilization in his country.33

India’s calculations of external intervention in these conflicts are founded on international nuclear norms. First, the nuclear powers want to prevent nuclear use in order to protect the ‘nuclear taboo’. Second, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could involve other NWS, possibly on opposing sides—a situation that the nuclear order strives to avoid. Third, the US does not want a Muslim state (Pakistan) to gain advantages from nuclear weapons at a time when other Muslim countries like Iran are considering acquiring WMD. In addition, in 2002 there were foreign troops on the ground in Pakistan that could be trapped in a nuclear confrontation (Bajpai 2002b, 155-56).

33 On January 12, 2003, President Musharraf made a dramatic public promise that no organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir; after the May 14, 2003 Kaluchak shooting he vowed that he would end infiltration across the Line of Control.
The nuclearization of South Asia thus creates a powerful incentive for the US and others to intervene. In the conflicts described above, both parties were hoping the other would ‘blink’ first—that is, pull troops back to escape the worst-case scenario of nuclear use. Since it could assume that the US shared a strong interest in avoiding an actual nuclear exchange, each party also tried to stimulate American intervention in its favor. India’s External Affairs Minister stated that the troop mobilization in 2001 was a signal both to Pakistan and to the international community (particularly the US) of India’s determination “to take any step” to counter terrorism (Anon 2002b; 2003c). India used its declared commitment to countering terrorism and its nuclear capability to convince the US that nuclear war was a possibility, forcing it to get more involved. Paradoxically, the more credible the American resolve to stay involved, the lower the risks to both India and Pakistan of adopting dangerous strategies of brinkmanship.

However, the need to remain in good standing with the international community restricted India’s military options. Surveys showed widespread public support in India for attacks on terrorist camps and hot pursuit across the *de facto* border, the Line of Control (LoC) (Manchanda 2002, 313). Yet India did not cross the LoC in ‘hot pursuit’ of militants, refrained from air strikes and commando raids on training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and showed openness to US intervention. This restraint, in contrast with Pakistan’s inability or unwillingness to control jihadis on its territory, was repeatedly parlayed into diplomatic gain. National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra said: “The recent operations in Kargil have demonstrated that our system and the political leadership believe in great responsibility and restraint, as you would expect from the largest democracy in the world” (Sidhu 2000, 145). While India’s stance during Kargil marked it as a mature country, Western fears of nuclear escalation boomeranged on Pakistan (Guha 1999a; Karnad 2002a, 145). Speaking at a
conference, India’s Ambassador called Pakistan the “epicenter of international terrorism.” He held Pakistan responsible for a hundred terrorist training camps in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), the growth of “terrorist factories” in the fifteen thousand madrassas in Pakistan, and for “nuclear blackmail.” In contrast, India has shown restraint with its ‘no first use’ policy (Sardesai 2003).

**Nuclear proliferation and terrorism**

India attempted, most dramatically in the crises described above, to use the international community to coerce Pakistan on the terrorism issue. Yet, the projection of nuclear restraint was also integral to its strategy. Indian decision-makers are aware that in the post-Cold War world and especially after 9/11, the possession of WMD is strongly linked in the dominant discourse to sponsorship of terrorism and undemocratic government. Thus, India’s self-presentation as a victim of terrorism depends on the ‘appropriate’ governance of its nuclear arsenal/capability.

First, as I showed in earlier chapters, although not a member of the NPT, India has been relatively conscientious about restricting the proliferation of sensitive technologies. The country highlights this restraint, contrasting it to the Pakistani program which has been held responsible for transfers of nuclear technology to North Korea and Libya—countries on the list of ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ (Ministry of External Affairs 2004). In 2002, Foreign Secretary Sibal complained:

> While deep concerns are mounting about the nexus between fundamentalism, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the spotlight is not on Pakistan which has all these ingredients of concern…there is a remarkable lack of curiosity about Pakistan’s nuclear connection with North Korea in exchange for missile technology, which poses grave challenges to our security (Nadkarni 2005).
Second, Pakistan has been through periods of martial law, alternating with quasi-civilian rule. It is thought that militaries were more likely than civilian leaders to consider nuclear weapons in roles other than pure deterrence. Observers also worried about the growing religious fundamentalism within the army and the rest of the ruling class in Pakistan (Cohen 1998b, 169, 74). Close ties with the Taliban, the victory of religious parties in the 2002 elections, and evidence about the involvement of Pakistani citizens in Islamist terrorism, reinforced these fears (Hersh 2001; Sagan and Waltz 2003). India was quick to capitalize, pointing out repeatedly that its own nuclear weapons are under civilian control. While the world worries about the security and safety of all South Asian nuclear weapons, India raises concerns about Pakistan’s arsenal and links it to terrorism (Santhanam and Rajagopalan 2001; Sudarshan 2003). In his 2002 address to the UNGA the Indian PM accused Pakistan of adding “nuclear blackmail” to its “quiver of state-sponsored terrorism” (Rajghatta 2002b).

Third, India uses its role in counter-terrorism to deflect attention from its position in the nonproliferation regime. As associations with terrorism made the possession of nuclear weapons suspect—as in the cases of Libya and Iraq—India made its opposition to terrorism louder and reinforced its democratic credentials. An ex-diplomat advocated that while India should keep working towards a multilateral regime, terrorism should be the main focus of attention in multilateral forums like the UN to divert attention from Kashmir and the nuclear issue (Dubey 1998a). India’s Foreign Minister specifically claimed that the US was paying too much attention to nonproliferation and not enough to terrorism (Singh 2002, 46).

34 Kampani disparages these concerns about the Pakistani program (Kampani 2001b).
Intervention: the balancing act

In the discussion above we have seen India’s slow and strategic accommodation with US priorities on terrorism. However, the government tries to balance this with recourse to other norms to preserve some space for long-range strategic maneuver. Indian elites do worry that the country’s efforts at maintaining the identity of a victim of terrorism will not insulate it from the fallout of the terrorism-WMD-human rights/democracy linkage (Ramachandran 1998).35

The Kashmir issue illustrates India’s evolving position on the international community’s role. In 1948 India referred the matter to the UN, which at that time appeared to be a fair and capable arbiter. However, the Indian government swiftly became disillusioned with the UN, which, in its perception, favored Pakistan as a result of Cold War alignments. Nehru wrote in 1948, “I must confess that the attitude of the great powers (on the question of Kashmir) has been astonishing. Our experience of international politics and the way things are done in the higher regions of the UN has been disappointing to the extreme—no doubt all this will affect our conduct of international relations in the future” (Mitra 1998, 34).

During the 1950s and the 1960s India positioned Kashmir as a purely internal issue where Pakistan had no locus standi, much less the US. The 1972 Shimla Agreement between India and Pakistan was intended to locate Kashmir as a bilateral issue. India concentrated on keeping international players out of the dispute. There were several reasons for this: external intervention was seen as a strategic equalizer for the Pakistani side, third parties were not really perceived as ‘neutral’ in the dispute, and

35 Author’s interviews with Arundhati Ghose, New Delhi, 1 August 2003; Soli Sorabjee, Ithaca, 1 October 2003.
allowing international intervention would have brought into question all states’ accessions to India. In the discourse on Kashmir India has historically taken shelter behind the sovereignty norm. India has disapproved of intervention, in Kosovo for instance, for fear that this logic would encourage the internationalization of Kashmir (Kampani 1999).

Currently India enjoys a good relationship with the reigning superpower. Some Indian leaders believe that since at this historical moment, intervention can work in India’s favor, the country should not be tied to its old principles. One commentator wrote that although “the very word ‘internationalization’ sends the Indian political class into paroxysms of furtiveness, India has now chosen deliberately to internationalize.” In June 2002, the Prime Minister indicated that he would accept ‘facilitation’ of dialogue on Kashmir (Rajamohan 2002b).

Writers on the Left and the Right of the political spectrum continue to express apprehensions about the long-term effects of US interest in Kashmir (Chari 2003b, 51; Dixit 2002a; Gill 2001). Even a reference to Kashmir as a “central issue” by the US Secretary of State caused unease in India (2001d). While calling on the international community to sanction Pakistan, India attempts to restrict the scope of intervention. For instance, India demanded a suspension of international financial assistance to Pakistan during the 1999 conflict, but rejected the UN Secretary-General’s offer to dispatch an envoy to mediate between India and Pakistan (Swami 2002).

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36 Author’s interview with Kanti Bajpai, 3 February 2003, New Delhi.
37 Author’s interview with Air Comm. Jasjit Singh, New Delhi, 24 July 2003.
India’s response to the US intervention in Iraq is another illustration of the balancing act. India is a quasi-member of the ‘coalition of the willing’ although not on the list of 45 countries that Secretary Powell produced in March 2003. Yet, even within the ruling coalition there were rumblings of disapproval (Bhaumik 2003). The PM publicly opposed the philosophy of ‘regime change’ (Anon 2002c; Baruah 2002a; Bhaumik 2003). The Indian Parliament witnessed an intense debate over the wording of its 8 April 2003 Resolution—the question was whether it should ‘deplore’ or ‘condemn’ the US actions (2003h). Initially, the Indian government had laid down UN authorization for a multinational peacekeeping force as a condition for India’s participation in the Iraqi operation (Baruah 2003). But even when authorization had been secured, and in spite of other incentives offered by the US, the government felt compelled to withdraw its initial offer of 17,000 Indian troops to be deployed to Iraq. By citing domestic compulsions, a government wishing to express muted disapproval was able to save face with the Americans.

**Effects on national politics**

India, though weak in material power, is able to constrain more powerful actors by harnessing the rhetorical power of norms. However, the story would not be complete without a discussion of how Indian decision-makers themselves are constrained by the norms that they deploy. While Realist and Liberal regime theories would allow for the possibility that certain norms may influence domestic policy precisely because India promotes them at the international level, they would not see national identity itself as being affected. However, if we see national identity as constructed, then ‘strategic’

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38 India supported the US airstrikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998, but also pointed out that international cooperation was better than unilateral action (Nanda 1998).
39 US ‘carrots’ were economic as well as political (Anderson, Bennis, and Cavanagh 2003; Deen 2003).
changes over time would produce a new conception of identity. This development can only be demonstrated through process-tracing over a period of time; but this work cannot avail of that explanatory distance. Here I present some initial descriptions of domestic change, showing the political structure being molded by the regime’s imperatives.

Counter-terrorism and governance

The most direct effect on domestic policy of international activism, as discussed above, was the acknowledgment of other countries’ rights to intervene in internal conflicts such as Kashmir, changing the balance of power among different groups within the government and the secessionists. At the 1994 Geneva session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, for instance, the Indian delegation was able to prevent Pakistan from introducing a resolution censuring India on Kashmir. In turn, it had to allow foreign delegations to visit Kashmir (Gupta 1994). Naturally, Indian leaders also fear that participation in counter-terrorism operations would invite new terrorist attacks. If India is seen as too closely allied with the US, it might become a target of Islamist terrorism.

India has also made changes in its domestic institutional framework that mirror developments in other countries. In January 2003, the Office of the Counter-terrorism Coordinator was set up in the Ministry of External Affairs. In 2002 the BJP government introduced the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), which was widely criticized for curbing press and civil liberties (Ananthanarayanan 2004; Krishnan and Tewary 2003). POTA treated terrorist acts as outside the normal criminal procedure which seeks to balance the rights of criminal defendants with the

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40 Author’s interview with Meera Shankar, New Delhi, 14 May 2003.
interests of the state. POTA was justified by pointing to the USA-PATRIOT Act and a similar law in the UK (Mohapatra 2004). Upholding the constitutionality of POTA, India’s Supreme Court cited international obligations: UNSC Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) and GA Resolution 56/1. The Court reminded the government: “It has thus become our international obligation also to pass necessary laws to fight terrorism” (Paul 2005). Government officials also claimed that POTA was less stringent than laws in other countries (Ghosh 2001). Similar comparisons were made in favor of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act over a decade ago (Marwah 1995, 357-79). The State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, while congratulating India on POTA, claimed that US officials had met with their Indian counterparts to discuss US anti-terrorism laws such as the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and to exchange ideas and suggestions (Anon 2001e).

Counter-terrorism and party politics

As we have seen, India’s stance in international negotiations on the terrorism issue hewed to the principles of anti-colonialism and global justice. Since it has one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, India was careful to avoid branding Islamic movements with the terrorist stamp. In the 1990s, however, the BJP came to power at the national level. It was less constrained by the need to appeal to a Muslim electorate. How did international counter-terrorism fit into the party’s strategy?

The BJP has determinedly portrayed itself as the ‘party of national security’ and its participation in the international fight against terrorism is integral to its strategy, as its ideologues make clear (Punj 2003). The BJP National Executive in 2001 declared that

41 POTA was repealed in September 2004 by the new Congress government and replaced by the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, but questions remain about effects on civil rights.
terrorism would be one of the main issues in its election strategy. Party spokesman V. K. Malhotra declared: “There is no doubt that terrorism and the passage of POTO [The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, a precursor to POTA] will be an election issue. The BJP will campaign in its favor because terrorism today is a worldwide evil” (Sahay 2001). Invoking terrorism, the party has been somewhat successful in overcoming its initial image with the international community as a Hindu fundamentalist party; and these gains also play into its legitimacy with Indian voters.

At the same time, India’s democratic and secular credentials had to be constantly reinforced. This implies that the government must take unpopular actions, and alters the balance of power between moderate and extremist factions. Provocative statements by leaders such as Ashok Singhal of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, part of the BJP’s ‘family’, were deplored by the BJP President on the grounds that they compromised India’s fight against terrorism and provided the international community “with a pretext to bracket [the party] with the forces of religious fundamentalism” (Gupta 2002; Vyas 2002, 11). Elections in Jammu and Kashmir in 2002 held at a high human cost were meant to provide an alternative political path to militancy; they were also necessary to reaffirm India’s democratic credentials at a time when the US was openly discussing regime change.42

Counter-terrorism and human rights

India’s self-presentation as a victim of terrorism also constrains the freedom of action of state actors.43 The Ministry of External Affairs hastened to point out that the 2002

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42 State Department spokesman Richard Boucher welcomed the elections (Boucher 2002a).
43 Similarly, the Nuclear Terrorism Convention’s provisions for the treatment of detainees vary considerably from US practice after 2001. This multilateral obligation might force the US to change its domestic policies (Welsh 2005a)
US State Department report on terrorism acknowledged that India was the country most affected by terrorism (Shukla 2003). At the same time, the Ministry did not appreciate criticism of India’s record on religious tolerance in another State Department report, and resorted to terming it interference in internal affairs (Raj 1999).

In February 2002, local Muslims were accused of setting a train on fire in Godhra in Gujarat. In the weeks after this incident, Muslims were systematically targeted by rioters with the complicity of the state government and over 2500 were reportedly killed. In April 2002, the Ministry of External Affairs upbraided visiting foreign dignitaries and missions in New Delhi for their statements on Gujarat, terming it a purely internal affair (Malhotra 2002a). Indian and foreign commentators were quick to point out that the international community’s right to intervene was now accepted and had been invoked by India itself (Anon 2002a). The practices of democracy and secularism had come under scrutiny precisely because India had trumpeted their importance (Malhotra 2002b). The most dramatic outcome of the spotlight was found in the State Department's International Religious Freedom Report released in September 2004. Narendra Modi, the Chief Minister of Gujarat and a prominent BJP leader, was held responsible for the Gujarat massacre. Consequently, Modi was barred from entering the US (Anon 2005g).44

**Counter-terrorism and other regimes**

In this section I situate the counter-terrorism regime within the larger framework of international norms. How does counter-terrorism impinge on other regimes? Here I

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44 Even according to official Government of India figures, 790 Muslims were killed in the post-Godhra violence (Anon 2005b), as opposed to a toll of 800 dead in the entire al-Aqsa intifada.
discuss briefly the relationship of this evolving regime with international human rights and with the nonproliferation regime.

Counter-terrorism and human rights
The gradually consolidating human rights regime is most affected by the counter-terrorism regime. The latter constitutes states as victims, never perpetrators of terrorism. While states still remain responsible for their domestic actions under other aspects of international law such as prohibitions against genocide, the terrorism justification is often invoked for these actions. The US and its allies have depicted human rights and democracy as the ultimate targets of terrorism. These are the universal values, exemplified by the US, that the terrorists are alleged to hate. Yet these very values are being compromised by US practices in the ‘war on terrorism’ such as illegal detentions of suspected terrorists, torture of detainees, extra-legal transfers of detainees to and from the US. Moreover, the US is becoming more tolerant of illegal and unethical practices in other countries, thus creating more breathing space for human rights violators. In preparation for its 2003 Country Reports the US government issued instructions to its embassies that human rights violations undertaken by states in actions that had the expressed support of the US should not be included in the reports (Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights 2003, 74).

These practices foster a strong perception that human rights are to be subordinated to an ill-defined security imperative under all circumstances. Invoking security considerations, officials and politicians can ward off domestic and international scrutiny. Often these invocations specifically refer to the ‘norm leader’—the US. Various instances in the Indian case have been provided above, but similar behavior in other states is documented (Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights 2003, 74-79).
The infringement of rights by the counter-terrorism regime’s indirect effects is not confined to weak states. The redefinition of civil rights by domestic legislation referencing an international threat has been documented in the UK and Australia (Cavanagh 2002; Hocking 2003; Michaelsen 2005). International norms are often pressed into service to justify these draconian laws (Pitts III 2003). Since September 2001, 24 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have introduced specific anti-terrorism legislation in their parliaments45 (Whitaker 2005). Enacting stringent counter-terrorism legislation is presented to domestic audiences as a necessary step for being a civilized and modern state.

**Counter-terrorism and nonproliferation**

Two connections can be established between stockpiles of nuclear weapons and terrorism—first, that nuclear weapons are used to terrorize weaker peoples; second, that weapons could fall into terrorists’ hands (Dhanapala 2001). The former reflects the saying in the anti-colonial struggle that "terrorism is the poor man's atom bomb" (Teichman 1989, 515). However, this connection was swept aside because the counter-terrorism regime today sidelines the issue of ‘supply of terrorism’, and places nuclear terrorism centre-stage. The equation between supporting terrorism and possessing WMD was strengthened by constant juxtaposition of these two ‘crimes’ in references to North Korea, Pakistan and Iraq. As a result, the international norms against nuclear proliferation and terrorism began to blur into each other. Nonproliferation and counter-terrorism are increasingly linked as international security strategies.

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45 This list does not include countries such as Guyana, Malaysia, and Panama that have enacted anti-terrorism measures as amendments to existing criminal laws, or countries like Egypt, Pakistan, and Peru that had similar laws on the books even before the current war on terror.
One argument claims that counter-proliferation reduces the severity of the terrorist threat by keeping dangerous weapons out of terrorists’ reach (Walsh 2002; Wirtz 2002). A different but related argument predicts that state sponsors of terrorism make nuclear threats to deter action by the US or the international community against them. Counter-proliferation, then, creates the strategic space for counter-terrorism. Concerns about the terrorist use of nuclear weapons played a role in bringing about the 1979 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Donohue 2001, 21). In October 2002, the UN First Committee passed an Indian resolution urging governments to thwart terrorists from acquiring WMD or delivery vehicles (Baruah 2002c).

A significant achievement of the international legal process is the conclusion of the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism in 2005, after seven years of negotiations on a Russian draft. The convention outlaws any use or threat of use, of a nuclear weapon or other radiological device by nonstate actors, and would require all states to cooperate in prosecuting individuals accused of committing these crimes (Wurst 2005). Even more significant is the passage of UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004. As a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN charter, 1540 imposes on all UN members the duty to prevent the diffusion of WMD technology even if they have not acceded to export control arrangements. Recognizing its far-reaching implications, many states raised objections to the resolution. They complained that the UNSC was turning into a legislative body. They expressed the apprehension that the reference to Chapter VII could serve as a pretext for coercion against states accused of non-compliance with the resolution; and also, that the resolution comes at the expense of the aspiration toward complete disarmament. However, the resolution was passed as
its movers made the argument that the world was running out of time on this issue and traditional arms control would not meet the challenge (Mendelsohn 2006).

While the danger of nuclear terrorism cannot be denied, I want to point out the consequences of the rhetorical association of nonproliferation and counter-terrorism. It created an atmosphere where dissent was no longer tolerated. At the 2002 NPT PrepCom, for instance, members were afraid to challenge the US on nuclear disarmament issues. Observers at the conference wrote: “the ‘we don’t want to be tarred with the terrorist brush’ attitude…may be linked to the ‘those who are not with us’ rhetoric” (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003, 46). The association between terrorism and WMD is used to delegitimize new nuclear powers. Playing on this association, Indian diplomats chose a strategy of highlighting Pakistan’s “incitement of terrorism” at the 47th UNGA session to weaken Pakistan’s credentials in championing nonproliferation (Murthy 1993, 119). Even the proposed US missile defense system, recognized as dangerous to nonproliferation efforts, is being sold as a shield against “terrorists and rogue states” (Carter 2004).

Counter-terrorism and deterrence

One could read the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as showing that WMD could be ‘existential. Any object—like an airplane—could be turned into a weapon of mass destruction. On the other hand, the attacks refuted the assumption that terrorists would not aim for mass casualties. The world’s attention turned to the possibility that a terrorist group could acquire nuclear weapons and use them too. Is nuclear deterrence still valid against this new threat? Terrorist groups were considered to be undeterrable since they had no stake in a stable society, and also because they had apocalyptic goals that were not amenable to negotiation. The sponsorship of terrorism is intimately
linked in the dominant discourse with desire to acquire WMD and ultimately to upset the international status quo; it functions as one of the marks of ‘rogueness.’ This in turn allows for certain predictions about the country’s behavior. According to the 2002 US National Security Strategy (NSS), since rogue states are characterized by WMD ambitions and sponsorship of terrorism, it is obvious that they are risk-acceptant and uncaring about their populations. They will use these weapons to wage aggression against their neighbors. In short, they are “enemies of civilization” (National Security Council 2002, 15).

It is precisely the posited character of potentially nuclear-armed terrorists that allows the NWS to retain their nuclear arsenals as insurance. The 2002 NSS states: “We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few” (National Security Council 2002, 1). The deployment of new threats to justify nuclear arsenals has been discussed in detail in earlier chapters. Here I point out that the constitutive processes of the counter-terrorism regime strengthen the tendency to preserve the current nuclear status quo, however discriminatory. Even the loudest voice warning of the dangers of nuclear terrorism, Graham Allison, writes that the international community should “draw a bright line” under today’s eight nuclear-armed states—which would include non-signatories to the NPT: India, Israel, and Pakistan (Allison 2004, 165).

**Conclusion**

The definition of proliferation that has become hegemonic has succeeded in preventing the precipitous expansion of the club of nuclear-armed states. Yet it has also halted progress towards disarmament. Even the end of the four-decade-long
bipolar conflict did not lead to the renunciation of nuclear weapons. Rogue states, terrorists and inchoate threats now justify their continued possession. Although haunted by the possibility that nuclear arsenals would fall into the hands of terrorists, states want to retain them. The treaty language of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention makes it clear that the treaty “does not address, nor can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way the issue of the legality of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by states” (Wurst 2005).

The counter-terrorism regime too can succeed only by making it unthinkable, or at least inappropriate, for countries to support terrorism. By delegitimizing ‘root causes’ and ‘definitional’ arguments, it is already taking a big step in this direction. The goal is to make terrorism a crime like genocide or piracy, undertaking which would be a fatal blow to the sovereignty of a country. The initial definitions of terrorism that are being conceptualized today will also have a structural effect. For instance, we can predict that the entry-into-force of the Draft Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism will put pressure on all countries to accept that states cannot be said to commit terrorism. Only crimes against states can be named as terrorism. We already observe a gradual but inexorable marginalization of dissent and acceptance of the dominant definition as common sense. Edward Said writes that this refusal to study root causes amounts to ‘terrorist exceptionalism’—since terrorism is a human phenomenon like any other, we should probe its causes (Troyer 2001).

However, as we have seen in examining the case of India, states are not passive objects of the regime. Even states lacking in material power can deploy the regime’s own symbolic resources to reinterpret and subvert it. India, struggling to reinvent itself as an international actor in the post-Cold War world, has adopted counter-terrorism as
a device in its foreign policy arsenal. India takes international norms seriously, citing them to bolster its position in the short-term, and seeking to influence, in the long term, the content of these norms. While collaborating with the hegemon is a strategic necessity, Indian policy-makers have succeeded in curbing the latitude with which hegemony is exercised. This is a strategy that has paid dividends so far, although it has also involved significant compromises in both its domestic and foreign policies.
On 18 July 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was welcomed to the White House in Washington DC, and later that day Singh and President George W. Bush issued a Joint Statement. Inter alia, the statement declared that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states” (Office of the Press Secretary 2005). This declaration has been widely taken to mean that the US has accepted India’s self-declared status as a Nuclear Weapon State.

Just over seven years earlier, Bush’s predecessor had reacted to the Indian nuclear tests with dismay, saying that India had put itself “at odds with the international community” and “on the wrong side of history” (Clinton 1998). In 2005, however, it seemed that India had emerged on the right side of the nonproliferation regime with a validated nuclear identity, leaving an undefined and worrisome past behind it. The 2005 declaration represented a shining moment for Indian elites who had been pushing for the country to openly declare its nuclear status. However, the groundwork for this moment was laid over several decades. In fact, the nonproliferation regime has been willing to treat India as exceptional since 1967 (Tellis 2002b, 22). Writing at the end of the Cold War, the influential statesman Joseph Nye referred to India and Israel as “de facto nuclear states” while describing South Africa and Pakistan as “covert nuclear states” (Nye 1989-90, 55).

1 Similarly, speaking at the P-5 meeting in June 1998, British Foreign Minister Robin Cook said: “We fully understand India’s aspirations in the international community...If India wishes to be respected in the international community...then the best way to do it is to sign up to the international nuclear arms control regimes. The world community is unlikely to reward a country that breaks all those rules.” (Anon 1998i).
The bulk of my thesis is an attempt to explain the process of India’s nuclear identity construction through a focus on the constitutive effects of international nonproliferation norms. In this concluding chapter, I make some predictions as to the effects on global security of the world’s gradual recognition of India’s nuclear identity. These are presented in the first section. In Section Two I show how my approach is able to explain more than the three conventional accounts of nuclear acquisition. In Section Three I put forward some implications for IR theory, and in Section Four draw out some lessons for policy-makers interested in strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Section Five is devoted to three cases of global concern—Iran, Israel and North Korea. I hazard some predictions about these countries based on the India case. In Section Six, I draw out implications from the study of France and South Africa, and from the counter-terrorism regime. In the last section, I discuss prospects for further research.

**Section One: Recognizing India’s identity**

From all over the political spectrum (see the reports of the left-wing Carnegie Endowment and the right-wing Cato Institute), analysts have been calling on the norm leader to accept India’s post-1998 nuclear status (Alagappa 1998, 12; Gobarev 2000; Tellis 2005). They point out that India is not a rogue that could easily be exiled (Karp 1998). Some suggest offering it Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership (Gahlaut 2005; Gilani 2004). Others propose that India be invited to sign regional arms control treaties as a nuclear power (Taksal 1999). What predictions can we make about the effects of the recognition of India as a *de facto* nuclear weapons state (NWS)? I first discuss the effects on India, then on regional and global security.
Dealing with a nuclear India

After the September 2001 attacks, the international community’s concerns about WMD outside the arsenals of the NWS were heightened by fears of terrorism. India finds it even more important to reinforce its identity as a stable and mature nuclear power. As we have noted, it has been striving to portray itself as a victim of transnational terrorism and a leader in the fight against it. These new identities give the world more say in Indian policy, but they may also loosen restraints on it. India’s self-presentation as a secular democracy combating terrorism and a nuclear power exercising restraint enables it to lay claim to certain options. The most dangerous manifestations of this new freedom of action were seen in the 1999 and 2001-02 conflicts with Pakistan, when India deployed international norms in nuclear brinkmanship. On the domestic front, if the international community acquiesces in India’s definition of all anti-state violence as terrorism, it would heighten internal intolerance. In 2003, Pakistan’s President Musharraf termed the violence in Gujarat “ethnic cleansing” (Malhotra 2003). However, the world ignored this instance of state-sponsored violence against a vulnerable religious minority, since India had established itself as a victim of terrorism.

Regional relationships

How does the formal acknowledgement of nuclear capabilities affect deterrence? The full-fledged war over Kargil with Pakistan, followed by the border standoff three years later, proved that nuclear-armed states could enter into conflicts, albeit limited ones. Clearly, bringing nuclear arms out of their closets did not contribute to India-Pakistan stability. On his visit to South Asia in March 2000, President Clinton called it the most dangerous place in the world (Cohen 2000b, 1). India and Pakistan have the only
nuclear ‘hot border’ in the world (although some would count the Korean DMZ as one). Somewhat dangerously, Lieberman suggests that short-term failures of deterrence will force long-term learning (Lieberman 1994, 414-15).

Pakistan cannot access the same normative resources as India for presenting itself as a responsible state. Although it is unlikely that Pakistan would get the same treatment as India, given its fraught relationship with the US, its protests of discrimination will gain in credence after the 2005 nuclear deal, and will have to be quieted with some concessions. India has offered to sign a No First Use (NFU) pact with Pakistan, but the latter, being the conventionally weaker party, has refused to give up the right to use nuclear weapons at a time of its choosing. Pakistani military and political leaders have repeatedly declared that they would resort to the early use of nuclear weapons in a war with India if conventional defenses fail (Kanwal 2001, 1955).

Yet, there are some grounds for optimism. India and Pakistan have adhered to a ceasefire on their border since December 2003, democratic elections have been held in Kashmir and militancy is on the wane. The two countries have entered into an agreement on mutual notification of missile tests (Kohlmeier 2004). Domestic political imperatives, encouragement from the US, and a desire to win the approval of the world are driving the reconciliation. Another cause for optimism, the growing rapprochement between India and China, may have been facilitated by India’s new nuclear status. Susan Shirk reports that China did not change its military posture vis-à-vis India after 1998, and even canceled the development of the DF-25, the 1700 km range missile that could target Indian strategic forces (although she admits that other missiles in southwestern China could easily be retargeted) (Shirk 2004, 90-91). The long-term menace to this delicate balance from the two Asian giants comes mainly
from US attempts to use India as a counter to a rising China. The 2005 deal, by freeing up India’s fissile material reserves

*Global nonproliferation*

India has successfully projected its nuclear program as more legitimate than those of other nuclear aspirants, say, Pakistan or North Korea. The former head of Policy Planning in the US State Department, Richard Haass, wrote: “We […] long viewed India, as well as Pakistan and Israel, as in a different category than Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea. Double standards—and triple standards if need be—are what a realistic and successful foreign policy is all about” (Haass 1998). Discussing the nuclear deal, the US Ambassador called India “a unique case” (Menon and Subramaniam 2005). Yet questions of fairness are important as they do influence the ease with which norms can be defied. ‘Managed proliferation’ erodes the moral basis of the NPT (Dhanapala 2004, 3).

The July 2005 deal and other arrangements that accommodate India will inevitably be seen as rewarding India’s nuclear exploits. The question for the regime’s health is: will states perceive India as being rewarded for its restraint, or for its violation of norms? Countries could take away the message that responsible behavior is rewarded by international acceptance—and refrain from selling their fissile materials or hiring out their nuclear experts. Or, they could learn that the US and by extension, the international community, will accept a fait accompli—and be encouraged in their nuclear ambitions.
Section Two: Alternative explanations

Scott Sagan’s article, “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb” is often cited in the literature because it is a handy heuristic for understanding proliferation. I use it here to organize my survey of the existing literature on India and its relation with the nonproliferation regime.\(^2\) I point out that Sagan’s security and domestic politics models both suffer from a ‘level of analysis’ problem: while the security model takes national identity (and therefore national security interests) as given, the domestic politics model, while opening up the black box of the state, neglects to consider international influences on national identity.

This level of analysis issue also contributed to the disciplinary separation between IR, especially security studies, and area studies, which rendered it almost impossible for specialists of South Asia to work on nuclear weapons. Security studies scholars who were interested in the nuclear question, on the other hand, remained more or less uninformed by an understanding of the Indian political context. They fell back into a reflexive dependence on a Realist argument turning on national interest, and their work focused on problem solving. While a few scholars acknowledge the specificities of the Indian situation their analysis of domestic politics is often simplistic.\(^3\)

Regimes, security, and securing compliance

The conventional tripartite division of theories of proliferation obscures the fundamental role that states’ identities play in security politics, a role that blurs the

\(^2\) In Chapter One, I presented a detailed analysis of Sagan’s third model, the norms model, since it was so closely related to my own approach. Here I discuss the security and domestic politics models.

\(^3\) I am grateful to Peter Katzenstein for pointing out that a pluralist bargaining model of domestic politics may not apply outside Europe and North America. Accounts of nuclear policy employing such models would naturally be unsatisfactory.
distinctions between the security and norms models. Using the cases of China and Pakistan, I show that identity considerations are essential to security and deterrence.

The ‘security model’ provides the conventional, Realist answer to the question: ‘Why do states build nuclear weapons?’: ‘to counter external threats.’ States are rational security-maximizing actors in an anarchic international system. To Realists, the mechanism through which regimes affected state choices was a form of coercion. Though not direct or physical coercion in the first instance, it was coercion nonetheless that restrained states from pursuing their goals in destabilizing ways. Regimes cannot have power independent of the states that back them. Thus it was said of the League of Nations that it was not the League that failed the nations, but the nations that failed the League. Regimes functioned as mechanical clearinghouses where issues were passed through the filters of power and interest, and the ‘right’ outcomes for each constellation of power were calculated and published. Robert Jervis expressed pessimism about security regimes in the path-breaking Krasner volume, arguing that these were difficult to institute because the general Prisoners’ Dilemma is compounded in this field by the primacy of defense, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the international arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and has (Jervis 1983, 175).

The security model features two stories about India’s nuclear path—why it embarked on the path, and why the path was so long and winding. In the structural version of the security model, the shifts in the international power constellation impinge on India. India’s nuclear decisions are responses to the varying intensity of security threats. During the Cold War as bipolarity insulated India from the most extreme threats it chose the low-risk path of acquiring nuclear capability without manufacturing
Structural Realists see the long-drawn deferral of formal nuclear status as facilitated by India’s international situation. In 1998, Indian leaders realized that they could no longer defer the nuclear decision—the post-Cold War environment featured threats so acute that nonproliferation had to be abandoned (Paul 1998). The security environment began to deteriorate only in the 1990s (Jha 1998). The benefits of going nuclear began to outweigh the costs (Paul 2000). In this view, the regime’s quest to stop India’s progress was thus misguided and destined to fail (Hagerty 2001, 107).

Statist Realism has also been called “neoclassical realism” (Rose 1998). Statist Realists do not abstract society out of their theory, but examine the effect of a country’s values, leadership structures and economy on security perceptions and policies. Within the Realist paradigm, they study how state interests are conceptualized. In India, for instance, the classical objects of security – territorial integrity and national sovereignty – co-exist with, and are sometimes subordinated to, internal peace, economic development, and the maintenance of a chosen way of life (Bajpai 1998b). This version of Realism is particularly appropriate for new and weak states.

Statist Realists believe that the threat to security, at least after the 1964 Chinese nuclear tests, was intense enough to justify India going nuclear. Those Realist scholars who study internal political determinants of security policy believe that the regime is unimportant compared to the perception of national interest. Here we find a disjuncture between the primacy of security—a Realist tenet, and the obvious deviance of India from the logical path of nuclear acquisition. To explain why it is that India did not go nuclear at crucial junctures such as the Chinese test in 1964 or the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, why it chose to declare the 1974 test a Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion, and why it drew back from testing on several occasions, Statist Realists point to internal factors. According to Ashok Kapur, successive Indian governments were “befuddled by a Gandhian and Nehruvian morality” (Nayar and Paul 2003, 159). Ganguly believes that the chaotic features of domestic politics explain India’s failure to adhere to Realist prescriptions and shape its policy in response to external threats (Ganguly 1999a, 439).

Supporters of the BJP government claim that successive governments did not have the courage to stand up to the world by going overtly nuclear—that is, a lack of political will (Gupta 1998b). As Jagmohan, a BJP Member of Parliament said about the absence of testing before 1998: “Why did they not do it? Because that level of commitment and level of courage was not forthcoming.” Others claim that the influence of idealism or the turbulence of democracy restrained leaders. Yet others attribute the ‘lack’ of a decision to material factors, such as deficiencies in fissile material/technology/economic strength. Nayar and Paul claim that India’s major-power aspirations “had gone into eclipse” as it struggled with strategic and economic crises in the 1960s and 1970s (Nayar and Paul 2003, 231).

In both types of Realist accounts the regime is but a constraint, which India is forced to throw off in the 1990s. Ganguly, for instance, notes three shifts in this period in India’s stance vis-à-vis the regime: “a reduced sense of urgency about the need for

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4 Most Realist accounts use both structural and domestic factors in explaining policy. They do sometimes acknowledge the importance of prestige, status and reputation factors. However, these are usually mentioned without much analysis and with the goal of exposing the hypocrisy of the regime. Realist/security accounts often perform the ideological function of justifying the Indian program; consequently, critics of such accounts are easily portrayed as serving the interest of India’s enemies. While the majority of analysts based in India support the security justification, some scholars based in North America join them. In this category are Sumit Ganguly, Devin Hagerty, Neil Joeck, T. V. Paul, Raju G. C. Thomas and Kenneth Waltz.

5 Lok Sabha Debates, 27 May 1998

6 Author’s interview with Brahma Chellaney, New Delhi, 30 July 2003.
international agreements in disarmament matters, a withdrawal from an active role…, and the pursuit of more traditional goals of statecraft such as national security based upon military power, as opposed to reliance on the force of moral arguments” (Ganguly 1999b, 157). The change is symbolized by India’s citing of security concerns in its rejection of the CTBT (Ghose 1996). However, in the absence of objective standards for ‘costs’ or ‘threats’, explanations in the security model run the risk of serving as *ex post facto* justifications for decisions (Sagan 2000, 26). The security model is, in a sense, non-falsifiable. If we accept that it is the perception of threat that matters, then it can only be disproved if policy-makers ‘confess’ they were motivated by symbolic or personal goals.

Explanations in the domestic politics model assume that foreign policy change results from factors operating *within* the nation-state. They are diametrically opposed to the traditional Realist approach in which events within the ‘black box’ of the state are essentially irrelevant. They provide a corrective to perspectives that concentrate on external stimulus and assume an automatic response. Since they view the regime as a constant and constraining presence, they end up ‘black-boxing’ the international. At their extreme, they assume that the security rationales put forward by decision-makers are facades.  

The domestic politics model regards the state not as a unitary actor but as a complex of intersecting interests. Nuclear weapons programs serve the parochial interests of domestic political actors—officials in the nuclear technology establishment, units within the military, and/or politicians (Sagan 2000, 27). This approach fits with the

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7 Statist Realism differs from the domestic politics model in that it holds that the external power structure *should* have been decisive.
pluralist strand of the Liberal school. Pluralists disaggregate the state and consider the resources and interests of domestic actors. They assume the primacy of societal actors. Regimes affect international outcomes through their influence on the rational calculations of decision-makers at the national level. The institutionalist strand of Liberalism emphasizes established (formal and informal) arrangements among actors with different, yet linked, interests. State preferences—which are official representations of domestic economic and political coalitions—are not necessarily in conflict, and international institutions exist to facilitate their coordination or convergence (Moravcsik 1997). Institutions provide benefits that offset the costs of restraint even for powerful states (Ikenberry 2003). Institutions arise out of a ‘demand’ by states with pre-formed interests and identities. The term institution encompasses cooperative arrangements ranging from informal understandings among states to formal bodies like the UN. Institutionalists would treat the international nonproliferation regime as an imperfect institution. The inadequacy of the incentives it provides to the above-mentioned actors impels states to go nuclear (Betts 1993; Frankel 1993).

Table 7.1 Causes of change in Indian nuclear policy

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The most important strand in the domestic politics model argues that a pro-nuclear “strategic enclave” sustained India’s nuclear program and sought to conduct nuclear tests. The term ‘strategic enclave’ was first used by Itty Abraham to denote the nuclear and missile programs, which he saw as a subset of the military-security complex (Abraham 1992, 233). It has been used by other scholars studying the Indian program. I define the strategic enclave as ‘technocrats and bureaucrats working for nuclear agencies in India.’

This enclave has, it is alleged, instituted self-reinforcing mechanisms that shield its organizations from public and legislative scrutiny. Nuclear programs, like other government endeavors, end up creating bureaucratic and economic interests well-situated to perpetuate themselves. The Indian nuclear program was sustained by a clique of technocrats, bureaucrats and strategists who made full use of the concealment and resources the state allowed them. Dhirendra Sharma describes this enclave as a “virtual nuclear sub-government” (Sharma 1983, 84). Scientists exhorted the political leadership to take the costly step of testing the devices (Joeck 1997, 31). For instance, the former head of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Raja Ramanna justified the 1998 test on the grounds that scientists cannot be kept forever in suspended animation.

Note that such explanations do not necessarily attribute ‘bad faith’ to decision-makers—who may genuinely believe they are advancing national interest. They do, however, beg the question of how it was that, in a normally contentious democracy

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8 “Parochial politics” arguments have much in common with technological determinism, but they are more focused on actual benefits accruing to real actors.
with scarce resources, these groups were able to advance their preferred policies. Further, the widespread enthusiasm that greeted the 1974 and 1998 tests suggests that the Indian nuclear program was not simply ‘hijacked’ for parochial ends. Since the diplomatic and financial costs of the nuclear program are rather high, we would assume that the strategic enclave is quite powerful. How did the strategic enclave come to acquire such clout? Scientific and technological elites credibly claimed to provide important resources. This work has analyzed the use of international norms by the strategic enclave to acquire a certain level of state resources in the first place and then to strengthen its position. I also show the contribution of developmentalism as an economic strategy to this endeavor. Thus, my explanation allows for the role of domestic actors in furthering the nuclear program, but also accounts for their power.

Other variants of the domestic politics model claim that the symbolic aspects of nuclear capability were be used by politicians to create a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect. Explanations for India’s 1998 tests often focus on the nationalist ideology of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), accusing the party of violating the national consensus on nuclear policy which was that the option should be kept ‘open’. While some charge the BJP with using the tests for electoral gains, others claim that the party’s foundational religious-nationalist ideology impelled it to test.

In fact, nuclear policy has never been a major issue in Indian politics. The fortunes of the two governments that conducted nuclear tests soon declined. In 1975, the Prime Minister felt threatened enough to declare an internal Emergency (for the first and last time in India’s history). Shortly after the 1998 tests, the BJP lost state elections in three Northern strongholds. In early 1999, the BJP-led government was forced out of
office at the national level. What of the claim that the BJP was ideologically committed to building a ‘Hindu’ bomb? Authors have pointed out that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the ideological parent of the BJP has been clamoring for a bomb since the 1960s. However, although BJP policy is influenced by the RSS, as a political party it is not irrational. RSS directives on issues such as the economy and Ayodhya temple did not prevail. In May 1998 the party needed to reinforce the coalition that had brought it into power. It is precisely because there was consensus on the nuclear issue that it allowed for bold steps that would establish the BJP as the ‘party of national security’ in India.

The impact of economic change on India’s nuclear aspirations occasions much debate. Etel Solingen writes that India’s earlier nationalist, inward-looking economic strategy encouraged the growth of a technological-military-industrial complex. A brief period of liberalization and nuclear rollback in the early 1990s was torpedoed by the advent of the “radical-confessional Hindu BJP” which represented import-competing groups and was therefore hostile to “Western” regimes (Solingen 1994, 147-48). Solingen’s pluralist argument is based on the differential empowerment of economic groups as a result of liberalization. In fact, in the context of a comprehensive conception of security, a state-led economic strategy, a global market that was both free and institutionalized, and a fractured and inconsistent economic sanctions regime, economic integration actually eased the government’s decision to undertake the tests. Economic integration also chipped away at notions of Indian exclusionism and pacifism.

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10 On 14 March 1999, the AIADMK withdrew support to the government; as a result the Lok Sabha was dissolved and elections took place. The AIADMK was upset at the pursuit of legal proceedings at the state level against its leader Jayalalithaa.
Section Three: Theoretical implications

In this section I lay out the implications of the conclusions in the preceding chapters for IR theories, especially those of nuclear acquisition.

Causal and constitutive mechanisms

If Constructivists want to claim that rules or norms do not operate causally in the sense of determining how actors behave, they must identify the mechanisms operating to engender motivation and sustain compliance (Sharrock and Button 1999, 197, 206). This leads us to a search for constitutive mechanisms. The complex and subtle means by which they affect state decisions is remarkably hard to capture with the methods used to study causation. Intersubjective meanings, or norms, quasi-causally affect certain actions not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering those actions plausible or implausible, respectable or disreputable (Yee 1996, 97, emphasis mine).

Both Realists and Liberals see regimes as influencing the cost-benefit calculations of state elites—the latter are more sensitive to the possibility that costs and benefits could be non-material and could be affected by domestic considerations. Liberal theorists remain convinced of the centrality of the state, the primacy of national interest/security and actor rationality. While affirming that “pressures from domestic interests and those generated by the competitiveness of the state system exert much stronger effects on state policy than do international institutions, even broadly defined” (Keohane 1989, 6), some institutionalists began to accept that the very process of participation in institutions could redefine interests (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). States could develop an interest in preserving institutions even when the forces that brought them
into being are no longer operative (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, 4). Yet, as I have shown at length, identity is fundamental to all cost-benefit calculations.

I have shown that decision-makers in India, France and South Africa were well aware of the need to maintain certain *specific nuclear identities*, although they may not have explicitly used these terms. India, after the five tests in 1998, repeatedly put forward its claim to be treated as a NWS (Anon 1998r). Why is naming so important? India is well aware that the legal status of NWS remains out of reach, yet it ‘performs’ that identity to the best of its ability. This strategy has been remarkably successful. Asked if France recognised India as a nuclear weapon power, Laurent Fabius, then President of the National Assembly, replied: “We recognize facts. India is well advanced in the nuclear field” (Anon 1998f).

*Evaluating regime performance*

Realists originally shied away from considering the normative role of regimes, which were to them as morally neutral as the international system itself. In the post-World War I period claims about the influence of institutions became discredited as ‘idealism’, or worse. E. H. Carr, discussing interwar disarmament efforts, decried the strategy of “regarding one’s own vital armaments as defensive and beneficial and those of other nations as offensive and wicked.” He used “the weapon of the relativity of thought” against the assumption of a harmony of interests (Carr 1949, 74-75). Institutionalists exalted the benefits of regimes and highlighted their efficiency but in the process they concealed the workings of power. Susan Strange objected to the very term ‘regime’ because its connotations of authority and legitimacy were inappropriate to the international system (Strange 1983). At the other extreme, some scholars claim that the only way states today can realize and express their sovereignty is through
participation in international regimes (Chayes and Chayes 1995, 27). In this work I have shown that regimes are not merely functional, but also perform the function of allowing states to realize different identities. Scholarly work on regimes must take this aspect of regimes into consideration.

Viewing the regime solely as a constraint on going nuclear leads us to underestimate its power. The nonproliferation regime has made it dangerous and inappropriate for countries to go nuclear. Signing the NPT has become a matter of international good citizenship (Talbott 1999, 113). This work has taken a fresh look at the operation of the regime, to achieve a deeper understanding of its effect on countries’ policies. First, it recognizes that the regime’s main source of power is its ability to ‘identify’ proliferation and define the identities of its members. Second, it examines how states, the objects of the regime, attempt to resist and change it. I use the case of India to illustrate how a country negotiated and redefined its identity vis-à-vis the nonproliferation regime, leading to an outcome (testing) that represented both the regime’s success and its failure.

While the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT was welcomed by the international community, the regime’s ability to prevent proliferation is now in question. Nonproliferation arrangements deserve credit in the first place for averting the nightmare scenarios of the 1960s—aside from the five NWS, there are only three (India, Israel, Pakistan) and possibly four (North Korea) states in possession of nuclear weapons. The very existence of threshold states shows that there is some cost imposed by regimes (Spector 1998, 62-3). The vast amount of time and energy that states devote to strengthening the regime also indirectly indicates its importance.
Integrating the three models

One of the goals of this project has been to challenge the distinction between the three models of security, which prove unhelpful in explaining specific policies although such heuristic distinctions are important for systematizing and categorizing various accounts. However, in describing decisions to ‘proliferate’, the models are juxtaposed in a winner-takes-all game. Ascribing a nation’s decision to one model over another is also a highly political decision. Security justifications for weapons programs enjoy legitimacy in the global discourse. Not surprisingly, Indian elites are hostile to analyses of the nuclear program that incorporate cultural variables, insisting that the program is driven by India’s ‘legitimate’ security needs. American scholars are rebuked for the claim that domestic politics determined nuclear policy (Jha 1998).

I find that since India’s security environment was itself fashioned by the nonproliferation order, its search for security cannot be separated from its stance on nuclear arms control—that is, the norms and security models are linked. Nuclear weapons, like the long-range missile and the spy satellite, are tools with which states move up the power index and exude a sense of nationhood and strategic autonomy (Bhaskar 1997). China, for instance, uses its space program to establish itself as a great power in a way that does not demand a defense response from the US.\textsuperscript{11} Attempts to establish certain identities are not only quests for prestige or endeavors to satisfy domestic constituencies, but also satisfy security imperatives.

Similarly, India’s nuclear ambitions were stronger for combining security with domestic political and economic motives. Nuclear science, both in its civil and military aspects, was considered a liberating technology, enabling India to challenge

\textsuperscript{11} Christopher Chyba, personal communication, 21 August 2005.
the international hierarchy. Attempts to stymie India’s nuclear enterprise strengthened the conviction that this technology was critical. Nuclear advocates in India could thus tell their opponents that rejecting nuclear weapons was equivalent to accepting subordinate status in the international sphere or widespread poverty in the domestic (Subrahmanyam 1982, xiii).

The term ‘peaceful uses of nuclear energy’ took on multiple meanings. Apart from the original significance of ‘using energy in the civilian sector’, it conveyed the prospect of using nuclear capability to bring about peace, through deterrence, through disarmament and through development. During the 1974-1998 period, these peaceful uses were predicated on the basis of three distinctions: between capability and intentions, between nuclear technology and weapons technology, and between disarmament and nonproliferation. In 1998, India switched its position and insisted on placing its nuclear capability in the security field. It gave up the idea of disarmament for nonproliferation. However, India still insists on distinguishing its military capabilities from its peaceful and deterrent intentions.

Studying the discourse around the tests in 1974 and 1998 is instructive in showing change and continuity in Indian policy. The five most salient words in 1974 are nuclear, India, Indian, test and Pakistan. On comparing this to 1998, we find essentially the same list: nuclear, India, Pakistan, USA and tests, followed by government and Indian. Since India, Indian and India’s together account for 21.6% of the words in 1974 (and 18.6% in 1998), we can gain more insights from moving down the list. The next most salient words in 1974 are USA, government and energy; in 1998
they are government, two, and security. We see that energy and security occupy roughly the same place at 3.3% each in 1974 and 1998 respectively. Again, while the 1974 list features peaceful (2.8%) in 13th place and weapons in 21st place, the 1998 list features weapons in 10th place (3.0%, while peaceful did not cross the threshold for significance).

**Horizontal and vertical proliferation**

Does the nonproliferation regime acknowledge a link between horizontal and vertical proliferation? Why is this an important question? Some claim that the delinking of vertical and horizontal proliferation is key to the discourse on proliferation (Gusterson 1999, 114). Others argue that the NPT symbolizes the acknowledgement of this link (Scheinman 1987, 15). During the Cold War, the two superpowers shot down the claim that the US-Soviet competition fueled horizontal proliferation on the grounds that their bombs threatened each other rather than non-nuclear states. Poulse has contested this argument citing the “psycho-logic” of power: for example, ideas of nuclear polycentrism and multiple deterrence originating in France were borrowed by the Chinese (Poulse 1996, 110-11). Barrie Paskins coined the “partial linkage thesis”—countries acquire nuclear weapons partly with an eye to their unique security problems, and partly with an eye to the apparent success story of the East-West deterrent system (Paskins 1983, 128). Responding to the 1974 test, Hedley Bull pointed out that the will to proliferate derives from the idea, affirmed by NWS policies, that nuclear weapons are vital strategic instruments and a source of great power status (Bull 1975, 176).

12 The word ‘two’ is most often used in phrases like, “the two countries/states/heads of government”, and indicate bilateral diplomacy. In 1998 this would have been mainly confrontational!
My discussion of the Indian case demonstrates not only that the values and attitudes expressed by the dominant powers about nuclear weapons and technology serve as a basis for the formation of expectations among decision-makers elsewhere, but that the principles enshrined in regimes, often at their behest, structure the security environment for all states, and set up norms of appropriacy and possibility. For instance, the December 2002 report of India’s National Security Advisory Board cited the US Nuclear Posture Review earlier that year to press for a dilution of India’s No First Use commitment to Pakistan. The US government was threatening a nuclear response to chemical and biological weapons and the Board wanted India to follow suit. The report also advised the government to use the term ‘terrorist’ for all internal militant groups (Anon 2003a). The content analysis of the 50-year period from 1950-1999 shows that the most salient term (after ‘nuclear’) in the entire sample was ‘USA.’ This term is even more salient than ‘India’. It is also important to note that after 1980, the term is to be found most frequently clustering with ‘India.’ This indicates that the US was seen as a factor in India’s own security problematique, whereas in the 1950s the term ‘USA’ is most often found to be associated with other terms like ‘bomb’, ‘president’ or ‘atomic’.

While the US stopped nuclear testing in 1992 and has declared nonproliferation to be one of its foremost foreign policy goals, it has moved away from multilateral arms control. The present government has initiated research that signals interest in the use of nuclear weapons. For instance, the Department of Energy’s Advanced Concepts

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13 Of course, this idea was not totally new to the Indians. We should note that soon after the 1998 tests, the Defence Minister described them as erecting an effective deterrent against WMD, not specifically nuclear weapons. Lok Sabha Debates, 29 July 1998, starred question 523.

14 The US is unlikely to sign the CTBT. Other moves include withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, disinterest in the Fissile Materials Control Treaty, and the weakening of the Biological Weapons Convention.
Initiative is researching low-yield nuclear weapons designs, while its Enhanced Test Readiness program aims to reduce the time needed to prepare for future tests (Grotto 2004). American research into the testing of small nuclear weapons is particularly worrying for other states (Varadarajan 2004b). Powerful bureaucratic interests are at work to preserve these programs, but the main motivation behind them is to maintain the credibility of the American deterrent. While 1980s strategies of warfighting were aimed at making deterrence more credible, today the strategic goal is no longer to deter peer competitors (Huntley 2006). Tactical military nuclear weapons are intended to be used for compellance on a regional scale.

The US claims that this nuclear consolidation is irrelevant to the calculations of other countries. High-level officials recently testified that the repeal of the prohibition on low-yield warhead development by the US government would not trigger proliferation (Secretaries of Defense 2004). However, even a country like India which does not face a direct threat from the US (and is building a closer partnership with it) sees the nuclear weapon as essential to independence. US counterproliferation policy, which could translate into direct strikes on nuclear establishments, and US geostrategy, hostile to rising powers in general, are presently portrayed as subsidiary and remote threats, but are increasingly referenced by Indian scholars (Bajpai 1998a, 151-52). Nuclear weapons become valued as they provide relatively inexpensive deterrence against “advanced and predatory countries” (Karnad 1998). The Indian case thus prods us to recognize the American arsenal as a factor in the defense strategies of states of proliferation concern, like Iran and North Korea.

At the same time, India’s own actions have only heightened incentives for other states to acquire nuclear weapons. In 1966, an Indian representative to disarmament
negotiations argued: “First of all we must ensure that no prestige accrues to those misguided nations which have embarked, or are embarking on, nuclear weapon programmes. There must be an end to all this talk about the high table or top table, a select club, centres of nuclear power, and a superior coterie, or a group of four or five who could meet among themselves and work out the salvation of the world” (Trivedi 1966, 621). India’s quest for inclusion in the nuclear club in fact ended up reinforcing the prestige of nuclear weapons. North Korean leaders, for instance, became more likely to perceive nuclear weapons as attractive (Huntley 1999, 509).

The importance of context and discourse

The Indian case does not fit within a pluralist understanding of politics where power is dispersed among powerful competing actors with prior interests and identities, and this is likely to be true of other new nuclear states as well. Even in the accounts of those working within the domestic politics model we often see simplistic cultural relativist arguments pitted against the straightforward security model. The main lesson of the India case for this model is to be more attentive to context.

For instance, the lack of attention to military doctrine has been seen as evidence that security was not the motivation for the Indian bomb program (Liberman 2001, 62; Perkovich 1999). In fact, the marginalization of military options was a result of a particular conception of deterrence as automatic and existential, in both India and South Africa. South African scientists, engineers and policy makers speaking both on and off the record, say that the weapons were never intended for actual military use, and remained un-integrated into military doctrine. Their use was solely political (Muller, 34). Indian decision-makers hold a mechanistic conception of deterrence, in which nuclear weapons are stripped of military implications and viewed purely as
political instruments (Tellis 2001, 280-81). This does not mean that the weapons are not the product of security imperatives.

Section Four: India and the regime-- lessons for policy

What insights could policy-makers draw from the preceding analysis as they re-assess the performance of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? This section answers that question, while the next deals specifically with lessons from India for dealing with states of proliferation concern.

Rebuilding the regime

At least 44 countries currently possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure to build nuclear weapons (these are listed in Annex II of the CTBT). The regime’s current focus on technological capability has led to concern about the destabilizing potential of fuel cycle capabilities. The US government has proposed a modification in the provision of technological assistance for civilian nuclear programs promised under Article IV of the NPT—countries deemed to be in violation of Articles I and II (on the diffusion of nuclear technology) would be excluded (Rademaker 2005). The IAEA chief also suggested in a 2003 article that the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium should be restricted to facilities under multinational control (El Baradei 2003). This means that the ‘nuclear hedging’ discussed by Ariel Levite would no longer be possible. The Indian case suggests that such a move may force countries to formally go nuclear, as they can no longer use nuclear development in deterrence signaling. The tightening of the regime may lead to unexpected defections in the short and medium term.
The economic bargain is supposedly at the heart of the nonproliferation regime: countries receive aid in the civilian uses of nuclear technology in return for giving up military uses. When the US government in January 2004 announced formal cooperation in technology transfer in nuclear, space and other high-technology areas, it asserted that economic ties would temper the evolution of the Indian arsenal. We have seen, however, that in India the line between civilian and military uses of nuclear power was blurred, suggesting that technology that helps one sector would benefit the other. Similarly, the US is pushing for the clear separation of civil and military nuclear sectors. In the French case this was found to be uneconomical. Nuclear civil-military synergy was supporting national autonomy (Jabko and Weber 1998, 125).

Supply of conventional arms and security guarantees
The US approved arms supplies to Pakistan in the hopes that by boosting its security against India, they would help to quell Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions (Anon 1992; Galbraith 1990, 68). The US offered light water reactors to North Korea in 1994 for the same reason. However, we see from the India case that nuclear weapons are desired not just to combat immediate security concerns, but also to place the country in a specific identity category. Arms transfers do not address these issues. In fact, in the South Asian context, transfers may have strengthened the position of the military in Pakistan and spurred nuclear development. Obviously, they also encouraged India to ratchet up its own arms spending in response. We have seen also that security guarantees are also credible only when they are backed by a solid commonality of interests between two nations. Nations may demand security guarantees as signals to the world that they have legitimate security concerns.
Economics and nuclear restraint

‘Integration optimists,’ often working within the Liberal paradigm, predict that as a country becomes more integrated with the world economy, the opportunity costs of defiance of the nonproliferation order rise. Sanctions, for instance, can do more damage. The internationalization of markets, finance and technology is credited with securing near-universal adherence to the nonproliferation order (Solingen 1995, 208). The Indian case leads us to doubt that this mechanism will always come into play.

First, the distinction between defense and economic imperatives was blurred in the comprehensive conception of security in India. According to Andrew Wyatt, “the strategic imperatives of economic nationalism continue to inform policy-makers’ decisions even in the context of liberalizing reform.”\(^{15}\) Supporters of liberalization believed that India as a declared NWS would have a higher profile in the international economy. Thus, we need to be more cautious about the so-called ‘European approach’ to nuclear proliferation, based on institutions and economic incentives. Policies of economic engagement would lead to restraint only if they empowered independent actors, primarily concerned with economics, who are able to put pressure on the government. This process did not play out in India, consequently we must be skeptical about its power in more authoritarian states. Against this we must acknowledge that in the Chinese case, as economic integration increased the country moved closer to the nonproliferation regime.

This study also has implications for the debate as to the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Sanctions seem to have been ineffective in the Indian case. In 1967, top policy-makers perceived a veiled threat of withdrawal of economic aid if India

\(^{15}\) Andrew K. J. Wyatt, personal communication, 29 June 2005.
rejected the NPT (Jha 1983, 301). Yet they did not hesitate to oppose the treaty. After the 1974 PNE India faced mild sanctions which only had the effect of spurring the indigenization of nuclear infrastructure. In 1996 the Finance Ministry estimated the potential costs of sanctions as $3 billion (Perkovich 1999, 412). Yet this economic punishment was predicted to be bearable and India tested two years later. Theories postulating the restraining effects of economic integration tend not to consider the possibility that domestic interests both in sanctioning countries and targeted ones can cushion the effects of sanctions. Moreover, sanctions’ direct effects are increasingly outweighed by their signaling effects. By creating the perception that an economy is unstable, they dissuade private investors. India was able to signal its economic stability in other ways. Policy-makers would do well to factor this indirect effect into their cost-benefit analyses. Finally, although the international norms enveloping economic integration contributed to reducing the economic costs for India (such as the prohibition on holding trade hostage to security), such norms are not taken into account in the literature.

The rising influence of international actors

Obtaining recognition of its nuclear identity from the norm leader was a major policy goal for India. Strobe Talbott, who represented the US at talks with India’s Jaswant Singh in the months after the 1998 tests, said that his interlocutors saw the dialogue, in and of itself, as a justification for the tests (Talbott 2004, 95). When Indian opposition parties assailed the secrecy of the Singh-Talbott talks, Vajpayee countered that such talks were an inevitable part of diplomacy as a NWS (Anon 1998h).

In the last seven years, there has been a steady stream of strategic analysts advising India on nuclear issues. India’s acceptance of arms control creates a less ideological,
more practical, approach—a new openness to learning about safety and best practices in command and control, for instance. However, the mounting influence of Western ideas and the hegemony of deterrence in particular, are warping India’s distinctive approach to doctrine. Indian security thinking is increasingly being influenced by foreign actors, and internally, by non-governmental experts who are sensitized to developments in the international sphere. India’s rapprochement with the US gives it a stake in the current world order. The economic and technical cooperation envisaged in the July 2005 deal in particular, will aid the cultivation of such constituencies in both countries. However, India’s closeness to the US also means that it is less restrained by the views of nonaligned nations and other normative considerations. With the end of the Cold War challenges to Realist doctrine already became weaker (Bidwai and Vanaik 2001, 197, n.1). India’s official discourse now self-consciously seeks out Realist arguments. The principle that all nations have equal and legitimate security interests is at times cited to justify India’s acquisition of weapons (Singh 1999, 310).

Indian disarmament diplomacy has often involved grand symbolic gestures, empty of content, and aimed at domestic acclaim (Anon 1996).16 Liberalizers and nuclear pragmatists are the new constituency for arms control (although interlocutors should note that they are motivated by entrenched beliefs about technology and national strength, not by economic calculations). Proponents of the international regime’s institutions will increasingly find conditional allies among these younger actors, while traditional disarmament supporters become increasingly estranged.

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16 In the 1950s, Bedi and Berkes wrote that Indian diplomats strove to portray Indian foreign policy as “embodying the conscience of mankind and India as a Power haughtily superior to the corrupting influences of politics and sterile considerations of power” (Berkes and Bedi 1958, 38).
Section Five: States of concern for the regime--implications and predictions

India is an exceptional case in some ways—a large country with a robust domestic market and, lately, a thriving economy. It has sustained a democratic form of government in conditions which elsewhere have led to authoritarian and military rule. It has had a remarkably high profile in diplomacy. In other ways, India is typical of the countries of concern to the nonproliferation regime. Its economy remains underdeveloped and autarkic, although incremental liberalization was initiated in a top-down fashion. While it lacks a classic military-industrial complex, elite beliefs are crucial in determining foreign policy. The forces of religious fundamentalism are on the rise. In this section I draw out some implications for other countries from the Indian experience, focusing on Iran, Israel and North Korea.

The utility of a deterrence framework

In the Indian case, I reinterpreted restraint (‘keeping the option open’) as a security strategy aimed at establishing deterrence.\textsuperscript{17} Framing the nuclear behavior of these three countries in a deterrence framework helps us recognize that pressure from the regime can heighten their threat perceptions. It should be noted that supporters of nonproliferation tend to resist this move, and concentrate on demonstrating that Iran, Israel and South Korea do not face security threats that merit a nuclear response.

Governments can fight to keep the option open even under extreme duress. Although Iraq was forced to abandon its nuclear ambitions after 1991, Saddam Hussein

\textsuperscript{17} This should also sensitize us to the deterrent function of capability development elsewhere. South Korea was persuaded to sign the NPT in the 1970s. Recently there were revelations that the country had enriched a small quantity of uranium, proving that it was capable of building nuclear weapons. Blaming ‘rogue scientists’ for this violation of its agreement with the IAEA (South Korea is allowed to conduct experiments only if they are reported to the agency), the country escaped repercussions (Tirone 2004).
endeavored to retain its intellectual capital by keeping the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission alive (Director of Central Intelligence 2004). He persisted with this policy even when it became obvious that the US would invade to ‘verify’ that Iraq had no atomic weapons.

Israel’s trajectory to nuclear capability is similar to India’s in that it developed an ostensibly peaceful nuclear complex. It was the second nation to join the Atoms for Peace program (Bahgat 2005). The Israeli Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1952. Over the years this body developed close links with defense research organizations, and with France, establishing a secretive and resource-rich nuclear complex. In the 1970s, Israel was capable of producing a few dozen nuclear warheads, and might have acquired 100 to 200 warheads by the mid-1990s.\footnote{The Jericho series of ballistic missiles can reach any point in the Middle East, and Israel is also capable of launching satellites, giving it a putative ICBM capability.}

Like India and France, Israel abandoned the idea of relying on security guarantees. It has followed a carefully crafted strategy of ambiguous or opaque deterrence. As it embarked on the construction of nuclear infrastructure, its leaders insisted they were interested solely in the civilian uses of nuclear power. David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that the Dimona nuclear research center was dedicated to “peaceful purposes” (Anon 2000c). Prime Minister Levi Eshkol pledged in the mid-1960s that Israel would not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. The US, apprehensive about the destabilizing effect of Israeli weapons, put pressure on the country to sign the NPT as a NNWS.
However, by late May 1967, Israel had already assembled a couple of crude nuclear devices and no longer had any intention of joining the NPT (Cohen 1998a, 16). The Western powers, for their part, did not want to trigger an international crisis by revealing the extent of Israeli nuclear development. The question of accession to the treaty was shelved. In September 1969, Israel reached a secret agreement with US President Nixon. Israeli PM Golda Meir explained that Israel had been compelled to develop a nuclear capability, and that it could not sign the NPT without compromising its opaque deterrent. She also promised that Israel would not become a declared nuclear power—it would not test nuclear devices, nor declare itself a NWS. Thus, while staying out of the NPT, Israel would not defy it (Bahgat 2005).

Originally, opacity was a tactic that enabled Israel to continue its nuclear development while minimizing international friction, especially with the US. By the 1970s it had become the foundation of Israel's security policy (Cohen 2000a, 22). Israel made use of its nuclear capability in international relations with calibrated statements and deployments. The ultimate threat was to exercise the ‘Samson option’ and detonate a nuclear weapon when its survival was already doomed. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War the US responded to a veiled threat from the Soviet Union (which was backing Egypt) by increasing the level of nuclear alert. There is also a lesser-known nuclear dimension to this crisis. During the early stages of the war when Israel suffered military setbacks, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed to place nuclear warheads on missiles. US intelligence spotted ill-concealed signs that the nuclear-capable Jericho missiles were on high alert. It has been hinted that Meir extracted arms supplies from the US using this subtle threat of nuclear use (Hersh 1991, 225-30).

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19 Observers have speculated that a suspected nuclear explosion in the southern Indian Ocean in 1979 was a joint South African-Israeli nuclear test (Anon 2000c).
backing down on the nuclear deployment issue in 1973, Israel burnished its image as a responsible nuclear power. Again, during the first Gulf War, facing threats from Saddam Hussein, Israeli leaders played up their restraint.

North Korea declared in February 2005 that it had manufactured nuclear weapons for self-defense. It attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to position itself within the deterrence paradigm by linking its nuclear activities to the American threat. In mainstream policy analysis, North Korea’s security justifications are denied legitimacy. We must note, however, that the second Bush administration has indicated that it seeks regime change in North Korea, which would inevitably involve intervention. North Korea was also specifically named as a threat to the US in the 2002 State of the Union speech. Declarations of capability on North Korea’s part have included the testing of the Taepodong missile in 1998, the announcement that it had started reprocessing plutonium in April 2003, and its second withdrawal from the NPT in January 2004.

While North Korea has overtly defied the regime, Iran is pursuing a more subtle strategy of deterrence. George Perkovich hypothesizes that Iran is developing a capability that does not involve actually making weapons or explicitly violating the NPT (Ruppe 2005). Iran’s nuclear infrastructure dates from the pre-Islamic Revolution days. Iran has admitted to constructing uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz, and a facility at Arak to produce heavy water (used in plutonium production) (Takeyh 2003). The IAEA chief recently declared that if Iran decided to make nuclear weapons it could do so in two to three years (El Baradei 2005). More significant is the fact that

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20 In 2005 America’s own National Intelligence Estimates team calculated that Iran required ten years to develop a weapon.
Iran can come within *weeks* of acquiring a large arsenal of weapons without breaking the rules of the NPT or IAEA (Anon nd).

Diplomatic attempts to negotiate with Iran and secure the country’s renunciation of enrichment and processing have had limited success. The Iranian President declared: “This nation will never give up its right to use peaceful nuclear energy. Our enemies have to know that the Iranian people will develop their nuclear technology to the limit” (Anon 2005c). On the diplomatic front, Iran justifies its program using the regime’s norms—specifically, the right to develop a nuclear fuel cycle for civilian purposes. Although it exports oil, Iran claims that it intends to reduce its domestic dependence on fossil fuels by turning to nuclear power, and that the US is backing away from the obligations inherent in the NPT’s Article IV, which guarantees countries this right (Ruppe 2005). Like India, Iran also attacks the NWS for disregarding their responsibilities under Article VI, which promotes disarmament.

Iranian attempts to acquire a deterrent are being evaluated on the basis of the objective threat it faces. However, this evaluation should not be separated from the issue of Iran’s identity in the international sphere. The US has named Iran a member of the ‘axis of evil’ and accuses the state of sponsoring terrorism against the West. President Bush also refused to rule out the possibility of military action against Iran, stating specifically that he would not “take any option off the table” (Rajghatta 2005). Viewing Iran’s actions through a deterrence paradigm also highlights the inevitability of considering the nuclear status of Israel.

I recognize that Israel in the 1990s diverges from the path taken by the other cases I study. The regime seems to have a different effect on Israel than on my other cases.
Israel has not tested or acknowledged its nuclear status. Yet, unlike France and South Africa, it has turned a deaf ear to calls to sign the NPT. As opposed to France, Israel had something to lose by signing the NPT. In the South African case, the probability of securing protection from the US fell once the Cold War ended, therefore, nuclear capability lost its rationale. However, the US-Israel alliance actually became stronger; Israelis could still use a nuclear threat to force the US to intervene on their side in a conflict. Unlike India, Israel is protected by the norm leader from attempts to categorize it as a NNWS.21

At the same time, we have been witnessing some Israeli moves towards a more open nuclear posture. In 1998 former PM Shimon Peres admitted that Israel had a bomb (Anon 1998m). In December 2003 Mohammad El-Baradei, the Director-General of the IAEA, called on Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons, saying that the agency operated under the assumption that Israel has nuclear arms (Anon 2003e). Israel did not protest this statement. We can predict that Israel will face greater pressure to clarify its nuclear status, if and when a peace deal in the region becomes likely, and in this set of circumstances it will probably test and try to get NWS status.

What predictions can be made about the stability of NWD in the Middle East and the Korean peninsula? This question cannot be answered without a careful study of the regional dynamics. However, the Indian case did reveal that the decision to cross the nuclear threshold in 1998 was not motivated primarily by an increase in the indicators of threat from China or Pakistan, but from an apprehension that India’s undefined status in the regime rendered it vulnerable to international pressure. Putting pressure

21 The US does not want this issue to further hobble the possibilities for conflict resolution in West Asia.
on Iran to disarm might be counter-productive outside the context of acknowledgement and alleviation of its security problematique, say, through regional peace talks. Like North Korea, Iran has been accused of sponsoring cross-border terrorism and there are worries that such support will increase under a nuclear shield. The counter-terrorism regime contributes to marginalizing and stigmatizing these countries. Here it might be working at cross-purposes with nonproliferation if such naming spurs ‘rogue’ behavior.

Dealing with violators
The DPRK has broken not one but two of the regime’s norms—it has acquired nuclear weapons, while a signatory to the NPT, and it has helped other countries acquire them (though some question whether it is a worse offender in this respect than Pakistan). It is a proliferator in both senses of the term. Among the three countries, it is the closest to having a nuclear capability, and is accordingly treated more cautiously. North Korea clearly perceives an existential security threat from the West. Progress on disarmament cannot be made without tackling this issue, a process which would involve acknowledging that it has some grounds for fearing this threat. The next step would involve multilaterally verifiable disarmament, without which countries like Japan and South Korea would reconsider their renunciation of the nuclear option.

Unlike North Korea, Iran is still marginally ‘within’ the regime. Attempts to deal with Iran can be roughly classified into the ‘bargaining’ approach (offering economic and diplomatic benefits in return for cooperation) and the ‘deterrence’ approach (threatening it with the consequences of continuing on the nuclear path). The former is mostly favored by the European Union, and the latter by the American government. Iran experts Ray Takeyh and Kenneth Pollack recently proposed that the West use its
economic clout to strengthen the hands of Iranian pragmatists, who could then argue for slowing, limiting, or shelving Teheran's nuclear program (Takeyh and Pollack 2005). It is true that in the early 1990s Rafsanjani was substantially successful in introducing market reforms and a less confrontational foreign policy in order to facilitate economic recovery (Keddie 2003, 264). Yet, it is important to note that the Iranian discourse, like the Indian, features a link between nuclear capability and self-sufficiency, particularly in the field of energy (McFarquhar 2005; Sayimi 2003). The Speaker of Iran’s Parliament recently declared that “benefiting from science and different technologies is a symbol of defending a country's independence” (Anon 2005f). This suggests that an Iran that is more democratic and more integrated into the global economy may well cling to its nuclear option, just as India’s formal declaration of nuclear status was facilitated by the liberalization of the 1990s.

The Israeli case has exercised a powerful demonstration effect. That the US turned a blind eye to the Israeli bomb did not go unremarked in India (Chellaney 1994; Segal 1998). In fact, the refusal of the dominant powers to name Israel as a ‘proliferator’—the 1996 Proliferation: Threat and Response report prepared by the Pentagon does not mention it—weakens the norm (Spector 1998, 64). Any Middle East peace process will necessarily bring into question of the Israeli nuclear arsenal, and so will any resolution of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, Israel is now also a second-tier supplier of fissile material (Rauf 1995). It will increasingly face greater scrutiny of its nuclear exports and pressure to join supplier groups.
Section Six: Lessons from other cases and possibilities for further research

I have also attempted to discern the processes through which the international regime influenced policies in France and South Africa. In France, I noted an embrace of the NWS identity that it had resisted in the name of independence. Like India, France has since been steadily moving closer to the mainstream of NWS behavior. In the process, its distinctive minimalist stance has been encroached upon. The conception of deterrence in the 1995 French White Paper that I discussed at length, was one of “insurance” against rogue behavior (Carle 1994, 176). Although this appeared to be a minimalist approach, it left the door open to expand the concept to encompass all kinds of threats. In June 2001, President Chirac declared that if European territory was threatened with WMD, the choice before him would not be “between the total annihilation of a country and doing nothing.” This has been interpreted as a move away from an anti-cities strategy to one with a wider array of nuclear strike options (Yost 2005, 89). The authors of the new deterrent strategy confirmed in June 2003 that the possibility of nuclear retaliation also applied to any attack on a French city with chemical or biological weapons (Yost 2005, 90).

South Africa was the “archetype of the pariah state” (Black 1999, 94). Yet in around five years it went “from pariah to participant”, as the title of one volume puts it (Mills 1994). Renouncing its nuclear capability was a vital step in the country’s rehabilitation in the global sphere. While this nuclear renunciation was undoubtedly motivated by domestic factors and security imperatives, South Africa was responding to changes in international norms just as India was—although in the opposite direction. South African policies will be crucial in the near future, as the country constructs its identity as the ‘alternative’ norm leader. For instance, its support to the Landmines Convention
played a significant role in that agreement’s success, while assisting in the country’s identity reconstruction (Price 1998, 634).

As the counter-terrorism regime grows in strength, it is valuable to study the ways in which it affects the nonproliferation regime. Counter-terrorism can be a means through which states that have acquired a certain nuclear capability can be socialized into compliance with international norms promoting restraint. Countries like India that are suspicious of nonproliferation safeguards have been open to cooperation within the Marine and Container Security components of the Proliferation Security Initiative (Anon 2004a). Yet, nuclear nonproliferation and counter-terrorism could also be acting at cross-purposes. First, in order to secure cooperation against terrorists dominant powers may have to tolerate proliferation, as in the case of Pakistan and India, thereby weakening regime principles. A general disregard for international norms in the name of fighting terrorism would ease decisions to acquire nuclear weapons (and vice versa). Second, maintaining a suitable deterrent stance against terrorists may involve retaining a nuclear arsenal. Third, operations in the ‘war on terror’ would lead to more intervention by the US, isolating ‘rogue’ states, creating incentives for them to acquire nuclear weapons. Fourth, resources are limited and diversion of resources at the national and global levels to fighting war on terror in its myriad aspects reduces time and money for nuclear safety mechanisms (Clarke 2005).

There are several possibilities for future research. First, the argument can be extended to other cases of proliferation, moving beyond the three countries surveyed in this work. It would also be interesting to study the effects of constitution on states that

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22 The official Indian reaction to the American attacks on Afghanistan and Sudan, which came soon after the 1998 tests, avoided expressing explicit disapproval (Katyal 1998). Some commentators applauded the US actions (Nalapat 1998).
have not had conflictual relationships with the regime, and note the differences in the regime’s influence in those cases. Second, within India, it would be interesting to study the opposition to nuclear weapons and the civilian nuclear program in India. As we have seen, oppositional voices were muted and co-opted by nuclear advocates. By specifically examining how the discourse of anti-nuclear movements differed from the dominant one, we can understand the causes for the marginalization of dissent. This analysis would be relevant for predictions about the fate of anti-nuclear movements in other parts of the world. Third, one could also study the reaction of the international system to India’s moves, focusing the spotlight on the feedback loop between India and the regime. This project would involve conducting interviews with those responsible for dealing with India in the foreign policy bureaucracies of the major powers and of international organizations, supplemented by content analysis of international media stories relating to the Indian nuclear program over the years.

Conclusion

This project stemmed from dissatisfaction with the accounts of the Indian nuclear program, derived from various theoretical perspectives that are found in the literature. My research showed that the underlying flaw in all these accounts was the inability to consider the interaction between the state and the international system as fundamental and constitutive. Thus, the insights derived from this set of case studies are applicable to the study of general international interactions.

The main task of this work was therefore, to make the process of constitution of Indian national identity by the nuclear nonproliferation regime ‘visible.’ I have used both quantitative (content analysis) and qualitative (textual analysis, interviews) methods to
carry out this task. In each chapter, I have tried to show that taking constitution into account is essential to a comprehensive understanding of decisions on nuclear and counter-terrorism policy. It is my hope and belief that such an understanding will contribute to policy-makers’ efforts to reduce the nuclear danger. While this work has shown many of the unexpected and undesirable consequences of the operation of the nonproliferation regime, I consider the regime to be the most important international arrangement today and worthy of being strengthened through academic study as well as political strategies.
APPENDIX ONE

TECHNICAL APPENDIX: PROCEDURE FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS

While the last section of Chapter 1 discusses the utility of the methodology of content analysis, this appendix sets out in details the procedures followed and the tools used in the analysis presented in Chapters 3 and 4.

CATPAC: basic operations

My theoretical approach (Constructivism) drives my choice of research strategy (case study, analysis of discourse) and thus the method (quantitative textual analysis). The software package chosen for the analysis, CATPAC, eliminates the need for preconceived categories and tests of intercoder reliability. It enables the organization of large bodies of text into meaningful conceptual groupings (Doerfel and Barnett 1999, 592). Many commonly-used content analysis programs search the text for words that the analyst is looking for, but CATPAC is inductive in that it generates lists of salient words.

CATPAC does not encode the types of relations between the salient concepts that it identifies, as my substantive question does not require semantic analysis. There are other software packages that read blocks of text and match them with pre-written dictionaries of words associated with a particular emotion or attitude. DICTION, for instance, looks for words dealing with certainty, activity, optimism, realism and certainty.
CATPAC is one of the few programs that performs network analysis. The basic idea is that meaning stems not from particular words but from the embedding of words in context. CATPAC’s software can be compared to the neurons in a human brain. If words are connected repeatedly, the software ‘learns’ that pattern. An exclude file is created to eliminate prepositions, conjunctions and so on. The biggest advantage for political scientists of this software is that it allows for objective and inductive analysis. It is also less time-consuming and less expensive than dictionary-based programs.

CATPAC is a self-organizing Artificial Neural Network that reads any text (entered in ASCII format), discards minor words entered into a prewritten ‘exclude file,’ and discards also other words that fall below a user-set frequency of occurrence. For every remaining word, an artificial neuron is constructed that represents it. A scanning window of user-set size is then passed through the text. Whenever a given word is in the scanning window, the neuron that represents it is activated. Active nodes that are connected to each other can be identified. This means that words that are close to each other in the text will be tightly connected; it also means that a word similar to another word which is similar to a third word will be tightly connected to the third word, and so on (Woelfel 1993, 72).

What are the disadvantages of CATPAC? In this project the foremost difficulty was the time, effort and cost involved in procuring the newspaper articles and turning them into machine-readable form. Another disadvantage is that the program, unlike human coders, is not attuned to spelling errors or variations. Thus spelling had to be checked carefully (for instance, ‘china’ and ‘chian’ are not counted as the same; ‘non-proliferation’ had to be standardized to ‘nonproliferation’). The exclude file was
changed in order to leave out of the analysis certain words that appeared often but did not convey meaning, such as ‘Mr.,’ the names of months, and so on.

Words that are used in phrases often appear as clusters. For instance, United and States; therefore these phrases were changed to one word in the input text (‘United States’ is represented as ‘USA,’ ‘nonproliferation treaty’ was changed to ‘NPT’). However, words were not lemmatized—different forms of a word appear separately as they did carry different semantic values.¹ For instance, ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’ appear separately. CATPAC, therefore ‘undercounts’ occurrences of some words. Moreover, unlike human coders, it does not recognize metonyms or synecdoches or appellations (such as ‘White House’ for the US.). A more serious problem is that quantitative analysis can miss large structures of thought. For instance, one may not find the word ‘domino’ in foreign policy documents, but decisions may have been structured by that metaphor (Shimko 2004, 207-08).

Steps in content analysis using CATPAC

1. constructing a sample
   a. choosing a time period: In this case, each year between 1950-1999 was sampled.
   b. constructing a sample: A ‘representative week’ was constructed. This is a stratified random sample with each year as the unit of analysis. Using a random number table, I selected three dates to represent each day of the week. To put it differently, I created a week with three Mondays, three Tuesdays, and so on, thus identifying 21 days in every year. This

¹ Automatic lemmatization programs are available as freeware.
avoids the possibility that a simple random sample would have a disproportionate number of certain weekdays, thus skewing the coverage of the nuclear issue (for instance, the Sunday supplements might pay more attention to it). I scanned the newspaper archive for references to the nuclear issue (very broadly defined—all references to nuclear/atomic energy were noted). Since 1974 and 1998 saw an explosion on the production of nuclear texts, following the nuclear explosions in May of each year, I sampled 14 days in every month for those two years. 1974 and 1998 were also represented in the overall sample by 21 days a year.

c. choosing publications: This is essentially a subjective decision. Many scholars of India agree that The Hindu is the ‘newspaper of record.’ In this case it was chosen precisely because it was considered to be ‘middle of the road’ in its political views. I believe that the results would be congruent with analysis carried out with other publications. In my further research I plan to test this claim by including other publications in the sample. CATPAC, like many other software programs, only analyzes text in roman characters. While I began to collect data from Hindi newspapers, I decided not include them in the sample at this time, because of the high costs in time and money of translation (and verification of translation). I plan to include Hindi and possibly other regional language publications in my sample in the future.

d. identifying sources for data: This was the most difficult part of the procedure. Many Western newspapers are available in electronic form. The New York Times, for instance, is available on an electronic
database (Lexis-Nexis) from 1 January 1980 onwards. Lexis begins its indexing of several English-language Indian newspapers only in 1997. As a result I changed my initial plan of sampling from three newspapers. However, in the future this should become less of a problem.

e. identifying articles and inputing into a database. Since articles were not available in electronic format they were selected for the sample manually. That is, with the help of a research assistant, I read through each issue of the 21 days in the sample for each of the fifty years in order to identify articles that included the term ‘nuclear’ or synonyms. However, for the period 1992-1996 I made use of the index (its publication has since been discontinued) produced by the *Hindu* newspaper.

2. choosing a method of analysis and software: The advantages and disadvantages of quantitative analysis in general and CATPAC in particular were discussed above. Another issue in choosing a software is that of cost. The software CATPAC used here was purchased from Galileo Corporation at the student rate of $49.

3. obtaining data in hard copy: The majority of the articles of the Hindu in my sample were obtained from the microfilm section of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (commonly known as Teen Murti) in New Delhi, and some were obtained from the South Asia Library at the University of California at Berkeley.

4. transforming data into electronic format:
   a. It is possible to scan printed materials into electronic format by using optical character recognition (OCR) software. However, this was not
possible since the articles in question were quite old, and the scans were unclear. The typing of the majority of the articles was done in India by a professional typist.

b. Quality control through spell-checking, manual proofing, standardizing terms and collating is important for quantitative analysis. This includes removing extraneous material such as the names of reporters, reporting agencies, dates, mentions of the newspaper itself which could interfere with the counting of terms.

5. transforming data into machine-readable format: The files were saved as .txt files. CATPAC requires ASCII files as input.

6. running the analysis using content analysis software  
   a. in the first step, the text file is read by CATPAC and a ‘dendogram’ is generated. This contains the top 25 salient words (the length of this list can be changed) in order of frequency and also in alphabetical order along with their frequencies as a percentage of total words in the unit.
   b. In the second step, the clusters are viewed with a freeware tool called THOUGHTVIEW. This program allows us to view the clusters in 2-d and 3-d.

7. modifying the analysis based on results

8. Interpreting the results. The results can be interpreted only if the analyst has a fairly close knowledge of the issue. Two questions are usually asked of such analyses—generalizability of the results from the sample, that is, how applicable are these results to the larger population of texts? This can be found by statistical methods if we know the size of the larger population, which we do not know in this case. The question of replicability, i.e. whether these results would be supported or contradicted if we chose another publication or
another software, is, as I indicated above, something that my future research will answer.
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