FRANCISCO SUÁREZ ON ACTING FOR THE
SAKE OF THE ULTIMATE END

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Sydney F. Penner
May 2011
Despite standing as one of the most important philosophers at the threshold of early modern philosophy, Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) has been strangely ignored in twentieth-century scholarship. In my dissertation, I contribute to our picture of Suárez by exploring his views on practical reasoning. I argue that Suárez stands in the eudaemonist tradition, rather than moving towards an unappealing legalism, as has been suggested. Attributing such a legalism to Suárez depends on a narrow focus on his De legibus; to balance our picture, I focus on his often-overlooked De fine hominis, in which it quickly becomes evident that it is our happiness that provides us with reasons for action.

In Chapter 2, I look at Suárez’s taxonomy of different kinds of ends and then look more closely at his conception of happiness. While he recognizes the possibility of a pluralist conception, he adopts a monistic account according to which God is sufficient for happiness. This is, however, in tension with his commitment to there being other things that are intrinsically good. In Chapter 3, I look at his account of four ways in which an agent can act for the sake of an end: with actual, habitual, virtual, or interpretative intention. In Chapter 4, building on distinctions examined in earlier chapters, I look at a sequence of questions that Suárez considers about whether agents have to intend an
ultimate end when acting, whether they can intend more than one, and
whether they have to intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end and, if so,
with what sort of intention.

Finally, I look at Suárez’s account of the will as a free and rational
power. Suárez argues that we can only choose options that we have
judged as conducive to our ends, but he insists that the will is free in
a libertarian sense and so we need not choose the option judged to be
most conducive to our ends. We cannot choose something purely bad
but we can choose a lesser good.

An appendix includes the first English translation of De fine hominis
dd. 1–5 and Disputatio Metaphysica XXIII.2, the key texts on which my
arguments rely.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Sydney Penner was born on November 21, 1977, in Spanish Lookout, Belize. He moved with his family to Nova Scotia in 1986. Despite a love of reading, staying at home and helping on his parents’ farm appealed to him more than going to school, resulting in an early departure from formal schooling. Eventually, however, the lure of books overwhelmed his love of the agrarian life and he entered college in 1999. In 2001 he received the Associate of Arts degree in Biblical Studies from Rosedale Bible College. After studying history and philosophy at Acadia University and Yale University, he received the Bachelor of Arts degree magna cum laude from Yale University in 2005. He moved to Cornell University in 2005 and wrote a dissertation on Francisco Suárez under Scott MacDonald’s supervision. In 2010 he accepted a Junior Research Fellowship at Merton College, Oxford.
I dedicate this dissertation to the other part of my life, Erin, Katherine, and Nathaniel; they will, I imagine, be happy to take up some more of my time and attention.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Professors and graduate students alike ensured a congenial and supportive environment at Cornell; to attempt to acknowledge all my debts would test anyone’s patience and would, besides, make the inevitable omissions that much more egregious.

More of my philosophical training than I would ever have anticipated came in the form of conversations with my fellow students. I am happy to report that I benefitted from many students, at least one of whom must be mentioned by name: Jacob Klein. He ensured that our conversations were exemplary in enjoyment and philosophical profit—for me, certainly. I can only hope that they were so to him as well.

My committee members were, without exception, warmly supportive of my project. To have specialists in ancient, medieval, and early modern philosophy support research on Francisco Suárez made for a compelling vote of confidence.

I first looked at Suárez as a reader of Aquinas; by now I am keenly interested in what happens in the early modern period after Suárez. Much of the credit for awakening that interest goes to Andrew Chignell and Sukjae Lee. How could I not respond to such infectious enthusiasm? While their influence is not as manifest in this dissertation as perhaps it should be, I am hopeful that it shall yet bear fruit.

I cannot think of a better spur to rigorous philosophical work than Terry Irwin. Sloppiness anywhere is bound to be noticed by him, with the result that he will ask a question in a style that I associate closely with him, one that starts by probing what seems like a tangential detail but ends up calling into doubt an alarmingly big chunk of one’s work.
I have no doubt that I still fall far short of emulating his rigour and astuteness, but I shall always be grateful for what I have learned from him. It is also worth noting that I likely would never have written on Suárez had it not been for Terry’s own work on him.

There are many things for which I could thank Scott MacDonald, the chair of my committee: indulgent discussions, friendly encouragement, written comments on my dissertation, and more. But I am perhaps most grateful for what he has taught me about careful, patient engagement with historical texts that does not presume better understanding of them than I actually have. It is a lesson I hope to remember lest more years with the texts I study lull me into assuming mastery.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Biographical Sketch .................................................. iii
Dedication .............................................................. iv
Acknowledgements ...................................................... v
Table of Contents ...................................................... vii
List of Tables .......................................................... ix
List of Figures .......................................................... x
List of Abbreviations .................................................. xi
Preface ................................................................. xii

1 Suárez as a Eudaemonist ........................................ 1
1.1 Introduction ....................................................... 1
1.2 Teleological conception of reasons ............................ 1
  1.2.1 Suggestions contra .......................................... 1
  1.2.2 Texts pro ...................................................... 5
  1.2.3 Did Suárez change his mind? ............................ 10
1.3 Ends qualifiedly and unqualifiedly ultimate ............... 14
1.4 Eudaemonism ..................................................... 20
1.5 Psychological and Rational ............................... . . . 27
1.6 Conclusion ......................................................... 32

2 Ultimate Ends ......................................................... 33
2.1 Introduction ....................................................... 33
2.2 A Taxonomy of Ends ............................................. 34
  2.2.1 Formal and material ....................................... 35
  2.2.2 Activities and products of activities .................. 36
  2.2.3 Finis actionis and finis rei genitæ ....................... 37
  2.2.4 The end which is made and the end which is obtained 38
  2.2.5 Objective and formal ..................................... 39
  2.2.6 Finis cuius and finis cui ............................... 40
  2.2.7 Ultimate and non-ultimate ends ......................... 42
2.3 Pluralism or monism? ........................................... 57
  2.3.1 Aristotle ..................................................... 57
  2.3.2 Suárez ........................................................ 65
2.4 Conclusion ......................................................... 86

3 Four Kinds of Intention ............................................ 88
3.1 Introduction ....................................................... 88
3.2 The four intentions of lexicons and handbooks ............ 91
3.3 The will’s intention in general ............................. 95
3.4 The four intentions in Suárez ............................... 99
  3.4.1 A note on texts ............................................. 101
  3.4.2 Actually intending ......................................... 103
LIST OF TABLES

1  Citations in *Disputationes metaphysicæ* . . . . . . . . . . xxix
LIST OF FIGURES

5.1 Argument Outline .............................................. 184
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DBM  Suárez. *De bonitate et malitia*.
DFH  ———. *De fine hominis*.
DL   ———. *De legibus*.
DM   ———. *Disputationes metaphysicæ*.
DS   ———. *De sacramentis in genere*.
DVI  ———. *De voluntario et involuntario*.
QDV  Aquinas. *Quæstiones disputatæ de virtutibus in communi*.
ST   ———. *Summa Theologiæ*.

All citations of Suárez will include parenthetical reference to the relevant volume and page number of his *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–66). Though the *Opera omnia* does not contain the most reliable text, it is the most readily accessible edition.
Jacob Brucker (1696–1770), called ‘the father of the history of philosophy’ by Victor Cousin, has this to say about scholastic philosophy in his famous *Historia critica philosophiæ*:

Finally, around the eleventh century, a new kind of philosopher arose, which is usually called ‘scholastic’. It vowed obedience even to the words in Aristotle, yet perverted every sound argument, both philosophical and theological. And as a result of all the vain worship of clevernesses, it trapped their souls in an demented mode of philosophizing.

Brucker divides the history of philosophy into three periods. The first period runs from the beginning of the world to the rise of the Roman Empire in the first century BCE. The second period begins with Jewish and other philosophies just before the coming of Christ and ends with demented scholasticism. The third period runs from the earliest humanist revival of learning—perhaps marked more by satire of the scholastic Aristotelians than by the building of new philosophical systems—to Brucker’s own day. The first period receives extraordinarily

---


thorough coverage from Brucker. Not surprisingly, given his assessment of scholasticism’s merits, the second period receives short shrift, at least relatively speaking. Here is what William Enfield, who regretted that ‘so valuable a fund of information should be accessible only to those, who had learning, leisure, and perseverance sufficient, to read in Latin six closely printed quarto volumes, containing on the average about a thousand pages each’, ³ has to say in his charming eighteenth-century paraphrase of Brucker’s work when defending the rather cursory treatment of scholastic philosophers:

To follow the Scholastics in detail, through the mazes of their subtle speculations, would be to lose the reader in a labyrinth of words. We must refer those who wish for this kind of entertainment to the writings of Albert, Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, and Occam; where they will soon discover, that these wonderful doctors amused themselves and their followers by raising up phantoms of abstraction in the field of truth, the pursuit of which would be as fruitless a labour, as that of tracing elves and fairies in their midnight gambols. A brief review of their method of philosophising is all that is practicable, and all that the intelligent reader will desire, in this part of our work. ⁴

Enfield clearly had little sympathy himself for the subtleties of scholastic philosophy. Despite needing to pare down Brucker’s six large Latin volumes into two much smaller English volumes, he has the space to

³The History of Philosophy, from the Earliest Times to the Beginnings of the Present Century Drawn up from Brucker’s ‘Historia Critica Philosophiae’ (London, 1791), vol. 1, v.

⁴Ibid., vol. 2, 385–86.
entertain his readers in the above vein at some length.\textsuperscript{5}

But with the revival of learning championed by the humanists, especially with their emphasis on a proper learning of Greek and Latin, philosophy was restored: ‘Finally, after the great darkness in which all erudition and philosophy, having been buried, lay, a new light came forth and its splendour was restored to the sciences.’\textsuperscript{6} Brucker identifies Bruno, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and Leibniz—among others—as especially bright stars in the firmament of modern, true philosophy.

Brucker’s narrative, of course, has origins in the self-serving historiographical narrative spun by Renaissance humanists, who presented the medieval period as centuries of a slumbering human spirit after the culture and learning of the Greek and Roman civilizations and who gave themselves leading roles in the Renaissance that burst forth, throwing off the veil of medieval Christianity and arid scholastic Aristotelianism. Religion was reformed, painting received perspective, literature was eloquent again, and, not least, philosophy was purged of scholastic accretions so that the true wisdom of Plato and Aristotle could shine again.\textsuperscript{7}

This narrative was widely adopted. The cursory treatment of scholastic philosophy, whether accompanied by explicit dismissals or not, in well-
nigh countless histories of philosophy or ethics from Brucker’s time to the present could readily be adduced as evidence. The very term ‘medieval’ linguistically enshrines this tendentious historiography.

In electing to write on the scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez, S. J. (1548–1617), I am betraying that I have a taste for ‘this kind of entertainment’, as Enfield put it. But I do not bring up Brucker merely to indicate that I have different tastes. Rather, I think a historiographical narrative like Brucker’s, in broad outline at least, is still prevalent today and, I also think, the story of the dissemination and reception of Suárez’s works is a useful antidote to such a narrative.8

Suárez was born into a prosperous family in the Andalusian city of Granada on January 5, 1548, a mere half-century after Ferdinand and Isabella finally wrested the city from eight centuries of Moorish control. In 1564, as a student at the University of Salamanca, he asked to join the vibrant, rapidly expanding Society for Jesus. He was initially rejected on grounds of deficient health and intelligence. He was persistent, however, and was eventually admitted as an ‘indifferent’, meaning that his superiors would decide later whether he had the capacity for the study leading to the priesthood. There seems to have been little doubt later on, since, despite the initial worries about his intelligence, he rapidly rose in prominence. During his career he taught at the schools in Segovia, Valladolid, Tome, Alcalá, Salamanca, and, finally, at Philip II’s insistence, in Coimbra.9 He wrote prolifically; his published works

8Suárez, incidentally, receives a part of a paragraph in Brucker’s six large volumes (Historia critica philosophiae, vol. 4, 137–38).
9Suárez was reluctant to accept the post at Coimbra, although a highly prestigious post, because of political dangers. The Portuguese were less than welcoming of a Spanish Jesuit appointed by a Spanish king, even if the Spanish king was also Philip I of Portugal after having successfully claimed Portugal during the 1580 Portuguese succession crisis. One wonders, too, if the Portuguese may also have had
fill twenty-six large volumes. His unpublished manuscripts would no doubt fill several more. Suárez died on September 25, 1617, in Lisbon.  

It is worth pausing to take note of Suárez's dates. He is often regarded as one more medieval scholastic, albeit one of the later ones. But seeing him as a medieval scholastic is misleading at best, as his dates should suggest. Anyone born in 1548 is clearly not part of the racial concerns. The Portuguese joined the ‘anti-Spanish’ campaign during the Jesuits' Third General Congregation (1573), where ‘Spanish’ was likely a euphemism for ‘Jew/converso’. Spanish Jesuits had been unusually open to those of Jewish origins, with the result that there were many converso Jesuits even at the highest levels of the Order. In fact, Suárez himself had converso ancestry. But it is hard to know if such concerns were part of the political intrigue surrounding Suárez's appointment. It is, at any rate, difficult to argue with the kings of powerful empires and so Suárez’s appointment had to be accepted.

One amusing consequence of the situation was that Suárez now needed to acquire a doctoral degree, since the Coimbra faculty objected to having a colleague without one. The Jesuit Provincial in Lisbon promptly conferred one on Suárez. This failed to satisfy the faculty, so Suárez had to make a trip to University of Évora in southern Portugal, where he directed a public theological debate and received a doctorate for his efforts. For more on Suárez’s appointment to the Coimbra post, see Carlos Noreña, ‘Suárez and the Jesuits’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 284 and Paul V. Murphy, ‘“God’s Porters”: The Jesuit Vocation according to Francisco Suárez’, Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu 70 (2001): 3–28; for more on the role of conversos in the Jesuit order, see Robert Aleksander Maryks, The Jesuit Order as a Synagogue of Jews: Jesuits of Jewish Ancestry and Purity-of-Blood Laws in the Early Society of Jesus (Leiden: Brill, 2010), especially xxv–xxvi and 104–108.


To get a sense for the Renaissance philosophical context in which Suárez was working, see Brian P. Copenhaver and Charles B. Schmitt, Renaissance Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) and Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler, and Jill Kraye, eds., The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For more on the Jesuit order in which Suárez was a prominent figure, see John W. O'Malley et al., eds., The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) and The Jesuits II: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540–1773 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006). For Suárez’s Spanish context, see the works cited in footnote 18 on page xix.
age of Aquinas, Scotus, and Ockham. Much has happened in Europe in the centuries separating them from Suárez. He comes after the Reformation, after the rise of humanism, after the Europeans’ rediscovery of the Americas, and after their recognition of the great number of non-Christian cultures in other parts of the world. Much in the world is going to look different to an educated person in Suárez’s day than it would have in Aquinas’s day. It is difficult to see what sense it could make to consider Suárez’s era as medieval rather than early modern.

Of course, Suárez might be a citizen of the early modern era and yet be firmly rooted in the scholastic tradition and so justifiably called a scholastic (at least if we divorce the term ‘scholastic’ from temporal connotations). I think this is fair. It seems clear that Suárez is part of the scholastic tradition, though one might wonder whether he is a ‘strictly scholastic thinker’, as Carlos Noreña calls him. Suárez was, after all, a Jesuit rather than a Dominican, and, as Noreña himself indicates, their conservative opponents saw the Jesuits as dangerous in part because of their reliance on humanist education. There were many humanists in the Jesuit order. It is also worth noting that Suárez seems to have gotten into trouble because he objected to the traditional form of scholastic teaching and so made a point of lecturing in a different manner. The divergence in form of the Disputationes metaphysicæ from most earlier scholastic literature has also often been noted. Finally, in case one is

---

11 Readers of Suárez will soon discover traces of these events in his writings.
12 ‘Suárez and the Jesuits’, 278.
13 Ibid., 271.
14 For some examples, see Robert A. Maryks, Saint Cicero and the Jesuits: The Influence of the Liberal Arts on the Adoption of Moral Probabilism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008).
tempted to think that the difference between scholastics and humanists is the difference between barbaric, mangled Latin and elegant, Ciceronian Latin, we have testimony from Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) that Suárez ‘stands out by his incomparable eloquence’. I will leave it to the readers to make their own judgements on that score.

Still, there is ample reason to think of Suárez as belonging to the scholastic tradition. He predominantly cites medieval scholastics such as Aquinas, Scotus, Biel, and Durandus (and Aristotle, of course); more importantly, he discusses them as colleagues engaged in a common project rather than as objects of ridicule as becomes fashionable among all too many early modern philosophers. He adopts the classic scholastic practice of organizing his texts into clearly delineated sections, each addressing one question. He cites the authorities on either side of an issue—exhaustively—before attempting to reach a resolution. Finally, he himself explicitly says in the introduction to one of his works that he will not depart from the scholastic method since it is familiar to him and especially suitable for finding truth and combatting error. His defence of the scholastic method is significant; if we keep his dates in mind, we

---


recognize that he is not a scholastic merely by default. Rather, he chose to remain in the scholastic tradition.

Whether scholastic or otherwise, intellectual and cultural life flourished in Spain during Suárez’s time. This is the Siglo de Oro of Spain.¹⁸ The magnificent Complutensian Polyglot—the first printed polyglot of the complete Bible—was published just before Suárez’s birth. The painter El Greco (1541–1614), the author of Don Quixote Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616), and the composer Tomás Luis de Victoria (1548–1611) were all born in the same decade as Suárez. Lope de Vega, ‘the Spanish Shakespeare’, was born when Suárez was fourteen years old. Most relevant for our purposes, philosophy flourished in Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is when the famous Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle’s texts, combining the philological scholarship of the humanists with the philosophical exegesis of the scholastics, were prepared.¹⁹ That the names of most of the prominent figures of the Iberian scholasticism of the time sound relatively unfamiliar to us—Francisco de Vitoria (1483/1486–1546), Domingo de Soto (c. 1494–1560), Pedro da Fonseca (1528–1599), Domingo Báñez (1528–1604), Luis de Molina (1535–1600), and Gabriel Vásquez (c. 1551–1604) are some others in addition to Suárez—says


more about our ignorance than about the importance of this later scholasticism.

But this revival of scholastic philosophy should surprise us if we are inclined to accept the narrative we have been considering. Recall the bright light with which early modern philosophers reputedly shone after the darkness of the medieval scholastics. If Renaissance humanism was such a welcome awakening, why did so many so quickly want to slumber again? Perhaps because scholasticism never actually was so moribund.

Francisco Suárez is undoubtedly a preeminent figure in Iberian scholasticism and his *Disputationes metaphysicæ* is likely his most influential work. A brief look at the history of this work should lay to rest any suggestion that Iberian scholasticism was merely a quaint relic in a conservative—and Catholic—outpost of Europe.²⁰ It was first published in Spain in 1597, well after Renaissance ideals had time to permeate all of European thought.²¹ The book was extraordinarily well-received. Within several decades it went through almost twenty editions. These editions were not restricted to the Iberian peninsula: by 1620, for example, there

---

²⁰ Jeremy Robbins, a scholar of Spanish literature, argues against the view that Spain was intellectually backward during the seventeenth century in *Arts of Perception: The Epistemological Mentality of the Spanish Baroque, 1580–1720* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007). He actually makes the case too hard for himself, since he fails adequately to recognize how the scholastics themselves might be examples of intellectual vigour rather than moribundity.

had been six editions in Germany. It quickly became widely used not only in Jesuit-run schools, but also in Protestant universities in northern continental Europe, especially in Germany. These facts become even more remarkable when one notes what sort of work the *Disputationes metaphysicæ* is. Written in true scholastic fashion, it exhaustively catalogues the views from Hellenistic, Patristic, Jewish, Islamic, and Christian scholastic sources on whatever question is at hand before arguing that one view is more probable than another. Combining this thorough scholarship with a comprehensive discussion of metaphysical questions results in a forbidding work. The fifty-four disputations, each covering numerous questions, fill two large volumes of the *Opera Omnia* in Latin. That such a work should receive such a remarkable reception throughout Europe suggests that scholasticism had more vigour left than the aforementioned historiographical narrative allowed.

The editions of Suárez’s works, numerous as they are, fail to account fully for the dissemination of his thought. Numerous handbooks were compiled by other philosophers that to a large extent relied on Suárez’s work. For example, Franco Burgersdijk (1590–1635) summarized many of Suárez’s views in textbooks that were widely used in seventeenth-century Holland. Christoph Scheibler (1589–1653), ‘the Protestant Suárez’, played a similar role in Germany. One historian, Karl Eschweiler, in a study of Spanish scholasticism’s influence in German universities, deems Scheibler’s *Opus Metaphysicum* the most widely-used textbook in Germany. Eschweiler eventually concludes that for most

---

of the seventeenth-century, Suárez’s metaphysics provided the received philosophy in German Protestant universities.23

Besides noting the widespread dissemination of Suárez’s work, one can easily collect statements lauding the philosophical merit of Suárez. The Dutch student of natural law, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), considered Suárez to be a philosopher and theologian of such sharpness that he hardly has any equal.24 The Dutch philosopher Adriaan Heereboord (1614–1659), a student of Burgersdijk, calls Suárez ‘the pope and chief of all the metaphysicians’.25 Among the German philosophers, Christian Wolff (1679–1754) says that Suárez is the scholastic who ‘pondered metaphysical questions with particular penetration’.26 Leaving the continent, Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651), clearly inspired by Suárez, describes him as ‘acute’ at least twice.27 It is clear that Suárez was not merely an inspiration for textbooks.

So, contrary to what the narrative of Brucker and others might have led us to expect, the story of Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicæ appears to reveal a thriving scholastic tradition of philosophy in early

---


25‘omnia metaphysicorum papa atque princeps’. This commendation is frequently quoted but all the instances I have seen rely on the same handful of secondary sources instead of citing the original. But the quotation is not apocryphal: it can be found as ‘omnia Metaphysicorum Principis ac Papæ’ in Heereboord’s Meletemata philosophica (Amsterdam, 1680), 27. See Eschweiler, ‘Die Philosophie der spanischen Spätscholastik’, 266–68, for more on the presence of Suárez in Dutch schools.


modern Europe. Yet present-day philosophers, at least in the analytic tradition, know very little about either Suárez in particular or about late scholasticism in general. Analytic philosophers, of course, have not always been known as appreciative of earlier traditions of philosophy. But scholars in this tradition have by now made great strides in recovering and analyzing earlier traditions. The ancient and modern periods in particular have been the subject of more-than-competent studies that have not only revealed the wealth of philosophical thought to be found there to specialist communities but to the broader philosophical community.

Medieval philosophy has lagged in this regard. While there have been an increasing number of insightful studies of particular figures of the medieval period, we still cannot claim to have a comprehensive picture of the medieval philosophical tradition. Nor can medieval philosophical thought claim to be part of broader philosophical discussion to anything like the extent that ancient and modern philosophy can. A lamentable tendency to think of the history of philosophy as starting with Plato and Aristotle and then continuing with Descartes is still evident rather too frequently. Remaining ignorant of the wealth of medieval philosophical discussion is not the only danger. As Terence Irwin has pointed out with respect to the history of ethics, ancient ethical thought can look more alien to modern concerns than it really is if we are unaware of medieval

---

28 There is a variant narrative that is also put into question by this story, namely, the narrative that recognizes a golden age of scholasticism around the time of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) and Bonaventure (1221–1274), but judges subsequent scholasticism to have rapidly devolved into arid subtleties such that the criticism of the Renaissance humanists were well-deserved by the time they were around to make the criticisms. Many works could be cited that accept this narrative, but see the critical overview provided by Kent Emery, Jr., in his editorial in *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* 51 (2009): v–ix. Also cf. Marcia L. Colish, *Remapping Scholasticism* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2000).
developments.\textsuperscript{29} We risk misunderstanding the \textit{termini} of a tradition by neglecting the development in between.

What scholarship there has been on medieval philosophy has tended to focus on a handful of prominent figures of the thirteenth- and early fourteenth-centuries. Aquinas, Scotus (c. 1266–1308), and Ockham (c. 1287–1347) have received significant, competent attention, though there is still a great deal more to say even about them. But how much do we know about, for example, Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1275–1332/1334) and Gabriel Biel (c. 1425–1495)? Yet both were considered significant enough in the early modern period to have chairs for the teaching of their thought in the universities. Or how much do we know about John Buridan (c. 1295–c. 1358), who wrote an influential commentary on Aristotle’s \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} in addition to a great deal of work in what we would call philosophy of language? Numerous other similar examples could be cited.

Perhaps the best indication of the extent of our neglect of Suárez in particular is noticed when looking for editions and translations of his works. The vast majority of his work is not currently in print. There is a nineteenth-century \textit{Opera Omnia} that includes all of his works that were published either in his lifetime or shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{30} Good academic libraries will usually have a copy but acquiring it is difficult. Nor does the \textit{Opera Omnia} quite live up to its billing, since it does not include any of the numerous unpublished manuscripts to be found in various European libraries. Most of these manuscripts are no doubt of limited philosophical interest, but at least some, e.g., his commentaries


\textsuperscript{30}Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–1866.
on some of Aristotle’s works, would be of interest.\textsuperscript{31} The situation with critical editions is even worse. While there has long been talk among Spanish scholars of preparing a critical edition of his works, only several works have critical editions to date. Many of the works most in need of a critical edition in the sense of there being questions about the reliability of the available editions do not have one. Even fewer of his works are available in English translation. Approximately a third of the fifty-four disputationes that make up his \textit{Disputationes metaphysicae} are available in English. The translations vary in quality. Significant excerpts from several other works are available in a mid-twentieth-century volume.\textsuperscript{32} But most of his works do not have even excerpts translated. None of his works are available in their entirety.

So the state of scholarship on the history of philosophy is this: flourishing scholarship on ancient and modern philosophy, reasonably good progress on the early and middle periods of medieval philosophy, and mostly ignorance on late medieval and early modern philosophy up to Descartes. Seen from this perspective, it is perhaps not surprising that we know so little about Suárez, despite the influence he had in seventeenth-century Europe. We know hardly anything about his contemporaries and immediate predecessors either. This ignorance has


perils for our understanding of modern philosophers as well parallel to the perils resulting from ignorance of the medieval period generally. Recent scholarship on modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Leibniz, has increasingly recognized the extent of their indebtedness to scholastic philosophy. But these modern philosophers were as likely to be reading Suárez as Aquinas. Assuming that when Descartes uses scholastic terminology he is using it in the same way that Aquinas uses it fails to recognize that the terminology has been developed and refined for several centuries by the time it reaches Descartes. In order to fully understand modern philosophy, we need to understand the late scholasticism that preceded it.

A perceptive reader may have noticed that I have provided little evidence so far of the influence of Suárez on prominent philosophers of the modern period. Works on Suárez usually go through a standard laundry list that is intended to show that the modern philosophers are heavily indebted to Suárez: Descartes received schooling with Suárezian textbooks at La Flèche; Leibniz says in his autobiography that he read Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* as if it were a novel when he was a boy; and Schopenhauer lauded Suárez’s work as the storehouse of scholastic wisdom. Even the road to Kant may not be too long; we already noted Christian Wolff’s praise of Suárez. These claims are tantalizing, to be sure, but it is not clear to me of how much consequence

---

33I have in mind here works such as John Carriero’s *Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’ Meditations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Carriero is to be lauded for the careful attention he pays to Aquinas when reading Descartes and I think the result is illuminating. But I think there are places where reading Suárez instead of Aquinas would have been even more illuminating and would have prevented misleading contrasts.

34These claims can be found in many places; two will serve as representatives: Riedl, ‘Suarez and the Organization of Learning’, 5–6 and Doyle, ‘Suárez—The Man, his Work, and his Influence’, 13–15.
they are. Showing that someone read Suárez is not the same thing as showing that he or she was influenced by Suárez in any interesting way. Unfortunately, there are almost no detailed comparisons of the philosophical positions of Suárez and philosophers who were allegedly influenced by him of the sort that would convincingly establish influence. Given the reception that Suárez’s works received in the seventeenth-century, some significant influence seems likely. Still, there is clearly a great deal of work left to be done in order to reveal the lines of influence.

But perhaps it is premature to hope for such work before we even have a solid understanding of Suárez’s work itself.

The historical rationale for a study of Suárez is clear, then. The reception of his work in the century or two after his life at least suggests that his philosophical thought is of a caliber such that we can profit from engaging it. There is another reason to think that Suárez’s work might be especially interesting. One of the most sophisticated alternatives to Aquinas in medieval thought is provided by Scotus. His penchant for denying the philosophical doctrines of Aquinas is well-captured in the old phrase ‘Ait Thomas, negat Scotus’. So an obvious reason to be in-

---

35Perhaps the most substantive work of this nature has been done with respect to Descartes. Two examples of work helpfully informed by attention to Suárez are Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), and Alison Simmons, ‘Sensible Ends: Latent Teleology in Descartes’ Account of Sensation’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 39 (2001): 49–75. Roger Ariew tackles the question of influence head-on in ‘Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez’, in The Philosophy of Francisco Suárez, edited by Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Whether Descartes was significantly influenced by Suárez and, if so, to what extent is a matter of some controversy. For example, David Clemenson argues in Descartes’ Theory of Ideas (London: Continuum, 2007) that Suárez’s influence on Descartes is usually overstated and that Descartes’ primary late medieval sources are Pedro da Fonseca, Antonio Rubio, Francisco Toletus, and the Coimbran commentators. Suppose that Clemenson is right about the lines of influence; one might still think it somewhat unseemly to quibble already about which late scholastics were really the most influential ones, given that we know so little about any of them.
interested in Suárez is to see how he navigates the Thomist and Scotist traditions. Which positions does he adopt? When does he try to forge a middle path? Why? By the time of Suárez, philosophers in the respective traditions have had several centuries both to sharpen the criticisms and to formulate responses; insofar as Suárez is a sympathetic heir to these traditions, we might expect to find especially sophisticated positions in his work.

It is possible, I suppose, that we will be disappointed and will find that Suárez's earlier reputation was unmerited. But we know so little about his thought that we are certainly not in a position at present to make that judgement. And even if it should turn out that there is little to be found in Suárez that would not have been easier to find elsewhere, studying his thought will help give us a fuller picture of the Western philosophical tradition. Studying his work is especially rewarding in this regard because of his treatment of his predecessors. He is known both for how exhaustively he surveys all the different positions that have been taken on an issue and for how judiciously he presents the arguments for those positions. Suárez is more likely to be faulted for failing to dismiss a position where he should than for failing to give it its due. Given that Suárez frequently engages with the thought of other figures of whom we are ignorant, studying his work is especially useful in filling out our picture of the medieval philosophical tradition.

A Jesuit historian has compiled a list of the citations in Disputationes metaphysicae and found that 245 different authors were cited. Seeing

the most frequently cited authors, excluding citations of himself, is revealing:

Table 1: Citations in *Disputationes metaphysicæ*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Citations</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aristotle</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>14. Albert the Great</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Thomas Aquinas</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>15. Henry of Ghent</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Augustine</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>17. Gabriel Biel</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cajetan</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>18. Avicenna</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Soncinas</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>19. Ægidius</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Averroes</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>20. Hervæus Natalis</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Iavellus</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That Aristotle and Aquinas easily head the list is not surprising. That Duns Scotus is third is of some interest. As we will see, Suárez thinks of himself as a student of Aquinas yet frequently finds himself in sympathy with Scotus’s criticisms of Aquinas. But what is most revealing about this list is that we know hardly anything about any of the philosophers
listed from the fifth position down.\textsuperscript{37} While Suárez’s lengthy discussions of the views of others often makes it more difficult and more tedious to figure out what his views are, they are also rewarding in that one can learn a great deal about other relatively-unknown philosophers while working through his writings.

Leaving aside the perspective to the past, a good understanding of Suárez will put us in a position where we can meaningfully answer the question of whether modern philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz were influenced by the thought of Suárez, and—if they are, as seems likely—the question of where the lines of influence run. Doing so should provide us with a better understanding of the subsequent modern tradition. Reason for further study of Suárez is not lacking.

**Goals of this study**

The obvious goal of this study is to fill part of the just-discussed lacuna in scholarship by providing a critical discussion of Suárez’s philosophical views. Of course, since Suárez wrote voluminously in numerous areas of philosophy and theology, my study will of necessity have to focus on only a small part of that work.\textsuperscript{38} There are several reasons that make his eudaemonist account of practical reason and action an apt focus point. First, even by the standards of Suárez scholarship, it is an area of his thought that has received little attention. What study has been done on Suárez has mostly been in either metaphysics, usually

\textsuperscript{37}It is also noteworthy how many authors Suárez cites much more frequently than ones that we might have thought of as the prominent medieval figures, e.g., Ockham or Anselm.

\textsuperscript{38}The 1856 *Opera omnia* runs to twenty-six large volumes.
relying on his *Disputationes metaphysicæ*, or in political philosophy, relying on his *De legibus*. Both works include material that is relevant to a study of practical reason and action, but this material has received less attention. Other works by Suárez in this area have received practically no attention at all.

Secondly, it is an area of great philosophical interest. Questions about practical reason and action are frequent subjects of debate in contemporary philosophy and, furthermore, these debates often draw in perspectives from earlier traditions. There is enough dissatisfaction with modern alternatives to fuel an interest in earlier alternatives with the result that much work has been done to recover the views of philosophers such as Aristotle and Aquinas.

Thirdly, Suárez fits into a long, vibrant tradition of reflection on the subject such that this is a natural place to start in a project of fleshing out our picture of the development of philosophical reflection in late scholasticism. Suárez belongs, first and foremost, to the Aristotelian tradition of ethical theorizing that is rooted in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. As we saw, Suárez cites Aristotle far more often than any other philosopher. It is a tradition marked by the claims that all the actions of a rational agent are done for the sake of her ultimate end, i.e., her happiness, and that the content in which the formal concept of happiness is realized is identified through a theory of human nature. That is, an understanding of the essence of human beings, i.e., of human nature, reveals what the function of a human being is. Happiness results from acting such that one fulfills one’s function.

More specifically, Suárez thinks of himself as continuing to work in
this Aristotelian tradition as it was shaped by Aquinas. Here is how Suárez himself describes his relationship to Aquinas:

Since in my other lucubrations and theological disputations I always had St. Thomas as my first guide and teacher and I tried with strength to understand, defend, and follow his teaching, I will attempt to surpass that in the present work with even greater eagerness and affection. And I hope, with divine aid, to achieve that so that I will not depart from his true mind and view in any matter that is important and of some significance, drawing out his view not from my own head but from his classic expositors and defenders and, where they fail him, from the various passages collected among them themselves.\footnote{De gratia, Prolegemenum VI, cap. 6, n. 28 (= OO 7:322): \ldots cum in aliis lucubrationibus nostris ac theologis disputationibus, D. Thomam semper tanquam primarum ducem et magistrum habuerimus, ejusque doctrinam pro viribus intelligere, defendere ac sequi conati fuerimus, in praesenti opere, moto majori studio et affectu id præstare curabimus; speramusque cum divino auxilio consequuros esse, ut a vera ejus mente atque sententia, in nulla re gravi aut alicuius momenti discedamus; non ex nostro capite, sed ex antiquis ejus expositoribus ac sectoribus, et ubi illi defuerint, ex variis ejusdem locis inter se collatis eam eliciendo. On this passage, cf. Elisabeth Gemmeke, \textit{Die Metaphysik des sittlich Guten bei Franz Suarez} (Freiburg: Herder, 1965), 18–19. All translations of Suárez are mine.}

Suárez is undoubtedly right in identifying Aquinas as his ‘first guide and teacher’. Most of his works are clearly conceived as broadly following themes set forth in Aquinas’s \textit{Summa Theologiae} and Aquinas earns far more citations than any other medieval philosopher. Suárez’s work is best seen as an attempt to further this tradition by spelling out further details and by responding to challenges raised against it.

We might, however, reasonably doubt whether Suárez is quite as faithful a disciple as he portrays himself to be here. He clearly con-
ceives of himself as following Aristotle and Aquinas rather than, say, Scotus or Ockham. But his temperament is that of a harmonist. When he sees Scotus apparently rejecting a Thomistic position he is as likely to try to find a *via media* that will give some semblance of reconciling both views as he is to defend Aquinas by rejecting Scotus’s arguments. In some cases Suárez adopts positions that look suspiciously like Scotus’s positions but then claims that Aquinas also holds these positions if he is just properly interpreted, as we will see. In these cases, we might well doubt whether Suárez correctly interprets Aquinas.⁴⁰

So a subsidiary goal in this study is to keep an eye on Suárez’s relation to the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition, that is, to see how he further develops that tradition. An example of such development can be seen in Suárez’s discussion of the different ways of acting for the sake of an end. Given the crucial claim in an Aristotelian account that all rational actions are done for the sake of the agent’s ultimate end, one needs to know something about what is necessary for an action to count as having been done for the sake of the ultimate end in order to evaluate the plausibility of the claim. Aquinas made explicit the thought that in order for an action to be done for the sake of an end the agent need not be consciously attending to an end while acting. Aristotle quite plausibly thought this as well, but he does not explicitly say so. Aquinas uses the example of a traveller to make his point. The traveller’s steps enroute

⁴⁰In some cases, Suárez finds support for his favoured readings of Aquinas in texts that he mistakenly thinks are Aquinas’s. For example, Suárez’s account of the metaphysics of relations looks much more like Ockham’s account than Aquinas’s, but Suárez thinks he finds Thomistic support for it in a text spuriously attributed to Aquinas but that is probably by Hervæus Natalis. See *Disputationes metaphysicæ* XLVII.2.13 (= OO 26:789). For more on Suárez’s relation to Aquinas, see Marco Forlivesi, ‘Francisco Suárez and the “Rationes Studiorum” of the Society of Jesus’, in *Francisco Suárez and His Legacy: The Impact of Suárezian Metaphysics and Epistemology on Modern Philosophy*, ed. M. Sgarbi (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2010), 77–90.
to the destination are all taken for the sake of getting to the destination even if the traveller does not think about the goal at every step. This seems plausible enough as far as it goes, but Aquinas does not make clear exactly what is required for an action to count as having been done for the sake of an end. Suárez develops this thought further. He distinguishes four ways of intending an end: actually, habitually, virtually, and interpretatively. Actual intention is the paradigmatic case of intention, i.e., where the agent thinks of the end at the time of deliberation and action, and uncontroversially suffices for providing the needed relation between an action and end. Suárez sketches two accounts of habitual intention but finds both lacking and suggests that habitual intention is insufficient to relate an action to the end in the needed way. He does think that virtual intention suffices. On his account, virtual intention requires that some force (virtus) remain from a prior actual intention (perhaps via the memory). He also discusses interpretative intention. But here matters become trickier, both with respect to what the account of interpretative intention is supposed to be and what kind of work it is supposed to do. Those details will have to wait for Chapter 3. What is clear is that these distinctions between different ways of acting for the sake of an end provide for a more sophisticated evaluation of the Aristotelian claim that all rational actions are done for the sake of the agent’s ultimate end.

It is perhaps also worth noting that this study will spend less time disputing alternative interpretations in the secondary literature than is customary in treatments of, say, ancient and early modern philosophy. This is explained by the rather limited scholarship on Suárez to date.
Primarily engaging in argumentation over the plausibility of Suárez’s doctrines is premature. We first need to engage in the exegetical work requisite for understanding what his doctrines are.

**Outline of the study**

I will begin by outlining Suárez’s account of practical reasoning in broad strokes. My primary purpose—in addition to introducing what I take to be core features of his account—is to sketch an alternative to the picture that has recently been drawn according to which Suárez abandons talk of ends in favour of a theoretical grasp of rules commanded by God which agents ought to obey. I argue that Suárez in fact accepts a teleological account of practical reasoning. More specifically, he accepts eudaemonism in both its rational and psychological flavours.

Reflection on ultimate ends is, of course, a prominent part of ethical theorizing for eudaemonists, since acting well requires aiming at the right ends and properly deliberating about the means to such ends. As could be expected, then, Suárez devotes many pages to considering the ultimate end or happiness. In Chapter 2 I follow suit and examine his account of the ultimate end in more detail, starting with a survey of his taxonomy of different kinds of ultimate ends. One key question motivating my discussion is how mid-level ends such as good health, pleasure, and virtuous action fit into Suárez’s scheme. Mid-level ends are ends that are desirable for their own sake but that are not the truly ultimate end that happiness is. The question of their status is especially pressing for Suárez, since it looks like he rejects the inclusivist strategy of—to put it rather simplistically—identifying happiness with an aggregate of
mid-level ends.

As noted earlier, the question of what is required for an action to count as being for the sake of an end is especially relevant for eudaimonists. It is also, however, of independent interest. In Chapter 3 I discuss the four different kinds of intention for ends that Suárez distinguishes: actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. The first three kinds are clearly distinguished by Scotus and quickly became part of the scholastic conceptual toolbox. The last kind, however, is of later origin. Understanding just what it is also turns out to be problematic since Suárez appears to present multiple incompatible accounts of it.

Building on the distinctions examined in earlier chapters, in Chapter 4 I look at a sequence of questions that Suárez considers about whether agents have to intend an ultimate end when acting, whether they can intend more than one ultimate end, and whether they have to intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end and, if so, with what sort of intention. In the course of answering these questions it becomes clear that Suárez is wary of strong forms of psychological eudaemonism that might turn out to be implausible. He ends up denying that agents always properly intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end when acting; rather, they may only interpretatively intend such an end. It is, unfortunately, not entirely clear how strong of a claim is left, given the unclarity about what Suárez takes interpretative intention to be. It is, however, quite clear that Suárez thinks that agents ought properly to intend their unqualifiedly ultimate end.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I look at Suárez’s account of the will as a free and rational power. Here he arguably departs from Aristotle and Aquinas for a view that is closer to that of Scotus. Suárez argues that
we can only choose options that we have judged as conducive to our ends, but he insists that the will is free in a libertarian sense and so we need not choose the option judged to be most conducive to our ends. We cannot choose something purely bad but we can choose a lesser good. This emphasis on freedom is part of the reason why Suárez can only commit to an attenuated psychological eudaemonism.

**Texts**

Since Suárez’s writings are not widely familiar, I will make a few remarks about the texts that I will rely on. This is by no means a discussion of all of his works, though such a discussion would be useful since no fully satisfactory bibliography of Suárez’s work is to be found. The 1856 *Opera omnia* with its twenty-six volumes presumably provides ample material for most scholars starting to take an interest in Suárez. But we do know of a significant amount of writing by Suárez that is not included in the edition. Much of this additional material has never been published and is generally not even included in bibliographies of his work.\(^{41}\)

The main texts for my purposes will be *De fine hominis* and *De voluntario et involuntario*, the first two of five treatises that correspond to sections of the *Prima secundæ* of Aquinas’s *Summa Theologiae*. These

treatises are not commentaries in a strict sense, but are based on lectures that Suárez gave in Rome on Aquinas’s *Summa Theologicae* relatively early in his career. There are two reasons for focusing on these texts: (1) they contain the bulk of Suárez’s discussion of some of the core material of this study and (2) they have received very little attention from scholars so far. There are also some potential problems to be aware of in using these texts. First, they come from earlier in his career than his better-known works do. Insofar as they are used in conjunction with those later texts, one needs to remember that his views may have evolved in the intervening period. I am not aware of any drastic shifts, but there is some evidence that he changed his mind on at least some details.\(^{42}\) Second, they were not published during Suárez’s lifetime but were published posthumously by his literary executor, Baltasar Alvarez (1561–1630), in 1628. Alvarez was not the most meticulously scholarly of editors and so there is some reason for caution with these texts. Again, I am not aware of any places where Alvarez’s editing resulted in egregiously false representations of Suárez’s views. But, for example, he is notorious for deleting sections from the text where he thinks that the same material has been covered in Suárez’s *Disputationes metaphysicae* and inserting references to the latter discussions. But given the possibility that Suárez changed his views by the time of the latter discussions, this practice threatens the internal integrity of the earlier works. Fortunately, this particular editing practice is readily spotted. Third, given that these texts are based on Suárez’s lectures and that we do not have evidence that he edited them, we should not rule out errors even apart

\(^{42}\)Josephine Burns argues to this effect in her dissertation *The Early Theory of Human Choice in the Philosophy of Francisco Suárez* (PhD diss., Marquette University, 1968).
from Alvarez’s editing. All three of these problems are reason for some caution, but I am not aware of any reason to think that their effects are serious enough to call into question the usefulness of these texts for Suárez scholarship.

Suárez’s best-known work is the Disputationes metaphysicæ. It was published during his lifetime and can safely be taken to accurately represent his views. It also has the distinction of being one of the first systematic, comprehensive treatises on metaphysics that is not a commentary. Most of the material in this work will not be relevant for a study of action, but there are several sections that will be. One of the disputationes on efficient causality, XIX, has a fairly lengthy, interesting discussion of the causality exercised by the will. Two disputationes, XXIII and XXIV, deal with the metaphysics of final causality and hence will be relevant for my purposes.

After the Disputationes metaphysicæ, the De legibus seu de Deo legislatore is Suárez’s best-known work. This is also based on earlier lectures on the Prima secundæ, but was edited by Suárez and published in 1612. It represents the latest of his work that I will make use of in this study. Much of it is more relevant to political philosophy, but parts of it are relevant to the ethical issues under discussion here.
1.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I begin to outline Suárez’s account of practical reasoning. The picture will be drawn in broad strokes, but I wish to sketch an alternative to the picture that has recently been drawn of Suárez. The picture can subsequently be filled in with further details. I will first take note of the picture that I intend to challenge and will then start drawing my own, starting with more general claims and moving to more specific ones. That is, I will move from attributing a teleological conception of reasons to Suárez to attributing both psychological and rational eudaemonism to him.

1.2 Teleological conception of reasons

1.2.1 Suggestions contra

A teleological conception of practical reasoning is so pervasive in Suárez’s writings that one should not need to defend attributing it to him. Several recent authors, however, suggest that one of Suárez’s significant departures from Aquinas is that he abandons talk of ends and acting for the sake of ends in favour of rules commanded by God and obedience to
such rules.¹ Here are some representative quotations to that effect:

Germain G. Grisez:

Like most later interpreters [of Aquinas], Suarez thinks that what is morally good or bad depends simply upon the agreement or disagreement of action with nature, and he holds that the obligation to do the one and to avoid the other arises from an imposition of the will of God. Hence “evil” in the first principle of natural law denotes only the actions which definitely disagree with nature, the doing of which is forbidden, and “good” denotes only the actions whose omission definitely disagrees with nature, the doing of which is commanded. **An act which falls in neither of these categories is simply of no interest to a legalistic moralist who does not see that moral value and obligation have their source in the end.**²

John Finnis:

In Suarez and Vasquez the terms ‘end’ and ‘good’ are almost entirely gone, replaced by ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and cognate notions.³

¹For a notable exception, see Julius Seiler, Der Zweck in der Philosophie des Franz Suarez (Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1936). Seiler emphasizes the teleological character of Suárez’s philosophy.


on Suárez. Both focus on Aquinas; Finnis states explicitly in the preface to the book from which the quotation above is drawn that he is not seeking to do historical scholarship. Nevertheless, claims about Suárez figure prominently in their projects. Both think that a pure, viable natural law theory can be gleaned from Aquinas if we can get past centuries of misinterpretation that led to a degenerate form of natural law that was susceptible to Humean criticisms. Suárez is a key culprit in this story of misinterpretation and degeneracy. The details of Finnis's and Grisez's projects need not detain us here, but it is worth noting that establishing their account of Suárez to be wrong in fundamental ways is *ipso facto* to call into question their larger narrative.

Pauline C. Westerman does attempt to provide the historical scholarship on Suárez and others that Grisez and Finnis do not provide. She argues that doing the historical work shows that Grisez and Finnis are wrong to attribute a viable natural law theory to Aquinas. Rather, Aquinas’s account is already infected with difficulties. Suárez and others were effectively forced into their positions—the ones that Grisez and Finnis criticise—by attempting to address the difficulties in Aquinas’s account. Unfortunately, Westerman by and large accepts the account Grisez and Finnis give of Suárez’s views:

> As for rational creatures, they are supposed to follow God’s explicit laws. All they have to do is to rely on God’s commands.

---

4Ibid., v.  
6Ibid., 5–6.
Here, there is no room for practical reason either in Aquinas’s sense of the word, as the kind of reasoning that starts from the perception of ‘ends’. It is sufficient that rational creatures understand the moral precepts issued by God.\footnote{Ibid., 97–98.}

This passage is echoed a few pages later:

Rational beings . . . are capable of following God’s rules, but in order to do so, they should rely on God’s explicit commands. Natural desires are irrelevant to moral reasoning.\footnote{Ibid., 102.}

We might isolate the following claims from the quotations we have seen:

**NSD**: Suárez has no significant discussion of ends and goods.

**PR**: According to Suárez, practical reasoning does not start from the perception of something as an end to be achieved.\footnote{Westerman in particular seems to identify practical reasoning with reasoning that starts from ends. If practical reasoning is construed in that way, then the view being attributed to Suárez amounts to the abandonment of practical reasoning altogether. But it strikes me as odd to say that Suárez replaced practical reason with theoretical reason; better to say that there are different conceptions of practical reasoning and that Suárez replaced one with another (I, of course, do not want to say this either).}

**MV**: According to Suárez, moral value has its source in conformity to explicit divine commands rather than in an end.
Presumably, the truth of MV and PR would go a long ways to explaining NSD. Why spend much time discussing ends and goods if they are irrelevant to moral reasoning? But we shall see shortly whether any of these claims are credible.

1.2.2 Texts pro

The first claim, NSD, can be dealt with in summary fashion. Suárez has an entire treatise devoted to a discussion of the ultimate end: *De fine hominis*. Numerous other treatises make reference to ends, as we shall see. So why would anyone claim that Suárez seldom refers to ends? It is hard to think of any other reason than simply having failed to read Suárez beyond *De legibus*. The latter work is, of course, Suárez’s most influential work in moral philosophy by a wide margin, so it is a sensible work with which to start learning his views. Ends do make an appearance even in *De legibus*, as we shall see, but it is no doubt true that much of its discussion proceeds without significant appeal to ends. If this were the only work that Suárez had written, one might be forgiven for inferring that Suárez attaches little importance to practical reasoning about ends. Such an inference would still be rather hasty, given that one should notice that *De legibus* is a commentary on a fragment of a much larger work in moral philosophy, i.e., the treatise on law in Aquinas’s *Prima secundæ*. In other words, there would be little reason to think that Suárez conceived of *De legibus* as a comprehensive presentation of his moral philosophy even if it were the only work by him on the subject. As it is, we have a number of other works, includ-
ing five treatises that are commentaries on earlier sections of Aquinas’s *Prima secundae*. Given that fact, it is ill-advised to infer that Suárez does not discuss some notion before one has consulted these other treatises. With respect to the case at hand, such consulting immediately establishes the falsity of NSD.

So Suárez discusses the ultimate end. Philosophers who spend significant time discussing the ultimate end tend also to think that it plays an important role in practical reasoning. But this need not be the case, so we need to look somewhat more closely in order to determine the credibility of PR and MV.

We need not look far to start seeing an answer. The first disputation of *De fine hominis* consists of a series of questions about final causality with respect to the will. Some of the questions are not immediately relevant to our concerns here, but a picture of the action of rational agents starts emerging in the course of discussing the questions. The aspect under which ends exercise final causality is the aspect of good, since final causality requires drawing the will to the end but nothing can draw the will except goodness. A necessary condition for the will to be drawn to an end is that the end be cognized by the intellect and presented to the will as good. A great deal more remains to be said

---

10 *De fine hominis* (henceforth: *DFH*) 1.3.1 (=OO 4:6): ‘for the causality of the end consists in drawing the will to itself for the sake of being loved in itself or other things for its sake. But nothing can draw the will except something good insofar as it is good. Therefore, goodness is that by which an end has the power of final-causing’ (*quia causalitas finis in hoc consistit, quod trahit voluntatem ad se propter se amandum, vel alia propter ipsum: sed nihil potest trahere voluntatem nisi bonum, quatenus bonum est: ergo bonitas est a qua habet finis virtutem causandi finaliter . . .*). Citations to *DFH*, as well as to *De voluntario et involuntario* (henceforth: *DVI*), *De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum* (henceforth: *DBM*), and *Disputationes metaphysicae* (henceforth: *DM*), will be by disputation, section, and paragraph number.

11 Ibid., 1.3.2 (=OO 4:6): ‘It is certain that in order for good to final-cause it is nec-
about Suárez’s account of action but a rudimentary picture is starting to emerge and it is clear that it is teleological in character.

One question in the disputation bears directly on our discussion, namely, the question how the end is related to the adequate object of the will. Suárez’s answer is that the end just is the adequate formal object of the will:

Therefore, I say, first, that the adequate reason for the will’s acting—and therefore the adequate formal object of the will—is the end. . . . the end alone is the adequate reason for acting for the will.\textsuperscript{12}

Suárez makes the same claim in a later work:

An end can be called the adequate formal object [of the will], because whatever the will loves is either an end or for the sake of an end.\textsuperscript{13}

As the last quotation suggests, to say that an end is the adequate formal object of the will is to say that the will is always directed to an end. The immediate object of the will might be a means but a full story will show

\textsuperscript{12}DFH 1.5.3 (=OO 4:11): \textit{Dico ergo primo, rationem adæquatam operandi voluntatis, atque adeo formale objectum adæquatum voluntatis esse finem, . . . solus finis est adæquata ratio operandi voluntatis, quia illud est voluntatis ratio operandi, quod illum attrahit, seu movet ad operandum.}

\textsuperscript{13}Disputationes metaphysicæ XXIII.6.17 (=OO 25:873): \textit{finis autem dici potest formale objectum adæquatum, quia quidquid voluntas amat est finis vel propter finem . . .}
that the means are willed for the sake of an end. Suárez considers the objection that perhaps at least some velleities, i.e., weak willings that are insufficiently strong to lead to genuine intention or choices, happen without being for the sake of an end. But he insists that the velleities resulted from some perceived goodness in the object and hence they, too, are in some way directed to an end. This concern about velleities suggests that Suárez is not just claiming that the will is always directed to an end although some of its acts fail to be but rather endorsing the stronger claim that all the will’s acts are directed to an end.

The teleological character of Suárez’s account is evident in a less direct way when looking at his descriptions of the different acts attributed to the will. Intentions have objects as their ends. The object of enjoyment (fruitio) is an end. Elections are always of means to an end; the end is always willed through an election. More generally, Suárez organizes his account of the different acts of the will by the different relationships the acts bear to ends.

I will mention one more text before moving on. When Suárez discusses what it means to will something, he points out that all such willings are concerned with ends. Why?

---

14 *DFH* 1.5.4 (=OO 4:11).
16 *DVI* 7.2.2 (=OO 4:253).
17 ‘Choice’ is frequently used as a translation for electio. Perhaps that is the best translation; I have decided, however, to use the cognate ‘election’ (and ‘elect’ for the Latin verb ‘eligo’) on grounds that election is a technical notion in scholastic moral psychology and that this fact is obscured if ‘choice’ is used as a translation. But little harm will be done in thinking of elections as choices, since I take all elections to be choices. I leave it an open question, however, whether all choices are elections.
18 *DVI* 7.1 and 7.3.3 (=OO 4:251–53 and 255).
19 See the introductions to disputations 6 and 7 in *DVI* (=OO 4:241–42 and 253).
Because the principle for every motion of the will is an end.\textsuperscript{20}

Since willing objects is one sort of motion of the will, the principle—or source—of such willing is also an end.

PR, the claim that Suárez thinks that practical reasoning does not start from the perception of something as an end to be achieved, is clearly belied by these texts. If the only way to engage the will is to present it with an object cognized as an end, practical reasoning had better perceive objects as ends. Otherwise, action would never get off the ground.

What about MV? Might moral value still originate in conformity to explicit divine commands rather than to ends? Adequately answering this question would require going afield to deal with Suárez's account of obligation (\textit{obligatio}), the distinction between it and duty (\textit{debitum}), and the relation between both obligation and duty and moral value.\textsuperscript{21} I will not pursue that here; suffice to note that a statement in the introduction to the first disputation in \textit{De fine hominis} raises questions about MV. Suárez introduces the topic of ends by noting its importance for explaining actions insofar as human beings are capable of moral goodness and badness. As he notes:

\textit{The end is the principle of moral actions.}\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{20}\textit{DVI} 6.1.1 (=OO 4:242): \textit{quoniam principium omnis motus voluntatis est finis} . . .

\textsuperscript{21}For a careful discussion of these issues, and criticism of Finnis's less careful treatment, see Terence Irwin, \textit{The Development of Ethics}, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), §437.

\textsuperscript{22}1.1.pr. (=OO 4:1): \textit{[finis] est principium moralium actionum} . . . Cf. the similar claim in \textit{De legibus} (henceforth: \textit{DL}) I.7.4 (=OO 5:30–31). Citations to this work are by book, chapter, and paragraph number.
Strictly speaking, this is compatible with MV. Perhaps Suárez thinks that all actions have an end as their principle, but only receive moral value insofar as those actions are conformed to explicit divine commands. But the suggestion seems to be stronger, i.e., that the moral value of actions has something to do with ends. While what I have said so far is not conclusive, we at least have reason to doubt MV in addition to rejecting NSD and PR.\textsuperscript{23}

1.2.3 Did Suárez change his mind?

One possible response to the textual evidence I have presented would be to note that Grisez, Finnis, and Westerman are relying on De legibus, which is one of the last works to be published in Suárez’s lifetime. It was published in 1612, five years before his death. Most of my contrary textual evidence, however, comes from an earlier period of Suárez’s career. De fine hominis and De voluntario et involuntario were only published posthumously in 1628, but they are based on lectures that Suárez gave early in his career, i.e., early in the 1580s, in Rome.\textsuperscript{24} Perhaps my evidence only shows that Suárez was hewing to the Thomistic line early in his career. But perhaps he abandoned those views as his philosophical

\textsuperscript{23}Julius Seiler affirms the centrality of the ultimate end to Suárez’s moral philosophy when he says: ‘Die allem geschaffenen Sein wesentliche, passive Hinordnung auf das letzte Ziel ist für das vernunftbegabte Geschöpf nicht bloß der tiefste Grund seines aktiven Hinstrebens zu diesem letzten Ziele, sondern der Menschengeist erkennt aus diesem metaphysischen Verhält auch eine für sein Tun verbindliche Sittenordnung. Die Ordnung des Seins begründet eine Ordnung des Sollens’ (\textit{Der Zweck in der Philosophie des Franz Suarez}, 85).

\textsuperscript{24}For a historical study, see Nikolaus Öry, ‘Suárez in Rom: Seine römische Lehrtätigkeit auf Grund handschriftlicher Überlieferung’, \textit{Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie} 81 (1959): 133–47.
views matured.

It is certainly the case that Suárez might have changed his views and one should attend to this possibility. I resist attributing a change of mind to Suárez in this case for at least two reasons.

The first reason concerns methodology. If a change in mind can be demonstrated, then one should, of course, be willing to recognize the change in mind. But the starting assumption should be that a thinker is coherent both synchronically and diachronically. So, until shown otherwise, we should assume that what Suárez says in *De legibus* coheres with what he says in *De fine hominis*. Now it might be argued that it has been shown otherwise, i.e., that his account in the earlier work is teleological in nature but his account in the later work is in terms of precepts and that these are two incompatible accounts of ethics. But that is too quick. Aquinas also talks in terms both of ends and of precepts. Grisez and Finnis, at least, do not think that this signals an inconsistency in Aquinas’s account. That is, the thought is that one can have a coherent account constructed from both ends and precepts. If that is so, then we cannot already conclude that Suárez is not entitled to both what he says in his early works and what he says in his late works. It is, of course, possible that it will turn out that Suárez makes claims about ends and claims about precepts that are, in fact, incompatible. But critics of Suárez will need to make a more subtle, detailed case in order to establish that.

The second reason relies on textual evidence from later works. *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597) is not as late as *De legibus* but it is usually
taken as representing Suárez’s mature views. It contains fewer discus-
sions relevant to ethics, but some of his views at the time can be gleaned
from the disputation on final causality (XXIII and XIV). He worries that
the actions of non-rational creatures may not really have a final cause,
i.e., may not really be for the sake of an end. He concludes that non-
rational creatures do not so much themselves act for the sake of the end
as that they are directed to the end by a superior agent, i.e., God.25 Fur-
thermore, Suárez is a concurrentist. For a creature’s action to actually
come about, God has to contribute causally to the action. From this,
he thinks, one can infer that all actions in some sense are for the sake
of an end, because God is a rational agent and so his contribution to
the action will be for the sake of an end.26 The assumption here is that
rational actions are always for the sake of an end.27 That assumption
crops up repeatedly in the two disputations.

But might Suárez have changed his mind during his mature period,
i.e., between 1597 and 1612? The evidence in support of my case is
sparser in *De legibus* but, fortunately, not entirely absent. In fact,
Suárez begins in the preface by an appeal to the ultimate end. He rec-
ognizes that a theologian writing a treatise on laws might be regarded
as trespassing on the territory of legal scholars, but he argues that a
theologian has a legitimate interest in law. The reason is that one of the
aspects of God that theology should address is his aspect as our ulti-

26 *DM* XIV.2.7 (=OO 25:896).
27 Final causality in the case of divine actions is tricky for Suárez. In *DFH* he just
says that God is not subject to final causes since God cannot be subject to true causes
(1.1.10 [=OO 4:4]). Later in his career in *DM* he devotes an entire section to the
question of final causality in the divine case and concludes that God cannot have final
causes—he just has an ‘eminent reason for loving’—but that God’s transeunt actions
can and do have final causes (XXIII.9 [=OO 25:882–85]).
mate end, that is, as the ultimate end in the attainment of which our happiness resides. But if theology legitimately considers God as ultimate end, then theology also legitimately considers how one may attain that ultimate end. This is where laws come in, since laws direct creatures to their end.\textsuperscript{28} Given that the rationale for a theological treatise on laws rests on considering God as our ultimate end, the claim that ends drop from sight in \textit{De legibus} seems rather awkward.

Perhaps the most explicit statement in support of a teleological conception of practical reason comes when Suárez argues that it belongs to the nature of law to be enacted for the sake of the common good. One of his arguments explicitly relies on the following premise:

\begin{quote}
But the ultimate end, or felicity, is the first principle of moral actions, for in moral matters the end is the first principle of acting and thus the ultimate end is the first principle of such actions.\textsuperscript{29}
\end{quote}

Note the similarity of this passage to the one quoted earlier from \textit{De fine hominis}: ‘The end is the principle of moral actions’.\textsuperscript{30} It is difficult to see how a view that says that Suárez abandoned teleological practical reasoning could account for it.

Given the wealth of evidence for a teleological account of practical reasoning from Suárez’s earlier works, including from the 1597 \textit{Disputa-}

\textsuperscript{28}Preface, first paragraph (=OO 5.ix).
\textsuperscript{29}DL I.7.4 (=OO 5:30–31): \textit{Sed finis ultimus seu felicitas est primum principium moralium operationum, nam in moralibus finis est principium operandi et ita ultimus finis est primum principium talium operum.} Latin text from the critical edition by Luciano Pereña et al.
\textsuperscript{30}1.1.pr. (=OO 4:1).
*tiones metaphysicæ*, and given that he makes at least some statements in his latest works in keeping with his earlier statements, we should conclude that it is an account to which he adhered throughout his career.

### 1.3 Ends qualifiedly and unqualifiedly ultimate

So far I have argued that Suárez thinks that it is ends that provide us with reasons for action.31 I have not yet made any claims about whether Suárez thinks that there is some one ultimate end for the sake of which we always act or that there are multiple ultimate ends any of which can provide reasons for action. Either would count as a teleological conception of practical reasons. Some of the texts I quoted might well support the stronger claim that there is some one ultimate end, since they talk about acting *propter finem* where *finem* is singular. But the Latin expression can be read in two ways; it is not always clear whether *propter finem* means for the sake of an end or for the sake of the end.

Fortunately, Suárez has explicit discussions about precisely this question. First, though, we need to make a distinction on which he frequently relies when discussing ultimate ends, namely, between qualifiedly (*secundum quid*) ultimate ends and unqualifiedly (*simpliciter*) ultimate ends. I will examine Suárez’s account of ultimate ends in more detail in Chapter 2, but for now we can characterize an ultimate end

---

31I have not yet distinguished between justifying and motivating reasons. But, as we will see, Suárez’s accounts for both kinds of reasons would be offered in terms of ends.
roughly as something loved or desired for its own sake and superordinate to means. A qualifiedly ultimate end is an end that is not superordinate to all means and that is itself referred to a more ultimate end. The ends of particular arts are like this. Suárez uses the art of medicine as an example. The end of medicine is health, so health is an ultimate end. Health is only a qualifiedly ultimate end, however, because it can still be referred to a further end, namely, happiness, and is not superordinate to all means (many means are for the sake of other ends than health). An unqualifiedly ultimate end is superordinate to all means and is not itself referred to any further end.\(^{32}\)

Suárez has no doubts that human beings intend qualifiedly ultimate ends in their actions:

Thirdly, it must be said that it is necessary that a human being performing human actions intend some ultimate end at least negatively and qualifiedly.\(^{33}\)

To speak of human beings performing human actions may sound redundant, but Suárez has in mind the distinction that Aquinas draws between human actions and actions of a human. The point is to rule out actions like idly scratching one’s beard, since arguably such actions involve no intention at all. The claim about intending an ultimate end is restricted to deliberated actions. In such actions Suárez takes it to be a necessary fact that the agent intend some ultimate end at least of a


\(^{33}\)DFH 3.1.5 (=OO 4:27): *Dicendum tertio, necessarium esse hominem exercentem actiones humanas intendere aliquem finem ultimum saltem negative et secundum quid.* Suárez says in DFH 1.6.3 (=OO 4:13) that ‘negative ultimate ends’ is an alternative term for qualifiedly ultimate ends.
qualified sort, if not an unqualifiedly ultimate end. He alludes to the fa-
miliar argument made by Aristotle\textsuperscript{34} and Aquinas,\textsuperscript{35} among others, that
desires would be vain if there was an infinite regress of ends, i.e., if in-
tention did not stop in some end.\textsuperscript{36} That is, something has to be desired
for its own sake in order for any desires to get off the ground.\textsuperscript{37}

But what we need to see is whether an agent has an unqualifiedly
ultimate end for the sake of which she acts whenever she acts (to be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Here Suárez proceeds more cau-
tiously than he does with qualifiedly ultimate ends. One section of De
fine hominis is devoted to answering the question ‘whether it is neces-
sary that a human being always act for the sake of an unqualifiedly
ultimate end that he himself intends’.$^{38}$ He first distinguishes two ver-
sions of the question: (1) whether it is necessary that an intention for
the unqualifiedly ultimate end precede human actions and (2) whether,
once there has been such an intention, subsequent actions regarding
particular ends must flow from it.

With respect to the first question, Suárez notes that Aquinas seems
to have answered affirmatively. As Aquinas puts it:

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Nicomachean Ethics} 1094a18–22.
\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Summa Theologæ} IaIIæ.1.4 co.
\textsuperscript{36}DFH 3.1.5 (=OO 4:27).
\textsuperscript{37}Interestingly, Suárez appears to think that there are less and more perfect ways
of acting for the sake of an end, even apart from the differences between natural
and rational agents. In $DFH$ 2.2.12 (=OO 4:21)he suggests that the mentally ill and
children who do not have the full use of reason do in some way act for the sake of
ends via an imperfect use of reason. Because they do not have the ability to perfectly
cognize ends, however, they cannot be held culpable for what they do (Ibid., 2.2.13
[=OO 4:21–22]).
\textsuperscript{38}DFH 3.5 (=OO 4:35–37). Earlier Suárez talked about an end instituted for humans
by God (in 3.1.1 [=OO 4:26]); the ‘by the human’ phrase in this question is included to
make clear that we are now talking about the agent’s own intentions.
Hence, the will naturally tends to its ultimate end, for every human being naturally wills happiness. And all other willings are caused by this natural willing, since a human being wills whatever he wills for the sake of the end.\textsuperscript{39}

This passage suggests a picture in which an agent first wills and intends her ultimate end and then all subsequent willings for lower-level ends result from this initial intention for the ultimate end.\textsuperscript{40} Suárez grants that this is what is suggested by passages like the one above by Aquinas, as well as passages by a number of other philosophers. He promptly dismisses these putative authorities for an affirmative answer with the claim that none of them make express statements on the matter in question, but rather are just affirming that the will is naturally drawn to good that is proposed to it (a much weaker claim with which he agrees).\textsuperscript{41} That Suárez has grounds for so quickly dismissing these philosophers as not making express statements on the matter in question is not obviously true, but he does not elaborate on what he takes his grounds to be.

His treatment of these passages does, however, indicate that Suárez

\textsuperscript{39}\textit{Summa Theologicae} Ia.60.2 co.: \textit{Unde voluntas naturaliter tendit in suum finem ultimum, omnis enim homo naturaliter vult beatitudinem. Et ex hac naturali voluntate causantur omnes aliae voluntates, cum quidquid homo vult, velit propter finem. Cf. ibid., IaIæ.1.6 ad 3.}

\textsuperscript{40}Perhaps Aquinas does not have temporal priority in mind. If he does not, then Suárez's negative answer to the first question need not amount to rejecting Aquinas's position.

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{DFH} 3.5.1 (=OO 4:36). This dismissal leaves it unclear who his opponents are in the discussion, since just before listing these putative authorities he said that the reason he needed to say something about the question is because certain authors gave an affirmative answer to the question. Did he mean to say that there are certain authors who \textit{seem} to give an affirmative answer? Or does he have unnamed opponents in mind who he thinks actually give an affirmative answer?
is going to resist giving an affirmative answer to the question. And, indeed, he goes on to state explicitly that an agent can intend particular ends before ever having intended an unqualifiedly ultimate end. His primary authority for this negative answer is, significantly, the most prominent medieval alternative to Aquinas: Scotus. Suárez appeals to experience on behalf of his answer: who among us when we reached the age of reason immediately had an intention for the unqualifiedly ultimate end? The example of someone who has just reached the age of reason is one on which Suárez leans more than once. He takes it as obvious that such youths can, and generally do, start acting for the sake of particular ends like health or honour before they have given any thought to some grand unqualifiedly ultimate end. If that is so, then we know that there is at least one kind of case in which we have human actions without an intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end. Suárez goes on to provide some rational considerations for why such an intention is not necessary for human actions. The crucial claims in his account are that there is no reason to think that someone reaching the age of reason would necessarily first think about the good in general (in fact, we should expect the opposite, since agents have been habituated from infancy to think about particular ends), that any good object is sufficiently good to move the will because the general goodness that is the will’s object is contained in any good object, and that the will can elicit an intention for any object that is sufficiently good in that way. Presumably, if we concede that an intention for the unqualifiedly ultimate end is not necessary in the case of someone having just reached the age of reason, then we should at least allow for the same possibility
more generally.\footnote{DFH 3.5.3 \((=\text{OO 4:36}).\)}

So Suárez thinks that a rational agent can act prior to forming an intention for the unqualifiedly ultimate end. Furthermore, he argues that even once an agent has formed such an intention, that intention can fail to be operative in later actions. The agent might entirely forget her earlier intention. Or she might be drawn to some particular end on the strength of its own goodness and fail to consider this particular end in relation to her unqualifiedly ultimate end. In such cases, Suárez thinks, the intention for the particular end does not flow from the intention for the unqualifiedly ultimate end. We have, then, another sort of case in which agents act without the action resulting from an intention for the unqualifiedly ultimate end.\footnote{DFH 3.5.4 \((=\text{OO 4:36–37}).\)}

We might expect this to be the end of the story: Suárez has a teleological conception of practical reasoning in that he thinks that human actions are done for the sake of ends but he does not think that there is some one end for the sake of which all an agent’s actions are done. But the matter turns out to be more complicated. In the section that follows the one just discussed, Suárez asks whether there is not still some sense in which all an agent’s actions are done for the sake of the unqualifiedly ultimate end. In his answer, to this question it becomes clear that merely talking about intention generally is insufficient. We need to distinguish between different kinds of intention; then we can say that certain kinds of intentions for the unqualifiedly ultimate end are not necessary but that another kind is. This other kind is interpre-
tative intention. Suárez concludes that human beings in all their actions interpretatively intend the unqualifiedly ultimate end.\footnote{DFH 3.6 (=OO 4:37–39).} Distinguishing these different kinds of intention—and seeing whether interpretative intention is intention in any robust sense—will be the subject of Chapter 3. For now it suffices to see that Suárez’s answer to the question of whether all human actions are done for the sake of one ultimate end is: It’s complicated.

### 1.4 Eudaemonism

Often Suárez just talks about the ultimate end without specifying whether it is unqualifiedly or qualifiedly ultimate. In such cases, he should be read as referring to the unqualifiedly ultimate end, since he routinely identifies the ultimate end with happiness, sometimes explicitly:

> For happiness and the ultimate end are the same thing.\footnote{De gratia, prolegom. 4, cap. 1, n. 9 (=OO 7:182): nam beatitudo et finis ultimus idem sunt.}

But qualifiedly ultimate ends are things like health and they are qualified precisely because they can be further referred to happiness. So when Suárez identifies happiness with the ultimate end, we should understand the ultimate end in question to be the unqualifiedly ultimate end. This is the end that plays a crucial role in ethics. The first three disputationes in De fine hominis discuss ultimate ends generally, but the
remaining thirteen are about happiness.

Suárez says a bit more about the relationship between the concepts of the ultimate end and of happiness when he starts to discuss happiness in De fine hominis:

The happiness of a human being is the same thing as his ultimate end, since they only seem to differ because the formal nature of a cause is indicated by the name ‘end’ while the nature of perfect and consummate good is expressed by the name ‘happiness’.\(^\text{46}\)

‘Happiness’ and ‘ultimate end’ refer to the same thing but they have different connotations. When we talk about something as our ultimate end, we are emphasizing its aspect as a final cause; when we talk about the same thing as our happiness, we are emphasizing its aspect as our perfect good. So what we are starting to see is a eudaemonist account, i.e., an account in which happiness ultimately provides the reasons for an agent’s actions.

Suárez complains that scholastic philosophers use the term ‘happiness’ in too many senses, with the result that many disputes turn out merely to reflect verbal differences.\(^\text{47}\) One of the primary differences is whether the term is used to refer to the aggregate of all goods or to the single best good. As Suárez notes, there is ample support for either us-

\(^{46}\) DFH 4.1.pr. (=OO 4:39): Beatitudo hominis re ipsa idem est cum ultimo fine, cum solum differre videantur quod sub nomine finis indicat formalem rationem causae; sub nomine autem beatitudinis solum dicit rationem boni perfecti; et consummati . . .

\(^{47}\) DFH 4.1.1 (=OO 4:39).
age in the philosophical tradition. A given philosopher’s usage might, of course, reflect deeper philosophical views about happiness. For example, a philosopher who believes that there is only one intrinsic good will presumably deny that happiness involves an aggregate of multiple goods and hence will use the term ‘happiness’ to refer to a single good. But Suárez does not seem to be concerned in this discussion with the question of whether there are multiple intrinsic goods or ends. Rather, he assumes that there are multiple ends. The question just is whether we should take the term ‘happiness’ to refer to the achievement of all our ends or to the achievement of our best single end. Suárez’s answer to this question is that ‘happiness’ more properly refers to the achievement of the best good. He thinks this accords best with a variety of things that we say that involve the term. For example, insofar as we say that a saint is happy even though suffering bodily privations, we must mean that the saint achieved the best good since she clearly has not achieved an aggregate of all the goods which she desires.

If we think about the aggregate of goods as being a collection of goods in some sense on a par but with one happening to be slightly more valuable than the others, we might well wonder why its slightly higher status should result in happiness being especially linked to it. After all, achieving the next two goods on the ranking might contribute more to one’s happiness than achieving the first good, so why not call that achievement happiness? But this is not Suárez’s picture of the aggregate. On his view, the best good plays a much more integral role in the aggregate:

\footnote{DFH 4.1.1–3 (=OO 4:39–40).}

\footnote{DFH 4.1.3 (=OO 4:40).}
This [i.e., that ‘happiness’ refers to the best good] can, finally, be established by reason in this way: although many things come together for the perfect state of happiness, it is, nevertheless, necessary that something among them is highest to which the remaining are referred or from which they flow as from a first spring or in which they are eminently contained. For there cannot be a perfect aggregate of multiple things without some order between them. Therefore, that which is the highest and perfect in that state is called the essence of happiness. But the others are, as it were, its properties or accidents. Or, [to put it] differently, although many goods are found in a happy [person’s life], one does not, nevertheless, attain one’s highest end through all of them nor follow it through all of them. Therefore, not all pertain equally to happiness nor to the nature of the ultimate end. Therefore, ‘happiness’ signifies the ultimate perfection to which the remaining things are referred. The essence of happiness is rightly not said to consist in that whole collection but in that member which is highest and ultimate in the collection.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{50}DFH 4.1.4 (=OO 4:40): \textit{Ratione denique ita potest hoc declarari, quia licet ad statum perfectum beatitudinis multa concurrant, tamen necesse est, ut inter illa aliquid sit sumnum, ad quod cætera referantur, vel ex eo tanquam ex primo fonte dimanent, aut in eo eminenter contineantur: quia non potest esse aggregatio multorum perfecta, sine aliquo ordine multorum inter se: illud ergo, quod est summum et perfectum in eo statu, dicitur essentia beatitudinis, cætera vero sunt veluti proprietates aut accidentia ejus. Vel aliter, quamvis multa bona repertantur in beato, non tamem per omnia attingit suum supremum finem, aut illum consequitur: ergo non omnia æque pertinent ad beatitudinem, neque ad rationem ultimi finis: ergo beatitudo significat perfectionem ultimam, ad quam cætera referantur: merito essentia beatitudinis non dicitur consistere in tota illa collectione, sed in eo, quod est in illa supremum et ultimum...}
Given such an integral role in the aggregate, it is easy to see why one might think of the best good as the essence of happiness. There are, of course, a number of questions that could be raised about the passage just quoted. Suárez seems to start from the thought that there cannot be a perfect aggregate without some order between the members of the aggregate. But that is a fairly weak requirement. Certainly, requiring that there be some ordering relations between goods is not yet to require that one of the goods be the source of the remaining goods or eminently contain the remaining goods. We could also ask whether the three disjuncts in the second sentence are supposed to be three separate conditions or whether they are supposed to be explicative of each other. If there are three separate conditions, does only one of them need to be satisfied in order to have the required ordering or do all three need to be satisfied? And what exactly is the referring relation that the remaining goods are supposed to bear to the primary good? Presumably, it is not just instrumental and constitutive relations that count as referring relations. But what else? Furthermore, what exactly does it mean to say that the other goods are like properties of the best good?

Unfortunately, Suárez does not elaborate further in this disputation on these questions. Perhaps he does not find these questions as pressing because of what he thinks fulfills the role of being the best good. Since he takes God to be the best good, he may well think that all the various conditions suggested in the above passage are in fact readily satisfied. That is, God is in fact the best good, the good to which all other goods ought to be referred, the source of all other goods, and a good that eminently contains the remaining goods. Since all these are
true, it is not a pressing question whether we could drop one or more of these conditions and still be left with a perfect aggregate.

While I think that a number of these questions would bear reflection, I will follow Suárez’s lead and leave them aside for now. What we can already conclude is that Suárez thinks that happiness is our ultimate end, that happiness properly signifies the achievement of our best good rather than of the aggregate of all our goods, and that the best good plays a much more integral role in the aggregate than merely that of being preferable to the other goods. Or, as Suárez puts it in his one-sentence characterization of happiness:

For [happiness] is the attainment of the most ultimate and highest good that can be desired by a human being and in which the remaining [goods] are virtually contained or to which they are referred.51

In modern moral philosophy a great deal of attention is given to the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons (with the former kind often thought particularly crucial to morality), so, before concluding that Suárez offers a classic eudaemonist account, we should ask whether the happiness which agents intend in their actions is their own happiness (in which case the reasons would be agent-relative) or whether agents at least sometimes act for the sake of the greatest happiness for the greatest number (in which case the reasons would be

51DFH 4.1.5 (=OO 4:40–41): Unde concludi potest formalis quædam, et generalis descriptio beatitudinis, saltet quoad quid nominis, est enim consecutio ultimi, ac supremi boni, quod ab homine desiderari potest, et in quo cætera virtute continetur, seu ad illud referuntur . . .
agent-neutral). Eudaemonism is typically understood as an egoist position, i.e., it is typically understood as the claim that an agent’s own happiness provides her with reasons to act.\textsuperscript{52} I think the material we have already seen is most easily read in the egoist sense. When Suárez says that an agent’s ultimate end is the achievement of the best good, namely God, he is most naturally read as saying that it is her vision of God that is her ultimate end. This reading is confirmed by Suárez’s appeal to the premise that agents always in some way act for their own sake when he is arguing that God acts for his own sake:

In addition, every agent insofar as it is an agent acts in some way for its own sake and thus is an end of its actions. Therefore, the first agent also does everything for its own sake.\textsuperscript{53}

The claim that the agent is an end of its actions might seem puzzling, since the examples of ends that we have seen so far are objects that the agent wishes to attain, e.g., health. But Suárez emphasizes a distinction that goes back at least to Aristotle between a finis cuius and a finis cui.\textsuperscript{54} The intended distinction is easily seen. When an agent wants, for example, good health, she does not just want that good health exist somewhere or other; rather, she wants the good health for someone, e.g., herself. In that case, the good health would be the finis cuius and she

\textsuperscript{52}It has not always been understood in this way. Nineteenth-century authors often distinguish between private and public eudaemonism, where private eudaemonism is the equivalent to our eudaemonism but public eudaemonism is more akin to utilitarianism. For an example of this, see Frances Power Cobbe, An Essay on Intuitive Morals: Being an Attempt to Popularize Ethical Science (Boston, 1859), 99.


\textsuperscript{54}Suárez explains this distinction in \textit{DFH} 1.6.4 (=OO 4:13–14) and \textit{DM} XXIII.2.2 (=OO 25:847). He cites Aristotle, \textit{De Anima} II, c. 4 (415b20–22).
herself would be the *finis cui*.\(^{55}\) Given this distinction, Suárez considers the question of which end is really the ultimate end. He resists this question, however, on grounds that it is better to think of the *finis cuius* and the *finis cui* as together constituting a single, integrated end.\(^ {56}\) At any rate, when Suárez says that an agent is always the end of her own actions, we should read the end in question as being a *finis cui*. So the claim would be that an agent always acts in order to attain something for herself.

What we have, then, is the classical eudaemonist position that rational agents act in order to achieve happiness for themselves. Given the philosophical tradition in which Suárez stands, this is not surprising. It does, however, conflict with some recent interpretations of Suárez, e.g., those of Grisez, Finnis, and Westerman.

### 1.5 Psychological and Rational

So far I have not made explicit a crucial distinction whose distinguenda usually go under the terms ‘psychological eudaemonism’ and ‘rational eudaemonism’.\(^ {57}\) Psychological eudaemonism is a claim about explanatory reasons, namely, the claim that the ultimate explanatory reason for an agent’s action is always her perceived happiness. But saying for what reasons agents in fact act is not yet to answer the question of what

\(^{55}\)I will say more about this distinction in the next chapter.

\(^{56}\) *DFH* 1.6.4–8 (=OO 4:13–15) and *DM* XXIII.2.3–8 (=OO 25:847–49).

reasons they ought to heed. Rational eudaemonism answers the normative question by affirming that the ultimate justificatory reason for an agent to do something is the agent’s happiness. More precisely:

**Psychological eudaemonism:** An agent is motivated to act insofar as she takes that so acting is likely to contribute to her happiness. Her judgement about an action’s likely contribution to her happiness explains her motivation.\(^{58}\)

**Rational eudaemonism:** An agent has a justificatory reason to act insofar as so acting is likely to contribute to her happiness. An action’s likely contribution to her happiness grounds the justification for it.

Psychological eudaemonism conflicts with at least one commonly-held belief since it denies that agents ever act in ways that they recognize as harmful to themselves. If one accepts that agents do act in ways that they recognize as harmful to themselves, one should reject psychological eudaemonism. Rational eudaemonism does not succumb to that worry, since it does not deny such actions; it just describes them as irrational.

Suárez does not explicitly distinguish between these two kinds of eudaemonism. In fact, there are frequent passages where one wonders whether he has a psychological claim in mind or a normative claim. But he seems to be committed to both psychological eudaemonism (though

\(^{58}\)Psychological eudaemonism might easily be restricted to certain classes of action. For example, we might use Aquinas’s distinction between properly human actions and actions of a human and then restrict the claim of psychological eudaemonism to properly human actions.
perhaps only in a highly attenuated sense, as we shall see later) and rational eudaemonism. His commitment to both might, in fact, go at least some way in explaining why he fails to make an explicit distinction between them.

We have already seen at least one argument that should suggest that the subject is psychological eudaemonism. Recall, for example, Suárez's arguments for why it is not necessary that agents properly intend the unqualified ultimate end, in which he relied heavily on the case of youths who have just reached the age of reason.\textsuperscript{59} His claim was that it is implausible to think that youths always immediately form an intention for the unqualified ultimate end. Yet they still act. But it is difficult to see the relevance of this if what is under question is rational eudaemonism. The rational eudaemonist would have an easy answer to cases of youths not acting for the sake of the unqualified ultimate end: they are merely failing to appreciate properly the reasons that they have. Reaching the age of reason does not ensure that one will act in accordance with the reasons one has. So the fact that Suárez feels compelled to deny that it is necessary that agents properly intend the unqualified ultimate end in their actions suggests that he is thinking about a psychological claim here, i.e., a claim that can be falsified by actual particular cases of action. This denial, of course, might sound like a denial of psychological eudaimonism rather than an affirmation. But recall that he goes on to say that there is a weaker kind of intention—namely, interpretative intention—that agents do always have for the unqualified ultimate end when they act. It looks like we are still getting some form

\textsuperscript{59}In section 2, above.
of psychological eudaemonism, though how strong of a form will turn on what interpretative intention is.

It is also quite clear that Suárez is committed to rational eudaemonism, as was already suggested by a passage I quoted earlier: ‘an end alone is the adequate reason for acting for the will’.\textsuperscript{60} Assuming that the adequate reason in question here is not merely a motivating reason, we see here the connection between ends and reasons. Suárez’s distinction between false and true happiness also suggests that he accepts rational eudaemonism. False happiness will also explain human actions, so if all we wish to do is explain human action, i.e., answer the question to which psychological eudaemonism is an answer, the distinction does little work. But in order to justify human actions one needs to appeal to true happiness. According to Suárez, true happiness is found in attaining the end ‘instituted by nature’. Suárez distinguishes between the ultimate end instituted for an agent and the ultimate end intended by the agent on several occasions. In the following passage the normative implications come through clearly:

Moreover, unqualifiedly ultimate ends can be subdivided. For a certain one is instituted by nature and is that for the sake of which man was created and is that to which he ought to refer himself and all his [actions]. But another one is that end which a human being institutes for himself by his own intention, which sometimes is the former thing for the sake of which he was created, namely, God, and then the human

\textsuperscript{60}See page 7.
being is said to have the true unqualifiedly ultimate end in
his intention. But sometimes this end intended by the human
being is distinct from that for the sake of which he was created
and such is called a false ultimate end.\textsuperscript{61}

The normative language is explicit here: there is an end instituted by
nature and humans ought to order themselves to it. On the assumption
that you ought to pursue those ends which you have justificatory rea-
ton to pursue, this true ultimate end provides rational justification for
action. As Suárez puts it later, an end instituted by nature is necessary
for right reason; otherwise, an agent would have no guide by which to
direct her actions rightly.\textsuperscript{62} So it is an agent’s ultimate end that pro-
vides her with justificatory reasons for action, but it has to be her true
ultimate end in order to fulfill that role.

Finally, we might cite Suárez’s commitment to the identification of
the ultimate end with the good.\textsuperscript{63} Given that the good provides agents
with justificatory reasons for action and that the ultimate end, i.e., hap-
piness, is the good, rational eudaemonism follows readily enough.

\textsuperscript{61}DFH 1.6.2 (=OO 4:13): \textit{ultimus autem finis simpliciter subdividi potest. Nam quidam est ex natura institutus, et est ille, propter quem homo est creatus, et ad quem debet se et omnia sua referre; alius vero est, quem homo sibi instituit ex propria intentione, qui interdum est illemet, propter quem est creatus, scilicet Deus, et tunc dicitur habere homo verum ultimum finem simpliciter in intentione sua. Interdum vero hic finis intentus ab homine est distinctus ab illo, propter quem est creatus, et talis dicitur ultimus finis falsus.}

\textsuperscript{62}DFH 3.1.1 (=OO 4:26): \textit{Deinde ipsa constitutio naturæ humanæ hoc intrinsece postulat, tum quia alias non haberet homo natura sua certum terminum, in quem secundum rectam rationem operationes suas dirigeret; unde fieret ut neque etiam posset recte vitam suam instituere . . .}

\textsuperscript{63}See, for example, \textit{DFH} 1.3 (=OO 4:6–7).
1.6 Conclusion

I began this chapter by noting that several recent scholars have claimed that Suárez marks a radical break from the eudaemonist tradition exemplified by Aquinas. I proceeded to argue that there is ample textual evidence for challenging that claim and for attributing a eudaemonist account to Suárez as well. To be sure, there are many more details to be explored and numerous questions to be answered, some of which I will do in subsequent chapters. But we have certainly already seen enough textual evidence to attribute a eudaemonist account to Suárez at least tentatively.
CHAPTER 2
ULTIMATE ENDS

2.1 Introduction

Given the central role that ends play in any teleological account of practical reasoning, it will be worth taking a closer look at what Suárez has to say about ends, both with respect to their formal features and with respect to what he thinks constitutes our ultimate end. I will first look at a number of the distinctions that he makes between different kinds of ends. Some of them are interesting in their own right, but looking at these distinctions will also provide us with some requisite terminology for understanding his subsequent discussions about ultimate ends. I will look at some of those further discussions both in this chapter and in later chapters.

After presenting the taxonomy of ends, I will turn to a question that has received a good deal of attention in the literature on historical eudaemonists, namely, the question of whether given eudaemonists understand happiness as constituted by multiple particular goods or as constituted by some one good that is deemed the best or only good. The question is especially pressing for any philosopher who affirms that there are multiple things that are good for their own sakes but says that everything is to be done for the sake of happiness. Because the question has been most fully explored with respect to Aristotle, I will summarize some of the interpretations of Aristotle that have been proposed. I will then turn to Suárez and argue that he accepts the crucial claims that
make the question of how particular goods are related to happiness especially pressing. Furthermore, I will show that he thinks God alone is the object of happiness. So happiness is not composed of multiple particular goods. I will end by raising an objection to Suárez’s account, as well as a diagnosis of where I think his story went wrong.

2.2 A Taxonomy of Ends

As Suárez says when he starts his discussion of the different kinds of ends, ‘some of the classifications of ends . . . which bring greater light’ to a discussion about the ultimate end are to be set out.¹ By Suárez’s time a sophisticated set of distinctions between different kinds of ends has been developed to allow for more precision in discussions about ends. Suárez provides a taxonomy of some of these distinctions in at least two of his works. In *De fine hominis*, he presents four distinctions, while in his later *Disputationes metaphysicae* he adds another two to the list. His treatments of the four distinctions shared by the two works are similar.

For the sake of completeness, I will review all six distinctions in summary fashion. I will not treat all equally; the last two, especially the very last one, are the most relevant for our purposes. First, however, I will discuss one distinction that one might have expected to see but which is absent.

¹ *DFH* 1.6.1 (=OO 4:12): *In hac quæstione explicandæ sunt nonnullæ partitiones finis, quæ necessaria sunt, et magnam lucem afferunt ad ea omnia quæ in discursu hujus materiæ tractanda sunt . . . .*
2.2.1 Formal and material

Aquinas asks whether all human beings have the same ultimate end. A negative answer might seem obvious; one does not have to look around much to see wide-ranging disagreements about what things are worth pursuing. Aquinas, however, thinks that there is a sense of the question to which a positive answer is right. His response relies on distinguishing two ways of talking about the ultimate end: ‘in one way, according to the concept (rationem) of the ultimate end; in the other way, according to that in which the concept of the ultimate end is instantiated.’² Aquinas thinks the concept of the ultimate end is the concept of one’s complete perfection; this he thinks is desired by everyone, so in this sense all human beings have the same ultimate end. The ultimate end taken in this sense came to be known as the ultimate end taken formally or the formal ultimate end. Aquinas also thinks that vision of the divine essence instantiates this concept, but he recognizes that there is disagreement about this claim. So if we are talking about that in which the concept is instantiated, then it is not true to say that all human beings have the same ultimate end. The ultimate end taken in this sense came to be known as the material ultimate end.³

We can safely assume that Suárez is familiar with Aquinas’s discussion of this distinction—he is, after all, commenting on this very part of Aquinas’s Summa Theologæ in De fine hominis. Furthermore, he is

² ST IaIIæ.1.7 co.: Respondeo dicendum quod de ultimo fine possumus loqui dupliciter, uno modo, secundum rationem ultimi finis; alio modo, secundum id in quo finis ultimi ratio inventur.
clearly well-acquainted with Cajetan’s work and so presumably knows that Cajetan makes use of this distinction in defending Aquinas against Scotus.\textsuperscript{4} And, as it turns out, Suárez himself makes use of the distinction in Disputation 3. Given that he is familiar with the distinction, it is surprising that he makes no mention of it in the course of listing different distinctions that might be drawn with respect to ends, especially in light of the fact that he goes on to make use of the distinction.\textsuperscript{5}

2.2.2 Activities and products of activities

The distinction between ends that are activities and ends that are products of activities is a familiar one from the opening paragraph of Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth: *EN*):

But the ends [that are sought] appear to differ; some are activities, and others are products apart from the activities. Wherever there are ends apart from the actions, the products are by nature better than the activities.\textsuperscript{6}

Some activities are such that the activity itself is the end we are aiming at; Suárez mentions playing a musical instrument and contemplation as examples. In other cases, the activity is directed towards something that

\textsuperscript{4}Commentary on ST IaIIæ.1.6.

\textsuperscript{5}There is also a curious sentence in *DFH* 16.1.5 (=OO 4:151) where Suárez appears to invoke the distinction between objective and formal happiness he makes (see §2.5 below), but where it is easier to make sense of what he is saying if we read the term ‘formal happiness’ as in contrast to ‘material happiness’ in Aquinas’s sense rather than as in contrast to ‘objective happiness’.

\textsuperscript{6}Translated by Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 1094a4–7. All quotations from the *EN* will be from this edition.
comes to be as a result of the activity. Suárez mentions housebuilding as an example. One generally does not engage in housebuilding for the sake of housebuilding; rather, housebuilding is directed to what is produced by it, namely, a house. The products in question here need not be substances like houses. Suárez also uses medical care as an example, the end of which is health. It is the former kind of ends, of course, that is most relevant for Suárez’s ethics, given the central role of contemplation of God.\footnote{DFH 1.6.9 (=OO 4:15) and DM XXIII.2.9 (=OO 25:849).}

### 2.2.3 Finis actionis and finis rei genitæ

The second distinction is less familiar and it is unclear to me what its significance is supposed to be. Suárez makes it only in the Disputationes metaphysicæ discussion. There he notes that Aristotle says both that the end of generation is form and that every individual thing is for the sake of its activity. Suárez extends the claim about generation to cover every activity, natural or otherwise, that produces something that endures. All such activity is at least proximately for the sake of form, or, as Suárez prefers, for the sake of the produced thing which is a composite of form and matter. The produced thing is the finis actionis, the end towards which the action is directed (so the genitive terms in the names for these two kinds of ends appear to refer to the subjects of those ends rather than to a specification of those ends). The produced things, in turn, are for the sake of activity, where activity is understood in a broad sense. Often, the activity in question will be the activity for which the
thing was made.\textsuperscript{8} That activity is the \textit{finis rei genitæ}, the end towards which the produced thing is directed. For example, human beings were made to contemplate God and the sun was made to illuminate and so the \textit{finis rei genitæ} for a human being is contemplation and for the sun illumination. Presumably, Suárez is talking here of the ends instituted by nature, as he puts it elsewhere,\textsuperscript{9} rather than of just any end that an agent may happen to intend.\textsuperscript{10}

\section*{2.2.4 The end which is made and the end which is obtained}

Sometimes we have as ends things that already exist but that we wish to obtain, e.g., money that the greedy person sees and wishes to get her hands on. In such cases we have an end which is obtained (\textit{finis qui obtinetur}). In other cases, however, we intend ends that do not yet exist. In such cases we have an end which is made (\textit{finis qui fit}). Suárez uses as an example the vision of God. A person in this life intending the vision of God is intending an end that does not yet exist. God, of course, does already exist. So God is an end which is obtained and the vision of God is an end which is made.\textsuperscript{11}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[8]Suárez does not think this will cover all cases. For example, a house’s end is habitation, but Suárez does thinks that habitation is an activity only in an extended sense of the term.
\item[9]\textit{DFH} 1.6.2 (=\textit{OO} 4:13).
\item[10]\textit{DM} XXIII.2.10–11 (=\textit{OO} 25:849–50).
\item[11]\textit{DM} XXIII.2.13 (=\textit{OO} 25:850).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
2.2.5 Objective and formal

The previous distinction might well have made one think of the more
common distinction in medieval philosophy between an objective end
and a formal end. Suárez, however, treats this as a separate distinction.
The activity or use that we intend is our formal end, but, as Suárez says:

Activity . . . requires besides the act itself an object to which
it is turned, as contemplation . . . is turned to some thing or
truth . . .  

The object is the objective end; the activity or the use of the object the
formal end. The miser has possession as her formal end, while money
is her objective end. The saint contemplating God has the vision as her
formal end, while God is her objective end.  

Suárez gets the distinction from Aquinas, who uses it in several con-
texts, though not under these terms. Aquinas and Suárez both agree
that while the object and the use of the object may be distinguished in
this way they really make up one end. This seems sensible. The miser
does not intend (possession) and (money); rather, she intends (possession of money).

\[12DM\text{ XXIII.2.12 (}=\text{OO 25:850}): \text{haec autem operatio, præsertim si sit immanens, præter actum ipsum requirit obiectum circa quod versatur, ut contemplatio, quae est finis hominis, versatur circa aliquam rem aut veritatem contemplatione dignam . . .}\]

\[13DFH\text{ 1.6.10 and DM XXIII.2.12 (}=\text{OO 25:850).}\]

\[14ST\text{ Ialæ.1.8 co., 2.7 co., and 11.3 ad 3.}\]
2.2.6 *Finis cuius* and *finis cui*

The fifth distinction can be traced back to Aristotle.\(^{15}\) Since I have yet to think of a happy English translation, I will use the admirably concise Latin terms used by Suárez: *finis cuius* and *finis cui*. The *finis cuius* is that for the obtaining of which the will is moved; the *finis cui* is the person (usually the agent herself) for whom the *finis cuius* is sought. For example, in the case of a person who wants to enjoy a concert, the concert is the *finis cuius* and the person herself is the *finis cui*.\(^{16}\)

There seems to have been something of a dispute in the medieval period over which of these really merited the appellation ‘end’. According to Suárez, William of Ockham, Henry of Ghent, and Gabriel Biel all argued that only a *finis cui* has the proper nature of an end. The basic thought is that, to remain with my example, the concert is for the sake of the concertgoer but not the other way around. So the concertgoer, the *finis cui*, is the real end and not the concert.\(^{17}\) On the other hand, we commonly talk of the things we intend to obtain as our ends. If you ask me what my ends are, I probably will not start by mentioning myself despite being the *finis cui* for the other ends. As Suárez notes, Aristotle frequently talks of ends where he clearly has a *finis cuius* in mind rather than a *finis cui*.

Suárez’s response to the dispute is to grant something to both sides.

---

\(^{15}\) Suárez cites D.A. B.4 (415b20); Tad Brennan pointed out to me that the distinction can also be found in Phys. B.2 (194a35) and Metaph. XII.7 (1072b1).

\(^{16}\) Suárez discusses the distinction in DFH 1.6.4–8 (=OO 4:13–15) and DM XXIII.2.2–8 (=OO 25:847–49).

\(^{17}\) Perhaps there is something of a Kantian thought here that persons are the real ends-in-themselves and the source of value.
Both kinds of ends really have the nature of end, since both kinds of ends are loved for their own sakes (the concertgoer loves both the concert and herself for their own sakes, i.e., as good in themselves). But, more importantly, in many cases at least, the finis cuius and finis cui together form an integrated end.\textsuperscript{18} As Suárez describes it for the case of someone using medicine:

\begin{quote}
This whole, the healthy human being, is the integrated and adequate end of that action, in which the two mentioned ends [i.e., health as the finis cuius and the human being as the finis cui] are included, components, as it were, of one integrated end.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

This seems a sensible solution. A full account of what the agent who uses medicine intends has to point out more than just that the medicine is a means to the end of health. It is part of the intention that a particular person, namely, the agent, be the subject of the health.

We can combine what Suárez says here concerning the finis cuius and finis cui with what he said about the integration of the objective and formal ends. Once we do that, we see that the person using medicine intends that (she enjoy good health), the miser that (she possess the money), and the saint that (she see God).\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18}It is tempting to think that Suárez should have made this claim universal, but he refrains from doing so in both De fine hominis (1.6.6 [=OO 4:14]) and Disputationes metaphysicae (XXIII.2.5 [=OO 25:847–48]).

\textsuperscript{19}DM XXIII.2.5 (=OO 25:848): Unde fit ut totum hoc, homo sanus, sit integer et adæquatus finis illius actionis, in quo predicti duo fines includuntur, quasi componentes unum integrum finem.

\textsuperscript{20}This way of putting it suggests that propositions are the objects of intentions, i.e., that ends are propositions. (I might also, easily enough, have suggested states
2.2.7 Ultimate and non-ultimate ends

The last division is of the most relevance for our purposes but also presents significant obstacles. Despite the fact that Suárez is explicitly endeavouring to explicate concepts to which he will appeal later, he fails to make clear just which concepts he has in mind. It looks like he thinks he is presenting several different ways of understanding the same distinction, but he in fact ends up making several different distinctions. That he treats the subject in two separate works further complicates the matter. The two treatments are obviously parallel in structure, share numerous phrasings, and use some of the same examples. This might suggest that they are supposed to say the same thing. But on closer examination, one begins to wonder whether the two accounts do not diverge in significant ways. Between two works that each contain multiple characterizations we have a rather large number of characterizations of which to ask whether they really amount to the same distinction.

In an attempt to present the material in as clear a way as possible, I will proceed as follows. First, I will present the portion of the material

---

21 DFH 1.6.1–3 (=OO 4:12–13) and DM XXIII.2.14–16 (=OO 25:850–51).
that is common to both works. This, fortunately, is the introductory material. Second, I will present the further characterizations of the distinction between the two kinds of ends, taking each work in turn. To this point, I will present the material as unproblematic, but in the third section I will turn to the difficulties with the accounts.

Two ways to qualify as an end

In both *De fine hominis* and *Disputationes metaphysicæ*, Suárez begins by noting that two accounts (*rationes*) of an end may be distinguished or that there are two ways in which something may qualify as an end.\(^{23}\) The first nature is that of being loved for its own sake. Suárez claims in both works that this notion of being loved for its own sake includes the negation of ordering to a further end.\(^{24}\) On the face of it, this is hardly plausible, but I think Suárez is best understood as intending to say that the end cannot *merely* be ordered to a further end. That plausibly follows, and, furthermore, is consistent with his subsequent examples of ends that are in fact ordered to further ends (as well as loved for their own sakes). The second account is that of being that for

\(^{23}\) The talk of accounts comes from *DM* XXIII.2.14 (=OO 25:850: ‘two accounts of final causes can be distinguished’ [*duæ rationes in finali causa distingui possunt*]), while the talk of two ways of qualifying comes from *DFH* 1.6.1 (=OO 4:12: ‘it should generally be noted that there are two ways for something to qualify as an end properly speaking’ [*communiter notandum est duo convenire fini proprii dicto*]). I do not think that the different language indicates different projects—he goes on to spell out the different accounts or ways in more or less identical terms between the two works.

\(^{24}\) *DFH* 1.6.1 (=OO 4:12): ‘The first is as it is loved for its own sake, in which is included a negation of its ordering to something else’ (*primum est ut propter se ametur, in quo includitur negatio ordinationis ejus ad aliquid*). *DM* XXIII.2.14 (=OO 25:850): ‘The former is that by which as end is said to be loved for its own sake . . . . for in that which is said to be loved for its own sake is included a negation of love for the sake of something else’ (*prior est qua finis dicitur propter se amari . . . . nam in illo quod dicitur propter propter se amari includitur negatio amoris propter alium*).
the sake of which other things are loved or chosen. Taking good health as our example, we can readily see how it might be thought to meet both accounts: it is both loved for its own sake and other things are loved for its sake.

Since according to the first account ends can be identified apart from other things, I will use the term ‘intrinsically-defined end’ when talking about it. Similarly, since according to the second account an end is identified relative to the means for which it is the end, I will use the term ‘extrinsically-defined end’ for it. I will characterize them as follows:

Something is an **intrinsically-defined end** iff it is loved for its own sake.

Something is an **extrinsically-defined end** iff one or more other things are loved or chosen for its sake.

In both works, Suárez goes on to distinguish between ultimate and non-ultimate ends, first with reference to intrinsically-defined ends and then with reference to extrinsically-defined ends.

---

25 *DFH* 1.6.2 (=OO 4:13): ‘Secondly, something is qualified to be an end as other things are loved for its sake’ (Secundo convenit fini ut alia propter ipsum amentur). *DM* XXIII.2.14 (=OO 25:850): ‘The latter is insofar as other things are loved for its sake and it itself is that very reason for loving [them]’ (posterior [est] quatenus alia amantur propter ipsum et ipse est ratio amandi illa). Cf. *DM* XXIII.2.16 (=OO 25:851): ‘But if we consider an end under another relation, namely, insofar as something is chosen or done for its sake . . . ’ (*Si vero finem consideremus sub alia habitudine, scilicet, quatenus propter ipsum aliquid eligitur aut fit . . .*).
Suárez uses the example of giving alms to help illustrate the distinction between proximate and ultimate intrinsically-defined ends. He says that alms-giving can be loved both for the sake of its intrinsic moral goodness (honestas) and as a means for obtaining a pardon for sins. More generally, he thinks there are often cases where a particular good is loved for its ‘intrinsic goodness’ and yet is also referred to a further end. In such cases, the will does not rest on obtaining the particular good, e.g., almsgiving, since it still has not achieved all that it intends. Hence, those goods are proximate or non-ultimate ends. If, however, the end is such that the will rests upon obtaining it, i.e., such that it is not referred to anything further, then the end is an ultimate end.²⁶

We may characterize the two kinds of ends as follows (appending superscripts to indicate that these are the characterizations from DFH):

²⁶DFH 1.6.1 (=OO 4:12–13): ‘Non-ultimate will be called that means alone which participates in the nature of an end insofar as something else is ordered to it. But it often happens that a particular good, although it is loved for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, nevertheless at the same time is referred to a more ultimate end, in which way alms can be loved both for the sake of the intrinsic moral goodness of mercy and as a means for obtaining pardon from sins. And in this way such an end is called non-ultimate, because, although it participates in the causality of an end under a certain aspect, yet the will does not stop in it but tends towards something more ultimate. Therefore, that is called absolutely ultimate in which the will stops without referring it to something else’ (non ultimus dicetur solum illud medium, quod participat rationem finis, quatenus alius ad ipsum ordinatur; sæpe autem contingit, ut particulare bonum, quamuis propter intrinsccam bonitatem ametur, simul tamen referatur in ulteriorum finem, quomodo potest amari eleemosyna, et propter intrinsccam misericordiæ honestatem, et ut medium ad impetrandam veniam pro peccatis; atque hoc modo talis finis dicitur non ultimus, quia licet sub quaedam ratione participet causalitatem finis, tamen voluntas in illo non sistit, sed ulterior tendit: ille ergo dicitur ultimus absolute in quo sistit voluntas non referendo illud in alius). I suspect there is a textual problem with the first sentence, since it is difficult to quite make sense of it as it stands. But in this case I think we can safely glean the meaning of the passage with the help of the example and with the parallel passage in DM XXIII.2.14 (=OO 25:850–51).
Something is an **ultimate intrinsically-defined end** iff it is loved for its own sake and not referred to any further end.

Something is a **proximate intrinsically-defined end** iff it is loved for its own sake but it is referred to a further end.

Extrinsically-defined ends are, we may recall, ends for whose sake something else is loved or chosen. We can easily make a distinction, then, on the basis of how many other things are chosen for its sake. The end for whose sake everything else is chosen, i.e., that is superordinate to all other means and ends, will be more ultimate than the one for whose sake only some other things are chosen. Interestingly, Suárez does not use the terminology of ultimate versus proximate when making the distinction here. Rather, he prefers calling the end for whose sake everything else is chosen an ‘unqualifiedly ultimate end’ while the other ends he calls ‘qualifiedly ultimate ends’.\(^{27}\) I will follow him in using these terms for making the distinction with respect to extrinsically-defined ends.

We may characterize the two kinds of ends as follows:

Something is an **unqualifiedly ultimate extrinsically-defined end** iff everything else (that is loved or chosen) is loved or chosen for its sake.

Something is a **qualifiedly ultimate extrinsically-defined end**

\(^{27}\)He also suggests that the distinction between unqualified and qualified is the same as the distinction meant by the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’, between ‘universal’ and ‘particular’, and between ‘of the one acting’ and ‘of some action’ (*DFH* 1.6.3 [=OO 4:13]).
end\textsuperscript{DFH} iff at least one other thing (but not all other things) is loved or chosen for its sake.

Suárez thinks of the ends of individual arts as qualifiedly ultimate ends. For example, health is a qualifiedly ultimate end because what is done in the art of medicine is done for its sake, but there are many things outside the art of medicine that are not chosen for its sake.\textsuperscript{28}

**The distinction in *Disputationes metaphysicæ*  

In *Disputationes metaphysicæ* Suárez makes a three-way distinction between proximate, remote, and ultimate ends. The idea is straightforward. If you have a sequence of multiple hierarchically ordered ends, the first end you get to coming from the means, so to speak, is the proximate end. Any end after that will be a remote end. The very last end will be the ultimate end. These notions overlap; for example, in a hierarchy of two ends the last end will be both a remote end and an ultimate end. It is less clear whether Suárez understands ‘proximate end’ in such a way that in a one-end scenario, that end would be both a proximate end and an ultimate end. But those details need not detain us here. In order to avoid unnecessary further complications, I am going adapt his characterizations to leave just proximate and ultimate ends, where proximate is to be understood as ‘non-ultimate’ (thus ruling out the possibility of an end being both proximate and ultimate). But it should be a relatively straightforward matter to see how the three-way distinctions would go.

\textsuperscript{28}DFH 1.6.2–3 (=OO 4:13).
As in *De fine hominis*, Suárez looks at intrinsically-defined ends first. He uses the same example of a proximate end, namely, alms-giving which is loved both for its intrinsic moral goodness and as a means to the forgiveness of sins. Proximate ends are ends loved for their own sakes but also referred to more ultimate ends. Ultimate ends are ends in which the intention of the agent stops (completely), which I take to identify the same feature as saying that the end is not referred to any further end.\(^{29}\)

We may characterize the two kinds of ends as follows:

Something is an **ultimate intrinsically-defined end**\(^{DM}\) iff it is loved for its own sake and not referred to any further end.

Something is a **proximate intrinsically-defined end**\(^{DM}\) iff it is loved for its own sake but it is referred to a further end.

In *De fine hominis* Suárez switched from ‘ultimate’ versus ‘proximate’

\(^{29}\)DM XXIII.2.14 (=OO 25:850–51): ‘Still, it happens that, although some object is loved for its own sake and for the sake of its own goodness, nevertheless, either from its nature or from the intention of the one acting, it is directed to and tends to a more ultimate end, as when someone gives alms, both because the action is morally good in accordance with the aspect of compassion and because it is suitable for making satisfaction to God on behalf of sins. Therefore, in that case one end is ordered to another, although under that aspect by which it is ordered it does not have the nature of an end but of a means. Therefore, that end which is immediately loved for its own sake is called a proximate end. But the other end to which it is ordered is called a remote [end]. But if the intention of the one acting is stopped in the remote end, it will also be an ultimate [end]’ (Contingit tamen ut, quamvis aliquid objectum propter se et propter bonitatem suam ametur, nihilominus vel natura sua vel ex intentione operantis referatur et tendat in ulteriorem finem, ut cum quis facit eleemosynam, et quia honesta sit actio in ratione misericordiae, et quia est accommodata ad satisfaciendum Deo pro peccatis. Tunc ergo unus finis ordinatur ad alium, quamquam sub ea ratione sua ordinatur non habeat rationem finis, sed medii. Ille igitur finis qui immediate propter se amatur, dicitur finis proximus; alius vero finis ad quem alter ordinatur, dicitur remotus; quod si in illo sistat intentio operantis, erit etiam ultimus . . .).
to ‘unqualifiedly ultimate’ versus ‘qualifiedly ultimate’ when he moved from intrinsically-defined ends to extrinsically-identified ends. In *Disputationes metaphysicæ* he continues to use the terms ‘ultimate’ and ‘proximate’ (and ‘remote’). Suárez notes that the distinction is easier to understand when thinking about extrinsically-defined ends than when thinking about intrinsically-defined ends. He is certainly right that it is straightforward enough in this case. The terms are defined strictly by position on an ordering of means and ends. Take the first thing that one does (=A) for the sake of some end. Take the very last end (=E) in the complete chain of means and ends for that action, along with all the means and/or ends (=M<sub>i</sub>) that come between the first action and the last end. Arrange them in order: \(\langle A, M_1, M_2, \ldots M_n, E \rangle\), where every element in the ordering except E is for the sake of its right-hand neighbour.\(^{30}\)

There need not be more intermediate elements than \(M_1\); in fact, there need not be any intermediate elements, in which case the set would be \(\langle A, E \rangle\). Whatever is immediately to the right of A is the proximate end, i.e., either \(M_1\) or E. Note that this is true even if \(M_1\) is not desired for its own sake. We might desire \(M_1\) solely as a means to \(M_2\), but it is still a proximate end, since A is desired for its sake. Note, too, that E can be a proximate end in addition to being the ultimate end. If there is an \(M_1\), then any element to its right is a remote end. The last end, i.e., E, is the ultimate end.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\)I am simplifying here. In many cases, the structure of means and ends will be more tree-like rather than chain-like; for example, \(M_1, M_2, \ldots M_3\) might all be done directly for the sake of \(M_4\). But it should not be too difficult to see how the classification would apply in such more complicated structures.

\(^{31}\)DM XXIII.2.16 (=OO 25:851): ‘For when multiple means subordinated among themselves are chosen for one end, it is necessary both to be given a first and an ultimate means, as much in the order of intention as in the order of execution. For in neither order can one proceed into infinity. Otherwise, either the choice or the execution would never begin... Therefore, this means which is first in execution and last in
This is clear as is, but, as I said, I want to tweak the characterizations in order to make it easier to compare later Suárez’s characterization of the distinction between proximate and ultimate ends here with the characterizations we have already looked at. In order to make the characterizations parallel, I will change the definition of proximate ends here in order to make any end that is not the ultimate end a proximate end, i.e., to make ‘proximate end’ stand for any non-ultimate end. I will leave the characterization of ultimate ends unchanged.

We may, then characterize ultimate and proximate (aka non-ultimate) ends as follows:

Something is an **ultimate extrinsically-defined end** DM iff it is the most ultimate end in an ordered series of means and ends.

Something is a **proximate extrinsically-defined end** DM iff something else is loved for its sake but it itself is loved for the sake of some more ultimate end.

choice has no character of an end, because it is loved neither for its own sake, since it is only a means, nor is something else loved for its sake, since in that the choice is ended. Still, the second means has now the character of a proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was chosen for its sake. The third means, moreover, has the character of a remote end with respect to the first means, and thus can be proceeded through many ends more or less remote until it is stopped in the ultimate [end], which is always necessary, since one cannot proceed into infinity’ (Nam quando ad unum finem plura media inter se subordinata eliguntur, necesse et dari primum et ultimo medium, tam ordine intentionis quam ordine executionis; in neutro enim ordine potest in infinitum procedi; alias vel electio vel exsecutio nunquam inchoaretur…..Hoc ergo medium quod est in executione primum et in electione ultimo nullam habet rationem finis, quia nec propter se amatur, cum tantum sit medium, nec etiam aliud amatur propter ipsum, cum in illo finita sit electio; tamen secundum medium habet iam rationem finis proximi respectu medii prioris, quod propter ipsum electum est. Tertium autem medium habet rationem finis remoti respectu primi medii, et sic potest per plures fines magis vel minus remotos procedi donec sistatur in ultimo, quod semper necessarium est, cum non possit in infinitum procedi.).
It is worth noting that on Suárez’s views an ultimate extrinsically-defined end will be loved for its own sake even though the characterization does not make that explicit. This is because desire can only get off the ground if the most ultimate end—and there has to be a most ultimate end—is loved for its own sake.

Comparing the characterizations

The problem with these characterizations is not so much that they are difficult to understand when taken individually. Rather, the problem is to understand how they are related to each other. This is true both of the two characterizations in one work (especially in *De fine hominis*) and across the two works (especially of the extrinsically-defined ends). In both works, the two characterizations are presented in such a way that one expects two characterizations of the very same concepts. For example, in *Disputationes metaphysicæ* Suárez says that ‘these three concepts’ (*illas tres rationes*), including the concept of a remote end, are easier to understand under the second characterization than under the first. That sounds very much like a reference to the same three concepts that were just distinguished under the first characterization. On the other hand, the characterizations simply do not look like equivalents. They do not even look like they would result in extensional equivalence.

Here are the four characterizations of ultimate or unqualifiedly ultimate ends for comparison, numbered for ease of reference:

1A. Something is an **ultimate intrinsically-defined end** \(^{\text{DFH}}\) iff it is
loved for its own sake and not referred to any further end.

2A. Something is an **ultimate intrinsically-defined end**\(^{DM}\) iff it is loved for its own sake and not referred to any further end.

3A. Something is an **unqualifiedly ultimate extrinsically-defined end**\(^{DFH}\) iff everything else (that is loved or chosen) is loved or chosen for its sake.

4A. Something is an **ultimate extrinsically-defined end**\(^{DM}\) iff it is the most ultimate end in an ordered series of means and ends.

We can easily see that (1A) and (2A) are the same. Although (4A) looks different, Suárez could plausibly argue that it will at least result in the same extension as (1A) and (2A) on grounds that something will be the most ultimate end in an ordered series of means and ends just in case it is loved for its own sake and is not referred to any further end. That leaves (3A), which looks less assimilable. The problem is that it is one thing to say of an end that it is not a means to a further end and quite another to say that everything one does is for the sake of that end. Consider a person who has two ends each of which she values for its own sake and neither of which are means to any further end she has. Such a person has two ultimate ends according to the characterizations in (1A), (2A), and (4A), but no ultimate end at all according to (3A) since neither end is such that everything else is ordered to it.\(^{32}\)

\(^{32}\)I think Suárez is trying to pick out with (3A) what Scott MacDonald calls ‘strong ultimate ends’ in ‘Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning’. MacDonald defines a strong ultimate end as that end which ‘completely fulfills all a human being’s rational desires’ (p. 47). Suárez does not here explicate unqualifiedly ultimate ends in terms of complete fulfillment of desires, but he brings up that notion in other contexts in association with this kind of ultimate end so I think it is fair to say that he takes it that only an end that completely fulfills desire is such that one would refer everything to it. I do not take
Could (3A) be interpreted as saying that everything else in the given order of means and ends is loved or chosen for the ultimate end’s sake rather than as saying that everything whatsoever that is loved or chosen is for its sake? This does not strike me as a natural reading of the text in question, but perhaps it is not wholly implausible. Still, the interpretation does seem to be ruled out by other passages. For example, Suárez says in De fine hominis 3.3.1 that an unqualifiedly ultimate end is complete (perfectus) and self-sufficient (sufficiens). But that is not true on (3A) if we assimilate it to the other three characterizations.

It might be suggested that the way to assimilate (3A) is by appeal to aggregate ends. So one might respond to the example in the previous paragraph by saying that the two ends mentioned are in fact constituents of an aggregate. That aggregate will, then, be the agent’s most ultimate end and the two particular ends will be ordered or referred to it by a constituency relation. Note that now the agent both has an ultimate end according to (3A) and does not have two ultimate ends according to the other characterizations (because the two ends I first mentioned turn out to be ordered to a further end). We thereby get all four characterizations to agree on how many ultimate ends the agent has and which end is her ultimate end.

It is not clear, however, that Suárez can take this suggestion onboard. As I will show in subsequent chapters, Suárez thinks it entirely possible for agents to intend multiple particular ends without properly intending any aggregate of those ends.

(1A), (2A), and (4A) to correspond to MacDonald’s weak ultimate ends, since he defines those as ends that are desirable in themselves (p. 45). Suárez adds the condition that they not be referred to a further end, but MacDonald leaves that point open.
Even if he were ultimately to grant that non-ultimate ends are always in some sense ordered to an ultimate end that includes as constituents every end loved for its own sake, the possibility of a dispute over whether that is the case shows why it would be best to keep distinct the notions of an end that is not a means to a further end and of an end to which everything else is ordered. So if all four characterizations are supposed to be of the same kind of end, it looks as if two significantly different notions are being conflated.

There are similar problems with the characterizations of proximate or non-ultimate ends:

1B. Something is a proximate intrinsically-defined end\textsuperscript{DFH} iff it is loved for its own sake but it is referred to a further end.

2B. Something is a proximate intrinsically-defined end\textsuperscript{DM} iff it is loved for its own sake but it is referred to a further end.

3B. Something is a qualifiedly ultimate extrinsically-defined end\textsuperscript{DFH} iff at least one other thing (but not all other things) is loved or chosen for its sake.

4B. Something is a proximate extrinsically-defined end\textsuperscript{DM} iff something else is loved for its sake but it itself is loved for the sake of some more ultimate end.

Before we even got to these various characterizations of the distinction between proximate and ultimate ends, we might have expected trouble on grounds that extrinsically-defined ends and intrinsically-defined ends are not the same thing. There would seem to be many
more things for whose sake something else is loved than things that are loved for their own sake. But if our two starting characterizations have already come apart, then any further divisions will likely continue to be apart. As it happens, in the case of ultimate ends they may come back together because the thing at the end of a chain of means is also something loved for its own sake (in order to allow desire to get off the ground). But in the case of proximate ends we see the problem with having one characterization in terms of extrinsically-defined ends and another in terms of intrinsically-defined ends.

Take (2B) and (4B). A proximate intrinsically-defined end must be loved for its own sake (otherwise it fails to be an intrinsically-defined end). But a proximate extrinsically-defined end need not be, since an extrinsically-defined end is merely something for whose sake something else is loved or chosen. If I go to the pharmacy to buy medicine, then medicine is my proximate end (because I chose to go to the pharmacy for its sake) even though I certainly do not love medicine for its own sake. Suárez seems to recognize these consequences of his characterizations. In his discussion of (2B), he clearly shows that he is aware that such a proximate end must be loved for its own sake. In his discussion of (4B), he equally clearly shows that he is aware that with this characterization many things will qualify as proximate ends that are not loved for their own sakes. It is difficult to see how (2B) and (4B) could be taken as merely two different ways of characterizing the same thing.

33DM XXIII.2.15 (=OO 25:851).
34DM XXIII.2.16 (=OO 25:851).
35It is not wholly clear whether the qualifiedly ultimate ends from DFH are always ends that are loved for their own sakes, so I have not included such a condition in (3B). I do suspect, however, that Suárez is conceiving of them as loved for their own sakes, given that he takes the term to be synonymous with 'particular end' and given...
Given that the prospects of assimilating the different characterizations to each other are dim, we are left to wonder why they are presented as different ways of spelling out the same distinction rather than as being different distinctions. This is not just a local interpretive puzzle. Insofar as Suárez uses these terms elsewhere in formulating arguments, it will be unclear just which characterization one should have in mind when considering his arguments. For example, in several places he presents a brief argument for the claim that agents have to act for the sake of an ultimate end, relying on the thought that an infinite regress of ends will not allow desire to get off the ground. This argument is much more compelling if what we have in mind are ultimate ends as characterized by (1A), (2A), and (4A) than as characterized as by (3A). If the conclusion is supposed to be that agents have to have ultimate ends in the latter sense, then more argumentation is clearly needed.

The best we can do, it seems to me, is just to keep the differences between these characterizations in mind and then to supply whichever characterization allows for the most plausible interpretation of the arguments Suárez goes on to develop. Which characterization does that may well vary from context to context.

the role the concept plays in later disputations, e.g., in DFH 3. If we did include that condition, then (3B) would come close to MacDonald’s conception of a weak ultimate end (‘Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning’, 45).
2.3 Pluralism or monism?

A prominent issue in discussions of eudaemonism is whether happiness should be thought of as a monistic end or as a pluralistic or inclusive end composed of diverse goods. Besides the philosophically interesting questions raised by this discussion, it has no doubt received special impetus from being linked to a pressing interpretative question in Aristotle. Since the discussion has also reached the greatest sophistication in Aristotelian scholarship, it will be worthwhile briefly to survey the treatment of the question with respect to Aristotle.

2.3.1 Aristotle

Going back at least to W. F. R. Hardie’s well-known article, ‘The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics’, it has been standard to use the terms ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ to refer to the two conceptions of happiness.\(^{36}\)\(^{37}\)

---


But, as J. L. Ackrill pointed out, this is not entirely happy terminology:

The term ‘inclusive’ suggests the contrast between a single aim or ‘good’ and a plurality, while the term ‘dominant’ suggests the contrast between a group whose members are approximately equal and a group one of whose members is much superior to the rest.38

Understood in this way, one might think that Aristotle holds happiness in both the inclusive and dominant senses, i.e., that he thinks happiness is composed of a plurality of goods with one good—virtue—as the dominant part of the plurality.39 But this is not how the terms are to be understood, since they are meant to pick out contrasting conceptions of happiness. Rather, what is meant when it is said that Aristotle thinks that happiness is a dominant end is that he thinks that happiness is constituted by a single good, e.g., contemplation. When it is said that

38'Aristotle on Eudaimonia', 17.
he thinks that happiness is an inclusive end, the expected meaning is intended, namely, that he thinks that happiness is constituted by multiple goods, e.g., contemplation, virtuous activity, and friendship. Since I find this traditional terminology misleading, I will use the term ‘monistic’ instead of ‘dominant’ as the contrast term to ‘inclusive’ or ‘pluralistic’.\textsuperscript{40}

One other preliminary point may be made. Discussion about this issue generally jumps quickly to arguing for or against the monistic-end interpretation, without spending much time explaining just what it would mean to say that happiness is a monistic end. But it is not immediately obvious what conditions would need to be met for an end to be monistic. Presumably an end composed merely of tokens of precisely the same type would count as a monistic end. Requiring all tokens to be of the same type, however, seems too strong a condition. But what is the relevant weaker condition? Suppose we ask the question of other ends than happiness: is contemplation itself a monistic end?\textsuperscript{41} If not, is happiness monistic even if composed of nothing other than contemplation? I think it would be worth sorting through these issues at some point, but for now we can just note that the question of inclusivism versus monism came up in a particular interpretive context and gets its content from that context. The answer to the question of just how to count goods when thinking about monism is that particular goods—which we might call mid-level ends—such as virtuous action, contemplation, and friendship each count as one good. If happiness is constituted by only one of those goods, then happiness is a monistic end. If composed of

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{40}This is not original to me. Lear, for example, also uses ‘monistic’ in her \textit{Happy Life and the Highest Good}.
  \item\textsuperscript{41}See the \textit{Eudemian Ethics} where Aristotle assumes that physical health itself has parts when he compares physical health to the good of the spirit (1220a3–4).
\end{itemize}
more than one of those goods, then it is an inclusive end. I will follow this assumption about counting goods in the following discussion.

It is not too difficult to see why one might give a monistic-end interpretation of Aristotle. In Book I of EN, after having noted the importance of establishing what the good is so that we will, like archers, have a target to aim at, Aristotle points out that there are apparently many ends. Not all of these, however, are the good that we are to aim at. As he says:

And so, if only one end is perfect (teleion), the good we are looking for will be this end; if more ends than one are perfect, it will be the most perfect (teleiotaton) of these.\(^{42}\)

While it is perhaps not necessary to read this passage in this way, it suggests that the good or happiness is to be identified with one particular good, which will either be the only finally valuable end there is or will be the best one if there are more than one.

The monistic-end interpretation receives further support from EN X.7, where Aristotle says that the best good is understanding. The happiest life is the life of study:

Hence complete happiness will be its activity in accord with its proper virtue; and we have said that this activity is the activity of study (1177a17–18).

\(^{42}\)1097a28–30. I have altered the translation in this case in a contentious way in order to emphasize how this passage might be taken to support a monistic interpretation. Those who favour an inclusivist reading, as Irwin does, tend to favour ‘complete’ as a translation, while those who favour a monistic-end reading tend to favour ‘perfect’ or ‘final’. See Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 29, fn. 43.
The identification of happiness with contemplation or theoretical study may come as a surprise to readers who have read through all the intervening books on moral virtue and friendship, but at least the identification of happiness with one particular good should not be surprising to readers who read the previously-quoted passage from Book I as endorsing monism.

There is a great deal more to be said here—a great deal more has been said in defence of the monistic-end interpretation—but this will suffice for present purposes to indicate how the interpretation might be motivated. Despite the apparent support for a monistic-end interpretation, one can also readily raise trouble for that interpretation. I will mention two sources of trouble.

Aristotle claims that happiness is self-sufficient, where this means that happiness is by itself sufficient to make a life desirable and lacking nothing:

[W]e regard something as self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing; and that is what we think happiness does (EN I.7 [1097b15–17]).

Elsewhere, Aristotle makes it clear that he thinks there are other goods that are valuable for their own sake besides contemplation, namely, mid-level goods like virtuous actions. Inclusivism might seem to follow straightforwardly from these claims. If a variety of goods are finally valuable and a happy life is self-sufficient, i.e., lacks nothing, then surely the happy life must include all those goods. This argument is a bit
too quick; after all, we do not want the result that pursuing happiness means amassing tokens of the greatest variety of goods possible. Richard Kraut rightly points out that it would be absurd to say that someone was missing out on happiness just because she had never enjoyed the taste of a tangerine, even though she had attained all other goods. But we need not have quite such a naïve picture of the inclusive good. For example, a more sophisticated inclusivist might have virtue determine what goods to pursue when and to what degree. Still, even if we reject this simple of an argument from self-sufficiency to inclusivism, we might well think that identifying happiness with contemplation alone will be a hopeless way to satisfy the self-sufficiency criterion.

Perhaps the more serious worry about the monistic-end interpretation comes from reflecting on Aristotle’s claims that mid-level ends such as virtuous actions and friends are to be chosen for their own sake and that all things are chosen for the sake of happiness. To take virtuous actions as our example, Aristotle seems to be committed both to the claim that virtuous activity is to be chosen for its own sake and to the claim that it is to be chosen for the sake of happiness. When we hear claims of the form ‘X is for the sake of Y’, we tend to first think of instrumental relations. That is, we tend initially to interpret the claim as saying that X is an instrumental means to Y in the way that driving to the store is a means to buying bread. In such cases, X is valuable only to the extent that it contributes to the attainment of Y. I do not choose driving to the

---

43 Aristotle on the Human Good, 278.
44 For Irwin’s response to Kraut’s objection, see ‘The Structure of Aristotelian Happiness’, 388–89.
45 For some discussions of the self-sufficiency criterion by defenders of monistic-end interpretations, see Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good, 294–300, and Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, ch. 3.
store for its own sake; rather, I choose it for the sake of buying bread. If we are thinking in terms of this sort of instrumental-means relation, Aristotle’s two claims sound puzzling in conjunction. Is virtuous activity choiceworthy for its own sake or merely as a means to happiness?

In a famous article first published in 1974, Ackrill proposed inclusivism as a solution to this problem. Ackrill suggests that if happiness is an end that includes the various mid-level ends, then we can understand the mid-level ends to be choiceworthy for their own sake but also choiceworthy for the sake of happiness in the way that a constituent part is choiceworthy for the sake of the whole of which it is a part. As he puts it:

[O]ne can answer such a question as “Why do you seek pleasure?” by saying that you see it and seek it as an element in the most desirable sort of life . . . The answer to the question about pleasure does not imply that pleasure is not intrinsically worth while but only a means to an end. It implies rather that pleasure is intrinsically worth while, being an element in eudaimonia. Eudaimonia is the most desirable sort of life, the life that contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities.

To say that pleasure is for the sake of happiness is not to pick out an instrumental-means relation but, rather, to pick out a constituency relation. This solution is, of course, not available to the monist who identifies happiness with intellectual contemplation, since it is not plausible

---

46'Artsotle on Eudaimonia'.
47'Artsotle on Eudaimonia', 21.
to say that the other mid-level ends that Aristotle mentions are constituents of contemplation. But insofar we allow that the locution ‘for the sake of’ can pick out a constituency relation, the inclusivist has a way to reconcile the claims that mid-level ends are choiceworthy for their own sake and choiceworthy for the sake of happiness.\textsuperscript{48}

It is worth noting that those who advocate monistic-end interpretations might be able to find analogous solutions. The general strategy is to find a for-the-sake-of relation that leaves both relata valuable for their own sakes, i.e., that does not lower one to the status of an instrumental means to the other. Inclusivists appeal to the constituency relation, but other relations might fit the general strategy. Gabriel Richardson Lear, for example, defends a monistic-end interpretation and argues that the relation needed to solve the problem of mid-level ends is one of teleological approximation.\textsuperscript{49} As she interprets Aristotle, morally virtuous action approximates or imitates contemplation, which is the paradigm final value. The crucial feature of teleological approximation in her account is that insofar as virtuous actions succeeds in approximating a paradigm that is valuable for its own sake, virtuous action will also be valuable for its own sake, while, of course, also being valuable for the sake of contemplation. The inclusivist strategy, then, may not be the

\textsuperscript{48}Kraut claims to find Ackrill’s parthood for-the-sake-of relation mysterious (\textit{Aristotle on the Human Good}, 210–13). He sees no reason why one would say that a part of some mere aggregate should be said to be for the sake of that aggregate. Nothing gets explained in doing so. I think Kraut is right to worry that it makes little sense to say that X is for the sake of Y, where Y is some mere, unorganized aggregate of which X happens to be a part. But inclusivists need not think the inclusive end is a mere, unorganized aggregate. Once the inclusive end has a structure such that it can play a normative role with respect to its constituents, Kraut’s criticism no longer applies. We do well, however, to note that we should not think of the constituency relation in question as just any mere parthood relation. Cf. Lear, \textit{Happy Lives and the Highest Good}, 41, fn. 67.

\textsuperscript{49}\textit{Happy Lives and the Highest Good}, ch. 4.
only way to solve the problem of mid-level ends. It is fair to say, however, that inclusivism has become the predominant way to read Aristotle since Ackrill’s ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’.

2.3.2 Suárez

As we saw in the case of Aristotle, the issue of mid-level ends arises from the conjunction of two claims: (1) that mid-level ends have final value and (2) that all things are to be chosen for the sake of happiness. Suárez also accepts those two claims and so the same problem needs to be addressed for him. The problem may be especially acute for Suárez since he rejects the identification of happiness with an aggregate of goods and so cannot appeal to the inclusivist strategy.

The value of mid-level ends

There are a number of contexts in which Suárez makes it clear that he thinks there are mid-level ends that are valuable for their own sake. I will briefly look at several.

1. When he discusses the question of whether an agent can intend two particular ultimate ends as such, Suárez also notes that an agent can order the very same means to two particular ultimate ends that are not subordinated to each other. The example he uses is one of choosing medicine. If I am given the choice of two medicines, both of which will cure my illness but only one of which is pleasurable to ingest, I will,
other things being equal, choose the one that gives me both health and pleasure. That is, I will choose the medicine that is a means to two ends at once. And, as Suárez goes on to say:

[I]t is not necessary that one [end] be ordered to the other, since each is lovable in itself and apart from the other.\(^{50}\)

This passage is perhaps not definitive in that it might be seen as saying merely that an agent could love both health and pleasure for their own sakes without making the further claim that they in fact are valuable for their own sakes. But Suárez leaves no hint that he might hesitate to identify health and pleasure as valuable for their own sakes.\(^{51}\)

2. As we say earlier, when Suárez makes the distinction between non-ultimate and ultimate ends, he leaves little doubt that some non-ultimate ends are loved for their own sake. Again, one might worry that this just says that agents in fact do sometimes love objects in this way without saying that these putative qualifiedly ultimate ends really are valuable for their own sake. But Suárez makes it clear that he does think some of these ends are valuable for their own sake. His favoured example is of giving alms. He notes on a number of occasions that giving alms is to be loved both for the goodness (specifically, honestum) that it contains in itself, as well as for its usefulness in obtaining a pardon for sins:

\(^{50}\)DFH 3.2.6 (=OO 4:29): *Non est necesse ut unam ad alteram ordinet, cum utraque sit per se, et absque altera amabilis.*

\(^{51}\)See also DM XXIII.2.5 (=OO 25:848): ‘But health is itself loved for the sake of itself, because it per se perfects the human being for whom it is loved’ (*salus vero ipsa propter se amatur, quia per se perficit hominem cui amatur.*
For it often happens that a particular good, although loved for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, nevertheless at the same time is referred to a more ultimate end, in which way alms can be loved both for the sake of the intrinsic *honestas* of mercy and as means towards obtaining pardon for sins.\(^{52}\)

Almsgiving, as an instance of virtuous activity, is both valuable for its own sake and as a means to further goods.

3. The reference to *honestas* in the previous paragraph might have brought to mind the classical division of good into three kinds: *honestum*, *delectabile*, and *utile*.\(^{53}\) The latter two terms can be translated relatively unproblematically as ‘pleasurable’ and ‘useful’. In early modern English ‘*honestum*’ could be translated with its cognate but in contemporary English ‘honest’ has shifted too far from the meaning of ‘*honestum*’. Various other translations have been suggested: the noble, the virtuous, the fine, the moral good, and so on. The ‘fine’ perhaps comes the closest to suggesting the same range of goods that ‘*honestum*’ can cover. For present purposes, however, I will bypass the worries about how to translate the term and mostly leave the term in Latin.\(^{54}\)

Suárez considers this threefold division the most important of the


\(^{53}\) Suárez notes that Aristotle already made this distinction in *EN* II, ch. 3 (1104b31–34), and VIII, ch. 2 (1155b18–19). Aquinas defends the division in *ST* Ia.5.6.

\(^{54}\) For more on *honestum*, see Terence Irwin, *The Good and the Right: Aristotle and His Interpreters on Kalon and Honestum*, unpublished.
ways that good may be divided.\footnote{He discusses the division at some length in DM X.2.3–36 (=OO 25:336–46).} Furthermore, he argues that the division is exhaustive. This is not immediately obvious from looking at the terms. As Suárez conceives it, we can first divide good into that which is good because it is instrumentally useful and that which is good in itself, i.e., finally valuable. The former kind of good corresponds to the division called ‘useful good’. The latter kind is then further divided into the ‘good agreeable on account of pleasure or only on account of itself apart from pleasure’.\footnote{DM X.2.5 (=OO 25:336): bonum conveniens ob delectationem vel absque illa, sed solum propter setpsum.} The former kind, unsurprisingly, corresponds to the division called ‘pleasurable good’; somewhat more surprisingly, the latter corresponds to the division called ‘\textit{bonum honestum}’. This may leave \textit{honestum} looking like something of a grab bag category. Any good that is good for its own sake apart from pleasure is \textit{honestum}. As Suárez characterizes it, in order for something to be \textit{honestum} it is only necessary that ‘it have some aspect of agreeability on account of which it is lovable even if it is neither pleasurable nor useful’.\footnote{DM X.2.5 (=OO 25:336): habeat aliquam rationem convenientiae propter quam sit amabilis, etiamsi nec iucunda neque utilis sit.}

What is significant for our purposes is how expansive a notion of \textit{honestum} this is. Suárez considers a set of objections that includes the worry that this account of \textit{honestum} will cover too many things.\footnote{DM X.2.6 (=OO 25:337).} In his response it becomes clear that Suárez allows an expansive conception:

For we concede that this good is not limited to action, habit, or form, but applies to every thing which is desirable \textit{honeste}
and according to right reason for a human being.\textsuperscript{59}

For something to be desirable according to right reason is for it to be agreeable or suitable to rational nature. More than one thing, presumably, is agreeable to rational nature. Among other things, Suárez cites virtues, virtuous actions, and God as examples of \textit{bona honesta}. Recalling that \textit{honestum} is a subdivision of the good that is valuable for its own sake, it is clear that Suárez is here, too, attributing final value to multiple mid-level ends. Pleasure, of course, is a further mid-level end with final value, since it is also a subdivision of the good that is valuable for its own sake.

We have, then, seen three contexts in which Suárez attributes final value to mid-level ends. Before leaving this section, it is also worth noting that one might hope that Suárez would be committed to this claim. After all, claiming that no goods but the vision of God have final value would be a difficult position to defend.

\textbf{Happiness as that for which everything is to be chosen}

One would expect Suárez to hold that happiness is that for the sake of which everything else is to be chosen. That, after all, is just the role that happiness typically plays in the philosophical traditions on which he draws. There is much disagreement about what constitutes

\textsuperscript{59}DM X.2.14 (=OO 25:339): \textit{Concedimus enim hoc bonum non limitari ad operationem, vel habitum, vel formam, sed convenire omni rei quae honeste et secundum rectam rationem est appetibilis ab homine}. If this were read as a definition of 'honestum', the appearance of 'honeste' in the definiens would be worrisome. It is not clear to me, however, that the 'honeste' adds anything beyond the 'according to right reason' clause and so I suspect that it could be omitted without harm.
happiness, but, with some notable exceptions, wide-ranging agreement that happiness is the ultimate end, i.e., the end for which everything else is chosen.

We can readily confirm that Suárez does in fact hold this view. As he says in his discussion of what the word ‘happiness’ means: ‘“happiness”, therefore, signifies the ultimate perfection to which the remaining are referred’.\(^{60}\) It might be objected that ‘the remaining’ in this passage is not unrestricted and so this passage does not in fact show that all other things are to be chosen for happiness. It is true that ‘the remaining’ here is restricted. But the context makes clear that Suárez has in mind the remaining perfections and goods. Since those are precisely the cases in question, we have all that we need. Nobody has suggested that something that is not even a good will be chosen for its own sake and not for the sake of happiness.

We can also infer that Suárez holds that happiness is that for the sake of which everything else is to be chosen from his explicit affirmation that an agent’s happiness is the same thing as her ultimate end: ‘The happiness of a human being is the same thing as the ultimate end . . . ’\(^{61}\) Suárez does not specify—somewhat surprisingly given that in the immediately prior sections he repeatedly emphasizes the distinction between unqualifiedly ultimate ends and qualifiedly ultimate ends—that happiness is to be identified with the unqualifiedly ultimate end. Still, we can safely assume that he does not intend to identify happiness with merely one of many qualifiedly ultimate ends. That would be a striking

\(^{60}\text{DFH 4.1.4 (=OO 4:40): ergo beatitudo significat perfectionem ultimam ad quam cætera referuntur.}\)

\(^{61}\text{DFH 4.1.pr. (=OO 4:39): Beatitudo hominis re ipsa idem est cum ultimo fine . . .}\)
departure from the philosophical tradition within which he works and would provide no reason for giving happiness the role in moral philosophy that Suárez gives it.

Furthermore, for several reasons I think we should take the identification to be with an ultimate end to which everything else is ordered, i.e., my characterization (3A) from section §2.7.4, rather than merely with an end that is loved for its own sake and not loved for the sake of anything else. First, this is the characterization that Suárez provided in the case where he used the terms ‘unqualifiedly ultimate’ versus ‘qualifiedly ultimate’ instead of ‘ultimate’ versus ‘proximate’. In the discussion just prior to stating that happiness is the same thing as the ultimate end he frequently made use of the distinction using the terms ‘unqualifiedly ultimate’ and ‘qualifiedly ultimate’. Second, a little earlier in the discussion Suárez asked whether an agent can intend two ‘unqualifiedly ultimate ends’ at the same time. He argued that this is impossible because an agent intending two ends cannot be intending each of them as individually her complete good. But parts of her complete good are not unqualifiedly ultimate ends. Rather, her complete good is her unqualifiedly ultimate end. In this argument, Suárez clearly uses the term ‘unqualifiedly ultimate end’ in the sense of an end to which everything else is referred. Third, if Suárez thought that there were multiple ultimate ends of which one is to be identified with happiness, it would seem misleading at best simply to say that happiness is the same thing as the ultimate end. It seems best, therefore, to take Suárez to be identifying

62DFH 3.3 (=OO 4:30–34).
63Note especially DFH 3.3.5 (=OO 4:31).
64I take this to be true even keeping in mind that in the Latin there is not a definite article in front of ‘ultimate end’.
happiness with that ultimate end for whose sake all other things are loved or chosen.

**God as our ultimate end**

We now have the problematic conjunction of claims: (1) that mid-level ends have final value and (2) that all things are to be loved or chosen for the sake of happiness. As we saw in the scholarship on Aristotle, a standard way of reconciling these claims is by appeal to an inclusive notion of happiness, where the mid-level ends are parts of happiness. The question now is whether Suárez avails himself of that solution. I shall argue in this section that he does not, but rather identifies happiness with only one good, namely, God.

Suárez is well aware of the inclusive conception of happiness. In his discussion of what the term ‘happiness’ means, he notes that it can be defined as the aggregation of all goods. He explicitly grants the coherence of an inclusive conception:

> [I]t is clear that it is not necessary that a human being constitute this ultimate end in one thing or in one good, for he can desire a collection of multiple goods as the ultimate *terminus* of his desires. For in this way many philosophers placed happiness either in a collection of temporal goods or in those along with virtue. Nor is there any repugnance in this either from the mode of desiring or from the concept of an ultimate

---

65DFH 4.1.2 (=OO 4:39).
end, as is clear from what has been said.\textsuperscript{66}

There are two things to note here. First, as far as the formal features of practical reasoning and ultimate ends are concerned, Suárez thinks that an inclusive conception of happiness is acceptable. If it turns out that happiness consists of a single good, that will be a result of what the goods in question are like rather than being a result of structural features of practical reasoning.\textsuperscript{67} Second, an inclusive conception is not just a logically possible position; Suárez thinks that many philosophers have actually held this view. He has an even stronger statement to similar effect elsewhere:

\begin{quotation}
[All the philosophers seem to think that a human being requires for his felicity other goods—created goods—in addition to God.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quotation}

He goes on to say that many theologians also think this.

Furthermore, he affirms Aristotle’s perfection (or completeness or finality) and self-sufficiency criteria for happiness.\textsuperscript{69} These criteria are

\textsuperscript{66}DFH 3.3.5 (=OO 4:31): \ldots constat non esse necessarium ut homo constituat hunc ultimum finem in una re, seu in uno bono, potest enim plurium collectionem appetere ut ultimum terminum suorum desideriorum: sic enim philosophi multi posuerunt beatitudinem vel in collectione bonorum temporalium, vel in eis simul cum virtute: neque in hoc est ulla repugnantia ex modo appetendi, vel ex ratione finis ultimi, ut ex dictis constat.

\textsuperscript{67}This means that Suárez might well be happy with everything that MacDonald says about the relationship between weak and strong ultimate ends in ‘Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning’, since MacDonald explicitly limits his focus to formal considerations prior to identifying the strong ultimate end with some set of good[s].

\textsuperscript{68}DFH 5.2.2 (=OO 4:49): In hac questione philosophi omnes sensisse videntur indigere hominem praeter Deum alii bonis creatis ad felicitatem suam \ldots . The term ‘philosophers’ here refers primarily to ancient philosophers, since most of the medieval figures whom we often call ‘philosophers’ he calls ‘theologians’.

\textsuperscript{69}Gabriel Richardson Lear has an in-depth discussion of both criteria in Chapters
sometimes thought to require an inclusivist conception. For example, Aristotle says that something ‘is self-sufficient when all by itself it makes a life choiceworthy and lacking nothing’. But how can a single good be self-sufficient in that sense? We might think only an aggregate of goods stands a chance of being self-sufficient. Suárez seems equally committed to an inclusivist conception, since he says:

An unqualifiedly ultimate end . . . is a perfect end and a sufficient good.

Suárez does not emphasize the self-sufficiency criterion early in the treatise when discussing the formal features of ultimate ends. He does, however, repeatedly make use of it when evaluating different candidates for objective happiness. When Suárez considers what objects constitute happiness, he first considers goods other than God. He divides these into three categories: external goods (e.g., money), goods of the body (e.g., health, bodily pleasure), and goods of the soul (e.g., knowledge). In a few cases—for example, in the case of money—he argues that these goods are merely instrumental goods. In most cases, however, he does not do so. In fact, although appealing to the Stoics for support for the position that goods of the body are inferior goods, he hastens to add

---


70 EN 1.7, 1097b14–16.

71 DFH 3.3.1 (=OO 4:30): Finis ultimus simpliciter, ut supra dixi, et constat ex Aristotelis I Ethicorum cap. 7 et 8, est finis perfectus, et bonum sufficiens . . . Suárez uses the Latin terms here that translate the corresponding Greek terms in Aristotle’s EN. The two criteria receive somewhat more extended treatment in DFH 5.2.4 (=OO 4:49–50).
that the Stoics went overboard. In contrast to what they said, goods of the body really are good and to be sought as long as honestas allows.\(^{72}\)

Still, not surprisingly, he does not think that any of these kinds of goods nor any combination of them meets the self-sufficiency criterion. God is necessary in order to meet that criterion:

\[
\text{Therefore, all [other goods] without God cannot satisfy human capacity.}^{73}\]

So God is necessary for happiness. None of this is surprising. In agreement with the Christian tradition, Suárez thinks that God is the best good for a human being.

He next asks just the question relevant for our purposes: ‘Whether God alone without the association of any created things is a sufficient object of happiness.’\(^{74}\) Suárez’s answer is unambiguous and clear:

\[
\text{Therefore, it should be said that absolutely and strictly speaking God alone is the object of our essential happiness and in this way he suffices for our happiness without the association of creatures.}^{75}\]

\(^{72}\text{DFH 5.1.4 (=OO 4:47).}\)

\(^{73}\text{DFH 5.1.7 (=OO 4:48): ergo non possunt omnia sine Deo explorere capacitatem hominis.}\)

\(^{74}\text{DFH 5.2 (=OO 4:48): Utrum solus Deus sine consortio alicujs creaturæ sit sufficiens objectum beatitudinis.}\)

\(^{75}\text{DFH 5.2.3 (=OO 4:49): Dicendum ergo et absolute et simpliciter, solum Deum esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis essentialis, atque hoc modo illum sine consortio creaturæ sufficere ad nostram beatitudinem.}\)

William George Ward (1812–1882), often a perceptive reader of the scholastic philosophers, suggests that Suárez is one of the philosophers for whom happiness is nothing more than the set of all goods (On Nature and Grace. A Theological Treatise. Book I. Philosophical Introduction [London, 1860], 409, 413–14). Ward is misled by what Suárez says before he gets to the discussion of objective happiness.
And a little later:

Therefore, it is also the case that [God] alone is a [human being’s] ultimate end.\textsuperscript{76}

Christ was happy even during the Passion. The souls of the holy after death and before the resurrection are happy even though they lack bodies and therefore also lack the goods of the body. Suárez even imagines a world in which all that exists is one soul seeing and loving God. That soul, too, is happy since it has God and God is sufficient for happiness—even if the soul could not cognize even itself.\textsuperscript{77} Suárez drives the point home by noting that a good is not the highest good if it along with another good would be more desirable than it by itself. The striking implication is that God and good health are not more desirable than God alone.\textsuperscript{78} Since God alone is the object of happiness, all other things are to be referred to God:

God alone is the perfect end who should be loved for his own sake and all other things for his sake.\textsuperscript{79}

For God alone is to be loved beyond all other things and they should all be referred to this love and to the attainment of God himself in order for them to belong truly to our perfection.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{76}DFH 5.2.4 (=OO 4:50): \textit{Et confirmatur tandem, quia solus Deus est primum hominis principium: ergo solus etiam est ultimus finis ejus . . .}

\textsuperscript{77}DFH 5.2.3 (=OO 4:49).

\textsuperscript{78}DFH 5.2.4 (=OO 4:50).

\textsuperscript{79}DFH 5.2.4 (=OO 4:50): \textit{sed solus Deus est perfectus finis, propter se amandus, et reliqua omnia propter ipsum . . .}

\textsuperscript{80}DFH 5.2.5 (=OO 4:50): \textit{quia solus Deus est supra omnia diligendus, omniaque ad hunc amorem, et ad ipsius Dei consecutionem referenda sunt, ut vere pertineant ad nostram perfectionem . . .}
This claim that all other things are to be done for the sake of God is, of course, in keeping with what we saw in §3.2.2. It follows quickly enough from the propositions that all things are to be done for the sake of happiness and that God is objective happiness.

One question that remains, however, is how broadly applicable this conclusion is. Suárez focuses on perfect happiness throughout most of his discussion. So perhaps the claim is only that God alone is the object of the happiness of the next life (happiness in very different circumstances than ours in this life), leaving open the possibility that the imperfect happiness of this life includes other goods such as moral virtue.81 It seems, though, that Suárez rules out this possibility. He began the relevant disputation by noting that the discussion applies to all kinds of happiness, natural and supernatural, of this life and of the next, since they all have the same object.82 Furthermore, once he has arrived at the conclusion that God alone is the object of happiness, he takes care to state explicitly that this conclusion also applies to the happiness of this life; for even in this case, a human being ‘ought to love God beyond all other things and to refer all things to him as to an ultimate end.’83 It seems, then, that Suárez is committed to the stronger claim that God alone is the object of both the happiness of the next life and the happiness of this life.

Similar-sounding claims are not, of course, new in the Christian

---

81 Terence Irwin ascribes this sort of view to Aquinas in The Development of Ethics, vol. 1, §§280 and 282.
82 DFH 5.pr. [=OO 4:45].
83 DFH 5.2.5 [=OO 4:50]: . . . deberet Deum supra omnia diligere, et in eum ut in ultimum finem omnia referre.
philosophical tradition. Aquinas makes some similar-sounding claims (though it is not clear that his position is quite this radical). Augustine is perhaps best-known for making such claims, notoriously saying in *De doctrina christiana* that only the Trinity is to be enjoyed, but that all other things, including human beings, are to be used, i.e., loved for the sake of God. Suárez leans heavily on Augustine when citing authorities on behalf of his view that God alone is sufficient for happiness.

Nonetheless, we might well be surprised by Suárez’s claim, given that he recognizes the possibility of an inclusivist conception of happiness and that he affirms that mid-level ends are valuable for their own sakes. Suárez is well aware of the reasons for not holding his view. Although God is the supreme good, he is not the only good. Human beings desire some of these other goods as well, and so some of these other goods are necessary for desire to be fully satisfied. Hence, God, however great a good, is not a sufficient good. Nor will it do to say that God contains all goods eminently. A sick person desires to attain the form of health in herself, not just to see eminent health in God. Suárez’s response to the arguments for the insufficiency of God is rather too brief. He simply

---

84 Part of the reason why Christian philosophers make such claims is no doubt the presence of claims such as the following in Scripture: ‘So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do everything for the glory of God’ (1 Cor. 10:31 New Revised Standard Version).


87 *DFH* 5.2 (=OO 4:48–51).

88 *DFH* 5.2.1 (=OO 4:48).
points out that the complete state of happiness comes with these other goods, since they are either antecedently or consequently necessary for happiness.\textsuperscript{89} But these other goods are neither ‘the ultimate end nor parts of it’. Rather, they are things ordered to the ultimate end.\textsuperscript{90} This response is not entirely to the point. First, it is not clear that all the relevant goods will be antecedently or consequently necessary.\textsuperscript{91} Secondly, and more importantly, somebody arguing that both A and B are ultimate ends may be pleased to find out that whenever she attains A she will as a matter of fact also have attained B, but for all that she is likely still to insist that it is wrong to say that only A is her ultimate end.

\textbf{An objection}

One might raise worries about Suárez’s account from a number of angles. In this section I will raise one objection, briefly consider a couple of strategies for responding to it, but end by indicating lingering dissatisfaction. In the following section I will offer a speculative diagnosis to indicate where I think Suárez made a stronger claim than he should have.

Is it plausible to say that God is sufficient for happiness or that God together with some other good is no more desirable than God alone? Despite granting that other kinds of things are genuinely good, does

\textsuperscript{89}Without claiming to be comprehensive, an example of something antecedently necessary for happiness would be an instrumental means that is necessary for attaining happiness and an example of something consequently necessary would be something that follows necessarily upon achieving happiness, e.g., delight might be thought consequent upon happiness.

\textsuperscript{90}\textit{DFH} 5.2.8 (\textit{=OO} 4:51).

\textsuperscript{91}But see \textit{DFH} 16.1.5 (\textit{=OO} 4:145).
Suárez not end up facing the same sort of incredulous responses that the Stoics faced? Just as it is hard to see how the sage being tortured on the rack is happy, so it is hard to see how the saint being martyred for the faith is happy. Why should the saint not be grateful for the presence of God and yet wish to have been spared the agonies of martyrdom?

There is a simpleminded way of arguing against Suárez that should be resisted. At first glance, one might think the following principle plausible: if A is good for its own sake and B is good for its own sake, then having both A and B is more desirable than having either by itself. But one does not need to reflect long to realize that the principle is dubious. A woman might well think that marrying one man would be a very good thing and that marrying another man would also be a very good thing, but that marrying both would not be good at all. So the thought that God together with some other good must be better than God alone needs to be motivated by some more subtle principle. But Suárez might be able to appeal to God’s infinite goodness to ward off threat from any such additive principles.

Furthermore, Suárez can appeal to his claim that perfect happiness can only be achieved in the next life. The saint being burned at the stake is not perfectly happy—she is only imperfectly happy. Hence, it is no part of Suárez’s picture that she should not desire something better.\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{92}In case we are too taken with the thought of how agonizing it must be to be burnt at the stake, Suárez could also point out that many martyrs are reported to be joyful in the face of death, according to the reports of both ally and enemy. For historical discussions of this, see Brad S. Gregory, Salvation at Stake: Christian Martyrdom in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 97–138, and my ‘Swiss Anabaptists and the Miraculous’, Mennonite Quarterly Review 80 (2006): 207–28.
Still, I think there is a genuine challenge here for Suárez. Take the appeal to the distinction between perfect and imperfect happiness. That only seems to allow the martyr to desire the perfect vision of God in the afterlife. It is less clear that it opens up room for desiring a healthy, unburnt body as part of her ultimate end. But why should her ultimate end not be to contemplate God as best she can in this life along with bodily goods, all of which is to be followed by the better contemplation of God in the next life? We might appeal to the life of Christ as told in the Synoptic Gospels to help motivate the point. As I noted earlier, Suárez suggests that Christ was happy during the Passion. But consider the following part of the story:

Then Jesus went with them to a place called Gethsemane; and he said to his disciples, ‘Sit here while I go over there and pray.’ He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be grieved and agitated. Then he said to them, ‘I am deeply grieved, even to death; remain here, and stay awake with me.’ And going a little farther, he threw himself on the ground and prayed, ‘My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not what I want but what you want.’

Surely hermeneutical torture would be required to make this sound like a description of happiness or even of something compatible with happiness! Insofar as Suárez thinks that Jesus has a sinless will and hence provides an example for other rational agents to follow, how are we to understand Jesus’s prayer that the cup be passed from him? Is he not

\[^{93}\text{Matt. 26:36–39 New Revised Standard Version.}\]
expressing a desire to be spared a bodily evil? Despite communing with God, is he not expressing a desire for something more?

Perhaps Suárez can answer these questions satisfactorily. It is not clear to me how.

**A diagnosis**

Consider the following sequence of claims:

1. Everything else should be referred to God.
2. God alone is our true ultimate end.
4. God and any other good are no more desirable than God alone.

I take Suárez to affirm all of these. One might think each of these claims amounts to largely the same thing. It is not too difficult to see how someone who accepted (1) might readily slide on to the rest of them. On closer inspection, however, it is not clear to me that any two of these claims amounts to the same thing and so I think such a slide illegitimate unless supported by additional argumentation. In some cases the question whether two of the claims amount to the same thing may turn on uninteresting quibbling over words, so I will not canvas the possibilities.

But it will be helpful to take a closer look at (1). I take (1) to be a perfectly sensible claim in a Christian framework—and no doubt in a variety of other theistic frameworks—according to which God is the creator of everything else and all goodness is closely linked to God, whether
in the sense that good objects are created by God or in the sense that objects are good in virtue of participation in God\textsuperscript{94} or in the sense that objects are good in virtue of resembling God.\textsuperscript{95} It is plausible to think that in such a picture of the world all goods other than God are extrinsic goods, since they have their value from another source or in relation to another source.\textsuperscript{96} That would seem to follow straightforwardly, for example, on a picture in which objects are good in virtue of resembling God. But if all goods other than God are extrinsic goods, then we have what we need to make a case for (1).

I do not take the claim that all objects other than God are good only extrinsically already to amount to the claim that all things should be referred to God. The former is a claim about the way things have value and the latter is a claim about how we should value things.\textsuperscript{97} I do, however, think that the way things have value can affect how we should value them.

\textsuperscript{94}For a useful introduction to this theme in medieval thought, see Scott MacDonald’s introduction, ‘The Relation between Being and Goodness’, in Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology, ed. by Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 1–28.


\textsuperscript{96}In a full account of what extrinsic goodness is, we might want further specification such the mere fact that something has a causal ancestor is not sufficient for a thing’s value to be extrinsic rather than intrinsic. But we need not concern ourselves with those details here.

\textsuperscript{97}Christine Korsgaard famously makes a distinction akin to this in her ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 169–95. There is now a large literature exploring this and related distinctions in values. Rae Langton wrote an especially fine piece: ‘Objective and Unconditioned Value’, Philosophical Review 116 (2007): 157–85. Although I do not follow her discussion closely here, I was inspired at various points by her discussion. Jonathan Dancy also provides a useful discussion in ‘Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value’, chapter 9 of Ethics without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Some of the other literature on the subject may be traced in their footnotes.
A crude way of drawing the connection would be to say that we should value things for their own sake (I will call this ‘finally-value’) if and only if they are intrinsically valuable and we should instrumentally-value things if and only if they are extrinsically valuable. A simple-minded Kantian might think, for example, that rational beings are intrinsically valuable and so should be finally-valued and that money is only extrinsically valuable and so should only be instrumentally-valued. But this strikes me as much too crude. I see no reason why some extrinsic goods should not be finally-valued. For example, suppose the view that created objects are good in virtue of resembling God is right. Why should it follow that human beings, for example, are only to be instrumentally-valued? It seems, rather, that one might conclude that insofar as there is a significant resemblance between human beings and God (sharing personhood, rationality, and so on, though to different degrees), we have reason to finally-value other human beings.

But there might be more nuanced ways of drawing the connection. I will not attempt to formulate a general theory of when and how the ways things are valuable affect how things are to be valued, but I want to present several cases that are relevantly analogous to the case of God and created objects in the Christian framework. In the first case, consider Diego Velázquez, Suárez’s contemporary, and one of his paintings, perhaps Las Meninas. In the second case, consider someone who has received a gift from a close friend. In the third case, consider an aging parent with a precious photograph of her son as a toddler. Finally, consider a spouse with her wedding ring. In all these cases, it seems to

---

98Langton proposed this example, although for her own purposes (‘Objective and Unconditioned Value’, 162–63).
me, we have objects with extrinsic value (perhaps intrinsic value, too, in some cases), but where they should not be merely instrumentally-valued. But if we finally-value them, the way we do so should be affected by the ways in which the objects’ values are extrinsic. It would, for example, be perverse to value the ring more than the marriage that it symbolizes. Similarly for the other cases. But it is not just a question about which of a pair of items is more valuable. Rather, in all cases it seems right to say that the object in question—the painting, the gift, the photograph, the ring—should be valued with reference to the painter, the giver, the person depicted, or the spouse. *Las Meninas* may well be valuable for its own sake but it would hardly be right for the museum holding it to neglect keeping a record of who painted it. To use Suárez’s terminology, all these goods should be referred to further ends.

I want to suggest that these cases are analogous in the Christian view of the world to God and the things he created. Further, although this is somewhat speculative, I think thoughts of this sort lie behind Suárez’s claim that all other ends should be referred to a more ultimate end, i.e., God. Hence, we get to (1) in the sequence of claims that I presented at the beginning of this section.

It should also be clear by now why I do not think that (1) need lead to the later claims in the sequence. We are all familiar with the notion that one end can be an instrumental means to another end. Sometimes that is meant when it is said that one end should be referred to another. The inclusivist interpretations of Aristotle reminded us that to say that one end should be referred to another can also mean that one end is a
constitutive part of the other end. I am suggesting a third relation that might be meant, namely, the complex relation where an agent enjoys an end and recognizes its relation to a creator or giver and appropriately honours or respects the creator or giver in the enjoyment of the end. But there is no need to go from the claim that we should refer all things to God to the claim that God alone constitutes our happiness, especially if the latter claim is taken in the strong sense where it entails that God alone is just as desirable as God in conjunction with any other good.

It is true, of course, that Suárez does make the further claims. But I cannot see why he should do so.

2.4 Conclusion

We have seen that Suárez does not avail himself of the inclusivist conception of happiness. Instead he thinks that true happiness is found in God alone. I suggested that this leads to some claims that are striking to say the least, e.g., the claim that Christ was happy during the Passion. I also speculated that Suárez was led in this direction because he—and perhaps earlier Christian philosophers—were tempted to slide from the plausible claim that everything should be referred to God to the less plausible claim that God alone is our ultimate end, even though the former claim does not entail the latter.

One reason for resisting Suárez’s further claims is that it leads to incredible claims about the sufficiency of God for happiness. But I want to end by noting a further, more important reason for resisting. We
are trying to provide an account of practical reasoning. Our ultimate end (and happiness, if we’re identifying it with the ultimate end) has a certain role to play in practical reasoning. It is supposed to tell us what choices to make as rational agents, for example. A choice that gets me closer to the ultimate end is a better choice than one that takes me farther from the ultimate end. But if our ultimate end fails to include all the goods we rationally care about, then it is hard to see how it can play this regulative role, even if it does include our most important good. It seems likely that in some case or other an agent will face a choice where her most important good is not at stake but where one of the goods not considered part of her ultimate end is at stake. In such a case, the ultimate end would be of no help in determining what she should do.

I suspect Suárez would agree with what I have just said. I suspect he would agree that it would be a bad result if there turned out to be cases where the ultimate end was irrelevant to our deliberation. But it also seems to me that he makes some claims that lead to just such a result.
3.1 Introduction

Any theory that says that agents ought to act for the right reasons or for the right ends owes us an account of what is required for the agent to stand in such a relationship to reasons or ends. Similarly, a theory that makes striking claims about what reasons or ends agents in fact do act for also owes us such an account. It seems likely that such an account will refer to intentions; the fact that I purchased seeds for the sake of planting a garden has something to do with the fact that I purchased the seeds with the intention of planting a garden. Suárez certainly assumes that facts about what ends actions are for are grounded in facts about what intentions the agent has. When he asks the question in what ways a human being can act for the sake of an end, he cites four ways and then promptly begins a discussion of four kinds of intention. The assumption, clearly, is that each way of acting for the sake of an end rests on a different way of intending the end.

The source of one strand of scholastic discussion of intention is Aquinas’s comment that the force of an intention can remain even after the agent has ceased considering the end to which the intention is directed. According to Ignatius Theodore Eschmann, this comment gave ‘rise to the major scholastic dispute’ concerning the article in which it is embedded.¹ A brief look at the context of Aquinas’s comment will

¹The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Two Courses (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
usefully introduce the topic for this chapter.²

Aquinas has just argued that human beings have one and only one ultimate end. In article six he addresses the question of whether an agent wills everything that she wills for that ultimate end. The Third Argument relies on the premise that considering an end is necessary to ordering something to that end. For example, in order for it to be the case that I went on the excursion to please my wife, I must have been thinking about pleasing my wife at the time. But, the argument continues, people aren’t constantly thinking about the ultimate end, so it can’t be the case that everything they will and do is for the sake of the ultimate end.³

Aquinas responds by denying that one has to consider an end at the time of acting in order for that action to be for the sake of the end:

It is not necessary that one always consider the ultimate end whenever one desires or does something. Rather, the force (virtus) of the first intention, which is directed to the ultimate end, remains in any desire of whatever thing, even if one is not actually considering the ultimate end, just as it is not necessary to consider the end at every step when going on a journey.⁴

²I cover Aquinas’s inchoate distinctions between different kinds of intention in more detail in Appendix A.

³Præterea, quicumque ordinat aliquid in finem aliquem, cogitat de illo fine. Sed non semper homo cogitat de ultimo fine in omni eo quod appetit aut facit. Non ergo omnia homo appetit aut facit propter ultimum finem.’

⁴ST IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3: ‘Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitetur de ultimo fine, quandocunque aliquid appetit vel operatur; sed virtus primæ intentionis,
We can distinguish a negative and a positive claim here. The negative claim is that it is not necessary to think about the end while acting in order for that action to have been done for the sake of the end. That claim seems right, as the example persuasively illustrates. But of course we will need some alternative condition for what makes it the case that an action is done for the sake of an end. The suggested positive claim seems to be that the necessary condition is that there have been an actual intention of the end at some point, the force (\textit{virtus}) of which remains in the agent. This seems plausible, at least initially. So we might say that what makes it the case that every step on the way to Rome was taken for the sake of the end of getting to Rome was that the agent had decided to go to Rome before setting out. Once that intention has been set, there is no need to constantly think about the end while executing the means. The potential problem for Aquinas is that this may not suffice for the position he is arguing for, namely, that every human action is done for the sake of the ultimate end. After all, can it plausibly be said that every time we act we previously thought about the ultimate end, intended it, and that some of that force remains to cause our action? It is not difficult to see why this passage might have engendered a dispute among later scholastics.

Aquinas himself has several other passages in which he makes this distinction. He also distinguishes between habitual intention and virtual intention, both of which are to be distinguished from actual intention. Unfortunately, he does not spell out in detail what these different

\textit{quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in qualibet appetitu ciuscunque ret, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in qualibet passu cogitet de fine.}
kinds of intention amount to, and, to make matters more confusing yet, he fails to use the terminology consistently. Suárez has a more systematic discussion of the matter, although it turns out not to be as clear as one would wish either. Before turning to Suárez, however, I want to turn briefly to the legacy of Suárez’s discussion, so to speak.

3.2 The four intentions of lexicons and handbooks

By the eighteenth century, a standard distinction between four kinds of intention was in circulation, repeated with little commentary in myriad lexicons, handbooks, textbooks, encyclopedias, and the like. It is cited frequently in sacramental theology, since the Council of Trent stressed that a minister of the sacrament must have the intention ‘to do what the Church does’. But it is a common point that the minister need not have an actual intention to do so, but that a virtual intention will suffice. The four-way distinction appears to be the same that Suárez makes. In fact, many of these later works direct readers to Suárez as a source of the doctrine; some even are more or less verbatim excerpts from Suárez.

Given that the terms of the distinction are no longer standard parlance, it may be helpful to see the standard, evolved account first in order to be able to have it as a reference when looking at Suárez’s account. We should not, however, assume that the later account is the

—

5See, for example: William Stone, *Familiar Instructions on the Sacraments* (Dublin: James Duffy & Sons, 1881), 10–11. Aquinas also discusses the role of intention in administering the sacraments and also denies that actual intention is necessary. He says, however, that habitual intention is what is needed: *ST* IIIa.64.8 ad 3. Cf. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* IV, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2, qc. 1 ad 4.
same as Suárez’s account.

*The Catholic Encyclopedia* provides a relatively clear, though somewhat oversimplified, account of the distinction as it had become standard. It is worth quoting at some length:

With the purpose of determining the value of an action, it is customary to distinguish various sorts of intentions which could have prompted it. First, there is the actual intention, operating, namely, with the advertence of the intellect. Secondly, there is the virtual intention. Its force is borrowed entirely from a prior volition which is accounted as continuing in some result produced by it. In other words, the virtual intention is not a present act of the will, but rather a power (*virtus*) come about as an effect of a former act, and now at work for the attainment of the end. The thing therefore that is wanting in a virtual, as contrasted with an actual, intention is not of course the element of will, but rather the attention of the intellect, and that particularly of the reflex kind. So, for example, a person having made up his mind to undertake a journey may during its progress be entirely preoccupied with other thoughts. He will nevertheless be said to have all the while the virtual intention of reaching his destination. Thirdly, an habitual intention is one that once actually existed, but of the present continuance of which there is no positive trace; the most that can be said of it is that it has never been retracted. And fourthly, an interpretative intention is one that as a mat-
ter of fact has never been really elicited; there has been and is no actual movement of the will; it is simply the purpose which it is assumed a man would have had in a given contingency, had he given thought to the matter.  

Clearly, actual intention is the fundamental kind of intention with reference to which the other kinds are defined. Actual intention is intention of the kind we experience when reflecting on our ends and thinking about how best to achieve them. The picture here seems to be that actual intention requires occurrent acts both of the intellect and of the will, namely, the attention of the intellect and the will aiming at the end. In virtual intention the force of the act of the will remains but the act of the intellect does not. Habitual intention and interpretative intention have neither, though habitual intention was preceded by both and interpretative intention would have given rise to an actual intention had the situation been different. Given that only actual and virtual intention include something presently operative, whether an act of the will or a remaining force, it is not surprising that sacramental theologians judge habitual and interpretative intention insufficient for confecting sacraments even though they allow both actual and virtual intention.

We may extract the following four characterizations for later reference:

---

6The Catholic Encyclopedia: An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, and History of the Catholic Church, ed. by Charles G. Herbermann et al. (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 1913), s.v. 'Intention'.

7The Encyclopedia's presentation of habitual intention is unfortunate for any reader who does not immediately assume that a habitual intention will involve a habit; i.e., a lack of retraction is not quite 'the most that can be said of it'.
CE 1: *Actual intention* requires that the will aim at the end and intellect think of the end at the time of the action.

CE 2: *Virtual intention* requires that at least some force remain at the time of action from a previous actual intention.

CE 3: *Habitual intention* requires that there have been an actual intention, that it not have been retracted, but that no force from it remain to positively affect the action.

CE 4: *Interpretative intention* requires that there would be an actual intention were the agent to have thought about the situation, though in fact there is not an actual intention.

How these distinctions apply to specific situations may be seen in a little story provided by Charles Coppens in *A Brief Text-book of Moral Philosophy*:

A boy is sent by his father to assist a distressed family. He sets out with the *actual* intention of fulfilling this commission. While walking along, he is occupied with other thoughts and is unmindful of his message, yet he directs his steps aright in virtue of his former intention—that is, with a *virtual* intention. He may delay for hours at a friend’s house, totally uninfluenced by the purpose for which he started out; nevertheless, as that purpose has not been given up, it remains as a habit; it is *habitual*. At last he reaches the distressed family, and finds them in such want that he feels confident that his father, if he knew the circumstances, would wish him to give a larger alms than the sum appointed. Accordingly he gives this
larger alms, acting on his father’s intention as he interprets it. This is the father’s interpretative intention—i.e., what he would have actually intended if he had known the facts.  

The general picture should be clear enough for present purposes, even if we will eventually want to see more details.

### 3.3 The will’s intention in general

Suárez follows Aquinas in his general account of intention, though he is perhaps more concerned that the intention referred to in discussion of human action not be confused with other kinds of intention. Suárez provides a little etymological story, according to which ‘intention’ (intentio) comes from ‘to intend’ (intendere) which means to aim at something or to tend to something (in alium tendere). But this metaphor finds application in a variety of areas:

From this etymology, the name ‘intention’ has various significations: for both the attention of the mind and the application of the senses are customarily signified and sometimes inanimate things are said to intend their ends.

---

8(New York, 1895), 13. Other texts, both from the nineteenth century and from earlier, that make the distinction between these four kinds of intention may easily be found; I have seen dozens.

9Cf. Aquinas, ST IaIIæ.12.1 co.

10DVI 6.1.2 (=OO 4:242): ‘… ex qua etymologia nomen intentionis varias habet significations: nam et mentis attentionem, et sensuum applicationem significare solet, et interdum res inanimes dicuntur intendere suas fines.’ Citations of this treatise and of other works by Suárez will be by disputation, section, and number or analogous divisions.
But, Suárez notes, in this discussion we are only talking about that sort of intention which is ‘a certain free or perfectly voluntary tendency to some end, which is proper to things having use of reason’.\textsuperscript{11} This restriction to intentions arising intrinsically from the agent is relevant to the question of whether all human beings have the same ultimate end. Suárez thinks it clear that the ‘author of nature’ has established an ultimate end for humans and that those actions which do not come from a deliberated will are done for the sake of this end in the same sense that natural agents are said to act for the sake of the ends appointed for them by God.\textsuperscript{12} But in ethics we are interested in those intentions by which agents themselves order their actions.\textsuperscript{13}

Suárez agrees with Aquinas that intention is an act of the will rather than of the intellect.\textsuperscript{14} He also rejects Bonaventure’s argument that intention is composed of both an act of the intellect and an act of the will. He thinks that Bonaventure’s argument merely shows that intention presupposes an act of intellect, which Suárez is happy to grant.\textsuperscript{15} But if the object of both the will and intention is an end, a question arises about what the difference is between willing and intention. Suárez replies that the end can be thought of under two aspects. The end thought of as a good that is lovable for its own sake is the object of willing. But the end thought of as a good that ought to be sought out via means is the object of an intention. This crucial involvement of means

\textsuperscript{11} DVI 6.1.2 (=OO 4:242): ‘...quamdam liberam, vel perfecte voluntariam tendentiam in aliquem finem: quae propria est rei utentis ratione ...’

\textsuperscript{12} DFH 2.3.3–4 and 3.1.prerm.–3 (=OO 4:22–23 and 25–27).

\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Aquinas, \textit{Questiones disputatae de veritate} (henceforth: \textit{De veritate}) q. 22, art. 1.

\textsuperscript{14} DVI 6.1.3 (=OO 4:242). Cf. Aquinas, ST IaIæ.12.1 and \textit{De veritate} q. 22, art. 13.

is evident when we note that the core cases of intention are cases in which we are considering how to achieve the end. From this distinction between the two aspects of the end, we can also learn that intentions can be only of ends that have not yet been achieved since an end that has been achieved has no need of being sought out via means. Willings, however, can also be of achieved ends.\textsuperscript{16} So willing and intention are not the same, according to Suárez.\textsuperscript{17}

As I noted at the beginning of the chapter, Suárez moves readily between talking of acting for the sake of an end and talking of intending that end. This might suggest that he accepts the following biconditional:

\textbf{B 1}: An action is done for the sake of \( E \) iff the agent intends \( E \).

But this cannot quite be right, since intention comes prior to action. Insofar as the normal sequence from an intention to action can fail, the biconditional fails. But merely taking intention to be a necessary condition is perhaps too weak. Nesting a biconditional under the assumption that the action actually came to be would make a stronger claim, yet succeed at avoiding the objection just made:

\textbf{B 2}: If an action is done, it is done for the sake of \( E \) iff the agent intends \( E \).


\textsuperscript{17}Suárez does, however, conclude that it is probably the case that desire and intention are the same [DVI 6.1.8 (=OO 4:243)]. Perhaps this suggests that ‘desire’ is not a good translation for ‘\textit{desiderium}’.e
According to this claim, an intention is necessary for an action to be for the sake of something and the presence of an intention during an action is sufficient for it to be for the sake of something.

That may capture Aquinas’s view of the matter, but Suárez seems to think that the presence of an intention in the agent is insufficient for an action to be for the sake of the intended end. He does not spell out his positive view but he seems to think that the intention has to figure in the action’s etiology in a way that is not guaranteed merely by the intention’s presence.\(^{18}\) If we thought of the agent as temporally extended such that past intentions are attributable to the agent, it would be easy to see why Suárez would want to say that intentions attributable to the agent are insufficient for actions to be for the sake of the intended ends. Clearly, an agent’s actions are not for the sake of an end that she used to love but has come to loathe. But Suárez seems to be making a stronger claim, i.e., that intentions in some sense present in the agent at the time of the action may fail to figure in the action’s etiology. I will discuss this point further when discussing habitual intention. For the moment, I will just revise the claim about the link between acting for the sake of and intending:

\[ \text{B 3: An action is done for the sake of } E \text{ iff an intention for } E \text{ figures in the etiology of the action.} \]

Having the intention figure in the etiology of the action, of course, sidesteps the objection raised earlier concerning intentions that failed to give rise to action.

\(^{18}\text{See 2.4.2 (=O}O\text{ 4:24).}\)
Defending this account of intention would, of course, require further work, but this should suffice to give some context for discussing the particular kinds of intention.

### 3.4 The four intentions in Suárez

According to Suárez, ‘it is said’ that there are four ways that the human being acts for the sake of an end: actually, habitually, virtually, and interpretatively.\(^{19}\) He then goes on to talk about four different kinds of corresponding intentions. It is not clear to me how much Suárez’s discussion relies on earlier philosophers. The ‘it is said’ locution suggests that he is borrowing the fourfold distinction from others. Aquinas does not make the distinction (certainly not clearly), but of course the distinctions might well have evolved between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries so Suárez may be borrowing from some intermediate figure. If these distinctions were original to Suárez, then we could expect him to think that all of them have a significant role to play. But, as we will see, it seems that he may actually not think that all four ways are useful contributions to understanding human action.

On the other hand, Suárez is usually the consummate scholar who cites the views of many of his predecessors so the relative paucity of citations in his discussion of ways of intending is striking. Most of what references there are to Aquinas (to be expected in a work that is broadly a commentary on Aquinas’s *Summa Theologicae*)—and of Aquinas he com-

\(^{19}\) *DFH* 2.4.1 (=OO 4:24).
plains that he confuses his terminology and fails to make an adequate distinction.\textsuperscript{20} This might suggest that Suárez did not have much earlier material with which to work.

So much for what can be gleaned from Suárez himself about his sources. If we go back and look at other earlier discussions of intention, a few matters become clearer. Aquinas uses three of the terms (‘actual’, ‘habitual’, and ‘virtual’), but, as Suárez justifiably complained, it is not clear that he has a clear, consistent threefold distinction in mind.\textsuperscript{21} If we turn to Scotus, however, we see him complaining that a distinction between actual and habitual intention is commonly made as if it were a sufficient division. Scotus thinks it is not sufficient and recommends adding virtual intention as a third member, which he proceeds to distinguish sharply from the other two members.\textsuperscript{22} It looks as if Scotus’s distinction then becomes a standard one.\textsuperscript{23}

None of these earlier figures mention interpretative intention, however, and I have yet to discover anyone who does. It is, of course, entirely possible that someone does. Late medieval scholasticism is one of the least well-known periods of philosophy; inferring an absence of something merely from the fact that we do not know of its presence would be irresponsible. Durandus of Saint-Pourçain might be thought to come close to talking about interpretative intention, since he does on several occasions mention interpretative willing. But it appears—on first pe-

\textsuperscript{20}2.4.3 (=OO 4:24).

\textsuperscript{21}See Appendix A for more on Aquinas’s discussion.

\textsuperscript{22}Ordinatio IV, dist. 6, q. 6.

\textsuperscript{23}It is, for example, related by Gabriel Biel, Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, ed. by Wilfridus Werbeck and Udo Hofmann (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1984) liber IV, pars I, dist. 6, quæst. 1, art. 1, not. 3 (p. 226).
rusal, at any rate—that he has a quite different notion in mind for use in different contexts.\textsuperscript{24} Given that I have yet to find earlier discussions of interpretative intention and given that, as we will soon see, Suárez seems unsure about how to articulate what it is, I am tempted to think that he is introducing the notion. The temptation is only strengthened by observing the number of later works that refer back to Suárez when discussing the distinction. These citations suggest that Suárez’s discussion is seminal in some way.

I will, however, now leave this historical question aside and simply proceed to look at Suárez’s account.\textsuperscript{25}

### 3.4.1 A note on texts

Suárez discusses the fourfold distinction in at least three texts: \textit{De fine hominis},\textsuperscript{26} \textit{De bonitate et malitia},\textsuperscript{27} and \textit{De sacramentis in genere} (henceforth: \textit{DS}).\textsuperscript{28} The first two works were only published posthumously but

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{24} In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri IIII (Venetiis, 1571), II.30.2–3, IV.4.7, and IV.6.4. My thanks to Peter John Hartman for providing me with these references. Durandus also talks of interpretative deliberation (II.24.6).

\textsuperscript{25} Johannes Brachtendorf covers much of the same material in his paper ‘Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez’, 533–36, that I will be discussing in this section, but I will omit constant citations of his paper. Our readings of Suárez are by and large in agreement. The most notable difference is that I look at Suárez’s putatively inconsistent accounts of interpretative intention in several works, while Brachtendorf only looks at the discussion in \textit{De fine hominis}. The significance of that will become clear later.

\textsuperscript{26} 2.4 (=OO 4:24–25). This is the text discussed by Brachtendorf in ‘Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez’.

\textsuperscript{27} 6.5 (=OO 4:368–71).

\end{footnotesize}
are based on lectures that Suárez gave in the 1580s in Rome, while DS was first published in 1595.

The context in which the distinction appears is different in each case. In DFH, he is asking in how many ways the will of a human being acts for the sake of an end. In DBM, he is asking what kind of relation to the end is required for an interior act of the will to have the goodness that comes from having a good end. Finally, in DS, he is asking what sort of intention a priest needs to have in order to confect a sacrament. To borrow some terminology from J. L. Austin, the latter is a question akin to asking about the felicity conditions for a class of performatives.\textsuperscript{29} This variety of contexts shows that this is supposed to be a theoretically useful distinction; it is not merely a post hoc fix to a particular problem.

The three accounts do pose a problem for readers. While all three texts provide similar accounts of the first three kinds of intention (actual, habitual, and virtual), they diverge in their treatments of interpretative intention. In fact, each account looks incompatible with each of the other two. So in the following discussion I will focus on the DFH account for the first three kinds (I think it is safe to do so in these cases), but will take each text in turn for interpretative intention (in this case I think it would not be prudent to rely on one text and assume that its account can be applied elsewhere).

\textsuperscript{29}Cf. Austin’s Γ.1 felicity condition (How to Do Things with Words [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975], 15).
3.4.2 Actually intending

Suárez does not say much about this kind of intention in the section on these distinctions, but some of what is required for an actual intention will become clearer once we see what is distinctive about the other kinds. Presumably the sort of intention that is in mind is the sort exemplified by the intentions we have in paradigm instances of deliberation followed promptly by the actions that are to help us achieve our intended ends, e.g., the intention to get a job that one has when deliberating about how to get a job and sending a résumé to a prospective employer. Here is how Suárez characterizes it:

It is called ‘actually’ when the will acts for the sake of the end because it is actually moved by the end, for which reason an actual cognition and thought about the end itself is especially required for this way of acting, because, unless it is actually apprehended, an end cannot actually move. Next is required an actual motion of the will, either to the end itself or to something else for the sake of it, because this signifies an actual action for the sake of the end.\(^\text{30}\)

This by itself is not terribly helpful, since the conditions identified sound rather like the standard story we could have gleaned from his discussion.

\(^{30}\text{DFH 2.4.1 (=OO 4:24): ‘Actualiter dicitur voluntas operari propter finem quando actu movetur a fine, unde ad hunc modum operandi imprimit requiritur actualis cognitio, et cogitatio de ipso fine, quia nisi sit actualiter apprehensus, non potest actualiter movere. Deinde requiritur actualis motio voluntatis, vel in ipsum finem, vel in alium propter ipsum, quia hoc significat actualis operatio propter finem.’}^\)
of final causation in Disputation 1 of *DFH*.\(^{31}\) First, cognition of an end is a necessary condition for final causation. Secondly, the way ends move is by drawing the will, by eliciting action from the will. In other words, in order for there to be an action for the sake of an end, the will has to move towards that end, and in order for the will to move towards that end, the intellect has to cognize the end and so present it to the will. So what we see in the above passage are just a couple of the minimal conditions necessary for action for the sake of an end. If the other kinds of intention fail to meet these conditions, then it is difficult to see how they have any chance of grounding a final causal relation. As we will see, Suárez does not think that they all will be enough to ground such relations, at least not directly. But neither is he willing to grant that none of them do.

His discussion of the other kinds of intention can help us see what else needs to be added to leave us with a distinctive set of conditions for actual intention. He also has a characterization in *DS* that helps us identify a further condition:

\[
[F]or [actual intention] consists in this, that a willing to make the sacrament is actually elicited at the same time that it is made externally.\(^{32}\)
\]

Here we have a temporal qualification: for an action to be done with an actual intention the intention needs to exist at the time that the action

\(^{31}\)In addition, one may consult *Disputationes metaphysicæ* XXIII for Suárez’s account of final causation.

\(^{32}\)DS 13.3.3 (=OO 20:250): ‘*consistit enim in hoc, quod actu eliciatur voluntas faciendi sacramentum, eo tempore, quo exterius fit*’.
is being done. If I form an intention to walk to the library but lose the intention by the time I get around to walking, I cannot be said to have walked with an actual intention. Furthermore, the intention should be understood to be occurrent at the time of the action rather than merely dispositional.

Given what we have seen so far, we might posit the following as a provisional characterization of acting with an actual intention:

An agent performs an action \( A \) with an **actual intention** for an end \( E \) iff (i) she occurrently intends \( E \) (ii) at the time she performs \( A \).

For (i) to be true, of course, it has to be the case that the will aims at an end (otherwise, there we be no intention of any sort) and that the intellect cognizes the end (since this is a prerequisite for the will to do its work).\(^{33}\)

A natural thought to have at this point is that Suárez is contrasting an occurrent mental state with a dispositional state. Occurrent mental states are often thought of as mental states of which we are aware at the time that they are occurrent. For example, I have the dispositional belief that a pair of variables can be positively correlated in each of multiple populations even though they are negatively correlated in the aggregated populations (a fact known as the Simpson’s Paradox). Occasionally—for example, when *The Guardian* publishes a silly piece by a Member of Parliament alleging rampant racial discrimination in

\(^{33}\)The similarity of this account with the CE 1 from Section 2 should be apparent.
Oxford admissions and betraying ignorance of Simpson’s Paradox along the way—my dispositional belief becomes occurrent and I am aware of having it. It is, however, not clear that this awareness is essential to a mental state being occurrent, though it is easy to slide into thinking of occurrent mental states as ones of which we are aware.

But perhaps what Suárez has in mind with his emphasis on ‘actual’ cognition and ‘actual’ willing is that actual intention is an intention of which we are aware at the time of acting. Perhaps in the other cases we will have intentions that are operative but of which we are not aware. This might seem like a plausible story to tell in the case that Aquinas raises of someone on a journey who is not thinking of the destination at every step along the way. The traveler intends to get to the destination, to be sure, but is just no longer aware of the intention, i.e., is not directing conscious attention to it.

There is, however, also reason not to go with this story. First of all, recall that intention is an act of the will. An act of the intellect is a prerequisite for acts of the will, to be sure, but intention itself for all that belongs to the will. Awareness, however, is an act of the intellect; presumably, this is true even in cases where the awareness is of acts of the will. It would seem somewhat odd, then, if distinguishing different kinds of intention hinged on the presence or absence of acts in another faculty. Secondly, Suárez explicitly recognizes the possibility of intentions being present without giving them sufficient attention to

---

allow us to notice or recall their presence.\textsuperscript{35} Thirdly, there are other contexts in which a division between actual and virtual acts are made where it is explicitly recognized that we might not be aware of the actual acts. For example, Cajetan distinguishes between actual and virtual deliberation and then subdivides actual deliberation into perceptible and imperceptible.\textsuperscript{36} Suárez knows Cajetan’s work well and cites this very passage.\textsuperscript{37} Finally, when discussing prayer, Suárez first asks whether a certain kind of intention is necessary for the utterance of words to count as prayer and then, having answered affirmatively, he asks in the next question whether attention is necessary.\textsuperscript{38} He gives no indication of finding these two questions entangled with each other. This is not surprising if he is thinking of the first question as strictly about an act of the will and the second as strictly about an act of the intellect. It would be more surprising, however, if resolving the first question requires encroaching on the subject of the second question.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35}DS 13.3.5 (=OO 20:252): ‘It is responded that that attention is very weak and relaxed, and does not include the reflection by which we notice that we will or attend. And, for that reason, although it really is there, as the external effect proves, we, nevertheless, do not experience it in itself while it remains nor can we recall it after it is completed nor can we discern whether we had it’ (‘Respondetur, illam attentionem esse valde debilem et remissam, et non includere reflexionem, qua advertamus, nos attendere aut velle; et ideo, licet revera sit, ut exterior effectus probat, nos tamen illam in se non experimur, quamdui durat, nec, postquam transacta est, recordari aut dijudicare possumus, an illam habuerimus.’).

\textsuperscript{36}Summa Totius Theologiae S. Thomæ de Aquino. IIaIIæ.88.1. The text of Cajetan’s commentary is often most easily available by consulting the Leonine edition of Aquinas which includes it. Barnwell discusses this passage in The Problem of Negligent Omissions, 228–29.

\textsuperscript{37}DVI 4.3.12 (=OO 4:227).

\textsuperscript{38}De Religione, t. IV, lib. 3, cap. 3–4 (=OO 14:222–30). His answer to the latter question is that humans cannot help but be distracted sometimes, so either attention or the intention to attend will suffice. Willing inattention, however, is fatal.

\textsuperscript{39}I am not suggesting that the terms ‘attention’ and ‘awareness’ are interchangeable. I take it that ‘attention’ suggests a focus on an object that is stronger than mere awareness of it. Still, they seem to be related notions.
It might be objected, however, that the passage of Aquinas in which he raises the traveler case talks explicitly of considering (cogitare), i.e., of an act of the intellect. A key premise in the objection to Aquinas is that we are not always considering the ultimate end and Aquinas’s response relies on denying the necessity of always considering an end for whose sake an agent acts. Since that passage is the locus classicus of this discussion and since Suárez is well aware of the passage, is that not good reason to think that it is conscious awareness that is at issue here, the reasons of the previous paragraph notwithstanding? I am not sure that it is. Note that the claims are about consideration of the ultimate end. Consideration of the ultimate end entails awareness of the ultimate end but it need not entail awareness of the consideration or awareness of an intention.\textsuperscript{40} Hence it seems to me that we still have the possibility of an actual intention the having of which we are not aware.

I do not claim my case to be decisive, but I think it would be best to try to find an account of the distinction between the different kinds of intention that does not hinge on awareness of having the intention and to allow for the possibility that Suárez thinks that some actual intentions might go unnoticed by the agents having them. Our mental lives are complex affairs: why should there not be cases where our cognitive and appetitive faculties are actually engaged but without a further reflective act whereby we are aware that they are?

\textsuperscript{40}One might also wonder why Aquinas thought that he had to give up on actual intention in cases where one is no longer considering the end. Consideration of the end might be necessary for the intention to form, but is it obvious that the intention, once formed, could not persist even though consideration cease? But, for whatever reason, neither Aquinas nor Suárez pursue this option (though I suppose one could try reading the virtus that is left behind in the case of virtual intention as an intention in the will that is just no longer accompanied by cognition).
3.4.3 Habitually intending

Suárez starts his discussion of habitual action for an end by noting that there are different explanations of this kind of acting.\(^{41}\) He also complains that Aquinas seems to talk about this way of acting, but fails to sufficiently distinguish it from other ways (as we saw, Suárez has reason to raise this complaint).\(^{42}\) Given that Suárez makes these observations, one might expect him to provide a clear account of habitual intention so as to clear up these difficulties. But he is not as clear as he might be. I suspect that this is because he inherits this member of the division from his predecessors, but is not convinced of its usefulness, at least for his purposes. I will say more about this later.

I noted earlier that Scotus takes the distinction between actual and habitual intention to be the common distinction. Taking this as our clue, we might infer that this twofold division came first and, further, that it is simply the widespread division between occurrent acts and habits or dispositions. An agent can have an occurrent intention to an end and she can have a disposition or inclination to form such occurrent intentions. Insofar as we are familiar with this distinction from a range of other applications, it is not surprising that it occurred to moral psychologists to make the distinction with respect to intention. I take both of the alternative accounts of habitual intention that Suárez mentions to be variations of this one.\(^{43}\) Ignoring the variations for the moment,

\(^{41}\)DFH 2.4.2 (=OO 4:24).
\(^{42}\)DFH 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24).
\(^{43}\)If they are variations of what is fundamentally the same account, it is not surprising that in most contexts where habitual intention comes up, Suárez does not bother to distinguish between the two variations.
we can posit the following as our characterization of habitual intention:

An agent performs action $A$ with a **habitual intention** for an end $E$ iff at the time she performs $A$: (i) she is disposed to form an actual intention for $E$ but (ii) does not actually or virtually intend $E$.

On one variant account of habitual action, what is supposed to be happening is that the person acting has inclined herself or her will to some end but performs an action for a different end:

But not everyone explains in the same way what acting habitually is. Some explain it by reason of a certain attendance of a habit attending the action to the same things by the will or subject, so that it is said that a human acts habitually on account of some end when he acts on account of some object while retaining a habit inclining to another end, although the relation of this habit in no way ends in action of this kind nor refers it to the end of these, but only [refers] the human or acting will itself. . . . It is explained by example: for in this way it is commonly said that the just person, even while he sins venially, habitually acts for the sake of God, not because the work of sin itself is referred by that to God, but because at the same time with that work he retains a habitual relation of the person himself or the will to God as ultimate end and because the work by itself does not exclude this relation. And in the same way the infidel who habitually has an idol for the end,
even while he performs an honest work of justice and mercy,
is said to act habitually for the sake of the idol.\textsuperscript{44}

It is a crucial feature of this account that the action itself is not ordered to the former end, i.e., to the end to which the agent is ordered. Furthermore, it is crucial to this variant account that the action is not suitable to be so ordered. The standard example is of the just person who sins venially. The idea is that the just person has ordered herself to God but, nevertheless commits a venial sin. The action of sinning is itself not actually ordered to God nor is it a suitable action to be ordered to God. But, so the story goes, the just person still carries the habit that orders her to God. For that reason, we can say that the act of sinning was habitually done for the sake of God. As Brachtendorf parses this, the will of the just person still has a fundamental orientation to God, even though that orientation fails to find expression in the act of sin.\textsuperscript{45}

Suárez thinks that Aquinas had this sort of habitual intention in mind in \textit{Summa Theologiæ} IaIIæ.88.1 ad 2 and IaIIæ.24.10. Given the lack of detail in Aquinas’s account, it is hard to tell if this attribution is right.

\textsuperscript{44}\textit{DFH} 2.4.2 (=OO 4:24): ‘\textit{Quid vero sit operari habitualiter, non omnes eodem modo exponunt: aliqui hoc explicant ratione cujusdam concomitantiae habitus concomitantis operationem in eadem voluntate seu subjecto, ita ut dicatur homo operari habitualiter propter aliquem finem, quando operatur propter aliquod objectum retinendo habitum inclinantem ad alium finem, quamvis relatio hujus habitus nullo modo cadat in hujusmodi operationem, nec referat illam in horum finem, sed solum ipsum hominem seu voluntatem operantem. \ldots quad exemplo explicatur: nam hoc modo dici solet justus, etiam dum venialiter peccat, habitualiter operari propter Deum, non quia ipsum opus peccati ab eo referatur in Deum, sed quia simul cum illo opere retinet habitualem relationem ipsius personae, vel voluntatis in Deum ut finem ultimum, et quia opus ex se non excluding habet relationem, atque eodem modo infidelis, qui habitualiter habet idolum pro fine, etiam dum facit opus honestum justitiae et misericordiae, dicetur habitualiter operari propter idolum.’

\textsuperscript{45}‘Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez’, 533: ‘Der sündige Gerechte handle zwar nicht aktuell, aber doch habituell im Blick auf Gott, insofern die grundsätzliche Ausrichtung des Willens auf Gott in ihm bestehen bleibe, auch wenn sie die konkrete Handlung nicht bestimme’. 111
Suárez, however, deems this variation irrelevant for talking about action on grounds that the habitual relation in question fails even to have the action as one of its terms. That is, the habit only relates the person or the person’s will to God, rather than relating the action to God:

From these examples and from the matter itself it is clear that this way is very improper, because . . . this habitual relation does not end in the work itself, because neither through the present act nor through some preceding [act] is an action of this kind referred to that end, nor does it take some entity, either a physical or moral property, from that. Indeed, in no way is it sometimes referable to that end, as is clear concerning the venial [sin]. Therefore, that entire habitual relation [is] of the subject alone. Hence, it is better to say that he acts with a habitual relation to such an end than that he acts, strictly speaking, for the sake of such an end.46

Suárez thinks it would be better to say that the person commits a sin while having a habitual relation to God rather than saying that the action itself was habitually done for the sake of God.

Suárez’s criticism here might be thought puzzling. As he presents it, the crucial problem with habitual intention is that it is the person that

46DFH 2.4.2 (=O0 4:24): ‘Ex quibus exemplis et ex re ipsa constat hunc modum esse valde improprium, quia . . . hæc habitualis relatio non cadit in ipsum opus, quia nec per actum præsentem, nec per aliquem præcedentem refertur hujusmodi actus in il- lum finem, nec ab illo sumit aliquam entitatem, vel proprietatem physicam, vel moralem: imo nullo modo interdum referibilis est in illum finem, ut constat de veniali: ergo tota illa relatio habitualis solius subjecti, unde potius potest dici operari cum relatione habituali ad talem finem, quam operari proprie propter talem finem.’
is the subject of the relation rather than the action. But this seems to be true of actual intention as well. The person, not the action, actually intends the end. So why the problem with habitual intention? I take the problem to be that a habitual intention does not figure in the action’s etiology. That is the sense in which the action is not related to the end. Actual intentions, however, do figure in actions’ etiology and thereby relate the actions to the relevant ends.

Since the first account is problematic, at least for present purposes, Suárez says ‘this habitual relation is explained in another way’.\(^{47}\) It is not entirely clear, though, whether Suárez is just reporting the motivation for the second account or whether he is himself affirming it.

Initially it appears that the second account says that there is something remaining from a previous act that serves to relate the current action to the same end:

Therefore, this habitual relation is explained in another way, since it is thought to be something remaining from another preceding act, through which that work either in particular or at least under a generality is related to such an end, although when that work happens the preceding act or relation in no way is, neither actually nor in some force (so that having that left it could through it influence the work), but merely habitually. This is because that intention, once a habit, was not retracted, as, for example, someone who had referred at the end of the morning every work of God to God, but afterwards in

\(^{47}\)DFH 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24).
thinking of God he does something referable of itself to God, yet without that memory of his prior intention and without any actual or virtual influx, then that human being is said to act habitually on account of God, on account of a remaining relation of habit having been held from a prior intention and not having been retracted.\textsuperscript{48}

On this account, the action itself is related in some way to the end, rather than only the person being related to the end as with the previous account. The idea seems to be that if one forms an intention for an end, then something of that intention can remain as long as the intention is not retracted. Suárez uses the example of someone who in the morning intends to perform every work for the glory of God but who during the day acts without any thought of her former intention or of God. Notice that her subsequent actions are supposed to be consonant with her original intention; this is what distinguishes this case from the previous one of the just person who sins. The thought then is that despite the fact that the intention formed in the morning no longer causally contributes to the actions, we can still say that her actions are done for the glory of God, thanks to the habit left from the prior intention. It is important, however, to see that what remains is a habit rather than force (\textit{virtus}),

\textsuperscript{48}DFH 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24): ‘\textit{Alio ergo modo explicatur hac relatio habitualis, quando censetur relicta ex aliquo actu præcedenti, per quem illud opus vel in particulari, vel saltem sub generalitate relatum est in talem finem, licet quando fit illud opus præcedens actus, seu relatio, nullo modo sit nec actualiter, nec in aliqua virtute, quam reliquerit, ut per eam influat in opus, sed mere habitualiter, quia illa intentio semel habita, retractata non fuit, ut verbi gratia, retulit quis summo mane omnia opera Dei in Deum, postea vero in discursu Dei operatur aliquid referibile de se in Deum, tamen sine illa memoria prioris intentionis, et sine ullo influxu actuali, vel virtuali, tunc dicitur ille homo habitualiter operari propter Deum, propter relationem habitu relictam ex priori intentione habita, et non retractata.’
since otherwise this account would collapse into the account of virtually acting for an end.

So habitually acting for an end is distinct from actually acting for an end because there is no actual intention at the time of the action. It is distinct from virtually acting for an end because there is no remaining force from the prior intention. Rather, what remains is a habit. Furthermore, in this variant of acting with habitual intention the subsequent actions in which we are interested are ones consonant with the habitual intention.⁴⁹

Suárez thinks that this variant account of habitual intention also fails to do what is needed:

For in this way of which we are talking now the end . . . [does not] virtually influence, because we also suppose that nothing remains in the human from the prior intention that now relates to the present action, but he holds himself in such a way in his way of acting and [would even] if the prior act had not preceded.⁵₀

---

⁴⁹ Suárez goes on to cite two passages from Aquinas in which he thinks that Aquinas may have this sort of acting in mind. Both citations are odd. As we saw earlier, in ST IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3 Aquinas clearly says that the force from the first intention remains. But then it would be a case of virtual intention on Suárez’s account, not habitual intention. The other citation is perhaps even more odd: Disputed Questions on the Virtues (henceforth: QDV) q. 2, art. 11, ad 2. For in ad 2, Aquinas explicitly makes the distinction between actual and virtual action. Habitual action only comes up in the following solution, i.e., ad 3. It is odd both that Suárez would cite the place where Aquinas does explicitly distinguish between virtual and habitual action when he is complaining about Aquinas not making a satisfactory distinction—less surprising would have been if he had pointed out Aquinas’s apparent inconsistency from one work to the next in using the terms—and that he then cites the passage in which Aquinas talks about virtually acting rather than the one about habitually acting.

⁵₀ DFH 2.4.3 (=OO 4:24–25): nam in hoc modo, de quo nunc agimus, finis nec actu influit, quia, ut supponimus, nec actu cogitatur, nec actu movet; nec etiam virtualiter
Here Suárez seems to be saying here that with a habitual relation nothing remains of the prior intention that could refer the present action to the end.\footnote{This is a claim that he makes about habitual intention in a number of places.} But before he seemed to say just that, namely, that something did remain ‘through which that work either in particular or at least under a generality is related to such an end’, just not the intention’s virtus. This might look like a contradiction, but I think the better way to read the passage is to read the initial statement as a promise of what this variant account is supposed to provide. Suárez then argues that the promise cannot be fulfilled, since the habit either fails to relate the action to the end or, if it does so, it has to do so either via an act of will or via some remaining force and so would collapse into either actual or virtual intention.\footnote{Note the difference between saying that something remains and saying that something remains that relates the action to an end. Something does remain in the case of habitual intention, i.e., a habit, but Suárez denies that it relates actions to the originally intended end.}

Suárez ends the DFH discussion of habitual intention by expressing scepticism about whether habitual intention confers any value to actions.\footnote{This is of a piece with that he says about habitual intention in a variety of contexts. He does not think that it suffices for connecting an action to an end,\footnote{DFH 2.4.2–3 (=OO 4:24–25).} for confecting a sacrament,\footnote{DS 13.3.3 (=OO 20:250).} or for ensuring that uttered words count as prayer.\footnote{De Religione, t. IV, lib. 3, cap. 3, n. 6 (=OO 14:223–24).} In each of these contexts, he takes pains to argue that people are misguided who think that an appeal to habitual intention will do the needed work. Rather, if we need something weaker...}
than actual intention, we need to look to virtual intention. As he puts it elsewhere:

[A habitual relation] does not consist in any influence and true causality, but is merely extrinsic.\(^57\)

Virtual intention, however, does make a causal contribution.\(^58\)

Suárez does not—here at least—make the point, but it strikes me that there would be other contexts in which appeal to habitual intention would be relevant and useful. Consider the case of the just person who sins venially. If we were evaluating the person rather than the particular action, the habitual intention would be relevant. It is a good thing that the person is disposed to form just intentions, even if that disposition is not manifested in the current action. Of course, if the intention did manifest itself, it would no longer be a merely habitual intention but would have become actual. Still, the disposition is to be valued. But insofar as we are in contexts where we are evaluating actions to which a habitual intention did not contribute, Suárez is justified in being sceptical of appeals to it.

\(^{57}\text{DFH 3.5.4 (=OO 4:36): ‘Probatur, quia talis intentio, vel influeret actu, vel virtute in actus posteriores: neutrum autem dici potest: ergo nullo modo, omittò enim relationem mere habitualem, quia, ut supra dixi, hæc non consistit in aliquo influxu et vera causalitytate, sed est mere extrinseca.’}\)

\(^{58}\)I do not take the point to be that habitual intentions are causally impotent generally. Rather, the claim is that habitual intentions are only indirectly causative; the way a habitual intention would figure in an action’s etiology would be to give rise to an actual or occurrent intention which would then be the direct cause of the external action. When Suárez talks of acting with a habitual intention, he should be understood as talking of acting with merely habitual intention, i.e., as talking of a situation in which the habitual intention did not give rise to an actual intention and ipso facto did not causally contribute to the external action.
3.4.4 Virtually intending

Suárez provides a clear account of the general conditions for virtual intention (although some of the concrete details will prove a trickier matter):

About the third way of acting, namely, virtually, for the sake of the end, it should be noted that it is as if a middle between the preceding [two], because it neither requires actual influx for the sake of the end as the first does, nor entirely nothing as the second. But it requires some influx through some remaining force\(^{59}\) from a prior intention. But it is difficult to say concerning this way what this force is and especially for this way I suppose that it is necessary that actual cognition and intention of such an end have gone before, because otherwise nothing would be whence that force would remain. Next, it is necessary that such an intention is not retracted through a contrary intention, because otherwise this contrary intention would destroy the force remaining from the prior intention. Thirdly, it is necessary that some effect remain from the prior intention, so that the work which is said afterwards to come to be virtually on account of such an end proceeds from it in some way.\(^{60}\)

\(^{59}\)The Latin ‘\textit{virtus}’ has the merit of being cognate with the name of this kind of intention. The English term ‘virtual intention’ is the standard traditional term for this kind of intention and I have decided to keep it. I think ‘virtue’ would be a misleading translation for ‘\textit{virtus}’ in this context, however.

\(^{60}\)\textit{DFH} 2.4.4 (=OO 4:25): ‘\textit{Circa tertium modum operandi, scilicet virtualiter propter finem, notandum esse veluti medium inter precedentes, quia nec requirit actualiter influxum propter finem ut primus, nec omnino nullum ut secundus: sed requirit aliquem
Surprisingly, Suárez, who usually meticulously lists sources, fails to cite anyone for this account of virtual distinction, yet he evidently is closely following Scotus and Biel.\textsuperscript{61} Scotus introduces virtual intention by noting that the division between actual and habitual intention leaves an opening for a third member that is in some sense intermediate between the other two and goes on to provide an account that is largely the same as Suárez’s.

We can easily glean five necessary conditions from the passage quoted above for there to be a virtual intention. I take the conditions to be jointly sufficient:

An agent performs action $A$ with a \textbf{virtual intention} for an end $E$ iff (i) she actually intended $E$ at some point prior to performing $A$ and at the time of performing $A$: (ii) she no longer actually intends $E$, (iii) she has not retracted her previous actual intention, (iv) some force from her previous actual intention remains, and (v) this force gives rise to $A$.

The fifth condition was not explicit in the passage quoted above. It is worth noting, however, that my earlier point about intentions figuring

\begin{quote}
\textit{influxum per aliquam virtutem relictam ex priori intentione: difficile vero est circa hunc modum dicere, quid sit hac virtus, et imprimit sumo ad hunc modum necessarium esse ut praeecesserit actualis cognitio et intentio talis finis, quia alias nihil esset, unde illa virtus fuisse relicta. Deinde oportet ut talis intentio non sit retractata per contrariam intentionem, quia alias hac contraria intentio destruxisset virtutem relictam ex priori intentionem. Tertio, necessarium est ut duret effectus aliquid relictus ex priori intentione, ut ab illo procedat aliquid modo opus, quod dicitur postea fieri virtualiter propter talen finem.}'
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{61}Scotus, \textit{Ordinatio} IV, dist. 6, q. 6, and Biel, \textit{Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum}, liber IV, pars I, dist. 6, quaæst. 1, art. 1, not. 3 (p. 226). Suárez does cite both Scotus and Biel in his discussion of virtual intention in DS 13.3.5 and indicates his sympathy with their account.
in the etiology of the action seems especially necessary in the case of virtual intention, since there might well be many candidate intentions present at any given moment in an agent that would satisfy the first three conditions. There is no problem, presumably, with saying that there are many virtual intentions present in the agent. But obviously we do not want to say that any action undertaken is done for the sake of each and every of the virtually intended ends; condition (v) prevents us from need to say that.

The basic conditions for virtual intention are clear enough; the tricky part comes in saying just what the ‘force’ is that is left behind by actual intention. Although one gets the impression that Suárez is not entirely satisfied with any of the proposals on offer, his preferred story is that the force remains in the executive power, i.e., the power that executes the commanded action. For example, a priest may intend to celebrate the Mass—this is the same example that Scotus uses—but be distracted during the course of doing so such that he no longer has the actual intention. The executive power, however, retains the force of the earlier intention and continues to produce the relevant external actions until the sequence is completed. Even if the actions in the course of pursuing the end vary, the force of the intention is passed along as one action incites another.

In the DFH discussion, Suárez recognizes that cases where the executive power is wholly disengaged require a different story. To adapt

---

62 This impression is especially strong when reading his discussion in DS 13.3.5–6 (=OO 20:251–52).
63 DFH 2.4.4 (=OO 4:25) and DS 13.3.6 (=OO 20:252).
a case that Aquinas raises, consider a doctor who wakes up in the morning and begins to make preparations to go collect herbs for making a medicine. Suppose, plausibly, that he remembers that he planned to make medicine today. But making medicine is not his ultimate end—he formed the plan to make medicine when he had an actual intention to cure patients. Today, however, as he collects herbs, he gives no thought to curing patients. He does not repeat the deliberation that led from the end of curing patients to the more proximate end of making medicine. Rather, as Suárez would say, making medicine ‘is immediately represented as needing to be carried out without any profound motion or special consideration of either it or the end to which it is ordered’. Suárez does not think it plausible to attribute some enduring force in the executive power that remains through sleep and so forth in cases such as this. Rather, the will has to act to begin a new sequence of external actions. Suárez does not spell out how the force enduring from the previous intention should be understood in these cases, but he is, nevertheless, confident that such cases really occur. Elsewhere, he suggests memory as a mechanism involved in virtual intention; these cases seem apt for invoking memory as a means to restart the executive power.

We might wonder why we should posit these enduring forces in executive powers or memory. Why not just say that the actual intention endures in the will, although cognition of the end ceases. The thought is that even if cognition of the end is a prerequisite for forming an inten-

---

64 QDV q. 2, art. 11, ad 2.
65 DFH 2.4.4 (=OO 4:25): ‘…statim repræsentatur ut exequendum absque alta motione, seu speciali consideratione illius, seu finis, ad quem ordinatur…’
66 DFH 3.5.4 (=OO 4:37).
tion, the intention, once formed, can remain in the will while the attention of the intellect turns elsewhere. That Suárez does not recognize this possibility shows us something interesting about how he conceives the relationship between intellect and will. Biel is helpfully explicit about this matter. He infers 'an agent is not actually intending an end' from 'an agent is not thinking about an end' and then defends the inference on grounds that intention is an act of will and so, like other acts of will, cannot be present without an act of intellect.\footnote{Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, liber IV, pars I, dist. 6, quæst. 1, art. 1, not. 3 (p. 226).} Intellect and will are more inextricably bound together than would be suggested by the mere claim that the will cannot act without a prior act of intellect; rather, the will cannot act without a concurrent act of intellect. Suárez is less explicit about this (at least in the texts I am currently considering), but I take him to be in agreement with Biel. This is why we have to posit enduring forces in powers other than the will in cases where we no longer have cognition of the intended ends.

### 3.4.5 Interpretatively intending

We now get to the more mysterious fourth member. As I noted earlier, I have been unable to find any predecessor to Suárez who mentions interpretative intention. Furthermore, Suárez’s account is opaque and, to make matters worse, he appears to offer no less than three accounts of it, all incompatible with each other. His accounts of the other three kinds of intention stay more or less the same between \textit{DFH}, \textit{DBM}, and \textit{DS}. But each work offers a different of interpretative intention, accounts.
that are not even similar on the surface. I will focus on the accounts in *DFH* and *DBM*, but, for the sake of completeness, I will also briefly look at *DS*.

**In *De Sacramentis in Genere***

In *DS*, Suárez is asking what sort of intention is sufficient for confecting a sacrament. The particular case he is concerned about when rejecting the sufficiency of interpretative intention is the case of a drunk priest who says the words of consecration over some bread. This is supposed to be an instance of the familiar kind of case where an agent has voluntarily put herself in a position where her actions are no longer fully voluntary. We can call such actions indirectly voluntary and still impute moral responsibility on those grounds. So the priest no longer has his rational faculties about him, but, since he had them when he put himself into such a position, we can say that whatever he does while drunk is indirectly voluntary.

Suárez says that ‘there is thought to be’ a kind of interpretative intention in cases of indirectly voluntary action. He does not spell out just what these interpretative intentions are, but I take the thought to be that if an agent’s action is indirectly voluntary, then we can say that the agent interpretatively intended to do that thing. On this account, the priest interpretatively intended to say the words of consecration over the bread.

It is not clear to me, however, what is to be gained by saying that in-

---

68 *DS* 13.3.2 (= *OO* 20:249).
directly voluntary actions are accompanied by interpretative intentions. Furthermore, on this account of what they are, interpretative intentions do not seem relevant when asking questions about eudaemonism, e.g., when asking whether agents always intend happiness. Hence, I will leave this account to the side and focus on the remaining two accounts.

**In De fine hominis**

Each of the three ways of intending an end so far has posited a different psychological state. That is, the intentions were the kinds of intentions they were because of facts about the subject. As presented in *DFH*, the fourth way of intending seems to posit no new psychological state. Rather, the subject has an intention of some end and that end is by its nature ordered to a further end:

About the fourth way, which we call interpretatively acting for the sake of the end, it should be noted that sometimes the will intends some object in which the force of one’s consideration and actual motion ceases. Yet that intended thing by its nature is carried along and ordered to another end. Therefore, in this case the will is said properly and explicitly, as it were, to intend the end proposed to it. But it is said to intend interpretatively the more ultimate end to which the end intended in the former way by its nature is brought.69

---

69*DFH* 2.4.5 (=OO 4:25): ‘*Circa quartum modum, quem vocavimus interpretative operari propter finem, advertendum est, interdum voluntatem intendere aliquod objectum, in quo sitit ex vi considerationis et hujus actualis motionis; tamen illa res intenta natura sua fertur, et ordinatur in alium finem: tunc ergo voluntas dicitur proprie, et quasi ex-
It is a fact about the object, i.e., that it is ordered to a further end by its nature, rather than a fact about the subject that grounds an interpretative intention, though of course a fact about the subject—namely, that she has a proper intention—is a necessary condition for the interpretative intention. It is worth noting that interpretative intention seems to be contrasted with proper intention. It is not difficult to see why—when one learns about an interpretative intention, one is not really learning something new about the agent but rather is learning something new about that which the agent intended.

Suárez does not do so himself, but perhaps an analogy might be made with belief. Suppose we know that someone believes $p$ and $q$. Then we learn that $p$ and $q$ entail $r$. We might then say that the believer is committed to $r$, but in some sense, of course, we have not learned anything new about the believer. Rather, we have learned something about the objects of her belief.

Suárez himself uses the example of just action:

And in this way he who acts virtuously for the sake of the goodness of mercy or justice, thinking nothing of God or of another end, is said to act for the sake of God or for the sake of happiness and to satisfy that [statement] of Paul in 1 Cor. 10[:31], ‘Do all things for the glory of God’, because, that is to say, the *bonum honestum* itself that is intended is brought by its nature to God and is a means by which one is

*PLICITE INTENDERE FINEM SIBI PROPOSITUM: INTERPRETATIVE VERO DICITUR INTENDERE ULTERIORM FINEM, AD QUEM FINIS PRIORI MODO INTENTUS NATURA SUA FERTUR*. 
directed to happiness.\textsuperscript{70}

When someone acts for the sake of the moral goodness of justice, she interpretatively acts for the sake of God even if she neither has thought nor is thinking about God. Aquinas thinks that fulfilling St. Paul's precept requires virtual intention, i.e., it requires that at some point one have consciously ordered everything to God. Suárez appears to think that unnecessary. It is sufficient to act for the sake of ends that are ordered by their nature to God.

Unfortunately, Suárez does not elaborate on how it is that an end by its own nature is ordered to a more ultimate end. What exactly is the relationship between the two ends such that there is reason to ascribe an interpretative intention of one on the basis of an actual or virtual intention of another? Suárez provides several more examples elsewhere of ends that are ostensibly ordered by their own nature to further ends. For example, he notes that some philosophers think that whenever one intends two particular ends for their own sake, one always also intends an integrated good that unites the two particular ends. Suárez denies that one always properly intends such an integrated good. He grants, however, that we can always ascribe an interpretative intention for the integrated good.\textsuperscript{71} This example might suggest that an ordering by nature to a further end is based on a close logical relation, e.g., that when-

\textsuperscript{70}DFH 2.4.5 (=OO 4:25): ‘…et ad hunc modum is, qui operatur honeste propter bonitatem misericordiae aut justitiae, nihil de Deo cogitans, aut de alio fine, dicitur operari propter Deum, vel propter beatitudinem, et implere illum Pauli, 1 Corin. 10: Omnia, in gloriam Dei facite, quia videlicit ipsum bonum honestum quod intenditur, natura sua fertur in Deum, et est medium, quo tenditur ad beatitudinem.’ Note the homeoteleutonic omission in the Vivès edition.

\textsuperscript{71}DFH 3.2.5 (=OO 4:29).
ever one actually intends one end and actually intends another end, one interpretatively intends the conjunction of them.\textsuperscript{72}

But this will not account for all his examples. We already saw that he thinks that actions done for the sake of moral goodness are done for the sake of God. It is hard to see a similar sort of logical relation between moral goodness and God. He also says—I will examine this more closely in the next chapter—that any action whatsoever, virtuous or not, is interpretatively done for the sake of the ultimate end taken formally.\textsuperscript{73}

So what could explain the connection in all these cases? Might a causal connection serve the function? In that case, the idea would be that attaining the end of virtuous action also results in the attainment of the beatific vision.\textsuperscript{74} The attainment of two particular ends results in the attainment of an integrated good that contains both. But it is not clear that it makes sense to talk of the formal ultimate end in this way. What would be attained by achieving the aggregate of one’s ends would be that in which the formal ultimate end is realized, i.e., the material ultimate end. So it is not clear to me that a causal connection can be what Suárez has in mind.

\textbf{In De bonitate et malitia}

In \textit{DBM} we have yet another account of interpretative intention:

\textsuperscript{72}Perhaps the integration of two goods is something more demanding than mere conjunction, in which case more than mere logical relations would have to hold between one end and that end to which it is ordered by nature.

\textsuperscript{73}\textit{DFH} 3.6.2 (=OO 4:37).

\textsuperscript{74}A further question is whether this requires questionable theological assumptions.
[An interpretative] intention is thought to be when a human being is in such a condition and so disposed that if such an end were to come into his thought, he would refer his act to it . . . [A] similar disposition does not suffice for blame, for, as is often read in Augustine, God will not judge us for the things we would have done had these or those occasions come up or if such and such thoughts had been allowed to be stirred up in us.  

Recall that the previous characterization made a claim about the object of the agent’s actual intention, namely, that the object was such that it by its nature is ordered to a further end. The characterization here, however, does not appear to say anything about the object of an agent’s intention. Rather, we have a counterfactual claim about the agent, namely, that the agent is such that were she to consider the end, she would order her action to it. This characterization, unlike the previous one, sounds very much like the account from The Catholic Encyclopedia related in §2.  

It’s not too difficult to see how this might get applied in the case of the precept from St. Paul that Aquinas and Suárez worry about, i.e., that one should do everything for the glory of God. We might imagine

---

75DBM 6.5.1 (=OO 4:368): Prima ergo affirmat sufficere intentionem interpretativam, quæ tunc esse censetur, quando homo est ita affectus et dispositus, quod si talis finis in suam cogitationem veniret, actum suum in ullam referret. Sed hunc dicendi modum apud nullum scriptum invenio, neque habet fundamentum, aut probabilitatem, quia illa conditionalis nihil ponit in esse, imo nec cognosci potest, nisi a solo Deo. Item quia similis dispositio non sufficit ad culpam, non enim, ut sæpe apud Augustinum legitur, judicabit nos Deus per ea quæ faceremus, si hæ, vel illæ occasiones occurrerent, aut si tales cogitationes in nobis excitari permetteret . . . Boldfacing mine—it marks the text translated above.
that someone who has dedicated her life to God but then does something without having considered that particular thing in relation to God would be happy enough to order it to God were the thought to come into her mind. This sort of intention might also be thought a promising avenue to explore when thinking about the claim that we do everything for the sake of happiness. Most people do things often enough without actually thinking about happiness, but the counterfactual ‘they would have done what they did for the sake of happiness, if they had thought about happiness’ is no doubt often true in such cases.

One might worry, however, that interpretative intention understood in this way threatens to collapse into one of the other kinds of intention. If the intention is, for example, causally efficacious, i.e., standing at the source of some or all of the agent’s actions, then is it not a case of actual intention? Is it not genuine act of the will? On the other hand, if not, then what separates it from habitual intention? It is worth noting here how often we employ counterfactuals when talking about dispositions (e.g., ‘that vase is fragile—it would have broken if it had fallen’). Is it not apt to say that the person who has dedicated her life to God is disposed to or has a habit of ordering things to God?

76We might take the following sentence as some evidence that interpretative intention and habitual intention are rather close to each other: ‘[Actual or virtual intention] is not the same as an “interpretative” intention, which exists only as a disposition or habit of mind, and becomes actual if one thinks about [the end] . . . ’ (Robert J. Sanson, ‘Implied Simulation: Grounds for Annulment?’, The Jurist 48 [1988]: 751–52).
Relating the last two characterizations

Leaving aside the characterization from DS, we now have two characterizations of interpretative intention on the table:

1. An agent performs action $A$ with an interpretative intention$^{DFH}$ for an end $E_1$ iff at the time of performing $A$: (i) she properly intends (i.e., actually or virtually intends) $E_2$, (ii) this proper intention gave rise to $A$, (iii) she does not properly intend $E_1$, and (iv) $E_2$ is ordered by its nature to $E_1$.

2. An agent performs action $A$ with an interpretative intention$^{DBM}$ for an end $E_1$ iff at the time of performing $A$: (i) she does not properly intend $E_1$ but (ii) would properly intend $E_1$ if she were to think about $E_1$.

These characterizations certainly do not sound the same, but might they just be different descriptions of the same thing? It’s hard to see how. For example, suppose Suárez is right that just actions are such that they are naturally ordered to God, so that according to the first characterization a person performing just actions thereby interpretatively intends God. But we might suppose there to be atheists who perform just actions but who would quite emphatically not order those actions to God were they to think of God. It seems, then, that they would have the interpretative intention according to the first characterization but not according to the second. Or we might go in the other direction. We might suppose there to be possible cases where an agent would order an action to a given end but where there is nothing about
the end that she actually intends that is ordered by its nature to that
given end. For example, a devout Christian might be disposed to or-
der everything to God but be sadly misguided such that she regularly
commits reprehensible deeds. Suárez claims that virtuous actions are
naturally ordered to God; he does not claim that vicious actions are.

The basic problem is that one characterization talks about the objects
intended by an agent and the other characterization talks about the
agent’s psychological states and it is difficult to see why these two sorts
of things should be strongly correlated. Perhaps one strategy to bring
these into alignment would be to idealize the agent sufficiently. The idea
would be that if a proximate end by its nature is ordered to an ultimate
end, then an ideal agent would recognize that fact and so would come
also to intend the ultimate end. For example, the ideal agent would
recognize the connection between just action and God and so would
intend God were she to think of God. Perhaps this would take care
of the objection involving atheists performing just actions. But I am
not sure that there is anything in the text to warrant this ideal-agent
reading. Furthermore, it does not appear to do the work that it needs to
do. First, it does not address the problem of the devout but misguided
Christian. Second, it is not clear that it really addresses the atheist case.
The atheist who discovers that her just actions are naturally ordered
to God has two options in the face of her discovery: keep performing
just actions and recognizing that they are for the glory of God or cease
performing just actions now that she knows they are naturally ordered
to something not her ultimate end.
At this point, we should pause and ask why there are these different characterizations. Perhaps Suárez thinks that a fourth kind of intention is needed but he has not yet fixed on a fully satisfying account of it. As a result he tries one approach in one work, but, not really satisfied with it, ends up trying another one in the next work. Perhaps he heard objections to his DFH account when he gave his lectures in Rome and so tried a new approach when he gave the DBM lectures. This is, of course, all speculative, but it would be in keeping with the suggestion that interpretative intention is a new development in the tradition. An alternative explanation for the different accounts might be that he is actually not making just one fourfold distinction but rather is making three of them, each tailored to its specific context. The fact that the first three members remain the same in all three contexts suggests against this latter explanation, but perhaps not decisively. But on either explanation, it would be a mistake to expect to find a way to align the different characterizations. On the former explanation, one might still want to try to identify the common motivation behind the different characterizations.

In sum, there may not be any successful alignment to be had; and if there is, I have not discovered it yet.

3.5 Conclusion

I have presented Suárez’s fourfold distinction of intentions in some detail. Actual intention is the paradigmatic case. In contemporary terms, we might call it ‘occurrent intention’. A habitual intention for a given
end is the disposition to form actual intentions for that end, but without there currently being an actual intention for that end or any enduring force from a previous actual intention. Virtual intention shares with habitual intention the fact that there is currently no actual intention, but diverges from it in that there is some force (*virtus*) remaining from an previous actual intention that continues to result in external actions. So far matters are relatively clear. The fourth member, interpretative intention, poses more of a challenge, both because it is more difficult to see what the logical space that it is supposed to fill is and because Suárez seems to provide three quite dissimilar accounts of it.

I want to end by noting a few points about the post-Suárez reception of this fourfold distinction. In Scotus and Biel we find a threefold distinction. It is difficult to say whether the credit is all due to Suárez, but, certainly, after Suárez it is standard to distinguish between four kinds of intention rather than just three. I have seen dozens of ethics textbooks, lexicons, and the like from the 18th and 19th centuries that list the four kinds of intention and provide brief characterizations of them. Many of them direct readers to Suárez as a source of the doctrine; some are more or less verbatim excerpts from Suárez.

One thing I find striking is that virtually all of them adopt the counterfactual characterization of interpretative intention, i.e., the one from *DBM*. They do not even mention the other characterizations. One might have thought that if you had to pick you would pick one of Suárez’s other characterization as his official position. The *DS* account might have some claim in that *DS* is the only one of the three works that was
published during Suárez’s lifetime. But the DFH characterization might
be thought to have the strongest claim, on grounds that it comes in
the lengthier, ex professo discussion. Not to mention that if you were
reading Suárez cover to cover, that is the one you would get to first. I
have found one exception to the general rule that the 18th and 19th
century authors adopt the counterfactual account. Joannes Polman, in
his Brevarium theologicum, defines it this way:

> Interpretative intention is that by which someone intending
something is thought implicitly to intend something else con-
tained, attached, or subsequent to it.\(^{77}\)

Polman’s characterization also sounds as if the issue is something about
the object of an agent’s intention, i.e., whether something is contained,
attached, or subsequent to it, and so resembles the DFH characteriza-
tion. By and large, however, it is the counterfactual account that gets
picked up in the subsequent tradition. One would be curious to know
for what reason it became canonical.

\(^{77}\)Brevarium theologicum (Antwerp, 1686), 546: ‘Intentio interpretativa est ea, qua quis intendens aliquid, censetur implicitely intendere aliud: in eo contentum, annexum, aut subsequum.’
CHAPTER 4

ACTING FOR ULTIMATE ENDS

4.1 Introduction

In the last chapter we looked at the different kinds of intention that a rational agent might have towards an end. Suárez’s discussion of this matter in *De fine hominis* constitutes the last question of Disputation 2. This is no accident, since in Disputation 3 he turns to a series of questions about just what ultimate ends human beings can and do intend. In principle, we should be in good position to answer the questions of Disputation 3, since we have seen a taxonomy of ends in Disputation 1 and a taxonomy of intention in Disputation 2.

Suárez proceeds in an admirably logical manner in Disputation 3. He opens with the question whether it is necessary to posit any sort of ultimate end for agents, concluding, unsurprisingly, that it is necessary. He then asks several questions about the possibility of intending more than one ultimate end at once. This is followed by the question of whether it is necessary that a human being always act for the sake of a properly intended unqualifiedly ultimate end. Here, perhaps more surprisingly, Suárez denies that this is necessary. But he then asks—and this is the last question of the disputation—whether it is not still the case that all human actions are done for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end in some weaker sense. Here he answers affirmatively.

Given the admirable progression of questions in Disputation 3, I
shall follow the progression quite closely in this chapter, starting where Suárez starts and ending where he ends.\footnote{Johannes Brachtendorf discusses the same material that I am looking at in this chapter in his paper ‘Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez’, 539–50.}

As I noted, we \textit{should} be in good position to discuss the questions of Disputation 3, given the groundwork done in the previous two disputations. In fact, however, our position is not as good as it might be. We saw in the previous chapter that Suárez’s account of interpretative intention is not as clear as we might desire and in the chapter before that we saw that his account of ultimate ends is not as clear as it might be. But precisely those two notions play crucial roles in Disputation 3, so any unclarity with respect to them will infect the conclusions here. We ought, then, to keep in mind the different ways of understanding those two notions as we work through this material.

That said, we can perhaps take one of the characterizations that we discussed in Chapter 2 as the default for understanding the present Disputation. Recall that Suárez presents two ways to draw a distinction between less ultimate and more ultimate ends both in \textit{DFH} and \textit{DM}. Since the distinction in Disputation 1 of \textit{DFH} is obviously meant to be preparatory for the present Disputation, we are justified in focusing on it. Recall, further, that in \textit{DFH} he uses different terms for the two characterizations: ‘ultimate’ versus ‘proximate’ or ‘non-ultimate’ and ‘unqualifiedly ultimate’ (‘\textit{ultimus simpliciter}’) versus ‘qualifiedly ultimate’ (‘\textit{ultimus secundum quid}’). In the Disputation that we are turning to now, he consistently uses the latter pair of terms or one of the pairs that he suggested as equivalents (‘universal’ versus ‘particular’ or ‘pos-
itive’ versus ‘negative’). Given that fact, we may take the second characterization of the distinction offered in DFH as our default. That is, we should read Suárez as having this characterization in mind, unless we have reason to think that one of the other characterizations would make better sense of a given argument. The second DFH characterization is the one that I presented in the following way in Chapter 2, §2.7.2:

Something is an unqualifiedly ultimate extrinsically-defined end$^{DFH}$ iff everything else (that is loved or chosen) is loved or chosen for its sake.

Something is a qualifiedly ultimate extrinsically-defined end$^{DFH}$ iff at least one other thing (but not all other things) is loved or chosen for its sake.

In the following discussion, I will shorten the terms to ‘unqualifiedly ultimate end’ and ‘qualifiedly ultimate end’—still quite enough of a mouthful.

4.2 At least one ultimate end?

The first question of Disputation 3 asks whether we need to posit any ultimate end at all for human beings and their actions. Suárez immediately notes that a human being can be ordered to an ultimate end in two ways: extrinsically and passively by her creator or intrinsically and actively by a human being herself through an elicited act of will (and Suárez immediately notes the freedom of the will).
We might think that Suárez elides an important option here, an option that I would be tempted to call a passive but intrinsic ordering. Suppose the action whereby God creates human beings is directed to end X. Suppose further that God creates human beings such that they are by their nature inclined to end Y. For the time being we can leave open the question whether X and Y are actually the same end. It is clear that humans’ ordering to X is an extrinsic and passive ordering, in the same way that a tool that I make has an extrinsic and passive ordering to the end for which I make it. But what about the ordering to Y? It is not an end actively chosen by humans; rather, they seem passive with respect to it. On the other hand, the ordering does not seem extrinsic. The cause of the ordering is extrinsic, but that is not the same thing. The ordering itself seems intrinsic insofar as humans’ nature is intrinsic.

Suárez seems to lump together these two kinds of ordering under his first way, namely, extrinsic and passive ordering. He affirms that human beings are ordered to an ultimate end in the first way. He takes this to be obvious from faith (Revelation 1:8: ‘I am the Alpha and the Omega’), by authority (all philosophers who have discussed happiness have assumed this), and by reason. Some of what he goes on to say sounds like he has an ordering in mind that is analogous to the ordering an artifact or tool has to the end intended by its maker. For example, his opening assertion is that there is an end ‘for the sake of which human beings were made by the author of nature.’

\[\text{Cf. the familiar distinction between external and internal teleology in discussions of natural teleology.}\]

\[\text{DFH 3.1.1 (=OO 4:26): ‘Dico ergo primo dari aliquem finem ultimum simpliciter, ad quem, et propter quem homo institutus est ab auctore naturae.’}\]
rational grounds for this claim, he argues that humans are ‘in the world neither vainly nor by chance: they are, therefore, an effect for the sake of some end’.

But it is less clear that the ancient philosophical authorities that he claims on his behalf had this sort of ordering to an end in mind. We might think that what they had in mind is the claim that human nature is such that it is directed to some end or other. Suárez goes on to make the further argument that there must be an extrinsic, passive ordering to an end ‘because otherwise a human being would not by his nature have a fixed terminus in the following of which right reason could direct his actions, with the result that he would not be able to set up his own life rightly’. But surely the end according to which an agent should direct her life is the one to which her nature is intrinsically ordered.

While we might wish that Suárez had explained himself more clearly here, we can glean something from the discussion: Suárez must think there is a close connection between God making human beings for some end and the normative claim that humans should order their lives to that end. It is by no means obvious that a creature being made for some end always entails an analogous normative claim (imagine a malevolent creator making creatures in order to watch them be frustrated in their attempts to pursue their natural inclinations). But Suárez might be able to tell a plausible story about a benevolent God making creatures and imprinting them with natural inclinations to their ends in a harmonious

---

4DFH 3.1.1 (=OO 4:26): ‘Et ratio est facilis, quia homo nec frustra, nec casu est in mundo: est ergo effectus propter aliquem finem . . .’

5DFH 3.1.1 (=OO 4:26): ‘quia alias non haberet homo natura sua certum terminum in quem secundum rectam rationem operationes suas diriget: unde fieret, ut neque etiam posset recte vitam suam instituere . . .’

6I am focussing on Suárez’s discussion in DFH, but he covers some of the same ground in DM XXIV.
way such that the creatures achieving their ends and achieving that for which they were made come to the same thing.\textsuperscript{7} One would just like to see Suárez tell this story in some detail.

To be fair to Suárez, his focus in Disputation 3 of \textit{DFH} is on ends as intended by rational agents themselves, i.e., on the intrinsic and active ordering to ends. With respect to this kind of ordering, Suárez first argues against the universal claim that rational agents must always properly intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end. He returns to this issue with the fifth question; I will pass over it until I start discussing Section 5. Suárez does, however, affirm a nearby universal claim. He argues that human actions do require intending some kind of ultimate end. It just need not be unqualifiedly ultimate. The reason that some kind of ultimate end is required is that something must be loved or desired for its own sake in order to get the rest of the story of action off the ground. If nothing is desired for its own sake, then there is no reason to desire anything else either. Why desire $X$ for the sake of $Y$, if $Y$ also is not desirable for its own sake? If nothing is desired, then there is no reason to execute any actions. This is a familiar argument—well-known versions are told by Aristotle and Aquinas, for example—and Suárez accepts it. But it only establishes that something has to be desired for its own sake.\textsuperscript{8} The claim that there has to be some one end to which everything else is directed, i.e., that there has to be an unqualifiedly ultimate end, is a stronger claim that outruns this argument, since qualifiedly

\textsuperscript{7}Cf. Aquinas, \textit{Scriptum super libros Sententiarum}, IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3., especially qc. 1, co. Also see Suárez’s reference to the ‘inclination of nature’ at the opening of n. 3 in \textit{DFH} 3.1 (=OO 4:26).

\textsuperscript{8}Suárez considers several related regress arguments of this sort in more detail in \textit{DM} XXIV.1.2–8 (=OO 25:890–92).
ultimate ends can also be desirable for their own sakes.

4.3 Possibly more than one ultimate end?

Having shown that rational action requires intending at least one ultimate end of some sort, Suárez turns to the question of whether it is possible to have more than one ultimate end. There are three different pairings to consider, given the distinction between qualifiedly and unqualifiedly ultimate ends. I will follow Suárez in taking each pairing in turn. His answers are what we would expect on the characterization of qualifiedly and unqualifiedly ultimate ends that we are taking as default and so I will review them in cursory fashion.

4.3.1 Two qualifiedly ultimate ends?

Suárez first argues that an agent can intend two qualifiedly ultimate ends and choose the means appropriate for either. Thinking of some examples, e.g., an agent who intends both honour and good health and does things to achieve both, should make it clear that this is possible.\(^9\)

Aquinas might be thought to agree with Suárez on this point, since he has an article the conclusion of which is that one can intend two things at the same time. But Aquinas considers an objection that goes as follows:

\(^9\)DFH 3.2.3 (=OO 4:28).
1. Intention is the movement of the will to a terminus.

2. There cannot be several termini in the same direction of one movement.

3. Therefore, the will cannot intend several things at the same time.\(^{10}\)

In his response, Aquinas points out that the second premise needs to be qualified, because a single movement in a given direction can have multiple termini provided that the termini are ordered to one another. He then goes on to note that multiple things in reality can constitute one thing in thought. He uses the example of wealth, which is one object in thought, but which in reality is constituted by many things. As he puts it, both the acquisition of wine and of clothes are included in becoming wealthy. Though he does not explicitly say that this is the only way that an agent can intend multiple ends, the suggestion seems to be that agents can do so because they can bring the different ends together under some sort of further, aggregated end.\(^ {11}\)

Suárez recognizes the suggested implication, but resists it. He makes it clear that he thinks that agents can intend multiple ends without intending anything aggregated of them, anything they have in common, or any concept applying to all of them. He concedes that perhaps there is some interpretative intention for an integrated end (something he will discuss further later), but there certainly need not be any proper intention for an integrated end.\(^ {12}\) Suárez would respond to the argument that Aquinas considers by denying that the conclusion follows from the

---

\(^{10}\)ST IaIIæ.12.3 arg. 2.  
\(^{11}\)ST IaIIæ.12.3 ad 2.  
\(^{12}\)DFH 3.2.5 (=OO 4:29).
premises. Perhaps there cannot be multiple *termini* in the same direction of one movement, but what of it? The will can have more than one movement: one intention is directed to one end, another intention is directed to another end, and so on. In this way, an agent can intend multiple ends without running afoul of either premise of the argument.\(^{13}\)

Suárez argues, secondly, that an agent can pursue multiple ends via the very same means. Again, he appeals to an example. Someone given the choice between two medicines, each an effective cure, but only one of which brings delight, will choose the medicine that brings both health and delight. Such a person, then, chooses the same means—the delightful medicine—for two ends: delight and good health. Suárez notes, however, that although the external means, i.e., the medicine, is the same for both ends, there will be two distinct internal acts, one directed to one end and the other directed to the other.\(^{14}\)

### 4.3.2 Two unqualifiedly ultimate ends?

In Section 3 Suárez asks whether an agent can intend more than one unqualifiedly ultimate end at the same time. He goes through a number of variations of the question and considers several arguments for an affirmative answer, but, in short, the answer is that an agent cannot do so. The reason is quite simple: an unqualifiedly ultimate end is an end to which an agent refers everything—it is a sufficient good that completely satisfies an agent. If an agent intends more than one end,

\(^{13}\text{DFH 3.2.3 (=OO 4:28).}\)

\(^{14}\text{DFH 3.2.6–7 (=OO 4:29).}\)
each end must be a partial end since the agent would not be satisfied if one of the ends was left unattained.

For our purposes, this section is most interesting for what it tells us about how Suárez conceives of unqualifiedly ultimate ends. First, his argument here confirms that our default understanding is the correct one, since the other characterizations of ultimate ends that we considered in Chapter 2 would not allow this argument to go through. Secondly, it is in this section that it is most evident that Suárez accepts the traditional characterizations of one's ultimate end as a perfect, sufficient good that completely satisfies the will's strivings.

Two of the arguments for the contrary position seem rather unmotivated, but I do want to look briefly at the third argument that Suárez considers. There is a tradition of thinking that someone who sins mortally is turning from God as her ultimate end and placing her ultimate end in some created thing instead. The argument that Suárez considers here relies on taking the present ‘ultimate end’ to stand for an unqualifiedly ultimate end. It is not entirely obvious that that is the best way to understand the traditional position, but I will leave that matter aside for now. Suárez’s opponent then notes that someone can commit multiple mortal sins on behalf of multiple created goods. If in each such case the agent is taken to place her unqualifiedly ultimate end in the respective created good, then it looks like the sinning agent intends more than one unqualifiedly ultimate end.

---

15If an agent having multiple occurrent intentions at the same time sounds dubious, then consider the case in terms of virtual intentions.
16DFH 3.3.2 (=OO 4:30–31).
One way to respond to this argument would be simply to deny that an agent sinning mortally necessarily places her unqualifiedly ultimate end in a created thing. Suárez notes that Adrian of Utrecht (later Pope Adrian VI) takes this route.\textsuperscript{17} Adrian actually offers some rather compelling arguments for his view, but it seems not to have been a popular view and Suárez moves on by noting a list of authorities who insist that agents sinning mortally do place their ultimate ends in created things. This suggests that Suárez agrees with the rejection of Adrian’s view; indeed, he ends his discussion of the majority view with the statement that it is \textit{probabilis}.\textsuperscript{18} But Suárez is closer to Adrian than this suggests. He goes on to note that one can intend an ultimate end either properly (i.e., actually or virtually) or interpretatively. He thinks that Adrian’s arguments show that someone sinning mortally need not properly intend a created good as her unqualifiedly ultimate end. In that sense Adrian is right. On the other hand, the mortal sinner does interpretatively intend some created good as her unqualifiedly ultimate end. Against such intention Adrian’s arguments have no force, because there is no difficulty with saying that an agent has many interpretative intentions, even for unqualifiedly ultimate ends. It is consistent to say that an agent actually loves God more than, say, carnal pleasure and that she interpretatively loves carnal pleasure more than God.\textsuperscript{19} I will not discuss this point further at the moment, but it is worth keeping in mind for when I return to interpretative intention later in the chapter.

\textsuperscript{17}DFH 3.3.10 (=OO 4:33).
\textsuperscript{18}DFH 3.3.11 (=OO 4:33).
\textsuperscript{19}DFH 3.3.12–13 (=OO 4:33–34).
4.3.3 One unqualifiedly ultimate end and one qualifiedly ultimate end?

The last pairing to consider is of one end of each type. The question here should be understood apart from the possibility of intending an unqualifiedly ultimate end and intending some particular end that is a constituent of the unqualifiedly ultimate end—clearly, that is possible. Rather, the question is whether one can intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end, i.e., a perfect, sufficient good, and then intend an additional good that is not ordered to the former end. This might be thought obviously impossible. After all, the former end does not look like a sufficient good or like an end to which everything is ordered if the agent intends some further good.\(^{20}\)

Suárez does think, however, that something akin to that is psychologically possible. An agent can generally intend \(X\) as her unqualifiedly ultimate end and yet can, with respect to some particular action, intend \(Y\) where \(Y\) is not part of \(X\).\(^{21}\) This would be a failure to act according to right reason—Suárez notes a couple of times that the agent ought to order every action to the unqualifiedly ultimate end in recognition of its perfection and sufficiency. But agents can and do fail. Hence, an agent can place her unqualifiedly ultimate end in a good or collection of goods, recognize the good or goods as sufficient, but then in a particular circumstance be attracted to some other good and act to attain it without considering the fact that this conflicts with her unqualifiedly ultimate end.

\(^{20}\)DFH 3.4.1 (=OO 4:34).

\(^{21}\)DFH 3.4.4 (=OO 4:35).
ultimate end. This does not mean that she abandoned her intention for her unqualifiedly ultimate end. It also need not mean that she has an erroneous belief that this other good will contribute to attaining her unqualifiedly ultimate end. Rather, it just means that she sees something as good and acts for its sake without even considering these further matters.\textsuperscript{22}

This account is in keeping with two themes in Suárez. He often makes a point of noting that agents can act with minimal cognitive and deliberative work prior to acting. We will see more examples of that in Chapter 5. Secondly, he insists that seeing something as good in itself is sufficient to motivate the will to pursue that good (a point he made in Section 1 and takes up again in Section 5, which is where I will address it). It is not necessary that every good be related back to an unqualifiedly ultimate end in order to motivate the will. Given the sufficiency of qualifiedly ultimate ends to motivate the will, it is not surprising to see Suárez saying here that the agent can start acting for the sake of some good without relating it to her unqualifiedly ultimate end and thereby failing to recognize that the good in fact conflicts with her larger goals.

\section*{4.4 Necessarily one unqualifiedly ultimate end?}

In the last two sections of Disputation 3, Suárez returns to the question of what sort of relationship there needs to be between human agents and unqualifiedly ultimate ends. He already indicated in Section 1 that

\textsuperscript{22}DFH 3.4.5 (=OO 4:35).
he does not think that human beings always properly intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end. He discusses this issue in greater detail in Section 5. Having stated again that human agents do not always properly intend an unqualifiedly ultimate end, he asks in Section 6 whether it is still the case that all their actions are for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end despite the lack of a proper intention; that is, whether there is an interpretative intention.

There is a suggestive dialectical feature in the last two sections in Disputation 3. In Section 5, Suárez first discusses a view that ‘St. Thomas seems to favour’. He then goes on to reject that view and accepts instead Scotus’s view. He ends by noting that Aquinas’s statements should be interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with Suárez’s own view. This may be right, but we should be wary: Suárez typically refrains from expressing disagreement with Aquinas and is willing to jump through some hermeneutical hoops to make it look like he and Aquinas are in agreement. In Section 6, on the other hand, Suárez affirms a view that he claims to draw from Aquinas and defends it against an objection from Scotus. Given the defence of Scotus in Section 5 and the defence of Aquinas in Section 6, we can expect Suárez to try charting some kind of middle course between Aquinas and Scotus, a strategy he often likes to pursue.

\[23\]DFH 3.5.1 (=OQ 4:36).
\[24\]DFH 3.5.3 (=OQ 4:36).
4.4.1 By proper intention

Suárez divides the question of Section 5 into two: (1) Must a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end precede all actions of a rational agent? and (2) Once a rational agent has properly intended an unqualifiedly ultimate end, do all her subsequent actions stem from it? He calls the first the absolute version (is such an intention absolutely necessary?) and the second the hypothetical version (on the hypothesis that there is such an intention, what follows?).  

The absolute version of the question

Recall that in Section 1 Suárez distinguished between two kinds of ordering to an ultimate end: an extrinsic and passive ordering and an intrinsic and active ordering. Everything in Section 5 concerns the second kind of ordering, i.e., the ordering where an agent by an elicited act of will intends an end. Suárez already made one argument for a negative answer to question (1) in Section 1, by raising the case of someone who has just attained the use of reason, a case which is supposed to be a counterexample to the universal claim that rational agents must always act from a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end. The argument starts with a dilemma: either such an intention is necessary in and of itself or it is necessary as a prerequisite for the rational agent’s other actions. Suárez appeals to his libertarian account of the will to rule out the first horn: every determinate intention in this life is free.

\[26^{DFH \ 3.5.1 \ (=OO \ 4:35).}\]
at least with respect to exercise.\footnote{For more on Suárez’s libertarian account of free will, see Chapter 5.} But a necessary intention would not be free in a libertarian sense. So such an intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end cannot be necessary in and of itself. But is it a prerequisite for other actions? Again, Suárez argues that it is not. He thinks it is obvious that someone who has just reached the age of reason can start acting for the sake of particular ends such as health or honour before ever considering an unqualifiedly ultimate end. In fact, this is quite likely to happen since these particular ends are just the ends that an agent will already be accustomed to having as ends from childhood. And there is no reason to think this could not happen: particular ends are desirable for their own sakes—why should they not be sufficient for grounding rational action? Ends that have never been considered cannot be properly intended so it follows that an intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end is not necessary for the agent’s other actions either. Both horns having been ruled out, it follows that rational agents do not always need to act from a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end.\footnote{DFH 3.1.4 (=OO 4:27).}

When Suárez returns to the issue in Section 5, he spends some more time outlining the opposing view and its motivations. Suárez grants that Aquinas says things that sound very much like the opposing view, though in the end Suárez wants to interpret Aquinas in a way that does not commit him to it. Whether or not Aquinas held the view, some Thomists, e.g., Cajetan,\footnote{See his commentary on \textit{ST} IaIIæ.1.6.} almost certainly did, so I will refer to this view, i.e., the view that answers the question affirmatively, as the Thomists’
view. According to these Thomists, before an agent can start acting rationally, she must properly intend her unqualifiedly ultimate end such that this first intention can then give rise to her intentions for particular goods and thereby her subsequent actions. That is, all an agent’s intentions and actions are supposed to be grounded in a basic intention for one ultimate end. In Chapter 2, I noted that Suárez, surprisingly, omits the distinction between formal and material ultimate ends from his taxonomy of ends. But that distinction, of course, is one that the affirmativists will want to rely on. The claim is not the thoroughly implausible one that rational agents first sit down and decide just which goods make up their ultimate end, intend those goods, and then and only then start pursuing goods. Rather, the claim is the—still striking, but more plausible—one that rational agents first intend their formal ultimate end, i.e., something like ‘the complement of all my goods’ or ‘the good in general’ or ‘the perfect and complete good for a human being’.

Once this formal end is intended, the agent is prepared to identify particular goods as constituents of her formal ultimate end and thus as goods that she should pursue. Suárez recognizes that this is the claim and so, despite failing to take note of the distinction between formal and material ends earlier, he starts making use of the distinction when discussing the Thomists’ view in Sections 5 and 6.

Suárez rehearses three arguments for the Thomists’ position. Al-

---

30 We could ask whether these expressions capture the same thing. It looks like some are agent-relative notions while others are not.

31 DFH 3.5.1 (=OO 4:35–36). It is not entirely clear to me whether Suárez is thinking in terms of temporal priority here or in terms of some other sort of priority. It seems to me that Aquinas’s arguments require causal priority, but perhaps final-causal priority rather than efficient-causal priority. We are used to thinking of prior causes as also being prior in time, but that assumption can be questioned.
though some of the claims that are made certainly invite further analysis, I will present the arguments without much commentary. But it will be helpful at least to see which premises Suárez rejects. He does not explicitly spell out what he finds problematic in these arguments. After presenting an argument for his own view, he dismisses the arguments for the opposing view with the statement that they 'do not prove anything'.

But it is not too difficult to imagine the responses that Suárez might make. Here is the first argument:

1. The will cannot love an imperfect good except for the sake of a perfect good.

2. Any particular good, i.e., anything other than the unqualifiedly ultimate end, is imperfect.

3. [Therefore, the will cannot love any particular good except for the sake of a perfect good.] (from 1, 2)

4. [The will can love one good for the sake of another good only on the basis of an intention for the latter good.]

5. Therefore, the will cannot love any particular good except on the basis of an intention for the perfect good. (from 3, 4)

This is a reasonable elaboration of an argument that Aquinas makes for the claim that a human being desires everything for the sake of the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{32}}\text{DFH 3.5.3 (=OO 4:36).}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{33}}\text{DFH 3.5.2 (=OO 4:36): 'T]he will cannot love an imperfect good except for the sake of a perfect [good]. Moreover, any particular good you please is imperfect. Therefore, the will does not desire it except by force of an intention for a perfect and complete good' ('Fundamentum hujus sententiae est primo, quia voluntas non potest amare bonum imperfectum, nisi propter perfectum: quodlibet autem particulare bonum est imperfectum: ergo voluntas non appetit illud nisi ex vi intentionis boni perfecti et consummati').}\]
ultimate end:

First, indeed, because whatever a human being desires, he desires under the concept of the good. What is not desired as a perfect good, i.e., an ultimate end, must be desired as tending toward a perfect good, because the beginning of something is always ordered towards its completion, as is clear both in those things that are done by nature and in those things that are done by art. And for this reason every beginning of perfection is ordered towards completed perfection, which is through an ultimate end.\(^{34}\)

Notice especially that in the second sentence Aquinas explicitly affirms premise (1). Suárez also accepts (1), but only in the attenuated sense that he explains in Section 6, i.e., in the sense for which interpretative intention is sufficient. But let’s say he accepts it. In that case, he will point out that (4) and (5) both need to be made more precise. Is the intention in question proper, i.e., actual or virtual, or interpretative? If the former, then (4) is to be rejected. If the latter, then it can be accepted but (5) will only follow if the intention in it is also understood as interpretative intention. But if we go that route, then the conclusion is not to the point, since the present question is about proper intention. We can start to see here how Suárez will interpret Aquinas in a way compatible with his own views.

\(^{34}\)ST lIaIæ.1.6 co.: ‘Primo quidem, quia quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni. Quod quidem si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut tendens in bonum perfectum, quia semper inchoatio alicuius ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius; sicut patet tam in his quae fiunt a natura, quam in his quae fiunt ab arte. Et ideo omnis inchoatio perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem consummatam, quae est per ultimum finem.’
The second argument makes an analogy between efficient causation and final causation:

[J]ust as second efficient causes depend essentially in their causality on the influx of a first cause, so also particular ends depend on an ultimate [end]. Therefore, just as a second cause cannot act without the moving of a first [cause], so particular ends cannot move without the moving of an ultimate [end], because they do not move except by virtue of the preceding intention. Therefore, it is necessary that the intention precede in this way.35

Again, Aquinas makes an argument that sounds rather like this one.36 And, again, there might be a way of understanding this argument such that Suárez would accept it, but on that understanding the conclusion does not conflict with Suárez’s view. If first causes are causes at the beginning of series of efficient causes and ultimate ends stand at the end of series of final causes but there can be more than one series of each kind, each with its own first cause or ultimate end, then Suárez would accept the dependency claim. As his acceptance of the infinite regress argument for final desirability shows, he is committed to there being an ultimate end that gets the final causal chain going. Furthermore, he grants that the proximate ends and means essentially depend on that ultimate end. But this only shows that we need a qualifiedly ultimate

---

35DFH 3.5.2 (=OO 4:36): ‘Secundo, quia sicut secundae causae efficientes, pendent essentialiter in causalitate sua ab influxu primae causae, et ita particulares fines pendent ab ultimo: ergo sicut non potest causa secunda agere, nisi movente prima, ita non possunt fines particulares movere nisi movente ultimo, quia non movet nisi virtute precedentis intentionis: ergo necesse est ut hujusmodi intentio præcedat.’

36ST lalūe.1.6 co. Cf. Sent. IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 2, co.
end, not that we need an unqualifiedly ultimate end.

The third argument also makes an analogy, this time between the intellect and its first principle and the will and its first principle:

According to Aristotle, the ultimate end is related to desirable things just as the first principle to speculative things. But the intellect cannot assent to conclusions without assent to the principle having preceded. Therefore, neither can the will be brought to particular ends without an intention for the ultimate [end] preceding.  

Suárez cites Aristotle here, but we might plausibly take Aquinas to make this argument, too. Aquinas makes the analogy on a number of occasions and says explicitly that the cognition of the first principle in speculative things, i.e., the law of noncontradiction, is the cause of the cognition of all other things and that in the same way the desire for the ultimate end is the cause of other desires. Without seeing more details about how the story is supposed to go in the case of the intellect—is it really the case that the intellect cannot assent to conclusions without first assenting to the law of noncontradiction? what does that assent look like?—it is difficult to evaluate the strength of this argument. But one can imagine the general form Suárez’s response would take. Either the assent and desire/intention are to be understood in robust terms as

---

37 DFH 3.5.2 (=OO 4:36): ‘Tertio, quia, juxta Aristotelem, ita se habet finis ultimus in appetibilibus, sicut prima principia in speculabilibus: sed non potest intellectus assentire conclusionibus, nisi præcedat assensus circa principia: ergo nec potest voluntas ferri in particulares fines nisi præcedat intentio circa ultimum.’

38 Scriptum super libros Sententiarum IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, co. See also ST Ia.60.2 co.
real mental acts or in some weaker sense, e.g., as implicit or interpretative phenomena. If the former, then the argument is not plausible in either the speculative or practical case. If the latter, then it may be right but the conclusion is again compatible with Suárez’s own view.

We can get a better sense for Suárez’s view by looking at an additional positive argument he provides in Section 5. Recall that the question is whether a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end is necessary. Suárez asks where this necessity might come from and imagines three answers that might be provided: it comes on the part of the intellect, on the part of the object, or on the part of the will. His strategy is to argue that none of these options is plausible and so therefore we should conclude that such an intention is not necessary.\(^39\)

In the case of the intellect, the thought might be that if the intellect cognizes a perfect good, it necessarily moves the will to intend it. But, as Suárez is quick to point out, there is no reason to think that the intellect will immediately cognize the perfect or general good. Rather, given that the intellect tends to be excited by the deliverances of the senses, we would expect most agents to spend a good deal of time thinking about particular goods revealed by the senses rather than anything as rarified as the complement of all good. Besides, agents have since their infancy become accustomed to thinking about particular goods such as food and toys. Since the antecedent condition of the intellect cognizing the perfect good is not met, this is not a plausible source of a necessity claim.

\(^{39}\text{DFH} 3.5.3 (=\text{OO} 4:36).\)
As for the object, it does not stand any chance of grounding the necessity claim. After all, being cognized is a prerequisite for an object to be able to move the will and we just saw that there is no reason to assume that the object is always cognized.

So what about the will? Here we get to the crux of the matter (we might well take the Thomists’ arguments above to turn on this question). Suárez takes it as obvious that an object that is good in itself is desirable for its own sake and so is sufficient for moving the will. I think Suárez is moved by two considerations. One: the object is good in itself. What does that mean if not that it is suitable for initiating desire? If it is already good on its own, why would other goods have to be called in to get the will to respond to its goodness? Two: as we saw in the argument made in Section 1, Suárez emphasizes the power of the will as a free faculty. To deny that the will can elicit an intention for an object except by appropriately relating it to an unqualifiedly ultimate end would be to bridle the will.

**The hypothetical version of the question**

Someone might respond that Suárez has made a convincing case that a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end is not absolutely necessary. The case of someone just attaining the use of reason showed us that. But that is a philosopher’s quibble. Most rational agents are not on the cusp, but rather have been using reason for a good long time. So perhaps most rational agents have in fact at some point formed a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end. And maybe once an agent
has formed such an intention, all subsequent actions necessarily flow
from it. To say this would be to answer the hypothetical version of the
question affirmatively.

Suárez does not even grant this. This should not be surprising, given
what we saw in his response to the question about intending both an
unqualifiedly ultimate end and a qualifiedly ultimate end. He sees no
reason why an agent should not properly intend an unqualifiedly ulti-
mate end but then act for the sake of a good without in any way relating
that good to her unqualifiedly ultimate end. In what sense, then, would
that action have arisen from the intention for the unqualifiedly ultimate
end? Furthermore, he thinks there could be cases where the only time
that an agent considered her unqualifiedly ultimate end at all was so
long ago that no trace of that intention remains in her memory or oth-
erwise. Hence, it no longer exists in either actual or virtual form and so
cannot give rise to any actions.

Suárez concludes, then, that both the absolute and hypothetical ver-
sions of the question concerning proper intention should be answered
negatively.

4.4.2 By interpretative intention

Having answered the questions of Section 5 negatively, in Section 6
Suárez asks whether it might still be the case that all human actions
are done for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end in some way not
dependent on a proper intention for such an end. Before answering
the question, he refers back to his discussion of the different kinds of intention in the previous disputation and notes that the relevant kind of intention now is interpretative intention:

This question can be resolved most easily by first considering those things which were said above in disp. 2, sect. 4, concerning the various ways of acting for the sake of an end. For the way with which we are concerned now does not require the agent to have a proper intention, either present or past, but only an interpretative intention. An interpretative intention is thought to be contained in the proximate object itself of human action or will insofar as the object by its nature tends to another [object], either as a means to an end or as a part to a whole.  

Not only does Suárez refer back to the Disputation 2 discussion of interpretative intention, his characterization of it here in terms of an object tending by its nature to a further object is entirely in keeping with the characterization there as we saw it in our discussion in Chapter 3, §4.5.2. Nothing here suggests that Suárez is thinking of interpretative intention in terms of what the agent would have actually intended had she thought of it, as he characterized interpretative intention in DBM.

\footnote{DFH 3.6.2 (=OO 4:37): ‘Haec quæstio facillime expediri potest, suppositis his, quæ supra dicta sunt, in disp. 2, sect. 4, de variis modis operandi propter finem: nam hic modus, de quo nunc agimus, non requirit propriam intentionem ipsius operantis vel præsentem, vel præteritam, sed solum interpretativam, quæ censetur contineri in ipso objecto proximo humanæ operationis, seu voluntatis quatenus illud natura sua tendit in aliud, vel tanquam medium ad finem, vel tanquam pars ad totum.’}
We might raise doubts about how significant interpretative intention understood in this way is, i.e., whether it can ground an interesting claim about all actions being done for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end. After all, could one not reason analogously that an agent who desires a spouse must then interpretatively intend a million spouses, since acquiring one spouse is a means towards acquiring a million? Interpretative intentions seem too easy to come by. On the other hand, while the significance of the claim may be questioned, at least we seem in a good position to know which characterization of interpretative intention is at stake when Suárez answers the central question of Section 6:

Hence, it should be said, firstly, that a human being in all his actions, good as well as bad, acts in some way for the sake of a formal ultimate end by a natural connection between any object of the will whatever and such an end. This is how St. Thomas should be understood . . .

The answer in this case is affirmative: Suárez grants that all human actions are done for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end by interpretative intention. He also thinks that Aquinas’s claims about acting for the sake of the ultimate end should be understood in this way.

Matters quickly become more puzzling, however, when Suárez turns to arguing for his conclusion:

 dfh 3.6.2 (=OO 4:37): ‘Unde dicendum est primo, hominem in omnibus actibus suis, tam bonis, quam malis, operari aliquo modo propter ultimum finem formalem ex naturali connexione cujuscumque objecti voluntatis cum tali fine. Ita est intelligendus D. Thomas . . .’

160
Secondly, the reason is clear: a human being naturally desires a complement of all good. In his every willing, moreover, he desires at least a part of or some beginning of this good. Therefore, whatever he desires, he desires implicitly and interpretatively insofar as it contributes in some way to his complete good. And this is to love the former interpretatively for the sake of the formal ultimate end. It is confirmed and explained: because although an elicited intention for this end does not precede in the human being, yet a natural propensity to it does precede. And from this propensity proceed all acts concerning particular goods. Therefore, all [actions] tend to an end of this kind at least by an impetus of nature.\footnote{DFH 3.6.2 (=OO 4:37–38): ‘Secundo, ratio est clara, quia homo naturaliter appetit complementum omnis boni; in omni autem voluntate sua appetit saltem partem, seu inchoationem aliquam hujus boni: ergo implicitè et interpretative appetit quidquid appetit, quaternus confert aliquo modo ad suum completum bonum; et hoc est amare illud interpretative properi ultimum finem formalem. Confirmatur et explicatur, quia licet non præcedat in homine intentio elicita hujus finis, præcedit tamen naturalis propensio in illum, et ab hoc procedunt omnes actus circa particularia bona: ergo saltem impetu naturæ omnes tendunt in hujusmodi finem.’}

The line of argumentation here is surprising. We might have expected Suárez to identify some representative objects of human action and then go on to show how all these objects tend by their natures to the unqualifiedly ultimate end. That seems to be what is needed, given that—under the characterization provided a little earlier—interpretative intention relies on there being a certain relation between the object of an intention and some further end.

Instead, Suárez proceeds to tell a story about a desire for a complement of all good, about a natural propensity, and an impetus of na-
ture. This sounds like he is attributing psychological features to agents, rather than just saying something about the objects of an agent’s intentions. The natural way to read him here is as saying that human agents are fundamentally oriented towards their unqualifiedly ultimate ends. We might call this fundamental orientation a desire—he says here that humans naturally desire their complete good; elsewhere he affirms that human beings have an innate desire for happiness—but it should not be confused with elicited acts of the will. The reason, presumably, that there is no proper intention here is precisely because there is only a disposition here. The will is disposed to acts—wishings, willings, intendings, choices, and so forth—that have the ultimate end as their object, but the basic orientation itself is not such an act. And the last passage quoted suggests that this basic orientation is part of the story behind the will’s acts. That is, when the will intends some particular good, the will’s basic orientation is part of the explanation for that act of intention. This story is in keeping with the passages from Aquinas that Suárez cites; a story about a natural desire for the complement of good is more promising as an interpretation of Aquinas than one that just talks about objects that by their nature are ordered to the complement of good.\(^{44}\)

In the previous chapter, I expressed puzzlement at Suárez’s account, or, rather, accounts, of interpretative intention. Does the talk of natural propensity in the present context help us understand what he means by interpretative intention generally? Perhaps all interpretative intention relies on basic desires in the way seen here. It is hard to see, however,


\(^{44}\)Though some Thomists’ may want to insist on something stronger yet.
how this can help. In the present case, Suárez appeals to a basic desire when arguing for an interpretative intention. This raises a problem (what is the connection between the basic desire and interpretative intention?) rather than providing help. For not all cases where Suárez talks of interpretative intention are cases amenable to appeal to basic desires. For example, he says elsewhere that someone who sins mortally interpretatively intends the created thing for the sake of which the sin is committed as an ultimate end. But presumably Suárez would not want to say in all such cases that the agent had some sort of basic orientation or impetus of nature towards the created thing.

So I think it would be a mistake to find in Section 6 a general model for understanding interpretative intention. Rather, we should just take this as part of the answer to a specific question, namely, whether human beings can be understood to act for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end if not by a proper intention. The answer is that they act for it with interpretative intention and, in this case, that seems to involve a basic orientation or desire to the unqualifiedly ultimate end. This raises a question about what the connection is between this orientation and interpretative intention—I have no good answer—but the appeal to a basic orientation does help to address the earlier worry about how interesting an affirmative answer is. That human beings have a basic orientation towards happiness does tell us something interesting about them.

Suárez’s initial affirmative answer is about the ultimate end taken formally. He goes on to ask whether human beings also act interpreta-

\[DFH\ 3.3.12\ (=\text{OO} \ 4:33).\]
tively for the sake of the ultimate end taken materially. Curiously, he takes this question to be about the true constituent of the ultimate end, namely, God. The question could also be about whatever good or goods an agent happens to take as constituting her ultimate end, but Suárez does not consider that variant. With respect to God, he argues that all virtuous actions are interpretatively done for the sake of God, because all virtuous actions tend to God and are suitable means to God. The case of sinful actions is trickier. Suárez concludes, however, that even they in some remote, indirect way are interpretatively done for the sake of God, because they in some way represent an attempt to imitate divine perfection.

4.5 Conclusion

It is clear from Suárez’s discussion in Disputation 3 that he is cautious about accepting psychological eudaemonist claims that are too strong. He is wary both of restricting agents’ freedom and of over-rationalizing agents. He thinks that agents are free to adopt a variety of ends and to do so with fairly minimal cognitive processes. An agent can intend some particular end simply because it is good, or even just apparently good, without needing to compare it to other ends, without needing to place it in an elaborate scheme of ordered ends, and without thinking about just how it relates to her overall goals in life. Seeing it as good is sufficient. As a result, Suárez shies away from attributing a proper intention for an unqualifiedly ultimate end—or happiness—as a necessary feature of rational human agents. All that he is willing to grant is an interpretative
intention for such an end.

There are two other claims, however, that are not called into question at all and, in fact, seem to be assumed throughout the discussion. The first is that agents act for the sake of ends. Intending an unqualifiedly ultimate end may not be necessary, but intending some kind of end, either qualifiedly ultimate or unqualifiedly ultimate, is necessary. There is no suggestion here of moving away from a teleological conception of practical reasoning.

The second claim is that rational agents ought to act for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end. Suárez questions as a psychological matter whether agents always do so, but there is no suggestion that they ever ought not so to act. Rather, it is assumed throughout that a rational agent ought to recognize that her happiness is found in God and that her entire life ought to be directed to attaining God as her ultimate end.
5.1 Introduction

We saw hints in the previous chapter of the importance that Suárez places on the will's freedom. This chapter will focus on Suárez's account of the relationship of intellect and will and of the will's freedom. This subject is of interest in its own right and I will present it as such. At the end of the chapter, however, I will indicate some implications for understanding Suárez's eudaemonism.

Suárez's account of the will and its freedom in particular was widely influential. As one historian puts it:

If you argued for liberty of indifference in the seventeenth century, you were probably directly or indirectly following Suarez; and if you argued against it, you were probably directly or indirectly arguing against Suarez.¹

Suárez is a key source for early modern libertarianism, i.e., the view that at the time of acting the will has the power both to act in some way and to refrain from acting in that way.²

²Philosophical doctrines are often most widely diffused when adopted as dogma by religious groups. This might be true of Suárez’s libertarianism as well. The bitter disputes between Calvinists and Arminians in much of non-Lutheran Protestantism are well-known; less well-known is that Jacobus Arminius (c. 1559–1609) was often accused of being a secret follower of Suárez and other Jesuit philosophers (see Carl
Despite Suárez’s intrinsic merit as a philosopher and his historical importance as an influence on early modern philosophy, his treatment of the will has received virtually no recent attention.¹ My aim in this chapter is to start filling in our picture of Suárez’s views on the will. His position can be understood as a balancing act between the desire to attribute libertarian freedom to the will and the desire to maintain the will’s status as a rational appetite. That is, Suárez wants to say that whatever the will chooses, there was some reason for it to so choose.² For example, suppose I have good reason to go buy groceries today, but, being free, I choose not to go buy groceries. On Suárez’s view there must be something to say, some reason to provide, for why I chose not to go buy groceries. How much a libertarian can say is, of course, at issue.

¹Half a century ago, Thomas U. Mullaney set out Suárez’s view on freedom as a preliminary to criticising it from a Thomistic perspective in Suarez on Human Freedom (Baltimore: The Carroll Press, 1950). Unfortunately, his explication of Suárez is rather opaque. William N. Clarke provides a clear, succinct overview of Suárez’s account of free will in ‘The Notion of Human Liberty in Suarez’, The Modern Schoolman 19 (1942): 32–35. Clarke does not delve into the details, however. He also suggests that Suárez borrows incompatible elements from Aquinas and Scotus; I think incoherence is less of a threat, since it seems to me that Suárez borrows less from Aquinas than Clarke—and Suárez’s own language—suggests. A more recent Spanish article by Giannina Burlando presents Suárez as a libertarian working in the tradition of Scotus and Ockham: ‘Configuración psicológica de la libertad humana en F. Suárez’, Teología y vida 40 (1999): 31–48.

²Suárez, along with his contemporaries, constantly attributes actions to the intellect and to the will. Locke famously ridicules such faculty psychology (An Essay concerning Human Understanding 2.21.14–20), but I think it is premature to conclude that Suárez affirms some pernicious faculty psychology. That is, I take it that on Suárez’s view actions attributed to the will or to some other faculty are, for all that, first and foremost actions of the agent. So whenever he says that the will chooses something, we could instead say that the agent chooses something. But I will generally follow Suárez and talk of the intellect making judgements and the will making choices.
In particular, I will argue that Suárez holds the following four theses:

1. Human beings have libertarian freedom.
2. The will can elect\(^5\) \(x\) only if \(x\) has been cognized by the intellect and judged to be good.
3. An intellect’s judgement that \(x\) is good is sufficient for the will to be able to elect \(x\).
4. An intellect’s judgement that \(x\) is good does not necessitate the will to elect \(x\), even if the intellect has not presented any better option.

There is a potential tension between the sufficiency and necessity conditions in (3) and (4). The challenge for Suárez is to explain these theses in a coherent and satisfying fashion.

Before examining Suárez’s position more closely, I will provide some historical background (Section 2) by briefly characterizing the views of two predecessors, Aquinas and Scotus. Suárez’s account of the will illustrates his tendency to construct his views from elements borrowed from both Aquinas and Scotus. In Section 3, I introduce Suárez’s views on the freedom of the will and argue that he is, indeed, committed to a libertarian account. I then turn to a key negative part of his project in which he argues against intellectualist accounts that ground freedom in the intellect (Section 4). This is one area in which he sides with Scotus rather than Aquinas, because, as we will see, he does not think that the intellect’s judgements are free in the way Aquinas seems to think they are. In Section 5, I look at Suárez’s account of how practical judgements

\(^5\)On my use of ‘elect’ and ‘election’, see footnote 17 on page 8.
relate to the will’s activity as a way of coming to better understand his positive account. Finally, in the conclusion I briefly indicate some implications for eudaemonism.

5.2 Aquinas and Scotus

As I noted in the Preface, Suárez sees himself as continuing to work in the Aristotelian tradition as it was shaped by Aquinas, but is also often influenced by Scotistic lines of thought. Given these predilections, it will be worth looking at the views of Aquinas and Scotus before returning to Suárez. Two notes should be made first, however. (1) In what follows I will present Aquinas and Scotus as I read them rather than as Suárez reads them. This distinction is especially relevant in the case of Aquinas, because, as I noted earlier, Suárez tends to read Aquinas as holding the views that he, Suárez, holds even in cases where one might have doubts about the plausibility of this reading. The present case is no exception, so in order to see where Suárez diverges from Aquinas, we cannot rely on his interpretation of Aquinas. What his interpretation is should emerge in the subsequent discussion of Suárez’s own views. (2) At least some of my claims about Aquinas and Scotus are tendentious (though none should be novel). Still, I shall not try to defend them here since that would take me too far afield.

Let’s have a particular case of decision-making in mind for ease of exposition. Suppose an agent is presented with the option of going either to London or to Paris. She deliberates about the matter, considering
various reasons for and against going to either place. She concludes that both options are good, but that, on balance, going to London is the better option. Or, to use the scholastic jargon, her intellect judges that going to London is good, that going to Paris is good, but that going to London is the better option (she does not like finding out exactly how bad her French is). Now one of the crucial questions will be whether she is still free to go to Paris once she has made that judgement.

5.2.1 Aquinas

On Aquinas’s view, what makes the will a rational faculty is that it is determined by judgements of reason. That is, the will’s rationality depends on the rationality of something else, namely, the intellect. The will naturally desires the good, but it is the good as cognized by the intellect, not uncognized good. If the intellect cognizes an object as good or agreeable to the agent, the will desires it even if the object is not in fact good or agreeable for the agent. On the other hand, if the intellect does not cognize an object at all or cognizes it as bad, the will does not desire it. So if the will desires going to London, it is because the intellect

---

judged going to London to be good; if the will prefers going to London to going to Paris, it is because the intellect judged going to London to be better than going to Paris (ignoring complications introduced by cases of weakness of the will). Aquinas does still think that the will is the subject of freedom. The will is free both to move to going to London and to move to going to Paris. But the cause of this freedom is the intellect’s deliberation rather than something in the will. Non-rational animals also act on the basis of apprehending something as to be pursued or avoided. Their apprehensions, however, are not free, but rather are necessitated by the object. Rational agents, in contrast, can deliberate about their options and are free to make different judgements through this process of comparing different options. As long as both going to London and going to Paris are neither perfectly bad nor perfectly good, so that the intellect can focus on either the good or the bad aspects of each, the intellect can judge of either of them that it is good or that it is bad. So these judgements are free and these are the judgements that Aquinas identifies as the causes of the will’s free choices.\footnote{The key features of Aquinas’s moral psychology can be found in \textit{ST [Summa Theologicae]} IaIIae.1–21. \textit{De malo} q. 6 is also of particular relevance.}

This is not to say that the will cannot affect the intellect. The will might, for example, direct the attention of the intellect to one object rather than to another and so influence the intellect’s practical judgements. But this does not mean that the will can lead to action apart from the judgements of the intellect. This very desire to direct the attention of the intellect to one object requires that the intellect have judged it good to be directed in that way.
For convenience, let’s label the position that the intellect determines the will via its judgements ‘intellectualism’. Not everyone interprets Aquinas as an intellectualist in this way. But many interpreters, medieval and modern, critics and defenders, have read him as being committed to intellectualism and so for present purposes I will assume this reading without further argument.\(^8\)

Aquinas’s intellectualism sparked fierce controversy. Many critics thought that it was incompatible with Christian commitments (Bishop Tempier of Paris condemned intellectualist theses in 1270 and 1277 that are reasonably attributable to Aquinas) and that it failed to provide grounds for the sort of freedom needed to ground moral responsibility.\(^9\) Aquinas thinks that the intellect’s freedom resulting from its capacity for deliberation is sufficient freedom for moral responsibility. But his critics insist that we need freedom in the will that is not merely derivative of deliberative freedom. The will must be able to reject the conclusions of intellect or else it is not really free. And if the will is not free, then sins are just the result of cognitive errors rather than of bad willing. Insofar as we think that cognitive errors are not the sort of thing to bear the weight of moral responsibility, this conclusion is problematic.

---

\(^8\)Most of the authors cited in footnote 6 on page 170 accept an intellectualist account, though they disagree over whether Aquinas is a determinist. Gallagher resists an intellectualist account; he claims that Aquinas allows the will to direct the intellect’s attention without the intellect having judged that the will should do so.

\(^9\)For an account of the reactions against Aquinas, see Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 110 ff.
5.2.2 Scotus

Scotus formulates a number of objections to Aquinas’s intellectualism and provides a prominent alternative account. Scotus emphasizes that the will is not free if it is determined by the judgements of the intellect. On Aquinas’s view if my intellect judges that going to London will better promote my happiness than going to Paris, then my will will desire going to London rather than going to Paris. This is because the will desires the good, i.e., my happiness, and it relies on the intellect to tell it where the good is to be found. Prior to the judgement of the intellect, the will can pursue either going to London or going to Paris. But once the intellect has judged going to London better, the will is no longer free to pursue going to Paris. Scotus denies that the will is free if it is necessitated in this way by the judgements of reason. He claims that even in the case where intellect judges that going to London will better promote my happiness than going to Paris, the will can refrain from moving to going to London. Genuine freedom of the will requires that it be free to pursue going to London or not to pursue going to London even after the intellect has made its judgement.\(^\text{10}\)

Yet Scotus does want to maintain the conception of the will as rational desire. Having the will refrain from pursuing going to London

\(^{10}\)See, for example, *Reportatio parisiensis* II-A, dist. 39, q. 2: 'Therefore, whatever the onus imposed on the will is, I say that it is not some obligation (*receptum*) in the will caused by the revealing intellect. But it can be called a natural order, since it is difficult for the will not to be inclined to that which is prescribed at the last point by practical reason; still, it is not impossible' (‘*Quidquid ergo est onus impositum voluntati, dico quod non est aliquid receptum in voluntate ab intellectu ostendente sed potest dici naturalis ordo quia difficile est voluntatem non inclinare ad id quod est dictatum a ratione practica ultimatim, non tamen est impossible*’). The transcription is from Oxford, Merton College 61, fol. 215r. I am grateful to Tobias Hoffmann for directing me to this text and sharing his copy of it. Cf. *Ordinatio* III, dist. 17.
against the recommendation of the intellect simply because of some passion is not sufficient for a free rational desire.\textsuperscript{11} So in order to show how the will can be free from the determination of the intellect and yet rational, he adopts the two basic affections that Anselm posited: the affection for advantage (and Scotus identifies advantage with happiness) and the affection for justice. If the will had only an affection for happiness, then it would be necessitated by the intellect whenever the intellect judged that one course of action better promoted happiness than another. If the will were thus necessitated, the agent would not be blameworthy even if the course of action pursued were unjust. Blameworthiness requires that the agent have been able to will otherwise. Having the affection for justice provides that ability. Now when the intellect judges that going to London better promotes the agent’s happiness than going to Paris, the will can still move to going to Paris and do so rationally, i.e., for the reason that going to Paris is more just than going to London (e.g., because the agent owes it to her mother to visit her in Paris).\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11}Note that I am not using ‘rational’ here in the sense that Scotus uses it. He uses ‘rational’ as a contrast term to ‘natural’, so that the will turns out to be more truly rational than the intellect, since the intellect would be a natural power were it not for the influence of the free will.

5.3 Libertarian freedom

In the case of Aquinas and Scotus, I did not explicitly consider whether they affirm libertarian accounts of freedom or not. Rather, I focussed on their views about the psychological economy of rational agents, i.e., about the relationship between intellect and will. In the case of Suárez, I do want to establish that his is in fact a libertarian account, before examining his account of agents’ psychological economy.

As Suárez notes, there is a general consensus among ancient philosophers, the Fathers of the church, and scholastic philosophers that human beings often act freely, i.e., that they have freedom of decision.13 This is a consensus that has suffered little erosion subsequently.

---


I will use the term ‘freedom of decision’ as a translation for ‘liberum arbitrium’. Suárez clearly uses the term ‘liberum arbitrium’ as a name for the subject of the perennial philosophical question regarding the kind of freedom relevant in discussions of moral responsibility. Outside of that usage, he seldom uses the term ‘arbitrium’. I will use ‘freedom of decision’ in the same way. Nowadays the question is customarily referred to as the freedom-of-the-will question, a result, no doubt, of the popularity of the view that the freedom in question is located in the will. But using ‘freedom of the will’ as a translation risks obscuring the philosophical positions in play, since some of the positions affirming liberum arbitrium arguably do not locate said freedom in the will. Similar concerns suggest against ‘freedom of choice’, especially if ‘choice’ is also used as a translation of ‘electio’.

---

Suárez also thinks that freedom of decision is assumed in our moral practices:

From this it is also clear that punishment and reward are not conferred on a human being only for the sake of subsequent actions (namely, so that he is enticed to them or drawn away from them) but also precisely and *per se* for the sake of the good or bad that he has performed in them. And for the same reason a human being is considered worthy of praise and honour on account of his actions, none of which could be understood if not for freedom. . . . this is the common way among everyone of thinking about human actions. For everyone judges those who act badly to deserve punishment by the fact that acting in that way was placed in their will and power. And for this reason they speak indignantly of injury inflicted by someone who was using reason but not when inflicted by someone who is insane or inattentive. Indeed, they do not even think a loss inflicted by these as an injury. Hence, . . . even those who deny freedom of decision, as long as they speak severely about injuries to them that are inflicted by other human beings and attempt to avenge them, they confess—whether they wish to or not—that they were inflicted freely. Because if it had not been in their power not to inflict such harms, then the concepts of injury, just anger, and vengeance would have no place there.\(^\text{14}\)

\(^{14}\text{DM XIX.2.16 (=OO 25:698): 'Unde etiam constat poenam et praemium non conferri homini solum propter subsequentes actiones, scilicet ut ad illas vel alliciatur vel ab eis retrahatur; sed etiam praecise ac per se propter bonum vel malum quod in eis operatus}
The thought is that the way we ordinarily apply praise, blame, and other related concepts shows that we assume that at least some human actions are free. We praise and blame others for their actions, but we refrain from doing so when we think that they did not perform their actions freely. This suggests that we consider freedom a necessary condition for moral responsibility, i.e., for meriting praise and blame.

This consensus about freedom of decision might be thought superficial, however, since it holds only as long as we permit diverse conceptions of what the said freedom is. Suárez does not explicitly note that the consensus to which he appeals would vanish were his own understanding of freedom built into the question. He does, however, note that the terms ‘necessity’ and ‘free’ are used in a variety of senses. Furthermore, he is admirably clear about which senses he thinks are appropriate for the current discussion. There is a sense of natural necessity to which all non-rational things, including brute animals, are subject, a sense which he explained at some length in the previous section. To say that human beings have freedom of decision is to deny that they are always subject to necessity in that sense.

Suárez defines this sense of natural necessity when answering the est. Et propter eandem causam censetur homo dignus laude et honore ob actiones suas, quae omnia sine libertate intelligi non possunt. Et hinc etiam confirmatur hunc esse communem modum sentiendi omnium hominum de humanis actionibus. Omnes enim judicant esse dignos poena eos qui male operantur, eo quod sic operari in eorum voluntate et potestate posuit sit, et ideo indigne ferunt injustam illam ab homine ratione utente, non vero illam ab amente aut non advertente, immo damnum ab his illam inter injustas non reputant. Unde, ut recte supra advertit Eusebius, ipsi etiam qui liberum arbitrium negant, dum graviter ferunt injustas sibi ab aliis hominibus illatas et eas vindicare conantur, velint, nolint, eas libere illatas confiendentur; qua si non fuisse in aliorum potestate talia nocentum non in ferre, nulla ibi esset ratio injustae aut iuriae aut justae irae vel vindictae.'

15 DM XIX.2.8 (=OO 25:694–95).
16 DM XIX.2.9 (=OO 25:695).
question whether there are created efficient causes that act necessarily. His answer is that there are many created causes that ‘act necessarily once all the things required for acting are present’. He explains the inclusion of the ‘once all the things required for acting are brought in’ clause:

Now that condition ‘once all the necessary things are present’ is added, because one must presuppose that the cause is [i] sufficient, [ii] proximately apt, and [iii] complete with all the conditions required for acting. For if any of these is absent, the action will not follow, not, indeed, as a result of indifference or indeterminacy on the part of the cause, but as a result of the absence of some concause or as a result of the absence of a power or condition necessary for acting.

Suárez then proceeds to discuss nine putative conditions that must be present in order for a cause to act. He affirms six of the nine, including the conditions that the agent have sufficient power to act, that the patient be close to the agent, that there be a suitable medium between the agent and patient, that there be no impeding cause, and so forth. The

---

17DM XIX.1.1 (=OO 25:688): ‘Haec quaestio est facilis, et ideo breviter dicendum est primo, dari in causis creatis plures, quae necessario operantur, si omnia, quibus ad operandum indigent, adhibeantur.’

18It is not clear to me whether a concause for Suárez is just a contributing or accompanying cause or something else. The Latin term ‘concausa’ is sometimes used as a contrast term to ‘cause’. See: Johann Ramminger, Neulateinische Wortliste, s.v. ‘concausa’. <www.neulatein.de/words/1/004505.htm> (accessed October 26, 2009).

19DM XIX.1.1 (=OO 25:688): ‘Additur vero illa conditio, Si omnia necessaria adsint, quia supponenda est causa sufficiens, et proxime apta, et cum omnibus conditionibus ad agendum requisitis. Nam, si aliquid horum desit, non sequetur actio, non quidem ex indifferentia vel indeterminatione causae, sed ex defectu aliquituis concausae, vel ex defectu virtutis, aut conditionis necessariae ad operandum.’

intent of this discussion is clear enough. When we ask, for example, if fire necessarily heats water, we are not asking whether whenever there is fire somewhere water will be heated. That is clearly not the case. A fire in England does not heat water in Canada. But the latter observation also fails to show that there are no necessary causal connections. If there is a fire, the water is nearby, no one is rapidly dumping ice into the water, and so on and so forth, then the fire does necessarily heat the water. In fact, according to Suárez all natural causation not involving rational agents involves such necessary causal connections.

We have seen what sorts of conditions need to be presupposed in order to ask whether a causal connection is necessary. We have not, however, seen a definition of necessity. Suárez provides that later: ‘the necessary is opposed to both that which is impossible and that which is possibly not’. Putting what we have seen together:

[A]n action that is called necessary is one which cannot not be or become, always assuming that hypothesis, namely, that

It is perhaps of some interest to note that one of the proposed conditions which he rejects is the one that says that the cause not be indifferent. The worry is that indifferent natural causes, i.e., causes that are indifferent but not free in the way that rational agents are, will not necessarily produce any of the effects to which they are indifferent. In fact, they will not produce any of the effects at all. Proposed examples of this kind of phenomenon include a perfectly circular fire at the centre of the earth, a perfectly flat piece of glass on a perfectly flat boulder with a perfectly flat boulder falling on it, and Buridan’s ass scenarios (cases where a brute animal has apprehensions perfectly equal in all respects of two objects, e.g., an ass between two precisely identical piles of hay). Suárez, however, does not think that these cases are best described as involving indifference. For example, he agrees that the fire at the centre of the earth would not move outwards but he thinks this is because of an impediment resisting the action rather than indifference. Suárez appears to be inclined to reject the possibility of indifference in the natural world. He is so inclined even in the case of Buridan’s ass, though he seems less confident that he has a persuasive response in this case so he grants that if it were possible for a brute animal to have apprehensions perfectly equal in all respects of two objects, then the animal would indeed not be able to move towards either.
all things required for acting have been posited.\textsuperscript{21}

We are now in position to see what Suárez means when he asks if human beings perform free actions. What he is asking is whether there are cases where we can both elect and not elect an action even once all the causes and required conditions for that election are present.\textsuperscript{22} As he explicitly notes, voluntary actions are compatible with the sort of necessity just described, for voluntary actions are just uncoerced actions performed according to the agent’s will. That is compatible with there being a chain of necessary causes running through the agent’s will. If voluntary actions are taken to be free actions, then it is ‘entirely obvious’ that there are free actions.\textsuperscript{23} But this is not the proper sense of ‘free’, according to Suárez. Rather, truly free actions are those that are free from the sort of necessity just described, i.e., actions free in a libertarian sense. What is at dispute is whether all we have are voluntary actions mixed with necessity (compatibilism) or actions free of necessity:

For no one ever doubted, or even could doubt, that human beings in many of their actions act spontaneously and by their

\textsuperscript{21}DM XIX.2.8 (=OO 25:694): ‘Proprie enim et dialectico more loquendo, necessarium opponitur tam impossibili quam possibili non esse, quo modo necessaria actio dicitur, quae non potest non esse aut fieri, subintelligendo semper illam hypothesin, scilicet, positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, et de hac necessitate actionis diximus sectione praecedenti.’

\textsuperscript{22}Cf. Suárez’s fellow Iberian Jesuit Luis de Molina in Liber Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Præscientia, Providentia, Præestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia (Antwerp, 1595), disp. 2: ‘But [freedom] can be taken in another way, insofar as it is opposed to necessity. Taken in this way, that agent is called free which, once all the requisites for acting are posited, is able to act and able not to act, or is able to do one thing in such a way that it is also able to do the contrary’ (‘Alio vero modo accipi potest, ut opponitur necessitati: quo pacto illud agens liberum dicitur, quod positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere, aut ita agere unum, ut contrarium etiam agere possit.’).

\textsuperscript{23}DM XIX.2.9 (=OO 25:695).
own will, moving and applying themselves to a task by a prior cognition. But whether necessity and determination to one [effect] are mingled with this very voluntariness—this is what was called into controversy.\textsuperscript{24}

A freedom untainted with necessity is what Suárez thinks is required in order for our moral practice to be justified. As we saw at the beginning of this section, Suárez argues for the claim that we have freedom in part by an appeal to consensus. But it is much less clear that there is much of a consensus once freedom is defined in the way Suárez defines it.

It is also a freedom that is less obviously consistent with an account of the will as a rational appetite. But seeing how this freedom relates to the rationality of the will requires delving deeper into the details of where Suárez locates the freedom.

\section*{5.4 Suárez’s criticism of intellectualism}

Suárez does not follow Scotus’s conception of the will as having two basic affections. He does, however, agree that the will is not a free faculty if it is necessitated by the judgements of the intellect. That is, he locates freedom in the will rather than in the intellect. He begins his discussion of the question of how the will is determined by the judgements of reason by reviewing an argument for the claim that a free act of will is

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{24}DM XIX.2.9 (=OO 25:695): ‘nullus enim unquam dubitavit, vel dubitare potuit, an operentur homines in multis actionibus suis, spontaneae et propria voluntate sese moventes et applicantes ad opus prævia cognitione, sed an in hoc ipso voluntario misceatur necessitas, et determinatio ad unum, hoc est quod in controversiam vocatum est.’
\end{footnote}
always necessitated by a judgement of reason. Given that will is ratio-
nal desire, in accordance with his reading of Aristotle, it follows that will
can be led only towards an object that is cognized as good by reason. So
the will cannot choose an object prior to the judgement of the intellect,
because to do so would be to choose an uncognized object. But neither
is the will able to reject the judgement once it has been made, because
doing so would again be in some sense to choose an uncognized object.
That is, in rejecting the judgement, will would be choosing without any
reason, since reason has obviously not made a judgement correspond-
ing to that choice. Hence, the will is necessitated once the judgement
has been made or it is not rational desire.\textsuperscript{25}

So Suárez is clearly aware of the threat to the rationality of the will
if one rejects the position that the judgements of reason necessitate the
will. Insofar as the will can reject the judgements of reason, it looks
irrational. It is also telling that Suárez attributes this argument to ‘the
disciples of St. Thomas’ rather than to Aquinas himself. Whenever he
does this, it is likely that he rejects a position that is widely attributed
to Aquinas and that he will try to show that Aquinas does not in fact
hold the rejected position.

Suárez then notes that the Thomists’ position does not find favour
with Henry of Ghent, Scotus and his disciples, and others. Suárez af-
firms the argument of Henry and Scotus:

And, certainly, the argument [.] seems irrefutable to me.

For if this judgment of reason is a prerequisite for acting in

\textsuperscript{25}DM XIX.6.1 (=OO 25:719).
such a way that it is a necessary cause in its own genus with respect to a free act of the will, and if, once this judgment has been posited, the will is unable not to consent to it, then the will is not a power of the kind that is able—once all the things required for acting have been posited—to will and able not to will. Therefore, it is not a free power.\textsuperscript{26}

Suárez thinks that he even has some support in Aquinas for this position, for Aquinas affirms that freedom is formally found in the will alone. But Suárez thinks that it is obvious that a faculty which lacks the power either to act or not to act once all antecedent conditions have been posited is not formally free. So if the will is not free to act or not act once the judgement of reason has been posited, then the will is not formally free. Suárez seems to think that Aquinas’s claim that freedom formally resides in the will commits him to denying that the judgements of reason necessitate the will.\textsuperscript{27}

Suárez offers an extended argument for why the necessitation of the will by the judgements of reason would destroy freedom of decision. The argument can be read as a \textit{reductio ad absurdum}, proceeding by a set of nested dilemmas no one of whose horns is both plausible and allows for freedom. The following tree may help illustrate the structure of the argument. Each branching should be read as a disjunction (e.g., ‘either [1] the judgement itself is necessitated or [2] the judgement is free’). The

\textsuperscript{26}DM XIX.6.2 (=OO 25:719): ‘Et sane ratio [. . .] apud me est irrefragabilis; nam si illud iudicium rationis est ita praerequisitum ad operandum ut in suo genere sit causa necessaria ad actum liberum voluntatis, et illo iudicio posito voluntas non potest non consentire illi, ergo voluntas non est talis potentia quae, positis omnibus absolute praerequisitis ad operandum, possit velle et non velle; ergo non est potentia libera.’

\textsuperscript{27}DM XIX.5.12 (=OO 25:715).
parenthetical comments at the leaves briefly indicate why that disjunct should be rejected according to Suárez. The numbers assigned to the nodes correspond to those used in the subsequent discussion.28

![Figure 5.1: Argument Outline](image)

Elections are the acts of the will which Suárez thinks the will is free to either perform or not perform, so assume for reductio ad absurdum that all elections are necessitated by judgements of reason. Now consider some election that is necessitated in this way by a judgement. We now encounter the first dilemma:

Either (1) the judgement in question is itself necessitated

or (2) it is free.

If (1), then the will is certainly not free, since there is no freedom in either the making of the judgement or in the act of will. That is, both

28Tobias Hoffmann told me that a similar antecedent to this argument can be found in Peter Auriol.
the judgement and the act of will proceed necessarily from prior conditions.\textsuperscript{29} Now on my reading of Aquinas, he would reject (1), since the practical judgements resulting from deliberation are supposed to be free if they are judgments about objects that are only imperfectly good. This is part of Aquinas’s more general commitment to doxastic voluntarism, or, better, doxastic libertarianism (since on Aquinas’s account the doxastic freedom is not rooted in the will). He seems to think that there are only two kinds of cases in which the intellect’s assent to a proposition is necessitated. The basic kind is that of first principles, i.e., propositions whose necessary truth we grasp simply by understanding the terms of the proposition. The second kind is that of demonstrative conclusions, i.e., conclusions that deductively follow from first principles. But Aquinas seems to be committed to a far-reaching doxastic libertarianism that says that in all other cases the intellect is free to assent or not assent. For our purposes, what is important is that he thinks that most practical judgements that say that something ought to be pursued or ought to be avoided are free.\textsuperscript{30}

We start to see here what the crucial difference is between Aquinas’s and Suárez’s assumptions that leads Suárez to reject the Thomistic account of freedom. Aquinas accepts (2) and thinks that this is sufficient for freedom. Suárez does not think that (2) will help. This is not because Suárez rejects doxastic voluntarism outright. In fact, he does not. But his account of it crucially relies on the will and so is of no help for a position assuming that the will is wholly determined by the intellect. Suárez thinks that in at least some cases where it is not clear to a

\textsuperscript{29}DM XIX.5.3 (=OO 25:719–20).

\textsuperscript{30}ST Ia.82.2 co., IaIIae.10.2 ad 2 and 17.6, and IIaIIae.1.4 co.
person whether a proposition is true or not the person can believe the proposition by willing to believe it. But it is only through the will that the intellect can be free with respect to believing a proposition.\textsuperscript{31} Since we are assuming for \textit{reductio} that all the will’s elections are necessitated by judgements, we can see why judgements that are free for this reason are of no help by working through the next dilemma.

Suppose the defender of Aquinas goes with (2), given that (1) seemed so unpromising. There are two ways in which an act can be free, so Suárez introduces another dilemma:

Either (2.1) the judgement is free as commanded by the will

or (2.2) it is free as elicited by the intellect.\textsuperscript{32}

Scholastic philosophers typically analyse complete human actions into a series of acts, some of which are elicited and some of which are commanded. An elicited act is an immediate exercise of either the intellect or the will. A commanded act, on the other hand, is the object of an elicited act. Obvious examples of commanded acts are simple bodily acts. For example, usually my raising my hand is a commanded act. But my \textit{willing} to raise my hand is an elicited act. Commanded acts are not restricted to bodily acts. The disjunct (2.1) indicates that Suárez entertains the possibility of acts of the intellect commanded by the will.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31}DM XIX.5.20 (=OO 25:717).
\textsuperscript{32}DM XIX.6.3 (=OO 25:720).
\textsuperscript{33}For a nice account of this distinction between commanded and elicited acts in the context of Aquinas’s action theory, see Alan Donagan, ‘Thomas Aquinas on Human Action’, in \textit{The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy}, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
In posing the dilemma between (2.1) and (2.2), Suárez relies on a general principle that he introduced earlier which says that acts can be free in either of two ways:

An action can be denominated as free in two ways: namely, either (i) as an elicited act or [free] proximately with respect to the power effecting the action, in the way that willing itself is free or (ii) as a commanded act or [free] remotely with respect to a power moving or applying a lower power to acting, in the way that walking is free.\(^{34}\)

We might put the distinction as one between acts that are directly free and acts that are derivatively free by originating from directly free acts.\(^{35}\) As we just saw, Suárez accepts that there are judgements that are free as commanded by the will, so (2.1) might seem a promising option. But:

Either (2.1.1) the act of will that commands the intellect is itself determined by the intellect

or (2.1.2) it is not so determined.\(^{36}\)

If (2.1.2), then we have already abandoned our initial assumption

\(^{34}\)DM XIX.6.3 (=OO 25:712): ‘[…] dupliciter actionem aliquam denominari liberam, scilicet, ut actum elicitum, seu proxime in ordine ad potentiam efficientem actionem, quomodo ipsum velle liberum est, vel ut actum imperatum, seu remote in ordine ad potentiam moventem seu applicantem inferiorem facultatem ad agendum, quomodo ambulare est liberum.’


\(^{36}\)DM XIX.6.3 (=OO 25:720).
that all elections are determined by the intellect, i.e., we have already accepted the position for which Suárez is arguing. But if we say that the act of will is itself determined by the intellect (2.1.1), we are beginning an infinite regress. For in that case, the initial election is necessitated by a judgement which is commanded by an act of will which in turn is necessitated by a further judgement and so forth. In order to avoid the regress, there must be a first act that is directly free. So we can see why the kind of doxastic voluntarism that Suárez condones cannot be of use to his opponent here.\footnote{DM XIX.6.3 (=OO 25:720).}

As for (2.2), Suárez rejects that it is possible for judgements to be free as elicited by the intellect because he does not think that the intellect is a formally free faculty. That is, he does not think the intellect is directly free. He does not say here why one should deny that the intellect is formally free, but rather relies on lengthy arguments that he made in the previous section of the disputation to that effect. A sketch of the argument will have to suffice here. Again, Suárez introduces a further dilemma, since there are two ways for the intellect to be formally free:

Either (2.2.1) the intellect is free with respect to the specification of its own act

or (2.2.2) it is free with respect to the exercise of its own act.\footnote{DM XIX.5.13 (=OO 25:715).}

The distinction between these two kinds of freedom is standard in the scholastic philosophers’ conceptual toolbox for action theory. Its usual home is in discussions of the will, so let’s start there. Specification of
an act is the fixing of the species or kind of act. So to be free with respect to specification is to be able to will an object and also able to will a contrary object, i.e., an object of a different species. For example, an agent might be able to will to eat the apple and also able to will to eat the pear instead. To will to eat the apple is a different species of act than to will to eat the pear. To be free with respect to exercise, on the other hand, is to be able to will and also able not to will where the object is held fixed. For example, an agent might be able to will to eat the apple and able not to will to eat the apple. In this case, the species of act is held fixed, but the agent is able to exercise that act or to refrain from exercising that act.

In the case of the intellect, the acts in question are different. They will be acts such as assenting to a proposition or believing a proposition. Suppose we take the proposition that God exists. An intellect would be free with respect to specification if it were able to assent to the proposition that God exists and also able to assent to the proposition that God does not exist. It would be free with respect to exercise if it were able to assent that God exists and also able not to assent that God exists.

With that background in place, we can return to Suárez’s argument. He argues that the intellect is not free with respect to specification since the intellect’s judgements are determined by the apparent truth or falsity of the objects of the intellect. For example, the intellect cannot dissent from what appears true. This is because the intellect is determined by its nature to assent to what is true and to dissent from what is false. If the intellect perceives neither truth nor falsity, then the in-
tellect cannot elicit either assent or dissent. One might think that there are cases where the intellect sees degrees of both truth and falsity, such that it can freely judge either way. This might seem analogous to the claim that the will can freely choose in cases where the objects include both goodness and badness. But Suárez rejects this possibility, since he does not think that truth and goodness are analogous in the relevant ways. Truth and falsity cannot exist together in the same object. Goodness and badness, however, can do so, since the same object may be fitting to an agent with respect to one aspect but unfitting with respect to another.\footnote{The argument here seems to go a little too quickly. Even if truth and falsity cannot co-exist, \textit{apparent} truth and falsity still might be able to and hence might allow the intellect to judge freely. My thanks to Scott MacDonald for drawing my attention to that point.} In fact, he sees here—insightfully, in my view—a key difference between the will and the intellect. The only way the intellect can be undetermined with respect to its own act is if it does not see the object clearly. By contrast, the will can be undetermined with respect to its act even in cases where the agent has a perfectly precise grasp of the object. This is why there is no indifference with respect to acts of judgement in the divine omniscient intellect, but there is indifference in the divine will. So Suárez does not think that (2.2.1) can ever be true.\footnote{\textit{DM} XIX.5.14–16 (=OO 25:715–16).}

Nor can the intellect be free with respect to exercise, since only acts that are directly voluntary, i.e., not derivatively voluntary the way external actions are voluntary, can be formally free with respect to exercise. But Suárez argues that only acts that are elicited by an appetitive faculty can be directly voluntary and so acts of the intellect cannot be directly voluntary. But then they cannot be free with respect to exercise and so...
(2.2.2) does not work either.\textsuperscript{41}

So now that we have gone through all the options, we can put the pieces together. Since the intellect is not free with respect to the specification of its own act, i.e., not (2.2.1), and it is not free with respect to the exercise of its own act, i.e., not (2.2.2), the intellect is not formally free. But then (2.2) does not hold. We also saw that (2.1) does not do the work needed here, so neither option can secure (2). Since (1) was rejected at the very beginning, we can now see, if Suárez is right, that none of the horns of these dilemmas can preserve freedom.

Since these troubles started from the assumption that all acts of the will are necessitated by judgements of reason, Suárez concludes that we should relinquish that assumption. So on his view practical judgements do not determine the will with necessity.

### 5.5 The role of practical judgements

Suárez does insist that practical judgements are necessary for the will to be able to choose. But to say that the judgements are a necessary condition for the choices of the will is not to say that they necessitate the will’s choices. On Suárez’s view, practical judgements are not judgements that say that such and such must be done. Rather, they are judgements that such and such is sufficiently good to be loved by the will. But these judgements do not necessitate the will.\textsuperscript{42} Rather, the will

\textsuperscript{41}DM XIX.5.17–20 (=OO 25:716–17).

\textsuperscript{42}This is the sort of Jesuit subtlety that Hobbes famously scorns. Hobbes argues that a sufficient cause just is a necessary cause. Hence, if a judgement is sufficient
may choose not to pursue the object, even though the judgement is also sufficient for the will to be able to choose to pursue it.\textsuperscript{43} Or, in slogan form: ‘[the will] is determined by the intellect with respect to sufficiency, but it determines itself with respect to efficacy’.\textsuperscript{44}

Suárez seems to have at least two kinds of cases in mind when he says that the will is not necessitated by the intellect. Sometimes he describes the case such that it looks like the will is left free because of the way the intellect presented its judgements: namely, because it made no comparative judgement of the form $x$ is better than $y$. The following passage suggests this kind of case:

I said above that a judgement about an object that must be loved is not necessary, but rather one about an object that can be loved; not a judgement about an object that must be

---


\textsuperscript{44}DVI VIII.4.11 (=OO 4:264): ‘ [. . . ] ab intellectu determinatur, quasi quoad sufficientiam: ipsa vero se determinat quoad efficaciam’. Cf. Scotus on the will as having superabundant sufficiency in response to the question what reduces indetermined potency to act in \textit{Quaestiones in Metaphysicam} IX, q. 15: ‘I reply: there is a certain indeterminacy of insufficiency, based on potentiality and a defect of actuality, in the way, for instance, that matter without form would be indeterminate as regards the actuation given by form. There is another indeterminacy, however, that of a superabundant sufficiency, based on unlimited actuality, either in an unqualified or in a qualified sense. . . . But the indetermination ascribed to the will is not like that of matter, nor, insofar as it is active, is it the indeterminacy of imperfection, but rather it is the indeterminacy of surpassing perfection and power, not restricted to some specific act’ (‘Responsio: est quaedam indeterminatio insufficientiae, sive ex potentialitate et defectu actualitatis, sicut materia non habens formam est indeterminata ad agentum actionem formae. Est alia superabundantis sufficientiae quae est ex illuminatione actualitatis, vel simpliciter vel quodammodo [. . .] Indeterminatio autem quae ponitur in voluntate non est materialis, nec imperfectionis, inquantum ipsa est activa, sed est excellentis perfectionis et potestatis non alligatae ad determinatum actum.’).
elected, but rather one about an object that can be elected. Nor is a comparative judgement (as I will call it) always necessary, that is, a judgement that this is more worthy to be elected than the others. Rather, an absolute judgement is sufficient, that is, a judgement that this is worthy to be elected or is useful.\footnote{DM XIX.7.6 (=OO 25:725): ‘quod supra dicebam, non esse necessarium iudicium de obiecto amando, sed de amabili, nec de eligendo, sed de eligibili, nec semper esse necessarium iudicium comparativum (ut sic dicam), scilicet, hoc esse eligibile prae aliis, sed sufficere absolutum, scilicet, hoc esse eligibile aut utile.’ Note how what Suárez says here is very much in keeping with what we saw in Chapter 4 about being able to love particular goods without reference to an unqualifiedly ultimate end.}

This account leaves open the possibility that were the intellect to make a comparative judgement that going to London is better than going to Paris, the will would be necessitated to elect going to London. But the intellect does not always make such comparative judgements (Suárez later suggests that it normally does not\footnote{DM XIX.7.11 (=OO 25:726).}) and so, when it does not, the will is left free. Suárez goes on to point out two variant kinds of cases in which there are comparative judgements of a kind, but where the will is still left free for a reason similar to what we just saw.\footnote{DM XIX.7.6 (OO 25:725).} One case is where the intellect judges that two options are equally good. We saw earlier that Suárez has doubts about whether Buridan’s-ass cases actually are possible, but he shows no indication of similar doubts about what we might call ‘Buridan’s-human’ cases. That such cases arise seems quite plausible, especially once we note that we do not need a case in which the options are precisely equally good; all we need is a case in which they
are sufficiently close to being equal so that a being with limited cognitive powers is unable to detect the difference. Such cases seem quite plausible, perhaps even ordinary. And in those cases Suárez thinks the will is free to choose either despite a comparative judgement that the options are equally good. The other kind of case is one in which the intellect judges one option to be better in one respect but the other option better in another respect. For example, we might judge one kind of medicine to taste better than another, but judge the latter more likely to cure the illness than the former. Here we have comparative judgements, but, Suárez thinks, the will is free to choose either. We might conclude, then, that the kind of judgement that would threaten to necessitate the will would be a comparative judgement that one option is better than another all things considered.

But would such a comparative judgement really remove the will’s freedom? Suárez concludes that it would not on grounds that as long as the intellect does not judge that it is absolutely necessary that, say, one should go to London, the will can still refuse to elect going to London even if it was judged to be a better option than going to Paris. Suárez is worried here about safeguarding God’s freedom, since in the case of God we cannot attribute freedom as a result of the absence of certain kinds of comparative judgements. God’s omniscience precludes that. So Suárez takes as theological givens that (i) God judged that the Incarnation was the best means for redeeming human beings and yet that (ii) God could have elected other means for redeeming human beings. That is a counterfactual scenario, but Suárez also takes there to be actual scenarios of the same structure. In contrast to Leibniz, Suárez seems
to think that God judged this world not to be the best world and yet nonetheless actualized this world.\textsuperscript{48} In one passage, he makes it clear that there is no further reason to which to appeal in order to explain why God chose this world. He simply wished to and that is all that is to be said about the matter.\textsuperscript{49} This power is not exclusive to God. Other rational beings can also elect one option even if the intellect has made a comparative judgement that says that another option would be better.\textsuperscript{50}

There is a question why Suárez sometimes presents the will as being free as a result of an absence of a certain kind of comparative judgement, as we saw earlier. For if the will is free even when the intellect has made such a comparative judgement, then we have already secured freedom for all the cases covered by the former kind of scenario. So why present the former kind? It appears that Suárez is less confident about his conclusion that the will can elect contrary to a comparative judgement. In one place, he says that this conclusion is more probable

\textsuperscript{48}DM XIX.6.13 (=OO 25:723). This is a curious case. One might have expected Suárez to take the position that we need the will to be free from necessitation by the intellect in order to safeguard our moral practices, but that, nevertheless, the will \textit{ought} to elect in accordance with reason where that means electing whatever intellect judges to be best. That is, one might have expected him to say that the will is free to elect contrary to the intellect’s comparative judgements but that to do so is blameworthy. Presumably, however, Suárez will decline to conclude that God is blameworthy for not having actualized the world he judged to be best. As Andrew Chignell pointed out to me, there is, of course, also a tradition in theology of thinking about grace as \textit{unmerited} favour. What Suárez expresses here is entirely in keeping with that tradition.

\textsuperscript{49}DVI VIII.4.11 (=OO 4:264). I take this to show that Suárez is making a stronger claim than Malebranche is when he famously says that God ‘could have made a world more perfect than the one we inhabit’ (\textit{Treatise on Nature and Grace} 1.1.14 as translated in \textit{Philosophical Selections}, ed. by Steven Nadler [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992], 260). Malebranche thinks there is a good reason for God to refrain from making a better world: namely, to avoid excessively irregular action. But if Suárez’s claim is to serve its intended purpose, he really has to mean that there is no such further reason to explain God’s choice.

\textsuperscript{50}DM XIX.6.13 (=OO 25:723).
than not but is less certain.\textsuperscript{51} So perhaps the former sort of account is intended to secure freedom even if the latter sort is deemed untenable. He may also want to include the former sort as an accurate description of how our actual decision-making often goes. Recall that he thinks that we do not ordinarily have comparative judgements in place when we elect to do something.\textsuperscript{52}

We are now in position to see what Suárez’s picture of the rationality of the will is. We might have thought that to say that the will is a rational appetite is to say that we can fully explain the will’s elections by appeal to reasons provided by the intellect. If the will elects a course of action, it does so because intellect gave it reason to do so by judging that the course of action is a good one. This is what an intellectualist can say about the rationality of the will. Suárez can agree with much of it but not all of it. He can agree that the will can only elect a course of action if the intellect has cognized it and judged it good, thereby providing the will with reason to elect it. But we have to be careful what we mean when we say that the intellect judged it good. It is easy to hear a ring of finality in the phrase and think that the intellect has judged it to be better than any other course of action, all things considered. But Suárez rejects that such a judgement is required. Appeal to reasons provided by the intellect can partially explain an agent’s actions, but not fully. If an agent follows the pleasurable course of action rather than the virtuous one, we can conclude that the agent judged the pleasurable course of action to be good to some degree. This judgement is unsurprising, since the course of action is pleasurable and pleasure is a good. And this is

\textsuperscript{51} DM XIX.6.13 (=OO 25:723).
\textsuperscript{52} DM XIX.7.11 (=OO 25:726).
why the agent chose it. The judgement that the pleasurable course of action is good to some degree is sufficient to enable the will to choose that course of action. The course of action is good enough, so to speak. But we cannot conclude that the agent judged the pleasurable course of action better than the virtuous course of action all things considered. In fact, she might have made the converse judgement without the converse judgement necessitating the will. So part of the explanation for the agent’s course of action is that she simply wished to pursue the pleasurable course of action.

Suárez is surely right to say that the intellect’s judgement about the pursued object is sufficient to explain something, but his opponent might well press harder and demand that Suárez offer an explanation of why the agent pursued pleasure rather than virtue. Given that the will pursues goodness, must not there be some goodness that drew the will to pleasure rather than to virtue, some goodness that the intellect apparently did not cognize? Scotus, I take it, would say that the will pursued pleasure because it contributes to the agent’s advantage and, since will has an affection for advantage, it can pursue pleasure even if the intellect judged that virtue contributes more to justice. Suárez is not as explicit about this contrastive question as one might have wished, but it seems that he is committed to saying that in this case intellect judged that there was some goodness in both pleasure and virtue, that there was more in virtue than in pleasure, but, nevertheless, the will pursued pleasure. Why pleasure? Because it is good. Why pleasure rather than virtue? Merely because the will wanted to. This way of putting things may make Suárez’s position sound more mysterious than Sco-
tus’s, since Scotus can give a reason for why the will pursued pleasure rather than virtue. Ultimately, however, Scotus is susceptible to the same sort of worry: why does the will pursue the advantageous course in this case when in other cases it does not? It seems that for both Scotus and Suárez there is at some point a contrastive question that lacks a satisfying answer.

A thoroughgoing intellectualist, on the other hand, avoids this worry, though at the expense of a satisfying account of freedom. For an intellectualist, if the will pursues one option rather than another, it must be because the intellect judged that option to be better. We need to distinguish between two versions of the claim that the will is a rational appetite in order to capture the difference between Aquinas and Suárez. The moderate version holds that the will is responsive in a certain sort of way to reasons; namely, by requiring a reason for making a choice before being able to make it. That is, it holds that a judgement that $x$ is good is necessary in order for the will to be able to elect $x$. The stronger version holds that as well but adds that the will’s choosing one option over another must also be explained by appeal to reasons provided by the intellect. To say that, however, is to grant that the intellect’s judgements necessitate the will’s elections. Suárez affirms that the will is a rational appetite but he advocates the moderate version of that claim because he thinks that the only way to account for moral responsibility is leave the will free even after the intellect’s judgements have been made.

---

53 Of course, a theory’s ability always to answer such contrastive questions is a virtue only if they ought always to be answered. Whether that is so is a question for another time.
5.6 Conclusion

We have seen how Suárez develops a sophisticated and subtle account of the will to capture as best as possible a set of intuitions not entirely in harmony with each other. Suárez feels pressure from thinking about moral responsibility to affirm that the will is free in a robust sense. The category of voluntary actions, i.e., actions that we might call free in a compatibilist sense, is too broad and voluntariness too weak a condition; not all voluntary actions are actions for which the agent is morally responsible. But Suárez thinks that the category of free actions, i.e., free in a libertarian sense, fits the required role. Since he rejects the view that judgements of the intellect are intrinsically free, he has to locate freedom in the will. This, in turn, puts pressure on the claim that the will is a rational faculty. How is the will rational if it rejects the judgements received from the intellect? Suárez thinks, however, that he can affirm a moderate version of the claim by insisting that the will can only elect options judged to be good by the intellect. So the will never elects without reason to so elect. All he is compelled to abandon is the stronger claim that any election can be fully explained by appeal to judgements made by the intellect. It is difficult to see how a libertarian could do better than that.

It is worth noting that libertarianism rules out a certain strong version of psychological eudaemonism. A psychological eudaemonist might be committed to the claim that agents always choose those options judged most conducive to their own happiness. But Suárez has to reject that claim, since that leaves insufficient freedom to the agents. On
Suárez’s picture, agents can choose options other than the one judged most conducive to their happiness. This just follows from his libertarianism. So the only psychological eudaemonism that he can accept is a weaker one that puts some constraints on which options an agent can choose (only those that contribute or are perceived to contribute to her happiness) rather than determining which option she will choose.

Libertarianism is, of course, compatible with the normative claim that one ought always to choose the option most conducive to happiness. But perhaps we have other reason for doubting that Suárez accepts this normative claim. I noted earlier that he seems to think that God did not actualize the best possible world. Since he presumably does not think that God is blameworthy for this, it might look like Suárez does not think that agents ought always to choose the best option. Straightforward inferences, however, are hard to come by with this case. There are disanalogies between God and other rational agents to worry about, for example. But the case at least raises the question whether Suárez is committed to a maximizing normative claim.
A.1 Introduction: always intending the ultimate end

In the first question of the Prima Secundæ of his *Summa Theologæ*, Aquinas makes a series of well-known arguments for increasingly strong claims about human action. The conclusion of the first argument is that all human actions are done for the sake of an end. But by the culmination of the series of arguments, Aquinas purports to have shown that all humans in all their actions act for the sake of the same ultimate end.\(^1\) Furthermore, he thinks that the ultimate end is knowing and loving God.

These are striking claims; interpreted in a strong sense, they are quite implausible. Aquinas, of course, makes clear that they are to be interpreted with some philosophical nuance. But disregarding nuance and precision is sometimes helpful in orienting oneself and seeing what the critical issues are. So suppose Aquinas is indeed making the claim that all human actions are done for the sake of knowing and loving God (where this is a descriptive claim rather than a claim about what *ought* to be the case). Objections easily come to mind, as they did to Aquinas’s medieval critics. Some people think that their ultimate end is pleasure and do whatever they can to achieve as much of it as possible. Some people do love God but also love other things and sometimes choose

\(^{1}\)For an illuminating discussion of the progression in this series of arguments, see MacDonald, ‘Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning’, 31–66. Also, cf. Aquinas, *De Veritate* q. 22, art. 1.
other things even when they know that doing so is contrary to God's will. Even the most devout often do things with nary a thought for how doing so might or might not contribute to their end of knowing and loving God. Furthermore, people often do things that involve no thought of any sort, e.g., idly scratching one's beard. So we might conclude that easily available knowledge of how humans in fact act shows Aquinas's claim to be false.

Aquinas, of course, would respond that the critics have misunderstood his position and have attributed a stronger claim to him than he actually made. This is no doubt true. Several parts of Aquinas's account attenuate the claim. First, Aquinas distinguishes properly human actions from actions of a human, where the latter are actions which do not come from a deliberated will. Idly scratching one's beard would be an example of the latter. Aquinas's series of arguments is meant to apply only to properly human actions.\(^2\) Secondly, he distinguishes the ultimate end taken formally and taken materially, which helps to dispel the worry regarding people who disagree about what the ultimate end consists in. Lastly, pointing out that acting for the sake of an end does not require occurrent thought about the end while acting helps dispel the worry about actions done without thought about any ultimate end.

It is this last part of the defence that will be my primary concern here, i.e., the distinction between actual intention of an end and other forms of intention, along with the claim that at least some of the other

\(^2\)ST IaIIæ.1.1. For some discussion of this distinction, see MacDonald, ‘Ultimate Ends in Practical Reasoning’, 35–37. Unless made explicit otherwise, all claims in this paper about human actions should be understood as claims about properly human actions.
forms are sufficient for an action to have been done for the sake of a given end. There is clearly something right about Aquinas’s response, as his example of someone walking along a road makes evident. It is not necessary for someone who is walking to a destination to think about the destination at every step for every step to have been made for the sake of getting to the destination. This point is frequently cited in defences of Aquinas’s account and justifiably so, for it succeeds in diffusing a certain obvious, albeit rather crude, objection. That is, if the critic of Aquinas’s account thinks to have shown that we do not always act for the sake of an ultimate end because we sometimes act without thinking about an ultimate end, then it is enough for the defender to show that it is false that thinking about an ultimate end during an action is a necessary condition for that action to have been done for the sake of that ultimate end.

But more would need to be said, were the critic to refine her objection. Instead of relying on the crude—and readily refuted—assumption that occurrent thought about an end is necessary for an action to be for the sake of that end, she could propose a particular type of action in which she does not think that the agents act for the sake of an ultimate end. She might be inspired by the following passage from

---

3_{ST}\text{IaIæ.1.6 ad 3.}


5Perhaps a charitable interpretation would have the critics making a more refined objection to start with, though Scotus, for example, certainly seems to be relying on the crude assumption in *Sent.* IV, dist. 49, q. 10 (≡ *Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality*, transl. Allan Wolter [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University Press of America, 1996], 194–95): ‘But if the question is about the desire of the will insofar as it is an elicited act, then I say that it is not necessary that the will desire whatever it desires for the sake of an ultimate end as for the sake of happiness. For one could desire some-
Can’t a man just do what he does, a great deal of the time? He may or may not have a reason or a purpose; and if he has a reason or purpose, it in turn may just be what he happens to want; why demand a reason or purpose for it? and why must we at last arrive at some one purpose that has an intrinsic finality about it?6

The worry expressed here, or at least one of them, is that accounts of action that claim that all human actions are done for the sake of one ultimate end attribute far more deliberated structure to a human’s practical life than is warranted. When thinking about human action, it is natural to think of examples from our lives that we thought about at some length at the time of the action, namely, those actions that were accompanied by significant consideration and deliberation. For example, it is natural to think about actions like applying for a job or sending in college applications. These are actions that were likely preceded by significant consideration about what our long-term ends were and by deliberation about how we might best achieve those ends. Outlining elaborate structures of subordinated ends under an ultimate end like happiness or a good life seems like a natural and fitting way to cap-thing and not for the sake of happiness negatively or contrariwise. Negatively, because one could desire something and not consider the ultimate end of happiness, and, consequently, one would not then desire for the sake of happiness, since one would not think about it then’ (Si autem quaestio querat de appetitu voluntatis prout est actus elicitus, sic dico quod non oportet quod voluntas appetat quidquid appetit propter finem ultimum ut propter beatitudinem. Potest enim appeteret aliquid et non propter beatitudinem negative et contrarie. Negative, quia potest appetere aliquid et non considerare de fine ultimo beatitudinis, et per consequens tunc non appetit propter beatitudinem, cum non cognoscat eam tunc). All translations are mine.

ture the end-directedness of such actions. It may well be that such well-planned actions are paradigmatic human actions—I am inclined to think they are. But they are not so in virtue of frequency. Often we act with little attention to how our actions might fit into our structure of ends. I see a good papaya in the store, think that it would make a lovely addition to dinner, and buy it. I see someone with her arms full behind me and make sure to hold the door open for her. In neither case do I spend any time thinking about my ultimate end.

There is little difficulty, of course, in imagining how they might fit into a scheme of ends. Holding the door open is a way of helping someone; helping people contributes to my virtue; and being virtuous is a constituent of my ultimate end. Perhaps this is the right way to think about the action. But one might legitimately worry that this explanation misconstrues the action by making it seem more elaborate than it is. As Anscombe asks: ‘why must we at last arrive at some one purpose that has an intrinsic finality about it?’ I certainly did not consciously intend some grand end while buying the papaya or while holding the door open. Nor does it seem quite like Aquinas’s case of walking to a destination, since there was not even any prior time in which I thought about buying the papaya as a way of helping to achieve my ultimate end. Assuming that intentions are not superfluous in determining whether an action is done for the sake of an end, what intention made buying the papaya an action for the sake of my ultimate end?

An even more troublesome kind of case might be ones in which an

---

agent acts relatively unreflectively—as in the case of buying a papaya—and where the action turns out to conflict with the agent’s ultimate end even as conceived by herself. Not only is there no actual thought about an ultimate end in such a case, but it is also difficult to see how the action might be fit into the agent’s scheme of ends.

If the critic of Aquinas’s account presses these worries, defenders of Aquinas’s position will need to say more about intending ends than just that occurrent thought about the end is not always necessary. What is necessary if not that? What makes it the case that an action is for the sake of a given end if not an actual intention? Unfortunately, Aquinas himself has little to say about this. Nor do most of his defenders, who generally seem content to make the useful but ultimately unsatisfying point that occurrent thought about the end is not always necessary.

A.2 Three forms of response

Before proceeding with a discussion of intention, I want to distinguish three ways of responding to criticisms of Aquinas’s claim and to note how they might relate to each other. I have already touched on all three, but it may be useful to make the distinction explicit. Let us take Aquinas’s crucial claim to be the following:

\textbf{AQC}: All human actions are done for the sake of the ultimate end.
If criticism shows that a strong reading of this claim is implausible, the defender will need to propose a weaker interpretation that does not succumb to the criticism. The claim readily divides into three candidate components for interpretative attention: (1) ‘all human actions’, (2) ‘are done for the sake of’, and (3) ‘the ultimate end’. All three have, in fact, been the subject of attention in defences of Aquinas’s position. I will take them in order.

With respect to (1), we already briefly noted one way in which the subject of the claim was restricted, namely, the distinction between those actions which result from a deliberated will and those which do not. Restricting the claim to those actions resulting from a deliberated will precludes objections based on actions like scratching one’s beard. But one might restrict the class of actions to which the claim applies even further. Scott MacDonald’s response to objections of one sort to Aquinas serves as an example. Noting that one common line of objection is to appeal to alleged empirical facts about what ends humans actually have when they act and to claim that these facts conflict with Aquinas’s claims, MacDonald forestalls all such empirically-based objections by taking Aquinas’s claims to be analyses of the concept of rational action rather than descriptions of human activity. If we restrict the subject of the claim to fully rational human actions, then many putative counterexamples can be dismissed as merely being examples of less-than-fully-rational human actions. It is hardly surprising that one can find examples of human activity that fail to meet the conditions of full rationality.\(^8\)

With respect to (2), I take Aquinas to accept that an action’s being for the sake of an end is grounded in an intention that the agent has towards the end. So the question becomes what ways of intending an end are sufficient to play this grounding role. Since exploring that question will shortly be the focus, I will not say more about this form of response here.

With respect to (3), one way of interpreting ‘an ultimate end’ in order to avoid an implausibly strong claim already appears in Aquinas. When discussing the question of whether all human beings have the same ultimate end, Aquinas makes a distinction between an ultimate end taken formally and taken materially and restricts his conclusion to the ultimate end taken formally. To say that all human beings intend the ultimate end taken formally is to say that all human beings intend something under the description of being that which fulfills their perfection. But to say that all human beings intend the ultimate end taken materially is to say that all human beings intend that specific thing or things which in fact realizes that description. That is, if wealth were what perfects humans, then the claim would be that all humans intend wealth. But humans disagree about what realizes the description and so they can all intend the ultimate end taken formally while intending different putative realizers. Emphasizing this point is a standard way of responding to critics of AQC. For example, Cajetan charges Scotus with failing to heed this distinction when making the claim that humans can act for the sake of other ends. It may be granted that, for example, a fornicator fails to intend the ultimate end taken materially, but that

\[9^{ST}\text{ IaIIæ.1.7.}\]

\[10^{Commentary on ST IaIIæ.1.6.}\]
does not falsify the claim that all humans intend the ultimate end taken formally.

A full response to criticism of AQC might well incorporate all three forms of response. But some particular responses might also make other responses superfluous. For example, if we narrowed the class of actions under consideration to certain paradigmatic actions where the agent devotes significant time and attention to considering her ends and deliberating about how best to achieve them just prior to acting, there would be no reason to consider whether weaker forms of intention can ground for-the-sake-of relations. Or, rather, there would be no reason stemming from a desire to defend AQC; there might well be independent reasons to be interested in intention. But the point now just is that it is worth keeping in mind that there are several distinct forms of response and that what one says with respect to one may bear on what one can or needs to say with respect to the others.

A.3 Aquinas

For the remainder of this discussion, I shall focus on (2), namely, on the for-the-sake-of relation. As I already noted, this question becomes a question about intention. What ways of intending ends are sufficient to ensure that an action was done for the sake of that end? Aquinas does not discuss this question at length, but in a number of places it becomes clear that he recognizes different kinds of intention and, furthermore, that he thinks something weaker than paradigmatic or actual intention
is sufficient to relate actions to ends in the desired way.

A.3.1 Virtually intending

Perhaps the best-known passage in which Aquinas makes this sort of distinction occurs in his discussion in the *Summa Theologæ* of whether a human being wills everything for the sake of the ultimate end. As noted earlier, one of the obvious objections is that people often act and desire without thinking at all about the ultimate end. In response to this, Aquinas rejects an assumption made in the objection:

It is not necessary that someone always think about the ultimate end whenever he desires something or acts. But the force of the first intention, which is in respect of the ultimate end, remains in whatever desire of whatever thing, even if there is no thought of the ultimate end. Just as it is not necessary that someone going along a road think about the end in every step.\textsuperscript{11}

The example is persuasive. It certainly seems right to say that every step of a journey is done for the sake of the end or destination, even if one is thinking about something wholly different during the course of the journey. It is less clear, however, whether this will get Aquinas everything that he needs for the argument.

\textsuperscript{11}ST IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3: *Ad tertium dicendum quod non oportet ut semper aliquis cogitet de ultimo fine, quandocumque aliquid appetit vel operatur, sed virtus primae intentionis, quae est respectu ultimi finis, manet in quolibet appetitu cuiuscumque rei, etiam si de ultimo fine actu non cogitetur. Sicut non oportet quod qui vadit per viam, in quolibet passu cogitet de fine.*
We might distinguish a negative and a positive claim here. The negative claim is that it is not necessary to think about the end while acting in order for that action to have been done for the sake of the end. That claim seems right, as the example shows. But of course we will need some alternative condition for what makes it the case that an action is done for the sake of an end. The suggested positive claim seems to be that the necessary condition is that there have been an intention of the end at some point, the force (*virtus*) of which remains in the agent. This seems plausible. So we might say that what makes it the case that every step on the way to Rome was done for the sake of the end of getting to Rome was that the agent had decided to go to Rome before setting out. Once that intention has been set, there is no need to constantly think about the end while executing the means. The potential problem for Aquinas is that this may not suffice for the position he is arguing for, namely, AQC, i.e., that every human action is done for the sake of the ultimate end.\footnote{There is a potential complication here regarding the distinction between an ultimate end in the sense of something done for its own sake and an ultimate end in the sense of the complete good, i.e., happiness. I take it that Aquinas has the latter in mind here and it is in that case that I think this problem arises.} After all, it seems quite plausible that someone might have fixed on some subsidiary or proximate end, e.g., going to Rome, without ever having giving a moment’s thought to the ultimate end.

Aquinas has a somewhat more detailed discussion of this in *QDV* where he talks about St. Paul’s precept that ‘whether you eat or drink, or do anything else, do everything for the glory of God’ (1 Cor. 10:31). Aquinas takes this precept to mean that all of our actions are to be referred to God. Since actually doing this seems impossible, Aquinas again makes a distinction between different ways of intending an end:
Actually to refer everything to God is not possible in this life, just as it is not possible to always think about God, for this belongs to the perfection of our homeland. But as for virtually referring everything to God, this belongs to the complete charity to which everyone is held. For evidence of this it should be considered that, just as in efficient causes the power of the first cause remains in all the subsequent causes, so also the intention of the principal end virtually remains in all secondary ends. Hence, whoever actually intends some secondary end, virtually intends the principal end. For example, a doctor while he is collecting herbs actually intends to prepare a potion, perhaps thinking nothing about health, yet he virtually intends the health for the sake of which he gives the potion. Therefore, likewise, [when] someone orders himself to God, as to an end, there virtually remains in everything which he does for the sake of himself an intention for the ultimate end, which is God. As a result, merit can be earned in everything, if he has charity. Therefore, in this way the apostle instructs that everything is to be referred to the glory of God.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13}QDV q. 2, art. 11, ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum, quod omnia actu referre in Deum, non est possibile in hac vita, sicut non est possibile quod semper de Deo cogitetur: hoc enim pertinet ad perfectionem patriae. Sed quod omnia virtute referantur in Deum, hoc pertinet ad perfectionem caritatis ad quam omnes tenentur. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod, sicut in causis efficientibus virtus primae causae manet in omnibus causis sequentibus, ita etiam intentio principalis finis virtute manet in omnibus finibus secundariorum: unde quicumque actu intendit aliquem finem secundarium, virtute intendit finem principalem: sicut medicus, dum colligit herbas actu, intendit conficere potionem, nihil fortassis de sanitate cogitans, virtualiter tamen intendit sanitatem, propter quam potionem dat. Sic igitur: aliquis seipsum ordinat in Deum, sicut in finem, in omnibus quae propter seipsum facit manet virtute intentio ultimae finis, qui Deus est: unde in omnibus mereri potest, si caritatem habeat. Hoc igitur modo apostolus praecipit quod omnia in Dei gloriam referantur.
Here, Aquinas introduces some terminology for the distinction he wants to make: actually intending or referring and virtually intending or referring. At first glance, one might think that Aquinas is making the same distinction here that he made in the previous passage at which we looked. Certainly, it has the same motivation, i.e., wanting to avoid the claim that actual thought about an end while performing an action is necessary for that action to have been done for the end. And it is easy to read the example of the doctor as parallel to the example of the traveller. But note that as the example is described the doctor is actually intending something, i.e., the secondary end of making a potion. So there are two cases that we might distinguish. The first case is the case of the doctor as described here, where collecting the herbs counts as being done for the sake of health because the end of making a medicine was selected for the sake of health and the doctor actually intends making a medicine. In the second case, the doctor is collecting herbs but actually intends neither health nor preparing a potion. Instead, his mind is wandering and he is, say, thinking of how beautiful the nearby robin’s song is. The second case seems more akin to the travelling case, though perhaps the travelling case is underdescribed.

Nevertheless, these cases can be described so that a crucial feature they have in common is emphasized. In both cases the agent starts by actually intending an end (getting to a destination in one case, attaining health in the other). In both cases, the intention and resulting deliberation lead to the selection of means with which to pursue that

---

14 I will use the term ‘virtually acting’ to refer to acting done with a virtual intention and the term ‘virtual action’ to refer to an action done with a virtual intention. Likewise for the other ways of intending. I take it that Suárez also uses these terms in this way.
end (walking in one case, preparing a potion in the other).\textsuperscript{15} The doctor case, of course, is more complicated since further deliberation is needed before the doctor is in a position to act, i.e., he needs to select means by which to prepare the potion. But this complication is of no consequence for the matter at hand. In both cases, actual intention of an end led to the selection of means. Now that the means have been selected, the intellect can cease thinking about the end and yet the force of the original intention plausibly remains. In one case, the force is manifested by action, namely, by walking; in the other, by further deliberation, namely, by thinking about how to prepare a potion.

Described in this way, the two cases appear similar in a crucial respect: the force of an actual intention can remain even though the attention of the intellect cease. Cajetan also interprets virtual intention in this way in his commentary on the \textit{Summa Theologæ}:

To love virtually, however, is to do devout works from a preceding intention for God, as when someone at the beginning of the office by charity intends devoutly and attentively to say the divine office and afterwards pays his obligation having wandered off contrary to his intention. Such a person paid his obligation and said the office by virtually loving devotedly and attentively. For the force of the first intention remains

\textsuperscript{15}It might be objected that Aquinas’s description of the doctor case does not specify that the doctor selects the subsidiary end of preparing a potion via an actual intention of attaining health. But I think it is appropriate to read the case in this way, since the analogous case of acting for the sake of oneself with a virtual intention for God does suggest that the agent initially ordered himself to God with an actual intention for God. I also take this to be a natural reading the claim that ‘the intention of the principal end virtually remains in all secondary ends’.
Cajetan’s picture also is of the force of an actual intention remaining while the attention ceases. It is worth noting, too, that the account of virtual intention that becomes standard in subsequent centuries is a plausible elaboration of what Aquinas says in both cases.\textsuperscript{17}

\subsection*{A.3.2 Habitually intending}

Aquinas goes on to make a further distinction:

It is one thing habitually to refer to God and another virtually to refer to God. For even someone who is doing nothing or who does not actually intend anything, as when sleeping, can habitually refer to God. But to refer something virtually to God is to act for the sake of an end ordered to God. Hence, habitually to refer to God does not fall under a precept but to refer everything to God virtually falls under a precept of charity, since this is nothing other than to have God as one’s ultimate end.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{flushleft}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16}IaIIæ.24.10: Amare autem virtualiter est ex praecedenti intentione ad Deum operari pia opera: ut cum quis a principio officii intendit ex caritate dicere devote et attente officium divinum, et postea praeter intentionem evagatus persolvit illud, talis amando devote et attente virtualiter persolvit ac dixit officium; manet enim vis primae intentionis in toto.’
\item \textsuperscript{17}See Chapter 3.
\item \textsuperscript{18}Ibid., ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum, quod aliud est habitualiter referre in Deum, et aliud virtualiter. Habitualiter enim refert in Deum et qui nihil agit, nec aliquid actualiter intendit, ut dormiens; sed virtualiter aliquid referre in Deum, est agentis propter finem ordinantis in Deum. Unde habitualiter referre in Deum, non cadit sub praecepto; sed virtualiter referre omnia in Deum, cadit sub praecepto caritatis: cum hoc nihil aliud sit quam habere Deum ultimum finem.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushleft}
So now we have *habitually* intending on the table in addition to actually and virtually. Unfortunately, there is very little explication of what exactly it means to habitually intend something. It does not require any activity at all and, since one can even be sleeping, it clearly does not require any actual intention at all. But it is less clear what is required.

The reference to sleeping naturally suggests the distinction between first and second actuality that Aristotle makes, a distinction that Aquinas makes use of elsewhere.\(^{19}\) Aristotle points out that there are different senses in which we may say that something is potential or actual.\(^{20}\) A human being is potentially a knower insofar as she is in the class of beings that can come to have knowledge. She actualizes this potentiality if, for example, she learns grammar and becomes a grammarian. If she now falls asleep, she still knows grammar in one sense. That is a first actuality. If, however, she is awake and reflecting on the principles of grammar or using them, she knows grammar in a different sense. This is a second actuality. So perhaps Aquinas has first actuality in mind when he talks of habitual intention. Perhaps the person who habitually intends God has a settled disposition to come to actually intend God. This understanding of habitual intention seems to fit well with the text just quoted and, furthermore, could surely play an interesting part in a discussion of practical reason. But, as we will see shortly, there is some reason, albeit perhaps not decisive reason, to think that this is not how Aquinas thinks about it.

\(^{19}\) E.g.: *ST* Ia.76.4 ad 1.

\(^{20}\) *DA* 412a22–26, 417a21–b1, and *EN* 1146b31.
Aquinas uses the term in several other places. In one passage he says that that which we love in venial sin, we love for God’s sake habitually though not actually. But this passage provides even less explication of what that means. A third passage is even worse, since it makes clear that he applies his terminology inconsistently. He discusses the same precept from St. Paul in the Summa Theologiae that he discusses in QDV (both works are from late in his career) and again says that the precept does not require that everything be actually ordered to God. Here, however, he says that it suffices that it be habitually ordered to God:

Consequently, not everyone who does not actually refer everything that he does to the glory of God acts contrary to this precept. Therefore, it suffices that someone habitually refer himself and all that he has to God in order not to always sin mortally when he does not actually refer some act to the glory of God. Moreover, venial sin does not exclude habitual ordering of the human act to the glory of God but only actual [ordering], because it does not exclude charity which habitually orders to God.

---

21 ST IIaIIæ.24.10 ad 2: Quod non contingit in peccato veniali, sed solum in mortali, quod enim amatur in peccato veniali, propter Deum amatur habitu, etsi non actu.

22 IaIIæ.88.1 ad 2: Et sic non facit contra hoc praeceptum quicumque non actu refert in gloriam Dei omne quod facit. Sufficit ergo quod aliquis habitualiter referat se et omnia sua in Deum, ad hoc quod non semper mortaliter peccet, cum aliquem actu non refert in gloriam Dei actualiter. Veniale autem peccatum non excludit habitualem ordinationem actus humani in gloriam Dei, sed solum actualem, quia non excludit caritatem, quae habitualiter ordinat in Deum. Cajetan does not discuss the reference to habitual intention in his commentary on this passage.
But this is precisely what he denied in the discussion in the QDV—that was why he introduced the distinction between habitually and virtually intending an end.

In another passage in the Summa Theologiae in which he mentions habitual intention, he describes the case in a way that makes it sound like the traveller case which I took to be an example of virtual intention. Here, Aquinas is discussing whether a certain intention is required on the part of ministers in order for the sacrament of baptism to be valid. In response to an argument that requiring an intention is too demanding since it would require that the ministers’ attention never wander, he says that a habitual intention is sufficient for the validity of a sacrament. As an example, he mentions a priest who intends to baptize someone in accordance with the Church’s practice but whose attention is then caught by something else during the performance of the baptism. According to Aquinas, this baptism is still valid by force of the first intention (virtute primæ intentionis). But this sounds like the traveller case. In both cases we have an actual intention and in both cases some force remains by which the requisite actions are performed even though the mind thinks of something else. And nothing here sounds like the habitual intention of the QDV which is compatible with sleeping.23

One response to these passages might be to say that Aquinas had a distinction between two kinds of intention in mind but that he merely

---

23In his commentary on this part of the Summa Theologiae, Suárez reads Aquinas as referring to virtual intention without so much as noting that Aquinas actually uses the term ‘habitual intention’ (DS 13.3.5 [=OO 20:252]). Aquinas discusses the same objection to the requirement of an intention in his Sentences commentary. He provides the same response, although he does not use the term ‘habitual intention’ there: IV, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 2, q.c. 1 ad 4.
confused his terminology for them. But there are further passages that makes matters even more confusing. In discussing the question whether some human acts are indifferent, i.e., neither good nor bad, he includes this argument for an affirmative response:

Further, our works cannot be meritorious unless done for the sake of God. Therefore, either a habitual relation to the end suffices for the goodness of an act or it requires an actual relation. If a habitual relation suffices, then if someone once a year referred all actions which he will do in that year to God, they would all be meritorious. And thus the way of salvation would be most easy, which is contrary to Matt. 7:14: ‘Narrow is the way which leads to life’. If, however, an actual relation of the work to God is required, then a work can never be good unless someone actually thinks about God. If, therefore, no act is indifferent, then all acts which one does when not thinking about God will be bad and sinful, which is very harsh. Therefore, it is necessary that some acts be indifferent.24

It is not entirely obvious what it would mean to refer all the actions one will do for the rest of the year to God, but what does seem clear is that

---

24 *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* II, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 arg. 6: *Praeterea, opera nostra non possunt esse meritoria nisi propter Deum facta. Aut ergo ad bonitatem actus sufficit habitualis relatio in finem, aut exigitur actualis. Si sufficit habitualis, ergo si aliquis semel in anno referret omnia opera quae facturus est in illo anno, in Deum, omnia essent meritoria; et ita facillima esset via salutis: quod est contra illud Matth. 7, 14: arcta est via quae ducit ad vitam. Si autem exigitur actualis relatio operis in Deum, tunc nunquam posset esse opus bonum, nisi aliquis actu de Deo cogitaret. Si ergo nullus actus est indifferens, tunc omnis actus quem quis exercet de Deo non cogitans, erit malus, et peccatum: quod est valde durum. Ergo necesse est aliquos actus indifferentes esse.*
what is described here does not sound like the same kind of thing as either the virtual or habitual intentions we have encountered so far. It seems that an occurrent mental act is required—once a year, anyway—which might suggest a virtual intention. But presumably the suggestion is not that the agent’s actions for the rest of the year will arise from the force of the ‘habitual relation’ so that rules out a virtual intention.

Given that this characterization appeared in an argument for the position contrary to Aquinas’s, we might suspect that Aquinas will respond by saying this is a mischaracterization of habitual intention and will thus disarm the argument. But Aquinas does not do this. Instead, he grants that a habitual ordering of an act to God does not suffice for merit. But neither is actual intention required, so he posits a third option:

But it suffices that at some point all those ends are actually referred to the ultimate end, just as it happens when someone thinks to direct his entire being to the love of God. For then whatever he orders to himself will be ordered to God.²⁵

So what is required is that at some point one actually refer one’s proximate ends to the ultimate end, i.e., God. Once one has done this, all of one’s actions done for the sake of these proximate ends will also be done for the sake of the ultimate end. This, of course, sounds exactly like the description of virtually intending in the QDV, though Aquinas does not use the term here. If this third option here is, in fact, virtual

²⁵Ibid., ad 6: sed sufficit quod aliquando actualiter omnes illi fines in finem ultimum referantur; sicut fit quando aliquis cogitât se totum ad Dei dilectionem dirigere: tunc enim quidquid ad seipsum ordinat, in Deum ordinatum erit.
intention, then this passage would agree with the *QDV* passage on at least that count. The description of habitual intention, however, seems less compatible with the characterization given in the *QDV*. Nor, it is worth noting, does it sound like a distinction between first and second actuality is in mind here.

To add one more wrinkle, in discussing the role of ignorance in moral culpability in *De malo* Aquinas discusses an example involving an apparently not-too-perceptive fellow who has intercourse with a woman whom he falsely thinks is his wife. Aquinas notes in passing that although the man does not actually will to have intercourse with a woman who is not his wife since he does not know that she is not his wife, he may for all that habitually will to do so and would actually will to do so were he to know that she is not his wife (\textit{tamen vult habitu, et vellet actu, si sciret}). In other words, not only is he not very perceptive, but his motives might not be trustworthy either. Aquinas is talking here about habitually willing rather than habitually intending, but, if we can read this case as also involving a habitual intention, it adds a further complication to deciphering what Aquinas meant by that term. For it does not seem that we have either habitual or virtual intention here but, rather, something that looks very much like later accounts of interpretative intention, i.e., something that involves counterfactual attributions.

Given the diverse and apparently incompatible characterizations of habitual intention that we can find in Aquinas’s writings, it is perhaps worth noting what his commentators made of habitual intention. Here

---

\textsuperscript{26} *Q*. 3, art. 8 co.

\textsuperscript{27} See the discussion of interpretative intention in Chapter 3.
is Cajetan’s interpretation of habitual intention in his commentary on the Summa Theologæ:

To love habitually, however, posits neither an actual relation nor a persevering preceding intention, but it conveys only an associated habit and an efficacy insofar as it is on the part of a habit. So just as it is nothing other to say ‘loving God habitually’ than to say ‘he has a habit by which God can be loved’ so it is nothing other to say ‘this is loved habitually for the sake of God’ than ‘to have a habit by which this can be loved for the sake of God’.28

With this passage, too, one might have asked for further explication. It is somewhat puzzling to read that with a habitual intention there is no force remaining from a preceding intention but that there is an efficacy.29 But perhaps one should understand Cajetan as simply saying that there is nothing remaining from a prior actual intention that would provide the force for an action, but that the habitual intention has some efficacy in the sense of readily giving rise to new actual dispositions. Here again we might think that the Aristotelian distinction between first and second actuality would provide a good way of understanding the passage.

28IIaIIæ.24.10: ‘Amare autem habitu nec actualem relationem, nec praecedentem intentionem perseverantem ponit; sed solum habitus concomitantiam, et efficaciam quantum est ex parte habitus, importat. Ita quod, sicut nihil aliud est dicere amare habitu Deum quam dicere, habet habitum quo Deus amari potest; ita nihil aliud est dicere, amatur hoc habitu propter Deum, quam habere habitum quo propter Deum hoc amari potest’.

29This passage comes just after Cajetan said that the force from an actual intention remains for a virtual intention, so I am reading his claim that there is no ‘persevering preceding intention’ as saying that there is no persevering force from a preceding intention.
If Cajetan thinks of habitual intention as a first actuality, perhaps he is right to attribute such an understanding to Aquinas. I suspect that the best explanation for the various apparently conflicting characterizations in Aquinas’s work is that he repeatedly noticed that other kinds of intention than actual intention were needed and so he would introduce some distinct kind of intention. But he failed to systematize these distinctions and to use the terminology consistently. Hence, it is futile to try to reconcile all the characterizations with each other. Rather, each characterization provides a record of a distinction that Aquinas thought was needed for the particular task at hand. If this is right, it is quite possible that Aquinas thought of habitual intention as a first actuality in at least some of the cases, e.g., in the first passage we discussed in this section.

**A.4 Conclusion**

Are these kinds of intention sufficient for Aquinas’s claim that all human actions are done for the sake of the ultimate end? It is not clear that they are. Actual intention obviously is not enough. Adding virtual intention—understood as characterized in the previous section—seems unlikely to suffice either, given how closely it relies on preceding actual intentions. Some of the characterizations of habitual intention required that a certain actual intention precede it. But actions that are done without the agent having ever thought of the ultimate end with respect to those actions might be thought to require some kind of intention that does not rely on actual intentions in this way. But this is not the place
to settle whether Aquinas has distinguished enough kinds of intention
to provide him with the resources for a full defence of AQC. Doing so
would require discussing each of the characterizations of habitual in-
tention in turn. Doing so would also require discussing the other ways
of responding to AQC and how they related to the discussion of inten-
tion. For example, how plausible it is to think that actually intending
the ultimate end preceded all the actions in question depends in part on
what we take the formal ultimate end to be.

Whether or not these distinctions suffice for a defence of AQC, they
do help to show how acting for ends might be a pervasive feature of hu-
man action, even if many of those actions are done without attendant
cognition of those ends. Our look at Aquinas, then, has both shown
what some of the motivations are for making these distinctions and in-
dicated points about which greater clarity would be desirable. We can
also, then, see why later philosophers such as Suárez would have picked
up on this issue.
APPENDIX B

DE FINE HOMINIS DD. 1-5 WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The standard edition of Suárez’s work is the *Opera Omnia* published by Vivès in Paris in 1856–1866. The Vivès edition is not a critical edition, but that is not of as much concern as it might be since Suárez scholars do not need to worry about the sort of complex textual issues that Scotus scholars, for example, have to worry about. On the other hand, the Vivès edition does introduce some errors; in particular, one finds homeoteleutonic omissions with alarming frequency. Its handling of what were marginal notes in the first editions is also unsatisfactory: many notes are omitted and, when they are included, they are included as italicised text all too often inserted in the wrong place.

The following Latin text is from Volume 4 of the Vivès edition. The text is improved, however, by making numerous corrections on the basis of comparisons with the 1628 edition published in Lyon. For recorded variants, $A = 1628$ edition and $V =$ Vivès edition.

All marginal notes are as found in the 1628 edition. I have decided to preserve them as marginal notes, even though the formatting requirements for dissertations leaves the result less than wholly satisfactory.

Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is likely to continue being the most widely used edition for the foreseeable future.

The translations are a work-in-progress; to check for more recent versions, go to http://www.sydneypenner.ca/texts.html.
Francisco Suárez, S. J.

DE FINE HOMINIS DD. 1–5, SECT. 1

<1>

DISPUTATIO I.

De causalitate finis, respectu humanæ voluntatis.

Universa hæc doctrina maxima ex parte versatur in explicandis humanis actionibus, quatenus humanæ sunt, ac bonitatis, ac malitiae moralis capaces: in quo potissimum a fine pendent, qui est principium moralium actionum, et ideo prius hanc Disputationem præmittendam duxi, in qua munus, varios modos, rationem, seu distinctionem finis explicabo: hæc enim Disputatio necessario præmittenda videtur, ad explicanda nonnulla principia, et varium titulum, quibus, in sequentibus utendum nobis est, ne cogamur eadem semper repetere: curabimus autem a questionibus philosophicis, quoad fieri potest, abstinere, aut eas tantum breviter attingere, quantum ad rem Theologicam fuerit necessarium.

This entire doctrine stems chiefly from its part in explaining human actions insofar as humans are capable of both moral goodness and badness. They above all depend in this on the end, which is the principle of moral actions. For this reason, I start first with this disputation that should come first, in which I explain the function, different modes, nature, or distinctions of the end. For it seems necessary to set this disputation at the beginning in order to explain some principles and different labels which we will make use of in the following [sections] so that we are not compelled always to repeat the same thing. Moreover, we will take care, insofar as possible, to stay away from philosophical questions or to touch on them only briefly insofar as they are necessary for the theological matter.
Sectio I.

In quo consistat causalitas finis respectu humanae voluntatis.

1. Primum omnium statuendum est, finem et causalitatem ejus, qualiscumque illa sit, proprie suum locum habere in voluntate humana, et in actibus, seu effectibus ejus, quod est certissimum. Primo ex modo loquendi Scripturæ sacrae, ubique enim tribuit homini modum operandi propter finem, quod maxime illi convenit ratione voluntatis, ad Romanos 8: Propter te mortificamur tota die, etc. Sed in omnibus superamus propter eum, qui dilexit nos, et Psalmo 118: Inclinavi cor meum ad faciendas justications tuas, propter retributionem. Secundo experimentia constat, hominem non casu, nec fortuito in incertum ferri, sed in definitum finem dirigere operationes suas. Tertio, constat etiam ratione, quia motio finis præcipue habet locum in agentibus per

---

1 Suárez also discusses this subject in DM XXIII.4.

---

Section I.

In what the causality of the end consists with respect to human will. 

1. First of all, it should be established that the end and its causality, whatever that is, properly has its place in the human will and in its acts or effects. This is most certain. First, [it is certain] because of the way of speaking in Holy Scripture, for it everywhere attributes to human beings the way of acting for the sake of an end which is especially suitable for them by reason of the will. For example, Romans 8[:36–37]: ‘For your sake we are put to death all the day long . . . But in all these things we overcome for the sake of him who loved us.’ And Psalm 119[:112]: ‘I have inclined my heart to doing your right things for the sake of the reward.’ Secondly, it is clear from experience that a human being is not brought to an indefinite thing by chance or by fortune; rather, he directs his actions to a definite end. Thirdly, it is also clear by reason, because the motion of an end especially has a place in agents through the
intellectum: nam finis movet agens ad operandum, movet autem per cognitionem: agens autem intellectuale maxime cognoscere potest rationem finis, et ordinem ejus ad media: ergo voluntas, quae ratione ducitur, maxime potest moveri a fine.

2. Secundo, ut intelligatur proprius quæstionis sensus, supponendum est ex Cajetano, 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 4, et clarius 2, 2, quæst. 17, a. 5, sicut in causa efficienti quatuor distinguuntur ita etiam posse in causa finali distinguui, scilicet, res quæ causat, ratio, seu forma, quae est principium causandi, causalitas ejus actualis et effectus causatus: in hac sectione præcipue agimus de tertio, scilicet de causalitate actuali finis, qua intellecta, facile constabit, quis sit, et quotuplex effectus finis in humana voluntate: de ratione autem seu principio causandi, dicemus postea in sectione tertia: et inde constabit, quenam res poscit esse causa finalis. Quare in universum, et in omni genere cause illa res potest rationem cause participare, cui potest convenire forma illa, quae est ratio causandi.

For the end moves an agent to acting, but it moves through cognition. But intellectual agents especially can cognize the ratio of the end and its relation to means. Therefore, the will, which is led by reason, can especially be moved by the end.

2. Secondly, in order that the proper sense of the question is understood, one should suppose according to Cajetan in Ia.5.4 and more clearly in IIaIIæ.17.5 that just as four things are distinguished in an efficient cause, so also [four things] can be distinguished in a final cause. Namely, the thing which causes, the nature or form that is the principle of causing, its actual causality, and the caused effect. In this section we will deal especially with the third, namely, with the actual causality of the end. Once this is understood it will easily be clear what the effect of the end in a human will is and how many kinds of effects there are. Moreover, concerning the nature or principle of causing, we will speak later in the third section. And thereupon it will be clear what then can be a final cause. Wherefore in general and in every genus of cause that thing can participate in the nature of cause with which that form which is the nature of causing can agree.
1. Opinio in præsenti quæst. 3. Tertio, his positis, duæ possunt esse extremæ sententiae in præsenti sectione. Prima est, causalitatem finis non consistere in motione aliqua respectu humanæ voluntatis, sed in hoc solum, quod effectus, qui a voluntate progreditur, in aliquid ut in finem ordinetur, ita ut esse finem nihil aliud sit, quam esse id, cujus gratia aliud sit: nam hoc modo rationem finis Aristoteles ubique describit, præsertim 2, Physicor. et 5 Metaphysicæ. Unde Cajetanus supra dicit, causalitatem finis esse innominatam, signifi l 50 can vero per hanc vocem esse propter quod, seu id esse, cujus gratia. Et potest suaderi hæc sententia, quia in in operibus Dei est propria causalitas finis, Deus enim vere ac perfecte operatur propter finem: sed respectu Dei non potest hæc causalitas consistere in motione voluntatis ejus, ut videtur per se notum, quia id est maxima imperfectio in Deo. Similiter in inferioribus agentibus naturalibus est propria causalitas finis, quæ non potest consistere in motione agentis, cum non cognoscat finem: ergo similiter in voluntate humana, quæ est quasi media inter Deum et res Suadetur exemplis. 3. Thirdly, these things having been posited, there can be two extreme views in the present section. The first is that the causality of the end does not consist in some motion with respect to the human will but in this alone, namely, that the effect which is advanced by the will is ordered to something in such a way that to be the end is nothing other than to be that for the sake of which something exists. For Aristotle describes the nature of the end in this way everywhere, especially in Phys. II and Metaph. V. Hence Cajetan says earlier that the causality of the end is innominate, but is signified through this expression: ‘to be for the sake of which’ or ‘to be that for the sake of which’. And this view can be urged because there is a proper causality of the end in God’s actions, for God truly and perfectly acts for the sake of an end. But with respect to God this causality cannot consist in the motion of his will, as seems per se notum since that would be a great imperfection in God. Similarly, in lower natural agents there is a proper causality of the end, which cannot consist in the motion of the agent, since the agent does not cognize the end. Therefore, one should philosophize likewise in the case of the human will, which is, as it were, the middle between God and lower things. Secondly, The same by reason.

DE FINE HOMINIS 230  DISP. I, SECT. I
because it can scarcely be understood what that motion is or what sort of thing it is, since either it is something antecedent to the act of will (and this cannot be the case since there is nothing in the will) or it is the very act of will itself (and this cannot be the case since such an act is more an effect of the end that its causality). For the end moves to such an act by drawing and enticing the will. Therefore, etc.

4. Nevertheless, this view explains neither the matter itself nor the common way of speaking of theologians and philosophers. For first, all the authors place the causality of the end in a metaphorical motion with respect to our will. St. Thomas thinks in this way in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 and in De Veritate, q. 22, art. 2, where these words should be noted: ‘Just as to inflow in the way of an efficient cause is to act, so to inflow in the way of a final cause is to be sought (appeti) or to be desired.’ An in De Pœnitentia, q. 5, art. 1, [co.], he says: ‘The is not a cause except insofar as it moves the efficient cause to acting. Hence, where there is no act, there is no final cause, [as is clear from] Metaph. III, text. 12.’ And it seems that this doctrine is taken from Aristotle De gen. I, cap. 7. Secondly, that the end is said to be that for the sake of which something happens is
nis dicatur esse id, cujus gratia aliquid fit, solum est denominatio quædam extrinseca in ipso fine; ex eo quod aliquid aliud ordinatur ad ipsum: ergo non satis est hoc ad causalitatem propria finis. Patet consequentia, tum quia hæc denominatio non dicit eminentionem aliquam realem, nec influxum: tum etiam, quia alias quilibet terminus motus, et quodlibet objectum cujuscumque actus, quatenus est terminus, ad quem tendit operatio agentis, habebit propriam causalitatem finis. Item, cessante actione agentis hoc solo quod res esset propensa, seu inclinata natura sua in finem, durat semper causalitas finis, quia semper durat illa denominatio, quod hæc res est propter illam, quæ emanare potest ex sola actione præterita, et ordinata ipsius agentis: hoc ergo solum non satis est ad explicandam hanc causalitatem finis. 

5. Secunda sententia est, hanc causalitalem consistere in motione metaphorica voluntatis, quæ ex se antecedit tempore, et distinguetur ab omni actu elicito ab ipsa voluntate. Quæ opinio in hunc modum explicari potest, quia finis non movet voluntatem, only a certain extrinsic denomination on the end itself from the fact that something else is ordered to it. Therefore, this is not enough for a proper causality of the end. The consequence is clear, both because this denomination does not express some real emanation or influx and also because otherwise any terminus whatever of motion and any object of any act (insofar as it is a terminus to which the action of the agent tends) will have the proper causality of an end. Likewise—in a case where an agent rests from action—by the mere fact that the thing disposed or inclined by its nature to the end, the causality of the end would always remains, because the denomination that his thing is for the sake of that—which can emanate merely from an action of the agent that is past and ordered—always remains. Therefore, this alone is not sufficient to explain this causality of the end.

5. The second view is that this causality consists in metaphorical motion of the will, which from itself temporally precedes and is distinguished from every act elicited by the will itself. This opinion can be explicated in this way, [namely,] because the end does not move the will unless it was first cog-
nisi præcognitus sit: hoc autem ipso quod finis est cognitus, et bonitas ejus, etiamsi voluntas per proprium suum actum in illum non tendat (est enim libera, et potest suum actum suspendere) intelligitur excitari et moveri a fine cognito, ut ipsum amet et intendat: hæc enim excitatio et motio antecedit consensum voluntatis, et intelligitur oriri ex conjunctione et sympathia potentiarum intellectus et voluntatis, quatenus in eadem animæ essentia radicantur: ergo in hac motione consistit causalitas finis, quia hæc motio metaphorica non videtur posse alio modo explicari. Et hoc confirmat secunda ratio facta in præcedenti sententia: quia quidquid post hanc motionem sequitur, non est nisi amor, vel intentio finis, qui sunt actus voluntatis, qui non sunt causalitas: sed potius effectus causalitatis finis. Secundo, quia, seclusa praedicta motione, postea finis solum se habet ut terminus specificans actum tendentem in ipsum: at vero sub hac ratione finis non exercet causalitatem finis, sed potius participat causalitatem formæ specificantis, ut significat D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 6, nized. But by this very fact that the end and its goodness is cognized—even if the will does not tend to it, for the will is free and can suspend its act—the will is excited and moved by the cognized end so that it loves and intends the end. For this excitation and motion precedes the consent of the will and is understood to arise from the union and sympathy of the powers of intellect and will, insofar as the essences are rooted in the same soul. Therefore, the causality of the end consists in this motion, since this metaphorical motion does not seem to be able to be explained in another way. And a second argument made in the preceding section confirms this. For whatever follows after this motion is nothing other than love or intention for the end, which are acts of the will. These are not causality but rather the effect of the causality of the end. Secondly, because, apart from the aforementioned motion, afterwards the the end only holds itself as the terminus specifying the act tending to it. But, to be sure, the end does not exercise the causality of the end under this aspect, but rather participates in the causality of the specifying form, as St. Thomas indicates in IaIIæ.2.6 ad 1. And in all object the specificative act is the same nature and mode of causality. Therefore.
ad. 1, et in omnibus objectis, actus specificativus est
eadem ratio et modus causalitatis: ergo.

6. Hæc vero nec intelligi possunt, nec satisfacere:
quia hic non agimus de causalitate finis in actu primo,
ut sic dicam, seu de proxima applicatione ejus ad cau-
sandum, sed de causalitate, et influxu ejus in actu se-
cundo, hic autem intelligi non potest priusquam in
voluntate aliud causatum sit, quia realis causalitas
debet ad aliud reale haberi, alias nihil esset: sed si in
voluntate nulla est res nova, nec operatio aliqua, vel
affectio, nihil intelligi potest, quod a fine causatum
sit: ergo nec intelligi potest causalitas finis in actu
secundo. Confirmatur ac declaratur, quia illa exci-
tatio, quæ dicitur esse in homine cognoscente finem
et bonitatem ejus, antequam voluntas proprio motu
moveatur, nihil aliud est revera, quam cognitio et ju-
dicium intellectus, nam in voluntate nihil de novo
positum est, quod ante non esset: sed judicium intel-
lectus non est causalitas finis, ut per se constat, sed
potius est approximatio finis, ut <3> causare possit:
ergo non potest in hoc solo consistere causalitas fi-

6. But this cannot be understood and does not satisfy. For
we are not dealing here with the causality of the end in the
first act—if I may speak that way—or with the proximate ap-
application of it to causing, but with its causality and influx into
the second act. But this cannot be understood before some-
ting is caused in the will, because real causality must be had
towards something real. Otherwise, it is nothing. But if there
is no new thing in the will, neither any action or affection,
then nothing can be understood as having been caused by the
end. Therefore, no causality of the end can be understood in
the second act. It is confirmed and shown because that exci-
tation which is said to be in the human who is cognizing the
end and its goodness before the will is moved by a proper mo-
tion, is really nothing other than the cognition and judgement
of the intellect, of nothing new was posited in the will that
was not there before. But the judgement of the intellect is not
the causality of the end, as is clear per se, but rather is an ap-
proach of the end so that it can cause. Therefore, the causality
of the end cannot consist in this alone. You may perhaps say

DE FINE HOMINIS

234

Disp. I, sect. I
nis. Dices fortasse ex hoc judicio statim resultare in voluntate affectionem vel motionem aliquam saltem per simplicem complacentiam, ratione cujus est actualiter, et universaliter propensa in finem, ut illum intendat, et efficaciter amet. Sed hoc nihil refert ad rem de qua agimus, explicandam: primo quidem, quia, si haec affectio est libera, potest voluntas illam suspendere: si autem est naturalis, non est per se semper necessaria ad causalitatem finis: hujusmodi enim imperfecti motus ex imperfecto modo operandi insurgunt in nobis, vel ex conjunctione appetitus, vel ex imperfecta deliberatione. At vero, seclusis his imperfectionibus, non sunt necessarii illi imperfecti actus, ut voluntas ex perfecto judicio ac libertate a fine moveatur, ut videre licet in Angelis, in Beatis, in Christo et Virgine, et nonnunquam etiam contingit in nobis. Deinde de illomet affectu simplici redit eadem difficultas: nam ille etiam est quidam actus voluntatis, unde est quidam effectus ipsius finis, de quo inquirendum superest, quæ sit causalitas finis circa talem actum: et quod de illo dictum fuerit, dici etiam that from this judgement there at once results in the will some affection of motion, at least through a simple taking of pleasure, by reason of which it is actually and generally favourably disposed to the end, so that it intends and efficaciously loves it. But this has no bearing on the matter that needs to be explained and with which we are dealing. First, indeed, because if this affection is free, the will can suspend it. But if it is natural, it is not per se and always necessary for the causality of the end. For motions of this imperfect sort rise up in us from an imperfect way of acting or from a union of desire or from imperfect deliberation. But, on the other hand, apart from these imperfections, these imperfect acts are not necessary in order for the will to be moved by the end from freedom and perfect judgement, as may be seen in the case of angels, the blessed, Christ, and the Virgin, and sometimes even in us. Next, the same difficulty returns concerning the simple affect itself. For it is also a certain act of the will. Hence it is a certain effect of the end itself, concerning which it remains to be inquired what the causality of the end is with respect to such an act. And what has been said about that, will also be able to be said about the perfect act of intention or election.
poterit de perfecto actu intentionis, seu electionis.

1. **Assertio verae sententiae, de qua videndus Author disp. 23 Metaph. sect. 4.**

Eius ratio ex D. Thom.

7. Dico ergo causalitatem finis circa voluntatem nostram non esse in actu secundo, donec ipsa voluntas actu moveatur, et tendat in ipsum finem. Hæc assertio probatur sufficienter argumentis factis contra secundam sententiam, et videtur mihi expresse divi Thomæ, locis nuper citatis, ex cujus verbis potest ratione nova confirmari: quia donec causa efficiens sit in actu, non potest intelligi causa finalis actu causare: nam finis, ut definit Aristoteles, est, *cujus gratia aliquid fit*: si ergo nihil actu fit, non est actu finis; si autem efficiens actu non efficit actu, nihil fit: et consequenter nihil fit propter finem: ergo, de primo ad ultimum, ante actum agentis non est causalitas finis: ergo pari ratione in voluntate ante actionem voluntatis non est causalitas finis circa ipsam in actu secundo. Quod tandem declaratur, quia vel haec causalitas esset circa ipsam potentiam voluntatis, et hoc non, quia, secluso actu, illa non aliter se habet, nec immutatur aliquo modo: vel est circa actum ipsius voluntatis, et hoc esse non potest sine ipso actu.

7. I say, therefore, that the causality of the end concerning our will is not in the second act until the will itself is actually moved and tends to the end itself. This assertion is sufficiently proved by the arguments made against the second view and it seems to me explicit in St. Thomas in the places just cited, from whose words it can be confirmed anew by reason. Because until the efficient cause actually is, the final cause cannot be understood to actually cause. For the end, as Aristotle defines it, is that ‘for the sake of which something happens’. If, therefore, nothing actually happens, the end is not actually. But if the efficient cause actually does not actually effect [anything], nothing happens. And consequently nothing happens for the sake of the end. Therefore, from the first to the last, there is no causality of the end before an act of the agent. Therefore, by a like argument, before an action of the will there is no causality of the end in the second act concerning it in the will. This is shown, finally, because this causality would concern either the power itself of the will (and this is not the case, because, apart from an act, it could not hold itself otherwise nor is it changed in some way) or an act of the will itself (and this cannot be

De fine hominis 236 Disp. I, sect. I
2. Assertio. 8. Dico secundo: Causalitas finis in voluntate non est res aliqua, nec modus distinctus ab actu et actione voluntatis: sed est ipsam actio, quae simul est et a voluntate in genere causae, et a fine in suo genere, scilicet, trahente, et determinante voluntatem ad tamum actum. Hæc conclusio hoc solo sufficienter probatur, quia non potest intelligi quid alium sit hæc causalitas finis, nec alium est necessarium ut voluntas moveatur in finem: ergo revera in hoc consistit. Deinde potest exemplis declarari, quia sicut in potentia cognoscitiva actionis natura sua pendet a potentia, et ab objecto ut movente potentiam, ita suo modo actio voluntatis, in potentia autem cognoscitiva eadem actionis ut est a potentia est concursus ejus ad tamum actum, et ut est ab objecto est similiter causalitas ejus: ergo eodem modo in voluntate actio ejus, quia intrinsecum, et essentialiter pendet ab his duobus principiis, scilicet a potentia et a fine proposito, ut est effective a voluntate, est concursus ejus: ut vero est a fine in

without the very act).

8. I say secondly: the causality of the end in the will is not some thing or mode distinct from the act and action of the will. Rather, it is the very action itself which is at the same time both by the will in the genus of efficient cause and by the end in its genus, namely, by drawing and giving determinateness to the will to such an act. This conclusion is sufficiently proven by this alone that it cannot be understood what else this causality of the end would be nor is anything else necessary for the will to be moved to the end. Therefore, it really does consist in this. Finally, it can be shown by examples, since just as in the case of cognoscitive power an action depends by its nature on the power and on the object as moving the power, so also in its way an action of the will. But in the case of the cognoscitive power the same action insofar as it comes from the power is a concursus of it to such an act and insofar as it comes from the object is likewise its causality. Therefore, in the same way, in the case of the will its action, because it depends intrinsically and essentially on these two principles (namely, on the power and on the proposed end), is its concursus, insofar as it effectively comes from the will. But insofar as
suo genere causæ, est motio actualis ejus, nec oportet in illa actione duas rationes, aut modos distinguere, quia per se ipsam et essentialiter postulat utramque habitudinem. Solum est differentia, quod in potentia cognocitiva concursus potentiarum pertinet ad causam effectivam, in voluntate vero ad causam finalem, quod provenit ex propriis modis operandi talium potentiarum. Aliud exemplum adhiberi potest in causa exemplari, quæ media apprehensione concurrat etiam ad effectum suum, et concursus ejus solum in hoc consistit, quod fiat effectus ad imitationem ejus: unde in re non distinguitur ab actione agentis, sed eadem actio quæ proficit effective ab agente, manat ab idea exemplariter, ut sic dicam, et ut sic, est concursus ejus: sic ergo in præsentii dicendum est.

1. Corollar. causalitatem finis proprius solum reperiri in agentibus intellectualibus.

9. Unde intelligitur primo hujusmodi modum causalitatis finis tantum habere locum in agentibus per cognitionem, nam alia agentia non possunt a fine moveri; et ideo est communis omnium sensus, apprehensionem finis esse illi vel rationem causandi, it comes from the end in its own genus of cause it is its actual motion. Nor is it necessary to distinguish in that action two aspects or modes, because it requires through it itself and essentially each habitude. The only difference is that in the case of the cognositive power the concursus of the power pertains to the effective cause, but in the case of the will to the final cause. This results from the proper modes of acting of such powers. Another example can be employed in the case of an exemplar cause, which also concurs with its effect by means of an apprehension. And its concursus consists only in this, namely, that the effect comes about by imitation of it. Hence, it is not distinguished in reality from the action of the agent, but the same action which flows forth effectively from the agent flows from the idea exemplarily, if I may speak in this way. And, as such, it is its concursus. Therefore, the same sort of thing should be said in the present case.

9. Hence, it is understood, first, that the mode of this sort of causality of the end only has a place in agents through cognition. For other agents cannot be moved by the end. And for this reason it is the common sense of everyone that for it the apprehension of the end is either the nature of causing or a

DE FINE HOMINIS

The first corollary: the causality of the end is properly found only in intellectual agents.
vel rationem necessariam ad causandum. Ut autem hæc causalitas propria ac formalis sit, necesse est ut hæc cognitio sit intellectualis: quia, ut infra dicemus, solum finis movet sub ratione boni et convenientis. Sub hac autem ratione propræ et formaliter solum cognoscipotest per intellectum, quia necessarium est cognoscere habituidinem unius ad aliud, et proportionem quandam inter appetibile et appetentem, seu inter medium et finem. Unde bruta, quamvis per cogitationem moveantur ad appetendum, et ideo fit in eis quædam participatio hujus causalitatis finis, tamen non est perfecta in eis ac formalis ratio finis propter causam dictam.

10. Secundo colligitur, hanc causalitatem finis, prout exercetur in voluntate, non reperiri propræ in Deo, nec in voluntate ejus: sed solum in voluntate creata, quæ per actionem propriam, et actum a se distinctum movetur in finem: quia, ut dixi, ubi non est actio agentis, non est actualis motio finis: sed in voluntate divina non est propriæ actio, quæ tendat in finem, quia actus, quo Deus vult quidquid nature necessary for causing. Moreover, for this causality to be proper and formal, it is necessary that this cognition be intellect, because, as we will say below, the end only moves under the aspect of good and agreeability. But something can be properly and formally cognized under this aspect only through the intellect, since it is necessary to cognize the habitude of one thing to another and a certain proportion between the desirable things and the one desiring or between means and end. Hence, brute animals, although they are moved to desiring things through thought and therefore a certain participation in this causality of the end happens in them, still, it is not perfect in them and for that reason it is not called the formal nature of the end.

10. It is gathered, secondly, that this causality of the end, as it is exercised in the will, is not properly found in God nor in his will but only in a created will which through a proper action and act distinct from itself is moved to the end. For, as I said, where there is no action of the agent, there is no actual motion of the end. But in the divine will there is no proper action which tends to the end, because the act by which God wills whatever he wills is not distinguished from his will nor
vult, non distinguitur a voluntate ejus, nec est aliquid factum, seu causatum: nihil enim, quod sit ipsemet Deus, potest habere veram causam, voluntas autem Dei est ipsemet Deus. Dices, ergo Deus non vere ac proprie operatur propter verum finem. Respondeo, negando consequentiam simpliciter: quia, ut notavit Gabriel, in 2, dist. 1, quæst. 5, art. 1, aliud est loqui de fine, aliud de causa finali: finis autem tantum dicit terminum seu rationem extremi, ad quod aliud ordinatur; causa vero finalis, proprie dicit id, quod movet agens ad operandum: quamvis autem respectu Dei, et voluntatis ejus, finis non habeat hanc causalitatem, tamen Deus altiori, et perfectiori modo ordinat effectus suos, seu exteriores actiones ad determinatos fines: et ideo perfectissimo modo, et ablatis omnibus imperfectionibus, operatur propter finem. Secundo, quia licet divinæ voluntatis non detur propria causa, dari tamen potest ratio ejus ex parte finis desumptæ, ut docet D. Thomas 1, cont. Gent., c. 86, et hoc modo sine causalitate finis circa divinam voluntatem Deus proprie operatur propter finem. Atque ex his is something made or caused. For nothing that is God himself can have a true cause, but the will of God is God himself. You may say: therefore God does not truly and properly act for the sake of a true end. I respond by denying the consequence, strictly speaking. For, as Gabriel noted in II, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1, it is one thing to speak of the end, but another to speak of the final cause. The end, moreover, only expresses a terminus or the nature of an extreme to which something else is ordered. But the final cause properly expresses that which moves the agent to acting. Although with respect to God and his will, the end does not have this causality, nevertheless, God orders his effects and external actions to determine ends in a higher and more perfect way. And, therefore, he acts for the sake of an end in a most perfect way that is free from all imperfections. Secondly, because, although a proper cause is not given to the divine will, a reason can nevertheless be given for it on the part of the chosen end, as St. Thomas teaches in SCG I, c. 86. And in this way God can properly act for the sake of an end without causality of the end around the divine will. And by these things there is a sufficient response to the foundations of the other opinions in nn. 3–5. And it will become even more
satis responsum est ad fundamenta aliarum opinionum, in num. 3 et 5, et amplius patebit ex sequenti sectione.

Sectio II.

Utrum causalitas finis in voluntate nostra sit tantum respectu mediorum, vel etiam respectu ipsius finis.

1. Explicata motione causæ finalis in voluntate nostra, superest explicandum, quotuplex sit hæc motio, et circa quos actus versetur: nam inde constabit qui sint effectus finis: supponimus autem in genere quosdam actus voluntatis versari circa finem ipsum <col. b> amando vel intendendo illum, vel fruendo illo; alios vero circa media, quæ propter finem eliguntur. Est ergo quornadam sententia, causalitatem finis solum exerceri circa media, quæ propter finem appetuntur atque adeo motionem voluntatis ad appetendum finem propter se ipsum non esse, nec pertinere ad causalitatem finis, sed solum eam motionem, qua eligat media, vel eis utitur propter finem. Ita Gabriel, in 2, d. 1, q. 5, a. 1, et Gregorius, in 1, sectio.

Section II.

Whether the causality of an end in our will is only with respect to means or also with respect to the end itself.

1. Having explained the motion of the final cause in our will, it remains to explain how many kinds of this motion there are and with which acts it is concerned. For by doing so it will become clear what the effects of the end are. We assume in general that certain acts of the will are concerned with the end itself by loving, intending, or enjoying it, but others are concerned with means that are elected for the sake of the end. There is, therefore, the view of some that the causality of the end is exercised only concerning means that are desired for the sake of the end, for which reason the motion of the will in desiring the end for its own sake is not nor does it pertain to the causality of the end. Rather, only that motion by which it elects means or uses them is for the sake of the end. Gabriel in II, dist. 1, q. 5, a. 1, Gregory in I, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, and Med-
d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, et Medina, 1, 2, q. 8, in principio, et idem sentit Hervæus, quodlibet 1, q. 8, et quodlibet 2, quæst. 1, quatenus dicit rationem finis consistere in hoc, quod facit media esse amabilia propter ipsum: in quo magis explicat aptitudinem quam actum. Potest autem hæc sententia probari ex Aristotele 2, Physic., cap. 3, et 5 Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, dicente finem esse cujus gratia aliquid fit : nam in hac definitione aperte explicat habitudinem mediæ ad finem. Unde 3, Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, inquit : Omne, quod, per se et propter naturam ipsius, bonum est, finis est, atque icta causat, quoniam illius gratia cætera fiunt : in quibus verbis significat, illam rem esse finem, que per se bona est et amabilis: et hanc conditionem supponit requiri ante causalitatem finis, hanc vero causalitatem in hoc consistere, quod hujus rei gratia aliquid fiat ratione prædicta. Confirmari hoc potest, quia finis dicit essentialiter habitudinem ad media, ut ex ipsa vocis proprietate constat; nam finis idem est quod extremum; ubi autem non est medium, nec extremum esse potest: ergo causalitas finis proprie non exercetur nisi circa ina in IaIIæ.8, in the beginning, [say] this. Hervæus thinks the same thing in Quodlibet 1, q. 8, and 2, q. 1, insofar as he says that the the nature of the end consists in its making means lovable for its sake, by which he explains the aptitude more than the act. Moreover, this view can be proven from Aristotle, Phys. II, cap. 3, and Metaph. V, cap. 2, saying that the end is ‘that for the sake of which something happens’. For in this definition he obviously explains the relation of means to an end. Hence, in Metaph. III, cap. 2, he says: ‘Everything which is good in itself and on account of its own nature is an end and causes in that way’, because, ‘the other things come about for its sake’. He indicates with these words that that thing is an end which is in itself good and lovable. And he supposes that this condition is required prior to the causality of the end. But that causality consists in something coming about for the sake of that thing for the aforementioned reason. This can be confirmed because the end essentially expresses a relation to means as is clear from the very meaning (proprietate) of the word, for the end is the same thing as that extreme. But where there is no mediate thing, there can be no extreme. Therefore, the causality of the end is not, strictly speaking, exercised except

It is argued for this view from Aristotle.

Confirmatur 1.

DE FINE HOMINIS 242 Disp. I, sect. II
media. Et confirmatur, nam Deus licet se ipso sit beatus, et se propter se amet, et in se ipso quiescat, non est proprie finis sui ipsius, quia non tendit per aliquod medium ad consecutionem sui, vel sue beatitudinis: ergo signum est causalitatem finis solum exerceri in ordinatione mediorum ad finem.

2. Sententia vera.

2. Nihilominus dicendum est, finem exercere causalitatem suam circa voluntatem nostram, non solum ut eligentem, vel utentem mediis, sed etiam ut amantem, vel intendentem finem ipsum. Quam sententiam late tradidi, in disp. 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 3, et imprimis existimo esse doctrinam divi Thomæ, 2, q. 1, artic. 1, ad 2, dicentis, voluntatem nostram operari propter finem, etiam agenda actionem quæ est ultimus finis; non potest autem operatio esse propter finem in nostra voluntate, nisi interveniente causalitate finis. Idem constat ex loco supra citato, de <5>

Probatur primo ex D. Thom.

Veritate, q. 22, art. 2, ubi dicitur, influxum finis esse amari et desiderari. Idem 3, contra Gentes, c. 2, dicit

2That is, Alvarez has cut some text here.

corneceing means. And this is confirmed, for God, although he himself is happy and loves himself for his own sake and rests in himself, is not, strictly speaking, his own end, because he does not tend through some means to the attainment of himself or his own happiness. This, therefore, is a sign that the causality of the end is only exercised in the ordering of means to an end.

2. Nevertheless, it should be said that the end exercises its causality concerning our will not only in electing or using means but also in loving or intending the end itself. I have discussed this view more thoroughly in DM XXIII, sect. 3, and, in particular, I think this is the teaching of St. Thomas in Iaæ.1.1 ad 2 when he says that our will acts for the sake of the end ‘even when dealing with the action which is the ultimate end’. But an activity cannot be for the sake of the end in our will except by the causality of the end intervening. The same is clear from the previously cited place from De Veritate, q. 22, art. 2, where it is said that the influx of the end is to be loved and to be desired. Likewise, he says in SCG III, c. 2, that the end is that to which the impetus of the agent tends. There-
finem esse id, in quo tendit impetus agentis: ergo sive tendat per electionem, sive per intentionem, ibi exercetur ratio, sive causalitas finis. Præterea Aristotelis 2, Metaphysicae, c. 2, sic inquit: *ipsem cuius causa finis, tale autem est id, quod non est alterius gratia, sed ejus causa cœtera*: ubi per negationem illam explicat positivam quamdam motionem, aut conditionem finis proprie ac simpliciter dictam, in qua illa negatio fundatur, scilicet ut propter se ametur seu intendatur: ergo utraque illarum actionum, seu motionum pertinent ad causalitatem finis, et quodammodo integrat rationem ejus, quinimo quod finis habeat vim ad movendum et trahendum voluntatem ad se, habet et virtutem trahendi illam propter finem.

2. Ex Aristot. 60

3. Unde ratione argumentor hoc modo; quia finis trahendo voluntatem ad eligenda media propter ipsum, exercet causalitatem suam: ergo et trahendo voluntatem ad volendum eundemmet finem propter se. Probatur consequentia: nam in electione medii propter finem duo possunt considerari: unum est quod ex intentione, quæ est actus voluntatis, oritur fore, whether it tends through election or through intention, the nature or causality of the end is exercised there. Furthermore, Aristotle in *Metaph.* II, c. 2, says it is this way: ‘The end of which is a cause and of such a kind that it is not for the sake of another thing but is of itself the cause of the remaining things’. Here he explains through that negation a certain positive motion or condition of the end, speaking properly and strictly, in which that negation is grounded, namely, as it is loved or intended for its own sake. Therefore, each of those actions or motions pertains to the causality of the end and in a certain way integrates its nature. Indeed, should the end have the power for moving and drawing the will to itself, it also has the power for drawing it for the sake of the end.

3. Hence, I argue from reason in this way: because the end in drawing the will to electing means for the sake of the end exercises its causality, therefore, [it also exercises its causality] in drawing the will to willing the very end itself for its own sake. The consequence is proven: for in the election of a means for the sake of the end two things can be considered. One is that an election arises from intention, which is an act of the will. And
electio, et hoc non pertinet ad voluntatem finis, sed
efficiens, ut postea videbimus. Alterum est quod
finis propositus, et intentus movet in suo genere ad
electionem mediorum, tanquam forma dans illis
appetibilitatem; sed in hoc eadem, vel major ratio est
de ipso fine trahente voluntatem ad appetitionem
suam: ergo pertinet hoc ad causalitatem finis non
minus, quam illud. Secundo, voluntas nostra tendit
in finem per veram actionem suam, quam perfecto,
et rationabili modo operatur: ergo sicut illius actio-
nis datur vera causa efficiens, ita etiam vera finalis
causa, quae est prima earum. Tertio, amor Dei su-
per omnia revera est amor ultimi finis ut sic; ergo
ille amor causatur a bonitate Dei in genere causæ fi-
nalis. Unde in beatis voluntas, quæ necessario amat
Deum, ab ipsa Dei bonitate clare visa, in hoc genere
causæ determinatur, et necessitatur ad hunc amorem,
et si per possibile, vel impossibile homo haberet il-
lam beatitudinem sine alius mediis, nihilominus con-
sequeretur Deum, et frueretur illo ut ultimo fine suo,
et Deus exerceret quoad hos actus, circa voluntatem
this does not pertain to the willing of the end, but of the effi-
cient [cause], as we will see later. The second is that proposed
and intended end moves in its own genus to the election of the
means as a form giving desirability to it. But in this case there
is the same or an even stronger argument concerning the end
itself drawing the will to desiring it. Therefore, this pertains
no less to the causality of the end than the former. Secondly,
our will tends to the end through its true action, which acts in
a perfect and reasonable way. Therefore, just as a true efficient
cause is given of that action, so also a true final cause, which
is the first of them. Thirdly, the love of God beyond every-
thing else really is love of the ultimate end as such. Therefore,
that love is caused by the goodness of God in the genus of final
cause. Hence, the will of the blessed, which necessarily loves
God by the goodness of God having been clearly seen, is deter-
mined and necessitated in this genus of cause to this love. And
if per possibile or per impossibile a human being had that hap-
piness without other means, he would nevertheless attain God
and enjoy him as his ultimate end and God would exercise the
causality of the ultimate end in relation to the will with respect
to these acts. Just as an angel, although by nature he immedi-
causalitatem finis ultimi, sicut Angelus, licet natura sua absque aliis mediis, statim habeat beatitudinem naturalem in Deo ut in fine naturae, nihilominus illum respicit ut finem <col. b> suum, atque adeo ut causam finalem omnium actionum, quibus tendit in ipsum. Denique negari non potest quin finis determinet, et moveat voluntatem ad hos actus; sed illa ratio non potest ad aliud genus causae pertinere: ergo.

4. Atque ex hac resolutione intelligitur primo quos effectus habeat causa finalis in voluntate nostra: omnes enim actus, quos voluntas exercet tam circa finem ut sic, quam circa media propter finem, sunt proprii et immediati effectus causa finalis, in quibus ita est distinguenda ratio effectus a causality ipsa, sicut distinguitur actio a termino, ut constat ex dictis in precedenti sectione. Intelligitur secundo, omnem hanc finis causalitatem proxime et immediate versari circa actus elicitos ab ipsa voluntate, per illos autem extendi, et communicari alius actibus humanis, qui ab hujusmodi voluntatis actibus imperantur: ab eis ately has his natural happiness in God as in the end of nature without other means, nevertheless respects him as his end and for that reason as the final cause of all his actions by which he tends to God. Finally, it cannot be denied that the end determines and moves the will to these acts. But that aspect cannot pertain to another genus of cause. Therefore.

4. And from this resolution it is understood in the first place what effects the final cause has in our will. For all the acts which the will exercises both concerning the end as such and concerning means for the sake of the end are proper and immediate effects of the final cause. The ratio of effect should be distinguished from the causality itself in these [acts] in the same way as an action is distinguished from the terminus, as is clear from what was said in the preceding section. Secondly, it is understood that this entire causality of the end proximately and immediately concerns the acts elicited from the will itself, but is extended and communicated to other human actions through those which are commanded by willed actions of this
enim diriguntur, et ordinantur in finem, quod est not-
tandum pro his, quae postea, tractat. 3, dicemus de
bonitate et malitia horum actuum, et in Disputatione
sequentii amplius hoc explicabitur.

5. Ad fundamenta prioris sententiae in numero
1, respondetur primo. Aristoteles in verbis illis, fi-
nis est, cuius gratia aliquid fit, virtute comprehendisse
illa duo, scilicet quod finis propter se ametur, et alia
propter ipsum. An vero utrumque eorum sit de ra-
tione finis, dicam infra section. 4. Dico præterea
quando finis intenditur, vel amatur, ibi aliquid fieri,
scilicet, ipsam intentionem, vel affectionem circa
finem, et illud ipsum fieri gratia finis: nam sicut
propter bonitatem finis cogniti eligere homin media,
ita propter eamdem bonitatem finis cogniti eligere
amorem, seu intentionem talis finis. Unde ad ra-
tionem, videlicet, quia finis dicit habitudinem ad me-
dia, primo respondetur, licet dicat habitudinem ad
media, non tamen ad sola illa, sed ad omnem effec-
tum, quem in suo genere causare potest: nam sicut
efficiens dicit habitudinem ad factum, seu ad omne
sort. For they are directed and ordered to the end by these,
which should be noted according to these. We will discuss this
later in De Bonitate and Malitia and it will be explained more
thoroughly in the following disputation.

5. To the foundation of the former view in n. 1 I respond
first: Aristotle in those words ‘the end is that for the sake
of which something happens’ implicitly includes these two,
namely, that the end is loved for its own sake and that other
things are loved for its sake. But whether each of these is of the
nature of the end, I will discuss below in sect. 4. I say, further-
more, since the end is intended or loved where anything hap-
pens, namely, the very intention or affection of the end, even
that very thing happens for the sake of the end. For just as a
human being elects means for the sake of the cognized end’s
goodness, so also he elects love or intention for such an end for
the sake of the same goodness of the cognized end. Hence, to
the argument—namely, because the end expresses a relation to
means—I respond, first, that, although it expresses a relation to
means, [it expresses a relation] not only to those but to every
effect that can be caused in its genus. For just as the efficient
cause has a relation to what was made or to everything that
id, quod a virtute effectiva prodire potest: ita finis, ut est causa, dicit ad omne id habitudinem quod ex virtute finalisandi causari potest. Deinde etiam faciendo vim in nomine finis, quod significet terminum et extremum, respondetur, non solum esse terminum respectu mediorum, sed etiam respectu voluntatis intendentis in ipsum finem propter se amatum, sub qua ratione habet rationem cujusdam ultimi et extempi, quia ut sic non ordinatur in alium, et ipsum actus voluntatis, qui quodammodo mediat inter ipsum et finem, in ipso fine consistat tanquam in ultimo termino. Ad confirmationem de Deo responsio est clara ex superius dictis, quaestione precedenti, numero 11, nam in Deo ad intra quatenus se amat propter se, non est causalitas finis proprii, quia non intervenit aliquis actus, qui proprie fiat ex motione finis.

Sectio III.

Utrum finis exerceat causalitatem suam sub ratione boni cogniti.

Explicuimus causalitatem finis et effectum ejus: se-
can be produced by an effective power, so also the end, insofar as it is a cause, expresses a relation to everything that can be caused by the final-causing power. Next, also, by making the force of ‘end’ be that it signifies a terminus and extreme, I respond that it is not only a terminus with respect to means but also with respect to the will intending the end loved for its own sake, under which aspect it has the nature of a kind of ultimate and extreme, because as such it is not ordered to something else and the very act of the will which in a certain way mediates between itself and the end stands to the end itself as to an ultimate terminus. The response to the confirmation concerning God is obvious from what was said above in the preceding question, n. 11. For in the case of God insofar as he loves himself for his own sake within, there is no causality of a proper end, because there is no intervening act which properly comes about from the motion of the end.

Section III.

Whether an end exercises its causality under the aspect of cognized good.

We explicated the causality of the end and its effect. The next
quitur ut dicamus de ratione causandi, seu de virtute, per quam causat. De qua duo sunt certa, circa quae alia erunt dubitanda et explicanda.


The nature of the end or the force through which it causes is goodness. This is St. Thomas's view in [ST] Ia IIæ.1,1, co. (towards the end). He discusses it more thoroughly in SCG III, c. 2 and 3, where he shows that to act for the sake of the end is the same thing as to act for the sake of the good. In [ST] Ia.5.4 he similarly shows that good has the nature of an end, where in his solution ad 2 he in this way explains Dionysius's statement from On the Divine Names, c. 4: ‘Goodness is self-diffusive’. [Alexander] of Hales holds the same doctrine in [Sent.] I, q. 17, memb. 3 and q. 34, memb. 1, and it is gathered from Aristotle, who says in EN I, c. 7: ‘That is the good of each for whose sake everything else is done’ [1097a17–18]. Likewise at the end of book I and in Phys. II, c. 3, where he says: ‘the end and the good are the same’. And the reason is clear from what was said, for the causality of the end consists in drawing the

---

1 195a22–25
se amandum, vel alia propter ipsum: sed nihil potest trahere voluntatem nisi bonum, quatenus bonum est: ergo bonitas est a qua habet finis virtutem causandi finaliter; est ergo illi ratio causandi.

2. Hanc autem veritatem per se claram, obscuriorem reddit Cajetanus, 1 p., art. 4, q. 5, dicens, bonitatem formalem esse ipsum rationem causae finalis in actu exercito, non vero in actu signato, nisi tantum fundamentaliter. Quorum verborum sensus in idem redit. Nam per hoc nomen *bonum* non explicatur res sub habitudine ad effectum, seu actum finaliter causandi, et hoc vocavit Cajetanus finem in actu signato, quam rationem non *<col. b>* significat formaliter ratio *boni*, sed tantum explicat perfectionem objecti, seu convenientiam quam habet cum voluntate, ex qua habet quod finalisare possit, quam habitudinem formaliter explicat nomen, seu ratio finis: et ideo dicitur fundari in bonitate. Et hoc modo dixit Cajetanus *bonum* significare rationem finis in actu exercito fundamentaliter, ac si in causa efficiente dicere-
mus calorem, verbi gratia, esse finem agentis fundamentali
ter, tamen ut sic non significare formaliter ipsum
habituidinem efficientis.

Secundo certum est ut bonum causet finaliter necessarium esse ut cognition sit; quia appetitus vitalis sequitur formam apprehensam, et ideo ferri non potest nisi in objectum cognitum ut constat ex philosophia, et ex 1 p., quæst. 80 et sequentib., et ex quæst. 8 et 9, 1, 2, viderique possunt quæ scripsi in disp. 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 7, et libr. 2, de Orat. mentali, cap. 13. Hinc vero oriebatur occasio disputandi quomodo se habebat esse cognitum ad rationem causandi finalem, an scilicet sit tantum conditio necessaria, vel etiam ratio causandi, et consequenter an bonum cognitum causet finaliter secon
dum esse cognitum, vel secundum esse reale. Quam quaestionem late tractat 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, Medina, et Cajetanus ibid., et antea in 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 4, et Ferrarius 1, cont. Gent., cap. 44, et aliqui

Secondly, it is certain that in order for good to final-cause it is necessary that it have been cognized, because the vital appetite follows an apprehended form and therefore cannot be brought to anything other than a cognized object. This is clear from the philosophers and from [Sent.] p. 1, q. 80 and following and from [ST] IaIæ.8–9. And what I wrote can be seen in DM XXIII, sect. 7 and de Orat. mentali lib. 2, c. 13. But from here has arisen an occasion for disputing how being cognized is related to the nature of final-causing, whether, namely, it is only a necessary condition or also the nature of causing, and consequently whether cognized good final-causes according to cognized being or according to real being. This question is discussed more thoroughly in Medina’s and Cajetan’s [commentaries on ST] IaIæ.1.1 and before that in Ia.5.4, and by Ferrara in [his commentary on SCG] I, c. 44, and by other theologians in [Sent.] II, dist. 1, especially Gabriel in part. 5, and others in
theologi in 2, dist. 1, præsertim Gabriel, part. 5, alii in 2, dist. 25, præsertim Scotus et Capreolus. Sed quoniam hæc res in disput. 23 Metaphysicæ, sect., 8, a me late traditur, et, ut existimo, nihil difficultatis habet, dicam breviter quæ sentio, et quod ad Questiones Theologicas postea tractandas est necessarium.

3. Advertendum est ergo, interdum appetere voluntatem objectum cognitum solum in ordine ad cognitionem, ut, verbi gratia, quando contemplando rosam non appetit illam habere, sed tantum considerare et cognoscere, et tunc esse cognitum non solum est conditio, sed est ratio, movendi voluntatem, quia non solum est quid praecessitum ut voluntas moveatur, sed etiam est terminus appetitio- nis, cujusmodi est quacumque alia res quæ judicatur esse conveniens, et hoc modo quando homo delectatur tantum in cognitione non vero in re cognita secundum se, esse cognitum est id, a quo actus accipit suam rationem et bonitatem vel <7> malitiam: sicut est quando homo appetit videre Deum, illud esse visum pertinet ad formale objectum, quod est causa II, dist. 25, especially Scotus and Capreolus. But since I discuss this matter more thoroughly in DM XXIII, sect. 8, and, as I think, has no difficulty, I will briefly say what I think and what is necessary for discussing the theological questions afterwards.

3. It should, therefore, be noted that sometimes the will desires a cognized object only in relation to cognition, as, for example, when in contemplating a rose it does not desire to possess it but only to consider and cognize it. In that case to be cognized is not only a condition but also the reason for moving the will, because not only is the cognition a prerequisite for the will to be moved but it is also the terminus of the desire just like any other thing that is judged to be agreeable. And in this way when a human being is delighted in the cognition alone but not in the cognized thing according to itself, to be cognized is that from which the act takes its nature and goodness or badness, just as when a human being desires to see God, that being seen pertains to the formal object that is the cause of final-causing.

But sometimes the will desires the cognized object so that it has and obtains that thing itself, as when it desires health and...
finalisandi. Aliquando vero voluntas appetit objectum cognitum ut re ipsa illud habeat et consequatur, ut quando appetit sanitaratem, et tunc plane ratio finalisandi est bonitas, quam in reipsa objectum habet, vel habere apprehendit, quia illud est finis voluntatis, in quod tendit impetus agentis, sed non tendit nisi in esse reale ipsius finis, ut illud hable at obtineat: ergo. Item, illud habet propriam rationem finis, quo consecuto, quiescit voluntas, et quo deficiente frustratur ab intentione sua, sed non quiescit in sola apprehensione, nisi re ipsa finem consequatur, et nisi hoc obtineat, frustrari dicitur: ergo signum est moveri a fine secundum suum esse reale. Non est autem intelligendum requiri ad causalitatem finis quod res illa, quæ est finis a parte rei præexistat, quia cum solum moveat metaphoricum per cognitionem, satis est quod animo apprehendatur, et quasi in imagine repraæsentetur; sensus ergo est rem illam secundum esse reale, quod objicitur, et in ea appre-

It is shown secondly.

Real existence does not also enter for the nature of final-causing.

87 habere] om. V.
93 consequatur] consequantur V.
henditur, movere voluntatem, et habere causalitatem finis, quia secundum illud esse judicatur conveniens:
movet autem, ut diximus, quatenus conveniens judi-
catur; cognition iigitur hujus convenientiae et bonitatis,
non est propria ratio movendi, quia tunc voluntas
non appetit cognoscere, sed dicitur esse cognitione nec-
essaria per modum approximationis, non quidem se-
cundum locum, sed tantum subordinationem poten-
tiarum animae; et quia sine illa non habet finis illum
modum quo indiget ad suam causalitatem. Et hoc
modo explicata haec sententia clarior est, ut patet ex
Scoto, Gabriele, Cajetano et Ferrario, locis supra ci-
tatis, et nullam habet difficultatem alicujus momenti.

4. Ut tamen facile dissolvantur multa argumenta,
qua hic multiplicat Medina; oportet ultimo advert-
evere, quod sicut in causa efficiente approximatio non
est ratio agendi, sed conditio, potest tamen ratione
illius variari actio, si diversum agens applicetur, ita
et in hac apprehensione, seu cognitione intellectus,
contingere potest, ut ratione illius varietur actio vol-
untatis, si in objecte aliud esse, seu aliam rationem ap-
it moves, as we said, insofar as it is judged agreeable. Therefore,
the cognition of this agreeability and goodness is not properly
the nature of moving, because in this case the will does not de-
sire to cognize. But the cognition is said to be necessary in the
mode of approximation, not, indeed, according to place, but
only according to a subordination of the soul’s powers, and
because without that the end does not have that mode which it
needs for its causality. And this view is clearer when explained
in this way, as is clear from Scotus, Gabriel, Cajetan, and Fer-
rara in the places cited above, and it has no difficulty of any
importance.

4. Nevertheless, so that the many arguments which Med-
ina multiplies in this place are easily resolved, it is necessary at
last to notice that just as with an efficient cause coming close
together is not the nature of acting but a condition for it, yet
the action can be varied by reason of that, if a different agent is
applied, so also it can happen with this apprehension or cogni-
tion by the intellect that by reason of it the action of the will
is varied, if some other being or another aspect of good or bad
prehendat boni, vel mali: quo sensu dici solet finem specificare actum voluntatis, non ut in re est, sed ut apprehenditur: nam licet eleemosyna, verbi gratia, in re sit bona, si quis illam existimat malam, actio voluntatis non est bona, sed mala. Propter quam rationem videtur dixisse divus Thomas, 1. 2. quæst. 31. artic. 3. ad 1. cum objectum voluntatis sit bonum apprehensum. diversitatem apprehensionis pertinere ad diversitatem objecti, atque idem sentit Cajetanus, q. 30. art. 3. Sed hæc non sunt contraria, quia tunc apprehensio boni tantum variat objectum in quantum in illo apprehendit et applicat diversum esse objecti. atque adeo distinctam bonitatem, vel convenientiam, quæ, ut dixi, est ratio movendi voluntatem. Quocirca quando dicitur objectum movere ut apprehensum, cavenda est æquivocatio in illa particula reduplicante: nam si reduplicet solam denominationem provenientem ab apprehensione ita ut ipsa apprehensio sit forma, per quam finis movet, falsum est, ut dixi. si autem reduplicet ipsum esse objectivum, quod apprehendit, sic vera est locutio, atque is apprehended in the object. The end is usually said to specify the act of the will in this sense, not as it is in reality but as it is apprehended. For although giving alms, for example, is good in reality, if someone thinks it bad, the action of the will is not good but bad. For this reason St. Thomas seems to have said in [S7] IaIIæ.31.3 ad 1. that when the object of the will is apprehended good, difference of apprehension pertains to difference of the object. And Cajetan thinks the same in q. 30. art. 3. But these are not contraries, because apprehension of the good now varies the object only insofar as different being of the object is apprehended and applied in it and for that reason the distinct goodness or agreeability, which, as I said, is the nature of moving the will.

Wherefore, when it is said that the object moves 'as apprehended', one should avoid equivocation in that reduplicated particle. For if only the denomination coming forth is reduplicated by the apprehension such that the apprehension itself is the form through which the end moves, it is false, as I said. But if the objective being itself (which is apprehended) is reduplicated, the locution is true. In the same way the diversity of cognition, which holds only on the part of the power, either in
eodem modo diversitas cognitionis, quæ se tenet tan-
tum ex parte potentiae, aut cognitionis, seu in pro-
priis qualitatibus ipsius actus intelligendi, ut sunt,
verbi gratia, quod sit clara, vel obscura, et similis,
hæc, inquam, diversitas non variat rationem finis, et
consequenter nec motionem voluntatis: at vero di-
versitas cognitionis, quæ redundat in objecto, scilicet
quia aliud est quod cognoscitur, vel alia proprietas
in eo apprehenditur, hæc variat finem et motionem,
quia proponit, et appropinquat subjectum secundum
aliud esse objectivum: unde quasi diversificat illud,
et sic reddit diversam cognitionem non ex parte esse
cogniti absoluti, sed ex parte objecti quod cognosc-
itur. Et hæc de causalitate, effectu et principio, seu
forma, quæ est principium finis.

SECTIO IV.

Sub qua ratione boni moveat finis, et consequenter an
media participent causalitatem finis.

SECTION IV.

Under what aspect of good an end moves and, hence, whether
means participate in the causality of an end.4

4Suárez also discusses this material in DM XXIII.6.

144 se ] om. V.

DE FINE HOMINIS

256

Disp. I, sect. IV
1. Cum triplex sit bonum, honestum, delectabile et utile: de duobus primis nulla est quæstio, quia de honesto per se notum est esse maxime per se experimentabile, quinimo ait divus Thomas, 1 part., quaest. 5, art. 6, rationem honesti in hoc consistere, quod sit per se conveniens: de bono vero delectabili dixit Aristoteles 10, Ethic., cap. 2, et cum eo D. Thomas, 1, 2, quaest. 2, art. 6, ad 1, stul-<8> tum esse querere propter quid appetatur. Nam delectatio ex se habet appetibilitatem. Unde constat utramque hanc rationem boni esse sufficientem ad causandum finaliter, quia quod movet ut per se appetatur, etiam habet vim ad movendum ut alia appetatur propter ipsum finem, si fuerint necessaria, alias prior motio non esset efficax, nam ex efficac intentione finis sequitur electio medi a si necessaria sit. Tota ergo quæstio versatur de bono utili, quod non est propter se bonum, nec propter se amabile, sed tantum propter aliud: lo-

1. Good is threefold: *honestum*, delightful, and useful. About the first two there is no question, since it is *per se notum* of *honestum* that it especially is choiceworthy in itself. Indeed, St. Thomas says in *ST* Ia.5.6 that the nature of *honestum* consists in being agreeable in itself. But with respect to delightful good, Aristotle said in *EN* X, cap. 2—and St. Thomas agrees with him in *ST* IaIæ.2.6 ad 1—that it is foolish to ask for the sake of what it is desired. For delight holds desirability in itself. Hence it is clear that each of these aspects of good is sufficient for final-causing. For that which moves so that it is desired in itself also has the strength to move so that other things, if they are necessary [for attaining the end], are desired for the sake of the end. Otherwise the former motion would not be efficacious, for from an efficacious intention for the end follows the election of means if they are necessary. Therefore, the whole question is about useful good, which is not good for its own sake and is not lovable for its own sake but only for the sake of something else. For we are speaking formally about useful

The doubt only concerns useful good as such.

---

5 Suárez uses the traditional threefold division of good into *honestum*, *delectabile*, and *utile*. Translation of these terms is liable to lead to unhappy results. For example, one might be tempted to translate *honestum* with ‘moral good’ or ‘virtuous good’, but those English expressions really do not cover a wide enough range of cases. I will here leave *honestum* and its cognates untranslated and use ‘delight’ or ‘delightful good’ (*pleasure* would be another option), and ‘useful good’ for the other two kinds of good. Suárez discusses this division in more detail in *DM X*.

5 esse] om. V.
quimur enim formaliter de bono utili, ut sic, nam si contingat bonum quod est utile ad unum finem, esse alias per se convenientis, vel delectabile illud est accidentarium ad rationem utilis, et sub ea ratione participabit objectum illud aliquam rationem finis, nam quatenus utile est, proprie habet rationem medii, et ideo hac quæstio coincidit cum illa, an medium, ut medium, finaliter causæ, in qua re tres excogitari possunt diversæ sententiae, quas latius attuli, disput. 23, 25

Metaphysicæ, sect. 6.

1. Sententia affirm.

2. Prima est, bonum utile, ex hoc solum quod utile est, atque adeo omne medium, sive sit primum, sive secundum, posse habere rationem causæ finalis. Hanc sententiam videtur indicare Gabriel, in 1, dist. 38, quæst. 1, art. 1, ubi ex sententia Gregorii distinguuit triplicem finem, unus est, qui per se appetitur, et alia propter ipsum, qui est finis ultimus in aliqua serie. Alius qui non propter se appetitur, sed alia appetuntur propter ipsum, ut sunt media inter-

2. The first view is that useful good—and, consequently, every means—simply by the fact that it is useful can have the nature of a final cause. Gabriel seems to indicate this view in I, dist. 38, q. 1, art. 1, where according to the view of Gregory he distinguishes three kinds of ends. One kind is that which is desired for its own sake and other things for its sake, which is an end ultimate in some series. Another kind is that which is not desired for its own sake but other things are desired for its sake, as intermediate means are. The third kind is that which

6This may well indicate that Alvarez, the editor, has cut some text here.

29 23 ] 13 V.
30 Metaphysicæ ] Metaphysicæ 5 V.
media: tertius est, qui nec propter se appetitur, nec
alia propter ipsum: sed solum ipse appetitur propter
alia, ut est primum medium in executione, et ulti-
mum in intentione. Ratio vero hujus sententiae esse
potest, quia causalitas finis consistit in motione vol-
untatis, sed voluntas non tantum movetur ad finem,
sed etiam ad omne medium, quandoquidem illum
appetit, nec etiam movetur a solo fine ultimo, seu
a bono per se amabili: sed etiam ab ipso bono, et
medio utili, ut sic: ergo in illo reperitur causalitas fi-
nis. Probatur ultima pars minoris, in qua est difficul-
tas, quia ipsum medium est bonum utile, et utilitas
est aliqua bonitas in ipso existens, non enim inheret
in fine, sed in ipsa re, qua est utilis ad finem: ergo
medium ratione suae utilitatis trahit voluntatem ad
se. Secundo, quia voluntas determinatur ad eligen-
dum hoc medium potius quam illud, non a fine, sed
a medio, scilicet, quia est magis aptum ad compara-
ndum finem: ergo est in ipso medio causalitas res-
<col. b>pectu voluntatis ad alliciendam et determi-
nandam illam.
3. Secunda sententia extreme contraria est, nullum medium participare rationem, vel causalitatem finis: cui videtur favere Aristoteles, loco citato supra, sect. 2, num. 2, ex 2, Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, ubi dicit

*de ratione finis esse, ut alia appetantur propter ipsum, et ipse non, propter alia; ergo nullum medium habet rationem finis: nec dici potest Aristoteles ibi loqui de fine ultimo; nam potius ex illo primo intendent probare perveniendum esse ad aliquem finem ultimum, et non procedi in infinitum in causa finali: loquendo ergo de fine ut sic, vere in 2, Phys., cap. 3, dicit, omnia media eti inter se subordinata sint, esse propter unum finem intentum, verbi gratia, propter sanitatem: et 1 Ethic., cap. 7, dicit, in unaquaque serie illud esse finem, quod ultimo appetitur. Et ideo adjungi potest confirmatio ex ipso nomine finis; significat enim id, quod est extremum, et in quo sistit voluntas tendens ad finem, sed non habet rationem extremit, nisi id, quod propter se amatur, nec voluntas in alio sistit, nam per quocumque medium ulterior

3. The second view is the extreme contrary that no means participate in the nature of causality of an end. Aristotle seems to favour it in the passage cited above in sect. 2, n. 2, from *Metaph. II*, cap. 2, where he says that it belongs to the nature of an end ‘that other things are desired for its sake but not itself for the sake of something else’. Therefore, no means has the nature of an end. Nor can it be said that Aristotle is speaking here about the ultimate end. Rather, he intends to prove from this first point that one should come to some ultimate end and not proceed to infinity in the final cause. Therefore, he must be speaking about the end as such. Indeed, in *Phys. II*, cap. 3, he says that ‘all means even if subordinated among themselves are for the sake of one intended end’, for example, for the sake of health. And in *EN I*, cap. 7, he says that ‘in each series that is the end which is desired ultimately’. And therefore a confirmation can be added from the very name ‘end’, for it signifies that which is the extreme and in which the will tending to an end stops. But a thing does not have the nature of an extreme except that which is loved for its own sake. Nor does the will stop in anything else, for through any means whatever it tends

74 *in*] *om. V.*
3. Sententia distinctione utens.

4. Tertia sententia distinguit: nam medium considerari potest, vel quatenus amatur propter aliud, vel quatenus aliud amatur propter ipsum: et priori ratione negatur habere finis rationem, quia sub illa exercet formalem rationem mediui: medium autem et finis ut sic, saltem ratione formali distinguishunt. Posteriori autem ratione dicitur habere rationem finis, quia ut sic, non exercet rationem mediui, sed potius rationem termini, non ultimi, sed proximi et intermedii. Ex quo fit, illud medium, quod est executione primum, seu intentione, ac resolutione ultimum, nullo modo habere rationem finis, quia tantum propter aliud eligitur, et nihil amatur propter ipsum: reliqua vero media, que inter primum medium et finem ultimum intercedunt, participabunt rationem finis modo jam dicto. Hanc opinionem tenet Ægidius, in 2, d. 38, quæst. 2, art. 2, et significat Gabriel 2, d. 1, quæst. 5, art. 1, citans Qui ei adhaerant, vel faveant.

 Qui ei adhaerant, vel faveant.

87 sic] om. V.
98 38] 28 V.

tendit in finem: ergo.

to a further end. Therefore.

4. The third view makes a distinction: for a means can be considered either insofar as it is loved for the sake of something else or insofar as something else is loved for its sake. And it is denied to have the nature of an end by the former aspect, for it exercises the formal nature of a means under that aspect. But a means and an end as such are only distinguished by a formal nature. But by the latter aspect it is said to have the nature of an end, because as such it does not exercise the nature of a means but rather the nature of a terminus (not an ultimate but a proximate and intermediate one). Hence it results that that means which is first in execution or last in intention and resolution has in no way the nature of an end, because it is only elected for the sake of something else and nothing is loved for its sake. But the remaining means—which stand between the first means and the ultimate end—participate in the nature of the end in the way just mentioned. Ægidius holds this opinion in II, dist. 38, q. 2, art. 2, and Gabriel indicates it in II, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1, citing Ockham, q. 3 of the same distinction.
Ocham ibi quæst. 3, art. 1, et videtur sententia divi Thomæ 3, contra Gent., cap. 2, ubi in ratione finali inquit: In his, quæ sunt ad finem, omnia intermedia sunt finis respectu prioris: et in 2, Phys., in lect. 5, in hunc modum explicat citatum locum Aristoteles, dicens: De ratione finis non esse, quod sit ultimum simpliciter, sed solum respectu precedentis: et eodem modo exponit Aristoteles 1, Eth., cap. 7, ubi certe <9> videtur philosophus multum favere, nam aperte dicit, non omnes fines esse perfectos et propter se expetibiles, et inter fines ponit divitias et instrumenta artis, quæ sine dubio sunt media ulterioris finis, licet comparentur ut finis respectu earum actionum, per quas fiunt, vel acquiruntur. Inter has sententias hæc postrema melius loquitur, et simpliciter verior est: tamen, quia secunda in aliquo sensu dicit etiam aliquid verum, oportet aliam distinctionem adhibere præter jam dictam. Possumus enim loqui de fine aut quoad propriam causalitatem finis, prout a nobis explicata est, vel solum, quoad rationem et denominationem termini, propter quem aliquid sit. And it seems to be St. Thomas’s view in SCG III, cap. 2, where he says in the final argument: ‘In those things which are for the end every intermediate is an end with respect to the former thing’. And in Phys. II, lect. 5, he explains the passage cited from Aristotle in this way, saying: ‘It does not belong to the nature of an end to be unqualifiedly ultimate but only to be ultimate with respect to the preceding [means]’. He explains in the same way [the passage] from Aristotle, EN I, cap. 7, where the Philosopher certainly seems greatly to favour [this view], clearly saying that not every end is perfect and choiceworthy for its own sake. He also places wealth and the instruments of arts among the ends. But these are without doubt means to a further end, although they are related as an end with respect to those actions through which they are made or acquired.

Among these views, this last one speaks better and is, strictly speaking, truer. Still, since the second view also says something true in some sense, some distinction beyond the one just made must be applied. For we can speak about the end either with respect to the proper causality of the end—as I explained it—or only with respect to the nature and denomination of a terminus for whose sake something is.
1. Assertio. 5. Dico ergo primo, propriam causalitatem finis reperiri tantum in eo fine, qui in sua serie est ultimus, atque adeo in bono tantum, quod propter se amatur, et non propter aliud. Hac conclusio colligitur ex Aristotele in secunda sententia citato: et probatur ratione, quia omnia media a primo usque ad ultimum, non sunt amabilia propter se, sed solum ratione finis: ergo media non trahunt voluntatem ad se, sed solus finis est qui trahit voluntatem ad omnia media. Unde divus Thomas, 1 part., quæst. 5, art. 6. Utilia, inquit, dicuntur, quæ non habent in se, unde desiderentur: ergo non habent in se, unde causent finaliter: ergo tota causalitas est a bono per se amato. Secundo, quia media, ut amatur propter aliud, non exercent causalitatem finis: ergo nec illam exercent quatenus aliud amatur propter ipsa: ergo nullo modo sunt finis. Primum antecedens recte probatur, ab ultima opinione, et ex communi modo loquendi omnium philosophorum constat: non enim distinguunt finem qui sit etiam medium, a fine ut

Probatur 1. 125 It is proven, first.

Probatur 2. 130 It is proven, secondly.

5. I say, first, therefore, that the proper causality of an end is found in that end which is ultimate in its series and, therefore, only in good loved for its own sake and not for the sake of another good. This conclusion is gathered from Aristotle as cited in the second view. And it is proven by reason, for all means from the first one to the last one are not lovable for their own sake but only by reason of the end. Therefore, means do not draw the will to themselves. Rather, it is only the end which draws the will to all the means. Hence, St. Thomas in ST Ia.5.6 says that those things are called useful which do not have in themselves that for which they are desired. Therefore, they do not have in themselves that by which they final-cause. Therefore, all the causality is from the good that is loved for itself. Secondly, because means insofar as they are loved for the sake of something else do not exercise the causality of an end. Therefore, neither do they exercise it insofar as something else is loved for their sake. Therefore, they are in no way the end. The first antecedent is rightly proven by the last opinion and it is obvious from all philosophers’ common way of speaking, for they do not distinguish the end which is also

129 qui] quia V.
fine. Item, quia tota causalitas ipsius finis, ut supra vi-
sum est, comprehenditur in illis duobus actibus, quod
propter se ametur, vel alia propter ipsum: quin potius
causalitas finis maxime censetur exerceri in electione
mediorum propter finem. Probatur vero prima con-
sequentia, quia si medium, quatenus ipsum eligitur
vel amatur, non habet vim causandi finaliter: ergo
nec illam habebit, quatenus aliud amatur propter ip-
sum: quia si non habet vim trahendi voluntatem ad
se, multo minus habebit vim trahendi voluntatem ad
alia propter se: ergo sola hæc vis et causalitas est in
fine. Tertio argumentor ex specificatione actuum,
nam omnes actus circa media, sive sint immediate
propter finem ultimum in illa serie, sive sint eligendo
unum medium propter aliud, omnes, inquam, illi
<col. b> actus sumunt suam speciem ab actibus vol-
untatis, quatenus est principium eorum: ergo. An-
tecedens autem per se notum et certum est, ut latius
dicturi sumus, tractatu tertio. Tandem confirmari
potest conclusio exemplis: nam in adoratione, verbi
gratia, quæ dicitur respectiva, quamvis res adorata sit,
a means from the end as end. Likewise, because the whole
causality of the end itself, as was seen above, is comprehended
in these two acts: that it is loved for its own sake and that
other things are loved for its sake, lest the causality of the end
be thought exercised chiefly in the election of means for the
sake of the end. But the first consequence is proven, because
if a means does not have the power to final-cause with respect
to itself being elected or loved, it will then not have it with re-
spect to something else being loved for its sake. For if it does
not have the power of drawing the will to itself, it will much
less have the power of drawing the will to other things for its
sake. Therefore, this power and causality is only in the end.
Thirdly, I argue from the specification of acts, for all acts con-
cerning means—whether elected immediately for the sake of
the ultimate end in that series or elected for the sake of an-
other means—all these acts, I say, take their species from the
acts of the will insofar as they are the principles of the former
acts. Therefore. Moreover, the antecedent is per se notum and
certain, as we will discuss more extensively in the third trea-
tise. Finally, the conclusion can be confirmed by example. In
adoration, for example, which is called respective, although the
verbi gratia, imago, vel calix, vel aliquid hujusmodi, tamen tota ratio et causa adorationis est excellentiae personae, propter quam fit adoratio: ita autem se habet medium respectu finis sicut imago respectu personae representatae. Simile exemplum est in dilectione, qua proximus amatur precise propter Deum: nam licet proximus sit res amata, tamen tota ratio et causa ipsius amationis, est bonitas Dei: sic ergo et in praesenti.

2. Assertio.

6. Dico secundo, considerando in fine habitudinem termini, qua explicatur illa voce, propter quam, vel, cujus gratia aliud fit: hoc modo dici possunt media interjacentia inter primum medium et ultimum finem, participare rationem finis. Hoc probant fundamenta tertiae sententiae et modus loquendi, non solum philosophorum et theologorum, sed Sacræ etiam Scripturæ: sic enim dicitur Christus, verbi gratia, mortuus propter nostram salutem, quamvis ille non fuerit finis ultimus mortis ejus, sed gloria Dei: non potest autem negari, quin per hæc adored thing is, for example, an image, a chalice, or something like this, still, the whole reason and cause for the adoration belongs to the more excellent person for whose sake the adoration happens. A means, moreover, is related to the end in the same way that the image is related to the person represented. The love by which a neighbour is loved precisely for the sake of God is a similar example. For although the neighbour is the thing loved, nevertheless the whole reason and cause for the loving itself is the goodness of God. So also, therefore, in the present case.

6. I say, secondly, in considering the relation of the terminus to the end, which is explained by the phrase ‘for the sake of which or on account of which something is done’: in this way the means that lie between the first means and the ultimate end can be said to participate in the nature of an end. The foundations of the third view and the way of speaking not only by philosophers and theologians but also by Sacred Scripture (Christ, for example, is said in this way to have died for the sake of our salvation, although not that but the glory of God was the ultimate end for his death) proves this. Moreover one cannot deny that the nature of the end is explicated through
verba explicetur ratio finis, quinimo Aristoteles inde
probare solet aliquid esse finem, quia per illum re-
spondemus questioni, propter quid. Denique quia
constat remotum medium non ordinari ad finem ul-
timum, nisi mediante proximo medio, ad quod im-
mediate refertur: imo nec habet convenientiam et
proportionem cum ipso fine, nisi mediante medio proximo: ergo ordinatur ad illud ut ad propinquum
finem, seu terminum: ergo sub hac ratione partici-
pat illud medium rationem finis: unde tandem fit medium ultimum in electione, seu resolutione,
quod est primum in usu et executione, non enim
posset propriis dici finis cum non moveat ut finis,
nec propter se aliquid moveat, sed omnino ipsum
fiat propter aliud: ergo nec rationem causae, nec ra-
tionem termini, quae est in fine, proprie participat.
Verum est, interdum divum Thomam, 1 parte, ques-
tione quinta, articulo sexto, vocare bonum utile ut
sic terminum proximum motionis voluptatis, sed il-
lud intelligitur non propriis de ratione terminandi,
quae est in fine, sed eo modo, quo omne objectum,
these words. In fact, Aristotle usually proves from them that
something is an end, because we respond through that to the
question why something is. Finally, it is obvious that a remote
means is not ordered to an ultimate end except by the media-
tion of a proximate means to which it is referred immediately.
In fact, it does not have agreeability and proportion to the end
itself except by a proximate means’ mediation. It is, therefore,
ordered to that proximate means as to a near end or terminus.
Under this aspect, then, that means participates in the nature
of an end. For this reason, finally, the means that is first in use
and execution happens last in election or resolution. For it can-
not properly be called an end when it does not move as an end
and nothing else is moved for its own sake but it itself happens
wholly for the sake of something else. Therefore, it does not
properly participate in the nature of a cause or in the nature
of the terminus that is in the end. It is true that in ST Ia.5.6
St. Thomas sometimes calls useful good as such a proximate
terminus of the will’s motion. But that should be understood
not as being properly about the nature of terminating that is
found in an end but in that way in which every object or mat-
ter to which an act of mind or will is direct can be called the

Explicatur
D. Thom.
seu materia, circa quam versatur actus mentis, seu voluntatis, potest dici terminus ejus, et adhuc sub ea ratione non ipsum objectum, ad quod <10> terminatur electio, seu motio interior voluntatis, sed ipsemet voluntatis actus est quasi secundum medium, quod ad finem ordinatur, nam talis electio fit propter finem consequendum.

Ad fundam. 210
7. Ex dictis constat responsio ad fundamenta secundae et tertiae opinionis, quia prout a nobis exposita sunt, non sunt contraria, et ita fundamenta earum probant assertiones positas. Ad fundamenta vero primae opinionis, respondetur, quamvis medium, ut amatur propter finem, materialiter terminet actum voluntatis, tamen solum finem esse, qui trahit voluntatem ad hujusmodi materiale objectum, quod non est appetibile, nisi ex bonitate finis. Ad pri-mam vero probationem, quod utilitas est in medio, respondetur, si per utilitatem intelligamus formam aliquam, vel vim activam, ratione cujus medium con-

act's terminus. And, besides, under this aspect the object itself in which election or the internal motion of the will is terminated is not, as it were, ordered to the end, but the very act of will itself is what, according to the means, as it were, is ordered to the end. For such an election is made for the sake of the end that is to be pursued.

7. The response to the foundations of the second and third opinions is obvious from what has been said, because they are not contrary as I explained them and so their foundations prove the posited assertions. But to the foundation of the first opinion, I respond that, although the means as it is loved for the sake of the end materially terminats the act of the will, nevertheless it is only the end which draws the will to a material object of this kind that is not desirable except by the goodness of the end. But to the first proof (that utility is in the means), I respond: if by utility we understand some form or active power by reason of which the means is directed at achieving the end, it is true that a utility of this sort is in the
ferat ad consequendum finem: verum est hujusmodi utilitatem esse in ipso medio: verbi gratia, in potione amara est virtus expellendi pravum humorem, et sic de aliis: et hoc modo illa forma est aliquam bonitatem conveniens illi rei, cujus est perfectio: nihilominus tamen respectu ejus, qui amat hujusmodi rem solum ut medium, tota illa utilitas non est appetibilis, nisi ex bonitate finis, a quo quodammodo extrinsece informatur. Et hoc modo loquendo de bonitate et utilitate medii ut appetibilis est ab operante propter finem, sic negatur intrinsecus in medio, sed extrinsecus a fine. Propter quod dixit divus Thomas, 1 part., loco citato in num. preced., bonum utile tantum esse analogice bonum.

8. Ad secundam probationem respondetur comparando varia media ad finem, posse inveniri æqualitatem in ipsis mediis ut utilia sunt ad finem, et tunc si voluntas eligat unum præ alio, tota causa finalis illius determinationis est finis, effectiva vero est voluntas means itself. For example, the power to expel a bad humour is in the bitter potion and so on for similar cases. And in this way that form is some goodness agreeable to that thing whose perfection it is. But, still, with respect to the one who loves a thing of this kind only as a means, all that utility is not desirable except as a result of the goodness of the end by which it is informed extrinsically in a certain way. And speaking in this way about the goodness and utility of the means as desirable for the one acting for the sake of the end, I deny that it is intrinsically in the means. Rather, it is extrinsically [in it] from the end. For this reason St. Thomas said in the place cited in the previous paragraph from ST Ia that useful good is only analogically good.

233 dixit ] om. V.
libere operans, et possunt in eadem determinatione
duo distingui, unum est absolutum, scilicet quod vol-
untas hoc eligat præ illo, et hoc non est necesse quod
sit a fine, nec requirit causam finalem positivam,
quia illa comparatio præter electionem unius medii,
solum addit negationem alterius, et ad non eligen-
dum non requiritur specialis finis, sed solum quod
illud medium non sit necessarium. Atque idem di-
cendum est (si contingat media esse inæqualia) volun-
tatem pro libertate sua eligere quod minus utile est,
quod, an facere possit, disputabimus infra, tract. 2.
At vero quando media sunt inæqualia, et voluntas
eligat quod est utilius, totum illud attribuitur fini,
ut causæ finali, quia ille, quantum est de se, ad hoc
non ita movetur, non est ex defectu finis, sed ex liber-
tate voluntatis, quæ non patitur necessitatem a fine.
Et hoc quidem verum est, quando excessus medii
est proprie ac formaliter in utilitate: nam si contin-
gat esse in alis conditionibus, verbi gratia, quia est
things can be distinguished in the same determination. One is
absolute, namely, that the will elects this one in preference to
the others. And for this it is not necessary that it results from
the end nor does it require a positive final cause, since that
comparison beyond the election of one of the means only adds
a negation of another. And a special end is not required for not
electing something; rather, all that is needed is that means
not be necessary. And likewise it should be said (if the means
happen to be unequal) [about the case] where the will by its
freedom elects a less useful means. (Whether this can happen
we will discuss below in the second treatise.) But, on the other
hand, when the means are unequal and the will elects the one
that is more useful, that is wholly attributed to the end as final
cause, because it, insofar as it is of itself, moves to this whole.
If the will sometimes is not moved in this way, that is not a re-
sult of a defect of the end but of the freedom of the will, which
does not undergo necessity from the end. And this is certainly
ture when a means exceeds what it properly and formally has
in utility. For if it happens to be in other conditions—for ex-
ample, because it is more pleasing or delightful—the fact that
suavius, vel delectabilius, tunc non solum a fine, sed
ab ipso medio provent, quod voluntas magis ad illud
trahatur, quam ad aliud, sed sub ea ratione medium
non se habet ut pure medium, sed admiscetur ali-
qua ratio finalis finis proximi, quia res illa, quæ est
medium, jam non solum amatur propter utilitatem
ad aliud, sed etiam, quia est aliquo modo per se bona
et amabilis.

**Sectio V.**

*Quomodo se habeat finis ad objectum adequatum vol-
untatis.*

1. Decisio hujus quæstionis ex præcedenti haberi
potest, et a D. Thoma tangitur 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1
et autem dubitandi est, quia objectum adequatum voluntatis est bonum: dix-
imus autem, non omne bonum habere causalitatem
finis, sed solum illud, quod est propter se amabile,
on autem bonum utile, ut sic. Unde Aristoteles
1, Magnor. moral., cap. 5: *Bonorum, inquit, ques-

1. A settling of this question can be reached from the previ-
ous one. It is also touched on by St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1.
And it will be useful for those things which are to be discussed
and therefore should briefly be presented. Moreover, the rea-
son for doubting is that the adequate object of the will is good.
We said, moreover, that not every good has the causality of an
end, but only that good which is lovable for its own sake. Use-
ful good as such, however, does not. Hence, Aristotle says in
*Magna moralia* I, cap. 5: ‘Of goods certain ones are ends but

Section V.

*How the end is related to the adequate object of the will.*

1. It does not seem that the end is an adequate
object of the will.
dam sunt finis, quaedam vero non: unde concluditur argumentum, quia voluntatis objectum est omne id, circa quod voluntas versatur, non solum autem versatur circa finem, sed etiam circa media: ergo non est finis objectum adequatum. In contrarium autem est, quia divus Thomas, citato articulo primo, dicit, finem esse objectum voluntatis, et videtur loquii de objecte adequatuo, quia alius non recte concluderet voluntatem omnia operari secundum rationem finis, quia potentia operatur omnia sub ratione objecti sui: est enim hoc verum de objecto adequato, et non de alio, et ideo comparat divus Thomas finem respectu voluntatis colori respectu visus: est autem color objectum adequatum visus. Confirmari potest ex Aristotele 2, Physic., capite tertio, dicente, finem et bonum idem esse: et 1, Ethic., capite septimo, illud esse uniuscujusque rei bonum, cujus gratia operatur: ergo sicut bonum, ita et finis est objectum adequatum voluntatis, quia quidquid voluntas amat est finis, vel propter finem.

certain others not’. From which the argument is concluded: since everything to which the will is directed is an object of the will, but it is directed not only to the end but also to means, therefore the end is not the adequate object. To the contrary, however, because St. Thomas in the cited first article says that the end is the object of the will. And he seems to be talking about an adequate object, because otherwise he does not rightly conclude that the will does everything following the nature of an end since a power does everything under the aspect of its object. For this is true of an adequate object and not of others. For this reason St. Thomas compares an end with respect to the will to colour with respect to sight. Colour, moreover, is the adequate object of sight. It can be confirmed from Aristotle, Physics II, cap. 3, ‘the end and the good are the same’, and from EN I, cap. 7, ‘that is the good for each thing for the sake of which it acts’. Therefore, just as good is the adequate object of the will, so also is the end, because whatever the will loves is an end or for the sake of an end.
Auctorum varietas in præsenti quæst.

2. In hac re, qui affirmant, media, ut media, habere causalitatem finis, facile concedunt, finem esse objectum adæquatum voluntatis sub fine media comprehendendo. Alii vero, qui illud negant, docent, finem esse objectum principale voluntatis, quia omnia, quæ voluntas vult, aliquo modo ordinantur in finem: non tamen adæquatum, quia non quidquid voluntas vult, est finis. Alii autem distinctione utuntur. Conradus, ad citatum art. 1, distinguist duplex objectum voluntatis, scilicet per se, et per accidens, et dicit, objectum adæquatum per se, tam motivum, quam terminativum esse finem, media vero solum esse objecta per accidens. Alii denique Thomistæ distinguunt de objecto motivo et terminativo, et docent, finem esse adæquatum objectum motivum voluntatis: non autem terminativum, quia voluntatis actus etiam ad media terminantur. Et hæc sententia magis ad veritatem accedit, quam alio modo, ita declaro. Possimus enim loqui aut de objecto formalis, quod est voluntati ratio operandi: aut de materiali objecto, circa quod voluntas operatur, ut videre

2. In this matter, those who affirm that means, as means, have the causality of an end easily concede that an end is an adequate object of the will by including means under the end. But others, who deny that, teach that an end is the principal object of the will because everything that the will wishes is in some way ordered to the end. It is, however, not adequate, because not anything whatever that the will wishes is an end. Others, moreover, use a distinction. Conradus, at the cited art. 1, distinguishes a two-fold object of the will: namely, per se and per accidens. And he says that the adequate object per se, more motive than terminative, is the end, but means are only objects per accidens. Finally, others of the Thomists distinguish between motive and terminative objects and teach that the end is an adequate motive object of the will, but not an [adequate] terminative [object], because acts of the will are also terminated at means.

And this view comes closer to the truth, which I show in another way as follows: for we can speak either of the formal object which is the reason for the will’s acting or of the material object concerning which the will acts, as may be seen in the examples given above in the preceding section, n. 5, in the case
licet in exemplis supra positis, sectione præcedenti, num. 5, de amore proximi propter Deum, vel adorationis imaginis propter rem representatam: nam res, quæ amatur, vel adoratur, est divina voluntas, vel excellentia præcepti, et ideo merito datur objectum formale in istis.

3. Dico ergo primo, rationem adæquatam operandi voluntatis, atque adeo formale objectum adæquatum voluntatis esse finem. Hanc existimo esse mentem divi Thomæ, loco citato, et eam probant, quæ posteriori loco adducta sunt in ratione dubitandi: et sequitur ex dictis in sectione præcedenti, quia tota causalitas finis est in ipso fine non solum respectu sui, sed etiam respectu mediocrum: ergo solus finis est adæquata ratio operandi voluntatis, quia illud est voluntatis ratio operandi, quod illam attrahit, seu movet ad operandum. Est autem adversendum, sermonem esse de voluntate operandi proprie ex causalitate finis, in qua non solum exterior effectus, sed etiam interior actus est ex causali-

3. Therefore, I say, first, that the adequate reason for the will’s acting—and therefore the adequate formal object of the will—is the end. I consider this to be the mind of St. Thomas in the cited place and those things which were brought up in following place in the reason for doubting prove it. And it follows from what was said in the preceding section, because the complete causality of the end is in the end itself not only with respect to itself but also with respect to the means. Therefore, the end alone is the adequate reason for the acting of the will, because that which draws the will or moves it to action is its reason for acting. It should be noted, however, that the discussion is about wills acting properly by causality of an end in which not only the exterior effect but also the interior act is from the causality of the end. For if the discussion were about...
Objectio. Sed objicies, quia interdum voluntas nostra operatur circa aliquod objectum, nec intendendo il• lud ut finem, nec eligendo propter finem, sed per simplicem quamdam complacentiam volendo illud actu imperfecto, quem velleitatem vocant: ergo ratio talis actus nullo modo est finis. Cujus signum etiam est, quia talis actus versatur etiam circa rem impossibilem: finis autem cum dicat ordinem ad esse, et ad executionem, semper est aliquid possibile. Respondetur hujusmodi actum semper versari circa objectum, propter aliquam bonitatem, quæ in ipso apparent, vel absolute, vel sub aliqua conditione: et hoc modo etiam ille actus est ex causalitate finis, quia tale objectum per illam bonitatem movet et trahit il-

Dilutio. Obiectio. 4. Sed objicies, quia interdum voluntas nostra operatur circa aliquod objectum, nec intendendo il• lud ut finem, nec eligendo propter finem, sed per simplicem quamdam complacentiam volendo illud actu imperfecto, quem velleitatem vocant: ergo ratio talis actus nullo modo est finis. Cujus signum etiam est, quia talis actus versatur etiam circa rem impossibilem: finis autem cum dicat ordinem ad esse, et ad executionem, semper est aliquid possibile. Respondetur hujusmodi actum semper versari circa objectum, propter aliquam bonitatem, quæ in ipso apparent, vel absolute, vel sub aliqua conditione: et hoc modo etiam ille actus est ex causalitate finis, quia tale objectum per illam bonitatem movet et trahit il-
lam voluntatem ad eliciendum simplicem affectum, et hoc modo etiam ille actus ex causaliitate finis, non quidem ut dicit ordinem ad intentionem, vel executionem, de quo procedit argumentum factum, sed solum ut dicit ordinem ad effectum voluntatis, quem excitat.

5. Dico secundo, finem non esse objectum materiae adæquatum voluntatis. Hoc probat prior ratio dubitandi in principio posita: quia voluntas etiam versatur circa media: nec recte appellantur media solum objecta per accidens voluntatis, ad eum modum, quo substantia, verbi gratia, dicitur objectum per accidens visus, nam potentia non attingit per proprium actum hujusmodi objectum per accidens, sed solum attingit objectum per se, quod conjungenitur objecto per accidens, quod valde remote et extrin-sece accipit hanc denominationem: at vero voluntas vere ac proprie versatur circa media immediate et in se atingendo illa per proprium actum distinctum ab illo, quo versatur circa finem ut objectum quod intendit per actum electionis, quo immediate vult et

5. I say, secondly, that the end is not the adequate material object of the will. The first reason for doubting posited in the beginning shows this. For the will is also directed to means. Not only objects per accidens of the will are rightly called means, according to that way by which substance, for example, is called the object per accidens of sight (for a power does not reach through a proper act of this sort a per accidens object but only reaches a per se object that is connected to a per accidens object, which receives this denomination very remotely and extrinsically). But, on the other hand, the will is truly and properly directed to means immediately and in itself attains them through a proper act distinct from that by which it is directed to an end as the object which it intends through an act of election, by which it immediately wishes and chooses the means themselves. Therefore, they are comprehended un-
eligit ipsa media: comprehenduntur ergo sub objecto per se, quamvis materiali.

6. Sed quaeret aliquis, an totum materiale objectum voluntatisprehendatur sub hoc disjuncto, finis vel mediis: nam Scotus, in 1, distinct. 1, quæst. 3, negat, *quia potest voluntas*, inquit, *habere aliquem actum, qui nec versetur circa finem, nec circa media*, quia potest voluntas esse de bono nec propter se, quod spectat ad finem; nec propter aliud quod pertinet ad media, sed abstrahere de bono ut sic, abstrahendo a bono propter se, vel propter aliud: hoc enim objectum apprehendi potest <12> per intellectum, qui quamlibet rationem realem potest abstrahere, et est sufficiens ad movendam voluntatem: ergo est etiam sufficiens materia circa quam versatur actus ejus. Imo etiam sequitur contra priorem assertionem, formalem rationem objectivam talis actus non esse finem, sed aliquid abstractum, et universalius fine. Et pro hac sententia citant alii Nominales in illa distinctione prima, Ocham, Gabriel, Major et alii, qui dicit, dari actum medium inter cæci-
der the *per se* object, although material.

6. But someone will ask whether the whole material object of the will is comprehended under this disjunction: end or means. For Scotus in [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 3 denies [it] ‘because the will can’, he says, ‘have some act which is directed neither to an end nor to a means’. For the will can be of the good neither for its own sake (which regards the end) nor for the sake of something else (which pertains to means), but it abstracts concerning the good as such, abstracting from the good for its own sake or for the sake of something else. For this object can be apprehended through the intellect, which can abstract any real nature you please, and it is sufficient for moving the will. Therefore, it is also sufficient matter for its act to be directed to it. Indeed, it also follows—contra the prior assertion—that the formal objective reason for such an act is not the end but something abstract and more general than the end. Other nominalists (Ockham, Gabriel, Major, and others), I, dist. 1, are usually cited for this view. They say that a middle act is given between blindness and sight. But perhaps these were speaking in another sense, as we will see below in dealing with these acts.

A small question that has arisen: whether a means and end at the same time are an adequate object of the will.
The response of Scotus.
tatem et visum: sed hi fortasse alio sensu locuti sunt, ut videbimus infra agentes de his actibus.

7. Dicendum tamen est, omnia objecta voluntatis sufficienter comprehendi sub fine et mediis intelligendo, ut dixi, nomine finis, quidquid propter suam bonitatem amatur, sive ametur actu efficaci, sive non efficaci, sive sit primario intentum, sive secundario, tanquam quid conjunctum fini primario.

Hæc conclusio colligitur ex Aristotele 3, Ethicor., cap. 3 et 4, quatenus in rationibus, quibus ibi utitur distinguunt fines, et media tanquam duo membra complecentia totum objectum voluntatis. Et eodem modo philosophatur Nyssenus sive Nemesius, lib. 5 Philosophiæ, cap. 4, et Damascenus, lib. 2, de Fide, cap. 22, et D. Augustinus 1, de Doct. Christian., cap. 8, ubi omnia bona a voluntate amabilia ad ea revocat quibus utendum est, vel fruendum. Idem sumitur ex D. Thoma 1, cont. Gent., cap. 86, et 1, 2, q. 8, ubi Cajetanus, art. 1, aliqua etiam Thomistæ hoc sequuntur: Gregorius, in 1, dubion., q. 1. Probatur ratione, quia omne bonum amatur, vel propter

7. It should, however, be said that all objects of the will are sufficiently comprehended under the end and means by understanding, as we said, by the name ‘end’ whatever is loved for the sake of its goodness, either loved with an efficacious act or not, either with a primary intention or with a secondary intention as something conjoined with a primary end. This conclusion is gathered from Aristole, EN III, cap. 3 and 4, since in the arguments which he uses here he distinguishes ends and means as two members making up the entire object of the will. And Gregory of Nyssa or Nemesius philosophizes in the same way in Philosophiæ V, cap. 4; John of Damascus in de Fide II, cap. 22; and St. Augustine in de Doct. Christ. I, cap. 8, where he calls all goods lovable by the will ‘which are to be used or enjoyed’. The same is taken from St. Thomas, SCG I, cap. 86 and ST IaIIæ.8, where Cajetan in art. 1 and also other Thomists follow this. [Also] Gregory in 1, dub., q. 1.

It is proven by reason, because every good is loved either for its own sake or for the sake of something else; therefore, either as end or as means. But these two are opposed as a con-
se, vel propter aliud; ergo vel ut finis, vel ut medium: tradiction, because in an object which is loved for its own sake, as such, is included a negation, namely, that it is not loved for the sake of the goodness of something else. Therefore, no intermediate can be found between these two, because by the very fact that a means is not ordered to another for the sake of which it is loved means that it will be loved for its own sake. And I show it in this way: because whatever is loved by the will is good—honestum, pleasurable, or useful. But the former two have the nature of an end, insofar as concerns themselves, because they have in themselves that for which they are loved. If sometimes they are referred to another, it is extrinsic to them and then they introduce the nature of a means. But the third good, namely, useful good, has the proper nature of a means.

8. Scotus responds to this that it is possible for the good or the agreeable to be loved as it is abstracted from all these. But this is not rightly said, because the good either is such through intrinsic goodness [or through extrinsic goodness]. In the first way it has the nature of an end, but in the latter it has the nature of a means. Moreover, one general nature cannot be ab-

8. Scotus responds to this that it is possible for the good or the agreeable to be loved as it is abstracted from all these. But this is not rightly said, because the good either is such through intrinsic goodness [or through extrinsic goodness]. In the first way it has the nature of an end, but in the latter it has the nature of a means. Moreover, one general nature cannot be ab-

174–175 aut solum per habitudinem ad extrinsecam bonitatem ] om. V.
non potest autem abstrahi una ratio communis utrique, quia in hujusmodi analogia non datur ratio communis objectiva, sicut non potest intelligi quod aliquis amet sanum in communi, ut abstrahit ab eo quod formaliter intrinsece sanum est, et ab eo quod dicitur tale per habitudinem ad sanitatem: sed unusquisque amat sanitatem propter seipsam: signum vero, vel instrumenta sanitatis propter ipsam: sic igitur quando quis amat bonum in communi, revera amat illud quod est in se, et per se conveniens, et ille est appetitus finis non in particulari, sed in communi, descendendo autem ad particularia bona, nullum est quod ab illis duabus rationibus abstrahat, scilicet propter se, vel propter aliud: igitur finis et media exhauriunt totum objectum voluntatis.

Sectio VI.

Quotuplex sit finis.

1. In hac questione explicandae sunt nonnullae partitiones finis, quae necessariae sunt, et magnam lucem

Section VI.

What kinds of ends there are.

1. Some of the divisions of ends that are necessary and that bring greater light to all those things to be discussed in the
1. Divisio finis in ultimum et proximum. 

Primo ergo dividitur finis in ultimum, et proximum sive non ultimum; quæ divisio colligitur ex D. Thoma, in hac quæstione, præsertim art. 4, et ab Aristotele 2, Physic., c. 3, et aliis locis. Ut autem intelligantur singula membrorum, et aliquæ subdivisiones, communiter notandum est duo convenire fini proprioe dicto; primum est, ut propter se ametur, in quo includitur negatio ordinatio ejus ad alium, atque hinc fit ut omnis finis formaliter sub ratione finis consideratus habeat rationem ultimi: unde si in dicta divisione ultimus finis sub hac ratione sumatur, non ultimus dicetur solum illud medium, quod participat rationem finis, quatenus alium ad ipsum ordinatur; sæpe autem contingit, ut particulare bonum, quamvis propter intrinsecam bonitatem ametur, simul tamen referatur in ulteriorem finem, course of this subject are to be explained in this question, albeit more concisely than in *DM* XXIII.2 and adapted to the theological subject.

Therefore, ends are first divided into ultimate and proximate or non-ultimate. This division is gathered from St. Thomas, in this question, especially art. 4, and from Aristotle *Phys*. II, c. 3, and other places. But so that the individual members and other subdivisions are understood, it should be noted generally that there are two ways for something to qualify as an end properly speaking. The first is, as loved for its own sake, in which is included a negation of its ordering to something else, and which results in every end formally considered under the aspect of an end having the nature of an ultimate end. Hence if in the stated division the ultimate end were taken under this aspect, that means alone which participates in the nature of an end only insofar as something is ordered to it would be called not ultimate. For it often happens that a particular good, although loved for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, is at the same time, however, referred to a more ultimate end. In this way alms can be loved both for the sake

---


8It looks like there are several different ways of translating the previous sentences with rather different results.
quomodo potest amari eleemosyna, et propter intrinsecam misericordiae honestatem, et ut medium ad impertrandam veniam pro peccatis; atque hoc modo talis finis dicitur non ultimus, quia licet sub quadam ratione participet causam salutatem finis, tamen voluntas in illo non sistit, sed ulterius tendit: ille ergo dicitur ultimus absolute in quo sistit voluntas non referendo illud in alium, qui quidem est ultimus in executione, quia illo consecuto quiescit voluntatis motus; est autem primus in intentione, quia est id, quod primo propter se amatur.


2. In the second way, something qualifies as an end as other things are loved for its sake. And from this head that division can be explained differently and its members subdivided differently. For there is a certain end which is called unqualifiedly ultimate. Another is called qualifiedly ultimate or ultimate in some series. Health is called the ultimate end of medicine in this way, because everything which falls under this art is referred to this end and they do not tend beyond it. Similarly, for other cases.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{9}Suárez also discusses this division in \textit{DM} XXIV.1.
Moreover, unqualifiedly ultimate ends can be subdivided. For a certain one is instituted by nature and is that for the sake of which man was created and to which he ought to refer himself and all his [actions]. But another one is that to which a human being institutes himself by a proper intention, which sometimes is the former thing for the sake of which he was created, namely, God, and then the human being is said to have the true unqualifiedly ultimate end in his intention. But sometimes this end intended by the human being is distinct from that for the sake of which he was created and such is called a false ultimate end.

It is not easy, however, to explain in what way the human being is said to intend something as an ultimate or as an end unqualifiedly. For if we say that the nature of this end is to be such that the human being refers himself and everything that belongs to him to it, it seems to follow that the just person, because sometimes he sins venially, does not love God as ultimate end, because he does not refer all of his actions to God, for actions of venial sin are not referred to God by the one acting.

44 et ] om. V.
52 falsus ] om. V.
But if we say—as some do—that the nature of an ultimate end is to be so that all things are referred to it which are referrible to it, this will not be a proper unqualifiedly ultimate end, but is consistent with every end which is ultimate in some series, for it necessary so that all things are referred to it which pertain to it but not others.

3. Wherefore, it is above all of the nature of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that a human being by duty and merits refer himself and everything that belongs to him to it absolutely and unqualifiedly. Hence, so that the intention of the ultimate end from wherever is perfect, it is necessary so that nothing that is not referrible to such an end admits in the human. But so that it is preserved absolutely and unqualifiedly, although not with its complete perfection, it is enough so that nothing that is absolutely contrary to such an end and entirely repugnant to its attainment admits.

And in this way an end not ultimate should be proportionately distinguished. For with respect to an unqualifiedly ultimate end, every other particular end may be called non-ultimate. And, similarly, in each series or art, every other end to which not everything is referred, may be called non-
intelliguntur aliæ divisiones sub aliis terminis, quæ rem eamdem alīs verbis continent: solet enim dici quidam finis ultimus positive, alius vero negative: rursus quidam finis ultimus universalis, alius partic-

85 ularis: quidam finis ultimus operantis, alius vero tan-
tum alicujus operis: quando enim finis ultimus talis est ut omnia simpliciter ad ipsum referantur, ille est ultimus etiam positive, quia omnia in illum tendunt, et propterea etiam est finis ultimus operantis, quia se et omnia sua in illum refert: quando finis vero est solum privativus in aliqua serie, vel aliquo ordine, tunc est particularis et negative, quia solum dicitur ultimus propter negationem ulterioris termini in illo ordine.

90 4. Secunda divisio est in finem cuius et finem cui, quæ divisio sumitur ex Aristotele 2, de Anima, cap. 4, nam licet Argilopilus transferat finem quo et finem cui, tamen priora verba sunt magis consentanea textui græco et melius explicant sensum divisionis: ultimate. And hence other divisions are understood under other terms, which comprise the same matter with different words. For it is customary to call a certain ultimate end positive, but another negative. Again, a certain ultimate end universal, another particular. A certain ultimate end of the one acting, but another only of some act. For when the ultimate end is such that everything is referred to it unqualifiedly, it is also a positive ultimate end, because everything tends to it and therefore it is also the ultimate end of the one acting, because he and everything that belongs to him is referred to it. But when the end is only privative in some series or in some order, then it is particular and negative, because it is called ultimate only on account of the negation of a more ultimate terminus in that order.

4. The second division is into finis cuius and finis cui, which division is taken from Aristotle, DA II, c. 4. For although Ar-

95 gyropoulos \(^{10}\) translated it to finis quo and finis cui, the former words are more consistent with the Greek text and better cap-
ture the sense of the division. For that form or good for the textui græco et melius explicant sensum divisionis:

The reference is presumably to John Argyropoulos (1415–1487), the Byzantine lecturer who taught Greek—and Aristotle—to a number of notable Italian humanists. The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (ed. by William Smith, 1870) mentions a Latin translation of book III of De Anima but none of book II, though it does note that a commentary on De Anima has been credited to him.

\(^{10}\) The reference is presumably to John Argyropoulos (1415–1487), the Byzantine lecturer who taught Greek—and Aristotle—to a number of notable Italian humanists. The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (ed. by William Smith, 1870) mentions a Latin translation of book III of De Anima but none of book II, though it does note that a commentary on De Anima has been credited to him.
dictur enim finis cujus forma illa, vel bonum, cujus adipiscendi gratia operatur voluntas, ut est, verbi gratia, visio beata, vel sanitas, etc., finis autem cui, dictur persona ipsa, seu subjectum, cui bonum illud amatur, vel queritur, ut est homo, qui sibi querit sanitatem. Circa hanc vero divisionem inquiri potest, an utrumque ejus membrorum habeat rationem finis. Quibusdam enim videtur solum finem cui, esse proprium finem: at vero finem cujus esse lato modo finem. Ita Gabriel, in 2, dub. 1, quaest. 5, secutus Ocham, ibi quaest. 3, art. 1. Et fundamentum ejus est, quia de ratione finis proprii dicti est ut ametur amore amicitiae, finis autem cujus non amatur amore amicitiae, sed concupiscenciae, cum ametur alteri qui est finis cui, qui proprii amat amorem amicitiae: et videtur sentire divus Thomas, prima secundae, quaest. 26, articulo quarto, ubi dicit, illum amari simpliciter, cui bonum aliquod amatuer: bonum autem ipsum, quod aliqui amatuer, tantum amari secundum quid. Et confirmatur, quia finis cujus videtur multum convenire cum medio: nam <14> sicut

But concerning this division it can be asked whether both of these members have the nature of an end. For to certain people it seems that only the finis cui is a proper end. But in truth a finis cuius is an end in a certain more general way. Thus Gabriel in [Sent.] II, dub. 1, q. 5, following Ockham there in q. 3, art. 1. And the foundation of it is because concerning the nature of an end it is properly called as it is loved with the love of friendship, but a finis cuius is not loved with the love of friendship but with the love of concupiscence, when it is loved for another who is the finis cui, who properly is loved with the love of friendship. And St. Thomas seems to think [this] in [ST] IaIIae.26.4 where he says: ‘that is loved strictly speaking for whom some good is loved, but the good itself, that is loved for another, is only loved in a manner of speaking’.

And it is confirmed, because a finis cuius seems to agree with many means. For just as a means is for the sake of an end
medium est propter finem, et non e contrario, ita
finis cuius est propter finem cui, et non e converso.

Item sicut medium non est amabile, nisi propter pro-
portionem, quam habet cum fine: ita finis cuius gratia
non amatur, nisi quia est proportionate et conveniens
illi, cui amatur: ergo solus finis cui est proprie et ul-
timate finis.

5. Aliis autem e contrario videtur, solum finem
cuius gratia fit operatio, esse proprie finem; illum
vero, cui hic finis amatur, esse tantum subjectum,
quod perficit, vel actuat ipse finis: quae habitudo est
distincta a propria habitudine finis. Quod potest
confirmari illo exemplo de visione beata, quæ est fi-
nis operationum omnium hominum, et non proprie
ordinatur ad hominem, ut ad finem: quod maxime
verum est de ipso Deo, qui est proprie finis ultimus,
et homo sibi illum appetit ut eo fruatur, et tamen
non potest homo dici finis ipsius Dei, quamvis sit is,
cui Deus amatur et inquiritur. Et confirmatur: nam
ubicumque Aristoteles agit de fine proprie, et sub ra-

and not the other way around, so a finis cuius is for the sake
of a finis cui and not the other way around. Likewise, just as
a means is not lovable except for the sake of the proportion it
has with the end, so a finis cuius is not loved except because it
is proportionate and agreeable to the one (cui) is loved. There-
fore, only a finis cui is properly and ultimately an end.

5. To others, however, it seems the other way around: only
the finis cuius for the sake of which an action happens is prop-
erly an end. But he for whom this end is loved is only the
subject who executes or implements the end itself, which habi-
tude is distinct from the proper habitude of an end. This can
be confirmed by that example of the beatific vision, which is
the end of all human action and is not properly ordered to a
human as to an end. That is especially true concerning God
himself, who is properly the ultimate end, and a human de-
sires him for himself in order to enjoy him, and yet the human
cannot be called the end of God himself, although it is he for
whom God is loved and sought.

And it is confirmed: for wherever Aristotle deals with the

\[130 \text{ hic } \text{ om. V.}\]

6. Nihilominus dicendum censeo utrumque horum posse participare rationem finis: ac frequentius ita concurrere, ut ex utroque quodammodo insurgat unus finis integer, qui primo intenditur et inquiritur. Probatur et explicatur: nam in utroque eorum potest esse ratio sufficiens ad terminandum motum voluntatis propter se ipsum, et propter suam bonitatem: sic enim quando homo inquirit sanitatem, et se diligit cui sanitatem vult, non propter extrinsecam bonitatem, sed propter id quod ipse est, et propter identitatem, quam secum habet, et similiter diligit sanitatem propter bonitatem ejus: in quo multum differt a medio, quia medium solum censetur ama-

end proper and under the nature of a cause, he attributes the nature of an end to a *finis cuius*, as is clear in *Phys.* II, c. 3 and 7, where in this sense he says that the end is first in intention and ultimate in execution and coincides with the form which is the effect of the agent. And in the same place he says that ‘we are ourselves also an end in a certain way’, signifying that a *finis cui* is an end only in a certain way and in a manner of speaking.

6. Nevertheless, I think it should be said that both of these can participate in the nature of an end and more frequently they concur so that from both of them one integrated end arises in a certain way, which first is intended and sought.

It is proven and explained: for in both of them can be a sufficient nature for terminating the motion of the will for its own sake and for its own goodness. For thus when a human seeks health and selects himself as the one for whom he wishes the health, it is not account of the extrinsic goodness but on account of that which he is himself and on account of the identity which he has with it, and similarly he selects health for the sake of the goodness of it. In this respect it differs greatly from a means because a means is thought lovable only insofar as it
bile quatenus est utile ad aliud: salus vero ratione sui, quatenus per se perficit hominem cui amatur. Atque ita finis totalis hujus intentionis est homo sanus, in quo includuntur prædicti duo fines quasi componentes integrum finem. Quomodo etiam dicit sæpe Aristoteles potentiam esse propter operationem tanquam propter finem <col. b> cujus gratia, cum tamen operatio sit etiam propter potentiam ut ipsam actuet et perficiat, quia quod per se intenditur, est quod potentia sit in actu ultimo constitutæ. Igitur ratio finis utrique horum proprie convenit, et ideo Aristoteles, citatus num. quarto, in dicto loco de Anima, utrique illam attribuit.

Quodnam horum sit potior finis.

7. Sed ut hoc magis explicetur, inquiri potest, quis horum sit principalior finis: potest autem fieri comparatio vel in esse rei, vel in esse causæ: si comparantur priori modo, non potest universalis regula tradi: nam interdum unus finis est res perfectior, interdum alius, nam cum homo intendit acquirere sanitatem, perfectior res est finis cui, scilicet homo, quam finis cujus, scilicet sanitas: quando vero homo in-
is useful for something else. But health is a reason in itself, insofar as it in itself perfects the human for whom it is loved.

And so the complete end of this intention is a healthy human, in which are included the just-mentioned two ends as if components of an integrated end. In this way also Aristotle often says that ‘potency is for the sake of action just as for the sake of a finis cuius, when nevertheless an action is also for the sake of a potency as it actualizes and perfects it, because what is in itself intended is that the potency is ultimately constituted in actuality. Therefore, the nature of an end properly agrees with both of these and for that reason Aristotle, cited in n. 4, in the place mention in DA, attributes it to both of them.

7. But in order to explain this further, it can be asked which of these is the more principal end. Moreover, a comparison can be made either in the being of the thing or in the being of the cause. If they are compared in the first way, no universal rule can be given. For sometimes one end is more perfect, sometimes the other. For when a human intends to acquire health, the more perfect thing is the finis cuius, namely, the human, rather than the finis cuius, namely, health. But
tendit acquirere Deum, perfectior res est finis cuius gratia, scilicet Deus, quam finis cui, qui est homo. Et ratio est, quia interdum res perfectur a forma, quæ in esse entis est minus perfecta, quia præter perfectionem, quam habet ipsa forma, intendit acquirere aliam perfectionem alterius formæ, quamvis inferior sit. Interdum vero perfectur res per conjunctionem ad aliam perfectiorem se, ut homo per conjunctionem ad Deum: ergo propter hanc causam potest finis cuius gratia interdum esse res minus perfecta, interdum vero perfectior, quam res, seu persona cui amatur. At vero si comparetur in esse finis, videtur sane finis cui frequentius participare rationem finis principiorem, tum quia in eo genere amoris videtur magis amari: tum etiam, quia in illo sistit maxime tota motio voluntatis. In contrarium vero urget illud argumentum, quia honeste, et sancte amamus Deum nobis; in quo amore Deus est finis cuius et non cui: et tamen dici non potest quod nostunc amemus eo amore magis, quam Deum, alias amor ille esset inordinatus: nec etiam dici potest quod nos when the human intends to attain God, the more perfect thing is the finis cuius, namely, God, rather than the finis cui, which is the human.

And the reason is because sometimes one thing is perfected by a form which in the existence of the being is less perfect, because in addition to the perfection which the form itself has, it intends to acquire another perfection of another form, although it is inferior. But sometimes the thing is perfected through a conjunction with another thing more perfect than itself, e.g., a human through a conjunction with God. Therefore, on account of this cause a finis cuius can sometimes be a thing less perfect and sometimes a thing more perfect than the thing or person for whom (cui) it is loved.

But, on the other hand, if it is compared in the being of the end, it seems reasonable that the finis cui more frequently participates in the more principal nature of an end, both because it seems to be loved more in that genus of love and also because the complete motion of the will especially stops in that. But that argument to the contrary is pressed, because we love God for us in a way that is honestum and holy, in which love God is a finis cuius and not a finis cui. And yet it cannot be said that
simus principalior finis illius motionis, alias nos esse-
mus finis ultimus nostri et non Deus, quod est plane falsum.

8. Quapropter in hac parte dicendum censeo, non posse tradi universalem doctrinam, sed distinctione utendum esse et considerandum quale sit illud bonum, quod alicui amatur, et cujus gratia fit opera-tio, nam si bonum illud sit particulare et quasi secundaria, et accidentaria perfectio ejus cui amatur: sic finis cui, induit principaliorem ratio- <15> nem finis, quia ejus perfectio simpliciter magis intenditur. Signum etiam est, quia hujusmodi finis amari potest non solum ut finis, sed etiam ut medium, et amor illius sepe oritur ex priori amore ipsius personæ cui amatur: ut homo ex absoluto et perfecto amore sui, qui est amor benevolentiae, amat sanitatem, et potest illam amare non solum ut perfectionem formalem suam, sed etiam ut medium utile ad alia. At vero interdum bonum illud, cujus acquirendi gratia homo

we then love it more with that love than God. Otherwise that love would be inordinate. Nor can it be said that we are more principally the end of the motion. Otherwise, we would be our ultimate end and not God, which is plainly false.

8. For this reason I think in this part it should be said that a universal doctrine cannot be given but that it is necessary to use a distinction and to consider what kind of good it is that is loved for someone and for the sake of which the action is done. For if that good is particular and as if secondary and its accidental perfection is loved for someone (cui), then the finis cui clothes itself in the more principal nature of an end, because its perfection is more intended, strictly speaking. And a sign of this is because an end of this sort can be loved not only as end but also as a means, and love for it often arises from a prior love for that person for whom (cui) it is loved. As a human being from an absolute and perfect love for himself, which is the love of friendship, loves health, and can love it not only as his formal perfection, but also as a means useful for others.

But sometimes that good for the sake of the acquiring of which the human acts or which he loves for himself is the max-
operatur, seu quod sibi amat, est maximum ac summum bonum respectu ejus cui amatur, ut est Deus respectu hominis, et tunc illud bonum est præcipuum, etiam in ratione finis, quia ille est simpliciter finis ultimus, et non potest recte ad alium ordinari ut ad finem. Unde quando homo sibi amat hoc bonum, non ordinat illud ad se ut ad finem, sed potius amat conjungi illi bono ut bono et ultimo fini suo. Ex quo sequitur, et tandem intelligitur, quod licet respectu agentis vel mediorum, finis cuius et cui, induant rationem finis, tamen comparando illa inter se, non est necesse, ut mutuo, seu adinvicem unus sit finis alterius vel e contrario: ut in prædicto exemplo, quamvis homo sibi amet Deum, tamen non ordinat Deum ad se ut ad finem, sed potius ipse ordinatur ad Deum, ut ad finem ultimum, non quidem ut medium, propri loquendo, sed ut subjectum, quod potest consequi hujusmodi finem.

imal and highest good with respect to him who is loved, as God is with respect to the human, and then that good is principal, even in the nature of an end, because it is the unqualifiedly ultimate end and cannot be rightly ordered to another as to an end. Hence, when a human loves this good for himself, he does not order it to himself as to an end, but rather loves to be united to that good as his ultimate end and good. From which it follows and finally is understood that although with respect to the agent or the means the finis cuius and the finis cui clothe themselves with the nature of an end, nevertheless in comparing that between the them, it is not necessary that by exchange or in turn one is an end of the other or the other way around. As in the previously given example, although the human being loves God for himself [i.e., for the human being], nevertheless he does not order God to himself as to an end, but rather he himself is ordered to God as to the ultimate end, not indeed as a means, properly speaking, but as a subject that can seek after an end of this sort.

222 seu] sed V.
223 cui] qui V.
3. Divisio
finis in eum qui consistit in operatione tantum, vel in re operata.

9. Tertia divisio est: nam aliquando finis est operationis tantum, ut est, verbi gratia, contemplatio, vision, eucharistia, et in universum omnis actio, quae non intenditur, ut ex illa aliquis effectus resultet et maneat, sed propter se. Interdum vero finis est aliquis effectus resultans ex actione, ut est domus in adificatione, et sic de aliis. Quae divisio quamvis respectu finis ut sic videatur materialis, quia magis sumpta est ex rebus, quae sunt finis, quam ex ratione finalisandi, tamen illa sæpe usus est Aristoteles, ut 1, Ethic., cap. 1, et 1, Mag. mor., cap. 3, quia ad explicandum ultimum finem humanarum actionum necessaria est. Et quidem circa finem, qui consistit in re facta, nihil notandum occurrit, nec multum refert ad moralem considerationem, quia finis hominis, ut postea dicemus, non consistit in re facta aliqua, sed in operatione. Circa aliam ergo partem est observandum: etiam in illo fine, qui dicitur consistere in operatione potentiae, distinguendo actionem physicam a termino producto et <col. b> facto, quia nulla est actio, per quam non aliquid fiat, ut patet: tum in ac-

9. The third division is: for sometimes the end is the action itself, as it is, for example, in contemplation, vision, playing the harp, and in general every action which is not intended so that from it some effect result and remain but [rather is intended] on account of itself.

But sometimes the end is some effect resulting from the action, as is a house in building and likewise for others. This division although with respect to the end as such seems material, because it is taken more from the things which are the ends than from the nature of finally causing, nevertheless it was often used by Aristotle, as in EN I, c. 1 and MM I, c. 3, because it is necessary for explaining the ultimate end of human action. And indeed on account of the end which consists in the thing having been done, nothing to be noted comes to mind, nor does it matter much for moral considerations, because the end of a human, as we will say afterwards, does not consist in some thing having been done, but in action.

Therefore, regarding the other part it should be observed: even in that end which is said to consist in the action of a power is distinguished the physical from the terminus having been produced and made, because there is no action through

The 3rd division of ends into those which consist in the action along and those which consist in the thing having been done.

The latter member is taken care of.

The 1st note regarding the former member.
tionibus immanentibus, in quibus et est actio et qualitas facta, quæ dicitur proprie actus immanens: et in transeuntibus, quæ interdum debent esse finis, ut est citharizatio, cantus, etc., nam in illis est sonus, qui fit, et actio, per quam fit; tamen quia termini harum actionum tales sunt, ut non durent nisi quamdiu sint; ideo tam actio quam terminus computatur per modum unius finis, quamvis revera finis sit ipse actus, seu terminus, qui per actionem fit. Secundo est observandum in hujusmodi actionibus maxime immanentibus, dari præter actum objectum, circa quod versatur ipse actus, ut, verbi gratia, visio Dei, est finis ultimus hominis tanquam operatio quædam, cujus objectum est Deus ipse, et in his non solum actio, sed etiam objectum datur, et est vere finis, quia illius gratia fit actio, scilicet ad possidendum illum, et fruendum illo.

which nothing becomes, as is clear. Moreover, in immanent action, in which both an action and quality are made, which is properly called an immanent act and in transitive [actions], which sometimes ought to be ends, as are playing the harp, singing, and so on. For in these the sound which is made also is an action through which it is made. Yet because the termini of these actions are such that they do not endure except as long as they are made, therefore the action more than the terminus is reckoned in the manner of one end, although in reality the end is the act itself or the terminus which is made through the action.

Secondly, it should be observed that especially immanent actions of this sort are given beyond the object act, regarding which the act itself is turned, as, for example, the vision of God is the ultimate end of a human just as a certain action whose object is God himself. And in these not only the action but also the object is given and is truly an end, because the action is done for the sake of it, namely, for the sake of possessing him and enjoying him.
10. Atque hinc oritur alia subdivisio finis, quæ sæpe usus est divus Thomas in hac materia, præsentim prima secundæ, quæstion. secunda et tertia, et quæstione decima, articulo tertia ad tertium, et in 1, distinct. prima, quæstione secunda, articulo primo ad primum: scilicet, quod finis alius est ut adeptio, alius ut res adepta, qui etiam dici solet finis formalis et objectivus, et finis quo, et finis qui, id est, qui acquiritur et quo acquiritur: qui duo, ait divus Thomas, non sunt duo fines distincti, sed integrant unum finem, quia nec objectum attingi potest, nisi per actum, nec actus fieri potest, nisi circa objectum, et ideo eadem est intentio, et motio agentis ad acquirendum actum et objectum: constituant ergo et componunt illa duo unum finem: possunt autem inter se conferri eo modo, quo fecimus n. 7, inter finem cuius et cui, et eadem fere doctrina proportionaliter applicari potest, et ideo hæc sufficiant de fine in communi.

DISPUTATIO II.

De actionibus voluntatis, quæ sunt propter finem.

DE FINE HOMINIS

10. And from here another subdivision of ends arises, of which St. Thomas often makes use in this matter, especially in [ST] IaIæ.2, 3, 10.3 ad 3 and in [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 2, art. 1 ad 1, namely, that one end is that of achievement and another that of the thing having been achieved, which is customarily called a formal end vs. objective end and a finis quo vs. finis qui, that is, what is acquired and by what it is acquired. These two, says St. Thomas, are not two distinct ends, but are integrated into one end, because the object cannot be attained except through the act nor can the act be done except on account of the object. Therefore, it is the same intention and motion of the agent for acquiring both the act and object. Therefore, these two constitute and compose one end. Moreover, they can be brought together in the way by which we brought together the finis cuius and finis cui in n. 7. Almost the same doctrine can be applied proportionately. And therefore these [divisions] suffice concerning the end in general.

DISPUTATION II.

Concerning actions of the will which are on account of the end.

DE FINE HOMINIS
Ex dictis in disputatione præcedenti satis constat, voluntatem nostram operari propter finem: quod etiam est tanquam per se notum apud philosophes, et ex modo loquendi Sacrae Scripturae, ubi etiam in sectione 4, numero 6, confirmatum est. Et ratione patet; quia, cum homo utatur ratione, cognoscit in fine propriam <16> rationem finis, propter quam est appetibilis, et proportionem mediorum in finem, et ita potest ordinare unum ad alterum, atque adeo operari propter finem. Duo ergo explicanda supersunt, primo in quibus actionibus: secundo, quot modis operetur homo propter finem.

Sectio I.

Utrum omnes actus liberi voluntatis humanæ sint propter finem?

1. Ratio dubitandi est primo, quia tantum media, quæ ordinantur ad consequendum finem, videntur esse propter finem: hoc enim in rigore significat illa particula, propter: sed non omnes actus liberi voluntatis humanæ sint propter finem: hoc enim in rigore significat illa particula, propter: sed non omnes actus liberi voluntatis humanæ sint propter finem.

4 quæ] qua V.

DE FINE HOMINIS

It is clear enough that our will acts for the sake of an end from what was said in the preceding disputation. It is also per se notum, as it were, among the philosophers and from the way of speaking in the Holy Scriptures, whereby it was also con
dirmed in sec. 4, n. 6 [of the preceding disputation]. And it is evident by reason, given that when a human being uses reason, he cognizes in the end [i] the proper nature of the end for the sake of which it is desirable and [ii] the relation of means to the end. As a result, he can order one thing to another and to that extent act for the sake of the end. Two things, therefore, remain to be explained: in what actions? and, in how many ways can a human act for the sake of an end?

SECTION I.

Are all free acts of the human will are for the sake of an end?

1. The reason for doubting is, first, that only the means which are ordered to the pursuit of the end seem to be for the sake of the end. For the phrase 'for the sake of' taken rigorously signifies this. But not all free acts of the will are means for the
tatis sunt media ad finem consequendum, ut patet primo de actu electionis: ille enim habet pro objecto medium (est enim electio de mediis): non potest
autem ipsa dici medium: Deinde, multo minus inten-
tio finis, quæ antecedit electionem, habet rationem
medii. Secundo, quia id fit propter finem, quod fit
ex amore finis: sed non omnis actus voluntatis fit ex
amore finis, ut constat saltem de ipsomet amore, quia
non supponit alium amor. Unde fieri potest aliter
argumentum: nam primus actus circa finem, qui est
amor, seu simplex voluntas, non procedit ab alio
actu, a quo ordinatur in finem: ergo non est propter
finem: nam esse propter dicit quamdam ordinationem
ad finem, sicut in actu intellectus, quamvis assen-
sus conclusionis sit propter principia, tamen assen-
sus principiorum non potest dici esse propter principia. Atque ex his rationibus videtur enervari di-
vus Thomas, discursus 1, 2, quaest. 1, art. 1. Nam licet verum sit omnes actus voluntatis versari circa
finem aliquo modo, quod tantum concludit sua ra-
tione: patetque ex dictis, disputat. 1, tamen inde non
pursuit of the end, as is especially clear concerning an act of
election. For it has a means for an object (for it is an election
of means). Moreover, it cannot be called a means. Next, much
less does the intention for the end, which precedes election,
have the nature of a means.

Secondly, [one can doubt] because what is done for the
sake of an end is that which is done from a love for the end.
But not every act of the will is done from a love for the end, as
is clear at least of the very love itself, since it does not suppose
another love. Hence, the argument can be made in another
way: for the first act concerning an end, which is love or simple
will, does not proceed from another act by which it is ordered
to the end. Therefore, it is not for the sake of the end, for ‘to
be for the sake of’ expresses a certain ordering to an end, just
as in the case of acts of the intellect the assent to the principles
cannot be said to be for the sake of the principles, even though
the assent to a conclusion is for the sake of the principles.

And for these reasons St. Thomas seems to be weakened
in the discussion in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1. For although it is true that
all acts of the will are directed to an end in some way, that
hardly finishes his argument. And it is clear from what was
fit omnes actus esse propter finem, quia non omnes sunt media ad finem, nec omnes ordinantur ad finem ex priori intentione, seu affectu ad finem. In contrariam vero est D. Thomas: et ideo observandum inter actus libere voluntatis quosdam esse imperatos, quosdam elicitos: et inter hos, quosdam esse qui versantur circa media, ut electio, et usus: alios, qui circa finem: inter eos autem quidam antecedunt consequentem finis, ut sunt amor, et intentio, quidam vero consequuntur, ut delectatio: et amor etiam tunc durare potest: de hoc ultimo dicam disputat. sequenti, de cæteris in praesent. <col. b>

1. Assertio affirm. de actibus imperatis.

2. Primo ergo de actionibus imperatis a voluntate libera, certa res est esse propter finem, quia hujusmodi actiones esse solent potissima media ad finem consequendum. Item quia procedunt ex intentione finis, media electione amati: ergo propter finem: ergo propter eundem finit. Sed in his actionibus imperatis hæc breviter observanda sunt; primo inter-

said in disp. 1 that it does not follow from that that every act is for the sake of an end, since not all [acts] are means to an end and not all [acts] are ordered to an end by a prior intention or affect for the end. But St. Thomas disagrees. It should, therefore, be observed that among acts of free will one kind has been commanded and and another kind has been elicited. And among the elicited acts, there is one kind that is directed to means (e.g., election and use) and another that is directed to the end. Among the latter, moreover, some precede the attainment of the end (e.g., love and intention), but others follow (e.g., delight). Love can remain even then. I will speak about this last one in the following disputation, but about the rest in the present one.

2. First, therefore, concerning acts having been commanded by a free will, it is certain that they are for the sake of an end, since actions of this kind are usually chiefly means for the pursuit of the end and since they proceed from an intention for the end by means of an election of the thing loved. Therefore, for the sake of the end. Therefore, they are done for the sake of the same.

39 in praesenti. ] in hoc ultimo dicam, disputat. sequenti, de cæteris in praesent. V.
An observation on behalf of this assertion.

But a couple of things should be noted about these commanded actions. First, sometimes they are means to an end not only by reason of themselves as they are in coming to be but also by reason of the termini as they remain in having been made. For example, when a house is made, both the building process and the house that has been made are said to be for the sake of the end, as Aristotle rightly says that the instruments of art are means. A difference in the way of speaking should, however, be noted, since ‘being done for the sake of an end’ is properly said only of action or of a terminus as long as they are in the stage of becoming. But things already having been done by actions that have ceased are said to be or to have been done for the sake of the end, not as being done now.

It should be observed, secondly, that sometimes a commanded action is not ordered to another end, but is itself intended as end, as is clear from Aristotle’s distinction mentioned above in the preceding disputation, sec. 6, n. 9. And so if that action has an object like contemplation, it can for that reason be said that it is done for the sake of an end or we may speak properly and formally of the act as it is an action either as it is an immanent act or an intrinsic terminus of an

Observatio altera.

DE FINE HOMINIS 298 D ISP. II, SECT. I
ratione sui termini, poterit dici fieri propter finem, ut revera fit: terminus autem ipse non est propter finem, quia est ipsemet finis. Et haec sunt addenda his, quæ dicit divus Thomas, citato articulo 1, ad 2. Ultimo est observandum in his actionibus esse propter finem non esse aliquid intrinsecum inhaerens ipsis, sed tantum denominationem ab actibus voluntatis, a quibus procedunt, et ordinantur, nec aliter causantur a fine, nisi mediante voluntate quam finis immediate movet sive allicit.

Observatio 3.

2. Assertio
affir. de actibus, qui versantur circa media.

3. Secundo dicendum est actus elicitos a voluntate, qui versantur circa media, maxime propter esse propter finem, ut est, verbi gratia, electio. Probatur, quia hujusmodi actus procedunt ex intentione finis. Item omnino ordinantur ad finem consequendum. Denique actus imperati per hos actus elicitos, dicuntur esse propter finem ratione illorum: ergo multo magis ipsi. Quo- <17> circa isti actus non immer-

action. But if an action does not have an object, as is the case, for example, with playing a cithara, then that action to the extent that it is an action and is done by reason of its terminus will be able to be said to be done for the sake of the end, as it really happens. Moreover, the terminus itself is not for the sake of the end, because it is the end itself. And these observations should be added to what St. Thomas says in the cited art. 1, ad 2. Lastly, it should be noted that in these actions ‘being for the sake of an end’ is not something intrinsic inhering in them, but only a denomination from the acts of the will from which they proceed and are ordered. Nor would they by caused by the end otherwise except except by means of the will which the end immediately moves or entices.

3. Secondly, it should be said about acts elicited by the will that are directed to means that they are most properly for the sake of an end. Election is an example. It is proven from the fact that acts of this kind proceed from an intention of the end. Likewise, they are entirely ordered to the pursuit of the end. Finally, acts commanded through these elicited acts are said to be for the sake of an end by reason of them. Therefore, much more they themselves [are for the sake of an end]. Wherefore,
ito dici possunt media ad finem consequendum: nam qui dat verbi gratia, eleemosynam ut satisfaciat, velit mereatur gloriäm, non solum ipsum dare, sed etiam velle dare assumit ut medium ad tale medium, quia non est minus necessarium velle quam dare, atque adeo nec minus utile: et ita in dicto exemplo ratio meriti magis in interna voluntate posita est, quam in externa actione; ad id vero non est necesse, ut tale medium sit directum objectum electionis, sed satis est quod intrinsece sit actus voluntarius seipso volitus, quasi per intrinsecam reflexionem.

90

3. Assertio affirm. de intentione finis.

4. Dico tertio, etiam actus intentionis finis est proprie propter finem, propter quod imprimit intentionio ex se procedit ex amore finis: ergo hoc satis est ut dicatur esse propter finem, seu gratia finis, quia id fit gratia alicujus, quod fit ex amore illius. Deinde, quia illa actio proprie humana: ergo fit ab efficiende propter aliquem finem, non enim fit temere, vel casu, sed tendit ad definitum scopum, et hoc non habet ex directione, seu motione extrinseca superiors agentis, sed ex interna directione ipsius hominis operantis: these acts can not without cause be called means to the pursuit of an end. For he who, for example, gives alms in order to make amends or earn glory assumes not only to give alms but to wish to give as a means to such a means, because it is no less necessary to wish than to give and therefore no less useful. And thus in the stated example the reason for the merit is placed more in the internal will than in the external action. But for that it is not necessary that such a means is the direct object of election, but it is enough that it is intrinsically a voluntary act having been willed by itself as if through an intrinsic reflection.

100

4. I say, thirdly, that even an act of intention for an end is properly for the sake of the end for the sake of which the intention in the first place proceeds of itself from the love for the end. Therefore, this is enough so that it is said to be for the sake of the end or thanks to the end, because that which happens thanks to something happens from a love for that. Next, because that action is properly human. Therefore, it is done by effectiveness for the sake of some end, for it does not happen blindly or by chance but tends to a definite target. And it does not have this from the direction or extrinsic motion of a fur-
ergo in eo actu propriissime operatur homo propter finem tanquam se movens in finem formalem ejus cognitionem. Denique hoc magis, et a fortiori constabit ex sequenti dubio.

5. Est autem specialis difficultas de actu amoris, seu voluntatis simplicis circa finem: quidam enim gravis auctor existimat, hunc autem nec esse propter finem ut a voluntate procedit, nec esse ab ipso fine formaliter, sed effective, atque ita solum esse propter finem respecta ipsius objecti ut efficientis, eo modo quo actiones agentium naturalium sunt propter finem ex naturæ institutione. Fundamentum ejus est supra tactum, quia ille actus non fit ex amore finis. Hæc sententia mihi non placet, et primo quia sine causa hic auctor miscuit presentem difficultatem cum alia an objectum appetibile concurrat effective ad actum voluntatis: hæc enim quæstio, non solum habet locum respectu amoris, sed etiam respectu intentionis, et cujuscumque actus, et quantum

5. But there is a special difficulty concerning the simple act of love or will directed to an end. For a certain author of importance judges that this is not for the sake of the end as it proceeds from the will nor is from that end formally, but effectively and so it is for the sake of the end only by respect of that object as effective object in the way in which the actions of natural agents are for the sake of an end by the institution of nature. His foundation was mentioned above, because that act is not done from a love for the end.

This view is not pleasing to me. First, because this author without cause mixed up the present difficulty with another one, i.e., whether a desirable object concurs effectively with the act of will. For this question not only has a place with respect to love but also with respect to intention and any act whatever. And, insofar as it touches on the present matter,
ad præsens attinet, illa efficientia non est necessaria, quia cum amor seu appetitio non sit per modum assimilationis, sed per modum impetus ipse appetitus est sufficiens principium illius, nec satis intelligi-

<col. b> tur quo modo bonum cognitum priusquam existat possit habere effectivam causalitatem. Secundo, quidquid sit de efficientia, male negatur objectum appetibile habere causalitatem finalem respectu assimilationis, sed per modum impetus ipse appetitus est sufficiens principium illius, nec satis intelligi-

130 

tum appetibile habere causalitatem finalem respectu simplicis amoris: nam metaphorice movet, et trahit voluntatem ad se, ut supra probatum est. Tertio, cum dicitur hujusmodi bonum, seu objectum appetibile movere voluntatem propter finem inquiro quis sit ille finis: nam vel est ipsummet bonum quod movet ad amandum se propter se, et tunc sequitur ipsummet bonum esse finem talis apprehensionis, et concurrere ad illam in genere cause finalis, quod intendimus: vel est aliquis alius finis extrinsecus, ut magis insinuant auctores illius sententiae: et hoc revera falsum est, quia finis ut finis non movet ad amandum se propter al-

135 iud, sed ad amandum se propter suam bonitatem et alia propter se, nam quando ipse amat propter al-

that efficiency is not necessary, because, since love or desire is not by way of likeness but by way of impetus, the desire itself is a sufficient principle of it. Nor is it sufficiently understood in what way good cognized before it exists can have effective causality.

Secondly, whatever is the case regarding efficiency, it is bad to deny that the desirable object has final causality with respect to simple love. For it moves metaphorically and draws the will to itself, as was shown above.

Thirdly, when it is said that a good of this kind or desirable object moves the will for the sake of an end, I ask what that end is. For either it is that very good itself that moves to the loving of it for its own sake—and then it follows that the good itself is the end of such a desire and concurs with it in the genus of cause (final, which we intended)—or it is some other extrinsic end, as the author of that view very much suggests. And this really is false, because an end as end does not move to loving it for the sake of something else but to loving it for the sake of its own goodness and others for its sake, for when it is loved for the sake of something else it is no longer loved as an end, but rather, as a means, and such a love arises more from the
iud jam non amatur ut finis, sed potius, ut medium, et talis amor potius oritur ex motione finis alterius extrinseci, quam hujus, qui dicitur amari propter al-
iud. Quarto, quidquid sit de efficientia objecti, negari non potest quod amor sit ab ipsa voluntate, nam cum sit actus vitae, necesse est ut voluntas efficiat talem actum propter finem, quia omne agens agit propter finem: ergo talis actus non tantum ut est ab objecto:

sed etiam ut a voluntate, est propter finem; nec dici potest esse propter finem illo imperfecto modo, quo actiones agentium naturalium sunt propter finem, quia illa actio procedit ex perfecta cognitione finis, et in eum tendit non tantum motione, seu ordina-
tione superioris agentis, sed ex intrinseca cognitione et facultate, et ordinatione amantis, et hoc est agere propter finem proprie. Unde divus Thomas 3, cont. Gent., cap. 2, dicit, agentia per intellectum non esse dubium quin agant propter finem, quia agunt pra-
concipiendo in intellectu, id, propter quod agunt, et ex tali præconceptione agunt.

Fourthly, whatever concerns the efficiency of the object, it cannot be denied that love is from the will itself, for when it is an act of life it is necessary that the will effect such an act for the sake of the end, because every agent acts for the sake of an end. Therefore, such an act is for the sake of an end not so much as it is from the object but rather as it is from the will. Nor can it be said to be for the sake of the end in that imperfect way by which the actions of natural agents are for the sake of an end, because that action proceeds from a perfect cognition of the end and tends to that not only by motion or by the ordi-
nation of higher agent, but from an intrinsic cognition and faculty and by the ordination of the one loving. And this is properly to act for the sake of an end. Hence, St. Thomas says in SCG III, c. 2 that there is no doubt but that agents act for the sake of an end through intellect, since they act by precon-
cieving in the intellect that for the sake of which they act and they act from such a preconception.
4. Assertio
affir. de
prædicto actu
simplicis
amoris.
Probatur 1.
ex D. Thom.

6. Quare dicendum est, hujusmodi actum amoris non minus esse propter finem, quam actum intentionis, et utrumque esse propter finem, nisi fortasse de nomine sit disputatio. Est aperta D. Thomæ sententia 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, in corpore, ubi universalter docet omnem actum humanum voluntatis esse propter finem; certum autem est simplicem amorem, verbi gratia, Dei ut ultimi finis libere elicium, esse actum humanum. Deinde in ratione sua ait non aliter actum esse propter finem, nisi quia est sub ratione finis, qui est objectum voluntatis, sentiens ut actus humanus sit propter finem satis esse quod sit ex propria causalitate finis; ostensum est autem amorem esse ex causalitate finis, et negari non possit quin fiat sub propria et perfecta ratione objecti voluntatis: ac denique in solutione ad primum expresse docet voluntatem ultimi finis esse propter finem. Probatur etiam ex communi modo loquendi, dicimur enim recte amare Deum ut ultimum finem, propter se ipsum, et quia ultimus finis noster est. Item, amamus finem propter bonitatem illius; sed ratio boni est ra-

6. Wherefore it should be said that an act of love of this kind is no less for the sake of an end than an act of intention. And both are for the sake of an end, unless perhaps there is a dispute about the name. The view of St. Thomas is clear in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1 co., where he universally teaches that every human act of will is for the sake of an end. Moreover, it is certain that simple love, for example, for God as the ultimate end freely elicited, is a human act.

Next, in his argument he does not say otherwise than that an act is for the sake of an end, except because it is under the nature of an end, which is the object of the will, thinking that a human act being for the sake of an end is enough for it to be from the proper causality of an end. Moreover, it was shown that love is from the causality of an end and it cannot be denied that it does not come about beneath a proper and perfect character of an object of the will. And, finally, in ad 1 he expressly teaches that the will for an ultimate end is for the sake of the end.

It is proven also by the common way of speaking, for we say rightly to love God as the ultimate end for the sake of him himself and because he is our ultimate end. Likewise, we love
tio finis: ergo eodem modo amamus finem propter ipsum finem, sicut in assensu primorum principiorum, assentimur illis propter immediatem connexionem ipsorum.

3. Ex ratione.

7. Denique, ut rationem explicemus, hujusmodi actus amoris considerari potest, vel ut directe tendit in objectum, vel ut includit reflexionem supra se ipsum quatenus ipse est volitus, cum sit voluntarius.

Priori modo est propter finem, non quod sit propter extrinsecam rationem volendi talem finem, sed quia est propter intrinsecam bonitatem ejus, et propria motione, et causalitate illius: in quo eadem est ratio de intentione et amore, ut numero 5, dicebam, contra ultimam sententiam, quia etiam intentio versatur circa finem propter se ipsum, et non propter extrinsecam rationem. Nec probari potest quod particula illa, propter, significet extrinsecam rationem volendi, ut ex communi loquendi modo ostensum est. Si vero ille actus consideretur posteriori ratione, sic amari potest et propter se ipsum, vel propter suam boni-

an end for the sake of its goodness, but the nature of good is the nature of an end. Therefore, in the same way we love an end for the sake of the end itself, just as in assenting to first principles, we assent to them for the sake of the immediate connection of them.

7. Finally, so that we may explain this argument, an act of love of this kind can be considered either as it tends directly to the object or as it includes reflection beyond it of itself to the extent that it itself is willed when it is voluntary.

In the first way it is for the sake of an end. Not that it is for the sake of an extrinsic reason for willing such an end, but because it is for the sake of its intrinsic goodness, both by a proper motion and by its causality, in which is the same nature of intention and love, as I said in n. 5 against the last view. Because an intention also turns concerning an end for the sake of it itself and not for the sake of an extrinsic reason. Nor can it be shown that that particle 'for the sake of' (propter) signifies an extrinsic reason for willing, as was shown from the common way of speaking.

But if that act is considered in the latter characterization, then it can be loved even for its own sake or for the sake of its
tatem et propter objectum, scilicet quia est tenden-


tia in illud, ut in simili recte dixit D. Thomas, in 4,

dist. 49, quæst. 1, art. 1, quæst. 2, et ex illo Capreolus,
in 1, dist. 1, quæst. 1, a. 3, ad argumenta contra sen-
tentiam communem. Ac denique esse potest propter


ipsum operantem ut propter finem cui, vel ut ipsum


deficit: ergo, etc.

Ad 1. 215 8. Ad rationes ergo dubii in principio positas fa-
cilis est responsio ex dictis. Ad primum enim negatur


solum media esse propter finem, nam hoc solum


est verum, quando finis est extrinseca ratio volendi:
tamen simpliciter omnis actus, qui est ex propria


causalitate finis præconcepti, est propter finem. Ad


secundum negatur esse propter finem esse ex amore


finis, ita ut amor necessario supponendus sit ante ac-
tionem quæ est propter finem, sed sufficit ut actio


sit ex bonitate ipsius finis trahens <col. b> volun-
tatem ad sui amorem: nam quod ex parte voluntatis
intercedat diversitas actuum, et quod unus supponat,
non refert ad causalitatem finis, sed potius pertinet
goodness and for the sake of its object, namely, because there is


a tendency to that St. Thomas rightly says in parallel in [Sent.]
IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 1, q. 2, and from that Capreolus in [Sent.]
I, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3 against the common view. And, finally, it


can be for the sake of the one acting himself as for the sake of


a finis cui or as it perfects him. Therefore, etc.

225 supponendus] constituendus V.

8. Therefore, the response to the reasons for doubting


posed in the beginning is easy from what has been said. For


regarding the first, it is denied that only means are for the sake


of an end, for this is only true when the end is an extrinsic rea-


son for willing. Yet, strictly speaking, every act which is from


the proper causality of an end preconceived is for the sake of


the end. Regarding the second, it is denied that to be for the


sake of an end is to be from the love for the end, so that love


must necessarily be presupposed before the action which is for


the sake of the end. Rather, it is sufficient that an action is


from the goodness of the end itself drawing the will to love


for it. For the fact that a diversity of acts comes between on


the part of the will, and that one supposes that, does not re-
ad quamdam efficientiam inter ipsos actus.

Sectio II.

Utrum actus voluntatis necessarii sint propter finem, et consequenter an sint proprie actus humani.

Arguitur pro neg. parte.

1. Ratio dubii est, quia divus Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, articulo secundo, duo supponit: primum est, solum actus illos esse proprie humanos, quorum homo est dominus: habet autem homo dominium solum liberorum actuum, quia illi tantum sunt in ejus potestate: ergo ex sententia D. Thomæ solum actus liberi sunt humani. Alterum est, solum actus humanos esse propter finem, quia de iis tantum docet esse propter finem: ergo actus necessarii non erunt propter finem. In contrarium autem est, quia hi actus videntur esse ex propria causalitate et motione finis præconcepti. Supponendum imprimis est, non esse sermonem de illo modo imperfecto agendi propter finem, qui dicitur de agentibus naturalibus, quæ potius moventur in finem, quam se in illum moveant, de quo late, in

Arguitur pro affirm.

It is argued for the affirmative.

Notatio 1. pro resoluzione.

It is argued towards a resolution.

DE FINE HOMINIS

307

DISP. II, SECT. II

Whether necessary acts of the will are for the sake of an end and consequently whether they are properly human acts.

1. The reason for doubting is that St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.2 assumes two things. The first is that only those acts are properly human of which the human being is master. But a human being has dominion only of free acts, because those alone are in his power. Therefore, according to the view of St. Thomas, only free acts are human. The second assumption is that only human acts are for the sake of an end, because it is only about these that he teaches that they are for the sake of an end. Therefore, necessary acts will not be for the sake of an end. But the contrary is the case, since these acts seem to be from the proper causality and motion of the preconceived end. It should be assumed in the first place that the discussion is not about that imperfect way of acting for the sake of an end that is attributed to natural agents, which are more moved to the end than that they move themselves to it (concerning which more [is said] in
disp. 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 10, sed sermo est de proprio modo operandi propter finem ex propria ordinatione ipsius hominis operantis. Deinde suppono, duobus modis posse actum voluntatis esse necessarium, primo ex imperfectione, ut contingit in actibus indeliberatis, in quibus voluntas excitatur antequam ratio perfecte advertere possit, ut in motibus primo primis et indeliberatis. Secundo ex perfectione, ut contingit in amore Dei, quem habent beati: ille enim ab intrinseco est necessarius, non ex inadvertentia, aut imperfectione, sed potius ex perfectissima cognitione summi boni, ex quo amore potest oriri alius actus electionis necessariae, si sit de objecto habente necessariam connexionem cum praedicto amore.


2. Dico ergo primo, ut actio voluntatis sit perfecte propter finem, non esse de ratione illius ut sit libera, sed sat est, ut ex perfecta advertentia, et judicio rationis procedat. Probatur primo, quia perfecta causalitas finalis reperiri potest sine libertate: Deus enim clare visus per suam liberam bonitatem trahit voluntatem ad sui dilectionem <19> necess.

DM XXIII, sec. 10). Rather, the discussion is about the proper way of acting for the sake of an end by a proper ordination of the acting human being himself.

Next, I assume that an act of the will can be necessary in two ways. The first is from imperfection, as happens in undeliberated acts in which the will is excited before reason can fully notice it, as especially in first and undeliberated motions. The second is from perfection, as happens in the love for God which the blessed have. For that is necessary from something intrinsic, not from an inadvertency or imperfection, but rather from a most perfect cognition of the highest good, from which love can arise another act of necessary election, if it is of an object having a necessary connection with the aforementioned love.

2. Therefore, I say, first, an act of the will is perfectly for the sake of an end not by reason of its being free, but it is enough that it proceed from a perfect awareness and a judgment of reason. This is proven, first, from the fact that perfect final causality can be found without freedom. For God having been clearly seen draws the will to a necessary delight in him through his own free goodness as the most lovable ultimate
sariam, tanquam finis ultimus summe amabilis. Dic-
tum est autem, idem esse, actum esse propter finem,
et esse ex propria causalitate finis: ergo hoc sufficit
ut actus sit propter finem, etiamsi liber non sit. Et
ad hæc applicari potest ratio divi Thomæ 1, 2, in
articulo 1, quest. 1, quia talis actus est sub pro-
prio objecto, et motivo voluntatis perfecte proposito et applicato: ergo est sub ratione finis, atque adeo
propter finem. Secundo sic explicatur: nam ex inten-
tione finis necessario sequitur electio medii, si illud
ut unicum et necessarium proponatur, et hoc non ob-
stat, quominus illa electio sit proprie propter finem:
ergo etiamsi fingamus intentionem esse simpliciter
necessariam, et consequenter ex illa ortam esse elec-
tionem necessariam, nihilominus illa electio erit pro-
prie omnino propter finem, quia non obstante neces-
sitate fit cum perfecta ordinatione medi ad finem:
ergo ulterior etiam ipsa intentio, quamvis contin-
gat esse necessaria, nihilominus erit propter finem,
dummodo procedat ex perfecta finis cognitione, et
ex efficacissima motione illius in suo genere, atque
end. But it was said that it was the same for an act to be for
the sake of an end and to be from the proper causality of an
end. Therefore, this suffices so that an act is for the sake of an
end even if it is not free. And the argument of St. Thomas in
[ST] IaIIæ.1.1 can be applied to this: for such an act is under
the proper object and motive of the will having been perfectly
proposed and applied. Therefore, it is under the aspect of an
end and therefore [it is] for the sake of an end.

Secondly, it is explained in this way: for from a necessary
intention of the end follows the election of a means, if that is
proposed as unique and necessary and this does not stand in
the way so that that election is not properly for the sake of the
end. Therefore, even if we imagine an intention that is strictly
necessary speaking and consequently a necessary election has
arisen from it, nevertheless that election will properly be en-
tirely for the sake of the end, since with necessity not standing
in the way it happens with the perfect ordination of a means to
an end. Therefore, further, even the intention itself, although
it happens to be necessary, will still be for the sake of the end,
provided that it proceeds from a perfect cognition of the end
and from the most efficacious motion of that in its genus.

DE FINE HOMINIS

309

Disp. II, sect. II
adeo eadem ratione idem erit de actu amoris necessario procedente ex simili cognitione et motione objecti boni, quod contingit tantum in visione beata: et ideo divus Thomas radicem operationis propter finem, nunquam tribuit libertati, sed perfectæ cognitionis rationis, per quam et proportio mediorum cum fine, et ipsius finis cum operante cognosci potest, ut videre est 3, contra Gentes, c. 2, et 1, 2, q. 1, art. 2, ubi probat bruta non operari propter finem formaliter et proprie, quia carent praedicta cognitione.

1. Obiectio contra assert. 3. Objicies primo; ergo processio Spiritus sancti in Deo est propter finem, quia licet sit necessaria, tamen est a voluntate ex perfecta cognitione divinæ bonitatis. Respondeo, negando consequentiam ob ea, quæ diximus in disputatione prima: nam ubi non est causalitas finis, non est actio propter finem: diximus autem in Deo ad intra non esse causalitatem finis, quia ibi nulla est actio proprie, nec Deus est finis sui ipsius, et ita licet dici possit Deum

Diluitur.

70 75

therefore for the same reason the same will be true in the case of a necessary act of love proceeding from the similar cognition and motion of a good object that happens only in the beatific vision. For this reason St. Thomas never attributes the root of activity for the sake of an end to freedom but to perfect cognition of the reason, through which both the proportion of the means to the end and of the end itself to the one acting can be cognized, as is seen in SCG III, c. 2 and in [ST] IaIæ.1.2, where he shows that brute animals do not act for the sake of an end formally and properly since they lack the aforementioned cognition.

3. You will object first: therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit in God is for the sake of an end, because, although it is necessary, nevertheless it is by will from a perfect cognition of divine goodness. I respond by denying the consequence for the reason we offered in the first disputation.\textsuperscript{11} For where there is no causality of an end, there is no action for the sake of an end. But we said in God within there is no causality of an end because there is no proper action there nor is God his own end. And so, although one can say that God loves him-

\textsuperscript{11}DFH 1.1.10.
se amare propter bonitatem suam, tanquam per rationem amandi, non vero tanquam propter finem, nec ex causalitate finis.

2. Obiectio.
4. Objicies secundo: videri idem dicendum de delectatione, vel de fruitione Dei, quod illa etiam sit propter finem, nam ex dictis videtur sequi esse propter finem, quia licet sit actio necessaria, tamen est voluntaria, cum sit elicit a voluntate, et consequenter est a propria <col. b> causalitate objecti boni, quod consecutum delectat propter bonitatem suam: ergo rationes factae numero 2, procedunt etiam de hoc actu. Hoc dubium attigit Fonseca 5, Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, quæst. 10, sectione 2, non sub ratione delectationis, sed satietatis, aut quietis appetitus, quam dicit factam esse propter finem, quatenus assecutio finis, ad quem consequitur; facta est propter finem; postquam vero finis consecutus est, inquit ille, non est propter finem, quia assecuto fine cessat actio propter finem.

Sed hæc doctrina videtur solum habere locum in eo fine, qui consistit in aliquo effectu facto, non self for the sake of his own goodness, just as through a reason for loving, but it is not as for the sake of an end nor from the causality of an end.

4. You will object secondly: it seems that the same should be said about delight or about the enjoyment of God, that that also is for the sake of the end, for from what was said it seems to follow that it is for the sake of the end, because although it is a necessary action, nevertheless, it is voluntary, since it is elicited by the will and consequently is by a proper causality of the good object, which, having been achieved, delights for the sake of its goodness. Therefore, the arguments made in n. 2 also work with regards to this act. Fonseca mentions this doubt in *Metaph.* 5, c. 2, q. 10, sec. 2, not under the nature of delight but of satiety or of the rest of desire, which is said to have come about for the sake of the end insofar as the achievement of the end after which it followed was made for the sake of the end. But after the end has been achieved, he says, it is not for the sake of the end, because action for the sake of the end ceases with the end having been achieved.

But this doctrine seems to have a place only with respect to that end which consists in some effect having come about,
vero in illo, qui consistit in operatione. Item consistit in satietate et quieta privativa et mortua, quals est in rebus inanimatis, non vero in positiva et vitali, quals est in viventibus, quam nomine delectationis significamus: hoc enim quamdiu est, fit, et ideo videtur esse proprae propter finem. Nihilominus non censeo hunc actum esse tam proprae propter finem, sicut est intentionio, vel amor. Et ratio est, quia non immediate oritur ex propria causalitate finis, nec ex directo imperio et motione alicujus actus voluntatis, qui sit propter finem, sed solum resultat naturaliter ex amore finis jam consecutio: objectum enim bonum immediate et per se movet ad amorem sui, ex quo sine alia motione resultat delectatio, si finis sit praesens: et ideo tale objectum non habet propriam et immediatam causalitatem in illum actum: ergo ille non est propter finem proprae quamquam actus elicitus, nec etiam quamquam imperatus, quia non est actus, qui proprie pendet ex motione voluntatis, sed naturaliter resultat ex praesentia finis: non est ergo propter finem, sed est quid consequens assecutionem but not with respect to that [end] which consists in activity. Likewise, [with respect to those ends which] consist in satiety and in privative rest and the rest of death, the sort that are in inanimate things, but not in positive and vital ones, the sort that are in living beings, which we signify with the name ‘de-light’. For this happens as long as it is and therefore it seems to properly be for the sake of the end. Nevertheless, I do not think that this act is as properly for the sake of an end as is intention or love. The reason is that it does not immediately arise from the proper causality of the end nor from the direct command and motion of some act of the will which is for the sake of the end, but only results naturally from the love for the end that has now been achieved. For the good object immediately and per se moves to a love for itself from which delight results without any other motion, if the end is present. And therefore such an object does not have a proper and immediate causality in that act. Therefore, it is not for the sake of the end properly as an elicited act or even a commanded act, since it is not an act which properly depends on a motion of the will, but it naturally results from the presence of the end. Therefore, it is not for the sake of the end, but is what follows from

De fine hominis

Disp. II, sect. II
The attainment of the end.

5. Thirdly, it can especially be objected against this doctrine, because a necessary action is not human. Therefore, it is not for the sake of an end. The consequence is proven from that fact that, as St. Thomas indicates in the cited art. 1, only human actions are for the sake of an end. But the antecedent is shown from the same St. Thomas in the same article: ‘because that action is human of which a human being is master’. But he is master only of free actions, for it is not said that a human being is master of his actions only because he possesses it or brings it about. For he also possesses life, of which he is not master, and brings about nutrition and increase of which he lacks mastery. Nor is he called a master because he has the right to such an action or its use, because he does not have to the right to an act of sin and yet he is master of that act. And a servant does not have the right to all his actions, because it lies more with the master, and yet he is master of his actions. Therefore, this mastery consists only in the free will acting or omitting his actions. Therefore, where there is no freedom, there will be no mastery nor human action.

125 quia ] om. V.
est libertas, nec dominium erit, nec actio humana.

6. Hæc difficultas petit, ut explicemus, quid necessarium sit, ut actio sit humana. Aliquie enim universaliter docent, actionem necessariam non esse actionem humanam. Cujus duplex ratio addi potest ex Caietano, prima secundæ, quæstione prima, articulo primo: quia illa non est actio, quamvis late loquendo sit operatio: proprìa enim, inquit, actio illa est, qua homo se movet; in actione autem necessaria potius agitur, quam agat; hæc vero ratio mihi non placet, quia actio immanens vere est actio, licet contingat esse necessaria: quamvis enim actio transiens sit etiam actio, ut sumitur in predicamento actionis, distinguït tamen Aristoteles interdum actionem a factione, ut videre licet in 2, Physicorum, text. quinquagesimo-septima, et quinquagesimo-secundo: et 9, Metaphysicæ, text. quinquagesimo-sexto: tamen, ut exponit divus Thomas, prima secundæ, quæstione quinquagesima-septima, articulo quarto, factionem vocavit actionem transeuntem, actionem vero eam quæ immanens est. Quod vero inter immanentes illa

6. This difficulty demands that we explain what is necessary for an action to be human. For some teach universally that a necessary action is not a human action. Two reasons can be added for this from Cajetan [ST] IaIIæ.1.1.

One is that it is not an action (actio), although it is an activity (operatio) more broadly speaking: ‘for that’, he says, ‘is a proper action by which a human being moves himself’. But in a necessary action he is moved more than that he moves.

But this reason is not pleasing to me, because an immanent action really is an action even though it happens to be necessary. For although a transeunt action is also an an action, so that it is taken up in the category of action, nevertheless Aristotle distinguishes between doing (actionem) and making (factione), as may be seen in Phys. II, t. 57 and 52 and in Metaph. IX, t. 56. Nevertheless, as St. Thomas explained in [ST] IaIIæ.57.4, ‘making’ names a transeunt action, but ‘doing’ that which is immanent. But the claim that those immanent [acts] that are free and not necessary are called ‘doings’ cannot be gathered either from Aristotle or from the use and way of speaking. Nor is it according to the mind of St. Thomas in that art. 1, who

Why a necessary action is not considered human.
The first reason from Cajetan.

This reason displeases.
dicatur actio, quæ est libera, et quæ non necessaria, nec ex Aristotele, nec ex usu et modo loquendi haberi potest, nec est juxta mentem S. Thomæ illo art. 1, qui distinguuit actionem in actionem hominis, et actionem humanam: ergo illa etiam quæ non est humana, est etiam actio. Secunda ratio est ejusdem Cajetani, in fine articuli 5, actionem voluntatis ex perfecta cognitione procedentem, et simul necessariam, qualis est amor beatificus, non esse humanam, quia est plusquam humana, scilicet quodammodo divina; agitur autem hic de homine ut homo est, non ut elevato ad participationem divinæ naturæ per gloriam. Sed nec hoc placet, sequitur enim supernaturalum Dei amore viæ, etsi liber sit, non esse actum humanum, quia est plusquam humanus, et quodammodo divinus, procedit enim ex participatione divinæ naturæ per gratiam.

Notatio pro reddenda vera ratione.

7. Sustinendo ergo hunc dicendi modum, aliter est explicanda ejus ratio, advertendo, dupliciter dici posse esse aliquam actionem hominis propriam; loquor autem de homine <col. b> ut intellectualis est,

distinguishes action into action of a human and human action. Therefore, that also which is not human is still action.

The second reason is from the same Cajetan at the end of art. 5: an action of the will proceeding from perfect cognition and at the same time necessary (of the kind that the love of the blessed is) is not human, because it is more than human, namely, it is divine in a certain way. But here one is talking about a human being as he is human, not as elevated to a participation in the divine nature through glory. But this does not please, for it follows that supernatural love for God in this life, even if it is free, is not a human act, because it is more than human and divine in a certain way, for it proceeds from a participation in the divine nature through grace.

7. Therefore, in sustaining this way of speaking, the reason for it should be explained otherwise, by noticing that something can be said to be a proper action of a human being in two ways. But I am speaking of a human insofar as he is intel-
et distinguitur a cæteris creaturis inferioribus, non ut ab Angelis distinguitur, nam quæ hic de homine tractamus, omnia similiter in Angelis inveniuntur, ut constat ex 1 part., quæst. 60.

Primo ergo est aliqua actio propria hominis quoad substantiam et entitatem, non vero quoad modum, ut est, verbi gratia, intellectio necessaria; convent enim homini, ut ratione utitur: nec actus talis speciei potest reperiri in inferiori creatura, modus tamen, scilicet quod ex necessitate fiat, communis est aliis rebus: et idem est de actionibus cogitative et aliis, quæ licet conveniant homini secundum gradum genericum, non tamen præcise consideratum, sed ut conjunctum, et elevatum per gradum rationalem: et hæ actiones dicuntur proprie hominis, ut homo est, non tamen humanæ.

Secundo modo contingit actionem esse proprias hominis ut homo est, et in substantia, et in modo, quia scilicet efficiuntur cum indifferentia, et sine necessitate: et hoc modo videtur locutus divus Thomas, dict, quæstione 1, art. 1, quia hæc est omnibus modis lectual and is distinguished from the rest of the lower creatures, not as he is distinguished from the angels. For what we are discussing here concerning a human being was found to be similar to angels in every respect, as is clear from [ST] Ia.60.

First, therefore, is a proper action of a human being with regard to its substance and entity but not with regard to its mode, as is, for example, necessary intellection. For it is agreeable to a human being, as it uses reason. Nor can such an act of appearance be found among lower creatures, a mode, nevertheless, namely, that it happens by necessity, is common with other things. And it is the same with cogitative actions and others which although they are agreeable to a human being according to his generic position, nevertheless not as considered apart but as conjoined and elevated through a rational position. And these actions are properly said of a human being as he is human, yet are not human.

In the second way it happens that an action is properly of a human being as he is human, both in substance and in mode, because, namely, they are brought about with indifference and without necessity. And St. Thomas seems to have spoken in this way in the aforementioned q. 1, art. 1, because this is in
propria hominis, ut homo est, et per illum tendit homo ad consecutionem sui finis, et bene, vel male operatur, et dignus est laude, vel vituperio. Ac denique, quia, licet consideratione physica aliae actiones possunt dici humanæ, quia procedunt ab anima humana, ut rationalis est, tamen consideratione morali solum, hæ postremae dicuntur proprie humanae, quia ille modus est totius esse moralis fundamentum seu ratio: et hæc doctrina est valde probabilis.

8. Aliis vero placet, actum, etiamsi necessarius sit, dummodo sit a voluntate ex plenaria potestate operante, esse actionem humanam: idque dupliciter: primo, per extrinsecam denominationem, scilicet quia est libera in sua causa: verbi gratia, actus amoris Dei in patria ortus est ex actionibus liberis, quibus homo meruit illum statum, et ideo dicitur humanus, et liber in sua causa. Sed hoc non placet, primo enim non est universalis ratio: in aliquibus enim est ille actus sine præcedentibus actionibus liberis, ut in infantibus baptizatis: tum quia est valde improprium, every way proper to a human being as human and through it a human being tends to the attainment of his end, acts either well or badly, and is worthy of either praise or blame. And, finally, because they proceed from the human soul as it is rational, yet in a moral consideration alone, these latter are called properly human, because that mode is the foundation or nature of all moral being. And this doctrine is very probable.

8. But to others it is pleasing that an act is a human action even if it is necessary, provided that it is from the will by a full power acting. And there are two [reasons]. First, through an extrinsic denomination, namely, because it is free in its cause. For example, an act of love for God in the homeland has arisen from the free actions by which the human being won that state, and therefore is called human and free in its cause. But this does not please, for, first, it is not a universal reason. For in others that act is without preceding free actions, as in baptized infants. Also, because it is very improper, because that act is not commanded by a preceding human action which does not please.
quia ille actus non imperatur a precedenti actione humana, nec ab illa informatur nisi valde remote. Al-
ius modus apparens est, quod ille actus intrinsece sit humanus, quia est perfectissime voluntarius, et illa necessitas, quam <21> habet, non est ex imperfeci-
tione, sed potius ex perfectione nascitur: nam sicut operari libere circa bona non summe bona, nec sim-
pliciter necessaria perfectionis est, ita circa summe bonum, et summe necessarium ferri necessario ad perfectionem pertinet: ideo Deus sicut alia libere, ita se necessario amat, et utrumque ex infinita perfectione: videtur autem esse proprius actus humanus, qui ex maxima perfectione hominis, et, ut sic dicam, ex plenia potestate, et advertentia rationis procedit.

The other way is apparent: that that act is human intrinsi-
cally, because it is more perfectly voluntary and that necessity which it has is not born from imperfection but rather from perfection. For just as to act freely for a good that is not the highest good is not necessary *simpliciter* for perfection, so [to act] for the highest good even the highest necessity to bring necessarily pertains to perfection. Therefore just as God [loves] others things freely, so he loves himself necessarily, and both from infinite perfection. But a properly human act seems to be that which proceeds from the maximal perfection of a human and, if I may speak in this way, from the full power and attention of reason.

To me, however, these two things appear to me in this matter. First, the aforementioned controversy pertains more to a manner of speaking than to a real dispute. For if by human action we understand action that is moral and worthy of praise and blame, then only free action is human. And here the more usual way of speaking seems to be the one that St. Thomas follows in [ST] IaIIæ.1.1. But if by human action we understand

1. *Autoris pronuntia-
tum circa 3. obiectionem.

9. Mihi autem in hac re videntur hæc duo: pri-

9. To me, however, these two things appear to me in this


4. The first pro-
nouncement of the author concerning the third

objection.

DE FINE HOMINIS

318

DISP. II, SECT. II
si autem per actionem humanam intelligamus per-
flecte, rationaliter, et ab intrinseco procedentem ex
plena hominis voluntate, sic actus beatitudinis dici
potest actus humanas. Secundum est, quocumque
modo istorum loquamur, facile posse expediri ter-
tiam objectionem factam, in num. 5, nam si dica-
mus actum beatificum, verbi gratia, esse humanum,
ad D. Thomam respondendum est, vel sub dominio
talis actus comprehendisse non solum liberum, sed
etiam voluntarium perfecte, quia utrumque fundatur
in plena potentate libertatis, vel certe locutum esse de
homine viatore, et per actus suos tendente in finem
suum, in quo nulla est actio humana, quæ non sitt
libera; si autem demus illum actum non esse hu-
manum, neganda est consequentia: ad D. Thomam
vero dicendum est, nunquam posuisse exclusivam,
sed solum dixisse, omnem actionem humanam esse
propter finem, ex quo non sequitur, omnem ac-
tionem propter finem esse humanam. Unde cum
illo articulo primo definivisset omnem actionem hu-
manam esse propter finem abstinuit ab actione libera:
something perfectly, rationally, and intrinsically proceeding
from the full will of the human being, then the act of beati-
tude can be called a human act.

Secondly, in whichever way of these we are speaking, a
third objection can easily be obtained, in n. 5. For if we speak
say, for example, that the beatific act is human, then one should
respond to St. Thomas either that not only such acts as free
ones abut also perfectly voluntary ones were included under
mastery, because each is founded in the full power of liberty
or surely we were speaking of humans in this life and through
his acts tending to his end, in which none is a human action
which is not free. But if are given that that act is not human,
then the consequence should be denied. But it should be said to
St. Thomas that nothing exclusive was set up but it was only
said that all human actions are for the sake of an end, from
which it does not follow that all actions for the sake of an end
are human. Hence, with that first article having had defined
that all human actions are for the sake of an end, he withheld
from free action. Therefore, it is a sign that he was not speak-
ing exclusively.
ergo signum est non locutum fuisse exclusive.

2. Assertio de actibus voluntatis ex inadvertentia.

10. Secundo principaliter dicendum est actus voluntatis, qui ob inadvertentiam, seu indeliberationem rationis absque fiunt, non esse proprie et perfecte propter finem. Ita colligitur ex D. Thoma, hic art. 1, ad 3, cont. Gent., cap. 82, et ratio ex dictis est facilis, quia propria operatio propter finem oritur ex eo, quod ratio cognoscit rationem finis, et proportionem mediorum ad ipsum: ergo quando ratio non potest perfecte advertere, non erit propria perfect attention, it will not properly act for the sake of an end. This will be even clearer from the following doubt.

11. But here someone will ask whether human beings who cannot perfectly use reason, as is the case with children, the mentally ill, and those who are sleeping, can sometimes act for the sake of an end. For from the preceding assertion seems to follow a negative answer, which can be confirmed. For if they can act for the sake of an end, then they can assign means to the end and cognize the relation between them. Therefore, by the same reason they will be able to compare one means to an-

12Which book?

A small question concerning not using perfect reason.
alio: ergo eligere: ergo libere operari: ergo peccare.

12. But experience and reason seems to be to the contrary, for although these people have an imperfect use of reason, nevertheless, they can exercise an act of intellect, as is gathered from St. Thomas in [Sent.] IV, dist. 4, q. 1, art. 4, q. 1, ad 3 and [ST] Ia.8.2 ad 2, because, although they use phantasms, they are not brought together so that they can receive species in the intellect and use these also for composing and syllogizing. Therefore, they can cognize through the intellect good and the utility of means to the end [and] from a proper ordination of the will act for the sake of an end.

And it seems reasonable to speak thus, although these humans do not have perfect mastery of their actions nor the perfect cognition of the reason. And therefore they do not as perfectly act for the sake of the end as prudent humans. For if they are not wholly insane, they can in some way act for the sake of an end, which experience shows. Hence, if they are asked for the sake of what they desire health, they respond that it is because being sick is disagreeable to them. And if they are
experimentum unum. 

appetant sanitatem, respondent, quia ægrotare est disconveniens sibi: et si rogentur, cur utantur medicina, respondent, quia conferi ad sanitatem: signum ergo est non ita privatos esse ratione, quin possint medium cum fine conferre, atque adeo unum ad alterum ordinare, quod est operari propter finem. Confirmatur: nam aliquando experimur in his omnibus quasdam actiones procedentes ex quadam veluti prudentia et sagacitate, quæ non possunt referri in solum instinctum naturæ, sicut solet fieri in brutis: homo enim, quia ratione utitur, non habet a natura hujusmodi instinctus: ergo proveniunt illi actus ex cognitione rationis, atque adeo ex ordinatione unius ad alterum.

alterum. 

13. But to what was adduced to the contrary in n. 11, it was now said that freedom is not necessary for action for the sake of an end. Next, we will discuss below when dealing with election whether there is some indifference and vestigial freedom in these humans. Meanwhile, one can look at [Francisco de] Vitoria in Relectione de pueris pervenientibus ad usum ra-

13. Ad adducta vero in contrarium num. 11, jam dictum est, ad operationem propter finem non esse necessariam libertatem: deinde an his hominibus sit aliqua indifferentia et libertatis vestigium, dicens infra agentes de elen<22>tione: interim videri potest Victor in Relectione de pueris pervenientibus ad usum ra-

314 prudentia ] providentia V.
usum rationis. Quidquid autem de hoc sit, certum est hujusmodi homines non esse capaces culpæ, præsertim mortalis, quia non possunt perfecte cognoscere rationem boni, honesti et ultimi finis: de quo suo loco dicemus.

Sectio III.

Utrum homo operetur propter finem in actionibus, quæ a voluntate non procedunt.

1. Diximus hactenus de actionibus voluntatis, tam elicitis, quam imperatis, et tam liberis, quam necessariis: ut ergo si completa disputatio de actibus hominis dicendum est brevissime de reliquis operationibus ejus, quæ a voluntate non procedunt: latius enim id agimus in disp. 23, Metaphysicæ, sect. 3, art. 18. Et primo potest esse difficultas de actibus intellectus, qui præveniunt voluntatem, nam illi videntur maxime proprii hominis, et valde perfecti: ergo ut sunt ab homine debent habere hanc perfectionem. Quod maxime urgeri solet de visione beata: nam illa

It is argued for acts of the intellect preceding will.

13De eo ad quod tenetur homo cum primum venit ad usum rationis, ed. by T. Urdánoz (Madrid: 1960). Cf. also Suárez, De legibus II.6.25.

DE FINE HOMINIS 323

Disp. II, sect. III
est operatio, in qua est ultimus finis: ergo etiam est propter finem ex D. Thoma 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 1, ad 1. Secundo idem inquiri potest de actionibus mere naturalibus facultatis vegetativaæ, seu animalis, ut sunt nutritio, motus cordis, etc., nam si alia agentia naturalia agunt propter finem, cur non etiam homo in his actionibus, præsertim quia etiam passiones involuntariae possunt ab homine recipi propter finem; ergo magis actus naturalis.

Arguitur tertio pro actibus appetitus animalis.

2. Tertio est major difficultas de actibus appetitus tam ex ratione communi hominis quam cæterorum animalium, quia hic appetitus movetur ex cognitione boni; ergo ex metaphorica cognitione objecti boni, in qua diximus, disp. 1, consistere causalitatem finis: ergo in hoc appetitu præcise, et vi sua habet locum actio propter finem, præsertim cum D. Thoma sæpe dicit, bruta apprehendere rationem boni, utilis, et ab ea moveri, ut patet ex 1 p., quæst. 28 [sic], art. 4, ubi autem est bonum utile, est ordinatio in finem. Deinde ex speciali ratione hominis, quia in eo appetitus non movetur tantum ab aestimativa, sed etiam a ultimate end is. Therefore, it is also for the sake of the end, according to St. Thomas [ST IaIIæ.1.1 ad 1. Secondly, the same can be asked about merely natural actions of the vegetative faculty or soul, like nutrition, the motion of the heart, etc. For if other natural agents act for the sake of an end, why not also a human being in these actions, especially since the involuntary passions can be accepted for the sake of an end by a human? Therefore, natural acts even more.

2. Thirdly, there is a greater difficulty with acts of the appetite coming from the general nature of a human being than with [acts] of the rest of the animals, because this appetite is moved as a result of a cognition of good. Therefore, as a result of metaphorical cognition of the good object, in which the causality of the end consists, as we said in disp. 1. Therefore, with regards to this appetite, considered apart from other things, and its strength, action has a place for the sake of the end, especially since St. Thomas often says that brute animals apprehend the nature of useful good and are moved by it, as is clear from [ST Ia.78.4, where, moreover, the useful good is ordained to the end. Next, from the special nature of a human
cogitativa, quæ juxta multorum opinionem discur-
rere potest circa <col. b> particularia: ergo poterit
etiam conferre medium cum fine. Quin potius aliqui
existimant, quando intellectus confert, et cognoscit
proportionem medi cum fine, si objectum sit sensi-
bile et proportionatum, necessarium esse ut cogitatio
comitetur intellectum et similem collationem faciat:
eter appetitus sequens hanc potentiam et formaliter,
et ex propria ordinatione appetit unum propter al-
iud, et præsertim quia ex motione rationis sæpe ap-
petitus fertur in id, quod videtur sensui repugnare:
propter quod D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 30, art. 3, ad
3, dixit in nostro appetitu esse concupiscentiam, quæ
est cum ratione, et 1 p., q. 81, art. 3, ad. 2, dicit in
homme moveri appetitum a ratione universali.

Prima. 3. Advertendum est breviter, aliud esse actum
procedere a voluntate; aliud esse volitum a voluntate:
nam primum dicit rationem effectus et causæ, secun-
dum vero tantum dicit rationem objecti et actus, qui
circa illud fertur. Atque simili ratione illud est ac-

35 being, because in him the appetite is moved not only by the
estimative but also by the cogitative [faculty], which accord-
ing to the opinions of many can think through things from
one thing to another concerning particulars. Therefore, it will
also be able to associate a means with an end. In contrast, oth-
ers think that when the intellect associates and cognizes the
relation of the means to the end, if the object is sensible and
proportionate, it is necessary that a cogitation attend the in-
tellect and make a similar association. Therefore, the appetite
following this power both formally and from a proper orda-
tion desires one thing for the sake of another, and especially
because the appetite is often brought by a motion of reason
to that which seems repugnant to the sense. For this reason
St. Thomas says in [ST] IaIIæ.30.3 ad 3 that there is rational
concupiscence in our appetite and says in [ST] Ia.81.3 ad 2
that appetite in a human being is moved by universal reason.

3. It should be noted briefly that something else is an act
proceeding from the will, something else is wished by the will.
For the first expresses the nature of an effect and cause, but the
second only expresses the nature of an object and act, which
is made for the sake of the former. And for a similar reason

Notationes pro decisione.
Prima.

3. It should be noted briefly that something else is an act
proceeding from the will, something else is wished by the will.
For the first expresses the nature of an effect and cause, but the
second only expresses the nature of an object and act, which
is made for the sake of the former. And for a similar reason

Second.

325

Disp. II, sect. III
tum fieri propter finem, aliud vero extrinsece ordinari in finem aliquo modo: nam primum requirit quod ipsa mutatio sit a voluntate ut a causa operante propter finem: secundum vero solum requirit: ut actus ametur, seu sit volitus propter aliquem finem, licet ab ipso amante non fiat ipsa actio propter talem finem ex propria et intrinseca ordinatione ejus. Supponimus enim ultimo, sermonem esse de operatione propter finem formaliter ac propriè ex ordinatione ipsius operantis proxime, et non tantum ex extrinseca ordinatione ipsius auctoris naturæ, prout naturalia agentia operantur propter finem.

4. Dicendum est ergo, actus seu actiones omnes quæ nullo modo cadunt sub humanam voluntatem, esse posse propter finem passive, seu extrinsece, eo videlicet modo, quo actiones naturalium agentium sunt propter finem, non tamen active et intrinsece, id est, ex propria ipsius hominis ordinatione et intentione. Prior pars per se clara est, quia non est in hac parte homo deterioris conditionis, quam alia naturalia agentia; nam in his actibus etiam operatur the former is an act that happens for the sake of an end, but the other is extrinsically ordered to the end in some way. For the first requires that the change itself is from the will as from a cause acting for the sake of an end. But the second only requires that the act is loved or is willed for the sake of some end, although from the one loving himself the action itself does not happen for the sake of such an end from its proper and intrinsic ordering. For we suppose, lastly, that the discussion is about acting for the same of end formally and properly from a proximate ordering of the one acting himself and not only from an extrinsic ordering by the author of nature, as natural agents act for the sake of an end.

4. It should be said, therefore, that all acts or actions which in no way fall under human will can be for the sake of an end passively or extrinsically, namely, in that way in which the actions of natural agents are for the sake of an end, but not actively and intrinsically, that is, from a proper ordering intention of the human being himself. The first part is clear per se, because a human being is in no worse of a condition with respect to this than other natural agents. For in these actions he also acts from the impetus of nature and tends to the target hav-
ex impetu naturæ, et tendit in scopum ab auctore naturæ destinatum; et hoc probant rationes dubitandi in num. 5, positæ, ut dicemus. Posterior autem pars facile probatur ex his dictis, quia motio finis propría est voluntatis, cuius finis est objectum, unde tendere in finem per proprium actum, atque alia ordinarie in finem, ad voluntatem spectat: ergo, secluso omni actu vo- <23> luntatis, non potest esse actus propter finem ex propría, et intrinsecæ ordinatione operantis. Ex quo fit, si actus sit a voluntate ut a causa elicienente, vel operante, tunc posse fieri, et esse propría propter finem; sicut dictum est in præcedentibus. Si autem non sit a voluntate, ut a causa, sit tamen voluntarius saltem objective, tunc non fit propría propter finem, quia non fit ex motione voluntatis; potest tamen ordinari ad aliquem finem, quia hoc ipso quod voluntas vult aliquem actum, propter aliquem finem illum vult: et hoc est ordinare illum in aliquem finem, quæ ordinatio licet physice nihil ponat in ipso actu, potest tamen ad moralem valorem conferre: sic enim passiones, quæ non sunt a volun-

From which it happens that if the act is from the will as from an eliciting or acting cause, then it can happen and be properly for the sake of an end, just as was said in the preceding [passages]. But if it is not from the will as from a cause, yet is at least objectively voluntary, then it will not properly happen for the sake of an end, because it does not happen from a motion of the will. Nevertheless, it can be ordered to some end, because by the fact that the will wishes some act it wishes it for the sake of some end and this is to order that to some end. Although this ordination physically places nothing in that act, nevertheless it can confer moral value. For thus the passions, which are not made by the will, if they are accepted through
tate, si per voluntatem acceptentur, et ad satisfaciendum pro peccatis referantur, possunt ad hunc effectum habere aliquem moralem valorem.

Ad argum. de actibus intellectus in num. 1.

5. Ex his facilis est responsio ad rationes dubitandi in principio positas. Ad primam enim respondetur, visionem Dei (et idem est de omni actu naturali intellectus, ut antecedit omnem actum voluntatis), non esse propter finem ut est ab ipso nomine: quia solum est quasi ex impetu naturæ, unde potius est finis, quam propter finem, licet ut est affectio sui objecti haberet illum pro fine, prout ex naturali sua inclinatione; at vero eo modo, quo illa actio potest esse voluntaria, potest ordinari in finem, sic enim potest beatus velle videre Deum in gloriam ipsius Dei; vel etiam in suum commodum, ut illa visione consequatur suum summum bonum.

Ad secundum jam est responsum, quomodo inferiores naturales actiones, vel passiones sint propter finem, vel possint aliquo modo ordinari in finem.

DE FINE HOMINIS 328 D ISP. II, SECT. III

5. From these things a response to the arguments posited in the beginning is easy. For to the first is responded that the vision of God (and the same for all natural acts of the intellect as the precede every act of the will) is not for the sake of an end as it is from the name itself, because it is only as if from the impetus of nature. Hence it is more an end that for the sake of an end, although insofar as it is an affection for its object, it may have that for the end as from its natural inclination. But on the other hand, by that way by which that action can be voluntary, it can be ordered to an end. For in that way the blessed person can wish to see God in the glory of God himself or also according to his advantage, as that vision attends his highest good.

To the second argument was already responded how lower natural actions or passions are for the sake of an end or how in some way they are ordered to an end.
6. Ad tertium, quod ad bruta attinet, dicendum est, inveniri in illis quamdam imperfectam partici-
pationem causalitatis finis, quatenus ab objecte apprehenso excitantur, ut per appetitum elicitum in illum tendant, et illum prosequantur, aut ab illo fugiant: nam cum causalitas finis consistat in moti-
tione voluntatis, quæ est appetitus elicivus, quan-
tum participat de hoc appetitu et motione, tantum necesse est participent de causalitate finis. Nihilomi-
nus, absolute loquendo, non operantur formaliter propter finem, quia solum moventur a fine materi-
aliter, ut docet D. Thomas, 1, 2, quaest. 1, art. 2, et melius quaest. 6, <col. b> art. 2, et potest in hunc modum explicari. Nam quoad actiones, quæ versantur circa media, quibus acquiritur finis, bruta non agnoscent proportionem mediiorum cum fine, nec unum cum alio conferre possunt, atque adeo hoc modo operantur propter finem; quoad eas vero ac-
tiones, quæ versantur circa finem, non cognoscent in ipso fine propriam convenientiam sub qua movet, et propter quam est per se appetibilis, quia hoc etiam it should be said that there is found in these a certain imperfect participation in the causality of the end, to the extent that they are excited by the object having been apprehended, so that they tend to it through an elicited desire and either pursue it or flee from it. For since the causality of the end consists in a mo-
tion of the will, which is the elicitive appetite, insofar as they participate in this appetite and motion, it is also necessary that they participate in the causality of the end.

Nevertheless, absolutely speaking, they do not formally act for the sake of an end, because they are only moved by the material end, as St.Thomas teaches in [ST] IaIIæ.1.2 and better in 6.2. And it can be explained in this way. For regarding actions which turn concerning the means by which the end is acquired, brute animals do not recognize the relation of means to an end nor can they compare one with another and therefore they act for the sake of an end in this way. But regarding those actions which turn concerning the end, they do not cognize in the end itself a proper agreeability under which it moves and for the sake of which it is desirable per se, because this also requires a comparison of such an object with nature
requirit collationem talis objecti cum natura, et perfectam cognitionem illius; et ita quamvis materialiter tendant in rem sibi propositam, tamen non proprie operantur circa illam propter finem. Unde quando D. Thomas significat bruta apprehendere utilitatem, vel convenientiam, aut disconvenientiam cum propria natura, non est intelligendus, quia formaliter cognoscatur a brutis, sed tantum materialiter ex instinctu naturæ, quia videlicet apprehenso objecto statim ex instinctu naturæ apprehendant esse prosequendum vel fugiendum. Et hoc significat D. Thomas, loco citato, cum ait: *Apprehendere has intentiones naturæ quodam instinctu*. Cujus signum est, quia eodem impetu, et modo tendunt in id, quod est medium, et in id, quod est finis, quia utrumque apprehendunt ut prosequendum, et in neutro apprehendunt distincte rationem, propter quam prosequendum sit, qua de re latius in disputatöne 23, and its perfect cognition. And so although they tend materially to the thing having been placed before them, nevertheless, they do not properly act concerning it for the sake of an end. Hence, when St. Thomas indicates that brute animals apprehend utility or agreeability or disagreeability with proper nature, it should not be understood as being formally cognized by brute animals but only materially by an instinct of nature, because, namely, by the object having been apprehended they apprehend immediately by an instinct of nature that it is to be pursued or avoided. And St. Thomas indicates this in the cited place when he says: ‘to apprehend these intentions of nature by a certain instinct’. It is a sign of this that by the same impetus and in the same way they tend to that which is the means as to that which is the end, because they apprehend both as something to be pursued and they apprehend in neither a distinct reason for the sake of which it should be pursued. We say more about this in *DM XXIII.10*.

---

14 Ia.78.4 co.? It reads: ‘Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem’.  

DE FINE HOMINIS 330  DISP. II, SECT. III
7. To the other part about the appetite of a human being, I respond that it would be a long disputation about what a the cogitative [faculty] of a human being can cognize and do. It should not be discussed in this place. But I do consider it more probable that this power cannot properly go from one thing to another in thought in such a way, nor even compose and divide. And it is much more certain that it cannot cognize universal things. It is likewise certain that the sensitive appetite of a human being cannot immediately be moved by reason, but only by means of the cogitative [faculty] or a particular image, as St. Thomas explained in the cited place. And therefore I also think that this appetite considered per se and to the extent that it moves itself (but not as it is moved by the will) cannot properly act for the sake of an end, because sense cannot compare the means which this appetite can elect and so it has some proper freedom, particularly concerning objects presented as equal, which is false, as we will discuss more widely in its place.\footnote{Which part does Suárez take to be false?} Therefore, only this appetite surpasses the appetite of brute animals, because it can sometimes be moved by the motion of a superior appetite and therefore is not moved

\footnote{Which part does Suárez take to be false?}
only by the instinct of nature, but also in some way by the
direction of reason, in which case it holds itself more as one
moved than as moving itself. And therefore under this reason
it cannot properly act for the sake of an end by its power apart
from others but from some preceding reason of the will.

SECTION IV.

In how many ways it happens that the will of a human being acts
for the sake of an end.

1. We have taken care of the first part of those two which we
proposed at the beginning of the disputation. Resolving the
latter [part], which seemed necessary in this place so that the
way to those matters which are to be discussed afterwards is
less encumbered, remains. And, as I have often pointed out,
the discussion is not about action for the sake of the end
generally by natural agents, but about human beings’ proper way
[of acting for the sake of an end], which is usually divided into
several different ways. Only four ways can be recalled. For it is
said that a human being acts for the sake of the end either habit-
ually, actually, virtually, or only interpretatively, which must
Actualiter dicitur voluntas operari propter finem quando actu movetur a fine, unde ad hunc modum operandi imprimis requiritur actualis cognitio, et cogitatio de ipso fine, quia nisi sit actualiter apprehensus, non potest actualiter movere. Deinde requiritur actualis motio voluntatis, vel in ipsum finem, vel in alium propter ipsum, quia hoc signifcet actualis operatio propter finem. Posset tamen hoc loco quæri an in hoc modo operandi requiritur actualis intentio finis propter se ipsum, vel suffictiat actualis electio, vel usus propter finem actu et distincte cognitum: sed hæc quæstio infra tractanda est cum dicetur de intentione et electione, et statim aliquid attingam agendo de tertio modo operandi.

2. Quid vero sit operari habitualiter, non omnes eodem modo exponunt: aliqui hoc explicant ratione cujusdam concomitante habitus concomitantis operationem in eadem voluntate seu subjecto, ita ut dicatur homo operari habitualiter propter aliquem finem, quando operatur propter aliquod

be explained briefly. The will is said to act actually for the sake of the end when it is actually moved by the end. Hence, for this way of acting, actual cognition and thought about the end itself is especially required, because [the end] cannot actually move [the will] unless it is actually apprehended. Next, an actual motion of the will, either to the end itself or to something else for the sake of it, is required, because this signifies an actual action for the sake of the end. Nevertheless, one may ask here whether in this way of acting an actual intention for the end for the sake of it itself is required or whether an actual choice or a use for the sake of the end actually and distinctly cognized suffices. But this question should be discussed below when intention and choice are discussed; I will say something [about it] shortly in dealing with the third way of acting.\footnote{Cf. 1.3.5. Or is Suárez referring to the material in De Voluntario et Involuntario disp. 6 and 8? He also makes extensive references to these relations in De Bonitate disp. 6, sect. 5.}

2. But not everyone explains in the same way what acting habitually is. Some explain it by reason of a certain attendance of a habit attending the action to the same things by the will or subject, so that it is said that a human acts habitually for the sake of some end when he acts for the sake of some object while retaining a habit inclining to another end,
objectum retinendo habitum inclinantem ad alium
finem, quamvis relatio hujus habitus nullo modo ca-
dat in hujusmodi operationem, nec referat illam in
horum finem, sed solum ipsum <col. b> hominem
seu voluntatem operantem. Hunc modum significat
D. Thomas 2, 2, quæst. 24, art. 10, et 1, 2, quæst. 88,
art. 1, ad 2, et quæst. 3, de Malo; quod exemplo
explicatur: nam hoc modo dici solet justus, etiam
dum venialiter peccat, habitualiter operari propter
Deum, non quia ipsum opus peccati ab eo referatur
in Deum, sed quia simul cum illo opere retinet ha-
bitualém relationem ipsius personæ, vel voluntatis
in Deum ut finem ultimum, et quia opus ex se non
excludit hanc relationem, atque eodem modo in-
fi delis, qui habitualiter habet idolum pro fine, etiam
dum facit opus honestum justitiæ et misericordiæ,
dicitur habitualiter operari propter idolum. Ex qui-
bus exemplis et ex re ipsa constat hunc modum esse
valde improprium, quia, ut dixi, et Cajetanus notat,
loco citato in 2, 2, hæc habitualis relatio non cadit
in ipsum opus, quia nec per actum præsentem, nec
although the relation of this habit in no way ends in action of
this kind nor refers it to the end of these, but only [refers] the
human or acting will itself. St. Thomas signifies this way in
[ST] IIaIIæ.24.10 and IaIIæ.88.1 ad 2 and in De Malo, q. 3. It is
explained by example: for in this way it is commonly said that
the just person, even while he sins venially, habitually acts for
the sake of God, not because the work of sin itself is referred
by that to God, but because at the same time with that work
he retains a habitual relation of the person himself or the will
to God as ultimate end and because the work by itself does not
exclude this relation. And in the same way the infidel who ha-
bitually has an idol for the end, even while he performs a work
of justice and mercy that is honestum, is said to act habitually
for the sake of the idol. From these examples and from the
matter itself it is clear that this way is very improper, because,
as I said and as Cajetan observes in the cited place in IaIIæ,
this habitual relation does not end in the work itself, because
neither through the present act nor through some preceding
[act] is an action of this kind referred to that end, nor does
it take some entity, either a physical or moral property, from
that. Indeed, in no way is it sometimes referable to that end,
per aliquem præcedentem refertur hujusmodi actus in illum finem, nec ab illo sumit aliquam entitatem, vel proprietatem physicam, vel moralem; imo nullo modo interdum referibilis est in illum finem, ut constat de veniali: ergo tota illa relatio habitualis solius subjecti, unde potius potest dici operari cum relatione habituali ad talem finem, quam operari propri propter talem finem.

3. Alio ergo modo explicatur hæc relatio habitualis, quando censetur relicta ex aliquo actu præcedenti, per quem illud opus vel in particulari, vel saltum sub generalitate relatum est in talem finem, licet quando fit illud opus præcedens actus, seu relation, nullo modo sit nec actualiter, nec in aliqua virtute, quam reliquerit, ut per eam influat in opus, sed mere habitualiter, quia illa intentio semel habita, retractata non fuit, ut, verbi gratia, retulit quis summo mane omnia opera Dei in Deum, postea vero in discursu Dei operatur aliquid referibile de se in Deum, tamen sine illa memoria prioris intentionis, et sine

3. Therefore, this habitual relation is explained in another way, since it is thought to be something remaining from another preceding act, through which that work either in particular or at least under a generality is related to such an end, although when that work happens the preceding act or relation in no way is, neither actually nor in some strength (so that having left that it could through it influence the work), but merely habitually. This is because that intention, once a habit, was not retracted, as, for example, someone who had referred at the end of the morning every work of God to God, but afterwards in thinking of God he does something referable of itself to God, yet without that memory of his prior intention and without

18Cf. 3.5.4.
ullo influxu actuali, vel virtuali, tunc dicitur ille any actual or virtual influence, then that human being is said
homo habitualiter operari propter Deum, propter re- to act habitually for the sake of God, on account of a remaining
lationem habitu relictam ex priori intentione habita, relation of habit resulting from an intention that was held pre-
et non retractata. Quem modum insinuare videtur viously and has not been retracted. St. Thomas seems to sug-
D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 6 ad 3, et quæst. 2, dis- gest this way in
putata de virtutibus, art. 11, ad 2, quamvis hac loca
possunt intelligi de relatione virtuali statim expli-
canda: nam D. Thomas sæpe relationem virtualem often calls a virtual relation ‘habitual’ and never makes a sat-
vocat habitualem, et nunquam satis distinguitt; inter has tamen ex dictis constabit esse aliam distinc-
tionem: nam in hoc modo, de quo nunc agimus, fi-
nis nec actu influit, quia, <25> ut supponimus, nec
actu cogitatur, nec actu movet; nec etiam virtualiter influit, quia etiam supponimus ex priori intentione
nihil esse in homine relictum, quod nunc conferat ad
præsentem operationem, sed ita se habere hominem in modo operandi, ac si prior actus non præcessis-
set: est ergo hujusmodi relatio mere habitualis, de qua non parva quæstio est, an conferat operi aliquam
moralem conditionem, aut valorem, aut in ordine 
ad meritum, vel ad satisfactionem, vel aliquid hujus-
any actual or virtual influence, then that human being is said
to act habitually for the sake of God, on account of a remaining
relation of habit resulting from an intention that was held pre-
viously and has not been retracted. St. Thomas seems to sug-
gest this way in [ST] IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3 and in DQV q. 2, art. 11, ad
2, although these places can be understood as concerning the
virtual relations that will be explained shortly. For St. Thomas
often calls a virtual relation ‘habitual’ and never makes a satis-
factory distinction. Yet from what has been said it will be
clear that there is some distinction between these. For in this
way of which we are talking now the end does not actually in-
fluence, because, as we suppose, it is neither actually cognized
nor does it actually move. Nor does it virtually influence, be-
cause we also suppose that nothing remains in the human from
the prior intention that now directs to the present action, but
he holds himself thus and [would even] if the prior act had not
preceded. Therefore, a relation of this sort is merely habitual,
concerning which it is not a trivial question, whether it directs
on the act some moral condition or value or in order for merit
or for satisfaction or something of this sort, which should be
discussed in the proper places.
modi, quæ in locis propriis tractanda sunt.

3. Modus per relationem virtualem.

4. Circa tertium modum operandi, scilicet virtu-
aliter propter finem, notandum esse veluti medium
inter præcedentes, quia nec requirit actualiter in-
fluxum propter finem ut primus, nec omnino nul-
sum ut secundus: sed requirit aliquem influxum per
aliquam virtutem relictam ex priori intentione: diffi-
cile vero est circa hunc modum dicere, quid sit hæc
virtus, et imprimis sumo ad hunc modum necessar-
ium esse ut præcesserit actualis cognition et intentio
talis finis, quia alias nihil esset, unde illa virtus fuisset
relictæ. Deinde oportet ut talis intention non sit retrac-
tata per contrariam intentionem, quia alias haec con-
traria intentione destruxisset virtutem relictam per pri-
orem intentionem. Tertio, necessarium est ut duret
effectus aliquis relictus ex priori intentione, ut ab illo
procedat aliquo modo opus, quod dicitur postea fieri
virtualiter propter talem finem. Quis autem sit hic

4. About the third way of acting, namely, virtually for the
sake of the end, it should be noted that it is, as it were, a mid-
dle between the preceding [two], because it neither requires an
actual influx for the sake of the end as the first way does nor en-
tirely nothing as the second one does. Rather, it requires some
influx through some remaining force (virtus) from a prior in-
tention. But it is difficult to say concerning this way what
this force is. In the first place, I assume that it is necessary for
this way of acting that there have been actual cognition and
intention for such an end. Otherwise, there would not be any-
thing from which that force could remain. Next, it is necessary
that such an intention not be retracted through a contrary in-
tention. Otherwise, this contrary intention would destroy the
force remaining from the prior intention. Thirdly, it is neces-
sary that some effect remain from the prior intention, so that
the work which is said afterwards to come to be virtually for
the sake of such an end proceeds from it in some way.

19Cf. *DM* XIX.8.20: 'And for this reason it is commonly said that every intention of a particular end is a virtual choice of happiness, a choice that does not always have to be preceded by an elicited intention of happiness itself; rather, a natural and necessary propensity [for happiness] suffices' (*Atque hac ratione dicitur omnem intentionem finis particularis esse virtualem electionem felicitatis, ad quam non semper est necesse ut præcedat intentione elicita ipsius felicitatis, sed sufficit naturalis ac necessaria propensio*). Also cf. *DM* XXIV.2.15.

20Cf. 3.5.4.
effectus aliter videtur explicandum respectu actuum externorum, aliter respectu actus interni ipsius voluntatis: potest enim actus exterior fieri propter finem absque actuali cogitatione, et intentione finis. Exemplum vulgare est quando quis iter agit, quod incipit propter aliquem finem, in ipso vero actuali progressu non semper recordatur ipsius finis: imo ne interdum recordatur ipsius incessus, vel motus: et idem contingit in celebratione Missæ ex priori intentione: tunc ergo virtus relicta ex priori intentione nihil aliud esse videtur, quam applicatio ipsius potentiae executive ad actualem operationem externam, quæ durat et continuat in ipso effectu quamdiu non cessat omnino ab actione, nec per contrarium voluntatem suspenditur actus, et licet contingat actiones externas variari, tamen quia uni in mente succedit altera, una etiam excitat ad alteram, et hoc modo virtus interior censetur durare in ipso effectu. At vero, quando actio <col. b> externa omnino interrupta fuit, verbi gratia, per somnum, vel quid hujusmodi, tunc necesse est actum voluntatis quasi de novo in-

this effect is, however, seems to need to be explained differently in the case of external acts than in the case of interna acts of the will itself. For an external act can happen for the sake of the end apart from actual thought and intention of the end. A common example is when someone goes on a journey that he begins for the sake of some end but which end he does not constantly think of during the actual progress. Indeed, not even the walking or motion itself is always in mind. The same thing happens in the celebration of the Mass by a prior intention. Therefore, in this case the force remaining from a prior intention seems to be nothing other than the application of the executive power itself to an actual external action, which endures and continues to the same effect as long as it does not entirely cease from action and the action is not suspended through a contrary will. And although the external actions happen to vary, nevertheless because one succeeds another in the mind, one also incites to another, and in this way the interior force is thought to endure in the effect itself. But, on the other hand, when an external action has been entirely interrupted, for example, through sleep or something of this sort, then it is necessary that the act of will start anew, as it
choari; et quoniam voluntatis actus esse non potest sine cognitione intellectus, ideo ex parte illius videitur commodè exponi hæc virtus relicta ex priori intentione, quia nimirum ex precedenti intentione, apprehensione, consultatione, et aliis similibus actibus factum est ut potentia, proposito tali objecto, verbi gratia, quod iter sit agendum, statim repræsentatur ut exequendum absque alta motione, seu speciali consideratione illius, seu finis, ad quem ordinatur: hoc modo statim voluntas exequitur id, quod proponitur, et incipit illo medio uti, quod proximum est, seu quod tunc occurrit primo exequendum, et sic recte dicitur virtualiter operari propter finem.

5. Circa quartum modum, quem vocavimus interpretative, operari propter finem, advertendum est, interdum voluntatem intendere aliquod objectum, in quo sistit ex vi considerationis et hujus actualis motionis; tamen illa res intenta natura sua fertur, et ordinatur in alium finem: tunc ergo voluntas dicitur proprie, et quasi explicite intendere finem sibi proposita. And because there cannot be an act of the will without cognition of the intellect, therefore for its part this force seems to be explained agreeably through a prior intention. For without doubt it was made from a preceding intention, apprehension, deliberation, and other similar acts as a power, so that once such an object (e.g., that one should go on a journey) has been proposed, it is immediately represented as needing to be done without any deep motion or special consideration of it or the end to which it is ordered. In this way the will immediately carries out that which is proposed and begins to use the means which are proximate or which then occur first in the carrying out. And thus he is rightly said to act virtually for the sake of the end.

5. About the fourth way, which we call interpretatively acting for the sake of an end is interpretatively.

---

21Cf. Aquinas’s use of ‘interpretative’ in *ST IIaIIæ.97.1 co.*
tum: interpretative vero dicitur intendere ulteriorem
finem, ad quem finis priori modo intentus natura sua
fertur: et ad hunc modum is, qui operatur honeste
propter bonitatem misericordiæ aut justitiae, nihil de
Deo cogitans, aut de alio fine, dicitur operari propter
Deum, vel propter beatitudinem, et implere illum
Pauli, 1 Corin. 10: Omnia, in gloriæm Dei facite, quia
videlicet ipsum bonum honestum quod intenditur,
natura sua fertur in Deum, et est medium, quo ten-
ditur ad beatitudinem. Et ideo licet homo actu suo
non intendat illum finem ulteriorem, dicitur operari
propter illud interpretative, quod alii vocant operari
propter finem ex natura ipsius operis potius quam ex
intentione operantis, de quo modo operandi occur-
rent plura in sequenti disputatione.

said to intend interpretatively the more ultimate end to which
the end intended in the former way by its nature is brought.
And in this way he who acts for the sake of the goodness of
mercy or justice in a way that is honestum, thinking nothing
of God or of another end, is said to act for the sake of God
or for the sake of happiness and to satisfy that [statement] of
Paul in 1 Cor. 10[:31], ‘Do all things for the glory of God’, be-
cause, that is to say, the bonum honestum itself that is intended
is brought by its nature to God and is a means by which one
is directed to happiness. And for this reason even though a hu-
man being does not intend that more ultimate end by his own
act, he is said to act for its sake interpretatively. Others call
this acting for the sake of the end by the nature of the act it-
self rather than by the intention of the one acting. Numerous
[references] to this way of acting will occur in the following
disputation.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22}\textit{E.g.}, 3.1.3, 3.1.4, 3.2.5, 3.3.12–13, 3.6.2, and 3.6.4.

163–164 natura sua fertur in Deum, et est medium, quo tenditur } \textit{om.} V.

\textbf{DE FINE HOMINIS} 340 \textbf{Disp. III}
De ultimo fine hominis in communi, et de modo operandi propter illum.

Postquam de fine generaliter dictum est, oportet ut de illo in particulari aliqua dicamus, quoniam hic finis et præcipuam rationem finis habet, et primum principium est omnium operabilium, et ejus ratio in beatitudine po-<26> tissimum reperitur, ad quam totus hic sermo de fine referitur: diximus autem supra, disput. 1, sect. 6, num. 2, alium esse finem ultimum simpliciter et positive, alium vero ultimum secundum quid et negative: et quamvis præcipua hujus disputationis intentio sit de priori, tamen ob majorem claritatem et doctrinae complementum, dicemus etiam de posteriori, et primo videbimus quam sit necessarius hic finis ad operationes humanas: deinde, an sit unus tantum vel possit esse multiplex.

On the ultimate end of humans in general, and the manner of acting for the sake of it.

After what has been said of the end in general, it is necessary that we say something about it in particular, because this end not only has the special character of an end but also is the first principle of everything that can be done and its character is to be found above all in happiness, to which this whole discussion about the end is directed. Moreover, we said above (disp. 1, sect. 6, n. 2) that it is one thing for an end to be the unqualifiedly and positively ultimate end, and another thing, however, [for it to be] a qualifiedly and negatively ultimate end. And although the main purpose of this disputation is concerning the former, nevertheless, for the sake of greater clarity and completeness of doctrine, we will also talk about the latter. And first we will see how this end is necessary for human activity; then, whether there is only one or whether it is possible for there to be more than one.
Whether it is necessary to set up some ultimate end for humans and their actions.

A human being ordered to an ultimate end can be understood in two ways: in one way, by the intention of the author of nature, an ordering that is, as it were, extrinsic and passive; in the second way, by free will and its action (for without doubt a human being first determines through an act of his will some ultimate end for himself towards which he directs his actions), and, for that reason, an ordering that is, as it were, intrinsic and active. This end can be understood either as an unqualifiedly ultimate end or as a qualifiedly ultimate end.23

1. In the first place, then, I say that some unqualifiedly ultimate end is given to which (ad quem) and for the sake of which (propter quem) humans were made by the author of nature. This conclusion is, strictly speaking, of the faith, as I showed in Disputationes metaphysicæ 24, sect. 1, because [1] it is evident that God is the ultimate end of all creatures and [2] on account

---

23 Neither the 1628 nor the Vivés editions number the first paragraph.

1st assertion: some unqualifiedly ultimate end is applicable to a human. It is proven from authority.
alypsis 1, *Ego sum* α et ω; quod latius tractatur, 1 part., quaest. 5, art. 4, et specialiter constat esse finem ultimum hominis, qui proprie et peculiari modo potest Deum attingere, ut latius infra probabimus, disputat. 5, agentes de objecto beatitudinis. Et hoc etiam est lumine naturae notum, quod homo habeat aliquem finem ultimum sibi communicabilem, et ita posuerunt omnes philosophi, qui de beatitudine disputarunt: ut videre est apud Aristotelem 2, Ethicor., a princip., et Ciceronem, 1. de Finibus, et alia congerit Augustinus, lib. 9, de Civitate, fere per totum. Et ratio est facilis, quia homo nec frustra, nec casu est in mundo: est ergo effectus propter aliquem finem: et cum in finibus non procedatur in infinitum, necesse est ut sit factus propter aliquem finem ultimum. Deinde ipsa constitutio naturae humanae hoc intrinsec postulat, tum quia alias non haberet homo natura sua certum terminum in quem secundum rectam rationem operationes suas dirigeret: unde fieret, ut neque etiam posset recte vi-

of Rev. 1[:8] (*I am the Alpha and the Omega*), which is discussed more extensively in [ST] Ia.5.4 and [3] it is evident, in particular, that [God] is the ultimate end of humans who are able to reach God strictly speaking and in a special way, as we will show more extensively below in disp. 5 when dealing with the object of happiness. That a human being has some ultimate end communicable to himself is also known by the light of nature. All philosophers who have disputed concerning happiness have supposed this, as is seen in Aristotle, in the beginning of *EN II*, and in Cicero, *De finibus* I, and Augustine collects others throughout Book IX of *De civ. Dei*.

And the reason is easy: because humans are in the world neither vainly nor by chance. They are, therefore, an effect for the sake of some end. And since one does not proceed into infinity with ends, it is necessary that it have come about for the sake of some ultimate end. Therefore, this establishment of human nature intrinsically demands these things. Both [i] because otherwise a human by his own nature would not have a fixed *terminus* in the following of which right reason could direct his actions, with the result that he would not be able

---

24 The idea here is that God is the ultimate end of humans, in a way that is distinctive of or peculiar to humans. Non-rational animals do not have God as their ultimate end in the same way.
tam suam instituere: tum denique, quia sicut in intentionibus, et electionibus non potest in infinitum procedi, sed deveniendum necessario est ad aliquem ultimum finem; ita in singulis rebus necesse est, ut tota natura inclinetur ad aliquid ultimum, sicut contingit in arte: licet contingat in una arte, multas esse actiones, necesse tamen est ut omnes tendant in unum aliquem finem: nam si ars est una, et multas actiones sub se comprehendit, necesse est aliquem ordinem inter eas servari, atque adeo omnes ferri ad aliquid, quod est perfectum, et consummatum in tali arte: sic ergo cum natura hominis una sic, et plures operationes complectetur, perfecta ejus institutio intrinsec postulat ordinem, atque adeo imperfectiora propter perfectiora, et haec propter id, quod in homine est perfectissimum, sicque illud habebit rationem ultimi finis.

2. Dices, hoc discursu ad summum probari, vivere secundum rectam rationem esse finem ultimum hominis, non tamen quod in eo gradu et ordine detur aliquis finis ultimus, quia in eo gradu sunt multae to set up his own life rightly, and, finally, [ii] because just as
in intentions and choices one is not able to proceed into infinity, but some ultimate end must necessarily be arrived at, so in each individual thing it is necessary that the whole nature be inclined to something final, just as in the case in art. Although it is the case that in one art there are many actions, nevertheless it is necessary that they all aim at some one end. For if art is one and many actions are included under it, it is necessary that some order be kept among them and, indeed, that all be brought into relation with something which is perfect and consummate in such an art. Likewise, therefore, since the nature of humans is one in this sort of way and embraces many actions, a perfect arrangement of it intrinsically posits order. And, indeed, the more imperfect things on account of the more perfect and these on account of that which is most perfect in humans and so it will have the character of an ultimate end.

2. You will say that this reasoning proves at most that the ultimate end of humans is to live following according to right reason. Nevertheless, some ultimate end is not yet given in the same grade and order, because there are many virtues in

An objection against what was just said is resolved.
virtutes, omnes propter se amabiles, quæ possunt intendi per modum finis ultimi. Respondeo, etiamsi stemus totum id, quod argumentum postulat, id non esse contra positam assertionem, quia nunc non agimus de fine ultimo, in quo consistat, an in una re, vel operatione, sed solum an sit, et hoc concludit ratio facta. De alio vero puncto acturi sumus, disput. 6, sect. 3, agentes de beatitudine. Addit præterea Durandus, in 2, distint. 38, quæst. 4, num. 8, rationem factam posse proportionaliter applicari, nam in ipso vivere secundum rationem est multitudo actionum et operationum, inter quas potest etiam servari ordo, ut imperfectiora ad perfectiora ordinentur: ac denique tota rationalis vita ad id, quod summum et perfectissimum est; quod latius tractaturi sumus agentes de beatitudine.

3. Atque ex hac conclusione sequitur omnes homines convenire in hoc ultimo fine, vel secundum naturæ propensionem, quia est hominum natura; vel secundum Dei ordinationem, quia tota humana species ad eundem finem adeo distincta est: at vero the same grade—all worthy to be loved for their own sake—which can be intended through the mode of an ultimate end. I respond: even if we should grant everything which the argument posits, it is not contrary to the posited assertion, because we are not now asking what the ultimate end consists in or whether it is one thing or action, but only with whether there is one. And the reasoning given concludes this [matter]. But we will deal with the other point in disp. 6, sect. 3, when dealing with happiness. In addition, Durandus adds in 2, dist. 38, q. 4, n. 8, that the given reasoning can be applied analogously, for to live following reason involves in itself a multitude of actions and activities among which order can still be preserved so that the more imperfect are ordered to the more perfect and, finally, the entire rational life to that which is the highest and most perfect. We will discuss this more extensively when dealing with happiness.

3. And from this conclusion it follows that all human beings agree in this ultimate end. They either follow the inclination of nature (because it is the nature of human beings) or they follow the ordination of God (because the entire human species has for that reason been marked off to the same end).
secundum appetitum elicitivum non omnes homines
eumdem finem intendunt, quia hoc pendent ex eorum
libertate et cognitione, vel ignorantia. Addit vero
D. Thomas, quaest. 1, art. 7, omnes, <27> qui habent
affectum bene dispositum, convenire in hoc ultimo
fine etiam secundum intentionem elicitam. Quod
intelligendum est juxta modum et qualitatem bonæ
dispositionis: nam si illa dispositio sit supernaturalis,
et ex cognitione, ac virtute supernaturali procedat,
omnes, qui illam participaverint, convenient in eodem
fine supernaturali: si autem dispositio fuerit tan-
tum naturalis, seu moralis, convenient in fine ultimo
naturali vel formaliter intento, vel saltem interpretative, quia omnes intendunt secundum rectam ra-
tionem vivere. Unde licet in finibus proximis differe
possint, ut Durandus notavit, loco citato, quia unus
potest unam virtutem intendere, alius aliam: tamen
omnes tendent in eumdem ultimum finem, quia ille
finis adeo perfectus est, ut inquit Bonaventura, in 2,
distinct. 38, art. 1, quaest. 4, ut omnes bene operantes

But, to be sure, not all human beings intend the same end in
following elicitive appetite, because this depends on their free-
dom and cognition or ignorance. In addition, St. Thomas says
in [ST IaIIae.] 1.7 that everyone who has a well-disposed affection
agrees in this ultimate end even when following elicited intention. What must be understood equally is the mode and
quality of the good disposition. For if that disposition is super-
natural and proceeds from supernatural cognition and virtue,
all who have participated in it agree in the same supernatu-
ral end. If, however, the disposition is only natural or moral,
they agree in the ultimate natural end either formally having
been intended or at least interpretatively,25 because everyone
intends to live in accordance with right reason. As a result,
although they differ with respect to proximate ends (as Duran-
dus wrote in the cited place) because one can intend one virtue
and another another, they still all aim at the same ultimate end
because that end is indeed the more perfect (as Bonaventure
says in [Sent.] II, dist. 38, art. 1, q. 4), so that it draws to itself
everyone acting well and it alone can satisfy the well-disposed
affection.

25See 2.4.5.

ad se trahat, et solus ipse possit affectum bene dispositum satiare.

2. Assertio, prima hominis actionis non necessario est circa ultimum finem simpliciter. Probatur, quia talis intentio neque est absolute necessaria per se, neque ad alias operationes: ergo nullum modo est necessaria. Prior pars antecedentis probatur, quia omnis intentio voluntatis in via est libera saltem quod exercitium, vel etiam quod specificationem, si sit de re aliqua determinata. Posterior vero pars probatur, quia ad operationes morales sufficit intentionem particularis finis, qui proprie intendatur, et sit ultimus tantum secundum quid, et negative. Unde explicatur, et confirmatur conclusio, nam quando homo pervenit, verbi gratia, ad usum rationis, potest inchoare operationes suas morales a particularibus objectis, verbi gratia, intendendo honorem, salutem, vel quid simile prius quam tractet de fine ultimo simpliciter.

4. Second, it must be said that it is not necessary that every human being, when he first acts, intend with a proper and formal elicited intention some unqualifiedly ultimate end to which he directs himself and all his [actions]. This is proven: because such an intention is neither absolutely necessary through itself nor for other actions. Therefore, it is necessary in no way. The first part of the antecedent is proven: because every intention of the will in this life is free at least with respect to exercise, or even with respect to specification, if it is determinate according to some thing. Now the latter part is proven: because for moral actions an intention of a particular end suffices which is properly intended and is ultimate only qualifiedly and negatively. Hence, the conclusion is confirmed and explained: for when a human being arrives at, for example, the use of reason, he can begin his moral actions with a particular object, intending, for example, honour, good health, or something similar, which he deals with before dealing with the unqualifiedly ultimate end. And he can freely...

---

26That is, becomes a young adult.
pliciter, et propter illos fines potest libere eligere et operari: nec dici potest quod saltem interpretative intendat finem illum particularem tanquam finem ultimum simpliciter et positive hoc enim necessarium non est, alias in tali affectu peccaret mortaliter, quod est plane falsum, quia fieri potest ut tale objectum nec contra præceptum sit, nec contra charitatem, et consequenter ut nec formaliter, nec virtute, seu interpretative ametur ut summum bonum. <col. b>

5. Dicendum tertio, necessarium esse hominem exercentem actiones humanas intendere aliquem finem ultimum saltem negative et secundum quid. Juxta quam conclusionem potest intelligi D. Thom- as, 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 4, et eam convincit ratio ejus, quia non est progressus in infinitum in finibus, sicut neque in aliis causis per se ordinatis, de qua præter Aristotelem 2, Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, legi potest idem D. Thomas 1, contr. Gent., cap. 3, et lib. 2, cap. 16, et lib. 3, cap. 17, et Scotus, in 1, distinct. 2, quæst. 1, et Durandus, distinct. 3, quæst. 1. Atque hinc sequitur, primum actum hominis incipientis operari humano choose and act for the sake of those ends. Nor can it be said that he at least interpretatively intends that particular end as an unqualifiedly and positively ultimate end, for this is not necessary. Otherwise he would sin mortally with such an affection. This is plainly false, because it can happen that such an object is neither contrary to precept nor contrary to charity, and consequently that it is loved neither formally nor virtually nor interpretatively as the highest good.

5. Thirdly, it must be said that it is necessary that a human performing human actions intend some ultimate end at least negatively and qualifiedly. Saint Thomas can be understood as agreeing with this conclusion in [ST] IaIIae.1.4, [co.], and his account establishes it [the conclusion], because there is not a progression into infinity with ends, just as there also is not in other causes ordered per se. Concerning these, in addition to Aristotle in 2 Metaphysicæ, cap. 2, one can read the same Saint Thomas in cont. Gentiles lib. 1, cap. 3 and lib. 2, cap. 16 and lib. 3, cap. 17, Scotus in 1, distinct. 2, q. 1, and Durandus in distinct. 3, q. 1. And from here it follows that the first act of a human beginning to operate in a human way necessarily

DE FINE HOMINIS

3rd assertion: an ultimate end is always intended in some manner in human actions.
modo necessario esse debere circa aliquid per modum finis ultimi saltem negative: quia necesse est, ut aliquid propter se ametur, ut possint alia propter ipsum amari: illud autem, quod propter se amatur, ut sic habet rationem ultimi, quia ut sic, non refertur in aliud: si enim referretur, jam illud aliud esset prius amatum.

145 6. Dices primo, nonne satis erit ut antecedat voluntas, seu intentio boni in communi? Respondetur, posse hanc intentionem esse omnium primam, non tamen esse satis ut ex illa progresiatur homo immedi- ate ad electiones faciendas, sed necesse est ut prius fi- gat intentionem in aliquo particulari objecto propter se amando, quia media, et executio eorum versan- tur circa singularia, et ideo non habent determinatam utilitatem vel proportionem, donec cum re aliqua determinata conferuntur, quæ per illa consequenda sit, et ideo illa generalis intentio non sufficit ac movet, et excitat ad amandum particulare bonum, quod sub illo communi continetur.

150 6. [But] you may say first: will it not be enough that the will or an intention of the good in general goes before? It is answered: it is possible that this intention comes first, yet it is not enough so that a human can immediately proceed from it to the choices that must be made. Rather, it is necessary that he first fix an intention on some particular object that ought to be loved for its own sake, because means and their execution have to do with singular things. And, therefore, they do not have determinate usefulness or proportion until they are brought together with some determinate thing which is to be obtained through them. For this reason that general intention does not suffice either to move or to excite to loving a particular good which is contained under that general [good].

27 This objector is going in the other direction, by suggesting that we can get by with even less, i.e., all we need is a recognition that something is good. Cf. 3.6.1.
7. Dices secundo, quia fieri potest ut amor alicujus boni determinati, verbi gratia, honoris, praecesserit ante usum rationis, et postea adveniente usu rationis, ex vi illius fieri electiones: ergo fieri potest ut prima operatio humana sit circa bonum tantum propter aliud amatum. Respondetur, etiamsi concederemus totum, non esse contra assertionem positam, quia illud est per accidens, nos vero per se loquimur de homine, qui simpliciter incepit operari, verbi gratia, Adam cum primum creatus fuit: et idem est de Christo, de Beata Virgine et de Angelis. Secundo dicitur in eo eventu cum ante electionem antecedere debet consultatio, necessarium etiam esse, moraliter loquendo, ut præcedat intentio rationalis, qua velit homo consequi finem illum per convenientia media, hæc enim est, quæ movet ad consultationem; unde non sufficit ille quasi naturalis affectus, qui potest antecedere.

7. Secondly, you may say: for it can happen that love of some determinate good (honour, for example) occurs before the use of reason and afterwards by a developing use of reason choices are made because of the force of it [i.e., the love]. Therefore, it can happen that the first human action is concerned with a good only loved for the sake of something else. I answer: even if we conceded the whole point, it would not be against the posited assertion, because that [example] is per accidens; we, however, speak per se concerning a human, who began to act strictly speaking (for example, Adam when first created; and the same is true of Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and of the angels). Secondly, it is said that in the event when deliberation ought to go before choice it is also necessary, morally speaking, that rational intention go before, by which [intention] a human wills to follow that end through appropriate means. This [intention], indeed, is what moves to deliberation. Hence, that natural, as it were, affection which can precede does not suffice.
Sectio II.

Utrum possit homo intendere in suis operationibus duos ultimos fines particulares tantum.

Arguitur primo pro parte neg.

1. Ratio dubii est primo, quia fieri non potest ut ejusdem effectus dentur duae causae totales ejusdem rationis et ordinis: ergo neque fieri potest, ut in voluntate dentur duo fines ultimi, et inter se non subordinati, qui voluntatem moveant. Probatur consequentia, quia alias uterque finis esset causa totalis in suo ordine: nam si essent tantum particulares, jam non essent duo, sed ex utroque conflaretur unus finis: nos autem agimus de finibus totalibus, ita ut unusquisque sit sufficiens ad movendam voluntatem. Unde argumentor secundo, quia ultimis finis est primum motivum voluntatis, nam est primum in intentione: sed non potest voluntas simul, et æque primo moveri a duobus, tum quia sicut repugnat esse duo prima principia, ita etiam duo prima motiva: tum etiam, quia motivum voluntatis est illud, quo posito moveretur voluntas, et sine quo non moveretur: nam, ut dix-

Secundo.

1. The reason for doubting is, first, because it is not able to happen that two complete causes of his reason and order are given for his effects. Therefore, it also cannot happen that two ultimate ends are given in the will, with no subordination between them, which move the will. The consequence is proven: because otherwise each end is the complete cause in accordance with its own order. For if they were such particulars, they would no longer be two but one end would be composed out of each. We, however, are discussing about complete ends, so that each one is sufficient to move the will. From which I argue secondly, because an ultimate end is the first stimulus of the will, for it is first in intention. But the will cannot be moved at the same time and equally firstly by two things. [This is] both because, just as there being two first principles is repugnant, so also there being two first stimuli [is repugnant], and also because the stimulus of the will is that by the positing of which the will is moved and without which it
imus, agimus de motivo totali: ergo repugnat hujus-modi motiva simul multiplicari. Tertio, non potest idem motus simul terminari ad duos terminos inter se non subordinates: ergo nec motio voluntatis ad duos fines; nam finis etiam est terminus hujus motio-nis, et sicut motus specificatur a termino, ita motio voluntatis a fine, repugnat autem simul concurrere duo specificativa ejusdem motus. Quarto, fieri non potest ut ad eundem finem simul eligantur, vel applicentur duo media æque proxima, seu prima in ex-cutione, atque inter se non subordinata, quia non potest actio agentis simul incipere a duobus: ergo neque e contrario possunt duo fines simul intendi. Tandem finis ultimus negative dicitur, ad alium non ordinatur; sed omnes fines particulares ordinantur ad finem ultimum simpliciter et universalem, quia de ra-tione illius est, ut omnia in ipsum referantur: ergo non possunt dari duo fines ita ultimi, quin saltam uterque illorum in unum tertium ordinetur.

would not be moved. For, as we said, we are discussing about complete stimuli. Therefore, it is repugnant to multiply mo-tives in this way. Thirdly, the same movement cannot at the same time be determined by two limits that are not subordi-nated between themselves. Therefore, neither is the motion of the will determined by two ends, for an end is also the goal of its motion and just as movement is specified by a limit, so motion of the will [is specified] by an end. It is repugnant, however, to run together at the same time two specifications of the same movement. Fourthly, it cannot happen that two equally proximate means (or first in execution and not subordi-nated between themselves) are chosen or applied to the same end at the same time, because an action of an agent cannot be begun by two things at once. Therefore, conversely, neither can two ends be intended simultaneously. Finally, an ultimate end spoken of negatively is not ordered to another, but all par-ticular ends are ordered to an unqualifiedly ultimate and uni-versal end, because it is according to its natio that everything is referred to it. Therefore, there cannot be given two ends ulti-mate in this way, without at least one of them being ordered to one third thing.
Notatio pro assertionibus.

2. Advertendum est, sermonem esse posse de duobus finibus, aut respectu ejusdem voluntatis, et eorumdem mediorum seu ejusdem consultationis et electionis, vel tantum respectu ejusdem voluntatis eligentis, et tendentis per diversa media ad diversos fines. Rursus, in ipsis electionibus, seu actibus, qui propter finem fiunt: considerari potest vel actus interior voluntatis, qui proxime, et immediate fit ex motione finis, vel actus exterior, seu imperatus ab illo interiori, sub quo comprehenditur omnis executio exterior mediiorum et effectuum, qui fiunt propter finem consequendum.


2. It should be noted that the discussion can be about two ends, either with respect to the same will and with respect to the same means or to the same deliberation and election, or with respect to same will choosing and aiming at different ends through different means. In turn, in the elections or acts themselves, which are performed for the sake of the end, one can consider either the interior act of the will, which takes place proximately and immediately by the motion of the end or the exterior act or the command from that interior [act] by which is comprehended every exterior execution of means and effects which are performed for the sake of the end that is to be pursued.

3. First, it should be said that the same will can intend different ends, of which either is ultimate at least negatively and in the same way can ultimately choose different means on account of those [ends]. This conclusion seems sufficiently clear from the first example, for a human can at the same time intend health and choose the means necessary for it, in bringing it about, and can at the same time intend honour, for example, and likewise choose appropriate means on account of it. In the same way, entirely different arts also tend to different
tendunt ad diversos fines ultimos in sua serie: et homo potest utriusque artis finem simul intendere; nec fiat vis in verbo, simul, quia ad præsentem quaestionem nihil refert, quod physice, aut metaphysice loquendo, possit voluntas simul exercere duos actus, vel non possit, etsi divus Thomas, prima secundæ, quaest. 12, art. 3, ad 3, hanc quaestionem attingens concedit, posse simul exercere duos actus, sed nihil refert, quod intelligatur de simultate metaphysica, sed sufficit de simultate morali et virtuali: quomodo dicimus hominem simul intendere et scientiam, et temporale commodum, et non simul de utroque cogitett. Ratio vero conclusionis est, quia hujusmodi duo fines non habent inter se repugnantiam, quia uterque simul potest esse conveniens homini: ergo neque intentiones eorum inter se repugnant. Neque in eos procedunt argumenta facta, quia illæ intentiones sunt effectus diversi, et consequenter diversæ motiones: unde nihil repugnat quod a diversis principiis simul procedant, et ad diversos terminos tendant. Atque eadem est ratio de variis electionibus, ultimate ends in their series [of ends]. And a human can at the same time intend the end of either art. Nor does this just happen because of the force of the term ‘at the same time’ (simul), because nothing in this question suggests that, speaking in the manner of physics or metaphysics, the will can or cannot at the same time execute two acts, although St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIae.12.3 ad 3, touching on this question, concedes that it can at the same time execute two acts, but nothing suggests that is understood concerning the simultaneity of metaphysics, but it suffices concerning moral and virtual simultaneity. In this way we say that a human at the same time intends both science and temporal advantage and does not think (cogitet) of either. But the reason for the conclusion is, because in this way the two ends are not repugnant to each other, because each can be agreeable to a human at the same time. Therefore, neither are intentions of them repugnant to each other. Neither do the arguments that were made proceed against them, because these intentions are different effects and consequently different motions. Hence, nothing is repugnant that proceeds at the same time from different principles and tends to different termini. And the same is the reason for various choices or actions on
seu operationibus propter hos fines, quia etiam illæ inter se non semper repugnant, et ad diversos terminos tendunt.

4. Sed dicunt alii utrumque istorum finium ordinari ad ipsum operantem, et ita illum esse finem ultimum utriusque. Sed hoc imprimis non est ad rem, quia operans non est finis <29> cuius gratia, sed cui; finis autem cui non tollit, quin finis cuius sit ultimus in suo ordine, si ad aliud in eodem ordine non referatur, et hoc modo nunc agimus de fine ultimo, quandoquidem etiam finis ultimus simpliciter potest appeti amanti tanquam finem cui. Deinde non est in universum verum, nam potest homo simul intendere finem aliquem sibi acquirendum, et alium acquirendum amico in illo sistendo tanquam in fine cui.

5. Alii autem dicunt, quandocumque homo intendit hujusmodi duos fines particulars, semper eos intendere sub ratione unius aliquo modo, ut, verbi gratia, quatenus integrant absolutam perfectionem, seu hominis commoditatem, vel aliquid hujusmodi: et hoc insinuat D. Thomas, in illa quæst. 12, art. 3, account of these ends, because even these are not always repugnant to each other, and tend to different termini.

4. But others say that each of these ends is ordered to the agent himself and thus he is the ultimate end for each. But this, in the first place, is not to the point, because the agent is not the finis cuius but the finis cui. The finis cui, moreover, does not do anything, unless the finis cuius is ultimate in its order, if it is not directed towards something in the same order. And in this way now we are dealing with the ultimate end, seeing that the unqualifiedly ultimate end can also be desired by a lover as a finis cui. Next, it is not universally true, for a human can at the same time intend some end to be acquired by him and another to be acquired by a friend, stopping in him as in a finis cui.

5. Others, however, say that whenever a human being intends two particular ends in this way, he always intends them under the concept of one in some way: for example, to the extent that they integrate absolute perfection or the advantage of the agent, or something of this sort. And St. Thomas suggests this in [ST] IaIIae.12.3 ad 2. I respond that although perhaps
ad 2. Respondetur, quod licet fortasse in re ipsa semper intercedat aliqua convenienitia, vel unitas, quæ inter hujusmodi fines considerari potest, non est tamen necesse ut homo formaliter consideret, et intendat hanc unitatem, sed potest absolute velle hoc, et illud bonum propter se amabile, non conferendo illa nec inter se, nec secundum aliquam rationem, in qua convenient. Unde licet interpretative possit dici homo intendere in singulis finibus integrum commodum, seu bonum, non tamen proprie et formali intentione, ut latius sectione ultima hujus Disputationis. Quæ responsio applicanda etiam est ad ultimum argumentum supra factum, quod maxime posset procedere contra hanc assertionem.

6. Dicendum secundo: Etiam potest homo ordinare simul eadem media ad distinctos fines particulares ulimos negative, et inter se non subordinatos. Ita sumo ex D. Thoma, dicta quæst. 12, articulo 3, ubi optimum signum adducit, quia in eligendis mediis, cæteris paribus, illud medium anteponitur cæteris, quod ad plures fines utilius esse potest: si in the thing itself there always intervenes some agreeability or unity which can be considered between ends of this sort, it is not, nevertheless, necessary that a human being formally consider and intend this unity. Rather, he can absolutely will this and that good lovable in itself, not by bringing them together nor between them nor following some concept in which they agree. Hence, although one can be said interpretatively to intend in individual ends an integrated advantage or good, [this is] not, nevertheless, by a proper and formal intention, as [is discussed] more extensively in the last section of this disputation. This response is also applied to the last argument given above, which could especially proceed against this assertion.

6. A human being can also order at the same time the same means to distinct negatively ultimate particular ends that are not subordinated to each other. Thus I take up from St. Thomas, in the previously mentioned [ST IaIIae].12.3, where the best evidence is adduced, because in choosing means that means is preferred to others, ceteris paribus, which can be useful for more ends. For if anyone intending health could make
quis enim intendens sanitatem possit uti medicina, use of medicine by which he could at the same time receive de-light, he would choose this. Therefore, he intends at the same
time health and pleasure through the same means, because each can be established at the same time through it. And it is not
necessary that one be ordered to another, since either is lovable in itself and apart from the other. And from here is taken the
proper reason for the conclusion, for the will can at the same
time intend two ends which are not subordinated to each other and are not ordered to one third thing, and the same means can in itself be useful for each end to be achieved. Therefore,
the will can choose the same means for the sake of each end.
The consequence is shown, because neither on the part of the
will nor on the part of the object itself is there something re-pugnant in the human, because the object under each concept taken at the same time appears agreeable and lovable, and the will can be moved and stimulated by each. This will become more evident when the arguments made in the beginning after the following assertion are solved.

7. Third, it should be said, when the will chooses a means on account of multiple ends formally different in that aspect

DE FINE HOMINIS

357

Disp. III, sect. II
in ea ratione boni sub qua movent, et inter se non subordinatos, sed proximos respectu electionis, tunc quamvis externum medium electum possit esse unum et idem, tamen interiores actus sunt diversi. Hæc conclusio potissimum probatur illa ratione, quam attigit divus Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, articulo 3, argumento 3, quia finis dat speciem actui interiori: non potest autem idem actus æque primo et immediate constitui in duplici specie: ergo si est duplex finis, et motivum proprium, non erit idem actus, sed duplex, qui ex illius motione causatur. De qua re hic plura non dicam, quia latius tractanda est infra tractatu 3.

8. Argumenta igitur in principio facta, potissimum probant hanc ultimam conclusionem, non vero procedunt contra aliam. Ad primum respondetur, quando voluntas movetur a duplici fine duobus actibus internis intentionum vel electionum, jam ibi reperiri duas causalitates seu motiones finis, et duos proximos terminos, seu effectus earum, atque ita non tantur duæ causæ totales unius effectus, sed plurium.

8. Therefore, the arguments made in the beginning chiefly prove this last conclusion, but do not proceed against the others. I respond to the first: when the will is moved by a double end to two internal acts of intention or choice, two causalities or motions of the end are now found there and two proximate termini or effects of them. Thus, two complete causes of one effect are not given, but of more than one effect. In fact, rather, notice, by the way, that with respect to such acts it is more re-
Quin potius obiter adnota respectu talium actuum magis repugnare dari duas causas totales finales, quam duas efficientes, quia licet repugnet dari duas efficientes totales respectu ejusdem actionis, non tamen respectu ejusdem termini, quia causa efficiens est extrinseca, et non specificat terminum: at vero causæ finales repugnant tam respectu motionis, quam respectu actus, qui est veluti terminus causalitatis voluntatis, quia dant speciem actui, et non potest idem actus habere duas species æque primas: at vero respectu actus, seu medii externi nulla est repugnantia, quod duo fines simul concurrant, et moveant, quia, ut supra dixi, non habent immediatum influxum in actum externum, sed in internum, nec dant illi propriam speciem immediate, sed solum mediate quasi per denominationem extrinsecam ab actu interno, quoniam nihil repugnat constituiri in duplci specie accidentaria et extrinseca. <30>

9. You may say that this at least follows: that two entire causes of the same effect may be given in the genus of efficient causes, because the interior act of the will effectively moves the
fective movet facultates interiores ad actus externos: ergo si in voluntate est duplex actus, et uterque eorum sufficit per se ad motionem externam efficiendam, et actu influit suo modo, jam actus externus procedit a duplici principio naturali imperante, seu sufficiens. Respondetur primo, illos duos actus internos raro concurrere omnino simul physice, et in instanti, jam enim num. 3 notavi hanc simulatem non esse nobis necessariam ad ea, quae tractamus, sed sufficere moralem. Deinde, si contingat simul haberi, dici potest, quod de aliis causis physicis responderi solet, quod licet utraque per se sit sufficiens, tamen quando simul æque applicatur, neutram agere tota virtute sua, et necessaria ad effectum. Denique in hæc efficientia, qua movet voluntas inferiorem aliam potentiam ad suum actum non est nisi per naturalem consensus potentiarum, qua fit, ut posito in appetitu tali actu, seu voluntate, statim anima, in qua omnes potentiae radicantur, applicetur ad operandum per aliam potentiam, quod facere potest interior faculty to external acts. Therefore, if in there are two acts and each of them suffices in itself for an efficient external motion and actually gives influx in this way, the external act now proceeds from two natural commanding or efficient principles. I respond, first, that those two internal acts seldom concur entirely at the same time physically and in an instant, for I already noted in n. 3 that this simultaneity is with us not necessary to that which we are discussing but suffices [to be] moral. Furthermore, if it may happen to be had at the same time, the same thing can be said that is customarily said concerning other physical causes: that, although each is sufficient in itself, nevertheless, when they are equally applied at the same time, neither acts by its complete strength and is necessary for the effect. Finally, in an effect of this sort nothing else is disagreeable, because this efficiency by which the will moves some lower power to its act does not exist except through a natural consensus of powers, by which it comes about that, such an act or willing having been placed in the appetite, the soul, in which all powers are rooted, is applied immediately to acting through another power. This can bring about equally well through one act or through more than one that the will is
æque bene, sive per unum, sive per plures actus fer-
atur voluntas in tale objectum, seu actionem exter-
nam.

10. Et hinc facilius est solutio ad secundum: nil
 nihil enim repugnat dari duo motiva respectu ejus-
dem mediis, seu objecti volitii, dummodo motiones
internæ voluntatis diversæ sint. Unde in voluntate
divina, cujus actus non sumit speciem ex objecto ex-
terno, non solum res potest esse volita propter du-
plicem finem, sed etiam idem actus potest propter
utramque rationem ferri ad tale objectum, quia al-
tiori, et eminentiori modo omnia comprehendit.

Tertium etiam ex dictis est facile, nam illa propor-
tio sumpta ex moti et termino ejus, ad summum
procedit respectu actus interni propter convenien-
tiam in specificatione, non vero respectu mediis ex-
terni, ut dictum est. Ad quartum respondetur imo
sæpe accidere ut duo media eligantur ad eundem
finem æque immediate, et sine subordinatione inter
se, ut si unum non habuerit effectum, saltem aliud
habeat, vel si utrumque habuerit, tanto existimantur
brought to such an object of external action.

10. And from here the solution to the second argument
is easier: for there is nothing repugnant in giving two motives
with respect to the same means or willed objects, provided that
the internal motions of the will are different. Hence, in the
divine will, whose act does not take up the species from an
external object, not only can the thing be willed on account
of two ends, but the same act can also be brought to such an
object on account of each reason, because it comprehends ev-
erything in the most profound and eminent way. The third
argument is also easily resolved from what has been said, for
that proportion taken up from the motion and terminus of it,
proceeds at most with respect to the internal act on account
of the agreeableness in the specification, but not with respect
to external means, as was said. To the fourth argument, I re-
pond that on the contrary it often happens that two means
are chosen for the same end equally immediately and without
subordination between them, so that if one will not have the
effect, at least another may, or, if either will have it, they are
melius. Quare si interdum aliqua duo non possunt simul eligi, solum esse potest, quia non possunt judi-
cari simul utilia; et tunc argumentum proportionale
factum non est <col. b> simile, quia nos tractamus
quando unum medium simul judicatur utile ad plures
fines. Ultimum argumentum solutum est in fine, num. 5.

Ad 5.

SECTION III.

Utrum possit homo simul intendere duos ultimos fines
simpliciter et positive, et propter illos operari?

Hic finis dupliciter consideratur.

1. Finis ultimus simpliciter, ut supra dixi, et constat
ex Aristotele 1, Ethicorum, c. 7 et 8, est finis perfec-
tus, et bonum sufficiens, atque adeo maxime neces-
sarium intendenti talem finem. Unde dupliciter ap-
prehendi potest: primo sub ratione communi suffi-
cientis boni, etc., non constituendo illum in una vel
alia re determinate, et hic vocari solet finis ultimus
formaliter, in quo non habet locum præsens quæstio,
quia, cum concipiatur abstracte et confuse, clarum
est non posse concipi nisi per modum unius: nam

thought so much the better. Wherefore if sometimes some two
cannot be chosen at the same time, it can only be because they
cannot be judged useful at the same time. And then the argu-
ment made analogous is not similar, because we are discussing
the case when one means is judged at the same time useful
for more than one end. The last argument was solved at the
end of n. 5.

Whether someone can at the same time intend two unqualifiedly
and positively ultimate ends and act for the sake of them.

1. An unqualifiedly ultimate end, as I said above and as is clear
from Aristotle, [Nichomachean Ethics], book 1, c. 7 and 8, is
a perfect end and sufficient good, and to that extent is very
much necessary to the one intending such an end. Hence, it
can be apprehended in two ways. First, under the general con-
cept of sufficient good, etc., not as establishing that in one or
another determinate thing, and this is customarily called an ul-
timate end formally. With respect to it, the present question
does not have a place, because, although it may be conceived
abstractly and confusedly, it is clear that a [formally ultimate

DES FINE HOMINIS
qui appetit esse beatus absolute et præcise, non potest
in ipsa beatitudine varietatem, et multitutinem ex-
cogitare, donec de re cogitet, qua beatificandus est.

Secundo igitur modo concipi potest ultimus finis ut
constitutus in re aliqua, aut rerum collectione, qui
dicitur finis ultimus realis, seu materialis: et de hoc
est quæstio, an necessario sit unus tantum: agimus
autem de fine intento ex formali, aut virtuali hominis
intentione, quia de connaturali fine ultimo, ad quem
homo tendit impetu naturæ, seu ordinatione divina,
non est dubium quin sit unus, ut latius infra cum age-
mus de beatudine, et de hoc fine procedunt duas ra-
tiones ultimæ D. Thomæ, prima secundæ, quæst. 1,
art. 5, quæ possunt etiam accommodari ad finem ul-
timum formalem: de quibus dicemus plura, sect. ul-
tim. hujus disputationis.

2. Atque hinc oritur ratio dubitandi in hac quæs-
tione, quia intentio hominis non tantum fertur ad
verum finem, sed ad falsum etiam et apparentem:
ergo quamvis in re ipsa non possint esse duo ul-
end] cannot be conceived except in the manner of one. For
whoever desires to be happy absolutely and precisely cannot
think of variety and multiplicity in the happiness itself, as long
as he thinks of the thing by which he will be made happy. In
the second way, therefore, the ultimate end can be conceived
as constituted in some thing or collection of things, which is
called a real or material ultimate end. And the question is con-
cerning this, whether it is necessarily one as such. We, more-
ever, deal with the end intended by a formal or virtual human
intention, because concerning the connatural ultimate end to
which a human tends by a natural impetus or divine ordering
it is not doubted but that it is one, as [we discuss] more ex-
tensively below when we deal with happiness, and concerning
this end two ultimate reasons appear in St. Thomas, [ST] Ia-
Iae.1.5, which can also be adapted to an ultimate formal end,
concerning which we say more in the last section of this dispu-
tation.

2. And from here arises a reason for doubting in this ques-
tion, because the intention of a human is not only brought
to the true end but also to a false and apparent [end]. There-
fore, although there cannot be two true ultimate ends in the

DE FINE HOMINIS 363

DISP. III, SECT. III
timi fines veri, possunt ab homine falso apprehendi, et existimari, sicut existimantur duo Dei, aut duo prima principia: ergo eadem ratione possunt appeti, et intendi duo fines ultimi simpliciter. Secundo, ut homo dicatur intendere duos fines, satis est ut saltem successive habeat hujusmodi duas intentiones, dummodo virtualiter utramque retineat, quamvis non actualiter. Jam enim supra diximus nos hic non agere de simultate metaphysica, sed morali, vel virtuali; potest autem homo nunc intendere unum ultimum finem, verbi gratia, voluptatem et paulo post alium, verbi gratia, honorem, non retractando priorem intentionem; quae est enim repugnantia in hoc? nam illae duae res, neque in esse rei inter se pugnant, neque in esse finis, quia utraque potest per se appeti ultimate in illa sistendo, et ad eam referendo omnia, quae necessaria fuerint, in quo videtur ratio ultimi finis consistere. Tertio est vulgaris difficultas, nam qui peccat mortaliter, constituit finem ultimum simpliciter in creatura, sed potest quis simul peccare mortaliter diversis actibus, et circa diversas creaturas; thing itself, they can be falsely apprehended and thought by a human, just as two Gods are thought or two first principles. Therefore, for the same reason two unqualifiedly ultimate ends can be desired and intended. Secondly, in order to say that a human being intends two ends, it is enough that he at least successively have two intentions of this sort, provided that he retain each virtually although not actually. For we already said above that we are not dealing with metaphysical simultaneity, but moral or virtual [simultaneity]. However, a human can now intend one ultimate end, for example, pleasure, and then a little later another, for example, honour, while not retracting the first intention. For what is repugnant in this? For these two things oppose each other neither in being the thing nor in being the end, because each can be desired per se ultimately in that setting up and direct everything which is necessary to it (in which the nature of an ultimate end seems to consist). The third is a common difficulty, for whoever sins mortally sets up an unqualifiedly ultimate end in a created thing, but anyone can sin mortally at the same time with different acts and on account of different created things. Therefore, he can direct [himself] to multiple created things as ultimate ends.
The 1st assertion.

4. It should be said first that it cannot happen that someone conjunctively loves and intends two complete and integrated ultimate ends. Hence, if he happens to love more than one thing or more than one good, in some way ultimately stopping in them, he does not desire them as complete ultimate

Notes

towards a decision.
partiales; integrum autem ultimum finem constituit in collectione, seu aggregato earum. Hæc est sententia D. Thomæ 1, 2, quæst. 1, artic. 5, et prima ratio ejus est demonstratio, quia finis ultimus integer, et totalis est ille, quem homo appetit ut complemen-
tum suorum desideriorum, atque adeo ut bonum sibi suf-
cies et alis præferendum, ac maxime necessarium; sed, si homo simul appetat duo bona, impossibile est ut utrumque existimet esse tale, quale des-
crispisimus debere ultimum finem, quia si unum exis-
timatur sufficiens, alterum non potest reputari necessar-
ium, quia sufficiens est quod non indiget alio, vel e contrario, si utrumque existimatur necessarium, in neutro quiescet appetitus: ergo neutrum erit integer finis ultimus. <col. b>

Instantia bipartita.

5. Dices, unde constat totum illud esse de ratione ultimi finis, vel saltem cur non poterit homo hoc ignorare, et ita ex ignorantia saltem, appetere plures ultimos fines? Respondetur ad priorem partem, id constare ex ipsa vocis impositione, et ex communi hominum sapientum usu, qui hoc intelligunt per ul-

ends, but as partial. Moreover, the integrated ultimate end is constituted by a collection or aggregate of them. This is the view of St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.1.5. The first argument for it is the demonstration: because the integrated and complete ultimate end is that which a human being desires as something that fulfills his desires and therefore as a good sufficient to him and preferred to all others and maximally necessary. But, if a human being desires at the same time two goods, it is impossible for either to be thought such as what we described the ultimate end as needing to be, because if one is thought sufficient, then the other one cannot be thought necessary, because to be sufficient is to not need something else. Or the other way around, if both are thought necessary, the appetite will rest in neither. Therefore, neither will be the integrated ultimate end.

5. You may say: Is it clear from this that that whole is of the nature of an ultimate end or at least why it will not be able to be the case that a human being ignore this and thus from ignorance at least desire more than one ultimate end? To the first part I respond that it is clear from the imposed words themselves and from the common use of wise men who under-
timum finem. Item, quia in hoc distinguitur finis ul-
timus et totalis a partiali, seu particulari fine. Ultimo
denique ex re ipsa, quia constat, posse hominem in-
tendere aliquid in quo plene quiescat, et ad quod diri-
gat se, et omnia sua quantum est ex modo appetendi,
et intendendi talem finem: hinc ergo appellamus ulti-
mum finem simpliciter. Unde ad alteram partem re-
spondetur, quamvis possit homo speculative ignorare quid significet ultimus finis simpliciter, et ideo posse
existimare se amare plura ut ultimos fines, tamen
revera et practice, atque in exercitio non intendere illos, ut totales fines, sed ut partiales, quandoquidem ita appetit, ut non sit contentus altero, sed utroque aggregate. Atque hinc obiter constat non esse neces-
sarium ut homo constituat hunc ultimum finem in una re, seu in uno bono, potest enim plurium collectionem appetere ut ultimum terminum suorum desideriorum: sic enim philosophi multi posuerunt beatitudinem vel in collectione bonorum temporali-
num, vel in eis simul cum virtute: neque in hoc est ulla repugnantia ex modo appetendi, vel ex ratione
stand this through an ultimate end. Likewise, because in this is
distinguished an ultimate and complete end from a partial or
particular end. Lastly, finally, from the thing itself, because it
is clear that a human being can intend something in which he
fully rests and direct himself and everything of his to it by a
mode of desiring and intending such an end. This, therefore,
we call an unqualifiedly ultimate end. Hence, to the second
part I respond that although a human being can speculatively
ignore an unqualifiedly ultimate end signifies and therefore can
think himself to love more than one thing as an ultimate end,
yet in reality and practically and in exercise he does not intend
them as complete ends but as partial [ends], seeing that he de-
sires them in such a way that he is not content with one of
them but [only] with the aggregate of both. And from this, by
the way, it is clear that it is not necessary that a human being
constitute this ultimate end in one thing or in one good, for he
can desire a collection of multiple [goods] as the ultimate ter-
minus of his desires. For many philosophers in this way placed
happiness either in a collection of temporal goods or in those
along with virtue. Nor is there any repugnance in this in the
way of desiring or from the nature of an ultimate end, as is

Satis fit secundæ.

He satisfies the second part.
finis ultimi, ut ex dictis constat.

2. Assertio. 6. Dicendum secundo, neque etiam disjunctive potest homo intendere plura bona distincta, et formaliter diversa, intending ea tanquam ultimum finem simpliciter, et totalem. De hac re nihil locutus est D. Thomas: probari ergo potest duobus modis, primo, quia intentio hæc objecti disjuncti quando objecta, seu bona, quæ in disjunctione ponuntur, sunt formaliter diversa, est inefficax respectu singulorum, et insufficiens ut moveat ad opus, et ad electionem faciandam: ergo non potest hæc esse sufficiens intentioni ultimo finis. Antecedens declaratur primo, quia neutrum illorum bonorum absolute intenditur, sed quasi sub conditione, vel in defectu alterius. Deinde, quia cum bona sint formaliter diversa, licet fortasse unum, vel alterum medium possit ad utrumque conferre propter aliquam convenientiam, quam inter se habere possunt: tamen absolute et simpliciter indigent diversis mediis et electionibus: ergo illa intentione non est sufficiens ad <32> electiones faciendas, donec ad aliquod ex illis bonis determinetur:

The 2nd assertion.

It is persuaded, firstly.
ergo quamdiu est sub disjunctione, neutrum illorum bonorum respicit ut ultimum finem simpliciter.

Secundo. 

Secunda ratio est, quia per talem intentionem, seu amorem, non potest utrumque illorum bonorum appetitum ut necessarium vel sufficiens appetenti: ergo neutrum amatur per modum ultimi finis. Antecedens patet, quia quodlibet illorum bonorum amatur non simpliciter, sed in defectu alterius: ergo neutrum per se existimatur necessarium absolute, sed ad summum sub conditione, si aliud desit. Rursus, cum utrumque aliquo modo appetatur, utrumque censetur bonum appetentis, et cum sint bona formaliter diversa unum non confert ad bonitatem alterius, neque e contrario: ergo fieri non potest ut aliquod eorum appetatur tantum per se sufficiens ad satiandum hominis appetitum: ergo revera neutrum amatur ut ultimus finis.

3. Assertio.

7. Dicendum tertio, si bonum, quod amatur per modum ultimi finis, sit unum formaliter, seu ejusdem rationis, nullum est inconveniens, quod sub disjunctione appetatur ut obtinendum in hac, vel illa re numero diversa. Exempla sunt facilia: si quis, of those goods as an unqualifiedly ultimate end. The second argument is because through such an intention or love one cannot desire either of those goods as necessary or sufficient for the one desiring. Therefore, neither is loved in the way an ultimate end is loved. The antecedent is clear because neither of those goods is loved unqualifiedly but only in the absence of the other. Therefore, neither is thought absolutely necessary through itself but at most under the condition 'if the other one is absent'. On the other hand, when each of them is desired in some way, each of them is thought good for the one desiring and, when the goods are formally diverse, one does not add to the goodness of the other nor the other way around. Therefore, it cannot happen that one of them is desired as in itself sufficient for satisfying the desire of the human. Therefore, in reality neither is loved as an ultimate end.

7. It should be said, thirdly, that if the good which is loved in the way an ultimate end is loved is formally one or of the same nature, then there is nothing disagreeable about it being desired under a disjunction as obtaining in this or that thing diverse in number. Examples are easily come by: if someone,
verbi gratia, canonicatum appetat, et in hoc constituent suum finem ultimum, bene potest sub disjunctione intendere hunc, vel illum, quicumque ille sit. Ratio est, quia tunc finis est unus formaliter, et illa distinctio numerica rerum naturalium nihil refert vel ad mutandam intentionem, vel ad satiandum hominis appetitum. Quod explicatur illa duplici ratione facta in precedentie assertione contrario modo indacta: primo quidem, quia illa intentio sufficit ad adhibenda media, et electiones faciendas usque ad ascensionem ipsius finis: quod si interdum necesse est adhibere aliquod speciale medium ad consequendum illum finem potius in una re quam in alia, illud est raro et per accidens, et tum jam determinabitur intentio ad rem illam potius quam ad aliam: non quia habeat aliam rationem boni, nec quia censeatur sufficientior ad saturandum appetitum, sed quia accidit ut fortasse hic et nunc facilius acquiri possit, quam alia. Secundo, quia cum illis in rebus sit eadem ratio boni, quae licet per se sufficit ad satiandum appetitum, qui non querit nisi tale ac tantum bonum, et in illo ponit for example, desires the office of canon, and his ultimate end is constituted in this, he may well under a disjunction intend this or that one, whichever that may be. The reason is because then the end is one formally and that numerical distinction of natural things refers nothing either to changing intention or to satisfying the human appetite. This is explained by the two reasons given in the preceding assertion brought in the opposite mode. First, certainly, because that intention suffices for applying the means and making the choices all the way to the comprehension of the end itself. If it is sometimes necessary that some particular means be applied in pursuing that end more in one thing rather than another, that is rare and per accidens and then in that case the intention will be determined to that thing more than to the other, not because it has another aspect of good nor because it is thought more sufficient for sating the appetite, but because it happens that perhaps it can more easily be acquired here and now than another. Second, because when there is the same aspect of good for these in the things, which, granted, in itself suffices for satisfying the appetite, he does not strive for except if it is such and only such a good and in that he places his end.
180 finem suum.

Obiectio contra præced. assert. 

8. Sed objici potest, nam ille, qui sub disjunctione ita appetit duas res, verum non potest alterutra earum satiari: ergo non potest eas disjunctive appetere per modum ultimi finis, sed necessarium est, ut appetat aggregatum utriusque tanquam ultimum. Antecedens patet, quia si quis velit interficere Petrum, aut furari bona ejus, peccat peccato furti et homicidii: ergo signum est illum consentire in utrumque peccatum, atque adeo utrumque velle. Respondetur, eum, qui tantum sub disjunctione vult unum e duobus, verum non velle absolute et simpliciter utrumque. Quod patet primo, quia cum illo proposito stat voluntas efficax non committendi utrumque. Secundo, quia homo id tantum vult, quod sibi proponit per modum objecti, proponit autem sibi disjunctum, ut in alterutra parte exequendum, et non in utraque simul. Tertio, quia qui vult orare, vel eleemosynam facere, non ita meretur sicut ille, qui vult orare, et eleemosynam facere. Et idem est in malis objectis.

Solutio. 

8. But one can object, for the person who under a disjunction desires two things in this way, really desires both of them. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied by either of them. Therefore, he cannot desire them disjunctively in the way an ultimate end is desired, but it is necessary that he desire the aggregate of each of them as ultimate. The antecedent is clear because if someone wishes to kill Peter or to steal his goods, he sins by the sins of theft and homicide. Therefore, it is a sign that he shared in each sin and therefore wished each of them. I respond that he who only under a disjunction wishes one of two does not in reality absolutely and unqualifiedly want each of them. This is clear, first, because with that purpose the will stands effective not by committing to each of them. Second, because the human who only wants what he proposes to himself in the mode of an object, proposes a disjunction to himself so that he pursues either part but not both at the same time. Third, because he who wishes either to worship or to give alms does not thereby earn merit just as the one who wishes to worship and give alms. And the same is true in bad objects, especially if they are of the same nature. For he who proposes either to steal ten
præsertim si sint ejusdem rationis: qui enim pro-
ponit furari decem vel a Petro, vel a Paulo, non ita
peccat, ac si proponeret furari decem a Petro, et de-
cem a Paulo: ergo voluntas, quæ fertur ad aliquod
disjunctum, non est absoluta respectu singularium
partium, sed potius tantum secundum quid et quasi
conditionaliter, et ideo si membra illa tantum mate-
rialiter diversa sint, illa voluntas æquivalet voluntati
unius rei determinatæ habentis eamdem bonitatem,
vel malitiam: in illo autem exemplo in contrarium
adducto, quia in singulis membris disjunctiones sunt
malitiae formaliter diversæ, ideo opus voluntatis ab
utraque illarum partium sumit malitiam, quia non
solum peccat voluntas absolute volendo pravum ac-
tum, sed etiam volendo illum sub conditione, scilicet
in defectu alterius, et quia in eo casu in utrumque
consentit saltem conditionaliter, ideo utriusque malit-
tiam participat, quamvis utraque fit minor, quam si
objectum esset copulative volitum. Unde propter
cudem causam si quis consentiat in objectum dis-
junctum constans una parte honesta, et altera turpi,
from Peter or ten from Paul does not sin the same degree as if
he were to steal ten from Peter and ten from Paul. Therefore,
the will which is brought to some disjunction is not absolute
with respect to a single part but rather is only [brought] qual-
ifiedly and as if conditionally. And therefore if those members
are only materially diverse, that willing is equivalent in force
to a willing for one determinate thing having the same good-
ness or badness. Moreover, in that example brought in for the
contrary, because in the single members the disjunctions are
formally diverse badnesses, therefore the work of the will takes
up badness from each of those parts, because not only does the
will sin absolutely in willing a corrupt act, but also in willing
it under a condition, namely, in the absence of something else.
And because in that case it consents conditionally in each of
them, therefore it participates in the badness of each of them,
although each of them becomes less than if the object were
conjunctively willed. Hence, on account of the same cause, if
someone consents to a disjunctive object that clearly is bones-
tum in part and shameful in part, he unqualifiedly sins by that
badness which he desires under the disjunction (for example, if
he proposed to assist his neighbour, either with his own goods
simpliciter peccat ea malitia, quam sub disjunctione appetit, ut si proponat subvenire proximo, vel ex propriis bonis, vel ex alienis, furando illa, si aliter non possit ei subvenire.

225 Ad 1. & 2. argum. in n. 1.

9. Ad argumenta initio facta, primum solutum est explicando primam conclusionem. Ad secundum vero facile respondetur, eum, qui mutat intentionem finis ultimi, hoc ipso retractare priorem intentionem, et ideo neque actu, neque virtute intendere duos ultimos fines.

230 Ad 3. in eodem num. 2. Respondio Adriani.

10. De tertio vero argumento multa scribuntur ab auctoribus, sed quando illa difficultas ad materiam de peccatis, in tract. 5, spectat, breviter est expedienda. Primo ergo respondet Adrianus, quodl. 5, art. 3, negando eum, qui peccat mortaliter necessario constituere ultimum finem suum in creatura, quia revera non diligit illam plus quam Deum, imo nec plus quam rem aliam temporalem: qui enim peccat, verbi gratia, propter voluptatem carnis, non or with foreigners’ goods, plundering them if he could not assist him otherwise).

237 in creatura.] increatura V.

28 Born Adriaan Florenszoon Boeyen; became for a short time the unhappy Pope Adrian VI.
daret totam substantiam suam ut ea voluptate fruere-tur brevi tempore: ergo non diligit illam voluptatem plus quam substantiam. Rursus, illemet, qui sic peccat propter concupiscendam, fortasse non negasset fidem et religionem divinam, etiamsi oporteret to-tam substantiam perdere: ergo illemet amat Deum plus quam substantiam suam: ergo plus quam voluptate-tatem: ergo signum est illum hominem, dum sic pec-cavit mortaliter, non amasse illam voluptatem plus quam omnia, nec plus quam Deum, nec per modum ultimi finis. Et similia argumenta multiplicant Adrianus, quae magna ex parte congerit Medina: et juxta hanc sententiam est facilis responsio ad argumenta.

11. Tamen Cajetanus, Conradus, Medina et alii hanc sententiam communiter rejiciunt, asserentes, qui mortaliter peccat, constituere finem ultimum in creatura. Et videtur aperta sententia D. Thomæ 2, 2, quæst. 24, art. 10, ad 2, ubi dicit, \textit{duplex est cupiditas; una, qua finis in creatura constituitur, qua morti-ficat totaliter charitatem, cum sit venenum ipsius}, etc., substance so that he might enjoy that pleasure for a brief time. Therefore, he does not love that pleasure more than [his] sub-stance. Again, he who sins in this way for the sake of concupiscence perhaps did not deny the faith and divine religion, even if he might have to destroy [his] entire substance. Therefore, he loves God more than his substance; therefore, more than plea-sure. Therefore, this is a sign that that human, when he thus sinned mortally, did not love that pleasure more than every-thing else nor more than God; nor [did he love it] in the way an ultimate end is loved. And Adrian multiplies similar argu-ments, most of which are collected by [Bartolomé de] Medina. And with this view the response to the arguments is easy.

11. Nevertheless, Cajetan, Conradus, Medina, and others generally reject this view, asserting that he who sins mortally does set his ultimate end in a created thing. And it clearly ap-pears to be the view of St. Thomas in \textit{[ST] IIaIIæ.24.10 ad 2}, where he says: ‘Cupidity is two-fold: one, by which the end is placed in a created thing, which altogether kills charity, since it is its poison . . . ’.\footnote{Quotation is not exact.} He must be speaking here of an ultimate

\footnote{Quotation is not exact.}
ubi necesse est loqui de fine ultimo. In eadem est sententia Scotus, in 1, dist. 1, q. 5, ubi dicit peccatorem, quantum in se est, frui creatura; loquitur autem de fruitione simpliciter prout est ultimi finis. Cui sententiae favet modus loquendi sacræ Scripturæ ut est illud ad Philip. 3: Quorum Deus venter est; et illud Jerem. 3: Me dereliquerunt fontem aquæ vivæ. Unde sumitur ratio: nam qui peccat mortaliter, avertitur a Deo tanquam ab ultimo fine: ergo convertitur ad creaturam, ut ad finem ultimum. Juxta hanc vero opinionem ad difficultatem tactam respondent aliqui, peccatorem non converti ad creaturam, circaquam peccat, ut ad finem ultimum, sed ad seipsum, quem diligit plusquam Deum, juxta illud Matth. 10: Qui diligit animam suam plus quam me, non est me dignus, et illud Augustini 14, de Civit., cap. ult.: Amor sui usque ad con- <col. b> temptum Dei ædificat civitatem Babylonis, unde D. Thomas 1, 2, quest. 77, art. 4, dicit omnia peccata oriri ex amore sui. Sed hæc responsio non satisfacit, quia ipse peccator non est end. Scotus's view is the same in [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 5, where he says: ‘a sinner, insofar as he is in himself, enjoys a created thing’. Moreover, he speaks of enjoyment strictly speaking as it is of an ultimate end. The mode of speaking in the holy Scriptures supports this view, for example, that [passage] from Phil. 3:19, ‘whose God is the belly’, and that from Jer. 3 [i.e., 2:13]: ‘They have forsaken me, the fountain of living water’. Whence the argument is taken: For he who sins mortally is turned from God just as from an ultimate end. Therefore, he is turned to a created thing as to an ultimate end. But concerning this opinion some respond to the mentioned difficulty that the sinner does not turn to the created thing concerning which he sins as to an ultimate end, but to himself, whom he loves more than God, as that [passage says] in Matth. 10: ‘Whoever loves his soul more than me is not worthy of me’ and that [passage] from the last chapter of book 14 of Augustine’s City of God: ‘Self-love up to contempt of God builds the city of Babylon’. Hence, St. Thomas says in [ST] IaIIæ.77.4 that all sins arise from self-love. But this response does not satisfy, because the sinner himself is not the finis cuius, but rather the finis cuius...
finis cujus, sed cui amatur bonum illud, cujus gratia peccat, et de illo bono dicitur quod habeat rationem finis ultimi illius peccati, nec est contra rationem finis ultimi, quod alicui appetatur. Unde propter illud bonum censetur peccator deserere Deum, et illo fruitur tanquam bono adepto et sufficienti sibi. Quapropter aliter responderi potest, si plura peccata mortalia tantum successive committantur, tunc peccatorem toties intendere vel mutare finem ulti-
mum, quoties de novo mortaliter peccat, præsertim si peccatum sit diversum a praecedentibus, vel illi re-
pugnans quantum ad conversionem: nam quamvis praecedentia peccata semper moveant habitualiter, et quantum ad reatum, tamen intentio actualis, vel vir-
tualis peccantis mutari potest, atque boc modo sem-
per manet fixa in uno ultimo fine. Si autem simul committat plura peccata mortalia, tunc non conver-
titur ad singula objecta talium peccatorum ut ad fines ultimos totales, sed partiales tantum, et ultimus finis totalis erit aggregatum ex illis omnibus. Et haec re-
sponsio est probabilis et facile sustineri potest. [i.e., the end for whom] that good for the sake of which he sins is loved. And concerning that good is said that it has the nature of the ultimate end of that sin, nor is it contrary to the nature of an ultimate end that it is desired for something else. Hence, on account of that good the sinner is thought to forsake God and he enjoys that just as a good that is both attained and sufficient for him. For this reason one can respond in another way: if many mortal sins are committed only successively, then the sinner intends or changes his ultimate end as many times as he sins mortally concerning something new, especially if the sin is different from the preceding ones or incompatible with it in-sofar as turning to it. For although the preceding sins always move habitually and with respect to guilt, nevertheless the actual or virtual intention of the sinner can be changed and in this way always remain fixed on one ultimate end. If, however, he commits many mortal sins at the same time, then he is not turned to a single object of such sins as to complete ultimate ends but only as to partial [ends], and the complete ultimate end will be the aggregate of all those. And this response is probable and can easily be supported.
12. Vera tamen doctrina, ut existimo, est, dupliciter intelligi posse eum, qui mortaliter peccat, ponere ultimum finem in creatura primo formaliter ac propria intentione: secundo tantum interpretative, seu imputative. Prior modus verus non est, ut recte probant argumenta Adriani et exempla ipsa: non enim omnis peccator dum peccat, ita diliget creaturam circa quam peccat ut se, et omnia sua in illam referat, et ut illam amet expresse, et formaliter tanquam bonum sibi sufficiens: quin potius nec semper amatur ut finis proximus res illa, circa quam peccatur, sed solum ut medium; ut cum quis furatur propter mœchiam, non constituit finem in objecto furti, quantum est ex formali intentione sua. Posterior igitur modus verus est, nam quia peccator propter bonum creatum deserit suum finem ultimum et bonum illud præfert divinæ amicitiae, ideo interpretative censetur diligere illam creaturam plus quam Deum, ut amicum et ultimum finem: et hac ratione imputative et interpretative dicitur ponere ultimum finem in creatura.

12. Nevertheless, it is a true doctrine, as I think, that to say that he who sins mortally places the ultimate end in creatures can be understood in two ways: first, by a formal and proper intention, second, by an intention that is only interpretative or imputed. In the first way, it is not true, as the arguments of Adrian and the examples themselves rightly proved. For not every sinner while he sins thus loves the created thing concerning which he sins so that he refers himself and all his actions to it and so that he loves it expressly and formally as his sufficient good. On the contrary, that thing concerning which he sins is not even always loved as a proximate end but only as a means. For example, when someone is enraged on account of an adulteress, he does not constitute his end in the object of his rage insofar as his formal intention is concerned. Therefore, in the latter way it is true, for because the sinner deserts his ultimate end on account of a good created thing and prefers that good to divine friendship, he therefore is thought interpretatively to love that created thing more than God as a friend and ultimate end. And for this reason he is said interpretatively and by imputation to place his ultimate end in a created thing.
13. Ex qua doctrina est facilis responsio ad difficultatem positam: cum enim dicimus, non posse aliquem intendere plures ultimos fines, <34> intelligendum id est de propria et formali intentione, nam in hac reperitur repugnania supra posita, at vero interpretative tantum, et secundum moralem imputationem non repugnat intendere plura ut ultimos fines, quia tunc in actibus formalibus non est repugnania, quia neuter eorum tendit in objectum suum formaliter, ut in summum bonum sufficiens: id autem quod implicite tantum, et interpretative continetur in actu, non variat rationem operis, nec modum operandi; unde fit, ut peccator in informal modo suo operandi aliquid amet ut medium, et tamen illi imputetur, ac si amaret ut finem: et idem est de amore talis objecti super alia bona: nam quantum est ex formali affectu, non semper diliget illud plus quam alia omnia: tamen interpretative illi imputatur, ac si ita diligeret.

13. With this doctrine there is an easy response to the posited difficulty. For when we say that someone cannot intend multiple ultimate ends, it should be understood concerning proper and formal intention, for in this is found the repugnance posited above. But on the other hand if it is only about interpretative intention and according to moral imputation, then it is not repugnant to intend multiple things as ultimate ends, because then there is not a repugnance in formal acts, because neither of them tends to the object itself formally, as sufficient for the highest good. Moreover, that which only implicitly and interpretatively is contained in the act does not vary the nature of the work nor the mode of acting. Hence it happens that the sinner in his informal mode of acting loves something as a means and yet it is imputed to him as if he had loved it as end. And likewise concerning love of such an object beyond other goods. For insofar as it is from a formal affect, the person does not always love it more than all others. Nevertheless, interpretatively it is imputed to him as if he loves it thus.
Section IV.

Utrum possit aliquis simul intendere duos fines ultimos, unum simpliciter, et alterum secundum quid. Whether someone can at the same time intend two ultimate ends, one unqualifiedly ultimate and the other qualifiedly ultimate.

Ratio dubitandi pro neg. 1. Hæc sola superest nobis facienda comparatio in qua ratio dubitandi est; quia finis ultimus simpliciter est ille, in quem homo diriget se, et omnia sua: ergo impossibile est, ut cum tali fine simul intendatur alius, qui sit ultimus, etiam secundum quid tantum et negative. Patet consequentia, quia vel illius finis ordinatur ad alium finem, qui dicitur ultimus simpliciter, vel non; primum, ergo jam ille non est ultimus, etiam negative, cum ordinetur ad alium; si secundum, ergo alter non est finis ultimus simpliciter, cum non ordinatur ad rationem finis ultimi simpliciter, cum non ordinatur in ipsum. Confirmatur primo, quia de ratione finis ultimi simpliciter est, ut sit bonum secundum, quia nescit est hominem operari omnia propere finem simpliciter, ut divus Thomas.
20 hic docet, artic. 6; ergo fieri non potest ut cum tali fine intendatur alius, qui sit ultimus negative.

2. In contrarium est, quia justus, qui venialiter peccat, habet Deum pro ultimo fine simpliciter, et tamen in objecto venialis constituit finem ultimum secundum quid. Propter quam difficultatem prae- tim mota est hæc quæstio, illa enim non obstante, multi Thomistæ sentiunt, non posse hominem simul <col. b> duos fines ultimos intendere etiam dicto modo, propter rationem in principio positam: et ideo conantur invenire modum, quo defendant istum venialiter peccantem habere Deum pro ultimo fine, etiam in ipso actu venialis peccati. Dicunt ergo, in eo actu operari justum propter Deum, saltem habitualiter: sed hoc, ut ex supra dictis constat, duobus modis potest intelligi: primo, proprie, ita ut revera justus per aliquem actum suum referat peccatum veniale in Deum, saltem ea intentione universali, qua refert omnia sua in Deum. Et hoc modo intellecta

21 sit ] sit V.

DE FINE HOMINIS

25 secundum quid. Propter quam difficultatem præser- tim mota est hæc quæstio, illa enim non obstante, multi Thomistæ sentiunt, non posse hominem simul duos fines ultimos intendere etiam dicto modo, propter rationem in principio positam: et ideo conantur invenire modum, quo defendant istum venialiter peccantem habere Deum pro ultimo fine, etiam in ipso actu venialis peccati. Dicunt ergo, in eo actu operari justum propter Deum, saltem habitualiter: sed hoc, ut ex supra dictis constat, duobus modis potest intelligi: primo, proprie, ita ut revera justus per aliquem actum suum referat peccatum veniale in Deum, saltem ea intentione universali, qua refert omnia sua in Deum. Et hoc modo intellecta

fiedly ultimate end, as St. Thomas teaches here in ST IaIIæ.1.6. Therefore, it cannot happen that along with such an end another end is intended that is negatively ultimate.

2. It is to the contrary, because the just person who sins venially holds God for the unqualifiedly ultimate end and yet constitutes his qualifiedly ultimate end in the venial object. This question is especially provoked because of this difficulty. Indeed, with this not standing in the way, many Thomists think that it is not possible that a human being at the same time intend two ultimate ends—even in the way stated—because of the reason posited in the beginning. And therefore they try to find a way in which they can defend that the person sinning venially holds God for the ultimate end even in the very act of venial sin. They say, therefore, that in that act the just person acts for the sake of God, at least habitually.

But this, as is clear from what was said above, can be understood in two ways. First, properly, such that the just person really through some act of his refers the venial sin to God, at least by that universal intention by which he refers all his actions to God. And understood in this way this view is obvi-
hæc sententia est valde falsa, quia peccatum veniale
non est hoc modo referibile in Deum, essetque con-
trarium divino honori hoc modo referre peccatum
veniale in Deum, quia esset profiteri peccatum ve-
niale placere Deo: et ideo, quando illa relatio fit uni-
versalis omnium operum in Deum, aut debet intel-
ligi distributio accommoda, scilicet, omnium, quæ
apta sunt referri in ipsum, vel certe si justus interdum
habuit generale propositionem absolute et simpliciter
operandi propter Deum, quando postea venialiter
peccat, mutat ex parte prius propositionem, et non est
in illo constans. Secundo, potest hæc sententia intel-
ligi improprie, quia scilicet cum peccato veniali simul
esse potest habitualis operantis conversio ad Deum
ut ultimum finem, et hoc, quidquid sit de modo lo-
quendi re ipsa verum est: tamen sic non explicat, quis
sit finis ultimus illius operis peccati venialis, quia, ut
supra, distinct. 2, quæest. 4, numero 2, dixi, illa rela-
tio habitualis non est operis, sed subjecti, neque in-
format ullo modo ipsum opus, sed concomitatur tan-
tum: ergo per hoc solum non explicatur quem finem
ously false, because a venial sin is not referable in this way to
God and it would be contrary to divine honour to refer a venial
sin to God in this way because it would declare the venial sin to
please God. And, therefore, since that relation to God is made
universal of every action, either a suitable division ought to be
understood, namely, of everything which is apt to be referred
to God, or, surely, if the just person sometimes held a general
practice absolutely and unqualifiedly of acting for the sake of
God, he (when afterwards he sins venially) changes from the
part of the earlier practice and is not constant in it.

Secondly, this view can be understood improperly, be-
cause, namely, with the venial sin there can be at the same time
a turning of the one habitually acting to God as ultimate end
and this, whatever the way of speaking is, is true by the thing
itself. Nevertheless, thus is not explained that something is the
ultimate end of that action of venial sin, because, as I said above
in dist. 2, q. 4, n. 2, that habitual relation is not of the action
but of the subject, nor does it inform in any way the action
itself but only accompanies it. Therefore, through this alone is
not explained which end the action itself has or which end the
one acting has in such an act when it is not referred to God.
habeat ipsum opus, aut operans in tali actu, cum illum non referat in Deum.

Quid ali resolvant.

3. Respondet Medina justum referre actum peccati venialis in se ipsum, et quia se ipsum refert habitualiter in Deum per habitum charitatis, ideo consequenter refert habitualiter ipsum actum peccati venialis. Sed hoc non est recte dictum, nec satisfacit, primo, quia operans non refert peccatum veniale, et objectum ejus in se ipsum, nisi tanquam in finem cui: hæc autem relatio non excludit rationem ulteriorum ultimorum.

Impugnatur.

3. Medina responds that the just person refers the act of venial sin to himself and because he himself refers habitually to God through an act of charity; consequently the very act of venial sin for that reason refers [to God]. But this is not rightly said nor does it satisfy. First, because the one acting does not refer the venial sin and its object to himself except as to a finis cui. Moreover, this relation does not exclude the nature of an ultimate end, as I have often said.

Finally, because although the person is referred habitually to God, it does not follow that whatever is in the person is also referred habitually to God. For what is unlawful in no way is a means of tending to God. And therefore although the person with respect to himself is referred [to God], yet nevertheless not so that God is the end of the venial sin. Otherwise, the venial sin could also be actually referred to God, because the just person can actually refer himself to God as ultimate end, and yet actually venially sin through some place and some vain concomitant complacency. And, contrariwise, he can venially sin for the sake of someone else who is in mortal sin by re-
care propter alium, qui sit in peccato mortali referendo in ipsum tanquam in finem cui ipsum veniale peccatum absque alia relatione in ulteriorem finem a se, vel ab alio, propter quem operatur, intentum.

4. Dicendum ergo existimo, nullam esse repugniantiam quod aliquis simul intendat unum finem ultimum simpliciter respectu personæ operantis, et tamen quod in aliquo opere sistet in aliquo fine; qui sit ultimus negative, seu secundum quid solum respectu talis operis. Hoc probat sufficienter exemplum adductum de homine justo peccante venialiter; imo idem fere procedit in homine existente in peccato mortali, nam ille etiam potest venialiter peccare, et per talem actum non constituit ultimum finem simpliciter in creatura, nec refert illum in finem peccati mortalis, alias in eo etiam actu mortaliter peccaret. Item, fieri potest simile argumentum de infidel idololatra, qui retulit omnia sua opera in idolum, tanquam in ultimum finem, et tamen postea absque relatione V. 96–97 peccaret V.

4. Therefore, I think it should be said that there is no repugnance in someone at the same time intending one unqualifiedly ultimate end with respect to the person acting and yet that in some action he will stop in some end which is ultimate negatively or qualifiedly only with respect to such an action. The example that was brought up concerning the just human who sins venially sufficiently shows this. Indeed, almost the same thing happens in the case of the human existing in mortal sin, for he can also sin venially. And through such an action he does not constitute [his] unqualifiedly ultimate end in a created thing, nor does he refer that to the end of the mortal sin. Otherwise, he would actually mortally sin in that as well.

Also, a similar argument can be made concerning the infidel idolater, who referring all his actions to the idol as to an ultimate end, and yet afterwards without any memory of that
ulla memoria illius finis, eleemosynam facit ductus honesta et certa doctrina, non ergo referit illud opus in idolum tanquam in finem ultimum: sistit ergo ejus intentio in objecto illius operis per se bono et amabili, tanquam in fine ultimo, saltem negative, licet operans habitu retineat alium finem ultimum simpliciter. Ratio autem est, quia in hoc nulla est repugnantia ex parte ipsorum objectorum seu finium, et alioqui voluntas est libera ad operandum pro ut voluerit. Antecedens patet, quia non est necesse ut intentio finis ultimi simpliciter informet omnes alios actus hominis habentis talem intentionem; quod facilius patet respondendo rationi dubitandi posita in principio.

5. Ad quam sic respondetur, non esse de ratione ultimi finis simpliciter, ut qui illum intendit, omnia opera sua actu referat in ipsum, sed satis est quod hoc sit debitum ipsi ultimo fini; si verum sit, et cum dignitate et proportione appetatur: nam alioqui ut operans dicatur intendere talem finem, satis est, ut nihil end gives alms, having been led by *honestas*. For he in that case he acts morally well according to sound and reliable doctrine. Therefore, that action does not refer to the idol as to an ultimate end. Therefore, his intention stops in the *per se* good and lovable object of that action as in an ultimate end, at least negatively, although the one acting habitually retains another unqualifiedly ultimate end.

The reason, moreover, is because there is no repugnance in this on the part of the objects themselves or of the ends and, besides, the will is free to act as it wills. The antecedent is clear, because it is not necessary that the intention of an unqualifiedly ultimate end inform every other act of the human being having such an intention, which will be more clear in responding to the argument for doubting posited in the beginning.

5. To this I respond that it is not of the nature of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that he who intends it actually refers all his actions to it; it is enough that this is owed to the ultimate end itself, if it is true and is desired with dignity and proportion. For otherwise it is enough so that the one acting is said to intend such an end that he loves nothing that opposes it and
that he absolutely intends to employ all necessary means for its attainment, since with that intention he can stand so that in such an action he has a fickle inordination with respect to such an end to the extent that he does not tend to it through such an action.

Whence, by the way, a certain difference between mortal and venial can be noted: through a mortal [sin] a human being unqualifiedly deserts his ultimate end, because he absolutely prefers some good to it. But through a venial [sin] he does not desert the end itself, but only does not seek it through such an act.

Whence is responded to the first confirmation that the unqualifiedly ultimate end is intended as a sufficient good after it has been achieved. Nevertheless, as long as it has not been gotten hold of, a human being can love some other good more than the end. This indeed—although it is inordinate, since that ultimate end is true and owed—is, nevertheless, not impossible, because it is not necessary that someone who intends some good as sufficient inquire into that good in every one of his actions. The second confirmation aims at the following question, where it will be cleared up.
Utrum necesse sit, hominem semper operari propter finem ultimum simpliciter a se intentum.

1. Duplex potest esse sensus questionis, primus absolutus, an necessarium sit præcedere in homine aliquam intentionem finis ultimi absolute propter quem operetur. Secundo ex hypothesi, an postquam homo habuit talem intentionem, necessarium sit, ut ab illa procedant omnes alii actus circa fines particulares. Prior sensus resolutus fere est ex dictis in prima sectione hujus disputationis, paucia vero addenda sunt propter quosdam auctores, qui necessarium putant, ut ante omnes intentiones finem particularium, antecedant in homine secundum rationem operante, intentio finis ultimi universalis, non quidem finis ultimi materialis, quia non est necesse, ut in aliqua re particulari primum omnium ponatur finis ultimus simpliciter, quia neque hoc est necessarium ad posteriores actus, qui versantur circa particulares. Expeditur prior sensus.

Two senses of the question.

The former sense was nearly resolved by what was said in the first section of this disputation, but a few words should be added because of certain authors who think that in a human being acting rationally an intention for the universal ultimate end must precede before every intention for a particular end—a universal ultimate end, because it is not necessary for an unqualifiedly ultimate end to be placed first of all in some particular thing, for neither is this necessary for the posterior acts which are turned to particular goods. And this is hardly possible for a human be-

31DFH 3.1.4.
ularia bona, nec fere est homini possibile, quia con-
stituere finem ultimum in hac, vel illa re, est valde
difficile, et magnum cognitionem requirit: loquun-
tur ergo hi auctores de fine ultimo formali, id est,
de complemento totius boni, volunt enim necessar-
ium esse, ut primus actus humanæ voluntatis sit circa
felicitatem, vel circa bonum in communi, seu circa
perfectum et completum bonum ho-<36> mini, ut
ex hoc affectu oriantur actus circa particularia bona.
Huic sententiae videtur favere divus Thomas, prima
secunda, quæst. 1, art. 6, ad 3, in illis verbis: Virtus
primeæ intentionis, quæ est respectu ultimi finis, movet
in quocumque appetitu cujuscumque rei, etsi de ultimo
time actu non cogitet. Idem videtur sentire in 1 part.,
quæst. 60, art. 2, et Capreolus, in 1, dist. 1, quæst. 5,
art. 1, circa primam conclusionem, et in 4, dist. 49,
quæst. 3, a. 1, et Cajetanus, eadem 1, 2, et 1 part.,
quæst. 22, art. 2, dub. 2. Citati etiam solent Duran-
dus, in 2, dist. 38, quæst. 3, et dist. 39, quæst. 3, et
Henriquez, quodlibeto 3, quæst. 17. Sed hi auctores
nihil expresse dicunt, sed solum voluntatem natu-
ing, because to constitute the ultimate end in this or that thing
is very difficult and requires powerful cognition. Therefore,
these authors speak of the formal ultimate end, that is, of the
complement of all good. For they want it to be necessary that
the first act of a human will is about felicity or about the good
in general or about the perfect and complete good of a human
being, so that acts concerning particular goods arise from this
disposition (affectu).

St. Thomas seems to favour this view in these words from
[ST'] IaIIæ.1.6 ad 3: ‘The force of the first intention which is
with respect to the ultimate end moves in any desire for what-
ever thing, even if one does not actually think about the ulti-
mate end’. The same seems to be thought in Ia.60.2 [co.]; in
Capreolus, [Sent.] I, dist. 1, q. 5, art. 1, concerning the first
conclusion and in [Sent.] IV, dist. 49, q. 3, a. 1; and in Ca-
jetan, [ST'] IaIIæ.1.6 and in Ia.22.2, dub. 2. They usually also
cite Durandus in [Sent.] II, dist. 38, q. 3 and dist. 39, q. 3 and
Henry [of Ghent] Quodl. III, q. 17. But these authors say
nothing expressly but only that the will is naturally carried to
a good proposed to it.
2. The foundation of this view is first because the will cannot love an imperfect good except for the sake of a perfect [good]. Moreover, any particular good you please is imperfect. Therefore, the will does not desire it except by strength of an intention for a perfect and complete good.

Secondly, because just as second efficient causes depend essentially in their causality on the influx of a first cause, so also particular ends depend on an ultimate [end]. Therefore, just as a second cause cannot act without the moving of a first [cause], so particular ends cannot move without the moving of an ultimate [end], because they do not move except by virtue of the preceding intention. Therefore, it is necessary that the intention precede in this way.

Thirdly, because, according to Aristotle, the ultimate end is related to desirable things just as the first principle to speculative things. But the intellect cannot assent to conclusions without assent to the principle having preceded. Therefore, neither can the will be brought to particular ends without an intention for the ultimate [end] preceding.\textsuperscript{32}

\textsuperscript{32}Aquinas seems to make arguments very much like this in \textit{ST} Ia.60.2 co. and \textit{Sent.} IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, co.
1. Assertio pro priore sensu quæstionis.

3. But with regards to the first part or sense of the question, it should be said that it is not necessary absolutely that an intention for an ultimate end, either formal or material, go before intentions or desires for particular goods. This is the view of Scotus in [Sent.] IV, dist. 49, q. 3 and in I, q. 4, where John Mair follows this way. And Durandus clearly thinks the same, in the second place cited above, [i.e., Sent. II, dist. 39, q. 3, as well as Medina in [ST] IaIæ. ad art. 6, cited above. In the end, he judges this view more probable. And it can easily be proven from what was said in sect. 1 of this disputation and confirms it from the part. For is there anyone who has experienced an act of this sort in himself that is before everything else?

And it can be demonstrated briefly by argument, because the necessity of this act arises either [i] from the intellection, [ii] from the object, or [iii] from the will itself requiring an act of this kind before other subsequent [acts]. But none of these can plausibly be said.

Firstly, concerning the intellect. It is shown: because there is nothing that necessitates it to cognizing first concerning the good. In fact, it more easily excites to some external cogitation.

Demonstratur tripartito argumento.

Primo.
quia movetur a sensibus, qui primo offerunt particularia bona: tum etiam, quia in infantia ante usum rationis habet homo consuetudinem cogitandi de his particularibus bonis. Secundum de objecto, etiam per se constat, quia si objectum illud non sit prius cognitum, non prius movebit voluntatem: ostensum autem est non necessario prius cognosci, aut proponi, et aliunde in bonis particularibus, quae per se bona sunt, est sufficiens ratio objectiva ad movendam voluntatem, et terminandum actum ejus, quia in quolibet bono continetur communis boni ratio, quae est formalis ratio objecti voluntatis. Et hinc tandem concluditur ultima pars, quod nec ex parte voluntatis creatae datur hæc necessitas, quia si objecto sit sufficiens ratio, ut per se ametur, voluntas habet sufficientem virtutem, ut eliciat actum circa illud absque priori actu, quia habet naturalem inclinationem ad bonum, et vires ad appetendum illud si sibi proportionatur: hac enim ratione quaelibet alia potentia animæ sive sensitiva, sive intellectiva, potest primo operari circa quodlibet objectum, si sibi sufficienter

tion, first, because it is moved by the senses, which in the first place offer particular goods, and then also, because a human being in infancy before he has the use of reason has a custom of thinking about these particular goods.

Secondly, concerning the object. It also is evident per se, because if that object is not first cognized, it will not first move the will. Moreover, it was shown that it is not necessarily first cognized or proposed, and, from elsewhere, in the case of particular goods which are good per se, an objective reason is sufficient for moving the will and terminating its act, because the nature of general good, which is the nature of the object of the will, is contained in any good whatever.

And from here, finally, is concluded the last part, that this necessity is not given on the part of the created will, because if the object is a sufficient reason so that it is loved per se, the will has sufficient strength for eliciting an act concerning it without a prior act. [This is] because it has a natural inclination to the good and strength for desiring that if it is proportionate to the will. For this reason any other power of the soul, whether sensitive or intellective, can first act concerning any object, if it is sufficiently proposed to it. Therefore, there is no necessity
proponatur: nulla est ergo necessitas, ut ille actus generalis alios antecedat, nec rationes contrariæ sententiae aliquid probant.

4. Circa secundum sensum quæstionis positæ, qui sequuntur primam sententiam citatam, numer. 3, consequenter dicunt, supposita intentione ultimi finis, necessarium esse ut reliquæ particulares intensiones ab illa procedant ut a causa et ratione operandi: imo ad hoc ponunt illam primam intentionem, ut sit causa cæterarum. Dicendum tamen est, etiamsi contingat illam universalem intentionem praecedere, non esse necessarium, ut ab illa procedant omnes posteriores actus voluntatis, qui versantur circa particularia bona. Ex quo evidentius constat, illam intentionem non esse necessaria. Probatur, quia talis intentionem vel influeret actu, vel virtute in actus posteriores: neutrum autem dici potest: ergo nullo modo, omitto enim relationem mere habitualm, quia, ut supra dixi, hæc non consistit in aliquo influxu et vera causalitate, sed est mere extrinseca. Probatur ergo prior pars de actuali influxu, quia hic non est sine ac-

that that general act precede the others, nor do the arguments for the contrary view show anything.

4. Concerning the second sense of the posited question, those who follow the first cited view, n. 3, consequently say that, an intention for the ultimate end having been assumed, it is necessary that the remaining particular intentions proceed from it as from a cause and reason for acting. Indeed, for this reason they posit that first intention so that it is the cause of the rest. Nevertheless, it should be said that even if happens that that universal intention precede, it is not necessary that all the posterior acts of the will which are turned to particular goods proceed from it. From this it is even more evident that that intention is not necessary.

It is proven: for such an intention either actually or virtually gives influx to the posterior acts. But neither can be said. Therefore, [it gives influx to them] in no way (for I omit the merely habitual relation, because, as I said above [in disp. 2, sec. 4, n. 3], this does not consist in any influx and true causality, but is merely extrinsic). Therefore, the prior part concerning actual influx is proven, because this does not exist without

DE FINE HOMINIS

391

DISP. III, SECT. V
tuali cogitatione: non semper autem actu cogitamus de <37> ultimo fine quando aliquid appetimus in particulari. Altera vero pars de virtuali influxu pro-batur, quia fieri potest ut illa intentio tanto tempore antecesserit, ut omnino non maneat nec in memoria, nec, in aliquo effectu suo: influxus autem virtu- tualis intelligi non potest sine aliquo istorum, ut supra ostensum est, disput. 2, sect. 4, num. 4; ergo. 

Et confirmatur, nam licet demus præcessisse in ho-mine appetitum consummati boni sui, tamen fieri potest, ut talis homo nunquam contulerit particu-lare bonum, verbi gratia, sanitatem cum illo objecto universali, considerando nimirum hoc bonum esse partem quamdam illius completi boni: ergo quando voluntas postea appetit hoc particulare bonum, non movetur ex vi prioris intentionis, sed solum ex vi presentis objecti, quia ad amandum, vel eligendum ex vi præcedentis intentionis, non sufficit sola in-tentio, sed requiritur etiam collatio objecti electionis cum objecto intentionis, quæ fit per consultationem, actual cogitation. Moreover, we do not always think about the ultimate end when we desire something in particular. But the other part concerning virtual influx is proven because it can happen that that intention went before by such a long time that nothing remains in memory or in any effect of it. Virtual influx, however, cannot be understood without something of these, as was shown above, disp. 2, sec. 4, n. 4. Therefore.

And it is confirmed: for although we may grant that the desire for his consummate good precedes in a human being, yet it can happen that such a human being will never consider a particular good, for example, health, with respect to that universal object, considering without doubt that this good is a certain part of that complete good. Therefore, when the will afterwards desires this particular good it is not moved by the strength of the prior intention, but only by the strength of the present object, because the intention alone does not suffice for loving or electing with the strength of the preceding intention, but it requires also the bringing together of the object of elec-tion with the object of the intention, which happens through consideration (consultationem), as I will talk about later.

129 4] 5 V.
ut postea dicam.

5. Atque ex his tandem concluditur, non esse necessarium hominem operari semper propter ultimum finem simpliciter a se intentum, seu ex vi intentionis suæ, vel quia non est necesse ut talis intentionio antecedat, vel quia etiamsi antecesserit, non est necesse ut ab illa procedant reliqui omnes actus: utrumque enim ostensum est. Et ita soluta relinquitur quaedam confirmatio posita in fine sectionis præcedentis huc remissa, et ex ibi dictis confirmari etiam potest hæc veritas. Quo autem sensu D. Thomas sit exponendus, dicam, sect, sequent., ex quo etiam facile patebunt solutiones rationum præcedentiae in num. 2, quæ solum probant ad summum voluntatem debere semper moveri ab aliquo objecto bono per se amabili, quod in se includat rationem communem boni, et in virtute continet aliquo modo saltem implicita et interpretative ultimum finem, ut jam explico.

5. And from these is finally concluded that it is not necessary that a human being always act for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end that he has intended or [that he always act] from the force of his intention [for such an end], either because it is not necessary that such an intention go before or because even if it went before it is not necessary that all the remaining acts proceed from it. For each of them has been shown. And [with the question] thus resolved, a certain confirmation posited at the end of the preceding section and having been referred to here remains. And from what was said there this truth can also be confirmed. Moreover, in what sense St. Thomas should be explained, I will say in subsequent sections, by which also it will easily be clear what the solutions of the arguments of the first view in n. 2 are, which only show at most that the will ought always to be moved by some good object lovable in itself, that in itself includes the general nature of good and in virtue of that contains the ultimate end in some way, at least implicitly and interpretatively, as I will explain now.
SECTION VI.

Whether all the actions of a human being are for the sake of an unqualifiedly ultimate end, at least by inclination.

It is argued for the negative side.

1. The reason for doubting is that the discussion is either about the formal ultimate end or about the material ultimate end or that thing to which a human being tends by his nature as to an ultimate end, but a human being does not seem always to act for the sake of an ultimate end in either case. It is clear concerning the first, because, as I said above in sect. 1, n. 6, an intention for a formal ultimate end is not enough to choose what needs to be done. And therefore it is also not enough for acting for the sake of the end by a proper intention of the acting human being. Nor, therefore, is a natural proportion to this formal end enough for a human being to be said in all his acts to act for the sake of this ultimate end from an inclination of nature, because not everything that he loves is a means to this end. The other part is shown, because the ultimate end to which a human being tends by his nature is God, but not all acts which a human being performs tend to God, as is most clear concerning bad acts or sins. Therefore.
2. Hæc quæstio facile expediri potest, suppositis his, quæ supra dixi sunt, in disp. 2, sect. 4, de variis modis operandi propter finem: nam hic modus, de quo nunc agimus, non requirit propriam intentionem ipsius operandis vel præsentem, vel præteritam, sed solum interpretativam, quæ censetur contineri in ipso objecto proximo humanæ operatio- nis, seu voluntatis quatenus illud natura sua tendit in aliud, vel tanquam medium ad finem, vel tanquam pars ad totum. Unde dicendum est primo, hominem in omnibus actibus suis, tam bonis, quam malis, operari aliquo modo propter ultimum finem formalem ex naturali connexione cujuscumque objecti voluntatis cum tali fine. Ita est intelligendus D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 1, art. 6, ut clarius idem explicuit in 4, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qæstiunc. 4, ubi cæteri theologi idem sentiunt præter eos, qui existimant voluntatem posse ferri in malum sub ratione mali, quod improbabile est, ut nunc suppono. Et colligitur eadem conclusio ex Aristotele 1, Ethicorum, cap. 4 et 7, et 1, Rhetor., cap. 5, et est frequens apud Augustinum 10, Confess., 2. This question can be resolved most easily by first considering those things which I said above in disp. 2, sect. 4, concerning the various ways of acting for the sake of an end. For the way with which we are concerned now does not require the agent to have a proper intention, either present or past, but only an interpretative intention. An interpretative intention is thought to be contained in the proximate object itself of human action or will insofar as the object by its nature tends to another [object], either as a means to an end or as a part to a whole.

Hence, it should be said, firstly, that a human being in all his actions, good as well as bad, acts in some way for the sake of a formal ultimate end by a natural connection between any object of the will whatever and such an end. This is how St. Thomas should be understood in [ST] IaIIæ.1.6, as he has more clearly explained in [Sent.] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qæstiunc. 4, where other theologians think the same (besides those who think that the will can be brought to bad under the aspect of bad, which is improbable, as I currently assume). And the same conclusion is gathered from Aristotle, EN I, c. 4 and 7, and Rhetor. I, c. 5, and is frequently in Augustine in
Nam qui bonus est, inquit, ideo bonus est, ut beatus sit: et qui malus est, malus non esset, nisi inde beatum se posse esse speraret. Secundo, ratio est clara, quia homo naturaliter appetit complementum omnis boni; in omni autem voluntate sua appetit saltem partem, seu inchoationem aliquam hujus boni: ergo implicite et interpretative appetit quidquid appetit, quatenus con- fert aliquo modo ad suum completum bonum; et hoc est amare illud interpretative propter ultimum finem formalem. Confirmatur et explicatur, quia licet non præcedat in <38> homine intentio elicita hujus finis, præcedit tamen naturalis propensio in illum, et ab hoc procedunt omnes actus circa particularia bona: ergo saltem impetu naturæ omnes tendunt in hujusmodi finem. In quibus rationibus intelligitur hoc non solum procedere in actionibus liberis, sed etiam in naturalibus, et in omni appetitu cujuscum- que boni. Intelligitur etiam hanc habitudinem partic-

item ratione. 45

Confirmand. 50

Explicatur. 55

59 naturalibus, et in ] om. V.

DE FINE HOMINIS 396 Disp. III, sect. VI
ularium finium, seu objectorum ad ultimum finem formalem, non tam esse mediī ad finem proprie lo- 
quendo, quam partis ad totum secundum veritatem, 
aut saltem secundum apparentiam et similitudinem, 

ut recte D. Thomas explicuit: nam quando homo 
appetit, verbi gratia, voluptatem, aliquo modo eam 
existimat partem sui completi boni, quia licet talis 
voluptas non semper sit illa, quæ vere pertinet ad per- 
fectionem felicitatis humanae, habet tamen quamdam 
similitudinem cum illa.

3. Sed objicit Scotus, nam si homo in omni actu 
suo appetet hoc modo finem ultimum formalem 
postquam constituit finem illum in aliqua re deter- 
minata, non posset non operari propter illam bea-
titudinem in particulari, consequens autem constat 
esse falsum, nam fidelis cognoscens et credens suam 
beititudinem consistere in visione Dei, non omnia 
operatur propter illam, imo potius multa contra il-
lam. Respondetur negando majorem, quia in hoc 
modo operandi propter finem non est attendenda

relation (habituidinem) of particular ends or objects to the for-
mal ultimate end is not so much of a means to an end, prop-
erly speaking, as of a part to a whole, according to truth or
at least according to appearance and similitude, as St. Thomas
rightly explained:33 for when a human being desires, for ex-
ample, pleasure, in some way he thinks of it as a part of his
complete good, because although such pleasure is not always
that which truly pertains to the perfect happiness of a human,
nevertheless, it has a certain similitude to that.

3. But Scotus objects: for if a human being in all his acts
desired the formal ultimate end in this way after he establishes
that end in some determinate thing, he would not be able not
to act for the sake of that happiness in a particular [case]. The
consequence, however, is clearly false, for the faithful person,
cognizing and believing that his happiness consists in the vi-
sion of God, does not do everything for the sake of that vision
but rather does many things against it. I respond by denying
the major, because in this way of acting for the sake of the end
there is no particular intention of the human being to be no-

33Sent. IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, ad 1.

Obiectio 
Scoti diluitur. 

DE FINE HOMINIS 397 DISP. III, SECT. VI
particularis intentio hominis, ut terminatur ad particularem finem, quia non semper operatur ex illa, semper tamen operatur ex intentione alicujus boni.

4. Secundo dicendum est, hominem in omnibus suis actionibus virtutis interpretative operari propter ultimum finem particulararem, seu realem propter quem est conditus, id est, propter Deum. In hoc etiam omnes conveniunt, quia omne bonum honestum habet proportionem cum ultimo fine vero, et ex se tendit in Deum, et potest esse aptum medium ut referatur in Deum et veram felicitatem, atque hoc modo quicumque honeste operatur, dici potest operari propter Deum. Sed difficutas est de quibusdam malis etiam peccati, an in his etiam possit homo dici aliquo modo operari propter finem, atque adeo propter rem illam, quæ est verus ultimus finis humanæ naturæ: quibusdam enim videtur non posse hoc affirmari ullo modo cum peccatum sit aversio vel deordinatio a Deo, alii vero <col. b> contrarium probant, quia homo etiam in his actionibus quærit quamdam similitudinem cum Deo.

4. Secondly, it should be said, that a human being in all his actions of virtue interpretatively acts for the sake of a particular or real ultimate end on account of which he is preserved, that is, on account of God. In this also everyone agrees, because every moral good has proportion with the true ultimate end, from itself tends to God, and can be a suitable means [to God] so that it is referred to God and true felicity. And in this way whatever is done in a way that is honestum can be said to be done for the sake of the end and even for the sake of that which is the true ultimate end of human nature? For with certain [actions] it seems impossible to affirm this in any way since sin is an aversion or directing away from God. But others show the contrary, because a human being seeks a certain similitude to God even in these actions.
3. Assertio decisiva proximi dubii.

5. Breviter tamen dico tertio, hominem, dum peccat, per ipsummet actum peccati, aliquo modo operari propter Deum, non tamen eo quo per actum honestum. Intelligitur conclusio de peccato ratione actus positivi, nam malitia nullo modo est propter finem ultimum, imo nec propter finem, quia ipsa non est intenta, sed per accidens consecuta. Probatur ergo utraque pars conclusionis, explicando convenientiam et differentiam, quæ in hoc convenire potest inter actum turpem et honestum: nam primo si uterque comparetur ad Deum, uterque est ex causalitate et efficientia Dei. Unde ex hac parte ncesses est, ut uterque aliquo modo ordinetur in Deum, nam sicut Deus propter seipsum omnia creavit, ita etiam propter seipsum concurririt ad actum peccati, et in hoc ipso ostendit bonitatem suam. Et hoc generaliter docet D. Thomas 3, contra Gentes, cap. 17. Secundo conveniunt, quod uterque actus habet necessariam connexionem et dependentiam cum Deo: unde fit ut peccator dum appetit aliquod bonum, quod sine Deo habere non potest, implicite appetat Deum esse:

5. Nevertheless, I briefly say, thirdly, that a human being, while he sins, through the very act itself of sin, in some way acts for the sake of God, yet not in that way in which he does through an act that is honestum. The conclusion is understood concerning sin by reason of a positive act, for malice is in no way for the sake of the ultimate end. Indeed, it is not for the sake of any end, because it itself was not intended but was attained per accidens. Therefore, each part of the conclusion is shown, by explaining the agreement and difference which can come together in this between actions that are shameful and honestum. For, firstly, if each is compared to God, each exists by the causality and efficacy of God. Hence, from this part it is necessary that each in some way is ordered to God, for just as God created everything for the sake of himself, so also he concurs with an act of sin for the sake of himself. And in this very thing he reveals his goodness. St. Thomas teaches this in general in SCG III, c. 17. Secondly, they agree in that each act has a necessary connection with and dependency on God. Hence it happens that when the sinner desires some good—which he cannot have without God—he implicitly desires for God to exist. Nevertheless, in this he does not so much re-
quanquam in hoc non tam respiciat Deum ut finem, quam ut principium, et quasi medium necessarium ad suum appetitum impleendum. Tertio vero conveniunt, quod in utroque reperitur quædam participatio divinæ bonitatis et felicitatis, nam peccator dum peccat appetit etiam aliquo modo felicitatem, et in hoc ipso appetit assimilari Deo, quod commune est omnibus creaturis, ut divus Thomas dixit 1, 2, quæst. 1, articulis 7 et 8. Et ita exponit divus Thomas hanc locutionem in 4, distinct. 49, quæst. 1, articulo 3, quæstiunc. 4, ad 2 et 3, et etiam est sententia Augustini, lib. 2, Conf., cap. 4 et 6.

Explicatur eadem assertio ex disconvenien
tia eorumdem actuum. Primo. 6. Differunt tamen inter se actus pravus et honestus, quod actus peccati revera nullo modo pertinet ad veram hominis beatitudinem, quæ in Deo consistit, nec tanquam pars ejus, nec tanquam perfectio accidentalis illius; actus autem honestas, secundum suam honestatem et speciem consideratus, pertinet aliquo modo ad decorem et perfectionem beatitudinis. Unde fit secundo, ut actus malus ex natura sua spect God as end than as principle and as a necessary means, as it were, to satisfying his desire. And, thirdly, they agree in that in each is found a certain participation in divine goodness and felicity, for when the sinner sins he also desires felicity in some way. And in this very thing he desires to imitate God, which is common to all creatures, as St. Thomas said in [ST] IaIIæ.1.7 and 8. And in this way St. Thomas explains that locution in [Sent.] IV, dist. 49, q. 1, art. 3, qc. 4, ad 2 and 3. It is also Augustine’s view in Conf. II, c. 4 and 6.

The same assertion is explained from the disagreement of the same acts. First.

Second.
non sit medium ad consequendum Deum, quatenus est finis <39> ultimus hominis: actus autem honestus de se sit accommodatus ad consequendum hunc finem: atque hinc tandem actus honestus simpliciter dici potest natura sua tendere in Deum tanquam in finem sibi proportionatum, et quia ex se placet Deo, et ad ipsum est referibilis: actus autem pravus non dici potest proprie, et simpliciter esse propter Deum, cum praedicta omnia in illum non conveniant, sed tantum secundum quid ac remote dicetur esse propter imitationem quandam divinas perfectionis, quam suo modo intendunt omnia naturalia agentia, in quo est quodammodo peccator inferior illis, quoniam debito modo, et juxta ordinem divinae providentiae intendunt omnia naturalia agentia assimilari Deo: peccator vero ut sic, indebito modo, ut prater ordinem querit assimilari Deo, et ideo impropriissime dicitur operari propter Deum.

is the ultimate end for a human being. But a morally good act of itself is suitable for following this end. And, hence, finally, it happens that an act that is *honestum* can be said without qualification by its nature to tend to God as to an end proportionate to itself, both because it pleases God by itself and is referrible to him. A corrupt act, however, cannot be said properly and without qualification to be for the sake of God, when all the just-mentioned things do not agree with him. Rather, it may be said to be only with qualification and remotely for the sake of a certain imitation of divine perfection, which all natural agents intend in their way—in this the sinner is in a certain way inferior to the natural agents, because of the way he ought [to be]—and according to the order of divine providence all natural agents intend to imitate God. But the sinner as such [intends] it in an undue way, so that he seeks to imitate God in a way contrary to the order. And so he is said most improperly to act for the sake of God.
De beatitudine in communi; an sit, at quid sit.

Concerning happiness in general: whether it is and what it is.

The happiness of a human being is the same thing as his ultimate end, since they only seem to differ because the formal nature of a cause is indicated by the name ‘end’ while the nature of perfect and consummate good is expressed by the name ‘happiness’. This is why God is said to have perfect happiness even though he does not properly have an ultimate end. But because in the case of a human being happiness is something distinct him that moves him to love it and to search for it for its own sake and with all remaining things ordered to it as to a perfect good (as Aristotle says in EN I, c. 4), therefore happiness has the nature of an end. And for this reason, after one has spoken about the general nature and causality of the ultimate end, one ought to inquire into what the ultimate end is or what true happiness for a human being is. Three matters are especially disputed concerning this: What is it? What perfections follow it? And in what way is it desired or acquired? But before I will approach these matters, I should first talk a little about the signification of the word and of the question.
20 nificatione vocis, et de quæstione, an sit beatitudo, whether there is such a thing as happiness.

pauca præmittere.

Sectio I.

Quæ sit communis ratio beatitudinis, et propria hujus vocis significatio.

Quorumdam non contemnenda acceptio duplex beatitudinis.

1. Hæc quæstio est prima omnium, juxta Aristotelem 1, Poster., cujus materia est maxime necessaria, ut fixum ac certum scopum possit habere disputatio: nam ex defectu ejus, scholastici in hæ re multiplicatis hujus nominis acceptionibus, plures quæstiones revocant ad disputationem de modo loquendi, ut videre licet in Scoto, in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 3, 5 et 6, et Durando, quæst. 4 et 6, Paludano, quæst. 3, Maiore, quæst. 1 et 5, Ochamo, in 4, quæst. ult., art. 4, et Olchoto, q. 8, articulo 2, apud quos, omissis alis divisionibus, de quibus dicam in sect. 3, illa est celebrior, quod beatitudo interdum est nomen collectivum, significant aggregatum omnium

1. This question is the first of all those whose matter—according to Aristotle in Post. I—is especially necessary in order for the disputation to have a fixed and certain target. For it is a defect that the scholastics in this matter turn many questions to a dispute over ways of speaking by multiplying the senses of this name. One can see this in Scotus, IV, dist. 49, qq. 3, 5 and 6; Durandus, qq. 4 and 6; Paludanus, q. 3; [John] Maior, qq. 1 and 5; Ockham, IV, art. 4 of the last question; and Holkot, q. 8, art. 2. Among these senses, other divisions about which I will speak in sect. 3 having been set aside for the moment, the more famous sense is that ‘happiness’ sometimes is a collective name, signifying the aggregate of all perfections of a human being. But sometimes it signifies a single perfec-

DE FINE HOMINIS 403 DISP. IV, SECT. I
perfectionum hominis; interdum vero significat simplicem perfectionem, verbi gratia, perfectissimam hominis operationem. Quam distinctionem alii rejeciunt tanquam gratis, et sine fundamento confictam, quoniam beatitudo nomen univocum est, atque ita unam aliquam rationem significare debet. Sed revera non potest rejici, quia et in re ipsa, et in usu sapientium habet magnum fundamentum; sed debet proprie et commode explicari.

2. Primo ergo beatitudo significare potest statum quemdam felicem, in quo habebit homo plenitudinem bonorum et complementum suorum desideriorum, qui interdum in sacra Scriptura nomine Regni caelorum appellatur Matth. 25: Veritate, benedicti, accipite regnum; interdum nomine vitae æternæ, ibidem: Et ibunt hi in vitam æternam: interdum nomine gloriae, Et ita intrare in gloriam suam, Luc. 24. Atque hoc modo videtur definiisse beat-

23 debet [om. V.]
33 24 [23 A V.]

34 I will use ‘felicitous’ for ‘felix’, although it’s not an entirely, well, felicitous translation, and reserve ‘happy’ for ‘beatus’ and ‘happiness’ for ‘beatitudo’.

2. First, therefore, happiness can signify a certain felicitous state, in which a human being has an abundance of goods and a full complement of the things he desires, which in the sacred Scriptures is sometimes designated by the name ‘kingdom of heaven’, e.g., in Matt. 25[:34]: ‘Come, you who are blessed, receive the kingdom’. And sometimes by the name ‘eternal life’, e.g., in [Matt. 25:46]: ‘And these will enter into eternal life’. And sometimes by the name ‘glory’, e.g., in Luke 24[:26]: ‘And thus to enter into his glory’.

The 1st sense of ‘happiness’ in the author’s view.
And Boethius seems to define happiness in this way, saying: ‘Happiness is a perfect state with an aggregation of all goods’. What Augustine says can also be understood in this way: ‘Happy is he who has everything that he wants’ (de Trin. XV, c. 5) and ‘To live happily is to rejoice in true and certain goods’ (de lib. arb., I, c. 13). Likewise, Gregory of Nyssa in the beginning of de Beatitude: ‘Happiness’, he says, ‘is a certain comprehension of all those things which are understood in a human, by which none of those are absent which pertain to the desire and cupididity for goods’. Likewise, St. Thomas says in [ST] IâIIæ.5.3 and 4 that happiness is a ‘perfect and sufficient good, excluding all bad and satisfying every desire’.

Finally, it seems that sometimes Aristotle speaks in this way concerning happiness, saying: ‘to live well and to do well and to be felicitous are thought by everyone to be the same’ (EN I, c. 4).

And a reason can be added for supposing that this sort of state is possible for humans and can require every part for perfect felicity. For this state is conceived in the mode of one complete and consummate good. Therefore, it can be signified...
matri boni: ergo potest una voce significari. Quid ergo impedit quominus hac voce beatitudo vel felicitas significetur, cum hæc sit accommodata, et nulla alia sit ad hoc imposita. Et confirmatur, nam in homine solemus distinguere beatitudinem animæ et beatitudinem corporis, et sic dicimus, Christum in via habuisse animæ beatitudinem, non tamen corporis, et sancti dicunt animas nunc esse beatas, non tamen habere beatitudinem omni ex parte completam: ergo in his omnibus locutionibus supponitur beatitudinem uno modo significare hujusmodi status omni ex parte perfectum.

2. Acceptio

3. Magis vero proprie juxta scholasticam consuetudinem accipit solet beatitudo prout significat summamquamdam perfectionem hominis, qua conjungitur optimo ac summo bono, seu fini ultimo suo, quæ alio modo dici solet perfectissima hominis operatio, qua suum finem ultimum consequitur. Atque hoc modo frequentius videtur loqui de beatitudine Aristoteles 1 et 10, Ethic., et D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 2, cum docet, beatitudinem consist

3. But according to scholastic custom happiness is usually more properly taken as signifying a certain highest perfection of a human being, in which he is conjoined with his best and highest good or ultimate end, which in another way is usually said to be a human being’s most perfect activity by which his ultimate end is acquired. And Aristotle seems to speak more frequently in this way concerning happiness in EN I and X, as well as St. Thomas in [ST] IaIIæ.2, when he teaches that happiness consists in contemplation or in the best activity. But
if other goods are required for the beatific state, it is only insofar as they serve this best activity so that they in some way perfect the human being in relation to the best activity. And St. Thomas speaks more often in this way concerning happiness in this matter and in all of q. 2, and when the absence of happiness excludes the remaining created goods besides God, and q. 3, art. 1 and 4 and often elsewhere when he teaches that happiness consists in the attainment or possession of the highest good.

Likewise, for the same reason, both the holy Fathers and the philosophers often say that a human being is capable of the happiness of the soul and not of the happiness of the body, for if the discussion is about the collection of goods, these are found partly in the soul and partly in the body. Nevertheless, speaking properly concerning happiness in the aforementioned signification as the attainment of the ultimate end, this is found in the soul, as we will say later, and therefore the holy are called happy only in their souls, strictly speaking, however much they may lack the goods which pertain to the body. And, similarly, Christ was happy during his earthly life on account of the happiness of the soul.
Finally, for this reason only a human being is properly called capable of happiness, as Augustine taught in *Quæst.* lib. 83, q. 5 and *de Civit.* XII, c. 1. For if the discussion is about a perfect state and a collection of all the perfections owed to a nature, each thing can be called capable of its felicity according to the capacity of its nature, if it is in the perfect state according to its nature. Nevertheless, because happiness properly signifies and requires conjunction with the ultimate end by arriving at it in some way in itself through the proper activity of a creature capable of happiness, for this reason only a rational creature is, strictly speaking, capable of happiness because only it is capable of this activity in which the essence of happiness consists.

4. This can, finally, be established by reason in this way: although many things concur for this perfect state of happiness, it is, nevertheless, necessary that something among them is highest to which the remaining are referred or from which they flow just as from a first spring or in which they are eminently contained. For there cannot be a perfect aggregate of many things without some order between the many things.
se: illud ergo, quod est summum et perfectum in
eo statu, dicitur essentia beatitudinis: caetera vero
sunt veluti proprietates aut accidentia ejus. Vel aliter,
quamvis multa bona reperiantur in beato, non tamen
per omnia attingit suum supremum finem, aut il-
um consequitur: ergo non omnia æque pertinent ad
beatitudinem, neque ad rationem ultimi finis: ergo
beatitudo significat perfectionem ultimam ad quam
cætera referuntur; merito essentia beatitudinis non
dicitur consistere in tota illa collectione, sed in eo,
quod est in illa supremum et ultimum: hoc igitur
proprie significare potest hac vox beatitudo; atque
hoc fere modo utemur illa in tota hac materia; sta-
tum vero beatitudinis ad tollendam æquivocationem
hoc modo semper appellabimus, quamvis in eo statu
possit esse latitudo, et in illo oporteat aliqua distinc-
tione uti, quam opportuniori loco trademus.

5. Atque ex his sequitur primo, quod sicut supra
agentes de fine diximus interdum finem significare
rem, quæ intenditur: interdum vero consecutionem
illius rei, ita in præsenti in beatitudine duo possunt

Therefore, that which is the highest and perfect in that state is
called the essence of happiness. But the others are, as it were,
properties or accidents of it. Or, to put it differently, although
many goods are found in a happy [life], one does not, never-
theless, attain one’s supreme end through all of them nor does
it follow from all of them. Therefore, not all pertain equally to
happiness nor to the nature of an ultimate end. Therefore, hap-
piness signifies the ultimate perfection to which the remaining
things are referred. The essence of happiness is rightly not said
to consist in that entire collection, but in that which is supreme
and ultimate among [the members of that collection]. The ex-
pression ‘happiness’, therefore, can properly signify this. And
we will generally use it in this way in this entire discussion.
But in order to avoid equivocation we will always designate
the state of happiness in this way, although there can be lati-
tude in that state and one should make some distinction in it,
which we will make in an opportune place.

5. And from these things it follows, first, that just as we
said above when talking about the end that sometimes the end
signifies the thing which is intended and sometimes the acquisi-
tion of that thing, so at present two things can be considered in
considerari, aliud est res, qua vel quibus beatificari, aliud est consecutio illius rei; illa vocatur objectum beatitudinis, seu beatitudo objectiva: hæc vocatur beatitudo formalis, seu per modum consecutio: utraque vero constituit unam beatitudinem, quia una sine altera beatificare non potest, sed utramque in suo genere concurrere necesse est. Unde concludi potest formalis quædam, et generalis descriptio beatitudinis, <41> saltæm quoad quid nominis, est enim consecutio ultimi, ac supræmi boni, quod ab homine desiderari potest, et in quo cætera virtute contineatur, seu ad illud referuntur: quæ descriptio ex communi sensu omnium, qui de beatitudine loquuntur, sumitur; et sacra Scripture etiam hac ratione de beatitudine loquitur per modum possessionis, seu consecutionis, Matth. 25, possideate rege: 1, ad Corinth. 4: Sic currite ut comprehendatis, ad Philip. 3: Sequor, si quo modo comprehendam. Et ratio esse potest, quia beatitudo dicit terminum, quamdiu autem homo inquirit, non quiescit, terminatur autem inquisitio ad happiness: one is the thing by which or in which we are made happy and the other is the acquisition of that thing. The former is called the object of happiness or objective happiness; the latter is called formal happiness or happiness in the mode of attainment. But both together constitute one happiness, because one without the other cannot make one happy, but it is necessary that both it their genus come together. Hence, a certain formal and general description of happiness can be composed, at least insofar as the name is concerned: for it is the attainment of the most ultimate and supreme good that can be desired by a human and in which the remaining [goods] are virtually contained or to which they are referred. This description is taken from the general consensus of everyone who talks about happiness. And holy Scripture also for this reason talks about happiness in the mode of possession or attainment: ‘take hold of the kingdom’ (Matt. 25[:34]), ‘Run so as to get [the prize]’ (1 Cor. 4[i.e., 9:24]), and ‘I press on, in that way I may take hold’ (Phil. 3). And the reason can be that happiness expresses a terminus. As long as a human being searches, he does not rest, but his search is terminated by the attainment. Therefore,

Descriptio integræ beatitudinis.
acquisitionem: ergo necesse est ut beatitudo in acquisitione consistat. Quod exemplo falsæ beatitudinis declarari etiam potest, nam avarus, qui beatitudinem suam ponit in divitis, non censet se beatam in illas inquirendo, aut vendendo, sed obtinendo et possidendo; et idem de similibus. Idem ergo erit in vera beatitudine, quæ consistit in consecutione veri ac supremi boni. Sic Gregorius Nyssenus explicans sextam beatitudinem, *Beati mundo corde*.

Sed inquiret aliquis, quæ sit formalis ratio hujus consecutionis. Respondetur nunc in communi solum dici posse consistere in aliqua conjunctione hominis cum illo bono, quo beatificandus est. An vero hæc conjunctio fiat per unionem, vel operationem, vel alio modo, pertinet ut ita dicam, ad materialem rationem beatitudinis, quœ postea est a nobis explicanda: nam ex formali ratione consecutionis, ut sic, illud proprio definiri potest. Itaque videitur hæc ratio in hoc consistere, quod res, seu bonum, ita possideatur ac teneatur, sicut appetitur et desideratur; nam cum hæc consecutio sit terminus desiderii, it is necessary that happiness consists in attainment. It can also be shown by the example of false happiness, for the miser who places his happiness in wealth does not consider himself happy in seeking wealth or in selling, but in obtaining and possessing. And likewise for similar cases. Therefore, it will be the same in true happiness, which consists in the acquisition of the true and supreme good. Gregory of Nyssa explains the sixth beatitude—‘Happy are the pure in heart’ ([Matt. 5:8])—in this way.

But if someone asks what the formal nature of this acquisition is, I respond that for the moment it can generally only be said to consist in some conjunction of a human being with that good by which he is to be made happy. But whether this conjunction happens through union or action or in some other way pertains, if I may speak this way, to the material nature of happiness, which is to be explained by us later. For from the formal nature of attainment as such the former can properly be defined. And so it seems that this nature consists in this, that the thing or good is seized and held just as it is sought and desired (*appetitur et desideratur*). For when this attainment is the *terminus* of a desire and satisfies it, then the thing is consid-
et satietas ejus, tunc censetur res consecuta quando
ita obtinetur sicut desideratur, quod videre licet in
falsa beatitudine, nam qui illam ponit in divitiis, eas
assequitur per dominium et possessionem; qui vero
in delectatione ciborum, habebit consecutionem per
sensum gustus et tactus, et sic de cæteris: ergo sicut
in falsa beatitudine, consecutio respondet pravo ap-
petitiui, ita in vera beatitudine illa censetur vera con-
secutio quæ terminat, et apta est satiare perfectum
ac rectum appetitum veri, et summi boni; et quo-
niam hic appetitus est consentaneus, et proportion-
atus fini, seu objecto suo, ideo consecutio illi respon-
dens erit etiam proportionata tali objecto, atque adeo
talis erit, quæ summa bonum postulaverit, seu quatenus natura sua apta fuerit ut pos-
sideatur et <col. b> teneatur; qualis autem in partic-
ulari sit, postea dicemus.

ered to have been achieved when it is obtained in the way that
it is desired. One may see this in the case of false happiness,
for he who places it in wealth pursues it through ownership
and possession, but he who places it in the delight of food, will
have attainment through the senses of taste and touch, and so
on for the rest. Therefore, just as in false happiness attainment
responds to a depraved desire, so in true happiness that is con-
sidered a true attainment which terminates and is apt to satisfy
the perfect and right desire for the true and highest good. And
because this desire is fitting and proportionate to its end or
object, the attainment corresponding to it will also be propor-
tionate to such an object and will be just like the thing which
the highest good demanded or insofar as its nature was apt for
possessing and holding. What it is in particular, however, we
will talk about later.
Utrum ostendi possit beatitudinem hominis esse possibilem, aut futuram esse?

1. Ratio dubii est, quia perfecta beatitudo repugnat cum imperfectione humanæ naturæ: quomodo ergo ostendi potest humanam naturam esse capacem tantæ perfectionis? Antecedens declaratur primo, quia beatitudo, ut diximus, requirit collectionem omnium bonorum, et excludit omnia mala: homo autem natura sua subjectus est multis malis, et miseriis, quæ vitare non potest. Secundo, et principaliter, quia pars beatitudinis, et via necessaria ad illam consecutionem, est nihil mali velle, seu carere peccato, quod non potest homo sua natura, cum constet contrariis affectibus, et inter se pugnantibus. Tertio, quia de ratione beatitudinis est æternitas, nam qui timet carere bono, quod habet, non potest esse beatus; sed homo, ut homo, non est perpetuus natura sua: ergo. Dicet fortasse aliquid, hanc rationem to-tam solum procedere de beatitudine priori modo ac-

Section II.

Whether it can be shown that human happiness is possible or is going to be.

1. The reason for doubt is that perfect happiness is incompatible with the imperfection of human nature. Therefore, how can it be shown that human nature is capable of such perfection? The antecedent is shown first, because happiness, as we said, requires a collection of all goods and excludes every bad. But a human by his nature is subject to many bads and miseries which cannot be avoided. Second, and principally, because part of happiness and a necessary road to its acquisition, is to will no bad things or to be free from sin, which a human by his nature cannot be, since he stands on contrary affects that fight among themselves. Third, because happiness is eternal of its nature, for he who fears losing the good which he has cannot be happy. But a human as human is not everlasting by his nature. Therefore.

Perhaps someone will say that this whole arguments only works concerning happiness taken in the first way as signifying a collection of all goods, but not concerning the essence of
cepta, ut significat collectionem bonorum omnium, non vero de essentia beatitudinis. Sed contra hoc est, quia licet tota collectio bonorum non sit de essentia beatitudinis, tamen de ratione beatitudinis essentialis est, ut secum afferat, et postulet statum illum perfectionem: ergo requirit subjectum capax illius status.

2. In hac quæstione agere possumus solum formaliter de beatitudine prout a nobis definita est, an homo sit capax illius, vel materialiter, seu in particulari, an cognosci possit qua re et quo modo beatificandus sit homo: et hoc modo tractat illam Scotus in 4, dist. 49, quæst. 2, et contendit, posse ratione naturali probari esse hominem capacem beatitudinis consistenti in visione Dei: quam quidem sententiam ego falsam existimo: sed non potest hic ex professe probari, donec ratio et natura illius beatitudinis magis cognita sit: et ideo in priori tantum sensu breviter est hoc quæstio expedienda, in qua præterea potest esse sermo aut de capacitate tantum, aut etiam de facto an possit probari, hominem aliquando posse consequi beatitudinem suam. Denique in hoc procedere happiness. But contrary to this is that although the whole collection of goods is not of the essence of happiness, nevertheless it is essential to the nature of happiness that it brings [them] with it and requires that perfect state. Therefore, it requires a subject capable of that state.

2. In this question we can deal only formally concerning happiness as it was defined by us, whether a human is capable of it or materially or in particular, whether it can be known how and in what way a human ought to be made happy. And Scotus discusses it in this way in Sent. IV, dist. 49, q. 2, and asserts that it can be shown by natural reason that a human is capable of happiness consisting in vision of God. I certainly consider this view false. But it cannot here be shown from what was declared, until the reason and nature of that happiness is better known. And, therefore, this question needs to be briefly explicated in the former sense only, in which the discussion can also be either concerning the capacity alone or also concerning the fact whether it can be shown that a human can at some point achieve his happiness. Finally, the question can proceed in this either from revealed principles or from princi-
1. Assertio, de fide.

3. Dico ergo primo secundum fidem: Certum est hominem esse capax absolutæ et <42> perfectæ beatitudinis, et de facto consecuturum illam. Probatur, quia Deus in Scriptura sacra promisit hanc beatitudinem omnibus, ut per se constat: hæc autem promissio supponit in homine capacitatem ad recipiendam illam, quia Deus non promittit impossibilia. Rursus quamvis Deus non promittat hanc beatitudinem omnibus absolute, sed justis, et consequenter promissio respectu omnium non sit absoluta, sed conditionata, scilicet, si in justitia decesserit: tamen et ex eadem sacra Scriptura, et ex aliis regulis fidei, constat et posse, et de facto impleri hanc conditionem in multis hominibus. Quod denique illa sit beatitudo absoluta et perfecta, constat ex modo, quo de illa loquitur, et ex his, quæ de illa docet, vocat enim illam supereminens bonum, quod nec oculus vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit; vo-

3. I first speak, then, in accordance with the faith: It is certain that a human being is capable of absolute and perfect happiness and will in fact achieve it. It is proven, because God promised this happiness to everyone in holy Scripture, as is clear in itself. But his promise assumes a capacity in the human for receiving it, because God does not promise impossible things.

On the other hand, since God does not promise this happiness to everyone absolutely, but to the just, consequently the promise is not absolute with respect to everyone, but conditional, namely, ‘if he departed from justice’. Nevertheless, both from the same holy Scripture and from other rules of the faith, it is clear both that this condition can be and in fact is fulfilled in many humans. Finally, that this is absolute and perfect happiness is clear from the way in which it is spoken of and from the things that [Scripture] teaches concerning it. For it calls it a supereminent good ‘that neither the eye has seen nor the ear has heard nor the heart of man ascended’; it calls it ‘the

46 Scriptura sacra] sacra Scriptura V.
cat æternum gloriæ pondus, æternum gaudium, quod
negat omne malum, et omnem tristitiam, et alia sim-
ilia, quæ postea videbimus.

2. Assertio.  
4. Dico secundo, ex principiis naturæ probari
potest, hominem esse capacem alicujus beatitudinis.

1. Probatio.  
Probatur primo experimento ipso, nihil enim magis
receptum fuit apud omnes philosophos, quamvis
enim de re, in qua consistit beatitudo humana, fuerit
inter illos infinita dissensio ut sequenti disputatione
attingam: tamen quod aliqua sit beatitudo hominis
fuit summa consensio, et ita hoc sumit tanquam pri-
num fundamentum moralis philosophiæ Aristotelis,
in 1, Ethic. Secundo declaratur ratione in superi-
oribus tacta, quia homo habet aliquem finem ulti-
mum: ergo potest illum consequi, alias frustra et in-
sipiente ordinaretur in illum: sed consecutio finis
ultimi est beatitudo: ergo.

Instantia.  
5. Dices, hac ratione probaretur bruta esse beat-
itudinis capacia, quia etiam habent suum finem ulti-
mum, et possunt pervenire ad suam ultimam perfec-
tionem. Scotus supra respondet esse aliquo modo ca-

4. I say, secondly, that it can be proven from the princi-
posses of nature that a human is capable of some happiness. It
is shown first from experience itself, for nothing more was re-
ceived by all the philosophers. For although there was infinite
dissension among them concerning the thing in which human
happiness consists, as I will touch on in the following dispu-
tation, yet that something is the happiness of a human was the
highest consensus. And thus this can be taken as the first foun-
dation of Aristotle's moral philosophy in EN I. Secondly, it is
shown by the argument given in previous sections, because a
human has some ultimate end. Therefore, he can achieve that;
otherwise, he was ordered to it in vain and foolishly. But the
achievement of the ultimate end is happiness. Therefore.

5. You may say that by this argument is proven that non-
rational animals have the capacity for happiness, because they
also have their ultimate end and can reach their ultimate perfec-
tion. Scotus above responds they have in some way a capacity
for a certain imperfect happiness. Nevertheless, Aristotle in *EN X*, c. 8 and 9 and Augustine, whom we just cited, simply deny that non-rational animals have the capacity for happiness and Gregory of Nyssa says in *de Beatiudinibus* that a human is capable of happiness because he is [made] in the image of God, which is proper to intellectual nature. Therefore, one should add from St. Thomas [*ST* IaIIæ.5.1] to the second argument that was made that although God is the ultimate end for everything, he is, nevertheless, not the ultimate end in the same way [for everything], because he cannot be reached in the same way by everything. For a human being can by his actions immediately reach knowing and loving God and therefore he can properly acquire that end and therefore he can properly be happy. For, as Scotus rightly said, happiness signifies the acquisition of the best and ultimate good strictly speaking. But, non-rational animals, on the other hand, cannot reach God immediately by their actions, by only some created perfection by which they in some way imitate God, and therefore they cannot acquire that ultimate end according to itself. And therefore they are not capable of happiness. And it is for this reason

---

90 Deus | *om.* V.
sunt capacia beatitudinis: et hinc est quod homo
dicitur immediate creatus propter Deum, aliae vero
inferiores creaturae sunt immediate propter ipsum
hominem, et per illum ultimate tendunt in Deum.

105 Confirmatio. Et confirmatur hae ratio ex naturali appetitu ho-

minis ad beatitudinem, hic enim innatus est om-
nibus hominibus, ut dicturi sumus late in fine hu-

jus materiae, et frequenter disputat Augustinus, li-
bro primo, de libero Arbitr., capite decimo-quarto,
et lib. de Vita beata, et lib. 10, Confess., cap. 20, et
in Enchirid., cap. 25, sed appetitus naturalis fundatur
in naturali capacitatem, et non tendit nisi in rem aliquo
modo naturae possibilem, quia appetitus naturalis est
naturae consentaneus: ergo beatitudo, quae est objec-
tum hujus appetitus, est res possibilis homini cujus
ipse est capax natura sua.

110 3. Assertio. 6. Dico tertio, ex principiis etiam naturae

potest humanis rationibus satis congruentibus os-
tendi humanam speciem fore aliquando beatifican-
dam. Loquor de specie humana, quia non est necesse
ut in omnibus suis individuis consequatur suum

that a human is said to be immediately created for the sake of
God, but other lower creatures are immediately [created] for
the same of man himself and through him ultimately tend to
God.

And this argument is confirmed by the natural desire of a
human for happiness, for this is innate to all humans, as we
will soon discuss more broadly at the end of this material and
as Augustine frequently argues (de lib. arb. I, c. 14; de vita beata;
Conf. X, c. 20; and Ench. c. 25). But natural desire is founded
in natural capacity and does not tend to anything except to
something in some way possible for the nature, because natu-
ral desire is appropriate to the nature. Therefore, happiness,
which is the object of this desire, is a possible thing for a hu-
man, [something] of which he is capable by his nature.

115 6. I say, third, that it can be shown even from the prin-
ciples of nature by sufficiently congruent human reasons that
the human species will sometime be made happy. I speak of the
human species, because it is not necessary that each and every
individual achieve his end. Because when the multiplication of

DE FINE HOMINIS

DE FINE HOMINIS

418

Disp. IV, sect. II
finem; quia cum multiplicatio individuorum sit quodammodo per accidens, non est inconveniens aliqua deflectere a suo fine, præsertim quia cum homo sit liberi arbitrii, per eum stare potest quominus suum finem consequatur: satis ergo erit quod in aliquibus individuis haec species suum finem obtineat. Hoc autem probari potest, quia ad convenientem providentiam auctoris naturæ spectat ita gubernare et dirigere singulas naturas in suos fines ut non omnino illis frustretur: primo quidem, quia viderentur frustra creati homines propter talem finem, si nunquam neque in ullo individuo illum essent consequuturi: quid enim prodesset hominis capacitas beatitudinis, si nunquam esset implenda? Secundo, quia id, quod nunquam accidit in omnibus individuis alius speciei etiamsi quamplurima multiplicentur, merito dici potest impossibile, si non omnino physice, seu metaphysice, saltem moraliter, et humano modo loquendo: pertinet autem ad providen- 〈43〉 tiam auctoris naturæ, et quodammodo debitum est ipsi humanæ naturæ ita dirigi in suum finem, ut possit individuals is in a certain way per accidens, it is not disagreeable that someone is turned aside from his end, especially because when a human has free will, it can stand through that that his end is not achieved. Therefore, it will be sufficient that this species obtain its end in some individuals.

Moreover, this can be proven, because by the agreeable providence of the author of nature he sees thus to govern and direct each nature to his end so that it is not wholly frustrated for them. First, indeed, because created humans would seem frustrated for the sake of such an end, if no individual were ever able to achieve it. For what would be the use of a capacity for human happiness if it were never fulfilled?

Secondly, because that which never happens in any individual of some species even if they are multiplied as far as possible, is deservedly called impossible—if not entirely physically or metaphysically, at least morally and in a human way of speaking. Moreover, it pertains to the providence of the author of nature and in a certain way it must be that human nature is directed to its end in such a way that it can achieve it.

Thirdly, we can also use the argument which Chrysostom and other Fathers often use to prove the resurrection, for cer-
illum consequi. Tertio possumus etiam uti ratione, qua Chrysostomus et alii Patres sæpe utuntur ad probandam resurrectionem, nam quidam homines totam vitam in vitii, et in peccatis transigunt, alii honeste vivunt: pertinet ergo ad providentiam auctoris naturæ illos punire, hos remunerare: ergo respondere debet operibus virtutis aliquod beatitudinis præmium.

7. Dices, absolute loquendo, potuisse Deum ita gubernare humanas res, ut nullus hominum ad beatitudinem perveniret, permittendo omnes labi in peccatum, et in eo durare usque ad finem vitae, sicut multis speciebus Angelorum evenisse creditur. Respondetur: ideo non dixi rationes factas esse demonstrationes, sed morales rationes multum suadentes et ostendentes modum providentiae maxime consentaneum divinae sapientiae et bonitatis. Unde licet non negemus potuisse Deum id facere de potentia absoluta; negamus tamen id esse satis consentaneum et naturis rerum, et convenienti ordini universi. Ad exemplum autem Angelorum respondetur, illud sup-

7. You may say, speaking absolutely, that God was able to govern human affairs in such a way that no human would attain happiness, permitting everyone to perish in sin and to harden in that all the way to the end of life, just as it is believed happened to many species of angels. It is responded that it was for that reason not said that the arguments made were demonstrations but moral reasons greatly persuading and showing the mode of providence most appropriate to divine wisdom and goodness. Hence, although we do not deny that God could bring that about by absolute power, we do nevertheless deny that it would be appropriate both to the natures of things and to the agreeable order of the universe.

To the example of the angels, moreover, is responded that
ponere omnes Angelos esse specie diversos, et in singulis speciebus tantum esse unum individuum: quo admisso, non est similis ratio, quia non poterat species angelica permitte peccare, et cadere a suo fine, quin omnia individua ejusdem speciei permitteren-
tur eodem modo cadere, quia supponunt non esse multa, sed unum, et alioquin fuit conveniens etiam Angelos permitte suæ libertati, et ideo in illis cense-
tur illud non esse inconveniens, quia omnes conveni-
unt in eodem gradu, et in eodem modo tendendi in suum finem: homines autem habent suum proprium modum, et quodammodo specialem gradum consti-

tuunt.

Ad argum. in num. 1.

8. Ad rationem dubitandi in principio positam procedendo ex principiis revelatis dicimus duo: Pri-
mum est, non posse hominem suæ naturæ viribus, aut per naturales causas illum felicem statum conse-
qui. Secundum est, in hac vita omnino non posse ad illum pervenire, etiam per auxilia gratiæ secun-
dum legem ordinariam. Nihilominus satis est, illum statum fore aliquando possibilem homini cum div-
it assumes that every angel is a difference species and that there is only one individual in each species. By that having been ad-
mitted, it is not a similar argument, because the angelic species was not able to be permitted to sin and to fall from its end, lest every individual of the species was permitted in the same way to fall, because they are not supposed to be many but one. And besides, it was agreeable also to permit the angels their freedom, and therefore that is not considered disagreeable in them, because all are agreeable in the same degree and in the same way tend to their end. Humans, moreover, have the same proper mode and in a certain way constitute a special degree.

8. To the reason for doubting given in the beginning, we make two points proceeding from revealed principles. The first is that a human cannot through his natural strengths or through natural causes achieve that felicitous state. The second is that in this life he cannot wholly reach that, even through the help of grace in accordance with the ordinary law. Nonetheless, it is sufficient that that state will be possible at some point for a human with divine power and help.
Moreover, proceeding from principles of nature, we may similarly make two points taken from Aristotle. The first is that the happiness possible for a human in accordance with his nature is imperfect and yet not wholly nothing. And this is what Aristotle says in *EN* I, c. 10: we can be happy still as humans. Hence it is not of the essence of whatever happiness that it absolutely and strictly speaking exclude every defect, but it is first and through itself the essence of it that it is the attainment of the ultimate end. Consequently, to be sure, it holds so that it excludes every bad insofar as that will be able to happen in accordance with the capacity of the subject. The second is what Aristotle says in *EN* X, c. 7: such a life surpasses the nature of a human, for this is not ‘itself that by which a human lives thus, but by which he is something divine in himself’. That is, insofar as he has a mind and an immortal soul, in which the human can achieve everlasting happiness and be free from temporal disadvantages and in some way be satisfied in accordance with the capacity of his nature.
Sectio III.

Quotuplex sit beatitudo.

Prætermittuntur diuisiones quædam.

1. Hanc dubitationem etiam præmitto, quia pertinet ad quæstionem an est, et fundamentum erit eorum, quæ dicenda sunt, et ordinis in hac materia servandi. Certain divisions are ignored.

5 Omitto autem imprimis divisionem beatitudinis, in veram et falsam, quoniam tantum de vera agimus: et falsa in infinitum multiplicari potest pro libito humanæ voluntatis. Omitto præterea divisionem beatitudinis in objectivam et formalem, quia et utraque explicata jam est, et ex utraque consurgit unus finis, et una beatitudo. Denique omitto divisionem beatitudinis in essentialem et accidentalem, quoniam hæc quidem coincidit cum his, quæ diximus de beatitudine vel pro essentia vel pro statu: nam ea, quæ reperientur in statu beatitudinis præter essentiam, possunt dici accidentia beatitudinis, quamvis in eas sit latitude: nam quaedam sunt maxime intrinseca, et inseparabilia ab essentia beatitudine; alia vero sunt magis extrinseca; de quibus omnibus postea vide-

10

SECTION III.

What kinds of happiness there are.

1. I also present this questioning, because it pertains to the question of whether happiness exists and it will be the foundation for the things that remain to be discussed and for the order to be kept in this material. I leave aside, however, the first division of happiness into true and false, because we are discussing only true happiness. And false happiness can be multiplied to infinity through the whims of human will. In addition, I leave aside the division of happiness into objective and formal, both because each has already been explained and because each arises from one end and one happiness. Finally, I leave aside the division of happiness into essential and accidental, because this indeed coincides with these, because we spoke of happiness either through essence of through state. For those things which are found in the state of happiness in addition to essence can be called accidents of happiness, although it is in them with latitude. For certain ones are especially intrinsic and inseparable from essential happiness, but others are more extrinsic, concerning all of which we will see later. Three or four divisions,
bimus. Notandæ igitur sunt tres, vel quatuor divisiones præcipuæ.


2. Primo dividitur beatitudo in naturalem et supernatutum. Hac divisione utitur sepe D. Thomas, 1, p., q. 23, a. 1, dicens: hominem ordinari ad duplicem finem, alterum naturæ proportionatum, alterum superantem facultatem naturæ; idem autem est finis ultimus et beatitudo, ut diximus. Item q. 62, art. 1, distinguit in Angelis hanc duplicem beatitudinem, et dicit, eos fuisse creatos in beatitudine naturali, non vero supernatutali, juxta doctrinam Augustini, libro de Eccl. dogmat. (si ejus est opus), capit. 59. Addit vero <44> ibi beatitudinem naturalem esse quodammodo beatitudinem, vel quia comparata est ad supernaturalem, est imperfecta, vel propter aliam rationem, quam infra subjiciam. Eadem distinctione, agens de hominibus, utitur D. Thomas 1, 2, q. 62, art. 1, in corpore, et ad 3, et q. 109, art. 5, ad 3, et q. 110, art. 3, et optime in 3, distinct. 23, quæst. 1, art. 4. quæst. 3, et ex hac

therefore, should especially be noted.

2. First, happiness is divided into natural and supernatural. This division is often used by St. Thomas, who says in [ST] Ia.23.1 that a human being is ordered to a twofold end, one proportionate to his nature and the other surpassing the faculty of nature. Moreover, as we said, the ultimate end and happiness are the same thing. Likewise, in Ia.62.1 he distinguishes in the angels this twofold happiness and says that those creatures were in natural happiness, but not supernatural, according to the teaching of Augustine in libro de Eccl. dogmat. (if that is his work), c. 59 [i.e., c. 29, al. 59]. But he adds there that natural happiness is happiness in a certain way, either because it is imperfect compared to supernatural [happiness] or on account of another reason, which I will present below. St. Thomas uses the same distinction in discussing human beings in [ST] IaIæ.62.1 co. and ad 3; 109.5 ad 3; 110.3; and best in [Sent.] III, dist. 23, q. 1, art. 4, q. 3. And from this division he gathers also the necessity for grace and the division between infused and acquired virtues.
divisione colligit etiam necessitatem gratiæ, et divisionem virtutum in infusas, et acquisitas.

Accedit ratio.

3. Et ratione declaratur: nam imprimis quod sit aliqua beatitudo hominis supernaturalis simpliciter de fide certum est, quoniam Dei visio, et amor ac fruitio, quae illam consequuntur, supernaturalia sunt, ut partim insequentibus dicemus, partim constat ex materia de charitate et gratia. Ex quibus etiam certum est, media, quibus illa beatitudo comparatur, esse supernaturalia, resurrectio etiam ad vitam immortalam et gloriae omnino supernaturalis est.

Datur ergo beatitudo supernaturalis. Quod vero præter hanc detur naturalis præter dicta, sect. praecedenti, potest ex altero membro ita declarari: nam si beatitudo illa supernaturalis est, potuit ergo Deus absque miraculo condere hominem non ordinando illum ad illam beatitudinem, nec providendo illi modum, aut media, quibus illam consequi possit, in quo nihil ageret contra, vel præter id, quod debuit est tali naturæ; sed homo sic conditus necessario habiturus esset aliquam beatitudinem naturalem, ad

3. And it is shown with this reasoning: for, first, some supernatural happiness for a human being simply is certain by faith, since the vision, love, and enjoyment of God, which attend it, are supernatural, as we will discuss partly in the following sections and is clear partly from the material on charity and grace. From these it is also certain that the means by which this happiness is acquired are supernatural. Resurrection to immortal life and glory is wholly supernatural. Therefore, supernatural happiness is given. But that natural [happiness] is given in addition to this, besides what was said in the preceding section, can be shown from the other part. For if that happiness is supernatural, then God could have made a human being without a miracle by not ordering him to that happiness nor providing the way or means to him by which he can seek after it. Nothing in this would go contrary to or beyond that which is owed to such a nature. But a human being having been made in that way would necessarily have some natural happiness to which, if he wished, he could reach. Therefore, it is necessary that in addition to supernatural happiness some natural happi-
quam, si velit, possit pervenire: ergo necesse est præter supernaturalum beatitudinem dari in humana natura aliquam beatitudinem naturalem. Major mihi videtur certa, primo ex communi consensu theologorum, qui in hoc sensu distinguunt hominem constitutum in puris naturalibus, ab homine elevato ad finem supernaturalem, et utrumque statum censent esse possibilem, quoniam alias hominem esse ordinatum in hunc finem naturalem, esset debitum ipsi naturæ, et consequenter non esset donum gratiae, ut recte dixit Thomas, 1, 2, q. 110, art. 4, ad 2, gratia enim est supra omne naturæ debitum. Consequens autem est valde falsum, magnamque præbens occasionem errori Pelagii: quia si ordinatio in hunc finem esset naturæ debita, etiam media sufficientia ad eumdem finem deberentur naturæ: nam sicut qui dat formam, dat consequentia ad formam; ita qui dat finem, necesse est ut conferat media conducent-

The major seems certain to me, first from the general consensus of theologians, who in this sense distinguish between a human being constituted in purely natural [conditions] from a human elevated to a supernatural end and they think that either state is possible, because otherwise that a human being is ordered to this natural end would be owed to nature itself and consequently it would not be a gift of grace, as Thomas rightly says in [ST] IaIIæ.110.4 ad 2, for grace is beyond everything owed to nature. Moreover, the consequence is certainly false and presents a great occasion for the Pelagian error. Because if ordination to this end were owed to nature, sufficient means to this end would also be owed to nature. For just as what gives a form gives the consequences to the form, so also what gives the end necessarily is such that it confers the means conducive to that end. Otherwise, such an ordination to such an end would be superfluous, especially because the means and the end ought to preserve proportion between themselves and therefore they

---

65 distinguishing ] distinguunt V.
70 donum ] donorum V.
72 est ] om. V.

35 Supernatural

DE FINE HOMINIS

Disp. IV, sect. III
tia ad illum finem, alia superflua esset talis ordinatio ad talem finem, præser<col b> tim, quia media et finis debent inter se servare proportionem, et ideo sunt ejusdem ordinis et sub eadem providentia cadunt. Propria vero ratio a priori est, quia finis non debetur nisi ratione ipsius esse quasi primarii et substantialis: finis ergo supernaturalis solum correspondet ipsi gratiæ, quæ est participatio veluti substantialis divinae naturae. Sicut ergo haec gratia non est debita humanæ naturæ, ita nec beatitudo illa, quæ est proprius finis illius: sicut ergo potuit humana natura creari absque gratia, et absque ulla promissione illius, salva omni proprietate et providentia tali naturæ debita, ita potuit creari sine ordinatione ad finem supernaturalem.

4. Jam vero probanda est minor propositio principalis rationis, et probatur facile ex dictis supra, quia homo sic creatus haberet aliquem finem ultimum, et illum posset suis actionibus aliquo modo attingere cognoscendo et amando illum: ergo esset capax alicujus beatitudinis proportionatae et connatu-

are of the same order and fall under the same providence. But a proper argument is from the former, because an end is not owed except by reason of itself being as it were primary and substantial. Therefore, a supernatural end only corresponds to grace itself, which is just as a participation in substantial divine nature. Therefore, just as this grace is not owed to human nature, so neither is that happiness, which is its proper end. Therefore, just as human nature could have been created without grace and without any promise of it, save every property and providence owed to such a nature, so it could have been created without ordination to the supernatural end.

4. But now the minor proposition of the principle argument should be shown and it is shown easily from what was said above, because a human being created thus would have some ultimate end and would be able to attain it in some way with his actions by knowing and loving it. Therefore, he would be capable of some happiness proportionate and con-
ralis sibi: ergo in humana natura datur aliqua beatitudine naturalis praeter supernaturalem. Dices: Esto, hoc verum sit de homine in puris naturalibus condito, non inde fit etiam nunc habere hominem hanc beatitudinem naturalem. Respondetur, aliud esse loco qui de re, aliud de nomine: nam quod ad rem attinet, non potest homo nunc non esse capax illius beatitudinis, seu perfectionis, quam haberet in puris naturalibus, quia nunc est eadem natura, et consequenter eadem capacitas: unde quia non destruat naturam, sed perficiat, non privat illam hac perfectione naturali. Et ita certum est in supernaturali beatitudine habiturum hominem omnem perfectionem sibi connaturalem, quomodo probat D. Thomas, 1 p., q. 12, a. 12, hominem videntem Deum non privari cognitione naturali Dei, quin potius maxime in illa perfici; et idem proportionaliter est de amore. Quod vero spectat ad modum loquendi, facile concedemus naturalem beatitudinem non mereri, nunc beatitudinis nomen absolute dictae et sine aliquo addito diminuente, quia in homine elevato ad finem supernatu-

rational to him. Therefore, some natural happiness is given in human nature in addition to supernatural.

You may say: It shall be that this is true of a human being in purely natural conditions but that it does not happen for that reason that he now has this natural happiness. I respond that it is one thing to speak of the thing and another [to speak] of the name. For what pertains to the thing, a human cannot now not have the capacity for such happiness or perfection which he would have in purely natural [condition], because he is now the same nature and consequently [has] the same capacity. Hence, since grace does not destroy nature but perfects, it does not rob [his nature] of this natural perfection. And thus it is certain that in supernatural happiness a human being will have every perfection connatural to him, just as St. Thomas shows in [ST] Ia.12.12 that a human being seeing God is not deprived of natural cognition of God, lest he not rather be especially perfected in that. And it is proportionally likewise with love. But looking at that as a way of speaking, we readily concede that natural happiness does not now merit the name ‘happiness’, absolutely speaking and without diminishment by some added qualifier, because in a human being elevated to a
ralem illa non habet rationem ultimi termini, seu perfectionis ultimæ, propter quod si aliquis homo fortasse illam habere posset absque alia, ut aliqui existimant de pueris excedentibus in solo originali peccato, non posset dici simpliciter beatus, sed potius miser, quia caret beatitudine illa simpliciter, propter quam creatus est.

5. Secundo, dividitur beatitudo in beatitudinem perfectam vitæ futuræ et imperfectam hujus vitæ. Hac utitur frequenter divus Thomas in hac materia, patet 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 2, ad. 4, et art. 5, et quæst. 5, art. 3, et habet fundamentum in Aristotele 1, Ethicor., cap. 9 et 10, et potest accommodari utrique membro præcedentis divisionis. Et ita potest facile reddi illius ratio: nam quod spectat ad supernaturalem beatitudinem, certum de fide est secundum legem ordinariam, et, seclusus privilegiis, non obtineri in hac vita in tota sua perfectione essentiali, ut postea suo loco disputabimus: necesse est tamen ut supernatural end it does not have the nature of an ultimate terminus or ultimate perfection. On account of this if some human perhaps can have that without the other, as some think concerning children who die with only original sin, he could not be called happy strictly speaking. Rather, he would be miserable because he lacks that happiness for the sake of which he was created.

5. Secondly, happiness is divided into the perfect happiness of future life and the imperfect happiness of this life. This division is used frequently by St. Thomas in this matter. It is clear in [ST] IaIIæ.3.2 ad 4, 3.5, and 5.3 and has a foundation in Aristotle in EN I, c. 9 and 10 and can be accommodated to either member of the preceding division. And thus the argument for it can easily be reused. For as far as supernatural happiness is concerned, it is certain by faith that according to ordinary law and apart from special privileges it is not obtained in this life in its complete essential perfection, as we will discuss later in its place. Still, it is necessary that for the duration of this life something is best even relative to the grace through which a
human being is especially conjoined with his supernatural end
insofar as he can through this state. Therefore, that will have
the nature of the happiness of this life, even though in com-
parison to that for which we hope it is imperfect and really is
not happiness, because [the will] does not stop in it but seeks
the future through it. Nevertheless, relative to this state of
life, it can be called happiness because it is its best and ultimate
state.

6. And the same reasoning can easily be applied to natu-
ral happiness which in its rank and order can be acquired with
greater perfection in this life than supernatural happiness in
its order, because a human being can know and contemplate
God in this life in creatures, love him, and exercise other works
that are honestum, which all have greater proportion with cog-
nition and natural love of God, which the separated soul can
have, than the cognition of faith has, for example, with a clear
vision of God. And thus the philosophers placed the natu-
ral happiness of a human being especially through the state
of this life. But the soul having been supposed immortal, it
is necessary that it can also be happy after this life, which is

It is compared with respect to the other member.
vero animi immortalitate, necesse est, ut etiam post hanc vitam possit esse beata, quae dicitur etiam beatitudo hominis ratione partis praecipue: an vero illa etiam beatitudo communicanda esset corpori, stando in providentia naturali, attingemus alio loco. Atque ex hac duplici divisione colligitur ordo servandus in hac materia: nam primo ac praecipue dicendum est de beatitudine supernaturali futuræ vitæ, et obiter attingemus quae pertinent ad beatitudinem imperfectam, scilicet, naturalem hujus vitæ, postea vero de naturali beatitudine in utroque etiam statu dissere-

7. Tertio dividu solet beatitudo in speculativam et practicam: et habet fundamentum in Aristotele Ethic., cap. 7, 8 et 9, et illa etiam utitur D. Thomas, 1, 2, quaest. 3, art. 7, et quaest. 5, art. 4, et alii <col. b> theologi in 4, dist. 49, præsertim Paludanus, quaest. 4, art. 2. Et videtur in eo fundata hae division, quod ad consummatam hominis beatitudinem requiritur perfectio non tantum cognitionis, sed etiam operis, seu, quod idem est, scientia et virtus. Nihilominus also called happiness of a human by reason of the special part. But whether that happiness is also to be communicated to the body, remaining in natural providence, we will touch on in another place. And from this twofold division is gathered the order that should be kept in this matter. For first and foremost should be spoken of the supernatural happiness of the future life and in passing we will touch on those things which pertain to imperfect happiness, namely, the natural [happiness] of this life, but afterwards we will also discuss natural happiness in either state.

7. Thirdly, it is customary to divide happiness into speculative and practical. And this has a foundation in Aristotle in EN X, c. 7, 8, and 9, and it is also used by St. Thomas in [Sent.] IAIIæ.3.7 and 5.4 and by other theologians in [Sent.] IV, dist. 49, especially by Paludanus in q. 4, art. 2. And it seems that this division is founded in the fact that for consummate happiness of a human being is required perfection not only of cognition but also of works, or, what is the same, of [both] science and virtue. Nevertheless, this division is still not com-

DE FINE HOMINIS 431 D ISP. IV, SECT. III
tamen hæc divisio non est admodum necessaria vel propria, quia vel neutra istarum est beatitudo hominis, sed pars beatitudinis ejus, quæ ex utraque confluat: vel certe (quod verius est) si altera tantum est beatitudo, altera non meretur hoc nomen, nisi valde improprie, quatenus est aliquid ad completum statum beatitudinis necessarium. Et ita sentiunt Aristoteles et D. Thomas de felicitate, quia cum non sit propter se, sed propter aliud non habet propriam beatitudinis rationem, ut postea latius videbimus.

8. Quarto dividitur a quibusdam beatitudo in beatitudinem hominis et in beatitudinem tantum potentiae alijus, quomodo beatitudo hominis, verbi gratia, licet non consistat in amore, tamen beatitudo voluntatis dicetur consistere in amore. Sed hæc divisio nec ab aliis auctoribus celebrata est neque ab Scoto probatur aliqua ratione, neque aliquam utilitatem affert ad ea quæ dicenda sunt; et præterea valde improprie dicitur potentia beaticari, persona enim est vel natura, quæ proprie per personam beaticatur. Tandem vel operatio potentiae est consecutio ultimae beatitudinis, a qua nullo modo dividitur beatitudo hominis.

8. Fourthly, happiness is divided by certain people into the happiness of a human being and the happiness of some power alone, in which way, for example, although the happiness of a human does not consist in love, nevertheless the happiness of the will is said to consist in love. But this division is not upheld by other authors nor is it proven with some argument by Scotus nor is it of any use for the things that need to be discussed. And, in addition, it is improper to talk of a power being made happy, for it is a person or a nature which properly is made happy through the person. Finally, the activity of the power is the achievement either of an integrated ultimate end.
finis integra, vel partialis; aut nullo modo est consecutio: si primum, per talem operationem non solum persona, sed etiam potentia beatificatur vel in toto, vel ex parte, quia per talem operationem consequitur aliquo modo suum finem; si vero dicatur secundum, talis operatio nec erit beatitudo hominis, nec personæ, cum sermo sit de beatitudine propria, quæ consistit in consecutione ultimi finis. Solum igitur duæ primæ divisiones ad discursum hujus materiae nobis deserviunt.

**DISPUTATIO V.**

**DE OBJECTO HUMANÆ BEATITUDINIS.**

Expedita quœstione, an sit beatitudo; sequitur explicanda quœstio, quid sit: et quoniam formalis beatitudo, ut infra dicam, in operatione consistit, quæ speciem et rationem suam sumere solet ab objecto, ideo primum omnium de objecto dicendum est; quod præcipue tractat D. Thomas, 1, 2, in tota quœst. 2, et attingit etiam in sequenti, partim in art. 1, partim <46> in 6 et 7, et late 3, contr. Gent., or of a partial [ultimate end]. But there is no achievement in either way. If the first, then through such an action not only the person but also the power is made happy either in whole or in part, because its end is achieved in some way through such an action. But if the second is spoken of, then such an action will be happiness neither of the human nor of the person, since the discussion is of happiness proper, which consists in the achievement of the ultimate end. Therefore, only the first two divisions are useful for our discussion of this material.

**DISPUTATION V.**

**ON THE OBJECT OF HUMAN HAPPINESS.**

Having gone through the question whether happiness exists, it follows that one should explain the question what it is. And since formal happiness, as I will discuss below, consists in activity, what its species and character is is usually taken up from the object. And for that reason the discussion should first of all be about the object. St. Thomas discusses this especially in IaIIæ.2, but also touches on it in the following question, partly in art. 1 and partly in art. 6 and 7, and more thoroughly in SCG
Solum est in hoc principio advertendum, hanc disputationem de objecto, communem esse omni beatitudini tam naturali quam supernaturali vitae-presentis et futurae, conveniunt enim omnes in illa re, in qua beatitudo consistit, quamvis de modo attingendi, vel consequendi illam sit diversitas, ut postea videbimus.

Sectio I.

Utrum omnes creatura sine Deo possint esse sufficient objectum humanae beatitudinis.

1. Hæc quæstio celebris fuit inter antiquos philosophos, inter quos fuit magna opinionum varietas in explicanda hominis beatitudine, de quibus, quia prolixum esset illas referre, legi possunt ex philosophis Aristoteles, lib. 1, Ethic. et 10, Cicero, lib. de Finibus, et in Paradoxis; ex Patribus vero Augustinus 10, de Civit., a principio, et cap. 56, et tractatu de Epicureis et Stoicis: obiter Ambrosius, lib. 2, 10 a cap. 27 usque ad 63. Reliqui doctores in 4, dist. 49. III, from cap. 27 all the way to cap. 63. The remaining doctors [discuss it] in IV, dist. 49. It only remains to be noted in this beginning that this disputation is about the common object of all happiness, natural and supernatural, of the present life and of the future life. For they all agree in this matter (in what happiness consists), although there are differences about the way of attaining or achieving it, as we will see later.

Section I.

Whether all created things without God could be a sufficient object of human happiness.

1. This question was renowned among the ancient philosophers, among whom there was a great diversity of opinions in explaining human happiness. Because relating [all of those opinions] would be prolix, one can read, of the philosophers, Aristotle, EN I and X, and Cicero, de finibus and Paradoxa. And, of the Fathers, Augustine, DCD, from the beginning and cap. 56, and de Epicureis et Stoicis; Ambrosius, de officiis II, cap. 2, in passing; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata II, about

Different writers on human happiness.
One genus of goods.

Unum genus bonorum.

Breviter omnia creatae bona possunt ad tria capita revocari; in primo sunt bona externa, quæ dicuntur bona fortunæ, et intrinsece non afficiunt ipsum hominem, ut sunt quatuor illa, de quibus D. Thomas, disp. 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 4, divitiae, honor, fama, potestas, de quibus non invenio philosophum aliquem asseruisse in illis solis consistere beatitudinem, licet aliqui ea conjunxerint cum aliis bonis. In secundo capite sunt bona corporis, ut sunt sanitas, robust; et ad hoc caput etiam spectat voluptas corporis et indolentia, et in his bonis multi beatitudinem constituunt, ut Carneades apud Ciceronem, lib. 5, de Finib., qui hac vocabant prima bona naturæ: et Aristippus apud Lactantium supra. Et multi in hunc modum interpretantur sententiam Epicuri, ut Augustinus supra, et D. Thomas 3, contra Gent., et Lactantius, et alii dicant esse locutum de

The second genus.

Alterum genus.

Pleasure of the body and freedom from pain also belong in this division. Many constitute happiness in these goods, as Carneades—who calls these the first goods of nature—does according to Cicero in de finibus V. Aristippus also does according to Lactantius (cited above). And many also interpret the view of Epicurus in this way, as Augustine (cited above), St. Thomas in SCG III, and Lactantius. But others say that he was speaking about the pleasure of the soul. In the third order are the goods of the soul. Here we can understand either the

The third genus.

36 The reference in the Latin text does not make sense. But Aquinas does discuss these four goods in turn as candidate ultimate ends in ST IaIIæ.2.1–4.
Ter. genu. animæ voluptate. In tertio ordine sunt bona animæ, per quæ intelligere possumus, aut animam ipsum, et perfectiones illi inærentes, aut etiam extrinsecum aliquod bonum per modum principii vel objecti. Et hoc modo etiam Deus inter bona animæ comprehen- ditur: <col b> hic igitur de omnibus bonis agimus, excepto Deo.  

1. Assert. neg. de bonis fortunæ.  

2. Dico ergo primo, bona fortunæ per se sola non possunt hominem beatificare. Hanc conclusionem tractat bene ex scholasticis Major dist. 49, quæst. 1, et est non solum certa, se etiam evidens. Et probatur primo generatim quia omnia hæc bona imprimis sunt inferioris ordinis; deinde sunt extrinsecæ et nec perficiunt hominem in se ipso, neque possunt esse objecta perfectorum actuum: tertio, non sunt bona stabilia, sed facillime amittuntur, etiam nobis invitis et sine ulla culpa: quarto, his bonis etiam iniqui abundant, imo facilius illa consequuntur: quinto, unum sine alio non satiat appetitum, nec omnia simul sine salute.  

2. Therefore, I say, firstly, that goods of fortune cannot in themselves alone make a human being happy. Of the scholastics, Major treats this conclusion well in [IV], dist. 49, q. 1. Not only is it certain, it is also self-evident. And it is proven generally, firstly, because all these goods are of an especially inferior order. Also, they are extrinsic and do not perfect a human being in himself nor can they be objects of perfect acts. Thirdly, they are not stable goods, but they are very easily lost, even against our will and without any fault [on our part]. Fourthly, these goods also abound in unfairness—indeed, that follows more easily. Fifthly, one without another does not satisfy desire nor all of them together without health.

47 ulla ] om. V.
2. Probatio
singulatim ac
primo de
divitiis.

3. Ratio breviter de singulis, nam primo divitiæ
non sunt propter se appetibles, sed solum ut instru-
menta vita: deinde difficillimi acquiruntur et diffi-
cilius conservantur; et si inordinate, ac propter se
amentur, nunquam satiant appetitum: *avarus enim
nunquam implebitur pecuniis*, Eccl. 15. Et propter
hanc causam Christiana religio non solum non con-
stituit beatitudinem in divitiis, sed etiam constituit
cas despicere, ut beati esse possimus. De qua re legi
potest Augustinus, sermon. 4 ad fratres in Erem.,
et 28, de verbis Apostoli, Gregorius, 3 part. Pas-
toralis, admonit. 27, Chrysostom. homil. 69 et 70,
in Matth. 20. De honore ait Aristoteles, Ethicor. 1,
cap. 5, esse in honorante, non in honorato, et
pendere ex arbitrio ejus, et ideo non posse consis-
tere in illo beatitudinem, ut probant etiam rationes
factæ divitiis: potius ergo est quid consequens beati-
tudinem, quia honor debetur virtuti, et testimonium
ecellens; beatitudo autem debet potius consistere in
alia excellencia, quam in testimonio ejus: et hoc

3. An argument, briefly, for each one, for, firstly, wealth
is not desirable for its own sake but only as an instrument
to life. Also, it is very difficult to acquire and more difficult
to keep. And if it is loved inordinately and for its own sake,
it never satisfies desire, for ‘the miser will never have enough
money’ (Eccl. 15). And for this reason the Christian religion
does not only not place happiness in wealth but decrees to de-
spise it so that we can be happy. Concerning this matter, one
can read Augustine, *ad fratres in Erem.*, sermon 4, and *De ver-
bis Apostoli* 28; Gregory, *Pastoralis*, part. 3, admonit. 27; and
Chrysostom, homil. 69 and 70 on Matthew 20. Concerning
honour, Aristotle says in *EN* I, cap. 5, that it is in honouring,
not in having been honoured. And it depends on his choice
and therefore cannot consist in that happiness, as those argu-
ments made about wealth also prove. Therefore, it is rather
what follows on happiness, because honour and an excellent
report is owed to virtue. But happiness ought rather to consist
in some excellence than in a report of it. And in this way God
is sometimes said to honour his saints according to the reward
of virtue, because he perfects those and makes them excellent

62 Chrysostom. * om. V.*
modo dicitur Deus interdum honorare Sanctos suos in præmium virtutis, quia ita illos perficit, et excellentes facit, ut reddat honore dignissimos, et hoc modo dicitur in psalm. 138: *Nimis honorati sunt amici tui, Deus*; et Sapient. 5: *Existimabamus vitam illorum insaniam, et finem illorum sine honore; ecce quomodo computati sunt inter filios Dei*. Tertio, eadem est ratio de fama, quæ etiam est bonum extrinsecum, et consistit in aliorum opinione, quæ saepè non est in potestate nostra: hoc autem præcipue intelligendum est de fama, seu gloria, quæ potest esse in mente creaturæ: nam illa bona fama, quam habere possimus in mente Dei, ut Cajetan notat 1, 2, quaest. 2, art. 3, conferre potest nostram beatitudinem, saltem causaliter, quia Deus illis conferit beatitudinem, quos bonos et justos cognoscit, et hæc ipsa scientia, quatenus est ipsemet Deus, potest pertinere ad objectum nostræ beatitudinis, quamvis non proprie nos beaticet ea ratione, quæ terminatur ad nos per modum scientiæ visionis: sed quatenus in se est infinitum bonum, ut postea latius declara-
bimus. Hic vero inquiri poterat, an hæc bona honoris, et famæ, quamvis non sint ultimum bonum, sint saltem per se appetibilia, ut finis proximus: sed hæc res pertinet ad 2, 2, quæst. 131. Tandem rationes factæ eodem modo procedunt de potestate dominandi; nam etiam hoc bonum est valde extrinsecum, et inferioris ordinis: non est autem bonum stabile, et auferri potest nobis invitis, et in eo sæpe excellunt homines iniqui. Ac denique non magis potest satiare hominem adeptio famæ et honorum, quam divitiæ. Denique de insufficientia horum bonorum, et moderatione in eis adhibenda, legi potest Chrysostomus, homil. 25, et quæst. 3, ad populum, Augustinus in psalm. sexagesimum tertium, Gregorius 18, Moralium, et Bernardus, serm. 13, in Cant.

2. Assert. 4. Dico secoundo: nullum corporis bonum, etiam voluptas, potest esse objectum humanæ beatitudinis. Hæc assertio etiam est evidens, et ita probata semper fuit a melioribus philosophis et contraria rejecta ut absurda et indigna hominibus, adeo ut Sto-

4. I say, secondly, that no good of the body, even pleasure, can be the object of human happiness. This assertion is also evident and so was always proven by the better philosophers and the contrary rejected as absurd and unworthy of humans, to such an extent that the Stoics said that these inferior goods

About power.
ici dicerent, hæc inferiora commoda non esse appel-
landa bona præter unum, nempe honestum bonum: in quo tamen non recte dixerunt; habent enim hæc
aliquam bonitatem et conjunctionem cum natura: ea
tamen ab homine expetenda non est, nisi cum hones-
tate sit conjuncta. Et hinc facile probatur conclusio,
quia hæc bona corporis sunt infima, et quodammodo
aliis animalibus communia; homo autem ut supra ex
Aristotele dicebamus, non est capax beatitudinis se-
cundum id, quod commune habet cum brutis, sed se-
cundum id, quod in eo divinum est. Deinde, quamvis
homo habeat bona corporis, verbi gratia, salutem,
robur, indolentiam, etc., si tamen careat aliis bonis,
etiam extrinsecis, ut honore et fama, etc., non est
contentus, nec satiatus: ergo non sunt hæc sufficiens
bonum hominis, cum nec per se sola sufficient, nec
secum afferant alia, quà necessaria sunt. Quæ om-
nia eodem modo procedunt de voluptate, de qua pos-
sent alia rationes fieri: nam hæc sæpe est rectæ ra-
tioni contraria, et <col. b> impedit spiritualia bona:
should not be labelled goods except one, namely, bonum hon-
estum. Nevertheless, they did not speak rightly with respect to
these, for these have a certain goodness and conjunction with
nature, yet they are not to be sought by a human being un-
less conjoined with honestas. And from here the conclusion
is easily proven, because these goods of the body are the most
inferior and common in a certain way to other animals. But,
as we were saying above according to Aristotle, a human be-
ing does not have a capacity for happiness according to that
which he has in common with brute animals but according to
that which in him is divine. Next, although a human being has
the goods of the body (for example: health, strength, freedom
from pain, etc.), if, nevertheless, he lacks other goods, even ex-
trinsc ones such as honour, fame, and so on, he is neither con-
tent nor satisfied. Therefore, these are not a sufficient good for
human beings, since they are neither sufficient by themselves
nor bring along other things which are necessary. All these in
a certain way also proceed in the case of pleasure, concerning
which other arguments can be made. For pleasure is often con-
trary to right reason and impedes spiritual goods. In fact, if it

129 de ] om. V.
imo si sit nimia, ipsi etiam corpori nocet, et dolores atque ægritudines affert; si autem sit temperata, majus bonum est virtus, quæ illam moderator: et hæc ipsa moderatio est signum, voluptatem non esse propter se expetendam, sed solum quoad necessarium fuerit, vel ad conservandam naturam, vel ad rectas operationes exercendas. Aliaæ rationes videri possunt iu divo Thoma 3, contra Gentes.

135 et hæc ipsa moderatio est signum, voluptatem non esse propter se expetendam, sed solum quoad necessarium fuerit, vel ad conservandam naturam, vel ad rectas operationes exercendas. Aliaæ rationes videri possunt iu divo Thoma 3, contra Gentes.

5. Dico tertio: etiam bona animi creata per se sola non sufficere ad hominis beatitudinem. Probatur, quia inter hæc bona primum est ipsa anima, quæ quidem est subjectum suæ beatitudinis, non tamen esse potest objectum, quia non potest esse finis ultimus sui ipsius, et ideo non potest in se conquiescere: nam sicut non est a se, ita non potest esse seipsa beata, sed quærer aliiud melius se et optimum, in quo quiescat. Secundo sunt inter hæc bona illa, quæ formaliter inhærent ipsi animæ, ut sunt potentæ suæ et actus, et in his consistere quidem potest formalis beatitudo, non tamen objectiva, quia hæc minus perfecta bona sunt, quam ipsam anima, is excessive, it even harms the body itself and brings along grief and sorrows. But if it is temperate, virtue, which is the moderator, is the greater good. And this very moderation is a sign that pleasure should not be sought for its own sake, but only to the extent that it is necessary either for preserving nature or for exercising the right activities. Other arguments can be seen in St. Thomas, SCG III.

140 5. I say, thirdly, that even created goods of the soul do not suffice in and by themselves for human happiness. It is proven, since among these goods the first is the soul itself, which indeed is the subject of its happiness, yet cannot be the object because it cannot be the ultimate end for itself and therefore cannot take rest in itself. For just as it does not exist from itself, so also it cannot be happy in itself, but seeks something better than itself and best, in which it may rest. Secondly, there are among these goods those which formally inhere in the soul itself (for example, the soul’s powers and acts). And formal happiness does in fact consist in these, yet not objective happiness, since these are less perfect goods than the soul itself, at least with respect to substantial entity. You may say: the be-

3rd negative assertion about created spiritual goods.
About the soul.
About goods inhering in the soul.
An example is resolved.
salem quod entitatem substantialem. Dices: visio beata numeratur in his bonis, et tamen illa posset esse sufficiens objectum beatitudinis: nam si quis videret in alio homine hujusmodi visionem, esset beatus, quia necessario videret Deum. Respondetur, etiamsi concedatur totum, non esse contra conclusionem, quia, si videndo illam visionem, videtur Deus, non ideo erit aliquis beatus, quia videt visionem, sed quia videt Deum: visio autem ipsa erit veluti medium cognitionum ducens in Deum, si autem viso illo actu non necessario videtur Deus, quod fortasse verius est, cessat etiam argumentum, quia tunc illa visio ut objectum, non esset sufficiens ad beatificandum.

6. Ultimo connumerari possunt inter hæc bona Angeli, quatenus sunt objecta, quorum cognitione multum perficitur mens hominis: et hoc etiam non potest sufficere ad beatitudinem hominis, qui est capax majoris boni, ut jam dicam: et quia Angeli non sunt per se principium et causa animæ hominis, et ita nec sunt finis hominis: item, nec sunt, nec continent omne bonum, sed sunt quoddam bonum participato. Visio atific vision is numbered among these goods and yet it can be a sufficient object of happiness. For if anyone were to see in another human being a vision of this sort, he would be happy because he would necessarily see God. It is responded that even if the whole were conceded, it would not be contrary to my conclusion, since, if in seeing that vision God is seen, then that person would not be happy because he saw the vision but because he saw God. But the vision itself will be, as it were, a cognized means leading to God. But if by that act having been seen, God is not necessarily seen, which perhaps is more true, then the argument also fails, because then that vision as object would not be sufficient to make one happy.

6. Lastly, angels can be reckoned among these goods, insofar as they are objects the cognition of which greatly perfects the mind of human beings. And this also cannot suffice for the happiness of a human being, who is capable of a greater good, as I already said, and because angels are not per se principles and causes of the human soul and thus are not the ends for human beings. Nor are they nor do they contain every good, but rather they are a certain participated good. Therefore, they...
tum: non ergo possunt satiare hominem. Unde cum
D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 3, art. 7, dicit, in specula-
tione substantiarum separatatarum positam esse quam-
dam hominis imperfectam beatitudinem, <48> non
est intelligendus de beatitudine essentiali, etiam na-
 turali et hujus vitæ: sed de quadam accidentali perfec-
tione: lege eundem 3, contra Gent., capit. docimo-
septimo et vigesimo-quinto, et lib. quarto, capit. 54.

Obiectio.

Dicet aliquis, majorem perfectionem, atque propor-
tionem habet natura Angelica cum humana, quam
ipse Deus, quia habet majorem similitudinem et
propinquitatem: ergo magis consistit beatitudo hu-
mana in cognitione Angelorum, quam Dei. Respon-
detur negando consequentiam, quia licet habeant ma-
jorem proportionem in perfectione entis, non tamen
in ratione causæ et effectus, et in ratione finis, et rei
ordinatae ad finem, nec etiam in dependentia et con-
nexione necessaria. Unde fit ut sicut potest esse an-
ima sine Angelis non tamen sine Deo, ita potest esse
beata sine Angelis, non tamen sine Deo: fit etiam
inde, ut perfectiorem cognitionem Dei possit homo
cannot satisfy a human being. Hence, when St. Thomas says
in IaIIæ.3.7 that a certain imperfect human happiness is places
in the speculation about separate substances, he should not be
understood [to be referring to] essential happiness, even natu-
ral and of this life. But concerning a certain accidental happi-
ness, read his SCG III, cap. 17 and 25, and IV, cap. 54. Some-
one may say that angelic nature has a greater perfection and
proportion to human nature than God himself, since it has a
greater similarity and nearness. Therefore, human happiness
consists more in the cognition of angels than of God. It is re-
sponded by denying the consequence, since although they have
a greater proportion in the perfection of being, yet not in the
aspects of cause and effect and in the aspect of an end and of a
thing ordered to an end, nor also in necessary dependence and
connection. Hence it happens so that just as the soul can exist
without angels but not without God, so also it can be happy
without angels but not without God. Hence, it also happens as
a result that a human being can naturally attain a more perfect
cognition of God in this life than of angels.
naturaliter assequi in hac vita, quam Angelorum.

7. Ultimo ex his concluditur, omnia bona creatasimul sumpta non posse sufficere ad beatificandum hominem sine Deo, est de fide, ut a fortiori patebit ex his quæ dicemus, sectione sequenti. Ratione probat D. Thomas, 1, 2, quæst. 2, art. 8, ex capacitate potentiarum animæ nostræ, sunt enim universales potentiae: quia habent universalissima objecta: voluntatis objectum est bonum universale, sub quo omne bonum comprehenditur: bona autem creatae sine Deo non complectuntur omne bonum: sed solus Deus est universale bonum: ergo non possunt omnia sine Deo explere capacitatem hominis. Circa quam rationem multa notat Cajetanus, quia videtur in ea committi æquivocatio: nam Deus est bonum universale non in prædicando, sed in causando, et secundum quamdam continentiam eminentalen: objectum autem voluntatis est universale in prædicando: nulla tamen est æquivocatio, sed ex una universalitate fit optimum argumentum ad aliam: nam cum voluntatis objectum sit bonum, et intellectus sit ens, plane compre-

7. Lastly, from these it is concluded that all created goods taken together cannot suffice to make a human being happy without God. This is of the faith, as will be clear a fortiori from the things we will say in the following section. St. Thomas shows it by reason in IaIIæ.2.8 by appealing to the capacity of the powers of our soul, for they are universal powers, because they have most universal objects. The object of the will is universal good, under which every good is comprehended. But created good without God does not include every good. But only God is universal good. Therefore, all these goods without God cannot satisfy the capacity of a human being. Cajetan writes much about this argument, because he seems to commit an equivocation in it. For God is a universal good not in predication but in causation and according to a certain eminential content. But the object of the will is universal in predication. Nevertheless, there is no equivocation, but from one universality is made the best argument for the other. For since the object of the will is the good and of the intellect being, they clearly comprehend God under their objects and thus are in some way capable of God. In turn, God, since he is the highest

DE FINE HOMINIS 444 DISP. V, SECT. I
hendunt Deum sub suis objectis, et ita sunt aliquid modo capaces Dei. Rursus Deus cum sit summum bonum, et summum ens, est praecipua pars, et praecipuum objectum harum potentiarum; ergo fieri non potest, ut homo secundum has potencias fiat beatus in solis creaturis sine Deo, quia deest illi id, quod est supremum, et optimum in capacitate sua.

8. Unde confirmatur, nam in homine operatione secundum rationem duplex facultas considerari potest; altera est speculative ad contemplandum, et hac non potest esse contenta si non perveniat ad Deum, qui est supremum intelligibile. Unde recte Gregorius Nazianzenus, orat. 21, de Laudibus Athanasii: \textit{Intelligibilium omnium (inquit de Deo)} summus est vertex, in quo desiderium omne consistit, ac desegitur, nec supra eum usque fertur, nec enim quipiam sublimius habet, aut habebit unquam mens ulla, quamvis philosophica, et altissima tendens, ac summe curiosa: hoc enim rerum omnium expetendarum extremum est, quo cum pervenerimus, conquiescit om-

8. Hence, it is confirmed, for in a human being acting according to reason, two faculties can be considered. One is the speculative faculty for contemplation. And this cannot be content if it does not reach God, who is the supreme intelligible. Hence, Gregory of Nazianzus rightly says of God in \textit{de laudibus Athanasii}: ‘Of all intelligibles the highest, he is the peak in which every desire consists and to which it is focused, nor is it brought all the way beyond him, for no mind has anything more sublime nor will it ever have, although philosophical, tending to the deepest things, and most diligent. For this is the farthest limit of all things to be sought, by which all speculation is brought to rest when we arrive at it.’ The other faculty of the human mind is for acting according to reason.
nis speculatio. Altera facultas humanæ mentis est ad operandum secundum rationem: hæc autem multo minus potest esse perfecta sine Deo, sed solum quando honestissima operatione fungitur, quæ est amor Dei. Propter quod dicit Eccles. ult.: Deum time, et mandata ejus observa, hoc est enim omnis homo. Nec contra hoc occurrit difficultas alicujus momenti.

SECTIO II.

Utrum solus Deus sine consortio alicujus creaturæ sit sufficiens objectum beatitudinis.

1. Ratio dubitandi. 1. Ratio dubitandi est, quia licet Deus sit supremum hominis bonum, non tamen est unicum ejus bonum: nam præter Deum, indiget homo ut commode vivat, et bonis corporis, et aliis bonis animæ praeter cognitionem Dei, quæ omnia bona naturaliter appetit: ergo non satiatur appetitus hominis Deo: ergo solus Deus non est sufficiens objectum beatitudinis ejus. Nec satisfaciet si quis respondeat, hæc omnia bona contineri in Deo, continentur enim em-

But this even less can be perfect without God, but [can be perfect] only when activity that is most honestum is performed, which is love of God. For this reason, it says at the end of Ecclesiastes [12:13]: ‘Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man.’ Nor does any difficulty of any importance occur against this.

SECTION II.

Whether God alone without the association of any creatures is a sufficient object of happiness.

1. The reason for doubt is that, although God is the supreme good for a human being, nevertheless, he is not his single good. For besides God, a human being needs both bodily goods and other goods of the soul (which naturally desires all these goods) besides cognition of God in order to live advantageously. Therefore, the desire of a human being is not satisfied with God. Therefore, God alone is not a sufficient object of his happiness. Nor will it satisfy if someone responds that all these goods are contained in God, for they are contained eminently,
inenter, non formaliter: homo autem indiget illis prout formaliter illum perficere possunt non tantum secundum eminentiam suam: nec enim erit homo sanus cognoscendo sanitatem, quae est eminenter in Deo, sed habendo in se formalem sanitatem, et sic de aliis. Secundo agut difficultatem, quia ut homo sit beatus, non satis est videre Deum: sed necesse est ut videat se videre, quia alias, nec amare poterat suam beatitudinem, nec de illa gaudere: propter quod quidam dixere, magis consistere beatitudinem nostram in cognitione reflexa, quam in directa: ergo in objecte nostrae beatitudinis non solum continetur Deus, sed visio Dei, illa vero creatura est. Simile argumentum fieri potest de amore, quia, ut simus beati, non satis est videre Deum, sed etiam <49> videre illum ut summum bonum a nobis dilectum, quia non potest beatificare, nisi quod amatur, et quatenus tale esse cognoscitur, quia beatitudo est satietas amoris, et terminus ejus: ergo in illo objecto includitur non solum Deus, sed etiam amor Dei, qui est quid creatum. Simile etiam est, quia ut simus beati, necesse not formally. But a human being needs them as they formally perfect him, not only according to his eminence. For a human being will not be healthy by cognizing the health which is eminently in God, but by having formal health in himself. And likewise concerning the others. Secondly, it increases the difficulty, since in order for a human being to be happy, it is not enough to see God. Rather, it is necessary that he see that he sees, because otherwise he can neither love his own happiness nor rejoice in it. For this reason some said that our happiness consists more in a reflexive cognition than in a direct [cognition]. Therefore, God is not contained alone in the object [of our happiness, but the vision of God. But that is a created thing. A similar argument can be made about love, because in order for us to be happy it is not enough to see God but [we need] also to see him as the highest good loved by us. For nothing can make us happy, unless it is loved and insofar as it is cognized to be such. For happiness is the satiety of love and its terminus. Therefore, not God but also the love of God is included in that object. [But the love] is something created. It is also similar because in order that we be happy it is necessary that we cognize our happiness as lasting perpetually. Other-
est ut cognoscamus beatitudinem nostram perpetua
duraturam, alias non possit excludi omnis timor et
anxietas, prout ad beatitudinem necesse est: ergo
in objecto nostræ beatitudinis includitur non solum
Deus, sed etiam perpetua duratio ejusdem beatitu-
dinis; illam autem duratio creatum quid est. Tan-
dem de beatitudine naturali potest esse difficultas,
quia non potest anima nostra cognoscere Deum nisi
cognoscendo seipsam, vel aliquam aliam creaturam;
imo nec in beatitudine supernaturali (ut multi exis-
timant) potest videri Deus, nisi visis in ipso aliquo
modo creaturis: ergo.

2. In hac questione philosophi omnes sensisse
videntur indigere hominem praeter Deum alius bo-
nis creatis ad felicitatem suam: non tamen accurate
dinstinerunt, aut intellexerunt, an illa bona sint es-
sentialia, ut particularia objecta essentialis beatitu-
dinis, vel solum ut dispositiones quaedam vel pro-
prietates, seu accidentariae perfectiones ejus: quin-
imo etiam inter theologos, Durandus, Holcotus, et
alii, quos citavi, disput. præced., sect. I, contenti illa

2. In this question all the philosophers seem to think that
a human being requires for his felicity other created goods in
addition to God. Nevertheless, they have not accurately distin-
guished or understood whether these goods are essential as par-
ticular objects of essential happiness or only as dispositions of
a certain sort or properties or accidental perfections of hap-
piness. In fact, even among the theologians—Durandus, Holcot,
and others whom I cited in the preceding disputation, sect. I—
after having secured that distinction of happiness insofar as it

Resolutio

quorundam
rejicitur.

DE FINE HOMINIS

448

Disp. V, sect. II
distinctione beatitudinis quatenus significat aut perfectissimam operationem, aut collectionem omnium bonorum, respondent, solum Deum esse objectum beatitudinis priori modo sumptæ, non tamen posteriori modo. Sed hujusmodi distinctio non deservit ad rem explicandam, sed potius confundit illam: nam juxta illam responsionem videtur sequi, Deum nullo modo esse adequatum objectum nostræ beatitudinis, sed partiale, quamvis precipuum. Supponendo ergo sermonem esse de propria, et essentiali beatitudine, advertendum est aliud esse loqui de proprio objecto bono, cujus consecutione beati sumus, alia vero de his, quæ vel cum illo objecto conjuncta sunt, vel ex parte nostra sunt necessaria ad consequendum illud objectum perfecte, et ut in nobis efficiat illos effectus omnes, quos perfecta beatitudo requirit: non enim omnia, quæ hoc modo requiruntur, oportet ut sint proprie objecta beatitudinis essentialis, sicut non omnia quæ sunt necessaria ad introductionem, vel conservationem formæ, nec etiam quæ illa consequuntur, pertinent ad essentiale compositum.

Indicates either the most perfect activity or the collection of all goods, they respond that God alone is the object of happiness taken in the former way, but yet not in the latter way. But a distinction of this sort does not serve to explain the matter, but rather confuses it. For according to that response it seems to follow that God is in no way an adequate object of our happiness, but a partial [object], although the principal one. Therefore, in supposing the discussion to be about proper and essential happiness, it should be noted that it is one thing to talk about the proper good object by the attainment of which we are happy but another thing [to talk] about those things which either are conjoined with that object or are necessary on our part for attaining that object perfectly and as it effects in us all those effects which perfect happiness requires. For it is not necessary that all those things which are required in this way are properly objects of essential happiness, just as not all those things which are necessary for the introduction or conservation of a form—nor also those things which follow it—pertain to the essential composite.
3. Therefore, it should be said that absolutely and strictly speaking that God alone is the object of our essential happiness and in this way he suffices for our happiness without the association of creatures. I think this assertion certain and in that way all the theologians consent to it. And it is gathered from the way of speaking in the holy Scripture. First, from those places in which God alone is our ultimate end, as we discussed above in disp. 3, sect. 1. For the ultimate end and the object of happiness are the same thing. Next, from those locutions: ‘They called the people happy to whom these things are; happy the people of whom the Lord is its God’ (Ps. 144[:15]). And: ‘God is my portion for eternity’ (Ps. 73[:26]). And: ‘Let not the wise one boast in his wisdom, nor the strong in his strength, but let him boast in this, that he knows and understands me’ (Jer. 9[:23–24]). These words of Christ also compose John 17[:3]: ‘This is eternal life, that they may know you, the only true God. . . .’ For many of the Fathers interpreted this place to be about true happiness, as I will indicate in its place. [Gregory of] Nyssa also taught this truth in De beat., beatitude 6, and he gathers it from that promise of Christ ‘because they will see God’. Augustine discusses the same [truth]
bunt. Optime eamdem tractat, et ex sacra Scriptura confirmat Augustinus, lib. 22, de Civitate, cap. 30, præmium, inquit, virtutis erit ipse, qui virtutem dedit. Colligitur etiam ex Extravaganti Benedicti XI, quam refert Castro, verbo Beati, ubi definit beatitudinem nostram consistere in visione et fruitione Dei. Unde a posteriori confirmari potest. Nam Christus Dominus in via fuit absolute et simpliciter beatus propter hanc visionem et fruitionem, etiamsi affectus est multis malis pœnæ; et similiter animæ sanctæ sunt absolute beatae, quamvis careant corporibus, et consequenter alii bonis corporis. Et addere possumus, si fingamus non esse in mundo aliam creaturam, nisi unam animam videntem et amantem Deum illam fuisse futuram sufficienter beatam, et tamen nec cognosceret, nec frueretur alia creatura; quamvis autem supponat necessario existentiam ipsius animæ et facultatum ejus, non tamen per modum objecti, sed subjecti beatitudinis, ut supra dicebamus, ipsa non est finis sui, sed se ipsam debet in Deum refferre. Cujus etiam signum est, quia etiamsi fin-
best and confirms it from sacred Scripture in De civ. Dei XXII, c. 30: ‘the reward of virtue’, he says, ‘will be he who gave virtue’. It is also gathered from the Extravagans of Benedict XI, to which Castro refers under the word ‘the happy’, where he determines that our happiness consists in the vision and enjoyment of God. Whence it can be confirmed a posteriori. For the Lord Christ was absolutely and strictly speaking happy in this life on account of this vision and enjoyment, even though he was affected with many evil punishments. And, similarly, the holy souls are absolutely happy, even though they lack bodies and consequently the other bodily goods. And we can add that if we imagined there to be in the world no other creature but one soul seeing and loving God, it would be sufficiently happy and yet would neither cognize nor enjoy other creatures. Moreover, although it necessarily assumes the existence of the soul itself and its faculties, yet not through the mode of object but of the subject of happiness, as we said above, it is not its end but it ought to refer itself to God. It is also a sign of this that even if we were to imagine such a soul not to cognize itself, but only to see God and to enjoy him, it would be happy by this alone, since its ultimate end was achieved.
geremus talem animam non cognoscere seipsam, sed solum videre Deum, ipsoque frui, hoc ipso solo esset beata, quia consecuta est ultimum finem suum.

4. Atque hinc reddi potest ratio hujus veritatis, quia ut Aristoteles ait 1, Ethicor., capite septimo, finis perfectus simpliciter est qui <50> propter se semper, et nunquam ob aliud est; talis autem est felicitas: sed solus Deus est perfectus finis, propter se amandus, et reliqua omnia propter ipsum: ergo solus ipse est objectiva beatitudo simpliciter humanæ naturæ. Quod in hunc modum confirmatur et explicatur. Nam licet in beatitudine multa requirantur bona ad completum statum ejus, tamen, ut recte Augustinus dixit, dicto libro de Civitate, omnia debent in laudem Dei ordinari, illumque tanquam finem ultimum respicere; id autem, quod est finis, et ultimum bonorum omnium, illud est proprium et per se objectum beatitudinis. Confirmatur præterea ex Aristotele eodem 1, Ethicorum, capite septimo: perfectum bonum est, quod per se est sufficiens; sufficiens autem per se, illud esse ponimus, quod solum

4. And from here an argument for this truth can be delivered, since as Aristotle says in EN I, c. 7, the perfect end, strictly speaking, is that which is always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. But such a thing is felicity. But God alone is the perfect end who should be loved for his own sake and all other things for his sake. Therefore, he alone is the objective happiness, strictly speaking, of human nature. This is confirmed and explained in this way: for although with regard to happiness many goods are required for its complete state, nevertheless, as Augustine rightly said in the cited book of De civ. Dei, all things ought to be ordered to the glory of God and to respect him as the ultimate end. That, moreover, which is the end and the ultimate of all goods is the proper and per se object of happiness. It is confirmed in addition from Aristotle in the same book I of EN, c. 7: a perfect good is that which is per se sufficient. But we consider that per se sufficient which alone and removed from all the other [goods] makes life desirable and lacking in nothing. But we think felicity to

It is confirmed, first.

It is confirmed, secondly.
Moreover, in *EN* X, c. 2, he adds: _nullius indigentem_: _hujusmodi autem felicitatem ex nullius_: _addit cum Platone, summum bonum per se, et nullo addito tale esse, et non fieri expetibilius propter additum alterius boni_; nam _hoc ipso_, inquit, _non esse summum bonum_. Unde concluditur ratio: _nam Deus per se solus est summum bonum simpliciter, et perfecta cum ipso conjunctio, seu illius adeptio est per se maxime expetibilis et sufficiens ad perfectionem hominis, non solum quia in Deo continetur omne bonum eminenter, sed etiam quia secum affert quidquid ad beatitudinem hominis necessarium esse potest: ergo solus Deus est essentiale objectum nostræ beatitudinis. Et confirmatur tandem, _quia solus Deus est primum hominis principium_: ergo _solus etiam est ultimus finis ejus; ergo in reditu ad ipsum et in consecutione ejus stat hominis beatitudo_. Lege Augustinum 5, Confession., capite quarto, et decimotertio de Trinitate, capite septimo, be something of this kind. Moreover, in *EN* X, c. 2, he adds with Plato that the highest good is such _per se_ and with nothing added to it and does not become more desirable on account of adding another good. For ‘by that fact’, he says, ‘it would not be the highest good’. Whence the argument is concluded: for God alone is _per se_ the highest good, strictly speaking, and a perfect union with him or an attainment of him is _per se_ most desirable and sufficient for the perfection of a human being, not only because every good is eminently contained in God but also because he brings along with himself whatever can be necessary for the happiness of a human being. And it is confirmed, finally, because God alone is the first principle of a human being. Therefore, he alone is also the human being’s ultimate end. Therefore, the happiness of a human being remains in returning to him and in the attainment of him. Read Augustine, *Conf.* V, c. 4, and *De Trin.* XIII, c. 7, and letter 57 and St. Thomas, *SCG* c. 37.

155 _in_] *om. A.*
et epistola 57, et D. Thomam, contra Gent., cap. 37.

5. Atque ex rationibus factis colligitur, asser- tionem positam veram esse, tum in beatitudine sup ernaturali perfecta vitæ futuræ, de qua maxime pre cedunt omnia dicta, et potest de illa peculiari ratio reddi, quia illa beatitudo propriè respondet gratiæ, tanquam sibi connaturalis: gratia autem est quæ- dam propria participatio divinae naturæ: et ideo si cut divina natura seipsa est beata, ita propria beatitudo respondens huic gratiæ, consistit in conjunc tione ad eamdem divinam naturam per altissimam participationem illius visionis, qua ipsa se fruitur: tum etiam de beatitudine supernaturali, qualis in hac vita imperfecte haberi potest; quia solus Deus est supra omnia diligendus, omniaque ad hunc amorem, et ad ipsius Dei consecutionem referenda sunt, ut vere pertineant ad nostram perfectionem: tum denique de felicitate, seu beatitudine naturali, quæ habere posset vel in hac vita, vel in anima separata propter eamdem rationem, nam etiamsi homo

5. And from the arguments that have been made it is gathered that the posited assertion is true: [i] in the case of the perfect supernatural happiness of the future life, concerning which all the things that were said are especially forceful. And a special argument can be delivered concerning it: for that happiness properly answers to grace as it is connatural to it. But grace is a certain proper participation of the divine nature. And therefore just as divine nature itself is happy, so a proper happiness responding to this grace consists in union with that same divine nature through the highest participation of that vision by which he enjoys himself. [ii] In the case of the kind of supernatural happiness that can be had imperfectly in this life. For God alone is to be loved beyond all other things and all things should be referred to this love and to the attainment of God himself in order for them to truly belong to our perfection. Finally, [iii] in the case of the felicity or natural happiness which can be had either in this life or in the separated soul on account of the same reason. For even if a human being had been made in accordance to purely natural [states], he ought

158 et ] om. V.
esset conditus in puris naturalibus, deberet Deum supra omnia diligere, et in eum ut in ultimum finem omnia referre.

An realis existentia pertineat ad objectum beatitudinis. Quidam enim assurrunt, quod licet de ratione Dei, ut Deus est, sit existere, tamen si præcise consideretur id quod necessarium est in illo, sic non necessario includi existentiam rei in seipso, sed solum esse objective in mente. Quod per hanc conditionalem explicatur: nam si intelligamus beatitudinem hominis consistere in visione pulchræ imaginis, si Deus conservaret in oculo illam visionem destruendo objectum in esse existentis, tam beatus maneret homo sicut antea; quia ex parte sua codem modo attingeret illud objectum, atque ita realis existentia illius objecti non esset necessaria ad talem beatitudinem, sed solum objectiva: ergo si per impossibile fingeremus, cognitionem, aut visionem Dei manere in intellectu to love God beyond all other things and to refer all things to him as to an ultimate end.

6. But someone will doubt here whether God is the object of our happiness as really existing on the part of the thing or only as objectively existing in a human mind. For some assert that although it is of the nature of God as he is God to exist, still, if that which is necessary for that [happiness] were precisely considered, it would not in that way necessary include the existence of the thing in itself but only objective being in the mind. This is explained through this conditional: for if we understand the happiness of a human being to consist in the vision of a beautiful image, if God were to conserve that vision in the eye while destroying the object with regard to the being of existence, then the human being would remain just as happy as before, because for his part he achieves that object in the same way. And thus the real existence of that object would not be necessary for such happiness, but only objective [existence]. Therefore, if, per impossibile, we imagined that the cognition or vision of God to remain in our intellect, even if

6. Sed dubitabit hic aliquis, an Deus sit objectum nostræ beatitudinis ut realiter existens a parte rei, vel solum ut objective existens in mente humana. Quidam enim assurrunt, quod licet de ratione Dei, ut Deus est, sit existere, tamen si præcise consideretur id quod necessarium est in illo, sic non necessario includi existentiam rei in seipso, sed solum esse objective in mente. Quod per hanc conditionalem explicatur: nam si intelligamus beatitudinem hominis

Whether real existence pertains to the object of happiness. Denying pleases certain people.

DE FINE HOMINIS 455 DISP. V, SECT. II
nóstro, etiamsi Deus non existeret eodem modo, essemus beati, quia haberemus eamdem formam beatificam: ergo ex præcisa ratione beatitudinis non requiritur existentia realis in illo objecto, sed solum esse objective. Cui modo dicendi videtur favere Durandus, in quarta, distinctione quadragesima sexta, quæstione prima, numero octavo.

Oppositum convincitur. 7. Sed hac opinio videtur mihi valde falsa, et apertam repugnantiam involvens, quia Deus est objectum nostræ beatitudinis, quatenus est primum ens ac purissimus actus et perfectissimus: ergo necesse est ut in ejus ratione, etiam ut objectum est talis beatitudinis, includatur quod sit ens necessarium per essentiam, atque adeo quod includat, non solum objectivam, sed realem, et veram essentiam: quin potius in hoc objecto non sunt hac duo separabilia, quia illud, quod maxime de illo cognoscitur, aut in ipso videtur, est quod existat, et sit suum esse: et ideo etsi fortasse in aliis rebus, et præsertim in objectis sensibilibus posset fieri a Deo ut maneat intuitiva <51> visio sine reali existentia objecti, tamen in hac Dei

God were not to exist in that way, we would be happy because we would have the same form that makes us happy. Therefore, real existence is not required in that object according to the precise nature of happiness, but only objective being. Durandus seems to favour this way of talking in IV, dist. 46, q. 1, n. 8.

7. But this opinion seems to me very false and involving an obvious repugnance, because God is the object of our happiness, insofar as he is the first being and most pure and perfect act. Therefore, it is necessary that in his nature—also as he is the object of such happiness—there is included that he is a necessary being through essence and for that reason that he includes not only objective but real and true essence. Indeed, rather, these two are not separable in this object, because that which is especially cognized concerning him or is seen in him is that he exists and that this is his being. And therefore although perhaps in other things and especially in sensible objects God can bring it about that the intuitive vision remain without the real existence of the object, nevertheless, in this vision of God it involves a manifest contradiction. Not only
visione manifestam contradictionem involvit, non
solum quia ex parte Dei repugnat non esse, sed etiam,
quia ex parte visionis repugnat manere, et non terminari
ad ens necessario existens ut sic: imo etiam in
cognitione abstractiva Dei, quae vera sit et scientifica,
repugnat esse, et non fieri circa ens quoddam neces-
sarium, quod a se essentialiter existat.

220
8. Ad rationes dubii in principio positas. Ad
primam fatemur, ad completum statum beati-
dinis requiri alia bona: illa tamen non sunt proprie ob-
jecta essentialis beati, quia nec sunt finis ult-
timus, nec pars ejus, sed ad alii ut finem ultimum
ordinantur, et ab illo quasi a primo fonte originem
ducunt. Ad alteram vero rationem dubii simili-
respondet, ad summum probare aliquid creatum re-
quiri ex parte nostra, ut ipso Deo perfecti efficiamur
beati, quid autem illud sit, et quae alia bona in beati-
dine requirantur ad completum statum ejus, postea
est latius explicandum in singulis beati, quae

225
230
235
been.}

because it is repugnant on the part of God not to be, but also
because on the part of vision it is repugnant to remain and not
to be terminated in a being necessarily existing as such. Indeed,
also in the case of abstractive cognition of God, which is true
and scientific, it is repugnant for it to be and not to take place
concerning a certain necessary being which essentially exists
from itself.

8. To the reasons for doubting posited in the beginning.
In response to the first we admit that other goods are required
for the complete state of happiness. Nevertheless, they are not
properly objects of essential happiness, because they are not
the ultimate end nor parts of it, but are ordered to something
else as to an ultimate end and from that, as it were, they draw
out the origin from the first font. But it is responded similarly
to the other reason for doubt: at most it proves that something
created is required on our part so that we can be made perfectly
happy by God himself. Moreover, what that is and what other
goods are required with respect to happiness for its complete
state needs to be explained more thoroughly afterwards with
regard to each individual state of happiness.
Sectio III.

Utrum Deus secundum totum, quod in se habet, vel secundum speciale attributum sit objectum humanae beatitudinis.

Triplex dubium in praesenti quest.

Tria sunt, de quibus potest in hoc dubio inquiri.

1. Primo de divinis attributis et absolutis perfectionibus Dei. Secundo de divinis relationibus. Tertio de ideis seu actionibus liberis, qui in Deo existunt: de quibus sigillatim dicam pauca.

Punctum I.

An omnia, vel aliquod attributum Dei, pertineat ad objectum beatitudinis.

1. Sententia. 1. Circa primam partem duo possunt excogitari dici modi: primus est juxta opinionem Scoti discernens, seu distinguentis attributa divina ab essentia Dei, quam ex parte sequuntur aliqui Thomistæ, qui licet non admittant distinctionem ex natura rei inter attributa et essentiam, nihilominus dicunt attributa

2 attributum ] arbitrium V.

De fine hominis

Section III.

Whether God is the object of human happiness according to everything that he is or according to a special attribute.

There are three things into which we can inquire in this doubt.

The first concerns the divine attributes and absolute perfections of God. The second the divine relations. The third the ideas or free actions that exist in God. I will say a little bit about each one.

Point I.

Whether all or some attribute of God pertain to the object of happiness.

1. Concerning the first part, two ways of speaking can be imagined. The first follows the opinion of Scotus in speaking or in distinguishing the divine attributes from the essence of God.

This is followed in part by some Thomists, who although they do not admit a distinction ex natura rei between attributes and essence, say, nevertheless, that the attributes are beyond the
esse extra rationem essentialem Dei, et unum attributum esse extra essentialem alterius prior quam secundum nostrum modum intelligendi in re ipsa fundamentum concipi naturam divinam, ut constituentem essentialiter Deum, et ideo postulantem talia attributa, quæ re ipsa cum ipsa identificantur. Juxta hanc ergo opinionem <col. b> in præsenti dici potest, Deum esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis præcise secundum eam rationem, quæ in eo intelligitur esse essentialis, quia secundum illam præcise constituitur in esse Dei: sicut, si homo ut homo esset objectum beatitudinis humanæ, intelligeremus solam essentiam animæ et corporis pertinere proprie ad tale objectum; proprie etates vero, sicut sequuntur essentiam, ita etiam pertinere ad quamdam beatitudinis perfectionem, seu objecti illius, non vero ad primaram rationem ejus. Quam sententiam attigit Scotus, in 1, distinctione 1, quæstione 1, et quamvis ibi eam non tractet, colligi tamen potest ex fundamento ejus.

2. Secundus modus dicendi est, Deum esse objectum nostræ beatitudinis secundum quoddam speciale essential nature of God and that one attribute is beyond the essential [nature] of another before, according to our way of understanding which is founded in the thing itself, the divine nature is conceived as essentially constituting God and for that reason requiring attributes of the sort that are in reality identified with him. Therefore, according to this opinion one can say about the present case that God is the object of our happiness precisely according to that nature which is understood to be essential in him, because according to it happiness is constituted precisely in the being of God. Just as, if a human being as human being were the object of human happiness, we would understand the essence alone of the soul and of the body to pertain properly to such an object. But just as properties follow essence, they in that way also pertain to a kind of perfection of happiness or of its object, but do not pertain to its primary nature. Scotus touches on this view in I, dist. 1, q. 1, and, although he does not discuss it there, it can, nevertheless, be gathered from his foundation.
attributum, vel secundum bonitatem suam. Hanc opinionem attigit Medina 1, 2, quæstione 3, art. 5, ubi inquirit, cum beatus judicet Deum esse omnipotentem, esse trinum, et unum, in quo judicio consistat beatitudo. Respondet consistere in hoc quam bonus Deus Israel his qui recto sunt corde, cætera vero judicia, inquit, quæ habent beati, vel sunt præmia fidei, vel necessario conjuncta. Fundamentum esse potentem, quia Deus est objectum beatitudinis nostræ ut est summum bonum, quia tale objectum ut est ultimus finis simpliciter ac perfectissimus: ultimus autem finis, et summum bonum idem sunt, ut Aristoteles dixit 1, Eth., cap. 7. Et ideo ex sententia omnium beatitudo consistit in adeptione summí boni: ergo Deus ratione suæ bonitatis, et non ratione aliorum attributorum, est objectum nostræ beatitudinis.  

3. Utramque opinionem falsam existimo, et sic dicendum, Deum secundum omnia sua attributa, et absolutas perfectiones esse objectum proprium, ac primarium nostræ beatitudinis perfectæ, quam speramus in futura vita. Quæ sententia fundari potest in according to his goodness. Bartolomé de Medina touches on this opinion in IaIIæ.3.5, where he asks in which judgement happiness consists, since the happy judge God to be omnipotent and to be three and one. He responds that it consists in this: ‘How good is God to Israel, to those who are of a right heart’. But the remaining judgements that the happy have, he says, are either gifts of faith or necessarily conjoined. The foundation can be that God is the object of our happiness insofar as he is the highest good, because such an object is the most perfect and unqualifiedly ultimate end. But the ultimate end and the highest good are the same thing, as Aristotle said in EN I, cap. 7. And for this reason from the view of everyone that happiness consists in the attainment of the highest good it follows that God is the object of our happiness by reason of his goodness and not by reason of other attributes. 

3. I think each view is false. One should instead say that God according to all his attributes and absolute perfections is the proper and perfect object of our perfect happiness which we hope to have in our future life. This view can be founded in those words from 1 John 3:2: ‘We shall be like him and
we shall see him as he is.’ Therefore, as God is through his essence most wise, omnipotent, and so forth, we will also see him as such. Therefore, God insofar as he in his essence encompasses all goods will be the object making us happy. Secondly and principally, I argue from reason, for God is not the object of our happiness except as he is the supreme intelligible being and the supreme good formally or eminently containing all other goods. For in that way—but in no other way—he can fulfill the capacity of our intellect and will. But God is not a being of this kind after some special attribute, but insofar as he is an immense ocean of all perfection. Therefore, insofar as he is the object of our happiness he formally includes every absolute attribute which expresses a simple perfection strictly speaking and eminently includes all the other perfections. This is shown, thirdly, because the contrary views arise from false foundations. For in the first place it is false that the divine attributes are distinguished ex natura rei from the divine essence, as was shown more thoroughly when discussing St. Thomas’s ST Ia.3. It is also false that these attributes which express perfection strictly speaking are not included in
tenditur latius circa quæst. 3 primæ part. D. Thomas, falsum est etiam, hac attributa, quæ dicunt perfectionem simpliciter, non includi in conceptu essentiali Dei adequato, quia Deus ex præcisa essentia sua est ens infinitum intensive in perfectione essentiali, et ideo ex eadem præcisa essentia complectitur omnem perfectionem simpliciter, quia illud ens, quod formaliter afficitur his perfectionibus, quæ vocantur simplices simpliciter, perfectius est in genere entis intensive quam si illas formaliter excludat: et ideo tam essentiales sunt istæ propositiones, Deus est sapiens, Deus est justus, sicut hæc, Homo est animal rationale. Unde retorquendo argumentum, cum Deus sit objectum beatitudinis nostræ ratione suæ perfectionis essentialis, necesse est ut in hoc objecto formaliter includantur omnia attributa.

4. Præterea secunda opinio confingit summam Dei bonitatem esse speciale attributum Dei ab aliis distinctum: nam revera non est nisi infinita perfectionem simpliciter, quæ dicunt perfectionem essentiali, essential perfection. And for that reason he encompasses every perfection strictly speaking according to the same essence taken precisely, since that being which is formally affected by these perfections (which are called simple strictly speaking) is more perfect in the genus of intensive being that if those were formally excluded. And therefore these propositions—namely, that God is wise and that God is just—are just as essential as this one—namely, that human beings are rational animals. Hence, by turning back the argument, since God is the object of our happiness by reason of his essential perfection, it is necessary that all attributes are formally included in this object.

4. Furthermore, the second opinion imagines the highest goodness of God to be a special attribute of good distinct from his other attributes. For in reality it does not exist unless it

Arguitur specialiter contra 2. sententiam.
tio ejus consurgens, nostro modo intelligendi, ex omnibus attributis; quod in hunc modum explicari potest: nam sicut in nobis, ita in Deo duplex bonitas intelligi potest, vel physica, vel moralis, et neutra in nobis est specialis aliqua virtus ab aliis distincta; sed bonitas physica est ipsamet entitativa perfectio, quæ consurgit ex principiis naturæ; bonitas autem moralis integra, nihil aliud esse potest, quam collectio omnium virtutum, vel in habitu, vel in actu, et utraque bonitas suo modo reperitur in Deo; nam et est perfectissimum ens in genere entis, et est summum bonum in genere moris, quæ bonitas in ipso nihil aliud est, quam perfectio ejus essentialis, ratione cujus essentialiter est summæ justæ, summa misericors, etc.; ergo Deus, ut summum bonum, formaliter includit omnes perfectiones: ergo retorquendo etiam argumentum, ex eo quod Deus est objectum beatitudinis et summum bonum, non sequitur aliquod attributum esse extra rationem objecti illius, sed potius sequitur omnia includi in ipso formaliter.\textless col. b\textgreater

is an infinite perfection of him arising, in our way of understanding, from all the attributes. This can be explained as follows: just as in us, so also two kinds of goodness can be understood in God, namely, physical goodness and moral goodness. Neither goodness is some special virtue distinct from others in us. Rather, physical goodness is the entitative perfection itself which arises from the principles of nature and complete \textit{integra} moral goodness cannot be anything other than the collection of all virtues, whether in habit or in act. Each goodness is found in its way in God. For he is both the most perfect being in the genus of being and the highest good in the genus of morality. This goodness is in him nothing other than his essential perfection by reason of which he is essentially most just, most merciful, and so forth. Therefore, God as highest good formally includes all these perfections. Therefore, in also turning back the argument according to which God is the object of happiness and the highest good, it does not follow that some attribute is beyond the nature of that object but rather it follows that all the attributes are formally included in it.

\textbf{DE FINE HOMINIS} 463 \textbf{Disp. V, sect. III}
Arguitur iterum contra eandem. 5. Quocirca falsum etiam est, quod illa opinio secunda fingebat, scilicet, esse in beatis varia judicia horum attributorum quœ non pertinent ad ipsam beatitudinem, sed cum illa conjuncta sunt: hæc, inquam, falsa fictio est, quia sicut in Deo secundum se hæc attributa non sunt multa, sed una simpliciter perfectio Dei, ita in beato ut sic, id est, ut intuente Deum, non sunt varia judicia de his attributis, sed unico, et simplicissimo, quo intuetur Deum sicuti est, judicat Deum esse omnipotentem, sapientem, etc., quia, ut infra dicemus, videre Deum, non est videre unum vel aliquid attributum ejus, sed videre totam Dei naturam formaliter includentem hæc attributa. Et per hæc responsum est dictis opinionibus.

Eadem vera sententia procedit etiam de beatitudine supernaturali huius vitæ. 6. Atque hinc facile intelligitur, quomodo Deus sit objectum illius imperfectæ beatitudinis supernaturalis, quam in hac vita consequi possimus: nam idem Deus secundum totam beatitudinem suæ perfectionis formalis et bonitatis, qui beatificat in patria, est etiam objectum beatitudinis ejus, sed ibi ut consecu-

5. For this reason what that second opinion imagines—namely, that there are in the happy various judgements about these attributes which do not pertain to happiness itself but that are conjoined with ti—is also false. This is, I say, a false imagining, because just as these attributes in God according to himself are not multiple but are, strictly speaking, one perfection of God, so also in a happy person as such—that is, as intellectually seeing God—there are not various judgements about these attributes but he judges God to be omnipotent, wise, and so forth by a singular and most simple judgement by which he intellectually sees God as he is. For, as we will say below, to see God is not to see one or another of his attributes but to see the whole nature of God that formally includes these attributes. And through these things I respond to the mentioned opinions.

6. And from here it is easy to understand in what way God is the object of that imperfect supernatural happiness which we can achieve in this life. For the same God according to the whole happiness of his formal perfection and goodness who makes one happy in the afterlife is also the object of his happiness [in this life]: there as attained, here as hoped for; there as
tus, hic ut speratus: ibi ut visus, hic ut amatus. Solum est considerandum, si in hoc objecto consideretur ratio sub qua attingitur a nostris potentiis, vel actibus, sic solent assignari speciales, ac diversae rationes, sub quibus attingitur, scilicet, ratio veri respectu intellectus, et ratio boni seu appetibilis respectu voluntatis. Quæ due rationes conveniunt Deo secundum totam perfectionem essentialem, quam includit, nam ratione illius et summe intelligibilis est, et summe amabilis; tamen ratio, quæ nos beatificat, non est hæc ratio, sub qua loquendo, ut loquimur, de beatitudine objectiva, sed est ipsa infinita perfectio, quæ in objecto attingitur: illa enim est quæ nos satiat, quia omne bonum continet: illa vero ratio, sub qua, non addit objecto aliquam realem perfectionem, sed sumitur ex ordine ad modum operandi nostrarum potentiarum. Quæ notanda sunt pro his, quæ dicitur de formali beatitudine. Denique quod attinet ad naturalem beatitudinem ex dictis colligi potest quid in hoc puncto dicendum sit, proportione servata: est enim Deus objectum illius secundum totam per-

It also proceeds in the case of natural happiness.
fectionem, quæ de illo cognosci potest ex principiis naturæ, quod eisdem rationibus ostendi potest.

PUNCTUM II.

An pertineant divinæ relationes.

7. Circa secundum punctum de relationibus, 7. With respect to the second point about relations, which is a difficult point, we suppose in the first place that it has no place in natural happiness, because it is clear that God as being three cannot be naturally cognized. Likewise, the imperfect happiness of this life, even if it is supernatural, can come about without cognition of the divine relations, since God as the supernatural end can be cognized by means of faith and can be loved beyond all other things by means of infused charity even if the Trinity of persons is not distinctly cognized. And the reason in both cases is that God can be cognized as infinite good by abstractive cognition even when the relations are not cognized. And for this reason every imperfect happiness which is founded in abstractive cognition alone does not necessarily include the aforementioned relations in its object.

Non procedit punctum quoad beatitudinem viæ.

5 habere locum in beatitudine naturali, quia constat Deum, ut trinum, non posse naturaliter cognoscire. Similiter beatitudo imperfecta hujus vitæ, etiamsi supernaturalis sit, consistere potest sine cognitione divinarum relationum, quia potest Deus, ut finis supernaturalis, fide cognosci, et charitate infusa super omnia amari, etiamsi Trinitas personarum distinente non cognoscatur. Et ratio utriusque est, quia cognitione abstractiva potest Deus ut infinitum bonum cognosci, non cognitis relationibus: et ideo omnis beatitudo imperfecta, quae in sola abstractiva cognitio fundatur, non necessario includit in objecto suo praedictas relationes.

7. With respect to the second point about relations, which is a difficult point, we suppose in the first place that it has no place in natural happiness, because it is clear that God as being three cannot be naturally cognized. Likewise, the imperfect happiness of this life, even if it is supernatural, can come about without cognition of the divine relations, since God as the supernatural end can be cognized by means of faith and can be loved beyond all other things by means of infused charity even if the Trinity of persons is not distinctly cognized. And the reason in both cases is that God can be cognized as infinite good by abstractive cognition even when the relations are not cognized. And for this reason every imperfect happiness which is founded in abstractive cognition alone does not necessarily include the aforementioned relations in its object.
Altera quæstio est, quid viso Deo, necessario videatur: altera quid visum pertineat ad objectum beatitudinis.

8. Difficultas ergo est de beatitudine perfecta, quæ consistit in clara Dei visione. Quam difficultatem attigerunt Scotus, in I, dist. 1, quæst. 2, et Cajetanus 2, 2, qæst. 2, art. 8, tractantes aliam quæstionem, an possit videri essentia non visis relationibus, quam fere confundunt cum præsenti quæstione: sunt tamen revera difficultates diverse, nam etiamsi fateamur visionem essentiale habere necessariam connexionem cum visione relationum, non videtur inde sequi relationes pertinere ad objectum nos beatificans, quia etiam cognitio creaturarum habet necessariam connexionem cum comprehensione essentiae, qua Deus beatus est, et alio modo cum visione intuitiva, qua nos speramus esse beatos, et nihilominus non pertinent creaturæ ad objectum nos beatificans: atque etiam e contrario quamvis essentia cognosceretur sine personis, adhuc maneret quæstio, an sic præcise visa sufficeret ad nos beatificandos. Omissa ergo altera quæstione, quam suo loco tractabimus, circa præsentem.

8. The difficulty, therefore, is in the case of perfect happiness which consists in a clear vision of God. Scotus in I, dist. 1, q. 2, and Cajetan in IIaIIæ.2.8 touch on this difficulty when treating another question—whether the essence can be seen without the relations being seen—which they conflate with the present question. They are in reality, however, different difficulties, for even if we grant that the essential vision has a necessary connection with the vision of the relations, it does not seem to follow from that that the relations pertain to the object that makes us happy. For the cognition of creatures also has a necessary connection with the comprehension of the essence by which God is happy and in another way also with the intuitive vision by which we hope to be happy; nevertheless, creatures do not pertain to the object that makes us happy. And also, conversely, although the essence were cognized without the persons, the question would still remain whether the essence seen precisely in that way would suffice for making us happy. Setting aside the other question, therefore, which we will discuss in its place, [we turn] to the present question.
1. Opinio relationes divinas non pertinere ad objectum beatitudinis.

9. Est prima opinio Scoti, qui affirmat objectum nostræ beatitudinis esse essentiam præcise sumptam, non vero relationes. Cujus sententia duplex potest excogitari fundamentum: primum est, quia Pater æternus est beatus ex vi visionis solius essentiae, et non ex cognitione relationum: ergo essentia præcise sumpta est objectum divinæ beatitudinis: ergo multo magis nostræ, quæ est illius participatio. Antecedens probatur, primo quia Pater æternus ex se est sufficienter beatus, et non ab aliis personis, alias acciperet ab illis maximam perfectionem: <col. b> quod est inconveniens, cum ipse ex se sit infinite perfectus. Secundo, quia objectum beatitudinis concurrir nostro modo intelligendi per modum principii et speciei intelligibilis ad formalem beatitudinem: sed relationes Filii et Spiritus sancti nullo modo concurrunt ad beatitudinem Patris, alias perfectio Patris aliquo modo esset ab illis personis ut a principio: ergo non pertinent illæ relationes ad objectum beatitudinis. Tertio, quia Pater prius origi-
ine quam generet Filium, est beatus, quia est Deus, et Deus essentialiter est beatus, et tamen in illo priori non intelligitur videre personas, quia antecedit illas. Dices, hæc argumenta non procedere saltem de relatione Patris. Respondetur primo, etiam applicari posse ad hoc, quia relatio Patris non potest videri sine relatione Filii: ergo si una non pertinet ad objectum, nec etiam alia. Secundo possunt fieri eadem argumenta de hoc Deo, ut subsistente absolute in divinitate prius ratione, quam intelligatur esse personæ, quia sic est perfecte beatus.

[10.] Alterum fundamentum præcipuum est, quia essentia potest videri sine personis, et illa, ut sic, sufficit ad beandum, quia est bonus simpliciter infinitum formaliter, et eminenter continens omnem perfectionem: relationes vero ut sic, vel nullam perfectionem formaliter addunt, vel si addunt, illa eminenter continetur in sola essentia, quia non est perfectius ens tota Trinitas relationes includens, quam sit sola essentia ut a relationibus abstracta: ergo tota ratione

the Father is God and God is essentially happy and yet in the proposed case he is understood not to see the other persons because he precedes them. You will object that this argument fails to work at least in the case of the relation of the Father. I respond, first, that it can also be applied in this case because the relation of the Father cannot be seen without the relation of the Son. Therefore, if one does not pertain to the object, then neither does the other. Secondly, the same arguments can be made about this God as subsisting absolutely in divinity prior to the nature that is understood to belong to the person [of the Father] because even in this way he is perfectly happy.

[10.] The other foundation is especially that the essence can be seen without the persons and that it, as such, suffices for making one happy, since it is a good that is without qualification formally infinite and that eminently contains every perfection. But the relations as such either add no perfection formally or, if they do, it is [already] contained eminently in the essence by itself. For the whole Trinity including the relations is not a more perfect being than the essence alone as abstracted from the relations. The whole ratio of the happy-

---

37The Vivès edition starts n. 10 here and includes the next paragraph as part of n. 10. The 1628 includes this paragraph as part of n. 9, which is the more logical division.
tio objecti beatificantis in essentia. Unde Benedictus XI, in sua Extravagante, absolute docet sanctos esse beatos visione divinæ essentiae.

10. Secunda opinio est Cajetani, qui docet, relationes pertinere ad objectum primarium et essentiale nostrae beatitudinis, ita ut sine illis non intelligatur sufficiens divina essentia ad beandum. Probatur primo, quia Deus est objectum nostrae beatitudinis, ut in se est, juxta illud: Videbimus eum sicuti est, sed Deus sicut est, dicit divinam naturam ut existentem in tribus personis: ergo nisi ita videatur, non videtur sicuti est: ergo non ita videtur ut possit beatificare. Quod exemplo ita declaro: nam si beatitudo consistet in videnda Christi humanitate, sicut nunc est in rerum natura, qui videret illam, et non videret unionem ejus, adhuc illam non videret ut beantem.

Secundo, quia respectu divinae beatitudinis relationes includuntur in objecto beatificante, quia non <54> potest comprehendi Deus, quin cognoscatur ut includens relationes: ergo idem erit respectu nostrae beatitudinis, quae est partipatio divina. Tertio, quia, si in making object, therefore, is in the essence. Hence, Benedict XI teaches unconditionally in his Extravagans that the saints are happy by vision of the divine essence.

10. The second opinion is Cajetan’s. He teaches that the relations pertain to the primary and essential object of our happiness such that the divine essence cannot be understood to make one happy without them. It is proven, first, from the fact that God is the object of our happiness as he is in himself according to [1 John 3:2]: ‘We will see him as he is’. But God ‘as he is’ expresses the divine nature as existing in three persons. Therefore, unless he is seen in that way, he is not seen as he is. Therefore, he is not seen in such a way that he can make one happy. I explain this example as follows: if happiness consisted in seeing the humanity of Christ as it now is in the nature of things, someone who saw the humanity but did not see its union would so far not see him as making one happy. Secondly, from the fact that with respect to divine happiness the relations are included in the happy-making object, since God cannot be comprehended unless he is cognized as including the relations. Therefore, the same will be true with respect to our happiness, which is a participation in the divine
Deo tantum esset una persona, non esset objectum beatificans natura ipsa sine persona, sicut enim propri non est primum principium, et creator deitas, sed Deus (nam si haec dicuntur de deitate, est propter summam identitatem cum Deo), ita proprius ultimus finis est Deus, ut sic, et non deitas, nisi propter identitatem: Deus autem dicit personam: ergo eodem modo nunc non est Deus beatitudinis objectum sine personis. Patet consequentia, quia non est minus idem nunc essentia cum tribus personis, quam si esset tantum una. Tandem est argumentatio Cajetani, quia visa divina natura, et non visis personis, non quiescet mens hominis: tum quia, qui videt aliquam naturam, et non videt in quo supposito sit, inquietudine laborat, donec videat quomodo sit: tum etiam, quia mysterium Trinitatis est maximum, et quod potissimum declarat eminentiam divinæ naturæ: ergo non viso illo, non potest mens humana satiari.

It is proven, thirdly.

100
Suadetur 4. ex Caiet.

105
It is proven, fourthly, from Cajetan.

110
quia visa divina natura, et non visis personis, non qui-
quiescret mens hominis: tum quia, qui videt aliquam naturam, et non videt in quo supposito sit, inquietu-
dine laborat, donec videat quomodo sit: tum etiam,
quia mysterium Trinitatis est maximum, et quod po-
tissimum declarat eminentiam divinæ naturæ: ergo
non viso illo, non potest mens humana satiari.

115

happiness. Thirdly, from the fact that if there were only one person in God, his nature itself without the person would not be the happy-making object. For just as God rather than deity is properly the first principle and the creator (if they are said of deity it is on account of highest identity with God), so also the ultimate end is properly God, as such, and not deity except on account of identity. God, moreover, expresses a person. Therefore, in the same way God without the persons is not now the object of happiness. The consequence is evident because the essence now is no less identical to the three persons than if it were only one person. Finally, there is Cajetan’s argumentation from the fact that the human mind would not rest from seeing the divine nature without seeing the persons. This is both because someone who sees some nature but does not see in what it is supposited works disturbed until he sees in what way it is and also because the mystery of the Trinity is the greatest [mystery] and what especially shows the eminence of the divine nature. As a result, the human mind cannot be satisfied without seeing it.
1. Autoris assertio. 11. Inter has sententias media via tenenda est, et primo absolute et simpliciter dicendum, Deum trinum et unum esse primarium, et adequatum objectum nostræ beatitudinis. Probatur primo rationibus Cajetani, quæ hoc saltem persuadent, et favet communis modus loquendi Sanctorum, quos infra refermus agentes de visione beatifica: et præsertim exponentes illud Ioannis 3: Videbimus eum, etc., quod tacite exponens Concilium Florentinum, in Litt. union., dicit Sanctorum animas plene purgatas, intueri clare Deum trinum et unum, sicuti est. Secundo, quia Deus trinus et unus absolute est primum principium nostrum, ad cujus imaginem facti sumus: ergo est et ultimus finis noster: ergo objectum beatitudinis nostræ: nam beatitudo, ut dixi, consistit in consecutione ultimi finis, et magna perfectio humanæ naturæ est, quod ad suum primum principium convertatur, et in illo quiescat. Et confirmatur, nam sola Trinitas una suprema adoratione a nobis colitur, et uno amore charitatis infusæ super omnia diligitur. Est ergo adequatum objectum nost-

11. A middle way between these views should be held. First, it should be said absolutely and strictly speaking that God as three and one is the primary and adequate object of our happiness. It is proven, first, from Cajetan’s arguments, which at least convince one of this. And the saints’ common way of speaking (to which we will return below when dealing with the beatific vision) favours it, especially when explaining the passage from [1] John 3 (‘We will see him . . . ’). The Council of Florence when tacitly explaining this passage in Litt. union. says that the fully purified souls of the saints intellectually see God three and one as he is with clarity. Secondly, from the fact that God as three and one is absolutely our first principle in whose image we were made. Therefore, he is also our ultimate end. Therefore, the object of our happiness. For happiness, as I said, consists in the attainment of the ultimate end and the greatest perfection of human nature is that it be directed to its first principle and that it rest in it. And it is confirmed: for the Trinity alone is worshiped by us with one supreme adoration and is loved beyond all other things with one love of infused charity. It is, therefore, the adequate object of our highest love. Therefore, also of our happiness. This will
trae supremae dilectionis: ergo et beatitudinis nostræ, et hoc magis constabit ex sequenti.

2. Assertio. 140

12. Dico secundo: In hoc objecto essentia est propria ratio formalis essentialis, ac de se sufficiens ad nostram beatitudinem: relationes vero etiam concurrunt tanquam intrinsece <col. b> pertinentes ad substantialem quandam, seu personalem constitutionem illius objecti. Declaratur in hunc modum: nam Deus est objectum nostræ beatitudinis: ergo eo modo pertinebit ad objectum nostræ beatitudinis, quo pertinuerit ad constitutionem ipsius Dei: relationes autem, ut sic, non sunt de conceptu essentiali Dei, sed sola divinitas; pertinent tamen intrinsece ad constitutionem personalem Dei, seu ut natura divina modo sibi connaturali eminentissimo subsistat: ergo eodem modo tam divinitas, quam relationes pertinebunt ad objectum beatitudinis nostræ. Unde in hoc est magna differentia inter relationes, et creaturas possibles, nam licet demus creaturas aliquo modo videri necessario visa essentia, tamen solum vider.

148 pertinuerit ] pertinebit V.

12. I say secondly: In this object essence is the proper formal essential ratio that is of itself sufficient for our happiness. But relations also concur as intrinsically belonging to a kind of substantial or personal constitution of that object. This is explained as follows: since God is the object of our happiness, something will pertain to the object of our happiness in that way in which it pertained to the constitution of God himself. Relations as such, however, are not part of the essential concept of God; only divinity is. Nevertheless, they do belong intrinsically to the personal constitution of God or as the divine nature subsists with it in a connatural and most eminent way. Therefore, relations will belong to the object of our happiness in the same way as divinity does. Hence, there is in this a great difference between relations and possible creatures, for although we grant that creatures are in some way necessarily seen once [God’s] essence has been seen, they are, nevertheless, only seen as effects eminently contained in cause or as an object of divine omnipotence and therefore as something ex-
tur ut effectus eminenter contenti in causa, seu ut objectum omnipotentiae divinae, atque adeo, ut quid extrinsecus Deo, terminans habitudinem quamdam transcendentalis divinae omnipotentiae, relationes vero ut intrinsecas ipsi Deo, et pertinentes aliquo modo ad constitutionem ipsius, saltem in esse personali; et ideo licet non sint de formalis et essentiali conceptu hujus objecti, ut beatificantis, includuntur tamen in illo intrinsece, ac substantialiter. Et confirmatur illo argumento, quod finis ultimus respicit primum principium; quamvis autem Deus trinus et unus absolute sit primum principium nostrum, tamen formalis ratio, ac per se necessaria, ac sufficiens ut sit primum principium, est divinitas: rationes vero solum concurrunt, ut rationes subsistendi, quando de facto divinitas consistit in tribus, qui sunt primum principium: ergo codem modo loquendum est de ultimo fine, et objecto beatitudinis.

Et hanc sententiam sic expositam sumo ex D. Thoma 2, 2, quaest. 2, art. 8, argum. 3, cum solutione.

159 quid] quod V.
13. Ad fundamenta Scoti ergo quatenus fieri possunt contra primam conclusionem respondetur ad primum æternum Patrem esse beatum videndo seipsum, et divinas personas, et divinitatem sensu a nobis explicato. Nec inde fit quod accipiat beatitudinem a personis, quia divinitas est illi sufficiens ad beatitudinem suam; tamen quia hac divinitas ex infinitate sua de facto est in aliis etiam personis, pertinet suo modo ad beatitudinem Patris ut illas videat, et suam essentiam in ills, quod non accipit ab aliis, sed ex se etiam hoc habet. Unde ad secundam probationem negamus relationes nostro modo intelligendi concurrere per modum speciei ad illam cognitionem, sed sola essentia est per se sufficiens ratio illius visionis, nam tota per se concurrit ratione entis etiam ut terminatur ad personas. Ad tertiam vero probationem negatur assumptum, quia Pater in nullo signo, proprius loquendo, est beatus visione divinitatis, et non personarum. Nam prioritas originis in re non est prioritas in quo, sed a quo. Unde quod Pater dicatur prius origine beatus, quam Filius, vel 13. In response, therefore, to the foundations of Scotus insofar as they can be contrary to the first conclusion, I respond to the first one that the eternal Father is happy by seeing himself and the divine persons and divinity in the sense that I just explained. Nor does it thereby follow that he receives happiness from the persons, since divinity is sufficient for him to be happy. Nevertheless, because this divinity as a result of its infinity is in fact also in the other persons, it belongs in its way to the happiness of the Father so that he sees them and his essence in them, which he does not receive from the other persons but also holds in himself. Hence, in response to the second proof, we deny that the relations concur through the mode of species to that cognition in our way of understanding. Rather, the essence alone is in itself a sufficient ratio for that vision, for the entire [essence] concurs in itself by reason of being even as terminated in the persons. But in response to the third proof, the assumption is denied. For in no sign, properly speaking, is the Father happy by vision of divinity without vision of the persons. For priority of origin in reality is not priority in which (in quo) but priority from which (a quo). Hence, that the Father is said to be happy before the Son or the Holy Spirit by
Spiritus sanctus non significat in aliquo priori esse beatum, sed solum quod Pater habet ex se sine origine quod sit beatus, Filius autem habet a Patre: et ideo sicut Pater non prius est quam Filius, juxta illud Athanasii: *In hac Trinitate nihil prius, aut posterior*, ita nec prius est beatus visione sui, quam visione Filii. Ad secundum fundamentum negatur assumptum, non enim potest videri essentia sine personis, concedo esse sufficientem ad beatificandum, quia revera est ens infinitum simpliciter, et ex vi sui conceptus essentialis, non solum est deitas, sed Deus, ut alias probatum est in materia de Incarnatione: Deus autem est sufficiens objectum beatificans. Nihilominus tamen de facto, quia hic Deus existit in tribus personis, quae pertinent ad intrinsecam, et personalem constitutionem ejus, ideo quaelibet illarum personarum, et omnes simul, pertinent ad objectum, quod de facto beatificat.

Ad 1. arg. in num. 10.

14. Ad argumenta vero Cajetani quatenus fieri possunt ex parte contra secundam conclusionem, re-
priority of origin does not indicate that he is happy in something prior but only that the Father has from himself without origin the fact that he is happy. The Son, however, has it from the Father. And for this reason just as the Father is not prior to the Son—according to Athanasius’s statment: ‘nothing is prior or posterior in this Trinity’—so also his being happy by vision of himself is not prior to his being happy by vision of the Son. In response to the second foundation, the assumption is denied, for the essence cannot be seen without the persons. Furthermore, although I grant that the essence be seen without the persons, I concede that it is sufficient for making one happy, since it is in realy infinite being strictly speaking and by the force of its essential concept it is only deity but also God, as is proven elsewhere in the material on the Incarnation. God, however, is the sufficient happy-making object. But, nevertheless, in fact, because this God exists in three persons which belong to his intrinsic and personal constitution, it follows that whichever of these persons you please and all simultaneously belong to the object that in fact makes one happy.

14. But with respect to the arguments of Cajetan insofar as they can be contrary in part to the second conclusion, I re-

DE FINE HOMINIS 476

ISP. V, SECT. III
spondetur ad primum solum probare quod de facto erimus beati videndo Deum trinum et unum, non tamen quod essentia, et relationes æque pertineant ad rationem illius objecti. Secundum etiam argumentum ad summum idem probat, quanquam in rigor-ore non sit efficax, tum quia idem argumentum fieri potest de creaturis, quas Deus necessario cognoscit comprehendo se ipsum: tum etiam quia nostra beatitudo non est comprehensio Dei. Ad tertium respondetur, non esse similem rationem; nam quidquid sit de identitate, tamen si intelligeremus in Deo tantum esse unam personam, subsistentia personalis illius personæ esset de essentiali conceptu Dei, nam esset perfectio absoluta: at vero nunc relationes personales quamvis sint unum cum essentia, non sunt tamen de conceptu essentiali ejus, ut ex materia de Trinitate suppono. Ad ultimum de appetitu respondetur, si per impossibile aliquis videret hunc Deum, non videndo personas, illum debeere manere quietum, et satis-tatum tam in intellectu, quia videret objectum for-maliter, vel eminenter continens <col. b> illam per-

Ad 2. Against the second.

Ad 3. Against the third.

Ad 4. Against the fourth.

spond to the first argument that it only shows that we will in fact be happy by seeing God three and one but, for all that, it does not show that the essence and the relations equally belong to the *ratio* of that object. The second argument also at most proves the same thing, although technically it does not work, both because the same argument can be made about creatures which God necessarily cognizes in comprehending himself and also because our happiness is not a comprehension of God. To the third, I respond that it is not an analogous argument, for whatever may be the case concerning identity, even if we were to understand there to be only one person in God, the personal subsistence of that person would be part of the essential concept of God. For it would be absolute perfection. But now, on the other hand, the personal relations are not part of his essential concept, although they are one with the essence, as I assume from the material on the Trinity. To the last argument, concerning desire, I respond that if, *per impossible*, someone were to see this God without seeing the persons, he ought to remain at rest and satisfied both in intellect (since he sees the object that formally or eminently contains that perfection and every truth) and in will (since he enjoys strictly speaking the highest
fectionem, et omnem veritatem: tam in voluntate, quia frueretur simpliciter summo bono; unde solum differret ab alio, qui videret Trinitatem, sicut minus beatus, a magis beato. Unde sicut nunc ille qui minus beatus est, satiatus est, quamvis alius melius videat, ita dicendum esset in illo casu, qui tamen propter alias causas impossibilis est.

PUNCTUM III.

An pertineant ideæ, vel actus liberi Dei.

15. In tertio puncto in principio hujus questionis proposito multa dici poterant, tamen quia attingunt materiam de modo, quo videntur creaturæ in Verbo per visionem beatam, ea nunc prætermitto: solum sunt breviter adnotanda duo. Primum est, in rationibus, seu ideis creaturarum, quæ sunt in divina essentia, aliud esse considerare id, quod est in ipso Deo formaliter, sive illud sit eminentissima illa perfectio, in qua eminenter continentur omnes perfecti
good). Hence, he only differs from someone else who sees the Trinity as someone who is less happy from someone who is more happy. Hence, just as now one who is less happy is satisfied even though someone else sees something better, so one

15. Many things could be said about the third point raised at the beginning of this question. But since they touch on the subject about the way in which creatures seem [to be] in the Word through the happy vision, I pass over them for now. Only two things should be noted briefly. The first is that when it comes to the notions or ideas of creatures that are in the divine essence, it is one thing to consider that which is in God himself formally, which is either that most eminent perfection in which all the perfections of creatures are contained eminently

8 ideis ] in eis V.
tiones creaturarum, sive sit infinita scientia, in qua intelliguntur esse exemplaria rerum omnium. Al-
iud vero esse considerare creaturas ipsas, quae in Deo
continentur tanquam in causa prima efficienti et exam-plari: nam primum horum pertinet ad intrin-
secam et essentialem perfectionem Dei: secundum
vero est extrinsecum ipsi Deo. Unde fit ut ad object-
tum beatitudinis pertineat omnis illa perfectio div-
ina, in qua continentur rationes creaturarum, et per-
forcementes earum, quia tota illa perfectio est formaliter
in Deo, et est essentialis illis; dictum est autem Deum
secundum totam essentiam suam esse objectum beat-
utudinis nostrae. Nihilominus tamen creaturae ipsae,
quae continentur eminenter in Deo, vel in ideis di-
vinis representantur, per se non pertinent ad object-
tum beatitudinis secundum suam proprium, et for-
malem perfectionem, ac rationem: quia ut sic, sunt
simpliciter objecta creatae. An vero, et quomodo
cognosci possit illa perfectio, et videri clare et infinita
scientia ejus et potentia, non visis creaturis, dictum
est disputando de perfectione visionis beatae.

or the infinite knowledge in which the exemplars of all things
are understood to be. But it is another thing to consider the
creatures themselves that are contained in God as in a first ef-
cient cause and exemplar. For the first of these pertains to
the intrinsic and essential perfection of God, but the second is
extrinsic to God himself. As a result, it is the case that all those
divine perfections in which the natures of creatures and their
perfections are contained pertains to the object of happiness,
because that whole perfection is formally in God and is essen-
tial to him. It was said, moreover, that God is the object of
our happiness according to his whole essence. But, neverthe-
less, the creatures themselves that are contained eminently in
God or that are represented in the divine ideas do not in them-
sew pertain the object of happiness according to its proper
and formal perfection and ratio. For, as such, there are, strictly
speaking, created objects. But whether and in what way that
perfection can be cognized and both its infinite knowledge and
power be clearly seen without seeing the creatures was stated
when disputing about the perfection of the happy vision.
16. Secundo notandum est fere simili modo dicendum esse circa actus liberos voluntatis divinae: aliud est enim considerare in Deo actum voluntatis quo vult se, et alia a se: aliud est considerare illum eundem actum prout libere terminatum ad hoc, vel illud objectum creatum. Primum necessario convenit ipsi Deo, nam sicut est suum esse, et suum <56> intellegere, ita est suum amare: unde perfectio illius actus, absoluta est et essentialis Deo, et ideo per se pertinet ad objectum beatitudinis nostræ, ut patet ex principio supra posito: at vero secundum omnino est extra rationem, et perfectionem divinæ essentiae: quamvis enim Deus nihil extra se libere vellet, æque perfectus essentialiter maneret, et in se summe beatus, et sufficiens ad beatificandum alios: unde illa libera determinatio actus divini ad objecta creata, si aliquid ei addit, non pertinet ad necessarium, et essentialem perfectionem ejus: vel quod verius est, nullam rationem, aut perfectionem realem illi addit, sed solum connotat extrinsecum objectum, et relationem rationis ad illud, ut tractatur 1 p., quæstion. 19, et late expostatur alio loco: vel quod verius est, nullam rationem, aut perfectionem realem illi addit, sed solum connotat extrinsecum objectum, et relationem rationis ad illud, ut tractatur 1 p., quæstion. 19, et late exposuit alio loco.

DE FINE HOMINIS

480 DE FINE HOMINIS

Disp. V, sect. III
sui in disp. 30 Metaphysicæ, sect. 9. Unde fit quod licet ad objectum beatitudinis pertineat videre illum actum divine voluntatis prout in se necessario est, ac de se sufficiens, ut sine sui mutatione terminetur libere ad extrinseca objecta: tamen videre in illo actualém determinationem liberam non pertinet per se ad objectum beatificum, quandoquidem hoc est extra essentiam, et perfectionem Dei.

17. Ultimo posset in hac disputatione inquiri, sub qua ratione Deus sit objectum beatitudinis, hactenus enim solum explicuimus objectivam rationem, quæ nos beatificat: dicendum ergo videbatur de ratione sub qua: quia tamen, ut supra dixi, hoc involvit habitudinem ad nostras potentias, et actus, quibus attingimus illud objectum, ideo melius id explicabitur tractando de formali beatitudine. Tandem inquiri poterat, an Deus sit objectum beatificum prout in se est summum bonum, propter se amabile amore amicitiae, an vero ut est summum bonum ipsius beati amabile amore concupiscientiae: sed hoc etiam omitto, quia involvit though it pertains to the object of happiness to see that act of the divine will insofar as it is in itself necessary and of itself sufficient to be freely terminated in an extrinsic object without change in itself, nevertheless, to see in it the actual free determination does not pertain in itself to the object of happiness, since this is beyond the essence and perfection of God.

17. Lastly, one can ask in this disputation under which ratio God is the object of happiness. For so far we have only explained the objective ratio that makes us happy. It seems, therefore, that we should talk about the ratio under which. Nevertheless, because, as I said above, this involves a relation to our powers and acts, by which we attain that object, it will therefore be better to explain this when discussing formal happiness. Finally, one could ask whether God is the beatific object insofar as he is in himself the highest good, lovable with friendship love for his own sake, but whether as the highest good of the happy person he is lovable with concupiscient love. But I also set aside this question, since it involves many things about the way of desiring happiness that are to be discussed A little question about the ratio under which the beatific object is passed over. Another little question is briefly explained.
multa, quæ postea dicenda sunt de modo appetendi be
titudinem: solumque breviter suppono ex dictis, Deum ut simpliciter est summum bonum, summe amabile, omni ratione esse objectum nostræ beati
tudinis: nam quod illud objectum sit maxime ama-
bile ipsi beato tanquam summum bonum ejus, per se notum videtur, quia nihil est amabilius homini ipsa beati
tudine. Propter quod dixit Anselmus, libro de Casu diabol, cap. 4, ex commodis constare beati
tudinem: et D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 7, ad 2, 
dicit, beati
tudinem amari tanquam summum concupi
tum. Quod vero Deus etiam ut objectum beatificum, sit summum bonum propter se maxime diligendum, docuit idem D. Thomas, ibid., quæst. 4. Ratio etiam est <col. b> clara, quia Deus sub hac ratione etiam est finis ultimus hominis, in quem ipsa etiam hominis beatitudine referri debet. Denique, quia beatitudine est satietas amoris, et ideo satiare debet, non solum amorem concupiscentiæ, sed etiam amorem amici
tiæ perfectum: oportet ergo ut objectum illius sit tale later. I only suppose, briefly, from what was said that God as strictly speaking being the highest good, lovable in the highest degree, is the object of our happiness under every ratio. For the fact that the object that is the highest good for the happy person himself is the object that is most lovable for him seems per se notum, since nothing is more lovable to a human being than happiness itself. For this reason Anselm said in De casu diaboli, cap. 4, that happiness consists of advantages. And St. Thomas in IaIIæ.1.7 ad 2 says that happiness is loved as an ardently desired good. But that God as the beatific object is also the highest good maximally lovable for his own sake is the same St. Thomas teaches in the same place in question 4. And the reason is clear: because God under this ratio is also the ultimate end for a human being, to which the very happiness of the human being ought to be referred. Finally, because happiness is the satisfaction of love and therefore it ought to satisfy not only concupiscent love but also perfect friendship love. It must, therefore, be the case that its object be such a good that it can satisfy either kind of love. But how God does this when perfectly possessed by the happy will be explained when dis-

84–85 et D. Thomas 1, 2, quæst. 1, art. 7, ad 2, dicit, beati
tudinem ] om. V.
bonum quod utrumque amorem satiare possit. Quo-
modo autem hoc faciat Deus, quando a beatis per-
fекте possession, explicabitur tractando de consecu-
tione hujus objecti, quæ est nostra beatitudo.
cussing the attainment of this object. This attainment is our
happiness.
The following Latin text is from the digitized version coordinated by Salvador Castellote und Michael Renemann. It was retrieved from http://perso.wanadoo.es/v963918818/d23.htm on November 22, 2007. Spelling errors corrected without note. Their digital version is in turn based on the Vivès edition; for comments about its reliability, see the introduction to Appendix B (226).

The text of Disputationes metaphysicæ seems to be somewhat more reliable in the Vivès edition than the text of De fine hominis, but I have made a few corrections on the basis of comparison with the 1597 edition. For recorded variants, A = 1597 edition, D = digital source, and V = Vivès edition. All marginal notes are as found in the 1597 edition and, again, I have decided to preserve them as marginal notes.

Numbers in angle brackets indicate page numbers in the Vivès edition for ease of reference, given that it is likely to continue being the most widely used edition for the foreseeable future.

The translation is a work-in-progress; to check for more recent versions, go to http://www.sydneypenner.ca/texts.html.
Quotuplex sit finis.

1. Antequam progrediamur ulterius ad explicandam caetera quae proposuimus ad causalitatem finis pertinentia, oportet varias divisiones vel potius nominis significationes explicare, ut distincte intelligatur de quo sit disputatio.

Prima divisio finis Cuius et Cui.

2. Est ergo prima ac celebris divisio finis in finem cuius et finem cui, quae sumpta est ex Aristot., II de Anima, c. 4, ubi Argyropilus vertit finem quo et cui; sed priora verba sunt graccis conformiora et intentionem melius declarant; nam finis cuius dicitur cuius adipiscendi gratia homo movetur vel operatur, ut est

How many kinds of ends there are.¹

¹See the parallel discussion in DFH 1.6.

2. There is, then, the first and famous division of ‘end’ into finis cuius and finis cui, which is taken from Aristotle, book II of De Anima, c. 4, [415b20–22], where Argyropoulos changes it to finis quo and finis cui;² but the former words are conformed to the Greek and better show the intended [distinction]. For that is called the finis cuius for the sake of the obtaining of

²The reference is presumably to John Argyropoulos (1415–1487), the Byzantine lecturer who taught Greek—and Aristotle—to a number of notable Italian humanists. The Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology (ed. by William Smith, 1870) mentions a Latin translation of book III of De Anima but none of book II, though it does note that a commentary on De Anima has been credited to him.
sanitas in curatione; finis cui dicitur ille cui alter finis procuratur, ut est homo in intentione sanitatis; nam, licet homo curetur propter sanitatem, ipsam vero sanitatem sibi et in suum commodum quae est.

3. Quaeri vero potest quis horum habeat propriam rationem finis. Quidam enim soli fini cui illam attribuunt, quod sentit Gabriel, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, sequens Ocham, In II, q. 3, a. 1; atque idem sentit Henric., Quodl. II, q. 1. Et probatur: nam ille est proprius finis, in quo sestit intentione agentis; caetera enim potius habere videntur rationem mediorum; sed intentione solum sestit in fine cui caetera procurantur; nam ad illum omnia ordinantur; unde, sicut medium solum amatur quatenus proportionatum est fini, ita finis cuius solum amatur quatenus est proportionatus et conveniens fini cui; ergo. Et confirmatur: nam finis amari debet amore amicitiae vel saltem benevolentiae, quia debet amari propter se; sed solus finis cui ita amatur; nam

which a human is moved or operated on, as health is [the end of which] in medical care. That for which another end is procured, as a human is [the end for which] health is intended, is called a finis cui. For, although a human is cured for the sake of health, he seeks, however, that health for himself and to his own advantage.

3. But someone can ask which of these has the proper nature of an end. For certain people attribute that to the finis cui alone. This is what Gabriel thinks in [Sent] II, dist. 1, q. 5, following Ockham in [Sent.] II, q. 3, a. 1. And Henry [of Ghent] thinks the same in Quodlibet II, q. 1. And is it shown: for this is properly an end, in which the intention of an agent stops. For the remaining things seem rather to have the nature of intermediaries. But the intention only stops in the finis cui, [i.e., the end for which] the remaining things are procured. For all things are ordered to it. Hence, just as the intermediary is only loved in so far as it is proportionate to the end, the finis cuius is only loved insofar as it is proportionate to and agreeable to the finis cui. Therefore. And it is confirmed: for the end ought to be loved with friendship love or at least with benevolent love, because it ought to be loved for its own
finis cuius amatur alteri, qui dicitur finis cui; atque ita amor finis cuius est concupiscen
tiae, alterius vero est amicitiae seu benevolentiae, et ideo finis cuv amatur simplicit
er, finis autem cuus tantum secundum quid, iuxta doctrinam D. Thom., I-II, q. 26, a. 4, di
centis illud amari simpliciter, cui amatur bonum; hoc autem bonum, quod alteri amatur, tantum amari se
cundum quid.

D. Thom.

4. Aliunde vero apparat solum finem cuus pro
prie habere rationem causae finalis; nam Aristotel
les, ubicumque hanc causam definit, per hoc eus ra
tionem explicat, quod sit cuius gratia aliquid fit, ut patet II Phys., c. 3 et 7, et V Metaph., c. 2; et ha
ratione dicit finem esse primum in intentione et ul	timum in executione, et similiter ait formam esse finem generationis, non vero ipsum generantem. Et ra
tione declaratur, quia hic cui alter finis acquiritur vel quae
tur, solum est subiectum quod perfectur vel actuatur alia re quae intendentur ut finis; ut homo

4. But from elsewhere it appears that only the finis cuus p
properly has the nature of a final cause. For Aristotle, wher
ever he defines this cause, explains the nature of it through this, that it is for the sake of which (cuus) something is done, as is clear in Physics II, c. 3 [194b33–34] and 7 [198a23–25] and Metaphysics V, c. 2 [1013a33–34]. And for this reason he sa

Aristotel.

sake. But only the finis cu is loved in that way. For the fi
nis cuus is loved for something else which is called the finis

St. Thomas.

cui. And thus love for the finis cuus is concupiscent love, but
[love] of the other [end] is friendship love or benevolent love.

And therefore the finis cu is loved, strictly speaking; the finis

D. Thom.
est subiectum sanitatis aut visionis beatae, quae est finis nostrarum operationum; haec ergo habitudo non est proprius finis, sed alterius rationis; nemo enim prope dixerit hominem esse finem visionis beatae, sed potius visionem esse finem hominis; nam res est propter suam operationem ut propter finem. Et confirmatur: nam in fine cuius comprehenditur, ut infra dicam, obiectum operationis, ut est Deus respectu visionis beatae; unde non solum amat sibi homo visionem Dei, sed etiam Deum ipsum amore concupiscientiae pertinente ad spem, ut theologi docent; non potest autem dici quod homo sit finis Dei eo quod sit ille cui amatur Deus; ergo per illam particulam cui non explicatur propria ratio finis.

55. Nihilominus dicendum <848> est in utroque horum salvari posse propriam rationem finis, interdum vero ita coniungi ut ex utroque coalescat unus integer finis. Hoc est consentaneum Aristoteli in citato loco De Anima. Et ratione probatur, nam

is intended as the end, as a human is the subject of health of the beatific vision, which is the end of our activity. This disposition, therefore, is not properly an end but of another nature. For no one will properly say that a human is the end of the beatific vision, but rather that the vision is the end for a human. For a thing is on account of its activity as on account of an end. And it is confirmed: for in the finis cuius is comprehended, as I will say below, the object of acting, as God is with respect to the divine vision. Hence, not only does a human love the vision of God for himself, but [he] also [loves] God himself with concupiscient love pertaining to hope, as the theologians teach. Nor, moreover, can it be said that a human is the end of God by the fact that he is that for which (cui) God is loved. Therefore, through that particle ‘for which’ (cui) is not explained the proper nature of an end.

5. Nevertheless, it should be said that the proper nature of an end can be saved in each of these, but sometimes they are so joined that one integrated end coalesces from both. This is consistent with Aristotle in the cited passage from De Anima. And it is shown by reason: for each of these ends can

[The putative problem] is resolved.
uterque horum finium potest per se excitare voluntatem et ab ea diligi seu intendi propter suam bonitatem; sic enim quando homo inquirit sanitatem, se diligit, cui sanitatem vult propter suum commodum et perfectionem, quam per se appetit propter summam coniunctionem vel potius identitatem quam secum habet. Similiter diligit et intendit sanitatem propter perfectionem ipsiusmet sanitatis, in quo magna est differentia inter medium et finem cuius; nam medium, verbi gratia, potio, solum est amabilis quatenus est utilis ad salutem; salus vero ipsa propter se amatur, quia per se perficit hominem cui amatur. Unde fit ut totum hoc, homo sanus, sit integer et adaequatus finis illius actionis, in quo praedicti duo fines includuntur, quasi componentes unum integrum finem. Sic etiam potentia dicitur esse propter operationem ut propter finem cuius gratia fit, quamvis etiam operatio vere sit propter ipsam potentiam, nimirum ut ipsam perficiat et in ultimo actu consti\-tuat; ut merito dici possit finem integrum esse potentiam ut perfecte actuatam, quod alii dicunt: poten-

per se excite the will and can be selected or intended by it [i.e., the will] on account of its [i.e., either end’s] goodness. For thus when a human seeks health, he selects himself for which he wishes the health on account of his advantage and perfection, which he desires in itself for the sake of the highest conjunction or, rather, identity which it has with him. Similarly, he loves and intends health for the sake of the perfection of the health itself, in which there is a great difference between the intermediary and the finis cuius. For the intermediary, for example, medicine, is only lovable insofar as it is useful for health. But health is itself loved for the sake of itself, because it per se perfects the human for whom (cui) it is loved. Hence it happens that this whole, the healthy human being, is the integrated and adequate end of that action, in which the two mentioned ends are included, components, as it were, of one integrated end. Thus also potency is said to be on account of activity as on account of the end for the sake of which it comes to be, although the action also truly is on account of the very potentiality without doubt as it perfects and in the ultimate act constitutes. As rightly can be said that the complete end is potentiality as perfectly actualized, which others say: ‘poten-
tiam non tam esse propter operationem quam propter seipsam operantem. Atque hoc modo non repugnat duas res sub his diversis rationibus ad invicem esse unum finem alterius et e converso; sic enim intellectus est propter visionem Dei et visio etiam est propter intellectum, ut ipsum perficiat. Neque hoc est inconveniens, tum propter rationes diversas, tum quia intentio agentis quasi adaequate fertur in compositum ex utroque cum mutua habitudine componentium inter se, quo modo materia est propter formam, et forma est etiam aliquo modo propter materiam; totum autem est quod per se primo et adaequate intenditur. Quamvis autem finis cui et cuius possint ita ad invicem comparari, non est tamen id semper necessarium, ut statim declarabo.

6. Quaeret vero ulterius aliquis, esto uterque eorum sit proprie finis, quis eorum sit principalior. Respondeo comparationem fieri posse vel in ratione entis, vel in ratione causandi. Priori modo non est per se necessarium ut unus ex his finibus sit semper <col. b> perfectius ens; interdum enim finis cui tiality is not so much on account of activity as on account of the one acting'. And in this way it is not repugnant that two things under these different concepts be in turn one end for the other and vice versa. For thus the intellect is for the sake of the vision of God and also the vision for the sake of the intellect as perfecting it. Nor is this disagreeable, both on account of the different reasons and because the intention of the agent, as it were, is adequately brought into a composite of both with a mutual habitude of the composing things between each other, in the way in which matter is for the sake of form and form is also in some way for the sake of matter. The whole, however, is what per se and adequately is intended. Moreover, although the finis cui and the finis cuius can in that way be compared in turn, nevertheless, it is not always necessary, as I will show at once.

6. But someone might ask further: granting that either of these is properly an end, one of them is principal. I respond that the comparison can be made either in the nature of being or in the nature of causing. In the first way it is not per se necessary that one of these ends always be more perfect being. For sometimes the finis cui is a more noble thing, as when a human
est res nobilior, ut cum homo propter sanitatem sibi acquirendam operatur; interdum vero accidit e converse, ut cum idem homo operatur propter acquirendum sibi Deum, qui longe nobilior est. Et ratio est quia interdum res seu suppositum perfectius intendit sibi acquirere aliam perfectionem, quamvis minorem, ad quod satis est quod tale subjectum perfectiori modo se habeat cum tali forma quam sine illa, quamvis si praeceps comparetur ad eandem formam, sit quid perfectius. Aliquando vero res aliqua perficitur per coniunctionem ad perfectiorem, ut homo per coniunctionem ad Deum, et tunc optime potest res minus perfecta operari gratia alterius perfectioris ut illam habeat et possideat prout potuerit, quo etiam modo materia appetit formam, et si posset gratia consequendi illam aliquid operari, id faceret; sub qua consideratione forma habet rationem finis cuius, et materia finis cui, quae minus perfecta est quam forma.

7. At vero si illa duo conferantur posteriori modo, scilicet, in ratione causae et finis, idem vide- acts for the sake of acquiring health for himself. But sometimes it happens the other way around, as when the same human acts for the sake of acquiring God—who is far more noble [than he is]—for himself. And the reason is because sometimes the more perfect thing or suppositum intends to acquire for itself another perfection, although a lesser one, for which it is sufficient that such a subject has itself in a more perfect way with such a form than without it, although if compared precisely to that form, it [i.e., the subject] is more perfect. But, finally, any thing is perfected through union with the more perfect, as a human through union with God, and then the less perfect thing can best act for the sake of another more perfect so that it has and possesses that just as it will be able to, in which manner also matter desires form. And, if it were possible that something act for the sake of pursuing that, it would do so. Under this consideration a form has the nature of a finis cuius and matter—which is less perfect than the form—of a finis cui.
tur esse quaerere quis eorum sit principalior quod
quaerere quis magis ametur magisque intendatur. Et
sane rationes prius factae videntur suadere finem cui
magis amari, quia magis ratione sui diligentur, magisque in illo sistit motus voluntatis. Solum videtur
obstare exemplum illud de amore concupiscentiae et
intentione consequendi Deum quatenus bonum nostrum est. Neque enim dicere possimus eo actu amare
nos magis nos ipsos quam Deum; alias amor ille esset
inordinatus; neque etiam dicere possimus illam inten-
tionem principalius sistere in nobis quam in Deo;
alias absolute finis ultimus intentionis essemus
nos et non Deus, et ita esset etiam inordinata inten-
tio.

8. Quapropter distinctione vel limitatione opus est; nam in bonis particularibus, quae praecipue vel
etiam omnino amantur in commodum amantis, vel
ut illum perficient, vel sub aliqua alia habitudine ad illum, verum est finem cui principalius amari esseque
principiorem finem. Et hoc probant rationes prius factae. Quae confirmari possunt, nam sape huius-
that it is asked which of them is more primary as far as which of them is loved more and is intended more. And, reasonably, the reasons just given seem to suggest that the finis cui is loved more, because it is selected more by its nature and the movement of the will more stops in it. It only seems to oppose that example of the friendship love and of the intention of following God insofar as he is our good. For neither can we say that by that act we love us ourselves more than God. Otherwise, that love would be inordinate. Nor can we say that that intention more primarily stops in us than in God. Otherwise, the absolutely ultimate end of that intention would be us and not God and thus it would also be an inordinate intention.

8. For what the distinction or determination is useful: for in the case of particular goods, which especially or even entirely are loved for the advantage of the one loving, either as they perfect him or under some other disposition to him, it is true that a finis cui is loved more primarily and is more primarily an end. And the arguments given earlier show this. They can be confirmed: for often a particular good of this sort that
155 modi particulare bonum quod est finis cuius sup- pontit absolutum amorem illius personae cui amatur, et amor eius ex illo amore nascitur; sic enim homo interdum amat seipsum proprio amore benevolentiae et ex illo postea amat sibi sanitatem. Et hinc <849>
160 etiam saepe fit ut talia bona particularia amentur ut media et utilia ad alios fines ipsi amanti convenientes; signum ergo est respectu horum finium ipsum finem cui esse principaliorem magisque dilectum. At vero quando finis cuius gratia est summum bonum et finis ultimus, si ordinate ametur et intendatur, semper debet retinere principaliorem rationem finis magisque trahere ad se intentionem operantis. Quia cum sit finis ultimus simpliciter, non potest ita referri in alium sub aliqua ratione finis ut in alio principaliter sissetur. Atque ita, cum homo intendit consequi Deum, licet ipse sit aliquo modo finis cui bonum illud quaeritur, tamen absolute potius homo ordinat seipsum in illum finem, nam vult coniungi bono ut ultimo fini suo. Quo fit ut, licet in eo motu et tendentia respectu mediornum et operationis homo proprie dicatur fi-
170 is a finis cuius presupposes an absolute love of that person for whom (cui) it is loved, and the love of it is born from that love. For example, a human sometimes loves himself with a proper benevolent love and afterwards as a result loves health for himself. And hence it also sometimes happens that such particular goods are loved as means and tools to other ends themselves agreeable to the one loving. Therefore, this is evidence with respect to these ends that the finis cui itself is more primary and more selected. But when, however, the end for the sake of which (finis cuius gratia) is the highest good and ultimate end, if it is loved and intended ordinately, it ought always retain the more primary nature of an end and draw more to the intention itself of the one acting. Because when it is the unqualifiedly ultimate end, it cannot thus be directed to another under some concept of an end so that is is primarily stopped in another. And thus, when a human intends to follow God, although he himself is in some way the finis cui, [i.e., the end for which] that good is sought, nevertheless, the human, rather, simply orders himself to that end, for he wishes to be joined with the good as his ultimate end. By which it happens that, although in that motion and tendency with respect to means
nus cui, tamen respectu ipsius Dei, qui principaliter quaeritur, non tam dicendus sit finis quam subjectum quod ordinatur ad consequendum illum finem. Quamvis non negem posse etiam vocari finem cui; nam revera habet illam rationem, ita tamen ut intelligatur potius ordinari ad alterum finem objectivum et ultimum, quam illum ad se ordinare.

Secunda divisio finis in operationem et rem factam.


and actions a human properly is called the finis cui, nevertheless, with respect to God himself, who is primarily sought, he should not so much be called an end as a subject which is ordered to the following of that end. Although I would not deny that he can also be called a finis cui. For in fact he has that character, though in such a way that he is understood more as ordered to another objective and ultimate end than that that [end] is ordered to him.

The second division of ‘end’ into activity and the thing produced.

9. Secondly, ‘end’ is usually divided into that which is the activity only and that which results from the activity or to which the action tends as in the produced thing. Aristotle mentioned this division in [Nichomachean] Ethics I [1094a3–4] and Magna Moralia I, c. 3 [1184b10 ff.]. And insofar as it holds on to the formal nature of an end, the division of the material seems to have been taken from the things which exercise this causality rather than from variation in the causing. All the same, nevertheless, [the division] is necessary in order to understand the authors, especially Aristotle in the various places, and in order to explain other divisions and especially to show the ends of
Exempla itaque utriusque membri facilia sunt, tam in operibus artis quam naturae. Nam finis curatio-
nis est sanitas, aedificatio domus, generationis re-
genitae, et sic de aliis; at vero pulsationis cytharae non est alius finis praeterquam ipsa cytharizatio, et con-
templatio nisi sola ipsa contemplatio. Quamquam in secundo membro advertere oportet etiam in illis actionibus posse philosophice distinguere terminum ab actione; nam terminus semper est aliqua qualitas; actio vero est via seu tendentia illius qualita-
tatis; tamen, quia terminus huius actionis talis est ut non duret nisi quamdiu fit, eo quod in fieri et con-
servari pendet ab actuali motu seu influxu potentiae, ideo quod attinet ad rationem finis non distingui-
tur inter actionem ut actionem et ut terminum; in actionibus vero prioris generis finis intentus est res facta, quae permanet cessante actione. Ex quo etiam intelligitur hanc divisionem tantum esse datam de fine cuius; nam finis cui neque est actio, neque fit per actionem, sed supponitur potius ad actionem, cum sit ipsummet agens.

Different things and especially of humans. The examples, accordingly, of either member [of the division] are easy, so in the works of art as in nature. For the end of curing is health, of building a house, of generating a begotten thing, and so on for others. But, on the other hand, there is no other end in the striking of a kithara than the very playing of the kithara and in contemplation other than the contemplation itself. Nevertheless, in the second member it must also be noticed that in those actions a *terminus* can be philosophically distinguished from the action. For the *terminus* is always some quality, but the action is a way or course to that quality. Still, because the *terminus* of this action is such that it does not endure except as long as it is made, by the fact that in being made and being preserved it depends on the actual motion or influx of power. Therefore, what holds on to the nature of an end is not distinguished between the action as action and [the action] as *terminus*. But in actions of the former genus the intended end was the produced thing which continued after the cessation of action. By which is also understood that this division is only given concerning the *finis cuius*, for the *finis cui* is neither an action nor made through an action, but rather is supposed on
account of the action since it is the very agent himself.

The third division of ‘end’, namely, of action or of the produced thing.

10. And from this there arises a third division of ends into the end of the action and the end of the produced or begotten thing, which is taken from Aristotle, *Physics* part II, c. 7 [198b1–4?] and *De Caelo* part II, c. 3 [286a8?]. For in the first passage he says that form is the end of generation, but in the second he says every single thing, and therefore the form itself or the begotten thing, is on account of its activity. And so it happens (as is also taken from Averroes, *De Caelo*, IV, text. 22) that the begotten thing is the end of generation and, furthermore, the activity on account of which the thing is generated is also the end—certainly, proximately and immediately of the begotten thing itself; remotely and mediately, moreover, of the generation itself. In which division two things so far come to mind which should be noticed: one is that when Aristotle says that the form is the end of generation, under the form is comprehended the whole composite or the begotten thing itself. For generation is chiefly for the sake of that. Nevertheless,
ducendo formam in materiam, ideo per formam ex- because the begotten thing is not made except that the form
plicuit generationis finem. Et quod de generatione is introduced into the matter, therefore the end of generation
235 dixit Aristoteles intelligendum est de omni actione, is set forth through the form. And that which Aristotle says
fuit ut permaneat, et extendi etiam potest ad cre- concerning generation should be understood concerning every
ationem; nam etiam res quae creatur est proximus fi- thing becomes such that it endures, and can also be extended
nis illius actionis. to creation. For a thing which is created is also a proximate

11. Alterum observandum est, finem rei gen- 11. The other thing which should be observed is that the
itae communiter censeri esse aliquam operationem end of the begotten thing is commonly thought to be some ac-
propter quam res fit, ut est visio Dei respectu ho- tivity on account of which the thing is made, as the vision of
minis vel illuminatio respectu solis; tamen, ut om- God is with respect to a human or illumination with respect
nem finem rei genitae comprehendamus, per opera-
tionem necesse est intelligere omnem usum ad quem
res quaedam genita seu creata, non est propria ali-
quae operatio, est tamens causalius <85G> eius, scil-
lice sustentatio formae, aut tali composto substancia-
tiae; similiter finem dominus est habitationi, quae non
est operatio, sed protection quae quas extrin-
secum informati habitant, et sic de alii. Et iuxta

11. The other thing which should be observed is that the end of the begotten thing is commonly thought to be some activity on account of which the thing is made, as the vision of God is with respect to a human or illumination with respect to the sun. Still, in order that we may comprehend every end of the begotten thing, it is necessary to understand of every use to which the begotten thing is ordered. For the end of matter, which is a certain begotten or created thing, is not a proper activity yet it is its causality, namely, sustenance of the form or such a composition of the substance. Similarly, the end of a house is habitation, which is not an activity but a certain protection and, as it were, extrinsic information of the inhabitant. And likewise concerning others. And in accor-
hunc modum contingit non solum respectu rei gen-
itae dari finem qui sit operatio, propter quem sit
ipsa res genita, sed etiam respectu unius operationis
dari aliam quae sit finis eius; sic enim cytharizatio
est propter delectionem et locutio propter intellec-
tionem. Potest enim una operatio ad aliam concur-
rere, vel obiective, vel effective, vel saltem ut neces-
saria vel utilis conditio ad aliam operationem, et ideo
potest ad illam ut ad finem ordinari.

Quarta divisio in finem obiectivum et formalem.

12. Quarto, ex his divisionibus, praeertim ex se-
cunda, oritur alia, qua dividitur finis in obiectivum
et formalem. Nam, ut diximus, interdum finis est
operatio; haec autem operatio, praeertim si sit im-
manens, praeter actum ipsum requirit obiectum circa
quod versatur, ut contemplatio, quae est finis homi-
nis, versatur circa aliquam rem aut veritatem con-
templatione dignam, propter quam aliquo modo est
ipsa contemplatio, quia per illam quasi comparatur
et possidetur secundum modum sibi proportiona-
dance with this way it happens not only with respect to the
begotten thing that an end is given which is activity—for the
sake of which is the begotten thing itself—but also with respect
to one activity is given another which is its end. For example,
playing the kithara is for the sake of delight and speaking for
the sake of understanding. For one activity can concur with
another, either objectively or effectively or at least as a neces-
sary or useful condition for the other activity. And, therefore,
it can be ordered to it as to an end.

The fourth division into objective and formal ends.

12. Fourthly, from these divisions, especially from the second,
arises another, by which ends are divided into objective and
formal [ends]. For, as we said, sometimes an end is an activity.
This activity, however, at least if it is immanent, requires be-
sides the act itself an object to which it is turned, as contempla-
tion, which is the end of a human, is turned to some thing or
truth worthy of contemplation, for the sake of which the con-
templation itself is in some way, because through that it is, as
it were, collected and taken hold of in accordance with a mode
proportionate to itself. And in this sense theologians distin-
tum. Et in hoc sensu distinguunt theologi, in fine hominis, visionem et Deum visum, et visionem dicunt esse finem formalem, quem etiam appellant finem quo, et adeptionem finis; Deum autem appellant finem obiectivum, seu finem qui, quia comparatur per finem formalem. Ita sumitur ex D. Thoma, I-II, q. 1, a. 8, et q. 2, a. 7, et q. 11, a. 3, ad 3, ubi advertit hos non tam esse duos fines quam unum, quia neque objectum attingi potest nisi per actum, neque actum fieri potest nisi circa objectum, et ideo motio ac intentio agentis est ad utrumque per modum unius, et ita unam causam finalem compleunt. Quamquam eo modo quo sunt res diverse, possunt inter se comparari et una ad alteram ordinari. Atque hoc modo potest ad hanc divisionem applicari fere tota doctrina quae circa primam tradita est.

280 Quinta divisio finis in eum qui fit et eum qui obtinetur.

13. Et hinc ulterius fit (quae potest esse quinta divi-
sio) quod finis cuius aliquando supponitur operationi agentis et intenditur <col. b> non ut efficiendus, sed ut obtinendus, quod verum habet de fine obiectivo, et hoc modo est Deus finis nostrarum actionum, et extenditur hoc ad omnes res quae supponuntur ut obiecta vel materia circa quam, ut divitiae sunt finis avari, non producendus sed acquirendus, etiamsi iam existat. Aliquando vero finis non supponitur, sed fit per actionem agentis, sive fieri dicatur proprie pro re facta, sive late, ut etiam dici potest de actione. Atque hoc modo visio Dei est finis hominis, et in universum omnis operatio, vel terminus per ipsam factus, est finis non praeexistens, sed subsequens ad intentionem agentis. Atque hanc divisionem in terminis docuit D. Thom. D. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 18, sumiturque ex doc- trina Aristotelis, partim II Phys., et V Metaph., ubi potissimum facit mentionem eius finis qui fit per actionem agentis; partim II de Caelo, text. 64, et XII Metaph., text. 36, ubi dicit Deum esse finem gratia cuius caetera agent; constat autem Deum non esse finem qui per actionem agentis fiat, sed qui ad ac-

sion) that the finis cuius is sometimes supposed in the activity of the agent and is intended not as something to be effected but as something to be obtained, which is true concerning the objective end. And in this way God is the end of our actions and this is extended to all things which are supposed as the object or matter on account of which, as riches are the end for the greedy, not the producing but the acquiring, even if they have already appeared. But sometimes the end is not presupposed but is made through the action of the agent, either as it is said to become properly through the produced thing, or, more broadly, as it can also be said concerning the action. And in this way the vision of God is the end of humans and in general every activity or terminus made through it is not an end pre-existing but subsequent to the intention of the agent. And St. Thomas taught this division in termini in Contra Gentiles III, c. 18, and it is taken from the doctrine of Aristotle, Physics part II, and Metaphysics V, where he especially makes mention of that end which is made through the action of the agent, and De Caelo part II, text. 64 and Metaphysics XII, text. 36, where he says that God is the end for the sake of which (finis gratia cuius) the remaining things act. It is clear, however, that God

DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICÆ 500 D ISP. XXIII, SECT. 2
Sexta divisio in finem ultimum et non ultimum.

14. Sexto, dividitur finis in proximum et remotum ac ultimum. Haec divisio frequens est apud auctores, et fundamentum habet in Aristotele, citatis locis, et in II Metaph., c. 2, ubi ostendit non dari processum in infinitum in finibus. Videri tamen potest alicui repugnantiam involvere divisionem illam cum diviso; nam de ratione finis est ut sit ultimus, ut nomen ipsum prae se fert. Et quia de ratione finis est ut propter se ametur et alia propter ipsum, et consequenter ut ipse non ametur propter alia; iam enim non esset finis, sed medium; non ergo recte dividitur finis in proximum et remotum vel ultimum. Ut ergo intelligatur divisio, duae rationes in finali causa distinguui possunt: prior est qua finis dicitur propter se amari; posterior, quatenus alia amantur propter ipsum et ipse est ratio amandi illa. Sub priori ergo ratio is not the end which is made through the action of agents, but that which is presupposed for the actions of all agents.

The sixth division into ultimate and non-ultimate ends.

14. Sixthly, ends are divided into proximate and remote and ultimate ends. This division is common in the writings of authors and it has a foundation in Aristotle, in the cited places and in *Metaphysics* II, c. 2, where he shows that a progression into infinity is not given in ends. Still, it can seem to someone that this division involves a repugnance with a divided [part]. For it is of the nature of an end to be ultimate, as the name itself makes clear. And because it is of the nature of an end to be loved for its own sake and others for its sake and consequently it itself is not loved for the sake of others. For then it would not be an end, but a means. Therefore, ends are not rightly divided into proximate and remote or ultimate. Therefore, in order to understand the division, two accounts of final causes can be distinguished. The former is that by which an end is said to be loved for its own sake; the latter, insofar as other [things] are loved for its sake and it itself is that reason for loving. Un-

320 illam ] illa D V.
tione omnis finis, si praecise quatenus finis est con-
sideretur, habet rationem ultimi, ut ratio facta os-
tendit; nam in illo quod dicitur propter se amari in-
cluditur negatio amoris propter aliud; in qua nega-
tione consummatur ratio ultimi. Contingit tamen ut, quamvis aliquod obiectum propter se et propter bonitatem suam amatur, nihilominus vel natura sua vel ex intentione operantis referatur et tendat in ul-
teriorem finem, ut cum quis facit eleemosy-
nam, et quia honesta sit actio in ratione misericor-
diae, et quia est accommodata ad satisfaciendum Deo pro peccatis. Tunc ergo unus finis ordinatur ad al-
ium, quamquam sub ea ratione qua ordinatur non habeat rationem finis, sed medii. Ille igitur finis qui immediate propter se amatur, dicitur finis proximus; alius vero finis ad quem alter ordinatur, dicitur remo-
tus; quod si in illo sistat intentio operantis, erit etiam ultimus; si vero in ulteriorem finem ille ordinetur, erit tantum remotus, non tamen ultimus; quia vero non potest in infinitum procedi, sistendum erit in

der the former concept, therefore, every end, if it is considered precisely insofar as it is an end, has the nature of an ultimate [end], as the given reason shows. For in that which is said to be loved for its own sake is included the negation of love for the sake of another,⁴ in which negation is brought about the na-
ture of an ultimate [end]. Still, it happens that, although some object is loved for its own sake and for the sake of its good, nevertheless, either from its nature or from the intention of the one acting, it is directed to and tends to a more ultimate end, as when someone gives alms, both because the action is honestum in accordance with the aspect of compassion and be-
cause it is appropriate for making satisfaction to God on behalf of sins. Therefore, in that case one end is ordered to another, although under that aspect by which it is ordered it does not have the nature of an end but of means. Therefore, that end which is immediately loved for its own sake is called a prox-
imate end. But the other end to which it is ordered is called a remote [end]. But if the intention of the one acting is stopped in the remote end, it will also be an ultimate [end]. But if it is ordered to a more ultimate end, it will only be a remote [end]

⁴Should not the claim be that saying that something is loved for its own sake is a negation of the claim that it is loved merely for the sake of something else? That is all that Suárez’s further claim requires and seems much more plausible.

DISPUTATIONES METAPHYSICÆ 502 DISP. XXIII, SECT. 2
aliquo qui sit ultimus.

15. Atque ita facile constat necessitas praedictae divisionis; nam, quia intentio agentis necessario debet in aliquo fine immediate versari, quia alias nunquam inchoaretur, ideo necesse est esse aliquem finem proximum; est enim ille quem proxime et immediate agens intendit tali actu seu intentione. Non est autem simpliciter necessarium ut praeter finem proximum detur remotus, quia potest intentio agentis sistere in uno fine; tamen, quia potest etiam in ulteriorem finem tendere, ideo praeter proximum dari potest finis remotus. Et similiter, quamvis aliquis finis ultimus semper sit necessarius, eo quod non proceditur in infinitum, non est tamen necessarium ut finis ultimus semper sit distinctus a proximo; nam si voluntas in uno tantum fine sistat, quod facere potest, ille erit simul proximus et ultimus, saltem negative, id est, post quem non est alius; quando vero plures sunt fines subordinati, tunc necesse est but not an ultimate [end]. But because it cannot proceed into infinity, it will be stopped in something which is an ultimate [end].

15. And thus the necessity for the mentioned division is easily clear. For, because the intention of an agent must necessarily be immediately turned to some end, because otherwise it would never be started, therefore it is necessary that there be some proximate end. For it is that which the agent proximately and immediately intends in such an act or intention. It is not, however, strictly speaking, necessary that a remote [end] is given besides the proximate end, because the intention of the agent can stop in one end. Still, because it can also tend to a more ultimate end, therefore a remote end can be given besides the proximate [end]. And, similarly, although some ultimate end is always necessary, so that one does not proceed into infinity, it is not, nevertheless, necessary that an ultimate end always be distinct from the proximate [end]. For if the will stops in only one end, which can happen, that [end] will at the same time be proximate and ultimate, at least negatively, that is, there is not another after it. But when more than one end is subordinated, then it is necessary that these
hos fines esse distinctos. Atque hinc fit ut, quamvis contingat plura media inter se subordinari, ut primum sit propter secundum et secundum propter tertium et sic usque ad finem qui propter se amatur, si tamen nullum ex illis media amatur propter se, sed pure ut medium propter aliud, nullum eorum habeat rationem finis proximi aut remoti sub praedicta ratione; sed ille finis ad quem ordinatur tota mediorum series, licet videtur remotus in ratione objecti volitii et materialis, tamen in ratione finis est proximus seu primus in quem ut in finem tendit voluntas, et erit etiam ultimus, si non in alium finem ordinetur.

16. Si vero finem consideremus sub alia habitu- dine, scilicet, quatenus propter ipsum aliquid eligitur aut fit, sic facilius est distinguere illas tres rationes finium, non solum <col. b> in rebus quae propter se appetuntur, sed etiam in rebus quae sunt pure media quae propter aliud eliguntur. Nam quando ad unum finem plura media inter se subordinata eliguntur, necesse et dari primum et ultimum medium, tam ends be distinct. And hence it happens that, although it may turn out that multiple intermediaries are subordinated, so that the first is for the sake of the second and the second is for the sake of the third and so on all the way to the end which is loved for its own sake, if nevertheless, none of these intermediates is loved for its own sake but purely as means to another, none of them will have the character of a proximate or remote end under the just-stated characters. But that end to which the entire series of intermediates is ordered, although it seems remote in the nature of the willed and material object, nevertheless in the nature of an end it is proximate or the first to which the will tends as to an end. And it will also be ultimate, if it is not ordered to another end.

16. But if we consider an end under another disposition, namely, insofar as for the sake of it something is chosen or done, then it is easier to distinguish these three concepts of ends, not only in the things which are desired for their own sakes, but also in things which are purely means which are chosen for the sake of something else. For when multiple means subordinated among themselves are chosen for one end, it is necessary both to be given a first and an ultimate means, as
ordine intentionis quam ordine executionis; in neutro enim ordine potest in infinitum procedi; alias vel electio vel executio nunquam inchoaretur. Dicitur autem primum medium ordine intentionis id quod est immediatum fini quoque primo eligitur post intentionem finis, et illud ipsum est ultimum in executione. E contrario vero illud medium quod est in ordine eligendi postremum, est in executione primum; nam ubi finitur electio, inde incipit executio, ut paulatim per media usque ad consecutionem finis perveniatur. Hoc ergo medium quod est in executione primum et in electione ultimum nullam habet rationem finis, quia nec propter se amatur, cum tatum sit medium, nec etiam alius amatur propter ipsum, cum in illo finita sit electio; tamen secundum medium habet iam rationem finis proximi respectu medii prioris, quod propter ipsum electum est. Tertium autem medium habet rationem finis remoti respectu primi medii, et sic potest per plures fines magis vel minus remotos procedi donec sistatur in ultimo, quod semper necessarium est, cum non pos- much in the order of intention as in the order of execution. For in neither order can one proceed into infinity. Otherwise, either the choice or the execution would never begin. The first means in the order of intention, however, is called that which is immediate in the end and which is chosen first after the intention of the end and that itself is ultimate in execution. But in the other direction that means which is last in the order of choosing is first in execution. For where a choice is ended, there begins the execution, so that one gradually through the means comes all the way to the attainment of the end. Therefore, this means which is first in execution and last in choice has no character of an end, because it is loved neither for its own sake, since it is only a means, nor is something else loved for its sake, since in that the choice is ended. Still, the second means has now the character of a proximate end with respect to the prior means, which was chosen for its sake. The third means, moreover, has the character of a remote end with respect to the first means, and thus can be proceeded through many ends more or less remote until it is stopped in the ultimate [end], which is always necessary, since one cannot proceed into infinity. And so it is sufficiently clear how
sit in infinitum procedi. Atque ita satis constat illa, divisio quantum ad expositionem terminorum pertinet; nonnullae vero quae ex illa oriuntur, in discursu disputationis tracabuntur commodius, praesertim duae, scilicet, an media participent aliquo modo causalitatem finis, et an necessæ sit constitutæ aliquæm finem ultimum, ubi etiam varias acceptiones finis ultimi declarabimus, et an habeat propre priam et per se causalitatem quatenus finis ultimus est seu remotus.

much this division pertains to the exposition of *termini*. But some questions which arise from this are discussed more advantageously in the course of the disputation, especially two, namely, whether means share in some way in the causality of the end and whether it is necessary to set up some ultimate end, where we also show different meanings of ‘end’ and whether it has a proper and *per se* causality insofar as it is an ultimate end or a remote [end].
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Bataillon, Marcel. Érasme et l’Espagne: recherches sur l’histoire spiri-
revised and enlarged, as Erasmo y España: estudios sobre la historia
espiritual del siglo XVI, translated by Antonio Alatorre (Mexico: Fondo

Bauer, Emmanuel J. ‘Francisco Suárez (1548–1617): Scholasticism
after Humanism’. In Philosophers of the Renaissance, edited by
Paul Richard Blum, translated by Brian McNeil, 236–55. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010. First pub-
lished as ‘Francisco Suárez: Scholastik nach dem Humanismus’, in
Philosophen der Renaissance, edited by Paul Richard Blum (Darm-

Biel, Gabriel. Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum, edited by
Wilfridus Werbeck and Udo Hofmann. 4 vols. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr,
1984.

Boler, John. ‘Transcending the Natural: Duns Scotus on the Two Af-
fecteds of the Will’. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 67

Bos, Egbert P., and H. A. Krop. Franco Burgersdijk (1590–1635): Neo-

Brachtendorf, Johannes. ‘Die Finalität der Handlung nach F. Suarez:
eine spätscholastische Kritik an Thomas von Aquins Lehre vom Let-

Bradley, Denis J. M. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and
Human Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Science. Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1997.

Brandt, Caspar. The Life of James Arminius. Translated by John

Brewer, Talbot. The Retrieval of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009.

Broadie, Sarah. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University Press,

Brucker, Jacob. Historia critica philosophiae a mundi incunabulis ad nos-


Heereboord, Adriaan. *Meletemata philosophica*. Amsterdam, 1680.

Heinaman, Robert. ‘Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency in the “Nico-


———. ‘Fuentes de la metafísica de Suárez’. In Suarez en el cuarto


———. *Opera omnia*. Paris: Vivès, 1891–95.

———. *Opera omnia*, edited by C. Balić et al. Vatican: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–.


Kraye, Jill, ed. *Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical


Mendia, B. 'Influencia de los maestros franciscanos en la psicología del conocimiento intelectual de Suárez'. Verdad y Vida 6 (1948): 421–53.


517


sui ipsius et multorum aliorum ignorantia (1370).


Polman, Joannes. *Breviarium theologicum*. Antwerp, 1686.


Rueve, Stephen J. *Suarez and the Natural Moral Law*. PhD diss., St. Louis University, 1933.


———. *De bonitate et malitia humanorum actuum*. In *Ad primam secundae D. Thomæ tractatus quinque theologici*... and vol. 4 of *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–66).

———. *De fine hominis*. In *Ad primam secundae D. Thomæ tractatus quinque theologici*... and vol. 4 of *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–66).

———. *De gratia*. Vols. 7–10 of *Opera omnia* (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–66).


——. _De voluntario et involuntario_. In _Ad primam secundæ D. Thomæ tractatus quinque theologici..._ and vol. 4 of _Opera omnia_ (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–66).


——. _Explicatio in libros Magnorum moralium, libros Morales ad Eudemum et librum De virtutibus_. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, lat. 6775.

——. _Metaphysicarum disputationum_. . . . Salamanca, 1597.


White, Stephen A. ‘Is Aristotelian Happiness a Good Life or the Best
Whiting, Jennifer. ‘Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle’. 


Williams, Thomas. ‘How Scotus Separates Morality from Happiness’. 
