ARISTOTLE ON THE VIRTUES OF SLAVES, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN

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by
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There is a puzzle about what Aristotle means when (e.g. at *Pol.* 1.13) he attributes virtue of character to deliberatively imperfect persons like slaves, women, and children. This is because his official ethical works (*EN*, *EE*) seem to insist that virtue requires the deliberative excellence of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*). If slaves, women, and children don’t have the virtue that Aristotle develops at length in the ethical works, then what exactly is the “virtue” that he ascribes to them?

I argue that the virtue of slaves, women, and children, while not amounting to virtue strictly-speaking, *approximates* such virtue in the following way (chapter 1). Start with the uncontroversial idea that virtue strictly-speaking, as a mode of rational excellence, essentially involves not only the excellence of an agent’s (strictly) rational or deliberative part, but also the excellence of her non-rational part—her *alogon* or emotional part—*qua* that part’s ability to “follow” or “be persuaded by” reason. Now, while slaves, women, and children lack perfect deliberative faculties and so cannot have the deliberative excellence required for virtue strictly-speaking, they can at the very least have non-rational parts that follow reason in a way, and so can have virtue that approximates virtue strictly-speaking.

Such obedience of the *alogon* consists, I argue, in the *alogon* attaching to fine objects *qua* fine (chapter 2). To support this claim, I look at what Aristotle says about
following reason. I then examine the motivational and evaluative capacities of non-rational desire and argue that appetite (*epithumia*) and spirited desire (*thumos*) can, if habituated properly, be motivated by considerations of the fine (*kalon*) as such (chapters 3 & 4).

Granting that slaves, women, and children can have non-rational desires for fine action as such, can they decide on (*prohairesthai*) fine action? To answer this question, I argue for an account of decision whereby it essentially arises out of reflective deliberation about the constituents of happiness (chapters 5 & 6). Because women can, but slaves and women cannot, engage in such deliberation, only women are capable of deciding on virtuous actions. The virtues of slaves and children do not include prohairetic motivation (chapter 7).
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Kristen Inglis was born in 1981 in Norfolk, Virginia. She completed an undergraduate degree in philosophy and economics at the University of Virginia before starting her PhD in philosophy at Cornell.
Dedicated, with love, to my parents Jennifer McKendree and Scott Inglis.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DA:  De Anima
EE:  Ethica Eudemia
EN:  Ethica Nicomachea
HA:  Historia Animalium
MA:  De Motu Animalium
Met.: Metaphysica
MM:  Magna Moralia
Phys:  Physica
Poet. De Arte Poetica
Pol.: Politica
Rhet.: Rhetorica
Top. Topic
I. Introduction

In Politics 1.13 Aristotle asks whether natural slaves, women, and young people can participate in the same kind of virtue of character as adult male citizens do. He decides that while they can participate in a type of virtue of character, they do not participate in the same virtue as adult male citizens.

We must suppose that all [slaves, women, and children] necessarily partake of the virtues of character, but not in the same way: rather, in such measure as is proper to each in relation to his own function (hoson hekastōi pros to hautou ergon). Hence the ruler must possess virtue of character in completeness (telean) (for any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and reason is a master-craftsman (architektonos)); while each of the others must have that share of this virtue which is appropriate to them (hoson epiballei autois). (Pol. 1.13 1260a14-17)

When Aristotle attributes virtue of character to slaves, women, and children, he cannot be attributing to them the virtue of character he discusses in his ethical works (call this latter virtue “paradigmatic virtue”). For paradigmatic virtue requires the deliberative excellence

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1 Aristotle distinguishes between legal slaves and natural slaves. Natural slaves are people whose natural constitutions make them disadvantaged, and disadvantaged in a way that actually makes it advantageous for them to be ruled and owned by another. This inferior natural constitution consists in having a deficient reasoning capacity, a deficiency that, in Aristotle’s view, is found in non-Greeks: “Hence, as the poets say, ‘It is proper that Greeks should rule non-Greeks,’ on the assumption that non-Greek and slave are by nature identical” (Pol. 1.2 1252b4-1252b8). Aristotle also defines a natural slave as anyone “who, though human, belongs by nature not to himself by to another,” explaining that “a human being belongs to another if, in spite of being human, he is a possession; and a possession is a tool for action and has a separate existence” (Pol. 1.5 1254a13-18). He provides further characterizations of natural slaves at Pol. 1.5 1254b22-3 and 1.13 1260a12.
of practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) (*EN* 6.13 1144b30-2), and Aristotle suggests later in *Pol*. 1.13 that slaves, women, and children, being deliberatively deficient, lack practical wisdom. This raises the following question: if the virtues of slaves, women, and children are not instances of paradigmatic virtue, what are the natures of these virtues? What sorts of ethical capacities do slaves, women, and children have, according to Aristotle?

For example, we might ask about the kind of motivational attitudes involved in slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues, and in particular about how these attitudes compare with those of the paradigmatically virtuous person. The latter, Aristotle tells us, has both non-rational and rational motivation prompting her to act virtuously; that is, in addition to having appetitive desires (*epithumia*) and spirited desires (*thumos*) that prompt her to act virtuously, she decides (*prohairesthai*) on virtuous activity.

A related question concerns the values or ends for the sake of which virtuous slaves, women, and children perform virtuous actions. Do slaves, women, and children, like the paradigmatically virtuous person, do virtuous actions for the sake of the fine (*kalon*)? Or are they like the slavishly virtuous people of the *Phaedo* who live orderly lives not because they value virtuous activity for its own sake but because they want to maximize their self-interest (which they narrowly conceive as pleasure) over a lifetime?

Determining these specifics about the ethical capacities of slaves, women, and

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2 “Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] (*kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tēs psuchēs*), they are present in different ways. For the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (*bouleutikon*) entirely (*holōs*). The woman has it, but it is without authority (*akuron*). A child (*pais*) has it, but it is incomplete (*ateles*)” (*Pol*. 1.13 1260a10-14).

3 For passages suggesting that the virtuous person’s appetites prompt her to pursue virtuous action, see *EN* 2.3 1104b5-7 and *EN* 3.12 1119b15-6.

4 For a passage where Aristotle says that spirited desire prompts the virtuous agent to pursue virtuous action, see *EN* 3.8 1116b32-1117a5.

5 *EN* 2.4 1105a30-1105b1.

6 The virtuous person acts “because it is fine” (*hōti kalon*, 1116a11, b3, 1117b9, *MM* 1191a20) and “for the sake of the fine” (*tou kalou henēka* 1115b12-3, 23, 1116b31, 1117a8) (*Cf.* *dia to kalon* 1120a24-8, 1122b6-7, 1123a24-5, *EE* 1230a27-33, 1248b36-7, *MM* 1190a28-34, 1191a23-4, b15).

7 *Phaedo* 68c-69c.
children is important for two reasons. For starters, we might just want to know what Aristotle thinks about the ethical capacities of people who made up more than half the population and played important roles in the polis. More importantly, however, if we can show that Aristotle has a satisfactory account of non-paradigmatic virtue, then the ethical works’ account of paradigmatic virtue may turn out to be less objectionable than it otherwise might be. For one might reasonably interpret paradigmatic virtue as requiring rather sophisticated intellectual capacities—a grasp of philosophical ethics, for example—and this might make the account seem unrealistic: any account of virtue simpliciter that requires the virtuous agent to be something like a moral philosopher is, so one might think, implausible and unattractive. If, however, Aristotle’s ethical theory and moral psychology have room for a type of virtue of character that is available to deliberatively imperfect persons, the demanding account of paradigmatic virtue is rendered less objectionable.

We have good reasons, then, to try to get a handle on the nature of slaves’,

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8 At Pol. 1.13 1260b13-21 Aristotle explicitly notes that together women and children make up more than half the population and on this basis urges that women and children receive appropriate education.

9 Slaves were responsible for the polis’ labor needs; women for the preservation of household goods; and young people (if they were boys) were trained to eventually be legislators and (if they were girls) to work within the home.

10 I defend this interpretation of paradigmatic virtue in chapters 5 and 6.

11 This is Sarah Broadie’s complaint against interpretations of paradigmatic virtue that make philosophical reflection about the good a pre-requisite for virtue. In her opinion, it unrealistic to require the virtuous person to have a blueprint of the good that is arrived at by philosophical reflection (a “Grand End”):

“[A]ristotle would be the last to deny that philosophical ethics must be rooted in such reflection. But if we take account of experience, we must recognize that in so doing we recall particular practical responses, our own and others’, which seem and have seemed to us right; and we bring to mind the kinds of personalities which those responses represent. Some of them seem to exemplify what, speaking un-guardedly, we should be happy to term ‘practical wisdom’. Are we now to withhold, any more than before, the predicate ‘wise’ until we have made sure that the subjects possessed an explicitly pictured Grand End? And if we do now withhold it for the sake of a theory, does not our same moral experience show that practical wisdom defined now according to the theory is not a necessary condition for good decisions and virtuous actions? But if that is so, practical wisdom as defined is not to be considered an essentially practical virtue (and if not practical, why a virtue at all?), since it would appear that we can function well in practice without it” (Broadie, 201).
women’s, and children’s virtues. But if we cannot straightforwardly identify their virtues with the paradigmatic virtue of the ethical works, how do we go about identifying the evaluative and motivational attitudes that characterize their virtues?

In the remainder of the chapter, I present a methodology for approaching slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues. First, I argue that when Aristotle attributes virtue of character to slaves, women, and children, we should interpret him as attributing to them approximations of paradigmatic virtue, where these approximations are based on the way in which these parties approximate the excellent rational activity that constitutes paradigmatic virtue. I then argue that we can determine what sorts of motivational attitudes their virtue includes if we determine (1) the psychological phenomena involved in motivational attitudes like decision, and (2) the psychological capacities of slaves, women, and children. (1) and (2) will set the agenda for the rest of the dissertation.

II. Pol. 1.13 in Outline

We should begin by examining in greater detail the Pol. 1.13 passage where Aristotle first mentions their virtues. He begins by presenting a certain puzzle concerning the capacities for virtue in slaves in particular, a puzzle that he later extends to women and children. The puzzle goes as follows:

[1] As to slaves the question might be asked: does a slave possess any other virtue, besides his merits as a tool and a servant, more valuable than these, for instance temperance, courage, justice and any of the other virtues or character? [2] Or has he no virtue beside his bodily service? [3] For either way there is a difficulty: [4] if slaves do possess virtue, how will they differ from freemen (eleutherôn)? [5] Or if they do not, this is strange (atopon) as they are human beings (anthrōpōn), and participate in reason (logou koinōnountōn). [6] And nearly the same question is also raised about the woman and the child (paidos):
have they too virtues and ought a woman to be temperate, brave and just, and can a child be intemperate or temperate, or not? [7] This point therefore requires general consideration in relation to natural ruler and subject: is virtue the same for ruler and ruled, or different? [8] For if both have to partake of “good and fine character” (**kalokagathias**), why should one have to rule unqualifiedly, and the other unqualifiedly obey? (Pol 1.13 1259b22-35)

After acknowledging that slaves have virtues of the body ([1]), Aristotle considers whether slaves have virtues of the soul—virtues such as temperance, courage, and justice ([2]). Reasoning that slaves are human beings and so participate in reason (**logou koinōnountôn**), he infers that they can partake in some sort of virtue ([5]). Women and children also participate in reason and so should be eligible for virtue ([6]). But attributing a type of virtue to slaves, women, and children raises the following puzzle: if both free adult males and slaves, women, and children partake of virtue, why is it right for the one group to rule, and for the other to be ruled unconditionally? ([8]) Or, to put the question a bit differently, in what way do their virtues differ from that of freemen such that they should obey and their masters should rule? Only adult free males, after all, are given ruling power.

To resolve the dilemma, Aristotle appeals to certain facts about the psychological capacities of slaves, women, and children:

Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] (**kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tês psuchês**), they are present in different ways. For the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (**bouleutikon**) entirely (**holós**). The woman has it, but it is without authority (**akuron**). A child (**pais**) has it, but it is incomplete (**ateles**). (Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14)

This solution involves first of all acknowledging that the naturally ruled parties have certain psychological credentials: “the parts of the soul” are present in slaves, women, and children. (We shall examine in the next section what exactly this cryptic phrase...
means). Such credentials are not enough, Aristotle then says, to give slaves, women, and children the power to rule. This is because their psychological capacities are importantly limited: the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (bouleutikon) entirely (holôs), the woman’s is without authority (akuron), and the child’s is incomplete (ateles). These imperfections justify these groups’ subordinate positions, for, as Aristotle insists later, rulers (i.e. adult free men) do not possess such deficiencies:

Hence the ruler possesses virtue of character to its fullest extent—for any work, taken absolutely, belongs to the master-craftsman, and reason is a master-craftsman (to gar ergon estin haplôs tou architektonos, ho de logos architektôn)—but each of the others [slaves, women, and children] have just as much as is appropriate to them (hekaston hoson epiballei autois). (Pol. 1.13 1260a17-9)

Slaves’, women’s, and children’s deliberative capacities are limited by comparison with those of the natural rulers, and these limitations are what justify slaves’, women’s, and children’s subordination.

So the primary elements of Aristotle’s response to the puzzle are the following. First, there is the concession that slaves, women, and children have certain soul parts and so may partake of a kind of virtue of character. Second, there is the insistence that such virtue is based on imperfect or limited psychic capacities, imperfections and limitations that the natural ruler does not have. Finally, there is the claim that, to the extent that the natural ruler’s virtue is based on perfect or complete rationality, his virtue is superior in a way that makes it right for him to rule and for the ruled class to be ruled.

III. Pol. 1.13 in Focus: Slaves’, Women’s, and Children’s Virtues as Approximations of Paradigmatic Virtue
With this rough outline of *Pol.* 1.13 in hand, let us look in greater detail at the dilemma that Aristotle raises. As I will try to show, an examination of the dilemma reveals that he takes slaves, women and children to approximate paradigmatic virtue in some way.

When Aristotle says that it is slaves’ participation in reason that makes it *prima facie* reasonable to attribute virtue of character to them ([5]), he implies that rational capacity has an important connection to virtue of character. This suggests that *Pol.* 1.13 is alluding to the account of paradigmatic virtue developed in the ethical works, for the ethical works present paradigmatic virtue as a perfection of the rational soul. Such an account of virtue results from the function arguments in *EN* 1.7 and *EE* 2.1, where Aristotle appeals to the human function (*ergon*) to clarify the nature of the human good. What counts as the good for *x* depends on what sort of thing *x* is, and so if we want to know the human good, we must know what sort of thing a human is. After ruling out the life of nutrition and perception as possible functions of humans on the grounds that these functions belong to plants and animals, Aristotle identifies a practical (*praktikê*) sort of life of what possesses reason (*tou logon echontos*) as the distinctive human function (1098a4). Because a virtue of *x* is that characteristic which makes *x* perform *x*’s function well (1106a15-24), it follows that human virtues are those states of the soul whereby human beings perform well their distinctively human function of living lives guided by reason.

The rationality relevant to virtue of character comes in two forms, corresponding to two parts or aspects of the rational part of the soul (*to ehoi logon*). One part of *to
echon logon actually thinks (dianooumenon)\textsuperscript{12} and in particular deliberates (bouleuesthai 6.1 1139a 12-3). The other part (the alogon) does not itself think but rather desires; this part is the seat of non-rational desires and emotions, and it counts as derivatively rational or rational “in a way” (pēi, 11102b4) insofar as it can respond to the strictly rational part by “obeying” (peitharchei, peitharchikon), “listening” (euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or harmonizing with (homophônei) reason.\textsuperscript{13} 14 Paradigmatic virtue of character is thus that state of the soul whereby a human being expresses well her two types of rationality: the rationality of her deliberative part and the rationality of her non-rational part (her alogon

\textsuperscript{12} “There remains a practical sort of life of what possesses reason tou logon echontos); and of this, one aspect “possesses reason” insofar as it is obedient to reason, while the other possesses it insofar as it actually has it, and itself thinks (to d’ hōs echon kai dianooumenon)” (1.7 1098a3-5).

\textsuperscript{13} If one must say that this part too has reason [s.c. the part that is responsible for appetite and non-rational desire], then reason, too, will be twofold, consisting of one part that has reason strictly speaking and in itself, and another part that is capable of listening as if to one’s father” (1.13 1103a1-2). “Another nature in the soul would also seem be nonrational (alogos), though in a way has a share in reason (metechousa mentoi pēi logou). For in continent and incontinent people we approve their reason, or the [part] of the soul that has reason, because it urges them in the right way and towards what is best; but they evidently also have in them some other [part] beside reason, which combats and resists reason. For just as paralyzed parts of the body, when we decide to move them to the right, do the contrary and move off to the left, the same is true of the soul; for incontinent persons have impulses (hormai) in contrary directions. But whereas in the body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not see it; nevertheless we should suppose also that the soul has something apart from reason, which opposes and runs counter to reason, though in what sense the two are distinct does not concern us here. But this [part] as well [as the rational part] appears, as we said, to participate in (metechein) reason; at least in the continent man it obeys (peitharchei) reason—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it listens still better (euêkoôteron), for there it agrees (homophônei) with reason in everything. Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general (to d’ epithumêtikon kai holōs orektikon), does in a sense participate in principle (metechei pōs), insofar as it listens to reason and obeys it (hēi katêkoon estin autou kai peitharchikon): in the sense in fact in which we speak of ‘listening to reason’ from father and friends, not in the sense of the term ‘rational’ in mathematics. And that the nonrational part is in a way persuaded by (peithetai) by reason is indicated by our practice of admonishment (nouthetēsis), reprimanding (epitimēsis), and encouraging (paraklēsis) generally” (EN 1.13 1102b13-1103a1).

\textsuperscript{14} In EN VI.1, Aristotle says that the thinking part of the soul (dianooumenon 1098a5) is itself bipartite: the scientific part—to epistémonikon—is that by which we study beings whose principles do not admit of being otherwise, and the rationally calculating part or deliberating part—to logistikon/bouleutikon—is that by which we study beings whose principles do admit of being otherwise (EN 6.1 1139a7-9; 1139a12-5). Since virtue of character is about principles which admit otherwise, it involves the deliberative part but not the scientific part. Thus, we can set the scientific part of the dianooumenon aside.
or emotional part) *qua* that part’s ability to “listen to” or “obey” reason.\(^\text{15}\)

We’ve seen that slaves, women, and children cannot have paradigmatic virtue, since this virtue requires the deliberative excellence of practical wisdom, and these parties lack practical wisdom. Nevertheless, we have seen that Aristotle clearly alludes to paradigmatic virtue in *Pol.* 1.13 when he connects virtue to reason and relies on that account of paradigmatic virtue when he attributes virtues to slaves. (Recall the passage where he connects virtue with reason: “If [slaves] do not possess virtue of character], this is strange (*atopon*) as they are human beings (*anthrōpōn*), and participate in reason (*logou koinōnoountón*)” (1259b28)).

What is going on? When Aristotle says that slaves have a share in reason and thus are candidates for virtue, he must be drawing our attention to the fact that slaves have rational capacities that in some way approximate or resemble the rational capacities involved in paradigmatic virtue. This approximation, he must be saying, makes slaves eligible for some sort of approximation of paradigmatic virtue.

What sort of approximation of paradigmatic virtue does he have in mind? A passage from *Pol.* 1.5 clarifies the kind of approximation of rational excellence, and so virtue, that Aristotle seems to wants to attribute to slaves in *Pol.* 1.13.

For he who can be another’s (and that is why he is another’s), and he who participates in reason (*koinōnōn logou*) to the extent that they perceive (*aisthanesthai*) but not have (*echein*) [reason], is a slave by nature. (*Pol.* 1.5 1254b22-5)

Aristotle says that the natural slave “participates in reason enough to perceive (*aisthanesthai*) it, but not to possess (*echein*) it.” The contrast he draws here between

\(^{15}\) This is correct in spite of 1.13’s assignment of the virtues of character to the reason-responsive part and *phronēsis* to the strictly rational part (1.13 1103a1-6). For Aristotle makes clear later (at 6.13 1144a17) that one cannot have virtue of character strictly speaking (*kurios*) unless one has *phronēsis*. 
perceiving (*aisthanesthai*) reason and having (*echein*) reason is strongly reminiscent of the contrast at *EN* 1.13 between the part of the soul that “listens to,” reason (1102b27, 31 & 1103a3) and the part of the soul that has reason (*echein*) strictly speaking and actually thinks (*dianooumenon*). Indeed, a few lines later in *Pol.* 1.13, we get a clear reference to *EN* 1.13’s division of the soul:

For the soul by nature contains a part that rules (*archon*) and a part that is ruled (*archomenon*), to which we assign different virtues, that is, the virtue of the part having reason (*tou logon echontos*) and that of the nonrational (*alogou*). (*Pol* 1.13 1260a4-9)

Given the parallels between *Pol.* 1.5 and *EN* 1.13, it is reasonable to interpret *Pol.* 1.5 as saying that slaves have one of the two aspects of the distinctively human soul that he presents in *EN* 1.13. At *Pol.* 1.5 he is attributing to slaves the capacity to have an obedient *alogon* and correspondingly denying slaves the capacity to have reason strictly speaking. Since an obedient *alogon* partly constitutes paradigmatic virtue, a slave who has an obedient *alogon* has a critical part of paradigmatic virtue. This explains why Aristotle at *Pol.*1.13 can appeal to paradigmatic virtue as a reason to attribute virtue to slaves without thereby attributing to them paradigmatic virtue. What he is attributing to them is an *approximation* of paradigmatic virtue, one based on slaves’ abilities to have reason-responsive *aloga*. It is only an approximation of paradigmatic virtue, since slaves lack the excellence of the strictly rational or deliberative part.

Aristotle’s strategy is the same regarding the virtues of women and children: he attributes to women and children approximations of paradigmatic virtue that are based on the way in which they approximate the rational activity that is constitutive of paradigmatic virtue. To see this, recall from *Pol.* 1.13 1260a10-9 that in solving the first
horn of the dilemma, Aristotle attributes to slaves, women, and children “parts of the soul” that he takes to be relevant to virtue: “Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] (kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tês psuchês), they are present in different ways.” We saw that Aristotle says that the soul parts that make slaves candidates for virtue are the parts of rational soul. Thus, it is reasonable to think that the “parts of the soul” that make women and children candidates for virtue are the rational soul parts. Aristotle is implying that they have aloga that are potentially obedient to reason, deliberative soul parts, or both. Whether women’s and children’s approximations of paradigmatic virtue are identical to slaves’ approximations is a question that I explore in chapter 7.

It is important to stress that in attributing approximations of virtue of character to slaves, women, and children, Aristotle is not thereby attributing to them genuine human virtue. The states Aristotle attributes to these parties come close to genuine virtue, but they fall short of the threshold for genuine human virtue, because human virtue is the state whereby the distinctively human soul functions well, and these parties lack a crucial part of this excellence. I will continue to talk of slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues, but it is important to stress that in doing so I use “virtues” as shorthand for “virtue approximations.”

**IV. Paradigmatic Virtue as a Guide to the Motivational Attitudes Involved in Slaves’, Women's, and Children's Virtues**
Knowing that slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues are approximations of paradigmatic virtue does not tell us whether their virtues includes decision (*prohairesis*), or whether they are restricted to non-rational motivation. Nor does it tell us whether their virtues are directed at the fine (*kalon*) as such, or whether their virtues are oriented around a different value. To determine what sorts of evaluative and motivational attitudes are involved in their virtue, we need to look more closely at the psychological natures of these attitudes themselves and at the psychological capacities of slaves, women, and children.

With respect to the natures of these attitudes, we need to determine what roles, if any, the non-rational soul and the deliberative soul part play in the generation of a decision for virtuous activity. Along the same lines, we need to figure out what sorts of psychological capacities can give rise to a concern with the fine as such.

With respect to slaves’, women’s, and children’s psychological capacities, we need to determine both their non-rational desiderative capacities and their deliberative capacities. Can they all have aloga that are reason-responsive? Can they have deliberative parts that approximate practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) in some way?

Difficulties surround both issues. For example, there is substantial disagreement over the relative roles the *alogen* and deliberative part play in the generation of a decision. According to one line of interpretation, *deliberation about the human good is responsible for the production of wishes (boulēseis), the desiderative element in decisions. By contrast, according to a different line of interpretation, the *alogen* is responsible for the production of wishes.*

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16 I defend this particular line of interpretation in chapters 5 and 6.
Concerning motivation by the fine, some commentators take this to be an essentially rational motivation that results when agents realize, on the basis of reflection, that fine action is part of their good. Others argue that motivation to do fine actions as such need not have such rational origins. On this view, appetites and spirited desires have the cognitive and evaluative capacities to pursue the fine as such.

Regarding the issue of slaves, women’s, and children’s psychological capacities, Aristotle does not tell us as much as we would like. It is not clear, for example, what Aristotle means when he says that slaves lack entirely the deliberative faculty, that women’s deliberative faculty is inauthoritative (akuron), and that children’s deliberative

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17 In this camp is Terence Irwin. Irwin grants that a good condition of the non-rational part may be a necessary condition of the virtuous person’s attachment to fine action, and moreover seems to think that one’s non-rational desires can attach to actions that are fine for the pleasure or honor that comes from them. However, he seems to think that one cannot have a non-rational desire for the fine as such. On his view, desiring the fine as such requires pursuing fine action on the basis of a rational conviction about what makes fineness worth choosing:

“Aristotle suggests that rational desire for the fine is thoroughly good dependent [i.e. that it is based on a conception of the good that is prior to what one desires]. The demand to choose virtuous action because it is fine is more stringent than the demand to pursue it non-instrumentally. For we might have an attachment to virtuous action that is both non-instrumental and non-rational; we stick to it even when we gain no further instrumental benefit from it, but we do not stick to it because we have some rational conviction about what makes it worth sticking to in these circumstances. The virtuous person’s choices rest on convictions about the good that have formed her views about the goals that are worth choosing” (Irwin [1], 191).

18 In this camp is M.F. Burnyeat. Burnyeat seems to think that doing fine actions for the sake of the fine can arise out of an agent’s coming to take pleasure in fine activity.

“[If] learning to do and to take (proper enjoyment in doing just actions is learning to do and to enjoy them for their own sake, for what they are, namely, just, and this is not to be distinguished from learning that they are enjoyable for themselves and their intrinsic value, namely, their justice and nobility, then perhaps we can give intelligible sense to the thesis that practice leads to knowledge, as follows. I may be told, and may believe, that such and such actions are just and noble, but I have not really learned for myself (taken to heart, made second nature to me) that they have this intrinsic value until I have learned to value (love) them for it, with the consequence that I take pleasure in doing them. To understand and appreciate the value that makes them enjoyable in themselves I must learn for myself to enjoy them, and that does take time and practice—in short, habituation.” (Burnyeat, 78.)

Burnyeat’s discussion of habituation focuses on pleasure rather than on development of an agent’s deliberative capacities, and so he seems to think that one can develop an appreciation for the intrinsic value of fine action without developing one’s capacities for deliberation. He grants that the appreciation for the intrinsic value of fine action does not include the virtuous person’s understanding of what makes a given fine action fine and thus intrinsically valuable; he grants that habituation does not give you “the why” (to dioti) that the person of practical wisdom has.
faculty is incomplete (ateles). In the case of slaves, is Aristotle denying them the capacity to do any and all deliberative reasoning?

A main goal of the dissertation will be to get some clarity on these issues. By doing so, we can begin to understand the specific motivational and evaluative features of slaves’, women’s, and children’s virtues.

My first aim, taken up in chapter 2, is to argue that the human alogon can prompt an agent to pursue fine action and fine as such. My argument rests on an interpretation of what it is for the reason-responsive part of the soul (the alogon) to obey (peitharchei, peitharchikon), listen to (euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or harmonize with (homophônei) reason. On the view I put forward, one of the features that make an alogon obedient to reason is its grasping, and being motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such. In chapters 3 and 4, I’ll supplement my argument by examining in greater detail the evaluative and cognitive capacities of non-rational desire. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that wishes, and thus decisions, result from reflective reasoning about the good.

I then turn to examining the non-rational desiderative capacities and deliberative capacities of slaves, women, and children (chapter 7). There I argue that slaves, women, and children can all have reason-responsive aloga and thus can have non-rational motivation prompting them to pursue the fine qua fine, but that only women can decide on fine activity.

What emerges from the discussion is the following. Slaves’ and children’s virtues consist entirely in desiderative excellence; they approximate paradigmatic virtue only to the extent that they can have reason-responsive aloga. While such an approximation allows them to pursue virtuous activity for the sake of the fine, their deliberative
imperfections preclude them from having the capacity to decide on virtuous activity.

Women turn out to be a different case; their virtue involves both non-rational motivation for the fine as such, and prohairetic motivation for fine action as such.
CHAPTER 2
NON-RATIONAL DESIRE AND THE FINE (TO KALON)

I. Introduction

We are interested in whether the virtues of slaves, women, and children involve these people doing virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, or whether their virtues are oriented around some other value. To answer this question, we should determine whether the human alogon can give rise to a concern for the fine as such. If it can, then deliberatively deficient individuals like slaves, women, and children should be able to act for the sake of the fine. If it cannot, then slaves, women, and children must perform virtuous actions for some end other than the fine.

In this chapter, I argue that the human alogon can prompt an agent to pursue fine action as such. My argument rests on an interpretation of what it is for the reason-responsive part of the soul (the alogon) to obey (peitharchei, peitharchikon), listen to (euêkoôteron, katêkoon) or harmonize with (homophônei) reason. On the view I put forward, one of the features that make an alogon obedient to reason is its grasping, and being motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such.

My interpretation of the reason-responsive alogon assumes that appetites and spirited desires have the evaluative and cognitive sophistication to pursue the fine as such. In chapters 3 and 4, I’ll examine the evaluative and cognitive capacities of non-rational desire in detail and show that they do have such sophistication.
II. What is it for a Person’s Alogon to Obey Reason? Some Desiderata for an Interpretation

II.1 EN 1.13 in Focus

We should begin by looking closely at EN 1.13, the longest discussion of the part of the soul that is reason-obedient:

Another nature in the soul would also seem be nonrational (alogos), though in a way has a share in reason (metechousa mentoi pēi logou). For in continent and incontinent people we approve their reason, or the [part] of the soul that has reason, because it urges them in the right way and towards what is best; but they evidently also have in them some other [part] beside reason, which combats and resists reason. For just as paralyzed parts of the body, when we decide to move them to the right, do the contrary and move off to the left, the same is true of the soul; for incontinent persons have impulses (hormai) in contrary directions. But whereas in the body we see the erratic member, in the case of the soul we do not see it; nevertheless we should suppose also that the soul has something apart from reason, which opposes and runs counter to reason, though in what sense the two are distinct does not concern us here. But this [part] as well [as the rational part] appears, as we said, to participate in (metechein) reason; at least in the continent man it obeys (peitharchei) reason—and no doubt in the temperate and brave man it listens still better (euêkoôteron), for there it agrees (homophönei) with reason in everything. Thus we see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in reason at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general (to d’ epithumêtikon kai holôs orektikon), does in a sense participate in reason (metechei pôs), insofar as it listens to reason and obeys it (hēi katêkoon estin autou kai peitharchikon): in the sense in fact in which we speak of ‘listening to reason’ from father and friends, not in the sense of the term ‘rational’ in mathematics. And that the nonrational part is in a way persuaded by (peithetai) by reason is indicated by our practice of admonishment (nouthetêsis), reprimanding (epitimêsis), and encouraging (paraklêsis) generally. (EN 1.13 1102b13-1103a1)

19 For further descriptions of this soul division, see EN 1.7 1098a4-8 and EE 2.1 1219b26-1220a4: “The remaining possibility, then, is some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason (tou logon echontos). One [part] of it has reason as obeying reason (epipeithes logôi); the other has it as itself having reason and thinking (to d’ hôs echon kai dianooumenon)... We have found, then, that the human function is activity of the soul in accord with reason or requiring reason” (EN 1.7 1098a4-8, translation Irwin [2]). “We must now investigate the soul: because virtue belongs to the soul, and does so not incidentally. As it is human virtue that is the object of our inquiry, let us assume that there are two parts of the soul that share in reason, but that they do not both share in reason in the same way: one’s nature is to command (to men
The passage says that the part of the soul that is obedient to reason is the *appetitive* and *desiderative* soul part (epithumētikon kai holōs orektikon, 1102b30-1). While *orektikon* here might make one think that Aristotle is here referencing *all* desires, including rational desire or wish (*boulēsis*), the context suggests that he means only the non-rational desires of appetite (*epithumia*) and spirited desire (*thumos*). For Aristotle uses the incontinent person’s opposing impulses (*hormai*, 1102b21) to suggest that the soul has multiple parts, and he is justified in making this suggestion only if he is assuming that the *orektikon* is battling an impulse coming from *elsewhere*—namely from the rational part. This reason-derived impulse is presumably a wish (*boulēsis*) (or its close cousin, decision (*prohairesis*)). For elsewhere Aristotle assigns wish to the rational part (*DA* 432b5), and in his discussion of incontinence he makes clear that what conflicts with the appetitive desire is a decision. If this is right, then the *orektikon* that obeys reason does not include wish or decision; it is the agent’s *non*-rational desires—her appetites and spirited desires—that listen to reason.

An important piece of information comes from the passage’s appealing to incontinent, continent, and virtuous agents as evidence that the soul has a part that is potentially obedient to reason. Aristotle appeals to the virtuous agent as an example of

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20 Aristotle recognizes three species of desire (*orexis*): appetite (*epithumia*), spirit (*thumos*), and wish (*boulēsis*). (*EN* 1111b11-5; *EE* 1123a26-7, 1225b24-6; *MM* 1.12, 1187b37; *DA* 414b2, 432b5-6, 433 a22-26; *Pol.* 7.15, 1334b17-25).

21 “But further, [decision] is not wish either, though it is apparently close to it” (*EN* 3.2 1111b20)
someone who follows reason to the fullest extent; the virtuous person’s alogon agrees with (homophônei 1102b28-29) reason in everything (panta). As Aristotle makes clear later, the virtuous person, in addition to acting on reason’s decision, has non-rational desires that cooperate with that decision (sunergei, EN 3.8 1116b32). So when a person’s alogon follows reason to the fullest extent, none of her non-rational desires prevent her from acting on reason’s decision; indeed, she has non-rational desires that positively push her towards the action that reason recommends.

The continent person follows reason, but not to the fullest extent possible. While the continent person’s alogon obeys (peitharchei) reason, the virtuous person’s alogon “listens better” (euêkoôteron, 1102b28) and “agrees with reason in everything” (homophônei...panta, 1102b28-29). One reason the continent person fails to meet the threshold of full agreement or listening is that the continent person has non-rational desires that urge her towards actions that are incompatible with reason’s recommendations, so that it takes some struggle before she acts on her decision. However, these recalcitrant non-rational desires are not strong enough to cause her to act against reason’s recommendation, and for this reason her non-rational desires count as following reason in a minimal way.

Unlike the continent agent, who follows reason in a minimal way, the incontinent person does not follow reason at all. The incontinent person’s non-rational desires are sufficiently opposed to reason such that she fails to act on reason’s recommendations altogether (1142a17).

II.2 Is Reason-Responsiveness Mere Correspondence?
If we focus on these illustrations of the virtuous, continent, and incontinent agents, it is reasonable to think that according to Aristotle having a reason-responsive *alogon* is, in part at least, a matter of having non-rational desires that correspond with reason’s recommendation enough for an agent to *do* the action that reason recommends. Now, while such correspondence between the *alogon* and reason’s recommendation is surely part of what Aristotle has in mind when he talks about the *alogon* following reason, it cannot be all. That it is not enough is clear from the passage in *Politics* 1.5 where Aristotle discusses the difference between natural slaves and animals. We’ve already looked at this passage, but it’s worth revisiting again:

[1]For he who can be another’s (and that is why he is another’s), and [2] he who participates in reason (*koinόnŏn logou*) to the extent that they perceive (*aisthanēsthai*) but not have (*echēn*) [reason], is a slave by nature. [3] Whereas the lower animals cannot even perceive reason; they follow (*hupēretei*) their feelings (*pathēmasin*). [4] The use (*ergon*) made of them differs little: for from both—slaves and tame animals—comes bodily help in the supply of essentials (*Pol.* 1.5 1254b20-5).

According to the passage, a natural slave “participates in reason enough to perceive (*aisthanēsthai*) it, but not to possess (*echēn*) it” ([2]). In chapter 1, I noted that the perceptual terminology here is strongly reminiscent of the terminology Aristotle uses at *EN* 1.7 and 1.13 when he describes the relationship between a continent or virtuous person’s *alogon* and her rational part: as we’ve seen, there too he talks about the *alogon* “listening to” reason (1102b27, 31; 1103a3). Also reminiscent of *EN* 1.13 is the contrast between perceiving reason (*aisthanēsthai*) and having reason (*echēn*). These two similarities between *Pol.* 1.5 and *EN* 1.13 strongly suggest, I argued, that in *Pol* 1.5 Aristotle has in mind *EN* 1.13’s division of the soul.
If the *Pol* 1.5 passage is making use of *EN* 1.13’s division of soul, then when Aristotle says in *Pol* 1.5 that animals—even tame ones ([4])—obey feelings ([3]) and not reason, he is denying animals the capacity to have the reason-responsive *alogon* that he discusses in *EN* 1.13. Now, the fact that *tame* animals—animals who are trained to do what their masters demand—fail to obey reason is important, because it suggests that having a reason-responsive *alogon* isn’t merely a matter of having non-rational desires that prompt you to do (or, minimally, do not prevent you from doing) the actions that reason recommends. After all, tame animals do what their master’s reason recommends, and yet Aristotle says at *Pol*. 1.5 that these animals don’t follow reason. It follows that obeying reason must not simply be a matter of having non-rational desires for actions that correspond enough with the actions that reason recommends so that the agent does what reason recommends; reason-responsiveness must involve something else.

What else might be involved? However we answer this question, our answer must involve something of which animals are not capable. I will call this the “animals constraint,” and it will be helpful for testing our interpretation of following reason.

*Pol*. 1.5 puts another constraint on our interpretation of a reason-responsive *alogon*. Because *Pol*. 1.5 attributes to natural slaves the capacity to have a reason-responsive *alogon*, any interpretation of a reason-responsive *alogon* must be able to account for the fact. Call this the “natural slave” constraint. The natural slave constraint, like the animals constraint, will be crucial for testing our interpretation of following reason.

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22 The natural slave constraint is the reason that Broadie’s interpretation of reason-responsiveness fails. According to Broadie, when Aristotle says that the human *alogon* obeys reason he means that a person’s *alogon* is defined in terms of a functional relationship that it shares with reason. On her view, it is because
III. A Promising Start: Lorenz’s Interpretation

Lorenz argues that the non-rational part of the soul can listen to or obey reason insofar as reason can affect appetite and spirit by informing them of salient features of an agent’s situation. Reason can draw appetite’s attention to a pleasant aspect of a situation and spirit’s attention to a fine or shameful aspect of a situation, and thereby adjust the direction of a person’s appetitive and spirited desires. By pointing out to the alogon

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future painful consequences of eating an unhealthy meal, for example, reason can cause the alogon’s appetitive desire for the meal to subside:

As far as appetite is concerned, its attention may be redirected from the pleasure that seems imminent to some other prospective pleasure (“encouragement”) or to some prospective pain (“admonition” or “warning”). Similarly, it should be possible to move spirit by drawing its attention to shameful or otherwise unseemly aspects of a course of action (“reprimanding”) or alternatively to fine or admirable aspects (another form of “encouragement”). In these various ways, an intense occurrent non-rational desire may grow less intense or may subside altogether.24

On Lorenz’s view, obeying reason is a matter of the alogon receiving factual information from reason about a subject’s circumstances and adjusting its desires in response. This information is the product of reason’s deliberations about how to (e.g.) avoid future pain, deliberation that yields the belief that the unhealthy meal is a source of future pain.25

On Lorenz’s interpretation, non-rational desires respond not just to any source of reason but to an agent’s own deliberations and beliefs. Thus, a tame animal that has developed, under the guidance of his master’s reason, non-rational desires that correspond to the actions his master’s reason recommends does not follow reason, since the direction of its desires is not the result of its own deliberations. For this reason, Lorenz’s interpretation meets the animals constraint.

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24 Lorenz, 189.
25 In the presentation of his interpretation, Lorenz focuses on reason’s ability to direct the alogon by playing a sort of informational role that is analogous to the sort of role that phantasia might play: the role of informing the alogon of certain sources of pleasure, etc. However, Lorenz makes a comment that suggests that a reason-responsive alogon will be sensitive to considerations of the kalon when he says that reason can “move spirit by drawing its attention to shameful or otherwise unseemly aspects of a course of action (“reprimanding”) or alternatively to fine or admirable aspects (another form of “encouragement”).” (189). If Lorenz intends this comment to say that a distinguishing feature of a reason-responsive alogon is sensitivity to the fine as a value, then I agree with his interpretation. Because he makes no attempts to motivate the view that sensitivity to the fine is partly constitutive of following reason, I have assumed here that he does not hold this view.
There are several virtues of Lorenz’s interpretation. For starters, it meets the animals constraint. Secondly, it coheres well with what happens in childhood training. Certainly a crucial aspect of such training is teaching children to use their reason to anticipate future pains or pleasures and other considerations that do not present themselves immediately. The goal is to get children to consider a wide variety of factors and modify their desires in response. Given the strong connection Aristotle draws between an obedient alogon and reason on the one hand and a child and parent or guide on the other (EN 1.13 1102b30-1103a4; EN 3.12 1119b5-20), the fact that Lorenz’s interpretation coheres well with childhood training is a point in its favor. Given that natural slaves presumably have rational capacities that are well-developed enough to anticipate future pains and consequences, Lorenz’s interpretation meets the natural slaves constraint as well.

Lorenz’s interpretation also coheres well with what DA 3.3 says about incontinence. There, Aristotle says that an incontinent person’s appetite and reason are opposed because appetite tends to be sensitive to immediate pleasures, whereas reason takes into consideration long-term pleasure and pain:

Now, desires arise which are contrary to one another, and this occurs whenever reason (logos) and the appetites (epithumiai) are opposed, and this happens in those animals which have perception of time. For intelligence (nous) bids us resist because of the future, while appetite has regard only to the immediate present; for the pleasure of the moment appears absolutely pleasurable and absolutely good because we do not see the future. (DA 3.10 433b5-10)

The passage suggests that reason plays a critical role in informing appetite of salient features of an agent’s situation like hidden sources of future pain or pleasure, and that failure to follow reason—here manifested by the incontinent or continent agent—is a
function of the non-rational part not being sensitive to reason’s communications about these features. If continent and virtuous people do not suffer from this sort of discord, presumably this is partly because the appetites of continent and virtuous people, unlike the appetites of incontinent people, respond to information from reason about salient aspects of the agents’ situations.

IV. Should We Stop at Lorenz’s Proposal?

With its many virtues, Lorenz’s interpretation should be incorporated into any plausible interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon. Nevertheless, I think his interpretation fails to capture all that is involved in reason-responsiveness. As I hope to show, there are good reasons to think that reason-responsiveness involves an evaluative shift in a person’s alogon, a shift whereby the desires of the alogon become sensitive to reason’s own values. Specifically, one of the features that makes an alogon reason-responsive is its coming to grasp, and be motivated by, the fine (kalon) as such.

IV.1 Does a Reason-Responsive Alogon Follow Reason’s Evaluations?

Consider the following passage where Aristotle compares the appetitive part of the soul to a young child:

[1] If, then, [the child or the appetitive part] is not obedient (eupeithes) and subordinate to its rulers (hupo to archon), it will go far astray…That is why appetites must be moderate and few, and never contrary to reason (tôi logói méthen enantiousthai). [2] This is the condition we call obedient (eupeithes) and temperate. [3] And just as the child must live according to the instructions of his guide, so too the appetitive part [must be] according to reason (kata ton logon).
[4a] Hence the temperate person’s appetitive part must agree with reason (sumphônein τοὶ λογοῖ); [4b] for the aim of both [his appetitive part and reason] is the fine (skopos gar amphoin to kalon), and the temperate person’s appetites are for the right things, in the right ways, at the right times— which is just what reason also prescribes (tattei). (EN 3.12 1119b5-20)

Aristotle says that the temperate person’s appetitive part obeys (eupeithes), accords with (kata), and agrees with (sumphônein) reason, and he suggests that this condition involves both reason and the appetitive part aiming at the fine [4b]. We know that reason commands that one do what is fine for the sake of the fine. 26 Thus, the decision (prohairesis) reason issues to the agent takes the form of “do X for sake of Y”, with an action like “stand fast in battle” standing in for “X” and “the fine” standing in for “Y.”27

This raises the following question: When Aristotle says that the aim of appetite in a reason-obedient soul is the fine, is his point only that we have appetitive motivation to do actions that are in fact fine? Or does he mean something stronger, namely that appetite pursues these fine actions under the description ‘fine’, so that ‘the fine’ is part of appetite’s aim?

I want to argue that following reason involves the fine (kalon) becoming part of the object of appetite (and spirit). Specifically, I’ll suggest that the alogon follows reason when the following two conditions hold: (1) its desires respond to empirical information from reason concerning salient features of the agent’s situation and (2) its desires attach to fine actions qua fine. Call this the “Evaluative view,” since it says that a central part of following reason is following reason’s evaluations of fine actions as choiceworthy qua

26 This is the upshot of Aristotle’s claim that the virtues courage are followings of reason (EE 3.1 1229a2). Since the virtues make one to do fine actions (1101b32) and do them for the sake of the fine (EN 3.7 1115b20-5), it seems that reason’s command is to do fine actions for the sake of the fine.

27 If I am right about the structure of decision, it explains why Aristotle says that decisions distinguish characters better than actions do (EN 3.2 1111b5-7). The idea is that when we know someone’s decision, we thereby know the Y of the action and thus their motive. By contrast, when we know someone’s action, we only know X; we do not know their motive.
fine. Call Lorenz’s interpretation the “Non-Evaluative view.” My goal in the remainder of the section is to set out some considerations in favor of the Evaluative View.

I should make clear that my aim here is to present different pieces of evidence that, when examined together, strongly suggest the Evaluative view of reason-responsive alogon. My case is a cumulative one. It relies not on one extremely compelling piece of evidence that necessarily implies the Evaluative view, but rather relies on an overall picture that emerges when we think about the concept of following reason and examine several important passages.

One note before proceeding. To assess the plausibility of the argument I give here, it will be ultimately necessary to state what the fine is for Aristotle. This is a complicated task, and to keep my argument in this chapter clear, I set aside the task until the next chapter. Simply presenting this chapter’s argument does not require a full exposition of the fine. For now, it will suffice to say that fine actions include the actions prescribed by the virtues, and that when someone does fine actions for the sake of the fine, her motivation is not self-interested.

IV.2: Considerations in Favor of the Evaluative View: The Concept of Virtue

Consider the following analogy. Imagine a parent who is a moral individual, and makes moral decisions throughout her life. She returns misplaced wallets to their owners, and does so because returning the wallets is the right things to do. She prepares honest tax returns, and does this because being honest with one’s taxes is the right thing to do. In doing these moral actions, she sometimes has a second motivation: for example, in the
tax case, she desires to avoid the harsh penalties that come with tax evasion. Nevertheless, the desire to do the right thing is a major motivation for her.

The mother has two children, and as the children grow up their behaviors and attitudes resemble their mother’s to different degrees. The elder child files honest tax returns, and does so both because doing so is the right thing to do and because he wants to avoid the harsh penalties that come with tax evasion charges. The younger one also files honest tax returns, but does so only because he wants to avoid the penalties associated with tax evasion.

Both children have followed in their mother’s footsteps to some extent, since both file honest tax returns. However, the elder follows his mother to a greater extent, since (unlike his brother) he files honestly for all the same reasons his mother does.

Returning to reason and appetite, we’ve seen that a virtuous agent’s reason commands her to do what is fine because it is fine. Thus, reason commands (e.g.) standing fast in battle or repaying one’s debts because standing fast in battle and repaying one’s debts is fine. On the Evaluative interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon, the alogon responds to reason’s command when it prompts the agent to stand fast in battle for the sake of the fineness of such action. By contrast, on the Non-Evaluative interpretation of a reason-responsive alogon, the alogon prompts the agent to stand fast in battle not for the sake of the fine, but for the sake of a value to which the alogon has a natural sensitivity (perhaps honor or pleasure).

It seems that just as the elder son is more a follower of his mother than the younger son, so the alogon on the Evaluative view is more a follower of reason than the alogon on the Non-Evaluative view. If the reason-responsive alogon on the Evaluative
view more fully instantiates following reason or harmonizing with reason, than the non-
Evaluative view, then reason-responsiveness on the Evaluative view is a better candidate
for virtue. After all, virtue is that by which we perform our function well (EN 2.6
1106a15), and what it is for \( X \) to perform its function \( F \) well (or, equivalently to perform
\( F \) with virtue) depends in part on the extent to which \( X \) type things can \( F \): if \( X \) type things
have an inherent capacity to \( F \) to extent \( R \), then presumably the virtue of \( X \) will be
whatever state allows \( X \) to \( F \) to extent \( R \). Thus, Aristotle’s notion of virtue as that in
virtue of which we perform a function well suggests that we should prefer views of
reason-responsiveness that attribute to the \( alogon \) the fullest sort of following reason
consistent with the inherent capacities of the non-rational part. It follows that if the
human the \( alogon \) has the capacity to follow reason in the Evaluative way, then the virtue
of the \( alogon \) will be the state whereby it follows reason in the Evaluative way and not
simply in the non-Evaluative way.

IV.3 Textual Considerations in Favor of the Evaluative View

§ EN 7.6

In a passage that shows some striking similarities to the \( EN \) 1.13/EE 2.1 passages about
reason-responsiveness, Aristotle uses the term “following reason” to describe the \( alogon \)
when the \( alogon \) has an evaluative attitude that renders it similar to reason in some way.
Here is the passage:

[\( a \)] Moreover, let us observe that incontinence about spirit is less shameful than
incontinence about appetites. [b] For (gar) spirit would seem to hear reason in some way (akouein men ti tou logou), but to mishear it (parakouein de). It is like overhasty servants who run out before they have heard all their instructions (tês prostaxeôs), and then carry them out wrongly, or dogs who bark at any noise at all, before looking to see if it is a friend. [c] In this way (houtôs), spirit, since it is naturally hot and hasty, hears (akousas), but it does not hear the instruction (ouk epitagma d’akousas), and rushes off to exact a penalty (hormâi pros tên timôrian). [d] For (gar) reason or appearance has shown that an insult or slight has been received and spirit, as though (hôsper) it had reasoned (sullogisamenos) that it is right (dei) to fight this sort of thing, is irritated at once (chalepainei dé euthus). [d] Appetite, however, if reason or perception merely says that an object is pleasant (ean monon eipêi hoti hêdu), rushes off for gratification (hormâi pros tên apolausin). [f] With the result that spirit follows reason in a way (akolouthei tôi logo pôs), but appetite does not. Therefore [incontinence about appetite] is more shameful. [g] For (gar) if someone is incontinent about spirit, he is overcome by reason in a way (tou logou pôs hêttaí); but if he is incontinent about appetite, he is overcome by appetite, not by reason. (EN 7.6 1149a30-b5)

Aristotle says that even in cases where spirit leads the incontinent person astray by causing her to act on her anger and retaliate, spirit (unlike appetite) counts as in a way following or listening to reason. Notice the striking similarity of language between this passage and EN 1.13/EE 2.1. At EN 7.6 he says that the spirited part but not the appetitive part listens (akouein) to reason’s orders (epitagma, tês prostaxeôs), and on that account spirit but not appetite follows reason (akolouthei tôi logo pôs). In EN 1.13 and EE 2.1 Aristotle says that the alogon listens to (katêkoon, euêkoôteron, akouein) reason, the part that instructs (epittatein 1219b30, epitaktikon 1102a21).

There are several influential interpretations of what Aristotle means by this claim that spirit but not appetite follows reason, but all agree that it has something to do with spirit, and not appetite, having a certain evaluative attitude that reason finds dear.28 If any

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28 Irwin seems to think that what distinguishes spirit from appetite, and what makes spirit but not appetite a follower of reason, is that spirit involves evaluations of actions as being ‘good,’ ‘right,’ ‘bad,’ and ‘wrong,’ rather than simply as ‘pleasant’ or ‘painful’ (Irwin [2] 163). Lorenz argues that spirit, but not appetite, follows reason insofar as spirit has an evaluative outlook that “partially reflects reason’s own evaluative outlook”—albeit in a “cruder and significantly different” way, an outlook that spirit “derives from correct
of these interpretations are on the right track, then Aristotle clearly uses “following reason” to refer to sensitivity to reason’s evaluations. Given that there is no reason to think that the “following reason” he mentions at \textit{EN} 7.6 is not a kind of following reason that is relevant to the \textit{EN}/\textit{EE} 2 sense of “following reason,” we should assume that the evaluative reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 is applicable to the reason-responsiveness discussed in \textit{EN} 1/\textit{EE} 2.

Specifically, I want to propose that, given the similar language at \textit{EN} 1/\textit{EE} 2 and \textit{EN} 7.6, we see the following reason at 1.13 and the following reason of 7.6 as reflecting different \textit{aspects} of a single account of full harmonization with/following of reason; these aspects, when brought together, constitute the full harmonization that is partially constitutive of virtue.

Recall that, on my view, full harmonization or following is filling a complex prescription that reason issues—do \( X \) for the sake of \( Y \). What fills “\( X \)” here will be an action described in purely descriptive terms. By contrast, what fills “\( Y \)” is “the fine”—an evaluative term. When I say that both \textit{EN} 1.13 and \textit{EN} 7.6 describe the state of following reason but describe different aspects of this following, what I have in mind is the following. In \textit{EN} 1, Aristotle is concerned with the question of whether a person’s non-rational desires correspond with reason enough to support (or at the very least not hinder) the agent’s doing of \( X \). After all, full harmonization of reason requires that the \textit{a logos} attach to actions recommended by reason, and not simply values recommended by reason.

\begin{footnote}[32]{reason” (Lorenz 193). Grönroos argues that the relevant difference between appetite and spirit is that the “very value involved in spirited desire…is more complex…and touches upon more aspects of life than pleasure” (Grönroos 263).}
By contrast, in *EN* 7.6, Aristotle is concerned with the $Y$ portion, not the $X$ portion, of reason’s prescription. When the *a logos* harmonizes with reason to the fullest extent, the values which serve as the ultimate ends ($Y$) of the *a logos* are as close to the values of reason as possible. Given Aristotle’s concern with $Y$, what he needs at *EN* 7.6 is an illustration that shows non-rational desire acting on behalf of values that are the same as, or close to, reason’s own values. His case of the angry incontinent person does just this: it shows that anger, by being sensitive to values like self-respect and justice, acts on behalf of values that are dear to reason.\(^{29}\)

Unfortunately, *EN* 1/*EE* 2’s focus on $X$ is at the expense of $Y$, which is why *EN* 1/*EE* 2 puts appetite and spirit on a par *qua* followers of reason and appeals to cases of controlled action to illustrate following reason. Similarly, *EN* 7.6’s focus on $Y$ is at the expense of $X$. Because Aristotle at *EN* 7.6 is not concerned with the $X$ portion of reason’s prescription, he does not restrict his illustrations of following reason to cases of self-controlled actions.\(^{30}\)

Similarly, because Aristotle at *EN* 7.6 is not concerned with the $X$ portion of reason’s prescription, he need not represent spirit and appetite as on a par *qua* followers of reason. It is because spirit’s values in the anger case are dearer to reason than appetite’s values that Aristotle says that spirit but not appetite follows reason. (Indeed, as

\(^{29}\) This responds to Lorenz’s objection that the reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 does not apply to the reason-responsiveness discussed in *EN* 1.7/1.13. To support the view that *EN* 1.13 following reason and *EN* 7.6 following reason are wholly separate, Lorenz points out that whereas the reason-responsiveness that Aristotle has in mind in *EN* 1.13 is “precisely not manifested by uncontrolled people when they act without self-control,” “the way in which spirit follows reason in [*EN* 7.6]… *is* in evidence in acts that express lack of self-control, namely lack of self-control with regard to anger” (Lorenz 192, fn 18). However, as I have argued, *EN* 1.13 and *EN* 7.6 are concerned with different aspects of one and the same kind of following reason. Because they are concerned with different aspects, it is possible for some details of the 1.13 illustration to diverge from some details of the 7.6 illustration.

\(^{30}\) Of course, the spirited part in the example does not follow reason in a full sense, since (this being a case of incontinent action), it prompts the agent to act against reason’s recommendation.
we shall see in chapter 3, spirit pursues the fine as such in a more straightforward way than appetite does, and thus spirit really is more of a follower of reason than appetite is).\footnote{This responds to Lorenz’s other objection that the reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 cannot apply to the reason-responsiveness discussed in EN 1.7/1.13. Lorenz argues that because the reason-responsiveness discussed in EN 1.7/1.13 applies to both appetite and spirit, whereas the reason-responsiveness discussed at 7.6 applies to spirit only, the followings must be wholly separate and unrelated. However, as I have argued, EN 1.13 and EN 7.6 are concerned with different aspects of one and the same kind of following reason. Because they are concerned with different aspects, it is possible for some details of the 1.13 illustration to diverge from some details of the 7.6 illustration.}

The important point is that each discussion—the one we get in EN 1/EE 2 and the one we get in EN 7.6—intends to reveal only one aspect of reason-responsiveness, and that we need to join the aspects of both illustrations to have a full picture of following reason. Again, were EN 1.13 and EN 7.6 not in the project of describing dual aspects of one and the same kind of following reason, EN 1.13’s and EN 7.6’s striking similarity of language is highly misleading.

§ Following Reason vs. Following Emotion

If we survey the ethical works, we find that the ethical works contain a dichotomy between following reason and following emotion, a contrast that seems to track the distinction between pursuing the fine as such and pursuing the pleasant as such. This contrast offers some support to my claim that part of what it is for an alogon to follow reason is for its desires attach to fine actions \textit{qua} fine.

Recall the \textit{Pol.} 1.5 1254b20-5 passage where Aristotle defines a natural slave as someone who “participates in reason (\textit{koinónon logou}) to the extent that he perceives (\textit{aisthanesthai}) but does not have (\textit{echein}) [reason].” In that passage, Aristotle contrasts
those who participate in reason (koinônôn logou) to the extent that they perceive (aisthanesthai) reason and those who cannot perceive reason but follow (hupêretei) their feelings (pathêmasin). When we look elsewhere for places where Aristotle talks about following reason and following feelings, they seem to refer to different types of motivational outlooks, and specifically motivational outlooks that are connected in some way with the fine and the pleasant respectively. In particular, Aristotle suggests that those who follow reason pursue the fine as such, whereas those who follow feelings pursue the pleasant as such. One place where we get this picture is in EN X.9, where Aristotle contrasts the good (epieikês) person and the base (phaulon) person.

The good person (epieikês) who lives with a view to the fine (pros to kalon zônta) will obey reason (tôi logôi peitharchësein), but the base (phaulon) person who desires pleasure (hêdonês oregomenon) is held in check by pain, like a beast of burden (lupêi kolazesthai hôsper hupozugion). (EN X.9 1180a10-2)

Aristotle gives two features that distinguish the good person from the base person. First, the good person obeys reason (tôi logôi peitharchësein), whereas the base person does not. Second, the good person pursues the fine (pros to kalon zônta), whereas the base person pursues the pleasant (hêdonês oregomenon). Now, Aristotle is not simply saying that the good person and the base person differ in the kind of actions they do, with the virtuous person doing what is in fact fine and the base person doing what is in fact pleasant. After all, Aristotle thinks that the virtuous person’s actions are pleasant—indeed the most pleasant32—and thus the good person does pleasant actions no less than the base person does. It follows that the nature of the contrast that the passage draws between the

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32 “Further, each type of person finds pleasure in what ever he is called a lover of; a horse, for instance, pleases the horse-lover, a spectacles the lover of spectacles. Similarly, what is just pleases the lover of justice, and in general what accords with virtue pleases the lover of virtue…. Actions in accord with virtue are pleasant by nature, so that they both please lovers of the fine and are pleasant in their own right” (EN 1.8 1099a8-15, translation Irwin [2]).
good and the base person must be a contrast between their motives: the good person is motivated by the fine as such, whereas the base person is motivated by the pleasant as such. Accordingly, we seem to have a connection between obeying reason and being motivated by the fine on the one hand, and obeying feelings and being motivated by the pleasant on the other hand.

In a different EN X.9 passage, Aristotle strongly suggests that someone who follows reason aims at the fine as such.

[1] For the many naturally obey fear, not shame (ou gar pephukasin aidoi peitharchein alla phoboi); they avoid what is base because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful (oud' apechesthai ton phaulon dia to aischron alla dia tas timorias). [2] For (gar) since they live by their feelings (pathei gar zontes), they pursue their proper pleasures and the sources of them (tas oikeias hedonas diokousi kai di' hon hautai esontai), and avoid the opposed pains, (pheugousi de tas antikeimenas lupas), and they have not even a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant (tou de kalou kai hos alethos hedeos oud' ennoian echousin), since they have had no taste of it (ageustoi onte). (EN X.9 1179b11-16, translation Irwin [2].)

The passage suggests that living by feelings (pathei gar zontes) implies pursuing the pleasant as such and not pursuing the fine as such. The many live by emotions (pathei gar zontes), and because they live this way (epei) they pursue their proper pleasures (tas oikeias hedonas diokousi kai di' hon hautai esontai) and avoid the opposed pains (pheugousi de tas antikeimenas lupas) ([2]). Such people do not pursue the fine--they “have not even a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant (tou de kalou kai hos alethos hedeos oud' ennoian echousin), since they have had no taste of it (ageustoi onte)” ([2]). Aristotle contrasts this condition with the condition of those people who have a sense of shame and avoid the base because it is disgraceful ([1]).

Aristotle is saying not simply that the many pursue what is in fact pleasant and
avoid what is in fact fine. On the contrary, he is saying the many, because they follow their emotions, pursue the pleasant as such and not the fine as such. To see this, first note that Aristotle invokes the many’s tendency to live by their feelings (pathei gar zōntes) to explain their dispositions to obey fear rather than shame and to avoid the base because of the penalties and not because of disgrace. This, at any rate, is suggested by what appears to be an explanatory ‘gar’ connecting [2] with [1]. If this is right, then the contrast between motivation by fear and motivation by shame can tell us something about what it is for the many to live by feelings.

What is it to be motivated by fear, and how is it different from motivation by shame? If we look at Aristotle’s discussion of citizen bravery in EN 3.8, we see that the contrast is centered on a contrast between motivation by the pleasant as such and motivation by the fine as such.

[1a] Citizen (politikē) bravery is the most like the [full] bravery described earlier, [1b] since it comes about on account of virtue (di’ aretên ginetai) [1c] (for (gar) it comes about on account of shame (di’ aidô) and [1d] on account of a desire for fineness (kai dia kalou orexin) [1e] (namely honor (times gar)) [1f] and by aversion from disgrace (phugên oneidous), which is something shameful (aischrou ontos). [2a] Into this class someone might also put those compelled by their superiors. [3a] But they are worse, [3b] insofar as not on account of shame (ou di’ aidô) [3c] but on account of fear they act (alla dia phobon auto drōsi), [3d] and they flee not the shameful but the painful (pheugontes ou to aischron alla to lupêron). [4] For their superiors compel them, just as Hector does: ‘If I notice anyone shrinking back from the battle, nothing will save him from being eaten by dogs.’ (EN 3.8 1116a16-1116b5)

Aristotle discusses two conditions—citizen bravery and bravery from compulsion—that resemble genuine bravery but fall short of it. Presumably, it is the behavioral similarity between these pseudo forms and genuine bravery that falsely lead people to think that the former are instances of the latter. Brave citizens and compelled soldiers stand fast in battle like genuinely brave people, but this behavior is not enough, Aristotle wants to say,
to make the citizens and the compelled genuinely virtuous.

While neither citizen bravery nor compelled bravery is genuine bravery, citizen bravery is nonetheless better than compelled bravery ([3a]). The reason is that citizens act on account of shame, whereas the compelled act on account of fear ([3b], [3c]). What sort of motivational contrast is Aristotle drawing here? Aristotle says that those who act on account of fear flee not the shameful but the painful (phereontes ou to aischron alla to lupêron) ([3c], [3d]), suggesting that what defines people who act out of fear and distinguishes them from those who act out of shame is a concern with pleasure and pain. (That people who act out of fear have an overriding concern with pleasure and pain is not surprising, given Aristotle’s definition of fear. The definition specifies a special relationship between fear and pleasure and pain). By contrast, those who act on account of shame (di’ aidô) act on account of a desire for fineness (kai dia kalou orexin) ([1c], [1d]).

People who are “brave” because of fear do the same actions as the people who are brave because of shame. After all, Aristotle’s whole point in EN 3.8 is to argue that actions that resemble brave actions on the outside are not real instances of bravery. It follows that what separates the fearful person who remains at the battle line from the person who remains at the battle line on account of shame is not her actions but her motive: the fearful person acts on account of pleasure and pain, whereas the person with a sense of shame acts out of a concern for fineness. If this is right, then the contrast between acting because of fear and acting because of shame is a contrast between acting out of a concern for the pleasant as such and acting out of a concern for the fine as such.

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33 Fear is “a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future” (Rhet. 1382a21-2).
Returning to X.9 1179b11-6, recall that Aristotle invokes the many’s tendency to live by their emotions (\textit{pathei gar zôntes}) to explain their disposition to obey fear rather than shame (\textit{ou gar pephukasin aidoi peitharchein alla phobôi}). We’ve seen from the citizen bravery passage that the contrast between motivation by fear and motivation by shame is a contrast between being motivated by the pleasant as such and being motivated by the fine as such. It follows that when Aristotle invokes the many’s tendency to live by their feelings to explain their disposition to obey fear rather than shame, he is invoking the many’s tendency to live by their emotions to explain their disposition to pursue the pleasant as such and avoid the fine as such. It is not unreasonable to conclude from this that living by emotion is a matter of pursuing the pleasant as such at not the fine as such. Given the contrast between obeying reason and obeying feeling (\textit{Pol.} 1.5 1254b20-5), we can infer that obeying reason is a matter of pursuing the fine as such and not only the pleasant as such.

The two passages from \textit{EN} X.9 thus suggest that following reason and following feelings have something to do with the contrast between pursuing the pleasant as such on the one hand and pursuing the fine as such on the other. The person who follows reason pursues fine actions for their own sakes, because she values fineness for its own sake. The person who follows feelings might perform actions that are, from an external standpoint, fine, but this person, even if he recognizes the action as fine, does not do it for that reason; instead, the person acts on considerations of pleasure alone.

In the pieces of evidence I cited, what follows reason are lives or persons as a whole. While we cannot automatically assume that what it is for an \textit{alogon} to follow reason is the same thing as what it is for a whole person or a life to follow reason, we
should assume that they are not identical only if we can find compelling reason to resist the identity. That is, it seems that our default position should be that “following reason” in the case of the *alogon* means the same thing as “following reason” in the case of a whole life or person. If that is right, then for the *alogon* to follow reason is for it to respond to considerations of the fine and not simply to considerations of pleasure.

IV.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, several pieces of evidence suggest the Evaluative view over the Non-Evaluative view of a reason-responsive *alogon*. First, Aristotle’s notion of virtue as that in virtue of which we perform a function well suggests that we should prefer views of reason-responsiveness that attribute to the *alogon* the fullest sort of following reason consistent with the capacities of the non-rational part. Second, Aristotle in *EN* 7.6 uses “following reason” to refer to the following of evaluations, and, given the striking similarities between *EN* 7.6 and *EN* 1.7/1.13, we have reason to think that the evaluative following discussed in 7.6 is applicable to the following reason presented in *EN* 1.7/1/13. Finally, the contrast in the ethical works between “following reason” and following passions strongly suggest that following reason involves pursuing the fine as such.

*V. Testing the Evaluative View Against the Desiderata*

The Evaluative Interpretation meets the desiderata presented in section II.
V.1 The Animals Constraint

The Evaluative interpretation agrees with the Non-Evaluative view that part of what it is for an alogon to respond to reason is for it to respond to the beliefs and calculations of the rational part. Since animals lack beliefs and calculations, they cannot have a reason-responsive alogon. But the Evaluative view meets the animal constraint for a second reason. Consider the following passage in *Pol*. 1.2 where Aristotle contrasts the evaluative capacities of animals with the evaluative capacities of human beings:

And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for up to this point (*mechri gar toutou*) their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another), speech is intended to set forth the expedient (*sumpheon*) and inexpedient (*blaberon*), and therefore likewise the just (*dikaion*) and the unjust (*adikon*). And it is a characteristic (*idion*) of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has any sense of good (*agathou*) and evil (*kakou*), of just and unjust, and the like (*tôn allôn*), and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state. (*Pol*. 1.2 1253a7-17)

According to this passage, non-rational animals do not need language, for they act on considerations of pleasure and pain alone (“up to this point” (*mechri gar toutou*)), and these considerations are effectively communicated without language. By contrast, man needs language, because it is characteristic (*idion*) of man to have a sense not just of the pleasant but of good (*agathou*) and evil (*kakou*), of just and unjust, and the like (*tôn allôn*). By “the like”, Aristotle surely includes the fine, as he frequently groups the just with the fine and good. (See, for example, his claim that political science studies just and fine things (*dikaia kai kala*, *EN* 1.3 1094b14-5) and his claim that practical wisdom is concerned with “just and fine things, and things good (*agatha*) for a human being” (6.12 1143b22-3)). So in *Pol*. 1.2, Aristotle seems to say that animals differ from humans
insofar as the former are confined to acting on considerations of the pleasant and painful alone, whereas the latter have evaluative concepts other than ‘pleasant.’ It follows that an animal, not being able to represent objects as fine, cannot represent as fine the objects that reason recommends. They cannot have a reason-responsive *alogon* as the Evaluative view interprets it.

V.2 The Natural Slaves Constraint

*Pol.* 1.2 strongly suggests that slaves can represent objects as fine. For slaves are human (1254a16, 1259b27-8) and thus have the capacity to go beyond the pleasant and pursue the good, the just, and the fine. His descriptions of the naturally slavish Triballoi and Scythians explicitly say that natural slaves have the capacity to represent objects as fine:

And in the same way, in certain places it is fine (*kalon*) to sacrifice one’s father, e.g. among the Triballoi, but without qualification it is not fine. But possibly this indicates not “where” but “for whom” for it makes no difference where they may be: for everywhere it will be fine to the Triballoi, since they are Triballoi. (*Top.* 2.11 115b22-6)

If the audience esteems (*timion*) a given quality, we must say that our hero has that quality, no matter whether we address Scythians, or Spartans, or philosophers. And in general the category of the esteemed falls into the category of the fine. (*kai holōs de to timion agein eis to kalon*), since there seems to be a resemblance between the two. (*epiaper ge dokei geitnian*) (*Rhet.* 1367b7-11)

In chapter 5 I will argue that natural slaves like the Triballoi and Scythians do not have wishes; they have non-rational desires alone. Assuming that the Triballoi people’s judgments about what is fine are action guiding, these judgments about the fine must
underlie non-rational desires in particular; they cannot underlie wishes. This suggests that natural slaves’ non-rational desires are sensitive to the fine as a value.

Since slaves do not reason, they will need an external source of reason to guide them to reason-recommended actions. I’ll discuss this in more detail in chapter 7.

V.3 Motivation by the Fine and Reason Strictly Speaking

Sensitivity to the fine as such is connected to reason strictly speaking, since the fine is a value dear to reason. However, such sensitivity is not sufficient for reason strictly speaking. As we shall see in chapters 5 and 6, reason strictly speaking involves actual deliberation about ends, whereas (as I will argue in chapter 3) when one has a non-rational desire for the fine as such, this desire is the result of pre-rational attachments to what is familiar (oikeion). Motivation by the fine as such thus does not entail rationality in the strict sense.

VI. Conclusion

I argued that the human alogon can prompt an agent to pursue fine action as such. My argument was based on an interpretation of what it is for the alogon to obey reason. According to that interpretation, an alogon follows reason when (i) its desires responds to factual information from reason about salient features of an agent’s situation, and (ii) its desires attach to fine actions qua fine.
If my interpretation of a reason-responsive *alogon* is right, it follows that individuals acting on their non-rational desires can pursue fine actions and fine actions as such.
CHAPTER 3
SPIRIT, APPETITE, AND PURSUIT OF THE FINE (KALON)

I. Introduction

My interpretation of reason-responsiveness is plausible only if I can show that the desires of the alogon can attach to fine actions as such. In this chapter, I try to show that the alogon is in fact susceptible to the fine as a value. I first offer an account of the fine in terms of what I will call “honorability.” I then argue that spirited desires can pursue the fine so construed. To make this argument, I show that spirited desires are the desires through which we form attachments to what is familiar (oikeion), attachments that lead spirited desires to pursue honorable actions and honorable actions as such. Assuming that an agent is habituated in a well-ordered society, her alogon will satisfy its desire for honorability by attaching to actions that are in fact honorable.

I’ll then argue that appetitive desires can be sensitive to the fine and the fine as such insofar as that they can be trained to seek the pleasures of fine action under the description “pleasures from fine action.” Like spirited desires, appetitive desires that are habituated in a well-ordered society will satisfy its desire for pleasures from fine action by focusing on actions that are in fact fine.

II. The Fine (To Kalon)
II.1 The Fine: Overview

Since I want to argue that the desires of the alogon can be susceptible to the fine as a value, we should first clarify what the fine is. In the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that the fine is that which, being choiceworthy in itself (di’ auto haireton), is praiseworthy (epaineton). In the EE’s discussion of the difference between the good and the good-and-fine, Aristotle makes a similar connection between the fine and the praiseworthy:

Being good and being fine-and-good admit of distinction, not only in their names but also in themselves. For, of all goods, those are ends which are worth having for their own sake, while, of these, all that are praiseworthy (epaineta) for themselves are fine…But health is not something praiseworthy (epaineton); for neither is its function. Nor is [acting] with strength, for strength is not, either. But, though they are not praiseworthy (epaineta), they are goods (EE 8.3 1248b16-25).

Aristotle suggests that ends constitute one class of goods, where ends are those goods that are choiceworthy for themselves. He then says that fine things make up only a subclass of the category of ends, and are those ends that are praiseworthy. So while health and strength are goods, they are not fine, since they are not praiseworthy.

In the EN, Aristotle clearly says that strictly speaking only voluntary actions are praiseworthy (1109b31, EE 1223a9-15), and he says specifically that the actions that are praiseworthy are virtuous actions (1101b32).

Virtuous actions benefit others (EN 1169a8-11), but it is not enough for an action to benefit others for the action to be fine. As EE 8.3 makes clear, actions are fine only when they have a specific motive:

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34 “Whatever is praiseworthy, being chosen for its own sake, is kalon, or whatever being good, is pleasant because it is good” (Rhet 1.9 1366aa33-4). Aristotle does not go on to connect pleasure with the fine in the Rhetoric (this is not the case for goodness and praiseworthiness), so I have assumed that the point about pleasure is not intended as an essential feature of the fine.
There is a certain state of a citizen such as the Spartans have, or other such people would have. This is a state of the following sort; there are those who think that one should possess virtue, but for the sake of the natural goods. They are therefore good men (for natural goods are so for them), but they do not have nobility (*kalokagathian*). For they do not possess the things that are fine for themselves, but those who possess them, also choose things fine-and-good (*kala kai agatha*) for themselves; and not only those things, but also the things not fine by nature, but good by nature, are fine for them. For they are fine when that for the sake of which they act and choose is fine (*EE* 8.3 1248b37-1249a6)

The Spartan is good but not fine and good, because the Spartan does virtuous actions for the sake of the natural goods (1248b40) and not for the virtuous actions (“themselves”) (1249a3-4) or (equivalently) for the sake of the fine (1249a5-6). When the Spartan chooses virtuous actions, he (unlike the virtuous person) does something fine only incidentally (1249a15-6). There are other passages where Aristotle connects fine action to an action that is prompted by a particular motive. For example, he says that fine actions do not aim at self-interest (1125a11-2, 1168a9-12, 1169a3-6, *Pol.* 1338a30-2)\(^\text{35}\) and do not aim at pleasure (*EN* 1110b11).\(^\text{36}\)

How should we understand this motive “for the fine”? Because of the prominence of praiseworthiness in the ethical works’ discussions of the fine (*Rhet.* 1.9, *EE* 8.3 1248b16-25),\(^\text{37}\) a plausible starting point for interpreting the fine is to say that Aristotle identifies acting for the sake of the fine with acting for the sake of the honorable or

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\(^{35}\) A similar contrast Aristotle invokes to describe the fine is that between acting for the sake of the fine and acting from necessity (1116b2-3 1120b1, 1155a28-9, 1165a4, 1171a24-6). One acts from necessity (*anankezesthai*) when one stands fast in battle to avoid some greater evil (say, death or punishment) (1180a4-5).

\(^{36}\) It is for the sake of either the pleasant or the fine, he says, that every action is performed (1110b11).

\(^{37}\) Aristotle distinguishes between honorable in possession and honorable in result (IV.2 1122b15-23). The distinction between honorable in possession and honorable in action helps clarify Aristotle’s distinction elsewhere between the praiseworthy and honorable (*EN* 1.12 1101b10-5). At *EN* 1.12 Aristotle doesn’t commit himself here to a distinction between the honorable in action and the praiseworthy (how could he, since he describes fine action as both honorable and praiseworthy? Rather, he is distinguishing between the praiseworthy and the honorable in possession. Praiseworthiness, being essentially about action, cannot apply to honorable possessions. So when Aristotle says that fine actions are honorable, he means that they are honorable in action. This is presumably the same thing as being praiseworthy.
praiseworthy, where acting out of a concern for the honorable or the praiseworthy, is *acting out of a non-instrumental concern to instantiate a moral ideal*. By ‘moral ideal’ I mean a set of ideals that is not defined in terms of the agent’s interests (and hence might require self-sacrifice).

This characterization fits well with several important aspects of Aristotle’s description of the fine. Recall the passages where Aristotle contrasts acting for the sake of the fine with acting for the sake of self-interest. These passages suggest that Aristotle takes fine action to be conceptually distinct from self-interested action. Note also that the concepts of honor and the honorable seem to be essentially social: they essentially originate in a peer group. Thus, any value connected to honor or the honorable most likely will not be conceptually tied to self-interest.

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38 Examples of fine action include those actions that benefit others and promote the common good: “Those things...are fine...which a man does not do for his own sake; things which are absolutely good, which a man has done for the sake of his country, while neglecting his own interests; things which are naturally good; and not such as are good for the individual, since such things are inspired by selfish motives. And those things are fine which it is possible for a man to possess after death rather than during his lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness; all acts done for the sake of others, for they are more disinterested; the successes gained, not for oneself, but for others; and for one’s benefactors, for this is just; in generally, all acts of kindness, for they are disinterested. And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed (*aischunontai*); for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful (*aischra*), in words, acts, or intention.” (*Rhet.* 1.9 1366b37-1367a7) Aristotle also mentions the long hair of the Spartans as an example of something fine: “Customs that are unique (*idia*) to individual peoples and all the instances of what is praised (*epainoumenôn*) among them are noble; for instance, in Sparta it is fine to wear one’s hair long, for it is the mark of freedom (*eleutherou*), the performance of any service task being difficult for one whose hair is long. And not carrying on any vulgar (*banaouson*) profession is fine, for a free person does not live in dependence on others.” (*Rhet.* 1.9 1367a27-33)

39 As Terence Irwin has pointed out, Aristotle also connects the fine with the common good. For example, he says in the *Rhetoric* that the extreme degree of virtue is to benefit everyone” (1367b6-7) and provides a general account of virtue as “a capacity to provide and protect goods and a capacity to benefit in many and great ways” (1366a36-8). “When everyone is contending towards the fine and straining to do the finest actions, the community will gain everything it ought to (*deonta*), and each individual will gain the greatest of goods, if that is the character of virtue” (1169a8-11). “Since the feature of virtue that is properly praised is its tendency to benefit others, this is also the feature that makes it fine” (127).

I think that this is compatible with my claim that the fine making characteristic is praiseworthiness or honorability. What is going on here is description at different levels. At the most general level, the fine making characteristic is praiseworthiness. But at a more specific level, one can determine that the feature that we should pick out for praise is promotion of the common good.

Consider someone who pursue what he regards as praiseworthy but who is ignorant of what is in fact praiseworthy. For example, consider someone who wants to do what is praiseworthy but does not
Putting together these elements of the fine, we can say the following. One performs a fine action when one performs the sort of behaviors characteristic of the virtues, and moreover does so out of a non-instrumental concern to instantiate a moral ideal. Acting finely as such thus requires not only that one does actions that the virtuous person tends to do, but that one does them because such behavior instantiates a moral ideal.

II.3 Richardson-Lear’s View

Richardson-Lear has a different view of the fine. Because her interpretation has been influential, I want to examine it before moving on to the question of whether the alogon can pursue fine action as such.

According to Richardson Lear, the central elements making up something fine is (1) fittingness (*prepon*), (2) order (*taxis*), (3) symmetry (*summetria*), (4) definiteness or boundedness (*horismenon*), (5) visibility, and (6) pleasure. The first four elements constitute something’s being effectively teleologically ordered—its having parts that are well-ordered in relation to its end (*telos*), and taken together they capture the fact that fine actions seem well-ordered and thus good to an agent.

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know what makes (e.g.) courage praiseworthy. The person does actions that are in fact fine and does them because he thinks they are praiseworthy. But he cannot identify the feature that makes them praiseworthy; he does not know that it is promotion of common good that makes it praiseworthy and thus fine. I say that this person does the fine and the fine as such in the sense that he does actions that are in fact fine and moreover does them because of their praiseworthiness (as opposed to their pleasure, or for instrumental reason). Of course, he lacks a synoptic understanding of fineness and so doesn’t pursue the fine as such in the way the virtuous person does.
Because “defining the fine as effective teleological order does not yet distinguish it from the good,” Richardson-Lear introduces (5) and (6). When something is, in addition to being effectively teleologically ordered, both visible and pleasant, it is kalon. (5) captures both visibility to the senses and visibility to the intellect and is important primarily because it makes (6) possible: something’s being visible allows the agent to take pleasure in what she sees. According to Richardson-Lear, virtuous actions, insofar as they lie in a mean, display a type of order that is pleasant for the virtuous agent to behold.

I have three main problems with Richardson Lear’s account. First, she relies heavily on Aristotle’s statements about the fine that occur in non-ethical contexts, and we’ve seen that it is questionable whether the accounts of the fine offered in these different passages are part of one unified account. Second, she downplays the references to praiseworthiness in the accounts of the fine that surface in explicitly ethical contexts. Finally, EE 8.3 directly contradicts her account.

Since I’ve already discussed the first problem in some detail, I will explain the second and third problems. In addition to ignoring entirely the connection EE 8.3 draws

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40 Richardson-Lear, 122.

41 “But the visibility of the fine is also important as a condition of its causing (its proper) pleasure. Aristotle says that the decent person, “insofar as he is decent, delights in virtuous actions and is pained by bad ones just as a musical person delights in fine and beautiful [kalois] songs and is pained by bad [phaulois] ones” (EN IX.9 1170a8-11). Here I think it is clear that the pleasure comes not so much from doing what is fine as from contemplating it” (Richardson Lear 123-4).

42 (6) plays a critical role in Richardson-Lear’s account. The fine is important to reason because, as a form of aesthetic pleasure, it makes the perfection of virtuous actions “easily intelligible.” The intelligibility of such perfection is threatened by the fact that reason is constantly focused on future action, and thus a rational agent is vulnerable to losing sight of the fact that virtuous rational action is an end in itself:

But if practical reasoning is by nature ever sensitive to external circumstances and focused on future action, there is a risk of not fully registering in consciousness that one has already achieved the ultimate practicable good: virtuous rational activity itself….This is why it matters to reason that actions be fine as well as good. For when our actions are fine, their perfection is easily intelligible. In fact the grander and more beautiful they are, the more easily we know their goodness (Richardson-Lear, 131).
between the fine and praiseworthiness, Richardson-Lear downplays *Rhet.* 1.9’s reference to praiseworthiness and instead focuses almost entirely on its reference to pleasure, using it to establish (6). Such treatment is unjustified, for if we look at the passage and its surrounding context, we see that it is praiseworthiness, and not pleasure, that receives most of Aristotle’s emphasis. To establish virtue’s fineness, for example, Aristotle relies on virtue’s praiseworthiness; he does not rely on its pleasantness. He reiterates the fine’s connection with praise when later on in *Rhet* 1.9 he says that what is rewarded with honor (*timê*) is fine (*Rhet.* 1.9 1366b37-1367a7; Cf. *Rhet.* 1.9 1367b10-12) and what is honorable (*timion*) is fine (*Rhet.* 1.9 1367b31). Richardson-Lear unjustifiably leaves out the connections the ethical works draw between praise and the fine.

Next, the *EE* 8.3 passage seems to directly contradict Richardson Lear’s account. *EE* 8.3 suggests that pleasantness is not the feature that, when combined with goodness, makes something fine. Health is a good and, being visible, should be pleasant according to Richardson-Lear’s account. Since But *EE* 8.3 clearly states that health is not fine, Richardson-Lear’s account must be wrong.

II.3 Conclusion

If acting finely as such involves both doing actions that are characteristic of the virtues and doing them out of a non-instrumental concern for the honorable, then the question

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43 For example, after quoting the passage, she concludes that the fine in action is “the morally pleasant.” Moreover, she leaves praiseworthiness out of her characterization of the “central elements of the fine”: “I will argue that there are three central elements of the fine or beautiful as Aristotle conceives it: effective teleological order, visibility, and pleasantness” (Richardson Lear, 117). She seems to understand “praiseworthy” as “likely to bring about praise” and not “deserving of praise (whether or not it is likely to bring about praise),” and this might influence her decision to downplay the role of praise in her account of the fine.
before us is the following: Is it possible for agents, *qua* experiencing appetitive and spirited desires, both to do actions characteristic of the virtues and do them out of a non-instrumental concern to do what is honorable? A “yes” answer means that appetitive and spirited desires can attach to fine actions as such.

One clarificatory remark before we go on. I will sometimes talk of the *alogon* pursuing the fine (or fine actions), and I will sometimes talk of the *alogon* pursuing the fine as such (or fine action as such). I use the former locution to refer to the behaviors that are characteristic of the virtues. As I shall use the terminology, a person who stands fast in battle performs a fine action, even if she stands fast in battle because she wants to avoid the painful penalties that come with deserting does an action. However, such a person does not perform a fine action as such, since fine actions as such are not only are actions that are characteristic of virtues, but actions that are done *qua* instantiations of a moral ideal. Acting finely as such requires doing what is fine and doing it because it is fine.

**III. Spirit, Honor, and Honorability**

III.1 Spirit’s Love of Honor

I first want to establish that the spirited agent, *qua* spirited (that is, *qua* having spirited desires), can pursue the honorable; that is, I want to show that, in virtue of having certain spirited desires, an agent non-instrumentally desires to live up to particular moral ideals.
If this is right, then--given that motivation by the fine is identical to motivation by the honorable—the spirited person can have the distinctive motive involved in fine action.

To show that some spirited desires pursue the honorable, I want to examine spirit in a somewhat roundabout way. Aristotle emphasizes that young people (neoi) have a spirited aspect (Rh. 2.11 1389a3-15), and this suggests that young people’s motivational attitudes can tell us something about the motivational and evaluative capacities of spirit.

Consider the following passage:\textsuperscript{44}

(a) [The young (neoi)] are passionate (thumokoi), hot-tempered, and carried away by impulse (hormê), and are apt to give way to spirit (thumos); (b) for (gar) on account of their love of honor (philotimian) they cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant when they think they are being wronged. (c) They are lovers of honor (philotimoī), but of victory (philonikoi) especially; (d) for (gar) youth appetitively desire (epithumei) superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority. (e) And (their desire for) both of these is greater than their desire for money, to which they attach only the slightest value, because they have never yet experienced want… (Rh. 2.12 1389a3-15)

Here, Aristotle says that young people love honor and victory ([c], [d]). He makes it clear that their desire for victory is not a spirited desire but rather an appetitive desire; the youth appetitively desire victory, insofar as (gar (d)) they appetitively desire (epithumei, (d)) superiority, a type of victory.\textsuperscript{45} Aristotle claims throughout his works that the object of appetite is pleasure; appetite always pursues what is pleasant.\textsuperscript{46} Presumably, then, young people appetitively desire victory and superiority in the sense that they desire the pleasures of these things. (And indeed, a passage at EN 7.4 discusses those who have an

\textsuperscript{44} In addition to being moved by spirit, young people are moved by appetite: “The young, as to character, are ready to appetitively desire (epithumêtikoi) and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily appetites they especially obey sensual ones and of these they are incontinent. Changeable in their appetites and soon tiring of them, they appetitively desire excessively, but soon cool; for their wishes (boulêseis), like the hunger and thirst of the sick, are keen rather than strong.” (Rh. 2.12 1389a3-7)

\textsuperscript{45} Aristotle considers a distinctively appetitive love of victory at EN 7.6, where he discusses a kind of appetitive incontinence with respect to the pleasures of victory (EN 7.4 1148a22-29).

\textsuperscript{46} Appetite “is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant” (Rh. 1.10 1369b15-16); appetite is “of the pleasant and painful” (EN 1111b17); appetite is “a desire for what is pleasurable” (DA 2.3 414b5-6).
excessive *appetite* for the pleasures of victory and honor,\(^{47}\) which confirms that, for Aristotle, appetitive desires for such things do exist.\(^{48}\)

While young people’s desires for victory are distinctively appetitive desires, their concern with honor (*philotimian*) that the passage mentions does not seem to be appetitive; it is not a desire for the pleasures of honor, and so differs from the sort of desire for honor discussed at *EN* 7.6. Evidence that their concern for honor is spirited rather than appetitive is found in the connection the passage makes (at [b]) between young people’s desires for honor and their susceptibility to indignation in the face of slights. This is because Aristotle relegates indignation in the face of insults to the domain of anger (*orgê*) (*Rhet.* 2.2 1378a31-3), an emotion that is *spirited* (not appetitive) (*De Anima* 1.1 403a30 and *Top.* 8.1 156a32, 4.5 126a8-10, 2.7 113b1).\(^{49}\)

So the *Rhetoric*’s description of young people suggests that spirit can make one an honor lover, where this love is not reducible to a concern for the pleasures of honor. But if these spirited desires are not desires for honor’s pleasures, how exactly should we understand them? We might think that the spirited person desires medals, awards, and good reputation for themselves; her final end is not the pleasure of these awards but rather the awards themselves. While this love of external honors might be part of the story concerning spirit’s love of honor, it cannot be the whole story. On the contrary, an examination of spirit’s essentially social nature—in particular the way that nature is

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\(^{47}\) “Hence some appetites and pleasures are for fine and excellent kinds of things, such as wealth, profit, victory, and honor. About all these and about the things in between people are blamed not for experiencing an appetite and love for them, but for doing so in a excessive way.” (*EN* 7.4 1148a24-29)

\(^{48}\) Aristotle also talks about appetites for learning at *NE* 1111a30-1 (cf. *Rhet.* 1371a33) and appetites for health at 1111a30-1. Presumably, these appetitive desires are desires for the pleasures associated with learning and with health.

\(^{49}\) Again, this doesn’t rule out an appetitive concern with honor. It is possible that young people have both appetitive and spirited concerns with honor. My point here is that the particular desires for honor that Aristotle discusses in this passage are spirited rather than appetitive.
manifested in shame (aidôs), a moral phenomenon that Aristotle ties to spirit—reveals that young people’s spirited desires involve a concern with what I, following Aristotle, have called “the honorable”; they desire to instantiate a moral ideal, and not merely to acquire external honors.

III.2 In What Does Spirit’s Love of Honor Consist? Spirit’s Love of Honor as a Love of Honorability

To see that spirit’s concern with honor includes a concern with the honorable (and not just with external honors), let us look at a passage where Aristotle discusses the proper upbringing of citizens:

In fact, however, arguments seem to have enough influence to stimulate and encourage the cultivated ones (eleutherious) among the youth, and perhaps to make virtue take possession of a well-born character that truly loves what is fine; but they seem unable to turn the many toward the fine and good. For the many naturally obey fear, not shame (aidôs); they avoid what is base because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful (aischron). For since they live by their feelings (pathei), they pursue their proper pleasures and the sources of them, and avoid the opposed pains, and have not even a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant, since they have had no taste of it. (EN 10.9 1179b5-17, translation Irwin)

Here Aristotle contrasts the concerns of the many and the youth to set up a contrast between motivation by the pleasant and painful on the one hand, and motivation by a sense of shame on the other. The association the passage makes between young people and shame (a connection echoed elsewhere—see EN 4.9, for example) has the potential to tell us something about the particular sense in which spirit makes young people honor...
lovers. This is because shame both involves the desire for a certain kind of honor and is a spirited attitude. Let us look at these aspects in turn.

First, shame involves the desire for a certain kind of honor. In Aristotle’s definitions of shame, he explicitly connects shame\(^{50}\) with honor (or dishonor): shame is “an impression (phantasia) concerning dishonor (adoxias) and that for its own sake but not for the sake of its results” (Rhet. 2.6 1384a); “[w]e are ashamed (aischunontai) when we suffer or have suffered or are about to suffer the sorts of things that bring on dishonor (atimian) and reproach…” (2.6 1384a13).\(^{51}\) Insofar as shame is an aversion towards dishonor, it goes hand in hand with a certain kind of desire for honor.

Second, shame is a type of spirited desire. The strongest support for the claim that shame is a spirited disposition comes from Aristotle’s claim that spirit, as the desire through which we feel friendship, is an essentially social desire. Consider the following passage:

[Thumos] is the capacity of the soul by which we feel friendship (philoumen). A sign of this is that one’s spirit is roused more against those with whom one is familiar (sunêtheis) and against friends (philous) than against those whom one does not know (agnôtas), when one takes oneself to be slighted. Therefore Archilochus for instance, when reproaching friends, correctly addresses his spirit in these words: ‘For surely thou art plagued on account of friends.’ (Pol. 7.6 1327b38-1328a6)

According to this passage, it is spirit by which we first feel friendship; it is a desire through which we form special attachments to friends and to the familiar (sunêthesis).\(^{52}\)

\(^{50}\) Or a sense of disgrace (aischunê). Aristotle seems to use “shame” (aidôs) and “sense of disgrace” (aischunê) interchangeably. Cf. EN 4.9, where his argument is valid only if he identifies the two.

\(^{51}\) Cf. Rhet. 2.6 1383b13-14: A sense of disgrace (aischunê) is some sort of pain (lupê) or uneasiness concerning the things that appear to carry dishonor (adoxian).”

\(^{52}\) The connection between spirit and the forming of attachments for what is familiar is reminiscent of a similar connection that Plato draws in the Republic, when Socrates suggests that the spirited auxiliaries will have the proper sentiments towards what is familiar (oikeion) to them or what is “their own.” Socrates says that the guardians must be spirited if they are to be brave, and then stresses that this spirited nature must
The suggestion here is that spirit is the desire through which we conceive of ourselves as members of a social ordering, and develop attachments to fellow members of that ordering. Aristotle, like Plato, thinks that spirit makes us sensitive to group identities; it furnishes us with friendly feelings for what is our own or familiar (oikeion).

The fact that spirit is the desire through which we form attachments with what is oikeion is important, because it suggests that shame is spirited. For shame too essentially involves sensitivity to one’s social standing and the way a community views oneself. Consider, for example, Aristotle’s claim that the opinion of others looms large in shame:

They are more ashamed of things that are done before their eyes and in broad daylight; whence the proverb, ‘The eyes are the abode of shame.’ (Rhet. 1384a30, quoting Euripides)

Aristotle says that the presence of actual observers heightens the feeling of shame, suggesting that shame is inextricably bound up with the views of others, that it operates in an essentially social context. Given the connection between spirit and community, shame is likely a spirited desire.

If I am right that shame is a spirited desire and that it involves a concern with honor, then presumably the shame motivational framework that Aristotle ascribes to young people at EN 10.9 is connected with the spirited concern with honor he ascribes to young people in the Rhetoric 2.12 passage. Thus, we should examine shame to see what light it might shed on the nature of young people’s spirited concern with honor.

combine gentleness towards those who are familiar to them (tous oikeious) and harshness towards their enemies. He then appeals to dogs as animals that get right this combination of these sentiments: “you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars (sunêtheis) and acquaintances (gnôrimous), and the reverse to stranger…When a dog sees someone it doesn’t know (agnôta), it gets angry before anything bad happens to it. But when it knows someone (gnôrimon), it welcomes (aspazetai) him, even if it has never received anything good from him” (Rep 2 375a-376b). On the spirited quality of dogs, see 375a.
Shame often manifests itself before an audience (recall the Euripides quotation), but it is not simply a concern for good reputation or external honors. After all, the audience involved in shame may be no more than the detached perspective of the person experiencing shame, and such “self-reflective” shame suggests that shame as a whole transcends a crude concern with public honors or good public opinion. To see this, consider two passages from the *Odyssey* that, as Bernard Williams points out, exhibit self-reflective shame. At *Od* 2.64-5, Telemachus tells the Ithaca assembly that the poorly-behaving suitors should “be outraged themselves (*autoi*) and feel shame in the face of other men who live around.” As Williams notes, Telemachus is not repeating himself. Later, at 6.310-20, Nausikaa fears what people will say if they see her with an attractive stranger, and that there will be an uproar; but she then goes on to say, “And I myself would think badly of a girl who acted so.”

These examples indicate that shame involves a person regarding *herself* as falling short. Nausikka, having internalized the moral norms of her society, makes a self-evaluative judgment in the normative terms of her society. This is significant, because it suggests that shame has a concern with the honorable, a concern with living up to one’s particular moral standards or ideals. This sort of desire is not crudely dependent on her receiving praise or honors; on the contrary, shame implies that agents actually internalize the moral judgments of the community, and use these moral judgments as standards that they have non-instrumental reason to live up to. (Indeed, were shame simply a concern with honor, it would be very hard to explain the *discriminating* aspect of shame—the fact

53 Williams, 82-4.
54 “*Nemessēthēte kai autoi, allous t’aidesthēte periktionas anthrōpous.*”
55 Williams, 83.
56 “*hōs ereousin, emoi de k’ oneidea tauta genoito,kai d’ allēi nemesō, hē tis toiauta ge rhezoı,hē t’ aekēti philōn patros kai métrōs eontō,andrasi misgētai, prin g’ amphadion gamon elthein.*” 6.285
that shame concerns not just anybody’s views of ourselves, but rather the views of the people we respect and admire.\textsuperscript{57} 

Spirit’s connection to friendship (\textit{philoumen}—recall the quote from the \textit{Politics}) can help illuminate the character and development of shame attitudes. In books 8 and 9 of the \textit{EN}, Aristotle discusses the development of friendships (\textit{philia}) and gives significant attention of the development of friendships that happen early in an agent’s upbringing.

On a charitable interpretation of that account, one that coheres well with our own moral experience and one that best explains his comments on shame, an agent’s love for her family or friendship carries with it an internalization of the standards they set.\textsuperscript{58} Because

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{57} Aristotle on the discriminating character of shame:
\begin{quote}
Now since shame is the imagination of disgrace, in which we shrink from the disgrace itself and not from its consequences, and we only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us. Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect. (\textit{Rhet.} 2.6 1384a22-27)
\end{quote}
\item\textsuperscript{58} In support of this idea, consider the account of moral development that Rawls puts forward in \textit{A Theory of Justice}. This is of course, a much different time period than Aristotle, but I’m not sure how much that matters. We’re looking for an interpretation of Aristotle that is plausible, and Rawls nicely articulates what I think we have encountered in our own moral experience. Rawls discusses three stages of morality, the first stage corresponding to morality developed in the family, the second stage corresponding to the morality developed at the level of community, and the third stage corresponding to the morality developed at the level of principles. Rawls, like Aristotle, draws attention to the fact that parents love and benefit their children, and that children recognize this and respond to it with love: He suggests that when children come to love their parents, they form the desire to be the sort of people their parents want them to be, to do the things their parents want them to do. In cases where they fall short of this ideal, they feel “guilt”—an emotion that Rawls distinguishes from shame, but which nevertheless bears important similarities to it.

\begin{quote}
\textit{G}iven the nature of the authority situation and the principles of moral psychology connecting the ethical and natural attitudes, love and trust will give rise to feelings of guilt once the parental injunctions are disobeyed. Admittedly in the case of the child it is sometimes difficult to distinguish feelings of guilt from the fear of punishment, and especially from the dread of the loss of parental love and affection. The child lacks the concepts for understanding moral distinctions and this will reflect itself in his behavior. I have supposed, however, that even in the child’s case we can separate (authority) guilt feelings from fear and anxiety (Rawls, 407).
\end{quote}

Rawls suggests that attachments formed during childhood supply children not only the desire to receive praise from parents, but also a concern to live up to the model of character and behavior that their parents put forward for them. This latter concern is not reducible to a concern for parent’s affection or good opinion; if it were, it would be difficult to explain children’s feelings of guilt (as opposed to fear or anxiety) when they fall short of their parents’ expectations.

Like Aristotle, Rawls stresses that such family attachments, as well as attachments in community, result from the benefits that people receive from family and community. This development is not merely one of association or reinforcement, but rather a development of genuine love and friendship:
of the internalization that results from such love, the agent adopts these moral standards as goals worth pursuing for their own sakes: she will view the recommended actions as worth doing independently of the praise or external honors they might bring. This is the sense in which a child’s friendly attitudes bring about a concern with honorability.

So spirit’s essentially social context---its connection to friendship and the development of social relations---explains how spirited agents develop a concern with honorability. In short, spirited agents, in virtue of the love they have for their family and community members, non-instrumentally desire to uphold and instantiate the practices, actions, and character traits which make up the moral ideal they have internalized from their family and community. In this way, they desire the honorable; they do not merely desire external honor. When they fall short of these moral ideals, they experience shame.

Indeed, this claim that spirited people can aim at the fine as such coheres nicely with the Rhetoric’s claim that young people are apt to pursue the fine:

[a] In their actions, they choose to do fine things over useful things (sumpherontôn); [b] for they live more by their character rather than by calculation (logismô), with calculation being of the useful, and virtue being of the fine. [c] At this age more than any other they are fond of their friends and companions, because they delight in living in company and [d] as yet judge (krinein) nothing by utility (pros to sumpheron) not even their friends. [e] All their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively. (Rhet. 1389a34-1389b3)

The passage suggests that young people actually judge actions as fine and perform actions because they judge them as fine. This seems to be the implication that they judge

Because we recognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in turn. Thus we acquire attachments to persons and institutions according to how we perceive our good to be affected by them. The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind. Now this tendency is a deep psychological fact. Without it our nature would be very different and fruitful social cooperation fragile if not impossible (Rawls, 433).
(krinein) nothing by utility [d]; given the passage’s earlier contrast between the fine and the useful [a], the cognitive verb at [d] suggests that they do judge actions according to those actions’ fineness; that is, they judge actions as fine, and perform those actions for that reason. Young people, we have seen, have spirited natures, and spirited agents want to do what is honorable and what will be honored. If, then, I am right about these connections between spirit and honorability on the one hand, and honorability and the fine on the other, we should not be surprised by the Rhetoric’s claim that young people pursue fine actions under the description “fine.”

III.3 The Spirited Agent’s Pursuit of Honorable Actions

So one of the ways in which spirit makes a person an honor lover is in its imparting to the spirited agent a general desire to do what is honorable and to be a person of moral worth. Of course, someone with a general desire to do what is honorable will not succeed in doing what is honorable if she does not know which particular actions are honorable. Spirited agents learn from social norms and honor practices⁵⁹ which actions are honorable ones, and so they can focus their general desire for honorability on actions that are genuinely honorable. In a good society, the behaviors characteristic of the virtues are what are honored, and so the spirited agent will focus her desires for honorability on the types of actions associated with temperance, courage, and justice.

⁵⁹ What is praised and honored tends to promote the common good (EN IV.2 1122b15-23).
IV. Citizen Bravery

In his discussion of bravery, Aristotle discusses five conditions that resemble full bravery but fall short of full bravery. Among the conditions he discusses is “citizen bravery,” a kind of bravery that is the closest of the pseudo forms to the real thing. I want to look at this discussion because, on one interpretation of the passage, it lends support to the connections I made in the foregoing sections between certain spirited desires and the pursuit of the fine as such. Here is the citizen bravery passage:

Others are also called brave, according to five ways. [a] Citizen (politikê) bravery comes first, for it looks most like bravery. [b] For (gar) citizens seem to endure dangers on account of the penalties inflicted by law and public disgrace, and because of the honors (dia ta ek tôn nomôn epitimia kai ta oneidê kai dia tas timas); and on account of this they seem to be the bravest, among whom the cowards are dishonored and the courageous honored… [c.i] This is the most like the [full] bravery described earlier, [c.ii] since it comes about on account of virtue (di' aretên ginetai) [c.iii] (for (gar) it comes about on account of shame (di' aidô) and [c.iv] on account of a desire for fineness (kai dia kalou orexin) [c.v] (namely honor (times gar)) and by aversion from disgrace (phugên oneidous), which is something shameful (aischrou ontos). [d] Into this class someone might also put those compelled by their superiors. [e.i] But they are worse, [e.ii] insofar as not on account of shame (ou di' aidô) but on account of fear they act (alla dia phobon auto drôsi), [e.iii] and they flee not the shameful but the painful (pheugontes ou to aischron alla to lupêron). For their superiors compel them, just as Hector does: ‘If I notice anyone shrinking back from the battle, nothing will save him from being eaten by dogs.’ Commanders who strike any troops who give ground, or who post them in front of ditches and suchlike, do the same thing, since they all compel them. [f] It is necessary that one be brave not on account of compulsion but because [bravery] is fine (dei d' ou di' anagkên andreion einai, all' hoti kalon). (EN 3.8 1116a16-1116b5)

To support his claim that citizen bravery is closest to genuine bravery, Aristotle argues that it comes about “on account of virtue” [c.i.-c.ii]. He then explains (see explanatory “gar” at [c.iii]) this claim about its origins in virtue by asserting that citizen virtue comes
about on account of shame [c.iii] and a desire for fineness (kalou) [c.iv], where the latter is glossed as a desire for honor [c.v].

Note that we can read the passage in such a way that it illustrates the connections I have drawn between spirit, the fine, and honorability. At [c.iv], Aristotle connects aiming at fineness with aiming at honor. If we understand this connection as that between aiming at fineness and aiming at the honorable, then [c.iv] lends support to my claim that pursuing the honorable is a way of being motivated by the fine as such. The passage also gives some hints that the brave citizen’s pursuit of the fine is grounded in spirit. For the passage emphasizes shame as the primary motivational framework governing citizen bravery (see, for example, [c.iii], [e.ii], and [e.iii]), and as we’ve seen in the foregoing discussion, shame is a spirited motivational framework. If this is right, then it is not unreasonable to think the brave citizen’s desire for fineness is ultimately grounded in spirited motivational attitudes.60

V. Appetite and the Fine

So far I have discussed spirited desires, and have argued that spirited desires can attach to fine actions and fine actions as such. I now want to turn to the case of appetitive desires.

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60 Thus, I disagree with C.C.W. Taylor’s interpretation of this passage: “Where, then, lies the difference between true courage and mere civic courage? The difference, such as it is, must be this: the courageous person has fully internalized the values from which he or she acts, whereas the values motivating civic courage are external. The primary motivations of the civicly courageous person are the desire for honor and the desire to avoid disgrace, i.e. to be favorably regarded, and to avoid being unfavorably regarded by others. …Shame is primarily the fear of being disgraced in the eyes of others; it is thus the mirror image of the desire for honor, to stand well in the eyes of others, which in the case of civic courage is the form which desire for the fine takes (a28-9). The person of civic courage is thus motivated primarily by considerations of social standing, by contrast with the person of true courage, who is motivated primarily by considerations of standing in his or her own eyes. The courageous person cares above all about what he or she sees as fine, not what others see as fine, and similarly for avoiding what he or she sees as disgraceful” (Taylor, 186).
Can appetitive desires attach to acting finely as such? That is, can appetitive desires prompt one to do the behaviors characteristic of the virtues, and moreover do them out of a non-instrumental concern to do what is honorable or be an honorable person?

The answer to this question is complicated. On the one hand, Aristotle makes clear that pleasure is the ultimate end of appetite, and thus pleasure will be part of the end of any appetitive desire. On the other hand, he suggests that, at least in the virtuous person, ‘pleasures from fine action’ is part of the description under which appetite pursues pleasures. The content of some of the virtuous person’s appetitive desires necessarily include ‘the fine,’ and on these grounds appetite pursues fine action in a non-instrumental way. Thus, there is a sense in which appetite pursues the fine as such. My goal in this section is to make these ideas clearer.

Aristotle consistently says that the object of appetite is pleasure. Appetite “is the cause of all actions that appear pleasant” (Rhetoric 1.10 1369b15-16); appetite is “of the pleasant and painful” (EN 1111b17); appetite is “a desire for what is pleasurable” (DA 2.3 414b5-6). The pleasures that appetite pursues is not restricted to bodily appetites, but rather includes pleasures of all kinds. This is clear from EN 7.4, where Aristotle discusses those who have an excessive appetite for the pleasures of victory and honor.61 Aristotle also talks about an appetite for learning at EN 1111a30-1, Rhet. 1371a33, and for health at 1111a30-1.

Recall that in the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that the fine is that which “being good, is pleasant because it is good” (Rhetoric 1366a33-4). I want to focus on the second part of this claim, the claim that the kalon is pleasant because it is good. One way of reading

61 “Hence some appetites and pleasures are for fine and excellent kinds of things, such as wealth, profit, victory, and honor. About all these and about the things in between people are blamed not for experiencing an appetite and love for them, but for doing so in a excessive way” (EN 7.4 1148a24-29).
this is that fine action is pleasant to the agent because the agent regards the action is
good. On this interpretation, a person’s taking pleasure in fine action is not a matter of
that agent taking pleasure in (e.g.) returning deposits. Rather, what she takes pleasure in
is the goodness of the action. If the agent can take pleasure in something’s goodness,
presumably she can also take pleasure in its fineness. And Indeed, Aristotle seems to
describe just this when he says that the temperate person “enjoys the [abstinence] itself”
(EN 2.3 1104b7). The idea seems to be that the virtuous person sees her abstinence or
standing fast as a case of acting finely, and takes pleasure in it as such so that she takes
pleasure in (e.g.) returning deposits and standing fast in battle under the description ‘fine
activity.’

How does an agent come to take pleasure in doing the fine thing under that
description? Presumably, she will be habituated in doing fine activity with a view to
acting finely. The trainee will be told, for example, that the goal in all action is to act
finely and that one ought to do courageous or just or temperate activity not simply
because these activities are advantageous or themselves enjoyable, but because they are
instances of fine activity. In this way, the trainee is continually reminded that these
activities are to be pursued as instances of fine activity. When the trainee performs
activities like standing fast in battle or repaying a debt she will be guided by a father, a
teacher, or some other rule-maker who will, in each instance, tell her, ‘This is what acting
finely requires of you now.’ Because these sorts of judgments accompany the learner’s
performance of these activities, the learner comes to see her actions as instances of fine
action. Moreover, so Aristotle seems to think, and so a plausible theory of psychological
development would say, frequent exposure to virtuous activity will make one come to
delight in that activity’s fineness.\textsuperscript{62} 63

The upshot of this is that what the developing moral agent comes to desire is not
just pleasure, but \textit{pleasure from fine activity}, such that her belief that the activity is fine is
critical for her to enjoy it. Insofar as her appetitive desires pursue the pleasure that comes
with fine action, under that description, appetitive desires’ pursuit of fine actions is of
fine action as such. Of course, appetite would not pursues the fine activities if those
activities ceased to be pleasant. Nevertheless, appetite’s pursuit of the pleasures of fine
action is not merely instrumental; there is a tighter connection between appetite’s pursuit
of fine action and pleasure than that of instrumental means to external end.

\textit{VI. Conclusion}

In this chapter, filled out some of the details of my interpretation of a reason-responsive
\textit{alogon} by examining the evaluative capacities of spirited and appetitive desire. I argued
that spirited desires and appetitive desires can pursue the fine as such. To make this
argument for spirited desires, I argued that spirited desires are the desires through which
we form attachments to what is familiar (\textit{oikeion}), attachments that lead one to pursue

\textsuperscript{62} “The character of one’s pleasure depends on what is enjoyed, and what the virtuous man enjoys is quite
different from what the nonvirtuous enjoy…Specifically, what the virtuous man enjoys…is the practice of
the virtues undertaken for its own sake. And in cases such as the facing of danger…..the actions which the
practice of the virtues requires could only be enjoyed if they are seen as noble and virtuous and the agent
delights in the achievement of something fine and noble.” (Burnyeat 77).

\textsuperscript{63} Though Aristotle takes attachment to the fine to have this sort of rational aspect, he does not make it a
condition of loving the fine that a person be able to give a reasoned defense of what (say) makes
courageous (as opposed to cowardly) action good. In other words, nothing in his characterization of the fine
says anything that requires the virtuous agent to be able to offer a reasoned defense of why one action
rather than another counts as fine.
what I called ‘honorability.’ Such a concern is, I argued, a concern with the fine (*kalon*).

To make the argument for appetitive desires, I argued that virtuous moral agents take pleasure in fine activity under the description “fine activity”, so that their appetites pursue as an end not pleasure simpliciter but pleasure from virtuous activity.

If what I have said here is correct, then it appears that spirited and appetitive desires’ have the evaluative capacities required for the *alogon* to be sensitive to the fine as a value. In the next chapter, I’ll further my argument that the *alogon* has these capacities by examining in greater detail the kind of cognition involved in non-rational desire.
CHAPTER 4
THE COGNITION INVOLVED IN NON-RATIONAL DESIRE

I. Introduction

In this chapter I examine the nature of the cognitions underlying Aristotelian emotions by addressing the question of whether phantasia (appearance) can all by itself serve as the cognition underlying human emotions (pathê), or whether belief (doxa) is necessary. Based on an analysis of phantasia, I argue that phantasia is sufficient to serve as this cognition.

Getting clear on the nature of the cognition underlying human emotions is important, since the emotions have an important connection to the non-rational desires, By looking at the cognitive dimensions of emotions, we can better understand the cognition that characterizes the non-rational desires. One of the things that will emerge from the discussion is that phantasia can have rather sophisticated content, and thus that human emotions and (and so presumably desires), whether they rest on mere phantasia or on belief, can have sophisticated content. They can, for example, represent complex actions as fine.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I set out the debate between phantasia-based and belief-based views of Aristotelian emotions. Next, I argue that Rhetoric I gives

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64 Aristotle clearly thinks that some appetitive and spirited desires are emotions. For example, he calls appetite (epithumia) an emotion (pathos) at EN 2.5 1105b22, DA 1.1 403a30, Top. 8.1 156a32, and clearly relies on the equivalence at EN 3.1 111b1 and V.8 1135b21). Anger, a paradigmatic emotion, is a special kind of spirited desire (DA 1.1 403a30, Top. 8.1 156a32). At least for many emotions, desires make up part of the emotion. Anger, for example, involves the desire for revenge (Rhet. 2.2 1378a32) and fear involves some sort of desire for safety (Rhet 2.6 1383a5-8). Both emotions and non-rational desires belong to the alogon (IX.8 1168b20).
us a reason to think that phantasia-based views are correct. Next, I offer an analysis of phantasia to reply to an objection that phantasia lacks the cognitive sophistication to represent the objects of the emotions. According to my analysis of phantasia, phantasias can have the sort of sophisticated cognitive content that Aristotelian emotions have.

**II. Can Emotions (Pathê) Rest on Phantasias?**

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle’s must sustained discussion of the emotions,65 Aristotle makes clear that human emotions are essentially cognitive: they involve seeing the world in a particular way. In his definitions of several emotions, he uses ‘phantasia’ or some cognate of ‘phantasia’66 to describe the cognitive state of the emotion. For example:

Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for what appears to be revenge (timôrias phainomenês) on account of an apparent slight (dia phainomenên oligôrian) at the hands of men for whom it is not fitting to slight oneself or one’s friends (tou oligôrein mé prosêkontos). (Rh. 2.2 1378a30-2)

Let fear (phobos) be a certain pain or disturbance from an appearance (ek phantasias) of a destructive or painful evil which is about to happen. (Rh. 2.21382a21-2)

For confidence is the contrary of fear and what causes confidence is the contrary of what causes fear; hence, it is anticipation (elpis) with appearance (phantasias) of safety (tôn sôtêriôn) being near, and the absence or remoteness of fearful things. (Rh 2.5 1383a17-8)

Pity is a kind of pain at what appears to be a destructive or painful evil

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65 If the orator is going to be successful in modifying the emotions of his audience, the orator must know what emotions actually are and how they really work. It follows that the *Rhetoric* must give the orator practical advice that tracks (what Aristotle regards as) a correct account of the emotions. It will do not good, after all, for the orator to know merely what the common man thinks about the nature and workings of emotions if the common man is wrong about these things. If Aristotle is going to accomplish his stated aim of giving useful advice to the orator who wants to persuade, he needs to present his own view of the emotions and not merely the common view. Sihvola, Cooper, and Nussbaum put this point nicely. Sihvola, 32, Cooper [3], 240, Nussbaum [1], 82-3.

66 E.g. forms of phainesthai. Aristotle uses phantasia as the noun corresponding to phainesthai (*DA* 428a7,14; 428b1, 3; 433a28).
(phainomenoi kakoi phthartikoi Ð euperoi) for someone undeserving to be struck by it (tou anaxiou tugchanein), [an evil which] one could expect oneself or someone near to oneself to suffer, and this when it appears near (touto hotan plesion phainetai). (Rh 2.8 1385b13-6)

Envy is pain at apparent prosperity (eupragiainen phainomeni) as consists of the good things already mentioned: we feel it towards our equals not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it. (Rh 2.10 1387b23-4)

The subject of each of these emotions represents her situation as being a certain way: the angry person has a representation of a slight, the fearful person has a representation of future pain, and the confident person has a representation of safety.

In De Anima 3.3 Aristotle sharply distinguishes phantasia from belief (doxa). There he describes phantasia as a mental capacity that, by retaining and synthesizing sense perceptions, enables subjects to perceive things as being some way or another. It is less rational than belief and supposition in that it does not depend on having certain rational faculties. For example, animals can have phantasia but not belief or supposition.

DA 3.3’s distinction between phantasia and belief has led some commentators to argue that when the Rhetoric uses phantasia or its cognates to describe emotions, Aristotle is saying that phantasia in the DA 3.3 sense—that is, phantasia as a sub-rational mental state that falls short of belief—is sufficient for emotion; belief is not required.67 Thus, on this view, what DA 3.3. calls phantasia can underlie the emotions. Call this

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67 This is Gisela Striker’s View:
What serves as the defining feature—the differentia specifica, as it were—is in almost all cases an impression or appearance (phantasia)—that a terrible evil is near, that someone has suffered an undeserved misfortune, that one has been treated with disrespect, and so on—which causes the pain of disturbance. It is evident that Aristotle is deliberatively using the term “impression” rather than, say, “belief” (doxa) in his definitions in order to make the point that these impressions are not to be confused with rational judgments. Emotions are caused by the way things appear to one unreflectively, and one may experience an emotion even if one realizes that the impression that triggered it is in fact mistaken. (Striker, 291)
interpretation of emotions in the *Rhetoric* the “phantasia-based view” of emotions, since it says that *DA* 3.3 *phantasia* is a possible cognitive basis for an emotion.

According to another camp of commentators, when the *Rhetoric* uses *phantasia* or its cognates to describe emotions, it is using a non-technical notion of *phantasia*, one that is roughly equivalent to what *DA* 3.3 calls “belief” (*doxa*). According to this view, the *Rhetoric* is not referencing *DA* 3.3 *phantasia* and arguing that it can underlie emotion. Instead, Aristotle thinks only *DA* 3.3. belief can underlie emotion. Call this second camp the “belief-based view,” since it says that *DA* 3.3 belief, and not *DA* 3.3 *phantasia*, is the lowest possible cognitive basis of an emotion.

We should take a closer look at Aristotle’s distinction between *phantasia* and belief in *DA* 3.3 to see what is at stake in deciding between the *phantasia*-based view and the belief-based view of Aristotelian emotion.

Neither, again, can *phantasia* be ranked with the faculties, like knowledge or intellect, which always judge truly; it can also be false. It remains, then, to consider whether it be *doxa*, as *doxa* may be true or false. But *doxa* is attended (*akolouthéi*) by conviction (*pistis*), for it is impossible to hold *doxai* without being convinced of them (*gar doxazonta hois dokei mé pisteuein*); but no brute (*thérión*) is ever convinced, though they may have imagination. Further, every *doxa* implies conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded (*pistei de to pepeisthai*), and persuasion implies reason (*peithoi de logos*). Among brutes, however, though some of them have *phantasia*, none have reason. It is evident, then, that *phantasia* is neither *doxa* joined with sensory perception nor *doxa* through sensation, nor yet a complex of *doxa* and sensation, both on these grounds and because nothing else is the object of opinion but that which is the object of sensory perception… (*DA* 3.3 428a18-23).

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68 This is Nussbaum’s view:

Further pursuit of the question shows clearly, however, that no technical distinction between *phantasia* and believing is at issue in any of these analyses of emotion: *phantasia* is used, in the rare cases where it is used, simply as the verbal noun of phainesthai “appear”. The passage contains no suggestion that *phantasia* is being distinguished from *doxa*, belief. ….In other words, what is stressed is the fact that it is the way things are seen by the agent, not the fact of the matter, that is instrumental in getting emotions going. Intentionality, not absence of commitment, is the issue (Nussbaum [2], 307).

See also Dow.
Aristotle says that to have a belief, one must be convinced (pistis), and being convinced requires that one have been persuaded (pepeisthai). Persuasion in turn requires reason (logos). To have a phantasia, by contrast, one need not be convinced and so having a phantasia does not require logos. For this reason, phantasia, but not doxa, is available to animals. 69

Unfortunately, there are several ways to interpret this distinction between phantasia and belief. According to some interpreters, DA 3.3’s distinction between phantasia and belief tracks the distinction between a cognitive attitude that does not involve assent and a cognitive attitude that does involve assent. In support of this interpretation, these interpreters appeal to the following passage:

But there are false appearances about which we can at the same time have true belief (hupolêpsis). For example, the sun appears (phainetai) only a foot in diameter, but we are convinced (pepisteutai) that it is larger than the inhabited word: in this case, therefore, either, without any alteration in the thing and without any lapse of memory on our part or conversion by argument we have abandoned the true belief (doxan) which we had about it. (DA 3.3 428b1-5)

When the sun strikes me as being a foot wide, I don’t assent to the proposition that the sun is a foot wide, since I believe that the sun is actually much larger. So, commentators conclude, appearances must be the sorts of attitudes that don’t involve assent.

69 In the Theaetetus, Socrates presents belief (doxa) as the result of silent inner thinking (dianoeisthai) (189E-190A; cf Sophist 263E-264A and Philebus 38C-E). Here, belief is the upshot if a kind of dialectical self-examination—the product of the soul asking itself questions and giving answers.

70 Alexander of Aphrodisias also takes the phantasia /doxa distinction to track the Stoic distinction between phantasia and assent (suykatathesis). Alexander, DA 67, 16-20. Nussbaum also takes this view: “The real difference here between phantasia and belief here seems to be just the difference that the Stoics will bring forward as the difference between phantasia and belief: in the former case, the sun strikes me as being a foot wide, but I don’t commit myself to that, I don’t accept or assent to it. In the latter case, I have a conviction, a view as to how things really are. The same contrast seems to be at work in our emotion examples. The loud noise strikes the brave man as something terrible, but, being a brave man, he doesn’t accept that it is in fact terrible; he judges that it is not so terrible” (Nussbaum [1], 84). See also Cooper [3], 269-70.
According to an opposing camp of interpreters, the distinction between *DA* 3.3’s *phantasia* and *doxa* does not track the distinction between a cognitive attitude without assent and a cognitive attitude with assent. Instead, the contrast is between different kinds of assent. Whereas appearances are often accompanied by automatic, non-reflective assents, the assents characteristic of beliefs necessarily are the product of reflections that support the proposition in question.

This interpretation can accommodate the passage about the sun appearing a foot wide. What this passage says, according to this interpretation, is that *phantasia* need not lead to assent. In particular, in cases where the *phantasia* that *p* conflicts with a *doxa* that not *p*, the *doxa* that not *p* can prevent assent to the *phantasia*. In cases where there is no conflicting belief, however, the appearance will be assented to (albeit in a non-reflective way).

Given these two interpretations of *DA* 3.3, appearance-based views—views that take *DA* 3.3. *phantasia* to be the lowest possible cognitive state for emotion—thus break into two kinds. According to one appearance-based view, emotions can rest on mere *phantasia* in the sense that the content of emotions need not be assented to at all. According to the other appearance-based view, emotions can rest on mere *phantasia* in the sense that they can rest on appearances that are *unreflectively* assented to; the content of the emotions does not require the reflective assent characteristic of belief.

Correspondingly, there are two possible belief-based views. According to one belief-based view, emotions necessarily rest on belief and not *phantasia* insofar as they necessarily involve assent. According to another belief-based view, emotions necessarily rest on belief and not *phantasia* insofar as they necessarily involve reflective assent. This
second belief-based view is implausible, given weakness of will. Therefore, we can put it to the side.

I want to argue in favor of appearances views, though I will not argue for a particular version of appearance views in this chapter.

III. A Consideration in Favor of Appearances Views

One reason to think that Aristotle’s discussion of the emotions in Rhetoric 2 employs the technical notion of phantasia—the DA 3.3 sense of ‘phantasia’ that distinguishes it from belief—is that a bit earlier in Rhetoric (at 1.11 1370a28) Aristotle clearly distinguishes phantasia from belief. 71

[1] Of the appetites some are irrational, some are with reason (tón de epithumiôn hai men alogoi eisin hai de meta logou). [2] By “irrational” I mean those which do not arise from any supposition (ek tou hupolambanein). [3] Of this kind are those known as natural; for instance, those originating in the body, such as the appetite for nourishment, and a separate kind of appetite answering to each kind of nourishment; and those connected with taste and sex and touch in general; and those of smell, hearing, and vision. [4] Rational appetites are those which we have been persuaded to have (meta logou de hosas ek tou peisthênai epithumousin); there are many things we desire to see or get because we have heard of them and been persuaded (akousantes kai peisthentes). [5] Further, pleasure lies in the sensory perceptions (en tóî ais thanes thai) of a certain emotion (tinos pathous); but appearance (phantasia) is a feeble sort of sensory perception (aisthêsis tis asthenês), and there will always be in the mind of a man who remembers or expects (mennêmenoi kai tóî elpizonti) something the appearance (phantasia) of what he remembers or expects (hou memnêtaï è elpizei). If this is so, it is clear that memory and expectation also (kai hédonai hama mennêmenois kai elpizousin), being accompanied by sensory perception (epetiper kai aisthêsis), may be accompanied by pleasure. It follows that anything pleasant is either present and perceived, past and remembered, or further and expected, since we perceive present things, remember past ones, and expect future ones (hôst' anagkê panta

71 Nussbaum disagrees: “The distinction between phantasia and doxa seems to be introduced in one passage in Book I (1370a28) but is altogether absent from Book 2. In general, the account shows no awareness of the more technical psychological distinctions of the De Anima.” (Nussbaum [2], 321, n. 16).
Rational appetite (appetite *meta logou*), unlike an irrational appetite, results from supposition (*ek tou hupolambanein*), and persuasion (*ek tou peisthêinai*) ([2], [4]). We will immediately recall that Aristotle at *DA* 3.3 presents a similar cluster of concepts. There he says that belief (*doxa*) and supposition (*hupolêpsis*) involve conviction (*pistis*), conviction involves being persuaded (*pepeisthai*), and being persuaded involves *logos*.

Aristotle’s comments in *Rhet* 1.11 about non-rational appetite also recall the *DA* 3.3 discussion. *Rhet* 1.11 ties *phantasia* closely with sensory perception, saying that *phantasia* is a feeble sort of sensory perception ([5]). In *DA* 3.3, Aristotle also connects *phantasia* and perception: *phantasia* is about what perception is about (*DA* 3.3 428b12) and is a change brought about by the functioning of perception (428b25-6; 429a1).

The similarity of the associations that we find in *Rhetoric* 1.11 and *DA* 3.3 strongly suggest that *Rhetoric* 1.11 relies on a view that is similar to the one in *DA* 3.3. This gives us some reason to think that ‘*phantasia*’ in the *Rhetoric*’s definitions of the emotions is the same as the *phantasia* in the *DA*. 3.3. Thus, barring any objections to taking *phantasia* as the cognition involved in emotion, *Rhetoric* I gives us reason to prefer an appearances based emotion over a belief-based view.

### IV. An Objection to Appearances Views
According to Dow,\textsuperscript{72} when Aristotle in the \textit{Rhetoric} uses ‘\textit{phantasia}’ to describe emotions, he cannot be invoking the \textit{DA} 3.3 technical conception of \textit{phantasia}. His argument rests on the claim that the \textit{phantasia} of \textit{DA} 3.3 lacks the cognitive sophistication to do the sorts of things that Aristotle says that emotions can do. To make this argument, Dow starts from a feature of \textit{phantasia} to which I have alluded: its connection to perception (\textit{aisthēsis}). \textit{Phantasia} is about what perception is about (\textit{DA} 3.3 428b12-13\textsuperscript{73}) and is a “change brought about by the functioning of perception” (428b25-6; 429a1). Aristotle doesn’t make clear in \textit{DA} 3.3 how we should interpret these claims, but Dow interprets them as meaning that the objects of \textit{DA} 3.3 \textit{phantasia} include “only things that can be objects of sensory perception.”\textsuperscript{74} This is a problem of the technical reading, Dow argues, because the objects of sense perception are substantially more limited than the objects of emotion. Specifically, emotions involve:

(1) Abstract objects
(2) Things as being in the future.
(3) Causal properties of objects.
(4) States of affairs.

Anger involves the appearances of abstract objects like revenge and slight, and (according to Dow) “[n]one of these seems to a possible objects of \textit{aisthēsis}, as would be required for \textit{phantasia} proper.”\textsuperscript{75} Along the same lines, fear involves the appearance of future harm, and Dow doubts that “something’s being in the future can be part of what...

\textsuperscript{73} hé de phantasia kinēsis tis dokei einai kai ouk aisthēseōs ginesthai all’ aisthanomenois kai hōn aisthēsis estin (\textit{DA} 3.3 428b12-13).
\textsuperscript{74} Dow, 170-1.
\textsuperscript{75} Dow, 171.
Appears.”76 In the emotion of shame, the object of shame is recognized as something that will bring disrepute, but this involves discriminating the causal properties of objects, a type of discrimination that Dow says perception cannot do. Finally, pity involves the pitying person seeing himself or someone close to him suffer the same thing as the pitied person. Dow thinks this is problematic for those who want to align Rhetoric phantasia with DA 3.3 phantasia, since Aristotle in the DA says that phantasia does not involve asserting one thing of another (3.8 432a10-11).

To address Dow’s objection we need to look more closely at what Aristotle takes phantasia to be, what sorts of objects it can take, and how it is related to sense perception. As we shall see, while phantasiai have sense perceptions in their causal ancestries and depend on sense perception for some of their contents, they nonetheless can have contents that go beyond what is perceived. In fact, so I will suggest, part of what it is to be a phantasia is to have content that goes beyond what is perceived. It follows that, contrary to Dow’s claim, the objects of phantasiai are not restricted to the objects of sense perception. Moreover (and this is the important part) an examination of phantasia faculty’s characteristic operations suggests that the objects of phantasia can be quite sophisticated, and sophisticated in a way that makes them able to have emotional content.

V. An Interpretation of Phantasia

I will argue for the following account of phantasia: phantasia (1) is a non-reflective appearance that, (2) while having sense perception in its causal ancestry and depending

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76 Dow, 171.
on sense perception for some of its content, (3) has content that goes beyond what is perceived by the senses.

V.1 Phantasia as Non-Reflective Appearance

*Phantasia* corresponds with the verb ‘to appear’ (*phainesthai*), a connection Aristotle explicitly cites in *DA* 3.3 428a13-4. We can thus understand *phantasai* as a type of appearance. It is a *type* of appearance because there may be appearances that do not count as *phantasiai* in the *DA* 3.3 sense. If, for example, something appears to us on the basis of reflective reasoning, the appearance would not be a *phantasia* in the *DA* 3.3 sense.

V.2 Phantasia as Having Sense Perception in its Causal History and Depending on Sense Perception for Some of its Content

*Phantasai* are changes (*kinêseis*) that occur as a result of the activity of perception (428b25-6; 429a1) and are about what perception is about (*DA* 3.3 428b12-130). To understand the nature of *phantasia*’s relationship to perception, we thus should examine perception.

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77 This is because one of the conditions for being a *phantasia* in the *DA* 3.3 sense is that it not result from reasoning. This is the upshot of the contrast with belief at *DA* 3.3.

78 Aristotle does mention “deliberative *phantasia*” (*bouleutikê phantasia*), a *phantasia* that results from deliberation. This expands the scope of *phantasia* in a way that I am not concerned with here. “Thus perceptual (*aisthêtikê* *phantasia*, as we have said, belongs in the other animals, whereas deliberative (*bouleutikê*) *phantasia* is in deliberative animals (*en tois logistikois*). For the task of deliberation is whether to do this or that and pursuing the greater good necessarily involves a single measurement. Hence it is possible to make one out of many images)” (434a6-10).

79 ἡ ἐν *phantasia* *kinêsis* τὸς δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἀισθησίους γινέσθαι ἀλλ’ ἀισθανομένους καὶ ἴδον *aisthêsis* *estin* (*DA* 3.3 428b12-13).
Perception is a kind of alteration of the perceiver: “perception comes about with <an organ's> being changed and affected … for it seems to be a kind of alteration” (DA 2.5 416b33–34). In this alteration, the perceiver takes on the form of the perceived object and thereby becomes like the object in some way (417a18-20, 418a3-6). Crucially, not just any sort of correspondence between a perceiver and object will do; Aristotle insists that the sense organ is potentially like the object (417a18-20, 418a3-6; 3.2 425b22-3; 3.4 429a15-7). Because the sense is potentially like the perceived object at the outset and during the sensation it becomes like the object in actuality, the content of perceptual states are identical with their causes. For this reason, perception is infallible (DA 3.3 427b12, DA 2.6 418a11-14).

Perception has an objective aspect insofar as it involves a causal interaction between a perceptual organ and the perceived object whereby the organ receives perceptual forms. But it also involves a subjective aspect insofar as it involves the subject representing the environment as being a certain way; when someone perceives, she makes some sort of judgment or discrimination (krinei, 2.6 418a14, 3.3 427a20-21).

What is perception of? For starters, it is limited to the objects of the special (idion) senses of sight, hearing, taste, and touch. This perception of special sensibles is perception of things “in themselves” (kath hauta 2.6 418a24), and includes perception of colors, odors, sounds, tastes, and tactile qualities. Moreover, perception is limited to particulars of these special sensibles—to this particular redness as opposed to redness in general—and to present (not past or future) objects.

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80 DA 2.5 417b22-3
81 “By perception we apprehend (gnôrizomen) neither what is future nor what is past, but only what is present” (De Memoria 449b13-5).
The special senses are unified in a way that allows a perceiving subject to discern different special sensibles as belonging to the same object. Because of the convergence afforded by the unity of sense, a subject can simultaneously perceive (by sight) whiteness and (by taste) sweetness (DA 425a30-b3), and, connecting the perceptions together, perceive that the white is sweet (DA 418a20-23; 425a21-2; 23-7; 30-b4). Thus, the unity of the special senses is presumably what allows perceiving subjects to organize the visual array into objects. Such organization need not be on the conceptual level; it may simply involve clustering different sensory properties together so as to apprehend them as belonging to a single object. A perceiving subject who, encountering a man, experiences a cluster of sensory properties—whiteness, round shape, a sound of such-and-such pitch, etc.—will represent a white, rounded, such-and-such pitched thing.

Aristotle’s language does not always make clear that perception is limited in the ways that I’ve suggested. For example, in addition to perception of special sensibles (perceptions of things “in themselves” (kath hauta)), he mentions “incidental perception” (kata sumbebêkos 2.6 418a7-30). As illustrations of incidental perceptions, he gives the example of perceiving that the white is the son of Diares (2. 6 418a20-3, 425a21-2) and perceiving common (koina) sensibles—e.g. perceiving motion, rest figure, magnitude, number and unity (DA 3.1 425a14-6). Perceiving that the white is the son of Diaries is not an act of sense perception strictly speaking, since the son of Diaries is not the object of any of the special senses. Similarly, perceiving that something is in motion is also not an act of sense perception strictly speaking, since perception is limited to present objects and apprehending motion involves an awareness of the thing at an earlier time.
When Aristotle refers to incidental perception, he is using ‘perception’ in a loose sense. He notes these stricter and looser senses at DA 2.6 418a24-5 when he says that perception of special sensibles is perception strictly speaking (kuriôs):

Of the two kinds of things perceptible in themselves (kath’ hauta) the special sensibles are sensible strictly speaking (kuriôs) (DA 2.6 418a24-5).

While he suggests here that common sensibles (koiâna) are perceived in themselves, later (at 3.1 425a15) he says that they are perceived only incidentally. The latter view is his more considered view.

With this rough account of sense perception in hand, we can examine Aristotle’s characterization of phantasiai as changes (kinéseis) that result from perception. Crucial to understanding this claim is the phantasia faculty’s role in storing sensory perceptions in a subject’s perceptual apparatus, perceptions that can be marshaled up at a later time. These stored perceptions are phantasiai, changes that are formed simultaneously with the activity of perception but are retained (emmenein, DA 3.3 429a4) beyond the relevant episode of perceptual activity.

Aristotle discusses the phantasia faculty’s activity of storing sensory images in his discussion of dreams (paradigmatic examples of phantasiai):

In blooded animals, as the blood becomes calm and separated out, the change belonging to perceptions from each sense organ is preserved (sozomenê). This makes dreams connected, makes things appear to the dreamer, and brings it about that they seem to see on account of the changes descending from sight, to hear on account of those coming from hearing, and so on with those that proceed from the other organs. For also when one is awake, it is because of the change from there arriving at the starting point that one seems to be seeing, hearing, and perceiving. (De Insomniis 3, 461a25-b1 translation Lorenz)

Aristotle is concerned with explaining why some dreams are especially well-connected. To do so, he appeals to the calmness of the blood in which sensory perceptions are
preserved (sozomenē). These stored perceptions—the changes in the perceptual faculty that constitute phantasiai—are marshaled up during sleep, and they have sensory effects similar to the original sensory impressions: “For also when one is awake, it is because of the change from there arriving at the starting point that one seems to be seeing, hearing, and perceiving.”

The case of dreams illustrates the way in which phantasiai have sensory perceptions in their causal ancestries. Dreams are the result of the phantasia faculty storing sensory impressions in the perceptual apparatus and marshaling them up when the subject is asleep. In section IV.3 I’ll examine other cases of phantasiai, including remembering, anticipating prospects, perceiving common sensibles, and conceptualized perceiving, and in each case we’ll see that these phantasiai causally derive from sense perception in some way.

The case of dreams also illustrates how the character of a phantasia mental state can derive from the content of the sense perception on which it is based. When the subject dreams of a white object, the content of her dream—whiteness—is due to the whiteness of a former sensory impression. It is in this sense that the phantasia is about what my sense perception is about (DA 3.3 428b12-130). The examples surveyed in IV.3 will further illustrate the ways in which the character of a phantasia can depend on the character of the sense perceptions from which it is derived.

V.3 Phantasia as Having Content that Goes Beyond what is Perceived
While *phantasia* is dependent on sense perception—both causally, by deriving from sense perceptions, and in terms of its character—it can have content that goes beyond what is being perceived. This will prove to be important, insofar as it will illustrate the sophistication of *phantasia’s* objects relative to perception’s objects.

The case of dreams nicely illustrates how *phantasai* have objects that go beyond what one perceives at a given time. When one dreams of a white object, one is not perceiving the white object, since one’s eyes are closed. The whiteness that makes up the content of the dream thus goes beyond what the subject perceives.

A *phantasia* does not simply involve content that one is not perceiving at the moment of the *phantasia*; it also can involve content that is *never* perceivable. Memory (*mnêmê*)—a case of *phantasia*[^82]—provides an illustration of this. Just as in the case of a dream of a white thing, the memory of the white thing is a change in the perceptual faculty such that the perception of the white thing is preserved (*sozomenê*). This *phantasia* of the white thing is then marshaled up at a later time and represents the white object when it is no longer in view. As in the dreams case, the whiteness that makes up part of the content of my memory derives from the whiteness of the original perception.

My memory of a white thing has content that goes beyond what is being perceived, since in memory I represent the white thing even when there is no white thing to perceive. But the content of my memory goes beyond the content of what I am perceiving in another way. This is because a memory does not simply represent the object that was, as a matter of fact, perceived in the past. In addition to this, it represents the object as *something represented at some earlier time in the past* (*De Memoria* 2 452b23-453a4). ‘In the past’ is part of the content of my *phantasia*, but ‘in the past’, not being a

[^82]: Remembering is the having of a *phantasia* as a likeness of what it is based on (*De Memoria* 451a15).
special sensible, can never be part of a perception. *Phantasia* thus can involve content that is not perceivable at all.

The case of apprehending prospects—another case of *phantasia*—illustrates a further way in which *phantasia* can involve content that is not even in principle perceivable. Consider the following passage where Aristotle discusses a lion that, upon perceiving a deer, anticipates a future meal:

> Nor do other animals find pleasures from these senses, except coincidentally. What a hound enjoys, for instance, is not the smell of a hare, but eating it; but the hare’s smell made the hound perceive it. And what a lion rejoices in (*chairein*) is not the sound of the ox, but eating it; but since the ox’s sound made the lion perceive that it was near (*hoti d’eggus esti*), the lion appears to enjoy the sound. Similarly, what pleases him is not the sight of a deer or a wild goat, but that he will have food (*all’ hoti boran hexei*). *(EN 3 1118a19-25, Translation Irwin)*

Aristotle says that what pleases the lion is that he will have food (*all’ hoti boran hexei*). This lion’s cognition cannot be a perception strictly speaking, because it is not possible to perceive an event in the future. This cognition cannot be a belief, either, since animals do not have beliefs.\(^{83}\) The cognition is a *phantasia*.

Aristotle doesn’t say precisely how the lion acquires a *phantasia* of a future meal, but, given what we’ve seen about the *phantasia* faculty’s role of storing sensory perceptions, we can tell the following story. The lion’s apprehension of the deer as a future meal is causally dependent on prior sensory impressions (namely, the impressions of deer and deer-eating.), sensory impressions that have been stored as *phantasiai* and drawn up when a current sensory impression (e.g. the scent of a deer) triggers the *phantasiai*. The character of the resulting *phantasia* is due to the content of previous sensory impressions.

\(^{83}\) *DA 3.3 428a18-24.*
That *phantasia* can store sequences of sensory perceptions is clear from a passage in the *De Insomniis* where Aristotle suggests that sense perceptions can be preserved in a way that leaves in tact their order and complexity.

As most of the blood travels down to its source, the changes present within it—some potentially, some actively—travel down with it. They are so disposed that in *this* change, *that* one will emerge from the blood, and as *this* one perishes, *that* one. They are disposed towards one another like the artificial frogs that rise to the surface of water as salt is being dissolved. In a similar way, these changes are in us potentially, and become active when what arrests them is relaxed. (*De Insomniis* 4, 461b11-21, translation Lorenz)

In this passage, Aristotle is describing dreaming, and he suggests that the stored sensory perceptions tend to be ordered in particular ways: the perceptions are stored in such a way that the activation of one stored perception is disposed to follow the activation of some other stored perception, and that one is disposed to follow another, etc.

What determines the order or structure of these sense perception? Aristotle suggests that they are based on similarity, opposition, and proximity in our original sense perceptions:

In recollecting, then, we undergo some one or other of the earlier changes, until we undergo the one that is habitually followed by the change in question. *It is for this reason also that we hunt for that which follows in the sequence, beginning in thought with the now or with something else, and with something similar to the thing in question, something opposite to it, or something proximate to it.* Recollection occurs for this reason: for the changes that belong to these things are in some cases the same ones, in other cases they occur together, in yet other cases the one change contains part of the other, so that after the earlier one only a little remains to be undergone. (*De Memoria* 2, 451b10-21, translation Lorenz, italics mine)

In this passage, Aristotle is concerned with explaining how we can recollect something—i.e. deliberately recall something—and how we can be reminded of something. He argues that stored sense perceptions that are similar, opposite, or
proximate to each other tend to be marshaled up together. A song that I hear reminds me of a happy time, because the song triggers a memory I have of the song, and drawn up with that memory is a memory of a temporally proximate event—viz., the happy time. The important point is that, according to this passage, we preserve sense perceptions according to associations that we form from sensory experience, associations that are based on the similarity, opposition, and proximity that we experience in our sensations.

The lion’s *phantasia* of a future meal has content that goes beyond what is immediately perceived. For starters, it involves apprehending something that is not present (eating a deer). It also involves apprehending something as in the future. ‘In the future’ is part of the content of the lion’s *phantasia*, but ‘in the future’, not being a special sensible, can never be part of a perception. *Phantasia* thus can involve content that is not perceivable at all.

Cases of what Aristotle calls “common perception” illustrate yet more examples of the ways in which *phantasia* can involve content that goes beyond what a subject perceives. Take the perception that this object is moving. Because moving is an event that happens over an interval of time, it is not strictly speaking something that can be part of the content of a perception. How then does a subject perceive motion? *Phantasia* plays the critical role. My impression that *x* is moving from location A to location B to location C is constituted by multiple stored sense perceptions of *x* at earlier times—a stored perception of *x* at location A at time *t*1, a stored perception of *x* at location B at *t*2, etc.). Again, the character of my *phantasia* that *x* is moving will derive to some extent from the content of the sense perceptions on which the *phantasia* is based, but it will not be exhausted by these perceptions’ contents, since none of these contents include motion.
As a final illustration of how phantasia can have content that goes beyond what is perceived, consider phantasia’s role in conceptualized perceptions—perceptions like ‘Diores is a man’ that involve apprehending objects as falling into certain sortal categories. In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle suggests that if a subject has multiple experiences of a cluster of certain sensory perceptions and so is able to form multiple memories of this complex perception, then a person can acquire a rudimentary concept or universal that those perceptions instantiate.

[1a] So from perception there comes memory (mnêmê), as we call it, and from memory (when it occurs often in connection with the same thing), experience (empeiria); [1b] for memories that are many in number form a single experience (empeiria mia). [2a] And from experience or from the whole universal stabilized in the soul (pantos èremésantos tou kaholou en téi psuchêi) [2b] (the one apart from the many, whatever is one and the same in all those things) (tou henos para ta polla, ho an en hapasin hen enêi ekeinois to auto), [3] there comes a principle of skill (technê) and of understanding (epistémê)—of skill if it deals with how things come about, of understanding if it deals with what is the case. (An. Post 2.19 100a6-9. Translation Barnes)

The passage posits connections between perception, memory, experience, and universals. We’ve already discussed the connection between perception and memory: memories arise when we marshal up past sensory impressions that we have stored in the perceptual faculty. The connections between memories, experience, and universals are more complex. Suppose I have a memory of a man. Pre-conceptually, this memory amounts to my representing a white, rounded such-and-such pitched thing. Aristotle’s idea seems to be that after frequent encounters with other white, rounded, such-and-such pitched things, I acquire more memories of such things and that these memories, when apprehended together, count as having an experience of a man ([1b]). Aristotle immediately transitions (at [2a]) from talking about the experience of one thing to a universal of that thing,
suggesting that that experience of \( x \) things constitutes having a grasp of the universal ‘\( x \)’.

Note that having (e.g.) the universal ‘man’ does not presuppose that one have a linguistic ability to apply ‘man’ to instances of the universal. It simply involves the ability to discriminate white, rounded, such-and-such pitched things as belonging to a certain sortal category.

My having a universal is causally dependent on previous sense perceptions that I have stored in my perceptual faculty. Moreover, the universal ‘white, round, such-and-such pitched sort of thing’ has the content it does because of the sense perceptions that caused it. Were the sense perceptions different, the content of my universal would be different.

Perceiving that the white is a man is not, strictly speaking, a case of perception, since man is a universal term, and perception is restricted to particulars. But in virtue of *phantasia*’s role in concept development, we can have mental states that go beyond what is immediately perceived.\(^{84}\)

\(^{84}\) I should make clear a point about the nature of these universals, since Aristotle makes clear that certain sorts of universals are the domain of *nous*, not of *phantasia*. Aristotle thinks that thought is what grasps essences—what flesh is, as opposed flesh (429b10-8).

Now, since magnitude (\( to \ megethos \)) is not the same as the essence of magnitude (\( to \ megethei \ einai \)), nor water the same as the essence of water (and in this way also in the case of many other things, though not all of them. For in some cases the thing and its essence is the same), we judge the essence of flesh and flesh itself either with different things or with the same thing but in different ways. For flesh is not apart from matter, but like “snub-nosed” it is a particular form in a particular matter. It is, then, with the sense faculty that we judge heat and cold and all those qualities of which flesh is a certain proportion). But it is with another thing, either separate from sense, or related to it as the bent line when it is straightened out in related. (*DA* 3.4 429b10-17)

The intellect is necessary for an agent to grasp the essence of flesh; an agent who merely has perception can in some sense aware of flesh but not recognize flesh for what it essentially is.

We might understand the difference here as the difference between Locke’s “real” and “nominal” definitions. Nominal definitions are rough and ready definitions that appeal to superficial, sensible features; a nominal definition of gold might appeal to gold color, shininess, and malleability. Real definitions, by contrast, are what give the causal, robust, explanatory nature of things; a real definition of gold will specify the atomic number of gold that explains why it has the sensible features it does. When Aristotle says that we can extract universals from sense perception he must mean nominal universals; correspondingly, when he says that animals lack universals, he must be referring to real universals.
So something’s being in the future, something’s being in the past, motion, and universals are not even potential objects of sense perception but nonetheless can be part of phantasia. *Phantasia* thus can have sophisticated content that perception cannot have.

V.4 Conclusion

I’ve tried to show the ways in which *phantasia* is dependent on sense perception –both causally, by deriving from sense perceptions, and in terms of its character--but can have content that goes beyond what is being perceived. Aristotle must present *phantasia* to make up for the limitations of sense perception, for it is clear that there are many mental states that have sophisticated content that perception cannot account for. Perception may explain my perceiving that this is white, but it does not explain my connecting this perception with (e.g.) a man, since man is not a special sensible and hence cannot be the object of perception strictly speaking. While Aristotle doesn’t explicitly state that such cases require him to postulate *phantasia*, an examination of *phantasia* suggests that *phantasia* is nicely situated to supply a subject with content that goes beyond what is immediately being perceived by the senses.

A reasonable conclusion to draw from this is that Aristotle designed *phantasia* to account for those non-reflective mental states that contain contents that go beyond what is given in sense perception. If this is right, then it’s also reasonable to think that being a *phantasia* is in part a matter of having content that goes beyond what is immediately perceived.
The discussion shows that *phantasia* can have rather sophisticated mental content, content that sense perception cannot have. In the next section, we’ll see how some of the aforementioned operations of *phantasia* allow *phantasiai* to have (at least some of) the sort of the specific content that underlies emotions.

**VI. Addressing Dow’s Challenge**

According to Dow, when Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* uses ‘*phantasia*’ to describe emotions, he cannot be invoking the conception of *DA* 3.3, because (on Dow’s view) emotions involve certain sorts of objects that *phantasia* cannot take on. These objects include: (1) abstract objects, (2) things as being in the future, (3) causal properties of objects, and (4) states of affairs. Having developed an account of *phantasia*, we can now assess Dow’s claim. Can the foregoing account of *phantasia* account for (1)-(4)?

Consider (2): things as being in the future. Recall our discussion of a lion that apprehends the prospect of eating a deer. What pleases the lion is that he *will* have food (*all’ hoti boran hexei*) (*EN* 3 1118a19-25). This cognition cannot be a perception strictly speaking, because one cannot directly perceive an event in the future, and it cannot be a belief, since animals do not have beliefs. Thus, the cognition must be a *phantasia*. So a *phantasia* can represent an object as being in the future.

Consider (3): causal properties of objects. When a person experiences shame, the object of shame is recognized as something that will bring about disrepute. (1383b13-4). We saw that the faculty of *phantasia* preserves sensory affections in an orderly way, a way that reflects the associations the perceiver makes from the similarity, opposition, and

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85 *DA* 3.3 428a18-24
proximity of her perceptions. Now, causal relations are ordered and associated with each other in important ways: causes precede effects and causes are consistently conjoined with their effects. Given the proximity of causes and effects, cause and effect relationships can be represented by phantasia. Phantasia can represent (e.g.) adultery as causing disrepute by conjoining sense perceptions of adulterous relationships with sense perceptions of (e.g.) jeers, condemnation, etc. Aristotle’s theory of associations between sense associations thus endows phantasia with the cognitive sophistication to represent causal properties of objects.

Consider (4): states of affairs. We’ve seen that even perception can be propositional: I can perceive that this white is sweet. We’ve seen that phantasia involves propositional thinking as well: I can perceive that the white is the son of Diare (DA 418a20-3, 425a21-22). Note that this propositional thinking needn’t involve linguistic ability. It need only involve the ability to connect subjects and predicates and to discriminate certain sorts of things from others.

Finally, (1): abstract objects. Anger involves appearances that include slight and revenge. We saw earlier that phantasia is responsible for certain sorts of concepts. One can acquire the concept ‘man’ from raw sense data and memory. Can we say something similar for the abstract objects that occur in Aristotle’s definition of the emotions?

Take the concept of revenge. To acquire this concept, an animal will begin with particular sensory impressions that include the perception of one animal striking another,

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86 If, as I argue, phantasia can involve propositional content, what does Aristotle mean when he says at 3.8 432a10ff that phantasia does not involve asserting one thing of another? One possibility is that Aristotle is here talking about a particular sort of phantasia—contemplating mental images (phantasmata). See Sorabji [2], 19: “In cannot detract from the clear example of propositional appearance that the sun is only one foot across that Aristotle later goes on to contrast appearance with affirming or denying (phasis, apophasis) something as true or false…Aristotle has so often described appearance as liable to be false, that in this passage he must be talking about a different type of appearance, namely contemplating mental images (phantasmata)...”
where the strike is not preceded by an instigating strike. The animal will then perceive the
struck animal assert himself against its perpetrator. This sequence of sensory impressions
constitutes a perception of revenge, a perception that, when coupled with other stored
perceptions of revenge, constitutes the concept of revenge.\textsuperscript{87}

*Phantasia* also seems sufficient to get the concept of safety that surfaces in the
definition of confidence. Confidence is the emotion opposed to fear, and fear is
specifically directed at future pains.\textsuperscript{88} It follows that safety is understood as a haven from
pains. It is not difficult to see how sensory perceptions could form the basis for a concept
of safety so construed. Even animals can perceive pain and pleasure, and, given their
ability to store impressions and make associations, they can come to associate certain
situations with pleasure and others with pain. If a deer has frequent brushes with a lion,
the deer will come to associate lions with pain. Correspondingly, the deer will come to
associate places not frequented be lions with safety.

\textsuperscript{87} In support of this idea that animals have the concept of slight and revenge, consider the following
passages from EN 3.2:

Those who say decision is appetite or spirit or wish or some sort of belief would seem to be
wrong. For decision is not shared with nonrational animals, but appetite and spirit are shared with
them. (EN 3.2 111b11-3, translation Irwin [2])

Aristotle says that decision cannot be appetite or spirit, since appetite and spirit are common (*koinon*) both
to rational and non-rational beings, but decision belongs to rational beings only. For the argument to work,
Aristotle must be saying that animals and humans partake in a very similar spirited desire. After all, if the
spirit of animals were substantially different in kind from the spirited desire of humans, then a proponent of
the view that decision is spirited desire could resist Aristotle’s argument by saying that decision is the
distinct sort of spirit present in humans.

Now, the spirit of animals and the spirit of human beings cannot be identical, for we’ve seen that
spirited desires in humans can involve evaluation that goes beyond the pleasant, and Aristotle clearly
denies such evaluation to animals (*Pol. 1.2*). If animals’ spirited desires do not involve the sophisticated
sort of evaluation of human desires, and if animal spirited desire and human spirited desire must, for the
purposes of Aristotle’s argument, be similar, what serves as the common feature that unites animal and
human spirit?

I propose that Aristotle is unifying them in terms of some of their content—specifically, the part
of the content involving revenge. In the animal cases, there will be no linguistic expression for this object.
\textsuperscript{88} *Rh. 2.2 1382a21-2*
Prosperity (eupragia)\textsuperscript{89} and worth (axios)\textsuperscript{90} are both concepts that surface in the content of emotions. Now, animals cannot have the appearance of prosperity or worth, since they have perception of pleasant only (Pol. 1.2). However, perhaps human phantasia, because it is enriched by conceptual resources provided by the distinctively human desiderative part, can have concepts like prosperity and worth. Evidence that Aristotle holds this view comes from Eudeman Ethics 1235b19-30:

[1] There is also a question as to whether what is loved (to philoumenon) is the pleasant or the good. [2] If we love what we appetitively desire (epithumoumen) (and that is specially characteristic of love, for "None is a lover (erastês) who does not love (philei)"), and appetite is for what is pleasant, on this showing it is the pleasant that is loved. [3] Whereas if we love what we wish for (to boulometha), it is the good (to agathon). [4] But the pleasant and the good are different things. [5] We must attempt to decide about these matters and others similar to them, taking as a starting point the following. [6] The thing desired (orekton) and wished for (boulêton) is either the good or the apparent good (to agathon è to phainomenon agathon). [7i] That is why also the pleasant is desired (orekton), [7ii] for it is an apparent good, [7iii] since some people think it good, and to others it appears good even though they do not think it so (phainomenon gar ti agathon. tois men gar dokei, tois de phainetai k'an mê dokêi), [7iv] (for appearance and opinion are not in the same part of the soul (ou gar en t'autôi tês psuchês hê phantasia kai hê doxa)). [8] Yet it is clear that both the good and the pleasant are dear (philon).

At [7iii] Aristotle contrasts someone who thinks (dokei) pleasure is good with someone who does not think pleasure is good but nonetheless suffers an appearance (phainetai) that pleasure is good. Here, phantasia and doxa are clearly different cognitive attitudes; indeed, they are in different parts of the soul [7iv]. What is important for our purposes is that Aristotle insists that phantasia, no less than doxa, involves concepts like ‘good’.

\textsuperscript{89} Prosperity is mentioned in the definition of envy: “Envy is pain at apparent prosperity (eupragiâi phainomenêi) as consists of the good things already mentioned: we feel it towards our equals not with the idea of getting something for ourselves, but because the other people have it.” (Rh 2.10 1387b23-4)

\textsuperscript{90} Worth is mentioned in the definition of pity: “Pity is a kind of pain at what appears to be a destructive or painful evil (phainomenoi kakoi phathartkoi ê lupêroi) for someone undeserving to be struck by it (tou anxioû tugchanein). [an evil which] one could expect oneself or someone near to oneself to suffer, and this when it appears near (touto hotan plêsion phainetai)” (Rh 2.8 1385b13-6).
People suffer appearances of pleasure as good, and they suffer these appearances even when they do not think pleasure is good [7iii]. This shows that *phantasia* can have content like “the good” and yet fall short of the belief threshold.

How does *phantasia* acquire concepts like “the good”? Aristotle does not say, but presumably the acquisition outlined in *Posterior Analytics* 2.19 plays an important role. For there he presents it as a model for acquiring concepts in general, and gives no indication that it is restricted to only a subset of concepts.

Given that *phantasia* can have content that includes the objects listed in Dow’s (1)-(4), I conclude that Dow’s challenge to appearances-based readings fail. The sophisticated content of the emotions does not pose a challenge to appearance-based views of the emotions.

**VII. Conclusion: Implications for My Interpretation of the Reason-Responsive Alogon**

Let me sum up what I have tried to accomplish in this chapter. I began by addressing the question of whether *phantasia* can serve as the cognition underlying human emotions. To answer this question, I first noted that *Rhetoric* I suggests that Aristotle has a clear distinction between *phantasia* and *doxa* in mind, and thus, barring any objections to appearance-based views of the emotion, we should assume that Aristotle holds an appearance-based view of the emotions in the *Rhetoric*.

I then presented Dow’s claim that *phantasia* lacks the cognitive sophistication to account for the complex content of emotions. To assess this claim, I explored *phantasia* in detail, offering the following account: *phantasia* (1) is a non-reflective appearance
that, (2) while dependent on sense perception, (3) has content that goes beyond what is available in sense perception. To establish this account, I examined the different operations of phantasia in dreams, memory, apprehending prospects, common perception and conceptualized perception. These operations suggested that phantasia can have objects that go beyond sense perception to include rather sophisticated objects: objects like abstract objects, propositions, causal properties, and evaluative properties. Thus, contrary to Dow’s assertion, phantasia can have the content characteristic of the emotions.

That phantasia can have sophisticated content is important, because it shows that even when the cognitions involved in emotions (and, given the close connection between emotion and desire, also desires) rest on phantasia and not belief, they can nonetheless have sophisticated contents. Given the cognitive sophistication not only of belief but also of phantasia, there is no reason to think that the objects of appetite and spirit need to be crude. On the contrary, there is every reason to think that the cognitions underlying appetites and spirited desires can include contents like fineness and goodness. We can appetitively desire to stand fast in battle qua something pleasant and fine or have a spirited desire for the fineness of refraining from an unhealthy indulgence.
CHAPTER 5

ARISTOTELIAN DECISION (*PROHAiresis*)

**I. Introduction**

So far I have argued that one can have non-rational desires—appetites (*epithumia*) and spirited desire (*thumos*)—that prompt one to do fine actions *qua* fine. In this chapter, I want to look at the specific motivational attitude of Aristotelian decision (*prohairesis*). The goal is to see to what sorts of psychological capacities are involved in the production of a decision.

Section II examines two different interpretations—a deflationary and a robust interpretation—of decision. Section III argues that these interpretations have very different implications for whether intellectually deficient people like slaves, women, and children can decide on virtuous activities. In section IV I argue in favor of a robust account of decision by arguing in favor of a robust account of wish (*boulēsis*), decision’s underlying desiderative element. According to the interpretation I put forward, Aristotelian decision is a rather intellectual thing: it arises out of deliberation about the constituents of happiness, and as such is available only to intellectually sophisticated individuals.

**II. Decision (*Prohairesis*)**

II.1 Introduction to Decision
Aristotle says that a decision is a matter of desiring to do what deliberation has shown to be conducive to some wished-for end (EN 3.2 1111b26-30). More specifically, a decision is the product of (i) a wish (boulēsis) for some practically remote end and (ii) deliberation (bouleusis) about the means to (ta pros) that end. When deliberation identifies means, then—assuming the means are practicable—the agent decides to perform those means. Thus, an agent wishes to be healthy; discovers from deliberation that medicine will make her healthy; and so decides to take medicine.

Aristotle thinks that both the alogen and the deliberative soul plays a role in an agent’s having and acting on a correct decision. However, commentators disagree about the alogen’s and deliberation’s respective roles, and in particular their roles in producing the wishes that underlies decisions. Because this disagreement has large implications for the nature of decision, we ought to take a closer look at what Aristotle tells us about wishes.

II.2 Aristotle’s Two Claims about Wish

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91 EN 3.3, 1112b15-17; 6.2 1139a31. Aristotle most explicitly states that wish is the desiderative element involved in decision at EE 2.10: “Since, then, decision is neither opinion (doxa) nor wish (boulēsis) singly nor yet both (for no one decides suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes suddenly), it must be compounded of both, for both are found in a man deciding” (EE 2.10 1226b2-5). But see also EN 3.2 1111b20 where Aristotle says that though boulēsis is not prohairesis, “it is apparently close to it;” cf. EN 3.3 1113a10-4): “We have found, then that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, we deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with our wish” (Translation Irwin [2]).

92 Note that means can include both instrumental means and constitutive means.

93 “It is clear that a prohairesis will not be correct in the absence of phronēsis, or in the absence of virtue; for the one causes us to do (poieî prateîn) the end (telos), the other causes us to do the things leading to the end (ta pros to telos)” (6.13 1145a3-6). As I will show in chapter 6, when Aristotle says that the decision will not be correct in the absence of virtue and in the absence of phronēsis, by “virtue” he means the desiderative aspect of paradigmatic virtue.
Aristotle makes two distinctive claims about wish that distinguish it from non-rational desire. (1) We wish only for what we think to be good (*oietai einai spoudaion*), whereas we can have an appetite for something we do not think to be good (*EN* 1136b7-8; Cf. *Rhett.* 1369a3, cf. *EE* 1223b7, 32-33) and (2) Wish, but not non-rational desire, is connected to reason, a connection seen in wish’s placement in the rational part of the soul (the non-rational desires appetite (*epithumia*) and spirit (*thumos*) are in the non-rational part), and in Aristotle’s statement that wish moves an agent “according to reasoning” (*kata ton logismon*),” whereas appetite moves “even contrary to reasoning” (*para ton logismon*) (*DA* 3.10 433a21-6).

These two formal characterizations actually tell us rather little about wish. Take (1), the claim that we only wish for what we *think to be good*. What is the kind of *thinking to be good* at issue here? For example, must the thought have a certain kind of causal history—say, one involving explicit reasoning about what is good for oneself—or can the thought be generated in some other way? Or consider (2): Granting that wish has a connection to reason, what exactly is the nature of this connection? Must a desire be the result of some sort of reasoning if it is to count as a wish? If so, what kind of reasoning? If not, in what way is wish connected to reason? Deflationary and robust accounts have very different answers to these questions.

II.3 Deflationary Accounts of Wish on (1) and (2)

The essential feature of deflationary accounts of wish is that they deny that reflective reasoning about the human good plays an essential role in the generation of a wish; they
offer interpretations of (1) and (2) that distinguish wish from appetite in some way other than by connecting wish to reflective reasoning. Here I’ll focus on three deflationary accounts of wish: Fortenbaugh’s, Broadie’s, and Mele’s.

According to Fortenbaugh’s deflationary reading of (1) and (2), the distinction between wish and appetite amounts to the fact that the former, but not the latter, is “cognitive,” where by “cognitive” he means “involving judgment or belief (doxa)”. Though Fortenbaugh never officially defines judgment and belief and so never spells out precisely what it is to “involve judgment or belief”, he seems to take it is a necessary and sufficient condition for a mental state’s involving judgment or belief that it have propositional content and be alterable by language. Contrasting mental phenomena that are cognitive in this sense with “non-thinking” bodily urges that have physiological causes and are alterable only by force, Fortenbaugh puts wish into the former category and appetite into the latter.

Fortenbaugh maintains that the fact that wish rests on judgment or belief connects wish with rationality (feature (2) of wish), because, only a rational being can make a judgment; non-rational animals are restricted to appearance (phantasia). But he insists that the judgment underlying a wish need not be consciously entertained by the agent, and that it need not be the product of reasoning about the good. For this reason the kind of thinking to be good referred to in (1) can be non-conscious and the result of non-rational habituation.

Broadie offers a deflationary reading of (1) and (2) that distinguishes wish from appetite in a different way. According to Broadie, whereas an appetitive desire for X does

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not rest on any reason that supports $X$ as worth pursuing, a wish for $X$ does rest on such reasons; this, Broadie suggests, is what claim (1)—the claim that a wish for $X$ involves thinking $X$ to be good—amounts to. On her view, when one wishes for $X$, one opens oneself up to the question of why pursuing $X$ would be good, whereas when one has an appetitive desire for $X$, one is not subject to questions about why one desires $X$: it is simply the case that one wants $X$, and if someone asks why one appetitively desires $X$, then that person misunderstands what it is to have an appetitive desire.

Broadie thinks that it is because a wish is potentially backed by reasons that wish bears a connection with rationality. This is because (so she says) only a rational being can have a grasp of why it would be good for (e.g.) Troy to have won the Trojan War (her example)\(^\text{97}\); this grasp of reasons is what allows rational beings, but not non-rational beings, to have wishes. But she also maintains that the reasons backing a wish for $X$ need not be consciously stated by the agent; what is required of the bouletic agent\(^\text{98}\) is that ex post facto she can explain why she desired to do what she desired to do: she can offer reasons that explain why she desired $X$. Furthermore, Broadie insists that these reasons need not be the result of reasoning about the good, but rather can be reasons an agent has because of non-rational habituation. This feature firmly puts Broadie’s account in the deflationary camp.

\(^{97}\) “[To have a wish that Troy had not been taken] one has to have a sense of the past and an understanding of why things would have been better had it been different. No one could wish for no reason that Troy had not been taken…in the way in which one can just want a drink of water or to return a blow” (Broadie 107, italics hers).

\(^{98}\) By “bouletic agent” I mean an agent qua wishing.
Finally, Mele argues that wish, but not appetite, is “conditioned by” a conception of the good or “doing well” (eupraxia); this, on Mele’s view, is what Aristotle means by claim (1). Mele doesn’t say exactly how he conceives of a conception of the good, but presumably, a conception of the good specifies a general list of goods and includes some sense of those goods’ relative weights.

Mele argues that it is because a wish expresses a conception of the good that wish has a special connection to reason (2). This is because, as Mele points out, Aristotle thinks that regarding something as an instantiation of one’s conception of the good is not possible for non-rational animals; it is possible for human beings alone. In support of this claim that possessing a conception of the good is something distinctive of human beings, Mele cites the passage from Pol. 1.2 passage we’ve already looked at:

The reason why man is a political animal (politikon) to a fuller extent than any bee or any herding animal is obvious. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure and pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasures and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further, the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the association of these makes a family and a city (hé de toutón koinônia poiei oikian kai polin). (Pol. 1.2 1253a7-17)

99 In Mele’s words “…the practical intellect of a deliberator does have a conception of eupraxia or happiness, and one’s wishes, along with the choices derived from them, are conditioned by this conception” (Mele, 145).
100 “[W]ish alone of the three species of desire depends upon a conception of the good, and this is something which rational beings alone have (Cf. Pol. 1253a15-18: ‘It is characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil of just and unjust and of the like…’” (Mele, 147).
101 “Of these” may mean “in these matters” (i.e. in matters concerning the good, as opposed to matters concerning the pleasant). Alternatively, “of these” may refer to those animals with a sense of the good (as opposed to a sense of the merely pleasant).
Mele maintains that the conception of the good that informs a wish need not be explicit in an agent’s mind, and need not be the result of reasoning about the good.\textsuperscript{102} While the conception may be the result of reasoning—and indeed, in the case of the practically wise (\textit{phronimos}) agent, it will be supported by such reasoning—it may also be the result of non-rational habituation. Thus the account’s status as deflationary.

These, then, are the three deflationary accounts. All accounts try to explain features (1) and (2) without drawing any essential connection between having a wish and engaging in reasoning about the good.

\section*{II.4 Robust Accounts of Wish on (1) and (2)}

On the robust reading of (1) and (2), (1) and (2) make it a condition of having a wish for \(X\), but not an appetite for \(X\), that the desire result from, or be sustained by, reasoning about the good that issues in the conclusion that \(X\) is in fact good. Thus, according to robust accounts, the sort of \textit{thinking to be good} referenced in (1) is thinking that arises out of reasoned reflection: a desire counts as a wish only if that desire is sustained by reasoning that yields reasons for thinking that \(X\) is in fact good.

These reasons must issue from reason itself and be arrived at independently of the non-rational part’s own “reasons” or commitments, and so cannot be “thoughts” that arise out of non-rational moral habituation. Whatever “thoughts” non-rational desires involve, they are not thoughts based on reason’s reasons, and so don’t count as wishes. This view, then, makes the connection to rationality referenced in (2) a very strong connection:

\textsuperscript{102}He explicitly distances himself from the view that “wish \textit{must} itself be the result of deliberation about one’s overall good” (Mele, 147). The rejected view he refers to is the account Irwin offers in Irwin [6], 257.
having a wish involves taking a reflective attitude towards one’s final ends; it involves trying to figure out through reasoning about the human good which ends are actually worth going for, rather than simply taking one’s ends for granted.

Terence Irwin defends a robust account. According to Irwin, wishes are desires of the rational part of the soul that are informed by deliberation (bouleusis) about the components of the good. On Irwin’s view, one starts out with a few general ideas about the good, and from deliberation grasps the categories of goods and actions that make up the good. These results of deliberation then make up a conception of the good that informs any desires that count as wishes.

III. Implications of the Debate for Deliberatively Imperfect Agents’ Prohairetic Abilities

The debate about wish has important implications for deliberative imperfect agents’ abilities to make decisions. If robust accounts of wish are right that wish rests on deliberation about the constituents of the human good, then it will be very difficult for rationally deficient agents to have prohairetic motivation. After all, the robust view places rather strict rational requirements on wish and so on decision, and as a result prohairetic agency will be hard to come by for deliberatively deficient agents. By contrast, if deflationary accounts are right, then it is much easier for rationally deficient agents to have the wishes that are pre-requisites for virtuous decisions. After all, on deflationary views, having the wishes involved in decisions does not require reasoning about the good or having a rationally-derived conception of the good. Rather, it simply requires having

\[103\] Irwin [1], 173-5. See also Cooper [1], 242.
from moral upbringing certain desiderative dispositions. Assuming basic instrumental reasoning skills, people should be able to focus these wishes onto particular actions.

Given that robust and deflationary accounts of wish have very different implications for our question of whether deliberatively deficient individuals can make decisions, we have reason to decide between the two accounts. But how do we decide between them, given that Aristotle’s explicit exposition about wish is too indeterminate to favor one account over the other?104

**IV. The Deflationary and Robust Accounts on Slaves’ Bouletic Capacities**

**IV.1 Introduction**

In this section, I argue that an hitherto unmined source can help us on this front. I will argue that Aristotle’s comments about slaves—in particular, his remark that they fail to partake of “living according to decision” *(tou zên kata prohairesin, Pol. 3.9 1280a34)*105—may advance our understanding of wish in a way that supports the robust over the deflationary account. The remark ultimately implies, I argue, that Aristotle denies wishes to slaves and thus makes it a criterion of any good account of wish that

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104 Examining Aristotle’s account of virtue of character may seem to be one way to decide between the two accounts. For example, if Aristotle describes virtue of character as a primarily non-rational condition, then, given the connection between virtue and decision, we have reason to doubt the robust interpretation of wish. However, many passages about virtue of character that are cited as evidence for a non-rational interpretation of virtue have alternative interpretations that make Aristotle’s account of virtue consistent with the robust account of wish. Elsewhere in my dissertation, I argue that passages often cited as evidence for a non-rational account of virtue can actually be interpreted in such a way that makes virtue something very rational.

105 The *Pol. 3.9* passage, in full, is as follows: “But a city exists not for the sake of mere living *(tou zên monon)* but rather of living well *(eu zên)*. Otherwise there could be a city of slaves or of other *(allôn zôôn)* animals. There is no such thing because they do not partake *(metechein)* of happiness nor live according to *prohairesis* *(tou zên kata prohairesin)*” (1280a31-4).

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wish be something unavailable to slaves. A problem for deflationary accounts is that they fail to meet this criterion: they cannot make sense of Aristotle’s denial of wish to slaves. Moreover, this failure of deflationary accounts suggests, we shall see, that wish involves the sort of sophisticated rational activity that the robust account implies. That’s the argument. If it’s right, then we can make some progress in our understanding of wish.

The argument proceeds as follows. In IV.2, I show that deflationary accounts must attribute wishes to natural slaves, whereas robust accounts need not. In sections V and VI, I argue that the claim that natural slaves “fail to live according to decision” implies that slaves do not have wishes. I first argue that the claim is best interpreted as saying that natural slaves lack the rational capacities needed to make decisions. I then show that the best explanation for Aristotle’s asserting this is that he denies slaves wishes. The fact that deflationary accounts attribute wishes to slaves gives us reason, I argue in VII, to favor robust over deflationary accounts.

IV.2 Deflationary Accounts on Natural Slaves’ Bouletic Capacities

I now want to turn to the following question: given the deflationary and robust accounts’ descriptions of wish, do legally free natural slaves’ desires count as wishes? That is, if deflationary accounts of wish are right, should we describe legally free natural slaves’ desires as wishes? What if robust accounts are right? To answer these questions, we will need to take a closer look at slaves and the sort of desires they have. The reason for restricting the analysis to legally free natural slaves will become clear in sections V and VI.
Aristotle’s statements about natural slave moral psychology suggest that at least some of slaves’ desires are cognitive phenomena alterable by means such as language (Fortenbaugh’s account of wish), rest on or presuppose reasons (Broadie’s account), and depend on a conception of the good (Mele’s account). Thus, if any of the deflationary accounts of wish are correct, then slaves’ desires count as wishes.

The following passage from the Politics makes clear that slaves’ desires are cognitive in Fortenbaugh’s sense:

Hence it is clear that the master ought to be the cause of virtue in the slave, but not as possessing that art of mastership which teaches a slave his tasks. Hence those persons are mistaken who deprive the slave of reasoning (logou) and say to use command (taxei) only; for one should admonish (noutheteteon) slaves even more than children (paidas) (Pol. 1.13 1260b5-7).

Here, Aristotle suggests that masters ought to use reasoning (logou) as means for directing slaves; they ought to admonish (noutheteteon) slaves. Now, if slaves’ desires were brute non-thinking forces or bodily sensations—Fortenbaugh’s appetitive desires—then there would be no reason for Aristotle to recommend reasoned admonition as the appropriate way to alter slaves’ desires: it is useless, after all, to use cognitive means like reasoned speech against a bodily sensation or feeling. By insisting that masters use reasoned admonition on slaves, the passage suggests that slaves’ desires are cognitive in Fortenbaugh’s sense and thus are the sort of desires that Fortenbaugh’s deflationary account identifies as wishes.

A passage from the Rhetoric about the proper relationship between slaves and masters suggests that slaves’ desires can rest on the kinds of reasons that Broadie connects with wish. Consider the Rhetoric’s claim that masters should not punish slaves
without offering an explanation (*logos*) that justifies punishment and so prevents slaves from becoming angry:

> And [men grow mild (*praoi gignontai*)] if they believe that they themselves are in the wrong and are suffering justly (*ean adikein oiôntai autoi kai dikaiôs paschein*), since men no longer think then that they are suffering without justification (*para to prosêkon nomizousi paschein*); and anger (*orgê*), as we have seen, is this. Hence we ought always to chastise beforehand (*prokalazein*) with words (*tôi logôi*): if that is done, even slaves are less aggrieved by the actual punishment. (*Rhet. 2.3 1380b16-20*)

This passage seems to say that masters can prevent a slave from getting angry by explaining to the slave why she deserves punishment. The fact that slaves can follow these explanations and adjust their emotional responses as a result suggests that their desires are potentially supportable by reasons. After all, were their desires not potentially supportable by reasons, it’s not clear why offering a slave a justificatory *logos* for his punishment would affect her desire for revenge, the kind of desire involved in anger.\(^{106}\)

Presumably, the reason that the justificatory *logos* is effective is that it shows the slave that what she took as a reason for being angry—viz., that she has been wronged—does not actually hold; the justificatory *logos* causes the slave to see the situation in a new light, and thus removes what she earlier took as a reason for desiring revenge. By insisting that masters offer a justificatory *logos* to slaves, then, Aristotle suggests that slaves’ desires rest on reasons and thus are the sort of desires that Broadie’s account identifies as wishes.

What about Mele’s account? We saw earlier in our discussion of Mele’s account that Aristotle makes it a distinguishing feature of human beings that they have a

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\(^{106}\) See Aristotle’s discussion of incontinence with respect to spirit at *EN* 7.6, where he mentions insults and belittlement (b12-13). Given that elsewhere Aristotle associates insults and belittlement with anger (*Rhet. 2.2*), the agent at *EN* 7.6 who acts incontinently on spirit appears to be acting out of anger in particular.
conception of the good (Pol. 1.2 1253a8-16). This suggests that slaves can have a conception of the good, because Aristotle insists that slaves are human beings (1254a16, 1259b27-8). Aristotle’s classification of slaves as humans, combined with Pol. 1.2’s insistence that it is a distinguishing feature of human beings suggests that slaves, as human beings, can have a conception of the good.\textsuperscript{107} Given that Mele says that wishes are desires that rest on a conception of the good, Mele’s account predicts that slaves will have wishes.

So it follows that, on any of the deflationary accounts, slaves’ desires meet the necessary criteria to be wishes. It follows that deflationary accounts must attribute wishes to slaves.

IV.3 Robust Account on Slaves’ Bouletic Capacities

If the robust account of wish is right, then do slaves have wishes? Since the robust account maintains that wishes are desires that essentially arise out of, or are sustained by, reasoning about the good, answering this question requires that we determine whether slaves can engage in such reasoning.

The passage that is crucial in this regard is Aristotle’s claim that natural slaves lack entirely (holós) a deliberative faculty (bouleutikon).\textsuperscript{108} To interpret this claim, we need to examine Aristotle’s notion of deliberation (bouleúsis). Deliberation, he says, is

\textsuperscript{107} There is no indication that the Pol. 1.2 passage restricts the capacity to have a conception of the good to perfectly rational human beings; on the contrary, the passage suggests that the capacity to have a conception of the good is something that every human being qua human being has. This seems to be the upshot of the passage’s point that the capacity for speech is closely related to the capacity to have a conception of the good.

\textsuperscript{108} Pol. 1.13 1260a10-14.
concerned not about ends but about what “promotes” or “forwards” a given end; we deliberate *peri tôn pros ta telê* (*EN* 3.3 1112b12). He compares a practical deliberator in this respect to a doctor: “A doctor, for instance, does not deliberate about whether he will make healthy, or a public speaker about whether he will persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce good order, or any others about the end. Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine how and by what means (*to pôs kai dia tinôn*) it will come about” (3.3 1112b12-17).

These “things promoting the end” (*ta pros ta telê*) include not just instrumental means but also constitutive means, instrumental means being the efficient cause of an end, and constitutive means being that which counts as achieving the end. Deliberation, moreover, has two spheres of application: craft (*technê*) and action (*praxis*). For our purposes, there are two relevant differences between the spheres. First, in craft, the deliberator deliberates about the means—either instrumental or constitutive—to some limited end (say, a pot); by contrast, in action the deliberator deliberates about means—again, both instrumental and constitutive—to happiness or “doing well” in general (*eupraxia*) (*EN* 6.5 1140b6-7). Second, deliberation in craft is not prescriptive in the way that deliberation in action is. When deliberation in the realm of action identifies *X* as means to *eupraxia*, it thereby prescribes *X*, because *eupraxia* is necessarily the end we pursue (*EN* 1.2 1094b6, 1.4 1095a14-20). By contrast, the end of craft need not be something that we necessarily pursue, and so the conclusion of deliberation in craft is not essentially prescriptive.

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109 Thus, for example, it is from instrumental deliberative reasoning that I discover that the instrumental means to my attending the Pistons game include my getting into my car and driving to the Palace of Auburn Hills, and it is through constitutive means-end reasoning that I discover that the constitutive means to my attending the Pistons game includes my watching the 1st quarter, the 2nd quarter, etc.
Instrumental deliberation in both craft and action are fairly straightforward, as is constitutive deliberation in craft, so we needn’t go into examples here. Constitutive deliberation in action is more interesting. There are two kinds: 110 “particular action constitutive deliberation”, where the deliberator considers how to instantiate her conception of the good in the specific ethical context in which she find herself, and “blueprint constitutive deliberation,” where the deliberator tries to form a conception of the good by deliberating about the components of the human good. In particular action constitutive deliberation, the means the deliberator tries to identify is the particular action to be done here and now that puts into practice her conception of the good. Identifying this action will be challenging in moral contexts where there are a variety of competing goods at stake. In such cases, deliberation is required to determine which of the various goods deserves the agent’s concern. This deliberation can be rather complicated and involved, if these goods have a complicated relation to each other within one’s conception of the good, or if the particular moral context presents the goods in an irregular combination.

In “blueprint constitutive deliberation,” the means the deliberator seeks are the components that make up happiness. Such a deliberator asks questions like the following: does happiness include contemplation as a major part? Does it include friendship? 111 This

110 For an articulation of these two types of deliberation see McDowell, 32-3.
111 This is the sort of deliberative inquiry that characterizes Aristotle’s ethical works. He describes the inquiry undertaken in the EN as a sort of ‘political science’ (1094b11), and later says that political science is the same state as practical wisdom (phronēsis) (1141b23-4). It is clear as early as EN 1.2 that he takes the EN to be an inquiry into the nature of the ultimate end for man, saying that we must try to grasp ‘in outline’ the ultimate good, and that such a search belongs to political science (1094a25). His subsequent dialectical turn (1095a17) toward the endoxa concerning the highest good makes sense if the EN is inquiring into the constituents of ultimate good. This evidence suggests that Aristotle sees the EN as a deliberative investigation about the constituents of the human good. For an argument against this reading see Broadie, chapter 4.
is the sort of reasoning about the good that robust accounts, but not deflationary accounts, make essential to wishes.

With these different kinds of deliberation in mind, we can now return to the interpretive question of interest: how ought we to interpret Aristotle’s claim that slaves lack entirely (holôs) a deliberative faculty (bouleutikon)? One restraint governing our interpretation is this: any plausible interpretation must be something that Aristotle could have reasonably believed, given the empirical evidence available to him. That is, charity requires that we not attribute to him any views that would have conflicted with empirical evidence that would have been obvious to him.¹¹²

For this reason, an unrestricted interpretation of the claim—an interpretation that denies slaves the ability to engage in any and all kinds of deliberation—is not plausible. As I suggested in chapter 5,¹¹³ the empirical data about slaves in ancient Athens suggests that Aristotle had every reason to regard slaves as capable of both instrumental and constitutive means-end deliberative reasoning in craft. Simply put, Aristotle couldn’t, without facing blatant evidence to the contrary, have denied that slaves engaged in activities requiring the adaptability and deliberative understanding that characterizes craft knowledge. And indeed, Aristotle himself declares that Asians—a group he describes as especially naturally slavish (Pol. 3.14 1285a19-22)—are both intelligent (dianoêtika) and “technical” (technika) (Pol. 7.7 1372b27-8).

So we must set aside the unrestricted interpretation. If slaves suffer from a deliberative incapacitation, it cannot be an incapacitation that extends to craft: it must be one in the sphere of action. Now, this incapacity in the sphere of action could not include

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¹¹² This is a constraint that Malcolm Heath (2-3) places on an interpretation of Aristotle’s theory.
¹¹³ Chapter 5, p.15
an incapacity with respect to instrumental deliberation. To see this, consider the naturally slavish Triballoi tribesperson who, according to Aristotle, thinks that sacrificing her father is a fine and choiceworthy action.\textsuperscript{114} Suppose she has a desire to sacrifice her father. Will she have the instrumental deliberative skills to figure out how to do this? The answer is obviously yes. After all, as we’ve seen, natural slaves clearly had abilities for instrumental deliberation in craft, and it would be extremely odd for them to have such skills in craft but not in action: why would this kind of reasoning break down in one sphere but not in the other?\textsuperscript{115} There doesn’t seem to be a principled way of attributing an instrumental deliberative incapacity in the one sphere but not in the other, and for this reason we should think that Aristotle regarded slaves as capable of instrumental deliberation in action.

Slaves’ deliberative incapacity, then, must be an incapacity with respect to constitutive deliberation in action. We saw that there are two types of this particular kind of deliberation: particular action constitutive deliberation, where the goal is to implement a conception of the good in a particular ethical context, and blueprint constitutive deliberation, where the goal is to form a conception of the good by identifying the components of happiness. Unlike the case of deliberation in craft, or instrumental deliberation in action, both of these deliberative capacities are somewhat sophisticated: they are capacities that develop relatively late in human development. Moreover, unlike the other kinds of deliberative capacities, it seems that Aristotle could have denied these

\textsuperscript{114}“And in the same way, in certain places it is fine (kalon) to sacrifice one's father, e.g. among the Triballoi, but without qualification (haplós) it is not fine (kalon). But possibly this indicates not “where” but “for whom,” for it makes no difference where they may be: for everywhere it will be fine (kalon) to the Triballoi, since they are Triballoi” (Top. 2.11 115b22-6).
\textsuperscript{115}Heath makes this point. I have taken this example about the Triballoi from his discussion. Heath, 4.
two sorts of deliberative capacities without committing himself to a view that starkly conflicted with empirical evidence.

It seems, then, that the following interpretations are plausible interpretations of Aristotle’s claim that slaves entirely lack a deliberative faculty. It could mean: that slaves lack the ability to identify how to instantiate a given conception of the good; that they lack the ability to deliberate over the constituents of happiness; or that they lack both the ability to identify how to instantiate a given conception of the good and the ability to deliberate over the constituents of happiness. All three of these interpretations are consistent with what Aristotle tells us about slaves’ deliberative capacities and (unlike the unrestricted interpretation) don’t conflict with the empirical evidence that would have been readily available to Aristotle.

This conclusion about possible interpretations of slaves’ deliberative deficiencies is important, because it shows that the defender of the robust account need not identify slaves’ desires as wishes. For having a wish on the robust account requires the capacity for blueprint constitutive deliberation, and we’ve seen that Aristotle’s comments about slaves’ deliberative capacities can be read so as to deny slaves that capacity; they can be read as denying slaves the capacity to reason about the good. If we interpret Aristotle’s comment that slaves lack a deliberative faculty in such a way, the comment implies that slaves are restricted to taking for granted the conception of the good they receive by nature or from upbringing; they cannot take a reflective stance towards their ends and revise that conception.

This marks an important difference between deflationary and robust accounts. If deflationary accounts are right, then one is committed to attributing wishes to slaves, as
Aristotle’s description of slaves’ moral psychology indicates that slaves have the kind of desires that deflationary accounts identify as wishes. By contrast, if robust accounts are right, then one is not committed to attributing wishes to slaves, as there are possible interpretations of slaves’ deliberative incapacities that make it consistent to say that slaves lack wishes. This difference between the accounts will prove to be crucial for deciding between them.

V. Politics 3.9: Slaves Do Not “Live According to Decision”

Aristotle makes an important claim in Pol. 3.9 when he says that slaves do not partake of (metechein) living according to decision (tou zên kata prohairesin) (1280a31-4). The claim is important, because if we interpret it as saying that natural slaves are by nature incapable of making decisions (as this section argues we should), we can potentially learn something about slaves’ bouletic capacities.

Slaves’ capacities for making decisions potentially implies something about their bouletic capacities because decision is necessarily the product of (i) a wish (boulêsis)\(^{116}\) for some end and (ii) deliberation about the means to (ta pros)\(^{117}\) that end. To illustrate, an agent wishes to be healthy; discovers from deliberation that medicine will make her healthy; and so decides to take medicine. It follows from the structure of decision that if

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\(^{116}\) *EN* 3.3, 1112b15-17; 6.2 1139a31. Aristotle most explicitly states that wish is the desiderative element involved in decision at *EE* 2.10: “Since, then, decision is neither opinion (*doxa*) nor wish (*boulêsis*) singly nor yet both (for no one decides suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes suddenly), it must be compounded of both, for both are found in a man deciding” (*EE* 2.10 1226b2-5). See also *EN* 3.2 1111b20 where Aristotle says that though wish is not a decision, “it is apparently close to it.” Cf. *EN* 3.3 1113a10-4: “We have found, then that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, we deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with our wish” (Translation Irwin [2]).

\(^{117}\) Such means can include both instrumental and constitutive means. See section II.2.
slaves cannot make decisions it is because they cannot have wishes or because they cannot adequately engage in the deliberation that such wishes prompt. In the next two sections, I’ll exploit this connection between decision and wish to argue that the Pol. 3.9 passage ultimately denies slaves wishes.

V.1 Overview of the Pol. 3.9 Passage

Pol 3.9 comes in an argument about the nature of justice in a city. Aristotle begins by noting that justice is “equals for equals and unequals for unequals” (Pol 3.9 1280a11-13). That is, it is a condition in which people of equal worth have equal shares in city offices and power and where people of unequal worth have unequal shares in city offices and power.

He notes that this formula doesn’t tell us much. After all, what do we use to measure the personal worth of the city’s members? This depends, Aristotle says, on the true end of the city. If the city’s purpose is the accumulation of possessions, then personal property is the true measure of a man’s worth; in this case, the oligarchs are correct to say that wealth should determine political power.

But in fact Aristotle thinks that the oligarchic conception of justice is flawed, and he thinks it is flawed precisely because oligarchs misunderstand the purpose of the city. The oligarchs think that the purpose of the city is the acquisition of possessions, but this

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118 Aristotle says that there is no decision without a state of character (6. 1139a17-b13), and so in principle a third explanation for failing to make decisions is that slaves lack states of character. I do not treat this as a serious possibility, however, because it seems rather unlikely. A state of character results from the repetition of similar activities (EN 2.1 1103a26-b25, 2.2 1104a11-b3), and Aristotle seems to think that even animals (some of them at least) live by habit (Pol. 7.13 1332b3-4). Thus, he seems to think that even animals can develop some sort of rudimentary state of character.
is wrong; the true purpose of the city, Aristotle says, is “not mere life” (tou zên monon) but the “good life” (eu zên), which crucially includes the exercise of the virtues. Since the good life involves exercising the virtues, a true city is one that aims to bring about virtue in the citizens.

If Aristotle’s argument about the city’s true purpose is to convince the oligarch, he needs to show that the oligarchic conception of the city’s purpose doesn’t hold up to common sense. He does this by offering the following line of reasoning:

…a city exists not for the sake of mere living (tou zên monon) but rather for the sake of living well (eu zên). Otherwise there could be a city of slaves or of the other (allôn zôôn) animals. There is no such thing because they do not partake (metechein) of happiness nor of living according to decision (tou zên kata prohairesin). (Pol. 3.9 1280a31-4)

Aristotle says that if the true purpose of the city were merely the acquisition of life’s necessities, there could be a city of animals or of slaves. After all, animals and slaves can engage in cooperative behavior that is aimed at acquiring basic needs; they can come together for the purpose of “mere living.” And yet, Aristotle notes, we don’t apply the label “city” to groups of animals or slaves who live cooperatively in this way. This fact suggests, Aristotle thinks, that everyone implicitly recognizes that the true city aims not at mere living but at living well.

V.2 Slaves Do Not Live According to Decision: Interpretive Options

119 The good life consists in “good actions” (Pol. 3.9 1281a2). (Cf. Pol. 7.1-3, especially 7.1 1323b21-9) Because the good life consists mainly in being virtuous and doing virtuous acts, a true city, insofar as it is a city that aims at the good life, is a city that aims at producing the virtues in its citizens.

120 “This makes it clear that a city must concern itself with goodness if it is to be truly and not merely for convenience called a city. Otherwise the community becomes an alliance….and its law becomes a treaty, and a ‘guarantor of reciprocal rights’ as Lycophron the sophist said, instead of being what makes the citizens good and just men” (Pol 3.9 1280b6-11).
What does Aristotle mean when he says that “slaves do not live according to decision”? The meanings of both the subject and predicate of the phrase are not immediately clear. Take the subject: slaves. As we’ve seen, Aristotle recognizes two kinds of slavery—legal and natural. The predicate “do not live by decision” also admits of a variety of meanings.

To fail to “live by decision” might mean to not be the sort of being who is capable of making decisions at all and hence to be a being who is incapable of action (*praxis*); into this category fall children and non-rational animals.\(^{121}\) Alternatively, to fail to “live according to decision” might mean to not be able to make those decisions that one *would* make in conditions of legal freedom. Into this category would fall anyone who is forced by some authority to act against her will, or anyone who is forced because of non-ideal social or economic circumstances to preoccupy herself with procuring basic necessities.

Note that how we interpret the predicate has implications for how we interpret the subject. For example, if we interpret “not living according to decision” as “lacking the natural constitution required to make decisions,” then the slaves referred to here are presumably natural slaves and natural slaves as such. By contrast, if we interpret “not living according to decision” as “not being able to make those decisions that one *would* make in conditions of legal freedom,” then presumably the slaves referred to here are legal slaves and legal slaves as such.

Given these different ways of understanding the subject and predicate of the phrase “slaves do not live according to decision”, there seems to be two\(^ {122}\) possible points that Aristotle could be making when he says that slaves fail to live according to decision:

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\(^{121}\) *EN* 3.2 1111b18, 12, 1.9 1099bb32-1100a5, 6.1 1139a19-32.

\(^{122}\) One might think that there is a third possibility: “living according to decision” refers specifically to a sort of political decision-making activity, one where there is collective deliberation about the good of the community. The problem with this interpretation is that it doesn’t fit well with *EE* 1.1 1214b6, where
Interpretation (A)

When Aristotle says that slaves fail to live according to decision, he is saying that slaves (like the animals with which they are grouped) have a rational deficiency that prevents them from making decisions; lacking the capacity to make decisions, they are not capable of genuine action. Because this interpretation appeals to a natural property of slaves (namely, their deficient rational capacities), it requires us to understand the slaves in question as natural slaves; whether they are legal slaves in addition doesn’t matter.

Interpretation (B)

When Aristotle says that slaves do not live according to decision he is referring to legal slaves and is saying that these slaves are unable to decide on activities they value for their own sakes. The idea is that slaves’ legal status requires them to devote all their time and energy either to serving their master’s needs or to procuring the necessities of life, and they thus lack the sort of lifestyle required to pursue activities that they view as intrinsically worthwhile. While the life of enslavement is compatible with making certain decisions—namely decisions aimed at external ends—it is not compatible with making the decisions that are most relevant to virtue and happiness, since the latter decisions are for fine (kalon) actions, and these actions require leisure.123

Aristotle also uses the phrase “living according to decision.” The EE context is clearly not a political one; the passage in question is about the individual. Given that “living according to decision” clearly does not have a political meaning in the EE, we should not inject such a meaning into our reading of Pol. 3.9.

123 Here a qualification is in order. While Aristotle says that leisure is not necessary for virtuous action (1334a22-8), he seems to think that lack of leisure limits one’s ability to express a virtuous character. Someone who is legally enslaved or someone who takes up a menial occupation is limited in what they can do: though their choices are strictly speaking free, they are “mixed” in the sense that they involve voluntary and involuntary elements. Aristotle says that in such mixed cases, it is hard to tell the difference between the virtuous and the vicious decision (cf. 1110a11-19, 1115b7-10, 1116a29-b3). So it’s reasonable to think that a lack of leisure constrains one’s capacities for virtuous expression. For a discussion of this issue see Irwin [7], 411-414.
Because (B) says that a particular social condition—namely, legal enslavement—prevents slaves from having certain kinds of decisions—namely decisions on activities they regard as ends in themselves, it requires us to understand the slaves as legally enslaved. It doesn’t automatically tell us whether the slaves are also natural slaves.

How do we decide between (A) and (B) as the best interpretation of Pol. 3.9? A good way to decide is to see whether the 3.9 passage or its argumentative context gives us reason to think that 3.9 is concerned with legally-free natural slaves, naturally-free legal slaves, or natural slaves who are also legally enslaved. If the slaves in question are legally-free natural slaves, then we can rule out (B), since (B) only makes sense if the slaves are legally enslaved. By contrast, if we can show that the slaves are naturally free legal slaves, we can automatically rule out (A), since (A) only makes sense if the slaves are natural slaves. (Note that we cannot rule out (B) by just showing that the slaves are natural slaves, since it is compatible with (B) that the slaves are both legally and naturally enslaved.)

An examination of the passage suggests that the slaves in question are at least natural slaves. To see this, note Aristotle’s grouping of slaves with the “other animals” (allón zón). Here, he seems to be using zón in the sense of “lower animal” and not in the sense of “member of genus ‘animal.’” (After all, adult Greek males are members of the genus ‘animal,’ and Aristotle certainly doesn’t think that positing a city of them is an absurdity.) Thus, in calling the slaves in question “other animals” (allón zoon), Aristotle is somehow assimilating slaves to lower animals. So the slaves in question are natural slaves—deficient beings who (like all lower animals) benefit from being ruled by another.
Does Aristotle take these slaves to be legally enslaved as well? The argumentative structure of Pol 3.9 suggests not. Consider the structure:

(i) Assume that the city is nothing more than a cooperative union of individuals aimed at securing life’s necessities (Assume that the purpose of a city is “mere living”).
(ii) Slaves and animals engage in cooperative behavior aimed at securing life’s necessities. (Slaves an animals can come together for the purpose of “mere living”)
(iii) So (from i and ii), slaves and animals should be able to form cities.
(iv) But we don’t think that there can be cities of animals or slaves, as animals and slaves do not partake (metechein) of happiness nor live according to decision (tou zên kata prohairesin).
(v) Thus, (i) must be false: the purpose of a city is not “mere living.”

To determine whether the slaves referenced in (ii), (iii), and (iv), in addition to being naturally enslaved, are also legally enslaved, we should favor those interpretations of the slaves’ legal status that meet two conditions. First, the interpretation should make the claim in (ii) rather straightforward. For Aristotle in Pol. 3.9 speaks as if his audience knows from experience what a community of slaves aimed at mere living would look like; he does not speak as if he is introducing a strange counterfactual thought experiment. Second, the interpretation should be one on which Aristotle’s oligarch opponent will readily accept premise (iv). After all, when Aristotle offers (iv), he seems to assume that his oligarchic opponent will reject outright the notion of a city of animals or slaves.

What understanding of the slaves’ legal status can meet both of these conditions? If we understand slaves as legally free natural slaves, then we get a plausible interpretation. For the slaves in question will be natural slaves who freely occupy their native lands and engage in cooperative behavior. There is nothing strange or counterfactual about this; indeed, it describes the life of most non-Greeks. On this
reading, then, the city of slaves that Aristotle asks the oligarch to consider is a straightforward scenario, one for which the oligarch has a ready reference point: viz., the communities of Celts, Scythians, Thracians, etc. that surround Greece. In this way, interpreting the slaves in (ii), (iii) and (iv) as legally free makes (ii) totally straightforward. Moreover, if we understand the slaves in (ii), (iii), and (iv) as legally free, Aristotle’s oligarchic opponent has reason to accept (iv). For the communities of legally-free natural slaves that engaged in cooperative living and that were prevalent around Greece (consider the tribes and cultures making up Northern Europe) were perceived by Greeks not as cities but rather as wild tribes or despotic empires. Aristotle himself calls these groups “apolitical” (apoliteuta) (Pol. 7.7 1327b29).

It seems, then, that we ought to understand the slaves at Pol. 3.9 as legally-free natural slaves. With that in mind, let us return to the ways we can interpret the claim that such slaves fail to “live according to decision.” We can rule (B) out, because it relies on a legal feature of the slaves in question, and our analysis of 3.9 has shown that the slaves in question are legally free. That leaves us with (A): slaves (like animals and children) lack the natural constitution required to make any decisions at all; they do not live a life of action.

VI. Pol. 3.9: Evidence of Natural Slaves’ Bouletic Restrictions

Why cannot slaves make decisions? We’ve seen that decision is a matter of desiring to do what deliberation has shown to be conducive to some wished-for end (EN 3.2 1111b26-
30). More specifically, it is the product of (i) a wish (*boulēsis*[^124^]) for some practically remote end and (ii) deliberation (*bouleusis*) about the means to (*ta pros*)[^125^] that end. It follows that if slaves cannot make decisions, this is because (i) they cannot have wishes or because (ii) they cannot adequately engage in the deliberation that such wishes prompt. I want to argue that (i) is crucial to understanding why slaves cannot make decisions: slaves cannot make decisions because they are not, on Aristotle’s view, the kind of beings who can have wishes.

In order to see this, let’s assume the opposite—that slaves *can* have wishes—and see whether we can explain their inability to make decisions by attributing to them an incapacity with respect to the deliberation that those wishes prompt: *granting that slaves can have wishes*, can we explain slaves’ wholesale inability to make decisions by attributing to them an inability to engage in the deliberation that their wishes prompt?

Consider again the naturally slavish Triballoi tribesperson who, according to Aristotle, thinks that sacrificing her father is fine and choiceworthy. As we’ve seen, slaves clearly had the instrumental reasoning ability to identify the instrumental means to ends such as sacrificing one’s father. So a failure of instrumental reasoning should not render the slave incapable of deciding to sacrifice her father.

[^124^]: EN 3.3, 1112b15-17; 6.2 1139a31. Aristotle most explicitly states that wish is the desiderative element involved in decision at EE 2.10: “Since, then, decision is neither opinion (*doxa*) nor wish (*boulēsis*) singly nor yet both (for no one decides suddenly, though he thinks he ought to act, and wishes suddenly), it must be compounded of both, for both are found in a man deciding” (EE 2.10 1226b2-5). But see also EN 3.2 1111b20 where Aristotle says that though *boulēsis* is not *prohairesis*, “it is apparently close to it;” cf. EN 3.3 1113a10-4): “We have found, then that what we decide to do is whatever action, among those up to us, we deliberate about and desire to do. Hence also decision will be deliberative desire to do an action that is up to us; for when we have judged [that it is right] as a result of deliberation, we desire to do it in accord with our wish” (Translation Irwin [2]).

[^125^]: Note that means can include both instrumental means and constitutive means.
To explain the Triballoi slave’s inability to decide to sacrifice her father, Malcolm Heath\textsuperscript{126} appeals to the role that particular action constitutive deliberation plays in making a decision. What prevents a slave from deciding on some action in a given case, Heath suggests, is that her ethical context presents her with a wide range of moral considerations that she cannot adequately take into consideration; while she wishes to act finely, she cannot be adequately sensitive to the moral complexities of a given situation in a way that does justice to her conception of the good. In short, she lacks the particular action constitutive deliberative capacity to identify the action that instantiates her conception of the good.\textsuperscript{127}

The problem with this explanation for slaves’ inability to make decisions is that it only works in tough moral cases—cases where there are multiple moral goods at stake, thus complicating the ethical context. The explanation does not work in cases that are ethically straightforward from the agent’s point of view, and so it does not explain Pol. 3.9’s wholesale denial of decisions to slaves. To see this, consider a slave who wishes to act finely, and situate her in a scenario that’s morally straightforward from her point of view—i.e., a scenario where there’s no question as to what action instantiates her conception of the good. If the slave has a proper conception of the good, such a case might be one where the choice in question is between pursuing some bodily pleasure and helping some friend in need. In this case, there’s no question about what constitutes fine

\textsuperscript{126} Heath 6.
\textsuperscript{127} In Heath’s words: “Consider a simple case of practical reasoning. I see a destitute person who is hungry and has nothing to eat. I recognize that it would be kalon to help him, and want to do so. How can I help? I could help by giving him food; and here is some food. So I shall give him this food. But perhaps that would be wrong. Here is some food, but the food belongs to someone else—and it would be disgraceful to steal…A practical reasoner must consider, not just what can be done to implement a goal, but what can be done consistently with the action still being fine, and since virtuous action is performed because of (or for the sake of) the kalon. Practical reasoning must integrate a multiplicity of morally relevant considerations” (Heath, 6).
action, and so no constitutive deliberation is needed to sift through competing moral
considerations and identify the action that instantiates her conception of the good. The
slave’s conception of the good is all by itself sufficient for directing the slave to the right
action: helping her friend.

Note that this point doesn’t presuppose that a slave’s conception of the good is
fully worked out. It simply grants that the slave’s conception of the good has some sort of
significant content; such content need only be a list of certain worthwhile goods and
some grasp of rules of priority between these goods. Once a slave has this kind of
“rough-and-ready” conception of the good, then there will be ethical contexts in which
this conception automatically directs her to a particular action; no constitutive
deliberation is needed.

Aristotle seems willing to attribute to slaves such a rough-and-ready conception
of the good. We’ve seen from Pol. 1.2 that human beings, and thus slaves, can make
evaluations that include concepts like ‘goodness.’ Moreover, as we’ve seen from his
comment about the Triballoi tribespeople, natural slaves can evaluate things as fine: the
Triballoi people think that sacrificing their fathers is fine, and so presumably include this
in their conception of the good. If such people have even a minimum conception of the
good, then in cases where there are not a lot of competing goods at stake, their conception
will be sufficient to guide them to a particular action.

What begins to emerge from this discussion is the following. If we grant slaves
wishes, as we have been doing up until now, it’s problematic to try to explain slaves’
inability to make decisions by attributing to them an inability to engage in the
deliberation—either instrumental or constitutive—that such wishes prompt. The source of
the problem is that as human beings slaves are eligible for a conception of the good, and such a conception seems sufficient to guide slaves to particular actions in cases that are morally straightforward.

One might try to resolve this puzzle by revising the interpretation of *Pol.* 3.9 so as to say that slaves cannot form decisions in *morally complex cases*—cases where there are a variety of competing moral considerations. On this proposal, *Pol.* 3.9 denies slaves the capacity to make decisions that require sensitivity to a broad range of moral considerations—the sort of decisions that require particular action constitutive deliberation.

The problem with this move is that it seems to makes it a condition of taking part in city life that one have the ability to determine, in every possible case, what action instantiates one’s conception of the good. But recall that Aristotle introduces the claim that slaves cannot live according to decision as support for the view that slaves cannot form cities (see discussion of 3.9’s argumentative context in V.2). If we follow the proposed interpretation of 3.9, then Aristotle at 3.9 is making it a condition of taking part in city life that one be able to make decisions in significantly complex moral cases. This places an extremely high intellectual condition on members of cities: depending on Aristotle’s particular view of practical deliberation, it requires either that the rulers of a city have a fully-worked out conception of the good that is spelled out as an exhaustive set of rules of conduct¹²⁸ applicable to any and all moral cases, or that they have the

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¹²⁸ This is the picture of practical reasoning advocated by “rule-case” interpreters like Irwin and Cooper. According to the “rule-case” interpretation, the practical deliberator determines how she should act by applying rules to cases, the rules taking the form of “In such-and-such conditions, one should do such-and-such”, and the cases being individual ethical contexts where those conditions obtain. This set of rules specifies all the content of a person’s conception of the good. For a more detailed description of the “rule-case” interpretation, see Cooper [2], 97.
moral perception just “to see”\textsuperscript{129} what particular action in any and every ethical context instantiates their conception of the good. Requiring such abilities of individuals makes something like omniscience a requirement for city life. Given that Aristotle’s oligarchic opponent has no reason to grant the assumption that a kind of omniscience is required for participation in city life, Aristotle on the proposed interpretation of Pol. 3.9 offers an unconvincing argument. Thus, charity to Aristotle requires us not to interpret Pol. 3.9 along the proposed lines.

It follows that while an impairment with respect to particular action constitutive deliberation may explain slaves’ failure to make decisions \textit{in particular cases}—specifically, those cases where determining what constitutes doing well is complicated—it cannot explain Pol. 3.9’s strong claim that slaves don’t make decisions at all.

So far we have been holding fixed the assumption that slaves can have a wish and have looked to see whether we can explain their inability to make decisions by attributing to them a deliberative incapacity with respect to wishes. And we’ve seen that we cannot appeal to an instrumental or particular action constitutive deliberative incapacity to explain this denial. That is, \textit{holding fixed the assumption that slaves can have a wish}, we cannot reasonably appeal to either an incapacity with respect to instrumental deliberation or an incapacity with respect to particular action constitutive deliberation to explain slaves’ \textit{comprehensive} inability to make decisions, their inability (shared with animals) make any sort of decision at all.

So why cannot slaves make decisions? This is the critical question. Having exhausted other possibilities, I maintain that the best explanation for Aristotle’s claim

\textsuperscript{129} This is the picture of practical reasoning as a type of “moral perception” is advocated by opponents of the “rule-case” picture. See, for instance, McDowell, 27-33.
that slaves do not make decisions is feature (i): slaves cannot make decisions because they are not, on Aristotle’s view, the kind of beings who can have a wish. This seems necessary to make sense of Aristotle’s wholesale denial of decisions to slaves.

VII. No Wish for Slaves: Implications for the Deflationary and Robust Accounts of Wish

VII.1 Defeat of Deflationary Account; Preliminary Support for Robust Account

This conclusion that slaves cannot have wishes provides an important criterion of any plausible account of wish. In particular, it entails that any plausible account of wish must be able to explain slaves’ inability to form wishes. The problem with deflationary accounts is that they do not meet this criterion: on their accounts of wish, slaves’ desires count as wishes. For as we saw earlier (section III), slaves’ desires are cognitive phenomena alterable by means such as language, they rest on reasons, and they depend on a conception of the good. In attributing wishes to slaves, deflationary accounts fail a crucial criterion of any plausible account of wish.

Moreover—and this is important—it appears that the failure of deflationary accounts to meet this criterion has something to do with their failure to posit a direct, robust, connection to reason.130 For we have seen that non-rational desires—the sort of desires our analysis has shown to characterize natural slaves—can be of a rather

130 It cannot be that slaves lack an ability to form a wish simply because they lack the “internal calm” required to form a desire for something at a distance; the fact that slaves can implement and execute long-term projects and strategies show that slaves were capable of having desires for “practically remote” objects, suggesting that it is not a lack a foresight that explains their inability to have a wish.
sophisticated sort: they can involve propositional thought and be alterable by cognitive means like language, they can rest on reasons, and they can make up a conception of the good. What this means is that any plausible account of wish must make the connection to reason that distinguishes wish from non-rational desire rich enough to distinguish wish from a class of desires that are themselves pretty sophisticated. The particular way that deflationary accounts fail this criterion suggests that a stronger connection to reason is needed.

We saw in our examination of slaves’ deliberative capacities that the robust account can make good sense of Aristotle’s denial of wish to slaves. The triumph of the robust account and the failure of the deflationary account in this regard provide preliminary support for the robust account’s thesis that wishes essentially involve reasoning about the good.

**VIII. Back to Decision**

If the argument that I’ve given is right, then we have reason to favor the robust account’s thesis that Aristotelian wish is a rather intellectual thing. Having a wish involves recognizing the object of one’s wish as part of one’s good, and recognizing it as so on the basis of reasoning about one’s good. It follows that decision, to the extent that it rests on a wish, also requires the capacity to deliberate about the human good. The prohairetic agent, insofar as she is a bouletic agent, is someone who takes a reflective attitude towards her own desires, someone who, rather than taking her ends as a given, tries to determine which ends are actually good for her.
Given the robust account of decision, do slaves, women, and children have the capacity to make decisions? I answer this question in chapter 7.
I. Introduction

In chapter 5 I argued in favor of a robust interpretation of wish. I argued that for a desire to be a wish, it must result from deliberation about the constituents of the human good. It must result from reason stepping back and examining, on its own independent grounds, what is worth going for.

If the robust interpretation of wish is right, then paradigmatic virtue thus turns out to be a very intellectual sort of thing. This might seem to fit poorly with certain passages in the ethical works where Aristotle seems to construe virtue as primarily a non-rational condition. Call this non-rational portrait of virtue “anti-intellectualism” about virtue. If anti-intellectualism is right, then pre-rational pleasure and pain training, not phronēsis-informed deliberation about ends, supplies the virtuous agent with the ends that underlie her virtuous decisions.

The seeming textual evidence for anti-intellectualism, and corresponding non-rational interpretation of that evidence, is the following:

1) 1.13: Division of Soul and Corresponding Division of the Virtues. In EN 1.13 Aristotle, immediately after dividing up the soul into the non-rational part and the rational part, seems to assign virtue of character to the non-rational part, in
contrast with *phronēsis*, which he assigns to the rational part (1.13 1103a5-8). Someone tempted by anti-rationalism might interpret this assignment of virtue to the non-rational part as an indication that virtue of character is primarily a non-rational condition, a condition in which not reason but rather non-rational desire has the role in virtue of supplying the agent with the wishes that underlie her decisions.

2) EN 2.1-2.3: Acquisition of Virtue of Character. Aristotle appears to contrast habituation with teaching as modes of acquiring virtues, and he suggests that this contrast corresponds to the contrast between virtue of character on the one hand and intellectual virtue on the other. The fact that Aristotle distinguishes between habituation and teaching may suggest that habituation, unlike teaching, does not involve training of one’s rational part. And indeed, Aristotle’s own description of habituation in 2.1-3 emphasizes not training of reasoning capacities but rather training in pleasures and pains, suggesting that habituation involves training of the non-rational part in particular. If virtue of character is acquired primarily via pleasure and pain training, it seems that non-rational desire, not deliberative excellence, plays the role in virtue of supplying the virtuous agent’s wishes.

3) EN 6.12 and 6.13: Division of Labor between Virtue and Phronēsis. Several passages in 6.12 and 6.13 posit a division of labor between virtue and *phronēsis* whereby virtue makes the end (*skopos*) or decision (*prohairesis*) right and *phronēsis* the things “forwarding” or “promoting” that end or decision (*ta pros to telos, ta pros touton*). On an anti-intellectualist interpretation, the contrasting

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131 “If we ought to say, then, that [the non-rational part] also has reason, then the [part] that has reason as well [as the non-rational part] will have two parts, one that has reason to the full extent by having it within itself, and another [that has it] by listening to reason as to a father. Virtue too is divided according to this difference; for we call some of them virtues of intellect, others virtue of character—wisdom, good sense, and *phronēsis* on the one hand counting on the side of virtues of intellect, open-handedness and temperance counting among those of character” (1.13 1103a2-8, italics mine).

132 Virtue, then, is of two kinds, virtue of intellect, and virtue of character. Virtue of intellect arises mostly from teaching, that is why it needs experience and time. Virtue of character results from habit; hence its name ‘ethical’, slightly varied from ‘ethos’ (2.1 1103a15-17).

133 Because of this, *our whole concern is necessarily with [pleasure and pains]*, for it makes no small difference with regard to action whether someone feels pleasure and pain in a good way or a bad way... So that for this reason too *the whole concern both for virtue and for political expertise is pleasures and pains*; for someone who behaves well in relation to pleasure and pain will be good, while someone who behaves badly in relation to them will be bad (2.3 1105a6-13, italics mine).

But we must take someone’s pleasure or pain following on his actions to be a sign of his state. For if someone who abstains from bodily pleasures enjoys the abstinence itself, he is temperate; if he is grieved by it he is intemperate. Again, if he stands firm against terrifying situations and enjoys it, or at least does not find it painful, he is brave; if he finds it painful, he is cowardly. For virtue of character is about pleasures and pains (2.3 1104b5-10).

134 The passages, in full, are as follows:

Further, the *ergon* is brought to completion according to (*kata*) a person’s having *phronēsis* and virtue of character; for virtue makes the goal (*skopon*) correct, while *phronēsis* makes correct what leads to it (*ta pros touton*) (6.12 1144a7-9).

The decision (*prohairesis*), then is made correct by virtue, but the doing of whatever by the nature of things has to be done to realize that decision is not the business of virtue but of another ability” (6.12 1144a20-2).
structure of these division of labor passages implies that whatever “makes right” an agent’s distinctively virtuous ends and decisions is something quite different from phronēsis—something of a non-rational sort, for example. Similarly, the division of labor seems to assign reason specifically to the domain of calculating instrumental means to these non-rational ends—reason discovers the actions that “forward” or “promote” these ends, but it does not select the ends themselves. So interpreted, these passages deny that phronēsis has the leading role because it supplies the virtuous agent with the ends that underlie her decisions and desires.

Taken together, the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) may be construed as saying that virtue is a primarily non-rational condition, a condition in which reason’s primary role is an ancillary one of specifying instrumental means to ends.

The challenge facing my robust interpretation of wish, then, is the following: if, as I argued in chapter 5, it is phronēsis-informed deliberation about ends that supplies a virtuous agent with her wishes, why does Aristotle seem to construe virtue as a primarily non-rational condition? Why does he assign virtue of character to the non-rational part of the soul? Why does he construe habituation, the mode of acquisition for virtue of character, as a process wholly devoid of intellectual elements? And finally, why in 6.12 and 6.13’s division of labor passages does he contrast virtue with phronēsis, seemingly construing virtue’s end-setting aspect as something non-rational and relegating phronēsis to the domain of technical means-end reasoning?

In this chapter I present an answer to these questions, one that has two main components. The first component involves drawing attention to the mode of presentation with which Aristotle presents virtue of character in the EN. The second component

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It is clear, even if [phronēsis] did not lead to action (praktikē), that there would be a need for it because of its being a virtue of its soul-part, and because a decision (prohairesis) will not be correct in the absence of phronēsis, or in the absence of virtue; for the one causes us to do (poiei pratein) the end (telos), the other causes us to do what forwards the end (ta pros to telos) (6.13 1145a3-6)
involves presenting a particular interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of virtue and *phronēsis* in 6.12 and 6.13.

With regard to Aristotle’s mode of presentation in the *EN*, I will argue that Aristotle presents virtue of character in a *selective* manner, focusing on virtue’s non-rational aspects in the early books, and not making fully clear virtue’s significant rational aspect until book VI. He seems to present virtue in this selective manner for the purposes of teaching, desiring to convey the important roles that both non-rational desire and reason play in virtue, and thinking it pedagogically superior to present these two elements in relative isolation from one another. Thus, in the early books we find Aristotle focusing primarily on virtue’s non-rational aspects, and thus presenting a mere part or aspect of virtue. We should not conclude that the non-rational portrait of virtue offered in *EN* 1.13 and 2.1-3 is a more or less accurate representation of virtue as a whole.

In fact, so I will argue, Aristotle in book 6—particularly in 6.12 and 6.13—substantially builds upon the early books’ account of virtue by emphasizing the leading moral role that *phronēsis* plays in virtue. In book VI Aristotle builds upon the earlier books’ non-rational portrait of virtue in a way that offsets the initial portrait of virtue as something primarily non-rational. To support this claim, I will offer alternative interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13 that does not support anti-intellectualism. According to my alternative interpretation, Aristotle in 6.12 and 6.13 makes clear *phronēsis*’ role in selecting the ends that underlies the virtuous agent’s decisions.\footnote{135 Although book VI is commonly considered as belonging to the *EN* and not to the *EE*, there is some uncertainty as to whether it in fact chronologically belongs to the *EN*. Here, I’ll assume that book VI is part of the *EN*.}

The conclusion to be drawn from Aristotle’s selective mode of presentation and my interpretation of 6.12-3 is that the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) does not pose a
real threat to the robust interpretation of wish. (1) and (2) aren’t a problem, because they represent Aristotle account of virtue of character before he fills out virtue’s substantial rational aspect. Moreover, the passages discussed in (3) are not a problem, because they can be interpreted in a way that supports, rather than refutes, the robust account of wish.

My aim in this chapter is to argue that that we need not read the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) as entailing anti-intellectualism. That is, my goal in this chapter is to argue that the passages outlined in (1)-(3) do not present an insurmountable problem for the robust account of wish, and may reasonably be read in a way that supports the robust account.

**II. Aristotle’s Selective Manner of Presentation and the Early Books’ (Incomplete) Account of Virtue**

II.1 Evidence of a Selective Manner of Presentation

Having established the two kinds of virtues in 1.13—the virtues of character and the virtues of intellect—Aristotle begins book II with an examination of virtue of character. This examination appears to run up until book VI, when Aristotle moves on to discuss the virtues of intellect, including *phronēsis*. But despite his announcement at 6.1 1139a1-3 that, having discussed the virtues of character, it is time to turn to the intellectual virtues, Aristotle clearly does not take his account of virtue to be completed by the end of

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136 “After we divided the virtues of the soul, it was said that some are virtues of character and some of intellect. And so, having completed our discussion of the virtues of character, let us now discuss the others as follows, after speaking first about the soul” (6.1 1139a1-3).
book 5. This is because he takes phronēsis itself to play a role in virtue of character, as is clear from the following definition of virtue he gives at 2.6 1106b36:

> Virtue, then, is a state (hexis) involving decision (prohairetikē), lying in a mean relative to us, a mean determined by reason, namely the reason by which the phronimos would determine it” (horismenē logo kai ho an ho phronimos horiseien) (2.6 1106b36-1107a2).

The reference to the phronimos in the 2.6 definition signals to the reader that an examination of phronēsis will be necessary to complete the account of virtue of character.

And indeed, we see Aristotle at 6.1 acknowledging just this fact:

> Since we said earlier that we must decide on (airesthai) the mean condition, not the excess or deficiency, and that the intermediate condition is as the correct reason (logos orthos) says, let us now determine what it says (6.1 1138b18- 20, italics mine).

Aristotle’s reference to the “earlier” claim that one must choose the mean action according with correct reason is a clear allusion back to 2.6 1106b36-1107a2’s official definition of virtue, and that definition’s reference to the phronimos’ “reason” that determines the mean. Aristotle in the 6.1 passage is acknowledging that the official definition’s reference to the reason of the phronimos entails that a discussion of phronēsis is necessary to complete the account of virtue, since the correct reason that determines the mean is nothing other than phronēsis. It is on these grounds that Aristotle proposes to investigate phronēsis in 6.

Assuming that the foregoing is correct, then it’s reasonable to think that Aristotle intends his reference to phronēsis in 2.6 1106b36-1107a2’s official definition of virtue to act as a placeholder until he can, via a full discussion of phronēsis in book 6, present virtue’s intellectual aspect and hence complete the account of virtue of character.

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137 See also a reference to correct reason (orthos logos) at 2.2 1103b32-4
138 “And the correct reason (orthos logos) is phronēsis” (6.13 1144b23-4).
Aristotle, recognizing that virtue involves both a non-rational and a rational element, consciously holds off until book 6 to discuss the rational element in detail. The result is that the early books’ account of virtue is incomplete, insofar as it represents only one aspect of virtue: its non-rational aspect.

Presenting the components of virtue in a selective manner makes sense, if Aristotle thinks that the different elements of virtue have an important role. For one way that one can bring to the fore (e.g.) non-rational desire’s role and its importance in virtue is by discussing it in isolation from virtue’s other element.

If, as I have argued, it is reason, rather than non-rational desire, that supplies the agent with the wishes that underlie her virtuous decisions, what makes non-rational desire so important that Aristotle sees it crucial to treat non-rational desire in isolation, and do so at the significant length that he does? To answer this question, we ought to look at three roles in virtue that Aristotle clearly attributes to non-rational desire, roles that don’t involve supplying an agent with her wishes, but which are roles that Aristotle nonetheless has reason to emphasize.

II.2 Roles for Non-Rational Desire

Let us reflect on three roles for non-rational desire in virtue. (1) A controlled state of the non-rational part is a pre-requisite for the formation of a prohairesis. If an agent’s non-rational part is dominated by unruly desires or willful activity, a prohairesis is unlikely to form at all. (2) A controlled non-rational part allows for the ready execution of reason’s prohaireseis. An uncontrolled non-rational part may issue in desires that conflict with
reason’s *prohairesis*, causing an agent to act against the action prescribed by the *prohairesis*. (3) A well-ordered non-rational part allows reason to do its work without distortion; a poorly-ordered non-rational part can corrupt the reasoning of the rational part so as to lead reason to issue in a *bad prohairesis*. (4) A well-ordered non-rational part is partly constitutive of virtue. Let us examine these four roles in detail.

Starting at the most basic level, a good condition of an agent’s non-rational part is important because it facilitates the *formation* of a *prohairesis* in the first place. If an agent is in a state of constant pre-occupation with unruly desires demanding immediate satisfaction, then the agent lacks the sort of “internal calm” needed for an agent to go through with forming a *prohairesis*; in such cases, the agent will act straightaway on impulse. It seems to be for this reason that Aristotle says that young people should not be students of political science. Because youth tend to be emotional, they lack the internal calm that provides the mental space required to form *prohairesis* and thus do not engage in ethical action on *prohairesis*.139

In addition to being crucial for the *formation* of a *prohairesis*, a good condition of one’s non-rational part is necessary for the ready *execution* of a *prohairesis*. We’ve seen that when the non-rational part of the soul is in good condition, its desires “agree with reason in everything” (1.13 1102b28); the non-rational part obeys the rational part and is ready to fall in line with the *prohairesis* issued by reason. By contrast, when the non-rational part fails to be in a good condition, its desires conflict with the recommendations

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139 “Since [a young person] lives according to his feelings (*kata pathos*), his study will be futile and useless, for the end [of political science] is action, not knowledge. It does not make a difference whether the man is young in age or immature in character since the deficiency does not depend on age, but results from following his feelings in this life and in a given pursuit; for an immature person, like an (*kathaper*) incontinent person, gets no benefit from his knowledge.” 1095a2-10). Note that Aristotle compares young people to incontinent people does not say that they are incontinent people. Presumably they are like incontinent people because they tend to act on impulse, and presumably they fail to be identical to incontinent people because they fail to form *prohairesis* in the first place.
of the rational part, potentially causing the agent to act against her prohairesis. This is the condition of continent and incontinent people whose non-rational parts “clash and struggle with reason” (1.13 1102b 18) and have “impulses in contrary directions” (1.13 1102b22). Such conflict potentially tempts the agent to act against her prohairesis, threatening the goal of ethical action on prohairesis.

A third way in which a well-ordered non-rational part is important for the achievement of ethical action: a well-ordered non-rational part helps ensure that the prohairesis that reason forms are correct prohairesis. If a person has excessive appetites for (say) bodily pleasure, her reason may as a result adopt false value judgments about pleasure and so fail to arrive at the correct prohairesis; in this way a bad non-rational part can corrupt the reasoning processes that lead to an agent’s prohairesis. Aristotle emphasizes this potential “distorting” effect of non-rational desire, pointing out that a person must have controlled appetites if her reason is to arrive at the proper reasoned conception of the good. Passages abound in the Ethics about the “deception” (apatê) about the end comes out because of pleasure (3.4 1113a33); our deliberations concerning pleasure in particular may be “bribed” or “biased” (adekastoi) (2.9 1109b7). In such passages, Aristotle suggests that, given our inclination for pleasure, a well-controlled state of non-rational desire is crucial for us to form and maintain the grasp of the end furnished by phronēsis. This seems to be what he has in mind when he describes an inseparable connection between temperance and phronēsis: “This is also how we come to give temperance (sôphrosunê) its name, because we think that it preserves phronēsis (sôzousan tên phronēsin) (6.5 1140b 12-4). Here, Aristotle suggests that a
controlled state of one’s non-rational part has a sort of “preservative power”\textsuperscript{141}, a power to preserve the conception of the good recommended by reason; presumably it preserves such a conception of the good by keeping in check influences that can potentially corrupt an agent’s reasoning, influences like appetitive pre-occupation with bodily pleasures.\textsuperscript{142}

Finally, non-rational desire has a constitutive role in virtue. Recall that the human function is a practical life of what possesses reason (\textit{tou logon echontos}), where reasoning comes in two kinds: (i) reason-responsiveness (\textit{epipeithes logoi}) of the \textit{alogon} and (ii) deliberation. To the extent that a good condition of the \textit{alogon} is part of the human function, it follows that well-ordered non-rational desire is partly constitutive of virtue.

These four roles for non-rational desire make clear that Aristotle has reason to emphasize non-rational desire. He has reason to employ a selective manner of presentation, because such a manner is effective at conveying the importance of non-rational desire in virtue.

II.3 Implications of the Selective Manner of Presentation

\textsuperscript{141} Richard Sorabji uses this phrase. Sorabji [1], 213.

\textsuperscript{142} It is important to stress that the fact that non-rational desires must be in a controlled state if one is both to acquire and preserve the correct conception of the good, we do not commit ourselves to saying that non-rational desires are themselves the source of this conception of the good. The source of this conception of the good, as I argued in chapter 1, is \textit{phronesis}-informed reasoning; a controlled state of the non-rational part is simply a necessary pre-requisite for reason to be able to do its proper work.
If we take seriously the possibility that the early books’ account is substantially incomplete, we immediately see that the textual evidence outlined in (1) and (2) does not by itself pose a problem to intellectualism. Take the passages outlined in (2). There, we see Aristotle emphasizing the role of habit and pre-rational pleasures and pain training in the acquisition of virtue, but we do not see him mentioning the role of reasoning or deliberative training. The selective manner of interpretation helps explain this in a manner friendly to intellectualism; Aristotle doesn’t mention deliberative or reasoning capacities not because they play a relatively unimportant role, but rather because he is here focusing on only one aspect of virtue—its non-rational aspect—and hence is focusing on only one aspect of virtue’s acquisition—its non-rational aspect.

Or consider (1): Aristotle’s assigning of virtue to the non-rational part in 1.13 and separating it from *phronēsis*. Again, the selective manner of interpretation has an intellectualism-friendly explanation for Aristotle’s associating virtue with the non-rational part. Aristotle assigns virtue to the non-rational part not because he takes the intellect to have only a minimal role in virtue, but rather because he is here focusing only on the non-rational aspect of virtue.

Given Aristotle’s selective mode of interpretation in the *EN*, we should wait until book 6’s discussion of the rational elements of virtue before deciding whether virtue is a primarily non-rational condition. For book 6 may offer clues on the rational elements of virtue that show that the nonrational portrait of virtue in the early books is substantially incomplete. Book 6 may fill out the early books’ picture of virtue in a way that gives reason the role of specifying the agent’s ends. The anti-intellectualist interpretation relies on the assumption that book 6 only makes a minor addition to the account of virtue of
character offered in the early books of the *EN*. It assumes that book 6 simply fleshes out a technical ability that *phronēsis* adds to virtue, and that the early books’ account of virtue is therefore more or less a complete account.

But does anything in book 6 suggest that Aristotle there assigns reason the role of selecting ends, thus substantially offsetting the non-rational portrait of virtue in the early books? In the next section I argue that there is a way of interpreting book 6 such that Aristotle is doing precisely this. As I will argue, there is a way of reading book 6 that allows us to see the early books as offering a substantially incomplete portrait of virtue, a portrait that book 6 ultimately corrects by making clear, particularly in 6.12 and 6.13, the role that reasoning, rather than non-rational desire, plays in supplying the virtuous agent with her ends.

**III. Book 6: The Role of Phronēsis in Virtue of Character**

To defend the claim that book 6 substantially expands the account of virtue in the early books of the *EN*, I here offer a reading of book 6—with emphasis on 6.12 and 6.13—that shows Aristotle in 6 attributing to *phronēsis* the role of determining an agent’s wishes. Presenting and defending my reading comes in two steps. My first step involves focusing on book 6’s comparison of *phronēsis* with political science. Here, my goal is to argue that this comparison puts to rest any interpretation that attributes to Aristotle a Humean picture of reason. This step, we will see, does not in itself offer much positive support for my interpretation of Aristotelian wish and decision; it merely resolves an obstacle to my reading. My second step is the more important step, in that it offers a particular
interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13, one that, if true, attributes to phronēsis and not to non-rational desire the moral role in EN virtue.

III.1 Phronēsis and Political Science

Let us begin by addressing the question of whether Aristotle thinks that reason can specify final ends at all. For some of Aristotle’s comments might seem to place him in a Humean camp that relegates reason to the domain of finding technical means to antecedently-determined ends;143 on this Humean view, reason can tell us what actions are instrumental in bringing about given ends, but it cannot recommend ultimate ends themselves. Might Aristotle follow Hume in this respect?

Book 6’s comments about phronēsis rule out this possibility. An indication that Aristotle rejects the view that reason has a narrow scope comes from his comment that political science is the same state as phronēsis (6.8 1141b23-4).144 This comment is important, because it suggests that we can learn something about the nature of phronēsis-informed deliberation if we examine the nature of the inquiry undertaken in the Ethics. For Aristotle describes the inquiry of the Ethics as an exercise of “political science” (1.2 1094b12-3). This suggests that the inquiry of the Ethics is itself an exercise of phronēsis-informed reasoning, and that examining the nature of inquiry undertaken in the Ethics can tell us something about the nature of phronēsis.

143 See, for example, his remark that nous or dianoia by itself moves nothing (EN 6 1139a35, DA 3.10 433a23) 144 “Political science (politikē) and phronēsis are the same state (hexis), but their being (to einai) is not the same” (6.8 1141b23-4).
The comment that political science is the same state as *phronēsis* thus prompts us to investigate what sort of reasoning we see in the *Ethics*. Now, as early as 1.2, Aristotle makes it clear that he takes the *Ethics* to be an inquiry into the nature of the final good for man, stating that we must try to grasp “in outline” the final good. Such a final good, if identified, will be of tremendous practical benefit, for it will be a target at which we, like archers, can aim (1.2 1094a21-4). Because the *Ethics* seeks to identify the final good, Aristotle subsequently takes a dialectical turn (1.4 1095a17) toward the *endoxa* about the human good.

It is clear, then, that the inquiry in the *Ethics* is a search for the final good for man, a search that Aristotle thinks will lead to great benefit. If this is right, and if we take seriously Aristotle’s identification of political science with *phronēsis*, we have considerable evidence that Aristotle takes reason to be capable of determining final ends and not simply means.

The fact that reason can, on Aristotle’s view, all by itself specify final ends does not show that reason does play the role in virtue of supplying the virtuous agent with her ends. For perhaps Aristotle thinks that such reasoning about the good is the business of a philosopher or statesman and not be the business of the on-the-ground virtuous deliberator; he may think that the virtuous person *qua* virtuous—and not *qua* statesman or philosopher—receives her goals not from reasoned reflection about the good but rather from habituation. And indeed, it might seem that 6.12 and 6.13’s division of labor passages are making precisely this point that the virtuous person *qua* virtuous receives her wishes and ends from habituated non-rational desire. For those passages are concerned with proving the utility of *phronēsis* to the morally virtuous person *qua*...
virtuous; they are concerned with showing why the morally virtuous person needs to acquire *phronēsis*.

6.12 and 6.13 remain, then, a potential problem for the robust interpretation of wish. In the next section, I present an alternative interpretation to the one that we have considered thus far. Reading 6.12 and 6.13 along the interpretive lines that I present, we can see 6.12 and 6.13 completing the picture of virtue in a way that makes clear the important moral role of reason in virtue.

III.2 6.12 and 6.13

In 6.12 and 6.13 Aristotle discusses the relationship between virtue and *phronēsis*, a discussion prompted by an objector who questions the virtuous person’s need to possess *phronēsis*. In this section, I put forward a particular reading of the main passages in these chapters. On the reading I put forward, Aristotle answers the objector by making clear that genuine virtue is a condition in which *phronēsis* has a major moral role to play.

§The Objection

In 6.12 Aristotle takes on an imaginary objector who asks of what use *phronēsis* is. The objector begins by noting that in the case of health, we do not think that knowledge of what contributes to a healthy state is necessary for an agent to act in a way characteristic of health. For if an agent is already healthy, then healthy actions will proceed from his state regardless of whether he has knowledge of medicine; health, being a disposition of
the body, automatically issues in healthy activity, and so an agent need not learn
medicine if he is to act in a way that the healthy person acts. Why, so the objection goes,
should the case of phronēsis and practical goodness be any different from the case of
medical knowledge and bodily goodness? For if someone is good she thereby has a
consistent virtuous disposition, and so will do good acts regardless of whether she heself
possesses phronēsis. In the objector’s words: “If phronēsis concerns the just and the fine
and the good, and these things are that which it is characteristic of the good man to do,
and he will become no more a doer of these things in virtue of having knowledge, if the
virtues are dispositions…” (1143b21-8).

According to the interpretation of Aristotle’s response that I will motivate in a
moment, Aristotle responds to the objection by clarifying for the objector what genuine
virtue is and showing that the objection rests on a false conception of virtue. He thinks
that once the objector understands what genuine virtue is, he will no longer question
phronēsis’ importance to the virtuous person. However, to see why Aristotle takes the
objection to rest on a false conception of virtue, we need to take a closer look at what the
objector’s conception of virtue is. We can get a sense of the objector’s conception by
examining in greater detail the full challenge he poses to Aristotle. The objector reasons
as follows:

…[S]hould we say [phronēsis] is useful for becoming good? In that case it will be
no use to those who are already excellent. Nor, however, will it be any use to
those who are not. For it will make no difference to them whether they have it
themselves or obey others who have it (ouden gar dioisei autous echein è allois
echousi peithesthai). And that will suffice for us, just as it is with health: we wish
to be healthy, but still do not learn medical science (hikanōs t' echoi an hémin
hóspér kai peri tén hugieian: boulomenoi gar hugiainein homós ou manthanomen
iatrikēn) (6.12 1143b28-34).
We should begin by considering the analogy with physical fitness and athletic training that the objector invokes at 1143b26-8. We might think that for one to become physically fit, that person need not herself possess the expertise related to athletic training. For to be physically fit is to possess a state from which physically fit activities flow, and to have this state, one need not personally possess the expertise that produces it. What one really needs is *access* to a person who possesses such expertise; such a person can then use that expertise to produce physical fitness in oneself by subjecting one to the proper training. By obeying the trainer’s instructions, one can gradually acquire the state of physical fitness and the activities that flow from fitness, and in this way, a person can come to do all the actions that flow from physical fitness without possessing the knowledge that produces physical fitness.

The objector seems to think that we can apply by analogy the case of physical fitness and knowledge of physical fitness to the case of virtue and *phronēsis*. On the objector’s view, just as we can engage in the activities that flow from a state of physical fitness without ourselves possessing knowledge about what produces physical fitness, so too can we decide on virtuous actions without having the knowledge that pertains to these virtuous actions; in both cases, what we need is merely access to someone else who possesses that expertise. As the objector argues, “it will make no difference to [those wanting to be virtuous] whether they have [*phronēsis*] themselves or obey others who have it (ouden gar dioisei autous echein è allois echousi peithesthai).”

There seems to be two possible scenarios that the objector may be envisaging when he argues that one can acquire virtue by “obeying others who have [*phronēsis*] (è allois echousi peithesthai).” The objector may be envisaging a case where a non-
phronimos’ rational part, being sophisticated enough to recognize the intellectual superiority or expertise of another individual, makes a rational choice to heed the advice of that individual. The person’s rational part adopts as her own the ends or goals that the phronimos recommends, and thus is able to do decide on virtuous actions. Alternatively, the objector may be envisaging a case where a non-phronimos’ non-rational part heeds the advice, instruction, or persuasion of some external source of phronêsis and adopts certain ends as a result. On this interpretation, the objector is arguing that affective habituation under an external source of phronêsis is sufficient to supply the agent with the right moral principles and ends, and so is sufficient to produce in the agent the disposition to consistently decide on the proper actions.

I believe that there is evidence to support the latter over the former reading. This evidence comes from an earlier passage at 1.13 where Aristotle considers a formally similar situation in which an intellectually inferior party heeds the instruction or persuasion of an intellectually superior party. To see why this 1.13 passage seems to imply the second reading of the objection at 6.12, we must examine the 1.13 passage:

...[A] [T]he appetite (epithumêtikon) and in general desiring part (holOs orektikon) does in a way have a share in [reason] (metechei), i.e., insofar as it is capable of listening to it and obeying it (katêkoon estin autou kai peitharchikon); [B] it is the way one has reason (echein logon) when one [is persuaded] by one’s father or loved ones, not the way one has reason in (for example) mathematics. [C] That the non-rational is in a way persuaded by (peithetai) reason is indicated by the giving of advice (nouthetêsís), and by all reproof (epitimêsís) and exhortation (paraklêsís). [D] If one should call this too “having reason,” then the one aspect of soul that possesses reason will also be double in nature: one element of it will have it in the full sense and in itself, another as something listening [to reason] as to (hosper) a father. [E] Virtue too is divided according to this difference; for we call some of them intellectual virtues, others virtues of character (1.13 1102b30-1103a4).
Aristotle in this passage considers a case that is formally similar to that which 6.12 considers: a case in which a rationally-inferior party is “persuaded by” (peithetai) a rationally-superior party to take some recommended practical direction. (Note the similar language peithesthai in both the 1.13 and the 6.12 passages). In the 6.12 passage, the two parties in question are separate individuals, whereas in the 1.13 passage the two parties are parts of the soul within the same person.

The 1.13 passage is also important because it seems to consider this case in a way that paves the way for 6.12’s objection that the virtuous person needn’t herself be a phronimos. Note first that Aristotle has identified virtue of character throughout the Ethics as a type of “accordance with reason” (2.6 1107a1, 6.1 1138b20-5, cf. 3.7 1115b19, 3.11 1119a20, 1119b18, 6.1 1138b20-5). The 1.13 passage seems to assign virtue of character to the non-rational part of the soul ([E]), and this assignment might lead one to believe that virtue of character amounts to the non-rational part “according with” or “listening to” reason. Such an understanding of virtue of character leads to the autonomy worry once we combine it with 1.13’s claim that the alogon, in being “persuaded by” the rational part ([C]), partakes in reason in the way that a child who listens to a father partakes in reason (hosper tou patros akoustikon ti) ([D]). For the allusion here to paternal authority may very well make the reader think it fine for the persuasion involved in virtue to be administered by an external rather than internal rational principle.

In taking literally the allusion to parental authority, would such a reader be grossly over-reading what Aristotle presents as a mere a metaphor? No, for it seems that Aristotle intends the allusion to parental authority to go beyond the level of metaphor.
The fact that Aristotle thinks that a child’s obedient response to parental admonition is evidence that the *alogon* listens to reason suggests that Aristotle takes a child’s obedient response to parental admonition to be *analogous* and *continuous* with, if not identical with, the response made by an *alogon* to an internal source of reason. As Broadie points out:

Aristotle points to the actual exercise of authority in family or community as providing further evidence that there exists a part of the soul capable of listening to reason: ‘That the non-rational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation’ (1102b33-1103a1). The reference to every sort of reproof etc. cancels any suggestion that he has in mind only self-admonition, self-reproach and the rest. He is squarely considering paradigm cases where the parties are distinct individuals.\(^{146}\)

Thus, to the reader of the 1.13 passage, it is reasonable for the following questions to arise: is there a morally relevant difference between an agent’s listening to an external, as opposed to an internal, source of reason? If not, and if moral virtue just is a matter of one’s *alogon* listening to some source of reason, what reason is there for an agent to acquire her own *phronēsis* rather than to rely on that of another?

Thus, the 1.13 passage anticipates the very objection that 6.12 raises. (Recall the 6.12 challenge: “Nor, however, will [*phronēsis*] be any use to those who are not [already good]. For it will make no difference to them whether they have it themselves or obey others who have it” (*ouden gar dioisei autous echein è allois echousi peithesthai*) (6.12 1143b30-1)).

These two considerations—the fact that 1.13 and 6.12 consider scenarios that are formally identical and the fact that 1.13 considers the scenario in a way that anticipates the autonomy objection at 6.12—suggest that the objector at 6.12 has been influenced by

\(^{146}\) Broadie, 63.
the 1.13 passage and has 1.13 in mind when he presents his objection. Now in 1.13 we have a person’s non-rational part heeding to the advice or persuasion of a rational part; we do not have a rational part heeding the advice or persuasion of another rational part. It follows, then, that the objector at. 6.12 most likely is raising a case in which it is a non-*phronimos*’ non-rational part in particular that is heeding the advice, instruction, or persuasion of some external source of *phronēsis*; the objector is not envisaging a case in which the non-*phronimos*’ rational part makes a rational choice to follow the advice of another.

Thus, so far on this interpretation of the objection, we can understand the objector as envisaging a case where the virtuous person receives her virtuous goals from non-rational habituation under an external source of *phronēsis*; she does not receive her goals from reasoning. With this interpretation of the objector’s proposal in mind, we can see that the objector is assuming an anti-intellectualist conception of virtue: the objector makes virtue a primarily non-rational condition by denying that virtuous decisions necessarily arise out of reasoning about the good.

The objector’s holding such a conception of virtue is not unreasonable, given Aristotle’s comments about virtue in the early books of the *EN*. For Aristotle’s assignment of virtue of character to the non-rational part and his description of habituation as involving primarily habituation in pleasures and pains encourages the objector to think that the virtuous person’s ends needn’t arise out of deliberative reasoning.
§ Aristotle’s Response to the Objection (I): The Importance of Rationally-Derived Ends for Virtuous Prohaireseis

It is, I will argue, this feature of the objector’s conception of virtue that Aristotle first targets in his response to the objection: Aristotle argues that the conception of virtue assumed by the objector is flawed to the extent that it insists that non-rational habituation is sufficient to supply the virtuous person’s ends. As we shall see, Aristotle clarifies for the objector genuine virtue by arguing that virtuous prohaireseis and desires do not arise out of a non-rationally-derived grasp of the end. By showing that the virtuous decisions and desires characteristic of virtue decisively depend on rationally-derived ends, Aristotle makes clear that virtuous ends cannot arise out of habituation of one’s non-rational part by an external source of phronēsis.

To motivate this interpretation of Aristotle’s response, let us look at the following passage:

[A] First, let us state that phronēsis and wisdom must necessarily be desirable in themselves, if virtues they are, each of one of the two soul-parts in question, even if neither of themselves produces anything at all...[B] The next point is that they are in fact productive: not in the way medical expertise produces health, but in the way health does—this is how wisdom produces happiness; for since it is a part of virtue as a whole it is the possession of it, and its exercise, that make a person happy. [C] And further the product (ergon) is completed because of phronēsis and virtue of character. [D] For virtue makes (poei) the goal (skopos) correct, but phronēsis [makes correct] the things leading to the [goal] (ta pros touton).... [E] Concerning the charge that phronēsis in no way makes one more of a doer of fine and just actions, we must go further back, taking up this beginning: [F] Just as we say that some people do just things while not yet being just, for example those doing the things ordered by the laws either unwillingly or because of ignorance or because of some other thing, and not because of the things themselves, although they do that which is necessary and that which the good person must do, in this way, it seems, it is possible for a person of a certain disposition to do each of these with the result that he is a good person, I mean (hoion) [doing them] because of decision (dia prohairesin) and for the sake of the actions themselves.
Virtue, then, makes the decision (prohairesis) right, but the doing (to prattesthai) of whatever by nature is to be done for the sake of the decision (ekinês heneka) is not the business of virtue but of some other capacity (6.12 1144a6-22).

Aristotle begins [at (A)] by arguing that phronêsis, being an excellence of the rational part, is desirable and worth choosing for its own sake, and would be so even if it made no contribution to goodness in action. In other words, phronêsis has value independently of its causing us to be good ethical agents in the world. But he then asserts (at [B]) that phronêsis in fact does make a contribution to practical goodness; phronêsis contributes to our practical goodness, in the sense that it facilitates our acting virtuously.

What is phronêsis’ contribution to practical goodness? Aristotle tells us (at [C]) that phronêsis helps complete the ergon, where “ergon” seems to mean “practical goodness” or “genuine virtue.” He then explains this claim about phronêsis’ contribution by saying that phronêsis makes correct the things leading to an agent’s goal (ta pros touton, [D]). This claim is on its own vague, but [E] suggests that Aristotle begins to flesh out what he has in mind in [F]. Let us, then, turn to [F].

In [F], Aristotle distinguishes between (i) doing virtuous actions and (ii) doing virtuous actions virtuously. He contrasts two sorts of people, person A and person B, both of whom do right actions, but only one of whom actually counts as a virtuous person. Both A and B have their desires focused on the right actions and ends, and in this way do “what is necessary and that which the good person must do.” However, person B, but not person A, performs those actions in a particular way, a way which, according to Aristotle, actually makes B virtuous and not merely a doer of virtuous actions: person B, unlike A, performs virtuous actions “because of decision (dia prohairesin) and for the sake of the
actions themselves (autôn heneka prattomenôn).” This suggests that Aristotle seems to think that *phronesis’* contribution to practical goodness is a contribution that helps distinguish person A from person B; *phronēsis* has a role in practical goodness that helps distinguish the person who merely performs the proper actions from the person who not only performs the proper actions but performs them *because* she has a virtuous *prohairesis*.

What exactly is this role that *phronēsis* plays in person B’s action but not in person A’s action? What role does *phronēsis* play in the formation of the virtuous *prohairesis* that makes person B, but not person A, virtuous? And, moreover, why isn’t an *external* source of *phronēsis* capable of playing this role? After all, to answer the objection, Aristotle must not simply show that *some* source of *phronēsis* plays a role in virtue; he must show that a person’s *own* *phronēsis* plays a critical role.

Defenders of the robust account of wish have answers to these questions. Because on this view wishes (and thus decisions) by nature have reasoning about final ends in their causal history, habituation of non-rational desires cannot result in virtuous decisions. Given that *phronēsis* is what gets an agent the rationally-derived wishes that are a pre-requisite for a virtuous *prohairesis*, one must have *phronēsis* if she is to be virtuous.

Is there any evidence that Aristotle offers this response to answer the objection? I think there is: if we look at 6.12’s and 6.13’s response to the objection, we can see an interpretation on which Aristotle makes these important connections I’ve just outlined between virtue, a virtuous *prohairesis*, and *phronēsis*. Consider again the first way in which Aristotle describes *phronēsis’* role in practical goodness or genuine virtue:
he says (at [D]) that phronësis makes right the things leading to the end (ta pros touton). We saw that his analysis (at [F]) of person A and person B seems to flesh out what he means by this, and that in that analysis, he seems to imply that a person’s own phronësis plays a critical role in the formation of the virtuous prohairesis that distinguishes truly virtuous person B from not virtuous person A. With that in mind, let us examine [D]’s claim that phronësis makes right the things leading to the end (ta pros touton). It’s possible that by this Aristotle means that phronësis ensures that an agent engages in the correct deliberative processes, the deliberative processes that lead the agent to a proper judgment of the end. On this interpretation, the ta pros touton are the reasoning processes ultimately responsible for one’s virtuous ends or conception of the good; and phronësis, by being an excellence of the rational part, is what ensures that those reasoning processes are the right ones. The idea is straightforward: without phronësis, one would not be able to arrive at the correct end, because one wouldn’t engage in the sort of phronësis-informed reasonings that are necessary to arrive at the correct end.

We can continue this interpretation as follows. Having established at [D] phronësis-informed reasoning’s role in getting the agent to the right end, Aristotle goes on to link having the right end with having a correct prohairesis. At [G] we see Aristotle describing phronësis’ contribution to a correct prohairesis as follows; he implicitly (not explicitly) says that phronësis [makes right] the things that are “for the sake of” (ekeinê heneka) the prohairesis. Now, I want to argue that here he is saying that phronësis contributes to a correct prohairesis partly because it supplies the agent with a rationally-derived end. That this is what he has in mind at [G] is suggested by the later division of labor passage at 6.13 1145a3-6. That passage reads as follows:
It is clear, even if \textit{phronēsis} did not lead to action (\textit{praktikē}), that there would be a need for it because of its being a virtue of its soul-part; and it is clear that a \textit{prohairesis} will not be correct in the absence of \textit{phronēsis}, or in the absence of virtue; for the one causes us to do (\textit{poiei prattein}) the end (\textit{telos}), the other causes us to do the things leading to the end (\textit{ta pros to telos}) (6.13 1145a3-6).

This passage is important because it explicitly tells us the role that \textit{phronēsis} plays that makes possessing \textit{phronēsis} crucial for the one wishing to have a virtuous \textit{prohairesis}. Aristotle says that \textit{phronēsis} contributes to a person’s coming to have a correct \textit{prohairesis} insofar as it is \textit{phronēsis} that causes one to do (\textit{poiei prattein}) or engage in the things that lead to the end (\textit{ta pros to telos}). Our analysis of [D] has already supplied us with an interpretation of this claim that \textit{phronēsis} makes right the things leading to the end; “the things leading to the end” are the deliberations or reasonings leading to an end or conception of the good, and \textit{phronēsis} makes them right in the sense that it ensures that the agent will engage in those deliberations that will lead to a correct grasp of the end. What the division of labor passage in 6.13 adds is the point that it is because \textit{phronēsis} plays this role—the role of making correct the deliberations leading to a correct grasp of the end—that possessing it is so critical for one to have a correct \textit{prohairesis}.

Thus, what we have so far here is Aristotle defending the utility of \textit{phronēsis} by stressing \textit{phronēsis’} role in producing a correct grasp of the end. Such a conception of the end is necessary for virtue partly because of the prohairetic aspect of virtue: insofar as we agree that the virtuous person doesn’t simply do actions but decides on them, and insofar as a \textit{prohairesis}, has its origins in a rationally-derived rather than a non-rationally-derived grasp of the end, it follows that one can have virtue only if one has the \textit{phronēsis} required to supply proper ends.
On this interpretation, then, when Aristotle at [G] says that *phronēsis* makes right the things “for the sake of” the decision, he is here attributing to *phronēsis* a critical moral role in the production of virtuous decisions; he is here pointing out *phronēsis*’ role in supplying the ends that underlies virtuous decisions. In supplying not just instrumental means but ends as well, *phronēsis* “makes right” the distinctly virtuous aspect of the virtuous person’s decisions; it does not simply make right the morally-neutral instrumental means-end deliberations involved in producing a decision.

This is a major step in Aristotle’s clarification of genuine virtue. It involves showing that virtue, insofar as it involves decision, necessarily involves rationally rather than non-rationally derived ends, and hence necessarily involves *phronēsis* on the agent’s part. It involves showing that the ends that underlie the virtuous person’s *prohairesēsis* aren’t simply non-rational desires that have been properly habituated under an external source of *phronēsis*. In this way, Aristotle corrects the objector’s conception of virtue according to which an agent has the ends required for virtuous decisions just in case her non-rational desires have been habituated by an external source of *phronēsis*.

But if it is *phronēsis*-informed reasoning that supplies the agent with the correct ends, what are we to make of Aristotle’s claim (at [D] and [G]) that *virtue* makes the aim or goal right? (1144a8, cf. 1144a20, 1145a5). To answer this question, it is necessary first to determine what Aristotle means by “virtue” here. The contrasting structure of the passages suggests that he has something non-rational in mind, something rather different from *phronēsis*. We have already seen that the objector presupposes a non-rational portrait of virtue, a portrait whereby the ends underlying virtuous decisions and desires do not arise out of reasoning about ends but rather out of habituation. I want to put
forward the possibility that when Aristotle says that virtue makes the end correct, he is adopting the objector’s sense of virtue, and is doing this in order to show the role that non-rational desire plays in what is virtue strictly speaking.

To see how one might develop this line, let us grant that “virtue” here is understood as a condition of the non-rational part, a condition similar to the objector’s conception of virtue. We have already seen (in section II) the important role non-rational desire plays in virtue, and in these division of labor passages, we can see (so this interpretive line argues) Aristotle honing in on one particular role that we discussed there: non-rational desire, by causing us to desire the actions and ends that accord with reason, makes reason’s recommendations ultimately effective. This is how we can understand the division of labor passages’ claims that virtue “causes us to do” (poiei prâtein) the end (telos) (1145a3-6); that virtue “makes right” the end (skopon) (1144a7-9); and that virtue makes right the prohairesis (1144a20-2). Here, virtue is “virtue” in the objector’s sense, and Aristotle is granting that virtue so construed plays an indispensable role in genuine virtue, or practical goodness; as a condition of the non-rational part, such virtue “makes correct” an agent’s conception of the end or prohairesis in the sense that it supplies the non-rational motivating power needed to make such a conception or prohairesis ultimately effective or implemented in action.

On this interpretation, then, the passage does not say that an agent gets her ends from non-rational desire; it says rather that she has the non-rational desire for these ends in virtue of having a controlled non-rational part; what supplies the ends is phronësis-informed reasoning about the good.
If this interpretation is right, then it shows the anti-intellectualist to be making the following sort of mistake when interpreting the division of labor passages. Recall that anti-intellectualists interpret the division of labor passages as limiting the role of reason in producing the wishes that underlie the virtuous person’s decisions and desires. Anti-intellectualists interpret the claim that virtue makes the end or *prohairesis* correct as saying that it is not reason but rather a non-rational condition, viz., virtue, that is responsible for an agent’s virtuous ends; on his view, reason specifies not ends but only instrumental means.

We now see that this interpretation is not necessary. For we can distinguish (i) what supplies a rational judgment about the end to be pursued from (ii) what supplies the desire for that end. Taking this distinction seriously, we need not see the contrast in the division of labor passages as a contrast between what specifies an end and what specifies the instrumental means to that end. We can instead see the contrast as being a contrast between two functions on one particular object. Specifically, we can see the contrast as being a contrast between what supplies an agent with her ends and what makes said ends ultimately effective; it is *phronēsis*-informed reasoning that supplies the former, and non-rational desire that supplies the latter.

§ Aristotle’s Response to the Objection (II): The Importance of a Rationally-Derived Ends for Virtuous Non-Rational Desires

On the interpretation developed thus far, Aristotle responds to the objection first by pointing out *phronēsis*’ role in providing the ends that are involved in acting on virtuous
decisions; he points out that *phronēsis* is necessary for virtue, because the virtuous person acts on a *prohairesis*, and thus acts on ends that are rationally rather than non-rationally-derived.

In 6.13 Aristotle adds to this answer, this time focusing on the importance of having a *phronēsis*-derived ends if one is to have the proper non-rational desires required for virtue; Aristotle argues for the utility of *phronēsis* by pointing out *phronēsis*’ role in giving adequate direction to a person’s non-rational desires. This addition comes in Aristotle’s discussion of natural and full virtue. Here is the most important passage from that discussion:

[A] We must, then, examine virtue over again. For virtue is similar [in this way] to *phronēsis*; as *phronēsis* is related to cleverness (*deinotēta*), not the same, but similar, so natural virtue (*phusikē aretē*) is related to full (*kurian*) virtue. [B] For each of us seems to possess his type of character to some extent by nature; for in fact we are just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, immediately from birth. [C] But still we look for some further condition to be full goodness (*to agathon kuriōs*), and to partake of these features in another way. [D] For these natural states belong even to children and to beasts, but [E] without understanding (*nou*) they are evidently harmful (*blaberai*). [F] Still, this much would seem to be clear: just as a strong body moving around without sight suffers a heavy fall because it has no sight, so it is with [virtue]. [G] But if someone acquires understanding (*noun*), he improves in his actions, and [H] the state he now has, though still similar [to the natural one], will be fully virtue. [I] And so, just as there are two sorts of conditions, cleverness (*deinotēs*) and *phronēsis*, in the part of the soul that has belief, so also there are two in the part that has character, natural virtue and full virtue (*kuriōs aretē*). [J] And of these, full virtue does not come about without *phronēsis* (6.13 1144b1-17).

In this passage, we see Aristotle again contrasting genuine virtue with a non-rational conception of virtue, and emphasizing the important role that *phronēsis* plays in the former. This non-rational conception of virtue is “natural virtue”; it appears to be a state of the non-rational part whereby the non-rational desires are focused on the proper
actions and ends, and as such it is a condition available to animals and small children ([B]). An animal whose natural state of non-rational desires disposes him to engage in dangerous behavior has “natural bravery” in the sense that its non-rational desires dispose him to do behaviors that are typically associated with bravery, behaviors like facing dangerous predators. Similarly, a child whose natural state of non-rational desires dispose the child to give to friends has “natural generosity” in the sense that his non-rational desires are focused on behaviors typically associated with generosity.

Now, natural virtue is not genuine virtue, Aristotle says, though they bear important similarities; [A] “natural virtue (phusikê aretê) is related to full (kurian) virtue” insofar as they are “not the same but similar.” Presumably they are similar to the extent that they both involve having one’s non-rational desires focused on the proper objects and actions. We have also seen how they are dissimilar: genuine virtue, insofar as it involves excellent prohairesis, involves having a rationally-derived ends that issue in that prohairesis. Given that animals and children lack reason altogether, they are incapable of having the rationally-derived conception of the good that is a pre-requisite for having any prohairesis at all (let alone a virtuous one). To the extent that animals lack reason and hence phronêsis, they cannot have the virtuous prohairesis characteristic of virtue.

But here in 6.13 Aristotle makes a further point about how phronêsis contributes to virtue. Up until now, he has focused on phronêsis’ role in producing the rationally-derived conception of the good that is a necessary material for forming a prohairesis; here, he draws attention away from this role of phronêsis and instead focuses on phronêsis’ role in supplying the agent’s non-rational desires with the right direction. Aristotle here expresses skepticism at the possibility of one acquiring the proper state of
non-rational desires without possessing *phronēsis*; he says that “natural” virtue (and presumably “habituated” virtue as well), is like a heavy body that suffers a heavy fall as a result of not having sight ([F]), suggesting that non-rational desire, when not supplemented by reason, is unlikely to achieve a state whereby it perfectly aligns itself with the right actions and ends. Without *phronēsis*, one’s non-rational desires from time to time will inevitably attach to the wrong objects or ends, so that a person will “improve” in her actions, only if these non-rational desires are supplemented by understanding (*noun*) [G]. So here, Aristotle suggests that “natural virtue” is in reality quite limited in ensuring correct action; *phronēsis* is necessary to ensure that non-rational desires are properly directed.

What exactly does Aristotle have in mind here? He seems to be pointing out that non-rational desires are most likely to focus consistently on the right actions if they are directed by a correct *prohairesis*, that is, a *prohairesis* that is issued by the agent’s *phronēsis*-informed reasoning. That is, he seems to think that one will have the proper appetites and spirited desires only if one has the proper *phronēsis*-issued *prohaireses* from which to take their cue. This is a reasonable view to take, given that Aristotle thinks that hitting upon the mean definitive of a virtuous response is a rather nuanced and hence difficult aim, one requiring taking into account various weights and measures of the different human goods at stake.\(^{147}\)

Thus, in 6.13, Aristotle offers a second reason while *phronēsis* is necessary for

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\(^{147}\) “Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it hits upon what is intermediate. Moreover, there are many ways to go astray, since badness is proper to what is unlimited as the Pythagoreans said, and good to what is limited; but there is only one way to be correct. That is why error is easy and correctness hard, (since missing the target is easy and hitting it is hard. And so for this reason also excess and deficiency are proper to vice, the mean to virtue; ‘for we are noble in only one way, but bad in all sorts of ways’ (2.6 1106b27-33).
virtue: in addition to being necessary for a person to have a virtuous *prohairesis*, *phronēsis* is necessary for a person to consistently have the proper non-rational desires. Without *phronēsis*, one will not simply lack a virtuous *prohairesis*; one will also lack non-rational desires that are consistently focused on the proper objects and actions, since non-rational desire, when not supplemented by *phronēsis*-issued *prohairesis*, is like a blind moving body. Non-rational desires will consistently be focused on the intermediate action only if those non-rational desires are responses to *prohairesis* issued by *phronēsis*-informed reasoning.

If what I have said so far is correct, then we can summarize 6.12’s and 6.13’s response to the objection as follows. Aristotle’s primary strategy in answering the objection is to clarify his conception of genuine virtue in a way that allows him to show that, contrary to the claims of the objector, the virtuous person must possess *phronēsis*; the virtuous person cannot rely on the *phronēsis* of someone else. And he does this by making clear that in genuine virtue, *phronēsis* has a critical *moral* role to play, a role that the objector’s (false) conception of virtue neglects. This role is none other than that of supplying the agent with a conception of the good, a conception of the good that is ultimately responsible both for supplying the agent’s virtuous decisions and for giving an agent’s non-rational desires proper direction; in Aristotle’s words, *phronēsis* “makes right” the things leading to the end or decision (*ta pros to telos*), where by this he means that *phronēsis* ensures the correctness of the reasonings needed to lead to a correct grasp of the end. In this way, he rejects the objector’s conception of virtue according to which the virtuous agent’s conception of the good has its origins not in reasoning but rather in pre-rational habituation of one’s non-rational part.
§ Implications of this Interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13

I have offered an interpretation of 6.12 and 6.13 according to which 6.12 and 6.13 correct the early books’ non-rational portrait of virtue. In particular, I have argued that Aristotle corrects this picture primarily by emphasizing the role that *phronēsis* plays in supplying the virtuous person’s conception of the good; this conception of the good supplies the wishes that underlie the virtuous person’s decisions and gives proper direction to her non-rational desires.

If I am right that Aristotle in 6.12 and 6.13 emphasizes this role for *phronēsis*, then we can understand Aristotle in 6.12 and 6.13 as building upon the earlier books’ non-rational portrait of virtue in order to show a substantially expanded picture of virtue of character. Having focused on virtue’s non-rational aspects in the early books, Aristotle waits until book 6 to present virtue’s rational aspects, operating in this selective manner in order to convey the important roles that both non-rational desire and reason play in virtue. The result is that in the early books Aristotle focuses almost exclusively on virtue’s non-rational parts, presenting a portrait of virtue that is significantly incomplete. For in genuine virtue, we learn in 6.12 and 6.13, it is reason and not non-rational desire that has the leading role of supplying an agent with her conception of the good.

Interpreting Aristotle’s mode of presentation and 6.12 and 6.13 along these lines, we can show that the evidence outlined in (1)-(3) needn’t be read along anti-intellectualist lines presented in section I; rather, we can interpret such evidence in a way that is friendly to a robust conception of wish.
I am not arguing that the evidence outlined in (1)-(3) cannot be read in a way to support anti-intellectualism; in fact, I do think that there are anti-intellectualist readings of the evidence in (1)-(3) that are internally consistent and compatible with the *EN*. My aim instead has been to show that the textual evidence outlined in (1)-(3) does not on its own refute the account of virtue of character I argued for in chapter 5, and I have done this by trying to show that there is an interpretation of Aristotle’s mode of presentation and of 6.12 and 6.13 that helps explain away (1)-(3) in a manner friendly to my robust interpretation of Aristotelian wish and decision.
CHAPTER 7

SLAVES’, WOMEN’S, AND CHILDREN’S RATIONAL CAPACITIES

I. Introduction

Let us take stock. In chapters 2-4 I argued that the human *alogon* can prompt an agent to pursue the fine as such. My argument rested on an interpretation of what it is for the reason-responsive part of the soul (the *alogon*) to obey (*peitharchei, peitharchikon*), listen to (*euêkoôteron, katêkoon*) or harmonize with (*homophônei*) reason. On the view I put forward, one of the features that make an *alogon* obedient to reason is its grasping, and being motivated by, the fine (*kalon*) as such. In chapters 5-6 I argued that decisions necessarily rest on reflective reasoning about the human good.

In this chapter I look at the deliberative and non-rational desiderative capacities of slaves, women, and children. The goal is to compare these capacities with the capacities that (according to the previous chapters) go into non-rational and prohairetic motivation for fine activity. As we shall see, while slaves, women, and children can all have appetites and spirited desires that obey reason and thus can act out of a non-rational concern for the fine as such, only women can have prohairetic motivation for fine activity.

II. Natural Slaves

II.1 Natural Slaves’ Deliberative Capacities
Aristotle says at *Pol.* 1.13 1254b20-5 that slaves lack a *bouleutikon*:

> Although the parts of the soul are present in all [i.e., slaves, women, and children] (*kai pasin enhuparchei men ta moria tès psuchês*), they are present in different ways. For the slave lacks the deliberative faculty (*bouleutikon*) entirely (*holós*). The woman has it, but it is without authority (*akuron*). A child (*pais*) has it, but it is incomplete (*ateles*). (*Pol.* 1.13 1260a10-14)

We saw in chapter 5 that Aristotle denies slaves the capacity to deliberate about ends in themselves. While they can deliberate about how to achieve a given object of desire, they cannot step back from their desires and rationally determine whether they are worth having. If I am right about this, then it’s plausible that when Aristotle says that slaves lack a *bouleutikon*, he is saying that they lack the capacity to deliberate about the make-up of the human good; they lack the capacity to deliberate about ends in themselves.

If slaves cannot deliberate about the human good, then they cannot form wishes and so cannot make decisions. Any motivational attitudes they have will be non-rational—based in appetite or spirited desire. And indeed, in chapter 5 we saw that Aristotle accepts this conclusion. Because slaves lack wishes, Aristotle says that they fail to “partake of living according to decision” (*Pol.* 3.9 1280a34).

While slaves cannot deliberate about the constituents of the human good, they are capable of means-end reasoning. This will be important to their ability to focus their non-rational desires onto concrete actions in particular circumstances.

II.2 Non-Rational Desiderative Capacities of Slaves

*Pol.* 1.5 1254b22-5 attributes a reason-responsive *alogon* to slaves, and (if my interpretation of reason-responsiveness is correct) this means that they can have non-
rational desires that both (1) respond to empirical information from reason concerning salient features of the agent’s situation and (2) attach to fine actions *qua* fine. Indeed, Aristotle makes several claims that confirm that slaves can represent objects as fine and be motivated by considerations of fineness: Aristotle implies that slaves, being humans, have the capacity to make judgments about the good (and presumably the fine), and he explicitly says that the non-Greek Triballoi and Scythians—natural slaves in Aristotle’s view—represent objects as fine.\textsuperscript{148}

If natural slaves’ desires obey reason, and if natural slaves lack reason (*Pol*. 1.5 1254b22-5), then they need an external source of reason to guide them to reason-recommended actions. How can slaves rely on an external form of reason to direct their non-rational desires? Moral *paideia*, training of the *alogon*, allows slaves to learn moral principles and rules of good conduct like “justice requires that I keep my promises” or “bravery requires that I not leave the battle line.” Such moral principles would make up a slave’s conception of the good, and the slave could apply these principles to her particular situation to identify appropriate action. In cases where technical means-end instrumental deliberation is needed, a slave could perform the necessary calculation himself.

**III. Children**

III.1 Children’s Deliberative Capacities

\textsuperscript{148} If this passage conflicted with what Aristotle says about natural slaves or the fine elsewhere, we would have reason to doubt that Aristotle really attributes the concept ‘fine’ to slaves. However, absent any passages that conflict with the attribution of the concept ‘fine’ to slaves, we should assume that Aristotle is speaking with theoretical rigor in this passage.
Children have a *bouleutikon*, but it is ‘immature or ‘undeveloped’ (*ateles*: 1260a14). We saw that it’s plausible to interpret Aristotle’s claim that slaves lack a *bouleutikon* as a claim that slaves lack the capacity to deliberate about the make up of the human good. It is reasonable, then, that when Aristotle goes on to describe a child’s *bouleutikon* as *ateles*, he is saying that the child’s capacity to deliberate about the human good is *ateles*. What would such a claim mean?

One idea is that Aristotle is pointing out that the *bouleutikon* is only potentially present in a child: while the child cannot deliberate about ends at all, she will develop a working *bouleutikon* when she enters adulthood and at that time will acquire the ability to reason about ends. Thus, on this reading of *ateles*, children’s and slaves’ actual deliberative capacities are very close: both children and slaves wholly lack a working *bouleutikon*, and so cannot engage in any deliberation about ends.

Scott argues against the “potentiality” interpretation on the grounds that it cannot explain a seeming asymmetry Aristotle draws between slaves and children at *Pol.* 1.13 1260b5-7. That passage says the following:

Wherefore they are mistaken who are in favor of withholding reason from slaves and say that we should employ command only, for one should admonish slaves more than children. (*Pol.* 1.13 1260b5-7)

This passage is ambiguous about the relative rationality of children and slaves. This is because it is not clear if slaves need admonishment more than children because (i) slaves are capable of rationally and usefully receiving more of it (i.e. are more rational than children) or because (ii) slaves are incapable of doing any of their own deliberation (i.e. are less rational) and therefore need more, (i.e. forcefully and relentlessly). In any case,
Aristotle does here attribute an asymmetry between slaves and children, and so Scott concludes that Aristotle must not take both slaves’ and children’s virtue to consist in an *alogon* obedient to an external source of reason.

But I think that this is not necessitated by the asymmetry of 12605-7. Aristotle’s point may simply be the following: precisely because slaves do not have a deliberative faculty even potentially, their potential for virtue is *entirely* dependent on their masters. By contrast, children, while dependent on their masters during their childhood, will *over time* develop their own rational capacities, and this means that they will (in time) have a deliberative faculty which can help direct their *alogon*. To the extent that slaves have no hope of developing their own deliberative capacities, it follows that more rides on their receiving direction from their masters than rides on children receiving direction from their fathers. Children may be able to correct for a lack of direction from an external capacity when they start to develop their own capacities, but there is no such hope for a slave. Hence why Aristotle suggests that it is more important for slaves to receive admonishment than children.

An alternative interpretation is that a child has a *partially*-functioning *bouleutikon*. On this interpretation, the child can do a limited amount of reasoning about ends—perhaps there are some desires which a child can step back from and subject to rational scrutiny—but she cannot do this with all her desires. So, unlike slaves, children can do some deliberation about ends.

One weakness of this “partially-functioning” interpretation is that it ignores the passages where Aristotle compares slaves with children,\(^\text{149}\) comparisons that may suggest

\(^{149}\) For example, like slaves, children do not act on decision; they act only on non-rational desire (*EE 1224a24-30*). Moreover, both slaves and children are considered “parts” of their master (*EN* 1224a24-30).
that he takes them to suffer similar deliberative deficiencies. For this reason, we ought to favor the interpretation that interprets *ateles* as “potential.”

If I am right, then when Aristotle says that children’s *bouleutikon* is *ateles*, he is saying that they have the mere potential to deliberate about the make up of the human good. Before they activate this potential in adulthood, they cannot deliberate about the human good. Given that wish, and hence decision requires deliberation about ends, children will not have prohairetic motivation for virtuous activity. Any motivation they have will be based in non-rational desire.

III.2 Children’s Non-Rational Capacities

Aristotle seems to attribute to children a condition of the *alogon* that is identical to, or at the very least, close to, reason-responsiveness. This is the implication of the following passage where he compares a reason-responsive *alogon* to a child who is obedient to a parent:

> That the non-rational part of the soul also is persuaded (*peithetai*) in some way by reason is shown by correction (*nouthetês*), and by *every sort* of reproof (*epitimês*) and exhortation (*paraklêsis*)” (*EN* 1.13 1102b34-1103a1, italics mine).

Aristotle cites a child’s obedient response to parental admonition as *evidence* that the *alogon* listens to reason, and, as Broadie has pointed out, the fact that he does this

5.6 1134b11, *MM* 1194b11-17; slave: *EN* 1.4 1254a8-11). The both have virtues “relative” to their masters: “Since the child is undeveloped, it is clear that his virtue is not his own in relation to himself, but in relation to his goal and his guide; likewise, the virtue of a slave is in relation to his mater (*Pol*. 1.13 126-a31-3). Also, Aristotle describes slaves and animals as lacking reason (*echêin logon*), and he describes children (and animals) as *alogon* (*EN* 1111b8-9).

150 cf. 3.12 1119b14-16.
suggests that he takes a child’s obedient response to parental admonition to be *continuous* with, indeed perhaps identical to, the response made by an *alogon* to an internal source of reason. In Broadie’s words:

Aristotle points to the actual exercise of authority in family or community as providing further evidence that there exists a part of the soul capable of listening to reason: ‘That the non-rational element is in some sense persuaded by reason is indicated also by the giving of advice and by all reproof and exhortation’ (1102b33-1103a1). The reference to *every* sort of reproof etc. cancels any suggestion that he has in mind only *self*-admonition, *self*-reproach and the rest. He is squarely considering paradigm cases where the parties are distinct individuals.\(^{151}\)

If Broadie is right, then what a child does when it obeys his or her parents is continuous with the responsiveness to reason displayed by an internal source of reason. And if this is right, then a child’s *alogon* is reason-responsive in the same general way the *alogon* of the virtuous person is responsive to that person’s own reason.

Thus, children with reason-responsive *aloge* will have non-rational desires that, in addition to being directed at the right objects, encapsulate cognitions about the choiceworthiness of those objects *qua* fine. As we saw in chapter 3, Aristotle’s comments about young people strongly suggest that young people can have non-rational desires that encapsulate such evaluative cognitions about the choiceworthiness of fine action and fine action as such.

Just as in the slave case, a child will rely on an external source of reason. That is, the child will be habituated under a *phronimos* ruler or system of laws so as to acquire a conception of the good that includes the virtues and is spelled out in terms of moral principles. The child can then apply these principles to individual situations.

\(^{151}\) Broadie, 63.
IV. Women

IV.1 Women’s Deliberative Capacities

Pol. 1.13 says that a woman’s bouleutikon is “inauthoritative” (akuron). What does akuron mean here? According to Scott and Deslauriers,¹⁵² a woman’s deliberative faculty is akuron in the sense of lacking intellectual authority. On his interpretation, women can deliberate about the sphere of the household but not about the sphere of the city. This restriction amounts to a deliberative inferiority because the sphere of political science includes that of household management and specifies the ends of the other practical sciences like household management. Because women lack the capacity for political science, they must adopt their ends from their husbands. In Scott’s words:

The man of political expertise sets the goals for those subordinate to him, often adjusting or even overruling their judgements. So a woman’s deliberative faculty ‘lacks authority’ in the sense that she has to defer to those who have expertise about the goal for the sake of which the household exists. If this is correct, a virtuous woman has a functioning rational part that can issue commands for her alogon to obey, and she does not have to borrow her husband’s phronēsis directly to control her alogon. Yet a woman’s deliberations lack the deeper and synoptic understanding that would come from political phronēsis, and so she does depend on her husband to guide those deliberations.¹⁵³

Having adopted these ends, women can then use their own deliberative capacities to identify appropriate particular actions to do.¹⁵⁴ Whether women thereby act on decision depends on whether they adopt the ends of their husbands rationally-- that is, whether

¹⁵³ Scott., 15.
¹⁵⁴ Women are in charge of preserving the household goods (Pol 3.4 1277b24-5), and if they are to be able to do this with any competence, they must have basic instrumental deliberation skills. So they will have certain instrumental deliberation, along with (if Scott is right) the capacity to engage in mid level deliberation that takes for granted the ends women receive from their husbands.
they adopt their husbands’ ends out of a rational conviction that men are intellectually superior. If their adoption of ends is based on such a conviction, then it seems that women do make decisions. After all, people often make choices to defer to the option of experts, and these choices can be rational.\footnote{If, however, women adopt these ends on non-rational grounds—if, for example, their adopting their husbands’ ends is not based on the rational conviction that their husbands are rationally superior—then women’s actions will not be the result of decision. Their virtue will be restricted to non-rational motivation.}

Unfortunately, Aristotle tells us very little about women’s deliberative capacities, and thus it is difficult to know whether Scott’s interpretation of \textit{akuron} is right. As we shall see, there is an alternative interpretation of Aristotle’s claim that women’s \textit{bouleutikon} is \textit{akruon}, an alternative that says the claim is about women’s non-rational desiderative faculties in particular. We thus should move on to women’s desiderative faculties.

IV.2 Women’s Non-Rational Desiderative Capacities

According to Fortenbaugh\footnote{Fortenbaugh, 60.} and Sherman,\footnote{Nancy Sherman. \textit{The Fabric of Character}. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, 154.} when Aristotle says that a woman’s deliberative faculty is “\textit{akuron},” he means that it lacks authority over her \textit{alogon}—that is, he means that women’s desires are unruly and naturally disposed to overrule her deliberative faculty’s decisions. On this reading, women are naturally disposed to weakness of will (\textit{akrasia}). Aristotle, following popular opinion in antiquity, regards women as unable to subordinate their physical appetites and desires to rational control.\footnote{References to women’s alleged difficulties at controlling their emotions are widespread in Greek literature. “Are you going to say that ‘Foolishness is not to be found in men, but that it is inborn in women’? I know young men who are no better than women in defending themselves against the assaults of Aphrodite on the heart of youth. But they are male, and that helps them. Euripides, \textit{Hippolytos}: 966-70); “A
Such a reading coheres with other uses of “akuron” in the ethical works. One passage in particular (cited by Fortenbaugh) is \textit{EN 7.9 1151b15}:

The stubborn include the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. The opinionated are as they are because of pleasure and pain. For they find enjoyment in winning [the argument] if they are not persuaded to change their views, and they feel pain if their opinions are voided (akura), like decrees [in the Assembly]. Hence they are more like incontinent than like continent people. (\textit{EN 7.9 1151b13-17})

In this passage, Aristotle is concerned with distinguishing stubborn people from incontinent people. He thinks that stubborn people’s and continent people’s similar behaviors have led people to falsely think that the two types of people are the same. Given that Aristotle wants to maintain a behavioral similarity between continent and stubborn people, then when he compares stubborn people to continent people on the grounds that stubborn people don’t want their opinions to be voided or rendered inauthoritative (akura 1151b15), the point of comparison is presumably that continent people’s opinions are also not voided. Since the continent person acts on her decision against her appetite, presumably her opinions are authoritative in the sense of not being overruled by appetites. Thus, Aristotle sometimes uses kuron and akuron to describe the condition of a continent’s and incontinent’s alogon.

If we are right to interpret akuron as “inauthoriative,” so that Aristotle is here attributing to women a natural disposition to be weak-willed, it would not follow that they cannot have reason-responsive aloga. They might be able to overcome this disposition through extra training or habituation. Such habituation could not permanently

\begin{quote}
Youth does not share in the pleasure of intercourse with a man as a woman does, but looks on sober as a spectator of Aphrodite. Consequently it does not excite any surprise if contempt for the lover is engendered in him.” (Xenophon, \textit{Symposion}: 8.21-2); “Now if they’d been summoned to some shrine of Bacchos, Pan, Kolias, Genetyllis, there’d have been no room to move, so thick the crowd of timbrels. But now—not a woman to be seen.” (Aristophanes, \textit{Lysistrata}: 1-4)
\end{quote}
or completely remove her alogon’s tendency to have overpowering emotions (otherwise Aristotle could not justify permanent rule by men), but sustained habituation and occasional interference by male rulers could control woman’s emotional unruliness so that in most cases there is no disconnect between her alogon and her deliberative faculty.

In fact, we have reason to interpret women’s desiderative capacities in a way that makes their alogon reason-responsive (albeit with modifications like the one’s suggested above). For Aristotle criticizes the Spartans for making slaves and women equal, and his criticism is presumably based on the conviction that women are rationally superior to slaves. If Aristotle thinks that women are rationally superior to slaves, then it’s likely that he extends any rational capabilities that a slave has to a woman. Since slaves have reason-responsive aloga, it is reasonable to assume that women have reason-responsive aloga.

If then, a woman can have a reason-responsive alogon in this qualified way, her non-rational desires can attach to reason-recommended actions qua fine. Since on the incontinence reading of akuron, nothing is wrong per se with the ratiocinative quality of a woman’s bouleutikon, a woman whose alogon is brought under control by an external source of reason should eventually be able to use her own deliberative part to deliberate about ends. If this is right, then a woman should be able to have the wishes that are a prerequisite for a virtuous decision. Thus, her virtue will include prohairetic motivation.

159 “Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say, ‘Tis meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;’ as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one” (Pol. 1.2 1252b1-9).
We see, then, that there are two different interpretations of Aristotle’s statement about a woman’s bouleutikon, and that these interpretations have different implications for how we interpret women’s virtue. On Scott’s reading, women lack the capacity to engage in the highest level of deliberation, but they can nevertheless acquire the wishes that are a pre-requisite for decision if they adopt, on rational grounds, their virtuous husbands’ ends. Since on Scott’s interpretation nothing is wrong per se with women’s non-rational part, they can have reason-responsive non-rational desires that support their decisions.

On Fortenbaugh’s and Sherman’s reading, there is nothing defective about a woman’s deliberative faculty—in principle she’s capable of the highest forms of practical reasoning—but rather something wrong with her alogan. For her alogan to continually be reason-responsive, she requires extra training by phronimos lawmaker. Once she has acquired this extra training, then we can assume that in addition to deciding on virtuous activity, she has well-ordered non-rational desires that prompt her to pursue fine action qua fine.

Aristotle does not tell us enough about women for us to decide between these two interpretations of akuron. It’s possible that the claim describes women as natural incontinents, and it is possible that it describes women as lacking the most architectonic forms of reasoning. Either way, however, we have reason to think that women can have reason-responsive aloga and make virtuous decisions.

V. Skepticism about Guidance from Moral Principles
I have assumed that slaves and children can focus their desires on the proper actions because they have been habituated under an external source of reason that provides them with moral principles.

However, some commentators insist that Aristotle is skeptical about the possibility of moral principles or rules of conduct. Broadie, for example, says the following:

[No]t even the wisest moralist can firmly lay down general rules for good or right action, since only the agent in each case can know then and there what is best. There is no recipe for ‘functioning well.’ It is functioning in accordance with the right reason or the orthos logos, but no one can say in advance what the orthos logos for a particular situation might be.  

Broadie denies that practical deliberation primarily involves the application of rules of conduct to particular cases, where these rules are based on an agent’s conception of the good (whether rationally or non-rationally derived). This is because no such principles are possible: there are an infinite number of combinations of values and considerations possible for particular situations, and so it is impossible to formulate principles that can account for all these considerations:

[No]t even the wisest moralist can firmly lay down general rules for good or right action, since only the agent in each case can know then and there what is best. There is no recipe for ‘functioning well.’ It is functioning in accordance with the right reason or the orthos logos, but no one can say in advance what the orthos logos for a particular situation might be. 

Without moral principles, one can identify correct action only by relying on the quasi-perceptual ability to read ethical situations that comes with phronēsis (Broadie’s ‘practical intelligence’):

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160 Broadie, 60.
161 Broadie, 60.
I would say that having such principles is a surrogate for Aristotelian practical intelligence. If we could understand clearly the role he assigns to intelligence, we should no longer feel it a lack that practical principles do not appear in his account of the formation of rational choice.\(^\text{162}\)

Scanning a given situation, the \textit{phronimos} deliberator is able to examine the particulars that characterize that particular ethical context and “see” the situation aright. Thus, the agent’s decisions are not to be explained in terms of a deliberative process that has yielded moral principles but rather in terms of a deliberative process that is a type of perception whereby the agent “sees” what to do, where this choice is not explicable in terms of a discursive justification.\(^\text{163}\)

Desires must be focused on particular actions if they are to lead to action, and such focusing requires moral principles, Broadie’s “reading ability,” or both. Whereas moral principles can be transferred from one party to another, a perceptual ability cannot. The bigger the role for a reading ability in identifying correct action, the less likely a non-\textit{phronimos} will be able to identify correct action. That is, if Broadie’s view is correct, then, while deliberatively imperfect agents can identify correct action in non-complex moral occasions, they will not be able to identify correct action in morally complicated situations: in situations when there are multiple goods at stake, the rough-and-ready values inculcated through habituation will be insufficient to focus an agent’s desire on precisely the action to be done in that situation.

\(^{162}\) Broadie, 248-9.

\(^{163}\) According to Broadie, an ethical agent’s deliberation begins when some specific and ordinary end enters that agent’s current situation. These ends are ordinary and specific in that they are not ultimate ends nor ends that are desirable only to the virtuous; they are, rather, things “which we desire immediately, as soon as it occurs to us that they might be possible, because nature or upbringing disposes us to seek them—things such as “gaining a college degree, making a fortune, establishing useful contacts, moving to a place with good opportunities, getting one’s affairs into good order, successfully defending one’s reputation against libelous attack, winning a war”(234). When an agent encounters one of these ends—call it \(O\)—she typically forms a wish for \(O\). According to Broadie, the task for deliberation is to determine whether, and if so, how, she can achieve \(O\) in a way that does justice to “all else that matters” (363).
In my view, Broadie’s skepticism about moral principles rests on an over-interpretation of Aristotle’s warnings about the inexactness of ethics. When we look at the passage where Aristotle stresses the inexactness of ethics we do not see extreme resistance to moral principles:

But let us take it as agreed in advance that every account of the actions we must do has to be stated in outline, not exactly. As we also said at the beginning, the type of accounts we demand should accord with the subject matter; and questions about actions and expediency, like questions about health, have no fixed answers. While this is the character of our general account, the account of particular cases is still more inexact. For these fall under no craft or profession; the agents themselves must consider in each case what the opportune action is, as doctors and navigators do. The account we offer, then, in our present inquiry is of this inexact sort; still, we must try to offer help.” (1103b34-1104a11, Irwin translation).

The lack of “fixed answers” need only imply that moral principles must be general in scope. This makes sense of comparison between ethics and fields like medicine and navigation. In medicine and navigation, rules must be general: they cannot apply to every situation, and so in particular cases experience and perception are necessary to make sure that the principle should be applied. 164 165

164 “Aristotle does not say that all ethical truths (e.g., ‘Bravery is fine than cowardice’) are only usual. He means that those giving relatively specific practical advice (e.g., ‘Stand firm in the battle-line’ or ‘Keep promises’) are only usually true. He does not try to add the exceptions to make a more complex rule with no exceptions (e.g., ‘Keep your promises except in conditions A, B, C’). He might argue that such rules will be so complex as to be unlearnable and useless; he prefers the agent to use deliberation, perception, and understanding to see what different moral principles apply to a situation, and how they affect each other. This is what the prudent person can see because of experience and familiarity with particular cases” (Irwin [2], 352). Irwin grants that to apply these rules, it is sometimes necessary to have some sort of further moral perception: “Aristotle certainly commits himself to saying that general rules cannot always be expected to decide particular cases, and that it is a mistake to attempt to formulate them so precisely that we can apply them to particular cases with nothing more than the aid of ordinary (nonmoral) perceptual information. That does not show, however, that we cannot firmly lay down general rules that will hold in most cases; it does not even show that we cannot lay down exceptionless rules, as long as they are imprecise enough” (Irwin [4], 326).

165 Aristotle on the importance of perception in particular cases: “Still, we are not blamed if we deviate a little in excess or deficiency from doing well, but only if we deviate a long way, since then we are easily noticed. But how great and how serious a deviation receives blame is not easy to define in an account; for nothing else perceptible is easily defined either. Such things are among particulars, and the judgment depends on perception” (1109a30-b23, translation Irwin).
If Aristotle recognizes general moral principles, the law or guardians can transfer such principles to deliberatively deficient individuals, and such individuals can rely on these principle in action. Of course, because these principles do not apply in every case, reliance on these principles inevitably brings about occasional mistakes. Those without moral perception who follow principles will occasionally act incorrectly, and for this reason deliberatively deficient individuals suffer a genuine practical handicap. Nevertheless, even with this handicap individuals who rely on moral principles can, in a good number of cases, be counted on to identify correct action.

**VI. The Virtues of Slaves, Women, and Children: Conclusions**

VI.1 Slaves and Children

I argued that Aristotle thinks that slaves and children can have *aloga* that are reason-responsive in this way. It follows that slave and children, to the extent that they can have the reason-responsive aspect of paradigmatic virtue, can have an approximation of paradigmatic virtue, an approximation that includes the non-rational motivation to do fine action as such. This non-rational desiderative state is the result of habituation under an external source of *phronēsis*.

I then turned to the prohairetic aspect of slaves’ and children’s virtues. According to the account of decision I defended in chapter 5, decision rests on deliberation about the good, and so any agents who lack this capacity cannot have
decision. Slaves and children lack this capacity, and so do not make any decisions; their virtue is thus limited to the non-rational desiderative aspect of paradigmatic virtue.

VI.2 Women

Women can have the reason-responsive aspect of paradigmatic virtue, and so can have an approximation of paradigmatic virtue, an approximation that includes non-rational motivation to do fine action *qua* fine. Women’s virtue also includes a prohairetic element.


Peter Garnsey. *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.


Gabriel Richardson Lear. “Aristotle on Moral Virtue and the Fine” in Kraut (ed.)


