

NON-MARITAL BIRTHS, POVERTY AND WELFARE REFORM

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Laura Anne Colosi

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Laura Anne Colosi, Ph.D.

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The central question this paper addresses is what effect will the provisions to reduce non-marital births in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 have on non-marital birth rates? Data from state waivers prior to the 1996 legislation is used to capture the “policy environment” in which a non-marital birth occurred in several states between 1992 and 1996; and to assess variation(s) in fertility behavior among those states. Creation of policy variables based on state waiver data allowed for further estimates of the impact (in selected states) of the specific policy provisions in the PRWORA aimed at reducing out of wedlock childbearing, and subsequent welfare receipt.

A review and summary of research regarding the strength of association between non-marital child bearing and welfare receipt is provided and includes both a brief review of general literature about non-marital births and a more focused review of literature specific to the antecedents of non-marital births. The empirical analysis in this work utilizes data from the Urban Institute’s *National Survey of American Families* (conducted in 1997 and 1999 after the Federal legislation was implemented) to examine two questions: whether or not the policy provisions and program efforts from the PRWORA accounted for the differences in determinants of non-marital births for teenage women and women over the age of twenty; and whether or not emphasis should have been placed on reducing *teen* pregnancy as a means to reducing welfare receipt and poverty in the 1996 PRWORA. Regression analysis estimated the impact of demographic variables on non-marital births in addition to the effect of specific welfare policies in selected states, and shows that the determinants of a non-marital

birth differ by age of the mother, and the focus on reducing teen pregnancy is warranted despite the fact that adolescent women account for only 30% of non-marital births. Three areas in the legislation that require further analysis are identified and recommendations for addressing these shortcomings in the legislation are also offered to increase self-sufficiency of poor families in the context of legislative reauthorization, and future reform efforts.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Laura Colosi joined the Department of Policy Analysis and Management at Cornell University in 2002, her research interests are in the area of families and social policy, with a particular interest in low income families. Specific research interests include the evaluation of social welfare programs; the impact of welfare policies on child and family well being; and the importance of both father's involvement and child support policies for children in single parent families.

This work is dedicated to my husband, Chris, for restoring my faith in fatherhood, by showing me the unending love, commitment, and tenderness that fathers give to their children; modeling the type of father every child needs to thrive.

To my mother for struggling all those years to support our family by herself while continuing to instill the great optimism and faith in me that has led up to this project's completion and my own success as a mother.

And last, but not least, to my beautiful children, Elena and Gianna, who remind me each day of the magic of this world, and the boundless hope that each of us should have for all children, regardless of their circumstance.

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

Passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) illustrates that the provision of the welfare benefits has always been a highly politicized issue. In addition, the specific provisions regarding family structure and childbearing signified a continued desire to regulate the fertility behavior of unmarried, low-income women dependent on welfare as a condition of governmental support. The intersection between the political problem of reforming welfare to satisfy public opinion and the moral principles underlying how we provide welfare benefits to support the poor renders welfare reform a seemingly intractable policy issue. This intractability has led to numerous attempts at reforming the welfare system, some high profile failures and some modest successes.

As we entered the new millennium, many were espousing the great success of Bill Clinton's 1996 law, as welfare rolls were down by unprecedented numbers. Many analysts speculated that the success was a result of strong economic conditions, while others still worried about the continued struggles of those families who left welfare, especially the hardships experienced by children.

The central question this paper addresses is what effect will the PRWORA provisions to reduce non-marital births have on non-marital birth rates from 1996 to the present? The existence of state waivers in the majority of states prior to the 1996 legislation presents the opportunity to both capture the "policy environment" in which a non-marital birth occurred in several states between 1992 and 1996; and to assess variation(s) in fertility behavior among those states. This assessment required a determination of how policy provisions differed by state, and if specific provisions were more effective than others for unmarried women; both teens and women over 20. Creation of policy variables based on state waiver data allowed for further estimates of

the impact (in selected states) of the specific policy provisions in the PRWORA aimed at reducing out of wedlock childbearing, and subsequent welfare receipt. More importantly, answering this question may provide a “snapshot” to policy makers with regards to whether or not program and policy efforts are on the right track in reaching the stated goal of reducing out of wedlock childbearing, and to the identification of the salient issues to address during the reauthorization of TANF with regard to non-marital births.

This analysis begins with a brief history of welfare policy, discussion of preceding welfare policies including AFDC, state waivers, the Family Support Act of 1988 and the two opposing Senate bills that eventually became the 1996 PRWORA. Chapter 2 also offers a discussion of the PRWORA’s provisions, focusing on the sanctions and incentives regarding non-marital child bearing and teen pregnancy and a comprehensive look at the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act*, as well as a discussion of the debates, issues, political negotiations and other events that led to the eventual signing of a Republican bill by a Democratic President. Although there are several portions of the PRWORA that impact families receiving welfare, it is Title I that focuses on issues related to non-marital childbearing, and as such, will be the focus of this paper.

A review and summary of research regarding the strength of association between non-marital child bearing and welfare receipt is provided in Chapter 3. This includes both a brief review of general literature about non-marital births and a more focused review of literature specific to the antecedents of non-marital births. Finally, underlying theories of pregnancy prevention programs are briefly explored in relation to the approaches taken in PRWORA to reduce teen pregnancy.

After examining what is known about non-marital childbearing and teen pregnancy in Chapter 3, Chapter 3 also provides both an overview of the economic

and demographic hypotheses regarding a woman's decision to bear a child out of wedlock found in the literature, and identifies factors that affect non-marital birth rates. Such factors are identified to highlight those variables related to non-marital fertility that are included in the estimated regression model analyzed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 4 describes the methods used and findings from the regression analysis of policy effects utilizing data from the Urban Institute's *National Survey of American Families* (NSAF), conducted in 1997 and 1999 after the Federal legislation was implemented. This required an assessment of whether or not the policy provisions and program efforts from the PRWORA accounted for the differences in determinants of non-marital births for teenage women and women over the age of twenty. A second issue examined in Chapter 4 is the emphasis placed on reducing *teen* pregnancy as a means to reducing welfare receipt and poverty in the 1996 PRWORA. This analysis shows that the determinants are different by age groups, and the focus on reducing teen pregnancy is warranted despite the fact that these women account for only 30% of non-marital births.

The analysis in Chapter 4 also allows for exploration of whether or not it reasonable to assume that a non-marital birth *causes* poverty or is it likely that the poor conditions in which many women live reduces the opportunity cost of having a child outside of marriage. One could suppose that these factors exist concurrently, and that non-marital births are influenced most heavily by a set of mutually exogenous factors like race, family structure, religious activity, and place of residence. Analysis of the regression model(s) in Chapter 4 estimate the impact of all these variables on non-marital births in addition to the effect of specific welfare policies in selected states.

The findings from both the literature review and empirical analysis inform the discussion in Chapter 5, which identifies three areas in the legislation that require

further analysis. Recommendations for addressing these shortcomings in the legislation are also offered, and this work concludes with an assessment of the most promising measures to increase self-sufficiency of poor families in the context of legislative reauthorization, and future reform efforts.

CHAPTER TWO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY WELFARE REFORM AND NON-MARITAL CHILD BEARING

Introduction

Reforming our nation's welfare system has been a part of mainstream political discourse for as long as AFDC (now TANF) has existed. The current debates do not differ substantively from those that occurred from the very beginnings of social welfare policy. There are four factors that keep welfare policy on the forefront of political debates: the cost to the public of benefit provision; the threats to the American work ethic; threats to family values; and threats to the social order.¹ These four factors are key to understanding the infusion of moral judgment into legislative sanctions to modify the "irresponsible" behavior of single parents (primarily women) in the PRWORA.

In the early 1990s, Americans became more frustrated with increased government spending on these policies, which was coupled with an increase of the welfare rolls and no clear reductions in poverty resulting from welfare programs. These trends led a long standing fear (on the part of policy makers and the public) that the system was creating dependency, especially among single women with children.

The long history of social welfare policies, dating back to the Elizabethan Poor Laws, shows that the underlying assumption behind welfare is that a family's financial status is directly linked to its members' well-being. Therefore it follows that it is in our society's best interest to try to help those in need get "back on their feet." Consequently, legislative efforts were (and continue to be) designed to provide the means by which families experiencing financial hardship could become economically self-sufficient. The earlier parts of welfare history have been documented and

¹ Joel F. Handler, *The Poverty of Welfare Reform* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995).

discussed in several well-known works and will not be discussed in depth in this chapter.² Rather, this brief history begins with the events just prior to the criticism of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and the resultant efforts to address those faults through reforms of welfare policy.

AFDC was designed primarily for unmarried women with children under 18 years old in their household.³ Eligibility was based on income level, and if a female-headed family had income and assets below their state's specific level, they were entitled to a cash transfer amount to increase their income to the guaranteed income level. Once a family receiving AFDC benefits had an increase in their income, their benefit levels were reduced at a federally determined reduction rate. Thus, the Federal government (with some state flexibility in setting their own minimum income requirements) monitored AFDC in partnership with states that were responsible for implementing welfare policy provisions. This state flexibility in income levels led to considerable variation among program recipients in different states; for example, in 1989, benefits in California totaled \$788 monthly for a family of four, while they were only \$144 a month in Mississippi.⁴

In addition to the cash entitlement through AFDC, there were a variety of in-kind benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid. Other in-kind benefits such as housing assistance and job training supported welfare recipients, but were not considered entitlements. To further complicate the system, both the federal and state governments funded and administered these various programs and different state agencies had responsibility for the specific types of benefits. Finally, child support

² For example, see Frances Fox-Piven and Richard Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993); Linda Gordon, *Pitied but not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

³ About half of the states also had an AFDC-UP program for which married families who met income requirements were eligible for benefits if they met certain requirements.

⁴ For example, Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1984); or Robert Moffitt, "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review," *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (1992), 3.

policies varied state by state, with no means for interstate enforcement, and highly variable formulas for establishing support amounts and enforcing orders among state courts. As a result, the welfare system lacked coordination among state agencies and was embedded with conflict among different levels of government, which led to an uncoordinated, complex system of service delivery.

In the mid 1980s criticisms of the Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) program included charges that it was administratively cumbersome, provided disincentives to work for its recipients, lacked provisions for adequate support services to facilitate self-sufficiency, did not adequately collect and enforce child support obligations for women dependent on welfare, and penalized two parent families, which encouraged the breakup of the “traditional” family unit. Many people saw the system as a handout to the poor, which required no mutual obligation on the part of the recipient or the state. Others viewed the system as ignoring a recipient’s need for basic human dignity by encouraging dependency rather than self-sufficiency and the fulfillment of human potential.

The disincentives for work were two fold. First, the marginal tax rate on earnings for welfare recipients was virtually 100%, for every dollar earned, the recipient lost one dollar in benefits, (e.g., food stamps or AFDC cash assistance). Second, the jobs that recipients were trained for through the job training programs were low skilled minimum wage jobs – a level of earning that did not pull a family out of poverty. For example, in 1993 a full time worker earning \$4.25 per hour (minimum wage) would have a gross annual salary of \$8,840, while the poverty line for a family of two was \$9,500 and \$11,600 for a family of three.⁵ Thus, a woman with two children could receive the more money by staying on public assistance or taking a full-time minimum wage job. In addition, when a welfare recipient found employment

⁵Jean Hopsfenberger, “Poverty’s Price: \$4.25,” *Star Tribune*, March 29, 1993, 1B.

he/she could lose health insurance, incur extra expenses for day care and transportation, and thus significantly reduce take home earnings through employment. Although the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has remedied some of this problem, it will not be discussed in depth in this analysis.

In addition to the disincentives to work, disincentives toward marriage also existed in the welfare system. The penalties for marriage levied on welfare recipients reduced the financial gains of marriage, and perpetuated the increases in the single parent homes. This also reduced the likelihood that children would be able to live with both their parents. The broader, ethical considerations involving the effects of marriage disincentives on well-being of the children in lower income households are too complex to address here. It is important to note that the reduction of benefits after marriage pushed a family further below the poverty line *because* of marriage, which subsequently encouraged living together, and in essence, cheating the system. Note also that at the time, family courts handled child support issues and there was no interstate ability to enforce orders or standard procedures in place to help women on assistance collect support. As a result, child support became one major impetus for the 1988 reform of the welfare system.

To better understand the current policy debates about our nation's welfare system, it is necessary to explore how the current system was established. To accomplish this task, a detailed legislative history is provided of the two most recent legislative overhauls of the welfare system – the *Family Support Act of 1988* (FSA) and the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996* (PRWORA).

Family Support Act of 1988

Reforms of the welfare system under President Reagan were aimed at creating mutual responsibility by requiring able-bodied recipients to either work or prepare for

work in return for their benefits. In his 1986 State of the Union address, President Reagan announced a new study on welfare to try to achieve “lasting emancipation” from the cycle of dependency that had become so prominent among its recipients. Signed on October 13, 1988 the *Family Support Act* was viewed by both the public and legislators as a major legislative overhaul of the welfare system. Critics of the legislation believed that passage of the *Family Support Act of 1988* (FSA) continued the paternalistic nature of AFDC by placing greater emphasis on both personal responsibility to support one’s children and the importance of work as a means to get off welfare.

Legislative Provisions

The *Family Support Act* set forth the following three objectives:

1. To strengthen the federal child support enforcement program to guarantee children are supported by both parents;
2. To provide basic education and training services through the new Job opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Program to enable families receiving AFDC to move towards self sufficiency; and
3. To provide supportive and transitional assistance to AFDC families leaving welfare.

To accomplish these objectives the FSA included seven titles⁶ each of which delineated rules, procedures and regulations to be imposed upon the states, federal government, or individuals. It also assigned primary responsibility for the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the provisions contained in the Act to the Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration.

⁶ (e.g., child support and establishment of paternity, job opportunities and basic skills training program, supportive services for families, etc.)

The *Family Support Act* embodied the assumptions that parents are responsible for supporting their children, recipients should be assisted in employment training and finding jobs, and public assistance should be temporary. Increased child support enforcement (Title I), participation in JOBS (Title II) and the provision of transitional services (Title III) were the substantive titles that modified the existing means by which welfare benefits were delivered. Each of these Titles included extensive changes in both eligibility for and delivery of these benefits to increase personal responsibility and promote employment among welfare recipients.

The cornerstone of the Family Support Act of 1988 was the extensive efforts made to increase child support orders in courts for women on public assistance, mandatory paternity establishment for women on welfare (as a condition to receive benefits), stricter enforcement of delinquent fathers, and the establishment of interstate computer systems to address the common occurrence of non-custodial parents simply changing their state of residence to avoid paying child support. The underlying assumption of these measures was simple – when possible, both parents should be held accountable for the financial support of their children – both to improve the quality of life for children in single parent homes and to offset the cost of providing assistance to their mothers. The Family Support Act of 1988 established a comprehensive; much needed system of enforcing and collecting child support orders for women on welfare.

The legislation also focused on better job training (Title II: JOBS), maintaining transitional benefits for parents who become employed, as well as health insurance for a period of time determined by each state. However, the Family Support Act of 1988 did little to rectify the disincentives toward marriage. This further perpetuated the disadvantages associated with marriage for women receiving assistance, and thus, did

not impact the trends towards both greater cohabitation and children living in single parent households.

At the time of the FSA's passage, the problem that plagued the welfare system was not one of inadequate services (the Federal government spent a total of 203 billion dollars on family programs alone in 1989), but ineffective services. Despite the programs that were in place, the poverty rate, unemployment, the welfare rolls, and single-parent households were all rising. The question was why wasn't this huge network of services effectively meeting the needs of our nation's poor? As a result, many states began seeking alternative ways to deliver its programs, and sought Federal approval to engage in demonstration projects.

Welfare waivers

In the late 1980s states began applying for welfare waivers from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). A "waiver" was simply when DHHS granted permission to states to design and implement their own welfare programs guided by state, not Federal policy requirements. Those states granted waivers were not held to federal government requirements in the administration of their AFDC initiatives.

Examples of waivers include:

- Minor parent provision: A requirement of teen mothers to live at home or with a responsible adult;
- Stay in school: the requirement of teen mothers to attend school to receive benefits;
- Paternity Establishment: A mandatory 25% benefit reduction imposed on unmarried mothers who do not help with paternity establishment;

- Time limits: the state sets a maximum time that any family may receive welfare benefits, this is imposed on all families and ranged from 1 to 5 years depending on state of residence;
- Work requirements: Minimum hours and/or job training participation that must be fulfilled to receive welfare benefits (includes sanctions for non-compliance); and
- Family cap: the refusal of benefits for additional children born to women receiving public assistance.

Many states applied for more than one waiver, and generally, the combination of several waivers by one state began to be known as a “demonstration project.”

States began applying for substantially more welfare waivers toward the end of George Bush’s presidency (1988-1992). According to Horvath and Peters⁷, between 1987 and just before passage in 1996 of the PRWORA, 46 states had received approval and implemented welfare waivers to amend either their AFDC or Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) programs.

In the early 1990s many states continued to apply for waivers as a way to reach their goals to increase child support collections and work participation of welfare recipients. In addition, the increased use of welfare waivers clearly illustrated the growing trend to devolve authority over social programs from the Federal government to states. This shift in authority signaled a change from the centralized authority that characterized many social policies to one in which states were treated as equal partners in decision-making.⁸

Criticisms of the welfare system carried over into the 1990’s and played a key role in shaping President Clinton’s domestic policy agenda. The continued rise in the

⁷ Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, *Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearing*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, September 1999).

⁸ Charles McClintock and Laura A. Colosi, “Evaluation of Welfare Reform,” *Evaluation Review* 22, no. 5 (October 1998): 668–694.

costs of welfare programs, the child poverty rate, the non-marital birth rate and subsequent number of people dependent on the system led to a noticeable frustration on the parts of both the government and the taxpayers. As Bill Clinton took office in 1990, it was clear that the major disincentives of the welfare system had to be addressed by the new administration, to both reduce the deficit and the poverty rate. The question he faced was – how to remedy this situation?

Legislative response to the issues of welfare was characterized by the same two important objectives in the FSA of 1988, enforcing parental responsibility and encouraging work. The 1996 legislation, however, included two important shifts in the way in which these goals would be accomplished: greater regulation of the program recipient's behavior, and increased state flexibility (and responsibility) for program design and delivery through the TANF block grant.

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWORA)⁹

Presidential candidate Bill Clinton had promised to “end welfare as we know it,” and made his first attempt to accomplish this in the proposed 1994 *Work and Responsibility Act*, which toughened welfare provisions and added time limits on recipients' benefits. In 1995, however, when the Republican Party won a majority in the Congress – the new majority in both the House (*Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995*) and Senate (*Family Support Act of 1995*) drafted their own versions of the *Work and Responsibility Act*. Both pieces of legislation were tougher on welfare recipients, provided states greater flexibility in setting welfare policy, and less interference from the Federal government in program delivery. The 1995 legislative proposals intended to reduce the reliance on the welfare system and increase self-sufficiency of the nation's poor. It was the means by which to achieve

⁹ A detailed history of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 is provided in Appendix A.

this goal that were key points of contention in the debates. Thus, discussion of the two legislative proposals prior to passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) highlight both philosophical and structural differences regarding the underlying purpose of welfare benefits and the way in which the system of service delivery should be organized.

The two major pieces of legislation proposed mirror the conservative and liberal perspectives on how to accomplish the twin goals of increasing work and personal responsibility of those in need. The *Family Support Act of 1995*, sponsored by Senator Moynihan, was the democratic version of welfare reform set forth in the 104th Congress. The second, more conservative proposal was from the House of Representatives, the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995* – a more extensive reform of the welfare system than the former – which gained a great deal of attention, as the Republicans controlled both the House and the Senate floors. To better understand the 1996 legislation, it is necessary to first describe these two proposals, and what each hoped to accomplish in the context of welfare reform.

The Family Support Act of 1995

The focal point of the FSA of 1995 was enforcement of child support as a means to increase monetary collections, which would subsequently reduce the costs of benefit provision to single women with children (the majority of the welfare population). Several other components of the *Family Support Act of 1995* built on the provisions set forth in the original *Family Support Act of 1988*, and in effect, increased the requirements placed on recipients regarding the JOBS Program, the AFDC Program, and Child Support Enforcement.

The provisions of Title I, geared at improving the JOBS Program included, but were not limited to:

- Emphasized work by requiring states to encourage job placement by using performance measures that rewarded staff performance in placements, or other such management practice as the states chose;
- Provided for a job voucher program that used private for-profit and non profit organizations to place recipients in private employment;
- Eliminated certain Federal requirements to give States flexibility in operating their JOBS program; and
- Allowed States to provide JOBS services to non-custodial parents who were unemployed and unable to meet their child support obligations.

The provisions of Title II: Aid to Families with Dependent Children, included several provisions that were tougher on recipient's activities required to receive benefits:

- Required states agencies to assign each custodial parent under the age of 20 to a case manager responsible for assisting the teen parent in obtaining services and monitoring their compliance with program requirements;
- State agencies would require custodial parents under 20 who had not completed high school to (1) attend school (2) participate in a program combining classroom and job training or (3) work toward a high school education or its equivalent. After the completion of a high school education they could participate in state run JOBS program;
- Allowed states to provide both monetary incentives or penalties to encourage custodial parents under age 20 to complete their high school education, and participate in parenting activities;

- Required individuals under 18 who had a dependent child or was pregnant to live with a parent, legal guardian, or other adult relative. If this was not feasible, they must live in a foster home or maternity home with payments made to the adult who had supervision; and
- Established an Interagency Welfare Review Board, as the central organization for coordinating the review of state applications for waivers, and the Board was to provide technical advice and assistance to the states.

Title III of the Act addressed issues of Child Support Enforcement, and its provisions were quite extensive:

- Improved enforcement of interstate child support enforcement by providing uniformity in State laws and procedures, creating a framework for determining jurisdiction in interstate cases (required adoption of 1992's Uniform Interstate Family Support Act by January, 1997);
- Required AFDC applicants and recipients to aid in establishing paternity in obtaining support payments, and strengthened the definitions of "cooperation" to include both the provision of a name and other information helpful to verify the identity of the father (this was a condition of AFDC benefits, but a state would not deny benefits while attempting to locate absent father);
- Required States to streamline their procedures for establishing paternity, and when paternity was clearly established (i.e. genetic test), the State could issue a temporary order that required the payment of child support (if father was unable to pay, he was

placed in a job training program and once employed his wages were garnished automatically);

- Established a “paternity outreach” program to encourage voluntary paternity acknowledgment through both information dissemination and education programs;
- States were allowed to suspend any professional licenses, (driver’s license, etc.) or a passport to delinquent parent; and
- Increased moneys available for programs to facilitate non-custodial parent’s access to and visitation of their children, through mediation, counseling, and education.

There were many other child support provisions including; the review of orders every three years, the establishment of a National Commission on child support guidelines to study these issues, the establishment of a central registry for all child support orders and the creation of an automatic payment system for employers to use if needed, the expansion of the federal parent locator service, and finally, the establishment of a new hire directory (this is a database used for enforcement of orders).

The *Family Support Act of 1995* placed more restrictions on recipients as condition of benefit receipt, and capitalized on the system already in place for the delivery of services. In essence, the Democratic proposal represented an effort to “fine tune” the system in place rather than creating an entirely new system. This proposed legislation retained Federal standards while giving states more flexibility in program delivery. The bill had no floor action whatsoever (with the exception of its introduction by Senator Moynihan on May 18, 1995), the result of the Republican Congress’s focus on its own proposal – the *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995*.

The Personal Work and Responsibility Act of 1995.

The *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995* received the greatest consideration in both the House and Senate. The focal point of the Act was to restrict eligibility for many programs, and to establish time limits of benefits provided. It was an extensive piece of legislation, which proposed replacement of many programs (established under the Family Support Act of 1988) with block grant programs (in-depth discussion in this chapter will focus in the TANF block grant). The rationale for the shift to a block grant was to provide states a greater flexibility in meeting the needs of their poor population.

By far the most controversial component of the legislation was Title I: Block Grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. This was the section that dismantled the AFDC program entirely by replacing the AFDC program under Title IV of the Social Security Act with a single program of block grants to the States. This was known as the temporary emergency assistance (TEA) programs that operated statewide and included mandatory work, education, and job preparation requirements for needy families either already with or expecting a child as a condition of benefit provision. The purpose of TEA remained similar to that of AFDC – to assist such families in becoming self-sufficient. Other specific provisions in Title I of this proposed legislation were as follows:

1. Limited such families to no more than five years of TEA cash assistance, with certain exceptions;
2. Denied cash assistance for minor children born into families on TEA assistance who already had a child;
3. Required mandatory adult-supervised living arrangements for unmarried teenage parents; and

4. Allowed states to terminate assistance to adults who refused to engage in work, educational or job training activities, regardless of whether they had children.

This legislation drew upon many states' experiences with welfare waivers, and now set forth Federal standards that involved mandatory work requirements, time limits, family caps, minor parent provisions and strict sanctions for non compliance with any of these requirements.

In addition, the primary objectives set forth in this proposal were to reduce the costs of the system to substantially decrease the size of the population who were eligible for benefits, and placing time limits on benefits. The desire to lower the welfare rolls was also illustrated by Title IV, which restricted welfare and public benefits for aliens based on the notion that "it was a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal immigration provided by the availability of public benefits."¹⁰

The use of block grants was another way Congress hoped to reduce the costs of providing assistance, illustrated by Title VII: *Child Protection Block Grants*, which replaced Child Welfare Services with a block grant program to the States to implement (1) child protection programs regarding child abuse and neglect; and (2) child protection payments for foster care and adoption assistance.¹¹ In addition, Title VIII, *Child Care and Development Block Grants Amendments of 1995*, reduced the minimum amount made available for activities to improve the quality of child care from 20% to 3% of already established funds and amended the *Child Care and Development Block Grant Act of 1990* to repeal authority for Federal payments to

¹⁰ *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995*, 103rd Congress, HR 4, Title IV.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Title VII.

Head Start agencies or certain local educational agencies for early childhood development and before and after school activities.¹²

In March 1995, the House's *Personal Responsibility Act* of 1995 was combined with the Senate's *Work Opportunity Act* (a similar bill in the Senate at that time) to become a joint resolution, H.R.4 *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act* (PRWORA), which was then the only proposed piece of welfare legislation to be set forth into Congressional floor action.

On December 29, 1995 the bill was sent to President Clinton, and there was a great deal of media speculation about whether or not the President could veto the legislation without contradicting his own campaign promise to “end welfare as we know it.” At the time, social researchers predicted that enacting the legislation would most likely place an additional one to two million children into poverty, and as a result, he vetoed the legislation on January 9, 1996. In his veto message, President Clinton cited two primary shortcomings in H.R. 4; it weakened several of the important work provisions that were vital to welfare reform's success, and it was designed to meet an arbitrary budget target rather than to achieve serious reform.¹³ In addition, the President stressed that his Administration would continue to “set forth in detail [their] goals for reform and [their] objections to this legislation.” He also emphasized his willingness to sit down in good faith to discuss welfare reform, and reiterated his belief that there was enough bipartisan support for the underlying goals of welfare reform that a successful reform of the system was possible.

Areas of Contention

If there was enough bipartisan support on the underlying purposes of welfare reform – increasing work and responsibility – then the question remained, why hadn't

¹² Ibid., Title VIII, Sections 807 and 808.

¹³ U.S. Congress, House, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995—Veto Message from the President of the United States* (H. DOC. NO. 104-164), January 22, 1996.

successful reform been accomplished? The debates between liberals and conservatives regarding welfare proposals raised several, broad – but important questions:

- What is the role of government in providing social welfare benefits?
- Which levels of government should be involved in these policies – federal, state or local? If more than one level is involved, what are the roles of each that characterize the intergovernmental relationship?
- What do the current debates reveal about the value placed on recipients – are they lazy people “milking” the system or potential human capital?
- What are the short and long term benefits of each proposal related to the cost involved?

It was the resolution (or compromise) of these questions that would be the key to these two groups reaching equilibrium. This equilibrium, or the adoption of a policy, could only be achieved through bargaining, compromising and negotiating between the policy makers involved.

The major points of disagreement with the proposed action involved the following: the purpose of welfare policy; how to achieve the objective(s) of welfare policy; and who had greater authority or responsibility for welfare policy and program delivery. Most politicians agreed that the purpose of welfare reform policies was to create self-sufficiency among those persons who were dependent on government assistance. However, conservatives tended to emphasize welfare as a temporary form of assistance, whereas liberals viewed it more as a form of social insurance. It was apparent that those who held a conservative view of welfare believed that the primary means to create self-sufficiency was through negative sanctions and imposing limits.

Those with a liberal view of welfare wanted to reduce dependency by providing services to people in need of assistance.

Conservatives favored state responsibility for welfare programs, and on the whole, believed that the government had every right to be intrusive toward those persons on welfare. Liberals promoted Federal authority over welfare programs to guarantee consistency in benefits, the establishment of national standards, and congruence with other Federal objectives (e.g., anti-discrimination).

Several key points of contention between the Democrats and Republicans stemmed from their beliefs on how to increase work and responsibility among welfare recipients, although they could not seem to agree on the appropriate way to accomplish these tasks. There was, however, one common goal among both conservatives and liberals, to reduce the costs of the welfare system. The liberal approach was characterized by short-term investments in programs for long-term gains in employment and self-sufficiency. The conservative approach involved immediate cuts in spending to push people off the system and into work – resulting in both short and long term savings. Regardless of one’s views on welfare, in 1996, it was clear that the current welfare system needed improvement and that the public expected a viable reform from the Clinton administration. Media reports alluded to pressure on the President to follow through on his campaign promises many years earlier, and on August 22, 1996 President Clinton signed the Republican bill, entitled, *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996* (PRWORA).

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996

The PRWORA was an expansive overhaul of the welfare system that resembled the Republican’s version of welfare reform more than any of the other proposed legislation. The most noted change embodied in the PRWORA was the elimination of the open-ended entitlement program, AFDC, replacing it with a block

grant program for states to provide time limited cash assistance to needy families under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).¹⁴ This change to block grants gave states greater flexibility in welfare service eligibility and provision than they had previously under the FSA of 1988. Finally, many of the policies set forth under state waivers in the previous years were now Federal regulations.

For example, the Federal government established a maximum time limit of five years of benefits per recipient, implemented requirements of teen mothers as a condition of benefit receipt, and instituted the family cap by no longer providing additional benefits for a subsequent birth to a mother on welfare. Many additional changes were made to the child support, childcare and child welfare systems. Table 2.1 provides a summary of key provisions in each section of the legislation.

¹⁴ American Public Welfare Association [AWPA], *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act: A Summary*, 1996.

Table 2.1. General Provisions, Public Law 104-93.

<i>HR 3734 Section</i>	<i>General Provisions</i>
<p>Title I: Block Grants for the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF)</p>	<p>Amended the Social Security Act and numerous other acts to provide for comprehensive reform of the welfare system.</p> <p>Converted AFDC and Job Opportunities and Basic Skills training program and certain other welfare programs into a single block grant program to be used by States to provide cash and other benefits to needy families.</p> <p>Restricted welfare eligibility for unwed mothers under age 18, families that have been on welfare for more than five years, and additional children born while families are on welfare.</p>
<p>Title II: Supplemental Security Income</p>	<p>Restricted supplemental security income (SSI) program eligibility of certain disabled children, and establishes incentives for State and local penal institutions for information that results in suspension of SSI benefits to prisoners.</p>
<p>Title III: Child Support</p>	<p>Revised rules governing distribution of child support collections among Federal and State governments and welfare families.</p> <p>Required each State to establish an automated registry of all child support cases in the State and a directory of new hires, and to provide the information to the Federal Parent Locator Service.</p> <p>Required all States to adopt uniform laws to expedite interstate child support collections and to enact certain laws concerning paternity establishment.</p>
<p>Title IV: Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits For Aliens</p>	<p>Restricted eligibility of certain aliens for Federal welfare, health, and other benefits</p>
<p>Title V: Child Protection</p>	<p>Granted authority to states to make payments to private childcare institutions.</p> <p>Extended matching funds for statewide child welfare information systems.</p>

Table 2.1 (Continued).

<i>HR 3734 Section</i>	<i>General Provisions</i>
Title VI: Child Care	Combined four Federal childcare programs for low-income families into a single block grant to States, the expanded Child Care and Development Block Grant program.
Title VII: Child Nutrition Programs	Amended the National School Lunch Act and the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 to revise child nutrition programs.
Title VII: Food Stamps & Commodity Distribution	<p>Revised the methods for determining the value of energy assistance benefits and motor vehicles for food stamp program eligibility purposes.</p> <p>Authorized States to coordinate food stamp program rules with those of a new State program providing temporary assistance for needy families.</p> <p>Revised food stamp eligibility criteria, including establishment of work requirements for certain recipients.</p> <p>Required States to implement electronic benefit transfer systems for food stamps.</p> <p>Amended the Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983 and other acts to consolidate and revise USDA commodity distribution programs providing food to State and local agencies and charitable organizations for distribution to low-income persons.</p>
Title IX: Miscellaneous	<p>Restricted benefit eligibility for certain types of criminal activities.</p> <p>Established national goals to prevent teen pregnancies.</p> <p>Expressed the sense that laws regarding statutory rape must be aggressively enforced.</p> <p>Defined appropriate sex education programs, “abstinence only” that were eligible for Federal funds.</p> <p>Modified eligibility requirements for the earned income tax credit available to certain low-income working taxpayers who had dependent children or meet other qualifications.</p>

Title I: TANF Block Grant

The general purpose of the TANF block grant is to “provide assistance to needy families with children so they can be cared for in their own home and to reduce dependency by promoting job preparation, work and marriage¹⁵” States were also given specific flexibility to use funds to both reduce non-marital pregnancies and support the formation of two parent families. States were allowed to use block grant funds “in any manner reasonably calculated to accomplish the purpose of TANF.”¹⁶ The change to the block grant meant that states now have the ability to determine both eligibility and benefit levels.

Provisions related to childbearing and marriage also include the establishment of the *Illegitimacy Reduction Bonus Fund* which earmarked \$20 million per year to be disbursed annually in each fiscal year (beginning in 1999) to the 5 states that reported the greatest success in reducing out of wedlock births without increasing abortions in comparison to the previous two years. In addition, teen parents were required to remain at home or in an approved adult supervised setting, and participate in an educational activity towards the completion of a high school diploma or GED as a condition of benefit receipt. States were also given an option to deny assistance overall to unmarried teens with children.¹⁷

Other state options related to family formation and childbearing include the reduction or termination of benefits to women who fail to cooperate in the establishment of paternity for their children. States may also deny assistance to additional children born to a woman already on welfare by establishing a family cap.

It is clear that the PRWORA focused on decreasing non-marital births (especially to teenaged women) and included specific discussion on the importance of

¹⁵ AWP, *The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act: A Summary*.

¹⁶ Public Law 104-193, 1996.

¹⁷ Ibid.

marriage to reducing poverty. There are several portions of the PRWORA that impact families receiving welfare, but it is Title I that focuses on issues related to non-marital childbearing, and as such, are the focus of the remainder of this analysis. The PRWORA provisions under the Title I TANF block grant are expansive in scope and coercive in nature, as illustrated by the Federal regulations that allow states to turn benefits on and off as a way to change the behavior of welfare recipients (e.g., work requirements, time limits, family caps, minor parent requirements, and benefit reductions associated with non-compliance in paternity proceedings.)

Non-Marital Childbearing

The connection between welfare programs and non-marital childbearing stems from the simple idea that AFDC was designed to provide assistance to families with only one able bodied parent. A woman who had one or more children born out of wedlock heads most families receiving welfare. A great deal of research and evaluation of welfare policies focused on whether or not the welfare system itself led to the increase in non-marital births.¹⁸ The public perception that followed was that the government (more specifically, taxpayers) had become a substitute for the traditional male provider in a household. This notion did not go unnoticed in the course of drafting and passing the 1996 welfare reform legislation. As such, one primary thrust of the PRWORA of 1996 was to reduce welfare dependence by decreasing non-marital births, with a particular focus on teen pregnancies.

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) “express(ed) the sense of the Congress that prevention of out of wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out of wedlock births (were) important Government

¹⁸ Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, *The Best Intentions: Unintended Pregnancy and the Well-Being of Children and Families* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1995), 197.

interests.”¹⁹ The Federal legislation implied that this reduction was crucial to the success of welfare reform in increasing self-sufficiency, not just reducing the welfare rolls and exploration of this assumption is critical to determining the prospect of welfare reform alleviating poverty overall.

One third of all births in 1996 were non-marital, and children in one-parent families had an increased risk of abuse, poor academic achievement, behavior problems, unemployment, and poverty.²⁰ In addition, children born out of wedlock were more likely to become single parents themselves. Within 5 years of a non-marital birth, 75% of teens are (or have been) on welfare.²¹ Between 1960 and 1996, the number of births to unmarried teens quadrupled from 87,000 to 376,000.²² Despite this increase in births to teenaged women, most non-marital births (70%) were to women over 20 years of age and the majority of non-marital births (60%) were to white women.²³

The prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and births was a central goal of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and prior state welfare reform efforts through welfare waivers. In 1996, the Congress made the following findings stated in the first section of the PRWORA:

1. Marriage is the foundation of a successful society;
2. Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society that promotes the interests of children;
3. The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented; and

¹⁹ Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Subtitle A.

²⁰ U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways & Means, *Summary of Welfare Reform Made by P.L. 104-193—Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and Associated Legislation* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

²¹ U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways & Means, *Summary of Welfare Reform*.

²² R. Wertheimer and K. Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform,” *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-24 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, August 1998).

²³ K. Moore, “Reducing Out of Wedlock Births: What States Need to Know” (Presentation given at the Virginia Forum on “The Commonwealth and You...Partners in Prevention!” November 1997, 1998).

4. Therefore, in light of this demonstration of the crisis in our Nation, it is the sense of the Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very important Government interests and the policy contained in part A of title IV of the Social Security Act (as amended by section 103(a) of this Act) is intended to address the crisis.²⁴

The justification for the focus on non-marital births was simple—the disadvantages of single motherhood frequently manifest themselves into poor outcomes for their children.

The negative child outcomes associated with non-marital childbearing evoked a strong public interest in the issue and its connection to the cost of providing welfare benefits to unmarried mothers. Moreover, some scholars debate whether or not the provision of welfare benefits caused an increase in non-marital births, especially among teenage women.²⁵ The costs associated with non-marital births and particularly teen pregnancies are significant, and the costs were a primary catalyst for debating, drafting and passing the 1996 welfare reform legislation.

Table 2.2 provides some costs associated with non-marital births to mothers, their children, and taxpayers highlighted in the Congressional findings in P.L.104-193 (PRWORA):

²⁴ U.S. Congress, House, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*, HR 3734, 104th Congress, Title I, section 101.

²⁵ Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (1992), 3.

Table 2.2. Costs of Non-Marital Childbearing.

<i>Person(s) Affected</i>	<i>Associated Cost</i>
Taxpayers	\$6.9 billion each year to taxpayers due to increased medical care expenses, welfare and food stamps. 53 percent of TANF funds dispersed goes to families formed by a teenage birth.
Children	Child of teen mother is 10 times more likely to live in poverty than a child born to a mother who is married, out of her teens and graduated from high school. The daughter of an adolescent mother is up to 83 percent more likely to become a teenage mother herself, and the son of an adolescent mother is 2.7 times more likely to be arrested and imprisoned than the son of a mother who delayed childbearing until her early twenties.
Mothers	More than 80 percent of teen mothers become impoverished and dependent on welfare. Only three in every 10 adolescent mothers earn a high school diploma by the age of 30. During the first 13 years of parenthood, adolescents earn an average of about \$5,600 annually, which is less than half the poverty level.

Source: U.S. Congress, House, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*, HR 3734, 104th Congress, Title I, section 101.

As a result, reducing both the short and long term costs of non-marital births was an important part of the policy response embodied in the PRWORA. The Act included strict requirements of teen mothers as condition of receipt of their benefits (e.g., live at home, stay in school), family caps, time limits and reduction in benefits for non-compliance in paternity proceedings. The Federal government also established specific annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies, and States were granted increased flexibility in operating programs specifically designed to “prevent and reduce the incidence of out of wedlock pregnancies.”²⁶

The PRWORA includes the following provisions to reduce the number of non-marital births:

²⁶ Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Section 401.

- a. Teen mothers are required to live at home or with a responsible adult;
- b. Teen mothers are required to attend school; A mandatory 25% benefit reduction is imposed on unmarried mothers who do not help with paternity establishment;
- d. Funding was provided for abstinence education;
- e. DHHS is required to rank states annually on their performance in reducing non-marital birth ratios;
- f. \$1 billion was provided over five years for performance bonuses to reward states that achieve goals of the Act; and
- g. \$400 million was provided in bonus payments to states that reduce their illegitimacy rates. The first two provisions are requirements of

teen mothers as a condition of receipt of benefits, the third is a sanction against the mothers related to paternity establishment, and the fourth involves increased funding for abstinence only education (\$50 million under Title V of the Social Security Act). The final three legislative provisions involve incentives for states to achieve the pregnancy reduction goals that were set forth in the legislation. Assessing the impact of the pregnancy reduction provisions of the legislation requires the exploration of the effect of the PRWORA provisions on non-marital birth rates from 1996 to the present.

Conclusion

Welfare reform will be at the forefront of political debates for many years to come. The legislative history of welfare policy illustrates the difficulties involved in reaching consensus on each major component of welfare programs. This is in large part due to: the administrative complexity of provision of benefits to over 2 million families; the disagreement between political parties on the means by which welfare can be made more efficient and more effective; and the moral principles revealed as

we decide who should receive services, what level of benefits they should receive and what the government can expect as a condition of benefit receipt. In essence, it is the content of welfare policies and the way in which programs and services are provided that reflects the public's attitudes toward low-income families.

At this time, increased regulation of the poor (particularly women with dependent children) in both policies and programs seems to be a political necessity, and as such the current welfare proposals demonstrate both the public's dissatisfaction regarding the costs of welfare provision, and continued belief that the welfare system threatens both family values and the American work ethic.²⁷ The justification for these beliefs before and after PRWORA is partially due to an influx of social science research (see Chapter 3) on the relationship between non-marital births, poverty and welfare reform throughout the 1990s. Chapter 3 provides a review of the literature available prior to the passage of PRWORA, and in effect, the "evidence" by which many decisions were made by policy makers to address the continued impact of non-marital childbearing on child outcomes.

²⁷ Handler, *The Poverty of Welfare Reform*.

CHAPTER THREE
LITERATURE REVIEW
Teen Pregnancy Prevention Efforts, Family Planning, and Welfare Policy

Introduction

A review of the literature available prior to the passage of PRWORA provides the body of evidence many policy makers may have relied on to make legislative decisions to address the impact of non-marital childbearing on child well-being. The 1996 legislation reforming welfare “expresse(d) the sense of the Congress that prevention of out of wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out of wedlock births are important Government interests.”²⁸ This emphasis on non-marital childbearing was in response to the increased number of single parent families dependent on welfare in the early to mid 1990s.

In addition, a large body of social science research showed that children in one-parent families had an increased risk of abuse, poor academic achievement, behavior problems, unemployment, poverty, and were more likely to become single parents themselves. Changes to welfare rules to discourage non-marital childbearing began under welfare waivers in the early 1990s and continued after TANF in 1996.²⁹ Many of the changes made were (and continue to be) based on an increased body of research about the relationship between welfare provisions and non-marital childbearing for both teens and adult women. For the most part, that research has failed to find a clear relationship between the two.³⁰

Historically, measures to reduce out of wedlock child bearing have included public funding of contraception through family planning programs, the legalization of

²⁸ Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Subtitle A.

²⁹ Paul Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births.” *Welfare Reform and Beyond* Policy Brief No. 5 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, August 2001).

³⁰ R. Wertheimer, and K. Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform,” *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*. Series A, No. A-24 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, August 1998); Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births”; Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (1992): 1–61.

abortion, sex education programs³¹ and numerous pregnancy prevention programs that were established and continue to be funded in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.

The 1996 legislation changed the approach to reducing non-marital births by granting states an increased flexibility in operating their pregnancy prevention programs and by establishing “annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies.”³² As the legislation undergoes the reauthorization process, it is apparent that the first of the two primary objectives of welfare reform has been achieved – the welfare rolls are down by an unprecedented 53%. Reductions in non-marital childbearing are not as obvious, as the national percentage of births to unmarried women leveled off in 1998 and then began to rise slightly every year since. In some states, the rates have increased at more noticeable increments. Since 1994, however, there have been substantial decreases in teen pregnancy rates. While a large body of research³³ confirms the relationship between reducing both teen and adult non-marital births and improving child outcomes, there is little or no evidence that either pushing single mothers into the work force or off welfare altogether (due to time limits or sanctions) improves the well-being of their children.

Policy measures such as time limits, family caps, increased work requirements, child support enforcement, minor parent provisions, and tougher sanctions for non-compliance are all designed to make welfare participation less attractive. These new regulations are designed to discourage non-marital births, reduce long-term welfare dependence, and subsequently increase the ability of both parents to provide for their

³¹ K. Luker, *Dubious Conceptions: The Politics of Teen Pregnancy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

³² Public Law 104-193, Title IV, Section 401.

³³ Rebecca A. Maynard, ed., *Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs of Adolescent Childbearing* (New York: Robin Hood Foundation, 1996); Alan Guttmacher Institute. *Teenage Pregnancy: Trends and Lessons Learned*. Issues in Brief Series 2002, No. 1, 2002; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, *Report to Congress on Out of Wedlock Childbearing* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

children. Additionally, the relaxed rules for two parent families on welfare (in some states) are intended to encourage marriage and support two parent families in need.

This chapter reviews the research and literature on the strength of association between non-marital childbearing, teen pregnancy and welfare dependence before and after the PRWORA passed in 1996. Note also that the research findings in Chapter 5 examine the effect of policies and programs on non-marital childbearing and welfare participation, and are provided in conjunction with issues to consider in the context of reauthorization of the welfare law.

Births to Unmarried Women

In 2001, the *percentage* of births to unmarried women was more than one-third (33.4 percent),³⁴ and this percentage also varies from state to state – for example, non-marital births in 2001 ranged from 17.4% of all births in Utah to 57.1% in the District of Columbia.

The non-marital *birth rate* is defined as the number of births per 1,000 unmarried women ages 15-44. In recent years non-marital birth rates increased for women ages 20-44, but declined for teenaged women. The Centers for Disease Control in 2002 reported a 5% decline in the national teen birth rate, from 48.5 births per 1,000 females aged 15-19 years in 2000 to 45.9 in 2001. Overall, the teen birth rate has declined 26 percent since 1991.³⁵ The greatest headway in pregnancy prevention has been made with younger teens (age 15-17), whose birthrate dropped 8% in 2001, while the rate for older teens (18-19) also dropped, 4% in 2001.³⁶ The rates vary among states, although all states did show some decline as shown in Table 3.1.

³⁴ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Births: Preliminary Data for 2001*, NVSR Vol. 50, No. 10, (PHS) 2002-1120, 2002.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

In 2000 rates for teenagers 15-19 years ranged from 23.4 per 1,000 in New Hampshire to 72.0 in Mississippi. The highest rate was for the District of Columbia, 80.7. Among younger teenagers (15-17 years), the rates ranged from 9.8 in New Hampshire to 45.0 in Mississippi; with the highest rate in the District of Columbia, 60.7. Among older teenagers 18-19 years, the rates ranged from 44.5 in Vermont to 114.1 in Arkansas.³⁷

Race. The variation in non-marital birth rates also reflects differences in the composition of teenage populations in each state by race and Hispanic origin.³⁸ In fact, Wertheimer and Moore believe that *most* variation in non-marital birth rates among the states is due to racial composition in each state, given that Hispanic and African Americans have an increased number of teen pregnancies.³⁹ In general, rates for Blacks and Hispanics are much higher than that of White teens. Figure 3.1 shows that in 2001, the National Center for Health Statistics reported that 37.4 of every 1000 live births among White women ages 15-19 were to unmarried teens, whereas 71.4 per 1000 births were to African American women ages 15-19, and 71.8 per 1000 to Hispanic women ages 15-19.⁴⁰

³⁷ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Teenage Births in the United States: State Trends, 1991–2000, an Update*, NVSR Volume 50, No. 9, (PHS) 2002–1120, 2002.

³⁸ S. Ventura, S. Curtin, and T. Mathews, *Teenage Births in the United States: National and State Trends, 1990–1996* (National Vital Statistics System. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 1998).

³⁹ Wertheimer and Moore, “Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform.”

⁴⁰ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Births: Preliminary Data for 2001*.

Table 3.1. Percent Births to Teenaged Women, Each State 1991 & 2000.

State	1991			2000			Percent change between 1991 and 2000		
	15-19 years	15-17 years	18-19 years	15-19 years	15-17 years	18-19 years	15-19 years	15-17 years	18-19 years
United States ^a	62.1	38.7	94.4	48.5	27.4	79.2	-21.9	-29.2	-16.1
Alabama	73.9	47.7	109.5	62.9	37.9	97.3	-14.9	-20.5	-11.1
Alaska	65.4	35.3	111.7	42.4	23.6	69.4	-35.2	-33.1	-37.9
Arizona	80.7	51.4	122.6	69.1	41.1	111.3	-14.4	-20.0	9.2
Arkansas	79.8	49.4	122.8	68.5	36.7	114.1	-14.2	-25.7	-7.1
California	74.7	46.9	113.6	48.5	28.6	75.6	-35.1	-39.0	-33.5
Colorado	58.2	35.3	91.4	49.2	28.6	79.8	-15.5	-19.0	-12.7
Connecticut	40.4	26.3	59.4	31.9	16.9	56.3	-21.0	-35.7	** -5.2
Delaware	61.1	40.3	87.1	51.6	30.5	80.2	-15.5	-24.3	** -7.9
District of Columbia	114.4	102.8	125.5	80.7	60.7	101.8	-29.5	-41.0	-18.9
Florida	68.8	44.0	102.9	52.6	29.7	88.0	-23.5	-32.5	-14.5
Georgia	76.3	50.6	110.9	64.2	36.8	104.3	-15.9	-27.3	-6.0
Hawaii	58.7	34.7	91.5	45.1	24.7	70.5	-23.2	-28.8	-23.0
Idaho	53.9	29.3	90.8	43.1	21.3	72.8	-20.0	-27.3	-19.8
Illinois	64.8	40.6	99.1	49.5	28.5	81.1	-23.6	-29.8	-18.2
Indiana	60.5	35.2	95.2	50.3	26.2	85.9	-16.9	-25.6	-9.8
Iowa	42.6	22.8	71.5	34.7	17.4	60.3	-18.5	-23.7	-15.7
Kansas	55.4	29.4	94.1	45.3	22.4	78.5	-18.2	-23.8	-16.6
Kentucky	68.9	42.6	105.5	55.3	29.2	92.2	-19.7	-31.5	-12.6
Louisiana	76.1	51.1	111.4	62.1	36.3	97.1	-18.4	-29.0	-12.8
Maine	43.5	23.8	70.1	28.7	13.4	52.8	-34.0	-43.7	-24.7
Maryland	54.3	35.2	79.8	41.6	23.8	68.8	-23.4	-32.4	-13.8
Massachusetts	37.8	25.2	52.9	27.1	15.0	44.9	-28.3	-40.5	-15.1
Michigan	59.0	35.5	91.1	39.2	21.3	66.3	-33.6	-40.0	-27.2
Minnesota	37.3	20.7	61.4	29.6	15.6	51.0	-20.6	-24.6	-16.9
Mississippi	85.6	60.1	120.4	72.0	45.0	109.9	-15.9	-25.1	-8.7
Missouri	64.5	38.7	100.7	48.8	26.5	82.2	-24.3	-31.5	-18.4
Montana	46.7	23.6	83.0	35.8	19.1	60.8	-23.3	-19.1	-26.7
Nebraska	42.4	23.6	69.2	37.2	19.3	62.7	-12.3	-18.2	-9.4
Nevada	75.3	43.9	119.1	62.2	34.2	106.7	-17.4	-22.1	-10.4
New Hampshire	33.3	17.1	53.8	23.4	9.8	45.4	-29.7	-42.7	-15.6
New Jersey	41.6	26.3	62.9	31.7	17.0	54.9	-23.8	-42.7	-15.6

Table 3.1 (Continued).

State	1991			2000			Percent change between 1991 and 2000		
	15-19 years	15-17 years	18-19 years	15-19 years	15-17 years	18-19 years	15-19 years	15-17 years	18-19 years
New Mexico	79.8	50.0	124.4	66.2	40.2	105.1	-17.0	-19.6	-15.5
New York	46.0	29.1	69.0	35.6	20.1	58.1	-22.6	-30.9	-15.8
North Carolina	70.5	46.2	101.7	59.9	32.8	101.4	-15.0	-29.0	**0.3
North Dakota	35.6	18.1	62.4	28.2	12.5	51.4	-20.8	-30.9	-17.6
Ohio	60.5	36.2	93.8	45.6	24.1	77.2	-24.6	-33.4	-17.7
Oklahoma	72.1	41.7	115.6	60.1	32.9	99.8	-16.6	-21.1	-13.7
Oregon	54.9	31.3	90.7	43.2	23.5	72.8	-21.3	-24.9	-19.7
Pennsylvania	46.9	29.2	70.5	35.2	19.6	58.8	-24.9	-32.9	-16.6
Rhode Island	45.4	30.1	63.6	38.4	21.3	64.0	-15.4	-29.2	**0.6
South Carolina	72.9	48.0	105.4	60.6	36.7	92.9	-16.9	-23.5	-11.9
South Dakota	47.5	26.3	79.2	37.2	19.4	62.2	-21.7	-26.2	-21.5
Tennessee	75.2	47.8	112.1	61.5	34.2	101.6	-18.2	-28.5	-9.4
Texas	78.9	50.4	119.3	69.2	42.7	107.1	-12.3	-15.3	-10.2
Utah	48.2	27.0	79.8	40.0	22.0	62.7	-17.0	-18.5	-21.4
Vermont	39.2	21.3	62.0	24.1	10.6	44.5	-38.5	-50.2	-28.2
Virginia	53.5	31.8	81.2	40.8	21.7	66.9	-23.7	-31.8	-17.6
Washington	53.7	31.0	86.5	38.2	20.3	64.5	-28.9	-34.5	-25.4
West Virginia	57.4	32.4	93.2	46.4	22.8	79.8	-19.7	-29.6	-14.4
Wisconsin	43.7	24.8	71.2	34.5	18.3	58.8	-21.1	-26.2	-17.4
Wyoming	54.2	26.4	98.6	40.8	19.0	73.4	-24.7	-28.0	-25.6

**Not significant at $p < 0.05$

^a Excludes data for the territories. Note: Birth rates by State shown in this table are based on population estimates provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, projected from the 1990 census; see reference 2. Therefore, the rates shown here may differ from rates computed on the basis of other population estimates.

Source: *National Vital Statistics Report*, vol. 50, no.10, June 6, 2002.

Recently, the greatest reduction in teen birthrates was among African American teens, which declined from 108.5 births to unmarried teenage women in 2000 to 71.4 per 1000 in 2001. Between 2000 and 2001, birthrates for Hispanic teens have not shown a similar decline, with a rate of 72.4 per 1000 births in 2000 to a 71.8 per 1000 among teens in 2001.⁴¹




Figure 3.1. Non-Marital Birth Rate, by Race, Women Age 15–19 Years, Selected Years.

Source: *National Vital Statistics Report*, vol. 51, no.2, December 18, 2002.

Other factors influence the non-marital birth rates more generally. For example, some researchers⁴² have stressed overall changes in the population, specifically, the increased number of women of reproductive age that can influence birthrates. This demographic trend can increase all births, including those to unmarried

⁴¹ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *Births: Preliminary Data for 2001*.

⁴² For example, S. Ventura at the NCHS, I. Sawhill at Brookings Institution, and Kristin Moore of Child Trends.

women. Additionally, married women have had fewer children in recent years, which can lead to a corollary rise in the non-marital birth ratio.⁴³

Consequences of Non-Marital Childbearing

State efforts to prevent teen pregnancy and non-marital childbearing vary under the PRWORA, as each state has flexibility to design their own programs and implement specific measures (e.g., family caps, time limits) as a means to reduce out of wedlock births. The Congressional language in the PRWORA clearly articulates the need to reduce non-marital births, as childbearing by single women (not just adolescents) has many consequences for the child born outside of marriage. Additionally, children born to parents who marry after discovering a pregnancy are more likely to experience divorce, and as result, are likely to be brought up without one of their parents in their home. Finally, growing up in a single parent household has its own set of risks, including but not limited to; high school drop out, early childbearing, lower academic achievement, and behavior problems.⁴⁴

Interestingly, those consequences of being born to an unmarried mother mirror the factors that predict early childbearing, as numerous studies have shown that school failure, behavior problems, family dysfunction and poverty increase the likelihood that a woman will have a child outside of marriage.⁴⁵ Thus, the same factors that predict early childbearing for the mother become risk factors for their children, establishing a strong likelihood of inter-generational incidents of non-marital births and welfare dependence.

⁴³ Offner, "Reducing Non-Marital Births."

⁴⁴ Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, *The Best Intentions: Unintended Pregnancy and the Well-Being of Children and Families* (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1995).

⁴⁵ Wertheimer and Moore, "Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform."

Causes of Non-Marital Childbearing

Despite all the research on the consequences and causes of early childbearing, there still remains widespread disagreement on what caused the increases in non-marital childbearing in the 1990s. This led to debates among legislators and researchers on how to solve the problem, as different perspectives on the root cause of a social problem inevitably led to various proposed solutions.

Several theories on the underlying cause of increases in non-marital childbearing were offered at the time leading up to the passage of PRWORA. First, many believed that non-marital births increased because of an incentive created by welfare provisions. However, evidence of this theory is mixed, as Moffitt found a slight majority of researchers who found an incentive effect in their research.⁴⁶ Others believed that as more women entered the workforce they were able to support themselves, and the financial necessity of marriage was reduced. Wilson posited that the marriage rate was down because the low employability of men made them less attractive to marry.⁴⁷ The evidence of this was also mixed, as research conducted by the Brookings Institution found that the marriage rates fell at the same rate among well-educated and less educated black men.⁴⁸

Changes in social norms and values were also offered as a root cause of the increase in non-marital births, as Sawhill proposed that sexual mores changed such that marriage is no longer a prerequisite to pregnancy and/or childbearing.⁴⁹ Finally, many researchers believed that welfare policies themselves created the upward trend in births to unmarried women. In fact, they found that some welfare regulations

⁴⁶ Robert Moffitt, ed., "The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility," in *Welfare, the Family and Reproductive Behavior* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1998).

⁴⁷ William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

⁴⁸ Isabel Sawhill, "What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?" *Welfare Reform and Beyond* Policy Brief No. 8 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 2001).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

created marriage penalties; as income increases benefits decline – which is common in means tested programs – but when coupled with the reductions in TANF, food stamps, Medicaid, and EITC, the total reductions can be as high as 85% per dollar of income.⁵⁰ Sawhill contradicts this idea, as she believes there is little evidence that these provisions directly discourage marriage, because often people don't understand the laws, or the penalties incurred are not a part of the marriage decision.⁵¹ Although the scope of research provided about the increase in non-marital births in the 1990s was large, it did not lead to a consensus on causes of the upward trend and influenced the solutions proposed to reverse the trend.

Efforts to Discourage Non-marital childbearing

There are many possible approaches to reduce non-marital births. Obviously, the first is to prevent unintended pregnancy among unmarried women, especially teens. A corollary approach is to increase the education and employment opportunities of young women to make the opportunity cost of an early pregnancy higher. Prevention efforts that target unmarried men (especially ages 15–25) have also had some impact on teen pregnancy rates in local communities.⁵² For some women, marriage incentives may be appropriate (e.g., removing monetary disincentives to marriage for women on welfare). Finally, encouraging unmarried couples to delay childbearing to a later age (preferably after marriage) may reduce non-marital births and increase the formation of two parent families. It is important to note, however, that inducing people to marriage before they had planned to do so may not ensure children are raised in two parent homes – as these couples may face a higher risk of divorce.

⁵⁰ Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births.”

⁵¹ Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?”

⁵² Freya Sonenstein et al., *Involving Males in Preventing Teen Pregnancy* (The Urban Institute, 1997).

Teen Pregnancy and Welfare Dependence

The minor parent provisions (requiring teens to live at home and stay in school as a condition of benefits) in the 1996 Act are designed to address the connection between teen pregnancy and welfare receipt. The reduction of teen pregnancy seemed relevant to the broader goal of reducing not only non-marital childbearing, but also welfare dependence because 75% of teens relied on welfare benefits within 5 years of a non-marital birth, and 55% of welfare mothers were teens at the time of their first birth.⁵³

According to Sawhill,⁵⁴ there are several important reasons for focusing on teen pregnancy prevention as a way to reduce the overall rate of non-marital births.

1. Half of all first non-marital births are to teens;
2. Once teens have had their first child they are more likely to have additional children out of wedlock.
3. Half of all current welfare recipients had their first child as a teenager.
4. All single mothers face challenges raising children;
 - Teens are at an even greater disadvantage.
 - Only 20% of teen mothers receive ANY support from fathers, and 80% of them end up on welfare; and
 - They have longer spells on welfare.
5. Teen childbearing is more costly than adult non-marital childbearing.⁵⁵

⁵³ U.S. Committee on Ways & Means, *Summary of Welfare Reform Made by P.L. 104-193—Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 and Associated Legislation* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996).

⁵⁴ Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?”

The disadvantage related to early childbearing is not only a direct result of the early birth, but also the disadvantaged background of the mother in the first place (e.g., poverty, lack of education). However, regardless of the mother's background, it is well documented that teen mothers are less likely to finish high school or get married in their lifetime.⁵⁶ In addition, they are more likely to have additional children outside of marriage, and unwed mothers who eventually marry still have higher rates of divorce, poverty and welfare dependence.⁵⁷ These rates illustrate that encouraging marriage is not always the best solution for many women, and efforts to prevent pregnancy are also important to increase the odds of success for young women at risk.

The link between teen childbearing and subsequent welfare receipt has been well established and it is important to also remember that adolescent mothers are not yet adults. As such, the consequences of an early birth are experienced by both the teen mother and her child(ren). Appendix D provides a detailed list of the consequences for both mother and child due to adolescent childbearing. Consequences for the child born out of wedlock include low birth weight, higher rates of chronic illness,⁵⁸ lower academic performance,⁵⁹ higher rates of abuse and neglect,⁶⁰ and poverty.⁶¹ Adolescent mothers are less likely to complete their education,⁶² have lower

⁵⁵ Ibid. For example, Mathematica Policy Research estimates \$7 billion a year, \$3200 per teen birth (Rebecca A. Maynard, ed., *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Consequences of Teen Pregnancy* [Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press; Lanham, MD, 1997]).

⁵⁶ D. Lichter and D. Graef, "Finding a Mate? The Marital and Cohabitation Histories of Unwed Mothers," in *Out-of-Wedlock: Causes, and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility*, ed. L. L. Wu and B. L. Wolfe, 317–343. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001).

⁵⁷ Sawhill, "What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?"

⁵⁸ Rebecca A. Maynard, ed., *Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs of Adolescent Childbearing* (New York: Robin Hood Foundation, 1996); B. Wolfe and M. Perozek, "Teen Children's Health and Health Care Use, in Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy*, 181–203.

⁵⁹ Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs of Adolescent Childbearing*; R. H. Haveman, B. Wolfe, and E. Peterson, "Children of Early Childbearers as Young Adults," in Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy*, chapter 9.

⁶⁰ Sawhill, "What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?"

⁶¹ National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, *President Isabel Sawhill, Analysis of the 1999 Current Population Survey, a Monthly Survey of about 50,000 Households Conducted by the Bureau of*

incomes,⁶³ have more children out of wedlock,⁶⁴ and face decreased marriage prospects.⁶⁵ The consequences experienced by both the mother and child are severe and long term, and the children of teens face greater problems than those born to older mothers.

Non-marital Pregnancy Prevention: What's been done so far?

Pregnancy prevention programs vary in the governmental level at which they are implemented, target population they are intended to reach, type of program, and the theoretical underpinning of the program.⁶⁶

Implementation Level. Prevention efforts differ by the level of government responsible for their implementation. Two primary types of programs exist to reduce out of wedlock births: national programs that help finance contraceptive services like Medicaid and Title X of the Public Health Service Act; and community-based pregnancy prevention programs.

Target population. The general population for pregnancy prevention programs includes all women of childbearing age, from 15 years old to 44 years old. Preventing non-marital births involves a varied population of women who are usually targeted through community based prevention programs. However, most programs focus on reaching younger women in their teens or early twenties.

the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 2000).

⁶² V. J. Hotz, S. W. McElroy, and S. G. Sanders, "The Impacts of Teenage Childbearing on the Mothers and the Consequences of those Impacts for Government," in Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy*, 55–94.

⁶³ National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, *President Isabel Sawhill, Analysis of the 1999 Current Population Survey*.

⁶⁴ D. S. Kalmuss and P. B. Namerow, "Subsequent Childbearing among Teenage Mothers: The Determinants of Closely Spaced Second Birth," *Family Planning Perspectives* 26, no. 4 (1994): 149–153, 159.

⁶⁵ D. Lichter and D. Graef, "Finding a Mate?"

⁶⁶ K. Moore, B. Sugland, C. Blumenthal, D. Gleib, and N. Snyder, *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs: Interventions and Evaluations* (Washington, DC: Child Trends, Inc., 1995).

Types of teen prevention programs. The *National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy* identified five main types of prevention programs: sex and HIV education programs; programs designed to improve access to contraceptives; sex education for parents and their children; multiple component programs; and youth development programs.⁶⁷ In addition to these community based programs, there are several national media campaigns that focus on teen pregnancy because a higher proportion of teens experiencing a birth out of wedlock are likely to be welfare dependent, despite the fact that 70% of out of wedlock pregnancies are to women over the age of twenty.

Programs for women over 20. Where do women over 20 at risk of a non-marital birth receive their services if not through the programs listed above? Many poor women over age 20 receive services through Title X and Medicaid (a brief history and description of family planning efforts follows in the next section). Women with more financial resources receive their services through private health care and are by definition, not as great a risk of non-marital childbearing as women from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Theoretical Underpinnings. Most well designed prevention programs start with a theoretical model of the major components involved in the problem they are intending to ameliorate. In the area of out of wedlock births, the research literature cites eight theories of learning believed to explain the dynamics of issues surrounding an out of wedlock pregnancy. Appendix E provides a summary of each theory. In addition, the provisions set forth in the legislation, and how they relate to each theory is discussed in the next chapter. Regardless, it is important to note that program content will vary according to the basic philosophical tenets to which administrators subscribe.

⁶⁷ D. Kirby, *No Easy Answers: Research Findings on Programs to Reduce Teen Pregnancy* (Washington, D.C.: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, March 1997), 24.

The research literature cites eight theories of learning believed to explain the dynamics of issues surrounding an out of wedlock pregnancy. To understand the legislative sanctions placed on teen mothers under welfare reform, the three most popular theories are outlined and discussed in a legislative context.

Social learning theory posits that the likelihood of an individual engaging in or avoiding some type of behavior is determined by the individual's understanding of the association between that behavior and a particular outcome. The individual must next believe that he/she has the capacity to avoid the behavior, and that the method for avoiding the outcome will be effective. The individual must also believe there is benefit to avoiding the outcome. One way to develop attitudes about the behavior is through observation of others, witnessing the rewards or sanctions of the behavior and then acting out according to their own belief.⁶⁸ Relating this theory to non-marital childbearing it is clear that unmarried women (regardless of their age) need to perceive a non-marital birth as an outcome that will have a deleterious effect on either their present or future circumstances. In addition, this theory would also posit that those children raised by single mothers are less likely to make that observation, if their primary role model (mothers) did not perceive the impact of a non-marital birth as impacting their own outcomes; and thus, could explain some of the issues underlying intergenerational welfare dependence.

The culture of poverty perspective is the most politically charged of the theories and argues that adolescent sexual and fertility behavior is "both an adaptation and reaction of the poor to their marginal place in society."⁶⁹ One main tenet of this is that youth are aware of their limited opportunities and poor living conditions and as a result, adopt standards of behavior that would be considered unacceptable by mainstream society. Wilson argues that these behavioral norms are a result of

⁶⁸ Moore et al., *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs*, 63.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 64.

structural factors and inequality.⁷⁰ Murray argued that welfare programs have rewarded this behavior over time and led to patterns of inter generational dependency.⁷¹

In PRWORA, these two theories may have influenced the inclusion of minor parent provisions, which require teens to live at home or in an “adult-supervised” setting as condition of benefit receipt. Thus, for teens who may have believed early childbearing would result in government supported independent living, this approach may serve to discourage childbearing, as the reward of living on their own is no longer available to them. In addition, the minor parent provisions also require teen mothers to attend high school or an alternative educational setting (e.g., GED, vocational training) as soon as their child reaches twelve weeks old. These conditions must be met to receive monetary benefits, and as such, these measures are intended to discourage any perceived reward to early childbearing. While the minor parent provisions are intended to remove any perceived gains from an early birth for teenaged women, they rely on the assumption that teens have the capacity to make rational, long-term decisions in their best interest.

The minor parent provisions may have an unintended affect when analyzed under an opportunity cost model of fertility behavior among teens. In fact, there may be a portion of teens at risk of early childbearing who delay risky behavior because they fear being kicked out of their family home or having to drop out of school as a result of an early birth. The requirements set forth in the 1996 Act could have the reverse effect; teens may feel reassured that they would have place to live and also be provided means and incentives to finish school despite having a child at an early age. Consequently, the minor parent provisions could be seen as contrary to the opportunity

⁷⁰ Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*.

⁷¹ Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1984).

cost model of prevention, which is based on the assumption that young women believe they have nothing to lose by having an early birth. To address the notion of opportunity costs, prevention efforts would focus on increasing the opportunities of young women for meaningful employment and emphasize the utility of an education to facilitate that employment.

Models of analysis

Cost benefit. Economists have examined factors such as higher wages that increase the cost of non-marital child bearing and should therefore be associated with decreased rates of fertility. Factors that decrease the cost of non-marital child bearing, for example, welfare benefits that vary with the number of children a woman bears, should be associated with increased rates in fertility.⁷² These economic factors are frequently discussed as a cost-benefit analysis, which examines “total cost” (which includes indirect/direct costs) associated with the decision to bear a child out of wedlock relative to the benefit of that decision. Direct costs include prenatal care, delivery cost, and childcare cost. Indirect costs include lower educational attainment, decreased employment or lost wages, poverty and decreased marriage prospects. The benefits commonly listed are welfare benefits and the emotional benefits of parenthood. The cost-benefit approach assumes that increases in teen pregnancy and non-marital childbearing were a result of welfare benefits in the early and mid 1990s. This assumption has mixed support in the research literature,⁷³ and it is important to note that, “the current policy debate over the causes of out-of-wedlock birth continues

⁷² Greg J. Duncan, W. Jean Yeung, Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, and Judith R. Smith, “How Much Does Childhood Poverty Affect the Life Chances of Children?” *American Sociological Review* 63, no. 3 (Jun 1998), 406–423; Shelly Lundberg and Robert D. Plotnick, “Adolescent Premarital Childbearing: Do Economic Incentives Matter?” *Journal of Labor Economics* 13, no. 2 (Apr 1995): 177–200; Robert Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review,” *Journal of Economic Literature* 30 (1992): 1–61; Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1994).

⁷³ Duncan et al., “Childhood Poverty”; Lundberg and Plotnick, “Adolescent Premarital Childbearing”; Moffitt, “Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System”; Murray, *Losing Ground*.

to be dominated by incentive-based explanations even though virtually all past studies show small or no effect of welfare programs on out-of-wedlock birth.”⁷⁴

Increasing economic opportunities for women (especially teens) should increase the opportunity cost of out of wedlock births, but at the same time this also empowers women to choose single motherhood and gives some women (e.g. middle class) the financial means to do so.⁷⁵ Peters et al. discuss a model of **planned** fertility that posits that a woman will weigh the costs (financial and personal) of bearing a child against the benefits, and choose to have the child when the benefits are greater than the costs. Thus, in the standard model the decision is based heavily on income available to support the child. Consequently, the fact that welfare benefits are only provided to single women with children underlies the assumption that the very provision of benefits may provide an incentive for a woman to choose to have the child outside of marriage (rather than terminate the pregnancy or marry the child’s father).⁷⁶ The choice of single parenthood over marriage is also more likely for a woman whose child is fathered by a man with little or no earning potential.

Additionally, note that the majority of births to unmarried women were **unintended** at the time of conception – 78% of pregnancies to unmarried women, 63% of pregnancies to formerly married women,⁷⁷ and 80% of pregnancies to teen aged women.⁷⁸ Thus, it is important to consider if the standard economic model can be applied to **unplanned** pregnancies – as a basis for appropriate policy measures to

⁷⁴ R. Kaestner, “Drug Use, Culture, and Welfare Incentives: Correlates of Family Structure and Out-of-wedlock Birth,” *Eastern Economic Journal* 24, no. 4 (Fall 1998), 397.

⁷⁵ G. Duncan, “How Non-Marital Childbearing is Affected by Neighborhoods, Marital Opportunities and Labor-Market Conditions,” in *Report to Congress on Out of Wedlock Childbearing* (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995).

⁷⁶ H. E. Peters, R. D. Plotnick, and J. Se-Ook, “How Will Welfare Reform Affect Childbearing and Family Structure Decisions?” (Revision of paper presented at “Changing Welfare” Conference, University of Illinois at Chicago, July 2001).

⁷⁷ E. Terry-Humen, Jennifer Manlove, and Kristin A. Moore, *Births Outside of Marriage: Perceptions vs. Reality*, Child Trends Research Brief, April 2001.

⁷⁸ National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, *General Facts and Statistics*, February 2002, available at <http://www.teenpregnancy.org/resources/data/genfact.asp>.

reduce the rate of non-marital births, particularly for young, unmarried women with few means to support themselves or their children.

The impact of a mistimed or unwanted pregnancy on the decision to have a child outside of marriage requires an understanding of each woman's view of welfare at the time she discovers her pregnancy. Specifically, are the costs associated with the birth lower when single women are eligible for government-supported assistance, or does the stigma associated with welfare dependence increase the perceived cost to the mother? It is likely that each expectant mother's perception of reliance on public assistance is contingent on her background such as the family structure she grew up in (as we know that daughters of single mothers are more likely to have a child out of wedlock).

Lost earnings that result from leaving the labor force to care for the child are the primary opportunity costs for women over 20 who have a child outside of marriage. Peters et al. suggest that the "opportunity costs of children are lower for women whose earnings potential is lower because of poor education or lack of experience... This suggests that welfare policies that increase education require work or otherwise help increase women's earnings are likely to reduce fertility."⁷⁹ However, for young women (under 20 years of age) the opportunity costs of a child born out of wedlock are very different. For example, many teens do not yet have significant earning power; so lost wages are not part of their cost benefit ratio. The decision making process for teens is not as well understood, but research confirms the importance of expectations for future education and employment possibilities on adolescent behavior.⁸⁰ The cost-benefit approach to non-marital fertility offers insight into potential approaches to modify fertility behavior, and may underlie some of the policy measures whose impact is estimated in Chapter 4.

⁷⁹ Peters et al., "How Will Welfare Reform Affect Childbearing and Family Structure Decisions?," 5.

⁸⁰ Kristin Moore (Child Trends), personal correspondence, January 23, 1999.

Very much related to cost benefit analysis, Bane and Ellwood⁸¹ label the recent welfare reform provisions that deny additional benefits to women who have another child while on public assistance (family cap) as the *rational choice* model.⁸² Peters et al. also apply a rational decision-making approach that focuses on financial incentives as primary variables of interest and stress that, “other things equal, financial incentives can make a difference, even for demographic behavior.”⁸³ The question is, if we know that financial incentives can impact decisions regarding out of wedlock births, what are the other primary factors that shape a woman’s decision to have a child outside of marriage? And, how does the strength of financial incentives differ by age, race and ethnicity of the mother?

The rational choice model is generally appropriate for modeling *planned* fertility decisions, and is not a perfect fit for analysis of non-marital childbearing. This is because the choices a woman is forced to make after the discovery of an *unintended* pregnancy are much different than those made by a woman before she intentionally becomes pregnant. The stress alone of making choices after discovering a mistimed pregnancy changes the influence of every part of the cost-benefit ratio. In addition, for teenage women, decisions regarding sexual activity and contraception are rarely rational and it is unlikely that many teenagers understand that the chances are that they will be on welfare within five years of having a child born outside of marriage.

Kaestner believes that the lack of explanatory power of the rational choice model and the commonly held view that values and culture are the cause of out-of-wedlock births, suggests “that research efforts should be directed toward uncovering the empirical relationship between cultural factors and family structure.”⁸⁴ This point

⁸¹ Mary Jo Bane and David T. Ellwood, *Welfare Realities: From Rhetoric to Reform* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

⁸² Kaestner, “Drug Use, Culture, and Welfare Incentives.”

⁸³ Peters et al., “How Will Welfare Reform Affect Childbearing and Family Structure Decisions?,” 3.

⁸⁴ Kaestner, “Drug Use, Culture, and Welfare Incentives,” 397.

is particularly salient when examining differences in non-marital birth rates between racial and ethnic groups. Schneider suggests a “holistic anthropological approach” is needed to facilitate “different strategies for policy makers and scholars interested in solutions to urban poverty.”⁸⁵ Previous discussion showed two approaches to addressing the structural causes of non-marital birth rates: to account for cultural differences when setting forth policy solutions (e.g., Wilson, 1986, 1996); or to set forth policies designed to modify (culturally based) behaviors that may lead to increased births outside of marriage (Murray, 1994.).

Successful Teen Pregnancy Prevention Efforts

Pregnancy prevention efforts have two primary goals, to delay sexual intercourse for non-active teens and/or to encourage contraceptive use for teens and unmarried women that are sexually active. One major obstacle to establishing (or continuing) these prevention programs is the notion that the programs in and of themselves cause increases in adolescent sexual activity and pregnancies. However, this idea is not supported by research, and several studies have shown no relation between programs and increased sexual activity or pregnancies. For example, the Institute of Medicine found that “programs that provide information on both abstinence and contraceptive use neither encourage the onset of sexual intercourse nor increase the frequency of intercourse among adolescents; in fact, programs that provide both messages appear to be effective in delaying the onset of sexual intercourse and encouraging contraceptive use, especially among younger adolescents.”⁸⁶

⁸⁵ J. Schneider, “Pathways to Opportunity: The Role of Race, Social Networks, Institutions, and Neighborhood in Career and Educational Paths for People on Welfare,” *Human Organization* 59, no. 1 (2000): 83.

⁸⁶ Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, *The Best Intentions*, 244.

Research also shows that adolescent pregnancy is a complex problem associated with individual risk factors such as school achievement, risk taking, and personal aspirations; and family characteristics such as family structure, monitoring, communication, values, poverty, economic and educational opportunities.⁸⁷ The New York State Task Force on Preventing out of Wedlock Births found that prevention efforts must take into account racial, religious, and cultural, gender, age and economic differences in designing programs.⁸⁸

Reduction of the national rate of births to unmarried women requires further examination of the capacity of successful programs to affect behavior across diverse communities, particularly based on race and socioeconomic class. Knowledge about how to reach adult men and women has always been more limited and most prevention efforts are targeted to adolescents who are easier to reach than adults.

Impact of Teen Pregnancy Programs in Reducing Out Of Wedlock Births

In the mid-1990s, despite the reports that many existing programs were making an impact on teen birth rates in their communities, research showed that a “stronger, larger, more long-term and more coherent intervention strategy was needed.”⁸⁹ Critics cited several deficits of programs. First, few prevention programs were theory based and therefore, lacked a clear operational model. This led to problems assessing the program’s impact if their goals and objectives were not explicated through the framework a model would provide. Second, many prevention programs lacked systematic and rigorous evaluations. In addition, many prevention programs reached a small population (affecting only that community’s problem), with a modest impact on state and national rates. Many programs were short lived either due to lack of funding

⁸⁷ Moore et al., *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs*.

⁸⁸ New York State Task Force on Out of Wedlock Pregnancy and Poverty, Interim Report, January 1998.

⁸⁹ Moore et al., *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs*, 59.

or due to program design. Consequently there was not enough time to refine intervention strategies on the basis of community feedback and evaluation results.⁹⁰

In general, before PRWORA, these prevention efforts were rarely seen as a success, as the language in the 1996 legislation defined out of wedlock pregnancy, not just teen pregnancy, as a “major social problem.”⁹¹ At that time, one opposing view was that “federal programs have slowed, but not reversed teen pregnancy rates,” and that given how sexually active teens had become, “these programs are a success, but are seen as a failure.”⁹² Thus, at the time of PRWORA’s passage, the evidence of program successes and opinions offered on that success were conflicted, at best.

Recent research confirms the success achieved by teen pregnancy prevention efforts, as the Centers for Disease Control 2002 report that the teen pregnancy rate is at a new record low, after falling for the last ten years,⁹³ and since 1991, the teen birth rate has declined by 26 percent. While there has been a consistent decline in the teen birth rate, it is hard to know the extent of influence Federal policies and state programs has had on that reduction. However, researchers from the *National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy* believe that it is likely that the increased flexibility granted to states in program design and delivery under PRWORA is a factor in the increased effectiveness of these programs.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, *The Best Intentions*; Moore et al., *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs*.

⁹¹ U.S. Committee on Ways & Means, *Summary of Welfare Reform Made by P.L. 104-193*.

⁹² K. Luker, *Dubious Conceptions: The Politics of Teen Pregnancy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 184.

⁹³ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, *HHS Report Shows Teen Birth Rate Falls to New Record Low in 2001*, CDC Office of Media Relations, June 6, 2002, available at <http://www.hhs.gov>.

⁹⁴ National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, *Not Just a Single Issue: Teen Pregnancy Prevention’s Link to Other Critical Social Issues*, ed. Sarah Brown (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, February 2002); C. Flanigan, *What’s Behind the Good News: The Decline in Teen Pregnancy Rates During the 1990s* (Washington, DC: The National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 2001).

State Program Efforts: Teen Pregnancy

Early efforts under PRWORA focused both Federal policy and state program efforts on decreasing the welfare rolls and moving people to work. In the late 1990s, however there was a noticeable increase in state efforts to reduce teen pregnancy and adult non-marital childbearing [see Appendix F].

Child Trends⁹⁵ reports that 23 states provide contraceptive education in public schools, 26 provide abstinence only programs, and 15 have a mixed curriculum that incorporates more than one component in program delivery. Table 3.2 shows an increase in most types of teen pregnancy prevention programs from 1997 to 1999.

Table 3.2: State Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs.

Policy	Number of States 1997	Number of States 1999
Pregnancy prevention policy in public schools	18	28
Family planning services to teens	33	44
Contraceptive education in public schools	14	23
Contraceptive clinics in public schools	3	3
Abstinence Education in schools	20	26
Media Campaign	15	36

Source: R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, "State Policy Initiatives for Reducing Teen and Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps," *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, November 2000).

Reliance on abstinence education as a means to reduce teen pregnancy occurs despite the evidence⁹⁶ that more comprehensive sex education has a greater impact on both delaying onset of teen sexual activity and an increased use of contraception. Further, only 14% of states have a "truly comprehensive policy that teaches about both

⁹⁵ R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, "State Policy Initiatives for Reducing Teen and Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps," *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, November 2000).

⁹⁶ C. Dailard, "Sex Education: Politicians, Parents, Teachers and Teens," *The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy*, February 2001.

abstinence and contraception as a part of a broader program designed to teach adolescents to become sexually healthy adults.”⁹⁷ While the increase in various types of prevention programs has played a role in the substantial declines of unintended pregnancy among teens in the 1990s, research by the Alan Guttmacher Institute indicates that this rate could decline even more if the focus on abstinence was coupled with contraceptive education.⁹⁸

Targeting Males in Prevention Efforts

There is growing attention to the responsibilities of boys and young men in preventing teen pregnancy and 40 states have strategies to prevent unwanted or too-early fatherhood by 1999.⁹⁹ The best available data show that after increasing 32 percent between 1986 and 1991, the teen birth rate for fathers aged 15-19 remained fairly constant until 1994, then decreased 16 percent between 1994 and 1999.¹⁰⁰ Although pregnancy prevention programs in high schools are an important way to reach young men at risk, many of the fathers of children born to teen mothers are older; almost half of young men who impregnate a minor teen (under 18) are three or more years older.¹⁰¹ As a result, a critical step needed to further impact teen pregnancy rates is to focus on men in their late teens and early twenties. Thus, the 1996 Act identifies two possible avenues to reach males at risk of fathering children outside of marriage are; to enforce statutory rape laws, and/or to use a national media

⁹⁷ Ibid, 9.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ J. Knitzer and S. Bernard, *Map and Track: State Initiatives to Encourage Responsible Fatherhood* (New York: National Center for Children in Poverty, Columbia University, 1997).

¹⁰⁰ S. J. Ventura, T. J. Mathews, and B. E. Hamilton, *Births to Teenagers in the United States, 1950–2001*, National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 49, no. 10 (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 2001).

¹⁰¹ J. E. Darroch, D. J. Landry, and S. Oslak, “Age Differences Between Sexual Partners in the United States,” *Family Planning Perspectives* 31I, no. 4 (1999): 160–167.

campaign to raise awareness of tougher penalties against men who father children outside marriage, especially involving teenaged women.¹⁰²

Adult Non-marital Childbearing

One component of prevention efforts that is key to reducing unintended pregnancies among women (teens and older) is increased access to effective contraception.¹⁰³ As shown in Table 3.3, 32 states are trying to improve access to contraception among adult women to reduce their likelihood of a non-marital birth. In addition, 17 states had general media campaigns to discourage non-marital pregnancies, and Georgia, North Dakota and Tennessee had programs to encourage expectant couples to marry. Another popular approach in more than 40 states is increasing the financial disincentives toward men that father a child out of wedlock, through both mandatory paternity establishment by mothers receiving welfare and increased child support enforcement.

Table 3.3. State Non-marital Pregnancy Prevention Policies & Programs.

Policy	Number of States
Family cap	19
Improved access to contraceptives	32
Media Campaign	17
Programs to encourage abstinence before marriage	14
Programs to encourage expectant couples to marry	3
Changes to tax code to encourage marriage	1
Paternity establishment programs	43
Child support enforcement	42
Youth employment and education programs	26

Source: R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, “State Policy Initiatives for Reducing Teen and Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps,” *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, November 2000).

Adoption of the family cap (the denial of additional benefits for subsequent children born to a mother receiving welfare) is another direct effort by states to reduce non-

¹⁰² U.S. Committee on Ways & Means, *Summary of Welfare Reform Made by P.L. 104-193*.

¹⁰³ Dailard, “Sex Education: Politicians, Parents, Teachers and Teens.”

marital births. Research on the impact of this measure to date has had inconclusive results¹⁰⁴ perhaps because the family cap was instituted at the same time several other important measures were undertaken (e.g., time limits) either under welfare waivers or post PRWORA. The only state to report a noticeable effect of family caps on non-marital births was New Jersey, which also reported a corollary increase in abortions – a direct opposition to the stated goals of PRWORA.

Title X and the U.S. Family Planning Effort

Family planning programs have been a feature of U.S. welfare policy for a long time. In 1965, as part of the War on Poverty, bipartisan support for voluntary family planning programs emerged with the following four goals:

1. to expand economic development;
2. alleviate poverty;
3. avoid welfare dependency; and
4. improve women and children's health.¹⁰⁵

Title IV-A of the Social Security Act was amended in 1967 to require state welfare agencies to offer and provide family planning services to women receiving public assistance. President Nixon passed legislation in 1970 (with bipartisan support) creating the first comprehensive federal program devoted to provision of family planning services nationally – Title X of Public Health Service Act.

Throughout the 1970s more clinics were established and subsequently, expenditures rose. In 1972 Title XIX of the Social Security Act was amended to mandate inclusion of family planning services in all state Medicaid programs.¹⁰⁶

During the 1980s the Federal Government spent almost \$340 million in federal and

¹⁰⁴ Offner, “Reducing Non-Marital Births”; Sawhill, “What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?”

¹⁰⁵ U.S. Congress. *Social Security Act*, Title IV-A, 1967.

¹⁰⁶ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Title X and the U.S. Family Planning Effort*, 1995, retrieved on October 5, 1998, from www.agi-usa.org.

state funds to provide family planning services to 5 million women at nearly 5200 clinics. Conservative and fiscal pressures emerged in the 1980s that restricted services that could be provided as a condition of funding. Specifically, President Reagan added restrictions that affected teens and poor women's access to abortion. Before *Roe v. Wade*, 75% of teens carried their pregnancy to term, after the Supreme Court's 1973 decision, the rate dropped to 50% – as of 1988 the rate was up to 60%.¹⁰⁷

In 1990, \$622 million were spent in public funds on contraceptive services, and were disbursed in the following manner (in ascending order): Medicaid; Title X family planning program; Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant; Social Services Block Grant; Community health centers; and Migrant/ rural health centers. Of these programs, Medicaid and Title X serve the greatest number of women. In 2002, the U.S. Congress allocated \$265 million to Title X Family Planning, and requested the same amount for fiscal year 2003. 6.6 million women receive services through these programs each year,¹⁰⁸ and only 30% of women served are teens, 50% are 20-29 and 20% are older than 30.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the Title X programs are critical to addressing the needs of women at risk who are not reached by teen pregnancy prevention programs.

Importance of Title X to PRWORA

The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimated in 2002 that in the last 20 years, “family planning clinics have helped women avoid 20 million unintended pregnancies, 9 million of which would have ended in abortions.”¹¹⁰ Thus, family planning services under Title X further the dual goal in the PRWORA – to reduce non-marital births without increasing abortion. As a result, in 2001 the Alan Guttmacher Institute

¹⁰⁷ Luker, *Dubious Conceptions*, 155.

¹⁰⁸ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Fulfilling the Promise: Public Policy and U.S. Family Planning Clinics*, retrieved March 30, 2002 from www.agi-usa.org.

¹⁰⁹ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Title X and the U.S. Family Planning Effort*.

¹¹⁰ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Fulfilling the Promise*.

advocated that Title X programs be supported and funding needs increased to the levels it experienced prior to President Reagan's Administration (in constant dollars, funding for the Title X program declined by over 65% in the last decade.)¹¹¹

Research on family planning is emphasized in welfare reform discussions because Title X clinics are an established national network of community-based services that adhere to uniform federal regulations and guidelines, but only half of those eligible for Title X programs are served.¹¹² In addition, over 83% of Title X clients have incomes below 150 percent of the poverty level and many clients are uninsured and do not qualify for Medicaid. Therefore, Title X clinics may be the only affordable way for poor women over 20 to receive family planning services (including counseling, contraception and health check ups). Most importantly, Title X provides services to women before they are pregnant, unlike Medicaid – which generally provides family planning services after a pregnancy occurs. Thus, to prevent non marital births, Title X clinics are already in place, and can reach many women over 20 who would be at risk of an unintended pregnancy.

According to Campaign for our Children, 50% of pregnancies to young, unmarried women will end in abortion, 43% will end in an unintended birth, and 7% will end as an intended birth.¹¹³ Providing birth control to unmarried women on welfare has a great deal of public support, yet family planning has had little emphasis as a solution to the problems of non-marital births and poverty in 1996 legislation. As already stated, research shows that another reason to emphasize family planning for women over 20 is that they account for 69% of abortions, and the current restrictions placed on both family planning and access to abortion affect the women who account

¹¹¹ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Title X: Three Decades of Accomplishment*, The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, February 2001, retrieved from www.agi-usa.org.

¹¹² Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Fulfilling the Promise*.

¹¹³ Campaign for our Children, *National Overview*, 1998, retrieved October 1998 from www.cfoc.org.

for a majority (70%) of non-marital births.¹¹⁴ The PRWORA includes very specific goals for states to reduce out of wedlock births, without a corollary increase in abortion rates. Available research indicates that a comprehensive prevention effort aimed at this group of women is crucial to reduce the out of wedlock birth rate, the abortion rate, welfare dependence and poverty.

Impact of Family Planning Programs

Research conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute in 2001 and 2002 shows that publicly funded family planning services have prevented large numbers of unintended pregnancies, abortions and births among low-income women, especially unmarried women and teens. They also estimate that contraceptive services provided helped women avoid 1.3 million unplanned pregnancies each year, which would have resulted in 534,000 births and in the absence of family planning, it is estimated that an additional 386,000 teens would become pregnant each year, resulting in 155,000 births.¹¹⁵ Moreover, without publicly funded family planning services, AGI believes an additional 356,000 women who had never been married would give birth each year, increasing out of wedlock births by one quarter. They also postulate that every public dollar spent to provide family planning services, saves the public an average of \$3.00 in pregnancy related and newborn care.¹¹⁶

The Institute of Medicine also affirms the importance placed on Title X programs in the effort to reduce unintended pregnancies.

Financial barriers to contraception should be reduced by increasing the proportion of all health insurance policies that cover contraceptive services and supplies ...extending Medicaid coverage for all postpartum women... and continuing to provide public funding for comprehensive contraceptive services, especially those for low income women and adolescents who face major

¹¹⁴ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Fulfilling the Promise*.

¹¹⁵ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Title X: Three Decades of Accomplishment*.

¹¹⁶ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Fulfilling the Promise*.

financial barriers in securing such care. This last point speaks to the major role that public financing programs, such as Title X and Medicaid, have played in helping millions of people secure contraception...it is essential that such public investment be maintained.¹¹⁷

These programs are an important source of services for many women, as 25% of US counties relied on Title X as their only source of family planning.¹¹⁸

One way to judge the impact of current prevention programs and family planning services is the non-marital birth rates in the U.S. relative to other industrialized countries. The United States' out of wedlock birth rate ranked fourth as shown by Table 3.4.

Table 3.4. International Percentages of Births to Unmarried Women.

Rank	Country	Percentage of Births To Unmarried Women
1	Sweden	50%
2	Denmark	48%
3	United Kingdom	31%
3	France	31%
4	United States	30%
5	Canada	28%
6	Germany	15%
7	Italy	7%
8	Japan	1%

Source: M. Abrahamson, *Out of Wedlock Births: The U.S. in Comparative Perspective* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998).

It is important to note, however, that although the United States' non-marital birth rate ranked fourth, the United States does have the highest rate of teen pregnancy, and this further supports the emphasis on reduction of teen pregnancies as a way decrease overall rates of non-marital childbearing in the U.S.

¹¹⁷ Institute of Medicine Committee on Unintended Pregnancy, *The Best Intentions*, 6–7.

¹¹⁸ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Title X and the U.S. Family Planning Effort*.

Relationship between Welfare and Non-marital childbearing

Adolescent women, poor women over the age of twenty and middle class women experience different situations when faced with a non-marital pregnancy. Of the three groups, middle class women are likely to have the educational attainment needed to support themselves and a child by working. Teens and poor women are faced with a different set of circumstances surrounding the choice to have a child out of wedlock. Many are forced to rely on welfare as a means to support their children. This has reinforced the notion that welfare receipt encourages out of wedlock childbearing. However, the relationship between welfare and non-marital births is not always clear. On one hand, increasing economic opportunities for women (especially teens) should increase the opportunity cost of out of wedlock births. On the other hand, increasing the labor market opportunities of women also empowers women to choose single motherhood and gives some women (e.g. middle class) the financial means to do so.¹¹⁹

Denying benefits to unwed mothers appears to be a viable solution to save money and decrease non-marital childbearing. Prior to PRWORA, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the average income earned by an unmarried mother (through AFDC benefits and working) in 1992 was \$4,731 a 34% drop (in constant dollars) from the average income of \$7,161 in 1976. More recently, increases in non-marital childbearing are coupled with a decline in the real value of welfare payments,¹²⁰ and thus, it is hard to argue that there is a direct relationship between welfare receipt and out of wedlock pregnancy. Moffitt conducted an extensive review of 68 studies specifically looking at the effects of AFDC on fertility, and was able to only conclude that there is some effect, the magnitude of which cannot be

¹¹⁹ Duncan, in *Report to Congress*.

¹²⁰ B. Wilcox, J. Robbermolt, J. O'Keefe, and M. Pynchon, "Teen Non-Marital Child Bearing and Welfare: The Gap Between Research and Political Discourse," *Journal of Social Issues* 52, no. 3 (1996): 71–90; Moffitt, "The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility."

determined.¹²¹ He further posited that the “evidence is too weak to support definite policy recommendations.”¹²²

The research to date reports mixed results as to the strength of association between non-marital childbearing and welfare dependence. There is also mixed evidence regarding the effect of specific state measures taken to reduce out of wedlock child bearing and absence of concrete evidence does not allow the conclusion that no relationship exists between the policies and the outcomes thus far. The next chapter provides both the theoretical considerations and regression analysis of the impact of state policies on non-marital birth rates in 13 states.

¹²¹ Moffitt, “The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility.”

¹²² T. Joyce, R. Kaestner, and S. Korenman, *Welfare Reform and Non-marital Fertility in the 1990s: Evidence from Birth Records* (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002).

CHAPTER FOUR METHOD AND FINDINGS

Introduction

Thorough review of the research on the relationship between non-marital childbearing and welfare dependence provides mixed results as to the strength of association between the two phenomena. One widespread assumption is that the provision of benefits to single women if they had a child outside of marriage was a primary factor for a woman to choose to have such a birth. While the increase of single parent families varies across geographic regions and population groups, children, mothers and the public bear the consequences of the upward trend in out of wedlock births. The resultant Congressional action was due to both the consequences experienced by individuals, and the public's frustration with the rising costs of welfare provision in the mid 1990s (with few noticeable results). In 1995, the *Report to Congress on Out of Wedlock Childbearing* the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services found seven primary determinants of a woman having a child out of wedlock: family structure; income; education; race; location; availability of contraceptive and family planning services; and employment opportunities for men. Despite these findings, research on non-marital childbearing and welfare dependence has increasingly focused on the role of economic incentives to reduce out of wedlock births and subsequent welfare dependence.

This chapter begins with a general overview of sociological and cultural factors related to women's decisions to bear a child out of wedlock. In addition, demographic characteristics of recipients (such as family structure, race and ethnicity, and educational attainment) are identified, as well as other explanatory theories offered regarding non-marital fertility. All of these factors are highlighted to show why certain demographic and policy variables (six specific measures in the 1996

legislation) are included in the regression model that estimates their influence on the non-marital birth rates in 13 states.

Determinants and/or Antecedents of Non Marital Births

General factors related to non-marital fertility include population changes, trends in marriage, divorce and employment rates of women, as well as social norms or values towards premarital sex and childbearing. In addition, cultural and structural characteristics of communities play a role in fertility decisions of unmarried women. While these broader issues are not specifically estimated in the empirical analysis presented in the next chapter, these factors must be acknowledged when examining non- marital fertility and childbearing.

Sociological Trends

The rise in single parent families over the last two decades was not only due to the economic incentives many thought existed in the welfare system, but also a result of several factors related to general changes in the population of women between age 15-44. First of all, there has been a slow but steady increase in the number of women between 15-44 years of age.¹²³

Additionally, women now spend a greater percentage of their reproductive years outside marriage because of later age at first marriage, higher rates of divorce, and lower rates of remarriage, increasing the risk of a non-marital birth.¹²⁴ Unmarried pregnant women are now less likely to marry before the birth, increasing both the rate of cohabitation and the incidence of children growing up with single parents.

¹²³ S. J. Ventura, W. D. Mosher et al., *Trends in Pregnancy Rates for the United States, 1976–97: An Update*, National Vital Statistics Reports, vol. 49, no. 4 (Hyattsville, MD: National Center for Health Statistics, 2001).

¹²⁴ Ibid.

Finally, society is more accepting of premarital sex and of childbearing outside of marriage¹²⁵ and as a result, attitudes about non-marital childbearing have changed.

Cultural Factors

There are two well-known views on the importance of cultural and structural issues to decisions about marriage and fertility. Murray emphasizes the influence of cultural norms among different communities, as well as the changes in social norms regarding marriage and childbearing as important factors to explain the higher rates of non-marital childbearing among minority populations.¹²⁶ Wilson believes that the rise in out of wedlock childbearing among African American women is a result of the lack of “marriageable” men, and that increasing the earning potential of men is a good way to promote marriages in the African American community.¹²⁷

Wilson favors welfare measures that account for the impact of cultural norms on trends in non-marital births and welfare dependence in various communities (e.g. lack of employment opportunities for African American men); whereas Murray suggests that although the trends may be a result of cultural factors, policies should try to modify (culturally based) behaviors of various groups through incentives and sanctions (e.g., denying benefits to unmarried women). These two views both relate to the culture of poverty perspective on how to change fertility behavior among welfare recipients and is discussed below at greater length.

¹²⁵ Anne K. Driscoll, Gesine K. Hearn, V. Jeffrey Evans, and Kristin A. Moore, “Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women,” *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 61, no. 1 (Feb 1999): 178–187.

¹²⁶ Charles Murray, *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950–1980* (New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1994).

¹²⁷ William Julius Wilson, *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (New York: Knopf, 1996).

Demographic factors

Demographic characteristics also influence a woman's decision to bear a child out of wedlock, and whether or not to marry prior to the child's birth. As a result, analysis of out of wedlock births requires examination of the importance of demographic factors such as family structure, race or ethnicity and education on fertility decisions. Other explanatory variables considered in existing research¹²⁸ include religious affiliation, access to family planning services, parental educational attainment, and birth order. Again, although all of these factors are not estimated in the empirical analysis, their importance needs to be identified to provide a complete analysis of factors impacting fertility decisions.

One example of the importance of family background on the non-marital birth rate is that children of teen mothers are more likely to be teen mothers and high school dropouts themselves. Sandefur and McLanahan offer three hypotheses regarding the inter-generational transmission of family structure:

1. Family structure and parents' education may have economic effects¹²⁹ on a child's development;
2. Transmission of outcomes may reflect an explicit or implicit transmission of values; and
3. Outcomes may be the result of diminished expectations and resources in neighborhoods where poor families live.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Shelly Lundberg, and Robert D. Plotnick, "Adolescent Premarital Childbearing: Do Economic Incentives Matter?" *Journal of Labor Economics* 13, no. 2 (Apr 1995): 177–200; R. Kaestner, "Drug Use, Culture, and Welfare Incentives: Correlates of Family Structure and Out-of-wedlock Birth," *Eastern Economic Journal* 24, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 395–416; Driscoll et al., "Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women"; J. Schneider, "Pathways to Opportunity: The Role of Race, Social Networks, Institutions, and Neighborhood in Career and Educational Paths for People on Welfare," *Human Organization* 59, no. 1 (2000): 72–85.

¹²⁹ For example, lower educational attainment and/or reduced earnings in their lifetime, or welfare dependence themselves.

¹³⁰ G. Sandefur and S. McLanahan, *Family Background, Race and Ethnicity, and Early Family Formation* (Mimeograph, University of Wisconsin, July 1990).

They further conclude that causality between poverty and non-marital childbearing could run either or both ways – or could be determined by a mutual set of exogenous factors such as family background and culture.¹³¹ As a result, it is difficult to appropriately model and identify effects of non-marital childbearing and poverty on each other, so many analyses focus on determinants of the decision to bear a child out of wedlock as a means to reduce welfare dependence.

Family structure is key to understanding child outcomes and the high incidence of intergenerational welfare dependence. As we know from the literature review provided in Chapter 3, children raised in single parent homes have poorer outcomes (including higher incidence of non-marital births and welfare dependence) than those raised by two biological parents, especially if the parents are married.¹³² More importantly, Driscoll confirms that girls who experience frequent changes in family structure are at “increased risk of having premarital sex during adolescence and of having a premarital birth”¹³³ which increases the intergenerational cycle of welfare dependence. Peters et al. point out that “research has not directly addressed how some changes in family structure affect child well-being...if welfare increases incentives to cohabit or to live in a three-generational household, is that good or bad for children, relative to living in an independent female headed household?”¹³⁴ As a result, the importance of family structure on non-marital fertility requires further analysis, but existing data does not allow for that estimation in the regression model provided in the next chapter.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² S. McLanahan and G. Sandefur, *Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).

¹³³ Driscoll et al., “Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women,” 180.

¹³⁴ H. E. Peters, R. D. Plotnick, and J. Se-Ok, “How Will Welfare Reform Affect Childbearing and Family Structure Decisions?” (Revision of paper presented at “Changing Welfare” Conference, University of Illinois at Chicago, July 2001), 31.

Race has also been shown to be an important factor in non-marital birth rates. To investigate the hypothesis that the difference in non-marital birth rates were caused by cultural differences between races, Murray examined the relationship between out-of-wedlock birth and race-specific measures of population density and found the “variations in the black out-of-wedlock birth rate are correlated with the racial density of the geographic area, a measure that he asserts is a proxy for the strength of cultural factors that determine out-of-wedlock birth.”¹³⁵

The importance of race to employment rates also plays a role in unmarried women’s decision to have a child outside of marriage. This is supported by Wilson’s theory about the lack of marriageable males in African American communities, and by Willis, who states, “after decades of progress, black men have suffered disproportionately as the widening of the wage distribution during the past two decades has reduced the earnings of those at the bottom of the skill distribution.”¹³⁶ They believe that this lower earning potential reduces the attractiveness of marriage to low-income women who can rely on public assistance as a source of income for their children. As a result, non-marital birthrates are estimated for women by race in this empirical analysis.

Education is a key predictor of not only future employment, but also whether or not the opportunity cost of an out of wedlock birth is high. Kaestner found that

...the only variable that had a consistently significant effect on the probability of having an out-of-wedlock birth is education...the magnitude of the effect is relatively large. For example, evaluated at the mean value, an additional year of education lowers the probability of having an out-of-wedlock birth by approximately one percentage point. Thus, a non-black male with a college

¹³⁵ R. Kaestner, “Drug Use, Culture, and Welfare Incentives: Correlates of Family Structure and Out-of-wedlock Birth,” *Eastern Economic Journal* 24, no. 4 (Fall 1998): 397.

¹³⁶ R. J. Willis, “A Theory of Out-of-wedlock Childbearing,” *The Journal of Political Economy* 107, no. 6 (1999): S60.

degree has a probability of fathering a child out-of-wedlock that is four percentage points lower than a non-black male with a high school degree.¹³⁷

Increasing educational opportunities and attainment will raise women's expectations for future employment, and could further reduce the non-marital birth rates by making an unplanned pregnancy less desirable to women at risk of an out of wedlock pregnancy. Efforts to increase educational attainment of males will theoretically increase subsequent employment and marriage rates. This is especially true for lower income men and women – under an economic model of marriage – as higher earnings make the spouse better able to provide for his family, and thus marriage becomes a more attractive option than single parenthood.

Although access to family planning services, parental educational attainment and birth order are considered important factors to fertility decision among unmarried women, the regression model provided in this chapter does not estimate their influence, as the data set used in the analysis did not include such factors. The empirical analysis presented explores the importance of race, age, educational attainment, employment, and religious affiliation on an unmarried woman's likelihood of having a child outside of marriage and further estimates the impact of recent welfare policies in reducing non-marital births and teen pregnancy.

Policy Measures

The 1996 PRWORA sets forth seven provisions specifically to reduce the non-marital birth rate among both teenage and older women who are not married. Two of these apply to teenaged women and the other 5 apply to all unmarried mothers. They include:

1. The requirement that teen mothers live at home or with a responsible adult;

¹³⁷ R. Kaestner, "Drug Use, Culture, and Welfare Incentives," 412.

2. The requirement that teen mothers attend school;
3. Family caps;
4. Time limits for welfare receipt;
5. Tougher work requirements of program participants;
6. The mandatory 25% benefit reduction imposed on unmarried mothers who do not help with paternity establishment; and
7. The provision of entitlement funding for abstinence education.¹³⁸

Minor Parent Provisions

The requirement that a teen mother live at home or with a responsible adult is based on the idea that many teens, unhappy with their family living arrangements, could become pregnant, move out on their own, and be supported by government provision of welfare. Therefore, this requirement is designed to remove that specific incentive to have a child outside of marriage. Wertheimer and Moore show that 75% of teen mothers rely on welfare within 5 years of a non-marital birth,¹³⁹ and thus, this provision is particularly important for shaping decision made by teens at risk of an out of wedlock birth.

The second requirement of teen mothers to attend school has two primary purposes, to emphasize the importance of education for a successful future, and to increase the opportunity costs associated with bearing a child outside of marriage. In general, if a woman's expectations for her future are high, she is less likely to become pregnant, and if she does discover a pregnancy, she is less likely to have the baby.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, Horvath and Peters found a connection between high levels of school engagement and reduced teen pregnancy, and as such, "findings support the potential

¹³⁸ Public Law 104-193, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*, HR 3734, August 22, 1996, Washington, DC.

¹³⁹ R. Wertheimer, and K. Moore, "Childbearing by Teens: Links to Welfare Reform," *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-24 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, August 1998).

¹⁴⁰ Kristin Moore (Child Trends), personal correspondence, January 23, 1999.

for school attendance and performance requirement waiver to decrease non-marital fertility rates among teens from welfare families.”¹⁴¹

Family Cap

The third measure designed to directly impact fertility behavior is the imposition of a family cap, the elimination of any increase in benefits after the birth of an additional child born to a mother on welfare. Horvath and Peters found that of all welfare waivers, the family cap has the greatest potential as an effective policy tool to impact non-marital birth rates.¹⁴² However, research to date provides inconclusive results regarding the impact of the family cap on non-marital birthrates. For example, O’Neill examined the impact of family cap in New Jersey (the first state to implement it under waivers) and found that the “potential benefit reduction may be significant to induce families to consider carefully the decision to have another child with out first securing the means to support it.”¹⁴³ In contrast, Acs concluded that “while restricting benefits for young mothers who have additional children while on welfare may carry a significant symbolic message – that long term dependence on public assistance is not an acceptable lifestyle – it is unlikely to have a substantial affect on women’s childbearing decisions.”¹⁴⁴

Time Limits and Work Requirements

The imposition of time limits and work requirements are designed to indirectly affect fertility decisions by making welfare receipt less attractive.

¹⁴¹ Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, *Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearing* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, September 1999), 12.

¹⁴² Horvath-Rose and Peters, *Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearing*, 1999.

¹⁴³ J. O’Neill, cited in Horvath-Rose and Peters, *Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearing*, 1999, 10.

¹⁴⁴ Gregory Acs, “The Impact of Welfare on Young Mothers’ Subsequent Childbearing Decisions,” *The Journal of Human Resources* 31, no. 4 (1996): 898.

The Federal requirement is a 5-year lifetime limit on benefits, but states were given the flexibility to impose even shorter time limits ranging from 1 to 5 years in the PRWORA. The time limit placed on welfare receipt embodies the idea that assistance is only temporary. This lack of long-term support presumably changes the cost benefit ratio for women at risk of a non-marital birth by reducing any perceived economic incentives to having a child outside of marriage.

Increased work requirements are also imposed to make public assistance less desirable, and to remove any perceptions of that provision of benefits without any requirements on the recipient's part to find employment may induce women to have a child outside of marriage to receive welfare. While the family cap has been shown to impact fertility decisions, time limits and work requirements do not have a clear connection to non-marital birth rates, although researchers at Child Trends find that they do have an effect on reductions in caseloads.¹⁴⁵

Mandatory Paternity Establishment

Welfare measures (set forth under state waivers or the 1996 provisions) involving mandatory paternity establishment and tougher state measures to increase child support are designed to increase fathers' responsibility for their children born outside of marriage. In addition, this enforced financial responsibility of men who father children to women reliant on welfare is pursued to offset the cost of benefit provision to the resultant female-headed household. In general, the idea behind such measures is that the shift of costs to fathers may lower the rates of non-marital births, as men change their fertility behavior to avoid the financial cost of child support.

There is some evidence¹⁴⁶ that states with tougher child support enforcement have lower non-marital birthrates, which supports the potential of this policy to reduce

¹⁴⁵ Kristin Moore (Child Trends), Personal Correspondence, January 23, 1999.

¹⁴⁶ Irwin Garfinkel, Jennifer L. Hochschild, and Sara S. McLanahan, eds., *Social Policies for Children* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996).

births outside of marriage. It is critical to note, however, that stronger child support enforcement is not a perfect solution, as many women bear children to men with little or no earning power, and hence, no ability to pay child support.

Stronger enforcement of laws concerning establishment of paternity and payment of child support tend to reduce the prevalence of out-of-wedlock childbearing by altering opportunity costs for men significantly.¹⁴⁷ However, many studies of non-marital fertility and welfare dependence of women do not address the antecedents of fertility decisions made by men who father children outside of marriage.

The policy measures designed to reduce the incidence of non-marital births are estimated in the regression analysis, including minor parent provisions, time limits, work requirements, and mandatory paternity establishment. Entitlement funds provide to states for abstinence education are not included in the regression model at this time.

Regression Model

Policy measures to reduce non-marital births are directed at changing women's behavior in both childbearing and childrearing. Driscoll suggests that "circumstances in which such births occur, their timing in the life course of women, and women's subsequent behavior all are important factors to consider" when examining the causes and consequences of non-marital childbearing.¹⁴⁸ Public policies based on a rational model of planned fertility and the standard economic cost benefit ratio may not "account for the diversity within the welfare population or the ways that both macro structural and individual factors influence individual experience."¹⁴⁹ Therefore, exploration of the interaction among economic, cultural and demographic factors of non-marital childbearing may yield a more thorough understanding of the predominant

¹⁴⁷ R. J. Willis, "A Theory of Out-of-wedlock Childbearing," *The Journal of Political Economy* 107, no. 6 (1999): S33-64.

¹⁴⁸ Anne K. Driscoll et al., "Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 61, no. 1 (Feb 1999): 187.

¹⁴⁹ Schneider, "Pathways to Opportunity."

determinants of women's fertility decisions and the impact of specific policy measures set forth under welfare waivers and PRWORA.

As a result, this chapter provides an estimation of the impact that demographic factors such as state of residence, age of mother, race, religious activity and educational attainment have on rates on non-marital births in 13 states. In addition, waiver data was used to generate policy variables representing the 6 provisions specifically designed to reduce non-marital births: minor parent provisions; family cap; time limits; work requirements; and mandatory paternity establishment (Figure 4.1).

The model was estimated to examine if the recent success in reducing non-marital births (particularly for teens) to determine the strength of association between state welfare policies and incidence of non-marital births. This analysis also assessed the impact of demographic characteristics of both teens and older women, as well as the influence age and race (that could be co-variates in the relationship of interest).¹⁵⁰ The next chapter outlines the method and findings generated by the empirical analysis of the impact of both demographic variables and state policies on non-martial birth rates in 13 states.

¹⁵⁰ D. Kleinbaum, L. Kupper, and K. Muller, *Applied Regression Analysis and Other Multivariable Methods*, 2nd edition (Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press, 1988).




Figure 4.1. Conceptual Model of Relationship among Variables.

The effect of specific state measures taken to reduce out of wedlock child bearing is not yet clear, as shown by the mixed evidence reviewed in Chapter 3. Studies that focus on specific structural issues or groups of people yield important information. However, examining the “interaction between individual factors and macrosocial structures also yields much richer policy analysis than arguing that simply addressing either structural problems or individual deficits will solve the complex nature of poverty in the United States.”¹⁵¹

The influence of demographic variables on the probability that a woman will have a non-marital birth, as well as of policy measures on non-marital birth rates in 13 states are estimated by regression models that test the hypothesis that education, religion, race and ethnicity have important effects on non-marital birth rates. In addition, analyses were conducted on a split sample based on the mother’s age at time of a non-marital birth, to explore the different effect of each variable on teenage women and women over the age of 20. Previous chapters provide the justification for this split, which is quite simply, that teens and older women behave differently, and the policy measures designed to reach teens and women over 20 are different and thus, require separate estimations.

The strength of the association between specific state welfare policies and the state’s propensity for non-marital births is also estimated in the regression model, and further allows for questions about the likely success of the provisions in the PRWORA of 1996. Policy variables were created using welfare waiver data (between 1989 and 1995) from the period before PRWORA, to take advantage of the variation across states provided by the waivers. This captures each state’s “policy environment” in which non-marital births do or do not occur. This empirical analysis relies on a regression model to estimate the probability that a child is born outside of marriage as

¹⁵¹ Schneider, “Pathways to Opportunity.”

a function of the welfare policies in the state at the time of his birth and other socio-demographic characteristics of the mother.

Data

This analysis uses micro data from the 1997 *National Survey of American Families* (NSAF), a nationally representative survey that gathered information on more than 48,000 households with and without children – which includes 145,574 total persons on whom information was gathered.¹⁵² Low-income households (< 200% of poverty) were over sampled in the NSAF, because the policy changes under study are expected to affect them the most.

The NSAF data collects information on the economic, social and health status of adults under 65, children, and their families across 13 states. The NSAF is primarily conducted via a telephone survey, but does include non-telephone households as a second sample based on geographic areas. (Households without a telephone comprise approximately 3.5% of the total sample). The majority of interviews were conducted with adults with children in their household, and questions were asked about no more than two children per household. One child is selected from among all children under age six and the other is selected from among all children between the ages of 6 and 17; and the respondent is the household member who is most knowledgeable about the children. Respondents are asked about several dimensions of well-being, including (but not limited to) questions regarding demographics (age, race, sex), employment, education, economic hardships, child well-being and participation in religious activities. (Appendix G provides greater details on the NSAF research design).

The results of the NSAF are noteworthy because many “state-representative surveys do not capture important dimensions of well-being and have small sample

¹⁵² Melissa Leonard, Urban Institute, personal correspondence, November 1998.

sizes in many states, particularly for low-income families.”¹⁵³ Westat, Inc. fielded the initial survey between February and November of 1997 and the follow-up survey was fielded in 1999 with a Fall 1999 release of the entire microdata set. The survey included representative samples in 13 states; Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. These 13 states were chosen by Urban Institute because they “account for over half of the U.S. population and have a broad array of government programs, fiscal capacity and economic well being.”¹⁵⁴ As a result, researchers at the Urban Institute believe that the NSAF data provides a baseline from which many changes brought about by “new federalism” can be assessed or measured.¹⁵⁵

Data from the National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF) is used to estimate a logistic regression model of out of wedlock births and its antecedents. The NSAF data was chosen for the analysis in this chapter for the following reasons:

1. The NSAF collected information on most of the variables of interest needed to estimate the effect of many demographic characteristics on non-marital births;
2. Researchers at the Urban Institute¹⁵⁶ were able to assist in the creation of a variable needed to isolate a sub-sample of children who were born outside of marriage;
3. Data collected on both the most knowledgeable adult (MKA) and focal child were able to be merged from two separate files into one file using SAS. This allowed for the identification of households

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Urban Institute, *NSAF MKA Public Use File and Documentation and Codebook*, 1-2. 1997.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Provided by Fritz Scheuren at the Urban Institute, May 2000.

relevant to the sub sample of women between ages of 15-44 with children present.

4. NSAF data was easily sorted by state, allowing for the creation of policy variables that could then be merged with the NSAF files on women with children, and thus, facilitated a better understanding of the “policy environment” in which non-marital births did or did not occur.

The NSAF yielded a total sample of 42,973 households. Analysis of the correlates to non-marital births required the identification of households with children under the age of 6 to capture those households most likely to have been affected by the welfare reform provisions adopted prior to the passage of PWRORA via the state waiver process. Although the data only include births that occurred prior to the passage of PRWORA, many of the prior state welfare waivers included provisions that were similar to provisions adopted by states after PRWORA, and variation in these policies is relevant to assessing the likely effect of the PRWORA provisions. As a result, the analysis in this chapter uses a sub-sample of 12,615 households with children under the age of six (i.e. children born between 1992 and 1996) to facilitate the estimation of effects of policy measures in each of the 13 states included in the NSAF.

State welfare policies

Policy variables were established for welfare reform policies that influence the decision to bear a child out of wedlock (e.g., family caps, minor parent provisions). Inclusion of policy provisions required compilation of welfare plans and waiver information for these 13 states to create policy variables needed to estimate the influences of each state’s welfare programs on the probability that a woman living in that state would have a child outside of marriage. Six policy variables (Table 4.1) were

coded as dichotomous variables for each of the 13 states for five consecutive years (1992-1996 inclusive).

Table 4.1. Welfare Policy Variables.

VARIABLE	DEFINITION
Minor Parent Provision (MPP)	Requirement of teen mothers to live at home or with a responsible adult to receive benefits.
Stay in School Requirement of Teens (SIS)	Requirement of teen mothers to attend school to receive benefits.
Mandatory Paternity Establishment (PE)	A mandatory 25% benefit reduction is imposed on unmarried mothers who do not help with paternity establishment;
Family Cap (FC)	The restriction of benefits for additional children born to women receiving TANF.
Time limit (TL)	Each state sets a maximum time that families may receive assistance, ranging from 1-5 years – this varies by state.
Work requirements (WR)	Includes job training activities, part or full time employment as a condition of benefit receipt.

Note also that to assess the impact of these policies on the out of wedlock birth rate, the regression analysis controls for each state’s out of wedlock birth rate before the 1996 legislation to estimate each state’s specific propensity for out of wedlock births. All 13 states were coded for six policy variables from 1992-1996 (inclusive), and then matched to the individual data on the subset of the 12,615 households in the sub-sample by state of residence and the year in which the non-marital birth occurred.

Method

This analysis estimates a logistic regression model of the probability that a child is born outside of marriage as a function of the welfare policies in the state at the time of his birth and other socio-demographic characteristics of the mother. The estimated equation is: $\{N\text{MAR} = \beta (\text{demographic variables}) + \boxtimes(\text{policy variables}) + \mathcal{E}\}$ or more specifically, $\{\text{Non marital birth} = \beta^1\text{Education} + \beta^2\text{Race} + \beta^3\text{Religious}$

activity + S(Welfare policies) + ϵ . The logistic regression estimating the probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock) includes the variables listed in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2. Variables Included in Regression Model.

VARIABLE	DEFINITION
<u>Dependent</u>	
NMAR	Focal child born out of wedlock
<u>Control</u>	
NMBR	State's non-marital birth rate, 1989, percent of total births for the state
<u>Demographic</u>	
MOMBIRTHAGE	Mother's age at time of birth
Education	
HSDROP	Mother is high school drop out
HSGRAD	Mother is high school graduate
COLLEGE	Mother has some college
Race	
BLACK	Race of mother – African American
WHITE	Race of Mother – Caucasian
OTHER	Race of mother – Hispanic, Asian, others
Religious Activity	
LOWRELIG	Mother attends religious service a few times a year or less
MODRELIG	Mother attends religious service a few times a month
HIGHRELIG	Mother attends religious service once a week or more
<u>Policies</u>	
MPP	Minor Parent Provision
SIS	Stay in School Requirement of Teens
PE	Mandatory Paternity Establishment
FC	Family Cap
TL	Time limit
WR	Work requirements

Variables

The **dependent variable**, whether or not a child was born out of wedlock is expressed as a dichotomous variable (0=marital birth, 1=non-marital birth). For this

analysis, this includes the 12,615 women in the sub sample who had a child between 1989 and 1996. It is important to note that the variable for identifying children out of wedlock includes only those children whose biological parents did not later marry each other, a total of 3,368 non-marital births (27.71% of the total sample). In addition, this variable was not included as part of the Urban Institute's original public release files, and was part of a separate (supplementary) data set provided to the author.¹⁵⁷ Finally, the use of a dichotomous dependent variable is not necessarily the best estimate of the impact of welfare policies on non-marital births -- as welfare programs are primarily aimed to reduce out of wedlock *pregnancy* -- therefore, the use of a non marital birth rate actually measures the *failure* of those policies to prevent such a pregnancy.

Independent variables include several antecedents of a non-marital birth, specifically, demographic characteristics of mothers who had a birth outside of marriage including: mother's race; mother's age; educational attainment; employment; and extent of religious activity. These variables were included in the NSAF questionnaire fielded in 1997 and the source questions are listed in Appendix H. The NSAF does not include welfare policy and program information for each state. As a result, **policy variables** were created based on each state's welfare plans and approved waivers from 1992 to 1996. The policy variables used to estimate the impact of state welfare programs on the out of wedlock birth rate and include those listed in Table 4.1 (above).

Descriptive Statistics

Independent variables included in this analysis included both policy variables and demographic factors of unmarried mothers -- such as educational attainment, race, and extent of religious activity. The sample comprised of 12,615 households with a

¹⁵⁷ Provided by Fritz Scheuren at the Urban Institute, May 2000.

child under the age of 6 included families living in 13 states previously identified.

Table 4.3 provides basic descriptive statistics on each variable estimated in the model.

Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics, Demographic Variables.

Variable	Frequency	Percent
Focal Child Born out of Wedlock (NMAR)		
Marital births	8786	72.29
Non-marital births	3368	27.71
Total	12154	100.0
Missing	461	
LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY		
No religious activity (NORELIG)	2265	18.17
Low level of religious activity (LOWRELIG)	3348	26.86
Moderate level of religious activity (MODRELIG)	2601	20.87
High level of religious activity (HIGHRELIG)	4249	34.09
Total	12463	100.0
Missing	152	
EDUCATION		
High School Dropout	2143	17.1
High School Graduate	4480	35.7
Some College	5911	47.2
Total	12534	100
Missing	81	
RACE		
White	10091	79.99
Black	2013	15.96
Other, includes Hispanic	511	4.05
Total	12615	100.00
Mother's age at time of birth (MOMBIRTHAGE) Mean=29.01 years (SD=7.28 years)		
Under 18	309	2.5
18-20	1093	8.7
21-25	2876	22.8
26-30	3454	27.4
31-35	2810	22.3
35-40	1356	10.8
41-45	424	3.4
46-50	117	1.0
Over 50	176	1.4
Total	12615	100.3

Respondent characteristics. Among the 12,154 households that provided data on the dependent variable – 28% of mothers (3,368) had given birth to a child outside of marriage. Table 4.3 also shows that the majority (80%) of the sample was comprised of White families, had completed some college (41.2%), and reported varied levels of religious activity.

State policies. The mean percentage of births to unmarried women among the women sampled in all thirteen states sampled was 24.7%, and those rates ranged from 19 to 32% among the states. In addition, the percent of this sample (N=12,615) affected by each state welfare policy estimated in this analysis also varied, and Table 4.4 provides the number of households affected by each policy.

Table 4.4. Welfare Policies, Percent of Sample Affected.

<u>Welfare Policy</u>	Number Of WOMEN AFFECTED BY POLICY	Percent OF TOTAL SAMPLE (N=12,615)
Paternity Establishment	644	6.6
Minor Parent Provision	926	9.4
Stay in School	1294	13.2
Time Limits	2535	25.9
Family Cap	2764	28.2
Work Requirements	4629	47.2

Note: column totals do not equal 100 due to multiple policies in each state.

Table 4.4 shows that the almost half (47.2%) of households sampled were in states that imposed work requirements as a condition of welfare benefits. In addition, both time limits and family cap policies were imposed in about a quarter of states (25.9 and 28.2% respectively.)

The policies estimated in the model include the family cap, time limits, work requirements, mandatory benefit reduction for non-compliance with paternity establishment, and two minor parent provisions, one requiring young mothers to live at home with a “responsible” adult (usually their parent) and the requirement that a minor parent must stay in school as a condition of benefit receipt. All 13 states were

coded for six policy variables from 1992-1996 (inclusive), and then matched to the individual data on the subset of the 12,615 households in the sub-sample by state of residence.

All of the welfare policy variables were assigned a “0” if the state examined did not include the policy in its welfare plan and a “1” if it did. Table 4.5 provides a list of waivers in place for each of the 13 states examined, between the years of 1992-1996.

Each policy variable entry was merged with the NSAF’s data by the state in which they reside, and then input by year (cross listed with the child’s age to match years). Each of the 12,615 observations of households with children under 6 was cross-referenced with both the state in which he/she was born and the birth year to get the most accurate picture of the policy environment in which the mother had a child outside of marriage. In addition, the state’s non-marital birthrate is included in this estimation to better capture the differences across states that influence a woman’s decision to bear a child out of wedlock.

Table 4.5: State Waivers, 1992–1996 (■ indicates policy in place).

WAIVERS →	APPLY TO MINOR PARENTS ONLY																																			
	LIVE AT HOME					STAY IN SCHOOL					PATERNITY EST.					FAMILY CAP					TIME LIMITS					WORK REQ.										
STATE	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	9 2	9 3	9 4	9 5	9 6	
ALABAMA																				■																
CALIFORNIA																		■	■	■															■	■
FLORIDA																			■	■			■	■	■								■	■	■	
MASS.				■	■								■	■					■	■														■	■	
MICHIGAN	■	■	■	■	■																		■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	
MINNESOTA																																		■	■	■
NEW JERSEY																	■	■	■	■	■							■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
NEW YORK																																				
TEXAS																														■					■	
WASHINGTON																														■	■				■	■
MISSISSIPPI																															■	■	■	■	■	
WISCONSIN																		■	■	■									■	■				■	■	
COLORADO																			■	■									■	■	■	■	■	■	■	

Findings

The birth propensities for unmarried women were estimated for those living in states with welfare policies designed to discourage non-marital childbearing already in place under welfare waivers in the early 1990s. After analyzing the entire sample of women, the sample was divided into women under 20 years of age and women over the age of twenty, and those models were estimated to detect any difference in the influence of the pregnancy reduction policies on women by age. Logistic regression analyses explore the relationship between the probability of a non-marital birth (NMAR=1) and the explanatory variables, both demographic characteristics of the mother, and state welfare policies in place at the time of the birth. [Appendix I provides the full SAS output for each model examined.] The models listed in Table 4.6 were analyzed to determine the variation in non-marital births that could be accounted for by the explanatory variables in the model – both demographic and state policies.

Table 4.6. Model Specifications.

	Sample	N	% of sample NMAR=1	Variables in model
Model 1	Women ages 15-44	8700	26.8 (2329)	Demographic State welfare policies
Model 2	Women age 15-19	637	68.6 (437)	Demographic State welfare policies
Model 3	Women over 20	7770	22.4 (1738)	Demographic State welfare policies
Model 4	Women ages 15-44	8700	26.8 (2329)	Demographic only
Model 5	Women age 15-19	637	68.6 (437)	Demographic only
Model 6	Women over 20	7770	22.4 (1738)	Demographic only

These separate models allow for an examination of the different impact all the variables have for both teenage women and women over 20. In addition, models were

examined without including the policy variables to test the significance of the all policy variables entirely for women in the sample, and then again for women by age (teens versus older women in the sample). Table 4.7 provides the results from the logistic regression analysis on six different models.

Estimation of six separate models provided detailed coefficient estimates for demographic and policy variables in the several iterations of the regression analysis. When looking at the model that includes demographic and policy variables for all women in the sample, all the demographic characteristics -- educational attainment, race and extent of religious activity -- and two policies, minor parent provisions and school requirements have *statistically* significant effects on non-marital childbearing [Table 4.7].

Race. Whether or not the mother is of African American descent is correlated with an increase in non-marital births, regardless of age of the mother. The effect is more pronounced for teen mothers and is statistically significant at the .01 level. In his study of teenage fertility and high school completion, Ribar also found African American origin of the mother to be the most influential, statistically significant predictor of whether or not a teenager would become pregnant (among 22 total independent variables).¹⁵⁸ In this analysis, the full model of both demographic and policy variables was estimated for a sample of women over 20 years of age and race showed significant effects on out of wedlock childbearing. In addition, statistically significant effects were found at the .05 level that show that there is a *negative* correlation between being white and having a child outside of marriage. This was true for all women, with a more noticeable impact for women over 20.

¹⁵⁸ David Ribar, "A Multinomial Logit Analysis of Teenage Fertility and High School Completion," *Economics of Education Review* 12, no. 2 (1993): 153–164.

Table 4.7. Regression Coefficients, All Models.

	All Women, all variables	Teens, all variables	Women over 20, all variables	All Women, without policy variables	Teens without policy variables	Women over 20 without policy variables
	Estimate (SE)	Estimate (SE)	Estimate (SE)	Estimate (SE)	Estimate (SE)	Estimate (SE)
Intercept	-1.7349* (.2472)	-.0697 (.7520)	-2.1273* (.2807)	-1.3496* (.1943)	.7622 (.6278)	-1.6197* (.2184)
State's non-marital birth rate, 1989	1.235 (.7850)	1.6185 (2.5532)	2.0391‡ (.8822)	.1803 (.6102)	-.6198 (2.0378)	.6734 (.6829)
Mother is high school drop out	1.4046* (.0729)	-.0381 (.2478)	1.3922* (.0825)	1.4668* (.0666)	-.0879 (.2307)	1.4160* (.0750)
Mother is high school graduate	.6208* (.0618)	-.0826 (.2461)	.5880* (.0685)	.6687* (.0568)	-.1546 (.2333)	.6258* (.0627)
Race, African American	1.8911* (.1467)	2.2475* (.4679)	1.9237* (.1660)	1.8613* (.1333)	2.3970* (.4523)	1.8614* (.1489)
Race, Caucasian	-.2575‡ (.1344)	.2588 (.3778)	-.2571 (.1538)	-.2438‡ (.1217)	.1783 (.3575)	-.2649‡ (.1373)
Moderate Religious Activity	-.4750* (.0721)	-.5654‡ (.2337)	-.5193* (.0815)	-.4766* (.0658)	-.4689‡ (.2124)	-.5366* (.0744)
High Religious Activity	-.9035* (.0662)	-.5133‡ (.2350)	-.9205* (.0739)	-.8985* (.0610)	-.6117* (.2183)	-.9133* (.0678)
Minor Parent Provision	.2589‡ (.1067)	1.1405‡ (.3735)	.0906 (.1198)			
Stay in School Requirement of Teens	.3079* (.0941)	.6291‡ (.3317)	.3436* (.1053)			
Mandatory Paternity Establishment	.2110 (.1250)	.4543 (.3949)	.1527 (.1428)			
Family Cap	.0214 (.0810)	.2618 (.2735)	-.0465 (.0915)			
Time limit	.0721 (.1066)	-.7474‡ (.3695)	.1320 (.1188)			
Work requirements	.0396 (.1004)	.1965 (.3482)	.0983 (.1133)			
Likelihood Ratio	1690.39	92.88	1376.65	1920.35	89.68	1523.91

*Significant at the 1% level, ‡Significant at the 5% level, SE=standard error

Religiosity. Extent of religious activities also correlates with lower probabilities of a non-marital birth for both teens and older women. Therefore, it appears that greater involvement in church related activities or religious communities decreases the likelihood of a woman bearing a child out of wedlock, regardless of her age. However, the strength of the effect shown by the coefficients is larger and statistically significant for women over 20 years of age.

Education. The highest coefficient (significant at the .01 level) estimates the effect of education on non marital birth rates and is found for women over 20 who have dropped out of high school. The estimates are also statistically significant for women over 20 who have graduated high school, but yielded lower estimated coefficients.

State Welfare Policies. Interpretation of the coefficient estimates for the six policy variables is a little more problematic.

For women over 20 years of age, the **family cap** policy – a provision that eliminates the marginal increment in welfare benefits for women who have another child while on welfare – does not significantly affect on fertility decisions of unmarried women. While Horvath-Rose and Peters¹⁵⁹ suggest family caps may be an effective policy measure to reduce non-marital births, review of many other studies on this policy measure show that the evidence is still inconclusive on the strength of impact a family cap has on non-marital fertility for both teens and women over 20 years of age.

The estimates in Table 4.8 show that the two policy provisions specifically designed to discourage teen pregnancies – **minor parent provision and stay in school requirements** – are *positively* correlated with non-marital births for these

¹⁵⁹ Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, “Welfare Waivers and Non-Marital Childbearing,” in *Welfare Reform: For Better, for Worse*, ed. Greg Duncan and Lindsey Chase Lansdale (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001).

women (consistent with Horvath and Peters¹⁶⁰). The highest effects are found for teens, and show a noticeable positive correlation with non-marital births. Although this finding may be in direct conflict with the goals of the provision, one unanticipated consequence of this measure could be the reduction of opportunity costs teens may face when becoming pregnant, as they may be less likely to be kicked out of their family homes. This finding serves as an interesting point for further analysis.

Table 4.8. Maximum Likelihood Estimates.

Group	Model	-2 log L	Ratio	Chi-square	Accept/Reject Ho?
All women	Full	8418.290	1.179	24.103	Reject
	Reduced	9931.001			
Women over 20	Full	6883.288	1.183	24.103	Reject
	Reduced	8140.813			
Teenage women	Full	699.847	1.187	24.103	Reject
	Reduced	831.103			

Another interesting finding is that **time limits** appear to discourage childbearing by women *under 20*, which may be consistent with the goals of such a provision – that welfare dependence should only be a short term solution, not a way of life. In addition, time limits were adopted by many states under welfare waivers, and continue to be a widely utilized provision in state welfare policies. In fact, Duncan et al. estimate that more than 40% of the current caseload will reach their 60-month limit by 2003.¹⁶¹ Consequently, research on the effect of time limits is an area that requires attention, especially as more families continue to reach their five-year limit of assistance regardless of consecutive or intermittent reliance. Finally, more detailed information from state’s incorporating time limits as part of their welfare programs is becoming available, and as such, will allow for more detailed research efforts in this area.

¹⁶⁰ Anne Horvath-Rose and H. Elizabeth Peters, *Welfare Waivers and Non-marital Childbearing* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, September 1999).

¹⁶¹ G. Duncan, K. Harris, and J. Boisjoly, “Time Limits and Welfare Reform: New Estimates of the Number and Characteristics of Affected Families,” *The Social Service Review* 74, no. 1 (2000): 55–75.

The absence of an effect also presents opportunity for further study; as both the **mandatory paternity establishment** and **work requirements** imposed on welfare recipients shows no significant effect for any of the models estimated. This is of particular note because both of these approaches to welfare are not new, and precede the 1996 welfare reform by many years. As such, opportunity for more extensive study of these measures may be possible, given the number of years each measure has been part of welfare law.

The probability of obtaining these results – or the likelihood that a woman would have a non-marital birth as a function of the model parameters provided – is tested by the maximum likelihood function. The first model specification (the “full” model) includes independent variables including demographic factors such as the state’s non-marital birth rate, whether or not a woman was a high school dropout or high school graduate (omitted category is “some college”), race, and extent of religious activity (omitted category is “low religious activity”). In addition, the “full” model estimates the six-policy measures; minor parent provisions, stay in school requirement, mandatory paternity establishment, time limits, family cap, and work requirements. To assess the appropriateness of estimating separate effects for each of the policy variables, the second model specification (the “reduced” model) excluded all policy variables and estimated effects only for the demographic variables.

The likelihood ratio is distributed as χ^2 with 6¹⁶² degrees of freedom. The test statistic is computed with the formula $[-2 \log (L)_{Ho}/(L)_{Ha}]$, and is significant at .05% level. Table 4.8 summarizes the calculations between full and reduced models for three groups of women drawn from the study sample: all women; women over 20 years of age; and teenaged women to explore if the policy measures as a group have any impact on the dependent variable. While some of the policy variables *individually*

¹⁶² [13 parameters in full model – 7 parameters in model without policies]

may not show an effect, the maximum likelihood estimate tests the joint significance of all the policy variables when estimated as a group for each of the six models specified earlier.

The decision to reject the null hypothesis indicates that separate estimates (coefficients) for each policy may not be needed. Specifically, the maximum likelihood ratio test shows that the difference between the two model specifications is not large enough to be statistically significant. These estimates support the hypothesis that the most influential factors in the model on the probability of a non-marital birth were the demographic variables estimated; even though a few models specified earlier did show important, sometime unanticipated, effects of state welfare policies on non marital births.

Limitations of the Analysis

This analysis considers the relationship of demographic and policy variables on the probability that a given birth will be out of wedlock. But a more complete analysis would carefully consider the full array of choices a woman faces when she discovers a pregnancy outside of marriage. Specifically, Child Trends, Inc.¹⁶³ created a decision matrix regarding non-marital births that further illustrates the nature of a woman's choice when faced with a non-marital pregnancy (see Appendix J). As such, more thorough analysis would estimate a multinomial logit in which the dependent variable, the out of wedlock birth rate, takes one of five values.

- (0) Out of wedlock pregnancy, no birth
- (1) Out of wedlock pregnancy, non marital birth
- (2) Out of wedlock pregnancy, marital birth
- (3) Marital pregnancy, marital birth

¹⁶³ K. Moore, B. Miller, B. Sugland, D. Morrison, D. Glej, and C. Blumenthal, *Beginning Too Soon: Adolescent Sexual Behavior, Pregnancy, and Parenthood* (Washington, DC: Child Trends, Inc., June 1995).

(4) No pregnancy

The values assigned to a multinomial logit are consistent with previous studies on the decision to bear a child out of wedlock. Additionally, use of the five value logit would allow for a better understanding of the point in a woman's decision making process that welfare policies may or may not have had an impact. More specifically, the use of a multinomial logit as a dependent variable allows for estimation of the greater range of possible impacts that policies may or may not have on women's childbearing decisions. The model estimated in this analysis only estimates one possible outcome among five possibilities – the decision to bear a child outside of marriage. Use of a multinomial logit allows for exploration of the impact of policies on the decision to terminate the pregnancy, or to marry the child's father either before or after delivery of the child conceived out of wedlock. (The data used in this analysis did not allow for this type of estimation.)

It is important to note that family background, as measured by whether or not a woman was raised in a single parent home, and access to family planning services are also hypothesized to have a strong influence on a woman's likelihood of having a child outside of marriage. Although these are two areas needing further examination, this empirical analysis does not estimate their impact; the NSAF data used for this sample do not capture family background, and access to family planning services are not collected at the state level at this time.

Another important shortcoming of this analysis is the exclusion of an independent variable that estimates the influence of each state's family planning services. Women's access to contraception is obviously an important factor in reducing the risk of an out of wedlock pregnancy and subsequent non-marital birth. This information was not included in the NSAF data and as such, did not lead to the creation of a specific policy variable that captures this state information. Inclusion of

“access to contraception” as a state policy would require examination of each state’s family planning laws, or family planning expenditures. Ribar suggests another possible way to estimate this variable would be to examine the percentage of women eligible for Medicaid who are at risk of non-marital pregnancy to measure interstate differences in the cost and availability of contraceptives.¹⁶⁴ Therefore, including this information as part of the “state policy environment” in any future estimation would allow for a more complete picture of influential factors on women’s childbearing decisions in many states.

Conclusion

These findings confirm the hypothesis that demographic variables have important effects on fertility decisions made by single women. In particular, these results show the importance of race and religiousness as predictors of a woman’s propensity to have a child outside of wedlock regardless of her state of residence. These results also support the contention that the pregnancy reduction policies have different impacts on teen mothers and unmarried women over 20. The welfare programs put into place specifically to reduce non-marital births have interesting results: the family cap, time limits and work requirements designed to primarily impact women over 20 showed no effect. However, the requirements to live at home and stay in school placed on teens are *positively* correlated with non-marital births, while time limits appear to discourage teens from early childbearing. These results seem to show that although the policy measures are impacting fertility behavior, it is not clear that they will bring about the desired changes set forth by Congress in the 1996 legislation, and as such, warrant further investigation.

¹⁶⁴ Ribar, “Teenage Fertility and High School Completion.”

CHAPTER FIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF WELFARE

Introduction

The rise in single parent families coupled with a decrease in real wages, the decrease in high paying manufacturing jobs and the disincentives of the welfare system itself led to an increased stratification of income in the U.S. in the mid to late 1990s.¹⁶⁵ As such, the 1996 reforms of welfare redistributed resources to assist poor families in the short run, under the assumption that society would gain in the long run through decreases in unemployment and welfare dependency of both children and adults.

Establishing a policy that provides an adequate benefit to unmarried mothers frequently (unintentionally) creates incentives for welfare receipt in the first place. “Welfare benefits have traditionally made it easier for single mothers, a group at high risk of poverty, to live independently, without the aid of their children’s father or families.”¹⁶⁶ Thus, the existence of a “safety net” influences decisions regarding births outside of marriage in both positive and negative ways.

Welfare Policy

Lowi believes that the welfare system has four main purposes. The first is “fiscal maintenance of the economic system” to ensure a steady flow of income to Americans. Another purpose is to “give the maximum number of people a stake in the system,”¹⁶⁷ specifically in the political process itself. A third purpose of welfare is to regulate the poor, usually through fiscal policies that turn benefits on and off to

¹⁶⁵ Jean Hopsfenberger, “Poverty’s Price: \$4.25,” *Star Tribune*, March 29, 1993, 1B.

¹⁶⁶ Robert Lerman, “Family Structure and Childbearing Before and After Welfare Reform,” in *Welfare Reform: The Next Act*, eds. Alan Weil and Kenneth Finegold, 33–52 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2002).

¹⁶⁷ Theodore Lowi, Government 428 class notes, Cornell University, November 12, 1992.

influence their behavior – particularly work – and now also fertility (as demonstrated by PRWORA). The final, most important purpose of the welfare system is to alleviate poverty. This highlights the need for a critical interpretation of post PRWORA “success,” as it is known that there has been an unprecedented decline in caseloads (53%), yet the child poverty rate has not fallen at the same rate.¹⁶⁸ It cannot be assumed that a decline in caseloads (the criteria by which politicians judge success) has had a corollary reduction in poverty amelioration. As such, future research efforts should focus on the connection between the two phenomena, and the implications for future policy and program decisions.

Welfare policy under PRWORA of 1996 had two primary goals regarding family structure: to reduce the rate of births to unmarried mothers (especially teens); and to increase the formation of two parent families.¹⁶⁹ Congress made the following findings in the first section of the PRWORA:

- Marriage is the foundation of a successful society;
- Marriage is an essential institution of a successful society that promotes the interests of children;
- The negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth on the mother, the child, the family, and society are well documented; and
- Therefore, in light of this demonstration of the crisis in our Nation, it is the sense of the Congress that prevention of out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock birth are very important Government interests and the policy contained in part A of title IV

¹⁶⁸ CLASP, *Frequently Asked Questions about Working Welfare Leavers*, by Elise Richer, Steve Savner, and Mark Greenberg, Center for Law and Social Policy, Pub No. 01-30, November 2001.

¹⁶⁹ U.S. Congress, House, *Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996*, HR 3734, 104th Congress, Title I, section 101.

of the Social Security Act (as amended by section 103(a) of this Act) is intended to address the crisis.¹⁷⁰

These dual goals were based on the association of increased child poverty to the rise in female-headed households. In addition, a large body of research¹⁷¹ showed the deleterious effects experienced by children growing up in single parent homes (above and beyond the effect of poverty). Welfare reform included changes in benefit eligibility to reduce out of wedlock pregnancy and to promote marriage and work – through measures such as time limits, family caps, and strict child support enforcement and increased paternity establishment.

Characteristics of Redistributive Policy

A primary characteristic of redistributive policy is that it imposes costs on some citizens (taxpayers) to benefit others, in hopes of providing a net gain to society. The PRWORA illustrates this premise by providing temporary assistance to families in need through TANF in hopes of reducing longer-term dependence and costs of the system. The goal of reducing both teen pregnancy and non-marital births is also geared towards reducing the cost born to society to maintain the system because of lower unemployment and fewer single parent families.

Redistributive policy is distinct from other public policies because it is based on the categorization of conduct and characteristics of groups of people. This categorization is based on “systems thinking” – the premise that human beings must be understood as a part of a system instead of individually.¹⁷² Therefore, it is through

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ For example, S. McLanahan, and G. Sandefur, *Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Sheldon H. Danziger, Gary D. Sandefur, and Daniel H. Weinberg, eds., *Confronting Poverty: Prescriptions for Change* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Urie Bronfenbrenner, Peter McClelland, Elaine Wethington, Phyllis Moen, and Stephen Ceci, *The State of Americans: This Generation and the Next* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

¹⁷² Lowi, Government 428 class notes.

welfare policy that people are seen as interdependent and placed in categories to determine the allocation of resources. In many ways, the extent of commitment embodied in our welfare policies reflects the extent of our ethical obligations to one another. Katz offers another insight, that the “redefinition” of the welfare system through PRWORA illustrates changes in the way we view the nature of citizenship.¹⁷³ For example, in the 1940s there existed a notion of “social citizenship”¹⁷⁴ which provided a minimum amount of economic security as a right of citizenship, derived simply from birth in the United States. After welfare reform in 1996, Katz argues that citizenship is viewed as an achieved status contingent on one’s contribution to society. Thus, “citizenship” as an American ideal is not limitless, but bound by one’s merit and obligations to contribute to society as a whole.

Redistributive policy manipulates the environment of individual conduct to bring about change in behavior. The policy is coercive through “primary rule,” which authorizes the government agency to enforce behavioral requirements on recipients as a condition of receiving government assistance.¹⁷⁵ This characteristic of redistributive policies is clearly shown by the imposition of behavioral obligations upon welfare program recipients to achieve program goals.

Specifically, PRWORA sets out to change marital and fertility behavior of those at risk of out of wedlock pregnancy, and also of recipients already on welfare as a result of a child born outside of marriage. Mink criticizes the Republican emphasis on the “moral necessity of marriage...and sanctions against out of wedlock childbirth... that compel poor single mothers to surrender basic constitutional rights to associational freedom and reproductive privacy as a condition of receiving economic

¹⁷³ Michael B. Katz, *The Price of Citizenship: Redefining the American Welfare State* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001).

¹⁷⁴ Drawing from T. H. Marshall’s *Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays* (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1950).

¹⁷⁵ Theodore Lowi, “New Dimensions in Policy and Politics,” in *Social Regulatory Policy* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988).

assistance for their families.”¹⁷⁶ The question is how can we devise a policy that both assures women these rights and holds fathers responsible for (at the very least) financial responsibility for their children? If the regulation of parental behavior is the only way to maximize child outcomes and reduce the costs of welfare provision it seems e both necessary and ethical to do so (allowing of course, for exceptions in cases of domestic violence, etc. which clearly do not maximize outcomes for anyone involved). Finally, the purpose of mandatory paternity establishment is not to force interaction between the mother and father, but rather to establish a legal relationship between the father and child – to collect needed resources on that child’s behalf – and hopefully facilitate other beneficial involvement in the child’s life.

Welfare policy is different from other public policies because the categorization of people as parts of a social system conflicts with the basic idea that all citizens are equal, especially citizens placed in various categories. In addition, changing public attitudes about the appropriate balance between government activities to help the poor and relying on the market economy constantly challenge the legitimacy of these policies. Notions of the deserving and undeserving poor and the extent of responsibilities for our neighbors are also obstacles to creating effective welfare policy. Perhaps the most difficult barrier faced in setting welfare policies is the disagreement on the goal of the welfare policy in the first place highlighted in legislative debates around PRWORA.

Some argue that equality is the goal of welfare, others equity; where equality refers to evenly proportioned shares of resources among citizens, equity involves issues of fairness. When looking at welfare policy, these ideas frequently contradict one another because equality would require such an enormous shift of income/resources from the middle and top fifth of society to the bottom, that it may

¹⁷⁶ Gwendolyn Mink, *Welfare’s End* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 69.

seem unfair to many. So, some could argue that inequality is fair under American meritocracy, where citizens must contribute to the system to gain from it. As a result, reaching an appropriate balance between American tenets of individualism and the need to provide poor families with the basic necessities is difficult. This struggle among political, economic, social and moral factors in establishing effective welfare policy makes it a seemingly intractable task. Formulating a redistributive policy is complicated at the onset, shown by the difficulties faced when determining the goal and objectives of the policy.

The Policy Process

Public policy is “an action (or an inaction), usually undertaken by the government, directed at a particular goal and legitimated by the commitment of public resources.”¹⁷⁷ Dobelstein believes policies are set forth for following reasons:

1. Solve a social problem;
2. Serve the public interest;
3. Legitimate specific social policy goals with respect to a given problem;
4. Provide an environment for resolving conflicting values; and
5. Establish the direction for future social action with respect to the issue under consideration.

The reasons for setting policies are important to understanding not only the goal of the policy, but the content as well. For example, policies set forth to “serve the public interest” require input from individual constituents and groups to determine if an issue warrants a policy solution, and develop an appropriate policy. Thus, policies signed into law should reflect the public’s concerns about the issue at hand; upholding the

¹⁷⁷ Andrew Dobelstein, *Social Welfare Policy and Analysis* (Nelson-Hall Publishers, Chicago, 1993), 16.

fundamental tenet of democracy that the government was established to serve the people. In the mid 1990s, public concerns around welfare focused on the cost of welfare provision and the harmful effects on children raised in single parent homes in the mid 1990s. Reduction of poverty and the costs of welfare thus become “specific social policy goals” that were legitimated through the passage of a policy and allocation of public resources to address the problem.

Intergovernmental Perspective

Further complicating the policy process is the interaction between the different levels of government. In addition, our government is bipartisan system coupled with checks and balances create conflicts which require cooperation, negotiation, bargaining and compromise for Congress to solve problems. Additionally, the size of each level of government is not a constant, and recent trends show a decline in the size of the Federal government and an increase in size of both the state and local governments [Appendix K].

Welfare reform has played a large role in this trend, as the Federal government, through the last two major pieces of welfare legislation, gave states more flexibility and autonomy in delivery of welfare services. The 1996 welfare reform fundamentally changed the relationship between federal, state and local governments that has led to greater variation in states’ approaches to policy and programs.¹⁷⁸ Note also the importance of people who work in government agencies that have responsibility for carrying out programs because they make a many “smaller” policy decisions in the course of implementing policies or programs. This local phenomenon may be an important factor in the original (successful) results of welfare reform.

¹⁷⁸ Alan Weil and Kenneth Finegold, eds., *Welfare Reform: The Next Act* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2002).

Policy-making Process

The policy process is complex and involves both several branches and levels of government. Ziegler characterizes the process as a “policy wheel” that illustrates the steps of policymaking.¹⁷⁹ Table 5.1 summarizes each step in the process [see Appendix L for the full policy wheel].

Table 5.1: Stages of the Policy Process.

Stage	Description
Problem Definition	Identifies the problem that requires solution.
Policy Formulation	Sets forth the policy to solve the problem.
Planning	Involves identifying objectives of the policy, clarification of goals.
Program Design	Sets forth how to accomplish objectives.
Program Development	Includes pilots and demonstration projects before a full commitment of resources is made and allows the input of formative information to guide actual program operation stage.
Program Operation	Delivery of services and monitoring of results.
Evaluation	Determine if accomplished intended goal of policy.
Redefinition & Reformulation	Identify successful and unsuccessful components of programs and incorporate lessons to new policy and program measures.

As previously discussed, welfare policy is problematic at several stages of the policy process. First and foremost, problem definition involves very different views, as some believe that poverty is a fault of the individual, others of the social system; others see welfare as an injustice based on unequal distribution of resources. Obviously, the definition of the problem shapes the solution set forth. For welfare policy this simple idea is further complicated by the variety of actors involved in the process, each infusing their own values and morals into the debates about the root cause of non-marital childbearing and welfare. Thus compromise is a key element to setting policies, and also a major criticism of our policy making body – because as a result, legislation sometimes appears “watered down” by the time it is passed.

¹⁷⁹ Jerome Ziegler, “The Intergovernmental System,” class notes, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, Fall 2000.

The evaluation of welfare policies is also challenging, especially if the goals of the policy were not explicated at the implementation stage or if monitoring efforts were not carefully conducted to collect the types of data needed to assess the program's impact. In addition, evaluations must account for the organizational context in which the policy was implemented, and the specific characteristics of the policy's target population. Time and budgetary constraints of the policy process make planning and evaluation almost a luxury in the policy process, despite the fact that careful attention at these two points on the policy wheel will increase a program's likelihood of success. Finally, the critical step of redefinition or reformulation in the policy process connects program evaluation back to the early stages of either problem definition or policy formulation in hopes of capitalizing on successes and learning from mistakes. This ability to recast both the problem definition and solution is the very basis of the incremental nature of policy today.

The policy wheel is an important tool for characterizing stages of the policy process. However, the wheel does not reflect two important facets that influence the policy making process: the impact of values and politics on the process, and the lack of perfect information underlying decisions made. Policymaking is a value-laden process as social values, professional values, and personal values play a role in problem definition, the range of solutions entertained in policy debates, and certainly the solution that is chosen and implemented. The influence of politics (defined as "methods or tactics involved in managing a government or state"¹⁸⁰) on policymaking occurs at most stages, particularly problem definition, policy formulation, and evaluation. Finally, at each stage of the policy process, decision makers are provided various types of research and information upon which they base their decisions. Policy makers have no choice but to make important decisions based on the information they

¹⁸⁰ Arch Dotson, CRP 710 class notes, Cornell University, 1992.

receive, which is rarely perfect and complete. As a result, a policy may fail simply because its formulation was based on incomplete, biased or faulty information.

Legislative Considerations: PRWORA

There are three components of the 1996 welfare legislation that may be illustrative of policy makers' reliance on imperfect information and/or the influence of politics on the policy process: the emphasis on reducing teen pregnancy; reliance on threats to modify fertility behavior of welfare recipients; and the absence of efforts to regulate fathers' behavior as a means to reduce non-marital pregnancies.

Emphasis on Reducing Teen Pregnancy

Most pregnancy reduction efforts focus on teens, despite the fact that teens only account for 30% of non-marital births, and 70% are to women over 20 years of age. *The question is, is it logical to place emphasis on reducing teen pregnancy to reduce poverty given the dynamics of the welfare population?*

The general consensus from the hearings around welfare reform was that teen pregnancy is a primary causal factor of poverty/welfare receipt. This may be true, as about half of women on welfare did have a child as a teen. While teens are not the majority of women who have children outside of marriage, 75% of them will be dependent on welfare within 5 years. The implications of this are important because it is these women who face the greatest difficulties in trying to get off welfare because: they are less likely to have a high school diploma; more likely to have incomes below 50% of poverty line; have larger families; and are more likely to never be married.

At first glance, this emphasis on teens may seem misplaced because the majority of pregnancies occur to women over 20, but close examination welfare population dynamics show that many of the women experiencing a non-marital birth over 20 are better educated, more likely to support themselves through work, or are

cohabitating with the child's father. However, while the emphasis on teens is appropriate, it should not preclude serious efforts to reach women over 20 at risk of non-marital pregnancy.

One way to reach women over 20 is through family planning services under Title X of the PHS Act, which stated “no American woman shall be denied access to family planning services because of her economic condition,” and also through Medicaid – both of which are crucial to reducing the non-marital birth rate for women over 20. Note that family planning was not emphasized in the 1996 legislation – despite the fact that the network of Title X clinics is well established nationally, has high rates of success in reducing unintended pregnancies, and reaches only half of women eligible for family planning services. The level of funds¹⁸¹ provided to Title X programs reflects a lack of commitment by Congress to use an already viable program to further reach its fertility goals in the PRWORA. Yet family planning has been given little attention as a solution to reducing both non-marital births and poverty. This contradicts public opinion which favors providing birth control to unmarried women on welfare.

The 1996 legislation rewards reductions in non-marital births without subsequent increases in abortion, implying that an implicit goal of the policy measure is to reduce the need for abortion. Women over 20 account for 69% of abortions, and reduced funds and lack of emphasis for family planning will do little to reduce the need for women to have abortions. It is important to remember that Title X services are available to women *before* they become pregnant (unlike Medicaid). It appears that politics dominated the debates about abortion, and other reproductive issues faced by

¹⁸¹ In constant dollars, funding for the Title X program declined by over 65% between 1980 and 1994 – given the inflation rate determined by medial care services index; it should be 500 million by now (currently \$265 million).

poor women will continue to be a barrier to implementing a solution that has potential to reduce both the out of wedlock birth rate and the need for abortion.

It is important to examine family planning in the context of TANF reauthorization, which does not include any additional funds for Title X programs at this time, even though they are the primary means to reach women over 20 who are at risk of an unplanned pregnancy. This point also confirms the need for future analysis that includes estimation of the influence of each state's sexuality education policies in the public schools, where we have greatest access to teens at risk of pregnancy. Finally, examining this policy measure allows for the discussion of the current Administration's strong emphasis on abstinence only programs as a means to reduce non-marital childbearing.

"Primary Rule" to Change Behavior

The 1996 pregnancy reduction provisions set forth in PRWORA rely on threats to change behavior, implying that a strong enough connection exists between receiving welfare and out of wedlock pregnancy that reducing benefits will reduce non-marital pregnancies and/or births. This approach has been taken even though research has provided inconclusive evidence that there is a direct causal relationship between benefit levels and childbearing by teens and poor women over the age of 20.¹⁸² The causality between poverty and non-marital child bearing could run either or both ways -- if you take the view that benefits increase pregnancies, it is logical to cut benefits to reduce pregnancies. Many studies show the real value of welfare payments has decreased while the pregnancy rates increased while others show corollary rises in both the poverty rate and the non-marital birth rate.¹⁸³ Thus, if you think that it may be a set of external life circumstances that cause women to believe they have nothing to

¹⁸² Robert Moffitt, ed., "The Effect of Welfare on Marriage and Fertility," in *Welfare, the Family and Reproductive Behavior* (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 1998).

¹⁸³ Ibid.

lose by becoming pregnant (because their social and economic future seems dim), the approach in the legislation will not impact the non-marital birth rate significantly.

The question is – is it the pregnancy itself or the environment in which the pregnancy occurs that causes negative outcomes for poor women and their children? Findings from Chapter 4 support the hypothesis that family background, religion, race and ethnicity, and access to family planning have more important effects on decisions regarding a non-marital birth than the sanctions and incentives in the legislation will. Therefore, increasing social and economic opportunities of all youth (e.g. enhancing school quality, etc.) through education and employment incentives could lead to delayed childbearing and have a greater impact on the non-marital birth rate than the punitive approach embodied in the welfare legislation.

What about Daddy?

Policy measures to reduce non-marital pregnancy primarily focus on changing women's behavior. Efforts to alter male behavior typically involve actions to establish a legal connection (and subsequent financial support) between the father and child after he/she is born. One plausible way to impact the overall rate of out of wedlock pregnancy (and subsequent non-marital births) would be to incorporate large-scale programs to impact males' fertility decisions. Studies have shown that boys have sex earlier, more often and with more partners than girls, and data from successful past efforts to include males in local prevention programs shows that they can change males' contraceptive behavior.¹⁸⁴ This has been illustrated by the increased use of condoms in the 1990s, showing that men can, and do, change their behavior. Finally, males, especially teens, are connected to many organizational settings that are good sites for prevention efforts (e.g., schools, athletic activities/clubs, churches, boy

¹⁸⁴ Freya Sonenstein et al., *Involving Males in Preventing Teen Pregnancy*. (Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 1997).

scouts, etc.). Finally, increases in statutory rape (coupled with the knowledge that on average, males are 2–3 years older than their female partners) makes intervention efforts aimed at men in their late teens and early 20s another important measure that could be taken to reduce teen pregnancy.

Analysis

Analysis of welfare policy and its potential for success requires an understanding that although we can not expect perfect information from social science research, reliable information should be considered when designing policies to reduce non-marital births. Additionally, when good information is available but seemingly unnoticed in policy debates, the influence of politics on the policy process may be the underlying reason. One explanation for what appears to be a large influence of politics in the welfare debates is the moral principles [Table 5.2] that are involved in setting forth welfare policy (particularly with regards to women’s fertility)

Table 5.2. Moral Principles Underlying Welfare Policy.

Autonomy: the right to make critical decisions about one’s own destiny.
Freedom: the right to hold and express personal opinions and take personal actions.
Preservation of Life: the right to continued existence.
Honesty: the right to fair and accurate information.
Confidentiality: the right to privacy.
Equality: the right of individuals to receive the same services, resources, opportunities, or rights as other persons.
Social Justice: the right of equal access to social resources.
Due Process: the right to procedural safeguards when accused of crimes or when benefits or rights are withdrawn.
Beneficence: the right to receive those treatments, services or benefits that allow one to establish or maintain a decent standard of well-being.
Societal/Collective Rights: the right of society to maintain and improve itself by safeguarding the public health and welfare, avoiding unreasonable or unnecessary expenditures, and preserving public order.

Source: Bruce Jansson, *The Reluctant Welfare State* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988).

These underlying moral principles may be an intervening factor between putting reliable information about non-marital births and welfare to use, and the previously

mentioned shortcomings in the Congressional response embodied in PRWORA. In general, the difference between what we know (research) and what we do (practice) is mediated by the influence of politics on the process through which knowledge is translated to action. This process, the politicization of knowledge, shapes policy at each, if not all of the stages of the policy process (formulation, implementation, evaluation). The short and long-term impact of this filtration of knowledge on the outcomes of actions taken is not clearly understood and is an interesting dimension to the analysis of any social policy. Thus, the mediating (confounding) effect of politicization of the issue may be a primary reason for the shortcomings in the legislative efforts regarding non-marital births and their link to welfare receipt, and is an area where greater examination may increase understanding of any social policies involving family structure and fertility decisions.

Recommendations

The efforts to reduce teen pregnancy under PRWORA have continued the decline in rates prior to the legislation, and the rates of births outside of marriage to women over 20 leveled off in the late 1990s, and recently increased slightly each year (averaging about 1% annually). The relationship between these trends and PRWORA is not known at this time, and it is important to acknowledge that these rates are also impacted by reductions in marital fertility. In addition, more children born outside of marriage are living with two parents (sometimes both biological) as a result of increase in cohabitation (Table 5.3).¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁵ G. Acs and S. Nelson, "Honey I'm Home, Changes in Living Arrangements in the late 1990s," *Assessing the New Federalism Policy Brief B-38*, 2001.

Table 5.3. Children’s Living Arrangements, 1997–1999.

	Total U.S.		
	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	Difference
Married biological/adoptive parents	59.8	60.2	+0.4
Married blended parents ^a	8.3	8.3	+0.0
Single mother	21.3	19.2	-2.1*
Single father	2.9	2.9	-0.2
Cohabiting parents with common children ^b	2.0	2.8	+0.8*
Cohabiting partners with no children in common ^c	2.6	3.2	+0.6*
No parents (foster or kinship or non-relative parents)	3.1	3.5	+0.5*
Other	0.1	0.1	+0.0

Source: Urban Institute calculations from the 1997 and 1999 NAF.

*Statistically significant difference at the 90 percent confidence level.

- a. The category “married blended parents” refers to children living with a biological parent who is married to either a stepparent or an adoptive parent.
- b. Children living with cohabiting parents with common children are living with both of their biological parents, who are unmarried.
- c. Children living with cohabiting partners with no children in common are living with one biological parent and that parent’s boyfriend or girlfriend.

Recommendation 1: Continue Efforts to Reduce Non-marital births

States must continue attempts to reduce out of wedlock pregnancy, both for teens and women over 20. To further reduce the rate among teenagers, additional funding for the provision of contraceptives is needed in more than half the states. While more than 35 states have abstinence education as part of their curriculum, less than half incorporate contraceptive education (see Appendix K), and only 5 states provide a clinic to increase teens access to birth control.

Reducing non-marital births among women over 20 years of age requires an increase in funding for family planning services under Title X – the only program that provides services to poor women before they become pregnant. Title X funding has seen no significant increase since the 1980s, and as a result, less than half of eligible women receive services. The importance of Title X programs to reaching poor women

at risk of births outside of marriage cannot be overstated. The lack of emphasis on these programs to reduce non-marital births to date is baffling given the reported high rates of program success¹⁸⁶ and the public support of providing birth control to poor unmarried women.

Recommendation 2: Expand Efforts To Change Male Fertility Decisions

Clear disincentives have been established for men who father children out of wedlock, most notably through increases in both paternity establishment and child support enforcement. The child support system underwent a major overhaul under the Family Support Act of 1988, and the additional provisions under PRWORA build on the success of mechanisms put into place under the 1988 legislation. To further improve the child support system, policies need to be created that help poor fathers who are unable to pay child support gain both skills and training needed to gain employment, and more importantly increase access to their children regardless of their inability to pay child support. As such, *the connection between non-payment and loss of visitation needs to be removed to foster greater involvement of fathers in children's lives.*

Equally important is the idea that policies and programs should help current and potential fathers succeed at work so they are able to support a family and commit themselves to a family. Promoting work is based in the premise that working parents provide a better environment for raising children than parents who rely on public assistance. Research shows that parental work only benefits children if it increases family income.¹⁸⁷ This is not the case for many low-income parents, as Loprest shows that many working welfare leavers live on resources below the federal poverty level;

¹⁸⁶ Alan Guttmacher Institute, *Teenage Pregnancy: Trends and Lessons Learned*, Issues in Brief Series 2002, No. 1, 2002.

¹⁸⁷ P. Loprest, "Making the Transition from Welfare to Work: Successes but Continuing Concerns," in Weil and Finegold, *Welfare Reform: The Next Act*, 17–32.

many low-income families are not receiving benefits they are eligible for; and a higher proportion of recipients are living in extreme poverty.¹⁸⁸ It is too soon to declare welfare a success in the increases in work, as the critical role of the strong economy in the 1990s must be acknowledged as an important factor in the welfare caseloads and employment rates.

Another justification for work promotion as a welfare policy was to increase child outcomes, but research by the Urban Institute (2002) confirms that children in those families that leave welfare are at similar risks for poor outcomes as children who remain in welfare families. Child only cases account for more than 30% of TANF caseloads, because of parents' ineligibility for benefits increased under sanctions.¹⁸⁹ In addition, gains in child well-being do not become evident immediately after a parent gains employment, thus, no general conclusion can be drawn about the impact of work on child outcomes to date. Therefore, *the focus on male responsibility should be expanded to include: reduction of pregnancies outside marriage through prevention programs in public schools and other organizational settings; and job training and education programs to equip men to be responsible fathers, financially and otherwise.*

Recommendation 3: Promote Marriage by Removing all Marriage Disincentives

Welfare policy embodies a clear preference for marriage to reduce the disadvantage of children who grow up in a single parent home. It is not clear that welfare policy can change the value placed on marriage by society as a whole. *As such, an effective way to increase marriage among low-income women is to remove the remaining disincentives for marriage.* According to Rowe¹⁹⁰ 33 states have established similar eligibility requirements for one and two parent families. This is a

¹⁸⁸ Alan Weil, "Ten Things Everyone Should Know About Welfare Reform," *New Federalism Issues and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-52 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, May 2002).

¹⁸⁹ Weil and Finegold, *Welfare Reform: The Next Act*.

¹⁹⁰ Gretchen Rowe, *State TANF Policies as of July 1999* (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2000).

positive trend, but the fundamental problem is that TANF is a means-tested program that phases out benefits after income rises. “Thus, family-structure neutral eligibility rules that include an income test continue to disadvantage married parent families.”¹⁹¹ Marriage penalties are highest for low-income families as a percentage of total income, in addition to penalties of lost benefits such as food stamps and Medicaid – these two combined can cost married couples up to 30% of income.¹⁹² The result is, of course, a substantial disadvantage to low income married couples.

The promotion of marriage is a good way to try to reduce the number of children born into single parent homes, but is not the perfect solution for all women. In particular, poor women with low marriage prospects will be heavily influenced by the marriage penalties listed above. Higher asset limits and income disregards have also been important measure to encourage marriage. *One other important way to increase marriage is to increase the labor force potential of men in poor neighborhoods.* This falls in line with the work of Wilson,¹⁹³ who believes that the disparity in marriage rates between African American and White communities is largely due to a lack of employable and marriageable men in poor areas. *In general, a clear connection between labor force policies and education quality should be drawn to the problem of non-marital childbearing, and specific efforts to draw this connection need to attend to the importance of cultural factors to fertility behavior.*

Conclusion

The reauthorization of TANF provides an excellent opportunity to examine both the assumptions underlying the definition of the problem of welfare dependence, and the criteria by which we measure success of our welfare policy and programs.

¹⁹¹ Weil, “Ten Things Everyone Should Know About Welfare Reform.”

¹⁹² Rowe, *State TANF Policies*.

¹⁹³ William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987); *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. (New York: Knopf, 1996).

This analysis can lead to important modifications of both our overall approach to welfare policy and also to specific programs and efforts designed to ameliorate the hardships experienced by America's vulnerable families.

CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION

Criteria for success

How we view success of the PRWORA will influence what measures we believe are needed to improve the welfare system. For example, since 1994 the huge decline (unprecedented) in caseloads could mean that either families are no longer in need, or families in need are no longer receiving assistance. The effect of economic trends must be considered in conjunction with changes in welfare dependence, and it is also important to note that the drop in welfare participation (almost 50%) was much more rapid than the drop in child poverty (21.8% in 1994 to 16.9% in 1999).¹⁹⁴ Why the measures led to the decline in caseloads are also not reducing child poverty requires further examination. It is possible that although fewer families are on welfare, a high number of children are still experiencing poverty and hardship. We know that many adults left welfare for work, but did not earn enough to live above the poverty line, and that in some cases, families left welfare participation without finding work or were forced off due to time limits. Finally, some families who need assistance were unable to get it, either from barriers to enrollment or failure to apply.¹⁹⁵ In the course of TANF reauthorization, we need to assess and strongly consider the effect(s) on children that “trickle down” from Congressional regulation of their parents.

Reauthorization and Non-marital childbearing

Marriage is not a perfect solution to all the issues involving non-marital childbearing as one third of unmarried births are to women ages 15-18, fathered by men who are on average, 3 years older. National statistics show that more than 50% of

¹⁹⁴ Mark Greenberg, Testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, March 15, 2001, accessed at <http://www.clasp.org/>.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

marriages end in divorce, and those who marry at younger ages are at greatest risk. Thus, family formation initiatives may better serve women over 20. In general, though, marriage may solve an immediate problem faced by women who discover an out of wedlock pregnancy, but in the long run, it may not provide a two-parent home for much of that child's life.

The question is can public policies discourage unintended pregnancies *and* support women who choose to have a child out of wedlock? In other words, are both aims mutually exclusive or does the support provided to women who have children outside of marriage inherently provide incentive to make that choice? If future welfare legislation passes (e.g., HR 4737) the primary focus on marriage promotion may be at the cost of other important issues regarding family formation and stability such as: teen pregnancy prevention; family planning efforts for women over 20 at risk of non-marital births; increasing educational and employment opportunities of young parents (whether they are married or not); and targeting very specific efforts to increase the “employability” and “marriageability” of young men.

Marriage accounts for 26% of exits from poverty for unmarried women with children (whereas 33% of women lift their families out of poverty through work).¹⁹⁶ Recently, President Bush's Administration unveiled the *Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act (HR 4737)*, which emphasizes marriage as a critical means to reduce poverty and non-marital childbearing. The legislation “express the sense of the Congress that increasing success in moving families from welfare to work, as well as promoting healthy marriage and other means of improving child well-being, are very important government interests.”¹⁹⁷ The commitment to this interest is an authorization of \$200 million to conduct marriage promotion programs and research

¹⁹⁶ Driscoll et al., “Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women,” *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 61, no. 1 (Feb 1999): 178–187.

¹⁹⁷ U.S. Congress, House, *Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Formation Act of 2002*, 107th Congress, Second Session, Title I, Section 101.

and \$20 million to fund “fatherhood programs.” When all family formation programs are accounted for, it is estimated that the bill allocates \$1.6 billion¹⁹⁸ for these purposes.

The underlying assumption of these policy measures is that marriage will improve the status of poor women with children. Mothers who receive TANF after a non-marital birth are less likely to marry than those who are not reliant on public assistance, and among those who marry, their husbands, on average, have lower incomes.¹⁹⁹ Thus, it is important to consider the marriage prospects for women on welfare and consider the employability of poor men as a way to encourage two-parent family formation.

The notion of assortative mating suggest that “higher male incomes tend to strengthen traditional marriage whereas higher female incomes, by reducing women’s dependence on male resources, may weaken traditional marriage and increase the likelihood that childbearing will take place outside of marriage.”²⁰⁰ When welfare benefits provide income only to unmarried women with children, it weakens the likelihood that she will marry. Therefore if the joint income between a man and a woman of limited means remains low or is reduced as a result of benefit reduction, there is no incentive to have a child within marriage. This is a strong factor in why marriage promotion is a less viable option for women currently receiving welfare, and for women who are at risk of non-marital birth whose only prospect for marriage is a low-income male.

As it stands, reauthorization legislation is worded such that it may be difficult for states to provide aid to unmarried, two-parent families and their children and some

¹⁹⁸ Jodie Levin-Epstein et al., *Spending Too Much, Accomplishing Too Little: An Analysis of the Family Formation Provisions of H.R. 4737 and Recommendations for Change* (Center for Law and Social Policy Publication No. 02-47, June 2002).

¹⁹⁹ Driscoll et al., “Nonmarital Childbearing among Adult Women.”

²⁰⁰ R. J. Willis, “A Theory of Out-of-wedlock Childbearing,” *The Journal of Political Economy* 107, no. 6, part 2 (1999): S33–64.

analysts believe that the requirements placed on states to assist two-parent families to the same extent as single-parent families are not strong enough.²⁰¹ More importantly, as the TANF reauthorization process is underway, shouldn't legislators stop and ask themselves if the allocation of so much money to marriage promotion is appropriate given the limited knowledge we have on the government's role in marriage and the potential impact of investing those funds, possibly at the expense of other needed services?

Reframing the Approach

One important aspect of reframing the approach taken to welfare is to think about the consequences to children each time we punish or regulate a mother. Why do we constantly focus on child outcomes in justification for regulating mothers when we don't consider the consequences of such regulations on the child outcomes in the first place? The question that must be asked today is how can we both change the "irresponsible" behavior of parents – mothers and fathers – and maximize outcomes of children in families dependent on the welfare system? In other words, could welfare policy and programs be redesigned to include the primary purpose of maximizing child outcomes?

President Bush's proposal to require women receiving welfare to work 40 hours a week without addressing who will care for their children (and no additional allocation of money for child care) is a good example of the need to reframe the current approach to welfare policy. Under PRWORA states have the option of shifting TANF money to the Child Care and Development (CCDF) block grant, and many states have exercised that option. Despite this, Bush's increased work requirements will necessitate an increased level of direct funding for childcare from the Federal government to help states meet the aggressive goal that will likely be part of the

²⁰¹ Levin-Epstein, et al., *Spending Too Much, Accomplishing Too Little*.

reauthorized legislation. The need to regulate parental behavior, in this case, overshadowed a more important discussion about how women with children can meet the requirement without additional subsidies for day care?

This proposal highlights an interesting view of motherhood. In essence, work requirements of mothers reliant on welfare send the message that a poor woman's place is in the labor force, not at home caring for her children. Yet, we criticize women who work for a lack of priority placed on their children's well being, and we blame them for any negative outcomes their child exhibits. Welfare policy, as it stands, places poor women in a no-win situation. This situation is exacerbated by policies that place strict requirements on their behavior as a condition of benefit provision, with little or no supportive mechanisms to help women meet the requirements in the first place.

To remedy this situation, welfare policy must support a broader base of family types, non-working and working poor through workplace policies and day care provision. In general, there needs to be greater value placed on child rearing as an activity²⁰² because if women are caring for children at home, they can only participate in the labor force marginally. The difficulty of achieving equality for women because of childcare duties is exacerbated for poor women.

Achieving better outcomes for both unmarried mothers and their children requires attention to the dilemmas women face when forced to comply with welfare regulations that fail to provide adequate supportive services. Legislative modifications need to be made under TANF reauthorization to enhance the likelihood that women who are already disadvantaged are not destined to fail under a harsh, illogical government policy. It is also critical to try to impact men's behavior, because every

²⁰² Mona Harrington, *Care and Equality: Inventing a New Family Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

child born out of wedlock has both a mother and a father who bears a moral, physical, legal, emotional responsibility for that child.

Welfare policies have been trying to modify family structure since their inception. The problem is the underlying assumptions of policy measures are based on the notion that two parent biological families are *possible* in most cases of an out of wedlock pregnancy. This assumption does not hold true, given the changes in attitudes about both sex and marriage in the 1990s. While it is admirable to try to create the family situation in which children thrive the most, it may be unrealistic to expect to accomplish this through regulation of welfare benefits.

Appendix A. Legislative history of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193).

<i>Date and Action</i>
1993
January 20. President Clinton is inaugurated. He popularized the idea of "end[ing] welfare as we know it" during his presidential campaign.
January 21. U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) reintroduces the Work for Welfare Act, which would provide full federal funding for the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS).
February 2. House Ways and Means Committee Republicans introduce a welfare reform bill with two tiers of AFDC, the transition program and the work program. After a total of five years' participation by clients in both programs, states could opt to drop clients from the rolls of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
June 21. The Clinton Administration names a 27-member task force to develop a welfare reform plan. The effort is led by Bruce Reed, deputy assistant to the president for domestic policy; David T. Ellwood, assistant secretary for planning and evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); and Mary Jo Bane, HHS assistant secretary, Administration for Children and Families.
November 10. House Republicans unveil H.R. 3500, a welfare reform proposal sponsored by Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) and cosponsored by 160 Republican lawmakers. The proposal requires that by 2002, 90 percent of those who receive AFDC for two years or more would work in exchange for their benefits. The proposal allows states to convert AFDC to block grants, requires paternity establishment in exchange for AFDC benefits, and denies AFDC to minor parents under age 18. It would save \$19.5 billion over five years.
1994
January 11. APWA releases a bipartisan plan for reforming the nation's welfare system, Responsibility, Work, Pride: The Values of Welfare Reform, that was developed by state human service commissioners. The plan calls for expanded job training and work, stronger child support enforcement, increased federal support for the JOBS Program, improved health care coverage, and streamlined administration of services.
January 18. U.S. Senator John Breaux (D-La.) calls for Congress to address welfare reform in 1994 year with the same urgency as health care reform.
January 25. Sixteen Senate Republicans, including U.S. Senators Bob Dole (Kan.) and Hank Brown (Colo.), introduce the Welfare Reform Act of 1994, S. 1795. It gives states the option of ending AFDC after two years, requires teen mothers to live at home, preserves the AFDC entitlement, and allows for the establishment of a voucher program in which the combined value of AFDC and food stamp benefits can be used as a wage subsidy.

<i>Date and Action</i>
February 18. House Republicans this week say they will file a discharge petition to force a vote on the House floor on H.R. 3500, the House Republican welfare proposal.
April 15. U.S. Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) introduce the first bipartisan welfare bill, the Welfare to Self-Sufficiency Act, S. 2009. The bill is modeled after Iowa's Promise Jobs Program.
April 22. Two additional welfare reform bills are introduced this week: U.S. Representatives Lynn Woolsey (D-Calif.) and Ralph Regula (R-Ohio) introduce legislation that would federalize child support collection and triple funding for the JOBS Program. The Working Off Welfare Act seeks to strengthen transitional services as families move off welfare.
Reps. Jim Talent (R-Mo.) and Tim Hutchison (R-Ark.) introduce the Real Welfare Reform Act, which denies benefits to unmarried mothers under age 21, imposes a 3.5 percent cap on welfare spending, and requires 50 percent of welfare recipients to work for benefits by 1996. U.S. Sens. Lauch Faircloth (R-N.C.), Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), and Hank Brown (R-Colo.) introduce the bill in the Senate.
May 11. The Mainstream Forum, a group of 90 Democrats led by Rep. Dave McCurdy (Okla.), introduces a welfare reform bill with a two-year lifetime limit on AFDC, followed by a mandatory community service requirement in which recipients could participate for a maximum of three years. The bill denies benefits to most noncitizens.
May 27. Rep. Patsy Mink (D-Hawaii) and 30 House Democrats announce welfare reform legislation that would provide cash assistance, food stamps, and housing assistance for two years to welfare recipients who obtain jobs and leave AFDC and whose income is less than 300 percent of poverty. The bill does not call for time-limited benefits.
June 14. President Clinton unveils the Work and Responsibility Act in Kansas City, Missouri. The proposal calls for \$9.3 billion in additional federal funding over five years and imposes a mandatory work requirement after two years on AFDC for recipients born after 1971 who are unable to find jobs. The proposal expands the JOBS Program and strengthens regulations regarding paternity establishment and child support. The bill requires minors to live at home as a condition of receiving aid. All but \$2.1 billion in new funding will be offset through reductions in entitlements, such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
June 24. The Clinton welfare bill is officially introduced in the Senate as S. 2224 and the House of Representatives as H.R. 4605.
July 14-15. House Ways and Means Chair Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) asks Human Resources Subcommittee Chair Harold Ford (D-Tenn.) to hold hearings on the Clinton bill and draft a welfare reform bill by early August.

<i>Date and Action</i>
July 22. Rep. Robert Matsui (D-Calif.) introduces H.R. 4767, the Family Self-Sufficiency Act of 1994. The bill increases funding for JOBS and calls for comprehensive child care services for AFDC recipients leaving welfare.
July 29. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources holds hearing on the Clinton welfare reform bill.
August 19. The Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources holds hearing on time-limited cash assistance for welfare recipients.
November 8. Republicans win a majority in both houses of Congress. The new congressional leaders promise to bring the "Contract With America" to the House and Senate floors within 100 days. The contract includes the Personal Responsibility Act, which proposes to reform welfare by curbing out-of-wedlock births through denial of benefits. The legislation also imposes a work requirement and caps spending growth of welfare programs. The bill requires all families to be off of AFDC after a total of five years of benefits. It is the first proposal to remove entitlement status from AFDC, SSI, and a number of nutrition programs.
1995
January 5. The House Ways and Means Committee begins hearings on "Contract With America" items, including welfare reform.
March 8. The House Ways and Means Committee approves, 22-11, a welfare reform bill—the Personal Responsibility Act—that would modify 40 federal programs, end the entitlement status of AFDC, and give states considerably more control over public assistance through block grants. The Senate Finance Committee begins hearings on welfare reform.
March 21. The House opens debate on the Personal Responsibility Act.
March 22. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that, although the Personal Responsibility Act will save \$66 billion over five years, all 50 states will fail to meet its job requirements.
March 23. The House rejects, 228-205, a Democratic proposal sponsored by Rep. Nathan Deal (D-Ga.) that would have provided job training and education to adults on welfare.
March 24. The House votes 234-199 to approve H.R. 4, the Personal Responsibility Act. Only nine Democrats supported the measure; five Republicans voted against it.
March 25. President Clinton denounces major elements of the House-passed welfare bill in his weekly radio address.

Date and Action
April 27. The Senate Finance Committee convenes its final hearing on welfare reform.
May 18. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.) introduces his welfare reform bill, the Family Support Act of 1995, which retains the individual entitlement status for low-income families.
May 26. The Senate Finance Committee approves, 12-8, a welfare reform proposal from Sen. Bob Packwood (R-Ore.) that would provide \$16.7 billion in block grants to the states for temporary assistance to needy families. Similar to the House bill, it includes a \$1.7 billion loan fund to states, a five-year lifetime time limit on assistance, and a state option to deny assistance to noncitizens.
July 20. Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) releases an outline of an alternative welfare reform bill that addresses the concerns of senators displeased with the Finance Committee bill--most specifically the formula for distributing block grants.
July 31. Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) announces a compromise welfare proposal at the National Governors' Association (NGA) summer meeting in Burlington, Vermont. At the NGA meeting, President Clinton announces that he has directed HHS to provide "fast-track demonstration approval"--within 30 days--to states with certain waiver requests for welfare reform.
August 8. Majority Leader Bob Dole halts Senate consideration of welfare reform legislation, S. 1120, the Work Opportunity Act of 1995, after two days of debate.
August 11. Dole announces 26 modifications to the Work Opportunity Act.
September 6. The Senate resumes debate of legislation, now called H.R. 4, the Welfare Reform Act.
September 7. The Senate votes 54-45 to defeat the Democrats' welfare reform plan. The bill would have preserved the entitlement to welfare while increasing the number of recipients enrolled in education, training, and work.
September 19. Following a week of debate, the Senate votes 87-12 to pass the Welfare Reform Act. Senators approve over 40 amendments to the bill, including a compromise leadership amendment, before final passage. The estimated savings is \$67 billion over seven years.
October 24. Over 40 House and Senate welfare reform conferees convene to begin working out the differences between the House and Senate bills.
November 8. An analysis of the Senate welfare reform bill by the Office of Management and Budget finds that proposed policy changes would result in one million more children living in poverty.

<i>Date and Action</i>
November 14. Welfare reform conferees release a preliminary outline of a compromise bill that will be included in budget reconciliation. President Clinton vows to veto the measure.
December 7. The Clinton Administration releases a budget plan proposing \$46 billion in savings over seven years for welfare reform.
The president vetoes the budget reconciliation bill, which contains welfare reform provisions.
December 21. The House votes 245-178 to pass the welfare reform conference report.
December 22. The Senate votes 52-47 to pass the conference report. The estimated savings is \$58 billion over seven years.
1996
January 9. President Clinton vetoes H.R. 4, the welfare reform conference committee bill. He says that an acceptable welfare reform bill must include more funding for child care, health coverage for low-income families, requirements for state funding, and additional funding during times of economic downturn or population growth.
February 6. The National Governors' Association unanimously approves bipartisan agreements on welfare and Medicaid reform at their winter meeting in Washington, D.C. Both House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) and Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kan.) pledge that both houses of Congress will give the governors' policy statements serious consideration.
February 20. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources holds hearings on the NGA policy statement for welfare reform.
February 22. The Senate Finance Committee holds hearings on the NGA policy statement.
February 28. HHS Secretary Donna Shalala, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, announces that the president cannot support the NGA welfare proposal "in its current form." She says that the proposal needs to be modified to provide vouchers for children of parents terminated from assistance, to retain the entitlement status of child welfare services and food stamps, and to include fundamental revision of the immigration section.
March 5. President Clinton notes in a speech before the National Association of Counties that his administration has approved waivers for 53 different welfare reform projects in 37 states, covering nearly 75 percent of all welfare recipients.

Date and Action
April 26. The White House proposes a new welfare reform bill with estimated savings of \$38 billion over seven years. HHS Assistant Secretary Mary Jo Bane tells Congress the bill "promotes work, encourages parental responsibility, and provides a safety net for children."
May 4. President Clinton announces executive actions urging states to tighten eligibility for teen mothers on welfare.
May 18. President Clinton announces his support for a Wisconsin proposal for welfare reform, Wisconsin Works, (or W-2) that would end the guarantee of welfare benefits and would require work.
May 22. Congressional Republicans introduce revised welfare reform bills in both the House and Senate that are modeled, in part, on the NGA policy statements. The legislation retains federal control of child protection and adoption programs and allows legal immigrants who are who are not yet citizens to be eligible for cash welfare. Republicans say they will attach to the welfare bill a plan to give states control of Medicaid.
June 6. The House votes 289-136 to approve H.R. 3562, the Wisconsin Only bill, which would authorize the state of Wisconsin to implement its statewide welfare reform demonstration project, Wisconsin Works.
June 18. President Clinton announces actions to strengthen child support enforcement through implementation of a new federal system to track delinquent parents across state lines. The administration hopes to increase collections by an additional \$6.4 billion and reduce federal welfare payments by \$1.1 billion over 10 years.
June 26. Senate Finance Committee approves S. 1795, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, the Senate Republican leadership's welfare and Medicaid reform legislation.
July 11. House and Senate Republican leadership announce their decision to split the welfare and Medicaid reform bills contained in H.R. 3507 and S. 1795. President Clinton had threatened to veto the reform bill, objecting to the Medicaid provisions.
July 18. The House of Representatives passes, by a vote of 256 to 170, its budget reconciliation package, H.R. 3734, which contains a modified version of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, H.R. 3507.
July 23. The Senate passes its welfare reform bill by a vote of 74 to 24.
July 25. House and Senate conferees begin meeting to work out the differences between their respective welfare reform measures.

Date and Action
July 30. House-Senate conferees complete work on H.R. 3734 and send bill to House for final passage.
July 31. President Clinton announces he will sign H.R. 3734. House of Representatives passes bill by a vote of 328 to 101.
August 1. Senate passes H.R. 3734 by vote of 78 to 21.
August 22. President Clinton signs the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.
August 27. Administration for Children and Families sends letter to each lead state agency for the Child Care and Development Block Grant asking them to submit an interim application-planning document that will enable them to receive the new mandatory and matching child-care funds available under H.R. 3734.
September 9–10. APWA, NGA, and the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) hold joint briefing, bringing together nearly 600 state and local officials to discuss the new welfare reform law, P.L. 104-193. The briefing includes explanations of the new law, workshops with federal agencies and departments, and open discussions among the states.
September 11. Mary Jo Bane, assistant secretary for HHS' Administration for Children and Families, and Peter B. Edelman, acting assistant secretary for HHS Planning and Evaluation, resign, citing concerns about the new welfare reform law.
September 17. APWA testifies, with NGA and NCSL, on behalf of states, regarding six technical corrections to the P.L. 104-193: problems with the \$50 pass-through on child-support payments, transferring Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) dollars to child care and Title XX, using maintenance-of-effort dollars for legal immigrants, treating disabled parents in two-parent families, making the "look-back" dates for children's eligibility for Medicaid or foster care/adoption consistent, and repealing the mandate on the state supplemental payment to Supplemental Security Income (SSI).
September 19. Clinton Administration withdraws August 19 approval of waiver that would have allowed the District of Columbia an exemption from the five-year ceiling on lifetime benefits after Sen. Don Nickles (R-Okla.) introduced legislation, S. 2060, to require D.C. to comply with the five-year limit.
September 30. P.L. 104-208, the omnibus spending measure, funds the Social Services Block Grant (Title XX) at \$2.5 billion for FY 97, superseding the amount (\$2.38 billion) allocated by the welfare reform act.
October 1. Deadline for states to file their plans to opt into the TANF Block Grant. Twenty-three states submit plans; two states, Wisconsin and Michigan, were authorized on September 30 to begin their TANF program.

<i>Date and Action</i>
October 11. Twenty-six states file TANF state plans. The Red Cliff Tribe of Wisconsin becomes first Native American tribe to file their own TANF plan. Florida is third state to receive HHS approval for its TANF plan.
The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) informs state Medicaid directors that “in absence of submitting a State Plan Amendment, you are expected to continue providing Medicaid eligibility for all the groups you covered on July 16, 1996, including permissible legal immigrants.”
October 25. The Social Security Administration (SSA) sends letter to state human service administrators detailing the timetable for redetermining noncitizens currently receiving SSI. In February and March 1997, SSA will send notices to noncitizens informing them that their eligibility is under review. After a 90-day response period, SSA will notify beneficiaries if their benefits are to be stopped.
SSA issues a guidance to state agencies on administering the 40 quarters of qualifying work determination used in assessing noncitizen eligibility for food stamp benefits.
October 28. HHS alerts state human service administrators to a December 1996 Federal Register notice and comment period to address the proposed distribution and allocation formula for \$500 million in enhanced funding for Medicaid eligibility changes necessitated by the new welfare reform law.
November 18. Thirty-five states and one Native American tribe have filed state TANF plans. Thirteen TANF state plans are determined to be complete.
November 29. HHS still works on recommendations for technical corrections to the welfare reform law, which was due to Congress on November 22. The earliest date for legislative action would be when Congress meets in January 1997.
December 4. HHS issues revised list of publication dates for welfare reform regulations. Title I, TANF: state plan submissions, financial management and reporting, individual development accounts (date uncertain); tribal program requirements (March 1997); audits, penalties, and corrective action (January 1997); data collection and reporting (March 1997) methodology for determining child poverty (February 1997); illegitimacy rate reduction bonus (March 1997); high performance bonus (April 1997); omnibus conforming regulation (October 1997). Title II, Child Support: state directory of new hires (January 1997); state case registry and expansion of federal parent locator service (June 1997); state laws concerning paternity establishment (January 1997); automated data processing (ADP) requirements (August 1997); ADP funding limitation (January 1997); grants to states for access and visitation programs (March 1997); tribal program (May 1997); omnibus conforming regulation (October 1997). Title VI, Child Care: child care program (December 1996).

<i>Date and Action</i>
<p>December 15. Clinton Administration sends Congress its recommendations on needed technical corrections to P.L. 104-193, which were required by legislation to be submitted by November 22, 1996. Over 130 pages long, this document includes over 70 recommended changes with a description of technical problems, proposed legislative language, and a budget impact analysis.</p>
<p>December 20. HHS determines that 20 TANF state plans are complete. Thirty-nine states have filed state TANF plans.</p>
<p>Source: American Public Welfare Association, downloaded from http://www.apwa.org/reform/timeline.htm</p>

Appendix B. Legislative Hearings related to Welfare Reform, 102nd-104th Congresses.

<i>Hearing Title</i>
102nd Congress
"Beyond Public Assistance: Where Do We Go from Here?" hearings before the House Select Committee on Hunger, Mar. 25, 1992.
"Federal Policy Perspectives on Welfare Reform: Rhetoric, Reality, and Opportunities," hearings before the House Select Committee on Hunger Domestic Task Force, Apr. 9, 1992.
"State and Local Perspectives on Welfare Reform: Rhetoric, Reality, and Opportunities," hearings before the Select Committee on Hunger Domestic Task Force, June 4, 1992.
"Administration's Welfare Reform Proposal," hearings before the Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, Committee on Finance. Senate, Aug. 4, 1992.
"Rethinking Poverty Policy," hearings before the House Select Committee on Hunger, Oct. 2, 1992.
103rd Congress
"Trends in Spending and Caseloads for AFDC and Related Programs," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Mar. 11, 1993.
"Selected Aspects of Welfare Reform," hearings before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures and the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Mar. 30, 1993.
"Impact of Immigration on Welfare Programs," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Nov. 15, 1993.
"Welfare Reform," hearings before the Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, Committee on Finance. Senate, Jan. 18, Feb. 25, 1994.
"Fraud in Federal Nutrition Programs," hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. Senate, Feb. 2, 1994.
"Ending Welfare As We Know It: Progress or Paralysis?," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Operations. House, Mar. 10, 1994.
"Welfare Reform, Special Hearing," hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. Senate, Apr. 11, 1994.

Hearing Title
"Work and Responsibility Act of 1994," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, July 13, 1994.
"Welfare Reform Proposals, Including H.R. 4605, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Part 1," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, July 14, 26-28, 1994.
"Welfare Reform Proposals, Including H.R. 4605, the Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Part 2," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, July 29, Aug. 9, 16, 1994.
"Hearing on H.R. 4605, Work and Responsibility Act of 1994," hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor. House, Aug. 2, 1994.
"Hearing Regarding the Impact of Welfare Reform on Child Care Providers and the Working Poor," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Education and Labor. House, Sept. 20, 1994.
"Field Hearing on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Education and Labor. House, Oct. 28, 1994.
"Reforming Welfare, Special Hearing," hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor, HHS, and Education Appropriations, Committee on Appropriations. Senate, Dec. 9, 1994.
104th Congress
"Contract with America: Overview," hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means. House, Jan. 5, 10-12, 1995.
"Contract with America: Welfare Reform, Part 1," hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means. House, Jan. 13, 20, 23, 27, 30, 1995.
"Contract with America: Hearing on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. House, Jan. 18, 1995.
"Reinventing Government," hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs. Senate, Jan.25, Feb. 2, 1995.
"Enforcement of the Food Stamp Program," hearings before the Committee on Agriculture. House, Feb. 1, 1995.
"Hearing on the Contract with America: Nutrition, the Local Perspective," hearings before the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. House, Feb. 1, 1995.

Hearing Title
"Contract with America: Welfare Reform, Part 2," hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means. House, Feb. 2, 1995.
"Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY96, Vol. IV," hearings before the Committee on the Budget. Senate, Feb. 2, Apr. 18, 19, 1995.
"Child Care and Child Welfare," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Ways and Means Committee and the Subcommittee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families, House Economic and Educational Opportunities Committee, Feb. 3, 1995.
"Child Support Enforcement Provisions Included in Personal Responsibility Act As Part of the CWA," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Feb. 6, 1995.
"Reforming the Present Welfare System," hearings before the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture. House, Feb. 7-9, 14, 1995.
"Child Care and Development Block Grant: How Is It Working?," hearings before the Subcommittee on Children and Families, Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Senate, Feb.16, 1995.
"Impact of Welfare Reform on Children and Their Families," hearings before the Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Senate, Feb. 28, Mar. 1, 1995.
"States' Perspective on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar.8, 1995.
"Broad Policy Goals of Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 9, 1995.
"Administration's Views on Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 10, 1995.
"Teen Parents and Welfare Reform," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 14,1995.
Hearings on welfare recipient transition to work before the Senate Finance Committee, Mar. 20, 1995. (Not available at time of publication.)
"Rising Costs of Social Security's Disability Programs," hearings before the Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy, Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 22, 1995.

Hearing Title
"Simulation Hearing on Obtaining Federal and State Assistance," hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities. House , Mar. 27, 1995.
"Growth of the Supplemental Security Income Program," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 27, 1995.
"Child Support Enforcement," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Mar. 28, 1995.
"Welfare Reform: Views of Interested Organizations," hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, Mar. 29, 1995. (Not available at time of publication.)
"Earned Income Tax Credit," hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs. Senate, Apr.4, 5, 1995.
"Child Welfare Programs," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Apr. 26, 1995.
"Welfare Reform Wrap-Up," hearings before the Committee on Finance. Senate, Apr. 27, 1995.
"Food Stamp Program and Electronic Benefit Transfer Systems," hearings before the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture. House, May 10, 1995.
"Federal Nutrition Programs," hearings before the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry. Senate, May 23, 1995.
"Review of the Administration's Proposals To Reform the Food Stamp and Commodity Distribution Programs," hearings before the Subcommittee on Department Operations, Nutrition, and Foreign Agriculture, Committee on Agriculture. House, June 8, 1995.
"Child Support Enforcement and Supplemental Security Income," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, June 13, 1995.
"Earned Income Tax Credit," hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, June 15, 1995.
"Welfare Reform Success Stories," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Dec. 6, 1995.
Hearings on immigration and welfare reform before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Senate Judiciary Committee, Feb. 6, 1996.

Hearing Title
"National Governors' Association Welfare Reform Proposal," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Feb. 20, 1996.
"Unanimous Bipartisan National Governors Association Agreement on Medicaid," hearings before the Committee on Commerce. House, Feb. 21, Mar. 6, 1996.
Hearings on views of the National Governors' Association on welfare reform before the Senate Finance Committee, Feb. 22, 28, 29, 1996.
"Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for FY97," hearings before the Committee on the Budget. Senate, Mar. 6, 12, 14, 20, Apr. 18, 1996.
"Causes of Poverty, with a Focus on Out-of-Wedlock Births," hearings before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means. House, Mar. 12, 1996.
Hearings on teen pregnancy prevention before the Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Apr. 30, 1996.
Hearings on welfare reform before the Subcommittee on Human Resources, House Ways and Means Committee, May 22, 23, 1996.
Hearings on H.R. 3507 before the House Commerce Committee, June 11, 1996.
Hearings on S. 1795 before the Senate Finance Committee, June 13, 19, 1996.
Source: Library of Congress, http://www.thomas.loc.gov

Appendix C. Congressional Actions, Welfare Reform, 104th Congress.

141 Congressional Record, 104th Congress, 1st Session – 1995
Mar. 21, House consideration of H.R. 4, p. H3343.
Mar. 22, House consideration of H.R. 4, p. H3436.
Mar. 23, House consideration of H.R. 4, p. H3581.
Mar. 24, House consideration and passage of H.R. 4, p. H3742.
Aug. 5, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S11575.
Aug. 7, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S11735.
Aug. 8, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S11803.
Aug. 11, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12428.
Sept. 6, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12680.
Sept. 7, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12757.
Sept. 8, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S12873.
Sept. 11, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13143.
Sept. 12, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13315.
Sept. 13, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13481.
Sept. 14, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13558.
Sept. 15, Senate consideration of H.R. 4, p. S13627.
Sept. 19, Senate consideration and passage of H.R. 4 with amendments, p. S13770.
Oct. 25, House consideration of H.R. 2491, p. H10781.
Oct. 25, Senate consideration of S. 1357, p. S15599.
Oct. 26, Senate consideration of S. 1357, p. S15707.
Oct. 26, House consideration and passage of H.R. 2491, p. H10853.
Oct. 27, Senate consideration of S. 1357, consideration and passage of H.R. 2491 with an amendment, and return to the calendar of S. 1357, p. S15979.
Nov. 17, House agreement to the conference report on H.R. 2491, p. H13148.
Nov. 17, Senate agreement to the conference report on H.R. 2491, with an amendment, p.S17227.
Nov. 20, House concurrence in the Senate amendment to the conference report on H.R. 2491, p. H13379.
Dec. 21, House agreement to the conference report on H.R. 4, p. H15317.
Dec. 21, Senate consideration of the conference report on H.R. 4, p. S19086.
Dec. 22, Senate agreement to the conference report on H.R. 4, p. S19154.
142 Congressional Record, 104th Congress, 2nd Session – 1996
July 17, House consideration of H.R. 3734, p. H7745.
July 18, House consideration and passage of H.R. 3734, p. H7784.
July 18, Senate consideration of S. 1956, p. S8070.
July 19, Senate consideration of S. 1956, p. S8329.
July 22, Senate consideration of S. 1956, p. S8395.
July 23, Senate consideration of S. 1956, consideration and passage of H.R. 3734 with an amendment, and return to the calendar of S. 1956, p. S8493.
July 31, House agreement to the conference report on H.R. 3734, p. H9403.
Aug. 1, Senate agreement to the conference report on H.R. 3734, p. S9322.

Appendix D. Consequences of Adolescent Childbearing.

Outcomes	Research shows...
Child Health	The children of teen mothers are more likely to be born prematurely and at low birth weight, raising the probability of infant death, blindness, deafness, chronic respiratory problems, mental retardation, mental illness, cerebral palsy, dyslexia, and hyperactivity. ^a
Child's Academics	Children of teen mothers do worse in school than those born to older parents. They are 50 percent more likely to repeat a grade, are less likely to complete high school than the children of older mothers, and have lower performance on standardized tests. ^b
Child Abuse	Children of adolescent mothers have high rates of abuse and neglect, and more likely to end up in foster care (higher public costs). ^c
Mother's Education	Teen mothers are less likely to complete the education necessary to qualify for a well-paying job — only 41 percent of mothers who have children before age 18 ever complete high school compared with 61 percent of similarly situated young women who delay child bearing until age 20 or 21. ^d
Family Poverty	Two-thirds of families begun by a young unmarried mother are poor. ^e
Subsequent Births	Teen mothers are likely to have a second birth relatively soon — about one-fourth of teenage mothers have a second child within 24 months of the first birth — which can further impede their ability to finish school or keep a job, and to escape poverty. ^f

^a R. A. Maynard, ed., *Kids Having Kids: A Robin Hood Foundation Special Report on the Costs of Adolescent Childbearing* (New York: Robin Hood Foundation, 1996); B. Wolfe and M. Perozek, "Teen Children's Health and Health Care Use," in Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy*, 181–203.

^b Maynard, *Costs of Adolescent Childbearing*; R. H. Haveman, B. Wolfe, and E. Peterson, "Children of Early Childbearers as Young Adults," in Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy*, chapter 9.

^c Isabel Sawhill, "What Can Be Done to Reduce Teen Pregnancy and Out-of-Wedlock Births?" *Welfare Reform and Beyond* Policy Brief No. 8 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, October 2001).

^d V. J. Hotz, S. W. McElroy, and S. G. Sanders, "The Impacts of Teenage Childbearing on the Mothers and the Consequences of those Impacts for Government," in Maynard, *Kids Having Kids: Economic Costs and Social Costs of Teen Pregnancy*, 55–94.

^e National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, *President Isabel Sawhill, Analysis of the 1999 Current Population Survey, a Monthly Survey of about 50,000 Households Conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics* (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 2000).

^f D. S. Kalmuss and P. B. Namerow, "Subsequent Childbearing among Teenage Mothers: The Determinants of Closely Spaced Second Birth," *Family Planning Perspectives* 26, no. 4 (1994): 149–153, 159.

^g D. Lichter, *Marriage as Public Policy* (Washington, DC: Progressive Policy Institute, 2001).

^h D. Lichter and D. Graef, "Finding a Mate? The Marital and Cohabitation Histories of Unwed Mothers," in *Out-of-wedlock: Trends, Causes, and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility*, ed. L. L. Wu and B. L. Wolfe, 317–343 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001).


ⁱ B. Miller, *Families Matter: A Research Synthesis of family influences on adolescent pregnancy* (Washington, DC: National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy, 1998).

Appendix E. Behavioral and Social Learning Theories.

Behavioral and Social Learning Theories	
Social and Cognitive Skills Prevention Model	Asserts that for behavior to change, individuals need specific cognitive and social skills to resist pressures and to negotiate interpersonal encounters successfully (p. 62) – so, need both the knowledge and the capacity to act on that knowledge.
Social Learning Theory	Posits that the likelihood of an individual engaging in or avoiding some type of behavior is determined by the individual's understanding of the association between that behavior with a particular outcome. The individual must next believe that he/she has the capacity to avoid the behavior, and that the method for avoiding the outcome will be effective. The individual must also believe there is benefit to avoiding the outcome. One way to develop attitudes about the behaviors is through observation of others, witnessing the regards or sanctions of the behavior and then acting out according to his/her own belief (p. 63).
Health belief Model	Based on the belief that the probability that an individual will perform a preventive action is based on a number of personal perceptions. These include: 1) perceived susceptibility of the outcome, 2) perceived seriousness of developing or experiencing the outcome, and 3) perceived benefits minus the perceived costs to performing the preventive action. Thus, the costs, seriousness and susceptibility must be perceived as high to engage in preventive action.
Theory of Reasoned Action	States that individual beliefs are what motivate action, whether they are rational or logical or not. Depends on 1) perceived outcome of action 2) evaluation of such outcomes 3) what others think about the action and 4) motivation to comply with others.
Culture of poverty perspective	Argues that adolescent sexual and fertility behavior is “both an adaptation and reaction of the poor to their marginal place in society (Moore et al, p. 64).” These behaviors become norms and inter-generational. One main tenet of this is that youth are aware of their limited opportunities and poor living conditions and as a result, adopt other standards of behavior.
Opportunity Cost perspective	Based on assumptions by young women who view themselves as having nothing to lose by having early births.
Utility maximization theory	Asserts that young men and women assess varied costs and benefits of sex, pregnancy and parenthood and behave in a way that maximizes their own personal utility.
Ecological perspective	Identifies the many levels of influence in an individual's environment that impact his/her behavior. At each level, factors are noted that play a role in out of wedlock pregnancy, and thus a programmatic response should be designed to address those factors identified.

Source: K. Moore, B. Sugland, C. Blumenthal, D. Gleib, and N. Snyder, *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs: Interventions and Evaluations*. (Washington, D.C.: Child Trends, Inc., 1995).
 Source (ecological perspective): New York State Task Force on Out of Wedlock Pregnancy and Poverty, interim report, January 1998.

Appendix F. State Participation in Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs.



Source: R. Wertheimer, J. Jager, and K. Moore, "State Policy Initiatives for Reducing Teen and Adult Non-Marital Childbearing: Family Planning to Family Caps," *New Federalism Issue and Options for States*, Series A, No. A-43 (Washington, DC: Urban Institute, November 2000).

Appendix G: Design Features of the National Survey of American Families.²⁰³

The NSAF is primarily a random digit dial telephone survey but roughly 3.5% of the total sample is with non-telephone households; the size of the non-telephone sample varies from state to state, depending on the share of the population without phones.

1. Interviews with Adults with Children

Questions are asked about up to two focal children per household (one focal child is selected from among all children under age six and the other is selected from among all children between the ages of 6 and 17). The respondent is the household member who is most knowledgeable about the selected focal children (where appropriate, there are multiple respondents per household).

The NSAF encompasses economic, health, and social dimensions of well-being, averaging 40 minutes to administer:

Household/Family Characteristics:

- Household composition, age, sex, birthplace, citizenship, race, and ethnicity.

Adult and Family Well-being:

- Current and past year's employment and earnings, past year's income by source, educational attainment and participation in training activities, economic hardship, food insecurity — receipt or loss of AFDC and food stamps, housing arrangements and cost, health insurance coverage, access to care and health services use, health status and functional limitation, psychological well-being, participation in religious and volunteer activities, knowledge about places or programs to receive different types of services, attitudes toward welfare, work, and child-bearing.

Child Well-being:

- Educational attainment and school engagement, child care arrangements, child's participation in work and recreational activities, behavioral problems, child support and contact with non-custodial parent, health status, functional limitation, health insurance coverage, health services use and access to care.

2. Interviews with Other Non-aged Adults

The sample includes about 1,200 interviews with adults without children in each state (with a larger sample in Wisconsin). These are non-aged adults in households without children under age 18 and with non-aged adults in households with children who are not parents/guardians of the children in those households. The respondents were randomly selected from among the non-aged adults who were eligible. The instrument contains a subset of the questions asked of families with children, averaging 25 minutes to administer. It includes the household/family characteristics and adult and family well-being measures.

²⁰³ K. Wang, *NSAF Questionnaire*, NSAF Methodology Report Number 12, November 1997.

Appendix H: Survey source questions for several NSAF variables.

Variable	Source Question
(1) State respondent resides in	Question SC 14
(2) Race	Section O, Questions 1,2,3
(3) Age	Question S 6
(4) Educational attainment	Section L, Question 1
(5) Employment	Section I, Question 2, 5,6,7,8,9,10
(6) Religious Activity	Section N, Question 13

Appendix I. Full SAS Output – Regression Models.

Model 1: All demographics and policies, all women in sample

NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG + MPP + SIS + PE + FC + TL + WR [*Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)*]

Response Variable: NMAR - Focal child born out of wedlock
 Number of Response Levels: 2
 Number of Observations: 8700
 Response Profile: 2329 (1) 6371 (0)

Model Fit Statistics		
Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	10110.685	8446.290
SC	10117.756	8545.285
-2 Log L	10108.685	8418.290

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > Chi Sq
Likelihood Ratio	1690.3953	13	<.0001
Score	1733.4537	13	<.0001
Wald	1311.1275	13	<.0001

The LOGISTIC Procedure
 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Chi-Square	Pr > Chi Sq
Intercept	1	-1.7349	0.2472	49.2617	<.0001
nubr	1	1.2325	0.7850	2.4651	0.1164
HSDROP	1	1.4046	0.0729	371.6187	<.0001
HSGRAD	1	0.6208	0.0618	100.9429	<.0001
Black	1	1.8911	0.1467	166.2734	<.0001
HIGHRELIG	1	-0.9035	0.0662	186.0061	<.0001
White	1	-0.2575	0.1344	3.6727	0.0553
MODRELIG	1	-0.4750	0.0721	43.3895	<.0001
MPP	1	0.2589	0.1062	5.9478	0.0147
SIS	1	0.3079	0.0941	10.6970	0.0011
PE	1	0.2110	0.1250	2.8518	0.0913
TL	1	0.0721	0.1066	0.4573	0.4989
FC	1	0.0214	0.0810	0.0694	0.7922
WR	1	0.0396	0.1004	0.1556	0.6933

Model 2: All demographics and policies, teen mothers.

NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG + MPP + SIS + PE + FC + TL + WR [*Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)*]

Response Variable: NMAR – Focal child born out of wedlock
 Number of Response Levels: 2
 Number of Observations: 637
 Response Profile: 437 (1) 200 (0)

Model Fit Statistics

Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	794.736	727.847
SC	799.193	790.242
-2 Log L	792.736	699.847

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > Chi Sq
Likelihood Ratio	92.8885	13	<.0001
Score	80.5231	13	<.0001
Wald	66.4276	13	<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Chi-Square	Pr > Chi Sq
Intercept	1	-0.0697	0.7520	0.0086	0.9262
nubr	1	1.6185	2.5532	0.4018	0.5261
HSDROP	1	-0.0381	0.2478	0.0237	0.8778
HSGRAD	1	-0.0836	0.2461	0.1153	0.7341
Black	1	2.2475	0.4679	23.0685	<.0001
White	1	0.2588	0.3770	0.4712	0.4924
MODRELIG	1	-0.5654	0.2337	5.8509	0.0156
HIGHRELIG	1	-0.5133	0.2350	4.7705	0.0290
MPP	1	1.1405	0.3735	9.3234	0.0023
SIS	1	0.6291	0.3317	3.5985	0.0578
PE	1	0.4543	0.3949	1.3238	0.2499
TL	1	-0.7474	0.3695	4.0921	0.0431
FC	1	0.2618	0.2735	0.9159	0.3385
WR	1	0.1965	0.3482	0.3186	0.5724

Model 3: All demographics and policies, mothers over 20 years of age.

NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG + MPP + SIS + PE + FC + TL + WR [*Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)*]

Response Variable	NMAR	Focal child born out of wedlock
Number of Response Levels	2	
Number of Observations	7770	
Response Profile:	1738 (1) 6032 (0)	

Model Fit Statistics		
Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	8261.935	6911.288
SC	8268.893	7008.700
-2 Log L	8259.935	6883.288

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > Chi Sq
Likelihood Ratio	1376.6467	13	<.0001
Score	1482.1519	13	<.0001
Wald	1100.1698	13	<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Chi-Square	Pr > Chi Sq
Intercept	1	-2.1273	0.2807	57.4570	<.0001
nubr	1	2.0391	0.8822	5.3429	0.0208
HSDROP	1	1.3922	0.0825	284.7989	<.0001
HSGRAD	1	0.5880	0.0685	73.6694	<.0001
Black	1	1.9237	0.1660	134.2652	<.0001
White	1	-0.2571	0.1538	2.7960	0.0945
MODRELIG	1	-0.5193	0.0815	40.5576	<.0001
HIGHRELIG	1	-0.9205	0.0739	155.3022	<.0001
MPP	1	0.0906	0.1198	0.5714	0.4497
SIS	1	0.3436	0.1053	10.6540	0.0011
PE	1	0.1527	0.1428	1.1442	0.2848
TL	1	0.1320	0.1188	1.2338	0.2667
FC	1	-0.0465	0.0915	0.2589	0.6109
WR	1	0.0983	0.1133	0.7525	0.3857

Model 4: All demographics, no policies – all mothers.

NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG
 [Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)]

Response Variable	NMAR	Focal child born out of wedlock
Number of Response Levels	2	
Number of Observations	10110	
Response Profile:	2759 (1) 7351 (0)	

Model Fit Statistics

Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	11853.349	9947.001
SC	11860.570	10004.771
-2 Log L	11851.349	9931.001

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > Chi Sq
Likelihood Ratio	1920.3482	7	<.0001
Score	1961.9257	7	<.0001
Wald	1503.0222	7	<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Chi-Square	Pr > Chi Sq
Intercept	1	-1.3496	0.1943	48.2382	<.0001
nbr	1	0.1803	0.6102	0.0873	0.7676
HSDROP	1	1.4668	0.0666	484.6093	<.0001
HSGRAD	1	0.6687	0.0568	138.4949	<.0001
Black	1	1.8613	0.1333	195.0206	<.0001
White	1	-0.2438	0.1217	4.0152	0.0451
MODRELIG	1	-0.4766	0.0658	52.4722	<.0001
HIGHRELIG	1	-0.8985	0.0610	217.1348	<.0001

Model 5: All demographics, no policies – teen mothers.

NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG
 [Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)]

Response Variable	NMAR	Focal child born out of wedlock
Number of Response Levels	2	
Number of Observations	747	
Response Profile	518 (1) 229 (0)	

Model Fit Statistics

Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	922.782	847.103
SC	927.398	884.032
-2 Log L	920.782	831.103

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > Chi Sq
Likelihood Ratio	89.6793	7	<.0001
Score	75.1803	7	<.0001
Wald	59.1166	7	<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates

Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Chi-Square	Pr > Chi Sq
Intercept	1	0.7622	0.6278	1.4743	0.2247
nubr	1	-0.6198	2.0378	0.0925	0.7610
HSDROP	1	-0.0879	0.2307	0.1450	0.7034
HSGRAD	1	-0.1546	0.2333	0.4391	0.5076
Black	1	2.3970	0.4523	28.0818	<.0001
White	1	0.1783	0.3575	0.2486	0.6180
MODRELIG	1	-0.4689	0.2124	4.8753	0.0272
HIGHRELIG	1	-0.6117	0.2183	7.8481	0.0051

Model 6: All demographics, no policies – mothers over 20 years of age.

NMAR = HSDROP + HSGRAD + BLACK + WHITE + NORELIG + MODRELIG + VERYRELIG
 [Logistic regression results, estimating probability that NMAR=1 (a woman has a birth out of wedlock)]

Response Variable	NMAR	Focal child born out of
wedlock		
Number of Response Levels	2	
Number of Observations	9017	
Response Profile	2049 (1) 6968 (0)	

Model Fit Statistics


Criterion	Intercept Only	Intercept and Covariates
AIC	9666.722	8156.813
SC	9673.829	8213.668
-2 Log L	9664.722	8140.813

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0

Test	Chi-Square	DF	Pr > Chi Sq
Likelihood Ratio	1523.9084	7	<.0001
Score	1635.3908	7	<.0001
Wald	1237.5465	7	<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates


Parameter	DF	Estimate	Standard Error	Chi-Square	Pr > Chi Sq
Intercept	1	-1.6197	0.2184	55.0182	<.0001
nubr	1	0.6734	0.6829	0.9724	0.3241
HSDROP	1	1.4160	0.0758	349.1253	<.0001
HSGRAD	1	0.6258	0.0627	99.7399	<.0001
Black	1	1.8614	0.1489	156.1796	<.0001
White	1	-0.2649	0.1373	3.7249	0.0536
MODRELIG	1	-0.5366	0.0744	52.0113	<.0001
HIGHRELIG	1	-0.9133	0.0678	181.4844	<.0001




Appendix J. Non Marital Pregnancy Decision Matrix.

Source: Moore et al., *Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Programs: Interventions and Evaluations* (Washington, DC: Child Trends, Inc., 1995).

Appendix K. State Participation in Teen Pregnancy Prevention Programs.





Appendix L. Policy Wheel.

Source: Jerome Ziegler, "The Intergovernmental System," class notes, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, Fall 2000.

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