Investigating Correct-by-Construction Attack-Tolerant Systems

Robert Constable, Mark Bickford, Robbert van Renesse
Department of Computer Science
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY
Email: {rc,markb,rvr}@cs.cornell.edu

Abstract—Attack-tolerant distributed systems change their protocols on-the-fly in response to apparent attacks from the environment; they substitute functionally equivalent versions possibly more resistant to detected threats. Alternative protocols can be packaged together as a single adaptive protocol or variants from a formal protocol library can be sent to threatened groups of processes. We are experimenting with libraries of attack-tolerant protocols that are correct-by-construction and testing them in environments that simulate specified threats, including constructive versions of the famous FLP imaginary adversary against fault-tolerant consensus. We expect that all variants of tolerant protocols are automatically generated and accompanied by machine checked proofs that the generated code satisfies formal properties.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Using a constructive Logic of Events based on Computational Type Theory (CTT) [ABC06], [CB08], [Bic09] we have been able to formally specify safety and liveness properties for distributed protocols and synthesize executable code from constructive proofs that the specifications are realizable [CB08]. We have used this proofs-as-processes method to build fault-tolerant protocols, provably secure protocols, and adaptive protocols [LKvR+99]. Recently we have created versions of the important Paxos consensus protocol [Lam01] this way. This basic methodology has led us to experiment with protocols that we think of as attack-tolerant in the sense that they can respond to perceived threats from the environment such as denial of service attacks, message order attacks, Byzantine attacks, and other threats. These attack-tolerant protocols will respond by adapting on-the-fly to alternative versions that are also known to be provably correct and provide the same functionality. This system development capability is based on a computational semantics for assertions in our standard Logic of Events. This logic is based on the concept of event structures [Win89], [Abr99] which are defined over executions of process in the standard model of asynchronous message passing computation [Lyn96], [AW04]. This semantics is expressed in CTT in such a way that proof terms contain distributed realizers. These realizers are abstract processes which can be compiled into appropriate programming languages such as Java, ML, Erlang, F*, etc. A key step in making this methodology practical is the use of programmable event classes to specify computing tasks at a high level of abstraction that can be refined automatically to processes. Recently we have extended our methodology to a broader notion of process, a General Process Model [BC10a], broad enough to encompass the higher-order π-calculus [Mil09] and other process algebras that include Petri nets. In the new model we can synthesize and reason about mobile processes as well.

B. Outline

In the next section we describe our formal computing model and the basic concepts needed to talk about mobile processes and to state assumptions on the computing environment. A simple consensus protocol illustrates the key ideas. In the final section we discuss the construction of attack-tolerant protocols based on synthetic code diversity and show how to state properties of the environment and create experimental computing platforms to test attack-tolerant protocols, for instance by launching a provably unbeatable attack with a constructive version of the Fischer/Lynch/Paterson result [FLP85].

II. FORMAL DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING MODEL

Here is a brief overview of our new General Process Model [BC10a] of distributed computation. We mention key concepts for reasoning about event structures created from these computations. A system consists of a set of components. Each component has a location, an internal part, and an external part. Locations are just abstract identifiers. There may be more than one component with the same location. The internal part of a component is a process—its program and internal (possibly hidden) state. The external part of a component is its interface with the rest of the system. In this account, the interface will be a list of messages, containing either data or processes, labeled with the location of the recipient. The “higher order” ability to send a message containing a process allows a system to grow by “forking” or “bootstrapping” new components. A system executes as follows. At each step, the environment may choose and remove a message from the external component. If the chosen message is addressed to a location that is not yet in the system, then a new component is created at that location, using a given boot-process, and an empty external part. Each component at the recipient location receives the message as input and computes a pair that contains a process and an external part. The process becomes the
next internal part of the component, and the external part is appended to the current external part of the component. A potentially infinite sequence of steps, starting from a given system and using a given boot-process, is a run of that system. From a run of a system we derive an abstraction of its behavior by focusing on the events in the run. The events are the pairs, \( \langle x, n \rangle \), of a location and a step at which location \( x \) gets an input message at step \( n \), i.e. information is transferred. Every event has a location, and there is a natural causal-ordering on the set of events, the ordering first considered by Lamport [Lam78]. This allows us to define an event-ordering, a structure, \( \langle E, \text{loc}, <, \text{info} \rangle \), in which the causal ordering \(< \) is transitive relation on \( E \) that is well-founded, and locally-finite (each event has only finitely many predecessors). Also, the events at a given location are totally ordered by \(< \). The information, \( \text{info}(e) \), associated with event \( e \) is the message input to \( \text{loc}(e) \) when the event occurred. We have found that requirements for distributed systems can be expressed as (higher-order) logical propositions about event-orderings. To illustrate this and motivate the results in the rest of the paper we present a simple example of consensus in a group of processes.

Example 1. A simple consensus protocol: TwoThirds

Each participating component will be a member of some groups and each group has a name, \( G \). A message \( \langle G, i \rangle \) from the environment to component \( i \) informs it that it is in group \( G \). The groups have \( n = 3f+1 \) members, and they are designed to tolerate \( f \) failures. When any component in a group \( G \) receives a message \( \langle \text{start}, G \rangle \) it starts the consensus protocol whose goal is to decide on values received by the members from clients. We assume that once the protocol starts, each process has received a value \( v_i \) or has a default non-value. The simple TwoThirds consensus protocol is this: A process \( P_i \) that has a value \( v_i \) of type \( T \) starts an election to choose a value of type \( T \) (with a decidable equality) from among those received by members of the group from clients. The elections are identified by natural numbers, \( el_i \) initially 0, and incremented by 1, and a Boolean variable \( \text{decide}_i \) is initially \( false \). The function from lists of values, \( \text{Msg}_i \), to a value is a parameter of the protocol. If the type \( T \) of values is Boolean, we can take \( f \) to be the majority function.

Begin

Until decide \( \_i \) do:
1. Increment \( el_i \); 2. Broadcast vote \( \langle el_i, v_i \rangle \) to \( G \);
3. Collect in list \( \text{Msg}_i \) \( 2f+1 \) votes of election \( el_i \);
4. Choose \( v_i := f(\text{Msg}_i) \);
5. If \( \text{Msg}_i \) is unanimous then decide \( \_i := true \)

End

We describe protocols like this by classifying the events occurring during execution. In this algorithm there are Input, Vote, Collect, and Decide events. The components can recognize events in each of these event classes (in this example they could all have distinctive headers), and they can associate information with each event (e.g. \( \langle e_i, v_i \rangle \) with Vote, \( \text{Msg}_i \) with Collect, and \( f(\text{Msg}_i) \) with Decide). Events in some classes cause events with related information content in other classes, e.g. Collect causes a Vote event with value \( f(\text{Msg}_i) \). In general, an event class \( X \) is a function on events in an event ordering that effectively partitions events into two sets, \( E(X) \) and \( E - E(X) \), and assigns a value \( X(e) \) to events \( e \in E(X) \).

Example 2. Consensus specification: TwoThirds

Let \( P \) and \( D \) be the classes of events with headers propose and decide, respectively. Then the safety specification of a consensus protocol is the conjunction of two propositions on (extended) event-orderings, called agreement (all decision events have the same value) and responsiveness (the value decided on must be one of the values proposed):

\[
\forall e_1, e_2 : E(D). D(e_1) = D(e_2)
\]
\[
\forall e : E(D). \exists e' : E(P). e' < e \land D(e) = P(e')
\]

We can prove safety and the following liveness property about TwoThirds. We say that activity in the protocol contracts to a subset \( S \) of exactly \( 2f+1 \) processes if these processes all agree in election \( n \) say at \( vt(n)_1, ..., vt(n)_k \) for \( k = 2f+1 \) and collect these votes at \( c(n+1)_1, ..., c(n+1)_k \), and all vote again in election \( n+1 \) at \( vt(n+1)_1, ..., vt(n+1)_k \), and collect at \( c(n+2)_1, ..., c(n+2)_k \). In this case, these processes in \( S \) all decide in round \( n+1 \) for the value given by \( f \) applied to the collected votes. This is a liveness property. If exactly \( f \) processes fail, then the activity of the group \( G \) contracts to some \( S \) and decides. Likewise if the message traffic is such that \( f \) processes are delayed for an election, then the protocol contracts to \( S \) and decides. This fact shows that the TwoThirds protocol is non-blocking, i.e. from any state of the protocol, there is a path to a decision. We can construct the path to a decision given a set of \( f \) processes that we delay. We also proved safety and liveness of a variant of this protocol that can converge to consensus faster. In this variant, if \( P_i \) receives a vote \( \langle e, v \rangle \) from a higher election, \( e > el_i \), then \( P_i \) joins that election by setting \( el_i := e; v_i := v \); and then going to step 2.

A. Realizers and Strong Realizers

If \( \psi \) is a proposition about event orderings, e.g. liveness, we say that a system realizes \( \psi \), if the event-ordering of any run of the system satisfies \( \psi \). We extend the “proofs-as-programs” paradigm to “proofs-as-processes” for distributed computing by making constructive proofs that requirements are realizable. For compositional reasoning, it is desirable to create a strong realizer of requirement \( \psi \)--a system that realizes \( \psi \) in any context. Formally, system \( S \) is a strong realizer of \( \psi \) if the event-ordering of any run of a system \( S' \) such that \( S \subseteq S' \), satisfies \( \psi \). If \( S_1 \) is a strong realizer of \( \psi_1 \) and \( S_2 \) is a strong realizer of \( \psi_2 \), then \( S_1 \cup S_2 \) is a strong realizer of \( \psi_1 \land \psi_2 \). One of our main tools is that propagation rules like those used in the consensus example have strong realizers. A realizer for a propagation rule \( A \Rightarrow B@g \) is a set of components that can each, as a (computable) function of the history of inputs at its location, recognize, and compute the value \( v \) of events in class \( A \) that occur there and send
messages that will eventually result in an events in class B with value \( f(v) \) at each location in \( g(v) \). We call the classes \( A \) that can be so recognized programmable. Basic event classes are programmable, and the set of programmable event classes is closed under a variety of combinators. Thus many classes can be automatically shown to be programmable, and their recognizers generated automatically, see [Bic09]. If \( B \) is a basic class and if we have reliable message delivery, then a component may cause an event in \( B \) by placing a message with an appropriate header on its external part. A rule, \( A \Rightarrow B \) is programmable-basic (PB) if \( A \) is programmable and \( B \) is basic. Under the assumption of reliable message delivery, every PB-rule is realizable.

Reliable message delivery is an assumption about the environment. In this case, the assumption is a fairness assumption on the choices the environment makes, stating that all messages in the external part of a component will eventually be chosen. We weaken this assumption by allowing some components to suffer send omission faults. Under that assumption, parameterized by a set of locations, \( F \), called the fail-set, every message on the external part of a component whose location is not in \( F \), will eventually be delivered. If send omissions are allowed, not every PB-rule is realizable, but the restricted rule \( A \mid \neg F \Rightarrow B \) is realizable, when \( A \Rightarrow B \) is PB, and \( A \mid \neg F \) is the class of \( A \)-events whose location is not in the fail-set. A fault-tolerant protocol like TwoThirds can be described by such restricted rules, and proved correct under appropriate assumptions on the size of the fail-set. A PB-rule \( A \Rightarrow B \) is also strongly realizable. Some desirable properties of protocols like consensus do not follow from conjunctions of PB-rules alone. We also need some propagation constraints, of the form \( A \not\Rightarrow B \circ g \). A realizer constructed for \( A \not\Rightarrow B \circ g \) will generate \( B \)-events only from \( A \)-events, so it will also realize \( A \not\Rightarrow B \circ g \).

III. Attack Tolerance

We assume that our systems will be attacked. We will protect protocols by formally generating a large number of logically equivalent variants, stored in an attack response library. Each variant uses distinct code which a system under attack can install on-the-fly to replace compromised components. Each variant is known to be equivalent and correct. We express threatening features of the environment formally and discriminate among the different types. We can do this in our new GPM model because the environment is an explicit component about which we can reason. This capability allows us to study in depth how diversity works to defend systems. We can implement attack scenarios as part of our experimental platform. It is interesting that we can implement a constructive version [RC08] of the famous Fischer/Lynch/Paterson result [FLP85] that shows how an attacker can keep any deterministic fault-tolerant consensus protocol from achieving consensus.

A. Synthetic Code Diversity

We introduce diversity at all levels of the formal code development (synthesis) process starting at a very high level of abstraction. For example, in the TwoThirds protocol, we can use different functions \( f \), alter the means of collecting \( Msg \), synthesize variants of the protocol, alter the data types, etc. We are able to create multiple provably correct versions of protocols at each level of development, e.g. compiling TwoThirds into Java, Erlang, and \( F^* \). The higher the starting point for introducing diversity, the more options we can create. We can also inject code diversity into the fully automatic verification of authentication protocols in Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [DDMR07] implemented in our system. These synthetic diversity techniques generate a large set of components, each of which is associated with a “genotype” that describes the parameters (such as choice of algorithm, choice of data structure, choice of implementation language) used to generate components of its “species”.

B. Formalizing the Environment

We can precisely describe how diversification and reconfiguration respond to threatening features of the environment because we can express some threats formally and discriminate among the different kinds as is done in the Nsysiad system [HvRBD08] to defend against Byzantine attacks. This capability will allow us to study how diversity defends systems. For example, we have studied message order attacks in which the environment delays key messages in consensus protocols to keep the system from deciding in a timely manner. This is an instance of the general phenomenon uncovered by Fischer, Lynch, and Paterson [FLP85] that consensus algorithms can be systematically defeated, as we discuss next.

a) The Environment as Adversary: The standard version of the Fischer/Lynch/Paterson theorem is that no deterministic algorithm can solve the consensus problem for a group of process in which at least one process might fail. This is a negative statement, producing only a contradiction, yet implicit in all proofs is an imagined construction of a nonterminating execution in which no process decides, they “waffle” endlessly. It appears that no such explicit construction could be carried out following the method of the classical proof because there isn’t enough information given with the protocol.

The key to being able to build the nonterminating execution is to provide more information, which was done in [RC08] by introducing the notion of effective nonblocking. Effective nonblocking is a natural concept when protocols are verified using constructive logic. \( P \) is called effectively nonblocking if from any reachable global state \( s \) of an execution of \( P \) and any subset \( Q \) of \( n - \text{f} \) non-failed processes, we can find an execution \( \alpha \) from \( s \) using \( Q \) and a process \( P_\alpha \) in \( Q \) which decides a value \( v \). Constructively this means that we have a computable function, \( wt(s, Q) \), which produces an execution \( \alpha \) and a state \( s_\alpha \), in which a process, say \( P_\alpha \), decides a value \( v \). Theorem (CFLP): Given any deterministic
effectively nonblocking consensus procedure P with more than two processes and tolerating a single failure, we can effectively construct a nonterminating execution of it. Let the function produced by this proof be \( \text{flpc} \), then for a consensus procedure such as the TwoThirds protocol given above and its nonblocking proof \( nb \), we have that the environment can use \( \text{flpc}(nb) \) to create a message-order attack that will prevent TwoThirds from deciding.

IV. CONCLUSION

We are exploring how to build distributed systems that are attack-tolerant by design. The key idea is to implement systems that can respond to attacks by modifying their code in a provably safe way. We believe that the more code variants we can produce, the more resistant systems are to attack. We have found ways to automatically produce many provably equivalent variants of components using formal synthesis. Variation arises from different choices made during synthesis. We start at a very high level of abstraction by formally proving that specifications are achievable. By starting at such a high level, we discovered more correct options than possible by less technically advanced methods. This discovery reveals new reasons for working formally at high levels of abstraction.

REFERENCES


