

## 4. The Political Structure of Chuschi

### 4.1 Dual Systems of Authority

We have seen that dual structures and concentric dualism are basic to the organization of comuneros' conceptualization of physical (2.8) and social (3.1) space. Dual opposition is likewise central to the political systems of the village. The basic opposition follows the comunero-*qala* distinction: a traditional prestige hierarchy characterizes comunero status and membership, while nomination to bureaucratic governmental office has been restricted to Spanish-speaking *qalas*.

After a description of the bureaucratic governmental organization, we will then concentrate on the prestige hierarchy of the comuneros. Two periods of fieldwork, 1967 and 1969-1970, provided two distinct experiences that resulted in two different analyses. Contrasting the two by giving the findings that resulted from both will provide a better understanding of the 1970 abolition of the prestige system that had been the apex of the indigenous hierarchy in 1967.

### 4.2 The Bureaucratic Authorities in 1967

Before the enactment of the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law, the village of Chuschi possessed a bureaucratic government characteristic of legally recognized indigenous communities throughout Peru. The village is also the seat of the government for the district. Both systems will be discussed. For the village, the highest bureaucratic official is the municipal mayor. Prior to the 1968 military takeover, the mayor was elected by all village residents, both males and females. Comuneros maintain that a person cannot vote unless he or she is married. Marital status, not age, determines the local electorate, which correlates with the concepts of illegitimacy and legitimacy discussed in

3.8. The military government suspended all elections in 1968, and thereafter all bureaucratic positions were to be appointed. However, in 1969 I witnessed the election of one of the most important political bodies in Chuschi, the *junta comunal*.

#### 4.2.1 *The Junta Comunal*

The *junta comunal* constituted perhaps the most important body in the village bureaucracy; they were the guardians of the village communal lands. The highest position, that of trustee or *personero*, the legal representative of the village in all land disputes, was one of extreme responsibility, consuming a great deal of time and energy because of the frequency and seriousness of boundary disputes. A *personero* was assisted by a six-man committee, elected like him for four-year terms. For the election I observed in 1969 the list of candidates had been compiled by the migrant organization in Lima, the Progressive Society of Santa Rosa of Lima, an organization whose stated purpose is to further and protect the well-being of the village. Members take it upon themselves to audit the accounts of the village, compile lists of candidates and supervise elections, raise funds, and represent the village legally. This last function was the original motivation for forming the society, which gathered the necessary documentation and petitioned for legal *comunidad* status for Chuschi in 1941.

#### 4.2.2 *The District Authorities*

District authorities, consisting of a governor and a lieutenant governor, do not have the power of those discussed above; rather, they insure communications between the district and its members and the subprefect in the province capital, Cangallo. They are primarily responsible for law and order in the district, taking orders directly from the subprefect. Until 1970 the governor had as subordinates one of the prestige systems, the *varayoq mayores*, also called the *hatun varayoq*. However, the village voted to abolish the *mayores*, leaving a dual system for each *barrio* and a separate organization representing the *puna*.

### 4.3 The Indigenous Prestige Hierarchy in 1967

During seven months of 1967 almost the entire period of field investigations in Chuschi was dedicated to the indigenous prestige hierarchy. I encountered three interrelated systems encompassing the essential social mechanisms of reciprocity and expressing the structural principles of the

comuneros' conceptualizations of space and ecology. The prestige hierarchy functions to reinforce these concepts and to maintain the closed corporate status of the village. Social mechanisms include the complex of reciprocal aid that is necessary for the completion of a position in the hierarchy. Another mechanism embodied in the prestige system is the concept of gaining prestige through service to the community. Such service is costly in material wealth and demands that one control wealth as well as command a large network of kin. In other words, men who successfully climb the ladder of hierarchically arranged positions and retire from public service are *apu*, or wealthy. When one retires from the prestige hierarchy, one acquires the prestigious status of *señor cesante*, literally, retired lord.


In 1967, ascension to the status of *señor cesante* required the completion of at least fifteen hierarchically arranged positions representing fifteen years of civil-religious service to the village. Such a man was indisputably *apu*, rich in wealth, kinsmen, and prestige. In chapter 7 we will see that the successful completion of the higher positions in the hierarchy requires the expenditure of at least three years of surplus.

Each position in the hierarchy is signified by a staff of office called a *vara*. The higher the position in the hierarchy, the more elaborate the decoration and adornment of the staffs. The highest positions are delineated by a staff made of a black, dense tropical forest wood, *chonta*, and adorned with silver. These staffs command respect, and it is common to see one of them at a ritual celebration displayed for all to see. One informant told me that a relative had loaned him the staff during the celebration of a saint's day that he had sponsored. He said, "See that staff. When that staff is in my house, I command and everyone has to obey." A senior member of the prestige hierarchy complained that "everyone used to tremble at the sight of the staff, but no more. We have lost our authority and no one pays us proper respect as they should." The staff is the traditional symbol of authority, and a member of the hierarchy must carry it at all times. While he sleeps, the staff is propped vertically against the wall—the staff of authority must never be placed horizontally on the ground. Another staff is carried on ritual occasions; it is a six-foot tree branch painted with red and green spirals. In 1967 these staffs were carried by members of the two systems associated with the village, the *hatun* (great) and the *taksa* (lesser), but not by the *sallqa* herders of the third structure.

Within each prestige organization a strict ranking order was observed. The ultimate authority, the *alcalde*, commanded those below him; he in turn was subordinate to the specific bureaucratic official above him. Section 4.3.1 presents a diagrammatic sketch of the bureaucratic and prestige structures in hierarchical relation to one another. The three *hatun* and *taksa* *alcaldes* were

each served by two subordinates called *regidores* (a Spanish term meaning aldermen), who were referred to as the “arms” of the *alcaldes*. *Regidores* in turn commanded those on the bottom of the hierarchy, the *alguaciles*. The dual structures that represented the moieties were mirror images of one another, and the lowest position, the *alguacil*, was the point of entry into the prestige hierarchy for young single boys. In 1967 I found that the competing demands of school attendance on two boys named as *alguaciles* resulted in their fathers’ performing their duties, and this custom had been occurring for several years. Moreover, infants had been named, a solution deemed most satisfactory: boys could attend school and progress up the hierarchy at the same time if their fathers performed their duties. Then when they married they would be eligible for the next position in the hierarchy, *hatun* *alguacil*. The obligatory progression in the hierarchy in 1967 is shown in figure 1.


**FIGURE 1**  
**OBLIGATORY PROGRESSION IN THE PRESTIGE**  
**HIERARCHY (1967)**



\*Owners of animals entered the organization of herders, the *sallqa varayoqkuna* (4.3.4), after holding the position of *hatun* *alguacil*.

In 1967 there were 27 men serving in the *hatun* and *taksa* organizations of the village, and the interrelated structures formed a pyramid (see figure 2).

**FIGURE 2**  
**THE CIVIL-RELIGIOUS HIERARCHY (1967)**



In addition to the six levels of the pyramid, the village prestige hierarchy was articulated with the herding organization under the priest and the complex of celebrations dedicated to the fourteen saints revered in the village. A man could not become *hatun* alcalde without having sponsored at least one saint's day celebration, a year-long religious obligation involving planting and harvesting the saint's corn field and publicly observing the saint's day by paying for the mass and decorations and preparing corn beer for all the devotees. A man wishing to become *hatun* alcalde also must have served in the herding organization, the *sallqa* structure.


Within each of the structures, a ranked hierarchy prevails, with deference behavior displayed by subordinates. For example, the *hatun* and *taksa* members meet with their respective alcaldes, who provide cane alcohol and coca for each subordinate. The regidores buy kerosene for the lamps of the alguaciles, who in turn show extreme deference; they carry their superiors'

hats and staffs and are generally responsible for their comfort. Seating and ritual drinking order always reflect ranking order, as does the order of entering and exiting a room as well as in religious processions. However, the entire hierarchy is subject to bureaucratic domination.

4.3.1 *The Indigenous and Bureaucratic Structures in 1967*

Figure 3 depicts the relationships between the bureaucratic authorities and the subordinated traditional prestige hierarchy. The district governor is responsible directly to the bureaucratic authorities in the province capital, Cangallo, and to the prefect in Ayacucho. His job is to maintain order in the entire district and carry out mandates from his superiors. He has at his disposal a portion of the prestige hierarchies of the communities in the district. Until 1970, the *hatun* hierarchy served the governor and the church.

**FIGURE 3  
INDIGENOUS AND BUREAUCRATIC HIERARCHIES (1967)**



However, the priest and his comunero accounts-keeper (*ecónomo*) maintain the church's herds through the services of the traditional *sallqa* structure.

Likewise, the municipal mayor is the superior bureaucratic authority over the moiety *taksa* structures. His task is primarily concerned with village affairs. However, the municipal mayor in Chuschi maintains the demographic records for the district, and in terms of power the municipal mayor is superior to the district governor. He also handles the municipal budget allocated to the village by the department. He is in charge of all village improvements and of keeping order.

As of 1968 the holder of this important office was named by the department prefect rather than elected by the village.

The 1969 Agrarian Reform Law abolished the personero and his junta comunal, the autonomous, elected committee in charge of legally defending the communal property of Chuschi. In its place two elected offices with subordinate committees have been instituted—the president of administration and the president of vigilance. These committees have the responsibility of the administration of the recognized community. They deal directly with departmental and provincial bureaucrats as well as report to the migrant community in Lima.

In 1970 these two important offices were occupied by returned migrants (see chapter 8). Therefore, the migrants' political role in the community became legitimized.

The bureaucratic structures represent the presence of foreign domination in the midst of the comuneros' social space. These dominators are localized in the center of the village around the plaza, reminding the members of this closed corporate community that they are subject ultimately to *outside* authorities who are not members of the communal fabric of the village represented by the various structures of the prestige hierarchy. This hierarchy embodies the basic dichotomies of Chuschino social organization:

The Prestige Hierarchy as a Native Construct  
of Their Social Organization

Basic Dichotomies	Prestige Hierarchy
Upper Barrio versus Lower Barrio	<i>Taksa</i> Organizations
Savage Puna versus Civilized Village	<i>Sallqa</i> versus <i>Taksa</i> and <i>Hatun</i>
Herding versus Agriculture	<i>Sallqa</i> versus <i>Taksa</i>
Church and State versus Community	<i>Hatun</i> versus <i>Taksa</i> and <i>Sallqa</i>

These basic dichotomies are native constructs of the fundamental opposing forces in Chuschino social and economic organization. These conflicts are

dramatized, often comically, in important rituals (see chapter 6).

We will now turn to a description of the organization and duties of each prestige structure as found in 1967, beginning with the apex of the system, the *hatun varayoqkuna*.

#### 4.3.2 *The Hatun Varayoqkuna*

The apex of the hierarchy was dedicated to the church and the center of the village. The members were called *hatun varayoqkuna*, which signifies "those who own the large (high or great) staff." This structure was also known in Spanish as the *envarados mayores*, which signifies the same. In 1967 there were nine members of this organization subordinate to the district governor, who utilized them as messengers to communicate with the provincial and departmental capitals. This traditional role was diminished by the completion of the road and the telegraph lines. The other major role of the *hatun* hierarchy was to publicly observe Easter, Lent, and Christmas and to attend all other religious holidays celebrated in the village. They were required to attend mass and to go in procession, with their high staffs of office, in rank order.

Aside from the ritual duties, the members of the *hatun* hierarchy were required to meet three times a week with their *alcalde* in his house to discuss and plan their activities. Their most important civil duty was to patrol the village and keep the peace. They had the power of arrest and could bring offenders before the village judge. Offenses included family quarrels, sexual breaches such as incestuous acts, and drunkenness. The provincial government considered these authorities necessary for village law and order, and the provincial prefect drew up the list of new *hatun* members to be installed by the village priest on the first of January every year. Members of this particular system in the hierarchy had to be married, and they could reside in either of the village moieties. In order to qualify for eligibility in the *hatun* structure, a man had to have completed at least one year as a *taksa* (small or lesser) *alguacil* in service to his *barrio*.

#### 4.3.3 *The Taksa Varayoqkuna*

Each *barrio*, upper and lower, had an independent prestige structure that was identical in organization and obligations. Membership in the moiety structures was determined by residence and *comunero* status. Members of each *barrio* organization met three times a week in the matrix chapel of the *barrio*. The *alcaldes* received orders from the municipal mayor and instructed their subordinates accordingly. Duties included: alternately cleaning the village plaza on Thursdays, the day before market; imposing fines for damages to

crops caused by animals; and canvassing house by house when the municipal mayor called a communal work day, a *faena*. Every household was required to supply one male for one day's labor; failure to do so resulted in a fine of ten *soles* collected by the *taksa* regidores. It is interesting to note that communal labor was abolished in 1810 (Fuenzalida 1970: 71) but still functions throughout the Andes. Furthermore, communal labor has become an integral part of Lima squatter settlement development.

Ritual obligations included responsibility for the observation of the ritual cleaning of the dual systems of irrigation canals, the Yarqa Aspiy, which delineates the beginning of a new agricultural cycle in September, and Santa Cruz, the harvest ritual in May. The latter was also the occasion of the installation of *taksa* members for a year of service. (See plate 7.)

#### 4.3.4 *The Sallqa Varayoqkuna*

The term *sallqa* has a double meaning in Quechua; it signifies the high puna and also means savage or uncivilized. People who live on the puna permanently and do not engage in agriculture in the *qichwa* zone are called *sallqaruna*, savage people. During carnival, the members of the *sallqa* prestige hierarchy descend upon the village on horseback and inflict on the civilized village such savage and barbarous acts as insulting the Virgin Mary, brandishing their whips at anyone crossing their paths, and feigning sexual acts. Everyone is a possible target for their sexual jokes. As mentioned in 2.8, the *sallqa* is the savage part of the world where uncivilized acts such as forbidden sexual activity occur. Villagers believe that incestuous acts occur in the *sallqa*, and people engaging in such acts are condemned to roam the streets of the village at night in animal form with bells around their necks. If such an animal is touched, it will immediately resume human form and plead with its captor to keep its secret. The *taksa varayoq* are charged with patrolling the village streets. If someone reports incestuous activities in the puna, the village prestige authorities must capture the offenders, who are then tied up in the village plaza for all to see. Such individuals must thereafter leave the village.

In 1967 the *sallqa* hierarchy consisted of the alcalde subordinate to the village priest; his accountant, the *ecónomo*, two *ovejeros* (sheep herders), two *vaqueros* (cattle herders), and numerous subordinate herders. All of the members had to live in the puna on the communal herding land and care for the church's 250 head of cattle and 1,500 head of sheep. In order to fulfill their obligations, the *sallqa* members depend on their relatives and compadres to tend their agricultural plots. The alcalde assumes his duties in January, when the *hatun* authorities are installed. The remaining members assume their duties in August or September, when the herds are branded or marked and the Wamanis



Plate 7. The *Varayoqkuna*. An *alcalde* drinking with his *regidores* during the ritual cleaning of the irrigation canals.

are paid their offerings during the ritual called the Herranza.

The *sallqa* authorities honor Mama Limpiay (Saint Olimpia) on the eighth day of December, the day of the Immaculate Conception. The other major ritual observed by the *sallqa* is Corpus Christi in June when the herds and the two small female saints, Mama Limpiay and Mama Rosa, who are guardians of the herds, are brought into the village until the Herranza, the branding and marking of the herds in August when the Wamanis are placated with ritual payments. Mama Rosa is honored on August 30.

#### 4.4 Historical Antecedents

In an effort to account for the events of 1970 that resulted in the abolition of the apex of the prestige hierarchy, the *hatun* structure, I interviewed aged men and women and discovered that the prestige hierarchy had undergone a continuous process of reduction. According to various informants, several positions in the hierarchy have disappeared. Among these was an organization called *qichwa varayoqkuna*, or in Spanish *campo envarados*, comprised of an alcalde and two young unmarried boys as his subordinates. Their principal duties were to guard the agricultural zone, the *qichwa*. In order to become a member of the *hatun* structure, a boy was required to complete three lesser positions in the hierarchy as well as a minor obligation called *estandarte del Señor de los Temblores*, standard-bearer of the Lord of Earthquakes. The last involved carrying a banner or standard during the celebration of the patron saint's feast day in July. In 1967 only one position in the hierarchy, *taksa* alguacil, was reserved for unmarried boys, and we have seen that due to school attendance eligible boys were scarce for this position and fathers assumed their sons' duties.

Aged informants insisted that another position has remained vacant for thirty years—inspector of water, responsible for the allocation of irrigation water. In the past the obligatory progression was to complete all of the *taksa* and *hatun* positions, inspector of water, and *sallqa* alcalde, and terminate with *qichwa* alcalde.

Also within the memory of informants was a hierarchical organization of women that mirrored the prestige hierarchy of the men. Their major obligation was to observe the fiesta of Santa Rosa of Lima on August 30. At least five positions were included in the female prestige system, and it is noteworthy that even though this structure has disappeared, Santa Rosa is the patron saint of the migrants in Lima and girls are named as co-sponsors of the celebration.

The best description of all aspects of life in the sixteenth century for Ayacucho and the Pampas River comes to us from a thousand-page letter written to the King of Spain by Don Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala, an Indian of noble

birth. Guamán Poma (1936: 354) describes the *Coya Raymi*, the great feast of the moon, the wife of the sun, as the principal feast observed by women in September, when women “beat their drums and wailed to the moon to provide water.” When I read this document to female informants, they claimed that thirty years ago this same ritual was observed during August and culminated with the feast of Santa Rosa, “*La Coya*,” wife of the sun.

Guamán Poma also describes village authorities (1936: 794-802) analogous to those in the structures of Chuschi. He mentions an *alcalde mayor* (*hatun alcalde*), *alcalde campo* (*qichwa alcalde*), and *alcaldes ordinarios*, who were responsible for law and order in the village. The *alcalde campo* was responsible for the safety of the crops, and the *alcalde mayor* was the assistant and messenger of the *cacique*. He also mentions subordinate *regidores* and *alguaciles*.

It is worth observing that the authorities described by Guamán Poma de Ayala and the modern authorities of Chuschi differ greatly from those mentioned in the ordinances passed by Viceroy Toledo in 1575 to institute village governments. Toledo’s ordinances declared that on the first of January the retiring authorities would elect two *alcaldes* from Indians of common birth (Toledo, Francisco de: 1867) to assume duties for two years. Also, a retiring authority could be reelected for another term in the same office (*ibid.*). Today, it is inconceivable that a man succeed himself in the same office. Reelection would be counter to the principle of obligatory hierarchical progression up a ladder of prestige-giving positions. Another discrepancy in Toledo’s 1575 decree and modern practice is in the admonishment against drinking. Toledo instituted punishment and loss of office for all Indian authorities who were found inebriated (*ibid.*). Today, ritual drinking and drunkenness during fiestas are obligatory for all members of the prestige hierarchy. It appears that the indigenous prestige hierarchy began a process of adaptation and reinterpretation shortly after the institution of foreign laws, superficially acquiescing to each new regime while maintaining traditional patterns in as unaltered a form as was deemed prudent. Guamán Poma probably wrote his famous letter to the king thirty to fifty years after Toledo’s ordinances were passed. The adapted form of indigenous authority has survived in spite of a law passed in 1938 abolishing all traditional authorities in Peru (Law No. 605, in Tarazona: 1946). The traditional authority structure in Chuschi was further reduced and readapted in 1970.

#### 4.5 The Events of 1970

On January 1, 1970, the usual date of the installation of new members into the *hatun* structure, the *comuneros* of Chuschi held a public meeting, voting instead to abolish the *hatun* structure altogether. Furthermore, public

observation of Lent, Christmas, and Easter was no longer to be the responsibility of the traditional authorities. Christmas and Easter have increasingly come under the domination of the schools. Continued pressure from the provincial subprefect culminated in an order on July 26, 1970, for those named as *hatun* authorities to either assume their duties or be jailed. Solidarity prevailed and the entire group of nine were jailed for two days; after a shouting, fist-waving free-for-all, a compromise of sorts was reached. The bureaucratic officials claimed that the *hatun* authorities were necessary for law and order to be maintained. The comuneros claimed that the *hatun* positions were no longer necessary and cost too much, and that the prestige and respect previously accorded the *hatun* authorities had all but disappeared. Also, they complained that it was the wrong time of year to assume office. A sixty-four-year-old informant said:

I think we should have them [traditional authorities] without expenditures. The harvests are less now, and besides we don't need the *hatunkuna* any more. We used to take papers to Cangallo and Ayacucho by foot, and we used to patrol with the *guardias* [policemen]. The alguaciles used to serve the governor of the district and another served the priest. Even our wives used to have to work for *qalas* [mestizos], tending their children and cooking. Today everything is different. Now even the priest tells the school children that they will have a different life. It is good to have only the *taksa varayoqkuna*. They can guard the fields and communicate with the comuneros. Now each barrio has an alcalde and his *varas*. That is enough.

The resident comuneros refused to accept the staffs of authority. Village *guardias* were instituted as a compromise, and four younger men accepted this duty. They will not carry a staff nor participate in costly fiestas; rather, they will wear arm bands designating their status as village policemen under the district governor, and fulfill their commitment to maintain law and order.

After these events, I asked comuneros how one would become a respected retired elder, *señor cesante*, and speculations included having to occupy such bureaucratic positions as governor of the district, municipal mayor, or judge, all requiring facility in spoken and written Spanish. Perhaps as the traditional structures undergo further pressure, the all-important acquisition of prestige will be shifted to the bureaucratic system. In chapter 8 we will see that an urban prestige structure developed in Lima. Other important changes in the dual authority structures of Chuschi occurred in 1970. The Agrarian Reform Law abolished the personero and his junta comunal and initiated two administrative bodies—a vigilance council and an administrative council. Due to

the stipulation of the law, migrants have returned and were elected to the above councils in 1971 (see 4.2.2). The remaining *taksa* structures and the *sallqa* organization will probably undergo further pressure. Traditional hierarchies have been reduced to the barest expression of the social and ecological concepts discussed in chapters 2 and 3.

Pressures were apparent in 1967 from the results of a census of twenty-seven retiring members of the prestige hierarchy as compared with seven bureaucratic officials. Three criteria provided a basis for *not* serving in the traditional prestige structures: (1) having worked or lived in an urban center such as Lima or Ayacucho, (2) having attended school beyond the third grade, or (3) having served in the army. All of the above can provide literacy in Spanish and thereby eligibility for a bureaucratic office. All of the bureaucratic officials had completed primary school, and none had progressed beyond the two lowest *varayoq* positions. In contrast, none of the twenty-seven traditional authorities had gone beyond the third grade, none had been in the army, and only two had worked outside of the village. The dichotomy of *comunero-qala* discussed in 3.1 was perfectly mirrored in the bureaucratic and traditional authority structures of the village. In 1970 I observed only one of a series of reductions of the traditional structure and the integration and legitimization of migrants into the political and social fabric of the village. Traditional structures will undergo further reduction and adaptation, probably with the social mechanism of prestige through service and generosity readapted to new social demands. The impact of an urban ideology on a closed corporate village is discussed in 8.6. Migrants are agitating for a takeover of the church's land and animals in order to establish a cooperative in the name of the village. Though the manner in which the cooperative is established will affect the prestige structure, given the history of continual reduction, it appears that the most sensitive structure at this point is the *sallqa* one. The *sallqa varayoqkuna* could be integrated into the structure of a cooperative, or their functions could be defined as not corresponding to an economic production unit. Investigation of the prestige hierarchy from 1967 to 1970 has shown that the hierarchy itself is flexible, but the principle of hierarchical progression is central to the structure. It is very possible that the indigenous prestige structure will one day incorporate bureaucratic positions at the apex. The bureaucratization of the system has already begun with the institution of village *guardias* in place of *hatun* alguaciles. Also, increasing demands of school attendance will probably reduce the number of *taksa* alguaciles from the present six for each barrio.

The ease with which the *hatun* structure was abolished is a reaction to the foreign domination of the church and the district bureaucracy, whereas the retention of the *taksa* moiety and the *sallqa* structures reaffirms the basic

dichotomies of:

savage ( <i>sallqa</i> )	-	civilized ( <i>taksa</i> )
herding	-	agriculture
outside (savage)	-	inside (civilized)
nonmember ( <i>qala</i> )	-	member (comunero)

Whatever adaptations are made in the prestige hierarchy, these oppositions will be found in some form. The reduction of the prestige hierarchy in 1970 appears to be an effort on the part of comuneros to preserve their closed corporate identity in the face of increasing pressure. Through the years, they have abandoned the nonessential elements and are faced with preserving and defining that which expresses the basic concepts governing their interpretations of their social and natural environment. The preservation of the basic dichotomies set forth above is the comuneros' major means of defending their way of life. Another line of defense, perhaps the strongest, is the structure of kinship and marriage.