2. The Village in the Context of a Changing Nation

2.1 Peru—A Land of Paradoxes

2.1.1 The Paradox of the Majority as a Cultural Minority

This book describes and analyzes the structural mechanisms of defense whereby traditional closed corporate communities (see 2.4) in the Andes have attempted to retain autonomy and self-determination. Their major strategy has been to maintain social and economic closure. That is to say, they have chosen not to participate in the national economy, preferring subsistence self-sufficiency. When national policies impinge on such closed communities, their concern has been to protect their control over their territory. These types of nonparticipating Peruvian communities have for centuries characterized the majority of the Peruvian population—the mass of Andean Quechua-speaking peasants.

Many scholars argue that these communities have become internal colonies, which are ethnically and territorially distinct and dominated economically and politically. Furthermore, these communities have become increasingly differentiated legally (Cotler 1970, Fuenzalida 1970a and 1970b, Quijano 1971, Van den Berghe 1974).

This chapter briefly discusses: the historical process by which the communities constituting the numerical majority have become internal colonies; the role played by the Peruvian landscape in maintaining territorial separation as well as economic and political domination; some of the dynamics of migration (2.2); the impact of the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law (2.3); and, finally, Peru's peasant communities (2.4). With this all too brief discussion of some of the factors responsible for the rapid changes taking place in the nation, we will turn our attention to the dynamics of social life in one Andean community by taking a hypothetical bus trip to Chuschi. The route chosen
is the one taken by migrants who travel weekly back and forth between Chuschi and Lima. At the present time, migration is perhaps the single most important factor responsible for cultural changes in Chuschi. A constant flow of people, goods, and information is maintained between Lima and the once isolated community. With this flow come new ideas and aspirations and new strategies for realizing these newly acquired goals (see chapters 8 and 10).

The current processes of changes, effected by members of the ethnic internal colonies who have gained mobility into the dominant culture, are in some ways similar to the processes that began during the early colonial period. The segment of the indigenous population that mediated between the colonial Spanish society and the indigenous masses was, however, the indigenous elites. Today, the impetus for change in peasant communities is coming from the members of Peruvian society who are partially integrated into the national culture and at the same time maintain leadership roles in their communities (Quijano 1965b, 1967, Cotler 1970, Handelman 1975). These individuals are often called cholos, a term that is sometimes used in a derogatory fashion to refer to upwardly mobile people who have neither become fully integrated into the dominant society nor fully shed their peasant identity. The migrants, with new links to the urban social sectors, are ideal cultural brokers and peasant mobilizers. Thus we shall see that the process of mediation between the two major segments of Peruvian society, which began with the emergence of a powerful commercial class of indigenous elites, can be viewed as parallel to the present emergence of a new mediating class, the cholos, who have important roles in peasant mobilization movements. However, the major difference is that current changes are being generated from the bottom of the urban class structure, whereas, during the colonial era, changes were generated by the indigenous elites.

Studies of the historical processes after the conquest have been expertly summarized by Spalding (1974), who has analyzed the transformations of the indigenous Andean society in her book De indio a campesino (From Indian to Peasant). She describes Peruvian society during the first part of the colonial period as heterogeneous in terms of both ethnicity and access to resources. The Incas dominated this variable society less than a century before the conquest by the Spanish (ibid.: chapter 2). An excellent description of ethnic and economic diversity during the early colonial period has been formulated by Duviols (1973). During this period Peruvian society was a typical colonial one in which the dual dichotomy of the conquerors and the conquered predominated. Nevertheless, Spalding argues that the Indian chiefs, the kurakas, emerged as a powerful commercial class with elite status in both societies. The kurakas' mediating role between the "two republics," the Spanish one and the indigenous one, functioned in such a way that the
indigenous chiefs mobilized production and tribute from the Indian masses for the benefit of the Spanish. These activities were in sharp conflict with the demands of the kinship-based, self-sufficient indigenous communities. Spalding's major question is, why, then, did the kurakas become the leaders of the rebellions that shook the eighteenth century? The greatest rebellion (in 1780-1783) was led by Túpac Amaru—baptized José Gabriel Condorcanqui—one of the greatest merchants of that century (ibid.: 53). Her hypothesis is that the economic role of the kurakas became converted. In addition to collecting the production and tribute from communities, the kurakas also became commercial distributors of products produced outside of the communities.

A continuous decline of the kurakas' power occurred during the later colonial period, caused in part by the imposition of Spanish authorities in the various regions of Peru and also by the incredible decimation of the Indian population. Their legal status was finally abolished in 1825, and Spalding hypothesizes that they became absorbed into the commercial class of Peru.

The experiences of indigenous communities during the colonial period were dominated by the exploitation of their labor and production by the dominant Spanish society. Moreover, due to the reduction of the Indian population, the Spanish rationalized the reduction of land controlled by the reduced Indian population. Indigenous communities were pushed to less productive regions by the continual reduction of their lands. The end result has been the creation of a suspicious, alienated, and subjugated majority, culturally and linguistically separated from the dominant society. This brief and all too inadequate historical background has been provided to help the reader understand the defense mechanisms of Chuschi, a peasant community whose historical memory has taught its members to protect themselves from the outside world by closing in upon themselves as much as possible.

With the absorption of the indigenous elite into the Spanish mercantile class, many indigenous communities were left with dual authority systems that are reflected in the present authority structures of Chuschi (see chapter 4). The traditional one functions to insure their self-sufficiency by maintaining ecological and cosmological order. The national bureaucratic one functions to exercise centralized control over the community.

Thus we see an interesting parallel with Spalding's historical analysis and the modern emergence of a new mediating class, the capitalistically oriented migrants (see 2.2 and chapters 8 and 10). They find themselves in the most paradoxical position of all. They identify with both the national culture and the traditional one. They argue for the incorporation of their peasant community into the national market, and yet they strive to protect the autonomy of the community at the same time. Often these goals are at odds with their own desires for upward mobility and personal success.
The migrants who crowd into urban centers from isolated communities like Chuschi are the greatest paradox of all. They are on the bottom of the urban class structure but dominate the direction of social change in their communities. They are responsible for the increase in education and, in some cases, better health care; for the expansion of the market system; and for the magnitude of the peasant mobilization during the 1960s (Quijano 1965, 1967, Cotler 1970, Handleman 1975). However, they often find themselves in conflict with their communities. As the migrants gain new aspirations, their goals at times conflict with those of the peasant majority of their community, who are attempting to defend their land and resources. At other times, mutually acceptable strategies for change are effected. Interestingly, Cotler (1969: 184) has argued that change is more rapid in areas of the Andes where extensive hacienda domination is absent. It is also clear that the development of roads and railways into remote regions of the Andes is changing the character of Andean communities. Van den Berghe (1974: 129-130) offers a geographical formulation to generalize about class and ethnicity in the southern Peruvian Andes. He argues that the range of local situations is sufficiently great to require empirical research. Generally, the more remote a community is from urban centers or means of communication with urban centers, the more forcefully will ethnic distinctions operate, resulting in clear differentiation between mestizos and Indians. Conversely, “the closer one gets to larger urban centers and their interconnecting main roads and railway, the more the processes of cultural hispanization and the extension of bilingualism tend to blur ethnic distinctions, and give more salience to class differences” (ibid.: 129). In other words, class differentiation will develop among mestizos, who are hispanized and bilingual and who identify with the national market and culture.

Small communities along main roads and railways are ethnically ambiguous. They are neither mestizo nor Indian, but rather occupy the ambiguous status of cholo, and, like the migrants discussed above, are not fully integrated into either ethnic or class structures. These regions are more complex. Therefore, it is profitable to discuss briefly the Peruvian landscape, given the fact that communication routes play such an important role in the transformation of ethnic populations.

2.1.2 The Paradoxes of Geography

Peru has one of the most difficult and demanding landscapes in the world. Less than 2 percent of Peru’s land is arable, whereas 19 percent of the land in the United States, 40 percent in Germany, and 7 percent in Chile, Peru’s southern neighbor, can be cultivated. In South America, only Brazil, with its
massive tropical forest, has a lower percentage of arable land—1.6 percent. Due to the misfortunes of geography, Peru occupies the lowest position among fifty nations in amounts of land capable of supporting cultivation (De la Puente Uceda 1966: 115). Problems of adequate arable land are intensified in Peru by the diversity of the three distinct geographical regions: the arid coastal plain, the snow-capped Andean chain, and the lush tropical forest.

Peru is a land of geographical paradoxes. Rainfall is almost nonexistent on the coast, overabundant in the tropical forest, and extremely variable in the highlands. Paradoxically, the arid coastal plain, with a mere annual precipitation rate of only 20 to 30 millimeters, is the most productive region in the nation. This long, narrow desert strip, 90 kilometers wide and 1,800 kilometers long, produces 45 percent of the country's annual production on only 27.8 percent of the total cultivatable land. The government plans to develop large irrigation projects to increase further the productivity of the coast.

In comparison, the heavily forested tropical region with its overabundant rainfall of 1,200 to 3,500 millimeters per year produces only 17 percent of the nation's annual production (Alcántara and Vásquez 1974: 42). In addition, the Peruvian coastal waters have some of the richest marine fauna in the world due to the cold, upwelling Humboldt current. Fish meal is one of the most important exports, used throughout the world as fertilizer.

The reason for the paradoxical success of the coastal plain's agricultural production is that the desert is cut by some fifty rivers that drain the Andean chain into the Pacific Ocean. As much as 1,226,000 liters per second rush off of the western slopes of the Andes (De la Puente Uceda 1966: 109). The river valleys lie like green snakes on the drab desert. The region produces the majority of Peru's two most important export crops, cotton and sugar. Cotton accounts for 50 percent of exports, sugar for about 20 percent. The productivity of the coastal river valleys is due to the high degree of mechanized, intensive farming developed in large part by foreign capital (see 2.3).

The highlands present an incredible complexity of microzones. Briefly, the eastern slopes facing the continent are moister than the western slopes along the Pacific coast. Also, the northern highlands are higher in humidity than the southern region. However, temperature and moisture are complicated by altitude, so that high grasslands are wetter and colder than the lower valleys. For an excellent explication of the highland environments see Troll (1958) and the recently published Atlas histórico-geográfico published by the Instituto Nacional de Planificación (1969).

To get a feeling of the variability of the Andes, imagine a one-day trip in which one leaves the coast, immediately climbs upward, and within three or
four hours crosses passes of over 4,000 meters in altitude. Snow-capped peaks reach 6,000 meters, with freezing-cold glacial moraines and puna in the highest altitudes. Rainfall can vary between 400 and 1,000 millimeters annually, depending on altitude and latitude. In this variable and vertical world, the Andean peasant has adapted well by trying to control as many of the micro-environments as possible in order to diversify crops and spread the risks of agricultural failure. Some communities have been restricted to only a few ecological microzones, but communities like Chuschi control a full range from above 4,000 meters to below 2,000 (see 2.4.3 and 2.7). Recent studies are beginning to document human adaptation in the various Andean micro-environments (Brush 1973, 1976, 1977, Concha 1975, Custred 1974, Flores Ochoa 1968, 1975, Fonseca 1972, Mayer 1974, Mitchell 1977, Orlove 1977).

Although population statistics are generally less than reliable in Peru due to the difficulties in collecting adequate censuses, the following figures provide a general picture of population dynamics in the Andes. The highlands population made up 61.7 percent of the nation's population in 1950, 51.1 percent in 1961, and 47.0 percent in 1970, and has been projected to fall to 38.0 percent by 1980 if current migratory trends continue (Instituto Nacional de Planificación: 1969).

2.2 The Push and Pull of Migration

Like most of the developing nations, Peru has a rapidly growing and mobile population. Since the 1961 census, population growth has been 2.9 percent annually, excluding the tropical forest population that remained inaccessible to the census. In 1961 the total population was calculated to be almost ten million; for 1972 the figures rose to over thirteen and one-half million (Oficina Nacional de Estadística y Censos 1973: 6). The metropolitan area of Lima is growing at an annual rate of 5.8 percent. It has been estimated that during 1970 about 100,000 migrants arrived in Lima, the center of government, banking, and industry (ibid.: 13). Over 70 percent of the nation's industry is located in Lima, a major attraction for the rapidly growing population. The National Office of Statistics and Census estimates that close to 40 percent of Lima's population are migrants primarily from the highland departments.

Furthermore, the proportion of the population under nineteen years of age has been estimated at 55.3 percent in 1970 (ibid.: 5). Population growth, estimated at 2.1 percent annually in 1970, is greater than economic growth (Alcántara and Vásquez 1974: 25). In 1972 there were 200 persons economically inactive for every 100 with employment (ibid.: 27). Arequipa's population exceeded 300,000 in 1972, and 37 percent were migrants. Likewise,
Puno-Juliaca, Cuzco, and Huancayo are experiencing growth due to migration. The recent petroleum exploitation in the tropical forest has stimulated the growth of Iquitos at the phenomenal rate of 6.2 percent annually (ibid.: 13-16). Therefore, a clearer picture is that the major population shift in Peru is from rural to urban centers, with Lima receiving the heaviest burden of migrants. Julio Cotler (1970: 539) argues that the arrival of migrants in cities cannot be attributed to a reduced demand for agricultural labor or to an increase in the demand for industrial workers. Rather, identifications and aspirations are being altered by increased consumption. These cultural changes are reaching traditional sierra regions and causing other changes in social relations and economic life. Such changes began after World War II when trade with the United States increased. The explanation certainly fits the migration history of Chuschinos.

In the recent government publication cited above, population projections were: 1980, eighteen and one-half million; 1990, twenty-five million; and 2000, in excess of thirty-three million (Alcántara and Vásquez 1974: 28).

Faced with this phenomenal growth and with the shift from rural to urban centers, the government has formulated long-range plans to industrialize and stimulate Peru’s internal market. It states that it will accept foreign investments but will gradually reduce dependence on foreign capital by developing petroleum exploitation and independent industries. The other major plan is to stimulate agricultural production through the formation of centrally controlled cooperatives aimed at increasing regional production.

2.3 The 1969 Agrarian Reform—A Structure of Cooperatives

The military government, under General Juan Velasco A., moved to nationalize large foreign capitalistic holdings. The first move of the regime was to nationalize the International Petroleum Company, now Petro-Perú, and six years later the foreign-controlled mines at Cerro de Pasco were nationalized.

The second move of Velasco’s regime was to take control of the sugar haciendas on the coast. Before the reform, eleven coastal haciendas represented one-sixth of all foreign investment in Peru (Alcántara and Vásquez 1974: 64). The expressed aim of the government was to retain the size and technological production of the sugar haciendas while creating cooperatives to promote social justice. The government’s slogan is, “The land belongs to those who work it.” The sugar haciendas were reorganized into Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción Social—CAPs. Statistics vary somewhat, but it has been estimated that by the end of 1974 over 348 CAPs, with a total of 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 hectares and 87,000 families, had been formed. The

The CAPs vary greatly in size, degree of technology, and productivity, and there has been some controversy about them. Because each cooperative operates as an independent unit, with the participating members dependent upon the success of the production, the fate of the participating families also varies. In a critical article, the Peruvian leftist journal *Marka* (1975, 1, no. 5: 16-20) argues that at the Pomalca cooperative the mean salary in 1972 was 1,511 soles a month (about 35 dollars), whereas at another sugar cooperative, Paramonga, the mean salary was twice as high for the same period. In addition, the authors note that managers and technicians who control the means of production earn 30,000 to 50,000 soles (about 800 to over 1,000 dollars). Workers have organized strikes for higher salaries and better working conditions. The authors argue that the workers are alienated from decisions, that redistribution of wealth has not occurred, and that private capitalistic managers have replaced governmental ones.

The article goes on to point out that all members accrue capital investment while working in the cooperative, at an annual rate based on salary, and, on leaving, the worker or manager can take his investment with him. A technician earning 50,000 a month accumulates 300,000 soles in six years (almost 7,000 dollars) but a worker earning 3,000 soles a month would have to work 100 years to accumulate the same amount. The authors note that members of the sugar cooperatives prefer private and individual accumulation over collective accumulation. The government made the decision to retain the capitalistic structure of the sugar haciendas, maintaining highly paid technicians and managers to prevent production from falling. In fact, production has increased since 1969. The government hopes to reduce the discrepancies in production in the various sugar cooperatives by increasing technology. Furthermore, the long-range plan is to increase the capacities of the workers for control and management.

The above criticisms by the leftist journal *Marka* argue that the corporate structure of the cooperatives has not changed but rather has only changed hands. This argument is in agreement with that of Greaves (1972: 67), who points out that the cooperative members have remained rural wage earners working for a corporate enterprise. In addition, the cooperative structures continue to exploit non-members as a temporary labor force during transplanting and harvesting. The economic position of these seasonal workers is extremely precarious.

The other major effort of the government to stimulate production has been the formation of enormous cooperatives dedicated to cattle production.
in the highlands. Beef is in short supply in Peru and is sold legally only fifteen days out of every month. The short supply of beef was intensified by the decapitalization of production just prior to the implementation of the reforms. As hacendados and wealthy peasants became aware of impending reforms, they converted their herds into cash (or consumed them) to avoid expropriation, causing a drastic drop in the number of cattle and sheep. Thus the government was faced with a double problem of creating cooperatives while at the same time increasing production rapidly for national consumption. These gigantic production centers are called Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social—SAISes.

An example is the SAIS Túpac Amaru near the mining center Cerro de Pasco in the central highland department of Pasco; it comprised fourteen expropriated haciendas and fifteen surrounding peasant communities covering an area of 377,000 hectares on which lived a total of 17,000 people in 3,000 families. As of 1975, there were 50 SAIS conglomerates covering 2.25 million hectares and incorporating over 55,000 families, or 5.3 percent of the rural labor force. More than 1,715,000 head of cattle have been expropriated since 1968. By 1972 these cattle-producing SAISes represented 35 percent of all the land adjudicated under the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law. Under government management the SAISes are expected to increase cattle production and augment the technology of the peasants whose communities have been incorporated. The aim is to increase the productive capacity of the peasant communities to the point that they become an integrated, interdependent part of the national economy (Marka 1975b, Knight 1975: 365). “The SAIS is explicitly designed as a transitional form which could lead toward the incorporation of the member communities into an enlarged cooperative, thus creating a CAP” (Knight 1975: 366). It is believed that SAIS membership will break down peasant distrust of the agrarian reform through redistribution of income. However, Knight (ibid.) states that in practice some community representatives form alliances with cooperative technical and managerial personnel to hold down workers’ incomes.

According to Plan Agropecuario, almost 12 million hectares of land have been adjudicated by the Peruvian government since 1969—truly the most massive redistribution of land in the history of South America (Alcántara and Vásquez 1975: 46). This far-reaching reallocation of land is a response to the inequality of distribution that characterized Peru’s agricultural sector before the reformist military regime assumed power. The 1961 census demonstrated that 0.4 percent of all land-holders held 76 percent of all farms over 500 hectares, while 83 percent of the nation’s agriculturalists held small plots of 5 hectares or fewer (ibid.: 38). The Agrarian Reform Law of 1969 is an effort to increase production by transforming the large capitalistic haciendas
on the coast and the highland haciendas into cooperatives; to stop the frag-
dmentation of peasant farms; to increase technology, especially among
peasants; and to draw the peasants into the national economy and culture.

By the end of July 1974, just under 5 million hectares had been allocated
to 196,523 families mainly organized into CAPs and SAISes. The original
agrarian reform plan was to transfer some 11 million hectares of land to
340,000 families by 1976 (Harding 1975: 220). Obviously the government
has fallen short of its goals.

In the introduction to an excellent collection of articles, *The Peruvian
Experiment*, that analyze these measures from various perspectives,
Lowenthal (1975: 15-16) concludes that the reforms are as noteworthy for
their limits as for their advances. The great majority of Peruvians will not
obtain land, because there is not enough to go around. The redistribution
of income after implementation of the laws will not even affect three-quarters
of Peru’s population, and those without steady jobs will not receive improved
social security benefits. The majority of school attenders drop out before the
sixth grade, and therefore will receive only limited benefits from the educa-
tional reforms. The military regime is distributing resources and rewards in a
more equitable way to those Peruvians able to make their demands felt.

Julio Cotler (1972 and 1975) has summarized some of the criticisms of
the military government’s policies. He argues that the urgent need of capital
for rapid industrialization, the decolonization of the export sector, and the
creation of an internal market counters the possibility of a redistribution of
income. The success of state-controlled capitalistic developments depends on
internal national peace. The government states that it seeks to insure har-
mony and reduce tensions between classes in order to create a unified nation.
Cotler (ibid.: 9) argues that such a policy amounts to depoliticization of the
popular masses. Government spokesmen counter that the polarized dichotomy
between those who owned the majority of the land and those who owned
nothing has been abolished through the expropriation of lands from the land-
holding elites and the formation of cooperatives. The government argues
that therefore these two classes no longer exist. Furthermore, it argues that
government policy is not to control the masses but rather to unify the classes
in order to realize a participating social democracy. Cotler (ibid.) states that
such policies will cause the dominated popular classes to lose their autonomy
and class consciousness. As the popular classes face rapidly rising inflation
and bureaucratic assistance programs (instead of redistribution of income),
violence will result.

As evidence that governmental policies are designed to raise class con-
sciousness and transform ethnic groups into production sectors, official
spokesmen point to the nationalization of the newspapers, whereby different
presses were designated to different segments of society. The agricultural sector, the industrial sector, cooperatives, and even the intellectuals were named as proprietors of the different national newspapers. In theory these sectors of society will have a voice in a participating democracy. The experiment is heralded by some as “giving the people a voice” and opposed by others as an oppressive measure.

Caught between these divergent views on how to effect social change are the majority of the Andean popular masses, the peasants. As we will see below, a wide range of variations of economic and socio-political structures exists in recognized peasant communities. At present, Andean peasants are faced with pressures unbeknown to them before from both the government and its critics. The responses by peasant communities to these pressures will be determined by the degree to which they are “open” to incorporation or, conversely, the degree to which they are attempting to maintain social closure and nonparticipation in the national culture. What I will argue below is that Andean peasant communities exist along a continuum between the two extremes of open participation in the national economy and culture and direct opposition to such incorporation (see 2.4.2).

2.4 Peru’s Peasant Communities

As of 1960 a total of 1,568 indigenous communities were registered and recognized out of 4,600 population centers censused. These communities are concentrated in the highland departments of Junín (276), Lima (236), Cuzco (215), Ayacucho (162), Huancavelica (147), Ancash (108), Huánuco (83), and Cajamarca (46), and 12 are found in Lambayeque (which is marginally defined as sierra). However, one is found in the tropical forest department of Loreto (Fajardo 1960).

A peasant community is a corporate land-holding body with legal and jural status by virtue of a series of laws beginning with a supreme decree of 1821 abolishing tribute and the hated labor grants, the encomiendas.

Beginning with the 1920 constitution a series of laws directed toward Indian communities was passed. Davies (1974) has compiled a list of the major Indian legislation from 1900 to 1948, which is appended to his book. A great flurry of laws was passed between 1925 and 1940, beginning with the recognition of Indian communities in 1925; subsequent laws granted Indians citizenship and guaranteed the integrity and inalienability of the indigenous communities’ lands. Laws were passed prohibiting the intervention of national bureaucratic authorities in the administration of communities’ lands, and in 1938 procedures were established by which the indigenous communities were registered with the Ministry of Labor and Indigenous Affairs. The 1938 law also
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established an autonomous three-person governing junta, headed by a perso-
nero, to be elected by the heads of households of the community for non-
renewable two-year terms. The law stipulated that the elections were to be
ratified by the ministry to ensure that the junta members met the require-
ments of the law—membership in the community, literacy, and military
service.

2.4.1 Abolition of the Old and Institution of the New

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1969 (Decreto Supremo No. 1776) abol-
ished the personero and the junta, replacing them with a vigilance council
and an administrative council, each with a president, a secretary-treasurer,
and delegates (Mayer and Palmer 1972). The 1969 law abolished private
property and established two statuses for membership in a peasant com-
munity: (1) full comunero—one who resides at least six months of the
year in the community, derives 50 percent of his income from agricultural
activities, and complies with the membership criteria set up by the com-
munity, usually birth and inscription; and (2) associate comunero—one
whose income is equally from agriculture and some other enterprise and who
resides in the community. Both statuses have usufruct rights to all lands held
by the village. In the case of inadequate land for all members, the law pro-
vides for a lottery system to allocate usufruct plots.

The Agrarian Reform Law has as specific goals (1) to increase technological
production, (2) to avoid fragmentation, and (3) eventually to organize the
communities into cooperative production units for the national economy.
The law changes the name of the communities from indigenous to peasant
communities, which implies that they shall become a part of the national
political body as well as become incorporated into the national economic
structure (articles 1, 3, and 15). Article 118 stipulates that the dominion of
lands cannot be directly transferred except to become incorporated into a
SAIS or other recognized cooperative. Communities may have usufruct of
the land in accordance with the communal or cooperative organization, and
the land must be worked directly by the members of the community. A
member cannot hold plots in a different community and furthermore has
usufruct to one plot near or adjacent to his residence.

The reform law attempts to achieve clear interdependence between the
agricultural sector and the industrial, public, and financial sectors.

Article 119 specifies that lands that became the property of individuals
after January 18, 1920 shall revert to the community without altering pos-
session, except that these lands cannot be alienated or transferred either by
contract or by inheritance. On the death of the holder, the land shall revert
permanently to the community. Article 120 provides for the recuperation of abandoned lands, and article 121 nullifies all sales or transfers of land that took place after January 1920, with indemnification to the previous owner. In addition, the law establishes a lottery system for allocating land in communities where land is insufficient for all members.

According to article 124 a special statute will be passed to specify the organization and functioning of peasant communities. However, as of 1975 the statute had not appeared; the government is still studying the organizational structures and economic capacities of the diverse peasant communities throughout the Andes.

2.4.2 "Open" and "Closed" Peasant Communities

Richard N. Adams (1962: 427-428) has stated that "corporate communities are characterized by a defense action to protect their members from a threat. In so far as we can tell from ethnohistorical reconstruction the communities come into being when they are in fact restricted or excluded from access to resources." This statement clearly holds for Peruvian peasant communities, which through time have been pushed continually into more marginal and less productive regions of the Andes. We can think of highland peasants as the marginal agricultural majority. A peasant community must always be considered as part of a larger social unit, such as the nation, that has impinged upon its agricultural producers.

However, another important dimension must be considered, and that is the degree to which a community is either "open" or "closed" structurally. Eric R. Wolf (1955) defines a peasant as an agriculturalist whose major aim is subsistence and who retains control over the land. He further differentiates between seven types of Latin American peasantry. For our purposes here, the most important distinction made is between the "closed corporate community" and the "open community." The former practices intensive cultivation on marginal lands, utilizing primitive technology. It is a closed corporation because it discourages influences from the outside and because the members of the community do not identify themselves as members of the larger culture. The corporate structure is maintained through control over communal lands as well as through restrictions against selling privately-held holdings to outsiders. In Peru, membership in the many communities demands active participation in the civil-religious hierarchy, whereby a member expends wealth and achieves status through service to the community in a series of ranked offices (see 4.3). Economically, this type of closed corporate community does not participate significantly in the cash economy. Most production is for subsistence, and when cash crops are produced they are
used to buy goods from the outside. Exchange and reciprocity are common (chapter 7), and the accumulation of wealth is not tolerated. Wealth is expended in civil and religious displays of generosity.

Wolf characterizes “open communities” as the type common to the vast, humid tropical forest lowlands. But we shall discover that open corporate communities are found also in the highlands of Peru. According to Wolf, an open community has continuous interaction with the outside world, and members are encouraged to identify themselves with the national whole. Their participation in the cash economy of the nation accounts for 50 to 75 percent of their production, and furthermore they reinvest to improve production rather than expend their wealth on the structural organizations that maintain closure, such as the civil-religious hierarchies. Nevertheless, open communities, like closed ones, have been pushed to marginal areas, and technology remains relatively primitive. However, they differ from the subsistence-based closed corporate communities in that their economic and social fate depends more heavily on the stability of the nation.

Wolf (ibid.: 463) states that open communities lack formalized corporate structures. However, Keatinge (1973: 40) points out that in Peru at least thirteen of the forty recognized peasant communities surveyed by Dobyns (1964:22) have been characterized as culturally mestizo. That is, members of these recognized corporate peasant communities identify themselves with the national culture and have not maintained the degree of social and economic closure characteristic of closed corporate communities; nevertheless, they are corporate entities controlling land and perpetuating rights and membership. Muquiyayo (Adams 1959) and Sicaya (Escobar 1968) of central Peru in the Mantaro Valley, Hualcan (Stein 1961) and Huaylas (Doughty 1968) in the northern Callejón de Huaylas, as well as Chinchero (Montalvo 1965) in Cuzco (which still maintains a civil-religious hierarchy) and Moche (Gillin 1947) on the north coast, are only a few examples of mestizo corporate communities that maintain a mixed (subsistence-cash) economy and identify and interact with the national culture, thereby maintaining open rather than closed social structures.

An illustrative example is the recognized open corporate peasant community of Huanchaco, located eleven miles from the north coastal city of Trujillo. It was studied by Gillin in 1947 and restudied by Keatinge in 1973. Keatinge found that 37 percent of the community’s 2,000 population are fishermen; only 10 percent farm their land directly, while 71.8 percent share-crop. Furthermore, this peasant community of monolingual Spanish speakers increased from 700 in 1947 to 2,000 in 1973. After the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law was passed, 32 share-croppers petitioned to form a cooperative, claiming that the law states that the land they worked belongs to them. As
Keatinge (1973: 38) rightfully points out, many of the communities studied thus far by anthropologists are open corporate peasant communities “which can play a dynamic role in the process of national integration if the flexibility inherent in the structure of these communities is fully recognized and utilized by those directing the course of national development.”

It is perhaps more fruitful to visualize communities in the highlands along a continuum between “open”—becoming incorporated into national economic participation—and “closed”—maintaining the structures that slow the process of incorporation. Van den Berghe (1974) argues that the actual location of communities in relation to communication routes has a great deal to do with the degree of incorporation and culture change evident. If we were to extend Van den Berghe’s argument we would expect class relations to predominate over ethnic relations in “open” communities, and the reverse to be true in ideal “closed” communities. For communities experiencing change, a complex mixture of class and ethnic relations and identifications will be present. Chuschi is such a community undergoing rapid change, and change has greatly increased since a road connecting Chuschi with the department capital was completed in 1966. Migration has increased; more consumer products reach the community, and, as we would expect, new aspirations and expectations arise.

Along with these changes, however, I have documented the efforts of the community members to defend their communal holdings and their ethnic identity. Two very dramatic examples will illustrate. In 1970, the apex of the traditional civil-religious hierarchies was abolished (4.5) by communal vote. The same organization was reinstated in 1972 in response to efforts by migrants to form a cooperative. The cooperative was closed (10.3) and ethnic identity was strengthened.

Class structures are being developed in the urban invasion settlement in Lima (10.4). But one can see ethnic relations functioning as a means of expressing group solidarity for both urban and rural members of the community when common dangers are perceived. Migrants helped organize an invasion of hacienda lands (10.3.3) claimed by the community. The action greatly accelerated the bureaucratic procedures for reviewing the case. The migrants play an important role in breaking down the social closure of traditional communities. However, these migrants often have priorities that are at odds with government planners. These and other problems of incorporating peasants into the national culture will be discussed below.

2.4.3 The Problems of Incorporating Peasant Communities into National Economic and Social Systems

The aim of the military junta of Peru is to transform the peasant masses
into economically productive agriculturalists for the national market. What is needed to effect this transformation is information on the economic systems of peasant communities. How many are closed corporate subsistence systems utilizing primitive technology with few or no cash crops? How many are dependent on herding? Are their economic activities directed toward the national market system? Furthermore, what is the nature and extent of economic activities other than farming and herding that propel peasant communities toward "open" national incorporation?

Unfortunately, such information is perhaps most difficult to obtain in closed corporate communities such as Chuschi because they perceive economic dependence on an outside market system as a serious threat to their continued independence. In addition, centuries of taxation based on production, and most recently taxation calculated per head of cattle, make systematic investigation of economic activities extremely troublesome. In Chuschi, my efforts to obtain economic data were further thwarted by the passage of the Agrarian Reform Law during my investigations in 1969. Members of the community understandably were more reluctant to divulge information that might place them in a disadvantageous position with authorities. Given these difficulties, I have provided examples of types of exploitation strategies (chapter 3) and the dynamics of migration (chapter 8) to illustrate the process of change occurring at present.

Fortunately, other investigators have been more successful in obtaining information on Andean economic systems, especially of mestizo communities. Adams's study of Muquiyayo (1959) provides excellent data on the historical dimensions of a peasant community's emergence into the market economy; and other studies, such as Escobar's (1968) of Sicaya, Stein's (1961) of Hualcan, and Doughty's (1968) of Huaylas, describe the impact of hacienda domination, agricultural techniques, the growing scarcity of land, the decrease in traditional reciprocal exchanges, and the commercialization of farming.

More recently, examination of the exploitation of various microecological zones by modern communities has been stimulated by John V. Murra's (1967, 1968, 1972, and 1975) "archipelago" model of verticality in the Andes, which argues that economic success in the Andes was achieved by pre-Incaic kingdoms by effectively controlling production and redistribution from diverse ecological zones often dispersed over large distances in the vertical and variable Andean chain. Important studies are emerging that allow us to compare the exploitative techniques and strategies of pastoralists and agriculturalists from different regions of the Andes.

Flores (1968) has studied the high-altitude pastoral community of Paratía...
in the province of Lampa, department of Puno, and describes the strategies of alpaca specialization. Custred (1974) describes how the community of Alccavitoria, in the province of Chumbivilcas, Cuzco, is restricted to altitudes of 3,920 to 4,890 meters. This community produces only potatoes six months out of the year and exchanges some of the products from its herds, such as dried meats, wool, hides, and woolen goods, for agricultural products from lower altitudes in direct barter relationships. However, Custred points out that the larger part of wool and meat production is destined for sale at the local market in order to procure cash to buy salt at a mine, or sugar and peppers at the market as items for barter.

Long-distance exchange relationships between a small lowland coca-producing community in the department of Huánuco with other communities in higher altitudes have been described by Burchard (1974). He has demonstrated that the traditional exchange relationships are wide-ranging in territory and stable. The coca producers exchange their product for food-stuffs, and even labor, with communities in the mid-altitudes of the region as far as 200 kilometers away.

One of the most interesting aspects of Burchard’s study is that he provides information on the temporary migration of a community of 400 Quechua-Spanish bilinguals. This community, situated some 64 kilometers from the capital of Huánuco, controls land at altitudes between 2,700 meters and 3,054 meters. Although agricultural exploitation is diversified, it is by no means self-sufficient. Of 58 families censused, half had members who had worked in Lima; 30 percent of male heads of households, as well as a number of women, had migrated to the Cerro de Pasco mines. Most of the population had worked at some time on haciendas, and some were even seeking wage employment as agricultural laborers in other peasant communities.

Perhaps most significant is the fact that 92 percent of the families had members who had migrated to the coca fields over 200 kilometers away to seek temporary employment (ibid.: 222-223). Both Burchard’s and Custred’s studies demonstrate the growing importance of cash in traditional exchange relationships.

In contrast, the community of Q’ero (Webster 1973) in the province of Paucartambo, Cuzco, controls a continuous territory including grazing land extending above 5,000 meters in altitude, agricultural plots in the intermediate zones, and tropical forest plots below 2,000 meters. The community’s ceremonial center is situated in the intermediate zone at 3,300 meters, and other dwellings are maintained in both the high pasture lands and in the lowlands. Exploitation of these various zones is achieved by family units, but the community authority structure controls crop rotation (Webster 1973: 118-119).
Orlove (1977) argues that in the province of Espinar, Cuzco, the transhumance cycle is controlled by the availability of pasture; agricultural activities are secondary. We are beginning to understand the diversity of economic techniques in the Andes. According to present data summarized by Lambert (1977), one universal seems to be that "households based on nuclear families control productive resources and allocate consumer goods. . . households strive to attain self-sufficiency, either through exchange or by securing direct access to land in several zones. Such vertical control also enables the group to utilize the labor of its members most efficiently, and provides it with some insurance against the disruptive effects of localized frosts, hailstorms, and excessive rainfall."

Mayer (1974) has contributed important information on subsistence activities, crop rotations, and exchange relationships of the community of Tangor, located in a narrow intermontane valley in the province of Daniel A. Carrión, Pasco. Mayer states that this village retains an economic system that is a vestige of islands of exploitation known as "archipelago" (after Murra) because its territory is interrupted by the holdings of other communities. Its grazing lands are located beyond other communities' lands.

Mayer differentiates between four named microzones: two for potato production and two for corn. Every family has access to land devoted to potato production and to pasture lands, but along the river valley, where corn can be grown, land is less evenly distributed.

Tangor and other communities in the narrow valley are nucleated at midpoints between the upper and lower microzones. This same settlement pattern is common on the Pampas River, where Chuschi is located, as well as along the Apurímac (Orlove 1975). Fonseca (1972), in a detailed comparison of vertical exploitation in the northern, central, and southern highlands, argues that this is a common strategy in the Andes, with the names for ecological zones referring not to fixed upper and lower levels but rather to different microenvironments in relation to a mid-point where nucleated settlements are found (ibid.: 318-324).

Exploitation of the various zones is accomplished by household units utilizing various forms of labor exchanges. One of the most common forms implies returned labor of equal value and is restricted to close and distant kin of the household work force.

Mayer (1974: 144) points out that "governmental community development agencies have since 1960 pushed cooperative ventures assuming that because peasants tend to exchange labor that they would therefore readily accept cooperative forms of organization." Mayer demonstrates that reciprocal labor exchanges are for very specific short-term tasks and are contracted on an individual basis. Even if the reciprocal contract is with formal
institutions it is conceived of in the same manner.

I have taken a different perspective and have distinguished between private and public reciprocity (chapter 7), the former between private individuals for short-term tasks, the latter between the civil-religious hierarchy and the entire community, the government, and the church on a continuous basis if both parties fulfill their contracts. In both of these forms the most important components of exchange are to secure a supportive network of relationships and to gain prestige through the display of extreme generosity to those who have aided one in specific tasks. As discussed in 7.2, the necessary generous supply of food, drink, cigarettes, and coca that accompany reciprocal labor exchanges often cost more than hired labor. Nevertheless, such exchanges are essential to a closed corporate community such as Chuschi because they guarantee the participation of members and the exclusion of outsiders—one of the principal mechanisms for maintaining social closure. The diversity and complexity of Andean exchange systems have been described in a volume edited by Alberti and Mayer (1974) entitled Reciprocidad e intercambio en los Andes peruanos.

It appears that Andean peasant communities do not readily accept cooperatives. Mayer (1974) and Escobar (1968) have shown that the trend is toward commercialization of agriculture and increased participation in the market economy. When this happens, reciprocal exchanges decline and eventually disappear. The ideal strategy in the Andes is to control many plots, however small, in all of the microzones controlled by one's community. This minimizes crop failure and increases the diversity of one's production, which in turn guarantees economic autonomy.

However, economic autonomy is declining in highland communities. In communities like Chuschi and Tangor, land is not the index of wealth. In Tangor, class stratification is due to differential access to cash through out-migration or connections with migrant relatives (Mayer 1974: 54). In Chuschi, class stratification depends on the number of animals held by a household and the prestige gained through service in the civil-religious hierarchy, which is increasing the demand for cash. Mutual dependence between the subsistence agriculturalists-herders of Chuschi and their migrant population in Lima is developing.

Most of the migrants in Lima retain land and animals in Chuschi. They maintain sharing agreements with their relatives in the village called mitades (halves). Those who stay in the village tend the fields and herds, and the migrants provide needed aid, usually in the form of gifts or loans. Migrants often return to oversee and participate in planting and harvest. This strategy provides a type of insurance for both parties: the migrant is able to supplement his or her low cash income in the urban environment with agricultural products, and the villager has a source of cash and aid. One of the most
important forms of aid is the assurance of help when one of the household migrates. Also, in Chuschi, a pattern is developing of sending children to migrant relatives in Lima to be educated. The traditional exchange network has been extended to encompass the migrant population in Lima. The rules of reciprocity remain the same, but new elements have been introduced. Migrants function as important cultural brokers, introducing new ideas and products to their rural relatives.

Another important function of migrants is as representatives and intermediaries for their village of origin with the web of bureaucracies in Lima. In the case of Chuschino migrants, wealth and power have become concentrated in Lima to the point that migrants control village politics.

From the point of view of government planners, the fact that permanent migrants retain their land creates developmental problems. They argue that it encourages instability in the population at a time when Peru needs a stable agricultural and industrial population to facilitate development. Furthermore, they argue that, after two or three generations, migrant populations lose interest in their agricultural land and do not farm even on a sharecropping basis. Land lies fallow and production drops.

The major problem in reconciling the perspectives of migrants and their rural relatives with development planners is that the arrangements between Andean peasants and their migrant relatives follow traditional rules of reciprocity designed to meet immediate needs. Furthermore, villagers view the political sophistication of their migrants as essential when dealing with bureaucratic agencies. Some villages in the Pampas River basin have voted to inscribe those migrants as comuneros who aid in the legal transactions of the communities with the government offices in Lima. In other words, they have decided that migrants can retain their claim to land as long as they act as intermediaries for the rural community.

A final problem I would like to mention is that of the inheritance of land. The 1969 Agrarian Reform Law abolished private property in recognized peasant communities and has furthermore established a lottery system for usufruct distribution. Many Andean communities have authoritative means of redistributing land, controlling crop rotation, and maintaining communal agricultural land, differentiated from private plots, for the benefit of the community (Mishkin 1963, Matos Mar 1964, Fonseca 1972, Mayer 1974). But many communities, such as Chuschi and others in the Pampas River region, control continuous territories extending from high communal grazing lands to agricultural plots held individually in the river valley. Inheritance, ideally, is parallel, that is, from father to sons and mother to daughters.

The reform law defines usufruct rights for heads of household that would negate the right of land to married and single women and thereby drastically
reduce their economic independence. Given the complex nature and diversity of Andean vertical exploitation, it appears that the stipulation of the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law that a peasant have usufruct to one plot adjacent to or near his residence will meet with a great deal of resistance by populations practicing the diversified microzonal exploitation that developed as a successful strategy in the Andes many centuries before the arrival of the Spanish. The geographical distribution and range of variation of vertical exploitation, subsistence, and settlement patterns, as well as inheritance practices and exchange relationships, are beginning to be systematically examined. The government is moving cautiously because it realizes that such information is essential.

According to one source (Marka 1, no. 5), only 137 communities had received a total of 476,000 hectares of land as of June 1975. Some communities have been incorporated into SAISes. However, recent complaints by various of these incorporated communities have been registered with the government to the effect that they do not want to be a part of the SAIS structures but would prefer their independence. Other efforts of incorporation include commercial agricultural empresas, or enterprises that must earn at least 50 percent of their profits from marketing. As of 1974, 263 such enterprises, called grupos campesinos (peasant groups), with 17,000 families controlling 125,000 hectares, have been formed (Alcántara and Vásquez 1974: 75).

In the department of Ayacucho, the National Office of Planning is contemplating forming multicomunity cooperatives directed toward the national market. However, somehow they will have to overcome old rivalries and disputes over land, which are common (see 2.10 for an example).

Mobilizing the peasants of Peru is the stated task of a governmental organization created in 1972 called SINAMOS—Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (National Support System for Social Mobilization). This organization has met with some resistance from the peasant sector, notably in Huancavelica and Cuzco and to a lesser degree in Ayacucho. In November of 1973 there were riots in the streets of Cuzco. The SINAMOS headquarters was burned and martial law was imposed for about a month. There were reports of shootings, but news coverage was limited. Rumors of opposition to SINAMOS came from other parts of the country. As of 1974, strikes among the cooperative members on the coast were occurring, and in February of that same year the national police went on strike in Lima for higher wages. The army surrounded the police headquarters, and official reports claimed that six or seven men were killed, but rumors had the numbers much higher. Martial law and strict curfews were imposed, and order was restored. During the first few days of the strike, looting of downtown stores and businesses near the invasion settlements was phenomenal. People were cutting through metal
protective doors and carrying off stoves, televisions, and other large appliances, and clothing, foodstuffs, and other goods. The new cultural center was burned. The army conducted a house-to-house search in the invasion settlements for the stolen property. For two months a nervous peace was maintained, but one can see that Codler's (1972) prediction of violence had come to pass. The military government desperately needs peace and broad-based support from the various sectors of Peruvian society to accomplish its aims.

The name SINAMOS was designed to connote SIN AMOS, without masters. But many critics argue that the organization often uses repressive measures and has become the new master of the highland peasantry. Recently, both the Agrarian Reform Law and SINAMOS have come under governmental scrutiny. Perhaps the bureaucratization of such an organization has resulted in many development workers' losing sight of their original aim of establishing self-determinancy for the Peruvian peasantry and working class in an effort to perpetuate their jobs. In the summer of 1975, the government greatly reduced the number of SINAMOS employees and is currently redirecting their efforts.

Since the reform law was passed in 1969 there have occurred signs of possible cohesion and solidification of the Peruvian peasantry. The government has organized agrarian leagues under the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA). However, a new peasant organization has emerged, with its center of support in Cuzco; it is called Confederación Campesina Peruana (CCP), the Confederation of Peruvian Peasantry.

In a recent interview Hugo Blanco (1975), the Trotskyite guerrilla who was jailed and deported by Belaúnde's regime, states:

I have returned to Cuzco after 13 years absence, and I have noted great changes. Hacendados have practically disappeared. Nevertheless, one notes that the peasant continues to live in the same misery as before. This is an apparent contradiction. When one converses with peasants, one notices that the form of exploitation has changed. Before, exploitation was more of a feudal type and now it is capitalistic exploitation. Now, the struggle of the peasantry is a struggle against capitalism and against the capitalistic state. . . . it seems to me that the CCP is the greatest and most important centralizing organization that the Peruvian peasantry has had in its entire history. . . . We Trotskyites support the CCP for two reasons: it is independent, and this is fundamental. . . . Our fundamental criticism of the CNA is not for supporting the government but for depending upon the government. . . . [the second reason we support the CCP] is that it depends upon the masses.
Hugo Blanco is voicing a hope that the masses of Peruvian peasantry will reject capitalism for a form of socialism allowing them solidified independence. However, until we understand the dynamics of Andean vertical exploitation, exchange systems, and strategies preferred by the diverse Peruvian peasant communities, we cannot foretell their choices as they approach degrees of national incorporation. In the remainder of this book I attempt to build toward an understanding of one closed corporate community and outline some of the dialectics occurring as the community is made aware of the rushing approach of the outside world.

2.5 On the Way to Chuschi

Before discussing the geographical location and micro-environments of the village of Chuschi, I would like to contrast briefly the departments of Ayacucho and Junín, the major migratory route for Chuschinos destined for Lima. (See map 1.)

Junín has the greatest number of recognized peasant communities (Fajardo 1960), but 60 percent of Junín’s population is urban. The city of Huancayo, situated in the beautiful and fertile valley of the Mantaro River at 3,249 meters, is the most important commercial center in the central Andes, with 1,700 established industries producing textiles, cement, and chemicals. Metal refining and exploitation of wood are also of importance. In 1967, the population of the city of Huancayo was almost 84,000 out of the department’s total of 521,210 (Instituto Nacional de Planificación 1969: 474).

An analysis of migration to and from Huancayo in relation to Lima for 1961 shows that population movement between the two cities remained balanced at 7 to 8 percent (ibid.: 279).

Not only is Huancayo a principal commercial center, the province is also a leader in agricultural production—over 4 billion soles were produced in 1965 (ibid.: 474). The department of Junín plays an important role in feeding the rapidly growing population of metropolitan Lima. The departments of Junín and Lima produce 50 percent of the metropolitan capital’s consumption.

In comparison, the neighboring department of Ayacucho is sixth in geographical size and is third in the number of recognized peasant communities after the departments of Junín and Lima. There are 162 such communities (Fajardo 1960).

In 1967 the city of Ayacucho, situated at 2,752 meters in the bend of the Huatata River, a tributary of the Mantaro, was less than one-third the size of Huancayo, with an urban population of 27,000 out of the department’s total of 410,000 (Instituto Nacional de Planificación 1969: 404-406). The total
urban population of the department of Ayacucho does not equal that of the city of Huancayo.

The city of Ayacucho increased only 2 percent in the twenty-year period between 1940 and 1960. This is due to the migratory flow to Lima. The city of Ayacucho lost 8 percent of its population to Lima in 1961, and only 2 percent returned that year. In comparison with the even flow of population to and from Huancayo and Lima, we see that Ayacucho is not experiencing growth (ibid.: 279).

In large part this is due to the lack of industry in the city. Because it is the department capital, its largest business is, of course, government, which employs the largest number of people. The only industry is artisan cottage weaving, knitting, pottery, leather work, and silver smithing. Ayacucho serves a wide region as a commercial center, but it is principally a center for redistribution of manufactured goods that come from Huancayo and Lima. Transportation therefore is another principal business.

Out of the total population of the department, 77 percent depend on agriculture and herding for subsistence (ibid.: 404). Only 13 percent of the department’s surface sustains production. The northern-eastern portion of the department is ceja de montaña between the Apurímac and the Mantaro rivers. In the extreme south, the snow-capped peak of Sarasara is surrounded by the high table of Parinacochas. Altitudes range from high peaks and cold punas to low temperate and hot valleys.

Corn, grown at middle altitudes, is one of the major products, whereas potatoes, wheat, barley, and other grains and tubers withstand the extremities of the higher altitudes. Fruits, coffee, and cacao are major products of the low valleys. Alpacas, llamas, sheep, and cattle are maintained on the extensive punas. Ayacucho is a melange of diversified microzones where altitude is a major factor. (See plate 2.)

The majority of the department’s population lives between 2,500 and 4,000 meters. In the six provinces the population is unevenly distributed. Lucanas in the south is the largest province, covering 40 percent of the department’s territory. Only four persons per square kilometer inhabit this large puna-dominated region. In Cangallo, where Chuschi is situated, population density reaches twenty-two persons per square kilometer (ibid.: 403).

Of this predominantly agricultural population, only half speak Spanish and over 40 percent are under sixteen years of age. In addition, 74 percent have never received formal education (ibid.: 403-404).

Ayacucho is a prime example of the two negative extremes of the land tenure system—the latifundio and the patchwork minifundio. The majority of the agricultural population (83 percent) holds farm plots that are less than 5 hectares in size, totaling only 28 percent of the department’s arable area,
Plate 2. Exploitation of Andean Vertical Ecology. Aerial view of a typical mid-altitude indigenous community in the department of Ayacucho, with agricultural production above and below the community.
whereas only 17 percent of the agricultural units are over 500 hectares in size and account for 57 percent of the productive land (ibid.: 403-404).

Bourque and Palmer (1975: 213-214) document the events following the expropriation of one of the largest haciendas in Ayacucho. The huge hacienda was utilized primarily for pasture (7,540 hectares), with only 93 hectares for dry farming (mostly potatoes). In October of 1969, this hacienda and twelve others, totaling some 25,000 hectares, were designated as part of a government-organized transitional structure called a PIAR—Integral Rural Settlement Project. This particular PIAR was to specialize in cattle production.

Organized much like the SAIS, the PIAR is visualized as concentrating government technical resources in a given homogeneous geographical area. It guarantees shared profits to its members and assumes that the membership eventually will become part of the Agricultural Production Cooperatives—CAP. However, efforts to cooperativize the traditional peasant sector have not been successful in Ayacucho. Bourque and Palmer (ibid.: 215) state that in December 1971, the scene of the former hacienda was a desolate one. Eighty-eight families had been declared beneficiaries, but those who remained on the land were near starvation. Indiscriminate grazing had ruined the improved pastures; the hacendado had sold the herd of improved cattle, in his eyes to compensate for his loss. No program of technical assistance was organized. And the ultimate irony is that this particular hacienda had been considered a model one. At the time of the expropriation, a plan had been approved to turn a large portion of the land over to the dependent peasants. The owner left Peru, but the peasants remained on the land, their situation becoming worse by the day.

Aside from problems of unequal land distribution, the department of Ayacucho is besieged by problems of high fertility, high mortality, intensive migration, and the uneven distribution of a population that is undereducated and underemployed. These problems are intensified by the lack of adequate systems of communication.

The migrant who leaves Chuschi, usually in search of employment for needed cash, travels by bus for three days to reach Lima. The buses leave Chuschi, which is at the end of the road, three times a week during the dry season and, road conditions permitting, once a week during the rainy season. Travelers crowd onto the buses, carrying produce, animals, wool, and often children to deliver to relatives residing in Lima.

The buses rumble away loaded to the utmost for the long journey, stopping in the nearby villages of Cancha-Cancha and Pomabamba. Then the buses cross the high cold puna of Pampa Cangallo, the home of the light-skinned Morochucos. The ascent continues until the divide between the Pampas and Ayacucho valleys is crossed at about 4,300 meters. Then the
buses toil slowly downward to the city of Ayacucho. Although the distance is only 120 kilometers, the journey to Ayacucho usually takes from six to eight hours.

Beyond Ayacucho the route continues north, following the Mantaro River into the department of Huancavelica, where the Mantaro is crossed at its great bend at Mayoc.

In the spring of 1974 the Mantaro flooded and this bridge was destroyed, disrupting the route between Huancayo and Ayacucho for almost a year. A new bridge was constructed farther north along mining roads. Travelers reach the bustling city of Huancayo toward the end of the second day of their journey. From Huancayo, they follow the railway route northwest through the fertile valley to Jauja and on north to the mining town of La Oroya.

At La Oroya both the road and the railway turn westward and climb upward to the pass at Ticlio, almost 5,000 meters, to descend into the Rímac Valley and the industrial, financial, and governmental heart of Peru—Metropolitan Lima. The buses arrive in the major market area of the city called La Parada—the stop. From there Chuschinos can walk to the invasion settlement where from 250 to 300 fellow villagers are nucleated.

A week does not pass without seeing several Chuschinos taking this long, tortuous journey either to or from Lima. The flow of goods, people, and information is constant. Chuschinos consider the invasion settlement in Lima an important part of their community, and we cannot fully understand the dynamics of change in this closed corporate peasant village without an understanding of the roles played by the migrants, the important cultural brokers who mediate between the closed, self-imposed isolation of the village, and Lima, the center of rapid cultural change (see chapter 8).

2.6 Location

The village of Chuschi is approximately 120 kilometers southwest of Ayacucho, the department capital, and 30 kilometers from Cangallo, the province capital, via an unpaved road (see maps 2 and 3). Prior to 1961, Chuschi communicated with department and province capitals and points beyond via foot paths and llama trails. Then, in 1961, Public Works of Ayacucho built a road from the department capital to Cancha-Cancha, 10 kilometers from the village of Chuschi. In 1966 the remaining 10 kilometers were completed by public communal labor, called faena, which obliges every household to contribute so many days of labor under pain of a fine. The village government provides coca for each laborer.

The completion of this road has facilitated the movement of the traffic to and from Chuschi and has increased the community’s importance as a market
center (see map 4). Bus lines already communicate between the village and Lima, as described above (2.5), and communication with the coast will be further increased when the village completes a road that will connect with the new road, Los Libertadores, that extends from Ayacucho to the old mining center of Castrovirreyna and then descends to the coast at Chincha and Ica. It is expected that this project will take several years to complete through the traditional obligatory communal labor.

The village of Chuschi has been an important market, administrative, and ceremonial center for the surrounding area for at least four hundred years. Once a week, on Fridays, people from distant communities converge on Chuschi to buy the manufactured goods brought in by some twenty to thirty traveling market vendors. The items most in demand are coca and cane alcohol, trago, the necessary elements for any ritual activity. Clothing, aluminum cooking pots, school supplies, dyes, and numerous small items such as needles, thread, safety pins, and decorative costume jewelry are conspicuous consumer items. Some fresh food stuffs are sold also. Wool and cheese are the two products that are produced in any quantity by the peasants. Entrepreneurs (very often women) from the department capital buy wool, cheese, and eggs and sell them to the market vendors in Ayacucho. Occasionally, a peasant, or a community, will sell an animal at the market. Animals are important as ready cash reserves. Pigs, sheep, goats, and cattle are sold. Rarely does one see llamas or alpacas sold in the village market, but occasionally guinea pigs are sold or traded.

Chuschi is also the communication center for llama and mule trains that carry goods to communities beyond the road and bring in goods to the road to be transported by truck. The completion of the road has enabled the few mestizo families holding land in the area to produce for the Ayacucho or Lima markets. However, the greatest impact of the road has been to open up a consumer market consisting of the communities along this part of the Pampas River. People walk one or two days to Chuschi to attend the weekly market. (See plate 3.)

The village is situated in a deep valley on one of the tributaries of the Pampas River, known by several names—Chuschi Mayo, Taksa Mayo, and, in the past, Chocloqocha Mayo. This small river serves as the boundary between Chuschi and its great rival, the peasant community of Quispillacta, whose central plaza is only 200 meters from the plaza of Chuschi. The conflicts between these two villages will be discussed in 2.7. Directly above the village to the southeast is the mountain peak, Chuschi Urqo, that prevents the sun from warming the village until 8:00 or 8:30 in the morning. The sun disappears behind the mountains at 4:30 in the afternoon, causing a variation in daytime-nighttime temperatures from a warm 75-80 degrees in the
Plate 3. Market Day in Chuschi. The boys' primary school is on the left. The view is to the south, showing communities across the Pampas River in the province of Víctor Fajardo.
daytime during the dry season to below freezing after the sun disappears. The daily variation is not so extreme during the rainy season.

Chuschi is dominated physically and supernaturally by the mountain peak, Comañawi (also called Humankiklla), and the powerful mountain deity or Wamani believed to reside there. This peak rises to an altitude of approximately 4,750 meters and is located south of Chuschi across the Pampas River in the province of Víctor Fajardo. The village is the capital of the district of the same name, covering 271.50 square kilometers. The Pampas River separates the district of Chuschi from the province of Víctor Fajardo to the south, and the district of Socos Vinchos borders on the north, María Parado de Bellido borders on the east, and Totos and Paras border on the west (see map 4 and plate 4.)

Since the nearest haciendas are some fifteen kilometers away in the province of Huamanga, Chuschinos have not felt direct hacienda domination. There is one small hacienda in the district that became the object of an organized invasion (see 10.33). Chuschi is an independent peasant community whose status was secured through the efforts of a small group of migrants in 1941. There are two other recognized communities in the district with lands that border on Chuschi’s, Quispillaqta and Cancha-Cancha. Not surprisingly, land disputes are a dominant theme in the documents and records of the village.

Chuschi represents one of the negative extremes of land tenure in Ayacucho, discussed in 2.5. Chuschinos hold on the average one and one-half to two hectares of agricultural land per household, relegating Chuschi to the bottom of the minifundio extreme. Furthermore, the maximum of two hectares held by the average household is usually dispersed throughout the community’s diverse ecological zones in as many as fifteen or twenty tiny fields.

2.7 Ecology and Agricultural Cycle

The village of Chuschi is situated at an altitude of 3,154 meters between the two ecological extremes under its control: the communal pasture land on the high puna reaching above 4,000 meters, and the individual, family-controlled land in the steep valley of the Pampas River below 3,300 meters. The village therefore exploits three distinct zones of what John Murra has termed the “vertical ecology” of the Andes (1967, 1968, 1970, 1972):

1. The sallqa or puna—3,300 meters to above 4,000. It is divided into an upper region, beginning at about 3,600 meters, which supports herds of alpacas, llamas, sheep, and cattle, and a lower region, 3,300 to 3,600 meters, where tubers such as potatoes, ocas, ullucos, and mashuas as well as wheat, barley, and quinua are grown. (See plate 5.)
Plate 5. Alpacas. On the *sallqa*, or puna, directly above Chuschi.
2. The *qichwa*—below 3,300 meters. This is the important corn-producing zone, which makes it the most valued of the three. The village is located in the *qichwa* at 3,154 meters. This zone, too, is divided into upper and lower regions; the lower limit is uncertain, but conjoins with the third zone. (See plate 6.)

3. The *mayopatan* or river bottom—2,300 meters. It provides cactus fruit, some tree fruits, and squash. Corn is also produced in this zone.

This pattern of exploitation of vertical zones is ancient in the Andes. Murra (1972) demonstrates that vertical control was maintained through the systematic relocation of populations in the various economic zones. This practice has become known as the *mitmaq* system after the Inca practice; however, Murra's document research provides five different cases of Andean groups of diverse political and economic development between 1460 and 1560. W. H. Isbell (1968) argues that this pattern of vertical exploitation dates at least from Middle Horizon times. What is apparent in Chuschi is a pattern of exploitation in which the nucleated settlement is located at about 3,000 meters, which marks the maximum altitude of corn cultivation in the Pampas Valley. The *sallqa* zones above the village as well as the *mayopatan* below the village can be exploited easily. Each member of the community attempts to control land in each of these zones to maximize his success with varied crops as well as to diminish the environmental threats of any one zone. The Agrarian Reform Law of 1969 stipulates that a communal member of a peasant community must reside adjacent to his agricultural land or at least nearby. The law also stipulates that such a member shall have usufruct right to one agricultural plot, not various small ones. This stipulation is an effort to diminish the unproductive minifundio. Strict enforcement of the above could be disastrous to the subsistence farmer who relies on vertical exploitation of various zones for success.

The agricultural cycle is determined by the two distinct seasons. The rainy season begins in late September, and planting is officially begun by the ritual cleaning of the irrigation canals at that time. The dry season is ushered in by the harvest festival in May. Often rains continue into May, but the major rains occur during the months of November through April. During the rainy season the village is often cut off from the outside world due to landslides and impassable roads.

Corn fields are irrigated before the initial planting in late September through November. After planting they are irrigated again, and if rainfall is sufficient, further irrigation is not necessary. Corn is harvested in June, after which herds are brought down off the high puna to feed on the stalks remaining in the fields. Potatoes are planted in November and December, but irrigation is not essential to potato cultivation.
Plate 6. The Qichwa Zone. A family plants a corn field, the women sowing seeds, the men plowing.
Division of labor in agriculture is sex-based. Women must always place the seed for planting. They also select the seed after harvest and reserve it for the next planting. At a wedding ceremony the female relatives of the bride and groom donate seed for the couple’s first planting. Men operate the plow and the native hoe, the *lampa*, while women place the seed and help with weeding and mounding earth around the young plants, which is performed twice during the growing season. Both men and women harvest in the following order: *ocas* are first; then potatoes, *mashua*, wheat, and barley; finally the corn fields interspersed with broad beans.

When the first corn field is planted, a celebration is observed in which the man and woman invite their compadres to plant the field, and a special chicha (corn beer) is prepared with toasted ground *quinua* (an indigenous high-altitude grain) sprinkled on the top. This drink is called *machka*. Planting and harvesting require communal labor, with relatives and compadres reciprocally aiding one another. When someone requests labor, he is calling together a *minka*, and those who respond to his request are giving *ayni* and expect repayment. Such reciprocal labor is essential to the subsistence agriculture of Chuschi.

2.8 The Natives’ Conceptualization of Their Ecology

The vertical zones of Chuschi’s ecology are conceptualized onto space through the delineation of boundaries between each of the zones and their subzones. The boundaries are demarcated by the location of chapels housing crosses. The focal point of the conceptual scheme is the village, which mediates between the high puna, *sallqa*, and the river bottom, *mayopatan* (see map 1). The village itself is divided into two localized barrios, one to the north called *Hanay* (Upper) Barrio and the other to the south called *Uray* (Lower) Barrio. Thirteen chapels are said to belong to the barrios, seven to Lower Barrio and six to Upper Barrio. The chapels, all housing crosses, radiate out along three access trails from two matrix chapels located within the boundary of the village. In chapter 6 we shall see that the chapels are the locales of fertility and harvest rituals. The organization of space is essentially conceived of concentrically, with the mirror halves of the village, Upper Barrio and Lower Barrio, at the center. The village is said to be civilized, whereas the term *sallqa* literally means savage. The agricultural zone is located between the nucleated village and the savage tundra. We can consider the *mayopatan* as part of the agricultural zone. Therefore, disregarding the accidents of geography, the conceptual pattern of Chuschino space is concentric, with the civilized village at the center opposed to the savage puna, the *sallqa*. (See map 5.)

The dual opposition of civilized versus savage is dramatized during Corpus
MAP 5

BARRIO DIVISION
ECOLOGICAL ZONES
PLAZA
COUNCIL BUILDING
CHURCH
MATRIX CHAPEL
CHAPEL
CEMETERY
BRIDGE
RIVER
Christi in May or June when the *sallqaruna*, or “savage men” of the puna, depicted by herders on horseback, descend on the village and enact savagery by defiling the Virgin Mary and insulting anyone they encounter. Also, the *sallqa* is where sexual acts not permitted in the village, such as incest and other illicit encounters, occur. Young single people arrange group rendezvous in the *sallqa*, which begin with marathon dancing and drinking and terminate in indiscriminate sexual intercourse. Such behavior is not tolerated within the boundaries of the village, where the traditional authorities, the *varayyoq*, patrol and arrest anyone engaging in such activities within the civilized zone.

The puna, or *sallqa*, begins above the altitude of corn cultivation at about 3,000 meters. This zone is delineated by chapels at its lower and upper boundaries. The upper *sallqa* begins at about 3,600 meters and continues to well above 4,000 meters. The highest regions of the tundra are the domains of the mountain deities, the Wamanis.

As owners of all plants and animals, the Wamanis are the most powerful indigenous deities of the Pampas region. Their residences are the highest mountains and puna lakes, which villagers never approach alone. A sickness called *puqyo unqoy* may be inflicted on anyone who walks beside a puna lake at night or who neglects the necessary rituals and offerings. The Wamanis must be placated with ritual payments to insure personal safety and the fertility of one’s animals. If angered, the Wamanis can devour the hearts of men and cause miscarriages and infant deaths. Ritual payments are made by individual families twice a year, during August and February, when the earth is “open” and the Wamanis are especially receptive to offerings.

The most powerful Wamani of the district of Chuschi resides in the lake, Yanaqocha, at an altitude of 5,095 meters northeast of the village in the communal puna lands called Chicllarazo (see maps 4 and 5 for locations of entities discussed). This particular Wamani commands the other Wamanis of the district, just as the highest military official commands those under him. He is also believed by many to communicate directly with the national president in Lima in Chuschi’s behalf. Two subordinate Wamanis reside in the mountain Ontaqarqa and in the lake Tapaqocha, both located in the high puna.

The Wamanis preside over territories and have an organizational hierarchy likened to provincial governmental structure. They are described as tall, white, bearded males who dress elaborately in western dress. Their palaces, located inside the mountains and lakes, are sumptuously furnished in gold and silver. The Wamanis transform themselves into condors and are associated with crosses and chapels. A group of children whom I asked to draw pictures of Wamanis depicted them as (1) richly dressed men (often bearded) living inside a mountain, (2) condors flying over the peaks, or (3) simply as mountain peaks and lakes with crosses located nearby. Palomino (1968) argues that the
The cross of the Andes is a prehispanic concept that reflects the indigenous symbolism of fertility and abundance. An examination of Chuschi’s complex of crosses and the rituals associated with them supports this view.

The communal grazing lands of Chuschi—Inga Wasi, Chicllarazo, and the church’s Cofradía de Buena Memoria—are located in the upper sallqa. The communal lands are said to belong to the village as a whole, and there are chapels with guardian saints at Inga Wasi and Chicllarazo. These two santas menores, as they are called, are cared for by the sallqa varayoq, who also dedicate a year to the tending of the church’s, 250 head of cattle and 1,500 head of sheep. The two santas menores are small replicas of Mama Rosa and Mama Olimpia in the village church. Twice a year, in June and December (during the solstices), the “daughters” (the small replicas) descend from their sallqa chapels and visit their “mothers” in the village church, where they remain until the ritual cleaning of the irrigation canals, the Yarqa Aspiy (6.2), which takes place around the time of the equinox in September.

Within the civilized village, the matrix chapels in the barrios are the meeting places of the dual prestige hierarchies, the varayoq of the Upper and Lower Barrios. Their principal tasks are twofold: the care of the chapels and other sacred places and the care of the dual irrigation systems. Residence in one of the moieties determines eligibility in the varayoq structure.

The concentric spatial pattern is repeated within the village itself. Upper and Lower Barrios are a basic dual pattern that is disturbed by the penetration of political and religious domination in the center of the village, represented by the church and the bureaucratic government. The Quechua-speaking communal members speak of these institutions as belonging to the category of foreigners associated with the threatening outside world that impinges on their closed corporate universe. We can conceptualize the organization of the ecological zones thus:

```
savage
  agricultural
    civilized
      village
    zones
  puna
```
The civilized village and its two barrios are positive forces; the agricultural zones mediate between the civilized village and the savage part of the world, the *sallqa* or puna. Likewise, the spatial organization of the village itself is concentric; the foreign, dominating outside world has penetrated the center of the village in the form of the church and the bureaucratic government, while the indigenous moieties maintain the traditional way of life. The *qalas*, or foreigners, have the opposite perspective; they see themselves as occupying the (positive) center of the village oriented to the outside world. From their viewpoint, the moieties are negative.

![Diagram](image)

2.9 A Note on the Prehistory of Chuschi

The prehistory of the region is little known. Recently archaeological work has been initiated in the Pampas River Valley with focus on San Miguel in the province of La Mar (W. H. Isbell 1973). The survey was begun in the Chuschi-Sarhua area in 1967 (see W. H. Isbell 1968, 1972a; also Raymond and Isbell 1969). One of the most interesting aspects of the 1967 work was the recovery of a classic Tiahuanaco artifact eroding from the wall of a circular platform mound called Plaza Pata, located below the modern village of Chuschi toward the Pampas River. The circular platform is constructed of rubble-filled fieldstone typical of the Middle Horizon site of Wari. The platform is forty-two meters in diameter across its flat top, which is under cultivation. The height of the platform varies from two to four meters, with variation due in large part to agricultural modifications. A ramp appears to project from the northeast side of the structure.

The artifact is pictured in Bonavia (1972: 55) and is discussed in Raymond and Isbell (1969). Burned llama bones were found in association with the vessel, which is called a *puma incensario* and features a modeled feline head projecting from an open body with a scalloped rim. This Middle Horizon style,
dating to about 700 A.D., had never been found previously this far north of Lake Titicaca.

W. H. Isbell (personal communication) is of the opinion that the vessel is a copy of classic Tiahuanaco, indicating some form of direct contact with a classic Tiahuanaco site, such as trade or political hegemony. Another Middle Horizon site, called Pillawa, is located across the Taksa Mayo River outside the modern village of Quispillaqta. This site had larger and denser occupation than Plaza Pata. W. H. Isbell (personal communication) suggests that Pillawa was a village site and Plaza Pata a ceremonial center.

There are numerous hilltop sites around Chuschi, with simple brown or red ceramic assemblages including ollas with low, slightly flaring collars and sub-hemispherical bowls (W. H. Isbell 1972c). There is disagreement as to the interpretation of these sites. Lumbreras (1959) proposes that they represent Late Intermediate occupation by the Chanca Confederacy in the Pampas region. We know from documentary sources (Rowe 1963: 188) that the Chancas centered in the province of Andahuaylas. They began an expansion by conquest about the same time as the Incas. The Chancas almost destroyed the Inca Empire at the end of Viracocha's reign (ibid.: 189). Since there is no evidence that the Chancas ever inhabited the Pampas region, the counter view to Lumbreras's is held by W. H. Isbell (in Bonaví a 1972), who argues that these sites represent a population that had been in the Pampas since Middle Horizon times or earlier. He further hypothesizes that Quechua speakers occupied the Pampas Valley and represent the expansion of maize farmers from the northeastern Andes southward into available low valleys with ample rainfall. This expansion was effected by the simple adaptation of slope cultivation utilizing semiterraces and dry farming. His argument maintains that the Pampas region was penetrated by these Quechua-speaking maize farmers continuously from at least Middle Horizon times or before and that the Inca expansion represents one of these waves.

2.10 A Brief Historical Sketch

During colonial times Chuschi was the administrative center for seven villages known as the Curato de Chuschi: Chuschi, Quispillaqta, Cancha-Cancha, Huarcaya, Tomanga, Auquilla, and Sarhua. Today the political division of the district of Chuschi is different; the latter four villages are now in the province of Víctor Fajardo (see map 4). When asked how Chuschi is divided, informants still say “into seven parts” and name the original seven villages of the curato, for which Chuschi serves as the market center. Even though the district of Chuschi was created in 1857 covering 271.50 square kilometers, a reduction of the area of the colonial curato, Chuschi remains the market
center—and to a lesser degree the administrative and ceremonial center—for the seven villages. The latter point is evidenced by the fact that some of the villages still send santas menores to “visit their parents” in the Chuschi church; this symbolizes their subordinate status to Chuschi as an administrative and ceremonial center. With the restructuring of the provinces, Chuschi lost its place as the official center for the seven villages, but some hierarchy may still exist among the indigenous prestige officials, the varayoq, as a vestige of the political structure of the colonial era.

Chuschi was recognized as an indigenous community, under present law called a peasant community, in 1941 as a result of the efforts of a small group of migrants residing in Lima. The other two principal villages of the district, Quispillaqta and Cancha-Cancha, are also legally recognized peasant communities, which means their large expanses of communal grazing lands cannot be alienated from the community directly controlling usufruct rights.

The earliest historical documentation pertaining to the village of Chuschi is a portion of the official report of an inspection in the province of Vilcas Huamán by the visitador Juan de Palomares in 1574, discovered by R. T. Zuidema. There was an earlier visita, conducted by Damián de la Bandera, but the report has not been found. (See Zuidema 1966 for a discussion of the ethnohistory of the Pampas River area). Palomares recorded the various land boundaries of the indigenous communities in the province.

From this document we know that Chuschi belonged to the labor grant (repartimiento) of Juan de Mañueco, a resident of the department capital, Guamanga (modern Ayacucho), who had been granted the Aymaraes Indians of Chuschi, Cancha-Cancha, and Moros. The Aymaraes were resettled in the Pampas by the Incas after the Chanca defeat. In a later document (1593), the Aymaraes Indians claim that they were relocated from the Apurímac by Topa Inca Yupanqui. According to John Rowe’s calculations (1963: 203), Topa Inca Yupanqui reigned from 1471 to 1493, which places the founding of the village during the late fifteenth century.

The principal chief (cacique) of the Aymaraes of Chuschi, Cancha-Cancha, and Moros was Antonio Astocabana, who succeeded the first principal chief named by Damián de la Bandera. This chief, called Guacra, had died, leaving no heirs. Antonio Astocabana, declaring that he was ill and had no sons willing to assume the office, petitioned that his brother, Juan Astocabana, succeed him in the office of cacique of the Aymaraes of Chuschi, Cancha-Cancha, and Moros.

Juan Astocabana declared that the Aymaraes of these three villages possessed forty-five llamas, eleven sheep, and twenty-three male and seventy-three female alpacas. There is no mention of population size for any of the villages. However, some idea of the ethnic complexity of the region is clear.
The province of Vilcas was totally repopulated by the Incas with tribes from various regions of the empire. Besides the Aymaraes from the Apurímac region and the fierce Angaraes from Huancavelica, as well as Incas of privilege, the Chilques, and Yungas Indians from Canas south of Cuzco and from Muchic (Zuidema 1966: 71), Palomares also mentions Quichuas, Condes, Papres, Cañares Quitos, and finally the Tanquiguas, who are said to be the only original inhabitants of the province of Vilcas Huamán (Jiménez de la Espada 1965: 219). The Tanquiguas had their headquarters in the curato of Guambalpa. Palomares mentions a boundary between the Tanquiguas and the Aymaraes near the lake Yaguarcocha, which is near the source of the Pampas River, the lake Choclococha.

The next major ethnohistorical source is Jiménez de la Espada’s publication of the Relaciones geográficas de Indias–Perú (1965). The relación of Vilcas Huamán was written by the corregidor Pedro de Carbajal in 1586. It describes briefly the curato of Chuschi, which was composed of four villages: Chuschi, nearby Cancha-Cancha, Sarhua, now in Víctor Fajardo, and Moros. The first three still exist, but the fourth, a reducción across the Pampas River, was abandoned during the colonial period. The relación (1965: 204) states that the Incas maintained 30,000 troops in Vilcas Huamán as an administrative and defensive center. In 1586 the capital of Vilcas was depopulated; the Indians of Vilcas had been diminished greatly, largely through service in the mines and as servants and herders for the Spanish, and the relación states that the Inca subjects went back to their original provinces.

In pre-Inca times, each ethnic population of the region was subject to its own chiefs and owed them personal service, such as house building, weaving, and agricultural and herding duties. The general language was Quechua, and each village had its own gods (ibid.: 207).

After the Inca conquest, the area was depopulated except for the Tanquiguas and repopulated by the Inca mitmaq resettlement policy. As stated earlier, this resulted in ethnic diversification, with groups from as far away as Quito and Cañares in Ecuador, the Yungas south of Cuzco, the Apurímac, and Muchic on the coast. Aymará was spoken in addition to Quechua throughout the province. The Incas imposed their own gods, the sun and the moon, as supreme deities. The relación states that the old sacred objects, the huacas, were destroyed; however, if present-day Catholicism is an example, it is likely that the ethnic populations brought their own religious concepts with them and added the sun and the moon to the pantheon.

The relación geográfica does not mention Quispillaqta, the neighboring village of Chuschi. However, Palomares states that in a deep ravine, half a league from a plain called Calcabamba, two villages have been settled, one called Chuschi, populated by the Aymaraes Indians of Mañueco, and one called
Locroca, belonging to Pedro de Rivera (written Rribera); both villages are surrounded by many corn fields, and they are separated by a small arroyo. This description corresponds to the location of modern Chuschi and Quispillaqta. Furthermore, the document describes the location of modern Cancha-Cancha, also populated by Aymaraes Indians of Mañueco (see map 4). However, Palomares mentions a village on the banks of the Calcamayo River called San Bartolomé de Calcabamba. The latter does not exist today, either on the Pampas River or its tributaries.

The modern oral history maintains that Chuschi was relocated from the plain of Calcabamba to its present location after three consecutive disappearances of a small effigy of El Dulce Nombre de Jesús (The Sweet Name of Jesus) from the Calcabamba chapel. The effigy of Jesus as a boy was found three times at the site of modern Chuschi. This theme of three disappearances and encounters of a religious statue as a origin myth is common to neighboring villages as well. The pampa of Calcabamba does have a chapel, but there is no evidence of house structures or refuse indicating a nucleated village.

The third important early source from the village archive of Quispillaqta is a copy of a decree, dated 1593, by the corregidor Blasco Núñez de Vela in Vilcas Huamán. (See Appendix.) Two Indians, Antonio Astocabana, principal chief of the village of Chuschi and all the Aymaraes of Juan Mañueco, and García Yanqui Tanta, also a principal from Chuschi, appeared before the corregidor. They claimed that the Canas Indians were usurping land allotted to them by Topa Inca Yupanqui with the aid of Negro slaves belonging to Diego de la Rivera. The Canas Indians produced an auto prepared by a previous corregidor of Vilcas, Damián de la Bandera, that stated they had been relocated from Canas, south of Cuzco, by Wayna Cápac. Blasco Núñez ruled that the Canas had legal claim to 10 topos of land to the west of the river. They have remained and expanded as the Chuschi population has declined.

In 1602 another dispute between the Aymaraes of Chuschi and the Canas Indians, now of Luis Rivera, Diego's son, comes before the corregidor in Vilcas. This document states that there were fifty Indians in the encomienda of Luis Rivera at the time. This is the only reference to population that we have. I assume that the reference is to fifty tribute-paying Indians and that we might assume a population of around four or five hundred. Unfortunately, there is no mention of the number of Indians in Chuschi. The reference to a land grant, an encomienda, is substantiated by oral history.

The disputes between Chuschi and Quispillaqta have continued through the centuries. The last actual battle occurred in 1959 when the two villages fought over boundaries of puna grazing land. It began with slingshots and stones but culminated in three Quispillaqta deaths by shotgun wounds inflicted by a Chuschino. A few months later a Chuschino was ambushed in
the puna in retaliation. The situation between Chuschi and Quispillaqta had reached the point in 1969 that Chuschi attempted to prevent Quispillaqta from receiving piped-in drinking water that originated in the puna of Chuschi. Government technicians prevented a conflict by proclaiming that water belonged to the state, not individual communities. Conflict between the two villages is heightened by the fact that Chuschi’s population is declining due to outward migration while Quispillaqta’s is increasing.