Introduction

The cultural landscape of Berlin is today undergoing significant change. In a city divided by the Cold War until 1989, the governments of both East and West Berlin transformed their cities into showpieces for their respective ideologies; "real existing socialism" on the one hand and capitalism and democracy on the other. As a result, reunified Berlin boasts an unusually rich and multifaceted cultural scene, especially in the realm of music. Three opera houses and six orchestras receive funding from the *Land* of Berlin. However, because of Berlin's severe financial problems, the cultural scene is also marked by deep insecurity. Can such a multiplicity of publicly funded orchestras, theaters, museums and especially opera houses survive in the long run?

Opera poses a unique set of problems, not only because it is the most expensive of publicly subsidized art forms, but also because it has traditionally represented, to use Jane Fulcher's term, "the nation's image."

Compared to France and Italy, Germany was late in establishing a national operatic culture. Nonetheless, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, vastly different political regimes in Germany have seen opera and the funding of opera houses as central to national identity.

The Berlin Republic, financially troubled and struggling with the development of a usable cultural identity after reunification, bears some striking similarities to debates about culture in the first German democracy, the Weimar Republic. Then as now, the questions of who ought to fund opera, how many opera houses could be supported by the

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1 Fulcher, *The Nation's Image.*
city of Berlin, and whether an "elite" art form deserved so much support in a democracy are subjects of intense controversy. Of course, there are also many important differences. The major one is that in the 1920s the idea of an opera public drawn from all strata of society was still a viable idea. Any representative national culture is of necessity far more fragmented today. Many Germans would no doubt feel intensely uncomfortable with such an idea, although in recent years there have been attempts to re-establish a distinct sense of German identity. Weimar culture does, however, provide a precedent for the complex interplay of democracy, opera and representation.

This study explores the history of the Kroll Opera (1927-1931) which, despite its legendary status in Weimar culture, has never been the subject of a full-length study. In its brief existence the Kroll gained passionate supporters and equally passionate detractors. This was due to its status as a representative institution of republican culture. Its fortunes therefore stood or fell with those of the Republic. As an object of nostalgia for the lost "golden twenties", the Kroll has taken on mythic status since it was forced to close in 1931. It casts a long shadow up to the present day. In one of the last interviews he ever gave, the late Götz Friedrich, Intendant of the Deutsche Oper in the former West Berlin, referred to the "progressive" tradition of the Kroll as something his house wished to emulate.² The Deutsche Oper was reviving two works rarely performed in Germany which had also been produced at the Kroll, Verdi's "Luisa Miller" and Marschner's "Hans Heiling."³

² OpernZeit, September 2000.
³ Ibid.
Friedrich's use of the Kroll as a symbol is indicative of the way in which nostalgia for the 1920s defines Berlin culture today. The reunified city, lacking a sense of civic identity, looks back to a period in which Berlin was the center of artistic innovation. What this nostalgia misses, however, is that the cultural experiments of the Weimar era were supported by cultural policies which viewed artistic education as a major project of the Prussian state. Politicians do not have the will or the means to reproduce this situation today. The achievements of the 1920s thus appear all the more admirable.

Nostalgia for Weimar culture is usually based on the notion that Berlin was central to the newest and most advanced developments in the arts. It is, however, a mistake to reduce the role of Berlin to the role of the avant-garde. This is the fundamental mistake made by many studies, the best known being those of Peter Gay and Walter Laqueur. On the issue of opera in particular, their analyses are faulty. This is because the story of opera in the Weimar era is not primarily the story of those works which might be described as avant-garde. The paradigm of "outsider as insider" and the rise of such phenomena as jazz, "Americanization", and the fusion of high and mass culture are often wrongly held to be typical of Weimar culture as a whole. Both authors mention the Kroll Opera exactly once in their studies. Laqueur's brief description is typical of common misconceptions about the Kroll: "In the Kroll Opera House Furtwängler and Klemperer conducted Hindemith as well as Stravinsky's "Oedipus Rex", Milhaud and Schönberg, even though the public preferred "Tosca"

and "Madame [sic ] Butterfly." In addition to being incorrect (Wilhelm Furtwängler never conducted at the Kroll) this sentence intends to convey two things about the Kroll: that it was heavily committed to contemporary works, and that it performed operas far removed from the preferences of the general public. Both statements are untrue. The fact that there is so little work on the specific topic of Weimar opera does not clarify matters.

Thus, although the Kroll has attracted the attention of historians of the Weimar period, there has still not been a sustained attempt to establish its cultural meaning. Too often, as in the above example, it remains a cliché as a rare example of how opera can be “avant-garde”. Hans Curjel, the former dramaturge at the Kroll, lent credence to this view when he published a book of documentation on it in 1971, which portrayed it as an institution ahead of its time. According to Curjel's account, it focused on artistic values rather than the escapism most contemporary audiences associated with opera. Curjel also included documentation of the Kroll's financial ties to the Berlin Volksbühne, a theater-goers' organization associated with the Social Democratic party. The Volksbühne financed the renovation of the house in return for a certain number of state-subsidized performances. Curjel's materials imply that Kroll supporters viewed it as an opera representative of republican values, and thus politically and socially progressive. Because the Kroll was viewed as offensive by right-wing politicians, for both political and aesthetic reasons, it had to close.

This is only partially correct. The closing in 1931 was due to political pressures, but to focus only on how the Kroll was destroyed by

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5 Laqueur, Weimar, p. 156
its enemies ignores the internal conflicts within the organization. There was no unity regarding aesthetic aims. The opera's claim to the status of a "social" organization was paradoxical because it did not sustain contact with its core audience, the Volksbühne members, who made up about 50% of the audience three nights a week. The task of enabling less well-off people to go to the opera could have been accomplished through cooperation with one of the other opera houses in Berlin, but the contractual arrangement which existed at the Kroll was unique in Germany. As the Volkbühne had ensured the Kroll's existence as an independent opera house, its members rightly felt that they should have some voice in its artistic policy. Archival records show that the policies of conductor Otto Klemperer and those he hired managed to alienate many of them. This was not primarily due to the Kroll's unusual interpretations of works from the standard repertory. In fact, the board of the Volksbühne protested that they were not being taken seriously, and were palmed off with too many light or less well-known operas. Visual aesthetics did not play the primary role in this conflict. What was the artistic principle animating the Kroll? Curjel provided an important clue when he spoke in later years of an "Entoperung der Oper" (taking the opera out of opera) which animated the Kroll. It would destroy what opera had become by the early twentieth century, in order to purify it and begin anew.

Other sources have failed to provide a full picture of how the Kroll's artistic aims were tied to state political aims and the culture of the city of Berlin. John Rockwell’s dissertation on the Prussian Ministry of Culture and its opera policy included a section on the Kroll, but did not
explore why the opera house became such an important political symbol. In the context of creating a republican cultural policy, the Ministry of Culture also had to create a republican opera. This meant primarily that opera, the most socially exclusive musical form, had to become accessible to those with lower incomes. Leo Kestenberg, responsible for musical matters at the Ministry, was committed to a concept of culture as the basis for a classless society. Rockwell considered Kestenberg's notions of Bildung antiquated, but this overlooks the fact that Bildung could become vital again only if it were democratized and expanded to the working class and less well-off people. This was a project which theoretically corresponded to Klemperer's idea of an "opera for every day" which would dispense with the pomp and snobbery which had characterized opera houses before 1918. In practice, however, bad decisions concerning the repertory and poor communication with the Volksbühne led to conflict. Only in its last year did the Kroll begin to create its own devoted public, but by that time economic disaster meant that few people had any time for culture and were willing to sanction the closing of the opera house with the weakest lobby. When hundreds of operas and theaters all over Germany faced financial collapse, the fate of the Kroll seemed logical.

Peter Heyworth's biography of Otto Klemperer ignores the ways in which Klemperer subverted his own project. Heyworth dismisses all aspects of performance at the Kroll which cannot be traced back to his subject's aims and ideas. In Heyworth's view, while musical quality

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8 Peter Heyworth, Otto Klemperer: His Life and Times. See particularly Volume 1 (Cambridge 1983)
remained high, other aspects of the Kroll's experimental aims were misguided. To separate "purely" musical innovations from aesthetic and political innovations is, however, highly questionable. The most interesting aspect of the Kroll is the tension between its artistic innovations and its social role. Other operas, such as those in Darmstadt or Kassel, were equally innovative but far less controversial because Berlin as a cultural capital drew so much attention. Most state and communal theaters allotted some tickets at a reduced price to theatergoers' organizations; in no other case, however, did such an organization play a founding role. My study examines more closely the motives of the artists involved in the Kroll, those of the Prussian Ministry of Culture, and those of officials of the Volksbühne, responsible for financing the project. This involves an examination of the state's role in supporting culture, which was written into the Weimar constitution. The 1931 debates in the Prussian Landtag over the projected closing of the Kroll revealed the question of the state's cultural obligations to its citizens to be a highly ambiguous one.

Those who appeared at these hearings frequently used the phrase "soziale Kunstpflege" (social support of art) which could mean two different things. Was the state merely obligated to provide money, or to actively sponsor cultural education to change the artistic expectations of audiences? The former definition could easily justify closing the Kroll, because the state could arrange to provide seats at reduced prices at one of the two other houses, the State Opera and the Municipal Opera. The latter definition supports the unique role of the Kroll within the Berlin cultural landscape, because its productions did not resemble those of the other two
opera houses. Evidence from these debates and from the press of the time indicates that the political stakes involved in sponsoring or attacking the Kroll were high. Its founders intended it to initiate a new conception of opera more compatible with the political aims of Weimar. Thus, the Kroll became representative of republican culture.

My project focuses on the Kroll as a means of exploring the concept of civic culture. This is in keeping with the general aim of my research, which addresses opera, particularly German opera, in the context of politics, civic identity and urban culture. In the historiography of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany, there exists a significant gap which the project attempts to fill. Although much material on bourgeois culture in the nineteenth century exists, the question of an integrated civic culture from the Wilhelmine period onwards has remained largely untouched, as scholars have devoted far more attention to describing class conflict and, in the area of urban history, working-class subcultures. Thorough studies of Berlin were extremely difficult to write before 1989 because, unlike London or Paris, the city's unresolved political situation hampered research and prevented definitive conclusions about the future of Berlin's cultural life. This situation has changed, so it is time for scholars to address the lack of studies on civic culture in Berlin. The Volksbühne, like other organizations close to the Social Democrats, has often been blamed for not developing an idea of proletarian culture. However, this was never its goal. Its leaders consistently spoke out for a culture which would include all classes. Theater and opera could serve as a basis for a new form of civic culture appropriate to the republic.
The innovations of the Weimar period did, however, have roots in the past and in the ideals of Bildung which evolved over the course of the nineteenth century. Chapter 1 discusses the various conceptions of the "national theater" which developed before 1914 and greatly influenced the attitudes of those who founded the Kroll. Chapter 2 describes the founding of Prussia's Ministry of Culture after 1918 and its stance toward opera as a vital ingredient of cultural policy. Chapter 3 discusses the Kroll's first season in the context of the "crisis of opera" discussion of the mid-1920s. Chapter 4 focuses on the Zeitoper form and considers the question of how this form relates to Weimar operatic life as a whole. Chapter 5 explores the Kroll's aesthetics and how they corresponded, or failed to correspond, to its role as a republican institution. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the circumstances behind the opera's closing in 1931 and the implications of this action for cultural policy. The reader will notice that the types of source material I use vary widely according to the focus of each chapter.

In order to understand the Kroll idea one must examine its origins in the tradition of the national theater. What was this tradition and who were its proponents? What is the role of the state in cultural life? Is culture merely a leisure activity in which the state plays no role? Or is the state obligated to provide its citizens access to culture? Furthermore, what political role does culture assume, particularly in a democracy? Some view high culture simply as a useless frill for the social elite. Such arguments are widespread in the United States.

High culture, in other words, depends on state support, which can become highly controversial. Those who object to the funding of
"immoral" artworks clearly fear that art has a subversive potential. However, on this question there is considerable debate: can culture, in the sense of artistic production, revolutionize people's views of the world? This study will consider the Kroll Opera in Berlin in light of these considerations. The Kroll was often accused of being an example of "degenerate art" which typified the attacks on German culture held to be typical of the Weimar Republic. This study, on the other hand, argues that the Kroll was intended to serve as an example of representative German democratic art and as an example of civic culture.

**What Is Civic Culture?**

The problem of civic culture is a complex one in its definition and its manifestations. In order to untangle its various aspects in the German context, and to deal with the related questions of political participation, urban life and art, one must consider the problem from a number of perspectives. While it is somewhat more familiar in studies of other nations, especially France, the concept of civic culture is relatively rare in studies of Germany. One might propose a number of reasons why this is the case, the most obvious one being the lack of a clearly defined national culture. Throughout most of its history, Germany had a locally defined culture with many different intellectual centers throughout the German-speaking world. Even after unification, the perceived unity of the German nation was largely mythical; thus, it is not enough to study national self-image and assume that this is civic culture.

A comprehensive study of civic culture involves relating political ideas to social change and cultural formations in Germany from the late
eighteenth century to the present. The nineteenth century is an important period of transition, one that I will explore in the first chapter.

Civic culture may be defined as the sum of forms of life which depend on the self-expression of the active citizen. It is an idea which originated within civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), with its combination of economic, political and moral categories, and continues to the present day.\(^9\) One must account for changes over time and distinguish among ideas of the civic in different sorts of communities, that is to say in small towns as opposed to large urban centers. When examining the German situation, problems of definition become even more acute. Civic culture is something which contributes to one's personal identity and to one's political identity as a citizen. These two forms of identity are different because citizenship does not emphasize features related to personal life. Civic culture assumes a relatively coherent community, which is held together by institutional and organizational life. This idea first arose in the form of civil society in the eighteenth century. However, the opportunity for liberals to create civil society in a form viable for all German-speaking lands did not materialize. Liberalism reinstated constraints on individuals which prevented their taking part in a true civic culture which included exchange of ideas. The civic became identified with the Bürgertum, once a more fluid category, but one that was increasingly defined as socioeconomic over the course of the nineteenth century.\(^10\) It was a category of people no longer defined morally, i.e., by

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\(^9\) See Isabel V. Hull, *Sexuality, State and Civil Society in Germany, 1700-1815.* Ithaca, New York 1996. "...'civil society' meant society in its organized aspect, society as it constituted a state apparatus to protect itself and to further the welfare of all its citizens." (p.204)

virtue, but by social standing alone. The Bürgertum, rather than interacting within culture, came to "possess" culture as a social good, thus neutralizing any power it might have had to reshape society.\textsuperscript{11}

The possibility of creating a civic culture ended up in the hands of the Bürgertum. Nevertheless, I do not equate civic culture with the cultural forms and productions of the Bürgertum, though the latter problem must inform my argument. There are several reasons for this. First of all, the concept of the Bürger is a highly ambiguous one, and remains so in current German historiography.\textsuperscript{12} Legal definitions of the group do not correspond exactly to cultural definitions. The category originally included inhabitants of cities and towns, but it gradually expanded - or, to adopt a different view, it flattened out and became more homogeneous. Adam Müller's complaint in 1809, "I do not want to and cannot be a Bürger, if everyone is supposed to be one" reveals the problems inherent in the conception of the Bürgertum at the beginning of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{13} Müller addressed the transformation of the Stadtbürger into the Staatsbürger, which was well under way by the time he wrote. The ambiguous legal definition of the Bürger\textsuperscript{14} showed that his relationship to the state lacked a precise definition. This ambiguity raises the question of how political participation by the Bürgertum might be

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{12} See, for example, Jürgen Kocka, ed., \textit{Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert and Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit im 19. Jahrhundert}; Nolte, Gemeindebürgertum; Lutz Niethammer, ed., \textit{Bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland: Historische Einblicke, Fragen, Perspektiven}. (Frankfurt 1990)
\bibitem{14} In the \textit{Allgemeines Landrecht}; see Schneider, op. cit. for further details.
\end{thebibliography}
defined. If the categories of the French Revolution were not held to be universally valid, German states would have to develop their own categories of political participation. Although the Bürgertum is a central concept in any discussion of nineteenth-century political culture, historians have devoted much research to clarifying the ambiguities which remain in the term. Hans-Peter Schneider accurately states that "the concept of the Bürger was and is completely amorphous and unclear."\textsuperscript{15}

The culture of the Bürgertum is not identical with civic culture, as the latter term ideally applies to all levels of society.\textsuperscript{16} However, it is incontestable that the Bürgertum played a major role in defining German civic culture, so any examination of it must rely on studies of this social group and its conception of its own identity. Some historians have argued that it is incorrect to define the Bürgertum as a class, and that it is more properly referred to as itself embodying a culture.\textsuperscript{17} This requires me to address the problem of what culture is. Culture thus had a direct political effect. This raises an important question: where does one draw the line between "productive" and "destructive" culture? I argue that such a distinction shows the danger historians incur when their definition of culture is not sufficiently broad.

The reason for this is that culture has a number of different but interrelated definitions. Examination of Wolfgang Kaschuba's and Hermann Bausinger's discussions of the issue brings me to the conclusion

\textsuperscript{15} Schneider, p.163. Given this situation, I prefer not to confuse matters further by trying to translate the term.

\textsuperscript{16} Civic culture, as noted above, is also an element of civil society, which, although it is made up of Bürger, should be distinguished from the culture of the Bürgertum. See discussion in Hull, \textit{Sexuality, State and Civil Society in Germany}, pp. 199-207.

that a definition of culture in a bürgerlich context has been inhibited for the reason that culture is easily confused with Bildung.\textsuperscript{18} It is, of course, understandable to conflate the two, due to the symbolic importance of Bildung as a constitutive feature of the life of the Bürgertum. It may, in fact, be identified as the constitutive feature of the evolving category of the Staatsbürger.\textsuperscript{19} When I refer to the element of self-formation in civic culture, I have Bildung in mind as well. It is no accident that Kaschuba, for instance, begins his discussion of culture with a reference to a newspaper and its reading public. This paper, the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, according to writer and activist Heinrich Laube, represented the best of German culture: "One felt oneself in the most important company when one read the paper in the society which represented German culture in the whole of Europe and beyond."\textsuperscript{20} This sentence, though pompous, does demonstrate the connection of Bildung as an idea to social formations. The practice of reading a specific paper places one within the parameters of a society, which is gebildet. Kaschuba's quest to define culture leads him to term it "symbolic practice" and he explains the ways in which the culture of the Bürgertum became merged with the concept of culture in general, affecting all areas of life. He posits a change from the


\textsuperscript{19} See Hull, p.203: "They [the Bildungsbürgertum] were thus a class in becoming, not quite part of the traditional order, not yet at home in the future they were trying to create. The criterion for inclusion in this new group was not traditionally social, that is, it exactly coincided neither with status, profession, nor even directly with wealth. Instead, it was a quality to which all might theoretically aspire and even achieve: education, Bildung. Because it was transsocial, the claim that Bildung was the constituent principle of the new Staatsbürger was subversive of the old order; as Friedrich Nicolai remarked, 'Reasonable and honorable people belong together without regard to Stand, religion or other peripheral considerations.'"

\textsuperscript{20} Kaschuba, p.92
eighteenth-century context, in which the picture of *bürgerliches Leben* on the various "islands" of what was to become *bürgerlich* culture was much more diverse. It reflected regional and confessional differences, and was not in any sense hegemonic.\(^1\)

To refer to these "islands" before the fact of their emergence represents an excessively teleological view, as the earlier period was not operating with nineteenth-century concepts. We need an overarching concept that will encompass the various terms used by historians. This is why I propose a broad definition of civic culture as a concept which is temporally broader than the culture of the *Bürgertum*, and is characteristic of both cities and smaller communities, though it takes different forms in each. Civic culture must encompass the civic, that is, one's identity as a citizen, and culture, that is, expressions of an individual's or a community's self-understanding. These expressions could be contained in artistic or literary production, but they are also present in everyday life, in seemingly automatic forms of behavior. Civic culture is open to all who define themselves as citizens.

In the nineteenth-century context, however, one must recognize that *Bürgerlichkeit* essentially co-opted the language and expressions of civic culture. This is why Kocka's proposal of defining *Bürgerlichkeit* as itself a culture is at least intriguing. However, this argument still does not clarify the notion of culture. When Bausinger distinguishes among three different types of culture, he gives a sense of its complexity. The three types are the ingredients of the artistic and literary canon (clearly connected to *Bildung*); the promotion of certain character traits and norms of behavior, \(^2\)

\(^1\) *Ibid*, p.103
such as order and industry; and, finally, styles of behavior. Bausinger places the greatest emphasis on the third definition, and emerges with a definition of culture as "a playing together of norms and forms, extending into everyday life." These forms are, however, intimately related to and dependent on the first two types of "culture". While I do not think Bausinger would necessarily deny this point, I state it explicitly in order to clarify my own position. Ritualized forms of social equality, for example the removal of one's hat as a gesture of greeting, informed the Bürgertum in its self-definition as a social group. However, these gestures were statements of supposed equality in a public space, for example a city street, intended to defend that equality. It was an assumption that people greeting each other valued the same character traits and that they would meet each other in the same social contexts.

It is here that the notion of artistic and literary culture becomes important. In the eighteenth century, a reading society would be a good example of such a social context. One is not required to adopt Jürgen Habermas's notion of the public sphere in order to describe a reading society as an example of culture, expressing a common and communal purpose. These societies were not limited to cities, but could be found in all areas of Germany. In the nineteenth century, it is more appropriate to speak of organizational life (Vereine) as an example of expression of civic culture, or of theaters and concert halls, which feature in both discussions described above. Bausinger quotes a description of theaters and concert halls from Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Cambridge, Mass., 1995.

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22 Bausinger, p.122
23 *Ibid.
24 Ibid, p.123-24
halls as places in which "public life raged and rioted." Kaschuba notes that "music, literature, art and philosophy are elements of communication and discourse...which then, in the form of a circle or Verein, become lasting structures of bürgerlich public life." I place the accent less on whether artistic culture takes place in an organizational context or Verein than on the degree to which it is public. Vereine can be considered public because they often organized activities such as festivals and demonstrations, whether or not these were explicitly defined as political. I emphasize public culture because it is ideally an expression of the values of a city, town or community and not simply those of a social circle.

Both forms of behavior and values may be expressed in the content of public culture and in the attitude of spectators. I state this point explicitly in view of the fact that the artistic and literary canon is mentioned by Bausinger, among others, only as an add-on or supplement to "real" history.

To sum up my position on the Bürgertum, I view it as one aspect of civic culture which came to define the notion over the course of the nineteenth century. Cohesive forms of civic culture existed in earlier periods, but were necessarily defined differently. Definitions are central to this problem, for, as I have noted, the definition of the Bürger also changed, becoming a less fluid category than it was in the eighteenth

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26 Hermann Riehl, quoted by Bausinger, p.135. The fact that he goes on to interpret this as a romanticized escape from more practical concerns is not convincing and does not help the argument.
27 Kaschuba, p.103
28 Thus, "public" does not necessarily mean something that takes place "outside" a home or private space. I propose considering reading societies public, but I am doubtful about salons as representative of civic culture, since they were not concerned with citizenship as such. On salons, see Ute Frevert, "Ausdrucksformen bürgerlicher Öffentlichkeit" in Niethammer, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland.
century. For this reason I suggest that, in that period, the category of *bürgerlich* corresponded more closely to my definition of civic culture. However, in the nineteenth century, as the public and the private became more strictly defined, and categories such as *Bildung* became less open-ended, it is more appropriate to distinguish between the *bürgerlich* and the civic.

When did these changes take place? The "bürgerliche Gesellschaft" took shape in Prussia between 1807 and 1820 with a series of legal reforms which had the effect of moving Prussia away from the older *ständisch* order towards a socioeconomicly defined and meritocratic order. The result by 1815 was that the *Wirtschaftsbürgertum* no longer faced economic restrictions, but political participation was hindered by censorship and repression of liberal tendencies.²⁹ Thus, this could be one moment when the *bürgerlich* is detached from the civic. However, one must also examine regional differences. Paul Nolte's work on Baden identifies a particular historical moment, the 1840s, when the idea of a political culture of the *Gemeinde*, open to all, began to collapse due to economic changes and increasing polarization by party affiliation.³⁰ There was thus a short window between the original challenge to the nobility and the process of liberal self-destruction, in which ideas of civic culture based on the *Gemeinde* could flourish.³¹ In the intervening years,

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³⁰ Nolte, p.188: "...eben hatte man ein neues Modell der bürgerlichen Selbstdetermination und Kommunikation entworfen, das dauerhaft auf der durch die Gemeindeordnung ebenfalls neubegründeten Bürgergemeinde ruhen zu können schien, da zerfielen seine Voraussetzungen schon wieder..." See also Hans Medick's discussion of Württemberg in Niethammer, pp.52-79.
³¹ Nolte's notion of the *Gemeinde*, which he connects explicitly to the ideals of 1989, differed significantly from Prussian models and from what later became German national models. Organized around the *Gemeinde* as a political center, liberals in the southwest developed the idea of a society
however, social groups were able to organize who otherwise would not have had the opportunity to do so.

Habermas's model proposes a similar process of polarization which meant the death of the "public sphere", but he is not regionally or historically specific. Habermas privileges "a bourgeois public of private people" as creators of a civic culture. This implies that the later nineteenth century, especially after unification, destroyed the possibility of a civic culture because it faced citizens with two alternatives: adapting to state power, or a pseudo-public life dominated by mass culture. The first chapter will explain why these alternatives are too simple.

which "in being constituted by politically responsible citizens [mündige Bürger] raised a claim to a political order that was simultaneously decentralized, individualistic and communally rather than hierarchically mediated." Nolte connects this idea of "political society", which does not conform to the strict separation of state and society found in Hegelian political theory, to the Greek polis as well as to the region's own political traditions in the early modern period. These are two very different ideals, and it would be interesting to see a sustained discussion of how the memory of actual traditions, however distorted, fits with appeals to the polis, an entity idealized without consideration of its lack of applicability to modern political life.