

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

“You can usually tell what kind of fighting went on in a town, and how much was necessary to take it, by the wreckage that remains. If the buildings are fairly intact, with only broken windows, doors, and pocked walls, it was a quick, hand-to-hand street fight. If most of the walls are still standing, but the roofs have gaping holes, and many rooms are shattered, then the entry was preceded by an artillery barrage. But if there isn’t much town left at all, then planes have been around.”

Bill Mauldin, Up Front (1945).¹

Author and cartoonist Bill Mauldin's account of destruction in Europe during World War II reveals two unique and important truths about that conflict: first, that Europe's centers of population readily doubled as battlefields; and second, that the introduction of a new technology—the bomber—increased the potential for mass destruction far beyond what could be achieved through traditional infantry combat and artillery bombardment alone. The result was a new type of war, wherein battles were waged from the air and involved distant ground targets that had, in previous wars, for practical or ethical reasons, generally been considered off-limits. The First World War had involved hard-fought, tug-of-war-type battles for the physical occupation of land, with limited tactical participation by the nascent air forces of the countries involved. But by the end of the Second World War, air power had evolved into a truly strategic means by which to wage war.² Although ground troops were responsible for some of the damage inflicted upon the European landscape between 1939 and 1945, most of the destruction was wrought by the Allied air forces.³

¹ Bill Mauldin, Up Front (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1945), 74-75.

² For an explanation of differences in the use of air power between the two world wars—between tactical and strategic bombing—see Alan J. Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992), 3.

³ Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgement: Allied Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 60.

Of all the war-making technologies developed during World War II, the bomber stands apart as one of the most successful, yet controversial. The British Royal Air Force (RAF) and United States Army Air Force (AAF) initially promised victory over Germany through a doctrine of “strategic-precision” daytime bombing. “Strategic” in this context referred to the bomber’s ability to destroy industrial and military sites as a means of crippling Germany’s ability to wage war. “Precision” described the air forces’ ability to strike desired targets while causing minimal collateral damage to nearby sites. The RAF and AAF also guaranteed minimal risk to the Allied airmen operating the bombers. However, early in the war the RAF realized that the bomber was less of a technological godsend than originally thought.⁴ Although touted for its precision targeting capabilities, the bomber’s ability to destroy isolated objectives was, in reality, a continual problem until the final years of the war. The effects of unpredictable atmospheric conditions on visual targeting instruments seriously diminished the bomber’s accuracy, and nascent radar systems were largely ineffectual. The risk to bomber crews was also substantially higher than anticipated because of the effectiveness of enemy defenses and a lack—again, until the end of the war—of long-range escort fighter planes.

In light of these exigencies, the RAF’s daytime, precision bombing strategy quickly gave way to nocturnal “area” bombing, wherein larger payloads of high-explosive and incendiary ordnance were dropped with less discrimination over commensurately large target areas.⁵ Sprawling cities were made targets, not individual buildings. The RAF understood that the delicate functioning of cities could be disrupted by massive

⁴ Ibid., 36.

⁵ John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 415.

attacks.⁶ Fires would be started, and would need to be controlled. Yet utilities would be inoperable and streets would be impassable. The homes of citizens would be rendered unusable,⁷ and shops would close, their wares destroyed. Such disruptions would force the reallocation of resources from other military and industrial uses, thus diminishing the output of Germany’s war machine. Area bombing also seems to have achieved an important secondary objective: it allowed the British to exact revenge on Germany for attacks conducted against its civilian population. It reassured the citizens of Britain that Hitler’s “Fortress Europe” was not impregnable.

Area bombing was also described as “morale” or “terror” bombing. If the RAF could not consistently destroy industries that were critical to Germany’s *ability* to wage war, then perhaps morale could be destroyed: Germany’s *willingness* to wage war. The RAF hoped that the injuring and killing of enough civilians (and in particular, workers) would cause the German population to rise up against the Nazi party and demand an end to the conflict.⁸ Although the morality of this revised strategy was debated, its adoption was facilitated by the Luftwaffe’s own area bombing, which had caused 40,000 civilian deaths in Britain’s cities between September 1940 and May 1941.⁹ Fueled by a hatred of German bellicosity, area bombing replaced precision bombing as the official RAF policy in early 1942.¹⁰

In contrast to that of the RAF, the AAF maintained its policy of daytime, strategic-precision bombing throughout most of World War II. The reasons for this were

⁶ Ibid., 422.

⁷ When residential units were intentionally targeted, the practice known as “de-housing.” Keegan, 421.

⁸ Ibid., 421.

⁹ Schaffer, 36.

¹⁰ Ibid. Because of the RAF’s inability to strike targets, area bombing had been the *de facto* practice—if not policy—from 1939 until 1942.


twofold. First, having no immediate exposure to the horrors of bombing raids, the citizens of the United States felt less animosity towards Germany than did their European allies. They tended to regard area-bombing and the destruction of non-military targets like housing as immoral.¹¹ It has even been suggested that American population, many of whom could claim German lineage, was less willing to indiscriminately bomb what was essentially a nation of relatives.¹² Faith in daylight strategic-precision bombing in the face of Britain's failures (and its successes in destroying targets while area-bombing at night) was bolstered by the depiction of bombers in the media. Written and visual depictions of the bomber were plentiful in newspapers and magazines. The bomber was also depicted in a uniformly positive manner, the content of news stories—and even advertisements—being carefully controlled by the United States Government.¹³ The bomber was portrayed in mythical terms; as a faultless, unstoppable piece of advanced technology that effectively removed the attacker from the battlefield, leaving only the defender to endure harm [Figure 1.1]. The shortcomings of the AAF bomber as it conducted its daylight sorties—in particular, the high risk to air crews and their questionable ability to hit targets—were diminished in the media. Instead, strategic-precision bombing capabilities were highlighted [Figure 1-2].

With the understanding that every bomb dropped on a city did some amount of damage and therefore contributed to the war effort, the RAF pursued its policy of area

¹¹ Ibid., 37-8.

¹² Ibid., 70.

¹³ Ibid., 69-70.



Dragon's Teeth

This is a legend that tells of dragon's teeth being transformed into an army of warriors, fully equipped for battle.

In this picture you see the legend being born. Here are gleaming dragon's teeth in the process of becoming a squadron of the most formidable weapons of the skies, Boeing Flying Fortresses.*

The legend is being reborn with vengeance, for since December 7, 1941, workers and production strategists have built the Fortresses with an amazing tempo. Today the rate of production is more than three times greater than it was on the day of Pearl Harbor. (For this performance, Boeing

was selected as the first aircraft manufacturer to receive the new Army-Navy award for production efficiency.)

The Boeing production system is the only one of its kind in the aircraft industry. Based on the principle of "production density," the Boeing system makes the most efficient use of men, machines, materials and floor space. So flexible is this production system that important design changes can be made quickly and without interrupting the production schedule. The concentration of all production facilities, so that the plant becomes one tightly integrated unit, makes possible a short, swift flow

of parts through manufacture to assembly.


In building the B-17, for example, the airplane is divided into several major units. As these are manufactured and assembled, they converge into the final assembly station to become a Flying Fortress, complete with instruments and guns, ready to roar off to battle.

The increase of speed and efficiency in production . . . both for peace and for war . . . is only one of the many different projects that form a constant part of the Boeing manufacturing and engineering programs at Seattle and in the Middle West and Canada.

BOEING

The advertisement reads, in part: "There is a legend that tells of dragon's teeth being transformed into an army of warriors, fully equipped for battle. In this picture you see the legend being born. Here are gleaming dragon's teeth in the process of becoming a squadron of the most formidable weapons of the skies, Boeing Flying Fortresses."

FIGURE 1-1: BOEING AIRCRAFT ADVERTISEMENT FROM ATLANTIC MONTHLY, DECEMBER 1942.



The caption reads: "Was that address 106 Leipzigerstrasse or 107?"

FIGURE 1-2: CARTOON FROM *COLLIERS*, SEPTEMBER 1942.

bombing throughout most of World War II. At the close of hostilities in 1945, the RAF had dropped approximately 50,000 tons of ordnance on the city of Berlin alone, destroying roughly 30 percent of the German capital's built-up area.¹⁴ The relatively small Hansaetic city of Lübeck in northern Germany was also bombed by the RAF, but only once, and with a mere 440 tons of ordnance.¹⁵ Yet 30 percent of that city's built-up area was also destroyed.¹⁶ Unlike Berlin, which was destroyed over repeated bombing raids, Lübeck was consumed in a single conflagration—a fire started by the incendiary bombs that were dropped on the city's heart, its medieval *Altstadt*, and fed by the densely packed, timber buildings.

The indiscriminate destruction wrought by area bombing meant that civilian buildings were frequently damaged along with their military counterparts. The bombs released over the compact cities of Europe destroyed houses, churches, and office buildings as readily as they did troop encampments, factories, and marshalling yards. The destruction of non-military targets was a secondary consequence of bombing that the Allies—and in particular, the RAF—were willing to accept.¹⁷ The alternative was to curtail the breadth of bombing campaigns, shift the primary responsibility for winning the war to ground troops, and, in a sense, concede the shortcomings of the vaunted technology of the bomber. Commanders in the RAF and AAF envisioned a new, dominant role for the air forces in the post-war period, and were therefore unwilling to make such a concession.¹⁸

¹⁴ Max Hastings, Bomber Command (New York: The Dial Press/ James Wade, 1979), Appendix E, 371-373.

¹⁵ Hastings, 372.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Keegan, 432-33.

¹⁸ See, for example, Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, 11-20; Schaffer, Wings of Judgement: Allied Bombing in World War II, 69; and Anthony Verrier, The Bomber Offensive (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 81-102.

With limited ability to discriminate between intended and unintended targets, the Allied air forces subjected the centuries-old cities of Europe to heavy aerial bombardment between the years 1942 and 1945. Although committed to bombing as a precursor to invasion by ground troops, the Allies realized that the liberation of Axis-occupied countries and occupation of the German and Italian homelands would proceed more smoothly if the Allied armies were perceived as benevolent conquerors, not ruthless invaders.¹⁹ Events early in the war had shown that one means of promoting a benign image was to protect the irreplaceable cultural patrimony of the nations under attack: the cherished art objects and ancient architecture by which a country's citizenry defined its national character.²⁰ To this end, the United States and Great Britain each established a commission comprised of civilians with academic and museum expertise to advise the military on how Europe's cultural treasures might be protected from unnecessary destruction.²¹ The American group, formed in 1943,

¹⁹ In weighing the advantages and disadvantages of precision and area bombing, Army strategists queried American psychologists about the possible effects of each type of attack on civilian morale. A full range of responses was received, but ultimately the Army heeded those which favored precision bombing: the view that the indiscriminate bombing and the unintentional destruction of overtly non-military targets—monuments, schools, hospitals—would be perceived as an act of barbarism, and ultimately lengthen the war by fostering enemy opposition and resolve. See Schaffer, Wings of Judgement: Allied Bombing in World War II, 90-91.

²⁰ For example, the British Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives officer Lord Methuen wrote that “The question of the preservation of antiquities and works of art in war-time first came to the fore when, after a short-lived occupation of Cyrenaica by General Wavell’s forces in 1940-41, the Italian Government quite falsely accused the British Army of the barbarous desecration of the Museum and ruins of Cyrene. When Tripoli was captured and the great classical sites of Leptis Magna and Sabratha fell into British hands, both the local military authorities and the War Office were obliged to take special stops for their protection and, with the prospect of the invasion of Italy before them, realised that if the Army was to be protected from scandal due precautions must be taken in advance.” Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary, Being a Record of Survivals and Losses of Historical Monuments in North-Western France, Together with Those in the Island of Walcheren and in That Part of Belgium Traversed by 21st Army Group in 1944-45 (London: Robert Hale Limited, 1952), xv.

²¹ For the official history of art and monuments protection during World War II, see United States Government Historical Reports on War Administration, Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office, 1946). For the British account of these activities, see Lt.-Col. Sir Leonard Woolley, A Record of the Work Done by the Military Authorities for the Protection of the Treasures of Art & History in War Areas (London: Her

became known as the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe (ACPS).²² The policies of the ACPS were enforced in the field by the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) units of the American and British armies—military units named after the types of resources they were charged with protecting.²³ With unpolished astuteness, Allied line troops jokingly referred to the members of these units as “Venus-savers” or “Venus-fixers.”²⁴

Much has been written about the efforts of the MFAA units in Europe during World War II. In the decade following the close of the war, several former MFAA officers chronicled their experiences in the various European countries in which they served. Many of these accounts were official records published by the Government Printing Office of the United States and His Majesty’s Stationery Office of Britain, while others originated in commercial or university publishing houses. Interest in the MFAA program began to wane in the mid-1950s. It was renewed in the late-1980s, following two series of events: wars in the Balkan countries and in the Middle East, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent availability of previously inaccessible World War II documents—particularly those relating to looted art. The newfound willingness of Holocaust survivors and their descendants to seek restitution from those European governments that colluded with Nazi Germany also helped to refocus attention on this moment in history. Yet despite the substantial size and breadth of the existing scholarship, authors have tended almost exclusively to focus on

Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1947), and the series of books that chronicle art losses in specific countries and regions of Europe (also originating from Her Majesty’s Stationery Office).

²² United States Government Historical Reports on War Administration, Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (Washington, D.C.: Superintendent of Documents, United States Government Printing Office, 1946).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Sumner Crosby, “‘Venus Fixers’ Won Their War, Too,” New York Times Magazine, 20 January 1946.

moveable cultural resources—art objects like paintings and sculpture, and archival collections. Little in the existing body of literature critically examines the war-time protection of Europe’s historic architecture—its unmovable cultural resources.²⁵ The ruins of antiquity, the Gothic cathedrals and mediaeval “old towns,” and the urban palazzi and rural châteaux that liberally dot the European landscape could not be spirited away to the safety of salt mines and flak towers. Instead, these monuments became the set pieces around which World War II was destructively played out. Numerous historical accounts and photographs have helped to establish a general awareness of the extent of destruction caused by the war, but the scholarship on this topic is sparse. My thesis seeks to help fill this void by examining the architectural monuments that the Allies earmarked for protection during World War II. I focus on the activities of the ACPS: the gathering of information pertaining to Europe’s cultural heritage, the codifying of policy and practices, and the eventual dissemination of this information to the MFAA—the ACPS’ operational arm “in the field.” In order to gauge the effectiveness of the ACPS’ program, I examine the German city of Frankfurt am Main as a case study.

A Ph.D. dissertation might allow for a comprehensive investigation of monuments protection during World War II, examining the efforts of the ACPS, MFAA, and other groups in the United Kingdom and Soviet Union to protect the architectural monuments of an individual country or military theater of operation. For a Master’s thesis, however, a single city serves as a better case study. The city of Frankfurt was

²⁵ To be sure, several of the MFAA books from the 1940s and 1950s consider historic architecture, but usually only graphically: as photographic records (typically limited to a single image) that only superficially record the amount of damage to any given monument. See, for example, Mason Hammond, Florentine Art Under Fire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949); Emilio Lavagnino, Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, 1946); and the “Works of Art” series (each issue describing a different by country or region) published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office in 1945 and 1946.

chosen because its plight was fairly typical of German cities during the war. It was heavily bombed by the RAF and AAF over a dozen times between August, 1942 and December, 1944, before being captured by elements of the United States 3rd Army in March of 1945. During the air raids, around 85 percent of Frankfurt's residential stock was damaged to some degree (26 percent being completely destroyed) and 75 percent of its commercial and industrial buildings were destroyed.²⁶ Landmarks such as the poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's birthplace were completely destroyed, as was the historic *Altstadt*—a dense neighborhood of residential and commercial buildings that was home to many fine examples of mediaeval *fachwerk* construction.²⁷ Frankfurt is nevertheless unique in one respect. In 1946, a team of American MFAA soldiers and Frankfurt city officials toured the city and surveyed the damage to its many monuments. The result of their effort is an untitled compendium that describes, in words and images, the state of Frankfurt's architecture at the close of the war.²⁸ Included are descriptive accounts of the battle damage and estimates for repair, as well as many "before-and-after" photographs of the city's historic buildings. Most of historic buildings in Frankfurt that were identified by the ACPS as worthy of preservation were included in this survey. A comparison of these monuments as they existed before the war and after provides a good measure of the efficacy of the ACPS in Frankfurt. Because the city is a representative example, the results of my investigation can reasonably be extrapolated to the cities of Germany and Europe in

²⁶ Rebecca L. Boehling, A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany, (New York: Berghahn Books, 1996), 81.

²⁷ Many pre-war travel guides specifically mention the *Altstadt* as a worthy place to visit because of its architecture. At least one book is devoted entirely—retrospectively—to the subject. See Wolfgang Klötzer, Die Frankfurter Altstadt: Eine Erinnerung, (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Waldemar Kramer, 1983).

²⁸ Six reproductions of this survey were made. The copy consulted for this thesis is located in the Photographic Resources section of the National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland, photocopied).

general, and conclusions can be made regarding the overall effectiveness of the ACPS' monuments protection program.

The aim of this thesis is to draw general conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the ACPS—and specifically, its efforts to protect and preserve historic buildings on the European continent. In order to do so, I chart the sequence of events from 1942, when interest in an ACPS-type program was first voiced, to 1946, when MFAA officers conducted their unique post-war survey of architecture in Frankfurt. In the course of this examination, focus is given to the ACPS' pre-invasion planning for monuments protection. I describe the group's origins within the civilian arts community, its membership base and organization, and its activities throughout the war. Ultimately, little attention is devoted to the culmination of this planning: the preservation work actually carried out on the battlefields of Europe by MFAA units. This was determined largely by my choice of case study. By the time the Allies reached Frankfurt, Nazi Germany was a month away from surrender, and the city was captured with relatively little intervention on the part of the German military. As the close of the conflict approached, the duties of the MFAA units shifted from the solving of immediate problems (art and monuments protection) to the addressing of more longitudinal, post-war concerns (the repatriation of art objects and preservation of archives). Relatively little monuments fieldwork—except, in the case of Frankfurt, a survey of war damage—was required of the MFAA at that time. A more appropriate and illustrative study of the MFAA's fieldwork would necessarily center on Italy, France, or the Benelux—the countries ravaged by protracted, slogging ground combat. More important than the role of ground troops to the Frankfurt case study is that played by the Allied air forces. The capture of the city had been preceded by nearly three years of destructive aerial bombing. Most of the damage to monuments in

Frankfurt had been caused by the RAF and AAF well in advance of the ground forces' arrival. A study of the bombing policies and capabilities of the Allied air forces helps to explain the motivations and activities of the ACPS, as well as the successes and failures of the monuments protection program.

The unpublished records of the ACPS' work—the correspondence, lists of monuments, maps, handbooks, and other documentation—are located at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. This extensive body of source material is the foundation of my research. Secondary material on the MFAA units, the air war in Europe, and on the history of Frankfurt established a general background to the thesis.

Framed by an introduction and conclusion (Chapters One and Eight), the body of this thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapters Two and Three establish a background for those that follow. Chapter Two examines the perception and treatment of architectural monuments during times of armed conflict. The subject is treated generally, citing several illustrative examples throughout history but focusing on the early stages of World War II. The chapter describes how combatants have historically protected cultural landmarks encountered on the battlefield—or, conversely, destroyed them—as a propagandistic or psychological tool; as a means of projecting a positive self-image, or achieving a demoralizing effect over the enemy. Discussed in Chapter Two are the British Army's experiences in 1940-41 at several ancient sites in the Mediterranean. Falsely accused by unfriendly local governments of desecrating archaeological sites, the British were forced to allot time and effort to counteract the accusations and mediate any hostility such claims might have bred. This example was precedent-setting: it was presented by proponents of an Allied arts protection program as evidence of the need for an ACPS-type program.

As a foil to the British Army's early experiences in cultural protection, I provide the Luftwaffe's infamous "Baedeker Raids" on historic English towns in 1942. These air raids serve as an example of how the deliberate destruction of cherished landmarks was regarded as a means by which an enemy's spirit and will to fight might be broken. Culturally significant—but militarily unimportant—towns such as Coventry and Bath were subjected to bombardment during these limited air raids. But instead of demoralizing the local population as hoped, the raids only helped to foster a willingness on the part of the British to embrace unrestrained warfare—a dispositional shift that would ultimately cause far greater harm to Germany's own cultural heritage.

When the ACPS program was established in 1943, several international legal instruments designed to protect cultural patrimony during armed conflicts were already in place. My intent in Chapter Three is to discuss how earlier attempts to protect cultural patrimony provided a legal foundation that gave direction to the ACPS.

With the understanding that aerial bombardment caused most of the damage that was inflicted upon Europe's cities (and to my case study of Frankfurt specifically), Chapter Four examines the practice of bombing urbanized areas during the war. Of primary importance here is how bombing policies and technologies evolved over the course of the war, and how the Allies differed in their approaches to bombing—a difference one might (literally) characterize as night and day. A vast body of secondary literature exists on these topics. The ways in which different types of bombs affected European buildings is also discussed in this chapter. British self-examinations of the effects of air attacks on their own cities, post-war Allied surveys of damage to those on the

continent, and fire insurance reports all shed light on this topic. To be sure, none of these studies specifically deals with the effects of incendiary and high-explosive bombs on historic buildings. But from their assessment of damage to various types of construction (timber-frame, load-bearing, etc.), and to different types of city district (varying by use, density, age, etc.), one can make assumptions about how older buildings fared when bombarded from the air. Descriptions of the effects of bombs on *fachwerk* construction in the “old town” districts of many cities are especially germane to this discussion: many—if not most—of the monuments slated for protection by the ACPS were mediaeval *fachwerk* buildings located within tightly-woven, old town neighborhoods.

The creation, organization, and early activities of the ACPS are discussed in Chapter Five. The ACPS was the direct result of the efforts of two civilian groups in the United States: American Defense-Harvard Group (AD-HG) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS). Both of these groups, with members drawn primarily from the academic and museum communities of Cambridge, Massachusetts and New York, realized the dire effects that total war would have on historic buildings and works of art. They therefore lobbied for the creation of a monuments protection program within the United States Government, one that could help to offset some of the anticipated destruction. Realizing that such a program was likely to be poorly-received by a government burdened with the execution of a two-front war, the members of AD-HG and ACLS took it upon themselves to draw up lists of significant monuments, art repositories, and archives for the various countries of Europe, and later, Asia. The items included in these lists were ordered by their relative cultural and historical importance. So their whereabouts could be identified, their locations were also plotted on maps. Having ready access to this information, and with the British

experiences with cultural resource protection in the Mediterranean helping bolster the argument, the United States Government agreed to the creation of the ACPS in August of 1943.

Chapter Six continues where Chapter Five leaves off, examining the activities of the MFAA during the final two years of the war. I examine the nature of the information provided to the MFAA by AD-HG and ACLS, and describe how it was used. The MFAA is given considerably more attention here, with accounts of how the units were formed and what their relationship with the ACPS and the greater military was.

Chapter Seven, the final full chapter in the body of my thesis, is devoted to the case study of Frankfurt am Main. Most of the information for this chapter derives from the unpublished post-war survey of damage to that city. This invaluable survey provides an exacting account of the level of destruction caused during World War II, primarily by the bombers of the RAF and AAF. Regarding his text, author Colonel Robert K. Phelps writes that a “merely perfunctory glimpse of the [photographic] plates will be enough to give the reader a notion of how much damage the city has sustained.” Moreover, “if the sections on the cultural importance of each building...and the description of the war damage...are read while the pictures are studied, the loss to the arts, to Germany, and to the rest of the world will become finally clear.”²⁹ This survey provides a rare opportunity to weigh the ACPS’ performance in its endeavors.

²⁹ Robert K. Phelps, introductory letter, dated 18 April 1946, to American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, “Survey of Damage to Frankfurt/Main’s Cultural Institutions,” Record Group 239 (College Park, MD: National Archives and Records Administration, photocopied).

Chapter Eight concludes the thesis, and offers some reflections on wartime monuments protection in the intervening years since World War II. Possible future endeavors along these lines are touched upon.

Had it not been for the determined efforts of the ACPS during World War II, the architectural face of Europe might not be as rich as it is today. This is the chief contribution of the group and its sister agencies. Yet a secondary contribution can be found in the post-war American interest in historic preservation. At least one key person involved in the ACPS, David Finley, later became a supporter of historic preservation in United States; in Finley's case, with the nascent National Trust for Historic Preservation.³⁰ Moreover, the MFAA's practice of ranking and recording historic properties likely influenced the Federal government's National Register of Historic Places, of which codification is an underlying tenet. The desire to protect the cultural treasures of Europe and Asia from the ravages of war thus outlived World War II and found an outlet in the peace-time United States.

³⁰ Historian Charles Bridgham Hosmer writes: "Finley had entered the field of cultural preservation during World War II when he served on the Roberts Commission, or the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and historic Monuments in War Areas. From August 1943 through 1946 he must have become familiar with the efforts of a small band of fine-arts officers who tried to preserve the artistic and architectural heritage of Western Europe." Charles Bridgham Hosmer, Preservation Comes of Age: From Williamsburg to the National Trust (Charlottesville, VA: The University of Virginia Press, 1980), 796.

CHAPTER TWO: THE DESTRUCTION AND PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PATRIMONY AS A PROPAGANDA TOOL

Introduction

“One thing hastens into being, another hastens out of it. Even while a thing is in the act of coming into existence, some part of it has already ceased to be. Flux and change are forever renewing the fabric of the universe, just as the ceaseless sweep of time is forever renewing the face of eternity. In such a running river, where there is no firm foothold, what is there for a man to value among all the many things that are racing past him?” Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, from Meditations (quoted in American Mosaic, p. 146).

Marcus Aurelius’ proposition represents what seems to be a commonly held truth: that mankind searches for evidence of certainty in a reality characterized by mutability and lapse. Tactile objects like buildings often become such “firm footholds.” They become physical manifestations of this desire for certainty. Indeed, architecture is a logical place to look to fulfill such a need. Among humankind’s various types of cultural output, it is perhaps the most omnipresent and tangible. As archaeologist Glynn Isaac notes, “Most of the marks that man has left on the face of the earth during his two million year career as a litterbugging, meddlesome and occasionally artistic animal have one aspect in common: they are things, they are not deeds, ideas, or words.”¹

Unlike other tangible vessels of culture, architecture is typically public. A building often stands glaringly in a community, for all to see and touch. It is not ensconced in a private collection for controlled viewing. And it is resilient. Whether maintained in pristine condition as a place for human activity or commemoration, or allowed to

¹ Isaac, quoted in David Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 238.

deteriorate into ruin, a building, in whole or in part, has the potential of existing for many generations. It reveals the hands that created it and the activities that subsequently shaped it—or were shaped by it. Because it is typically locked to a specific location, a building often comes to express the host nation’s or group of individuals’ shared values. It might stand as a memorial to an important, defining moment in a group’s history, one that is intended to serve as a signpost of civic virtue for future generations. It might also symbolize a key quality of the group’s collective worldview. Or it might represent the acme of artistic expression. Regardless of the message, architecture is a ready bearer of meaning. Having been informed by past generations, its existence serves to inform the current and future populations.²

If a community is aware of the importance of one of its buildings, it often focuses attention on the object. This can be achieved through commemoration in various other forms of representational communication—in particular, mass-produced forms like the written word and photographs. Familiarity, in turn, elevates the building’s perceived importance. Alternatively, a community can invest energy in prolonging the life of a building, in actually preserving its physical fabric. In either case, at some moment the building transcends its original status and becomes exceptional. It assumes a superlative role as a monument of architecture. Either officially, through public decree, or informally, a building is recognized as sufficiently different and better—more valuable—than its neighbors. It becomes a “monument.” For example, “monument” was defined by the U.S. Army in 1943 as “any site, building, or other structure, whether public, ecclesiastic, or private, whose historic, cultural, artistic, traditional, or sentimental value render its protection and preservation a matter of

² Lowenthal identifies six categories of “past-related” benefits: familiarity and recognition, reaffirmation and validation, individual and group identity, guidance, enrichment, and escape. See Lowenthal, pp.38-52.

public interest. Such monuments include ruins, museums, libraries, churches, memorials, palaces, and the like.”³

Although a monument may be specific to the nation or group that erected it, its meaning often transcends the immediate social or geo-political boundaries. Its message, while perhaps not universally condoned or even understood, is still widely appreciated. But few would challenge, say, the expression of godly beneficence inherent in the Gothic cathedrals of Europe (although the notion of inviolate Christian primacy would likely be challenged), or the transcendent, rehabilitative power of nature that infuses Frank Lloyd Wright’s Midwestern architecture. Conversely, what a cherished monument means to the host nation might be completely at odds with that of others. A blatant example of this can be found in the architecture of Hitler’s Germany. The “De-Nazification” of post-World War II Germany, wherein the institutional and physical legacies of National Socialism were eradicated, works of architecture included, was intended to quell any lingering devotion to a movement considered abhorrent across most sectors of humanity. In fairness, however, the monuments of the Third Reich were so short-lived that it is doubtful many Germans came to truly cherish them.

An architectural monument is most often, by its very nature, unique: it is what the mass of buildings that make up a city or nation is not. Whether significant due its

³ (General Administration Instructions, quoted in Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, United States Army in World War II: Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), 413.

In its post-war assessment of the MFA&A program, the Army defined “monument” (for the purposes of intervention by the Allied armies) as “any structure, real property, or site, including fixed objects, but exclusive of readily moveable objects, which, by reason of its cultural, artistic, historic, or archaeological value, should be protected...” General Board, United States Forces, European Theater. Report: Civil Affairs and Military Government Activities in Connection with Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (Study Number 36), 22.

great age, its presence as a backdrop to some hallowed historical event, or its superlative artistic quality, a monument stands in isolation on the landscape. Its existence is known and recognized. A monument is also irreplaceable, a quality that lends to its singularity. Given, then, its obvious place on the physical and mental landscape, how is it that a monument comes to be damaged or destroyed during times of armed conflict? Several possible explanations follow:

- 1) The destruction of the monument is accidental—it is destroyed as an unintended consequence of warfare;
- 2) The destruction is intentional—the values inherent in the monument (intellectual, artistic, historical) are repugnant to destroyers;
- 3) The destruction is intentional—the monument is meaningful to the host nation, and its destruction will serve to demoralize (intended consequence: enemy capitulates/ unintended consequence: creation of cause célèbre, hardening of resolve, retaliatory acts directed at enemy);
- 4) The destruction is intentional—the monument is meaningful to the host nation, and its destruction will serve to cause anger (intended consequence: ill-conceived military or political response, motivated by anger (i.e. baiting the enemy)/ unintended consequence: creation of cause célèbre, hardening of resolve, retaliatory acts directed at enemy); and
- 5) The destruction is intentional and self-inflicted—the monument is destroyed by the host nation as a means of inciting hostility toward the enemy.⁴

Belligerents can also make a concerted effort to protect monuments during war. Because their whereabouts are generally known (having been published in written accounts), monuments figure prominently on the landscape and are easily identified. Why would an invading army preserve an enemy's cultural heritage? Several possible explanations follow:

- 1) The preservation of the monument is accidental—it is preserved by sheer happenstance and through no additional effort

⁴ Lambourne describes at length the rival interpretations of the damage to Reims Cathedral during World War I—one offered by the French, the other by the Germans. The German interpretation held that the French “baited” the Germans by putting the building to military use. The Germans also claimed that the French added to the damage to incite hostility toward them. See Nicola Lambourne, War Damage in Western Europe: The Destruction of Historic Monuments During the Second World War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001).

- 2) Preservation is intentional—the values inherent in the monument are agreeable to the would-be destroyers (universal acceptance of the monument’s message)
- 3) Preservation is intentional—for the propagandistic value (message to host nation: the enemy is benevolent), with the hope that enemy opposition will be diminished
- 4) Preservation is intentional—for the propagandistic value (message to combatant’s home population: benevolent war being fought), with the hope that domestic and third party opposition will be diminished

The Second World War is rife with examples of the destruction and preservation of monuments for the various reasons given above. A good, illustrative example of the calculated destroying of historic buildings in the hopes of demoralizing and angering the host population (numbers 3 and 4 above) can be found in the German Luftwaffe’s 1942 “Baedeker Raids” on historic British cities renowned as tourist destinations. This set of raids was a response to the devastating raid on Lübeck earlier that year. In contrast, the seminal, defining experiences of the British expeditionary forces in North Africa provides a revealing example of strategic preservation as a means of painting the occupying army in a favorable light (numbers 3 and 4 above). Of course, the primary focus of this thesis, the work of the ACPS, touches on most of the various destruction/preservation scenarios described above.

The Destruction of Monuments: Lübeck and the “Baedeker Raids”

When the center of Coventry was bombed by the Luftwaffe in November of 1940, the intent was to disrupt the business workings of the city and demoralize the local population.⁵ The now-infamous gutting of the Coventry Cathedral can only be described as an unintended consequence of an imprecise air war. So, too, would one characterize the Allied destruction through shelling and bombing of the German-held

⁵ “The Germans preferred to concentrate, for psychological reasons, on a sprawling target like London, which absorbed their bombs in its hundreds of square miles, or on the *business* centers of Birmingham, Manchester, Coventry, and so on, instead of using all their strength to knock out the *industrial* areas of those towns.” Allan A. Michie, writing in 1943, in the boosterish, pro-R.A.F. book, The Air Offensive Against Germany (New York: H. Holt and Co.), 24.

Abbey at Monte Cassino, Italy, in 1944. One of the few incidents—and perhaps the most unusual—involving the calculated destruction of historic buildings during times of war occurred between April and June of 1942. During this short period, the German Luftwaffe launched a series of air raids limited to those British cities renowned for their rich architectural heritage.⁶ These infamous attacks became known as the “Baedeker Raids,” or the “Baedeker Blitz,” because the cities involved—Canterbury, Bath, Exeter, Norwich and York—were all designated as destinations of capital historic importance in the European travel guidebooks published by Karl Baedeker.⁷ Each of the cities had received three or more stars in the relevance ranking system employed in the Baedeker guides. Each was also famous for its Gothic cathedral or abbey or, in the case of Bath, its 18th-century urban design ensembles. Thus, in one of the more absurd events of the Second World War, the same guidebooks that helped tourists establish an itinerary of historic travel destinations also provided German bombers with a ready source of historic targets. Later in the war, the Allies also used Baedekers to identify important landmarks in the German homeland.⁸

The idea for the Baedeker Raids did not spring without precedent from the devious minds of German war planners. Instead, they were conceived as in-kind retaliation for the RAF’s devastating raid on the former Hansaetic capital of Lübeck that was executed two months prior, in March of 1942 [Figure 2-1]. The Lübeck attack

⁶ See, for example, Levine, Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, p.46. Levine writes that Lübeck “was easy to find, lightly defended, and an ideal target for fire bombing. Its center was of medieval wooden construction.”

⁷ The British also appropriated the guidebook title “Baedeker” to describe the handbook of possible targets used by R.A.F. bomber crews. See Verrier, The Bomber Offensive, 164 and 207.

⁸ An account of the Battle of the Huertgen Forest makes this clear: “In September and October 1944, the existence of the [Urft and Schwammenaeul] dams was no secret. One had only to turn to the Baedekers [sic.] regional guide to learn how the eye of the tourist would be struck by the immense size of the dams and by the beauty of the waters in their rustic woodland setting.” Charles B. MacDonald, The Battle of the Huertgen Forest (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 65.




FIGURE 2-1: 1925 MAP OF LÜBECK.

inadvertently achieved what the Baedeker Raids subsequently attempted to do: it laid waste to a set-piece of historic and culturally meaningful buildings.⁹ Indeed, the city had been described in English-language Baedeker guides as remarkably intact and “of great importance” to architectural history.¹⁰ The guide reads: “The town still contains reminiscences of its mediaeval greatness in its lofty towers, ancient gabled houses in the late-Gothic and Renaissance styles, fortified gateways, Gothic churches, and a venerable Rathaus.”¹¹ The RAF’s nighttime area bombing run left Lübeck’s historic *Altstadt* quarter of mediaeval architecture all but destroyed.¹² The fragile, largely wooden houses and commercial buildings burned with little provocation. The lack of firewalls and the dense composition of the neighborhood (with few open squares or wide boulevards) ensured that the fire, once started by incendiary bombs, would spread with little hindrance [Figure 2-2]. Many historic buildings from the 15th and 16th centuries were destroyed completely or left as useless, burnt husks.¹³


⁹ Strict laws that ensured the preservation of the *Stadtbild*, or city silhouette, protected the historic center of Lübeck, as well as that of Hildesheim and Rotenburg ob Der Tauber. Germany was at the forefront of preservation in Europe in this respect to these protective measures. See Spiro Kostof, *The City Shaped : Urban Patterns and Meanings Through History* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1991), 87.

¹⁰ Evidence for the significance of Lübeck can be gleaned from the attention the city is given in period architecture books. In *Die Schöne Deutsche Stadt: Norddeutschland mit 210 Bildern*, Lübeck figures prominently, with no less than fifteen photos and maps, far more than any other city featured. Gustav Wolf, *Die Schöne Deutsche Stadt: Norddeutschland mit 210 Bildern* (München: Verlag von R. Piper & Co., 1925).

¹¹ Karl Baedeker, *Northern Germany Excluding the Rhineland: Handbook for Travellers*, 17th ed. (Leipzig: Karl Baedeker, 1925), 128-29. Many of the significant works of architecture are described by Baedeker in his guide—more than most other towns of similar size that Baedeker describes. This seems to confirm the town’s relative historical importance.

¹² The RAF dropped a relatively small amount of ordnance on Lübeck—440 tons of high-explosive and incendiary bombs—but damaged or destroyed 30 percent of the city’s built-up area. RAF proponents of area bombing considered this a resoundingly successful demonstration of their preferred method of air warfare.

¹³ The Lübeck raid was devastating to the city’s *Altstadt*, to be sure. But the neighborhood, scars and all, was nevertheless acknowledged as a significant architectural ensemble through its inclusion on UNESCO’s World Heritage list in 1987. The summary of the nomination reads, in part: “Despite the damage it suffered during the Second World War, the basic structure of the old city, consisting mainly of 15th- and 16th-century patrician residences, public monuments (the famous Holstentor brick gate), churches and salt storehouses, remains unaltered.” From the World Heritage website, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/272>.



From Karl Gruber, Die Gestalt der Deutschen Stadt, page 49.

FIGURE 2-2: 1937 MAP (DETAIL) OF LÜBECK'S MARKET AND CHURCH AREA, SHOWING DENSE LAND USE OF THE SURROUNDING NEIGHBORHOOD.

The Lübeck raid was not typical. It was not a mundane attack on a German city of strategic importance, one of countless hundreds executed by the Allies during the course of the war. Rather, it was a seminal demonstration of the effectiveness of area bombing (using high-explosive and incendiary ordnance) on older cities with flammable building stock—a demonstration devised by parties within the RAF’s Bomber Command who favored a less restrained air war against Germany.¹⁴ This lesson would be reiterated later at Rostock (bombed shortly after Lübeck, in 1942), Köln (during the legendary “1,000 bomber raid” of 1942), Hamburg (1943), and finally—most infamously—at Dresden (1945), with drastic consequences.¹⁵ But it was the destructive success of the Lübeck raid that perhaps most helped to establish Britain’s bombing policy for the remainder of the war. The origins of Germany’s scarred post-war appearance can be traced back to this early, defining raid.

The RAF bombed German and Axis-occupied cities primarily because urban areas were large enough targets for its bombers, flying at great heights and dispensing extensive payloads, to consistently hit at night. British war planners were fully aware that historic cores of German cities made for ideal aiming points because of their propensity to burn uncontrollably and cause tremendous, wide-spread damage. Area bombing also served a secondary British purpose. It served to terrorize the enemy, and to demoralize him. It was hoped that a bludgeoned German citizenry would put pressure on its leaders to capitulate. As British-born author Allan A. Michie wrote in his 1943 entreaty to Americans to adopt the RAF’s method of waging an air war, the

¹⁴ The Lübeck raid was “openly designed to demonstrate what area bombing could achieve.” Verrier, *The Bomber Offensive*, 95.

¹⁵ “Dresden was an unbombed city, and it was an old city; like Lübeck, like Rostock, like Hamburg, it would burn” (Verrier, 311). See also Verrier, 144, which states that these raids helped determine German policy regarding the defense of cities for the remainder of the war.

area bombing of cities takes a valuable toll on the enemy populace. Because of British area bombing, Michie rationalized, “the motive of self-preservation [among Germans] is beginning to replace devotion to the Fuhrer.”¹⁶ Area bombing of German cities, both of their infrastructures and inhabitants, was also an unspoken means through which the British could vent the anger they felt toward their aggressors. Yet despite the multiple layers of meaning inherent in the RAF’s bombing policy, there is no indication that Germany’s historic city centers were expressly targeted for their historic value. Individual monuments do not seem to have been singled out for destruction—either for strategic reasons or out of anger for the enemy. The destruction of Lübeck’s *Altstadt* must be seen in this context.

Nevertheless, the German population interpreted the 1942 raid on Lübeck as an underhanded attack on German heritage and history.¹⁷ This interpretation was likely fostered by Nazi propagandists who sought to drum up anti-British sentiment. It provided an ideal justification to respond in-kind: to single out historic monuments in Britain for bombing. Until this time, German war planners had only speculated about the possibility of bombing monuments, but lacked a justification that outweighed the potential for negative propaganda. Nazi Minister of Propaganda Dr. Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary entry of 15 September 1940 that military planners should identify military targets in close proximity to cultural monuments.¹⁸ If none could be found, military targets should be fabricated. For example, planners should “ascertain whether there are any military targets in the vicinity of Buckingham Palace; if not, it should be

¹⁶ Michie, *The Air Offensive Against Germany*, 5.

¹⁷ Charles Whiting, *The Three-Star Blitz: The Baedeker Raids and the Start of Total War, 1942-1943* (London: Leo Cooper, 1987), 3.

¹⁸ Willi A. Boelcke, ed. *The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: The Nazi Propaganda War 1939-43* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1970), 91. See also “Germany Defends Europe’s Art and Culture Against Barbarians of Air, Goebbels Says,” *The New York Times*, 27 June 1943, 20.

asserted, in the event of foreign agitation being further stepped up, that secret military stores are concealed in its immediate neighbourhood.”¹⁹ Lest some outcry be generated by news of the seat of British royalty’s destruction, he concluded his directions by stipulating that “no details are to be published about the damage.”²⁰ As it happened, Buckingham Palace was slightly damaged during raids on London’s West End in 1940, but probably only unintentionally—what we would now describe as “collateral damage.”²¹

It is certain that German war planners targeted only those British cities with important historic buildings in the course of the Baedeker Raids. The fact that many of these buildings were ecclesiastical seems to have been incidental. Indeed, any strategic value to be found in the specific targeting of churches would likely be nullified by the enemy’s solidified resolve in the wake of such bombings. It is not clear, however, whether the Germans intended the raids to be perceived as overt attacks against cultural heritage, or whether any damage to monuments was to be explained away as accidental—as an unfortunate consequence of inexact, modern air warfare. The military and industrial importance of the cities involved—secondary, at best—seems to preclude the possibility of any credible pretext. The historic buildings of these cities were, in fact, the Luftwaffe’s intended targets, and the desired effect of the attacks was the terrorization and demoralization of the British populace.²² An immediate consequence would be the damage or destruction of cherished, irreplaceable architectural treasures. But a secondary consequence, perhaps even more important than the actual destruction of buildings, would be the realization that

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Lambourne, 46.

²² Whiting, 18.

similar fates might befall other British towns and cities. The Baedeker Raids would instill this crippling realization in the local mindset. A demoralized, besieged Britain was probably seen by Germany as more likely to acquiesce.

The Germans considered the Baedeker Raids on Exeter (23-25 April, 3 May), Bath (25-26 April), Norwich (27-29 April, 8 May), York (28 April), and Canterbury (31 May-1 June, 3 June) a success on one level. The attacks did what they were intended to do: destroy historic buildings in each city's commercial and residential districts. Among the individual monuments damaged during the raids were Exeter Cathedral, several 18th-century houses on the Royal Crescent in Bath, four smaller churches in Norwich, York's medieval guildhall, and the library and canon's house associated with Canterbury Cathedral.²³ The Cathedral itself managed to survive the Baedeker Raids with little injury.

In terms of military strategy, the Baedeker raids seem to have backfired. Instead of breaking the British will to fight, the raids seem to have only served to harden the island nation's resoluteness to defeat Nazi Germany. Moreover, the British did not merely condemn the raids and capitalize on the propagandistic value of German callousness. Rather, they acted in a manner that can only be described as tit-for-tat. Shortly after the Baedeker Raids, the R.A.F. bombed several historic, non-military cities—Lübeck's sister Hansaetic city of Rostock among them. The response in Britain to the Baedeker Raids—obvious attacks on the nation's heritage that they were—was an increased willingness to accept the area-bombing German cities.²⁴ By

²³ Lambourne, 53.

²⁴ Whiting, 81.

the war's end, the destruction caused to monuments during the Baedeker Raids paled in comparison to that wrought in German cities and towns alike.

The Baedeker Raids were possibly the most egregious example of monuments destruction to occur during World War II. Nevertheless, the subject of destroying historic architecture was repeatedly discussed in both the Allied and Axis camps. German high officials were, from the very outset of the war, aware of the symbolic potency of monuments, insofar as their destruction or preservation was concerned. Goebbels was especially attuned to their strategic worth. Excerpts from his diaries reveal his understanding that historic monuments could be used as a means of furthering Germany's war effort, as well as impeding the enemy's.²⁵ British air attacks on Germany early in the war serves to illustrate this. In September of 1940, two years before the bombing of Lübeck and the retaliatory Baedeker Raids, the R.A.F. bombed the medium-sized city of Hamm, at the eastern edge of the Rhein-Ruhr *industriegebiet*. During this raid, the Mediaeval Catholic Church of Our Lady was destroyed—one of Germany's first historic casualties of the war.²⁶ Realizing that the destruction of this local landmark could be put to an advantageous use, Goebbels noted in his diary that its fate should be publicized in the press; that the destruction of the church “should be featured in a big way in order to keep hatred of the British alive among the German people.”²⁷ The propagandistic worth of this destroyed building was undoubtedly augmented by its function as a place of worship. Its destruction could be interpreted as an attack on Catholicism, or on religious pacifism in general.

²⁵ Boelcke, 89.

²⁶ There is no evidence to suggest the destruction of the church was intentional. The inability of the R.A.F. to pinpoint targets would have made a conscious attack on a single building unlikely.

²⁷ Boelcke, 89.

One can assume that Goebbels' strategy was successful: that in a bellicose nation energized by wartime nationalism, most Germans felt some sense of loss or anger over the destruction of a blatantly non-military building like the Church of Our Lady in Hamm. However, this church was a monument of local significance. Its value as propaganda was intrinsically limited geographically (citizens of the Hamm area presumably knew and appreciated the building more than others throughout Germany), and perhaps even by religious denomination (non-Catholics likely felt less of a vested interest in the church building).²⁸ Conversely, an attack on a house of worship might have generated outrage across religious denominations. Fortunately for Goebbels, another air raid by R.A.F. bombers presented the opportunity to create anti-British sentiment on a national scale. In September of 1940, the British launched several trial attacks on Germany's capital of Berlin. Among the structures damaged in one of the raids were two of great importance to the German people: the Brandenburger Tor, the triumphal arch that punctuates the ceremonial Straße des 17. Juni Boulevard, and the Reichstag, the seat of federal government. Immediately realizing its propagandistic potential, Goebbels directed that the raid be "castigated by the press with hurting indignation as an attack on our national symbols."²⁹ The attacks on the Brandenburger Tor and Reichstag thus became attacks not just on inanimate architecture, but on the German people themselves.

As the air war in Europe stepped up its pace, and as devastating attacks on Germany's cities became commonplace, Germany's strategy involving the publicizing of damage

²⁸ Later in the war, as the pre-invasion bombing of German occupied Italy commenced, concern over the destruction of Catholic buildings was vocalized by Catholics both in Europe and in the United States. Most of this concern seems to have been focused on the seat of Christendom: Rome generally, and the Vatican specifically. Thus, there were examples of rallying that centered on something other than national identity—in this case, religious affiliation.

²⁹ Boelcke, 90.

to its monuments changed drastically. By 1943, it had become clear to Goebbels that the Allies might be using his carefully controlled news reports of damage to German churches to assess the accuracy and efficacy of their bombing raids. A mention in the German press of damage to a church would allow to Allied planners to ascertain if, and to what degree, their bombers had been successful in acquiring their targets. This had been a strategy employed by the Luftwaffe itself following raids on the cities of Britain. Goebbels noted in his journal that

...the Minister rejects the idea of releasing details about the destruction of churches since we have invariably deduced the measure of our own success from British reports of churches destroyed. From the percentage of churches hit we have assessed the destruction at railway stations and industrial objectives. We must not therefore give the British these useful pieces of information in the future.³⁰

Nevertheless, Goebbels conceded that the propagandistic value in reporting damage to certain types of buildings outweighed the potential for the enemy to misuse the information. He concluded his journal entry by indicating that “on the other hand, needless to say, reports about the destruction of individual world-renowned cultural monuments will be released.”³¹ Such reports made their way into the world press stream, and cautionary statements that might have accompanied them—something to the effect that *this report is unverified, and should be taken with a grain of salt*—were frequently lost, lending the report in question an air of uncompromised authority and accuracy.³²

³⁰ Ibid., 341.

³¹ Ibid.

³² See, for example, the recurring “Marginalia: Bomb Damage in Germany,” The Architectural Review, XLV, 570, June 1944, xlvii-xlviii. The June 1944 issue includes lists of bomb damage to significant works of architecture in Germany, along with the media that was the source of information. The entry for Frankfurt reads as follows: “St. Nicholas, Saalhof, Goethehaus, severly damaged; Haus Lichtenstein burnt out ([*Hamburger Fremdenblatt*], 12.12.43), Braunfels House, Bethmann Palace, Deutschordens-House destroyed (German Broadcast, 7.10.43).”

Why were the Lübeck and Baedeker Raids significant? These raids came to characterize the tenor of battle in WWII. They helped determine that the war would be a “no holds barred” conflict, insofar as Britain and Germany were concerned. The coup de grace came in 1945, with the fire-bombing of refugee-engorged Dresden. The Americans, however, whether motivated by post-war self-interest (the Army Air Force seeing a place for itself as an independent branch of the military) or genuinely altruistic intentions, were not as willing to adopt unconstrained warfare. This, of course, was partially due to the nonexistence of combat and destruction on the American mainland, and the concomitant lack of animosity toward the enemy that the first-hand experience of war engenders.

The British Experience in North Africa as a Precursor to Continental Europe

At the outset of World War II, the Allies were unprepared to meet the challenge of protecting historic sites from damage and destruction. British archaeologist Lt.-Col. Sir Leonard Woolley captured this state of preparedness when he described the British Army’s efforts as completely ad hoc. Fortunately, Woolley noted, “as so often happens with British improvisations, this one worked very well.”³³ The early, improvised efforts not only succeeded in doing what they were intended to do, but they also established a basis of action for the remainder of the war.

The first effort taken by the Allied nations during World War II to protect historic monuments occurred, of all places, on the northern African coastline, in what is present-day Libya. Three principal archaeological sites were involved: the great Mediterranean trading cities of Lepcis (or Leptis) Magna, Sabratha, and to the east—

³³ Woolley, 17.

across the Gulf of Sidra—the capital of Cyrenaica, Cyrene.³⁴ All of these sites were ancient in origin. Lepcis Magna was a Phoenician *emporium* founded before 600 B.C., and which eventually became a Roman territory under Trajan during the 4th century A.D. Sabratha was also a Phoenician *emporium*, and it too came under Roman control. Cyrene, conversely, was founded as a Greek trading colony in ca.630 B.C. The city changed hands several times over the centuries, alternating between Greek, Roman, Egyptian, and Arabic rule, before eventually being razed and abandoned in the 7th century A.D. In 1941, as today, the sites retained the architectural legacy of the cultures that once occupied them.

All three North African sites had undergone extensive excavation and reconstruction during the decades preceding World War II. The archaeologists involved in these projects were not Libyan, however. Rather, they were Italian: cultural emissaries from Mussolini's Italy, sent to explore and rebuild—and in no uncertain terms, reclaim—the former Classical colonies. Their goal was to lend physical expression to the new, far-reaching Roman Empire. The final message underlying the excavations was entirely more important to the Italian archaeologists than the process of discovery or informational yield. Indeed, British archaeologist Lt.-Col. Woolley observed that “scientific research was throughout made subordinate to, or more often altogether abandoned in favor of, theatrical display.”³⁵ Yet Mussolini’s program had evidently achieved the desired effect. Woolley added that “no visitor could fail to be struck by the imposing effect of the excavations, and to the Italian Fascist they did indeed symbolise the glories of his traditional ancestry.”³⁶ When the British Army marched across North Africa in early 1941, they inherited these new symbols of imperial Italy.

³⁴ Ibid., 10-17.

³⁵ Woolley, quoted in Lynn H Nicholas, The Rape of Europa (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 215.

³⁶ Ibid.

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's forces of armor and infantry suddenly became the stewards of great antiquity: among the more famous structures, the Severan basilica and theater at Lepcis Magna and two 2nd century theaters, one each at Sabratha and Cyrene. All had been partially reconstructed by Italian archaeologists.

The British occupation of these ancient cities was fleeting, however. In March of 1941, Churchill diverted four British divisions from the North African campaign to Greece, in response to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia's forced entry into the Tripartite alliance with Germany, Italy, and Japan.³⁷ With little opposition the Italian Army reclaimed the coastal areas of Africa in the spring. In the summer that followed, the Italian government, anxious to rouse as much anti-Allied sentiment as possible, published a pamphlet that allegedly chronicled the short British occupation of the North Africa. Entitled *Che cosa hanno fatto gli Inglesi in Cirenaica* ("What the English did in Cyrenaica"), the authors accused the British Army generally—and Australian elements of the British Army specifically—of desecrating the recently excavated and restored site of Cyrene.³⁸ They alleged that Allied soldiers had looted and willfully damaged many of the precious artifacts and buildings. By way of proof, the pamphlet provided substantiating photographs of the sites and the associated museum, with overturned storage boxes and empty sculpture pedestals standing in rooms littered with masonry fragments. The responsibility for this destruction could not be more unequivocal: the guilty parties had gone so far as to scrawl English graffiti over the walls of the restored monuments and the museum—an act of misguided authorship had, in fact, the Allies actually been the responsible party. They had not been. When the British regained lost ground in North Africa between 1941

³⁷ Keegan, 150-151.

³⁸ Woolley, 11.

and 1943, they were afforded the opportunity to inspect the Cyrene site and investigate the Italian claims.³⁹ They learned that the Italian government, in its attempt to create negative propaganda, had falsified photographic and written records. Not only were the shattered statues not broken by British troops, but they were not even broken recently. Woolley noted that “antiquity,” the passage of many hundreds of years, had caused almost all of the damage.⁴⁰ Missing museum pieces had not been carried off to the British Museum, but transferred to Tripoli and Rome by the Italians themselves.⁴¹ Only the graffiti was of British doing.⁴² The scrawl-covered walls provided a convenient photographic backdrop in front of which the Italians had carefully arranged their set pieces: overturned pedestals, empty boxes, and piles of detritus—presumably discarded historical shards. The resulting photographs created a sort of visual guilt by association.

The negative propaganda generated by *Che cosa hanno fatto gli Inglesi in Cirenaica* was evidently significant enough that the British Army decided to take preemptive precautions when operating around delicate and potentially inflammatory historic sites. This decision was motivated in part by the expectation that the Italian mainland—an area rich with many centuries worth of cultural heritage—would host combat before the outcome of the war was decided. So before reengaging Axis forces in North Africa in 1942, the War Office in London directed the Civil Affairs office of British Army’s Middle East headquarters to ensure the protection of ancient sites

³⁹ Professor and conservator Alan Rowe of the Graeco-Roman Museum in Alexandria investigated many of the sites and wrote a report disproving Italian claims. See Woolley, A Record of the Work Done by the Military Authorities for the Protection of the Treasures of Art & History in War Areas, 14.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 11.

⁴¹ Ibid. See also American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1946), 77.

⁴² Nicholas, 215-216.

along the anticipated coastal invasion routes.⁴³ These instructions were specific to the operations at hand, and did not constitute a general monuments protection program within the British Army. They were based on existing international guidelines, namely the *Manual of Military Law* (1929 Edition XIV, 133), which stipulated that “all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected.”⁴⁴ This, in turn, led to the implementation of Proclamation No. 24 of the Antiquity Law. This proclamation, issued on 17 November, 1943, prohibited the British Military Administration from excavating archaeological sites, and removing or destroying artifacts without permission from the Chief Secretary.⁴⁵

The British Army’s plans to spare the historic sites of North Africa were intended to include both the combat and post-combat phases of the campaign. But ultimately, most of the protective acts that were undertaken were done so during the latter phase, after the fighting had ended. In this regard, the experiences of the British along the Mediterranean coast anticipate and typify those of the remainder of the war. (A recurring observation made by Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officers describes the unexpected damage to buildings caused by billeting rear troops and engineers.) Another dimension of the African campaign that would hold true in later stages of the war was the relationship between speed of conquest and the resultant destruction caused by that conquest: a more rapid advance usually indicated less resistance, and therefore less battle damage to the landscape. Cyrene and Sabratha were liberated with minimal fighting, and the various cultural sites at both locations received

⁴³ Woolley, 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 15.

predictably little combat-related damage. Lepcis Magna was overrun with somewhat greater difficulty. As a result, the damage to monuments there was commensurately high. Once fighting had concluded, the British Army took great care to ensure that the sites saved from battle damage were not carelessly harmed by occupation soldiers. Lt.-Col. Woolley elaborated on the motivations by later writing that “the first and most legitimate aim [of monuments protection] was the preservation of [the Army’s] good name. As a champion of civilization, the troops must be guarded against all charges of vandalism.”⁴⁶ To these ends, historic sites, museums and historic buildings were posted as off-limits to troops and civilians, and damaged buildings were shored up to prevent additional damage or looting. Local guards were stationed at the sites, and Italian archaeologists were reinstated and allowed to return to their official, pre-war duties. The British Army also tried to instill in its troops the sense that ancient sites were intrinsically important and worthy of protection. Visiting experts on history and archaeology gave lectures regarding the local monuments and collections, and maps and tour books were printed for use by soldiers.⁴⁷ British Antiquities Officers—like Woolley, archaeologists and historians in times of peace who had been recruited for military service—also took the opportunity to survey several of the previously unexamined Classical sites.⁴⁸ They used aerial photographs produced for battle planning and analysis to identify sites not readily discernable from the ground. Given the wartime scarcity of resources, the British were able to accomplish a great deal, perhaps more than would have been expected. The Monuments and Fine Arts Sub-

⁴⁶ Ibid., 7

⁴⁷ Evidently the benefits of calling attention to important sites and generating interest and respect was perceived to outweigh the risk of focusing on potentially-lootable sites. Perhaps this was also to assure to the local population that the Allies regarded the war as a finite experience: as something that would eventually come to an end, and after which normalcy would return. Museums and heritage sites would eventually reopen. In a similar manner, museums in the United States and Britain continued to display selections of their permanent collections, while other, more important elements were spirited away to safety. It was hoped that this would instill a similar feeling in the local population; that it would lesson the sense (especially in Britain) that the nation was a fortress under siege.

⁴⁸ Woolley, 13.

Commission of the British War Office (as the governing body came to be known) appropriated a fitting motto from the Funeral Oration of Perikles: “We protect the arts at the lowest possible cost.”⁴⁹

The British Army’s North African experiment in monuments protection was largely successful. One of the only incidents of significant damage to an historic site involved the 18th century Karamanli Mosque in Tripoli, the ancient city of Oea and sister to Sabratha and Lepcis Magna.⁵⁰ R.A.F. bombers accidentally damaged this historic building (as well as several “old Arab houses” and lesser mosques) during air raids directed at Axis positions within the city. This incident represents an early example of what was to become a recurring theme in World War II: that bombers inflicted vastly more damage to buildings than ground troops—damage caused through intentional targeting of military sites and through unintentional, collateral damage of nearby buildings. Despite this exception to the rule, the British Army’s early effort to protect cultural sites from destruction or vandalism succeeded. Although difficult to gage, it probably helped to stem the production of negative propaganda by denying the enemy a ready supply of grist. The effort of preemptively protecting sites outweighed the post facto “damage control” required later.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 6.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 12.

CHAPTER THREE: THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PATRIMONY IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT: LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

Introduction

Should monuments be protected from destruction? The question is loaded; an outright, unqualified “no” is not an answer anyone is likely to give. Monuments are not common buildings. They are superlative and invested with value that common buildings lack. Part of their status as “monuments” assumes that they have been cherished and protected, and will continue to be protected in the future. A follow-up question: Should monuments be offered protection during war, when so much else—human life, established governments, economies, entire ways of life—is at stake? Those whose livelihood depends on the existence of monuments (scholars, those in the tourism industry, and so on) would, of course, answer affirmatively, peppering the response with such expressions as “irreplaceable cultural patrimony” and “the world’s heritage.”¹ Professional decision-makers might share this sentiment and offer a similar response, but their underlying motivations might be something less noble. Monuments, after all, have value as propaganda. The nation whose army marches through a foreign battlefield leaving a narrow wake of destruction stands a better chance of being perceived as a benevolent conqueror. Conversely, a policy of “scorched earth” may serve to intimidate in the short term but will likely engender protracted animosity and political intractability. The policy of monuments protection is something that a nation can tout as an indicator of its civility and humanity. The destruction of monuments—whether real or confabulated—could also be highlighted

¹ Evidence that scholar and museum officials took it upon themselves to contribute to the war effort can be seen in recurring articles in professional journals relating to this topic, such as the “Wartime Activities of College Art Staffs” in many issues of *College Art Journal* during the war years.

in order to cast a damning light on an enemy. Examples of both types of propaganda occurred in World War II.

This desire to protect irreplaceable historic monuments and art objects from damage during times of war is not a new one. People have long since acknowledged that fits of national rage—like those of individuals—have irreversible consequences that might have been preventable in more stable and rational times. The individual’s behavior is typically governed by that vague standard of personal conduct, the conscience. The nation-state, however, regulates its behavior through a codified set of laws. Yet it is precisely during periods of tumult—during times of war—when laws developed in peacetime begin to seem burdensome, and are cast aside so that political objectives can readily be met. When the limits of diplomacy have extended to the point where civil and humanitarian rights no longer matter—when the trading of human life is a primary means of political interchange—then the laws and treaties put into place to ensure lesser protections like the safeguarding of important historic buildings assume a meaningless quality. Adherence to these laws is quickly abandoned. World War II is just such an example of this. Many of the agreements that existed prior to the start of the war were quickly disregarded when the first shells that preceded the German invasions fell in 1939.

In this chapter I examine the legal instruments in place in 1939 that governed—or were intended to govern—the behavior of states vis a vis the war-time treatment of historic monuments. The majority of these instruments were not what one would describe as “monuments protection” treaties. Rather, they are far-reaching documents that generally attempted to prescribe what conduct was and was not permissible during war: the treatment of prisoners and wounded, the exacting of reparations, and so on.

The treaties were broad in nature, and the disposition of monuments was only one component of many. Moreover, the preservation of historic buildings was often an unintended consequence of some other type of protection: the protection of the *contents* of a building like a museum, church, or library that happened to be of historic value. Thus, the monuments protection section can almost be interpreted as a rider that accompanies a larger bill; in this case, monuments protection clauses accompanied humanitarian rights treaties—the former becoming unassailable due to its relationship with the latter.

To demonstrate the state of monuments protection in 1939, I examine the following agreements, all of which set, in one way or another, the stage for the monuments protection work done by the American Commission during World War II: the Lieber Instructions (1863); the Brussels Declaration (1874); the Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907); the Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1922-23); and finally the Roerich Pact (1935), the last pre-World War II treaty to address the protection of historic monuments, and the first to prescribe the war-time treatment of cultural resources and nothing more. A study of these treaties serves well to illustrate a simple point: that the drafters and subsequent signers of these documents believed that war should not be an unrestrained free-for-all; that the curtailing of nations' behaviors during these times was a valid and appropriate endeavor.² Within this larger framework was the notion that the protection of a nation's irreplaceable cultural treasures from destruction was also a sought-after goal. Ultimately, however, the treaties that existed in 1939 were largely disregarded in the course of the World War II. This was a vastly destructive and often random conflict, and despite the existence of treaties, it set new standards for what

² The very fact that so many nations signed these treaties (in spite of, or perhaps because of, their lack of binding legality) seems to suggest this. Lambourne also makes this statement in War Damage in Western Europe: The Destruction of Historic Monuments During the Second World War, 27.

would be considered tolerable behavior. The destruction of civilian buildings, historic or otherwise, and even entire cities, was considered a reasonable means to an end. In this sense World War II seems little different than earlier, pre-treaty wars—conflicts in which civilizations vanished when cities were besieged, occupied, and razed in their entirety. One is even reminded of the American Civil War, which saw the fallen city of Atlanta torched by Union forces as a punitive and symbolic measure. The Union government's seizing of Confederate general Robert E. Lee's house in Arlington, Virginia, and the subsequent conversion of the mansion and its grounds to the nation's premier cemetery for fallen heroes was far less destructive, physically, but in many ways every bit as vindictive.³

The protection of humanitarian rights during times of war was almost universally agreed upon. It comes as no surprise that most of the nations of the world signed the various treaties mentioned in the paragraph above. Yet the means by which monuments might actually be protected from destruction was not implicit. Thus, many of the treaties described in this chapter also attempted to establish a process by which monuments might be protected. These processes typically involved a series of steps: identification of the cultural monument, public notification of its whereabouts (though the use of a universally-accepted placard), and the guaranty that the identified monument would not be used for military purposes (otherwise relinquishing its protected status). It will become obvious that these treaties not only shaped the efforts of the American Commission during the war, but also shaped the means by which historic monuments were identified and earmarked for preservation in the decades following. It takes no leap of imagination to see a connection between these treaties

³ James Carroll makes this point in his op-ed piece, “America’s mortal secret,” The Boston Globe, May 3, 2005, online at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/05/03/americas_mortal_secret.

and the laws that inform the National Register of Historic Places; the inventory of historic buildings and archaeological sites in the United States.

Background

On March 15, 1943, William Bell Dinsmoor, President of the Archaeological Institute of America and professor of classical architecture at Columbia University, sent an unsolicited letter to United States Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimpson.⁴ Attached to this letter was a memorandum prepared earlier by Francis Henry Taylor, Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York.⁵ Using Taylor's memorandum as fuel for the argument he was about to make, Dinsmoor urged Stimpson to use his leverage in Washington to push for the creation of a Federal organization to oversee the protection of art objects and monuments in war-torn Europe and Asia. This was a suggestion originally proffered by Dinsmoor, Taylor, and others in the East Coast arts community several months before.⁶ In calling for the establishment of such a group of experts, Dinsmoor was vocalizing the cause of the American Council of Learned Societies' nascent Subcommittee on the Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas, a New York-based think-tank on which he was serving as chairman.⁷ Dinsmoor must have suspected how this proposal would be received in Washington. He must have anticipated that his letter, and the proposal that accompanied it, would

⁴ Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), 84; Study 36, p.1. Taylor had evidently sent a "preliminary" memorandum to Stimpson—one of several that were sent by different people. See Coles and Weinberg, 84.

⁵ This memorandum may have been submitted by Taylor to Stimpson at an earlier date.

⁶ Taylor, Dinsmoor, Leland, and Coleman sent a draft petition calling for the formation of such a group to Stout, Sachs, and Chase in earlier in the month. Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1994), 33.

⁷ Nicholas, 220; Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 34; and General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Report: Civil Affairs and Military Government Activities in Connection with Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (Study Number 36) [No other publishing information available], 2. The committee was formed on 29 January 1943, but the first meeting occurred on 25 June 1943.

be regarded by Stimpson as well-intentioned but nonessential to the war effort, and would therefore be unceremoniously disregarded—forgotten until irreparable damage to art and monuments had already been done. Dinsmoor thus set out to demonstrate that his idea was not a novel one, but rather one that had long since been seeded; that the legal framework for an international monuments protection program was already in place and awaiting adaptation to the present situation.⁸ To reinforce their message, Dinsmoor and Taylor also noted that there was ample military precedent. Citing one of history's most prominent figures, they described no less a leader than Napoleon, who had marched into the Middle East with a group of archaeologists and historians to advise his armies in the field.⁹ Napoleon's motivations were perhaps less selfless than what Dinsmoor and Taylor were proposing, but the very fact that archaeologists and historians could play a legitimate role in a fielded military was enough for the two authors.¹⁰ The eventual result of Dinsmoor and Taylor's effort—the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas—was based on these military precursors as well as legal ones, which they would mention in later discussions. Although they did not have any specific answers as to the logistics of such an organization, they operated with the assumption that their current efforts would benefit from an awareness of the efforts of those experts who had preceded them.

⁸ Taylor's 15 March 1943 memo that accompanied Dinsmoor's letter of the same date to Stimpson. See Coles and Weinberg, 84-85.

⁹ In 1942, Taylor and Dinsmoor had written a letter for President Roosevelt highlighting episodes of art and monuments theft, destruction, and protection during previous conflicts, citing, among other things, Napoleon's fabled march through Egypt at the close of the 19th century. It is assumed that Taylor and Dinsmoor continued to salt their argument for a monuments protection group with examples such as this. See Nicholas, 211.

¹⁰ Among the treasures brought from Egypt was Cleopatra's Needle, an obelisk that was taken from Napoleon's armies by the conquering British and which now stands in London. See Christopher Lloyd, The Nile Campaign: Nelson and Napoleon in Egypt (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973).

In the memorandum forwarded to Secretary of War Stimpson, Taylor cited several international instruments and standards to which the United States was already party. These were agreements that had been created, either in whole or in part, for the protection of monuments and art objects during times of armed conflict.¹¹ Despite the existence of these treaties, Taylor noted that more stringent protective mechanisms would be needed. He recognized that “the great scale of destruction in the present war has exceeded anything imagined or provided for by previous declarations,” and that it was therefore “imperative that certain additional measures be undertaken by the War Department.”¹² Taylor attributed the unique destructiveness of fighting overseas to a new form of warfare, one that had not been anticipated when previous treaties had been drafted: the capability to bombard enemy targets from aircraft using high-explosive and incendiary ordnance. By 1943, the Allies and Axis had already demonstrated that the magnitude of destruction in the war would far surpass that of earlier wars and make events such as the destruction of historic buildings in France during World War I pale in comparison.

The list of treaties that Taylor provided to the Stimpson’s War Department identified what was essentially a second generation of laws regarding cultural property protection. The late-nineteenth century had already witnessed the creation of several international treaties and standards that established the rules of war, several of which included provisions for the protective treatment of cultural objects during battle.

¹¹Taylor cited the following: Convention (II) with respect to the Law and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, July 29, 1899; Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907; Convention (IX) concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War, signed at The Hague, October 18, 1907; and the Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments, known as the “Roerich Pact,” signed in Washington, D. C. on April 15, 1935. Memo by Taylor, cited in Coles and Weinberg, 84-85.

¹²Ibid.

Elements of these treaties, as well as those mentioned by Taylor in his memorandum, would influence Allied cultural policies during World War II.

Lieber Instructions (1863)

One of the earliest legal instruments to describe the wartime protection of cultural objects dates from 1863. The instrument is American, surprisingly enough, given that the country was not even 100 years old at the time of the instrument's inception. While quelling a civil war, the United States government implemented a set of general orders to regulate its troops while in battle on foreign soil—in this case, one assumes while in the Confederate South. This set of orders, known as the “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” was drafted by American attorney Francis Lieber and issued as General Orders No. 100 through the United States Adjutant General's Office. Articles 34, 35, and 36 of these “Lieber Instructions” are important in that they described—albeit briefly—the standards by which cultural artifacts were to be treated during combat, culminating with the statement that “in no case shall they be...wantonly destroyed or injured.”¹³

To be sure, the Lieber Instructions address *moveable* cultural artifacts. They describe how such artifacts should be treated during war, and attempt to establish their status with regard to looting and taxation.¹⁴ Historic buildings are not mentioned, not even in passing. Yet this early document nevertheless illustrates what would become a

¹³ Art. 36, as contained in Dietrich Schindler and Jirí Toman, eds., The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions, Resolutions, and Other Documents (Geneva: Henry Dunant Institute, 1988).

¹⁴ Art. 34 defines what, during war, may be considered acceptable for public use and taxed. Art. 35 describes the protection of cultural objects like archival collections, “precious instruments” like astronomical telescopes, and art. Art. 36 explains how cultural objects may, in fact, be taken by a nation as reparations, but that such objects cannot be subsequently exchanged or possessed by individuals.

common thread that runs through most subsequent legal instruments involving cultural property protection during war, one of four such threads. The Lieber Instructions mention the desirability of preventing *unnecessary* damage to cultural objects in the face of *inevitable* damage.¹⁵ Later documents would pick up on this and expand the scope of protection to include historic buildings. Even as early as 1863, there existed a general awareness that in the midst of war and its attendant destruction, some types of damage should be averted, if possible—hence the qualifying call in the Lieber Instructions to avoid *wanton* destruction or injury. While typical in most respects, this treaty is unique in that it does not offer a caveat that condones, under certain conditions, the destruction of art objects. Subsequent treaties provide just such a loophole. They include a logical (but ultimately abused) “military necessity” caveat that permits the destruction of monuments or art objects in circumstances where military considerations require as much. Article 17 of the Brussels Declaration (1874) is typical of later treaties. It states that “all necessary steps must be taken to spare [from siege and bombardment], as far as possible, buildings dedicated to art, science, or charitable purposes...provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.” What constituted military use was open to sweeping interpretation. One readily encounters descriptions of incidents in both world wars involving the destruction of historic buildings and collections—incidents that suggest the loophole was much abused.¹⁶ This “military necessity” caveat will be discussed later in this thesis.

¹⁵ Similar to Art. 36, cited above, Art. 35 of the Lieber Instructions stipulates that “Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments...as well as hospitals, must be secured against all *avoidable* injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded” (author’s emphasis).

¹⁶ Reims Cathedral was allegedly occupied in by French troops during World War I, thus giving the invading German army to an excuse to shell the church. Recounting events in World War II, Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives officers described situations in which they prevented engineering companies from creating roads in historic towns by cutting swathes through the extant buildings. E.g. see letters cited in Coles and Weinberg, 423-24.

The Lieber Instructions also reveal a second recurring thread that runs through cultural protection treaties of this sort: that historic monuments were unintentionally offered protection, even when the call to do so was not explicitly spelled out in the language of the treaty. The Lieber Instructions do not extend protection to historic buildings for their architectural value per se, but rather for what they house, in terms of either objects or human activities. The types of buildings mentioned in the treaty as worthy of protection—churches, hospitals, universities, and libraries—were deemed important by some for obvious humanitarian reasons. But the signatory governments must also have realized the potential for symbolic value in these buildings. A combatant's destruction of a hospital filled with the wounded or a library rich with irreplaceable archives was easy propaganda for the enemy, who could paint the aggressor as brutal and amoral.¹⁷ Similarly, an invading army helps to make itself unassailable by wrapping its actions in benevolent acts such as the protection of civilian buildings. Thus, in the Lieber Instructions, the protection of buildings because they were regarded as vessels for important objects or sacrosanct activities inadvertently protected their artistic shells.

The object of the Lieber Instructions was to safeguard art objects and collections, though it unintentionally ensured that some degree of protection would be given to buildings like churches, museums, and hospitals that might have been significant for their architectural qualities. Forty-four years would have to elapse before the status of architecture would be elevated and thus singled out for protection on its own merit—

¹⁷ In the case of World War II, archives were given especial protection (alongside monuments and fine arts) because official records of the government were regarded as necessary for building a post-war legal case against the Nazi regime.

not, as was the case of the Lieber Instructions, because of the activities or objects that it might contain.

Brussels Declaration (1874)

In August of 1874, ten short years after the Lieber Instructions were issued, a legal instrument with language pertaining to cultural protection was crafted at the Brussels Conference in Belgium.¹⁸ This instrument, the “International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,” was informally agreed to—but not ratified—by the fifteen European nations participating in the conference. Article 17 of the so-called Brussels Declaration stated that

...all necessary steps must be taken to spare [from siege and bombardment], as far as possible, buildings dedicated to art, science, or charitable purposes, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.

To add weight to this requirement, Article 8 of the Brussels Declaration asserted that combatants unwilling to comply with these instructions would face legal prosecution following the war. It stated that the “seizure or destruction of, or willful damage to, institutions of [cultural] character, historic monuments, works of art and science should be made the subject of legal proceedings by the competent authorities.” The pertinent phrase here is, of course, “historic monuments.” This is probably the first example of monuments protection for its own sake to be mentioned in an international

¹⁸ Lambourne says this of the Brussels Declaration in War Damage in Western Europe: The Destruction of Historic Monuments During the Second World War, 29: “The first reference to a ban on destroying or stealing works of art in wartime appeared in the text of the Brussels [Declaration] of 1784.”

treaty on acceptable conduct during war. The Brussels Declaration is typical of cultural protection treaties of the pre-World War I era.¹⁹

The policy of sparing only those monuments not currently being used for military purposes becomes a third common thread that runs through cultural protection pacts. As discussed later in this thesis, the requirement that protection only be offered those monuments not being used for military purposes reappears in two sets of directives that General Eisenhower issued to Allied troops during World War II: one at the beginning of Italian invasion in 1943, the other in conjunction with the Overlord operation launched in northwestern Europe in 1944.²⁰ In the qualifying “as far as possible” statement of the Brussels Declaration, one sees the continuation of the partitioning of *unnecessary* from *necessary* damage, the former to be avoided but the latter permissible under certain mitigating circumstances. Several famous incidents

¹⁹Compare, for example, the Oxford Institute of International Law’s “Laws of War on Land Manual” of 1880, a document similar in intent to the Brussels Declaration of 1874. Using text taken nearly verbatim from the earlier document, Article 34 of the “Oxford Manual” mandated that

[i]n case of bombardment all necessary steps must be taken to spare, if it can be done, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science and charitable purposes, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are gathered on the condition that they are not being utilized at the time, directly or indirectly, for defense. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings by visible signs notified to the assailant beforehand,

while Article 53 continued by adding that the “destruction or willful damage to institutions of [cultural] character, historic monuments, archives, works of art, or science, is formally forbidden, save when urgently demanded by military necessity.” However, the Oxford Manual, unlike the Brussels Declaration, made no specific provision for the prosecution of combatants who failed to adhere to its standards for conduct.

In September of 1880, the Institute of International Law published a manual entitled “The Laws of War on Land.” This manual came to be known simply as the Oxford Manual, after the English university town in which it was written and published. The Institute of International Law was an organization whose efforts were directed at the growth and development of international law. Their manual was not a treaty per se; it required no signatories, and existed only to provide guidance to nations in matters of dispute and conflict resolution.

²⁰ See Eisenhower’s directives, cited in Coles and Weinberg, 417 (Italian campaign) and 864-5 (northwestern Europe campaign).

involving the destruction of monuments were justified using this “military necessity” caveat, among the more famous the damaging assault on Reims Cathedral during World War I and the complete destruction of Monte Cassino during World War II.²¹

At the core of the Brussels Declaration is the requirement that non-militarized monuments and sites of cultural importance be spared damage, but the treaty also indirectly addressed the inseparable question of how armies in the field will be able to identify a protected monument. Article 17 of the Brussels Declaration answers this important question. It stipulates that “It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings by distinctive and visible signs to be communicated to the enemy beforehand.” Although the drafters of the Brussels Declaration raise this subject, they leave the specifics of such a policy open to interpretation. No recommendations are made, for example, as to the design of the sign or where on the monument in question it should be mounted. Nor is the definition of “monument” broached. The assumption, in the absence of any contradictory explanation, is that the host nation would be responsible for defining its own monuments and for identifying them in the prescribed fashion. This need to physically tag cultural monuments for all to see is a fourth common thread that runs through legal instruments of this kind. It would resurface next in the Roerich Pact of 1935 (described later), which called for the mounting of a placard with a universally recognizable design that would identify a building. With this visible plaque, the building of historic or cultural value was no longer an unacceptable military target. The sign described in the Roerich Pact contained a symbol determined to be unique and readily identifiable: three solid circles—one circle resting atop a pair—within a ring, all burgundy in color, and


²¹ See Lambourne’s chapter “Precedents and Laws—War Damage to Historic Monuments 1870-1939” for an account of Reims Cathedral and others.

superimposed on a lighter background. The author of the Roerich Pact, Nicholas Roerich, had earlier included this symbol in his artwork [Figures 3-1 and 3-2]. The post-World War II efforts of UNESCO's Blue Shield program also continued the practice but used a different graphic design for its identification placard. Instead of a set of burgundy circles, the "Blue Shield" was literally that: a symbolic aegis designed to safeguard cultural monuments [Figure 3-3]. The Blue Shield represents the latest phase in the ongoing development of the symbolic shield.

Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907)


Two sets of conventions drafted at The Hague, Netherlands in 1899 and 1907 represent the first binding treaties that prescribe the treatment of monuments and cultural objects during times of conflict. Known generally as The Hague Regulations, the first of the two, "Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land," was signed and ratified by participant nations on 29 July, 1899. Its successor, "Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land," was in essence an update of the original treaty. It followed on 18 October, 1907. The later version of Hague Regulation is notable in that it was in effect during both world wars, and had been signed and ratified—but was ultimately disregarded—by most of the primary combatants in Europe.²² An examination of both versions of the Hague Regulations is also useful in that it shows the increasing recognition that historic monuments are suitable subjects for protection during war—not because they happen to be churches or archives or the like, but because they are monuments, and are considered valuable in and of themselves.

²² For example, the Hague Regulations of 1899 were signed and ratified by the United States (on 29 July 1899 and 9 April 1902), by Germany (on 29 July 1899 and 4 September 1900), and by the United Kingdom (29 July 1899 and 4 September 1900). The Hague Regulations of 1907 were signed and ratified by all three powers on 18 October 1907 and 27 November 1909.



This painting shows the prescribed monuments protection symbol: a ring with inset circles.

FIGURE 3-1: “PAX CULTURA,” BY NICHOLAS ROERICH (1931).



This painting shows the prescribed monuments protection symbol: a ring with inset circles.

FIGURE 3-2: “MADONNA ORIFLAMMA,” BY NICHOLAS ROERICH (1932).




FIGURE 3-3: THE UNESCO “BLUE SHIELD” PLACARD, DESIGNED AFTER WORLD WAR II.

The most relevant article in both versions of the Hague Regulations is Article 27. The original 1899 version reads as follows:

Art. 27 (1899 version): In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.

The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants.

All the threads common to art and monuments protection treaties identified earlier in this chapter can be found in this article: the need to minimize damage that will necessarily occur; the de facto protection of monuments for the activities or collections they house, but not for their own value per se; the caveat that only those buildings not being used for military purposes would be spared; and finally, the need for the defender to visually identify those buildings that would be subject to the Hague Regulations. It should also be noted that the drafters of this treaty envisioned a type of warfare that would quickly become antiquated. In 1899, and even still in 1907, the nature of warfare was one in which sprawling armies would engage each other on battlefields, besiege cities, and bombard military positions with land- and sea-based artillery. By mid-century cities would become battlefields and aerial bombardment would surpass artillery as the most efficacious means by which to bring an enemy into submission.

The second version of The Hague Regulations does not differ in many substantive ways from its predecessor. The important change is the inclusion of historic monuments in the list of buildings to be spared damage:

Art. 27 (1907 version): In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, *historic monuments*, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used for military purposes.

It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.

The 1907 Hague Convention also included another article that prescribes the treatment of certain types of buildings, specifically in the context of naval bombardment. Like Article 27, Article 5 of the Hague Convention (IX) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War of 1907 (18 October 1907) identifies historic monuments for protection:

In bombardments by naval forces all the necessary measures must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible sacred edifices, buildings used for artistic, scientific, or charitable purposes, *historic monuments*, hospitals, and places where the sick or wounded are collected, on the understanding that they are not used at the same time for military purposes.²³

Article 5 also answers a logical question hinted at in earlier treaties, but never addressed. It provides recommendations as to how buildings should be visually identified so that assailants will know that they are subject to The Hague Convention's rules. It describes an emblematic placard, the design of which would be universally recognizable:

It is the duty of the inhabitants to indicate such monuments, edifices, or places by visible signs, which shall consist of large, stiff rectangular

²³ This convention was signed/ratified by the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom on 18 October 1907/ 27 November 1909.

panels divided diagonally into two coloured triangular portions, the upper portion black, the lower portion white.

It is not clear whether placards of this type were ever affixed to historic monuments, or even produced for that purpose. Given the rather plain motif, it is no wonder that more unique and visually eye-catching placards would be designed in the future.

Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1922-23)

Of the pre-World War II treaties and conventions to address the issue of monuments protection, the Hague Rules of Air Warfare is without a doubt the most specific and exacting. Not only does this set of rules build upon such issues as the identification and tagging of protected historic monuments, it also establishes safe zones around individual buildings and groups of related buildings—the latter an early incarnation of what would later become historic districts. Most important is The Hague Rules' astute acknowledgement that the physical landscape of warring nations would be greatly affected by air warfare, and that fragile, historic buildings in particular stood the chance of suffering wholesale destruction. Whereas earlier treaties repeatedly attempted to prescribe the actions of land armies and navies, The Hague Rules alter the course of this trend. Its very existence hints at the growing significance—and the eventual primacy—of the world's combat air forces.

The Hague Rule of Air Warfare arose directly out of World War I. This is somewhat surprising, given that the extent to which combat aircraft were employed in that conflict was rather limited, especially when compared to subsequent wars.²⁴ Their use was almost strictly tactical: the sorties carried out achieved certain objectives which, taken on their own, had little direct or measurable effect on the outcome of the war.

²⁴ The damage to Reims Cathedral was one of the most publicized events of its kind. Yet ground troops caused the damage to this building, not air forces.

Yet the destructive potential of the airplane must have been obvious to those nations directly involved in the hostilities and even those observing from afar. It was with this in mind that six nations met in 1922 to discuss ways in which the role the airplane—and specifically, a nascent subset of this technology, the bomber—might be curtailed. At the Washington Conference of 1922 on the Limitation of Armaments, representatives of France, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States debated this issue and resolved to appoint a commission to draw up a set of international rules governing air warfare. This Commission of Jurists met in The Hague during the winter of 1922-23. The participant nations adopted the “Hague Rules” only informally, so it was never legally binding.²⁵ Ratified or not, the events of the following decades indicate that belligerent nations had no intention of letting such a potentially outcome-determining technology as the bomber be regulated. The Hague Rules thus had little effect in the scope and breadth of 20th century war.²⁶ Nevertheless, the document reveals an awareness of how the airplane might cause mass destruction during war if left unregulated.

Perhaps the most revealing section of the Hague Rules is Article 22, which attempts to prescribe in 1922-23 precisely that which would occur twenty years later, during World War II, one of the most unrestrained conflicts that the world would ever see. Article 22 acknowledges that aircraft have immense strategic potential as well as tactical. By bypassing traditional battlefields and other militarized areas, aircraft could strike at the population and industrial centers of an enemy nation. Armies need

²⁵ Jirí Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. (Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), 207.

²⁶ M. W. Royse suggests in Aerial Bombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare (New York: Harold Vinal, 1928) that belligerents adhered to The Hague Rules May of 1940. Lamourne questions this suggestion, citing the complete lack of moderation shown by the German army on the eastern front as evidence to the contrary. See Lamourne, 35.

not be destroyed outright. Rather, a suitable objective was the means by which a nation was able to wage war, its political, social, and industrial capabilities. The section on bombardment in Article 22 begins by stipulating that “Aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of injuring non-combatants is prohibited.”²⁷ This article attempts to stem the shift in what was considered acceptable targets, from traditional battlefields to civilian centers.

Two articles of the Hague Rules prescribe the treatment of historic buildings during times of conflict. Article 25 reads:

In bombardment by aircraft, all necessary steps must be taken by the commander to spare as far as possible buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, *historic monuments* [emphasis mine], hospital ships, hospitals and other place where the sick and wounded are collected, provided such buildings, objects or places are not at the time used for military purposes. Such buildings, objects and places must by day be indicated by marks visible by aircraft. The marks used as aforesaid shall be in the case of buildings protected under the Geneva Convention the red cross on a white ground, and in the case of other protective buildings a large rectangular panel divided diagonally into two pointed triangular portions, one black and the other white. A belligerent who desires to secure by night the protection for the hospitals and other privileged buildings above mentioned must take the necessary measures to render the special signs referred to sufficiently visible.

As in previous treaties, one finds that The Hague Rules include historic buildings in text that generally defines the treatment of charitable, religious, and artistic properties. Article 25 also continues the use of a protective placard originally conceived in the 1907 Hague Convention: a black and white rectangular panel. More novel is the issue of night bombing, which is also broached in the Hague Rules. This topic was, of

²⁷ Toman, 210.

course, a heated debate throughout World War II—the western allies being irrevocably divided on the issue of whether it was ethical to bomb cities at night, when precision targeting was next to impossible and collateral damage customary. That debate occurred twenty years after The Hague Rules were drafted, a period that allowed the technology of combat aircraft to advance by great bounds. The inclusion of the requirement to indicate the presence of “privileged buildings” at night reveals, once again, why this 1922-23 document must be considered far-sighted.

Whereas Article 25 merely alludes to historic buildings, Article 26 deals with monuments in more exacting detail. In its entirety, it reads:

The following special rules are adopted for the purposes of enabling states to obtain more efficient protection for important historic monuments situated within their territory, provided that they are willing to refrain from the use of such monuments and a surrounding zone for military purposes, and to accept a special régime for their inspection.

(1) A state shall be entitled, if it sees fit, to establish a zone of protection round such monuments situated in its territory. Such zones shall in time of war enjoy immunity from bombardment.

(2) The monuments round which a zone is to be established shall be notified to other Powers in peace time through the diplomatic channel; the notification shall also indicate the limits of the zones. The notification may not be withdrawn in time of war.

(3) The zone of protection may include, in addition to the area actually occupied by the monument or group of monuments, an outer zone, not exceeding 500 metres in width, measured from the circumference of the said area.

(4) Marks clearly visible from aircraft either by day or by night will be employed for the purpose of ensuring the identification by belligerent airmen of the limits of the zones.

(5) The marks on the monuments themselves will be defined in Article 25. The marks employed for indicating the surrounding zones will be

fixed by each state adopting the provisions of this article, and will be notified to other Powers at the same time as the monuments and zones are notified.

(6) Any abusive use of the marks indicating the zones referred to in paragraph 5 will be regarded as an act of perfidy.

(7) A state adopting the provisions of this article must abstain from using the monuments and the surrounding zone for military purposes, or for the benefit in any way whatever of its military organization, or from committing within such monument or zone any act with a military purpose in view.

(8) An inspection committee consisting of three neutral representatives accredited to the state adopting the provisions of this article, or their delegates, shall be appointed for the purpose of ensuring that no violation is committed of the provisions of paragraph 7. One of the members of the committee of inspection shall be the representative (or his delegate) of the state to which has been entrusted the interests of the opposing belligerent.

Taken in its entirety, Article 26 seems like little more than a longer version of its predecessors. It requires that a belligerent nation identify those monuments that will be offered protection, identify them in a prescribed manner, and then agree that they not be used for military purposes lest the protective nature of the rules be negated. Then—going a bit farther than earlier treaties—it allows designated monuments to be inspected by third parties who will certify that they are not being used for military purposes. This article also demonstrates an awareness of two realities of aerial bombardment. It acknowledges that bombing is fundamentally inaccurate; that ordnance dropped from a moving aircraft frequently misses the target. The explosive shock and fires of such “near-misses” can nevertheless cause significant damage to buildings, especially old ones. Thus, Article 26 establishes a buffer area around monuments—a 500-meter “zone of protection.” If enemy airmen avoid targeting not

just the monument, but the ring around the monument as well, the chances of the building being damaged would decrease.

The Hague Rules of Air Warfare were certainly far-sighted in their call for monuments' protection. But even had this set of rules been ratified by nations in 1923, it would have been hopelessly archaic by the time of the next world war. Several provisions were bound to become quickly antiquated. The choice of 500 meters for the buffer zone reflects the size and type of ordnance available in 1922-23, when the Hague Rules were written. The larger payloads and more effective high-explosive, incendiary, and even nuclear ordnance of World War II would render this zone ineffective. Moreover, the requirement that protected buildings be marked in a manner visible to airmen by day and night might have been feasible in World War I, when planes flew relatively slowly and at low altitudes. Again, by the 1940s, bombers released their payloads from positions many thousands of feet above their targets. Even with the mitigating technology of bombsights, airmen could simply not discern placards. The presence of clouds, smoke and explosions from flak batteries, and searchlights made this requirement even more of an impossibility. The very existence of The Hague Rules reveals an international fear of how the airplane might wreck havoc on cities. The amount of attention specifically directed to the protection of historic buildings indicates that this, too, was a deeply ingrained concern.

Roerich Pact (1935)

On April 15, 1935, twenty-one member states of the Pan American Union ratified a somewhat more comprehensive cultural protection treaty.²⁸ The "Treaty on the

²⁸ History of the Pact—as well as the complete text of the document—is included at the Roerich Museum's official website: <http://www.roerich.org>.

Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments” was commonly referred to as the “Roerich Pact” after the New York museum that initiated its drafting.²⁹ The Roerich Pact differs from its predecessors in two important respects. First, it was the earliest treaty to exclusively address the protection of cultural patrimony in times of armed conflict. Until this time, such protective measures had been subsumed under general rules of conduct during war, alongside human rights, rules of engagement, and so on. The Roerich Pact does not attempt to address any of these other matters. Second, it curtailed the geographic scope of the treaty’s purview, applying only to the signatory countries within the Americas—not Europe, and therefore not the major battlegrounds of World War II.

The Roerich Pact also continues or builds upon several practices begun in previous treaties. Like The Hague Rules of Air Warfare, it attempts to codify those monuments that are to be protected. Instead of vaguely calling for the protection of unspecified monuments, Article IV requires that each of the signatory states provide the Pan American Union with a list of monuments to which the protective pact would apply.³⁰ It is not clear whether lists were ever produced, who produced them, or what monuments were cited within. Article III of the Roerich Pact addresses another

²⁹ Nicholas Roerich, after whom the museum was named, was a Russian-born artist and professor who advocated for the protection of cultural heritage in times of war. Roerich first suggested a treaty like the that which would eventually bear his name in 1929. This was subsequently discussed by the International Museums Office of the League of Nations, and private conferences regarding the issue were held in 1931 and 1932 in Bruges, Belgium, and in 1933 in Washington, D.C. In 1933, Seventh International Conference of American States recommended signature of the pact. The treaty was then drawn up by the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union and signed on 15 April, 1935. The President transmitted a message describing the Pact to Congress on May 20, 1935. This was accompanied by an introductory letter from Secretary of State Cordell Hull. See Schindler and Toman, as well as the Roerich Museum website.

³⁰ Article IV states that “[t]he signatory Governments and those which accede to this treaty, shall send to the Pan American Union, at the time of signature or accession, or at any time thereafter, a list of the monuments and institutions for which they desire the protection agreed to in this treaty. The Pan American Union, when notifying the Governments of signatures or accessions, shall also send the list of monuments and institutions mentioned in this article, and shall inform the other Governments of any changes in said list.”

consideration tackled in previous treaties, but offers a different solution. It identifies a new placard through which protected monuments would be visibly marked: “In order to identify the monuments and institutions mentioned in article I, use may be made of a distinctive flag (red circle with a triple red sphere in the circle on a white background) in accordance with the model attached to this treaty” [Figure 3-4]. Unlike earlier designs for placards, this one went beyond simple recognition value and contained symbolic meaning. The design allegedly had ancient origins. The three dots symbolized “the totality of culture... Art, Science, and Religion,” and the enclosing circle signified “the eternity of time.”³¹

Once again, the “military use” caveat (wherein a monument’s protected status is negated when used by the military) recurs in the Roerich Pact. Article V states that “The monuments and institutions mentioned in article I shall cease to enjoy the privileges recognized in the present treaty in case they are made use of for military purposes.” Despite minor changes in the general functioning of monuments treaties, this provision remains consistent throughout.³²

The drafters of Roerich Pact regarded the armed conflict as their *raison d'être*. Yet in their treaty, they extended the call for the protection of cultural patrimony beyond time of aggressive abandon to times of peace.³³ This is the second way in which the

³¹ Roerich Museum website, http://www.roerich.org/pact_and_banner.html.

³² Lamourne regards this as evidence of how little treaties evolved over time, and how ineffectual they remained. Lamourne, 31.

³³ Article I reads: “The historic monuments, museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions shall be considered as neutral and as such respected and protected by belligerents. The same respect and protection shall be due to the personnel of the institutions mentioned above. The same respect and protection shall be accorded to the historic monuments, museums, scientific, artistic, educational and cultural institutions in time of peace as well as in war.”




FIGURE 3-4: ROERICH PACT SYMBOL.

Roerich Pact sets itself apart from its predecessors. It is unique in that it acknowledges that art and monuments—particularly the latter—are often lost to forces less blatant than unfettered belligerence. To have recognized this need for an institutionalized system for the protection of cultural heritage in the United States in the 1930s is remarkably farsighted. It would take another thirty years and the loss of many significant landmarks for Americans to finally develop the framework for historic preservation.

Conclusion

At worst, the legal instruments for the protection of art and monuments were ignored by the Allied and Axis combatants, since World War II was a war of mass destruction. Cities doubled as battlefields, and the civilian population was an unwitting combatant. In this type of warfare, commanders treated the laws governing the protection of art and monuments as niceties that were secondary considerations in the pursuit of victory. The “military necessity” caveat almost always superceded preservation. While one can, in fact, cite incidents wherein monuments were shielded under the auspices of one of a protective treaty (or more commonly, an Allied military directive), more often than not preservation was the result of uncalculated serendipity. Bombs frequently missed the intended target but missed nearby monuments as well, or ground fighting was swift and decisive and only minor damage to a town was incurred.³⁴ Most damage to historic buildings was simply unintentional.

³⁴ Monuments protection treaties and directives were cited when removing billeting troops from palazzi and chateaux. This will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

At best, the legal instruments offered monuments protection advocates in the United States and Britain a measure of legal precedent. It gave them polemical fodder for their pleas to the United States and British governments to do more to ensure the preservation of Europe and Asia's cultural patrimony. Many of the pre-1939 instruments disappeared during the course of World War II, but they reappeared in the decades following the war with new language intended to address the array of new types of warfare.³⁵ The ravaged landscape of Europe and Asia stood not only as a testimony to the destructiveness of modern combat, but to the inability of existing legal devices to prevent destruction of monuments and art objects.

³⁵ The 1959 Hague Convention, for example.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE EFFECTS OF WAR ON OLD TOWN CENTERS AND THEIR BUILDINGS

Of the legal instruments described in the previous chapter, probably the most prophetic was The Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1922-23. More than any other treaty, they demonstrate an early awareness of the destructive possibilities of war as conducted from the air. World War II not only fulfilled but also in most measurable ways surpassed the expectations laid out in that text. The basis of the document was the rather limited experiences of combat aircraft and dirigibles in World War I.¹ When The Hague Rules were drafted, expressions like “strategic precision bombing,” “terror bombing,” “area bombing,” “fire bombing”—even the word “bomber,” as used to describe an aircraft—had not even entered the popular lexicon. Yet it was the bomber that was responsible for most of the damage incurred by European cities during World War II. German bombers wrought havoc on Rotterdam and London early in the war, while British bombers responded in kind at Cologne and Hamburg in 1943, and combined Allied bombing forces destroyed much of Dresden in the closing days of the conflict, reducing many of the city’s famous monuments to “pulverized rubble.”² Over and over in the course of the seven-year war, European cities were pummeled and scarred by bombs dropped from the skies. Between 1941 and 1945, the

¹ For an overview of airpower during World War I discussed in the context of World War II, see Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945, 2-5. See also John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999), 42-69.

² “Rail City Blasted to Help Russians,” New York Times, February 16, 1945, p. 6. “The Germans pulled out all the stops on the sympathy propaganda, reporting that Dresden ‘has been turned into a heap of ruins’ and that ‘irreplaceable art treasures have been transformed into smoking, pulverized rubble.’” The article continues: “The Dresden Opera House, which the Germans reported destroyed, was the scene of most of Richard Strauss’ operetta debuts.” The article goes on to describe Dresden as an “ocean of fire.” See also “Dresden Nears Ruin,” New York Times, February 16, 1945, p. 1: “The great city of Dresden...received its fourth attack in less than forty-eight hours, jeopardizing the architectural if not the artistic treasures that made it ‘the German Florence’.”

Americans dropped 673,782 tons of explosives on Germany; the British, 676,539 tons.³

Most of the buildings damaged or destroyed outright in the battles of World War II were the result of aerial bombardment. Allied bombers were responsible for most of the damage to historic monuments in particular—95 percent of the damage, by some estimates.⁴ Ground battles, even slogging, brutally contested ones, caused relatively little damage by comparison.⁵ Thus, it is the bombing policies, the various types of bombs that were available, and their generalized effects on buildings that are the subject of this chapter. I will begin by describing the contrasting policies of the nascent British and American air forces in bombing Germany. The differences between the two air forces are important. While each created its share of destruction, the British—with their policy of area-bombing by night—were responsible for

³ USSBS, cited in Olaf Groehler, Bombenkrieg Gegen Deutschland (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag Berlin, 1990), 446.

⁴ One commentator had this to say: “A perfunctory glimpse at the more than two thousand photographs taken by [Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives] officers of Allied aerial bombing damage implies the heavy destruction wrought; at least 95 percent of the damage inflicted on major monument, public buildings, and archives by the Allies was the result of bombing.” Gerald K. Haines, “Who Gives a Damn About Medieval Walls’,” in Prologue—The Journal of the National Archives (Summer 1976, vol. 8, no. 2), 100. Haines cites Record Group 239, National Archives, as the sources of his information.

⁵ To be sure, ground fighting also produced significant damage but at comparatively isolated locations. Because combat between ground armies was more “face-to-face” than strategic bombing, there existed a punitive element as well. Take, for example, this description of retributive destruction caused by the U.S. Third Army as it progressed across Germany in the final months of the war:

It was during this period that the troops also evolved their own original contribution to German *Kultur*. It was called the ‘The Third Army German War Memorial Program.’ Purpose of the project was twofold: to bring the war home directly to as many Krauts as possible, and to enable future Kraut generations to trace readily the course of Third Army’s triumphant sweep through Germany. The memorials were very simple. They consisted of plastering every village and town in a zone of advance with several or more, as the occasion required, well-placed salvos. In addition to their long-range cultural mission, the memorials also had a very salutary immediate effect. It was found they appreciably expedited surrenders and discouraged sniping.

Col. Robert S. Allen, Lucky Forward: The History of Patton’s Third Army, (New York: Vanguard Press, 1947), 268.

damaging most of the historic architecture that was lost during the war.⁶ Next, I will examine the different types of bombs that were used and the effect that each had on buildings. Over the course of the war, the various combatants—but in particular, the British and Americans—built an extensive body of knowledge regarding explosives. Through trial and error, they learned which types of bombs could be used to achieve which effect, whether the desired effect was to create a great conflagration that would consume entire districts of wooden buildings, or to collapse masonry structures, or even to suppress the firefighting efforts on the ground. From this general discussion of the effects of bombs on buildings, I will narrow my focus to examine the specific effects on historic buildings. Unfortunately, no rigorous studies of the effects of incendiary and high-explosive ordnance specifically on historic buildings were ever undertaken. Because of their age and the use of combustible construction materials like wood, historic buildings are particularly fragile and easily damaged when confronted with fire or explosive shock. And every bit as important was the fact that the older neighborhoods in which many historic buildings are located were densely built up. Under specific circumstances, entire neighborhoods of close-knit historic buildings were destroyed during World War II; this was the case in Frankfurt's *Altstadt*. Europe's cities, as they existed at the outset of World War II, were tight-knit, pedestrian-oriented places with mixed land uses. Thus, residential, commercial, civic, and industrial uses stood side by side. The destruction of many historic buildings was likely the result of what we would now deem “collateral damage”—as opposed to any concerted efforts to destroy cultural patrimony.

⁶ German authorities kept chronicles of the effects of raids on cities: the day and time of the raid, number of attack waves, estimated number of aircraft per wave, area of city affected, and, when applicable, noteworthy buildings damaged during the raid. Although inconsistent in their reporting, these sources reveal when historic buildings were affected by bombing, and which air force was the culprit. In the case of Frankfurt—as well as a sampling of other German cities examined—the British wrought the majority of the damage, including the destruction of the city's famous *Altstadt*.

When the war concluded in 1945 and surveys of damage to cities could be undertaken, one stark fact became clear. It was readily evident that the effect of aerial bombardment on the historic architecture of Germany was disastrous. One contemporary journalist, writing shortly after the cessation of hostilities, epitomizes the state of German cities in his description of the metropolis of Cologne, the first city in Germany to play host to a “thousand bomber” British raid. In his article, he writes: “And so it goes, down the whole list [of German cities]. Never again will tourists gaze at Cologne with pleasure, for the city’s ugly bomb-pocked face is as repulsive as the face of war itself.”⁷ Although statements such as this can be interpreted as hyperbole—authors of other articles marvel at the number of buildings that actually survived—the fact remains that the bomber, guided by strategic bombing policies, caused unprecedented destruction to Europe’s cities, Germany’s in particular.

Contrasting Policies of the British and American Air Forces.

The policies of the Allied air forces evolved during the course of the Second World War. Their individual experiences over the cities of Europe and Asia shaped their tactics, and they shifted their policies and practices to maximize whichever objective they were hoping to achieve. The lessons each learned served to alter those strategies that had seemed prudent before the war, but in reality had been ineffectual or had unexpectedly deleterious consequences. The Royal Air Force’s discontinuation of precision-bombing Germany during daylight hours is possibly the most important example of this. A hopeful, early policy of daylight bombing was supposed to ensure pinpoint targeting, while the heavily defended bomber “fortress” was to guaranty minimal attrition. Quickly, however, the Royal Air Force realized that precision-

⁷ Al Newman, “Cologne Is Kaputt—Its Art Is No More,” Newsweek, 19 March 1945, 84-85.

bombing was hardly precise, and that the fortified bomber—meant to remove one combatant from the battlefield altogether, thereby making combat unilateral—was not as untouchable as previously thought. In light of these exigencies, the British policy shifted about as completely as it could have. Daylight precision-bombing of specific targets changed to near-indiscriminate nighttime area-bombing, and not of individual buildings but of entire cities. This was the British solution to a problem shared by all of the air forces involved in the war. Yet the American solution was different. The United States Army Air Force (USAAF) was stubborn in its conviction that its first, instinctual strategy—daylight precision-bombing, the same as the British—would win the war. In their estimation, precision bombing would disrupt the German war effort and stood the best chance of bringing the conflict to a quick close. That was the primary motivation behind precision bombing, or at least the one most often expressed in public. Secondly, precision-bombing was also positive propaganda.⁸ It was seen as a way to garner a favorable public response, since it would be perceived as the more humane of the two Allied approaches to bombing. It would also demonstrate to the American public that air forces could play a significant role in winning a war, thereby fueling the argument that the Air Force should be a separate and independently funded branch of the military. The argument generally succeeded. In 1947, the USAAF severed its ties to the Army, and became an independent military branch, the United States Air Force.⁹

⁸ Positive propaganda was especially important to the Army during the war. One of the more interested examples is the book Bombs Away: The Story of a Bomber Team, which was written by John Steinbeck specifically “for the U. S. Army Air Forces.” See for example the advertisement for this book in *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1942.

⁹ The Department of the Air Force was established on September 18, 1947. For a description of the evolution and founding of the United States Air Force, see the Air Force History Support Office’s web page at <http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/Evolution.htm>.

British and American bombing policies were similar in 1939 and 1941, when each nation entered the war. But one policy—that of the British—evolved drastically over the next few years, ultimately becoming a shadow of its original self. The changes were born largely of necessity because British bombers were unable to consistently strike their desired targets. Yet the willingness to accept the bombing of German civilian centers was made easier by the anger felt towards Germany for unleashing yet another conflict in Europe and, indeed, for bombing British cities in a similar manner. On the other hand, conditions in the United States precluded the acceptance of such a practice. The American public never suffered such attacks on its homeland. It had also never experienced civilian causalities firsthand. Americans, because of their insulation from the war, found it more difficult to espouse such destructive raids on a foreign civilian population, enemy or not. Moreover, the Germans were not as “foreign” as they were even to the British, fellow Europeans though they were. A majority of the American population traced its ethnic roots to Germany, and many German-Americans, with relatives in the Old World, perhaps still felt a paternal bond. Thus, it was perhaps difficult to support the destruction of one’s own heritage.

The British

To bring Germany’s war machine to its knees, the Royal Air Force resolved that it must destroy fragile human element: “the economy which feeds it, the morale which sustains it, the supplies which nourish it and the hopes of victory which inspire it.”¹⁰ One might rightly characterize British bombing strategy in World War II as “Douhetian,” after the 20th century Italian theorist Giulio Douhet.¹¹ An early

¹⁰ A British Chiefs of Staff memo. Noble Frankland, Bomber Offensive: The Devastation of Europe. (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1970) 38.

¹¹ Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 60.

investigator into the possibilities of air warfare, Douhet expanded the definition of a traditional battlefield by advocating raids upon enemy cities. He argued that such raids could create two important conditions that would tip the balance in the attacker's favor. First, they would give rise to shortages in goods and services. Second, while less tangible, a terrorized civilian society would also result.¹² He reasoned that the well-being of the proletariat was the keystone of any society; that a population constantly facing shortages of consumer goods, adequate housing, and services, would rise up against its government and insist that it provide sufficient protection or make peace.¹³ Civil unrest was essentially another front on which the enemy would be forced to fight. For the duration of World War II, the British attempted to put Douhet's theory to the test. With each year the attacks on civil populations escalated, culminating in the infamous terror raid on Dresden in 1945.

As destructive as the air raids on Germany were late in the war, early attacks were comparatively mild. In 1940 and 1941, raids were still being conducted during the day. Small British bomber forces flew tentatively across the Channel and into German airspace, selecting targets from lists that included key nodes in Germany's industrial network. On these lists were traditional "bricks and mortar" targets like refineries and factories, and the machinery housed within that forged the tools Germany needed to wage war. Perhaps the most crucial component in this network was the industrial worker: a relatively fragile link in the manufacturing chain, and one absolutely required to keep the factories up and running.¹⁴ Chief of Air Staff Lord Portal expounded this strategy in early 1942. He declared that "operations should now be

¹² Schaffer, 21-22.

¹³ Ibid., 22.

¹⁴ After the war, the British Bombing Survey, examining its handiwork in the wake of victory, noted that its objective had been "destroying the morale of the civilian population as a whole and of the industrial worker in particular." Quoted in Pape, 260-61.

focused on the morale of the enemy civilian population and, in particular, of the industrial workers... in the built-up areas" of Germany, specifically the industrial Rhein-Ruhr area.¹⁵ The destruction of this human element would slow production, if not shut the factories down altogether. Thus, from the outset, the British had decided that civilians—workers in particular—made viable targets.¹⁶ Yet these attacks were a mere suggestion of what was to come.

Early efforts by the British air forces were limited in scope, and focused on the destruction of industry and the efficacy of industrial workers. Their practices changed rather quickly. By 1942, British bombing policy was expanded to allow raids on cities in general, using a mixture of high-explosive and incendiary ordnance known to create sweeping, uncontrolled swathes of destruction. This effectively marked the transition from precision-bombing to area-bombing. Two reasons are typically given for this radical change.¹⁷ The first is what can only be described as pragmatic. Precision-bombing simply did not work as well as had been hoped. The practice of excising isolated targets from their crowded urban environments—a key element of the strategic campaign to break crucial nodes in the German war industry—was largely a failure. Such bombing required time and precision, two factors that German defenses could effectively mitigate. Furthermore, industrial operations, even bomb-damaged ones, were mobile. They could be moved from location to location with relative ease.¹⁸ Out of necessity then the British began to look to other ways in which to wage

¹⁵ Alexander Cockburn, "Bombs and the Baroque," *The Nation*, 30 September 1996, 10. In this essay, Cockburn reflects on two contemporary writings related to the 1945 bombing of Würzburg by the British, in which 85 percent of the city was destroyed. Cockburn discusses Peter Johnson's *The Withered Garland*, and an unspecified piece in *The Catholic Worker* by Gordon Zahn. See also Frankland, 41.

¹⁶ Keegan, 421.

¹⁷ Pape, 269.

¹⁸ Frankland, 74-75.


their air war against Germany. Strategic area-bombing rose as one possible solution. The practice of area-bombing centered on the bomber, which, fairly engorged with ordnance, would loose its large payload over a much wider target area, such as a sprawling city. Demonstration raids to test the efficacy of area-bombing proved successful, the 1942 attack on Lübeck being the example to which pundits and strategists alluded.

“The port of Lübeck received such a lacing on a single night that forty percent of the old inner town was laid in ruins. Row after row of buildings were left with only walls standing, and the streets were impassable with twisted debris. Warehouses, factories and port facilities were all heavily struck.”¹⁹

To be sure, area-bombing would destroy civilian targets, perhaps many more than what was intended. But thrown into the mix of devastated buildings would be military-industrial targets as well. In the case of Lübeck, the shipping facilities that gave the city its purpose crumbled alongside the remnants of its Hansaetic built heritage.

The second reason for the transition to area-bombing was political. Following two years of intermittent German raids on London and other cities in England and Scotland, whether home to war industries or not (including the attack on Coventry and the complete destruction of its famous cathedral in November of 1940), the British population demanded retribution [Figure 4-1]. Britons wanted their leaders to direct the armed forces to retaliate in kind. In such a climate, tactics that earlier might have been *verboten* were embraced with less hesitation. Massive bombing raids on Germany’s cities and their populations would not only stand up in the face of public

¹⁹ William B. Ziff, The Coming Battle of Germany (NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 158. Ziff continues by noting that “The same unhappy fate befell another large Baltic port, Rostock.”



From *Architectural Record*, July 1942, vol. 92, no. 1, p. 1.

FIGURE 4-1: PENCIL ADVERTISEMENT THAT MAKES REFERENCE TO BAEDEKER RAID VICTIM COVENTRY, AND THE LACK OF FAIR PLAY ON THE PART OF THE GERMANS.

scrutiny, they were actively supported and encouraged. And so area-bombing was embraced.²⁰

This transition in bombing strategy occurred with the promotion of Air Marshall Arthur Harris to the head of Bomber Command, and was codified in the “Towns Directive” of February 1942.²¹ Harris’ goal, for which is he still notorious today, was to put Douhet’s theory of terror raids to the test. His bombers would accomplish nothing short of rendering the cities of Germany uninhabitable. In the process of doing so, the civilian population would be subjected to such debilitating stress that they would be paralyzed into inactivity by the cycle of destruction and death around them: the memory of previous bombing raids and the threat of increasingly intense raids to come.²² This would be the catalyst to mass confusion and eventual uprising, and would lead to the collapse of German civic, political, and military life. Harris specifically chose housing as a target type, as the loss of one’s own house was thought to be more emotionally damaging than the generalized destruction of others’ property. Bomber Command thus entered this “de-housing” phase of the air war with lofty objectives: 600,000 dwellings destroyed and another 60,000,000 damaged; 25,000,000 civilians homeless; and nearly 2,000,000 civilian casualties.²³ The extensive use of incendiary bombs was regarded as the means by which British bombers could achieve these ambitious goals. In ideal circumstances, given the

²⁰ Another explanation for Britain’s decision not to engage in area-bombing at the beginning of the war was political: British leaders did not want to alienate the United States, who they hoped would enter the conflict as an ally. Building on this explanation, it has also been suggested that easing gradually into area-bombing was a conscious attempt to avoid inflaming Hitler’s wrath until Britain’s war machine was fully operational. See Frankland, 21.

²¹ Pape, 269.

²² The possibility of bombing civilians had been discussed earlier in the war by the British military. After the raids on Coventry in November of 1940, Bomber Command was issued the loose directive to air their ordnance at German city centers. In July of the following year, the Deputy Chief of Air Staff had written to Bomber Command noting that “the weakest point in [Germany’s] armour lie in the morale of the civil population.” See Frankland, 30-36.

²³ Pape, 261. See also Cockburn, 10.

correct mixture of ordnance, urban fabric (“the vulnerable built-up area of the city, which generally lies at its centre”), and favorable meteorological conditions, a firestorm might be started—a raging conflagration that would incinerate huge swathes of the targeted German city. Once again, the attack on Lübeck served as the model to be emulated. The “thousand bomber” raids that began over Cologne on May 30, 1942, were attempts by Bomber Command to replicate such a firestorm.

Despite the best strategic planning efforts of Britain’s air forces, the terror raids conducted by Bomber Command were largely ineffectual. Postwar studies of Germany’s wartime economy and surveys of its residents revealed an important reality: that “Allied bombing widely and seriously depressed German civilians, but depressed and discouraged workers were not necessarily unproductive workers.”²⁴ The German proletariat was more resilient to terror raids than the Allies had predicted. Yet the level of physical destruction caused by the area raids met—and even surpassed in some cases—strategic planning expectations. In this respect, the British were quite successful. Bombing policy had been shaped in part by the British public’s need to punish the Germans as much as it was to incapacitate the workings of German society. Photographs and written accounts of the levels of destruction found in Germany’s cities and towns thus provided a national sense of vindication. While it seemed to Londoners that their city had been ravaged by Luftwaffe raids, the facts and figures that portrayed the state of German cities put the British capital’s experiences into a much different context. Of the housing in the Frankfurt am Main, thirty-five to forty-five percent was destroyed. Hannover lost forty-eight percent, and Cologne over half—fifty-six percent of its housing stock was uninhabitable by mid-1945.²⁵ By

²⁴ USSBS, cited in Pape, 273.

²⁵ From Berichte zur Deutschen Landeskunde, Band 6, 1949, pp. 112-17: cited in Robert E. Dickinson, The West European City: A Geographical Interpretation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.,

comparison, the damage wrought on London and other British cities seemed almost trivial. In one 24-hour period, the British dropped as much ordnance on Duisberg—a single, medium-sized city—as the Luftwaffe dropped Britain's sprawling capital over the course of the entire six-year war.²⁶

The Americans

Before parting ways mid-war, British and American bombing policies were quite similar. Both were predicated on the same fundamental premise: that strategic-precision air raids would create blockages in Germany's economy, thereby crippling its war-making apparatus. Both nations came to the realization early in their experiences that precision-bombing did not work as well as hoped. But the British, fueled by fear and hatred of an enemy who was separated from their island homeland by nothing more than a narrow channel, cast aside their original policy and resigned themselves to nighttime area-bombing. This crude type of warfare destroyed many of the same key targets as precision-bombing, thereby creating the requisite blockages. But it was also intended to terrorize and demoralize the German population. For the British, the ends either remained consistent (the destruction of key industries) or were expanded (the demoralization of German civilians), but the means shifted dramatically (strategic precision-bombing to area-bombing).

The Americans never made such a radical transition in their bombing policy. Rather, they attempted to correct those problems in their precision-bombing program that

1951), 108. See also Groehler, 447, and Boehling, 81. Twenty-six percent of Frankfurt's pre-war 44,559 residential units were destroyed outright, twenty-seven percent were damaged beyond repair, thirty-two percent were damaged but salvageable, and fifteen percent were unaffected. Frankfurt's population in 1939 was between 548,000 and 561,000, but by 1946 it had been reduced—through migration and fatality—to either 239,000 or 424,000. Sources vary greatly on these statistics.

²⁶ Frankland, 127.

could, in fact, be remedied. For example, the primary tool in waging this sort of war, bombers, were made less vulnerable by extending the capabilities of fighter escorts to provide long-range tactical support. Bomb-sighting technology was also improved, and pre-flight information and planning were perfected so as to maximize the efficacy of each raid. Thus American policy at the conclusion of the war did not appear appreciably different than it had been at the start. Theorist William B. Ziff's The Coming Battle of Germany, while written in 1942, characterizes an American policy that remained relatively consistent throughout the war:

A national organism is like any other living body. If the heart of vitals are [sic] pierced, the limbs or periphery immediately proceed to die or dry up. No matter how much territory or resources Nazi Germany held fast in her grip, even were she able to conquer all Europe, Asia and Africa, if desperate and deadly blows were struck at her vitals—at her transportation centers, factory concentrations, and civilian morale—it would mean the quick and complete disintegration of her entire war effort.²⁷

The Americans' steadfast approach to strategic precision-bombing by day remained so for a number of reasons. First, a switch to area-bombing at night would not have been saleable to the American public. The animosity felt toward Germany was not as pronounced as that experienced on a society-wide basis by the British. The skies over Washington, D.C. and New York City were never speckled with Luftwaffe bombers. The Japanese were a more direct threat. With no German attack on American soil akin to that on Pearl Harbor, the Nazi threat seemed less tangible and immediate. It was therefore difficult for an American public—especially one significantly comprised of German-Americans—to support unrestrained area attacks on Germany's urban dwellers. The cities and towns were themselves another consideration. Americans were familiar with the picturesque quality of the "Old World" through touristy

²⁷ Ziff, 155-56. Ziff also recommended the targeting of the transportation system, on which the Wehrmacht was dependent for supplies.

exploits or armchair travels. The prospect of leveling these “quaint” and “charming” burgs must have smacked of needless, wanton destruction. Indeed, anecdotes abound of high-ranking officers in the United States Army who earmarked this city or that for protection, largely on the basis of some personal attachment.²⁸ Had Savannah or Boston or other American cities been “Canterburized” (the expression given by the German air force to refer to the destruction of a historic town and its showcase architecture), Americans may very well have been supportive of area-bombing like their British allies, and concerns about inciting the enemy’s wrath would have fallen to the wayside.

The second reason that the USAAF retained its policy of precision-bombing was financial. If precision-bombing could be made successful to the degree anticipated, it would be a cheap solution to winning the war in Europe. This was important to the USAAF because it desired independent status following the war, and needed ammunition for its argument.²⁹ On paper, strategic-precision bombing could simply be shown to be cheaper: “Attacking an enemy’s will through the more humane and economical method of selective attack [as compared with Douhetian carpet-bombing] made sense in the 1930s because the total budgets of the Army, of which the Air Corps was a part, was in decline.”³⁰ Britain’s Royal Air Force had been established in

²⁸ Among the cities mentioned in this capacity were Rothenburg ob der Tauber, Heidelberg, and Kyoto. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy took special interest in Rothenburg, going so far as to visit the American army in Germany that was approaching it to apprise its commanders of the city’s historical worth. His motives were personal: Rothernburg was an intact, mediaeval city that his mother had visited and loved. See Schaffer, *Wings of Judgement*, 47. Later in the war, Stimson argued against using nuclear weapons against Kyoto—a city of great cultural and religious significance. See Schaffer, 144-146.

²⁹ Pape, 65. See also Ramond Dan, “Air War is Backed by a Superhuman Effort,” *New York Times*, 7 May, 1994, sec. E, 3. This article describes the massive build-up required to wage the air war that was being waged in 1944.

³⁰ Pape, 66.

1918 as an entity independent of the Army or Navy. It had to rely on public perceptions for its continued existence, but not its very creation.

For most of World War II the Americans treated Germany like a living body; as a complex organism of interrelated and interdependent systems. An attack on an individual system—a raw material processing point or important transportation hub, for example—would create ripples across the greater industrial structure and, it was hoped, slow production and induce societal collapse. During 1941 and 1942, the American strategy was governed by what was generally known as the “industrial web theory.” The crux of this theory was the economic bottlenecks that were targeted through precision-bombing attacks: the aircraft factories and aluminum and magnesium plants on which the Luftwaffe was dependent; the electrical power grid; the transportation network; and the oil industry.³¹ The removal of these crucial components from the industrial process would halt production altogether, or at least slow it down considerably as alternate means of supplying the missing components were found. The Allies would thereby get the upper hand as Nazi Germany scrambled to maintain their levels of industrial production.

The year 1943 marked the first year that American air forces were committed to battle in earnest. That year, the American bombing doctrine shifted from one in which industrial nodes in general were attacked to one that targeted only those industries on which the German Army specifically was dependent.³² The goal was not to dismantle or slow the national industrial structure in its entirety, but rather only certain aspects:

³¹ The Americans developed their earliest written strategy in 1941, the *Air War Planning Document (AWPD-1)*. Pape, 259.

³² The two air war planning documents that succeeded *AWPD-1* (*AWPD-2* (1942) and *Combined Bomber Offensive* (1943) reveal the shift in target priorities from general industry to primarily those that affect the operational ability of Germany’s ground and air forces.

weapons systems that the *Wehrmacht* required to function, for example.³³ Thus, although the target selection evolved in 1943, the tactics did not. The practice of strategic precision-bombing was retained.

By early 1944, long-range fighters became available to escort Allied bombers on their continental sorties. These fighters not only leveled the playing field, but also effectively removed the Luftwaffe as a player for the duration of the war. Bombers were no longer restrained by having to repulse Luftwaffe fighters like great beasts swatting ineffectually at small, stinging flies. While the British found safety through night raids and accepted the need to area-bomb large targets like cities, the Americans used these fighter escorts to minimize the risks associated with daytime sorties and continued, unabated, their practice of precision-bombing. The year 1944 also marked the turning point in the type of bombs that were used. The ratio of high-explosive to incendiary bombs had been gradually evening out. And in this year, what would be the penultimate year of the war, the use of incendiaries surpassed that of high-explosives.³⁴ Target sets shifted again too, as the Allies began to single out transportation and oil industries in anticipation of the Normandy invasion.

As noted above, the USAAF's bombing strategy remained relatively consistent throughout the war. One noteworthy exception occurred late in the war, in February of 1945. Codenamed "Thunderclap," this operation was executed on a Berlin already reeling at the approach of the Red Army from the east.³⁵ As its name would suggest,

³³ Pape, 263.

³⁴ "American bombers now devote an average of 60 per cent of the loads they drop on Germany to incendiaries..." From "Fire-Bomb Havoc Focus of Attack," *New York Times*, 23 March 1944, 10. The article continues: "For some time increasing emphasis has been placed on the incendiary bomb as a means of carrying the war to German industrial centers."

³⁵ Pape, 271.

this operation was intended as a final, deafening assault on the lingering German resistance, an attack so devastating that surrender would be the only realistic option. Thunderclap was the first in a short series of raids on other cities in which American bombers adopted the British approach to area-bombing using incendiaries. The joint American-British raid on Dresden on the night of February 14 is perhaps the most infamous of all raids conducted in this manner.

Looking back and assessing the two bombing strategies employed by the Allies during World War II, it is easy to discern shortcomings on the part of the British—especially since they recognized these shortcomings themselves, and drastically switched policies mid-war. Yet the American “industrial web” strategy was also flawed. The USAAF could find no “Achilles heel, no small, vulnerable set of factories whose loss would cripple all war production, not even any important category.”³⁶ Although Germany’s economic output was diminished over the war, this was not because of strategic bombing, but rather due to the simple loss of territory as Allied land armies crossed Europe. Instead, the Allies’ interdiction strategy was successful, whereby the flow of materials needed by the Wehrmacht was stanchled.

Types of Ordnance

It is evident that the British method of nighttime area-bombing of cities caused more damage to buildings in Germany than the daylight precision-bombing of the Americans, and that much of this destruction was indiscriminate. The Royal Air Force also generally opted for larger payloads with heavier ordnance that caused less easily repairable damage.³⁷ Interspersed among the many unremarkable structures destroyed

³⁶ Pape, 275, 282.

³⁷ Frankland, 120.

or damaged were many historic ones. Included were medieval houses, Gothic churches, even ruins dating from the Roman occupation of Germany. In order to understand why so many buildings were damaged—why so many swathes of inner neighborhoods had simply ceased to exist by the end of the war—one needs not only to appreciate the bombing methods that were employed, but the most prevalent types of ordnance that comprised both of the Allies' respective payloads.

Types of Ordnance: High-explosive

The high-explosive bomb was the quintessential ordnance; the type of bomb one imagined whistling through the sky before detonating on its target, accompanied by a deafening explosion, shock wave, and crumbling building. Both the Royal Air Force and USAAF used high-explosive bombs extensively during World War II. These bombs ranged in size from 100 to 2,000 pounds, with larger bombs—for example the “block-buster”—being used on limited occasions where target specifics warranted it.³⁸

Assessments of war damage conducted by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) after 1945 revealed that in most cases, however, damage to German targets was the result of fire, not the concussion of explosions. Incendiary bombs, not high-explosives, caused much of the destruction wrought during the war.³⁹ The primary role of high-explosive ordnance in the bombing of Germany's cities was twofold. First, high-explosive bombs would, in essence, prepare the landscape for the incendiaries that would follow. Their shock would break windows and strip roofs of their fire retardant shingles, making buildings more open and vulnerable to spreading

³⁸ National Security Resources Board post-war study examined the effects of fire on Europe's cities. The Civil Defense Liaison Office, Fire Effects of Bombing Attacks (Washington D.C.: Office of Secretary of Defense, November 1950), 7.

³⁹ Verrier, The Bomber Offensive.

fire. Second, they suppressed any concerted efforts to mitigate the bomb damage—firefighting, saving of the injured, the recovery of threatened possessions, and so on. By the time citizens of the bombed city could safely emerge from their basements or shelters, fires were often beyond the point of control; they had to be left to burn themselves out.⁴⁰ Broken water lines and unnavigable streets filled with rubble hampered post-raid clean-up.⁴¹

Types of Ordnance: Incendiary Bombs

Incendiary bombs—“fire bombs,” in the popular parlance—were much smaller than high-explosives, but many more were dropped in a single given raid. These ranged in weight from 4 to 100 pounds. As was the case with high-explosives, larger incendiary bombs—500 pound oil-magnesium “block-burners”, for example—were used on occasions to destroy special targets.⁴² Although incendiary bombs with different flammable ingredients were used, the fundamental purpose was simple: to start fires that were difficult to extinguish.⁴³ In this capacity they functioned effectively on their own. But according to the Chemical Warfare Service of the United States War Department, incendiaries served an important role alongside high explosives: “The incendiary bombs are most effective against warehouses, factories and other combustible buildings, but also spread havoc when their blazing chemicals scatter through the rubble caused by the high-explosive.”⁴⁴

⁴⁰ The Civil Defense Liaison Office 11.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² The two primary types of incendiary bomb were “those in which the container was combustible and served as incendiary material,” and “those in which the case was merely a container capable of placing the incendiary filling at the desired place in the target.” Ibid., 7.

⁴³ The flammable ingredients in incendiary bombs included magnesium, thermate, phosphorus, and oil. “Fire-Bombing Havoc Focus of Attack,” New York Times, 23 March 1944, 10.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

Following the war, the USSBS examined the northern German city of Hamburg—one of a handful of cities in Germany—to assess the effects of British raids during July and August of 1943. This study concluded that Hamburg was typical of cities attacked during the course of World War II. In the raids conducted during the summer of 1943, approximately 55 to 60 percent of the city' built-up area—thirty square miles—was destroyed, 75 to 80 percent of which was caused by fire.⁴⁵ A 12½ square mile area at the city's center burned during one of these raids, which caused one of the war's most destructive firestorms. By 1945, approximately 300,000 housing units in Germany's largest port were rendered uninhabitable. Of Hamburg's pre-war population of 1,760,000, approximately 750,000 Hamburgers were left homeless.

Studies of war damage conducted at the conclusion of hostilities depicted the full destructive power of aerial bombing. Yet it also showed some of the shortcomings. The USSBS revealed that in attacks which did not create a destructive firestorm effect, normal fire barriers often limited the spread of fire from one building to another. For example, firewalls, parapets, and undeveloped spaces between structures prevented a fire from growing. The National Security Resources Board, a federal agency charged with assessing security risks and the effects of warfare, reported that a “10-foot open space between two brick buildings had about a 50 percent chance of preventing fire spread, and that a parapeted fire wall between them had about a 90 percent chance.”⁴⁶ These simple, technologically unremarkable devices were present in many neighborhoods in German cities.

⁴⁵ The Civil Defense Liaison Office, 9.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 10.

Payloads

In a single night, a typical bomb payload (destined for multiple targets in several German cities) would range from 1,000 to 2,000 tons. The bombing of Hamburg in 1943 involved over 7,000 tons of explosives; the joint Anglo-American bombing of Dresden that culminated the air war in Germany included even more.⁴⁷ By contrast, the largest attack on a British city was on a much smaller scale; at most, the Luftwaffe used around 70 tons of explosives. By the end of the war, the Allies had dropped approximately 1.3 million tons of bombs on Germany. In the 70 largest cities that were bombed, over 40 percent of the urban area was destroyed.⁴⁸

The National Security Resources Board noted that “an approximately equal weight of high explosives and incendiaries” were used in each raid. It continued by noting that

...high explosive bombs deterred fire fighting, disrupted communications, broke water main networks, created road blocks, opened up buildings, broke windows, and displaced roofing. In some cases they caused fires but this was a secondary and relatively minor factor. The incendiaries started most of the fires.⁴⁹

Effects on Buildings

Aerial bombing wrought intense havoc on many of Europe’s cities; there is no dispute about that. But certain cities suffered significantly more than others. A *Chicago Tribune* headline that appeared within months of Germany’s surrender illustrates this fact: “Berlin 20% Gone, London Only 2½, Experts Report.”⁵⁰ But the perceived

⁴⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁴⁸ USSBS, cited in Pape, 254.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 7.

⁵⁰ Henry Wales, “Berlin 20% Gone, London Only 2½, Experts Report,” *Chicago Tribune*, 26 March 1945, 4. The article notes that damage estimates were 10-15% higher than predicted based on aerial photos.

levels of destruction and actual levels were often mismatched. The same *Chicago Tribune* article includes a subsection entitled “Few Landmarks Damaged,” wherein the author notes that

The figures confirm my observations that post-war tourists in England will be amazed at the small amount of damage from raids discernible, and visitors familiar with pre-war London will be dumbfounded to find so few familiar haunts and landmarks damaged. During the blitz, Americans received the impression that about one London building out of three was rubbed or badly shattered.

Similar observations were made in various American and British newspapers about cities not only in Great Britain, but in the formerly occupied countries on the continent.⁵¹ The notable exception, of course, was Germany, the post-war accounts of which portray destruction unparalleled in Europe. A description of the mid-sized city of Saarbrücken, “sacred soil” of the Nazis, captures the amazement journalists experienced upon visiting Germany on the heels of the rushing Anglo-American armies: “Allied bombing and shelling have left [the city] a ghastly skeleton, a place where crumbling, gutted buildings sway above rubble littered streets.”⁵² Reporters described Frankfurt am Main in a similar manner:

This city, which was one of the grandest in the Reich and was of prime importance to the German war effort, is today in ruins. Most of it was done by the Allied Air Forces long before the infantry ever arrived. The pitiful force that tried to defend it did nothing but add to the ruins.⁵³

⁵¹ “Historic Sites of Gent Intact; Food Plentiful,” *Chicago Tribune*, 26 March 1945, 8. “Historic Gent...is undamaged by war. Its places of interest are intact and will be available for tourists after the war.” The article continues: “From Gent we went on to Bruges, which is intact except for bridges which have all been blown up and replaced by wooden structures. Bruges’ cathedral and its city hall were untouched.”

⁵² Seymour Korman, “Saarbruecken, Pride of Nazis, Now Skeleton,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 22 March 1945, 6. The article continues: “Near one destroyed bridge on the north bank of the river is a statue of Frederick the Great on horseback. Frederick’s fierce glare is still intact, but the back of his bronze pants and the rear end of the bronze steed have been mangled by bomb fragments.”

⁵³ “Frankfort a Ruin on a Vast Scale,” *New York Times*, 30 March 1945, 3.

Detectable in such articles as these is an underlying tone of vindication; that Germany's ruined cities with blocks of gutted buildings were the direct, justified consequence of her national policy of military conquest.

For the Allied air forces attempting to unseat the Nazi regime from afar, using aerial bombardment as a means to this end, the physical qualities of German cities and their buildings were an important planning consideration. For the British in particular, the presence of a historic *Altstadt* in a targeted city was a factor that sometimes helped to determine the scope and nature of the raid. Dense concentrations of old, wooden buildings provided fuel—in a sense, kindling—for the sweeping conflagrations they hoped their area-bombing would produce. The USAAF were less concerned with this. Strategic-precision bombing could only work if the precise whereabouts of a target was known. The same held true for the identification of historic monuments on the complex faces of European cities. The exact location of a monument was crucial to ensuring its protection from unintended damage. An article from *Newsweek* alludes to the Allies' awareness of historic monuments. In it, an aerial photograph of the Cologne Cathedral is featured, with the soaring Gothic structure standing in a sea of rubble. The caption reads: "Miracles: One of architecture... One of marksmanship."⁵⁴ Even at the end of the war when the level of destruction must have been publicly known, the message remained that the Allied air forces were capable of precision-bombing.⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Newman, 84-85.

⁵⁵ Mid-war, when the outcome was uncertain and propaganda was still an important tool, accounts of the destruction reflected the particular bias of the reporting country. For example, in November of 1944, the *Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten* described the bomb damage to the Cologne Cathedral in this way: "the south and the magnificent west sides... were hit. Large pieces were torn out... and there are gushing breaches in the left aisle." However, the *Stockholm Tidningen*, from presumably neutral Sweden, offered a contradictory report that the Cathedral "suffered hardly any damage." Both articles

As Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officer Mason Hammond wrote, “The fate of buildings in Germany was determined by their location. The cities, both large and middle-sized, were terribly bombed and in some cases fought through.”⁵⁶ The makeup of cities is therefore an important consideration. Within a German city’s *Altstadt*, its oldest quarter, buildings sat in cramped, seemingly random rows, and streets led narrow and circuitous paths whose origins largely would have been forgotten had they not become associated with street names. In Germany’s more populous cities, Frankfurt included, the buildings themselves were between three and five stories high with an average of 1,500 square feet of space.⁵⁷ These mediaeval buildings were constructed almost entirely of wood. The framing systems were comprised of wood beams, typically oak, with wooden floors, roofs, and even decorative embellishments in carved wood. Walls were typically filled with brick or a renewable material like plaster. The ground floors of some of these buildings—and eventually all of them, following a 1719 law—were constructed of stone, with top floors cantilevering out to provide more useable space in the upper stories.⁵⁸ Frankfurt’s wealthier residents could afford to erect buildings exclusively of stone, as could local institutions. Red sandstone made up many of Frankfurt’s civic and religious landmarks, which gave the city its rather unique appearance. Yet the *Altstadt*’s mélange of houses and stores—utilitarian buildings that were not erected to be landmarks—were constructed of wood,

quoted in “Bomb Damage to Germany,” *The Architectural Review*, June 1944, vol. XLV, no. 570, p. xlvii.

⁵⁶ Mason Hammond, “The War and Art Treasures in Germany,” *College Art Journal*, March 1946, vol. V, no. 3, 205. The author continued by noting that “The fate of the small towns and isolated buildings was far happier; they were not important enough to be bombed and even in the path of the conflict, they did not suffer to heavily” (p. 207). The author cites the Saalburg, a reconstructed Roman fort and ruins outside of Frankfurt, as an example of an isolated building that avoided damage during the war.

⁵⁷ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 8.

⁵⁸ Bernd Kalusche and Wolf-Kristian Setzepfandt, *Frankfurt am Main Architektführer*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1997). 13.

a more plebian material. Similar houses and commercial buildings could be found in other parts of the city, but the *Altstadt* housed the largest concentration.⁵⁹ It survived into the 20th century not by chance, but because of active protection under local ordinances.⁶⁰

Subsequent generations of urban dwellers constructed a more regular city around the irregular *Altstadt*. As populations grew, builders became more skilled at finding design solutions for new urban conditions. Buildings in the 18th century thus grew tentatively upward, and useable space in an average building rose to a maximum of about 3,000 square feet.⁶¹ A building's method of construction and its ability to withstand fire also improved. Although still erected as row houses, safety design mechanisms were included in many of these buildings to prevent the spread of fire:

Most...had masonry walls and tile or slate roofs on wooden battens. Heavy wooden “plugged” floors were characteristic. These floors had a layer of cinders or other inert matter between the ceiling and the floor finish above. Each building unit was separated from the adjacent buildings by a common wall which was sometimes parapeted and sometimes built just to the underside of the roof.⁶²

Similarly, streets in the 18th century were not only more regular than those of the *Altstadt*, they were wider. Private front yards and backyards and common green spaces also began to appear.⁶³ These architectural and planning designs helped the newer sections of German cities withstand the onslaught of incendiary and high-explosive bombs during the Second World War.

⁵⁹ “The average home of medieval times was a wooden frame building. Most were destroyed during World War II.” Kalusche and Setzepfandt, 7.

⁶⁰ For example, Frankfurt’s inner city was protected under a building ordinance issued in 1891, during a time of great growth and pressure to redevelop older areas of the city. Dickinson, 106.

⁶¹ Civil Defense Liaison Office 8.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Dickinson, 103.

Most of the written accounts of destruction during World War II involve descriptions of bomb damage to the buildings that were superlative for one reason or another. Such accounts might include the oldest buildings of the *Altstadt*, or the home of a famous personage like Goethe. Yet bombs were also responsible for the destruction of buildings of later provenance. German cities were filled with 19th and 20th century architecture. These buildings lined streets that were much wider and more regular than their medieval predecessors. Before the automobile and public mass transit allowed citizens to distance themselves from each other and for cities in Europe to spread out, row houses were the norm and free-standing buildings the exception to the rule. This began to change in the early 20th century. The influence of American style suburbs and a nostalgia for agrarian architectural forms gave rise to free-standing, single-family “farm” houses in German cities. The spaces within these buildings were small. Construction materials varied, from timber to masonry to stucco. As in earlier buildings, the use of wood structural members, roofs, and floors was common, but larger commercial and office buildings used modern iron and steel framing systems.⁶⁴ Also, high-density residential blocks (set on low-density lots) that were the product of modernist architectural experiments and styles used newer industrial materials such as steel and unadorned plaster.⁶⁵ Although less prone to loss through the spread of fire, these 19th and 20th century buildings presented sizable targets to the enemy.

⁶⁴ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 8.

⁶⁵ In Le Corbusier’s 1941 proposal for the rebuilding of Paris, *Destin de Paris*, he suggested a city built with modern materials (e.g. reinforced concrete) and laid out on a Cartesian grid with wide streets would allow it to survive bombing. Traditional towns, conversely, were “destined for destruction.” (Le Corbusier, quoted in Lambourne, 186). Many of the modernist architectural works in Frankfurt were on the outskirts of the city, in suburbs that were recently annexed. See Dickinson, 103, 107.

Firestorms

The building density at the center of a typical Germany city (the ratio of roof to ground area, as defined by the National Security Resources Board) was about 40 percent.⁶⁶ Masonry party walls separated all but the oldest buildings—those in the *Altstadt*—and served to contain fires that were started within individual buildings. Despite the density of construction in the city center, the spreading of fire—except in cases of firestorms—was a relatively rare occurrence. In those cities where firestorms were achieved, the intensity of destruction was surpassed only by the American atomic weapons used later in the war against Japan.

Four German cities have the unfortunate distinction of being the sites of particularly devastating firestorms during World War II. Hamburg and Dresden are well known for this, but the smaller cities of Kassel and Darmstadt suffered similar fates.⁶⁷ The expression “firestorm” was used to describe the rare occurrence of a large, incredibly powerful fire that formed a pillar (or “thermal”) that “struck a stratum of cold air condensing moisture on motes of soot and debris which fell in large black raindrops directly leeward of the fire area.”⁶⁸ Firestorms were the exception to the rule during World War II.

The National Security Resources Board identified three characteristics that were common to the firestorms at Hamburg, Dresden, Kassel, and Darmstadt:

- 1) Heavily built-up areas were blanketed with a high density of incendiary and high explosive bombs. The density of the incendiary bomb fall was so

⁶⁶ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 8. This report does not specify what is meant by the city center, but it is presumed to mean both the *Altstadt* and some surrounding built-up areas. Aerial photographs of the *Altstadt* section of many German cities suggest a much higher roof to ground ratio.

⁶⁷ It should be noted that these were four of the six cities studied by the USSBS after the war.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 9.

great that individual efforts in combating incipient fires were fruitless. It was estimated that within 20 minutes after the first wave had attacked Hamburg, two out of three structural units within a 4.5 square mile area were afire as a result of one or more incendiary bomb strikes. In Darmstadt... in a slightly longer period, two out of every three structures were burning in upper stories as a result of incendiary bomb strikes. This rapid ignition of a large area distinguishes a fire storm from peacetime conflagrations of the past which usually developed over a period of hours from one small start.

- 2) In the absence of a strong ground wind the interacting fire winds, set up by many individual fires augmented by the effects of heat of radiation over intervening spaces, merged the aggregate blazes into one inferno with its own pillar or column... of burning gases which rose almost vertically. Over Hamburg this pillar was more than 2½ miles high and about 1½ miles in diameter.
- 3) The rapid burning of great amounts of combustible materials was accompanied by a corresponding consumption of air, causing an influx of new air at the base of the pillar. This onrush of air, or fire wind, reached gale-like proportions as it headed toward the fire center. One and a half miles from the fire area of Hamburg this draft increased the wind from 11 miles per hour to 33 miles per hour. At the edge of the area, where velocities must have been appreciably greater, trees 3 feet in diameter were uprooted.

In these great German fires temperatures were raised to the ignition point of all combustibles and complete burn-out followed. The fires burned for nearly 48 hours before the areas cooled off sufficiently for them to be approached. No traces of unburned building materials or plant life could then be found. Only the brick building walls and a few large charred trees remained.⁶⁹

The spread of fire during a firestorm was attributable to both types of ordnance—high-explosive and incendiary. The two worked in unison to achieve the most destructive impact possible. First, the concussion of high-explosive bombs opened up buildings to the outside by shattering windows and doors. Roof tiles were blown off by the force of explosions, exposing the wooden structure beneath. The incendiary bombs that followed the high-explosives would themselves create small fires. The contents

⁶⁹ Ibid. See also Incendiary Attacks on German Cities, cited in Pape, 270 and elsewhere.

of houses and offices in the buildings acted as kindling, nurturing the growth of the fire. As the fires grew in number and intensity, convection currents—the “wind” of a firestorm—carried flying brands to buildings that had been exposed and weakened by high-explosives. With the added presence of air flow, the fire fed itself. If the conditions were right, as they had been in Hamburg, Dresden, Kassel, Darmstadt, and perhaps other German cities, then an uncontrollable firestorm would result. Surprisingly, heat played little role in the spread of fires during such conflagrations.⁷⁰

Firestorms are, in a sense, merely conflagrations on an epic scale, and they only occurred under specific conditions in a handful of German cities during the war. Yet many more cities were attacked by bombers ferrying the same incendiary and high-explosive payloads, and the resulting fires—although perhaps not to the level of firestorms—were nevertheless incredibly destructive. Given these conditions, it is no wonder that the historic buildings of Germany’s central cities were destroyed en masse, despite the best preemptive efforts of monuments protection officers in Washington and London and the firefighters working beneath the falling bombs.

Conclusion

Had combatants of earlier wars been present in Germany in early 1945, as the Allied ground forces marched eastward towards Berlin, they would have been amazed at physical state of the cities. When Patton’s 3rd Army entered Frankfurt in late March, the first Allied element to do so, it entered a city that did not look like it belonged at the western edge of Nazi Germany’s shrinking empire. Rather, its sad physical state gave the impression that it had been on the frontline for years. And indeed it had. Strategic bombing moved the various military fronts forward and back across Europe

⁷⁰ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 10.

over the course of the six-year war; it was only the physical occupation by ground troops that collapsed the front permanently and brought the war to a close. The combined efforts of the American and British air forces had bludgeoned intractable Germany into submission by incapacitating key industries, killing tens of thousands of civilians, and reducing large swathes of its cities to ruins.

For the Americans, damage to cultural landmarks can be attributed to bombing that, although improved in the course of the war, was often rather imprecise. Bomb damage to landmarks was frequently the result of “collateral damage.” Many targets like railroad stations and factories were located in dense urban areas, surrounded by centuries of architectural accretion. Errant bombs were bound to strike some of the fragile nearby landmarks. By contrast, the British not only deemed the destruction of landmarks an acceptable risk, their bombing policies operated on the assumption that indiscriminate destruction and the terror it caused was permissible—even useful. This Douhetian style of bombing did not work. Civilians were not terrorized to the point that they rose up against the Nazi government, nor were they demoralized to the point of economic apathy. Mason Hammond, a Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives officer during the war and Latin Language and Literature professor at Harvard, had this to say about terror air raids and the damage they wrought:

If one wanted a strong argument against the unnecessary damage inflicted by indiscriminate air attack one had only to fly into Berlin and look down on streets of houses whose façades stood but whose interiors were entirely gutted. It remains a debated question how far such whole bombing broke the spirit of either the British earlier or the Germans at the end.⁷¹

⁷¹ Hammond, 92.

CHAPTER FIVE: ALLIED PLANS TO PROTECT CULTURAL SITES

Introduction

With the stroke of his presidential pen, Franklin Delano Roosevelt created the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (ACPS) on 23 June, 1943.¹ The basic role of this new commission was identified in press releases as follows:

The Commission will function under the auspices of the United States Government and in conjunction with similar groups in other countries for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic and historic records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and restoring to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis powers or individuals acting under their authority or consent.²

The document continued by expressing the motivation behind the creation of the ACPS:

The appointment of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe is evidence of the concern felt by the United States Government and by artistic and learned circles in this country for the safety of artistic treasures in Europe, placed in jeopardy by the war.

The formation of the ACPS gave proponents of arts protection an official platform from which to launch their efforts to protect the antiquities of Europe and later, of Asia. The ease with which this act took place, as well as the seemingly simple and incontrovertible nature of the issue—who would *not* support the preservation of art

¹ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 3.

² The Department of State Bulletin, August 21, 1943, vol. IX, no. 217 (republished 1979). See Appendix 1 for complete transcript.

and monuments?—belied the struggle that advocates of this program had endured both in the months leading up to its creation and would yet endure, during the course of the long war. The effort that led to the creation of the ACPS was what we might now describe as “grass-roots,” at least in its earliest stages. It was a small group of individuals who initiated the discussion and voiced their concerns; an academic group of archaeologists, art historians, historians, and architects, and curators from some of the nation’s great museums. These were people whose professional lives revolved around European art and architecture, and for whom the continued existence of cultural artifacts was meaningful in some way. Yet despite their prominence and pedigree, their individual voices went largely unheard. It was only after they coalesced into a handful of advocacy organizations that the legitimacy of their messages began to be acknowledged by high-ranking government officials in Washington. In the absence of this bottom-up approach to shaping government policy, it is unlikely that European art objects and architectural monuments would have been given any more than a passing thought by the American war-planners and armies in the field during World War II.

Considering the many strands of advocates who stitched together the resolve and the mission cultural protection during armed combat, I will describe in this chapter the various groups involved in monuments protection during the war. At center stage is Roosevelt’s ACPS. The ACPS served as the government’s official voice for art and monuments protection. It did not act alone, however, and in many ways it was perhaps the least important of the groups involved. The ACPS was the intermediary between two groups of civilian experts—the American Council of Learned Societies and American Defense-Harvard Group—and the operational arm of the ACPS, the military’s Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives units. The ACPS in essence processed

information supplied by the former groups and dictated policy and procedure to the latter, who actually gave the program life on the battlefields of Europe. The Army's School of Military Government was another piece in this puzzle. It was involved in the training of Civil Affairs officers in the fundamentals of monuments protection. The School relied on the expertise of both the ACPS and the two civilian groups. Many renowned scholars contributed to this collaborative program of data collection, processing, and utilization. In the course of this chapter I therefore examine the personnel involved with each group, looking briefly to the backgrounds of their members as a means of explaining the direction that their efforts took.

It should also be recognized that historic buildings represented only a fraction of the cultural patrimony that the groups described above were charged with protecting—a third of the total, if the job title “Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives” fairly conveys the intended range of job responsibilities. All told, however, it was the fine arts (and to a lesser degree, archives) that took center stage. The reason for this was simple. While monuments work involved a single step (the protection of historic buildings), and rarely progressed so far as to include the logical, subsequent step (rehabilitation of damaged buildings), work with art objects typically involved two distinct steps. It involved the initial protection of the object, and then its repatriation. Unlike historic buildings, moveable objects like paintings and statues lacked a fixed geographical location to confer ownership. The determination of ownership and return of an errant object to its rightful owner therefore consumed a large amount time for the groups involved. Operating alongside this was the fact that art objects captured the imagination of the public in a way that old buildings simply did not. While pictures of ruined cities and decimated landmarks could be readily found in newspapers of the time, it was the occasional discovery of an unexpected art cache stored underground

(the juxtaposition of high art objects against a salt mine backdrop providing a striking and incongruous image) that popularized the work of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives units, and permitted their work to continue in the face of disinterest. Furthermore, the return of private property was, perhaps, more saleable an activity to the America public than the use of public money and labor to fund the rehabilitation of private property situated on faraway, foreign soil.

Civil Affairs and the School of Military Government

One thinks of all the centuries of Europe: the Romanesque; the Gothic and the Renaissance; the builders of Notre Dame and Chartres; the genius of stonemasons flowering in the day's work; the painters of religious ecstasy and tavern vulgarity; the masterless men who plied their noble trades in the shadow of tyranny and war; the young who dreamed dreams, the old who saw visions; the passion and revolt which expressed themselves, not in blood but in creation; the growth of a majestic continental culture though slow generations, out of multitudinous lives. This is the foundation on which the future will have to be built. The future will be surer if the visible objects remain. Dr. [William] Dinsmoor and his colleagues can play as significant a role as the generals do.³

When the State Department and War Department publicly announced the creation of the ACPS in August of 1943, two months after Roosevelt had formally approved the plan, the need for an official body to conduct arts protection was even more pressing than it had been earlier in the year.⁴ The pace of the war in Europe was moving along swiftly. By mid-year, the invasion of Sicily and the Italian mainland was at hand. With the looming prospect of pre-invasion bombing and American troops involved in ground battles came the real possibility of extensive damage to historic buildings. It

³ "Europe's Imperiled Art," New York Times, 8 May 1943.

⁴ Coles and Weinberg, 88; Nichols, 222, 234; General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 2-3; American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 3.

was in this context that civilians hastened their efforts to convince the United States government that Europe's cultural patrimony was something worth protecting.

Yet it was the military's role in the wake of combat, in the villages and cities behind the front lines, which spurred the first official action related to monuments protection. Allied military planners and strategists conducted their work with the assumption that victory would eventually be theirs: that the Axis nations would eventually succumb and the Axis-controlled countries liberated. The Allied occupation of areas with decimated infrastructure and a beleaguered, suspicious, or resentful local population presented the military with countless challenges. To address these concerns, a new Civil Affairs Division (CAD) had been created under the Secretary of War in January 1943.

One of the CAD's many and varied responsibilities was the protection of art and monuments during combat and the repatriation of moveable art objects to their owners in the period that followed.⁵ The War Department issued a press release on August 20 1943 that coincided with the State Department's announcement. This read, in part:

Every effort consistent with military expediency is being made to preserve such art objects as come within the scope of military operations... Military personnel whose backgrounds include a knowledge of art are being assigned to the Allied Military Governments to counsel and guide commanding officers of various units on the value of art objects. Maps showing the locations of widely known art objects, including statues, museums and other structures containing both public and private collections, are being furnished combat commanders, including those officers directing aerial attacks. Commanders are doing everything practicable to keep these objects out of direct range. In addition to preserving these art objects intact whenever possible, the duties of the AMG museums and monuments officers include advising on minor repair projects, and preservation of such fragments as are found after an

⁵ Coles and Weinberg, 85-86; General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 3.

occupation so that it may be possible for the objects to be completely restored after the war.⁶

Although the mission to protect and preserve monuments and art is clearly stated in this press release, this probably would not have been part of the CAD's responsibilities had it not been for the influence of a handful of determined civilians with, collectively, a pedigree that could hardly be ignored by Washington's elites. Before the American Defense-Harvard Group and the American Council of Learned Societies came together to lobby the government for an official art and monuments protection program, several individuals were working independently to achieve these same ends. The two most outspoken were Francis Henry Taylor and William Bell Dinsmoor. Both men held important positions in the art world. Taylor was the director of Metropolitan Museum in New York, president of Association of Art Museum Directors, and a writer on museums and art collecting. In late 1943 he would pen an article for the *New York Times* entitled "Europe's Looted Art: Can It Be Recovered?".⁷ Dinsmoor was an art history professor at Columbia University with expertise in Greek art. Over his fifty-year career, he authored several books on the architecture of ancient Greece and Rome. At the outset of the war, he was also serving as president of Archeological Institute of America.

In late 1942 and early 1943, Taylor and Dinsmoor had approached the Army on multiple occasions with the suggestion that monuments protection fall under the purview of the new Civil Affairs program.⁸ They even took the liberty of submitting an "outline of preliminary processes." This outline suggested that certain information collection and dissemination activities needed to be undertaken immediately with the

⁶ Coles and Weinberg, 88.

⁷ Francis Henry Taylor, "Europe's Looted Art: Can It Be Saved?" New York Times Magazine, 19 September 1943, 18-19, 42-43.

⁸ Coles and Weinberg, 85.

creation of a roster of experts already serving in the military that would fulfill staffing needs; the compilation of a database of historic monuments, archives, and private and public art collections; “first-aid” advice for the preservation of damaged cultural resources; a list of locations of “inventories of inventories”; and finally, a set of maps on which Europe’s cultural heritage was clearly identified.⁹ After a relatively short period of indecisiveness and inaction, the Army decided in June 1943 that the School of Military Government (SMG), housed at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville, would be responsible for training CAD officers in this type of work.¹⁰ This training was justified on the grounds that the positive propaganda it was expected to generate outweighed the initial effort. The SMG noted that “the Army will gain in good will if adequate steps are taken” by CAD to protect and preserve the monuments and art treasures of occupied territories.¹¹ To these ends, the SMG laid out a series of recommendations that would ideally shape its program in the subsequent years. These included the following general points:

That four or five carefully selected experts having a maximum knowledge and experience in the field of fine arts and archaeology be commissioned for the purpose of taking the course at the School of Military Government...

That the civil affairs section of each theater commander include one or two such experts...

That an appropriate number of experts be included in the pool of technicians and specialists being formed by the Provost Marshall General to be available when needed for operating functions in the field...

⁹ General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 1-2. Repatriation activities and art object-specific information were also described.

¹⁰ The Army established the SMG under the Provost Marshall Office in the first half of 1942. Immediately after its founding, members of American Defense-Harvard Group (who had been meeting since 1940), suggested that instruction might include monuments protection. This predated the formation of AD-HG’s monuments subcommittee, which wasn’t established until 20 March, 1943.

¹¹ Coles and Weinberg, 86. This is quoted from a memorandum sent by the SMG to CAD by way of the Provost Marshall, and based on recommendations made by Taylor and Dinsmoor.

That FM-27-5 [the Army's official civil affairs field manual] be amended or supplemented by appropriate reference to the subject...¹²

Thus, in late-1943, the SMG commenced its training of a specialized corps of soldiers, known generally as “Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives” (MFAA) officers after the type of objects they were charged with protecting.¹³ Of the MFAA officers, there were two types of ‘monuments men.’ There were those who already possessed expertise in the field and happened to be in the armed forces, and those who were given training to undertake art and monuments work duties as one ad hoc component of many in their CAD duties. Of the former group, there were already “more than fifty museum directors, curators, archaeologists and historians” who held commissions in the military at the outset of war.¹⁴ This group would be the driving force for monuments protection during World War II. (The activities of the MFAA in Europe are discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.)

As the war progressed, arts protection was folded into the general CAD instruction offered not only at Charlottesville, but also at schools across the United States and the world. It could be found at numerous American universities where civil affairs was being taught, and at SMGs established at Tizi Ouzou in North Africa and Wimbledon, England.¹⁵ With the training of MFAA officers and the inclusion of arts and monuments protection into its general CAD curriculum, the United States military had

¹² Ibid., 86. April 1943 memorandum from the director of the School of Military Government (SMG) to the head of the Army's Civil Affairs Division. This same passage is paraphrased in General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 3.

¹³ To ensure some degree of autonomy within the military hierarchy, most of the MFAA soldiers were officers. However, a few enlisted men seem to have received MFAA training as well.

¹⁴ Coles and Weinberg, 85.

¹⁵ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 37, 57. At the Civil Affairs Training Schools located at American universities, the level of training was limited to a pre-packaged slide presentation and printed statement entitled “First Aid Protection for Art Treasures and Monuments.” (The American Council of Learned Societies created these. See the description of this group later in this chapter.) The training of actual MFAA officers—as opposed to general CAD officers—occurred at the SMG in Charlottesville.

offered a tacit recognition of the worth of cultural resource protection. Yet the issues of *what* to protect and *how* to protect it remained to be established.

In August of 1943, Mason Hammond, a Harvard University Classics professor during peacetime, reported for duty in the new MFAA program. He was the first soldier to be so assigned.¹⁶ Yet when Hammond arrived, there was hardly a foundation of information on which to base his work (the scope of which was, incidentally, no less than Sicily and Italian mainland). The wealth of materials available at the close of the war simply did not exist earlier in 1943. There were no comprehensive lists or annotated maps indicating the location and key historic monuments and art repositories. Nor were there descriptions of each object or building's relevance and relative artistic worth. Moreover, the existing policy and directives did not offer explicit instructions as to the governance of MFAA officers' work in the field, and failed to describe even their relationships with and within the Allied armies. The United States government would rely on civilian experts to provide most of this information. The American Defense-Harvard Group (AD-HG) and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) gradually provided—by way of the ACPS—training materials, lists, and maps, and recommended potential students for MFAA training at the SMG at service in the theaters of war.¹⁷

American Commission

The years 1941 and 1942 saw increasing debate within the museum and educational communities over the problem of cultural protection in Europe. In March 1942, George L. Stout, conservator at Harvard's Fogg Museum of Fine Arts, organized a

¹⁶ The British concurrently assigned Capt. F. H. J. Maxse as Hammond's deputy. See Coles and Weinberg, 87-88, fn. 27.

¹⁷ "Mapping Europe's Art," Newsweek, 21 February 1944, vol. XXIII, no. 8, p.74.

conference in Cambridge to discuss this very matter.¹⁸ From this conference and discussions ongoing within the arts community at the time came a petition to the United States government calling for the protection of Europe's cultural heritage. The petition emphasized the universality of cultural heritage; that for the United States government to "safeguard these things will show respect for the beliefs and customs of all men and will bear witness that these things belong not only to particular peoples but also to the heritage of mankind."¹⁹ Among the original signatories were three Harvard staff: Stout; Paul J. Sachs, artist, collector, lawyer, and associate director of the Fogg Museum; and George Henry Chase, one of the university's deans. With the weight of Harvard behind it, this petition made its way to Washington and New York and into some very well-positioned hands. Among those who offered their support to the petition were Francis Henry Taylor and William Bell Dinsmoor; Waldo G. Leland, Director of the American Council of Learned Societies; and Laurence V. Coleman, Director of the American Association of Museums.²⁰ This early drive to garner support for arts protection thus encompassed a host of the most influential practitioners in the academic and museum world.

This informal group of experts was to pick up one additional supporter whose influence inside Washington and professional position outside the art world lent the effort no uncertain legitimacy. This person was Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the United States. Stone was a member of the National Gallery's board, and was therefore a ready conduit between upper echelons of the museum community and the President of the United States. At the behest of Taylor, Dinsmoor, and others (including that of

¹⁸ Coles and Weinberg, p. 84, fn 23.

¹⁹ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, p. 33.

²⁰ Ibid.

David E. Finley, lawyer and director of the National Gallery of Art), Stone approached Roosevelt in the winter of 1942 about arts protection; about “the creation of an organization to function under the auspices of the Government for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic or historic monuments and records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and returning to the lawful owners such objects.”²¹ Stone’s effort was met with little enthusiasm.²² Yet Roosevelt was made aware of the need for such a group—and such a need was a required first step.

Follow-up letters to the President were soon drafted. These elaborated on Stone’s appeal, and fleshed out some of the plans described in the original letter. The proposed organization of experts—volunteers all—would be called the “American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe” (ACPS). Its primary role would be to provide expertise and information to the art and monuments soldiers who were already being trained at the SMG at Charlottesville by the end of 1942. It would also recommend personnel already within the military whose civilian knowledge of art and monuments could be tapped for this program. Despite the persistence of the arts community, it would still be several more months before President Roosevelt would create the ACPS.

In June 1943, another of Washington’s political luminaries, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, wrote to the President to update him on what was being done by the SMG in the way of art and monuments training.²³ Hull’s correspondence seems to have provided the final push to approve the creation of the ACPS. Less than two months later,

²¹ Letter dated 20 April 1943, from the Director of the National Gallery to the Roosevelt, describing Stone’s earlier discussions with the President. Coles and Weinberg, 86.

²² Nicholas, 212.

²³ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 2.

Roosevelt offered his approval of the ACPS—a group that was “not an operating agency but [one that] was concerned only with matters of policy.”²⁴ The State Department’s press release of August 20, 1943, identified the role of the new group:

The Commission may be called upon to furnish officials and art historians to the General Staff of the Army, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by the armies of the United Nations. One of the principal functions of the Commission will be to act as a channel of communication between the Army and the various universities, museums, and other scholarly institutions, organizations, and individuals from whom information and services are desired. Already much valuable material has been collected and furnished to the Army by museums and universities through the efforts of individual members of the Commission and others serving in a volunteer capacity.²⁵ [Appendix 1]

The War Department’s concurrent press release elaborated by noting that protection of art and monuments would only occur if and when it did not interfere with military objectives:

Every effort consistent with military expediency is being made to preserve such art objects as come within the scope of military operations... Military personnel whose backgrounds include a knowledge of art are being assigned to the Allied Military Governments to counsel and guide commanding officers of various units on the value of art objects. Maps showing the locations of widely known art objects, including statues, museums and other structures containing both public and private collections, are being furnished combat commanders, including those officers directing aerial attacks. Commanders are doing everything practicable to keep these objects out of direct range. In addition to preserving these art objects intact whenever possible, the duties of the AMG museums and monuments officers include advising on minor repair projects, and preservation of such fragments as are found after an occupation so that it may be possible for the objects to be completely restored after the war.²⁶

²⁴ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 15.

²⁵ The Department of State Bulletin, August 21, 1943, vol. IX, no. 217 (republished 1979).

²⁶ Coles and Weinberg, 88.

The eight inaugural members of the ACPS included three presidential appointees. The first was Stone's colleague Owen J. Roberts, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Roberts served as the ACPS chair. David E. Finley, director of the National Gallery and member of the Commission of Fine Arts acted as vice chair. The secretary-treasurer position was filled by Huntington Cairns, a lawyer, secretary-treasurer of the National Gallery, and prolific writer on both law and art. The remaining members represented a cross-section of disciplines that reflected the ACPS' objectives. Alongside Dinsmoor, Taylor, and Sachs was Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, who championed the protection of archives. Herbert Lehman, New York governor and Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, was the only member without a background in the arts.²⁷ A ninth member, Alfred E. Smith, seems also to have been a member for a short time in 1943, but following his death he was replaced in November by Archbishop Francis J. Spellman of New York.²⁸ The commission's name informally evolved from "American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe" to the less unwieldy "Roberts Commission," after its chair.

With the creation of the ACPS, the nexus was put into place. The "channel of communication between the Army and the various universities, museums and individuals" that supplied information and services had been established. It is time now to turn attention to the two civilian groups that fed information to the ACPS to be

²⁷ Reprinted in 1979 in the Dept. of State *Bulletin*, vol. IX, no. 217, p. 111. See also "U.S. Group Is Named to Save Europe's Art," *New York Times*, 21 August 1943; and American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, *Report*, 3.

²⁸ "Spellman is Named to Monument Board," *New York Times*, 9 November 1943, 29. The rationale for naming of a Catholic priest to a commission populated by museum curators, archivists, and historians does not defy easy explanation, given the course of military operations. The Allies had identified the Mediterranean as their first beachhead into Europe, and countries rife with ecclesiastical monuments stood between the landing areas and the Axis capitals. It was probably deemed logical—and politically prudent—to have such expertise in the ACPS.

processed and prepared for use by monuments troops in the field. The guides that accompanied the Allied armies into the field and were shaped air force target lists were known as *Supreme Headquarters Official Lists of Protected Monuments*.²⁹

American Defense-Harvard Group

The ACPS was a clearinghouse of information on arts and monuments. It processed data, but created very little of its own. It instead relied on two independent groups to search out and analyze information and to provide it to ACPS. American Defense-Harvard Group (AD-HG) was one of two such groups.

AD-HG was a volunteer organization founded in Cambridge, Massachusetts in the summer of 1940. Comprised of local residents, most with ties to Harvard University, the group's amorphous, early goal was to help with the American war effort—to “defend” the United States in whatever ways were deemed most useful. After four years of war and accounts of cataclysmic destruction on the European continent, art and monuments protection became one of the group's specific goals. In March 1943, a subcommittee of AD-HG members was elected to address this issue. Among its original members were Paul J. Sachs, who served as chair; W. G. Constable, writer on English art; and H. O'Neill Hencken of the Peabody Museum, who served as secretary.³⁰ Sachs, as can be seen, involved himself liberally in the cultural protection movement, holding membership in the ACPS as well.

²⁹ Flanner, *Monuments and Men*, (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1947), 267 and Flanner, “The Beautiful Spoils III—Monuments Men,” *The New Yorker*, March 8, 1947, vol. XXIII, no. 3, 38.

³⁰ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, *Report*, 33. The appendix in this volume contains a complete list of those involved in AD-HG's efforts, as well as the geographical area or program with which they were associated.

In late-1942 and early-1943, with the invasion of Italy on the horizon, the U. S. Army began to solicit arts and monuments information from civilian groups with expertise in these areas.³¹ This information was to be incorporated into the SMG curriculum for monuments officers, and would provide the foundation for the CAD's art and monuments protection program. AD-HG's role was to amass information on the cultural patrimony of Europe. Its first step was, quite literally, to identify what was out there and where exactly it was located. This was a task more difficult perhaps than it would seem. AD-HG's experts were asked to compile lists of "cultural heritage"—art repositories, archives, and monuments—across the sweep of Europe, from the Mediterranean peninsula to the Scandinavia. This heritage included everything from Iron Age forts in France to Modernist buildings from Germany's brief but productive inter-war period. (The nature and distribution of monuments that appeared on these lists will be examined in the next chapter.) In order to compile such an inventory, AD-HG first requested information from scholars and museum curators who were experts on the various countries in question.³² Members also consulted readily accessible resources like art history books and travel guides. By June 1943, AD-HG had delivered its first cultural inventory to the Army. This comprehensive inventory listed art repositories, archives, and historic monuments on the Italian island of Sicily.

The members of AD-HG were prolific in the months and years that followed. They produced a series of exhaustive lists—"long lists"—for most of the Axis-aligned and the Allied countries in Europe, including Albania, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary,

³¹ Ibid., 33. Col. James H. Shoemaker requested on March 10, 1943 that AD-HG assemble "information on art objects and monuments which might need protection." However, discussions of this topic likely began earlier, in 1942, and precipitated the creation of AD-HG's art and monuments subcommittee.

³² Ibid.

Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily), Norway, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Additional lists were drawn up for a host of non-European nations where fighting was also expected to occur: China, Japan, Indochina, Korea, the Netherlands East Indies, Siam (Thailand), and Tunisia.³³ Each long list included a brief introduction to the country in question. This introduction provided a short history and an explanation of the national and religious relevance of the locations sited within. In addition to cultural heritage that was significant for its historic or artistic qualities, the lists also paid heed to “material which for any reason was treasured or revered by the local population.”³⁴ Thus, it can be seen that AD-HG’s long lists included the gamut of cultural resources. It included those of national or even universal value as well as those that were what we would now describe as “local landmarks.”

AD-HG also prepared a series of “short lists.” Based on the long lists, these included only those cultural treasures deemed to be of exceptional importance: the crème de la crème of each country’s historic buildings, archives, and museums. Short lists were included in the Civil Affairs manuals prepared by the War Department. The inclusion of this information in these manuals suggests that a basic knowledge of the nature and location of an occupied country’s cultural treasures—not all, but the most revered—was considered an important aspect of military government. Once again, this was in the military’s best interest as well the art community’s. The survival of a population’s cultural patrimony in the wake of battle lent a sense of stability to what probably seemed like a lawless and chaotic environment. Military governance under these circumstances must have proceeded with greater ease.

³³ Ibid., 34. See Ibid., 161, for a list of all AD-HG personnel and their geographic area of expertise.

³⁴ Ibid., 34.

In addition to generating long and short lists, the members of AD-HG undertook two other projects relating to art and monuments protection. They produced a very basic “how-to” manual that described preferred techniques of safeguarding and conserving the damaged art objects and buildings that soldiers were likely to encounter on the battlefield. Related to this, AD-HG also supplied the War Department with lists of personnel within the military who possessed some knowledge regarding cultural resources, and who would therefore be useful in rendering “first aid.”³⁵

Odd as it may seem, AD-HG did not operate alone during World War II. A second group of art and monuments experts provided a service to the U. S. Army that was similar to that offered by AD-HG. It, too, tapped the expertise of concerned members of the museum and academic worlds, but instead of the intellectual bastion of Cambridge, it called New York City home.

The American Council of Learned Societies

Of the two civilian monuments protection groups active during World War II, more has been written about the American Council of Learned Society’s (ACLS) Committee on the Preservation of European Cultural Material (or Committee on the Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas —the group seems to have had at least two working names). ACLS was AD-HG’s partner working at the Frick Gallery and Blumenthal House in New York.³⁶ And like AD-HG, ACLS was composed primarily of concerned scholars and museum officials who took it upon themselves to amass, on behalf of the United States government, background information on Europe’s cultural

³⁵ Ibid., 34.

³⁶ The latter location was a branch of the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Ibid., 35.

patrimony. In fact, many of the scholars involved in one group were also involved in the other.

ACLS was formed in early 1943 with William Bell Dinsmoor as chairman.³⁷ Dinsmoor was head of Archaeological Institute of America, an art history professor at Columbia, and one of the earliest, most vocal proponents of art and monuments protection during the war. His role was to oversee a pool of about ninety American experts and expatriate foreigners that included such luminaries as Erwin Panofsky, Turpin Bannister (dean of the architecture school at Alabama Polytechnic Institute, co-founder and first president of the American Society of Architectural Historians, and chairman of the American Institute of Architect's Preservation Committee), and Siegfried Giedion, who published his widely influential Space, Time and Architecture the year that the United States entered the war. The role of these experts was very similar to that of AD-HG. It was to gather information on cultural resources and to make it easily digestible. In order to compile lists of the monuments, art repositories, and archives in Europe, the group used whatever background information it could access, including the existing literature available at the Frick's art history library and information already assembled by AD-HG. Questionnaires were even sent to "officials and scholars of American art and educational institutions asking for data on their recent research abroad."³⁸ Relevant books on European and Asian history were

³⁷ Ibid. The appendix in this volume contains a complete list of those involved in ACLS' efforts, as well as the geographical area or program with which they were associated.

³⁸ Ibid., 35. See also the letter of 24 May 1943, cited in Coles and Weinberg, 87. In Taylor, "Europe's Looted Art," p.18, Taylor notes that no less than one thousand scholars have been working with the ACLS, their "principal objective to date has been that of guiding military authorities in the protection of cultural monuments in target areas."

obtained from the Library of Congress, National Archives, American Library Association, and Smithsonian.³⁹

Alongside Dinsmoor, several other luminaries comprised the ACLS. The vice chair seat was held by National Gallery director David E. Finley. Francis Henry Taylor, director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and president of the Association of Art Museum Directors also served. The other members were mostly academic types: Charles Rufus Morey, Marquand Professor of Art and Archaeology at Princeton University, and an expert on Early Christian art (and also wrote Protecting Europe's Art Treasures and other articles cited in AIA journal); Paul J. Sachs, professor of fine arts at Harvard University and associate director of Harvard's Fogg Museum); Albert Eide Parr, director of the American Museum of Natural History; Harry Miller Lydenberg, former director of the New York Public Library and head of the Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City; George Henry Chase, dean of Harvard; Sumner Crosby, assistant professor at Yale and president of the College Art Association; and finally, Archibald MacLeish, the Librarian of Congress.⁴⁰ Membership in the ACLS remained fairly consistent throughout its existence.

The results of ACLS' efforts were not unlike that of AD-HG. In one of the first articles in an American newspaper about the wartime art and monuments protection, the New York Times noted that the efforts of the nascent ACLS was “[t]o help salvage the art and scientific heritage of Europe from the destructiveness of war,” and that

[m]embers of the committee are studying actual cities and areas from an art and historical point of view with a view to providing the government as full information as possible to help preserve the European cultural

³⁹ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 35.

⁴⁰ “Salvaging the Art of Europe Planned: Data Are Being Compiled,” New York Times, 4 May 1943.

heritage... [and] is ready to cooperate with the Army and Navy, the State Department or any other branch to which it can be of service.⁴¹

The group produced a master index of cultural resources arranged by country in Europe and Asia. Within each country, additional lists were created for cities and administrative regions, and sites were assigned a level of relative cultural and historic importance. Special, thematic lists were also compiled. Among these were lists that described significant churches, residential buildings, monuments, and museums and archives.⁴² Perhaps the one thing that separates the work of ACLS from AD-HG is the series of maps that it produced. This work was done by a team of eight experts under the supervision of Dinsmoor and Crosby.⁴³ Using maps of European cities and regions provided by the Army Map Service, ACLS' members pinpointed the location of protected cultural sites on tracing overlays.⁴⁴ These overlays (and negatives of photos that were taken of them) were, in turn, reproduced and forwarded to Army and Army Air Corps in Washington, D. C. By the end of the war, ACLS had provided the military with 786 maps for areas within the following countries: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, French Indochina, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Java, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Rumania, Sumatra, and Yugoslavia. City maps for Germany alone numbered no less than sixty-nine.⁴⁵ [Appendix 2] In addition to the maps, ACLS supplied the Provost Marshal General's Office with eight bound atlases for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Norway. These

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 35.

⁴³ "Mapping Europe's Art," p.74.

⁴⁴ AD-HG's lists were "the basis of an extensive mapping of Europe with reference to its cultural treasures which was begun early in 1943 by a committee of the American Council of Learned Societies. Charles Rufus Morey, "Saving Europe's Art" (Part I)," Journal of the American Institute of Architects, vol. III, no. 3, March 1945 (adapted from "Protecting Europe's Art Treasures" in *Art News*), 102..

⁴⁵ Germany's capital had two maps associated with it: one for the city of Berlin, and one for the suburbs.

presumably were for use in the training of its Civil Affairs units.⁴⁶ (A discussion of the monuments included in these lists and maps are continued in Chapter 6.)

The maps supplied by ACLS were intended as a means by which field commanders and bombing planners could be educated as to the location of cultural resources. The objective, of course, was to minimize damage to non-military buildings wherever possible. They were also “roadmaps” by which Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives troops on the ground to find cultural resources in order to assess the condition in the wake of battle. Additional information therefore supplemented the maps. One member favorably described the information provided for the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in this way: the maps

...were triumphs of American scholarship and mechanical ingenuity. A convenient photostatic gridded map for every city in Italy containing three or more ‘monuments,’ with their location, classification, and evaluation by the familiar Baedeker system of stars, plus a list of museum and library personnel and an occasional line or two of explanation...prepared by a little group of patriotic scholars working at the Frick Art Reference Library in New York.⁴⁷

The ACLS had one additional wartime duty. It was responsible for providing curriculum information to the American universities where civil affairs training was offered to recruits. To these ends, the group prepared a 54-slide, “how-to” lecture entitled “First Aid Protection for Art Treasures and Monuments.” This presentation was regularly given at a handful of universities across the United States, including

⁴⁶ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 35.

⁴⁷ Theodore Sizer, “A Walpolean at War,” in Walpole Society Notebook. (Portland, ME: The Anthoensen Press, 1947), 8.

Harvard, Northwestern, Stanford, Yale, and Western Reserve, and the Universities of Michigan and Wisconsin.⁴⁸

The ACLS accomplished more than just lists of historic buildings and annotated maps to show their whereabouts, and a curriculum to train Civil Affairs soldiers in how to use this information. It played an important part in giving life to the government organization that ensured that these materials would be put to use. That organization was, of course, the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, which served as the fulcrum for all preservation activities undertaken during the war. Whether ACLS was ultimately more influential than its partner in Cambridge, American Defense-Harvard Group, it is difficult to gauge. (Although the “Harvard Lists” prepared by the “Boston Group” (as one Monuments officer called them) were simply “too detailed for use in the field and too heavy for one’s musette bag”⁴⁹), but period accounts of ACLS’ work suggest that perhaps it was. A retrospective April 1945 essay in the *American Historical Review* stated: “Due no doubt in part to the work of [the ACLS] committee and to [its director’s] imagination, there is now an American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe.”⁵⁰

⁴⁸ American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report, 37.

⁴⁹ Sizer, 8. The author does go on to concede that the information gathered by AD-HG was, in fact, “invaluable in compiling the official check lists of ‘monuments historiques’.”

⁵⁰ *The American Historical Review*, vol. 50, issue 3 (April 1945): 652-53. The director was Waldo G. Leland (see Report, p. 33). The article continues by noting that “[o]n the Commission five members of the A.C.L.S. committee are serving”—testimony to the crossover between groups involved in wartime arts protection.

Conclusion

Monuments protection during the Second World War involved breadth of experts from numerous disciplines. Represented were art and architectural historians, architects, archaeologists, and museum curators with expertise in collections management and conservation. It can fairly be said that without the efforts of these individuals to bring the issue to the fore, the cultural heritage of Europe would have been given little more than passing thought by military planners and armies in the field. In the following chapter, I will examine the efforts of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives units as they struggled to use the policies and procedural frameworks established by American Defense-Harvard Group, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas. The success or failure of these units stands as a testimony to the success of the program and worth placed on cultural resources by the Allied military.

It should be noted that the efforts of these groups had longevity beyond the war. Several of the experts involved were influential in guiding the nascent American historic preservation movement during its early, tentative years. Perhaps foremost among these is David E. Finley, then Director of the National Gallery and vice chairman to Owen Roberts on the American Commission. Although later in his career Finley made few overt references to his earlier work during the war, his post-war involvement in historic preservation suggests that these were, in fact, formative years for him. In his history of preservation in the United States, Preservation Comes of Age: From Williamsburg to the National Trust, 1926-1949, author Charles B. Hosmer recognized that

Finley had entered the field of cultural preservation during World War II when he served on the Roberts Commission, or the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas. From 1943 through 1946 he must have become familiar with the efforts of a small band of fine-arts officers who tried to preserve the artistic and architectural heritage of Western Europe.⁵¹

Attempting to preserve cultural resources in the war zones of Europe much have made the relative calm of the United States, and the challenges to buildings faced here, seem considerably less onerous.

⁵¹ Hosmer, 796. Indeed, historic preservation seems to have occupied much of Finley's time after World War II. Alongside fellow monuments veterans Waldo G. Leland and architectural historian Turpin C. Bannister, Finley played an instrumental role in establishing the National Council for Historic Sites and Buildings. Formed in 1947, the National Council was an early nation-wide preservation advocacy group, ultimately short-lived, but a direct predecessor to the American National Trust for Historic Preservation—a group with which he was also closely involved. In his most prolific years Finley authored two books on the National Trust: History of the National Trust for Historic Preservation (1965), and a follow-up work, The History of the National Trust for Historic Preservation, 1963-1973 (1976).

CHAPTER SIX: MONUMENTS, FINE ARTS, AND ARCHIVES

Lieutenant John Skilton, no noisy brawny lad:
Sensitive; among loud soldiers, sad.
By ingenuity, guts, energy
Saved the best Breton primitive stone Calvary;
Without help, cool as a church mouse,
Salvaged, from damp, Würzburg's Treppenhaus.
Praise him.

“Hymn,” from Monument, Fine Arts and Archives
soldier Lincoln Kirstein’s Rhymes of a PFC.

Introduction

Making preparations to protect cultural resources was as least as labor-intensive as the actual fieldwork that was done in the decimated cities of Europe. The process of establishing *what* was worthy of protection and *how* protection could be ensured occupied American Defense-Harvard Group’s and the American Council of Learned Societies’ efforts for most of 1943 and 1944. During the occupation phase of the war, the problem expanded from how merely to prevent the destruction of cultural artifacts to how to actually preserve them; how to restore damaged historic buildings to their previous state (or at least stabilize them), and how to go about returning pieces of moveable art to their rightful owners. These three issues—protection, preservation, and restitution—became paramount from the time of the Allied invasions in the Mediterranean through 1947, when the monuments program closed its doors, its job done. So while the two civilian groups and the American Commission played crucial planning roles during the early part of the war, the most important participants during the later stages were the military field units. These were Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (MFAA) units of the Allied forces, the soldiers who traversed Europe taking stock of its built heritage. These units understood the information amassed by their stateside colleagues, and actually put it to use.

In this chapter, I examine the MFAA units and their role in Europe. I will describe the challenges they faced, as well as how—or even if—they were able to overcome them. Their relationship with the civilian agencies as described in previous chapters is extended to explain how they used the maps, guides, and lists of historic buildings. It is also important to discuss here the MFAA’s place within the structure of the military hierarchy. This is somewhat more convoluted than might be expected. The official policies that informed the MFAA’s work underwent a lengthy process of formalization, and shifts in policy and procedure seem to have been commonplace throughout the war. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the MFAA’s work went unchanged. For example, the units consistently fell under the umbrella section of the military known as the Civil Affairs Division (CAD). Under CAD they were officially known as “Advisors on Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives.” Their assignment to this division (and not, say, to the Army Corps of Engineers—another logical place) speaks to the very public, very non-military nature of their work: monuments preservation was a civic benefit, something for the local citizenry. Furthermore, the carefully chosen appellation “advisor,” which appeared in their title, made clear that their role was to provide recommendations, and not—despite their officer commissions—to issue orders.¹ Fostering support for their cause in this sort of consultative environment was one of the ongoing challenges the MFAA units faced. In closing this chapter, I investigate the individuals that made up the MFAA ranks. Many of the men assigned to Europe and Asia during the war either entered the service as established experts in their fields, or would so become in the exceptional years that followed. The MFAA roster reads as something of a “who’s who” of 20th century academicians, architects, and museum officials.

¹ Morey, 102.

Weaving through this chapter is a thread begun earlier: the acknowledgement that no amount of advance planning or expertise on the part of the civilian agencies or MFAA units could have prevented much of the damage that befell the architecture of Europe. The provision of additional resources, a more authoritative place within the military, unflagging support from combat troops—none of these things would have made a significant difference insomuch as cultural preservation was concerned. The fate of Europe's historic fabric was, because of the brute force nature of the Allied strategic air campaign, decided long before MFAA troops began their march across the continent.² This quickly became obvious to all. The British government's post-war assessment of the monuments protection program, and the threat posed by bombing, sums up the futility of monuments protection in this type of war:

...the decision to undertake night bombing of Germany, which in cold fact could not be restricted to the specified target areas, and the later decision to adopt 'area bombing', were not ruled out by the desire to avoid the death of men, women and children who were not in the armed forces, they were not going to be restrained by any consideration for safety of art treasures or historic buildings. In these circumstances, there was not a great deal to be done by those charged with responsibility for minimizing damage to monuments and works of art, beyond making certain that the air forces, whether tactical or strategic, were not left without information concerning the treasures they might destroy.³

The effects of six years of bombing on the historic fabric of Europe thus make the successes of the MFAA seem comparatively minor. A slim handful of extant historic

² Distinction is made between strategic and tactical air bombing, the latter being a type of close-support bombing that achieved results similar to that of artillery bombardment. This type of bombing could be relatively focused and precise, unlike that of strategic bombing. See F. S. V. Donnison, Civil Affairs and Military Government Central Organization and Planning (London: HMSO, 1966), 234-235.

³ Ibid.

buildings can be pointed to as successful examples of the MFAA units' efforts to protect and preserve. For every one actively saved historic building, however, many more were destroyed, not willfully or by design, but by errant bombs dropped from tens of thousands of feet away. Likewise, of the ones that did survive, many did so through sheer accident, and not through the efforts of those charged with their protection. These realities need be kept in mind while reading of the MFAA's exploits.

The Nascent MFAA

As it existed at the end of World War II, the MFAA appears a reasonably cohesive organization with clearly defined roles and objectives. Yet in reality, the work of these units in the theaters of operation should rightly be described as piecemeal, with individual soldiers being assigned to this military operation or that on a rather ad hoc basis.⁴ No one doubted the value of preservation as a goal. To be sure, military planners had come to the realization early the war that the protection of cultural resources was a desirable Allied objective. The recognition of the intrinsic cultural value of historic buildings was the basic foundation of this realization, but only in part. As described in earlier chapters, the avoidance of negative propaganda was every bit as important to military planners as the historical or cultural significance that a building possessed. The furor felt in the wake of a destroyed church, chateau, or museum collection—whether destroyed by the Allies or by the Axis, and then blamed on the Allies—was something to be avoided. Indeed, throughout the course of the war the Allies were continually defending themselves against accusations of wanton

⁴ The official British history of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives program notes that “[t]his particular function of civil affairs, like many others, first developed in the field as the result of individual initiative, rather than at the centre as a result of comprehensive planning.” *Ibid*, p. 211.

destruction and looting.⁵ Despite the support for the cause, actually putting a program into operation to protect cultural resources, even when it involved only a tiny group of men and virtually no resources, was something of a challenge alongside the complex effort involved in staging a feat no less than the invasion and occupation of a decidedly hostile Europe.

As mentioned in chapter five, the School of Military Government (SMG) at Charlottesville, working with the Army's CAD, began training MFAA soldiers in mid-1943. At this early stage, the program was still being formalized and even the expression "Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives" had yet to be coined. The initial prospectus was meager. Four or five experts were to be trained at the SMG. These experts would then, in turn, be assigned to the headquarters CAD section in each of the theaters of operation. There they would be held responsible for overseeing the monuments protection program and assigning MFAA soldiers to different areas. ACPS supplied the military with a pool of possible MFAA soldiers, both those already in the service and civilians likely to enlist. By October of 1943, the SMG-trained monuments men had developed a tentative policy and general plans for the protection of Europe's heritage.⁶ The backbone of their work was, of course, the materials supplied by ACPS and the civilian groups that had provided them with information. The British army's experiences with archaeological sites in North Africa also provided a useful working context.

⁵ The accusations that the British vandalized archaeological sites in North Africa, discussed in earlier chapters, are perhaps the earliest examples of negative propaganda. But even in October of 1943, after the Allies had invaded Italy, forcing that country to surrender, Radio Fascista was broadcasting reports of widespread Allied looting of cultural sites. While looting did in fact occur, these reports were intended to foster local animosity and mistrust of the occupying armies and stymie their advance against the German defenders in Italy.

⁶ Memorandum from the Chief of CAD. This was written two months after Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily and the first American foray into Europe. The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 5.

In the following month, November, the first MFAA section was established.⁷ The section was located at Headquarters, Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC), within the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). Through the remainder of the war, MFAA units would be assigned to a variety of other CAD sections with the Allied military—to Armies, Army Groups, geographic “zones,” and missions to occupied and friendly governments.⁸ The organizational location of the MFAA units is perhaps less important than their physical location within the military geography. Nearly without exception, MFAA units were placed well behind the front lines, wherever these were at any given moment. This must have seemed practical at the time. After all, the nature of the MFAA’s work was strictly non-combative, and most of the MFAA units were civilians temporarily decked out in military clothing. They had little familiarity with military life, let alone life in an active combat zone. Yet their physical removal from areas of fighting would also inhibit their ability to successfully execute their roles as protectors of the built heritage. This will be discussed later in the chapter.

In April of 1944, five months after a MFAA section was established in CAD, one of the first MFAA soldiers was assigned his post. This was Col. Henry C. Newton.⁹ Newton’s first, critical task was to help formalize the organization of the MFAA and to develop standard operating procedures: the “means of which the civilian planning

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ For the shifting placement of the MFAA within the military structure, told from the British point of view, see Donnison, 218-219. See also The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 16.

⁹ In the pre-MFAA days, officers—primarily those in the British armed forces—already in service were being tapped for their archaeological and historical expertise. Among these were Maj. Sir Leonard Woolley, Lt.-Col. Mortimer Wheeler, and Maj. Ward-Perkins. All three of these archaeologists were instrumental in protecting classical sites in North Africa. While they were not MFAA, they were engaged in similar activities long before the MFAA program was established. Their work laid the foundation for what was to come.

already undertaken could be put into effect.”¹⁰ In a letter to Professor Geoffrey Webb, Newton described the types of soldiers he envisaged occupying the MFAA ranks alongside himself. He identified a need for those with experience in engineering or construction, in the conservation of art objects, and with knowledge of museum and archival collections; that is, with expertise in monuments, fine arts, and archives.¹¹ He also noted that MFAA soldiers would submit monthly reports describing the condition of cultural resources to both the War Department and the ACPS in Washington. This ensured a certain degree of accountability, and kept the ACPS—with their political connections in Washington—intimately involved with the work in the field, and available for lobbying.

For the purposes of this thesis, MFAA units had three fundamental duties. These can be described generally as documentation, prevention, and stabilization. They were to “record and assess war damage suffered by historic monuments prior to [Allied] occupation; take and advise the steps necessary to prevent further deterioration; [and to] supervise and pass estimates for repairs.”¹² These duties warrant additional attention, and will be described in greater depth in the paragraphs that follow. The documentation and stabilization of monuments are treated together, with prevention described alone. It will be seen that the former two goals were relatively easy to accomplish, while the latter not so much so.

MFAA Operations

The MFAA corps represented the culmination of the work initiated by AD-HG and ACLS, the two civilian arts groups whose members created what was, in essence, a

¹⁰ The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 5.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

database of cultural resources. Without a group of experts in the field whose role was to advocate for preservation, their maps and lists of cultural heritage, guidebooks and “how to” books, would all have been for naught. Likewise, the lobbying and dissemination of information that occupied much of the ACPS’ time would have been exercises in futility. Quite simply, the policies of protection needed someone to propagate and enforce them.

The MFAA was initially conceived as an autonomous body lodged within the greater structure of the Allied military, with all the cooperation, support, and resources one might expect of any other adjunct military section. As described by columnist Janet Flanner in her book Monuments and Men (an expanded collection of her contemporary accounts of the MFAA written for the *New Yorker* magazine),

The optimistic prospectus set forth early in 1944 for the M.F.A. & A. envisaged a bang-up Allied advisory staff, topped by a lieutenant colonel, with sixteen majors, more than half to be American [the other half Allied, primarily British], aided by a number of predominantly American field outfits, each containing a minimum of twelve junior officers; plus an officer attached to the H.Q. G-5 [Civil Affairs section] of each army, and three more officers under him at the front, assisted but six enlisted men. All were to be kept scurrying around Europe in trucks and jeeps, with cameras and typewriters, so they could send to the rear ‘a constant flow of reports and information,’ under fifteen subheadings.¹³

Indeed, the January 1944 draft document “Charter and Establishment of the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section under the Civil Affairs Division, HQ SAC,” specifically identified the following equipment needs: three ¼-ton, 4x4 trucks and a single ¾-ton truck; six 35mm Leica cameras; three portable typewriters; and

¹³ Janet Flanner, Men and Monuments, 267.

assorted arms.¹⁴ This equipment, meager as it may seem, was to be divided between 17 officers and six enlisted men, the MFAA corps for Europe. This small group was to include a chief with the rank of Lt. Col., two deputy chiefs, both of which were Majors, and a staff composed of 14 additional Majors, three enlisted clerks, and three enlisted drivers.¹⁵

The reality was not much different than that described in the draft charter. Over the course of the war, there were around fifteen MFAA soldiers on duty at any given time.¹⁶ They numbered 25 by 1945, a wartime high.¹⁷ (There were, however, no less than 84 MFAA soldiers immediately after the war, when the identification and repatriation of moveable art and archival collections became the primary goal.) Given the massive size of the Allied forces, three million of which were scattered about Europe in the tens of thousands, the minuscule nature of the MFAA component becomes readily apparent. Yet while small in number and inconsequential in terms of the demands they placed upon the greater military, few resources were allocated to them to accomplish their goals. Cameras and typewriters—the means by which MFAA units could record the damage to historic buildings—were few and far between. Even transportation to and from sites was difficult. The vehicles mentioned in the draft charter were allocated to combat and support units, leaving MFAA officers to hitch rides, walk, cycle, and generally to find their own way around Europe. Yet they were successful in getting to where they needed to go. Returning the United States and Britain, their jobs completed, the MFAA soldiers could look back on a two-year period in which approximately 3,145 historic monuments, museums, and archives

¹⁴ The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 7.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Janet Flanner, Men and Monuments, 268-69.

¹⁷ Ibid, 266.

had been visited in France, Germany, and the Benelux countries.¹⁸ Each man inspected over 200 sites on average.¹⁹

Documentation & Stabilization

The MFAA's role as the recorders of damage to monuments was considered paramount. It was considered the first critical step in the process: to record the building as it exists, and then make plans for its protection and stabilization. To accomplish this goal MFAA officers were to venture into the Allied-occupied areas of Italy, France, Germany, and so on, where the ACPS experts had identified the presence of protected historic resources. They were then to record the damage that they encountered upon their arrival.²⁰ The following excerpts from MFAA logs give some sense of the flavor—and the brevity—of the reports:

On M. F. A. & A. requests, engineers scraped 14th-century cathedral ruins from street functioning as Red Ball highway between Omaha and Utah beaches"; "Antwerp, Musée Plantin-Moretus, world's most famous printing museum, 18th century façade struck by buzz bomb"; "Aerschot, inspected Béguinage, pleasant building badly damaged by bombing. Thielt, inspected charming Rènaissance Belfry with tower and spire shot up in '44.²¹

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Haines figures that about ten MFAA officers "averaged one hundred twenty-five sites, sixty towns, and nearly four thousand miles of travel per month." See Haines, "Who Gives a Damn About Medieval Walls," 103.

²⁰ General Administration Instructions spelled this out: "As soon as practicable after occupation, the CAO should inspect all monuments within the area under his charge to determine what measures are necessary for their protection and preservation." Moreover, "[i]n his inspection, the CAO should note damages sustained by monuments in the course of occupation. He should render a report on such damage through channels to the CAO. He should include recommendations with respect to repairs, cost, available funds, available skilled labor, and the like. Where delay in repair would jeopardize the preservation of the monument, he should see to the execution of the repairs on his own authority. Costs of repairs should be charged to local funds save in very exceptional cases." Coles and Weinberg, 413-414.

²¹ Janet Flanner, "The Beautiful Spoils III—Monuments Men," The New Yorker, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (8 March 1947): 40.

MFAA reports such as these—along with photographs of the monument in question, particularly when damaged—would be channeled back to the ACPS. This record would, in turn, stand as evidence of the resource’s condition as first encountered by Allied ground troops—the assumption being that damage to the resource had been caused prior to their arrival, during combat, by either the Allied or Axis armies. More often than not, the towns and cities that were devastated most were those against which the Allied air forces had conducted bombing raids. This damage had been incurred months or even years prior—well in advance of the arrival of Allied ground troops.

Having recorded the state of historic buildings at a given location, the MFAA officer then was to provide the local military government leaders and civilian authorities with information about the condition of the monument and its location, and advice as to how, if damaged, it could be stabilized. Whenever possible, MFAA units were also to actively coordinate the stabilization of buildings. However, building materials were in short supply across the continent, and the amount of physical preservation that was actually accomplished under MFAA supervision was negligible.²² The extent of preservation work involved shoring up collapsing walls and providing makeshift shelters for buildings like churches in which the roof had been destroyed, thereby leaving interior decoration open to the elements. While MFAA units were encouraged to provide estimates for the repair of damaged monuments, little of this sort of work was ever undertaken. Once again, a paucity of building materials—and often, the lack of expertise to accomplish such work—prevented anything more than the crude

²² It should be noted that the French began rehabilitating their damaged monuments while the war was ongoing, and laws were enacted to help property owners in their restoration work. See Marvin C. Ross, “French Protection of Their Historical Monuments,” *Journal of the American Institute of Architects*, vol. IV, no 6 (December 1945): 267-69. Ross was a MFAA officer.

stabilization of teetering structures. Rehabilitation began in earnest only after hostilities had ended, when soldiers returned to their homes and civil life was reinstated. In 1947, the Allied Military Government in Germany was able to report somewhat optimistic news about the repair of monuments. It noted that

MFA&A officers have not participated directly in the reconstruction of war-damaged cultural monuments since the early post-combat days, and all such rebuilding is proceeding at German expense and often with German volunteer labor. In view of the extreme shortage of raw materials and skilled labor, and the extraordinarily long and bitter winter, which greatly hampered all types of outdoor work, the German authorities have made considerable progress in the repair of their historic buildings. Of the 452 cultural monuments inspected as of 1 April 1946, 317 were found to have been damaged in the war, none had been completely repaired, and in nearly three-fifths of them reconstruction had not even been begun. A year later some 1,638 buildings had been inspected, of which 891 proved to be damaged. About 12 percent of these war-scarred monuments had been completely restored, and work was in progress on an additional 31 percent.²³

Having recorded the condition of a monument on their protected list, and realizing full well that physical preservation was unlikely, MFAA units then set about to preventing additional destruction from occurring. In this role they were obligated to act as both police and educators.

Prevention

The other primary role of the MFAA involved the prevention of damage to historic buildings in the wake of battle. MFAA units were entrusted to “prevent damage by [Allied] troops; affix notices, close buildings or procure guards; check billeting; interest the troops by lectures or otherwise; and investigate charges of wanton damage

²³ From the Office of Military Government for Germany (U. S.), “Restoration,” Weekly Information Bulletin, no. 91 (5 May 1947): 12. The Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section, Economics Division contributed this essay.

brought against the Allied troops and report proved cases.”²⁴ While the documentation of destruction and the stabilization of damaged buildings necessarily took place after the Allies had occupied a land, the goal of preventing damage occurred both during and after combat. As mentioned repeatedly in this thesis, the primary cause of damage to historic buildings was not through ground combat, but rather through two other causes. One is obvious, the other perhaps less so. Aerial bombardment is one. The second was the less overt, almost gradual deterioration of historic buildings—an architectural feature broken here, another vandalized there—that occurred during the period of occupation that followed combat. Souvenir hunters, soldiers with little respect for the enemy’s homeland, men living in a lawless environment and willing to forgo the mores of peacetime—these individuals, numbering in the thousands, could be nearly as destructive as the munitions with which they fought.

So to prevent additional damage, MFAA units attempted to serve as educators. Historic buildings needed to be identified physically, visually.²⁵ To these ends, MFAA soldiers posted notices on protected monuments proclaiming that by order of SHAEF, the integrity of the monument at hand was in no way to be compromised. Signs that read “Off Limits” were used initially, but when it was discovered that these signs actually had the reverse effect—they invited mischief—the wording was

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Note that lists of monuments and maps were classified throughout the course of the war (see the “Restricted” and then “Unclassified” stamps on General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Report: Civil Affairs and Military Government Activities in Connection with Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives (Study Number 36)). This was to prevent the enemy from learning which monuments were designated off-limits during the war, for fear that they would misuse this information and house troops in historic buildings, knowing they might not be attacked (or that an attack would generate negative propaganda). Thus, the goals of the MFAA were somewhat are odds: keep the specific information under wraps, yet ensure that troops are aware of the sensitive nature of the monuments. Note also that the U. S. Office of War Information spread the word about the MFAA duties to the American public. See p. 37- in the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, Report.

changed to “Protected Monument.” Still later, MFAA soldiers cordoned off monuments with white “crime scene” tape and offered no explanatory placard, hoping that troops would interpret this as demarcating a minefield.²⁶ It is not known how successful these efforts were, as prohibitive signs being summarily ignored in the lawlessness of a war-torn city. When possible, such monuments were also physically closed to Allied servicemen and placed under the watch of military police or local civilian officials. Barring entrance to an open building was difficult, however, as construction materials were scarce and were typically allocated to more pressing military uses.

MFAA officers realized that an educated, curious army would be less inclined to intentionally or unintentionally damage historic monuments. They therefore set about to educate their fellow troops through lectures, tours, exhibits, and guidebooks.²⁷ In essence, the MFAA section asked Allied soldiers to be tourists; to undertake the “grand tour” of the continent.²⁸ They suggested that they take in the sites and the scenery of the Old World. And there was no shortage of sites. The sweeping cultural patrimony of Western civilization was laid out before the Allied armies, from the Classical in the south to the Baroque of the north. And many soldiers did indeed visit historic sites. Some of the most memorable photographs from World War II show

²⁶ Janet Flanner, Men and Monuments, 270.

²⁷ For example: “Public relations officers of divisions, regiments and battalions will receive instructions to give talks to the soldiers on the general problem of protecting cultural treasures, particularly those objects in places that are going to be attacked by their units.” From Herbert L. Mathews, “Civilization’s Cultural Treasure Chest,” Journal of the American Institute of Architects, vol. I, no. 6 (June 1944): 283; excerpted from “Allies to Spare Treasures in Europe During Invasion,” New York Times, 5 May 1944.

²⁸ See Sumner Spaulding, “Probable Affects [sic] of the War on American Art,” Michigan Architect and Engineer 1, 9 (December 1919): 154-164. This article describes how troops during World War I had the European continent as a source of learning. Spaulding writes: “The minds of these American youths are impressionable, and must have observed some of the beauty around them... the present opportunity of every American architect, sculptor and painter is unparalleled” (p. 155). Spaulding specifically talks about the work of the Department of Fine Arts at the (Allied Expeditionary Force (A. E. F.) University at Bellevue, near Paris.

war-weary GIs visiting impromptu art museums in caves and bunkers. A famous photograph of the discovery site of a cache of looted art in a mine at Siegen, Germany, shows a sign that reads:

Golden Arrow Art Museum (Siegen Copper Mine). Europe's Art Treasures Restored. Paintings of the Old Masters, Rembrandt, Rubens, Van Dyck, Delacroix, Van Gogh, Holbein, Bones and Crown of Charlemagne. Original Music of Beethoven. Discovered and Guarded by the 8th Infantry Division.²⁹

“Art exhibitions” such as that at the Siegen mine captured the public’s imagination. The unstated message was clear: art endures.

Drawing attention to art and monuments not only served a role within the military, it also helped foster goodwill with the local population. The reopening of historic buildings and mounting of art exhibits signaled a return to normal life.³⁰ Essays on the destruction to Europe’s cities, based on the reports prepared by MFAA troops, were also sent back to the United States, allowing the American public to experience the destruction second-hand; in short, to engage in a sort of “armchair travel.” The ACPS’ Francis Henry Taylor, visiting Britain in 1944, reported that “England had probably suffered the most extensive damage of all by blitz and robot bombing in its historic landmarks, museums and libraries.”³¹ Obviously, Taylor had not been to

²⁹ Janet Flanner, Men and Monuments, 275. The Merkers art and gold cache is also described here, which is probably the largest such cache recovered during the war. Discoveries at Alt Aussee, Bernterode, and Hunzen as described as well.

³⁰ “Professor DeWald told of exhibitions of treasures staged by the Allied Subcommission in Rome and Vienna for the enjoyment of the inhabitants and occupying troops. Thousands of persons came to see the exhibitions. The fact that these art objects were safe and were again on public display after so many years seemed to lift the morale of the populace of the two cities.” From “Inventory of Destruction in Italy,” Journal of the American Institute of Architects, vol. VI, no. 3 (September 1946): 117. See also “Restoration of Monuments,” from Weekly Information Bulletin [OMGUS], no. 65 (28 October 1946): 12.

³¹ Bone, James, “England After the Blitz,” Journal of the American Institute of Architects (excerpted from article in Britain Today, June 1945), vol. IV, no. 4 (October 1945): 151.

Germany yet. He reported (perhaps hyperbolically) that 2,800 churches had been destroyed and 4,000 damaged, Christopher Wren's famous “city churches” of London among them.³² Books such as Henry La Farge's Lost Treasures of Europe accomplished the same thing. La Farge's work depicted the destruction incurred in the course of war using paired “before” and “after” photos to convey the level of damage. The British government's “Losses and Survivals in the War” series, published after the war, chronicled the destruction in seven volumes that focused on Italy (two volumes), Greece, Malta, the British zone of occupation in Austria and in Germany, and a special volume dedicated to Italian archives.³³ Several other works on art and architecture loss in Europe appeared in the years following 1945. They serve, even today, as a reminder of the MFAA's efforts and ultimately how fragile the cultural patrimony is.

MFAA Personnel

About half of the MFAA units that served during the war were recommended for their posts by AD-HG and ACPS. The remainder volunteered, or were assigned to their posts. All were experts in their respective fields, but some more effective than others, as the following assessment would indicate:

In fact the officers selected by the army were technically well qualified, some outstandingly so. But these qualifications were only a part, in

³² See, for example, the following: Marvin C. Ross, “What Happened to Troyes, France,” by Marvin C. Ross, describes how the city survived the war basically intact (Journal of the American Institute of Architects, vol. VI, no. 1 (July 1946,): 40-43; reprinted from *College Art Journal*, November 1945); and Dorothy Newman, “Russian Art Treasures Destroyed by Nazis,” Architect & Engineer, vol. 156, no. 3 (March 1944): 28-30. The latter describes the treatment of architecture at the hands of the Nazis, accompanied by illustrative photographs. The editor of the essay notes a similarly themed exhibit sponsored by the American-Russian Institute of San Francisco and hosted at the de Young Museum that features “many excellent photographs which vividly showed these historic monuments, churches, shrines and other buildings both before and after Nazi destruction.” A companion booklet, “Vandalism,” is also mentioned.

³³ See Woolley, 3-5.

some ways the least part, of the qualifications needed. The officers appointed had to be able, and willing, to understand, and fit happily into the military organization. They needed to know the language of the country in which they were going to operate. They needed character, personality, and if possible a military record that would earn for them the respect and confidence of the commanders they would have to deal with, and that would enable them to live down the inevitable first thoughts that they were something to laugh at.³⁴

A few of the more prominent MFAA members will be discussed below. Their varied backgrounds and demonstrated expertise in their respective fields gives some sense of the breadth of the MFAA effort and the dedication to cultural resources shared by these individuals. Taken with the scholars and curators that made up the three civilian groups, AD-HG, ACLS, and ACPS, one becomes aware of the cohesiveness of the cultural community in their effort to protect historic resources during World War II.

The university community perhaps contributed the most experts to the MFAA program. These were men (*men*—women were not involved in the combat theaters) who, as a matter of course in their professions, already possessed an understanding of historic resources. And within their respective fields there were few who understood the resources better. Briton Lt. Lt.-Col. (later Col.) Geoffrey Webb, Chief adviser to SHAEF, was the endowed Slade professor of fine art at Cambridge University. Ernest T. DeWald, professor of renaissance art and archaeology at Princeton University, was director of the MFAA in the Mediterranean Theater.³⁵ Capt. E. Parker Lesley was an art professor at the University of Minnesota, and Capt. Edwin Rae an art instructor at the University of Illinois.³⁶ The role of German-born Lt. Walter Horn, art professor at the University of California-Berkeley, was to help piece together the wartime

³⁴ Donnison, 225.

³⁵ “Inventory of Destruction in Italy,” *Journal of the American Institute of Architects*, vol. VI, no. 3 (September 1946): 114.

³⁶ Lesley and Sheldon Keck, mentioned below, were both students of Charles Rufus Morey at Princeton.

movement of stolen art. Horn interrogated locals in Europe regarding the whereabouts of errant art caches. Frederick Hartt went on to become a well-known Italian art historian and author of textbooks, including the 1949 work Florentine Art Under Fire. Lt.-Col. Theodore Sizer, who described his experiences in the essay "A Walpolean at War," was a professor of art history at Yale University, and director of the Yale Art Gallery from 1929 to 1947. Capt. Ralph W. Hammett was a professor of architecture at the University of Michigan and a licensed architect. In the preface to his 1976 book Architecture in the United States: A Survey of Architectural Styles Since 1776, he noted that he spent "two years as officer in charge of Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives for all of France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg during World War II."³⁷ Finally, Capt. Walter Huchthausen, an art and architecture professor also at the University of Michigan and colleague of Hammett's, was the only MFAA officer killed in the line of duty. A sniper fatally shot Huchthausen while he was investigating monuments in the industrial Ruhr region of Germany.

Museums, like universities, were well represented among the MFAA staff. MFAA soldiers in the field in Europe included the following, by no means an exhaustive list: Lt. George Stout, a conservator at the Fogg Art Museum, Harvard; Lieutenants Lamont Moore and Craig Smythe of the National Gallery of Art; Lt. Sheldon Keck of the Brooklyn Museum; Lt. Calvin Hathaway of the Cooper Union Museum; Capt. Marvin C. Ross, curator at the Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore (who penned several articles on the MFAA for *Journal of the AIA*); and Lt. James Rorimer, director of the

³⁷ Ralph W. Hammett, Architecture in the United States: A Survey of Architectural Styles Since 1776 (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), vii. Hammett goes on to mention that "(f)or denoting the relative importance of the various architectural examples, an old cliché from Baedeker has been used: the use of asterisks to signify importance," with "*" signifying important works and "***" those that are very important. This, of course, is a convention used not only by Baedeker but also by the civilian agencies that drew up the list of protected monuments during the war.

Metropolitan Museum of Art (following Francis Henry Taylor), and author of the 1950 account about his MFAA experiences, Survival: the Salvage and Protection of Art in War. Even the Art Looting Investigation Unit of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which worked alongside the MFAA, included a handful of museum and university men: Lt. Theodore Rousseau, also of the National Gallery of Art; Lt. James Plaut of the Institute of Modern Art, Boston; and Lt. S. L. Faison, an art professor at Williams College.

Professors of history and museum curators were by far the best represented with the MFAA. Yet practicing architects were not uncommon. Capt. (later Maj.) L. Bancel LaFarge was a New York architect during peacetime. But during the war, LaFarge served as chief of the MFAA Sub-Section, G-5 USFET, and as head of the MFAA in the U. S. Military Government for Germany. Lt. Commander Hamilton Coulter and Capt. Robert Posey were also practicing architects. Pfc. Lincoln Kirstein (one of the few noteworthy MFAA soldiers from the enlisted ranks) elegized his experiences in World War II in Rhymes of a PFC. Several of the poems in this volume describe the activities and men of the MFAA: in addition to “Hymn,” the poems “Das Schloss,” “Arts & Monuments,” and “The Chosen” all include references. Kirstein is perhaps best remembered today as a post-war patron of the arts and co-founder of the New York City Ballet.³⁸ Finally, one of the few artists in the MFAA corps was Capt. Walter Hancock, a Prix de Rome-winning sculptor.

Obstacles, Some Solutions

Perhaps an even more significant problem than the lack of resources and the small number of MFAA troops was the lack of enthusiasm and information on the part of the

³⁸ “Lincoln Kerstein’s Vision,” Horizon, vol. 23, no. 5 (May 1980): 38-43.

Allied armies.³⁹ Despite ACPS' best efforts to disseminate their lists and maps of historic resources to the Army ground and air commands, the MFAA encountered forces who were, more often than not, completely ignorant of the program. Much—if not most—of the information sent to Europe never made it to its intended destination, having been lost en route or misplaced in the endless sea of military paperwork that accompanied the waging of the war. Thus, it seems that the original intentions of the civilian groups to educate the military failed. Only the converted—those who already appreciated the value of cultural resources—had ready access to the reams of information that were drawn up early in the war. And it was their responsibility, in turn, to make this information known to the military planners and decision makers on Europe's battlefields.

The loss of paperwork was not the MFAA's only problem; nor was it the most serious one. The group also encountered military leaders who were downright hostile to the prospect of cultural protection if, in any real or perceived way, if it stood to inhibit the achievement of some military objective. An MFAA officer's description of a scene played out in Italy illustrates this attitude. When the MFAA officer—an advisor, invested with little authority—protested an Army engineer's plans to demolish a damaged historic church in order to use its materials as paving stone, the engineer responded “You idiot! Who gives a damn about medieval walls.”⁴⁰ One imagines that this sort of response was commonplace among the troops. Indeed, another MFAA officer wrote that he had to disabuse an engineering company of the very same thing—although in his case, it was something that was given the stamp of approval in

³⁹ An entire section of The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, Civil Affairs and Military Government Activities in Connection with Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives is devoted to the obstacles faced by MFAA soldiers.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Haines, “Who Gives a Damn About Medieval Walls,” 102.

an Army field manual. This officer noted that “[e]ven the engineers are not always particular as to the source of their building materials, and one emergency field manual used in the present War actually suggested a nearby ruin of capital archaeological importance, as a good place to get paving blocks for roads.”⁴¹

It was because of this lack of cooperation between MFAA and regular units that General Eisenhower, the Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Headquarters, issued a directive (allegedly penned by Sir Leonard Woolley) to all his commanders on December 29, 1943. [Appendix 3] This directive was issued in anticipation of the Husky operation, and was later reissued, nearly verbatim, before the Allied landings at Normandy. In it, he admonished commanders about the haphazard use of “military necessity” as a justification for allowing damage to historic monuments. Eisenhower wrote:

Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity... But the phrase ‘military necessity’ is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even personal convenience. I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.

Eisenhower went on to state (in a manner not unlike Napoleon before him) that slack and indifferent behavior would not be tolerated within the Allied command.⁴² Only such a preemptive directive such as this—one directed at “every officer and soldier, down to the bombardier who releases his destructive load, the artilleryman who pulls the lanyard on his gun and the dogface who is going to charge into a town or

⁴¹ Morey, 103.

⁴² In his Egyptian campaign, Napoleon issued the following order of the day to the troops: “Have for the mosques and the ceremonies prescribed by the Koran the same tolerance that you showed for convents and synagogues, for the religion of Moses and of Jesus Christ.” Lloyd, 58-59.

village”⁴³—could help prevent wholesale destruction in Italy, a country famous for its history and one that an Army commander likened to a giant museum: combat in Italy, he colorfully said, was like fighting in a “goddam art museum.”⁴⁴ The same could be said for many of the other countries in Europe where Allied troops would venture.

General Order No. 69 was issued alongside Eisenhower’s 1943 directive. This order spelled out, in very general terms, the Allied Commander in Chief’s expectations of his troops insofar as the treatment of art and monuments was concerned. The order included four terse bullets that vested commanders with the responsibility of ensuring that monuments were respected by their troops:

- a. No building listed in the sections “Works of Art” in the “Zone Hand-Books” of Italy was to be used for military purposes without the explicit permission of the Allied Commander-in-Chief or of the Commander-in-Chief, 15 Army Group, in each individual case.
- b. Commanders were authorized to close and put “Off Limits” and of the buildings listed in the AMG “Zone Hand-Book.” Notices were to be affixed and guards provided if necessary.
- c. Allied Military Government Officers were prepared to furnish commanders with a list of historic buildings which might be used for military purposes when deemed necessary.
- d. The prevention of looting, wanton destruction and sacrilege of buildings was a command responsibility.⁴⁵

This order, like the companion directive, was issued prior to the invasion of Italy. And as such, not only is that specific country referenced, but so too is a type of cultural resource for which Italy is known: the ecclesiastical building. Specific mention is made that “sacrilege” of buildings—churches, one infers—would not be

⁴³ Herbert L. Mathews, paraphrasing Eisenhower’s directive of 29 December 1943, from “Civilization’s Cultural Treasure Chest,” Journal of the American Institute of Architects, (excerpted from “Allies to Spare Treasures in Europe During Invasion,” New York Times, 5 May 1944), 279.

⁴⁴ General Clark, quoted in Sizer, 17.

⁴⁵ Quoted in The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 6.

tolerated. Allied commanders understood well that destroyed Catholic churches would be interpreted as an attack on Catholicism itself. This, of course, would provide rich fodder for Axis propagandists and anti-war proponents in the United States and other Allied nations.

Also mentioned in the order is the recognition that certain types of historic buildings, although on the protected lists, could be used by military units under certain circumstances. This was a consideration less in Mediterranean Italy than it was in northern Europe. During the harsh winter of 1944, troops in France and the Benelux countries billeted in vacated châteaux since few other accommodations were readily available. It was under these circumstances that MFAA officers were forced to make crucial decisions of whether to leave billeted troops in the historic house and run the risk of vandalism, or to require that the troops find accommodations elsewhere. The latter was tremendously unpopular, as can be imagined, so MFAA officers trod lightly and treated each incident on a case-by-case basis.⁴⁶ Reports of both protection as well as loss abound.

The challenge faced by MFAA officers grew as Allied troops moved beyond Italy, France, and the Benelux, and into Germany. As the homeland to their enemy, troops showed even less discretion than they had earlier in preventing damage to historic buildings. Paraphrasing a MFAA report submitted in June 1945, one scholar writes that the military “bore little or no respect for German works of art. Monuments were smashed, houses looted, buildings bulldozed, and paintings and statues destroyed. MFAA officers who followed the Allies into Germany became obituary writers.”⁴⁷

⁴⁶ There is ample literature on the topic of looting and damage caused by billeting. See, for example, Haines, “Who Gives a Damn About Medieval Walls,” 97-106.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Janet Flanner's assessment was similar: "The M.F.A. & A. men who followed the Allies into Aachen and the Rhineland became simply obituary writers, since dead art lay in every direction: 'Cologne, circa 80 per cent of monuments and churches destroyed, including St. Maria in Capitol, famous Romanesque landmark...'"⁴⁸

To once again quote Janet Flanner, the MFAA officers "took notes on the gigantic, yawning destruction of the architectural face of war-struck Europe—of those now lost features of beauty, art and picturesqueness, of housed history of charm, whose disappearance made the profile of the Continent sectionally unrecognizable and necessitated the partial rewriting of all the Baedekers."⁴⁹ And moreover, the "reams of notes [they compiled] could have served the guidebook editors all too well" (*ibid.*). While the authors of the Baedeker series never utilized the MFAA note in updating their guides, the rewritten faces of European cities are indeed included in the revised editions. The circa 1983 edition of Baedeker's Germany is a case in point. Many of the descriptions of cities in this travel book include language that alludes to their fate during World War II. In Würzburg, for example, the late Gothic St. Mary's Chapel is described as being "built 1377-1479, destroyed by fire 1945, restored 1945-61."⁵⁰ The historical overview of Mainz includes the single sentence, "During the Second World War four-fifths of the old town was destroyed."⁵¹ The list of buildings included in the past tense is noteworthy. The entry for Mannheim, where "51% of the town and 95% of the port was destroyed," includes a regretful mention of the 1779 National Theater, "famous as the scene of the first performances of Schiller's plays 'Die Räuber,'

⁴⁸ Janet Flanner, Men and Monuments, 273. Flanner provides additional descriptions of damaged churches and other historic buildings (e.g. Karl Marx's birthplace in Trier, which was completely destroyed) in Xanten, Münster, the Ruhr, etc.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁵⁰ Baedeker's Germany, 257.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 182.

‘Fiesco,’ and ‘Kabale und Liebe’ in 1782 and 1784, stood [north] of the Palace; it was destroyed during the war.”⁵² Exceptional are such towns as Heidelberg, about which the Baedeker guide reads “In the Second World War Heidelberg remained untouched by bombing.” The description of Frankfurt, the subject of the case study that makes up the following chapter, is akin to Würzburg, Mannheim, Mainz, and most of Germany’s larger cities, and is therefore typical. It simply reads: “The Second World War caused severe destruction in Frankfurt, particularly in the crowded old town.”

Conclusion

The MFAA soldiers that operated in Europe during World War II came from a variety of backgrounds, and were nearly uniformly well trained in their respective areas of expertise. While a lack of support certainly inhibited their ability to protect and preserve cultural resources, a more damning problem was the inability to prevent wholesale damage to begin with. Of course, bombers running a strategic bombing campaign against Germany and occupied Europe were responsible for much of the destruction. This new technology created an amorphous, shifting “front line” that MFAA troops never had an opportunity to identify, let alone catch up with. Had they been able to do so—had they been able to educate the air force’s target acquisition planners and the bombardiers on bombing runs—then perhaps fewer monuments would have been encountered by ground troops in one sorry state or another. But even had education been possible, accurate bombing was not, and the Allied armies had long since committed themselves to near-indiscriminate area bombing. Locating MFAA troops with combat troops would have prevented some damage, but again: most of the damage to historic buildings occurred long before Allied group troops reached them. Even though MFAA soldiers begrudged their placement with support

⁵² Ibid, 185.

troops to the rear of the front lines, their placement there inadvertently prevented more post-combat damage than would otherwise have been possible.

CHAPTER SEVEN: A CASE STUDY: FRANKFURT OF MAIN

In Germany, “inventor of the blitz, 90 percent of the great historical monuments were struck [cf. 45% for the occupied countries] and 60 percent were blitzed into nothingness, a kind of boomerang destiny the Nazis had not thought of, with all their planning.”

Janet Flanner¹

Introduction

Although Janet Flanner’s estimate of the percentage of monuments damaged should be regarded as somewhat inflated, the point is nevertheless well taken. While the levels of destruction in Europe were high, in Germany—the source of European hostilities—they were many times higher. Indeed, the destruction caused to German cities was more widespread, and more complete, than that incurred by the cities of Italy or any of the Axis occupied countries of Europe. One need not look far for evidence to support this assertion. In fact, one of the most telling pieces of evidence comes not from the anecdotal evidence in the reports by MFAA units, but rather the lack of any such anecdotes. The MFAA continually worked to prevent the demolition of damaged historic buildings in Italy and the Benelux that were labeled by Army engineers as “dangerous structures.” Accounts of these activities can be found in the written record of their work. Yet few accounts of this kind are available for Germany.² Although the MFAA’s priorities had changed by the time they occupied Germany soil (repatriation of art was their chief goal at the war’s close), one would logically expect written accounts of this type, if not nearly as many as before. The record, while certainly not silent, is noticeably more subdued. The explanation is that there was more damage—and more cases of severe damage—in Germany, and the MFAA could do less to save the historic buildings of this country.

¹ Flanner, Monuments and Men, 272)

² See Woolley, 48 for a reference to the Benelux.

With few exceptions, most of Germany's larger urban areas were bombed repeatedly during the course of the war. Centers of industry and population were veritable lightning rods for Allied bombs. One city that may fairly be described as typical in the treatment it received from Allied bombers is Frankfurt am Main. Straddling the Main River in what is now the state of Hessen, Frankfurt was one of central Germany's primary financial, cultural, and commercial centers, and a transportation crossroads—not only for rail and waterborne traffic, but also for the aircraft and automobiles that were increasingly coursing through Europe. It was a thriving city with a pre-war population of around 600,000 residents. The city and its suburbs were home to industries key to Germany's war effort: chemical and automobile manufacturing plants, as well as several other heavy industries. At the geographical and historical center of Frankfurt stood one of Germany's—indeed, one of Europe's—finest examples of an *Altstadt* [Figures 7-1 and 7-2]. Frankfurt's *Altstadt* was an intact, cohesive collection of commercial, religious, civic, and residential buildings, the earliest of which dated back to the Middle Ages. This picturesque district was the heart of the city. It was both a cultural attraction and a functioning neighborhood during peacetime, but quickly became a hapless target for Allied bombers during the war.

In this, the final full chapter of the thesis, I analyze the city of Frankfurt as a case study, my goal to assess the efficacy of the ACPS' and MFAA's work. The history of the city is discussed very briefly as a way of explaining the urban fabric as it existed in 1939. An examination of the cultural resources that was present in Frankfurt before World War II will also be provided. My discussion will then move on to what was still standing in 1945, when the air raids ceased and Frankfurters could begin to assess



FIGURE 7-1: PRE-WAR IMAGE OF THE FRANKFURT ALTSTADT, WITH THE CATHEDRAL AT LEFT.




FIGURE 7-2: CIRCA 1929 IMAGE OF THE FRANKFURT ALTSTADT, WITH THE RÖMER SQUARE IN THE CENTER FOREGROUND.

the damage to what was once a picturesque city. It should be clear by this point in the thesis that the Allied air campaign against Germany made little effort to single out cultural resources and avoid inflicting damage to them. While some of Frankfurt's monuments did survive repeated bombings, many others were either partially damaged, or completely reduced to so much rubble. Simple shaded maps that show the damage to buildings as a percentage of the total building stock (in each city district) convey this reality rather unequivocally[Figure 7-3].

Frankfurt makes for an appropriate case study for a numbers of reasons. More than anything else, it is relatively typical. The circumstances of this city can be extrapolated to any number of others with a fair degree of confidence. Yet at the same time, Frankfurt, as a case study, is also unique. Unlike Germany's first tier of cities—the capital Berlin and major population centers of Hamburg in the north and Munich in the south—Frankfurt was the subject of a post-war written and photographic survey of cultural monuments. The Frankfurt survey was the only such survey undertaken by the Americans. (The British government, in contrast, published a series of short books that describe the losses to cultural heritage in a number of countries. The American MFAA units, although charged with substantiating damage to historic buildings, did not undertake similar studies for a reason already mentioned: cameras and film were in short supply, and photo-documentation not a priority.³) This rich archival resource is held in the collections of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and has never before been systematically examined. The survey's photographs alone provide an invaluable visual record of the city as it stood in 1945. Like other scenes from

³ "The only adverse criticism made by Colonel Newton was on the relative failure of the Sub-Commission to compile an adequate photographic record of war damage, this being due to no fault of their own but to the fact that cameras and photographic material alike were in short supply." Woolley, 25.



The city center and *Altstadt* appear at the center of the map, north-northeast of the river label "Main."

FIGURE 7-3: MAP SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF DAMAGE TO STRUCTURES, 1945: THE LIGHTER THE COLOR, THE MORE DAMAGE.

bygone calamities, they seem very dramatic to contemporary eyes, as the Frankfurt of today reveals little of what it once was a half-century prior.

Frankfurt: An Overview of Its History and Urban Design

Large swathes of Frankfurt were laid to waste during World War II because of decisions made centuries before Hitler hatched his nefarious plans. These decisions were military in origin, but manifested themselves in architecture—in simple bricks and mortar. Wars of the past had necessitated the need for physically defensible space. In Europe, the center of civic and commercial life—the city—assumed this role as a protected place. In order to be defensible, a city needed to be reasonably compact and small enough in terms of ground area that it could be enclosed by walls. Frankfurt was just such a city. Over the course of several hundred years, a series of concentric walls were erected to create a defended area that kept growing with the population. Within this proscribed area, buildable space was at a premium. It was therefore a dense place, with little in the way of public space or open space between buildings. This tight-knit compactness would ultimately be the city's undoing. Ironically, what once served to protect the local population later ensured its destruction en masse during World War II. Frankfurt's *Altstadt* was targeted by Allied planners and destroyed for that very reason—because it was tight-knit. Subsequent generations of architecture and urban design were less dense. Built by citizens less directly dependent on one another and therefore more spread out, these sections of the city fared better during the war.

Germany's cities, like most others in Europe, show a pronounced variation in building density that correlates with age. The oldest sections of an urban area were the most centrally located and the most densely built up. The original settlement, referred to in

Germany as the *Altstadt* by later generations, was located at the most favorable location for food procurement and defense—a spot typically situated at the banks of a river or other natural water feature. The city radiated out from this initial point of settlement as the population grew. Changes in the way that society operated affected this growth. Fundamental shifts in the way society was organized shaped the way the city looked. The shift in the economy from subsistence- to market-based agriculture, technological advances in infrastructure and building construction, and the increased ability of citizens to travel farther distances in less time—these things all impacted the built form of the city. The result was peripheral city districts and suburbs that looked quite unlike the original settlement. These new places were often endowed with a higher level of physical order that suggested a population that lived there by choice, and not out of necessity; a population of citizens who were less dependent on one another for protection and the provision of goods than their predecessors had been. While the rest of the city became less dense, and the street patterns and building footprints more regular, the *Altstadt* remained a compact, winding patchwork of mediaeval buildings that marked the nucleus of the urban area. It also increasingly became the symbolic birthplace of the city, the fount from which greater metropolitan region had issued. For Frankfurters, their particular *Altstadt* was the birthplace of the sausage named after the city's residents, the ancestral home of the Rothschild banking family, and the governmental, religious, and commercial center for the city itself, its hinterlands, and the greater Rhein-Main area.

The area that would eventually come to be known as Frankfurt am Main shows signs of human settlement dating back to around 2,000 B.C.⁴ Archaeological evidence is all that remains of these prehistoric settlers—this and the fact that they are the earliest

⁴ Kalusche and Setzepfandt, p. 2.

known participants in a settlement process that has continued, virtually uninterrupted, through to the present day. Subsequent generations of early Europeans also found this fordable spot on the river Main hospitable. The Roman army arrived here in the first century A. D. and stayed through the reigns of several Caesars. From garrisons in and around present-day Frankfurt they patrolled the *Limes* border wall, the remains of which still wends its ways through the forests of the nearby Taunus Mountains. Waves of Germanic tribes displaced the Romans, among them the Allemani—the Franks—who lent their name to the city in a somewhat altered, yet still recognizable, form: Franconefurt.⁵ Frankfurt was first referred to as a proper “city” in writings of 1219. By the Middle Ages, this centrally located settlement had become known as a crossroads in Europe and a host to great markets and trade fairs—qualities for which the city is still recognized today. Most of Frankfurt’s oldest buildings that were extant at the outset of World War II dated from this important period of growth. The greatest concentration of these mediaeval structures could be found in the *Altstadt*.

Three different fortification systems encircled Frankfurt’s urban development on three sides (the south side bounded by a natural obstacle, the Main river). The innermost system was the original 12th Century moat and wall network.⁶ A second set of walls was erected two hundred years later, and enclosed an urban area that was predictably much larger.⁷ In 1628, in response to the Thirty Years War, the outer wall system was enlarged and fortified with the addition of star-shaped bastions. Frankfurt’s fortifications defined the extent of the area’s growth until around 1700, when the population spilled out into the surrounded farmlands and the distinction between the

⁵ For one of the earliest literary mentions of the place name, see “Franconefurt,” written by Gunther Ligurinus in 1187, included in Hans-Ulrich Korenke, ed., Frankfurt Reisebeschreibungen in Alten und Neuen (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1990), 17.

⁶ Kalusche and Setzepfandt, p. 2.

⁷ Ibid.

city and nearby suburbs became blurred.⁸ Though the walls were gradually dismantled, their zigzag limns were allowed to remain a part of the city's street plan.

Within this original *Altstadt* neighborhood, buildings sat in cramped, seemingly random rows, and streets led narrow and circuitous paths whose origins would have been largely forgotten had they not become associated with street names.⁹ In the *Altstadter* of Germany's more populous cities, Frankfurt included, the buildings themselves were typically between three and five stories high with an average of 1,500 square feet of useable space.¹⁰ These mediaeval buildings were constructed almost entirely of wood. The framing systems were comprised of wood beams, typically oak, with wooden floors, roofs, and even decorative embellishments in carved wood. Walls were typically filled with brick or a replaceable material like plaster. The ground floors of some of these buildings—and all of them, following a 1719 law—were constructed of stone, with top floors cantilevering out to provide more useable space in the upper stories.¹¹ Frankfurt's wealthier residents could afford to erect buildings exclusively of stone, as could local institutions. Red sandstone made up many of Frankfurt's civic and religious landmarks, lending the city a rather unique appearance. Yet the *Altstadt*'s amalgam of houses and stores—utilitarian buildings that were not erected to be landmarks—were constructed of the more plebian material of wood. Similar houses and commercial buildings could be found in other older parts of the city like Sachsenhausen, but the *Altstadt* housed the largest concentration.¹²

⁸ Ibid., p. 13.

⁹ M. de Winter and S. Musterd, Towards Undivided Cities in Western Europe. (Delft: Delft University Press, 1998), 27.

¹⁰ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 8.

¹¹ Kalusche and Setzepfandt, 13.

¹² “The average home of medieval times was a wooden frame building. Most were destroyed during World War II.” Ibid., 7.

Near the center of the *Altstadt*, and rising paternalistically above the mediaeval residences and shops (ironically, many of them operated by Jews), stood Frankfurt's St. Batholomäus *Dom*, the imperial cathedral. Begun around 1250, the red sandstone edifice grew in fits over the next 700 years.¹³ Its tower alone rose over the course of a hundred-year stretch between 1415 and 1514.¹⁴ The cathedral's presence punctuated the location of the *Altstadt* on the city's skyline. To the west of the cathedral, and visually connected to it by an unpredictably straight street, was another of Frankfurt's landmarks—one characterized not by the presence of a building, but by the absence thereof: the *Römerberg* market square. This irregularly shaped outdoor "room" was bounded on the north and east by the *Altstadt*, on the south by the early-13th Century Alte Nicolaikirche, and on the west, by the *Römer* itself: a string of 14th Century patrician row houses that were purchased by the City of Frankfurt to house the municipal seat of government. Other landmarks were located on the *Römerberg*'s periphery, among them the *Saalhof* fortress and the mediaeval residence Haus Wertheim. Thus, it can be seen that many of Frankfurt's most treasured buildings were arrayed around this important marketplace, itself located at the edge of the equally important Mediaeval *Altstadt*.

Subsequent generations of Frankfurters constructed a more regular city around the irregular *Altstadt*. As populations grew, so too did architectural and engineering proficiency and the concomitant belief that cities should be more orderly places. Buildings in the 18th century thus grew upward and cities spread out. Useable space in the average building rose to a maximum of about 3,000 square feet.¹⁵ Quality of construction improved, and so too did a building's ability to withstand fire. Buildings

¹³ Heinz Schomann et al, Denkmaltopographie (Frankfurt am Main: Societäts-Verlag, 1994), 36.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 8.

from this age were still erected as row houses. But now, safety mechanisms were included in many of the designs:

Most [buildings]...had masonry walls and tile or slate roofs on wooden battens. Heavy wooden “plugged” floors were characteristic. These floors had a layer of cinders or other inert matter between the ceiling and the floor finish above. Each building unit was separated from the adjacent buildings by a common wall which was sometimes parapeted and sometimes built just to the underside of the roof.¹⁶

Streets in the 18th century city were not only more regular than those of the *Altstadt*, they were wider. Undeveloped private spaces began to appear too. Backyards and common green spaces accompanied the buildings of wealthier citizens. Although built for reasons other than fire prevention, these architectural and planning designs would later help the newer sections of German cities withstand the onslaught of incendiary and high-explosive during World War II. Open space simply inhibited the passage of fire from building to building.

The architecture and urban design of the 19th and 20th centuries were more resistant to fire than ever. Streets in German cities were even wider and more regular, and fewer row houses were erected. Before the automobile and public mass transit allowed citizens to distance themselves from each other and for cities to spread out, row houses had been the norm, and free-standing buildings the exception to the rule. This began to change in the early 20th century. The influence of American style suburbs and a nostalgia for agrarian architectural forms gave rise to free-standing, single-family “farm” houses in German cities. Construction materials varied now too, from timber to masonry to stucco. But as in earlier buildings, the use of wood structural members, roofs, and floors continued to be common.¹⁷ However, larger commercial and office

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

buildings used modern steel framing systems. The famous housing estates of interwar Frankfurt—architect Ernst May’s numerous *Siedlungen*—were high-density residential blocks constructed in a modernist vocabulary and using such modern construction materials as steel and unadorned plaster.¹⁸ A brief return to recherché agrarian houses and Albert Speer’s monolithic Classicist designs for the new Reich rounded out Germany’s architectural oeuvre as that country entered the war.

The various types of architecture and urban design in German cities made for a building density at the center (the ratio of roof to ground area) of about 40; that is, 40 percent of the surface of the average city was occupied by some man-made construction.¹⁹ In a district like the Frankfurt *Altstadt*, this percentage was much higher.

Historic Sites in Frankfurt

A list and accompanying map of Frankfurt show the nature and distribution of cultural resources in this city. They are typical of lists and maps prepared by American Council of Learned Societies and American Defense-Harvard Group or the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage.²⁰ [Appendix 4] The Frankfurt list included fifty-two individual resources within the city and its nearby suburbs. As would be expected, most of the resources are near the city’s historic core, and include houses, churches, museums, and other civic buildings. One entire neighborhood is

¹⁸ Much has been written on this topic. For a recent example, see the chapter entitled “The New Frankfurt and Ernst May, 1925-1930,” in Philippe Panerai et al, *Urban Forms: The Death and Life of the Urban Block*. (Oxford: Architectural Press, 2004), 90-113.

¹⁹ Civil Defense Liaison Office, 8. This report does not specify what is meant by the city center, but it is presumed to mean both the *Altstadt* and some surrounding built-up areas. Aerial photographs of the *Altstadt* section of many German cities suggest a much higher roof to ground ratio.

²⁰ In all likelihood, AD-HG volunteer Wilhelm Rheinhold Walter Koehler drew up the list of cultural resources for Germany. Given the scope of this undertaking, it is assumed that other staff from AD-HG and ACLS assisted him. Koehler wrote the brief history of German cultural resources for the ACPS.

included in the list as well. This is Frankfurt's *Altstadt*, and specifically its "characteristic mediaeval streets and houses from 14th-18th centuries." The drafters of the listed recognized the significance of the *Altstadt* as an architectural set piece. But they also earmarked for protection a handful of specific buildings and streets that captured the unique architectural quality of this district.

For the purposes of this thesis, just under half of the resources in Frankfurt that were identified as worthy of preservation are excluded from this discussion. Twenty of the "monuments, fine arts, and archives" included in the list fall squarely within the latter two categories, and are not relevant to the discussion of architectural monuments. In these cases, the significance of the cultural resource is tied to the contents of a building—not to the building itself, not to the architecture.

Of the remaining thirty-three resources on the lists prepared by AD-HG and ACLS, twelve are what can rightly be described as "monuments." They are works of architecture; buildings that are significant for their design or for their association with some important historical event or personage. This list includes the following (stars associated with a few of the listings below indicate superior significance, as determined by AD-HG and ACLS, with three stars signifying the greatest importance):

- Opern-Haus (opera), 1877
- Eschenheimer Turm (fortification tower), 1425
- Französisch-Reformierte-Kirche, ca. 1790, Classicistic
- Hauptwache (main guard house, now café), ca. 1730
- ***Characteristic mediaeval streets and houses from the 14th-18th centuries [the *Altstadt*—this will be addressed separately below]
- Liebfrauen-Kirche, 14th-15th centuries; South portal, ca. 1415
- Deutsch-Reformierte Kirche, ca. 1790, Classicistic
- Pauls-Kirche, 1787-1833, Classicistic

- Römer (City Hall), 1405, with 16th-17th century additions; on main floor, “Kaisersaal”; “Wahlstube” (election chamber), 18th century
- St. Nicolai-Kirche, 12th-15th centuries; tombstone of Siegfried zum Paradies, 1386
- Saalhof (group of buildings), 12th-18th centuries; probably occupies the site of an imperial palace; 12th-13th century Chapel, built to house the insignia of the Holy Roman Empire
- Wohnsiedlungen modern housing development, by Ernst May, 1926-30²¹

The significance of sixteen more of the resources in the Frankfurt list can fairly be assigned to some combination of categories in which architecture is one of the components. These are buildings or outdoor sculpture (including tombstones) deemed significant for their design, but that also happen to house an important art or archival collection, or significant interior design. This list includes the following:

- Hessendenkmal (monument), 1792, early Classicistic
- Haus der Familie von Bethmann with adjoining park; bourgeois country house and residence, 18th and early 19th centuries; in the adjoining Museum, painting, 1814
- *Städtisches Völkermuseum (Ethnographical Museum), in the former Palais Thurn und Taxis, 1732-41; ethnographical collection predominantly from the region of Oceania
- St. Katherinen-Kirche, 1678-82; 14th-18th century tomb monuments
- Antonius-Kirche, 19th century; contains the **Treasury of the Liebfrauenkirche with 15th-18th century art
- *Museum Heimischer Vor- und Frühgeschichte (Museum of Pre- and Early History), in the former Dominican Monastery; finds excavated in the area of Greater Frankfurt from Neolithic through Bronze Age, Roman period ([in suburb of] Heddernheim) up to the Francovian period
- Dominikaner-Kirche, 13th-15th centuries; collection of casts of mediaeval and Renaissance sculpture belonging to the University
- Alter Jüdischer Friedhof (old Jewish graveyard); tombstones from the 13th century
- Freies Deutsches Hochstift and Frankfurter Goethe Museum, in **Goethe Haus, 1755; birthplace of Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749) with collections and furniture related to his life; in an adjoining building, ***library of Goethe’s works and literature concerning his work; [manuscripts] and works of art of time of Goethe

²¹ “Frankfurt am Main, Germany (Hessen-Nassau, Prussia)” list. The names of the resources, their brief descriptions, and dates are taken directly from this list.

- *Haus “zur Goldenen Waage,” Renaissance, 1624 (belongs to the Museum of the City of Frankfurt); 17th-18th century interiors and furnishings
- **Dom St. Bartholomäus, 13th-15th centuries; restored 19th century; south of choir, “Wahl Kapelle”; sculpture, alters, tombstones, 14th-18th centuries; Dormition Altar, stone, 1434; in Sacristy, Treasury with pectoral, 1480, and other 15th-20th century goldsmith works
- Crucifixion, 1509, by Hans Backofen; stone group
- **Stadtgeschichtliches Museum, formerly Historisches Museum (Museum of the City of Frankfurt), in the former Leinwandhaus (Draper’s Hall), end of 14th century, enlarged 1902; monuments and objects pertaining to the history and culture of the City of Frankfurt, 9th to 20th centuries; **Dürer’s Heller altarpiece; 13th century stained glass windows
- Carmeliter-Kirche und Kloster (Carmelite Church and Monastery), 15th-16th centuries; *in cloisters and the refectory, murals by Jörg Ratgeb, 1517-19.
- *St. Leonhard-Kirche, 13th-16th centuries; 13th century portal sculpture; Gothic altars, 15th century stained glass; Holbein the Elder’s “Last Supper” (part of the Dominican altar, 1501); treasury with 15th century chalice
- Deutschordens-Kirche und Deutschordenshaus (Church and Lodge of the Teutonic Order), 14th-18th centuries; sculpture; on exterior of the parish house, early 15th century statue of Madonna²²

The remaining seven resources on the list cannot easily be shoehorned into another category. These are buildings that are clearly monumental in stature. They are landmarks of architecture and design, and significant structures on the cognitive map of the city. Yet in the brief descriptions that accompany each entry in the AD-HG and ACLS list, mention is made to the moveable art and archives housed within the building and not to the architecture itself. Here, the contents of the buildings overshadow the buildings themselves, even though the architecture is also clearly important. As the number of two- and three-star ratings in this group would suggest, these are some of Frankfurt’s most significant cultural collections:

- **Senckenbergische Bibliothek; ca. 290,000 vols.; outstanding library on natural history, founded in 1763; connected with the Museum of Natural History and University
- **Natur-Museum Senckenberg (Museum of Natural History); collection of natural history, especially of animal fossils

²² Ibid.

- **Stadtbibliothek (also Universitätsbibliothek), established 1668; 630,000 volumes; *mediaeval [manuscripts]; *ivories; outstanding collection of Hebrew [manuscripts] and books; World War I literature; Schopenhauer collection
- ***Städelisches Kunstinstitut (Städel Art Institute); outstanding collection of paintings of all periods; drawings and prints with unique pieces; art library
- ***Städtische Skulpturen Sammlung im Liebighaus; sculpture from antiquity to Baroque; Athena by Myron; alabaster altar, ca. 1430; head of Bärbel von Ottoheim by Nicolaus von Leyden²³

Finally, the list of Frankfurt's cultural resources included what we might now describe as a historic district. The “[c]haracteristic mediaeval street and houses” mentioned in the list was, of course, the Frankfurt *Altstadt* that has been referred to so often in the course of this thesis. Specifically, the area identified was the heart of the original settlement. This included the *Altstadt* itself, as well as areas to the immediate north and west.²⁴ The AD-HG/ACLS list assigns three stars to the district—the only three-star architectural resource in Frankfurt, and a superlative assessment that was not even afforded the Gothic cathedral that sits at the *Altstadt*'s center (which received only two stars). The list goes on to note that the “most important section” of the *Altstadt* is the Römerberg, and that other two sections—the Alter Markt and Domplatz—were important, but evidently considered to be less so. Within this district could be found the following individual buildings, which the drafters of the list acknowledge as being only a sampling:

- Braunfels, 1350 and 1695
- Markt 44 (Steinernes Haus), 1464
- Zum Großen und Kleinen Engel, 1562
- Salzhaus, ca. 1600
- Haus Lichtenstein, 1725
- Fahrgaße 17 (Haus Fürsteneck), ca. 1440

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The boundaries of the *Altstadt* were informal. Several of the buildings treated individually in the AD-HG and ACLS list actually fall in what could logically be called the *Altstadt*. Among these are the cathedral, St. Nicolai-Kirche, and even the Römer buildings themselves, which make up the west “wall” of the Römerplatz and are chronologically tied to the buildings of the *Altstadt*.

- Hinter-dem-Lämmchen-Gaße (Mohrenkopf, Gothic)
- Rotkreuzgaße (Großer Speicher), 1587
- Limpurgergaße (Haus Silberberg), 1595
- Große Gallusgaße (Brüsseler Hof), 1717
- Große Gallusgaße (Haus Behaghel), 1746
- Predigerstraße (Arnsburger Hof), 1717
- Töngesgaße (Engeltaler Hof), 1720

If plotted on a map of the city, we see that most of the thirty-three significant architectural resources were concentrated around the *Altstadt*. A handful was located in the city's outlying districts.

Sites: What Was (and Was Not) Included

The monuments list produced by ACLS and AD-HG for Frankfurt is typical of those for cities across Europe. The usual architectural suspects were included: churches and other ecclesiastical buildings like convents and monasteries; prominent civic buildings; chateaux; a variety of architectural exemplars of a particular style or era; buildings associated with the lives of eminent men; ruins of past empires; and so on. This was Europe's built patrimony—the buildings that feature prominently in guidebooks and textbooks, the destruction of which would foster negative perceptions of the Allies and the means by which they were waging their war.²⁵ The list for Frankfurt and for German cities in general is somewhat less extensive and diverse than those of other countries. This is attributable to Germany's relatively short history as a nation-state and its commensurately limited cultural patrimony, as compared with Italy or France.²⁶ Iron age forts and Roman ruins mark some of the earliest entries in the

²⁵ Avoiding the destruction of religious buildings was a primary concern for the Allies, and in particular the Americans. President Roosevelt even went so far as to publically reassure the Pope that American bombers would not target the Vatican. See Nicholas, *The Rape of Europe*, 235.

²⁶ For example, see American Defense-Harvard Group, Committee of the Protection of Monuments. *List of Monuments, South Italy*. [No additional publishing information available.]

lists. The buildings included in all the lists tended to have been built before 1900. How were these lists compiled?

The German lists, Frankfurt included, derive almost verbatim from the Handbuch der Deutschen Kunstdenkmaler, by author Georg Dehio. Dehio was a prominent German art historian whose series of popular, accessible guidebooks to German art and architecture were reprinted every few years. New editions of Dehio were released through the late 1930s, and then resumed after the war. Dehio wrote what were essentially cultural Baedekers. Arranged by region (Frankfurt fell into Volume IV, “Südwestdeutschland”), they were a primary source of information used by ACLS and AD-HG to develop the list of cultural resources in Germany. Moreover, Wilhelm Rheinhold Walter Koehler, the chief of the Germany section in AD-HG, specifically recommended that MFAA troops use them in the field as supplements to their official lists. The lists supplied by ACLS and AD-HG included more resources than the Dehio guidebooks, but the descriptions in them were scant by comparison.²⁷ In a sense, the ACLS and AD-HG regarded them as a window onto the German cultural mindset: for a resource to be included in Dehio meant that it was important to the German population. To avoid damaging these buildings was to avoid incurring accusations of cultural barbarism.

To be sure, the Frankfurt list can be described as fairly typical. A comparison with lists prepared for other cities in Germany reveals similar types of buildings, and similar numbers per city. Yet there is one notable property included in the list that stands out primarily for its age. This is the “Wohnsiedlungen modern housing

²⁷ Many of the properties that appear in the ACLS and AD-HG list are not present in Dehio. Conversely, only a handful of resources in Dehio—a few urban houses, for example, and outlying churches—fail to appear in the other.

development,” built between 1926-30 by city architect Ernst May. This modernist apartment complex is one of Frankfurt’s primary claims to architectural fame, and possibly one of Germany’s chief contributions to the development of 20th century architecture. The inclusion of this unspecified housing estate (there are several estates designed by May in Frankfurt²⁸) is remarkable in that at the time AD-HG and ACLS were drawing their list up, this complex was not even two decades old. Yet the significance of these estates was apparent to scholars even in the early 1940s, and the need to protect them for future generations was well understood. Other pre- and interwar architectural masterpieces—Hans Poelzig’s I. G. Farben office block in Frankfurt, Peter Behren’s famous AEG Turbine factory in Berlin (as well as his Hoechst AG headquarters building in Hoechst and Gaswerk Ost in Frankfurt)—were not afforded such protective status. (The industrial roles these buildings might play in the German war effort may have forced AD-HG and ACLS planners to leave these off the official lists. Although by this logic, the dehousing campaign waged by the British should also have kept the Frankfurt housing estates off the lists.) Fritz Höger’s Chile Haus in Hamburg, a crowning example of post-World War I expressionism, was, however, included in the list for that city. A handful of fin-de-siecle Art Nouveau and Jugendstil buildings in the Germany, France, and the Benelux were also included, but many more were not. (For example, none in Nancy were listed, and few in Brussels.) But these were the exceptions to the rule. The vast majority of properties in the lists for Germany and greater Europe herald from the 19th century or earlier.

²⁸ Several of May’s better-known estates were erected during the period from 1926 until 1930, among them Höhenblick (1926), Bruchfeldstraße (1926-27), Römerstadt (1927-28), and Hellerhof (1930-32). However, only the first three estates were on the outskirts of the city; Hellerhof was located closer to the downtown, in a pie-shaped neighborhood between the main passenger train station and train station for goods. It was partially destroyed during the war.

Several urban landmarks in Frankfurt were omitted from the lists drawn up by ACLS and AD-HG. No explanation is given as to why they were left off, but one can feel reasonably safe in certain assumptions. For example, the 1880s main train station, the *Hauptbahnhof*, is nowhere to be found on the list. This is a building that must have been an easy target for bombardiers to identify in their sorties—and therefore an easy building to either strike, or to avoid striking. The largest train station in Europe, the *Hauptbahnhof* is a landmark of Beaux-Arts design, and—in the typical Beaux-Art fashion—it occupies a prominent location at the terminus of Kaiserstraße, a major east-west boulevard. During a strategic air war in which transportation-related buildings (train stations, marshalling yards, and docks) were high-priority targets, buildings like the *Hauptbahnhof* were expected to be destroyed as a matter of course. It is likely, then, that planners at ACLS and AD-HG realized that their lists should exclude buildings that Allied military planners would regard as being important parts of the German war effort, as they would likely never survive. One assumes that a decision was made to cut losses; and to focus on those important buildings that military planners might be convinced to avoid. Frankfurt's primary train station was probably one of these.

Other buildings, even overtly non-military targets, are also inexplicably left off the Frankfurt list. Among these are numerous churches, freestanding urban houses, and the remains of the Medieval fortification system. Regarding the latter, the 15th Century *Eschenheimer Turm* is but one of at least five extant watchtowers, yet it is the only one included in the list. Many historically important civic buildings were also omitted (e.g. the Frankfurt Palace of Justice, the *Börse* stock exchange, and several suburban town halls), presumably because their destruction would have disrupted the functioning of cities—a desirable outcome. Also excluded is the old quarter of

Sachsenhausen located across the Main River in what was once an independent municipality. One assumes that these buildings and other obvious choices are omitted as a matter of convenience. Simply put, not all historically important buildings could be included. Understanding that balance necessarily would have to be struck between military and cultural needs, members of ACLS and AD-HG simply focused on properties that represented the crème de la crème of cultural patrimony. This, of course, was a reality not limited to Frankfurt but true to all cities in all countries for which they drew up lists.

What Survived

Combing the newspapers of New York, Washington, D. C., and London that date from the period between 1943 and 1945, when the Allied air campaign against Germany was in full swing, one is not hard-pressed to locate anecdotes that describe the vast destruction of the enemy's cities. March of 1944 was an especially active month in the skies over Frankfurt. Between the 18th and 25th, British and American bombers—primarily the former—paid numerous visits to the ill-fated city. In this short period, over 2,000 bombers dropped approximately 3,800 high-explosive bombs on Frankfurt, and two million incendiary bombs.²⁹ It was during this week-long period that the gravest destruction was wrought on the city's historic architecture. March 22—ironically, the day on which Frankfurt's native son, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, died—was perhaps the most destructive of all. On this night, 816 British bombers conducted an air raid using incendiary and high-explosive ordnance that is considered the worst attack on Frankfurt executed in the war.³⁰ The result of the attack was a conflagration with temperatures estimated at between 600 and 1,000 degrees Celsius

²⁹ Historisches Museum Frankfurt, “Zerstörung von Frankfurt im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” *Informationsblätter der Abteilung* 55 (Frankfurt, 1976), 55.05.6.

³⁰ Waldemar Kramer, *Frankfurt Chronik* (Frankfurt am Main: W. Kramer, 1964), 424.

that engulfed the historic *Altstadt* nearly in its entirety and left little intact in the area immediately around the gutted—but miraculously standing—cathedral. In the course of a single night, buildings that had survived the depredations of six hundred years were incinerated or reduced to piles of soot and rubble. In the article “Fires Rage in Frankfort After RAF’s Record 3,360-Ton Blow,” the New York Times had this to say of the attack: “The RAF set up a new record in its aerial bombardment Wednesday night when Lancasters and Halifaxes [types of British bombers] dropped 3,360 tons of bombs on Frankfort, a city that is vital to the enemy because of its chemical and engineering works.”³¹ Fires from this record-setting raid could be seen from 200 miles away, and a 15,000-foot plume of smoke advertised the city’s fate through the night of the 22nd/23rd and into the following day.³² As was often the case, American bombers followed closely on the heels of their British allies, conducting follow-up daylight attacks to bash the prostrate city and generally contribute to the chaos.³³ One imagines that an unintended consequence of these raids was the reduction of newly created rubble to an even finer grade of rubble. All told, the physical face of Frankfort suffered horribly from the approximately twenty major raids to which it was subjected:

In comparison to other European cities, Frankfort, in terms of its downtown area and its economy, experiences some of the worst destruction. Twelve and one-half million cubic meters of rubble was strewn about the city. Of the 44,559 residential buildings in use before the war, 26 percent were completely destroyed, 27 percent were

³¹ The New York Times, 24 March 1944, pp. 1, 3.

³² Ibid.

³³ “Series of Heavy Attacks Follows RAF’s Record Frankfurt Raid,” Washington Post, 24 March 1944, pp.1-2. “Strong forces of American bombers, following up a record 3360-ton bombardment of Frankfurt by the RAF last night, carried out a sweeping series of daylight attacks...” “This is the second night that Frankfurt was heavily hit.” “The RAF was barely back from firing Frankfurt, one the big centers of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Chemical Works and home of important plane plants, with a bomb tonnage that the air ministry said was a record for one raid, when more than 500 American heavies...drove deep into Germany with a deluge of perhaps 1500 tons of bombs.” “Frankfurt was hit shortly before 11 p.m. with a half-hour blow. An hour later a follow-up force of the swift RAF Mosquitoes saw huge columns of smoke and fire which could be seen as far as 200 miles away.”

seriously damaged, 32 percent were lightly damaged and only 15 percent were completely intact. In terms of residences, slightly over 50 percent were inhabitable, but of these only half were undamaged... Almost three-quarters of the industrial and commercial enterprises were destroyed. All the churches in the inner city suffered serious damage; only five Catholic churches in the suburbs and seven Protestant churches on the edges of the city remained intact.³⁴

Given the “blasting” and “pounding” (these were journalists’ expressions—evidently war reporters were the sportscasters of the mid-20th century) that the Allies gave to German cities, and the fascination with record-breaking payloads and their potential to create ever-larger areas of destruction, it does not require a great leap of faith to understand this simple reality: that many monuments earmarked for protection were destroyed along with military and civilian buildings throughout the city. The areas hit worst also happened to be the most historic. The damage to the commercial and civic core was most complete.³⁵

Historic buildings in the downtown that survived did so because of sheer happenstance or because concerted efforts were made by the local citizenry to protect them. One of Frankfurt’s most important Mediaeval houses is a case in point. Despite the destruction all around it, the ca.1600 Haus Wertheim emerged from the Allied blitz virtually unscathed. This most fortunate house is a *fachwerk* and sandstone structure located at the southern edge of the Römer Square. It survived because the city had allocated manpower to ensure that it remained intact. The reason behind this was not, however, Haus Wertheim’s historical or architectural worth. Rather, the city fire department sought to prevent the building from collapsing into the street during a raid,

³⁴ Quoted in Boehling, 81.

³⁵ “Damage at Frankfurt,” The Times (London), 27 March 1944, p.4. “A reconnaissance made late on Saturday shows that almost the whole of the commercial and administrative part of Frankfurt has been practically destroyed as a result of the heavy attack by aircraft of Bomber Command last Wednesday night and the daylight attack by the United States 8th Army Air Force on Friday.”

in the process blocking access to the Main River to the immediate south—the source of water for combating fires in the *Altstadt*, as well as a place of escape.³⁶ Haus Wertheim was the exception to the rule.

The Frankfurt Survey

In order to get a sense of the damage caused to Frankfurt as a result of the two dozen or so heavy air raids, I will now turn to the post-war survey of the city conducted by MFAA units. For lack of a simpler and more appropriate title, this tome will be referred to as the *Survey Frankfurt/Main* (or *Survey*)—the same name used by the holder of the survey, the National Archives and Records Administration.³⁷ This rich document was compiled in a relatively short period between 7 February and 18 April 1946. By this time, the buildings that the MFAA units assessed had last been subjected to fighting just under a year prior—Frankfurt being overrun and occupied by American ground troops of the Fifth Infantry Division in late March, 1945.³⁸ The fact that little had been done to stabilize the historic structures, let alone restore them, speaks to the sweeping shortages of building materials and manpower across Germany.

³⁶ Kalusche and Setzepfandt, 22.

³⁷ One copy of this survey (there were six made) is housed at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. It is referenced as RG 239-SFM: American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, “Survey of Damage to Frankfurt/Main’s Cultural Institutions,” Record Group 239 (College Park, MD: National Archives and Records Administration, photocopied).

³⁸ There is no shortage of articles from March of 1945 that describe the capture of Frankfurt by the United States Army, and—being one of the first major cities thrust into Allied hands—there are ample accounts describing the shock at the degree of destruction. This *New York Times* article from 30 March, 1945 (p.3) is typical: “Frankfurt a Ruin on a Vast Scale” reads the title, following by the sensationalist subtitle “Standing in Center, One Can Look in Any Direction and Not See Building Intact.” The article goes on to note that “This city, which was one of the grandest in the Reich and was of prime importance to the German war effort, is today in ruins. Most of it was done by the Allied Air Forces long before the infantry ever arrived. The pitiful force that tried to defend it did nothing more but add to the ruins.”

The aim of the Frankfurt *Survey* was simple. According to its authors, the *Survey* was undertaken so as to “present, in alphabetical, indexed form, as complete a documentation of war damage to the cultural monuments of Frankfurt/Main as could be collected in the time allotted.”³⁹ The “cultural monuments” that this group inspected were drawn from the ACLS/AD-HG lists and supplemented by local lists and local authorities who were knowledgeable of such matters. Thus, the list of buildings is considerably longer than that produced by the ACLS and AD-HG.. It includes 94 resources as compared with the original 65. The 29 additional houses, hotels, civic buildings, and other structures were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree. And this is why they were included. Being specifically a survey of damage to cultural monuments, the *Survey* excluded undamaged buildings and non-historic buildings. (There are exceptions: Eschenheimer Tor and the Hessendenkmal are included in *Survey*, although both suffered only nominal damage and are noted as being basically intact.) Not all of the monuments in the ACLS/AD-HG lists were included in the Frankfurt survey.

The *Survey* is remarkable not because it provides photographic documentation of the damage. Many accounts of the war do just that, and do it better. What is unique about the Frankfurt survey is its quantifying of damage. It includes detailed written descriptions of the damage to the architectural elements of each building, and the authors provide “estimates for repairs or restoration” in Reichs Marks. This is unique in the literature of the time.

³⁹ The *Survey* was an American-Germanic effort. The primary authors were American MFAA officers within the Military Government: Colonel Robert K. Phelps; Captain Everett P. Lesley, Jr.; and First Lieutenant Clyde K. Harris. A variety of German experts from the local Kulturamt assisted the MFAA officers. See “Survey of Damage to Frankfurt/Main’s Cultural Institutions,” Record Group 239, p. 1.

Many of the assessments of monuments from *Survey Frankfurt/Main* were also included in the Frankfurt list drawn up by ACLS and AD-HG. A sampling of these assessments is provided in this chapter. More than anything else, the sampling is intended to give a flavor of what MFAA troops in Frankfurt observed, once fighting had ceased and time could be taken to methodically assess the state of monuments within the city. The assessments also allow generalizations to be made about how different types of buildings were affected by the two primary types of ordnance, high-explosive and incendiary. In essence, *Survey Frankfurt/Main* can be regarded as an examination of the MFAA's efforts to protect the cultural resources of Europe. But as Colonel Robert K. Phelps notes in his introduction,

“A merely perfunctory glimpse of the [photographic] plates will be enough to give the reader a notion of how much damage the city has sustained. However, if the sections on the cultural importance of each building, and the description of the war damage, are read while the pictures are studied, the loss to the arts, to Germany, and to the rest of the world will become finally clear.”⁴⁰

The statement speaks to the breadth of destruction in Frankfurt, and to the inability of anyone during World War II—MFAA unit, civilian, or military commander—to prevent such damage.

The amount of information gathered on each building in the Frankfurt survey varies. But nearly every entry includes the following information:

- Name of Monument/Institution
- Address/Location
- Person in Charge (typically the owner of the building)
- Contents:
 - Pre-War
 - Present

⁴⁰ Ibid., 2.

- Cultural Importance
- History of War Damage
- Description of War Damage
- Estimates for Repair/Restoration:
 - Space to be re-built (in cbm)
 - Cost of restoration (in Reich Marks)
 - Prices involved in the restoration (both for labor and materials, in Reich Marks)
 - Degree of damage
 - Essential building materials (in square meters and tons)
 - Work necessary
 - Estimated duration of work
- Action Taken
- Photographs
 - Plate number
 - Photograph number

In addition to the vital information describing the building (its name, location, and owner) and brief information describing the *Survey* records themselves (e.g. photograph cataloging numbers), each entry provided some background on the building's cultural significance and its fate during the war. This included the significance of the building as a work of architecture as well as the importance of the building's contents.⁴¹ Breaking the description of the latter into "Pre-War" and "Present" sections was a way for the authors of the *Survey* to note if important artifacts were present at the outset of the war (either moveable objects or architectural elements within single buildings, or individual buildings located within a greater neighborhood like the *Altstadt*), what these objects were, and what their status was at the conclusion of the war—if they were intact or damaged, or if had been removed out of concern for their safety. The "History of War Damage" section recorded the day (or in most cases, multiple days) on which the building in question was subjected to substantial damage.

⁴¹ Inexplicably, a few of these descriptions indicate that the building in question and its contents were not significant at all. For example, see the entry for Antonius Kirche, in which the author notes "Of no historical or architectural importance; no special art." This begs the question: why did MFAA units investigate it? Or why was it included on the ACLS/AD-HG list to begin with?

The fateful month of March, 1944, is represented with great frequency here. The section entitled “Description of War Damage” offers just that. In it, the authors describe the damage to the building in narrative form, moving from one element to the next and recording each one’s current state. Damaged elements are typically described here, but in some cases the rare survival is as well: a vault that managed to avoid collapse when its neighbors all lay in shambles, for instance. This description of damage is lent some immediacy in the next section, “Estimates for Repair/Restoration,” which enumerates, in facts and figures, the cost to repair a damaged building or restore a demolished one. Included here are the materials and manpower required, the time it would take to complete the restoration, and any action that had theretofore been taken.⁴² The degree of damage to the monument is also provided as a percentage of the whole—a 100% damaged building being one in which even the walls had been reduced to rubble and the cellar below had collapsed. The use of a percentage to convey degree of damage is a bit misleading. Structures that were only 50% damaged might have been impossible to repair, while those that were more damaged—75%, for example—might have retained their core structural integrity, therefore making them easier to reassemble.

If the MFAA units who surveyed the historic monuments of Frankfurt and evaluated their condition had used some sort of codified damage assessment system, it is not known. That a building is assessed as being 82 percent damaged and not, say, 80 percent damaged—a seemingly more logical number—seems to suggest that such a system was in place. Yet the *Survey Frankfurt/Main* does not address this question. Little is offered in the way of methodology or explanation. The reader must then

⁴² Little action had been taken by 1946, but where it had, it usually involved the erection of makeshift shelters for immovable art objects within roofless buildings. One example is the Karmeliter-Kirche: “Emergency roof over the Ratgeb pictures; repair of seven cloister arches.”

assume that some sort of codified system was, in fact, in use by MFAA units as they went out into the field and gauged the success of their efforts. And one must assume that a relatively consistent yardstick was used for each building.

A sampling of different levels of damage is a good way to convey how MFAA units regarded various degrees of damage to Frankfurt's monuments. To this end, four samples are examined here: a low-level of damage (20 percent), moderate level (55 percent), high level (80 percent), and the highest level possible (100 percent)—the near complete destruction of a building. The four buildings used here for purposes of demonstration are the St. Leonhard-Kirche, Dom St. Bartholomäus, Goethe Haus, and Fahrgaße 17 (Haus Fürsteneck). A monument considered undamaged by the surveyors is not included.⁴³

St. Leonhard Kirche [Appendix 5]

Located on the north bank of the River Main, St. Leonhard's was the second church to be erected in the city of Frankfurt [Figures 7-4 and 7-5]. It dates from the early 13th Century, with additions through the 16th Century and renovations beginning in the early 19th. The gabled, Gothic structure was damaged by incendiary bombs on the 18th of March, 1944, and again on the 22nd. The *Survey* notes that the church was 20% damaged, the destruction being described in this way:

The roof was burnt entirely and part of the west gable fell in. The façades remained in good order. In the interior, the plaster of the arches suffered from the fire, but the arches themselves have remained standing. Lately part of the ribs of the arches in the north and south aisles fell in and parts were so loosened that they had to be taken away.

⁴³ Undamaged (or lightly damaged) monuments are rare in the “Survey of Damage to Frankfurt/Main’s Cultural Institutions,” Record Group 239. One, the Mediaeval Eschenheimer Turm, is simply described in this way: “Except for a few insignificant damages to the plaster the [building] is entirely intact.”



FIGURE 7-4: HISTORIC IMAGE OF ST. LEONHARD KIRCHE.



FIGURE 7-5: ST. LEONHARD KIRCHE AFTER THE WAR.

The authors of the Survey estimated that the 2,000 cubic meters of space that would have to be repaired would cost 155,000 RM. This would take twenty-five workers one year to complete.

St. Leonhard is one of a scarce few historic buildings that the *Survey* recognizes as being under repair during the summer of 1946. Under the heading “Action Taken,” the report notes that

The roof has been repaired and covered with roofing paper, the west gable walled up and the window tracery renovated where it was damaged. New lead glazing was put in. In the interior, the missing choir windows were lined with boards. The arches are being repaired. Two plinths have already been repaired.

The reason for St. Leonhard’s prompt repair had less to do with its important place in the pantheon of Frankfurt monuments, as was the case with the Goethe Haus or the Dom. The repair of both of these buildings was initiated immediately after the war ended. Rather, the speedy repair of St. Leonhard’s appears to have had more to do with its limited damage. It was easier to coordinate a repair when the incidents of damage were relatively minor, and were of such a nature as to not require hefty amounts of building materials, legions of skilled laborers, or a select group of craftsman with very specific skills. Materials and labor would be scarce commodities in the lean years following 1945.

Dom St. Bartholomäus [Appendix 6]

This soaring Carolingian cathedral, long a symbol of the city of Frankfurt, survived the sea of fire that for several hours in 1944 swirled around its base [Figure 7-6]. However, it did not emerge from the war unscathed. Despite photographs of its tower rising triumphantly out of the ruins of the *Altstadt* [Figure 7-7], the Dom was in




FIGURE 7-6: A CA.1932 TRAVEL BROCHURE FROM FRANKFURT IN WHICH THE CATHEDRAL FEATURES PROMINENTLY.



FIGURE 7-7: A CA.1945 IMAGE OF FRANKFURT RISING FROM THE RUINS OF THE ALTSTADT.

actuality struck on a number of occasions by high-explosive and incendiary bombs. The wooden roof of the nave was burned off, and several of the historic interior elements were completely destroyed. Yet the basic form of the building, its dramatic buttressed tower, and many of its architectural details did survive. The authors of the *Survey* therefore described it as being just over half destroyed—as 55 percent damaged [Figure 7-8].

St. Batholomäus was damaged in the autumn of 1943, and again in January and March of the following year. The damage included numerous altars and ecclesiastical details; windows, stained glass, and tracery; and structural elements (ribbing, vaults, arches). Yet no substantial portion of the cathedral collapsed. This is remarkable, given the sweeping destruction that occurred to the neighborhood around the building. In fact, the survival of both St. Batholomäus and nearby cousin, St. Leonhard's, lends some credence to the remark made subsequent to the war that certain periods of architecture were more inclined to survive than others; that Gothic architecture—church architecture, specifically—fared better than that from, for example, the Renaissance:

"[T]he fragile-looking Gothic constructions, with their airy, resilient flying buttresses and broken surfaces, resisted the shock of bomb concussion better than the solid, unbroken surfaces of the Renaissance constructions, which—being built on the modern, four-square principle—were bashed flat by modern blast."⁴⁴

The estimated cost to repair the damage to St. Batholomäus was 970,000 Reichs Marks. Although the building was only determined to be 55 percent damage, it was an enormous and complex structure to be repaired, and a daunting reconstruction project. Nevertheless, the authors of *Survey* predicted that sixty workers could repair the

⁴⁴ Flanner, *Monuments and Men*, 272 An image of a modern apartment in Hiroshima or Nagasaki demonstrates the same principle, but in the context of 20th century construction: a building that allows the shock of a blast to pass through it will not be collapsed as readily.




FIGURE 7-8: THE CATHEDRAL AFTER THE WAR.

cathedral in only two years, the assumption being that the necessary materials—sandstone, cement, lime gypsum, lumber, glass, roofing paper, and slate—would be readily available. And in 1946, when the Frankfurt survey was being conducted, it looked like the materials would be made available to this building, important as it was to the people of Frankfurt. According to *Survey*, at sometime between late 1944 and early 1946, materials and manpower had already been expended in the erection of an emergency roof over the nave and chapel. These temporary measures helped to stabilize the building and prevented additional deterioration to the interior.

Goethe Haus [Appendix 7]

Like the St. Bartholomäus Dom, the birthplace of poet Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was a significant monument in the minds of Frankfurters. Goethe was by any measure Frankfurt's best-known, best-loved native son. The legendary author's house was a national landmark, so much so that it appeared in books, prints, photographs, and even popular postcards⁴⁵ [Figure 7-9]. This building was so important that the *Survey* described it in succinct but exemplary terms: "Goethe's birthplace and the home of his youth [is a] cultural shrine for all nations." The furnishings of the house dated back to Goethe's time, and the invaluable collections of manuscripts and books made the house a museum in itself. Yet in addition to the physical artifacts, the Goethe's house was regarded as significant in itself because Goethe had been born there. He had walked the halls, written at a desk in his room, and lived an informative, productive part of his life in this architecturally unremarkable 1755 row house. The

⁴⁵ Houses associated with the banking family Rothschild also appeared in numerous photographs and postcards.




FIGURE 7-9: CIRCA 1900 POSTCARD SHOWING GOETHE'S HOME IN FRANKFURT, WITH A PROFILE OF THE WRITER INSET.

building was infused with his presence—and in this laid its primary source of cultural importance.

Despite its cultural importance, the Goethe Haus was damaged on 4 October 1943, and almost completely destroyed during the heavy raids of March, 1944⁴⁶ [Figure 7-10]. While visitors to the site may have been inclined to describe the building as a complete loss, the authors of the Frankfurt survey noted a few intact elements. The sections of walls, doorways, parts of the courtyard, the cellars, and other assorted fragments were enough evidence for them to render an estimate of 80 percent destroyed.⁴⁷

It was estimated that the reconstruction of Goethe's house—a “complete rebuilding from above the cellar”—would take thirty workers a single year to complete. In actuality, it took six years, from 1946 through 1951, when the house was again opened as a museum and shrine to the city's hallowed son.⁴⁸ This was one of the first buildings in Frankfurt to be reconstructed—again, due in part to the significance of the structure to Frankfurters specifically, and to Germans in general.

Fahrgaße 17 (Haus Fürsteneck) [Appendix 8]

To the northeast of the Dom stood a four-story house at Fahrgaße 17: a patrician house known as “Fürsteneck” [Figure 7-11]. Built around 1400 (and incorporating a 12th Century ground floor), the house changed hands multiple times over the centuries,

⁴⁶ “Goethe's Birthplace,” The Times (London), 3 April 1945, 5.

⁴⁷ In the Frankfurt survey, two damage values are given: 80 percent for Goethe's house, and 20 percent for the adjacent Goethe library. Only the house is considered here.

⁴⁸ George G. Wynne, Frankfurt through the Centuries, 2nd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Waldemar Kramer, 1975), 113.



FIGURE 7-10: GOETHE'S HOME AFTER THE WAR.




FIGURE 7-11: HISTORIC IMAGE OF FAHRTGÄE 17 (HAUS FÜRSTENECK).

and was modernized on several occasions, to fit contemporary tastes and fashion. In 1615, a forgotten master craftsman paneled the main room of the first floor. This magnificent Renaissance interior was removed from Fürsteneck in 1891 and installed in the Frankfurt Kunstmuseum. According to *Survey*, a copy was then reinstalled in the original building. The building was well known from the exterior due to the presence of a residential tower that rose from its west façade. This tower was known by the name, “Zu den drei Sauköpfen.”

On two nights in 1944, 18 and 22 March, Haus Fürsteneck was hit by incendiary and high-explosive bombs dropped by RAF bombers. It was destroyed in its entirety [Figure 7-12]. Ironically, the original Renaissance paneled room that had been removed from the house and placed under the watch of museum curators was also destroyed during the same raid.

According to the *Survey*, a rebuilding of this 6,390 cubic meter house would have cost 383,400 Reichs Marks. Sixty workers would have spent one year working on this relatively small project. Haus Fürsteneck was never rebuilt. Like most of the monuments destroyed in World War II, the shortage of labor and resources ensured that reconstruction would not proceed. Only the most significant of buildings would be restored. These were buildings that helped define the local or national character; buildings on the order of Goethe’s birthplace, the St. Bartholomäus Dom, or buildings that delineated the Römer—the historic open square known as Frankfurt’s “reception room.” But Haus Fürsteneck and its ilk submitted to progress. The rubble was cleared and infill development was permitted to take their place. Many historic buildings in many of Germany’s cities passed into history in just this way.



Haus Fürsteneck, like most of its neighbors, is still a heap of rubble three years after the war.

FIGURE 7-12: CIRCA 1948 IMAGE OF FAHRGÄBE (RUNNING DIAGONALLY IN THIS IMAGE).

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

“The irreplaceable architecture, the priceless murals are just broken stone and plaster. So much for the German dream of conquest. So much for a little Austrian housepainter. So much for the boastful fat man who said that, if British planes ever bombed the Reich, its people could call him Meyer. Bitterly the people of Cologne called him Meyer again and again in terror-filled nights when the city rocked and exploded. Local slang for the air-raid siren then was “Herr Meyer’s Hunting Horn.” (p. 85)

Was the Monuments Protection Program Successful?

The effort to save historic monuments was largely unsuccessful for reasons I have described repeatedly in the course of this thesis. In short, bombing technologies were not sophisticated enough to allow for the discrete destruction of military targets. Moreover, the Allies—and almost exclusively, the British—were convinced that terror raids on civilian population centers would cause unrest, revolt, and ultimately a quicker end to the conflict than could be achieved through conventional warfare. The practice of area-bombing was the physical manifestation of this conviction. This type of bombing, of course, was responsible for the most of the destruction inflicted upon German cities, and most of the damage to historic monuments. The possibility that monuments would be damaged during these raids was known to military planners, and they accepted this as an unfortunate consequence of the struggle to defeat Germany. That the military would willingly accept mass civilian casualties gives a sense of the tenor of World War II—the “no holds barred” ethos of the combatants on both sides. A period article in *The Times of London* captured this well. With a detached air it noted that “reconnaissance... shows that almost the whole of the commercial and administrative part of Frankfurt has been practically destroyed as a result of the heavy attack by aircraft of Bomber Command last Wednesday night and the daylight attack

by the United States 8th Army Air Force on Friday.”¹ According to the postwar survey of Frankfurt, the average damage to the historic buildings that were assessed was nearly 70%. A full two-thirds of the buildings identified in the AD-HG and ACLS lists that were also assessed for damage at the conclusion of the war had been compromised in some way. This can hardly be considered successful [Figures 8-1 through 8-5]. Yet despite this violent reshaping of the urban landscape, most European cities immediately began rebuilding. The unfaltering appeal of these lost environments is captured by Ernest DeWald, a MFAA officer working in Europe during the war. DeWald reflected on the importance of a nation’s physical cultural heritage, as well as the need to preserve the original and not slavishly recreate what has been lost:

To the world in general, the disappearance of many of its treasures of architecture and art constitutes an irreplaceable loss out of its storehouse of culture and history. No records of human achievement coming to us from the past can be so convincing as those which we can see and touch. And no amount of romantic reconstruction, once the monument is gone, can equal in effectiveness and conviction the original which contained within itself the very essence of its period in history. Much better the photograph therefore from which we can see at least what the original was actually like. But throughout the march of history these disappearances have taken place, and mankind has been fated to see vanish into the dust of the ages those material links of stone, wood and metal which bind it to the past.²

Final Thoughts

Since the close of World War II, there have been numerous conflicts around the world, both sweeping in scale as well as limited. Many of these have involved the accidental

¹ “Damage at Frankfurt,” *The Times* (London), 27 March 1944, p.4. While British and American papers reported on the potency of Allied bombs and on the consequent scenes of destruction within German cities, another message was also repeatedly sent to the public. This message suggested the opposite: that despite the ability of Allied bombers to destroy entire sections of cities, the destruction was calculated and precise, the result of strategic, precision bombing.

² Ernest DeWald quoted in Henry La Farge, *Lost Treasures of Europe* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1946), 9.



Note the level of destruction around the cathedral (right center), and the number of burned out buildings.

FIGURE 8-1: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF FRANKFURT, PROBABLY AN ALLIED RECONNAISSANCE IMAGE FROM THE SPRING OF 1944.



FIGURE 8-2: PHOTOGRAPH OF THE DEVASTATED RÖMER SQUARE AREA, PROBABLY TAKEN FROM THE CATHEDRAL.




FIGURE 8-3: PHOTOGRAPH OF THE RÖMER, 1945.



**FIGURE 8-4: PHOTOGRAPH OF SAALGÄBE AREA OF THE ALTSTADT,
PRE-1945.**



Note the extant fountain in middle of the image, and the cathedral—now visible—in the background at left.

FIGURE 8-5: THE SAME VIEW OF THE SAALGÄBE AREA, CA. 1945.

or calculated destruction of historic monuments. Stari Most, a 1557 bridge over the Neretva River at Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was toppled in 1993 in an ethnic civil war, and in 2001 Islamic fundamentalists dynamited the ancient Buddha statues at Bamiyan, Afghanistan.³ As of this writing, the second Gulf War continues with no end in sight. Despite the efforts of American military planners to prevent looting and destruction, both have happened intermittently across occupied Iraq. “Smart” munitions have failed, and Iraqi militants, realizing the potential to create negative propaganda that reflects poorly on their enemy, have holed up in historic mosques and baited Anglo-American soldiers into skirmishes.⁴ As small bands of dispossessed militia engage large armies on what may only loosely be described as battlefields, historic monuments continue to be hapless victims. The very fact that American authorities plan for future terrorist attacks at such historic landmarks as Philadelphia’s Independence Hall and Mount Rushmore speaks to the symbolic value of such monuments, and the likelihood that they will become targets in unconventional conflicts.⁵

Why the nations of the world have not made greater strides forward in the protection of cultural heritage during conflicts is a question to which there is no simple answer. After all, several of the most daunting problems faced during World War II have been remedied. Despite occasional mishaps, strategic, precision bombing is possible today, and information management and dissemination through a host of new technologies

³ See, for example, “Photos Document Destruction of Afghan Buddhas,” an CNN online article from March 12, 2001, at <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/03/12/afghan.buddha.02/>, and Armaly, Maha, Carlo Blasi, and Lawrence Hannah, ‘Stari Most: Rebuilding More than a Historic Bridge in Mostar,’ *Museum International* 224, vol. 56, no. 4 (2004): 6-16.

⁴ Similar baiting occurred in the first Gulf War, when Iraqi fighter planes allegedly were parked in close proximity to the famous ziggurat at Ur.

⁵ United States Government Accountability Office, *Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Better Protect National Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism*, June 2005, <http://www.gao/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-790>.

help preclude the familiar, post-facto rationalization for some damaged monument: “We didn’t know it was there.”

At the same time, a new problem confronts militaries today. As the centers of conflict move beyond Europe, the United States has begun to face enemies with foreign traditions and cultural foundations far removed from those of its Western European roots. It will be a challenge to come to terms with these differences and educate military planners so that they are able to identify unfamiliar historic monuments for what they are.⁶ A failure to do so will provide a wellspring of negative propaganda to enemy groups and give credence to the perception that Americans fight abroad in wars that are fundamentally cultural in nature.

Monuments, fine arts, and archives are probably more politicized today than they ever were, and so will they continue to be damaged and destroyed, and on occasion, preserved.

⁶ During the Balkan crises of the 1990s, in which NATO forces became involved in a peacekeeping capacity, the sensitive topic of damage to cultural monuments again came to the fore. Suggesting a lack of empathy for Serbian heritage on the part on NATO, billboards appeared in the capital of Belgrade that featured the doctored image of a collapsing, burning Eiffel Tower. An accompanying message read, “Just imagine. Stop the Bombs!” This presumably was intended to perpetuate the sense that local culture was under siege, and that icons of Serbian culture—icons no less important to Serbs than the Eiffel Tower is to the French—stood the chance of being erased, permanently. See, for example, <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/balkans/bc2a12p5.htm>.

APPENDIX 1

PRESS RELEASE OF AMERICAN COMMISSION CREATION

The State Department's August 20, 1943, press release announcing the creation of the American Commission reads as follows:

The President has approved the establishment of an American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, with the Honorable Owen J. Roberts, Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, as chairman. Mr. David E. Finley, Director of the National Gallery and a member of the Commission of Fine Arts, has been appointed vice chairman, and Mr. Huntington Cairns, secretary-treasurer of the Gallery, will serve as secretary-treasurer of the Commission. The other members pf the Commission are: The Honorable Herbert Lehman, Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operation; the Honorable Archibald MacLeish, Librarian of Congress; Dr. William Bell Dinsmoor, President of the Archeological Institute of America; Dr. Francis Henry Taylor, Director of the Metropolitan Museum in New York and President of the Association of Art Museum Directors; and Dr. Paul J. Sachs, Associate Director of the Fogg Museum of Fine Arts of Harvard University. The members will serve for three years.

The headquarters of the Commission will be in the National Gallery of Art. The Commission will cooperate with the appropriate branches of the Army and of the Department of State, including the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, as well as with appropriate civilian agencies. The Commission will also advise and work with the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Va., and subsequent organizations of civilian character which may take over control of occupied territory when it is possible to relinquish military control.

The Commission may be called upon to furnish officials and art historians to the General Staff of the Army, so that, so far as is consistent with military necessity, works of cultural value may be protected in countries occupied by the armies of the United Nations. One of the principal functions of the Commission will be to act as a channel of communication between the Army and the various universities, museums, and other scholarly institutions, organizations, and individuals from whom information and services are desired. Already much valuable material has been collected and furnished to the Army by museums and universities through the efforts of individual members of the Commission and others serving in a volunteer capacity.

The Commission will function under the auspices of the United States Government and in conjunction with similar groups in other countries for the protection and conservation of works of art and of artistic and historic records in Europe, and to aid in salvaging and restoring to the lawful owners such objects as have been appropriated by the Axis powers or individuals acting under their authority or consent.

The appointment of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe is evidence of the concern felt by the United States Government and by artistic and learned circles in this country for the safety of artistic treasures in Europe, placed in jeopardy by the war. It is also evidence of the Government's intention that, when military operations have been concluded, there shall be restitution of public property appropriate by the Axis powers. It is expected that the Commission will use its good offices toward this end and will advocate also that, where it is not possible to restore such property, either because it has been destroyed or cannot be found, restitution in kind should be made by the Axis powers to the countries from which property has been taken. The Commission, it is anticipated, will also urge that restitution be made of private property appropriated by the Axis nations.¹

¹ The Department of State, Bulletin, vol. IX, no. 217 (August 21, 1943). [republished 1979]

APPENDIX 2

HISTORIC MONUMENTS IN GERMAN CITIES

List of German cities for which maps indicating the location of historic monuments, museums, and archives were produced:

Aachen	Leipzig
Augsburg	Lübeck
Bamberg	Lüneburg
Bayreuth	Magdeburg
Berlin	Mainz
Berlin Suburbs	Mannheim
Bonn	Marburg
Braunschweig	München
Bremen	Münster
Breslau	Nuremberg
Coburg	Osnabrück
Danzig	Paderborn
Darmstadt	Passau
Dortmund	Potsdam
Dresden	Quedlinburg
Düsseldorf	Regensburg
Eichstadt	Rostock
Erfurt	Rothenburg
Essen	Schwerin
Frankfort	Soest
Freiburg	Speyer
Goslar	Stettin
Göttingen	Stralsund
Halberstadt	Stuttgart
Halle	Trier
Hamburg	Tübingen
Hannover	Ulm
Heidelberg	Weimar
Hildesheim	Wismar
Ingolstadt	Wolfenbüttel
Karlsruhe	Worms
Kassel	Würzburg
Kiel	
Koblenz	
Köln	
Königsberg	
Konstanz	
Landshut	

APPENDIX 3

EISENHOWER'S DIRECTIVE

General Eisenhower's directive for Italy:¹

29 December 1943

AG000.4-1

Subject: Historical Monuments

To: All Commanders

Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great deal to our cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments which by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate the growth of the civilization which is ours. We are bound to respect those monuments so far as war allows.

If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the building must go. But the choice is now always so clear-cut as that. In many cases the monuments can be spared without any detriment to operational needs. Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted principal. But the phrase "military necessity" is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even personal convenience. I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.

It is a responsibility of higher commanders to determine through A.M.G. Officers [MFAA soldiers] the locations of historical monuments whether they be immediately ahead of our front lines or in areas occupied by us. This information passed to lower echelons through normal channels places the responsibility on all Commanders of complying with the spirit of this letter.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
General, U.S. Army,
Commander-in-Chief.

¹ From Sizer, "Walpolean at War." This text is reproduced elsewhere.

APPENDIX 4


FRANKFURT LIST

1A/B-1	*Palmengarten; since 1938 combined with the Grüneburg Park; park with outstanding botanic collections.	Palmengarten and Miguelstrasse.
2A-2	Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research); library on sociology; part of the University.	Victoria Allee, near Bockenheimer-Landstrasse.
2A-3	Universität (Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität); libraries of the different departments, including archaeology, history, law, etc.	Mertonstrasse, now probably called Jordanstrasse (near Bockenheim).
2A-4	**Senckenbergische Bibliothek; ca. 290,000 vols.; outstanding library on natural history, founded in 1763; connected with the Museum of Natural History and University.	Senckenberg-Anlage 27
2A-5	**Natur-Museum Senckenberg (Museum of Natural History); collection of natural history, especially of animal fossils.	Senckenberg-Anlage 25.
2G-6	Hessendenkmal (monument), 1792, early Classicistic.	Friedberger Tor.
2G-7	Haus der Familie von Bethmann with adjoining park; bourgeois country house and residence, 18th and early 19th centuries; in the adjoining Museum, painting, 1814. "Odeon" in FKT arch. guide	Friedberger Tor.
2/3D-8	Opern-Haus (opera), 1877.	Opernplatz.
2E-9	Eschenheimer Turn (fortification tower), 1425.	Eschenheimertor.
3E-10	Frankfurter Zeitung (newspaper office building); #archives of material built up by the newspaper since ca. 1875.	Grosse Eschenheimer-strasse.
3F-11	*Städtisches Völkermuseum (Ethnographical Museum), in the former Palais Thurn und Taxis, 1732-41; ethnographical collection predominantly from the region of Oceania. Städtisches Afrika-Archiv (Africa Archives of the City); books and other material pertaining to the twelve expeditions of Leo Frobenius to Africa.	Grosse Eschenheimer-strasse 26.
3E-12	Frankfurter Kunstverein; had an important collection of photographs of paintings, mostly 19th and early 20th century.	Junghofstrasse.
3E-13	Französisch-Reformierte-Kirche, ca. 1790, Classicistic.	Goetheplatz.
3E-14	Hauptwache (main guard house, now café), ca. 1780.	Platz an der Hauptwache.
3E-15	St. Katharinen-Kirche, 1678-82; 14th-18th century tomb monuments.	Platz an der Hauptwache.
n hatched region 3/4-E/F/G-15A	***Characteristic mediaeval streets and houses from 14th-18th centuries. Most important section: Römerberg -- Alter Markt, Domplatz (only some listed): Braunfels, 1350 and 1695; Markt 44 (Steinerne Haus, 1464); Römerberg; Zum Grossen und Kleinen Engel (1562); Salzhaus (ca. 1600); Haus Lichtenstein (1725); Fahrgasse 17 (Haus Fürsteneck, ca. 1440); Hinter-dem-Lämmchen-Gasse (Mohrenkopf, Gothic); Rotkreuzgasse (Grosser Speicher, 1587); Limburgergasse (Haus Silberg, 1595); Grosse Gallusgasse; Brüsseler Hof (1717); and Haus Behaghel (1746); Predigerstrasse (Fransburger Hof, 1717); Föngegasse (Engeltaler Hof, 1720). (A list of)	
3F-16	Liebfrauen-Kirche, 14th-15th centuries; South portal, ca. 1415.	Liebfrauen Berg.
3G-17	Museum Jüdischer Altertümer (Rothschild-Museum); collection of Jewish ceremonial objects, silver and gold. (The collection was partly destroyed and partly looted in November, 1938; some of the objects were taken to the Museum of the City of Frankfurt.) Archiv der Israelitischen Gemeinde (Archives of the Jewish Community); records from the 17th century. (Presumably this material is now in the custody of the Institute for Jewish Research, established in 1941.)	Fahrgasse 146.
3/4C-18	Antonius-Kirche, 19th century; contains the ** Treasury of the Liebfrauenkirche with 15th-18th century art.	Savignystrasse.

(page 1)

5D-19	**Kunstgewerbe-Museum (Museum of Decorative and Minor Arts); collection of decorative and minor art objects; collection of Hoechst porcelain; in 1958-59, acquired Collection von Goldschmidt-Rothschild.	Neue Mainzerstrasse 49.
5D-20	*Bibliothek für Kunst und Technik; ca. 80,000 volumes; 363,480 photographs and reproductions of art objects; 4,840 posters; patent specifications.	Neue Mainzerstrasse 47.
5G-21	*Museum Heimischer Vor- und Frühgeschichte (Museum of Pre- and Early History), in the former Dominican Monastery; finds excavated in the area of Greater Frankfurt from Neolithic through Bronze Age, Roman period (Heddernheim) up to the Franconian period. Dominikaner-Kirche, 13th-15th centuries; collection of casts of mediaeval and Renaissance sculpture belonging to the University.	Battonnstrasse 75.
???		Klostergasse 11.
5G-22	Alter Jüdischer Friedhof (old Jewish graveyard); tombstones from the 13th century.	Dominikanerplatz.
4E-23	Freies Deutsches Hochstift and Frankfurter Goethe Museum, in **Goethe Haus, 1755; birthplace of Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749) with collections and furniture related to his life; in an adjoining building, ***library of Goethe's works and literature concerning his work; mss. and works of art of time of Goethe.	Hirschgraben 23 and 27.
4E-24	Deutsch-Reformierte Kirche, ca. 1790, Classicistic.	Grosser Kornmarkt.
4F-25	Pauls-Kirche, 1787-1853, Classicistic.	Paulsplatz.
4F-26	*Haus "zur Goldenen Waage," Renaissance, 1624 (belongs to the Museum of the City of Frankfurt); 17th-18th century interiors and furnishings.	Höllgasse 13.
4F-27	**Dom St. Bartholomäus, 13th-15th centuries; restored 19th century; south of choir, "Wahl Kapelle"; sculpture, altars, tombstones, 14th-18th centuries; Dormition Altar, stone, 1434; in Sacristy, Treasury with pectoral, 1480, and other 15th-20th century goldsmith works. *Crucifixion, 1509, by Hans Backofen; stone group.	Domplatz.
4F-28	*Reichsarchiv, Abteilung Frankfurt am Main (Frankfurt-am-Main Section of the National Archives); records of the Reichskammergericht (supreme court of the old Empire); archives of the German Confederation, 1815-66; archives of the National Assembly and of the national ministries of 1848-49; papers relating to the Movement for German Unification; material relating to war prisoners of World War I.	In Südbau of the Rathaus, Bethmannstrasse 31.
4F-29	Römer (City Hall), 1405, with 16th-17th century additions; on main floor, "Kaisersaal"; "Wahlstube" (election chamber), 18th century.	Römerberg.
4F-30	St. Nicolai-Kirche, 12th-15th centuries; tombstone of Siegfried zum Paradies, 1306.	Römerberg.
4F-31	**Stadtgeschichtliches Museum, formerly Historisches Museum (Museum of the City of Frankfurt), in the former Leinwandhaus (Draper's Hall), end of 14th century, enlarged 1902; monuments and objects pertaining to the history and the culture of the City of Frankfurt, 9th to 20th centuries; **Dürer's Heller altarpiece; 13th century stained glass windows. **Stadtarchiv (Municipal Archives); documents of the City of Frankfurt from the 13th century; archives of religious organizations, 9th to 19th centuries; archives of hospitals, guilds and business firms from the 12th century.	Weckmarkt 1-3.
	Archiv der Deutschen Burschenschaft; archives of the German Burschenschaft, a nationwide students' association.	Weckmarkt 3.
4E-32	Carmeliter-Kirche und Kloster (Carmelite Church and Monastery), 15th-16th centuries; *in cloisters and the refectory, murals by Jörg Ratgeb, 1517-19.	In the Stadtarchiv, Weckmarkt 3. Alte Mainzergasse and Carmelitergasse.

4F-33	*St. Leonhard-Kirche, 10th-16th centuries; 10th centuries; 13th century portal sculpture; Gothic altars, 15th century stained glass; Holbein the Elder's "Last Supper" (part of the Dominican altar, 1501); treasury with 15th century chalice.	Alte Mainzergasse and Mainufer.
4F-34	Saalhof (group of buildings), 12th-18th centuries; probably occupies the site of an imperial palace; 12th-13th century Chapel, built to house the insignia of the Holy Roman Empire.	Saalgasse.
4H-35	**Stadtbibliothek (also Universitätsbibliothek), established 1668; 650,000 volumes; *mediaeval mss.; *ivories; outstanding collection of Hebrew mss. and books; World War I literature; Schopenhauer collection.	Schöne Aussicht 2.
5D-36	Hochschulkundliche Sammlung; collection of material pertaining to study of Universities; archives of German students' associations; Library.	Gutleutstrasse 29-31.
4/5E-37	Bibliothek für Neuere Sprachen und Musik (Rothschild-sche Bibliothek), established 1887; ca. 125,000 volumes; 344 volumes of mss.; music and history of music. Archiv des Rheinischen Schrifttums der Gegenwart (Archives of Contemporary Rhenish Literature); ca. 400 mss.; ca. 350 letters; ca. 175 pictures of living authors.	Hermann-Goering-Ufer 15.
5D-38	Richard Strauss Museum (section of Bibliothek für Literatur und Musik); collection related to life and work of Richard Strauss.	Hermann-Goering-Ufer 27
5G-39	Deutschordens-Kirche und Deutschordenshaus (Church and Lodge of the Teutonic Order), 14th-18th centuries; sculpture; on exterior of the parish house, early 15th century statue of Madonna.	Sachsenhausen, Brückenstrasse.
5D-40	Friedrich Nicolaus Manskopfsches Musikgeschichtliches Museum; collection of history of music, presumably now part of the "Bibliothek für Neuere Litteratur und Musik."	Hermann-Goering-Ufer 14
5E-41	***Städelisches Kunstinstitut (Städel Art Institute); outstanding collection of paintings of all periods; drawings and prints with unique pieces; art library.	Schaumainkai 63 and Dürerstrasse 2.
6D-42	***Städtische Skulpturen Sammlung im Liebighaus; sculpture from antiquity to Baroque; Athena by Myron; alabaster altar, ca. 1430; head of Bärbel von Ottenheim by Nicolaus von Leyden.	Schaumainkai 71 and Steinlestrasse 21.
6D-43	Wilhelm-Kratz-Sammlung; *private collection of Frankfurt faience, 17th-18th centuries.	Steinlestrasse.
Not shown on map	Julius-Heyman-Sammlung; private collection of furniture, 15th-17th centuries; painting; sculpture; stained glass; faience. (May have been transferred to one of the museums.)	Palmstrasse 16.
Not shown on map	Wohnsiedlungen modern housing development, by Ernst May, 1926-30.	On the outskirts of the city.
PERSONNEL		
Dr. Walther Rauschenberger, Direktor, Senckenbergische Bibliothek (2A-4).		
Dr. Leo Frobenius, Direktor, Städtisches Völker-Museum, and Städtisches Afrika-Archiv (3F-11).		
Dr. Adolf Feulner, Direktor, Kunstgewerbe Museum (3D-19).		
Dr. Walter Schünemann, Direktor, Bibliothek für Kunst und Technik (3D-20).		
Dr. Heinz Wölcke, Direktor, Museum Heimischer Vor- und Frühgeschichte (3G-21).		
Dr. Ernst Beutler, Direktor, Freies Deutsches Hochstift (4E-22).		
Ernst Otto Graf Solms-Laubach, Direktor, Haus "zur Goldenen Waage" (4F-26); Stadtgeschichtliches Museum (4F-31).		
Dr. Karl Demeter, Archivar, Reichsarchiv (4F-28).		
Dr. Otto Ruppertsberg, Direktor, Stadtarchiv (4F-31).		
Dr. Harry Gerber, Leiter, Archiv der Deutschen Burschenschaft (4F-31).		
Dr. Richard Aehler, Direktor, Stadtbibliothek (4H-35).		
Carl M. Frommel, Leiter, Hochschulkundliche Sammlung (5D-36).		
Dr. Joachim Kirchner, Direktor, Bibliothek für Neuere Sprachen und Musik (4/5E-37).		
Dr. Ernst Holzinger, Direktor, Städelisches Kunstinstitut (5E-41).		



(map)

APPENDIX 5

ST. LEONHARD KIRCHE

1.	NAME OF MONUMENT/INSTITUTION: Leonhards-Kirche
2.	ADDRESS/LOCATION: Alte Mainzergasse.
3.	PERSON IN CHARGE: City of Frankfurt a/Main, Building Office, Estates Administration, Glauburgstrasse 17/19. Catholic Parsonage: St Leonhard, Alte Mainzergasse 45.
4.	CONTENTS: a. Pre-War: High altar, about 1500, Bavarian, with St Ulrich and four other saints. On the Predella, the legend of St Ursula. Altar of the Virgin, 1480, Flemish. Death and ascension of the Virgin; the Holy Family; in the side panels, The Adoration of the Shepherds, The Adoration of the Kings. Altar of the Crucifixion, about 1500; in the shrine, Crucifix and four saints; in the wings the 12 Apostles. The Corpse of Christ and two figures of watchers saved from the ancient Altar of the Holy Sepulchre. St Leonhard's altar, 1813, with altar-piece by Joseph Karl Stieler. The Last Supper, by Hans Holbein the Elder, part of the High Altar of the former Dominikaner-Kirche, 1501. Altar Crucifix, 16th century. Holy water basin. 1477. Stone pulpit, about 1500, hexagonal, with rich tracery. Chalice, about 1510, with relief: Mary, St. George and St. Leonhard. Three confessionals, 1708, with antique colored mounting, from the former Carmelite Church. Effigy, 1521. b. Present: All the above have been saved.
5.	CULTURAL IMPORTANCE: The site was presented to the citizens of Frankfurt in 1219 for the erection of a church. It was completed before 1230 and dedicated to the Virgin and St. George.

From 1317 a collegiate foundation. From 1323 dedicated to St Leonhard in consequence of the acquirement of relics of that saint. Extended 1430 - 1520. Repaired 1807 - 1811, 1881 and 1926/27. The Romanic building was a basilica with two round east towers and a square choir. In the towers were side nave apses. The towers were crowned by pointed stone cupolas over eight small gables at a time. In the north wall two splendid Romanic gateways, the more richly decorated signed Engelbertus f(ecit). With the extension a new Gothic choir was built with 3/8 keystone, fine starred vault; Modern Gertener may have been the architect. About 1500 the main aisle was re-built in the shape of a big hall. Completed in 1518; at the same time two side aisles with galleries were added. On the north side there was formerly a gallery with a projecting pulpit, from which, amongst other things, the municipal Privileges were read out to the citizens. In the north side aisle the small Seviour's Choir (Holzhausen Choir) with a so-called hanging vault.

6. HISTORY OF WAR DAMAGE:

Damaged by incendiary bombs on 18 and 22 March 1944.

7. DESCRIPTION OF WAR DAMAGE:

The roof was burnt entirely and part of the west gable fell in. The facades remained in good order. In the interior, the plaster of the arches suffered from the fire, but the arches themselves have remained standing. Lately part of the ribs of the arches in the north and south aisles fell in and parts were so loosened that they had to be taken away.

8. ESTIMATES FOR REPAIR/RESTORATION:

Space to be re-built:	2,000	cbm
Cost of restoration:	155,000	RM
Standard price: Unskilled labor (basic price):	40	RM
Skilled labor (basic price):	60	RM
Inclusive extra cost of sculpture and organ:	35,000	RM
Degree of damage:	20	%
Essential building materials:		
Bricks	6,000	
Sandstone	40	cbm
Cement	25	tons

Lime	30	tons
Gypsum	5	tons
Iron	24	tons
Foundation lumber	114	cbm
Finished lumber	10	cbm
Glass	160	qm
Roofing paper	1,400	qm
Slates	1,950	qm
Metal plates	90	

Work necessary:

Completion of roof; interior repairs.

Estimated duration of work:

1 year with 25 workers.

9. ACTION TAKEN:

The roof has been repaired and covered with roofing paper, the west gable walled up and the window tracery renovated where it was damaged. New lead glazing was put in. In the interior, the missing choir windows were lined with boards. The arches are being repaired. Two plinths have already been repaired.

10. PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Plate Number:

XXVII

b. Photograph Number:

160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166.

APPENDIX 6

DOM ST. BARTHOLOMÄUS

1. NAME OF MONUMENT/INSTITUTION:	Dom St. Bartholomäus
2. ADDRESS/LOCATION:	Domplatz
3. PERSON IN CHARGE:	City of Frankfurt a/Main, Building Office Estates Administration, Glauburgstrasse 17/19.
4. CONTENTS:	<p>a. Pre-War:</p> <p>Altars:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. High Altar, from the Katharinenkirche in Salzwedel. 2nd half of the 15th century. Predella and 8 wooden figures not belonging to it originally.2. Priest's Altar without panels, with carved baroque Antependium.3. North transept: Apostle's Altar 1523; Saxon; Predella not belonging to it originally.4. Chapel of the Virgin: Altar of the Sleeping Virgin; presented 1434, restored in 1856 and 1881; stone group under plaster canopy.5. Altar of St. Anne; about 1525, Frankish, modern panel; Predella not belonging to it originally.6. Community Altar; about 1500; Predella not belonging to it originally.7. 6 panels, illustrations from the Life of the Virgin, 16th century.8. South transept: Altar of Our Lady, Swabian, about 1500, new Predella.9. Chapel of the Sepulchre: Altar of the Holy Sepulchre.10. Altar of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, from Seth, Graubünden, by Ivo Striegel, of Memmingen, 1505. The figure of the Heart of Jesus new; also four of the six figures of the Predella. Festoons new.11. Altar of the Three Kings, 1619. Restored in 1821 and 1880. Wooden altar with scroll-work; altar-piece by Peter Brandel.12. Triptych altar from Unna, Westphalia, painted.13. In the tower porch: Bartholomew altar, 1728, by Servatius Hochecker.14. In the cloisters: Bartholomew altar, 1764. Altar-piece of 1670 by Oswald Onghers.

In the choir: Tabernacle, sandstone, 1415-1420.

In the south: Tabernacle, earthenware, 1480, by Nikolaus and Michel Esler.

Choir stall, 1352, richly carved.

Font, about 1700.

Wooden figure of the Virgin, 2nd half of the 15th century.

Stone figures: St Bartholomew and Charles the Great, beginning of the 15th century.

Sacristy: Crucifixion group, end of the 17th century.

In the choir: The Taking Down from the Cross, painting by Anton van Dyck, 1627.

Tombs:

Choir: König Günther von Schwarzburg, died 1349; lid of bier, 1352. The original sides of the bier used as border.

North transept: Stadtschultheiss Rudolf von Sachsenhausen, died 1370. Double tomb of Bürgermeister Joh. von Holzhausen, died 1393, and his wife Gudela Goldsteyn.

Cloisters: Johann von Schwalbach, died 1442.

South transept: Heinrich vom Rhein, died 1527; Mainz workmanship. Johann Carl von Franckenstein, died 1691.

Reichsschultheiss Haller von Hallerstein, died 1551.

6 tombstones, Thurn und Taxis.

Stones bearing coats of arms.

Memorial shields, 14th - 16th century.

Epitaph, Andreas Hirde, died 1518, with a relief of the Mocking of Christ.

In the tower porch: Crucifixion group by Hans Backoffen, presented 1509 (exact copy on the exterior wall of the Dom north transept).

b. Present:

Saved: Altars 1-10, and 12 and 13. Minor repairs necessary.

Destroyed: Altar 11; painting saved.

Destroyed: Altar 14; painting saved.

Damaged:

Choirstall: partly burnt, carving saved.

Font of 1700: top damaged.

Crucifixion group in the sacristy damaged.

Tomb of Joh. Carl von Franckenstein, severely damaged.

12 memorial shields severely damaged, parts extant.

Crucifixion group by Backoffen: severely damaged.

The rest of the inventory is undamaged.

5. CULTURAL IMPORTANCE:

Goes back to the Carolingian age. The foundation walls of the Carolingian building were discovered 1871 - 1874. Three-aisled basilica. Main aisle probably 6 bays, rectangular transept and center apse. East section probably older than the main aisle. In 1235-1245 the Carolingian structure was overhauled. 1250-1265 Gothic portico built, of the width of the transept. Carolingian choir and transept and both western towers retained. 1315 - 1370, Gothic choir, transept and cloister; choir dedicated 1349, built above Carolingian structure. Tower begun 1415 (the two western towers and the old Rathaus were therefore demolished).

Later cloisters and northern staircase to the tower begun 1460. Library, afterwards Election Chapel, south of the choir, begun 1430. The completed new building a triple-naved cross-shaped vaulted Hallenkirche, with three bays in the main aisle. Transept a rectangular intersection with four bays on either side. Choir broader than the center aisle, 3 bays and 5/8 of the keystone. Entire length 70 meters, width of transept 61 meters. Tower 94,75 meters in height. Begun by Madern Gertener, continued by Hans von Ingelheim.

A monastery was founded by the church about 874, named first Salvatorstift, then Bartholomäusstift. The church was the scene of the election and coronation of the German kings and emperors. In 1367 it was damaged by fire. Restored and unified by the cathedral architect Denzinger. The tower was completed according to the original design. The cloisters were made smaller.

Cross-shaped Hallenkirche with western tower. In the north, cloisters and sacristy, in the south Chapel of the Sleeping Virgin and Election Chapel.

6. HISTORY OF WAR DAMAGE:

Variously damaged in the autumn of 1943 (degree and time can no longer be ascertained).

Further damage on 29 January 1944, and severe damage on 22 March 1944, by explosive and incendiary bombs.

7. DESCRIPTION OF WAR DAMAGE:

Exterior:

Tower intact. The window glass and the doors of the south portal destroyed.

Main structure: Slates and rafters of the roof destroyed by fire (22 March 1944). Steel framework of the roof partly, both turrets entirely, preserved. Crossing (of the nave and transepts), the high choir and parts of the northern transept protected by emergency roof. Outer walls mainly undamaged. Damage from splinters of ex-

plosive bombs thrown in the vicinity, to the eastern facade of the south aisle, the flying buttresses of the choir and the main cornice. Slight damage from splinters at the northern entrance. The rose window shaken and endangered by blast. The tracery of the western windows in the southern transept partially destroyed. The ribs and tracery of the eastern windows in the southern transept entirely destroyed. Ribs of the two southern windows in the choir destroyed. Tracery underpinned by temporary masonry. Ribs of the three windows at the end of the choir destroyed, tracery underpinned by temporary masonry. One east window of the north transept entirely, two others partially, destroyed, tracery and ribs preserved but greatly endangered by air pressure.

Ancillary structures: In the south, roofs of the Chapel of the Sleeping Virgin and of the Election Chapel partially, ribs and tracery of the windows entirely, destroyed. In the east, tracery between the buttresses destroyed. In the north, sacristy roof slightly damaged. Cloisters severely damaged by explosive bomb (22 March 1944). Half of the north wall fallen in, arches and ceilings destroyed. Roof burnt (22 March 1944).

Fore-court to the entrance of the north tower now fitted up as a chapel, roof renovated and wovered with roofing paper, windows mended with emergency glazing.

Interior:

Doors and glass for windows missing. Most of the vault intact, a few holes in the middle aisle. Several severies in the choir endangered by cracks. Vault of the south transept has fallen in owing to explosive bombs (29 January 1944). Arches of the Electors' Chapel badly cracked. Severe damage to plaster on all wall surfaces. Main fiala of the large Tabernacle in the south transept destroyed. Stone ornaments of the Chapel of the Sleeping Virgin partly destroyed.

8. ESTIMATES FOR REPAIR/RESTORATION:

Space to be re-built: -

Cost of re-building: 970,000 RM

Standard price:

Unskilled labor (basic price): 40 RM

Skilled labor (basic price): 60 RM

Degree of damage: (steeple undamaged) 55 %

Essential building materials:

Sandstone	135	cbm
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Cement	30	tons
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Lime	58	tons
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Gypsum	3	tons
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Finished lumber	51 cbm
Glass (lead glazing)	1,150 qm
Roofing paper	7,000 qm
Slates	6,500 qm

Work necessary:

Restoration of the south wing and the upper half of the other exterior walls, also the roof and the interior.

Estimated duration of work:

2 years with 60 workers.

9. ACTION TAKEN:

Emergency roof and emergency chapel (about 100,000 RM).

10. PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Plate Number:

VI, VII, VIII.

b. Photograph Number:

35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46.

APPENDIX 7

GOETHE HAUS

1. NAME OF MONUMENT/INSTITUTION:
Goethe Haus
2. ADDRESS/LOCATION:
Grosser Hirschgraben 23.
3. PERSON IN CHARGE:
Freies Deutsches Hochstift. Director: Dr Beutler, Frauenlobstrasse 57.
4. CONTENTS:
a. Pre-War: Goethe's birthplace and the home of his youth. A cultural shrine for all nations. Mementos and household equipment of his age. An extremely valuable library. Autographs and portraits of Goethe's circle.
b. Present: The movable articles were saved by evacuation. The precious house destroyed to the foundations, only the cellar intact.
5. CULTURAL IMPORTANCE:
In 1582 the city trench which at this spot served as a preserve for animals was filled up and reconstructed. The house was built by 1592. It came into the possession of Goethe's grandmother on 1 April 1733 and she lived there alone with her son Johann Kaspar Goethe. After his marriage with Katharina Elisabeth Textor, daughter of the chief municipal magistrate, and after the death of Cornelia Goethe on 26 March 1754, the re-construction and re-building began. Johann Kaspar Goethe died on 25 May 1782. His widow sold the house on 1 May 1795 to private persons, but the old mementos and keepsakes were preserved. In 1863 Dr Volger bought the house for the Freies Deutsches Hochstift and it was restored to the same condition as in Goethe's youth. All later additions were removed and articles that had been thrown away were brought back. Cornelia Goethe had acquired two houses of different size and height but which were connected in the interior. The re-construction of 1755 brought the smaller and lower house under one roof and in one frontage with the larger house, the poet's birthplace. The architect was Johann Friedrich von Uffenbach, who also

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superintended the difficult re-building of the old Main bridge. During the re-construction the family remained in the house, which then received its present form.

It is seven-axed and three-storeyed. The first and second floors jut out over one another towards the street, forming so-called "hang-overs", in order to gain space. An interesting attic storey with a gable rises above the three center axes. The lowest storey is built of stone, the upper floors consist of white-washed timbers. The ground floor windows have beautiful hurdle-work iron bars.

In the interior, a spacious entrance hall and a broad staircase with a fine wrought-iron balustrade. On each floor it opens into a light, wide landing.

The Goetheshaus, with its valuable old furniture, was a dignified place of remembrance, in which a laurel wreath was deposited every year by the English Shakespeare Society. At the same time it formed a good example of a comfortable burgher residence of the second half of the 18th century.

6. HISTORY OF WAR DAMAGE:

Destroyed on 4 October 1943 by incendiary bombs and on 18, 22, and 24 March 1944 by explosive and incendiary bombs.

7. DESCRIPTION OF WAR DAMAGE:

The first incendiary bombs set the attic alight. The flames could be extinguished and the damage repaired. The three severe attacks in March 1944 destroyed the building to the foundations.

The street frontage has fallen in entirely. The south gable wall as far as the window sill is intact, half of the north gable wall - rising diagonally in the direction of the Hochstift - is destroyed. The wall of the courtyard is intact as far as the upper edge of the window-sills. The partition wall between the street and the courtyard room is intact to about 1,50 meters in height. The north wall of the little fountain court is also intact as far as the window-sill in height.

The fountain and the gateway of the courtyard are in good order. In the interior, the two first steps of the sandstone staircase and the right-hand sandstone notch-board are also partly extant. The twisted pillar and the top-part of the landing are extant. The cellars were saved, also the cellars stairs.

Windows and door lintels, as well as parts of the sandstone walls are lying in front of the heaps of rubble.

The ground floor facade of the Freies Deutsches Hochstift in Grosser Hirschgraben are in good condition on the whole, except for damage to plaster. Two windows of the first floor, one window of the second floor. The back facade is intact as high as the ground floor. In the interior, everything has fallen in. The iron and concrete staircase of the new connecting wing is intact and the facade wall as far as the cornice.

Pieces of masonry, window bars and balcony girders were rescued from the ruins.

8. ESTIMATES FOR REPAIR/RESTORATION:

Space to be re-built:

Goethe's birthplace:	3,800 cbm	
Library:	1,000 cbm	4,800 cbm

Cost of restoration:

Goethe's birthplace:	250,000 RM	
Library:	40,000 RM	290,000 RM

Standard price:

Unskilled labor:	40 RM	
Skilled labor:	60 RM	
Inclusive extra cost of sculpture:	22,000 RM	

Degree of damage:

Goethe's birthplace:	80 %	
Library:	20 %	

Essential building materials:

	G.Birthplace	Library
Bricks	40,000	-
Sandstone	10 cbm	-
Cement	20 tons	
Lime	30 tons	2 tons
Gypsum	10 tons	3 tons
Iron	5 tons	-
Construction lumber	162 cbm	-
Finished lumber	10 cbm	11 cbm
Glass	120 qm	70 qm
Roofing paper	500 qm	250 qm
Slates	500 qm	250 qm

Work necessary:

Goethe's birthplace: Complete re-building from above the cellar.

Library: Renovation of roof and interior finishing.

Estimated duration of work:
1 year with 30 workers.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS:

It will be possible to re-build the house by utilizing the numerous models and extant remains.

10. ACTION TAKEN:

Goethe's birthplace: None.
Library: Clearance work.

11. PHOTOGRAPHS:

- a. Plate Number:
XIV, XV.
- b. Photograph Number:
84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89.

APPENDIX 8

FAHRGÄBE 17 (HAUS FÜRSTENECK)

1. NAME OF MONUMENT/INSTITUTION: Fursteneck
2. ADDRESS/LOCATION: Fahrgasse 17
3. PERSON IN CHARGE: Bund tätiger Altstadtfreunde e.V. Director: Dr. Fr. Libbecke, Bad Homburg, Alsterparkstrasse 8. Office: Frankfurt a/Main, Mittelweg 3.
4. CONTENTS: a. Pre-War: Contained copy of a magnificent Renaissance room (panelled) of 1615. The original in the Kunstmuseum since 1891. Beautiful spacious staircase built in at the end of the 18th century. The building in itself important. Library and illustrative material of the Bund tätiger Altstadtfreunde. b. Present: In the raids of 18 - 24 March 1944 the house and its contents were completely destroyed down to the cellar. At the same time the original Renaissance room in the Kunstmuseum was destroyed by fire.
5. CULTURAL IMPORTANCE: In 1362 the site belonged to the alderman Johann von Holzhausen, the house was built shortly before 1400. Pentagonal ground-plan. Four storeys. Circle of turrets and battlements with four small octagonal corner towers. High Gothic hip roof. On the ground floor originally sixpartite cross-vaulted arbours; four pointed gateways leading to the Fahrgasse, walled in quadrangularly in 1791. On the western side of the courtyard originally a tower with a winding staircase. Demolished in the 18th century and the staircase transferred to the house. For two centuries the Fursteneck belonged to patrician families, from 1582 to a burgher family. In 1609 it came into the possession of Dietrich Gossmann, who had the splendid Renaissance room in the pentagonal main room of the first floor completed in 1615, by an unknown master. The Kunstmuseum purchased the panelling in 1891.
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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Probably the residential tower on the west side, "Zu den Sauköpfen", belonged to the Fürtsteneck in the Middle Ages. In any case the ground floor was much older than the Fürtsteneck; Romanic form, 12th century.

6. HISTORY OF WAR DAMAGE:

Destroyed on 18 and 22 March 1944 by incendiary and explosive bombs.

7. DESCRIPTION OF WAR DAMAGE:

The house was destroyed to the foundations, also the tower "Zu den drei Sauköpfen".

8. ESTIMATES FOR REPAIR/RESTORATION:

Space to be re-built:	6,390	cbm
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Cost of restoration:	383,400	RM
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Standard price:

Unskilled labor:

Skilled labor: (basic price):	60	RM
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Degree of damage:	100	%
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Essential building materials:

Bricks	225,000	
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Sandstone	138	cbm
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Cement	25	tons
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Lime	76	tons
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Gypsum	10	tons
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Iron	7	tons
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Construction lumber	115	cbm
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Finished lumber	20	cbm
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Glass	150	qm
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Roofing paper	660	qm
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Slates	1,000	qm
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Work necessary:

Complete re-building on remains of basement.

Estimated duration of work:

1 year with 60 workers.

9. ACTION TAKEN:

None.

10. PHOTOGRAPHS:

a. Plate Number:

XIII, XIV

b. Photograph Number:

79, 80, 81.

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