RATIONALIZING EMPIRE: NATION, SPACE AND COMMUNITY IN
JAPANESE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1931-1945

by Seokwon Lee

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IN JAPANESE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1931-1945

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Seokwon Lee
August 2010
This dissertation explores Asian discourses produced by Japanese social scientists during the wartime period. The intellectual history of the Japanese empire has long been conceived of as a fantasy to be forgotten rather than as an object to be studied. However, this study presents a new thesis: that Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular, committed themselves to the Japanese empire in a highly rational and scientific manner, rather than turning to the traditional and particularistic notion of Asia. Contending that beginning in the early 1930s, Japanese social scientists began searching for a new regional order to replace the League of Nations system, this study shows that the concept of Asia emerged as the main subject of social scientific studies in Japan. This dissertation investigates how the notion of a regional system developed by Japanese social scientists was transformed into a highly rationalized vision of imperial knowledge that eventually shaped the intellectual basis for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in the early 1940s. While taking into consideration various aspects of Asian discourses, this study primarily focuses on how imperial intellectuals in wartime Japan theorized and redefined the concepts of nation, space and community in order to justify Japan’s colonial violence, while challenging the notion of Western social sciences as modern, objective and therefore universal. In this process, my dissertation examines the intellectual space of Japanese imperialism where the project of overcoming the West and transcending the dichotomy between empire and colony took place.

In the conclusion, this dissertation argues that the project of rationalization and
modernization in wartime Asian discourses was not simply a break from the dominant nation-state and modernization discourses in postwar and postcolonial Asia. The purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, to provide a new intellectual perspective for writing a comprehensive intellectual history of Japanese imperialism.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Seokwon Lee was born in Seoul, South Korea in 1975. After obtaining a BA in History at Yonsei University in South Korea, he joined the Interdisciplinary Program of Area Studies at Yonsei University, where he completed a Master of Arts in Japanese Studies in 2003. In the same year, he began a PhD program in History at Cornell University. In 2008, he was a foreign researcher at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in Japan. He will start teaching at Fort Lewis College in Durango, Colorado, in the fall of 2010.
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and wife.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

One might say that it is a most pleasant moment to write acknowledgements for one’s work. But I have maintained the firm belief that the people who have supported an author are far more delighted to read a work that is well-written than to read acknowledgements for their help in creation. I also have held to a more radical principle; that is, one should not write acknowledgements unless a work is written well enough to reveal the names of one’s teachers. I am unsure whether this belief came from Confucian thinking, but it became an important principle at some point in my academic career. For this reason, I voluntarily waived the right to write acknowledgements for my MA thesis in 2003. But I have determined to change my philosophy at this time and would like to express my deepest gratitude to these wonderful people who have supported me in various ways, in hope that they find this dissertation worthy of their faith in me.

I still vividly remember when I first met Professor J. Victor Koschmann in his office on August 14, 2003, one day after I arrived in Ithaca. His smiles relieved many of the anxieties that I had as an international student. It did not take long for me to realize how lucky I was to have the opportunity to study with someone who is the most inspiring scholar in his field and at the same time displays a cure-all smile and endless optimism toward his students. Professor Koschmann was tremendously patient with me during my seven years as a doctoral student and provided both pointed comments and warm encouragement each time I felt ontological skepticism toward my work. In this way he led one student from Korea with bundles of disorganized curiosity toward the space of serious scholarship. An encounter with Professor Naoki Sakai led me to extend my gaze to critical Asian studies. His speculations and persistent interrogations of many concepts and theories that had been taken for granted
certainly played an important role in shaping the theoretical framework of both my
general study and this dissertation. Professor Sherman Cochran introduced me to the
joy of Chinese history. All the inspirations and encouraging comments I received from
him helped me develop transnational perspectives in studying Asian history and led
me to include China as an integral part of my dissertation.

Professor Brett de Bary taught me the importance of literature in studying history.
Thanks to her, I was also able to expose myself to the world of translation, which
showed me, as an intellectual historian, how important it is to gain a more precise
understanding of the thinking behind texts written in other languages. An encounter
with Professor Hirano Katsuya in 2006 was a blessing for me in many ways.
Throughout a number of discussions on history and everyday life, Professor Hirano,
who himself was once an international student, did not hesitate to share his personal
experiences and insights with me. I also would like to give my special thanks to him
for allowing me to join his 2008 seminar on Japanese historiography, which greatly
helped me concretize my arguments in the last two chapters of this dissertation.

I am also indebted to various institutions which supported my research project
both financially and academically. Robert Smith, Starr and Lee Teng-Hui Fellowships
from the East Asia Program and a Sage Dissertation Fellowship from the Graduate
School at Cornell University enabled me to concentrate on coursework and
dissertation writing. Multiple travel and conference grants from the East Asia Program,
the Department of History and the Graduate School enabled me to bridge my
transnational studies of Japan and Korea at critical moments. The Japan-Korea
Cultural Foundation generously supported my fieldwork in Tokyo for about a year. In
Japan, many teachers and colleagues deserve special credit. Professor Yonetani
Masafumi at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies was a ray of light in my somewhat
lonely life in Japan. Treating me just like his colleague, he became a real mentor and
friend, and through his help, I was able to present my work in Japan and broaden my interest in Japanese intellectual history. Ji Young Shin, Eun Mi Cho and other friends in Japan became wonderful colleagues and shared with me various insights regarding colonialism and imperialism. In Korea, The Institute for Korean Historical Studies gave me an opportunity to present my work in 2009.

Becoming part of an extremely inspiring history and Asian studies community was a big blessing in my life. Along with wonderful teachers, many graduate student colleagues reconfirmed me that my determination to study at Cornell was one of the best decisions I have made in my life. Takeshi Kimoto, Peter Lavelle, Akiko Ishii, Pedro Erber, Aaron Moore, Gavin Walker, Yoshiaki Mihara, Franz Hofer, Chris Jones, Chris Ahn, Travis Workman, Noriaki Hoshino, Claudine Ang, Lisa Onaga, We Jung Yi, Emma Willoughby, Masaki Kinjo, Marcie Middlebrooks, Jeff Dubois, Yuko Shibata, Yayoi Koizumi, Tarandeep Kang, Yuanchong Wang, Min-Hwa Ahn, Deokhyo Choi, Hajimu Masuda, and Joo-Rak Son, all of these wonderful colleagues inspired and helped me in many ways. InYoung Bong’s excellent study of Chinese literature enriched my study greatly. Soo Kyeong Hong was another reliable friend who always stimulated my intellect.

I also would like to express gratitude to many teachers and colleagues outside Cornell’s graduate study group for their warm support. The rigorous writings and passionate teaching of the late Professor Ki-Jung Pang, a much beloved teacher who passed away suddenly in 2008, were the biggest reason for my determination to be an intellectual historian. Professor Sungmo Yim at Yonsei University first introduced me to the joy and significance of Japan studies and gave me important advice at nearly all critical stages of my PhD study. The invaluable friendship and academic exchanges I have enjoyed with Jeong Wan Hong for almost two decades are among the most important assets I obtained at Yonsei University. Seung-ryul Lee, Sang Tu Ko, Sang
Joon Kim, Dongju Ham, Pyeong Sik Park, Eunbong Choi, Sang-Euy Lee, Tae-hoon Lee, Yunjae Park, and Joon-Hyung Park were wonderful teachers and at the same time gave me valuable advice during my study in Korea and in the United States. Sungjo Kim, Se Young Lee, Chung-Kang Kim and Soonyi Lee have always stimulated me at various stages of my study-abroad life. The people I met at Suyu+trans inspired me in many ways and in particular led me to deepen my ontological question of how I should live as a scholar. Gyewon Kim and Hyunjung Cho, both of whom I met in Tokyo, became good friends of mine at the last stage of this dissertation writing. I also would like to give my special thanks to Sara Schaffzin for her excellent editorial help and friendship in Ithaca.

Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my family for their unchanging and unconditional support. Eunix Bae, the love of my life, has shared all of my ups and downs and has been the biggest supporter of my life and study. Without her, I would not have finished this dissertation, and I thus dedicate this work to her. My mother, Gyesoon Ko, has trusted and supported me wholeheartedly and her joy over my accomplishments will be one of the most touching memories in my life. Gilchoon Bae and Jeong-Sook Lee, my parents-in-law, have supported and prayed for me as if I were their son. Jangwon Lee, my elder brother, and his wife, Hyunsook Park, have always encouraged me and taken up my share of family responsibilities in Seoul when I was abroad. I am also indebted to Sunil Bae and Woo-Kyung Jung for their kindness and support.

Finally, I am moved to tears at the thought that my father must be very happy to hear in heaven that I have finished this dissertation.
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Chapter 1

Introduction:
Rewriting the Intellectual History of Japanese Social Sciences

This dissertation is a study of wartime Japanese social sciences. No group of intellectuals was as preoccupied with the search for modernity as were Japanese social scientists in the early 20th century. Their ultimate aim was to explicate the path of historical development in Japanese society through a social scientific language. Not surprisingly, they were trained in prestigious imperial and private universities and many of them were among the blessed few Japanese people who were able to visit Western countries, Germany in particular. They dexterously absorbed the modern knowledge and technologies that soon became the intellectual backbone of the modern Japanese nation-state. However, this study does not aim to narrate the stories of those Japanese social scientists, who are still revered as the fathers of modernization in Japan. Rather, it deals with the period of time between 1931 and 1945, often categorized as the wartime or interwar period, a time which many renowned social scientists in postwar Japan asserted had left few traces for them to examine. In that respect, this dissertation might be a study of the “dark era” of Japanese social sciences.

In 1947, two years after Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War, the 33-year-old political scientist Maruyama Masao argued pointedly that prewar Japanese political science “had no tradition worth reviving.”¹ This barbed remark might be interpreted as a critique of wartime Japanese social scientists who committed themselves to

colonialism and the imperial war. It is understandable that social scientists’ involvement in wartime discourses was conceived of as an “original sin” by many postwar Japanese social scientists such as Maruyama, an intellectual icon of postwar Japanese democracy and the “civil society” school in the 1950s and 1960s. In that respect, it might not be out of line to understand Maruyama’s pronouncement as a reflection of a general attitude toward not just political science but wartime Japanese social sciences as a whole. However, one may wonder why Maruyama and his students particularly problematized wartime Japanese social sciences, given that the issue of colonialism and imperialism existed throughout modern Japanese history, ever since Japan began to colonize its neighbors in the 1870s.

An important clue to this question can be found in the ample historiography of Japanese social sciences written by Ishida Takeshi, a renowned political scientist as well as Maruyama’s own student. Echoing Maruyama’s critiques of wartime political science, Ishida positioned wartime Japanese social sciences in a distinctive way. According to him, the first and foremost guilt of wartime Japanese social sciences was that social scientists voluntarily subordinated themselves to the national entity (国体, kokutai), going against the critical and objective tradition that their ancestors such as Minobe Tasukichi and Yoshino Sakuzō had established. This guilt was described by Ishida as “atavismus”; that is, these wartime social scientists committed a “self-negation” by dismissing scientific objectivity and the rationality, which are imperative

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2 “Extensive self-examination does seem to have taken place in other branches of social sciences too, once the hollow sounding tunes heard briefly in the intermediate post-war period subsided. A year and a half after the war ended social scientists were asking themselves whether their sciences could really serve as guiding influences in contemporary reality... They realized that the problem was not to be solved by merely returning to ‘the good old days’ and treating the decade of reaction as a historical vacuum,” Maruyama wrote. Ibid., pp. 226-227.

3 Ishida Takeshi, *Nihon no shakai kagaku* (Tokyo: Tokyodaigaku shuppankai, 1984), p.144. Notably, both Maruyama’s and Ishida’s criticism directly and indirectly focused on the work of political scientist Rōyama Masamichi, Professor of Law at Tokyo Imperial University and a leading intellectual in the formation of East Asian Community discourses in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In Chapter 2, I will discuss in detail Rōyama’s theorization of a new political space and his encounter with Asian regionalism.
for social scientific thinking.\footnote{Ibid.}

In this way, the intellectual history of Japanese social sciences has been written with a clear division between the prewar and postwar periods. While wartime social sciences have remained a vacuum space or a “dark era” soon to be forgotten, those writing the history of the social sciences in Japan have been predominantly concerned with redeeming the glorious social scientific tradition of the prewar period. Through this process, the “continuity” in the intellectual history of Japanese social sciences has been revitalized as postwar Japanese social sciences have become once again an intellectual guide for reconstructing a modern nation-state, as did prewar social sciences.

This approach, however, has produced ruptures, making it difficult to draw a comprehensive picture of Japanese social sciences. In an effort to critically evaluate wartime social sciences, both Maruyama and Ishida conducted what they called a methodology-centered analysis. According to them, social scientists must embody objectivity and scientific rationality as a basic condition for analytical thinking. They were convinced that Japanese social scientists’ apolitical and highly objective perspective became distorted as they committed themselves to the state’s empire building project during the wartime period. In this way, scientific rationality and “bad ideologies” are postulated as essentially contradictory to each other. Highlighting the massive government intervention in social scientists’ knowledge production process during the wartime period, Maruyama and Ishida aimed to reduce the problem of wartime social sciences to the power relation between the authoritarian state and the intellectuals who responded to it.

It is important to note that this seemingly critical approach to wartime social sciences was also premised on a certain political intention. By divorcing objectivity and rationality in the social sciences from “bad ideologies” in real politics, both Maruyama

\footnote{Ibid.}
and Ishida intended to prevent Japanese social sciences from extending its consideration of imperialism and colonialism to other periods. The wartime period is thus portrayed as the most coercive time and thus a particular moment in Japanese history, when intellectuals were forced to collaborate with the state. Maruyama and Ishida not only showed no sympathy with them, but also made every effort to eliminate their “stained” knowledge from the realm of orthodox Japanese social sciences. In doing so, they effectively precluded the complicit relationship between social sciences and colonialism throughout modern Japanese history from being critically interrogated. Therefore, I argue that behind the ostensibly purely methodology-centered analysis of Maruyama and Ishida, there is an explicit political intention to rescue Japanese social sciences from the specter of imperialism and colonialism.

Leading social scientists’ writings in the late 1920s and early 1930s clearly show us that they were already developing a series of imperial discourses on an East Asian new order that was later concretized in the notion of the East Asian Community or the East Asian Cooperative Community. This explains why this study deals with a span of the two decades between the late 1920s and the 1940s, rather than simply focusing on the wartime period between 1937 and 1945. I argue that the commitment of leading social scientists such as Takata Yasuma, Rōyama Masamichi, and Shinmei Masamichi to Asian discourses before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 first tells us that their involvement was not simply a choice forced by the government. In this respect, it is seriously misleading to label these social scientists’ commitment to the Japanese empire, both in theory and in practice, a one-time “deviation” from authentic social sciences.

More importantly, my study explores the paradoxical nature of objectivity and scientific rationality in the social sciences. These wartime social scientists developed imperial discourses based on a critical observation of the limits of rationality and
objectivity inherent in the social sciences in the early 20th century. Their discourses are not unrelated to critical approaches to modern thought systems that first emanated from Europe. European intellectuals’ critical speculations on modernity were in many cases associated with disclosing the limits of democracy and the capitalistic modes of life. On the other hand, anti-Western and anti-modern theories rapidly gained currency as Japan’s conflict with the West became aggravated in the wake of Japan’s invasion of China in 1931. Anti-Western and conservative intellectuals intended to create a totalitarian system in which the Emperor dominates social values and unsurprisingly, their main targets were democracy and the capitalistic system. All these circumstances created certain conditions that symbolized “social sciences in crisis.” Japanese social scientists in the early 1930s were placed in the position of having to respond to challenges emanating both from real politics and from critiques of scientific objectivity and rationality in the social sciences.

However, the Japanese social scientists I will deal with in this study did not denounce objectivity and rationality as such. Instead, they attempted to expand the exteriority of social scientific thinking to the seemingly “unscientific” and subjective elements of human life. They were conscious that creating and rationalizing a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empire would not be possible by simply relying upon the existing principles of causality and objective rationality in the social sciences. Therefore, they strove to present a new concept of rationality by engaging both objective and subjective aspects in human society and incorporating them in a new social system called the East Asia Cooperative Community.

**Rationalizing Empire: Subjective Social Science (主体的社会科学)**

At this point, let me move on to the central thesis of my dissertation, rationalizing empire. It might be useful to revisit the sociologist Max Weber’s classic definition of
rationality. Weber defined rationalization as a driving force for modern society. According to him, it diminishes the religious, supernatural, and metaphysical part of human activities, which he viewed as irrational. Therefore, rationality is comprised of social and institutional forces controlled by reason, calculation, and goal-oriented activities. Weber distinguished modern society from other forms of society by the formers’ calculability, efficiency and predictability. Based on this premise, He established a universally shared speculative mode in the social sciences; that is, private, social and institutional phenomena in modern society must be explained, calculated and predicted, while relegating the rest of human activities to the realm of irrationality.

It is important to revisit the notion of rationality before discussing wartime Japanese social scientists’ engagement with the empire. To begin with, rational choice or rational action is not necessarily accompanied by social justice or politico-economic development. Rationality as a purely social scientific concept is often intertwined with a highly teleological sense of human life. In the social sciences, the term “rationalization” has denoted the optimization of effectiveness and productivity and precisely for this reason, it has been considered one of the core values of modern society. On the other hand, it is often accompanied by the after-the-fact justification of one’s own subjective action by linking it to the objective norms of society. In discussing Japanese social sciences in the interwar period, however, I do not use the term rationality in the narrow context of social scientists’ discussions of maximizing effectiveness, nor in the context of the after-the-fact justification of colonial violence executed by the Japanese empire.

Instead, I pay close attention to the way Japanese social scientists in the wartime period redefined the very concept of rationalization, which they first encountered through Western social sciences. The first challenge they confronted was how to

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explicate non-scientific and intrinsic elements such as Asian space, race, and community through a social scientific language. In responding to this challenge, they began dismantling the highly compartmentalized disciplinary order in the social sciences. Each discipline in the social sciences – political science, sociology and economics – has its own explanatory boundary – economy, society and politics – and sets forth objective theories to explain human activities using methodologies of its own.

The synthesis of these compartmentalized academic units creates an objective and comprehensive picture of each society. The wartime Japanese social scientists whom I will discuss became conscious that human activities are constituted under a hybrid and heterogeneous mixture of social elements, and they soon came to realize that an East Asian empire could not be created simply by instilling in imperial subjects ideas based on monolithic and compartmentalized social theories.

More importantly, redefining the notion of rationality by engaging non-social scientific concepts was closely associated with the logic of creating new social scientific thinking, that is, a subjective (主体的) social science. Here, the term “subjective” does not simply denote something that is not “objective.” To be sure, these social scientists were aware that the East Asian regional community was full of subjective (主観的) elements. Therefore, they searched for a social scientific logic that could convert these subjectivities (主観性) and uncertainties in space, ethnicity and community into rational forces necessary for building an empire. However, they were also convinced that building an East Asian empire could be accomplished simply by revisiting the notion of Asian commonness, which entailed non-social scientific elements.

It was for this reason that these social scientists faced a second challenge; that is, how a new social science should overcome the binary structure of empire and colony and theorize “subjects” as a new form of identity in a Japan-centered empire. This is
why the social scientific theories that I will analyze in this dissertation commonly
touched upon the question of transforming the colonized into the active participants of
the empire-building project. Therefore, I pay special attention to how these wartime
Japanese social scientists theorized non-social scientific Asian elements – religion,
culture, race, and community– in a new social scientific language of subject formation.
In this process, the logic of “rationalizing empire” was closely associated with the
project of a subjective social science (主体的社会科学) that focused on creating newly
motivated social scientific subjects who would serve the collective good of the East
Asian Community.

One important question still remains to be answered. Building an Asian empire
based on a newly defined rationalist mindset, rather than intrinsic and supernatural
forces necessarily called for the reconfiguration of the power relationship between
metropole and colony. These social scientists were convinced that in order to transform
the heterogeneous and subjective elements of Asian society into rational potentials for
the “community of destiny,” forward-looking and at times subversive social, economic
and political measures must be carried out in the colony: expansion of educational
opportunities and political rights, eradication of racial discrimination, and facilitation of
economic development. This notion was logically connected to reformative discourses
in Japan proper. To be sure, many of these social scientists were once ardent supporters
of liberal democracy, and some of them were preoccupied with the dream of socialist
revolution. These formerly liberal or left-wing thinkers often created political tensions
as they were opposed to the wartime policy of conservative bureaucrats and military
leaders during the wartime period. Many of them tried to “reform” the domestic
structure by proposing “radical” policies. Precisely for this reason, there has been
another tendency to evaluate these wartime social scientists from a different perspective.
In contrast to Maruyama and Ishida, who simply eliminated them from the orthodox
history of Japanese social sciences, a new perspective focuses on the historical impacts that their reformist social sciences had on both Japan and the colony. Although their imperial commitment has been harshly criticized, this new perspective aims to pave a new way toward understanding wartime intellectual history by overcoming the binary paradigm of the colonizer and the colonized, or resistance and collaboration.  

I fully agree that imperial/colonial history must be rewritten by including voices of minorities and the colonized. But I strongly disagree that rewriting the intellectual history of the Japanese empire in the highly ambiguous languages of reform or passive resistance can bring new life to it. To be sure, the rationalist stream, represented by the notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community, was substantially different from the total mobilization policy of hard-line military and political leaders who are unquestionably responsible for forcing a countless number of colonial subjects onto the battlefield. This does not mean, however, that what might be called rationalist and moderate intellectuals took a forward-looking perspective and formed a buffer-zone against brutal military violence. Rather than cast a somewhat romantic eye toward their frustrated dream of constructing a utopian empire, I argue that what is important is to thoroughly investigate why and how leading intellectuals subjectively immersed themselves in the empire building project. Through the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community, they aimed to create logics through which both the colonized and colonizer could voluntarily rationalize their commitment, in many cases even sacrificing their lives, to the community of collective violence. I also interrogate the perception that scientific rationality is free from any kind of atrocities toward humanity. Paradoxically, this study aims to show that the maximization of rational thinking itself  

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produced colonial violence in its extreme form during the Asia-Pacific War.

**Japanese Social Sciences as Area Studies**

To further investigate the paradoxical nature of rationality and objectivity in wartime Japanese social sciences, one might need to call into question the logic of universality and particularity inherent in the social sciences. The ontological value of the social sciences was to establish universal languages through which every phenomenon in human society could be explicated. At stake is the notion that the term universality is often considered identical with the West. Social scientists have observed societies outside the universal world through the binary of universality and particularity. Extending one’s gaze to the other has been conceptualized in the name of area studies, and this was the case for Japanese social scientists in the early 20th century as well. As many have pointed out, Japanese social scientists were actively involved in producing knowledge about Asia. The East Asian Cooperative Community, which later became the theoretical ground for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, was the zenith of their intellectual endeavors to produce and accumulate knowledge about Asia during the wartime period.

It is not uncommon for social scientists to get closely involved in producing knowledge about the other. Immanuel Wallerstein’s insightful study shows that postwar social scientific research in the United States was conducted with a political view toward accumulating practical knowledge and information about other areas in the name of area studies. In most cases, area studies in the United States were focused on assessing people and cultures in non-Western areas based on the universal logic of the social sciences. Accordingly, their modes of life are often categorized as “particular.”

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7 The following statement clearly shows the nature of postwar area studies in the United States. “The immediate need for social scientists who know the different regions of the world stands second only to the demand for military and naval officers familiar with the actual and potential combat zones….The primary
and in most cases, extending one’s gaze to the other for the purpose of knowing about “them” as opposite to “me” results in reinforcing one’s own identity. This process is often called the politics of identity or subject formation, that is, by determining the other as particular, one’s own position as universal is guaranteed. Precisely for this reason, the formulated notion of universality and particularity in the social sciences has perfectly explained the existential meaning of area studies. This is also why a number of critical intellectuals have recently engaged in efforts to deconstruct area studies.9

Returning to the history of Japanese social sciences, one may find important aspects of area studies in the early 20th century. Japanese social scientists of the time, as I have mentioned, aspired to guide and explain Japan’s passage into a modern society. To put it another way, this was a painstaking effort to identify Japan with the West, by demonstrating that Japan had the same path of modernization that the West had undergone. In spite of methodological differences, this epistemology dominated the mindset of Japanese social scientists until the early 1930s. As a result, they acquired the symbolic “trophy” presented by the West that Japan was the only Asian country that had successfully completed a modernization project.

The seemingly successful identity formation in prewar Japanese social sciences...
created a paradoxical space between Japan and its Asian neighbors. The birth of modern social sciences in Japan was inseparable from Japan’s position as a colonizer since the 1870s. The process of producing knowledge about the colonized took the typical form of universality and particularity. Japanese intellectuals’ colonial gaze was in no way different from that of European intellectuals, who determined their colonies, Southeast Asia in particular, as particular societies and developed “area studies.” In a similar way, Japanese intellectuals portrayed minority groups including Koreans as not belonging to the universal world and they therefore rationalized Japan’s colonization of these groups in the name of civilization and enlightenment. In this sense, early 20th century Japanese social sciences such as area studies were essentially double-layered. On the one hand, these Japanese intellectuals made every effort to position Japan in the universal world, and this very process of becoming universal citizens was possible by particularizing the rest of Asia.

However, the problem of universality and particularity was not as simple as Japanese social scientists might have anticipated. The “basic instinct” of returning to Asia never completely disappeared. The concept of Asia as a geographic, cultural, and racial given constantly resurged in the thinking of Japanese intellectuals.\textsuperscript{10} Needless to say, returning to Asia was in most cases a political move designed to spread the rhetoric of Japan’s mission of protecting Asia from Western imperialism. However, Japanese social scientists in political science, economics and sociology still strove to create a theory of having to universalize Asia in the grand current of civilization, while avoiding the question of Japan as a colonizer.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} Okakura Tenshin, \textit{The ideals of the East, with special reference to the art of Japan} (New York: E.P. Dutton and company, 1905).

\textsuperscript{11} Kang Sang Jung has made the interesting point that liberal Japanese intellectuals such as Nitobe Inazu and Yanaihara Tadao, both trained in the Department of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University and heavily influenced by Adam Smith’s evolutionary economic philosophy, attempted to rationalize the highly inconsistent relationship between liberal social science and colonialism in their advocating the logic of civilizing mission and the dissemination of advanced culture. Kang Sang Jung, “The Discovery of
In the meantime, the social scientific distance between Japan and Japan’s Orient became increasingly wide. To be sure, modernity or modernization was not necessarily conceptualized by Japanese social scientists in a positive way. The project of building a modern society was in many cases associated with constructing a powerful nation-state, which often results in the dominance of the state over individuals or society. Beginning in the late 1910s, Japanese social scientists started to speak out against the state which once enabled them to be a privileged social group. Radical Marxist intellectuals and liberal thinkers in social scientific disciplines called into question the superabundance of state authority, (*Staatslehre*). To put it another way, Marxists advocated the emancipation of the proletariat and liberal intellectuals called for the true establishment of democracy. In this process, they made an important theoretical breakthrough in discovering the concept of society (*社會, shakai*) and discovering social problems (*社會問題, shakai mondai*) that occurred as a result of modernization. Thus, they effectively demonstrated the possibility of critical and independent social sciences from the bottom up, overcoming the excessive influence of the state as a top-down agency.

I argue that the qualitative diversity of Japanese social sciences can be fully evaluated only when one takes into account the historical reality that Japan had become an imperial power. The expansion of an independent social space within Japan does not necessarily tell us that Japanese social scientists armed themselves with theories critical of imperialism. Nor does it show us that as a result, commoners at the bottom organized resistant movements against both the emperor system and imperialism. As Andrew Gordon’s study well demonstrates, the development of democracy and capitalism at

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home became paradoxically associated with endorsing national interests abroad, and consequently, imperialism and democracy could cohabit the political space for a considerable time.\(^\text{14}\) For this reason, many have delved into the question of why the democratic regime suddenly collapsed and the reactionary militarists came to power in 1930s Japan.\(^\text{15}\) A renowned postwar Japanese intellectual, Kato Shūichi, has presented the interesting thesis that this heyday of liberalist thinking in the Taisho Democracy period foreshadowed the coming of wartime totalitarianism in the 1930s.\(^\text{16}\)

**Wartime Japanese Social Sciences: The Reversed Logic of Universality**

The search for the origins of wartime mobilization in the tradition of Taisho democracy is very important as a meaning of critically understanding Japanese intellectual history, in that it provides an effective antithesis to the theory that Japanese fascism was a particular moment. The thesis of continuity between the prewar and wartime periods has recently gained currency among a wide range of students of Japanese studies, especially in the United States. It has played an important role in refuting the myopic and highly politically-oriented notion of universalism and particularism that has long constituted the core value of postwar Japan studies in the name of modernization theory. As Harry Harootunian and others have emphasized, the so-called advent of Japan studies in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s was closely related to the task of digging into the question of why only Japan accomplished modernization to the level at

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which it could boldly stand up against the United States in the Asia Pacific War. For this reason, modernization theory in postwar Japan studies has shown an explicit Japan-centeredness, completely omitting the colonial origins of wartime and postwar Japanese society.

The continuity thesis between prewar and wartime periods has been recently expanded to the postwar period. A group of scholars have ambitiously attempted to position prewar Japan in the dynamics of the world system and postwar Japan in the current of globalization. But one may wonder whether this new perspective could embrace the voices of colonial and minority subjects that had gone unrepresented for so long.

In this dissertation, I present the term internationality as a gateway to understanding the initial question I would like to pose. What ontological challenge did the epistemology of particularizing the rest of Asia face as Japan became an empire in the early 1930s? What kind of intellectual tasks pervaded the mindset of Japanese social scientists so that they questioned the very nature of social sciences as rational and objective? In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the Japanese government accelerated its military invasion of Northern China, which forged the Manchurian crisis, and that crisis was later expanded to the “China Problem” in the late 1930s and early 1940s. At the early stage of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese social scientists’ attitudes toward this overt imperialism were in no way different from their previous approach to the colony. The notion of civilizing mission was once again appropriated as

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a panacea. Although among intellectuals they were most “internationally-minded,” given that a majority of them had spent a substantial amount of time abroad and were always open to cutting-edge theories produced outside of Japan, their perception of internationality was so narrow that only a simplistic intellectual map of the world – the West as modern and universal and the rest of it as uncivilized and particular – had penetrated their mindset.19

Repeating the so-called messianic civilizing mission did not even convince many other intellectuals within Japan. As discourses on crisis in democracy and capitalism rapidly gained currency in Europe, Japanese intellectuals began critically revisiting the nature of modernization as well. In addition, Japan’s relations with the West became so seriously aggravated that Japan eventually withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. All in all, it became self-evident that Japanese intellectuals could no longer rely on the universality of democracy and capitalism in order to sustain Japan’s position as a world power. Therefore, the cohabitation of the democratic system at home and imperialism abroad gradually lost its validity. Right-wing conservatives dexterously utilized this opportunity to strengthen their power and as a result, the “democratic” tradition established by liberal and progressive social scientists was challenged by a number of anti-social scientific discourses: Emperor-centered Japanism, chauvinistic state socialism, and, eventually, spiritually-oriented Pan-Asianism.

Perhaps the most formalist interpretation of wartime Japanese social sciences would be to narrate the process of how social scientists gradually subordinated themselves to the state and served as intellectual resources for producing imperial knowledge for the Japanese empire. For example, prewar Japanese Marxists’

commitment to the empire, often theorized in the term *tenkō* (転向, conversion), was the most frequently chosen research topic for students of modern Japanese history.\(^{20}\) To be sure, this kind of approach has some validity to it. However, in many cases, the scope of related research has been narrowly confined to the dynamic between the coercive state and individuals who were forced to choose either collaboration or resistance, thereby marginalizing the presence of multiple actors inside and outside of the Japanese empire. In order to avoid reproducing the monolithic picture of the totalitarian state and intellectuals within Japan, I argue that in writing wartime Japanese intellectual history it is imperative to highlight the moment when imperial intellectuals encountered the space of Asia and how their engagement with Asian discourses forged changes in the hierarchy of imperial knowledge.

The reason Japanese social scientists’ encounter with Asia fundamentally reshaped the framework of knowledge production was that their engagement with state institutions did not take the form of traditional area studies. On an institutional level, their area studies show a great similarity to postwar area studies in the West, the United States in particular. Presumably, no other group of intellectuals would surpass wartime Japanese intellectuals in producing knowledge about the other in collaboration with the state. A great number of government-funded research organizations under the umbrella of area studies emerged during the fifteen-year period between 1931 and 1945. These institutions mainly targeted China and Southeast Asia, two potential territories of the Japanese empire, and were filled with leading social scientists from top-notch imperial and private universities.\(^{21}\)

The guiding principle of wartime area studies conducted by Japanese social

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scientists differed strikingly from that of West. Although many social scientists did not completely dismiss the epistemological view of Japan as universal and the rest of Asia as particular, they were at least aware that China and the colonies could not be incorporated into imperial Japan by simply repeating this logic. Natural as it may sound, the task of convincing Asian people of the notion of an East Asian community was inseparable from searching for common values between Japan and its Asian neighbors. Without providing these, these imperial social scientists had no choice but to resort to fascistic violence. This raises an initial question: How could social scientists find common values for a new East Asian order without resorting to the conventional thesis of universality and particularity? Not surprisingly, many imperial intellectuals attempted to answer this question by employing the racial, blood-oriented, cultural, and spiritual elements that they believed would constitute Asian commonness. The most evident example was the notion of *naisenittai* (Japan and Korea as one body) that emphasized the same racial and cultural origins between Japan and Korea.

Apart from the fact that these common elements in Asia were essentially an abstraction that could not be explicated in a social scientific language, the more fundamental problem was that the task of envisioning an East Asian empire should not be focused on a short-term government policy to mobilize colonial subjects for Japan’s war efforts. To engage colonial subjects and at the same time overcome the limits of democracy and capitalism, the empire-building project must focus on restructuring the existing socio-economic order at home, thereby creating a new system that could embrace the rest of Asia.

This study, therefore, pays special attention to social scientists who took a markedly different path from that of the conservative intellectuals, who simply addressed Asian similarities and attempted to link them to the so-called Imperial Way (皇道主義). First and foremost, these social scientists were convinced that simply
uncovering the similarities between the colonizer and the colonized would not make the colonized resonate with the Japanese empire, unless the power structure of empire and colony were restructured. In order to resolve this problem, they had to challenge the nation-state paradigm since it would constantly circulate the perception that Japan as an entity belongs to the universal world and the rest of Asia to the particular. These imperial social scientists argued that a new regional order as an alternative form of internationality must be something that does not repeat the schematic configuration of the West as universal and the East as particular.\footnote{Naoki Sakai, \textit{Translation and Subjectivity: On \lq\lq Japan\rq\rq and Cultural Nationalism} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 1997), pp. 153-176.} This signifies that their scientific Asian discourses would not simply repeat the modern configuration of knowledge that had been espoused in Western modernity. It necessarily raises another question: How did these social scientists confront the challenge of modernization?

**Creating a Universal Empire: the Question of Modernity**

Japanese social scientists’ intellectual endeavors to establish a self-sufficient regional order were naturally accompanied by interrogating the very framework of knowledge production dominated by the West. Wartime social scientists like Shinmei Masamichi, Takata Yasuma and Kada Tetsuji, for example, invariably problematized the unscientific elements of Western racism. However, their critiques of white supremacy were never presented to endorse the unity of yellow people as an anti-thesis. Instead of reversing the location of civilization so that the East was now conceived of as universal, they were more concerned with creating logics in which particularities of each individual, group and society in the East Asian Community would share the universal, best exemplified in the slogan, “the community of destiny.”

In writing the intellectual history of empire in wartime Japan, I do not base the
discursive position of my study on the problematic thesis, “overcoming modernity (近代の超克).” Undoubtedly, the rhetoric of anti-modernity, anti-individualism and anti-capitalism flooded intellectuals’ writings, novels, government propagandas, and other cultural and visual materials. The “war of thought (思想戦)” formulated a clear-cut battleground between Japan and the decadent West, and involved itself in the psychological and epistemological process of affirming an independent historicity in the East. As the term “overcoming” suggests, this logic in many cases employed the retrospective observation that Japan and the Japanese had striven relentlessly to catch up with Western modernity in its history, and that for this reason, what needed to be overcome was not just the West as an actual enemy but, more importantly, Western remnants within Japan. What was at stake in this intellectual domain is the fact that the more influential the slogan “overcoming the modern” became, the more the “war of thought” itself was reduced to the war between Japan and the West, marginalizing subjects in the colony as passive actors. The most extreme of this tendency might be the affirmation of the war as significant historical progress which liberated, or at least attempted to rescue, Asians from the oppression of white supremacy.

Apart from the fact that leading Japanese social scientists were still attentive to theories originating from the West, broadly defined, in their empire-building project, their attempts to construct a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empire were primarily concerned with managing the unevenness between metropole and the colony. Most

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importantly, issues in the underdeveloped, agriculture-centered, and even primordial modes of life in the colonies generated a complex set of problems that cannot be simply captured in the problematic of “overcoming the modern.” Here, I do not intend to make the point that the notion of overcoming modernity is intellectually insignificant. In fact, many recent works have revealed the intertwined nature of this discourse and have shown the irony that these advocates of “overcoming modernity” themselves embraced the paradoxical conviction that Japan as the only “modernized” country in Asia should lead the rest of Asia.

From the perspective of Japanese intellectual history, however, the notion of overcoming modernity still contains some provocative issues one must pay close attention to. Most importantly, I argue that it was colonial intellectuals who most fervently responded to this intellectual stream. For them, overcoming modernity first came as a prescription for dismantling the empire-colony power structure. It was due to their observation that colonialism is simply the twin of modernization, that is, it always takes place where surplus value and economic gaps constantly exist. However, putting excessive emphasis on the discursive part of overcoming modernity might result in overlooking the practical problem of underdevelopment and stagnation in the colony. Even imperial intellectuals were aware that the economic gap between Japan and the colony, and between metropole and rural areas, would not be solved simply by advocating anti-capitalism in theory. In this respect, my study also pays close attention to how the logic of modernization did not disappear but was appropriated in different contexts in these social scientists’ imperial discourses.

The new East Asian empire envisioned by these social scientists took the form of a universal empire in which subjects in Asia were to be treated as equal citizens. To this end, any sort of ideologies endorsing individualistic and profit-oriented activities were first denounced. But these social scientists were also aware that simply rejecting
individualism and capitalism, and addressing the notion of community as an alternative, would not bring about the society they aimed to create. To put it another way, building a new empire was not a matter of returning to the community of premodern times, often called *gemeinschaft* in German. Therefore, the socio-economic configuration of a universal empire was not aimed at simply eradicating cultural and economic differences, thereby creating homogeneous subjects. These imperial social scientists boldly argued that indigenous cultures, languages and lifestyles must be recognized in this universal empire. However, they also contended that a new form of subjectivity must be created beyond these particularities among different Asian people. Ironically, it is at this point that the notion of subjectivity was powerfully revisited by these social scientists.

As Naoki Sakai and others have pointed out, modernity itself is not a static concept, nor does it involve a certain point in time.25 Interestingly, the Japanese social scientists I will discuss were clearly aware that building an empire was not a monistic project that would render everyone into sameness. For example, Ezawa Jōji, the rationalist economist, addressed the principle of constructing space as a gateway to realizing the community of destiny. According to him, Asian space is neither a given nor a natural object, but where countless different memories and experiences occur simultaneously and ubiquitously. But, he believed that through the project of constructing a new space - for example through national land planning, - these different experiences can converge into a common goal, therefore, space, in his geopolitical thinking, was not a physical substance, but an active force for the destiny of community.26 In this way, heterogeneity in the empire was, for him and like-minded social scientists, not an obstacle but became an active dynamic to infuse into Asian people the sense of subjectivity through which even the colonized could voluntarily

participate in empire building. For social scientists like Ezawa, the concept of modern development thus occupied a central position in the East Asian Community.

Tracing the unexplored writings of these intellectuals in the Japanese empire, I argue, will provide important insights into the complex questions intertwined with coloniality, modernity and postcoloniality in East Asia. These questions might include: why were Korean intellectuals in postcolonial Korea preoccupied with the logic of mobilization and development? How can we historicize the legacy of total mobilization in the Japanese empire to explain the origins of a total mobilization state in 1960s and 1970s Korea?27

Things Told and Untold: Colonial (Un)consciousness

Last but not least, my study pays special attention to the voices of the colonized in the intellectual history of the Japanese empire. Although I will primarily focus on “Japanese” social scientists, this does not mean that the colonial voices are missing in this work. As many have pointed out, the wartime discourses of Japanese social scientists mainly targeted Chinese nationalism. They were convinced that the first and foremost task of building an Asian empire was to gain the support of the Chinese people, who were fiercely resisting Japan. Therefore, it was natural that the “China Problem” occupied a central position in their Asian discourses. In an effort to convince China, both conservative and liberal intellectuals in Japan emphasized the logic of war against the West; that is, the Sino-Japanese War was waged to create a self-sufficient politicians-economic sphere in Asia, thereby protecting it from Western imperialism.

Needless to say, completely missing in this rhetoric was the fact that Japan itself had been colonizing its neighbors and was conducting an imperialist war.

Although the social scientists that I will deal with in this work aimed to create a rational and utopian empire, they were not free from colonial consciousness either. Many of them took it for granted that Taiwan and Korea had already been part of the Japanese empire. Except for a small number of social scientists such as Moritani Katsumi, who was teaching social policy at Kyungsung Imperial University in colonial Korea, the colonial reality of the Japanese empire did not capture the attention of Japanese social scientists. Precisely for this reason, the notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community has been considered by Korean scholars to be empty rhetoric that was used to justify the mobilization of the Korean people for Japan’s war efforts.

As ironic as it may sound, it was colonial Korean intellectuals who responded most fervently to the voices from the empire. To be sure, Japanese social scientists were clearly aware that the economic gap between Japan and colonial Korea, and the agricultural problem in colonial Korea in particular, would be a major obstacle to incorporating Koreans into the Japanese empire. They were also conscious that their writings enjoyed a wide range of readership in colonial Korea. For example, Korean intellectuals expressed their political opinions in Japanese journals such as Tōyō no hikari 東洋之光, to which these leading social scientists often contributed articles. Nonetheless, most Japanese social scientists averted their eyes from the reality of colonization, and to this end, they persisted in promoting the rhetoric of a universal empire in which the empire-colony hierarchy no longer exists.

Importantly, this blindness toward Japan’s colonialism on the part of Japanese intellectuals ironically produced important spaces for identity politics. As I have discussed, the rhetoric of a universal empire was appropriated by a group of colonial Korean intellectuals as a way to surpass both the empire-colony power structure and the
limits of the capitalistic modes of production at the same time. Therefore, they subjectively interpreted the notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community in the name of *naisenittai*. Importantly, not all Korean intellectuals simply accepted the logic of Japan and Korea as one body at face value. They were aware that becoming a cosmopolitan citizen in the Japanese empire did not guarantee that the majority of the Japanese recognized colonial subjects as equal citizens. As I shall discuss in Chapter 6, Korean intellectuals such as In Jeong Sik acutely pointed out the limits of the East Asia Cooperative Community and the notion of *naisenittai*. Instead of repeating the highly abstract and philosophical notion of the East Asian Community or “overcoming modernity,” In saw modern development as a prerequisite step for *naisenittai*. In this way, the notion of modernization was paradoxically revitalized by colonial intellectuals.

Therefore, I do not subscribe to the idea that these imperial social scientists’ Asian discourses were empty rhetoric that did not address the issue of coloniality during the wartime period. I argue instead that by critically investigating why imperial intellectuals adhered to the logic of a universal empire, we can reveal more clearly the intertwined aspects of colonial reality addressed by colonial intellectuals.

**Organization**

As a study of intellectual history, this dissertation necessarily focuses on tracing the intellectual trajectories of a group of prominent figures in the history of Japanese imperialism. For this reason, I admit that elite-centeredness might inevitably appear in some places in this dissertation. However, rather than narrating the dominant position of these social scientists, my work aims to show the violent nature of knowledge production itself by investigating how their imperial discourses served the cause of total war and mobilization.

Importantly, this study does not follow a chronological or compartmentalized
order in the history of Japanese social sciences. The main purpose of my study is not to narrate the writings of leading Japanese social scientists in each discipline. These imperial social scientists soon realized that individual theories in sociology, economics and political science could not universalize the complex web of uncertain, unpredictable and at times irrational social and political relations in East Asia. This observation necessarily demolished the seemingly solid boundaries between social scientific disciplines and gave rise to new forms of thinking; that is, “interdisciplinary provinces” from today’s perspective, such as geopolitics and ethnology. Instead, this study concerns itself with why the concept and space of Asia came to be so important for Japanese social scientists that they immersed themselves in the project of rationalizing an Asian empire, voluntarily transcending the fortress of the most universalized and modernized mode of thinking, social science.

With these observations in mind, this dissertation deals with wartime Japanese social scientists and their encounter with an Asian empire, focusing on important conceptual and theoretical challenges they faced: space, ethnicity and community. Chapter 2 sets up a discursive framework for their actual encounter with these concepts. It focuses on how external and internal crises in 1930s Japan prompted Japanese social scientists to look beyond the narrow cage of Japanese society and to come to terms with Asian regionalism. Closely attentive to social and political changes in 1930s Japan and Asia, this chapter tries to answer the question of why Japanese social scientists’ exposure to regionalist thinking ironically led them to problematize their own social scientific thinking.

The project of building a multi-ethnic empire will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, the longest chapter of this dissertation. Not surprisingly, it was sociologists who most ardently involved themselves in creating the logic of a multi-ethnic empire. These social scientists were clearly aware that without overcoming the logic of race and
ethnicity, which could be a potential threat to the stability of empire in the name of ethnic nationalism, they could not rationalize a Japan-centered multi-ethnic community. This chapter examines how these social scientists redefined ethnicity not as supernatural, blood-oriented and thus a-historical but as a socially constructed and therefore “could-be-engineered” element in organizing a social community. Paying special attention to various debates on ethnicity, the chapter focuses on the writings and theories of Shinmei Masamichi and Takata Yasuma, two key figures in wartime and postwar Japanese sociology.

Chapter 4 probes the question of space in the making of an East Asian empire. A concept that is unexplored and seemingly unrelated to social scientific thinking, space generated an enormous amount of academic writing, and even played an important role in the emergence of a new social scientific discipline, geopolitics. Contrasting and comparing two distinct intellectual groups that developed geopolitics, this chapter investigates why and how Asian space was transformed from a given, natural, static and thus “uncivilized” space into a most dynamic and mobilizing force that attempted to bring the destiny of community to Asian people. This chapter also investigates the question of how the logic of modern development in the colony was appropriated and rationalized by imperial intellectuals. By closely reading the work of Ezawa Jōji and Rōyama Masamichi, two prominent social scientists, I argue that their discussion of maximizing productivity for Japan’s war efforts was paradoxically connected to emphasizing modern development in the colony.

In the chapters that follow, I will call into question the Marxist notion of an East Asian community. Chapter 5 deals with the question of how Japanese and Korean Marxists portrayed Asia in the Asiatic mode of production debate in the mid 1930s. It first aims to draw a picture of Japanese Marxist social scientists in comparison to so-called bourgeois social scientists. While bourgeois social scientists such as Rōyama
Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi were envisioning a new theory of community in their critiques of universal social science, Marxist intellectuals were still preoccupied with the logic of universal historical development based on historical materialism. By revisiting the Asiatic mode of production debate, this chapter examines how the concept of community itself was distorted by Marxist intellectuals and how these distortions had an impact on their later commitment to various “community” discourses.

Chapter 6 focuses on two prominent former Marxists, Hirano Yoshitarō and Moritani Katsumi, and their Asian discourses. By comparing their distinctive theories, this chapter aims to show how they reinterpreted the logic of community and accordingly theorized an East Asian community. Special attention will be paid to the absence of the politics of subject formation in these converted Marxists’ discourses on Asian community. This chapter also focuses on the problem of colonial Korea by closely reading the writings of Moritani Katsumi, who spent 18 years, between 1927 and 1945, as a professor at Kyungsung Imperial University. By engaging in multi-dimensional analyses of metropole and colony, and of Japanese and colonial intellectuals, I try to reveal the gap between theory and practice inherent in their imperial discourses. In addition, it poses one important question that should be seriously considered when discussing the legacy of wartime Asian discourses: How did the overwhelming experience of wartime mobilization and modernization impact the construction of postcolonial Asia, North and South Korea in particular, and the modes of people’s everyday life?
Chapter 2
Social Sciences in Crisis:
Regionalism and Cooperativism in Interwar Japan

Japan’s invasion of Northeast China in 1931 and the construction of Manchukuo the following year brought about profound changes in the topography of the Japanese empire. It first invoked severe diplomatic conflicts with Western powers that had condoned Japan’s annexation of Taiwan and Korea. The United States and European powers were unwilling to witness the emergence of another superpower in East Asia. The diplomatic tension reached its apex as Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1933. On the other hand, the racial configuration of the Japanese empire underwent dramatic changes beginning in 1931. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the Japanese economy was hit by severe unemployment and an imbalance between metro cities and rural areas. But this was not just the case for Japan proper. Under equally unfavorable conditions, colonial workers rushed to Japan in search of job opportunities. For example, the number of Korean residents in Japan increased from 311,247 to 798,878 over the 7-year period between 1931 and 1938.¹ This influx first demonstrates that metropole and colony in the Japanese empire were closely interconnected from an economic perspective. More importantly, the racial mixture caused by migration became a potential threat that would jeopardize the racial hierarchy in the Japanese empire.

Such changes had an impact on the mindset of Japanese intellectuals as well. Most of all, it was Japanese social scientists, liberal intellectuals in particular, who faced a serious intellectual challenge under these changing circumstances. As the

conflict between Japan and the West became worse, various anti-Western discourses flooded academia and the media. Criticizing modern values such as individualism and the “rationalist” world order established by the West, Japanese intellectuals advocated Asianism or the emperor-centered Japanism as a counter theory. On the other hand, totalitarian theories originating in Europe rapidly gained currency among conservative intellectuals. In spite of their different directions, both chauvinistic spiritualism and fascist movements focused on restructuring domestic politics by overthrowing the existing parliamentary democracy and capitalist economy.

More serious than the international crisis was the absence of regionalist thinking in the mindset of both liberal and Marxist social scientists. Advocates of anti-Western and totalitarian theories emerged in response to the growing conflict between Japan and the West, and overtly supported Japan’s imperialist moves. At the heart of such reactive movements lay a strong objection to Western thinking based on rationality as well as the world order dominated by European powers. More importantly, the so-called modern thinking and modernization as its result were being questioned by European intellectuals as well. In the wake of World War I, discourses on the limits of democracy and the capitalistic system rapidly gained currency. On a philosophical level, these discourses focused on interrogating the origins and limits of the concept of the modern in European society.²

This chapter examines Japanese social scientists’ encounter with regionalist thinking in the early and mid 1930s. Except for a small group of radical intellectuals, most social scientists rationalized Japan’s position as a colonizer in the name of civilization and enlightenment until the early 1930s. This explicit appropriation of

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Western universalism came to an impasse as Japan’s imperialist moves provoked severe criticisms from the West. Under this circumstance, many social scientists realized that they could not envision a new imperial order by simply resorting to the existing thinking in the social sciences. This observation generated various discourses on rationalizing Japan’s position and incorporating China and the colonies into a new order. Therefore, the first objective of this study is to critically investigate how the sense of crisis changed the mentality of Japanese social scientists and led them to create various alternative theories.

In this chapter I will critically analyze liberal social scientists’ responses to this international crisis and also investigate two theories of regionalism, the Asia Monroe Doctrine and the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc economy system. I argue that both liberal and conservative social scientists in the early 1930s failed to draw a picture of a regional community in which Japan and the rest of Asia could be united beyond the existing empire-colony power structure. Most of the regional discourses in the early 1930s were preoccupied with justifying Japan’s invasion of China, leaving the domestic structure intact. However, social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi 蝋山政道 (1895-1980) and Shinmei Masamichi 新明正道 (1898-1984) realized that without fundamentally changing the paradoxical coexistence of so-called “democracy” at home and colonialism abroad, creating a regional community and convincing the rest of Asia of this new order would not be possible. Thus, the early part of this chapter will focus on showing the limits inherent in the so-called “democratic” and thus reformist stream in 1920s Japanese social science led by liberal intellectuals such as Yanaihara Tadao 矢内原忠雄 (1893-1961) and Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸稲造 (1862-1933). Through this, I highlight the “failure” of the liberalist project in Japanese social science during the Taisho period to overcome the dual-structure of democracy at home and colonialism abroad. I will then move on to the question of how the Japanese social scientists in the
mid 1930s who inherited the legacy of these liberal social scientists in the previous decades tried to link reforms of the domestic socio-political structure to a new regionalist thinking.

Constructing a new regional order was inseparable from the notion of subjectivity formation. Since a new East Asian order, both the conservative and liberal versions, aimed to embrace China and people in the colony, it also had to provide a logic through which people in Asia could belong to a Japan-centered regional community. To this end, what had to be overcome first was the single nation-state framework; that is, political subjectivity was only possible by one’s becoming a member of the Japanese nation-state. The limits of democracy and the nation-state framework led the social scientists I will discuss in this chapter to envision a new theory of political subjectivity. Needless to say, the main question they posed was how the empire-colony power structure should be dismantled and under which political system the Chinese and people in the colony could be considered members of a regional community. By critically analyzing the limits of state socialists’ discourses on the totalitarian political system, I will show why both Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi came up with the unique notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community, which later became the theoretical backbone for total mobilization during the wartime period.

Social Sciences in Crisis

In the 1930s, a variety of crisis discourses awaited Japanese social scientists, who had enjoyed the “renaissance” of knowledge in the previous decades. To be sure, the sense of crisis was not so much limited to the social sciences as it pervaded the entire Japanese intellectual circle. The term “crisis” was inseparable from Japan’s conflicts with the West and thus crisis discourses were soon transformed into critiques of modern modes of life, individualism, consumerism and so on. Notably, anti-modern discourses
did not immediately replace the system of modern social scientific thinking that had dominated the mindset of Japanese social scientists. However, crisis discourses did not simply resonate within the framework of real politics. Recognizing the sense of crisis both in real politics and in the academic boundary of the social sciences, Japanese social scientists expressed anxiety over the limits of social scientific thinking in various forms.

In March 1934, a 27-year-old sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō 清水幾太郎 (1907-1988), who later emerged as one of the most influential social scientists during the wartime period, contributed a dismally titled article to the famous journal *Chūōkōron* (The Central Review, 中央公論). In this article, entitled “The Tragedy of Sociology (社会学の悲劇),” Shimizu, in a very skeptical tone, revisited fundamental questions in sociology – the relationship between totality and part, and between individual and society. As he himself acknowledged, the problem of sociology as tragic lay in the fact that the notion of civil society had been regarded as the most advanced answer to these essential questions. However, what Shimizu problematized was not simply the issue of civil society but the ontological meaning of sociology itself. In that respect, the German sociologist Georg Simmel captured Shimizu’s attention. Simmel observed that sociology is an academic discipline that deals with questions that cannot be solved in essence. Apparently, it was the paradoxical statement that sociology cannot exist without unsolvable propositions, which dislocated sociology from the realm of social sciences.

As many have pointed out, the term *shakai* (社会, society) had explained the ontological meaning of Japanese social sciences during the Taisho democracy period. As political scientist Ishida Takeshi has pointed out, the unique thinking process –

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4 Ibid., p.61.
problem consciousness (問題意識) → discovering social problems (社会問題の発見) → solving social problems (社会問題の解決) – had served as a driving force in envisioning an advanced society.\(^5\) Importantly, the logic of civil society, which Shimizu pointed out as the most advanced form encompassing state and individual, emerged in this thinking process. In an attempt to rescue social sciences from being an agency of state power, Japanese social scientists strove to theorize society as an independent space where autonomous individuals are guaranteed civil rights and freedom independent of the state. Although the term civil society was theorized by radical intellectuals such as Marxists as well, it was liberal intellectuals in early 20\(^{th}\) century Japan who paid the most attention to concretizing it.\(^6\)

The logic of civil society in its pure sense always faces challenges as individuals’ profit-oriented behavior is not mediated by social norms. Social problems, therefore, constantly occur between individuals and society, and between individuals and the state. To minimize potential and actual conflicts in the web of social relations, Japanese social scientists strove to provide practical theories for solving social problems, and they were convinced that social progress could be realized through this process. However, the act of solving social problems never provides a solution for the essential problem inherent in state-society relations or society – individual relations: how could social scientists theorize a form of community in which these social conflicts are permanently extinguished? Shimizu’s lamentation about civil society was based on this observation.

While Shimizu’s thesis at least derived from a pure academic concern, the sense of crisis was already foreshadowing a particular politico-economic direction for other social scientists. In an article entitled “Economic Theories in Crisis (経済理論の危

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Hijikata Seibi 土方成美 (1890-1975), Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University who later addressed the theory of controlled economy (統制経済) during the wartime period, asserted that contemporary economic theories based on individuals’ rational behavior and the theory of natural balance had failed to explain the existing international crisis. He was equally critical of Marxist economic theory, contending that symptoms of the current economic crisis clearly showed that communism would not be an alternative to the laissez faire system. As it became clear that neither liberalism nor communism could explicate the location of economic problems, Hijikata insisted that the state become the central actor. Accordingly, he targeted liberal democracy as well, insisting that the parliament must be restructured to support the state-controlled economic system.

How, then, did he redefine the concept of the individual in his new state-centered economic theory? Three months later, Hijikata contributed another article to the same journal. This time he searched for rational links between the state-controlled economy and what he called Japanese spirit (日本精神). He was convinced that the individual in capitalism had been distorted and would thus be destined to collapse. Therefore, the relationship between state and individual must be redefined.

The control (統制) that corresponds to our ethnic spirit (民族精神), needless to say, is not a control that limits individuals to a certain category and thus must be one that rejects obstacles oppressing development within individuals. The reason control in contemporary capitalist economies is being condemned is that the pressure of capital suppresses the development of the individual’s personality.

Based on this observation, Hijikata continued to argue that insofar as the theory of marginal utility and free competition is enforced, control and balance in the capitalist

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8 Ibid., p. 2.
9 Ibid., pp.10-11.
economy would not be achieved. It was at this point that Hijikata intended to theorize what he called Japanese spirit. He was convinced that there had been a spirit in Japan that enabled the development of the individual as well as the balance and control of totality.¹¹ His logic of Japanese spirit and its compatibility with a new state-planned economy, however, was not sufficiently articulated in the mid 1930s. Indeed, it reappeared 5 years later as a theory of bun (分, given role) in a book entitled *The Way of Japanese Economics* (日本経済学の道). Here, Hijikata sought the sustainability of a total society in individuals’ moral behavior. Morality, however, was depicted as if it could only be accomplished when individuals faithfully follow their roles given by the state.¹² In this way, Hijikata intended to rationalize a control economy through terms that were inexplicable from a social scientific perspective, and this, as I shall discuss later in detail, gives us an example of how Japanese social scientists in the 1930s hid themselves under abstract spaces such as traditional Japan or Japanese spirit.

Why, then, did the sense of crisis in the social sciences become widespread among Japanese social scientists, who had enjoyed the “renaissance” of knowledge over the past few decades? What kind of alternative thoughts did they develop afterwards? Apparently they were heavily influenced by crisis discourses on modernity that first emanated from Europe. On the other hand, the limits of the social sciences were appropriated to depict Japan as the victimized in the Europe-centered international order.

In January 1933, Chūō University professor Kawahara Jikichirō 川原次吉郎 (1896-1959) wrote an article entitled “The Poverty of Political Science (政治学の貧困).” As one may easily anticipate through this title, Kawahara touched acutely upon the limits of modern political science. However, this article was dissimilar to the

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previous two articles by Shimizu and Hijikata in that Kawahara projected his discontent with modern political science directly onto the particular political situation Japan was facing. He drew special attention to the diplomatic conflict between Japan and the West over the 1931 Manchurian Incident, and basically viewed the League of Nations as representing the voices of European countries. Instead of directly opening fire on the League of Nations, Kawahara tried to theorize this diplomatic conflict as an issue of objectivity in modern political science. Since Plato and Aristotle, Kawahara contended, the basic analytical unit in political science was the nation-state.\(^13\) He continued to argue that the necessity of establishing an objective international organization such as the League of Nations emerged since intellectuals and politicians naturally represent the interests of their own countries. However, he was adamant that the League of Nations had already lost the value of, in his words, kōheimushi (公平無私, fairness and impartiality) in the process of dealing with the Manchurian Incident.\(^14\) Therefore, it was described as an international organization lacking objectivity. In this way, Kawahara appropriated the notion of objectivity in modern political science as a way to highlight Japan’s position as the victimized in international politics.

Japan’s invasion of Northeast China in 1931 was a political prescription to break through the economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. However, Japan’s occupation of Manchuria, which culminated as Manchukuo which was founded in 1932, did not bring what it longed for. The expanded trade between Japan and Manchuria seemed to help recover the Japanese economy, but it did not fundamentally cure the basic problem of the imbalance between technology-centered heavy industry and the tattered agricultural sector. Takahashi Korekyo 高橋是清 (1854-1936), who became Ministry of Finance in December, 1931, attempted to rejuvenate the economy by

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\(^{13}\) Kawahara Jikichirō, “Seijigaku no hinkon,” *Keizai ōrai* 8, no.1 (Jan 1933), p. 175.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., pp. 173-182.
strengthening the Japanese Yen in the international currency market, but this policy incurred severe criticism from European powers.\textsuperscript{15} As Bruce Cumings has argued, the hierarchy among the economic powers was so solidly established in the early 1930s that Japan could not escape from the position of late-comer imperial state simply by annexing extra territories in Northeast China.\textsuperscript{16}

However, Japan’s one-dimensional military policy in Northeast China immediately caused hardships to both diplomacy and domestic politics, and more importantly, it dramatically changed the mindset of Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular. Between 1931 and late 1932, most Japanese intellectuals were convinced that Japan could end this diplomatic conflict favorably within the framework of the existing international order. They were rather anxious that this international crisis would be appropriated as an excuse by right-wing extremists to dismantle the democratic order at home. In fact, on May 15, 1932, a group of young right-wing officers in the Navy broke into the Prime Minister’s residence and assassinated Inukai Tsuyoshi, who had been taking a moderate position in dealing with diplomatic issues with the West. It was a symbolic incident that uncovered dormant conflicts between right-wingers and liberal intellectuals and bureaucrats regarding their understanding of the international order. Ultra-nationalists had maintained the firm belief that the existing international order established right after the end of World War I had represented the interests of European countries. Therefore, they persistently pressed liberal politicians and intellectuals to claim Japan’s special position in East Asia. However, liberal intellectuals were hesitant to position Japan as a particular country and rather adhered to the perception that it


must be conceived of as belonging to the universal international order represented by
the League of Nations. The Washington correspondent of the Tokyo Hōchi Newspaper,
Karl Kiyoshi Kawakami displayed this mentality very well:

All that needs to be said is that Japan has sought no special rights or
privileges in Manchuria, or anywhere in China. Even since she began the
intervention she has concluded no new agreement or obtained no new
concessions in Manchuria. All that she has been trying to do there is to
enforce or give effect to the agreements and treaties which China has violated
or has refused to execute for no valid reason.17 (Emphasis added)

Yet international circumstances became increasingly hostile to Japan as it continued to
claim Manchukuo as its legitimate state. It eventually reached the critical point of
considering withdrawing from the League of Nations. Although a number of liberal
intellectuals were concerned about the aftermath of extreme self-isolation, it suddenly
became a fait accompli that Japan would withdraw from the League of Nations, which
indeed took place in 1933.

The urgency of the international situation concerning the League of Nations
sparked fierce debates over Japan’s future direction vis-à-vis the international order.
Liberal social scientists were still anxious that leaving the League of the Nations would
further marginalize Japan’s position in the existing Europe-centered international order.
For example, Nitobe Inazō, a pioneer of colonial policy studies as well as a leading
liberal economist, suggested that Japan should persuade the world to recognize its
civilizing mission in China.18 He was thus opposed to withdrawing from the League of
Nations. Notably, Nitobe’s internationalism was premised on his firm belief that
colonization is the dissemination of advanced civilization to the underdeveloped. Such

1932), p. 95. Notably, this book was not just a publication by a newspaper reporter. Prime Minster Inukai
Tsuyoshi wrote the introduction of this book and The New York Times also showed keen interest in this
work. Under these circumstances, this book was printed three times in 1932 alone.
an epistemology had already been appropriated to justify Japan’s annexation of the existing colonies: the Ainu, Okinawa, Taiwan and Korea. Hence, it was not so much an internationalist or regionalist theory as an affirmation of the liberal imperialism first developed by Adam Smith.\(^{19}\)

Nitobe’s adherence to Adam Smith’s theory reveals the essential dilemma that Japanese social scientists, liberal intellectuals in particular, were facing in the early 1930s. Regionalist thinking never received attention in the social sciences during the Taisho Period. Except for China, which was regarded as a country Japan must eventually enlighten, the rest of Asia was simply conceived of as part of Japanese territory. Hence, the notion of internationality or regionalism was applied only to Japan’s relationship with the West. In this process, colonies were never given the status of a regional unit in the social sciences and this annexation was always justified in the name of civilization and enlightenment, as best illuminated in Nitobe’s work. To borrow Andrew Gordon’s concept, it generated a unique dual-thinking process called imperial democracy in the social sciences.\(^{20}\) The development of parliamentary democracy at home in the 1920s, Gordon has argued, functioned as a means to rationalize imperialist consciousness in the rest of Asia. For example, liberal social scientists like Nitobe strove to devise liberalist solutions for colonial reality and rationalize colonization as a gateway to modernization. Marxist social scientists were less concerned with criticizing Japan’s imperialism abroad than with focusing on class struggle at home.\(^{21}\) As a consequence, regionalist thinking remained a vacuum space in

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\(^{21}\) Gordon writes, “[T]he evidence for labor attitudes toward empire and imperialism is ultimately ambiguous. The proletarian camp went on to make considerable political gains in the mid-to-late 1930s, persisting in its domestic critique of capitalism and its call for social reform, but returning to the themes of
1920s Japanese social sciences.

Therefore, at the heart of crisis discourses on the social sciences was the intellectual challenge of how a new paradigm would overcome the theoretical limits of the dual-thinking structure. As a matter of fact, social scientists’ responses to these challenges were yet to be concretized, as many liberal social scientists intended to stick to the old theory. However, Japan was already dexterously carrying out its new order project in real politics. With the foundation of Manchukuo in 1932, slogans like Pan-Asianism or Japanism appeared conspicuously in major journals. To be sure, these ideologies did not have a concrete theoretical structure either, let alone a social scientific paradigm within them. However, they easily obtained readership and captured attention from intellectuals as well as ordinary people under the situation of intellectual vacuum on the part of social sciences. This gap provided intellectual grounds for non-scientific and irrational political slogans to widen their currency more rapidly than ever.

**The Asian Monroe Doctrine and the Bloc Economy System**

Under these circumstances, some social scientists attempted to concretize a regionalist perspective so as to rationally explain Japan’s current situation. Yanaihara Tadao, Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University, addressed the concept of the “line of sovereignty” in an article he contributed to the journal *Kaizō* shortly after Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations. This theory, reminiscent of former Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo’s theory of “line of interest,” was based on Yanaihara’s observation that not all territories in the world can be defined by the modern theory of sovereignty. Yanaihara contended that no political sovereignty was

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empire and emperor with extraordinary alacrity and verve. This makes the twelve-year interlude (1919-1931) of working-class anti-imperialism seem to us now a fainter and more fragile vision than it may have been.” Gordon, *Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan*, p.230.

22 For example, see “Nihonshugika shakaishugika” *Nihonhyōron* 11, no. 6 (June 1936), pp.5-39.

established in Manchuria and Mongolia in a modern sense. This observation led him to argue that special relationships between these entities and a certain nation-state may occur based on particular interests. According to him, Japan had developed historical and cultural interactions with them and this granted Japan a legitimate right to establish what he called a “Manchu-Mongolian state.” In fact, what Yanaihara really intended to address in this highly ambiguous political theory was a very simple notion, that is, Japan’s “advance” to Northeast China had nothing to do with imperialism. Yanaihara intended to inject rationality into Japan’s invasion of China by addressing the “exceptionalism” or “vacuum” in modern political science, not in Japanese social sciences. To be sure, Yanaihara’s thinking was a much more evolved form of rationalization, compared to the theory of Nitobe, who outspokenly affirmed colonization as a form of civilization, and by whom Yanaihara himself was taught colonial policy studies. However, such an attempt to rationalize Japan’s new order by attributing it to the limits of modern social science did not receive much attention from most Japanese social scientists. Most liberal social scientists were still preoccupied with the necessity of maintaining democracy and capitalism at home, and accordingly warned that parliamentary democracy would be jeopardized by right-wing extremists.

I argue that this explains why two regional theories – the Asia Monroe Doctrine and the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc theory – gained currency among Japanese social scientists beginning in 1932. The former represented a diplomatic solution for Japan’s crisis caused by the Manchurian Incident and the latter focused on economic aspects. In many cases, these two theories were discussed simultaneously to explain

24 Ibid., p.20.
26 For example, See Minobe Tatsukichi, “Gikaiseido no kiki,” Chūōkōron 46, no.3 (Mar 1931), pp. 3-12.
27 A number of articles regarding the Asia Monroe Doctrine appeared in major journals. Some of them include Imura Shigeo, “Tōyō monrōshugi no keizaiteki kiso – nichiman keizai brokku yori kyokuto keizai brokku e,” Gaikōjihō 672 (Dec 1932), pp.45-58; Tagawa Ōkichirō, “Ryōbe to tōa no rukye to hirukye – kyokutō monroshugi wo minishite,” Kokusai chishiki 14, no.6 (June 1934), pp.41-50; Rōyama Masamichi,
the political economy of Japan’s new order. For example, Imura Shigeo, an expert on Chinese economics, argued that the laissez faire liberalism had *de facto* ended at the turn of the 20th century and monopoly capitalism had already transformed the world economy in a new era. He then discussed the necessity of establishing a Japan-Manchuria-China economic bloc to protect Asia from the West’s economic exploitation. Therefore, the concept of the Asian Monroe Doctrine was, for Imura, not so much a concrete political paradigm as it functioned as a spiritual buffer zone dissecting the East from the West.

It is important to note that the Monroe Doctrine itself was not a political theory but a diplomatic policy first promulgated by the 5th president of the United State, James Monroe in 1823. Its core logic was to initiate an America-centered regional sphere throughout the Americas that could not be violated by European powers. It had been amended many times since then and Franklin Roosevelt revisited it to redefine American exceptionalism in the 1920s. However, being “exceptional” in the 20th century version of the Monroe Doctrine did not mean that the United States would adopt a substantially different system from Europe. In short, it was never intended to particularize the United States from the international trend of liberal democracy and colonial capitalism, nor did it aim to transform the socio-political system in Latin America by the United States. It was contrived by the United States to rationalize its hegemony over the Americas but was a very limited diplomatic policy from the beginning.

Ironically, the very limitedness of the Monroe Doctrine attracted liberal intellectuals in 1930s Japan. Bureaucrats and social scientists believed that just as the Monroe Doctrine had been recognized as a legitimate form of regionalism, Japan’s


28 Imura Shigeo, “Tōyō monrōshugi no keizaiteki kiso – nichiman keizai brokku yori kyokuto keizai brokku e,” p.43.
version of an Asian Monroe Doctrine could take the same path. Tachi Sakutarō 立作太郎 (1874-1943), for example, was outspoken in arguing that it was absurd for Western countries, the United States in particular, to condemn Japan for advocating the principles of “Asia for Asiatics,” while they had established hegemony in their territories. In short, by “equally” dividing the world into several spheres of influence where leading nations in each region preserved exceptional privileges, advocates of the Asia Monroe Doctrine attempted to defend Japan’s influence over East Asia. For this reason, this diplomatic theory has strong affinities with the bloc-economy system in two ways. First, both theories were intended to create a so-called self-sufficient space in East Asia free from the influence of Western imperialism. Second and more importantly, they sought to intensify Japan’s hegemony in East Asia without changing the domestic social structure.

Neither the Asian Monroe Doctrine nor the bloc-economy system was concretized regional theories although they ostensibly aimed to establish a regional community. As Hijikata’s return to spiritualism exemplifies well, moving from rational individuals to an omnipotent state was not accompanied by a sophisticated analysis of the state-individual relationship. Pan-Asian ideologies based on traditional, cultural, and thus non-scientific Asian similarities rapidly acquired readership among intellectuals. The fact that Manchukuo was adopting the bloc-economy system but at the same time emphasizing religious affinities among Asians shows how spiritual Pan-Asian ideologies were rapidly penetrating the vacuum space where universal social science was no longer dominant.

Under these circumstances, social scientists were placed in the position of having to create a theory that would rationally reorganize both the domestic social structure

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and Japan’s position in the regional order, not merely justify military invasion through diplomatic rhetoric as best illuminated in the Asian Monroe Doctrine. Second, the newly envisioned regional system had to be applied to people in the rest of Asia, thereby extinguishing the hierarchy between empire and colony. In short, Japanese social scientists in the early 1930s were prompted to create the logic that would later provide the theoretical basis for the East Asian Cooperative Community.\(^\text{30}\)

**Return to the State: State Socialism and the Absence of Subjectivity**

As I have discussed, social scientists’ encounter with crisis discourses developed in various directions. While a group of intellectuals aimed to concretize diplomatic and economic theories such as the Asia Monroe Doctrine and the bloc economy system, these notions were characterized by their division between domestic structure and the international order. In spite of differences, advocates of the Asia Monroe Doctrine and the bloc economy system intended to prevent discourses on Japan’s crisis in the existing world order from being appropriated as an excuse to fundamentally restructure the domestic system. It is noteworthy that liberal intellectuals’ discussions of rationalizing Japan’s territorial expansion, as best described in the internationalism of Nitobe Inazō and Tachi Sakutarō, did not contain any speculations on how their new international order should be associated with domestic reforms. Maintaining a steadfast belief in the liberal democracy and capitalism that they believed Japan had accomplished in the past few decades, they rather insisted that reactionary movements would jeopardize the domestic system.

However, it is important to note that crisis discourses emanating from Europe were inseparable from restructuring the domestic structure. For European intellectuals,

German and Italian intellectuals in particular, the crisis in the international order was much more closely related to envisioning a paradigm shift in the domestic structure, thereby intensifying hegemony in the international order. In an effort to overcome the limits of democracy and the laissez faire system, these European intellectuals revisited the concept of the state and as a result, various notions of state-centered social theories appeared in the early 1930s. While most liberal intellectuals in Japan were preoccupied with maintaining democracy and the capitalist system, another group of intellectuals showed keen interest in these newly emerging state-centered theories. In contrast to German and Italian intellectuals, who attempted to associate state theories with the international order, these Japanese social scientists were primarily concerned with questioning the logic of civil society in domestic politics and rehabilitating the state. Before moving to these state-oriented theories in early 1930s Japan, let me first discuss their newness as well as uniqueness.

To begin with, although both national socialism and fascism were gaining currency in Europe, their inception in Japan explicitly took the form of state socialism (国家社会主義). The reason state socialism gained currency in Japan is closely related to the intensity of critiques against civil society or class struggle theory in early and mid 1930s Japan. For example, pointing out the ambiguity between minzoku and nation (国民) in Japanese social sciences, political scientist Ishida Takeshi has highlighted this anti-democratic tendency as returning to an ethnic community (民族共同体) from the notion of class struggle. However, Ishida’s seemingly convenient categorization is ambiguous as well, since most advocates of state socialism did not simply subordinate their socialistic orientation to the state. State socialists were on the blacklist of the government censorship, simply because they did not officially dismiss socialism. For this reason, it is not so much a matter of replacing class with state as a task of closely

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examining the complex aspects of state-society relations in mid 1930s Japanese social sciences.

Second, as Ishida himself acknowledged, the emergence of the term *minzoku* in his analysis mostly involves social scientific discussions that appeared in the late 1930s by non-Marxist intellectuals such as Rōyama Masamichi and Takata Yasuma 高田保馬 (1883-1972).\(^{32}\) Given that they were *de facto* non-Marxists, the term *minzoku*, for them, was not a substitute for class, either. Rather, as I shall discuss in detail in the following chapters, the connotations that both nation and *minzoku* signified in their theories were very fluid from the beginning. For this reason, it was misleading to presuppose that the emergence of either state or *minzoku* in late 1930s Japanese social sciences was conceptualized in the narrow context of the *Japanese* state or the *Japanese* people, as clearly shown in Ishida’s discussion.

Therefore, what is important is to closely trace the emergence of the state as a central force in various totalitarian theories in the mid 1930s as well as to examine its limits. In so doing, one may draw a comprehensive picture of how state-centered totalitarian thinking and its theoretical drawbacks foreshadowed the advent of co-organic and cooperative theories in the late 1930s, as best exemplified in the East Asian Cooperative Community. This transformation is closely related to the observation that neither statism nor state socialism in the mid 1930s developed a sophisticated analysis of state-society or state-individual relations, although they aimed to overcome the limits of democracy and civil society. Precisely for this reason, state socialists’ efforts to envision a new type of subjectivity were focused on how the state as an omnipotent organ should absorb individuals and society under its control. However, the rhetoric of anti-capitalistic subjectivity formation did not explain how individuals would serve as

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\(^{32}\) Ishida mainly criticizes Rōyama Masamichi and his theory of community. However, Ishida’s critiques invariably focus on Rōyama’s writings after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, based on his participation in the Showa Research Institute. *Ibid.,* pp.142-148
an organ of the state. Nor did it contain any speculations about how the state-centered system would operate as a driving force to incorporate colonial subjects into the empire. Consequently, the lack of subjectivity formation in state socialism and its Japan-centeredness was observed by another group of social scientists, who showed keen interest in the cooperative system. In the pages that follow, I examine the content of state socialism and its limits as a regional theory.

Notably, state socialism itself was not a theory that first appeared in Japanese academic circles in the mid 1930s. The famous Marxist theoretician Takabatake Motoyuki (1886-1928), who translated Marx’s *Das Kapital* into Japanese several times, advocated state socialism in the late 1920s. Takabatake contended that social association, political and economic, is based on human beings’ social instinct (社会的本能), which is nothing but egoism. Human beings’ egoism, however, is much more complex than that of other creatures, and for this reason it often generates social conflicts. He was thus convinced that this state of conflict would not be fundamentally resolved unless human beings returned to what might be called the status of primitive society. This observation by Takabatake bears a striking resemblance to the basic theory of mainstream laissez faire economics that preconditions human beings as profit-oriented creatures. However, it did not lead him to endorse capitalism as the most appropriate system for human society. By transforming a nation into what he called a commodity, he argued, the capitalist system constantly reproduces class struggle caused by economic interests. Therefore, Takabatake argued adamantly that capitalism had failed to produce a nation (国民) that possesses patriotism for the state. He was equally critical of Marxism, which refers to the state as simply a “committee” for the bourgeois.

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33 Takabatake translated Marx’s *Das Kapital* and published it four times between 1918 and 1928. The most famous one among them was *Shihonron* published by Kaizōsha in 1926-1928.

and therefore called for the necessity of state-centered socialism.\textsuperscript{35}

Given that Takabatake’s state socialism was shaped as he became critical of Marxism in the late 1920s, it can be said that his theoretical orientation focused on the limits of Marxism rather than transforming it into an actual social force. For this reason, his turn to patriotism sounds somewhat abstract and naïve from the perspective of the social sciences. Nonetheless, his “pioneering” articulation of state socialism apparently foreshadowed the spread of various state-oriented theories in the mid 1930s and it was Waseda University professor Hayashi Kimio 林癸未夫 (1883-1947) who came to the forefront in this stream.

Taking the position of secretary in the Academic Association for Japanese State Socialism (日本国家主義学盟), founded at his alma mater in April 1932, Hayashi published his first major book on state socialism, entitled “The Principles of State Socialism (国家社会主義原理)” in the same year. He observed that state socialism first pertained to a state in which all kinds of socio-political, economic and cultural conflicts have been eliminated. Therefore, the concept of the social in his state socialism was indicative of a kind of equilibrium forced by state power.\textsuperscript{36} Here, what is more important is how Hayashi came up with his totalitarian theory in his harsh critiques of both Western totalitarian and liberal thoughts.

While acknowledging that the term state socialism did not exist in the West, Hayashi emphasized the necessity of “Japanizing” this Western totalitarian thought. He was convinced that although totalitarian theories emerged as an anti-thesis to liberal democracy, they emanated from the notion of organism inherent in Western liberalism. He was convinced that social theories based on the contract between individuals and state were not compatible with the case of Japan, where statism had been the ultimate

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., pp.6-12.
\textsuperscript{36} Hayashi Kimio, \textit{Kokka shakaishugi genri} (Tokyo: Shokasha, 1932).
principle.\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, Hayashi’s project of Japanizing Western political theories began with criticizing the concept of organism in the West. Here, what captured his attention were the writings of Jeremy Bentham.

Jeremy Bentham, an English philosopher at the end of the eighteenth century, explained the aim of the state as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” but the idea of “the happiness of the greatest number” is not \textit{integralistic}, but individualistic; for the number is calculated by regarding an individual as its unit, and he considers the State as a \textit{mechanical} group of individuals. This idea is rejected from the integralistic standpoint, which regards the State to be an inseparable organic unity above individuals…. In an organic body, what is important is only life as a whole. The individualistic theorists of the State regard individuals – who are mere cells in the State – as the supreme beings.\textsuperscript{38} (Emphasis added)

Although utilitarianism advocates the maximization of individuals’ happiness, it also recognizes the necessity of social norms and rules to mediate conflicts between individuals’ pursuit of happiness and social order. As Bentham’s notion of Panopticon well suggests, individuals’ act of pursuing happiness can occur only in a closed world where they are always under invisible surveillance. Importantly, the statement above does not reveal that Hayashi was an anti-organist, but it rather shows his unique understanding of organism. Given that Hayashi clearly portrayed the state as an organic unity, it seems evident that he also based his state socialism on a kind of an organist theory. But his repugnance for individuals as autonomous subjects in a state organ created an intentional misunderstanding of the Western organism.

Therefore, at the heart of Hayashi’s critiques of Western organist theories lay his strong anti-individualism. He was convinced that the amalgam of individuals’ happiness would never be realized as the collective good of the totality. This line of thinking was clearly illuminated in his understanding of Italian fascism. The


cooperative system between labor and capital in the Italian fascist movement, Hayashi asserted, would further separate that movement from the ideal of state socialism. In other words, Hayashi’s state socialism showed a kind of compulsory epistemology against the notion of the political in which individuals’ subjective resolution would work for the totality of a society. For this reason, the political in his theory was only possible in state organ without autonomous individual subjects.

Interestingly, Hayashi’s highly problematic approach to the state was heavily criticized even by right-wing intellectuals. Minoda Muneki蓑田胸喜 (1894-1946), a famous right-wing critic who was at the forefront of attacking liberal and socialist intellectuals, dismissed Hayashi’s state socialism as an empty rationalism and ethics that lacked humanity. By presupposing the state as an omnipotent organ that controls the politics, ethics, law and religion of kokumin国民, Minoda argued, the state became a trans-moral institution beyond a scientific analysis. Therefore, he did not hesitate to criticize the theory of Hayashi and like-minded state socialists as being fundamentally derailed from social science. However, the real discontent of Minoda, whose writing was substantially distanced from social scientific thinking as well, focused on the temporal aspect of Hayashi’s theory. In other words, by subordinating humanity to the state, Minoda believed, Hayashi’s state socialism eradicated the historicity of the Japanese state, whose principle was the spiritual integration of the Japanese people under the Emperor system. This explains a facet of the tension among conservative intellectuals in the mid 1930s regarding the question of how the Emperor should be defined in a new political system.

More serious than the problem of temporality was the question of how state

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41 Ibid., p.81.
socialists positioned the spatiality of their theory. In other words, once the state became an ultimate unit of analytical thinking, state socialism would only operate in the boundary of a single nation-state. Notably, this concern was not fully discussed in the early state socialism of Takabatake, who died in 1928. This problem also appeared in Hayashi’s discussion of state socialism, which invariably disclosed Japan-centeredness.

In 1932, Akamatsu Katsumarō 赤松克麿 (1894-1955), a Tokyo Imperial University graduate and a student of political scientist Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1878-1933), published a book entitled “The Basis for a New National Movement (新国民運動の基調)” Apart from the fact that he used the term “national movement,” which was apparently rejected by other state socialists, what is unique is that Akamatsu devoted much of this work to envisioning what he called an Asian version of state socialism. He first critically analyzed that internationalism in Marxism is based on the monolithic perception that the proletariat in every country is and should be imbued with class struggle consciousness.42 If individual differences within the proletariat are ignored, he asserted, this monistic observation of internationality in Marxism is nothing but utopian socialism, which, he believed, became the main reason for the failure of a series of international socialist movements.43 For him, the most serious problem was racial and ethnic conflicts among the proletariat.44

The observation above explains how Akamatsu understood fascism in Europe. He basically viewed it as an economic movement manipulated by financial capital. The state monopolizes financial capital and this necessarily enables the state to control industrial capital. In this process, the fascist state completes the nationalization of the whole economy. Based on this observation, Akamatsu was convinced that fascist movement will be closely associated with chauvinism, thus weakening the

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., p.48.
internationalization of the economy.\textsuperscript{45} However, Akamatsu was adamant that this nationalization of the economy would rather reinforce the state-centered capitalist economy and argued that the state manipulates peasants and the working class by propagandizing that they would be liberated from the status of the “slave of debt”.\textsuperscript{46} In short, the nature of fascist movements in Europe was, for Akamatsu, a highly economic and essentially capitalistic movement that is fundamentally different from state socialism.

As a matter of fact, not only state socialists but also leading social scientists in Japan shared the observation that fascist governments in Europe were deceiving destitute peasants and the poor urban working class. Shinmei Masamichi, Professor of Sociology at Tohoku Imperial University, acutely pointed out the limits of German fascism:

National socialism’s attack on capitalism based on its middle-class-oriented ideology is superficial. This is due to the fact that the limits of its middle class ideology have been already preconditioned... It is certain that the middle class decisively takes a non-negating attitude toward capitalism, compared to that of the proletariat. As long as the ideology of the middle class is spontaneous, it would return to the affirmation of capitalism in the end. Because the ideology of national socialism takes nothing but this natural sentiment of the middle class, national socialism would be hardly away from affirming capitalism, even if ideological artificiality is added to it.\textsuperscript{47} (Emphasis added)

The above remark by Shinmei, who was in Germany by the time he contributed several articles on European fascism to the journal \textit{Keizai ōrai}, is telling in two ways. First, he was precisely aware that the German fascist movement appealed to the spontaneity of middle-class workers; that is, they are against big business by nature. Therefore, the German fascist government tended to draw support from them by claiming that it

\textsuperscript{45} A roundtable discussion, “Fashizumu hihan,” \textit{Keizai ōrai}, 7, no.1 (Jan, 1932), pp. 37-68. The other two participants of this roundtable discussion were Sasa Hiroō 佐々弘雄 (1897-1948) and political scientist Rōyama Masamichi.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47} Shinmei Masamichi, “Doitu fashizumu no ideorogi,” \textit{Keizai ōrai} 6, no.7 (July 1931), p. 8.
would accelerate the nationalization of bourgeois capitalists and big businesses. Shinmei observed, therefore, that fascist movements always resort to nationalist sentiment. This led him to make his second observation about fascist movements; that is, fascism is easily associated with racist politics. Shinmei pointed out the paradox that although the German middle class were fascinated by the government policy to nationalize big business and finance capital, they were completely silent about the government’s attack on the Jewish middle class.  

Although both Shinmei and Akamatsu were critical of German national socialism from different perspectives, they had in common the observation that the capitalist system and democracy were being replaced by a new socio-economic structure.

How, then, did Akamatsu conceptualize the internationality of his state socialism? In a roundtable discussion on the European fascist movements, he first asserted that in order to protect Japan from the monopolizing tendency of European powers, it must initiate what might be called single-nation socialism (一国社會主義). As for his notion of single-nation socialism, he referred to the Soviet Union’s planned economy as a realistic example. Akamatsu’s proposal of the Soviet Union as a model for Japan’s rosy future, however, soon provoked harsh criticism from other participants, who argued that by focusing on its own people, the Soviet Union’s monopolistic economy did not recognize its neighbors as its competition partners, and could hardly serve for the general good of the proletariat in the world.

As for these critiques, Akamatsu attempted to rationalize his state socialism by pointing to its cosmopolitan ideal. He maintained that the new definition of internationalism must be that inferior ethnic groups form a united front and resist against the monopolizing interests of superior ethnic groups. To this end, he concluded

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48 Ibid., pp.11-12.
50 Ibid., p. 48.
that a realistic internationalism ought to be based on the guiding spirit that facilitates the equalization of the living conditions of various ethnic groups on a world level.\textsuperscript{51}

Akamatsu observed that the world was being divided into several politico-economic blocs – the America-Latino bloc, the British Empire bloc and the Russia bloc. However, he was opposed to the idea that Japan’s bloc economy system should be based on capitalism. He instead proposed what he called a Greater Asian socialist bloc. He wrote it:

Greater Asianism in the past was for exploitation. However, it was not based on the principle of the Kingly Way ideology. (王道主義) The principle of the Kingly Way Ideology must serve not for exploitation but for the realization of harmony among ethnic groups. To this end, we must construct a socialist Japan that possesses supreme culture. As long as Japan adheres to its capitalistic status, it has neither the qualification for the Asian international, nor the qualification for guiding Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{52}

Assuring Japan’s leading role in establishing a Greater Asian socialist bloc, Akamatsu believed, would necessitate a fundamental transformation of the domestic structure. Here, he advocated the importance of a national movement (国民運動). To be sure, his concept of a national movement was different from that of Germany, which he condemned as capitalistic. His notion of a national community instead envisioned the future of Japanese minzoku; that is, social and political conflicts would all be eradicated through what he called national spirit (民族精神).\textsuperscript{53}

To be fair, Akamatsu was at least aware that his notion of single-nation socialism had to be regionalized to embrace the rest of Asia. Moreover, he also recognized the necessity of the politics of subject formation in his emphasis on a national movement. Therefore, he insisted that a national party be organized to realize what he called Greater Asian socialism. However, the way he intended to infuse subjectivity into the

\textsuperscript{51} Akamatsu, \textit{Shinkokumin undō no kichō}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p.54.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., pp. 179-196.
people of East Asia was to return to such transcendental notions like ethnic spirit. In this way, the concept of the political in Akamatsu became increasingly esoteric and as a result, political subjectivity was conceptualized as producing spiritually homogenous subjects, an idea which could not be explicated from the perspective of the social sciences.

The Concept of the Political: Regionalism and Cooperativism

Not surprisingly, state socialism as politics without political subjects became the target of harsh criticism, even by other social scientists. For example, Kada Tetsuji 加田哲二 (1895-1964), Professor of Sociology at Keio University who later became one of the leading advocates of the East Asia Cooperative Community and a multi-ethnic empire, pointed out the shallowness of state socialism’s concept of nation and minzoku. He observed that a nation in Hayashi’s state socialism is portrayed as a mechanical entity of minzoku. Since Hayashi defined minzoku 民族 in a very intrinsic way, as a group of people sharing the same blood, Kata argued, no socio-political explanations can be found in Hayashi’s theory regarding why minzoku should be transformed into nation. Quite the contrary, Kada emphasized that minzoku itself is formed in the relations of production in capitalism. Therefore, the conflict between the East and the West, he asserted, was a racial conflict, but rather stemmed primarily from economic relations.55

The prevalence of state socialism and fascism in early 1930s Japan, in spite of their theoretical limitations, provides a key to understanding the direction of wartime Japanese social sciences. First, Japanese social scientists were preoccupied with the task of contriving the logic of community, national or ethnic, that would serve as a platform for total mobilization for Japan’s war efforts. Second, that believed that by abolishing

55 Ibid., p.174.
the distinction between metropole and colony, the East Asia community must achieve regional rationality, thus justifying Japan’s role in Asia. Therefore, from a social scientific perspective, the blueprint for the East Asian Cooperative Community had to be at once subjective and objective, national and regional, and totalistic and individual.

Tokyo Imperial University political scientist Rōyama Masamichi was one of those who delved into the question of a new direction for the social sciences in the early 1930s. To highlight Rōyama’s notion of the political, it might be useful to see how he understood internationality and accordingly criticized nationalism. He basically observed that political science represented by nationalism did not meet with the political demands of *total society* that emerges to overcome the limits of national boundaries. He went on to argue that since nationalism was based on the geographical demarcation of national governmental institutions, it was necessary to establish international politics to destroy the obstacles that national had created.56

Therefore, Rōyama’s early concept of political science, as many have argued, was primarily concerned with maximizing the potential of what he called international politics beyond the limit of national borders.57 The notion of internationalism continued to occupy the central place in his political theory after the outbreak of critical international events – the Great Depression in 1929 and the Manchurian Incident in 1931. However, its content changed markedly as he began viewing the world order from a completely new perspective. To begin with, Rōyama maintained that the old regional order sustained by the League of Nations had come to an end, since he believed that European powers could no longer appropriate internationalism as a means

to justify their international order. Hence, he observed that new forces such as the independence movement in India and the Soviet regime in Russia would not follow the Europe-centered world order.\textsuperscript{58} Based on these observations, he insisted that a new regionalism should be based on “recognizing particular situations that a certain region has in terms of the interrelations between nations or kokumin (国民).”\textsuperscript{59}

This logic first enabled him to revisit the Manchurian Incident from a new perspective. The particular situation in Manchuria, he asserted, could not be fully explained in terms of the current international order or existing political theories. Instead, he aimed to redefine this incident as a critical moment in the world order dominated by world capitalism.\textsuperscript{60} Notably, he did not simply remain in the ivory tower in making political statements. Rōyama involved himself in real politics by joining the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.\textsuperscript{61} Insisting that Japan had developed “special relations” with Manchuria, he argued that the only way to solve this problem of Manchuria “would seem to lie in the reconsideration of Japan’s assertion of a special position” and efforts “to safeguard Japan’s substantial interests in Manchuria.”\textsuperscript{62} He also participated in a special government-led research group whose goal was to find a way to resolve Japan’s situation in Manchuria. A year after the outbreak of the Manchurian Crisis, Rōyama wrote a unpublished book entitled \textit{Policies for Resolving the Manchurian Problem} (満洲問題解決案).\textsuperscript{63}

One may wonder how Rōyama differed from other conservative social scientists,

\begin{itemize}
  \item Rōyama Masamichi, “Sekai no saininshiki to chiikiteki kokusai renmei,” \textit{Kokusai chisiki} 13, no. 1 (Jan 1933), also in \textit{Seikai no henkyoku to nihon no sekai seisaku} (Tokyo: Ganshodo shoten, 1938), pp. 91-95.
  \item Rōyama, \textit{Seikai no henkyoku to nihon no sekai seisaku}, p. 102.
  \item Rōyama Masamichi, “Manshu mondai no jūdaika,” in \textit{Chūōkōron}, a special issue (Oct 1932), also in \textit{Seikai no henkyoku to nihon no sekai seisaku}, pp. 3-15.
  \item For an excellent study of Rōyama’s participation in the JIPR, see Jung Sun Han, “Rationalizing the Orient: The “East Asia Cooperative Community in Prewar Japan,” \textit{Monumenta Nipponica} 60, no.4 (Winter 2005), pp. 481-513.
  \item Rōyama Masamichi, \textit{Japan’s Position in Manchuria} (Tokyo: The Japanese Council Institute of Pacific Relations, 1928), p.103. It was the paper written for the third conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in Kyoto in 1929.
  \item Rōyama Masamichi, \textit{Manshū mondai kaiketsuan} (unpublished) (June 1932).
\end{itemize}
in that he also intended to rationalize Japan’s invasion of China. First and foremost, his notion of internationalism was not simply focused on diplomatic relations with the West. Instead, he placed great emphasis on restructuring both the domestic and the regional political structure to convince both Japanese and colonial subjects to embrace a new order. However, he was critical of the existing regionalist theories such as the Japan-Manchuria-China economic bloc system. His critical gaze also targeted the Asia Monroe Doctrine, which, he believed, would function as a mere diplomatic policy, leaving the domestic political system intact. As for the economic bloc system, he asserted, “[T]he term bloc-economy is by all means an artificial term, since no political system exists that connects Japan with China or other Asian countries.” He was convinced that such theories would serve national interests rather than the good of a regional community. This statement clearly demonstrates that for Rōyama, regionalism first pertained to the question of how the concept of the political beyond national interests should be theorized in a certain area.

Rōyama’s seemingly radical thinking, however, raises one fundamental question. He had emphasized what he called international politics in his adamant critiques of nationalism. However, he also justified Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, contending that “special” relations and interests must be recognized in a regional order. How, then, could Rōyama theorize “special” relations outside the boundary of a nation-state? This provides us with a clue to understanding the dialectical aspect of his regionalist thinking. On a microscopic level, his theory had to embrace particular modes of life that each community had sustained. To describe it macroscopically, it also needed to mediate conflicts between state and individuals, and among ethnic groups.

65 Rōyama Masamichi, Sekai kyōkō to burokku keizai (Gendai keizaigaku zenshū 29) (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1932), p.68.
In pursuit of a new theoretical breakthrough, Rōyama also showed keen interest in newly emerging political theories of the time such as German national socialism and Italian fascism. He paid special attention to the logic of how these totalitarian theories aimed to diminish socio-economic inequality and create spontaneous subjects for mobilization. In this way, the notion of community or cooperativism first captured Rōyama’s attention in the early 1930s. But it was not only Rōyama who was attentive to totalitarian and cooperative theories in Europe. After obtaining a professorship at Tohoku Imperial University, Shinmei Masamichi embarked on a trip to Germany. During his stay in Germany between 1929 and 1931, Shinmei experienced totalitarian movements in Germany and Italy more vividly than any other Japanese social scientist. He contributed articles to the famous journal *Keizai ōrai* on contemporary political situations in Europe during his stay, which played an important role in introducing fascism and cooperativism to Japanese academic circles.66

What captured Shinmei’s attention was the concept of cooperativism inherent in both German and Italian fascism. A cooperative community essentially arises out of an economic demand to overcome the social and class conflicts between labor and capital.67 According to Shinmei, the main difference between a cooperative community (協同体) and an association (組合) lay in the fact that the former functions as a political organization in itself, while the latter is viewed as a highly economic organization, thus having little impact on political issues. Cooperativism in Italian fascism, Shinmei argued, emerged in an attempt to replace parliamentary politics.68 Each cooperative community has different collective goals, at times coming in conflict

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66 The original title of these articles was *Ōshū tsushin* (歐 州 通 信, Communication from the West) and it appeared in the journal 11 times between February 1930 and January 1931.
67 Shinmei Masamichi, “Kyōdōtai kokka no kannen oyobi kikō (1),” *Hōgaku* 3, no. 1 (Jan 1934), pp.28-54.
68 Shinmei Masamichi, “Kyōdōtai kokka no kannen oyobi kikō (2),” *Hōgaku* 3, no. 2 (Feb 1934), pp.35-77.
with other cooperative communities. Therefore, they must belong to a grand community that eventually represents what might be called a central cooperative bureau. In this way, Shinmei concluded that cooperativism aims to mediate socio-political conflicts by creating a goal-oriented political space based on organic processes.

It is understandable that Shinmei, who stayed in Germany between 1929 and 1931, and witnessed a strong racist tendency in German national socialism, was influenced by the Italian fascist movement, which, he believed, at least was not based on racism. However, he was also clearly aware that this rosy ideal political totality faced certain obstacles from the beginning. First, he pointed out that Italian cooperative thought, which is traceable to the 1910s, presupposes the disappearance of class once cooperative communities begin to function effectively. But he observed that powerful class hierarchies still exist even at this stage and this makes it harder for cooperative communities to function as mediators. Second, Italian cooperativism was also premised on the perception that cooperative communities shape horizontal relations both with other communities and with the state. Under this system, individuals become autonomous political subjects, not controlled predominantly by the state. Hence, the emergence (創発性) of individuals that was emphasized in socialism continues to develop in each cooperative community. Shinmei observed, however, that these hypotheses are barely realized when homogeneous national interests come to the forefront. In this respect, he concluded that Italian cooperativism actually existed as a mere functional system for the fascist state, and accordingly, he redefined it as a cooperative state (協同体国家) rather than cooperativism.

Shinmei’s analysis of cooperativism posited two important questions as Japanese social scientists were searching for alternative social scientific methodologies. The first

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69 Ibid., pp.64-67.
70 Ibid., p.59.
question entails the issue of how a new form of political totality can be represented without resorting to the existing parliamentary system. The Italian version of cooperativism demonstrated well that a cooperative community will not function effectively insofar as political leaders’ decision-making eventually tops all other cooperative processes. Second and more importantly, the political space of cooperativism never exceeds that of the state in reality but rather sustains the state’s dominance over all other socio-political sectors. At stake was the issue of whether in the case of imperial Japan, reforming the domestic structure based on state cooperativism was likely to absolutize the Japanese state, thus creating inconsistencies with the regional order beyond the limits of nationalism.

In the same year Shinmei articulated his ideas about cooperativism, Rōyama also showed keen interest in this new political theory. Clearly aware of the problem of the state as a dominant agency in European totalitarian theories, Rōyama insisted from the beginning that the concept of the political must be distinguished from the concept of the state.71 This observation was logically connected to Rōyama’s unique understanding of political functionalism. Unlike Shinmei, who criticized the functionalist tendency in cooperativism under the Italian fascist regime, Rōyama saw functionalism as a way to overcome the dominance of the state in real politics. In order to capture Rōyama’s position more clearly, it might be useful to discuss his understanding of the relationship between modern politics and political functionalism. He contended that political science itself had existed as “a function (作用) of constructing an order in human life.” He went on to argue that modern political science, however, had already lost the principle of constructing an order, and therefore had been reduced to the narrow realm of maintaining an order.72

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This observation by Rōyama reveals his basic approach to the concept of the political. He was much less concerned with politics or political theory per se than with how something called the political actually functions and operates in real life. At the heart of Rōyama’s interest in new political theories, cooperativism in particular, was the question of how he could rationally create political spaces where the notion of political subjectivity functions to overcome the limits of the nation-state. In this way, a regional community was presented by him as a new political dimension. This also explains why, as Victor Koschmann has argued, Rōyama also showed interest not just in European totalitarian theories but also in the Soviet planned economy as well as the American New Deal policy.  

Given that modern political science had simply served to maintain the status-quo, and totalitarian theories were aiming to create another monolithic society, what kind of new agendas did he set up and how did he gradually direct himself to the notion of cooperativism? Returning to his 1935 articles, I argue that Rōyama’s critiques of modern political science were heavily influenced by the German political thinker Carl Schmitt and the American political scientist William Yandell Elliot (1896-1979). Rōyama first categorized the conceptual basis of political entities into three patterns – confederative (聯合的), totalitarian (全体的) and cooperative co-organic (協同的有機的). According to him, the confederative notion represents the combination of 19th century individual liberalism and party politics in the 20th century, that is, liberal and parliamentary democracy in a conventional sense. The totalitarian concept that emerged in the recent German political movement and its theoretical elements, Rōyama emphasized, were concretized by Carl Schmitt. Lastly, the cooperative co-organic notion is based on the observation that the two aspects of political totality – rational and

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conscious versus irrational and organic – must coexist in harmony. Rōyama calls the third notion “co-organism (協同的有機体論)”, and it was an American political scientist, William Elliot, who elaborated on this theory in his comparative research on the pluralistic theory of state and fascism.⁷⁴

Given that Rōyama, like other Japanese social scientists, was already aware of the limits of what he called the confederative concept of political totality, how did he view Carl Schmitt and German fascism? To answer this question, it might be worth briefly discussing Schmitt’s concept of the political. In a 1931 book, Der Begriff des Politischen, later translated as The Concept of the Political, Schmitt delineated his notion of politics, as he put it:

German political science has originally maintained (under the impact of Hegel’s philosophy of the state) that the state is qualitatively distinct from society and higher than it. A state standing above society could be called universal but not total, as that term is understood nowadays, namely, as the polemical negation of the neutral state, whose economy and law were in themselves nonpolitical.⁷⁵ (emphasis added)

Clearly distinguishing totality from universality, Schmitt attempted to denounce the notion of the state as the ultimate destination of modern political science. However, this remark came as no surprise to Japanese social scientists, since many of them were already imbued with the idea that the state merely constitutes part of a total society.⁷⁶ What is rather striking in Schmitt’s concept of the political was how he defined what he called a political entity:

The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will

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⁷⁴ Rōyama, “Seijiteki tōitsu no sho riron (1),” pp.2-3.
⁷⁶ As I shall discuss it further in Chapter 3, sociologist Takata Yasuma’s theory of state best exemplifies this tendency. See Takata Yasuma, Shakai to kokka (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1922).
thus always be in the world more than just one state. A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe…. *The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world.*

In this way, Schmitt revealed his understanding of universality and one can easily find a trace of dialectical thinking in his theory. A political entity was defined by him as recreating itself in its oppositional but mutual relation with another political entity. Rōyama also agreed with this observation and it might be no exaggeration to say that Rōyama’s critiques of rational universality in modern political science stemmed from Schmitt’s theory. This also explains the fact that the new orders in Rōyama and Schmitt, the East Asian Community and the German Empire respectively, were not envisioned under the project of establishing an alternative universal nation state in a conventional sense.

However, while showing similarities in outlining the external contour of political entity, Rōyama and Schmitt developed substantially different perspectives in discussing the internal dynamics of the political. As the Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben has recently argued, Schmitt’s denunciation of rationality in modern political science is represented by the observation that political arenas are not limited to institutional sectors. In other words, the exceptional exists outside the domain of rational political behavior within institutional sectors and the very presence of the exceptional defines the political. Therefore, sovereignty in Schmitt’s theory occurs only when one can declare an emergency. According to this logic, a political subject does not recognize the location of his sovereignty until he is positioned in the border between legal domains and domains outside the legal. Therefore, central to

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77 Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, p. 53.
79 Schmitt argues, “[T]here exists no norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a
Schmitt’s concept of the political is the observation that it is political leaders who determine and declare the exceptional.

Rōyama conceptualized Schmitt’s theory as a threefold structure. Instead of the conventional twofold structure, the state and the people, Rōyama argued, Schmitt suggested one in which political leadership mediates the relationship between the state and the people.80

Therefore, in order for political leaders to achieve monolithic support from ordinary people, Schmitt’s theory must be expanded to socio-psychological domains over legal systems. The political in Schmitt must create an internal and spiritual space that connects people to political leaders.81 Rōyama further argued that this logic had already generated numerous problems in economic sectors where leaders’ will and individuals’ profit orientation collided with each other. Precisely for this reason, Rōyama contended that Schmitt’s political theory would be highly likely to be appropriated to justify dictatorship while appropriating sovereignty. I argue that as early as in the mid 1930s, Rōyama seems to have understood why racism would inevitably play a central role in German national socialism. Moreover, although Schmitt repeatedly denounced the universality of the state, his political theory never transcended the border of the state as an analytical unit. This did not correspond to Rōyama’s regionalist perspective and he argued for the need to search for a cooperative and organic theory.

normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation exists... All law is “situational law,” The sovereign produces and guarantees the situation in its totality. He had the monopoly over this decision. Theirin resides the essence of the state’s sovereignty, which must be juristically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to decide. The exception reveals most clearly the essence of the state’s authority. The decision parts here from the legal norm, and (to formulate it paradoxically) authority proves that to produce law it need not be based on law.” Carl Schmitt, George Schwab ed., Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p.13.
80 Rōyama, “Seijiteki tōitsu no sho riron (1),” p.12.
For these reasons, Rōyama did not think that Schmitt’s notion of the political, in spite of its numerous insights, would be applicable to the project of changing the political structure in Japan. A month later, Rōyama contributed another article on cooperativism. This time, he turned to what he called co-organic theory, the third pattern in his categorization of the political entity. He first defined co-organic theory as a theory of an internal and organic entity that links social groups and partial societies. In fact, this theory derived from *The Political Revolt in Politics*, William Elliot’s *magnum opus*. Elliot wrote:

Such a theory of the relation of the state to other groups flows from a conception of the nature and functions of group life for which I propose the term *co-organic* as opposed either to the contractual or to the organic conceptions…The common ends which groups serve must fall into a scheme of moral values. The associational scheme of any political society assumes a character at once organic, economic, and functional. But the ordering of this functional realm can only assume moral character through a coherent scheme of ideal values.  

At the center of Elliot’s somewhat rosy picture of a co-organic community lay the question of how different interests in different groups could be “organized” and represented as a collective and moral values. Here, Rōyama differentiated co-organism from organism. For Rōyama, organism was concerned with the process of leading individuals and groups to realize what he called a goal-oriented and self-conscious unification through institutional means such as law and order. Rōyama called this concept the perception of organizing (組織化観念), borrowing the term from the American political scientist Ernest Barker (1874-1960). However, this conception of organism, Rōyama argued, neglects traditional and cultural aspects in a society that take place outside the arena of goal-oriented and rational activities. In other words, the

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organizing idea as a collective goal at times occurs outside non-organized sectors such as religion, customs and ethnicity. Therefore, co-organism as a synthesizing principle must be based on both rational and organizing ideas and non-rational and environmental factors. In this context, Rōyama viewed Elliot’s co-organism as a more advanced version of organism.\(^4\)

Morality in Elliot’s theory thus was not an abstract value *per se*. It instead represented a functionally idealized destination in co-organism. Each organ in a society operates co-organically and self-consciously to achieve its goals. This did not necessarily mean that both Rōyama and Elliot denounced the state and the constitutional system. Constitutionalism as a political system, Rōyama contended, represents the “[M]oral responsibility that arises out of the common consciousness which is one element of co-organic theory.”\(^5\) In other words, constitutionalism is not so much a rational and formal process of reaching what might be called a national intention (國家意思) and driving people toward it, but an ethical and moral means to safeguard the creation and recreation of a co-organic entity. Thus, a co-organic entity was described as intrinsically self-changing in itself. Therefore, as Victor Koschmann has argued, politics was, for Rōyama, radically redefined as the constant process of creating structures. It is in this context that Rōyama’s unique notion of the community of destiny (運命共同体) emerged.\(^6\)

How, then, did Rōyama conceptualize regionalism in his notion of East Asian Community? Similar to the way he categorized the theories of political totality into three patterns, he divided regionalism in three ways as well – exclusive regionalism (拘束的地域主義), inclusive regionalism (開放的地域主義) and cooperative regionalism

\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid., p.35.
According to him, exclusive regionalism pertained to the Tokugawa regime and its seclusionism, and Japan’s exposure to world capitalism since the Meiji Restoration. In contrast to the previous two notions of regionalism, which were based on exploitation and imbalance, the principle of cooperative regionalism, Rōyama argued, must be to ensure regional balance and development.\(^8^7\) To this end, he also postulated the necessity of defining East Asia in a spatial sense.

A region called East Asia has perpetually existed in a natural and geographical sense since the beginning of the earth. But, if we think about East Asia in a cultural sense, it is possible to say that unlike the West, it has not been considered an entity. A regional cooperative community, by nature, must have something other than natural and perpetual elements or cultural unification... The driving force that makes East Asia a regional cooperative community first lies in its spirit and mentality. It is generated through the essence of the regional destiny (Raumschicksal) of its minzoku 民族. The destiny that determines the existence of minzoku must be produced by the significance of unifying the destiny to certain regions.\(^8^8\)

Importantly, the “spirit” that Rōyama emphasized does not represent something transcendental. It instead occurs through the very process of co-organism. For this reason, East Asia as a region in Rōyama’s thinking is not static, nor too is the destiny of the East Asian community. Both East Asia and its destiny must negate and recreate themselves in the subjective and objective logic of cooperativism. In that respect, Rōyama’s wartime social science stayed far from the myth of objectivity in conventional social sciences and it bore a striking resemblance to philosophical approaches to total war, the Kyoto School of Philosophy for example. In the end, Rōyama’s new concept of the political and social sciences attempted to rationalize the Asian Pacific War and provide a logic basis for total mobilization.


Conclusion

The limits of liberalism during the Taisho period became self-evident as Japan confronted the international crisis in the early 1930s. In an attempt to cope with pressure from the West and at the same time justify Japan’s position in China, Japanese social scientists developed various regional discourses. Their responses to the international crisis first demonstrated that the “liberal” notion of developing democracy and capitalism at home and rationalizing colonialism in the name of civilizing mission during the Taisho period would no longer become the solution for the international and domestic crises Japan was facing. However, many regional discourses such as the Japan-Manchuria-China bloc economy and the Asia-Monroe Doctrine simply aimed to maintain the status quo without changing the paradoxical dual-structure of democracy at home and colonialism abroad. On the other hand, state socialists appropriated the international crisis to overthrow the democratic regime at home and establish a totalitarian government. However, their state socialism lacked regionalist thinking, or subjects outside Japan should be included in their new order and, most importantly, it also lacked the notion of political subjectivity. In their theory, individuals were portrayed as being subordinated to the state without having any political autonomy.

It was under these circumstances that Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi developed regionalist thinking in the mid 1930s. Although they were heavily influenced by the champions of 1920s Japanese social sciences such as Yoshino Sakuzō, they tried to overcome the spatial and theoretical limitations of the Taisho social sciences by radically redefining the concept of the political. Both Rōyama and Shinmei were clearly aware that producing a regional theory and thereby rationalizing Japan’s dominant position in East Asia must be associated with creating new political subjects. To this end, they envisioned a new space called the East Asian Cooperative Community in which the empire-colony power structure was dismantled and transformed into a new
form of cooperative identity. They sought to theorize an East Asian community in which the subjectivities (shukansei, 主観性) and heterogeneousness of Asian people were organically converged into what Rōyama called the community of destiny. In this sense, their project of establishing new social scientific thinking was in fact one of creating a subjective social science. (主体的社会科学).

The newness of their social scientific thinking rapidly gained currency and played an important role in forming a group of social scientists who advocated the theory of the East Asian Cooperative Community (Tōakyōdōtairon, 東亜協同体論) during the wartime period. In the chapters that follow, I will disuse how these wartime Japanese social scientists involved in the East Asian Cooperative Community confronted various theoretical challenges – nation, space and community. In Chapter 3, I will deal with the question of why these social scientists vehemently denounced racism as anti-social scientific and sought to find the dynamics of subject formation through the concept of minzoku (民族, nation) by focusing on two prominent sociologists Shinmei Masamichi and Takata Yasuma.

Chapter 3
The Social Scientific Creation of a Multi-Ethnic Empire:
Discourses on Race, Nation and Colonization

In a 1939 book entitled *Nation and Culture* (民族と文化), Komatsu Kentarō 小松堅太郎 (1894-1959), one of the most influential sociologists in prewar and postwar Japan, made an interesting point about “becoming” Japanese, while at the same time Japan was conducting a full-scale war against China:

> For example, one elite young Japanese man who does not have a sense of ethnic identity happens to go to work for a trading company near the Yangtze River upon graduation. If this young man is condemned, lynched and robbed of his belongings by a man from a certain country for no reason other than because he is Japanese, he will naturally feel that his ethnicity has been insulted. If his wife is violated on the street for no reason, he will feel the same way. In these cases, irrespective of his Japanese consciousness, he becomes Japanese as a natural man.¹

To be sure, this statement by itself does not allow us to assess the intellectual depth of Komatsu’s discussion of ethnicity. However, one might observe from it that the problem of ethnic conflict in the Japanese empire became so complex that leading social scientists like Komatsu indirectly disclosed their fear of ethnically-motivated reprisals against the Japanese in Japan’s occupied territories. I stress here that I do not intend to make the preposterous argument that fear of ethnic and racial discrimination against the Japanese was equivalent to that suffered by Japan’s colonial subjects. Komatsu’s seemingly naïve statement nonetheless shows how anxiety over the prospect of ethnic revolts within the Japanese empire gradually permeated the mindset of Japanese social scientists. It also indicates that the term *minzoku* (民族), often ambiguously translated as “race,” “ethnos,” or “nation,” and which had not been an

object of social scientific study precisely because of this ambiguity, rapidly gained currency among Japanese social scientists in the late 1930s.²

Therefore, it is not surprising that leading Japanese social scientists, including Kada Tetsuji 加田哲二 (1895-1964), Koyama Eizō 小山英三 (1899-1983), Komatsu Kentarō 小松堅太郎 (1894-1959), Shinmei Masamichi 新明正道 (1898-1984) and Takata Yasuma 高田保馬 (1883-1972), were all simultaneously involved in ethnographic studies during the wartime period. These figures also came to the forefront in developing a unique theory called “The East Asian Cooperative Community (東亜協同体).”³ Therefore, it would hardly be possible to understand their wartime Asian discourses without critically examining their ethnographic studies.

In this chapter, I will examine Japanese social scientists’ discourses on race and minzoku in the 1930s and early 1940s. Their encounter with the notion of minzoku was closely related to the observation that neither scientific racism nor racial science in the Western social scientific tradition would support the project of constructing a multi-ethnic empire.⁴ Therefore, the concept of minzoku and its interpretation first explain one facet of the intellectual tension between Japan and the West, Germany in particular. However, I do not intend to simply highlight the superficial tension between Western social science and Japanese intellectuals. I instead will show that these imperial social scientists’ encounter with the concept of race and ethnicity played an important role in

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² As I shall discuss in detail, the term minzoku has connoted plural meanings in Japan. It was often conceived of as conceptually the same as race or ethnic community. On the other hand, it signifies nation in the context of one’s belonging to a modern nation-state. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, I will use the Japanese word minzoku for the term 民族 rather than race, ethnos, or nation.

³ As I shall discuss in detail, social scientists such as Shinmei Masamichi, Kada Tetsuji, Koyama Eizō, and Takata Yasuma simultaneously produced the notion of East Asian Cooperative Community in the late 1930s. See for example, Shinmei Masamichi, Tōa kyōdōtairon (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939); Kada Tetsuji, Tōa kyōdōtairon (Tokyo : Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939).

their revisiting the discussion of identity formations in the Western social sciences.

In critically reading wartime social scientists’ works on race and ethnicity, one may need to keep in mind the fact that Japan emerged as a modern nation-state as it colonized its Asian neighbors beginning in the 1870s. Japanese intellectuals had developed various discourses on race and ethnicity as they faced changes in the colonial constitution of imperial Japan. The terms race and minzoku had been very ambiguously appropriated in both the political arena and academia in prewar Japan. The ambiguity was closely connected to prewar Japanese intellectuals’ seemingly illogical attempt to rationalize the superiority of the Japanese race while the same time emphasizing racial similarities among Asian people to justify Japan’s colonial rule in Asia. This gives us a clue to understanding why the social scientists I will deal with in this chapter problematized the limits of racial and ethnic discourses in both prewar Japanese and Western social science. They were clearly aware of the inefficacy of the existing discussion of race and ethnicity in light of the fact that the racial and ethnic configuration of the Japanese empire was undergoing fundamental changes beginning in the early 1930s.

Based on these observations, I will dedicate the first part of this chapter to examining the question of how Japanese intellectuals developed discourses on race and ethnicity in relation to Japan’s ongoing relations with the colonies, colonial Korea in particular. To this end, I will pay special attention to the ethnographic studies of Torii Ryūzō, a prominent Japanese anthropologist who conducted extensive research in Taiwan, Manchuria and Korea. A close and critical reading of his works will show the ambiguous nature of discourses on race and ethnicity in prewar Japan. In the second part of this study, I will deal with social scientists’ encounter with the term minzoku beginning in the mid 1920s. In particular, I explore the question of how and why sociologists became involved in ethnographic studies in the 1930s. To this end, I will
focus on two prominent sociologists, Takata Yasuma and Shinmei Masamichi, and their early sociology. Third and most importantly, I will examine the theory of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empire developed by Japanese social scientists during the wartime period. By critically analyzing Takata Yasuma’s theory of East Asian nationalism (*tōa minzokuron*, 東亜民族論) and Shinmei Masamichi’s notion of national sociology (*minzokushakaigaku*, 民族社会学), I will show how these imperial social scientists intended to rationalize Japan’s colonization and imperial war through the notion of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empire.

The Ambiguity of Race and Racism in Early 20th Century Japan

Racial science was developed and served as a scientific tool for tracing the origins of racial groups in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. However, it is often considered indistinguishable from the political ideology, that is, racism. As many have pointed out, students of racial science have constantly tried to position it within the realm of “objective science” by claiming that its main concern is to objectively find physical and cultural differences among races. In contrast, scientific racism explicitly takes the form of a political belief that the superiority and inferiority of races can be scientifically proved and objectified. As Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein have correctly argued, scientific racism has played an important role in producing and circulating a “universal” belief throughout the 20th century to rationalize the homogeneity and superiority of a national community over other racial groups. Scientific racism, in spite of its ostensible differences from racial science, also pretends to take the form of scientific and objective knowledge. In this way, racial science and scientific racism

have been appropriated in highly ambiguous ways by European intellectuals. Advocates of racism first attempted to appropriate “objective” knowledge accumulated from the field of racial science and constitute the logic of a racial hierarchy based on them. In order to rationalize the superiority of one race to the other, they must establish the concept of pure race; that is, there must be a group of people who share the exactly same physiological characteristics. This logic produced another ambiguity: is it possible to scientifically theorize a pure race and rationalize its racial superiority to other races? Together with European intellectuals, Japanese intellectuals also had to face this conundrum in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Since the American anthropologist Edward Morse’s pioneering work *Japanese Homes and Their Surroundings*, the first English language work that extensively discussed the origins of the Japanese race, was published in 1886, a number of methodologies and theories on race and ethnicity were introduced to Japan. Politically speaking, racial theories that originated from Europe were first appropriated paradoxically by Japanese intellectuals in their critiques of Western racism toward Asian races. However, what struck Japanese intellectuals most was the fact that the more they turned to what might be called objective modern racial science, the more clearly they realized that it would be impossible to prove the pureness of the Japanese race. In an 1890 essay, “On the Japanese Race (*nihonjinshuron*, 日本人種論),” the renowned philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856-1944) discussed the heterogeneousness of the Japanese race:

> In the Japanese race (*jinshu*,人種), there exists a *minzoku*（民族）that came...
from the Korean peninsula in ancient times, and there exists the southern
minzoku that came from the Southern Seas. The Ainu have been mixed with
the Japanese race and the Chinese have migrated to Japan.⁸ (Emphasis
added)

This statement by Inoue was based on two interesting observations. One was concerned
with his conviction that tracing and historicizing the origins of the “pure” Japanese race
is virtually impossible. Therefore, he accepted the natural science-oriented notion of
race that had demonstrated the multiple and heterogeneous origins of the Japanese race.
More importantly, he used the terms race 人種 and minzoku 民族 indistinguishably,
as if they denoted the same concept. This ambiguity made him unable to further discuss
conceptual differences between the two. For this reason, Inoue eventually took the
double standard in distinguishing the Japanese race from others, arguing that in spite of
its salient similarities with other Asian races, the Japanese race also has its own
particular cultural elements – language, customs and so on- that could become the
sources of pure Japaneseness.⁹ In this way, Inoue understood that the pureness of a
certain race is not a given but is socially and scientifically constructed.

Not surprisingly, the perception of similar origins among Asian races was
politically appropriated by many Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats. On the one
hand, the physiological and genetic commonness among Asian races provided an
excuse for Japan to colonize its neighbors under the guise of protecting Asian races
from Western imperialism. On the other hand, it often led to conflict with those
advocates of scientific racism who had claimed that discrimination between Japan and
its colonies must be justified based on the superiority of the Japanese race. In this way,
the explicit belief in racial superiority on the part of Japanese intellectuals was often
concealed as they constantly spread the rhetoric of unifying Asia to fight against

⁹ Ibid., pp. 794-795.
Western racism toward Asians.

Beginning in the 1920s, Japanese intellectuals once again appropriated this early version of Pan-Asianism in criticizing the immigration policy of the United States toward the Japanese and the Chinese.\(^{10}\) Hostility to American racism represented by the “yellow peril” thus became a very useful basis for propagandizing a theory of Asian unification. The notion of racial science based on Asian similarities supplied empirical evidence for a kind of Asianism, effectively transforming the science of searching for physiological and cultural differences among races into an anti-Western political ideology. In short, at the heart of the ambiguity in discourses on race in early 20\(^{th}\) century Japan was the conundrum of how the notion of race could fulfill Japan’s double-layered desire: to maintain its colonial hierarchy by creating a pure and superior Japaneseness inherent in its history and culture, and at the same time to scientifically rationalize its colonial governance through Asian sameness.

As Japan continued its territorial expansion, contesting discourses on the notion of race became even more complex. In contrast to the colonization of the Ryukyu and the Ainu, which was conceived of by Japanese intellectuals as simply restoring these territories to Japan, the colonization of Taiwan and Korea generated enormous tension with regard to the general principle of colonial governance. Necessarily, racial scientists and ethnographers became deeply involved in the process of producing new governing technologies. A number of ethnographers committed themselves to various government-funded research projects, and the discourse they produced focused most frequently on Korea. Most of these racial science projects were focused on collecting historical, biological and genetic evidence to prove the foregone conclusion that the

\(^{10}\) When the United States government enacted its new immigration law that restricted the influx of the Japanese and Chinese to the United States in 1924, it immediately shaped a strong anti-American racist tendency in Japanese academic circles. For example, see Mitsukawa Kametarō, \textit{Tōzai jinshu tōsō shikan} (Tokyo: Tōyō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1924).
Japanese and Korean people have the same racial origins. Among the ethnographers, it was Torii Ryūzō 鳥居龍藏 (1870-1953), often called the father of Japanese anthropology, who played the most important role in spreading this logic in his theory of *nichisendōsōron* (日鮮同祖論, Japan and Korea as having the same ancestor).

Born in 1870, Torii first encountered the discipline of anthropological studies when he attended Tokyo Imperial University. He was naturally exposed to the intellectual streams of the time that emphasized the similarity among Asian races and the heterogeneousness of the Japanese race.\(^{11}\) Having enormous impacts on both anthropology and adjacent disciplines, he began conducting extensive fieldwork research in Korea beginning in 1910, the year of Korea’s annexation by Japan. Torii’s involvement in government-funded projects in colonial Korea first indicates that ethnography studies in Japan as part of racial science rapidly lost their “objectiveness” by becoming policy studies. On the other hand, as philosopher Inoue Tetsujirō, whose discussion of the origins of the Japanese race was heavily influenced by Torii’s theory, wrote in 1890,\(^{12}\) Torii’s involvement in colonial ethnographic studies was also conceived of as a good opportunity through which the seemingly weak theoretical ground of *nichisendōsōron* could be concretized as a leading theory.

Torii made major fieldwork trips to Taiwan and Korea in 1895 and 1910 respectively, when the two countries were colonized.\(^{13}\) However, in contrast to his research in Taiwan between 1895 and 1910, Torii’s studies on Korean archeology and anthropology soon faced severe challenges as the international political climate rapidly

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\(^{11}\) In 1884, Tsuboi Shōgorō 坪井正五郎 (1863-1913) founded the Association of Anthropology 人類学会 at Tokyo Imperial University, which was renamed the Tokyo Association of Anthropology 東京人類学会 in 1886. Torii became a member of this association at the age of 16. In 1893, anthropology lectures were first established at Tokyo Imperial University and was also affiliated with this program in the same year.

\(^{12}\) Inoue Tetsujirō, ibid.

\(^{13}\) For Torii’s research trips to Taiwan and Korea, see Torii Ryūzō, *Kanpan ni kizamareta sekai:torii ryūzō no mita ajia* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku sōgō kenkyū shiryōkan, 1991), pp.8-10.
changed. In the aftermath of World War I, ethnic nationalism became one of the major forces that swept away the world order, and this was also the case for colonial Korea. Under these circumstances, Torii temporarily suspended his fieldwork in Korea in 1916. Three years later, the March First Independence Movement took place and it fundamentally changed the whole socio-political climate in colonial Korea. Torii could no longer enjoy his privileged relations with the colonial government.

Unquestionably, the rise of ethnic nationalism was first attributed to the larger discriminatory governing structure in the Japanese empire. Propagandizing the notion that Japan and Korea have the same ancestor in theory was inconsistent with the fact that the discriminatory racial hierarchy had already deeply penetrated the everyday life of the colonized Koreans in practice. All in all, the most serious pitfall for Torii and like-mined advocates of nichisendōsoron was the basic problem that racial similarities did not necessarily result in a feeling of ethnic commonality between Japan and Korea. In other words, minzoku as a social construct did not seem to be a primary concern in Torii’s concept of race. He was less interested in delving into the question of the socio-political dynamics of ethnic nationalism than in tracing the origins of the Japanese race back to ancient times by directly linking the long history of Korea to that of Japan.

However, Torii was still vocal in defending his theory of nichisendōsoron even after the 1919 March First Movement. In 1920, a year after the outbreak of this national uprising, the Governor General’s Office in Korea started publishing an institutional journal, entitled Dōgen (同源, Same Origin), in Kyungsung (present-day Seoul). As the title of journal clearly suggests, it explicitly targeted Korean nationalist intellectuals and spread the theory of nichisendōsoron in order to reduce room for ethnic nationalism to resurge in post-1919 Korea. However, many Japanese social scientists, who were aware

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14 After 1916, Torii took only one more trip to Korea in 1932 as part of his research trip to Manchuria funded by the Ministry of Education, as Japan occupied Northeast China as a new imperial territory.
that the rise of ethnic nationalism in the colony was closely related to the discriminatory power structure, did not accept this point of view. They were convinced that colonial ethnic nationalism could not be fully explicated in the simple logic of natural-science-oriented research. Beginning in the early 1920s, liberal social scientists such as Yanaihara Tadao 矢内原忠雄 (1893-1961) and Yoshino Sakuzō 吉野作造 (1878-1933) called for a complete resetting of colonial policy. Not surprisingly, Torii vehemently criticized these liberal social scientists:

One day, a friend of mine told me that Yoshino Sakuzō had published an article in a journal, arguing that “[S]ince Koreans are racially different from the Japanese, a law treating them as a different race must be applied although they behave dangerously.” If Yoshino had argued this, I must be opposed to his idea of Koreans being a different race. This is not just for Yoshino, but for everyone that has the same opinion as him…. Koreans are not racially different from Japanese (内地人) and they are the same minzoku and thus must be included in the same category. This is an anthropological and linguistic truth that cannot be changed.15 (Emphasis added)

The comment above clearly shows that for Torii, race and minzoku had the exactly same meaning. Therefore, this observation led him to conclude that Japan’s occupation of Korea represented the reunification of the same minzoku. On the other hand, this perception exemplifies the dramatic tension between social scientific discourse on ethnicity and Torii’s steadfast belief in “natural scientific truth.” Although Torii never mentioned the exact source for Yoshino’s argument, it might be useful to refer to one of Yoshino’s writings on colonial Korea from the 1920s to locate Torii’s ethnography in a more distinctive way. Yoshino vehemently argued:

Koreans are subjects of the Japanese state in a legal sense. However, because of the fact that they cannot be treated equally as genuine Japanese, they are not given the same rights as Japanese. This has become the evidence that explains why Koreans are not Japanese, although they must be Japanese in a

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legal sense… It is the moral responsibility of the Japanese that makes Koreans complete Japanese through constant efforts and this must be the basic principle of governing Korea. For this reason, as a point of departure for colonial policy, we must recognize that they (Koreans) have not become Japanese yet, and it must be the final destination of our endeavors to ask them to assume the duties of Japanese.\textsuperscript{16} (Emphasis added)

Undoubtedly, Yoshino, the icon of Japanese social sciences in the 1920s, seemed to be attempting to make a reasonable-sounding point on colonial policy, although he never denounced colonialism \textit{per se}. What is more important is that in Yoshino’s highly institutionalist understanding of “becoming Japanese,” there is little room for the monistic notion of race or ethnicity. Deploying mainly a legalist approach, Yoshino attempted to bring rationality to his social scientific argument of making Koreans become Japanese. In contrast, Torii’s impracticality reached its apex when he dismissed contemporary political theories such as the Wilsonian notion of ethnic self-determination. This became a theoretical watershed for both the 1919 March movement and the May 4\textsuperscript{th} Movement in China. In his harsh critique of this America-born theory, Torii reiterated his scientific “truth”; that is, the fact that Koreans and Japanese are the same \textit{minzoku} could be a solution for ethnic problems.\textsuperscript{17}

To be sure, discourses on race and ethnicity developed by social scientists in the early 1920s had a number of theoretical limitations. But, their relatively rational sense of recognizing social problems enabled them to provide a much more convincing analysis of ethnic issues in the colony. This recognition also foreshadowed the emergence of a new discursive space in dealing with the issues of race and ethnicity in the Japanese empire. The emergence of social scientific discourses on race and ethnicity also indicates that the search for homogeneous racial origins by returning to the past, as


\textsuperscript{17} Torii, “Nichisenjin wa 『dōgen』 nari,” pp. 539-541.
best exemplified in Torii’s research in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, gradually
lost its momentum. The tendency to view ethnicity as a social construct gained
momentum among Japanese intellectuals and under these circumstances, social
scientists came to the forefront in this new discursive space beginning in the 1920s.

**The Multi-Ethnic “National” System**

New questions arose as the limits of the discussion of the homogeneous path between
the Japanese race and the Japanese *minzoku* became evident. They first pertained to the
issue of how the Japanese *minzoku* should be rationally defined. Secondly, logical
interpretations of the Japanese *minzoku* had to be reflected in the reshaping of
governing discourses and technologies in the colony. First and foremost, the term
*minzoku* was redefined not as intrinsic or transcendent but as a social construct. In a
1921 book titled *Ancient Japanese Culture* (日本古代文化), the prominent philosopher
Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎 (1889-1960) asserted that an ethnic group called “Japanese
*minzoku*” had never existed and the Japanese race had been mixed with different races.
Although he did not completely deny certain linkages between the Japanese race and
Japanese *minzoku*, Watsuji ardently called for creating a new Japanese *minzoku*. ¹⁸

Watsuji’s distinct definition of ethnicity, reminiscent of contemporary theories
on nation and ethnicity such as Benedict Anderson’s well-known concept “imagined
community,” was widely shared by Japanese ethnographers in the 1920s. However, the
voices of those claiming the superiority and pureness of the Japanese race never
completely disappeared. As a matter of fact, this new tendency to theorize ethnicity as a
modern construct in 1920s Japan was closely connected to the question of how the
relationship between modernization and the individual should be construed. As
Tomiyama Ichirō  has succintly pointed out, these social scientists were convinced that

it is extremely difficult to judge whether one race is more compatible with modern society than another. Instead, they observed that racial science simply reveals physiological characteristics that each race has, but they were also convinced that these elements themselves do not denote hierarchical relations among races in terms of a certain race’s compatibility with modernization. Therefore, their concern was centered on the question of how such a historically mixed race as the Japanese race should be manipulated and ameliorated to cope with changes in modern society. Based on this observation, they believed that a new identity called Japanese minzoku must be created.

With the arrival of this new trend in ethnography studies, racial science in Japan experienced a methodological transformation. In the process of constructing a modern minzoku, racial scientists and ethnographers quickly abandoned efforts to differentiate racial characteristics between Asian races or to trace the origins of the Japanese race back to ancient times, as best represented in Torii’s research. Instead, they centered their concern on scientifically measuring and controlling within the Japanese race biological, genetic and social elements that were incompatible with the project of constructing modern Japanese society. Accordingly, new academic disciplines such as eugenics rapidly became popular among Japanese ethnographers. In 1924, a journal entitled *Eugenics* (ユーゼニックス, 優生学) was first published in Kobe by Koto Ryūkichi. In the following year, the Japanese Association of Eugenics (日本優生学学会) was established in Tokyo, and in the same year it began publishing a journal, *Yūseigaku* (優生学, Eugenics). From the very beginning, the Japanese Association of Eugenics made it clear that its founding philosophy was to make progress in the hygienic, environmental and social conditions of the Japanese people for the sake of the Japanese state. To this end, it insisted that one of its academic missions should be to

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record and manage the characteristics of the Japanese minzoku.\textsuperscript{21}

It must not be overlooked that the Japanese state, like did other modern nation-states, had made constant efforts to transform ordinary people into members of the national community. In that respect, it is an oversimplification to argue that scientific technologies for the construction of national subjects first began to be utilized by the state and intellectuals in the 1920s. However, as I have discussed, the project of constructing a modern national subject (国民) through the notion of race (人種) did not bear fruit during the first two decades of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. As a result, the concept of ethnicity emerged as a powerful theoretical tool to integrate the heterogeneous Japanese race into a homogenous Japanese national community. Hence, it seemed that ethnographers and scholars of eugenics devoted much of their academic effort to creating a logic that identifies minzoku with nation in terms of one’s belonging to a nation-state; that is, kokumin 国民 in Japanese. If this is the case, did this notion of nation offer a new approach to resolving the problem of ethnic nationalism in the colony? How did Japanese social scientists attempt to theorize the concept of nation in the Japanese empire?

Returning to Yoshino’s legalist approach to the so-called Korea problem, I argue that his acknowledgement that Koreans had not become Japanese clearly showed the problem of colonial governance. There was no question that for Yoshino and like-minded social scientists, Yanaihara Tadao in particular, racial similarities between Koreans and Japanese would no longer be a driving force to integrate Koreans into the Japanese empire. However, Yoshino’s seemingly forward-looking but highly naïve views on the Korea problem were also premised on two very problematic hypotheses. One was the conviction that becoming a member of a nation-state is not necessarily analogous to one’s becoming a member of an ethnic or a racial community. To put it

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
another way, Koreans could and should become Japanese national subjects in the sense of formal nationality, irrespective of the unchanging fact that Koreans cannot belong to the Japanese *minzoku*. Second, in order to theoretically rationalize his concepts of nation and *minzoku*, Yoshino then turned to a highly institutionalized assumption, that is, the same application of laws, systems and cultural politics to Koreans would produce the same outcome as that experienced by the Japanese people.

As Asano Toyomi’s excellent studies have succinctly shown, the common legal system between metropole and colony was established based on this universalist perspective in the social sciences, legal studies in particular, as clearly shown in Yoshino’s writings. Needless to say, Yoshino’s somewhat radical account of the Korea problem was not reflected in real politics. However, beginning in the 1920s, the Japanese colonial government introduced a new set of colonial policies often called *bunka seiji* (文化政治, cultural politics). By expanding legal, political and cultural spaces to the colony, the colonial power attempted to control spaces of dissent and absorb colonial intellectuals and bureaucrats into the realm of the colonial institution, thereby diminishing the potential for ethnic resistance. This notion, in contrast to the previous assimilation policy (同化政策), which aimed to eradicate the ethnic characteristics of the colonized, was centered on extending institutional, cultural, and educational opportunities to the colony in the name of *naichi enchō shugi* 内地延長主義. It was grounded in the observation that colonial subjects have their own ethnicity that is saliently distinguishable from the ethnicity of those at the metropole.

What, then, did the colonial power envision as an ultimate solution to the problem of colonial ethnic nationalism? Historian Komagome Takeshi has discussed this issue as he theorized the concept of the multi-ethnic national system (多民族国家)

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According to him, this system was put into practice as intellectuals and bureaucrats in Japan grappled with the question of how to embrace plural ethnic groups in the empire while trying to diminish the potential for ethnic revolt. By granting the colonized legal and institutional rights, Komagome contends, the colonial power aimed to absorb colonial subjects into a single imperial nation-state, and the eventual purpose of this system was to recreate the colonized as a member of the Japanese nation-state. He observed that colonial governance based on multi-ethnicity and a single imperial state continued in the Japanese empire from the 1920s to the early 1940s.

Apart from discussing Komagome’s problematic periodization, I argue that the multi-ethnic national system itself was not free from theoretical and practical limitations either. It first generated spaces of tension within Japan regarding the concepts of ethnicity and nationality. As Naoki Sakai has argued, although formal nationality is given to colonial subjects, this does not guarantee these minority people any sort of practical national belonging as granted by the dominant group at the metropole. As a matter of fact, even superficial policies to provide colonial subjects with the same legal and institutional rights in the sense of formal nationality were never put into practice. Rather, the project of establishing a universal imperial nation-state, irrespective of its practical possibility, constantly invited resistance inside and outside the empire. Conservative Japanese at the metropole incessantly strove to maintain the privileges guaranteed to them and this was also the case for Japanese residents in the colony.

The spread of the term minzoku in 1920s Japan revealed theoretical challenges that Japanese intellectuals was facing. Transforming the Japanese race into a Japanese

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*minzoku* as a modern construct basically meant establishing a nation state with one ethnic group. To logically associate this with the making of a multi-ethnic empire in which there would be no ethnic conflict, any sense of ethnic superiority or inferiority had to be eradicated. Faced with this challenge, Yoshino steadfastly believed that institutional and political measures could realize this, but not all social scientists sided with Yoshino. Yanaihara Tadao, Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University and one of the most liberal social scientists of the time, perhaps represents another direction. He vehemently rejected the multi-ethnic national system:

> Although independent Chosun [Colonial Korea] attempted to acquire permanent separation from Japan, is this a matter that Japan must be sorrowful for? If the occupation peacefully ended through morality (the way), we could maintain friendly relationships with Chosun. Chosun’s being independent from Japan does not necessarily mean that it becomes Japan’s enemy. If the impoverished and destitute Yi Dynasty attains vitality and accumulates energy that enables it to arise as an independent country, isn’t this a success of Japan’s colonial policy and an honor for the Japanese people? Shouldn’t we be satisfied that we have completed the responsibility of governing Chosun?26

**Instability of Empire**

To be sure, such a radical prescription by Yanaihara for the Korea problem was premised upon his internationalist notion that the modern world is comprised of plural nation-states that are given equal political status. Not surprisingly, his so-called “ethical imperialism” was rejected by most Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats, which eventually deprived him of his professorship at Tokyo Imperial University in 1937. However, Yanaihara’s approach clearly tells us just how far the so-called liberal social scientists could stretch the notion of colonization in 1920s Japan. He avoided the complex problems of a multi-ethnic empire by even affirming Korea’s decolonization.

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Presumably, Yanaihara’s “conscientious social science” and “ethical imperialism” temporarily liberated him from the conundrum of rationalizing colonization. Notably, Yanaihara, the most prominent scholar of colonial studies in the 1920s and 1930s, never denounced colonization as such. Heavily imbued with Adam Smith’s classic theory of colonization, he was convinced that colonization was an effective means to disseminate advanced civilization to the underdeveloped. Therefore, Yanaihara’s fundamental disagreement with Yoshino was not concerned with the social scientific irrationality of colonization, but with his practical judgment that an imperial nation-state with plural ethnic groups might be impossible to realize.

It is important to keep in mind that liberal approaches to colonial problems such as Yanaihara’s “ethical imperialism” were in fact premised on the conviction that colonization would not fundamentally change the demographic configuration at the metropole. To put it another way, imperial Japan adopted a minimalist strategy in governing the colonies by dispatching a small number of bureaucrats and military forces to them, while preventing colonial subjects from migrating to the metropole. However, this strategy in the colony changed considerably after Japan invaded Northeast China in 1931. The growing shortage of labor for the unskilled sectors in the urban economy and the ever-worsening overpopulation problem in agricultural areas prompted the Japanese government to fundamentally reshape its economic structure. Beginning in the early 1930s, a huge number of colonial workers moved to Japan and filled the gap in the low-wage sectors of the Japanese economy. On the other hand, the Japanese government initiated a massive migration project to relocate its peasants to Manchuria.27 As a result, the number of Korean residents in Japan proper increased by 500,000 during the seven-year period from 1931-1938 and it soon reached one million

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27 For a detailed study of the Japanese immigration to Manchuria, see Chapter 4 in Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 307-398.
even before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Although no official record has been discovered, over 2 million Koreans were reportedly residing in Japan proper by the time the Asia-Pacific War ended.28

Unquestionably, the fact that imperial Japan was increasingly becoming a multi-ethnic empire came as a threat to ethnic integrity deep-rooted in the mindset of the Japanese people and the ethnic hierarchy between metropole and the colony. More importantly, as Ann Stoler has argued, the collapse of ethnic integrity in the empire triggered by the political, social and economic crisis at the metropole often produced unexpected and intertwined scenes of tension inside and outside the empire.29 According to her research on European colonialism in Southeast Asia, the white population residing in the colony consisted of mostly of people who were politically and economically marginalized at the metropole. They migrated to the colony in search of a privileged status over the colonial population. The presence of these disintegrated people within the dominant group, therefore, increased the internal instability of the empire in the first place.30 Stoler’s analysis focuses on the migration of the colonizer to the colony, but this phenomenon took place simultaneously and ubiquitously throughout the Japanese empire. In the early 1930s, colonial subjects residing in Japan proper were in most cases incorporated into the lower class, and were gradually absorbed into the unskilled and low-wage sectors of the economy. To be sure, they were “unwanted” guests for those Japanese who were already economically impoverished, since they had to compete with colonial workers for low-wage jobs that were once their

28 The number of Korean residents increased from 311,247 to 798,878 over the 7-year period between 1931 and 1938. Pak Kyung Sik ed., Zainichi chōsenjin kankei shiryō shūsei 4 (Tokyo: San’ichi shobo, 1976), pp.63-64.
29 Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley, California: University of California Pres, 2002).
30 For Stoler’s analysis of white people and their racial and cultural interaction with the indigenous in Southeast Asia, see Chapter 2 “Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule,” Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule, pp. 22-40.
own. On the other hand, these colonial workers sometimes emerged as a radical political force, as they became increasingly associated with domestic anti-government organizations, the Japanese Communist Party in particular.\footnote{Ken Kawashima’s recent study well describes how the colonial population, workers in particular, became severely marginalized and as a result increasingly associated with radical social movements at the metropole. See Ken Kawashima, *The Proletarian Gamble: Korean Workers in Interwar Japan* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009).}

Changes in the ethnic constitution of the Japanese empire in the early 1930s provided important theoretical backgrounds for racial and ethnic discourses produced in the mid and late 1930s. To begin with, the term *minzoku* became a highly practical concern to Japanese social scientists. Yoshino and Yanaihara took a “third-person perspective” in dealing with colonial problems, believing that ethnic problems were a spatially remote issue that would not threaten the ethnic hierarchy at the metropole in the Japanese empire. However, beginning in the early 1930s, the problem of race and ethnicity rapidly emerged as a major social problem both at the metropole and in the colony. For this reason, Japanese social scientists were now in the position of having to take a “transnational perspective” to cope with ethnic problems.

I argue that the serious challenges Japanese social scientists experienced in the early 1930s also gave rise to a number of theoretical questions. If the homogeneous paradigm of a single nation-state could no longer sustain the already multi-ethnicized Japanese empire, where and how should Japanese social scientists search for the logic to maintain their belief in universality? Why did the terms *minzoku* and nationalism, which essentially represent particularism and separatism, capture their attention? In the pages that follow, I will explore these questions by analyzing the theories of two prominent sociologists, Takata Yasuma and Shinmei Masamichi.

**The Concept of the Social in Takata Yasuma’s Sociology**
In 1935, three years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Takata Yasuma, a leading social scientist who was teaching sociology and economics at Kyoto Imperial University, published a book entitled *The Problem of Nation* (民族の問題). Following this work, Takata and other social scientists such as Kada Tetsuji, Komatsu Kentarō and Shinmei Masamichi published a series of works on race and *minzoku*, which formed the mainstream ethnographic studies during the wartime period. It is important to take a close look at their social scientific research in each discipline – sociology, economics and political science – to critically approach their imperial discourse on race and ethnicity. These social scientists all theorized ethnicity as a social construct that occurs as human beings are exposed to the modern web of relations including the capitalistic mode of production. Therefore, their wartime writings on race and minzoku were closely connected to their social scientific research in the 1920s and 1930s.

Having published *Principles of Sociology* (社会学原理), a pioneering work in the history of Japanese sociology, in 1919, Takata devoted much of the early 1920s to establishing sociology as an independent academic discipline. For him, this enduring task started with problematizing the relationship between sociology and social sciences:

While sociology in the past comprehensively examined every social phenomenon, the new sociology aims to synthesize the parts of social phenomena (社会現状). The relationship between sociology and social science was in the hierarchy of high and low, as the former becomes a synthesizer of social scientific research and provides social science with basic knowledge and essential principles. However, the new sociology stands equally with other social scientific disciplines as it investigates parts of historical and social reality.32

If sociology must separate itself from the perception that it explains everything in an encyclopedic way, thereby reigning over other social scientific disciplines, how, then, did Takata redefine it light of his own thinking? To answer this question, it is important

to understand some characteristics of Takata’s sociological methodology. His early sociology was based on two distinct premises. One is what might be called perspectivism (見地主義): the notion that a subject projects his or her own perspective onto historical and cultural reality (実在), which are to be understood and extracted as objects of social cognition. Notably, extracted objects based on social cognition do not form hierarchal relationships of any kind. In Takata’s concept of society, all social phenomena, therefore, were basically conceptualized as relational. Secondly, Takata was convinced that human beings desire gregariousness (群居の欲望). These two notions shape the core concepts of Takata’s early sociology; that is, human society constantly searches for communitarian modes of life, but these cannot be extracted from intrinsic and primordial elements precisely because every phenomenon is socially constructed. This notion gives us a clue to understanding Takata’s later involvement in ethnographic studies. From the beginning, he was conscious that minzoku or nation is a social construct, and it is a highly fluid concept contingent upon human relations.

Such a seemingly rational observation, however, raises one important problem. Since individuals as social subjects all have different perspectives, one might wonder how a sociologist could establish a universal law by analyzing these social phenomena. In the 1922 book Introduction to Sociology (社会学概論), Takata first acknowledged that any kind of social law is basically psychological. In other words, all social laws are contingent upon individuals’ psychologically-motivated behavior in each society. This, however, does not indicate that he concedes the impossibility of discovering universal laws in sociology. He instead suggested new concepts such as “objective possibility (客観的可能性)” and “proportion of tendency (Tendenzielles Gesetz, 傾向律).” According to him, sociologists analyze social phenomena and extract a tendency that most commonly occurs to social subjects, and this process, Takata believed, enables

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33 Takata Yasuma, Shakaigaku gairon (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1922), pp.60-68.
sociologists to move closer to what might be called the objective cognition of society.

In this way, society was conceptualized by him not as a given and thus an omnipotent creation embracing everything in people’s lives, but a space where individuals cognize things and constitute relations. In the same vein, sociology was redefined not as a discipline elucidating society in an encyclopedic way, but as a “particular” social science（特殊社会科学）that discovers common forms among social phenomena and tries to get closer to the possibility of objective perception. In short, Takata’s project of establishing an independent methodology in sociology was closely connected to his desire to position sociology as what he called a “commoner (平 民)” within the social sciences.  

For this reason, it is highly conceivable that Takata was influenced by the German sociologist Georg Simmel’s so-called formal sociology (形式社会学). Distinguishing sociology from other social scientific disciplines – economics, political science and so on – which exclusively focus on the contents of social phenomena, Simmel contended that sociology is the only social science that examines social interaction exclusively. According to him, society is an amalgam of social interactions. Therefore, the duty of sociologists is to find similar forms (形式) – collaboration, conflict, and competition – in a variety of social interactions and to examine the essential meanings of these forms in different social contexts. This observation by Simmel came as a powerful alternative for Takata, who was also viewing sociology as a collective space of social relations. Takata’s early sociology was deeply imbued with Simmel’s formal sociology. In his seminal book Introduction to Sociology (社会学概 論), Takata outlined the constitution of society through such forms as cooperation, conflict and competition, all of which are actually the core concepts of Simmel’s

34 Takata, Shakaigaku genri, pp.40-43.
35 For Georg Simmel’s formal sociology, see Georg Simmel, trans., Howard Becker, Georg Simmel 1858-1918; a Collection of Essays (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1959).
Takata’s encounter with Simmel, however, created tensions in drawing a general picture of sociology. The subtle but substantial difference between Takata and Simmel, I argue, explain the uniqueness of Takata’s early sociology, which continued to appear in his writings on ethnicity during the wartime period. As I have discussed, Takata was opposed to the conventional definition of sociology as establishing a universal law that could be deductively applied to every social phenomenon. Nonetheless, his sociology also began with one fixed presupposition, which I pointed out as the second characteristic of his methodology: the desire of human beings for gregariousness (群居の欲望). In this respect, Takata redefined society as a “desired coexistence (Gewlltes Zusammenleben, 望まれたる共存).”

The conventional definition of minzoku and ethnicity is closely related to individuals’ having strong affinities with others based on blood, religion and culture. However, it is important to note that Takata’s notion of gregariousness was not premised on these intrinsic elements. His theory raises another question: how society and social subjects could co-existence in what he called “social differentiation (社会の分化).” For Takata, such coexistence was first related to the different layers of human beings’ desire. According to him, social subjects all have the same desire for gregariousness in a collective sense, but at the same time, they have desire to pursue their own interests. He attempted to explain this inconsistency through the term “social complication (社会的錯綜).” As rationality and functionality become prevalent within a society, he contended, such values as integration and cooperation, which were well preserved in what might be called primitive societies like townships and blood-

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37 Ibid., pp. 109-114.
38 Ibid., p. 102.
oriented or religious communities, would weaken.\textsuperscript{40} Here, it is important to trace how Takata broadened the dimension of social relations and accordingly differentiated his concept of society from the gathering of individuals in a primordial sense. Takata clearly argued that these blood-centered relations would collapse as human beings experienced a much more complicated web of social relations. This reconfirms and foreshadows the fact that his concept of \textit{minzoku} did not stem from these primitive communities.

Takata’s observation of profit-oriented relations in modern capitalist society demonstrates well his acute sense of reality in diagnosing social problems. Interestingly, it is at this point that Takata began problematizing Simmel’s methodology. He argued that Simmel’s methodology by no means delineated the “vertical” direction of society, simply enumerating and explaining its “horizontal integration (横的結合)” through the notion of forms.\textsuperscript{41} However, as human relations become increasingly complicated, they necessarily create vertical relations such as class and racial hierarchies, and as a result social problems also occur.

Takata’s rough answer to his own question of a new direction for sociology was what might be called the “world-level integration (世界的団結)” of society. Here, Takata seems to be proposing his own desire for society’s ideal future. His theory of world society was based on the hypothesis that the complication of pluralistic societies would rather sustain the integration of human beings as a whole.\textsuperscript{42} He observed that the nature of social differentiation, although it often creates social conflicts, is to preserve integration within it. Its expansion to human beings as a whole, he contended, would result in one grand form of an integrated society, describing this phenomenon as all

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p.9.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., p.14.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p.16.
human beings’ being part of “world society.”\textsuperscript{43} He then concluded with confidence that individuals’ complete autonomy and self-interest serving the good of society would be guaranteed only in this worldly integration.\textsuperscript{44}

This very rosy, ideal vision of society in Takata’s early sociology is telling in many ways. First, he did not limit his concept of society to simply explaining the difference between basic society – family, town and church – and derivative, that is, goal-oriented society. The complication of society from basic to derivative is best described in the German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies’ seminal work \textit{Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft} (Community and Civil Society). By dividing society into two groups, community and civil society, Tonnies argued that the former is constituted by human beings’ essential will (\textit{wesenwille}), and free will (\textit{kruwille}) is the locus that shapes \textit{Gesellschaft}.\textsuperscript{45} According to him, \textit{Gemeinschaft} is subdivided into three different categories based on the degree of will – blood-centered, regional and spiritual communities.\textsuperscript{46} Therefore, a community is characterized by the tenacious unions of its participants and is often realized in the form of customs, religion and ethnicity. On the other hand, civil society is represented by the preponderance of social relations based on individuals’ profit-oriented will.

As I shall discuss in detail, Takata was not unaware that the binary perception of society in Tonnies’ sociology might result in emphasizing a community-oriented totalitarian society. In fact, European intellectuals spread the sense of crisis in the goal-and-individualism-oriented modern capitalist society and many of their alternative theories showed a tendency to return to totalitarianism. Takata’s concern, therefore, was

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\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p.17.
\textsuperscript{45} Ferdinand Tonnies, trans., Jose Harris, \textit{Community and Civil Society} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. For Takata’s analysis of Tonnies’ theory, see Takata Yasuma, \textit{Shakai to kokka} (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1922), pp.40-41.
focused on how a sociologist could contrive a theory of overcoming such binary perceptions of society. To be sure, this observation continued to influence Takata’s sociology and his wartime writings on *minzoku* most clearly demonstrate how he intended to envision a new regional community that would overcome the schematic perception of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*.

Second, Takata’s logic of society showed both similarities with and dissimilarities to the intellectual stream of 1920s Japanese social science. The perception of creating a social space, often called the “discovery of society (社会の発見)” in the tension between society and state, apparently existed in Takata’s early sociology. But, as Kitajima Shigeru has argued, Takata was never satisfied with the logic of civil society as the most advanced social form. In that sense, Takata’s “desire” as a sociologist went well beyond the narrow space between state and society. It also tells us that spatiality in Takata’s early sociology is very important in understanding in what context he envisioned a cosmopolitan East Asian ethnic community in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The spatial dimension of Takata’s early sociology can be found in his understanding of the state. He acknowledged the historical formation of the modern nation-state as society entered the highly advanced stage of capitalistic development. What distinguished Takata from others, however, was the fact that he did not portray the state as an ultimate, all-encompassing total society. With regard to this issue, he addressed two categories of society, partial and integral society, and defined state as a partial society:

Generally Speaking, we must recognize the fact that there exist multiple societies within today’s society. Not only religious organizations, political parties, class, occupational organizations, and industrial associations, but also *minzoku*, family and other associations and eventually, the state; all these are a society, so to speak. Therefore, insofar as these are a single society, I also

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recognize that there exists an integral society (全体社会) that synthesizes them and is considered identical to the sum of these societies. An integral society, by definition, means the accumulation of associations that possesses and maintains close interrelations with each other, and it also designates what relates individuals involved in these associations, that is, a synthesis that integrates relational elements. Although integral society is identified as the sum of each individual society, this does not mean that integral society, as a universal creature, possesses each individual society as particular. This is because the association of integral society, aside from the association of individual societies, includes countless associations that are not connected to the formation of society as a unity.48

As the observation above shows, in Takata’s concept of society, the stats is not equivalent to an integral society. Takata, however, does not clearly delineate what an integral society is. Perhaps, the concept of an integral society seems to correspond to his unique notion of world society and world association, both of which were explicated on a very abstract level in his early writings.

Returning to Takata’s critiques of Tonnies, I argue that what Takata found more problematic in Tonnies’ simplification of society was that dividing society based on the form of will might lead to a false conclusion that the will of a certain association is superior to those of other associations. According to Takata, each individual has his own degree of will that is different from that of others. He went on to argue that the communal will in a certain community mere represents relational associations of their social wills, but it does not symbolize a totalized association or a collective force. This observation led Takata to problematize the tendency that the state is legitimized as a transcendental power through this logic of community. He writes:

I have keen interest in political scientist Laski’s observation that the degree of the state will’s superiority over other organizations is different from person to person. In the state or other organizations, there exists a will to maintain and empower it. However, it is difficult to say that this is the will of integral society. I do not recognize a unified will toward an integral society, but I do recognize that there is a basic will or basic social consciousness that exists as

a foundation…. Since will gives rise in the reciprocal association between individuals within a society and is formed as a result of these interactions, it shapes neither a unified association nor collective force.49

By refuting Tonnies’ notion of two different wills in human relations, Takata attempted to reconfirm his concept of society as constituted by the association of social relations, not by essential will or by free will. I argue that Takata’s critiques of Tonnies give us important clues to understanding of his later discussion of ethnicity. In summary, Takata rejected the one-dimensional process of subject formation inherent in Tonnies’ sociology and developed his concern with the intertwined process of one’s becoming a social subject by delving into the logic of minzoku.

Population and Minzoku as a Social Problem

How, then, did Takata encounter and conceptualize minzoku in the late 1920s and early 1930s? Takata paid relatively little attention to the issue of race and minzoku in his early writings. However, the sociological concepts he developed in the 1920s tell us the direction of his writings on race and ethnicity in the 1930s. In a 1920 article entitled, “An Individual Opinion on Racial Problems (人種問題私見),” he observed, as did many Japanese social scientists at the time, that racial problems were basically an issue between white and colored people.50 Therefore, Takata too, intentionally or unintentionally, tended to conflate the issue of racism with the problem of discrimination between Europeans and Asians in the early 1920s, thus avoiding mention of Japan’s racial oppression in the colony. However, unique in Takata’s understanding of race was his tendency to approach it not as an issue of a single nation-state, but as a broader issue involving a world society.

Instead of dealing directly with the issue of race and ethnicity, Takata showed keen

49 Ibid., p.86.
interest in the issue of population. Beginning with the simple observation that the birth rate exceeds the death rate in almost every society, Takata gradually came to realize that population is a highly overdetermined issue that is closely related to capitalism, imperialism and, most importantly, nation (minzoku). Takata believed that population increase would bring cultural development to human beings on a general level. Central to this understanding of population in modern capitalist society is that population itself became a theoretical barometer that differentiated Takata from other social scientists, Marxist intellectuals in particular. Many social scientists at the time attempted to address the issue of overpopulation by proposing social-policy-oriented prescriptions such as the expansion of the welfare system and government control of the birth rate. Takata was opposed to this direction, sustaining his “idealistic” vision of social equilibrium. He was also vehemently opposed to right-wing political approaches to colonial imperialism that aimed to mitigate overpopulation and agricultural problems in Japan proper.

Instead, Takata returned to the sociological concepts in his early sociology. He once again stressed the logic of social complication; that is, the more goal-oriented social relations prevail, the weaker the social integration on a general level becomes. He suggested that in order to solve this highly circulative problem, the living standard of the Japanese should be downgraded. Reversing the logic of social complication in such a way that “[T]he poorer and lower the living standard is, the stronger the integration toward society becomes,” Takata argued as follows:

The strength of our minzoku has existed in its lower standard of living. If this is the case, I believe that the so-called passive measures for resolving social problems might be applied to national self-defense. In other words, these

51 Takata Yasuma, Shakaigakuteki kenkyū (Tokyo: Hōbunkan, 1923), pp. 95-152.
52 Takata, Shakaigaku gairon, pp. 450-455.
54 Ibid., p.87.
measures may begin to solve minzoku problems. If we could lower the economic status of all the Japanese people, that might be killing two birds with one stone.55

Unquestionably, this idealistic approach to capitalism and population immediately provoked fierce critiques from Marxist intellectuals, including Kawakami Hajime 川上肇 (1879-1946), from whom Takata himself succeeded the professorship in economics at Kyoto Imperial University. Kawakami first disagreed to Takata’s observation that lowering the living standard would help mitigate poverty and the imbalance between metropole and rural areas. More importantly, Kawakami’s criticism focused on Takata’s somewhat naïve perception that developing commerce and industry would worsen these problems. Kawakami thus criticized Takata, arguing that the underdevelopment of commerce and industry in Japanese society indicated that there was a weak basis for capitalist production.56 Needless to say, Kawakami’s observation was based on his firm Marxist conviction that the maturity of the capitalist economy must precede socialist revolution.

Takata’s interesting views on the issue of population first uncovered the theoretical and practical tension between Marxist materialism and his idealism. As I shall explain later, Takata’s objection to the Marxist stage theory based on historical materialism underlay important concepts in his discourses on East Asian minzoku. On the other hand, he constantly attempted to link the issue of population to the problem of agriculture, and projected into it his personal background as a son from a poor peasant family. To be sure, Takata’s analytic mentality as a social scientist became highly “complicated,” as he was vocal in making the controversial statement, “[T]he core of the solidarity of our minzoku is a solidarity out of poverty and the poor’s affection toward Japan. I would say that the essence of Japan lies in poor peasants in rural

55 Ibid., p.88.
Second, as ironic as it may sound, Takata’s encounter with the notion of population shows well the way he intervened in real politics. Marxist intellectuals simply denounced his so-called “everyone-becomes-poor-theory (国民皆貧論)” as isolated from social reality. But Takata adhered to his universal perspective, believing that solutions for particular social problems must be sought from a universal theory. Central to this perception lay the question of how he attempted to universalize his sociological theories as he expanded them to consider colonial problems.

**Society and Politics - Shinmei Masamichi’s Logic of the Social**

While Takata Yasuma, already a leading sociologist, devoted much of his time in the 1920s to developing sociological methodologies, Shinmei Masamichi, born in 1898, some 15 years after Takata’s birth, began establishing his social scientific thinking in the late 1920s. Heavily influenced by and also benefiting from the liberal atmosphere of the Taisho period fostered by liberal intellectuals, Shinmei encountered sociology and social science even before he attended college. In 1916, Yoshino Sakuzō, Professor of Political Science at Tokyo Imperial University, published a monumental article on the history of Japanese liberalism in the well-known journal, *The Central Review* (中央公論).

It soon sparked a fierce debate over democracy, later called the *minponshugi* debate. Interestingly, Yoshino’s article led one high school student to choose political science as his college major. Shinmei was fortunate enough to study directly with the author of the article when he entered Tokyo Imperial University in 1918 at the age of

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58 It was Yoshino Sakuzō’s “Kensei no hongi wo toite sono yūsho no bi wo sumu michi wo ronzu (憲政の本義を説いてその有終の美を済すの途を論ず),” published in the January issue of *Chūkōron* in 1916.
At Tokyo Imperial University, Shinmei was soon exposed to the most liberal academic atmosphere of the time in Japan and actively engaged himself with this stream of thought. In 1919, a year after entering Tokyo University, he joined the student organization Shinjinkai 新人会, where he became acquainted with a number of young students who later became leading scholars in Japanese social sciences, including Rōyama Masamichi. In contrast to Takata, who focused on establishing sociology as an independent academic discipline, Shinmei’s close relationships with political scientists led him to develop a political-science-oriented sociological methodology. This tendency was clearly reflected in his first book, *Introduction to Sociology* (社会学序説), published in 1922, a year after his graduation from Tokyo Imperial University. For the most part, this book was constituted in a peculiar way, since not a single chapter was dedicated to sociology *per se*. Instead, Shinmei devoted much of this work to delineating the origins of the state in modern society and criticizing the dominance of the state from what might be called a sociological perspective:

The state is losing its nature as representing each member’s desire in total society (全体社会). It is now an organization subsumed by class interests. Should we expect the control of the whole society from the state which is based on the interests of private parties? Insofar as the state seizes control of society, it cannot be separated from the social…. However, I believe that it is necessary to examine why social conditions under the control of the state have become so tragic and inconsistent, and how the state arose and took the position of (controlling society). (Emphasis added)

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60 Shinmei Masamichi recalled that his encounter with Yoshino’s article heavily influenced his decision to study political science at college. See, Yamamoto Shizuō and Tonosaki Akiko eds., *Shinmei shakaigaku no kenkyū : ronko to shiryō* (Tokyo: Jichosha, 1996), pp. 175-181.
61 For a study of Shinjinkai, see Henry Dewitt Smith, *Japan’s First Radical Students* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).
63 SMC 1, p. 37.
The statement above shows that Shinmei had two different concepts of society. One was related to society defined in a conventional way; that is, as he himself conceptualized, human beings have different spaces of life compared to those of non-humans. He designated these spaces as society. However, for Shinmei, society in this sense is not the product of human beings’ goal-oriented activities. Therefore, the second concept of Shinmei’s sociology became crucial when the state as an omnipotent actor of human society did not fulfill its role. For this reason, sociology, although Shinmei never provided any definition of it, can be a discipline that studies a derivative or a relational space in relation to the state. This concept of society appeared in *Introductory Lectures on Sociology* (社会学序講), published in 1932, ten years after the publication of *Introduction to Sociology*. Dismissing social psychology that society is based on human beings’ instinctive activities that vary according to historical and environmental contexts, Shinmei presented the concept of social forces (社会力) that form the content of society.

His keen interest in the sociological analysis of political structure continued to develop, and his 1925 translation of the American historical sociologist Harry Elmer Barnes’ *Sociology and Political Theory* was perhaps the best example of this. As

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64 *SMC* 1, p.9.  
65 Shinmei theorized social forces as counter-concepts to psychological instincts inherent in human beings. According to Shinmei, a conventional explanation of the origins of society is that individuals with certain psychological instincts form society. However, this tendency, Shinmei contended, reduces the scope of sociology to tracing individuals’ different psychological natures, thereby rendering sociology into a discipline of idealism (観念主義). Social forces, on the other hand, are working organizations that constitute the content of society. Accordingly, Shinmei conceptualizes economic forces (経済力) as shaping the substructure of society, while other forces such as political forces and art forces (芸術力) form the superstructure and are in organic relations with economic forces. Although Shinmei never claimed that he was a Marxist, such a structuralist explanation of society demonstrates that he too was heavily influenced by materialism. See Chapter 3 in Shinmei Masamichi, *Shakaigaku jokō* (Tokyo: Ohata shoten, 1932); also in *SMC* 2, pp. 378-401.  
Barnes clearly articulated, “[T]he sovereignty of the state and its alleged qualities of originality, universality and absoluteness and the lack of finite limitations have long been dissolved under criticism, and now even its quality of unity is challenged.”\textsuperscript{67} It is conceivable that Shinmei found Barnes’ work interesting in his journey toward challenging the dominance of the state in the social sciences. Importantly, Shinmei’s concept of sociology, unlike that of Takata, did not attempt to establish an independent theory within it. Instead, he was apparently more concerned with positioning sociology in reciprocal relations with other social scientific disciplines. Simply put, by affirming the potential that a single subject such as the state can and should be analyzed from different angles within the social sciences, Shinmei attempted to softly inject sociology into the realm of already established social scientific disciplines.

In this way, Shinmei’s early sociology, imbued with a variety of liberal intellectual streams in the “renaissance” of 1920s Japanese social sciences, clearly exemplified the tension between sociology as an independent social science and his obsession with being involved in political issues. In 1928, two years after he joined the Sociology Department at Tohoku Imperial University, Shinmei published his major book, entitled \textit{On Formal Sociology} (形式社会学論). However, this nearly seven-hundred-page work was not written to simply praise Simmel’s achievement. Although he acknowledged Simmel’s theory as a revolutionary transformation in sociology, Shinmei was equally attentive to its limitations. Most of all, his discontent was centered on the observation that formal sociology views the state as a mere social element, ignoring its realistic importance. He wrote:

\begin{quote}
[In formal sociology] Society and state are considered in the framework of total and part. (全体と部分) Their relation is by nature not based on difference, as is the relationship between state and economy; however, their relationship with total and part is different. Society is bigger than the state.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{67} Barnes, \textit{Sociology and Political Theory}, p.5.
Formal sociology does not contrast them in the notion of liberal association and power association. The concept of society in formal sociology merely includes the meanings of human relations. If the state is examined in this kind of a formal category, it becomes a one small part of sociological research.\(^{68}\)

In the same vein, Shinmei was critical of formal sociology’s approach to economic relations. Categorizing a total society into forms and contents, he argued, formal sociology only examines economic relations that are ordained in formal categories.\(^{69}\)

As I have discussed, Takata intended to partly resolve the tension between Simmel’s sociology and his own concept of social science by developing a unique dialectic of his own between the two. In contrast, Shinmei engaged himself more deeply with this fundamental concern. In 1929, the year of the Great Depression, he embarked on a trip to Germany, where he studied German sociology until his return to Japan in 1931. Given that he already had taken a professorship at one of the leading imperial universities, his stay in Germany was not aimed at obtaining a professional degree. Moreover, he was not fortunate enough to enjoy the strength of the Yen which had enabled many Japanese students to rush to Germany in the late 1920s.\(^{70}\) The Great Depression did make him experience economic hardships, but his being at the center of the most radical social changes in Europe had an enormous impact on his later sociology and his encounter with the concept of *minzoku*.

While maintaining his ties to Japanese intellectual circles by writing brief monthly reports on German society and politics in the famous journal *Keizai ōrai* (経済往来), Shinmei witnessed the rise of the fascist movement in Germany.\(^{71}\) Upon his return to Japan, he became one of the most sophisticated writers in Japanese intellectual circles.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p.495
\(^{70}\) Yamamoto Shizuō and Tonosaki Akiko eds., *Shinmei shakaigaku no kenkyū : ronko to shiryō*, pp. 192-196.
\(^{71}\) The original title of these articles was *Ōshū tsūshin* (欧州通信, Communication from the West) and these articles appeared in the journal 11 times between February 1930 and January 1931.
on this new political current, and produced numerous articles on fascism in various journals. Not surprisingly, he was aware that Japanese social sciences, arguably the icon of progressive scholarship in the 1920s, faced an ontological crisis with the emergence of this reactionary and conservative political movement. However, what captured his attention from a social scientific perspective was that German social scientists, sociologists in particular, became gradually involved in real politics, redefining the principle of the social sciences. Sociologist Hans von Freyer was one of the German social scientists who captured Shinmei’s special attention.

Author of the seminal book *Soziologie als Wirklichkeitswissenschaft* (Sociology as a science of reality) published in 1929, Freyer advocated a methodological transformation in sociology in his emphasis on structuralism and his debunking of formal sociology. Not surprisingly, Freyer’s engagement with real politics as a sociologist received attention from Shinmei, who spent a long time developing a politico-sociological perspective. As a result, Shinmei’s 1935 book *Sociology of National Revolution* (国民革命の社会学) was actually an interpretation of Freyer’s sociology. Freyer denounced Simmel’s formal sociology as *Logoswissenschaft* (science of logos), which had only concentrated on constructing a world of abstraction in which, Fryer believed, the historicity of sociological objects was completely ignored. He instead insisted that contemporary sociology must be a science of *ethos*. To put this another way, sociology like Simmel’s, Freyer argued, had merely enumerated social phenomena through various social forms, but it did not provide a way to totalize social activities in a concrete structure, and as a result, society was deprived of its historicity.

Freyer’s critiques of social science, however, were not simply an attempt to

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endorse and return to what might be called conventional structuralism. He observed that Hegel’s idealism conceptualized the state as a synthesis of people’s collective freedom and cognitive personality in a community. However, he maintained that the state itself had been dominated by powerful social classes. For this reason, in order to conceptualize a total society, he contended, social scientists must pay attention to real power dynamics and structural changes that occur to the state.  

As the German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer put it, “[S]ociology is a science that studies totality as totality. It consolidates various social principles and therefore it is universalwissenschaft (universal science).”  

Freyer thus redefined sociology as a discipline of discovering universal totality in the web of social and political phenomena.

It was Freyer’s logic of totality that Shinmei drew special attention to in Sociology of National Revolution. Arguing that industrial society had been overwhelmed by economic interests, Fryer emphasized the necessity of its revolutionary transformation. However, he rejected both Marxist class struggle and civil society theories because they all marginalized the state as a by-product of social conflict. Instead, he contended that by creating a trans-class subject in society, the state of perpetual class struggle and crisis in the capitalist system could be overcome. He defined this new subject as nation (国民) and a conservative national revolution would have to be accomplished by these cooperative national subjects.

Although Freyer did not use the term cooperative community in his discussion of national subject, the concepts of cooperativism and cooperative subject were already gaining currency among European intellectuals. Shinmei also showed keen interest in these new political theories, and in 1934, he contributed two articles to Hōgaku 法学.

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74 Ibid., pp. 112-115, 75 Ibid., p. 124. 76 Ibid., p. 195. For Freyer’s theory of revolution from the right, see Jerry Z. Muller, The Other God That Failed : Hans Freyer and The Deradicalization of German Conservatism (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp.186-266.
the college journal of Tohoku Imperial University, that explicitly touched upon the issue of cooperativism. In these articles entitled “The Concept and Structure of the Cooperative State (協同体国家の観念及び機構),” he defined the cooperative state as a new type of state in which social subjects are incorporated into national subjects and the state accordingly eradicates all kinds of social and class conflicts through establishing a cooperative order.77 He was aware, of course, that this unprecedented political phenomenon in Western Europe, Germany and Italy in particular, was basically a totalitarian movement. However, Shinmei was less concerned with fundamental violence and coercion in fascist movements than with the observation that advocates of national socialism were mainly targeting peasant and urban workers, promising that they would be emancipated from the status of “debt slave.” Acutely aware that the identity politics of incorporating marginalized groups into national subjects became a driving force for the fascist state, Shinmei was also convinced that this rosy picture of eradicating socio-political hierarchies would never be realized. As Shinmei himself emphasized, both Hitler and the Italian fascists were heavily dependent upon the industrial bourgeoisies, and more importantly, the formation of national subjects in Hitler’s Germany was in fact excluding those who they considered to be racial minorities, the Jews in particular.78

Therefore, it is misleading to assume that Shinmei accepted the logic of European fascist movements at face value after his return from Germany. As a matter of fact, he was a most ardent critic of the German and Italian fascist movements. More important than evaluating how he viewed fascism is the question of how Shinmei attempted to theorize a new concept of subjectivity in his critical analysis of totalitarian movements.

77 Shinmei Masamichi, “Kyōdōtaikokka no kannen oyobi kikō (1),” Hōgaku 3, no.1 (Jan 1934), pp. 26-39; “Kyōdōtaikokka no kannen oyobi kikō (2),” Hōgaku 3, no.2 (Feb 1934), pp.35-77. For a detailed analysis of Shinmei these articles, read Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
in Europe. To be sure, German totalitarianism and Italian fascism, in spite of their theoretical limits, came as a new form of subject formation to Shinmei. The popularity of totalitarian theories in Japan was also closely related to the dismal status-quo Japanese sociology was facing in the early 1930s. As the young sociologist Shimizu Ikutarō lamented in a 1934 article in *The Central Review* (中央公論), sociologists’ tendency to view civil society as the most advanced framework precludes sociological theories from developing further.79

In summary, Shinmei’s sociology experienced a few detours before he engaged himself in ethnographic studies in the late 1930s. His search for a total society beyond Simmel’s formal sociology led him to directly confront European social theories. Yet it was through Shinmei’s stay in Germany and his exposure to fascist movements that he developed critical perspectives toward European social sciences and faced the challenge of creating a new paradigm for subject formation and a multi-ethnic empire in Japan. Thus, Shinmei developed his ethnographic studies in the late 1930s and early 1940s as he confronted the tension between state as a total society and *minzoku* as part of it. In contrast to Shinmei, Takata took an idealistic approach to the term *minzoku* and constantly distanced itself from the boundary of the nation-state. How, then, did these seemingly different paths of theorizing racial and ethnic issues shape mainstream ethnographic studies during the wartime Japan? How did Japanese social scientists face the eventual challenge of rationalizing a multi-ethnic empire through their social scientific research?

**Racism as Anti-Social Scientific**

In October 1938, a year after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Kada Tetsuji, who was teaching sociology and economics at Keio University, a prestigious Japanese

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private university, published *Race, Nation and War* (人種·民族·戦争), which soon became a best-seller.\(^80\) Not surprisingly, Kada reiterated the thesis that the Japanese race had mixed heritages, as already demonstrated in anthropologists’ ethnographic studies from the 1910s and the 1920s. Carrying this previous concept of race a step further, he asserted that the existing situation of white supremacy was mere a reflection of the capitalistic development that dominated Western Europe. Kada maintained that Western capitalism, historically speaking, had little to do with “superior” physiological characteristics of any kind within the white races.\(^81\) He was equally critical of the conventional concept of *minzoku* (民族), which he viewed as a mere extension of blood-centered essentialism. Under this extremely narrow conceptual understanding of the term *minzoku*, it is natural that Kada, who had been writing extensively on the issue of nationalism, internationalism and cosmopolitanism since the early 1930s, could not find any potential for what he called “*minzoku*’s development beyond *minzoku* (民族を超えて発展する).”\(^82\)

Given that not only Kada but also many other wartime Japanese social scientists rejected racism and racial science, Kada’s somewhat heated critiques of racist thinking were not surprising. However, important in Kada’s discussion of racism is the fact that not only was he aware of the irrationality of western racism but he was also attentive to the way both racist and anti-racist discourses in Japan were appropriated in real politics in a very complex way, thereby producing another form of racism. With these observations in mind, Kada discussed the genealogy of racial thinking in modern Japan. For him, racial science in the West was deeply flawed in the fact that it served as a


\(^{81}\) Ibid., pp.8-9.

theoretical tool for demonstrating the superiority of white Europeans in modern civilization.\textsuperscript{83} Interestingly, he was outspoken when he argued that modernization is not a one-dimensional, linear process, and that even industrialized societies continue to need agriculture and other not-yet-industrialized sectors.\textsuperscript{84} He then argued that Japanese social scientists had focused on scientifically proving that the Japanese race also had genetically dominant characteristics as Europeans tried to prove about themselves. For example, he discussed Taguchi Yukichi’s notion of the Japanese race which emphasized its similarity to European races in Taguchi’s refutation of the “yellow peril” theory.\textsuperscript{85} Kada problematized this “orientalist” version of racial theory put forth by Japanese social scientists, asserting even anti-Western racism in Japan was in fact a replica of Western racism, in that it had paradoxically repeated the logic of Western racism. He pointed out the irony in the fact that advocates of anti-Western racism in Japan firmly believed in Japan’s glorious modernization as proof that the Japanese race was as inherently superior as white races.

Kada maintained that irrespective of the theoretical validity of anti-racism, both racism and a Janus-faced Japanese version of anti-racism were being politically appropriated by conservative Japanists, namely advocates of the Imperial Way (皇道). For instance, he paid special attention to the way anti-Semitism had been spread in the Japanese media and academia. Here, he made an interesting point:

\textit{R}eportedly, the number of Jews residing in Japan is about one thousand. Due to the small number of Jews in Japan, most Japanese in fact do not recognize the Jewish problem as such. Nonetheless, discourses on the Jews are rapidly increasing in Japan. In Japan, there are more than one hundred pamphlets and works on the anti-Jew movement and I possess dozens of them.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., p.55. \\
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., p.63. \\
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p.27.
As David Goodman and Masanori Miyazawa have argued, Japanese intellectuals during the wartime period often described the Jews as a group of people who most powerfully embodied the “philosophy of liberalism and capitalism.” Many believed, therefore, that the Jews were even trying to “conquer the world through the power of money.” Fed by a conspiracy theory that the Jews would conquer the world, as best illuminated in the text of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, these anti-Semitic sentiments became increasingly widespread in the Japanese media. This evident racism on the part of Japanese intellectuals, however, was appropriated in reverse by another group of conservatives. As Nazi Germany began its genocide of Jews in Europe, a number of the Jews fled to East Asia, especially to Shanghai and Northern China. The presence of these Jewish refugees became an important and timely source for Japanese ultranationalists’ propaganda, as conservatives touted the morality and divine spirit of Imperial Japan. By integrating Jewish refugees into the racially harmonious East Asian Federation, these Japanists were convinced that they could send a strong message to the West, the United States in particular, that the morality and divine spirit of Imperial Japan was superior to the depraved values of the West.

To be sure, the issue of anti-Semitism was not an especially provocative topic in Japan during the wartime period. Nonetheless, the fact that it was discussed at all certainly exemplifies how both racism and anti-racism operated in such a political way that they would eventually be absorbed into a newly-formulated racism in wartime Japan. This new form of racism seemingly emphasized unity among Asian races but never denied the superiority of the Japanese race. Needless to say, this distorted racist

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88 *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* was first translated into Japanese in 1937 by Lieutenant Shioden Nobutaka and entitled *Mede to Furimeson no shōtai* (メーデーとフリーメーソンの正體).
thinking by Japanists actually played a role in their concealing of Japan’s colonization of its neighboring countries. Therefore, the discontent of social scientists was centered on the observation that any kind of politicized racial discourses, even if seemingly “anti-racist,” would give way to a far more essentialized racism. Kada was thus adamant in his denunciation of racial studies as fundamentally unscientific:

The reality of racial theories in our time becomes evident when we think of the problem of racial conflict between white races and colored races. However, the differences between them lie in the question of whether we should think about it from the standpoint of Western imperialism or from Japan’s standpoint. Racial theories, as I have discussed, do not contain elements as a hard science. Therefore their validity as social science is different (from other disciplines).90

Kada, a hard social scientist, clearly explains in this comment why racial theories continued to resurge both in Japan and in the West, although they do not have social scientific rationality. To him, therefore, racial studies became the dark side of modern social science. Distinguishing social science from racial theories, however, did not preclude racism from being politically appropriated for propagandistic purposes. Nor did it provide a practical solution for the problem of ethnic conflicts within the Japanese empire. Theoretically speaking, Kada’s critical approach to the concept of race clearly exemplifies Japanese social scientists’ tendency to avoid racial and ethnic discourses that originated in Germany. However, it also left much room for further discussion on what ought to be a driving force for creating a theory of a multi-ethnic empire.

**The Question of the Nation-State**

After writing several works on fascism and German sociology, Shinmei published his first major ethnographic study, *Race and Society* (人種と社会), in 1940. The publication of this book is traceable to 1936, when he became an instructor in the

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summer college organized by the Manchurian Railway Company Employee Association in Manchukuo. In Manchukou, he delivered several talks in major cities including Dairen and Harbin, and the monograph of his talk in Dairen, *Shujoku to shakai* 種族と社会 (Tribes and society), was published by the Manchurian Railway Company in 1936.  

Shinmei, a Taiwan-born sociologist who took his elementary education in both Korea and Japan, did not write on ethnic problems in the colony from within the ivory tower. Like Kada in his approach to the concept of race, Shinmei emphasized the fact that society had developed itself through changeable culture and organizations, not based on static racial elements. The fact that the biological unity among races is not self-evident, Shinmei argued, demonstrates that the idea of a pure race is simply a fantasy. In other words, race can only be considered part of a society when its absoluteness is dismantled and its reversibility is recognized.  

Central to this observation was the notion that no matter how race is conceptualized, it does not preclude the possibility of racial superiority and inferiority dividing a society. Clearly aware of this, Shinmei drew special attention to the relationship between race and the state:  

> When a certain race is distributed widely through a state and comprises a substantial portion of the whole population, one can say that the relationship between race and nation (*kokimin*, people in the sense of formal nationality) is very close. However, that case is an exception. A national society (*kokumin shakai*) is invariably based on race; however, race does not constitute a national society as an integral social association. The fact that the integration of national society is possible without racial integration is best demonstrated in the constitution of the populations of

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92 In 1915, Shinmei graduated from Kyungsung Middle School, the only middle school directly affiliated with the Governor General’s Office in colonial Korea. Yamamoto, *Shinmei masamichi – sōgoshakaigaku no tankyō*, p.133.  
94 Ibid., p.87.
Switzerland and the United States. Racists aim to constitute a national society from a racial perspective or commit racial discrimination within a society. In the present, German Nazism is showing this most thoroughly.\textsuperscript{95}

This argument above no doubt represents Shinmei’s theoretical positioning, as he delivered this lecture to Japanese workers in the Manchurian Railway Company. The state of Manchukuo was established in 1932 as a laboratory to realize multi-ethnicity and multi-culture in the Japanese empire. Therefore, it is conceivable that irrespective of his theoretical views, Shinmei was placed in the position of having to characterize the Manchurian state as an ultimate community of racial harmony. Arguably, he discussed a capitalist society like the United States as an example of a multi-ethnic nation-state. This tells us that Shinmei was also interested in theorizing a United States of East Asia, as he saw the multi-ethnic constitution of Manchukuo.

Shinmei maintained that racism temporarily faded away when the capitalistic mode of production dominated society, since profit-oriented social forces would rest atop racial hierarchies. However, it is a mistake to conclude that Shinmei endorsed an advanced capitalist society as the ideal destination of anti-racism and multi-ethnicity. He argued that modern capitalism based on individuals’ \textit{indefinite} pursuit of interests created a number of economic problems within a society. He contended that this explains why capitalist nation-states are often transformed into imperial nation-states, so that they may solve economic problems by annexing colonies. He stressed that it is this unique stage of capitalism that would lead to racism and ethnic nationalism between nation-states.\textsuperscript{96} In this respect, he was clearly aware that building a single multiracial state would not fundamentally solve the issues of racism and ethnic nationalism intertwined with international capitalism.

This observation on modern capitalism by Shinmei can also be found in his critical

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p.89.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., pp.284-285.
reading of Ferdinand Tonnies’ theory of *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft*. He did not deny that Tonnies’ highly binary analysis of society provides insights for diagnosing the crisis in modern capitalism.\(^{97}\) To be sure, the causal connection between monopoly capitalism and the resurgence of racism therein called for a new logic of community. However, he was strongly opposed to the circular logic that crisis in profit-oriented societies reconfirms the eternal validity of the communal life of premodern societies. Therefore, the search for a new cooperative community, he maintained, must go beyond the limits of such binary thinking and in this respect, he went even so far as to say that “[T]onnies’ sociology must be negated as a historical organization. (歴史的組織)\(^{98}\)

Such a bold statement made by Shinmei shows that his anti-racism developed in parallel with his steadfast belief that society can be neither formed nor explained by transcendental and primordial values such as *Gemeinschaft* in Tonnie’s theory. What, then, did he theorize as the ideal relations among different racial groups within a nation-state as well as with other states? It appears that Shinmei’s response to that question in *Race and Society* is still far from sophisticated. He argued that “[N]ational principles (国民的原理) are to recognize the social power (*soziale Kräfte*, 社会力) of each national society as well as its integration.”\(^{99}\) In doing so, he believed that each national society could lead to a “rational world order,” where the problem of racism can be resolved in an ideal way.\(^{100}\) However, he never expounded in this book how on “social power” would bring a state of equilibrium to highly complex racial relations in modern capitalism.

Given that *Race and Society* was written based on his public lectures in Manchukuo in 1936, two years before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the

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98 Ibid., p.89.
99 See footnote 65.
100 Shinmei, *Jinshu to shakai*, pp. 303-304.
spread of East Asian discourses, it is conceivable that Shinmei’s theory of a multi-
ethnic nation state did not encompass East Asia in general. Moreover, *Race and Society*
was focused less on delineating the concept of *minzoku* than on denouncing racism.
However, Shinmei’s work exemplifies well the theoretical concerns that Japanese social
scientists at the time were sharing. These concerns first pertained to the question of how
the framework of the nation-state is reformulated in envisioning a multi-ethnic empire.
If racial issues in modern society are not separable from crisis in the conventional
paradigm of the nation-state, the conventional logic of incorporating subjects into the
state by bestowing nationality on them must be also fundamentally reconsidered.
Second and more importantly, the relationship between capitalism and ethnicity needed
to be elucidated further. Unless constructing a multi-ethnic empire does not simply
mean a primitive community, as described in Tonnies’ *Gemeinschaft*, the next question
might be how the logic of cooperativism could be gleaned from a highly goal-oriented
and thus fragmented capitalist social formation. It was Takata Yasuma who took these
questions more seriously than any other social scientists in the late 1930s and early
1940s.

**Takata Yasuma’s Concept of *minzoku***

In January 1939, Miki Kiyoshi 三木清 (1897-1945), a renowned Kyoto School
philosopher and a leading theorist in Showa Research Institute (昭和研究会) founded
in 1933, published an article entitled “Principles of Thought for a New Japan (新日本
の思想原理).” Stressing that the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident in China was a
“world-historical moment,” Miki insisted in this 27-page pamphlet that “abstract
modern ideologies” should be overcome in order to establish “East Asian thought” and
complete an “East Asian Cooperative Community (東亞協同体).” Interestingly, among some eight ideologies to be sublated, Miki’s first target was nationalism. Needless to say, his somewhat extravagant charge against nationalism reflects the concern of Japanese intellectuals’ with growing Chinese nationalism. Miki wrote:

> With respect to Chinese nationalism, just as all of the world’s countries moved from feudal societies to modern states through nationalism, China is experiencing nationalism in the same way; thus it is important to recognize the historical necessity of Chinese nationalism. Japan should not interrupt China’s national unification; rather, it is important for the true establishment of the East Asian Community that China acquires individuality through national unity. But at the same time, China, in order to enter the new world, must go beyond nationalism. (Emphasis added)

Although Miki’s pamphlet was part of the government’s propaganda, his understanding of Chinese nationalism includes some profound philosophical points. To understand them, one may also need to pay attention to Miki’s logic of the East Asian Community. First, his zeal for the East Asian Cooperative Community was not grounded in any binary formation of the East and the West. Therefore, it is misleading to suggest that East Asian thought and community must be achieved only in relation to the West. Although he never denied the historicity of Western imperialism in East Asia, Miki’s logic of a cooperative community was far more sophisticated than a simple endorsement of a collective community in Asia as a counter force.

Therefore, the concern was based on the principle of subjectivity formation in a broader community-based society, and this notion would eventually replace the conventional constitution of the nation-state. In this respect, Chinese nationalism corresponded exactly to the historical process of obtaining individuality and forming a

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101 Miki Kiyoshi, Shin nihon no shisō genri (Tokyo: Showa kenkyūkai jimukyōku, 1939); also in Miki kiyoshi zenshū 17 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968), pp.505-533.
102 The eight modern ideologies were nationalism, totalitarianism, familism, communism, liberalism, internationalism, Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of Democracy (三民主義), and Japanism.
modern nation-state. However, the way Chinese nationalism emerged also reconfirmed for Miki that it would be destined to become imperialism unless the questions of liberalism and individualism were resolved. As sociologists such as Takata had vehemently argued, the prevalence of individualism based on capitalistic modes of production would continue to give rise to social disorder, including ethnic conflicts. Precisely for this reason, Miki called for “overcoming” nationalism in a conventional sense, but he also showed keen interest in the possibility that the notion of ethnicity (minzoku) might replace the logic of nationalism and nation in terms of formal nationality. Miki believed that by radically approaching the notion of ethnicity and using it to replace nationalism and nation as the basis for formal nationality, he could discover a new theory of subjectivity that would overcome the current crisis in capitalism and individualism.

As a number of social scientists grappled with the logic of ethnicity in the late 1930s and the early 1940s, Takata published his major ethnographic study, On Nation (民族論), in 1942. Before examining this book, which was far more sophisticated than his 1935 work, The Problem of Nation (民族の問題), I call attention to several important points that should not be overlooked. First, although Takata was involved in various government-funded projects in the mid 1940s, his concern with the concept of minzoku was traceable to the mid 1930s and it was theoretically rooted in his social scientific thinking in the 1920s.

Takata was appointed as the director of Ethnic Research Institute (民族研究所) in January 1943. Unquestionably, his participation in this institute demonstrates that Takata, like other social scientists of the time, was actively involved in imperial research institutions during the wartime period. Hence, I agree that it is important to

highlight Takata’s political involvement in the Japanese empire, as scholars such as Kevin Doak have pointed out. However, I strongly argue that placing excessive emphasis on Takata’s commitment to these institutions would preclude discussion of far more important points. First, such an emphasis, whether intended or not, tends to restrict Takata’s ethnographic studies to a short time between the mid 1940s and the end of the Asia Pacific War. As Takata himself reiterated in his writings on *minzoku*, his notion of ethnic nationalism was by no means a one-time deviation forced by the imperial government. Therefore, it is very problematic to simply focus on his wartime writings, much of which Takata wrote while he was affiliated with Ethnic Research Institute in particular, and hastily judge him as a “converted” wartime fascist. 106

Second and more importantly, such an approach is by no means separable from the issue of universality and particularity. Focusing on Takata’s wartime writings but ignoring their close connections to his early sociology from the 1920s, when Takata unquestionably identified himself as a universal social scientist, often results in positioning his wartime social science as particularism in opposition to his universal social science in the 1920s and 1930s. Needless to say, such an interpretation of Takata and other wartime Japanese social scientists reflects certain political intentions in the present. One facet of these political agendas is an attempt to rescue the historicity of *Japanese* social science from its “original sin” during the wartime period by declaring that wartime Japanese social science was far from universal social science. 107 Another direction is to reconfirm the values of universalism by stressing the failures of the

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106 Kevin Doak’s research seems to be the best example of this tendency. Doak pays special attention to Takata’s activities as the director of Ethnic Research Institute but fails to logically explain why and how a prominent sociologist like Takata encountered the term *minzoku* and further developed his *universalist* position as a social scientist by way of ethnographic studies. Doak’s article constantly attempts to locate Takata’s logic of ethnicity in the context of particularism, which, he believed, occurred only in imperial Japan. See Kevin Doak, “Building National Identity Through Ethnicity: Ethnology in Wartime Japan and After,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 27 (2001), pp. 1-39.

“particularist visions” of an East Asian Empire.

Paradoxical as it may sound, Takata took this issue very seriously and vehemently argued that his ethnographic studies would not be applied only to East Asia as a form of East Asian nationalism. As Takata put it:

Most of all, what I intend to do in this book is to analyze minzoku from the perspective of formal science (法則科学). It is nothing more or less than this. Insofar as I acknowledge the objectivity of formal science, it also demands an application to the world. *The demand of science is neither that of class nor that of nation* (国民)… As long as it [minzoku] is based on an analytical theory, it must be accepted by everyone. Therefore, I do not think that its content is particularly related to Japan.\(^{108}\) (Emphasis added)

Given that the notion of particularity often comes into play in discussing ethnicity and ethnic nationalism, for example in the cases of Chinese nationalism and German volk, how did Takata lead readers to comprehend that his minzoku theory was universal? In delving into this question and tracing the sophistication of his scientific thinking, it would be worthwhile to examine Takata’s definition of minzoku in his 1935 book, *The Problem of Nation*. In translating the following text, I will adhere to the term minzoku rather than ethnicity or nation to minimize any conceptual confusion:

> What is *minzoku*? *Minzoku* is a group of people who recognize themselves as a *minzoku*. This, by all means, sounds like a circular definition. Nonetheless, it articulates that the locus of *minzoku* does not reside in external characteristics such as blood and physical similarities, but in the consciousness of its members. The fact that *minzoku* consciousness is not induced by *minzoku*, but *minzoku* is induced by *minzoku* consciousness is, irrespective of its somewhat insufficient manifestation, a truth that hardly be refuted.\(^{109}\)

As early as the mid 1930s, a few of years before the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, Takata was already making a subtle but very compelling argument about the concept of

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ethnicity. Not only did he completely denounce race as irrelevant to minzoku, but he also argued that ethnic consciousness precedes the existence of an ethnic group. Therefore, for Takata minzoku as a collective consciousness was not a given community but a social construct by its nature, and this reconfirms the location of the term minzoku as an object of social scientific study. He then moved to the issue of the relationship between minzoku and nation (国民, kokumin). Here, Takata raises some conceptual questions:

First, some discomfort occurs when the term kokumin is translated into the word nation. The word kokumin includes in its meaning all members of a nation-state and it is often considered to be identical to the nation-state in dimension. However, nation corresponds only in exceptional cases to the nation state in its dimensions. Second, nation has often been translated as minzoku. Since the term nation has been commonly used in expressions such as minzoku problems, minzoku autonomy and minzokushugi (nationalism), I believe that calling nation kokumin would create a great many difficulties and this tendency would not change… For this reason, I have decided to call nation minzoku.\(^{110}\)

Although he chooses minzoku as the translation for nation, Takata does not acknowledge that it has the same definition as nation in terms of a nation-state or in terms of formal nationality. This clearly indicates that instead of a Japanese word, Takata adhered to the English word “nation” in the original text. For Takata, the term minzoku, therefore, is highly equivocal, and he thus affirmed its limited similarity to the concept of nation-state. Theoretically, Takata’s hesitation to equate minzoku with nation-state is directly concerned with his whole concept of partial (部分) and integral (全体) society. Takata stressed that the dimensions of an integral society are determined based on its degree of self-sufficiency.\(^{111}\) For him, the tendency for a nation-state to be considered as ultimate integral society and its members the subjects of

\(^{110}\) Ibid, p.238.
\(^{111}\) Takata, Shakai to kokka, p. 17.
an integral society did not indicate that a nation-state is in itself a self-sufficient society. More importantly, this logic, Takata argued, neither explains the hybridity of one’s becoming a subject in complicated social interactions, nor does it provide practical solutions for the crisis in the modern nation-state.

Takata maintained that the combination of Koreans and Taiwanese with Japanese *minzoku* itself does not constitute a nation-state as a self-sufficient integral society. Therefore, he contended that the boundary of a nation (*kokumin*, 国民) does not become the boundary of an integral society. In other words, he was strongly opposed to the idea that *minzoku* as a form of nation is itself either an integral society or a constituent of an element of an integral society, the nation-state in particular. Such a radical interpretation of the term *minzoku* tells us that Takata was painstakingly searching for a new logic of subjectivity formation in his observation of the limitations of the nation-state framework. Just as giving formal nationality to colonial subjects does not guarantee that they subjectively belong to the empire, Takata was opposed to the notion of constructing an East Asian empire by mechanically consolidating different ethnic groups. Here, he reconfirmed that *minzoku* itself does not constitute an integral society, nor a nation-state:

*Minzoku* is not an integral society. Needless to say, various partial groups are included in an integral society, but these partial groups are not included in *minzoku*. *Minzoku* is also nothing but a partial society and the reason it has a particular meaning among partial societies is only because it is extended to the broad dimension of people’s lives. On the one hand, the combination of an integral society includes the combination of *minzoku* as its most important part, but an integral society is constituted by various combinations and mixtures. Therefore, the combination of *minzoku* at times positions itself against (the general combination of) an integral society; that is, an integral society even includes the combination of a group [*minzoku*] against it.113

112 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
113 Takata, *Minzokuron*, p.28.
Although *minzoku*, among other social groups, constitutes part of an integral society, it is extended to people’s lives to a greater degree. This first explains why Takata placed an enormous emphasis on it in his vision of an East Asian empire. Second, it is a dynamic element in society itself; that is, *minzoku* is not a given and static creature. It always negates and recreates itself and it is in this very process that a new form of subjectivity necessary for a grand community emerges.

To this end, Takata had to debunk any possible links between transcendental, primordial, and thus non-scientific elements of society such as race, blood, and land. Takata even criticized his colleagues who shared the notion of anti-racism. Although they all agreed on the impossibility of racism as a communitarian theory, they also presented drastically different views on the concept of *minzoku*. For example, Komatsu Kentarō, a professor at Kansai Gakuin University, opened fire against Takata in a 1941 book, *Theories on Nation* (民族の理論). Critiquing Takata’s notion that *minzoku* consciousness precedes *minzoku*, Komatsu contended that *minzoku* consciousness itself is pre-determined by objective elements such as blood, language and culture. He thus charged that “a person’s subjective consciousness of Japanese *minzoku*” occurs only within the boundary where “he or she shares *Japanese blood*.“ In doing so, Komatsu attempted to expand on his argument as a dialectical logic; that is, he did not count on a one-dimensional orientation between subjectivism and objectivism in explicating the origins of *minzoku*. However, Komatsu’s logic was far from an ideal interpretation of this highly heterogeneous concept. Insofar as he affirmed that “Japanese blood” has an “objective” existence, he could not escape from the circular logic that *minzoku* is constituted by inexplicable and therefore unscientific “objective” elements.

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115 Ibid.
For this reason, Komatsu and like-minded social scientists intended to resolve this antinomy by resorting to the nation-state (国家) as an all-encompassing integral society. By so doing, they at once avoided the complexities of subjectivism and objectivism regarding minzoku and confined the dynamics of minzoku to the nation-state. Takata’s discontent with these liberal social scientists was thus centered on their problematic understanding of partial and integral society. In fact, he devoted many parts of On Nation to defending his theory against Komatsu’s critiques,\textsuperscript{116} and this subtle but important dissonance even among anti-racist social scientists lasted until the end of the war.

Takata also acknowledged that minzoku fostered by minzoku consciousness is often represented by a nation-state. He described this category of minzoku as a modern nation (近代民族) and this partly explains why he accepted, albeit unwillingly, nation as a translation of the term minzoku. A modern nation in this stage seeks to establish an ethnic nation-state based on the commonality of consciousness and life. However, the temporary parallel between minzoku and nation, Takata stressed, would not last long since modern nation states are destined to expand their territory.\textsuperscript{117} The politics of exclusion and inclusion arises within the modern nation at this second stage, so that either an ethnic nation attempts to integrate minority ethnic groups within itself, or it intends to separate itself from them by constructing another nation-state. Importantly, even if a majority ethnic group within a nation-state seeks to become a new nation-state, its minzoku consciousness has already changed from what it was in the past.\textsuperscript{118}

Therefore, Takata asserted that what might be called a pure ethnic nation-state is

\textsuperscript{116} Takata, Minzokuron, p. 29, 45, & 51. Takata held that Komatsu basically sees the nation-state as a form of Gemeinschaft that mediates the conflict between individualism and totalitarianism. This logic, Takata argued, necessarily led Komatsu to conceptualize minzoku as an integral society, since an integral society is described in Komatsu’s sociology as a society in which all of the members act for the good of the whole.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p.34-35.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p.48.
exceptional.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.37.}

**Beyond Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: A Community Capitalism?**

This understanding of the dynamics of \textit{minzoku} clearly demonstrates that Takata’s social theory is significantly different from the binary logic of community (\textit{gemeinschaft}) and civil society (\textit{gesellschaft}).\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p.59.} Nation or \textit{minzoku} itself does not necessarily indicate a collective community. However, the general crisis of capitalism constantly creates an urgency to retrieve communitarianism, and to eradicate the inequality and unevenness caused by individuals’ profit-oriented desires. Here, race, nation, and ethnicity as primordial forms of community reemerge as a platform for reconstructing a new society, that is, community. As I have discussed, Takata rejected this logic of community, emphasizing that \textit{minzoku} itself is a social construct in modern society. However, it is important to note that Takata’s social theory is not free from desire for a community either, as he and like-minded social scientists were all seeking to conceptualize the East Asian Community.

At stake here is the question of whether Takata’s theory of ethnicity could be a vehicle for overcoming the general crisis of capitalism and individualism, without resorting to a fantasy of community. To resolve this question, many Japanese social scientists had attempted to find a radical direction through class struggle theory. Undoubtedly, Takata was also exposed to the ardent intellectual atmosphere of Marxism in the late 1910s and 1920s at Kyoto Imperial University, where both Kawakami Hajime 河上肇 (1879-1946) and Yoneda Shōtarō 米田庄太郎 (1873-1945), Takata’s mentor in sociology, were lecturing on historical materialism. However, he gradually became critical of socialism and found class struggle theory insufficient to
explain highly dynamic and heterogeneous social relations. From the beginning, Takata tried to understand the term class in a broader sense, not limited to an economic perspective. He saw class as having three distinct phases. The primordial sense of class is created when individuals find affinities and sympathies with others. But this notion of class is not transformed into an actual class due to geographical and occupational obstacles, which necessitate the second phase. This basic sense of commonality is then expanded to a social level, when what individuals feel what might be called class sentiment. Finally, this sentiment develops into class consciousness, through which individuals form organizations and engage in conflicts with other groups.\textsuperscript{121}

Central to Takata’s concept of class was his observation that neither economic power nor class is constituted solely by economic relations. He writes:

\begin{quote}
It can be said that views on placing similarities of economic power (勢力) or economic interest in the center of class are considered economic views on class. Although these views are widespread among a number of economists and socialists, I would say that they are short-sighted. As natural as this may sound, I would like to emphasize it once again. No society exists without hierarchical organizations. However, hierarchical relations in society are determined not merely by economic environments. Economic interests themselves do not mean a social hierarchy, and economic power is one single element that determines such a hierarchy.\textsuperscript{122} (Emphasis added)
\end{quote}

Takata believed that materiality or property by itself does not constitute class as a social power. Instead, he pointed out the paradox that class relations are in many cases sustained through blood relations, as best demonstrated in the heredity of the aristocratic class in medieval Europe. Takata paid special attention to the fact that social powers are often determined and inherited by what he called customs (慣習), in many cases taking religious and racial forms.\textsuperscript{123} Takata first developed this understanding of

\begin{flushendnotes}
\textsuperscript{121} Takata Yasuma, \textit{Kaikyū to daisan shikan} (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1925), pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p.36.
\end{flushendnotes}
class in the 1920s, and persistently maintained it through the 1940s based on his observation that class struggle theory is an insufficient analytical unit in sociology.

Takata’s critical approach to class struggle theory shed new light on the complex relationship between nationalism and capitalism. Class consciousness in the capitalistic mode of production, he maintained, is often associated with ethnic consciousness, and they two factors reinforce each other. This relationship becomes all the more complex in a society with multi-ethnic groups. At the early stage of capitalism, Takata contended, national interests appropriate capital in order to reinforce their influence, and the development of capitalism thus becomes a passive means of realizing the demands of nationalism.\textsuperscript{124} Takata argued that the nation-state, appropriating the power of capital in the form of “nationalistic demands,” attempted to increase its profit at its highest stage of development.\textsuperscript{125}

According to German sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies’ theory of \textit{Gemeinschaft} and \textit{Gesellschaft} (Community and Civil Society), the spread of goal-oriented activities by human beings comes about because of complex social relations. Further, the development of productivity and technologies necessarily gives rises to the prevalence of capitalism. Takata was exquisitely aware of Tonnies’ logic and acknowledged that nationalism as a form of community and capitalism are diametrically opposed to each other in \textit{theory}. This explains why he described nationalism as “centripetal;” that is, an individual is represented as part of a total self (全体的自我), whereas capitalism is “centrifugal,” in that an individual always pursues a sense of superiority and a relationship of dominance.\textsuperscript{126}

The problem here is that unlike Tonnies’ somewhat simplistic analysis of \textit{gesellschaft}, the proliferation of profit-oriented relationships in modern society does not

\textsuperscript{124} Takata, \textit{Minzokuron}, pp. 129.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid., p. 130.
\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., p. 131.
necessarily mean that a community-centered society would come to an end. As Slavoj Zizek has correctly argued, the elementary feature of capitalism is its circularity, so that capital’s constant production of surplus value would not allow it to find equilibrium. According to Zizek, capitalism could not exist without its “inherent structural imbalance.” Takata observed that under this mechanism, capital must constantly increase its surplus value to limit social and economic inequality. He concluded that this is precisely the means by which a modern nation-state achieved development in the name of material civilization. He also pointed out that precisely for this reason, modern nation-states are not immune from all sorts of conflicts that are engendered by hierarchy and unevenness from a sociological perspective.\(^{128}\)

Takata’s analysis of modern warfare was in fact based on his understanding of gesellschaft. To peacefully increase capital and surplus value, he stressed, a modern nation state strives to develop modern technologies and expand the capitalist market. To this end, it must subordinate the selfish desires of individuals to the collective good of the community by establishing an authoritative but highly rational state institution. This modern nation-state system, Takata acknowledged, does not necessarily generate conflicts between nation-states, as he noted in the examples of Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, all of which had achieved a certain level of capitalist development.\(^{129}\) However, the ostensible status created by the peaceful accumulation of capital would not last forever, unless a modern-nation state permanently maintains what might be called an autarchy system. In an attempt to realize self-sufficiency and minimize the potential risks of conflict, Takata observed, a modern nation-state with many ethnic groups is often divided into several independent ethnic nation-states.\(^{130}\) He maintains

\(^{129}\) Ibid., p.132.  
\(^{130}\) Ibid., p.135.
that this differentiation, however, would never fundamentally resolve ethnic conflicts that are intertwined with the capitalistic mode of production in such an overdetermined society as modern society.\textsuperscript{131}

Takata’s zeal for a new society beyond the limits of \textit{gemeinschaft} and \textit{gesellschaft}, therefore, is closely connected to his phenomenological discovery that nationalism and capitalism are essentially reciprocal. In this respect, he, like other wartime Japanese social scientists, paid attention to the necessity of creating a broad nation-state through which a higher level of communitarian integration might be realized. Importantly, Takata’s project of constructing a grand communal body was not intended to eliminate socio-political elements that cause conflict and inequality. As Zizek has argued, the corporatist temptation, often called a fascist fantasy, aims to create a community by way of eradicating those social and economic elements that give rise to structural imbalance and social antagonism. A totalitarian state, therefore, often strives to create a homogeneous means of forming subjectivity, in which profit-oriented, selfish individualism must be subordinated to the communitarian good. Precisely for this reason, these anti-social and anti-harmonious elements are explicitly imputed to groups and matters outside society, i.e. racism.\textsuperscript{132} Zizek therefore conceptualizes the desire of eliminating unevenness in modern society as “capitalism without capitalism.”\textsuperscript{133}

Takata was keenly aware of the structural risks inherent in the capitalist system. He too unmasked his “corporatist” vision of envisioning a grand communal body. However, it should be emphasized that Takata’s notion of cooperative community was not centered on creating an omnipotent creature such as the Master that would realize social balance, as was described in Zizek’s analysis of German fascism. Nor was it

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., pp. 205-211.
based on institutional and thus highly rationalized faith: specifically that the bigger and stronger a nation-state was, the more effectively it could control social and economic inequality. Inherent in Takata’s logic of community was regionality beyond the limits of a single nation-state. This explains why Takata, citing the writings of Alfred Rosenberg, a symbolic figure in the racist theory of Nazi Germany, somehow expressed sympathy with his general idea of creating a *regional* community.\(^{134}\) Takata’s interest in Rosenberg, however, was nothing more than academic and superficial. To be sure, he was keenly aware of Rosenberg’s extremely racist orientation, as his main argument was to spread the trans-historical superiority of the Aryan race, which he himself “discovered” in the myths of Northern Europe.\(^ {135}\)

Importantly, the problem Takata found in Rosenberg’s theory was the issue of the distorted relationship between German nationalism and the German nation-state. He observed that Nazi Germany’s ultimate destiny was to establish a regional political community in Europe by expanding a German nation-state. What Takata found problematic in this process was that German nationalism was presented as the principle of the integration of subjects in Germany’s political community.\(^{136}\) He stressed, however, that German nationalism was based on two unchangeable myths: (1) one was a faith in the superiority of the German *minzoku*, and the other, based on this faith, was that the German *minzoku* had been always creative and thus contributed to the development of world culture.\(^ {137}\) Most problematic in this theory was that the German

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\(^{134}\) Takata, *Minzokuron*, pp.142-143.


minzoku itself is always portrayed as a given and thus trans-historical, lacking the dynamics of subject formation.

Takata was adamant that a number of Japanese social scientists were recklessly replicating this one-dimensional and scientifically inconsistent thinking in their vision of the East Asian Community, particularly regarding the East Asian economic bloc theory. To put it another way, there is no absolute minzoku, as Nazi Germany attempted to postulate about German nationalism. Takata strove to establish his theory of an East Asian nation as a grand minzoku and at the same time to rationalize it by reconfirming that his theory of nation was actually a product of his long-standing sociological speculation that he had been developing since the 1920s.\footnote{Takata Yasuma, Minzokuron, p. 145. Takata stressed, “[T]he logic of a grand minzoku (廣民族主義, grand-nationalism) is by no means a theory I developed out of the current situation in East Asia or Germany’s domination (in Europe). It [grand-nationalism] is simply a theory that is derived from the article “The Law of Expansion and Reduction in Basic Society (基礎社会の拡大と縮小の法則),” which I wrote twenty-five years ago.”}

Takata intended to rescue minzoku from the tendency to view it as a static element that only prevails in the stage of gemeinschaft. By expanding the concept of minzoku to the basic sociological conviction that a subject in a society constantly changes himself in relation with the other, he attempted to rationally overcome the observation that minzoku as a form of gemeinschaft is opposed to the capitalistic mode of production as a representative form of gesellschaft. Takata’s acute critiques of Nazi Germany’s race-and-state-oriented regionalism and its supporters in Japan may sound convincing, given that Japan, too, failed to assimilate the Koreans and Taiwanese into a Japanese nation-state in the 1920s and 1930s. The question, then, is how Takata responded through his logic of a grand nationalism to the ethnic nationalism that was jeopardizing the Japanese state.

\textit{Minzoku in Transition: East Asian Minzoku as a Grand Nation} (廣民族)
As social groups and organizations constantly change themselves according to social interactions, minzoku also experiences integration, development and disappearance in Takata’s theory. He continued to elaborate this observation in his series of writings on minzoku in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In his 1939 book On The East Asian Nation (東亜民族論), Takata attempted to conceptualize minzoku in the context of East Asia. Notably, his discussion started with harsh critiques of the so-called East Asian Cooperative Community, which was a social scientists’ blueprint for Japan’s new order that was widely known among Japanese intellectuals. Its “impotence,” Takata stressed, resided in the reality that the mission of a new East Asia, the integration of China in particular, was not clearly presented in this theory.¹³⁹

Among various doctrines presented in a series of discourses on the East Asia Cooperative Community, Takata primarily criticized the notion of the community of destiny. (運命共同体) Importantly, he also recognized the reality that Western imperialism necessitated the self-defense of East Asia to some extent. However, he was reluctant to accept the logic that the presence of the West would bind East Asia from a regional perspective, and that it would guarantee the historicity of the notion of the community of destiny, as best described in political scientist Rōyama Masamichi’s theory of the East Asian Cooperative Community. Takata’s critiques were two-fold. He argued that insofar as East Asian regionalism was associated with the theory of the “destiny” of East Asia, it would create a geography-centered and thus highly oversimplified epistemology of the East and the West.¹⁴⁰ Therefore, his second observation was that the problem of people of yellow color was not whether they belonged to East Asia in a regional sense, but rather whether they have an awareness of ethnically belonging to Asian minzoku:

¹⁴⁰ Takata, Minzoku to keizai 1, pp. 268-269.
The cooperation of regional destiny has actually become the destiny of common regions that have been oppressed by Western powers. However, I must raise this question…. Is this destiny regional in nature? Was it yellow people who experienced the oppression of Western powers, in particular imperialistic oppression by white people in the West? White people in Hong Kong and Shanghai live and breathe in East Asia, but they never experience oppression, but all the people of color residing in East Asia experience it. *Minzoku* in East Asia is exposed to a common destiny, since we yellow people live in the region of East Asia. *This is not so much a spatial destiny but rather minzoku.* The so-called cooperation of regional destiny is in fact nothing but the cooperation of the destiny of *minzoku.* (For this reason), is regionalism no more than a form of nationalism?\(^{141}\) (Emphasis added)

The subtle but significant difference between Takata and other advocates of East Asian regionalism is telling in many ways. Specifically, Takata emphasized the importance of nationalism in envisioning a new Asia. In doing so, he also reconfirmed that one’s sense of belonging to a certain ethnic group is not concerned as much with geographical and blood-related realities as it is with the dynamics of subjectivity formation. More importantly, by casting a critical eye on any sort of regionalism, Takata prevented his theory from being reduced to a regional logic of universality and particularity. He rejected the notion that the world is geographically constituted by the West as universal and the East as particular and oppressed. For this reason, Takata adhered to the concept of East Asian *minzoku* or East Asian nationalism, based on his universalist approach to *minzoku* and nationalism, which he refused to particularize *in relation to* the West.

With regard to ethnic nationalism, Takata was primarily faced with two contradictory realities. The first was that each ethnic group constitutes a community based on ethnic nationalism, and tends to be exclusive in nature. Second, plural nationalisms in each ethnic groups nonetheless have to accept the nationalism of East Asian *minzoku* in a broader sense.\(^{142}\) In order to scientifically rationalize this seemingly

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141 Ibid., p. 272.
142 Takata, *Tōa minzokuron,* pp. 11-12.
impossible logic, Takata proposed that the nature of East Asian nationalism is as follows:

Above all, nationalism as a demand for an essential minzoku is neither subordinated to East Asian nationalism, nor does the former serve as a means to the latter. To take this further, I do not argue that essential minzoku integrated with one another and constituted an East Asian minzoku. Each individual belongs to an essential minzoku and at the same time he belongs to a minzoku with a wider range. The two (nationalisms) have separate meanings in a sense. The question of how these two nationalisms have their own content and to what degree they integrate their members is primarily concerned with how they manage to effectively function in two different stages. Insofar as the maintenance and development of its members is only possible through the power of an essential minzoku, essential nationalism would be dominant. According to the degree to which essential nationalism recognizes and frees itself for nationalism in a broader sense, it [East Asian nationalism] might occur.\(^{143}\)

Clearly, the question Takata found to be most urgent was how he could theorize Chinese nationalism in his scientific approach to minzoku. To be sure, he never naively denounced Chinese nationalism as such. As he emphasized in *On The East Asian Nation*, he was convinced that the capitalist system of gesellschaft and ethnic consciousness as a form of gemeinschaft could co-exist. For him, this coexistence was necessary to create a modern subject as well. Therefore, capitalist development and the rise of ethnic nationalism in China were viewed by Takata as “necessary” steps toward an East Asian minzoku. However, this does not mean that he accepted discourses on Chinese nationalism produced by Chinese intellectuals at face value. In particular, Takata was critical of Sun-Yat Sen’s Three Principles of Democracy (三民主義). Citing the renowned philosopher Funayama Shinichi’s 船山信一 (1907-1994) work on Sun-Yat Sen, Takata dismissed Sun’s theory of democracy and nationalism as “atomistic.”\(^{144}\)

Of course, the notion of “atomism” that Takata appropriated to devalue Chinese

\(^{143}\) Ibid., p.12.
\(^{144}\) Ibid., p.18. Takata’s writings were based on his reading of Funayama Shinichi’s *Sanminshugi no shisoteki seikaku* (Intellectual characteristics of the three principles of democracy).
nationalism was not Takata’s original work. In the mid 19th century, Hegel conceptualized atomism by explaining civil society as a state of atomon where particularized individuals with multiple personalities form a society without an absolute unity. Individuals in civil society, Hegel argued, constantly attempt to compel the realization of their own interests over those of others, and the very impossibility of realizing the goals of individuals without interacting with others generates social relations. Therefore, everyone in civil society forms a network of inter-dependency and this network itself becomes the goal and means of human life. Hegel conceptualized this as a state of “anti-ethics,” and proposed the state as an absolute and universal unity for synthesizing the particularity of individuals.

Although Takata seemed to accept the Hegelian logic of atomism, his extension of this logic to nationalism was quite distinctive. Takata observed that the relation between individual and minzoku, especially in modern (Chinese) nationalism, isolates individuals within the narrow confines of a single minzoku, thus prohibiting individuals from forming subjectivity beyond ethnic nationalism.

How is atomistic social thought led by nationalism, and how does nationalism become one result of atomistic social thought? This question is premised on the condition that individuals as atoms are not separated from the integration of minzoku, and that individuals could develop themselves only through the medium of minzoku. Thus, if we presuppose that the integration of East Asia is necessary for the sake of its liberation, and that members of each ethnic group in East Asia could develop themselves only by an East Asian integration, (Chinese) nationalism must be led by East Asian nationalism.

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145 Friedrich Hegel, trans., T.M. Knox, *The Philosophy of Right* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britanica, 1952), pp. 64-80. In the book, Hegel presented three categories of civil society: (A) The mediation of need and one man’s satisfaction through his work and the satisfaction of the needs of all others – the System of Needs. (B) The actuality of the universal principle of freedom therein contained – the protection of property through the Administration of Justice. (C) Provision against contingencies still lurking in systems (A) and (B), and care for particular interests as a common interest, by means of the Police and the Corporation. Ibid., p.65.

146 Ibid.

147 Takata, *Tōa minzokuron*, p. 19
According to this argument, Takata contended, the “establishment of a new order in East Asia” would be extremely difficult without asking for the “destruction of China’s atomistic nationalism” and the “complete negation of the basic principles of Sun-Yat Sen’s theory.” However, this logic created two problems. First, as Takata himself acknowledged, one could not completely eradicate atomistic thought in the structure of gesellschaft such as Chinese society. More importantly, if atomism pertains to the subordination of individuals to a totality, as described in Takata’s critiques of Chinese nationalism, how could East Asian nationalism overcome atomism as the legacy of modern nationalism?

Takata was clearly aware that the Germans conceived of national socialism as an alternative to atomism in modern society. However, he was adamant that subordinating individuals to a totality or an absolute leader, as best exemplified in Hitler’s emergence in Nazi Germany, would be possible only by emphasizing the totality of minzoku, which would completely ignore the dynamism of subject formation within minzoku. For Takata, therefore, German nationalism, was not cooperativism (協同主義) but totalitarianism (全体主義). How, then, did Takata understand cooperativism in his discussion of minzoku? Here, Takata borrowed the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community from philosophical perspectives. Funayama Shinichi garnered special attention from Takata:

When I think how dialectical thinking could synthesize inconsistencies, the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community is a policy. As long as it is a policy, it must be realized in causal social relations. Then, how can inconsistencies from the perspective of an analytical theory be synthesized in reality? If cooperativism is the synthesis of totalistic and atomistic views, how can one say that “cooperativism is closer to a totalistic view”? … The total that is realized by the self-negation of the part becomes a part immediately, and this part once again becomes the total by way of self-

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148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
Takata’s so-called *ko-minzokushugi* (廣民族主義) was grounded in the philosophical theories of subjectivity formation developed by Japanese intellectuals, many of whom were not social scientists. However, Takata did not accept Funayama’s highly circulative philosophical dialectics at face value, since his criticism was that such dialectics could be only the precondition of the East Asian Cooperative Community, not its content. As a social scientist, Takata was faced with the question of how this theory of subjectivity formation could explain real problems, in particular the relations between different ethnic groups. To be sure, Takata also reiterated throughout *On The East Asian Nation* that the relationship between ethnic groups must be based on reciprocity, and that becoming part of an East Asian *minzoku* did not mean that one had to sacrifice his essential ethnicity.

This idealistic approach to East Asian *minzoku*, however, clashed with both Takata’s basic concept of sociology and the actual hierarchical relation between ethnic groups. The boundaries of society were always fluid in Takata’s view because interactions between social actors and between integral and partial societies constantly create new forms of society. In this respect, the dialectics of self-negation between total and part, and between objectivity and subjectivity, seem to correspond with Takata’s theory of society. Yet it is important to note that Takata’s understanding of dialectics did not necessarily presuppose the equal status of social actors and groups. In other words, he acknowledged social divisions in class, culture, religion and ethnicity, and in this respect his sociology was not intended to eliminate these social hierarchies. However, most advocates of a new East Asian order emphasized anti-hierarchical and anti-

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150 Ibid., p.23. The italicized sentence was directly quoted from Funayama Shinichi’s “Kyōdōtai rinen no sekaishiteki igi (The World-historical Significance of Cooperative Ideology).”
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., p. 25.
discriminatory relations among ethnic groups as an ideal goal for the East Asian Community. Conceivably, this gesture was intended to hide the real imbalance in power relations, and at the same time to project a utopian and messianic perception of the East Asian Community in the future.

Caught between idealism and a fragmented reality, Takata once again returned to what he called scientific thinking. He first acknowledged the reality of an uneven configuration between minzoku groups. Minzoku groups that are superior in population, culture and politics, Takata stressed, have become leading ethnic groups in human civilization, whereas inferior minzoku groups, or the middle ground (中庸) as he called it, have naturally disappeared in world history.\(^\text{153}\) He conceptualized this as a theory of circulative minzoku. (民族周流論) This thinking seems not to be a simple replica of the Comtean or Spencerian social organism, reminiscent of the logic of the “survival of the fittest.” Takata argued that the relationship between majority and minority ethnic groups is not one of “winner takes all.” Relatively inferior ethnic groups such as Indians in North America, he contended, would also survive, being surrounded by stronger ethnic groups. At stake is the fact that these non-mainstream ethnic groups could not develop enough to become a mainstream ethnic group in world history.\(^\text{154}\) Therefore, a “world-historical moment” for Takata occurs when a certain ethnic group emerges as a world-leading minzoku.

Takata’s observation clearly shows that he not only affirmed capitalistic development and the rise of nationalism in China as its result, but he recognized these phenomena as what the Kyoto School philosophers referred to as a “world-historical moment.”\(^\text{155}\) Since he did not take the one-dimensional worldview of the “survival of

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\(^{154}\) Ibid., p. 199.  
\(^{155}\) About the notion of “world history” and an East Asian new order by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, see a roundtable discussion, “Sekashiteki tachiba to nihon,” in *Chūōkōron* 57, no. 1 (Jan 1942), pp. 159-192.
the fittest,” the rise of Chinese nationalism did not mean that minority ethnic groups such as the Ainu, the Ryukyu and the Koreans would disappear. He was open to the possibility that these minor groups would take the position of a leading ethnic group through social interaction. Through interaction with Japan, Takata was convinced that Korean agriculture had developed significantly, and he called this process “rationalization.” He went on to argue that rationalization in East Asian minzoku must take the form of organizations in each ethnic group functioning to serve their own interests without exploitation and oppression. In so doing, he also tried to rationalize the role of a leading minzoku like the Japanese who, he believed, could bring about a world-historical moment. 

Making the Irrational Rational

The ostensibly “rational” and even “rosy” future for Asian people predicted by Takata, however, reached an impasse as he faced the difficulty of having to endorse Japan’s leading role in the current situation. To begin with, Takata had to explain first why ethnic groups in East Asia had to be united in order to logically apply his theory of circulative minzoku (民族周流論) to a new East Asian empire. As I have discussed, he did not attempt to solve this problem by framing it in terms of Western imperialism versus Asianism; that is, Asian people were destined to be united, otherwise they would be colonized by the West.

Social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi and Ezawa Jōji attempted to find a rationale for this unification by emphasizing futurity in their so-called “subjective” social science. In other words, Asian people who had experienced different paths to subject formations could find a sense of common destiny by projecting their present

156 Takata, Tōa minzokuron, pp.37-38.
157 Ibid., p.38.
into a new future, as yet to be constructed. Therefore, Rōyama and Ezawa argued for the necessity of the unity of Asian people less from a historical past characterized by sharing the same ancestry, than from the standpoint of an unknown but dynamic future that could be realized through the “community of destiny.”\(^\text{158}\)

Takata’s critiques of these “future-oriented” social scientists centered primarily on their excessive emphasis on the notion of spatiality. If either construction or development of the future were to play a central role in realizing the East Asian Co-operative Community, he argued, it would be geographically limited to East Asia, where the Japanese nation-state could exert direct political and economic control, thereby marginalizing Southeast Asia and other areas where people who are conscious of being “East Asian” resided.\(^\text{159}\) Takata, however, became increasingly engaged with arguments that were apparently neither scientific nor rational in order to rationally refute these social scientists. Presenting ancestry, region and culture as three key elements in unifying East Asia, he endorsed historical similarities inherent in Asian people because they share Asian blood and culture.\(^\text{160}\) To be sure, he was reluctant to accept the theory that Japan was messianically destined to unify East Asia in response to the West’s invasion of Asia. The necessity of an East Asian union was, for Takata, theorized by the national fate (民族的宿命) of Asian people, rather than by its spatial configuration that included Japan, China and Korea in relation to the West.\(^\text{161}\)

Arguably, Takata’s endorsement of blood and culture should not simply be equated with that of so-called nativists who argued for the pureness and eternity of the Japanese race. To be sure, he was heavily influenced by the Kyoto School philosophers whose thinking about subject formation was characterized by the co-figuration of self-negation.

\(^{158}\) For a discussion of the community of destiny in Rōyama Masamichi and Ezawa Jōji, refer to Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

\(^{159}\) Takata Yasuma, “Tōa to minzoku genri,” Minzoku to keizai 1, pp.237-239.

\(^{160}\) Ibid., pp. 267-268.

\(^{161}\) Ibid., p.272.
and creation. In this respect, Takata’s preoccupation with envisioning an East Asian Community that would extend beyond the regional boundary of China, Japan and Korea was inseparable from his zeal for a world society whose outlines he had been developing since the 1920s. However, his vision of a world society never included the notion of a cosmopolitan subject, as best described in Miki Kiyoshi’s wartime philosophy.\(^{162}\) According to Miki, Asian \textit{minzoku} is defined as a dialectic object to be negated, recreated, and eventually become part of a cosmopolitan society. However, Takata observed that there are no objective and irrefutable truths in Miki’s philosophy through which Japan might rationalize its leading role in East Asia. To resolve this dilemma, Takata’s notion of East Asian \textit{minzoku} was destined to return to \textit{History}, where he could find what he believed were objective realities such as blood and culture, while at the same time he had to present his vision of minorities’ becoming a majority \textit{within} the Asian community.

Takata’s logic of East Asian \textit{minzoku}, therefore, employed several theoretical orientations that are seemingly irreconcilable in one theory. To highlight the potential that minority ethnic groups might become a majority, he appropriated the philosophy of Miki Kiyoshi and Funayama Shinichi. Through the process of negating the self and creating a totality, Takata maintained that a minority ethnic group in the present could become a leading ethnic group of a new East Asian \textit{minzoku} in the future. In this respect, his theory of East Asian nationalism apparently spoke to the future and this logic was intended to mobilize colonial subjects to the project of building an East Asian empire. Takata constantly tried to distance himself from the specter of the nation-state, and from the faith that a new nation-state would become a “buffer-zone” for existing

ethnic conflicts as it incorporated colonial subjects.

However, he returned to history to conceal the irrational reality he was facing in the present. Takata was acutely aware that Japan’s past and present as an imperial colonizer must be rationalized in order to accomplish a Japan-centered empire-building project for the future. To this end, he immersed himself in the fantasy of culture and blood. It was precisely for this reason that he asserted that Japan’s annexation of Korea was not an imperial colonization but the dissemination of culture and advanced technologies between two nations [minzoku] that had shared cultural similarities in history. Such a naive view of colonization might not be expected from a social scientist like Takata, who was meticulous in his contemplation and writing.

Notably, Takata never touched upon issues relating to individual colonies other than Chinese nationalism in his writings. By not taking on the colonial problem as a particular issue, Takata could become a universalist. But I argue that it was Takata’s “performative” choice of refusing to directly address colonial problems in reality that created a paradoxical and very powerful discursive space between colonial and imperial intellectuals. Colonial subjects could internalize imperial discourses like Takata’s in their hidden desire to directly project themselves into a universal and cosmopolitan world beyond the inconsistencies between empire and colony. For this reason, colonial intellectuals’ failure to find any recounting of the colony in the writings of imperial intellectuals did not in fact disappoint them, nor did it detach them from the project of establishing a universal empire. Rather, it reinforced the desire of colonial intellectuals to be universalists. Takata’s writings demonstrate this paradox clearly.

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163 Takata never dealt with the Korea problem in detail in his wartime writings. But he discovered in a number of places that Korea had already become part of Japan and it was by no means imperial colonization. Takata, Minzokuron, pp.96-120.
164 I will examine the issue of colonial intellectuals’ subjective responses to imperial discourses in detail in Chapter 5, focusing on the writings of In Jeong-Sik, who was one of the most influential Marxist intellectuals in colonial Korea.
Shinmei’s Logic of a Multi-ethnic Nation-State

In contrast to Takata, who did not position the nation-state as a central organization for the East Asian Community, Shinmei attempted to find through the nation-state the middle ground for resolving problems caused by an ethnic hierarchy. One focal question he posited was how the notion of a multi-ethnic nation state would be different from the previous one, which had already failed to incorporate colonial intellectuals. To begin with, Shinmei divided ethnic groups into two sub-categories, grand *minzoku* and small and medium-sized *minzoku*. He observed that so-called ethnic spirit is inversely proportional to the size of each ethnic group; that is, small and medium-size ethnic groups often show much stronger nationalist sentiment than large-size ethnic groups do.\(^{165}\) Therefore, he maintained that a serious problem would occur when these small-size ethnic groups with strong passions create a nation-state and protested against nation-states made up of grand ethnic groups.

As we witness the establishment of strong nation states based on grand ethnic groups, it is very problematic that small and medium size ethnic groups form nation-states based on nationalism and continue to resist against strong nation states. The success of nationalism by these ethnic groups is eventually possible only when they receive support from grand nation states. In getting through this difficulty, small and medium size ethnic groups can only think of one direction…That is not a nationalism that has the notion of one *minzoku* and one nation as its content. That is a form of *kokuminshugi*, in that it affirms the formation of multi-ethnicity and a single nation. However, although the content of *kokumin* is multi-ethnic, it has the possibility of forming a single grand *minzoku*, insofar as there exist affinities in blood, region and culture.\(^ {166}\)

Shinmei attempted to separate his concept of *kokumin* from what he called the “modern” concept of nation in terms of formal nationality. According to him, modern

\(^{165}\) Shinmei Masamichi, *Minzoku shakaigaku no kōso* (Tokyo: Mikasa shobo, 1942), p.41. For your information, most of Shinmei’s writings on the East Asian Cooperative Community and East Asian nationalism during the wartime period are not included in *Selected Works of Shinmei Masamichi*.

\(^{166}\) Ibid., pp.42-43.
national society is characterized by the integration of national subjects based on administrative, financial and military measures. However, modern national society, he contended, had collapsed with the general crisis in democracy and liberal capitalism, and for this reason, he emphasized the importance of “restructuring national subjects (国民再組織)” based on a new way of thinking. In delving into this highly philosophical question of subjectivity, Shinmei too, like Takata, showed keen interest in the theories of Miki Kiyoshi and Funayama Shinichi. To be sure, Shinmei’s encounter with their philosophical perspectives deeply influenced his vision for a new East Asia, but on the other hand he did not hesitate to express harsh criticism of their ideas.

Shinmei’s main criticism against Miki and Funayama focused on their philosophical perspective to see all variables as non-static. In other words, for Shinmei, the principle of cooperativism as espoused by these philosophers lay in the perception that the relationship between total and part is spiral, always creating a new form of total and part which will be self-negated again. For this reason, the cooperativism of Miki and Funayama, he observed, regarded minzoku as part of these social variables to be self-negated and recreated. Shinmei’s discontent with these philosophers focused on the excessiveness and impracticality of their metaphysical understanding of society. For Shinmei, the dynamism between total and part, which Miki and Funayama theorized as the dialectics of self-negation and creation, was conceivable insofar as a visible totality is recognized in a society.

Not surprisingly, Shinmei reiterated that minzoku is a basic organization, but at the same time it constitutes in itself a general society (総合社会) as reality. Therefore, Shinmei stressed that leaning too much on the logic of metaphysics to link minzoku to

168 Ibid., pp.177-179.
169 Ibid., p. 180
philosophical cooperativism would result in cosmopolitanism, which can be a characteristic of any human society, but (precisely for this reason) cannot be a leading social theory in reality.\textsuperscript{170} The theoretical distance between Shinmei and these philosophers also explains some fundamental differences between Takata and Shinmei. As I have discussed, Tataka’s concept of minzoku, which to some extent contains essentialism such as blood and culture, was not theorized in a binary relation to the state from the beginning. Therefore, Takata attempted to draw the spatiality of his East Asian nationalism vis-à-vis a world society as the universal. However, the spatiality of Shinmei’s notion of minzoku was confined, as sociologist Seino Masayoshi has argued, to the realm of the nation-state.\textsuperscript{171} In A Study of Social Nature (社会本質論), published in 1942, along with A Concept of National Sociology (民族社会学の構想), Shinmei expounded on the relationship between minzoku and state:

\begin{quote}
[M]inzoku is a basic organization (基礎団体) as an element that constitutes a general organization (総合団体), and the state is a derivative organization(派生団体). However, needless to say, the historical and realistic form of the derivative organization (the state) is nation (国民), Sociologists have speculated that human society (人類) is either a general organization or a derivative society….Human beings stand as part of human society in terms of relational negotiations (関係的交渉性), but their belonging to human society does not constitute a general organization in terms of general relations of social activities… In the present, a national general organization (国民的総合団体) or a national general society (国民的総合社会) becomes the ultimate unit of human society in reality. (Emphasis added)\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

Just as Takata emphasized that his East Asian nationalism is a continuation of his sociological thinking from the early 1920s onward, Shinmei’s notion of minzoku and the East Asian Cooperative Community is traceable to his obsession with the state as a

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 187.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Seino Masayoshi, “Senjika no minzoku kenkyū (2) - takata yasuma to shinmei masamichi no baai,” Ritsumeikan sangyōshakai ronshū 30, no.2 (Sep 1994), pp.30-31.
\item \textsuperscript{172} Shinmei Masamichi, Shakai honshituron (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1942), pp, 400-401; SMC 2, pp.518-519.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
universal totality. The question was, then, how a new East Asian nation-state as a universal totality would overcome the limits of ethnic conflicts and the decadence of democracy and capitalism shown in the modern nation-state. To this end, Shinmei stressed that a new cooperative state should not simply be identified with Gesellschaft based on goal-oriented activities. Of course, he was clearly aware that Tonnies’ logic of Gemeinschaft as a form of community would hardly be compatible with the multi-ethnic formation of the Japanese empire.

For this reason, what was stressed in Shinmei’s logic of the East Asian Co-operative Community is the concept of artificial rationality (人為合理性). According to him, gemeinschaft is a conventional form of community based on what he called natural and emotional associations. Shinmei maintained that either cooperation or association in the cooperative community must take the form of an organic thought (有機的思想). In this sense, the term artificial rationality was presented as a vehicle for accomplishing “profit-oriented integrality (利益的総合性),” which Shinmei envisioned as a form through which the inconsistencies between community and civil society could be transcended.

However, it is at this point that Shinmei’s faith in rationalization came to an impasse. At the center of his logic of artificial rationality and organic thought was the nation-state. The state, he argued, transforms certain types of cultural similarities into the political and social will of a subject. Without a nation-state, a certain ethnic group, he emphasized, would never form a community in a real sense, simply because their cultural similarities could be neither politicized nor socialized, and therefore they could never create subjectivity. For this reason, he went so far as to argue, “In the case of multi-ethnic formations, there must be a nation-state that lacks cultural

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173 Shinmei, Tōa kyōdōtai no rishō, pp. 205-208.
174 Shinmei, Minzoku shakaigaku no kōso, p.13.
However, Shinmei’s rosy picture of an Asian nation-state never offered a sophisticated discussion of how these different ethnic identities could be incorporated into a nation-state.

Moreover, this seemingly extreme rationalist approach to the notion of community, which eliminated primordial and natural elements inherent in ethnicity, does not explain why ethnic groups in Asia had to be united under the banner of the East Asian Cooperative Community. If blood-oriented similarities in ethnic communities were to be transcended in a cooperative community in the end, why should it be geographically limited to East Asia? As I have discussed, Takata attempted to avoid this question by directly projecting his theory of *minzoku* into a world society. Shinmei’s notion of ethnicity, however, could not avoid this trap, since the spatial dimension of his theory was confined to a nation-state. For this reason, he also returned to commonness in blood-centered relations and culture as a precondition to rationalize the necessity of constructing an East Asian empire led by Japan. In other words, like Takata, he was also trapped in the irony that the more he stressed the state as the ultimate rationalized future of East Asia, the more he had to resort to blood, nature and culture, all of which he could not explicate through social scientific thinking.

**Conclusion**

Wartime Japanese social scientists exposed their messianic and universalist zeal for an East Asian empire through their involvement in ethnographic studies. Of course, their thinking started with the realistic observation that ethnic conflicts and discriminatory hierarchies both in the colony and at the metropole would create instability in the empire. To provide a practical solution for a complex web of socio-political imbalances and unevenness in the highly capitalist empire, they paid attention to the newness of the

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175 Ibid.
The multi-ethnic vision of an Asian empire emphasized an organic dynamism in which subjects belong to the East Asian Co-operative Community while retaining their ethnicity. This vision also retained subjects’ goal-oriented desires in society. Theoretically speaking, this logic was nothing more than the reflection of social scientists’ desire to overcome the limits of capitalism and civil society. Unsurprisingly, Takata Yasuma and Shinmei Masamichi envisioned a community in which a certain kind of socio-political equilibrium is realized. Ostensibly, this balance and harmony also guaranteed a higher degree of social mobility. Other social scientists such as Kada Tetsuji, in spite of their theoretical differences, all emphasized that this new form of community would overcome the imbalance and inequality in the present system. Their futuristic logic clearly explains why their voices shaped such powerful discursive spaces among colonial intellectuals, although they never grappled with colonial problems in detail.

In this way, Takata’s “radical” approach to the term minzoku and Shinmei’s logic of a multi-ethnic nation-state temporarily concealed colonial problem, and presented a theoretical platform to further mobilize colonial subjects for the sake of the Japanese empire. However, their attempts to rationalize the empire by way of the term minzoku vividly show their distorted desires for a universal social science. Their theories did not offer a fundamental critique of colonialism. In order to avoid colonial reality, they constantly subordinated it to the specter of universal community. However, their vision of community was by no means free from colonial violence and this clearly demonstrates that social scientists served the empire in the name of universal social science.

In Chapter 4, I analyze spatial theories produced by the social scientists who advocated the East Asian Community. Together with the concept of minzoku, the
seemingly abstract terms *kūkan* (空間, space) and *chiri* (地理, geography) captured special attention from these social scientists in their theorizing of imperial subjects (帝國的主体). I will pay special attention to how space and geography became a theoretical vehicle for constructing a new imperial community as well as how the problem of modernization was dealt with in these spatial theories.
Chapter 4
Mapping Greater East Asian Space:
Geopolitics in Interwar Japan

The “Greater East Asian Space”
In 1938, a year after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro made a series of announcements about a new order in East Asia, which eventually became officialized in the early 1940s as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Although various Asian discourses had already appeared, it was around this moment in time that Japanese intellectuals became increasingly involved in producing East Asian discourses. Not surprisingly, their spatial concept of East Asia was in most cases formulated in the strategic schema of the East vis-à-vis the West, but the question of how to rationally and scientifically conceptualize East Asian space quickly emerged as a main concern in East Asian discourses. This issue became more complex as the project of constructing a new Asia was juxtaposed with Japan’s destructive war against its fellow Asian country, China.

In *Principles of Constructing a Greater East Asia* (大東亜建設論), published in 1943, Murayama Michio 村山道雄 (1902-1981), secretary of the Planning Bureau, provided three main principles for constructing a new Asia: Imperial Spirit, Co-prosperity based on the Way (道義), and Japan’s leading role in a new order. In Murayama’s vision of a new East Asia, the concept of East Asian space was not simply represented as a given geographical unity vis-à-vis the West. Referring to the geopolitics of Karl Haushofer, a German specialist in geopolitics, Murayama outlined his concept of a new East Asian space as part of overcoming the artificial geographical and political constitution of the world which was improperly divided by Western

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Highlighting Haushofer’s argument emphasizing the differences between Japan and European powers in terms of colonial policy, Murayama attempted to link the construction of a greater East Asia to Japan’s glorious spiritual culture, which he believed was ethically superior to Western imperialist thinking.

Therefore, mapping East Asian space went beyond geographical borders, which for Murayama, were a highly politicized issue. However, his turn to Haushofer’s geopolitics did not seem to provide him with an ultimate answer to the question of how East Asian space could be defined in a scientific and rational manner. But, given that Murayama’s book was a kind of official governmental guide for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, one could understand the extent to which geopolitical thinking was influential in shaping the spatial concept of East Asian discourses by both Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats.

In this chapter I will examine the essential question of how East Asian space was theorized in a series of East Asian discourses produced by Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular. Although there are a great many studies of Japanese imperialism, both quantitative and qualitative, little attention has been paid to this basic but most essential question of space in wartime East Asian discourses. To approach this

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2 Ibid., pp.3-4.
3 Ibid., p.4. Murayama paid special attention to Haushofer’s comparison between Britain’s annexation of Ireland and Japan’s colonization of Korea. In Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean), Haushofer argued that the population of Ireland decreased from 8 million to 4.5 million, while Korea’s population increased from 11 million to 20 million under Japan’s rule. Karl Haushofer, trans., Taiheiyō kyōkai, Taiheiyō chisegaku (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942), p.244.
question, this chapter examines the emergence and spread of geopolitical thinking in Europe as an alternative spatial discourse and traces the intellectual trajectories of Japanese social scientists’ encounter with geopolitics in their rational and scientific theories of East Asian space. However, I do not limit my concern to the realm of geography or the history of geopolitics. I argue that a close look at the way geopolitics was introduced and interpreted will not only provide us with clues to understand how East Asia as a space became an object of social scientific research, but will also give us a picture of how Japanese social scientists grappled with the question of overcoming Western social scientific scholarship and went about establishing the “subjective” Japanese social sciences.

As part of this project, I will first discuss the rise of geopolitical thinking in post World-War I Europe, Germany in particular, and investigate in what context it was introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the 1920s. Secondly, I will examine the spread of geopolitical thinking in Japan beginning in the late 1930s as it started a full-scale war against China and later the United States. In particular, I will focus on the translation and introduction of the German geographer and political scientist Karl Haushofer. A close look at Haushofer’s emergence in 1930s and 1940s Japan will give important clues for understanding Japanese social scientists’ responses to a leading social theory originating in Germany. Third and most importantly, I will discuss two streams of geopolitics during the wartime period: the Kyoto School of Geography and the so-called rationalist geopolitics in the Tokyo area. By looking at these two distinctive geopolitical approaches to East Asian space, I seek an answer to the unexplored

question of how Japanese social scientists encountered and theorized East Asian space as an object of social scientific studies and eventually produced geographical and spatial knowledge for the Japanese empire. Special attention will be given to Ezawa Jōji’s concept of economic development and how he theorized the logic of subjectivity formation through the notion of developing spaces in the colony.

Space and Politics in Post-World War I Europe

World War I has often been described as Germany’s collapse and the rise of the America-centered international order, but its impacts on European society were much more profound than its political aftermath. In a geographical sense, Europe experienced a full-scale war not in the colonies but on its own soil for the first time in modern history. The impact of the “war in Europe” played a major role in establishing the League of Nations, the first international political organization in modern times, but on the other hand, the sense that such an international organization was inevitable clearly reflected European intellectuals’ skepticism toward their longstanding belief in what might be called the ‘balance of power’ theory, namely that the major powers in Europe had successfully maintained physical stability at home as well as European hegemony abroad without such an international organization. Interestingly, this observation of the limits of existing political theory was logically connected to European intellectuals’ fundamental reexaminations of democracy itself. In the 1919 book Democratic Ideals and Reality, published one year after the end of World War I, Halford Mackinder, a British geographer and political scientist, vehemently argued as follows:

Democracy refuses to think strategically unless and until compelled to do so for purposes of defense. That, of course, does not prevent democracy from declaring war for an ideal, as was seen during the French Revolution. One of the inconsistencies of our pacifists today is that they so often urge
Given that Britain as a member of the Entente Powers reconfirmed its hegemony in its victory over the Central Powers represented by Germany in World War I, Mackinder’s statement above leaves much room for further discussion. Why did a renowned British intellectual come up with the idea that democracy, unquestionably the fruit of British political thought, was no longer compatible with maintaining peace in the international order?

Mackinder’s insights on the limits of democracy were in large part grounded in his observation that the existing political ideology could no longer correspond to the rapidly changing geo-political constitution of nation-states. To put it another way, he viewed nation-states as what he called a “Going Concern,” by which he theorized that the state as an organic unity was destined to expand its territory. Therefore, he argued that in order for democracy as a political theory to correspond to this new geopolitical configuration of the nation-state, a whole new spatial perspective was needed to replace the old-fashioned notion of democracy as a static political theory. What he offered as an alternative to the geopolitical constitution was “heartland theory.” Contending that the world consists of a few “heartlands,” Mackinder predicted that nation-states which could occupy these heartlands would take political hegemony in the international order, and he also pointed out that “Eurasia” would become the most important heartland in the world.

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If new geopolitical thinking could be conceived of as a kind of political suggestion from the side of British intellectuals, geopolitics had a much stronger potential to be directly connected to national policies in Germany, where the sense of loss was endemic throughout the country in the aftermath of World War I. Friedrich Ratzel’s seminal book of 1897, *Politische Geographie* (Political Geography), and his theory of *Lebensraum* (Living Space) attracted attention in 1920s Germany, and the geopolitical theory of the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen, who has often been regarded as the first to conceptualize geopolitics, also became popular among German intellectuals. Ratzel’s theory of *Lebensraum*, based on the state-organ theory, emphasized that a nation-state must ensure that it has enough living space for its people, and in this respect his geopolitical conceptualization of a nation-state in his famous phrase, “expand or perish” was a vivid example of how an organist perspective became increasingly popular among post-World-War I European intellectuals. German intellectuals’ engagement with geopolitical thinking culminated in the emergence of political scientist and politician Karl Haushofer as a leading figure both in German academic circles and in Hitler’s Nazi Germany. Defining geopolitics as a “science to understand political living forms in natural living space in terms of geographical restrictions and historical movement,” Haushofer contended that geography as a discipline providing knowledge about the surface of the earth should now serve as a branch of policy studies for the territorial expansion of the nation-state.

Despite its potential to overcome the spatial limits of democracy and its theoretical justification of a fascist nation-state based on the organist notion, geopolitics never became a dominant social theory in Europe except in the case of Germany.

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Interestingly, it was in wartime Japan that this Western-originated spatial discourse rapidly gained currency among intellectuals and eventually played an important role in the making of Greater East Asian space in imperial Japan. How and in what context did this new geopolitical thinking affect both Japanese social scientists and the making of a Greater East Asian space in wartime Pan-Asian discourses?

**Japanese Intellectuals’ Encounter with Geopolitics**

The first encounter of Japanese geography with geopolitical thinking took place in 1925 and 1926, when Tokyo University geographer Iimoto Nobuyuki 飯本信之 (1895-1989) contributed three articles to *The Geographical Review* (地理学評論) entitled “The Reality of Racial Conflict and its Geopolitical Analysis.”¹⁰ Basically accepting Friedrich Ratzel’s concept of *Lebensraum*, Iimoto argued that conflicts surrounding living space mainly take a form of racial conflict.¹¹ In the 1928 essay “The Concept of So-called Geopolitics,”¹² Iimoto introduced the general stream of Western geopolitics. Central to his thinking was the fact that through the lens of geopolitics Western geographers were engaging with state theories that had previously been the realm of the social sciences. Given that geography in Japan at the time was being led by natural scientific approaches, geology in particular, Iimoto’s observation is revealing. In short, his introduction of geopolitics or political geography as part of the social sciences was partly an attempt to expand the scope of geography in Japan to the realm of the social sciences so that geographers could intervene in social and national issues.

More importantly, Iimoto’s conceptualization of geopolitics was grounded in the

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¹⁰ Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatsu (1)” *Chirigaku hyōron* 1, no.9 (Sep 1925), pp. 16-37; Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatsu (2),” *Chirigaku hyōron* 1, no.10 (Oct 1925), pp. 955-967; Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatsu (3),” *Chirigaku hyōron* 2, no.1 (Jan 1926), pp. 47-60.

¹¹ Iimoto Nobuyuki, “Jinshutōsei no jijitu to chiseigakuteki kōsatsu (1),” pp.21-23.

geographical configuration of the world based on racial constitution. However, his understanding of race was not concerned with simply acknowledging physical and social differences among races. He instead argued that geopolitics based on Western racism had served to constitute and justify the geography of white supremacy.

Devoting more than half of the articles to analyzing various forms of Western racist ideologies, Iimoto emphasized that Western powers had discriminated against both the Chinese and Japanese people. In other words, while Western geographers, German intellectuals in particular, were developing geopolitical thinking to criticize the existing world order dominated by “liberal democratic” powers within Europe, Iimoto’s approach to geopolitics in fact took on the schematic form of a dichotomy between the West as a victimizer and the East as the victimized. However, it should not be overlooked that in this strategic division of the world from a racial perspective, Iimoto was simply ignoring Japan’s colonization of fellow Asian countries. In short, when it was first introduced to Japan, it was politically appropriated by Japanese intellectuals to justify their double stance of situating Japan as a victim which belong to the “have-not” countries in the international order, and at the same time reinforcing Japan’s hegemony over the rest of Asia.

While geographical thinking was not widely accepted by Japanese geographers in the 1920s, the field of geography itself was developing both qualitatively and quantitatively. The geography lecture at Kyoto University, which was first separated from the Department of History in 1907, gained status as an independent department in 1913. It is highly conceivable that Iimoto’s understanding of geopolitics was nurtured by the general social and political trend of 1920s Japan, when the issue of racism emerged as an important topic both in real politics and in the academia. The year 1925, when Iimoto’s articles were published, was a year after the Immigration Act to restrict the Japanese immigration to the United States was passed by the United States government. Iimoto actually contributed three articles in 1925 and 1926. He briefly analyzed Western geopolitics and political geography in the first article and focused on criticizing Western racism against Asian races in the second and third articles.
1917. Professor Ogawa Takuji 小川琢治 (1870-1941), one of its founding members of the geography lecture, went on to establish the Geology and Mineralogy Lecture in the School of Natural Science in 1921. With the establishment of the department, geography studies at Kyoto Imperial University were led by Ishibashi Gorō 石橋五郎 (1877-1946) and his human geographical approach. Ishibashi, together with graduates of the history department, organized a research group, Shigaku-chirigaku dōsōkai 史学-地理学同窓会(Association of History and Geography Studies), in 1915 and published the journal History and Geography (歴史と地理) and in 1932, the Kyoto geography department began publishing its major journal, Journal of Geography (地理論叢).16

At Tokyo Imperial University, geography was first launched as an independent discipline in 1919, two years after the department of geography at Kyoto University was formed, but the speed and scale of its expansion was comparable to that of the Kyoto geography department. In addition to the general trend that geography was gradually obtaining the status of an independent academic department, Tokyo had another reason to intensify its geography research. The Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 fueled the idea that thorough geography studies could contribute to the “physical” stability of the Japanese nation-state.17 On the other hand, while Kyoto’s geography department was focusing on establishing its own scholarship, independent of the influence of the geography studies at Tokyo, Tokyo’s geography studies focused on

16 Ibid.
17 Ishida Ryūjirō, “Meiji-taishōkino nihon no chirigakkainoshisōtekidōkō,” Chirigaku hyōron 44, no.8 (Aug 1971), p. 545. The 1919 Tokyo Imperial University Act stated reasons for establishing an independent geography department: (1) Geography can vividly show the international order and its applied fields are not small (2) Geography in Western universities has already been producing its own students, therefore it is imperative that Japan also produces geography specialists. Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi henshu iinkai ed., Tokyo daigaku hyakunenshi 5 (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1984), p. 604.
representing Japanese geography as a whole. Yamazaki Naokata 山崎直方 (1870-1929), Professor of Geography at Tokyo University and often called the father of modern Japanese geography, organized a research group, Chiri dōsōkai 地理同窓会 (Club of Geography) and in 1923, the year of the Kanto Earthquake, founded and became president of a nation-wide research association, Association of Japanese Geographers (日本地理学会, hereafter AJG).\(^{18}\)

The development of geography studies in both Tokyo and Kyoto fostered the spread of the geopolitical thinking that would come later, but it is important to note that there existed regional as well as theoretical tension between the two leading institutions. A glimpse at the process of the establishment of the AJG shows the degree of tension between Kyoto and Tokyo. Although the Association of Japanese Geographers, as its name signifies, was aimed at representing geography studies in Japan, its cadre of researchers was from the beginning ‘geographically’ limited to the Kanto area. Of the 49 founding members of the AJG, most members were geography researchers at universities or high school teachers whose regional base was the Tokyo area. As a matter of fact, the division of geography studies in the 1920s was already accepted as a fait accompli by Tokyo-based geographers. According to the 50\(^{\text{th}}\) anniversary publication of the AJG in 1975, the establishment of the AJG and its own journal, The Geographical Review (地理學評論), was a result of competition between the two institutions. Geographers in the Tokyo area had in common the sense that in order to compete with the geography studies at Kyoto, which was on the rise and already publishing its own journal in the mid 1920s, it was necessary to found a sizable research organization as well as an academic journal in Tokyo.\(^{19}\) Since the mid 1920s, the AJG gradually extended its membership and academic influence in Japanese

\(^{18}\) It seems to be correct to translate Nihon chiri gakkai into the Association of Japanese Geography, but I follow the official English title provided by the association.

geography, but there was no intellectual exchange between Kyoto and Tokyo aside from a few articles contributed to *The Geographical Review* by Professor Ishibashi Goro, who was teaching at Kyoto but was a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University.  

The tension increased as both institutions started directing their research toward the realm of geopolitics. The influx of geopolitical thinking on the one hand played a role in creating a social scientific approach for geography, which had long been conceived of as part of the humanities, but in the case of the Tokyo and Kyoto geography departments, geopolitics, intentionally or unintentionally, became a barometer that now revealed the differences in their research. The Kyoto geography department’s endeavors to establish its own scholarship marked a turning point as Komaki Saneshige 小牧実繁 (1898-1990), Kyoto’s own Professor of Geography, rapidly directed the department’s research from the field of geopolitics in the mid-1930s.  

Around the same time, geopolitical thinking was gradually gaining currency for social scientists in Tokyo, but Komaki made it clear from the beginning that Kyoto’s geopolitics was fundamentally different from either Tokyo’s or Western geopolitics. This difference was due in large part to the academic trend surrounding a social organist perspective. Geopolitical thinking itself was heavily influenced by the organist notion of viewing space, people and most importantly the state as a social construct, and this notion of geopolitics did not come as something new to social scientists in Tokyo.  

Iizuka Kōji 飯塚浩二 (1906-1970), an economist and Tokyo University Professor of Geography, contended in his 1942 and 1943 articles in *Keizaigaku ronshū* 経済学論集 that the distinction between geography and geopolitics lay in whether or not researchers

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20 Ibid., p.19.  
would accept organist theory. As is well known, at Tokyo Imperial University this organist perspective, or “organ theory” as it is often called, not only became increasingly popular among geographers but had already been widely accepted by social scientists as a major social and political theory. Minobe Tasukichi 美濃部達吉 (1873-1948), a legal scholar and Professor of Law at Tokyo University, introduced organ theory as early as the 1910s and boldly attempted to redefine the emperor system as part of the state organ system. Not surprisingly, his organist perspective was criticized by other social socialists and ultra-nationalist activists, and he was forced to resign from the House of Peers in 1936, when this ultra-rightist movement reached its apex with the outbreak of the February 26 Incident. However, these fierce responses to Minobe’s organ theory paradoxically showed that an organist perspective was at least widely accepted in academia. In contrast, geographers at Kyoto University were more concerned with the philosophical tradition that had been established by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, which showed salient differences from the organist approach. In short, the regional and theoretical differences between the leading geography institutions failed to find a middle ground, and this lack of a compromise was important in the formation of multiple approaches to the mapping and constructing of East Asian space during the wartime period.

In spite of the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two leading geography institutions in their developing geopolitical thought, Japan’s rapidly changing position in the international order called for the birth of a new spatial thinking.

22 Iizuka Kōji, “Geopolitikuno kihontekiseigaku (1),” *Keizaigaku Ronshū* 12, no. 8 (Aug 1942), pp.56-84. Iizuka’s articles were published in three times. The second and third part of his articles appeared in *Keizaigaku Ronshū* 13, no.3 (March 1943) and *Keizaigaku Ronshū* 13, no.5 (May 1943) respectively.

23 Minobe finally resigned from the House of Peers in 1936, when his organist perspective was severely attacked by ultra-rightists who attempted to restore the Emperor as the central political authority. As Andrew Gordon correctly points out, the purge of Minobe and his “conservative” political theory symbolized Japan’s rapid move toward a fascist society. See Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present* (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.198-199.
Japan’s contradictory position in the League of Nations as the third largest country in naval power, which, at the same time, constantly represented itself as belonging to the ‘have-not’ nations was reaching a dead end. With the outbreak of the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Japan made it clear that it would continue territorial expansion in mainland China. Under severe criticism by major European powers in the League of Nations for this premeditated violence, Japan finally withdrew its membership from the League of Nations in 1933. Japan’s withdrawal from the most powerful international organization was passionately welcomed by both the masses and the media in Japan proper. At the same time, it provided a whole new intellectual sphere for Japanese intellectuals, who were now placed in the position of having to create their own theory of the international order that could replace the existing League of Nations system, which they themselves had long criticized.

Under these circumstances, the issues of internationalism and nationalism temporarily gained currency among Japanese intellectuals who in the 1910s and 1920s were focusing their attention on domestic issues represented by the minponshugi debate. Sociologist Takata Yasuma, for example, argued that although nationalism is not necessarily antagonistic to internationalism, in Japan’s current position in the Euro-

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24 Japan’s position as the third largest country in naval power was the result of the Washington Naval Conference held from November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922. The main purpose of the conference was to restrict the leading countries’ naval power, which emerged as the main threat to international peace during World War I. As a result, it was determined that the US, Britain and Japan were allowed to maintain battleships in a ratio of 5:5:3 tons respectively. The Washington conference was followed by a series of naval conferences in the 1920s, at which Japanese military leaders asked for equal status with the US, arguing Japan’s ‘have-not’ position in the international order. See Sadao Asada, “From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921-1930,” in Erik Goldstein and John Maurer eds., The Washington Conference 1921-1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Ilford: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 147-191.

centric international order, internationalism should be understood as reinforcing self-
protecting power.\textsuperscript{26} However, the debate over internationalism and nationalism in most
cases took place on an abstract level without producing sophisticated arguments. In this
sense, finding a middle ground between internationalism and Japan’s hegemony in East
Asia may have been too difficult a task for Japanese social scientists who had borrowed
most of their intellectual frameworks from the West but had not developed their own
perspective for interpreting international politics.

**Karl Haushofer and the Rise of Japanese Geopolitics**

Geopolitical thinking, once introduced to Japan by several geographers in the 1920s but
ironically utilized with a view toward criticizing Western racism toward Asian races,
started gaining attention now from different perspectives by Japanese scholars. This
time the widespread influx of geopolitics in Japan took place rapidly. Not only
intellectuals but also the government came to the forefront in introducing geopolitical
thinking. Many works on geography and geopolitics translated into Japanese were
financially and institutionally supported by the Japanese government,\textsuperscript{27} and among a
number of Western specialists in geopolitics, the presence of the German geographer
and politician Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) became especially important in Japanese
academia beginning in the late 1930s.

It was quite understandable that Japanese intellectuals were willing to accept social
scientific studies produced in Germany, given that Germany was the single most

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{26} Takata Yasuma, “Sekaishugi to minzokushugi,” *Keizai ōrai* (November 1934), in Takata Yasuma,

\footnote{27} The publication of twelve-volume work entitled *Shin doitsu kokka taikei* best exemplifies the massive
influx of German state theories into Japan. Importantly, one chapter in Volume 3 was dedicated to
introducing Karl Haushofer’s geopolitics. Satō Hiroshi, Professor of Economics at Tokyo University of
Commerce, and Ezawa Jōji, Lecturer at Tokyo University of Commerce, participated in this project. See,
Satō Hiroshi and Ezawa Jōji, “Chiseigakuteki kīte,” in Futara Yoshinori ed., *Shin Doitsu kokka taikei; dai
\end{footnotes}
influential country for Japanese intellectuals, and that they had imported modern knowledge and technologies from Germany beginning in the mid 19th century.

Moreover, since both Germany and Japan, in spite of their different concepts of the world, were searching for an alternative international order, especially in the mid and late 1930s, Japanese intellectuals were eager to accept this new spatial theory.

However, the somewhat overheated interest in Japan in Haushofer’s geopolitics leaves much room for further discussion. A glimpse at the successive translations of Haushofer’s major works gives us a picture of how rapidly he emerged as an influential scholar in Japanese academia. In particular, his *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) was translated and introduced in three different versions in 1940, 1942 and 1944 respectively. Most works on geopolitics produced by Japanese intellectuals commonly placed Haushofer as a symbolic figure who upgraded geopolitics from a subfield of geography or political science to an independent academic discipline. However, it is not my intention to say that Karl Haushofer was the only Western intellectual who had a major impact on Japanese intellectuals producing East Asian discourses. Yet I also argue that limiting Haushofer’s

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28 The Japanese translation of Haushofer’s works was concentrated between 1940 and 1944. The following are Japanese titles of Haushofer’s works on geopolitics and Japan: Taiheiyō no Chiseigaku 太平洋の地政学 (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) (1940, 1942); Gendai Eikokuron 現代英国論 (A Study on Modern Britain) (1940); Chiseigaku no kiso riron 地政学の基礎理論 (Basic Theories of Geopolitics) (1941); Chiseigaku nyūmon 地政学入門 (1941); Semeiken to Sekaikan 生命圈の世界観 (Life and Living Sphere) (1942); Nihon 日本 (Japan) (1942); Taikoku seiijō to kaiyō seiijō 大陸政治と海洋政治 (Land Politics and Sea Politics) (1943); Dainihon 大日本 (Greater Japan) (1943); Nihon no kokka kensetsu 日本の国家建設 (Japan’s Nation Building) (1943).

29 Haushofer’s *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* was first published in Germany in 1924 and republished in 1938. Its first Japanese translation appeared in 1940 by Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai entitled Taiheiyō Chiseigaku (2 Vols), and was followed by the translation of Taiheiyō Kyōkai with a slightly different title, Taiheiyō Chiseigaku, in 1942. The third version, in 1944, was not a direct translation but an introductory book to Haushofer’s *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozean*. See Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai, Taiheiyō Chiseigaku: Chiri rekishi sōgō kankei no kenkyū (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean: A Study on the General Relations between Geography and History) (Tokyo, Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai, 1940) 2 Vols; Taiheiyō Kyōkai trans., Taiheiyō Chiseigaku (Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1942); Sato Sōichirō, Haushoferu no taiheiyō chiseigaku kaisetsu (An Introduction to Karl Haushofer’s Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean) (Tokyo: Taiheiyō gakkō rokkoshuppanbu, 1944).
influence to the narrow scope of geography would hide more important issues in the intellectual legacy of Japanese imperialism. Notably, Japanese intellectuals’ first encounter with geopolitics, as I have discussed, took place when they recognized geopolitics as part of the social sciences. Haushofer was not simply content to reiterate the statement that geopolitics also belongs to the social sciences. For him, geopolitics was an intellectual weapon by which he could redefine the basic concepts of the social sciences so that social scientists were able to produce imperial knowledge in a more scientific and systematic way.

How did Haushofer obtain the title of the father of geopolitics, challenging the previous generation of geographers and political scientists such as Rudolf Kjellen and Friedrich Ratzel? More broadly, given that his geopolitical thinking was expanding its influence beyond the border of geography, what made his social scientific approach so distinct as to penetrate the mindset of Japanese intellectuals? The following statement, if not complete, would supply us with an important clue in understanding the structure of his social scientific thinking:

Politics can be, as it were, broadly defined as conflict about the exchange, acquisition and maintenance of power surrounding the surface of the world. Politics has the meaning that it has been created in a humanistic sense... At the same time it is tacitly accompanied by techne, that is to say, technology in politics. To be sure, as the example of geo (地: land) succinctly shows, things accumulated (either scientifically or practically) by knowledge on land and soil must be prepared for the preconditions for political techne.\textsuperscript{30} (Emphasis added)

Haushofer here makes a provocative statement regarding how the social sciences should cope with the crisis in the modern international system. He attempted to differentiate political science from political technology, and argued that the latter

responded to the demands for a new political thinking. However, what was more striking in his new approach to the social sciences was that the notion of *techne*, or technology in a broader sense, was not accompanied by the notion of objectivity as it had been for most social scientists. The importance and necessity of political technology, Haushofer contended, lay in its highly subjective nature. He asserted that “[T]hings necessary for people who are eager to develop geopolitics are not just knowledge related to it but *superiority* in human nature."

Accordingly, his geopolitics was now newly defined as a discipline not just to deal with spatial knowledge in a political sense but also to challenge the essential question of objectivity in the social sciences. His overthrow of the existing thinking in the social sciences through geopolitics reached its apex when he remarked on the temporality of geopolitics:

> The scientific policies of the Allies, history, international law and eventually law, all these things should not be limited to merely elucidating the past. (a number of political geographers were limited to this) These things must strive to construct a spiritual structure (=geopolitics) in order to contribute to the courage of going forward and venturing toward the future.\(^32\) (Emphasis added)

Futurity, as Haushofer emphasized, emerges as the locus for consolidating space and temporality in social scientific thinking. It is of course true that the existing social scientific disciplines did not neglect the notion of temporality. However, Haushofer contended that temporality in what he called scientific knowledge is no more than the representation of the past, and it therefore lacks insight into both where we exist

\(^31\) Ibid., p.54. Notably, the notion of technology in thinking about the dialectics between material and human beings’ labor and between subjectivity and objectivity was gaining attention from Japanese intellectuals. For example, Aikawa Haruki, a leading Koza -faction Marxist, and Tosaka Jun were developing debates on technology. For an extensive study of discourses on technology in wartime Japan, see Aaron Moore, “The Technological Imaginary of Imperial Japan, 1931-1945,” Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2006.

\(^32\) Karl Haushofer, trans., Tamaki Hajime, *Chiseijigaku no kiso riron*, p.63.
spatially now and how we can predict the future. For this reason, geopolitics could and should be, according to Haushofer, a spiritual structure to restore the integrity of space and temporality in social scientific thinking. Yet it is important to keep in mind that futurity in geopolitics is not determined only by scientific knowledge, but rests on human beings’ subjective resolution through political techne.

It is not surprising that Haushofer’s bifurcation between subjectivity and objectivity in the social sciences was criticized and rejected by Japanese social scientists. They had firmly believed in the objectivity of social scientific thinking, but Haushofer’s perception also paved the way for Japanese intellectuals who had been overwhelmed by the perception that “Western” social sciences were characterized by scientific objectivity. In particular, it had a tremendous impact on intellectuals who were grappling with the question of how to theorize and rationalize East Asian Space, keeping a distance from Euro-centric scholarship. As I shall discuss later, in this respect the coming of rationalist geopolitics to Japan was not just a strategic acceptance of a strain of anti-Euro-centric thinking within Europe, but was also an example of how and in what context Japanese social scientists were dominated by an oversimplification of objectivity and were directly facing the long-standing question of the West as universal and Japan or the East as particularistic.33

Haushofer’s radical theorization of geopolitics as an alternative to the geopolitical constitution of the existing international order provided Japanese intellectuals with a favorable basis for their search for a political and geographical theory to replace what they called the Euro-centric international order. However, insofar as this geopolitical theory and social scientific approach originated in the West, the impending question of

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how to rationalize or theorize East Asian space could not be fully resolved by the
theories of Haushofer. Various Asian discourses during the wartime period, despite
having had somewhat different visions of empire, took on the form of a regional
community. In the context of spatial thinking, the question remained unanswered is to
whether or not Western geopolitics could pave the way for constructing an East Asian
space where Asian subjects are encapsulated under the banner of a multi-ethnic and
multi-cultural empire

In addition to his application of scientific knowledge to the world, Haushofer had
one more distinction that made him stand out among other Western specialists in
geopolitics. Together with his geopolitical research, what captured the attention of
Japanese intellectuals was his extensive understanding of Japanese history and culture.
The degree of Haushofer’s understanding of Japan simply surpassed that of other
Western scholars and this was largely due to his 18-month stay in East Asia between
1909 and 1910.\(^3^4\) Interestingly, his first book-length publication, *Dainihon* 大日本, as
well as his doctoral dissertation in 1914 were not works about geopolitics but works on
Japan.\(^3^5\) This meant that his later interest in Japan and the Pacific Ocean was not just a
mechanical application of Euro-centric theories to a case study of Asia, as was much of
the Western scholarship at this time.\(^3^6\) This was the main reason for the popularity and

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\(^3^4\) Haushofer travelled to Japan, Korea and Manchuria as a military observer of the Bavarian Army.
Christian Spang, “Karl Haushofer Reexamined: Geopolitics as a Factor of Japanese-German
Rapprochement in the Inter-war Years,” in Christian Spang and Rolf Harald Wippich eds., *Japanese-
German Relations, 1895-1945 War and Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 139-140.

\(^3^5\) Karl Haushofer, *Dai Nihon; Betrachtungen über Gross-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft*
(Berlin: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1913). This work was translated into Japanese in 1942. Wakai Rinichi, *Dai

\(^3^6\) Alfred Mahan’s writings on East Asia are one example of how Western geographers viewed and
situated Asia in their geopolitical thinking. Mahan predicted that Japan, together with Russia, would
threaten American hegemony. Mahan’s analysis was based on his famous geopolitical theory of sea power
and land power. According to him, countries that acquired sea power first would take the initiative in the
world order, and Japan was one of the nations which had geographical access to sea power. But Mahan’s
writings on East Asia were highly strategic and observational, not based on actual and empirical
knowledge. See Alfred Mahan, *The Problem of Asia and its Effect on International Polices* (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1900).
extensive translation of Haushofer’s books in Japan.\(^{37}\)

Haushofer’s observations of Japan and his later writings basically viewed Japan as a country with great potential for development in a geopolitical sense. What made Haushofer’s encounter with Japan distinct was his peculiar emphasis on Japan’s spiritual side. He explained Japan’s successful modernization in terms of its balance between technology and spirit. He also argued that precisely because of the presence of the Imperial Spirit, Japan could maintain distance from what he called the flooding of individualism and liberalism that he believed was destroying European society.\(^ {38}\) To be sure, many Western intellectuals showed interest in Japan’s “success” in modernization. However, their interpretation of Japan’s emergence in the international order was mainly concerned with how faithfully Japan had accepted Western knowledge and technologies. In contrast, Haushofer paid attention to the spiritual aspect of Japanese culture and importantly, this notion corresponded to his later work on geopolitics, which emphasized a spiritual structure. For this reason, it is not hard to understand why Haushofer’s presence was essential in wartime Japanese geopolitics as well as in cementing diplomatic relations between Japan and Germany during the wartime period.\(^ {39}\)

Presumably Haushofer’s peculiar interest in Japan paved the way for Japanese intellectuals’ willingness to accept his geopolitical thinking. Nonetheless, it does not fully answer the question of how his geopolitics could be transformed into an ‘Asian’ geopolitics, or ‘Japanese’ geopolitics. This inquiry becomes even more complex considering that most of his writings on Japan were first published in German in the

\(^{37}\) A complete list of Haushofer’s writings on Japan can be found in Christian Spang, Ishi Shokai trans., “Karuhaushofarto nihon no chiseigaku: daiichijisekai daisengo no nichitokukankei no nakade,” Kūkan, shakai, chirisishō 6 (2001), pp.2-21.

\(^{38}\) Karl Haushofer, trans., Wakai Rinichi, Dai Nihon, pp.167-228.

1910s and 1920s, and strategically translated into Japanese in the wartime period. This difference of some 20 years could be understood as the typical gap between the production of knowledge in the West and its introduction to Japan.\textsuperscript{40} However, in the case of Haushofer, that would be an oversimplification, since geopolitical thinking started to gain currency in Japan in the 1930s, when Japan invaded northern China and withdrew from the League of Nations. However, in spite of his in-depth understanding of Japanese history and culture, Haushofer’s geopolitics had some theoretical characteristics that were not compatible with Japan’s geopolitical position. Most of all, since Haushofer’s geopolitics developed in Germany, where the nation state simply consisted of a single German minzoku, it was hardly possible to find in his geopolitics any theoretical speculations on the relationship between the state and nation (minzoku). To put it another way, he was more concerned with how the state should mobilize people from an organist perspective than with whether or not the association between the state and nation could be possible through geopolitical thinking.

What was at stake for Japanese geographers and social scientists was the question of whether it was possible to create a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural imperial space through geopolitical thinking. In summary, I argue that Haushofer’s importance in the Japan of the late 1930s and early 1940s can be characterized by two salient points. First, his peculiar understanding of geopolitics and social sciences expanded the scope of geography in Japan and heavily influenced Japanese social scientists who had a firm faith in the objectivity of the social sciences. On the other hand, his organist approach to geopolitics based on the nation-state and ethnicity provided Japanese social scientists with another challenge to the construction of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural East

\textsuperscript{40} For a quantitative study of Japanese students’ study in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, see Kato Tetsuro, “Personal contacts in Japanese-German cultural relations during the 1920s and early 1930s,” in Christian Spang and Rolf Harald Wippich eds., Japanese-German Relations, 1895-1945 War and Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 119-138.
Asian empire. In other words, the question was whether or not Japanese social scientists could establish a subjective Pan-Asian geopolitics, overcoming Western geopolitics as well as the universalism of Western social sciences.

The Kyoto School of Geography

As I have discussed, social scientists and geographers in the Tokyo area took the initiative in introducing Western geopolitical thinking. However, it was geographers in Kyoto who first addressed “Japanese” or “East Asian” geopolitics. As a matter of fact, it was not just the Department of Geography at Kyoto that was grappling with the notion of an “Asianized” spatial discourse. Some philosophers at Kyoto, later called the Kyoto School of Philosophy, were also focusing their attention on this issue. In particular, Watsuji Tetsurō 和辻哲郎 (1889-1960), one of the founding members of the Kyoto School of Philosophy, and his 1935 book Fūdo 風土 (Climate) directly touched upon the question of how space and human beings living in space should be defined. 41 Watsuji’s philosophical approach to the notion of spatiality was based on his observation that the ontological question of what it means to be a human being is not only a matter of social and historical concern but, more importantly, is a matter of geographical and environmental import. In other words, Watsuji’s search for subjectivity as a philosopher marked a turning point in his encounter with the notion of spatiality and his discovery of East Asia as an ontological space vis-à-vis the West.42

Kyoto geographers’ bold move in the process of developing Japanese geopolitics

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42 For Watsuji’s turn to spatiality and East Asian space, Naoki Sakai argues as follows: “Imitating the restorationist move in the West toward Eurocentricity, which was to a great extent motivated by an anxiety concerning the putative loss of the West’s superiority over the non-West in the 1930s and which found its cumulative expression in the obsessive emphasis on the idea of the distinctiveness of the West and on the separationist distinction of “we the West” from the rest of the world, Watsuji seemed to produce an equally ethnocentric move toward the East,” see Naoki Sakai, Translation and Subjectivity : On “Japan” and Cultural Nationalism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p.91.
is traceable to the mid 1930s. Komaki Saneshige, one of the first of Kyoto’s own PhDs in geography, took the position of assistant professor in the Department of Geography in 1931. With the appointment of Komaki, geography studies at Kyoto established an academic basis for creating original scholarship, yet his emergence also foreshadowed the ever-present tension between the Tokyo and Kyoto geography departments.

Originally trained in both human geography and geology under the instruction of Ishibashi Goro, who obtained a PhD at Tokyo University and resigned from his professorship at Kyoto shortly after Komaki was appointed as a professor, Komaki accelerated his move toward the world of geopolitics. Clearly aware of the tension between his position at Kyoto and its rival Tokyo University, Komaki’s engagement with geopolitics began with a criticism of Western geopolitics and an association of his geopolitical theory with the Imperial Way:

German geopolitics started by defining the state as an acting power. Insofar as it was created in the West, it is not strange for us to witness from this the manifestation of Western imperialism. For this reason, it is natural that such scholarship cannot permanently satisfy us. Our eventual purpose is to declare the Imperial Way in the world and to realize the spirit of the Hakkō Ichiū 八紘一宇 (eight corners of the world under one roof) in Japan’s world.

Komaki’s somewhat provocative remark toward what he called a kind of rationalist geopolitics that unequivocally indicated Tokyo-centered geopolitical research foresaw his next steps toward the so-called Kyoto geopolitics. However, simply charging geopolitics in Tokyo with being a replica of Western geopolitics does not elucidate the real academic theoretical between the two geography institutions in serious rivalry. Furthermore, as I have discussed, it is a mistake to characterize the encounter of

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43 Kyoto daigaku chirigaku kyōshitsu, Chirigaku kyōto no hyakunen (Kyoto : Nakanishiya shuppan, 2008), pp. 80-83.
Japanese social scientists with Western geography as parasitic on Western scholarship. What, then, distinguished Kyoto’s geopolitical perspective from that of Tokyo or Western geopolitics? If Kyoto’s geopolitics attempted to distinguish itself from an organist perspective at the outset, what constituted the methodological and epistemological backbone of Kyoto geography?

In Tōa chiseigaku josetsu (東亜地政学序説, Introduction to East Asian Geopolitics), Yonekura Jirō, Komaki’s own student and one of the main members of the Kyoto School of Geography, provided an interesting framework for geography. He conceptualized geography as a science to examine the world where the society of species spatially coexists. In addition to being the statement of a geographer who unquestionably regarded geography as a “science,” what was more striking in this comment was Yonekura’s peculiar introduction of the notion of species in geography. If geographical studies had already been redefined as a “social science” by Kyoto geographers, how, then, did the concept of species play an important role in shaping their politicized spatial discourses?

For Yonekura, the ultimate issue of geography must be the question of how geography could and should respond to the question of the unity between space and human beings. In order to respond to this question, however, Yonekura did not turn to the determinist perspective in viewing space as a given and the human being as a passive actor in relation to space. He instead paid special attention to the notion of dialectics. By focusing on the interplay between space and human beings, Yonekura attempted to redefine space in terms of objectivity and subjectivity. Needless to say, his dialectics and the configuration of subjectivity and objectivity did not operate based on a simple schema that equated space with objectivity and individuals with subjectivity.

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46 Ibid.
Yonekura contended that as Hegel’s dialectics vividly showed, dialectic thinking in the Western philosophical tradition had often resulted in neglecting the importance of space in its excessive dependence on the state both as the reason and as a medium between subjectivity and objectivity. In contrast to Western dialectics, Yonekura’s concepts of space and spatial dialectics were centered on redefining space as a sphere where the interplay and interrelation between space and human beings can take place. Space was on the one hand characterized by its objective nature against each individual, but insofar as space was a representation of each human being’s life, Yonekura argued, it should also be understood as an amalgam of multiple subjectivities. Therefore, the notion of the unity between space and human beings was naturally redefined, for Yonekura and other Kyoto geographers, as the question of how to resolve the conundrum of subjectivity and objectivity in human society. Here, Yonekura encountered the notion of species. He argued:

Species as a superior concept of nation [minzoku] is a broader concept of race including various nations. For example, in the case of what we call Asian races or European races, species as groups of nations preconditions Asian or European races that have Asia or Europe as their spatial ground. In addition, species have in common relatively similar characteristics through the proximity and similarity of residence and environment; therefore, they share a common destiny to cooperate and co-prosper.

As the statement above clearly shows, Yonekura’s search for spatial dialectics between human beings and nature bestowed the status of a medium between subjectivity and objectivity on the concept of species. Yonekura’s account of species is reminiscent of the theory of species developed by the Kyoto School of Philosophy, Tanabe Hajime 田邊元 (1885-1962) in particular. Not surprisingly, Yonekura acknowledged that his notion of dialectic space was formulated from his close readings of Tanabe and other

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48 Ibid., p.22.
49 Ibid., p.20.
50 Ibid., p.25.
Kyoto philosophers. It also implied that for Kyoto-based geographers, the schema of space was essential to their search for absolute dialectics, as Tanabe and the Kyoto School of Philosophy were grappling with the same question. This logic leads to a second question: How could space itself be dialectically conceptualized and how could the dialectics of space be possible in their search for Greater East Asian geopolitics?

Anti-Modern and Imperial-Way Geopolitics

As Komaki’s engagement with geopolitics intensified, the Department of Geography at Kyoto itself also emerged as a new center for geopolitical studies. After becoming a full professor in 1938, Komaki started to organize a research group focusing on geopolitics and another Kyoto School, the Kyoto School of Geography, was brought into being. With the confidence that came from being the leader of a school that included some 15 researchers and graduate students, Komaki boldly declared that the Kyoto School’s geopolitics were the only pure geopolitics that could realize the Imperial Spirit. Given that Kyoto’s geopolitics had been heavily influenced by the Kyoto School of Philosophy and had accordingly established a clear-cut binary formation of the East and the West, it was highly understandable that Komaki would turn to the notion of the Imperial Way.

However, it was not a simple distinction between the East and the West that

51 Ibid.
53 Although the exact number of researchers in the Kyoto School of Geography was not revealed, it can be estimated at approximately 15 researchers including Komaki himself. This number is based on the number of geographers who participated in a government-supported secret research group, the Yoshida Group, founded by Komaki Saneshige. See, Mizuuchi Toshio, “Tsusho “Yoshidano kai” ni yoru chiseigaku kanren shiryō,” Kikan, Shakai, Chiritsushō 6 (Osaka: Osaka siritu daigakko, 2001), pp. 59-112.
54 Komaki Saneshige, Nihon chiseigaku sengei (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1940), pp. 75-80.
constituted the backbone of Kyoto’s geopolitics. Komaki was convinced that by situating his Kyoto geopolitics within the spiritual arena of the Imperial Way, he could avoid the problem of social science becoming the slave of policy studies, or in Haushofer’s term, political techne.\textsuperscript{55} Importantly, while both Komaki and Haushofer emphasized spiritualism in their geopolitics, their understandings of spirit or the Imperial Spirit were quite different from one another. While spiritualism in Haushofer’s geopolitics was logically associated with the search for a subjective social science that would overcome the myth of objectivity in scientific thinking, Komaki’s turn to the Imperial Way was connected to a kind of essentialism, that is, to rescue the purity of Japan from the influx of tainted Western knowledge.

Just as he saw the Imperial Way the locus of East Asian geographies with which species in East Asia could be spiritually united, Komaki also paid attention to scientifically demonstrating that East Asian geographies in a physical sense were superior to the West and had the potential to integrate the East Asian people. Here it is important to note that Komaki did not simply attempt to search for an East Asian space by leaning on the conventional geo-environmental determinist notion that had attributed the creation of race to its geographical factors.\textsuperscript{56} Being conscious that human beings are creative creatures, Komaki redirected his question of spatial unity in East Asia as follows: How could people living in East Asia where there exist so many geographical dynamics eventually be united under the leadership of the Imperial Way?

Interestingly, according to this epistemological underpinning, the fact that East Asia was full of geographical dynamics that could be scientifically discovered did not become an obstacle to Komaki’s search for a dialectic unity in East Asia. Rather, he

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., pp. 78-79.

\textsuperscript{56} Komaki clearly differentiated race (\textit{jinshu}, 人種) from nation (\textit{minzoku}, 民族). While race is more subject to environmental and geographical factors, he contended that race just represents the geographical and inherent part in the creation of \textit{minzoku}. Thus he emphasized the necessity of \textit{minzoku} geography rather than racial geography. Komaki Saneshige, \textit{Minzoku chiri} (Tokyo: Chijinshōkan, 1937), pp.1-13.
believed that the diversity of environmental and racial constitutions could explain why East Asian space was superior to the West in a geographical and ethnic sense. In that sense Komaki was not most concerned with declaring that East Asia had existed in a form of perfect unification, rather, in accordance with the spirit of the Imperial Way, he focused on scientifically discovering a medium that could integrate such geographical diversity. He argued that the presence of the Pacific Ocean and its currents played an important role in integrating geographical characteristics and people in East Asia. Simply put, since the Pacific Ocean mediates the diverse characteristics of East Asian geographies, Komaki was concerned that East Asia as a spatial unit had the capability to embrace geographical differences and at the same time integrate them under the aegis of the Imperial Spirit.

One of the major concerns for the Kyoto School of Geography was theorizing East Asian geographies with a view toward shaping the scientific framework in East Asia for the precondition of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity space. Therefore, its next task was necessarily to discover the conditions for integrating people residing in East Asian space. However, the response to this search for an absolute dialectics between East Asian space and East Asian people had to be sought outside such inherent characteristics as blood and skin. Komaki himself reiterated in many of his writings that *minzoku* could not be created by simply sharing the same blood. If species is a superior concept of *minzoku* as well as a medium of unifying space and individuals, how could the concept of ‘East Asian people’ be established in Komaki’s geopolitics?

Concerning this issue, Komaki’s Greater East Asian geopolitics shows its fundamental difference from the so-called rationalist geopolitics or Haushofer’s geopolitics. As I have discussed, Haushofer called for an epistemological and

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58 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
methodological transformation by bringing a new notion of temporality to the social sciences. In other words, instead of leaning on a formula-laden future that is explicable as well as predictable in terms of social scientific objectivity, Haushofer paid special attention to the unpredictability of the future and the role of subjectified political technologies in driving people toward a common destiny. Komaki’s geopolitics also gave special attention to the notion of temporality, but in exactly the opposite manner. What captured Komaki’s attention was History. However, his notion of history was characteristic in that whereas history in a general sense signifies the accumulation of time, in Komaki’s theory of geopolitics, it was particularly concerned with how people had responded to challenges pertaining to space. Komaki believed that the issue of temporality and space could be the locus to differentiate East Asian space from Western space.

Both Komaki and Yonekura were convinced that the crisis in civilization was primarily responsible for destroying the possibilities for the unification of space and humans. To put it another way, by exerting too much artificial power over nature, Yonekura argued, European civilization had lost its spirit. Komaki also remarked “Europe’s discovery and colonization since the 18th century is in no way different from this tendency (toward spiritual destruction), and the development of science in Europe in fact has served for this.” Borrowing this time from the observations of Nishitani Keiji, a scholar of religion in the Kyoto School of Philosophy, Yonekura adamantly argued that the spiritual crisis caused by modernization could only be cured by restoring what he called three spirits – Nature, Reason and Religion.

Yonekura’s encounter with Nishitani’s historical analysis of European civilization came as no surprise, given that the philosophical base of the Kyoto geographers was

59 Yonekura, Tōa chiseigaku josetsu, p.12.
60 Komaki, Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daite, p. 38.
61 Yonekura, Tōa chiseigaku josetsu, p. 12.
derived mostly from their fellow Kyoto philosophers. Yet looking at their criticism
toward Western civilization from a geopolitical perspective, one could find that their
Imperial-Way geopolitics was now attempting to juxtapose East Asian space with the
West in the realm of modernization. The following remark by Komaki seems to give us
the clearest sense of how Kyoto’s geopolitical strategies of contrast operated:

[However] Asian *minzoku* has neither disobeyed nor resisted against nature. Rather, it has adored and been in accordance with nature. It has neither analyzed nor anatomized nature. Asian *minzoku* has never tried to overcome nature, but tried to make it alive. This is the *spirit of Asia*.  

(Emphasis added)

Needless to say, the ‘spirit’ that Komaki is praising for Asia *minzoku*’s loyalty to nature could only be realized and maximized by being subordinated to the spirit of the Emperor, as demonstrated by Japan’s capability for restoring its national polity since the 19th century following Europe’s exploitative invasion into East Asian space. Therefore, China and the Southern Seas were geopolitically redefined as a strategic area where Europe’s exploitive spirit and Asia’s Imperial spirit would collide.  

Interestingly, Komaki’s analysis is reminiscent of the notion of *Lebensraum* (Living space), which is the core concept of Western geopolitics. However, while *Lebensraum* in Western geopolitics was a concept that justified a nation’s territorial expansion into the future, Komaki’s East Asian space was constantly conceptualized as a return to the past. His bold ‘declaration’ of Japanese geopolitics in 1940 was repeated in 1942, yet this time with a new manifesto, *Dai azia no hukko ishin sengen* 大アジアの復古維新 宣言 (Greater Asia’s Declaration of Restoration).  

Once Asian space as well as Asian *minzoku* gained an independent and nature-friendly status in contrast to Western civilization and imperialism, how did the Kyoto...

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62 Komaki, *Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa*, p. 36.
63 Ibid.
School of Geography envision the economy of East Asian space? Komaki’s restorative (or reactionary) geopolitics now attempted to offer a spatial community in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity sphere. He viewed agriculture as the basis for communal living in East Asian space. Here his Imperial-Way geopolitics was closely associated with the traditional family system in East Asia.

In looking at the occupational constitution of the people of Greater East Asia, more than 50 percent of the Japanese, 60-70 percent of the Chinese, and over 90 percent of people in the rest of Asia are working in agriculture. In addition, due to environmental factors, agriculture in Greater East Asia is mostly irrigation agriculture. Without cooperation from family or village, managing this [irrigation agriculture] would be difficult. Society in Asia is based on the family system and it is for this reason that Asian society has permanently maintained a self-sufficient economy benefiting each ethnic group.

East Asian space, minzoku, and the Imperial Spirit, Komaki believed, could be most gloriously realized when they were combined with the family system and agriculture as its economic base. As Komaki himself emphasized, his search for an absolute dialectics in Japanese geopolitics would never become possible unless East Asian space was accompanied by a self-sufficient economic system.

**Kyoto Geopolitics’ Involvement in Total War**

Komaki’s sharp criticisms of Western and Tokyo-based geopolitics, as I have discussed, were based upon his firm belief that geographical studies should not be subordinated to the realm of technology. However, this did not mean that Komaki and the Kyoto School of Geography confined the scope of their research to the narrow space of the ivory tower. To begin with, Komaki deeply involved himself in the processes of

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propagandizing geopolitics through media and roundtable discussions. He was in a favorable position to come to the forefront in this ‘thought war.’ Koyama Iwao, a Kyoto School philosopher, focused on the necessity of ‘thought war’ in various writings and this peculiar intellectual trend was easily accepted by Komaki and the Kyoto geographers who were already familiar with the Kyoto School philosophers.

However, Komaki and Kyoto geopolitics were not content with this somewhat ‘traditional way’ of encountering the world outside the university.

Importantly, Komaki and his students established close ties with the army from an early stage in their geopolitics studies. According to the recently discovered documents on Kyoto geopolitics’ relationship with the army, their collaboration is traceable to late 1937, when Komaki had just launched geopolitical studies at Kyoto Imperial University. In response to a request from the Imperial Army, Komaki established a secret geopolitics research group later called “Yoshida no kai (吉田の会, The Yoshida Group).” This research group, whose real name is Sōgōchirikenkyukai (総合地理研究会, General Research Group of Geography), was actually established under the financial and political guidance of the Institute of National Defense (国防研究室).

Renting a private house near Kyoto Imperial University, Komaki and the Imperial Army continued this secret meeting and shared strategic geographic information on

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67 Komaki’s Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa was actually a compilation of his lectures to a Kyoto radio station between February 23, 1942 and February 28, 1942. Komaki Saneshige, Chiseigakujōyori mitaru daitōa, p.3. Komaki also actively engaged in the publication of books concerning the so-called thought war. See Komaki Saneshige, “Dai tōa no rinen,” in Dainihon genron hōkoku kyōkai ed., Seikaikan no tatakai (Tokyo: Dōmei tushinsha, 1944), pp. 204-233.
69 For example, Koyama’s article “Shinchitujō no dogisei” was also included along with Komaki’s in Seikaikan no tatakai.
71 Shibata Yōichi, “Ajia taiheiōsensoki no senryakukunyū ni okeru chirigakushano yakuwari-sōgōchirikenkyūkai to rikukunsanbohonbu,” Rekishichirigaku 49, no.5 (Dec 2007), pp.3-5. According to Shibata's research, the “Yoshida Group” received financial support from two different sources. One is Kōsenkai (皇戦会, The Imperial-War Group) that officers in the Imperial Army constructed and a private company, Showa Trade Company (昭和通商株式会社) was another.
battlefields and the colonies until the end of the war.\footnote{According to the studies of Mizuuchi and Shibata, Komaki and his students were able to accumulate books on geography and geopolitics and their volumes outnumbered those of the university library. Shibata, “Ajia taiheiyo sensoki no senryaku kenkyū ni okeru chirigakushin yakuwari - sōgōchirikenkyūkai to rikukunsanbohonbu,” pp. 6-7.}

Komaki and Kyoto geopolitics’ collaboration with the Imperial Army effectively undermines the notion that Komaki’s criticism of Karl Haushofer’s theory of geopolitics as a branch of policy studies was no more than meaningless rhetoric. More importantly, Kyoto geopolitics’ wartime studies of Asia and Southeast Asia as area studies became increasingly systematical and organized through their collaboration with the Imperial Army. Since the primary purpose of the “Yoshida Group” was to provide information on a region of interest to the army on a weekly or biweekly basis, Komaki and his research group were accordingly reorganized so that each member would focus on one or two specific regions. Their first collective work of 1943, entitled \textit{A New Discourse on East Asian Geopolitics} (大東亜地政学新論), clearly showed that Komaki’s geopolitics studies operated under a highly organized division of research.\footnote{Komaki Saneshige ed., \textit{Daitōa chiseigaku shinron} (Kyoto: Hoshino shoten, 1943). In this volume, except for Komaki’s introductory article, each contributor wrote an article on every region in East and Southeast Asia.} Although there were changes in the composition of the researcher team, this basic division of research remained intact until 1945.\footnote{Shibata, “Ajia taiheiyo sensoki no senryakukenkyū ni okeru chirigakushin yakuwari-sōgōchirikenkyūkai to rikukunsanbohonbu,” pp. 7-11.}

In addition, Komaki’s early connection to the Imperial Army might provide a clue as to why the Kyoto School of Geography developed close ties with the Imperial Army rather than the Navy. As I have discussed, Komaki emphasized the Pacific Ocean, which physically separates Asian space from that of Europe. Moreover, Komaki’s Imperial-Way geopolitics was unquestionably closer to the thinking of the Navy, which emphasized the Imperial Way more than the Army. Moreover, it has been widely accepted that the Kyoto School of Philosophy, by which Kyoto geopolitics was heavily
influenced, was closely connected to the Navy. I argue that Kyoto geopolitics’
collaboration with the Army that came in late 1938, when a full-scale war against China
was in progress and, accordingly, and the Kwantung Army was exerting a much more
powerful influence than the Navy. This could partly explain the conditions and reasons
for Komaki’s relationship with the Army. Finally, their somewhat peculiar
“honeymoon” terminated when the Army made its last request, which was to predict
where the US Air Force would bombard in Tokyo in 1945.75

Rationalist Geopolitics

While geographers at Kyoto University were advocating a spirit-oriented geopolitics
based on the Imperial Way, in what context was geopolitical thinking being developed
by social scientists in the Tokyo area? More importantly, how did Japanese social
scientists attempt to create a new geopolitical perspective of their own, overcoming the
influence of Western geopolitics characterized by Karl Haushofer?

From a quantitative standpoint, geopolitics in early 1940s Japan had already been
widely accepted as a major social theory. As many as 20 articles on geopolitics by
various social scientists appeared between 1937 and 1945 in Kaizō alone.76 Moreover,
as the translation of Haushofer’s works exemplifies, the wartime Japanese government
financially supported the spread of this spatial theory. However, the quantitative
expansion of geopolitics in Japan did not necessarily mean that geography studies, once
divided into two camps regarding geopolitics, eventually found a middle ground.
Komaki contributed a few articles to Kaizō, but other Kyoto School geographers hardly

75 Ōtake Tetsuya, “Heiyōchiri chōsa kenkyūkai ni tsuite,” Kūkan, shakai, chirishisō 4: gaisetsuhen

76 Takagi Akihiko, “An essay on geopolitical writings in the magazine Kaizō during the Asia-Pacific War
in Japan,” in Toshio Mizuuchi ed., Critical and Radical Geographies of the Social, the Spatial and the
Political (Osaka: Osaka City University Department of Geography Urban Research Plaza, 2006), pp. 51-
58.
participated in this journal.\textsuperscript{77}

This spread of the new spatial discourse eventually resulted in the establishment of both an independent geopolitics research group as well as a research journal. In November 1941, the Japanese Association of Geopolitics (hereafter JAG) was founded, led by Iimoto Nobuyuki, who had first introduced geopolitics to Japanese academia in the 1920s for the first time. While the JAG did not have a direct impact on the Association of Japanese Geographers, the existing national geography association, the rise of the JAG implied that geopolitics had now become a powerful ideological and theoretical weapon, accepted not only by geographers but also by social scientists in general. It also started publishing its own journal, \textit{Geopolitics} (地政学), beginning in January 1942, one month after the Pearl Harbor attack. The membership numbers of the JAG varied from year to year but around 50 people remained active until 1945. What was more conspicuous was its composition. College professors, high school teachers, researchers at government-funded institutions such as \textit{Tōa kenkyūsho} 東亜研究所, and generals and officers from the Army and the Navy alike were all involved in this new academic association, but no one from Komaki’s Kyoto school joined.\textsuperscript{78}

However, the fact that geopolitics was becoming a widespread and commonly discussed theory in wartime Japan makes it much harder to accurately determine the characteristics of what might be called Tokyo geopolitics. Komaki denounced it as rationalist-centered and thus a mere imitation of Western geopolitics. However, it remains unclear how rationalism became so closely intertwined with geopolitics. More importantly, it should not be overlooked that irrespective of the different intellectual

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid, p. 54. Komaki’s three articles appeared in 1942, 1943 and 1944.

\textsuperscript{78} It is noteworthy that officers from both the Navy and the Army participated in the JAG. Vice Admiral Ueda Yoshiki of the Imperial Army became president of the association, but a few high ranking officers from the Navy also joined it. More importantly, the JAG clearly stipulated in the “Mission of the Japanese Association of Geopolitics” that it should recognize the seas as the basis for the development of the Japanese nation, a position which bears a striking resemblance to Komaki’s emphasis on the Pacific Ocean. See “Sengei,” in \textit{Chiseigaku} 1, no.1 (Jan 1941).
camps in geopolitics, the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was universally espoused and eventually each and every work on geopolitics was aiming at realizing a co-prosperity space in Asia, which was most vividly depicted in Komaki’s Imperial-Way geopolitics. Based on these observations, I will examine the work of economic geographer Ezawa Jōji (1907-1975) and political scientist Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980), whose geopolitical thought can be seen as the locus of a rationalist extreme.

Born in 1907, Ezawa Jōji received his college education at Tokyo University of Commerce (present-day Hitotsubashi University), where the famous neo-Kantian philosopher Sōda Kiichirō (1881-1927) was teaching economic philosophy. After spending nearly 10 years in Germany, Soda introduced the concept of culture [kultur] to Japanese academia. Among the many issues in connection with which the so-called neo-Kantian philosophers studied, Soda was particularly interested in how intellectuals should cope with the crisis of culture triggered by rapid industrialization. For this reason, culture was reconceptualized by Soda not as a value parallel to politics and economics, but as a fundamental spirit that one must nurture in order to maintain independence from the state. Hence, “culturalism” was for Soda a series of activities to develop kyōyō (教養, bildung) for each individual.

Heavily influenced by Soda’s thought, which had shaped a mainstream perspective in economic philosophy at Tokyo University of Commerce, Ezawa began writing about German philosophy and culture in the 1930s. Just as Soda pointed out the dominance of industrialized nation-states over individual freedom and values, Ezawa vehemently criticized the notion that reason and rationalism had served only in the formation of a despotic nation-state. He pointed out that reason in the European intellectual tradition

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79 Sōda Kiichirō, Keizai tetsugaku no sho mondai (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1917).
took precedence over an individual’s various experiences with things.\(^{80}\) In other words, he contended that in the European philosophical tradition, individuals’ judgment of things is determined not by the images of their direct experiences with things but by the pure sense that already exists before experiences.\(^{81}\) He went on to argue that the state and the aristocratic class had defined reason and forced ordinary people to acknowledge its primacy, this highly abstract and exclusive process which he called rationalization seemingly provided a common value that everyone could share in the name of freedom and equality. However, it actually resulted in subordinating people’s social experiences with things to the narrow and standardized space called the “nation-state.”\(^{82}\) Ezawa’s observation later played an important role in developing his geopolitical thinking in relation to individuals’ experiences of subjectivity in space.

Ezawa’s highly “interdisciplinary” early writings on Western philosophy focused on the question of how he could make this theoretical framework more sophisticated in his later encounters with economic geography and eventually geopolitics. Rather than directly discussing geopolitics, Ezawa showed special interest in the field of economic geography, which had become popular among European intellectuals. His 1935 book *Theory of Economic Location* (経済地理学) was his first work in which he associated the economic philosophy that Soda introduced to Japan with geographical thinking. His primary concern centered on the question of how a new form of objectivity can be achieved if, as I have discussed, reason or rationality is merely a construct that the ruling class created to justify its political power. Hence, Ezawa argued that human beings’ efforts to obtain objectivity against nature as a *a priori* could be realized by conceptualizing nature as an object of negation.\(^{83}\)

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\(^{82}\) Ibid., p. 608.

Central to Ezawa’s early writings on the relationship between nature and human beings is the observation that conflict and collaboration form the basis of their interaction. In fact, Ezawa’s interest in economic geography was aimed at introducing the location theory of industry led by German economic geographer Alfred Weber, the younger brother of sociologist Max Weber. Translating Weber’s books into Japanese, Ezawa also developed a keen interest in how human beings could maximize economic profits by determining geographic locations that most efficiently maximize the economic effects of capital, raw materials, labor and transportation. For this reason, Ezawa was not content with the notion of living space (*Lebensraum*), the core concept of German geopolitics, which he believed to essentialize nature as a space where human beings are restricted to nature’s predominating power. Ezawa argued:

> The concept of living form (*Lebensform*) is a living that human beings experience in reality and it is preconditioned as an essential “meaning” before it is regarded as an object (*对像*). Insofar as it is understood as such, it cannot be said that it is an object of geopolitics. That it [living form] could be objectively represented as a living form is premised on the assumption that it conflicts with or resists against the other, or it is resisted by the other. In this case, *conflict, challenge and resistance become elements of negation in order for a living form to be objectified*.

This statement clearly shows that Ezawa basically conceptualized space as a place (*場所: basho*), where both experiences and the interaction of experiences take place. According to this observation, national territory was also conceptualized as the space where a group of people living in the state have shared their experiences. However, Ezawa argued that living within the same territorial boundary does not guarantee that

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people in the state have the same “objective” experiences. For this reason, Ezawa redefined the object of geopolitics as transforming these experiences into a certain type; that is, objectifying experiences. In this respect, Ezawa’s spatial thought presents a striking contrast to that of Komaki Saneshige, who searched for a middle ground between space and human beings in the spiritual mediation of the Imperial Way.

Furthermore, Ezawa’s observations of human beings as actors in space were substantially different from Komaki’s positioning of minzoku or species in space. Ezawa’s spatial theory is premised on the perception that objectifying or formalizing experiences is the process of transforming them into an objectified type. However, this process does not mean that minzoku or a special social group within the same spatial boundary is, too, objectified and positioned as a medium between nature and human beings. Ezawa instead insisted that minzoku cannot be objectified since it not only indicates sharing the same experiences in a certain space, but it is also a subject of voluntary activities. In other words, since minzoku is not necessarily restricted to a certain territorial border and the concept of minzoku pertains to the spatial as well as the temporal, the latter of which cannot be simply objectified, Ezawa held that in order to eventually comprehend the relationship between geography and history, which Haushofer himself termed a subfield of geopolitics, geopolitics should not simply be limited to the realm of objectification. In short, the main issue in Ezawa’s spatial theory was how to redirect the relationship between space and human beings in a futuristic sense rather than how to prove that a certain minzoku or species has an objectified spatial experience by returning to history as suggested by Komaki and Yonekura’s notion of species. Evidently, this question was not separable from the question of how to spatially conceptualize the ‘community of destiny’ among different

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86 Ezawa, Chiseigaku kenkyū, p.32.
87 Ibid., p.34.
Ezawa’s understanding of minzoku and temporality was a turning point where he attempted to redirect geopolitics from the realm of objectivity to subjectivity. How, then, could geopolitics intervene in the future as a subjective social science? It was at this point that Ezawa found validity in Haushofer’s geopolitics. Borrowing Haushofer’s statement that the aim of geopolitics is to predict the tendency of each group in the future and therefore it is not only an academic discipline but also a technology, Ezawa asserted that geopolitics enters the realm of “performative intuition” through a de-objectification process, and that this is how geopolitics encounters the future as temporality, distinguishing itself from other objective social sciences.  

It was not only Ezawa who penetrated this character of geopolitics as a subjective and intuitive science. The political scientist Rōyama Masamichi even argued that geopolitics was the first subjective social science:

The historical movement that shapes historical phenomena such as nation (国民) and minzoku has been the focus of a geopolitical approach […] Since historical examination is accompanied by value judgment, it has been said that there exists no objective reality in geopolitics. However, in contrast to the existing social sciences that have advocated objectivity and represented reality through formulation and fixation, it is interesting that geopolitics (in the social sciences) for the first time acknowledges subjectivity and also its characteristics as policy studies.  

Ezawa and Rōyama’s somewhat coincidental observations of geopolitics as a subjective social science entail several important questions. First, why is the notion of subjectivity such an important issue in examining the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Second, what role did the notion of subjectivity play in the making of Greater East Asian space? One possible answer might be that by emphasizing subjectivity and

88 Ibid., p.34
intuition in conceiving East Asian space, both Ezawa and Rōyama could re-conceptualize it as fundamentally unknown. To put it another way, any attempt to overcome the geographical determinism associated with Western racism must start by dislocating this geographical constitution of the world in the name of the East and the West. For this reason, geopolitics’ stance of approaching the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from a scientific perspective was paradoxical. As Rōyama himself indicated, “[T]he notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is still ambiguous in its grounds and content, and it is difficult to understand its origins.”

Geopolitics reconfirmed the ambiguity of this new East Asian discourse. However, the impossibility of demarcating the geographical border between the East and the rest of the world through objective social science ironically opened up new possibilities of subjectivity, thereby allowing geopolitics to emerge as an intellectual weapon for envisioning a new East Asian order.

It now became clear that for both Rōyama and Ezawa, geopolitics could be the kind of discipline that could provide an answer to the longstanding question of which regions or countries should be included and which should not in Greater East Asia. In what context could geopolitics play a role in envisioning the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere? More importantly, how did Rōyama and Ezawa theorize geopolitics in dealing with the issue of the economic gap between metropole and colony? In the pages that follow, I will explore the question of how the rationalist geopolitics developed by Ezawa and like-minded social scientists attempted to actually “rationalize” modernization and economic development in the colony as a driving force for constructing an East Asian empire.

**Space, Temporality and “Sphere”**

90 Ibid., p.363.
Henri Lefebvre has theorized space in his concept of spatial practice. According to him, space, a social construct, “embraces production and reproduction.” He observes that through this process of production and reproduction, some degree of cohesion between space and each member in a society takes place.\(^\text{91}\) To put it another way, the relationship between space and human beings is by no means static, and the capitalistic mode of production constantly intervenes in the process of human beings’ becoming spatial subjects.

Returning to Japanese social scientists’ discussion of empire building, I have argued in the previous chapters that these social scientists had a strong tendency to criticize individualism and capitalism. On the other hand, they also contrived the slogan of “overcoming modernity,” in which the logic of subjectivity formation was theorized in a highly abstract notion of negation and self-negation. Apart from assessing the validity of the notion of “overcoming modernity,” I argue that solving the issue of the economic gap between metropole and colony emerged as a central theme to convince colonial subjects of the historical necessity of creating a Japan-centered East Asian empire. The problem of economic imbalance was closely connected to the question of how spaces in the colony should be restructured and thus become a social space, where “some degree of cohesion” between metropole and colony takes place.

To solve this conundrum, Ezawa paid special attention to conceptualizing the term “sphere” in relation with temporality. As I have discussed, Ezawa basically theorized space as the location for individuals’ experiences and the proximity of experiences. Therefore, for Ezawa national land was a space where the objectification of experiences by people in a nation-state eventually takes place. However, this formulation of national territory as the objectification of experiences is always

accompanied by the process of the fixation of meanings.\textsuperscript{92} In other words, the threefold relationship of the state, national territory and people (minzoku) is predicated on the principle that people have the same and therefore objective experiences in the same space. However, when people share the same experiences, Ezawa contended, there is no guarantee that people in a nation-state will have the same destiny. Sharing the same past through the medium of space, national territory for instance, must be mediated again by a new space. In that respect, Ezawa conceptualized national territory as a place (basho, 場所).\textsuperscript{93}

Instead of focusing on the concept of basho, Ezawa was particularly concerned with the concept of “sphere” and its implications for the future. He was clearly aware that the creation of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity “Sphere” was not simply a matter of consolidating different national territories. Ezawa’s concern was how these geographical changes in national borders should be transformed into a new spatial consciousness that would allow people in a Greater East Asia to have the same spatial community of destiny. Hence, he insisted that a “sphere” be where the constant relationships between subjects and living forms (Lebensform) take place.\textsuperscript{94} However, he was also convinced that creating a co-prosperity “sphere” would be simply impossible unless people living in the “sphere” had a “stream of experiences” that pointed to the future. Precisely for this reason, he emphasized that the stream of experiences in the co-prosperity sphere should be directed toward sharing the same future instead of sharing the same past in the objectified and fixed border of national territories. In order for this concept of a “sphere” to operate constantly in the process of creating the stream of experiences, Ezawa maintained that the notion of living space (Lebensraum) should be substituted for the notion of reconstructing space.

\textsuperscript{92} Ezawa Jōji, Kokudo keikaku no kisoriron (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1941), pp.6-10.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p.8.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid., p.6.
(Raumordnung) and national territory plans.\textsuperscript{95}

Just as Rōyama emphasized that the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere should be a historical movement that transcends the border of nationalism,\textsuperscript{96} for Ezawa a ‘co-prosperity sphere’ would be impossible to create simply by scientifically analyzing natural conditions in East Asian space and consolidating them by the Imperial-Way as in Komaki’s Greater East Asian geopolitics. More importantly, his concept of Raumordnung, despite the concept’s origin in Europe, was not an East Asian version of Europe’s economic imperialism, which had geographically divided the world into several parts to maximize the exploitation of natural resources. In this respect, Ezawa’s attempts to connect the concept of Raumordnung to the notion of a co-prosperity sphere were fundamentally different from the theory of what might be called a bloc-economy, which aimed at consolidating East Asian space in the clear schematic division of Japan (Heavy Industry), Korea & Manchukuo (Agriculture & Heavy Industry) and Southeast Asia & the Southern Seas (Raw Materials). Criticizing this kind of geographical division of Asia as a lopsided production, he argued:

In terms of the co-prosperity sphere in the Southern Seas, the one-sided viewpoint by the leading powers based on the theory of location, that is, the notion of lopsided production, on the one hand destroys the self-sufficient power of indigenous people and on the other hand causes the maldistribution of population. Needless to say, the national land plan is the only thing that could resolve these problems.\textsuperscript{97}

Arguing that the bloc economy system would eventually destroy the ethnicity of people living in the colonies,\textsuperscript{98} Ezawa also maintained that the East Asian economic sphere should not be constructed based on hierarchal relations between ethnic groups. In this

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., p.4
\textsuperscript{96} Rōyama, Tōa to sekai:shin chūjō e no ronsaku, p.372.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., p.146.
way he tried to redefine it as an economic sphere upheld by the common ethnic sentiment and will of Asian people.99

**Modern Development and National Land Planning**

What, then, was the final destination of Ezawa’s geopolitics and his notion of an East Asian co-prosperity sphere? How were Ezawa’s concepts of Raumordnung and national land planning rationally connected to a spatial community of destiny? Borrowing from Rōyama’s concept of geopolitics as a subjective social science, how did Ezawa portray a common goal in an East Asian sphere through which subjects in East Asian space could share the same stream of experiences pointing toward the future?

Ezawa paid particular attention to the concept of autarky. If we loosely interpret this term to mean an economically self-sufficient nation or sphere, we can see that it was not just Ezawa who explicitly advocated an autarky. As I have discussed, Komaki Saneshige’s Imperial-Way geopolitics ultimately targeted a self-sufficient East Asian co-prosperity sphere, and the ultimate goal of the “bloc economy” system in Komaki geopolitics was no doubt to establish a self-sufficient anti-Western economic order. However, Ezawa’s notion of autarky seemed to be concerned with restructuring ethnic and economic borders of Greater East Asian space, rather than with assuring territorial expansion to the West. Ezawa contended that the previous and existing theories of European geopolitics simply emphasized territorial expansion based on the perception that solving the problem of limited resources in living space was only possible by politically occupying another space. For him, Britain’s colonization of India was a clear example of this resource-centered geopolitical concept of space.100

Instead of advocating constant territorial expansion by the leading powers,

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99 Ezawa Jōji, “Kyōeiken to kokudo keikaku,” *Chiseigaku* 2, no.3 (Mar 1941), p. 34.
Ezawa’s spatial theory, associated with the theory of marginal utility, focused on a “retrospective” approach to natural resources. Ezawa believed that the division of space through the distribution of raw materials could be an easy way for a leading power to temporarily obtain economic self-sufficiency, but he also maintained that this mechanical division of space would inevitably create political hierarchies within a certain spatial community and would not reach the level of sharing a common destiny. Precisely for this reason, for Ezawa the concept of autarky did not mean continuing to conquer unexplored space, but rather to economically develop ‘marginal’ spaces so that people in these spaces could have a new set of experiences. In short, autarky as the final destination of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was also the ultimate end of Ezawa’s geopolitical thinking, which emphasized the processes by which human beings negate natural space as given and construct a new space, constructing their own identity through this schema of negation and construction.

In terms of envisioning industrialization in the underdeveloped region of Greater East Asia, Ezawa’s idea might be seen as one of the most radical economic approaches. Even Yanaihara Tadao, Professor of Economics at Tokyo Imperial University and a leader among progressive intellectuals during the wartime period, relentlessly argued that oppressive and violent measures should be taken in ruling uncivilized people in Southeast Asia. Ezawa’s geopolitics became closely associated with modernization, and geopolitics’ encounter with modernization was also found in Rōyama’s notion of regional development. Criticizing both commercial investment and the notion of a bloc economy, Rōyama asserted that the final aim of an East Asian Cooperative Community should take the form of regional development.

101 Ibid.
102 Yanaihara was deprived of his professorship at Tokyo Imperial University for his provocative article “Kokka no rishō,” criticizing Japan’s invasion of China, in Chūō kōron in 1937.
To turn his theory of space into a realistic force for economic development, Ezawa showed keen interest in the notion of national land planning (国土計画). This idea rapidly gained currency among bureaucrats and intellectuals as Japan conducting its war against China, and it was highly likely that Japan would declare a total war against the United States. As the notion of total war clearly suggests, these intellectuals observed that both human and material resources must be mobilized for Japan’s war efforts. Central to this logic lay the question of how marginal utility should be maximized under the condition of limited resources. Therefore, advocates of national land planning naturally focused their concern on restructuring spaces in the Japanese empire for the sake of wartime mobilization.

After the Committee for National Land Planning (国土計画委員会) was established in Japan in 1939, national land planning became an important issue in the colony as well. In 1940, the Committee for National Land Planning was established in colonial Korea and it was filled with top-ranking officials in the Governor General’s Office and leading intellectuals at universities in colonial Korea. Between 1940 and 1942, a number of articles on national land planning appeared in major journals in Korea. Importantly, their discussion of national land planning varied substantially based on these authors’ political positions. For example, the converted Korean Marxist intellectual In Jeong-Sik interpreted it as part of a state-centered controlled economy that would replace the laissez-faire system based on individualism. In Jeong-Sik, “Chosun nongop kwa sikryang kwa kuk’tokyehoek,” Samcholl’i 13, no. 6 (June 1941), p.113. I will further discuss in Chapter 6 how converted Marxists during the wartime period encountered
observation was the thinking of a colonial intellectual that the economic gap between Japan and colonial Korea might be lessened by Korea’s voluntary participation in national land planning, which would result in the development of the Korean economy. But most Japanese intellectuals viewed it as merely part of the wartime total mobilization policies to exploit resources in the colonies. To this end, they emphasized the necessity of scientifically measuring the location of raw materials and effectively utilizing them in colonial Korea. For this reason, their discussion of and writings on national land planning took the form of geography-centered area studies to accumulate knowledge and information about raw materials in the colony. However, completely missing in their observation was how people in the colony should become the subject of a politically reconstructed and economically “developed” East Asian empire.

Ezawa was clearly aware of such limitations of national land planning when it was applied to the colony as a means to exploit resources. He was also equally critical of the economics-centered interpretation of such planning, which was that national land planning was primarily concerned with increasing productivity and marginal utility, or in other words, maximizing exploitation. Interestingly, he critically revisited Alfred Weber’s theory of industrial location (産業立地論), which Ezawa himself introduced to Japan in the mid 1930s, arguing that it is premised on the perception that economic conditions are naturally given. To put it another way, establishing plants or factories as part of national land planning where the total cost of labor, production and transportation is lower might contribute to increasing productivity and effectiveness. However, he contended that it would not change the political constitution of people’s life. In Basic Theories of National Land Planning (国土計画の基礎理論), Ezawa theorized the notion of economic development in national land planning as a logic of

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subject formation.

In order to completely realize national land planning, it must encompass all aspects of human life. For this reason, it should not only restructure population, the economy and transportation, but should also reach the political, administrative, legal and customary order of minzoku. It is insufficient to manage labor in industries and construct cities and villages, and build new railroads, national roadways and waterways that are necessary for development. … To put it another way, true national land planning is to take into consideration various representations, customs, blood-centered sentiments and religions in people’s life in rural villages. We should be able to anticipate that through the reorganization of (national land), what kind of effects the interplay of minzoku would bring out to a new order.107 (Emphasis added)

Ezawa’s understanding of national land planning and economic development clearly showed how he appropriated modernization as a driving force for constructing a new order. To be sure, he was also aware that capitalism had constantly caused economic inequality, and that this gap became the major reason for imperialism and colonialism. Therefore, modernization in a Japan-centered new order needed to be associated with restructuring the discriminatory political hierarchy between metropole and colony. Accordingly, his geopolitical approach to Southeast Asia concentrated on the question of how rapidly national land planning could restructure Southeast Asia into a modern space, and this was no doubt the same question that the general economic plan of Imperial Japan had to confront. Criticizing Europe’s exploitative imperialist economy in Southeast Asia, Ezawa argued:

In order for Japan to construct a mutually unified relationship in Southeast Asia, it is imperative that Japan change the allocation and distribution of raw materials and at the same time change the transportation relations of these raw materials…. To discuss industrialization in Southeast Asia presumably means to correct the existing relationships [in Southeast Asia], and at the same time, the reconstruction of the existing relationships is essential in restructuring Japan’s economic structure itself from a new perspective. 108

107 Ibid., p.45.
Consequently, the so-called rationalist geopolitics developed by both Ezawa and Rōyama ironically was associated with the concept of modernization, which had long been believed to be the fruit of the Western social scientific tradition. However, their notion of modernization leaves much room for further discussion. How could subjects in East Asia share the sense of the “community of destiny” while experiencing different stages of economic development? How could the notion of geopolitics and national land development constitute the realistic content of the East Asia Cooperative Community, without simply “objectifying” colonial subjects as means of exploitation for Japan’s war efforts?

**Conclusion**

Geopolitical thinking gained currency in interwar Japan as “Asia” emerged as a spatial concept challenging and replacing the West as universal in the international order. Yet it should not be overlooked that this rapid spread of spatial discourse unequivocally reflected the double mindset of Japanese intellectuals who on the one hand were advocating “overcoming the modern,” and “overcoming the West,” but who were also searching for scientific and rational ways to justify Japan’s spatial hegemony over the rest of Asia.

Nowhere were the seeds of geopolitics stronger than in the social sciences in wartime Japan. Various Pan-Asian discourses produced by Japanese social scientists during the wartime period aimed at distinguishing themselves from the previous Pan-Asianism, which had been characterized by its particularistic and culturalist orientations. Rationalizing the East in a social scientific manner and theorizing East Asian space were unquestionably one of the most imperative problems that Japanese social scientists were confronted with. In that respect geopolitics played an important role in
providing intellectual grounds for this very fundamental and important question.

I argue that the notion of geopolitics in wartime Japan went beyond a temporary intellectual fashion. Geopolitics provided a new space for other disciplines that had not been conceived of as social sciences. In this process, the fixed border of “objectivity” in the social sciences was gradually deconstructed. This did not mean that a certain departmental unit, geography for example, was newly included in the realm of social sciences. Instead, as the geopolitical thinking of Ezawa and Rōyama shows, these two social scientists tried to redefine the objectivity-centered framework of social scientific thinking by engaging with new concepts such as spatiality, futurity, and most importantly “subjective (主体的)” social science.

As both Ezawa and Rōyama showed in their writings, the question of modern development never disappeared from imperial social scientists’ discourses on an East Asian new order. In Chapters 5 and 6, I will further explore this question by analyzing the Asian discourse of Japanese Marxist intellectuals who most seriously dealt with the issue of historical development and universalism in 1930s Japanese social sciences.
Chapter 5
Japan and Asia:
The Asiatic Mode of Production Debate in 1930s Japan

Prewar Japanese Marxism and Asia

In Chapters 5 and 6, I will explore Japanese Marxists’ perception of Asia and their commitment to the East Asia Community during the wartime period. Marxist intellectuals were the most radical intellectual group in 1910s and 1920s Japan. The growing influence of Marxism was closely related to the limits inherent in liberalism led by Yoshino Sakuzō and like-minded social scientists during the Taisho period. As Kato Shūichi has correctly pointed out, these liberal thinkers called for a better politics based on democracy, or minpōnshugi to borrow Yoshino’s term, but this did not mean that they intended to fundamentally change the structure of the government.¹ Therefore, the urgent need for radical reforms such the abolition of the Emperor system, land reform, universal suffrage, all of which were necessary for bourgeois democracy, was primarily addressed by Marxist intellectuals. In this sense, being a true liberal was inseparable from being a Marxist, and this connection explained why Marxism became the emblem of Japanese social scientists in 1920s Japan.²

Marxism rapidly penetrated the mindset of Japanese social scientists in their search for universal values such as democracy and economic equality in Japan. However, there existed internal tension in the way this universalism was theorized and applied to Japanese society. After the foundation of the Japanese Communist Party in

1922, Japanese Marxism, in spite of its enormous influence throughout the academic circles and political worlds, gradually branched off two main theoretical factions. One group of Marxist social scientists focused on the feudal remnants in Japanese society. They contended that the presence of the emperor system and the oppressive bureaucratic organizations explained the immaturity of bourgeois democracy and their economic impacts could be seen most clearly in the backwardness of Japanese agriculture. Accordingly, they proposed a two-stage revolution theory; that is, bourgeois democratic revolution must precede socialist revolution in Japan. On the other hand, another group of Marxist intellectuals viewed the Meiji Restoration as an important turning point in realizing bourgeois democracy and capitalism in Japan, and argued for the urgency of direct socialist revolution.

In this chapter I will explore the first group of Japanese Marxist social scientists, often called Koza-ha (講座派, Lecturer’s faction). Their perception of the uniqueness and backwardness of the Japanese economy, agriculture in particular, was heavily influenced by Western Marxist thinkers’ analysis of Asian society. Ever since Marx’s writings on the backwardness of “Asiatic society” appeared in the mid 19th century, there had been a strong tendency to portray the historical development of Asian society as particular and thus backward in comparison to Western society. On the level of real politics, The Communist International (hereafter the Comintern) reiterated its manifesto in a series of theses on Asia between the late 1920s and the early 1930s that a two-stage revolution must be carried out in Japan and Asia, given that capitalism and democracy had not matured enough in these areas. The notion of Asiatic society was also discussed in theory in the famous Asiatic mode of production debate in the mid 1930s. Both Western Marxist theoreticians and Japanese Marxist social scientists fervently debated

3 The term Koza-ha was widely used by students of Japanese Marxism as Marxist social scientists in this group published a monumental 8-volume work, entitled Nihon shihoushugi hattatsushi kōza (日本資本主義発達史講座, Lectures on the Developmental History of Japanese Capitalism) between 1933 and 1934.
over how the notion of Asiatic society was defined and where it was positioned within Marx’s 5-stage theory of historical development.

All of these political and intellectual circumstances first demonstrate how deeply the perception of “Asian backwardness” came to permeate in the mindset of Marxist intellectuals in Asia, Koza-ha Japanese Marxist social scientists in particular. However, my study argues that the concept of Asiatic society should not be simply characterized by a few words such as stagnation, underdevelopment and backwardness. The notion of Asiatic society and its interpretation in mid 1930s Japan by Japanese Marxist social scientists instead reflect the highly intertwined nature of prewar Japanese Marxism. Although Koza-ha Marxist social scientists invariably acknowledged the backwardness of Japanese society vis-à-vis the West, their encounter with the rest of Asia through the logic of Asiatic society reveals some important points that must be discussed in answering the question of why they eventually converted (転向, tenkō) and committed themselves to the Japanese empire. Instead of revisiting the issue of conversion, which has been touched upon by a number of scholars, I will focus on theoretical limitations inherent in Koza-ha Marxist intellectuals’ understanding of Asia. In so doing, this chapter aims to draw a discursive map on which the continuity between prewar and converted Marxists during the wartime period can be logically explicated.

In the pages that follow, I will deal with three main questions. First, I will briefly

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summarize how the notion of Asiatic society first emerged in Western Marxism in the mid 1920s and how it was introduced and interpreted by Japanese and Korean Koza-ha Marxists in the mid 1930s. Here, I will emphasize that Japanese Marxists’ understanding of Asian backwardness over the course of the Asiatic mode of production debate took on very different perspectives when it was applied to the rest of Asia, China in particular. Second, I will show that in an attempt to differentiate the stage of the Japanese economy, feudalism, to be precise, from that of other Asian countries, these Japanese Marxist social scientists began highlighting stagnation in Asia village communities, which they believed no longer existed in Japan. In this process, they gradually internalized the perception that revolutionary potential could be no longer found in these Asian village communities. Finally, I will argue that the impossibility of theorizing political forces from the Asian village community and overcoming the logic of Asiatic society rapidly led them to endorse a Japan-centered East Asian community during the wartime period.

**The Asiatic Mode of Production Debate in 1930s Japan**

Before examining in what context the Asiatic mode of production debate emerged in Japan in the mid 1930s, let me briefly discuss its intellectual background. In July 1927, the Comintern announced a thesis on the prospect of a socialist revolution in Japan. In it, the Comintern articulated the necessity of a two-stage revolution in Japan, pointing out the remnants of the feudalistic system and the immaturity of capitalism.

In Japan, there exist the objective prerequisites both for a bourgeois democratic revolution (the survivals of feudalism in the political structure and the acuteness of the agrarian question) and for its transformation into a socialist revolution (the high level of capital concentration and trustification, the close interconnections of State and industry, the comparatively close approximation to a State capitalist system, the alliance between bourgeoisie and feudal landowners).
But if Japan’s economic situation offers a direct prospect of revolution, a
tremendous obstacle and barrier is provided by its ideological backwardness… Neither the Japanese proletariat nor the peasantry have revolutionary traditions or experience of struggle; the broad masses are only now awakening to political life, and only a very small proportion of them are involved in it; workers’ and peasants’ organizations are numerically small and have shown very little activity. Class instincts and recognition of the necessity for class struggle are still smothered by a stupefying patriotism or pacifist illusions…

As the statement above clearly shows, the Comintern diagnosed the developmental stage of Japanese society as remaining in feudalism. To overcome this backward status, the Comintern urged the Japanese Communist Party 日本共産党 (hereafter the JCP) to carry out thirteen radical movements, including the abolition of the monarchy (the emperor system) and granting complete independence for the colonies. These slogans first tell us that the Comintern maintained an internationalist perspective in discussing communist movements in Asia, that is, the JCP must pay attention to the Chinese revolution and anti-colonial movements in Korea. On the other hand, underlying the Comintern’s series of theses on Asia was the deep-rooted perception that the Asian region was portrayed as a backward area in general in its map of the international communist movement. In fact, the two-stage revolution theory was reiterated when the Comintern analyzed the socialist movement in colonial Korea, and this indicates that both Japan and colonial Korea, in spite of the empire-colony relationship between the two, were seen by the Comintern as feudal or semi-feudal societies. In a 1932 thesis,


6 The thirteen slogans are as follows: 1. Fight against the imperialist war danger. 2. Hands off the Chinese revolution. 3. Defense of the Soviet Union. 4. Complete independence for the colonies. 5. Dissolution of parliament. 6. Abolition of the monarchy. 7. Universal franchise from the age of eighteen. 8. Freedom of assembly of association, of speech, and of the press, etc. 9. Eight-hour work a day. 10. Unemployment insurance. 11. Repeal of all anti-labor laws. 12. Confiscation of the land of the Mikado, the landowners, the State and the Church. 13. A progressive income tax. Ibid., pp.400-401.

7 See, “Resolution of the E.C.C.I. on the Korean Question.” This document was adopted by the Executive Committee of the Comintern on December 10, 1928 and was issued to the Koreans in December 1928. It is commonly known as the “December Theses” in Korea. Suh Dae Sook ed., *Documents of Korean Communism 1918-1948* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp.243-256.
this viewpoint was confirmed once again, as the Comintern defined the Emperor system as the “chief pillar of political reaction and of all the survivals of feudalism in Japan.”

In discussing the logic of Asiatic society, it is important to understand how communist movements in Asia were perceived on a political level. The JCP and Koza-ha Marxists basically accepted the Comintern’s analysis and focused on abolishing the emperor system while at the same time resisting against colonialism and imperialism. Apart from the question of how dominant the presence was the Comintern in the prewar Japanese Marxist movement, it is evident that these Japanese Marxists followed the Comintern’s directions and shared the same conviction; that is, a socialist revolution would and should be realized in spite of backward elements in Asia. However, several questions still remained to be answered: How should revolutionary potential be theorized and turned into an actual social force? More importantly, did the developmental stage of Asian society represent the same backward elements? If this was the case, how should the empire-colony structure between Japan and its colonies be explained?

To be sure, radical socialist movements in real politics were focused on the necessity of realizing socialist revolution in Asia. But the subtle but essential questions that constantly challenged Marxist intellectuals in Asia could no longer be avoided on a theoretical level. In a sense, ambiguities and negative images on Asian society were first found in Marx’s writings on Asia themselves. Except for an about 10-page long writing, in which Marx categorized modes of production before capitalism, Marx

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mentioned neither Asiatic mode of production nor Asiatic society in other writings in detail. In *Foundations of the Critiques of Political Economy*, Marx presented three forms of production and possession that existed before capitalism – the Hebrew, Germanic and Asiatic forms. In contrast to the Germanic form, in which individuals possess property independent of community, Marx argued, “[T]he individual’s property can in fact be realized solely through communal labor.” Therefore, the commune in the Orient was conceptualized by Marx as the “presupposition of *property* in land and soil.”

Marx’s early writings on Asiatic society were based on his observation that private ownership did not emerge in the Orient. However, Marx did not articulate further on how this mode of production in the Orient should be positioned in his general theory of historical materialism. These ambiguities in Marx’s own writings caused a number of postmortem interpretations of Asiatic society by Western Marxist theoreticians. Of many issues in Marx’s writings on the Orient, it was his ambiguous judgment on the role of the British Empire in India that provoked fierce debates. Marx put it:

> England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan, was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. *The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution.* (Emphasis added)

Marx’s statement above left fundamental questions for European Marxists; that is, if the backwardness and underdevelopment in Asiatic society was geographically determined, how could immanent forces for a revolution be theorized within Asia? Arguably, one

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might not simply criticize Marx for endorsing the role of imperialism in Asia. But Marx’s writings on Asia clearly reveal that he himself was heavily influenced by Western thinkers such as Adam Smith, James Mill and Friedrich Hegel, all of whom developed particularistic and negative views on Asia. This also indicates that although Marx’s concept of Asiatic society was primarily concerned with modes of production in ancient times, it was inseparable from his backward and stagnant images of contemporary Asian society in general.\(^\text{13}\)

Since Marx’s writings mainly dealt with ancient modes of production, the first phase of the Asiatic mode of production debate among Western theoreticians also focused on the period between primitive community and slavery. Liudvig Mad’iar, for example, presented an in-depth analysis of Marx’s discussion of Oriental society. According to him, the dismantlement of the blood-centered primitive community in ancient society must be followed by a slavery system, but this universal path did not take place in China.\(^\text{14}\) Chinese society, Mad’iar maintained, instead sustained a unique state-centered land ownership system, which resulted in the absence of private land ownership necessary for the advent of the feudalistic mode of production.\(^\text{15}\) In this way, he concluded that Chinese society represented four unique elements distinct from feudalism in Europe – (1) absence of private landownership (2) artificial irrigation and state-centered huge irrigation projects (3) village communities (4) despotic politics.\(^\text{16}\) Echoing Marx’s writings on China and India, Mad’iar observed that these “Asiatic” characteristics are essentially related to unique geographical conditions in Asia.


\(^{15}\) Ibid., p.10.

Based on these observations, Mad’iar concluded that these structural problems in Chinese society inevitably called for external powers to destroy the primitive and state-centered mode of production and implant private land ownership in China. On the other hand, Mad’iar acknowledged that Japan experienced the stage of feudalism, if not exactly the same as that of Western Europe. The Hungarian-born Soviet theoretician Eugen Varga presented a similar analysis of the Asiatic mode of production, reconfirming that bureaucrats in China did not allow for the formation of private ownership, but maintained the state’s monopoly over all arable lands. In this respect, both Mad’iar and Varga basically accepted Marx’s highly negative evaluation of the development of feudalism in China and India.

It is important to emphasize that Soviet Marxists’ early writings on the Asiatic mode of production did not equate Japan with either China or India. Perhaps this gave Japanese Marxists a certain kind of mental relief that the developmental stage of Japanese society was different from that of China or India, even if powerful feudal remnants still remained in the Japanese economy. Therefore, this thinking thus led Japanese Marxist intellectuals, Koza-ha Marxists in particular, to think that semi-feudality in contemporary Japan was different from the Chinese version of Asiatic society, or that Asiatic society in Japan merely represented a time lag between Europe and Japan as a late-comer country. However, this “optimism” did not last long. As I discussed, the Comintern reconfirmed that the emperor system was still the major obstacle for bourgeois revolution in Japan and called for establishing a socialist front against imperialism and the emperor system.

Returning to the notion of Asiatic society, I argue that the reconfirmation of the two-stage revolution theory in the 1932 Thesis itself come as no surprise to Koza-ha

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18 Ibid., p. 13.
Marxists in Japan. Instead, what captured their attention was the fact that Soviet Marxist theoreticians began presenting quite different views on the Asiatic mode of production. This trend culminated in 1931, when Soviet Marxist theoreticians gathered in Leningrad and modified their earlier notion of the Asiatic mode of production. Mikhail Godes, who later had an enormous impact on Japanese Marxist social scientists, asserted in his concluding speech at the Leningrad conference that the Asiatic mode of production was nothing but a form of feudalism. In other words, Godes theorized it as a variety of the feudal modes of production rather than placing it outside the realm of Marx’s historical materialism.

The fact that the Asiatic mode of production was conceptualized as a form of feudalism had an impact on Japanese Marxists. Insofar as it belonged to the feudal mode of production, it was inseparable from the contemporary problems of the Japanese economy, agricultural problems in particular. To put it another way, the notion of Asiatic society and the presence of feudal remnants were logically interconnected and thus represented contemporaneity both in theory and practice.

On the other hand, Godes and other Soviet Marxist intellectuals redefined the Asiatic mode of production in an attempt to resolve ambiguities inherent in Marx’s writings on Asian society. Marx’s short essay on India, as I discussed, did not sufficiently articulate certain points for Western Marxist theoreticians to scientifically evaluate the structure of the Asian economy based on historical materialism. Just like Mad’iar and Varga, these Western Marxists recognized unique elements in Asian society. However, these findings did not lead them to portray the Asiatic mode of production as a particular mode of production that only existed in Asia. Aside from

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assessing the intellectual depth of Godes’ argument, his new theory indicated that the spatial and temporal dimension of the Asiatic mode of production was transformed from the *Asian village community* in China and India to feudalism in Asian society in general. However, it is important to note that Godes’ theory never completely removed Western Marxists’ negative images of Asia such as stagnation and underdevelopment associated with the Asiatic mode of production.

While the perception of Asian backwardness persisted in the mindset of Western Marxist intellectuals, how did Japanese Koza-ha Marxists theorize Asiatic society? Here it is important to note that acknowledging backwardness in Japanese society does not necessarily indicate that they thought socialist revolution would be impossible in Japan. Irrespective of various slogans for a revolution in Japan put forth by the Comintern, these Japanese Marxists were preoccupied with proving that immanent revolutionary forces could and should be found in theory. Accomplishing this intellectual mission meant that they could proclaim that in spite of feudal remnants in Japanese society, backwardness in Japanese society merely represented a time lag between Europe and Japan. To this end, these Koza-ha Marxist social scientists had to present a far more scientific analysis of Asiatic society and thus theorize revolutionary forces in Japan. However, it was their preoccupation with these intellectual challenges which widened the conceptual gap between Japan and the rest of Asia.

In a 1933 article, Aikawa Haruki 相川春喜 (1909-1953) first problematized the particularistic interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production. Vehemently criticizing the stagnation-oriented analysis of Mad’iar and Vargas, he defined the Asiatic mode of production as “the first hostile form in the process of social production (社会的生産過程の最初の敵対的形態),” which existed between primitive community and ancient
slavery.\textsuperscript{21} According to him, a hostile form in social production was indicative of the advent of class society. Therefore, for Aikawa, the ancient slavery system demonstrated that class relations first came into play in human relations, and slave-ownership took on the form of private property in Marx’s periodization of historical development. However, Aikawa paid special attention to Marx’s 1859 article “Foundations of the Critiques of Political Economy,” in which Marx himself divided the modes of production before capitalism into three categories. Carrying this notion a step further, Aikawa attempted to theorize the Asiatic mode of production as an offshoot of slavery. At this stage, primitive communities were drastically deconstructed but the conflict between slaves and slave owners still took on a communitarian form. To put it another way, Aikawa contended that slaves were a “commonly shared private property” in ancient Asiatic society, but the system could still be regarded as a form of ancient slavery.\textsuperscript{22}

Aikawa held that this mode of production existed not only in Asia but in other parts of the world. This observation led him to fundamentally reject so-called the geographic determinism that was once mentioned by Marx and constantly reemerged in the writings of Mad’iar and Varga. He was discontented with Godes’ theory as well. Although Godes rejected geographic determinism, Godes’ theory was distinctive from that of Aikawa in that Godes understood the Asiatic mode of production as a “unique feudal system” that existed only in Asia. Since Aikawa viewed it as a “transitional” system between primitive community and ancient slavery, it was neither a unique nor a particularistic form of feudalism, nor a mode of production that existed only in Asia.

It is not difficult to see Aikawa’s intentionality in his harsh critiques of Godes’ analysis of the Asiatic mode of production. By preventing it from being discussed in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Aikawa Haruki, “Ajiateki kannenkeintai heno keikō – “ajiateki seisanyoshiki to godesteki kenkai”,” \textit{Shisō} 139 (Dec 1933), p.79.
\item Ibid., pp. 80-81.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
relation to feudalism, Aikawa aimed to minimize the impacts of the notion of Asiatic society on contemporary Japanese society. He was clearly aware that any logical connections between the Asiatic mode of production and feudalism in Japan would eventually result in extending to Japanese society the images of stagnation and underdevelopment that had been applied to China and India. Therefore, it is highly understandable that Aikawa strongly emphasized the fact that Marx himself acknowledged the presence of feudalism in Japan.  

To be sure, Aikawa’s viewpoint represented one stream regarding Koza-ha Marxist social scientists’ discussion of the Asiatic mode of production. In contrast to him, Hayakawa Jirō 早川二郎 (1906-1937), who introduced Godes and the Leningrad Conference on the Asia problem to Japanese academic circles, attempted to get through this challenge by defining the Asiatic mode of production as a unique “tribute system (貢納制).” He acknowledged that, as Lenin articulated, there must be slavery between the primitive and feudal modes of production. Central to this observation of Japanese history was the problem that the transitory periods between these two modes of production were very complex. According to him, primitive communities began to collapse as external powers conquered them and this very process of conquering and being conquered represented the development of productivity and the emergence of class relations. However, this transition, he argued, did not necessarily result in the coming of a new mode of production. The development of production power had to create class relations and gradually dismantle primitive communities in theory. Hayakawa argued, however, that the leaders of the conquered primitive communities formed communal relations with the conqueror to sustain their power. This unique

25 Ibid., p.117.
relationship between a new ruler and the conquered community was therefore referred to the tribute system.\textsuperscript{26} Based on these observations, Hayakawa concluded that Asian societies entered the stage of feudalism without experiencing slavery.

Hayakawa acknowledged that the tribute system would represent stagnation in history but he was also adamant that it was “by no means an independent social relation.”\textsuperscript{27} Therefore, for him the lack of a slavery system did not imply that Asian society had not taken the universal path of economic development. Three months later, he reconfirmed this view in a new article by contendting that Asian society experienced what he called a “slavery economic system (奴隷制的経済制度),” not the social constitution by slave-owners that appeared in the West. (奴隷所有者の構成)\textsuperscript{28} Consequently, Hayakawa argued that Asia had simply “passed by” the slave-ownership stage and had taken normal development stages afterwards.

Although Aikawa and Hayakawa differed slightly in understanding of the Asiatic mode of production, their notion of Asia and the orient are telling in many ways. To begin with, both attempted to historicize the Asiatic mode of production. By staging it between the primitive community and the feudal system, they aimed to minimize its contemporaneity and claimed that it existed for a “short and transitory period of time” in ancient history. To be sure, this argument did not completely refute the fact that feudal remnants still functioned as a decisive factor in the mode of production in Japan. However, one can clearly recognize their intentionality; that is, by historicizing the Asiatic mode of production, they aimed to preclude it from being extended to a sort of deterministic that no social forces for a revolution could be found in Japan.

Second and more importantly, the historicization of the Asiatic mode of production

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp.115-116.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p.116.
\textsuperscript{28} Hayakawa Jirō, “Doreishoyūshateki kōsei to tōyōteki keitai no mondai,” Yuibutsuron kenkyū 33 (July 1935), p.75.
entailed more profound theoretical problems inherent in Koza-ha Marxist social scientists’ perception of Asia. As Aikawa boldly argued, “[T]he term “Asia” itself is inappropriate in discussing the Asiatic mode of production since this phenomenon existed in other parts of the world as well.” However, his separation of Asia from the perception of particularism paradoxically produced a highly abstract concept of Asia. First and foremost, Aikawa and Hayakawa’s strategy of overcoming the limits of the Asiatic mode of production focused on demonstrating that Japanese society had already passed by the stage of the Asiatic and thus stagnant primitive society. Both argued that class struggle took place as primitive communities were dismantled. Such an approach was not unexpected since Marx’s concept of Asiatic society, if not precisely articulated, was primarily concerned with the commune, that is, primitive community in Asia.

In order to completely surpass conceptual limits inherent in the logic of Asiatic society, they had to prove that the Asian village community had disappeared not only in Japan but in the rest of Asia, China in particular. However, completely missing in their discussion was the issue of how to cope with the problem of the Chinese village community. To be sure, they steadfastly extended an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist gaze to the revolutionary movement in China. But supporting the Chinese revolution on a political level did not mean that these Japanese Marxists were able to fundamentally overcome the specter of the Asian village community, which Marx and Western intellectuals pointed out as the essence of stagnation. In this way, the spatial dimension of the Asiatic mode of production was reduced to Japanese society, leaving the question of village communities unanswered.

If not taking exactly the same direction, Moritani Katsumi 森谷克己 (1904-1964) also interpreted the Asiatic mode of production in a similar way to Hayakawa.

29 Ibid.
While teaching at Kyungsung Imperial University in colonial Korea, Moritani intermittently participated in the Asiatic mode of production debate. Differentiating blood-centered community from the primitive Asian community, Moritani theorized Asiatic society as a mode of production that emerged during the transitory period between blood-centered community and agricultural community. According to him, the latter is characterized by the communal possession of land and he argued that peasants in agricultural communities gradually came to possess their own land. However, Moritani also tended not to historicize Asiatic society by positioning it in a certain stage of historical development. As I will discuss in detail in the following chapter, he instead tried to present an alternative view that the origins of the so-called oriental culture can be discovered by understanding Asiatic society. To be sure, Moritani’s somewhat unique standpoint was not unrelated to his position as an assistant professor at Kyungsung Imperial University in colonial Korea.

Consequently, Japanese Marxist social scientists’ discussion of the Asiatic mode of production, in spite of several differences among them, showed a strong tendency to reduce it to the context of Japanese history. To put it another way, they made every effort to discover objective evidence to reduce Asiatic society to the realm of the Asian village community, which, they claimed, had already disappeared in Japan. In this way, they attempted to prevent the feudalistic constitution of Japanese society from being conceived of as a continuous form of village community where spontaneous forces for revolution could hardly be found. This indicates that Japanese Marxists’ supporting anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements in Korea and China was not necessarily based on their observation that revolutionary potential could be theorized in these

31 Moritani Katsumi, “Shakai keizaishi ni okeru tōyō no tokushusei - 『tōyōteki na mono』 ha naika,” Rekishi 7 (1937); also in Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron, pp. 127-136.
countries, as they believed it could be in Japan.

How, then, did Marxist social scientists in colonial Korea confront this challenge? In the pages that follow, I will examine how Korean Marxist social scientists encountered the notion of Asiatic society in the mid 1930s. Here, I pay special attention to the problem of colonial consciousness. The absence of colonial Korea in Japanese social scientists’ discussion of Asiatic society necessarily created a vacuum space. Undoubtedly, it first represents Japanese intellectuals’ colonial consciousness as they took it for granted that Korea now naturally belonged to Japan. On the other hand, the way Korean Marxists filled this gap revealed their desire to overcome the emperor-colony structure by theorizing the possibility of universal socialist revolution in colonial Korea.

**Between Particularity and Universality**

The Asiatic mode of production debate in Japan showed an evident schematic structure that placed ancient Japan and contemporary China in two symmetric units. While Koza-ha Marxists admitted the presence of feudal remnants in Japanese society, these were portrayed as essentially different from the characteristics of the village community in the rest of Asia.

In a 1934 article published in the Korean language journal *Shin Dong-A*, Roh Tong Kyu (1904 - ?) touched upon this issue for the first time. In the article, Roh conceptualized the Asiatic mode of production as having nine major characteristics. However, these characteristics, as Roh himself pointed out, are too

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33 The nine categories Roh indicated are as follows: (1) importance of artificial irrigation (2) Asiatic despotism (3) absence of private land ownership (4) taxes commensurate with the rent from land (5) development of agricultural community (6) inseparable association of agriculture and handicraft industry (7) underdevelopment in urban areas (8) fixation of the class system such as Caste in India (9) irreversible repetition of stagnation. Ibid., pp.102-103.
desultory to determine the constitution of a certain society. Therefore, he maintained that the Asiatic mode of production must be discussed from the perspective of two questions: (1) Is the Asiatic mode of production an independent mode of production opposed to or different from slavery, feudalism and capitalism? (2) Can the so-called “Oriental society” that Western capitalism discovered be categorized either feudal or Asiatic society?34

Roh’s questions hinted that the direction of his theorization would be significantly different from that of Japanese Marxist social scientists. To begin with, the temporal scope of the Asiatic mode of production in his discussion was not limited to ancient time or the slavery system, nor did he avoid discussing it in relation to capitalism in contemporary Asian society. To answer these questions, Roh appropriated the strategy of “double translation.” He first introduced a series of opinions on Asiatic society promulgated by Western scholars, focusing on Hegel, Marx, Mad’iar and Godes. He then moved on to Japanese Marxists’ interpretation and critiques of these Western thinkers. Repeating Godes’ definition of the mode of production, Roh reconfirmed that feudalism occurs when producers create surplus products. However, the whole process of creating surplus value in Asian society, Roh argued, was controlled by oppressive relationships between landowners and producers. Based on this analysis, he concluded that the Asiatic mode of production was not an independent mode of production. Although surplus value took the form of taxes, not commodities from land, and peasants paid taxes to the government, these relations themselves could not constitute an ostensibly different mode of production. For this reason, Roh emphasized that the issue of an Asiatic society must be now confined to two remaining characteristics – artificial irrigation and centralized despotism.35

34 Ibid., p.103.
Central to Roh’s analysis of Asiatic society was his intention to differentiate the mode of production from the political structure. By emphasizing that surplus value was created in the agricultural sector, he tried to demonstrate that Asian society had experienced economic development. Therefore, the uniqueness of Asiatic society, for him, was not related to the mode of production itself, but understood as the question of why and how the state emerged as a dominant political unit. However, it was the relationship between village community and the state that Western Marxist theoreticians portrayed as Asiatic, since neither private ownership nor autonomous political subjects could be found in this structure. As he himself acknowledged, Roh was actually heavily influenced by Hayakawa Jirō, who positioned the Asiatic mode of production between primitive community and slavery.\(^{36}\) Hayakawa contended that class struggle and private ownership occurred as primitive communities were dismantled. However, what is important is the fact that Hayakawa’s argument focused on Japan, while it was widely accepted that the structure of Korean agriculture was much closer to that of China.\(^{37}\) To put it another way, Roh’s views were on shaky ground, since he simply repeated Japanese Koza-ha Marxists’ discussion of Asiatic society without explaining why the village community continued to exist in Korean agriculture.

Therefore, the only way for Korean intellectuals to overcome the question of the village community was to demonstrate that Korean society had experienced the typical feudalistic mode of production. It was the 1933 work of Paik Nam Un 白南雲 (1984-1979), *Chōsen shakai keizaishi* 朝鮮社會經濟史 (The Social and Economic History

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\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) For example, Moritani Katsumi published several articles in 1933 and 1934 and argued that certain characteristics such as irrigation and state land ownership were also found in Korean agriculture. Moritani Katsumi, “Chōsen shakai to shizen kankyō (1),” *Tōa* 7, no. 12 (Dec, 1934); Moritani Katsumi, “Kyūrai no chōsen nogyoshakai ni tsuite no kenkyū no tameni,” in Keijōteikoku daigaku hōbungakkai ed., *Chōsen shakai keizai shi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1933), pp. 397-482.
of Chosun), that directly touched upon this issue. Trained at Tokyo University of Commerce (present-day Hitotsubashi University), where he learned economics from two leading Japanese social scientists, Fukuda Tokuzō 福田徳三 (1974-1930) and Takata Yasuma 高田保馬 (1883-1972), Paik from the beginning centered his academic concern on the question of scientifically explaining Korean history through historical materialism. Fukuda had established himself as a leader in social policy studies in the early 1920s and Takata, as I discussed in the previous chapter, was boldly criticizing Marxism in the 1920s. Therefore, Paik absorbed Marxism through his acquaintance with other Marxist intellectuals, and his exposure to Marxist social sciences deepened his academic interest in establishing Korean studies based on Marxism.

Paik was well aware that Japanese Marxist social scientists paid little attention to colonial Korea in their discussion of the Asiatic mode of production. In fact, bourgeois and even Marxist social scientists had already published a series of writings on Korea that described Korean society as a typical underdeveloped colonial country. These early works had shaped basic but highly problematic perceptions of Korea. Surprisingly, a 1925 article of Fukuda Tokuzō, Paik’s mentor at Kyoto Imperial University, was among them. Based on his twenty-day stay in Korea in 1902, Fukuda boldly concluded that Korea was a stagnant society that had not even undergone the stage of feudalism. Although Fukuda was not an orthodox Marxist economist, his gaze at Korea was strikingly compatible with the conventional Asian stagnation theory, as best described

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38 Paik Nam Un, Chōsen shakai keizaishi (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1933).
39 For a detailed analysis of Paik’s study in Japan, see Pang Ki-Jung, Hanguk kun-hyondae sasangsas yongu : 1930, 40-yondae Paik Nam-un ui hangmun kwa chongchi kyongje sasang (Seoul: Yoksarpipyongsas, 1993), pp.29-64. As I have already discussed in Chapter 3, Takata studied German Neo-Kantianism and also taught economics at Tokyo University of Commerce before he moved to Kyoto Imperial University.
40 Paik, Chōsen shakai keizaishi, pp.55-56.
41 Fukuda Tokuzō’s article, entitled “Kankoku no keizai soshiki to keizai tani,” was published in Keizaigaku kenkyū in 1925.
by Soviet Marxists such as Mad’iar. Together with natural scientific studies of Korean races such as Torii Ryūzō’s 烏居龍藏 ethnographic studies, Fukuda’s social scientific study played an important role in establishing particularism-oriented Korean studies.

At the heart of Paik’s project of rewriting Korean history, therefore, was his harsh critiques of the “particularism” that was rampant in Korean studies in 1930s Japan. In *The Social and Economic History of Chosen*, he clearly took a new direction in the study of the economic history of Korea:

Studies of Korean history (朝鮮史) must set up as their mission empirically and practically exploring the processes of its historical and social development in the past, and theorizing its movements in practice. This is possible only by analyzing class relations in the life of Korean people and historical changes in social systems, and universally abstracting its formality based on historical dialectics (史的弁証法), which is the universal rule of movements in human society. In so doing, studies of Korean history as part of the whole history of human beings can examine the processes of the influx and development of modern capitalism on a world-historical scale.⁴² (Emphasis added)

To be sure, Paik was conscious that the universal rule of economic development in historical materialism had been applied differently to each society. Differences in economic development between advanced capitalist countries such as Japan and Korea were the most important challenge Paik was facing. He vehemently rejected to the notion that the particular temporality of a certain society would represent its historical particularism in relation to universal societies. Paik thus paid special attention to theoretically differentiating particularity in the stages of historical development from particularism in general:

The only particularity in historical science is the particularity in the stage of the historical development of a society… The whole process of historical development in Chosun, given that there are slight differences in geographical conditions, [...] is not something to be distinguished from the

⁴² Paik Nam Un, *Chōsen shakai keizaishi*, p.5.
rule of historical development in other cultural nations, but something that Chosun has experienced in a very similar way to other nations through the one-dimensional rule of world history. The slow tempo in Chosun’s developmental process and the light and shade in its culture are by no means essential particular.  

As he reiterated, “Blacks are blacks, but they become slaves only under certain conditions.” For him, particularity at a certain point of historical time was defined as a mere reflection of certain socio-economic conditions, and he was opposed to the idea that the amalgam of particularities represents particularism as a whole. Paik attempted to conceptualize the Asiatic mode of production as particular elements that occurred in the general process of development in Asian society.

To be sure, the first and foremost task in his rewriting of Korean history was to theorize the presence of the slavery mode of production, given that many Soviet Marxist theoreticians pointed out the absence of slavery as intrinsic to the Asiatic mode of production. As production power developed, he contended, primitive communities based on blood relations were dismantled and experienced class divisions, which generated slavery in all three kingdoms in ancient Korea. This explanation, however, faced logical inconsistencies. Most of all, Paik could not explain why the advent of slavery did not come with the dismantlement of the village community, and why the predominant state land ownership was established in ancient Korea. If surplus value in the slavery and feudalistic modes of production in Korea was monopolized by the state in the form of land taxes, these modes of production could not be regarded as a typical feudal system and therefore would not be transformed into a capitalist economy based on private ownership.

For this reason, central to Paik’s writings on Korean history was the question of

43 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
44 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p.207.
how to theorize the village community as a driving force for historical development. This problem constantly appeared in his other writings. In a 1937 work, *Chōsen hōken shakai keizai shi* (The Feudal Socio-Economic History of Chosun), which he entitled as the second volume of *The Social and Economic History of Chosun*, Paik admitted that the basic unit of agricultural production in the feudal system of the Koryo Dynasty (918-1392) was the village community (村落共同体) and it was directly controlled by the state.47

Ironically, the village community was described by him as a space where peasants cultivated land and distributed products on a communal basis, which reminds us of Marx’s categorization of Asiatic society. Since these peasants were still powerfully bound to the power of the state and the state actually monopolized land, the feudalistic mode of production based on land ownership did not occur in the village community. Paik strove to answer this seemingly impossible question by conceptualizing the land taxes peasants paid to the state as similar to taxes that peasants paid to landlords in the typical feudal relations of production.48 However, this mechanical analogy between the Asian village community and the European model of feudalism could not answer the question of why the village community continued to exist, even if Korean society, as Paik contended, underwent the universal path of economic development.

**The Village Community in Tatters**

Korean Marxist intellectuals’ writings in the mid 1930s clearly show that the focal issue in the Asiatic mode of production was the village community. As I have discussed, Japanese Marxist intellectuals tried to avoid this question by contending that the village

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48 Ibid.
community disappeared as the feudal mode of production was established in Japan. But this seemingly convenient explanation further widened the gap between Japan and the rest of Asia. Insofar as the village community powerfully remained as a significant mode of production in Asian society, it would constantly reproduce the notion of Asiatic society as stagnant and underdeveloped. However, Koza-ha Marxist social scientists’ encounter with the Asiatic mode of production showed their strong Japan-centeredness in their efforts to liberate Japan from the specters of the stagnant village community lacking revolutionary potential. Many Koza-ha Marxists simply avoided analyzing the nature of the Asian village community, and some intellectuals inherited and reproduced the negative images of the Asian community once promulgated by Western intellectuals. In this way, the Japanese interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production never played a significant role in removing particularism imposed on the Asian village community.

It was only Hani Goro (1901-1983), a Koza-ha Marxist historian, who strove to extract revolutionary potential from the peasant masses in the Asian village community Contributing four articles to the Journal of History (史学雑誌) entitled “The Formation of Capitalism in the Orient (東洋における資本主義の形成),” Hani directly confronted the question of the Asian village community and capitalism. Spatially speaking, Hani’s discussion included China, India and Japan from the beginning. He first delineated his observation that the Orient, intentionally or unintentionally, participated in the stream of the world economy, which was characterized by colonialism and capitalism. For him, India’s status as a colony, China’s status as a semi-colony, and finally the Meiji Restoration in Japan all demonstrated that the Orient is also part of the world economy. However, he also pointed out that Asia’s entrance into the world economy was actually forced by external powers. Summarizing

49 The four articles appeared in Shigaku zasshi no. 2, no. 3, no. 6 and no. 8 (all in 1932); Hani Goro, Meiji ishinshi kenkyū (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978), pp.13-150.
50 Hani, Meiji ishinshi kenkyū, p.21.
the formation of the world economy as a transition from an agricultural and handicraft-centered economy to a highly commercialized one, Hani viewed the incapability of Asia’s responding to this grand transformation as the core problem inherent in the Asiatic mode of production.

The village community in Asia, that is, an “Oriental-historical representation of the world-historical rule (世界史的法則の東洋史的表現)” to borrow Hani’s own words,51 had not been extinguished and in fact still determined the mode of production in the Orient. However, Hani did not approach the issue of underdevelopment or backwardness in Asia in the simple context of production power. Nor did he oversimplify the issue by arguing that China, India and Japan experienced the same paths of economic development. Instead, he contended that in spite of structural problems in the village community, Asian countries had improved production power to a considerable degree.52

Therefore, a close reading of Hani’s works tells us that his main concern was not stagnation or backwardness associated with productivity itself, but the question of why development in productivity did not result in the coming of new modes of production. He observed that under the state’s monopoly over land ownership, surplus value was not transformed into commercial capital but was absorbed predominantly by bureaucrats as land taxes. This system essentially precluded the capitalistic mode of production from taking place in urban areas. Surplus labor in the village community was not absorbed by industrial and commercial sectors in the city either, which worsened the problem of overpopulation in agriculture and impoverished peasants.53 Hani believed that this situation could also explain the underdevelopment of commercial capital and urban areas in China. Thus, the Asiatic mode of production in

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p.16.
53 Ibid., pp.77-83.
China was redefined by him as the question of how this “vicious circle” should be destroyed. However, he was opposed to the idea that the arrival of external powers might solve this problem:

Under the despotic ruling system in China, where the feudal relationships of production and possession are centered on the state level, the deconstruction of feudal relationships trapped in this circulation in Chinese society must lead to a complete emergence of the new relationship of production. Therefore, it is to destroy feudal forms in the class relations of production by realizing the capitalistic relations of production… However, the fact that China actually has been colonized and is forced to become a supplier of commodities and cheap labor power for foreign capital undoubtedly makes much more complex the problem of searching for liberation through collapsing the old relations of production and possession.\(^{54}\)

Hani did not believe that the influx of imperialism to underdeveloped countries would stimulate the collapse of feudal relations, as Marx had once argued regarding the impact of British imperialism on India. He instead emphasized that colonial powers had exploited Chinese peasants and as a result, the vicious circle deeply distressed them. Paradoxical as it may sound, this acute and critical analysis of Western imperialism and foreign capital in Asian society marked a point of departure where Hani saw the peasant masses as his last resort for bourgeois democratic revolution in Asia. Irrespective of the presence of the village community saturated with stagnation and underdevelopment, Hani asserted, the capitalist economy in the Orient is a historical necessity (歷史的必然).\(^{55}\) He continued to argue that on behalf of the immature bourgeois class, the Chinese peasant masses started organizing a revolutionary force against both colonialism and imperialism.\(^{56}\)

However, Hani’s projection of bourgeois revolution into the hands of the Chinese peasants did nothing but reveal the inconsistencies of his argument. Since these

\(^{54}\) Ibid., p. 106  
\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 49.  
\(^{56}\) Ibid., p. 115
peasants were never exposed to the new modes of production, only to be marginalized within overpopulated village communities, it was simply impossible to expect these peasant masses to become revolutionary subjects with political and class awareness. Roughly speaking, Hani imposed his abstract belief in the progress of oriental society on the Asian peasants, who could not realize bourgeois revolution according to Marx’s historical and dialectic materialism. Therefore, Hani’ writings foreshadowed Koza-ha Marxists social scientists’ fractured understanding of the village community in Asia.

In addition to pessimistic prospects for the village community in the rest of Asia, Japanese Marxist social scientists gradually modified their earlier analysis of Japanese capitalism and began rewriting it based on Marx’s 5-stage development theory. For example, in a 1928 article entitled “The History of the Meiji Restoration (明治維新史),” Koza-ha Marxist Hattori Shisō 服部之総 (1901-1956) argued that the Meiji Restoration was neither a social nor a bourgeois revolution but merely a transfer of political power from feudal lords to elite groups located in Satsuma and Choshu. According to him, the Japanese economy at the end of the Tokugawa period was still handicraft-industry-centered. Therefore, he concluded that the entrance of the Japanese economy into world capitalism since the arrival of Perry was not a bourgeois revolution in a real sense, but the result of top-down power reconstruction triggered by external powers.

However, Hattori’s emphasis on external powers was heavily criticized by both Rono-ha and other Koza-ha Marxists for overlooking immanent economic development that came to fruition during the Tokugawa period. As the Asiatic mode of production debate drew attention from Japanese Marxists, Hattori began modifying his earlier analysis of the Meiji Restoration. In an article entitled “Revolution and Anti-Revolution

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58 Ibid.
of the Meiji Restoration,” contributed to Lectures on the Development History of Japanese Capitalism,\(^5\) he argued that the manufacturing industry was already on the rise in late Tokugawa Japan, and accordingly conceptualized this as “proto-capitalism” (早期資本主義).\(^6\)

More important than emphasizing immanent forces in the Japanese economy was the way Koza-ha Marxists approached the village community in Japan. Hirano Yoshitarō’s (1897-1980) seminal book, The Constitution of Japanese Capitalist Society (日本資本主義社会の機構), clearly demonstrated this tendency. In this work, Hirano, a leading Koza-ha Marxist, emphasized that the Japanese peasants were still under the condition of what he called “half-slavery.” According to him, the oppressive Meiji government and landlords emerged as exploitative powers and as a result, most peasants in Japan cultivated land on a small scale and became “fractured and isolated.”\(^6\) However, as Nagaoka Shinkichi has correctly argued, Hirano’s description of the Japanese peasants as fractured and isolated shaped conspicuously different images of Japanese agriculture in relation to other Asian countries, China in particular. To put it another way, the dispersion and isolation of the Japanese peasants was portrayed by Hirano as the absence of the communal labor that was an essential element in the Chinese village community. Precisely for this reason, the main problem of Japanese agriculture was now summarized by him not as that of the static village community but as the immaturity of the capitalistic mode of production.\(^6\) Therefore, Hirano’s critiques of Japanese agriculture reconfirmed the general views of Koza-ha


\(^6\) However, Hattori conceptualized the term “proto-capitalism” as provisional, without providing an in-depth analysis of it. Hattori shisō zenshū 3, p.211.


Marxists toward the village community; that is, Japan already passed through the stage of the village community, and the capitalistic mode of production would soon occur as these “isolated” but liberated-from-village-community peasants absorbed modern technologies and nurtured political awareness.

Sooner or later, the absence of the logic of community in their socialism faced another fundamental challenge. Beginning in 1935, a number of Japanese Marxists dismissed Marxism and surrendered to Japanese imperialism. This political phenomenon, which occurred in the mid and late 1930s, is telling in many ways in understanding these converted Marxists’ involvement in imperial discourses. Their conversion meant that anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism on a political level, perhaps the only forward-looking gaze they extended toward China and Korea, were removed from their political point of view. Not surprisingly, their space of radical politics was rapidly replaced by the notion of a Japan-centered East Asian order in the name of civilizing mission and modernization. However, they did not change their earlier observation that the village community in the rest of Asia did not have any immanent forces for capitalistic development.

Beginning in the late 1930s, a number of discourses on the East Asian community emerged and rapidly gained currency among Japanese social scientists. As I discussed in previous chapters, it was non-Marxist bourgeois social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi and Kada Tetsuji who came to the forefront in developing the logic of cooperative community in Asia. To be sure, their theories of community were completely different from the notion of the village community. They attempted to create a new form of subjectivity that could serve the good of an East Asian community and at the same time maintain an individual’s own identity in his or her local community. Central to their intellectual project was the question of how this new form of subjectivity should be theorized. This was also inseparable from the realistic issue of
the economic gap between metropole and colony and between rural and urban areas. How, then, did these converted Marxists respond to this new stream of East Asian discourses? If they did not challenge the observation that neither subjectivity nor political awareness can be extracted from the village community, how could they theorize a new form of subjectivity that must go beyond the border of these static village communities? In Chapter 6, I will deal with these issues by exploring two converted Koza-ha Marxists’ discourses on the East Asian community.
Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed how Marxist social scientists in early and mid-1930s Japan and Korea encountered the intellectual challenge of the Asiatic Mode of Production. Their responses to it varied substantially and provided important issues not to be overlooked in understanding their wartime Asian discourses. Koza-ha Marxist social scientists attempted to demonstrate that the nature of the Japanese economy, in spite of the semi-feudal remnants within it, was essentially different from that of other Asian societies, which were based on the village community. In this process, they could not overcome the initial question Marx and Western Marxist theoreticians posed: Why did the village community continue to exist as the most dominant social system, even if improvements in productivity were achieved? This question was inseparable from the prospect of socialist revolution in Asia. Insofar as peasants are bound to a village community and the state dominates the entire agricultural sectors, how could peasants acquire subjective political awareness?

However, their discussion of the Asiatic mode of production did not become more sophisticated after the mid-1930s. As the domestic political atmosphere became increasingly aggravated beginning at that time, a number of Japanese Marxists were arrested and forced to disavow Marxism.¹ This ideological turnaround, often called *tenkō*, brought profound changes to the intellectual topography of wartime Asian discourses. Bourgeois social scientists such as Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei

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Masamichi had grappled with the question of the East Asian community before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. In contrast to them, Marxist intellectuals encountered the spread of Asian discourses, while their mainstream approach to Asia was still a clearly divisionist perspective; that is, Japan had developed a substantially different mode of production in comparison to the village community in China and Korea.

In this chapter, I examine the Asian discourses of two former wartime Koza-ha Marxists, Hirano Yoshitarō 平野義太郎 (1897-1980) and Moritami Katsumi 森谷克己 (1904-1964). Invariably, wartime Asian discourses, in spite of their different ideological orientations, all emphasized the notion of community as a driving force to bind Asian people together. This gave rise to an interesting question: How did Japanese Marxists, who did not overcome the specters of stagnation and backwardness in the Asian village community, create a new logic of an East Asian community? The notion of cooperative community necessitated the intellectual task of theorizing a type of subjectivity which would encompass both regional identity such as East Asian nationalism and local identities shaped through indigenous cultures, languages and religions. Could converted Japanese Marxist social scientists envision this new kind of subjectivity by reinterpreting the village community, where they could not find any political dynamics over the course of the Asiatic mode of debate?

In dealing with these questions, Hirano and Moritani provide two different directions that are inseparable from their previous writings on Asia. By analyzing these two former Marxist intellectuals, I will first investigate how they portrayed Asian society and theorized it in the project of restructuring the empire-colony structure. In this process, I will show the limits of their wartime Asian discourse, focusing on the colonial consciousness inherent in their logic of subjectivity formation in the empire. By looking at how pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals responded to their voices, I will
also highlight the tension between colonial and imperial intellectuals in envisioning a new form of subjectivity in an East Asian empire.

**Specters of Scientific China Studies : Hirano Yoshitarō and Karl Wittfogel**

Hirano Yoshitarō officially committed “tenkō” 転向 (conversion) after he was arrested in 1936, and his tenkō has been often considered a turning point in his scholarship on Asia. Although the political environment surrounding him played an important role in his later commitment to Japanese imperialism, it is also important not to overlook theoretical issues inherent in his writings on Asia. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the Chinese village community was first portrayed by Hirano as a unique characteristic of Asiatic society. But he did not simply endorse the colonial prescription by some Western Marxist theoreticians that external impacts on Asia, China and India in particular, would transform the Asiatic mode of production into a modern one. In this respect, an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist standpoint was predominant in Hirano’s early scholarship on Japan and Asia.

However, what is more important was how Hirano evaluated the political dynamics inherent in the Chinese village community. As many have argued, the Koza-ha Marxists’ encounter with the so-called China studies was traceable to their interest in the 1911 Nationalist Revolution in China.² Witnessing the collapse of the Qing dynasty, they anticipated that civil society would come into being in China before long. But this change in the political superstructure was not followed by changes in the mode of production from a Marxist perspective.

Between the anti-imperialist political ideal in Marxism and the impossibility of

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² For example, Narita Ryōji argues in his recent article that Japanese Marxists’ study of China in the 1920s and early 1930s was closely connected to their interest in the Nationalist revolution in China. See Narita Ryōji, “Hirano yoshitarō to murukusu shakaikagaku no ajia shakai ron,” Ishii Tomoaki, Kobayashi Hideo and Yonetani Masafumi eds., 1930 nendai no ajia shakairon – 1930 kyodotairon wo chūshin to suru gensetsukukan no shosho (Tokyo: Shakaihyōronsha, 2010), pp. 215-222.
drawing political forces from Asian village communities to realize an anti-imperialist revolution, the village community gradually lost the attention of Japanese Marxist social scientists, including Hirano. To be sure, intellectuals like Hani Goro strove to find political potentials from Asian peasant masses. However, his manifesto did not include a scientific analysis of how peasants could be reborn as subjects with political awareness. In this way, the Asiatic mode of production debate terminated without making theoretical progress toward radical revolution in the rest of Asia. On the other hand, Koza-ha Japanese Marxists gradually emphasized the transition of the Japanese economy from semi-feudalism to what might be called proto-capitalism, although feudal remnants were still a major obstacle to pure bourgeois revolution. Consequently, the Asiatic mode of production debate in mid 1930s Japan could not remove the pessimistic images of the Asian village community first promulgated by Marx and reproduced by Western intellectuals. Rather, through the efforts of Japanese Marxist intellectuals, it created an epistemology to separate Japan from the rest of Asia.

In an article published in 1934, two years before his conversion, Hirano developed a socio-economic analysis of Chinese society, referring to Adam Smith’s discussion of China. Here, Hirano made it clear that the Asiatic mode of production had bound Chinese peasants in an oppressive landlord-peasant relationship and as a result prevented civil society from emerging in China. Hirano’s gaze toward the Chinese village community was not optimistic as he put forth civil society as the sole path for bourgeois democratic revolution. But this did not simply mean that he endorsed the necessity of external intervention in China by Western powers.

Hirano aimed to approach China from a different perspective, and accordingly called for methodological transformations in China studies. In a 1934 article entitled

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“Two Ways in China Studies,” he opened fire against the so-called mainstream China studies in the West. Until the 1920s, Hirano asserted, Western intellectuals had been trapped in the perception that feudalism in China would be dismantled by external impacts, that is, western imperialism. Instead of such an ideology-laden approach, what he suggested was a scientific and objective interpretation of Chinese history and culture. It was under these circumstances that Hirano encountered the German economic historian Karl Wittfogel. In fact, much of Hirano’s thesis of methodological transformation in this article was based on Wittfogel’s “scientific” and “empirical” research on China. Beginning with the co-translation of Wittfogel’s seminal two-volume work with Moritani Katsumi, Kaitai katei ni aru Shina no keizai to shakai (Chinese Economy and Society in the Process of Dismantlement, hereafter Shina no keizai to shakai), in 1934, Hirano played a central role in introducing Karl Wittfogel to Japanese intellectual circles, and as a result Karl Wittfogel’s scholarship formed a powerful thread of China studies in the late 1930s.

To critically discuss Hirano’s notion of objective and scientific China studies, it is necessary to trace Wittfogel’s scholarship on China. Instead of repeating Marx’s

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concept of Asiatic society, Wittfogel’s early writings were more concerned with showing his peculiar understanding of dialectic materialism in relation to space and geography. Wittfogel maintained that dialectic materialism was predicated on its notion of geography being completely separated from the human being’s power of social production.⁷ He went on to contend that neither nature nor geography nor human beings’ acquired production power normatively explained the stages of certain economies.⁸ It appears that Wittfogel’s perspective was not that much different from Marx’s concept of nature, but Wittfogel’s view was that Marx’s notion of nature focused more on how nature determined human social behavior than on how it provides different possibilities for revolution.⁹ For this reason, Wittfogel never denied the validity of nature’s impacts on human activity, but he also tried to avoid a somewhat hasty conclusion that natural restrictions would eventually give reasons for the different stages of economies, as Marx conceptualized in his theory of the Asiatic Mode of Production.

In a 1933 book, *A Critique of Geography* (地理学批判), Wittfogel further elaborated on his spatial theory.¹⁰ Here, Wittfogel’s critiques of the existing spatial theories targeted Marx’s concept of nature as well as political geography, the latter of which rapidly gained currency in post-World War I Europe. Wittfogel’s concept of nature was premised on the perception that the world is not divided into universal spaces and particular spaces, as Marx’s concept of geography put forth. Criticizing Karl Haushofer’s geopolitical analysis of Asian society, Wittfogel argued that geopolitics does not provide a scientific analysis for why peasants in China, India and Japan

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⁷ Karl Wittfogel, trans., Sakada Yoshiocho, “Marukusushugini okeru futotekikeikino igi (fudoseijigaku, chiritekiyuibuturon narabini marukusushugi),” *Shisō* 103 (Dec 1930), pp. 110-123.
⁸ Ibid., pp. 118-119.
⁹ Ibid., p. 118.
¹⁰ Karl Wittfogel, trans., Kawanishi Seikan, *Chirigaku hihan* (The original German title is *Geopolitik, Geographischer Materialismus und Marxismus*) (Kyoto : Yūkōsha, 1933).
developed particular socio-economic activities.\textsuperscript{11} In other words, for Wittfogel the issue of particularity in Asia was not a problem that should be explained according to geographical characteristics, but more in terms of how people in Asian had shown certain social, economic and political activities under these geographical characteristics.

Through these theoretical speculations, Wittfogel formulated his notion of China studies. As his critiques of the existing epistemology of China well suggest, it seems evident that he strove not to repeat the conventional interpretations of Asiatic society that had emphasized stagnation in Asia as geographically determined. This also explains why Wittfogel painstakingly put forth the necessity of scientific and objective studies of China. Based on these observations, Wittfogel defined a scientific attitude toward China as follows:

\begin{quote}
A \textit{Scientific attitude} was, in terms of its fundamental configuration, based on the conviction that although Chinese civilization exists along with a variety of Western civilizations, the former is the same as the latter to some extent. For this reason, many social scientists think that categories that apply to the development of Western civilization can also be applicable to Chinese studies. The validity of this notion is obvious; that is, it enabled the introduction of scientific methods [to Chinese studies]. Since various characteristics of agricultural society are similar, a certain kind of mechanical identification is applied and this produces \textit{objective truth} to some degree. But this accomplishment does not transcend this level. A number of theoretical and practical misunderstandings and failures take place, and presumably these problems are, most of all, due to the lack of consciousness on what kind of society China is in its basic sense.\textsuperscript{12} (emphasis added)
\end{quote}

As the statement above indicates, Wittfogel’s concept of both nature and China as a scientific object was not premised on the assumption that the West represents the universal in social scientific research and the East the particular. Rather, for Wittfogel,

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., pp. 56-57.
\textsuperscript{12} Karl Wittfogel, trans., Hirano Yoshitarō, \textit{Shina shakai no kagakuteki kenkyū} (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1939), p. 57. This book was a compilation of Wittfogel’s writings on China in the late 1930s. The first chapter of this book, which contains the core part of Wittfogel’s methodology on China studies, was the translation of Wittfogel’s 1938 report, “New Light on Chinese Society, An investigation of China’s Socio-economic Structure,” published by the International Secretarist, Institute of Pacific Relations.
particulars of each society, Asian society in particular, were scientific variables that enabled social scientists to consider in retrospect the limits of the universality of the social scientific method. How, then, did Wittfogel interpret Chinese society? In *Shina no keizai to shakai*, Wittfogel concretized his famous theory of hydraulic society. Agriculture in China, Wittfogel argued, had been greatly influenced by water resources. Since floods and drought frequently take place in China, this geographical condition necessitated massive state-sponsored irrigation projects. Thus explained Wittfogel, the state directly intervened in the process of agricultural production, which was characterized by the state’s dominant ownership of arable lands.

This observation by Wittfogel led him to conclude that these geographical and structural conditions were not conducive to the Western form of a landlord-peasant relationship. Instead, the peasants were directly bound to the state and this unique production relationship lasted until external powers arrived in China. This thesis later became the theoretical grounds for Wittfogel’s seminal book, *Oriental Despotism*, published in 1957. However, unlike other Western Marxist theoreticians, Wittfogel never carried his argument a step further to claim that it was inevitable for external powers to change the economic structure in China. Ostensibly, Wittfogel seemed to maintain his objective and empirically oriented research on China, although he was also involved in highly political institutes such as the Institute of Pacific Relations.

All in all, Wittfogel’s China studies, based on meticulous interpretations of primary sources, rapidly received attention from many, if not all, Japanese intellectuals. However, his theory was not necessarily endorsed by Japanese Marxists at face value. Aikawa Haruki, for example, cast a dubious eye on Wittfogel’s methodology, denouncing Wittfogel’s theory as a form of “dual” materialism. Aikawa’s discontent

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14 Ibid.
was centered on Wittfogel’s notion of nature and geography as discussed in his 1932 and 1933 writings. He conceptualized Wittfogel’s material dialectics as “double dialectics.” In other words, Wittfogel’s notion of nature, Aikawa contended, was based on the perception that natural geographical conditions only provide possibilities for surplus value, but do not explain the reality of surplus value. For this reason, Wittfogel created a dual structure of production power, in which the production power conditioned and determined by nature and the production power determined by the social process of labor operated separately. Aikawa went on to argue that Wittfogel’s understanding of labor and production power as overdetermined between nature and society rendered his dialectics ambiguous.

In what context were Wittfogel’s ostensibly objective studies of China appropriated by former Japanese Marxist social scientists? To begin with, it is important to take a close look where Wittfogel’s interpretation of China was located in relation to his analysis of Japan. Interestingly, Wittfogel visited Japan in 1935 as a part of commemoration of the translation of Shina no keizai to shakai into Japanese. At a meeting with Japanese Marxist intellectuals, Wittfogel was asked four questions, two of which were about the differences between Chinese Confucianism and Japanese Confucianism, and the difference between the Chinese family system and the Japanese family system. Not surprisingly, Wittfogel wrote in a clear tone in the foreword of Shina no keizai to shakai that Japan had undergone a quite different process of economic development from China. This short remark provided Japanese Marxist

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16 Ibid.
17 For Wittfogel’s visit to Japan in 1935, see Fukuritu Shōji, “Wittofoguru hakase no nihon hōmon,” Shinagaku 8, no.1 (1935), pp. 133-141.
19 Ibid.
social scientists with a powerful basis for their claim that Japan had already passed the stage of Asian village community, characterized by stagnation and the despotic political structure.

Heavily influenced by Wittfogel’s so-called scientific and objective study of China, Hirano’s writings on China took on a much clearer divisionist perspective between China and Japan. A year after Wittfogel’s books were published, Hirano contributed an article to Shisō 思想 comparing Japan’s agriculture with Asiatic agriculture. In this article, Hirano did not deny that the premodern constitution of Japan’s agriculture bore a resemblance to Asiatic society. But he did not pessimistically conclude that the potential for civil society could not be found in Japanese society. In his seminal book, The Constitution of Japanese Capitalistic Society (日本資本主義社会の機構), Japanese peasants were described as “fractured and isolated.” However, the alienation of Japanese peasants in Hirano’s understanding of Japanese agriculture, as Nagaoka Shinkichi has argued, was in large part based on Hirano’s observation that they could not become independent peasants possessing arable land under the semi-feudal landlord-peasant system. To put it another way, Hirano argued that the impoverishment and marginalization of Japanese peasants took place as they were exposed to the capitalistic mode of production, although feudal remnants were still dominant in agriculture. Therefore, Japanese agriculture, although it still had semi-feudal remnants within it, was portrayed as fundamentally different from village communities in China. Such a statement could be easily associated with the observation that these Asiatic characteristics had already disappeared as Japan gradually entered the stage of the capitalist economy.

In this way, Hirano as a Koza-ha intellectual maintained his Marxist thinking in analyzing both Japanese and Chinese agriculture. Paradoxically, the very concept of civil society as a necessary step for bourgeois revolution became a major turning point in Hirano’s search for revolutionary potential in the Chinese village community. Importantly, rather than denouncing Chinese society as such, Hirano constantly strove to locate his research in the realm of scientific and objective analysis. To this end, Karl Wittfogel’s China studies were purposely appropriated by Hirano.

**Moritani Katsumi - Colonial Korea and the Concept of the Oriental**

Hirano Yoshitarō appropriated Wittfogel’s China studies to rationalize his highly biased gaze at China, namely armed with “scientific objectivity.” In contrast, Moritani Katsumi, a Koza-ha Marxist theoretician who was teaching social policy at Kyungsung Imperial University (京成帝国大学) in colonial Korea, wrote extensively on China and colonial Korea from a different perspective. Notably both Hirano and Moritani encountered each other on several occasions. Together with Hirano, Moritani was a co-translator of Wittfogel’s *Shina no keizai to shakai*, published in 1935, and four years later, they co-translated another of Wittfogel’s books, *Tōyōteki shakai no riron* (東洋的社會の理論). In this way, Moritani actively involved himself in China studies from the perspective of Marxist social science.

Moritani was appointed as a lecturer at Kyungsung Imperial University in June 1927, two months after he graduated from Tokyo Imperial University. In 1929, he became an assistant professor and took charge of social policy courses, which he taught until 1945. At Kyungsung Imperial University, he was known as a liberal intellectual among Japanese and Korean students. His Marxist scholarship did not deprive him of

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his professorship in colonial Korea, but it became a major reason for his remaining an assistant professor for 16 years, between 1929 and 1945.\textsuperscript{24} On the other hand, Moritani’s stay in colonial Korea between 1927 and 1945 partly explains his somewhat marginalized position within Japanese Marxist intellectual circles. However, it was this intellectual background that made him a very influential imperial intellectual in colonial Korea during the wartime period. Undoubtedly, Moritani was virtually the only converted Marxist intellectual who wrote extensively on colonial Korea and, precisely for this reason, tracing his scholarship must become an integral part of any effort to depict Japanese Marxists wartime discourses.

Before looking at Moritani’s wartime writings on colonial Korea and the East Asian community, it is useful to explore his observation of the Asiatic mode of production debate and his understanding of Asian society. Here, locating Moritani as an observer, as I have discussed, is related to the spatial marginality that he experienced as a Japanese professor in colonial Korea. Importantly, Moritani’s writings over the course of the debate were focused on problematizing the very concept of Asiatic society. In an article on Asiatic society in Hegel and Marx, Moritani began setting forth his critical approaches to the so-called Asiatic society conceptualized by Western thinkers.\textsuperscript{25} According to him, Asia was positioned by Hegel as one of the civilizations in world history. Moritani observed, however, that Hegel described China as a state in a political sense but portrayed Chinese society as lacking immanent forces for development. The absence of private ownership prevented class relations from being formed in China, and Hegel asserted, therefore, that everyone in China eventually degenerated to become a “slave before the Emperor.”\textsuperscript{26}

Although Moritani acknowledged that Hegel’s highly idealist approach to China

\textsuperscript{25} Moritani Katsumi, “Tōyōshakai ni kansuru hegeru to marukusu,” Shakai 2, no.1 (Jan 1933), pp.2-15.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp.3-7
was a product of 18\textsuperscript{th} century European philosophy, what he problematized seriously was the strong geographical determinism inherent in Hegel.\textsuperscript{27} Moritani contended that Hegel’s determinism actually became a prelude to European intellectuals’ particularistic gaze at Asian society through its geographical characteristics in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries. To be sure, not only Moritani but many Japanese Marxist social scientists did not simply endorse geographical determinism at face value, and even Marx’s concept of Asian geography became a target of criticism. However, it is important to note that Moritani’s viewpoint was heavily influenced by his research on colonial Korea.

Soon after the publication of an article on Hegel and Marx, Moritani produced numerous articles on colonial Korea between 1933 and 1935. Given that he was teaching at Kyungsung Imperial University, his extensive writings on colonial Korea were not unexpected. He was affiliated with the Institute for Chosun Economy (朝鮮経済研究所, Chōsen keizai kenkyūsho) at the College of Law and Literature at Kyungsung Imperial University. However, other Japanese scholars in this group represented quite conservative studies on Korea. Shigata Hiroshi, for example, actually led this group and sought to prove that the underdevelopment of Chosun society was attributable to the lack of immanent forces for modernization within Korea.\textsuperscript{28} On the other hand, Korean intellectuals were adamantly opposed to such a particularist view on Korea. For example, Paik Nam Un ґ白南雲 (1984-1979), who was teaching at Yŏnhee College 延禧専門学校 (present-day Yonsei University), promulgated a universalist approach to Korean history, insisting that like other societies, Korea had undergone the 5-stage economic development based on historical materialism. In this way, Moritani’s early writings on colonial Korea were situated within the rivalry between these different

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid
In a 1934 article entitled “Natural Environment and Chosun Society (1),” Moritani further elaborated on his anti-geographical determinism and applied it to colonial Korea. In this article, he paid special attention to the relationship between natural environment and ethnicity (民族性, minzokusei). He particularly problematized the tendency to explain world history based on climate and natural environment and argued that this explanation is often reduced to geographical materialism:

Generally, an attempt to draw upon ethnicity, that is the physical and spiritual nature of a certain ethnic group, and to explain the history of a nation-state through natural environment is not free from the same problem (geographical materialism). On one hand, a certain ethnic group under similar natural environment, climate in a general sense, shows differences in the processes of cultural development. Other ethnic groups at the same stage of cultural development are under conspicuously different natural environment. Moritani did not hastily conclude that the natural environment must be ignored in writing the history of a certain ethnic group or a nation-state. Instead, he emphasized that the basic mechanism of production and reproduction is greatly contingent upon natural conditions. He contended, therefore, that conducting research on the natural conditions of Korean society would provide a scientific basis for understanding the development of the Korean economy. Such observation by Moritani was associated with his somewhat radical interpretation of Marx’s historical materialism. In other words, Moritani intended to distinguish particularity (特殊性) from characteristics. According to him, differences in natural conditions invariably have different impacts on the mode of production and reproduction, creating some particular moments in the history of each human group. But the amalgam of these pieces of particularities, he contended, does not constitute the particularity of a certain people or nation in

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29 Moritani Katsumi, “Chōsen shakai to shizen kankyō (1),” Tōa 7, no.12 (Dec 1934), p. 43.
30 Ibid., p.46.
31 Ibid., p.48
comparison to the so-called universal path of history.\textsuperscript{32}

Based on these observations, Moritani was equally critical of what he believed to be an extremely universalistic approach to Korean history. For example, he asserted Paik Nam Un, a Marxist economic historian, put forth the logic of universality in an excessive way, intentionally ignoring particularistic characteristics that Chosun society had shown in its history.\textsuperscript{33} Moritani maintained that Paik showed an excessive intentionality to locate Korean history in Marx’s universal 5-stage theory of economic development, overlooking its important social and natural factors that would be imperative to a scientific understanding of Korean society. In this way, Moritani sought to locate his studies of colonial Korea in the realm of scientific objectivity and this indicated that his Korean studies should not be simply reduced to the hasty generalization of a certain culture, nationalism in particular. Not surprisingly, this standpoint bore a resemblance to that of Karl Wittfogel’s research on China, and Moritani actively engaged himself in expanding Wittfogel’s work to the understanding of Korean society. He observed that both China and Korea represented similar natural conditions, in that irrigation and great lakes were the main variables of agricultural production, and as a result, the central government emerged as a dominant political force to control this social pattern. Moritani described this as the river culture in the Orient in contrast to the ocean culture in the West.\textsuperscript{34}

Just as Wittfogel viewed the village community as the basic unit in Chinese society, Moritani thought that this was also the case for Korean society. He maintained that in spite of various socio-political changes, the so-called autonomous community in

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p.49.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. Paik Nam Un’s work that Moritani criticized was Paik’s seminal book, \textit{The Social and Economic History of Chosun} (Chōsen shakai keizai shi), published in 1933.
\textsuperscript{34} Moritani Katsumi, “Chōsen shakai to shizen kankyō (1),” \textit{Tōa} 8, no.2 (Feb 1935), pp. 22-40; Moritani Katsumi, “Kyurai no chōsen nōgyō shakai ni tuite no kenkyū no tameni,” in Keijōteikokudaigaku hōbungakkai ed., \textit{Chōsen shakai keizaishi kenkyū} (Tokyo: Tōkō shoin, 1933), pp. 397-482.
premodern Korea had survived. However, this autonomy was not necessarily interpreted in a positive way. Moritani went on to argue that village communities remained autonomous on a superficial level, since they were predominantly controlled by state power, leaving them intact from external powers. Consequently, he argued, such factors as class relations and a new mode of production did not arise in the village community in premodern Korea.

Moritani never carried his views a step further to make the value-laden judgment that Korean society lacked immanent forces, or that the autonomous village community had to be a driving force for the socialist revolution. Instead, he maintained that the village community in both China and Korea was a reflection of their geographical and environmental conditions, characterized by irrigation. Based on these observations, Moritani intended to make an “objective” statement that agricultural policies in the 1910s and 1920s followed by Japan’s annexation of Korea brought about significant changes in Korea.

To be sure, Moritani was not an anti-colonial Marxist social scientist, as he developed Korean studies from his own perspective. But he intended to maintain a physical distance from Koza-ha Marxists in Japan proper, who had been striving to reach a conclusion that (1) the Asiatic mode of production is an ancient form of production that existed not only in Asia but also in other parts of the world, and (2) contemporary Japanese society had already surpassed the stage of Asiatic society as it underwent rapid capitalistic development. In response to these highly Japan-centered analyses of the Asiatic mode of production debate, Moritani, who had not been outspoken during the course of the debate, published several articles between 1935 and 1937, that criticized his colleagues. In a 1935 article, Moritani revisited the question of the village community in Asia and rejected the tendency to place the Asiatic mode of production as a particular mode of production within the five stages of development in
Marx’s historical materialism. Instead, he emphasized that the village community in Asia existed in both ancient times and the feudal era.\(^{35}\)

Moritani’s somewhat later involvement in the notion of Asiatic society might not have received much attention from his colleagues, simply because the debate itself rapidly withered away beginning in 1935. Many of the participants were either arrested or forced to disavow Marxism beginning in the mid 1930s. However, it is important to note that Moritani continued to elaborate on these fundamental issues inherent in the logic of Asiatic society. Among them, what captured his attention was the notion of universality and particularity in Oriental culture. As I have discussed, his critical interpretation of so-called Asiatic society was based on the perception that the village community in Asia should be conceived of as a form of common culture rather than as a class system or a mode of production in a socio-political sense. Accordingly, Moritani carried his question a step further to the level of an epistemological analysis.

In a close reading of literary critic Tsuda Sōkichi’s 聴田左右吉 (1873-1961) notion of Oriental culture (東洋的文化, tōyōteki bunka), Moritani observed that Japanese intellectuals tended to think that such a thing as oriental culture did not exist in relation to so-called Western culture.\(^{36}\) Tsuda, a conservative intellectual, vehemently argued that the particularistic cultures developed by China, India and Japan could not be conceived of as an “oriental culture,” since fundamental differences existed among them. Although Moritani expressed some sympathy with Tsuda’s argument, his disagreement with such a divisionist view of Oriental culture focused on the way Tsuda preconditioned ethnic culture as trans-historically given.\(^{37}\)


\(^{37}\) Ibid. Although Moritani mentioned in passing Tsuda’s highly Japan-centered and almost hyperbolic interpretation of Chinese culture, Tsuda’s notion of cultural differences between China and Japan was premised on his conviction of the civilizational superiority of Japanese culture to Chinese culture. Based
pointed out that Tsuda’s notion of particularity in each culture was based on the fundamental perception that climate (風土) and geographic conditions produce different ethnic cultures.\(^{38}\)

It is understandable that Moritani, who held a steadfast belief in historical materialism, could not simply endorse Tsuda’s particularist approach to the notion of ethnicity. Moritani’s understanding of ethnicity as fluid was formulated as he encountered discourses on the nation by Western theoreticians. Analyzing the theories of nation and ethnicity by two prominent social democrats, Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) and Otto Bauer (1881-1938), Moritani revisited materialist and cultural conditions that give rise to ethnicity. Moritani was critical of Kautsky’s emphasis on a national language as a decisive condition for nation (民族) and character (性格): Would the language or character of a nation as a form of idea (観念) exist without a material base on which members of a nation live?\(^{39}\) In addition, Moritani was clearly aware that the so-called a modern nation is a historical product of social relations that constantly changes themselves.

Therefore, Moritani acutely pointed out the limits of the circulative argument that the particular culture of a nation is prescribed by the historical particularity of the nation:

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on these observations, Tsuda boldly argued, “Chinese thinkers usually hate retrospection and introspection, and they also hardly make any efforts to objectively see things as they are. Furthermore, their ways of speculation for the most part are ways of combining various ideas through association, and this association is in many cases inconsistent since it is merely rhetorical and based on ancient words and expressions. … The fundamental reason the Japanese could not understand and speculate on Chinese thought as thought although they have read huge numbers of Chinese books is not only that, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, Chinese thought in itself was not created based on profound reflection, and the Japanese language is not suitable for understanding Chinese language and sentences. Chinese thought expressed by Chinese language and sentences from the outset does not have any character that stimulates people to speculate or that enhances people’s ability of speculation.” (Emphasis added) Tsuda Sōkichi, Chūgoku shisō to nihon (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970, c1938), p.24.

\(^{38}\) Moritani, Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron, p.132.

If someone argues that the culture of Japan is an independent thing of Japan and it is represented in the Japanese people’s independent life prescribed by the climate and historical particularity of Japan, that person would not prove this argument unless he could explain clearly how independent the life of the Japanese is.\textsuperscript{40}

This observation led him to insist that China, Japan and India had commonly maintained the Oriental in terms of the life of productive labor (生産的労働) in relation to the West. Irrigation projects and so-called garden cultivation based on the state’s direct control were presented by him as examples of common characteristics in the Orient.\textsuperscript{41} In this way, Moritani’s interpretation of the Asiatic mode of production became increasingly detached from the formalist view; that is, how a certain mode of production should be positioned within the process of historical development. Based on these observations, Moritani reiterated in several articles published between 1935 and 1937 that the notion of the Asiatic mode of production should not be reduced to a certain period of time or a form of production. Consequently, by replacing the notion of modes of production with what he called “things on living (生活的なもの),” Moritani sought to find a middle ground between one-dimensional universalism and Asian particularism.

To be sure, such an apolitical approach to colonial Korea and China provided him with much room to engage in wartime Asian discourses based on the logic of similarities within Oriental culture. However, it also left behind one important question: Once he set aside the issue of the mode of production in analyzing Asian society, how did he elaborate on the question of modernization and ethnic nationalism in envisioning an East Asian community? Of course, this question must be asked of Hirano’s wartime Asian discourses as well. In the following pages, I move on to Hirano Yoshitarō’s encounter with the Asian community and his Greater Asianism (大アジア主義).

\textsuperscript{40} Moritani Katsumi, \textit{Ajiateki seisan yoshiki ron}, p.133.  
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
Hirano Yoshitarō’s Encounter with the East Asian Community

In 1936, a year after the publication of Wittfogel’s *Kaitai katei ni aru Shina no keizai to shakai*, Hirano Yoshitarō was arrested for organizing a Marxist research group with Yamada Moritarō and other Koza-ha Marxists. This incident, later called “the Comm Academy Case,” became a major turning point in Hirano’s Marxist scholarship and political engagement. In the following year, he submitted a letter of conversion to the government and was released soon after that. Between 1936 and 1940, Hirano did not publish Marxism-related academic, except for biographical works on his former mentors.

In 1939, Hirano began publishing works on political issues, focusing on China and the problem of ethnicity and nationalism in Asia. Together with Moritani Katsumi, he translated Wittfogel’s *Tōyōteki shakai no riron* (A Theory of Oriental Society). In the same year, he joined the Institute of East Asia (東亜研究所), one of the major government-funded think tanks where his former teacher Suehira Kentarō was the director of the institution. Hirano participated in the 6th committee, a special committee organized to conduct extensive field research on rural Chinese villages.

On May 1, 1940, shortly after joining the institute, Hirano’s writing appeared in the famous journal *Chūōkōron* 中央公論. In this roundtable discussion entitled “Social Constitution in the Orient and the Future of Japan and China,” Hirano delineated his notion of the East Asian community for the first time after tenkō.42 Notably, the participants in this discussion represented both disciplinary diversity and different political positions regarding China studies within Japanese Marxist circles. Among the discussants, Ozaki Hotsumi 尾崎秀実 (1901-1944) was one of the most renowned

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42 A round-table discussion, “Tōyō no shakai kōsei to nichishi no shōrai,” *Chūōkōron* 55, no.7 (July 1940), pp. 44-68.
journalists and had already contributed several articles on the so-called “China Problem” to major journals based on his experience as a China correspondent for the Tokyo Asahi Newspaper. Together with Ozaki, Hosakawa Karoku 細川嘉六 (1888-1962) represented the journalist side of the discussion. Tachibana Shiraki 橘樸 (1881-1945) was an established China scholar who published two major books on China, *Shina shakai kenkyū* (支那社会研究, A Study of Chinese Society) and *Shina shisō kenkyū* (支那思想研究, A Study of Chinese Thought), both in 1936. Similar to Karl Wittfogel, Tachibana’s China scholarship was characterized by his particularist approach to Chinese society based on Marx’s historical materialism.

Given that this round-table discussion was held three years after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, a major issue to which the discussants paid special attention was the question of how to rethink the nature of the Chinese village community, and based on this, how to examine the potential for constructing an East Asian community. Tachibana began the discussion by describing Chinese society as a community (共同体) as opposed to an assembly (集合体). According to him, the former is characterized by its blood-centeredness and the state’s control over individuals, whereas the constitution of the latter is based on individuals’ goal-oriented activities. An assembly in Tachibana’s discussion actually signified civil society in the West. This observation was followed by his observation that except for the case of Japan, no Asian countries had reached the level of civil society. In this way, Tachibana’s notion of social constitution took on a developmentalist perspective, in that he pointed out capitalistic

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43 Ozaki and Hosokawa became acquainted with each other as they organized a research group for the Chinese revolution (中国革命研究室) at the Ohara Institute for Social Research 大原社会問題研究所 in 1927. They organized another research group for China studies in 1939, but both were arrested in October 1941 for the Jorge Incident.

44 In *Shina shakai kenkyū*, Tachibana dedicated three chapters to analyzing capitalists, workers and bureaucrats in China and the titles of these chapters all end with the term “particularity” (特殊性). Tachibana Shiraki, *Shina shakai kenkyū* (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1936).

45 A round-table discussion, “Tōyō no shakai kōsei to nichishi no shōrai,” pp.50-52.
development as a key to the formation of civil society.

Endorsing Tachibana’s argument, Hirano attributed the nature of the Chinese community to its natural and environmental conditions, characterized by great lakes and irrigation. Based on this observation, which he actually borrowed from Karl Wittfogel’s research, he elaborated further on the differences between China and Japan. In contrast to geographical conditions in China, where the government always had to be prepared for attacks by nomadic tribes and as a result, the central government became increasingly dominant over all other social sectors, the archipelagic topography of Japan enabled local governments and landlords to develop a typical feudal system in which hierarchal relations arose between the samurai and peasants arose.46

In response to this distinction made by two intellectuals, Hosakawa, the journalist, revisited the issue of community in the contemporary world. Although a (village) community had been conceived of as something to be transformed into civil society, Hosokawa argued, a community in a new and sustainable form became increasingly necessary at the time of the universal crisis in capitalism.47 As for Hosokawa’s question, Tachibana defended himself by maintaining that Japan reentered the stage of a community-based society. Tachibana contended that a primitive form of community had been preserved in Japanese society, and described it as a “pyramid state organization,” in which the emperor is located atop the political structure and mediates social struggles and sustains what he called Gemeinschaft.48 His theory of community, however, was in fact delineated in a highly abstract way.

Needless to say, Tachibana’s notion of the pyramid community was inconsistent with his own developmentalist perspective, according to which community should be replaced by civil society when the capitalistic mode of production is attained. Although

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46 Ibid., p.55
47 Ibid., p.61
48 Ibid.
his remark was purposely made in an attempt to prove similarities between Japan and China in their communitarian social configurations, differences in natural and social conditions between the two, which participants of the roundtable discussion emphasized, would not simply disappear. Aware of these problems, Tachibana himself raised the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community (東亜協同体), which was rapidly gaining currency among Japanese and Korean intellectuals beginning in the late 1930s. Hirano delineated his understanding of this new theory:

Super-national-great-regionalism (超民族的大地域主義) deserves attention in the East Asian Co-operative Community. This ideology is different from imperialism. While there is conflict between empire and colony in imperialism, super-national-great-regionalism is the new theory that each ethnic group obtains independence at its highest degree in domestic politics, economy, culture and tradition, reorganizing defense, finance and diplomacy in a unit of a great region. At any rate, when it comes to discussing cultural cooperation between Japan and China in the East Asian Cooperative Community, I believe that it would be possible only when the differences between the two in ethnicity, social development, and cultural tradition are recognized. Henceforth, I have intentionally talked about the comparison between Japan and China in traditional social constitution before capitalism.49

This statement shows that Hirano, too, was sympathetic to this new theory to some extent. However, as he himself emphasized many times, the marked differences between Japan and China must be recognized. Hirano went on to discuss the conceptual differences between two Chinese letters, 協 and 共, in a legal sense. In ancient Roman law, he argued, the term 共 in community (共同体) indicated that an individual surrenders himself to totality. In this sense, the term 共 connotes a similar meaning to sharing. On the other hand, the term 協 might be used if it has the meaning of gathering individuals’ forces, and this corresponds to the system of German law.50

Hirano’s legal analysis of community and cooperative community is traceable to

49 Ibid., p.62.
50 Ibid., p.62.
his 1924 book *Roman Thought and German Thought in Civil Law* (民法におけるローマ思想とゲルマン思想), in which he observed that German law emerged in an attempt to postulate a cooperative society in Europe, replacing Roman law as representing individualism. Hirano held that the locus of German law lay the concept of *Genossenshaft*, which connotes a similar meaning to cooperativism, while the prefix “co” in terms of individuals’ belonging to a community is analogous to *communis* in Roman law. Hirano’s analogy with German and Roman law systems in discussing the East Asia Cooperative Community sounds inconsistent in many ways, simply because, as he himself emphasized, the latter pertained to “super-national-great-regionalism,” while the former operated in a single-nation-state framework. However, it tells us in which direction Hirano would develop his discourses on the East Asian Community. As I have discussed, Hirano’s writings in the early and mid 1930s over the course of the Asiatic mode of production debate clearly show his disillusion with community itself, the Chinese village community in particular. Beginning in the late 1930s, anti-individualist communitarian discourses were widely accepted by both conservative and “progressive” intellectuals, and under these circumstances, Hirano had to revisit his writings in the 1920s in which he deliberated the notion of community. However, his adherence to the fundamental differences between Japan and China, which he borrowed from Wittfogel’s theory, continued to dominate his epistemology. This explains why Hirano, together with Tachibana Shiraki, concentrated on the institutional and legal aspects of the East Asian Community, focusing on the term political power (政治力) in an attempt to draw a picture of community between the two saliently different societies.

Tachibana defined a new political power as deriving from the state’s capability to

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51 For an excellent analysis of the continuity between Hirano’s law studies in the 1920s and his East Asian discourses in the 1940s, see Mori Hideki, “Hirano Yoshitarō ni okeru hōgaku to shakaikagaku,” in Amano Kazuo (et al.) eds., *Marukusu hōgaku kōza 1: Marukusu shugi hōgaku no seritu to hatten, Nihon* (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1976), pp. 88-91.

52 A round-table discussion, “Tōyō no shakai kōsei to nichishi no shōrai,” p.63.
organize the Japanese people. Therefore, his idea is no doubt different from the so-called notion of reorganizing the nation (国民再組織) that was presented by many intellectuals as the logic of total mobilization. Responding to Tachibana’s discussion of domestic politics, Hirano sought to outline a new political power in a regional context. As he put it, “In short, the Japanese people guide and are respected by ethnic groups in East Asia, which fulfills the capabilities of the Japanese people. Only under this objective condition, can the alliance and cooperation between Japan and China be made.”

**National Politics (民族政治) and Subjectivity**

In this way, Hirano did not hide his desire to construct an East Asian empire under the leadership of Japan and resolve the issue of ethnic nationalism in China. However, he was clearly aware that the abstract notion of political power must be elaborated further to convince the Chinese people. Central to this question was how to draw a logic of politics from the Chinese village community and could link it to a Japan-centered regional order. Following the 1940 roundtable discussion, Hirano became actively involved in several government-funded China study projects. After conducting research on rural areas in China and Southeast Asia, Hirano published several books on ethnicity and nationalism in these areas. Beginning with the 1942 publication of *Minzoku seijigaku no riron* (民族政治学の理論, The Theory of National Political Science), he published two more books, *Minzoku seiji no kihon mondai* (民族政治の基本問題, The Basic Problems of National Politics) and *Taiheiyō no minzoku=seijigaku* (太平洋の民族=政治学, Nations in the Pacific Ocean = Political Science, co-authored with Kiyono Kenji) between 1942 and 1944. As the titles of these books suggest, Hirano’s

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53 Ibid., p.65  
54 Ibid.  
55 Hirano Yoshitarō, *Minzoku seijigaku no riron* (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1942); Hirano Yoshitarō and
main concern was the relationship between politics and nation. Needless to say, it was not only Hirano but virtually all Japanese intellectuals during the wartime period who grappled with this issue.

Before analyzing Hirano’s notion of national politics during the wartime period, it might be useful to discuss his concept of ethnicity in the mid 1930s. I argue that Hirano’s keen interest in the concept of ethnicity did not emerged unexpectedly in the early 1940s, although it is evident that the notion of ethnic politics served him as a vehicle for rationalizing his wartime discourses. While focusing on translating Karl Wittfogel’s works, Hirano also introduced one interesting book to Japanese academia, German psychologist Willhelm Wundt’s Social Psychology (Völkerpsychologie). From this 10-volume work, Hirano translated the 8th volume, which deals directly with the relationship between ethnicity and community.⁵⁶ In contrast to Hirano’s own translation of Karl Wittfogel’s Shimin shakaishi 市民社会史 (A History of Civil Society), which focused on the origin of European civil society from a Marxist perspective, Wundt’s concern was centered on how the primitive village community was transformed into Gesellschaft or a nation-state. In the Japanese preface, Hirano emphasized that Wundt’s approach to ethnology was a key in determining a general rule that each ethnic group shares in forming civil society.⁵⁷ What really attracted Hirano’s attention was Wundt’s understanding of ethnicity as cultural and social, not what might be called “natural minzoku.”⁵⁸ Wundt’s approach to ethnic psychology was naturally connected to Hirano’s interest in a nation state with multiple ethnic groups that later formed his notion of national politics.

Kiyono Kenji, Taiheiyō no minzoku seijigaku (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1942); Minzoku seiji no kihon mondai (Tokyo: Koyama shoten, 1944).

⁵⁶ The title of the 8th volume is Die politische Gesellschaft (Political Society), Hirano Yoshitarō trans., Minzoku shinri yori mitaru seijiteki shakai (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1938).

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.4.

⁵⁸ Ibid.
Another aspect of Hirano’s concern with nation and nationalism is traceable to his 1934 essay “The Rise of Chauvinism in the Mid Meiji Era and Its Social Implications (明治中期における国粋主義の台頭、その社会的意義),” published in Shisō.59 Here, Hirano provided two directions for modern nationalism:

Nation (民族) is the social association of human beings by the communality of ideologies represented by economic life, territory, language and culture. Nation is accompanied by amalgamation, absorption and assimilation in the process of the capitalist mode of production. Under a system controlled by the feudal mode of production, the formation of a minzoku and nationalism do not occur.60 (Emphasis added)

Given that this article was published in 1934, three years before Hirano’s tenkō, and when the Asiatic mode of production debate was still in progress, Hirano’s obvious definition of nation in Marxist language is not surprising. What is more important, however, is that Hirano acknowledged the positive aspects of nationalism in the rise of the capitalist economy. Basically viewing the nation-state in the capitalist economy as state-centered, he also believed that its foundation was grounded in the abolishment of the slavery system, and thus it could be conceived of as “liberating.”

More important in Hirano’s understanding of modern nationalism was not just its ontological affinity to the capitalist economy. He was clearly aware that the development of production power in one nation-state would not be limited to within it. Once the integration of different social groups in a single nation-state was accomplished, Hirano argued, the nation-state would inevitably widen its political and economic interests outside its territory. The two distinct directions he conceptualized were as follows:

59 Hirano Yoshitarō, “Meiji chūkini okeru kokusuishugi no taitō, sono shakaiteki igi,” Shisō 144 (May 1934), pp. 53-89.
60 Ibid., p. 54.
61 Ibid., p. 55.
A nation-state with a higher level of production power not only destroys the feudal system, but absorbs and assimilates other ethnic groups in a democratic way and creates a nation-state. (2) In the name of nationalism, a nation-state does not destroy the feudal system of other ethnic groups, rather reinforces its feudal system in collaboration with aristocracy, and forcibly assimilates and integrates them.\(^{62}\)

Hirano, of course, acknowledged that Japan’s annexation of neighboring countries exemplified the second of these two directions. However, he also maintained that Japan’s particular path to imperialism was in large part due to the fact that chauvinistic Japanism (日本主義), not nationalism, emerged as a central ideology during the Meiji era. He went on to argue that the preponderance of Japanism or chauvinism in Meiji Japan caused conceptual complexities between nationality (国民性) and ethnicity (民族性), and this distortion was in large part due to the presence of Western powers in Japan.\(^{63}\)

Therefore, Hirano’s prewar writings suggest that modern nationalism in a pure sense did not emerge even in Japanese society, not to mention in China, which was under the feudal system. In addition, his endorsement of modern nationalism was confined to Marx’s five-stage theory; that is, modern subjects come into being in the mode of capitalist production, but a new type of subjectivity should replace the capitalist mode of production in a socialist order. How, then, did he convert his notion of modern nationalism into a new theory of national politics in the early 1940s? In a 1943 book, *Basic Problems of National Politics* (民族政治の基本問題), Hirano delineated the direction of national politics in Greater East Asia:

Ethnic groups in Asia are now intimately associated with each other like a *family* and unified under a solid cooperative spirit through which they have shared life and death. Sharing coexistence and co-prosperity, joys and sorrows in the past and having the same destiny of life and death is only possible through the order and morality of cooperation and solidarity in

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 56.  
\(^{63}\) Ibid., p. 75.
family. It is through this that a new order in East Asia becomes not only a “new” order but a “true” order that should sincerely contribute to the establishment of peace in the world, differentiating itself from the old order of Britain and the United States, or a new order that they are now claiming. The order of family, indeed, becomes the principle for guiding ethnic groups in Greater East Asia and constructing an East Asian indigenous society (郷土社会) is the principle of national politics. 64 (Emphasis added)

The marked emphasis on family in Hirano’s vision of a new East Asian order deserves attention. In addition, his notion of indigenous society was strikingly different from his earlier discussion of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism. Therefore in Hirano’s theory of the East Asian Community, the notion of integrating indigenous societies in East Asia as an entity was focused on highlighting the differences between the East and the West. Referring to the work of J. H. Boeke, Professor of Economics at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands, Hirano further elaborated on his theory of the village community in a completely different manner. As Boeke argued, “[I]t is completely misleading to identify villages in Asia with those in the West, because the former are a spiritual and familial community that prioritize the happiness of family.”65

Apart from employing the abstract concept of a spiritual familial community, Boeke’s statement itself is not strikingly different from the conventional perception of Asiatic society in both Western bourgeois and Marxist social science. Boeke’s observation of a family-based society was also based on the static nature of Asian village society. As he argued, “When members of a grand family accumulate wealth, this family is divided into several small families, which explains the patriarchal family constitution in contemporary Asian villages.”66 In other words, a certain ethnic group is still decisively determined as the expansion of familial relations, irrespective of its economic development. If this is the case, it indicates that several questions still

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64 Hirano Yoshitarō, Minzoku seiji no kihon mondai (Tokyo: Koyama shoten, 1943), pp.3-4.
66 Ibid.
remained to be answered by Hirano, and among them, special attention was paid to how an East Asian society could be sustained that was both super-national and family-based society at the same time.

Hirano acknowledged that as capitalism prevailed, even peasants in Asian village communities underwent a drastic transformation in their modes of life. As he asserted, “[O]ne cannot judge whether the village community has stagnated as it did in the past. As development continues and the distribution of products grows, they necessarily bring a monetary economy to the community and as a result, one facet of community-based society collapses.”

This observation by Hirano meshes with his earlier definition of nation as emerging in the capitalistic mode of production. Instead of presenting a sophisticated analysis of identify formation in the capitalist village community, Hirano centered his argument on highly value-laden and abstracted aspects. He purposely emphasized that the advent of the modern economy spread individualism, competition and conflicts, eventually dismantling the moral consciousness of the community. These changes necessitated the implantation of what might be called civic responsibility, replacing the ancient concept of bonds.

Hirano observed that although a number policies were enacted to revitalize the value of community in the Western capitalist economy, all these measures eventually resulted in democratic politics (衆民政). However, such a seemingly rational order of politics based on individuals’ civic responsibility and political rights, he asserted, was completely fragmented as it was applied to national politics in the colony. French, British and the Dutch colonialism commonly aimed to maintain the discriminatory hierarchy between metropole and the colony, suppressing the development of indigenous cultures, colonized Asian ethnic groups in particular.

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67 Hirano, Minzoku seiji no kihon mondai, p.25.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., p.29.
national politics, therefore, was to reconfirm that a Japan-centered new Asian order would not repeat the path of European imperialism. To this end, Hirano proposed Japan’s superior leadership based on morality in incorporating ethnic groups into an empire.\textsuperscript{70}

In this way, Hirano’s discussion of national politics became increasingly detached from the politics of identify formation, that is, how a new form of subjectivity ought to be constructed in order to overcome the discrepancies between the capitalist economy and the multi-ethnic and cultural social constitution in East Asia. The dimension of Hirano’s national politics was reduced to the relations between the ruling majority and the ruled minority. In other words, what captured his attention most was not the nature and dynamics of ethnicity, but the question of what kind of political measures should be taken to effectively manage ethnic minorities. Therefore, Hirano’s discussion of national politics took institutional and legal directions. At the heart of it lay one important challenge: how to theorize moral and spiritual values in the Chinese village community as a guiding principle, replacing the legal rationality of the Western law system.

In this sense, spiritual values such as morality were suggested as a mediator through which Japan’s guidance could be accomplished in East Asia. This suggests that Hirano’s national politics lacked any sort of speculations on how minority ethnic groups could become essential subjects of an East Asian empire, as best illuminated in the notion of the East Asia Cooperative Community presented by bourgeois social scientists like Rōyama Masamichi and Shinmei Masamichi. However, Hirano’s theorization of the equal relationship between Japan and the colony still did not resolve certain fundamental questions: how could he present community-oriented common values that had existed in Asia as moral and spiritual vehicles to replace profit-

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp.29-38.
oriented individualism? More importantly, how should the socio-economic gap between metropole and colony be rationalized in the empire-building project?

In order to respond to these questions, Hirano sought to rehabilitate the moral values of the Chinese village community, which he once viewed as lacking any political dynamics. To this end, Hirano was actively involved in empirical China studies. Right after Hirano’s participation in the Institute of East Asia (東亜研究所) in 1939, the institute, together with the Northern China Research Bureau of the Manchurian Railway Company, launched an extensive fieldwork project entitled “Studies of Rural Customs and Practices in China (中国農村慣行調査)” on village community, law, the family system in China. As Suehira Akira’s meticulous study shows, this was the most extensive fieldwork research ever conducted during the wartime period.\(^71\) Given that Hirano wrote the general introduction for the six-volume work, “Rural Customs and Practices of China,” published between 1941 and 1944, there is no question that he played a crucial role in this fieldwork project.\(^72\) In the introduction, Hirano boldly announced that the purpose of this research project was to overcome the limits of previous China studies. By doing so, he intended to position this project as highly objective research on China, and thus irrelevant to any political purposes.\(^73\) Needless to say, Hirano’s statement on the apolitical nature of China studies was inconsistent, given that almost all major government-funded institutions participated in this highly political fieldwork project.

\(^71\) According to Suehira’s meticulous research, it was four different groups that actively participated in this fieldwork research: (1) the 6th Committee on Academy in the Institute of East Asia (Hirano was directly affiliated with this group) (2) College of Economics at Kyoto Imperial University (3) the research group in the Manchurian Railway Company (4) the secretary group in the Institute of East Asia; see Suehira Akira, “Ajia chōsa no keihō- mantetsu chōsabu kara ajiakeizai kenkyūshō e,” in Yamamura Shinichi, Sakai Tetsuya (et al.) eds., Teikoku nihon no gakuchi 6 – chieki kenkyū toshite ajia (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2006), pp. 29-34.

\(^72\) Chūgoku nōson kankō chōsa kankōkai ed., Chūgoku nōson kankō chōsa (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1941-1944) 6 Vols. It was reprinted in 1952 by Iwanami shoten. The English subtitle was Rural Customs and Practices of China.

On the other hand, a close look at this research project reveals some interesting aspects of Japan’s wartime China studies. For Hirano, overcoming previous studies on China in Japan actually meant that he had to challenge the concept of Oriental History (tōyōshi, 東洋史), presented and shared by historians and social scientists in Japan.\(^74\) The core logic of tōyōshi was to portray China as a particularistic and thus static historical space in relation to Japan which was seen part of the universal world.\(^75\) In spite of the appropriation of tōyōshi in different contexts by Japanese intellectuals, Marxist social scientists, including Hirano himself, did not separate themselves from it, as shown in the Asiatic mode of production debate. Therefore, to denouncing the logic of tōyōshi was overcoming the specter of particularism in China studies. For Hirano himself, it was to discover moral and spiritual values that could bridge the gap between Japan’s ethnic politics and indigenous Asian communities.

However, Hirano’s political positioning of this research project was not necessarily endorsed by other China specialists at the institution; on the contrary it uncovered severe tensions among the research teams. Both the institution and the research teams included scholars of China from various disciplines.\(^76\) According to Suehira, the tension occurred primarily between the researchers focusing on empirical research, the Kyoto University research group in particular, and the Tokyo group, represented by Hirano and the Tōa kenkyūsho.\(^77\) On the surface, this tension, according to Suehira’s explanation, was between a fieldwork-centered approach and a concept-oriented approach. I argue, however, that it clearly demonstrates that there existed fundamental disparities in visions of an East Asian community, even within

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\(^74\) Ibid., p. 10
\(^75\) It was Shiratori Kurakichi, Professor of East Asian History at Tokyo Imperial University, who founded the system of tōyōshi. For a detailed study of tōyōshi, see Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: rendering pasts into history (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
\(^76\) Hara Kakuten, Gendai ajia kenkyū seiritsu shiron – mantetsu chōsabu, tōsa kenkyūshō, IPR no kenkyū (Tokyo: Keisō shobo, 1984), pp. 771-780.
\(^77\) Suehira, “Ajia chōsa no keihō- mantetsu chōsabu kara aijakeizai kenkyūshō ē,” pp. 35-36.
government-funded think tanks. Hirano was at least aware that the epistemology of China as particular should not be put forth any longer, as the front of the so-called thought war (思想戦) was formed between the East and the West, not between Japan and the rest of Asia. However, conservative China specialists such as Tsuda Sōkichi were also participating in this project. Consequently, those dealing with the “China problem” were seriously at odds with each other in the early stage of state-centered China studies as part of colonial area studies, and under these circumstances Hirano’s ethnic politics also emerged.78

Beginning in the early 1940s, Hirano began reinterpreting village communities in China and Southeast Asia based on his fieldwork research. Among the characteristics of everyday life in the village community, special attention was paid by him to how the space of autonomous governance should be created. Hirano aimed to link this question to critiques of the modern legal system in the West, and to theorize moral codes in the Chinese village community as non-institutional but rather a highly effective self-sufficient lay system. He first vehemently argued that the modern legal system in the West was characterized by its non-involvement in an individual’s economic life in the name of liberalism, utilitarianism, individualism and self-responsibility. He pointed out, however, that unless equality before the law was guaranteed, or if there was anything undefined by the law in one’s life, the principle of nonintervention in an individual’s private life was not respected.79 According to Hirano, the colony was where this

78 The problem of different positions dealing with the China problem did not just appear in this fieldwork project. Since scholars involved in wartime China studies were from various backgrounds and gathered under the somewhat abstract slogan of the “East Asian community” or “East Asian cooperative community,” it was inevitable that these different positions could not be simply converged in a concrete system of knowledge. This internal disparity was especially intense between 1939 and 1942, during which time government-funded institutions rapidly being established and most of the China specialists were forcibly or voluntarily involved in them. For a summary of China studies in wartime Japan, refer to Ando Hikotarō, “Nijūsekini okeru nihon no chūgokukenkyū to chūgokucininshiki (8): senjikinihon no chūgokukanryuuuno tsuite,” Chūgokukankyūgijutu 51, no. 9 (Sep 1998), pp. 33-52.

79 Hirano Yoshitarō, “Nanrei higashiind no tōchi-gyōsei no kihon seisaku,” Hōritujihō 14, no.1 (Jan 1942), p.27.
vacuum space of the Western legal system emerged. The majority of the population in the Dutch East Indies was still under the control of its own indigenous law system. Precisely for this reason, even if a brutal assimilation policy were not enforced and indigenous cultures were recognized to some degree, as in the Dutch East Indies, for example, Hirano asserted that the fundamental discrepancy between Western law and what he called the “primitive law system” in Asian village communities would preclude the relationship of metropole and colony from being transformed into a co-prosperity community. He wrote:

National policy is based on the ideology of co-prosperity - autonomism and cooperativism and recognizes and acknowledges the life and tradition of indigenous society. Since it [cooperativism] aims to develop indigenous society toward its own direction, it is opposed to the lopsidedness of assimilation policy and takes the form of the individual and the particular. The national policy (民族政策) of Japan, a member of the co-prosperity sphere, that has led and protected national groups in East Asia is a cooperativism that has gone beyond Europe's cooperativism originating from the aspect of economic profit. (Emphasis added)

What, then, did Hirano suggest as the principle of a cooperative community to replace profit-oriented European imperialism? While developing national politics toward what he called underdeveloped ethnic groups in Southeast Asia, he wrote several articles on the theory of constructing indigenous village communities in China. Among other aspects of the Chinese village community, what captured his attention most is the concept of national morality (民族道徳) inherent in Chinese villages. He observed that national morality had controlled and enabled the cooperative life of Chinese village communities. In contrast to Europe’s legal system in which magistrates or administrators regulated the community, national morality, Hirano argued, constituted a

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80 Ibid.
system of law that permitted townspeople to mediate, regulate, and integrate socio-economic activities with the everyday life of the community. Hirano showed especially keen interest in the Chinese tradition of keeping moral ledgers (功過格: Gong guo Ge). Gong guo Ge was a kind of everyday life manual that recorded the bad and good deeds and also provided townspeople with a way to compensate for misbehaviors by doing good deeds. In doing so, Hirano believed that the indigenous legal system of Gong guo Ge created a political space where individuals in the community were given the autonomy to evaluate and criticize themselves, but their individual activities contributed to the general good of the community.\(^{83}\) Hirano further argued that the Chinese village (鄉黨) functioned as a space for negotiation and mediation in which elderly people minimized internal conflict and sustained the autonomy of the community.\(^{84}\) Hirano held that this decision-making process, in spite of the fact that it had paradoxically isolated townspeople into a limited spatial boundary of the village community and prevented them from protesting against the despotic state, enabled them to live with minimal class conflict.\(^{85}\)

In this way, Hirano believed that national morality in the Chinese village community would serve as a kind of a buffer-zone where the influx of the capitalistic mode of life could not penetrate. Therefore, various cooperative organizations that had existed in premodern China were portrayed as a positive means to incorporate the impoverished Chinese peasants under the capitalist economy.\(^{86}\) Such an immanent cohesiveness of the Chinese village community was proposed as the nature of Chinese ethnicity. Referring to Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893-1988), a Chinese philosopher and social activist who advocated rural reconstruction movements based on Confucian

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\(^{83}\) Ibid., pp. 10-13.  
\(^{84}\) Ibid.  
\(^{86}\) Hirano, Dai ajia shugi no rekishiteki kiso, pp.198-205.
ethics in the 1930s, Hirano maintained that village communities in China preceded modern capitalism and these village communities would continue to exist even after the arrival of capitalism. In this way, Hirano bestowed trans-historicity on both ethnicity and national morality and argued that they would serve as a superstructure that would transcend any sort of modes of production. To be sure, Hirano reiterated in most of his works that his Greater Asianism recognized indigenous cultures in China. The realistic question of the economic gap between Japan and China was effectively dismissed in an excessive emphasis on the dynamics of the village community. In this way, Chinese society was redefined not as static and underdeveloped but as sustainable and autonomous.

Completely missing in Hirano’s national politics was the question of how a new and co-operative subjectivity would be constructed in a new East Asian empire. If the logic of ethnicity and community had remained intact in China, how should the Chinese people become subjects of a Greater East Asia? To answer this question, he sought to create spiritual links between the Chinese Confucian order and the Emperor system. The family order, he believed, should be expanded to the logic of Japan’s leadership based on the emperor system. Ironic as it may sound, however, Hirano’s explanation of why Japan must lead China and other Asian ethnic groups, however, was thoroughly capitalistic. He revisited the Meiji Restoration, which he once conceptualized as merely a transfer of oppressive power, and redefined it as a “world-historical moment” for Asian people, in that Japan proved that Asia could accomplish modernization as well. Awakened by this world-historical moment in Japan, Hirano contended, Japanese intellectuals renewed their gaze at Asianism, and as a result, various Asian discourses

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88 Hirano, Dai ajia shugi no rekishiteki kiso, pp.7-15.
flooded for some 40 years between 1868 and 1911, followed by the Chinese revolution.\textsuperscript{89}

In this way, Hirano strove to present a vision of \textit{gemeinschaft} in China and incorporate it into a broader project of Greater Asianism. In an effort to rationalize the Chinese rural community as a visible force, he retracted his earlier discussion of nationalism as a social product in the capitalistic mode of production. Instead, he retreated towards the history of China to find an identity in a highly essentialist and nativistic form. To be sure, it was not so much his new discovery that would overcome the limits of the previous China studies, which were saturated with pessimistic views, but a highly politicized response to Chinese nationalism that was targeting Japanese imperialism. His gaze at other ethnic minorities in Asia thoroughly maintained the standpoint of the colonizer. Apart from the absence of Korea and Taiwan in his Greater Asianism, for him the indigenous people in Southeast Asia and the Southern Seas were no more than objects of colonial area studies that would eventually fall under the benevolence of Japan’s colonial governance.

**Colonial Korea and the East Asia Community**

In contrast to that of Hirano, Moritani’s wartime commitment was already preconditioned by several specific factors. As Japan waged a full-scale war against China in 1937 and Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro announced a new order in East Asia, colonial Korea became deeply involved in Japan’s wartime efforts. Under these circumstances, various politico-economic discourses on how to position colonial Korea in imperial Japan emerged. As many have pointed out, the basic direction was to make Korea a base to support munitions and human resources.\textsuperscript{90} In particular, colonial Korea

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p.31
\textsuperscript{90} Many works on the issue of wartime mobilization in colonial Korea deserve attention, including Pang Ki-Jung, “1930nyondae chosun nongkong byongjin jeongchak kwa kyeongje tongje,” \textit{Dongbanghakji}
recaptured attention from Japanese bureaucrats as a means to solve the problem of the rice shortage in Japan proper. From the perspective of political assimilation, conservative Japanese and pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals were spreading the notion of *naisenittai* (内鮮一体, Japan and Korea as one body) as a way to incorporate Koreans into the Japanese empire.

As I discussed in other chapters, the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community aimed to incorporate ethnic minorities into the broad concept of an East Asian nation. To this end, social scientists like Rōyama Masamichi and Kada Tetsuji maintained as a prerequisite that the discriminatory hierarchy between empire and colony must be abolished. In this sense, *naisenittairon* 内鮮一体論 was a Koreanized response; that is, pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals subjectively responded to the East Asian Cooperative Community, which was highly philosophical and abstract in nature.

As the meaning of the term itself connotes, *naisenittairon* was first conceived of as the degree of assimilation of the Korean people into Japan. However, it was also closely related to Korean intellectuals’ endeavors to create a socio-political space where Koreans could participate in the empire as political subjects. As part of this project, several directions of *naisenittai* came into being in academic circles. A group of intellectuals such as Hyun Yong Sop, for example, advocated the “complete Japanization of Koreans (徹底同化主義),” arguing that in order for Koreans to embody Japaneseness, Koreaness must be discarded, including the Korean language. This “radical” interpretation of *naisenittairon*, however, provoked criticism from another group of pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals. They maintained that discarding Koreanness would not necessarily result in an individual’s embodiment of Japaneseness. More important than creating a homogeneous culture, they argued, was to dismantle the structural inequity between Koreans and Japanese. This observation was based on the

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122 (2003), pp. 75-122.
practical perception that even if Koreans became Japanese by learning the Japanese language and absorbing Japanese culture, this would not guarantee that the majority of the Japanese people recognize these “Japanized Koreans” as equal citizens. Therefore, for these intellectuals, the notion of *naisenittai* was appropriated as a political weapon to press for structural changes in Japan proper. In Jeong Sik 印貞植 (1907 - ?), a converted Korean Koza-ha Marxist, put it:

The fact that the Japanese nation takes the initiative does not mean that it outwardly forces on other nations its ethnic authenticity as such. If there is any element to the detriment of the whole unification of Asia, it must be *sublimated* although it is part of the authenticity of Japanese nationalism. (for example, the islander-like character of the Japanese people) For that reason, the problem of *naisenittai* and the discourse on the reconstruction of East Asia based on *naisenittairon* are the problem of nationalism not only for the Korean people but also for the Japanese people.91

As an established scholar of colonial Korea, Moritani also showed keen interest in how the notion of the East Asian Cooperative Community could be applied to the relationship between Japan and Korea. In 1939, he was involved in Ryokki Renmei 緑旗連盟, a political organization established by Japanese residents in colonial Korea in 1930. With direct as well as indirect support from the colonial government, this organization soon became the most influential political agency that provided a bridge between pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals and Japanese intellectuals. Invariably, their guiding principle was *naisenittarion*. How, then, did Moritani portray the future of colonial Korea in an East Asian community in the making.

In a 1939 article contributed to *Ryokki* 緑旗, the journal published by Ryokki Renmei, Moritani attempted to link *naisenittairon* to the East Asian Cooperative Community. His writing started with the observation that each ethnic group’s nationalism must be recognized, but he also argued that not every form of nationalism

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would always result in its true completion. Ironic as it may sound, he criticized Chinese nationalism for being associated with “imperialism” and asserted that it was only Japan that achieved nationalism in a true form.

Moritani’s perception of the East Asian Cooperative Community first suggests that he, like other imperial intellectuals, took it for granted that Japan must lead other ethnic groups in Asia. However, he was also aware that the socio-economic gap between metropole and colony would eventually hinder the incorporation of colonial subjects into the East Asian community. Therefore, he believed that naiseittairon, a Koreanized version of the East Asian Cooperative Community, must be associated with the “epoch-making development of the status of underdeveloped Chosun.” This also indicates that economic development would take a central position in Moritani’s discussion of colonial Korea. In contrast to Hirano, who sought the logic of community through the primitive village community detached from capitalistic development, Moritani did not return to the past, nor did he romanticize the Asian village community.

At the center of his theorization of the East Asian Cooperative Community was the question of how and to what degree colonial Korea had to be developed and how Moritani himself rationalized the logic of Asiatic society, which he had been trying to formulate in the mid 1930s.

**Agricultural Problems and the Ethos of Productivism**

It is important to note that the great drought of 1939 became a turning point in Japan’s wartime agricultural policy. Although colonial Korea had been a major site for rice exploitation in the 1930s, the dramatic shortage of rice in 1939 ironically led Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats to rethink the importance of Korean agriculture. Not

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93 Ibid., p.20.
94 Ibid., p.21
surprisingly, their discussion was focused on increasing production power in Korean agriculture, while normalizing the devastated Japanese agricultural sector. As a result, various discourses on “reconstructing agriculture (農業再編成)” proliferated in both Korea and Japan between 1939 and the early 1940s. The main issue in these discourses was the question of where the main problems of Korean agriculture should be located.

In a 1941 roundtable discussion hosted by Ryokki Renmei, Moritani pointed to irrigation and the landlord-peasant relationship as the two main problems in Korean agriculture. These issues had been already discussed in full in Moritani’s prewar writings on Asian agriculture. In order to manage hydraulic issues, the state also emerged as a great landlord and most peasants were tenant farmers. This unique landlord-peasant relationship did not change in 20th century Korea. Most peasants were still tenant farmers cultivating extremely small plots of land. Moritani described this characteristic of the Asiatic mode of production as intensive agriculture; that is, cultivation greatly depended upon laborers who possess small plots of land.

Once peasant revolution was no longer the prescription for the feudal system, how did imperial intellectuals like Moritani attempt to solve this issue and envision a new type of community in colonial Korea? Here, it is vitally important to note that Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats had a strong tendency to reduce the political nature of the tenant-landlord relationship to the issue of an excessive supply of labor. In other words, intensive agriculture in colonial Korea, they argued, resulted in overpopulation in rural areas and inefficacy in production. They observed, therefore, that Korean agriculture would not meet the demand for rice in Japan proper, if these problems persisted. Moreover, as Japan waged a total war against the United States, underpopulation emerged as a major issue in securing human resources on the

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95 A roundtable discussion, “Hanto no nōsonmon dai wo kataru,” Ryokki 6, no. 2 (Feb 1941), p.149.
96 Ibid. See also Iwata Ryou, “Chōsen nōgyō saihenseini oite no kakusho,” Chōsen gyōsei 21, no. 8 (1941), p.6.
battlefield as well as for war industry.

For this reason, discourses on restructuring agriculture in colonial Korea increasingly turned from the direction of creating land-owning independent farmers, although even many Japanese intellectuals were acutely aware of its importance. Given that reshaping the landlord-peasant relationship was closely intertwined with the mode of production itself, many of these landlords were Japanese residents and pro-Japanese Koreans. Depriving them of their socio-economic privileges might result in destroying the backbone of the colonial structure. Instead, the term “productivity” or “production power” within the existing agricultural structure took the central position in their discussion. In this way, ironic as it may sound, these imperial intellectuals were envisioning a community filled with a highly capitalistic productivist spirit, but a community in equilibrium, that is, with neither class struggle nor independent subjects such as private landowners. However, instilling productivism into the mindset of Korean peasants was another challenge. To this end, they strove to refute the conservative perception of Korea; that is, underdevelopment in Korean agriculture, like that in China, was in large part due to geographical determinism.

Moritani attempted to overcome this determinist perspective by reconfirming that Asian countries, including Japan, all contain so-called Asiatic characteristics in agriculture, in spite of several differences. This statement was logically connected to holding up Japan’s agriculture as a successful example of development in productivity accomplished by the mechanization of agriculture.97 To be sure, what Moritani intended to address here was not the capitalistic mode of production in a pure sense. He was clearly aware that the capitalistic mode of production would give rise to all sorts of social conflicts that would eventually make it impossible to create an East Asian

community. Moritani did not turn to abstract spiritualism such as the Imperial Way either, though he was not completely free from the rhetoric of the so-called *hakkō ichiū* (八紘一宇, eight corners of the world under one roof), nor did he try to revitalize the so-called primitive form of community, as best illuminated in Hirano Yoshitarō’s imperial discourse. Instead, Moritani asserted that in order to develop productivity in Korean agriculture, what he called “organized intervention” must be emphasized. 98

Needless to say, the final purpose of reorganizing agriculture in colonial Korea was to maximize productivity in both the agricultural and industrial sectors. Moritani believed that if mechanization and efficiency reached a certain degree, it would push superfluous rural laborers to the city, where they could fill jobs in the war industries. In this way, he drew upon the picture of an East Asian economic co-prosperity sphere, and accordingly defined the relationship between metropole and colony:

The intensification of *gaichi* (外地, colonial Korea) as a military base or a stronghold in Japan’s conducting of radical policies in East Asia must be accomplished by facilitating industrialization, once agriculture has been improved to a certain degree…. In the aftermath of the Manchurian Crisis, industrial policy in Chosun has changed from rice-cultivation-oriented agriculture to the uniform advancement of agriculture and industry (*農工並進*). 99

How, then, did “organized intervention” produce such an advancement of agriculture and industry? On the surface, Moritani’s discussion of economic policy bore a resemblance to the notion of the controlled economy promulgated by Japanese economists and bureaucrats in the name of the Japan-Manchuria-China economic bloc. In an attempt to overcome the capitalist system and control individuals’ profit-oriented desires, these intellectuals insisted that major industries should be nationalized.

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98 Ibid., p.140.
99 Moritani, “Chōsen ni okeru shokuryōseisaku to kōshin no kihon mondai,” in *Tōyōteki seikatsuken*, p.192.
However, these highly organized forces turned to spiritualism in incorporating individuals into the state. Putting forth the Imperial Way, these intellectuals intended to create homogeneous subjects who functioned organically under the leadership of the state.100

Central to Moritani’s concern was the question of whether a controlled economy based on the nationalization of industry would result in the degree of productivity necessary for the Korean economy. Given that full-fledged industrialization had not even started in colonial Korea, the notion of nationalizing major industries could not be applied there. Precisely for this reason, Moritani was attentive to other theoretical streams relating to economic development, although he himself accepted the idea of the bloc-economy and self-sufficient economic sphere to a certain degree. Notably, beginning in the late 1930s, a group of social scientists in Japan were attempting to link the idea of restructuring the economy to spatial thinking. The state not only controlled the economy but also focused on reorganizing the spatial configuration of the economy between agriculture and industry, and between light industry and heavy industry, thereby maximizing marginal utility and the efficiency of labor. This geopolitical thinking was in fact concretized as a government policy in the name of national land planning (国土計画) in Japan in September 1940. Two months later, the Governor General’s Office in colonial Korea established the Committee for National Land Planning in Chosun, in which most high-ranking bureaucrats in the Governor General’s Office participated.

Moritani showed keen interest in this new spatial thinking and was appointed to the Committee for National Land Planning in colonial Korea. Not surprisingly, geopolitics rapidly gained momentum among Japanese intellectuals. Among various

100 A number of writings on economic control appeared in major journals during the wartime period. See, for example, Hijikata Seibi, Nihon keizai no michi (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1938).
spatial discourses, what Moritani problematized was the theory of industrial location, formulated by the German economist Alfred Weber, younger brother of sociologist Max Weber. According to Weber, an industry had to be located where the transaction cost of raw materials, labor and transportation was minimized. Moritani found this theory suitable for the case of colonial Korea, where the Governor General’s Office was supposed to construct basic infrastructure for industrialization such as roads, factories and ports.\(^{101}\) Expanding this idea to East Asia, he intended to draw upon the picture of an self-sufficient East Asian economic sphere (東亜自立経済圏). This economic sphere, he believed, would then need to be extended to a Lebensraum (living space, 生活圏) in East Asia, given that there are historical and cultural affinities among Asian people.\(^{102}\)

Moritani’s understanding of Weber’s theory suggests that he intended to link the theory of industrial location to a government-centered economic plan, although the theory itself was created from a highly capitalistic perspective. Therefore, national land planning in colonial Korea was also based on an anti-capitalistic approach to development and this anti-capitalistic approach to national land planning was also shared by colonial intellectuals. In Jeong Sik, a former Koza-ha Marxist who, together with Moritani, was appointed to the Committee for National Land Planning in Chosun, reconfirmed this:

> National land planning itself seems natural and rational but it is something that cannot be imagined in economic relations in which liberal or private interests are prioritized. Under the laissez faire system, private interests are prioritized in utilizing national land.\(^{103}\)

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\(^{101}\) Moritani Katsumi, “Kōgyo richi gairon” in Chōsen shōko kaigisho, Senjisangyōkeieikōwa (Kyungsung: Chōsen kōrōnsha, 1944), pp.264-266.


\(^{103}\) In Jeong Sik, “Chosun nongop kwa sikryang kwa kuk’tokyehoe,” Samcholl’i 13, no.6 (June 1941), p.113.
Based on this observation, In went to argue that the use of land in colonial Korea was disorganized; that is, land suitable for industry was used for agriculture, or vice versa.\(^\text{104}\)

In this respect, both Moritani and In recognized national land planning as a way of maximizing productivity and at the same time overcoming the anti-communitarian capitalist economy. I argue that the notion of land planning provided a middle ground for the two former Marxist social scientists who could not solve the conundrum that the absence of private ownership and a market economy in the Asiatic agricultural community would result in underdevelopment. When the state took the initiative in creating a community-centered economic sphere, they believed, efficiency could be maximized.

**Empire and Colony: Identity Politics**

However, this highly rationalized discussion of economic development in colonial Korea was not fully endorsed by Korean intellectuals. For Moritani, the completion of *naisenittairon* in colonial Korea would be achieved when colonial Korea became an important organ in the East Asian Cooperative Community. Needless to say, the only way for colonial Korea to prove its crucial position was to provide rice and munitions for imperial Japan. Moritani’s wartime discourses on colonial Korea, therefore, were centered on taking institutional measures to expand productive capacities. However, missing in Moritani’s discussion of *naisenittairon* was any consideration of identity politics; that is, how peasants and workers in colonial Korea could become subjective members of the East Asian community. In contrast to other imperial intellectuals who were casting a highly colonial gaze on Korea as merely a site for human and material exploitation, Moritani was at least aware that this approach was one-dimensional. Thus

\(^{104}\) Ibid.
Moritani contended that social policies had to be implemented in Chosun as well.\textsuperscript{105}

However, from the start such a social engineering-oriented approach to the colony was not concerned with transforming the already-impoverished peasant masses into independent subjects. As Ōkochi Kazuo’s 大河内一男 (1905-1984) discussion of social policy in wartime Japan well suggests, its main objective was to preclude labor from being marginalized in wartime production. Ōkochi argued, therefore, that social policy should be redefined as a policy to maximize production and labor resources, not as a policy of distributing to the economically marginalized.\textsuperscript{106} Reiterating Ōkochi’s theory, Moritani, who had been teaching social policy in colonial Korea, asserted that the locus of social policy lay in the project of “incorporating the lower class into the state organization by education and enlightenment.”\textsuperscript{107}

In this respect, Moritani viewed as necessary steps for the naisenittai project the 3rd Educational Act and the new conscription law allowing Koreans to voluntarily join the Imperial Army, both enacted in colonial Korea in April 1938.\textsuperscript{108} The 1938 Education Law stipulated the Japanese language as the “national language” and focused on extending technical training for potential workers in the war industry. Of course, it was also closely associated with the practical need to indoctrinate Koreans who would fight for the Japanese empire. As Leo Ching has argued, this so-called kōminka (皇民化) project required colonial subjects to objectify “Japanization” and to “act, live and die for the emperor in defending the Japanese empire.”\textsuperscript{109}

However, such a direct projection of Koreans into subjects of imperial Japan created ruptures between Japanese and pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals. Pointing out

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{105} Moritani, Tōyōteki seikatukken, p.193.
\textsuperscript{106} Ōkochi Kazuo, Shakaiseisaku no kihonmondai (Tokyo: Nihonhyōronsha, 1940), pp. 150-184.
\textsuperscript{108} Moritani, Tōyōteki seikatukken, p.193.
\end{flushleft}
that the *kōminka* project was primarily focused on abolishing Koreanness, In Jeong Sik cast a skeptical eye on these institutional measures. Two years after the implementation of the 3rd Educational Act, In described the status of Korean peasants as follows:

> Why hasn’t the mandatory education system been put into practice to date and why do millions of Korean people remain illiterate and uncivilized? The locus of this problem lies in the living standard of peasants. A survey of peasant families tells us that they have little room for education and culture. This is because they are thoroughly impoverished. As fieldwork surveys suggest, the cause of such impoverishment lies in social conditions such as landlord-tenant relations rather than natural conditions.110

In drew attention to the importance of politics for restructuring social conditions, criticizing Japanese intellectuals’ one-dimensional gaze at colonial Korea as a site for economic exploitation. Therefore, In appropriated the notion of *naisenittai* as a political weapon to call for transforming Korean peasants, who had been oppressed by feudalism, into modern national subjects. For him, the politics of Japan and Korea as one body was portrayed from the beginning as creating heterogeneous subjects. Becoming Japanese did not necessarily mean discarding Korean language and culture. Instead, Koreanness was presented as an effective cultural and spiritual condition to produce modern subjectivity, together with the modernization of colonial Korea.

**Conclusion**

For Japanese Marxist social scientists, the notion of the Asiatic mode production came as the biggest intellectual challenge in the early 1930s. In an effort to locate Japanese history in the universal developmental process of historical materialism, they either attempted to redefine the Asiatic mode of production itself or, in most cases, focused on confining it to the history of other Asian societies, China and Korea in particular. In this process, Asian village communities were portrayed as the cause of stagnation and

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110 In-Jeong Sik, *Chōsen no nōgyō chitai* (Tokyo: Seikatusha, 1940), pp.36-37.
underdevelopment. Therefore, Japanese Marxist social scientists became increasingly detached from any political zeal for finding political potential in this Asiatic social formation.

However, such an antagonistic attitude toward the Asiatic formation of community in Marxist scholarship on Asia faced another challenge as Japan waged a war against China and announced a new East Asian order. At the heart of this was the logic of the East Asian Cooperative Community, and many Japanese social scientists began casting a new eye toward the community-oriented Asian tradition and culture. Hirano Yoshitarō also invoked the notion of national politics to rationalize a multi-ethnic empire and became deeply engaged in the production of imperial knowledge on China during the wartime period. Criticizing both civil society and nationalism based on the capitalistic mode of production, he revisited the Chinese village community as a self-sufficient socio-political organization superior to the profit-oriented Western orientation toward individualism. By linking it to the logic of the family state in which the Emperor rests atop, he intended to create a theory of national politics that would embrace Asian people. However, his ethnic politics and Greater Asianism did not contain any speculations on how Chinese and other Asian people would become subjects in a new Asia. Ironically, Hirano argued that the Meiji Restoration proved that Japan was the only country to reach the universal standard of economic development. Based on these observations, he rationalized that Japan’s invasion of China was a necessary step to modernize this underdeveloped society. In his national politics he portrayed Southeast Asia as simply the site for economic exploitation. In this respect, Hirano never revised his view of the Chinese village community as stagnant and lacking developmental forces and simply appropriated its communitarian nature in his Greater Asianism, which was based on the philosophy of the family state.

In contrast to Hirano, Moritani developed a different vision of the East Asian
community, in large part due to his position in colonial Korea as a professor of social policy at Kyungsung Imperial University. Like Hirano, Moritani was also heavily influenced by Karl Wittfogel’s interpretation of Chinese society, but he rejected the idea of attributing underdevelopment and stagnation in Asia to geographical determinism. After the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Moritani aimed to concretize both the East Asian Cooperative Community and naisenittairon by advocating the notion of the uniform development of agriculture and industry in colonial Korea. To be sure, his notion of Korea and Japan as one body took on a developmentalist form. He was convinced that naisenittai as a Koreanized version of the East Asian Cooperative Community would be realized as colonial Korea became an indispensable organ in the Japanese empire.

To this end, Moritani grappled with the question of maximizing productivity and labor efficiency. In an effort to overcome the limits of the capitalist economy as well as lack of efficiency in the Asian village community, he encountered geopolitical thinking in the form of national land planning. Rather than drawing upon the state as an agency of monopolizing land and oppressing peasants, Moritani envisioned the imperial state as a highly rationalized organ to serve the maximization of productivity. However, as even pro-Japanese intellectuals such as In-Jeong Sik argued, such a rosy picture of colonial Korea would not be possible without fundamentally transforming the mode of production itself, that is, the feudal landlord-peasant relationship that subjugated Korean peasants. In this sense, Moritani saw the developmental side of modernization, completely ignoring the emergence of modern subjects in the process. Therefore, he could not respond to pro-Japanese Korean intellectuals’ identity politics, which held that Koreans must become modern subjects in order to become members of imperial Japan. In Jeong Sik was clearly aware of this logic and put forth the modernization of the Korean economy as a prerequisite for naisenittairon.
Conclusion

I have discussed Japanese social scientists’ wartime discourses on empire building. Throughout this dissertation, I showed that their commitment to the Japanese empire was not forced on them by the government, and thus was not a one-time “deviation,” but was instead a highly subjective involvement. For this reason, this study has also focused on exploring the thought and behavior of prewar Japanese social sciences that foreshadowed imperial social sciences during the wartime period. In that respect, the “crisis” in the social sciences in the early 1930s fundamentally changed the topography of Japanese social sciences. Until the late 1920s, Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular, had rationalized imperialism and colonization in the name of civilizing mission and modernization. At the same time, they strove to develop a “democratic” space based on the observation that the state had dominated society and individuals. While their zeal for reforming the domestic socio-political structure bore fruit in the 1920s to some extent in their “discovery” of society, this did not mean that they fundamentally questioned the paradoxical coexistence of democracy at home and imperialism abroad.

After Japan invaded Manchuria and China, Japan had to respond to the Chinese anti-imperialist nationalism, while confronting Western powers that were hostile to Japan’s imperialist moves. Under these circumstances, Japanese intellectuals presented a series of imperial discourses. Irrespective of differences in theory and practice, both right-wing and so-called “reformist” social scientists were clearly aware that the existing social scientific logic would no longer sustain the stability of the Japanese empire. Most of the right-wing intellectuals’ discourses eventually focused on transforming the Imperial Way into an imperial regional theory and appropriated the binary logic of Western imperialism and Asianism, in which Japan was defined as an
agency that would protect Asian people.

However, the social scientists I have discussed were acutely aware that repeating such a one-dimensional perception of the West and the East would not convince the Chinese and the colonized Asian people of the necessity of constructing an East Asian empire. Nor did they think that reproducing the rhetoric of civilizing mission would rationalize their commitment to the empire. While facing the challenge of overcoming the limits inherent in the liberal social scientific tradition during the Taisho period and looking at the rapid emergence of reactionary political discourses, these social scientists were placed in one position of having to contrive a new logic of social science.

In order to encounter Asia as a social scientific object, they first had to explain intrinsic, irrational and non-objective concepts such as blood, religion, customs and community, which had not been the object of social scientific study. In doing so, these social scientists voluntarily dismantled the fortress of scientific objectivity and rationality, which had been deep-rooted in social scientific thinking. This new project of imperial social science had to confront the binary formation of the West as universal and the East as particular as well. As I have shown throughout this dissertation, these imperial social scientists did not intend to create an East Asian empire and claim that the East was superior to the West and thus, it was the East that was universal. Rather than appropriate the schematic configuration of the East and the West, they strove to find the logic of a universal community from these seemingly unscientific and intrinsic elements of human society. They aimed to expand the exteriority of rationality and create what might be called a “subjective (主体的)” social science. In this way, individuals’ subjective and ubiquitous modes of life became part of social scientific study. These imperial social scientists believed that they could create a theory, which posited that the amalgam of individuals’ subjective and at times unpredictable behavior could become the basis for subject formation. They believed that through this theory,
Asian subjects in a new East Asian Community could share the sense of the community of destiny.

While producing imperial social scientific knowledge, these Japanese intellectuals faced two major challenges. One was to dismantle the empire-colony power structure. Second, and more importantly, they had to provide an alternative logic of subjectivity formation beyond capitalism. They were convinced that the question of ethnic and racial hierarchy between metropole and colony would not be fundamentally solved by simply adopting political measures such as giving the colonized a national identity. Individuals’ becoming members of a regional community entailed much more profound discussions of subjectivity formation than the binary configuration of empire and colony. For this reason, these imperial social scientists realized that a new form of subjectivity could not be created simply by suppressing individuals’ profit-oriented activities and eradicating all social conflicts and economic inequality by the state. To sustain the empire, or the destiny of community, to put it in a more symbolic way, an individual had to embody a productivist ethos, but the very logic of productivism was inseparable from the principle of the capitalist economy.

Depending on their academic disciplines and political positions, these imperial social scientists responded to this question quite differently. It seemed that they were all discussing the same theory, that is, the East Asian Cooperative Community, but the way each intellectual interpreted and rationalized it clearly the revealed theoretical limits inherent in his scientific thinking process. For example, Hirano Yoshitarō, a converted Koza-ha Marxist, never overcame the specter of the so-called Asian village community, which had been labeled the locus of stagnation and underdevelopment in Asian society. He tried to break through this reality by returning to history. By constantly reproducing images of harmony and social equilibrium from premodern Asian communities, Hirano linked these images to the Imperial Way and envisioned a family state. On the other
hand, Moritani Katsumi grappled with the question of how productivity could be maximized in Asian village communities, which lacked political and economic dynamics. It was at this point that he encountered geopolitics and the logic of the state-controlled planned economy.

However, none of these social scientists ever presented a sophisticated answer to the question of why Japan should lead the rest of Asia in the empire-building project. Ironically, they returned to the logic of capitalism and modernization; that is, most of these imperial social scientists claimed that Japan’s successful entrance into modern society demonstrated Japan’s leading role in Asia. Moreover, these social scientists at the metropole paid little attention to colonial reality. Apart from their naïve perception that Taiwan and Korea had already become part of imperial Japan, their rosy theory of an East Asian Community seemed far removed from what was happening in the colony in practice. In that respect, one might criticize their wartime discourses for “empty” rhetoric.

Nonetheless, I argue that it is important to carefully analyze why their writings captured attention from colonial intellectuals and had an impact on the formation of postcolonial Asia. Colonial intellectuals’ discourses resonated with these Japanese social scientists’ voices, although Japanese intellectuals never discussed colonial problems in detail. In this sense, the absence of particularism – the fact that they did not extend a “particularized” gaze to the colony and maintained a universalist standpoint – created an ironic political space. Colonial intellectuals developed their own version of an East Asian Community in which hierarchies between metropole and colony and between underdevelopment and modernization could be overcome at the same time.

As many have pointed out, postwar Japanese social scientists in the 1950s and 1960s removed these wartime social scientists from the orthodox history of Japanese social sciences. To be sure, their intentionality first stemmed from a strong belief that
scientific objectivity and rationality must not be associated with bad science such as that which justified colonialism and imperialism. Throughout this dissertation, I have highlighted the fact that the origins of Japanese social science are untraceable without looking at its colonial engagement. The “newness” of wartime Japanese social sciences, however, was the perception that “rationalizing” the empire could be done only by dismantling the notion of Japan as universal and the rest of Asia as particular. Therefore, the social scientists I have dealt with in this study invariably advocated the notion of a universal empire rather than particularize Asia or the Orient. In that respect, these imperial social scientists never dismissed the epistemology that viewed social scientific knowledge as creating a universal world. However, the very logic of universalism and cosmopolitanism produced a most violent theory which rationalized total war and mobilization.
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