STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY IN HIERARCHICAL EAST ASIA:
The Politics of Sovereign-Nationalism in Japan and Korea

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by
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Why do multiple understandings of state sovereignty exist in East Asia, and how do they affect security outcomes at the regional and domestic levels? I argue that Japanese and Korean leaders have historically sought to generate political legitimacy through alternative state-strengthening strategies, integration or insulation, vis-à-vis the region’s dominant power in the context of regional hierarchy. These varying ideas on achieving greater international status have remained an integral part of domestic security debates in Japan and Korea, which I refer to in this study as the framework of sovereign-nationalism. Through comparative case studies, I show evidence of varying but enduring patterns of hierarchical interaction and domestic legitimacy politics by examining Japanese and Korean security relations with China in the traditional East Asian order and with the United States in the post-1945 regional alliance system. In addition, I identify the mechanisms through which these ideas and practices of state-strengthening are reproduced and translated into political outcomes: framing through issue linkages and rhetorical entrapment.
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To my parents, Myung Soo Park and Young Ju Kim
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I spent most of my childhood reading books. I learned English through books when I first moved to the United States at an early age and re-learned Korean by reading more books when I moved back to South Korea. As much as I was enthralled by the various characters and stories introduced to me in the world of fiction and nonfiction, little did I know that I was also indirectly discovering and soaking in differences in social cues, cultural nuances, and historical interpretations. My instinct for comparative analysis has since then been honed more thoroughly and systematically, the culmination of which is this dissertation. I have had many teachers, colleagues, and friends to guide and inspire me along the way.

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CHAPTER ONE:
Hierarchy and Status in East Asian International Relations:
The Politics of Sovereign-Nationalism in Japan and Korea

“[A]mong the countries in the world, it is the Asian states that most clearly approximate the Westphalian state….The aspiration of the Asian political elite is to build strong, sovereign nation-states.”

“The Asian subsystem is dressed in Westphalian clothes, but is not performing according to a Westphalian script.”

Introduction

State sovereignty, as a concept and practice, is deeply contested in East Asian international relations. Its importance is widely recognized and frequently evoked; yet there exist multiple understandings on what exactly constitutes state sovereignty. This is manifested in the puzzling bifurcation of sovereignty claims that vary in content across time and context. While insular, and oftentimes xenophobic, rhetoric dominates protective stances on a wide range of issues involving state sovereignty, such as territory, immigration, and economic control, East Asian leaders have also pursued and justified greater international integration as part of their state-strengthening, and therefore sovereignty-enhancing, agendas. For example, in the 1980s and the 1990s, Japanese and Korean governments accommodated outside demands for opening up their markets in a proactive manner by promoting societal-wide reforms for kokusaika (internationalization) and segyehwa (globalization) respectively. Such contrasting

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3 On Japan’s pursuit of internationalization and international respect, see Mayumi Itoh, Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998); William W. Grimes, “Japan and Globalization: From Opportunity to Restraint,” in East Asia and
views on sovereignty were on full display in the 2003-04 period, when the United States asked Tokyo and Seoul to show support for the war in Iraq by dispatching troops. While the Roh Moo Hyun government was met with fierce opposition from a Korean public intent on enforcing greater sovereign autonomy, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro succeeded in portraying his decision to send the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) abroad as part of a broad effort to increase Japan’s “international contribution” and its standing on the international stage.

East Asian sovereignty claims vary not only in content, but also in degree. Not all assertions of state sovereignty are made with equal force or impact. The type of audience seems to matter in that Japan and Korea are more prone to accept compromises to their sovereignty from the U.S. but less so from each other. While sovereignty is fiercely guarded in Japanese and Korean relations with each other (and other regional neighbors), Japan and Korea have accepted serious infringements on their sovereign rights in the post-World War II period. For instance, the Japanese “Peace Constitution” was written under the directive of the American military occupation regime, and the Korean military’s operational control was under the United States command for more than forty years. The distinction made between Great

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4 For example, East Asian states are involved in long-standing emotional battles over relatively insignificant pieces of territory, such as Tokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyutai.

5 It was agreed in February 2007 that Korea would regain full (both peacetime and wartime) operational control over its military starting on April 17, 2012. The operational control (or command) of the Korean military has been in American hands since it was handed over by then-president Syngman Rhee to General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War. In 1994, peacetime operational control was transferred back to the Korean side. For details, see “62 nyŏn man e chŏnjak-kwŏn hwansu [The Return of Wartime Operational Control in 62 Years],” *DongA Ilbo*, February 24, 2007.
Powers, especially the region’s most dominant power, versus “the rest” is another puzzling aspect of Japanese and Korean foreign policy behavior.

The resulting picture is a tendency toward recalcitrant positions on sovereignty in intra-Asian relations on the one hand and some expectation of accommodation vis-à-vis the U.S. on the other. Japanese and Korean leaders and publics generally accept American leadership and authority as a provider of regional (and international) order. The power and standing of the United States is acknowledged in a uniquely deferential manner, a position that had been reserved solely for China in the historical past, in Japan and Korea. In addition, the language used to depict what used to be a deferential policy stance toward China in the hierarchical order of the past, such as sadae (revering, or showing deference to, the Great Power), is no longer used in the context of relations with China, but only against the United States (and very rarely against European countries), reflecting differing attitudes toward the U.S. and “the rest.” In Japan as well, the term and mechanism of gaiatsu (literally, foreign pressure) is reserved for the unique influence that the U.S. has in Japanese domestic politics.

Such sensitivity toward Great Powers has been a constant fixture in the history of East Asian international relations. Dealing with the rise and decline of regional hegemons is not new in East Asia. Through direct pressures and indirect penetration from regional hegemons, the sovereign control and authority of smaller states such as Japan and Korea have been challenged and compromised. Due to the widespread

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perception that the state lacks “complete” sovereignty, the very nature and meaning of state sovereignty have been widely politicized throughout Japanese and Korean history. The deference shown to the United States, therefore, is not a “natural” progression or expected legacy in a region historically led by a central dominant power, but rather a result of continuing domestic political contestation. The acceptable level of Great Power influence has varied under different contexts, as witnessed in the “anti-alliance” movements in Japan in the 1950s and Korea in 2002-2004.

The special status occupied by the U.S., well-recognized by its allies, as well as historically recurring debates on the role of Great Powers in Japanese and Korean security politics, generates the following questions. First, why has the region’s dominant power continued to play such an influential role in domestic and regional security politics in East Asia? Second, how has this influence varied? What are the sources of Japanese and Korean leaders’ positions on dealing with external Great Powers, and how do shifts occur between alternative security strategies? More specifically, in the postwar period, what explains movements toward greater acceptance or rejection of American influence in Japanese and Korean alliance relations with the U.S.?

In the next section, I introduce the framework of “sovereign-nationalism,” which identifies varying but enduring ideas of state-strengthening in the social context of regional hierarchy, reinforced by the experience of Westphalianization in the late 19th century. I then outline my argument on why state-strengthening persists as a

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8 Even though the term and concept “sovereignty” (shuken in Japanese; chukwŏn in Korean) entered Asian political discourse in the nineteenth century, it had been practiced under the traditional hierarchical order, in the conventional sense of the term. A centralized government had dominant control and authority over a defined territory and population. Domestic political struggles often involved foreign policy choices and how to protect or strengthen the country from within and without.

powerful source of regime legitimacy and show how sovereign-nationalism provides alternative routes to regime legitimation. Next I introduce my cases and methods of comparison and discuss possible alternative explanations on patterns of continuity and change in East Asian security. I conclude with a roadmap for the subsequent chapters of this study.

Conceptions of Sovereignty in Japan and Korea

Japanese and Korean debates on national security and foreign policy often reflect the dilemmas of achieving “complete” sovereignty since the introduction of the term into Asia in the late 19th century. This may not be surprising to Stephen Krasner, who argues that sovereignty, which comprises “bundles” of empirical categories, does not exist uniformly across all states. Sovereignty can be incomplete, and it is often violated in the face of coercive pressures or material interests, but without behavioral consequence for rulers and without endangering its institutional durability. Constructivists and others who work from sociological perspectives, on the other hand, view sovereignty as a historically evolving and highly constraining set of norms and practices. They argue that the modern state system based on

10 Similar concerns have affected China since its membership into the Westphalian state system. According to Yongjin Zhang, “China achieved its full sovereignty much later than its entry into international society.” Yongjin Zhang, China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 13. On China’s attempts to generate respect and status recognition since the 1990s, see Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for International Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
Westphalian sovereignty is a product of socially constructed meanings and shared understandings that are specific to a particular era.\textsuperscript{14} Membership into “international society” then was all-too-consequential for the fundamental nature and behavior of newly-inducted states in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{15}

But in the case of East Asia, different types of domestic understandings and practices of sovereignty resulted from varying degrees of embeddedness in the Sinocentric order.\textsuperscript{16} Different domestic meanings were attached to sovereignty through specific historical experiences.\textsuperscript{17} In Japan and Korea, the very translation of the term sovereignty was chosen carefully to symbolize the power and authority of the state so that they could compete with the Western powers, and to a lesser extent, China.\textsuperscript{18} In Japan in the 1870s, various terms, such as kunken (rights of the ruler), minken (rights

\textsuperscript{14} Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, for example, trace the historically variable interpretations of sovereignty as a source of legitimation for state practices—the emphasis oscillating between territory and the state, on the one hand, and population and the nation, on the other. See Samuel J. Barkin and Bruce Cronin, “The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations,” \textit{International Organization} 48, 1 (Winter 1994): 107-130. But, on the mixed interpretations and ambiguous applications of ideas on legitimate statehood and rightful state action even within in Europe during the 19th century, see Christian Reus-Smit, \textit{The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). On the double-sided nature of Japan’s entrance into international society, see Shogo Suzuki, “Japan’s Socialisation into the Janus-Faced European International Society,” \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 11, 1 (March 2005): 137-164.

\textsuperscript{15} Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., \textit{The Expansion of International Society} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).


\textsuperscript{17} In his study of changing Chinese stances on sovereignty, Allen Carlson notes that while external recognition of sovereignty is an important criterion for attaining membership in the international community, the issue of how each sovereign state attempts to define its sovereignty and construct particular interpretations of the sovereignty norm is an important topic that has been neglected in existing research. Allen Carlson, \textit{Unifying China, Integrating with the World: Securing Chinese Sovereignty in the Reform Era} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 21-22.

\textsuperscript{18} Many of the neologisms—for example, state, nation, sovereignty—were translated from the original European texts by Japanese modernizers such as Fukuzawa Yukichi in the late nineteenth century and diffused to China and Korea.
of the people), and kokken (rights of the state), proliferated, but shuken (sovereignty) emerged as the preferred translation to connote the supreme power of the state and nation in conjunction with the authority of the imperial institution.¹⁹

This “catching up with the West” imperative has continued to motivate strategic thinking and behavior in Japan and Korea, stronger in its salience and resonance than other possible historical legacies, such as militarism and colonization, the Cold War, or democratization. Hierarchical structures and rankings, especially their country’s standing in the world, remain all-important to the Japanese and Koreans.²⁰ Since the Meiji period, Japanese leaders strove to “catch up with and surpass” (oitsuku or oikosu) the West and become a “first-class nation” (ittō koku).²¹ According to Akira Iriye, Japanese political leaders in the modern era have been devoted solely to the enhancement of the power of the state (kokkashugi).²² Pointing out the “extraordinary responsiveness of Japan’s leaders to its external setting,” although the same could be argued for Korea, Kenneth Pyle writes: “Over the past century and a half, Japan has almost always taken its cues from the international system, set its priorities, even formed its self-identity, in relation to the international

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²¹ Richard J. Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 12.

order.” In other words, to be a truly accomplished state was to be judged favorably against civilizational standards, as promoted by the dominant power.

Such shared concern with reaching advanced-nation status through a “rich nation, strong army” (fukoku kyōhei in Japanese, pukuk kangbyŏng in Korean), as expressed in Japanese discussions of kokkashugi ((strong) state-ism) or kokkazō (vision for the state) and Korean portrayals of chukwŏn (sovereignty) or kukkakwan (views on the state), is what I refer to in this study as sovereign-nationalism. I define sovereign-nationalism as a shared societal conception (and implementation) of how best to enhance the standing of the state with reference to the region’s dominant power. It is a nationalism about the state, and like all nationalisms it can take on multiple, competing forms, which are subject to political mobilization by different elite groups and manifest themselves in competing strategies for state-strengthening in Japan and Korea under the context of continued hierarchy in the region.

The Framework of Sovereign-Nationalism

The defining feature of sovereign-nationalism in Japan and Korea is the ongoing concern for external status. The Japanese and Korean conception of state strength based on such status achievement has shown remarkable resilience. The need to attain higher standing within an international status hierarchy has been repeatedly promoted and mobilized throughout history by Japanese and Korean leaders in their

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23 Pyle, Japan Rising, 18.
24 For a detailed discussion of the traditional Chinese diplomatic order as a civilizational standard (chūka), see Chapter Two of this dissertation. On the application of a European “standard of civilization” to other regions of the world in the nineteenth century, see Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society. On the continued relevance of “externally established benchmarks for socio-political self-organization” within the current globalization debate, see Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke, “Civilizing Markets through Global Standards,” in Global Standards of Market Civilization, ed. Brett Bowden and Leonard Seabrooke (New York: Routledge, 2006), 5-7.
25 In this dissertation, I use the term hierarchy to refer to patterns of interaction between states based on their recognition of power asymmetry and status differentiation.
experience with various dominant powers, most notably China before the 19th century and the United States after 1945.26

Current debates on the role of the U.S. or the rise of China continue to reflect historically enduring notions of positioning and strengthening the state in reference to the dominant power. In their study of foreign policy debates in Germany and Japan, Katja Weber and Paul Kowert show that elite discussions on what kind of role to play in the postwar international order repeated themselves within “patterned constraints.”27 Similarly, discussions of foreign policy in Japan and Korea are guided by a long-standing strategic frame, one that encompasses categories of state power and strength shaped by a path-dependent hierarchical worldview.

This status-based conception of state strength, however, is neither homogenous nor fixed. Japan and Korea have historically alternated between two types of strategies to strengthen their state and define their status within the regional order: integration or insulation vis-à-vis the dominant power’s security framework (see table 1). Integration and insulation represent competing modes of status-seeking within the social context of hierarchy.28 Based on their degree of identification with the dominant power, smaller states have adopted alternative modes of socialization into the dominant power-led regional order. In the traditional Sinocentric order in East Asia, China’s

26 Such recognition of externally-imposed constraints (and threats), and the accompanying sense of vulnerability, are at the core of “small state” identities, which appeal to, and are largely accepted by, publics in both Japan and Korea. While the dominant perception in each country is that their position is uniquely vulnerable, comparative analysis shows that a self-defined sense of vulnerability can also explain a variety of security and political economic outcomes in Asia and Europe. See Peter J. Katzenstein, “Japanese Security in Perspective,” in Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 5-6.
28 On different forms of status-seeking behavior, such as social mobility, social competition, and social creativity, see Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status, Power, and World Order: Russia and China,” Paper presented at the 2009 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, New York, NY, February 18-19, 2009. Rather than direct competition, Japan and Korean have attempted social mobility through emulation or demonstrated social creativity through achieving distinction in a new or alternative domain.
smaller neighbors—it’s tributary states and trading partners—accepted the centrality of the Middle Kingdom, but also showed varying degrees of embeddedness into the Sinocentric order, as revealed in their domestic political institutions and culture as well as strategic behavior.

Table 1-1. Variation in Japanese and Korean State-Strengthening Strategies

<table>
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<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Sinocentric hierarchy</td>
<td>Insulation (1600-1868)</td>
<td>Integration (1392-1895)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid to late 19th century</td>
<td>Integration (1868-1920s)</td>
<td>Insulation (1895-1910)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 20th century-1945</td>
<td>Insulation (1930s-1945)</td>
<td>Loss of sovereignty (1910-1945)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Through integration, states gain coveted membership into or the exclusive club of “advanced (or civilized) nations.” In the traditional Sinocentric order, such status was granted by the Chinese court based on the “barbarian” country’s willingness to adapt to Sinocentric rules and rituals of diplomatic engagement. Tributary states, such as Korean and Vietnam, often competed to impress the Chinese emperor with their mastery of the Chinese classics and Chinese style of poetry. 

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29 Status and prestige confer a set of rights and benefits that are common knowledge, and are also admired, within a given “member group.” Barry O’Neill, *Honor, Symbols, and War* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 193-94.

bureaucrats refused to, or only very reluctantly chose to, deal with the “inferior” Japanese who were outside the realm of Chinese civilization and did not follow proper diplomatic protocol.\textsuperscript{31} Korean elites also reveled in the fact that they were “proper” Confucians, perhaps even more so than the Manchu-rulled Qing China.\textsuperscript{32} In the postwar period, integration has meant the emulation of “advanced countries” (senshinkoku in Japanese, sŏnjinguk in Korean) or to “become advanced (countries)” (senshinka in Japanese, sŏnjinhwa in Korean), a consistent theme in Japanese and Korean politics and foreign policy.

An insulation strategy on the other hand emphasizes a very different type of status for the state: self-reliance and distance from outside influences. The goal of insulation is to minimize the direct involvement of the Great Power in building state strength and generating political legitimacy for the leader. It is a minimalist definition of accommodation in that insular states do not directly confront or reject the dominant status of the local Great Power but rather seek to minimize the degree of its authority by turning to “self-strengthening” and alternative, indigenous sources of authority or legitimacy rather than external legitimation. In other words, insulation does not mean complete isolation or “exit” from the system, but rather creating distance from the dominant power. Even during the sakoku (national seclusion) period, Japan recognized and had contact with China, albeit indirectly.

Integrationist and insular strategic orientations are measured in terms of Japanese and Korean security alignment, levels of political interaction, economic and financial interdependence, social and cultural contact with the region’s dominant

\textsuperscript{31} Such reluctance is evident in the Korean emissaries’ description of their mission to Edo (Tokyo) to complete normalization of relations after the Seven Year War (1592-98) between the two countries. See Seung-Cheul Son, Chosŏn sidae hanil kwankyesa yŏngu [A Study of Korea-Japan Relations during the Chosŏn Period] (Seoul: Chisŏng ūi saem, 1994), 103-35.

power, indicating the degree of embeddedness in the social order created by the dominant power. For instance, in the traditional China-dominated framework of hierarchical relations, Japanese and Korean rulers adopted contrasting security strategies and promoted varying levels of political, economic, and social integration into the Sinocentric order to strengthen and legitimate the state—and their rule. Tokugawa Japan tried to insulate itself from Chinese dominance by “hiding,”33 while Chosŏn Korea for the most part sought to “ingratiate” itself with the regional hegemon through integration into the Chinese civilization.34 Such strategic choices were formed and perpetuated based on different domestic understandings of Sinocentrism in Japan and Korea, which led their respective rulers to assert varying “national” identities vis-à-vis China.35 Whereas Korea shared cultural and institutional similarities with China and engaged in sadae-based tributary trade, Japan, in order to carve out its own civilizational status next to China’s, avoided official, direct contact with China and relied instead on intermediaries for trade and communication.

In the postwar period, Japan and Korea have attempted to advance their standing in the world by promoting internationalization and aligning closely with the U.S., as evidenced in the “developmental states”36 of the 1970s and 1980s and in the

34 On the “ingratiation effect,” as an alternative to the balance-of-power mechanism, see Healy and Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History.” Similarly, Paul Johnson describes a strategy of seeking a “special relationship” with the regional hegemon by subordinated states, who strive hard “to please in every respect that the hegemon’s leaders will feel moved to reciprocate in the grand manner by showing special favoritism or generosity,” in order to secure protection from dominant powers. See Paul M. Johnson, “The Subordinate States and Their Strategies,” in Dominant Powers and Subordinate States, ed. Jan F. Triska (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986), 300.
globalization policies of the 1990s. For instance, the Korean government prioritized globalization as a top foreign policy agenda and pursued membership into the WTO and OECD as a means to “elevate South Korea’s international status and consolidate its ‘graduation’ into the top rank of world powers.” David Leheny argues that Japan’s pursuit of “internationalization” in the 1990s was really about becoming an internationally respected state.

It is important to note that regimes do not have infinite maneuverability in shaping their relations with the dominant power. Other factors, including structurally-given factors such as geography (island Japan versus peninsular Korea) or externally-imposed constraints as a result of military defeat and or the pressures of Cold War competition, may influence a regime’s freedom in deciding whether to continue to subscribe to the authority of the dominant power or to limit its influence in the domestic political arena. Yet, physical proximity to (or distance from) the Chinese mainland did not determine Korean and Japanese security strategies, and shared pressures or threats (for example, during the Cold War) did not translate into similar responses by Japan and Korea.

For instance, in the founding stages of their respective regimes, rulers in Chosŏn Korea expanded their ties to the Chinese court, from which they derived their legitimacy for their fledgling dynasty. This was a significant departure from the preceding Koryŏ Dynasty, which had attempted to fight off advances from the mainland by balancing the Ming court and Mongol forces (Yuan Dynasty) against

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38 Gills and Gills, “South Korea and Globalization.” 95.
each other in the 14th century. Tributary relations based on a shared culture and mutually accepted role divisions became institutionalized only at the beginning of the Chosŏn period vis-à-vis Ming China. In contrast, Tokugawa Ieyasu and his lieutenants, in establishing the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1868) in Japan, fearing a domestic backlash, chose to limit Chinese authority to maintain political stability after an intense civil war and to define their ruling legitimacy on the basis of approval from the Japanese emperor.

Why Does Sovereign-Nationalism Endure in Japan and Korea?

The role of hierarchy in regional security

Why then do these ideas of state-strengthening, which attach importance to external status, continue to shape strategic debates in Japan and Korea? Repeated regime appeals to ideas on state-strengthening in Japan and Korea have taken place in the context of hierarchical interaction with China historically and the United States in the postwar period. Because of the extreme inequality in capabilities between the dominant power on the one hand and secondary states on the other in these hierarchical orders, and because “exit” (i.e. avoiding Chinese or American influence altogether) was not an option, the first and foremost task of strengthening the state has

40 Han-kyu Kim, *Hanchung kwankyesa* [The History of Korea-China Relations], volume 2 (Seoul: Arûke, 1999), 563-570. In the early years of the Koryŏ dynasty (918-1392), the court had also debated whether to adopt a nativist insulation strategy or a China-centered universalism. See Michael C. Rogers, “National Consciousness in Medieval Korea: The Impact of Liao and Chin on Koryo,” in *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 151-72. On early Koryŏ relations with China, see Roh Kye-hyŏn, *Koryŏ oekyosa* [History of Koryŏ Foreign Policy] (Seoul: Kap’in, 1994).


been to stabilize relations with the region’s dominant power. Negotiating a stable compromise involved the ensuring of security protection against outside threats, minimizing confrontation with (and in some cases, reducing the threat of interference from) the dominant power itself, or both.

The relevance of hierarchy for interstate interaction, however, stems from not only the asymmetrical distribution of power, but also the element of social stratification. While the degree of identification with the dominant power and type of membership within the dominant power’s order may vary, the material and cultural dominance of the regional hegemon is recognized by all regional actors. The dominant power not only maintains political stability in the regional order but also exercises authority in establishing a social order according to its desired rules of membership, with a clear status differentiation between members and non-members.

Historically in Asia, China and its civilizational standards exerted its influence and authority directly: rulers in neighboring countries legitimated their rule by unifying their country, a key criteria for leadership according the classical Chinese texts, and by gaining outside recognition, especially from the Chinese suzerain. Since 1945 and the “Westphalianization” of Asia, the dominant power is a more indirect source of authority, functioning as a reference point for domestic contestation over how to define state identity and achieve greater status. Through varying forms of interaction with the dominant power, rulers in Japan and Korea endeavored to achieve

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44 Morris Rossabi argues that symbolic sanction from China, such as investiture by the Chinese emperor, “enhanced the prestige of the tribal ruler among his own and neighboring tribes,” and was useful for securing domestic political legitimacy. See Morris Rossabi, “Introduction,” in *China among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 3-4. See also Chai-sik Chung, *A Korean Confucian Encounter with the Modern World: Yi Hang-no and the West* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1995), 14.
different types of social status or standing—as “member” states or “self-reliant” states—vis-à-vis the former.

In the postwar period, by virtue of its dominant material capabilities and unsurpassed political influence in the region, the United States has shaped and led a hierarchically-structured regional order. In his recent book, David Lake reminds us that hierarchy is not the exception but rather quite common in interstate relations. According to Lake, hierarchy is defined not simply as a function of unequal power, but in terms of the compliance shown by the ruled to the authority of the ruler. In other words, hierarchical relationships are a form of strategic interaction among states: hierarchical stability depends not only on the exercise of power and influence by the dominant power, but also on the “consent of the governed,” the explicit or implicit acceptance of such external authority in subordinate states.

A key source of Japanese and Korean deference toward American leadership is undeniably the fact that the United States has been a disproportionately more powerful actor in the region (and the world) for most of the postwar period. At the same time, it was the way in which power was exercised that contributed to the durability of the U.S.-led postwar order, according to scholars such as John Ikenberry, who argue that the legitimacy of American leadership was enhanced through strategic restraint in

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attributing the “hegemonic stability” of the East Asian regional order to the presence of the United States, Ikenberry states that “in practical terms there is no alternative order that [the United States] or the countries in the region can conjure up that is more stable or mutually beneficial than the current order.”

This view of American leadership, however, overemphasizes the constraint on U.S. power at the expense of its structural power and the far-reaching impact that pressures from Washington or shifts in U.S. policy have on the domestic security politics of its allies. For instance, Japan and Korea normalized relations in 1965, after thirteen years of failed talks, when the U.S. increased its pressure on both sides due to its involvement in Vietnam. Moreover, Japanese and Korean leaders have not always been reassured by American strategic restraint; the degree of consensus on the role of the U.S. has varied in Japan and Korea and also at different time periods in each country.


Because the focus of existing approaches to hierarchical stability is on finding variation or anomalies in patterns of alignment behavior or other forms of behavioral compliance (e.g. alliance cohesion, political economic integration, lack of balancing), they pay relatively little attention to the domestic political sources of changing accommodation patterns shown by subordinate countries in their relations with the dominant power. I argue instead that hierarchical interactions have varied according to the degree of acceptability of American influence in Japan and Korea at different time periods. Specifically, I show how Japanese and Korean rulers have sought to increase or limit their reliance on the authority of the United States to legitimate their political rule.

In addition, such domestic contestations on what type of relations to pursue with the U.S. are not necessarily a reflection of American power or authority specifically. Foreign policy debates in Japan and Korea today continue to reflect longstanding concerns on managing Great Power relations, similar to those seen in the traditional Sinocentric order. These alternative strategies of regime legitimation, and resulting patterns of dominant-subordinate relations, have continued throughout different regional hierarchical orders—the historical Chinese tributary system and the U.S.-led security order since 1945. In other words, the enduring sources of Japanese and Korean hierarchical interaction with the region’s dominant power, and its variable patterns, are not unique to Pax Americana or even the Westphalian state system.

50 The fact that accommodation of the region’s dominant power has been the norm in Japanese and Korean foreign relations renders existing categories of alignment behavior, such as balancing and bandwagoning, insufficient in explaining state choices in hierarchical orders such as the East Asian region. Recent works that attempt to identify non-balancing behavior or develop alternatives to balance-of-power theory include Victoria Tin-bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2005); Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlfarth, eds., The Balance of Power in World History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). See also Brian Healy and Arthur Stein, “The Balance of Power in International History: Theory and Reality,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 17, 1 (March 1973): 33-61.

51 On different types of unequal but stable social relations among states based on hegemonial, hierarchical, or heteronomous rule, see Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, “Anarchy, Authority, Rule,” International Studies Quarterly 33, 2 (June 1989): 149-73.
**Domestic political legitimation**

Sovereign-nationalism remains relevant because Japanese and Korean political leaders continue to define their legitimacy, and contest the legitimacy of their opponents, in terms of state-strengthening, particularly in reference to relevant Great Powers. In other words, the type of relations they promote or sustain with the region’s dominant power is an ongoing source of political legitimacy for leaders. Some of the most widely politicized and contested security policies, such as the revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960 and the announcement in 2003 of South Korean plans to acquire autonomous defense capabilities, were a result of leaders’ attempts to change existing relations with the United States and legitimate their rule based on a more self-reliant identity.

By regime legitimacy, I am referring here to the social recognition and acceptance of the regime-in-power’s mandate to rule.⁵² According to David Beetham, rulers “lack legitimacy to the extent that they cannot be justified in terms of shared beliefs: either because no basis of shared belief exists in the first place…or because changes in belief have deprived the rules of their supporting basis.”⁵³ While theoretically there exist multiple sources of legitimacy for political leaders, the regime’s stance and standing vis-à-vis the region’s dominant power has continued to be the most enduring as well as salient in Japanese and Korean politics. Even economic performance, a common source of legitimacy for regimes in general, is

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heavily packaged in ideas of state-strengthening, as evident in discussions of the “developmental state” in Asia.  

Sovereign-nationalism continues to be mobilized as a source of regime legitimacy and as a frame for legitimacy competition because of a general tendency toward extreme sensitivity, or “overattention,” to the region’s dominant power. There is a widespread perception (both real and exaggerated) among the public that the United States (as China had in the past) wields much influence in domestic politics and in leaders’ policy preferences. Gaiatsu is almost expected, if not always welcomed, in Japan. In Korea, suspicions of “mad cow disease” in American beef imports triggers anti-American protests and quickly spills over into a general nationalist fervor. Such a shared consciousness in Japanese and Korean societies is what allows, and sometimes pushes, leaders to debate and contest alternative state-strengthening strategies.

**Explaining Shifts in Regime Legitimation Paths: Mechanisms of Domestic Contestation and Change**

Table 1-1 shows that major strategic transformations in Japan and Korea have taken place during key critical junctures—the formation of the Tokugawa regime and the Chosŏn Dynasty in the traditional East Asian state system, the interaction with the Western powers in the late 19th century, and the formation of the U.S.-led security order after 1945. While alternative strategies were debated during these periods of  

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55 In his portrayal of routinized asymmetrical relations between Vietnam and China, Brantly Womack refers to such hegemon sensitivity as the “politics of overattention,” in which vulnerability to the larger power makes the smaller state sensitive to all possibilities of the former’s actions. See Brantly Womack, *China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 82-84.  
56 This is in stark contrast to the lack of a “nationalist” reaction to a different “food crisis” around the same time—reports that various food items imported from China, including snacks targeted at children in particular, contained the toxic substance melamine.
transformation, the legitimation path that was ultimately taken has proved to be stable in all three instances. In fact, windows of opportunity for change have not only been rare but small, and attempts at alternative status conceptions were either partial or short-lived.

A key factor in the relative stability of the existing status conception in postwar Japan and Korea has been the dominance of conservative-leaning rule. In the aftermath of defeat in war and liberation from colonial rule in Japan and Korea respectively, the U.S. occupation authorities in both countries played a key role in empowering the “internationalists” over the anti-integration camp, the isolationist-oriented Japanese Left and the self-reliance-advocating Korean independence movement leaders. Through its exercise of power and leadership, the United States has played a key role in lending credibility as well as material support to the ruling regimes in Japan and Korea. Japanese and Korean leaders have relied on such external legitimation for most of the postwar period.

The dominant integration-oriented strategy, however, has periodically been challenged by the “anti-mainstream” in both Japan and Korea. State-strengthening debates are also reproduced through politicization of domestically contested policy agendas that are reminders of incomplete sovereignty—constitutionally-imposed military constraints in Japan and policy toward North Korea in South Korea. When leaders seek significant change in these issues, as did Park Chung Hee in the 1970s and Roh Moo Hyun in the early 2000s, they are also signaling departure from a long-standing policy position that had been conceived with the early involvement of the U.S.

In Japan, the so-called Yoshida Doctrine has been criticized by pacifists and revisionists who each promote different notions of self-reliance from the U.S.—the

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57 Samuels, *Securing Japan.*
former based on an isolationist foreign policy and the latter through constitutional revision and rearmament. The relative strength of the consensus on an integrationist strategy can also be gauged through the domestic political position held by those who represent departures from the “mainstream” integration consensus. The Left and the Far Right in Japan have been relegated to the sidelines for most of the postwar period until the rise of Koizumi Junichiro and Abe Shinzo, whose policy changes took place under close cooperation with the United States. In Korea, state-strengthening through integration has been questioned by greater calls for a self-reliant foreign policy, including an independent North Korea policy, during the trusteeship debates in the immediate postwar period as well as through the “autonomous defense” programs of Park Chung Hee in the 1970s and Roh Moo Hyun in the early 2000s.

In Chapters Four and Five, I examine instances of how leaders attempt to generate political legitimacy by promoting alternative conceptions of state-strengthening: Kishi Nobusuke’s rejection of Yoshida’s “Middle Power” integration strategy and his attempt to achieve greater foreign policy autonomy through the revision of the security treaty with the United States; and Park Chung Hee’s mobilization of a comprehensive, nationwide “self-reliance” movement in the aftermath of the Guam Doctrine and the Nixon administration’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea (see table 1-2). In both cases, shifts in U.S. policy prompted regimes efforts to mobilize alternative forms of state-strengthening in Japan and Korea.

58 On the creation and maintenance of the mainstream Yoshida consensus in postwar Japan, see Samuels, Securing Japan, especially Chapter 2.
59 In this study, I bracket the question of why some leaders are able to change the existing frame of sovereign-nationalism, while others are less successful. Success or failure of mobilization attempts is determined by multiple, often idiosyncratic factors, including the domestic balance of power at a given time. The more important issue at hand though is the fact that political mobilizations repeatedly occur along the frames of sovereign-nationalism, with consequences for policy outcomes, as illustrated in Chapter Six.
### Table 1-2. Mobilizations of Sovereign-Nationalism in Postwar Japan and Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945-1950s</td>
<td>· Liberals vs. Socialists</td>
<td>· Pro vs. anti-trusteeship debates in the late 1940s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>· Moderates vs. autonomists within the LDP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>· Kishi and the Security Treaty Revision crisis in 1959-60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td></td>
<td>· Park’s turn toward self-reliance in the early 1970s</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td></td>
<td>· Roh’s promotion of “autonomous defense”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A key element of recurring state-strengthening debates and mobilizations is the bounded use of language in recurring “sovereignty debates.” Because the term sovereignty was a product of late 19th century politics, it has meanings attached to it that determine their future use and interpretation. Reinhart Koselleck explains:

“When a concept, for instance that of ‘marriage,’ is used, experiences of marriage, which have a long-term effect and which have entered into the concept at and as its foundation, are linguistically stored in it. And the linguistic context, which is also pre-given, regulates the range of semantic content. With any topical use of the word *marriage*, the linguistically
determined pre-given data that structure its sense and its understanding repeat themselves.\textsuperscript{60}

Similarly, “sovereignty” in East Asia has built into its meaning the political experiences and consequences surrounding Japanese and Korean encounters with Westphalian sovereignty, such as “failed” militarism in the case of Japan and colonization in the case of Korea.

The use or avoidance of specific vocabulary on sovereignty indicates shared understandings and rules that have been in place since 1945, or even since the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{61} For instance, based on their experiences during the nineteenth century, sovereignty became conceptualized in different ways in Japan and Korea. In Korea, sovereignty tended to be used in opposition to Great Power intrusion and manipulation, often part of broader anti-Great Power mobilizations. In Japan, assertions of sovereignty became equated with Great Power-ism and the pursuit of Great Power-like expansionist interests which would bring Japan into competition with other Great Powers.

The non-use of certain terms is particularly important for studying Japanese security politics. Carefully avoided in Japan’s security discourse is the word 

\textit{minzokushugi} (nationalism), which is politically tainted with the historical baggage of

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imperialism and militarism. Instead, Japanese academics and analysts discuss state strategies (kokka senryaku or kokkakan) in terms of making their country “normal” (futsuu no kuni) again or contribute to international society (kokusai kōken). Other “nationalist” ideas are expressed through the broader discourse of nihonjinron (theories on Japaneseness), and when there is no viable substitute, the romanization of the English word nationalism, nasyonarizumu, is used. Rather than directly stating preferred policy views, Japanese politicians employ euphemisms such askokusai kōken (contribution to international community) to denote a more active security role. In contrast, the term minjokjuŭi (nationalism) and chukwŏn (sovereignty) are widely and almost indiscriminately used in Korea.

Patterns of language usage are important because certain types of discourses can legitimize certain behavior and politicize some phenomena over others. Rhetoric can influence political outcomes not only in the realm of normative persuasion, as has been the dominant focus of constructivist theorizing in the field of international relations, but also through framing competitions directed at an audience that share

62 The nation (minzoku/minjok) in both Japan and Korea is predominantly used and understood as race or ethnicity, rather than political community, in everyday parlance. Scholars on Japanese and Korean nationalism argue that ethnic nationalism is the most prevalent form of nationalism in these Asian countries and rarely politicized in their respective societies. See, for example, Michael Weiner, “Discourses of Race, Nation and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 18, 3 (July 1995): 433-456; Kosaku Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism in Japan (London: Routledge, 1992); Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea.


66 Recent examples include munhwa chukwön (cultural sovereignty) and kŏmyŏk chukwön (inspection sovereignty). Another word that is frequently misappropriated is sadaejuŭi.

some understandings of the boundaries of acceptable discourse.\textsuperscript{68} By referring to past concepts and categories, Japanese and Korean leaders continue to politicize and rearticulate the enduring strategic frame of sovereign-nationalism. Specifically, the mobilization of sovereign-nationalism occurs through two important mechanisms: linkage and entrapment.

\textit{Political framing and linkage through legitimating rhetoric}

The language of sovereignty-nationalism acts as both a constraint and opportunity for rulers seeking to mobilize support for their status-seeking vis-à-vis the dominant power. Sovereign-nationalist language can be a useful political resource for Japanese and Korean leaders, who are able to promote their preferred ideas on state-strengthening by linking them to contentious issues, usually involving alliance politics.\textsuperscript{69} The most important aspect of continued use (or avoidance) of sovereign-nationalist language is to perpetuate specific interpretations of history that act as “lessons” for state-strengthening, such as the taken-for-granted view that the pro-China \textit{sadae} policy had led to the loss of Korean sovereignty in the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The language of state-strengthening also keeps in place the social context of hierarchical interaction: reference to the word \textit{sadae} in textbooks, the media, and everyday parlance automatically conjures up American (and past Chinese) influence in Korean affairs. For instance, anti-\textit{sadae} has been frequently used as a mobilization slogan by Korean leaders in dealing with the various types of international influences perceived by their domestic constituents. Anti-\textit{sadae} nationalism fueled trusteeship debates in the immediate postwar period and gave legitimacy to Park Chung Hee’s


\textsuperscript{69} Given that the U.S. is the actor with the most power and authority in the region, alliance relations with the U.S. is where we are most likely to find Japanese and Korean state-strengthening language in action, which I analyze in greater detail through paired comparisons in Chapters Five and Six.
political and economic reforms. Chun Doo Hwan, Park’s successor as president, liked to warn against the dangers of adopting a sadae mentality toward foreign culture and values. The most recent manifestation of anti-sadae sentiments has been through the expression of anti-Americanism in the early 2000s.

The use of anti-sadae language was more than an act of reference to historical analogies, however, in that it readily produced political framing effects based on “common knowledge” or shared expectations. In his study of Arab states’ discourses on state and regional identities, Michael Barnett argues that leaders engage in rhetorical competition for legitimacy through the shared frame of Arabism. In a similar manner, alternative frames of status-seeking are contested through the shared language of sovereign-nationalism. When Roh Moo Hyun referred to his conservative opponents as sadaejuŭija-dŭl (persons with a servile attitude toward Great Powers), all important security debates became framed in pro- versus anti-American terms, in which anti-Americanism became a synonym for anti-sadaejuŭi. Whereas in the past, anti-American movements had been based on an anti-capitalist ideology or disagreeable U.S. policies, this time, anti-Americanism became equated with the historical lesson preaching the necessity of rejecting the practice of constantly bowing to Great Power interests and intrusions. Noting its emergence as a major ideological


trend in Korea, Jiyul Kim defines anti-Great Power-ism as “the desire of Koreans to escape from the sort of Great Power exploitation and victimization, actual and perceived, that the Korean peninsula has experienced since the latter half of the 19th century.”

But framing can also lead to unintended and adverse linkage effects. Roh’s “independent foreign policy” campaign, which became specifically linked to his North Korea policy, was widely portrayed as defying past stances toward North Korea under the rule of the conservatives as well as the Bush Administration’s inclusion of North Korea in the “axis of evil.” This narrow form of linkage left Roh vulnerable to rhetorical entrapment at the expense of other possible rhetorical resources, for which he paid high political costs.

**Entrapment and extremization: the path to polarization**

As indicated in the long periods of continuity in Table 1, integrationist and insular strategic orientations, once institutionalized and stabilized into a dominant state identity, tend to remain relatively stable. The strength of the opposition as well as the cohesiveness of the regime in the face of an unfavorable domestic power balance can impact the salience and importance attached to the regime’s defense of its existing status conception. Debates between alternative strategies tend to become polarized when leaders of the ruling regime face harsh political competition, either from outside challengers or within-regime divisions, and therefore become constrained in their strategic options (entrapment). It is difficult for regimes to diverge from their stated mandate because of the potential political fallout from hypocrisy. Regimes are

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74 Regimes that veer too far from collectively held values suffer from “credibility gaps” that make them vulnerable to alternative discourse. See Margarete Myers Feinstein, *State Symbols: The Quest for*
forced to defend, and continue to adhere to, their previous modes of state-
strengthening even when strategic interests change. For example, the central
government in Edo (Tokyo) on the eve of the Meiji Restoration (1868) could not
disregard the jōi (“expel the barbarians”) ideology or abandon the sakoku (national
seclusion) policy, even as they partially accommodated Western powers, without
damaging their credibility.

In general, the ability of a leader or the ruling regime to effectively challenge
existing conceptions of state status depends on a favorable domestic balance of power.
The Tokugawa regime had weak control over a decentralized system consisting of
regional fiefdoms, whereas the Meiji leadership, nearly 300 years later, was more
successful in securing power after the civil war, in which they overthrew the
Tokugawa government, and also in promoting a new integration strategy for the
Japanese state. In postwar Korea, Park Chung Hee was able to efficiently turn toward
a more self-reliant stance vis-à-vis the U.S. in the 1970s after having eliminated most
of the political opposition through his authoritarian Yushin system, but Roh Moo
Hyun faced a high level of political competition from not only the traditional
conservatives but also the more mainstream (or moderate) anti-conservatives of the
Kim Dae Jung faction. The higher level of political competition meant that Roh, in
order to differentiate himself from his more established opponents, had to stake his
legitimacy and political fortunes on his pro-autonomy agenda.

**Research Methods: Cases and Data**

In order to capture different dimensions of variation in the historically-
enduring sovereign-nationalist framework in East Asia, I conduct comparative case

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*Legitimacy in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, 1949-1959*
studies of Japan and Korea in the traditional Sinocentric hierarchical order and the post-1945 U.S.-led regional order. The East Asian region is a particularly useful case to examine in assessing sovereignty’s role in international politics because it allows us to assess the enduring influence of traditional ideas on legitimate statehood, since East Asia already had in place an indigenous system of relations among independent state actors before coming into contact with the European state system. In other words, the Westphalian system was not the first state-based model in East Asia, unlike in other non-European regions, where state sovereignty materialized after the breakdown of empires and decolonization. Until the demise of the Qing Empire in the late 19th century, East Asian interstate relations for centuries were conducted within the China-centered “world” order, with its own rules and practices. The difference was of course in the organizing principles of the two systems—Westphalian anarchy versus Sinocentric hierarchy.

The two major cases of this study, Japan and Korea, provide interesting contrasts and sites of comparison because they have faced similar structural and regional conditions and yet varied in their state-strengthening strategies. The comparisons examined in this dissertation are the formation of different conceptions of status and state-strengthening in Japan and Korea under Sinocentric hierarchy and

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77 The traditional East Asian system of interstate relations has been characterized as the “Chinese world order,” the Sinocentric tribute system, the “sadae order,” the hwa-i (or ka-i in Japanese; civilian-barbarian) order, and the kaikin (or haekŭm in Korean; Maritime Prohibition) system, to name a few examples. See John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Key-Huik Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1980); Yongkoo Kim, The Five Years’ Crisis, 1866-1871: Korea in the Maelstrom of Western Imperialism (Seoul: Circle, 2001); Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997); Hamashita, “The Intra-Regional System in East Asia in Modern Times.”
their different responses and transition to the European state system in the mid to late 19th century. Another critical juncture is the 1945-1960 period, when the stage is set in both countries for state-strengthening through integration. I examine two important cases in which leaders engaged in mobilizations of an alternative state-strengthening strategy, demonstrating the enduring frame of sovereign-nationalism in Japan and Korea in the postwar period.

Examining these dimensions of domestic legitimacy competition is important because it is difficult to find evidence of clear-cut changes in alignment behavior or other security policy outcomes, strictly in terms of behavioral output in post-1945 Japan and Korea. The U.S. hub-and-spokes system of alliances in Asia remains intact, even if the level of cooperation has varied, more than fifteen years since the end of the Cold War. Despite claims that Japanese security policy has changed since the “Gulf War” shock of 1991 or the commencement of the “War on Terror” in 2001, it is difficult to pinpoint whether changing structural conditions since 1991 or deeper societal-wide transformations contributed to the tacit acceptance of Koizumi’s increasing security activism (for instance, the Self-Defense Forces missions in Afghanistan and Iraq). Similarly, Korea’s newfound anti-American and inter-Korean nationalism notwithstanding, the Roh government’s dispatch of troops to Iraq and signing of the free trade agreement with the United States despite widespread public protests make it difficult to determine the extent to which Korean strategic behavior has changed.

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79 I am admittedly leaving out other possibly critical junctures, such as the immediate period after 1895 or the 1920s-30s period, which are subjects for future study.
In order to capture the different contexts of alliance politicization in Korea and Japan, I analyze the content of Japanese and Korean security discourses as an important part of policy outcomes, particularly focusing on the “language” of security in both countries. Rather than focusing on observing authority through “out-of-equilibrium” behavior by the dominant or subordinate actor, I look at the use of language and context of debates to determine continuities or changes in the type of relations pursued vis-à-vis the U.S. In other words, I measure outcomes not only in terms of behavioral change but also by observing patterns of domestic debate.

Examining security language is important because meaningful security words in Japanese and Korean discussions do not always directly translate. Moreover, the use or non-use of certain terms and discourses are themselves significant because they make political statements. For my analysis, I look at speeches of leaders and official statements outlining foreign policy goals, memoirs, as well as records of foreign policy debates in the Japanese Diet and Korean National Assembly. For the historical cases, I consult biographies and memoirs to trace understandings on sovereignty and the state by key individuals. In addition, I examine relevant debates in academic journals as well as popular news magazines such as Shin Dong-A in Korea and Chūō Kōron in Japan.


What role does state sovereignty play in East Asian security debates, and why are such domestically-held sovereignty conceptions important for studying regional

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80 According to Lake, “the true nature and limits of international hierarchy are revealed when the dominant state uses force to impose its preferences in the face of resistance—as the United States did in the invasions of the Dominican Republic in 1905, 1916, and 1965.” *Hierarchy in International Relations*, 114.
security? Does the seemingly strong attachment to sovereignty in Asia, as evident in
heated disputes over relatively insignificant territories for example, have more than
rhetorical or symbolic significance? This study finds the sources of current
understandings of sovereignty, and the role of the state in international politics, in the
region’s historical legacy of hierarchical interaction and shows how traditional
patterns of state-strengthening strategies have persisted through various regional and
domestic structural transformations since the arrival of the Westphalian state system in
the nineteenth century.

The framework of sovereign-nationalism identifies historical patterns of
continuity that have endured in postwar Japan and Korea previously overlooked by
existing international relations theories which tend to favor change as the expected
outcome. I address here three types of explanations of past or expected instances of
change in East Asian security which are not well-supported empirically, each focusing
on changes in the international system, varying levels of external threat, and domestic
political transformations. While ideational or cultural explanations are better at
capturing important elements of continuity in East Asian security, they tend to
highlight country-specific proclivities or reinforce a static view of historical legacies.

Following the logic of structural realism, which predicts patterns of alignment
and conflict according to shifts in the regional and/or international balance of power,
some have predicted conflict in an increasingly “multipolar” post-Cold War Asia,
which includes Japan, China, India, and Russia.81 Others expect the rise of Chinese
power to produce a power transition or the creation of a balancing coalition.82

81 Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International
Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33; Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and
the United States after the Cold War,” International Security 18, 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77; Liselotte
But systemic pressures are ambiguous in their effects. Similar structural shifts have led to different political responses in Japan and Korea, first in the decline of the Sinocentric order in the 19th century and also during the Cold War, when détente between the U.S. and China resulted in self-reliant mobilization in Korea but politics as usual in Japan. While on the surface, both countries appeared to move toward greater “autonomy” in foreign policy, the integration consensus was actually strengthened in Japan but destabilized in Korea. Neither Nixon’s retrenchment policy proclaimed in 1969 nor the announcement of his visit to Beijing was interpreted in the same manner in Japan and Korea. The prior context of relations with the U.S. in each country determined the degree of threat and “shock” felt between 1969 and 1971.

The sudden announcement by Nixon constituted a loss of face for Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, but ultimately Sino-U.S. rapprochement appeased pro-autonomy voices among the Japanese Left and Right by allowing greater room for Japan’s China policy. Past divisiveness on views of the alliance found common ground in the new “independent” China policy after 1971. In other words, the integration consensus expanded its constituency, and the distance between the middle ground of the Yoshida doctrine and revisionists began to narrow. In Korea, however, Nixon’s failure to consult on such a monumental policy change was yet another sign of American “abandonment” of Korea since the announcement of Nixon’s troop withdrawal plan, which had not only increased Korean insecurity but threatened to damage the Park regime’s credibility vis-à-vis his domestic political constituents as well as North Korea. Introducing sweeping political and military reforms, Park attempted to mobilize a new source of political legitimacy based on national self-reliance.

International systemic factors may also work in tandem with other influences, such as the role of the U.S., to produce region-specific outcomes. Examples include the U.S.-Japan-Korea “quasi-alliance” triangle and the underinstitutionalization of regional security frameworks in Asia. In his recent study of the transformation of Japanese security policies since the late nineteenth century, Kenneth Pyle argues that “[w]henever the system has changed, Japan has also changed,” but he also recognizes that its participation in the U.S.’s alliance system has tempered Japan’s role in regional and international security. In this sense, it is not the change in the balance of power per se, but the change in strategy of the region’s dominant power (such as the decline of U.S. commitment to its East Asian allies in the 1970s) that affects Japanese and Korean foreign policy options. Moreover, despite claims of declining American influence in the region since the 1970s, hierarchical stability under U.S. leadership has been maintained and accepted in the region.

A second predictor of change in East Asian security dynamics, particularly involving alliance relations between the U.S. on the one hand and Japan and Korea on the other, is the lack of shared threats in the post-Cold War period. While alliance cohesion was the expected outcome during the Cold War, given the shared threat of communism, realist predictions could not explain the persistence (and expansion, in the case of NATO) of alliances in the post-Cold War period. While it could be argued that emerging new threats, such as the rise of China, terrorism, and North

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84 Pyle, Japan Rising, 19.
85 For this argument, see Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism.
Korean missiles and nuclearization, have prompted the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances, the evidence does not appear to support this claim. For starters, there is a lack of outright balancing against China in either Korea or Japan. Nor did Japanese and Korean views of the events of 9/11 or the nature of terrorism echo those of Americans. The grueling process of the Six Party Talks proved that different interests and different strategic priorities were at work in Japan, Korea, and the U.S.

It could also be argued that the strained security partnership between the U.S. and Korea in recent years is evidence of weakening alliance cohesion in the absence of shared threats in the post-Cold War period. But alliance cooperation has continued even without the uniting thread of a common enemy in East Asia. Even though the threat of North Korea as a nuclear weapons proliferator was not widely shared by the Japanese, the Koizumi government actively strengthened alliance ties with the Bush administration, offering logistical support in Afghanistan and even dispatching the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, in order to resolve the issue of kidnapped Japanese. In Korea, alliance cohesion was arguably at its strongest in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when South Korean perceptions of the North Korea threat were beginning to dramatically weaken as a result of President Kim Dae Jung’s “Sunshine Policy.” While continuing security dependence on the U.S. may explain both cases of alliance cooperation, this is in fact a different argument from the one based on shared threats.

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89 In fact, as Victor Cha shows in his study of Japanese and Korean alliance relations with the United States, even during the Cold War, threat perception in Japan and Korea were directly affected by increasing or declining security commitments from their larger, and more powerful, ally. In other words, the key mechanism that drives Japanese and Korean security decisions (i.e. the role of the U.S.) has not changed with the end of the Cold War. See Cha, *Alignment despite Antagonism.*
Thirdly, structural shifts in domestic politics, such as the formation of a new or distinct coalition and democratization, are also expected to produce change in security outcomes. For example, Etel Solingen argues that domestic grand strategies and changes in the regional order are caused by the type of domestic political-economic coalition in power, either internationalist or statist-nationalist in orientation. According to her analysis, an internationalist “sword-won” coalition in 1960s-70s Korea executed the reconciliation process with Japan and gave up its nuclear weapons development program, both of which contributed to the creation of a cooperative regional order.90

Despite its theoretical plausibility, however, South Korean security strategies did not in reality result from a power struggle between a statist-nationalist military-industrial complex and pro-economic liberalization forces. Evidence shows that Park Chung Hee personally oversaw both weapons development programs as well as economic development plans detailing export targets and heavy chemicals industrialization.91 The real driving force behind the Park regime’s security policy decisions, it can be argued, was the desire to stay in power and the continued reliance on a state-strengthening nationalism to bolster his legitimacy. Similarly, in the Japanese context, T. J. Pempel shows that shifting coalitions are actually creative extensions of continued conservative rule in Japan.92 In other words, Japanese and Korean security policies have above all been motivated by concerns for regime legitimacy and the maintenance of political rule.

Democratization has not appeared to change this basic fact either, and Japanese and Korean rulers continue to rely on state-strengthening analogies that contest

different types of status vis-à-vis the United States to generate political legitimacy. For instance, both Roh, who himself as a human rights lawyer participated in the pro-democracy movement against Chun’s military regime in the 1980s, and Park, during his authoritarian rule in the 1970s, used the historical lessons of anti-sadae self-reliance to introduce their “autonomous defense” projects. To reiterate, ideas of state-strengthening still act as powerful imperatives for regimes and their security policy decisions.

Separate country-specific studies on ideational sources of Japanese and Korean security policies, on the other hand, tend to emphasize continuity over change. It is argued that national cultures, such as Japan’s antimilitarism93 or Korea’s “small state” identity,94 in the face of structural pressures, have continued to produce distinct stances on national security in the postwar period. But as Richard Samuels shows in his recent book which traces the ideological origins of the various positions on national security today back to the Meiji period, current security debates are artifacts of past ideas and policies that have been preserved as historical legacies through repeated contestation.95 In other words, change has occurred, but within the bounded constraints of historical legacies, which continue to affect patterns of contestation and change.

Historical precedent is an important part of David Kang’s argument on hierarchical stability. Kang argues that the East Asian region has been the most stable under a single dominant power.96 By extension, Asian states do not perceive the “rise

95 On Japan’s dual identity, see Yoshihide Soeya, Nihon no “midoru pawaa” gaikō [Japan’s “Middle Power” Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005).
of China” as threatening due to their long historical experience with regional stability and order under a dominant China.\textsuperscript{97} Accordingly, he further contends, regional states prefer a strong, rather than weak, China.\textsuperscript{98} Kang’s analysis suggests that truncated views of the history of Asian international relations tend to overstate the potentially destabilizing prospects for China’s rise.

However, it is also important to keep in mind that peaceful relations with China have not always been “normal” throughout Korean (or any other neighboring country’s) history, as Kang suggests. The Great Power-revering sadae policy was a Chosŏn phenomenon; earlier Korean kingdoms such as Koryŏ alternated between accommodation, mediation, and isolation strategies vis-à-vis the Chinese mainland and other various northern tribes.\textsuperscript{99} Because his focus is on the question of why East Asian states are not balancing against China, Kang does not probe deeper into the different types and sources of non-balancing behavior in the past (or current) hierarchical order.

While Kang makes an important contribution by noting the importance of the legacy of hierarchical stability shared by Asian states, he overemphasizes its “Chinese” character over the “hierarchical” by restricting its applicability to actors within the region, from which the United States is explicitly excluded.\textsuperscript{100} The shared belief in hierarchical stability, however, need not apply to a future scenario in which China is dominant, but may instead better explain the existing U.S.-led regional order.\textsuperscript{101} In fact, popular and academic discourse in East Asian countries such as Japan

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{97}David C. Kang, \textit{China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). See also Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations.”
  \item \textsuperscript{98}Kang, \textit{China Rising}, 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{100}Kang, \textit{China Rising}, 187-8.
  \item \textsuperscript{101}China’s long reign as regional hegemon ended when it was militarily defeated by Japan in 1894-1895. The United States took over leadership duties from Japan after 1945. On U.S. hegemony in the region after the end of World War II, see G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, “Conclusion: Images of Order in the Asia-Pacific and the Role of the United States,” in \textit{International Relations...
and Korea do not necessarily indicate preferences toward China-led stability; rather, they discuss the potential disruption to the current American hierarchical order. The fixation is on the pending choice between the United State and China, with parallels drawn to the “clash of civilizations” in the nineteenth century, between Western powers and institutions on the one hand and the declining strength and authority of the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” on the other.

Looking Ahead

In the next chapter, I examine the different types of social interaction within the regional hierarchical framework of the traditional Sinocentric order. Hierarchical stability was maintained not only through China’s dominant military power but also its civilizational authority. I show how the founding regimes of Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea established their domestic political legitimacy by claiming different types of status vis-à-vis China, resulting in the alternative state-strengthening strategies of defiant sakoku (national seclusion) and deferential sadae (revere the Great Powers).

Chapter Three examines the contrasting responses shown by Japan and Korea to the challenge of Westphalian sovereignty in the nineteenth century, which threatened to overthrow not only the regimes in power but also the traditional East Asian state system as a whole. This “clash of civilizations” acted as a critical juncture, resulting in divergent behavioral paths for Japan and Korea while producing and stigmatizing language (such as sakoku and sadae) that would endure as political

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resources for regime mobilizations of state-strengthening strategies in the postwar period.

The divergent political outcomes in Japan and Korea, as shown in the opposition movements’ criticism of existing sovereignty-strengthening strategies, can be explained by their previous positions within the Sinocentric order, reflecting different levels of integration into the Chinese civilization. I pay particular attention to the constraining effects of existing status conceptions and their consequences for the Japanese and Korean ruling regimes in order to demonstrate how Westphalian sovereignty was interpreted in the context of hierarchically-defined ideas of state-strengthening.

Chapters Four and Five examine how sovereign-nationalism endures in Japanese and Korean security debates in the postwar period, through language-based political frames and divisive policy agendas that are reminders of “incomplete” sovereignty in Japan and Korea. Notwithstanding the lack of concrete or definitive behavioral changes in Japanese and Korean alliance relations with the United States during the Cold War, there were important episodes in which domestic understandings of status and autonomy were contested and renegotiated. Kishi’s drive for “independence” during the 1960 Security Treaty revision was a challenge against not only the “integration consensus” that had been formed under Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru but also Yoshida’s passive stance on remilitarization and constitutional revision. Rejecting Yoshida’s Middle Power integration strategy, Kishi promoted a Great-Powerism that envisioned a greater security role and foreign policy independence for Japan.

Chapter Five is a case study of state-strengthening debates in postwar Korea. I show how an “integration consensus” was formed in Korea under Presidents Syngman Rhee and Park Chung Hee, following intense contestation between historically and
hierarchically defined state identities. In contrast, the integration consensus began to weaken in Korea when Park’s anti-communist legitimacy was damaged by détente and more importantly, the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

In Chapter Six, I discuss the policy consequences of contested sovereign-nationalism in Korea during the debates on dispatching troops to Iraq by comparing the outcome to a case of non-mobilization in Japan. I ask why, given the same unpopular policy choice, President Roh of South Korea suffered enormous political costs, while Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi largely avoided the politicization of alliance relations.

Chapter Seven, the concluding chapter of the dissertation, explores the implications of hierarchy and the ways in which it still structures East Asian international relations. I emphasize in particular the importance of examining domestic legitimacy politics in identifying patterns of continuity and change in hierarchical interactions. I then end by suggesting the theoretical significance and possible extensions of the concept and framework of sovereign-nationalism.
CHAPTER TWO:

Historical Origins of Sovereign-Nationalism:
Patterns of Hierarchical Interaction in the Sinocentric Order

Introduction: The Traditional State System in East Asia

The previous chapter has argued that the long-standing condition of hierarchy has fostered a sensitivity to the state’s relations with the region’s dominant power and to its relative status vis-à-vis other actors in the region. The traditional East Asian diplomatic order, which functioned as a well-institutionalized, if regionally confined, system of states from roughly around 1400 to the late 19th century, provides a paradigmatic example of hierarchy at work as a regional framework of interaction.\(^\text{102}\) According to Michael Ng-Quinn, a framework of regional interaction must be “regularized, established and structured according to some ‘rules.’” Rules are “principles, guidelines, standards, or criteria, which may be formally established or informally understood.”\(^\text{103}\)

Based on regularized patterns of interaction among different categories of actors, the East Asian region under the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) dynasties, even before its assimilation into the Westphalian sovereignty system in the late 19th century, acted as a system of independent states. Japan and Korea, as well as Vietnam and its neighboring kingdoms, acted as autonomous states conducting trade and fighting wars against each other.\(^\text{104}\) The state capacities of Ming/Qing China,

\(^{102}\) I am not arguing that the Sinocentric order was universal or uncontested in its existence. My aim is simply to examine this period to identify patterns of hierarchical interaction within a shared social context in East Asia.

\(^{103}\) Michael Ng-Quinn actually uses this definition to claim that a viable regional framework has failed to materialize in the history of Northeast Asian international relations. See Michael Ng-Quinn, “The Internationalization of the Region: The Case of Northeast Asian International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 12 (1986): 108.

Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868), and Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910) were comparable to that of modern states in terms of both domestic rule and conducting foreign relations.\(^{105}\) The centralized state bureaucracy of the Chosŏn dynasty in Korea had administered a relatively stable realm for over 400 years, and a sense of territory had already developed, as evidenced in various border disputes with the Northern tribes along the Amrok/Yalu River.\(^{106}\) Intellectuals recognized and asserted that Chosŏn was a separate and particular national identity vis-à-vis the universalist Chinese empire.\(^{107}\) Japan, too, existed as a separate political unit within Sinocentric Asia. After the establishment of a central military government in 1600, Tokugawa Ieyasu, in a letter to a Chinese official, claimed the legitimacy of his rule by citing the unification of Japan as the key criteria of an independent state in accordance with the classical Chinese texts.\(^{108}\) The Tokugawa regime was comparable to modern states in its exercise of public authority and its ability to control cross-border movements, even though it did not monopolize domestic political power due to the federalist structure of the feudal bakuhan system.\(^{109}\)

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\(^{105}\) Yongkoo Kim, *Sekyekwan chungdol kwa Hanmal oekyosa, 1866-1882* [The Clash of World Views and Korean Diplomatic History in the Late Chosŏn Period, 1866-1882] (Seoul: Munhak Kwa Chisŏngsa, 2001); Park, “Hanguk-sa ŭi it-ŏ-sŏ-ŭi kuke chilsŏ kwan-nyŏm e taehan sochal.”


\(^{109}\) Echoing Stephen Krasner’s argument on sovereignty as “organized hypocrisy,” Masaru Kohno states that there are few states—in history or in the modern period—whose sovereignty is not compromised or constrained in at least one facet and that Tokugawa Japan acted like and was recognized as a sovereign state. Masaru Kohno, “On the Meiji Restoration: Japan’s Search for Sovereignty?” *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 1, 2 (August 2001): 266.
While the European order was based on the precise division of territories and balance of power among nation states, interstate relations in the East Asian order were conducted according to the diplomatic rules and conventions of hierarchy, characterized by status differentiation among actors. Japan and Korea conducted their foreign relations in different categories, according to the counterpart’s relative status. 110 For instance, according to Korean records such as the Sillok [The Yi (Chosŏn) Dynasty Annals] or Tongmun-gwanji [Records of the Office of Interpreters], relations with Japan—as well as various northern tribes including the Liao—were termed kyorin (neighborly relations, or relations with a neighboring country), in contrast to the deferential practice of sadae (revering the Great Power) toward China. 111 This distinction was also institutionalized into different channels of diplomatic communication and two separate government bureaus, each dealing with sadae or kyorin relations.

Such rules of hierarchy in interstate relations were enforced by way of China’s dominant military power, complemented by its authority as the source of civilization. Sinocentrism, or the belief in the centrality and superiority of the Middle Kingdom civilization (J. chūka, K. chung-hwa), not only legitimated China’s dominant position and influence in the region, it bound Chinese power through institutionalized rules and rituals in dealing with its smaller neighbors. The Chinese world order, at least in theory, was “unified and centralized” by China’s universal preeminence. 112 Such Sinocentrism was based on the idea that China ruled “all-under-heaven” (J. tenka, K.

110 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the idea of equal relations did exist in East Asian international relations before the 19th century. When the 1876 Treaty of Kanghwa was signed between Japan and Korea, it was seen by Korean officials as simply restoring their long-interrupted kyorin relations, rather than newly instituting Western-style treaty relations.
111 See, for instance, Son, Chosŏn sidae hanil kwankyesa yŏngu.
chŏn-ha) and that China, as the Middle Kingdom surrounded by barbarians, was the only civilization in it. Key-Hiuk Kim argues that the “notion of sovereignty of individual states or nation was alien to the universal hierarchy that theoretically embraced the entire world, at the center of which stood China, supreme in moral authority and cultural grandeur.” 113 It was also expected that “barbarians” would eagerly embrace the prestigious Chinese standard of ‘civilization’ as their own. 114 The Chinese not only “regarded their culture as superior in a material and aesthetic sense; they believed it to be morally superior, and of universal validity.” 115 Even though China made little effort to socialize neighboring states into its exclusive civilization, it was widely accepted as the “central flower,” the epitome of power, influence, and authority. 116 The leaders of Japan and Korea, throughout different parts of their history, were “inspired by the Chinese example to set up orderly systems of government to rule their newly unified nations,” and “willing to take a subservient position in their relations with China in an effort to enhance their own power at home by identification with the greater nation.” 117

While many refute this view of a Chinese world order as a “myth,” 118 the rules of hierarchical interaction were generally recognized by other regional actors. There

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113 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 1-2.
114 The Sinocentric system worked reasonably well as long as China dealt only with envoys from non-Chinese countries that were willing to comply with Chinese customs. Cultural confrontation began when European embassies, such as the Macartney mission in 1793, came to Peking. See, for example, Alain Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two Civilizations: The British Expedition to China in 1792-4, trans. Jon Rothschild (London: Harvill, 1993); Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society.
117 Tashiro, “Foreign Relations During the Edo Period,” 286. Often overlooked is the fact that Japan had established suzerain-vassal relations (sakuhō kankei) with China before and during the rule of the Ashikaga shoguns during the Muromachi period. Even during the “seclusion” period of the Tokugawa bakufu, Japan was not strictly “outside” the system but merely in “hiding” in that it continued to trade with Chinese merchants and did not directly challenge the Chinese civilization.
118 Michel Oksenberg argues that despite attempts to maintain the façade of harmony and idealized normative order, Chinese strategies during periods of disunity were similar to Western realpolitik
was no demand for or recognition of “equal relations” in China’s relations with its neighbors. Ties between China and Korea were often presented by both sides in the high-flown moral rhetoric of Confucian fraternalism—China was the elder brother, Korea the younger. In Japanese discourses during the early Tokugawa period, China functioned as a metaphorical standard of morality and civilization. Kumazawa Banzan, a Confucian scholar, wrote in Shūgi washo (1672) that “chūka was the parent to the children, who were the eastern, southern, western and northern barbarians, as the mountain was parent to the river’s children.”

Japan and Korea also adopted the language of classic Chinese texts to refer to their diplomacy with China and each other, relaying a common understanding of the rules of proper interstate contact and communication. Relations of “amity” (J: washin; K: hwachin) between Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea “derived meaning from a shared formula of diplomatic discourse, the terms which referenced a mutually comprehensible Chinese lexicon.”


Yongjin Zhang argues that while there was “no formal legal expression of external sovereignty as a constitutional principle,” “sovereign” practices as well as a rich vocabulary to describe the panoply of diplomatic relations among states date back to the Ancient Chinese states-system. Yongjin Zhang, “System, Empire and State in Chinese International Relations,” Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 43-63.

While the rules and norms of hierarchy may not have been uniformly constraining of state behavior, the dominance of Chinese power and culture made China a “standard of civilization” and reference point for domestic political legitimation in its neighboring states. But Chinese authority was accepted in different degrees and forms, as the cases of Japan and Korea illustrate. The aim of this chapter is to identify the different types of relationships that formed in the Asian hierarchical state system and how they differed in their level of integration into the sphere of Chinese civilization. I show how different state-building prerogatives and the appropriation of various sources of legitimacy led to the development of alternative modes of identification with China in Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea. In addition, I argue that the Sinocentric order remained so stable because the bilateral relationships that had been negotiated with China served the interests and needs of the ruling regimes in Japan and Korea.

Patterns of Hierarchical Interaction in the Sinocentric Order

Interstate relationships based on unequal status were based on Confucian rules of proper conduct, informed by the norms of propriety (J: rei; K: ye). The principle of rei/ye, functioned as a general standard of morality for individuals to achieve harmony in all aspects of societal relationships—ranging from relations between members of the family to relations between the rulers and the ruled at a broader level. Extended into the realm of foreign relations, it provided guidelines for proper conduct between China and her vassals. Hierarchy and unequal status among states was supported by the idea that “everyone should be under someone’s direction” and be offered guidance, moral and otherwise.\(^\text{123}\)

Within the Chinese world order, the emperor (Son of Heaven) reigned atop a hierarchically-ranked society of states. All spheres of the Chinese civilization outside of China proper were divided into “internal vassals” and “external vassals.” The Sinocentric view also distinguished between the civilized center and outside barbarians (J: ka-i; K: hwa-i). The distinction between “civilized” and “barbaric” was the understanding of the rules and rituals of propriety. Barbarians were those who did not understand or abide by the rules. Not all barbarians were “foreigners” in a strict sense, since some of them had become “civilized” through cultural learning and assimilation and were seen to be within the domain of the universal Chinese empire.

In general, there were four categories of barbarians, named since the Han dynasty: the Koreans and Japanese to the east (J. tōi, K. tong-i), the various countries of Indochina to the south (J. nanban, K. nam-man), the Turkish and Tibetan peoples to the west (J. seijū, K. sō-yung), and the nomadic tribes of the north (J. hokuteki, K. puk-chōk). Barbarians in general were viewed with mistrust and carefully segregated and/or regulated. When China was strong and able to maintain control over the barbarians, it used a policy of benevolent nonintervention and dissociation. When the

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124 This is why Sinocentrism is also referred to as the “civilization-barbarian” worldview (in Chinese, hua-yi-guan). Initially, in ancient China, hua-yi geographically and culturally distinguished between the Han nation of China and other various minority groups that inhabited in the outermost regions of the four perimeters of the Middle Kingdom. After the Manchus came to power and established the Qing dynasty, however, the term hua-yi came to be used to differentiate between the Celestial Empire and other states. See Xiaomin Zhang and Chunfeng Xu, “The Late Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation: Analysis from an Ideational Perspective,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, 3 (Summer 2007): 414-15.

125 On the distinctions between “raw” and “baked” barbarians, see Peyrefitte, The Collision of Two Civilizations, 32.

126 Lydia Liu notes the heterogeneity of the concepts of hua and yi. She argues that the Chinese character yi has not always been translated as “barbarian” or “foreigner,” but also as “stranger” or “non-Chinese.” The boundaries of hua and yi have shifted “through the millennia of military conquests, ethnic conflicts, and cultural and discursive practices.” See Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 32-3, 75-6.

barbarians became too powerful, China appeased them through marriage alliances or personal diplomacy, using one barbarian to check another (i- chih-i).\textsuperscript{128}

The rules of propriety also prescribed different sets of identities and responsibilities for separate categories of actors. Responsibility was commensurate with status, and the dominant power had a different set of rights and obligations from those of secondary states.\textsuperscript{129} As the suzerain, China granted investiture to its vassal kingdoms as official approval of succession and was obliged to provide help to its vassals in times of emergency.\textsuperscript{130} Surrounding vassal states in response acknowledged the suzerainty of China and regularly offered tribute (gong) to the Chinese emperor in exchange for imperial gifts, followed the Chinese calendar, and presented memorials (biao) on appropriate statutory occasions, by which they could claim to be “civilized.”\textsuperscript{131}

The rules of mutual obligation, however, were open to interpretation even in one of the most tightly-knit sadae-jaso relationship between China and Korea.\textsuperscript{132} For instance, when Korea was invaded by Japanese forces in 1592, the Ming court delayed making a final decision on whether to provide military assistance to its crisis-stricken


\textsuperscript{130} For instance, Korea was not better prepared militarily on the eve of Hideyoshi’s invasions (1592-1598) because of Korean relations with China—namely, Korea’s participation in the Chinese tributary system and reciprocity of obligations. Donald N. Clark, “Faith and Betrayal: Notes on Korea’s Experience in the Chinese Tributary System,” Papers on the 3rd International Conference on \textit{Korean Culture and Its Characteristics on the Occasion of the 400th Anniversary of Yi Yulgok’s Death}, 1984, 200-1.


\textsuperscript{132} Some argue that the institutional ambiguities in the tribute system were intentional and allowed flexible operation. See, for example, Zhang, ”System, Empire and State,” 54.
vassal. Sinocentric norms of hierarchy and propriety in this sense were not necessarily all-constraining of state behavior.

At the same time, the position of the state within the larger hierarchical order was important for the domestic legitimation of rulers in China’s weaker, neighboring states. Japanese and Korean rulers competed for higher status and rank, claiming superiority over the other despite the outward appearance of titular equality within the Sinocentric order. In Korea, for instance, relations with China “were considered familial in nature and obligation,” but “relations with Japan were regarded as purely contractual.” The forms of communication differed as well. In dealing with China, Korean officials dealt directly with the Board of Rites in Peking and were careful to follow fixed ceremonial and diplomatic procedures. In contrast, methods for diplomatic dealings with Japan changed frequently, while Japanese envoys were often scorned and treated peremptorily. Moreover, the Korean king and Japanese shogun communicated only indirectly through the Lord of Tsushima (Taemado-ju). In Vietnam as well, the court implemented a replica of the Sinocentric order on a smaller scale, carrying out diplomatic relations only with neighbors that followed the

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133 The Ming intervention occurred only after it was confirmed that Japan’s intended target was the Chinese mainland. Initially, there were even suspicions on the part of the Chinese court that Korea was in cahoots with the Japanese. During the war as well, the primary object was not to rescue its “little brother” but to negotiate with Japan for a quick cessation of hostilities. See Myung-ki Han, *Imjin oeran kwa han-chung kwanky e* [A Study on the Relations between Korea and China from the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 to the Manchu Invasion of Korea in 1636] (Seoul: Yŏksa Bipyŏngsa, 1999), 42-55; Gari Ledyard, “Confucianism and War: The Korean Security Crisis of 1598,” *Journal of Korean Studies* 6 (1988-1989): 81-115.

134 In the aftermath of Hideyoshi’s invasion in 1592, Korea resumed official relations with the Tokugawa shogunate in 1609 on two levels: communication and ceremonial diplomacy with the bakufu and semi-tributary trade relations with the Tsushima domain. Tokugawa Japan reciprocated with a “good neighbor” (J: zenrin; K: sŏnrin) policy toward Korea. For a detailed description of equal kyorin relations between Korea and Japan, see Son, *Chosŏn sinda hanil kwanky esan yŏnu*; George M. McCune, “The Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan during the Tokugawa Period,” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 5, 3 (May 1946): 308-25.


136 The Sŏ clan also conducted independent trade and diplomacy with the Korean court. McCune, “The Exchange of Envoys between Korea and Japan,” 308-309.
ritualized behavior of vassal states. Vietnam did not and could not challenge Sinocentrism per se, but Vietnamese rulers attempted to generate legitimacy for themselves based on unique relations with China and the ability to re-create such hierarchical relations with its with smaller neighbors.

In other words, the stability of the Sinocentric order was maintained not only by the material and normative structures of hierarchy, but also domestic political factors in member states that made use of, or relied on, Chinese authority. Based on these different domestic needs, Asian states in the periphery interpreted and participated in the Sinocentric order through multiple channels and in various capacities. Japan stopped sending tribute missions after the Ashikaga period, but continued to trade with China. The Korean king’s memorials to the emperor were reverential and submissive in tone but never mentioned domestic issues. Yet, through formal rituals and/or informal rules, both were socialized into the regional system of states. The difference was in their degree of embeddedness in the Chinese civilization—for instance, the model tributary status of Chosŏn Korea versus the distant, noncommittal role of Tokugawa Japan.

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137 Few Southeast Asian states regularly paid tribute to Vietnam, but Burma, Siam, Laos, and Cambodia did dispatch gift-laden envoys whenever they needed a Vietnamese military counterweight to one of their rival neighbors. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, 235-9.
138 “Vietnam considered itself the equal of China only in its right to autonomy, never in the relationship itself.” Womack, China and Vietnam, 118.
139 In what Woodside describes as a “dual theory of sovereignty,” Vietnamese rulers had two sets of names, one reflecting their Chinese-style emperor status and the other connoting a protector figure that comprised the moral being of a truly Vietnamese leader. Woodside, Vietnam and the Chinese Model, 10-14.
140 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 8-9.
141 Michael Ng-Quinn also distinguishes between actors whose roles are “frozen,” such as Korea since the 14th century, and those who are uncommitted, such as Japan. In his view, both are culprits in providing stumbling blocks to the building of a framework of regional interaction. Ng-Quinn, “The Internationalization of the Region,” 111-3.
Variation in Legitimation Paths: Integration versus Insulation vis-à-vis China

Japan and Korea during the 17th and 18th centuries provide a clear contrast in the type of relations sought with China—seeking insulation from or integration into its regional order. Chosŏn Korea was very much a leading player in the Sinocentric “family of nations.” In comparison, Tokugawa Japan adopted a policy of maintaining informal and weakly institutionalized contact with its East Asian neighbors, using Tsushima and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū as intermediaries for trade with Korea and China.

Possible reasons for this divergence in strategic positions include physical and cultural distance from China. In other words, Korean rulers aligned more closely with China because geographic proximity made the Chinese threat loom larger, whereas leaders in Japan had the luxury of having an ocean between themselves and the Chinese mainland. Alternatively, Korea was a more natural ally than Japan because it shared China’s Confucian culture. Korea was the most Confucianized of all tributary states, and the ideology and principles of Confucianism permeated Korean society and politics. At the governmental level, Confucianism was institutionalized through the civil service examination, which required a broad knowledge of the Confucian classics and literature. There was a widespread presence of sŏwon (Confucian schools), where prospective and low-level officials gathered to study and debate the various tenets of Confucianism. In comparison, Japan’s social basis for Confucianism was weak, partly because it was not linked to an examination system. Scholarship in the Tokugawa Period was also characterized by the coexistence of numerous different schools of learning.

While geographical proximity and ideological similarity may have contributed to the different strategic choices in Japan and Korea, they are unable to capture variations in the history of Sino-Korean relations – why Sino-Korean relations were so stable, only during the Ming/Qing-Chosŏn period, compared to the past wavering between cooperation and confrontation.\(^{144}\) Historically, the various kingdoms on the Korean peninsula pursued multiple options to navigate between the Chinese mainland and the various northern tribes, such as alliances, neutrality, and balance-of-power diplomacy, and resorted to sadae diplomacy when China was dominant in order to maintain their survival and independence.\(^{145}\)

In addition, Confucianism was not a singular, homogeneous normative framework. Confucian thought was divided into various schools and subject to change and compromise. Even at the height of Confucianization in Chosŏn Korea, “Korea differed significantly from China in many practices.”\(^{146}\) In Japan, aspects of Confucian thought became merged into a nativist Shinto learning. While geography and Confucianism no doubt influenced Japanese and Korean strategic behavior toward China, the enduring and context-specific nature of their respective relations with China were a result of regime legitimation strategies, which were formed and institutionalized on their degree of reliance on Chinese authority. In the following sections, I show how hierarchical interactions varied in Sinocentric Asia as a result of

\(^{144}\) Tributary relations were not uniform throughout the history of bilateral relations. Koryŏ’s relations with the Liao, Kin, and Yuan (918-1368) differed from Unified Silla’s (and early Koryŏ’s) tributary relations with the Tang and Sung (669-1279). Fully institutionalized and culturally informed tributary relations only came into being between Korea and China in the late Koryŏ/Chosŏn and Ming/Qing period (1368-1894). Chun, Hanchung kwankyeya. See also Wŏn-gu Hwang, “Korean World View through Relations with China,” Korea Journal (October 1973): 10-17.


the different pathways chosen by the founding regimes of Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea to generate political legitimacy through their foreign relations.

*Tokugawa Japan’s defiance of the Middle Kingdom*

The founders of Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea faced very different challenges in their establishing of new political regimes and reordering of society. The key division between Japan and Korea was the source of threat to the regime. The Tokugawa bakufu, as had been previous regimes in Japanese history, was constantly under the threat of civil war—this weighed more heavily on the minds of rulers than the threat from the Chinese mainland. The Tokugawa military government, preoccupied with centralizing domestic control, preferred to maintain a low profile on the international stage in order to insulate themselves from potential conflict with China. Tokugawa diplomacy and ideology stressed solidification of internal rule and national autonomy, taking the route of indirect and informal participation in the Chinese world order.

The deeply political nature of the ruling regime’s relations with China is revealed in Japan’s past fluctuations in its diplomatic relations with the Chinese mainland. Between 607 and 838, Japan sent seventeen missions to Tang China. Envoys were selected from literary men of high rank to claim that Japan was civilized. Trade was carried out intermittently by merchants until the Ashikaga shogunate, upon

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147 A major reason for minimizing contact with outsiders was the fear by the Tokugawa bakufu of domestic rivals forming anti-regime alliances with foreign allies. In other words, the seclusion policy was a product of the Tokugawa regime’s fear that foreign powers could align with the tozama (outer domain) daimyo to undermine the bakufu, whose hegemony was still incomplete and precarious. See Suganami, “Japan’s Entrance into the International Society,” 186; Chushichi Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan 1825-1995* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 20; Ronald P. Toby, “Reopening the Question of Sakoku: Diplomacy in the Legitimation of the Tokugawa Bakufu,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 3, 2 (Summer 1977), 323-363; Kim, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order*, 23-24.

unifying the country in the early 15th century, resumed tributary relations with the hopes that Ming recognition would bolster their authority at home. In letters addressed to the Chinese court, the Ashikaga shogun signed himself as “King of Japan, a subject of the Ming Emperor.” Suffering from heavy criticism that he had compromised Japanese sovereignty for trading rights, he was eventually overthrown and remains an infamous historical example of toadyism. 149

Tokugawa rulers initially considered the possibility of formal relations with the Ming court but concluded that the cost was too high and settled for indirect trade through Tsushima. Acceptance of a tributary role in China’s East Asian order was incompatible with Japan’s sovereign independence. 150 For example, the shogun would have had to call himself a subject of the Ming emperor and use the Ming calendar in official documents. Tokugawa Ieyasu and his advisors decided that they could not compromise the very platform of legitimacy—sovereign autonomy and independence—that the Tokugawa regime was seeking to establish and instead, turned to the most potent Japanese political symbol, the emperor, and his Japanese imperial appointment as shogun. 151 Hayashi Razan, Ieyasu’s advisor and Tokugawa ideologue, unified the Neo-Confucian doctrine of hierarchical political order with the indigenous Shinto ideology in order to build an ideological foundation for independence from China. 152

Through the cessation of diplomatic ties with Ming China and especially after it was replaced by the “barbaric” Qing, Tokugawa Japan created its own ideological

centrality by adapting the notion of *chūka* and creating a Japan-centered version of the tributary order. In 1636, the Tokugawa regime began using a unique title for the shogun, “Great Prince of Japan” (*taikun*), rather than the King of Japan, which had been the title that had been used in past tribute missions. The Tokugawa *bakufu*’s most potent self-legitimation tactic was the manipulation of relations with Korea (via Tsushima) and the Ryūkyūs to reject the China-centered tributary system and demonstrate its own centrality in an alternative regional order free of Chinese domination and influence. In order to enhance the authority and legitimacy of the Tokugawa regime, the *bakufu* leaders worked strenuously to resolve the diplomatic crisis with Korea in the aftermath of Hideyoshi’s invasions. Contrary to the generally accepted image of *sakoku* (national seclusion), extravagant Korean embassies were sent to Japan and bilateral trade flourished through the *waegwan* (Japan House; *wakan* in Japanese) in Pusan during the Tokugawa period.

Korean and Ryūkyūan diplomatic missions to the shogun’s court, which continued into the 19th century, played important roles in the structure of the *bakufu*’s legitimacy, “both in the *bakufu*’s policy calculations and in the response of the

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154 Until then, the Japanese shogun was addressed as the “King of Japan” (despite the existence of the *tenno* in Japan) by both China and Korea, as was the custom in addressing rulers of vassal kingdoms. Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 88-89.


156 Past research has tended to overlook the significance of the *waegwan*, as if Tokugawa foreign relations only operated in Nagasaki, where Dejima and *Tōjin yashiki* handled Dutch and Chinese ships respectively. Recent research on the *waegwan*, however, reveals that it maintained important economic, political and social functions between Korea and Japan. In fact, the scale of the *waegwan* was much larger than Dejima and *Tōjin yashiki*; “the Waegwan was one hundred thousand tsubo in area compared with the ten thousand tsubo of *Tōjin yashiki* and four thousand tsubo of Dejima. Furthermore, the volume of trade conducted at the *Waegwan* surpassed that of the trade in Nagasaki during the mid-Tokugawa period.” See Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations*, 137-147.
political public.”\textsuperscript{157} For Tokugawa rulers, signaling domestic hegemony to the other daimyo was priority number one. A good example of the use of foreign policy to shore up political legitimacy was the exchange of embassies with Korea. In 1617, the most anti-Tokugawa tozama (outer domain) lords and collateral lords were all commanded to attend a reception for 428 Korean visitors in Edo (present-day Tokyo) so that they could be impressed by the many gifts and congratulations given by the Korean mission on the Tokugawa unification of the country.\textsuperscript{158} In sum, the Tokugawa bakufu succeeded in establishing an alternate universe within the Asian region by insulating itself from the Chinese civilization and capitalizing on an indigenous source of legitimacy.

\textit{Chosŏn Korea’s deference to Chinese civilization}

In contrast to the insular (from China) path to regime legitimation in Japan, which was in large part due to its chronic domestic instability and relative distance from the continent,\textsuperscript{159} Korea had a long history of foreign—especially Chinese—penetration. Throughout its history, rulers of various Korean kingdoms opted to accommodate the militarily stronger China, but also engaged in acts of defiance at times. It was with the founding of Chosŏn by Yi Sŏng-gye in the 14\textsuperscript{th} century that the

\textsuperscript{157} Toby, \textit{State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan}, 8. Hidetada’s reception of a Korean embassy at Fushimi Castle in 1617 was one of the clearest cases of the use of diplomacy as propaganda.

\textsuperscript{158} Gordon, \textit{A Modern History of Japan}, 18-19. The Ryūkyū missions had a similar purpose and effect: “Each mission was an extravagant and elaborately staged dramatization of the logic of ka-i. The large Ryūkyū contingent, including merchants, scholars and craftspeople as well as government officials, traveled in procession from Satsuma to Edo, flanked by an armed guard of Satsuma warriors. Ryūkyū officials were given precise instructions about their dress and conduct for these occasions. A decree of 1709, for example, stated that they were to carry long swords, dress in brocade and bring with them ‘Chinese style’ weaponry. Their equipment, above all, must be ‘of the sort used in a foreign court, so that they cannot be mistaken for Japanese.’” Nobuyuki Kamiya, \textit{Bakuhansei kokka no Ryukyu shihai} (Tokyo: Kokura shobō, 1990), 255; cited in Morris-Suzuki, “The Frontiers of Japanese Identity,” in \textit{Asian Forms of the Nation}, ed. Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), 51-52.

policy of showing deference to the Chinese civilization became solidified as a tool for guaranteeing long-term peace. In order to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the new regime as well as its security, the founders of Chosŏn sought recognition and approval from Ming China. As Etsuko Kang notes: “For the ruling classes of militarily weak countries, sadae diplomacy was a wise policy to avoid military violation by a stronger country and at the same time to secure internal dominance, since a rebellion of the ruled classes might occur with the military intervention of a stronger country.”160

Investiture (chaekbong) of the Korean ruler by the Son of Heaven had both symbolic and real significance: it symbolized peace and good will between the two countries and mutual protection against foreign invasion. Investiture also secured the Yi monarchy’s membership in the stable order of Confucian civilization.161 Ming-Chosŏn relations from the late 14th century to the first half of the 17th century was an exemplar of such sadae-jaso relations, in which the smaller state showed deference to the suzerain (sadae: literally, serving or revering the great) in exchange for protection and benign leadership (chaso; literally, benevolence and concern for the small neighbor).162 The Ming court was not interested in either the economic value of Chosŏn’s tributes or using investiture as a political leverage. Nor did the Ming have territorial interests in Chosŏn Korea. In return, Chosŏn promised to remain a loyal tributary to the Ming court (and later the Qing) and maintained sadae relations only with China. Despite some initial discord, “Korea quickly became the model and most

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important Ming tributary,” especially after Ming’s military intervention in the 1592 Japanese invasion. Unlike many tribes and nationalities that were “Sinicized” and subjected to the so-called administrative internal colonization (xingzheng jianzhi de neidihua), Korea’s voluntary Sinification allowed it to maintain its identity and saved it from political and cultural extinction.

In Korea, the link to a greater universal civilization also served to legitimize General Yi’s coup in 1392 on at least two levels. First, Yi Sŏng-gye was not of royal birth and had technically committed treason. He depended on an outside source of legitimacy to justify his rule and authority. Second, voluntarily showing deference to Ming China and the greater Chinese civilization neutralized the perennial external threat from China, especially in light of the fact that Koryŏ in its latter years had been defeated and occupied by the Mongol-ruled Yuan dynasty.

To justify their externally-induced sovereign authority, Chosŏn’s ruling class propagated the sadae principle, which was a part of their “Confucian revolution.” Chosŏn rulers asserted their political legitimacy by claiming to have attained regional and civilizational status as an integral part of the Sinocentric world, albeit from a

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163 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 5.
164 Han, Imjin oeran kwa han-chung kwanky, 16.
166 Investiture by the Chinese emperor “enhanced the prestige of the tribal ruler among his own and neighboring tribes.” Chinese support was useful to a new ruler, especially if he was opposed by his rivals domestically. Symbolic sanction from China was especially important in maintaining order in times of domestic unrest. Morris Rossabi, “Introduction,” in China among Equals: the Middle Kingdom and Its Neighbors, 10th-14th Centuries, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 3-4; Chai-sik Chung, A Korean Confucian Encounter with the Modern World: Yi Hang-no and the West (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1995), 14.
167 As noted by Haboush, the founding of the Yi dynasty was also a Confucian revolution, a complete break from the old Buddhist Koryo society. Haboush, A Heritage of Kings, 12-13; see also Martina Deuchler, “Neo-Confucianism: The Impulse for Social Action in Early Yi Korea,” The Journal of Korean Studies 2 (1980): 71-111.
peripheral and subservient position. Chosŏn’s acceptance of Sinocentrism indicated socialization into a “global society.” China was depicted as more than a militarily superior Great Power; it was the center of civilization and the only legitimate source of authority in the regional order. Reflected in elite attitudes and official state policy was a deep reverence for Chinese culture and civilization (chung-hwa), viewing China as more than a mere state (Chung-kuk).

Explaining the Durability of sakoku and sadae

Why then did sakoku and sadae last so long? The main reason is that sakoku and sadae helped Japanese and Korean rulers stabilize relations with China and maintain domestic political legitimacy. The ideals behind the security strategies of sakoku and sadae were institutionalized into the wider political and social order in each country. For instance, the ideology of sakoku allowed the Tokugawa regime to increase its own power and legitimacy at the expense of regional competitors.

In order to protect its hard-won legitimacy, and to maintain monopoly control over trade as well as the political dominance of the military government over all other domains, the Tokugawa regime banned Christianity and prohibited foreign travel. Japan, however, was not closed off from the outside world, as the word sakoku

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169 Yu, Chosŏn hugi ŭi chŏngchi sasang, 49-50.

170 “Throughout the more than five hundred years of the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910), the yangban elites had always positioned their nation vis-à-vis its continental neighbor. As the common name ‘Eastern Kingdom’ (Tongguk) suggests, China functioned as the core—the ‘Middle Kingdom’—of a transnational cultural realm within which these elites participated….Chosŏn elites developed a two-tiered sense of identity as members of a larger transnational realm but with a distinct sense of separateness articulated through the national unit (guk).” Andre Schmid, “Decentering the ‘Middle Kingdom’: The Problem of China in Korean Nationalist Thought, 1895-1910,” in Nation Work: Asian Elites and National Identities, ed. Timothy Brook and Andre Schmid (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), 83-84.

171 Japan’s kaikin (maritime prohibitions) policy was modeled after that of Ming China. Tashiro, “Foreign Relations During the Edo Period,” 289-290.
(national seclusion, or literally, closed country) implies.\textsuperscript{172} Japan continued to indirectly trade with China and Korea, even without formal recognition or diplomatic relations. In sum, “sakoku was not just a reactionary ban or limitation on all foreign relations”; instead, “it represents a constructive policy of foreign relations adopted by Japan in an effort to free itself from Chinese control.”\textsuperscript{173}

Sakoku as an ideology was strengthened with the introduction of National Learning. Following the death of Ogyū Sorai, the leading Confucian scholar during the Tokugawa period, and the decline of the Sorai school of Confucianism, Japanese political thought and discourse was reshaped by the birth of National, or Nativist, Learning (kokugaku). National Learning, which played an important role in this relatively early development of a unique cultural identity of “Japan-ness,”\textsuperscript{174} put emphasis on the imperial institution as the basis for national tradition and “national essence (kokutai).”\textsuperscript{175}

For some National Learning scholars, Japan’s rule by an unbroken line of imperial succession and the fact that it had never been conquered by a foreign invader were cited as reasons that Japan merited the name of Middle Kingdom, even more so than (Qing) China.\textsuperscript{176} Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) “rebuked Japanese Confucians who used Sinocentric ideals of moral, civilized behavior to disparage Japan” and advocated pluralism in cultural and moral standards.\textsuperscript{177} The nativists further portrayed Qing China as in decline and began to refer to China as shina (instead of chūka), far

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\textsuperscript{172} See Toby, “Reopening the Question of Sakoku”; Toby, \textit{State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan}.
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\textsuperscript{173} Tashiro, “Foreign Relations During the Edo Period,” 304.
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\textsuperscript{174} Gong, \textit{The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society}, 165-166.
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\textsuperscript{176} Harootuninan, “The Functions of China,” 14.
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removed from its earlier identification with civilization and excellence. By the late 18th century and early 19th century, scholars of the Mito school were claiming that not only was Japan outside the realm of Chinese domination, it was the “Middle Kingdom.” Wakabayashi argues that the ideology of “Japan as Middle Kingdom” in the period 1793 to 1825 allowed the Tokugawa regime to conceive of an independent and sovereign Japan not subservient to the China-dominated universal empire.

In Chosŏn Korea, sadae policy persisted in Chosŏn Korea because of the mutual benefits to each side. Despite heavy emphasis on elaborate rhetorical formalities and seeming intimacy with each other at the abstract-level in order to add to their political legitimacy, Chinese and Korean rulers sought to limit mutual contact as much as possible in reality—to avoid entanglement and to protect autonomy respectively. The essence of Chosŏn Korea’s sadae kyorin policies, Hara argues, was “to bar all intercourse…except for formalized ceremonial exchanges of envoys and limited trade conducted under close official supervision” with China and Japan based on a “desire to keep these two neighbors at a safe distance.” The Korean court was guaranteed autonomy in its domestic affairs and virtually left alone to do as it pleased as long as it declared fealty to China.

The ruling classes of Chosŏn also continued to rely on the legitimacy derived from Chosŏn’s status as a civilized country in the overarching Sinocentric Confucian order. The adoption of Confucianism as the ruling ideology contributed to the wider acceptance of sadae. The entrenched nature of this sadae ideology can be seen in the

179 Wakabayashi, Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning, 8-9.
181 Hara, “Korea, China, and Western Barbarians,” 392.
182 The receiving and sending of tributary embassies was a costly burden for both Korea and China. Yet, their political importance outweighed the economic costs in that they helped preserve the status and power of the Korean rulers and upper class. See Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations,” 106-111.
example of the Injo Revolt (1623) A crisis presented itself in the early 17th century, with the rise of the Manchus, who would eventually establish the Qing dynasty. The Manchus were considered barbarians and not deserving of sadae, as opposed to the great civilization of Ming China. When King Kwanghaegun and the Puk’in faction chose a pragmatic foreign policy initiative by accommodating the increasingly powerful Manchus, the result was a violent factional struggle and dethronement of Kwanghaegun in favor of a new king (Injo) by the opposition Sŏin faction. As justification for the coup d’etat, Kwanghaegun was charged with violating the rules of sadae and ungratefully forsaking Chosŏn’s fraternal duty to the Ming, especially when the latter had come to the aid of Korea during the Japanese invasions in 1592-1598.

The result of the Injo Revolt was the concentration of power in the hands of Neo-Confucian purists, who unsurprisingly harbored strong anti-Manchu sentiments and rejected demands for tributes from the Qing. Such resistance invited two rounds of invasion from the Manchus (1623, 1636-37), which did not curb the anti-Manchu sentiments of Korean rulers, especially after their capitulation to the “powerful barbarian.” Injo’s son and successor Hyojong, who as a prince had been taken hostage by the Qing as a part of the post-invasion settlement, deeply resented the Manchus and constantly schemed to attack the Qing, while Song Si-yŏl, the most influential Confucian scholar of his time, propagated the theory of “Rejecting the Barbarians (chŏk-hwa ron)” and argued for a Northern Expedition (pukpŏl ron).

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184 For details of Kwanghaegun’s foreign policy and the events leading up to the Injo Revolt, see Han, *Imjin oeran kwa han-chung kwanky’e*, 22, 244-254.


What this widespread rise of anti-Manchu/anti-Qing sentiments did not do was to dissociate Chosŏn Korea from the ideals of Chinese civilization (chung-hwa). Unlike Japanese rulers, who turned to an alternative source of authority and legitimacy in the form of the indigenous institution of emperor (tennō), the ruling literati in Korea strengthened their link to chung-hwa and even claimed that Chosŏn was the sole legitimate heir to the great Ming civilization.\(^\text{187}\) Put differently, Korean rulers pursued greater distance from the physical entity of chung-guk, currently occupied by Qing China, but not the civilizational universalism of chung-hwa.

The trauma of being invaded and defeated by a group of former semi-vassal states, the Manchus, explains why Ming loyalism persisted in Chosŏn Korea. King Hyojong plotted revenge throughout his reign (1649-1659), King Sukchong built a secret shrine to the Ming called Taebodan (the Altar of Great Retribution) in his palace, scholar-official Song Si-yŏl built another shrine to the Ming, and many of the Korean yangban continued to date their writings with the reign title of the last Ming ruler (Ch’ung-cheng) ignoring the pledge to use the Qing calendar. The tributary mission to China was relabeled as the “mission to Peking” (yonhaeng) instead of the Ming-era term of “going to court” (choch’ŏn). Korean officials and literati rallied around the slogan “revere the Ming, resist the Qing” (sung-Myŏng ban-Ch’ŏng).\(^\text{188}\)

However, tributary/sadae relations with Qing China resumed in a gradual “return to normalcy.” Chosŏn officials were mindful of the threat of another invasion from the Qing and had to be discreet about expressing their antagonistic feelings toward the Manchus. As a result, Chosŏn pursued a “double-faced diplomacy,” ideologically promoting itself as the torch-bearer of the spinoff version of chung-hwa (referred to as so-chung-hwa, literally, Small Middle Kingdom Civilization) while

\(^{187}\) See, for example, Manabu Watanabe, “The Concept of Sadae Kyorin in Korea,” Japan Quarterly 24, 4 (1977); Chung, Chosŏn junghwa sasang yŏngu.

\(^{188}\) Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 28-30.
adhering to the, albeit weakened, policy of *sadae* vis-à-vis the Qing. Moreover, the Qing became more lenient with its tribute demands and maintained a strict policy of non-interference into Korean domestic affairs, demonstrating to the Koreans that it understood the norms and duties of the “civilized” and reciprocal *sadae* relations. In addition, as Qing China materially prospered and culturally flourished with time, Korean tributary ambassadors to Peking were impressed by Qing achievements and could no longer write off the Manchus as completely worthless barbarians. By the 19th century, as the power and legitimacy of the central government began to wane with the monopolization of domestic political power by the king’s in-laws, continued support from China became critical. In short, traditional Korean-Chinese ties were maintained throughout the Qing period because it was beneficial to rulers in both countries for maintaining domestic power and rule.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the organization and practice of interstate relations in a system of hierarchically ordered states in historical East Asia. In contrast to the conventional view of the traditional Asian order as a rigid, normative order, I show how Japan and Korea showed variable hierarchical interaction patterns in their relations with China, based on their domestic legitimation strategies. As the next chapter will show, these sources of regime legitimacy became deeply contested as

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189 Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology*, 168; Chung, *Chosŏn chung hwa sasang yŏnku*.
190 Kim, *Han chung kwan kye sa II*, 724-727.
Japan and Korea adjust to the Westphalian state system, leading to different behavioral paths.

Studies of non-European nations that have attained sovereign statehood with the expansion of the West in the nineteenth century, and oftentimes in the aftermath of decolonization, have described how varied their understandings and claims of sovereignty are. For the small states of Southeast Asia, Westphalian sovereignty entailed strong norms of noninterference, which were institutionalized into the form of ASEAN to keep each other out of their own domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{193} In Africa and other Third World countries, sovereignty is asserted not against one another, but vis-à-vis the “West.” The “empty vessel” analogy is frequently employed in discussions of African sovereignty—how many African states lack empirical indicators of sovereignty (such as domestic authority, control over territorial borders, etc.) but cling onto their international legal status as sovereign states and indulge in various “sovereignty expenditures” such as defense spending, building airports, and maintaining disproportionately large cabinets.\textsuperscript{194}

Such regional variations point to the significance of different historical and political contexts in studying sovereignty’s role in different states and regions. What then is the legacy of the traditional Sinocentric state system in post-Westphalian Asia? The immediate impact was not the idealized European balance-of-power system. With the demise of the Qing, China disintegrated into warlordism, Korea lost its sovereignty, and Japan began to build its own empire. At the end of the Second World War and with the beginning of the Cold War, Japan and Korea became incorporated into the U.S.-led “hubs and spokes” system of alliances. Westphalian sovereignty and

\textsuperscript{193} See, for example, Amitav Acharya, \textit{Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia} (New York: Routledge, 2001).
formal equality are the explicit rules of the game, but a hierarchical worldview has continued to condition domestic sovereignty conceptions in postwar Japan and Korea, as I examine in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five.
CHAPTER THREE:
Variations in East Asian Responses to Westphalian Sovereignty:
Japan and Korea in the Nineteenth Century

The “Clash of Civilizations” in Nineteenth Century Asia

The arrival of Western powers and the rearranging of Asia into the Westphalian state system in the 19th century is widely considered to be one of the most important transformative periods in East Asian international relations. But responses differed among East Asian states: Japan adapted relatively early, whereas Korean (and Chinese) reactions were delayed. This chapter argues that the variable responses were due to the different constraints faced by Japanese and Korean regimes on the basis of their positions within the traditional East Asian system. The political legitimacy of the ruling regimes in Japan and Korea were premised on their sakoku and sadae relations with China, and it is these alternative sources of regime legitimacy that proved to be a key factor in shaping their responses to the “shock” of Westphalian sovereignty.

A key aspect of this period of transition and transformation was that two different state systems collided. Even though China had been weakened by its interaction with Western powers since the beginning of the 19th century, the Sinocentric order was still in existence and influenced interstate relations in the region, including those of Japan and Korea. The different foreign policy responses shown by Japan and Korea reflected attempts to adjust to changes in both the traditional regional order and the Europe-based but expanding “international society” during this critical period in East Asia.195

A comparative examination of Japanese and Korean security politics reveals interesting similarities as well as differences. At first glance, Japan and Korea showed contrasting responses to the European state system, with Japan initially rejecting and then striving to become part of the West, while Korea sought to maintain the status quo, as an autonomous-yet-dependent kingdom in the China-centered world, which significantly constrained its future options and prospects for transitioning into the Westphalian system of modern states. At the same time, leaders in both countries recognized and debated the critical role of China in the region’s, as well as their own, security. As argued by Takeshi Hamashita, in the period from the 1830s to the 1890s, the hierarchical order remained the primary organizing principle, with the treaty relationships subordinate to it.\footnote{Takeshi Hamashita, “Tribute and Treaties: Maritime Asia and Treaty Port Networks in the Era of Negotiation, 1800-1900,” in The Resurgence of East Asia: 500, 150 and 50 Year Perspectives, ed. Giovanni Arrighi, Takeshi Hamashita, and Mark Selden (New York: Routledge, 2003), 24; Hamashita, “The Intra-Regional System in East Asia in Modern Times.” On China’s lingering material and normative power during this period, especially over its neighboring states in Asia, see Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order; C. I. Eugene Kim and Han-Kyo Kim, Korea and the Politics of Imperialism, 1876-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).} Japanese and Korean interpretations of the consequences of a weakened China were, in turn, shaped by their previous positions—insulated or integrated—within the traditional Sinocentric order.

The next section discusses the different contexts—particularly, their variegated views on relations with China—in which Japanese and Korean leaders encountered Westphalian sovereignty. I argue that the different responses by Japan and Korea against the thrust of the Westphalian sovereignty system, as shown in the opposition movements’ criticism of existing sovereignty-strengthening strategies, are explained...
by their previous positions within the Sinocentric order, reflecting their different degrees of identification with China and different sources of regime legitimacy. Japan had been “outside” the Sinocentric sadae order and had in place its own particularistic worldview and indigenous source of legitimacy in the form of the tenno. Korea in contrast was entrenched within the Sinocentric hierarchical system. The political legitimacy of Japanese and Korean ruling regimes, when faced with the Western threat in the 19th century, depended on the defense of such existing security policies.

**Japanese and Korean Encounters with the West**

In the early 1840s, after news of China’s defeat at the hands of the Western powers in the Opium War reached Japan, the immediate reaction of the Tokugawa government was to reinforce the policy of national seclusion, while paying greater attention to coastal defense. By 1842, however, the bakufu leaders implemented “a major revision of its foreign policy,” by revoking the Order to Repel Foreign Ships (1825) and returning to the earlier Order for the Provision of Firewood and Water (1806). The primary motivation for the softening of their stance on sakoku was to prevent the arrival of British vessels from automatically developing into an altercation that might invite a punitive expedition such as the Opium War.\(^{197}\)

A sense of crisis began to loom in the Korean court around the mid 19th century as well, upon hearing the news of China opening up to Western powers and especially after 1860, with the Anglo-French pillage of Peking and subsequent occupation of Tientsin. The West, except for a small number of Catholic priests, did not arrive in Korea until the 1860s, and when they did, the ruling regime of Taewŏn’gun implemented a strict seclusion policy (swaeguk chŏngchaek) in order to

\(^{197}\) Mitani, *Escape from Impasse*, 42-49.
avoid China’s plight.\textsuperscript{198} Convinced that China (and Japan) invited calamity to themselves by allowing Western “barbarians” into their societies, the Taewŏn’gun resisted and fought off French and American expeditionary forces in 1866 in 1871 respectively.\textsuperscript{199} Such protective isolation however soon gave way to opening and reform. Despite resistance from conservative officials, King Kojing resumed formal diplomatic relations with Japan by signing the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876.\textsuperscript{200}

Such similar early responses notwithstanding, only Japan successfully followed through with self-strengthening reforms to become the Asian prototype of an independent Westphalian state. Possible explanations for this within-region variation in the degree of cognitive and behavioral adjustment include: different levels of external pressure and availability of information, types of regime interests, and domestic political culture. The first type of explanation is based on the view that the threat of Western invasion was greater in Japan since it held more interest for the European powers as a trading partner compared to the smaller “hermit nation” of Korea. The empirical evidence, however, does not appear to support this claim in that both Japan and Korea suffered military attacks from the French (and the British, in Japan’s case) around the same time—in 1863 and 1866 respectively.

\textsuperscript{198} When Kojong became king at the age of twelve, his father, the Taewŏn’gun, acted as regent and ruled Chosŏn Korea from 1863 to 1873.
\textsuperscript{200} It should be noted that Koreans did not attach the same meaning to the treaty as did the Japanese. The Koreans considered Article 1, which stated that Korea was an independent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as Japan, a mere reaffirmation of the traditional relations between Korea and China, in which Korea had autonomy of rule over its territory. Consistent with Korea’s sadae-kyorin policy, Korea did not seek Chinese counsel during its negotiations with Japan since Korean-Japanese relations were not viewed to be within the realm of “diplomacy”—an exclusive right of China. Additionally, Korean officials demanded that Japan add the respectful “great” (tae), used only toward China, to Chosŏnguk (Kingdom of Chosŏn) in order to emphasize Korean superiority over Japan. Deuchler, \textit{Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys}, 49.
Alternatively, Japanese leaders may have perceived a more heightened level of threat and crisis, based on their knowledge of the West from centuries of trading with the Dutch at Nagasaki harbor. Even the arrival of Commodore Perry was not a surprise event for the Japanese, as they had received numerous warnings from the Dutch. But this argument underestimates the availability of outside information to Korean officials and may overestimate the importance of access to such information. Decision-makers in Korea had a keen interest in and paid close attention to the decline of Qing power after 1840. Moreover, purportedly better information in Japan did not result in a more coherent threat perception among its rulers. There existed, in both Japan and Korea, intellectual differences on interpreting the nature of the Western threat, leading to intra-governmental divisions on prescriptions for dealing with these foreigners.

In addition, the same information was interpreted differently in Japan and Korea. Western attempts to “open” Asia were interpreted as a threat to Japan’s insulated autonomy based on tightly-controlled foreign (both trade and diplomatic) relations. To most Korean officials, the West represented heterodox thought that could potentially endanger the political monopoly of the ruling classes, whose stature was upheld by Confucian principles. The Western threat in Korea was, at least in the initial stages, was viewed as ideological or religious more than anything else. Moreover, the greatest potential threat to Korean security in the past had always been China. In fact,

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201 It is commonly argued that a lack of information about the outside world, especially the West, prevented Korean (and Chinese) decision-makers from accurately assessing changing strategic conditions.
202 For instance, in 1844, the Dutch government sent a royal letter to the “King of Japan” (the shōgun), advising him to open the country so that he might avoid being subjected to forced opening by the Western powers, as had China been after the Opium War. See Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan*, 38-39; Mitani, *Escape from Impasse*, 41-42.
203 A key source of intelligence-gathering was through the tribute missions, which were also venues of information exchange.
especially after 1882, China (as well as Japan and possibly Russia) was considered more threatening than the Western powers.

Such different assessments of this new external threat were also tied to the interests of the ruling regime. For instance, Stephen Krasner argues that Korean rulers were compelled to protect traditional norms and practices in their interactions with foreigners because they were beholden to their core domestic political constituents, the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats. But Korea was the anomaly, according to Krasner; in general, European and Asian decision-makers alike were susceptible to “organized hypocrisy,” maximizing their strategic interests by distorting existing practices or inventing optimal institutional arrangements when necessary. A further examination of the evidence, however, suggests that his argument—that domestic ideas and institutions could constrain rulers’ options—applies to the Japanese case as well. The Tokugawa government, in the years leading up to the Meiji Restoration, was similarly pressured by the jōi (expel the barbarians) movement to stop making concessions to the Western powers. Japanese rulers also had no choice but to decline the French offer of aid in the civil war against Satsuma and Chōshū because their political legitimacy depended on upholding Japanese autonomy and avoiding foreign military intervention.

The above comparison of Japan and Korea shows that regime interests varied according to the source—domestic or external—of their political legitimacy, which also reflected each country’s degree of embeddedness in the regional security architecture. Thus, it was not necessarily the case that Korean decision-makers were unable to embrace Western institutional forms because they were “trapped by Sinocentric norms,” but rather that their security—and domestic political—interests

were maintained through a close alignment with China. For example, *sadae* relations with China initially provided a buffer for Korean security against the Western threat. Later, Korean rulers deferred to the Chinese lead in implementing gradual reforms since their legitimacy depended on its status within the “great Chinese civilization.” In short, Japanese and Korean rulers pursued or halted reforms when it was politically legitimate to do so.

A third argument on why Japan adjusted better to the changing rules of the game examines the role of domestic political culture. For instance, Kimura Kan argues that Japanese and Korean officials had different attitudes toward opening. In Korea, “enlightenment” (*kaehwa*), or Westernization, and “opening up the country” (*kaeguk*), or signing treaties with Western powers, were understood as two different concepts. Korea’s decision to “open the country” was not based on the principle of “enlightenment” but rather on a Confucian-influenced “small state” ideology, which included the belief that Great Powers would come to its aid during national emergencies to find a proprietary solution.  

Martina Deuchler also attributes Korea’s laggard response to a strong Confucian heritage and long-standing tributary relations with China, which framed intellectual debates on modernization and conditioned its response to the outside world.

But it is important to keep in mind that neither domestic cultures nor interests were static in Japan and Korea in the mid to late 19th century. Japan’s reformism came to the fore only after the successful execution of the Meiji Restoration. In spite of the dominance of the Confucian ideology in Korea, Taewŏn’gun’s attempt at keeping the foreigners out was soon replaced by a reformist open-door policy, especially after 1876 and at the prodding of Li Hung-chang, China’s de facto foreign minister in Asia.

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206 Kimura, *Chŏsen/Kankoku nashonarizumu to ‘shōkoku’ ishiki*, 165-166.
207 Deuchler, *Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys*, xi-xii.
Under Chinese guidance, Korea signed a treaty with the United States in 1882, even cracking down on the “uphold the orthodox, reject the barbarians” (wijŏng chŏksa) movement of the Confucian literati.

In sum, both Japan and Korea accommodated the Western powers to varying degrees and at different junctures. It was their previous relationship with China, and the strength of their ties to the traditional tributary system, that determined the course of their political transformation in the late 19th century. While Japan was relatively insulated—both physically and ideationally—from the Chinese center, the legitimacy and security of Korea’s ruling regime were tightly integrated into the Sinocentric order. Accordingly, the Meiji leadership was able to make a relatively clean break in joining the Westphalian state system. Immediately upon taking power, the Meiji State Council declared that the new Japanese government would conduct itself according to “international law” (bankoku kōhō).208 In contrast, the rulers of Chosŏn Korea had to maintain a precarious balance between “equality” in relations with Europe and “semi-autonomy” vis-à-vis the Qing.209

Contested Regime Legitimacy in Japan and Korea

A comparison of Japan and Korea in the mid to late 19th century shows that their processes of transition into Westphalian statehood occurred in multiple stages and had different starting points. There was no single “shock” that suddenly and

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208 Bankoku kōhō was also the title of the translation text Elements of International Law by Henry Wheaton, which was first translated into Chinese in 1864 as Wanguo gongfa by American missionary W.A.P. Martin. It was later introduced to Korea under the title Manguk kongbŏp. On the politics of translation and spread of international legal texts during this period, see Lydia H. Liu, “Legislating the Universal: The Circulation of International Law in the Nineteenth Century,” in Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations, ed. Lydia Liu (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999).

uniformly reshuffled the Asian state system or interstate relations within it. The challenge of Westphalian sovereignty set off debates about how to deal with and assert autonomy vis-à-vis China as well as the West. Japanese and Korean strategies of insulation and integration had both been built on the foundation of a strong China, which is why leaders in Japan and Korea viewed the decline of Chinese power and leadership as the most threatening to regional security and stability, rather than Western military power per se.

In the context of a weakened China, the regime’s claims of insulation or integration based security lost their vigor and viability. The anti-regime opposition movement in each country contested existing sources of regime legitimacy with an alternative state-strengthening project, with varying degrees of success. It was the outcome of this domestic legitimacy contestation—rather than direct structural pressures or the degree of ideological inflexibility in Korea—which led to different behavioral paths for Tokugawa Japan and Chosŏn Korea.

The immediate trigger for each regime’s legitimacy crisis in 19th century Japan and Korea was the challenge to the ability of the ruling regime to defend the existing strategy of state-strengthening, on which its political legitimacy was based. Perry’s demands to the Tokugawa rulers for trade and diplomatic relations in 1853 and Chinese abandonment of the principle of domestic autonomy for its tributaries in the quelling of the 1882 Imo Rebellion in Seoul threatened to undermine that legitimacy. Central to the subsequent unleashing of legitimacy contestation is the constraint posed on the regime’s attempts to contain the crisis and maintain political power.

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210 Even Perry’s arrival in Japan was not a shock, as commonly believed, but anticipated for years. Dutch merchants had warned the bakufu leaders of future “visits” from England or the United States. On the myth of Perry’s “sudden” opening of Japan, see Kohno, “On the Meiji Restoration,” 274-275; Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 38. On the building up of Japan’s sense of crisis since the early nineteenth century, see Mitani, Escape from Impasse, 23-39.
Table 3-1. Chronology of Events: Japan and Korea in the 19th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>In 1853, Commodore Perry arrives in Japan, which forces the Tokugawa regime to open the debate on accommodation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860s</td>
<td>Jōi (repel the barbarians) activism invites British and French bombardments (1863-64). Tokugawa regime agrees to power-sharing with jōi loyalists. Civil War ensues and the Tokugawa regime is overthrown by the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance (1866-1868). The Meiji Restoration of 1868 restores imperial rule. The new Meiji government introduces Westernizing reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880s</td>
<td>Korea fights off punitive expeditions by the French (1866) and Americans (1871) and introduces an “isolation” policy. Signaling a transition to reforms, Korea signs the Kanghwa Treaty and opens its ports to Japan (1876). China militarily intervenes in the Imo Rebellion (1882) and signs a commercial treaty with Korea. The progressives launch the Kapshin Coup (1884) but fail in three days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890s</td>
<td>Sino-Japanese War (1894-95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900s</td>
<td>Russo-Japanese War (1905-06) Japan incorporates Korea as its protectorate in 1905 and announces annexation in 1910.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Existing sources of regime legitimacy limit the range of options available to the regime through the processes of entrapment and extremism. In what may be called the entrapment effect of state identities, rulers are forced to defend their
strongest and most salient source of legitimacy, especially during crises. Entrapment was particularly likely for the Tokugawa and Min governments in 19th century Japan and Korea since regime legitimacy was so closely tied to the self-reliance or membership-seeking identity of the state within Sinocentric Asia. Japanese and Korean rulers could not easily or inconsequentially diverge from their mandate even in the face of changing strategic conditions. Pushed by conservative factions within the government, bakufu leaders continued to adhere to the ideal of independence through insulation, as embodied in jōi thought, even though the formula of formal diplomatic closure and informal trade relations was no longer tenable. On the other hand, King Kojong and his officials during the late Chosŏn period agreed that the foremost strategic priority for Korea was to avoid isolation. In a continuation of past sadae policies, Korean rulers saw the United States as a replacement “elder brother” and a means to protect Korea’s autonomy from other Western powers as well as the Chinese.

The second stage of legitimacy contestation involved the regime being pushed to a more extreme position than the status quo due to “competitive outbidding” by domestic political opponents. In both Japan and Korea, accommodation attempts by the ruling regime allowed previously excluded actors onto the political scene—regional lords from the outer domains in the case of Tokugawa Japan and lower-ranking reform-minded literati in Chosŏn Korea. Ensuing political competition resulted in a polarization of ideas on legitimacy. Tokugawa rulers had to battle against and incorporate elements of jōi in order to demonstrate their commitment to protecting

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211 In their study of political mobilization in ethnic conflicts, Lake and Rothchild argue that “political outbidding” occurs when moderates, faced with an electoral challenge from extremists, are driven to “ethnicism.” One reason, as presented by Kaufman, may be that extremists within ethnic groups denounce and sanction middle-grounders, forcing them to choose ethnically-based identities. See David A. Lake and Donald S. Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” *International Security* 21, 2 (Fall 1996): 44; Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” *International Security* 20, 4 (Spring 2001): 136-75.
imperial authority (sonnō).\(^{212}\) Similarly, the Min clan-dominated Korean government was forced to defend the advanced status of the Sinocentric civilization against progressive ideas on Western civilization and enlightenment (munmyŏng kaehwa).

The ruling regimes in Japan and Korea met with varying levels of success in their attempts to protect their political legitimacy against the opposition. The Tokugawa regime in Japan was forced into power-sharing compromises early on and eventually lost its power through defeat in a civil war. The Min government in Korea was able to maintain its power through sustained alliance with the Qing court and cracked down its opposition, which included both orthodox Confucian conservatives and progressive reformers. Whereas anti-regime forces in Japan were able to coalesce into an “overthrow the bakufu” (tōbaku) movement against a weak central government, the early failure of the 1884 coup by progressive forces skewed the domestic balance of power in favor of the ruling regime and its traditionalist forces. Battling the legitimacy of Sakoku in Late Tokugawa Japan (1853-1868)

For the Tokugawa regime, sakoku was more than a policy; it symbolized the national ideology of “Japan as Middle-Kingdom,” which “allowed bakufu leaders to extricate Japan from subservience to a China-dominated diplomatic world order of universal empire and culture.”\(^{213}\) In order to protect such insulated autonomy, the bakufu leaders sought to avoid war with the Western powers by offering minimal concessions in the form of a small number of designated open ports, as they had done with Dutch and Chinese merchants for centuries. The Tokugawa regime’s conciliatory

\(^{212}\) In Jeffrey Legro’s portrayal of the Meiji Restoration, the lack of new, reformist ideas delayed consolidation of shock-induced collapse and change. The problem with this analysis is that powerful alternative ideas did exist in Japan, but the ideology that toppled the regime, “revere the emperor, expel the barbarians” (sonnō jōi) was not the ideology that consolidated the new Meiji regime, “rich country, strong army” (fukoku kyōhei). It was not the case that alternative ideas for consolidation were unavailable, but that it was not until after the Meiji Restoration that Westernization could be fused into a legitimate ruling ideology. Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005).

stance toward foreigners, however, was not widely endorsed among the daimyo (regional lords).

Perry’s arrival in 1853 had the effect of creating open political divisions on how to proceed with American demands for trade. In the hopes of garnering consensus, the bakufu’s chief councilor, Abe Masahiro, made an unprecedented foreign policy consultation to all the daimyō, requesting that they submit in writing their opinion on how best to deal with the Americans. While the fudai (inner domain) lords dominating the bakufu’s Senior Council favored a more pragmatic foreign policy of compromise while strengthening the country, the Tokugawa regime faced opposition from the frustrated, and traditionally the most anti-Tokugawa, tōzama han (outer domains) such as Satsuma, Chōshū, Hizen and Tosa. These previously excluded actors began to coalesce into a coordinated jōi (expel the barbarians) movement, based on earlier Confucian scholarship such as Shinron (New Thesis, 1825) and National Learning (kokugaku), which focused on the imperial institution as the center of the national tradition. Jōi activism grew stronger even in the face of repression from the regime.

214 Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 49. See also Beasley, Japan Encounters the Barbarian.  
217 Ironically, the domains with the most contact with and the most knowledge about the West, Chōshū and Satsuma, were also the most vocal in advocating jōi. Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 49-51; Thomas M. Huber, “Chōshū Activists in the Meiji Restoration” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1975), 79-81.  
218 When the issue of receiving the court’s approval for Japan’s treaty with the United States became mixed up with the issue of shogunal succession in Kyoto in 1858, the bakufu’s Senior Councilor Li Naosuke signed Townsend Harris’s commercial treaty on his own and purged his opponents from the outer domains of western Japan. On the Ansei Purge of 1858-1859, see Tsuzuki, The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan, 39; Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 52; Craig, Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration, 167-168.
Increasing pressure from the British and the French in the 1860s, however, revealed the futility of both *sakoku* and *jōi*. The *bakufu* and the *daimyo* were well aware of their weakness vis-à-vis Western gunships but continued to talk of driving out foreigners because of pressure from *jōi* activists, who championed their cause in the name of the Japanese emperor. In 1863, a significantly weakened *bakufu*, for the sake of protecting *sakoku* and their own legitimacy, was pushed to set a starting date for enacting *jōi* but could not actually enforce it in the face of continuing threat from the British. Satsuma and Chōshū, the headquarters for the *jōi* movement, tried to repel the foreigners on their own and were met with retaliatory attacks in 1863 and 1864.\(^{219}\)

In order to maintain their power and legitimacy, the *bakufu* also attempted to placate the *jōi* loyalists by introducing reforms to allow the imperial court’s participation in national politics, a shift from its earlier ceremonial role. Tokugawa officials, realizing that *sakoku* could never be restored, sought to regain their control and authority through *kōbu gattai* (literally, unity between court and *bakufu*), “a concept that proposed to achieve national unity through a coalition of high-ranking members of the imperial nobility and samurai class.”\(^{220}\) An unintended consequence of this institutional innovation, however, was the decentralization of power and “major shift of decision-making authority to a council of lords centered in Kyoto” away from Edo (present-day Tokyo), where the *bakufu* was located.\(^ {221}\)

While the Tokugawa government was further weakened through various factional struggles and intricate court politics, the opposition led by the Satsuma-Chōshū alliance consolidated its power by rallying around the newly extended slogan,

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\(^{219}\) As a result, Chōshū was forced to pay indemnities to the British, Americans, Dutch, and French and agree to provisions for foreign ships at Shimonoseki. Jansen, “Meiji Ishin,” 10-11; Tsuzuki, *The Pursuit of Power in Modern Japan*, 47-49.


“revere the emperor, expel the barbarians” (sonnō jōi).\(^{222}\) The bakufu’s abandonment of sakoku was portrayed as a repudiation of the sonnō principle and a betrayal of the emperor. Having secured the backing of Kyoto, the anti-regime forces gained a new layer of legitimacy and radicalized into a movement to overthrow the bakufu (tōbaku).\(^{223}\)

The beginning of the end for the Tokugawa regime came in 1866, when Satsuma and several other domains refused to aid the bakufu forces in a second punitive expedition against Chōshū in the summer of 1866. Yoshinobu stepped down as shogun in November 1867, but in December the joint forces of Satsuma and Chōshū took control of the imperial palace in Kyoto, abolished the bakufu, and announced an imperial “restoration” in January 1868. The civil war lasted another 18 months, but the anti-bakufu forces had succeeded in militarily overthrowing the Tokugawa regime by capitalizing on the latter’s failure to protect Japan’s self-reliant insulation, which had been the source of Tokugawa political legitimacy for over 250 years.

**Chosŏn Korea’s dual status problem (1882-1895)**

Wanting to avoid another military confrontation, and with the advent of Japanese influence, China pushed Korea to accommodate, rather than aggravate, the Western powers. Despite reservations with respect to the advice from a weakened China to sign treaties with the West, King Kojong (r. 1873-1907), and his Min clan-dominated government, abandoned his father’s isolationist policy in favor of modest reforms.\(^{224}\) But the Min regime faced harsh opposition from conservative Confucian

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\(^{222}\) The Sat-Chō alliance was the result of a secret mediation by the Tosa domain’s Sakamoto Ryōma between Satsuma and Chōshū in the mid-1860s.

\(^{223}\) Craig, *Chōshū in the Meiji Restoration*, 235-236.

\(^{224}\) The Min clan refers to the family members of King Kojong’s queen. Late Chosŏn Korean politics had been dominated by a series of such consort clans.
scholar-bureaucrats, who viewed Western religion and influence as disrupting the traditional socio-political order. Kojong and his reform-minded officials had to rely on Chinese authority and influence to deflect domestic opposition from the xenophobic conservative factions. By tying their legitimacy even closer to the protection of the Sinocentric civilizational order and showing deference to Qing China, the Min government was able to slowly introduce self-strengthening reforms, such as the establishment of the T’ongnigimu Amun, a Western-style Office for the Management of State Affairs.

The Korean regime’s reformist path, as well as its traditional relationship with China, came to an abrupt end with the soldiers’ mutiny of July 1882 (Imo Rebellion), when China actually interfered into Korean domestic affairs for the first time in their history of sadae relations. At the request of the Min government, China’s de facto foreign minister Li Hung-chang sent 3000 troops to Korea to help quell the Imo Rebellion, but went on to abduct the Taewŏn’gun and assume absolute authority over the country to enforce Korea’s foreign relations. Li had a Chinese garrison stationed in Seoul under the command of Yuan Shih-kai and hired various foreign advisors to control Korea’s financial and foreign affairs.

China’s military intervention and continued stationing of troops on Korean soil effectively ended the policy of “benign” leadership by China. The Qing court

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227 Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order, 326-327.
228 Yong-ha Shin, Modern Korean History and Nationalism (Seoul: Jimoondang Publishing Company, 2000), 34-36.
ordered the Min government to abolish all Japanese-style reforms and insisted on being consulted before making any foreign policy decision. In October 1882, the Chosŏn-Qing commercial treaty was signed to promote Chinese commercial activities and to strengthen its influence in Chosŏn. Such unprecedented changes in Chinese policy indicated an attempt to turn Korea into a Western-style protectorate. In late 19th century Chosŏn Korea, dealing with China, rather than Japan or the West, was the most important foreign policy “crisis.”

The Chinese about-face had serious consequences for the Korean government’s reform agenda. After 1882, progressive reformers split from the gradualists within the government in their frustration with the pace of and Qing influence over modernizing reforms. Against the ruling Min clan, who continued to rely on Chinese support in order to maintain their own power and authority, emerged an opposing coalition of the so-called “Enlightenment leaders” who formed their own Enlightenment (Independence) Party. The Enlightenment Party stated as its policy objectives “independence” from the Qing and continued implementation of reforms modeled after Europe and Japan. Dependent on China, the Min faction, which had formerly opposed the xenophobic policies of the Taewŏn’gun, now found itself as the conservative, pro-Chinese party.

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230 For example, in 1887, the Qing court insisted that Korea obtain permission from the Chinese Ministry of Protocol before dispatching any permanent diplomatic missions to Europe and America. Fangyin Zhou, “The Role of Ideational and Material Factors in the Qing Dynasty Diplomatic Transformation,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, 3 (Summer 2007): 40-41.

231 For details, see Dong-hi Choi, “1880 nyondae Chosŏn ui munje wa kumiyeolkangkwaui ogyokwankye [Issues in Foreign Relations with the Western Powers in 1880s Chosŏn],” in Hankuk oigyosa [The History of Korea’s Foreign Relations], ed. Hankuk jongchi oikyosa hakhoi [The Korean Diplomatic History Association] (Seoul: Chipmundang, 1993), 128-129. On China’s commercial activities in Korea as an “informal empire,” see Larsen, “From Suzerainty to Commerce,” 47-66.

232 Fujimura, “Japan’s Changing View of Asia,” 426-427; Larsen, “From Suzerainty to Commerce.”


234 Hwang, The Korean Reform Movement of the 1880s, 76-77.
In order to promote their own reform agenda against the powerful Min clan, the progressives labeled the gradualist reformers the Sadae Party and criticized their Great-Power-worshipping and anti-reform stance, despite the fact that they had once been on the same side—advocating reform—against the traditionalist Confucian scholar-bureaucrats.\(^{235}\) In doing so, what used to be a sign of propriety in the traditional East Asian order became transformed into an affront to Korean independence.\(^{236}\) The principle of *sadae* and the logic of civilization in promoting state security and legitimacy were now stigmatized as compromising Korean sovereignty.

Aided by a tacit alliance with the Qing military commanders stationed in Korea, the Min clan attempted to neutralize the power of the monarchy and the progressives. The Min clan leaders schemed to block the Enlightenment Party, whose members were mostly mid to low rank government officials, by cutting off funds for their modernization projects.\(^{237}\) According to Martina Deuchler, a major factor in the launching of the 1884 Kapshin coup d’etat by progressives was the Min clan’s stronghold on government power; progressive reformers were outside the decision-making level of government politics and could not reach the apex of power by traditional means.\(^{238}\) Against Chinese interference, and without military backing from the Japanese, on which the coup organizers had relied, the attempt at regime change failed after just three days.

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\(^{235}\) Moreover, the Mins had aided King Kojong in opening Korea to outside powers and initiating modernizing reforms, overturning the previous policy of seclusion instituted and enforced by the Taewon’gun.

\(^{236}\) Dong-guk Kang notes that *sadaejui/jidaishugi* are terms created and used by Enlightenment intellectuals in Japan such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and later in Chosŏn to portray Sinocentric traditions as backward and undesirable. Kang, “‘Zokuhou’ no seiji sisousi.” 96-103.


Neither the regime nor reformers were able to consolidate their power after 1884. Most reformist officials had been purged or exiled. The legitimacy of the regime’s ruling ideology and Korea’s civilizational status were in question. Yet, the Korean government remained dependent on Chinese (and other outside) support for their hold on power, and until the end of the Sino-Japanese War, maintained a dual presence in both the traditional East Asian world and the European state system as a paradoxical “autonomous-yet-dependent” sokbang (vassal).

Korean intellectuals debated the best strategy to negotiate between traditional sadae relations and the rules of Westphalian sovereignty. For instance, Kim Yun-sik advocated a continuation of sadae policy, arguing that a weak country like Korea could survive only by forming multiple alliances with other Great Powers, China being one of them. Yu Kil-chun, on the other hand, viewed Chinese encroachment as threatening and argued that it was necessary to balance against Chinese influence by aligning with Russia or the United States.

Even though traditional sadae relations had been forfeited, Korean officials continued to rely on Great Power patronage for regime survival and security. Korea clung to its treaty with the U.S. and other European powers as a security guarantee—against China and Japan. King Kojong believed that American recognition of Korea

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239 Korea’s sok-guk or sok-bang status was not the equivalent of a vassal kingdom or fief in the Western legalistic sense, but a dependent kin concept which defined sadae-chaso relations between great and small powers in the Sinocentric order. Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia, 87-88. See also Kang, “‘Zokuhou’ no sei ji sisousi”; Dai Yeol Ku, “Tongsoyang kukjejilsokwanui chungdol kwa saeroun jilsokwanui hyongsong [Clash of Eastern and Western Views of the International Order and the Formation of a New Worldview],” Kukjejongchi nonchong 28, 1 (1988).
240 Yong-hwa Chung, Mumnymg ui cheongchi sasang, 202-211.
as a full-fledged independent state would support Korean claims for independence from China.  

Table 3-2. Concessions to Foreign Investors in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rights or privileges granted</th>
<th>Concessionaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Exploitation of timber from Ullung Island</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>Providing electricity</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Building of Inchon-Seoul railroad</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Kyongwon and Chongsong mines in North Hamgyong province</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Unsan gold mines in North Pyongan province</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Building of Seoul-Uiju railroad</td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>Exploitation of forests in the Yalu River basin and on Ullung Island</td>
<td>Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Tanghyon gold mines in Kangwon province</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Building streetcar lines in Seoul</td>
<td>American</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Building of Seoul-Pusan railroad</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Unsan gold mines in North Pyongan province</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Chiksan gold mine in South Chungchong province</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Moreover, the U.S. was viewed as a replacement “elder brother” after China’s abandonment of traditional bilateral relations. In a telling example of their

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misinterpretation of Western law and institutions, Korean officials took the “good offices” clause stated in the 1882 Korean-American treaty as “a firm commitment on the part of the United States to come to Korea’s assistance if Korean sovereignty and independence were threatened,” as had been the moral principle guiding the sadae order. To repay the Americans according to the principle of mutual “moral obligation,” King Kojong awarded American businessmen—over other foreign competitors—with lucrative concessions (see table 3-2).

Detachment from the Traditional Sinocentric Order

Japan’s reverse course policy in the 19th century: from insulation to integration (1868-1920s)

The restoration of power to the emperor and his court was only the first stage of what turned out to be an extended process of identity politics. Upon taking power, the Meiji oligarchs embarked on a new course of action, jettisoning a traditionalist, particularistic notion of insular autonomy in favor of attaining Great Power status as an active member of “international society.” Whereas in the past Japan had attempted in hiding to build a parallel universe alongside China, the new Meiji leadership now sought to “catch up” and integrate with the advanced European civilization. The Meiji government dissociated itself from the jōi movement and forcibly carried out new

243 In 1897, the Korean king is reported to have told Horace Allen, the newly appointed American minister in Seoul, “We feel that America is to us as an Elder Brother.” Kojong expressed his appreciation for American ratification of the Korean-American treaty by dispatching the “mission to reciprocate the sending of envoy” (pobingsa) head by Min Yong-ik to the U.S. in July 1883. In the period 1885-1894, the Korean government invited foreign advisors almost exclusively from the United States. Lew, “American Advisers in Korea, 1885-1894,” 64.
reforms, persuading its citizenry that Japan must emulate and adopt Western institutions and culture in order to rival their power.245

Japan’s reverse course policy was not merely a continued accommodation of West, which had been the de facto policy during the late Tokugawa period. In sharp contrast to Qing China’s status quo aspirations, the worldview of Japanese elites changed dramatically since the late 1860s until the 1870s, owing in large part to the influx of Western Learning (yōgaku), led by reformers who had been part of state missions dispatched abroad to learn European institutions.246 In addition, the past failures of sakoku and jōi paved the way for active kaikoku (opening the country) by the new Meiji regime.247 The legitimacy of the regime was increasingly tied to the new slogan of bunmei kaika (civilization and enlightenment) and the building of a “modern” state. The Meiji leaders believed that the strength and autonomy of the Japanese state could not be maintained through self-reliance but by enhancing its competitiveness and standing within the greater international system.248 State-strengthening was to be accomplished by achieving civilizational status through Westernization.249

246 Kang, “‗Zokuhou’ no seiji sisousi,” 27.
247 Between 1853 and 1868, sakoku underwent a dramatic conceptual transformation, from idealization to stigmatization: “As of 1853 sakoku was an expression of ethnic virtue….By 1867 sakoku was well on the way to becoming an expression of archaic parochialism, and kaikoku was rapidly acquiring credibility as an expression of ethnic virtue and sound strategy.” Totman, “From Sakoku to Kaikoku,” 7.
248 Attachment to insular autonomy did not easily disappear; jōi loyalists remained active until they were finally crushed in the 1877 Satsuma rebellion led by Saigo Takamori. In addition, many intellectuals and party activists were still firmly opposed to the unequal treaties signed with the Western powers and demonstrated against their revisions in 1887 and 1889. See Stephen Vlastos, “Opposition Movements in Early Meiji, 1868-1885,” in The Cambridge History of Japan, volume 5: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Marius B. Jansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 387-388; Carol Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 114.
249 Westernization was discussed and promoted primarily as industrialization and acquiring technology and scientific knowledge but also as cultural change. The most famous public discussions on cultural change were held by the so-called Meirokusha (Meiji Six Society) intellectuals, created in 1873 and composed of leading philosophers, educators, legal scholars, and political economists such as Katō
Western political concepts such as privilege, right, and sovereignty were carefully studied and reconstructed during this time to connote the power of the state (kokken). For instance, sovereignty was interpreted as the power and authority of the state, “a term representing a country’s esteem and prosperity, its unlimited powers, its unrestricted kokken.” Even the imperial institution was linked to kokken in that Shinto was made a state religion. The symbolism of the emperor changed from its emphasis on the “national essence” (kokutai) to the external civilizational status of the Japanese state.

At the same time, the Meiji leaders also went to great lengths to accommodate the rules and norms of the international system, pressing for the adoption of Westernized legal codes in order to demonstrate the civilized progress of Japan and to hasten the revision of unequal treaties. Attacks against foreigners were banned and violations were severely dealt with in order to prevent diplomatic incidents and the undermining of the government’s stature in the international arena. The Meiji government also improved its system of law enforcement and embarked on an extensive propaganda campaign to inform the public that anti-foreign attacks were against “the laws of the world.” Such strategies were calculated to consolidate the government’s authority and prestige—both domestically and internationally.

Wanting to participate equally with the Great Powers, the Japanese government used French and English in their international diplomacy, recognizing the

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Hiroyuki, Fukuzawa Yikichi, and Nakamura Keiu, all of whom had started their careers in the Tokugawa schools for Western learning. Howland, *Translating the West*, 12-13.

250 Howland, *Translating the West*, 139.


power and importance of language.\textsuperscript{254} The Japanese also eschewed traditional diplomacy in favor of the European “law of nations” when dealing with its Chinese and Korean neighbors. Meiji officials recognized that international law would empower Japan over China and were determined to avoid a repeat of the signing of the Sino-Japanese Protocol in 1871-72, during which the Qing court had hampered negotiations based on traditional Chinese etiquette, expressing scorn for the “Dwarf Nation” of Japan.\textsuperscript{255}

Japan also began to compete with China for influence over Korea and leadership in the region—another sign of Japan’s concern with external status. The Treaty of Kanghwa signed in 1876 symbolized Japan’s status as a “Western” nation-state and brought prestige to the Meiji rulers.\textsuperscript{256} It also acted as Japan’s formal challenge to China, igniting their rivalry over Korea until it was forcefully resolved in 1894-1895.\textsuperscript{257} Following its victory over China in the war of 1894-95, Japanese leaders distanced themselves from the traditional Sinocentric order to achieve greater “civilization”—above and beyond China and Korea—among the Western powers.\textsuperscript{258} The desire for Great Power status continued through the experience of the Triple Intervention in 1895,\textsuperscript{259} when Britain, France, and Russia “took away” some of Japan’s gains in China, until recognition was received in the 1902 alliance with Britain.\textsuperscript{260}

\textsuperscript{256} Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status,” 746.
\textsuperscript{258} The latter idea was the precursor of the theory of datsu-a, or leaving Asia.
\textsuperscript{259} Kim, The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order; Suganami, “Japan’s Entry into International Society.”
\textsuperscript{260} Iriye, “Japan’s Drive to Great-Power Status,” 773.
Korea’s quest for sovereign independence (1895-1910)

Although their initial attempt to take out the Min clan had failed in the 1884 coup, followers of the Enlightenment movement continued to attack the principle of *sadae* in past relations with China as the source of Korea’s cultural and political dependence on and subservience to China. After the failure of the 1884 coup, the anti-*sadae* movement of the progressive Enlightenment Party emphasized the humiliation of Chinese suzerainty over Chosŏn and prioritized gaining complete independence from Qing China.  

But it was the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War that catapulted the Korean nationalist movement’s project to “de-center” the Middle Kingdom and erase Chinese cultural influence from all aspects of Korean society. China’s loss symbolized “the defeat of ‘old knowledge’ (*guhak*) by ‘new knowledge’ (*sinhak*),” according to editorials from all three nationalist newspapers, the *Tongnip sinmun* (Independent, 1896-1898), the *Hwangsŏng sinmun* (Capital Gazette, 1898-1910), the *Cheguk sinmun* (Imperial Post, 1898-1910).  

China was constantly cited as an example of a country that did not engage in the “civilizing” process, witnessed in the corrupt nature of Chinese law, its inhumane penal institutions as well as the dirty streets and hospitals and even the lazy and idle national character of the Chinese. Reports of Chinatowns both abroad and at home reinforced such images of a nation of “savage” customs.  

Departing from the traditional Sinocentric order also meant the reformulation of an alternative nationalist identity for an independent Korea. Korean modernizers felt it necessary to break with the transnational culturalism of the East Asian past in

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262 Schmid, *Korea between Empires*.  
favor of a “pure” national culture.\textsuperscript{264} In order to “clear the way for new institutions and values upon which to ground a modern Korean nation,” nationalist intellectuals such as Chang Chi-yŏn, Pak Ŭn-sik, and Sin Ch’ae-ho actively engaged the sadae debate, the “\textit{cause célèbre} at the time.”\textsuperscript{265} As part of this project, the Confucian scholar-bureaucrats were blamed for their obsequiousness before the foreign Chinese culture and inability to modernize Korean society. Enlightenment modernizers started to argue that Confucianism was a foreign, Chinese thought. Even though “Confucian precepts had been a part of the Korean intellectual tradition for over a millennium and had become thoroughly Koreanized, nationalists blamed the plight of the failing Yi political system on its excessive veneration of a foreign cultural system.”\textsuperscript{266}

Enlightenment leaders such as Yi Sang-jae, Yun Chi-ho, Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŏng-man), and Philip Jaisohn (Sŏ Jae-pil) created the Independence Club as a means to protect national sovereignty “by promoting national unity, economic and military strength, and modern culture, not relying on foreign powers.”\textsuperscript{267} The club members advocated the destruction of Yŏng-ŭn Gate, a “symbol of Korea’s subservience to and dependence on China.” They also persuaded King Kojong to adopt the imperial title (on equal status with the Qing court) and to stop granting concessions to foreigners.\textsuperscript{268} Despite such efforts, Korea’s independent status remained nominal, as strategic rivalry over the Korean peninsula and Japan’s increasing ambitions for regional leadership status in Asia led to its claiming of protectorate rule over Korea in 1905 and finally annexation in 1910.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[265] Robinson, “Perceptions of Confucianism,” 207-209.
\item[266] Robinson, “Perceptions of Confucianism,” 207.
\item[267] Nahm, \textit{Korea}, 191.
\item[268] Nahm, \textit{Korea}, 195.
\end{footnotes}
Conclusion

In this chapter, I have addressed the question of why the arrival of the modern European state system elicited such different responses in China’s two smaller neighbors. The alternative paths taken by the two countries in response to the Western threat, it is argued, can be traced back to their different degrees of identification and forms of interaction with China, the region’s long-standing dominant power. While Japan in the Tokugawa period had for the most part conducted foreign relations based on self-legitimation and insulation from China, the Korean kingdom of Chosŏn had maintained its security and status by revering the Great Power (sadae) of China and integrating itself into the Sinocentric world order. These existing sources of regime legitimacy had consequences for Japanese and Korean regimes when they faced foreign policy crises in the 19th century, influencing the terms of political debate and contestation over how best to achieve security and to strengthen the state. Moreover, the comparative study shows that these shifts in state identities were neither structurally-determined nor purely interest-based responses to systemic change.

By 1882, both Japan and Korea were accommodating the Western powers, but the motivations and priorities behind the policy were dramatically different. For Japan, datsu-a nyū-ō (leaving Asia, entering Europe) was a means to achieve greater status within the world hierarchy of states, where Japan (and China) ranked below the European powers. For Korea, signing treaties with Western powers and undertaking modernizing reforms were intended to show deference to the Chinese-recommended policy of “checking the barbarian with another barbarian.”

The delegitimation of the “old order,” however did not lead to a clear adoption of a “Westphalian script.” Despite the demise of the traditional Sinocentric system in East Asia, the legacy of the hierarchical worldview can be found in the sensitivity towards “Great Powers” shown in the political debates of contemporary Japan and
Korea. Anti-sadae-ism is a powerful mobilizing tool in contemporary Korea, as evident in recent anti-American movements, and Japanese leaders have faced criticisms of taibe jūzoku (subordination under the United States). At the same time, Japanese and Korean governments have also treated close military, political, and economic integration into the U.S.-led regional order as a quest for greater international status and recognition. In other words, Westphalianization of the East Asian system of states did not erase patterns of hierarchical relations. Moreover, if history is any indication, the late 19th century experience in which regional actors showed varying levels of acceptance toward newly-emerging challengers and their institutions, based on their existing relations with the reigning dominant power, demonstrates that the reshaping of regional order would depend more on the changes in Japanese and Korean acceptance of the legitimacy of American influence and leadership, an element underemphasized in contemporary discussions on the rise of China.
CHAPTER FOUR:
Debating “Independent Foreign Policy” in Postwar Japan:
The Security Treaty Revision Crisis of 1960

Introduction

The end of the Pacific War in 1945 marked a key transition in regional security: it would no longer be Asian in scope or leadership. Western law and civilization had already permeated Asia since the 19th century, but it was not until the collapse of the Japanese empire that Asia was reorganized into a system of Westphalian-style independent, sovereign states. While the rules and norms governing interstate relations may have changed, understandings of sovereignty and state-strengthening have retained their hierarchical context. Aspects of “old” Asia remained, most importantly, in the hierarchically-ordered regional structure. The formation of a U.S.-led Asian order following Japan’s defeat is aptly summarized by Chae-Jin Lee and Hideo Sato:

After the Pacific War (1941-45), the United States virtually dictated the domestic and foreign policies of occupied Japan and the southern part of a divided Korea. Even after South Korea formally established a new government in 1948 and Japan regained its political independence in 1952, the United States, as leader of the Western coalition against the communist bloc, successfully maintained a preponderant patron-client relationship during the 1950s and early 1960s. In return for the deference given to U.S. leadership, the two Northeast Asian client-states benefited from U.S. military protection, diplomatic patronage, and generous economic policies.269

After 1945, in a shift from their previous state-strengthening strategies, both Japanese and Korean regimes were able to forge an “integration consensus” by

associating self-reliance or insulation strategies with past failures—militarism and imperialism in prewar Japan and delayed modernization and Westernization in 19th century Korea. As a result, both Japan and Korea converged on an internationalist “strong state” nationalism (*fukoku kyohei* in Japanese; *puguk kangbyŏng* in Korean) under U.S. leadership. The United States played a crucial role in the formation and maintenance of the integration consensus, which is why national identity debates in postwar Japan and Korea have tended to politicize alliance relations.

The integration consensus, however, has not remained static in either Japan or Korea. Periodic challenges from alternative ideas on state-strengthening autonomy have tested its strength and recalibrated its content. What has remained unchanged, however, is the enduring frame of state-strengthening nationalism, in which Japanese and Korean leaders seek political legitimacy by promoting and appealing to competing ideas about enhancing international status. As was the case in traditional interstate relations in Asia, sovereign autonomy is not taken for granted in Japanese and Korean relations with the United States, even with the formalization of the European sovereignty system. “Informal” rules, rather than Westphalian rules of sovereignty equality and independence, have guided bilateral interactions in alliances. At the societal level, there exist multiple interpretations of what autonomy or independence entails and how best to achieve “full” sovereignty. In other words, alternative ideas of state-strengthening continue to be contested.

Historically, under Chinese hierarchy, the ruling regime’s autonomy was established bilaterally through informal rules and roles in interstate relations. Chosŏn Korea’s deferential policy of *sadae*, or revering the Great Powers, effectively secured autonomy in domestic rule as well as military protection from China. The Tokugawa regime in Japan took a different route to maximize its autonomy from the Chinese mainland: by monopolizing and closely regulating, through a series of edicts severely
limiting foreign contact and travel (what is now known as Japan’s sakoku, or national seclusion, policy), its indirect trade with China.

Similarly, in the postwar period, Japanese and Koreans discuss what kind of autonomy is achievable and/or desirable—in the context of hierarchical relations. Despite tendencies to equate pro-autonomy sentiments with anti-Americanism or anti-alliance movements, autonomy in Japan and Korea is not conducive to a single definition nor is it necessarily antithetical to some accommodation of influential Great Powers. Political leaders in Japan and Korea have navigated between “acceptable” degrees of autonomy from and accommodation of the United States.

The actual content and specific context of Japanese and Korean autonomy debates, however, vary in terms of their respective sovereignty-restoring projects. Japan’s lack of sovereign autonomy has been symbolized above all by the war-renouncing constitution written during the American military occupation in the immediate postwar period, which is why revision of the constitution, Article 9 in particular, has been priority number one on the agenda of conservatives promoting Great-Power-like independence. Alliance relations are assessed by different political groups through the prism of constitutional revision.

In this chapter, I examine how multiple interpretations of sovereign autonomy were debated in Japan and negotiated into a compromise solution, in which societal demands for sovereign independence were subdued under the goal of achieving economic development and international status, in the early postwar period. The United States came to play a sizeable role in this implicit social bargain, not only because of structural conditions such as the Cold War and the communist threat but also because regimes in power were constantly challenged by their opponents on their existing relations with the U.S. The security treaty revision initiative by Kishi Nobusuke from 1957 to 1960 was an attempt to recalibrate Japan’s status vis-à-vis the
U.S. and led to widespread contestation between the Japanese Left and the Right on what constituted an “independent status” for Japan. While Kishi succeeded in revising the security treaty, status quo was maintained in relations with the U.S. for the most part and the existing integration consensus was further strengthened and stabilized.

Defining Sovereign Autonomy and Independence in Postwar Japan

While militarism, war, and defeat have shaped and constrained Japan’s foreign and security policy after 1945, long-standing notions of state-strengthening and the goal of status achievement endure in Japanese security debates. In postwar Japan, state strength continues to be defined in terms of external status. In nearly every issue of Japan’s *Diplomatic Bluebook* since the 1970s, Japan’s international position and image is discussed. The basic objectives of diplomacy are stated as: the importance of recognizing that Japan has “great international influence and responsibility commensurate with that position,”270 “to play an international role befitting its stature as a member of the world community,”271 “to meet positively the expectations of the international community so as to become a ‘Japan useful to the world,’”272 and “to correctly assess its international position at all times if the nation is to enjoy long-lasting peace and progress.”273 Even other countries’ diplomatic achievements are evaluated in terms of their status gained or lost. For instance, in describing China’s détente with the United States, the assessment was that: “The importance of that

273 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook for 1975*, 64.
country in international politics was recognized from a new standpoint as U.S. President Richard Nixon announced on July 15, 1971, his plan to visit Peking.”

Accordingly, debates about Japan’s international status continue to be at the core of domestic legitimacy struggles. In what follows, I examine how Japan’s “autonomy” was defined in the immediate postwar period through the adoption of a minimalist integration strategy. Then I discuss the 1960 treaty revision case, in which Kishi attempted to redefine Japan’s status vis-à-vis the United States resulting in a highly polarizing process of domestic contestation. The above analysis shows that the external standing of the state continues to be an important source of legitimacy for Japanese leaders. While the content of security debates—on whether to achieve status by strengthening alliance ties or through greater distancing from the U.S.—remains relatively unchanged, what has varied since the 1960s is the degree of domestic polarization over Japan’s security options. This indicates a changed context, in which less political contestation may have paved the way for less policy rigidity in the realm of security policy since the mid-1990s.

Formation of the Integration Consensus: Yoshida’s “Middle Power”

Internationalism

Restoring compromised sovereignty was the immediate political task facing Japanese leaders in the immediate postwar period during and after American occupation. The goal was to create a strong, independent Japanese state, but there was no consensus on how to achieve full sovereignty. Japanese politics was polarized into two camps, each clinging to one side of Japan’s national image which had been split

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274 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook for 1971, 2.
275 For the argument that contested security norms lead to policy rigidity in Japanese foreign policy, as opposed to flexible policies in the economic policy realm, see Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security.
into two after the war—one as a traditional Great Power and the other as a pacifist country.\footnote{On Japan’s “dual identity” (nijyū aidentitii), see Soeya, Nihon no “midoru pawaa” gaikō, 16-18.}

By 1952, with the outbreak of the Korean War and signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, compromise solutions were reached in Japan: accommodation of the U.S. and its regional strategy in exchange for security guarantee and economic development. Japanese state-strengthening would be achieved through integration into the American security architecture and more broadly the “free world,” which in turn enhanced their external standing as American allies against communism and as members of the international community. A stable U.S.-led order in Asia was established and accepted in Japan based on this domestic integration consensus, which was held together by American leadership in the region and also its support for the ruling regimes.

American military presence in, and political commitment to, the region was more than a security guarantee; it legitimated and sustained new or weak regimes and their state-strengthening strategy in postwar Japan and Korea. In other words, both Japanese and Korean versions of the integration consensus had an international and domestic element in signaling the regime’s credibility. The first function of the integration consensus was to serve as a deterrence mechanism against Soviet and North Korean threat. Second, it skewed the domestic balance of power heavily in favor of pro-U.S., anti-communist regimes that were not necessarily the most popularly-supported. American support made the initially uncertain and incoherent integration proposal acceptable and legitimate, which had the effect of enhancing the domestic credibility of the regime while neutralizing certain agendas of potential political competitors.
Japan was politically divided in the period between 1945 and 1960, and the domestic balance of power was still in flux. Defeat in war, symbolized by the U.S. occupation, fueled isolationist and anti-militarist sentiments in Japan. Ordinary people expressed disgust at the formerly respected militarists.\textsuperscript{277} At the opposite extreme, conservatives sought to restore Japan’s prewar power and status as a Great Power through remilitarization, but they were in the minority. Armed neutrality based on pacifist ideals was a powerful alternative promoted by intellectuals. Until mid-1947, the proposal to make Japan a permanently neutral country according to international law gained wide popularity.

When the outbreak of the Korean War heightened the perceived threat from communism in Japan and allowed Japanese nationalists to openly advocate rearmament in order to pave the way for Japan to become an autonomous power, Washington feared that this would provoke and strengthen support for neutralism in Japan and turned to Yoshida Shigeru as the most dependent and pro-American partner.\textsuperscript{278} In a policy of “reverse course,” U.S. occupation authorities shifted their priority from democratizing Japan to securing an anti-communist regime. Yoshida “regarded cooperation with the West as central to Japan’s reemergence as a power in a hostile, bipolar world.”\textsuperscript{279} He believed that Japan’s foreign policy autonomy in East Asia could be best achieved by basing itself on the U.S.-led international system.\textsuperscript{280} Alliance with the U.S. would allow Japan to avoid heavy arms buildup and make it less threatening to its neighbors.\textsuperscript{281} As heirs of the Small Japanism of the interwar

\textsuperscript{277} John W. Dower, \textit{Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II} (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).
\textsuperscript{280} Soeya, \textit{Nihon no “midoru pawaa” gaikō}, 56-62.
period, Yoshida and other liberal internationalists, such as Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Miyazawa Kiichi, believed that “economic success and technological autonomy were the prerequisites of national security, and that an alliance with the world’s ascendant power was the best means to buy time until the former could be achieved.”

The “Yoshida Doctrine” of accepting American leadership, however, was widely criticized for being a “humiliating delegation of national security” to a foreign country. Even as Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and entered into alliance relations with the United States, with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, there was no consensus on defense and security issues. A 1952 study sponsored by the State Department noted that irrational or not, “neutralism had its advocates, who would argue that this might best protect Japan’s sovereign independence and reflected ‘a marked sensitivity’ feeding on nineteenth-century opposition to extraterritoriality and the trappings of Western imperialism.” Conservatives in general accepted security ties with the U.S. but some, especially Yoshida’s conservative nationalist rivals, like Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke, were discontent with the unilateral character of the 1951 agreement, which they considered “unbecoming for a sovereign nation” and eager to negotiate a treaty revision.

The Socialists’ “unarmed neutralism” based on the 1947 constitution and anti-Yoshida conservatives’ calls for constitutional revision to allow remilitarization were both expressions of nationalism, opposing “subordination under the U.S.”

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284 Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*.
The pacifists and revisionists were united in demanding “independent diplomacy” (jishu gaikō). Mass demonstrations against the Security Treaty and American military bases continued throughout the 1950s, culminating in the treaty revision crisis of 1959-1960. The majority in the Diet endorsed the security pact, but they remained silent from public debates as appearing to “befriend the U.S. was a liability when Japan was popularly regarded as subservient to American Cold War strategies and beholden to Washington for economic favors.”

Despite such overwhelming pro-independence sentiments, and caught between the opposing agendas of the Left and the Right, Yoshida created a compromise solution that united the conservatives under the banner of economic reconstruction. Yoshida also won over the Left with his pragmatist positions: “The more that Hatoyama, Kishi, Shigemitsu, and their colleagues demanded an autonomous military (jieigun) and an ‘autonomous defense’ (jishu bōei), the closer the pacifists were drawn to Yoshida’s moderation.”

Yoshida himself avoided all public mention of the word defense (bōei) until January 1951. Only with prodding from the U.S. did Japan take steps to rearm. As aptly characterized by Richard Samuels, Yoshida split the political opposition “by inventing a position for which there was no ‘natural’ constituency.”

Yoshida succeeded in mainstreaming and institutionalizing his middle power internationalism by negotiating only a limited rearmament with the United States. In

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289 Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 39.
291 Samuels, Securing Japan, 35.
292 Buckley, U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 50-51.
293 Samuels, Machiavelli’s Children, 223.
1954, he achieved the establishment of the Japan Defense Agency (Bōeichō) and the Self Defense Forces, which was much less than the full-scale rearmament that the U.S. had originally demanded. But having achieved gradual, de facto rearmament under Article 9, Yoshida had defeated the revisionists, whose calls for the revision of the constitution subsided by the end of the Yoshida government. But the limited, and compromised, nature of Yoshida’s integration strategy created frustration for both the Left and the Right, and created the background for their eventual collision during the Security Treaty Revision Crisis of 1960.

**Kishi and the Revision of the Security Treaty: Challenge to “Middle Power” Integrationism**

The security treaty that had been signed between Japan and the U.S., as part of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in September 1951, was symbolic of Japan’s military and economic weakness and dependence on the United States. It was generally regarded as a violation of Japanese sovereignty due to its “unequal” clauses. For instance, Article I allowed the U.S. to station troops in Japan without any formal commitment to defend Japan and to assist in quelling “internal disturbances,” a clause aimed at the Communists. Article II prohibited Japan from granting the use of its bases to any third power without U.S. consent.294

Pressures for revising the security treaty with the U.S. began to mount in the mid- to late-1950s, based on the widespread public support for neutralism.295 At the elite level, a group of revisionists were also eager to revisit the issue of Japan’s “subordinate position” under the security treaty in an effort to increase their foreign policy autonomy. In a departure from the “Yoshida Doctrine,” successive prime

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ministers such as Hatoyama Ichirō (1954-56) and Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-57) began pursuing a more independent path in their foreign policy, with Hatoyama rebuilding diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and Ishibashi promising to restore relations with mainland China.

In 1957, Kishi Nobusuke, who had been the head of the Diet Association for Establishment of an Autonomous Constitution that had been set up in 1955, became prime minister.296 Like his predecessors before him, Kishi also attempted to take Japan in a more autonomous route than the limited integration strategy that the Yoshida doctrine had practiced. Before his election, Kishi had pledged to increase trade with Communist China, cultivate ties with other Asian countries, and seek to revise the security treaty with the U.S. His goal was to redefine a more equal and independent status for Japan in its relations with the U.S. and thus prioritized the issue of the security treaty revision. In his words:

“I believed that it was necessary to seek a new Japan-U.S. relationship. After the reign of Yoshida, who was criticized for being ‘servile’ (tsuizui) to the United States, efforts were made to normalize relations with the Soviet Union by Hatoyama and to resume ties with China by Ishibashi. Both Japan-Soviet relations and Japan-China relations were new challenges that had been left untouched by the Yoshida government.”297

The treaty revision process began in September 1958, with the joint statement by Foreign Minister Fujiyama and Secretary of State Dulles. For the next fifteen months, revision of the treaty was opposed by a wide array of groups, including the various members of the Socialist Party of Japan, the Sohyo labor federation, the Japan Communist Party, the Zengakuren student association, as well as various factions of

But on January 19, 1960, a new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States was signed, replacing the agreement negotiated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and John Foster Dulles in 1951.

Kishi promoted the new treaty as assuring Japan’s position as a full and equal partner of the U.S.: “I thought it necessary, for the realization of equal relations between Japan and the United States (Nichibei taitō no jitsugen), to revise the security treaty so that its contents would be more equitable.”299 Most importantly, it included a “prior consultation” clause and obligated the U.S. to defend Japan. To symbolize this “new era” in Japan-U.S. relations, President Eisenhower was scheduled to visit Japan after the formal ratification of the treaty.300 The revised treaty was presented to the Diet on February 5, 1960, and special ad hoc committees were set up in both Houses for deliberation.301 On April 26, 1960, the last day the LDP could hope to push the treaty through the Lower House for it to be automatically ratified by the Upper House when the regular sessions of the Diet ended a month later, members of the Sōhyō as well as students launched demonstrations near the Diet, marking the “greatest mass movement” in the history of Japanese politics.302 The treaty revision bill was eventually passed on May 20, 1960, despite a sit-down by the Socialist Diet members, and went into effect on June 19, with 330,000 protesters gathered in front of the Diet.303 As a result of such political turmoil, Eisenhower’s planned trip to Tokyo was

301 Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 194-195.
303 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 138.
cancelled and Kishi was forced to resign for his underhanded tactics throughout the process.  

Multiple understandings of “independence”

Even though Kishi’s stated goal of finding greater independence in Japanese foreign policy was itself shared by many segments of Japanese society, Kishi’s attempt to redefine relations with the U.S. led to a widespread domestic contestation on how to define “independence.” For Kishi, independence was conceived as above all “equal relations,” in which Japan could pursue its own foreign policy goals as a fully-integrated member of the international system (of Great Powers). This was a marked departure from the Yoshida doctrine of keeping the U.S. and the alliance at arms length in order to focus on economic development. It was, in Soeya’s words, battle between the two images of the Japanese state: as a pacifist Middle Power (*heiwakokka Nihon*) and a traditional Great Power (*dentōteki taikoku*).  

Against Kishi’s promotion of equal status and full integration was the Leftist interpretation of independence as greater insulation from the U.S. and its alliance system. While Kishi emphasized *jiritsu* (self-reliance) and *jishusei* (independence), akin to Hatoyama’s *jishu dokuritsu* (self-reliant independence) and Ishibashi’s *dokuritsu jishu* (independent self-reliance), “true independence” for proponents of neutralism meant termination of the Security Treaty and complete independence from

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the United States. For the Communists in particular, Japan was a semi-dependent country (hanjūzokukoku) on the U.S. and could not be independent. Discussions of independence/self-reliance (jishujiritsu) in postwar Japan have also reflected the economic or societal nationalism of certain periods. Because alliance relations with the United States was already intensely contested during that period, Kishi’s attempt to define a larger international role (kokusaiteki yakuwari) for Japan tended to be interpreted as part of the established attack by the socialists on the conservatives’ foreign policy as “subservient to the United States.” Ironically, Kishi’s attempt to reduce Japan’s foreign policy reliance on the U.S. backfired as it was perceived to be even more pro-U.S. than Yoshida’s limited integration strategy.

A key factor in this debate was that the new treaty was seen to violate Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and to increase the likelihood of Japan’s involvement in an American war in Asia. The 1960 treaty revision crisis then was the result of popular opposition to the further strengthening of the Japanese-American military alliance, which would pave the way for constitutional revision, a greater degree of integration with U.S. global strategy, and eventual dispatch of the SDF overseas. Importantly, remilitarization was opposed not just by the Left but also the majority of conservative LDP members, who did not favor tightening the military alliance with the U.S.

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308 Packard, Protest in Tokyo, 93.
310 Scalapino and Masumi, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, 131.
312 Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse, 140-141.
Stabilization of the Integration Consensus in Postwar Japan

The outcome of the treaty revision crisis was to marginalize the revisionists and strengthen the mandate of the “mainstream conservatives” (hoshu honryū). In the aftermath of the Security Treaty revision crisis of 1960, Japanese leaders sought to sidestep complicated security debates. After 1960, security arrangements with the U.S. were no longer the subject of ideological confrontation, bringing to a close the era of high-intensity political conflict over the alliance. Edwin Reischauer in the aftermath of the crisis commented that most of the opposition, with the exception of extremists, “have accepted, with irritation but also with resignation, this fait accompli, as they call it; the Japanese public as a whole has recoiled in distaste and fear from the violence that accompanied the anti-treaty demonstrations.”

The Yoshida Doctrine, and acceptance of the U.S. security umbrella, became further institutionalized into Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato’s “low posture” (tei shisei) politics, which was exemplified in his ten-year “income-doubling program” and “low profile” foreign policy. The new conservative legitimacy-seeking strategy attempted to incorporate aspects of nationalist rhetoric, not in cultural particularist terms, as the old conservatives had done or wanted to do, but in a renewed assertion congenial to economic success. The conservatives succeeded in articulating a state-initiated corporate nationalism bringing together notions of personal interest and family-centered values, which proved to be durable for much of the post-1960

While there were some anxious expectations of another crisis during the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1970 it did not materialize and the treaty was automatically extended.

In the 1970s, the integration consensus broadened its domestic political constituency by appeasing pro-independence forces among the Left and the Right by improving relations with the People’s Republic of China. Past divisiveness on views of the alliance with the U.S. found common ground in the new “independent” China policy, which had been discouraged by the U.S. until the 1960s and was now made possible following Sino-U.S. détente. Although Japan had been shocked by the sudden détente between the U.S. and China in 1971, the rapprochement “made it possible for Japan to seek an autonomous foreign policy. Freed from the restrictions, Japan under Tanaka Kakuei normalized diplomatic relations with China without delay.”

Japan’s China policy had always been symbolic of long-desired independence from the U.S. for the LDP, especially the revisionists. In the 1950s, for instance, Hatoyama Ichiro had opposed Yoshida with his strong appeal for a truly self-reliant independent state (shin no jishu dokuritsu). To that end, he attempted to pursue diplomatic normalization with the Soviet Union in preparation for the March 1955 election and also planned to foster ties with the PRC. Ishibashi Tanzan also continued Hatoyama’s steps toward “independence.” It was expected that he would defy the U.S. and restore relations with China based on his expertise in trade and economics, before his untimely death. In 1960, Prime Minister Ikeda announced his diplomacy of

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“friendly relations” (zenrin gaiko) and secretly proposed ambassadorial talks to China and the Soviet Union, similar to the Chinese-United States Warsaw talks.\(^{321}\)

For the Japanese Left as well, policy on China represented a resurgent nationalism directed against U.S. hegemony over Japan. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP), whose arguments were couched in Marxist language, appealed to Japanese nationalism, attacking the government’s subservience to American policies over China. As observed by Sadako Ogata in the mid-1960s: “Underlying all pro-China arguments, from the left wing Socialists to traditional conservatives, is the desire to become more independent of the United States…. China trade is frequently called *jishu boeki*, or independent trade, and pro-China diplomacy is referred to as *jishu gaiko*, or independent diplomacy.”\(^{322}\) In this sense, Japan’s China policy in the 1950s and 1960s was a metaphor for Japan’s desire for autonomy from the U.S.

After the 1970s, intra-LDP competition dominated Japanese security politics. Moreover, pro-autonomy agendas are no longer a source of domestic divisions, but rather characterize the role that Japan plays as a “systemic supporter” of the United States.\(^{323}\) “Autonomous” foreign policy agendas such as Ikeda’s China trade, Satō’s normalization with China and the reversion of Okinawa, Tanaka’s normalization with China, and Fukuda’s Southeast Asia-focused foreign policy were all carried out in the context of complementing alliance relations with the U.S.\(^{324}\) Even Nakasone’s position on “autonomous defense (jishu-bōei)” was based on a strong alliance with the United States.

\(^{321}\) Lee and Sato, *U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea*, 32.
While arguments on autonomy versus alliance persist in the 1990s and 2000s, less contested is the need for increasing Japan’s “international contribution” not only in economic but also in security affairs. According to Fukushima, there is an increase in the usage of the phrase “UN-centered diplomacy” within the Diet’s general policy speeches by Japanese prime ministers since the end of the Cold War.\footnote{Akiko Fukushima, *Japanese Foreign Policy: the Emerging Logic of Multilateralism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 84.} The use of the phrase “international contribution” has also become increasingly popular among politicians and diplomats. Koizumi, who was expected to pursue more independent diplomatic initiative, took advantage of American requests for cooperation during the War on Terror and the War in Iraq to expand on Japan’s “international contribution,” without incurring the cost of a seeming pro-U.S. stance as Kishi did in 1960. His successor, Abe Shinzo also continued to emphasize the need for a greater international role: “it is time for Japan to become a normal country, which means adopting a homegrown constitution, promoting patriotism in schools, and accepting a greater role in international security.”\footnote{Richard Katz and Peter Ennis, “How Able is Abe?” *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2007): 80-81.} While the military alliance with the United States was deeply contested in the 1950s and the early 1960s as an impediment to a more autonomous Japan, in the changed context of today, views on the alliance are now less polarized and relations with the U.S. are now seen as largely complementary to the goal of enhancing Japan’s international standing.

**Conclusion**

For most of the postwar period, the ruling regimes in Japan and Korea have tied their security and legitimacy to successful integration into the U.S.-led regional and international order. The United States has played a key role in holding together the domestic integration consensus in Japan, which has remained relatively stable.
throughout the postwar period, as noted in Chapter One. The strength of this consensus, however, varied according to perceived changes in U.S. foreign policy, which created political opportunity structures for anti-mainstream, pro-autonomy initiatives, such as Kishi’s attempt at gaining “equal status” for Japan. Through such episodes of domestic contestation, the meanings attached to autonomy have been recalibrated, all the while reproducing and perpetuating the debate on what type of status Japan should pursue vis-à-vis the dominant power of the United States.
CHAPTER FIVE:

Anti-Sadae and “Autonomous Defense” in Postwar South Korea

Introduction

Since the experience of the late 19th century, subordination under China and the eventual loss of sovereignty to Japan, the historical lesson of sadae (deferring to Great Powers), warning against the perils of Great Power politics surrounding Korea, has been ingrained in the popular imagination of Koreans. In modern Korea, as Derek Mitchell notes, there is “a keen sense of grievance over a history of perceived victimization as a pawn in the strategic machinations of great powers—alternatively China, Japan, Russia (Soviet Union), and the United States.”327 The concept and practice of sadae was first politicized—and stigmatized—in the late 19th century when the newly created Reform/Enlightenment Party made their criticism of the existing policy of “revering Great Powers” (sadae) the centerpiece of their attack against the conservative establishment.328 As a result, what used to be a generally respectful view of Chinese civilization and influence was replaced by anti-China sentiments, especially at the popular level. In the postwar period, sadae has taken on a much more convoluted meaning while seeing a much more widespread usage. It is often used as a

328 Until the end of the 19th century, sadae referred to the policy, not attitudes. In fact, what is currently called the sadae mentality may have been true in Korean attitudes toward the “Great Civilization” of Ming China but this did not apply to the Qing. In contrast to sadae toward the Ming, serving the powerful but “barbarian” Manchus (Qing China) was viewed with distaste, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Manchu invasions of Chosŏn Korea in the early 17th century. Since the 19th century, sadae and sadaejuŭi have been symbolic of Korea’s past obsequiousness and lack of autonomy. Both words have negative undertones in Korean usage today, often translated as toadyism, subservience, or Great Power worship. It is telling that while the term sadae had been used historically, sadaejuŭi (roughly, sadae-ism or the mentality of deferring to Great Powers) is a relatively recent addition to the Korean lexicon. On this last point, see Yi, Minjok kwa yŏksa, 185.
metaphor for “foreign-loving” (or, valuing the foreign over indigenous, to be exact) in various contexts—political, economic, cultural, commercial, and even sports.

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Debates on State-Building and South Korea’s Integration into the American Order

On September 8, 1945, Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule by the Allied Powers and a makeshift U.S. military occupation of Korea began under the command of General John R. Hodge. American occupiers were welcomed, at least initially, in Korea as they were viewed as liberators who had ended colonial rule under Japan and would help Koreans rebuild their state. But one of the first moves made by the U.S. Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was to not recognize the provisional government of the Korea People’s Republic (KPR) led by nationalist leader Kim Ku, which was established in exile during the colonial period. The occupation authorities also shunned and purged many popularly-supported, left-leaning nationalist leaders.

In the immediate post-liberation period, however, ideological divisions among Korean leaders were not so clearly identifiable. The common theme of political debate among all Korean parties was on regaining sovereignty and the right to self-rule. In fact, many leaders in northern Korea could not distinguish Communism from nationalism, having adopted communism for its anti-imperialist doctrine in order to bolster their national liberation movement. Much of the public support for Korean communist leaders was based not so much on their Marxist-Leninist conservative

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331 Writing immediately after liberation, Kim Ku argued that: “The first task of our nation is to build a completely independent country that is neither restrained by or dependent on other countries.” See Kwang-sik Kim, “8·15 chik hu chôngchhi chidoja tül ŭi nosŏn pikyo” [The Political Ideologies of Korean Leaders in the Immediate Aftermath of the 1945 Liberation], in Haebang chônhusa ŭi insik [Views on the History of Korean Politics Before and After Liberation], volume 2, ed. Man-kil Kang et al (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1985), 50.
332 The Soviets had to strengthen their political training program for Korean members of the people’s committee, such as Kim Il Sung and Kim Tu-bong, on subjects such as organization work, public leadership, and current affairs. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, volume 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 407-408.
ideology but rather the fact that they had led resistance movements against Japanese imperialism. 333 Both Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee on the Right derived their political legitimacy from their stature as independence movement leaders. 334 But Rhee, more than others, lacked an independent political base as he had spent most of his years in exile in the United States, and allied with the conservative Korea Democratic Party (KDP). KDP members were mostly wealthy landlords, whose close relationship with the occupation authorities as well as their policy of seeking outside aid and tutelage for nation-building invited accusations of *sadae sasang* (ideology of deferring to Great Powers) from nationalist leaders. 335 For instance, Yŏ Un-hyŏng argued in December 1945 that:

“Our project [of state building] must now deal with foreign powers. The qualifications of our 30 million people will be shown to them. That we are in the situation of having to accommodate two honored guests does present a predicament. But we must always eschew the humiliation and weakness that is our *sadae sasang* (ideology of deferring to Great Powers), which has plagued our history for 500 years.” 336

The nationalist versus *sadae* cleavage, however, was replaced by reified ideological divisions with the announcement of Korea’s trusteeship proposal at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference held in Moscow in December 1945. 337 The long admired word, nationalist, appeared less often on the headlines of newspapers and newly created words such as pro-trusteeship and anti-trusteeship decorated the front

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333 The Korean “Left” subsequently split into the Communist Party, led by Pak Hŏn-yŏng, and Yŏ Un-hyŏng’s [Lyu Woon-hyung’s] socialist nationalists.
337 The Moscow Conference determined that postwar Korea would be given independence “in due course” but in the meantime would be governed under a five-year trusteeship jointly supervised by the U.S., Britain, China, and the Soviet Union.
The trusteeship issue polarized an already-divided country. Priorities on national reconstruction varied, based on alternative state-strengthening nationalisms: immediate sovereign independence on the one hand and gradual rebuilding through international support on the other. Korean nationalist leaders were also split on whether they should cooperate with American occupation authorities and whether to accept trusteeship under the U.S. and Soviet Union. By 1946, Korean nationalists were divided into two camps: pro- and anti-trusteeship. The Korean Right, including Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee, unanimously opposed the trusteeship plan. The Left was more moderate and cautious in its opposition, and on January 2, 1946, shifted their position toward expressing support for the Moscow agreement.

In general, Koreans viewed trusteeship as a continuation of dependence on outside powers, replacing the position previously occupied by Japan with the United States and Soviet Union. Rhee took opportunity of the support built through the anti-sadae, anti-trusteeship campaign to discredit the trusteeship-supporting Left as anti-nationalist. He further differentiated himself from the anti-foreign influence (pan woese), self-reliance-promoting nationalism of Kim Ku and began to mobilize an anti-communist cause to seek American support. After the failures of the 1946 U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission and the Left-Right Coalition Committee (Chwa-u hapjak wiwonhoe), American officials decide to hold UN-supervised separate elections.

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338 Kim, The Division of Korea, 166.
339 According to a U.S. Army report, more than 70 political parties formed in South Korea between August 15, 1945 and September 4, 1945, when American troops arrived in Seoul. See Kim, The Division of Korea, 121.
342 This coalition of moderates, led by Kim Kyu-sik and Yŏ Un-hyon, was created in October 1947 but soon became incapacitated with the assassination of Yŏ. On the formation and activities of the Coalition
which was boycotted by both Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, in southern Korea. Rhee was elected the Chairman of the First National Assembly in South Korea and became the inaugural President of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.

The Korean War and signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States in October 1953 integrate Korean security into the U.S.’s strategy in Asia. Instead of building a domestic consensus, however, Rhee, already having alienated most nationalist leaders, proceeded to manipulate anti-communist and anti-Japanese sentiments to eliminate his political rivals. After Rhee was ousted through the April 1960 student movement, intellectual and political debate resumed on the question of national priorities for reform and reconstruction. The dominant sentiment was that of achieving political and economic chuchesŏng (autonomy or self-identity) and charip (self-reliance). The largely ineffective Chang Myŏn government however was unable to push ahead with reforms.

It was with Park Chung Hee’s military coup in 1961 that a domestic integration consensus, based on state-strengthening economic development, took shape in Korea. Park’s lack of legitimacy was compensated by the support of the U.S. through alliance relations and his ambitious and determined plans for “national reconstruction” in order to achieve “first-rate nation” status. After securing Washington’s tacit approval by


343 Their opposition was based on the fear of perpetuation of the country’s division.
345 For instance, during the 1952 presidential election, Rhee arrested several assemblymen from the opposition DNP, accusing them of communist activities, and declared a state of emergency. He announced that the former Prime Minister John Chang, whom he had forced to resign just a month earlier, was a communist conspirator involved in plans to assassinate the president. Leading up to the July 1960 election, Rhee executed Cho Pong-am, the leader of the Progressive Party, who had obtained more than 30 percent of the total vote during the 1956 presidential campaign, based on a platform of peaceful unification with North Korea. See Cheong, The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea, 121-132; Han, The Failure of Democracy: Kim, Korea’s Development under Park, 41-47.
346 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park Chung Hee, 48-49.
promising to hold elections in the near future, Park began appealing to anti-sadae nationalism in order to mobilize the nation for economic development. During his 1963 election campaign, Park bemoaned Korea’s dependence on U.S. aid and characterized the opposition as “pre-modern, feudalistic and flunkeyist” in the face of foreign powers. He proposed economic development as “a new uniquely Korean way” to overcome sadaejuŭi (flunkeyism; mindset of deferring to Great Powers), defined as national dependence on the U.S. militarily and economically.

Park portrayed the alliance with the U.S. as a means to enhance Korea’s international status. One of Park’s common arguments for Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War was that “the deployment enhances the nation’s international standing.” In October 1966, after returning from a visit to South Vietnam, Park proudly proclaimed: “We have become an international leader in the new age, a truly sovereign country that has left behind its history of submission and disgrace.” Park also appealed to the public by arguing that a dispatch of troops to Vietnam would highlight Korea’s international role and status and “repay our debt” (poŭn ŭl wihan pabyŏng) to international society from the Korean War, which resonated with Korea’s Confucian culture.

U.S. “Abandonment” and Park’s Legitimacy Crisis

As argued above, allying with the United States was a crucial ingredient in legitimating the ruling regime and forging the integration consensus in postwar Japan.

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347 Kennedy’s invitation of Park to the White House in 1961 acted as a seal of approval and rendered some degree of legitimacy to Park. See Han, “South Korea and the Vietnam War,” 250.
349 Han, “South Korea and the Vietnam War,” 260.
350 Kyu-dŏk Hong, “Pak Chŏng-hi ŭi Betŭnam chamjŏn kyŏljŏng kwa Hanmi tongmaeng kwankye ŭi poŭn-hwa [Park Chung Hee’s Decision to Dispatch Troops to Vietnam and the Transformation of the Korea-U.S. Alliance Relations],” in Pak Chŏng-hee sidae yŏngu ŭi chaengchŏm kwa kwache [Issues and Challenges in the Study of the Park Chung Hee Era], ed. Sŏng-hwa Chŏng (Seoul: Sŏn-in, 2005), 308-309.
and Korea. Political mobilizations of sovereign-nationalism occur in response to key shifts in U.S. foreign policy or major changes in alliance relations. A decrease in perceived U.S. leadership (such as Nixon’s withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea) or a change in its policy that affects the alliance (such as détente with China) signals not only reduced commitment to Japanese and Korean security but also hurts the regime’s domestic political legitimacy. Such situations may force the regime to recalibrate the postwar integration consensus in order to defend or restore its credibility.

Park’s crisis of legitimacy began with increasing signs of “abandonment” from Washington in the late 1960s. Abandonment was perceived in two dimensions: the withdrawal of U.S. troops (and commitment) from Korea and disagreement on North Korea policy (in particular, on how to deal with the latest provocations). The Park regime’s concerns about U.S. commitment peaked in 1968. The lack of response shown by Washington to the North Korean commando raid on the South Korean president’s residential quarters, and holding secret talks directly with North Korea, instead of consulting with its South Korean ally, during North Korea’s seizure of the USS Pueblo undermined South Korean confidence in the U.S. Park’s frustration also came from the lack of autonomy in dealing with North Korea. After the events of January 1968, Johnson sent Cyrus B. Vance as personal representative to Seoul on February 12, 1968 to reassure Park and to advise Park not to take unilateral retaliatory action against the North.

Doubts about the level of U.S. commitment in Korea and fears of abandonment led the South Korean government to concentrate its efforts on securing stronger

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351 As Cha shows in his study of alliance cooperation and conflict in East Asia, domestic interpretations of shifts in U.S. policy (such as abandonment) played a key role in the threat perceptions of Japan and Korea. Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

support from the U.S. in venues such as the U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers’ conference and the Defense Ministers’ conference in May-July 1969. The South Korean government went as far as to publicly suggest that the U.S. use Cheju Island for the U.S. bases being displaced from Okinawa.353 But in early July 1970, the U.S. government officially notified the SK government that the number of U.S. troops would be reduced by a division—approximately 20,000 troops. It had been assumed by President Park that he had secured ‘special relations’ with the United States after sending troops to the Vietnam War. The decision’s timing “was particularly disturbing to Park because he expected to face a tough reelection campaign in 1971 and because the People’s Republic of China and North Korea reaffirmed their ‘militant solidarity.’”354

For Park Chung Hee, the “Nixon shock” confirmed the trend of decreasing U.S. commitment to Asia and to Korea. According to the testimony given at the House Committee on International Relations, William J. Porter, former ambassador to Seoul, Nixon’s announcement “had given President Park and his associates ‘one hell of a jolt’ because they were not consulted at a time when 50,000 South Korean troops were fighting ‘China-supported’ guerillas in Vietnam.”355

The South Korean government tried various persuasion tactics to overturn the troop reduction plan. Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon threatened to resign with his entire cabinet, claiming “if GI’s go, I go.” He stated in an interview with the New York Times on July 14, 1970 that: “We are not against the Nixon Doctrine in principle, but

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355 Cited in Lee and Sato, U.S. Policy Toward Japan and Korea, 65.
if North Korean Kim Il Sung miscalculates, the South Korean people will wonder if America will abandon its security treaty or come to our defense.” Kim Dong Jo, the Korean ambassador to Washington, implied that a “quick withdrawal of U.S. forces might require reappraisal of ROK troops in Vietnam.” In the annual U.S.-ROK defense ministers’ meeting (which had been agreed to in 1968), South Korean Defense Minister Jung Nae Hyuk insisted that promise of a five-year military modernization program did not constitute sufficient compensation for the withdrawal of a U.S. division, especially since there was no guarantee of funding from the U.S. Congress to implement the aid program.\(^{356}\)

By 1972, South Korea’s security situation was deemed dire, in the context of North Korean provocations, North Korea’s increasing legitimacy alongside China’s rising stature, the “betrayal” of Taiwan by the U.S. and Japan, the abandonment of Vietnam, and Nixon’s troop withdrawal plans. “The fact that neither the Nixon Doctrine nor the opening to Peking was preceded by adequate diplomatic consultation (or even advance notice) with the Korean ally only encouraged Seoul to interpret the new U.S. Asian policy in terms of worst-case assumptions.”\(^{357}\)

In addition to heightened threat perceptions, abandonment by the U.S. reduced the viability and desirability of Park’s strategy of promoting anti-communism and rapid economic growth at all costs, in particular the stifling of democracy. Korea’s status as a staunch “anti-communist ally” was also negated by the Sino-U.S. rapprochement. Such blows to the legitimacy of the Park regime created an opening for domestic opposition, led by pro-democracy activists. The challenge to Park’s political legitimacy materialized in his narrow margin of victory over—or, near-loss to—Kim Dae Jung’s New Democratic Party in the May 1971 election.


In an attempt to protect his rule, Park began to refer to an alternative source of regime legitimacy, shifting the focus of his mandate from an anti-communist partnership with the U.S. to self-reliance in defense and foreign policy. He introduced radical institutional and policy changes, such as the authoritarian Yushin constitution, development of an indigenous defense system, the launching of a five-year military modernization plan, and plans to acquire an independent nuclear deterrent capability.  

State-Strengthening through Self-Reliance and the “Autonomous Defense” Initiative

The self-reliance mobilization by Park was a way of addressing “abandonment” from Washington after the announcement of Nixon’s retrenchment policy and policy discord on North Korea. Based on the belief that Korea could no longer confidently rely on the U.S. for security or political support, both crucial elements for the credibility of his regime, Park turned to an alternative source of legitimation, one that could reduce his political dependence on the United States. The shift to self-reliance entailed both behavioral and rhetorical changes in Korea’s strategy of state-strengthening.

Going-it-alone on North Korea?

Emphasizing the necessity of political and social reforms to effectively and independently counter the increased security competition from North Korea, Park declared a national state of emergency on December 6, 1971, citing “drastic changes

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taking place in the international scene, including the recent admission to the United Nations of Communist China and the implications of the frantic war preparations being carried out by the Communist regime in North Korea."\(^{359}\) In order to create a self-reliant, self-helping “security state” with the independent capability to deter North Korea, Park forcefully implemented the so-called Siwol Yushin (October Revitalization) system in 1972.

The primary objective of autonomous defense (*chaju kukbang*) was to deter North Korea and to pursue *myŏl kong tong il* (destroy communists and unify Korea), a stated goal of the South Korean government since the end of the Korean War.\(^{360}\) On March 15, 1974, Park approved a secret defense modernization project called the Yulgok Operation (*Yulgok saŏp*) and issued a Presidential Guidance order directing the Ministry of National Defense to procure advanced military weapons and equipment. He set up a National Defense Fund (*pangwi sŏng-gŭm*), which raised a total of 16 billion won (approximately $32 million) between 1974 and 1975. In July 1975, three months after the fall of Vietnam, the Korean government introduced a compulsory National Defense Tax (*pangwi-se*) as a new revenue base for the Yulgok Operation. By 1980, the government had collected a total of 2,600 billion won (approximately US$5 billion).\(^{361}\)

The core of the Yulgok Operation was military modernization but it also involved a clandestine nuclear weapons development program. Given the increasing likelihood that Carter would remove the U.S. nuclear umbrella from the Korean

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\(^{359}\) Cite in Baek, *The United States and Korea*, 134.


peninsula, Park initiated a comprehensive nuclear capability program, including heavy water fuel rod processing and guided missile development. In an interview with the Washington Post in June 1975, Park declared: “Although Korea has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, we do not develop them presently.” But he added, in both private and public meetings with American officials, that “if the U.S. nuclear umbrella is to be removed, Korea will have to develop nuclear weapons.”

When his pursuit of nuclear weapons was blocked by Washington, Park sped up other aspects of his plan for defense self-reliance—for instance, the development of missiles—in preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. troops emphasized by President Carter. The Agency for Defense Development (ADD) adjusted its original target date of late 1980 for the development of surface-to-surface missiles to October 1978 and successfully test-launched the K-1 missile (Baekgom, 180km) on September 26, 1978. Park further encouraged the ADD to develop ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 km as well as satellite-launching rocket capability.

Park took further action to deter North Korea, including attempts to secure greater commitment from Washington, even resorting to non-diplomatic channels of persuasion. Park was also proactive in seeking cooperation from Great Powers other

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363 Washington became concerned about nuclear proliferation in Asia after India’s nuclear test in 1974 and monitored Park closely. According to Don Oberdorfer, various U.S. officials, including U.S. Ambassador to Korea Richard Sneider, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib, and the newly appointed Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, heavily pressured the South Korean government not to acquire nuclear weapons. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997), 68-74.
366 On Park Tong-Sun’s lobbying efforts to buy influence in the U.S. Congress, which culminated in the Koreagate scandal, see, for example, Kwang-Il Baek, The United States and Korea. For Park’s attempts to secure closer alignment with the U.S., see also Gills, Korea versus Korea, 157.
than the U.S. In response to the announcement of Nixon’s trip to Beijing on July 15, 1971, the South Korean government announced its intention to open diplomatic relations with non-hostile communist countries, including the Soviet Union and the PRC, should they cease to support North Korea’s aggressive stance. This was based on the idea that “it was essential to maintain normal and amicable relations with the big powers for South Korea’s survival and for peace in East Asia,” as outlined by Hahm Pyung Choon, national security advisor for President Park.\textsuperscript{367} South Korean leaders drew parallels to Korea’s victimization in the middle of Great Power politics in 1894-1905, when China, Russia, and Japan were competing for influence on the Korean peninsula, with U.S. policy toward Korea being dictated by relations with these countries, rather than Korea.\textsuperscript{368}

In this sense, Park’s “autonomous defense” achievements were designed to act as leverage in attempts at persuading the U.S. to maintain its military presence in Korea. For example, an independent deterrent capability could make American officials fear the possibility of unilateral action by Seoul against Pyongyang. It is also argued that South Korea’s nuclear weapons program was intended to be a bargaining chip against future U.S. troop pullouts.\textsuperscript{369}

Security self-reliance was also part of a wider societal mobilization campaign for the Park regime. Park engaged the entire nation in his state-strengthening mobilization campaign and personally oversaw the creation of the Homeland Reserve Force and the increasing of export targets. On February 7, 1968, Park announced his plan for a 2.5 million strong civilian force called the Homeland Reserve Forces

\textsuperscript{367} Pyung Choon Hahm, “Korea and the Emerging Asian Power Balance,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 1, 2 (January 1972), 247.


\textsuperscript{369} Kim, “Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles”; Nam, \textit{America’s Commitment to South Korea}, 103.
(Hyangto Yebigun), a “flawless self-reliant defense force that would be especially trained and equipped to combat Communist guerrillas from the North.” By 1970, the government introduced weekly military drills and lectures for all male high school and university students throughout the country in order to propagate its policy of anti-communist vigilance. The motif of self-reliance propagated even further with the launching of the New Village Movement (Saemaül Undong) in 1971, which initially began as a top-down rural development program but broadened into a community mobilization campaign with the aim of consolidating Park’s transition to authoritarian rule after 1972. Highlighting a “New Village spirit” (saemaül chŏngsin), defined as the spirit of self-reliance and independence (chaju), Park began to rank and fund rural villages in accordance with their adherence to the standards of the New Village spirit—that is self-reliance (chaju) and self-sufficiency (charip).371

The changing meaning of sadae

The change toward a new, self-reliant state-strengthening frame was also reflected in Park’s language. His earlier calls in the early- to mid-1960s for “national reconstruction” and “modernization,” which contained the theme of catching up to (and becoming a member of) the West, were replaced by the new dominant theme of self-reliance (charip) and independence from Great Power interference not only for “autonomous defense” but all aspects of society, as evidenced in the New Village Movement and the creation of a Homeland Reserve Force, among others. Park argued: “We have to secure our own independent self-defense strength adequate to crush any

370 Kim, Korea’s Development under Park, 111-112.
371 Rural areas received government funds for rural investment commensurate with their village rank: self-sufficient villages (charip maŭl), self-helping villages (chajo maŭl), and basic villages (kicho maŭl). See Kim, Korea’s Development under Park, 134-137.
North Korean aggression without the help of other nations. This is what I call the spirit of self-help, self-dependence, and self-reliance."

But there were also more subtle changes—for instance, in the meanings attached to the concept of anti-sadae. In the 1960s, Park had sparsely channeled anti-sadae sentiments toward the goal of economic reconstruction (puguk kangpyŏng). During this period, anti-sadae sentiments did not have a specific target. Sadae simply referred to the inability of past Korean leaders to reform and modernize “until it was too late”:

“China was the first country and Japan the second with which we opened relations in the Far East. But while these countries were replacing bow, arrow and lance with modern weapons, thanks to Western civilization, our people, isolated in this Peninsula, persisted in top-knots and leisurely idled on the warm ondol-floors until it was too late. We were a hermit nation.”

The mobilization of anti-sadae sentiments was a general appeal to nationalism and “national awakening” in order to reduce reliance on foreign aid and make progress in economic and social reconstruction:

“At first King Taejo adopted sadae diplomacy for political reasons but it was subverted into adoration of China, through the imported Chinese Confucian philosophy, in the minds of our intellectuals. This blind admiration for anything Chinese affected the roots of all social systems and daily life, making the Yi Dynasty a limited culture…Hence a habit of servile imitation was formed.”

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372 Speech delivered on January 1, 1970, printed in Major Speeches by President Park Chung Hee, 83.
374 Park, Our Nation’s Path: Ideology of Social Reconstruction, 71-72.
However, beginning in the early 1970s, Park began to make direct links between self-reliance and anti-\textit{sadae}, which was redefined as the desire to avoid victimization by, or interference from, Great Power politics:

\begin{quote}
\textquote{We must take [the lesson] to our hearts and minds that international society from now on will not spare either sympathy or support to any nation which does not have a strong spirit of \textit{chaju} (independence) and \textit{charip} (economic self-reliance)...And we must also renew our determination and will to maintain the spirit of self-reliant national defense by uniting the government and the people.}\textsuperscript{375}
\end{quote}

During this period of “crisis,” Park and other officials evoked the image of a weak Korea dominated by the Great Powers at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. Park’s Yushin system was justified on the grounds that “the interests of the third or smaller countries might be sacrificed for the relaxation of tension between big powers.”\textsuperscript{376} In the aftermath of the Nixon shock, Hahm Pyung Choon, national security advisor for President Park, commented that “it was essential to maintain normal and amicable relations with the big powers for South Korea’s survival and for peace in East Asia.” South Korean leaders drew parallels to Korea’s victimization in the middle of Great Power politics in 1894-1905, when China, Russia, and Japan were competing for influence on the Korean peninsula, with U.S. policy toward Korea being dictated by relations with these countries, rather than Korea.\textsuperscript{377}

\textsuperscript{375} Presidential Secretariat, \textit{Park Chung Hee Taet'ongnyŏng yŏnsŏl munjip} [President Park Chung Hee’s Speeches], vol. 8 (1971), 102.
\textsuperscript{376} Oberdorfer, \textit{The Two Koreas}, 37.
Conclusion

Even though the new self-reliant, anti-sadae mobilization had occurred in the aftermath of perceived abandonment from the U.S., it is important to note that anti-sadae sentiments were never equated directly with anti-American sentiments during Park’s rule. In Korea, public criticism of relations with the U.S. did not come to the fore until after democratization in the latter half of the 1980s. Open criticism of the U.S. or Americans was forbidden, and anti-American protestors faced imprisonment or worse because the National Security Law equated anti-alliance with pro-Communism and therefore treason.378

Even though it is difficult to discern the degree of political opposition during this period of authoritarian rule, Park’s self-reliance campaign found strong support among the general populace. Park was able to re-legitimate himself through an alternative strategy of state-strengthening, without experiencing a full-blown legitimacy battle, as Kishi had undergone in Japan during the Security Treaty revision crisis. While political costs probably would have been greater for Park had Korea been a democracy—in the form of challenge from the opposition, pointing out the “failure” of Park’s state-strengthening model, the lack of democracy as well as American and international criticism of authoritarianism, and presenting an alternative “advanced nation” model—Park’s pro-U.S. stance was less of an issue. In contrast to what would happen three decades later, under President Roh Moo Hyun, Korean liberals did not coalesce around the goal of greater foreign policy autonomy or define self-reliance in terms of alliance relations with the United States. Rather than directly criticize the U.S., the opposition believed that alliance with the U.S. would aid their pro-democracy cause and forced a degree of restraint on the Korean military regime.

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378 Lee, Big Brother, Little Brother, 9.
CHAPTER SIX:
Costs of Sovereign-Nationalist Mobilization:
Comparing Korean and Japanese Participation in the Iraq War

Introduction

This chapter explores the policy consequences of sovereign-nationalist mobilizations by comparing outcomes in Korea and Japan during the debates on dispatching troops to Iraq. I ask why, given the same unpopular policy choice, President Roh Moo Hyun of South Korea experienced high political costs in terms of both domestic political support and relations with the United States, while Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro largely avoided the politicization of alliance relations.

I argue that alliance relations were intensely contested in Korea but not in Japan because Roh’s political legitimacy was based on a political frame of “change,” in which he sought to redefine Korea’s status in its relations with the U.S., whereas in Japan the issue was framed not as a major shift in Japanese foreign policy, but rather a continuation of the widely supported mission to increase Japan’s “international contribution” (kokusai kōken). In Korea, as part of Roh’s anti-sadae mobilization, the troops dispatch issue became linked specifically and solely to South Korea’s search for autonomy (from the U.S.) on its North Korea policy, a topic already highly contested in domestic politics. In Japan, the Bush administration’s request for aid was met with relatively little debate or controversy, since issue was linked diffusely to a wide array of agendas such as redemption for the painful criticism of “checkbook diplomacy” during the first Gulf War, the expected quid pro quo assistance from the U.S. on the question of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea, and the LDP’s push for a greater role for the Self Defense Forces (SDF).
Allies in Arms: Japanese and Korean Responses to the American War in Iraq

The initial responses by the Japanese and Korean governments in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq were similarly swift and supportive—at least on the surface. Japan was among the first countries to express support for the U.S.-led war in Iraq.\(^{379}\) On March 20, 2003, almost immediately after Bush’s announcement, Koizumi called a press conference to publicly declare support for the Iraq War. Japan was also one of the first and most generous donors for postwar Iraqi reconstruction. As early as April 2003, Japan announced a series of small humanitarian aid packages. Overall, Japan pledged a total of more than $5 billion to help in postwar reconstruction activities over the next four years, making Japan the largest foreign contributor to the American effort in Iraq. Koizumi also signaled his willingness to consider the waiving of a good portion of Iraq’s $4.2 billion debt to Japan.\(^{380}\)

Not stopping at rhetorical and financial support, however, Prime Minister Koizumi swiftly pushed through a Diet resolution authorizing the government to dispatch its SDF to Iraq for postwar reconstruction assistance in July 2003. The Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Special Measures Law (Iraqu jindo fukko shien tokubetsu sochi ho), enacted the same month, authorized the SDF to carry more significant weapons than had been the case in previous peacekeeping operations, although it did stipulate that troops could not use their weapons unless attacked. Although Koizumi had hoped to send the SDF by the end of the calendar year, in late August he was forced to delay the proposed troops dispatch due to the


deterioration of the security situation in Iraq and continued negative public opinion in Japan.

Conditions for sending the SDF to Iraq took a turn for the worse when in November, a contingent of Italian troops in Nasariya, a city adjacent to the proposed Japanese deployment site of Samawah, came under attack. In addition, explicit warnings were made by Al-Qaeda that Japan too would be a target of retaliation if it sent troops to Iraq. Japanese public opinion plunged further when two Japanese diplomats, Oku Katsuhiko and Inoue Masamori, were killed in Iraq on November 29 on their way to a reconstruction conference in Tikrit.\textsuperscript{381} Polls by the \textit{Asahi Shimbun} showed that between July and December 2003, the proportion of Japanese favoring the SDF dispatch decreased from 46\% to 34\%, while opposition to the Iraq deployment increased from 43\% to 55\%.\textsuperscript{382} In fact, the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP)’s success in the November 2003 election was partially attributed to its opposition to the SDF dispatch plan.\textsuperscript{383}

Yet, Koizumi defied expectations and continued to press for a quick deployment of SDF units to Iraq. In late November, he forcefully reiterated his commitment to sending troops, and in early December the government released detailed guidelines for the eventual deployment of 1,000 SDF personnel. Japan would send 550 Ground Self-Defense Force soldiers, who were authorized to carry sidearms, machine guns, and anti-tank rocket launchers. They were to be augmented by 300 sailors and five or six ships from the Maritime Self-Defense Force, plus 150 members

\textsuperscript{383} Heginbotham and Samuels argue that the plan was opposed not just by the opposition parties but also by the old guard in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). See Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 81, 5 (September/October 2002).
of the Air Self-Defense Force, along with four military transport planes. The SDF sent a small advance team in late December, with another scheduled for late January 2004.\textsuperscript{384} In November 2004, Koizumi pressed for an extension of the troops’ one-year mission, despite public recalcitrance.\textsuperscript{385}

Indeed, in sharp contrast to its behavior in 1990-91, Japan was among the U.S.’s most faithful allies in 2003-2004.\textsuperscript{386} Nor was there much domestic political turmoil, despite the negative public opinion, in Japan surrounding the SDF dispatch to Iraq. The Iraq War is widely touted as constituting a turning point in the U.S.-Japan alliance, given Koizumi’s unprecedented support for the U.S. during this period. Tokyo’s declaration of support was issued without a new UN resolution to supplement Resolution 1441 specifically approving military action.\textsuperscript{387} In past cases of the use of force against Iraq, the Japanese government had declared “firm support” for the U.S. based on UN Resolution 678, which approved military action by the Multi-National Force in the 1991 Gulf War and also in the December 1998 aerial strikes on Iraq. In contrast, when the U.S. and other countries launched strikes against Iraq in January 1993 and September 1996, Japan had supported the U.S. under the condition that the military action be “limited” and a “necessary measure to maintain the performance of the U.N. resolution.”\textsuperscript{388}

\textsuperscript{384} Uriu, “Japan in 2003,” 180.
\textsuperscript{385} An Asahi Shimbun poll showed that 63% of the public opposed the extension of the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. “Koizumi says SDF must make global effort,” Japan Times, November 8, 2004.
\textsuperscript{387} The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1441, adopted on November 8, 2002, did not constitute outright permission for military action against Iraq, although the U.S. insisted that it did. The Japanese government had formerly been of the opinion that passage of a new supplemental resolution would be a precondition for Japan’s support of the use of force in Iraq. See Chijiwa Yasuaki, “Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations on the Eve of the Iraq War: Dilemmas over ‘Showing the Flag,’” Asian Survey 45, 6 (November/December 2005), 852.
\textsuperscript{388} Yasuaki, “Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations,” 844.
In similar fashion to Japan’s lightning response, South Korean President Roh quickly announced in March 2003 that the Korean government would lend personnel support for the U.S. mission in Iraq. In May 2003, 660 noncombat troops, consisting of the medical and construction units Seohee and Jema, left for Iraq. Even though some public criticism was directed against the Korean government for its hasty actions, the first round of Korea’s troops dispatch to Iraq went relatively smoothly.

Table 6-1. Japan’s response to the 9/11 terror attacks and the war in Iraq

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill passed and enacted by the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>Dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Forces to the Indian Ocean for rear-area logistical support for U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 2003</td>
<td>PM Koizumi’s press conference to declare support for Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-July 2003</td>
<td>Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq Special Measures bill passed and enacted by the Diet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2003-January 2004</td>
<td>Dispatch of Self-Defense Forces to Samawah, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 9, 2004</td>
<td>Extension of dispatch period until December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 8, 2005</td>
<td>Extension of dispatch period until December 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 20, 2006</td>
<td>Koizumi decides to withdraw the SDF from Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Initial dispatch of Korean (noncombat) troops to Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 4, 2003</td>
<td>The United States government requests that the Korean government send additional troops to Iraq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 23, 2003</td>
<td>Cabinet and presidential approval for Iraq troops dispatch bill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 13, 2004</td>
<td>Iraq troops dispatch bill passes through the National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September-December 2004</td>
<td>Dispatch of Zaitun unit to Iraq (total 3,566 troops)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 2004</td>
<td>The National Assembly approves the extension of Iraq troops dispatch until December 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2005</td>
<td>Replacement and reduction to 3,278 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 30, 2005</td>
<td>The National Assembly approves the extension of Iraq troops dispatch until December 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-December 2005</td>
<td>Replacement and reduction to 2,278 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 22, 2006</td>
<td>The National Assembly approves reduction and extension of Iraq troops dispatch until December 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 30, 2007</td>
<td>The president proposes the reduction and extension of troops in Iraq until December 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The real trouble started to brew when Washington requested that Korea send additional troops—this time combat troops—to Iraq. In the end, after more than three months of deliberation, the Roh government decided to send additional troops, but it took another two months to obtain approval from the National Assembly, deeply
dividing public opinion in the process. More damaging was the way in which the “compromised” troops dispatch proposal antagonized both the Korean public and American policymakers.

The controversial and protracted debate in Korea surrounding the dispatch of additional troops began in early September 2003 with the visit to Korea by Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Richard Lawless, who made the official request for additional troops to Ban Ki Moon, then National Security Advisor to the president. The following month, on October 18, two days before his meeting with President Bush at the APEC meeting in Bangkok, Roh called an emergency meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) and made the decision to send additional troops to Iraq. The government was immediately faced with massive protests and heavy criticism from not only the general public, but also the most fervent supporters of President Roh.

Neither did Roh’s troops dispatch proposal please the U.S. The two sides disagreed on the type of units that Korea would send to Iraq as well as the timing of their deployment. The U.S. reportedly requested about 5,000 troops that could independently oversee the security of the region where Korean troops would be deployed, with the ideal time of their dispatch around February-March 2004. The Korean government, however, wanted to send about 3,500 troops consisting of reconstruction and medical units and not before April 2004. The bill on the augmentation of troops to Iraq did not pass through the National Assembly until

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February 2004, and about 3,500 troops named the Zaitun Unit were sent to Iraq in September, nearly a year after they were requested by Washington. The Korean troops’ stay has been extended three times since their initial deployment, even through the number of troops has gradually shrunk.392

On the surface, the dispatch of troops to Iraq by Tokyo and Seoul at the request of their ally despite public reluctance appears to be the result of similar power and national interest considerations. The decision-making processes in both countries were undoubtedly heavily influenced by alliance considerations. But the Japanese and Korean troops dispatch processes, involving negotiations with the United States as well as decisions that catered to the expectations and reservations of the their respective publics, did not involve the core elements of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea alliances—in terms of the rationale behind the alliances or their functions.

Going beyond the formation and maintenance of military alliances, alternative theories of alliance politics have turned to the non-security functions of alliances to explain cooperation or conflict among states.393 Recent studies of alliance politics have also examined factors that lead to alliance durability, such as regime type394,

392 In February 2007, the total number of troops stood at 3,078, with 3,061 in the Zaitun Unit and 17 under the multinational forces command. By September, the number of troops in the Zaitun Unit dwindled to 1,089. See the Korean Ministry of National Defense website at http://www.mnd.go.kr/policyFocus/koreanSoldier/overseas/index.jsp (accessed February 19, 2007 and September 18, 2007). On October 30, the government announced its proposal to extend the stay of Korean troops, reduced by another 600, in Iraq for one more year but faces steep opposition from the newly-formed United New Democratic Party and the Democratic Labor Party. See Yong-Hyun Ahn, “Zaitun Unit to Reduce 600 Troops by Year’s End,” Chosun Ilbo, October 31, 2007.


“asset specificity,”\textsuperscript{395} and institutionalized national identities.\textsuperscript{396} In the same vein, I attempt to show how alliance relations are influenced not only by external threats and state-to-state relations but also the ways in which issues pertaining to the alliance get filtered through domestic politics. By doing so, my analysis sheds light on the very different domestic political contexts in which the troops dispatch decision was framed and executed underlying the divergent outcomes in Japan and Korea that existing accounts miss.

In the next section, I describe and critique alternative explanations for Japanese and Korean responses to the Iraq War. I then present my own argument, which attributes the different political processes surrounding the troops dispatch decision in Japan and Korea during the 2003-2004 period to varying political frames, and how specifically (or diffusely) the issue was linked to existing political agendas.

\textbf{Why Japan and Korea Sent Troops to Iraq with Varying Results: Alternative Explanations}

Existing arguments fall short in offering comparative insight into the Japanese and Korean responses to the Iraq War in that they cast incomplete or misleading pictures of the complex processes involved in the dispatch of troops. Those who focus on U.S. power preponderance and the asymmetrical nature of both alliances would argue that irrespective of domestic politics, the end result is that both Tokyo and Seoul complied with the wishes of their more powerful ally. On the other hand, others may choose to highlight the overall strengthening of U.S.-Japan security cooperation versus the worsening of U.S.-Korean relations during the Iraq War to account for any

\textsuperscript{395} Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability.” For its application to the U.S.-Korea alliance, see Suh, \textit{Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances}.

\textsuperscript{396} In his book, J. J. Suh forcefully shows how power, interests, and identities worked in tandem at various stages to produce “alliance persistence,” which he defines as the maintenance of alliances beyond their original purpose.
divergence between the two countries. Yet, as we will see below, each of these explanations does not aptly capture the empirical facts on the ground.

**Pressure from the U.S.**

The divergent levels of domestic contestation on the troops dispatch decision by the government in Japan and Korea may be explained by the different degrees of pressures from the U.S. felt in each country. The weight of American influence was felt by most Koreans, but *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) was virtually nonexistent in Japan—at least in the visible public sphere.\(^{397}\) When the Korean government expressed difficulty in meeting American demands for an autonomous security enforcement unit comprising about 5,000 troops, American officials are said to have retaliated with a harsher stance in negotiations on the returning of the Yongsan Base land and the timing of relocating U.S. forces in Korea.\(^{398}\) On May 17, 2004, perhaps not coincidentally during President Roh’s impeachment process, President Bush’s Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley announced that the U.S. would relocate some of the American troops stationed in Korea to Iraq.\(^{399}\) Such “negative reverberation”\(^{400}\) only reinforced the already existing views of differing interests between the two allies.

Such heavy-handedness was not noticeable in American dealings with the Japanese, however. In contrast to their stance in 1990-91, U.S. officials relied

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\(^{397}\) On the role of *gaiatsu* (foreign pressure) in Japanese policy making, see for instance, Schoppa, “Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes.”


\(^{399}\) As a result 3,600 U.S. troops from the 2\(^{nd}\) Division were relocated to Iraq in August. See Shin Dong-a, August 2004; Joong-ang Ilbo, August 3, 2004; Lee, “Allying with the United States,” 88-89.

\(^{400}\) According to the metaphor of “two-level games” the idea is that chief negotiators can mobilize and/or change domestic preferences in each other’s countries through strategic “meddling”: “In some instances, perhaps even unintentionally, international pressures ‘reverberate’ within domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance and thus influencing the international negotiations.” Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” *International Organization* 42, 3 (Summer 1988), 454.
primarily on broad expectations to influence Tokyo’s policy, refusing to articulate a specific guideline for Japan’s wartime support either in public forums or private consultations. Instead, Washington couched its expectations in vague concepts like international responsibility. Senior U.S. officials rarely conveyed verbal requests to their Japanese counterparts and instead asked the Japanese government to explore what kind of support it could offer during an Iraq conflict. The lack of guidance prompted multiple visits to Washington by high- and mid-level Japanese officials to clarify the Bush Administration’s position. Washington directly requested SDF dispatch in June 2003 only after the Japanese government had decided to commit troops.

Reports of Lawless’s request in October 2002 for the same amount of logistical support from the SDF as was provided in Afghanistan, if Japan were to join the “coalition of the willing” in the military offensive against Iraq, and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith’s request to Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda that Japan extend the Anti-Terrorism Law and continue to dispatch the SDF to the Indian Ocean seem to be the only instances where specific demands were made. In general, however, American pressure on Japanese policy has been much weaker in the post-9/11 period than in the 1980s and early 1990s.

But it is unclear whether the causal mechanism predicted by realist theory—namely that U.S. pressure forced compliance from its allies—is the most important determinant of Japanese and Korean strategic behavior. For instance, Korea early on sent noncombat troops to Iraq even without American demands. Moreover, outside

404 One possible explanation could be that while American fiscal and economic woes made “burden sharing” a high priority in Washington in the earlier period, there has been no overt congressional pressure on Japan in recent years.
pressure has not always guaranteed Japanese action. American demands for “boots on the ground” directed at Tokyo were unable to overcome the domestic barriers toward security-related policy change, as was made painfully clear during the 1990-1991 Gulf War.

Shared threat perceptions

A second way in which Japan and Korea could have differed was through their different threat perceptions vis-à-vis global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, which were similarly high in the U.S. and Japan but comparatively low in Korea. While Japan is characterized by a heightened threat perception since the late 1990s, there has been a sharp decline in the level of external threat perceived in Korea. The North Korean missile launch in 1998, its admission of abducting Japanese citizens in the past, and the current nuclear crisis have all built up to increased fear in Japan. On the other hand, in South Korea, perceptions of North Korea as an enemy have weakened and instead the rhetoric of fraternal affinity and feelings of inter-Korean nationalism has been on the rise. This is a marked departure from the past security environment, in which South Korea had long placed the highest priority on the U.S.-ROK alliance because of the crucial role played by the Americans in containing the North Korean threat.

But an examination of domestic debates reveal that sending troops was not necessary directly related to perceived terrorist attacks but rather to secure American cooperation in other (more) important issues, such as North Korea.

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407 Chan Yul Yoo, “Anti-American, Pro-Chinese Sentiment in South Korea,” *East Asia* 22, 1 (Spring 2005), 19.
Korean decision makers were in agreement on the important role played by the U.S. in regional security. Recognition of this fact was a key factor in their decision to send troops to Iraq. Against the backdrop of the second North Korean nuclear crisis which broke out in October 2002, both Japan and Korea “needed” the U.S. in finding a solution to the more immediate security problem right in their background. In other words, it was in the national interest of both countries to “placate” the U.S. so that they might find common ground on the North Korean problem and secure Washington’s support in progressing on the six-party talks and other diplomatic initiatives.

In short, Japan and Korea were obligated to send troops to Iraq in the pursuit of their broader national interest. The question then is why the “national interest” argument invoked to justify the sending of military personnel abroad resonated better in Japan than in Korea. What accounts for Japan’s sudden “active foreign policy” in the name of security and stability? Why was a similar justification not enough in Korea, where what constituted the national interest itself was debated?

Leadership preferences and domestic constraints

A third alternative account of compliance in alliance politics, particularly in the case of Japanese and Korean military participation in the American-led war in Iraq, would look at the political interests and preferences of leaders. Personal diplomacy was a major factor in the different fortunes of each American ally; U.S.-Korean relations have suffered since the 2002 election of President Roh Moo Hyun in Korea, while the U.S.-Japan relationship had never been closer under Koizumi’s reign (2001-2006). Much has been made of the mutual trust between Bush and Koizumi,408

leading to what Michael Green describes as “a fundamental convergence on universal norms between Washington and Tokyo that did not exist a decade ago.”\textsuperscript{409} This is often contrasted with the lack of rapport between Bush and Roh and the discord between the two governments. Whereas Japanese government officials tried to downplay suggestions of any rift in its relations with the U.S., Roh was not afraid to publicly refute on multiple occasions negative comments on North Korea made by “hawks” within the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{410}

In addition to close personal ties positively affecting his preference toward supporting the American war in Iraq, Koizumi faced lower political costs in the domestic sphere compared to Roh in South Korea. Rising anti-American sentiments raised the cost to the South Korean president for appearing subordinate to the U.S. and acquiescing to its demands.\textsuperscript{411} This was particularly true in the case of Roh, given his track record of pursuing a more “independent” foreign policy. President Roh’s Uri Party represents a shift to the left in the political spectrum, and many of the Uri Party members are more nationalistic, accommodating toward North Korea, and more skeptical about U.S. policies toward North and South Korea.\textsuperscript{412}

\textsuperscript{409} Michael J. Green, “U.S.-Japan Relations after Koizumi: Convergence or Cooling?” \textit{The Washington Quarterly} 29, 4 (Autumn 2006), 107.

\textsuperscript{410} “Roh Moo Hyun e ge Miguk un mueot inga? [What is the United States to Roh Moo Hyun?],” \textit{Hankyoreh} 21, no. 495 (May 22, 2003).


“quiet” period of 2003-06 questions the generalizability of the anti-Americanism and “unraveling of the U.S.-Korean alliance” argument. Furthermore, despite everything, Roh did decide to dispatch troops to Iraq even at great political cost to himself.

But costs and benefits are not fixed or exogenously given. For example, leaders can adjust some of the costs through creative agenda setting and social interaction with the public. In fact, both Prime Minister Koizumi and President Roh attempted to minimize their political costs through indirect strategies of persuasion—making the troops dispatch more palatable by linking it to other related and more “legitimate” issues. The success of the linkage strategy, in turn, was influenced by the way in which the troops dispatch issue was framed and contested in domestic political debates. In what follows, I show the processes by which the Iraq troops dispatch issue was deliberated and diffused in each country, with varied consequences for political leaders and their calibration of policy options.

**Specific versus Diffuse Linkage Strategies**

In the bargaining literature, issue linkage serves to facilitate bargaining in international negotiations or in multilateral regimes.\(^1\) In addition to such short-term quid pro quo political exchanges, issue linkage strategies—involving economic aid, for instance—can also be utilized for broader political influence in an unrelated domain, based on expectations of future payoff.\(^2\) Not all linkage leads to politically


\(^2\) In his examination of economic influence strategies, Randall Newnham argues that states have had more success when they provide general and indirect economic aid, with the aim of building trust toward long-term improvement over contentious bilateral issues, rather than linking aid to specific political agendas. See Randall E. Newnham, “How to Win Friends and Influence People: Japanese
desirable outcomes, however, as shown in the Korean government’s dealing with the troops dispatch issue vis-à-vis its domestic public and the U.S. While the decision making process in both Japan and Korea concerning the Iraq War had in the background, either implicitly or explicitly, relations with the U.S., different political strategies were at work to deal with the issue at hand. The Korean government used a strategy of specific linkage, in which the troops dispatch issue was introduced specifically and solely as a remedy for American hostility toward South Korea’s policy on North Korea. In Japan, however, sending the SDF to Iraq was linked diffusely to a wide range of security interests such as redemption for the painful criticism of “checkbook diplomacy” during the first Gulf War, the expected quid pro quo assistance from the U.S. on the question of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea, and the LDP’s push for a greater role for the SDF.

The type of linkage created between the troops dispatch issue and other domestic political issues in Japan and Korea led to the negotiated outcome between each country and the U.S. as well as its political viability in the domestic political sphere through the mechanism of the political framing of the troops dispatch issue. The political framing of the government proposal to aid the United States in the Iraq War, based on how much change Koizumi and Roh had sought in their conception of state status, contributed to the direct (specific) or indirect (diffuse) way in which alliance politics was linked to domestic politics. The direct implication of the United States in Korean security in general and the Roh government’s policy toward North Korea in specific raised the salience and political stakes of bilateral negotiations on the

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possibility of sending Korean combat troops to Iraq. In other words, the type of issue linkage created by the degree of leader involvement in domestic legitimacy politics affected the intensity—and therefore, the associated costs and benefits perceived by the leadership and general public alike—of the issue at hand.416

Especially in these high-intensity politicization contexts, the political maneuverability of leaders is reduced due to their commitment to past legitimacy-generating rhetoric. Such rhetorical entrapment occurs when actors (leaders or states) are constrained from maximizing their interests due to the exposure of—and backlash against—inconsistencies between earlier commitments and current policies. The key to how leaders and states become rhetorically entrapped is the cost of inconsistency.

In earlier works that introduced rhetorical entrapment as a concept, “shaming” and social sanctioning have been the dominant mode of suffering for states that have failed to uphold prior promises. For instance, in the diffusion of human rights norms, rhetorical entrapment characterizes states in the intermediate stage of the process of socialization, where initially they learn to “talk the talk” for political expediency but eventually become normatively and behaviorally committed to the human rights ideas themselves.417 In another example, the European Union, it is argued, was morally bullied into expanding its membership to Eastern European states, who took advantage of the inclusive liberal democratic norms espoused by the EU.418 On the other hand, a


recent study of rhetorical entrapment as a coercive strategy used by social movements against the semiauthoritarian regime in Russia argues that the costs involved can be political, rather than psychological. Leaders and regimes respond to rhetorical coercion not to reduce psychological damage or to resolve moral predicaments but to minimize political losses.

But the above accounts raise an important question: in what kinds of cases are we likely to see the rhetorical entrapment of leaders or regimes? After all, leaders and regimes do not expect to pay for every instance of political inconsistency. Under what conditions are “shaming” or “rhetorical coercion” effective tools of achieving policy change? The answer lies in the fact that rhetorical entrapment is ultimately about legitimacy—the “distance between what the actor is, or claims to be, and what the actor does.” Existing studies assume but do not further explore this prior condition of rhetorical entrapment: strong and salient rhetorical commitment to a political issue or normative agenda that defines the legitimacy of the leader or regime. In other words, entrapment does not occur with just any political rhetoric. Certain types of official rhetoric become a source of entrapment because they are important building blocks of the leader’s or regime’s legitimacy that have found a widely mobilized political constituency. Rhetorical entrapment then occurs in cases where leaders are sensitive to domestic audience costs—in high-stakes issues such as international crises and also, I would argue, cases where political and legitimacy competition are involved, as was the case with President Roh.

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Specific Issue Linkage and High-Intensity Politicization in Korea

In 2003-2004, during the time of the Iraq War, it was generally feared in South Korea that further deterioration in U.S.-Korean relations might lead to the speeding up of the process of withdrawing U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula and further U.S. recalcitrance on the North Korea issue.\(^{421}\) In justifying his decision to send troops to Iraq, President Roh claimed that his choice was a “strategic decision in order to resolve peacefully our number one national security agenda that is the North Korea crisis.”\(^{422}\) The Korean government’s policy of “all in” on North Korea is well illustrated through the events of June 21, 2004, when it received reports of the kidnapping of Kim Sŏn-il, a Korean citizen who had been in Iraq. At that time, Korean officials were working with their American counterparts for a breakthrough in the North Korea problem at the Beijing six-party talks scheduled for June 23. In order to persuade a stalling Washington, the Korean government almost immediately announced that it would not change its decision to send troops to Iraq in response to the kidnapping incident. The White House agreed to the new draft agreement on North Korea only on the evening of June 21 following that announcement.\(^{423}\) The one-on-one linkage of the North Korea issue to the Iraq troops dispatch decision was widely portrayed in the South Korean media as well. Numerous feature articles and columns outlined what Korea stood to “benefit” by sending troops in terms of U.S. “concessions” on the North Korea issue.\(^{424}\)

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\(^{421}\) “Geuraedo pabyung inga? [Still sending troops?]” Hankyoreh 21, no. 476 (September 25, 2003).

\(^{422}\) Dong-a Ilbo, September 12, 2006.

\(^{423}\) “Kim Seon-il pirap bodo jikhu jeongbu ga ‘pabyung ipjang bulbyun’ gangjo han kkadak [Why the government retained its ‘no change in our troops dispatch decision’ stance in the aftermath of the Kim Seon-il kidnapping reports],” Shin Dong-a, August 2004.

\(^{424}\) See, for example, “Geu hu 2 nyun birok Bukhaek 2 cha wigi (9): Bukhaek, Iraq pabyung gwa yeongye tongbo e Powell gyuk’ang [Two Years after the Second North Korea Nuclear Crisis (9): Powell Angry over the Korean Linkage between North Korea and the Iraq Troops Dispatch],” Joong-ang Ilbo, November 18, 2004; Dong-a Ilbo, September 12, 2006.
In Korea, the U.S. request for additional troops to Iraq was thrown directly into the already highly contested domestic political debate on the role of the U.S. in Korean security. The linkage between the decision to dispatch troops and the issue of North Korea policy did not help matters as North Korea was already an ideologically divisive issue in domestic politics. Steinberg and Shin have noted that key policy initiatives by recent governments have resulted in the polarization of domestic politics in South Korea, with each side staking out an ideological position.425

The staple of domestic political debate has been the Kim Dae Jung/Roh Moo Hyun “sunshine policy” with the role of the U.S. in Korean security at issue. Bilateral tensions between Washington and Seoul, as well as anti-American sentiments, began to build up with President Bush’s dismissal of Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy” in March 2001, followed by the “axis of evil” State of the Union address in January 2002.426 Such policy discord in recent years has been accompanied by the polarization of opinion on the U.S. at both elite and public levels.427 Roh has attempted to define a relationship that is less subordinate to American power, while the Grand National Party has been far more conciliatory toward the U.S. and consistently attacks the Roh government for being “soft” and naïve on security. Also at work in Korean politics has been the recalibration of what constitutes the Korean national interest and the role played by the United States. Anti- and pro-American labels are commonly thrown around as caricatures of party positions on the future of Korean security, caught between its long-time ally and a newly rising China.

What is interesting is that the dispatch of troops to Iraq in Korean political debates is often discussed in reference to Korea’s participation in the Vietnam War as

425 Steinberg and Shin, “Tensions in South Korean Political Parties in Transition.”
a U.S. ally, rather than more recent involvements like its humanitarian mission to Iraq during the first Gulf War or to Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime. The extensive involvement of South Korean troops in the Vietnam conflict was primarily carried out in consideration of its alliance relations with the United States—specifically, the fear that the U.S. would withdraw its security commitments from Asia, including Korea. The analogies between the two cases of troops dispatch serve to remind Koreans of their “junior partner” status vis-à-vis the U.S.

Throughout his presidential election campaign and during his presidency, Roh Moo Hyun has emphasized a more “independent foreign policy,” which has tended to be interpreted as nationalistic and anti-alliance. While not necessarily anti-American per se, Roh and the so-called “386 generation” perceive the U.S.-Korean alliance to be unequal and believe that the U.S.’s hegemonic behavior unilaterally imposes its own interests and is generally insensitive to Korean sovereignty. Mobilizing the Korean public with a anti-sadae (anti-Great Power) ideology, Roh has promoted a view of a Korean future free from Great Power rivalry, believing foreign influences to be the primary source of past and present predicaments. In fact, his

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432 Kim, “Pan-Korean Nationalism, Anti-Great Power-ism and U.S.-South Korean Relations.” Examples of discussions of Korean anti-sadae ideology include Yi, Minjok kwa yŏksa; Ledyard,
political legitimacy has been built on his definition of an anti-\textit{sadae} and self-reliant national identity. On August 15, 2003, a few weeks prior to the U.S. request for additional troops in Iraq, President Roh proclaimed his government’s firm resolve toward an autonomous and self-reliant defense policy.

When news of the possibility of sending additional Korean troops to Iraq leaked out in the fall of 2003, the domestic backlash was severe. To a public already mobilized on the ideas of autonomy and anti-Great Power-ism, the tiniest concession by Roh on succumbing to U.S. pressure was seen as a sellout. Roh faced opposition not only from his major supporters from various sectors of civil society but also from his own Uri party. Members from the New Millennium Democratic Party opposed his decision and formed an “Anti-War, Pro-Peace Group.”

In short, the previous rhetoric of anti-\textit{sadae} resulted in his entrapment, further narrowing his very slim margin of maneuverability between pressures from the U.S. and his own party. In the end, he was forced to side with the NSC and the “pro-autonomy” forces. Roh ignored the Ministry of National Defense and MOFAT’s calls for swift action and delayed the decision to send troops until October.\textsuperscript{433} Moreover, the number and type of troops to be sent were downsized. Such a middle-of-the-road policy, contrasting sharply with the quick compliance with the U.S.’s earlier request in March 2003, satisfied neither the Korean public nor the U.S. Predictably, the troops dispatch extension bill citing the strengthening of the Korea-U.S. alliance as one of the major reasons for sending Korean troops to Iraq failed to appeal to his constituents. After the government announced its decision to send additional troops to Iraq, some 351 “NGOs” threatened to pursue a vote-boycotting campaign targeting those

assemblymen who voted for the bill.\textsuperscript{434} The bill to send additional troops, after much public and political opposition, passed through the National Assembly only in February 2004, nearly two months after President Roh endorsed the bill.\textsuperscript{435}

**Diffuse Issue Linkage and Low-Intensity Politicization in Japan**

The political context in which the dispatch of troops to Iraq was discussed in Korea and Japan were radically different. The political meaning behind the troops dispatch issue was framed in its interaction with existing security debates, reinforced by the lingering memory of past legacies. In Japan, maintaining close relations with the U.S. was a key motivation behind the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq. In stating his support for the U.S. military action against Iraq even without a new UN resolution, Prime Minister Koizumi remarked that, “In due consideration of the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance, I will make my judgment in view of our national interest.”\textsuperscript{436}

More specifically, Japan’s contribution to reconstruction efforts in Iraq was also influenced by the role of the U.S. in resolving the North Korean issue, although the connection was not always made explicitly.\textsuperscript{437} Nonetheless, the general perception in Japan was that American cooperation was needed to make progress on the issue of kidnapped Japanese in North Korea.\textsuperscript{438}

Daniel Kliman also suggests a more nuanced link between North Korea and Koizumi’s support for Bush’s venture in Iraq: “Japanese policymakers worried that

\textsuperscript{434} Kim, “Hanguk pabyung oigyǒ,” 376.
\textsuperscript{435} Public opposition to the sending of troops to Iraq was visible throughout 2003-2004, with various opinion polls consistently showing 54\% to 58\% of respondents opposing the troops dispatch. Public disapproval continued even after the troops dispatch bill was passed in the National Assembly, peaking in the April 15 general elections and in the aftermath of the kidnapping and killing of Kim Sun-il by militants in Iraq in June. See Sung-su Joo, “Kukga jeongchaek kyuljeong e kukmin yeoron i jeohang hamyun? [When Public Opinion Resists Government Decisions?]” *Hanguk jeongchi hakhoibo* [Korean Journal of Political Science] 39, 3 (September 2005):157.
\textsuperscript{438} Uriu, “Japan in 2003,” 178.
failure to support the United States on Iraq would undermine extended deterrence” against North Korea. A glimpse into Koizumi’s strategic view—on the connection between North Korea and Iraq and on the strategic importance of the United States for Japanese security—is offered in his speech to the Diet in January 2004: “The relationship with the United States of America is the linchpin of Japan's diplomatic policy, and it is of extreme importance for Japan that the two countries cooperate to demonstrate leadership on the various issues facing the international community.”

There is no doubt that North Korea was top on the list of “various issues facing the international community” and Koizumi hoped to demonstrate the dynamism of the U.S.-Japan alliance to Pyongyang by acting in close coordination with Washington in another global crisis, the Iraq War.

In contrast to the South Korean case, the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq was portrayed as advancing multiple agendas on the Japanese security front. The Japanese government associated the troops dispatch with the accumulation of international prestige, the importance of Middle Eastern stability for the Japanese economy, and the potential benefits that could accrue from strengthened relations with the United States. Initially, with the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 20, 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi justified Japan’s postwar contribution to Iraq by invoking instability in the Middle East as a threat to Japan’s national security. Such a generic security rationale was articulated into a more detailed argument linking Middle East stability, oil security, and terrorism in the face of increasing public opposition: “A

439 Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 119-123.
441 Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 121-122.
stable democratic administration in Iraq is essential for the stability in the Middle East, and will be vitally important to Japan because the political situation in Iraq has a direct bearing on the prosperity and stability of Japan, which depends on the Middle East for nearly 90% of its oil resources.\footnote{443}{Japan Defense Agency, Overview of Japan’s Defense Policy, May 2005, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publications/overview/english.pdf (accessed February 1, 2007); see also Kliman, \textit{Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World}, 116-120.}

Japan’s aid to Iraq was also described as a global duty as “a responsible member of the international community,”\footnote{444}{“Prime Minister Koizumi's Report on Japan's Measures in Response to the Situation following the Use of Force against Iraq.”} indicating continuity, rather than change in the political framing of the issue. For instance, Koizumi showed little indication he was departing from the mainstream view of “international contribution.” Furthermore, helping to eradicate terrorism and WMD dangers through noncombat support would greatly enhance Japan’s global prestige.\footnote{445}{Kliman, \textit{Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World}, 77, 116.} Such a view was supported by arguments that acting in a timely manner during international crises was likely to increase Japan’s chances of becoming a permanent member of the UNSC.\footnote{446}{Watanabe, “A Broader Context,” 12.} Washington applauded such proactive Japanese efforts, and U.S. officials publicly emphasized Japan’s obligations as an advanced nation and alluded to the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq as the hallmark of Japan assuming a leadership role on the international stage.\footnote{447}{Kliman, \textit{Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World}, 128-129.} Highlighting the close partnership between the U.S. and Japan, American ambassador to Japan Howard Baker appealed to the Japanese public to support the U.S. war effort in Iraq: “Countries like Japan and the United States that believe in the rule of law have the responsibility to set standards of behavior and to address the challenges of dictators and tyrants who defy the will of the international community.”\footnote{448}{Howard H. Baker, Jr., “Iraq’s Choice and U.S. Resolve,” \textit{Daily Yomiuri}, March 4, 2003; cited in Yasuaki, “Insights into Japan-U.S. Relations,” 855.}
A third category of issues linked to Japan’s supporting role in the Iraq War was the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In general, Japan’s post-September 11 activism and acceptance of new roles as a U.S. alliance partner “indicate a strategic interest in elevating Japan’s profile internationally by putting the SDF forward to confront new security challenges.”\(^{449}\) Japan has also demonstrated greater equality within the alliance by expeditiously dispatching the SDF to Afghanistan and to Iraq.\(^{450}\) But since the Iraq War in particular, Koizumi has been alluding heavily to Japan’s dependence on its alliance with the United States for its security and prosperity, in light of the North Korean nuclear threat.\(^{451}\) North Korea was the intended topic of discussion when he stated that: “The United States is an irreplaceable ally of Japan and provides a vital deterrence that defends the peace and security of our nation. The United States also plays an indispensable role in securing the peace and security of the Asian region surrounding Japan.”\(^{452}\) Heightened threat from North Korea means that Japan places greater importance to a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. On December 9, 2004, Japan adopted a new National Defense Program Guidelines, in which China and North Korea were singled out as regional security concerns, signaling Tokyo’s move away from its postwar pacifism in favor of greater military cooperation with the U.S.\(^{453}\)

The main point of tension in the debate on sending the SDF to Iraq was whether or not Iraq would be defined as a “combat zone.” Those opposing Koizumi’s

\(^{452}\) “Prime Minister Koizumi’s Report on Japan’s Measures in Response to the Situation following the Use of Force against Iraq.”
decision accused him of reverting back to the militarization of Japan, using the term 
*hahei* (“deploying” troops) rather than the government-sanctioned *haken* (*dispatching* the Self-Defense Forces).\(^{454}\) Overall, however, consensus has been achieved, especially since 2001, that making “international contributions” helps gain global prestige and furthers Japan’s national interest. The domestic political environment has also been conducive to maintaining this consensus in that inter-party differences on defense issues have been less intense and subject to negotiation since the major electoral reforms in the 1990s and attendant changes in the party system. In both the antiterrorism and Iraq legislation, parties argued over differences of policy, not fundamental ideological principles.\(^{455}\)

In sum, Japan’s dispatch of the SDF to Iraq was perceived as a continuation of Japan’s activism in international affairs in the post-9/11 era. In September 2001, just eight days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Koizumi announced that Japan would provide military support to the U.S. for the war in Afghanistan and has pushed the Diet to pass two special measures laws authorizing the dispatch of SDF forces since then, the first to the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the second to Iraq for reconstruction efforts following Operation Iraqi Freedom.\(^{456}\) The Gulf War “shock,” in which Japan was criticized for its “checkbook diplomacy,” partially remedied the Japanese “allergy” against military matters and served as a catalyst for an emerging consensus that Japan has to play a greater role in

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\(^{454}\) Osamu Watanabe, “Ima naze Iraku tokuchihou nanoka [Why the Iraq Special Measures Law Now?],” *Sekai* [The World], August 2003, 49-50.

\(^{455}\) Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on Security Policies,” *Orbis* (Summer 2005), 440-441.

\(^{456}\) Other counter-terrorism activities undertaken by the Japanese government since September 11, 2001 include additional security measures, such as an increase in police guard and security checks for American military facilities, nuclear power plants, international airports and other major public facilities as well as upgraded aviation security. The Japanese government has also helped cut off global terrorist financing by freezing the financial assets of 376 individuals and entities with suspected terrorist ties (as of March 7, 2003). Hideaki Mizukoshi, “Terrorists, Terrorism, and Japan’s Counter-terrorism Policy,” *Gaiko Forum* (Summer 2003), 59-60.
Unlike Prime Minister Kaifu in 1990, Koizumi’s plan for dispatching the SDF to the Middle East did not face much domestic opposition. The only pacifist opposition came from the Japanese Socialist and Communist Parties, which between them controlled only eight percent of the Diet. Throughout September 2001, Yukio Hatoyama, the leader of the Democratic Party of Japan and Koizumi’s main opposition, expressed strong support for cooperation with the United States, although he was ultimately unable to deliver his party. Ichiro Ozawa, the head of the Liberal Party, also did not oppose deployment in principle, although he argued that deployment would require more explicit backing from the United Nations. More importantly, Koizumi and his plan received strong public support.

The lack of outright political controversy on the Iraq War is due in large part to the international “success” of the SDF dispatch to Afghanistan and the continuation of close U.S.-Japan relations. As part of the “coalition of the willing,” on November 19, 2002, the Koizumi cabinet extended the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, dispatching one transport ship and one escort vessel. Japan also sent an Aegis destroyer to the Indian Ocean, a plan that had originally been suspended because of domestic opposition. In February 2003, the Japanese government expanded its mission in the Indian Ocean by having its tankers provide fuel to naval vessels from countries other than the United States and Britain—Germany, New Zealand, France, and eventually Pakistan. With the relevant domestic debates already having taken

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457 Purrington, “Tokyo’s Policy Responses During the Gulf War,” 162.
459 Heginbotham and Samuels, “Japan’s Dual Hedge.”
461 As a result of the political standoff between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Ozawa Ichiro, the “free-floating gas station” was called home on November 1, after providing nearly $190 million worth of fuel to allied ships. The fight over the extension of the extra-constitutional anti-terrorism law also led to the resignation of Abe Shinzo, who had been prime minister for less than a year. See Blaine Harden, “Japan’s Floundering Abe Fights for Floating Gas Station,” Washington Post, September 9, 2007; Norimitsu Onishi, “Prime
place in 2001, such as overcoming the Gulf War syndrome, the grounds for the Iraq troops dispatch had already been laid.

Koizumi never had to pay the cost of hypocrisy due to his consistent strategy of promoting greater internationalism on the part of Japan. Since consolidating power during the early 2000s by combining new threats such as a rising China and the rogue regime in North Korea in an appeal to the public’s fears, security “revisionists” led by Koizumi and Shinzo Abe, Koizumi’s short-lived successor as prime minister, strove towards constitutional revision and the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Debates about sending the SDF abroad and amending the constitution were no longer taboo; public support for “proactive pacifism”—deepening participation in activities to ensure international security—increased. Greater activism in international affairs was actively embraced, especially after the Gulf War and 9/11. The revisionist leaders also reinstitutionalized Japanese security policy, turning toward a more global role. To facilitate this, the Diet enacted 15 new security-related laws between 1991 and 2003, the most important ones on the revisionists’ watch after 2001. In addition, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) became a policy agency from a procurement office, and has now been promoted to the Ministry of Defense.


On the impact of the Gulf War syndrome on Koizumi’s foreign policy, see, for example, Narushige Michishita, “Japan’s Response to 9-11,” in Coping with 9-11: Asian Perspectives on Global and Regional Order, ed. Sung-Joo Han (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2003), 46; Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 202.


Due to the aforementioned “success” of the SDF dispatch to the Middle East in 2001, Koizumi’s euphemisms of global duty and responsibility used to justify SDF deployment in Iraq were acceptable to the public. When Koizumi publicly linked Japan’s support for the U.S. in Iraq to the North Korea problem, something he had avoided before, it was received within the context of enhancing Japanese security. In contrast to the deep controversy created in Korea, the Iraq-North Korea connection proved to be an effective shield against negative public opinion in Japan. Two days after Koizumi’s press conference, the Mainichi Shimbun published the results of a poll which found that among those who favored the government’s Iraq policy, 49% gave the reason that “U.S. military power is needed to vie with the threat posed by North Korea.” Koizumi’s rhetoric of greater internationalism and the demonstration of the benefits of closely aligning with the U.S. then empowered him to appeal to the public on sending the SDF to Iraq for U.S. cooperation on North Korea.

Conclusion

The decisions by the Japanese and Korean governments to lend their military support to the U.S. war effort in Iraq were puzzling to many observers, given the domestic political constraints in each country and the lack of global support for the Iraq War in general. In Korea, the political tone set by President Roh’s election platform based on an anti-U.S., anti-Great Power ideology, coupled with rising anti-American sentiments, would have predicted non-cooperation with the U.S. in its “illegitimate” war. Yet, Roh did not abandon his decision to dispatch troops to Iraq, despite domestic opposition. In Japan, Koizumi went above and beyond what was

469 Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World, 123.
typical of previous Japanese governments’ responses to external conflicts. He passed two special measures laws to dispatch the SDF to an area of combat for the first time.

While it is undeniable that considerations of alliance management and dependence on U.S. leadership for breaking the impasse in the North Korean nuclear dilemma were key factors, domestic political constraints and framing effects help to produce divergent political outcomes. The “success” of the troops dispatch issue depended on both external factors (e.g., degree of pressure from the U.S.) and the domestic political context, in particular the framing of the issue at hand. The above analysis also suggests that the use of nationalist rhetoric to bolster legitimacy at home could lead to entrapment in other issue areas in the future, which confirms the dictum that short-term benefits are oftentimes outweighed by long-term political costs.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

Conclusion

What is the significance of Japanese and Korean sovereign-nationalisms? What value does the lens of enduring historical legacies offer compared to alternative accounts of East Asian security? The most recent debates in East Asian security address the type and degree of change we are witnessing due to the rise of China, rising nationalism or anti-American sentiments in the region, and shifting U.S. priorities, to name a few examples. This dissertation, however, has argued that throughout various international and domestic structural transformations, historically-shaped ideas on state-strengthening have endured and continue to inform security debates and leaders’ legitimation strategies in Japan and Korea. At the same time, I am not arguing that historical legacies affect political outcomes in a singular or linear fashion. It is important to distill patterns of continuity that can explain behavioral regularities as well as variation across different contexts. For example, the legacy of the traditional Sinocentric regional order in East Asia is often attributed to, and essentialized into, cultural affinities between China and its neighboring Asian countries. But as shown in previous chapters, the same patterns of hierarchical interaction continue under American, not Chinese, leadership in the postwar period. Japan and Korea have also alternated between different forms of status-seeking conceptions and behavior in different contexts. It is these political patterns maintained under the continuing structure of regional hierarchy that motivates this study.

Significance and implications of sovereign-nationalism

A key implication of my argument on sovereign-nationalism is the continuing importance of the role of the dominant power in the context of hierarchical relations.
The U.S. is more than a military alliance partner, but rather shapes—directly and indirectly—domestic identity politics as well as security decisions in Japan and Korea. Studies of Japanese and Korean relations with the United States often make references to the unequal structure of the alliance and frustrations arising from dependence on their larger and more powerful alliance partner, as manifested in the recent expressions of anti-Americanism in Korea. In reality, however, and despite perceived compromises to Japanese or Korean sovereignty, leaders in both countries have rarely adopted anti-American stances in the postwar period. This is not to say, however, that Japanese and Korean leaders are oblivious to, or represent exceptions to, the political benefits that may be reaped from voicing criticism of the U.S., as the election of “anti-American” president Roh Moo Hyun in 2002 and the continued political relevance of autonomy-promoting Ishihara Shintarō show.

What media and scholarly accounts of anti-Americanism sometimes fail to note is that there are in fact as many instances of a decidedly pro-U.S. or pro-alliance stance enhancing the political standing of leaders in Japan and Korea. For instance, even though the Japanese public hardly supported the American war in Iraq or President George W. Bush, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, rather than suffering

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political costs, increased his popularity and solidified his political position by developing close personal ties with the American president. Similarly, in South Korea, Kim Dae Jung won a close presidential election in 1997, not by running an anti-globalization, anti-“Washington consensus” campaign amidst the region-wide financial crisis and potential bankruptcy for the nation, but by emphasizing his ability to secure American confidence and support. The question then is why anti-Americanism has not been more prominent in Japan and Korea. Even more puzzling is the fact that close relations with the U.S. has often been an importance source of political legitimation for Japanese and Korean leaders.

Even anti-American mobilizations can be indirect recognition of U.S. dominance. President Roh sought to change Korea’s status in relation to the U.S., not reject American influence or leadership altogether. Even though Roh sought less dependence on the U.S. compared to his predecessors, the important and dominant role played by the U.S. in regional security (specifically in the North Korea crisis) was recognized. In this sense, anti-Americanism reflects neither American exceptionalism, a new wave of global backlash against the hegemonic influence of the U.S. as the lone superpower since the end of the Cold War, nor Korean exceptionalism, new and unprecedented demands for greater self-reliance in relations with the dominant power. Instead, what was conventionally portrayed as anti-Americanism in South Korea can be argued to be an instance of long-standing domestic legitimacy politics, in which leaders attempt to change the existing strategy of state-strengthening, based on a definition of status that emphasizes either membership-seeking or self-reliance.

While conventional accounts have examined the 1960 Security Treaty Revision crisis and the recent anti-alliance protests in Korea as isolated cases of anti-Americanism in each country, I argue that they are both examples of sovereign-nationalist mobilizations, during which leaders pursue alternative sources of political
legitimacy, one that challenges the established regime’s relations with the dominant power. Thus, it was not necessarily the case that Kishi’s “pro-U.S.” stance led to his downfall, while Roh’s “anti-U.S.” remarks were a low-cost strategy to get elected. Attempts to shift existing understandings of state-strengthening were costly for both leaders, resulting in intense domestic contestation over the undesirability of the current status in relations with the United States and the role of the U.S. and the alliance for Japanese and Korean security. In other words, it is not a pro-U.S. stance or an anti-U.S. per se that incurs high or low costs for leaders in Japan and Korea, but rather, attempts to change existing (negotiated) understandings of state-strengthening.

The alliance-strengthening paths taken by Kim Dae Jung and Koizumi Junichiro demonstrate that acceptance of American influence is not necessarily attributable to the continued rule by dominant “vested interests” in a given society. More important than the balance between pro-U.S. and anti-U.S. groups within Japan or Korea for the stability of hierarchical relations with the U.S. is the influence of shared beliefs on state-strengthening, based on their historical experience and the legacy of regional hierarchy. Domestic debates on, and changes between, the alternative status conceptions explain important shifts in Japanese and Korean security politics.

Because the framework of sovereign-nationalism examines outcomes at the level of domestic debates, it can better capture important changes as well as continuities. For instance, recent studies on Asian responses to the rise of China

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472 According to David Lake, relational authority between the dominant and subordinate powers is a self-enforcing contract, which becomes increasingly robust as vested interests form within the weaker country. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations*, 53-54.

473 A similar legacy is discernable in North Korea as well. Kim II Sung himself had noted that he developed the *juche* concept based on the self-reliance concept of Korean scholars in the early twentieth century. As Don Oberdorfer describes: In addition to justifying and sanctifying the Great Leader’s decisions and actions, *juche* was also “a declaration of political independence from his two communist sponsors….The *juche* philosophy has deep traditionalist roots and great appeal to the Korean antipathy for external domination.” Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, 19-20.
compare the different policies of each country to determine varying degrees of accommodation and balancing. The focus on short-term behavioral shifts, however, makes it difficult to assess the significance of recent changes—whether they are instances of temporary accommodation or indicate a longer-term trend of deferring to China’s historical status as the region’s dominant power. This suggests the need to identify different types and levels of change in the region’s security landscape to help determine what kinds of shifts are important for the stability of the regional order.

Changes in Japanese and Korean security strategies due to structural shifts, both external and domestic, have not been uniform, but have varied in their magnitude and intensity—ranging from small-scale policy adjustments, temporary rhetorical posturing, widespread political contestation, and regime change. Mobilizations of sovereign-nationalism are one such example of security politics in East Asia, one that has recurred historically.

The importance attached to domestic sources of Japanese and Korean interactions with Great Powers is another key feature of the framework of sovereign-nationalism. Examining recurring patterns of state-strengthening debates and strategies allows us to detect within-region similarities as well as variations. For example, similar patterns of domestic contestation are found not only in “anti-American” mobilizations in Japan and Korea in the postwar period but also in the mobilization of anti-American and anti-China sentiments in Korea in the early 2000s and late 19th century respectively.

Status-redefining domestic debates, however, also occur under different political contexts in Japan and Korea. Shifts in frame have not taken place with equal force or frequency in Japan and Korea. In Japan, the integration consensus stabilized after the crisis of 1960, partly because successive conservative regimes in the 1970s and the 1980s converged on playing the role of “systemic supporter” to the U.S. and
increasing Japan’s “international contribution” while pursuing “autonomous” policy agendas in Asia. In Korea, on the other hand, the link between alliance relations and regime legitimacy tightened even further with authoritarian leaders, such as Park and Chun, relying on U.S. support for popular legitimation. This has impacted political contestation in post-democratization Korea, since the role of the U.S. in Korean domestic politics as well as security is a much more salient and polarizing issue compared to the Japanese case.

Suggestions for future study

One issue of theoretical importance is whether sovereign-nationalism, as introduced in this study, is a uniquely East Asian phenomenon. Is hierarchical stability in East Asia largely a product of Confucianism and norms of hierarchy in social relations? Put differently, is the current U.S.-led hierarchical order less durable than the traditional Sinocentric system because of the lack of shared understandings on unequal relationships? The legitimation strategies of the Tokugawa regime in Japan and the Chosŏn dynasty in Korea would indicate that ritualization of informal rules and strategic compromises, rather than Confucian norms, led to enduring stability in hierarchical relations.

One way to test for region-specific effects would be to compare the Japanese and Korean cases to the Vietnam. Vietnam is a useful case to examine because it was contextually similar to Korea within the traditional regional order but was not part of the U.S.-led hierarchical order after 1945. Other avenues of research may ask what parts of the argument based on the cases of Japan and Korea might be transportable to other hierarchical contexts? Is it the strong link between state-strengthening ideals and the legitimacy of the regime? Or, is it the presence of strong foreign policy cleavages and their tendency toward polarization?
While my definition and articulation of sovereign-nationalism is based on the East Asian experience, in particular that of Japan and Korea, the idea of “incomplete” sovereignty resonates in other regions. The challenge then is to identify the different “lessons” of Westphalian sovereignty absorbed through local political legacies, reflected in region-specific debates and politics, as it was imported from Europe to other parts of the world.
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