TIED ABOVE, PRESSED BELOW:
SECURITY ALLIANCES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
OVERSEAS U.S. MILITARY BASES

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
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Do social movements matter in security politics? Connecting the international relations literature with social movement theories, my research examines how bilateral security alliances influence state-society interaction and social movement outcomes in the politics of overseas U.S. military bases. Investigating how host governments react to anti-base movement pressure while managing alliance relations with the U.S., I argue that the host government's response in finding a balance depends on the level of security consensus held by political elites regarding national security. When host government political elites are significantly divided regarding their perception of national security and U.S.-host state security relations, elites sympathetic to anti-base movements cooperatively engage anti-base activists. Thus a weak security consensus opens the possibility for major base policy changes by anti-base movements.

Conversely, when a common consensus regarding security relations with the U.S. exists among domestic political elites, the host government strategically responds to anti-base pressure by either ignoring, foot-dragging, co-opting, or at best, making token concessions to anti-base groups. By providing minimal concessions, host governments are able to maintain positive relations with the U.S. while mollifying major anti-base protests. Social movements, therefore, have little effect on base policy outcomes under conditions of strong security consensus.
I use movement episodes in five different countries - Philippines, Japan, Italy, Ecuador, and South Korea - to support my argument. The findings are based on government reports and documents, internal activist documents, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with activists, host government elites, and U.S. officials.
Andrew Yeo received his B.A. in psychology and international studies from Northwestern University in Evanston, IL, graduating magna cum laude in June 2000. He spent 2000-01 learning Korean language at Seoul National University’s (SNU), interning with the United Nations Division of Sustainable Development through SNU’s Graduate School of International Studies, and volunteering with UNICEF in Seoul. He entered the Department of Government at Cornell University in fall 2002, receiving his M.A. in May 2005, and his Ph.D. in August 2008. He has held visiting research appointments at the Center for International Studies at Seoul National University, and the Third World Research Center at the University of the Philippines. He will begin his position at Catholic University of America in Washington D.C. as an assistant professor in the Department of Politics in fall 2008.
To my parents, with much love.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In reference to our spiritual life, I once heard the phrase, “No man is an island.” The same is true with academic life. This dissertation could not have been completed without the generous help and support of countless individuals.

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I owe a special debt of gratitude to my committee chair, Peter Katzenstein. It is one thing to have an academic advisor who nourishes your intellectual growth, stretching your mental boundaries while also offering you sage advice. It is quite another to have an advisor who sincerely cares about you as a person, not just a scholar. How many advisors will send you comments from an airport in Hong Kong at 3am, serve you brownies and tea at his home while discussing dissertation projects, AND attend your violin recitals. I feel extremely fortunate having worked with a mentor not only serious about scholarship, but passionate about teaching, and above all, tremendously devoted to his students.

I also want to extend a heartfelt thank-you to Matthew Evangelista, who enthusiastically supported this project from start to finish. I was filled with doubt at

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1 The phrase is attributed to the poet and Anglican priest John Donne, first appearing in Donne’s Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII.
several stages of the project. More than once during these bouts of frustration, I received unsolicited e-mails from Matt with attachments and links to articles with information related to my project. In addition to timely e-mails, our open discussions provided encouragement when I needed them the most. That someone cared enough about my dissertation to take time and pass along information, put me in touch with relevant people, and help secure research funding, reassured me that at least one important scholar thought my work was interesting.

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Needless to say, in all my field research sites, numerous activists, scholars, and current and former government and military officials shared their perspective of base politics, which in turn, helped me shape my own understanding of alliances, anti-base movements, and the politics of overseas bases.

Finally, I thank my wonderful parents, who have shown me much love and support for the past thirty years in life. Even though they are still unclear on what it is I study, they have had a profound impact in my pursuit to become a respectable scholar and teacher. It is to them that I dedicate this dissertation.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Anti-Bases Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACBT</td>
<td>Airborne Combat Brigade Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACJ</td>
<td>Asociación Cristiana de Jóvenes (Young Men’s Christian Association)</td>
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<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee</td>
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<td>ALDHU</td>
<td>Latin American Association of Human Rights</td>
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<td>ATM</td>
<td>Anti-Treaty Movement</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>CEDHU</td>
<td>Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLB</td>
<td>Cabinet Legislative Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONAIE</td>
<td>Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Campaign for a Sovereign Philippines</td>
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<td>DFAA</td>
<td>Defense Facilities Administration Agency</td>
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<td>DND</td>
<td>Department of National Defense</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>EASR</td>
<td>East Asian Strategic Review</td>
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<td>FARC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FLAG</td>
<td>Free Legal Assistance of Government</td>
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<td>FOL</td>
<td>Forward Operating Location</td>
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<td>FOTA</td>
<td>Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
<td>Government Accountability Office</td>
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<td>GDPR</td>
<td>Global Defense Posture Review</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Grand National Party</td>
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<td>INREDH</td>
<td>Regional Foundation of Consultant's Office in Human Rights</td>
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<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Organization Committee</td>
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<td>Japanese Defense Agency’s</td>
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<td>KCTU</td>
<td>Korean Confederated Trade Union</td>
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<td>KCPT</td>
<td>Pan-South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Expansion in Pyeongtae</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>Kilusansa Pambansang Demokrasya</td>
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<td>LPP</td>
<td>Land Partnership Plan</td>
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<td>MBA</td>
<td>Mutual Base Agreement</td>
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<td>MDP</td>
<td>Millennium Democratic Party</td>
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<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
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<td>MLSA</td>
<td>Mutual Logistics Support Agreement</td>
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<td>MND</td>
<td>Ministry of National Defense</td>
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<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCCP</td>
<td>National Council of Churches in the Philippines</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>National Democrat</td>
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<td>NL</td>
<td>National Liberation</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDF</td>
<td>National Democratic Front</td>
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<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMBY</td>
<td>Not In My Backyard</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>New People’s Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBC</td>
<td>Overseas Basing Committee</td>
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<td>OIPAZ</td>
<td>International Observance for Peace</td>
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<td>OPP</td>
<td>Okinawa People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTA</td>
<td>Okinawa’s Teacher Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>OWAAMV</td>
<td>Okinawan Women Act against Military And Violence</td>
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<td>PACT</td>
<td>Philippine American Cooperation Talks</td>
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<td>PADH</td>
<td>Andean Program of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAR-SOFA</td>
<td>People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PdCI</td>
<td>Party of Italian Communists</td>
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<td>PKP</td>
<td>Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLANEX</td>
<td>National Plan of Foreign Policy</td>
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<td>PnB</td>
<td>Partido ng Bayan</td>
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<td>PNSMS</td>
<td>Patto Nazionale di Solidarietà e Mutuo Soccorso</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>People’s organizations</td>
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<td>Communist Refoundation Party</td>
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<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
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<td>PTFBC</td>
<td>People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup</td>
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<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<td>REDHER</td>
<td>Network of Friendship and Solidarity with Colombia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>RP</td>
<td>Republic of the Philippines</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SACO</td>
<td>Special Action Committee on Okinawa</td>
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<td>SCM</td>
<td>Security Consultative Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Social Democrat</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation</td>
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<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SERPAJ</td>
<td>Peace and Justice Service</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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<td>SPARK</td>
<td>Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWS</td>
<td>Social Weather Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPOCAM</td>
<td>Provincial Union of Farmers’ Organization of Manabí</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCAR</td>
<td>United States Civilian Administration of the Ryukyu Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USFK</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFJ</td>
<td>United States Forces, Japan</td>
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<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>VFA</td>
<td>Visiting Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
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CHAPTER 1

ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS AND THE SECURITY CONSENSUS FRAMEWORK

On May 8, 2000, an A-10 aircraft performing low altitude strafing exercises released its six 500 pound bombs to reduce weight after facing engine trouble off the coast of a small fishing village in South Korea. Although local activists had complained for years about the dangers of firing and bombing exercises conducted at the U.S. military-operated Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri, their protests fell largely on deaf ears. However, the bombing accident in 2000 garnered widespread media attention as civic groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) joined forces with local residents to protest against the bombing range and United States Forces Korea (USFK).¹

South Korean officials were caught in an awkward bind. From below, angry anti-base activists demanded base closure. From above, U.S. officials expected Seoul to fulfill certain alliance obligations by providing USFK a suitable firing range. After months of intense anti-base protests, the Korean government defused the crisis by offering partial concessions. The South Korean Ministry of Defense and USFK agreed to move the firing range 1.5 km further out into the sea, restrict training hours, and refrain from using live ammunition.

The South Korean government’s balancing act between international and domestic forces has replayed itself in different corners of the world. However, host government responses to anti-base pressure and base policy outcomes have varied. Needless to say, base politics have not always concluded favorably for the United

¹ Aside from property damage, no serious injuries were actually reported.
States. As the U.S. reshuffles its network of overseas bases in the post-9/11 world, we should expect more drama in the politics of overseas military bases.

Addressing domestic political challenges to overseas U.S. military bases, my dissertation investigates two key questions. First, do social movements matter in base politics, and second, how do host governments respond to domestic pressure from below while managing alliance relations with the U.S.? When host government political elites are significantly divided regarding their perception of national security and U.S.-host state security relations, elites sympathetic to anti-base movements cooperatively engage anti-base activists. In other words, a weak security consensus opens the possibility for major base policy changes by anti-base movements. Conversely, when a powerful, collective consensus regarding security relations with the U.S. exists among domestic political elites, the host government responds to anti-base pressure by either ignoring, foot-dragging, co-opting, or at best, making token concessions to anti-base groups. By providing minimal concessions, host governments are able to maintain positive relations with the U.S. while mollifying major anti-base protests. Social movements, therefore, have little effect on base policy outcomes under conditions of strong security consensus. In sum, the degree of security consensus held by host state political elites shapes or constrains the strategies employed by movement and government actors, thereby affecting basing policy outcomes.

The Politics of Overseas Military Bases

Why should anyone care about U.S. military bases and anti-base movements? Recent shifts in U.S. global basing strategy, underlined by the Pentagon’s 2004 Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR), have drawn significant attention on the politics of
overseas U.S. military bases.\textsuperscript{2} This interest is driven by the strategic and political implications of overseas military bases for the United States and its host government allies. Placing a premium on mobility and rapid deployment, a key component of the GDPR is the shift from large, permanent bases of the Cold War era to fewer and smaller overseas installations. Coined as “lily pads,” Department of Defense (DOD) planners envision post 9-11 bases as expandable, “lightly staffed facilities for use as jumping-off points in a crisis.”\textsuperscript{3} Although the GDPR is first and foremost a military plan, base realignment and relocation also carry political ramifications. Changes in global force posture require coordination with host state allies. As one senior State Department official remarked, “It is a military plan, in the first instance, but the political dimension of it is equally important. It revitalizes the U.S. ability to be a faithful, strong, and reliable security partner and it positions the United States to work very closely and cooperatively with friendly military forces around the world.”\textsuperscript{4}

The future of U.S. grand strategy is underpinned by its overseas basing system. Unfortunately, twenty-first century U.S. power projection, most visibly manifest in overseas bases, has heightened the domestic political sensitivity of U.S. military


\textsuperscript{3} Campbell and Ward 2003. The U.S. intends to retain a smaller number of \textit{main operating bases} while also establishing \textit{forward operating sites} and \textit{cooperative security locations}. Forward operating sites are installations with pre-positioned equipment ready for use and minimal troop presence. Cooperative security locations are created through pre-arranged agreements with the host state. This arrangement provides the U.S. access to host government facilities for training and operation purposes, but requires little or no permanent troops in peacetime. The new basing arrangements along the “arc of instability” provide greater flexibility in meeting new global security threats. See U.S. State Department, \textit{Foreign Press Center Briefing. “Senior Administration Officials from the Departments of State and Defense.”} Washington D.C. August 16, 2004. \texttt{http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/35246.htm} [accessed 10/18/06].

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Ibid.}
activity in several host nations. In the Czech Republic, peace activists in 2007
demanded a national referendum in hopes of blocking plans to construct a U.S. missile
defense base on Czech soil. In Ecuador, anti-base activists applauded President Rafael
Correa’s pledge not to renew an agreement giving the U.S. access to a key air base in
its war on drugs. Most notably, in Turkey, U.S. officials expressed frustration after
Ankara’s month-long vacillation and eventual denial of basing access for U.S. aircraft
prior to the 2003 Iraq invasion. These are just a few examples which suggest the need
for a broader study on anti-base movements and the politics of overseas military bases.

From a theoretical standpoint, anti-base movements challenge well-established
assumptions in the field of international relations. How do social movement actors
abroad thwart the strategic basing preferences of the most powerful military in the
world? Assuming states remain relatively autonomous in foreign and national security
policy-making, this question is all the more puzzling given that these foreign anti-base
actors are thousands of miles away with no direct mechanism to influence
Washington. A common assumption that civil society has relatively little impact on
security policy stems from several facts. Given the sensitive nature of “high politics,”
government and military officials are often insulated from societal pressure when
making decisions concerning national security.\(^5\) Policymakers may occasionally be
swayed by public opinion on foreign policy issues of mass appeal, such as the decision
to go to war.\(^6\) However, societal actors are excluded or often unaware of more
technical issues related to national security such as combat training, force structure, or

\(^5\) Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page. "Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?" *American Political
Often, domestic security institutions particular to the state further isolate security policymakers from
civil society. For instance, in South Korea, the National Security Laws, the institutionalization of the
U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command, and the subordinate role of the ROK military in the chain of
command system limits the role civil society plays in security policy.

\(^6\) Jacobs and Page 2005; Richard Sobel. *The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy since
base realignment. Regarding overseas bases, U.S. and host government officials often conclude basing agreements even before societal actors have time to react or voice their concerns.

Despite the autonomous nature of security policy decision-making, intense anti-base protests in several regions have led to a various range of policy shifts and outcomes. Thus one might question whether the politics of overseas military bases is really devoid of societal influence. Given certain political opportunity structures, anti-base movements have the power to induce change in policy outcomes. This observation is consistent with those found by transnational movement scholars who demonstrate how civil society influences “high politics” in issue areas such as arms control and disarmament.

Using data collected from fieldwork in the Philippines, Japan (Okinawa), Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea, my dissertation develops a theoretical framework which integrates the international relations literature with social movement theories. Under the context of U.S.-host state security relations, I explore the process of interaction between the U.S., host governments, and anti-base movements, and the strategic responses which lead to varying base policy outcomes. I find that the level of security consensus among host state political elites, particularly those within the

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foreign policy establishment, shapes 1) how host states respond to domestic pressure against bases and 2) the relative success of anti-base movements in gaining significant concessions from the host state and U.S. on base policy decisions. Table 1.1 below lays out a preview of the cases used to test the theoretical argument.

Table 1.1: Preview of cases used to test the security consensus framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Episode</th>
<th>Strategic Value of Base</th>
<th>Movement Strength</th>
<th>Security consensus among domestic elites</th>
<th>Base Policy Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines: Subic Bay (1990-91)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Closure (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan: Futenma (1995-96)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Minor concessions; status quo (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador: Manta (2005-06)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium-High</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Anticipated closure in 2009 (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy: Vicenza (2006-07)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Approval of base construction, no concessions (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea: SOFA (1999-2001)</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Minor concessions (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea: Maehyangri (2000)</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Minor concessions (+/-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea: Pyeongtaek (2005-06)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Delayed process, but no concessions (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines: VFA (1998-99)</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>No concessions; status quo (-)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 1.1 suggests, the impact of anti-base movements on base policy outcomes is limited when domestic elites exhibit either a strong or moderate degree of consensus during a particular episode. Thus, anti-base movements in Japan, Italy, or South Korea were at best only able to obtain minor policy concessions from the government. Conversely, domestic elites in the Philippines (in 1990-1991) and Ecuador did not
subscribe to a dominant pro-U.S. consensus, opening the opportunity for anti-base movements to shut down strategically significant U.S. bases.9

**Security Consensus Framework**

I attempt to link theories from two different sets of literature rarely examined together in a single framework. For social movement scholars who tend to focus on domestic political structures, the security consensus framework suggests that variables in the international system, such as bilateral alliances, shape or constrain movements.10 For international relations scholars, my theoretical framework highlights the role of civil society in world politics, a group often under-theorized in the literature.11 I do not naively suggest that civil society always matters in security politics. However, anti-base movements on several occasion have extracted concessions from powerful states. Such empirical puzzles warrant a study on the role of anti-base movements in the politics of bases. Unfortunately, existing theories in international relations are ill-equipped in helping us understand when and how anti-base movements matter. Nor do they help us accurately predict the type of response produced by host-states when balancing between international and domestic forces. The security consensus framework addresses this lacuna by providing a theoretical framework outlining the conditions in which we expect anti-base movement success, and changes in overseas basing policies.

My research suggests that host government response to anti-base movement pressure is largely shaped by domestic elites’ understanding of the U.S.-host state security alliance. More concretely, government response and social movement

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9 The section on research methods and design provides further explanation of the “strategic value” and “movement strength” categories.
outcomes vary based on the level of “security consensus” held by political elites regarding U.S.-host state security relations. The model used to analyze the dynamics between host governments, civil society, and the U.S. can be regarded as a two stage model. I approach the politics of overseas bases by first looking at structural factors - in this case, the security consensus built around bilateral alliances - and then move towards agency where overseas base policies are influenced by patterns of state-society interaction. Policy change requires a window of opportunity (a weak security consensus) at the international level. Social movement actors must then jump through the window by forming selective ties with elites to gain leverage in base policy decisions. As Bear Braumoeller argues when investigating causal complexity and multiple paths of non-occurrence to policy change, either the absence of this window (a strong security consensus), or the inability of activists to jump through the window of opportunity (mobilize and form ties with sympathetic elites) precludes any major change in base policy outcomes. The theoretical framework I present proposes when social movements matter in base politics. However, given that major U.S. military bases are positioned in states closely allied with the U.S., the theory also suggests that the hurdles anti-base movements face are fairly high when challenging the host government and the U.S. on basing policy decisions.

Defining the Security Consensus

I define security consensus as the shared perception and intersubjective understanding of the concept of national security held by host government elites.

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12 Bear Braumoeller. "Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics." Political Analysis 11, no. 3 (2003), p.212. I thank Christopher Way for pointing out Bear Braumoeller’s analogy of actors jumping through an open political window in outlining the necessary conditions for anti-base movement success. The framework is also reminiscent of Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions. Structural constraints at the international level in conjunction with various combinations of domestic factors between state and society produce social outcomes. See Theda Skocpol. States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

13 In a similar vein, Randall Schweller introduces an “elite consensus” variable when examining balancing behavior among states. He describes elite consensus as “a measure of the similarity of elites’ preferences over outcomes and their beliefs about the preferences and anticipated actions of others.”
For the purpose of my dissertation, “security consensus” is construed more narrowly as a pro-U.S. security consensus, based on the shared perception and understanding of U.S.-host state alliance relations among national elites. For example, do political elites agree that the U.S. alliance functions as an integral component of their national security strategy? Do host government elites value a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S? As a corollary, states characterized by a high degree of security consensus tend to accept the hosting of U.S. military bases as an important component of their alliance relationship with the U.S.

Although all national elites may hold particular beliefs about U.S.-host state relations, the relevant “holders” of the security consensus, are government or political elites within the foreign policy or national security establishment. These elites include heads of state or government such as the president or the prime minister, cabinet officials with a stake in base politics, bureaucrats in relevant agencies such as those in the foreign affairs ministry or department of defense, and government advisors, such as members of the national security council. Elites also include politicians and lawmakers, especially in cases where parliament ratifies the budget appropriating funds for U.S. bases, or the basing agreement itself. Opposition politicians who occasionally make their way into the foreign policy establishment may also be considered as legitimate holders of the security consensus.

As I elaborate on the concept of security consensus below, three important points are worth keeping in mind. First, the security consensus is fundamentally an ideational variable. Second, the security consensus is intersubjective in nature. Third,


14 I define “foreign policy and security establishment” as a broad set of political elites capable of influencing foreign policy and national security decisions. This term should not be equated with a pro-U.S. security consensus.

15 The following works were particularly useful when thinking about “security consensus” as an ideational variable: Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
although it is important to identify the derivatives of the security consensus, the theoretical framework in this dissertation is more concerned in evaluating the strength (or weakness) of the consensus rather than its origins. Inevitably, I must discuss where the security consensus comes from in the empirical chapters, but I do so without providing a nuanced theory of security consensus formation beyond the cursory treatment given below.\textsuperscript{16}

The security consensus is inextricably linked to alliance relations, and thus, many of the same factors leading to alliance formation. Threat perceptions, therefore, play a central role in shaping the security consensus. Threat perceptions are based on the material capabilities of adversaries.\textsuperscript{17} They are also rooted in identities and ideological differences.\textsuperscript{18} As constructivist international relations theorists note, by relying on perceptions and acknowledging the role of ideology in a theory of alliances, realists unwittingly move from the systemic to domestic level by “shifting analysis from material capabilities to ideational factors.”\textsuperscript{19} Hence, rather than assuming national security and elite preferences as given based on threat capabilities, I direct our attention towards internal, endogenous factors and the process of alliance formation.


\textsuperscript{16} In other words, the security consensus is treated as an independent variable throughout the dissertation. However, Chapter 7, which explores variation in the security consensus over time, attempts to offer a brief “theory of security consensus.” Here, the concept is treated as a dependent variable.


\textsuperscript{19} Katzenstein 1996, p.27.
Endogenous factors such as identity, ideology, domestic institutions, and historical legacies have an intervening effect on any elite consensus via threat perceptions. For example, regarding ideology, Mark Haas writes, “Ideological variables shape leaders’ understandings of the security environment in which they operate, in terms of which states constitute the greatest threats to leaders’ key interests and the level of this perceived threat.”\textsuperscript{20} In addition to their intervening effect, however, these endogenous factors also directly shape or sustain the security consensus. Once formed, the security consensus profoundly affects the domestic and foreign policy choices of elites.

In studying elite consensus, I am interested in collective rather than individual perceptions and beliefs.\textsuperscript{21} This is not to argue that perceptions of individuals are unimportant or unrelated to group ideas. However, as Jeffrey Legro notes, “Dominant ideas are often embedded in public discourse and symbols that also represent intersubjective phenomena that attach to group, not individual orientation.”\textsuperscript{22} The security consensus functions as a “dominant idea,” precisely because it is held by the majority of key elites within the state. A consensus identifying particular threats, and favoring strong ties to the U.S. as an appropriate response, may reify over time through processes of institutionalization.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, powerful actors or groups, either within or outside the foreign policy and national security establishment, may develop vested interests in maintaining the security consensus. The interests of powerful elites may become embedded in the institutionalization process. Alternative ideas to national security, ones less reliant on the U.S. alliance and its basing network

\textsuperscript{20} Haas 2005, p.2.
\textsuperscript{21} Legro’s discussion of collective ideas in international relations is particularly instructive. See Legro 2005, pp.4-7. Also See Alexander Wendt. \textit{Social Theory of International Politics}. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 150-64.
\textsuperscript{22} Legro 2005, p.5.
may certainly co-exist within the polity. However, political, institutional, and normative forces perpetuating a powerful consensus will often drown out these alternative security views at the policy decision-making level. Even if numerous individuals hold ideas contrary to the consensus, the “collective orthodoxy” may still prevail, shaping state responses.24 This is particularly true if ideas, values, and beliefs central to the consensus are wrapped within legal and institutional frameworks. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty play an important role in sustaining elite perceptions and beliefs about the U.S. alliance in Italian or Japanese defense policy. This is not to argue that the security consensus never changes over time, an issue raised in Chapter Seven. However, the intersubjective nature of the security consensus produces an inherent “stickiness.”

In sum, the elite security consensus, while often derived from external threats in the international system, is also driven by internal factors. Moreover, the intersubjective nature of the security consensus implies that material and ideational variables often interact as actors interpret their security environment.25 For instance, ideology or historical legacies may reinforce or heighten existing threat perceptions. These perceptions may persist long after objective material threat capabilities subside. Furthermore, external threat perceptions may strengthen over time, constructing particular identities between actors. For example, in South Korea, the reproduction of identities based on hostile interaction with North Korea, and the security dependence

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25 If non-material and ideational factors play such a large role, one might wonder why I choose to focus narrowly on host government elites while ignoring mass perceptions of national security. After all, if the security consensus is based on shared intersubjective understandings, mass public opinion should also factor into the security consensus. To a certain degree, mass perceptions are reflected in the policy preferences of political elites and vice-versa. Thus a common consensus regarding national security issues will often pervade both elites and the masses, particularly in a democratic polity. For the purposes of my dissertation, however, I privilege the security consensus among elites because it is elites who make and ultimately implement national security decisions.
formed after the Korean War between South Korea and the United States, bear significant influence today on South Korean security policy. Likewise, the asymmetric relationship forged between the two countries since the Korean War has a bearing on the attitude of host state elites towards U.S.-South Korean relations – an attitude which favors U.S. military bases. Japan’s defeat in World War II and its renouncement of the use of force in settling global disputes has also significantly shaped Japanese security policy. Reliance on the U.S security umbrella and its existing network of bases has become an accepted part of Japanese national security.

The concept of security consensus may strike readers as a bit unsettling; it acts as a catch-all variable, encompassing everything from threat perceptions to domestic institutions to identity and norms. As argued above, however, my theoretical framework only needs to demonstrate whether a strong or weak consensus exists among host government elites. Moreover, what constitutes the consensus will undoubtedly vary within the specific context of each country and the historical trajectory of U.S.-host state relations. For instance, the role of norms and domestic institutions will be much more pronounced in Japan, whereas the dominance of internal over external security concerns in the Philippines will play prominently in Philippine elites’ understanding of their security alliance with the U.S. I provide a more concrete explanation of the coding and operationlization of the security consensus later in the chapter.

**Anti-Base Movement Mobilization**

Before explaining how the security consensus relates to social movement outcomes, I first define the parameters of “anti-base mobilization.” I borrow extensively from the political process model in the social movement literature to
explain mobilization patterns in the empirical chapters.  

This school of thought contends that the political context surrounding movement mobilization significantly impacts movement development and outcomes. In particular, open political systems, divisions within elites, the presence of elite allies, and reduced state repression all help facilitate social movements. Often referred to as political opportunity structure (POS), these exogenous factors enhance or constrain a movement’s ability to mobilize, advance particular claims, build alliances, use certain strategies and tactics, and influence policy. It is important to note, however, that POS does not completely determine outcomes. Other factors, particularly the role of agency, must be calculated into the equation. We can thus approach POS as a variable which “influences the choice of protest strategies and the impact of social movements on their environments.”

Anti-base movements are comprised of NGOs, grassroots actors, local residents, and civic groups protesting against bases over various claims of injustice. Needless to say, as Figure 1.1 below suggests, various types and levels of anti-base activism exist. Some anti-base movements only operate at the local level as a simple “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) protest. The movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in South Korea by the Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force in the late 1980s is one example.


27 McAdam 1996.


30 For an alternative typology of anti-base protests, see Calder 2007, p.84. Calder’s identifies three varieties of anti-base protests based on actors’ motives: ideological, nationalistic, and pragmatic.
Although many anti-base movements begin at the local level, successful campaigns generally shape into broader coalition movements at the national or transnational level.\textsuperscript{31} Two examples include the national campaign to close down Kooni Firing Range, and the anti-base movement led by the Ecuador No Bases Coalition.

The arrow in figure 1.1 represents the typical trajectory of anti-base movements. Different movement sectors such as peace groups, labor unions, environmental groups, student unions, farmers, religious groups, or women’s groups usually coalesce under a common, albeit loose umbrella against U.S. bases or base policies. Successful mobilization thus entails forming a broad-based coalition across different sectors at the local and national level.\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, it requires movement

\textsuperscript{31} See McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001 and Tarrow 2005 on scale shift.

\textsuperscript{32} This does not mean that broad-based coalitions are without their own problems, such as factionalism across different organizations or sectors. Some of this tension is highlighted in the empirical chapters.
leaders to incorporate broader frames and expand at the national level without neglecting the local origins of anti-base movements.\textsuperscript{33}

Anti-base movements use various strategies to pressure the host state regime on basing policies. To gain media and national attention, activists will organize several large, mass rallies to publicize their campaign. Protests are organized in highly public or symbolic venues such as city hall, government agency buildings (i.e. the defense and foreign affairs department), or outside U.S. bases to capture attention. Anti-base movements will organize other events such as press conferences, public forums, music concerts, festivals, and educational campaigns to promote their cause. More radical tactics entail physical occupation of military bases in an effort to disrupt military operations or damage U.S. base property. In rare instances, anti-base activists engage in violence against U.S. personnel or host government forces.

Activists employ several tactics to influence the host government both indirectly and directly. Anti-base movements may pressure key host government officials indirectly by swaying domestic public opinion against U.S. bases, or creating tension at the alliance level by engaging in what the media often portrays as anti-American protests. These movements also attempt to influence policymakers more directly by providing sustained, vocal opposition over base-related issues such as crime, public safety, environmental pollution, or sovereignty rights. Additionally, movement activists may meet with government officials in public or private forums to discuss base problems, attempt to “educate” officials by providing information, or in some cases, lobby politicians and political candidates.

The Security Consensus as a Political Opportunity Structure

How does civil society penetrate the state, particularly on issues concerning national security policy? Conversely, how do states react to social movement pressure? I highlight two key insights borrowed from previous research in the social movements and transnational relations literature: domestic structure and elite access. First, civil society is more likely to gain access to elites under open domestic structures such as those found in democracies.34 Second, anti-base movements must “penetrate” the state and gain access to elites if they are to play a direct role in base policy outcomes – certainly no easy feat given the strong capacities of states to control national security policy.

The political opportunity model employed by social movement theorists view opportunities and state-society interaction from the perspective of social movement actors.35 For example, Herbert Kitschelt observes that regime openness and state capacity affects the strategy and overall effectiveness of social movements.36 The state autonomy literature inverts this perspective, with state-society interaction observed from the vantage point of states. Thus, the domestic structures which translate to political opportunities for social movements function as the same institutional tools which provide states the autonomy and strong capacity necessary to stave off social movements and other forms of domestic pressure.

34 Kitschelt 1986, p.68. Although social movement theorists tend to see open political structures as favorable to social movements outcomes, this is not always case. As Matthew Evangelista has demonstrated, transnational actors working under open, decentralized political environments, while able to gain elite access, are actually less effective in implementing policy because of the numerous competing voices in a more open system. Evangelista 1999.

35 The security consensus functions as a political opportunity structure (POS) at the national level. Although POS scholars tend to examine the entire institutional system (i.e. institutional structures at the local, regional, and national level) to determine degree of closure or openness, I part ways with traditional notions of POS by limiting my discussion of “open” or “closed” structures to the national elite level. While this may raise valid criticism from the social movement crowd, it is the state which acts as the common denominator in the security consensus framework, allowing me to link social movement analysis with the international relations literature.

36 ibid, p.64.
International relations and comparative politics scholars coming from the statist tradition point to institutional features of state agencies which make states more or less prone to societal pressure. State autonomy and capacity are underpinned by factors such as stable administrative-military control of territory, loyal and skilled bureaucrats, a large treasury, and strong institutions. Rather than focusing on institutional structures, however, I point to ideational features which enable key state actors to remain autonomous in the national security policy-making process. In particular, prevailing perceptions and ideology which underpin the security consensus among host government elites prevent societal actors from penetrating the state and finding common allies with sympathetic elites. In addition to institutional features, ideological structures enable the state to remain insulated when making important national security decisions, including those pertaining to the U.S. alliance.

The security consensus framework emphasizes that shared perceptions, beliefs, and ideas which promote the U.S.-host state alliance lead political elites’ to reject activist demands, ultimately undermining anti-base movement mobilization. On the other hand, a weak security consensus, characterized by elite division over the role of the U.S. alliance and bases for host state security, enables activists to exert greater influence on policy elites, and subsequently basing outcomes. In short, the security consensus operates as a political opportunity, constraining or facilitating movement effectiveness on base policy outcomes. Table 1.2 below summarizes the relationship

38 Skocpol 1985, p.16.
39 The logic here is reminiscent of Jack Snyder’s *Myths of Empire*, where Snyder discusses the ability of narrow interest groups with imperial ambitions to penetrate the state. A strong state is capable of ignoring the pressure of domestic groups with vested interests in promoting imperial expansion. Contrary to my argument, however, Snyder argues that ruling elites form ties with parochial interest groups in perpetuating the expansion myth when elites have an interest in promoting overexpansion. In my argument, it is the absence of certain perceptions, beliefs, or ideology – the security consensus – which enables elites to form ties with social movement groups. See Snyder 1991, p.40.
between the security consensus, patterns of state-societal interaction, and movement
effectiveness regarding policy shifts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Consensus</th>
<th>State-Societal Interaction</th>
<th>Movement Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong</strong> (Majority of host state elites believe U.S. alliance plays key role in national security strategy)</td>
<td>Anti-base movements unable to penetrate state. State attempts to diffuse anti-base movement pressure</td>
<td>No: Minimal base policy change or status quo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderate</strong> A significant number of host state elites believe the U.S. alliance plays key role in national security strategy. However, the consensus may not be deeply rooted. Other elites may also contest the consensus.</td>
<td>A few key elites may be receptive to anti-base movement pressure and persuasion. However, movements still face difficulty penetrating the state.</td>
<td>Maybe: Movements may gain minor concessions. However, impact is still limited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak</strong> (Elites divided in role of U.S. alliance for its national security strategy)</td>
<td>Anti-base movements penetrate the state, forming ties with sympathetic elites. Anti-base discourse diffuses to key elites</td>
<td>Yes: Significant base policy change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those expecting to read a dissertation on anti-base movements may find themselves sorely disappointed with this overwhelmingly structural account thus far. Where is agency? Although the proposed theoretical framework hinges on the security consensus, I steer away from making any direct causal claim between elite consensus and policy outcomes. Rather than determining outcomes, the security consensus delineates the boundaries of interaction between state and society. In other words, the consensus influences how political elites interpret and react to anti-base pressure. The core of my argument captures the dynamic relations between movement and government actors within the limits of the security consensus.

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40 On this point, see Goldstein and Keohane 1993, p.11; Yee 1996, p.71. Both scholars note the “egregious error” made by scholars working on ideas in international relations who purport that a direct causal link exists.
Where I argue that social movements do matter, anti-base movements make a difference not only because of favorable opportunity structures (a weak security consensus permitting elite access), but because they employ powerful framing strategies, take advantage of mobilization structures and networks, use effective and creative tactics, and form ties with elite allies. Thus, a weak security consensus does not guarantee that anti-base pressure will translate into real policy changes. Activists must actually take advantage of favorable political opportunities. And even though anti-base movements are relatively ineffective under a strong security consensus, the development of movement strategies and government counter-strategies shaped by the consensus produces a riveting account of base politics. The take home point is that structure and agency interact to produce particular outcomes. As I demonstrate later in the empirical chapters, the most exciting story of anti-base movements are woven into the patterns of interaction between government and movement actors, shaped by the security consensus (see Figure 1.2 below).

![Figure 1.2: Structure and agency in anti-base movement outcomes](image)

As a final word before proceeding with the specific causal mechanisms of my argument, the link bridging social movement analysis with international relations theory is the concept of political opportunity structure (POS). More specifically, by conceptualizing national elite perceptions of alliance relations as a POS, I am able to draw social movement analysis into international relations theory. The inclusion of social movements presents an argument quite different from the standard variants of
realism, liberalism, or constructivism. And while the security consensus framework resonates with the literature on domestic-international linkages, the addition of social movements brings a fresh perspective on the role of domestic politics in international relations. The result is an approach to base politics different from current power or regime-based explanations.

The fusion of social movement analysis with international relations theory is not without its own set of problems, however. As I discuss later, any research design which attempts to adequately address issues from both disciplines must maneuver between the level of movement episodes and the level of states. Furthermore, scholars grounded in the social movement literature may find the connection between the security consensus and POS too narrow, opting to interpret a national elite consensus as only one aspect of a broader set of POS within the entire institutional system. Therefore, other “political opportunities” such as local elite relations, public opinion, the stability of political alignments, or a decline in the state’s repressive capacity, may also affect base policy outcomes. Finally, from the standpoint of international relations, scholars accustomed to macro-level theorizing may find the security consensus framework banal, focusing too narrowly on one aspect of base politics. Why bother with social movements if power or political-economic based arguments explain the majority of base politics?

In the empirical chapters, I take into consideration cross-discipline challenges, exploring base politics from both the level of movement episodes as well as the level of states. This analytical move inevitably shifts us away from the lofty goal of parsimony, and the type of international relations theorizing which ultimately
subsumes every other variable under the sun. By disaggregating to the level of movement episodes, however, I propose a much richer, complex narrative of base politics. At the same time, a “statist” account of the security consensus framework, and comparisons between anti-base movements in different countries are possible. After all, domestic anti-base movements are still embedded within national contexts.

The Causal Logic of the Security Consensus Framework

The following section provides a more nuanced discussion of the theoretical framework, specifying the actors and the causal mechanisms linking movements, host government response, and policy outcomes granted by the U.S. and the host government.

Actors

Anti-base movement: For illustrative purposes, I treat anti-base movements as a unitary actor. In the empirical chapters, I discuss in greater length the tension, friction, and different ideological factions which exist within national anti-base movements. While different ideological strands between moderate and more radical groups certainly complicates the story, treating anti-base movements as a single unit in my framework enhances the analytical power of my theory. In each case, a core group of anti-base activists, often associated with broader, left-leaning ideological movements, are usually identifiable. Although the host government is aware of different factions within anti-base movements, and at times takes advantage of movement tension and factionalism, the state tends to treat and confront anti-base movements as a single unit.

Host state: The “host state” refers to political or government elites\(^\text{43}\) within the foreign policy and national security establishment. As argued earlier, these elites include officials and politicians in both the executive and legislative branches of

\(^{43}\) I will use the terms government and political elites interchangeably.
government responsible for foreign and policy decision-making. The government elites which matter the most in base politics will vary in each case depending on specific domestic institutional arrangements. For instance, in the Philippines, a new base treaty required ratification by the Philippine Senate, thus giving Senators significant influence in base politics. In Japan, executive and bureaucratic agencies such as the Defense Facilities Administration Agency handle base policy decisions.

Although movements may choose to target the U.S. in hopes of swaying Washington, empirically anti-base movements almost always designate the host state as their key target. Assuming the U.S. prefers retaining bases of high strategic value, the host state ultimately decides whether U.S. bases should stay or go. The host state makes this decision during negotiations with the U.S., and in parliamentary procedures approving basing arrangements or funding for U.S. bases. Therefore, anti-base movements prefer targeting the more immediate and tangible host state, rather than challenging Washington when both the host state and the U.S. perceive bases as critical for security.

**United States:** It might strike the reader as somewhat odd that the U.S. has remained outside of base politics to this point. From a systemic perspective, the United States is indeed the most important player in the politics of overseas U.S. military bases. The opening and closure of most bases around the world are heavily dictated by

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44 At a secondary level, host state elites might also include epistemic communities and other knowledge-based experts in academia, think tanks, or business. These groups influence foreign policy through informal channels and networks. Although not formally part of the state, epistemic communities and business elites help identify and address policy interests for government elites. The lines are often blurred between these informal state actors and government officials as non-government foreign policy experts and business leaders cross-over into policy and vice-versa. Although I acknowledge that the security consensus stems from the intersubjective understanding of national security by both sets of elites, in this study, I privilege host government officials; ultimately, host government officials engage and formulate policy responses to anti-base movements. See Lawrence and Page, 2005, p.108.

45 In other words, when the strategic value of bases are low, the U.S. will ultimately decide whether U.S. bases remain.
the strategic needs of the U.S. military. In many cases, the U.S. initiates basing policy changes due to changes in the strategic environment or technological improvements.

In this dissertation, I make several analytical moves in the research design which allow us to incorporate the role of the U.S., but without washing out the important dynamics between anti-base movements and the host government. First, I select movement episodes around bases of high strategic value to the U.S. Given the importance of the base, we can assume that the U.S. prefers maintaining the status quo regarding basing policies. Second, I examine episodes of contention which reflect changes to basing policies initiated domestically, either by anti-base movements or the host government. Lastly, it is worth noting that the U.S. and anti-base movements never interact directly. Legally, the U.S. cannot negotiate with anti-base movement activists. Thus the host state becomes the central arena for base politics, with the most intense action located at the intersection between state and society.

While the role of the U.S. remains “bounded” with these caveats in place, the U.S. still exerts its influence on base hosts, often in the form of economic incentives or diplomatic pressure. We should keep in mind that the definition of a pro-U.S. security consensus – elite perceptions and beliefs regarding the importance of U.S. security relations - implies that the U.S. commands significant leverage over host governments. Although the empirical narratives focus more closely on the interaction between anti-base movements and host governments, where relevant, I discuss the diplomatic pressure and negotiating tactics used by the U.S. to sway host nation actors. While not

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46 Admittedly, my theory does not encompass a comprehensive explanation for the closure or relocation of all overseas bases. Instead, I am interested in the narrow subset of cases where the interests of one of the three different actors (the U.S., host government, and civil society) diverge, and where politics is most inherent. There is little to say about anti-base movements in cases where base policy changes were clearly dictated by U.S. strategic preferences. For instance, the massive withdrawal of U.S. forces in Europe after World War II was unrelated to any domestic opposition against U.S. bases.
always the case, the U.S. may alter incentives of both movement and government actors.

**Conditions of Strong Security Consensus**

Figure 1.3 diagrams the interaction process between the U.S., host state, and anti-base movements when a strong security consensus exists among host state elites.

Figure 1.3: Host state response to anti-base movements under conditions of strong security consensus

Under conditions of strong security consensus, anti-base movements are unable to penetrate the state and remain relatively ineffective in achieving significant policy gains (T1). The existence of a strong security consensus among host state political elites (denoted by the solid circle) prevents or discourages anti-base movements from effectively pressuring elites. A dominant national security discourse and pro-U.S. security consensus permeates the foreign policy establishment, creating obstacles for
anti-base movements. Under a strong consensus, activists are unable to find political allies or gain any traction among elites involved in the base policy decision-making process. Complicating anti-base movement efforts, at T2, the host government responds to movement pressure by employing various strategies and tactics of its own to co-opt or weaken anti-base movements. Host governments are aware that domestic opposition to bases is often cyclical, triggered by accidents, high profile crimes, or other external events related to U.S. bases. The host government will therefore release its own public media campaign, drag out negotiations with activists until the movement loses steam, or make minimal concessions to mitigate any potential crisis between state and civil society. In short, anti-base movement efforts are thwarted because of the existing security consensus. In effect, the security consensus shapes the patterns of interaction between state and society. The confrontation between activists and government officials at best leads to token concessions amounting to marginal changes in basing policies, and at worst movement defeat and the status quo.

The effectiveness of anti-base movements\footnote{I equate movement effectiveness or movement success with base policy outcomes. Admittedly, this is a narrow definition of movement effectiveness or “success.” This definition of success may also bias the coding of cases towards movement failure given that movements rarely achieve policy goals in the short run. Although movements may ultimately fail on the policy front, they may achieve success at other levels such as raising issue awareness or shifting public opinion. Moreover, movement “success” is subjective. What movements might define as success (i.e. winning token concessions or delaying base expansion) the state may not. Defining movement success from the vantage point of the state (and hence policy outcomes) rather than social movement actors partially alleviates this problem.} is significantly reduced without access to key elites. This does not mean, however, that anti-base movements never have any impact under conditions of strong security consensus. Figure 1.3 indicates that at T1, anti-base movements may also pressure the host government by creating tensions in host state- U.S. relations. Paradoxically, anti-base activists are capable of exerting pressure because elites value strong security ties to the U.S.\footnote{If host government elites carried ambivalent attitudes towards bilateral U.S. relations, elites would feel significantly less pressure and public embarrassment from widespread anti-U.S. protests.} Domestic opposition against bases sends negative signals to the U.S. Large scale protests such as...
those in Okinawa in 1995 after the rape of a twelve year old girl, or in South Korea in 2002 when two schoolgirls were run over by an armored vehicle, eventually reach proportions which if left unchecked, have the potential to damage U.S.-host state alliance relations. Thus, the host government may respond to anti-base movements not necessarily out of domestic political concerns, but out of fear that U.S. alliance relations will deteriorate if base protests persist or grow. Sensitive to souring alliance relations, the host state will feel pressure to make at least partial concessions to anti-base movements to quell opposition. Therefore, anti-base pressure will occasionally lead to a negotiated response from both the U.S. and host state, partially addressing some of the demands of anti-base movements. These partial concessions may be regarded as token policy changes. Under conditions of strong security consensus, the state reacts as, what Jack Snyder describes, “a pivot adjudicating between international and domestic pressures.”49 Here, however, the logic of security, and ideas about bilateral U.S. relations are deeply engrained in the perceptions of host state elites. Although anti-base movements are capable of pressuring the state, the role of civil society in overseas base politics under these conditions is relatively limited.

**Conditions of Weak Security Consensus**

When is civil society capable of penetrating the state on national security policy issues? As Figure 1.4 indicates below, I argue that social movements are able to penetrate the state and gain access to elites when the security consensus is weak (denoted by the dashed circle). The interaction between host government elites and anti-base movements is more complex under a weak security consensus. While the host government may want to maintain alliance relations with the U.S., the security logic for maintaining U.S. bases for national defense may not be readily apparent.

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Political elites in states characterized by a weak security consensus tend to hold lower external threat perceptions. Bases may be bargained with the U.S. in a *quid pro quo*, but host governments have no strong incentive to maintain the status quo if U.S. bases present a political liability. Thus, at T1, anti-base movements are able to “penetrate” the state and influence key decision-makers.

In the absence of a strong security consensus, anti-base activists find potential allies among elites who are opposed to U.S. bases or sympathetic to movement demands (denoted by the “Xs” within the solid circle in Figure 1.4). Host state response is therefore fragmented at T2. Political elites in favor of U.S. bases challenge or attempt to co-opt social movements. On the other hand, political elites ambivalent or opposed to bases may encourage or even join anti-base activists.
Under conditions of weak consensus, access to elites gives anti-base movements leverage in the base policy process. Activists influence base policy outcomes by pressuring and altering the political calculations of elites who, in the absence of significant base opposition, would otherwise tolerate the status quo. Additionally, anti-base activists indirectly influence policy outcomes by providing host state elites of like-mind a domestic support base. Under these conditions, substantial changes in base policy outcomes become possible.

In sum, the degree of security consensus influences the different choices and strategies of anti-base movement and government actors, which in turn, produce particular policy outcomes. The security consensus functions as a political opportunity structure constraining or enabling the ability of social movement actors to penetrate the state and gain elite access. A weak security consensus provides an open window, enabling anti-base activists to shape outcomes in their interaction with the host government. It is the combination of a weak security consensus and the movement strategies employed by anti-base activists, particularly the ability to find support from sympathetic elites, which lead to movement success at the policy level. Conversely, under a strong security consensus, anti-base movements have difficulty penetrating the state. Influenced by a strong security consensus, dominant host government elites counter anti-base movement pressure by employing strategies which undermine activist efforts.

**Alternative Explanations**

What alternative explanations challenge or falsify the security consensus framework? The empirical and concluding chapters address competing approaches to base politics in greater detail. For now, I briefly present major alternatives arising from different analytical traditions found in international relations and comparative politics.
**Social movement explanations**

The first alternative is the social movement explanation, or more specifically the resource mobilization perspective of social movements.\(^{50}\) According to the resource mobilization perspective, the impact of anti-base movements depends on internal movement dynamics and overall mobilization strength. Why might movements succeed or fail according to this approach? Upon deeper examination of movement mobilization, internal issues such as fractionalization over movement strategy, or weak organizational structure may suggest that failed anti-base movements were simply too weak to ever influence U.S. basing policies. For instance, the rapid decline of the student and labor movements in South Korea in recent years may have led to a general decline in movement mobilization across all issues. Moreover, anti-base activists must often compete with other movement coalitions for limited human and material resources. Even though different movement coalitions may share many of the same organizational members, smaller NGOs and civic groups must limit their resources and attention to the coalitional issues they deem most important at any given time. On the other hand, anti-base movements such as those in the Philippines may have been more successful in influencing policy outcomes simply because they were better mobilized and capable of pooling large amounts of political and material resources.

Yet as argued above, successful mobilization does not sufficiently lead to major changes in basing policy. Movements may rally hundreds of thousands of protestors, use all the right frames, remain relatively united, and even find allies inside the government. However, movements must still sway political elites who must not only contend with domestic opposition, but also fulfill international alliance obligations. Guided by a dominant consensus in support of the U.S. alliance, elites

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\(^{50}\)See McCarthy and Zald 1977.
will devise counter-strategies against movements to undermine their credibility and political clout. Successful collective action is obviously a necessary component of any successful anti-base outcome. However, as the two-stage security consensus framework suggests, social movement factors must work in conjunction with ideational structures generated by elite perceptions of bilateral alliances.

**Power explanations**

The second alternative explanation hinges on the role of U.S. power and interests in overseas base politics. This explanation is rooted in the realist school of thought in international relations. Given that the U.S. overseas basing system is intended to address U.S. strategic interests, the U.S. exercises significant political weight in any basing policy decision. Focusing on U.S. strategic objectives and the distribution of power in the international system, a structural realist would dismiss social movements as largely irrelevant. Any policy changes which occur regarding overseas bases are largely a function of U.S. geopolitical interests. Realists would therefore explain the closure of bases such as Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines as a result of declined threats with the unraveling of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, U.S. bases in South Korea and Japan remain critical to regional security and U.S. strategic objectives. As long as U.S. bases remain strategically important, anti-base movements have little effect in influencing U.S. basing policies in these two countries.

Power-based theories offer a compelling alternative to the security consensus framework. I certainly do not ignore the role of power, particularly U.S. interests. On one hand, realist explanations are not antithetical to my own argument. In fact, if elite security consensus were only based on threat perceptions, we could easily substitute “consensus” with Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory into my causal framework.  

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51 Walt 1987.
Differences in the distribution of material capabilities would lead to higher or lower threat perceptions. Under low threat perceptions, the host government may feel ambivalent about its asymmetric alliance relationship with the United States, enabling activists to form ties with elites in bringing down U.S. bases.

Without denying the role of power, I take a more eclectic approach. I include ideology, norms, and institutions as the foundations of the security consensus in addition to threat perceptions based on material capabilities. Likewise, my theoretical framework draws from numerous insights from statist or neoclassical realists who take into account domestic factors and the role of perceptions. Yet power-based theories, particularly the systemic variant, do not provide the proper theoretical tools to assess the role of social movements in world politics. Civil societal actors are simply ignored. Even statist realists, when acknowledging civil societal pressure, will treat social movements as a domestic interest group without engaging the nuances revealing interactive effects between mobilization strategies and other international relations variables such as alliances.

**Regime type explanations**

The third alternative explanation to base politics is one dominated by regime types. For instance, Alexander Cooley contends that the stability of basing agreements, and hence base policy outcomes, are shaped by the institutional credibility of the contractual environment and the host regime’s level of political dependence on U.S. bases. Cooley finds that basing agreements are most stable under consolidated

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53 When realists do acknowledge civil society, they often treat this group as another domestic interest group.

54 Cooley 2008. Also see Cooley 2005.
democracies. Bases are depoliticized in firm democracies with credible political institutions legitimizing any basing contract.\textsuperscript{55} However, when host governments are relatively independent from U.S. security arrangements, and transitioning from autocratic to democratic regimes - conditions where the contractual environment is most unstable - U.S. bases become much more contested. We expect to find greater anti-base activity and the possibility of major base policy shifts during democratization.

While regime type explanations offer a compelling account of base politics, they deemphasize the role of bilateral security alliances when accounting for basing outcomes.\textsuperscript{56} Admittedly, my theoretical framework also privileges the domestic arena when analyzing base politics. However, host government elites, particularly those operating under a strong security consensus, are under constant pressure to maintain positive alliance relations as they attempt to address domestic criticism against bases. A focus on regime type skirts this important dilemma faced by host governments, one where elites are tied to international obligations, but pressed from below by civil societal actors. How this dilemma is resolved requires closer investigation of alliance relationships.

To counter regime type explanations, I must demonstrate that the security consensus affects elite response to domestic base opposition irrespective of regime type. For example, under conditions of strong security consensus, regardless of regime type or orientation, anti-base movements should remain ineffective, with basing policies remaining relatively unchanged.\textsuperscript{57} I address this point further in Chapter Four, as well as the concluding chapter.

\textsuperscript{55} Cooley 2008, p.15.
\textsuperscript{56} Cooley 2008, p.9; Calder 2007, p.69-70.
\textsuperscript{57} As I argue in the scope conditions section below, anti-base movements are largely a post-democratization phenomena making this argument harder to test. Movement episodes in Ecuador and Italy in Chapter Four, however, help clarify this issue.
Rather than pitting regime type and security consensus as competing arguments, scholars may find it more constructive to explore parallels and avenues for synthesis. Regime type may actually help inform whether a security consensus exists among host government elites. For instance, one might argue *ceteris paribus* that the security consensus shared amongst host state elites appears stronger in autocratic rather than democratic regimes given the decentralized domestic structure of democracies. As the empirical chapters demonstrate, many of the predictions found in the regime type analysis of base politics correspond with my own theoretical framework. However, the mechanisms which explain or predict base policy outcomes differ. In certain cases, regime type explanations will provide greater analytical leverage, while in other episodes, the security consensus will offer a more compelling account. If the preceding statement appears overly conciliatory, we should be reminded that rarely, if ever, does one find a fail-proof scientific theory in political science. Instead we rely on theories which, when tested and substantiated with thorough evidence, appear to offer the best interpretation of empirical reality.

**Research Design and Methods**

*Operationalization of Variables*

Security Consensus: Measuring concepts such as perceptions, beliefs, or ideology is a fuzzy science. The security consensus, based largely on collective perceptions and beliefs, is no exception. Although loose quantitative indicators correlated with security dependence, such as the number of U.S. troops per host state capita, the number of U.S. installations, or alliance burden sharing costs may point towards a security consensus, the concept is better understood and operationalized by using qualitative indicators. Table 1.3 below presents a simple framework used to evaluate the strength or weakness of the security consensus among host government elites.
Table 1.3: Coding of the Security Consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPTH</th>
<th>BREADTH</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>Moderate Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Weak Consensus</td>
<td>Moderate Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The degree of security consensus among elites can be captured in terms of two dimensions: breadth and depth. “Breadth” refers to the number of elites in the foreign policy and security establishment who share a pro-U.S. security consensus. In other words, how widespread is the security consensus among political elites. Wide breadth implies that virtually all political elites favor strong security relations with the U.S., and support U.S. basing policy. Conversely, narrow breadth suggests that a few key elites hold onto the security consensus, but it may not be widely shared among the larger foreign policy or security establishment. Narrow breadth is characterized by greater contention among political elites regarding U.S. alliance issues.

“Depth” refers to the security consensus embodied in domestic institutions. Maximum depth implies that the security consensus is deeply embedded within institutions or ideology. Domestic political and ideological constraints prevent political elites from deviating too far from a pro-U.S. security consensus, even if these elites privately prefer loosening security ties to the U.S. On the contrary, minimum depth suggests that the security consensus operates at a more superficial level. Although elites may share a common perception of the U.S. alliance, the consensus rests on more fragile ground if it lacks the institutions, historical legacies, norms, or
ideologies which often help solidify collective beliefs about security relations over time.

Table 1.3 indicates that the security consensus is strongest when breadth is wide and depth is at a maximum. Conversely, the consensus is weakest when breadth is narrow and depth is at a minimum. Naturally, a strong correlation exists between depth and breadth. A higher percentage of elites will favor strong U.S. alliance policies and U.S. bases if the consensus is deeply embedded in institutions and ideology. However, the two dimensions of security consensus are not always congruent. For instance, opposition politicians may challenge U.S.-centered foreign policies advocated by the ruling elite, indicating narrower breadth. At the core, however, ideology and institutions may prevent a pro-U.S. security consensus from completely unraveling, suggesting maximum depth. Institutional and ideological factors constrain the political choices of oppositional elites, requiring them to acquiesce to the broader foreign policy and national security establishment supportive of the U.S. alliance.\(^58\) This combination of narrow breadth and maximum depth results in a “moderate” coding of the security consensus.

Likewise, the security consensus is coded as moderate when breadth is wide and depth is at a minimum. An example of this scenario may occur when a state previously ambivalent towards U.S. security relations experiences a sharp increase in external threats. Saudi Arabia during the Persian Gulf War provides one such example. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Saudi elites previously ambivalent to U.S. military presence in the Middle East suddenly perceived U.S. forces in a much more favorable light. At the Saudi government’s request, the U.S. dispatched U.S. troops to protect Saudi Arabia from an Iraqi invasion. However, this widespread

\(^{58}\) Despite differences on policy issues, oppositional political elites may still accept and value the U.S. alliance (and U.S. bases) as an integral component of its national security strategy.
consensus favoring security commitment from the U.S was not deeply institutionalized within Saudi domestic institutions.  

What observable implications help us measure the dimensions of breadth and depth, determining whether the security consensus is coded as strong, weak, or moderate? To the extent that the security consensus exists as a dominant foreign policy idea guiding state behavior, one will find evidence of an elite security consensus (or lack of) – embedded in national debates, policy discussions, speeches, and institutional arrangements. I use elite interviews, policy documents, legislative transcripts, government records, and official statements to gauge whether the host government believes U.S. forces are a necessary component of national security. More generally, if government elites support U.S. troop presence, U.S. bases, and a greater role in general for the U.S. in host state security, the security consensus should be coded as strong. Additionally, the security consensus is interpreted as strong if government elites explicitly state that U.S. forces guarantee host state national security. Often, the security consensus will be correlated with high degrees of threat perception. On the dimension of depth, institutionalized agreements such as mutual defense treaties or formalized bilateral security arrangements, as well as domestic institutions which legitimate the U.S. alliance and bases also point towards a strong (or at least moderate) security consensus. For instance, the creation of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) in Japan handling U.S. base issues, or provisions in South Korea’s National Security Laws tacitly directed against North Korea, help legitimate strong alliance relations and U.S. bases.


60 Legro 2005, p.42.
On the other hand, coding the security consensus as weak can be justified if government documents and elite statements indicate intense debates among government elites and academic circles regarding the extent of external threat perceptions and the role of U.S. forces and bases in national security. National discourse and debates, elite statements and attitudes, media reports, and opinion surveys should point towards major rifts on the issue of the U.S. alliance and bases. Elite statements rejecting U.S. bases, downgrading the importance of the U.S. alliance, or proposing alternative security arrangements reducing U.S. influence would marshal support for narrow breadth and minimal depth, and hence a weak security consensus.

Figure 1.5 below codes the security consensus for each country evaluated in the empirical chapters.

![Figure 1.5 Coding the strength or weakness of a pro-U.S. security consensus](image-url)
Although the security consensus is coded as a categorical variable, for the purpose of illustration, breadth and depth are conceptualized continuously in Figure 1.5. This scheme helps clarify the coding of the elite security consensus in countries such as Italy (and perhaps South Korea), which most likely fall in-between the categories of strong and moderate. Minor contention regarding the direction of U.S. alliance policies may exist within the foreign policy establishment, implying narrower breadth. However, the security consensus is still deeply embedded in institutions, ideology, and historical legacies in these two countries, suggesting maximum depth. Regarding South Korea, although alternative views calling for greater foreign policy independence exist in Seoul, the institutionalization and embedded nature of the security consensus suggests, at the very least, the presence of a moderate security consensus. The security consensus in Japan, coded as “strong”, is straight-forward. Japanese political elites are largely in favor of strong U.S. alliance relations, with a pro-U.S. consensus deeply embedded in Japanese domestic norms and institutions. On the contrary, the consensus in Ecuador and the Philippines (1991) is coded as weak. The security consensus is neither deep nor wide in these two countries. In the late 1990s, however, the Philippines is characterized by a strong elite security consensus. Chinese aggression in the South China Sea in the mid-1990s, and political economic constraints plaguing the Philippines’ military modernization program helped rally the majority of Philippine elites to support strengthened security ties to the U.S. by the late 1990s.

**Base Policy Outcome:** Base policy outcomes depend on the interaction between movement and government actors, which in turn, are influenced by the strength or weakness of the security consensus. A range of base policy outcomes are possible. The spectrum ranges from the maintenance of the status quo on one end, to the complete removal of U.S. forces on the other. When a strong security consensus
exists among elites, the host state responds to anti-base movements by employing strategies which delay, co-opt, disrupt, or confront anti-base movements. Under these circumstances, the host state may grant minor concessions to movements at best, but no substantial base policy changes are made. When elites are divided, however, host state responses to anti-base movements are variegated. Under these conditions, sympathetic elites support and align with movements politically. Genuine interaction and dialogue takes place between government elites opposed to U.S. bases and anti-base movement activists. Thus, more substantive changes in base policies are expected, such as significant changes to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the closure of major military installations, or the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Unit of Analysis: Movement Episodes

Incorporating social movement analysis into international relations theory creates a bit of ambiguity, if not tension, in the choice of a proper unit of analysis. For international relations scholars, the use of states as the primary unit of analysis is the default choice. Likewise, the concept of security consensus privileges states by focusing on the perception of national elites. From a social movement perspective, however, the choice of states as the primary unit of analysis is problematic. A study of anti-base movements requires shifting our primary focus from the national level to the sub-national level by examining episodes, loosely defined as “bounded sequences of continuous interaction.” The security consensus framework must therefore account for both movement episodes and states as a unit of analysis.

62 An episode can range from something simple such as a two week hunger strike by students demanding a minority studies program, to “major cycles of contention, revolution, and civil wars.” See Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow. Contentious Politics. Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers, 2007, p.36.
Throughout the dissertation, I use anti-base movement episodes to examine the relationship between movement dynamics, their impact on U.S.-host state relations, and base policy outcomes. Using a more precise definition, movement episodes are understood as “a period of emergent, sustained, contentious interaction between at least two collective actors.” The use of movement episodes as a unit of analysis offers several analytical advantages. First, examining movement episodes targeting specific policy demands (i.e. base closure, SOFA revisions, the ending of live bombing exercises), enables me to track specific mechanisms linking anti-base movements, the security consensus, and base policy outcomes. Second, while civil disturbances, small-scale protests, and “noise” occur daily in front of several military bases, of greater importance for this project are sustained, large-scale anti-base protests over a longer period of time. Third, studying movement episodes raises the possibility of increasing the number of observations in a single country across time. These episodes and the corresponding policy outcome stemming from movements may then be used to extrapolate generalizations about movement dynamics and alliance relations in specific countries. Lastly, an analysis of movement episodes allows us to examine possible intervening variables which may affect base policy outcomes.

The use of episodes as the unit of analysis does not discredit the important role of the state, nor should it prevent us from making comparisons about base politics across countries in addition to movement episodes. Anti-base movement strategy and effectiveness are affected by bilateral security relations and the existence (or absence)

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64 For instance, the movement to close Futenma Air Station in Okinawa may be representative of anti-base movements in Japan. As long as a strong security consensus exists in Japan, anti-base movements will remain largely ineffective in terms of policy outcomes.
of an elite security consensus at the national level. As argued earlier, movement episodes are nested within the context of a particular state. Although a comparison of political opportunities across countries cannot be easily made, comparisons regarding the breadth and depth of elite cohesion regarding host state-U.S. security relations are possible.

**Case Selection**

To convince skeptics that social movements really matter, I need to demonstrate that anti-base movements are capable of influencing policy outcomes for bases of high strategic value. Anti-base movements are expected to have the least impact on policy outcomes when bases are strategically important to the U.S. (and the host state, depending on the degree of security dependence). The U.S. will insist that bases remain open in order to maintain national and international security. Therefore, the most interesting and important cases in this study are the hard tests: movement episodes targeting bases of high strategic value. Next, I limit my case selection to episodes of high movement strength and mobilization. Inherent in this choice is the assumption that the host government ignores poorly mobilized protests and minor civil disturbances.\(^{65}\) I assume, therefore, that anti-base mobilization of low movement strength have little impact on base policy decisions. In short, movement episodes involving bases of high strategic value and high movement strength (i.e major mobilization episodes) constitute theoretically “interesting” cases. Although a total of nine possible types of cases exist using these parameters, I try to select primarily hard

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\(^{65}\) Episodes of minor civil disturbances and protests involving bases – coded as low movement strength - occur frequently, but I regard this as “noise”. Bases with low strategic value are also uninteresting. Those skeptical about anti-base movements argue that the U.S. would have eventually shut down bases with low strategic value even without any domestic opposition.
test cases to maximize analytical leverage, providing variation only on the security consensus variable (See Table 1.1 on p.6 for the full list of cases).

Dealing with rare events, case selection for this study required, to some extent, selecting on the dependent variable. While some social scientists might find this selection process troubling, case selection was partially motivated by the need for variation on the independent and dependent variables to strengthen the robustness of the theory. Using movement episodes as the primary unit of analysis also helps explain variation across time within a single country. In each case, I first determine the degree of elite security consensus at the onset of a movement episode using a variety of evidence cited above. I then process trace the sequence of events, highlighting the interaction between movement and government actors to test whether the security consensus variable leads to the outcomes hypothesized earlier in Table 1.1.

**Scope Conditions**

How far does the security consensus framework travel across the entire universe of possible cases? The argument potentially applies anywhere anti-base protests have been (or are currently) present. Currently, the Pentagon’s 2007 Base Structure Report cites 823 overseas bases scattered across 39 countries. Figure 1.6 below provides a global map of U.S. base locations, highlighting the present, potential universe of cases.

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66 One might argue that providing “easy” cases, or providing cases with variation on additional variables might add value to the study by identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for movement success (i.e. base closure). Rather than identify a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, however, I am more interested in looking at the process of interaction between the state and civil society.

Relevant cases imply large protests against strategically important bases which the U.S. intends to maintain. Regarding strategically important bases, the number of large and medium bases, defined by the total plant replacement value (PVR) in 2007, totaled thirty-four.\(^{68}\) This does not necessarily exclude, however, strategically or functionally important bases which do not meet the Pentagon’s definition of a large or medium size base.

Because my theoretical framework focuses on high levels of movement mobilization, my argument is most acute in post-democratization periods. The potential for successful mobilization is reduced as authoritarian regimes often clamp down on protests. Nevertheless, limited anti-base protests do exist in non-democracies. Thus, potential cases operating under non-democratic regimes are not immediate grounds for exclusion.

\(^{68}\) DOD 2007, p.22. A large site is defined as a total PRV greater than or equal to $1.640B. A medium site is defined as a base with a total PRV less than $1.640B and greater than or equal to $875M.
Even though the universe of relevant cases appears narrowly restricted, the major political implications of base politics concerning several key installations in important host nations warrants a careful analysis of anti-base movements and the security consensus framework. Moreover, with the U.S. pushing for increased basing access in Eastern Europe, Central Asian, and Africa, my analysis may shed light on future hot spots ripe for anti-base or anti-American protests.

**Preview of the Empirical Cases**

I use anti-base movement episodes in five different countries - Philippines, Japan, Ecuador, Italy, and South Korea - to test my theory. Two central questions guide our discussion of the empirical chapters: 1) Why were anti-base movements in the Philippines and Ecuador more successful in shutting down bases, whereas anti-base movements in Okinawa, Italy, and South Korea were relatively unsuccessful? 2) Why and how did host state elites in Japan, Italy, and South Korea respond differently in balancing between domestic pressure and international alliance commitments compared to elites in the Philippines and Ecuador?

As Table 1.1 (see p.6) indicates, anti-base movements were most effective under conditions of weak security consensus. In the Philippines and Ecuador, elite statements, policy documents, interview records, and parliamentary transcripts highlight the division among government officials and policy-makers regarding the role of U.S. bases. Key elites influential in the politics of bases rejected the idea that U.S. military presence was needed for host state national security. Unlike countries characterized by a strong or moderate security consensus, no dominant national security discourse dictated U.S.-host state relations in the Philippines in the early 1990s or Ecuador in the past decade. Thus a significant number of Philippine and Ecuadorian political elites were receptive to anti-base sentiments. In both countries, activists formulated a strategy targeting elites. This resulted in much more interaction
and coalition building between anti-base movement activists and domestic political elites, giving activists the leverage needed to influence base policy outcomes.

On the contrary, in Japan, Italy, and South Korea, a dominant national security discourse and pro-U.S. security consensus permeated the security and foreign policy establishment. The inability to penetrate elite ranks became a major obstacle for Okinawan, Italian, and South Korean anti-base movements in their struggle against U.S. bases. To their credit, anti-base movements pressured the government, occasionally winning “partial concessions.” For the most part, however, the government tended to ignore activists’ core demands. Government officials were aware that domestic pressure and anti-base mobilization operated cyclically. Token concessions usually quelled anti-base activity until the next mobilization cycle, triggered by an accident, crime, death, or some other unforeseen external event. Observing the interaction between anti-base movements and government forces unfold in these three movement episodes demonstrates that the host government responded strategically to anti-base groups in an effort to co-opt, weaken, and demobilize anti-base movements.

Interestingly, in these three cases, the state allowed significant space for pressure groups to oppose U.S. bases, attested by the successful mobilization of anti-base coalition groups from various sectors. Activists even formed ties with minority party government elites. Occasionally, the state gave partial concessions to movement demands. But even though the state entertained anti-base movements to a certain degree, using both muscle and tact, the state ultimately overpowered any mobilization effort when U.S. alliance relations were put in jeopardy by massive anti-U.S. base demonstrations.
Outline of the Following Chapters

Following this introductory theoretical chapter, Chapter Two focuses on the interaction between anti-base movements and the host government under weak levels of security consensus. The primary case in this chapter is the 1990-91 Anti-Treaty movement against Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines. Chapter Three examines base politics under strong levels of security consensus, using the 1995-1996 Okinawan movement episode as an “ideal” type case. Chapter Four extends the application of my theory to additional regions. To increase the validity and robustness of the security consensus framework, I investigate recent anti-base movements in Manta, Ecuador and Vicenza, Italy. The variation in outcomes based on the different levels of security consensus in the two cases provides further support for my theory. Chapters Five and Six examine the security consensus and anti-base movements, respectively, in South Korea. Relaxing the fixed assumption of the security consensus, Chapter Seven explores in greater depth how variation over time in the security consensus alters movement and government strategies and varying policy outcomes. Through a paired comparison between the Philippines and Japan, I illustrate how the re-emergence of a security consensus in the mid-late 1990s weakened the impact of Philippine protests against U.S. military presence. Finally, Chapter Eight summarizes the findings of the dissertation. I also evaluate the security consensus framework with competing explanations in the base politics literature, highlighting both points of tension and areas of complement. I conclude by providing insights for anti-base activists, and drawing policy implications from my research to U.S. overseas basing strategy in the post-9/11 period.
“September 16, 1991, may well be the day when we in this Senate found the soul, the true spirit of this nation because we mustered the courage and the will to declare the end of foreign military presence in the Philippines...Therefore, I vote No to this Treaty, and if it were only possible, I would vote 203 million times No.¹

With a resounding “No,” Senate President Jovito Salonga cast the final vote against the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security between the Republic of the Philippines (R.P.) and the United States. The final tally totaled 12-11 against the Treaty, effectively ending over ninety years of U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Salonga’s vote was perhaps less suspenseful than the 12-11 margin would suggest since the Philippine Senate only needed eight out of twenty-three “No” votes to reject the Treaty.² Nevertheless, the rejection of the Treaty and U.S. bases in the Philippines was a monumental day for Filipinos. The decision was all the more astonishing given that a traditionally conservative institution such as the Senate ultimately snubbed its nose against its primary international benefactor. Asking how an economically deprived, politically unstable country held its own against a world superpower, Roland Simbulan, a long-time Philippine activist and scholar, and advisor to Senator Wigerbto Tañada during the R.P.-U.S. base negotiations replied, “The real moving spirit behind the twelve Senators was the broad and unified people’s movement outside the Senate...the Anti-Treaty Movement was forged with the

² The Senate required a 2/3 majority to pass the new bases Treaty.
broadest unity possible among organized forces and individuals. In the end, it was the power of the people that ended the most visible symbols of our colonial legacy and the Cold War in the Philippines.”

One cannot attribute the rejection of the R.P.-U.S. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security and the subsequent closure of Subic Bay Naval Station, strategically the most important base in the Philippines, to a single explanation. Numerous interacting factors most likely led to the closure of U.S. bases. Immediate factors highlighting the importance of agency focus on the negotiations between U.S. and Philippine officials. Base critics argued that a “lopsided treaty,” coupled with the “arrogant negotiating behavior” of the U.S. delegation headed by Richard Armitage, would never pass through the Senate. The revised 1987 Philippine constitution also factored into the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station in 1991. Article 15, Section 25 of the revised constitution required both Senate ratification and the passage of a national referendum on any new base treaty. This institutional change shifted decision power from the executive to the legislative, providing Philippine Senators and civil society greater leverage in the base policy-making process. Others argue that structural factors, such as the end of the Cold War or economic recession in the U.S., reduced Washington’s political will to continue operating bases with declining strategic value, thus leading to base closures. Finally, unforeseeable events, or “acts of gods” such as the explosion of Mount Pinatubo and the destruction of Clark Air Base affected the decision calculus of elites and the outcome of Subic Bay.

While Simbulan’s preceding quote regarding the role of anti-base movements should be placed within the context of other proximate and distal factors explaining

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base closures, I concur with Simbulan that social movements played a pivotal role in the Senate’s fateful decision on September 1991. The burden of proof, however, rests on those who contend civil society and anti-base movements mattered in the Philippines. What was the relationship between anti-base coalition movements and the Senators of the Eighth Congress who were given veto power over the new negotiated bases treaty? Why were Philippine elites divided over the issue of U.S. bases and the future of R.P.-U.S. relations, with the president leading the pro-base faction and the Senate leading the anti-base faction, and how did this affect their response to anti-base movements? How were anti-base activists, agents considered peripheral to state security policy-making, able to oust U.S. bases? Finally, how did the relationship between state and civil society interact with alliance politics to produce particular responses and outcomes which would alter the future direction of R.P.-U.S. relations?

I argue that a weak security consensus enabled anti-base movements to penetrate the state by taking advantage of divisions among Philippine elites over the fate of U.S. bases. In the absence of any strong security consensus, anti-base activists and nationalist politicians provided an alternative national security discourse which distinguished their position from the traditional pro-U.S. line previously embraced by the Philippine government. Thus, the weak security consensus functioned as a political opportunity, enabling activists to form ties with sympathetic elites. This in turn provided activists the leverage necessary to influence base policy outcomes – most significantly, the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station.

This chapter begins with a brief background on U.S. bases and the rise of anti-base coalition movements in the Philippines. The next section describes Philippine national security and the nature of R.P.-U.S. security relations between 1988-1991 from the perspective of host government political elites. Evidence based on government policy documents, Senate legislative transcripts, public opinion surveys,
and military data all suggest a lack of consensus among Philippine government elites regarding Philippine national security, and specifically strategic thinking towards its alliance partnership with the U.S. This position is substantiated by the Philippine security literature as well as interviews with former and current Philippine policymakers and scholars. Section three focuses on the interaction between anti-base movements and the state. Here I describe the tactics and strategies anti-base activists employed and the response to anti-base movements from both pro and anti-base government factions. In particular, I focus on the relationship between activists and anti-base Senators to trace the mechanisms linking the weak security consensus to movement strategies, government reactions, and policy outcomes.

U.S. Military Bases and the Rise of Philippine Anti-Base Movements

U.S. Bases in the Philippines

Contrary to the expectations of Filipino revolutionaries, Spain’s defeat in the Battle of Manila in May 1898 and its ultimate defeat in the Spanish-American War did not lead to Philippine independence. Excluding Filipino representation at the Treaty of Paris, Spain merely transferred (at the price of twenty million dollars) colonial power from the Spanish to the Americans. The U.S. also acquired Spanish military posts, including Subic Bay, and established several new military facilities during and after the Philippine-American War from 1899-1901.

Gaining independence in 1946, the Philippines and the United States signed the 1947 R.P.-U.S. Military Bases Agreement (MBA) which gave the US rent free “certain lands of the public domain” for a period of ninety-nine years. The MBA

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provided the U.S. with twenty-three facilities covering approximately 250,000 hectares. However, between 1947 and 1991, the MBA underwent at least forty amendments which returned base land to the Philippines and provided the Philippine government greater control over U.S. bases. Most notably, the 1966 Ramos-Rusk Agreement signed on September 16, 1966 changed the terms of the base limit from 99 to 25 years. Thus the MBA was set to expire on September 16, 1991. Later, the 1979 Romulo-Murphy Exchange of Notes transferred nominal control of U.S. bases to the Philippine government. The U.S. also agreed to provide $500 million of security assistance to the Philippines between 1979-1984. Both sides agreed to review the MBA every five years until its termination.

The revised Philippine Constitution in February 1987 gave the Philippine Senate considerable influence over the retention of U.S. bases after 1991. Under Section 25, Article 18, the revised constitution stated, “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum.”

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6 *Ibid*, 1989 p. 23. Also see Foreign Service Institute, Department of Foreign Affairs, *Primer on the R.P.-U.S. Military Bases Agreement.* Manila, Philippines: FSI, 1989. Changes in basing status during this period reflect the ability of pro-U.S. Presidents such as Ramon Magsaysay or Ferdinand Marcos to take advantage of nationalist sentiment to leverage concessions from the U.S. Both Magsaysay and Marcos used concessions to increase their domestic political legitimacy. As Alexander Cooley writes, “Marcos would maintain a tough, pro-Philippine sovereignty domestically, but could do so while maintaining unwavering U.S. support that he leveraged for base-related payments. In turn, these substantial quid pro quo payments allowed him to provide patronage for his military supporters and political base.” See Cooley 2008, Ch.3.

7 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Section 25, Article 18.
Function of Subic and Clark Bases

Subic Bay Naval Station in Zambales Province and Clark Air Base in Angeles City were the two largest U.S. installations in the Philippines. In 1986, Subic and Clark bases hosted 7,000 and 8,500 U.S. military personnel, respectively. The number of U.S. military personnel, civilians, and dependents on both bases totaled 38,550. Both bases provided logistical support, staging areas, fuel and porting, repair facilities, training facilities, military communications, ammunition and supply depots, and rest and recreation. Subic Bay was the largest overseas Navy installation in the Pacific, and served as the primary port, training facility, and logistics hub for the U.S. Seventh Fleet which operated in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Cubic Point in Subic also functioned as the land base for the Seventh Fleet’s strike force, Task Force 77. Meanwhile, Clark Air Base served as the headquarters of the 13th Air Force, the tactical arm of the U.S. Air Force in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Clark also acted as a staging point for strategic airlifts into the Indian Ocean. From a strategic perspective, bases in the Philippines were used to secure air and sea lanes, balance Soviet military presence in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, and provide regional defense for Southeast Asia.

Strategic Value of Subic Bay Naval Station

Realists skeptical of anti-base movements argue that the end of the Cold War and reduced threat perceptions ultimately led to base closures in the Philippines. Thus, any analysis of anti-base movement impact in the Philippines must address the context of regional strategic change. Certainly, the strategic environment shifted with the

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8 Simbulan 1989, p.11.
9 Ibid, p.11.
disappearance of the Soviet threat. Despite looming questions regarding the future strategic utility of Subic Bay among U.S. military planners, however, the evidence below suggests that the closure of Subic Bay was far from inevitable.

First, throughout all seven rounds of the Philippine American Cooperation Talks (PACT) between 1990-91, the U.S. panel firmly insisted on a ten year renewal agreement. This insistence suggests that Washington had no intention of shutting down Subic Bay in the immediate future.\textsuperscript{12} Second, Subic Bay’s strategic value and assets, and the enormous opportunity and financial costs in finding a replacement facility placed unacceptable demands on the U.S. to phase out Subic Bay under the preferred terms of the Philippine government.\textsuperscript{13} The naval supply depot at Subic Bay served as a logistics hub for all naval forces between Hawaii and the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, Subic was one of only two deep-water ports in the entire Pacific and Indian Ocean large enough to support aircraft carrier and air wing support facilities.\textsuperscript{14} In a prepared report on the status of overseas basing in the Asia-Pacific region, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford Jr. testified in March 1991, “U.S. interests in sustaining a presence in the Philippines remains undiminished. The facilities host the greatest concentration of U.S. logistics, communication, and training facilities in the world. The synergism of these functions and facilities provides the U.S. maximum operational effectiveness, but also an important presence that signifies…our

\textsuperscript{12} See Document 5.10: “Letter of special negotiator Richard Armitage, Washington DC, to Sec. Raul Manglapus, Manila, on the US compensation package proposal.” April 27, 1991; Document 6.8: “Paper written by a member of the U.S. Panel, detailing the requirement of the U.S. side to bring the talks to closure, transmitted by fax to the Ministry of Finance.” May 9, 1991 in Maria Castro-Guevara ed. \textit{The Bases Talks Reader: Key Documents of the 1990-91 Philippine-American Cooperation Talks}. Manila: Anvil, 1997. In round VI of PACT, however, the U.S. was willing to accept a 9 + 1 year phased reduction period. The Philippines, on the other hand, continued to insist on a seven year term period.

\textsuperscript{13} Desmond Ball. \textit{U.S. bases in the Philippines: issues and implications}. Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1988, p.11.

immediate and potential capabilities in a time of crisis.”¹⁵ Ford did concede to the possibility of reductions at Subic, but he insisted that “no single site would be capable of assimilating all the functions that are presently conducted in the Philippines.” He continued, “the impact of the loss of Subic would depend upon where and how functions at Subic were dispersed, but at a minimum, annual operating costs would increase…and Seventh Fleet war-fighting readiness would be reduced by the loss of access to the Philippine training ranges.”¹⁶ Shutting down Subic Bay, even after Mount Pinatubo’s explosion “was not the expressed desire of the administration.”¹⁷

Figure 2.1: U.S. troop deployment from 1975-2005 by region
Source: The Heritage Foundation. Calculations by Tim Kane, Ph.D, based on annual records from Department of Defense, DIOR.

Third, as Figure 2.1 above indicates, troop deployment levels in Asia after the Cold War remained around the 100,000 level. Unlike the dramatic decrease in U.S. troop

¹⁵ Ibid, p.816.
¹⁶ Ibid, p.817.
levels in Europe beginning in the late 1980s, the consistent level of U.S. forces in Asia imply less strategic change in the Asia-Pacific region than predicted, even with the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{18} In sum, the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station presents a hard test for anti-base movements.

\textbf{Origins of the Anti-Base Movement}

The historical roots of the anti-base movement begin with U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines. Although the Philippines declared their “independence” in 1898, the U.S. did not transfer full government authority to the Filipinos until 1946. Prior to independence, Philippine political elites collaborated with the Americans, but at the same time, publicly promoted Philippine autonomy under colonial rule. These conservative nationalists presented a political alternative to armed resistance and revolution.\textsuperscript{19} Former revolutionaries, intellectuals, and the urban middle class gradually re-entered Philippine politics after the Philippine-American War, organizing the Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party) in 1907. Whereas some conservative nationalists privately hoped for Philippine annexation to the United States, the Partido Nacionalista’s main goal was the eventual independence of the Philippines.

After independence in 1946, nationalist criticism against American rule transformed into opposition against American neo-colonial influence in the Philippines. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) were the most visible group voicing its criticism against neo-colonialism. The call for independence from American influence was also carried by those not necessarily aligned with the ideological left. Most notable were nationalist politicians in the 1950s and 1960s, such as Senators Claro Recto, Jose Laurel, Jose Diokno, and Lorenzo Tañada. In the 1950s, Claro Recto was one of the first prominent nationalist politicians to challenge the neo-

\textsuperscript{18} For example, the potential for conflict continued to exist across the Taiwan Straits and the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea.

\textsuperscript{19} Abinales 2005, p.106.
colonial mentality prevalent in Philippine political society. \(^{20}\) Recto’s nationalist call for true independence and the removal of U.S. bases was later taken up by Diokno and Tañada until the Marcos dictatorship purged them from Philippine politics. Although the early anti-base movement was taken up by other elites such as professors or lawyers, the leadership tended to rest with Senators given their national prominence.

President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law in 1972, thereby silencing nationalist politicians’ calls for the removal of U.S. bases. However, the growth of the Philippine Left during this period helped fuel a growing underground movement calling for the overthrow of the Marcos regime. As Philippine political scientist Miriam Ferrer argues, the Philippine Left “evolved as the most consistent oppositionist to the bases.”\(^{21}\) With U.S. bases viewed as a key pillar propping up the Marcos regime, the removal of bases and imperial foreign influence developed into a major agenda for the Philippine Left. For instance, in their ten point policy agenda, the National Democratic Front (NDF), the above-ground intellectual movement of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), made it clear that one of their goals was to rid the Philippines of U.S. bases and establish an independent foreign policy.\(^{22}\) Moreover, the Left argued that U.S. bases were being utilized for counter-insurgency operations and direct and indirect repression against Filipinos.\(^{23}\)

The involvement of the Left helped bring the anti-base movement to the masses. Nationalists across multiple sectors, including professionals, students,
workers, and farmers banded together in February 1967 to form the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism. Anti-base movements also sustained themselves within university campuses. Formed in the 1960s, student organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (Nationalist Youth) and the Samahan ng Demokratikong Kabagtaan (Association of Democratic Youth) all evoked strong nationalist tendencies. About 350 students from thirty schools around Manila launched an anti-base campaign on January 1979. In accordance with global peace and demilitarization goals, church groups in the Philippines such as the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) also grew more vocal against U.S. bases in the early 1980s. In sum, by the 1980s, a growing minority voice against U.S. bases influenced by leftist ideology and nationalism had developed across various sectors in Philippine society.

**Development of Anti-Base Coalition Campaigns, 1981-1991**

Groups predominantly on the left-end of the political spectrum addressed anti-base issues. Rather than focusing exclusively on bases, these groups tended to advocate several issues and platform goals. For instance, in addition to the removal of U.S. bases, coalition groups added to their agenda issues such as democratic reforms and the end of U.S. support for the Marcos regime. The first coalition movement to target U.S. bases almost exclusively was the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition (NFPC), formed in 1981. As the name suggests, NFPC’s primary goal was the abolishment of nuclear power in the Philippines. NFPC initially focused on the

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24 Ferrer 1994, p.6. Ferrer notes, however, that the anti-base movement was less successful in mobilizing the unorganized working class whose immediate concerns were economic rather than political. The anti-base movement, foremost a political-ideological struggle, mobilized its working class base primarily through political blocs.
construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, but the movement expanded to include the opposition of nuclear weapons and U.S. bases which stored such weapons. As a precursor to the anti-base coalition movement, NFPC would later devote its entire energy to U.S. bases after the closure of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant.

Anti-base leaders organized the first formal anti-base coalition movement in February 1983 under the name Anti-Bases Coalition (ABC). Under the guidance of former Senator Jose Diokno, ABC was represented by the political left as well as non-left nationalists within the professional class who were part of the anti-Marcos campaign. Over the next eight years, the anti-base movement evolved through periods of four different coalition groups: the Campaign for a Sovereign Philippines (CSP) in 1986, Kasarinlan in 1988, ABAKADA in 1989, and the Anti-Treaty Movement (ATM) in 1991. Anti-base coalitions were generally led by activists from the national democrat strand of the Left, often supported by prominent national elite figures. Although these coalition groups existed as separate entities at different points in time, the Philippine anti-base coalition movement can be viewed as an evolutionary process with the start of each campaign coalition acting as a new juncture point in the anti-base movement. For example, rather than dissolving completely after a period of inactivity, ABC acted as a convener for subsequent anti-base campaigns such as CSP, and became a member organization of broader anti-base coalitions such as

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27 The exception was Kasarinlan, formed by activists within the social democrat camp of the Philippine Left. The social democrats used Kasarinlan to distinguish their own anti-base activity from the national democrats. See Ferrer 1994, pp.12-13 for a discussion on social democrat involvement in the anti-bases movement. Also see Dionisio 2005 for a discussion on national democrats and social democrats role in coalition building. The national democrats (NDs) view themselves as the “voice of the marginalized majority” who demand “substantive and radical changes,” confronting repressive regimes with more militant action. Social democrats (SDs) view themselves as an alternative to the state and the CPP-NPA-NDF faction. They are supported by “the silent and non-ideological majority” of Filipinos. See Dionisio 2005, pp.25-26.
ABAKADA or ATM. Thus many of the same key groups and actors tended to appear in each subsequent coalition campaign across time.28

Both internal and external reasons account for the formation of five anti-base coalition campaigns in only an eight year span of time. Internally, the loose organizational structure of coalitions and lack of institutionalization made it difficult for anti-base movements to sustain themselves over a longer period of time.29 Pressing external events, such as Ninoy Aquino’s assassination in 1983 or the People Power revolution in 1986 also detracted attention away from U.S. base issues. On the other hand, political opportunities following Philippine democratization in 1986 such as the Constitutional revisions in 1987, or the renegotiation of U.S. bases under PACT in 1990-91, served as focal points for anti-base activists to regroup and initiate a fresh round of anti-base campaign activity.30 Although anti-base coalitions proceeded in a stop-and-go fashion, the movement itself followed an evolutionary trajectory.

The Anti-Treaty Movement, organized in preparation for PACT, is of particular importance in this chapter. While not significantly different from previous anti-base campaigns, the timing of the movement prior to the Senate vote on the new base treaty, and ATM’s ability to find allies among political elites opposed to U.S. bases, provided activists the leverage necessary to defeat any new basing agreement. In other words, anti-base activists penetrated the state. Forming ties with anti-base government elites, activists helped establish a new era of Philippine security without U.S. bases.

28 Interview with ABC Co-Chair, Ma Socorro Diokno, April 10, 2006. UP-Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines.
29 Ferrer 1994, p.22.
30 Interview with former Bayan secretary general Lidy Nacpil. April 28, 2006. Quezon City, Philippines.
The Weak Security Consensus and Philippine Political Elites

How did anti-base activists penetrate the state and form ties with sympathetic elites? More importantly, how were social movements, often considered tangential to the security decision-making process, able to oust the U.S. military from the Philippines? The success of anti-base movements and the ability of activists to penetrate the state and influence key political elites required movement actors to take advantage of the weak security consensus within the Philippine government. Thus activists employed mobilization frames and strategies which resonated with sympathetic anti-base political leaders. In this section, I marshal evidence supporting my contention that important Philippine political elites were divided on issues of national security.

The breadth and depth of the security consensus were relatively low in the Philippines. Regarding breadth, elites important to the base policy-making process, particularly a core group of anti-base Senators, opposed U.S. bases. The lack of security consensus was most pronounced in Senate debates on the renewal of the bases Treaty, and in the different preferences held by the pro-base Philippine president, Corazon Aquino, and the predominantly anti-base Senate. On the dimension of depth, the security consensus following the overthrow of Marcos in 1986 was mixed. Although ruling elites accepted the U.S. security umbrella during the Cold War, two factors made the basis for a deep-rooted security consensus more tenuous. First, nationalist elites continually challenged Manila’s neo-colonial dependence on Washington. Although marginalized during the height of the Cold War, the nationalist position gained strong legitimacy in the 1980s. Many of the political and ideological constraints perpetuating pro-U.S. foreign policies were removed with the rise of the People Power movement and the overthrow of the American-backed Marcos regime. Second, in a country historically focused on internal rather than external security, the
future role of the U.S. alliance in the post-Marcos era remained unclear. As anti-base Senators cited, and a few pro-base elites tacitly agreed, no clear security rationale existed for major U.S. military presence in the Philippines.

**Orientation towards internal security**

The divergent discourse regarding the future of R.P.- U.S. relations among Philippine elites, and the sudden departure of the U.S. military in 1991 is initially puzzling. Filipinos fought side-by-side with Americans against the Japanese in World War II. Filipinos lived under the U.S. security umbrella during the Cold War. Like other close Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea, the Philippines signed a mutual defense treaty with the U.S. in 1951, and hosted a substantial number of U.S. troops and bases. Moreover, internal political stability and national security in the Philippines, was always contingent on U.S. support throughout the Cold War. These factors alone would suggest a moderate degree of security consensus among Philippine elites.

On the other hand, this finding is less surprising if we place R.P.-U.S. relations under the context of Philippine sovereignty and national security. Unlike South Korea or Japan, the Philippines has historically been concerned with internal, not external security. In what Renato de Castro labels as “the legacy of internal defense,” the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) traditionally directed military operations around internal security threats. This included armed insurgencies from the New People’s Army (NPA), the armed faction of the Communist Party Philippines, communist rebel groups such as the Hukbalahap, and Muslim separatist groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Moro Islamic Liberation Front

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31 See Cooley 2008, Chapter 3.
(MILF), and most recently, Abu Sayyaf.\textsuperscript{33} As one security analyst quotes, “The communist insurgency and Muslim separatist movement in Mindanao have been the principal security preoccupation of the Philippine government for the last three decades.”\textsuperscript{34}

Under the Marcos regime, the Philippine government only intensified its preoccupation with internal security and domestic stability. Likewise, the AFP expanded its role in counterinsurgency operations to include the administration of martial law.\textsuperscript{35} The fall of Marcos and the onset of Philippine democracy in 1986 did not fundamentally alter the Philippine’s preoccupation with internal security. Although the CPP-NPA insurgency was on the decline after reaching its peak in 1987, the government continued to direct military resources towards domestic security in the wake of a growing Muslim insurgency and several attempted military coups.\textsuperscript{36} Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide survey data from Social Weather Station (SWS) regarding internal threat perceptions from communist insurgency and Muslim rebel groups between 1986-1993. Both survey data indicate that internal threat perceptions were relative highly in the Philippines.


\textsuperscript{34} Charles Morrison ed. \textit{Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1997}. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, 1997, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{35} Renato de Castro. "Adjusting to the Post-Us Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine Military's Modernization Program." \textit{Armed Forces and Society} 26, no. 1 (1999), p.120.

\textsuperscript{36} Morrison 1997, p97; de Castro 1999, p.120.
Table 2.1: Internal Threat Perceptions: Communist Insurgency

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Table 2.2: Internal Threat Perceptions: Muslim Rebels

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<td>26</td>
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**An Underdeveloped National Security Agenda**

The U.S. security umbrella also explains the internal focus of Philippine security. Guaranteed protection from outside aggression under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Philippine government could afford to allocate its resources towards internal security while the U.S. alliance guaranteed protection against external threats. However, over-reliance on the U.S. and the preoccupation with internal security did come at the expense of formulating any overarching, comprehensive national security agenda. De Castro notes how four decades of focus on internal security threats undermined the AFP’s ability to adequately address potential external security threats after the removal of U.S. bases in 1991. Poorly funded, the AFP weapons arsenal consisted largely of outdated equipment such as UH-1 Huey.

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37 Question worded in the survey as follows: “Please tell me how great or small is the danger of the following to the government of President Corazon Aquino: Rebel communists and communist supporters (very great, big, small, very small, none)?

38 Tables 2.1 and 2.2 aggregate “very great” and “big” responses into “great,” and “small” and “very small” responses into “small”.

39 Survey only conducted in the National Capital Region (Manila).

40 Question worded in the survey as follows: “Please tell me how great or small is the danger of the following to the government of President Corazon Aquino: Muslim rebels (very great, big, small, very small, none)?
helicopters and armored vehicles geared towards counterinsurgency.\textsuperscript{41} Former Philippine Secretary of Defense Orlando Mercado, who pushed for AFP modernization while still chair of the Senate Defense Committee, stated:

“The Department of National Defense, whose [responsibility is to] chart the policy direction as well as strategic vision [of the armed forces], was historically short on strategic thinking. This resulted from decades of preoccupation with fighting insurgency and separatism. External defense was left to the managers of the ‘security umbrella’ provided by the Americans. While this made political sense for a cash strapped third world country, it in effect was an abdication of the raison d'etre of a military organization.”\textsuperscript{42}

In light of Mercado’s comments, it is interesting to note that the Department of National Defense (DND) did not regularly publish defense white papers or any other overarching national security strategy agenda. According to political scientist Herman Kraft, the only year the DND conducted any comprehensive systematic study formulating a national security agenda was in the mid-1990s, published in 1998 as a defense policy paper titled, “In Defense of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{43} Mercado, then still the Senate Chairman of the Defense Committee, advocated outlining a national security strategy as a means to gather funds for the AFP modernization program. Devising a concrete national security strategy provided the justification necessary for an expanded budget and new equipment requests.\textsuperscript{44} However, this suggests that the 1998 Defense Paper was motivated less by the pressing need for a new overarching security strategy, and more for the appropriation of funds for AFP modernization.

\textsuperscript{41} De Catro 1999, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{42} Interview via e-mail with former Senator and Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado. April 22, 2006.
\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Herman Joseph Kraft. UP-Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. March 28, 2006.
The lack of external threat perceptions in the Philippines are confirmed by low defense spending trends in the Philippines. Figure 2.2 below indicates low defense expenditures in the Philippines relative to other ASEAN countries.

![Figure 2.2: ASEAN defense expenditure as percent GDP](source: IISS The Military Balance)

Although one might argue that the U.S. security umbrella enabled the Philippines to maintain a low military budget, Figure 2.2 indicates that Philippine defense spending remained low even after U.S. withdrawal in 1991. This suggests that the Philippines continued to place low priority in purchasing the expensive equipment necessary to maintain a grand strategy oriented towards external security threats.

National security priorities were less clear without the presence of any looming external threat. Therefore, the absence of perceived external threats, and the lack of any clear sense of direction in grand strategy weakened political support for U.S. bases. In the following weeks prior to the Senate vote on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security, numerous Senators repeated that no clear security rationale
existed for maintaining U.S. bases. The most telling speech was given by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, former Secretary of Defense under Marcos. Enrile quoted:

“In considering the draft Treaty, Mr. President, the first thing we must consider is this: Do we have an external enemy against whom we must be defended with the full panoply of U.S. military power: None that we may know of Mr. President. I have been a Secretary of National Defense of this Republic. I have the good fortune to be so for 17 years, and no one can tell me truthfully that today, in the next 10 years, we will have an external enemy for which we must have the security umbrella of the United States of America. No country in the region has any conceivable interest in invading the Philippines.”

Even Senators who voted to retain U.S. bases questioned the need for bases from a security standpoint. Senate Chairwoman of the Foreign Relations Committee Leticia Ramos-Shahani recalled:

“The world situation wasn’t so bad. Gorbachev was talking about perestroika. The Soviet Union was collapsing, and thus the U.S. bogeyman disappeared. China had opened up. I visited China, and they welcomed us with open arms. The ideological threat was gone, so why did we need the Seventh Fleet. What threat is there to defend us from. During that time, we were debating what do we really need the bases for.”

The absence of perceived external security threats, and the focus on internal security certainly weakened political support for U.S. bases. This provided activists the political space necessary to enter the debate over U.S. bases and forge ties with

46 Interview with Former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani. Makati City, Philippines. March 15, 2006. Of course, several pro-base Senators also cited the need for bases given the weak state of Philippines security. Leading the charge was Senator Vicinte Paterno, who stated, “With the power vacuum in the region that is brought about by the abdication by the Soviet Union of superpower status, we may find regional bullies emerging who want to dominate the region…the Gulf War illustrated the need for a continued defense umbrella of the United States and assistance to build up the Philippine defense capability…If U.S. security assistance were to be withdrawn abruptly, I am afraid our country would be a sitting duck for any aggressor.” See Republic of the Philippines, Record of the Senate. Fifth Regular Session, Vol 1, No. 7. “Privilege speech of Senator Paterno,” August 1, 1991, p.246-47.
government elites. Even among the executive-led pro-base faction, the security rationale for bases appeared ambiguous at best. Although some officials cited security issues as a reason to maintain bases, many of those inside the Aquino Administration, including Aquino herself, were more interested in the potential economic benefits reaped by the bases. Until July 1991, the Philippine panel requested a minimum annual compensation of $825 million for a seven year duration period. Foreign Secretary Manglapus expressed this sentiment at a meeting sponsored by Senate President Jovito Salonga’s summer retreat in what came to be known as the Pansol Reflections. He quotes, “Our optimum position is to eliminate both bases immediately; but the interest of our citizens as has been already clarified here by congressmen, labor leaders, and others, demand that we negotiate something that will take care of the welfare of our citizens.” The Philippine government eventually signed the Treaty at a much lower cost ($325 million). The lower compensation package certainly did not help ratification of the Treaty in the Senate, but it is still important to highlight that economic benefits alone were unable to generate the political will necessary to maintain U.S. bases.

Would the Philippine Senate have voted “yes” to U.S. bases had a strong security consensus existed? The theory I propose in this dissertation suggests such a possibility. One theoretical implication is that the presence of a strong security

47 This included President Aquino, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Treaty negotiating panel represented by various Cabinet officials.
48 President Aquino stated, “We have stressed to the American Panel our need for an immediate and sizeable capital infusion to shore up our international reserves, stabilize our currency, improve the investment climate, promote employment, and accelerate economic growth.” Doc. 4.14: “Press statement of President Corazon Aquino on the results of Pact V, Manila, 16 February, 1991.” In Castro-Guevara 1997, p.168.
consensus among government elites – that is, a shared perception and intersubjective understanding of national security embedded in R.P.-U.S. security relations and U.S. bases – would have resulted in the retention of Subic Bay Naval Station regardless of the low economic compensation. Implicit here is the assumption that security trumps economics. In short, the Philippine state lacked a strong security consensus. This lack of consensus among government leaders, contributed by low external threat perceptions and the focus on internal security, produced divergent attitudes regarding U.S. bases and R.P.-U.S. relations among Philippine elites. Anti-base activists were thus able to take advantage of divided elites by supporting anti-base Senators and forming ties with political elites sympathetic to their cause. Figure 2.3 below diagrams the factors and the resulting implications of a lack of security consensus for anti-base movements and their interaction with the Philippine state.

Figure 2.3: Factors underpinning the lack of security consensus in the Philippines
Interaction between state and society

While the degree of security consensus serves as an important variable for base policy outcomes, a complete picture is only provided by examining structural variables such as the security consensus in conjunction with agency. In the Philippines, the causal mechanisms linking the security consensus to movement outcomes were embedded in the relationship between anti-base movements and sympathetic elites. The absence or presence of a security consensus did not produce outcomes *per se*, but rather, provided a favorable opportunity structure for movements to penetrate the state and form ties with key elites.51 Activists, in turn, needed to make the right strategic decisions and tactical choices to successfully promote their anti-base agenda at the policy level. In sum, the combination of a permissive structural environment (the weak security consensus) and the movement strategies of anti-base actors led to the withdrawal of U.S. bases in the Philippines. This section proceeds with an analysis of anti-base mobilization strategies and the interaction between ATM and the anti-base Senators under the context of a weak security consensus.

Anti-Treaty Movement (ATM)

Formed in 1990 in preparation for PACT negotiations and the expiration of the 1947 Mutual Base Agreement (MBA), ATM held one major advantage over previous anti-base coalition groups: after MBA’s expiration, any new agreement negotiated between Washington and Manila required ratification from the Senate by a two-thirds majority. This provision, stipulated in the 1987 amended Constitution, suddenly

51 The security consensus (or lack thereof) in the Philippines may have been shaped to some degree by nationalist leaders and activists during the formative period of anti-base movements. In other words, the degree of security consensus may be partially endogenous to anti-base movements. While this creates an endogeneity problem between social movements and the elite consensus, the issue is less problematic for my argument since I only need to demonstrate whether the security consensus is weak or strong rather than the formation of the security consensus itself. I am more interested in the interaction between activists and elites once I determine the degree of elite security consensus.
enhanced the political clout of Senators as the MBA approached its September 16, 1991 expiration date. ATM activists recognized the Senate’s pivotal role, understanding that the fate of bases, if not terminated or negotiated favorably by President Aquino’s base panel negotiating team, rested with the twenty-three Senators. Additionally, the amended Constitution also called for a national referendum on any new base agreement approved by the Senate. Important constitutional revisions, therefore, provided Senators, and to a lesser extent civil society, political power in the politics of bases. The lack of security consensus and the ensuing division regarding the role of U.S. bases thus worked to the advantage of ATM.

*Mobilization*

ATM was an extension of the previous coalition group, ABAKADA, which had grown relatively inactive by 1991. As with previous coalitions, the National Democrat (ND) faction of the political left organized and directed the coalition.\(^5\) The political bloc Bayan, and coalition groups traditionally involved in anti-base movements such as NFPC and ABC, spearheaded mobilization efforts. Figure 2.4 diagrams the coalition structure of ATM and its relationship with Bayan, as well as other groups, sectors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and people’s organizations (POs).

\(^5\) Despite its ND orientation, ATM did manage to convince some social democrat (SD) factions to work together in blocking the passage of the new negotiated base treaty. See fn. 25 on the SD/ND distinction.
Similar to previous coalitions, ATM membership consisted of various NGOs, POs, interest groups, and individual political and community leaders. Sectors represented in the coalition included peace, environment, women, student, religious, intellectual, and labor groups. Note the degree of overlap among various groups and organizations, indicating that none of the groups were necessarily mutually exclusive.

Anti-base activists used existing mobilizing structures, such as social networks and institutions, to expand their coalition. Bayan, with its large political network across multiple sectors such as labor and peace groups, directed much of the mobilization work at the grassroots level. Also, groups affiliated with Bayan organized committees and sent representatives to the larger ATM meeting, who in turn directly mobilized their own members. Lidy Nacpil, former general secretary of Bayan, notes that many of the “personalities,” the recognizable faces of the movement such as politicians or celebrities, had little to do with the actual mobilization effort. However,
their presence as prominent public leaders or celebrity status did help gather crowds. This was particularly true for the unorganized masses.53

Framing

In addition to mobilization structures, anti-base activists employed cognitive frames which resonated with various sectors of Philippine civil society. Nacpil states, “If for example you mobilize the labor group, you have to frame it in their language and how it affects them.”54 Like other movements, activists faced an uphill battle mobilizing the masses since the heart of the base issue rested on more abstract principles such as sovereignty or respect. Nevertheless, ATM utilized nationalist and sovereignty rights frames in the larger anti-base debate. These frames were visible in ATM’s community discussion groups and the literature on bases distributed to the public. Nacpil and other movement leaders noted that a clear explanation of the issues through public forums, position statements, and media coverage was essential for mass mobilization.

Paradoxically, ATM conveners narrowed their focus from an anti-base to anti-Treaty position to form the broadest coalition possible. The coalition’s name, “Anti-Treaty Movement,” was indicative of this conscious shift in strategy. As Nacpil, Diokno, Simbulan and other key anti-base activists commented, forming ATM was a strategy which focused on the narrowest target possible; defeating the Treaty equaled a defeat for the bases. Nacpil argued, “To frustrate the extension of the life of the bases, this Treaty [had to] be junked. It didn’t matter if others would be [rejecting] it for reasons not as comprehensive as ours. What was important was that we mobilized the broadest opposition to the Treaty to [remove] the bases.”55 By focusing on the Treaty rather than bases, ATM drew in other groups and individuals who were not

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54 Interview with Lidy Nacpil. April 28, 2006.
55 Interview with Lidy Nacpil. April 28, 2006.
necessarily opposed to U.S. bases, but opposed to the unequal terms of the Treaty. The “paltry” $203 million annual compensation particularly drew the ire of many Filipinos. By low-balling Filipinos, the U.S. negotiators underestimated the reactions of nationalist elites. Simbulan writes, “The lopsided treaty sealed the unexpected alliance between the Senators who were pro-bases but anti-treaty, and the core group of anti-base Senators.” For example, Senator Teofisto Guingona states in his Senate speech of non-concurrence, “We want friendship with America. We want cooperation. We want trade. But we do not want servitude. We do not want an agreement that debases us as a nation. We do not want terms that degrade our dignity as a people.” Senator Rene Saguisag argued, “Saying yes to the Treaty, in its present form (italics mine), is, in my view, to condemn the Philippines to another ten years of exploitation under a one-sided, unequal, invidiously discriminatory arrangement.” The more progressive media outlets, sympathetic to anti-base movements, printed scathing editorials criticizing the unequal terms of the Treaty. Nacpil remarks, “One of the most important decisions made at the time was the shift in framing the issue to an anti-Treaty movement. Whether you were opposing the Treaty for the right reasons or not, for the comprehensive reasons or not, if we were divided at that time we would not have succeeded.”

**Strategy**

ATM took advantage of the political opportunity provided under conditions of weak security consensus. Activists recognized divisions among Philippine elites regarding the future role of U.S. bases, particularly within the Philippine Senate. As part of a two prong-strategy, activists first targeted elites. The immediate goal was to

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56 Simbulan 2002.
57 Senate Legislative Publications Staff 1991, p.53.
59 Interview with Lidy Nacpil. April 28, 2006.
block ratification of any new base treaty in the Senate. Thus a significant amount of time and energy were directed at lobbying Senators, or providing Senators information about the ongoing PACT negotiations and the implications of a lopsided Treaty favoring the U.S. For instance, ATM obtained an early draft of the Treaty proposed by the R.P-U.S. panel and provided this information to Senators. Activists also leaked the unfavorable Treaty terms to the press in the early rounds of PACT. Highlighting the lack of respect from “arrogant” American negotiators and their insultingly low base compensation package, activists publicized the unfair terms of the Treaty. By feeding Senators detailed analyses of the draft and publicizing the unfair Treaty terms in the media, activists provided fuel for anti-base Senators in their call to remove U.S. bases.

Realizing the large stake Senators held in deciding the future of U.S. bases, ATM activists immediately devised a lobbying strategy towards Senators. The first task was an analysis of the Senate “straw vote.” Senate President Jovito Salonga held two informal surveys, the first on February 21, and the second on July 30, 1991, to assess where the other Senators stood on the bases issue. In the first straw vote, twelve Senators indicated in writing they were against the bases without any qualification. The majority of the other Senators positioned themselves ambiguously stating they wanted to study the draft treaty before coming to any conclusion. Anti-base activists obtained a record of the informal straw vote held by Salonga, and in a document dated March 1, 1991, drafted a strategy and various tactics to influence the Senate vote in

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60 Interview with Ma Socorro Diokno. April 10, 2006. This information was confirmed by Roland Simbulan during a panel discussion at the Third World Roundtable, “Alliances, Anti-Base Movements and the Politics of US Military Bases: The Philippines Case in Comparative Perspective.” UP-Diliman, Quezon City. May 2, 2006. Reportedly, a Philippine government official sympathetic to movements had provided this information. Also see Ma Socorro Diokno. 1991. “Analysis of the Bases Talks,” and “Outline of Objections to Draft Agreement on Installations and Military Operating Procedures.” Internal ATM documents obtained from personal collection of Corazon Fabros.

September. In the draft, ATM grouped the Senators into five columns based on their stance towards the bases and how committed they were to their stated position. In other words, activists gauged the probability Senators could be swayed by ATM lobbying. The five categories and the respective movement strategy are detailed below.\textsuperscript{62}

**Column 1:** Senators voting no. Those listed in column 1 above need support by the different anti-base groups: their voting positions need to be reinforced. Senators Aquino, Enrile, Estrada, Guingona, Laurel, Mercado, Romulo, Saguisag, Tañada, Ziga, Salonga

**Column 2:** Senators voting no on current terms with option to change vote subject to final terms. Those listed in column 2 need reinforcement of their voting positions. They need to be furnished more information. They need to be lobbied personally. Senators Alvarez, Lina, Pimentel.

**Column 3:** Judgment reserved pending review of final draft. Those listed in column 3 can be classified into a) *Pro-bases and least likely to change their vote, regardless of the outcome of the talk and the terms and conditions of the new treaty.* Senators Maceda, Paterno, Shahani, Angara, Gonzales. b) *Still undecided, and open to the possibility of changing their vote, given more information.* Senators Rasul, Herrera, Tamano. Little or no efforts at all should be expended towards reaching or trying to influence those listed under column 3a and column 4. On the other hand, every effort should be exerted towards influencing those listed under Column 3b.

**Column 4:** Tentative Yes, subject to compensation and other terms. Senator Osmena.

**Column 5:** Yes. No senators.

Activists then proposed contacting various anti-base groups to “adopt” a bloc of Senators to target, and listed various tactics to be used to influence Senators. For

\textsuperscript{62} The following comes from an internal ATM document: “Senate Straw Vote, 01 March 1991”. Copy obtained from personal collection of Corazon Fabros. Document currently being archived in UP-Diliman Library Archives.
example, activists were encouraged to maintain support for Senators who were clearly going to vote “no” by sending letters, postcards, and telegrams of support and congratulations, and by “holding rallies, pickets, and other mass actions of support.” Meanwhile, ATM proposed spending a bulk of its resources and energy on the “wavering” or “swing vote” Senators. Activists formed a “Special Lobby Task Force” with three subcommittees: 1) Research 2) Lobby/Delegation 3) Writers/Media.  

ATM’s second, broader goal was the mass public campaign to educate Filipinos about the negative impact of U.S. military bases. As mentioned above, if the base treaty passed through the Senate, the Treaty would then have to pass through a national referendum. Thus anti-base groups needed to sway public opinion against U.S. military bases in case the Senate did not reject the Treaty. Anti-base movement leaders traveled around different regions of the Philippines, giving presentations or organizing forums to educate the public about U.S. bases and present reasons why base removal was in the best interest of Filipinos. Groups opposed to bases such as the National Council of Churches in the Philippines (NCCP) or NFPC also produced primers, pamphlets, and other literature to raise awareness about bases. Lastly, mass rallies were held in Manila and around Central Luzon. While the majority of Filipinos were in favor of U.S. bases, large anti-base rallies signaled the presence of a strong, vocal minority opposed to bases. Figure 2.5 recreates the flow chart drawn by ATM activists demonstrating how the two-prong strategy, Senate lobbying and mass action, were timed and coordinated as responses to specific government activity.

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64 In July 1991, perhaps the height of the anti-base debate, 25% opposed U.S. bases while 44% were in favor of U.S. presence (Social Weather Station 1991). Anti-base activists argue, however, that more than numbers, mobilization capacity and the composition of movement activists were just as important. Participating in anti-base campaigns were notable intellectuals, politicians, and lawyers who carried significant political weight beyond their numbers. As one activist remarked, who was protesting was just as important as “how many” Interview with Cora Fabros, March 6, 2006.
**Figure 2.5: Flow chart of ATM coordinated strategy**

Source: Internal ATM document. “Senate Straw Vote, 01 March 1991”. Copy obtained from personal collection of Corazon Fabros.

**Host State Response: Anti-base Elites and the Anti-Treaty Movement**

The preceding section discussed anti-base movement strategies and tactics aimed at both government officials and the mass public. Did any of this lobbying, media reporting, picketing, or marching have any bearing on actual policy outcomes? If the final Treaty vote rested with the Senate, how much influence did anti-base
activists have over the base policy-making process? Can a link be established between ATM pressure and the decision of key political elites? What was the nature of the relationship between anti-base Senators and activists? These questions must be addressed to substantiate the claim that social movements mattered in the closing of Subic Bay Naval Station.

As suggested in the February 21 straw vote, at least twelve of the Senators already held an anti-base stance before any formal ATM lobbying efforts. The fact that more than half the Senators were already open to anti-base arguments significantly aided the ATM campaign. In addition to having valuable activist resources towards lobbying, ATM activists found potential allies among key government elites with significant power in the base policy process. Nationally respected, with many coming from privileged backgrounds, the formal participation of Senators within the anti-base campaign increased the legitimacy, mobilizing capacity, and power of ATM. In particular, three anti-base Senators would become crucial players within ATM: Senators Wigberto “Bobby” Tañada, Joseph Estrada, and Juan Ponce Enrile. Tañada, whose father Lorenzo Tañada served as a key organizer in previous anti-base coalitions, was the most active of the three and played a crucial role in updating ATM with information from the Senate. The addition of Enrile and Estrada into the movement also boosted the image and credibility of ATM. Their addition invited the possibility of broader support by signaling to both the masses and other political elites that the anti-base movement travelled beyond leftist political rhetoric. As mentioned earlier, former defense secretary Enrile represented the established political right. Meanwhile, Senator (and later President) Estrada, a former action movie star, carried widespread popularity among the masses. Regarding the

involvement of Enrile and Estrada in ATM, Senator Rene Saguisag noted, “Since they stood for the right and the masses, the nation more easily accepted our vote. Enrile brought in the right, and Estrada brought in the masses. Some of the anti-base Senators were perceived as Communists so their presence gave us a tremendous boost”.  

The active participation of Senators Tañada, Enrile, and Estrada also helped ATM activists coordinate their tactical campaign against other Senators. The most important battleground for ATM was not necessarily on the streets, but inside Parliament with all attention focused on the Senate vote on September 16, 1991. As argued above, rather than blanket lobbying the Senators, ATM activists strategically lobbied political elites based on information from “insiders” like Senator Bobby Tañada.

One should note that the collaboration between ATM activists and anti-base Senators were not an automatic given simply because activists and elites shared similar positions regarding U.S. bases. Activists made a conscious, strategic decision to reach out to Philippine elites, even those formerly associated with the Marcos dictatorship. For instance, many activists were initially wary of Senator Enrile’s participation in ATM because of his ties to the Marcos regime. Activists suspicious of Enrile’s role during the Marcos era questioned whether the movement should allow his active participation. Etta Rosales, an official with Partido ng Bayan (PnB) states, “It was Bobby Tañada who invited Enrile to the launching [of ABAKADA] and even asked him to sit in front. He ended up wedged between Crispin Beltran and Nathaniel Santiago. The rest didn’t want to sit beside him at all. Of course, we had to shake hands with him.”

Also, some anti-base Senators, aware of ATM’s political left leanings, were cautious not to tie themselves too closely with groups associated with

69 Quoted in Ferrer 1994, p.15.
the extreme left. Nevertheless, ATM worked hard to reach out to all elites, putting aside former ideological differences.

In addition to the three Senators active inside ATM, several other Senators who eventually voted against the Treaty tacitly supported the anti-base movement. For instance, although Senate President Salonga stated that his “no” vote was independent of any anti-base movement pressure, he did welcome anti-base activity from the “legal left” since it strengthened his own position. Activists also note the immense pressure faced by Senators, particularly from pro-base groups, the business lobby, and public opinion which was generally in favor of bases. After reaching its peak in April 1990 with 43% of Filipinos expressing their desire for base closures on or before 1991, anti-base public opinion declined to 25% in July 1991. Figure 2.6 below presents survey data on the desired length of stay for U.S. bases in the metro Manila area.

70 Interview with former Senate President Jovito Salonga. March 4, 2006.
71 Interview with former Senate President Jovito Salonga. March 4, 2006. Suspicious of more radical groups such as the NDF, Salonga was careful to distinguish between the center-left and extreme left.
Figure 2.6: Public opinion indicating desired length of stay for U.S. bases in Metro Manila, 1987-1991. Source: Social Weather Report Survey

Activists feared that Senators not firmly committed to an anti-base position would cave into public opinion or the business lobby. To counter pro-base pressure, anti-base activists made their presence known, making sure the base issue would not go down quietly. Thus, support for anti-base Senators, and the constant presence of ATM in public debates, helped provide moral support and sustain the position of anti-base Senators.

Question in survey stated: “The existing treaty with regard to the US Bases here in the Philippines will expire in 1991. Which of the following resembles closest your opinion regarding the bases?” Possible responses: 1) Should be removed at the earliest possible time without waiting for 1991; 2) Should be retained until 1991 only, and removed thereafter; 3) Should be retained until 1991 only, and thereafter removed if the benefits offered by the US are not increased; 4) Should be retained beyond 1991 because present set-up provide huge benefits to the Philippines from the US.

The significance of ATM support in sustaining the position of anti-base Senators is debatable. The anti-base Senators I interviewed acknowledged that ATM support was “welcome” and “helpful,” but most stated or implied that their own position and vote was based on their own conscious. While this is true, activists emphasized that without their role and public support, Senators would have possibly caved under pressure to vote in favor of bases. For example, one activist noted his disappointment with Senator Heherson Alvarez (who had an activist background) and Senator Jose Lina; activists assumed both would vote against the base, but on September 16, both Senators voted “yes” to the Treaty. Interview with ATM activist, March 10, 2006.
Assessing or “proving” anti-base movement effectiveness is difficult considering the prior preferences held by Senators. The February and July 1991 straw votes indicate more than eight Senators, or the one-third necessary to reject Treaty ratification, were planning to vote against the bases. Thus even without anti-base movement activity, one might argue that the Senate would have voted “no” to U.S. bases anyway. Many Senators agree with this statement. Anti-base activists all staunchly disagree. Adjudicating the “correct” position \textit{ex post facto} is difficult. Rather than debating whether anti-base movements independently played an effective role, Cookie Diokno suggests another approach to effectiveness by arguing that the relationship between anti-base Senators and activists were symbiotic. Noting the relationship between the masses and Senators as a two-way process, she observes, “It was symbiotic. I don’t think one could have won without the other. You needed a mass movement... even though Senators [held the decision-making power]. If they didn’t have anyone listening to them, they didn’t have an audience, or if they didn’t have any group organizing the forums or people...would they have gotten anywhere?"\textsuperscript{75} In other words, Diokno implies that the presence of a core anti-base group within civil society helped reaffirm Senators’ anti-base stance. Additionally, Diokno, who analyzed the Treaty terms in detail, provided information to the other Senators through Senator Tañana. She argues that Senators themselves did not have time to study all the details of the agreements, and thus relied on ATM’s analysis. Simbulan attests this by noting that portions of ATM’s position paper and anti-base literature were used in the speeches of many of the anti-base Senators.\textsuperscript{76}

Senators are correct in stating they probably would have received their eight votes regardless of anti-base movement activity. In hindsight, one can argue that the

\textsuperscript{75} Interview w/Ma Socorro “Cookie” Diokno. April 10, 2006. Quezon City, Philippines.  
\textsuperscript{76} Roland Simbulan. Comments at anti-base presentation at UP-Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines. May 2, 2006.
outcome was clearly in favor of the anti-base faction. However, the months preceding September 16, 1991 were filled with uncertainty and suspense. Two pieces of evidence help adjudicate between several Senators’ claims that Treaty rejection was inevitable, and anti-base activist claims that the outcome was much more contested. First, public opinion polls consistently indicated a pro-base majority in the Philippines, placing enormous pressure on Senators to vote in favor of bases (see Figure 2.6 above). Fighting against majority opinion, ATM advocated a position which would require Senators to vote contrary to the electoral majority.\(^77\) Senator Salonga and other anti-base Senators also acknowledged extensive pressure from the U.S. and other Philippine elites. In addition to pressure from chief U.S. negotiator Richard Armitage, Salonga notes how several U.S. officials, including Congressman Stephen Solarz, Ambassador Frank Wisner and embassy officials Kenneth Quinn, and John Maisto, all made personal appeals to him, and most likely other Senators as well.\(^78\) President Aquino and government officials favoring a five to seven year phase-out of Subic Bay also employed pressure tactics by organizing their own pro-base protests and threatening anti-base Senators. Alfredo Bengzon, the vice chairman of the Philippines bases negotiating panel, states in his narrative of the PACT process how the President had rallied thousands on September 10, 1991 in Manila under national television to coerce Senators into voting in favor of the Treaty.\(^79\) The government bused state employees “complete with packed lunches paid for with government funds” to the Luneta, the site of the pro-base rally. At the rally, “speakers delivered a message to the anti-treaty Senators that would strike fear into the heart of any politician determined to hang on to his position at all costs.”\(^80\) Senator President Salonga also wrote in his

\(^{77}\) Senators are voted at-large in national elections.


memoirs, “I received a number of veiled threats in the Senate. I was told that businessmen from my town were going to picket my residence…For a while, I thought that we, the anti-Treaty senators, were engaged in a lonely struggle against our own people.”

Second, several Senators who stated they were originally anti-base did switch their position in the final September 16 vote. Whether due to immense pressure from pro-base factions or their own ambiguous preferences, Table 2.3 on the following page shows that four Senators who initially stated they would vote against the bases switched their position over the course of time. Table 2.3 confirms activist claims that even as late as August 1991, there was no guarantee that eight Senators would vote no, hence requiring activists to continue their campaign efforts. Movement claims that Senators would have been more tempted to vote in favor of U.S. bases had there been no public support organized by anti-base movements, and no interaction between ATM and the Philippine Senate, are therefore substantiated. Cookie Diokno comments, “If there were no loud, critical voices against bases, the Treaty may have just passed quietly without much debate. The fact that there was a vocal anti-base faction opened up a real debate on the bases issue.”

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82 Interview with Ma Socorro Diokno. April 10, 2006.
Table 2.3: Preference and voting behavior of Senators of the Eighth Congress on the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alvarez, Heherson</td>
<td>No, but w/revision</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angara, Edgardo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gonzales, Neptali</td>
<td>Study final agreement</td>
<td>Refuse to participate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herrera, Ernesto</td>
<td>Study final agreement</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lina Jr., Jose</td>
<td>No, but study final agreement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osmena, John</td>
<td>Tentative yes, but w/revision</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paterno, Vicente</td>
<td>Study final agreement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rasul, Santanina</td>
<td>Study final agreement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Romulo, Alberto</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramos-Shahani, Leticia</td>
<td>Study final agreement</td>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamano, Mamintal</td>
<td>Study final agreement</td>
<td>Yes, w/reservation</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aquino, Agapito</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Enrile, Juan Ponce</td>
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<td>Guingona, Teofisto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laurel, Sotero</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maceda, Ernesto</td>
<td>Reserve opinion</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercado, Orlando</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pimentel, Aquilino</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salonga, Jovito</td>
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<td>Saguisag, Rene</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tañada, Wigberto</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ziga, Victor</td>
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**Conclusion: Security Consensus and State Penetration**

State penetration is rather remarkable since military base decisions are often decided by the executive, or bureaucracies such as the foreign affairs or defense agencies. Relatively well-insulated from civil society, activists are often unable to
penetrate the more conservative foreign affairs and defense establishment, or even institutions such as the Philippine Senate, and therefore find it difficult to influence policy outcomes. In the Philippines, the executive and foreign affairs department were largely in favor of retaining U.S. bases, and particularly Subic Bay Naval Station.\textsuperscript{83}

However, as argued earlier in this chapter, forming allies with domestic political elites was possible because of elite divisions under a weak security consensus. While this may appear banal at first, it is a crucial point which determines whether anti-base movements are capable of penetrating the state and forming ties with key political figures in the bases debate. Too often civil society is marginalized in security policy because political elites, especially those within the foreign policy establishment, reject alternative security discourses contrary to the status quo. This is particularly true in asymmetric alliance patterns, where the weaker power lacks the leverage and political will to propose an alternative path diverging from the interests of the greater power.

Although the Marcos regime helped promote a common security consensus by silencing opposition and dissent through martial law, in the post-Marcos era, no strong security consensus existed regarding U.S.-Philippine relations and the role of U.S. bases. Even some elites favoring U.S. bases admitted that no external threats warranted bases for security reasons. As argued earlier, the debates regarding military bases in the Philippines \textit{Record of the Senate} largely revolved around sovereignty and economic issues, not security incentives stemming from U.S. military presence. The pro-base Aquino Administration and the majority of business elites were in favor of bases because of their implications for trade, investment, and U.S. economic assistance rather than security. During negotiations with the R.P. negotiating panel, Armitage complained that his counterparts were engaging in “cash-register”

\textsuperscript{83} Interestingly, defense officials were marginalized from the base debate. Interview via e-mail with former Senator and Defense Secretary Orlando Mercado. April 22, 2006.
diplomacy. Without a strong security consensus, and consequently any security rational for maintaining U.S. bases, political elites remained divided on the issue. Additionally, nationalist sentiments pushed forward by middle-class intelligentsia and the organized Left further fragmented elites. The weak security consensus, divided elites, and the presence of strong nationalist sentiments among several Philippine Senators provided the political space necessary for ATM activists and political elites to cooperate.

Activists, of course, had to make the right strategic choices and jump through the window opened by conditions of a weak security consensus. Again, in hindsight, it appears easy to convey ATM’s success story with a sense of historical determinism. Upon deeper reflection, however, activists could have selected poor strategies and made “wrong” choices which would have weakened movement effectiveness and their ability to influence base policy outcomes. What if ATM resisted putting aside ideological differences to join forces with anti-base elites who were not necessarily coming from the political left? What if activists decided to devote more resources on the mass public campaign rather than narrowly targeting Senators? What if ATM failed to capitalize on information from the leaked draft Treaty proposal, or decided not to reframe their agenda as “anti-Treaty”? Raising these counterfactuals forces us to question whether the closure of Subic Bay Naval Station was simply predetermined by the existence of a weak security consensus and the presence of anti-base Senators. Instead, the weak security consensus provided an open window for activists to form ties with sympathetic elites and influence outcomes. Movements took advantage of this window by employing proper framing strategies, mobilizing resources, and targeting both elites and masses using various tactics.

In the absence of a strong security consensus, key government elites sympathetic to anti-base sentiments responded to activist efforts by embracing the anti-base movement cause. On the other hand, the pro-base faction in government, led by the executive, promoted various tactics to confront, disrupt, or co-opt anti-base movements via persuasion and pressure tactics. The lack of security consensus among Philippine elites, however, posed obstacles for the President and other pro-base groups in forging any cohesive policy to counter anti-base rhetoric. Granted, in the final week prior to the Senate vote, public opinion had swung clearly in favor of pro-base groups. However, anti-base activists had already penetrated elite ranks long before September 16, and found a core group of Senators willing to align themselves with ATM to promote the anti-base cause. A former Embassy official in Manila noted how the anti-base movement “shaped the whole discussion of bases.” Government elites held “widely disparate views” on the bases and the future of U.S.-Philippine relations, thus providing activists the opportunity to form ties with sympathetic elites. In a symbiotic relationship between activists and government elites, anti-base movements were able to affect the policy direction of the government in shutting down Subic Bay Naval Station.

85 Interview with former U.S. Embassy official in Manila. September 2, 2005, Washington D.C.
CHAPTER 3
THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE
AND ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS IN OKINAWA, 1995-1996

On September 4, 1995, two U.S. Marines and a Navy seaman snatched a twelve-year old girl while driving their rented vehicle through a residential area in Northern Okinawa. Dragging her into the vehicle, they taped her mouth and eyes shut, and bound her hands and feet. The men then drove to an isolated beach and raped her.

The rape of an innocent schoolgirl galvanized what would become the “third wave” of Okinawan resistance against U.S. bases. Peaking on October 21 with approximately 85,000 protestors, the incident placed Okinawa Prefecture in the national spotlight, evoking sympathy from mainland Japan. The media’s focus on Okinawa revealed to the rest of Japan the heavy burden borne by Okinawans in maintaining the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Okinawa Prefecture hosted 75% of all U.S. bases in Japan.

For the United States and Japan, the rape and ensuing wave of anti-base protests arrived at an inopportune time. President Clinton was scheduled to meet Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in Tokyo in November to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Anti-base protests in Okinawa put the Japanese government in a particularly awkward position, with Tokyo caught in the nexus between domestic opposition against bases and its alliance commitments to the U.S. From below, anti-base protestors pressed for revisions to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and a reduction of U.S. military presence. From above, the U.S., while contrite over the tragic rape incident, still expected Tokyo to push forward with alliance strengthening measures. How, then, did Tokyo elites balance their response
between domestic anti-base opposition while maintaining their commitment to the U.S.-Japan security alliance?

A key question raised in this chapter asks why massive protests in Okinawa in 1995, large enough to reverberate in the halls of government in Tokyo, failed to produce significant shifts in basing policy outcomes as in the Philippines. Anti-base protests in Okinawa did initially pressure Washington and Tokyo, leading to government concessions and partial victory for anti-base movements. However, contrary to anti-base movements in the Philippines, the existence of a strong security consensus among Japanese political elites prevented Okinawan anti-base movements from winning substantial long-term gains on basing policy outcomes. In particular, heightened anti-base opposition triggered by the rape coincided with a period of alliance tightening between Tokyo and Washington, making it difficult for activists to gain any traction or leverage in their struggle against U.S. bases. Tokyo elites, influenced by a pervading consensus defining the U.S.-Japan alliance as a pillar of Japan’s national security strategy, resorted to token concessions and economic incentives to pacify anti-base sentiment without reneging on its alliance commitments to the U.S. The government’s use of economic incentives and coercive legal measures undermined the unity of anti-base movements in the long run. Thus, the strong security consensus, prevalent among Japanese political elites, helped shape Tokyo’s response towards anti-base movements.

Before proceeding, I should clarify where my interpretation of Okinawan anti-base movements situates with other existing accounts, and reveal the limited aims of my analysis. Depending on whose point of view and which time frame, Okinawan anti-base movements over the past ten years have been assessed as both a success and failure. Consistent with other chapters, I define “success” in this chapter in terms of policy outcomes. While token policy changes may be viewed as a success at the
tactical level, in my account, this does not constitute a “victory” for anti-base movements. As a reminder from the theory chapter, the definition of “success” does not necessarily come from the perspective of movements, but from the vantage point of the state.

Further complicating base politics in Japan is the combination of multiple actors, interests, and identities across three different levels of analysis – local, national, and international. Unsurprisingly, based on the level of interaction, different scholars have offered different interpretations of anti-base movements and the politics of bases in Okinawa. I do not attempt to unpack all these complex relationships, and rely on the analysis of numerous other scholars and activists to help clarify Okinawan base politics. Although the tension between different local groups at the micro-level adds a fascinating dynamic to the politics of bases, for the purposes of my argument, more attention will be given at the macro-level (Tokyo and Washington) and meso-level (Tokyo and Okinawa) of interaction. Particularly important is the challenge of anti-base movements and the ability of the central government to balance between international and domestic forces. My goal is to demonstrate that on the whole, anti-base movements have found it difficult to win significant concessions from Tokyo because of various factors pinned to the structure of the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the prevailing security consensus among Tokyo elites.

**U.S. Bases and the Okinawan Resistance Movement**

Understanding anti-base movements in Okinawa requires examining Okinawa’s historical and cultural antecedents in relation to their struggle with mainland Japan. Formerly known as the independent Ryukyu Kingdom, the Ryukyu Islands were annexed by Japan in 1872, and formally incorporated into Japan as Okinawan Prefecture in 1879. The Japanese government pursued a policy of assimilation in Okinawa to civilize what they perceived as a backwards group.
Although many Okinawan elites supported assimilation with Japan, Japan’s growing imperial ambitions and the Pacific War dramatically altered the attitudes and collective memory of Okinawans, and their relationship with the mainland.¹

**Battle of Okinawa and the first wave**

U.S. Marines set foot on Okinawa on April 1, 1945. In preparation for a major battle with the U.S., the Japanese military conscripted Okinawan men into the Imperial Army, and mobilized women and children to build airfields and defense fortifications. What stands out in the Battle of Okinawa is not the thousands of Okinawan casualties by American troops, but the atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers against Okinawans. Japanese soldiers raped, looted, and extracted rations from the civilian population. The soldiers fortified themselves in the most secure caves as Okinawan civilians were left exposed to the “typhoon of steel.” The Japanese military also recruited thousands of women into “comfort stations” as sex slaves. Soldiers executed Okinawans communicating in the Okinawan dialect under the pretense that they were spying on behalf of the Americans. Finally, with defeat imminent, Japanese troops either encouraged or forced residents to commit suicide rather than surrender to the U.S. In a matter of months, a third of the entire Okinawan population perished.²

The Battle of Okinawa is significant in two respects. First, Okinawa’s aversion to war stems directly from the collective memory of the Battle of Okinawa. Thus the battle “punctuates and articulates meanings of protest against war . . . and against the existence of U.S. military bases on Okinawa.”³ Second, the mobilization of Okinawans to fight for the Emperor while still demanding assimilation highlighted the duality of Okinawan identity. As Julia Yonentani argues, the multiple and

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² Tanji 2007, p.40.
³ *ibid* 2007, p.41.
contradictory meanings of “Okinawa” and “Japan” have been replayed in Okinawa’s struggle against U.S. bases.4

After the war, Japan regained its full independence in 1951 under the terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the U.S. maintained its right to govern Okinawa under the United States Civilian Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR). In addition to the use of former Japanese bases, USCAR expropriated Okinawan land to expand U.S. military presence. The confiscation of private property for base construction often resulted in local protests against U.S. bases. Thus the “first wave” of Okinawan struggle was directed against U.S. military land acquisition. The first wave culminated in June 1956 with the release of the U.S. House Armed Service Committee’s “Price Report.” The report justified the permanent leasing of base land as well as further land expropriation. The initial sense of unity in the “all-island struggle,” however, proved to be weak and temporary.5 The broad coalition formed by various groups - political parties, labor unions, teachers’ organizations, landowners, and farmers - eventually fragmented. Okinawans were split between conservative groups who wanted to cooperate with the U.S. while demanding maximum rent for bases, and other groups such as the Okinawa’s Teacher Association (OTA) and the Okinawa People’s Party (OPP) who sought Okinawa’s reversion back to Japan.6 Although failing to mobilize a cohesive coalition, the “first wave” Okinawan struggle did help solidify “the foundations of a new postwar identity and movement against marginalization.”7

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5 Tanji 2007, p.53.
7 Ibid 2006, p.76.
**Second Wave**

Land disputes with the U.S. military subsided as landowners signed contracts in exchange for large economic benefits. However, the Okinawan reversion movement continued into the 1960s in the “second wave” of Okinawan struggle. Led by the Okinawa Prefecture Council for Reversion to the Home Country, a coalition headed by members from the OTA, local political parties, and labor unions, the reversion movement raised three specific grievances: crimes and accidents stemming from U.S. military presence, the suspected deployment of nuclear weapons on U.S. bases, and the use of Okinawan bases to launch B-52 strikes in Vietnam.\(^8\) Okinawans believed that the island’s reversion to Japan would resolve these outstanding grievances. Framed as “reversion nationalism,” Okinawans united with progressive nationalist groups on mainland Japan opposed to the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. However, in the mid-1960’s, U.S. and pro-U.S. Japanese government officials managed to negotiate legal and political arrangements enabling U.S. bases to remain in Okinawa.\(^9\) This undoubtedly led to criticism against “reversion” as the basis of movement framing. Moreover, the onset of the Vietnam War forced pacifists within the reversion movement to reconsider Okinawa’s return to a state which supported U.S. military action in Vietnam. Realizing that reversion would no longer achieve Okinawans’ goal of reducing U.S. military presence, the Council of Reversion attempted to fuse “reversion” with “anti-war” frames.

**The Third Wave**

Okinawa reverted back to Japan in 1972. Anti-base protests remained relatively sparse over the next two decades. However, the silence did not remove the

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tension between U.S. and Japan’s desire to maintain regional order and security, and Okinawa’s hope for life without U.S. bases.\textsuperscript{10} It took the rape of a twelve year old girl in September 1995 to rekindle anti-U.S. military sentiment in Okinawa, thus ending the “low period” of Okinawan resistance.\textsuperscript{11} 

Report of the rape did not immediately elicit reactions in Okinawa. Political parties and anti-base groups remained silent, most likely due to the sense of shame attached to the young rape victim.\textsuperscript{12} The first group to break public silence and generate momentum against U.S. bases were women’s groups, such as the Okinawan Women Act against Military And Violence (OWAAMV), and the League of Okinawan Women’s Groups (\textit{Okifuren}). \textit{Okifuren} voiced their anger in a public statement on September 11. Other Okinawan organizations soon followed \textit{Okifuren}’s lead, incensed over the rape case and the U.S. military’s refusal in handing over the three suspects. Reminiscent of earlier coalition groups, labor unions, political parties, teachers’ unions, peace groups, and environmental groups organized rallies, participated in sit-ins, and formulated public statements against the U.S. military and the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).\textsuperscript{13} 

The local and prefectural government’s involvement in the anti-base struggle aided activists tremendously. Reformist political parties and city and village assemblies took part in protests. More importantly, the Okinawa Prefecture governor’s direct actions and confrontation against the central government served as a rallying point for Okinawans. On September 20, Governor Masahide Ota met Foreign Minister Yohei Kono, and presented a formal appeal to the Japanese government to revise SOFA.\textsuperscript{14} As argued below, Ota single-handedly triggered a domestic and diplomatic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} Inoue 2006, p.38.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Tanji 2007, p.106.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Tanji 2007, p.152.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Inoue 22, p.35.
\item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{Daily Yomiuri}. “Ota seeks revision of troop pact.” September 20, 1995.
\end{itemize}
crisis by refusing to sign the land lease which permitted the U.S. military to maintain bases in Okinawa.

Meanwhile, as Ota confronted Tokyo, anti-base protests in Okinawa continued to grow. On September 25, about 1,000 Okinawans protested in Naha, Okinawa’s capital. The following day, 3,000 Okinawans representing forty-three organizations and civic groups, organized by Heiwa Undo (Peace Movement Center), protested in Ginowan. Okinawans also received support from anti-base groups in mainland Japan. Thirty-five local assemblies in seventeen prefectures approved resolutions or produced statements requesting the Japanese government to review the SOFA agreement. The high point of this movement episode took place on October 21, 1995 with 85,000 protestors taking part in the “People’s Rally.” Denouncing the rape, the rally put forth a protest resolution with four demands: 1) imposing strict discipline on American military personnel in an effort to eradicate crime; 2) providing the rape victim immediate and full compensation in addition to an apology; 3) revising the Status of Forces Agreement; 4) reducing and realigning the number of military bases in Okinawa.

Mass protests in Okinawa, and support from local governments and NGOs on the mainland provided Ota additional leverage in negotiations with Tokyo. In an act of protest and defiance, Ota rejected the government’s request to sign the land lease contracts on behalf of Okinawan citizens who were unwilling to grant their land to the U.S. military. Ota stated, “In the past fifty years, Okinawa has always cooperated

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18 By law, if landowners and city officials refuse to sign land lease contracts to the Japanese government for U.S. military use, the governor may legally sign contract renewals on behalf of the landowners. If the prefectural governor also refuses to sign the contracts, the Japanese prime minister may file a lawsuit against the governor.
with the Japanese and U.S. governments, but they did not listen to Okinawan voices. This time, they should listen to us."\(^1\) The conjunction of mass protests and Ota’s defiance finally opened Tokyo’s ears to Okinawan voices.\(^2\)

Under the leadership of Ota and support from the prefectural government, Okinawan anti-base activists successfully mobilized citizens to form an island-wide anti-base movement. Mass mobilization and Ota’s defiance of Tokyo not only publicized Okinawan base issues in mainland Japan, but also attracted their sympathy and support. Anti-base movement demands were directed primarily against the central government rather than the U.S. Mass protests signaling increasing antagonism against bases, compounded by Governor Ota’s refusal to sign the base lease, threatened to undermine Tokyo’s post-Cold War security strategy and efforts to strengthen alliance ties with Washington. With the crisis reaching a boiling point, U.S. and Japanese officials established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to address Okinawan grievances. The SACO Report eventually recommended the return of 21% of U.S. military base land, as well as the implementation of several operational and noise abatement measures.\(^3\)

Did the December 1996 SACO Report indicate movement success? While Okinawans achieved successful mobilization, and extracted several concessions from Tokyo and Washington, further examination of this episode suggests that movements were less successful on the level of outcomes. As argued later, the SACO recommendations amounted to nothing more than token concessions. Many larger demands such as SOFA revisions were unmet. The central government’s use of

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\(^1\) Quoted in Inoue 2006, p.38.


compensation politics in later movement episodes also indicated where Tokyo’s priorities lay when balancing between domestic and international forces. Undoubtedly, numerous factors such as fragmentation within the anti-base movement, the marginalization of Okinawa, or the government’s use of selective incentives to counter base opposition may all have curtailed movement effectiveness. However, I argue that one factor in particular, the presence of a strong security consensus, played a heavy role in shaping the host government’s response to anti-base opposition. An elite consensus which elevated the role of the U.S.-Japan alliance acted as a barrier, preventing Okinawan activists from penetrating the state. Thus anti-base movements were unable to effectively push for changes on basing policy issues.

Security Consensus

Although it is often assumed that most Japanese elites support the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is worth examining where this consensus comes from and why it persists. That scholars and policy-makers have reaffirmed Tokyo’s strong alignment toward Washington for the past decade only makes my task easier. With the strength of the alliance rooted in Japan’s security norms and postwar domestic institutional arrangements, I marshal evidence from elite statements, policy documents, and public opinion polls confirming the breadth and depth of an elite consensus regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance from the mid-1990s to the present. Questions pertaining to the U.S alliance arise as Japanese officials periodically recalibrate national security policy to international events and domestic political trends. On the whole, however, the

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consensus surrounding the U.S.-Japan alliance and the role of U.S. bases in Japanese national security strategy has rarely been challenged.

**Thinking about Consensus**

Thinking about Japanese security in terms of “consensus” is not a novel approach. For instance, Richard Samuels traces the trajectory of Japanese grand strategy by connecting different “ideological dots” which highlight alternating periods of debate and consensus regarding Japanese security policy. The use of consensus as an analytical concept is most appropriate in Japan because security politics is often dictated by the dominant consensus held by powerful political elites. Broadly speaking, the post-war consensus takes into account Japan’s comprehensive approach to security, encompassing economic and political dimensions of security. More narrowly, the security consensus reflects Japan’s staunch support of the U.S.-Japan alliance in its national defense strategy.

My analysis begins with Japan’s defeat in World War II. Physically, mentally, and spiritually broken, Japan’s disastrous imperial East Asia Co-Prosperity project ended with the occupation of Japan by foreigners. At the mercy of the U.S. military, the occupation quashed any lingering hopes of re-establishing Japan as a military power. The demilitarization of Japan carried out by U.S. forces was both a “physical as well as a psychological project.” Japan’s defeat would eventually pave the growing consensus around the Yoshida Doctrine - the emphasis on economic development as a means to national power while relying on the U.S. alliance for

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23 Samuels 2007, Ch.1.
national security. The Yoshida consensus effectively institutionalized Japan’s post-war “cheap ride” to security under the U.S. security umbrella.25

Through 1952, the U.S. military laid the foundations of Japan’s political institutions, as well as the social and legal norms preventing Japan’s military from reemerging as a powerful force.26 Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution provided the cornerstone of Japan’s postwar security arrangement. Under Article 9, Japan renounced war as a sovereign right and the use of force as a means to resolve international disputes. Transcending mere legal rhetoric, the Article developed over time as a norm, entrenched in Japan’s political culture. Although revisionists today continue to test its limits, normative constraints have thus far made attempts at revising Article 9 extremely difficult.27

The Japanese government used institutions, such as the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), to curb its military ambition. To ensure that military-oriented revisionists would not usurp Article 9, bureaucrats and politicians formed the CLB as a civilian institution interpreting and legitimating Japanese national security. In addition to its function as an advisory body inside the prime minister’s secretariat, the CLB interpreted Article 9 and dictated the scope and limitations of the use of Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF). Over the years, the CLB reinterpreted the Article numerous times to fit Japan’s security needs as defined by mainstream elites, giving it an elastic quality.28

In addition to the CLB, several other institutional procedures were built to prevent the military from gaining the upper-hand on national security policy-making.

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27 Katzenstein and Okuwara 1993, p.104. For further discussion of Article 9’s revision see Katzenstein 2007, p.35; Samuels 2007, p.81.
For instance, the Japanese Defense Agency’s (JDA) autonomy and capacity was limited by placing the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials within the JDA. To ensure civilian control of the military, Prime Minister Yoshida placed the JDA under jurisdiction of his own office, thwarting any attempts to give the JDA full ministerial status. Yoshida also ordered the CLB to form “internal bureaus” within the JDA. These bureaus were headed by officials without prior military experience.

In sum, Japanese mainstream pragmatists, cultivating institutional and normative constraints, consolidated the postwar security consensus by alienating ultranationalists, and pacifying revisionists. The pragmatists’ comprehensive approach to security, underscoring economic over military power, was made possible under U.S. protection and the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This comes as no surprise considering that the development of Japan’s postwar security norms and institutions were borne out of Japan’s military defeat in World War II and the political order established by U.S. occupation forces. While postwar domestic institutions were implanted by the U.S. military, over time, Japanese leaders learned to embrace the U.S. as a key pillar to their national defense. These elites cultivated security norms and institutions around the U.S.-Japan security alliance, expanding the breadth and depth of the security consensus.

**End of the Cold War**

Did the elite security consensus regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance significantly evolve over time? The end of the Cold War did create an initial degree of uncertainty concerning the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Catalyzed by international criticism regarding Japan’s tepid response to the Persian Gulf War and the first North Korean

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29 Samuels 2007, p.95.
30 *ibid*, p.52.
31 *ibid*, p. 35.
nuclear crisis in the early 1990s, Japanese policymakers reexamined their global security role and alliance partnership with the U.S. Although some critics predicted a loosening of the U.S.-Japan alliance with the end of the Cold War, a review of defense policies inside Japanese and American policy circles in the mid-1990s foreshadowed a renewed commitment to the alliance heading into the new millennium. In February 1994, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa appointed an advisory group with the intention of revising the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The advisory panel advocated a comprehensive security policy while expanding its multilateral role in international affairs.\(^{32}\) The group report also suggested increasing U.S.-Japanese security cooperation by improving bilateral policy consultations and promoting joint training and operational planning.\(^{33}\) Draft reports of the advisory panel signaled to the U.S. that Japan was looking to redefine its security role in the post-Cold War era.

In the United States, the Clinton Administration conducted its own strategic assessment of East Asia. The 1995 East Asian Strategic Review (EASR) committed 100,000 troops to the region. Intended to provide a stable U.S. presence in Asia, the EASR was partially in response to the first North Korean nuclear crisis and the rise of China. The U.S. also expected Japan to increase its own contribution to the alliance. The EASR restated the importance of Japan as a security partner, declaring, “Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of U.S. security policy in Asia.”\(^{34}\) But even prior to the EASR’s release, the U.S. was already seeking ways to strengthen its relationship with Japan. Joseph Nye, then the assistant secretary of defense for international security, initiated a bilateral process encouraging greater Japanese

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\(^{33}\) Mochizuki 1997, p.9.

defense cooperation with the U.S. The working-level discussions under the Nye initiative influenced Japan’s own NDPO revision by reiterating the value of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and suggesting the geographic expansion of Japan’s national defense boundaries. Implying the elevated status of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the new NDPO made thirteen specific references to the U.S.-Japan alliance, compared with only two references in the previous defense outline.\(^{35}\)

It was under this context of alliance affirmation when public outrage over the rape in Okinawa reverberated throughout Japan. Support for the security alliance and U.S. bases in Japan dropped in public opinion polls. The November bilateral summit between Clinton and Murayama was also postponed.\(^{36}\) Reactions to the rape had relatively little impact on the larger framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Nevertheless, friction between Tokyo and Washington generated by the rape incident required both governments to address Okinawan base issues.

The consensus regarding U.S.-Japan security relations was manifest in the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, forged during the April 16, 1996 summit between Murayama’s successor, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, and President Clinton. The declaration reaffirmed the importance of the alliance stating, “The Prime Minister and the President recognize that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security is the core of the Japan-U.S. alliance, and underlies the mutual confidence that constitutes the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global issues.”\(^{37}\) As the MOFA Deputy Director General of North American Affairs Bureau discussed, the Joint Declaration reaffirmed that “the framework for the defense of Japan will continue to rest on the twin pillars of appropriate defense capabilities and the Japan-

\(^{35}\) Ina 1996, p.34.

\(^{36}\) Domestic issues in the U.S. were cited as reasons for Clinton’s cancellation to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting and his summit meeting with Prime Minister Murayama.

U.S. security arrangements.” The declaration paved the way for strengthened alliance relations in the twenty-first century, concluding:

“The three legs of the Japan-U.S. relationship - security, political, and economic - are based on shared values and interests and rest on the mutual confidence embodied in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The Prime Minister and the President reaffirmed their strong determination, on the eve of the twenty-first century, to build on the successful history of security cooperation and to work hand-in-hand to secure peace and prosperity for future generations.”

In addition to strengthened alliance ties, Japan sought to expand the role of its military in national security affairs. The expansion of the military’s role was not contradictory to the alliance, but rather working in conjunction with strengthened ties between Washington and Tokyo. For example, prior to the April 1996 summit, Tokyo and Washington signed the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). The agreement enabled Japan to provide logistical support to the U.S. military in peacekeeping efforts, humanitarian missions, joint exercises, and other U.S. operations during peacetime. In 1997, the U.S. and Japan produced the “Interim Report on the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.” Produced by the joint government Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), the interim report reviewed the new guidelines for cooperation on the basis of Japan’s NDPO and the 1996 Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration. The document aimed at improving coordinated responses to an armed attack against Japan. Moreover, the SDC’s interim report confirmed the underlying trend of increased security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in the mid-late 1990s. On basic defense postures, both

40 Mochizuki 1997, p.15.
sides would “firmly maintain U.S.-Japan security arrangements,” by developing procedures to increase cooperation in bilateral and multilateral operations in areas such as transportation, medical services, information sharing, education, and training. The interim report also permitted the SDF to provide rear-area support to U.S. forces in a military crisis around Japan. Under the threat of imminent attack, Japan and the U.S. agreed to “intensify intelligence sharing and policy consultations and initiate at an early stage the operation of a bilateral coordination mechanism.”

The string of bilateral agreements produced in the mid-late 1990s suggests that the strong consensus held by elites regarding U.S.-Japan security relations continued to exist after the Cold War. Elite statements and policy documents reflected a security discourse in Japan which favored close alignment to Washington. The persistence of an elite security consensus partially stemmed from external threats, such as a rising China or North Korean nuclear missiles. More importantly, internal factors, such as Japan’s domestic security institutions, norms, and culture played a significant role in perpetuating a strong consensus throughout the 1990s. Figure 3.1 below illustrates how the existence of external security threats, coupled with domestic norms and institutions, have helped forge a strong elite consensus centered around the U.S.-Japan alliance.

\[42 \text{ibid.}\]
Public Opinion

The consensus held by elites is also paralleled by the majority of the Japanese public. Figure 3.2 below presents data in the mid-late 1990s regarding Japanese attitudes towards the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Although attitudes towards the U.S.-Japan alliance dipped slightly in November 1995, attributed to the rape in Okinawa and negative publicity for the U.S. military, on the whole, the majority of Japanese tended to view the U.S. alliance positively.
Moreover, in a January 1997 poll, 57% of Japanese stated that military cooperation between the United States and Japan based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should remain at its current level. In the mid-late 1990s, a slight majority of Japanese also believed U.S. military presence in Asia should remain (50%) or increase (4%), whereas 41% indicated U.S. troop presence should decrease.

In sum, Japan’s security policy did evolve in the immediate post-Cold War period. Although Japan pushed the limits of Article 9 by seeking to expand it military role in the region, the U.S-Japan alliance remained deeply embedded in Japan’s

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43 Questions from November 1991, April 1992, and September 1996 are from the Asahi Shimbun. All other years are from Yomirui Shimbun. Although variation in wording changed slightly from year to year, poll questions referred specifically to the usefulness or benefit of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Question wording from the Asahi Shimbun read, “Japan has signed a security treaty with the United States. Do you think the Japan-US Security Treaty has been good for Japan, or not?” Wording from the Yomirui Shimbun read, “Do you think the United States-Japan Security Treaty is very useful, somewhat useful, or not useful at all with regard to providing Japan with national security?” “Useful” and “somewhat useful” responses in the Yomirui poll were aggregated into the “positive” category in Figure 4.1.


overall national security framework. Yuko Okamoto, the former MOFA Director of the National Security Affairs Division, North American Affairs Bureau, highlighted the strong consensus held by Tokyo elites in the following commentary at the close of the Hashimoto-Clinton summit:

“A collective security structure in Asia is still at least twenty years away. Until then, Japan in theory has only two alternatives: we can attempt to provide our own protection, or we can enter into an alliance with another, stronger country. Given the current military concentration in the surrounding regions, protecting ourselves would necessitates a Self-Defense Force several time larger than we have now…which in turn would require changes to the Constitution. It is unlikely that the Japanese people would accept this alternative. Thus the security alliance with the United States represents the only real alternative.”

The historical legacy of Japan’s imperial past and the postwar institutional security arrangements imposed by the U.S. helped produce norms and domestic structures which prevented Japan from pursuing a military-first security policy. Relying instead on the U.S. security umbrella for external defense, these structures led Japan to formulate a security policy in more comprehensive terms, focusing heavily on economic power. In other words, prevailing norms and institutional arrangements required Japanese policymakers to embed the structure of the U.S.-Japan security alliance into Japan’s national security framework. For these reasons, the security consensus among Japanese political elites has remained strong for over sixty years.

**Government Response to Anti-Base Movements**

How does the security consensus help explain the interaction between the state and anti-base movements, and the ensuing outcome on base policy issues? In this

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47 Katzenstein and Okawara, p.92.

section, I demonstrate how the strong security consensus influenced the government’s response towards Okinawan anti-base opposition. More concretely, Tokyo employed strategies undermining anti-base activity, rendering anti-base movements relatively ineffective on the policy front. While anti-base movements were able to extract several concessions (most notably the promised return of Futenma Air Station) by threatening to unravel Tokyo and Washington’s desire for a strengthened alliance, movement success was only partial at best.

*From the Rape Incident to the Special Action Committee on Okinawa*

As discussed earlier, thousands of Okinawan citizens mobilized to protest against U.S. military presence in Okinawa following the rape incident in 1995. Anti-base groups demanded revisions to SOFA, and a reduction in Okinawa’s burden share of bases. What impact did anti-base protests have on basing policy decisions? How did the Japanese and U.S. governments respond to such widespread opposition? In the wake of the 1995 East Asia Strategic Review and strengthening alliance ties between Washington and Tokyo, Japan’s initial response to anti-base demands were predictable. Despite bearing the brunt of Okinawan demands and a dip in Japanese support for U.S. military presence, Tokyo remained firm in its support for the alliance. Although Prime Minister Murayama publicly announced his willingness to open a review for SOFA revisions, the JDA and MOFA quickly asserted that SOFA revisions were a non-issue. Negating Murayama’s position, Foreign Minister Kono restated Japan’s position that SOFA revisions were off the table. The bureaucracies prevailed. As one Foreign Ministry official commented, MOFA “had no intention of conducting a full-scale review of the status agreement . . . The agreement and the Japan-U.S.
Security Treaty are two sides of the same coin . . . reviewing the framework of the status agreement would have a large impact on Japan’s national-security policy.”

Governor Ota’s refusal to sign the land lease contracts, however, generated concern among Japanese policy circles working to strengthen the alliance and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Takeshi Ozawa of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) conceded, "The timing of all this is really bad." MOFA officials feared that Okinawa’s recalcitrance would jeopardize the security alliance. After an emergency meeting, the prime minister’s office dispatched officials from the DFAA to Okinawa to resolve the impasse. Tokyo also sent the DFAA general director to Okinawa in hopes of directly negotiating with Ota. In another national embarrassment, however, Ota rebuffed Tokyo by refusing to meet with the general director.

Over growing public opposition to bases, and the embarrassing row created by Ota, MOFA officials began consulting Washington to discuss the implementation of criminal procedures under SOFA. Foreign Minister Kono asked Walter Mondale, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, for further base reductions, hoping that U.S. concessions on military bases and SOFA revisions would placate Okinawan anger. Although the meeting between Mondale and Kono produced an agreement to study further base reductions, activists viewed Tokyo’s motives skeptically. An editorial in the Asahi Shimbun criticized Tokyo, stating, “Embarrassed by the seriousness of problems arising since the rape of a schoolgirl… the government, simply eager to avoid

50 Of the 2,900 landowners required to sign the land lease contract, 2,000 landowners refused to sign. Tokyo, therefore, expected Ota to sign the leases on their behalf.
inconvenience to the Japan-U.S. military alliance, dithered miserably.”54 Citing
Tokyo’s past broken promises to Okinawa on base issues, the editorial continued, “Is
the Japanese government serious in addressing the cutback issue? The Okinawa
prefectural government is very wary of the central government, out of long experience
in dealing with [U.S. bases].” A September 20, 1995, editorial in the Asahi Shimbun
also criticized Tokyo for showing, “no sign of being prepared to make a proper
response to the pleas of the Okinawan people or to begin to try to ameliorate the
situation.”55

With Ota’s actions still threatening diplomatic relations between Tokyo and
Washington, the Prime Minister sent JDA Director Seishiro Eto to Okinawa to seek
Okinawan cooperation. The central government also exercised its authority by taking
legal action against Ota. Traditionally supporting the executive branch on issues of
defense and security policy, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Japanese
government.56 The Court argued that the special law created to legalize the acquisition
of private land for U.S. military use was constitutional. Adding that Ota’s refusal to
sign the lease jeopardized the public interest, the Supreme Court ordered Ota to sign
the lease contracts.

Rhetorically at least, Tokyo appeared ready to provide some concessions to
Okinawa to break the impasse with Ota and mollify anti-base sentiment. Speaking at a
House of Councilors’ Budget Committee hearing, Prime Minister Murayama quoted,
"The Japan-U.S. security arrangements are for the security of [all of] Japan, and it is
important for the whole nation to share the sentiments of Okinawa residents [over the
base issue] who have borne the lingering impacts of their wartime hardships.”57 Tokyo

56 Aurelia George Mulgan. "Managing the U.S. Base Issue in Okinawa: A Test for Japanese
57 Daily Yomiuri. “Government to transfer U.S. base functions from Okinawa.” October 17, 1995
also stated it would initiate studies to relocate firing ranges from Okinawa to other existing SDF ranges within Japan. Furthermore, the government, led by Murayama’s Social Democratic Party, decided to revise its earlier position in a joint communique pertaining to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty by requesting base reductions in Okinawa. Anti-base opposition thus compelled Tokyo to provide at least token concessions to prevent a domestic crisis from boiling over. More importantly, concessions were needed to placate swelling anti-American sentiment in Okinawa which threatened to disrupt positive alliance relations with the U.S.\textsuperscript{58}

Tokyo and Washington moved quickly to form the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) in November in response to the rape incident and massive demonstrations. SACO worked to develop solutions which would ensure Japan’s security while minimizing the impact of bases on Okinawans. SACO released an interim report on April 15, 1995, two days before the Clinton-Hashimoto summit where the two leaders were expected to produce the Joint Declaration on the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The report recommended that the U.S. return portions of base land, adjust training and operational procedures, implement noise reduction initiatives, and improve status of forces agreement procedures.\textsuperscript{59} The interim report’s release was undoubtedly timed to prevent Okinawan issues from trumping public affirmations of a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance during the summit. As one Japanese MOFA official commented, “Had we not been able to release anything on Okinawa prior to the summit…the summit would probably have been dominated by this one issue.


Furthermore, I doubt it would have presented how the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance should be."\(^{60}\)

In the final report, released in December 1996, SACO requested that the U.S. return Futenma Air Station and portions of land from other camp sites and training areas. The report also included changes to three operational and five noise abatement procedures.\(^{61}\) Through SACO, Tokyo granted several concessions to anti-base movement demands. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below present the specific recommendations on base reductions and noise reduction initiatives presented by SACO.

### Table 3.1 Base land returned under SACO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Return</th>
<th>Proportion Returned</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Replacement Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCAS Futenma</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>Between 2001-2003</td>
<td>Sea-based facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern training area (9,000 acres)</td>
<td>More than half</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>Remaining Northern Training Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aha training area</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>Acreage added to Northern Training Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gimbaru training area</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>Kin Blue Beach training area and Camp Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobe communications site</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Camp Hansen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yomitan auxiliary airfield</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Ie Jima auxiliary airfield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Kuwae</td>
<td>A major portion</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Camp Zukeran and other facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senaha Communication Station</td>
<td>Nearly All</td>
<td>March 2001</td>
<td>Torti communications station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makimino service area</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Between 1998-2000</td>
<td>Remaining Makimino area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naha Port</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>No date established</td>
<td>Urasce pier area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Consolidation on Camps Kuwae and Zukeran</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Remaining portions of Camps Kuwae and Zukeran</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{60}\) Tanaka 1996, p.8.
Table 3.2: Noise reduction initiatives under S ACO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Noise Reduction Initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft noise abatement countermeasures at Kadena and Futenma Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of KC-130 Hercules and AV-8 Harrier Aircraft from Futenma to Iwakuni Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of Navy Aircraft and MC-130 Operations at Kadena Air Base to opposite side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Install sound insulation walls at Kadena Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit night flight training operation at Futenma Air Station</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Paradoxically, anti-base movements were able to gain these concessions, however minimal, because of Washington and Tokyo’s commitment to the security alliance. As a thorn in the U.S.-Japan alliance’s side, Okinawan anti-base movements threatened to unravel the newly strengthened alliance. Moreover, while a strong security consensus at the national level prevented activists from forming ties with political elites, activists did take advantage of other political opportunities at the sub-national level. In particular, access to elites within the prefectural government, most importantly Governor Ota, helped the anti-base movement apply real pressure on Tokyo. Ota’s support for the Okinawan anti-base movement raised the diplomatic stakes for Washington and Tokyo. S ACO recommendations were offered, in part, to avoid any further diplomatic fallout.

**Reduction or Relocation?: S ACO’s Token Concessions**

Although the return of 21% of military base land is not insignificant, with the exception of Futenma Air Station, the promised returns still only amounted to token concessions. Most of the facilities returned were strategically unimportant, such as Senaha Communication Station or the Sobe Communication site, where base functions

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62 A more traditional approach to social movement analysis, one which includes the entire institutional system as part of the political opportunity structure (POS), offers a different interpretation of the Japan case. Presently, the security consensus framework only takes into account POS at the national level (see Chapter 1, fn. 35, p.18). Therefore, the security consensus held by national level elites is coded as strong. However, for the specific movement episode in 1995-96, one could code the security consensus in Japan as “moderate” if POS were expanded to include government institutions and actors at the prefectural and local level. Under a “semi-open” opportunity structure, anti-base movements formed ties with the sympathetic prefectural government, giving them greater leverage in the policy arena. This helps explain the partial concessions (or “mixed” outcome) represented by the S ACO agreement.
could easily be relocated to another facility. A GAO study assessing the impact of SACO’s base reductions on U.S. operational capabilities concluded that ten of the eleven base return recommendations presented “minimal risks to operations.” The GAO report quoted, “The services can maintain training opportunities and deployment plans and schedules, because land to be returned is no longer needed or will be returned only after Japan provides adequate replacement facilities on existing bases or adds land by extending other base boundaries.”

Furthermore, base consolidations were in many ways beneficial to the U.S. Through the SACO agreement, Japan agreed to build 2,041 new or reconstructed housing units at Camp Zukeran. Outside the SACO process, Japan agreed to build an additional 1,473 units near Kadena Air Base. As part of Camp Zukeran and Camp Kuwae’s consolidation process, the Japanese also agreed to replace the aging hospital at Kuwae with a new medical center in Zukeran at the cost of $300 million.

Base policy changes under the SACO Report were relatively minor, and did not necessarily reduce the strategic or operational capabilities of the U.S. military. However, as mentioned earlier, the return of Futenma Air Station presented the one major concession offered by the U.S. and Japanese governments. Both officials and activists alike viewed Futenma Air Station’s return as the capstone of the SACO report. As one MOFA official noted, “Futenma Air Station has an extremely important function for the security of Japan and the Far East… It took us about a month . . . to evoke a response from the U.S. side on Futenma.”

The GAO’s own study of U.S. military presence in Okinawa dwells on Futenma’s strategic importance and the difficulty in finding or constructing an appropriate replacement facility. The GAO stated:

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64 GAO 1998, p.42.
The most significant land deal involves the planned closure and return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma. The installation is a critical component of the Marine Corps’ forward deployment because it is the home base of the 1st Marine Air Wing. The Wing’s primary mission is to participate as the air component of the III Marine Expeditionary Force. The wing’s Marine Air Group-36 provides tactical fixed and rotary wing aircraft and flies about 70 aircraft, including CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters and KC-130 aerial refueling airplanes. Futenma’s primary mission is to maintain and operate facilities and provide services and materials to support Marine aircraft operations.66

Situated squarely in the center of urban growth in Ginowan City, Okinawans had requested Futenma’s return since the 1980s (see Figure 3.3 below).

Figure 3.3: Aerial photo of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Ginowan City
Source: MCAS Futenma Master Plan

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For Okinawans, Futenma represented all that was wrong with U.S. military bases: noise, pollution, safety hazards, crime, and the unfair burden of bases imposed by the Japanese government on Okinawans.

At a first glance, Tokyo and Washington’s conditional return of Futenma appeared to be a major victory for anti-base movements. Under greater scrutiny, however, the return required significant trade-offs for Okinawans. At stake was the conditional nature of Futenma’s return. Tokyo and Washington stated they would make reasonable efforts to implement the recommendation provided by SACO. However, the report did not function as a bilateral agreement, and was therefore non-binding. USFJ officials stated if “Japan does not provide adequate replacement facilities or complete action needed to implement some recommendations, the United States will not be obligated to implement those particular recommendations.”67 In an interview with Asahi Shimbun, Morietsu Arasaki, an activist and leading scholar on Okinawan anti-base movements, questioned the significance of concessions regarding Futenma Air Station. Arasaki stated, “If you look at the contents of the agreement to return the Futenma base you will find several drawbacks. While the U.S. agreed to return the land of the base, its functions are to be transferred to other U.S. bases on Okinawa, such as Kadena Air base, and on the mainland. This is not the reduction of the U.S. military presence that we are demanding.”68 Kuwae Teruko, secretary general of a women’s group opposed to U.S. bases added, “The return of the land by itself does little to solve the problems…We want to see a reduction of the functions of the bases, not the size of the land.”69 Thus many anti-base activists viewed the SACO

69 Mulgan 2000, p.33.
agreement as a deal merely shifting the problems associated with Futenma to different parts of the island rather than promoting any real base reduction. Moreover, the secrecy of SACO negotiations also raised suspicion that the U.S. was using the Futenma deal to replace the outdated base with a new facility capable of accommodating the MV-22 Osprey tilt-wing aircraft.  

Influenced by the pervading security consensus, Tokyo struck a balance between domestic anti-base pressure and its international alliance obligations by working out a deal with the U.S. on Futenma Air Station. The deal helped pacify anti-base sentiment for the time being. At the same time, the deal negotiated with the U.S. under SACO helped Japan maintain positive alliance ties with the U.S. Reflecting on Prime Minister Hashimoto’s motive in announcing the return of Futenma, Arasaki quoted:

“(He) wanted to calm the fierce and persistent protest of Okinawans to smooth the way for redefining the Security Treaty during U.S. President Bill Clinton's visit. Although the return of Futenma base is just cosmetic, it was announced with a big fanfare. Firstly, Tokyo hoped it would sway deliberation by the land expropriation committee of Okinawa prefecture on the central government's request for a six-month emergency use of a land plot--occupied by the U.S. military Sobe communication facility--in Yomitan village. Secondly, it hoped to influence a likely referendum by Okinawans on the whole U.S. bases issue. It appears that yet another purpose was to divide public opinion in Okinawa. The results can be seen in the immediate opposition from residents near the Kadena air base to accepting the transfer of Futenma's functions…”  

Arasaki’s words suggesting that Futenma was nothing more than a token concession are echoed by other scholars. Masamichi Inoue writes that the Futenma replacement plan did not arise out of “the benevolence of the U.S.-Japan alliance as its cunning

71 Ibid.
manipulation of Okinawa’s protest.” Inoue, Selden, and Purves state “Japan had requested America’s assistance in providing some symbolic morsel to give to the people of Okinawa, and Washington had complied.”

Token concessions in the form of returned base land was merely one aspect of Tokyo’s response to anti-base pressure. The central government used the politics of compensation as another strategy to pacify strong anti-base opposition. Taking advantage of Okinawa’s economic dependence on Tokyo, the Japanese government applied “soft coercion” to obtain local support for bases. First, the government allocated 7.5 billion yen to each local district hosting U.S. military bases. Second, large endowments were distributed to communities accepting bases slated for relocation within Okinawa. Third, the government offered 100 billion yen over a seven year period for projects proposed under the Informal Council on Okinawa Municipalities Hosting U.S. Bases, an advisory body to the Hashimoto Cabinet headed by prime ministerial aide Okamoko Yukiko. The Council helped implement Tokyo’s preferred policy by circumventing the National Diet and the prefectural assembly. Although the Council endorsed base reductions, it provided a “direct financial pipeline from the cabinet to local municipalities and preferctural business interest,” and hence made no genuine effort to reduce Okinawa’s base burden share.

The central government’s response is best summed by Masamichi Inoue: “Tokyo responded …by disclosing the view that global/American interests, rather than strictly national or local concerns, should take precedence.”

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72 Inoue 2007, p.128.
73 Masamichi Inoue, Mark Selden, and John Purves. "Okinawa Citizens, Us Bases, and the Dugong." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 29, no. 4 (1997). Similar to base expansion in Camp Humphreys in South Korea, the U.S. viewed Futenma’s relocation as primarily a domestic issue, and therefore left it to Japan to secure the land necessary for U.S. bases.
74 Yonentani 2001, p.74.
75 Ibid 2001, p.75.
76 Ibid 2001, p.75.
77 Inoue 2006, p.37.
consensus regarding U.S.-Japan relations acted as an ideological barrier preventing activists from penetrating the state. While Tokyo responded to anti-base movements by offering partial concessions and economic incentives, the government failed to satisfy the majority of core activist demands on SOFA revisions and base reduction. From the perspective of anti-base movements, activists were unable to form ties with elites within the central government to promote significant changes on basing issues. In fact, the powerful security consensus privileging strengthened U.S.-Japan relations in the late 1990s meant very few, if any, sympathetic elites were willing to form ties with activists.  

Unable to gain access to elites necessary to implement policy changes, and severely hampered by the island’s economic dependence on Tokyo, activists faced significant challenges. The difficulty in instituting any significant policy victory on Futenma’s relocation becomes even more apparent through examination of later anti-base movement episodes in Chapter 6.

**Conclusion**

The prevailing security consensus surrounding Japanese elite strategic thinking presented a formidable obstacle for anti-base activists. Eleven years have passed since the SACO Agreement, yet Futenma Air Base continues to operate. Anti-base movements have not completely “failed,” winning several tactical concessions over the past decade. However, “victory” remains elusive as Japanese and U.S. officials present new proposals to maintain significant U.S. military presence on the island. As Gavan McCormack argues, “the crucial point in the Futenma negotiations has been Japanese government determination to serve U.S. military design.”

This is especially true in Japan where security and U.S. base policy decisions were conducted almost exclusively by the bureaucracies rather than the Diet.

Henoko. Through compensation politics, the central government has managed to split the anti-base struggle into different local factions.

Tokyo’s response to anti-base protests is driven by a security logic. The central government’s strategy of co-optation and legal coercion against anti-base movements is motivated by its desire to maintain a strong U.S.-Japan alliance. The majority of Tokyo elites, particularly those responsible for national defense and foreign policy, contend that the U.S. alliance and U.S. bases serve a critical role in Japan’s national security strategy. This consensus is formed by actors’ external threat perceptions. But more significantly in Japan, the consensus rests on internal factors such as the norms and domestic institutions which have shaped national security thinking since the end of World War II. Given the strong security consensus among Japanese government elites, Okinawan anti-base activists find it tremendously difficult to sway base policy decisions. McCormack writes that, “Japan sees its primary policy imperative as submission to Washington, it has to ‘deliver’ Okinawa to the Pentagon, and to do that it must somehow ensure the submission of Okinawa’s restive local government and civil society.”80 By muddling through the Futenma relocation process, the Japanese government was able to strike a balance between its alliance obligations to the U.S. while staving off anti-base pressure. The SACO agreement was designed to ensure that the U.S. would retain its strategic effectiveness in Japan and the Asia-Pacific. As I later discuss in Chapter Seven, the elite security consensus continued to operate in the post-9/11 period, with Okinawan anti-base activists making little progress pushing beyond the status quo.

CHAPTER 4

ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS IN ECUADOR AND ITALY

"We'll renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami -- an Ecuadorian base....if there's no problem having foreign soldiers on a country's soil, surely they'll let us have an Ecuadorian base in the United States."1

- Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador

“I am about to tell the U.S. Ambassador that the Italian government won't oppose the decision by the previous government and the town council of Vicenza to allow the expansion of the military base . . . Our attitude in regards to the U.S. is that of friend and ally.”2

- Romano Prodi, Prime Minister of Italy

The preceding two chapters examined anti-base movement episodes from the Asia-Pacific region. Movement episodes from the Philippines and Okinawa suggest that alliance relations and the degree of security consensus shape government responses to civil societal pressure. More specifically, host government elite perceptions and beliefs regarding the U.S. alliance affects the likelihood of anti-base movement success in winning concessions from governments. This chapter extends the security consensus framework to anti-base movement episodes in other regions. Two recent cases, the No Bases movement in Manta, Ecuador, and the No Dal Molin movement in Vicenza, Italy, are used to test the validity and robustness of my theoretical argument. In Ecuador, a weak security consensus among political elites, and the ties formed between sympathetic politicians and activists, paralleled the 1991

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Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines. Conversely, a relatively strong security consensus among Italian government officials raised serious obstacles for anti-base protestors. The Italian case echoes the challenges faced by anti-base movements in Japan/Okinawa. Activists were unable to win significant concessions on basing issues when a consensus favoring strong ties with the U.S. pervaded elite ranks.

PART I: ECUADOR

I begin the Ecuador anti-base saga between 1999-2007 with a spoiler. In March 2007, President Rafael Correa reaffirmed his election pledge not to renew the Manta base agreement with the United States. In a formal letter addressed to activists attending the International No Bases Conference in Quito, Correa wrote, “I confirm the firm position of the Ecuadorian government to not renew the Agreement (allowing) the use of Manta Base by the United States of America…Ecuador joins the social movements that fight for peace, justice, human rights and environmental sustainability.”3 Having already rejected the renewal of the Manta Agreement even before formal negotiations with the U.S., Correa snubbed Washington further by offering the use of Manta’s airport facilities to Beijing.

The Ecuadorian government will most likely send the U.S. military packing from Manta in 2009, thus fulfilling a long-standing goal of Ecuadorian anti-base movements. The important question, however, is whether anti-base movements had any impact on this outcome. Similar questions were confronted in the Philippines case: did the preferences of elites and the voting behavior of the Philippine Senate dictate the eventual closure of Subic Bay Naval Station, thereby making the role of anti-base movements irrelevant or unimportant? The same alternative explanation can be used to evaluate the (future) withdrawal of U.S. forces in Manta: Quito’s decision

3 Letter from Rafael Correa to participants of the International No Base Conference. March 6, 2007. Official letter # DPR-0-07-8
not to renew the Manta base agreement may be explained by President Correa’s left-leaning convictions rather than anti-base protests. After all, Ecuadorian anti-base groups had challenged the U.S. since 1999, but had not achieved “victory” until the rise of a center-left government. How successful were anti-base activists? Did the Ecuadorian government attempt to co-opt or undermine movements using strategies similar to those used by the Japanese government. Or were elites divided in their support for U.S.-related policies as in the Philippines, enabling activists to “penetrate” the state and form ties with sympathetic elites?

The Manta anti-base movement episode follows the latter case. Unlike highly institutionalized bilateral alliances found in U.S. relations with Japan, the substance of U.S.-Ecuador relations has been historically thin. Ecuador did face external threats from neighboring Peru throughout the twentieth century. However, Quito has not relied on the U.S. for military assistance or support, nor has it depended on the U.S. for protection against external threats. Hence no strong security consensus regarding U.S.-Ecuador relations or the role of U.S. bases ever pervaded the ranks of Ecuadorian political elites. Under conditions of weak security consensus, elites were divided (or perhaps indifferent) in their articulation of foreign or national security policies concerning U.S. related issues. This lack of strong security consensus among Ecuadorian elites enabled anti-base activists to penetrate the state, and find common ground with sympathetic elites. Activists supported, lobbied, and encouraged elites to reject the Manta base agreement with the United States. Meanwhile, ties to key government elites responsible for setting base policies boosted the credibility and leverage of anti-base activists.

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4 Anti-base activists, who generally associate with the political left, did help elect the center-left Correa into power. Assuming that Correa would have been voted into power even without the support of anti-base groups, however, an elite-driven alternative explanation suggests that base closure hinges on Correa’s own personal conviction rather than anti-base pressure.
Background on the Manta Base Agreement

How did the U.S. military end up in Ecuador in the first place? For U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Panama had always played an important strategic role. However, the U.S. military’s departure in 1999 left Washington scouring the region for replacement sites.\(^5\) In particular, the loss of Howard Air Force Base two years earlier required the U.S to find replacement facilities to continue its regional counter-narcotics operations. After consultation with the governments of El Salvador, Antilles-Netherlands, and Ecuador, the U.S. chose three locations to function as replacement facilities. In Central America, the U.S. placed a forward operating location (FOL) in Comalapa, El Salvador. In the Caribbean, two FOLSs were established in Aruba and Curacao.\(^6\) Finally, in the South American Andes, the U.S. acquired Eloy Alfaro Air Base in Manta, Ecuador. Negotiations with Ecuador began in February 1999.\(^7\) The two sides initially signed an interim agreement in April 1999, later replaced by a ten year pact signed in November 1999.\(^8\) In addition to Eloy Alfaro Air Base, the agreement authorized the United States to utilize Manta’s port and military installations within the surrounding vicinity.

Unlike Subic Bay, the Manta FOL is not a main operating base. Selecting Manta as a comparable case study, therefore, warrants some brief discussion. The bases examined in the previous chapters were all hard tests for anti-base movements.

\(^5\) The U.S. agreed to withdraw its forces from Panama under the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty.
\(^6\) Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). “Forward Operating Locations: ONDCP Fact Sheet.” <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/international/factshft/forw_oper_locat.html> [Last accessed 2/3/08]. It is important to note that these FOLSs were built on existing airfields used by the host government.
All three movement episodes revolved around major U.S. military bases of high strategic value. On the contrary, the Manta base is relatively small, hosting on average only 250 military personnel, 65 U.S. civilians, and 180 Ecuadorian contractors.\(^9\)

Moreover, as an FOL, the Manta base is used jointly between the Ecuadorian and U.S. Air Force.

Despite its relatively small size and FOL status, the U.S. military recognized the strategic utility of Manta in the war on drugs. SOUTHCOM used the base for counter-drug surveillance flights over Central and South America. Washington noted that missions involving the Manta FOL in the Eastern Pacific and the Andean mountains significantly contributed to U.S. counter-drug strategy policies in Latin America. SOUTHCOM spokesperson Jose Ruiz quoted, “Since 1999, the FOL has conducted more than 3,300 counter-drug missions, totaling over 18,000 flight hours and has contributed directly or indirectly to the seizure of more than 52,000 kg of illegal drugs with a street value exceeding $2 billion.”\(^10\)

In a prepared testimony before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support stressed the importance of Manta FOL in the war on drugs. She stated, “The Manta FOL is the key to enhancing our source zone and Eastern Pacific counter-drug presence. It is the only FOL that can support counter-drug missions throughout the source zone, providing the necessary reach into southern Peru, Bolivia, and most importantly Colombia which supplies the largest percentage of cocaine shipped to the United States.”\(^11\)


\(^10\) Logan 2007.

Additionally, sunk costs were invested in the Manta base. The U.S. spent $63.3 million to upgrade facilities at Eloy Alfaro. Improvements included expanding the runway to increase load-bearing capacity necessary for landing an AWACS Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, constructing additional hangars, and building new dining and maintenance facilities. In short, while the Manta base was strategically less significant than the bases discussed in previous chapters and functionally easier to replace, the FOL was not so insignificant that the U.S. would give up its claim to Manta without providing some pressure or incentives to Quito.

**U.S.-Ecuador Relations**

The history of U.S.-Ecuador relations is relatively thin compared to countries with deeper U.S. alliance ties, such as Japan, South Korea, or even the Philippines. Unsurprisingly, the weak security consensus among Ecuadorian elites is characterized by narrow breadth and minimum depth. Ecuador remained a low priority for the U.S., and opportunities for interaction between Quito and Washington were fairly limited. Even when confronted by major security threats from neighboring Peru, Ecuador received minimal support from the U.S. For instance, the U.S. maintained neutrality during Ecuador’s border crisis with Peru in 1941, rejecting Quito’s appeal to dispatch a U.S. warship near Ecuador’s shore as a warning to Peru. Likewise, the U.S. refused Ecuador’s request for forty million rounds of ammunition during the ensuing Ecuador-Peruvian War. While brokering peace negotiations between the two sides, the U.S. failed to bring a case against Peru’s aggression, nor did it raise the issue of Peru’s bombing of civilians. The U.S. certainly sympathized with Ecuador, and in principle,

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13 Interview with FLACSO-Ecuador director Adrian Bonilla. March 9, 2006, Quito, Ecuador.
opposed territorial expansion through the use of force. However, the U.S. wanted to quickly resolve the border conflict to focus on the larger concern of building South American support for the Allied war effort.\textsuperscript{15}

During World War II, Ecuador permitted the U.S. to build two military bases on its territory. The U.S. built an air refueling base in Salinas on the western coast of Ecuador, and an air base on the Galapagos Islands as a forward defense against potential Japanese attacks targeting the Panama Canal. After the war, U.S. officials reasoned with Quito that the U.S. should be able to retain the bases rent-free. After all, the U.S. had borne all costs in building the bases. Moreover, Ecuador did not have the resources to keep the facilities running. As Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal wrote, offering the Galapagos base to the U.S. “would be a fitting contribution of Ecuador to hemispheric security.”\textsuperscript{16} The Ecuadorian government thought otherwise. With no financial incentives and public opinion against the Galapagos base, Quito turned down Washington’s base proposal in 1946.

During the Cold War, Ecuadorian political elites did not share Washington’s preoccupation with the Soviet threat. Instead, Peru continued to remain Ecuador’s top security concern. However, the U.S. stayed outside of the longstanding territorial dispute, remaining on the sidelines during the brief 1995 Alto-Cenepa War between Peru and Ecuador. Even as the Andean region attracted more attention in the 1990s with increasing drug trafficking concerns, Ecuador remained neglected compared to its Andean neighbors Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. As Figure 4.1 indicates, of the four countries, Ecuador received the least amount of military and police aid from the United States in the war on drugs.

\textsuperscript{15} Pieno 2007, p.114.
\textsuperscript{16} Pineo 2007, p.128.
Having traditionally remained on the fringe of U.S. strategy in Latin America, Quito never developed strong security ties to the U.S. Unlike countries such as Japan or Italy, alliance relations were never institutionalized within Ecuador’s national security framework. Thus Ecuadorian political elites never converged on a U.S. alliance-centered security policy. In sum, marked by narrow breadth and minimal depth, the security consensus remained weak (or absent) among political elites. True, the asymmetric nature of U.S.-Ecuador relations has often led Quito to adopt a position of “compliance and consensual acceptance” on foreign policy.\textsuperscript{17} However, Ecuadorian security expert Adrian Bonilla adds that Quito does not blindly follow Washington’s foreign policy directives, as is often the criticism in Japan and South Korea (see Chapter 5) where the security consensus remains strong among elites.\textsuperscript{18}

Given the lack of historical or institutional ties between Ecuador and the U.S., Quito was less compelled, or constrained, to follow the policy preferences of Washington.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure_4.1.png}
\caption{Military and police aid from the United States}
\footnotesize{Source: Center for International Policy. Figure for 2006 and 2007 are estimated and requested amount, respectively.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{17} Bonilla 2006, p.105.
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Adrian Bonilla. March 8, 2007. Quito, Ecuador.
Mobilization against the Manta Base

Did the anti-base campaign in Ecuador matter? I argue below that anti-base movements did make a difference in base policy outcomes. The absence of a strong security consensus provided a favorable political opportunity for anti-base activists. Pro-U.S. political leaders certainly resided in Quito, but government elites as a whole never shared a common understanding or fixed perception of U.S.-Ecuador relations. This enabled activists and political elites sympathetic to the anti-base cause to align with one another on the Manta base issue. Although Ecuadorian anti-base movements first mobilized in 1999 with inauspicious beginnings, by 2005, top government officials were beginning to advocate the non-renewal of the Manta base agreement. This position was eventually carried by presidential candidate Rafael Correa during his 2006 campaign.

Origins

Unlike other movement episodes, the Manta anti-base movement did not begin as a local NIMBY phenomenon. Rather, the movement emerged at the national level, and only later shifted downward to the local level. Peace and Justice Service of Ecuador (SERPAJ) was the first group to latch onto the Manta base issue. In March 1999, SERPAJ posted an alert to other social groups announcing that Ecuador would grant the U.S. basing rights in Manta. Despite slow mobilization, activist groups did attempt to protest U.S. military presence along with a slate of other issues, such as debt relief and privatization. In this vein, the Confederation of Indigenous

19 Most local communities in Manta were initially pro-base. However, land displacement issues did constitute one major grievance for a small group of residents in Manabí Province. Similar to the local resistance movement in Daechuri Village in Pyeongtaek, South Korea (see Chapter 6), these residents formed the Land Defense Committee of Portoviejo. The committee formed decades earlier to protest the Ecuadorian government’s consolidation of 25,000 acres of land to make way for Jaramijó Naval Base. While U.S. improvements to Eloy Alfaro base did not necessarily result in further displacements, local residents found additional incentives to renew claims to land seized previously by the Ecuadorian government. See Luis Ángel Saavedra. “The Manta Base: A U.S. Military Fort in Ecuador.” Fellowship, Winter 2007b, p.20-21.
20 Saavedra 2007, p.15.
Nationalities (CONAIE) organized one of the first large-scale demonstrations against the Manta Agreement in July 1999. CONAIE had recently won a seat to participate in formal dialogue with the Ecuadorian government by engaging in two-weeks of militant protest.\textsuperscript{21} However, the Manta issue was quickly overshadowed by Ecuador’s financial crisis and the dollarization of the economy in early 2000.\textsuperscript{22}

Although the ten year agreement signed in November 1999 immediately prompted several peace and human rights organizations to take action, a broader coalition with greater cooperation from local groups did not begin to take shape until 2001. Joining forces with local groups, this formation included organizations such as the Provincial Union of Farmers’ Organization of Manabi (UPOCAM), Tohalli Anti-Imperialism Movement, Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights (CEDHU), Andean Program of Human Rights (PADH), International Observance for Peace (OIPAZ), SERPAJ, the Anti-Corruption Network, the Young Men’s Christian Association– Ecuador (ACJ - Ecuador), and the Regional Foundation of Consultant's Office in Human Rights (INREDH). Activist groups also filed several lawsuits in the Constitutional Court challenging the Manta Agreement as unconstitutional in 2001.

In addition to national protests, anti-base groups invested significant amounts of time mobilizing citizens within Manabi Province. The Tohalli Anti-Imperialist Movement, the Land Defense Committee of Portoviejo, and later ACJ-Ecuador were

\textsuperscript{21} As with other anti-base movements, different formations or factions within the movement existed. For instance, although CONAIE publicly declared their opposition to the Manta base, I did not observe a strong CONAIE presence in the No Base Ecuador Coalition. On this point, No Base Ecuador coalition members stated, “CONAIE was invited to participate in the No Bases Ecuador Coalition, and indeed it participated in several coordination meetings. [However], it did not play the main role in the process of resistance in Manta or at the national level. Instead, it incorporated in its discourse the permanent fight against and closure of Manta Base as a matter of sovereignty.” E-mail interview with Helga Serrano and Ecuador No Bases Coalition members. August 31, 2007. Nevertheless, CONAIE is listed as a member of the No Bases Coalition.

\textsuperscript{22} Although their numbers were relatively small, CONAIE and other social and political groups continued to challenge the government in mid-late 2000. For instance, three thousand activists held a demonstration in Quito on May 1, 2000. See Ecuador No Base Coalition. “Base de Manta: Ojos y oídos del Plan Colombia.” [Manta Base: The Eyes and Ears of Plan Colombia]. Quito, Ecuador: Ecuador No Bases Coalition, 2007, p.24.
foundational in promoting resistance against the Manta base at the local level. Groups such as UPOCAM, ACJ- Ecuador, and SERPAJ hosted forums, cultural activities, and public debates in Portoviejo and Manta to raise awareness about base related issues and problems. ACJ, through its Manta branch, focused on educating local youth and peasants about the dangers associated with U.S. bases.

Human rights groups such as INREDH and the Andean Committee of Services promoted the anti-base cause by lobbying officials, providing communication through its networks, and conducting research on bases and militarization. These groups had compiled enough evidence to present cases of human rights violations on behalf of local residents. Issues of concern included “the right of fishermen to accede to port, the recovery of illegally expropriated land, damages resulting from the sinking and destroying of boats, and the control and access of waterways for military purpose.” Anti-base groups were especially concerned about the use of Manta base as a launching pad to aid Colombia in its fight against rebel insurgents such as the FARC. Activists feared that U.S. military presence would eventually drag Ecuador into a regionalized military conflict as Colombian rebels traversed Ecuador’s borders. By educating Manabí Province residents on the potential dangers of U.S. military presence, activists hoped to build public opinion against base renewal in 2009. Activists cited that support for the non-renewal of the Manta Agreement increased as more citizens grew aware of U.S. military presence and militarization through Ecuador’s involvement in Plan Colombia.

**Transnational Collaboration**

One key difference in the Manta anti-base movement compared to other episodes discussed in previous chapters is the movement’s degree of

23 E-mail interview with Helga Serrano and Ecuador No Bases Coalition members. August 31, 2007.
internationalization. Transnational links played a greater role in Ecuador than in other anti-base movements. The movement maintained close ties to groups outside of Ecuador, particularly those working on peace and demilitarization issues. For example, through personal contacts with the Tohalli Movement, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) visited Manta in 2002 to study the political, economic, and cultural impact of Manta base. Later, AFSC, the Regional Foundation of Consultancy in Human Rights, and the Network of the Colombian-Ecuadorean Brotherhood held workshops in Manta to discuss links between the Manta base and Plan Colombia. The Network of Friendship and Solidarity with Colombia (REDHER) organized similar meetings focused on the Manta base.

In January 2004, Ecuadorian anti-base activists gave a presentation on bases at the World Social Forum (WSF) in Mumbai, India. In the following WSF in Porte Allegre, the emerging network of global anti-base activists discussed potential locations to host the first international anti-base meeting. Ecuadorian anti-base groups grabbed the opportunity to propose their country as a possible location. At the request of the network’s International Organization Committee (IOC), several Ecuadorian groups with existing ties at the transnational level submitted a proposal on behalf of Ecuadorian activists. Once approved, these groups formally established the No Bases Ecuador Coalition. AFSC and INREDH acted as the initial coordinators, with ACJ-Ecuador replacing AFSC in 2006.26 The No Bases Ecuador Coalition coordinated with the global No Bases network to host a major international conference in Quito in March 2007. The conference concluded with a caravan from Quito to Manta where 400 international delegates joined thousands of protestors in Manta. The international conference, supported by the Mayor’s Office in Quito and blessed by President

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26 E-mail interview with Helga Serrano and Ecuador No Bases Coalition members. August 31, 2007. For a complete list of No Bases Ecuador Coalition groups, see Saavedra 2007, p.49.
Correa, attracted national media attention from all major news sources in Ecuador. In sum, anti-base groups were able to sustain their campaign over a relatively long period, maintain at least a semblance of movement unity, and reach a broad audience through the international conference.

**State-Society Interaction**

Anti-base protests mattered. However, having powerful leaders backing the anti-base stance may have mattered even more. After all, base politics and the renewal of the Manta Agreement were decisions made by political elites. This raises a problem of causal inference, making it difficult to assess the weighted impact of social movements. The absence of any security consensus may simply have led powerful anti-base elites, such as President Correa, to reject U.S. bases based on their own preferences, regardless of social movement pressure. Thus President Correa would have rejected U.S. bases, even if activists never mobilized. I offer a slightly different causal story which takes into account social movements: a weak security consensus provided activists the political space necessary to form ties with elites. Hence, the U.S. military’s withdrawal from Manta was spurred by the combination of both social movement and elite forces.

If anti-base movements truly mattered, some doubt should be cast on whether Ecuador government officials would have committed to a position of base non-renewal had anti-base movements not existed. The answer to base policy outcomes is clearly not mono-causal, and certainly not attributed to anti-base movements alone. The crucial question here is whether an actual link existed between state and society, or if anti-base movements were merely cheerleaders on the sideline rooting for politicians to say no to U.S. bases. The security consensus framework helps us think about the connection between anti-base movements and government elites. Here I process trace events throughout the Manta base episode to show how activists and
sympathetic elites reinforced one another’s position, leading to the (future) removal of U.S. troops.

**Legal action with sympathetic elites**

As argued above, in the formative stages of the anti-base campaign, human rights, religious, and indigenous groups took legal action against the Manta base agreement. That members of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces, National Congress, and Constitutional Court also questioned the Manta Agreement added to the credibility of activists’ legal challenge. For example, in September 2000, military officials requested that the government review the Manta Agreement, arguing that U.S. troops were taking on functions belonging to the Ecuadorian Armed Forces. Several months later, Hugo Moreno, the International Relations Committee Chair, also requested that the Foreign and Defense Ministers explain the implications of U.S. military presence in Manta.

Aside from street demonstrations, in the first stage of the anti-base campaign, several human rights organizations such as CEDHU and the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights, in conjunction with political parties, decided to challenge the Manta Agreement through the Constitutional Court. Discussions pertaining to legal action were first raised at the Anti-Imperialism Meeting, organized by the Tohalli Movement in July 2000. Activists presented their case before the Constitutional Court on January 15, 2001. Human rights lawyers claimed that the Manta Agreement required approval from the National Congress. Activist groups argued that the Manta Agreement violated Article 161, Number 2, of Ecuador’s Constitution, which authorized the National Congress to approve international treaties and agreements, including those

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27 Saavedra 2007, p.16.
which established political or military alliances.\textsuperscript{30} As representative Gilberto Talahua, chair of the Indigenous Affairs Committee maintained, "The accord was signed in violation of constitutional norms and without citizen discussion or participation."\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, activists claimed that the base served as an outpost for military actions tied to Plan Colombia.\textsuperscript{32} Although the Court ruled in favor of the government, anti-base activists had taken the first step in challenging the Manta Agreement through formal channels.\textsuperscript{33}

\textit{The Pro-U.S. Gutierrez Period}

With anti-base groups defeated in court, activists turned their attention towards the link between Plan Colombia and the Manta base. Human rights groups began to research and closely monitor social tensions taking place near the Colombian-Ecuador border, fueled by increasing violence and an influx of refugees beginning in late 2000.\textsuperscript{34} Acknowledging rising tensions on the borderland, the Ecuadorian government stationed approximately 10,000 troops to secure the Colombian-Ecuadorian border. The decision to deploy troops came after the termination of negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. Wanting to steer clear from the Colombian conflict, Ecuadorians voiced concern that Manta’s surveillance capabilities were being used to monitor rebel activity in Colombia. Ecuadorians feared that Washington’s increasing involvement in Colombia’s struggle against insurgents would inadvertently drag Quito into the conflict.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{31}Lucas 2000.
\textsuperscript{32}The U.S. and Ecuadorian governments denied allegations made by anti-base activists, claiming that Manta Base was limited to counternarcotics and surveillance operations. I do not deny Washington or Quito’s official position. However, it is true that Colombian insurgency groups engage in illicit drug trafficking, making it difficult to separate the war on drugs from counter-insurgency operations.
\textsuperscript{33}Pro-base demonstrations supporting the Constitutional Court’s ruling also took place in Manta.
\textsuperscript{34}Saavedra 2007, p.25.
In November 2002, Lucio Gutierrez, who briefly headed the junta government after Jamil Mahuad’s ouster in 2000, was voted into power with the backing of indigenous and leftist groups. Much to the consternation of some of his political supporters, Gutierrez quickly established a pro-U.S. stance. The indigenous political group, Pachakutik, criticized Gutierrez’s comments during a February 2003 trip to Washington in which he declared his intention to be “the best ally of the United States.”

Given Gutierrez’s pro-U.S. position, it became clear that the U.S. military would remain in Manta until at least the expiration of the bilateral base agreement in 2009. Under these political constraints, anti-base groups shifted their strategy to promote the non-renewal of the Manta Agreement in 2009. Monitoring activity near Manta base and the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, activists conducted extensive research, gathering as much information as possible to build a case for non-renewal. Under the Gutierrez period, major protests were less visible. However, anti-base groups organized conferences, such as the International Peace Camp, to reach out to Manabi Province residents. Additionally, civic groups documented base-related incidents around Manta port and the northern border. In particular, Rafael Jaque of the Latin American Association of Human Rights (ALDHU) investigated the alleged sinking of fishing boats by U.S. ships. Miguel Moran, leader of the Tohalli movement, also compiled a series of detailed reports implicating Manta to activities in Colombia to be sent to the Ecuadorian National Congress.

More significantly, it was during this period that the No Bases Ecuador Coalition began to coalesce, pooling together groups involved in earlier anti-base initiatives such as the First Imperial Movement, or the International Peace Camp, into

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a broader coalition linked with international anti-base groups. Anti-base groups also redoubled their efforts to educate the Manta population to undermine the city government’s support for continued U.S. military presence. Middle-class citizens had invested in businesses in hopes of profiting from U.S. military presence and the $70 million renovation and upgrades to the Manta base. However, the economic benefits promised by local pro-base officials never materialized. Unfulfilled promises, coupled with safety issues and disruptions in the fishing economy, led to increasing dissatisfaction with U.S. base presence among Manta residents.

**Growing elite dissatisfaction**

Concerned over growing political instability, the National Congress voted to replace President Gutierrez with his Vice-President, Alfredo Palacio, in April 2005. Activists contend that Gutierrez’s ouster allowed anti-base groups to make public the information compiled by various organizations. Under the Gutierrez Administration, Foreign Minister Patricio Zuquilandia refused to engage in dialogue with specific anti-base groups and their representatives, working to undermine and discredit their evidence against U.S. military presence. Demands to address the sinking of fishing ships and health hazards created by Colombia’s fumigation of cocoa plants were largely ignored by the Gutierrez government. In contrast, key cabinet officials in the Palacio Administration hinted that the agreement would not continue beyond 2009. On July 15, 2005, Foreign Minister Antonio Parra commented he would rather cut his hand off than sign a renewed base agreement. Parra made clear that national sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs would guide Ecuadorian foreign

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38 Saavedra 2007, p.27-29.
40 *ibid* 2007, p.41.
41 *ibid* 2007, p.41. However, Heinz Moeller, Ecuador's Foreign Affairs Minister under Gustavo Noboa Heinz Moeller, had requested the Colombian government to halt fumigations in 2001.
policy.\textsuperscript{43} Although Parra promised to respect the current base agreement, the new government’s emphasis on sovereignty made base renewal less tenable in the future. Parra’s words were tested when a U.S. naval ship damaged a fishing boat on May 21, 2005. Indeed, Foreign Minister Parra protested the detainment of the boat’s crew, and requested compensation for the damaged ship. The Ecuador government also refused to bow before U.S. pressure to grant U.S. soldiers immunity from the International Criminal Court, a move which cost the government $7 million in U.S. economic aid.\textsuperscript{44}

Foreign Minister Parra was replaced halfway into Palacio’s tenure by Francisco Carrión. Carrión’s position was even clearer than Parra’s on the Manta Agreement. Appearing before the International Affairs Committee in the National Congress on February 1, 2006, Carrión stated, “If I were foreign minister in 2009, I would not sign a renewal of the Manta Base agreement (with the United States) because I do not consider that it benefits the country's interests.”\textsuperscript{45} This position was echoed by Deputy Foreign Minister Diego Ribadeneira, who added, "I do not think that, the Manta Base [agreement] will be extended, whoever is foreign minister in 2009."\textsuperscript{46} Minister of Defense Marcelo Delgado, speaking as a private citizen, also expressed his disappointment with the current Manta Agreement. He argued, "We have received almost nothing in exchange for Manta Base...[Ecuador] must receive something in exchange. If we do not have that, there should be no negotiation [for renewal]."\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{43} Saavedra 2007, p.39.  
\textsuperscript{44} Saavedra 2007, p.41.  
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.} Carrion qualified his comment, however, when reminded of U.S. Ambassador Linda Jewel’s optimism about extending the Manta Agreement, and the potential friction his position would create with the U.S. In response, Carrion asserted his position against base renewal was a personal opinion, and not reflective of the Ecuadorian government. He added that the decision ultimately rested with the next government in any case. See BBC Monitoring Worldwide. “Ecuadoran Foreign Minister against renewal of Manta Base agreement.” September 2, 2006.  
Weak security consensus and movement-government ties

The lack of consensus among Ecuadorian elites regarding U.S.-Ecuador security relations is attested by the varying positions of the Nobua and Gutierrez government on one hand, and the Palacio government on the other. Under the Palacio government, activists found key elites sympathetic to their cause. For instance, Foreign Minister Carrión met with No Bases Ecuador Coalition members to discuss his position not to renew the Manta Base Agreement. Carrion’s National Plan of Foreign Policy (PLANEX 2020) was also established with input from various sectors of society, including anti-base groups and other civil societal organizations. In effect, demands from Ecuadorian pacifist groups were satisfied in PLANEX 2020, which stated that “Ecuadorian territory [would] not house foreign troops.” As a sign of commitment to PLANEX 2020, the Palacio Administration rejected signing an agreement granting U.S. soldiers immunity from criminal jurisdiction while on-duty. This decision was announced following a meeting between Minister of Government Mauricio Gandara and members of human rights groups.

More importantly, the connection between social movements and elites became more apparent in the rhetoric of elites. In 1999, U.S. military presence in Manta was unproblematic. Prior to the Palacio regime, Quito vehemently denied any link between the Manta base and the Colombian insurgency. By 2005, however, policy circles contemplating the future of Manta raised arguments similar to those previously

48 Saavedra 2007, p. 43. This was confirmed in an e-mail interview with Helga Serrano and Ecuador No Bases Coalition members. August 31, 2007.
presented only by activists - sovereignty and escalation of the Colombian conflict – as reasons not to resign the Manta deal.\(^{51}\)

It was under this shifting political environment that presidential candidate Rafael Correa ran on a platform announcing his pledge of non-renewal during the 2006 election campaign. According to a report by the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, the pledge against U.S. military presence in Ecuador struck a popular chord among numerous constituents.\(^{52}\) Correa’s primary challenger was the conservative Alvaro Noboa, who favored U.S. military presence in Manta. As No Base Ecuador coalition members contend, the 2006 elections enabled the Manta Base issue to move beyond activist circles and into mainstream public debates. The fate of U.S. military presence would rest with the electorate, based on the outcome of the election.

Correa’s electoral victory struck a blow against U.S. geopolitical interests. Still, some argued that Correa’s position was only a pledge, and not policy. Some skeptics argued that Correa’s hard-line position on the Manta Agreement renewal was nothing more than a bargaining strategy. By beginning with a position of non-renewal, Correa could leverage additional concessions such as foreign aid or preferential trade agreements.\(^{53}\) A few activists also expressed uncertainty as to whether Correa would hold onto his electoral pledge. Thus No Base Ecuador members continued to lobby and write support letters to keep Correa accountable to his pledge. Doubt was finally cast aside when Correa reaffirmed his position publicly during the International No Bases Conference held in Quito. The Ecuador government also delegated Assistant Secretary of Defense Miguel Carvajal to speak at the No Bases Conference plenary session, where he restated Correa’s pledge. In addition to Correa, the No Bases


\(^{52}\) Logan 2007.

Ecuador Coalition kept in contact with government allies such as the Minister of Government and Police, Fernando Bustamante, and the National Security Advisor, Gustavo Larrea.

In sum, under conditions of weak security consensus, elites remained divided on issues of national security and their foreign relations with the U.S. Likewise, political elites and presidential candidates held varying positions regarding the renewal of the Manta Agreement. Taking advantage of this political opportunity, activists gained considerable leverage in their struggle by forming ties with sympathetic elites within the central government.

One might argue that anti-base movements were epiphenomenal in the Manta Base outcome. Base policy decisions were determined by key elites irrespective of anti-base pressure. Once the position of key elites shifted, prospects of base renewal dimmed. Much like the Philippines case, however, without strong, organized anti-base opposition, the Manta base issue would have likely maintained a low profile. Instead, anti-base groups challenged the legality of the base agreement in the Constitutional Court, mobilized mass demonstrations, and educated citizens within Manabí Province about the security risks associated with Manta. Conducting extensive research, human rights organizations constantly fed government officials information pertaining to Manta Base and Plan Colombia. By 2005, major political figures, including Palacio’s foreign and defense ministers, hinted they would not resign the Manta base agreement with the United States. These sympathetic elites became potential allies in the battle to terminate the Manta base agreement in 2009. Activists had raised the Manta base issue to a level of national importance, attested by the inclusion of base non-renewal into Rafael Correa’s 2006 presidential campaign platform. Through a drawn-out campaign, anti-base movements helped shape a national security discourse built against U.S. military presence, ultimately leading to the non-renewal of the Manta base.
Part II: Italy

As the Manta anti-base campaign took a step closer in achieving its goal of non-renewal, capped by Correa’s electoral victory in late 2006, another anti-base struggle was rapidly gaining momentum in Europe. On February 21, 2007, Italy’s frail center-left ruling coalition crumbled over foreign policy issues. Failing to gain Senate majority approval supporting Italy’s NATO mission in Afghanistan and the expansion of a U.S. military base, Prime Minister Romano Prodi stepped down as head of government. However, this crisis, one of many triggered by radical left parties in the center-left coalition, lasted only briefly. After discussion with Italian President Giorgio Napolitano, Prodi returned to the helm of government the following week. To bolster his coalition, Prodi required each party to sign a twelve point memorandum which included unconditional support for his foreign policy.

Accustomed to frequent government turnover, most Italians remained unphased by Prodi’s temporary fall. However, the brief crisis did turn public attention towards Italy’s foreign policy, and specifically Italy’s commitment to the United States and the larger international community. Local resistance had been brewing since May 2006 when Vicenza city officials publicly revealed base construction plans at Dal Molin airfield. Due largely to anti-base protestors, the Vicenza issue quickly rose to national prominence in the months preceding Prodi’s fall. Four days prior to Prodi’s resignation, the No Dal Molin campaign had already launched its second major national protest. Far-left parties inside Prodi’s own coalition government supported this demonstration. What threat did anti-base movements pose to the Italian government and the future of U.S. base plans in northern Italy? How did the Italian government balance between its international commitments and domestic pressure?

54 Prodi’s victory in the April 2006 election represented the sixtieth government since 1946.
The Vicenza episode parallels the Okinawan anti-base movement episodes in several respects. Although the internal dynamics of the No Dal Molin campaign differ from Okinawan activists’ later efforts to block the expansion of Camp Schwab (see Chapter 7), the cycle of anti-base action and government reaction follow similar patterns. In the face of anti-base pressure, the Italian government initially dragged its feet on the matter, passing the buck to local city officials. Like Tokyo, Rome resorted to numerous political tactics to keep a lid on domestic opposition, and in particular, far-left party officials. Activists thus found it much more difficult to form ties with sympathetic elites. As I argued in previous cases, the Italian government’s response, and the movement’s difficulty in penetrating the state ultimately stemmed from U.S. alliance relations and the influence of a strong security consensus among Italian elites. Contrary to Ecuador, the historical development of U.S.-Italian relations, and the institutional framework of NATO helped foster a security “consensus” among elites. What made the Vicenza anti-base movement episode unique from similar cases such as Japan and South Korea (as discussed in Chapter 6) however, was the role of coalition politics. Coalition dynamics and a slim parliamentary majority initially provided activists an opportunity to broaden their anti-base agenda. However, Italian coalitional politics acted as double edged sword, eventually reinforcing the position of the security consensus.

U.S. Bases in Italy

Although U.S. military presence in Italy traces back to the post-war occupation, the current system of U.S. bases is more closely associated with Italy’s acceptance into NATO.55 In the south, Naples hosted the headquarters of Allied Joint Forces Command in Southern Europe and Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. Installations in Sicily, such as the Sigonella and Comiso base, took an increasingly

55 See Sandars 2000, p.227-238 for an overview of U.S bases in Italy.
important role in the 1970s as U.S. strategic priorities expanded in the Middle East. In the north, the U.S. built Camp Ederle in Vicenza, which functioned as the Southern European Task Force headquarters. The U.S. also established a major air base in Aviano in northeast Italy. These bases were intended to protect Italy from Soviet and Yugoslavian threats across the eastern border.\(^{56}\)

Most bases were established as NATO facilities with U.S. troops operating under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. Basing access and jurisdiction of U.S. troops were regulated by the Basic Infrastructure Agreement signed by Rome and Washington in 1954. Rome and Washington signed additional agreements in the mid-1990s placing U.S. bases under Italian command, and limiting their use to NATO operations. Although U.S. troops in Italy were under an American commander, Italy still retained sovereignty over U.S. bases.

The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review recommended reducing force levels in Western Europe from 100,000 to 50,000 troops, with most reductions coming from Germany. Despite significant cuts across Europe, troop levels have remained relatively constant in Italy at around 12,000 troops since the mid-1990’s.\(^{57}\) In 2006, 11,653 U.S. military personnel were stationed in Italy with major bases located in Aviano, Naples, Vicenza, and Sigonella.\(^{58}\) Sigonella functions as a critical point for air mobility routes.\(^{59}\) Its strategic location by the Mediterranean also enables the base to serve as a major naval logistics hub through the Fleet and Industrial Supply


\(^{59}\) Statement by General James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command to the Senate Armed Services Committee. March 1, 2005.
In the north, Aviano and Vicenza host the 173rd Airborne Combat Brigade Team (ACBT). Reactivated in 2000, the 173rd ACBT has grown from one to six battalions. Camp Ederle in Vicenza currently hosts two battalions. The remaining four brigades are located in Germany. As part of ongoing plans for U.S. military restructuring in Southern Europe, the Army plans to consolidate the entire 173rd ACBT to Italy.

Anti-Base Mobilization in Vicenza

From Formal to Informal Politics

Limited space at Camp Ederle required the U.S. military to construct a new base facility in Vicenza to accommodate the relocation of 2,000 troops. The U.S. approached the Berlusconi government in late 2003, inquiring about the use of the Dal Molin airfield in Vicenza. In April 2005, the U.S. ambassador to Italy announced that the Berlusconi government had agreed to set aside part of Dal Molin airfield for U.S. military use. *Stars and Stripes* reported that negotiations between the U.S. and Italian government had taken place over the past two years.

The base negotiations were conducted behind closed doors, leaving Vicenza residents in the dark about the Dal Molin project. Rumors and public speculation about base expansion were finally confirmed by the city government on May 25,

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64 Rizzo 2005.
2006. A U.S. military representative and a Vicenza city official presented details about the project during a city council meeting. Vicenza citizens criticized the secretive manner in which base negotiations were conducted between the U.S., Italian, and Vicenza governments. Echoing grievances by South Korean (see Chapter 6) and Ecuadorean activists, citizens were notified only after negotiations had been concluded.

Initially focusing on NIMBY issues, local citizens raised several grievances regarding the Dal Molin project. Activists claimed the increase in U.S. soldiers would adversely impact the environment, increase resource consumption such as water and electricity, congest traffic, and heighten safety risks. Later, activists increasingly focused on anti-militarization frames to broaden their reach. Noting Vicenza’s recognition as a UNESCO world heritage site, activists condemned the idea of polluting a historical city with another military base.

In response to the city’s announcement in May 2006, residents in Vicenza and surrounding communities coordinated their opposition through several local community councils. Since details of the base expansion were still relatively unknown to the general public, the community councils provided information, solicited opinions, and communicated their concerns to city officials. The community

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65 Activists note that suspicions were aroused because reports about possible base expansion in Italy (but not necessarily Dal Molin) were reported by the media, but not by the city. Moreover, upon learning that the U.S military was planning to pay for improved road and traffic conditions in Northeast Vicenza, community groups suspected that the U.S. military was making preparations for base construction. Interview with No Dal Molin activist, Guido Lanaro. January 14, 2008. Interview with No Dal Molin activist Enzo Cisca. January 15, 2008.

66 Vicenza is the site of several Palladian buildings and villas. Activist have written to UNESCO requesting Vicenza’s removal from the list of world heritage sites. They claim a city occupied by military bases is undeserving of such recognition. See No Dal Molin/Presidio Permanente documents. Una rigorosa analisi, dei documenti di progetto, di documenti comunali, di leggi e decreti eseguita da un gruppo di tecnici. [The rigorous analysis of project documents, municipality documents, and decree laws of a group of engineers]. Available at http://www.altravicenza.it/dossier/dalmolin/doc/20070405comitati01.pdf [last accessed 1/28/08].

67 Media and activist reports vary between six and nine such community advisory councils. Councils were organized based on location of residence. For example, the Caldogno area situated directly north of Dal Molin airfield formed a community council representing their local district.
councils also used several tactics to try and block base expansion, such as organizing protest marches, voicing opposition at city council meetings, and gathering signatures. Taking advantage of formal channels of politics, opposition community members also held discussions with city council officials throughout the summer of 2006. Citizens demanded a thorough study of the base’s environmental and economic impact before passing an agreement. More importantly, opposition groups requested that the city pass any base decision through a public referendum.

Unfortunately, the path of formal politics led Vicenza citizens to a dead end. On October 26, the Vicenza city council voted in favor of base expansion with 21 in favor and 17 opposed (three abstained). Additionally, the Vicenza city council rejected the use of a public referendum. The No Dal Molin campaign thus declared, “In the face of silence, and generic assurances on the political side, (anti-base) committees (began) active protests in October 2006 in front of the mayor’s office. Deaf to the various requests of democratic participation of local people, the government had already decided in favor of the base without any type of popular referendum.”

Reaching the limits of institutional politics, Vicenza citizens now turned towards informal politics by mobilizing a broad campaign against base expansion.

**The No Dal Molin Campaign**

To draw a broader, national appeal, local activists reached out to anti-war groups, inviting them to support the No Dal Molin campaign. No Dal Molin members also joined the *Patto Nazionale di Solidarietà e Mutuo Soccorso* (PNSMS) in solidarity with other local Italian movements fighting to protect local resources and

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68 Iversen 2007.
territory. Through PNSMS, anti-base activists networked with other social movements, such as the campaign against the construction of a high-speed railway in Val di Susa, or protests against garbage dumps in Grottaglie. No Dal Molin activists stated, “An agreement (has been made) with mutual support for the various movements throughout the country. In this way, local movements, protecting local resources were all supporters at the national level.”70 As the No Dal Molin campaign expanded its networks, local activists formed the *Presidio Permanente*,71 and prepared for their first national protest on December 2. This demonstration attracted approximately 30,000 protestors in Vicenza, signaling the arrival of a major social movement.72

On January 16, 2007, Prime Minister Prodi publicly announced his support for the new base at Dal Molin. Anti-base activists immediately reacted to the announcements. Citizens and activists spontaneously marched through the historical center of Vicenza expressing their outrage. Eight thousand citizens held a candlelight vigil. Some protestors burned voter registration cards and party flags to voice their indignation at Prime Minister Prodi, who only months earlier had made an electoral pledge to decrease militarization. Activists then occupied Vicenza railroad station. The protest march culminated at the *Presidio*, adjacent to Dal Molin air field. Marked by a giant white tent, the *Presidio* now functioned as “the permanent base of protest.”73

71 The *Presidio* functioned as an assembly or forum. As a physical place, the *Presidio* was a large white tent serving as the headquarters of the No Dal Molin campaign.
73 Osti 2007.
Party Politics and Political Opportunities

Coalition dynamics within Prodi’s ruling center-left government initially proved fortuitous for anti-base activists. The slim, two-seat Senate majority over the center-right gave fringe parties in Prodi’s nine-party coalition a disproportionate amount of power relative to their size. Prodi’s announcement to support base expansion in Vicenza, and Italian troops in Afghanistan under NATO, put his frail coalition to the test. Far-left party members were aghast that Prodi had endorsed a deal negotiated under the pro-Bush Berlusconi government. Members from the Party of Italian Communists (PdCI), Communist Refoundation Party (PRC), and the Green Party all expressed deep reservations about what they perceived as the militarization of Italy’s foreign policy. The three far-left parties vowed to oppose the new base, thus opening the door for activists to form ties with members of the ruling government. PRC representative Alfio Nicotra quoted, "Romano Prodi’s profoundly mistaken decision does not close the Vicenza question, but on the contrary, opens it...This is shown by the way people are mobilizing in Vicenza and by the requests we are getting to hold a national rally, whose goal would be to cut back foreign bases and reduce Italy's military servitude."^74

Activists took advantage of internal bickering within the center-left coalition. While Prodi’s fragile government teetered on the edge of crisis over foreign and defense policy issues, the No Dal Molin campaign made preparations for a second national protest on February 17. The three far-left parties gave their support to Vicenza activists. Government representatives from these parties, including several

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Senators and the Minister of Environment, joined protestors in Vicenza. The demonstration drew approximately 100,000 protestors.\textsuperscript{75}

Four days after the protest, Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema made an appeal to Parliament members to support U.S. base expansion in Vicenza, and Italy’s commitment to NATO in Afghanistan. D’Alema argued that the Vicenza base was essential for maintaining positive relations with the U.S., and “to change course would be a hostile act against the United States.”\textsuperscript{76} Despite his former ties to communists, D’Alema’s appeal did not win-over the radical left. Two far-left senators, Fernando Rossi (PdCI), and Franco Turigliatto (PRC), abstained from voting. To the delight of activists, the government failed to win majority support. Unable to garner the necessary votes from his own coalition, Prodi voluntarily resigned as prime minister. Prodi’s fall raised several hopeful questions for activists. If reinstated as prime minister, would Prodi change his stance on the Vicenza issue? Would a new government review the base agreement with the U.S.?

\textit{Successful Mobilization}

Italian activists have praised the No Dal Molin campaign as the first major movement specifically targeting U.S. military bases in Italy, and a model for other local movements to follow.\textsuperscript{77} Mobilization success goes beyond the size of protests witnessed on December 2 and February 17. Activists repeatedly pointed to the diverse

\textsuperscript{75} Activists cite between 100,000 to 120,000 protestors. Police reports cite between 50,000-80,000 protestors. See Colleen Barry. “Italian’s Protest U.S. Base Expansion.” \textit{Washington Post}. February 18, 2007.


\textsuperscript{77} Large protests against U.S. bases took place in the 1980s. However, these protests were aimed at preventing the deployment of cruise missiles stockpiled in U.S. bases rather than military bases themselves. Communities with long-standing anti-base opposition include those in Livorno, Napoli, Aviano, Sigonella, and Sardinia. However, most anti-base groups tend to be relatively small. With the possible exception of movements in Aviano and Sigonella, Italian peace groups have not paid significant attention to these struggles. Thus as Piero Maestri argues, “Vicenza is the first movement in which (peace activists) and the broader public recognize that military bases are an important issue.” Interview with Piero Maestri. Milan, Italy, January 17, 2008.
social, economic, and political background of participants, and the transformative
effect broad collaboration had on the identity and outlook of Vicenza citizens. Several
attributes enabled the No Dal Molin campaign to maintain a high degree of
cohesiveness up through the February 17 protest.

First, the No Dal Molin Campaign maintained its local flavor with a concrete
target and goal focused on stopping U.S. base expansion at Dal Molin. Moreover, the
movement was organized by local Vicenza citizens with relatively little outside
interference, giving the campaign an extra degree of credibility to supporters. An
autonomous movement of the citizenry made it more difficult for the government to
discredit the legitimacy of the movement.

Second, the blend of younger, radical activists with older, more established,
“ordinary” citizens had a positive impact on the campaign by appealing to a wider
reach of the Vicenza community. Younger activists reported feeling much safer
having “ordinary” citizens participate in the movement. Not only did the presence of
ordinary citizens and families help moderate the movement’s image, but as one local
businessman recollects being told by a younger activist, “If it weren’t for you guys, I
think the police would have cracked down on us.” Conversely, the older activists
and “ordinary” citizens were encouraged by the passionate resistance of younger
activists. An American peace activist in Rome observed how ordinary citizens who
had always played by the rules learned it was acceptable to step beyond these
boundaries, participating in civil disobedience.

Lastly, the movement successfully turned a local issue into a national
movement. Not only did activists network with other local movements and anti-war
groups across Italy, by early 2007, the anti-base movement had the full support of the

far-left political parties in Prodi’s coalition. Support went beyond mere rhetoric. For instance, in Milan, the Refounded Communist Party organized twenty buses to transport activists and party members from Milan to Vicenza for the February 17 demonstration. Moreover, party representatives and government officials joined activists on the streets of Vicenza.

**Strong Security Consensus**

As discussed above, anti-base activists reached a point of successful mobilization in Vicenza. Were they effective, however, in shaping base policy outcomes? How did the Prodi government respond to domestic opposition against base expansion after the embarrassing collapse of his center-left coalition? At the very least, the February 17 protests exacerbated the center-left crisis by exposing popular dissent and elite division in the mainstream media. Rather than whither in ignominious defeat, however, the crisis emboldened Prodi’s resolve to keep his coalition alive and push forward with his foreign policy agenda.

Prodi’s support for the U.S. alliance and NATO, and more concretely U.S. base expansion, is unsurprising if one accepts the existence of a security consensus among Italian elites. With fragile coalitions and frequent government turnovers, one would imagine it difficult for elites to find common consensus on any political agenda. Foreign and security policy, however, is one area where Italian political elites have found common ground. Thus one often finds broad support on key foreign and security policy issues, including those related to NATO and the U.S. alliance

**Italian Foreign Policy and U.S. Relations**

Italy’s close security ties to the U.S. is embedded in the historical trajectory of U.S.-Italian relations, providing the elite security consensus a substantial degree of depth. Rome’s favorable attitude towards NATO and the U.S. initially stemmed from

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genuine strategic concerns and common threat perceptions after World War II. Italy recognized the necessity of a permanent, peacetime alliance to secure its northeast border from Soviet aggression. U.S. forces also played an important role protecting Italian sovereignty from Yugoslavian threats to territorial claim. Meanwhile, vulnerability at sea required Italy to forge an alliance with a major maritime power such as the United States to protect its southern coasts.  

In the immediate postwar years, the Truman Doctrine and the reduced presence of British troops in the Mediterranean in 1947 enhanced the United States’ role in Italy’s postwar security. America’s protectorate role for Italy and Western Europe became institutionalized under the Marshall Plan and NATO. Some Italian foreign policy observers noted that Italy’s entrance into NATO, “assured for the following twenty-five years Italian support to all the initiatives of American foreign policy.” The result was “an almost structural inclination” on Italy to rely on the U.S. for security.  

Throughout the Cold War, U.S.-Italian relations were marked by “extraordinary subservience to the United States on security policy.” As Douglas Forsyth argued, for much of the Cold War, “Italy followed the U.S. lead on crucial foreign policy issues consistently, almost slavishly, throughout the postwar era.” Political elites, or more specifically Christian Democrat leaders, simply followed what could be deemed the traditional line of foreign policy. Italy’s virtual client state status

in the early postwar years naturally stemmed from its total political, military, and economic dependence on the United States. U.S. intervention in Italian politics, in particular, massive financial support for the Christian Democrats and other anti-Communist parties, contributed to this dependence.

The collapse of the Cold War did result in a more autonomous foreign policy posture. While overall relations remained strong, Rome and Washington faced disagreements regarding peacekeeping and intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, respectively. Despite occasional squabbles, however, Italy continued to maintain strong relations with the U.S. Maintaining close ties to the U.S. in the post-Cold War period as a matter of choice rather than necessity suggests the internalization of the Atlantic alliance by Italian elites.\(^{87}\)

**Security Consensus in the Post-9/11 Era**

A review of Italian foreign policy priorities under the second Berlusconi (2001-06) and Prodi government (2006-08) is helpful in understanding the breadth of the security consensus, and how the consensus influenced government responses and movement outcomes. Despite Berlusconi’s obvious pro-U.S., pro-Bush foreign policy stance, Italian academics diverge in their assessment of his foreign policy. Some scholars cite Berlusconi’s foreign policy agenda as anomalous. Berlusconi broke from traditional Italian foreign policy by heavily tilting his position towards the U.S. at the expense of the European community.\(^{88}\) Others, most notably Osvaldo Croci, have argued that Berlusconi brought continuity to Italian foreign policy by sustaining its two pillars: the Atlantic alliance and the European Union (EU), despite throwing his

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\(^{87}\) University of Bologna, Master’s in International Relations Students 2006.

\(^{88}\) While strong Atlantic ties were always a part of “traditional” Italian foreign policy, there was still a balance between the “twin pillars”. Interview with former Prodi advisor. January 19, 2008. Bologna, Italy. Interview with Robert Menotti. Rome, Italy, January 22, 2008. Also see University of Bologna, Master’s in International Relations Students 2006.
weight behind the “special relationship” with the U.S. Regardless of the “correct” interpretation, Berlusconi was undoubtedly pro-U.S. This was apparent in his selection of the staunchly pro-U.S. Antonio Martino as defense minister, and Renato Ruggiero as foreign minister. September 11 and the invasion of Afghanistan also reaffirmed Italy’s commitment to NATO when Italy dispatched 2,700 troops to Afghanistan to participate in “Operation Enduring Freedom.”

After Berlusconi’s defeat in the April 2006 elections, Americans and Italians alike recognized that a shift to the center-left Prodi would result in a much more “balanced” foreign policy from Berlusconi. On the eve of Prodi’s victory, Washington policymakers feared that Prodi’s victory would “put American-Italian relations on ice.”

Fears of a cooling of U.S.-Italy relations under a center-left regime were certainly legitimate. Only a year earlier, Spain’s pro-U.S. Jose Maria Anzar fell to the left-leaning Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Zapatero immediately withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq, damaging U.S.-Spain relations. Moreover, Prodi made clear that his foreign policy priority would center around a more autonomous Europe. Prodi also made the oft-quoted statement during his campaign, “I’m going to tell the United States when it’s right and when I think it’s wrong.” Perhaps most disconcerting for the Bush Administration was the inclusion of three far-left parties in Prodi’s ruling government.

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92 Ibid 2007
Fears of alliance deterioration never materialized. Prodi managed to sustain positive relations with the U.S., even as he distanced himself from Berlusconi’s U.S.-centric position. As Charles Kupchan notes, Prodi could have easily exploited anti-Bush sentiment in Italy for political gain. With his coalition crumbling, parting with Washington would have been an expedient way to strengthen his slim parliamentary majority. However, Prodi demonstrated his support for NATO by maintaining Italian troops in Afghanistan. He also maintained respect for the U.S.-Italian alliance by approving U.S. base expansion, despite significant domestic opposition from members of his own political coalition and civil society.

Italian political elites value their security partnership with the United States, and in general, accept NATO and U.S. relations as a major tenet of national security policy. Encompassing the bulk of the left-right political spectrum, the consensus is partially a function of political interests. Domestically, left coalitions may avoid damaging their relations to the U.S. to placate more moderate or right-leaning coalition members. Internationally, close ties to the U.S. may provide longer-term security benefits or boost Italy’s international prestige. Thus, while the Italian public overwhelmingly disapproved of the Bush Administration’s foreign policies, elites at the political center were willing to work with Washington. Political elites understand that maintaining ties to the U.S. are important to Italy’s foreign policy interests. Characteristic of the widespread depth in the security consensus, even when Italians and Americans disagree on specific policies, Italian elites prefer to keep the basic relationship functioning.

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95 Kupchan 2007.
96 As Robert Menotti notes, the United States is the only country in the world which elevates Italy onto the global stage. This was true with Italy’s inclusion into NATO in 1948, as well as Italy’s inclusion into the Group of Five in the mid-1970s.
97 This logic stems to other European states. For instance, Germany opposed the U.S. war in Iraq. However, they still permitted the U.S. to fly out of bases in Germany as a means of keeping basic relations functioning.
Although interests may inform the security consensus, the tendency by both left and right governments to stay on the path of Italy’s “traditional” foreign policy indicates that the consensus travels beyond political interests. Indicating greater depth, as argued earlier, the security consensus among Italian elites evolved as a process reinforced by shared norms and historical institutional legacies. Paralleling the domestic politics of other Cold War allies, the Christian Democrats and their American allies placed a “permanent freeze” on communists during the formative years of the U.S.-Italian alliance. The evolution of post-war domestic politics in Italy has kept left-leaning ideologues on the sideline of foreign policy and security debates. Like their Japanese counterparts, Italian political elites maintained a shared consensus, reified by processes of norm-sharing and repeated interactions with the U.S. over time. Through these endogenous processes, elites have internalized the significance of the U.S.-Italian relations and its international commitment to NATO. The consensus helps explain how Berlusconi received widespread support from the political right and left in the Chamber of Deputies in the initial decision to send Italian troops to Afghanistan. It also explains why Prodi continued to support NATO and U.S. related policies implemented by his political rival and predecessor. Prodi, along with Foreign Minister D’Alema, a former Communist, and the pro-American Defense Minister Arturo Parisi, were willing to work with the U.S., even if they intended to shift their foreign policy back to the traditional balance between NATO and the EU.

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98 What I view as a “security consensus” among Italian elites is understood by Carla Monteleone as part of a “pluralistic security community.” See Monteleone 2007.
99 I thank Matthew Evangelista for pointing this out. For further discussion on the topic of communist isolation, see Mario Del Pero "Containing Containment: Rethinking Italy’s Experience During the Cold War." Working Paper #2 pp. 1-27. New York: New York University, International Center for Advanced Studies, April 2002.
100 Monteleone 2007, p.71.
101 Only the three far-left parties (Green, PdCI, PRC) opposed the resolution. Ibid. 2002, p.93.
For the Italian government, base expansion in Vicenza should have been a non-issue. There was little cost or risk for the Italians in providing Dal Molin airfield to the U.S. Part of Dal Molin was already designated as an Italian Ministry of Defense site, and Vicenza already hosted existing U.S. military facilities. Why, then, had bases become so politicized in Italy, and how did Prodi respond to anti-base pressure? While I answer these questions through the framework of the security consensus, in the Italian anti-base case, I argue that the security consensus interacted with other political variables. Coalition and party politics created a complicated, but exciting dynamic between state and civil societal actors in the Vicenza movement episode.

Security Consensus, Coalition Politics, and Government Response

Understanding how the Prodi government responded to anti-base pressure requires stepping back to the Berlusconi era. Although Berlusconi agreed to base expansion in Vicenza, he requested that the project be put on hold until after the April 2006 elections.102 Public opinion polls had already given Prodi’s center-left coalition a slight edge over the center-right. Berlusconi feared that wider publicity for U.S. base expansion in front of an anti-Bush electorate would tip the scales further towards Prodi. The U.S. acquiesced to Berlusconi’s suggestion, and put the base project on temporarily hold.103

Unfortunately, for him, Berlusconi lost the election. The base project now landed on Prodi’s lap. Naturally, questions arose in Washington whether a coalition which included far-left parties would accept U.S. base plans brokered under the Berlusconi government. When Washington contacted Rome, the Italian government reassured the U.S. that it intended to continue with base plans at Dal Molin. However,

according to one foreign policy observer, Rome again asked for patience from Washington. Prodi was not necessarily opposed to U.S. bases. However, opposition from far-left parties within his fragile coalition made it difficult to discuss U.S. base expansion immediately following the election.

**Buck-passing**

Shortly after Prodi officially came to power in May 2006, the central government passed the Vicenza issue down to the local government. The base expansion project required consultation with local authorities on several technical issues such as building codes, zoning requirements, and safety and environmental regulations. Whether the timing was coincidental or deliberate, some U.S and Italian officials suggested that the Italian government had “passed-the-buck” onto local governments to avoid any political fall-out at the national level. The Italian government had turned the politically-charged issue of U.S. military bases at the national level into a technical matter discussed at the local level. By passing the base issue to the local government, Prodi found the political space and additional time needed to persuade his far-left coalition partners to vote in favor of U.S. and NATO-related policies.

Since the central government had passed the buck to local authorities, it was now the Vicenza city government which bore the brunt of anti-base pressure. As argued earlier, citizens first directed their actions against the Vicenza city government, demanding the base issue be resolved through a public referendum. However, after the city accepted base expansion and rejected holding a referendum, activists shifted their actions against the Prodi government. Although the local Vicenza government

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104 Interview with Roberto Menotti. January 22, 2008. Rome, Italy
105 Prodi entered office on May 17, 2006. The public announcement about Dal Molin at Vicenza City Council took place May 25. Base discussions were most likely held with local officials even during the Berlusconi government, especially since Vicenza mayor Enrico Hullweck and Silvio Berlusconi both belonged to the same political party, *Forza Italia*. 

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approved base expansion plans, it had no legal authority over bilateral basing agreements. As an issue of national defense and foreign policy, base agreements needed to be approved bilaterally at the level of states. The local government, therefore, passed the base issue back to Rome. The ball was once again in Prodi’s court, but now in an arena quickly filling with anti-base demonstrators not only from Vicenza, but across Italy.

Whether intentionally or not, passing the base issue back and forth between the local and national government created ambiguity over Prodi’s support for base expansion, even if Prodi supported U.S. bases in principle. Some Vicenza residents perceived indecisiveness on Prodi’s part. A reversal, or at least a review of the Dal Molin base project remained possible. In an interview with Corriere della Sera, the pro-base Vicenza Popular Bank president, Gianni Zonin, stated, “I am disappointed (with politicians). I do not like this buck-passing of responsibility between the municipal authority and the government. This confusion must stop: It must be either ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ with all due explanations.”106 With growing anti-base opposition in late 2006, U.S. officials too had grown increasingly nervous with noisy demonstrations and increasing delays on the base expansion project. U.S. Ambassador Ronald Spogli arrived in Vicenza on January 9, 2007 to speak with Vicenza business leaders. Putting direct pressure on Vicenza business and government leaders, and indirect pressure on Prodi, the Ambassador stated if the Dal Molin project fell through, the U.S. would pull out of Vicenza. The U.S. would then consolidate the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Germany, not Italy, within two years.107

107 Fumagalli 2007. This was confirmed by a Camp Ederle base official. Interview conducted on January 16, 2008. To put it bluntly, Spogli was threatening to shut down Camp Ederle if the U.S. could not use Dal Molin airfield.
Prodi finally provided clarity on January 16, 2007, declaring at a press conference in Bucharest, “I am about to tell the U.S. Ambassador that the Italian government won’t oppose the decision by the previous government and the town council of Vicenza to allow the expansion of the military base . . . Our attitude in regards to the U.S. is that of friend and ally.” Prodi’s acceptance of U.S. bases and NATO’s Afghanistan mission signaled to both domestic constituents and international allies that he remained committed to the Atlantic alliance. However, Vicenza activists and far-left politicians immediately reacted, suggesting that buck-passing the base issue to circumvent domestic political tension had backfired. Demonstrations took place in Vicenza. Activists proceeded with preparations for a major national protest on February 17, 2007. Prodi now faced joint opposition from his far-left coalition partners and anti-base activists. Not only had the campaign grown in size, but it had also grown more militant.

Prodi’s Rebound

Anti-base movements, and more specifically two far-left Senators, packed a significant punch by rejecting Prodi’s foreign policy agenda. The blow knocked Prodi out politically. Unfortunately, Prodi’s resignation was self-defeating for the radical left-parties in his coalition. Prodi’s knock-out had awakened his centrist senses. After conferring with President Napolitano, Prodi required all coalition partners to sign a twelve-point program, including "support for our foreign and defense commitments within the context of the UN and our membership of NATO and the EU."

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109 U.S. officials state that the extremely messy process and eventual February 17 crisis could have been avoided had Berlusconi or Prodi given full support to the project at an earlier stage. Greater blame, however, is placed on Berlusconi. Interview with U.S. Consulate official. January 18, 2008. Milan, Italy.
Here, we see how coalition politics and the security consensus mutually reinforced one another, creating significant political obstacles for anti-base activists. The three far-left parties were genuinely opposed to U.S. bases and Italian troops in Afghanistan. However, to prevent Berlusconi from returning to power, and to maintain their position within the ruling coalition, the far-left parties acquiesced to U.S. base expansion and Italy’s Afghanistan mission. A portion of the far left’s support base, among others anti-war and anti-base activists, openly criticized these parties for bending their foreign policy principles. Anti-war activist Piero Maestri argued, “The Italian Communist Party is no longer against the system, but are now inside the system. The communist party is promoting a foreign and military policy for the system.” As Maestri suggested, extreme parties challenge the system, but once inside, they try to maintain their power, working within the system.

Italy’s political institutional arrangements ultimately constrained the original foreign and security policy preferences of radical left actors. Thus coalition dynamics and institutional arrangements had the effect of reinforcing the dominant security consensus. Anti-base movements, reaching limits bounded by the security consensus and institutional constraints, were never quite able to penetrate the state. Despite successful mobilization, anti-base activists found it increasingly difficult to win major concessions on U.S. base policies. The February crisis, while exposing several flaws in Italy’s political institutional design, also affirmed that the majority of Italian political elites still valued strong ties to the U.S. The consensus does not imply that all Italian elites are pro-U.S, or even in favor of a strong Atlantic alliance. It only suggests that certain political and ideological constraints prevent political elites from veering too far off the path of the security consensus.

111 This has led to yet another split from the various existing communist parties, leading to the formation of Sinistra Critica (the Critical Left Party).
Ironically, the slim parliamentary majority which gave Prodi the leverage to “discipline” far-left parties so they could remain in power also contributed to his brief political fall. Taking advantage of Prodi’s slim majority, center-right politicians abstained from voting in favor of Prodi’s foreign policy agenda in an attempt to destabilize the ruling government. Under “normal” circumstances, the majority of center-right politicians would have backed U.S. base expansion and Italy’s NATO mission, giving Prodi’s foreign policy at least two-thirds majority support. As one U.S. official retorted, “Vicenza should have never been an issue in the first place.” Thus some of the blame for turning U.S. bases into a messy affair can be pinned onto the center-right. Needless to say, the center-right inadvertently provided anti-base activists a platform to turn a local NIMBY protest into a major national issue.

**Continued Anti-base Efforts**

Although Prodi’s return to power on March 1 signalled the beginning of a decline for anti-base activists, strong anti-base opposition persisted. Activists resorted to a wide range of protest activities: tree-planting, roadblocks, festivals, and boycotts targeting both the local and national government. On June 3, 2007, a group of activists interrupted Prodi during a public forum. Sitting in the audience, activists unexpectedly stood up, hollering and waving No Dal Molin banners. Activist leader Cinzia Bottene then stepped onto stage to directly confront Prodi. Putting him on the spot, she exclaimed:

“It’s a disgrace that the city of Vicenza is not defended by the Italian government. We have even tried to put the matter to a public referendum so that the voices of the people can be heard but they have not even allowed us to do that. I am disappointed because I helped vote them in. We voted them in on the basis of a platform of military

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113 Interview with U.S. consulate official. Milan, Italy, January 18, 2008. The official contends, “It was the center right, our normal allies (within the Italian government), that have allowed this to drag on to embarrass the center-left government. Thus the (political) right was complacent in supporting the base expansion, maintaining tension on the (base) issue.
spending (reduction) and active democracy. Where are those promises now?" \textsuperscript{114}

As if in direct response to Bottene, Prodi appointed EU Parliamentarian Paolo Costa as the government’s special envoy for base expansion in Vicenza. Costa acted as an intermediary between all interested parties: Vicenza citizens, the city and national government, and the U.S. military. All problems were now directly relayed to Costa. Costa did help negotiate several local zoning, traffic, and environmental concerns. He managed to convince the U.S. to change initial project plans by constructing the new base on the west rather than east side of Dal Molin airfield. Beyond this, however, there was no more substantive dialogue between the No Dal Molin movement and Costa (i.e. the national government). As one Minister of Defense advisor argued, all citizens who could be persuaded by rational means at this point had already been persuaded. Stopping the project, as activists demanded, was not an option.

\textit{Fractures}

After the February 17 protest, different factions within the No Dal Molin campaign became more pronounced. Factions had existed even prior to this date, but these cleavages became more acute over time as the campaign broadened to incorporate a wider audience. Divisions ensued over strategy and the target of protests. The \textit{Presidio}, the largest subset of the No Dal Molin campaign, became increasingly vocal against the center-left Prodi government. \textit{Presidio} activists criticized even far-left politicians, who opposed bases rhetorically, but avoided taking action in government. The \textit{Presidio} maintained its grassroots orientation, claiming no allegiance to political groups, parties, or organizations. According to \textit{Presidio} members, this group accounted for roughly 60-70\% of activists in the No Dal Molin struggle. \textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{114} Osti 2007.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview with Stefan Osti. Vicenza, Italy, January 16, 2008.
By contrast, a second distinct group, the *Coordinamento Comitati* (CC), continued to maintain ties with political parties and trade unions, working within the boundaries of formal politics. The CC distanced itself from the *Presidio*, wanting to avoid confrontation with the center-left government. Accounting for approximately 20-30% of the movement, the CC continued to place hope in a solution to the Vicenza base issue through institutional and legal means. The, smallest faction, *Comitato Vicenza Est*, also split from the *Presidio* due to personality issues at the leadership level, specifically with those members in the *Presidio* who had *disobbedienti* roots.

In mid-2007, the *Presidio* increased efforts to network with international groups, beginning with other anti-base movements in Europe. The *Presidio* also added an international team to coordinate with other anti-base groups around the world. U.S. officials observe that the movement has become less focused on local issues and the specific Vicenza base, and instead shaped into a more general anti-war movement. As one consulate official notes, increased criticism against the national government, and the transnational shift of the campaign indicates movement weakness as activists now recognize the Dal Molin project as a lost cause. What U.S. officials observe about the evolution of the movement correspond with activists description of the shift towards European-wide mobilization. It is also true that anti-base activists, particularly those associated with the *Presidio*, hold little hope that the Italian government will stand up against the U.S. Vicenza activists have not given up, however. Instead, they

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116 Vicenza Est is short hand for *Comitato di cittadini e lavoratori di Vicenza che chiedono la conversione della Caserna Ederle – base militare USA* [Vicenza citizens and workers committee on the conversion of Camp Ederle]. See their website at <http://www.comitatovicenzaest.splinder.com/> [last accessed 2/1/08].

117 The *disobbedienti* group arose from the militant *Tute Bianche* social movement, best known for their resistance during the G-8 summit anti-globalization movement. *Disobbedienti* members engage in direct action and civil disobedience against government authority. Realizing the importance of movement unity, representatives from each of the factions have been holding small group meetings to exchange information and maintain open lines of communication.

118 Other *Presidio* committees include coordinating teams for strategy, logistics, communications and media, and women’s issues.
have turned their attention to the U.S. By disrupting and delaying the base project, activists hope to “be enough of a pain to the U.S.” that the U.S. eventually gives up on Vicenza as the site for a new base.  

The U.S. began clearing unexploded ordinances (UXO) at Dal Molin in October 2007. Base officials hope construction to begin by summer 2008. According to Italian security experts and U.S. military and government officials, the Dal Molin project is a finished deal. While U.S. officials are prepared for further delays arising from technical issues, activists no longer have the political clout or backing to upend the project. David Bustamante, Director of Public Affairs at the Milan Consulate, charged, ““I think it is a done deal. I don't think there is any turning back. This is what Prodi has said and what the local authorities have said.”

Conclusion: Ecuador and Italy in Comparative Perspective

Anti-base movement episodes in Ecuador and Italy increase the robustness of the security consensus framework by applying it to different geographic regions. Admittedly, some skepticism is warranted over the choice of Manta and Vicenza bases, which are not as strategically important as Subic Bay Naval Station or Futenma Air Station. The Ecuador anti-base episode in particular may be criticized as an easy test for anti-base movements. Unlike bases in Japan or the Philippines, the U.S. made little effort to retain the base, lowering the barriers to success for activists. Despite these shortcomings, however, both cases do suggest that the degree of security consensus affects how governments respond to anti-base pressure, and how they align their position between domestic and international forces. Moreover, the Ecuador and

119 Of course, this means the U.S. base will have to go elsewhere, so it cannot be viewed as a complete victory. Interview with Stephanie Westbrook, Rome, Italy, January 23, 2008.
121 See Barry 2007.
Italy cases demonstrate that the security consensus functions as a political opportunity or barrier for anti-base movements.

In Ecuador, while some political elites pursued pro-U.S. foreign policies, a security consensus favoring strong security ties to the U.S. was not deeply entrenched among elite ranks. Over the course of its campaign, the No Bases Ecuador Coalition and other anti-base groups transformed a banal base agreement into a major national issue. While officials in the Mahuad and Guitierrez government blocked activists’ attempts to nullify the base agreement, activists did find support from important government figures. Unlike Italy or Japan where elite support for anti-base movements was limited to “radical” politicians, in Ecuador, respected leaders such as current Interior Minster Gustavo Larrea, Foreign Affairs Minister Francisco Carrión during the Palacio government, Congressman Julio Gonzáles of the Pachakutik Party, and Manabí Province governor Vicente Veliz publicly took an anti-base stance even before Correa’s ascent to power. Absent any strong security consensus, activists were able to work with sympathetic elites to prevent the renewal of the Manta Base agreement. Ultimately, President Correa rejected the Manta Agreement.

On the other hand, a strong security consensus acted as a barrier against Italian anti-base movements. While the No Dal Molin campaign achieved success in mobilizing activists and drawing national media attention to their cause, to date, the movement has been less successful in their efforts to block the expansion of the U.S. base in Vicenza. Common in other movement episodes where governments exhibited a strong security consensus, the Prodi government resorted to foot-dragging tactics to diffuse domestic pressure. While initially ambiguous on the Vicenza issue, Prodi eventually demonstrated his political resolve to maintain Italy’s international commitments. Even the debates which ensued after Prodi’s brief fall reaffirmed the existence of an elite “consensus” and the Italian government’s continued support for
U.S.-Italian relations. While the security consensus helped maintain generally positive relations between the U.S. and Italy, it posed a challenge to anti-base movements, and more generally, to leftist groups interested in pursuing policies contrary to the U.S.-Italian security alliance.

Ecuador and Italy provide an interesting comparison on the question of regime type as an alternative explanation to the security consensus. One might argue that the shift towards a left government in Ecuador enabled activists to achieve success on base policy outcomes. However, the Vicenza anti-base episode suggests that even with a center-left government in power, when a strong security consensus pervades among key political elites, elites will find ways to stave off domestic pressure to retain positive alliance ties to the U.S. In the Italian case, a relatively strong security consensus made it difficult for anti-base activists to translate their movement demands into policy outcomes.
"It's a crucial and legitimate government project that has much at stake, namely U.S.-Korea relations." – ROK Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung.¹

On May 4, 2005, 12,000 riot police entered Daechuri² village in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, a small village 50 miles south of Seoul in Kyongi Province. Activists and local residents, refusing to leave their farmland, were making a desperate stand to block the expansion and relocation of United States Forces, Korea (USFK) headquarters to Camp Humphreys. While South Korean infantry and engineering troops erected barbed wire around the base expansion land outside Camp Humphreys, 2,000 activists battled riot police who stormed Daechuri Elementary School, the makeshift headquarters of the Pan-South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Expansion in Pyeongtaek (KCPT).³ One hundred and twenty protestors, police, and soldiers were injured, and 524 protestors, mostly students and activists, were taken into custody.⁴ Immediately following the violence, the MND went on a public relations offensive, highlighting the violent tactics of protestors attacking an unarmed engineering brigade. The government’s public relations campaign severely damaged

² Although the focus of anti-base activists took place in Daechuri village, residents in adjacent Doduri village also took part in the struggle. For simplicity, I will refer to the villages of local resistance in this chapter as Daechuri. Both villages are within Pyeongtaek city’s jurisdiction.
³ Various English translations of the national anti-base group in Pyeongtaek have appeared, but their official website refers to the coalition by this name and acronym. I will refer to the national-level coalition group as KCPT.
the credibility of South Korean anti-base activists in their struggle to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys. KCPT never fully recovered from the May 4 clash, and eventually faded away by the end of 2007.

The outcome of the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement episode contrasts the outcome in the movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri in 2000, described in the dissertation’s opening chapter. Protests in Maehyangri ended with U.S. and South Korean officials making several tactical concessions to anti-base activists. Additionally, the movement to revise the U.S.-ROK SOFA, spearheaded by anti-base leaders, ended in 2001 with partial (if only token) revisions. How does a “moderate” security consensus affect state-societal relations, and the effectiveness of anti-base movements on base policy outcomes? How did South Korea’s security alliance with the United States influence the behavior of the Korean government and the strategic interaction between state and society across several movement episodes? Lastly, what additional factors contributed to different anti-base movement outcomes, despite all three episodes falling under the national context of a moderate security consensus?

Empirically, Chapters Five and Six present several anti-base movement episodes in a single country characterized by a moderate degree of security consensus. Theoretically, the two chapters demonstrate that even when movement episodes are “nested” within the same security consensus at the national-level, considerable scope for variation in processes and outcomes is possible. Chapter Five is devoted to the complex nature of the security consensus in South Korea. The security consensus is coded as “moderate,” suggesting that disagreement on some aspects of the U.S.-South Korean alliance exists, even though most foreign policy elites agree on the necessity
and value of the alliance. Although the security consensus has slowly ebbed over the decade, on issues central to the U.S.-ROK alliance, particularly U.S. troop presence, a baseline consensus continues to exist among political elites. I attempt to make sense of the seeming tension and contradiction between a “gradually ebbing” and “resilient” security consensus by evaluating evidence from existing laws and institutions, government documents, and elite statements. In relation to measures of breadth and depth, the security consensus exhibits narrower breadth, with some division between progressive and conservative elites. However, a pro-U.S. consensus, embedded in domestic institutions and ideology, is marked by greater levels of depth.

I open this chapter with a historical overview of South Korean anti-base movements. Next, I briefly discuss recent events regarding USFK transformation and base realignment. Finally, I devote the bulk of the chapter to a discussion of South Korean national security and the U.S.-ROK alliance between 2000-2007. After demonstrating the resilient nature of the security consensus in Chapter Five, Chapter Six investigates three different anti-base movement episodes in South Korea: the SOFA revision movement in 2000, the movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in Maeyangri in 2000, and the movement to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek in 2005-2006.

**Origins of the South Korean Anti-base Movement**

Although outside observers tend to assume that anti-American or anti-USFK sentiments are a relatively recent phenomena, anti-Americanism and South Korean anti-base movements have deeper roots. Scholars and activists generally agree that the Gwangju Massacre in May 1980 helped propel anti-American sentiment in South

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5 I thank J.J. Suh for helping me clarify the term “moderate” in the context of the U.S.-South Korean alliance.
Korea. While anti-American attitudes existed in South Korea even before 1980, the rise of such sentiments did not necessarily lead to an organized, systematic movement against U.S. military bases or USFK. Unification and pro-North Korean groups, particularly those influenced by national liberation (NL) ideology, had always taken an anti-American, anti-imperial stance while the mass public generally accepted U.S. military presence. In fact, prior to South Korea’s democratic transition in 1987, social and environmental externalities stemming from bases attracted little attention from the public. Moreover, government repression and security concerns functioned as structural barriers severely limiting mobilization against bases.\(^7\)

Awareness of social costs and the first signs of a shift in public perception of U.S. bases took shape with the widely publicized brutal rape-murder case of Yoon Geumi in 1992.\(^8\) USFK-related crimes were taken more seriously as civic groups pushed for revisions to the unequal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Local anti-base movements and not in my backyard (NIMBY) protests existed prior to this point, but only from the mid-1990’s did civic groups at the national level attempt to form a broader coalition movement. In 1997, national civic groups joined forces with local residents across different regions where U.S. bases existed to form the Pan-National Solution Committee to Return U.S. Bases. The movement demanded the reduction and

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\(^7\) Park 2005b, p.25.

eventual return of U.S. bases in South Korea, as well as the restoration of sovereignty rights, peace, and reunification. ⁹

Despite the formation of the Pan-National Committee to Return U.S. Bases, most anti-base movements, led by local NGOs, continued to focus on regional issues. However, in early 1999, Foreign Minister Lee Joung-bin raised the issue of SOFA revisions. Local anti-base coalition movements in Kunsan and Daegu, and NGOs in Seoul such as the National Campaign to Eradicate Crimes by U.S. Troops (USA Crime), viewed the minister of foreign affair’s public statement for SOFA revisions as an opportunity to open a broader coalition. In addition to base-related issues, SOFA revisions also encompassed other issue areas such as the environment, labor, safety, and women’s rights. Thus anti-base activists and NGO leaders from various sectors established the broad-based coalition People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA (PAR-SOFA) in October 1999 to push Washington and Seoul for substantive SOFA revisions. ¹⁰

In early 2000, protestors staged numerous rallies and public campaigns pressuring the South Korean government to take a resolute stance in negotiations with Washington. Two events in 2000 also triggered large-scale protests, and provided fuel not only for SOFA revision movements, but other movements related to USFK and U.S. bases. The first event occurred near Kooni Firing Range in May. An A-10 aircraft dropped its payload early in an emergency procedure resulting in property damage in the nearby village of Maehyangri. With widespread media coverage, this event eventually triggered a major reaction as national level civic groups and NGOs joined

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⁹ Koh 2005, p.298.
forces with local residents who had been struggling to shut down Kooni Range since 1988. The second event was the discovery of a USFK personnel dumping formaldehyde into the Han River, again prompting reaction not only from environmental groups, but the general public as well. By alerting USFK issues to the national public and mobilizing massive protests, the Maehyangri anti-base movement and PAR-SOFA pressured South Korean officials to take action on both issues in negotiations with the U.S. Both movements subsided with partial concessions granted in Maehyangri, and a revised SOFA signed by the U.S. and South Korea in 2001. Civic groups’ expressed major disappointment with the lack of substantive revisions. Despite a brief, sudden reawakening of the SOFA revision movement in 2002, anti-U.S. base related movements were unable to extract any further concessions from Seoul or Washington.

**USFK Base Relocation and Consolidation**

With the relocation of U.S. bases centered almost entirely on Pyeongtaek after 2004, activists moved away from SOFA issues and reoriented their struggle against the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The realignment and consolidation of U.S. bases under the context of U.S.-ROK alliance transformation raised new challenges for South Korean anti-base activists. Until the past decade, the configuration of U.S. bases in South Korea remained virtually unchanged since the end of the Korean War. Most U.S. bases were concentrated north of Seoul (see Figure 5.1 below).11

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11 The large presence of U.S. troops along the demilitarized zone functioned as a “trip-wire” deterrent against North Korea, symbolizing America’s commitment to South Korea’s defense. See Doug Bandow. *Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World*. Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1996.
In light of several outstanding land disputes pertaining to U.S. bases, and the dilapidated state of existing USFK facilities, Washington and Seoul initiated the U.S.-South Korea Land Partnership Plan (LPP) in 2001. The LPP was designed as a cooperative effort between the U.S. and South Korea to “consolidate U.S. installations, improve combat readiness, enhance public safety, and strengthen the U.S.-South
Korean alliance by addressing some of the causes of periodic tension” associated with U.S. military presence in South Korea. Signed in March 2002, the LPP recommended closing 15 out of 41 installations, thereby consolidating forces onto the 26 remaining bases without any reduction in troop numbers. Figure 5.1 above provides a map of selected U.S. installations under the LPP.

The LPP quickly grew outdated in light of changing U.S. global force posture demands. The United States began considering different options regarding force deployment in South Korea in line with a general reassessment of global force posture conducted under the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and the DOD’s Overseas Basing and Requirements Study. The Pentagon’s reassessment of U.S. overseas presence would undoubtedly “diminish the need for and alter the locations of many construction projects” associated with the LPP.14

In April 2003, high-ranking U.S. officials and South Korean officials discussed a much more comprehensive base realignment project superseding the LPP. The U.S. suggested moving U.S. troops away from the demilitarized zone. More importantly, the meeting concluded with a decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison, USFK headquarters in downtown Seoul, to a location approximately fifty miles south of the capital. By July 2004, Seoul and Washington had proposed a new vision for

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14 GAO 2003, p.3.
17 GAO 2003, p.13. The decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison dates back to a 1991 memorandum of understanding signed between Seoul and Washington. Unfortunately, dispute over relocation costs, and difficulty in finding an appropriate replacement brought the relocation process to a halt.
the U.S.-ROK alliance, including a greater role for the South Korean military in securing its own defense. After ten rounds of negotiations under the Future of the Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), both sides agreed to withdraw 12,500 U.S. troops by December 2008 from South Korea, relocate Yongsan Garrison out of Seoul, and consolidate the 2nd Infantry Division to Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek.18

What was the political context behind USFK base relocation and realignment? Given Yongsan Garrison’s location in the heart of Seoul, both governments cited urban sprawl and the potential for friction between U.S. soldiers and Korean civilians as a reason for Yongsan’s relocation. This friction was particularly salient after a USFK armored vehicle crushed two junior high school girls in June 2002, triggering massive waves of anti-American protests. Second, the withdrawal of 12,500 troops and the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River raised intense fear among South Korean conservatives. Amidst the rising threat of North Korean nuclear weapons in late 2002, some South Korean conservatives interpreted the relocation of troops away from the DMZ as a sign of weakened U.S. commitment to South Korea’s defense. Others criticized troop withdrawals and the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division as measures driven purely by U.S. national interests with little regard for its alliance partner.19 Moreover, some South Koreans associated Donald Rumsfeld’s comments regarding USFK relocation and impending U.S. troop

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19 With North Korea’s artillery most likely locked on Seoul, overly nervous Koreans argued that the U.S. was moving its troops to a safe location behind North Korean artillery range, leaving South Koreans to fend for themselves.
withdrawals as a form of punishment from Washington in reaction to the wave of anti-U.S. protests in 2002.\(^{20}\)

**A Moderate Security Consensus**

The political context of USFK transformation, and more specifically base relocation to Pyeongtaek, is embedded in a wider debate concerning the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Although offering a wide range of predictions, U.S. and South Korean security experts unanimously contend that the alliance has undergone significant transformation since 2002.\(^ {21}\) The consolidation and realignment of USFK on the Peninsula, the gradual withdrawal of 12,500 troops since 2003, and the impending transfer of war-time operational control by 2012 all attest to the changing nature of the alliance – whether for better or worse. In addition to changes in the alliance, many U.S.-ROK alliance experts note changing South Korean attitudes towards the U.S. Most public opinion surveys indicate a negative change in attitudes, particularly among the younger generation.\(^ {22}\) The generational gap and shifting trends in South Korean domestic politics have consequently polarized South Korean sentiments towards the U.S between progressive and conservative camps.\(^ {23}\) President

\(^{20}\) The U.S. countered this claim, arguing that Yongsan’s relocation, an agreement signed well before recent tensions in the U.S.-ROK alliance, was driven predominantly by U.S. global military realignment after 9/11, rather than any reaction to South Korean public opinion towards the U.S.


Bush’s hard-line position towards North Korea during his first administration also fueled the polarizing trend in attitudes towards the U.S. To a lesser extent, this polarization is also present among elites, suggesting a decrease in the breadth or scope of the security consensus. Under these circumstances, how does one justify any consensus, even a moderate one, among South Korean political elites? Here, the dimensions of breadth and depth are useful in determining the strength of the security consensus.

**Radicals, Progressives, and Conservatives**

A range of attitudes and perceptions exist regarding USFK and the U.S.-ROK alliance among South Korean bureaucrats, politicians, and academics. However, it is impossible to discuss attitudes regarding U.S.-ROK security relations without including North Korea. In fact, early in his administration, former President Roh Moo-Hyun attempted to link North-South policy with U.S.-South Korean relations.²⁴ Attitudes towards U.S. forces and the trilateral relationship between North Korea, South Korea, and the United States from 2000-2006 can be roughly divided into three camps as seen below in Figure 5.2.

![Figure 5.2: Shifting Security Consensus Among Political Elites, 2000-2007](image)

²⁴ The dispatch of 5,000 ROK troops to Iraq was largely seen as a move to persuade the U.S. to avoid a hard-line stance towards North Korea and support the South in its sunshine policy with the North.
Radicals believe that USFK should withdraw from the Peninsula given North Korea’s weakened state. To radicals, U.S. forces are seen as a liability rather than an asset by hindering inter-Korea reconciliation. This attitude is best represented by the Democratic Labor Party and a minority faction in the former ruling Uri Party. Differing from radicals, progressives believe that U.S. forces are still necessary in the mid-long term. However, they believe that changes regarding U.S.-ROK relations should occasionally be initiated by South Korea to offset “unequal” relations. Progressives contend that South Korea’s interests are best served by balancing their foreign policy between U.S. alliance interests and North Korean rapprochement. Relations with one should not be sacrificed at the expense of the other. The majority of mainstream progressives subscribe to this view. Moderate conservatives and progressives find common ground in maintaining U.S. forces for a limited period of time. However, conservatives argue that South Korea should react to U.S. policy rather than attempt to initiate changes in the alliance. For conservatives, foreign policy priority is given to the United States over North Korea. The current ruling party, the Grand National Party, holds this conservative view.

Former President Roh’s Uri Party achieved some success in moving the alliance towards a more equal partnership, particularly in the area of wartime operational control. Yet there are limits to what the liberal party can achieve. In other words, a pro-U.S. security consensus is fairly well embedded in domestic institutions and ideology, suggesting significant depth, even as the breadth of the consensus among elites narrows. South Korea’s foreign policy apparatus is still heavily influenced by a conservative line of thinking, and an elite consensus continues to operate on issues pertaining to U.S.-South Korean security relations. Boundaries exist as to how far progressive political leaders

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can push policies which run counter to Washington.\textsuperscript{26} These boundaries are partially a function of the power asymmetries in the alliance relationship, but more immediate is the unacceptability of breaking away from existing norms which guide South Korean national security strategy. Integral to this strategy is the U.S.-ROK alliance. Therefore, despite the diversity in elite attitudes and perceptions regarding national security, progressive and radical political elites find it difficult to implement their preferred foreign policies.

Several studies confirm a significant gap between older and younger generation Koreans in their attitudes towards the alliance. Some in the progressive and radical camp point to change in U.S.-South Korean relations as inevitable. Conservatives in their sixties or older who experienced the Korean War and were indoctrinated with anti-Communist ideology are being replaced by the younger 386 generation in positions of power.\textsuperscript{27} However, due to political and ideological structures embedded in South Korean security politics, high-ranking government officials in the foreign policy establishment and radical grassroots activists alike believe that the process of change is much more contested. Despite shifting attitudes and U.S.-ROK alliance transformation towards an equal partnership, the dissolution of the security consensus is not automatically given. Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwon, who served under the first half of the Roh Administration, states, “As some of the younger National Assembly members enter [government], they begin to realize through experience that their views are not reflective of the majority of society. The original positions they had when they first entered office often change.”\textsuperscript{28} As an example, Yoon cites how several


\textsuperscript{27} 386 refers to those Koreans who, in the late 1990s and early 2000, were in their thirties, went to college in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. This generation experienced the student democratization movement during the 1980s.

\textsuperscript{28} Interview with former Foreign Affairs and Trade Minister Yoon Young-Kwon. Seoul, South Korea. May 26, 2006.
government officials and politicians wanted to elevate China as South Korea’s new powerful ally while distancing themselves from the United States. However, this group shied away from their original stance after South Korea’s public dispute with China over the sovereignty of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo. Activists’ cynicism towards the government also suggests the resilience of the security consensus. Activists impatient with the slow pace of change from the “progressive” government expressed their frustration in 2006 with the previous Kim Dae Jung and Roh Administrations. With many 386ers now holding positions in the Blue House and the National Assembly, activists initially expected these officials to promote change, breaking free from what they viewed as psychological dependence on the U.S. Once in power, however, these politicians who previously held radical views moderated their position.29

Structural factors place a limit on the speed and extent to which the younger generation can bring about change or inject new progressive ideas into Korean politics. As one South Korean security expert noted, “There are certain realities which cannot be ignored. Even leftist-oriented National Assembly members cannot dare to say that we don’t need the alliance with the U.S. because the objective threat of North Korea still exists. As long as these structural factors do not change, there will be limits as to how far progressive politicians can bring change to the alliance.”30 Interestingly, this type of logic applied to even former President Roh’s seemingly contradictory foreign policy behavior. Many expected Roh to distance himself from the U.S. after his infamous campaign pledge not to “kowtow” to the U.S, and to assert Korea’s sovereignty in the alliance relationship. Once in power, however, with the exception of North Korean policy, Roh more or less acquiesced to most of Washington’s security and foreign policy demands. These demands

29 Interview with several grassroots activists from KCPT. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. October 19, 2005.
ranged from strategic flexibility, to USFK transformation, to the deployment of ROK troops to Iraq.

**Political and Ideological Structures**

Despite the polarization of South Korean attitudes towards the U.S, I argued above that political and ideological structures enable the security consensus to persist at a moderate level. These structures prevent elites from diverging too far from the security consensus. However, I do not deny that the security consensus has weakened over time. There was never any doubt in the consensus at the height of North-South tensions during the Cold War. Nor was there any doubt which country South Korea depended on for its national survival. In fact, the national security laws made it illegal to publicly criticize the U.S. military and the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, the fall of communism internationally and the near economic collapse of North Korea in the 1990s loosened the staunch security consensus which persisted throughout the Cold War. The North-South summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il in June 2000 helped accelerate this decline as hopes of Korean reunification rekindled in South Korea. GNP Representative Won Hee-Ryong reflects on this change, quoting, “The things that they say now in public would have been dangerous to say before the Kim Dae-Jung Administration. You would have been branded a communist. But the fact that you can say these things now openly in the National Assembly suggests that there has been significant change.” 31

Political and ideological structures still remain, however, because the target and source of the security consensus - the external threat of North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance - continue to persist in the minds of powerful elites. Regardless of how benign some South Korean progressives perceive the North, foreign policy elites still

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31 Interview with National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee Member Won Hee-Ryong. Seoul, South Korea. June 19, 2006.
believe North Korea poses a threat given its nuclear ambitions and unpredictable behavior. South Korea continues to maintain strong defensive measures against the North, even as it pursues rapprochement with Pyongyang. Given the high stakes involved in a North-South conflict, and the uncertain security environment in Northeast Asia, South Korean political elites continue to place a priority on the alliance and U.S. troop presence. Figure 5.3 below illustrates how ideology and the domestic political environment function to maintain a security consensus in an era of decreased North Korean threat perceptions and changing alliance patterns.

Figure 5.3: Factors underpinning the security consensus among South Korean elites

Figure 5.3 suggests that Korean political elites prefer maintaining their alliance with the U.S. because of North Korea’s continued threat, and uncertainty in Northeast Asia created by a rising China and strengthened U.S.-Japan relations. The historical
legacy of the Korean War and remnants of anti-Communist ideology also continue to color the perceptions of elite policy-makers, particularly those of the older, more conservative generation. These “distorted” lenses which magnify elite threat perceptions function as an ideological barrier. Based on prevailing attitudes and perceptions of national security, conservative elites stifle any rhetoric which calls for the dismantling of the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Both progressives and conservatives agree to the principles of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Where they disagree (and at times disagree with the U.S.), however, is in the policy means used to achieve security. In the past, progressives and conservatives have reacted sharply to different policy measures pertaining to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Table 5.1 below lists several recent issues which have divided conservative and progressive reactions on security issues.

Table 5.1: Narrow breadth? South Korean Progressive and Conservative reactions to U.S. alliance related security policy issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Action</th>
<th>ROK Progressive Reactions</th>
<th>ROK Conservative Reactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal of 1/3 USFK forces</td>
<td>-In general, seen as a positive step.</td>
<td>-U.S. abandoning its commitment to the alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocation of Second Infantry Division 50 miles south of Seoul</td>
<td>-U.S. looking out for only its own interests by moving its troops out of artillery range while preparing for preemptive strike against North Korea</td>
<td>- U.S. is less committed to the alliance by removing its “tripwire” position along the DMZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Flexibility for USFK</td>
<td>- U.S. may drag or implicate ROK into an unnecessary or unwanted conflict (i.e. Taiwan-China conflict).</td>
<td>-Dispatching U.S. troops on short notice weakens deterrence effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of wartime operational control to South Korean forces by 2009</td>
<td>- Prefers transfer of operational control by 2012, but generally seen as positive step</td>
<td>-U.S. sees alliance as less important -Weakens deterrence - ROK military unable to acquire necessary capabilities by 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bottom line</strong></td>
<td><strong>Progressives want a more equal alliance partnership.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conservatives are reluctant to see any shifts in the alliance.</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If managed poorly, domestic division, as well as tension between Seoul and Washington regarding the direction and strategic vision of the alliance, may lead to the
unraveling of the security consensus. These differences already point to a weakened consensus since the 2000 North-South summit. What prevents the security consensus and the alliance from unraveling completely, however, are the ideological and structural constraints mentioned earlier. These structures help perpetuate the security consensus within elite circles.\textsuperscript{32} Even with diverse opinions regarding U.S.-ROK relations, the security consensus held by elites, especially in the foreign and defense policy establishments, moderates more extreme views of the U.S.-ROK alliance. The security consensus thus streamlines these diverse opinions in the policy-making process. Figure 5.4 below indicates South Korean elites’ preference for cooperation with the U.S. In a study conducted by the East Asia Institute, 79\% of South Korean opinion leaders preferred cooperating the most with the U.S., as opposed to 13\% for China, and 1\% for Japan. Note the greater preference for cooperation with the U.S. among elites than the general public.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.4.png}
\caption{Country which South Korea should cooperate with the most.}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{32} Of course, frequent dialogue between Seoul and Washington have also helped maintain the alliance relationship through its most tumultuous period between 2002-2004. See Park 2005b.
Evidence of the Security Consensus in South Korea

North Korean Threat

Based on the dimensions of depth and breadth, what evidence indicates a moderate, pro-U.S. security consensus in South Korea? On the dimension of breadth, widespread recognition of a primary target or threat, such as North Korea, would suggest a need to maintain strong U.S. alliance relations. Despite decreasing North Korean threat perceptions, the South Korean public, and more importantly, South Korean elites, still identify North Korea as a threat. For example, in an EAI study asking South Koreans what constituted a “critical threat” to the national interest in the next ten years, global terrorism and North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons ranked first and second respectively. Regarding feelings of threat towards North Korea possessing nuclear weapons, a 2004 East Asia Institute-CCFR survey cited that 39% of Koreans felt “very threatened” and 49% a “bit threatened” as opposed to only 12% citing they felt no threat. The following year, Donga Ilbo conducted a similar survey where 61.9% of South Koreans stated they felt very or somewhat threatened by North Korea’s nuclear development, as opposed to 38.1% citing they felt little or no threat. The same survey also identified that a significant number of Koreans still found North Korea as the most threatening country to its security (See figure 5.5 below).

Figure 5.5: Which country do you feel is most threatening to the security of South Korea? Source: Dong-A Ilbo. N=1500. Survey conducted March 4-31, 2005.

Contributing to the depth of a security consensus, existing institutions such as the National Security Laws (NSL) also suggest that elites continue to perceive North Korea as a threat (and hence, the need for continued U.S. military presence), even if overall threat perceptions of the North have subsided. Although the NSL does not refer to North Korea by name, the South Korean government treats North Korea as an anti-state entity. The NSL is more than mere legal rhetoric, and is not taken lightly by the South Korean government. Even in recent years, the government has evoked Chapter 2, Article 7 against its citizens, which prohibits praising or sympathizing with

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36 Chapter 1, Article 2 of the South Korean National Security Law defines an anti-state entity as “domestic or foreign organizations or groups whose intentions are to conduct or assist infiltration of the Government or to cause national disturbances.” Even without direct reference, the North Koreans perceive the NSL as a law aimed at their regime. For instance, in a February 28, 2007 news article, the North Korean daily Nodong Sinmun expressed harsh criticism against the NSL, stating “The notorious National Security Law should have been thrown into the garbage bin of history with the advent of the June 15 (2000) era of reunification. But it is still in force, spurting poison… The fascist NSL should be repealed along with the disbandment of the Grand National Party (the South Korean opposition conservative party) that brings the whirlwind of confrontation, war and fascism to this land.” See BBC Monitoring-Asia-Pacific. “North Korea urges South to repeal its National Security Law.” February 28, 2007.
In January 2007, authorities arrested a middle-school teacher for using “pro-North Korean documents” to teach students about North Korea’s political system and nuclear program. The previous year, the Busan branch of the Korean Teachers and Educational Worker’s Union was placed under investigation after publishing a book on Korean reunification which advocated a pro-North position.\(^{38}\) Police even investigated the use of North Korean marching music on KBS, the nation’s public broadcasting system. The song was aired as background music in a political parody animation segment in 2004. Authorities cited the musical airing as a possible violation of Chapter 2, Article 7, Clause 5, which bans using or distributing North Korean music, writings, and other artistic expressions.\(^{39}\)

The NSL debates in 2004 also highlight the persistence of the North Korean threat in the minds of Korean elites. In 2004, several National Assembly members within the ruling Uri Party attempted to abolish the NSL to “reflect improved inter-Korean relations.” President Roh and Unification Minister Jung Dong Young also supported repealing the NSL.\(^{40}\) However, conservatives harshly criticized the president and other progressive factions calling for the laws’ repeal. The conservative position was bolstered by both the Constitutional Court, which rejected claims that the NSL was unconstitutional given the “current security circumstances on the Peninsula,” and the Supreme Court, which accused Uri Party leaders of attempting to “strip the

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\(^{37}\) According to Chapter 2, Article 7, those praising or sympathizing with anti-state groups may serve “up to seven years in prison for praising, encouraging, disseminating, or cooperating with anti-state groups, members or those under their control, being aware that such acts will endanger the national security and the democratic freedom.”


country of its last defensive measures against the North.”^{41} A statement prepared by
the Justice Department read, “Since the possibility of an attack, espionage, or other [subversive actions] by North Korea against our system remains open… we must remain fully prepared and exercise great caution…A state is unable to recover once its system collapses. Therefore a careless, loose judgment cannot be permitted when dealing with matters of a state’s security.”^{42} One might interpret calls to repeal the NSL by the president and other political elites as a sign of divergence in elite perceptions on national security and a weakening of the security consensus. While this is true, the fierce negative reaction by the GNP, the ensuing national debate, and the Supreme Court’s final ruling in favor of upholding the NSL suggests that security politics continue to fall under the jurisdiction of conservatives privy to the security consensus.

Political elite perceptions of the North Korean threat are also confirmed by the debates surrounding the designation of North Korea as “main enemy” in the MND White Papers. The MND first used the “main enemy” phrase after the 1994 nuclear crisis. The MND continued to use the phrase until controversy ensued over its usage prior to the publication of the 2001 White Paper. According to critics, referring to North Korea as the “main enemy” no longer seemed appropriate under the context of Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy and the North-South summit. Government officials in the Blue House and Unification Ministry proposed using a milder term to avoid provocation of North Korea amidst inter-Korea cooperation.

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The MND eventually dropped the “main enemy” term in its 2004 white paper, using the less insidious phrase “direct military threat.” As expected, conservative GNP politicians strongly opposed this shift, whereas ruling progressive Uri party members agreed that the removal of the term reflected the current state of inter-Korean affairs. However, in the most recently published 2006 White Paper, the MND characterized Pyongyang’s efforts to increase its nuclear weapons capability as alarming and a “grave concern” to South Korea. The MND stated, “The DPRK's nuclear weapons development has affected our national defense posture in no small way. In particular, there is a spectrum of uncertainty, associated with resolving the DPRK nuclear issue that can confront us in various shapes and forms.” In a section titled, “North Korean Situation and Military Threat,” the MND recognized the North-South exchanges which have taken place since 2000, but then proceeded by stating:

On the other hand, North Korea conspires to split South Korean society in the name of national unity and to pit South Korea against the United States by agitating anti-American struggles and insisting upon withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. As noted above, North Korea is very active in securing economic benefits from the South-North exchanges and cooperation. However, North Korea shows a lukewarm attitude when it comes to issues like tension reduction and military confidence-building leading to peace …on the Korean Peninsula.

Following the White Paper’s release in December, a senior MND official confirmed that the MND did indeed upgrade the level of threat from North Korea since the 2004 White Paper.

In sum, political elites, particularly those in the conservative foreign policy and defense establishment, still acknowledge North Korea as a threat. Even progressive

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Uri Party members pushing for more conciliatory measures concede that the North Korean threat has not been completely eliminated.\(^46\) The continued threat, even if reduced, prevents the lingering security consensus among political elites from completely dissipating. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and its unpredictable behavior require political elites to maintain an air of caution regarding the North, preserving its security partnership with the U.S.

\textit{U.S.-South Korean Alliance}

Under a moderate security consensus, the U.S.-ROK alliance still functions as the linchpin of South Korea’s defense. A national security strategy should emphasize this defensive alliance over other possible scenarios, such as regional security arrangements, or increasing bilateral military ties with China. As such, the U.S.-ROK alliance is still viewed by most Koreans as a legitimate source of South Korea’s defense. Likewise, USFK is seen as an integral part of South Korea’s national security. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 indicate that the majority of South Koreans continue to view U.S. troops and the U.S. security alliance as important, even with 47% of Koreans favoring a gradual withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2005.\(^47\)

\(^{46}\) This dual perspective of North Korea is summed up in National Assembly member Lim Jong-In’s comments: “While being the threat to the nation's security, North Korea is also our partner.” See Shin Hae-in. “Lawmakers clash over ‘main enemy.’” \textit{Korea Herald}. November 19, 2004.

\(^{47}\) \textit{Joong-ang Ilbo} National Survey. Conducted August 24-September 10, 2005. \(n=1200\). Only 7% favored immediate withdrawal. Although the data refers to public opinion rather than elite perception, I add this to show that a surprisingly large number of South Koreans still admit that U.S. troop presence serves useful for South Korean security, even as attitudes against U.S. policies have grown more critical.
Figure 5.6: Importance of USFK for protecting South Korea's security, 1988-2005
Source: Office of Research, U.S. State Department.

Figure 5.7: Should South Korea maintain the security alliance after reunification, 1997-2004? Source: Office of Research, U.S. State Department.

As demonstrated above, the target and source of security for South Korea remain unchanged. South Korea faces an external security threat from the North, as well as regional uncertainty involving larger Asian powers such as Japan and China.
Thus political elites agree, at least in principle, that U.S. forces in the mid to long term, are necessary for South Korean security. Other than radicals, very few South Koreans advocate alliance termination, immediate withdrawal of USFK, or the sudden removal of U.S. bases. Alliances persist even in the face of declining threats for various reasons. Asset specificities and institutional costs, as well as the formation of an alliance identity through close social interaction over time, have helped military alliances such as NATO survive even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.48
Likewise, the institutional arrangements built within the U.S.-ROK security alliance, and the close interaction between alliance partners for over fifty years, produced an alliance identity between the two countries which continues to exist in the 21st century.49

The elite security consensus is constituted and reinforced by institutions and identities undergirding the U.S.-ROK alliance. The security consensus takes into account material threat perceptions, but is also bound by historical legacies cemented by years of intense hostility between the North and South. The psychological dependence South Korea developed towards the U.S. during the Cold War also reifies the security consensus.50 Although the consensus is waning, it continues to place ideological and domestic political constraints in the security policy-making arena, and particularly on issues such as U.S. basing policy.

In sum, a moderate, pro-U.S. security consensus persisted among South Korean political elites during the first half of this decade. Even as the breadth of the security consensus narrowed over time, conservatives, as well as a significant majority

of progressive elites, continued to value security relations with the U.S. Of course, government officials in the more progressive Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun Administrations advocated greater self-reliance on defense issues. Attesting to the depth of the consensus, however, political and ideological constraints curbed the pace of these reforms, and frustrated the agenda of more radical elites demanding greater concessions from the U.S.\(^{51}\) Key elites dominating the security and foreign policy establishment marginalized voices claiming that the U.S. alliance functioned as a security liability rather than a common good. Regarding anti-base or anti-USFK opposition, a moderate security consensus limited the impact of anti-base movements on base policy outcomes. However, anti-base movements in South Korea should not be construed as a lost cause. A moderate consensus, especially if on the decline, suggests at least the possibility of greater open political space for activists in the future. The next chapter extends the discussion of the security consensus by exploring how a moderate consensus influenced state-societal interaction and anti-base movement outcomes across several movement episodes in South Korea.

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\(^{51}\) These concessions include an increase in alliance burden-sharing, further reductions in U.S. bases, and ceding influence to South Korea on North Korea and other regional issues.
CHAPTER 6
OPERATING UNDER A MODERATE SECURITY CONSENSUS: AN ANALYSIS OF THREE SOUTH KOREAN ANTI-BASE MOVEMENT EPISODES

Chapter Five concluded by arguing that a moderate security consensus existed among South Korean political elites. How did this consensus impact anti-base movement effectiveness and policy outcomes in South Korea? Similar to movement episodes in Japan or Italy where anti-base movements faced a strong security consensus, a moderate pro-U.S. consensus among South Korean elites limited the impact of three anti-base movements since 2000: the SOFA revision movement from 1999-2001, the Maehyangri movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in 2000, and the Pyeongtaek movement to block the expansion of Camp Humphreys from 2005-07. Empirically, South Korean anti-base movement episodes ended in either partial concessions (Maehyangri and SOFA), or the status quo (Pyeongtaek). No movement episode concluded in outright victory, as in the Philippines or Ecuador under conditions of weak security consensus.

Although the security consensus framework highlights limitations placed on anti-base movements under a moderate security consensus, the framework has difficulty explaining different outcomes when the degree of consensus remains relatively constant over time. Assuming that a moderate security consensus existed throughout all three episodes studied in this chapter (2000-2007), what explains the variation between status quo and partial concession outcomes?

The security consensus functions as the most important political opportunity structure in my theoretical argument. However, as this chapter intends to demonstrate, a more complete explanation of base politics is possible by opening the causal
argument to other political opportunities and factors present within a given movement episode. These factors include the strategic value of bases and the cost of base closure to the U.S., the bargaining position of the South Korean government, and the “fortuitous” timing of U.S. military related accidents. Other factors endogenous to anti-base movements, such as movement strategy and internal dynamics among coalition members, also help capture different nuances within movement episodes. In sum, by taking advantage of social movement analysis and movement episodes as the primary analytical unit, I intend to explain the factors and mechanisms leading to different outcomes in South Korean anti-base movement episodes.

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, I examine three anti-base movement episodes. The first episode, the SOFA revision movement from 1999-2001, ended with minor revisions to SOFA. Although no formal ties existed between the People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA (PAR-SOFA) and the South Korean government, a more permissive opportunity structure created by a string of USFK mishaps in 2000 enabled PAR-SOFA to play a key role in shaping the SOFA revision debate. The second episode, the Maehyangri anti-base movement in 2000, also ended in partial concessions. The Maehyangri campaign reveals a set of pressure mechanisms against Seoul (and Washington) similar to those found in the Okinawan anti-base movement leading to SACO recommendations. Finally, I devote the most attention to the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement episode from 2005-2007, which ended in the status quo. This “anomaly” is explained by the exceptionally high security stakes associated with base expansion at Camp Humphreys, magnifying the strength of the elite security

1 See, for example, the discussion in Chapter 3 on political opportunities available at the prefectural level in the Okinawan anti-base movement.
consensus in this particular episode. Moving beyond structure, however, movement choices and government counterstrategies also accounted for this “failed” outcome. Over time, external obstacles, tactical errors, and the South Korean government’s tough counter-measures undermined and eventually destroyed anti-base opposition.

**SOFA Revision Movement 1999-2001**

The SOFA revision movement from 1999-2001 best illustrates the relationship between anti-base movements and base policy outcomes under a “moderate” security consensus. The Kim Dae-Jung Administration (1998-2003), the most progressive administration to date, provided activists a more permissive environment for anti-base mobilization. Moreover, President Kim, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) in particular, expressed its desire for SOFA revision negotiations. Activists took advantage of the Administration’s more open stance on SOFA revisions. Additionally, activists adopted appropriate framing strategies which not only aided coalition building, but created space for government officials to use anti-base movements as bargaining leverage at the negotiating table. Thus, the early phase of the SOFA revision movement was marked by more cooperative relations between the state and civil society. As the SOFA revision campaign progressed, however, the constraints imposed by a moderate elite consensus became increasingly apparent. The South Korean government had to tread carefully not to disrupt the U.S. alliance,

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2 The base expansion project entailed the relocation of USFK headquarters from Seoul to Pyeongtaek, and the consolidation of the 2nd Infantry Division north of Seoul to Camp Humphreys.
3 While not protesting against a specific military base, South Korean activists and the media interpret SOFA protests in the same category as anti-base movements. See “2002 nyun yeojong-saeng bumdaewii chamgadanchae 63% ga pyeontaek bumdaewi chamga” (63% of civic groups involved in the 2002 Hyesoon-Miseon coalition group involved in Pyeongtaek umbrella coalition). Chosun Ilbo. May 17, 2006. Other scholars also classify SOFA revisions movements under the broader rubric of anti-base protests. See Cooley 2008 and Calder 2008.
4 An inappropriate framing strategy (i.e. “No more U.S. troops” or “Yankees go home.”), would have reduced the credibility of the SOFA revision movement, leading the government to dismiss activist demands.
eventually requesting restraint from civil society in what was increasingly perceived as anti-American protests.

Mobilization

South Korea first requested SOFA revisions in 1995 after several crimes committed by U.S. soldiers sparked anti-U.S. demonstrations. However, after seven rounds of negotiations between May 1995 and September 1996, the two sides failed to reach any agreement. Neither side brought up the issue again publicly until April 1999, when Foreign Minister Hong Soon-Young called for an early resolution to outstanding SOFA issues. Seoul was particularly interested in revising criminal jurisdiction procedures, granting the South Korean government custody of U.S. suspects at the time of indictment rather than conviction. As the two governments prepared to restart negotiations in October 1999, activist leaders informally discussed preparations for a large campaign to press Seoul and Washington on SOFA revisions.

On October 6, 1999, the People's Action for Reform of the Unjust ROK-US SOFA (PAR-SOFA), formally launched its campaign. Protests coinciding with the first round of negotiations in October led to several arrests, but were otherwise low-key. During this early phase of the PAR-SOFA campaign, activists focused on increasing media coverage to bring national attention to SOFA issues. Weekly protests took place outside the U.S. Embassy and other symbolic locations, with larger protests taking place prior to each round of negotiation.

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6 President Kim Dae-Jung had pledged to address SOFA revisions during his election campaign. Interview with PAR-SOFA General Secretary Mun Jung-Hyeon. November 7, 2005.
7 Oh 2001, p.207. PAR-SOFA also sent a letter to Foreign Minister Lee demanding concrete measures towards SOFA revision.
Several USFK mishaps in the early half of 2000 helped publicize the SOFA issue, playing into the hands of PAR-SOFA’s campaign strategy. First, the murder of a bar hostess in February 2000 by a USFK soldier, and his brief escape from U.S. custody in April 2000 while awaiting trial, boosted PAR-SOFA’s claim that SOFA revisions were necessary. Two other events, a bombing accident caused by an A-10 aircraft in Machyangri, and revelations that a USFK member had dumped formaldehyde into the Han River, also fueled public support for revisions.8 The latter incident enabled activists and the South Korean government to push more aggressively for an environmental clause into the SOFA agreement.

**Potential for State-Society Cooperation**

Key policymakers advocated SOFA revisions. For example, Foreign Minister Hong Soon-Young publicly raised the issue of SOFA revisions as early as 1999. As civil societal pressure mounted, Hong’s successor, Lee Joung-Bin, announced his intention to request adding an environmental clause to SOFA.9 National Assembly members also urged the government to take a resolute stand on SOFA revision negotiations. After the Machyangri incident, dozens of parliamentarians from both progressive and conservative parties made repeated calls on the government to push for SOFA revisions. Representative Lee Chang-Bok of the ruling Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) and Lee Bu-Young of the conservative Grand National Party (GNP) sponsored a resolution signed by sixty-one National Assembly members to thoroughly revise the U.S.-South Korean SOFA to the standards of SOFA with Germany (or NATO) and Japan. The resolution was eventually adopted by the Foreign Affairs committee and passed through the National Assembly.10

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8 Protests in Machyangri developed into a separate anti-base campaign, as I discuss later in the chapter. For more on the Machyangri case, see Yeo 2006, Kim 2001.
willingness of key elites to demand SOFA revisions created political space for activists. In a rare moment, South Korean civil society and the government found themselves on the same side of the debate.

Taking advantage of this political space between state and society required moderation on the part of activists. Even though some PAR-SOFA campaign organizers desired the complete withdrawal of USFK, these leaders understood that a large, credible coalition would never form under a “Yankee Go Home” banner. PAR-SOFA secretary general Mun Jung-Hyeon argued, “The government isn’t going to take you seriously if you’re making unreasonable calls like withdrawal. We (needed) a reasonable, constructive frame which the government can work with, such as ‘revise the unjust SOFA.’”

Up to a certain point, the South Korean government welcomed civil societal demands for SOFA revision. Protests provided the Korean delegation additional leverage during negotiations. Widespread protests, triggered by a string of USFK mishaps, signaled to Washington that public sentiment was rapidly turning against the U.S. The Korean negotiators could turn to their American counterparts and credibly claim that the unequal SOFA Agreement generated domestic unrest, threatening the stability of the alliance. As one MOFAT advisor remarked, “When Korean negotiators come to the table with the U.S., they feel like they are the underdog. They feel a power imbalance. Thus they need grassroots support from people’s organizations.”

Constraining Effect of the Security Consensus

While the South Korean government may have welcomed additional bargaining leverage against the U.S. derived from SOFA revision protests, the government also kept a cautious eye on civil society. Negotiations remained

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11 Interview with PAR-SOFA General Secretary Mun Jung-Hyeon. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. December 9, 2005.
deadlocked between Seoul and Washington, even as negative USFK incidents continued throughout 2000. Frustrated over the slow progress, activists grew increasingly critical of the Kim Dae-Jung government, and more radical in both anti-USFK rhetoric and protest strategies. Foreign Minister Lee requested that the public refrain from participating in anti-American demonstrations, quoting, “I hope that South Koreans will refrain from such undesirable, radical acts, as these could adversely affect Korea-U.S. relations.”13 After delaying SOFA negotiations for several months - a ploy activists claimed the government used to prevent anti-USFK sentiments from building further momentum - talks resumed in August 2000. As both sides entered into diplomatic gridlock, the government began to distance itself from activists’ more radical stance for major revisions. Seoul wanted to amend several SOFA clauses, but it did not want to push demands so far as to create a permanent rift in the alliance.14 President Kim Dae-Jung, who initially provided hope to civil societal actors that the government was finally listening, later criticized the more radical elements of protests. Kim stated, “We can criticize if the United States makes a policy which we feel is wrong, but this should not lead to anti-Americanism…the presence of U.S. forces serves our national interest.”15 Even with civil society penetrating the state under a “weakened” consensus, President Kim carefully balanced his response to domestic opposition with Korea’s alliance obligation to the U.S.16

In the revised SOFA Agreement signed on December 28, 2000, the U.S. agreed to transfer U.S. suspects to South Korean authorities at the time of indictment,

14 Interview with former Foreign Minister Lee Joung-Bin. Bundang, South Korea, June 22, 2006.
16 PAR-SOFA activists expressed diverging opinions towards President Kim. Some recognized that his campaign pledge to revise SOFA, and more open stance towards civil society, enabled activists to place a greater impact on policy decisions. Others, like Father Mun Jung-Hyeon, remained skeptical of President Kim. Mun believed President Kim ultimately sided with the Americans rather than the will of the people. Interview with several former PAR-SOFA movement leaders. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. December 9, 2005.
but only in the case of egregious crimes, such as murder and rape. The two sides also added an environmental provision, as well as other procedural changes regarding the resolution of labor disputes, quarantine regulations, and rules for facilities construction. While the government expressed immense satisfaction over the revisions, PAR-SOFA denounced the outcome. Kim Tae-Kyung of Green Korea United lamented, “We feel very insulted. The results of the talks did not come close to meeting our demands for a thorough revision of the unfair agreement.”\(^\text{17}\) The general secretary of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea stated, “Both the United States and Korea are boasting as if they have made a major breakthrough by agreeing on the handover of criminal suspects…but the U.S. side attached conditions to this agreement. We suspect that these conditions will make the pact useless.”\(^\text{18}\) Highly dissatisfied with the outcome, PAR-SOFA members stated that the Korean government merely agreed to superficial revisions to quell anti-American sentiment.\(^\text{19}\)

Civil society did play a role in the final revision outcome, mobilizing popular support and pressuring Seoul to push for substantial SOFA revisions at the negotiating table. Key political elites were willing (and in fact eager) to revise several SOFA clauses, and were therefore initially receptive to civil society’s informal participation. However, the SOFA revision movement also highlights the limits placed on anti-base movement demands. A moderate consensus and overarching U.S.-ROK alliance concerns continued to constrain the role of social movements as the South Korean government settled for “token” concessions.


\(^{18}\) Chang 2005.

\(^{19}\) Interview with secretary general of the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops in Korea. January 10, 2006. Koh contends that the South Korean government had no genuine intention of revising SOFA. Instead, Seoul was more concerned with alliance preservation and keeping a lid on rising anti-American pressure. As one SOFA legal counselor noted, “the government tends to lack the political will to demand SOFA revisions unless they are pushed by the public.” Interview with Choi Seung-Hwan. Seoul, South Korea, November 17, 2005.
Maehyangri Anti-Base Movement 2000

Like the SOFA revision movement, under a moderate security consensus, the Maehyangri episode ended in partial concessions. However, the mechanisms leading to this outcome follow a slightly different logic. PAR-SOFA activists initially shared the same basic goals as the South Korean government. In Maehyangri, however, state-societal interaction was much more confrontational. Unable to penetrate the state, activists resorted to more radical tactics. By illegally breaching Kooni Firing Range and disrupting USFK training, activists put pressure on the U.S.-ROK alliance. Paradoxically, the existence of a strong, pro-U.S. security consensus created a target space for activists to pressure Seoul and Washington. Protestors disrupted USFK operations, attracted negative media spotlight on the South Korean government and U.S. military, dampened public attitudes towards the alliance, and perpetuated the image of South Koreans as “a bunch of ingrates” to Americans. The protests would have eventually generated an alliance crisis had Seoul left the protests unchecked. Therefore, to alleviate anti-base pressure and preserve alliance relations, the host government and the U.S. provided partial concessions.

Origins

The movement in Maehyangri began as a NIMBY struggle long before it developed into a national campaign. Built in 1955, the U.S. Air Force used Kooni Firing Range for strafing and bombing exercises. Located only 1.4 km from Maehyangri village in Kyeongi Province, USFK trained 250 days a year, averaging 11.5 hours a day. According to one movement leader, about 700 families, or 4,000

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20 Although Kooni Firing Range eventually closed, I code the policy outcome as “partial concessions” since the base continued to operate until 2004. However, many activists cite the Maehyangri campaign as a major victory for Korean anti-base movements.

21 This last point is further exacerbated by the media, with anti-base protests often (mis)interpreted as anti-American in nature,
residents were affected by noise pollution. After years of quiet suffering, on July 4, 1988, residents from eight villages surrounding Kooni Range formed the Joint Committee on Noise Pollution and filed a petition to the MND and the Blue House. Receiving no response from either the ROK government or USFK, in December 1988, about 700 residents physically occupied the range. The range was occupied a second time by protestors in March 1989, eventually resulting in the USFK closing off the area and preventing any farming within the range’s premise.

Led by local resident Chun Mankyu, over the next decade, the local residents pushed both Korean and U.S. authorities to seek measures to reduce externalities arising from strafing exercises. Villagers claimed to have suffered casualties, physical and mental illnesses, and damaged property from misfirings over the last fifty years. In 1997, the MND proposed a plan to relocate villagers to a safer location approximately five kilometers from the training range. Local residents strongly resisted the resettlement plan, arguing that it threatened their livelihood as fishermen. Residents instead filed a lawsuit against the ROK government in 1998 demanding 35 billion won as compensation.

On May 8, an A-10 experiencing engine trouble dropped six 500 pound bombs to reduce weight as an emergency measure. Maehyangri villagers claimed seven people were injured and several houses damaged. Demanding justice and compensation, local residents formed the Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force. The local task force also discussed with outside civic groups the possibility of forming a larger coalition campaign. Fueled by the U.S.-ROK joint investigation committee’s conclusion that no damages were found by the A-10 bomb dropping, residents and

22 Kim 2001, p.245.
23 Ibid, p.251.
26 Ibid.
outside NGO activists organized the National Solution Committee to Abolish the Maehyangri Air Force Training Range (CAM).

**Strategy**

On June 2, the day the joint U.S.-ROK investigation team presented their findings, PAR-SOFA leaders and approximately seventy NGO representatives, activists, and students traveled to Maehyangri to protest.\(^{27}\) PAR-SOFA initially functioned as the organizing body, acting as a broker between the local resident committee and a wide array of civic groups, most notably labor and student groups. These “outside groups” used the SOFA revision and Maehyangri incident to confront the South Korean government on broader U.S. military issues.

CAM activists participated in a variety of activities such as protest marches, letter writing campaigns, festivals, and street performances. Activities took place in both Maehyangri and in Seoul. More militant activists illegally entered the firing range by cutting through barbed wire. In fact, the single most effective tactic was the threat and actual occupation of Kooni Firing Range. As one U.S. official lamented, “With protestors walking onto the range, we had to suspend training.”\(^{28}\)

To enhance organizational capacity and structure, local and national movement leaders formed a coalition campaign specifically devoted to the closure of Kooni Firing Range. On June 30, residents and activists formally launched CAM. Local residents recognized that their struggle would never carry weight at the national level without the wider participation of civic groups and NGOs.\(^{29}\) In an essay analyzing the Maehyangri movement, CAM steering committee leader Kim Jong-il\(^{30}\) acknowledged

\(^{27}\) Kim 2001, p.251.
\(^{30}\) No relation to the North Korean Leader. Kim Jong-il is affiliated with SPARK (Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea).
the significance of this new coalition. According to Kim, solidarity through CAM aided the broader anti-base struggle in three ways. First, it helped transform a local movement into a “larger, more continuous, national movement.” Second, it brought further attention to USFK related problems. Third, CAM helped instill a sense of national consciousness.

Of course, tension over movement direction and strategy existed between local and national groups. For instance, local Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force leader, Chun Mankyu, admitted that villagers were more concerned about government compensation or noise reduction rather than the larger political agenda carried by outside civic groups. Among others, this political agenda included demands for equality in U.S.-ROK relations, and peace and reconciliation with North Korea. One strategy which helped mitigate this tension was CAM’s adoption of a framing strategy focused on injustice and suffering. In particular, CAM highlighted the hazards and excessive noise generated by Kooni Range. Activists were aided by images of roaring jets conducting strafing exercises broadcast repeatedly in the media.32

**State-Societal Interaction**

On June 2, the first day strafing exercises resumed after the accident, local authorities arrested resident leader Chun Mankyu for entering the range and snatching the red marker flag used to signal on-going training exercises. The following day, two hundred activists marched to Hwaseong police station to demand Chun’s release, only to be detained halfway by riot police.33 Activists made preparations for a mass protest on June 6, and threatened to occupy the range. As promised, on June 6, PAR-SOFA

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32 A former Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA) researcher who investigated safety issues at Kooni on behalf of the MND admitted that noise pollution was blatantly obvious. Interview with former KIDA official. Seoul, South Korea. November 9, 2005

33 Kim 2001, p.255.
and the Maehyangri Resident’s Task Force Committee mobilized approximately 3,500 residents and activists in Maehyangri.\textsuperscript{34} Activists demanded the closure of Kooni Range, and compensation for damages resulting from strafing exercises. After the rally, participants linked arms to form a human chain from Maehyangri village to the front gate of Kooni Firing Range. For the most part, protests were peaceful with only minor clashes reported between riot police and activists.

As if in response to the previous day’s protest, the MND dispatched military medical personnel, members of the engineering corps, and heavy construction equipment to Maehyangri on June 7. The MND participated in “civilian support activities,” undoubtedly in an effort to quell rising tension. The public works campaign included repairing damaged homes and improving village road conditions.\textsuperscript{35}

In mid-June, the MND announced training exercises would begin on June 19. The news immediately prompted activists to mobilize a second mass protest on June 17. The government managed to block activists from entering the bomb drop zone on Nong Island by dispatching 2,000 riot police into the area. However, a handful of student activists managed to reach the isle by boat and stage a sit-in, again forcing a delay in the resumption of training.

South Korean officials soon found themselves in a diplomatic bind. According to South Korean defense officials, residents did not understand the complex issue at hand and the necessity in keeping Kooni Range operable.\textsuperscript{36} MND assurances that the USFK would establish measures minimizing training hazards were unacceptable to CAM. The MND proposed two possible solutions to resolve growing tension. The first option entailed relocating the training site. The second option involved relocating

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\textsuperscript{34} Kim 2001, p. 255.


\textsuperscript{36} Interview with MND Director of Policy Planning. Seoul, South Korea. December 19, 2005.
the residents. Although the MND initially preferred the second option, due to budget constraints and opposition from residents, the MND abandoned this route. Meanwhile, the MND assigned a high level ROK Air Force official to head negotiations with the U.S. and form a committee to study relocation plans. Negotiations between the USFK and MND focused on the issue of relocation and finding an alternative range site. In early July, an MND spokesman announced that the two sides were moving ahead with a plan to relocate the range about 1.5 km to a man-made shooting range on a tidal flat near Nong Island.37

The MND acknowledged the “well-organized” resistance of the Maehyangri anti-base movement. As the MND Director of Policy Planning noted, “My deputy spent all his time in Maehyangri, speaking for hours with police, local officials, and residents. However, residents were not open to the government’s position.”38 At the same time, the MND was cognizant of its responsibilities to the U.S., and the negative repercussions to the alliance in the event that a strategically important training range were lost. Balancing between international and domestic pressure, the South Korean government negotiated an agreement with USFK to appease anti-base opposition. Both sides approved the relocation of the strafing range on a tidal flat. The USFK also agreed to cease using live ammunition during training.39 CAM immediately denounced the concessions, stating that their demands had not been appropriately met. From the South Korean government’s perspective, however, partial concessions alleviated anti-base pressure. Indeed, protests in Maehyangri subsided as activists redoubled their energies towards the ongoing SOFA revision movement.

Given the strategic importance of Kooni Range, and Seoul’s desire to maintain positive alliance relations with Washington, why did the Maehyangri episode end in partial concessions rather than the status quo? On one level, one could dismiss the impact of social movements, arguing that policy changes amounted to token concessions. However, partial concessions do suggest that anti-base movements generated some degree of pressure against USFK and the South Korean government. This pressure mechanism is worth exploring. By forcing the suspension of USFK training, CAM created strains in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Pressure for concessions on base policies were magnified by activists’ use of the media which highlighted the injustices faced by local residents. A string of USFK mishaps in 2000, coupled with the ongoing SOFA revision movement, also increased the leverage of CAM’s opposition against Kooni Range. In the end, the South Korean government had to balance between domestic pressure and international alliance commitments by making partial concessions to CAM.

**Pyeongtaek Anti-Base Movement 2005-2007**

Although the pro-U.S. security consensus remained relatively constant at moderate levels between 2000 and 2005, the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement episode ended quite differently from the earlier two movement episodes in 2000.\(^4^0\) Over the course of a year, KCPT members organized three major rallies, sponsored numerous publicity and protest events in Pyeongtaek and Seoul, and galvanized activists in a major showdown with riot police which drew extensive national media coverage. Despite the size and duration of the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement, and the early

\(^{40}\) However, some may argue that the security consensus declined during this period, triggered by a shift in foreign policy stance towards North Korea from the Clinton to Bush Administration, and the electoral victory of President Roh Moo-Hyun after a wave of anti-American sentiment in South Korea. I argue that these events may have narrowed the breadth of a pro-U.S. security consensus among elites, but not necessarily diminished the overall depth of the consensus embedded in ideology and domestic institutions.
initial success in mass mobilization, anti-base activists failed to achieve any of their major goals or demands from the South Korean government. Unlike the SOFA revision or Maehyangri anti-base movements, why was KCPT unable to achieve any major victory on the policy front? What explains the South Korean government’s particular response to KCPT?

Anti-base movement “failure” in this episode is partly explained by the constraints of a moderate security consensus within the South Korean foreign policy establishment. One other factor magnifying the impact of the security consensus, however, creating even greater obstacles for KCPT, was the high security stakes attached to the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. Unlike Kooni Firing Range, a base of high strategic value in its own right, the process of base expansion at Camp Humphreys was linked closely to USFK transformation, and consequently, the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance. The South Korean government viewed base expansion in Pyeongtaek as a project absolutely essential to the preservation of the alliance. A moderate, pro-U.S. security consensus, coupled with the extremely high security stakes associated with base relocation and expansion at Camp Humphreys’, significantly shaped the nature and mode of interaction between movement and government actors. The South Korean government viewed activists as a public nuisance at best, and a group of radicals undermining U.S.-ROK relations and national security at worst. Once the government resolved to quash anti-base opposition, activists stood little chance in winning even partial concessions. In addition to these structural challenges, KCPT leaders faced problems sustaining mobilization efforts as the movement episode unfolded. Some of these problems were internal to KCPT, such as increasing tension between moderates and radicals as the government worked to both co-opt and coerce different movement actors. Other problems were outside the control of KCPT. For instance, the rise of other coalition movements around the same
time period, such as the anti-WTO movement in late 2005, or the anti-FTA movement in mid-2006, drew activist resources and public attention away from U.S. base issues, making it difficult for KCPT to sustain high levels of mobilization.

**Origins**

After Seoul and Washington announced the decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison in 2003, and the 2nd Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek in 2004, activists moved away from SOFA issues and reoriented their struggle against the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. The movement was led by the anti-base coalition group Pan-National Solution Committee to Stop the Expansion of U.S. Bases (KCPT). Although KCPT did not formally launch its campaign until March 2005, the seeds of the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement date earlier to two local coalition groups. A group of local activists formed the Citizens’ Coalition Opposing the Relocation of Yongsan Garrison in November 1990 when U.S. and Korean negotiators considered Pyeongtaek as a potential relocation site for Yongsan Garrison in the late 1980s. The coalition group, composed primarily of local NGOs, evolved into the Citizens’ Coalition to Regain Our Land from U.S. Bases in 1999, and then the Pyeongtaek Movement to Stop Base Expansion (Pyeongtaek Daechaekwi) in 2001 prior to the announcement of the LPP.

In April 2003, the South Korean and U.S. government formally announced the decision to relocate Yongsan Garrison to Pyeongtaek. The MND also announced its plan to expropriate land surrounding Camp Humphreys for base expansion. Of the designated base expansion land, the MND planned to acquire 240,000 pyeong (about 199 acres) of land from Daechuri village. Thus villagers organized the Paengseong Residents’ Action Committee (Paengseong Daechaekwi or Jumin Daechaekwi) in July 2003 to prevent the MND from taking over their farmland. After the conclusion of the U.S.-ROK Future of the Alliance Talks (FOTA) in 2004, the MND agreed to grant the
U.S. a total of 3,490,000 pyeong (about 2,897 acres) of land, 2,850,000 pyeong (about 2,366 acres) coming from Daechuri and Doduri village. Figure 6.1 below indicates the area of expansion, tripling the size of Camp Humphreys from 2005.

![Camp Humphreys base expansion](source: Hankyoreh 21, KCPT)

The conclusion of FOTA ratcheted the gravity of the situation. Hence in May 2004, Father Mun Jeong-Hyeon, the former PAR-SOFA movement leader, met with leaders of both the local Pyeongtaek anti-base coalition and the anti-base Residents’ Action Committee. At that point, Father Mun, along with other prominent NGO leaders, decided that the various anti-base movements in Pyeongtaek needed to unify under one national campaign. In early 2005, Mun and other anti-base leaders organized KCPT.

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41 The figures come from KCPT, [http://antigizi.or.kr/](http://antigizi.or.kr/). The MND reports 3,620,000 pyeong of land being provided to the USFK (about 3,005 acres). See Yoon 2006.
**Mobilization**

Similar to the ATM movement in the Philippines, mobilization structures were already in place through existing anti-base networks formed in previous campaigns such as the Maehyangri and the SOFA revision movements.\textsuperscript{42} Several leaders who served on various committees in previous coalition campaigns, such as Father Mun, Yoo Young-Jae from Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK), or Kim Yong-Han from the local chapter of the Democratic Labor Party, were part of KCPT’s executive committee. However, KCPT organizers made a conscious decision to include several representatives from the local Pyeongtaek anti-base coalition and the village-level anti-base Resident’s Committee on leadership positions to give local actors a voice in the campaign.\textsuperscript{43} KCPT held their first at-large leaders’ meeting with representatives from member groups on March 3, 2005. By July 2005, activists had successfully organized an anti-base coalition campaign linking national-level NGOs, local civic groups, and village residents into one large umbrella coalition. What was originally a local movement in Pyeongtaek had now become a national struggle. Approximately 120 organizations from labor, student, women’s rights, agriculture, human rights, peace, unification, and religious groups were directly or nominally involved in the campaign.

The significant overlap among individual organizations in multiple coalitions makes it difficult to diagram KCPT’s coalition structure. Additionally, many organizations were only nominal members of KCPT based on their association with other coalition movements supporting KCPT. The number of civic groups directly

\textsuperscript{42} Many of the same organizations and activists in earlier movements reappeared in the Pyeongtaek anti-base struggle. See “2002 nyun yeojoong-saeng bundaewii changlechande 63% ga pyeontaek bundaewi changga” (63% of civic groups involved in the 2002 Hyosoon-Miseon coalition group involved in Pyeongtaek umbrella coalition).

\textsuperscript{43} Minutes to KCPT at large leaders’ meeting #1. March 3, 2005. KCTU conference room. Seoul, South Korea.
and consistently active in the Pyeongtaek anti-base struggle amounted to a few dozen groups. Figure 6.2 below attempts to outline the basic organizational pattern of KCPT. This is followed by Table 6.1 which provides a profile of KCPT’s organizational composition, goals, and, strategies.

Figure 6.2 Membership of People’s Task Force to Stop Expansion of Bases in Pyeongtaek (KCPT). *Note:* Overlapping circles represent organizational rather than individual member overlap.
Table 6.1 Brief Profile of People’s Task Force to Stop Expansion of Bases in Pyeongtaek (KCPT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leading Organizations</th>
<th>Pyeongtaek Anti-Base Task Force (Coalition with several other local civic groups), Paengsong Residents Task Force to Stop Base Expansion, Korean Peasants’ League (KPL), PeaceWind, Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK), Korean Confederated Trade Union (KCTU), Confederation of Korean Student Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative Sectoral Membership</td>
<td>Peace, Trade Unions, Students, Farmers, Women, Religious organizations, Human Rights, Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making Process</td>
<td>Loose coalition with meetings open to civic group members. Key movement decisions decided by KCPT Steering Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Goals and Related Advocacy</td>
<td>Local: Block expansion of US bases in Pyeongtaek; Protection residents; land and livelihood National: Peace and stability on Korean Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing</td>
<td>Injustice (livelihood of residents, multiple eviction over years); Peace (instability on Korean Peninsula)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies</td>
<td>Target citizens to raise public awareness about plight of residents and USFK; Organize and encourage local residents; Form broad domestic coalition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mobilizing strategies required maintaining support from local and national NGOs as well as the unmobilized masses. The bulk of the organizing work was conducted by activists residing within or near Pyeongtaek. Organizers also included “local” activists representing national-level civic groups such as PeaceWind or SPARK, but living in Daechuri village during the campaign. Representatives from national and regional organizations who were coalitional members of KCPT attended

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44 I have listed only a few representative organizations actively involved in KCPT. Listing South Korean civic groups involved in anti-base movements is difficult because most organizations are only nominally members by their association with a local or regional coalition group. For instance, all member organizations of the Korean Confederated Trade Union (KCTU) are counted as member organizations of KCPT, regardless of whether individual organizations are actively involved or not in the anti-base struggle. On the other hand, individual activists in groups such as the National Campaign for the Eradication of Crime by U.S. Troops, or Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea, may be extensively involved with anti-base issues. However, because of limited resources, their organization as a whole cannot take part in the actual mobilization, finance, or strategic planning of the movement.
the members-at-large meetings. These individual representatives were then responsible for mobilizing their local chapters for large events and rallies. Labor unions and student groups, such as KCTU and Hanchongryon, provided the manpower and warm bodies at larger protests. Communication was largely conducted through the internet and mass e-mailing.\footnote{Interview with KCPT steering committee member, Pyeongtaek, South Korea. November 6, 2005; Interview with Hanchongryon member from Hanshin University, Pyeongtaek, South Korea. November 6, 2005.}

KCPT relied primarily on two types of frames: frames of injustice focused on the issue of livelihood and the forced expropriation of farmers’ lands, and frames of peace which claimed that U.S. base expansion destabilized Korean and Northeast Asian security. Despite the variegated agenda of national level NGOs under KCPT, the campaign successfully maintained a semblance of unity by placing the local land expropriation issue as their central focus.\footnote{In reality, there was always internal dissension regarding tactics, strategy, and even goals of the movement. After violent clashes between police and protestors, differences between grassroots organizations and established NGOs on the base relocation issue became much more pronounced. Grassroots organizations continued to focus on the rights of residents, while larger NGOs challenged the legal process, lack of transparency, and strategic motives behind base relocation and other USFK related issues.} While KCPT may have been more concerned about peace and sovereignty issues, the plight of elderly farmers forcefully evicted from their homeland were more likely to gain traction with the wider public. Framing the anti-base debate in a manner that highlighted immediate consequences, such as the forced eviction of elderly farmers, was much more effective in capturing a wider audience than using abstract frames such as peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the support and participation of local residents was essential for KCPT. KCPT invested significant resources to mobilize and sustain the morale of local residents in the wake of government threats and monetary bribery.

KCPT used various tactics to mobilize the public. According to PeaceWind activists living in Pyeongtaek, the most effective means of mobilization was a six
week, twenty city publicity campaign tour around the country. KCPT activists contacted regional NGOs in advance about their visit, particularly labor groups who had the largest mobilizing capacity. These groups would then contact other local civic groups and NGOs to listen to Father Mun and other KCPT members discuss the Pyeongtaek base relocation issue. In addition to labor groups, KCPT made special efforts to publicize their events to students, keeping in close contact with student unions.\textsuperscript{47} Second, NGOs sponsored both press conferences and public forums, inviting the press, government officials, and other activists to discuss pending base-related issues. Third, KCPT sent out electronic newsletters to all member organizations as well as individual members who had subscribed to the listserv. Lastly, KCPT used visual media, art, photo exhibitions, music, and street theater to publicize their cause.

In addition to the mobilizing tactics above, KCPT organized three large rallies to attract media attention and raise public awareness about the negative impact of U.S. base relocation to Pyeongtaek. Framing the rallies as “Grand Peace Marches,” these were held on July 10, 2005, December 11, 2005, and February 12, 2006 in Pyeongtaek. Gwanghwamun in downtown Seoul also provided a stage for anti-base protestors. In addition to occasional protests near the U.S. Embassy, from August 9 to October 25, 2005, celebrity folk singers Jeong Tae-Choon and his wife Park Eun-Ok performed behind the Kyobo Center as KCPT members handed out leaflets and flyers to the crowd. In January 2006, farmers brought attention to U.S. base issues by driving tractors all around the country bearing signs to stop base expansion at Camp Humphreys.

Despite KCPT’s mobilization efforts and large protest numbers ranging anywhere from 5,000-10,000 protestors, the movement was hampered by several

\textsuperscript{47} KCPT internal document. Organizational meeting notes. February 17, 2005, 10:00am. Seoul, South Korea.
external circumstances and internal constraints. The movement gradually strengthened throughout the summer of 2005, highlighted by a rally with 10,000 protestors outside Camp Humphreys on July 10. The event drew national attention, and KCPT’s momentum sustained through November. With winter approaching, however, other events such as the APEC summit in Pusan, and the WTO meeting in Hong Kong, “distracted” NGO groups from base issues. NGOs had to devote attention to their own parochial struggles.\textsuperscript{48} Activists also attributed the weakened support of labor unions in the anti-base campaign as an obstacle to mobilization. In the midst of financial scandals, and a rift between moderate and conservative labor union members within KCTU, the labor coalition was unable to devote significant attention to the Pyeongtaek issue.\textsuperscript{49} The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations beginning in May 2006 only detracted labor’s attention further away from U.S. base issues.\textsuperscript{50}

\textit{Strategy}

The major difference in strategy between KCPT in South Korea, and more successful movements such as the Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines, was the lack of coordinated, well-devised strategies directed at the South Korean government. ATM used a two-prong strategy aimed at both the mass public and government elites. Nominally, KCPT activists mentioned targeting the South Korean government, particularly the Blue House, the MND, and the Pyeongtaek city government. However, the bulk of KCPT’s strategy was oriented towards the larger public and “raising the national conscious of South Koreans,” rather than the South Korean government.\textsuperscript{51}


\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Pyeongtaek Democratic Labor Party official and activist Kim Yong-Han. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, November 7, 2005.

\textsuperscript{50} However, labor activists in KCPT helped organize a joint rally against U.S. imperialism with the anti-FTA coalition. A short attempt was made to link military bases and the FTA as an anti-U.S. struggle.

\textsuperscript{51} Public speech at Gwanghwamun, Father Mun Jung-Hyeong. Seoul, South Korea, October 11, 2005. Seoul, South Korea. Interview with Father Mun Jung-Hyeon. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, November 7, 2005. Some may argue that the institutional arrangements between base issues in the two countries differed because base treaties in the Philippines required Senate ratification. Philippine anti-base
an initial KCPT planning meeting in February 2005, organizers listed two primary objectives of the movement: 1) inform and formulate national public opinion; and 2) form strong solidarity with residents to stop the expansion of bases.\(^{52}\) Explaining why KCPT focused on society rather than directly targeting the government, Father Mun Jung-Hyeon stated, “I don’t try to solve problems with politicians, because I don’t expect them to change. Instead we must focus on society. Then we can see change.”\(^{53}\) Mun acknowledged KCPT was ultimately trying to push the government to change. However, some activist leaders such as Mun and Yoo Young-Jae believed influencing public opinion was more effective in pressuring the government to shift policy on security issues than direct government appeals. KCPT’s inaugural declaration illustrated the movement’s focus on the mass campaign:

> We cannot tolerate the lives of Pyeongtaek residents to be shaken so violently. Nor can we tolerate the serious threat posed by USFK relocation and permanent military dependency. Therefore, we are going to fight with all our strength to block the expansion of U.S. bases in Pyeongtaek. We are going to use a variety of methods, both on and off-line, and through media outlets, to wage a public campaign to inform the mass public the problems associated with military base expansion and the expanded role of USFK. Through demonstrations at every level, we are going to engage in an intense struggle against our government, which has deliberately ignored its people.\(^{54}\)

activists could therefore affect policy outcomes by directly lobbying government officials. However, the South Korean National Assembly, while not voting directly on base relocation, had the power to veto this process by voting on the budget allocated to the base relocation project. Voting in favor of the budget implies approval of the base expansion plan. Thus in principle, KCPT activists could have also oriented their strategy towards National Assembly members as in the Philippines. Although KCPT mobilized too late to affect the December 9, 2004 ratification, NGO groups did attempt to lobby National Assembly members to open a new hearing on the Yongsan base relocation bill. See National Assembly Records, Unification and Foreign Affairs Committee, 250th Assembly, 16th Meeting. December 7, 2004.  

\(^{52}\) KCPT internal document. “Organizational Meeting Notes.” February 17, 2005.  

\(^{53}\) Interview with Father Mun Jung-Hyeon, Pyeongtaek, South Korea, November 7, 2005. Mun notes, however, that there are others within the KCPT steering policy committee who do not necessarily subscribe to this view. These members believe activists should directly pressure the government to promote policy change.  

\(^{54}\) KCPT Inaugural Declaration [translated by author]. Available at KCPT’s website www.antigizi.or.kr/
As mentioned earlier, a strategy targeting the mass public required careful framing of the issue. To draw public attention, activists carefully constructed their slogans to take into account the local nature of the struggle and the plight of evicted residents. The goal was to attract those who may not necessarily have subscribed to the political views of anti-base activists, but agreed with KCPT on principles of human rights. Support from the Residents’ Action Committee was therefore essential.55 To maintain a local-oriented strategy, activists from national civic groups relocated to Pyeongtaek and occupied houses vacated by residents who had already taken the government’s financial compensation. Villagers and activists repainted homes, painted murals evoking images of peace and village life on the outside of walls, and converted abandoned buildings into public spaces, including a library and café. Residing in empty houses was also a tactic used to prevent the government from beginning base construction. The government would not bulldoze houses still occupied by elderly residents and activists. KCPT activists also participated regularly in the nightly candlelight vigils held in Daechuri, organized festivals, and welcomed visitors to Pyeongtaek and Daechuri village.

To raise national consciousness and influence public opinion on U.S. base issues, KCPT needed media support. This required activists to refrain from making more radical calls such as the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. bases and troops. Hence KCPT resorted to more neutral slogans such as “Stop the Expansion of U.S. Bases.” The rallies in July and December 2005, and again in February 2006, were used to attract media attention. Progressive internet media outlets such as OhMyNews and The Village Voice (Minjung-e Sori) devoted extensive coverage to the Pyeongtaek anti-base movement on their webpage. Hankyoreh, a major progressive-leaning daily

55 The loss of resident support in early 2007 was a major blow to KCPT. KCPT had to reformulate their entire campaign after villagers signed an agreement with the government in January 2007 to relocate by April 2007.
also provided frequent, favorable coverage. *Hankyoreh 21*, the weekly magazine produced by the same media company devoted a section each week to Daechuri residents and KCPT’s campaign. Daechuri residents and KCPT activists appeared on the cover story three times. Acknowledging their struggle, the editors even chose Daechuri residents as “people of the year” for their final 2006 cover story.

**The Security Consensus and State-Society Relations**

The preceding section suggests initial successful mobilization on the part of KCPT. How, then, did the South Korean government respond to anti-base mobilization? Examining the interaction between KCPT activists and the national government helps explain how the security consensus shaped the state’s response to anti-base pressure, and reveals why anti-base movements were engaged in what would ultimately become a losing battle. Aside from the lack of faith in the government’s ability to address KCPT’s immediate concerns, activists had very few influential elites to turn to who would promote their agenda inside the halls of government. Unlike the ATM movement in the Philippines, KCPT had very few elite “insiders” aiding them in the anti-base campaign. The few elites who were sympathetic to the movement, or at least in agreement with KCPT in opposing the enlargement of Camp Humphreys for USFK transformation, were found in the National Assembly.

**Minimal Elite Support**

Several representatives within the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) and the ruling Uri Party offered their support to KCPT, and tried to raise the relocation issue within the National Assembly. The two National Assembly members most actively supporting KCPT’s struggle were Uri Party member Lim Jong-In, and DLP floor leader and Unification and Foreign Affairs subcommittee member Kwon Young-Gil.

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56 The lack of elite access was another reason why KCPT’s efforts focused more indirectly on the mass public, rather than spending resources on a strategy which directly targeted the government.
Representative Lim was by far the most active politician, meeting regularly with residents and activists, and organizing public forums bringing together activists and MND officials to promote dialogue.\(^57\) Lim also addressed the base relocation issue and plight of Daechuri residents to other National Assembly members and government officials in hopes of convincing the National Assembly to reopen a hearing regarding the base relocation project to Pyeongtaek. Lim made clear to the public that the entire base relocation process was conducted without the input of Daechuri residents who were now being forcefully evicted. In addition to Lim, after the May 2006 clash between protestors and police, six Uri Party National Assembly members stepped forward with a public statement calling the government to hold discussions with both NGOs and Daechuri residents. The Uri Party representatives made three specific demands on the government: To stop using strong-arm tactics against civic groups and residents; to release those students and activists arrested during the May 5 clash; and to withdraw all riot police and military soldiers occupying the expanded base land area which were dispatched to Daechuri since early May 2006.\(^58\)

DLP floor leader Kwon Young-Gil, who played an active role in the 2000 Maehyangri anti-base movement, also expressed his support for KCPT and Daechuri residents. In the December 2004 subcommittee meeting concerning Yongsan’s relocation, Kwon repeatedly questioned the deputy MOFAT minister over the necessity of such a costly transfer. He criticized the government’s lack of transparency in outlining the underlying motives and costs of base relocation which were negotiated

\(^{57}\) Representative Lim’s office sponsored a public forum in October 2005, and an open dialogue between Daechuri residents and MND officials on November 3, 2005.

\(^{58}\) National Assembly press conference public statement. “\textit{Pyeongtaek mi-goon gijee hwak-jang gal-deung hae-gyu-eul eul-han woori-ee ip-jang}” (Our view on the resolution of the conflict over the expansion of Pyeongtaek base). May 16, 2006. Available from bulletin on Representative Lim’s homepage. \url{http://www.wedrea.or.kr} [last accessed May 20, 2006]. The six representatives were Woo Won-Sik, Yoo Seung-Hui, Lee In-Young, Lim Jong-In, Jung Chung-Rae, and Choy Jae-Chun.
between Seoul and Washington. Kwon also met with Father Mun on several occasions to assess the situation in Pyeongtaek and lend moral support to KCPT. Kwon, and his DLP colleagues Chun Young-sae and Dan Byung-Ho even made personal visits to Daechuri in a show of solidarity with activists and residents. DLP members were especially critical of Defense Minister Yoon Kwang-Woong, stating they would call for his resignation in the Assembly. They also reprimanded President Roh and Prime Minister Han in their negligent handling of the base relocation issue.

Yet the handful of National Assembly members sympathetic to KCPT’s cause had very little power to persuade their fellow representatives on the Pyeongtaek issue. The small faction in the Uri Party and the few DLP members calling for a reexamination of the base relocation project in May 2006 were a minority voice in the Assembly. Moreover, the National Assembly as a whole did not carry the same clout in base politics as the Philippine Senate. Most of this power was held in the National Security Council, or bureaucracies such as the MND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), institutions where anti-base activists had few allies and little access. The leverage the bureaucracies held over the National Assembly can be seen again in the December 7, 2004 Unification and Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearings. In an exchange between Deputy MOFAT Minister Choi Young-Jin and Representative Kwon Young-Kil, Kwon repeatedly demanded the release of FOTA

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61 In the early half of President Roh’s tenure, foreign policy decision-making power rested with the National Security Council rather than MOFAT. Inside the NSC, the more pro-U.S. “alliance faction” prevailed over the “independence faction,” advising the President to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance through specific policy measures such as USFK relocation to Pyeongtaek and the expansion of Camp Humphreys. I thank Kim Sung-Han and J.J. Suh for pointing this out.
62 In the Philippines, anti-base activists had the sympathy of bureaucrats, such as Alfredo Bengzon, vice-chairman of the Philippine base negotiating panel, and an unnamed DFA official who leaked a draft copy of the Treaty to ATM activists.
transcripts to examine the details outlining the motives behind Yongsan Garrison’s relocation to Pyeongtaek. However, Deputy Minister Choi sidestepped the issue. Choi claimed that even if documents were declassified, there was no guarantee Assembly members would receive access to the transcripts.63 Without pushing the issue any further, subcommittee members acquiesced to the MOFAT deputy minister’s plea to quickly approve the base relocation bill. The bill passed in a 14-1 vote in favor of base relocation.

Without the ability to form ties with influential elites on base issues, anti-base activists were unable to penetrate the state. Ultimately, anti-base activists’ efforts were thwarted because of the perpetuating security consensus held among political elites, particularly those within the foreign policy establishment. Anti-base movement leaders who were more open to dialogue with government officials also noted this obstacle. KCPT policy steering committee chair Yoo Young-Jae stated, “We’ve talked with several politicians and scholars, and we feel that a big problem is that regarding U.S. power, they (Korean elites) have a fear, or seem defeatist, and are unable to break free from that mentality. That’s the biggest problem. On the other hand, the nation as a whole wants to move past (that mentality).”64 Activist-scholar Jung Wook-Shik observes that South Korean political elites either blindly acquiesce to the demands of their patron, or because of fears of abandonment, dare not pursue policies which counter U.S. policy preferences.65 Even within the National Assembly, the voting record of National Assembly members on USFK base relocation indicates how political elites continued to support security policies in line with the security

64 Interview with Yoo Young-Jae, Seoul, South Korea. August 22, 2005.
consensus. Voting on December 9, 2004, 145 representatives voted in favor of base relocation while only 27 opposed.\(^66\)

**Government Response**

Given the moderate security consensus regarding U.S.-ROK security relations, the Roh Administration had to walk a fine line in responding to anti-base pressure while also managing its alliance relations with the U.S. For South Korea, the agreement signed with the United States approving Yongsan’s relocation and the consolidation of the 2\(^{nd}\) Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek was an “inevitable process” needed to “strengthen the U.S.-South Korean alliance and deter war from [breaking out] on the Peninsula.”\(^67\) The MND noted that extensive delays in the relocation project caused by activists would result in a breach in diplomatic trust with Washington. Several other security experts referred to the signed 2004 base relocation agreement as a “promise” to the United States, sealed by the National Assembly’s ratification.\(^68\) President Roh also recognized the potential for further deterioration in the alliance if the Korean government failed to fulfill its end of the bargain on base relocation.\(^69\)

At the same time, the South Korean government needed to be careful not to attract negative publicity.\(^70\) Using force could potentially inflame anti-American sentiment and strengthen support for KCPT. A Pyeongtaek city official working with

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\(^{68}\) Ibid. Also see comments by KIDA analyst Cha Doo-Hyun in KBS Simya Toron transcript. June 8, 2006

\(^{69}\) Interview with General Cha Young-Koo. Seoul, South Korea. December 19, 2005. Cha was the Director for Policy Planning in the MND, and a key player in the FOTA negotiations with the U.S.

\(^{70}\) This was particularly true for the MND, which was managing the technical aspects behind base relocation project.
the MND and USFK on the relocation project quotes, “The MND is acting very cautiously regarding forced eviction of residents because the residents are connected to anti-American movements. Evicting residents isn’t that big of an issue. It happens. But if residents are forced out, the MND is worried that the anti-American voice will become stronger or face negative reaction from the public.” How, then, did the South Korean state respond to civil societal pressure while maintaining its alliance obligations to the U.S.? Influenced by a moderate pro-U.S. security consensus, and the belief that the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance rested with base relocation and expansion in Pyeongtaek, the government outmaneuvered KCPT and Daechuri residents by employing strategies of delay, co-optation, and coercion.

In a twist of irony, the South Korean government ignored and isolated KCPT by focusing on the local residents. The MND made a sharp distinction between activists and residents, constantly referring to KCPT as “outside forces” (woebu saeryuk) engaged in a political struggle. More than concern for the rights of local residents or the national interest, the MND claimed that KCPT was more interested in promoting its own political agenda such as USFK withdrawal. In a briefing report, the MND stated, “Last May, external forces [KCPT activists] began residing in Pyeongtaek and joined forces with residents opposed to relocation. But rather than discuss compensation or other livelihood issues, they [KCPT] were opposed to base relocation all together making dialogue [with residents] difficult.” In a follow up press briefing by Defense Minister Yoon, the MND accused anti-base movements of

making unrealistic proposals. Yoon also blamed KCPT for creating an impasse in negotiations between the MND and local residents.\footnote{KCPT and the Residents’ Committee were skeptical of the MND’s willingness to negotiate. The government claimed it held at least forty-five meetings with both pro and anti-base residents, and 150 formal and informal consultations. Activists, however, stated that the government met the anti-base faction only once for any real dialogue. See MND Press Briefing. May 3, 2006; KBS \textit{Sima Toron} Transcript, June 9, 2006.} The MND claimed that KCPT had discouraged residents from taking the government’s compensation, and instead, encouraged them to demand a re-evaluation of the entire base relocation project.\footnote{Special Statement Prepared by the MND Minister of Defense, Yoon Kwon-Woong. May 4, 2006.}

After KCPT’s first major protest in July 2005, the MND decided to hold further discussions with activists and Daechuri residents, hoping residents would sell their land voluntarily if given greater compensation. However, for the remaining residents, the issue was not about compensation, but about democratic principles and their livelihood as farmers. With residents and activists refusing to leave, the MND announced it would conclude the eminent domain process in mid-December and acquire the remaining 20\% of base expansion land.\footnote{To the consternation of KCPT, the court ruling on eminent domain actually completed a month early on November 23, 2005. See Kim Do-Gyum. “Handal ab-dang-guyjin jae-fyal jeol-cha” [Ruling process pushed forward one month]. \textit{Minjung-ee Sori}. November 22, 2003.} By January 2006, the MND had legally purchased all the land, despite residents and activists still residing in the village.

The government certainly had the power to expel residents and activists by this period. The MND, however, decided to wait until spring to forcibly remove KCPT activists and residents. As activists and Pyeongtaek city officials cited, the Korean government was not likely to “throw out grandmothers in the dead of winter.”\footnote{Interview with Peace Wind activist. KCPT headquarters. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, December 12, 2005. Interview with Pyeongtaek City official, Office of ROK-US Relations. Pyeongtaek City Hall. Pyeongtaek, South Korea. February 9, 2005.} At this stage, the South Korean government was willing to delay base expansion rather than risk a violent confrontation.\footnote{Activists hoped to delay the government long enough, either until another hearing opened regarding base relocation in the National Assembly, or until USFK altered its expansion plans to allow Daechuri residents to keep their land. From KCPT’s perspective, delaying the eminent domain process enabled
In February 2006, USFK relayed to the MND that the South Korean government needed to push ahead with the land acquisition, declaring “time was not unlimited.”79 Originally, USFK had expected the land to be transferred to them by December 31, 2005. However, the MND explained to USFK its situation with anti-base resistance, and agreed to transfer the base land by the end of February. Of particular concern for USFK was Congressional funding for base relocation and USFK transformation. At the time, USFK believed that land transfer needed to be completed prior to USFK Commander Burwell Bell’s report to Congress on March 7. General Bell was expected to provide an assessment and update on military strategy and operational requirements in review of the Defense Authorization Request for fiscal year 2007. As one U.S. military official explained, USFK feared the Appropriations Committee would not provide all the funds necessary to push ahead with USFK relocation if General Bell informed Congress that the expansion land had still not been entirely secured.80 The same USFK official continued that the MND was in a difficult position “trying to find a neutral ground, mediating between its citizens and its security strategy.”81 The above statements suggest that the MND was dragging its foot on the base relocation issue. To maintain the alliance and push ahead with the transformation project, USFK expressed to the MND that Seoul needed to follow through and “make good on its part in a timely fashion.” At the time though, USFK understood the situation faced by the MND, and was not heavily pressuring Seoul to speed up the land transfer.82

79 Interview with USFK officials. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, February 3, 2006.
80 Interview with USFK officials. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, February 3, 2006.
81 Interview with USFK officials. Pyeongtaek, South Korea, February 3, 2006.
82 By January 2007, however, General Bell was publicly expressing his displeasure with the delay. His remarks prompted Foreign Minister Song Min-Soon to reassure the U.S. that base relocation would “proceed as agreed.” See Jin Dae-Woong. “Seoul reassures U.S. on base relocation.” Korea Herald. January 11, 2007.
However, by April 2006, the MND had shifted from its tactic of delay and foot-dragging to one of resolution and force. At this point, it becomes clear how the security consensus influenced the government’s response to anti-base protestors, shaping the ensuing policy outcome. One month earlier, MND workers were sent to Daechuri to dig a trench and erect barbed wire around the expanded base area to prevent residents from continuing their farming. However, MND workers aborted their plan as several hundred protestors set fire to fields and physically took over two of the backhoe tractors used to dig trenches.83 Thus in early April 2006, Defense Minister Yoon stated, “The delay in base relocation is coming close to a point where it may create a diplomatic row with the United States. Therefore, from here on out, we will strengthen our possession over the designated base land.”84 The following day, the MND posted an article on its website titled, “Delay in Pyeongtaek base relocation may ignite into a diplomatic problem.” The article outlined reasons why the process was being delayed and its impact on the national interest.85 A few days earlier on April 8, the MND had sent 750 workers accompanied by approximately 5,000 riot police to begin filling in the farmers’ rice irrigation system with concrete. The MND blocked the irrigation canals to prevent residents’ attempts to continue farming. Protestors fought with riot police and prevented workers from destroying two canals, but workers managed to fill in at least one canal with concrete.86

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85 Ibid.
Even after these measures, activists and residents continued to cut through barbed wire and plant rice crops. The concrete the MND used to fill the irrigation canals were also smashed by activists, allowing water to flow again onto the farmland. The MND offered direct negotiations on May 1, but after key leaders such as Kim Jitae of the village Resident’s Committee boycotted talks with the MND, Korean officials hinted they would abandon negotiations and secure the land by force. Sensing the gravity of the situation, Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook called an emergency meeting to resolve the stalemate. Han urged the MND and police to look for peaceful means of resolving the dispute, and concluded the meeting with an agreement between residents and MND officials to settle the issue through dialogue.87

After agreeing to dialogue, however, the MND instead went on the offensive and launched a national media campaign on May 3. The MND announced it would dispatch thousands of riot police and ROK soldiers into Daechuri village. Fearing potential public backlash by sending ROK troops (accompanied by riot police) to establish a barbed wire perimeter around the base expansion area, the MND preempted KCPT in the national media. In a special press conference, Minister Yoon explained the current situation of the base relocation project, the reasons why riot police needed to be dispatched, and the exact nature of work ROK soldiers would be undertaking in Daechuri. Minister Yoon made clear that soldiers would be unarmed. ROK soldiers’ duties were limited to erecting barbed wire around the perimeter of the expanded base land. In his briefing to the nation, Yoon outlined the history of the Yongsan relocation project and the purpose of base expansion. He then described how the MND consulted the residents numerous times about the importance and inevitability of the base relocation project. The MND was portrayed as reasonable and


willing to continue dialogue with residents. In contrast, the government framed KCPT as irresponsible radicals bent on inciting residents for their own political purposes. The MND added that the delay in base relocation caused by KCPT “outsiders” were costing South Korean taxpayers millions of dollars.

Preparing the nation for potential violence, on May 4, the MND in a show of force sent 2,800 engineering and infantry troops to dig trenches and set up 29 km of barbed wire two meters in depth to prevent activists from entering the expanded base land. These troops were accompanied by 12,000 riot police. As soldiers and riot police entered Daechuri before dawn on May 4, KCPT activists in Daechuri quickly alerted their members through e-mail and telephone, mobilizing about 1,000 activists, mostly students, labor union members, farmers, and peace activists. 88 About 200 students linked arms and lay flat inside Daechuri Elementary School, the makeshift headquarters of KCPT. As morning approached, riot police physically removed hundreds of activists and students barricading themselves inside KCPT headquarters and bulldozed the building. As soldiers were setting up the barbed wire fence, several activists managed to break through the perimeter and began beating unprotected soldiers with bamboo poles. About 120 police, soldiers, and protesters were injured and 524 students and activists were detained in the two day fiasco. 89 Of those detained, no Daechuri residents were taken into custody. The MND used this information to support their claim that the conflict stemmed from the “outside forces” of KCPT rather than local residents.

The violence in Pyeongtaek, instigated primarily by student activists who were not necessarily KCPT members, created a devastating blow to the anti-base movement. The MND and conservative mainstream media capitalized on the violence, claiming how activists had beaten unprotected soldiers who were merely engaged in manual labor.90 Consequently, the general public held anti-base and anti-American activists responsible for the violence in Pyeongtaek. Public opinion polls released by the Prime Minister’s office indicated that 81.4% of Koreans were against the protestors’ use of violence, and 65.8% opposed NGO and civic group involvement in the relocation issue.91 Moreover, rifts within the anti-base movement began to widen as more moderate civic groups and NGOs began distancing themselves from the radical core of KCPT.92

With its remaining resources, KCPT attempted to mobilize one last major stand. The coalition group organized a candlelight vigil in Seoul on May 13, and a protest in Pyeongtaek on May 14 to denounce the stationing of 8,000 riot police in Daechuri, and the violence “sanctioned” by government forces the previous week. Again, in a display of power and resolve, the government sent 18,000 riot police to Daechuri. To prevent any activists from entering Daechuri, the government blocked off all roads into the village, establishing four different checkpoints. With the exception of Daechuri residents, government officials, and mainstream media, nobody was allowed to enter the village. As one resident lamented, the entire village had been

put under *de facto* martial law. Unable to enter the village, the 5,000 activists who came in support of KCPT and Daechuri residents ended up protesting either at the train station, or in a village adjacent to Daechuri. Aside from a few scuffles, the protest in general remained peaceful. The government managed to subdue KCPT, both physically and mentally, and cut KCPT off from any national support the activists desperately sought.

After the May 4-5 incident, the office of the Blue House and Prime Minister stepped forward in response to the violent clashes and the delay in the relocation process. The Blue House issued a statement after the clash, reaffirming its support for USFK base relocation and expansion. Noting that the eviction of residents was inevitable, the Blue House stated, “Hereafter, the base relocation project must progress without any more setbacks to avoid further losses to the national interest.”

Presidential spokesman Jung Tae-Ho also made similar statements, again citing the delay’s diplomatic and economic costs and the importance of base relocation for the U.S.-ROK alliance.

Fearing another clash between police and protestors, Prime Minister Han Myeong-Sook, herself a former activist, issued a much anticipated public statement in a live national broadcast. In her televised speech, she expressed regret and sadness for the previous weeks’ violence, and sympathy and concern for residents forced to relocate. Her message implored activists to use restraint, and to express differences in

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93 Not even public transportation was allowed to enter the village. I walked 8km and, to the bewilderment of activists, through all four checkpoints to enter the village that day. I was allowed through the first three checkpoints with a U.S. passport, and only allowed through the final checkpoint after showing a government-level visa and reasoning with the police I was conducting research under U.S. State Department funding (Fulbright). Ironically, the peace activist “guarding” the entrance to the village also requested identification, and it was not until I contacted Father Mun that I was given clearance into the village.


opinions in a legitimate and peaceful manner. However, taking the same position as the MND and Blue House, Prime Minister Han reiterated the importance of the base relocation project in maintaining positive bilateral relations with the United States. Prime Minister Han declared, “Fellow citizens, as you know well, from the Korean War up until today, our alliance with the United States has been the basis of our national security, national defense, and economic development. The firm preservation of the ROK-U.S. alliance is necessary for our society and country’s stability and development.”96 Emanating from the prime minister’s office rather than the MND or MOFAT, the statement signified the seriousness of the South Korean government in pushing ahead with base relocation. Table 6.2 below summarizes KCPT’s activities and the unfolding conflict with the government which eventually lead to KCPT’s decline.

Table 6.2.: Chronology of Events in the Pyeongtaek Anti-Base Movement

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 Oct</td>
<td>Local Pyeongtaek Movement to Stop Base Expansion organized</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003 April</td>
<td>US and ROK announce Land Partnership Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Paengsong Resident’s Action Committee to Stop Base Expansion organized</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004 July</td>
<td>FOTA talks between ROK and U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Ratification of Yongsan relocation plans by National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 March</td>
<td>Pan--South Korean Solution Committee Against Base Extension in Pyeongtaek organized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10</td>
<td>First major rally with 10,000 protestors held outside Camp Humphreys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 23</td>
<td>MND legally acquires remaining base expansion land held by residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 March 15</td>
<td>MND enters Daechuri village to conduct surveys for base construction on farmland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8</td>
<td>MND fills in irrigation canals. Protestors and riot police clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 4-5</td>
<td>MND enters Daechuri to fence of base expansion land and destroy activist headquarters at Daechuri elementary school; Violent clashes between police/military.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 12</td>
<td>Prime Minister Han Myeong-sook makes formal statement calling for peaceful dialogue between activists and the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14-15</td>
<td>Major protests in Seoul and Pyeongtaek. 18,000 riot police block activists from entering Daechuri. No violent clashes reported. Thousands of riot police remain in Pyeongtaek to prevent further breaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5</td>
<td>Daechuri village chief and KCPT leader Kim Ji-tae turns himself in to authorities. Kim is subsequently arrested and not released until December 28.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5-11</td>
<td>Protestors take part in a peace march from the Blue House (in Seoul) to Pyeongtaek.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 8</td>
<td>MND adds 2.8km of barbed wire to secure land not fenced in May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 Feb 13</td>
<td>After 12 rounds of negotiation, Daechuri residents reach agreement with South Korean government to take government compensation and relocate by end of March.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 9</td>
<td>Residents leave Daechuri. KCPT continues campaign in a new direction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Denouement**

The Pyeongtaek issue carried the attention of the national media for the next month. The prime minister also met with activist leaders in mid-May to discuss peaceful resolutions to the Pyeongtaek issue. Other than agreeing to restraint and non-violence, however, the core differences between the government and activists remained the same. On June 5, Kim Jitae, Daechuri village head and chair of the Residents' Committee, turned himself in to local authorities as a condition for resuming talks between residents and the South Korean government. The government wanted to question Kim regarding his alleged role in fomenting illegal protests.
Rather than releasing him after questioning, however, Kim was arrested and placed in prison until December 28. Kim’s arrest dealt an incredible moral blow to the local residents. Although anti-base protests continued, by June 2006, various umbrella coalition groups, particularly the labor and farmers’ groups, had shifted almost entirely away from the anti-base movement to prepare for protests against the upcoming U.S.-South Korea FTA negotiations.

The government again sent around 15,000 riot police on September 13 to destroy empty homes where activists and the handful of residents were residing. In October 2006, workers began leveling the land for construction as the government continued negotiating with the residents. The South Korean government and Daechuri residents finally signed an agreement on February 13, 2007, with the residents agreeing to move out by March 31 to nearby Paengseong Nowhari. With the village residents’ decision made independently from KCPT, KCPT put forth a statement stating they would respect the agreement. However, the anti-base struggle which had focused on Daechuri up to this point now needed a new direction.

The Pyeongtaek episode demonstrates the constraining role of the security consensus for South Korean anti-base movements in the politics of overseas military bases. The security consensus held by host state elites created a situation where the South Korean government needed to balance between its alliance obligations to the U.S. while staving off domestic pressure from anti-base movements. Responding to this dilemma, the South Korean government chose to drag its feet and temporarily


delay the process of base expansion while co-opting local residents. However, foot-dragging for an extended period also raised diplomatic costs with the U.S. Given the initial USFK transformation timeline to relocate Yongsan Garrison and the 2nd Infantry Division to Camp Humphreys by 2008, the South Korean government did not want to jeopardize its alliance relations with the U.S.\(^9\) Thus the MND shifted tactics in April 2006. The MND used overwhelming power to block off protestors from the designated base expansion land, and co-opted local residents while isolating national civic groups. Meanwhile, the use of radical tactics, which were effective in Maehyangri, backfired for KCPT. The MND’s media campaign launched against anti-base movements after violent clashes on May 4-5, and their strategic efforts to isolate activists by only negotiating with residents, ultimately led to the devolution of the movement.

**Conclusion**

None of the three anti-base movement episodes covered in this chapter resulted in major policy changes. Working under the constraints of a moderate elite security consensus, South Korean anti-base movements were relatively limited in their efforts to institute change in basing policy outcomes. Even though South Korean elites experienced some disagreement over U.S. alliance-related policies, for the most part, the foreign policy and national security establishment continued to value the alliance and U.S. military presence. A moderate consensus persisted, in part because the consensus had become embedded within domestic institutions and ideologies favoring close security ties to the U.S.

The security consensus framework remains limited, however, in helping us understand subtle variation in outcomes among different South Korean anti-base movement episodes. Under conditions of moderate security consensus, two episodes

\(^9\) Base relocation has now been pushed back to 2012.
ended in partial concessions, while one ended in the status quo. To account for the status quo outcome in Pyeongtaek, and the subtle differences in mechanisms leading to partial concessions in the SOFA revision and Maehyangri episodes, I examined additional factors and political opportunities within each movement episode.

As this chapter demonstrates, the ability to disaggregate below the level of state and incorporate social movement analysis allows us to examine processes and mechanisms not captured by traditional approaches to international relations. The three anti-base movement episodes presented in this chapter were all initially successful in forming a broad-based coalition, attracting large numbers, and drawing national media attention. However, internal movement dynamics and external circumstances varied across movements as episodes unfolded. For instance, in Maehyangri, tactics such as illegally breaching into a USFK firing range to disrupt training exercises, effectively pressured Seoul and Washington to consider some form of concessions. On the other hand, similar radical tactics in Pyeongtaek resulted in violence, generating negative publicity for activists and revealing further divisions within the movement. Furthermore, failure to proceed with base expansion at Camp Humphreys entailed extremely high security costs for the South Korean government. Hence, the South Korean government appeared much more resolute in the Pyeongtaek case, using coercive tactics to dismantle anti-base opposition.
CHAPTER 7
ALLIANCE RELATIONS AND THE SECURITY CONSENSUS ACROSS TIME

The preceding chapters demonstrated how alliance relations and the degree of security consensus influenced basing policy outcomes by shaping the patterns of interaction between the host government, anti-base movements, and the U.S. Process tracing events in a single movement episode, the case examples provided a “snapshot” of anti-base movements in the Philippines, Japan, Italy, Ecuador, and South Korea. By restricting the analysis to a limited time frame, the concept of security consensus remained “fixed.”

What happens when the security consensus changes over time? For instance, how would increasing security ties between the Philippines and the U.S. in their fight against terrorism impact protests against U.S. military presence in the Southern Philippines? What if Japanese leaders, fearing alliance entanglement, decided to pursue a more independent security policy and abandon its current alliance relationship with the U.S.? Would host governments react differently against anti-base movements? Would activists in these countries find greater success under conditions of a weakened security consensus? Conversely, would social movements find it much more difficult to influence basing policies if key elites coalesced more tightly around a security policy centered on the U.S.? Addressing these questions, this chapter examines variation in the security consensus across time.

Shifting the analysis from single movement episodes to a diachronic analysis is important on two accounts. First, examining episodes across different time periods allows us to test the robustness of the theory by adding within case comparisons. Shifts in the security consensus should lead to different configurations of state-societal
interaction, thus producing different policy outcomes over time. Second, a diachronic analysis provides more leverage on the predictive power of my argument. For example, under conditions of a weakened security consensus, we expect greater movement success as patterns of interaction between activists and security policymakers move from confrontation to greater cooperation. Conversely, even with a spike in anti-base movement opposition, base policies should remain unchanged if host nation political elites continue to accept the U.S. alliance and U.S. bases as part of its greater national interest.

This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one begins by presenting a brief “theory of security consensus.” To account for change in the elite consensus over time, the concept is treated as a dependent variable. I raise two relevant questions: what are the micro-foundations of the security consensus, and how does it change over time? After accounting for change, part two treats the security consensus as the independent variable as in previous chapters. Applying the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, I explore how variation over time in the security consensus alters movement and government strategies, hence leading to different policy outcomes. I use the Philippines and Japan/Okinawa in a paired comparison to demonstrate why the prospects for Philippine anti-base movement effectiveness decreased over time, but remained fairly constant in Okinawa. In the conclusion, I discuss the possibility of increased effectiveness for South Korean anti-base movements.

A Theory of Security Consensus

Elite perceptions of national security and their understanding of the U.S. alliance do not change overnight. As discussed in Chapter 1, institutional and ideational factors underlying the security consensus gives the concept an inherent stickiness. Nevertheless, elite perceptions and beliefs about national security, and more specifically bilateral security alliances and U.S. bases, are mutable. What
factors result in shifts in the security consensus? Specifically, what exogenous or endogenous changes alter political elites’ perceptions and beliefs of the U.S. security alliance?

In Chapter 1, I argued that external threat perceptions bear significant weight in the formation and persistence of the elite consensus. In addition to material capabilities, threat perceptions are informed by domestic and ideational variables such as identity, ideology, and historical legacies. This suggests that ideational factors indirectly shape the security consensus via threat perceptions. However, factors such as historical legacies, beliefs, ideology, and domestic institutions may also directly feed into and reinforce the security consensus. Hence, a shift in any one or combination of these factors could potentially lead to shifts in the security consensus. Figure 7.1 below illustrates several factors which help form and perpetuate an elite consensus supporting the U.S. alliance and U.S. bases.

![Diagram of factors leading to the security consensus](image)

**Figure 7.1: Sub-factors leading to the security consensus**

*Continuity*

While the security consensus may shift for numerous reasons, a change in one particular variable does not necessarily produce change on the outcome variable. The
security consensus does not shift easily for two reasons. First, the three sub-variables which provide depth to the security consensus - institutions, historical legacy, and ideology/identity - are themselves not easily mutable. For instance, historical legacies do not easily fade, even if they are reinterpreted over time, or their impact mitigated through generational change. As an example, Chinese leaders continue to invoke the hundred years of humiliation instigated by Western imperialism. The legacy of Nazi fascism also profoundly shapes how German political elites think about security policy and foreign affairs.\(^1\) Thus historical legacies and collective memory continue to shape the worldview of foreign policy elites and their interactions with the outside world.

Likewise, institutions, embedded in well-known beliefs and practices, do not easily change. The path dependent logic of institutions enables policy continuity, even when elites are confronted with environmental change.\(^2\) Of course, if we acknowledge that institutions are placed within “concrete temporal processes,” as argued by historical institutionalists, change is plausible.\(^3\) However, this implies a slow evolutionary process rather than sudden transformation.

Second, because the security consensus hinges on collective perceptions and ideas, a consensus, by definition, tends to be rigid. A shift in the consensus requires a shift in ideas, beliefs, or perceptions of numerous individuals. If a large number of powerful elites all hold vested interests in maintaining the security consensus, one or two individuals transmitting alternative ideas will not easily shatter the existing order of beliefs. In short, the intersubjective nature of the security consensus provides the concept a degree of stability over time.

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\(^1\) Berger 1998.
If shared perceptions and collective beliefs are relatively “sticky,” what brings about change in the security consensus? I argued above that the variables which constitute the microfoundations of the security consensus are not easily mutable. But they do change. And like other ideational variables, the security consensus can shift over time. As suggested above, shifts often occur gradually. A change in external threat perceptions is the most obvious variable to examine when identifying shifts in the security consensus. As indicated in Figure 7.1, elite attitudes and beliefs about bilateral alliances are likely to shift with changes in threat perceptions. This logic is supported by the correlation between threat perceptions and alliance durability found in the quantitative alliance literature. Change in threat perceptions may itself be triggered by changes in the structural environment and shifts in the balance of power. For example, growing U.S. military and economic superiority over the Soviet Union by the mid-1980s corresponded with shifts in beliefs and attitudes about the Soviet threat. Germany’s rapid rise at the turn of the century also heightened British threat perceptions. Faced with the German challenge to British naval superiority, British leaders warmed to the idea of an alliance with France. Casting aside their colonial bickering, the two sides signed the Entente Cordiale in 1904.

Shifts in the elite consensus may also be produced by domestic and institutional change within the target state. Challenging structural accounts, Mark Haas argues that U.S. leaders’ beliefs about the Cold War corresponded closely with domestic-ideological and institutional changes within the Soviet Union. Thus U.S. policymakers’ belief that the Cold War had ended stemmed from their perception of

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Gorbachev’s reform and his commitment to political liberalism.\textsuperscript{5} Change within the system of internal political governance may also alter the relative strength of the security consensus among elites, and therefore elite attitudes towards alliance partners. For instance, regime change may bring leaders with a different set of beliefs and ideology into power. If ideology draws alliance partners together, regime change may potentially weaken (or strengthen) the security consensus among elites, leading to a new phase in alliance relations, or new alliance configurations all-together.\textsuperscript{6} Regime change may also facilitate institutional shifts, which alter elites’ understanding of national security and U.S. relations over time.

Although change is usually gradual, external shocks or major events, such as the collapse of the Cold War, or the terrorist attacks of 9-11, function as critical points leading to shifts in the consensus. These “shocks” may cause elites to recalibrate (or in extreme cases, fundamentally alter) their existing beliefs and perceptions about national security and the value of the U.S. alliance.\textsuperscript{7} For instance, Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Straits, or a successful North Korean nuclear test would likely strengthen the security consensus among host government elites in the Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{8} Other “shocks,” such as Korean reunification or Chinese democratization, on the other hand, would potentially weaken the security consensus with the reduced need of forward deployed bases in the region.

\textsuperscript{5} Haas 2007, p.146.
\textsuperscript{6} Leeds and Savun 2007, p.1121. The record here is mixed. Leeds and Savun (2007:1121) do find a correlation between regime change and alliance termination, whereas other scholars, such as Bennett (1997), do not.
\textsuperscript{7} Jeffrey Legro presents a more nuanced theory explaining how shocks lead to new thinking, or in this case, a shift in the security consensus. Applying Legro’s theory into my argument, if an external shock shatters the existing consensus, and elites are able to consolidate around an alternative idea, a new consensus emerges. See Legro 2007, p.14.
\textsuperscript{8} Shocks are more likely to produce conditions which immediately strengthen, rather than weaken the security consensus. On the other hand, the security consensus is more likely to weaken gradually rather than abruptly.
Security Consensus Across Time

Figures 7.2 and 7.3, below provide estimates of the general trend over time in the degree of security consensus, indicating an increase (or strengthening) in the Philippines, and relatively little change in Japan. These figures should be treated as notional trends, based on my own qualitative assessment of U.S.-host relations.9

Figure 7.2: Security consensus over time in the Philippines

Figure 7.3: Security consensus over time in Japan

9 The concept of the security consensus is not easily quantifiable. In the preceding chapters, I used primarily qualitative indicators within historical narratives to determine the strength (or weakness) of the security consensus at a given moment in time. The figures below are used only as heuristics to illustrate how the security consensus framework operates over time.
In the Philippines, rising Chinese territorial ambitions and the sudden upsurge of Communist and Muslim separatist movements in the late 1990s helped rally Philippine elites to renew security ties with the U.S. Increased threat perceptions helped forge a pro-U.S. alliance consensus, manifest in the return of U.S. military forces and the strengthening of bilateral security ties. Meanwhile, the consensus among Japanese elites, encased within domestic security norms and institutions, remained relatively constant up through the first decade of the millennium. External threats such as North Korea’s nuclear saber-rattling and China’s growing regional ambitions continue to prop an elite consensus favoring the U.S. alliance and the network of bases. However, in recent years, the Japanese polity has shown greater willingness to adjust its norms and institutions, most significantly the revision of Article 9. The long-term future of Japan’s elite security consensus is open for debate, but for now, it continues to remain relatively strong.

According to the security consensus framework, anti-base movements are most effective under conditions of weak security consensus. Therefore, I hypothesize that the probability of anti-base movement effectiveness, defined in terms of policy concessions from the government, is negatively correlated with the degree of security consensus. Movement effectiveness increases with the weakening of the security consensus, and decreases with its decline, ceteris paribus. Figures 7.4 and 7.5 provide a general trend of movement effectiveness across time.\textsuperscript{10} Of particular note is the Philippines. The security consensus framework suggests that the probability of anti-base movement effectiveness decreased over time as the elite security consensus

\textsuperscript{10} Of course, numerous factors internal to social movements, and other exogenous factors may also influence movement effectiveness. As with Figures 7.1 and 7.2, however, Figures 7.3 and 7.4 are used as a simplified heuristic to depict the relationship between the security consensus and social movement success. I do not naively suggest that only the security consensus matters in social movement outcomes. However, I do believe the security consensus bears much weight in an anti-base movement’s ability to win major policy concessions from the government.
increased in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, in the post-SACO period, Okinawan anti-base activists faced difficulty pushing forth their demands with protestors marginalized by Tokyo political elites.

**Figure 7.4:** Probability of anti-base movement effectiveness in the Philippines

**Figure 7.5:** Probability of anti-base movement effectiveness in Japan
Philippines

As argued in Chapter Two, Philippine elites were divided in their position over the future of U.S.-Philippine relations in 1991. Contributing to the lack of consensus was the popular belief that U.S. bases no longer played an important role for Philippine national security given the internal nature of security threats. Yet, by the end of the decade, the majority of Philippine political elites eagerly awaited the return of U.S. “visiting forces.” If elite discourse suggested a weak security consensus in the early 1990s, how did a consensus linking national security priorities with the U.S. alliance reemerge by the end of the decade? Why did Philippine elites, including several Senators who voted to oust the Americans in 1991, later come to embrace the return of U.S. forces and strengthened security ties?

Three related issues transpired in the decade after Subic Bay’s closure which helped solidify the importance of the U.S. security alliance. First, the heavy financial burden of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) modernization program sent Manila scouring for additional economic assistance. Second, the Philippines faced increasing threats to national security in the late 1990s. A greater sense of vulnerability triggered by Chinese adventurism in the Spratly Islands increased the salience of external threats in the Philippines. Additionally, the Philippines experienced an upsurge in internal insurgencies from Communists and Muslim separatist groups in the late 1990s. These two factors - increased threat perceptions and the demands of military modernization – catalyzed the revival of U.S.-Philippine security relations in the late 1990s. Lastly, if U.S.-Philippine relations had not warmed enough by the beginning of the 21st century, 9-11 and the global war on terror sealed the revitalized alliance by further consolidating elite support.

AFP Modernization

U.S.-Philippine relations hit an all time low after the Philippine Senate booted the Americans off the island. Snubbed by the Philippines, the U.S. downgraded its political and military relations with Manila. With the loss of the U.S. security umbrella, the Philippines needed to quickly modernize its military.\(^\text{12}\) To fill in the security void, the Philippine government passed the Philippine Modernization Act in February 1995. The military modernization program shifted more emphasis towards external defense with military hardware and weapons systems upgrades for the Philippine Navy and Air Force.\(^\text{13}\) After much wrangling in the Philippine Congress over the AFP’s proposed budget, the Philippine government passed the AFP Modernization Act (Republic Act 7898) in February 1995. The Act proposed 331.62 billion pesos (about $13.24 billion in 1996 dollars) over a fifteen year period for military modernization.

Even after the passage of Republic Act 7898, a new round of debate ensued about whether the Philippine economy could sustain such a hefty increase in military spending. Philippine legislators, concluding that the Philippine government would be unable to finance the modernization bill in its entirety, proposed a budget limit of 170 billion pesos. The Philippine Congress and the AFP finally reached a compromise, and divided the modernization program into two sub-programs. The appropriated budget would only cover sub-program 1, which would receive 164.55 billion pesos to develop the AFP’s core capabilities.\(^\text{14}\) Congress also set a ceiling of 50 billion pesos (about $2

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\(^\text{12}\) The 1951 U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty still remained in effect, however.


billion in 1996 dollars) for the first five years of the fifteen year program.\(^{15}\) Just as the AFP and Congress ironed out cost issues, the Asian Financial Crisis presented a new challenge to military modernization. The peso depreciated by nearly 40% against the U.S. dollar, requiring the Air Force and Navy to suspend several weapons orders such as fighter planes and offshore patrol vessels.\(^{16}\)

**Increased Threats**

Coincidentally, it was the conflict in the Spratly Islands with China which strengthened the Philippine government's resolve for military modernization. Tensions flared in February 1995 when the Chinese navy occupied Mischief Reef, territory in the Spratly Island group claimed by the Philippines. In response to the construction of an alleged military outpost,\(^{17}\) President Fidel Ramos dispatched warships and fighter jets to the area. The following month, the AFP seized several fishing boats, detaining sixty-two Chinese fishermen.\(^{18}\) Although both sides sought diplomatic solutions to resolve the conflict, the Philippines remained wary of Chinese intentions in the South Sea. Further sightings of Chinese naval vessels in the region, and the construction of a helicopter landing pad for the People’s Liberation Army in 1997, continued to fuel tension. Philippine policymakers now identified China as the primary, long-term security threat.\(^{19}\)

In addition to external threats posed by China, the Philippines faced an upsurge in several internal insurgencies in the late 1990s. Until at least 1995, the number of communist insurgents had been declining from a peak of 25,000 guerillas in 1988 to a

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\(^{17}\) China claimed the platforms were intended to provide shelter for fisherman.


low of 5,000 in 1995. The number of Muslim separatists had also declined sharply from approximately 26,000 fighters in 1987 to around 14,000 in 1991. However, this trend reversed in the mid-late 1990s. NPA numbers steadily increased, reaching to 11,930 members in 2001. The number of guerilla fronts also expanded from 58 in 1995 to 70 in 2000. Regarding Muslim separatist groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), increased their level of violence, engaging in full-blown combat against the AFP by the end of the decade. Although MILF numbers continued to increase, a new, Muslim separatist group, the Abu Sayyaf, posed an even greater security risk. Operating as a transnational network, the Abu Sayyaf successfully plotted several bombings and kidnappings in the Southern Philippines.

In light of rising external threats and heightened internal disorder, improved security ties to the U.S. suddenly looked appealing. To Philippine elites, the Mischief Reef incident signaled revisionist intentions behind China’s rise as a major regional power. If previously lost in impassioned debates against U.S. bases, Philippine elites now recognized the important balancing role served by U.S. military presence in Asia. A renewed defense commitment between the two countries acted as a hedging strategy against Chinese incursion into the Spratlys. Furthermore, Philippine counter-threats against China rang hollow given the dismal state of the Philippine military. Thus, strengthening security ties with the U.S. offered a quick resource boost to the underfinanced, poorly equipped AFP. U.S. military assistance could also be directed against the Communist and Muslim separatist insurgencies, freeing resources for AFP modernization.

21 Morrison 1997, p.98.
23 de Castro 2003, pp.977-78.
To revive the U.S.-Philippine security alliance, officials began negotiating an agreement in 1996 which would legally enable U.S. troops and ships to operate on Philippine territory. After two years of negotiations, Washington and Manila signed the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1998. Most immediately, the VFA guaranteed legal status to U.S. troops partaking in joint military exercises in the Philippines. In a mutually beneficial move, the VFA functioned as a means for Washington to help develop the AFP’s operational strategy and create joint operability between the two forces. The VFA also opened access to air and naval facilities in the Philippines, facilitating rapid deployment of U.S. troops in the event of a crisis. The Philippine Senate subsequently ratified the VFA in 1999. The agreement not only permitted U.S. troops to take part in large-scale training exercises such as the Balikitan exercises in early 2000, but arranged a new framework for AFP modernization.24

9-11 and the Global War on Terror

If events and circumstances in the late 1990s helped mend U.S.-Philippine relations, 9-11 provided the ideological glue. As the first Asian state to support the Bush Administration’s global war on terror, the Philippines immediately pledged to grant overflight rights and logistical support. In a State Department broadcast, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly praised the Philippines for its “early, principled, and unequivocal support to the international fight against terrorism.”25 A joint statement produced during President Arroyo’s November 2001 meeting with President Bush in Washington affirmed that both countries would “work on a vigorous, integrated plan to strengthen the Philippine security forces' capacity to

24 Ibid. p.979. Balikatan, translated as “shoulder-to-shoulder”, are annual joint exercises to improve combat planning, combat readiness, and interoperability in support of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. The exercises had been suspended since 1993, but resumed in 2000 with 2,500 U.S. troops.
combat terror and protect Philippine sovereignty.”

The joint statement continued by offering an integrated plan which would “include a robust training package, equipment needed for increased mobility, a maintenance program to enhance overall capabilities, specific targeted law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation, and a new bilateral defense consultative mechanism.”

Bush also pledged to promote a ten-fold increase in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to $19 million for fiscal year 2002, an additional $10 million in military goods and services to assist the AFP, and another $10 million to support counterterrorism and law enforcement assistance. Figure 7.6 below indicates the amount of U.S. economic and military assistance given to the Philippines from 1993 to 2006.

Figure 7.6: U.S. military and economic assistance to the Philippines

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
The two spikes beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000 roughly coincide with the onset of VFA negotiations and the war on terror, respectively.

Figure 7.7 provides a list of the number of publicly known joint military exercises between the U.S. military and the AFP, indicating the greater extent of military cooperation since the passage of the VFA.

![Figure 7.7: Number of joint military exercises between the U.S. military and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Source: Docena 2007, p. 54-56.](image)

In early 2002, 600 U.S. troops and special operation force members began training and conducting joint operations with the AFP to combat the Abu Sayyaf. After Afghanistan, the deployment to the southern Philippines marked the single largest deployment of U.S. forces in the war on terror since 9/11.²⁹ The impact of joint counter-terrorist efforts received widespread praise after Philippine forces, with the assistance of the U.S. military, killed top Abu Sayyaf leader Abu Sabaya in a firefight. Abu Sabaya had mastermind the kidnapping of dozens of foreigners, including an American missionary couple in 2001.

By 2003, the fight against terrorism had cemented alliance relations, adding a new level of depth to the security consensus. In the first official state visit of a U.S. President to Manila in over 30 years, President Bush and President Macapagal-Arroyo confirmed that “the U.S.-Philippine partnership (had) taken on new vitality and importance in the context of the global war on terrorism.” This echoed an earlier meeting in Washington when Bush reaffirmed U.S. commitment to support the Philippines in destroying terrorist networks. In a joint statement, both sides confirmed that “the U.S.-Philippine security partnership has never been healthier.”

The shift in elite attitudes favoring a stronger U.S.-Philippine alliance was not limited to just a few elites at the top. Unlike 1991, a widespread consensus existed both within the executive and legislative branches of government. This consensus was reflected in Manila’s response to civil societal opposition against the VFA. Although activists sustained numerous large, vocal protests against the VFA for over a year, very few elites were sympathetic to anti-VFA activist demands. Elites repeatedly stated that the VFA tied directly into the Philippine’s national interest. The strong consensus favoring ratification of the VFA, and hence a strengthened U.S.-Philippine alliance, made it difficult for activists to gain any real traction in the VFA debate.

Anti-VFA Protests

Anti-base activists did not disappear with the closure of U.S. bases in 1992. Groups instrumental to the movement, such as BAYAN and NFPC, continued their resistance against the U.S. military under new formations. For example, NFPC helped

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32 While the anti-VFA protest was not directed against U.S. military bases, the arguments used by activists were similar to those found in anti-base protests. The VFA related directly to U.S. military presence in the Philippines. Many activists also feared that the VFA would eventually lead to the return of permanent bases.
establish a new organization, the People’s Task Force for Bases Cleanup (PTFBC), to address environmental damages at Subic and Clark base. In November 1994, NFPC and other organizations such as the League of Filipino Students, Gabriela, and BAYAN organized a rally during Clinton’s visit to the Philippines to oppose the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA).\textsuperscript{33} Although President Fidel Ramos and Foreign Secretary Romulo favored ACSA, the Senate viewed the proposal suspiciously. Senator Tanada and Senator Mercado (now the chair of the Defense Committee), who had voted “no” to bases earlier, questioned how the Philippine government could permit foreign troops and facilities from entering the Philippines without a treaty covering legal arrangements.\textsuperscript{34} Proposals potentially suggesting the return of U.S. forces continued to evoke negative reactions among a significant number of elites. The Philippine government eventually rejected ACSA.\textsuperscript{35}

Anti-base (or anti-U.S. military) groups mobilized in a similar fashion against the VFA. Mobilization took place as early as 1996 when rumors first circulated about possible negotiations granting U.S. troops legal status on Philippine soil. The NFPC again played a pivotal role, initiating the anti-VFA movement with Free Legal Assistance of Government (FLAG). After Manila and Washington signed “VFA-1,”\textsuperscript{36} anti-VFA groups escalated their efforts as negotiations for “VFA-2” entered full-swing. Political, social, and religious groups, led by BAYAN, formed a broad

\textsuperscript{33} The proposed ACSA permitted the U.S. entry into Philippine ports to refuel and resupply ships. The U.S. could also spend up to $12 million dollars on supplies and parts. See Daniel Boone Schirmer. \textit{U.S. Bases by Another Name: ACSA in the Philippines}. Brooklyn, NY: Philippines Bases Network, 1995, p.7.

\textsuperscript{34} Schirmer 1997.

\textsuperscript{35} De Castro 2003, p.977.

\textsuperscript{36} “VFA 1” prescribes the legal status of U.S. troops in the Philippines. However, the Philippine government insisted that the VFA also address issues of reciprocity for Philippine defense and military officials visiting the U.S. Thus, the two sides added a counterpart agreement - “VFA 2” – which guaranteed Filipino military personnel visiting the U.S. the same legal rights prescribed to U.S. military personnel training in the Philippines. Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines. \textit{The Visiting Forces Agreement (A Primer)}, 1998, p.19.
coalition group known as “Junk VFA” to persuade the Senate not to ratify the VFA.\textsuperscript{37} Activists held anti-VFA rallies and protests nearly weekly as the date of Senate deliberations edged closer. Protests took place on July 13, 1998 as Philippine negotiators under the new Estrada Administration met their U.S. counterparts. Activists also planned a succession of protests near the U.S. Embassy to coincide with Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit on July 21. Defense Secretary William Cohen was given the same courtesy a month later when activists protested outside AFP Headquarters during his visit. In September, the Kilusan sa Pambansang Demokrasya (KPD) rallied outside the Senate building, and organized a caravan march from the former grounds of Clark Air Base to Subic Bay. The Junk VFA Movement sponsored two days of protests in Manila and several cities throughout the Philippines on September 15-16 to coincide with the date of the Senate’s rejection of U.S. bases in 1991.\textsuperscript{38} Protests continued throughout early 1999 as the Senate held VFA hearings. Charged as an affront to Philippine sovereignty, activists highlighted the adverse social and environmental impact of even “visiting” troops.\textsuperscript{39} Above all, activists feared that the VFA would eventually lead to the permanent stationing of U.S. troops and the return of permanent bases.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} NFPC Secretariat Cora Valdez-Fabros notes that a separate anti-VFA coalition, “No to VFA,” also formed due to ideological differences with members of Junk VFA. No to VFA was represented largely by the “rejectionist,” or RJ strand of the political left. The RJs splintered from the CPP in the early 1990s, rejecting the basic principles of Marxist–Leninist–Maoist thought. Of the two coalitions, the larger Junk VFA attracted significantly more publicity and media attention. Interview with Cora Valdez-Fabros. Quezon City, Philippines. March 6, 2005.

\textsuperscript{38} Although organizers expected a turn-out of 30,000, only 1,000 protestors arrived in Manila due to torrential rains. See Tonia Macapagal and Angie Rosales. “Rains fail to dampen rally protesting VFA.” The Manila Standard. September 17, 1998.

\textsuperscript{39} For a comprehensive list of reasons behind VFA opposition, see the “Arguments of Anti-VFA - De La Salle University Stand on VFA.” http://poligov.tripod.com/antivfa.html, [last accessed 3/10/08].

\textsuperscript{40} Interview with Herbert Docena. Quezon City, Philippines. March 13, 2006.
**State-Societal Interaction**

Similar to the base treaty in 1991, the VFA required ratification in the Philippine Senate. Before opening the VFA debate to the entire Senate, the VFA was sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the National Defense and Security Committee for their recommendation. Between January 26 and March 11, 1999, the Defense and the Foreign Relations Committees conducted six public hearings – three within the Senate, and three in different cities around the Philippines – inviting nearly one hundred experts to share their reaction to the VFA. To gather a wide range of opinions, particularly those opposed to the VFA, the Senate invited academics, lawyers, activists, NGO workers, and local officials.

Anti-VFA activists attempted to counter government claims which linked VFA ratification to the national interest. Targeting elites, Junk VFA members devised strategies nearly identical to those used in the Anti-Treaty Movement.\(^\text{41}\) However, activists found it nearly impossible to form ties with sympathetic elites as they had done only eight years earlier. Unlike 1991, Philippine elites in 1999 had a much different perception of national security and the U.S. alliance. In 1991, elites were divided in their attitude towards the U.S. alliance. Unable to justify the security logic behind U.S. bases, nationalist sentiments overpowered any justification to retain U.S. military presence.

By 1999, the tide had changed. Eighteen of the twenty-three Senators voted in favor of the VFA. In their deliberation speech, all eighteen pro-VFA Senators pointed to the security benefits accrued from the VFA and strengthened U.S. alliance relations. Senate President Blas Ople, initially reluctant in approving the VFA, quoted, “And because we remain a militarily weak nation, this security alliance with the United

\(^{41}\) Internal Junk VFA notes and documents. Copies obtained from personal collection of Corazon Fabros and NFPC Archives.
States remains a major anchor of our national safety, security, and freedom. How to give substance and effect to this treaty in a post-Cold War world that remains fraught with risks, is the very aim and purpose of the Visiting Forces Agreement. In a similar vein, Senator Franklin Drilon stated, “It will not be often that an opportunity to strengthen our capability to enforce our common interests with the United States will present itself. The VFA is one such opportunity we cannot afford to miss, for without the Visiting Forces Agreement, any thought of arming ourselves in defense of our interests or to deter aggression will be meaningless.”

To demonstrate the breadth and depth of the new founded security consensus among political elites, it is worth mentioning the shift in attitude of three members of the “Magnificent Twelve” who voted against U.S. bases in 1991: Joseph Estrada, Orlando Mercado, and Juan Ponce Enrile. Now as President and National Defense Secretary, respectively, former senators Estrada and Mercado strongly endorsed the VFA, imploring the Senate to pass the agreement as a matter of national interest. Defense Secretary Mercado argued that the VFA “should not be considered a document independent of the country’s national defense strategy…but considered within the context of a more comprehensive policy on national defense and security.” Both Estrada and Mercado’s “turnabout,” from their Senate days spurred the wrath of anti-VFA activists. Ironically, Senator Enrile, who eight years earlier

44 In addition to Senator Enrile, two other members of the Magnificent Twelve still served in the Philippine Senate: Aquilino Pimentel Jr. and Teofisto Guingona Jr. Both Senators voted against the VFA.
45 Senate Legislative Publications Staff 1999, p.227.
vehemently denied any external security threat justifying the need for U.S. bases, spent a substantial portion of his speech evoking the China threat. He quoted:

“China…has clearly and unequivocally initiated an aggressive move against our national interest and that we are far too weak militarily and economically today to provide ourselves with an adequate defense against such a clear and present danger to us without the assistance of our Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States of America; and so the need for the Visiting Forces Agreement to enable our military forces and those of the United States to work together.”

In almost direct contradiction to his speech in 1991, Enrile continued, “I am…constrained to admit that our defense alliance with the United States is probably the only viable security umbrella and certainly the only one we can count on today in the event of need.”

If most Senators appeared staunchly in favor of the VFA, the consensus held even tighter in the executive branch of government. The executive summary of the VFA focused on the Agreement’s “vital importance…to the continued potency of the Mutual Defense Treaty…and (its) effectiveness as a deterrent to a potential aggressor.” More concretely, the VFA “provide(d) the AFP with the opportunity to enhance its defense capabilities by taking part in U.S. military assistance and training program.” Joint military exercises with U.S. troops enabled the AFP to adopt new strategies and technologies. In other words, Philippine elites linked the VFA and strengthened security ties to the U.S. with AFP modernization. The VFA also minimized the cost of the AFP modernization program by improving external

47 Ibid., p.66.
48 Senate Legislative Publications Staff 1999, p.195.
49 Ibid, p.205.
50 Ibid, p. 205.
capabilities without expending exorbitant amounts on additional resources. During a public hearing, National Security Advisor Alexander Aguirre reminded the Senate that the country faced threats on two fronts, one internal, and one external, but remained hindered in its security response because of limited resources. Therefore, the U.S. alliance remained the best option to deter potential aggressors.\textsuperscript{51}

By the end of the decade, new external security threats and the sense of urgency felt by Philippine elites to modernize its military resulted in the reemergence of an elite security consensus. The consensus favored strengthened U.S. alliance relations and the return of “visiting” U.S. forces. Under this political environment, activist demands were drowned out by Philippine elites’ insistence on VFA ratification. Granted, mobilization against the VFA did not reach the magnitude of protests in 1991. Unity was hampered by the split within the Philippine left, which resulted in two different anti-VFA coalitions. Nevertheless, protests continued frequently for over a year as the Philippine public awaited the Senate’s verdict. Anti-VFA activists received the backing of several prominent Catholic leaders, including the outspoken moral leader of the EDSA revolution, Cardinal Jamie Sin. Yet, unable to penetrate the strong consensus and form ties with sympathetic Senators as in 1991, the anti-VFA movement failed to translate their demands into actual policy outcomes.\textsuperscript{52} Even if anti-VFA movements had reached levels of protest similar to those in 1991, the security consensus framework predicts that Philippine elites would have undermined activist mobilization.

Since 9-11, U.S. “visiting forces” have remained entrenched in the Philippines. In the post-9-11 period, even with countries rejecting U.S. military requests for access,

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid, p228
\textsuperscript{52} Public opinion regarding the VFA paralleled opinion of U.S. bases in the early 1990s with 36% against and 63% in favor of temporary visits of U.S. soldiers to participate in military exercises. See Social Weather Station Survey, question on VFA, 1998.
the Philippines has “repeatedly complied...explicitly endorsed ...and actively supported” U.S. military presence in the Philippines.\textsuperscript{53} The consensus, while reformulated by national security threats in the mid-late 1990s, has slowly become embedded within Philippine domestic institutions. Herbert Docena argues, “Although domestic opposition to U.S. presence remains strong, the political forces that favor the U.S. continue to dominate the country’s political system.” Activists opposed to U.S military presence and activity in the Philippines have thus found it much more challenging to influence security policy decisions pertinent to the U.S.-Philippines alliance.\textsuperscript{54} In particular, the strengthening of an elite security consensus over time has made it difficult for anti-base movements (or anti-U.S. military protests) from winning major concessions from host governments.

**Okinawa**

*Security Consensus after 9-11*

Whereas the strengthening of the security consensus over time explains change in movement outcomes in the Philippines, in Japan, the high degree of security consensus maintained since the mid-1990s should correspond to very little change in the status quo. That is, Okinawan anti-base movements continue to face immense challenges due to the U.S.-Japan alliance structure and the pervading consensus held by elites. Although Japan continues to increase its own military role in regional security affairs, flirting with revisions to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Japanese elites still place the U.S. alliance near the center of its national security policy. Delays and co-optation through token concessions and economic incentives

\textsuperscript{53} Herbert Docena. "At the Door of All the East: The Philippines in United States Military Strategy." Quezon City, Philippines: Focus on the Global South, 2007, p.106.

\textsuperscript{54} Activists note their success over the Angelo dela Cruz incident. Protestors pressured President Macapagal-Arroyo to withdraw Filipino troops from Iraq after Iraqi insurgents kidnapped a Filipino truck driver, Angelo de la Cruz. Iraqi insurgents threatened to execute de la Cruz unless Manila withdrew its 51-member humanitarian force. While the case was a clear victory for protestors, the issue did not apply directly to Philippine national security interests such as the VFA.
have helped Tokyo maintain positive alliance ties to the U.S. at the expense of Okinawan anti-base movements.

**Security Consensus in the 21st Century**

Chapter Three argued that U.S.-Japan relations strengthened in the mid-late 1990s, despite brief tensions generated by the 1995 rape incident. This elite security consensus showed little sign of waning entering the twenty-first century. Immediately after 9-11, Japan supported the U.S. “war on terror” by passing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law. The initial support for the war on terror extended Japan’s offshore support for U.S. military activity based on the 1997 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. However, Japan took this a step further by deploying SDF forces beyond Japanese waters.\(^55\) For instance, Japan permitted Aegis destroyers to escort Japanese ships sent to provide logistical support to U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean. Security cooperation with the U.S. extended to other issue areas such as theater missile defense and the Iraq War. Supporting the U.S.-led invasion in Iraq, Japan dispatched a small contingent of ground forces to participate in reconstruction projects. According to Japan specialist Thomas Berger, “a broad spectrum of elite opinion [which] had solidified in support of the alliance” in the late 1990s enabled Japan to quickly adjust to the new U.S.-Japan alliance in the post 9-11 world.\(^56\)

An analysis of Japan’s domestic politics this decade supports the persistence of an elite security consensus. Richard Samuel’s examination of domestic factions within the Japanese security debate reveals four broad discourses: neoautonomists, pacifists, middle power internationalists, and normal nationalists. Based on Samuel’s typology, Figure 7.6 below maps the various security discourses found in Japan.

\(^{55}\) Berger 2004, p.56.  
\(^{56}\) *ibid*, p.54.
Although multiple discourses exist, the normal nationalists and middle power internationalists have alternated in power for the last six decades. Note how these two groups, located on the right-half of the spectrum, are most closely aligned to the U.S. Moreover, the Koizumi–Abe strand of normal-nationalists have dictated security policy since 2001. Although the normal-nationalist camp, divided between revisionists...
and pragmatists, hold different visions for the SDF, neither strand has ever been divided on the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance.\textsuperscript{58}

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi (and briefly under his successor, Shinzo Abe), the revisionists enhanced the salience of military power in Japanese national security. Symbolized by the JDA’s elevated status to Ministry of National Defense in 2007, the transformation of Japanese security policy may have stretched the principles of the Yoshida Doctrine and Article 9 to its limits.\textsuperscript{59} However, the strong security consensus built around the U.S.-Japan alliance remains intact. As Peter Katzenstein observes, “Japan has embraced what looks like a grand strategy of unquestioned security alignment with the United States. In an era in which the American imperium is under siege, Japan is deeply invested in enhancing its special relationship with the United States.”\textsuperscript{60} Japan’s recent assertiveness may thus be interpreted as an updated version of the Yoshida Doctrine, with key elements such as the U.S. alliance and the hosting of U.S. bases in place. As Mike Mochizuki notes, even if constitutional revisions do take place, Japan will likely continue to restrain its use of military force in operations not directly impacting Japan’s national security.\textsuperscript{61}

The historical legacy of Japan’s imperial past and the postwar institutional security arrangements imposed by the U.S. helped produce norms and domestic structures which prevented Japan from pursuing a military-first security policy.\textsuperscript{62} Relying instead on the U.S. security umbrella for external defense, these structures led Japan to formulate security policy in more comprehensive terms, focusing heavily on

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} ibid, p.177.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Samuels 2007, Ch. 4. Thomas Berger, however, believes the Yoshida Doctrine makes “more sense today than ever,” attested by Japan’s ever tighter coupling with the U.S. See Berger 2004, p.54-55.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Katzenstein 2007, p.31.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Katzenstein and Okawara, p.92.
\end{itemize}
economic power. In other words, prevailing norms and institutional arrangements required Japanese policymakers to embed the structure of the U.S.-Japan security alliance into Japan’s national security framework. Thus the security consensus, still deeply entrenched in Japanese norms and institutions, remains strong in the twenty-first century.

**From SACO to the Henoko Struggle**

Chapter Three ended with a discussion of the SACO policy recommendations and the conditional return of Futenma Air Station, which in its best light, amounted to token concessions. The SACO report in December 1996 marked the conclusion of the first cycle of protest in the “third wave.” Yet twelve years after the SACO Agreement, Futenma remains open as Tokyo and Okinawan anti-base activists wrangle over the construction of Futenma’s replacement facility in Henoko Bay. To understand why anti-base movement’s failed to make substantial progress on the Futenma issue a decade after SACO requires examination of additional movement episodes in the post-SACO period. In this section, I highlight how the pervading security consensus and the use of compensation politics by the Japanese government led to a virtual standstill in the Futenma relocation issue.

As noted earlier, Futenma’s relocation did not amount to anti-base victory. Outlined in the final SACO report, Futenma’s return was contingent upon the construction of an offshore replacement facility in the Henoko district of Nago City. By relocating Futenma within Okinawa, the Japanese government managed to split the anti-base struggle into internal local factions. As Miyume Tanji notes, “In the post-SACO period, the protest actors inevitably splintered into smaller, multiple groups...and) became geographically scattered and regionalized.” Specifically,

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64 Tanji 2006, p.163.
Nago City residents were split between pro and anti-base factions. Pro-base LDP members in Okinawa with close ties to Tokyo supported the offshore base, hoping to obtain large subsidies from the Japanese government. Although these members supported the mayor of Nago City, the mayor initially supported the anti-base position. Hoping to shift Mayor Tetsuya Higa’s position on the bases, several officials from Tokyo met Nago city officials in a closed door meeting to persuade Higa to support the offshore facility. Indeed, Higa emerged from the meeting with a different attitude. While not explicitly endorsing the base, he allowed Tokyo to begin topographical surveys in preparation for base construction.  

Henoko district in Nago City became the focal point of post-SACO anti-base movements in Okinawa. Political parties, labor unions, teacher’s associations, women’s groups, and environmental groups launched a fresh campaign aimed at blocking the construction of the offshore facility. Unlike earlier Okinawan anti-base movements directed by political parties and unions, however, shimin, or local citizens, carried the anti-base mantle forward. At the core of this shimin struggle was the Henoko Life Protection Society, a committee formed in January 1997 by twenty-seven residents opposed to the offshore heliport. The group pitched a large tent (later replaced by a prefabricated structure) by Henoko’s fishing port, naming their makeshift headquarters the “struggle hut.” The Society was based on the identity of local Henoko residents, and characterized by the participation of older residents who experienced the Battle of Okinawa.

Several other anti-base groups in Nago and Northern Okinawa organized in solidarity with the Society in opposing the heliport construction. Four labor unions in Nago formed the Five Party Coalition in February 1997 with the specific goal of

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65 Ibid 2006, p.164
supporting the Henoko Life Protection Society and enlarging its support base.67 This coalition was joined by Okinawa Peace Center, an island-wide coalition of labor unions, in hopes of drawing in support from trade unions in various areas of Okinawa. Two more anti-base groups formed in April: the Society of Nago Citizens Opposed to the Heliport, and the All-Nago Citizens’ Group Against the Heliport.68 Like the Henoko Life Protection Society, these two groups defined themselves as a “citizens” movement, distancing themselves from any political affiliation. The shimin-led anti-base movement represented local residents rather than any political group or ideological position. Of course, political parties and unions still served an important role by bringing in mobilization resources and experience. However, they played more of a supporting rather than lead role in the post-SACO anti-base movement.69

As the number of anti-base groups in Nago City proliferated, activists organized a broader coalition composed of twenty-one groups to promote a referendum in an effort to derail base relocation plans. Named the Nago Citizens’ Referendum Promotion Council, the coalition channeled anti-base opposition into the political process by proposing a city-wide referendum to vote in favor or against the offshore facility.70 The anti-base coalition used multiple frames to draw attention to the struggle against the offshore base.71 Anti-base literature and flyers evoked anti-Japanese sentiment. Okinawans were reminded of Tokyo’s past deceitfulness: Japan’s sacrifice of Okinawa during World War II, and the continued presence of the U.S. military even after Okinawa’s reversion in 1972. By highlighting that Futenma’s replacement facility represented U.S. rather than Okinawan interests, activists

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67 Ibid. 2006, p.165.
68 Ibid. 2006, p.165.
71 For instance, flyers produced by the Japanese Communist Party (February 2000) and the Okinawa Committee for Struggles against the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit addressed multiple grievances stemming from U.S. bases.
contradicted official statements that Tokyo was working to address Okinawan grievances. The anti-base coalition also adopted an environmental frame by focusing on the dugong – a sea mammal related to the manatee. Realizing that the endangered dugong inhabited Henoko Bay, activists claimed that the offshore base would destroy the dugong population. The dugong became the unofficial symbol of the anti-base struggle during this phase of the movement, which helped draw in environmental NGOs and other activists from mainland Japan. The dugong appeared on anti-base flyers, t-shirts, and badges with slogans such as, “Money disappears in a moment, but nature, if protected lasts forever,” or, “On the beautiful sea and beautiful island that cultivates life, we do not need the offshore base...”

On December 1997, 51.3% of Nago residents voted against the offshore heliport in Henoko. Despite this victory for the anti-base coalition, Tokyo, weighing the importance of the U.S. alliance, continued to skirt around anti-base opposition. The central government refused to openly discuss base issues with any top officials in the Okinawan prefectural government for nearly ten months after Governor Ota rejected Prime Minister Hashimoto’s appeal for the construction of the offshore heliport. The Futenma relocation issue eventually transferred to the hands of the next governor, the LDP backed Inamine Keiichi, and the new administration headed by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo. With new leadership in Okinawa, Obuchi reopened financial flows, pledging 10 billion yen to Inamine’s government and making a personal pledge to find a solution to Futenma’s relocation. To further placate anti-base opposition, Prime Minister Obuchi announced in April 1999 that Nago City (along with Kyushu) would host the 2000 G-8 summit. In preparation for the summit,

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72 Inoue 2007, p.177.
73 Yonetani 2001, p.78.
74 Ibid 2001, p.78.
75 Ibid 2001, p.80.
Tokyo pledged an annual 100 billion yen stimulus package to Northern Okinawa (where Nago City was located) for the next ten years with the first 100 billion yen redirected to Okinawa beginning in 2000. The economic incentives worked their magic. In December 1999, Nago City consented to the construction of an offshore heliport, under the stipulation that Tokyo meet several conditions, including a fifteen year limit on military use of the offshore base. Tokyo had again played its hand well, relying on compensation packages and other economic incentives to soothe over anti-base opposition. By inducing local communities to accept large-scale public works and providing additional material incentives, Tokyo pacified anti-base opposition. Economic incentives helped separate more radical elements of anti-base opponents from those who were willing to tolerate bases, so long as they were well-compensated.

Rifts within the Nago anti-base movement deepened with more grassroots movements overshadowed by party political machines in the 1998 Nago City mayoral election. As the movement gained exposure globally, the tension between pro-base residents’ material interests and the global aspirations of anti-base Okinawans trying to reach out to a broad, international audience became more pronounced. For instance, when environmental and peace groups from mainland Japan arrived in Henoko wearing “Save the Dugong” buttons, Henoko residents retorted, “Our life is more important than the dugong’s.” Masamichi Inoue notes, “Tokyo’s carrots and sticks, when fused with the pro-base group’s desire to revitalize the local economy, slowly but steadily permeated from the top to the bottom of Nago’s pyramid-like pro-base mobilization structure.” Of course, Tokyo exploited these tensions through

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76 Ibid 2001, p.80.
77 For a discussion on compensation politics as a government strategy in Okinawa, see Mulgan 2001.
78 Inoue 2001, p.188.
compensation politics. With indirect support from Tokyo, pro-base groups captured the mayoral race, while the Nago anti-base coalition withered as a cohesive movement.

**Into the 21st Century**

Twelve years have passed since the SACO agreement, yet Futenma Air Base continues to operate. Have anti-base movements completely failed in their struggle against U.S. bases? Table 7.1 below highlights several movement episodes during the past ten years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Movement’s Immediate Goal</th>
<th>Government Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1995-Dec</td>
<td>Rape of 12 year old school girl</td>
<td>Base Reduction/SOFA revision</td>
<td>SACO recommendations: Base land return including Futenma Air Station. Noise reduction policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1997 - December</td>
<td>Announcement of Henoko as replacement facility</td>
<td>Referendum in Nago City to block construction of offshore</td>
<td>Government officials sent to influence referendum outcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1997</td>
<td>site of Futenma</td>
<td>replacement facility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2000</td>
<td>Upcoming G8 Summit</td>
<td>Raise international attention about Okinawan bases. Stop off</td>
<td>Government pledges massive economic subsidies and public works projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>shore facility plan.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2004</td>
<td>Helicopter crash at Okinawa International</td>
<td>Compensation for crash; suspend military flights over civilian</td>
<td>Government investigates crash; Pledges to push forward with relocation plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University</td>
<td>areas; early return of Futenma Base</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004 - Sept</td>
<td>Drilling surveys in Henoko Bay</td>
<td>Block geological survey and drilling of seabed through canoe</td>
<td>Government cancels offshore plan. Announces new plan expanding Camp Schwab.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>protest.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the very least, it is safe to conclude that anti-base movement outcomes over the past decade have been mixed. Over the course of several movement episodes, anti-base movements were able to win tactical concessions, such as the inclusion of

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80 This list excludes anti-base mobilization aimed at influencing election outcomes, such as the 1998 and 2006 Nago City mayoral elections, or the 1998 and 2006 gubernational elections. The distinction between formal and informal politics regarding bases in Okinawa is often blurred.
Futenma’s relocation in the 1996 SACO report, the rejection against an offshore heliport in the 1997 referendum, and the blocking of Tokyo’s attempt to push ahead with the “coral reef” base plan in 2005. At each point of “victory,” however, the Japanese government countered the activists’ tactical gains by putting forth new proposals keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa and managing positive alliance relations with the U.S. As activists correctly pointed, the Futenma agreement originally outlined under the SACO report amounted to base relocation rather than reduction.81

In a catch-22, activists may successfully block new base plans for Northern Okinawa, but in doing so, enable Futenma Air Station to remain open.

To their credit, anti-base activists were effective in blocking the offshore replacement facility plan. In April 2004, a group of activists paddled into Henoko Bay in canoes to physically prevent the DFAA from conducting geological drilling surveys. After five hundred consecutive days of resistance, local Henoko activists prevailed as the government removed the scaffolds from the water in September 2005. However, as activists valiantly “paddled” against the government, Tokyo and Washington entered negotiations to discuss U.S. military realignment in Okinawa. In October 2005, the U.S. and Japan announced it would scrap the offshore facility plan. Rather than building on top of a reef as engineered in the offshore plan, the two sides agreed to a “coastal plan” which would expand nearby Camp Schwab. To accommodate the functions of Futenma, the government planned to build a V-shaped

81 On the contrary, Japan and the U.S. believe this relocation is tantamount to a reduction. As one U.S. official stated, “The Futenma base will be moved from an area where 80,000 live to one where only less than 2,000 reside. You cannot say this is not burden reduction. If the return of the base is realized, a military base that is located in a densely-populated area will be moved to the north, where there is a small population . . . This will be very beneficial for Okinawa.” Interview with Naha U.S. Consul General Thomas G. Reich by Tsuyoshi Matsumoto of the Ryuku Shimpo. November 22, 2005. Transcript available on Naha Consulate website. “Consul General Speaks to Ryukyu Shimpo on DPRI.” <http://naha.usconsulate.gov/wwwh-interview20051122.html> [last accessed 11/23/07]
runway extending Camp Schwab into the sea. In addition, the U.S. announced the relocation of 7,000 U.S. marines to Guam on the condition of Futenma’s relocation. Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush signed the USFJ realignment plan, committing Japan to take on a greater role in the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Tokyo, however, forged this new agreement without any consultation with the local or prefectural government in Okinawa. Okinawans, including the LDP governor Keichi Inamine, were outraged that Tokyo had again neglected their voice.

The strong security consensus, specifically national elite perceptions and beliefs regarding U.S. bases and the U.S.-Japan alliance, have stalemated base policy outcomes for over a decade. The inability of anti-base movements to achieve significant base reductions is likely attributed to both internal movement problems as well as structural factors. The major challenge faced by Okinawan anti-base movements, however, is fundamentally structural. The U.S.-Japan alliance structure, and the perceptions and beliefs held by elites regarding this relationship, pose a formidable obstacle for activists. Activists challenge what elites perceive as essential to Japan’s national interest. In turn, Tokyo’s response to anti-base pressure is shaped by the strong security consensus. Internal weaknesses and division are endemic to most anti-base movements, but governments also generate internal conflict or exploit tension by employing strategies of co-optation or coercion against anti-base groups. From a diachronic standpoint, the continuity of the security consensus in Japan has

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84 The base policy changes which have taken place have largely been initiated by the U.S., who continue to work with Tokyo in maintaining a stable force presence in the region, while circumventing Okinawan base opposition.
limited anti-base movement effectiveness, and kept movement outcomes relatively static over the course of a decade.

**Conclusion**

This chapter demonstrated the relationship between the security consensus and movement effectiveness diachronically in the Philippines and Japan. By allowing “variability” in the security consensus, particularly in the Philippine case, I showed how change in the security consensus over time resulted in different patterns of action between state and society, thereby producing different outcomes. As an elite security consensus regarding U.S. relations strengthens over time, movement effectiveness should decrease as patterns of interaction between activists and security policy-makers move from cooperation to greater confrontation. Thus, in the Philippines, anti-base activists who found allies within the Philippine Senate in 1990-91 were increasingly marginalized as Philippine elites tightened their alliance with the U.S. In the security scarce environment of the 1990s, Philippine elites embraced the U.S. alliance as the best guarantee against national security threats.

Although not discussed at length in this chapter, we should expect greater movement “success” when the security consensus weakens over time. As the host government moves away from a U.S.-alliance centered security policy, political space opens for activists to penetrate the state and form ties with elites. For anti-base movements to achieve success, however, activists must still employ the right strategies and frames while taking advantage of the available political opportunity to “penetrate” the state. With a gradual ebbing of the security consensus, South Korea is one potential country where anti-base activism may bear greater policy impact in the future. Granted, a moderate security consensus embedded in institutions and ideology continues to place constraints on anti-base movement effectiveness. However, a major
“shock” such as North Korean reunification could ultimately shatter this elite consensus, empowering civil society on USFK and U.S. alliance related issues.

With relatively wide breadth and maximum depth, the elite consensus in Japan remains virtually unchanged from the mid-1990s. Anti-base movements continue to challenge U.S. military bases in Okinawa. However, for the foreseeable future, the impact of Okinawan anti-base movements appears limited. Barring major structural changes in the elite consensus and U.S.-Japan security relations, Tokyo will continue to marginalize anti-base opposition, offering token economic concessions to Okinawa in an effort to retain U.S. military bases.
CHAPTER 8
ALLIANCES, ANTI-BASE MOVEMENTS, AND THE
FUTURE OF U.S. BASING STRATEGY

In this dissertation, I investigated two central questions. First, when and how did anti-base movements affect U.S. base policy decisions. Second, how did host governments maneuver between domestic politics and U.S. relations in the wake of anti-base opposition. The central claim was that elite beliefs and perceptions regarding U.S. relations in the context of national security a) functioned as a political opportunity structure inhibiting or facilitating movements and b) influenced patterns of movement-government interaction leading to particular policy outcomes.

As highlighted in the Philippines and Ecuador cases, anti-base movements were more likely to influence basing policy outcomes under conditions of weak security consensus. A weak consensus, leading to policy incoherence and division among elites, enabled activists to penetrate the state. With easier access to elites, anti-base forces presented an alternative security agenda by demanding the removal of U.S. bases. Not only did anti-base activists challenge elites advocating a pro-U.S. foreign policy stance, their demands resonated with several key elites responsible for base policy decisions. Therefore, by forming ties with sympathetic elites, activists played an important role in pushing for major base policy changes.

Conversely, as demonstrated by Okinawan, Italian, and to some extent South Korean anti-base movements, activists often faced stiff resistance from governments under conditions of strong or moderate security consensus. Shaped by and embedded within historical legacies, anti-communist ideology, and domestic institutions, a core consensus favoring alliance relations with the U.S. persisted among key elites in
Tokyo, Rome, and Seoul. Moreover, in Japan and South Korea, heightened external threat perceptions stemming from the North Korean nuclear threat and China’s regional ascension helped solidify a consensus favoring U.S. bases in the post-Cold War era. Certainly, voices demanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces existed within the polity. However, these alternative views, often carried by elites on the political fringe, were typically isolated or ignored. Facing major anti-base protests, host governments attempted to diffuse domestic pressure to prevent U.S.-host state alliance relations from deteriorating.

In crisis situations created by powerful anti-base opposition, host governments occasionally provided limited concessions in an effort to quell protests. For example, Tokyo and Washington commissioned the SACO Report in response to intense protests triggered by the 1995 rape incident in Okinawa. On the whole, however, the presence of a strong or even moderate security consensus reduced anti-base movement effectiveness. Despite large-scale mobilization, basing policies remained virtually unchanged. When concessions were provided by host governments, they were often token in nature. Prioritizing national security, host governments thwarted anti-base pressure by using a range of strategies from delay to co-optation to coercion. In sum, a dominant elite consensus favoring U.S. force presence and strong ties to the U.S. functioned as a powerful ideological barrier against anti-base movements.

**Theoretical Issues**

My theoretical argument embraces insights from both international relations and comparative politics. The security consensus framework draws from the political process model found in the social movement literature. It also resonates with arguments presented by statist realists addressing the role of domestic politics in international relations. However, the concept of “security consensus,” constituted by ideas, institutions, and ideology in addition to material-based threat perceptions,
borrows extensively from insights found in the constructivist perspective of international relations. This should encourage other scholars to continue exploring innovative research situated at the intersection of both subfields.

**Unit of Analysis**

A potential challenge for scholars conducting research at the nexus of international relations and comparative politics is the levels of analysis problem. As this dissertation demonstrates, however, drawing social movement analysis into international relations theory creates space for intellectual innovation in the choice of a proper unit of analysis. Shifting the unit and level of analysis below the level of states to movement episodes opens the door for a more complex, richer, set of explanations. At the same time, this analytical move does not negate the important role of the state, or the national context in which anti-base movements are embedded in. By thinking about anti-base movements at the level of countries and movement episodes, this dissertation is able to address important theoretical and empirical questions across disciplines.

**Middle-Range Theories**

The theoretical framework laid out in Chapter One is open to criticism that I present an overwhelmingly structural account of base politics. The security consensus, as a “super-variable,” creates an excessively parsimonious argument, determining base policy outcomes simply by the presence or absence of elite ideational cohesion. This criticism is echoed more generally by social movement scholars who find fault with POS. Critics contend that POS promises to explain too much, while at the same time ignoring the role of agency.¹ As Gamson and Meyer argue, “The concept of political

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opportunity structure is . . . in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment."²

The empirical chapters assuage any appearances of advocating a purely structural account of base politics. In the case studies, I described movement mobilization in detail, building evidence that activists indeed achieved high mobilization strength in all the cases.³ In the Philippines and Ecuador, I showed how anti-base activists actively supported and formed ties with sympathetic elites. Penetrating the state, activists presented an alternative security discourse eventually adopted by enough key elites to change base policy outcomes.⁴

A purely structural argument would directly link a weak security consensus to changes in base policies. My analysis suggests that the link and underlying causal mechanisms are more complicated. Nor is it inevitable that a weak security consensus always leads to base withdrawals or other major changes. For example, despite the weak security consensus in Ecuador, Washington and Quito would have likely re-signed the Manta Base Agreement had anti-base activists not escalated the issue into a national controversy. One might counter this claim by arguing that a leftist president, such as Rafael Correa, would not have accepted U.S. military presence. However, careful process tracing of events show that the shift against Manta, which took place even before Correa’s election, rose from the bottom up. In short, the Manta case was not a pure elite-driven process dictated by a weak security consensus. Movement strategies, such as the decision to host the international No Bases conference in Quito,

³ The one partial exception may be the anti-base movement in Manta, Ecuador.
⁴ An alternative discourse against U.S. bases already existed in the Philippines prior to the formation of anti-base movements in the early 1980s. This position was magnified by the Anti-Treaty Movement. While the anti-base faction were never in the majority, they had built enough momentum in the elite Senate to reject U.S. bases.
or disseminating information to elites based on extensive research in Manta and the Colombia-Ecuador border, also played an important role in outcomes.

Even under conditions of strong or moderate security consensus where movements seem to demonstrate significantly less impact, outcomes were still dependent upon the action of agents. For instance, government elites in South Korea could have used force earlier to remove local residents in Pyeongtaek. However, the government, partially out of fear in escalating anti-American sentiment, opted to delay coercive tactics until the spring of 2006. The MND’s public relations campaign prior to the dispatch of riot police also worked brilliantly in undercutting public support for KCPT. Hence, even though a strong security consensus significantly shaped the patterns of engagement between state and society, the choices of actors still mattered. Using brute force during the development phase of KCPT in 2005, or failing to adequately explain and interpret government actions in Pyeongtaek to South Korean citizens could have potentially altered outcomes. Derailing the entire relocation process may have been a stretch, but greater concessions to KCPT, such as a reduction in base size, were in the realm of possibility.\(^5\) In sum, while the consensus constrains or facilitates what actors can or cannot do, it does not determine outcomes itself. A larger part of the story revolves around the choices of movement and government actors within structural boundaries.

**Addressing Regime Type in the Base Politics Literature**

Scholars of base politics, most notably Alexander Cooley and Kent Calder, have pointed to regime type as a major factor influencing base politics. Base agreements appear most stable in consolidated democracies, and most unstable during

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\(^5\) While U.S. and Korean officials stated this was a non-option, in the face of unrelenting anti-base opposition and a resurgence of anti-U.S. public opinion, I presume both governments would have been more amenable to KCPT demands. For instance, KCPT wanted both governments to reassess base location plans, questioning the need for the entire relocation of the 25th Infantry Division to Pyeongtaek, or the addition of recreational facilities such as a golf course.
periods of democratization. Given the correlation between democratic transitions and mass mobilization, one might find it surprising that a dissertation examining anti-base movements makes no direct reference to regime type. This section addresses regime type as an alternative explanation to the security consensus framework. Although one may pit regime type and the security consensus as competing explanations, to a certain extent, the two approaches to base politics may actually complement one another.

The relationship between regime type and base politics is most succinctly put forth by Alexander Cooley. Cooley develops a compelling theory explaining “when and why bilateral military basing agreements become accepted, politicized, or challenged by host countries.” While the argument rests on two interacting variables – the regime’s political dependence on U.S. bases, and the contractual credibility of political institutions – the latter variable, understood through variation among regime types, provides much of the analytical heavy-lifting. In brief, consolidated democracies provide the most credible institutions, and therefore the most stable environment for basing agreements. According to Cooley, the institutional features of consolidated democracies – procedural legitimacy, institutional stability, and consolidated party systems - help “lock-in” basing commitments. Under consolidated democracies, basing agreements are accepted when host governments remain dependent on security contracts. Even when host governments are not dependent on U.S. bases for political, economic, or security benefits, the institutional features of democracies help depoliticize base issues. As a set of broader routine, bilateral

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6 Cooley 2008, p.16-17; Calder 2007, p.112-14.
7 Cooley 2008.
8 Cooley 2008, p.3.
9 Ibid 2008, p.15-16. Procedural legitimacy refers to institutional procedures, such as legislative ratification, which give basing contracts greater domestic credibility. Institutional stability refers to the delegation of basing issues to bureaucracies. The base policymaking process becomes “entrenched” by the increasing number of “veto players” who have a stake in maintaining bases. Lastly, consolidated party systems “tend to moderate the political stance of controversial foreign policy and sovereignty issues.”
security arrangements, basing issues “are generally removed from everyday party politics and debates.”

Conversely, base agreements are most unstable during phases of democratic transition when contractual institutions are least credible. The lack of procedural legitimacy, jurisdictional ambiguity, and weak party systems which reward ideological or nationalist mobilization in democratizing countries, all bode poorly for U.S. bases. Basing agreements are highly politicized during regime shifts. In particular, host regimes not dependent on base contracts for security or other benefits “are…the most likely of all base hosts to unilaterally abrogate the contract and evict the U.S. military.”

Lastly, authoritarian regimes provide a mixed bag. The lack of independent institutions allows a central figure to dictate the terms of basing agreements. As long as the regime remains dependent on the security contract and feeds political, economic, and/or security benefits to the ruler, basing agreements remain relatively stable. However, the lack of independent institutions also places the future of bases directly at the whims of dictators. As regime dependence on U.S. security contracts decreases, the leverage of dictators increase vis-à-vis the United States. Base issues, therefore, become politicized, characterized by increasing demands from host governments. These demands may include greater economic compensation, revisions to SOFA, or a reduction in the number of troops or bases.

On one level, Cooley’s analysis of base politics and my own are not competing explanations because we focus on different questions, looking at slightly different outcomes. First, my analysis focuses on a narrower aspect of base politics: the impact of anti-base movements. Second, although Cooley and I are both interested in basing

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policy outcomes, our dependent variables mean different things. For Cooley, outcomes refer to the politicization and stability of basing contracts. In my analysis, policy outcomes is taken as a measure of movement effectiveness or movement success.

Disclaimers aside, how does the security consensus framework address the question of regime type in base politics? While recognizing that both approaches have something unique to offer in the analysis of base politics, I contend that the security consensus subsumes regime type explanations. For the security consensus framework to hold against Cooley’s argument, the empirical cases need to demonstrate that major domestic opposition to bases and base policy changes were determined by anti-base movement opposition under conditions of weak security consensus rather than weak domestic political institutions. Conversely, the stability of base agreements should derive from the security consensus rather than the contractual credibility of political institutions under democracies. I test the weight of both arguments by briefly investigating base politics in Italy, South Korea, and the Philippines which appeared in both works. I also include an analysis of base politics in Spain, reinterpreting Cooley’s analysis through the security consensus framework.

**Italy**

According to Cooley’s theory, during the Cold War, Italian acceptance of U.S. bases stemmed from two factors: Christian Democrat dependence on U.S. security contracts, and the credibility of domestic political institutions. The democratic nature of Italian politics kept basing issues depoliticized even after the Cold War and the decline of the Christian Democrats. Although Italy’s reliance on U.S. bases significantly diminished without the Soviet threat, democratic institutions helped legitimize U.S. military presence in Italy.

Offering a different explanation, in Chapter Four, I argued that the stability of U.S. bases on Italian soil rested with the security consensus, not the political
institutions associated with regime type. The high degree of regime dependence on U.S. security contracts during the Cold War, noted by Cooley, is reflected in the existence of a strong security consensus. Key elites shared a common understanding that U.S. bases functioned as a necessary component of Italian national security. Over time, Italian elites internalized the norms and values shared under the Atlantic alliance, transforming NATO into a key pillar of Italian foreign policy. The strong consensus persisted despite Italy’s fragmented, and at times, unstable political party system. For example, on the eve of Prodi’s 2006 electoral victory, U.S. officials feared the Italian government would renege on the Vicenza base expansion agreement signed by Prodi’s conservative predecessor and political rival, Silvio Berlusconi. That he did not is more a testament to the security consensus and Italian elite understanding of the Atlantic alliance, rather than democratic political institutions.

On the other hand, the contractual environment may be less stable than Cooley warrants in Italy because of frequently changing electoral laws and the disproportionate strength of minor parties. Moreover, even under consolidated democracies such as Italy, security contracts are less transparent and credible than Cooley assumes. In interviews with U.S. consulate and Italian security experts, no one was able (or perhaps willing) to verify the existence of an overarching, bilateral agreement guaranteeing Dal Molin airfield for the expansion of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.13 In fact, No Dal Molin activists cited the lack of transparency and the central government’s failure in informing Vicenza citizens about base expansion in a timely fashion as a major grievance.14 In sum, the democratic institutional logic put forth by

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13 As one Italian security expert and Ministry of Defense advisor argued, most documents related to U.S. bases have been kept secret until recently. The few documents which are available tend to be vaguely worded. Interviews with activists also corroborated this statement. Interview with Italian security expert. January 22, 2008. Rome, Italy.

14 The lack of transparency and the undemocratic nature of basing agreements were also listed as a major grievance by South Korean anti-base activists in Pyeongtaek.
Cooley fails to explain the politicization of the recent Vicenza movement episode, and the continuity of favorable U.S. basing policies in Italy.

In the Italian case, it appears that the security consensus subsumes regime type. The moderation of left parties on foreign policy issues is explained by the dominance of the security consensus, and reinforced by democratic institutions and party politics. In other words, stable, democratic institutions feed into the security consensus. Moreover, Italian elites may exhibit greater support for U.S. security relations and bases precisely because they share the same democratic principles. Contrary to Cooley’s interpretation, bases are not necessarily depoliticized in Italy, as witnessed by major anti-base protests from 2006-2007. However, we expect basing policy outcomes to remain relatively unchanged due to the strong degree of security consensus held by Italian political elites. Placing a high value on U.S.-Italian relations and the NATO alliance, Italy will continue to play a critical role in U.S. overseas basing strategy for the foreseeable future.

**South Korea**

The South Korean case also uncovers discrepancies between Cooley’s theory and my own. Cooley links greater politicization of USFK related issues from 1996-2002 to Korea’s relatively recent democratization and the uncertain contractual environment in South Korea. Democratization indeed empowered civil society to intensify criticism without having to fear a brutal government crackdown. Despite greater politicization, however, U.S. force presence, SOFA, and other base related issues remained relatively intact.

Cooley interprets the contractual environment in South Korea from 1996-2002 as unstable, with democratic institutions still undergoing the consolidation process. I offer a different interpretation. Strong alliance ties and the persistence of the security consensus helped weather much of the political storm, leading to few changes on
basing policy issues. Cooley is correct in noting the politically charged issue of U.S. military presence from 1996-2002. Perhaps this is due to the unstable contractual environment given the democratizing nature of South Korea’s political institutions as argued by Cooley. Analyzing anti-base movements through Cooley’s theory, as South Korea moves towards greater democratic consolidation, we should observe a decrease in anti-base protests. Yet in 2006, South Korea once again witnessed major clashes between the South Korean government and civil society over U.S. military issues. Will base politics become routine in South Korea, or as Katharine Moon has argued, will South Korea’s vibrant, growing civil society suggest even greater politicization of U.S. base issues in a period of consolidated democracy? If the security consensus persists at moderate levels, anti-base protests will only have a limited impact on base policy outcomes. However, if we continue to see a gradual ebbing of the consensus, as argued in Chapter Five, we should not only expect to see greater contestation from civil society, but greater changes in base policy outcomes as well.

**Philippines**

The Philippines in 1991, marked by conditions of weak security consensus, corresponds to the unstable contractual environment found in Cooley’s argument. The overthrow of Marcos and low contractual credibility of political institutions in the aftermath helped politicize U.S. bases, leading to the ouster of U.S. forces. My argument explains this outcome and the pivotal role of anti-base movements based on the weak security consensus held by elites. Which interpretation provides a closer fit between theory and evidence?

Examining the Philippines case longitudinally gives us some leverage. Both Polity IV scores, which evaluates “concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic

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15 A democratic institutional argument would counter this criticism by arguing that base policy outcomes remained unchanged during this period.

16 Moon 2003.
authority in governing institutions,” and Freedom House scores which measure the
degree of political and civil liberties, have remained fairly constant since 1990.\textsuperscript{17} If
the contractual environment of U.S. bases remains unchanged as indicated by
measures of democracy for the Philippines, we should expect the same level of base

What are the legitimating mechanisms which have helped depoliticize U.S.
military presence in the Philippines today?\textsuperscript{18} With constant threats of coups, and the
fluidity of party politics, it is unclear whether credible political institutions are intact
in the Philippines. The acceptance of U.S. forces since 1999, therefore, is better
explained by the re-emergence of the security consensus among key Philippine elites,
as argued in Chapter 6. Thus, the stable contractual environment guaranteeing U.S.
military related agreements today, such as the 1999 VFA and the 2002 Mutual
Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA), is shaped more by the strong security
consensus rather than consolidated democratic institutions.

\textit{Spain}

A case study in Cooley’s research not found in my dissertation is the Spanish
case. Does the security consensus framework apply to additional cases found in
Cooley’s work, but not my own? Rather than challenging the institutional argument
presented by Cooley, I use his analysis to probe whether my framework applies to
Spanish anti-base movements in the 1980s.

The security consensus was relatively weak in Spain in the early 1980s. Spain
was loosely aligned with the West during the early years of the Cold War. However,

\textsuperscript{17} Polity IV scores have been locked at 8 (out of 10 with 10 being most democratic) since 1987.
Freedom House scores have generally hovered between 2 and 3 (on a 1-7 scale, 1 being most free) since
1987.

\textsuperscript{18} The absence of permanent bases may be the simplest answer. Moreover, U.S. troops are primarily
located in the Southern Philippines, far from the political capital. However, as Herbert Docena notes,
the constant rotation of U.S. forces has \textit{de facto} re-established a permanent U.S. presence in the
Philippines, even without U.S. bases.
unlike other strong U.S. allies such as Germany and Italy, Spain remained outside NATO until 1981. The ideological and institutional ties shaping elite perceptions and beliefs regarding the U.S. alliance were not fully developed during this period. This is reflected in the 1982 presidential election when Felipe Gonzalez of the Socialist Party (PSOE) ran on an anti-NATO party platform. While Gonzalez remained ambivalent about U.S. base presence, other PSOE and Communist (PCE) members voiced their opposition to both NATO and U.S. bases.\(^{19}\) Meanwhile, anti-base activists routinely organized large demonstrations outside U.S. bases in Rota, Zaragoza, and Madrid.

Gonzales eventually backtracked from his initial anti-NATO stance, successfully guiding Spain’s entry into the Atlantic community in 1982. However, base issues remained unsettled. In the mid-1980s, the PSOE pushed for more favorable basing terms. Spanish base negotiators listed the closure of the Torrejón air base as a high priority. After two years of negotiations, the U.S. and Spain concluded a new basing arrangement reducing U.S. troop presence in Spain by 40%. Furthermore, Spanish negotiators extracted additional economic and military benefits. Most importantly, the U.S. agreed to withdraw forces from bases in Torrejón and Zaragoza.\(^{20}\)

Cooley attributes the politicization and outcome of base politics during this period to the instability of political institutions resulting from Spain’s recent democratization. I do not necessarily counter this explanation. However, the correlation between strong anti-base mobilization, a weak security consensus, and major shifts in base policy outcomes makes it worth exploring the security consensus framework in the Spanish case. Did anti-base movements and the conditions of weak security consensus contribute to base closures during the 1986-88 negotiations? A

\(^{19}\) Cooley 2008, p.76.
\(^{20}\) Ibid 2008, p.79.
fundamental question is whether anti-base movements helped Gonzalez solidify his position entering base negotiations with the U.S. in 1986. Did anti-base activists work with sympathetic elites, pushing the government to negotiate more favorable base terms?

On one hand, base policy outcomes may have been purely elite driven. Even without major protests, the PSOE would have likely pushed for a new basing agreement. A movement-based account, however, posits that absent major protests, PSOE members would not have formulated and sustained a coherent position challenging current basing arrangements. A weak security consensus enabled activists to work in tandem with anti-base elites to push forward an alternative basing agreement. Even if activists and elites shared the same preferences, it may have required anti-base movements to help elites project and clarify their true positions publicly. My discussion does not challenge Cooley’s interpretation of the Spanish case *per se*. It only suggests reconsidering the case from the vantage point of social movements, evaluated in the context of U.S.-Spain relations and the pervading elite security consensus at the time.

In sum, I differ from Cooley by arguing that bilateral relations and the salience of national security weighs heavily in the politics of military bases. The security consensus conditions elite response to domestic base opposition irrespective of regime type. I argue that the depoliticization of U.S. bases has less to do with the consolidated nature of democratic institutions, and more to do with the existing security consensus permeating key elites in host countries.

Despite empirical discrepancies between Cooley’s analysis and my own work, the two theories are not necessarily incompatible. In certain respect, the two arguments may complement one another since Cooley does not specifically address anti-base movements in his own theory, nor do I specifically discuss regime type in
my own argument. It may be beyond mere coincidence that allied countries where the security consensus remains strongest – Germany, Italy, Japan, or South Korea - also happen to be consolidated democracies. Upon closer examination, the three mechanisms discussed by Cooley which contribute to depoliticization - procedural legitimacy, internal jurisdiction, and party politics - actually feed into the sources of security consensus. For example, the bureaucratization of base politics in countries like Japan helps perpetuate and institutionalize elite perceptions and beliefs about U.S. bases and the Japan-U.S. alliance. Likewise, the consolidation of political parties helps solidify the dominant position of elites favoring a strong security consensus. Thus elite attitudes and beliefs, buffered by the institutional mechanisms suggested by Cooley, help stabilize basing agreements despite the presence of major anti-base protests.

**The Future of U.S. Basing Strategy**

The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR) marks the first major transformation of U.S. global force posture since the post-World War II era. Initial adjustments to American force posture were already in motion with the end of the Cold War. Following strategic and operational changes outlined in the Pentagon’s 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR), the Bush Administration mandated a thorough review of U.S. global force posture. In particular, the review addressed the

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21 Regime type is taken for granted in my analysis, partly because the phenomenon of anti-base movements is most acute in post-democratized societies. Regime type matters when exploring anti-base movements because it affects the probability of successful mobilization (i.e. authoritarian regimes tend to quash civil societal attempts at collective action), as well as the degree of state penetration. Anti-base movements will find it more difficult to penetrate strong, autocratic states compared to democratic states which provide access through institutional procedures and formal channels. Kent Calder also addresses the interaction between anti-base movements and regime type, examining the distinction between centralized and decentralized democracies as an intervening variable on policy outcomes. See Calder 2008, p.123.

22 The impact of institutions in Cooley’s argument corresponds to the dimension of “depth” in my coding of the security consensus.

23 The GDPR is also known as the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS). Global defense posture “comprises the size, location, types, and capabilities of forward military forces. It constitutes a fundamental element of our ability to project power and undertake military actions beyond our borders” (DOD 2004, p.4).
shift from static defense to expeditionary operations, new advances in military technology and capabilities, and increasing uncertainty in the strategic environment.24

The Pentagon began its review process prior to the events of 9-11. However, this cataclysmic event reinforced the dire need for a flexible strategy and new global force posture. An overseas basing strategy needed to reflect “new” threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the insurgencies unfolding in Afghanistan (and subsequently Iraq).25 Additionally, the strategy needed to contend with the possible realignment of traditional alliances and the addition of new strategic partners.26

The network of overseas military bases is intimately linked to the U.S. national security strategy. The presence of forward-deployed troops, equipment, and supplies, and the portfolio of bilateral arrangements permitting global U.S. military presence are not mere policy choices, but an extension of strategy itself.27 Overseas bases exist as “the skeleton upon which the flesh and muscle of operational capability will be molded.”28 More specifically, bases provide strategic deterrence, territorial control, logistics and transportation capabilities, and alliance support.29 They facilitate communication, command, and control, and intelligence-gathering. Overseas bases are the physical units generating the basic structure of U.S. global defense posture. However, global defense posture is defined beyond the number of installations and

25 The OBC acknowledged new threats along the “arc of instability” spanning from West Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and the Andes. However, the OBC also cautioned against ruling out traditional, great power rivalries in Asia or Europe. Additionally, the OBC’s review of U.S. global force posture recommended adopting a comprehensive definition of threats, taking into account human rights violations, natural disasters, and epidemics. Finally, the review criticized the DOD-centric analysis of global force posture, recommending greater interagency cooperation in any future assessments.
26 DOD 2004, p.2.
28 OBC 2005, p.4.
troops. It encompasses security cooperation with alliance partners through different legal arrangements.\textsuperscript{30} Therefore, an overhaul in global force posture not only reflects operational changes, such as greater flexibility and enhanced rapid deployment capabilities, but an expanded role for alliance partners.\textsuperscript{31}

This dissertation speaks directly to the last category - the role of alliance partners. U.S. global force posture both "presupposes and determines" the network of political relations forged between the United States and alliance partners.\textsuperscript{32} The ability to build or share facilities, place troops, store munitions, or pre-position equipment implies a bilateral relationship between the host nation and the U.S. Bases not only fulfill a military function, they represent a political arrangement with "bilateral, international, cultural, and economic consequences."\textsuperscript{33} Unfortunately, U.S. strategic needs and the political realities presented by host nation politics are not always congruent, resulting in bilateral and internal domestic friction. As Kent Calder argues, bases are "embattled garrisons": strategically important but politically vulnerable.\textsuperscript{34}

As discussed in this dissertation and other volumes addressing the politics of bases, a central characteristic of base politics is its two-level nature. The international environment shapes bilateral relations, which in turn establishes the permissive conditions for U.S. bases in host countries. However, the domestic politics of host nations have an enormous bearing on the status and operation of U.S. forces. Thus, well before President Bush’s August 2004 message on global defense posture, the U.S. had already embarked on an ambitious diplomatic campaign, consulting with dozens of allies about changes in U.S. overseas force deployment.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{30} DOD 2004, pp.7-8.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. 2004, p.9.
\textsuperscript{32} OBC 2005, p.8.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid 2005, p.10.
\textsuperscript{34} Calder 2007, p.9
The OBC took a positive step by identifying the political risks associated with the current direction of U.S. global force posture. Currently, the U.S. relies on a mix of traditional alliances and new partners to hedge against future threats. The former provides predictability and greater reliability for cooperation and access in the event of conflict. The latter gives the U.S. improved access and proximity to global hotspots. In the final review, the OBC reiterated the importance of traditional alliance partners, and advised the DOD to reassess the timing of troop withdrawals in major host countries, particularly Germany. At the same time, the OBC called for caution when relying on new alliance partners. Specifically, the U.S. should not assume the possibility of long-term relations prior to any formalized agreement. Bilateral arrangements with new partners lack a mutual history of support. Furthermore, new partners characterized as fledgling democracies or autocracies, particularly those concentrated in Africa and Central Asia, do not guarantee long-term political stability. Admitting that U.S. soft power is on the decline, the OBC correctly suggested that base planners consider the motives behind new basing agreements, such as short-term economic gains versus long term national interests. In light of domestic anti-base opposition, the security consensus framework offers four sets of policy implications related to U.S. overseas basing strategy.

1. Managing the Security Consensus

While the OBC recognizes domestic instability as an issue affecting U.S. force presence and basing access, particularly with new security partners, it also assumes that our traditional allies will generally accept U.S. basing arrangements. This assumption is warranted if we accept the security consensus hypothesis. Even when faced with serious civil societal pressure against U.S. forces, host government elites

are likely to stave off movement pressure and manage its alliance relations with the U.S. if a security consensus exists.

Unfortunately, global attitudes regarding U.S. leadership have shifted in recent years, suggesting a decline in the security consensus. As argued throughout this dissertation, an eroding security consensus enables activists to exploit elite division, magnifying domestic opposition against U.S. military presence. This was illustrated in the Philippines, where a weak security consensus, undoubtedly accelerated by the democratization movement and the post-Cold War security environment, led to base closure. Turkey is another case where the lack of elite consensus and domestic opposition resulted in the rejection of base access and over-flight pass for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The U.S. has little direct control over the degree of security consensus within host governments. The consensus shifts with changes in the external security environment and internal domestic political factors which Washington may or may not be able to influence. Where possible, however, the U.S. can take action by promoting policies which foster mutual trust, respect, and transparency among alliance partners. If host nation acceptance of U.S. forces rests on shared national interests, Washington must demonstrate to their allies that they too have a stake in U.S. global defense posture. *Quid pro quos* function as effective leveraging tools in base politics, but a stable network of overseas bases cannot be sustained entirely through compensation politics. U.S. military presence and foreign bases must also fit into the host nation’s national interest and overarching security framework.

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A common perception among anti-base activists (and some host government elites) is that U.S. global defense posture exists solely for the benefit of U.S. interests. Certainly U.S. strategic imperatives trump all other motives behind the planning of overseas basing strategy. And on reflection of some questionable U.S. foreign policy behavior in the past – meddling in domestic affairs, propping up dictatorships, or circumventing human rights conventions - anti-base activists have good reason to believe that U.S. military presence functions more as a force of evil rather than good. Often missed from this perspective, however, is the understanding of security as a collective good, and the possibility that U.S. bases at times function as a stabilizing, balancing force. For instance, in the Asia-Pacific, a region plagued with historical animosities, mutual distrust, and relative insecurity, the U.S. military functions as the stabilizing linchpin.

Managing the security consensus requires greater diplomatic effort on the part of the U.S. in clarifying its strategic goals and objectives to host nation partners. This warrants a larger role for the State Department on overseas basing issues, and more generally in international affairs – a view shared by several senior officials in the second Bush Administration including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. More specifically, the U.S. needs to bolster public diplomacy. One possible solution is the resurrection of the United States Information Agency (USIA), a position advocated by Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain. Until its closure in October 1999, USIA used a wide range of overseas information programs to foster mutual understanding between the United States and other nations. Before its functions were transferred to the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs, USIA maintained 190 offices in 142 countries with the broad goal of explaining and supporting American
foreign policy and promoting U.S. national interests.\(^{39}\) Unfortunately, as McCain argued, “Dismantling an agency dedicated to promoting America and Americans amounted to unilateral disarmament in the struggle of ideas.”\(^{40}\) Whether conducted by the State Department, or an independent agency such as USIA, the U.S. needs to communicate its strategy and values clearly and persuasively to other nations.

To manage the security consensus, the U.S. should also consider extending its network ties to opposition political members in host countries.\(^{41}\) The goal is to demonstrate to both incumbent and opposition political leaders that host country’s have a national security stake in maintaining close security ties to the U.S. Alexander Cooley has advocated a “political hedging” strategy by maintaining contacts with opposition political groups and actors. A hedging strategy ultimately lowers the risk of major base policy upheavals in the event of regime change or other domestic political windfalls.\(^{42}\) We cannot assume that our traditional allies will indefinitely accept or refrain from seriously challenging U.S. strategic imperatives when contingency plans implicate host countries.

2. New Allies, Bad Friends?

I echo the words of caution issued by the OBC as the U.S. pushes to sign basing agreements with new allies and partners. Weak institutions and the political uncertainty of democratic transitions create an unstable environment for U.S. bases. Therefore, the U.S. should weigh other options before signing deals with authoritarian regimes, or even nascent democracies.\(^{43}\) Along similar lines, Kent Calder predicts an increase in “bazaar politics” – when host nations “haggle and play aggressive dual

\(^{39}\) See archived website of the former United States Information Agency.  
\url{http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/factshe.htm} [last accessed April 3, 2008].  
\(^{41}\) This prescription is also advocated by Alexander Cooley and Kent Calder. See Cooley 2008, p.273; Calder 2007, p.239  
\(^{42}\) Cooley 2008, p.273; Calder 2007, p.239.  
\(^{43}\) Cooley 2005.
games” in an effort to extract as much as possible from the U.S. – as Washington forges new ties with regimes in Central Asia and the Middle East.44 I offer a somewhat different explanation (but arrive at the same conclusions as Calder and Cooley) why some of our new allies may not make the best friends in the long term.

Unlike Washington’s traditional alliance partners, new defense cooperation agreements forged with volatile regimes lack the long-standing historical legacy, ideology, or institutional mechanisms which help reinforce a strong security consensus among government elites. New basing agreements, such as the CSLs negotiated in Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, and Zambia, are signed by host states under the pretense of short term gains through foreign aid, military assistance, or political legitimacy. The lack of deeper security interests or shared values suggests a precarious bilateral relationship.

A weak or absent consensus makes basing arrangements much more susceptible to change based on events and circumstances. Diplomatic confrontation, civil societal opposition, or base-related incidents which would normally not warrant the abrogation of base agreements under conditions of strong security consensus, could potentially trigger major base policy changes. The diplomatic fall out between the U.S. and Uzbekistan and the ouster of U.S. forces from the K2 base in 2005 is instructive. U.S. criticism against the Karimov regime’s brutal crackdown against protestors in Andijon resulted in restricted nighttime flights and heavy airlift from K2. Eventually, the Uzbekistan government terminated the SOFA Agreement, resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. forces.45

The news is not all bad regarding new alliance partners. While elites in African or Central Asian states lack a strong consensus supporting U.S. security arrangements,

we should expect more favorable attitudes towards U.S. bases in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{46} The U.S. has or is currently negotiating basing agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland. As members of NATO, elites in these countries are generally supportive of U.S. policies, and place a high value in their strategic partnership with Washington.\textsuperscript{47} Elites not only perceive NATO membership and close ties to the U.S. as a means of boosting international reputation, but also as a deterrent against Russian influence.

In sum, DOD plans to expand its overseas basing network in regions such as Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe have resulted in several new basing agreements since 2001 – some with democracies, others with more questionable democratic credentials. The U.S. should exercise caution when selecting new partners for basing agreements. States with similar regional security goals, interests, and values as the U.S., shared by the majority of host government political elites, make the best partners for U.S. overseas basing strategy.

There is some truth that basing agreements are unstable under weak democracies. Unfortunately, the U.S. cannot simply avoid dictatorships or fledgling democracies across the board. Often times, strategic interests necessitate working with less than ideal regimes to secure larger objectives. Difficult trade-offs must be made. On one hand, by adopting what other nations perceive as hypocritical policies, the U.S. creates the potential for “blowback.” On the other hand, the international environment is constantly changing. FOLs or CSLs critical today may be unnecessary

\textsuperscript{46} Cooley also finds greater stability in Bulgaria and Romania as a result of their consolidated democratic status and the stability of domestic political institutions. See Cooley 2008, pp. 244-46
\textsuperscript{47} This does not mean, however, that anti-base opposition will not take place in NATO countries. This is currently the case in Czech Republic, where anti-base protestors are mobilizing to block the establishment of a missile defense radar installation. More generally, NATO membership itself was contested by a sizeable percentage of the population. I thank Matthew Evangelista for pointing this out.
ten years from now, enabling base planners to discount longer term basing arrangements.

Perhaps the best strategy is a diversified portfolio of bases. The U.S. should maintain several MOBs with traditional allies or new partners where the security consensus runs high. When securing FOLs or CSLs with new partners, the U.S. should weigh in on domestic political factors affecting the mid-long term stability of agreements. The U.S. should clarify the role of U.S. presence with host nations. Money talks, and *quid pro quos* may initially attract political elites. But for longer term arrangements, the U.S. will have to foster stronger diplomatic ties to host states so that elites themselves perceive a security stake in its partnership with the U.S.

3. Afghanistan and Iraq

What implications can be drawn for U.S. bases in Afghanistan and Iraq? Regardless if the U.S. denies the “permanent” status of these bases, current signs indicate that they will remain in place for at least the mid-long term.\(^{48}\) In Afghanistan, protests against the U.S. military have erupted on numerous occasions. The most dramatic incident occurred in late May 2006 when a U.S. military convoy truck recklessly slammed into traffic, killing several people. Exasperating the situation, U.S. soldiers fired into a crowd as angry Afghanis rioted on the streets.\(^{49}\)

U.S. forces continue to face protests and violent armed opposition in Afghanistan.\(^{50}\) At least within Kabul, however, Afghan leaders, most importantly President Harmid Karzai, share the belief that U.S. military and NATO forces must remain in Afghanistan if the regime is to survive. U.S. bases are integral to


Afghanistan’s national security. Thus, the central government is not likely to push for major changes on base related issues until the country stabilizes. With that said, U.S. planners should remain wary of political instability and insecurity outside of Kabul. Afghanistan’s fragmented provinces and President Karzai’s inability to influence warlords outside of Kabul makes predictions on base politics difficult. One of Washington’s priorities in Afghanistan is to assist Kabul in expanding its capacity to govern beyond the capital region. A true security consensus cannot exist as long as provinces function independent of Kabul.

Political fragmentation and sectarian violence obfuscate any direct policy prescriptions from the security consensus framework to Iraq. Prime Minister Nuri Al Maliki is heavily dependent on U.S. forces for Iraq national security. Therefore, he is unlikely to demand major withdrawals in troop levels in the immediate future. However, anti-U.S. forces - both the violent and non-violent variants – place considerable pressure on the fragile Iraqi government to reduce U.S. military presence as soon as possible. Noteworthy is the influential Shiite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces. While the Iraqi government needs U.S. forces to stay afloat, it is difficult to argue that a strong consensus favoring permanent U.S. military bases will exist once Iraqi forces take over security functions. It is highly plausible that a few permanent U.S. bases will remain open in Iraq. But Iraqi political elites will likely see major U.S. presence as a political liability. Mounting civilian casualties, abuse scandals, and the recklessness of private military contractors have already pushed Iraqi officials to demand greater regulations against the U.S. military, as well as private military corporations. In a best case scenario, anti-base opponents will push Iraqi elites to extract further benefits from the U.S. in exchange for a permanent presence. In the worst case, anti-base elements
will use violent means to raise the political costs for elites favoring to keep American forces inside Iraq for the long-haul.

4. U.S. Bases and the Local Community

Base politics scholars have recommended that policymakers address the “micro-politics” of bases which adversely impact bilateral relations.\(^{51}\) This includes addressing base issues at the local level, where most anti-base movements are rooted.\(^{52}\) Currently, the U.S. military hosts numerous community relations programs which enable local residents and U.S. military members to interact through sports, community service, and cultural activities. U.S. military members visit local schools and provide free tutoring or English language instruction.

While these programs improve community relations between the U.S. military and local residents, they tend to draw-in community members from the “pro-base side.” Base commanders and public affairs officers do not necessarily avoid dialogue and discussion with anti-base residents. However, an attitude persists among base officials that everybody who can be potentially persuaded has already been persuaded, with the remainder opposing U.S. bases for ideological reasons.\(^{53}\) As one commanding officer wrote to an activist, “We have to agree to disagree.”\(^{54}\)

My own observations of relations between local residents and the U.S. military corroborate the sentiments of base officials. Understandably, base commanders do not want to spend time and energy interacting with those who resent their presence and refuse to listen to the “voice of reason.” Community networks, however, are an important part of base politics. Implementing concrete measures addressing (or preventing) problems arising

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\(^{51}\) Cooley 2008, p. 272.


\(^{53}\) Interview with base officials at Yongsan Garrison and Camp Humphreys in South Korea, and Camp Ederle in Vicenza.

\(^{54}\) Letter from Major General Frank Helmick, Commanding General, United States Army Southern European Task Force, to a Vicenza activist. November 19, 2007.
from base presence such as crime, pollution, or noise, help build credibility and trust behind U.S. intentions within the local community. If directly meeting anti-base residents and activists is a non-starter, working with local community leaders to explain the reasons and benefits behind U.S. military presence may work as an indirect method of disseminating information.55

**Anti-base Movements: Local and Global**

Finally, we return to the central topic of this dissertation: anti-base movements. Where do anti-base movements fit into base politics and overseas basing strategy? Anti-base protests are only one component of base politics. At times, however, they exert a powerful impact on base policy decisions. Unfortunately, the patterns, motives, and behavior of anti-base movements, and their ability to undermine bilateral relations and U.S. basing strategy are not always clearly understood. U.S. base officials, diplomats, and policy-makers often evaluate anti-base movements as a monolithic entity. In reality, anti-base movements, as described in the empirical sections of this dissertation, are comprised of different actors. Each address the issue of bases from slightly different angles. The variety of anti-base protestors range from local residents focused on NIMBY issues, to “professional” activists deeply engaged in broader, transnational social justice movements. Likewise, activists with different political agendas join anti-base movements to assert their particular cause, such as the environment, sexual crimes and abuse, or demilitarization. When mobilized effectively, civil society not only creates tension between alliance partners, but threatens the permissive environment for U.S. global force posture.

In the previous section, I covered several policy implications and prescriptions for the U.S. government on overseas basing strategy. What insights and lessons can be

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55 This point was raised by the base commander at Camp Humphreys. Interview conducted on December 7, 2005.
drawn for anti-base movements? I offer three sets of recommendations for activists regarding anti-base movement strategy and advocacy. The first suggestion stems directly from the security consensus framework: when possible, activists should form ties with political elites. As discussed in the introductory chapter, U.S. base policies are ultimately decided by government officials. Therefore, anti-base movements gain greater leverage and influence on basing policy outcomes when forming ties with sympathetic elites. This was certainly the case with successful anti-base movements such as the Anti-Treaty Movement in the Philippines and the No Bases Coalition in Ecuador. Although not included in this dissertation, ties between Puerto Rican anti-base activists and several U.S. Congressional representatives helped activists shut down Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Vieques in 2001. The support of several prominent U.S. political figures such as Hillary Clinton and Jesse Jackson, and direct involvement of U.S. representatives such as Nydia M. Velazquez and Luis V. Gutierrez increased publicity and political leverage for the Vieques movement.  

Encouraging anti-base movements to form ties with sympathetic elites seems self-evident. Yet, one might find surprising the level of resistance to this suggestion by some activists. Ties to political elites raise the specter of co-optation. The lack of trust in politicians, the political establishment, or more generally, formal politics, often stem from activists’ own experience and interaction with government officials over the course of several movement episodes. This attitude was expressed by several anti-base activists in South Korea, Japan, and even the Philippines. Activists in Vicenza also faced heated discussions over strategy: should they maintain support for radical left parties? At the local level, should movement leaders move from informal to more formal avenues of politics?  

57 E-mail correspondence with No Dal Molin activist Enzo Ciscato. May 15, 2008.
formal political actors is understandable, research across several anti-base movement episodes suggests that movements which form alliances with political elites and engage base politics through both formal and informal channels tend to have a greater impact on basing policy outcomes.

Second, activists must seek broad coalitions with diverse groups, even at the risk of inter-coalition division and factionalism. Although no strict formula for anti-base coalition formation exists, the trajectory of most anti-base movements begins at the local level, eventually shifting scale to the national or transnational level. Scale shift occurs when movement leaders at the local level, acting as brokers, contact or reach out to outside civil societal groups and NGOs. Broad anti-base coalitions are advantageous with greater mobilizing capacities, which in turn generate greater publicity and media attention. This was the case in the movement to shut down Kooni Firing Range in Maehyangri. Maehyangri was virtually unheard of, despite protests by local villagers to close Kooni Range since the late 1980s. Without the involvement of numerous NGOs and civic groups, the bombing accident in Maehyangri in 2000 would likely have gone unnoticed. Fortunately, a year before the accident, a documentary about the plight of Maehyangri residents’ in 1999 drew the attention of several NGOs, including Green Korea United (GKU). After the accident, GKU and other civic groups involved in the PAR-SOFA campaign latched onto the Maehyangri issue, committing their support to local anti-base leaders. Local anti-base activists alone would not have been able to build the pressure necessary to force U.S. and South Korean officials to the negotiating table.

Lastly, and related to the previous point, activists need to adopt framing strategies which attract a broad formation, but at the same time minimize 1) potential

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58 Activists representing organizations at the regional or national level may also act as brokers, offering their support even before local movement leaders reach out to outside groups.
within group factionalism and 2) the alienation of local anti-base groups within the larger coalition. Anti-base movements in the Philippines and South Korea which led to full or partial concessions formed under politically neutral campaign banners, such as the Anti-Treaty Movement or People’s Action for Reform of the Unjust SOFA. These neutral slogans helped draw in other civil societal actors often wary of joining anti-base groups associated with groups on the far left.\textsuperscript{59} Friction between local and national groups also loomed large in several anti-base coalitions, such as those in Okinawa. Successful movements in the Philippines and Ecuador were able to avoid these tensions, partially because the movement’s center of gravity began at the national rather than local level. For other coalitions with a strong local base, however, such as those in Vicenza and Pyeongtaek, “outside” groups worked to ensure that local grievances were not neglected by the broader framing of the movement. The length and scale of mobilization experienced by KCPT and the Dal Molin Campaign would not have taken place without bridging the more abstract claims for peace and sovereignty with more tangible frames such as forced eviction or environmental destruction.

In studying anti-base movements in different parts of the world, I noticed many striking similarities and patterns. Anti-base activists used similar frames, often a mixture of local rights and justice claims embedded within more abstract peace and sovereignty frames. Movements relied on loose coalition structures as their mode of organization. Although opposed to U.S. bases and U.S. policies, activists targeted the host government rather than the United States. Perhaps the least profound, but most symbolically meaningful similarity was the anti-base movements’ predilection for

\textsuperscript{59} Debate over the use of moderate versus radical tactics took place within ATM and PAR-SOFA. By in large, however, the overarching strategies called for moderation, thus providing political space for more politically neutral NGOs, such as environmental organizations, to enter the coalition.
large tents. My first visit to the Presidio – the large, white tent functioning as the headquarters of the No Dal Molin campaign – evoked earlier memories of candle-light vigils in the Pyeongtaek greenhouse, or conversations in the tent-like structure at Henoko. The Tuesday night public forum I witnessed inside the Presidio felt surreal, as if the same discussions of strategy, same criticisms, same words of hope and encouragement, were transported from Pyeongtaek in 2005 to Vicenza in 2008.

These similarities and patterns warrant further research on anti-base movements as a global or transnational phenomena. This dissertation has focused almost entirely on domestic anti-base movements. However, a growing transnational anti-base network also exists, alluded to in Chapter Four. As “rooted cosmopolitans,” many local anti-base activists have formed ties with other anti-base campaigns facing similar struggles in an effort to reduce or abolish U.S. bases around the world.  From a policy perspective, U.S. officials may brush aside transnational anti-base movements for now. However, if local grievances remain unaddressed, anti-base activists will win additional support for their cause. They will continue to deepen ties not only among themselves, but with the un-mobilized mass public and political elites. For example, peace activists across Europe have already mobilized to support anti-base initiatives in the Czech Republic. Populist support for left-leaning elites in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela may also complicate U.S. basing initiatives in Latin America.

Chalmers Johnson writes, “The American network of bases is a sign not of military preparedness but of militarism, the inescapable companion of imperialism.” Although it may be a slight stretch to equate U.S. global force posture with formal empires of the past, this is exactly how many opponents of military bases interpret the

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60 Tarrow 2005, pp.28-29.
network of U.S. overseas bases. As visible symbols of American power abroad, bases, at times, elicit intense political reactions. U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq today have continued to fuel anti-base sentiment well into the twenty-first century as parts of the world grow wary of U.S. militarism. For sure, we can expect more anti-base protests in the future. The global anti-base movement strives to channel and transform the local NIMBY nature of anti-base protests into a transnational NIABY (not-in-anyone’s backyard) movement. The key question is whether anti-base movements progress to the point where overseas basing strategy becomes increasingly costly or untenable because of political opposition in critical combat support or access regions.\(^63\) Relying more heavily on CSL and FOL bases may help address (or avoid) NIMBY grievances. However, the U.S. will need to diligently pursue parallel political and diplomatic solutions if it wishes to sustain its overseas basing network into the long-term future.


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