1 00:00:00,320 --> 00:00:04,880 The following is part of Cornell Contemporary China Initiative Lecture Series 2 00:00:04,880 --> 00:00:08,240 under the Cornell East Asia Program. The arguments and viewpoints 3 00:00:08,240 --> 00:00:10,720 of this talk belong solely to the speaker. 4 00:00:10,720 --> 00:00:11,520 We hope you enjoy. 5 00:00:11,520 --> 00:00:15,520 >> Welcome back to the Cornell Contemporary China Initiative. 6 00:00:15,520 --> 00:00:19,360 My name is Nick Admussen. I'm the director of the CCCI and the assistant professor 7 00:00:19,360 --> 00:00:26,000 of Asian studies. Tonight I am very very happy to introduce Professor Allen Carlson, 8 00:00:26,000 --> 00:00:29,280 who is a professor of government in the Department of Government 9 00:00:29,280 --> 00:00:34,480 at Cornell University, one of our own, and also director of the China & Asia-Pacific 10 00:00:34,480 --> 00:00:38,640 Studies program. I know we have a lot of CAPS students in the audience today. 11 00:00:38,640 --> 00:00:43,120 CAPS is also supporting this lecture, today's lecture. I see you guys smiling 12 00:00:43,120 --> 00:00:50,240 proudly, the CAPS students. All of them. Good. Allen's the author of an imperial 13 00:00:50,240 --> 00:00:54,720 bushel of research, as opposed to an  American bushel which I think is smaller. 14 00:00:56,240 --> 00:01:00,960 But I want to zoom in for a second on his 2008 book called 15 00:01:00,960 --> 00:01:06,000 "Unifying China, Integrating with the World" which I think taught the field a lot 16 00:01:06,000 --> 00:01:10,160 of things about sovereignty. A lot of people had said or felt that sovereignty was very 17 00:01:10,160 --> 00:01:13,360 important to Chinese government but I think very few people understood 18 00:01:13,360 --> 00:01:17,040 how much it changes over time before Professor Carlson's research period. 19 00:01:18,400 --> 00:01:24,080 And because national policy towards sovereignty affects international relations 20 00:01:24,080 --> 00:01:28,320 as well as domestic policy, that puts him in a great position to talk to us today 21 00:01:28,320 --> 00:01:32,960 about policy towards the Tibet Autonomous Region, which is what 22 00:01:32,960 --> 00:01:37,120 he's gonna talk about today. I absolutely can't wait to hear this. I hope you're 23 00:01:37,120 --> 00:01:43,685 as excited as I am. And let's give him a warm welcome. 24 00:01:43,685 --> 00:01:44,720 >>   25 00:01:44,720 --> 00:01:48,960 Thank you Nick, and I wanna thank the East Asia Program for putting together 26 00:01:48,960 --> 00:01:53,920 this amazing series and also do call attention to the CAPS program 27 00:01:53,920 --> 00:01:58,640 and its support of the series. And if any of you are interested in learning more 28 00:01:58,640 --> 00:02:04,080 about China, CAPS is a really great place to do so whether you just take a class 29 00:02:04,080 --> 00:02:09,440 with us, do the minor, or the major. Our offices are over in Morrill Hall. 30 00:02:10,240 --> 00:02:13,760 Come by, I'm happy to talk to you or you can talk to our staff as well. 31 00:02:15,440 --> 00:02:20,320 As for today's talk, we're talking about one of the least sensitive issues 32 00:02:20,320 --> 00:02:27,440 in Chinese politics, he says sarcastically.  This in fact is probably one of the most 33 00:02:27,440 --> 00:02:31,200 sensitive topics when we're talking about China, as it is for all countries 34 00:02:31,200 --> 00:02:36,000 when the question of who belongs and where boundaries should be drawn 35 00:02:36,000 --> 00:02:39,600 becomes. So even before I start the talk I just have a question for y'all. 36 00:02:39,600 --> 00:02:42,320 How many of you have been to Tibet? 37 00:02:45,120 --> 00:02:49,840 Okay good. How many of you have been to a Tibetan region within China? 38 00:02:49,840 --> 00:02:57,767 Slightly more. Excellent. And maybe those are the same things or not. 39 00:02:57,767 --> 00:03:02,480 I actually became a political scientist after doing a semester with the School 40 00:03:02,480 --> 00:03:06,960 for International Training Tibetan studies  program when I was your age which took 41 00:03:06,960 --> 00:03:14,160 me to Dharamsala, Kathmandu, Lhasa, and also Sikkim. And from that time 42 00:03:14,160 --> 00:03:19,360 I was fascinated with this question of where Tibet sat, both within China 43 00:03:19,360 --> 00:03:24,800 and within the international order. In  my dissertation work, decades ago now, 44 00:03:26,000 --> 00:03:30,480 I looked at this issue with reference to the question of sovereignty as Nick has said, 45 00:03:31,120 --> 00:03:37,520 trying to figure out essentially how Beijing was constructing its sovereign claims 46 00:03:37,520 --> 00:03:44,880 over Tibet, and in contrast how some Tibetans, not all, were forwarding us 47 00:03:44,880 --> 00:03:48,720 a distinct narrative, their own narrative  about Tibet as a separate place. 48 00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:54,240 From that early research to today I've emphatically stayed away from 49 00:03:54,240 --> 00:04:00,160 the question of which side is right. I don't find that normative question 50 00:04:00,160 --> 00:04:05,520 all that interesting. Rather I'm looking at Tibet and its place in the world 51 00:04:06,080 --> 00:04:12,000 more analytically. I'm trying to make sense of how and why we've gone from how 52 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:16,560 things were to how they are and looking forward a little bit to predicting the future. 53 00:04:17,120 --> 00:04:23,760 So if at the end of the talk any of you want to ask me "so should Tibet be independent?" 54 00:04:23,760 --> 00:04:29,120 I will say I do not know. Conversely if any of you say "so Tibet is part of China, 55 00:04:30,400 --> 00:04:37,360 do you agree?" and I will say I don't know. In both cases, and we'll get to that soon, 56 00:04:37,360 --> 00:04:40,560 whether it's the Tibetan claim of independence or the Chinese claim 57 00:04:40,560 --> 00:04:46,000 of Tibet being a part of China, these are  claims that are made within a Westphalian 58 00:04:46,000 --> 00:04:53,680 or sovereign order, which has only existed  in Asia from the end of the Qing essentially. 59 00:04:53,680 --> 00:04:57,920 So relations before then, whether we're talking about where Tibet sat vis-a-vis   60 00:04:59,200 --> 00:05:03,200 what was China then or Xinjiang, or even  the relationship between countries there 61 00:05:03,200 --> 00:05:08,880 or nations there, see they're not even the right terms, dynasties were more 62 00:05:08,880 --> 00:05:16,960 ambiguous than what we have now. And so to go back and take our current system 63 00:05:16,960 --> 00:05:22,320 and push it into that old order I think creates a number of difficulties for anyone 64 00:05:22,320 --> 00:05:27,600 who's attempting to do it. Anyways, today I'm gonna focus more on contemporary 65 00:05:27,600 --> 00:05:33,440 issues and particularly what I see, and it will document as a turn in Beijing's 66 00:05:33,440 --> 00:05:38,240 policy towards minorities in general, Tibet and Xinjiang more specifically, 67 00:05:38,880 --> 00:05:44,560 shifting from a degree of, there's always been a balance in Chinese policy towards 68 00:05:44,560 --> 00:05:49,840 minorities between autonomy and assimilation and over the past four or five 69 00:05:49,840 --> 00:05:55,680 years the more assimilationist approach has dominated, has come to the fore, 70 00:05:55,680 --> 00:06:02,160 in treatment of both Tibet and Xinjiang, which I'm not as much of a specialist in. 71 00:06:02,800 --> 00:06:06,800 And one of the things that signals this or one of the things where I feel the level 72 00:06:06,800 --> 00:06:13,080 of this has gone beyond anything before is in a recent drive to sinicize, 中国化, 73 00:06:14,320 --> 00:06:21,600 Tibetan Buddhism, 藏传佛教, which is a new turn in religious policy and policy 74 00:06:21,600 --> 00:06:27,120 within the TAR. I'll highlight that towards the end of the talk. Also you see 75 00:06:27,120 --> 00:06:29,200 the quote below which I haven't translated. 76 00:06:29,200 --> 00:06:30,400 "像石榴籽那样紧紫抱在一起 [held together like pomegranate seeds]." 77 00:06:34,400 --> 00:06:39,440 So even if you're not a speaker of Chinese you'll understand the image there. 78 00:06:40,800 --> 00:06:42,840 This is an image of what? 79 00:06:42,840 --> 00:06:44,400 >> A pomegranate. 80 00:06:44,400 --> 00:06:49,440 A pomegranate, 石榴籽. And the seeds within a pomegranate, people drink those 81 00:06:49,440 --> 00:06:52,800 like juice, which are pomegranates. I've never had one cause they're like 82 00:06:52,800 --> 00:06:57,920 5 dollars a piece or something. It seems incredibly expensive. But the point here 83 00:06:57,920 --> 00:07:05,600 is when you cut open a pomegranate the seeds are pretty much right on top 84 00:07:05,600 --> 00:07:13,120 of each other. 紧紫抱在一起, they're squeezed together. Xi Jinping 85 00:07:13,120 --> 00:07:17,920 when he was addressing the 19th Party Congress used this reference to talk 86 00:07:17,920 --> 00:07:23,120 about how nationalities in China should be interacting with each other today. 87 00:07:24,000 --> 00:07:28,400 They should be like the seeds within a pomegranate squeezed together. 88 00:07:29,440 --> 00:07:34,880 This was in 2017 and I'll come around to this later in the talk but I think it really   89 00:07:36,320 --> 00:07:41,280 represents the shift away from autonomy, there's still vestiges of autonomy within 90 00:07:43,440 --> 00:07:48,400 Chinese policy towards Tibet, but towards  more and more assimilationist approach. 91 00:07:51,360 --> 00:07:55,920 Setting the stage for current Sino-Tibetan relations. As I was just talking about 92 00:07:55,920 --> 00:08:03,200 what we had historically were two empires who interacted with each other in various 93 00:08:03,200 --> 00:08:07,840 ways that waxed and waned depending on which was more powerful. There are some 94 00:08:07,840 --> 00:08:12,880 seminal events within the Sino-Tibetan relationship which are referred to by both 95 00:08:12,880 --> 00:08:17,760 sides, both the Tibetans and the Chinese, as symbolizing or representing moments 96 00:08:17,760 --> 00:08:24,080 of either independence or belonging to a Chinese order. I'm not gonna go 97 00:08:24,080 --> 00:08:28,880 into those today. Actually I'm giving - it just so happens this week that I'm doing 98 00:08:28,880 --> 00:08:33,600 two talks on Tibet. On Thursday I'm giving a talk to the Reppy Institute, 99 00:08:33,600 --> 00:08:38,720 which will focus much more on this question of international order and how 100 00:08:38,720 --> 00:08:43,760 it's created at different points in time. And during that talk I will for instance 101 00:08:43,760 --> 00:08:52,000 go into detail about the 5th Dalai Lama's trip to Beijing, in the 1600s it was, 102 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:59,040 when he meets with the Shunzhi Emperor, emperor of the Qing, and the question of 103 00:08:59,040 --> 00:09:03,440 what type of protocol and order was followed, or subsequently later in the Qing 104 00:09:03,440 --> 00:09:08,880 the institution of the use of the golden urn as a way to select reincarnates. 105 00:09:09,600 --> 00:09:19,680 Leaving the details aside what's clear is that historically it was, as Michael Oxenberg 106 00:09:19,680 --> 00:09:24,480 wrote in one of the last pieces he did before he died a decade ago, it was a 107 00:09:24,480 --> 00:09:30,640 multi-layered relationship. So in that multi-layered relationship, again, 108 00:09:30,640 --> 00:09:37,440 we're talking about a pre-Westphalian order in this part of Asia. So to take 109 00:09:37,440 --> 00:09:43,200 concepts that we now are familiar with, whether it's independence or sovereignty, 110 00:09:43,200 --> 00:09:50,400 any of those, and project them back is to take that old order and fit it 111 00:09:50,400 --> 00:09:57,600 into a set of categories that we understand but will leave out parts of what was 112 00:09:57,600 --> 00:10:04,000 going on at the time. In my mind it does an injustice to the complexity 113 00:10:04,000 --> 00:10:13,280 of the dynastic relationship between those in  Tibet and in China itself. That being said, 114 00:10:13,280 --> 00:10:22,240 with the end of the Qing in 1911 and China's introduction into the Western 115 00:10:22,240 --> 00:10:27,280 international order there no longer was the space for that ambiguity. 116 00:10:28,160 --> 00:10:33,120 And what you had were actors on each side working assiduously 117 00:10:33,840 --> 00:10:43,760 to construct legal claims to that status as part, in this case, part of China, 118 00:10:44,400 --> 00:10:50,720 first the Republic of China and subsequently the PRC. And for what it's worth the Tibetans 119 00:10:50,720 --> 00:10:57,680 at the time didn't really know what - were attempting to contribute 120 00:10:57,680 --> 00:11:02,400 to these discussions but were in some ways even more marginalized 121 00:11:02,400 --> 00:11:05,840 than the Chinese were. So China's coming into an order that's not their own. 122 00:11:05,840 --> 00:11:10,640 Tibet is on the margins of China. And the Tibetans then, as for example 123 00:11:10,640 --> 00:11:14,960 my research that was done by a former  PhD student of mine, Amanda Cheney, 124 00:11:15,520 --> 00:11:20,000 who now has a postdoc at the Lund showed, the Tibetans didn't even have 125 00:11:20,000 --> 00:11:25,360 some of the words at the time to explain or to describe how they thought they fit 126 00:11:25,360 --> 00:11:32,240 into this new world. The early usage of for instance the Tibetan word "rangzen," 127 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:37,920 which is independence. Rangzen when it  was first being used around the time 128 00:11:37,920 --> 00:11:45,440 of the Simla Convention in 1913-1914 was translated by the Tibetans sometimes 129 00:11:45,440 --> 00:11:49,840 as independence, sometimes as autonomy, sometimes as something else. And now 130 00:11:49,840 --> 00:11:54,720 that term though is clear to any Tibetan. When you say rangzen or if you use 131 00:11:54,720 --> 00:12:01,280 the term rangzen in a public demonstration, for example, within the TAR everyone else 132 00:12:01,280 --> 00:12:06,960 knows what you mean too and you're not gonna fare very well. But that's the term 133 00:12:06,960 --> 00:12:11,520 that we now know it's understood it's politically charged. But in this period 134 00:12:11,520 --> 00:12:14,800 when we're moving from a dynastic order into the Westphalian order, 135 00:12:14,800 --> 00:12:22,880 it was sort of indeterminate or at least up in the air and ambiguous. China was in 136 00:12:22,880 --> 00:12:28,800 a superior position. It was an asymmetrical relationship. The Tibetans in the 1920s 137 00:12:28,800 --> 00:12:34,480 and 1930s under the 13th Dalai Lama were somewhat in chaos just on their own. 138 00:12:35,840 --> 00:12:42,560 In regards to whether Tibet was going  to modernize, heavy contestation between 139 00:12:42,560 --> 00:12:48,160 various monasteries and orders within Tibetan Buddhism, a lot of internal strife 140 00:12:48,800 --> 00:12:52,800 and uncertainty about how to respond to becoming part of the outside world. 141 00:12:54,960 --> 00:13:01,920 China itself is in a civil war between the KMT and CCP which ultimately 142 00:13:01,920 --> 00:13:07,840 the CCP wins in the late 1940s. And through the 30s and 40s though 143 00:13:08,560 --> 00:13:16,240 Tibet, again, is sitting in this ambiguous position as both being a part of whatever 144 00:13:16,240 --> 00:13:23,040 China was becoming but also not fitting in particularly well to that. That ambiguity, 145 00:13:23,040 --> 00:13:27,680 and then we'll move forward from there, ends quite quickly after the establishment 146 00:13:27,680 --> 00:13:36,640 of the PRC in 1949. Mao we know stands in Tiananmen and talks about the Chinese 147 00:13:36,640 --> 00:13:42,800 people having stood up. At that point in October of 1949, actually Tibet, 148 00:13:42,800 --> 00:13:47,040 what becomes the Tibetan Autonomous Region, was still outside of CCP control. 149 00:13:47,920 --> 00:13:52,480 It was basically the last region of what we now know as the People's Republic of China 150 00:13:53,280 --> 00:13:59,840 that the PLA entered into and was able to take control over. So Mao stands up. 151 00:14:00,640 --> 00:14:03,440 Mao is in Tiananmen and China has stood up.   152 00:14:04,400 --> 00:14:09,840 One of the first military campaigns that then  takes place after the establishment of PRC 153 00:14:09,840 --> 00:14:15,440 is moving into the Tibetan region both to vest their control over Tibet and also due 154 00:14:15,440 --> 00:14:19,760 to concerns about remnants of the KMT that may have still been in the area 155 00:14:19,760 --> 00:14:23,840 and further south. Deng Xiaoping actually is the leader of this military campaign 156 00:14:24,800 --> 00:14:32,640 and it goes quite quite smoothly over the course of 1950. Actually minimal 157 00:14:32,640 --> 00:14:36,960 resistance on the part of Tibetans. We could even talk a little bit about why 158 00:14:37,520 --> 00:14:43,840 it was so easy for China to move into Tibet, or for the PRC to move into Tibet in 1950 159 00:14:45,600 --> 00:14:48,400 but that's maybe a detail that we can leave aside for the time being. 160 00:14:49,520 --> 00:14:57,920 Regardless, through this movement - oh and also by the way in the Chinese 161 00:14:57,920 --> 00:15:02,720 orthodoxy this is not a military campaign, but peaceful liberation of Tibet. 162 00:15:03,840 --> 00:15:11,600 和平解放 [heping jiefang]. And there is again a degree of truth in that claim 163 00:15:11,600 --> 00:15:17,760 in that initially the Tibetans again were divided about how to respond in their 164 00:15:18,640 --> 00:15:26,800 interactions with the PLA in 1950. By the end of 1950 the PLA has established 165 00:15:26,800 --> 00:15:35,680 control over much of Tibet, and in 1951 we get the signing of the 17-Point 166 00:15:35,680 --> 00:15:42,400 Agreement between the Dalai Lama and Mao. The Dalai Lama himself 167 00:15:42,400 --> 00:15:47,520 does not go to sign the agreement. Actually it ends up beings signed by 168 00:15:47,520 --> 00:15:56,080 Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme who is the leader of the civilian government at the time. 169 00:15:56,080 --> 00:16:02,960 This is a photo of the signing of the 17-Point Agreement. The core of this agreement 170 00:16:03,600 --> 00:16:10,480 essentially is that the Tibetans give up claims to independence in return  171 00:16:10,480 --> 00:16:18,560 for guarantees of a high level of autonomy within what will become the Tibetan 172 00:16:18,560 --> 00:16:23,360 Autonomous Region. The 17-Point Agreement also, and this I'll show you   173 00:16:23,360 --> 00:16:28,640 in a couple of slides, solidifies what continues to be a contentious issue, 174 00:16:29,360 --> 00:16:36,480 that being what is Tibet and where do its boundaries lie. Not just within 175 00:16:36,480 --> 00:16:41,440 the international order, so Tibet is part of China, but how extensive Tibet is 176 00:16:41,440 --> 00:16:48,720 within the PRC itself. And as Nick referred to looking at, in particular, the Tibetan 177 00:16:48,720 --> 00:16:53,600 Autonomous Region. So the 17-Point Agreement, the Tibetans are essentially 178 00:16:53,600 --> 00:16:59,840 saying, there's not much we're gonna be able to do in terms of resisting 179 00:16:59,840 --> 00:17:07,360 what China is doing but at the same time we feel distinct enough to have a set of 180 00:17:07,360 --> 00:17:11,360 demands that will allow us to preserve Tibetan language, culture, and the rest. 181 00:17:11,920 --> 00:17:18,800 And also this issue of, once more, of how extensive the boundaries or what Tibet 182 00:17:18,800 --> 00:17:26,880 itself is. Anyways, 1951, the 17-Point Agreement, which establishes a temporary 183 00:17:26,880 --> 00:17:35,680 calm between the Tibetans and the central government in Beijing. Over the course 184 00:17:35,680 --> 00:17:41,280 of the 1950s though, and again I'm happy in Q&A to go into more detail about 185 00:17:41,280 --> 00:17:44,720 what underlies these developments, but over the course of the 1950s 186 00:17:45,440 --> 00:17:52,080 the agreement, which is signed here, ends up being unsatisfactory to at least some 187 00:17:52,080 --> 00:17:54,480 living within Tibetan regions in the PRC. In particular, and I'm gonna skip ahead 188 00:17:54,480 --> 00:18:08,480 in the slide right now just to kind of draw this out. In particular, so '51 is the 17-Point 189 00:18:08,480 --> 00:18:14,640 Agreement. It establishes essentially the boundaries here of what in 1965 190 00:18:14,640 --> 00:18:17,200 becomes known as the Tibetan  Autonomous Region, the TAR. 191 00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:24,960 What it leaves out are culturally and linguistically two large areas which were 192 00:18:24,960 --> 00:18:32,560 historically part of whatever Tibet could  have been considered. Not clear that here 193 00:18:32,560 --> 00:18:39,200 Lhasa is the capital of the Ü-Tsang region of Tibet historically. Up here in what is now 194 00:18:39,200 --> 00:18:41,840 Qinghai. How many people have been to Qinghai? 195 00:18:42,560 --> 00:18:50,000 Yes okay. So Qinghai historically was the Amdo region of what was considered Tibet. 196 00:18:50,720 --> 00:18:56,560 The 14th Dalai Lama actually comes from Amdo. And down here roughly in this area 197 00:18:57,360 --> 00:19:06,240 we have the region which is referred to as Kham, which is now for the most part 198 00:19:06,240 --> 00:19:12,480 outside of the TAR. Anyways, the agreements here about leaving Tibet alone, 199 00:19:12,480 --> 00:19:17,600 giving it autonomy on the 17-Point Agreement, didn't extend to these regions 200 00:19:17,600 --> 00:19:21,520 outside of what becomes the Tibet Autonomous Region. This appears 201 00:19:21,520 --> 00:19:27,120 to have been the cause of unrest, particularly in Kham, starting in 202 00:19:27,120 --> 00:19:35,840 the mid-1950s, 1955, 1956. And you begin to have fighting between those in Kham 203 00:19:36,640 --> 00:19:44,400 and Chinese officials and the Chinese military. Between 1956 and 1959 204 00:19:45,440 --> 00:19:53,680 this resistance picks up and actually you begin to have a number of refugees 205 00:19:53,680 --> 00:19:59,520 coming from areas where there's conflict into Lhasa, which then politicized Lhasa 206 00:20:00,400 --> 00:20:07,600 in a way that had previously not been the case. And this culminates in March 207 00:20:07,600 --> 00:20:16,480 of 1959 with what is known as the Lhasa uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama 208 00:20:16,480 --> 00:20:23,120 to India where he has now resided for decades after the Indian government 209 00:20:23,120 --> 00:20:30,800 gives him this little parcel of land up in Northern India in Dharamsala. 210 00:20:30,800 --> 00:20:32,160 Has anyone been to Dharamsala? 211 00:20:33,920 --> 00:20:37,280 Yes, okay. Me too. A long time ago, very long time ago. Actually when I was in 212 00:20:37,280 --> 00:20:42,160 Dharamsala when I was very very young, about your age, I met Richard Gere.   213 00:20:42,160 --> 00:20:46,640 He's the one celebrity I've ever met. This was before at the Oscars he gave 214 00:20:46,640 --> 00:20:51,840 a speech about Tibet and the rest of it. He's been a devote Buddhist for a very very 215 00:20:51,840 --> 00:20:55,360 long time. And the thing in Dharamsala, it's a very small town particularly at the 216 00:20:55,360 --> 00:20:59,360 time, was you were supposed to act as if he wasn't Richard Gere. 217 00:20:59,360 --> 00:21:03,760 Like everyone's there just practicing Buddhism and the rest of it. And so we're in 218 00:21:03,760 --> 00:21:06,480 this pancake house and Richard Gere was sitting next to me and I thought, 219 00:21:06,480 --> 00:21:11,680 oh my god. And I haven't met another Hollywood celebrity since. But I met him, 220 00:21:11,680 --> 00:21:21,200 well I at least saw, at least I was in the room with him. Anyways. So in '59 in March, 221 00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:27,840 March 10th becomes this charged symbolic date in Sino-Tibetan relations. 222 00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:33,680 Pretty much anything big that happens with Tibet after this date is going to happen 223 00:21:33,680 --> 00:21:39,360 on March 10th. The Tibetans are well aware of this. March 10th is not the day 224 00:21:39,360 --> 00:21:44,720 the Dalai Lama actually leaves Tibet, but it's the start of this uprising in Lhasa 225 00:21:45,280 --> 00:21:50,720 which results in extensive fighting. His departure, in his autobiography, 226 00:21:50,720 --> 00:21:55,120 his departure from Tibet is treated as  almost magical. It's almost like he flew out 227 00:21:55,120 --> 00:21:59,360 of Tibet. Subsequent research which has been done, especially since more 228 00:21:59,360 --> 00:22:04,400 archival stuff has been opened up, has made pretty pretty clear that the CIA 229 00:22:05,280 --> 00:22:13,200 was helping extensively with his departure. So the narrative here is the Dalai Lama 230 00:22:13,200 --> 00:22:17,600 almost walks over the clouds. In truth there's a lot of logistical support 231 00:22:17,600 --> 00:22:23,200 which is going on. Actually after '59 we continue to, the US government continues 232 00:22:23,200 --> 00:22:30,400 to support Tibetan opposition in a variety of ways. And actually, for what it's worth, 233 00:22:30,400 --> 00:22:36,240 Cornell played a tiny role in that resistance in that some of the guerilla fighters, 234 00:22:38,240 --> 00:22:41,440 who came to the U.S., their military training was received 235 00:22:41,440 --> 00:22:48,080 out in Colorado, I think in Fort Hale. But they learned English here on campus 236 00:22:48,080 --> 00:22:54,080 for a short period of time. Cornell probably doesn't want people to talk about that 237 00:22:54,080 --> 00:22:58,880 right now. I'll try to find the records of this, and it's in a book about Tibet 238 00:22:58,880 --> 00:23:04,080 and the Cold War. I haven't found notes and stuff but apparently this did go on. 239 00:23:05,040 --> 00:23:11,280 '59 is hugely significant. So if we're looking at dates, '51 is this sort of 240 00:23:11,280 --> 00:23:16,000 we're gonna be able to get along, the 17-Point Agreement. '59 is the end 241 00:23:16,000 --> 00:23:23,840 of that facade. And in all nationalist disputes, history, the past, is always present. 242 00:23:24,640 --> 00:23:31,200 And so in this case '59 stands out as a seminal date, on March 10th of 1959 243 00:23:31,200 --> 00:23:36,880 a seminal date, for those within Tibet  itself and in the Tibetan diaspora 244 00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:39,040 because it's when the Dalai Lama leaves. 245 00:23:43,440 --> 00:23:49,840 After 1959, I'm just gonna entirely, well I'll get there. 246 00:23:54,320 --> 00:24:00,960 So '59 uprising, this slide is an entire course, maybe not a course that's probably 247 00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:10,160 too much, but at least it's a lecture in and of itself. Tibet is contested internationally. 248 00:24:10,160 --> 00:24:14,480 Where does it stand? And the external boundaries or international boundaries 249 00:24:15,040 --> 00:24:21,440 of this part of the PRC are also contested, in particular in this case by India. So   250 00:24:21,440 --> 00:24:27,040 to this day China and India have an outstanding border dispute over 251 00:24:28,400 --> 00:24:31,680 all three sections, there's the eastern, western, and the central section, 252 00:24:31,680 --> 00:24:36,480 but particularly the eastern and western  sections of their border, and in 1962 253 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:46,240 went to war over the location of the boundary in this place. This is related 254 00:24:46,240 --> 00:24:50,720 also though to the Tibetan question. Some of the debate about where 255 00:24:50,720 --> 00:24:56,720 the boundary lies here goes back to the Simla Convention of 1914 and where 256 00:24:56,720 --> 00:25:02,560 everyone ends up being located. But this is a contested border. And the Dalai Lama 257 00:25:02,560 --> 00:25:10,960 from 1959 onward is living in India that has a border conflict with the PRC. 258 00:25:13,360 --> 00:25:21,200 Anyways, in 1965 you get the establishment of the 西藏自治区, or the Tibetan 259 00:25:21,200 --> 00:25:27,120 Autonomous Region. Again, the groundwork for this was set in the 17-Point Agreement 260 00:25:27,120 --> 00:25:34,240 in 1951. A preparatory committee was established in '56 and the TAR was meant 261 00:25:34,240 --> 00:25:43,840 to be established prior to the 1959 uprising. It takes until 1965 to be established 262 00:25:43,840 --> 00:25:49,840 and this is essentially on the eve of the Cultural Revolution as well. When I first 263 00:25:49,840 --> 00:25:54,800 started giving lectures on Tibet a couple of decades ago I spent a great deal of time 264 00:25:54,800 --> 00:25:58,400 on the Cultural Revolution and its impact on Tibet. We could talk about that later. 265 00:25:58,400 --> 00:26:02,880 but I'm leaving it out of today 'cause I do wanna get to the more recent issues 266 00:26:02,880 --> 00:26:12,000 as soon as we can. The political structure of the Tibetan Autonomous Region falls 267 00:26:12,000 --> 00:26:19,520 within this this framework. And what you  then have is within the Tibetan Autonomous 268 00:26:19,520 --> 00:26:26,240 Region the TAR government itself has a chairman who has always been ethnically 269 00:26:26,240 --> 00:26:31,840 Tibetan, this is also the case in other autonomous regions within the PRC, 270 00:26:32,720 --> 00:26:42,320 but real power has lied with the TAR party secretary, so the CPC committee 271 00:26:42,320 --> 00:26:48,400 secretaries. And when we look at recent changes in policy towards Tibet, 272 00:26:48,400 --> 00:26:55,200 these party secretaries play a particularly  significant role and there's one especially 273 00:26:55,200 --> 00:26:58,960 who I want to call attention to in a few moments who you should remember. 274 00:26:59,760 --> 00:27:03,920 There's maybe three or four things to really take away from the talk. One is the pomegranate 275 00:27:03,920 --> 00:27:11,120 seed reference of Xi. Another is Chen Quanguo, who was the party secretary 276 00:27:11,120 --> 00:27:18,400 from 2011 to 2016 if my date's right. And a couple other things too but we'll   277 00:27:18,400 --> 00:27:29,520 get there in a moment. So this is the TAR. Under Deng Xiaoping beginning in 1979,   278 00:27:29,520 --> 00:27:36,800 this photo is from earlier, this is Deng accompanying Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme 279 00:27:36,800 --> 00:27:41,440 on his way to Beijing to give peace talks, but what you essentially have under Deng, 280 00:27:41,440 --> 00:27:44,480 as you have in the rest of the country, is an acknowledgement of some 281 00:27:44,480 --> 00:27:49,200 of the mistakes that were made under Mao and an attempt to become a bit more 282 00:27:49,200 --> 00:27:58,480 pragmatic in approaching political and economic issues. For the TAR 283 00:27:59,040 --> 00:28:07,600 what this means more specifically, two things. One, in '79 very early after Deng 284 00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:17,040 reaches his role as paramount leader he sends out an invitation to not the Dalai 285 00:28:17,040 --> 00:28:22,880 Lama himself but to Dharamsala to allow a delegation from the diaspora 286 00:28:22,880 --> 00:28:33,200 to come into the PRC to examine conditions within Tibet. This is in '79. Two delegations 287 00:28:33,200 --> 00:28:40,560 end up coming in '79 and 1980. It backfires though from Beijing's perspective in that 288 00:28:41,360 --> 00:28:46,000 Deng felt that these delegations would come, they would say things are great 289 00:28:47,120 --> 00:28:50,480 and maybe the Dalai Lama can come back and there's no need to have any sort 290 00:28:50,480 --> 00:28:57,200 of a conflict anymore. In contrast the delegations were received as if 291 00:28:57,200 --> 00:29:02,880 they were affiliated with the Dalai Lama and led to an outpouring of public support 292 00:29:02,880 --> 00:29:07,520 for the Dalai Lama in a way that greatly embarrassed Deng. And so after those 293 00:29:07,520 --> 00:29:12,400 first two visits we don't get any more  delegations going on. But it was a sign  294 00:29:12,400 --> 00:29:19,120 of a more flexible policy being instituted. In addition restrictions on monastic activity 295 00:29:19,840 --> 00:29:22,720 which had been put in place during the Cultural Revolution were lessened. 296 00:29:24,000 --> 00:29:26,800 The monasteries which had been destroyed were allowed to be rebuilt. 297 00:29:27,840 --> 00:29:34,160 There was no longer a prohibition against the practice of Tibetan Buddhism in public. 298 00:29:35,280 --> 00:29:39,440 So this would be, again if we're talking about and the theme here is assimilation 299 00:29:39,440 --> 00:29:45,920 versus autonomy, this is a period where the Chinese government was experimenting 300 00:29:45,920 --> 00:29:54,160 with granting a higher level of autonomy to this region, not simply 'cause they were 301 00:29:54,160 --> 00:29:58,880 feeling good but rather with the idea that this would be a more effective policy. 302 00:30:00,400 --> 00:30:06,480 That assimilation created blowback and resentment and in contrast 303 00:30:06,480 --> 00:30:10,960 autonomy, the idea of granting autonomy is that with autonomy you'll develop 304 00:30:10,960 --> 00:30:16,960 a higher level of legitimacy for Chinese rule. We're giving you space to do what you want 305 00:30:16,960 --> 00:30:24,480 then you accept the rules that we're giving you. And it appeared in the beginning 306 00:30:24,480 --> 00:30:34,240 in the first part of the 1980s that this was working but the struggle for Beijing 307 00:30:34,240 --> 00:30:40,960 when it comes to Tibet ever since the flight of the Dalai Lama and even earlier is that 308 00:30:40,960 --> 00:30:45,520 Tibetan political institutions and religious institutions are so deeply intertwined. 309 00:30:47,040 --> 00:30:55,680 And so to restrict religious behavior has impacts on people's political values 310 00:30:55,680 --> 00:31:04,560 and ideas and vice versa. So by the late 1980s things in Tibet begin to shape up 311 00:31:04,560 --> 00:31:12,160 in a new way. First of all in 1987, in September of 1987 the Dalai Lama 312 00:31:12,880 --> 00:31:16,240 made his first political speech in the United States to the Congressional 313 00:31:16,240 --> 00:31:23,440 Human Rights Caucus. The Dalai Lama had been to the U.S. before starting in 1979, 314 00:31:23,440 --> 00:31:30,720 but this was the beginning of him taking a much higher profile role within U.S. politics. 315 00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:42,400 This is then associated with a rise of protests, a cycle of protests, within the TAR. 316 00:31:43,200 --> 00:31:49,920 This photo is one of the more iconic photos about Tibet that you'll find. I think if you 317 00:31:49,920 --> 00:31:56,400 Googled Tibet and Tibetan protest this photo comes up. It's of a monk, 318 00:31:56,400 --> 00:32:03,200 Jampa Tenzin, who was amongst protestors in the Tibetan capital of Lhasa in 1987 319 00:32:05,200 --> 00:32:10,720 raising his fist and presumably shouting out something like rangzen, again independence. 320 00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:21,920 This '87-'89 period is the time in which there is the highest level of public expression 321 00:32:21,920 --> 00:32:27,200 of resistance to Chinese rule in Tibet since 1959, and there's been nothing 322 00:32:27,200 --> 00:32:34,160 comparable to it since then. I'll talk in a little bit about the 2008 incident 323 00:32:34,160 --> 00:32:38,320 and also self-immolations that have been taking place. But this is clearly like the 324 00:32:38,320 --> 00:32:48,080 high tide of public opposition to Chinese rule over Tibet. It's led by the monastic 325 00:32:48,080 --> 00:32:55,840 community and unfolds largely through making use of everyday religious practices 326 00:32:56,560 --> 00:33:02,400 for political purposes. So for example between '87 and '89 there's somewhere 327 00:33:02,400 --> 00:33:08,000 between 20 to 30 demonstrations which take place within Tibet and Tibetan regions 328 00:33:08,720 --> 00:33:14,080 in the PRC. The vast majority of these demonstrations actually are starting with 329 00:33:14,880 --> 00:33:18,880 not just monks leading them but through monks carrying out, again, everyday 330 00:33:18,880 --> 00:33:25,600 religious practices. [Unclear], for example, is one of the core everyday 331 00:33:26,240 --> 00:33:31,760 practices in Tibetan religion, so going around a temple or a monastery 332 00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:37,920 in order to collect merit. It's supposed to help you in the next life. So everyone 333 00:33:37,920 --> 00:33:43,200 does this. If everyone's doing it and then in the midst of that everyday practice 334 00:33:44,000 --> 00:33:49,920 you begin to shout out political slogans, that's kind of taking this religious practice 335 00:33:49,920 --> 00:33:55,040 and making it into something more. And these '87-'89 demonstrations 336 00:33:55,040 --> 00:34:02,800 were very much in that vein. They were spurred in part by the Dalai Lama's 337 00:34:02,800 --> 00:34:09,120 more public presence on the international stage and at the same time were 338 00:34:09,120 --> 00:34:17,440 an unintended consequence of the  partial reforms that Deng and Hu Yaobang 339 00:34:17,440 --> 00:34:22,240 had instituted in the early 80s. So what had happened from those reforms was   340 00:34:22,240 --> 00:34:26,400 an opening up of religious space which then made it possible for monks 341 00:34:26,400 --> 00:34:34,000 not only to practice their religion but also to organize a social movement in opposition 342 00:34:34,000 --> 00:34:39,280 to Chinese rule, which was then generally supported by the lay population as well. 343 00:34:43,440 --> 00:34:49,120 In 1988 the Dalai Lama in the midst of all of this goes to the European Parliament 344 00:34:50,000 --> 00:34:54,240 and makes what ends up being called the Strasbourg Proposal, 345 00:34:56,320 --> 00:34:59,200 which is the core of what's considered the Middle Way for Tibet. 346 00:34:59,920 --> 00:35:03,600 This is June of 1988. He in this statement says, 347 00:35:03,600 --> 00:35:08,160 "the whole of Tibet, known as [unclear], which is Ü-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo, 348 00:35:08,160 --> 00:35:13,360 "should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law 349 00:35:13,360 --> 00:35:16,720 "by agreement of the people for the common good and their protection 350 00:35:16,720 --> 00:35:22,800 of themselves and their environment," here's the key line, that within this he adds, 351 00:35:24,880 --> 00:35:33,280 "in association with the People's Republic of China." So the Dalai Lama, who has now 352 00:35:33,280 --> 00:35:39,040 been in exile for decades, in '88 despite the fact that some within the diaspora 353 00:35:39,040 --> 00:35:42,800 are calling for independence in a stronger stand and even the demonstrators 354 00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:48,320 within Tibet are looking for something  more than autonomy, he doesn't endorse 355 00:35:48,960 --> 00:35:55,360 the 17-Point Agreement, he doesn't endorse the TAR specifically, but he does say 356 00:35:55,360 --> 00:36:00,720 that whatever this is going to be, whatever Tibet is going to be, will be in association 357 00:36:00,720 --> 00:36:02,480 with the People's Republic of China. 358 00:36:05,040 --> 00:36:12,800 This is a non-starter for Beijing. It goes nowhere. On the face of it it would seem like 359 00:36:12,800 --> 00:36:16,960 this is a fairly moderate position. No independence,   360 00:36:18,240 --> 00:36:26,160 working with the People's Republic of China. Beijing rejects it for two reasons. 361 00:36:26,160 --> 00:36:32,160 One, they see it as disingenuine, feeling that he is not really talking 362 00:36:32,160 --> 00:36:40,400 about accepting autonomy but is somehow trying to cloak or cover, come up with a ruse 363 00:36:40,400 --> 00:36:42,560 to create greater independence. And secondly,   364 00:36:43,200 --> 00:36:50,320 because the state of the Strasbourg Proposal is  not just about the TAR. It's about historically 365 00:36:50,320 --> 00:36:57,680 what was considered Tibet. And that really ends up being a sticking point 366 00:36:57,680 --> 00:37:02,320 in subsequent negotiations between the two sides. So the demonstrations 367 00:37:02,320 --> 00:37:04,800 are ongoing, the Dalai Lama is making these proposals. 368 00:37:06,400 --> 00:37:11,040 And hopefully some of you will recognize who this is. 369 00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:15,680 Who's Hu Jintao? Who is Hu, as they say. 370 00:37:16,720 --> 00:37:17,220 Someone? 371 00:37:20,560 --> 00:37:21,840 Yes. 372 00:37:21,840 --> 00:37:23,201 >> Wasn't he the previous president [unintelligible]? 373 00:37:23,201 --> 00:37:28,240 >> Yes. Before Xi Jinping he was China's leader. And before he became party 374 00:37:28,240 --> 00:37:34,160 secretary and president of China he was also then the party secretary of Tibet 375 00:37:34,960 --> 00:37:43,120 between 1988 and 1992. So he's actually brought in to the TAR to bring an end 376 00:37:43,120 --> 00:37:48,560 to these riots and demonstrations. And arguably the degree in which 377 00:37:48,560 --> 00:37:54,240 he effectively does that becomes a major stepping stone in his career 378 00:37:55,200 --> 00:38:00,640 moving forward. Hu might not have become party secretary if he hadn't done 379 00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:05,440 his time into that and accomplished what Beijing wanted so effectively. 380 00:38:07,680 --> 00:38:12,000 If he started in '86 or '85 and these demonstrations occurred that probably 381 00:38:12,000 --> 00:38:15,520 wouldn't look that good for him. In contrast he's coming in towards the end of them 382 00:38:16,480 --> 00:38:23,040 and helps to bring them under control. This is done through a declaration 383 00:38:23,040 --> 00:38:28,640 of martial law on Lhasa on March 8th of 1989 which lasts through May of 1990. 384 00:38:29,360 --> 00:38:36,960 In signing the end of this declaration of martial law, Li Peng stated in view 385 00:38:36,960 --> 00:38:40,000 of the fact that the situation in the city of Lhasa has become stable and social 386 00:38:40,000 --> 00:38:43,520 orders have returned to normal, the task of enforcing martial law in the city 387 00:38:43,520 --> 00:38:52,320 has been successfully fulfilled. By the way, the Dalai Lama wins a Nobel Peace Prize 388 00:38:53,920 --> 00:39:03,360 in the fall of 1989 and continues with his relationship with the U.S. government 389 00:39:03,360 --> 00:39:09,040 by visiting George H. W. Bush in April of 1991. And this is the first time 390 00:39:09,040 --> 00:39:13,840 the Dalai Lama meets with an American president. So he'd been to Congress in '87, 391 00:39:15,040 --> 00:39:20,480 meets with Bush in '91, subsequently meets with each American president to date. 392 00:39:22,000 --> 00:39:28,160 He has not met with President Trump and I would think the odds of him meeting 393 00:39:28,160 --> 00:39:33,520 with President Trump are fairly long, but who knows the world is crazy. 394 00:39:34,720 --> 00:39:38,720 Before trump was elected he went on I think it was Charlie Rose's show 395 00:39:38,720 --> 00:39:43,760 or someone and gave an interview where he made quite a bit of fun actually 396 00:39:43,760 --> 00:39:48,240 of the president in a very good-natured Dalai Lama way. But he does this thing 397 00:39:48,240 --> 00:39:51,280 where he took his hand down and "doo doo doo doo doo." 398 00:39:51,280 --> 00:39:57,120 That was his Trump with the hair falling over. If you have like a minute Google 399 00:39:57,120 --> 00:40:04,240 Dalai Lama and Trump, you'll find the video. It's kind of wonderful. I don't think that if  400 00:40:04,240 --> 00:40:08,160 the president has seen it that he'll sit down with the Dalai Lama. 401 00:40:10,480 --> 00:40:15,600 Now moving quickly. So that was all background but you need to know 402 00:40:15,600 --> 00:40:18,240 the background, again, because past is present in these struggles and it's gonna be 403 00:40:18,240 --> 00:40:22,560 the same thing in Xinjiang. I don't know the Xinjiang material like Magnus does here 404 00:40:23,120 --> 00:40:29,360 but in all of these cases you have these moments in the past, which, not only 405 00:40:29,360 --> 00:40:34,880 are not forgotten, become loaded with symbolic significance, whether it's dates 406 00:40:34,880 --> 00:40:41,200 or locations or specific terminology. Here though what we're seeing, and this is 407 00:40:41,200 --> 00:40:47,760 when I wrote my book this was the Tibet, there seemed to be a status quo 408 00:40:47,760 --> 00:40:51,840 which had emerged. Which is we had these demonstrations in '87-'89. We knew 409 00:40:51,840 --> 00:40:56,320 that at least, particularly the Tibetan monastic population, but the lay population 410 00:40:56,320 --> 00:41:01,920 as well was not especially satisfied with being part of China. But the Chinese 411 00:41:01,920 --> 00:41:08,160 government had established effective control over the TAR. And that control 412 00:41:08,160 --> 00:41:15,200 was established through silencing dissent, and this through the use of surveillance, 413 00:41:17,600 --> 00:41:23,200 detentions, other sorts of unsavory  behaviors. But just silencing dissent, 414 00:41:23,200 --> 00:41:28,000 you can understand what's entailed in that. And we're able to then control 415 00:41:28,000 --> 00:41:35,760 public space. After '89 for almost two decades there's no noise coming out 416 00:41:35,760 --> 00:41:44,240 of Tibet. There's a difference though between control and authority. So this policy 417 00:41:44,240 --> 00:41:50,320 of silencing dissent and spurring development, so you have a massive influx 418 00:41:50,320 --> 00:41:54,960 of capital in the form of infrastructure projects, economic incentives, the Tibetan 419 00:41:54,960 --> 00:41:59,600 economy begins to develop rather rapidly. So development and silencing dissent. 420 00:42:00,560 --> 00:42:10,560 Which actually, is kind of the formula for the PRC in general after 1989. 421 00:42:11,680 --> 00:42:19,760 And it's worked in Han areas fairly effectively since then. Eli can talk about 422 00:42:19,760 --> 00:42:25,680 labor unrest and other people. But overall this isn't something that Beijing 423 00:42:25,680 --> 00:42:30,000 comes up with, that Jiang Zemin comes up with just for Tibet. This is the Chinese 424 00:42:30,000 --> 00:42:37,680 government. Keep the troublemakers quiet, and there aren't a lot, and also you can vilify 425 00:42:37,680 --> 00:42:41,280 the troublemakers as being unpatriotic and all the rest of it. So talking about 426 00:42:41,280 --> 00:42:46,160 democracy then isn't about talking about a human right, it's about being a bad 427 00:42:46,160 --> 00:42:52,160 Chinese. It's about being anti-government. And making sure that the economy keeps 428 00:42:52,160 --> 00:43:02,240 rolling forward. And again, it works to a degree. And you see this for example 429 00:43:02,240 --> 00:43:07,200 in the first White Paper in Tibet in September 1992, which I spent way more 430 00:43:07,200 --> 00:43:12,160 time with. If you ever have a hard time falling asleep reading Chinese White Papers 431 00:43:12,160 --> 00:43:17,520 is a good way. Just pick one up in English or Chinese and start thumbing through them 432 00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:22,960 and you'll have, better than any sort of sleeping pill. This is the first White Paper 433 00:43:22,960 --> 00:43:27,920 on Tibet. I think it's actually the second White Paper that China publishes after 434 00:43:27,920 --> 00:43:33,040 its first on human rights. And it was kind of a big deal that at least Beijing 435 00:43:33,040 --> 00:43:37,520 was talking to the world about what was going on within Tibet. But it was very 436 00:43:38,480 --> 00:43:43,360 defensive white paper and saying what's going on Tibet is all good. There are no 437 00:43:43,360 --> 00:43:47,760 problems here, nothing to see here. Like Kevin Bacon at the end of 438 00:43:47,760 --> 00:43:54,640 Animal House. In subsequent White Papers the same theme is developed. New progress 439 00:43:54,640 --> 00:43:58,080 on human rights in Tibet and Tibet marches toward modernization. 440 00:43:59,040 --> 00:44:01,840 So new progress in human rights, this is not saying we're silencing dissent 441 00:44:01,840 --> 00:44:04,880 but this is essentially saying there's no human rights problems here, 442 00:44:04,880 --> 00:44:07,280 and there's no human rights problems here because we've gotten rid of all the 443 00:44:07,280 --> 00:44:13,040 troublemakers. And we're marching forward on the arc of history, 444 00:44:13,040 --> 00:44:14,160 going in the right direction. 445 00:44:16,880 --> 00:44:24,080 Under Guo Jinlong, who's the TAR party  secretary from 2000-2004, I would say 446 00:44:24,080 --> 00:44:31,200 this one of the high tides of this "things are quiet, we're developing the region, nothing 447 00:44:31,200 --> 00:44:39,280 to see here." And in particular the largest of the infrastructure projects which is 448 00:44:39,280 --> 00:44:45,920 developed is the railway line which goes from Xining in Qinghai to Lhasa itself, 449 00:44:46,960 --> 00:44:50,800 which actually through the late 1990s had been considered impossible 450 00:44:53,040 --> 00:45:00,080 to complete in terms of engineering. Much of this railway is on permafrost 451 00:45:00,080 --> 00:45:04,240 and it was in areas it was thought you couldn't build a railway line. 452 00:45:04,240 --> 00:45:07,680 And it's pretty remarkable just in terms of engineering that it was completed. 453 00:45:09,200 --> 00:45:14,480 And Guo was a main part of driving that through. It finishes after his term. 454 00:45:14,480 --> 00:45:21,040 But this is again the old approach, which was not allowing for Tibetan   455 00:45:21,040 --> 00:45:26,160 independence, not at all, but saying autonomy works especially if we get rid 456 00:45:26,160 --> 00:45:32,400 of the troublemakers and we kind of are paying you off. That's the old line 457 00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:38,880 and it appeared to work. The Dalai Lama meanwhile, I wanted to include this just 458 00:45:38,880 --> 00:45:46,560 because the world is crazy sometimes. So George W. Bush, who gave an amazing 459 00:45:46,560 --> 00:45:54,880 eulogy to his father actually last year which was remarkable to see, turns out 460 00:45:54,880 --> 00:45:58,720 that he always wanted to be a painter. I don't know if he always wanted to be 461 00:45:58,720 --> 00:46:02,000 a painter. But what he's largely been doing since he stepped down from office 462 00:46:02,000 --> 00:46:07,200 is painting. And he paints people he met. And he's painted the Dalai Lama. 463 00:46:08,000 --> 00:46:12,560 Apparently he actually quite loves and adores the Dalai Lama, George W. Bush. 464 00:46:12,560 --> 00:46:17,680 Talks about him extremely fondly. And the Dalai Lama as it wouldn't be 465 00:46:17,680 --> 00:46:23,360 surprising talks fondly about George W. Bush too. The Dalai Lama has not a bad 466 00:46:23,360 --> 00:46:29,040 word to say about anyone. I've met him a couple of times many many years ago 467 00:46:30,320 --> 00:46:35,120 and I do have to say that he is an incredibly charismatic and engaging individual. 468 00:46:35,120 --> 00:46:40,160 I don't know what happens in the afterlife or in other lives but if there is something 469 00:46:40,160 --> 00:46:46,400 about him which does seem to be rather special. And certainly he's captured  470 00:46:46,400 --> 00:46:52,000 the attention of George W. Bush. And this is significant to the Tibetan Policy 471 00:46:52,000 --> 00:46:58,800 Act of 2002. Because with Bush's support and this bill, which goes through Congress, 472 00:46:59,520 --> 00:47:04,320 which commits the United States to, I need to look up the specific language here, 473 00:47:04,320 --> 00:47:05,120 oops. Sorry 474 00:47:08,400 --> 00:47:10,880 Oh forget it. I'm not gonna find it. 475 00:47:12,560 --> 00:47:20,720 But commits the United States to both China and Tibetans have to be committed 476 00:47:20,720 --> 00:47:25,920 to dialogue between the two sides, and it also establishes within the State 477 00:47:25,920 --> 00:47:30,320 Department a position, a sort of under secretary for Tibetan affairs. 478 00:47:32,800 --> 00:47:39,120 This formalizes U.S. policy on Tibet. And China is not at all happy about this. 479 00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:44,320 Interference in internal affairs, violation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, 480 00:47:44,320 --> 00:47:50,880 creates all sorts of noise. What's fascinating is in contrast just in the fall another bill 481 00:47:50,880 --> 00:47:55,120 passed through Congress, and Trump signed it, which related Tibet and this 482 00:47:55,120 --> 00:48:00,160 reciprocal access, and China essentially shrugged its shoulders. So 2002, 483 00:48:00,160 --> 00:48:07,040 this infuriates Beijing. 2018, China doesn't really care. And I'll get to I think a little bit 484 00:48:07,040 --> 00:48:08,320 why in a moment. 485 00:48:12,000 --> 00:48:19,280 In 2003, 2004 you have more White Papers and Yang Chuantang is party secretary 486 00:48:19,280 --> 00:48:27,520 who's also considered somewhat moderate and this leads to this quote. 487 00:48:28,160 --> 00:48:32,240 There's a meeting between representatives of the Dalai Lama that "西藏形势很好, 488 00:48:32,240 --> 00:48:41,280 根本不存在什么 '西藏问题'." There's no Tibet problem, no Tibet issue, nothing 489 00:48:41,280 --> 00:48:47,000 to see here. And again that's when I was writing before. This shifts though fairly 490 00:48:47,840 --> 00:48:54,800 quickly. Let me just go straight to here. In March of 2008 when you have unrest 491 00:48:54,800 --> 00:49:01,280 in Lhasa. And how do you term this? Is it 骚乱, is it a riot? Or is it an incident, 492 00:49:01,280 --> 00:49:08,880 or is it a demonstration, or is it a protest? Whatever it was, what it resulted in 493 00:49:08,880 --> 00:49:16,000 was a real challenge to Beijing's assumption that there was no 西藏问题 [Tibet issue]. 494 00:49:17,200 --> 00:49:22,320 In 2004 you could say this, "there's no Tibet problem." China's leaders today will still say 495 00:49:22,880 --> 00:49:28,080 there's no Tibet problem, there's no issue. 2008 blew that myth up though. 496 00:49:29,760 --> 00:49:34,320 It's only two or three days of demonstrations and riots, not particularly organized   497 00:49:34,880 --> 00:49:40,960 as were the '87-'89 protests. The monastic community was involved but not central to it. 498 00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:50,320 The most visible aspect of incident was Tibetans within Lhasa attacking 499 00:49:50,320 --> 00:49:58,240 Han establishments. Restaurants, other sorts of Han-owned enterprises. 500 00:49:59,040 --> 00:50:08,640 And it results in some deaths and a number of casualties as well. And it's taking place 501 00:50:08,640 --> 00:50:13,280 at the same time the Party Congress was meeting in Beijing itself. Actually 502 00:50:14,080 --> 00:50:19,440 the party secretary at the time in Tibet was not in Lhasa and there's a whole 503 00:50:19,440 --> 00:50:24,080 interesting set of discussions about why this sort of rioting lasts for three days 504 00:50:25,360 --> 00:50:28,240 and probably it lasted in part because Beijing was caught off guard 505 00:50:28,240 --> 00:50:34,640 and the leadership wasn't there. It's also taking place against the backdrop 506 00:50:34,640 --> 00:50:41,840 of the lead up to the 2008 Summer Olympics. So you had this short-lived two, three days 507 00:50:41,840 --> 00:50:50,800 of rioting within Lhasa itself followed by demonstrations around the Olympic torch, 508 00:50:50,800 --> 00:50:54,240 which is being carried around the world to go to Beijing at the end of the summer. 509 00:50:55,120 --> 00:51:02,720 So attracting both supporters of Tibet and supporters of China's position as well. 510 00:51:02,720 --> 00:51:05,600 Becomes exceptionally contentious. Actually the last time on campus 511 00:51:05,600 --> 00:51:13,440 that I talked about Tibet was in the middle of all this and it was a very charged 512 00:51:13,440 --> 00:51:14,640 environment I'd say. 513 00:51:16,720 --> 00:51:24,400 The question then is - so through the 1990s and the first part of the 2000s, development 514 00:51:24,400 --> 00:51:30,480 and silencing dissent resulted in control. Beijing felt it was its position in Tibet 515 00:51:30,480 --> 00:51:38,400 was solid. We can talk about why Tibet is so important to China. But the policy line 516 00:51:38,400 --> 00:51:46,080 has appeared to be fairly successful. Now there is a reconsideration 517 00:51:46,080 --> 00:51:52,480 of this granting of limited autonomy. And the question becomes do you double 518 00:51:52,480 --> 00:51:59,680 down on assimilation or do you go with autonomy itself. This is followed by 519 00:52:00,480 --> 00:52:06,160 a significant amount of writing coming out of the Chinese National Minority 520 00:52:06,160 --> 00:52:11,280 Establishment and here in the form of writings which become known 521 00:52:11,280 --> 00:52:18,240 as 第二代民族政策, or the Second Generation Minority Nationality Policy 522 00:52:19,040 --> 00:52:24,160 which is led by people like Ma Rong at 北大 [Peking University] who's a sociologist 523 00:52:24,880 --> 00:52:32,640 and also Hu Angang Hu Lianhe, I think Hu Angang at least is at Tsinghua 524 00:52:32,640 --> 00:52:38,400 I can't remember where Hu Lianhe is. This is where using Chinese sources 525 00:52:38,400 --> 00:52:42,400 becomes really interesting. In English this discussion is not unavailable. 526 00:52:42,400 --> 00:52:51,360 In Chinese beginning in 2008, 2009, no one, whether it's Ma Rong or Hu or Hu, 527 00:52:51,360 --> 00:52:58,240 they're not saying we failed but they're saying we need to reconsider how we're 528 00:52:59,040 --> 00:53:05,760 governing these non-Han regions within the PRC. And there are three main 529 00:53:05,760 --> 00:53:10,560 developments that weigh the scales in favor of assimilation. 530 00:53:12,160 --> 00:53:14,880 First is the appointment, and again this is one of the people I want you to remember. 531 00:53:14,880 --> 00:53:22,880 So the 像石榴籽, like the pomegranate seeds. Chen Quanguo, who's party secretary 532 00:53:22,880 --> 00:53:31,200 from 2011 to 2016, really takes the lead in pushing for a more assimilationist 533 00:53:31,200 --> 00:53:39,600 approach to minorities in general and Tibet more specifically. Chen is - just let me find 534 00:53:39,600 --> 00:53:41,840 notes quickly real quickly. 535 00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:53,200 Chen is from Henan province and had served as party secretary of Hebei before becoming 536 00:53:53,200 --> 00:53:59,520 party secretary of Tibet in 2011. During his time there he really places an emphasis 537 00:53:59,520 --> 00:54:07,280 on surveillance and control. And after his time in Tibet, Magnus would be quite 538 00:54:07,280 --> 00:54:13,040 familiar with where he ends up, he becomes party secretary of Xinjiang. 539 00:54:14,000 --> 00:54:18,640 And what's interesting to look at is the degree in which some of the policies 540 00:54:18,640 --> 00:54:24,400 which are being carried out in Xinjiang now were first instituted in Tibet under Chen. 541 00:54:24,400 --> 00:54:28,720 Surveillance, detention of a couple friends who had family members who were detained 542 00:54:29,360 --> 00:54:35,200 in Tibet under Chen. So there is a pattern of behavior here where Chen, 543 00:54:35,760 --> 00:54:42,160 whether it's on his own initiative or carrying out orders, is really pushing 544 00:54:42,160 --> 00:54:46,960 a more assimilationist approach to governing a non-Han region. 545 00:54:48,000 --> 00:54:53,520 And the extent to which he's using these policies in Tibet are probably less than 546 00:54:53,520 --> 00:54:59,120 in Xinjiang for a variety of reasons but there are real similarities in the approach. 547 00:54:59,680 --> 00:55:05,920 So Chen is a particularly important figure in minority policy within China over 548 00:55:05,920 --> 00:55:11,840 the past seven or eight years. So his appointment is one of the things that weighs 549 00:55:11,840 --> 00:55:17,040 in the direction of assimilation. Secondly, the Dalai Lama, who has been a constant 550 00:55:17,040 --> 00:55:23,680 in PRC policy, in 2011 announces that he is stepping down from all political positions. 551 00:55:24,720 --> 00:55:32,720 And this I think in terms of the move towards assimilation, it puts to the forefront 552 00:55:32,720 --> 00:55:39,200 the fact that the Dalai Lama, the current Dalai Lama is not always going to be 553 00:55:39,200 --> 00:55:45,600 around. And so I think up until 2011 there had been a sense that the Dalai Lama 554 00:55:45,600 --> 00:55:49,200 was central to Chinese policy, in Tibet at least, they had to deal with him 555 00:55:49,200 --> 00:55:53,680 and now there's a question of what will Tibet policy look like after he steps down 556 00:55:53,680 --> 00:56:01,680 from his position of political authority. Third, between 2011 and 2013 you have 557 00:56:01,680 --> 00:56:07,360 a wave of self-immolations in Tibet. This a painting by Tashi Norbu 558 00:56:07,360 --> 00:56:14,960 who is a Tibetan artist based in Amsterdam and it was on her website. And she writes, 559 00:56:14,960 --> 00:56:18,960 "the work expresses the dual hope that the self-immolator sacrifice will lead 560 00:56:18,960 --> 00:56:22,800 "to the religious realization of ultimate  reality through burning away ignorance 561 00:56:22,800 --> 00:56:26,160 and also burning away the conventional reality of oppression." Not gonna show, 562 00:56:26,720 --> 00:56:34,720 there are vivid images of self-immolations which occur. But I think this actually 563 00:56:34,720 --> 00:56:42,720 is a little bit more palatable. I will add though that the various Tibet organizations 564 00:56:42,720 --> 00:56:46,880 that have kept track of this have reported that there have been, this number 565 00:56:46,880 --> 00:56:54,480 is unbelievable, 155 people have self-immolated since 2009. 566 00:56:55,920 --> 00:57:02,800 And self-immolate is kind of that doesn't sound so horrible. It's horrible. 567 00:57:03,360 --> 00:57:08,080 But what that means is these people have lit themselves on fire. Which is 568 00:57:09,040 --> 00:57:14,720 historically unprecedented. Self-immolation as a form of political protest has occurred 569 00:57:14,720 --> 00:57:19,200 at various points in time in various places most notably in Vietnam during the war 570 00:57:19,200 --> 00:57:24,640 with the United States and with France. This number of self-immolations, I at least 571 00:57:24,640 --> 00:57:28,160 in my preliminary research, there's nothing  like this which has occurred anyplace else 572 00:57:28,160 --> 00:57:28,960 in the world over time. 573 00:57:31,280 --> 00:57:37,520 They largely are taking place between 2011 and 2013. The first is 2009. 574 00:57:37,520 --> 00:57:49,600 But really focused during this period. In 2012, for example, 86 self-immolations 575 00:57:49,600 --> 00:57:50,100 occur. 576 00:57:53,200 --> 00:57:58,000 The self-immolations are concentrated. This map from   577 00:58:03,920 --> 00:58:04,560 one of the Tibetan 578 00:58:04,560 --> 00:58:09,840 organizations demonstrates the geographic distribution of the self-immolations 579 00:58:09,840 --> 00:58:14,800 and you'll note that the vast majority are occurring actually outside of the TAR itself. 580 00:58:17,520 --> 00:58:22,560 Again we can talk a great length about this but just to quickly go through. Beijing's 581 00:58:22,560 --> 00:58:32,560 response is this regulation, "关于反自焚工 作暂行规定的通告." So the Notice on Interim 582 00:58:32,560 --> 00:58:37,520 Provisions on Anti-self-immolation Work, which goes beyond saying that 583 00:58:37,520 --> 00:58:44,640 self-immolation is illegal to establishing a legal framework to penalize anyone 584 00:58:44,640 --> 00:58:48,880 associated with someone who self-immolates. So these set of provisions 585 00:58:48,880 --> 00:58:52,240 relate to the type of punishments which will be meted out to those 586 00:58:52,240 --> 00:59:01,520 who are affiliated with self-immolators. The institution of this policy has effectively 587 00:59:01,520 --> 00:59:04,720 ended the wave of self-immolations. A few still occurred. A couple occurred 588 00:59:04,720 --> 00:59:12,880 last year. But this really stopped things. Alongside of that you begin to get, again, 589 00:59:12,880 --> 00:59:19,440 this hardening of China's position and what it is to be Chinese. So for example 590 00:59:19,440 --> 00:59:27,040 here, this is an article that Hu Angang and Hu Lianhe published titled 591 00:59:27,040 --> 00:59:34,960 "中国梦的基石是中华民族的国族一体化." So the English translation of this article, 592 00:59:34,960 --> 00:59:38,800 which they forward in the journal, is "China Dream: It Belongs to Everyone 593 00:59:38,800 --> 00:59:44,800 of the Chinese nation." But that seems like a loose translation at best. It seems like 594 00:59:44,800 --> 00:59:52,400 the most favorable of translating things. So one could - we don't have time for a joke. 595 00:59:52,400 --> 01:00:02,800 But here in particular the latter part of it, "一体化," the coming together emphasis,  596 01:00:02,800 --> 01:00:06,880 which is drawn out more in subsequent statements, this is under Xi Jinping   597 01:00:06,880 --> 01:00:11,440 who becomes party secretary in November of 2012 and president of PRC in March 598 01:00:11,440 --> 01:00:18,480 of 2013. So between 2013 and 2017 Xi issues a number of statements 599 01:00:18,480 --> 01:00:23,920 which really emphasize assimilation and control. One of the most significant 600 01:00:23,920 --> 01:00:35,360 of these is a quote which he says in 2013,  "治国必治边, 治边先稳藏." To govern 601 01:00:35,360 --> 01:00:41,200 the country you have to control or govern the borders, and to govern the borders  602 01:00:41,200 --> 01:00:51,040 or control the borders you need to stabilize to that. This becomes the guiding principle 603 01:00:51,920 --> 01:00:57,280 for Beijing's approach to Tibet in subsequent years. It comes out, 604 01:00:57,280 --> 01:01:03,520 for example, in 2014 in the Fourth Nationalities Work Forum which 605 01:01:03,520 --> 01:01:09,200 produces the guidelines talking about 工体化. So community or belonging 606 01:01:09,760 --> 01:01:13,280 and the emphasis again and again on 中华民族, or the Chinese people 607 01:01:13,280 --> 01:01:20,000 or the Chinese nation. There's not a single translation of 中华民族. It can go different 608 01:01:20,000 --> 01:01:30,960 ways. And in addition this emphasis on 各民族交往交流交融. So 交往 is just moving 609 01:01:30,960 --> 01:01:35,760 back and forth. 交流 is exchange of information. And any of you who's taken 610 01:01:36,640 --> 01:01:41,120 even basic Chinese, like 交流交流. Let's talk, we'll talk it out, we'll discuss. 611 01:01:41,120 --> 01:01:52,640 交融 is a different term. 交融 is intermingling or mixing. And in this case it really is about 612 01:01:55,280 --> 01:02:02,640 lessening distinctions between ethnic groups within China and drawing minorities 613 01:02:02,640 --> 01:02:08,000 away from thinking of themselves as particularly distinct. 交融 creates 614 01:02:08,000 --> 01:02:12,400 an opening for a heavier emphasis on assimilation than had previously 615 01:02:13,120 --> 01:02:17,600 been the case. And all of these things fit together into the way policy ends up 616 01:02:17,600 --> 01:02:23,120 being enacted. August '15, at the Sixth Meeting of the Tibet Work Forum 617 01:02:23,120 --> 01:02:28,560 you get these 五个认同, which I'm calling recognitions. I spent more time actually 618 01:02:28,560 --> 01:02:33,920 trying to figure out how I wanted to translate 五个认同 than anything else in these slides. 619 01:02:33,920 --> 01:02:39,440 认同 on some level is like identity. You can talk about what your 认同 is. 620 01:02:41,120 --> 01:02:47,280 And we also have 三个代表, the three represents. But 认同 isn't represent. 621 01:02:47,280 --> 01:02:52,080 It's also not identity in this case. I think recognitions work. And so the guiding 622 01:02:52,080 --> 01:02:59,680 principles of ethnic work are 认同, or recognizing, 伟大祖国, the great 623 01:02:59,680 --> 01:03:05,733 motherland; 中华民族, the Chinese people; 中华文化, the Chinese culture; 中国共产党, 624 01:03:05,733 --> 01:03:10,800 the CCP; and 中国特色社会主义, Chinese socialism.   625 01:03:10,800 --> 01:03:12,240 This shows up in White Papers 626 01:03:12,240 --> 01:03:21,200 and then it begins to materialize in policy. So Larung Gar is this massive monastic 627 01:03:21,760 --> 01:03:26,320 structure outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region. At its high point there was 628 01:03:26,320 --> 01:03:32,560 an argument that upwards of 40 thousand monks and nuns were living in Larung Gar. 629 01:03:32,560 --> 01:03:41,280 In 2015, 2016 there is a drive to reduce that population and to modernize 630 01:03:42,080 --> 01:03:49,200 Larung Gar to make it more sanitary and developed. Those who lived there 631 01:03:49,200 --> 01:03:52,800 didn't necessarily see this as a  modernization drive they saw this attempt 632 01:03:52,800 --> 01:03:59,920 to shut the area down. Alongside of this you have the detention of Tashi Wangchuk 633 01:04:00,800 --> 01:04:04,640 who is a linguist who talks about the need to preserve Tibetan language. 634 01:04:04,640 --> 01:04:10,240 He does a video with New York Times which ends up with him being detained 635 01:04:10,240 --> 01:04:14,720 as a result of that. The National Work - People's - Work Congress Report - 636 01:04:14,720 --> 01:04:18,560 sorry. This is new stuff for me so I have all this material and I know this is taking 637 01:04:18,560 --> 01:04:21,760 too long so I'm gonna quickly go through the last parts of it. 638 01:04:21,760 --> 01:04:27,760 Here it's at the 19th Party Congress where Xi comes out with this statement 639 01:04:27,760 --> 01:04:34,000 of nationalities. The people of China need to hold together, "像石榴籽 640 01:04:34,000 --> 01:04:41,040 那样紧紧抱在一起." So the Chinese nation or people need to hold - I'm sorry, 641 01:04:41,600 --> 01:04:45,600 the people need to hold together. This is the next quote. He also talks about 642 01:04:45,600 --> 01:04:53,200 there's already been integration of the Chinese people. In a letter published 643 01:04:53,200 --> 01:04:59,920 in Xinhua in 2017 he writes, this seems like it could come straight from President 644 01:04:59,920 --> 01:05:04,640 Trump, this emphasis on borders and the need for borders to have peace. 645 01:05:05,440 --> 01:05:11,040 In fact some of Trump's anti-immigration policies have echoed within Chinese 646 01:05:11,040 --> 01:05:15,440 cyberspace in interesting ways, have been picked up and, particularly in Guangzhou, 647 01:05:15,440 --> 01:05:19,760 questions of illegal immigrants, particularly Africans, and the degree 648 01:05:19,760 --> 01:05:24,160 to which the Chinese government has dealt with them in contrast to what's seen 649 01:05:24,160 --> 01:05:28,000 as Trump's effective policies and a further hardening of China's position. 650 01:05:28,880 --> 01:05:33,840 In Analysis Published Within the Minority  Establishment. Here this is actually 651 01:05:33,840 --> 01:05:38,320 the core of the work that I'm doing. It's not necessarily super interesting 652 01:05:38,320 --> 01:05:44,320 in terms of learning about what's going on in Tibet. In a work of Ma Rong, Chen Zhen 653 01:05:44,320 --> 01:05:51,040 and Du Ganju, Ga CangJia, and Renqing Zhuoma there is a series of writings 654 01:05:51,040 --> 01:05:57,920 which pick up upon these general themes of assimilation and the five recognitions, 655 01:05:57,920 --> 01:06:07,120 the 五个认同, and argue that Tibetan Buddhism can only be legitimately practiced 656 01:06:07,120 --> 01:06:10,960 when it incorporates those principles into those religious practices 657 01:06:12,080 --> 01:06:17,360 and the argument in these articles is that in fact Tibetan Buddhism has always been 658 01:06:17,360 --> 01:06:22,640 sinified, always draws upon actually the way Buddhism is practiced in China, 659 01:06:22,640 --> 01:06:27,600 and to ignore that is essentially a perversion or an unorthodox version 660 01:06:27,600 --> 01:06:35,680 of what Buddhism itself is. Which is a pretty bold set of claims. This is the first time, 661 01:06:35,680 --> 01:06:41,280 this is the stuff I'm writing about. This is the first time that the Chinese state 662 01:06:41,280 --> 01:06:47,120 has looked to turn Tibetan Buddhism around. Not to push it down and say 663 01:06:47,120 --> 01:06:52,400 it shouldn't be practiced, but rather that if it's practiced in the right way, 664 01:06:53,440 --> 01:06:59,920 which involves bowing to the central authorities in Beijing, then it's a wonderful 665 01:06:59,920 --> 01:07:05,120 practice and a great part of Tibetan culture. If, though, it does not include those 666 01:07:05,120 --> 01:07:13,520 five recognitions of the motherland, of the party, and so forth, then it is splittist 667 01:07:13,520 --> 01:07:15,680 and also not real Buddhism. 668 01:07:18,720 --> 01:07:25,360 So in a way it's a recognition that policy to this point has failed because what 669 01:07:25,360 --> 01:07:29,600 the policy had been doing was changing the outer trappings of Tibetan life 670 01:07:30,560 --> 01:07:34,320 without going to this core question of what Tibetan Buddhism is and how it is 671 01:07:34,320 --> 01:07:35,120 to be practiced. 672 01:07:37,440 --> 01:07:44,160 Subsequently Tashi Wangchuk is convicted to five years in prison in May of 2008. 673 01:07:44,160 --> 01:07:50,960 And what you really have then in terms of this sinification of Tibetan Buddhism drive, 674 01:07:50,960 --> 01:07:56,560 in 2018 Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, two of the just a step below essentially Xijinping 675 01:07:57,280 --> 01:08:02,720 in terms of authority, both do visits to Tibet both talk about 藏传佛教的中国化. 676 01:08:07,440 --> 01:08:12,080 Both talk about sinification of Tibetan Buddhism on these trips and the need 677 01:08:12,080 --> 01:08:20,800 to sinify Buddhism in Tibet in order to establish greater levels of stability. 678 01:08:20,800 --> 01:08:27,920 And to then carry out Xi's mission or vision that the growth and stability of the country 679 01:08:27,920 --> 01:08:34,160 depends on stabilizing Tibet. And finally, and then we still have a little bit of time 680 01:08:34,160 --> 01:08:40,160 for discussion, what the future holds. So in 2014, this is already a number of years 681 01:08:40,160 --> 01:08:45,200 ago, the Dalai Lama in an interview with the BBC said, "whether the institution 682 01:08:45,200 --> 01:08:48,400 "of the Dalai Lama should continue or not is up to the Tibetan people. 683 01:08:48,400 --> 01:08:55,840 "There's no guarantee some stupid Dalai Lama won't come next who will disgrace 684 01:08:55,840 --> 01:09:00,960 "himself or herself. That would be very sad. So, much better that a centuries-old 685 01:09:00,960 --> 01:09:05,680 tradition should cease at the time of a quite popular Dalai Lama." 686 01:09:05,680 --> 01:09:11,440 So what I've tried to do there is cover a whole bunch of stuff to give you a picture 687 01:09:11,440 --> 01:09:15,440 of how we've gotten to where we are with Tibet. The relationship actually 688 01:09:15,440 --> 01:09:20,720 to what's going on in Tibet and to what is going on in Xinjiang. But in fact any one 689 01:09:20,720 --> 01:09:27,040 of these aspects of the talk we could really dig into and discover a lot more with it. 690 01:09:27,040 --> 01:09:34,480 So this quote alone, on the surface it's this 80, at the time he was 80 he's 83 now 691 01:09:35,280 --> 01:09:43,760 well maybe 79, it's a 70 to 80-year-old man just saying, oh well, I've done well, 692 01:09:44,400 --> 01:09:48,240 I've been happy with the job, and things probably need to change. 693 01:09:48,240 --> 01:09:52,720 Just the adorable old Dalai Lama. Good for you Dalai Lama. 694 01:09:52,720 --> 01:09:57,280 You're so non-egocentric, you don't even need this institution continued. 695 01:09:57,280 --> 01:10:04,480 But every single line here within this quote, the next Dalai Lama being some stupid 696 01:10:04,480 --> 01:10:10,960 Dalai Lama, being a him or a her, a centuries-old tradition should cease 697 01:10:10,960 --> 01:10:16,160 at the time of a quite popular Dalai Lama, all of that is loaded. Absolutely loaded. 698 01:10:16,160 --> 01:10:21,680 Both to the Tibetan diaspora, to Tibetans  living within the TAR, and to Beijing. 699 01:10:23,360 --> 01:10:26,800 Where my research lands and where I hope you guys coming out of this talk 700 01:10:26,800 --> 01:10:34,640 will hopefully build upon is we're in a time of potentially massive change within 701 01:10:34,640 --> 01:10:39,920 the Sino-Tibetan relationship. Even reincarnate Lamas don't live forever. 702 01:10:39,920 --> 01:10:43,920 The Dalai Lama has made it clear that he is not going to himself. He's actually 703 01:10:43,920 --> 01:10:48,080 I think at this point lived longer than any other previous Dalai Lama. I think the 5th 704 01:10:48,080 --> 01:10:52,080 maybe lived until he was 65, if memory serves. Although there's even some 705 01:10:52,080 --> 01:10:57,280 questions about when he passed away. But whatever has gone on in Tibet 706 01:10:57,280 --> 01:11:03,200 I think can be considered a prelude to what will unfold in the coming years, 707 01:11:04,400 --> 01:11:10,000 which I think that Beijing has really no idea what that will look like. 708 01:11:10,000 --> 01:11:14,400 I don't think the diaspora does either and those in Tibet as well. And I think 709 01:11:14,400 --> 01:11:18,320 as a result it's going to be rather tumultuous and contentious 710 01:11:19,200 --> 01:11:23,360 and hopefully after this talk you'll be more prepared to make sense of those events 711 01:11:23,360 --> 01:11:25,840 as they unfold. Thank you.