CIUDAD DE ANILLOS

(CITY OF RINGS):

INTERNAL MIGRATION AND UNEVEN INTEGRATION IN SANTA CRUZ,

BOLIVIA

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INTERNAL MIGRATION AND UNEVEN INTEGRATION IN SANTA CRUZ,

BOLIVIA

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This dissertation investigates the consequences of internal migration to Santa Cruz, an expanding urban center in lowland Bolivia whose growth stems from uneven regional development. Regional divisions between the highlands and the lowlands have long afflicted Bolivia. The roots of the regional differences predate the country's independence, but they have intensified in the past decade amid unresolved power struggles between Bolivia's central government and the opposition based in the lowland region, as recent events in Bolivia over regional autonomies have demonstrated. Drawing on the perspectives of political geography, urban planning, and sociology, this study examines the processes of migrant integration and social exclusion in Santa Cruz, and how migration is affecting regional identity formation in Bolivia's lowland region.

In Chapter 2, I explore the historical construction of the eastern lowlands region, called the *Oriente*. I trace its transformation from an isolated frontier to Bolivia's major production zone and the emergence of the regional elite though periods of economic change based on extractive industries. Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the city of Santa Cruz and argues that modernist planning in the 1950s and 1960s

did not coincide with the realities of mass urban migration that ensued. I also suggest that migration-induced population growth and shifts in the local economy toward services and informal employment are creating particular patterns of urban growth and deepening socio-economic polarization. In Chapter 4, I analyze migrant integration and social exclusion through migrant interviews in several urban districts, the ways that civil society organizations potentially intermediate between migrants and longer-term residents, and connections between migrants and local institutions.

Chapter 5 examines the connections between migration flows, growth of the informal economy, and conflicts over public space in Santa Cruz as a window into the dynamics of migrant integration and exclusion. I investigate the spatial dimensions of informal commerce in the city and analyze a municipal plan for reorganization of public markets, as well as contrasting visions of public space from planners, long-term residents, informal workers, and migrants. In the perspective taken here, struggles over public space reflect unresolved tensions around race, ethnicity, and space in a changing city.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

After growing up in Nashville, Joshua Kirshner pursued undergraduate studies at Harvard College. In 1994, during college, he completed a School for International Training Semester Abroad program on sustainable development in Cochabamba, Bolivia. He returned to La Paz, Bolivia in the summer of 1996 to conduct field research for his honors thesis on Andean migrant musicians. Kirshner received an A.B. degree Magna cum Laude in social anthropology in 1997. As a Sheldon postgraduate travel grant recipient, he spent one year researching regional music styles in Bolivia in 1997, and also made extended visits to several Latin American countries including Chile, Brazil and Cuba.

He completed a masters' degree in Urban Planning at the University of California, Los Angeles in 2002, where he studied labor issues in the Los Angeles port and logistics sector for the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor with funding from the University of California Institute of Labor and Employment. He later worked as a researcher for the North American Integration and Development Center, based at UCLA. After finishing PhD coursework at Cornell University in City and Regional Planning, he spent 14 months in Bolivia conducting fieldwork for this dissertation.

Kirshner will begin a postdoctoral fellowship position at the Centre for Sociological Research at the University of Johannesburg in South Africa in June 2009.

For my parents Carol and Howard, and for Shannon

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call of duty. I am most grateful to my family for their love and constant support through this entire experience.

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INTRODUCTION: INTERNAL MIGRATION, NATIONAL INTEGRATION, AND REGIONAL DIVISIONS

"Los cruceños nacemos donde nos da la gana."
(We cruceños are born wherever we like.)

-Ruben Costas, prefect of the Department
of Santa Cruz

Introduction

Regional divisions between the highlands and the lowlands have long afflicted Bolivia. The roots of the regional differences predate the country's independence, but they have intensified over the past decade amid unresolved power struggles between Bolivia's central government and the opposition based in the lowland region, as recent events in Bolivia over regional autonomies have demonstrated. Tensions between President Morales's program of national development and growing support for autonomy movements in the eastern lowlands are accentuating the divisions. Regional disparities reflect vastly different natural resource endowments, ethnic variation, as well as deliberate state investment policies. These disparities also condition labor migration flows as economic dynamism in the lowland urban and agro-industrial centers has lured migrants from poorer regions over the past four decades. Internal migration has redrawn Bolivia's demographic map during this period, as the four *altiplano* (highland) departments show a steadily declining percentage of national population, while the eastern lowlands departments comprise an increasing share. In this dissertation, I explore the consequences of internal migration to Santa Cruz, an

expanding urban center in lowland Bolivia whose growth partly stems from uneven regional development.

I view the problem of migrant integration in the larger context of the lowland region's changing position in the national and global economy brought on by booms in export agriculture and natural resources. I draw on the perspectives of political geography, sociology, regional development, and urban planning to address two research questions. What processes of migrant integration and exclusion are occurring in lowland Bolivia, and what are the forces shaping them? Integration and exclusion can be understood as a range of dynamics influencing access to basic services, availability of jobs and residential location in relation to longer-term residents and other social groups. Second, how is internal migration affecting processes of regional identity formation in the lowlands region? To situate migration in a social framework, this research engages with recent currents in the study of international migration that view migrants as agents who form social networks and connections between home and host communities across nation states (Massey 1990; Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton 1992). Rather than passive recipients of social and economic forces, immigrants are active participants that might contest and shape the realities they find in their new places of destination (Olwig and Sorensen 2002).

These concepts are also useful for analyzing internal migration in cases where migrants face similar forms of exclusion and foster connections across boundaries of region and social class. My research adds to this discussion through its focus on migrants and their reception amid the social, political and economic transformations occurring in Bolivia. It also contributes to debates surrounding migration and citizenship rights, a topic often overlooked in studies of internal migration, and to research on the ways migrants forge connections with interest groups arrayed at

multiple scales in order to address challenges of incomplete national integration and to move beyond the fault lines of regional polarization.

Santa Cruz: Urbanization and Migrant Attraction

National investment, foreign aid, and government grants of public lands to regional elites since the 1950s have contributed to Santa Cruz's emergence as a growth engine of the Bolivian economy. Once an isolated frontier outpost, the city of Santa Cruz has grown from a population of 43,000 in 1950 to more than one million in 2001 and has developed as the center of the country's major production zone. It now houses the Bolivian headquarters of multi-national agricultural and petroleum firms such as Archer Daniels Midland, British Gas, Spain's Repsol, and Brazil's Petrobras. The city and its immediate environs produce 42% of the nation's marketed agricultural output and 34% of its industrial GNP (PNUD 2004). Wealthy compared to the Bolivian Andes, the Santa Cruz Department has the country's lowest poverty level, 38%, and the highest proportion of migrants in its population, 25% (INE 2001).[1] It now leads the country in GDP, exports, and living standards. Currently, soy and hydrocarbons comprise 80% of Santa Cruz Department's exports, yet neither industry generates broad-based employment or economic diversification (PNUD 2004).

Santa Cruz began a period of rapid economic growth following the 1952 national revolution, when the MNR party implemented the "March to the East" program that channeled public investments and international development money toward the Santa Cruz region to boost the fledgling national economy. The state promoted national self-sufficiency in sugar, rice, beef, timber and other lowland commodities. Official resettlement plans from impoverished rural highland areas to

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[1] Bolivia is divided into nine departments, each headed by a prefect and divided into provinces and municipalities. The city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra (often shortened to Santa Cruz) is the capital of the Department of Santa Cruz.

the lowlands reinforced this effort (Gill 1987). Responses to this program reveal the regional divisions it intended to address; for instance, some in the highlands noted that subsidized agricultural credit and investments largely bypassed highland zones (ibid). Lowland observers, in turn, found that the program involved an "occupation of spaces understood as 'empty,' as a means to efficiently consolidate national territory. This entailed moving human contingents from the altiplano and valley regions to the eastern lowlands, in a process known as 'colonization'" (Sandoval et al. 2003: 49).

Economic expansion in Santa Cruz and its immediate periphery, largely unabated for over five decades, has created an optimistic context for regional development, along with an image of prosperity and sustained growth. This prosperity has attracted—and also resulted from—mass migration to the city of Santa Cruz, originating both within the department and in poorer highland areas, and underscored by an average annual population growth rate of 5.08% between 1992 and 2001.[2] This demographic growth has shaped the spatial and material dimensions of the city. Spatially, the "*mancha urbana*" (literally translated as "urban stain") continues to expand, especially along the southern and eastern edges, while economically, there is a widening gulf between the formal and the informal economies. New representatives of both elites and subaltern groups have carved out political spaces, while local cultures are diversified yet in the view of some, also threatened by intensifying migration flows (Peña and Jordan 2006; Prado *et al.* 2005).

The city's spatial structure has developed outward from the old center, or *casco viejo*, which is surrounded by a series of ring roads, or *anillos*. The city is comprised of 12 municipal districts, and neighborhood units within each district.

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[2] This rate is exceeded only by El Alto, a "satellite" of La Paz, which grew at 5.10% from 1992 to 2001. In contrast, the city of La Paz grew at 1.1% during this period. The growth rate of the city of Santa Cruz nearly doubles that of Bolivia, 2.74%, and it exceeds that of Santa Cruz Department, 4.29% (INE 2001). The average growth rate for the city of Santa Cruz between 1950 and 2001 is 6.7%, the highest in the country (CODEPO 2004).

Established and high status families are associated with the *casco viejo* and its stately *Plaza 24 de Septiembre*, but they are increasingly dispersing to newer affluent communities such as Equipetrol and Urbarí on the near north side and south of the center. Anthropologist Allyn Stearman observed that the older center has been "protected" from outsiders, as Andean (and poorer lowland) migrants settled in areas beyond the outer rings (1985: 42-45), a pattern common in cities worldwide (see Robinson 2006). Waves of migrants from rural Santa Cruz Department and highland regions have claimed urban space in the outer rings, progressively further from the center. The bulk of these migrants seek work and educational opportunities and an escape from extreme poverty faced in communities of origin (CODEPO 2004). Marginal "satellites" on the southern and eastern edges of the city, such as the Plan Tres Mil, are currently marked as poor and dangerous (Postero 2007).

Santa Cruz has developed as a regional hub that has captured resources from agro-industry and natural resource extraction on its periphery (PNUD 2004). Elite civic and business groups that have benefited most from economic growth have joined forces to promote autonomy for the *'Media Luna'* (half moon) region, named for the crescent shape it forms along the eastern frontier of the country (Barragán 2004). The *Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz* (Santa Cruz Civic Committee), a body comprised of business and professional organizations, would like to see the entire Media Luna – the four Bolivian departments of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz and Tarija – form their own autonomous region among the nine departments that make up Bolivia (the five western departments are Andean.) The growing regional autonomy movement has unfolded in response to the indigenous-led popular mobilizations based in the highland cities that have demanded the nationalization of natural gas resources and the rewriting of the 1994 constitution, which became a real possibility with the 2005 victory of Morales and his party, the MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo*, or Movement

toward Socialism.) Supporters of autonomy view the highlands as hostile to foreign investment and prone to political instability (Barragán 2004; Peña and Jordan 2006). In contrast, autonomists claim their region as having developed through individual initiative and entrepreneurship, representing "*la Bolivia productiva*" and ready to embrace the global economy (ibid; Schroeder 2007). In addition, supporters of regional autonomy emphasize their love of freedom and have drawn connections between personal freedom and free market economic development (Dabdoub 2001; Plata 2008).

The cultural identity and ethnic makeup of the highlands and lowlands differ markedly as the *altiplano* has a high proportion of indigenous Quechua and Aymara while the Media Luna has a much larger mestizo population, but also includes smaller indigenous groups such as the Guaraní and Chiquitano. Migration has the potential to shift this balance, thereby complicating the regional tensions within Bolivia. In response to the pressures and destabilizing effects of economic globalization, the central government, based in the highlands and largely put in power by popular-indigenous mobilizations, and the lowland autonomy movement, which is centered in Santa Cruz and spearheaded by regional business interests, increasingly represent distinct visions for the future of the country.

Background: Ethnicity and National Integration in Bolivia

An examination of processes of migrant integration and social exclusion, particularly in Andean South America where many migrants identify as indigenous, can be connected to the broader movement toward the integration of indigenous peoples and other ethnic groups in national societies, as well as the resurgence of ethnic identities in contemporary Latin America. In the Andes, indigenous peoples

have long faced structures of racism and inequality that have shaped the development of national social and political hierarchies (Postero 2007; Radcliffe 1999).

Particularly since the 1990s, there has been a sharp rise in political mobilization around ethnic identities in Latin America among indigenous peoples. In response, many Latin American governments have sought to construct a more inclusive national identity, one that recognizes indigenous people as members of and contributors to the national fabric. The shift began to be felt in the 1980s, and it was largely fostered by the United Nations' efforts to raise awareness of indigenous peoples' rights and also by postmodern currents of identity politics (see Hall 1996).[3]

Reflecting these currents, research in a variety of disciplines seeks to explain the growing political importance of indigenous social movements. For instance, in a recent study of indigenous mobilization in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, Yashar (2005) examined how indigenous organization is challenging both the "practice and terms of citizenship in Latin America's new democracies" (p. 282).

In the context of indigenous struggles across the hemisphere, the Bolivian case stands out. Approximately 60 percent of Bolivians consider themselves to be native peoples, the highest proportion in Latin America.[4] Although they form a majority, indigenous people have long been oppressed as a minority in Bolivia.

The national revolution of 1952, led by the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, or MNR), sought to reverse this situation and to integrate indigenous peoples into the national polity. In doing so,

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[3] An important result of the international activity around this issue in the 1980s was the adoption of the International Labor Organization's Convention No. 169 in 1989, which recognizes "the aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over their institutions, ways of life, and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages, and religions, within the framework of the States in which they live" (ILO 1989, cited in Postero 2007: 51).

[4] Though ethnic boundaries are increasingly blurry, by most accounts Bolivia's population remains nearly two-thirds indigenous. Out of a national population of 8.3 million, roughly one-third are Quechua and one-fourth are Aymara (INE 2001), while the eastern lowlands contain some thirty smaller indigenous groups.

however, it denied them their identity. The MNR dismantled the feudalistic hacienda system through a land reform, introduced mass education, and abolished the category "Indian" in law, replacing it with "*campesino*," or peasant. Many observers have noted that it was in the post-revolutionary period that the "mass of Indians" acquired meaningful citizenship, but this change was accompanied by policies that sought to assimilate "Indians" as "Bolivians" (Canessa 2005; Luykx 1999). For instance, the MNR transferred land to peasants though the land reform, but outlawed communal land ownership. This practice disrupted indigenous land tenure systems and encouraged the dissolution of many rural communities. Many Indians were granted small plots, which, divided among later generations, could not support agricultural subsistence. The resulting land crisis has been an important impetus of urban migration (see Albó et al. 1981).

Contrary to the expectations of political and social elites, indigenous peoples did not entirely assimilate into the dominant culture in Bolivia nor did they accept late-twentieth-century policies that increasingly threatened their survival. Significant regional indigenous movements emerged in the Andes and Amazon to defend local autonomy, and later to demand an equal position in the democracy that took shape in the 1980s and 1990s. Bolivia's current president Evo Morales, elected in December 2005, is South America's first fully indigenous head of state. An Aymara coca farmer, he emerged as a leader of indigenous-based popular movements.

These events are the latest phase of a central conflict dividing Bolivia for much of its history: the gulf between the poor indigenous majority and the elite *criollo* minority (mostly white or identified as such). There is also a small, mostly *mestizo* middle class, which aligns it self with one side or the other, depending on the

situation.[5] This classification of course is an over-simplification of a dynamic reality

involving shifting allegiances among the peasantry, the urban working class, the

military, the business elite, and workers in the growing informal and service sectors

(Luykx 1999: 8).

Since the 1952 revolution, a major government concern has been how to create

a unified nation from a diverse combination of frequently antagonistic social groups.

Yet efforts at national unity must confront class, regional, as well as ethnic divisions.

Bolivia's nine departments are intersected by deep cultural, economic, and political

divisions, expressed in individuals' frequent strong identification with their own

department and rivalry toward others (Healy and Paulson 2000). Even more salient is

the distinction between *cambas*—the fair-skinned, Spanish-speaking inhabitants of the

eastern lowlands—and *collas*, the indigenous and mestizo inhabitants of the western

altiplano and inter-montaine valleys. Although this distinction is regional, it

increasingly refers also to ethnicity, as is shown by the discrimination suffered by

colla migrants in the lowland Santa Cruz (Gill 1987; Stearman 1985).

Studies of nationalism and identity in the Andes and elsewhere have been

influenced by developments in the theory of ethnicity that attempt to undo static

classifications based on essential, primordial characteristics (Luykx 1999: xli). From

this perspective, ethnicity is conceived not as an isolating category, but as a relational

one. Ethnic categories are recognized as fluid, and individuals can be assigned to a

category on the basis of speech or dress as much as by actual descent or phenotype.[6]

Much of this work draws on Barth's (1969) conception of ethnic groups as defined

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[5] The term *mestizo*, which varies in meaning in different parts of Latin American, refers in Bolivia to
people of mixed European and indigenous descent who wear Western-style dress, speak Spanish, and
may or may not also speak an indigenous language. In the Andean region, *mestizos* generally live in
cities and towns, while the rural peasantry is almost entirely Aymara or Quechua (Albo 1994).
[6] See, e.g., Radcliffe's (1999) work on migration, gender, and domestic service work in Ecuador, in
which she argues that in the rural Andes, whiteness is not phenotypical, but rather constituted through a
combination of dress codes, possession of cash and Spanish-language use.

primarily by their relation to other groups. Barth theorized that ethnic groups create and develop boundaries between themselves and other ethnic groups as a means of self-definition and social reproduction. This involves use of membership criteria and ways of signaling membership and exclusion. Accordingly, boundaries and exclusionary narratives are a primary means of binding individuals together as a group, but the forms such exclusion takes may vary.

The awareness that ethnicity is not an inherent quality in individuals or groups, but rather is constructed through self definition and social interaction can be connected to questions of ethnic mobility and relations between the state and particular ethnic groups. These questions are also relevant to studies of migration, relations between migrants and other social groups, and the ways migrants form a sense of belonging.

Migration, Rural-Urban Interconnections, and Urban Transformation

While studies of internal migration have focused primarily on the motivation and determinants of migration, recent debates on migration and inter-group relations in destination areas provide a conceptual framework for the present study. Previous research has approached the topic using a modernization framework, which treated migrants as "peasants in cities," and examined their varying propensities to adapt in new environments (Roberts 1978; Lobo 1982; Lomnitz 1977). More recent work has critiqued studies emphasizing migrant adaptation in cities and begun to explore the historical and contemporary links between rural and urban worlds through human migration (Golte and Adams 1987; Skar 1994). Researchers from this perspective have discarded polarized rural and urban contrasts, and some scholars have portrayed migrants as fully integrated into urban areas of settlement, despite social and cultural differences (Albó et al. 1981; Degregori et al. 1986). Others have highlighted "rituals of belonging" performed by urban migrants and directed at the state. Notably, these

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performances are often aimed not to resist state authority but to promote greater inclusion in the national polity (Goldstein 2004).

Building on a wealth of literature on migration of Andean peoples, a recent body of work parallels the transnationalist perspective to emphasize migrants' formation of links between communities of origin and destination, both within and across the national territory.[7] Researchers working within this framework argue that categories such as seasonal, temporary, and permanent migration should be seen as fluid and overlapping, and migrants are transforming urban realities through reciprocal relationships with home communities (Albó 1997; Goldstein 2004). Along with transnational theorists, these researchers build on the notion that cultures are not located in particular places (Paerregaard 1997).[8] This work shifts our thinking about migration as primarily concerned with demographic issues of individuals moving through bounded spaces to a framework in which migrants are viewed as historical agents moving between multiple sites where boundaries are being negotiated. These new understandings of migration imply a reconsideration of the conceptual links between community, culture, and space (ibid).

This research applies these new conceptions of migration to an analysis of how highland Bolivian migrants experience integration and social exclusion in Santa Cruz. This involves analyzing official and unofficial policies that shape the context of reception, and the ways migrants engage and contest these policies. Whereas scholars have understood "rituals of belonging" by migrants and marginalized groups as directed toward the nation state, in the case of Santa Cruz, highland migrants must position themselves in relation to at least two overlapping sovereignties, that of the

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[7] Murra's (1972) classic work on how the Incas circulated altitude-specific products through the kingdom with a "vertical archipelago" system has influenced an extensive literature on human movement in the Andes.
[8] See Gupta and Ferguson's (1992) discussion of "deterritorialization" to explain how identities become detached from local places.

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Bolivian nation and that of *cruceño* autonomous territorial claims.[9] The perspective

taken here explores how migrants actively negotiate social and spatial boundaries,

civic participation, and citizenship rights, and the interplay of these claims with those

of interest groups such as long term residents living in the same zones of the city.

While research on international migration has highlighted migrants' struggles for

citizenship rights (e.g. Portes 1999; Sassen 1999; 2006), the citizenship rights of

internal migrants who face marginalization in their own country has been largely

overlooked. This research contributes to a broader critique of how certain categories

have been constructed in migration studies, and how terms such as "migrant" can be

used to deny citizenship and reinforce boundaries of belonging and exclusion (see

Barth 1969). Moreover, the study sheds light on the concrete effects of incomplete

national integration and the unresolved dilemmas of colonialism in a developing

country.

Regions and Scale-Making Projects

   While migrants' actions in many cases resist formulas that assign particular

identities with specific places, other actors call increased attention to notions of

boundaries and place. Amid growing debates over the relationship between the state,

territory, boundaries, and geographic scale, new research in geography and political

economy analyzes the operations of the state at different scales as a response to and

result of increasing global interconnections (Agnew 1994; Jessop 2002; Soja 2000).

Brenner (2004) has extended the discussion theoretically and empirically in his

analysis of recent changes in Western Europe, where national governments have

reoriented policies toward sub-national regions, a "new state space" (2004). Drawing

on Lefebvre's notion of the social production of space (1991), Brenner suggested that

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[9] See Ong (2006) on the notion of "overlapping sovereignties."

"states mobilize space as a productive force" through infrastructural investment, spatial planning, industrial policy and financial regulation directed towards particular locations and scales (2000: 370). Whereas Keynesian welfare states sought to equalize development across national territory, newly configured states target investments to globally competitive cities and regions, calling on market forces to solve redistribution problems while decentralizing decision-making and fiscal responsibility. Brenner (2004) has argued that instead of working to smooth out the differences within and between cities and regions, this approach tolerates and even encourages uneven development.

Research on regions in the global economy has primarily focused on advanced, industrialized areas. Attending to new patterns in the global south, however, enlarges our understanding of regions and changing political and economic geographies. Though clearly divergent in their natural resource endowments, the Bolivian state (and foreign aid agencies) has favored certain regions through development and investment policies, accentuating regional disparities. In particular, Santa Cruz has shifted from an isolated frontier to holding a central position in the national economy in the last half-century. This shift stems from national investment in agricultural, hydrocarbon, and mineral resources as well as from large-scale migration to the city and surrounding region (Gill 1987; Urioste and Kay 2005).

Bolivia has long faced regional divisions stemming from its complicated geography and distinct ethnic and regional cultures. These divisions have shaped its political realities since the colonial era (Kohl and Farthing 2006; Roca 1999).[10] While regionalism in the Santa Cruz lowlands is not a new phenomenon, it is taking on an increasingly ethnic dimension (Peña et al. 2003; Schroeder 2007). The regional

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[10] On Santa Cruz regional movements following the 1930s Chaco War and the construction of *Cruceño* identities, see Pruden (2003). See Gustafson (2006) and Lowrey (2006) on lowland regional and ethnic identity in more recent times.

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autonomy movement traces its immediate roots in the founding of the Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz in 1950, which led "civic struggles" in the 1950s to gain 11 percent of petroleum royalties for the department. Petroleum royalties have since driven the elite's urban and regional growth strategy (Calderón and Laserna 1983). During the period of modernist planning in the city of Santa Cruz of the 1950s and 1960s, this strategy was known as "*sembrando regalías*" (harvesting royalties) (Prado et al. 2005).

Recent evidence suggests a resurgence of regionalism in the past decade in the face of transformative changes in the Bolivian state (Barragán 2004; García Linera 2006). Lowland regionalism has been widely viewed as a response by elites as they lose dominance in the face of rising popular-indigenous challenges to neoliberal reforms, widespread opposition to the privatization of state resources, rising inequality, and deepening corruption and violence since the late 1990s (García Linera 2006; Lacroix 2006; Soruco 2008). As neoliberal governments suffered a series of setbacks and debilitating crises in the early 2000s, traditional *criollo* ("white") elites have "retreated from the centralized state on which they long depended" (Gustafson 2006: 350). Voicing demands for more decentralization and encouraged by the possibility that natural resources would come under regional rather than national control, elites began to entrench themselves in the departments. From there, they have promoted departmental autonomy and positioned themselves against the redistributive nationalist and indigenous project, evidenced in the electoral victory of the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) in 2005. While regionalism has its strongest expression in Santa Cruz and the Media Luna, moderate conservatives in La Paz and Andean parts of the country have also begun to emphasize regional development at the department level while maintaining a commitment to the free market and an opposition to the national-popular stance of the MAS government (García Linera 2008).

Urban-based elites in Santa Cruz and the Media Luna appear to be reconstituting national territory at a diminished, regional scale (see Smith 1992). This move reflects a global turn toward the creation of sub-national spaces of governance that detach production, social exchange, and citizenship rights from the wider national territory (Ong 2006; Ferguson 2005). In eastern Bolivia, the economic model underlying this vision of development is based on large-scale agricultural production and natural resource extraction, particularly in the context of the recent natural gas boom.[11] Regional elites oppose both the redistributive land reform and the nationalist policies for gaining sovereignty over natural resource exploitation proposed by the central government. The extractive industries generate wealth, but it is spatially and socially concentrated among urban middle and upper classes of select city neighborhoods, and it does not generate significant levels of employment (PNUD 2004; Gray Molina 2005).[12] Furthermore, as a recent UN report noted, while the population of Santa Cruz Department has increased at an average of roughly four percent annually, the GDP per capita in 2001 is scarcely higher than its 1970 level in real terms (ibid: 61).

In this context, critics view the regional autonomy movement as an attempt by regional elites to attribute economic and political crisis and instability to the Andean based nation state, while claiming control over functions previously held by the central government (García Linera 2006; Soruco 2008). By extension, some supporters of autonomy associate the crisis with Andean migrants, MAS actors, and lowland

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[11] Bolivia holds South America's second largest natural gas reserves since the discovery of large deposits in the 1990s. Roughly 85% of these gas deposits are located in Tarija Department, while Santa Cruz benefits mostly from infrastructural investment, refining, transport facilities, and houses most of the multinational oil and gas firms' Bolivian headquarters (Andersen and Mesa 2001).

[12] In 1995, 5% of the department's population received 28% of the earned income, and 87% of the department's production is tied to the city and its immediate agro-industrial periphery, which represent only 14% of its territory. While some Santa Cruz neighborhoods create an atmosphere of Miami-style luxury, poverty rates reach 50% in the city and 80-90% in some rural provinces (PNUD 2004: 25).

indigenous organizations that contest the regionalist project. As shown in the Santa Cruz draft "autonomy statute," the subject of a May 2008 referendum and a de facto regional constitution, autonomists want control over the signing of contracts with multinationals, administration of schools, health care and justice, public forests, subsoil resources, and land distribution, and even internal migration.[13] Autonomous communities created in countries such as in Spain since the 1980s inspire these demands, but they seem to go beyond moderate decentralization and federalism (see Prats 2006). Regional autonomy and its appeal to a strong sense of place-based identity could lead to increased discrimination and exclusion of highland migrants and others deemed as outsiders or "invaders" (Blanchard 2006).

On the other hand, some argue that decentralizing power to regional governments will increase efficiency, accountability and local democracy (Prats 2006; Dabdoub 2001; Urenda 2006). The regionalist project holds the potential to raise levels of resources earmarked for basic services and infrastructure in local areas, fostering increased migrant integration. My dissertation research probes the complexities of migrant reception in the context of regional autonomy claims and other expressions of regional identities that constitute new ways of imagining citizenship in relation to the Bolivian state.

Research Methodology

I selected the city of Santa Cruz for this study because it is currently Bolivia's fastest growing city and primary migrant destination, and because many of the tensions experienced in Bolivia around regional divisions are concentrated in Santa Cruz. The findings from the field research suggest that the development model

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[13] Estatuto de Autonomía del Departamento de Santa Cruz, 2006, p. 11, http://www.asamcruz.org/Estatuto%20autonomicode%20scz.htm, accessed January 15, 2008.

underlying growth in Santa Cruz is increasing social and spatial inequalities both within and between regions. Export-based economic growth has attracted migrants from poorer regions, but the urban and regional economy lacks the capacity to create adequate employment, housing, and municipal services for newcomers. In this sense, Santa Cruz parallels other examples of Andean and Latin American urbanization, in which large-scale urban migration occurs without the sufficient possibility of absorption into an industrial workforce or other formal labor market structures (Roberts 1978; 1995).

At the outset of the research, I anticipated that while the influx of migrants from poorer regions would offer a source of labor and enterprise, in many cases the local and departmental governments would be unprepared financially and politically to extend basic services to newcomers, such as running water and sewage. In this sense, migrants experience an uneven form of integration in destination communities. In addition, I expected that changes in the political-economic context in Bolivia, which have taken place at the national, regional, and local level, would alter the opportunity structures for various groups involved in the migration process.

I conducted field research for the dissertation over several visits to Santa Cruz and La Paz between 2005 and 2007. These visits spanned an important period in Bolivia's recent political history, from the election of Evo Morales as president in December 2005 and the convening of the Constitutional Assembly in August 2006 to the drafting of the Santa Cruz Autonomy Statutes in November 2007. During initial research in the summers of 2005 and 2006, I analyzed data from the national census on population growth in Santa Cruz and eastern Bolivia, the spatial distribution of migrants and urban social indicators, and I collected planning documents, maps, and government data on public investment at the municipal, departmental and national

levels. I also reviewed literature on migration flows, uneven regional development, and relevant cases in other countries.

During the principal period of research for twelve months in 2006-07, I probed migrants' perspectives on integration through conducting structured interviews in selected neighborhoods of the city of Santa Cruz with high migrant concentrations, focusing on three different urban districts. I grouped the interview participants into three different categories: 1) highland migrants living in peripheral areas, 2) migrants from rural areas of the lowlands living in peripheral areas, and 3) highly skilled highland migrants living in affluent areas. I also participated in a community survey in several neighborhoods of one of these districts, the Plan Tres Mil, led by *Centro Integrado de Justicia*, a legal services agency. To supplement these data, I interviewed leaders of *juntas vecinales* (neighborhood associations) on relations between migrants and longer-term residents within neighborhoods, interactions with local government and traditional Santa Cruz institutions, and how competition between regions might affect migrant reception at the local level.

To identify official and unofficial policies of integration and social exclusion, I interviewed municipal and departmental officials and leaders of traditional Santa Cruz institutions, such as the influential Civic Committee and the Chamber of Commerce (CAINCO). In these semi-structured interviews, I probed stances toward influx of highland migrants and demographic change, whether it is considered a drawback or advantage for development, and potential effects of regional autonomy on migrant integration. I attended meetings of civic groups and conducted archival research on the Civic Committee, exploring its institutional history and its influence on local and regional development policies. I also examined the historical construction of regional identities in Santa Cruz, and how this process has been affected by waves of inward migration and urbanization. Conversations with representatives of small firm

entrepreneurs, land speculators, service cooperatives, and trade unions contributed insights into how various social structures affect migrant incorporation in destination areas.

Finally, my research drew on popular press materials for evolving perceptions of migration, and identified key areas of dispute, such as housing expansion in peripheral areas, conflicts over uses of public space and informal economic activities, and unequal access to services and other resources. I describe the methodology in more detail in the following chapters.

Major Arguments and Scheme of the Study

Part of my aim in this study is to counter claims of an east-west divide in Bolivia that appear in much scholarly and popular commentary. Although regional divisions are longstanding, the view of a physical/geopolitical divide may mask another difference concerning two distinct visions of development for Bolivia. On the ground, the MAS government seeks to build a strong pro-poor, developmentalist and redistributive state, and speaks of grounding sovereignty (*sentar soberanía*) across national territory (Gustafson 2008). Supporters of autonomy, in contrast, envision a weak neoliberal state comprised of business and market friendly regions, which do not necessarily adhere to the regulatory and redistributive pressure of national politics, while embracing global economic connections (Schroeder 2007; also see Ferguson 2005). The east-west optic misses the fact that there is a strong right-wing presence in the Andes as well as a significant MAS presence in eastern Bolivia. The discourse of regional division mainly serves to boost the racially charged rhetoric of autonomy and ethnic divisions, and it seems to conflate Andeanness, indigenous cultures, and the MAS government.

Santa Cruz civic leaders, in connection with their pro-business counterparts in La Paz, frequently speak of development in terms of productive chains, clusters, and corridors.[14] In this view, parts of the country can develop as transit zones for goods and capital while others are largely excluded from this process (see Bebbington 2001). Regional leaders in Santa Cruz might oppose the national government as being overly concerned with the demands of the highland population, and by extension shun highland migrants in their rhetoric. But evidence shows that highland migrants in Santa Cruz who support the regional autonomy project and situate themselves to identify with Santa Cruz have the potential to integrate with many of the social actors in the city and region.

The social and economic class position of migrants also plays an important role in the integration process. In this context, social exclusion may be based more on class, cultural practices, and political ideology, rather than merely on place of birth or ethnicity. Specific practices, perceived by long-term residents and civic leaders as going against Santa Cruz interests, are considered threats and trigger xenophobia, racism, and exclusion. I also suggest that the city of Santa Cruz is emerging as a strategic site for new types of connections between social groups, and new types of claims (Holston and Appadurai 1999; Sassen 2002; 2006); these dynamics have the potential to facilitate broader integration.

In Chapter 2, I examine the social and historical construction of the eastern Bolivian lowlands region, called the *Oriente*. I trace its transformation from an isolated frontier to Bolivia's major production zone and the emergence of the regional elite though periods of economic change based on extractive industries. In doing so, the chapter situates Bolivia's current regional polarization in historical perspective.

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[14] For example, see Prado et al. (2005) for maps of Santa Cruz's potential ties to soy producing and energy hungry regions of Brazil, such as Campo Grande and Cuiabá in Mato Grosso, and on to the Atlantic Coast.

Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the city of Santa Cruz, its history of planning, urban growth, and demographic change. I argue that the period of modernist planning in the 1950s and 1960s did not coincide with the realities of mass urban migration that ensued. I also suggest that migration-induced population growth and shifts in the local economy toward services and informal employment are creating particular patterns of urban growth and deepening socio-economic polarization. Chapter 4 develops an analysis of migrant integration and social exclusion by examining interviews with migrants in several urban districts, the ways that civil society organizations potentially intermediate between migrants and longer-term residents, and connections between migrants and local institutions.

Chapter 5 explores the connections between migration flows, growth of the informal economy, and conflicts over uses of public space in Santa Cruz as a window into the dynamics of highland migrant integration and exclusion. I examine the spatial dimensions of informal commerce in the city and analyze a recent municipal plan for reorganization of public markets, as well as contrasting visions of public space from planners, long-term residents, informal workers, and migrants. Migrants working in the informal economy are situated within networks of production and exchange that connect urban consumers and the rural producers. Building on this strength, vendor associations represent a potential alternative center of power within the city, often seen as threatening to elites and long-term residents. In the perspective taken here, struggles over public space reflect unresolved tensions around race, ethnicity, and space in a changing city.

In a concluding chapter, I evaluate the effects of migration and demographic change on local and regional institutions and propose policies to enhance migrant integration and inclusive urban development.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE BOLIVIAN

'ORIENTE:'

A PRELUDE TO CURRENT REGIONAL TENSIONS

Introduction

The present study points to and analyzes the growing importance of Bolivia's eastern lowlands region, called the Oriente. Historically, popular and scholarly literature has focused on Bolivia as an Andean country. Since the 1970s, however, the Oriente has become a center of economic development through agribusiness expansion, colonization projects for poor highlanders, and exploitation of natural gas reserves.

This chapter analyzes the historical formation of the Oriente region, and in doing so it situates Bolivia's current regional polarization in historical perspective. It traces the emergence of the Santa Cruz regional elite through periods of economic change and capital accumulation based on extractive industries. After touching on the colonial and early republican period, I focus on the 1952 national revolution and its agrarian policies, the era of dictatorship and return to democracy, and the recent period of neoliberal reform starting in 1985 and the challenges to these reforms since 2003. In the course of the analysis, I suggest that although the lowland elite has historically positioned itself in opposition to the central government, most recently through the demand for departmental autonomy, sustained state support and intervention has been crucial for economic growth and development in the Oriente since the national revolution of 1952.

Examining the historical roots of regional polarization in Bolivia offers insight to the larger question of how migrants integrate in Santa Cruz. Uneven development between regions has both spurred migration flows and complicated the reception of migrants in the destination community. The chapter lays the groundwork for exploring regionalist politics in the lowlands, how regionalist sentiment has intensified in recent years, and its implications for newcomers to the area.

The Geographical Setting

Before the determined push into the Oriente for national economic development in the 1950s and more forcefully in the early 1970s, the region languished in physical and economic isolation.[15] Although it lies near the heart of the South America, daunting topographical barriers separate it from other population centers. The eastern range of Andes begins less than 50 kilometers west of the city of Santa Cruz, the Oriente's main city since the colonial era. The city sits at a 430-meter elevation, and the town of Samaipata—situated 100 kilometers to the west—is 1,640 meters. The height of the Tiraque pass on the main road to Cochabamba is 3,430 meters. The breadth of the mountain range, the *Cordillera Oriental*, extends from Santa Cruz almost to the edge of Cochabamba, the closest major city, nearly 500 kilometers away. Seasonal factors such as rain and mudslides combine with topographical ones to increase the difficulty in crossing the cordillera. Before the asphalt highway was completed in 1954, journeys from Santa Cruz to Cochabamba often turned into month-long adventures (Sanabria 1979).

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[15] I use the terms 'Oriente' and 'lowlands' interchangeably to refer to the eastern part of Bolivia.

Map courtesy of Joe Stoll, Syracuse University Department of Geography

Figure 2.1: Map of Bolivia showing Departments and Department Capitals

To the north, east and south of the city of Santa Cruz stretches a vast, flat plain. Its features vary by the amount of rainfall: tropical Amazonian rain forests interspersed by seasonally flooded pampas extend to the north, pasture and wooded lands to the east, and dry savannas and scrub forests, known as the *Gran Chaco*, lie to the south. The east side of the Andes extending toward the Brazilian border is mostly flat, but the sparsely inhabited plain separates Santa Cruz from the Atlantic coast and markets beyond by more than 2,000 kilometers. The physical barriers that isolate the eastern lowlands—and the social and political struggles against this isolation—have shaped the development of the region (Roca 1999; Palmer 1979).

The Oriente includes the three eastern Bolivian departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando.[16] Santa Cruz is Bolivia's largest department and comprises almost one third of the country's territory. The city of Santa Cruz—the Oriente's major city and epicenter of its regional politics—is located in an area called the "*zona integrada*" (integrated zone) that includes five provinces in the western central part of the Santa Cruz department. This subtropical area is suitable for producing rice, sugarcane, cotton, soybeans, and cattle. These have all become major cash crops as the area became the focus of state-supported agricultural expansion since the 1950s.

Four Centuries of Isolation and the Rise of Regionalism

Cruceño historians have emphasized the Oriente as having a distinct colonial heritage from highland Bolivia (Sanabria 1979; Roca 1999).[17] Lacking the rich silver veins the Spaniards found in the highlands, the Oriente was largely abandoned by colonial administrators and relegated to Catholic missionaries and rubber producers during the colonial era (Stearman 1985). A group of Spanish explorers who set out

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[16] The Oriente region also includes two provinces in Tarija and two provinces in Chuquisaca departments, which lie in the lowland Chaco desert.
[17] The term 'Cruceño' is used for a person from Santa Cruz.

from Paraguay seeking a route to the highland silver deposits from the Atlantic coast arrived in the Oriente in the mid 1500s. Unable to find a way though the mountains, many settled on the flat, tropical plains. The city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra was founded in 1561 by Ñuflo de Chavez. Facing persistent threats from the Guaraní and other Indian groups, in 1595 the founders moved the city to its present site on cleared jungle land. The settlement gradually grew into a sugar- and cotton-producing zone, but Santa Cruz never held an important place among the cities developed under Spanish rule (Palmer 1979).

This history contrasts with the settlement of highland Bolivia. After conquering the Incas in the Peruvian highlands, the Spaniards set up colonial administration of the former empire. The Bolivian highlands were part of the Spanish *audiencia* of Alto Perú (Upper Peru), governed from the viceroyalty of Lima (Klein 1992). Beginning in the 1540s, the Spanish exploited the rich silver veins of Cerro Rico in Potosí using highland Indian labor, and La Paz became a commercial and transshipment center (ibid). The silver mining boom lasted into the 17th century, and a *criollo* (European descended) class of settlers developed on large haciendas to support the mining economy, particularly around Cochabamba.

From the colonial period through the early19[th] century, goods produced in Santa Cruz, such as sugar, coffee, rice, and hides, supplied the markets of highland mining centers and northern Argentina. Transportation was difficult and slow, as goods traveled by mule over treacherous paths, but protectionist policies supported a fledgling internal trade (Sanabria 1979). In the late 19th century, however, treaties following the 1879 War of the Pacific with Chile and Peru and the advent of the tin boom ended protectionist policies and stifled the incipient internal trade (Roca 1999; Soruco 2008). As the tin industry grew in the late 19th century, the Bolivian government promoted the interests of the emerging tin-mining elite, and in the 1890s

it built rail links to the Pacific ports of Arica and Antofagasta, Chile.[18] The railroad

enabled Bolivia to import cheaper and higher quality foods to the mining centers of

Oruro and Potosí than the goods produced in the remote eastern lowlands. As Bolivia

grew more dependent on foreign imports, the mining sector became the country's

economic mainstay. The mines generated the foreign exchange necessary to import

basic food requirements. The Oriente languished in isolation, its agriculture stagnant

(Sanabria 1979).

The small commercial and landed elite of Santa Cruz was not content with this

situation, and in 1903 some of its prominent members founded the *Sociedad de*

Estudios Geográficos e Históricos de Santa Cruz (Society of Geographical and

Historical Studies of Santa Cruz) to voice their concerns to the central government.[19]

The society expressed two main points in its magazine: the connection of the

departmental capital to highland and international markets through the construction of

a railway, and the protection of national industries in the face of competition from

Peru and Chile. Regional demands for a railroad link to the highlands flared in a brief

uprising in 1921 in Santa Cruz. There was a more forceful revolt in 1924, which

rallied popular support using the slogan "*Ferrocarril o Nada!*" (Railroad or Nothing!)

The army forcibly repressed the revolt, primarily with highland troops, while the

national government and the press in La Paz labeled the movement as "separatist"

(Palmer 1979: 62). It died out within two weeks given the lack of support from other

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[18] Before the loss of its maritime territory to Chile in 1879, Antofagasta was part of the Bolivian department of Litoral.

[19] Some members of the elite made fortunes in the rubber boom of 1880 to 1915. Rubber production was centered in Bolivia's northeastern Amazon, and commercial capital was transferred to the city of Santa Cruz (Soruco 2008). The rubber boom was the first instance of an export economy based on resource extraction in the Oriente, serving as a prelude to later export-based development.

parts of the country, the weak regional economy, and the power of the highland mining interests.[20]

The Chaco War, the Bohan Plan, and the Beginnings of Change

The Chaco War marked the beginning of important changes that would reshape Santa Cruz in the coming decades. The conflict that broke out against Paraguay in 1932 was sparked by a border dispute and inflamed by the possibility of lucrative oil resources in the Chaco desert. The four-year conflict was tragic on both sides, and Bolivia suffered a crushing defeat. By the war's end, Bolivia had lost thousands of its young men and a major part of the Chaco to Paraguay (Klein 1992).

In the turbulent years following the war, new political actors who saw the Indian peasantry and miners as allies for political change replaced the ruling oligarchy (Postero 2007). Nationalization of the tin mines and equal rights for the Indian population became pressing issues. The war also had direct effects at the regional level in Santa Cruz and the Oriente. Demand briefly grew for agricultural production to feed soldiers on the front and for transport connections to mobilize troops and supplies. The loss of territory to Paraguay caused renewed concern over the region's isolation and rekindled demands for a railroad. In addition, a desire to promote economic development not exclusively based on mining emerged more strongly after the Chaco defeat (Ibernagaray 1992; Gill 1987).

Shortly after the Chaco War in 1938, the Bolivian government nationalized the U.S.-owned Standard Oil operations, causing a sharp dispute with the U.S. government. The United States would soon enter World War II and needed cheap

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[20] The "Ferrocarril o Nada!" campaign spurred the national government to widen the mule trail from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz, shortening travel time to 15 days. The first motorized vehicles entered Santa Cruz from the interior in 1932. The "Saavedra Road," named for the president at the time, would serve as a major supply artery during the coming war in the Chaco (Palmer 1979: 65).

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source of tin. The rift over Standard Oil was settled in an accord signed in 1942, in which Bolivia received a $25 million grant for economic development programs to be designed by U.S. economist Mervin Bohan. The agreement marked the beginning of U.S. economic assistance to Bolivia. The resulting "Bohan Plan" recommended economic diversification, import substitution, and monetary stabilization (Gill 1987).

The Bohan Plan echoed economic doctrine then prevalent across Latin America known as import substitution-industrialization (ISI). What was unusual was its focus on the remote Oriente (Postero 2007). The plan proposed starting import substitution of basic agricultural commodities in Santa Cruz, building a highway network to link production areas to cities, and transforming the largely pre-capitalist and inefficient hacienda system into extensive commercial agricultural enterprises. It also encouraged developing proven oil and natural gas reserves to support national development (Sandoval et al. 2003). The Bohan Plan viewed the Oriente as Bolivia's new growth area (Thorn 1971, cited in Postero 2007).

Bohan issued the plan in 1942, but a decade elapsed before the post-revolutionary government came to power and began efforts to modernize the Bolivian economy based on the plan's recommendations (Soruco 2008). This suggests that implementing the Bohan Plan required a profound transformation of Bolivian society of the sort achieved by the national revolution and subsequent state intervention. In particular, the freeing of labor from debt peonage on the haciendas of the western highlands proved indispensable for realizing the economic changes envisioned in the plan.

The National Revolution, Agrarian Reform, and the "March to the East"

The social discontent surrounding the Chaco war grew in the ensuing years and set the stage for the national revolution of 1952, which overthrew the "tin oligarchy"

and placed the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR) in power. The new government sought to bring together previously fragmented segments of Bolivian society, including labor, the miners, the middle class, and Indian peasants. At the head of a broad coalition, the MNR promised to develop the national political economy through state-led economic development and modernization (Grindle and Domingo 2003; Postero 2007). Its platform had three main elements: 1) nationalization of the mines to reorganize capitalist accumulation, 2) agrarian reform to eliminate servile relationships in agriculture and to promote a domestic market, and 3) universal suffrage (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987: 3).

A key part of the revolutionary program, the MNR's 1953 agrarian reform set out to restructure the country's agricultural system by reorganizing labor relations and the landholding structure. The agrarian reform law won broad support from farmers, most of whom were highland Indians (Eckstein 1983). The reform expropriated large landholdings called *latifundios* that were not worked by the owners, provided parcels of land to peasants with little or no land, and freed peasants from forced labor. An additional goal of the reform was to encourage internal migration from the densely populated Andean highlands to the Oriente as a means to advance rational population distribution, promote national unity, and to incorporate the eastern lowlands into the national economy (Prado 1983; Eckstein 1983; Gill 1987).

Several commentators have argued that the land reform was not merely designed to benefit peasants, but also aimed at encouraging large-scale agrarian capitalism in Bolivia (Calderón and Laserna 1983; Eckstein 1983; Gill 1987; Postero 2007).[21] Before the revolution, large landholders relied on forced peasant labor and

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[21] For example, Gill (1987) noted that the MNR did not initiate the land reform until a year and a half after the revolution, and it did so after militant peasants had expropriated haciendas in a few key areas of the country. In her view, the reform was a political measure to win popular support that the MNR needed to consolidate power.

debt peonage, and few farmers used wage labor or focused on maximizing profits. To stimulate capitalist agriculture, the agrarian reform granted loans, technical assistance, and capital investments to producers (Gill 1987; Soruco 2008). These efforts focused on the Oriente, where pressure for land was less acute in the Oriente than in the highlands. Moreover, the organized peasant resistance that was a powerful force in the Cochabamba Valley and parts of the altiplano was largely absent in the eastern lowlands (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; Healy 2005). As a result, the lowland estate owners did not lose their land through redistribution and were able to use the capital investments to industrialize their agricultural production.

The agrarian reform brought accelerated change to the Oriente. As part of the reform, the MNR created a new category called the "agricultural enterprise," which differed from the latifundios in terms of capital investment, use of new technology, and wage labor (Soruco 2008). Unlike the unproductive latifundios, the state exempted the agricultural enterprises from expropriation. Amid rising public investment in commercial agriculture, many lowland families converted their properties to agricultural enterprises (Gill 1987). The MNR also encouraged peasants in densely populated areas to migrate and gain access to larger plots, which were plentiful in the Oriente (Eckstein 1983). In some cases, fragmentation of highland plots through inheritance spurred peasants to migrate in search of subsistence (Albo 1997; Goldstein 2004). Meanwhile, the demand for laborers on lowland estates and agricultural enterprises grew as commercial agriculture began to expand, particularly in the "integrated zone" located to the north of Santa Cruz city (Gill 1987).[22] Sugarcane fields, sugar refineries, cattle ranches and farms sprouted up in this fertile, subtropical area.

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[22] The area to the south of Santa Cruz city has sandy and dry soil, which limits its agricultural potential (Weeks 1946, cited in Gill 1987).

The late 1950s and 1960s saw the beginnings of economic and demographic growth in the Oriente. The agrarian reform marked a shift in national agricultural policy, and foreign capital began to stream in for infrastructure and agricultural development projects.[23] The Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway—finished in 1956 with funds from the U.S. Export-Import Bank—linked Santa Cruz to highland markets and greatly reduced transport costs (PNUD 2004). The Santa Cruz department received 42 percent of the U.S.-financed credit program *Crédito Agrícola Supervisado* (Supervised Agricultural Credit) between 1955 and 1964. The MNR and the U.S. government created the program in 1954 and channeled the funds through the Bolivian Agricultural Bank (Sandoval et al. 2003).[24] Credit favored large-scale sugarcane and rice producers as they could post sufficient collateral (Gill 1987).

As shown in Table 2.1, the Bolivian Agricultural Bank credit program gave priority to the Oriente. This geographical pattern intensified in later decades, especially during the 1970-1975 period when Santa Cruz received 70 percent of agricultural loans in Bolivia, and the Oriente region received 89 percent.

The growth of commercial agriculture in the Oriente depended at the outset on labor from the Andean highlands and valleys. Historically, only a small fraction of Bolivia's peasantry lived in the lowlands, and lowland peasants lacked the strong collective organizations found in the highlands (Eckstein 1983). Furthermore, the

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[23] The U.S. government considered the MNR to be reformist and wanted to keep Bolivia within its geopolitical "sphere of influence" (Soruco 2008). French sociologist Blasier (1979) noted that the Bolivian revolution was "the only genuine social revolution that the U.S. gave its early and constant support" (cited in Lavaud 1998: 354). From 1952 to 1954, the U.S. supplied more economic aid per capita to Bolivia than any other Latin American country. For a recent discussion of the limits to the radical impulses of the Bolivian revolution, see Thomson (2009).

[24] For more details on the credit program, technical assistance and extension provided to lowland agriculture in this period, see Arrieta et al. 1990; Ibernagaray 1992.

Table 2.1: Distribution of Agricultural Loans from the Bolivian Agricultural Bank by Department and Geographic Region, 1955-1975 (%)

	1955-64	1964-70	1970-75
Altiplano	16.1	18.7	4.3
La Paz	11	13.5	2.5
Oruro	2.5	2	1.2
Potosi	2.6	3.1	0.7
Valleys	25.9	17.4	6.6
Cochabamba	13.5	9.9	2.7
Chuquisaca	5.7	3.9	2.7
Tarija	6.7	3.6	2.7
Lowlands	57.5	56.1	88.6
Santa Cruz	42.6	43.1	69.6
Beni-Pando	14.9	13	19

Source: Arze 1979, cited in PNUD 2004

lowlanders did not respond to the agrarian reform by organizing unions and other organizations, and many chose to stay on the estates where they had worked before the reform, while those who did not often cleared their own lands in frontier areas (Painter 1985; Gill 1987).

In 1963, the MNR organized the *Plan Nacional de Colonización* (National Colonization Plan) to resettle tens of thousands of highland peasants to three main areas: the Chapare, a subtropical zone near Cochabamba, the Yungas, subtropical valleys east of La Paz, and the sparsely populated eastern lands of Santa Cruz. The MNR justified the "colonization" program as an effort to redistribute population more evenly across national space, to reinforce lowland development efforts with manpower, and to provide land for peasants.[25] But some critics charged that colonization served as a "safety valve" that allowed the government to avoid

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[25] "Colonization" refers to frontier settlement, and includes both officially sponsored programs as well as spontaneous settlement. Officially directed settlements were supported by the state as well as international donor organizations, including the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID (Painter 1985).

confronting social problems that persisted after the revolution, such as inequality, landlessness and deepening poverty (Gill 1987). Moreover, in the settlement areas themselves, the state often did not provide sufficient water supplies, schools, health centers, and other services. Inadequate access to markets forced settlers to rely on a few low-value crops for income, and production was mainly for household subsistence (Painter 1985).

While the MNR invested millions of dollars implementing the Bohan Plan, it largely overlooked urban industrial development and bypassed the densely populated highland region in providing agricultural credit, extension, and technology (Gill 1987). This biased approach—justified in the name of agricultural modernization and national integration—contributed to spurring mass migration, particularly to Santa Cruz and its surrounding agro-industrial zone. Settlements such as La Angostura and La Guardia appeared on land opened up by the Cochabamba – Santa Cruz highway. Santa Cruz department's population grew at a rate of less than one percent from 1900 to 1950, jumping to 4.1 percent from 1950 to 1976 (CODEPO 2004). Official colonization programs added to this growth, but the vast majority settled in a so-called spontaneous manner, arriving in both rural communities and growing urban areas, and often forming their own sindicatos (peasant unions) in frontier zones (Sandoval 1983; Prado et al. 2005; Gill 1987) (see Chapter 3 for further discussion of migration flows to Santa Cruz).

In 1964, 12 years of MNR leadership ended when General Rene Barrientos, backed by the army that had been re-equipped by the United States, established military rule in a coup. Despite a changed political environment, Barrientos's approach to economic development diverged little from the path set by the MNR. The military government continued to support commercial agriculture in Santa Cruz without initiating any comprehensive agricultural development programs in highland

areas (Gill 1987). Agricultural investment favored large private growers, and the threat of land expropriations through the agrarian reform receded in Santa Cruz. Bolivia was entering a cycle of economic growth that would last more than a decade; the national economy grew at an average annual rate of 5.7 percent between 1964 and 1978 (PNUD 2004).

During the 1960s, sugarcane and rice were the Oriente's main cash crops (Arrieta et al. 1990; PNUD 2004). By the late 1960s, the influx of peasant settlers undercut the profitability of rice for large-scale growers, and the state cut rice price subsidies (Gill 1987). Large landowners in Santa Cruz and new arrivals, including ex-hacienda owners from the highlands whose lands had been appropriated in the agrarian reform, professionals, and wealthy speculators made investments in sugarcane and cotton cultivation. Sugarcane and cotton growers used salaried labor and mostly grew on plantations of 50 hectares or more (Arrieta et al. 1990; Soruco 2008). The harvest was primarily for export rather than domestic consumption, and producers organized into associations to protect their interests. Sugarcane growers in 1961 founded the *Federación de Caneros de Santa Cruz*, and beef, cotton, sorghum, soy, rice, and milk producers' associations followed suit. In 1966, the large growers created an umbrella group called the *Cámera Agropecuaria del Oriente* (Agricultural Chamber of the Eastern Lowlands, CAO) to shape regional agricultural policy and voice demands at the national level, particularly concerning government price levels and credit allocation (Gill 1987).

Although their constituency was small, the growers' associations successfully lobbied the government and secured benefits for their membership during the period of military rule in Bolivia, which lasted through the 1970s. The group's influence continued in the neoliberal era of the 1980s and 1990s, and they form an important part of the current regional elite.

Military Rule and the Opening of the Oriente

In the 1970s, the Bolivian government invested much of its foreign aid into tin and petroleum exploitation and agribusiness. The Oriente increasingly became the focus of economic development efforts, and the Bohan Plan's recommendations were finally put into effect. Along with the colonization and highway projects that opened up Santa Cruz and the Chapare, and then the Beni further to the north, the government awarded individuals and agribusinesses with large concessions of frontier land. In Santa Cruz alone, the military government of Colonel Banzer Suárez awarded almost 10 million hectares (Sanabria 1993: 51).

U.S. economic assistance focused on large-scale investment in agriculture and transport, particularly in Santa Cruz's integrated zone. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) made credit, fertilizer, seed, and machinery available to Santa Cruz landholders, and it provided sugar mill owners with generous loans to expand and modernize production. The Bolivian government issued land grants to support cattle ranching in areas where cotton and sugar cultivation had exhausted the soil. The beneficiaries of government subsidies and land concessions consolidated their control over the regional economy. As the economic importance of Santa Cruz grew, this group gained power at the national level. Their power reached its apex during the 1971-1978 dictatorship of Hugo Banzer Suárez (Eckstein 1983; Gill 1987; Sanabria 1993; Soruco 2008).

The Banzer regime strengthened the ties between military personnel and lowland landholders and growers in a mutually beneficial alliance. Lowland agro-industrialists supported Banzer's 1971 coup, while Banzer himself and six of his ministers were Santa Cruz natives (Gill 1987). The military repressed any social unrest from tenant farmers and wage laborers, helping to create a favorable investment

climate. Meanwhile, military commanders acquired land in the Oriente and took advantage of the 1970s export boom to gain personal profit.

During this period, the government encouraged capitalist agriculture mainly through credit programs and land concessions. The government disbursed loans through the *Banco Agrícola Boliviano* (Bolivian Agricultural Bank, BAB). Originally founded in 1942, the development bank was intended to provide service to the agricultural sector. The MNR government reorganized the BAB to offer financial assistance to peasants and small farmers after the 1952 revolution. But after 1954, the emphasis shifted to offering low interest long-term credit to large-scale producers. Its foreign capital base expanded in the early 1970s as international commodity prices soared, particularly for sugar and cotton (Eckstein 1983; Gill 1987). From 1966 to 1978, international development agencies made approximately $146 million available to the BAB and commercial banks for agricultural credit. USAID managed 46 percent of foreign-financed credit, and the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank provided the rest through direct government loans (Gill 1987). Meanwhile, peasants and small producers scarcely benefited from international capital in this period, and they accessed little of BAB's own funds (Eckstein 1983).[26] The government did not create a credit program for small farmers with less than 50 hectares until 1975 (Gill 1987).

The granting of large land concessions, which could be used as collateral, eased access to credit for cash crop producers. The government encouraged frontier expansion through land grants, and land itself became a valuable commodity. While the MNR initiated the granting of eastern lands to individuals and enterprises, the Banzer regime greatly outpaced it: of the land giveaways of 10,000 hectares or more

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[26] Between 1964 and 1971, peasants received roughly one third of all BAB loans, but only 4 percent of BAB funds (Eckstein 1983: 111).

between 1952 and 1994, 2.4 percent were distributed during the MNR government (1952-1964) while 48 percent were distributed under Banzer (1971-1978) (Ministerio de Desarrollo Sustenible 2002, cited in Soruco 2008: 67-8).

The justification for granting large land extensions fit the government's import-substitution program, which held that large holdings offered more productive potential than smaller parcels. Some recipients used their grants to expand sugarcane, cotton, and cattle ranching activities (Ibernagaray 1992; Gill 1987). But others engaged in speculative activity to maximize gains from rising land value. For example, by classifying land as pasture, individuals could get larger grants and then sell the parcels for a profit to those eager to begin commercial farming ventures (Gill 1987). Unproductive landholdings, termed *tierras de engorde* (fattening lands) in Santa Cruz, could also be used as insurance against cyclical downturns (Soruco 2008).

Economic instability mounted during the 1970s. By the decade's end, falling commodity prices led to steep drops in sugar and cotton production (Stearman 1985; PNUD 2004). Export revenues declined, inflation soared, and producers found it more difficult to acquire commercial and multilateral loans. Moreover, many of the speculative loans in the Oriente defaulted. By 1978, almost 70 percent of delinquent BAB loans were in Santa Cruz, and cotton and soy producers were typically the worst offenders.

Supporting the interests of lowland landholders, the Banzer regime did not pressure growers to repay their credit. Instead, it issued a decree in 1977 that extended the repayment period for cotton and soy loans from BAB and the state bank for an additional 8 to 12 years. Furthermore, Banzer purchased credit portfolios of Citibank, where over 80 percent of the loans were overdue, and transferred them to BAB to prevent Citibank from pressuring the borrowers (Ibarnegaray 1992: 83).

This "bailout" amounted to an income transfer to large producers, and multinational banks foisted their bad debts onto the government, adding to the national debt (Eckstein 1983; Gill 1987). The situation was part of a larger debt crisis that engulfed much of Latin America by the early 1980s (Postero 2007). The instability undermined the first democratic government of Hernán Siles Zuazo and the UDP (Democratic Popular Unity), which was elected in 1982 but did not complete its term. The escalating crisis prompted president Victor Paz Estenssoro to adopt structural adjustment measures in 1985 through Supreme Decree 21060, beginning the neoliberal reforms that continued through the 1990s (Klein 1992).

In 1985, as the Bolivian economy submitted to an International Monetary Fund structural adjustment program, nearly 73 percent of the debts in the Banco Agrícola Boliviano credit portfolio were in Santa Cruz, as shown in the table below. An additional 17 percent of BAB debts were in Montero, a growing agricultural center in the integrated zone. While a large number of loans were also made in Cochabamba and La Paz, their value was far less than with those in Santa Cruz and Montero.

Table 2.2: BAB Credit Portfolio by Regional Branch, December 31, 1985

Regional branches	Number of loans	Amount (in thousands of Bolivian pesos)	Percent
La Paz	583	183,901,877	0.58
Cochabamba	986	228,331,044	0.71
Oruro	125	2,829,560	0.01
Potosi	93	1,711,860	0.01
Tarija	350	473,018,292	1.48
Chuquisaca	230	4,795,415	0.01
Santa Cruz	893	23,246,018,543	72.69
Montero	535	5,505,832,817	17.22
Beni	737	2,231,353,266	6.98
Pando	24	103,190,006	0.32
Total	4,556	31,980,982,680	100

Source: Ibarnegaray 1992: 85

In economic terms, the 1970s was a period of lost opportunity for the Oriente and the country as a whole. Rather than diversifying the regional economy, the development strategy took advantage of favorable terms of trade for a handful of commodities (PNUD 2004). But these favorable terms proved short lived. By the early 1980s, for example, the cotton boom ended and cotton production virtually disappeared in Santa Cruz by 1981 (Arrieta et al. 1990).

More broadly, the national government sought to incubate an agro-industrial class of entrepreneurs during the post-revolutionary period, both in its national-populist phase (1952-1964) and its military phase (1964-1982). Although sugar and cotton cultivation was lucrative, Santa Cruz landholders' faulty debt repayment suggests that the state had fostered commercial elite, rather than a productive one. Lowland agro-industrialists proved to be most successful at speculative landholding (Soruco 2008; Lavaud 1998).

Neoliberal Changes and Continuities

The advent of neoliberalism in 1985 marked a profound shift that dismantled state-led capitalism in Bolivia.[27] Regarding policy toward the Oriente, however, neoliberalism was a "coherent sequence" with the support provided by the military-state capitalist system preceding it (Soruco 2008: 88). As in the 1960s and 1970s, the Oriente was central to the national economic growth strategy. Neoliberal governments supported lowland agriculture by lowering property taxes, providing tax exemptions for imported capital goods and diesel subsidies, offering credit, and facilitating access to new international markets through trade agreements not always favorable to

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[27] For more detail on the neoliberal transformation in Bolivia initiated by President Victor Paz Estenssoro, see Malloy (1989); Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattus (1990); Kohl (1999); and Kohl and Farthing (2006).

national interests. The highland tin economy was partly eclipsed in the 1970s by lowland agriculture, ranching, hydrocarbons, and briefly, illegal coca paste.[28] This geographical shift occurred more fully in the 1980s with the collapse of international tin prices and the closure of the state-owned tin mines.

By the 1990s and early 21st century, Santa Cruz department became the engine of the national economy. From 1992 to 2001 its contribution to the national GDP rose from 25.8 to 30.1 percent. Its economic dynamism was heavily based on its export capacity, and it contributed 34 percent of the value of national exports on average in the 1990s, which jumped to 55 percent in 2002 following increases in natural gas exports to Argentina and Brazil (CAINCO 2004). As in earlier periods, however, this contribution to economic growth relied on a narrow base, as soy and hydrocarbons accounted for 80 percent of its exports in 2001 (PNUD 2004: 51).[29] As shown in Figure 2.2, Santa Cruz contributed to 42 percent of agricultural production, 34 percent of industrial output, and 25 percent of extractive industry in the national GDP in 2000. These figures exceed those of regional economies that were traditionally agricultural (Cochabamba, with 13.5 percent), industrial (La Paz, with 23 percent), or based on mining (Oruro, with 18.5 percent) (PNUD 2004).

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[28] Coca paste is a basic ingredient used in the production of cocaine. This source of capital dried up in the 1990s due to pressure from the Bolivian government and U.S. drug eradication efforts (Kohl and Farthing 2006).
[29] Soy and derivatives made up 50 percent of the total value of exports from Santa Cruz department, while hydrocarbons comprised 30 percent in 2000 (PNUD 2004).

Source: PNUD 2004

Figure 2.2: Santa Cruz Department Contribution to GDP by Sector, 1988-2000

Following a decade of stagnation (1978-1988), national level neoliberal reforms created a favorable environment for lowland agriculture, which boomed in the 1990s with expanding soy production. The soy sector received special attention from the World Bank project "Eastern Lowlands: Natural Resource Management and Agricultural Production," which in 1990 financed soy and wheat production with US $55 million. Subsequently, both soy production levels and cultivated land expanded in an unprecedented fashion. Land under soy cultivation grew from 72,000 to 610,00 hectares from 1987 to 1999, which represented an area 12 times greater than the area under cotton cultivation at the height of the cotton boom in 1974 (PNUD 2004: 53). Soy production grew from 130,000 tons to 970,000 tons in the same period (ibid). Meanwhile, soy growers created production linkages and coordinated activities with producers of related goods such as cooking oil, flour, and sunflower oil in a growing agro-industrial complex (Medeiros 2008). Soy also spread to new growth areas, such

as Pailón, a town located east of the city of Santa Cruz and outside of the "integrated zone" that has concentrated agro-industry since the 1950s (PNUD 2004; Medeiros 2008).

The soy boom continued in the 2000s, but its structural limitations were becoming evident. By 2005, the area under soy cultivation grew to 930,000 hectares with production of 1.7 million tons. Soy had become Bolivia's second export product, accounting for 43 percent of "non-traditional" exports and 14 percent of total exports in 2005. A full 97 percent of soy exports, however, are destined to *Comunidad Andina de Naciones* (Andean Community of Nations, or CAN) members.[30] This market is increasingly unstable, as a potential free trade agreement between Colombia and the United States would allow cheaper U.S. soy to enter Colombia. Without the customs preferences of CAN, Bolivian soy is not competitive with large producers such as Brazil, Argentina, and the U.S. due to transport costs. Although soy production expanded vertiginously in recent years, its productivity (yield per hectare) has declined since 2003 (Medeiros 2008). Furthermore, rapid expansion of the soy frontier is causing ecological damage, deforestation, and violent conflicts over land (Madeiros 2008). The regional development model being pursued in the Oriente relies on continuous frontier expansion in pursuit of new lands and resources, creating serious challenges to sustainability.

An additional potential weakness of the soy sector is the dominance of a small number of mostly multinational firms over production, processing, exporting, and finance. Whereas the cruceño elite once relied on government credit and finance for their operating capital to produce sugar and cotton, the soy industry is currently financed by a few key private processing and export firms, which also control the

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[30] CAN members include Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia, and Bolivia.

importation of agricultural inputs.[31]   This condition suggests the vulnerability of regional agro-industrialists (Soruco 2008).

Despite instability and susceptibility to global economic fluctuations, the regional economic boom in Santa Cruz has continued. Poor and middle class highlanders continue to migrate to the city of Santa Cruz and its surrounding agricultural centers, such as Warnes, Montero, and Yapacaní. By 1998, the population of the city of Santa Cruz reached one million (CODEPO 2004).

Also in the 1990s, petroleum firms discovered vast natural gas reserves in Santa Cruz and Tarija departments. The gas resources are the second largest in South America and represent a growing proportion of state revenues since the late 1990s (Hindery 2004). In 1996, the Bolivian government partially privatized the state petroleum company *Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales Bolivianos* (YPFB). This brought investment from several multinational firms and led to an agreement for the construction of a natural gas pipeline to Sao Paulo, Brazil, a primary export market. Firms holding contracts for Bolivia's gas include Brazil's Petrobras, Spain's Repsol, French Total, British Gas, and Shell from the U.S.

Despite the rise in foreign direct investment, the uneven geographic distribution of gas and other resources has accentuated regional inequalities in Bolivia. Gas reserves are found in four of the country's nine departments: Santa Cruz, Tarija, Cochabamba, and Chuquisaca. Since a percentage of royalties goes directly to gas producing regions, the highland departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí stand to gain only to the extent that the central government redistributes fiscal revenues in this region. On May 1, 2006, President Evo Morales announced his intention to re-nationalize hydrocarbons assets, in effect forcing foreign firms to sign new contracts

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[31] These firms include Archer Daniels Midland-SAO S.A. and Cargill Bolivia (which operate with U.S. capital), Gravetal Bolivia (Colombian), Industrias Aceiteras S.A.-"Fino" (Peruvian and Bolivian), and Industrias Oleaginosas Ltda., Intergrain, and Granos del Oriente (Bolivian) (PNUD 2004: 54).

giving Bolivia majority ownership and as much as 82 percent of revenues.[32]

Meanwhile, increasingly tense debates around the structuring of the revenues between

the central government and the regions, and how this income might be taxed and

invested, have brought the once isolated Oriente to the center of national politics.

Table 2.3 shows the distribution of hydrocarbons income from royalties and

taxes (*Impuesto Directo a Hidrocarburos*, or IDH) by department from 2005 to 2007.

Table 2.3: Distribution of Hydrocarbons Income by Department, 2005-2007

Distribution of Hydrocarbon Royalties and Taxes ($US millions)			
Beneficiaries	**2005**	**2006**	**2007**
Tarija	137.9	218.5	237.4
Santa Cruz	44.4	96.8	117.9
Cochabamba	40.5	80.5	86.6
La Paz	20.4	61.2	73.3
Beni	29.1	57.4	62.3
Chuquisaca	16.9	51	58
Pando	23.7	50.1	54.2
Oruro	18.2	42.8	46.1
Potosí	18.2	42.8	46.1
Department Totals	349.2	701.1	781.9
National Treasury & State Oil Co. (YPFB)	259.2	598	789.8
Total	608	1,299	1,572

Source: Ministerio de Planificación, August 2007

Competing Visions of the Oriente

The dramatic economic growth in the Oriente during the past half-century has

raised competing interpretations. Scholarly and popular accounts from within the

Oriente differ sharply from those of outsiders in their reading of events. To begin

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[32] This measure returned royalty and taxation rates to the levels where they were before the hydrocarbon sector's privatization in 1996. An editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* called the nationalization "another Latin craze: the abrogation of contracts," but the Morales government called the move a "nationalization without expropriation" (*Latin American Energy Fad, the Wall Street Journal,* p. A14, May 3, 2006).

with, cruceño historians and commentators have emphasized the "foundational myth" that Spanish explorers who arrived from Asunción and Río de la Plata on the Atlantic coast founded Santa Cruz (Sanabria 1979; Roca 2001; Sandoval 1983).[33] This genealogy ties cruceños more closely to relatively white and European lowland Paraguay than to indigenous Andean Bolivia (Pruden 2003; Plata 2008). The *mestizaje* (or mixing) that resulted from the Spanish encounter with scattered lowland Indians formed the basis for "lowland exceptionalism" within the predominantly Andean nation of Bolivia (Lowrey 2006).

Pruden (2003) noted that during the 1930s Chaco War, an upsurge of scholarly publication reminded its lowland Bolivian audience of their distinct cultural and ethnic lineage. Some authors espoused conspiracy theories to explain why Santa Cruz joined Bolivia in 1825 when it gained independence, as opposed to Paraguay, Argentina, or forming its own country (Pruden 2003). This literature has been rediscovered under the banner of "autonomy" in the early 2000s (Dabdoub 2001; Lowrey 2006).

Following the 1952 revolution and agrarian reform, many cruceños resented the "colonization" of the Oriente by internal highland migrants as a means to populate the vast region, and they felt that they had no control over this process (Dabdoub 2001). This added to a long list of grievances regarding the central government's marginalizing of the region as evidenced by the lack of railroad connections and the deferred granting of petroleum royalties to producing departments.[34] Worse still, when cruceños organized to make demands on the state "in defense of their interests,"

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[33] This route contrasts with that taken by Spanish explorers who arrived in present-day highland Bolivia from Lima on the Pacific coast via the Andes.

[34] The Siles government first discussed granting 11 percent of the gross earnings from hydrocarbons to producing departments in 1929, and the Busch government agreed on the formula in 1938 after nationalizing Standard Oil, but the legislation was not enacted until 1957 after a protracted struggle by Santa Cruz civic organizations.

these efforts were often stigmatized and discredited in the highlands as "regionalist" and "separatist" (Dabdoub 2001: 165).

Regarding the state-directed economic development efforts of the MNR, the eminent cruceño historian Isaac Sandoval noted that although it avoided redistributing large landholdings in the Oriente as it did in the highlands during the agrarian reform, there was "a certain fear among cruceño elites of state intervention in their economic activities" (Sandoval 1983: 164). This distrust grew with the increasing presence of government-organized sindicatos (peasant and trade unions) that claimed rural and urban lands in Santa Cruz, led by popular classes (ibid). Despite this issue, state policy promised to "consolidate a modern agro-industrial class," for which it promoted "concentration of property, credit assistance, and the introduction of capital-intensive technology" (Calderón and Laserna 1983: 202).

From the Andean perspective, the government's approach to promoting national development was increasingly asymmetrical. Looking back, Arze (1979) summed up the project as one of "transferring income from the highland mining sector, which was recently nationalized, toward the lowland agro-industry and hydrocarbons sectors and thereby creating conditions for the emergence of a lowland bourgeoisie [that was] similar to the one the 1952 revolution had just overthrown in the highlands" (cited in PNUD 2004: 39). Furthermore, the government channeled increasing amounts of foreign aid to the Oriente. While the national government funded the colonization program as a means to support highland peasants and relieve population pressure in the highlands as part of its development program, this expenditure was dwarfed by the outlays made to lowland sugar and cotton growers in the 1960s and 1970s (Gill 1987). The colonization sites often lacked public investment, basic services were minimal, and the entire program was discontinued in

1975 (Painter 1985; Gill 1987). These factors support the highland view that national development policies have favored lowland landowners in recent decades.

In 1980, the cruceño historian José Luís Roca argued that a "*lucha entre regiones*," (struggle between regions), rather than a class struggle, has been central to Bolivia's history. With this formulation, Roca added geography to previous arguments about race and cultural origins to highlight the distinctiveness of the Oriente. Although it has been criticized by some cruceños for assuming internal unity within the region and treating regions as homogenous spaces without class conflict or other inequalities (Prado et al. 2005), the argument has recently been rediscovered in some circles (e.g. Dabdoub 2001). It seems noteworthy that the contention emerged from Santa Cruz rather than La Paz. It is a cruceño perspective that reflects local circumstances. In La Paz, both elites and popular groups have long pursued political projects of national scope and aspirations. These same groups have been highly "territorialized" in Santa Cruz, their vision of development largely limited to the space of the region (see Soruco 2008: 7-8).

Although the source of many of Bolivia's internal struggles lies in territorial divisions, the "struggle between regions" notion that is currently in vogue among autonomists serves to promote unity for the region in the face of challenges for dominance by the highland tin economy through the 1980s and more recently by struggles over control of natural gas resources. Regionalist sentiment also serves to preclude the possibility for alternative struggles that might emerge from within the Oriente, repositioning lines of contention away from class and gender forms of oppression and toward regional difference (Argirakis 2008). Contemporary lowland elites have revived the argument as a central trope in supporting "a defensive and reactionary political position in the face of a series of unresolved and pending historic challenges" (ibid: ix). Such challenges include resolving the process of national

integration initiated in the 1950s and expanding citizenship rights to previously marginalized groups such as indigenous peoples and landless peasants.

Perhaps what is most striking about the history of the Oriente are the sharply conflicting interpretations of its rise to national importance. The region was both historically remote and abandoned, but also central to the country's future. It spearheaded opposition to the national government, but has also been the main beneficiary of the government's development strategies. This dichotomy seems to reflect deep-seated ideas, myths, and contradictions about the role of the eastern frontier in the national psyche.[35] Many Bolivians view the Oriente, and Santa Cruz in particular, as synonymous with opportunity. Lorgio Balcazar, member of the Civic Committee, noted that Santa Cruz is often seen in the interior of the country as the "*sueño Boliviano*" (Bolivian dream).[36] Other simplifications abound in the Oriente, for instance that the region's economic growth results from private initiative, rugged individualism, and a fierce sense of independence from the national government (Whitehead 1973; Soruco 2008). Such views continue to shape the way lowland elites imagine and position themselves and the region vis-à-vis the national state.

The following figures illustrate the rising importance of Santa Cruz department as the "engine of the national economy." Figure 2.3 shows the growth in contribution to GDP of Santa Cruz, La Paz, and Cochabamba Departments from 1970 to 2002. La Paz decreased its share from 33 to 25.7 percent while Santa Cruz grew from 16.6 to 30.3 percent during this period. Figure 2.4 shows the share of exports by department in 2002. Santa Cruz accounted for more than half, or 55 percent, of national exports.

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[35] Similar contradictions appear in many parts of the world. For example, tropes about the absence of the state and rugged individualism can be found in the American West, despite ample evidence of state support.
[36] Lorgio Balcazar, Manager, Santa Cruz Civic Committee, Interview with author, January 8, 2007.

Source: CAINCO 2004

Figure 2.3: La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz Departments' Contribution to GDP, 1970-2002

Source: CAINCO 2004

Figure 2.4: Share of Exports by Department, 2002

The Consolidation of the Lowland Elite

Despite generous state subsidies, credits, public investment, protections, and land grants, public officials and civic leaders in the Oriente continue to emphasize the region's abandonment by the central government. This position was logical up to around 1940. But since then, the Oriente and especially its largest department Santa Cruz has been anything but neglected. Tellingly, most of the influential cruceño institutions formed in the first half of the 20th century when the region was isolated from the national economy (Soruco 2008). These include the Sociedad de Estudios Geográficos e Históricos de Santa Cruz (Society of Geographical and Historical Studies) in 1903, the Comité de Obras Publicas (Public Works Committee) in 1946, and the Comité Cívico Pro Santa Cruz (Santa Cruz Civic Committee) in 1950.

The Civic Committee, founded by members of the traditional Santa Cruz elite, has nurtured a "regional collective consciousness" in contrast to the national objectives of the MNR post-revolutionary government (Sandoval 2000, cited in Sandoval et al. 2003). The committee has included members of the region's prominent business interests and professional organizations, and it has emphasized the Spanish, non-Indian heritage of its membership (Whitehead 1973). In 1957, the Civic Committee began a vigorous and emotional campaign against the central government, insisting that a larger portion of the oil revenues generated in the department be earmarked for local expenditure. A 1938 law recognizing departmental participation in hydrocarbon production allowed the department to collect an 11 percent tax on all oil and natural gas extracted in Santa Cruz. These earnings grew as production expanded in the 1950s, but the government had never implemented the law (Palmer 1979).

Given the historical neglect shown by past national governments toward Santa Cruz and the Oriente, the Civic Committee garnered wide support for the demand of

11 percent of gross revenues. The Committee also mobilized growing sentiment against the influx of highland Indians while stressing the cultural and racial superiority of the lowlanders and the prevalence of their Spanish descent in contrast to the more indigenous Andean region. In this way, the upper class appealed to the urban poor by urging them to support the interests of all cruceños (Whitehead 1973).

The Civic Committee prevailed in what was known in Santa Cruz as the "*luchas cívicas*" (civic struggles) for a larger share of oil revenues in 1959. The department channeled the new income to a series of urban and regional development projects in the 1960s and 1970s (Palmer 1979; Prado et al. 2005). This coincided with efforts to integrate Santa Cruz and the Oriente into the national economy, as described earlier. The *Corporación Regional de Desarrollo* (Regional Development Corporation, or CORDECRUZ), a departmental public agency formed in the 1970s, began projects favored by large-scale agriculturalists and urban infrastructure initiatives using hydrocarbon royalties. The agency also managed programs sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank and USAID during the 1970s credit bonanza (Gill 1987). Oil and gas revenues gave CORDECRUZ an advantage over other regional development agencies in Bolivia during this period, enabling Santa Cruz to surge ahead of the rest of the country in terms of infrastructure, not to mention its ability to attract young engineers, architects and planners (Stearman 1985). One observer noted that CORDECRUZ "emerged as the most solvent institution in comparison with the rest of the country" in the 1970s (Ibernagaray 1992: 53).

The military dictatorships from 1964 to 1982 found that civic committees served as better mechanisms to exert centralized control over regions than political parties. While the model of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee inspired newer civic committees that formed in other Bolivian cities in the early 1970s, the strength of local oligarchies in other regions was far less than the elites that dominated Santa Cruz

(Calderón and Laserna 1983).[37] In the 1970s, the civic committees were the only civil society organizations that the military did not suppress. Under the Banzer dictatorship, members of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee held prominent government posts, enabling them to transfer a maximum amount of government surplus to the region.[38]

As the Oriente became more closely integrated with national and global markets, the presence of the state grew stronger. This took shape under the MNR and later through the influence and intervention of the military. Military support for and participation in lowland regional development created a strategic alliance between military and agro-industrial interests. In the 1970s, Santa Cruz presented pole of political power to challenge the formerly unipolar force of La Paz (Lowrey 2006; see also Whitehead 1973). Even as neoliberal reforms reduced and reconfigured the government's role in directing the national economy and providing social protections, neoliberal administrations created favorable conditions for agro-industrial development and hydrocarbons extraction in the Oriente, which began to displace the formerly highland-dominated national economy in the 1980s.

In the neoliberal era, and most likely in the emerging post-neoliberal one, controlling access to geographically fixed resources is key to Bolivia's future, and this influences the forms that political contestation take. The political contestation emerging from Santa Cruz involves a resurgence of questions of geography, ethnicity, and distribution of resources. These issues echo those raised by commentators in the 1930s questioning Santa Cruz's accession to a newly independent Bolivia in 1825

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[37] As a result, the political orientation and demands of most civic committees were broader than in Santa Cruz, and in some cases such as Cochabamba and Potosí, they supported progressive social movements, especially during the 1970s when other opposition groups were forced into hiding (Farthing 2007).
[38] These individuals were also able to turn around some of the loans that Banzer ostensibly directed for agricultural development in the Oriente and deposit them in their own Miami bank accounts (Malloy and Gamarra 1988).

(Pruden 2003) and that the Civic Committee articulated in the "civic struggles" against the central government in the 1950s. Although cruceño historians such as Roca (1980) have described this as a "struggle between regions," that represents the main conflict on which Bolivian history has hinged, such claims serve to diffuse class conflict, even though the two are closely interconnected.

The collapse of the elite-led political party system and the election of Evo Morales and the left leaning *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement toward Socialism, or MAS) to lead the national government in December 2005 have intensified regionalist opposition based in Santa Cruz. Cruceño elites view their approach to regional development as threatened by an antagonistic central government. The reliance on a narrow-based extractive model (Gray 2005) and dependence on key export sectors has reinforced the lowland elites' opposition to the national government's policies of redistributive land reform and establishing national sovereignty over natural resource exploitation (Gustafson 2006; García Linera 2006).

For example, the lowland agrarian and cattle chambers, the Santa Cruz *Prefectura* (departmental government), and Civic Committee leaders argue that Morales's proposed amendments to the 1996 agrarian law represent attacks on Santa Cruz agro-industry.[39] In particular, the stipulation against unproductive lands, which would be subject to redistribution for productive use (referred to as the *Función Economica Social*, or Economic-Social Function, FES), has collided with the interests of Santa Cruz landholders and the agrarian structure that has developed in the Oriente since the 1950s. The current Civic Committee president Branco Marinkovic faulted the law for "cutting the latifundios to pieces," and added, "We don't want to separate [from Bolivia], but we want our own government to make decisions here. We don't

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[39] The new law proposed by MAS is called the *Ley de Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria*, or Law of Community Reorganization of the Agrarian Reform.

want communism in the 21st century."[40] In a 2007 newspaper interview titled "*El Agro No Se Va a Someter*" ("Agro will not surrender"), the president of the lowland agricultural chamber (CAO), Mauricio Roca, criticized the central government for offering US $59 million in support for small and medium sized producers, but not for large-scale growers, while "taking demagogical positions" with respect to agriculture and "intervening in the means of production" (Vargas 2007a).

In another example, the regional development model generates natural gas royalties, and this has led to rent seeking battles between lowland elites and the central government. The Morales administration has proposed using hydrocarbons taxes to finance an expanded pension system that would benefit low-income elderly Bolivians throughout the country.[41] Lowland elites oppose this measure, as it would substantially cut departmental budgets; the Santa Cruz prefect and other regional leaders recently proposed that the program be funded by alternative sources (Vargas 2007b).

Moreover, the crisis of economic instability that affects the lowland agro-industry is joined by a crisis for elites tied to the breakdown of racial privilege and traditional power structures (García Linera 2006; Soruco 2008). In response to the broad changes that are taking hold in Bolivia, elites have distanced themselves from the national government and moved to the regional scale. Much has been said in popular and scholarly circles about the east-west divide and even the threat of civil war between highland Andean "collas" and lowland "cambas." Although the regional divisions are deep and longstanding, the emphasis on this territorial divide serves to

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[40] *Estatuto Cruceño Restringe TCO y Tolera Concentracion de Tierras, Agencia Boliviana de Informacion,* March 5, 2007. Marinkovic is also president of the largest Bolivian-owned soy and sunflower oil exporter and ranks as one of the country's wealthiest individuals.
[41] The new pension, called *Renta Dignidad* (dignity payment) would replace a previous program, *Bonosol*, which was a once a year payment of US $220 to Bolivians over age 65. The new system would pay US $25 on a monthly basis to those over age 60, and would be financed by 30 percent of the hydrocarbons tax income.

obscure an underlying tension between two distinct visions of development for Bolivia espoused by the MAS and its conservative opposition.

On the ground, the MAS government seeks to build a strong pro-poor, developmental and redistributive national government, "renewing the presence of the state as the director of the economy," solidifying public ownership of natural resources, and reducing the chasm between the rich and the poor (García Linera 2008: 2). Supporters of regional autonomy, in contrast, envision a weak, neoliberal government of interconnected and market friendly regions, detached from the regulatory and redistributive pressures of national politics, while promoting increased foreign investment. The east-west viewpoint glosses over the significant right-wing presence in the Andes as well as increasing MAS support in eastern Bolivia (Gustafson 2008). Moreover, the discourse of regional division heightens the racially charged rhetoric of autonomy, and it often conflates Andeanness, indigenous cultures, and the MAS government. By reducing cultural identity, political ideology and territory, however, this viewpoint misses the crosscutting interactions between regional, ethnic, and class differences that underscore the current geopolitical struggle in Bolivia.

The Agenda of October (2003) Versus the Agenda of January (2005) and the Demand for Autonomy

Journalistic accounts often explain the recent unrest in Bolivia in terms of the domestic struggle over the control of Bolivia's hydrocarbons resources, and focus on demands by indigenous Andeans for nationalizing hydrocarbons exploitation. Resolving the contention around the control of natural gas development was an important part of the 'Agenda of October,' the social protests that toppled the Sánchez de Lozada government in October 2003 (Postero 2007; García Linera 2006). Less

often discussed is the competing 'Agenda of January,' a series of protests and demands for regional autonomy that contributed to the national upheaval that brought down President Carlos Mesa's government (successor to the ousted Sánchez de Lozada administration) in June 2005. The interplay between these two agendas shapes Bolivia's contemporary political dynamic, and the tension between them remains unresolved (Lowrey 2006).

The October 2003 uprising was centered in El Alto, the satellite city north of La Paz, where the majority of the population is indigenous Aymara. The protest focused on the president's plan to allow transnational corporations to export Bolivia's natural gas reserves via a pipeline through Chile to Mexico and the USA. Campesino groups, neighborhood associations, labor unions, street traders, and university students all came together to protest in El Alto and La Paz, and the protests spread to the highland cities of Oruro and Cochabamba. The mobilizations forced the president to resign and leave the country after the Bolivian military allegedly killed more than 80 people. Protestors demanded that the government renationalize the hydrocarbons sector that was privatized in the first Sánchez de Lozada administration (1993-1997) and use the natural gas resources to support the development of Bolivia's own industries.

Following the president's resignation, the former vice president, Carlos Mesa Gisbert, an historian and well-known television journalist, was sworn in as president. In his inaugural speech, he promised two responses to the protesters' demands: to hold a public referendum on the uses of natural gas and to convene a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution and reform the state. He ended his speech calling for a Bolivia in which there is "unity in diversity" (Mesa gobernará sin politicos y hará Referendum y Constituyente, *La Razón*, October 18, 2003).

While the "Agenda of October" emerged in the Andean highlands and represented a broad repudiation of the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, the "Agenda of January" was led by Santa Cruz civic organizations that carried the 1990s logic of decentralization and devolution to its extreme conclusion. The Santa Cruz Civic Committee called for the direct election of departmental authorities, replacing appointment by the central government, and pressed for a national referendum on regional autonomy (Urenda 2006; Mansilla 2007). The Civic Committee also stipulated that this precede the national referendum on the constituent assembly. Having the referendum on autonomy take place before the referendum on the constitutional reform would effectively diminish the impact of the latter referendum, as it would diffuse the national government's power.

Since the upheaval of October 2003, the Civic Committee and the Prefectura have spearheaded the demand for regional autonomy. The upsurge of popular-indigenous based social protest since the late 1990s, and intensifying in the early 2000s, has generated fissures not only in the government in power at the time, but in the entire political system (García Linera 2006; Argirakis 2008). Starting when Carlos Mesa became president in 2003, Santa Cruz business interests' representation in government ministries and party leadership positions began to disappear. Unable to dominate the 2004 municipal elections and sensing their national political influence waning amid growing popular mobilization, Santa Cruz elites shifted their focus to demanding more power for the departmental government, where it was possible to exert greater influence (Gustafson 2006; Farthing 2007).

In January 2005, former Civic Committee president and current departmental prefect Rubén Costas announced plans to form a "provisional autonomous council" in Santa Cruz (Urenda 2006). Following a government cut in diesel subsidies in December 2004 in response to IMF pressure to reduce the national deficit, the Civic

Committee and the Prefectura organized a "*cabildo*," or mass public assembly, to demand greater autonomy and to protest against "centralism." Estimates of the numbers in attendance range from 350,000 (Urenda 2006) to 200,000 (Cabildos cobran vigencia como mecanismo de expresion y lucha, *El Deber,* December 29, 2007). The unrest spread to Tarija where protesters blockaded roads to push for the proposed refinanced state petroleum firm YPFB to be headquartered in the department, near the largest gas fields. The protests in Santa Cruz and Tarija culminated in the nation-wide referendum on the autonomy issue, and they came to be known as the "Agenda of January."

The autonomy referendum occurred in July 2006 with Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni and Pando, the Media Luna departments, voting overwhelmingly in favor of greater autonomy, while the country's western departments voted almost as strongly against.[42] As the central government did not take immediate steps to recognize the results of the vote, regional leaders in Santa Cruz and the Media Luna organized a series of protests, drew up Autonomy Statutes, and held new referenda for their approval in May 2008. These referenda took place without consent from the central government. The Autonomy Statutes propose increasing regional control over land distribution and natural resource extraction while limiting the reach of the national government.[43] Meanwhile, by framing these demands under the banner of "autonomy," regional leaders have skillfully portrayed Morales and the MAS as the embodiment of the "centralism" that has historically been much resented by the lowland population (Malloy 1989).

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[42] Beni, Santa Cruz, Tarija and Pando voted "Yes" on the autonomy referendum by 73, 71, 60, and 53 percent, respectively, while in La Paz the "Yes" vote was only 26 percent (CNE 2006).
[43] For example, Article 102 of the Santa Cruz Autonomy Statute states "the right to property, the regularization of this right, and the distribution, redistribution and administration of lands in the Department of Santa Cruz is the responsibility of the departmental government" (Estatuto Autonómico de Santa Cruz, 2008, p. 11, author's translation).

Facing increasing pressure to resolve the autonomy issue, Morales aims to circumvent the power of regional elites by pushing to expand autonomy within departments at the provincial level. This proposal would create pressure on regional elites from below. Elected representatives in the Constitutional Assembly have debated the MAS proposal of "provincial autonomy." More broadly, Morales and the MAS leadership recognize that "enhanced decentralization of authority" is a necessary task for the Bolivian government (García Linera 2008: 4). But in their view, this requires a deeper form of decentralization, rather than a selective one that limits the process to departmental borders while maintaining "the anachronisms, privileges, and contradictions that exist within it" (ibid).

Increasingly, regional politics in Santa Cruz and the Oriente has come to represent a form of resistance to national politics, or a "containment dike," in the absence of an alternative political project (Argirakis 2008: vii). The regional civic block in the Media Luna has consolidated around its opposition not only to the government currently in power, but against the broader process of change occurring in the country, one that addresses issues of racial privilege and discrimination, demands equity and social justice, and proposes redistributing power and resources (García Linera 2006). In order to defend their position, regionalist leaders appeal to the defense of democracy, liberty, and justice against an authoritarian state. They have also presented their demands in terms of pursuing free market development as opposed to more interventionist policies (Schroeder 2007). But in doing so, they increasingly resort to the use of symbolic and material violence.[44]

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[44] Organized street violence has become increasingly common in Santa Cruz. For example, when campesinos from Yapacaní and San Julian in the integrated zone marched into the city of Santa Cruz to demonstrate against the Goni administration in October 2003, members of the *Unión Juvenil Cruceñista*, the young men's branch of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, allegedly attacked them with clubs.

Under the banner of "autonomy," the civic regionalist demands from Santa Cruz and Media Luna appear increasingly reductionist, simplifying the current political upheaval as a strict dichotomy between the "Oriente and occidente," (east and west) "Andes and lowlands," "cambas and collas," "Media Luna vs. Andean centralist government," or "modernity vs. pre-modernity." This viewpoint glosses over the diverse manifestations of a heterogeneous reality both within the region and across the country. The streams of migrants into the city and surrounding region of Santa Cruz are one expression of this reality.

Conclusion

The history of development in the Bolivian Oriente is marked by a paradox. The Santa Cruz model of economic growth is viewed by many local observers as based on private initiative and nurtured through centuries of abandonment and quasi independence from the national government (Roca 1999; Mansilla 2007). Yet it was active state intervention that provided ongoing support for the model. In 1942, the U.S. sponsored Plan Bohan recommended developing lowland agriculture to offset the country's reliance on the mining economy, to substitute food imports, and to incorporate the lowlands into the national economy. But this plan could not be realized immediately as it required reserves of labor that were freed from servitude on haciendas of the Andean highlands in the 1952 national revolution and agrarian reform. Following the 1952 revolution, Santa Cruz and the Oriente began a long period of economic growth.

Santa Cruz elites continue to stress their abandonment by the state, but, since the MNR's rise to power, the region has been anything but neglected. Rather, the Oriente became a focal point of capitalist development and a growing force in national political life. A second paradox in the region's developmental history is that the

national revolution and agrarian reform, which ended the hacienda system in the Andes, was used in the lowlands to consolidate even greater landholdings (Soruco 2008). This was particularly true during the Banzer dictatorship of the 1970s, when the state redistributed public lands to regional elites and actively represented their interests, such as by making loans for investment in commercial agriculture under favorable terms (Gill 1987). The clientelist nature of the land giveaways and credit during the Banzer era, however, gave a speculative character to the emerging elite as much as a productive one. It also heightened the pattern of social inequality that continues to shape social interactions in the region.

Along with the dramatic regional economic growth that Santa Cruz and the Oriente have experienced since the 1950s have come waves of highland migrants. Many of these migrants are not would-be farmers, but instead aspire to work in the urban economy of the city of Santa Cruz, or alongside it in the burgeoning informal economy. In the following chapter, I turn to the effects of the dramatic regional economic growth over the past half century on the region's main urban center, the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

CHAPTER 3

URBAN PLANNING AND MIGRATION IN THE CITY OF SANTA CRUZ

Introduction

In the course of three decades, Santa Cruz changed from a frontier town in Bolivia's tropical eastern lowlands to the center of the country's major production zone. Migration, agribusiness, and export enterprises have brought people from all over the country together in a new urban setting. This chapter explores Santa Cruz's urban history and its growing social and economic complexity. I focus on the period since 1950 when the city experienced rapid population growth and demographic change. I examine efforts by city planners and architects to modernize and redesign the city in the 1950s to the 1970s period, and I argue that these efforts did not adequately meet the needs created by mass migration and rapid urban growth. I then consider the city of Santa Cruz in the 1990s and 2000s, and I explore patterns of socio-spatial segregation and changes in the labor market, as well as new administrative and rational approaches to urban development such as municipal decentralization that occurred during this period.

The challenges of creating a "modern" city that fits the realities of urban life in Latin America are not unique to Santa Cruz. In the 20th century modernist period of urban planning and design, cities throughout the Americas, including Santa Cruz, borrowed from European urban philosophies in an attempt to create orderly, rational, and well managed cities (Hardoy 1992). Public and civic leaders aimed to redesign Santa Cruz based on modernist principles, but as will be explained below, it never became the "garden city" that its modernist planners had envisioned.

The administrative and symbolic center of contemporary Santa Cruz is the *Plaza 24 de Septiembre*, named for the independence of the Santa Cruz department. Fronting the plaza is the main cathedral, the *alcaldía* (town hall), a social club, police station, and prefecture. Until recently, one might see a sloth lazily hanging in the huge trees of the plaza, but the municipal government recently relocated it to a local zoo for safekeeping. The blocks around the plaza feature remnants of traditional Santa Cruz architecture, including covered walkways and large wooden columns, called *horcones de galería*, supporting upper balconies. In the torrential downpours of the rainy season, the covered walkways allow one to walk around the city without getting soaked.

Only a generation ago the *casco viejo* (or old center) made up the entire city, but it is now one small part of an expanding metropolis. Its streets follow the grid pattern imposed by the Spanish, meant to impose order and civility (Hardoy 1975). Today one sees Internet cafes, computer stores, pricey clothing boutiques, and restaurants and bars catering to tourists, oil executives, and members of the upper class.

If one boards a taxi or one of the dozens of "micros" (minibuses) that take passengers to the outer neighborhoods, one gradually sees the accoutrements of developed city life fade away. After passing quiet residential neighborhoods with neat, fenced in gardens just outside of the old center, the avenues and streets become dusty and unpaved and most lack street signs. In the rainy season from December to February, the streets are often submerged in a foot or more of muddy water due to lack of a drainage system, leaving pedestrians to roll up their pant cuffs and wade across. Houses are mostly made of adobe, or sun-dried mud bricks with roofs made of corrugated tin sheeting. New neighborhoods often begin as dirt lots, with no houses or services, and enterprising families acquire materials to build a one-room structure,

gradually adding rooms that can be rented to newer arrivals (Limpias 2003). One gets

the impression that economic growth has not only expanded opportunities for the

wealthy, but poorer areas of the city have grown rapidly as well.

The Early History

After its founding in 1561 by Spanish conquistador Ñuflo de Chavez, the

settlement of Santa Cruz relocated twice before arriving at its present site in 1621

along the Piraí River. Official documents dating to 1621 refer to the settlement as

Santa Cruz de la Sierra, named for a town in Extremadura, Spain, where Chavez

originated. In accordance with the Spanish *Ordenanzas de Población* (Population

Ordinances, 1573), the city was founded around a plaza, 100 by 100 meters,

surrounded by a church, town hall, and convent (Köster 1983). In the next 150 years it

grew at a snail's pace: the nine original streets emanating from the plaza became 11

(Prado et al. 2005). Until the mid 20th century, Santa Cruz was largely marginalized

and impoverished, with the exception of the rubber boom from 1880 through 1915,

when several ornate neoclassical buildings designed by Italian architects appeared in

the city center (Limpias 2003).

The 'Plan Techint' and the Experience of Modernist Planning in Santa Cruz

In the 1940s concern grew among Santa Cruz public and civic leaders that the

city lacked the infrastructure and public services to match its economic potential

outlined by U.S. economist Mervin Bohan in his 1940-41 economic mission to

Bolivia. In 1943, the Bolivian legislature approved the formation of a *Comité de

Obras Publicas*, or departmental Committee on Public Works, with special taxes to

fund its projects. The department prefect headed the committee (Palmer 1979).

Before the committee formed, improvements in public services for the city of

Santa Cruz occurred mostly through the initiative of private individuals. For example,

in the 1920s, Jose Cronenbold, a cruceño senator, initiated projects to provide clean

drinking water. Claude McKenny, an immigrant from the United States, inaugurated

electric light and power operations in Santa Cruz in 1927 (Palmer 1979). Aside from

these developments, basic public services were precarious or non-existent before the

beginning of rapid urbanization in the 1960s. As recalled by Roberto Barbery, a

member of an influential family in local politics, in the Santa Cruz of the 1950s "there

was no piped water or sewage, electricity was insufficient, and to think of installing a

telephone or paving the sandy streets was almost a dream" (cited in Ruíz 2006: 55).[45]

The formation of the Committee on Public Works institutionalized the debate

on urban services and provided a vehicle for the financing and execution of urban

projects. Although taxes on oil and gas revenues eventually provided resources for

public works, Santa Cruz received miniscule income from this source until oil exports

began in 1966 (Palmer 1979: 275). The formula for 11 percent of gross receipts from

hydrocarbon revenues for the producing departments dates to the start of oil

exploration in the Bolivian Chaco in the early 1920s, but the central government

postponed it for almost four decades. In 1955, the MNR government initiated a new

petroleum code, which opened Bolivia to investment by foreign oil companies.[46] The

code incorporated the 11 percent formula, but the national government reduced its

obligations to producing departments.

Adeptly using the oil royalties issue as a way to protest MNR state planning

policies that were unpopular by right wing leaders in Santa Cruz, the newly formed

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[45] All other Bolivian departmental capitals enjoyed such services by the 1930s except for Trinidad and
Cobija, the capitals of Beni and Pando in the northern Oriente, which were even more isolated than
Santa Cruz (Prado et al. 2005).
[46] In 1938, the government of General Busch nationalized Standard Oil operations in Bolivia and
formed the state owned company *Yacimientos Petroleros Fiscales Bolivianos* (YPFB).

Santa Cruz Civic Committee organized a campaign against the government, calling for the unity of all cruceños (Whitehead 1973).[47] Melchor Pinto Parada, the Civic Committee's first president, rediscovered the technique of the *cabildo abierto* or mass rally in the main plaza, which had been used as a means to protest regional grievances during the colonial and early republican periods. This allowed for broad participation in the committee's actions beyond official members of the committee, political parties, and trade unions. It also created a sense of continuity with previous cruceño rebellions against the central government, such as the "*Ferrocarril o Nada*" (railroad or nothing) revolt of 1924 (see Chapter 2). The campaign was openly defiant of the central government, at one point calling a general strike and seizing machinery from the state oil firm to use for improving the streets of Santa Cruz (Palmer 1979). In 1959 the government enacted the *Ley de Regalías Petroleras* (Law of Petroleum Royalties) granting 11 percent revenues from the state oil firm to be administered departmentally, while also dedicating 11 percent of private oil firms' royalties for public works in 1961 (ibid).

The Civic Committee campaign roused the civic spirit of cruceños concerned about the lack of public works and infrastructure in the city and department (Prado et al. 2005). Once the battle for royalties was won, the Committee on Public Works channeled the income primarily to urban development projects in the city of Santa Cruz "with only nominal control from central government authorities" (Roca 1999: 187). In 1963, the Committee was reorganized as an autonomous institution, headed by professional engineers with members of public and private sectors serving on its board of directors (Prado et al. 2005).

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[47] Although some in the MNR interpreted the Civic Committee campaign as a separatist movement, various analysts have argued that it was a regional political movement seeking to maximize central government concessions while minimizing its influence or control in the city (Pruden 2003; Whitehead 1973).

In what was viewed as an absence of national policy for urban development, and coinciding with the "civic struggles" for 11 percent royalties, in 1957 the Committee on Public Works announced a request for proposal to design the first comprehensive plan for Santa Cruz (Limpias 2003). The Committee selected the consulting firm *Companía Técnica Internacional* (or Techint) of Milan, Italy to assess the needs of and recommend plans for the expansion and modernization of the city. The president of Techint, Carlo de Leonardis, and Santa Cruz prefect Hugo Mendez signed a contract in 1958 (Palmer 1979). After several revisions, the firm submitted its *Plan Techint* to the Committee on Public Works in 1960.

Figure 3.1: Urbanization Scheme for Santa Cruz, Plan Techint, 1960

The Plan Techint envisioned the basic structure of the city following the design of four concentric rings. Influenced by Ebenezer Howard's Garden City movement of

urban design of the early 20th century and a plan designed for São Paulo, Brazil from the 1930s, the Techint team proposed to revamp and modernize the city through the creation of greenbelts and self contained *unidades vecinales* (neighborhood units) situated along concentric ring roads, or *anillos* (rings) surrounding the city center. The main arterials would radiate outward toward the north, south, east and west from the central plaza and intersect avenues traced along the lines of the concentric circles. A green belt would preserve open land, parks, and farmland beyond the circular ring roads (Limpias 2003). The semi-autonomous neighborhood units of nearly one square kilometer would include commercial, educational, and cultural centers and house about six thousand inhabitants (Palmer 1979).

The city's central plaza and colonial center furnished a focal point for the plan, while the neighborhood units allowed for future urban expansion and decentralization. Following the Garden City design model, the plan sought to draw people away from the city center, and the decentralized neighborhood units would be linked together by a transportation network (see Hall 1990; Howard 1902). The plan also included designs for water and sewage systems, an electrical plant, street paving, sanitary service, and a system for supplying liquid gas for domestic fuel (Limpias 2003). The Techint proposal sought to create an orderly, balanced, and flexible urban environment that would foster economic dynamism and accommodate urban growth, and it envisioned that Santa Cruz would become the nation's economic center.

At first, cruceño engineers faulted the plan for its failure to include a detailed blueprint complete with surveying markers. Techint's proposal lacked sufficient detail to serve as a precise guide for urban development, and future contractors needed to calculate specific measurements and make various modifications (Palmer 1979). But the major tenets of Plan Techint served as the conceptual basis for cruceño urbanization (Limpias 2003; Palmer 1979). As in other Latin American cities

influenced by the principles of modernist urbanism, public and civic leaders in Santa Cruz believed that the plan would make the city more economically productive, healthier, and more amenable to control by local public authorities (Hardoy 1992; cf. Goldstein 2004; Scott 1998).

Following the guidelines of the Plan Techint, one of the first priorities to be addressed by the Committee on Public Works was street paving. The Committee opted for the use of hexagonal blocks of reinforced concrete called *losetas* as pavement, a design developed by a Brazilian company called Blokret. The Committee acquired the patent, and street paving in Santa Cruz formally began in the spring of 1966 (Limpias 2003: 208).[48] Meanwhile, new housing construction began outside of the central core. Much of it was in a chalet style, using modern materials such as metals, industrial ceramics, and reinforced concrete, rather than traditional materials of adobe, wood, and earthenware tile (ibid).

The implications of the dramatic physical and economic changes that enveloped the city from 1957 through 1967 were discussed in a series of economic development conferences organized by the city's influential *Cámara de Industria y Comercio* (Chamber of Commerce, or CAINCO) and attended by members of the city's business elite. Reflecting on the recent changes and their meaning for the city's future, one member, Humberto Ribera averred, "The city feels possessed of a new spirit. It is an era [in which the city] flourishes, and a new mentality has arrived for new undertakings" (Ribera 1967, cited in Limpias 2003: 209, my translation).

As the implementation of Plan Techint's recommendations progressed, the Committee on Public Works recognized the need to better coordinate the various

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[48] In 1961, Mayor Sandoval Morón called on local engineers to asphalt the main plaza, but with the first rains the asphalt had dissolved into a mire of oil and sand. Known for his authoritarian style, Sandoval Morón reportedly ordered the engineers to take off their shoes and march around the square, accompanied by a brass band and the jeers of the populace (Whitehead 1973).

projects. In 1967, it organized the *Consejo del Plan Regulador* (Council of

Regulatory Planning), which enforced zoning and building ordinances in accordance

with the Techint proposal (Limpias 2003). According to architect Victor Hugo

Limpias, in some cases, the cruceño architects exceeded the measures outlined by the

Techint consultants, for example in designing a *Parque Industrial* (Industrial Park)

situated northeast of the city, separated from residential communities and anticipated

to be the site of future manufacturing and processing plants.[49] The scale and pace of

completed urban public works was impressive: from 1963 to 1978 the Council of

Regulatory Planning oversaw the construction of a sewage system, telephone network,

electric energy plant, and street paving to the second ring. In the early 1970s boom

period, high oil prices accelerated the construction and urban expansion process.

Fernando Prado, architect and planner who headed the Council of Regulatory Planning

in the mid 1970s, has referred to the process as "*sembrando regalías*," or harvesting

oil royalties (Prado 1984; GMSC 2004).

The 1972 *Plano Regulador* (Regulatory Plan) culminated the process of

adopting Techint's recommendations. The plan included the design for the third and

fourth rings, creating a closed radio-centric layout for the city, as shown in Figure 3.2.

The fourth ring demarcated the city's outer boundary (Limpias 2003).

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[49] Victor Hugo Limpias, architect and chair of architecture department, Universidad Privada de Santa
Cruz, interview with author, February 10, 2007.

Figure 3.2: *Plano Regulador*, **City of Santa Cruz, 1972**

The municipal government adopted the strategy for urban growth laid out in the Plano Regulador and put it into effect through a series of laws, ordinances, and programs that aimed to shape the future growth and development of the city. The Plano Regulador was updated in 1978, 1995, and again in 2004 (Prado et al. 2005). Furthermore, in an effort to coordinate the needs of the growing urban population with the economic and ecological conditions in the surrounding region, the departmental government in 1978 created the *Modelo de Ordenamiento Territorial* (Territorial Land Use Model), under the leadership of Santa Cruz architect Jaime Zapata (Limpias 2003).

Various parts of the Plan Techint proposal have never been implemented; for example, the neighborhood units did not become the self-contained and self-sufficient social spaces as envisioned, and the transport system linking these units with other zones of the city is informal and unplanned, rather than the centrally coordinated

system advocated by Techint. The Industrial Park was completed in the mid 1970s, but it mostly contains food processing and assembly plants rather than industrial manufacturing. But the planners' imprint on the contemporary city is unmistakable, and many cruceños are aware of their city's recent planning history.[50]

Observers from within and outside Santa Cruz have suggested that the elites and professionals who led the urban development process in Santa Cruz in the late 1950s and 1960s period benefited from holding a cohesive vision of development for the city and region (Prado 1993; Boisier 1999; PNUD 1995). They leveraged favorable conditions such as natural resource endowments and nurtured a strong regional cultural identity. Commenting on the unity displayed during the "civic struggles" for oil royalties in the late 1950s, Whitehead (1973) noted that Santa Cruz enjoyed a higher level of literacy than elsewhere in the country during this period. This facilitated efforts by the upper classes to appeal to the local poor on behalf of the interests of all cruceños. Moreover, Santa Cruz elites did not face "the racial and linguistic barrier[s] that made the upper classes of the altiplano vulnerable in the case of mobilization from below" (ibid: 37). Using the oil royalties as a catalyst, Santa Cruz elites launched a "collective regional project" that successfully transformed the poorest region of Bolivia into the wealthiest in the span of less than 20 years (Boisier 1999: 51).

But this collective regional project also had shortcomings. Limpias (2003) noted that with the rise of Colonel Banzer's regime in 1971, the leadership of the Council of Regulatory Planning changed, which disrupted the local planning process. The sense of purpose and the "mystique" surrounding the original program was lacking amid the new social and institutional conditions, and the council lost its unitary vision of the physical dimension of the city (ibid: 213).

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[50] V. H. Limpias, interview with author, February 10, 2007.

More fundamentally, the idealized model of urbanism espoused by Techint consultants and cruceño planning professionals did not foresee the rapid population growth that started in the 1970s, and did not adequately address the tremendous demand for housing, employment, and municipal services created by massive urban migration (PNUD 2004; Prado et al. 2005). As in other developing cities that adopted European modernist design concepts, such as Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Mexico City and Cochabamba, the realities of urban life in Latin America often collided with modernist ideas of rational, orderly, well-managed cities as migrants began arriving in unprecedented numbers in the second half of the 20th century (Goldstein 2004; Hardoy 1992).

Ambitious planners attempted to transform traditional Santa Cruz—with its dusty, sandy streets and precarious water and sanitation services—into a utopian city of the sort imagined by Ebenezer Howard and other European modernist designers of the turn of the century. As Soruco (2008) observed, no other Bolivian city attempted to form a closed system of rings.[51] In Santa Cruz, the utopian city that was constructed in the 1960s and early 1970s was inspired by Howard's vision for an industrial English city, "a satellite of London" (Soruco 2008: 88). It was planned for some 40,000 to 60,000 inhabitants, with a residential area within the first ring, an industrial area in the second ring, and an agricultural zone beyond. But the city's actual population of more than 250,000 in 1978 already exceeded the 200,000 envisioned for the year 2000 in the Plan Techint, and unplanned urban expansion had surpassed the "outer boundary" of the fourth ring (Limpias 2003; Romero 1988). As a result of these changed realities, the city of Santa Cruz never became the example of an orderly "garden city" that its planners had anticipated.

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[51] Although it was based on the traditional Spanish grid pattern, modernist planners in Cochabamba also sought to promote a sense of order, rationality and progress in their design for the city in the 1940s and 1950s (Goldstein 2004).

Santa Cruz: Destination of Bolivian Migration

There is a long and well-documented history of human movement in the Andes, but the migration boom that followed the Bolivian national revolution of 1952 was unprecedented. The revolution against the old postcolonial order transformed social relations in Bolivia, and the urban centers of the country grew rapidly in the ensuing years. Although cities such as La Paz and Cochabamba also attracted large numbers of urban migrants, no other Bolivian city grew at the pace of Santa Cruz.

Between 1950 and 1976, the population of the city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra more than quadrupled. According to the national census of 1976, it had grown to 254,700 from 43,000 in 1950 (CODEPO 2004). During this period, the nature of the population growth changed along with the rate of growth. Before 1950, the migrant population was mostly drawn from rural areas of Santa Cruz department. By 1976, however, large numbers of migrants were coming from Bolivia's Andean valley departments of Cochabamba and Chuquisaca and the altiplano departments of Potosí, Oruro and La Paz (PNUD 2004). This trend continued in the 1980s and 1990s, and by 1992 the population of Santa Cruz was 697,300 (CODEPO 2004). The pattern of rapid growth continued into the 21st century, and by 2001 the official population had reached 1,113,582 (INE 2001), and estimated to be 1.5 million in 2005 (Prado et al. 2005).

Source: Compiled using data from INE, *Comité de Obras Publicas*, and *Oficina Técnica del Plan Regulador*, cited in Limpias (2003)

Figure 3.3: Population Growth in the City of Santa Cruz, 1942-2001

In 1950, just over a quarter, or 26.4 percent, of the departmental population was urban. By 1976, roughly half, or 52.7 percent, of the departmental population lived in urban areas, suggesting continued population expulsion from rural areas of the department (PNUD 2004). This trend increased in the 1990s and into the 21st century: in 1992 the department was 72 percent urban, rising to 76.2 percent in 2001 (INE 2004).[52]

Santa Cruz is currently Bolivia's largest city, with more than one million inhabitants. Its rate of population growth between 1992 and 2001 was 5.08 percent, surpassed only by El Alto, a "satellite" city of La Paz, whose rate was 5.10 percent

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[52] Since 1992, Santa Cruz is the most urbanized department in the country. In contrast, the departments of La Paz and Cochabamba were 66 and 58.9 percent urban in 2001, respectively (INE 2004).

during this period. In 2006, Santa Cruz ranked as the 14th fastest growing city in the world among cities with populations larger than one million.[53]

The rapid population growth experienced in the city of Santa Cruz can also be viewed in the context of migration flows between departments. The following table shows the net migration rates by department, highlighting the main areas of population attraction and expulsion during three recent national censuses of the last quarter century. Santa Cruz, Tarija and Pando have positive rates of migration in all three periods.[54] In Santa Cruz and Tarija, these rates were highest in the early 1970s period and slowed in the late 1980s, only to pick up in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, Potosi, Oruro and Chuquisaca expelled population in each period (with the exception of Oruro in the first period). The rate of expulsion for these departments increased after 1987 following the decline of the tin mining economy.

Table 3.1: Net Migration Rate by Department (1976-2001)

	Net Migration Rates		
	1971-76	1987-92	1996-2001
Chuquisaca	-4.7	-3.8	-6.4
La Paz	1.4	-1.4	-3.1
Cochabamba	3.1	4.6	2.4
Oruro	2.4	-12.9	-9.1
Potosí	-3.1	-12.8	-15.3
Tarija	10.6	6.3	7.1
Santa Cruz	18.9	7.4	10.6
Beni	-2.1	0.6	-8.6
Pando	14.1	2.2	21.0

Source: INE 2001

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[53] http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/urban_growth1.html, accessed December 2, 2008. The three fastest growing cities in the world with populations above one million were Beihai, China; Ghaziabad, India; and Sana'a, Yemen. The only Latin American cities that ranked in the top 25 were Santa Cruz, Bolivia and Toluca, Mexico.

[54] These rates are for recent migrants, or those who arrived within five years before the census enumeration. In terms of total numbers of recent migrants in each of the three periods, Santa Cruz far outweighs Tarija and Pando. For example, in 1996-2001, Santa Cruz gained a net total of 91,271 migrants, while Tarija received 11,732, and Pando gained 4,436 (INE 2001).

Figure 3.4 shows the changes in the share of the three departments with the largest population—Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz—in the national population between 1976 and 2001. Santa Cruz comprised 15.4 percent compared to La Paz's 31.8 percent in 1976. But by 2001, Santa Cruz grew to 24.5 percent, narrowing the gap with La Paz's share of 28.4 percent of the national population.

Population Distribution By Department (%)

Department	1976	1992	2001
Santa Cruz	15.4	21.2	24.5
Cochabamba	15.6	17.3	17.6
La Paz	31.8	29.6	28.4

Source: CODEPO 2004

**Figure 3.4: Departments of Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and La Paz
Share of National Population, 1976-2001**

Much analysis of urban migration in Bolivia in the second half of the 20th century emphasizes an explosion of population movement to cities stemming from several interconnected factors that spurred movement out of the rural altiplano and valleys toward La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, the three urban centers referred to by Bolivian social scientists as the *eje central*, or central axis of the country (PNUD 2004; Goldstein 2004). The 1952 revolution and agrarian reform abolished forced labor and broke up the haciendas across the Andean highlands, redistributing parcels

to peasants with little or no land (Eckstein 1983; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Many recipients later subdivided their allotted parcels through inheritance or land sales, and the resulting plots were often too small to sustain livelihoods, which along with the new freedom of movement, motivated out-migration (Albó 1997: 120; Sanabria 1993; Romero 1988; Painter 1985).

Completed in 1954, the highway linking Cochabamba to Santa Cruz brought a vast expansion of the local demand for labor in Santa Cruz while facilitating the movement of labor to fill the demand (Eckstein 1983). The MNR government also funded the paving of a secondary road linking Santa Cruz to Montero and Yapacaní, agricultural centers in the "integrated zone" located north of the city (PNUD 2004).

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Oriente was sparsely populated before the 1952 revolution, and the large haciendas found in the highlands were not prevalent. The agrarian reform scarcely affected lowland landholders, and many were able to convert their properties into *empresas agrícolas* (agricultural enterprises)*,* which were not subject to expropriation. Benefiting from credit provision and international development money, Santa Cruz elites invested in sugar and cotton, opening large extensions of cultivated land. The state instituted a colonization program in 1963 to assist lowland landholders in filling the growing demand for labor, especially for harvesting (Gill 1987).

The *Instituto Nacional de Colonización* (National Colonization Institute, INC) administered land allotments and awarded land titles in the areas of the country designated as settlement zones. Despite initial state support, the experience with directed settlement as a development strategy proved disappointing. In Santa Cruz department, the settlement areas included the Cotoca, Cuatro Ojitos, Huatú, and

Caranda, near the state owned sugar mill Guabirá in the "integrated zone."[55] In each case, the state had not provided adequate water supplies, and services such as schools and health centers were scarce. Inadequate access to markets forced settlers to rely on a few low value crops, with production mostly for household subsistence. Many settlements were located in areas susceptible to flooding (Painter 1985). Spontaneous settlers, who arrived without state support, far outnumbered the settlers who were part of directed colonization programs. The government discontinued the colonization program in 1975 (Sandoval et al. 2003: 52).

While much of the migration to the eastern lowlands was initially directed to new agricultural areas, by the 1970s these flows were increasingly destined to the city of Santa Cruz (PNUD 2004; PASOC 2005). In 1968, the city of Santa Cruz's population slightly exceeded 100,000, and this jumped to more than 250,000 by 1976. Increasingly, many highlanders moving east were not would-be farmers and instead sought to work in the urban economy of Santa Cruz, or alongside it in the burgeoning informal economy.

Adding to the growing impetus for migration out of rural highland areas and toward urban centers, in the early 1980s a severe drought on the highland plateau (altiplano) devastated peasant smallholders. Several devastating animal diseases affected livestock, especially sheep and llamas, compounding the threat to rural livelihoods (Goldstein 2004: 71). This ecological crisis coincided with a national economic crisis that began in the late 1970s and escalated in the early 1980s. Declining agricultural commodity prices, skyrocketing inflation, and rising international debt characterized the crisis (Klein 1992: 271-272). The price of tin, which had long served as Bolivia's major export commodity, plummeted in the early

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[55] The program also created colonization zones in semi-tropical areas of Cochabamba and La Paz departments.

1980s, leaving the country without a major source of foreign currency for debt repayment.[56]

Bolivia's economy plunged in the early 1980s. The GDP declined every year between 1981 and 1986, and its currency collapsed in 1984 due to hyperinflation that reached the 60,000 percent mark. The national government, under President Victor Paz Estenssoro and responding to pressure from the United States and the International Monetary Fund to liberalize the Bolivian economy, acted in 1985 by instituting a series of broad-reaching economic reforms (Healy and Paulson 2000; Kohl and Farthing 2006). Known as the *Nueva Política Económica* (New Economic Policy, or NEP), the stringent measures included wage freezes, cuts in government spending, and adopting a free market program of deregulating production and the import and export sector, and increased labor "flexibilization" (Benería and Floro 2006; García Linera 1998).

As part of these measures, the NEP permanently closed the nationally owned tin mines, which put thousands of miners out of work (ibid). The tin mines, mostly located in the highland departments of Oruro, Potosí, and La Paz, had offered a source of stable employment and way of life for tin miners since the late 19th century. In addition to causing social upheaval, the closure of the mines required the relocation of tens of thousands of miners and their families starting in 1986 (Gill 2000). Many of the laid-off miners began arriving in urban centers such as El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. Euphemistically known as *'relocalizados,'* these workers and their families were "relocated" to cities as part of the Bolivian government's agreement with the formerly powerful miners' union to provide for the displaced workers (Gill 2000; Nash 1992, cited in Goldstein 2004).

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[56] Except illegally through the coca leaf, which became a major cash crop in the late 1970s. Coca production expanded in the 1980s in response to rising demand from North America and Europe for cocaine (Sanabria 1993; Casanovas 1990).

Neoliberal reforms also liberalized Bolivia's farm economy, which had once supplied a large portion of domestic consumption (Klein 1992). Many small-scale farmers and herders were unable to compete with the sudden influx of cheaper supplies from abroad, leading to huge increases in agricultural imports. The failure of peasant production was particularly stark in the rural altiplano, where technical extension, credit, and mechanization were scarce in comparison to the eastern lowlands (Gill 2000). The result was an emptying out of the countryside and mass migration to urban centers, the export agricultural zones of Santa Cruz, and to Argentina (Kohl and Farthing 2006).

As the neoliberal reforms continued, many of the laid-off miners, dislocated peasants and urban dwellers from highland areas set their sights on the city of Santa Cruz (Stearman 1985; Sandoval et al. 2003; PASOC 2005). As a city concentrating the surplus from domestic and foreign investment in agribusiness, oil and natural gas extraction, a growing finance and banking sector, and a thriving informal economy centered on small-scale commercial opportunities, Santa Cruz offered the promise of economic opportunity in the country's once remote tropical lowlands.

The Migrant "Invasion" and Responses to Demographic Change

The influx of newcomers presented challenges to the schemes devised by the Plan Techint, the *Consejo del Plan Regulador* (Council of Regulatory Planning), and municipal authorities. In the absence of affordable housing opportunities, newcomers began to organize as settlers or renters unions (*sindicatos de inquilinos*) aiming to secure housing for their members. Rental properties in the central parts of the city were too expensive for most recent migrants, especially in areas with paved streets.

In the 1950s, the MNR government had attempted to provide housing through an urban land reform law that limited the amount of urban land that could be owned

by any one member of a family (Rojas 1972, cited in Whitehead 1973). Luís Sandoval Morón, a local MNR leader who served as mayor of Santa Cruz during the mid 1950s, adopted the reform and succeeded in distributing hundreds of lots in the city. In some cases, the redistributed parcels were part of *quintas,* or estates owned by the city's landed elite. In the 1950s, with the city's population only 40,000, some of the quintas were as close as six blocks from the central plaza (Prado et al. 2005). These actions turned the city's landholding elites firmly against the MNR (Sandoval et al. 2003). In 1957, the MNR national leadership sent Morón as Bolivia's delegate to the United Nations (Whitehead 1973). With Morón out of the picture, the urban land reform ceased in Santa Cruz.

As the city's population grew in the 1960s, its *mancha urbana* (urban footprint) began to spread beyond the colonial center and past the *Avenida de Circunvalación*, an avenue that surrounded the outskirts of city and would become the second ring in the 1972 *Plano Regulador*. In addition to haphazard urban expansion, the lack of housing for the newly arrived created the problem of land speculation. In the absence of formal ways to regulate the sale and development of open land on the outskirts of the city, *loteadores* (land speculators) began to exploit the opportunity for personal profit. The loteadores sold undeveloped parcels of land at high prices, often promising buyers that in a short period of time city planners would provide streets, parks, and urban services. They often advertised the sale of lots in "modern urbanizations" (Prado et al. 2005). This situation complicated the city's efforts to provide basic services and to define the limits of the city itself (Goldstein 2004).

By the mid 1970s, it became apparent that the growth of the city was proceeding without regulation by the municipal government (*alcaldía*). During this period, private sales of land in the agricultural greenbelt ringing the city increased. Individual loteadores bought up sections of agricultural land, particularly in the poorer

southern and southeastern zones, and divided it into lots to sell illegally to recent immigrants. The alcaldía proved incapable of regulating this process, and it outpaced the Council of Regulatory Planning's ability to design and plan new neighborhood units (Limpias 2003). Lacking the means to prohibit illegal land occupations, the local authorities were forced to recognize the new settlements. This prompted changes to the Plano Regulador, which was updated in 1978 as the *Plan Director Ampliado*, and included new communities and "urbanizations" that had sprouted up outside of the fourth ring. Seeking to control the establishment of new settlements in outer areas, the plan defined an Area of Expansion, in which communities would be subject to municipal taxes and offered municipal service provision.[57] The expanded urbanizing space modified the concept of concentric rings as an organizing principle, and the long distances from the city center made it difficult to provide basic services and infrastructure in outer areas, a problem that persists today (Limpias 2003).

Despite the intention of imposing order, the process of urbanization continued to outpace planning efforts. Renters organized land occupations in areas designated as *areas verdes* (green spaces) by the municipal government. To urban planners, green space and public areas were important elements to the rational growth of the city. Leaving such spaces unpopulated would provide recreational spaces for the city's residents and limit the number of people living in a particular area, serving as a control on population growth (Salek 2007). But to migrants facing a serious housing shortage, such green spaces were viewed as vacant lots that could be used for residential development.

During the 1980s, the modernist vision of city planning began to fade. Institutions such as the Council of Regulatory Planning, once among the city's most

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[57] Fernando Prado, former Director of the Council of Regulatory Planning, and former Director of Planning for the city of Santa Cruz (*Oficial Mayor de Planificacion Urbana*), interview with author, September 27, 2007.

venerable and prestigious, became mired in corruption (Limpias 2003). The

Committee on Public Works, which since 1963 had spearheaded the urban planning

process in Santa Cruz, became the *Corporación Regional de Desarrollo*

(CORDECRUZ) in 1978. It delegated urban development issues to the municipal

government and dedicated itself to regional infrastructural projects (Prado et al. 2005).

The crisis enveloping the national government from 1978 to 1985, marked by a

succession of de facto governments, a contracting GDP, and massive national debt,

added to the disarray of local planning institutions (ibid). Furthermore, the

consolidation of neoliberal reforms at the national level starting in 1985 emphasized a

free market and deregulatory approach to urban development along with other sectors

of the political economy, and real estate interests primarily filled the vacuum (ibid).

The municipal government failed to intervene in urban development issues

throughout much of the 1980s. One exception was relocation of 3,200 families who

were left homeless after massive flooding of the Río Piraí in 1983. The municipality

under Mayor Sergio Antelo, a professional architect, opened up a 90-hectare area in

the southeastern periphery and distributed lots to each affected family, creating the

section of the city known as the Plan Tres Mil (Plan Three Thousand) (Antelo 1988).

The area grew rapidly in the coming years, providing housing and a market area for

large numbers of the city's poor migrants. By 2001 its population approached

150,000, and it continues to grow (INE 2001; PAP 2006). Much of the housing in this

area is self-built, or *auto construcciones*.

The irregular settlement patterns and urban expansion in peripheral areas and

green spaces by migrants were often viewed by native cruceños as an "invasion" on

the body of the city (Blanchard 2006: 3). Andeans have established vibrant enclaves

in the city that have become an important part of the urban fabric. In public discourse

and in the local media, however, Andeans are often stigmatized as unwanted outsiders.

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The stigma often focuses on two recurrent themes. First, they are stereotyped and caricatured as exclusively involved in informal trade and commerce, even though many work as merchants and in fact occupy multiple professions in the urban economy. Lowland Bolivia lacks the tradition of market exchange that is highly developed in Andean parts of the country, and Quechua and Aymara migrants are widely considered to be retail specialists in food products and other domestic goods.[58] Coinciding with the influx of highland migrants in the 1970s and 1980s, the city's largest central markets formed, including La Ramada and Mercado Mutualista (Limpias 2003; Andia 2002).[59] Cruceños have increasingly voiced concern about the threat of contamination and lack of hygiene caused by expansion of these markets onto the surrounding streets and open spaces. The unease is frequently couched in the language of orderly, rational urban development, such as advocating redesigning of the main public markets (see Salek 2007). The conflicts over market expansion and uses of public space and how these reflect unresolved tensions over migration, urban growth, and demographic change will be explored further in Chapter 5.

Secondly, migrant settlers are portrayed as "*avasalladores*" (usurpers) of the city's public spaces, turning parks and farmland into settlements for their own interests and causing chaotic urban growth. Public officials, media commentators, and native cruceños have viewed the settlement process, based more on meeting needs than following the bureaucratic procedures of the Plan Regulador, as irrational, anarchic, and harmful to the city (Antelo 1988). Moreover, migrants are often seen as an economic burden on the city, increasing poverty, making it more difficult to provide

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[58] Lorgio Ardaya, Director, Office of Consumer Protection, City of Santa Cruz, interview with author, July 24, 2007.
[59] Several smaller central markets predate this period, including Los Pozos and Siete Calles. Limpias (2003) noted that as the city grew, the residential communities did not develop as self-sufficient units as envisioned in Plan Techint, and instead they were highly dependent on the central core for commerce and supplies. This situation contributed to the growth of the public markets.

services, and harming the city's public image (Blanchard 2006). In reality, the relationship between migrant status and poverty in the city of Santa Cruz is complex. The city's districts that have the highest proportion of recent migrants also have the highest poverty rates, but within these districts recent migrants are not necessarily poorer than non-migrants (PAP 2006). This relationship, and migrants' perceptions of their integration in the city, is examined further in Chapter 4.

Many native cruceños have responded to the reshaping of the city through migration and urban growth by focusing on a nostalgic image of Santa Cruz's past in which life was simpler, quieter, and seemingly more refined. As the pace of urbanization increased the 1970s and 1980s, cruceño observers recalled a genteel community composed mostly of criollo ("white") residents (Fernández 1984; Archondo 2000; Ruíz 2006). The rapid changes affecting the city's social, economic, and physical character have unsettled the traditional criollo elite, whose families had dominated Santa Cruz for centuries (Soruco 2008). In the 1980s many of these elites rallied around the Civic Committee, calling it the "moral government of the cruceños," and hearkening back to the late 1950s "civic struggles" for 11 percent of petroleum royalties (Flores 2002; Peña et al. 2002). Several cruceño historians and commentators authored books about Santa Cruz's distinctive history and culture during the period, including Fernández (1984), Prado (1986), and Roca (1980).

Adding to the threat that migrants seemed to pose to Santa Cruz was their cultural and linguistic differences from native cruceños. The majority of the migration to Santa Cruz before the mid 1950s originated in rural areas of Santa Cruz Department, whose population had much in common with the city's urban residents. These were mostly Spanish-criollo descendents who spoke Spanish exclusively, and

many shared kinship ties with urban cruceños.[60] With increasing migration from the highlands, and much of it from Aymara and Quechua-speaking communities, the cultural identity of the city seemed under attack (Archondo 2000; Blanchard 2006). Women wearing derby hats and *polleras* (long, multilayered skirts traditionally worn by Aymara and Quechua women) could be seen tending the stalls of the city's public markets. Quechua and Aymara could be heard on public mini buses and in the market places.

In the absence of municipal institutional controls, in many cases migrants themselves took an active role of the urban development process. The alcaldía has often been unable to tax properties or approve land transactions in areas not officially recognized by the city, such as the entirety of District 12 until 1995. An unintended consequence of the alcaldía's failure to incorporate these neighborhoods into membership in the city proper has been to incapacitate the local government from having a presence in and regulating the development of these communities. The following sections of this chapter explore the growing complexity of the city of Santa Cruz in socio-spatial, economic and political realms.

Socio-Spatial Segregation and the Geography of Urban Poverty

In 1950, Santa Cruz Department contributed just six percent of the national GDP, and its per capita income was less than one third of the national average. Fifty years later, Santa Cruz produced 30 percent of GDP, and its per capita income was 23 percent higher than the national average (PNUD 2004: 35). Since the 1990s, Santa Cruz has boasted the country's highest per capita income, education levels and life expectancy (ibid). Both the city and the region, however, show signs of rising

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[60] Nelson Jordan, sociologist and researcher for *Programa de Investigacion Estrategica de Bolivia*, personal communication.

inequality, expressed in income concentration among urban and middle classes of the city and its immediate surroundings. In 1995, just five percent of the department's population accounted for 28 percent of earned income (PNUD 2004: 25). In addition, 87 percent of the department's production is tied to the city and its immediate agro-industrial periphery, which comprise only 14 percent of its territory. While a few elite Santa Cruz neighborhoods enjoy Miami-style opulence, poverty rates reach 50 percent in parts of the city and 80 to 90 percent in some rural provinces (ibid; PAP 2006).

The 1995 Plan Regulador, which updated the 1978 Plan Director, divided the city into 12 districts, and neighborhood units within each district, or *unidades vecinales* (UVs). In 2004 the municipality added 4 new districts for future growth; these are designated as rural and are largely unpopulated (GMSC 2004).

As shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6, poverty is concentrated in areas outside the fourth ring, in outer districts that have emerged in the last two decades. Districts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12—all located outside of the fourth ring—have poverty levels between 30 and 51 percent, while Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 11—all located within the fourth ring except for a small part of Districts 1 and 3—have poverty levels in the single digits (PAP 2006).[61] The outer districts are the most densely populated, and have the highest proportion of migrants from other departments. In particular, Districts 6, 7, and 8 currently have populations of over 100,000 (INE 2001). Osvaldo Peredo, city council member representing District 8, which recorded almost 150,000 inhabitants in 2001, noted that it is "the largest district in Bolivia, and it has more people than the cities of Tarija, Trinidad, and several other department capitals."[62]

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[61] To gather these data, the Program for the Alleviation of Poverty (PAP) surveyed 6,038 households in Santa Cruz, which yielded information from 29,313 inhabitants. PAP used a stratified sample in order to survey residents in each *unidad vecinal* (UV) of each of the 12 urban districts.

[62] Osvaldo "Chato" Peredo, city council member, City of Santa Cruz, interview with author, August 8, 2007.

City of Santa Cruz: Percentage of Poor Households

Source: Elaborated from PAP (2006) data

Figure 3.5: Percentage of Poor Households by Urban District

In addition to rising socio-economic segregation, the city of Santa Cruz is experiencing fragmentation of its social space. In the past decade, the construction of several national highways has opened up new axes for residential settlement and economic activity on the edges of the city. These areas are expanding into secondary cities and agricultural centers such as Warnes, La Guardia and Cotoca, in some cases blurring city boundaries (Prado et al. 2005). Heightened demand for security has led to the growth of gated communities and high-rise condominiums, which are set apart and far from the city center.[63] Many of the gated communities are located in District

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[63] This trend follows Latin American mega cities such as São Paulo and Mexico City; see e.g. Caldeira (2000), Cabrales Barajas (2006).

90

Source: Elaborated from PAP (2006) data

Figure 3.6: Map of Urban Poverty by District

5, situated north of the city center and outside the fourth ring, along the road to Viru

Viru International Airport. Those designed for elites have recreational spaces such as

swimming pools, sports grounds, and even golf courses and horseback riding. New theme parks, such as Aqualand and Playland, attract affluent residents and tourists and are located on the edge of the urbanized area, outside of the municipal jurisdiction (Prado et al. 2005). These trends of urban expansion have resulted in a process described as "*metropolización*," (ibid; INE 2004; GMSC 2004) increasing social and economic polarization, as well as demands for new and more decentralized forms of urban government (Andia et al. 2002).

The commodity booms of the 1970s in Santa Cruz supported a growing urban service economy, and since then commerce, tourism, and financial activities have grown faster than other sectors (CAINCO 2004). Many of the multinational firms operating in Bolivia are locating their headquarters in Santa Cruz, in some cases relocating their offices from La Paz. The offices of petroleum firms such as Petrobras, Repsol, and British Gas tend to locate near the fourth ring along axial roads such as Doble Vía La Guardia, Equipetrol Norte, and Avenida Banzer. Financial and producer services, such as banking, insurance and advertising, are concentrated in the central *casco viejo*, within the first ring. Here, newly erected shopping centers and sleek apartment complexes are edging out decrepit colonial era buildings, and there are also efforts to refurbish older buildings.

Labor Market Trends and Rising Informality

Although regional economic growth since the 1960s has rested on a narrow economic base, the booms in sugar and cotton supported a growing service sector. When the regional economy contracted amid falling commodity prices and declining terms of trade in the late 1970s, coinciding with exponential population growth in the city of Santa Cruz, the service sector expanded further (PNUD 2004). Fernando Prado

has referred to the process as "*urbanización sin industrialización*" (urbanization without industrialization) (Prado et al. 2005).

Table 3.2 shows the location quotients for the main sectors of the economy of Santa Cruz Department from 1970 to 2000. While the location quotient for agriculture dropped from 1.28 to 1.06 in the period from 1970 to 1988, reflecting a sharp decline in commodity prices, the figure for commercial and financial services grew from 0.85 to 1.02 during the same period. By 1995, the location quotient for agriculture jumped to 1.38, following the boom in soy production, and commercial and financial services grew to 1.08.[64] Although these data are for Santa Cruz Department, the commercial and financial sector is heavily concentrated in the city of Santa Cruz, which serves as a "center of operations" of the regional economy (PNUD 2004: 103).

Table 3.2: Location Quotients of the Santa Cruz Department Economy by Sector

Sector	1970	1977	1988	1995	2000
Agriculture and livestock	1.28	1.21	1.06	1.38	1.39
Extractive industry	0.85	0.72	0.90	0.40	0.82
Manufacturing	1.03	1.04	1.10	1.11	1.14
Commerce and finance	0.85	0.94	1.02	1.08	1.06

Source: PNUD 2004

Alongside the growth of the commercial and financial sector, employment in the informal economy has been on the rise during the past two decades in Santa Cruz. The informal economy has been defined as income-generating activities that take place outside the state's regulatory framework in an environment in which similar activities are regulated (Castells and Portes 1989). Mapping the extent of informal economy—either in terms of the numbers of people involved or their economic

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[64] A quotient of greater than one means that production in the sector exceeds the national average.

output—is difficult because much of it is unrecorded and informal workers often pursue activities that do not meet researchers' categories (Kudva 2006). Furthermore, informal work often overlaps with formal employment in a complex continuum, such as through subcontracting or outsourcing arrangements (Benería 2001; Roy 2005; Biles 2008). (See chapter 5 for further discussion of the informal economy).

Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the economically active population (EAP) in the city of Santa Cruz from 1989 through 1997. In 1997, roughly 38 percent of the EAP worked in the public and private sectors (6.8% and 30.8%, respectively), which make up the formal economy. The informal economy is comprised of three categories: domestic service (*servicio doméstico*), productive micro-enterprises (*semiempresarial*), and self-employed workers and family units (*familiar*). These three categories accounted for an estimated 63.3 percent of the EAP in 1997. This figure is similar to recent national estimates of more than 65 percent for informal employment in Bolivia (see Benería and Floro 2006). The figure might be an overestimate, as some self-employment, micro enterprise work, and domestic service is formal.[65] Furthermore, the boundaries between formal and informal are increasingly blurry, making statistical counting diffult. However, this could be offset by the challenges in recording the full extent of informal employment and the fact that informal workers may avoid giving accurate information to officials.

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[65] The presence or absence of government regulation, including compliance with employment regulations and access to legal benefits and worker protections (social security, health care, etc.) serves to distinguish formal and informal employment in recent research (Benería and Floro 2006; Biles 2008). This approach contrasts with previous research that used the size of establishment to determine formality (Rakowski 1994).

**Table 3.3: Economically Active Population by Labor Market Sector,
City of Santa Cruz, 1989-1997**

	Economically Active Population				Percent			
	1989	**1992**	**1995**	**1997**	**1989**	**1992**	**1995**	**1997**
Total	196,408	268,773	354,222	630,302	100	100	100	100
Public	29,949	24,503	27,693	43,046	12.70	9.12	7.82	6.82
Private	47,526	75,993	83,049	194,417	24.20	28.27	23.45	30.84
Domestic Service	17,420	18,696	26,373	18,934	8.87	6.96	7.45	3.00
Micro-enterprise	22,210	57,987	91,009	113,965	11.31	21.57	25.69	18.08
Self-employment And family units	84,303	91,594	126,098	259,940	42.92	34.08	35.60	41.24

Source: GMSC 2004

In addition to growing informal employment, including unregistered domestic
services, micro enterprises, and self-employment; official data suggest that
employment patterns are concentrating in specific zones of the city. Table 3.4 shows
occupational categories by urban district using 2001 census data. The districts with
higher levels of economic development (1-4, 11) have fairly similar distributions, as
do districts with higher poverty levels (6, 8, and 12). The categories of
"obrero/empleado" (waged workers) and "patrón, socio, empleador"
(owner/employer) have higher proportions in the more prosperous districts while
"trabajadores por cuenta propia," (self-employed workers) are more concentrated in
the poorer outer districts. In Districts 8 and 12, the self-employed approach 40 percent
of the EAP, while in Districts 2, 3 and 11, less than 30 percent are self-employed.

Table 3.4: Occupational Categories by Urban District, City of Santa Cruz, 2001

Urban District	Percentage					Total no. of workers	% District population
	Waged workers	Self-employed	Owner/ employer	Cooperative	Family production		
1	60.44	30.09	5.92	0.18	3.37	46,952	11.20%
2	63.19	26.52	6.89	0.16	3.25	32,807	7.83%
3	64.27	27.68	4.81	0.11	3.13	18,881	4.51%
4	58.41	31.63	6.03	0.11	3.82	35,118	8.38%
5	63.44	29.01	4.69	0.11	2.76	30,898	7.37%
6	60.54	32.72	3.38	0.18	3.17	37,916	9.05%
7	57.27	35.72	3.09	0.11	3.8	34,802	8.31%
8	54.29	39.11	3.12	0.09	3.39	49,654	11.85%
9	58.65	33.47	3.93	0.09	3.85	28,083	6.70%
10	56.83	36.41	3.58	0.15	3.03	35,611	8.50%
11	59.59	27.41	9.36	0.14	3.51	35,676	8.51%
12	55.2	39.18	2.76	0.1	2.76	26,019	6.21%
Total Rural	53.22	40.56	1.99	0.09	4.13	6,627	1.58%
Total	58.96	32.79	4.77	0.13	3.35	419,044	100.00%

Source: INE 2001, cited in GMSC 2004

The 2001 census data shows the proportion of self-employed is higher in peripheral areas than in central parts of the city, suggesting that employment differences have a spatial expression. Using 2001 census data, a recent UN report suggests, however, that migrants arriving in Santa Cruz between 1996 and 2001 (recent migrants) have higher formal labor market insertion than the total population (PNUD 2004: 74). Based on data for Santa Cruz Department, Figure 3.7 indicates that 61 percent of recent migrants to Santa Cruz participate in the labor market as salaried workers as compared to 50 percent total population.

Using the same 2001 census data, Figure 3.8 compares educational levels between recent migrants to Santa Cruz and the total population by sex. Higher percentages of recent migrants, both men and women, have post-secondary degrees (*Licenciatura, Normal, o Técnico*) as compared to the total population. However, recent migrants also have higher levels of illiteracy and lower primary education than

the total population (shown here as "no education"). This is especially true of recent migrant women, whose illiteracy level is 23 percent. Taken together, these data cast doubt on the notion that recent migrants to Santa Cruz primarily find work in informal parts of the urban economy, and that the growing informal economy is mainly caused by the rapid influx of migrants (PNUD 2004: 74).

Source: INE 2001, cited in PNUD (2004): 74

Figure 3.7: Comparison of Employment, Recent Migrants and Total Population, Department of Santa Cruz (%)

**Figure 3.8: Education Levels, Migrants and Total Population by Sex,
Department of Santa Cruz (%)**

These census data, analyzed by the United Nations Development Program, suggest that migration is having an overall positive, rather than negative, effect on the Santa Cruz labor market. While labor migration flows can be shown to have contributed to local and regional economic dynamism, a deeper problem for the regional economy lies in its the narrow productive base and its vulnerability to external shocks (PNUD 2004: 75). Accordingly, rising labor informalization in Santa Cruz may result less from the migration influx than from the limited base and enclave nature of the regional economy (Gray Molina 2005).

Popular Participation and Municipal Decentralization

Following the recessionary period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, migration to Santa Cruz increased after the neoliberal structural adjustment reforms in the mid-1980s. These economic reforms, which retrenched state investment in national industry, decreased social spending, and opened the economy to global capital,

coincided with a political reform program focused on decentralizing the national state (Kohl 2003). This reform had important effects on local municipal governments.

The 1994 Law of Popular Participation was created in the context of international pressures to open up markets and apply neoliberal policies. Multilateral funders promoted decentralization as a key aspect of neoliberal restructuring packages in many developing countries (Rowland 2001; Kohl 2003). But the law also reflected evolving internal demands in Bolivia. In particular, the tensions between the center and outlying regions such as Santa Cruz, where regional elites had long opposed central control from La Paz and advocated regional or departmental decentralization, motivated the debate. Santa Cruz lawyer and later prefect Carlos Hugo Molina began advocating for municipal decentralization in the 1980s (Van Cott 2000: 138). In 1985, the Law of Municipalities allowed for direct election of the mayor and the city council, replacing appointment by the president, and established a framework for further devolution of government competencies to the local level (Mayorga 1997). The "regionalist" demands for greater decentralization partly coincided with the position of campesinos and indigenous communities who began making claims for local autonomy and greater political participation in several parts of the country starting in the 1980s (Postero 2007). President Sánchez de Lozada's 1993 campaign platform, called the *Plan de Todos* (Plan for Everyone), encompassed these tensions and interests, while also closely adhering to international neoliberal development practice (Kohl 2003).

In 1993, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada ("Goni") was elected president on a promise of governmental reform, particularly with the intention of promoting broader political representation and citizen involvement in government. Breaking with longstanding centralizing tendencies in Bolivian politics (Malloy 1989), in 1994

Goni's administration introduced the Law of Popular Participation, or *Participación Popular*, to meet this objective.

The Ley de Participacion Popular (LPP) called for the creation of a new level of elected political leadership at the local level, extending decision-making power and rights of financial allocation to *Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* ("base communities," or OTBs). Instead of a top down distribution of government resources, development funds would be distributed to the OTBs, which would administer them through a local Comité de Vigilancia, or Oversight Committee. The LPP committed 20 percent of national tax revenues (called *co-participaciones*) to municipal governments to be used for construction and maintenance of schools, health clinics, secondary roads and plazas, micro-irrigation, and sports facilities (Rowland 2001; Kohl and Farthing 2006).[66] The law also created a new system for citizen participation in how the co-participación funds would be spent. The law required mayors and city councils to make annual development plans based on the petitions of the OTBs, and to publish a budget report from the previous year. The OTBs were to canvas their members' needs and make proposals for the city's yearly budget and annual operating plan. The Oversight Committee, made up of representatives of the OTBs, would oversee the POA's design and implementation (Rowland 2001).

Through the LPP, the national government for the first time formally recognized local community organizations, including urban neighborhood associations (*juntas vecinales*), pre-Hispanic indigenous groups, and present-day *sindicatos de campesinos* (peasant unions). The plan expanded the importance of local— particularly rural—communities while shifting resources and authority away from the

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[66] Prior to the LPP, 10 percent of national revenue was channeled to the department capitals for urban development, and another 10 percent was distributed indirectly through regional development corporations; the latter were discontinued with the LPP. At the time, departmental prefects were appointed by the national government (Rowland 2001).

central government (Medeiros 2001). Much of the analysis of Participacion Popular has focused on its effects on rural and indigenous communities, many of which did not even appear on maps until the advent of the law in 1994 (Rowland 2001). But the plan also affected urban and peri-urban communities in important ways. In many cases, illegal squatters acquired the status of landowners and taxpayers through the process of reorganizing communities as OTBs and accompanying land legalization efforts (Goldstein 2004; Feldis 2002).

The new system of revenue sharing between the central government and municipalities meant that mayors and city councils suddenly gained importance as sites of economic activity. Municipal elections became increasingly contested by political parties, newly aware of the troves of potential votes in the densely populated peripheral urban areas of major cities such as La Paz and Santa Cruz that had long been overlooked (Lazar 2008). Whereas the political parties previously focused their attention and resources on national elections, local politics grew in strategic importance amid the redistribution of fiscal resources.

More than a decade since its implementation, critics have charged that despite initiating important changes in public deliberation and local participation, the LPP did not produce a meaningful redistribution of resources or result in major changes in power inequalities (Postero 2007; Ayo Saucedo 1999). Based on a study of several municipalities throughout the country, Kohl (2003) concluded that the law was not primarily aimed as a democratizing effort to benefit the poor. Instead, it was part of a broader government strategy to ease the stresses caused by the larger structural adjustments it imposed while achieving greater efficiency of the state. Focusing on the implications of the LPP for indigenous peoples' empowerment, Postero (2007) found that the Guaraní communities she studied were unable to address key issues such as unequal land distribution and unfair labor exploitation, as these fall outside the

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scope of municipal politics. She argued that in practice "inclusion at the local level has fragmented and refocused indigenous demands to the immediate decisions of local governing, precluding more critical responses to existing inequalities" (p. 160).

Paralleling the experience of decentralization at the national level, in 1995, under Mayor Johnny Fernandez, the city of Santa Cruz government began a decentralizing process in an effort to extend its reach into the barrios and outer areas through a system of *subalcaldias* (sub mayors offices). The 1995 *Plan Director* created 12 urban districts and advanced the objective of de-concentrating municipal administrative capacity to the district level (Andia et al. 2002; Prado et al. 2005). The formation of the districts and subalcaldias, several of which were located in peripheral areas, also represented an effort to intervene more actively and to incorporate previously excluded parts of the city.

Decentralizing the municipality fit well with the national government's efforts to do away with top down planning and increasing citizen involvement in determining issues related to their own development through Participación Popular. It also provided a framework for governing the urban periphery (cf. Goldstein 2004). According to Prado (2005: 61), one of the main problems of urban administration in recent years has been the failure to delegate responsibilities and capacities to the subalcaldias and away from the overly centralized system of municipal government, which has failed to manage urban migration and expansion. Critics note that the subalcaldias are appointed by the city council, rather than elected locally. In this way, they merely act as a "branch office" of the municipal government at the district level.[67]

An additional challenge lies in the recent growth of neighborhoods and zones that lie outside of the officially recognized urban districts. Fernando Prado noted that

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[67] Daniel Valverde, Subalcalde Distrito 4, interview with author, September 18, 2007.

in most cases, these "*urbanizaciones populares*" are the result of real estate speculation and questionable deals in which newcomers are promised basic services, transport connections, and other necessities. When buyers find that these are not forthcoming, the seller has usually already left town.[68] Currently, more than ten urbanizations outside of the Santa Cruz city limit are known to exist (Escobar 2007). Prado added, "In some cases, residents are not sure what municipality they belong to. They are selling lots in neighboring cities, and people then request services such as water and telephone lines from the municipality of Santa Cruz. This adds to the problem of lack of planning for continued population growth and the failure to concentrate the population to help avoid further dispersion."[69]

Conclusion

Following the "*luchas civicas*" (civic struggles) for greater petroleum royalties of the late 1950s, public and civic leaders of the city of Santa Cruz gained the resources to support the goal of updating and modernizing the city. The modernist phase of planning in Santa Cruz succeeded in creating an iconic design of four concentric rings, while preserving parts of the old colonial center and allowing for future growth. But the planners attempted to impose a master plan that did not coincide with the social realities of the city and could not respond adequately to the demographic changes the city experienced. Perhaps the planners, in their idealized vision, expressed the anxieties that many cruceños felt about social change in a city and society that had long been detached and isolated from the central government and other national population centers (compare with Goldstein 2004: 78-79). The design pattern of concentric rings, which is not found in any other Bolivian city, was perhaps

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[68] Fernando Prado, interview with author, September 27, 2007.
[69] Prado interview, September 27, 2007.

meant to avoid the "Andeanization" that occurred in Lima, in which highland migrants reshaped central areas of the city (Soruco 2008; DeGregori et al. 1986; also see Archibald 2007).

By the 1980s, the modernist inspired attempts to redesign the city of Santa Cruz faded amid unprecedented demographic growth and changes in the local and national political framework. The Committee on Public Works was designated as the Regional Development Corporation (CORDECRUZ), while city planning fell under the responsibility of the municipal government. In some cases this politicized local planning efforts, but with the changes in the terrain of Bolivian politics at the national level primarily through the Law of Popular Participation, it also opened up avenues for local participation. In the following chapter, I shift the focus to the experience of urbanization and integration in the changing city and region of Santa Cruz from the perspective of migrants themselves.

CHAPTER 4

MIGRANTS IN SANTA CRUZ, TERRITORIAL POLITICS, AND

ASPIRATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Introduction

Recent studies of migration have emphasized migrants as agents moving between multiple sites where boundaries are being negotiated, rather than viewing them as individuals moving through bounded spaces on a path toward assimilation. These new understandings of migration have called for a reconsideration of the conceptual links between community, culture, and space (Paerregaard 1997). While migrants' actions in many cases resist formulas that assign particular identities with specific places, local and regional institutions in Santa Cruz increasingly call attention to localizing notions of boundaries and place.

My aim in this chapter is to examine how these diverging tendencies affect the exercise of citizenship rights and belonging for migrants in Santa Cruz. I analyze first-hand information collected from migrants in Santa Cruz and bring it to bear on questions of migrant integration and urban development discussed in the previous two chapters. I suggest that local forms of participation have the potential to enhance the inclusion of migrants, but that regionalist demands are reinforcing boundaries and making it more difficult for migrants to integrate. While the migrants in this study have not crossed international borders, the exercise of citizenship rights is complicated by the fact that rural-to-urban migrants are unsettling to dominant social categories of race and space that organize both the urban and national landscape in Bolivia and elsewhere in the Andes (Goldstein 2004; Orlove 1993).

The analysis developed in this chapter has implications for theories of migrant integration and urban development, as well as for development practice, as it relates to new conditions faced by internal migrants and the rapid transformation of urban centers in resource-rich regions of developing countries. It also contributes to our understanding of how migrants engage with the politics of exclusion and incorporation that often overlap.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I examine the changing context of citizenship rights in Bolivia and propose two important shifts that affect citizenship practice. Following a brief discussion of my research methodology, I examine the patterns and implications of recent migrant-induced demographic changes in the city of Santa Cruz. Third, I present findings from migrant interviews, focusing on civic participation and perceptions of regional polarization, and how these influence migrants' sense of belonging, in the sense of full membership and participation in local and national society.

Changing Structures of Citizenship in Bolivia

As described in the present study, Bolivian society has long faced deep ethnic, racial, and geographical divisions. In a recent study of indigenous politics in Bolivia, anthropologist Nancy Postero (2007) has argued that the new forms of social activism in Bolivia have moved away from basic demands of race and class to frame demands in terms of citizens' rights. For example, during the protests of October 2003, protesters demanded participation in public decision making about the issues of natural gas. Members of indigenous groups and the urban poor came together in these protests, and they argued that they had rights as citizens to be included in the process.

In the social sciences, and urban studies more specifically, there has been a recent turn to questions of citizenship. Citizenship refers to the relation between

individuals or groups and the state. Sociologist T. H. Marshall described three sets of rights necessary for full citizenship, which are civil rights, political rights, and social rights (Marshall 1949: 78). He argued that while civil and political rights were important, they did not eliminate the inequalities of social class.

Democratic countries in Latin America, including Bolivia, have extended the rights of liberal citizenship to all citizens, but critics argue that the exercise of citizenship is marked by underlying degrees of exclusion around race, class and gender. Caldeira and Holston (1999) observed, for instance, that in Brazil the poor enjoy full political rights, but lack sufficient civil rights. They are subjected to systemic crime, police abuse, and government corruption, leaving them deprived of a sense of individual security. This situation impedes the democratic rule of law, and points to a gap between citizenship as a legal category and the actual practice of citizenship (Dagnino 2003; Holston and Appadurai 1999; Sassen 2002).

Drawing on the analysis developed in the previous two chapters, I suggest two shifts that have affected the practice of citizenship in Bolivia. The first shift stems from legislation called the Law of Popular Participation of 1994, introduced in Chapter 3, which focused on decentralizing the national state. As part of broader economic and political restructuring beginning in the mid 1980s, popular participation sought to "modernize" both government and civil society through transferring some management responsibilities to the local level and bringing previously excluded groups into the local development process (Postero 2007: 217). The second shift, introduced in Chapter 2, is the resurgence of autonomy claims and "civic regionalism" in Santa Cruz and the lowlands since the late 1990s, and intensifying in response to the election of Morales as president in 2006. These dynamics have further altered the relationship between the state and civil society.

The Law of Popular Participation, or *Participación Popular*, was Bolivia's answer to decentralization, a key development idea of the 1990s (Kohl and Farthing 2006). The program departed from longstanding centralizing tendencies in Bolivian politics (Malloy 1989), and it committed 20 percent of national revenue to the municipalities. These funds, called *co-participaciones*, are divided across all municipalities according to population, and used for construction and maintenance of schools, health clinics, secondary roads and plazas, sports facilities, and micro-irrigation (Kohl and Farthing 2006, chp. 6).

To support this process, the plan created a new system for citizen participation in the allocation of these development funds. The plan required mayors and city councils to submit annual budget plans based on the petitions of local neighborhood organizations, called *Organizaciones Territoriales de Base* ("base organizations", or OTBs). Accordingly, the state legally recognized longstanding neighborhood associations, called *juntas vecinales*, as OTBs in urban areas (Desafío 2006). Delegates of OTBs or juntas vecinales are elected to sit on a local *Comité de Vigilancia* (Oversight Committee), which supervises the allocation of development funds by the municipality. In this way, Participación Popular has enabled the state to identify and regulate local "base" communities by determining the form they take and the ways they must operate (Dagnino 2003; Goldstein 2004; Kohl 2003; Van Cott 2000).

Several commentators have argued that the LPP reflects neoliberal philosophies of government, in which citizenship is viewed as an active exercise of responsibilities, including economic self-reliance or self-help, economic models of leadership, and efficiency (Postero 2007; Kohl 2002). Critics have also charged that Bolivian political elites designed the program with little input from popular organizations, responding primarily to multilateral funders and free market ideology

(Ayo Saucedo 1999; Kohl 2002).   The plan was partly aimed at weakening and replacing the traditional corporatist union style of politics that held sway in Bolivia since 1952 (Malloy 1989; Klein 1992).   Under this model, the *sindicatos* (peasant and trade unions) would mobilize their constituents in opposition to the state in order to gain resources and concessions.   Collective organizations figured prominently in the local and national arena under this system.   Neoliberal policy reforms sought to change this relationship, weakening collective organizations while privileging the market, individuals, and sanctioned forms of organization.   The closure of the state owned mines, public sector downsizing, the privatization of key industries, and the expansion of "flexible" and informal work fragmented the sindicatos and weakened their negotiating position.[70]

Popular participation has "rescaled" civic participation from the national to the local level.   In this context, place-based juntas vecinales negotiate and petition municipal governments for development funds, and in this way serve as important "support structures of citizenship" (Roberts 1996).

Demands for regional autonomy in eastern Bolivia are related to the impetus for decentralization and popular participation.   Tensions between the center and outlying regions like Santa Cruz are deeply rooted, and regional elites have long opposed central control from La Paz and advocated regional or departmental decentralization (Calderon and Laserna 1983; Roca 1999).   But the national government has not recognized regional autonomy, and it has mostly operated at the level of identity discourse and claims of authority over functions of the central government.   The Santa Cruz Civic Committee, a group of business and professional

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[70] Despite their diminished position, the sindicatos remain a vital force in Bolivian society.   In urban areas, small trade and producers associations play an important role for many people working in the informal economy, such as street vendors, merchants, and bus and taxi drivers (which I discuss in Chapter 5).

organizations, and the current *Prefectura*, or departmental government, have spearheaded the recent demand for regional autonomy. They advocate increased decentralization to the department level and propose that natural resources and land distribution policy come under regional rather than national control (Prats 2006; Urenda 2006).

In July 2006, the national government agreed to hold a nation-wide referendum on regional autonomy. All four lowland departments voted overwhelmingly for greater autonomy while the country's western highland departments voted almost as strongly against. The national government did not take steps to recognize the results of the vote, although it did allow the direct election of departmental prefects, replacing appointment by the central government.[71] In response, the Civic Committee named a "pre-autonomous council" that drafted an "autonomy statute," or de facto regional constitution that outlines tenets regarding land distribution and natural resources that directly contradict national initiatives. The Committee also staged several events to protest against "centralism" and for autonomy. These included "*cabildos*," or public rallies, and two department-wide "civic strikes" or work stoppages. In the *Cabildo de Un Millón* (the Cabildo of One Million), held December 15, 2006, thousands of cruceño*s* gathered in the streets surrounding the statue of Christ on Monseñor Rivero Avenue.[72] Waving green and white flags of Santa Cruz, the crowds celebrated "autonomy" with chants and speeches from the departmental governor and Civic Committee leaders.

This display of what its leaders have called "civic regionalism" was accompanied by slogans against centralized bureaucracy and the Movement to Socialism (MAS), the national government whose support is based in the highlands.

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[71] See *La Rebelión de las Regiones, Pulso Semanario,* July 14-20, 2006, p.12.
[72] The Santa Cruz newspaper of record, *El Deber,* reported more than 200,000 in attendance (*Unos ven Polarización desde 2005*, *El Deber,* November 18, 2007).

The event took on a festive atmosphere, aiming to attract as many people as possible, and later included live music and dancing. During this period, the colors green and white from the departmental flag and the green cross symbolizing Santa Cruz in the city's coat of arms were pervasive in the city center, flooding civic assemblies, hanging from buses and taxis, and marking business logos. These *cruceño* symbols are less common in outlying areas. The Civic Committee has begun to stage similar events in outer parts of the city, however, including a smaller "cabildo" in the main plaza of the Plan Tres Mil in January 2007 with the aim of attracting popular support (*Cívicos piden desde el Plan garantizar la paz nacional, El Deber*, January 10, 2007.)

Through such public displays, the regional autonomy movement is reinforcing and "re-territorializing" the boundaries between regions by implicitly linking citizen "rights" to the prosperity of Santa Cruz to those loyal to the regionalist project (see Gupta and Ferguson 1992). Those who oppose or contest the regional autonomy have been subjected to intimidation and even physical violence. For example, during the "civic strike" of August 1, 2007, several highland merchants and vendors who continued working were beaten up and their stores defaced by members of the young men's branch of the Civic Committee, the *Unión Juvenil Cruceñista* (UJC).[73] In this polarized context, highland migrants or campesinos that support the MAS are increasingly viewed as "invaders" and threats to the region's interests (Andia 2002).

The regionalist view of a migrant "invasion" rests on the popular construction of Andean migrants that has developed over the past several decades, in response to their influx into the city. The local media and leaders of public discourse have

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[73] In other examples, UJC members in January 2005 attacked a peasant march in support of the MAS at the fourth ring, north of the Christ statue (*Ciudadanos despejen vías a la fuerza, El Deber*, January 29, 2005). During the national conflicts of October 2003, members of UJC and Camba Nation, a separate pro-autonomy group, attacked peasant marchers in the central plaza, and the leader of a provincial civic committee allegedly kicked an Andean woman wearing a *pollera* (traditional skirt) until she fell to the ground (Gustafson 2006; Peña and Jordan 2006).

caricatured and stigmatized Andean migrants, or collas, while associating them with marginality, poverty, urban disorder, lack of hygiene, and holding them responsible for the uncontrolled expansion of peripheral barrios and chaotic market spaces (Blanchard 2006; Andia 2002).

The rise of elite regional interests and the fragmentation of national territory and identity are not unique to Bolivia. In fact, the regional autonomy movement reflects a global trend toward the creation of sub-national spaces of government that aim to detach production, social exchange, and citizenship rights from the wider national territory (Ong 2006; Ferguson 2005). Regions and regional identities are being reconceived as geographically and economically relevant units beneath the nation state where particular forms of governance and market-oriented development can flourish (e.g., Brenner 2004; Jessop 2002; Paasi 2003; Soja 2000). Often promoted by regional growth elites or imposed by authoritarian regimes, city-regions and special development zones are afforded special rights as a result of their resources, location, or potential competitive advantage and therefore insulated from wider democratic and regulatory pressures (Ong 2006).

How do these dynamics relate to the practice of citizenship among migrants to Santa Cruz? In the discussion that follows, I suggest that migrants must confront contradictory tendencies between the local, regional, and national scale in gaining full citizenship and integration. The shifting of public deliberation from the national to the local through popular participation offers a communication channel to the local state, and a means for demanding particular social and economic rights, albeit with uneven results. As Holston and Appadurai (1999) observed, however, the decreasing role of the nation state has created "uncertainty about the community of allegiance, inclusiveness… the location of sovereign power… and cultural identities increasingly viewed as defining natural memberships" (1999: 2). The resurgence of regional

identity in Santa Cruz as a challenge to the nation state has produced a similar effect, calling attention to racial, ethnic and regional differences and in some cases raising barriers to belonging for outsiders. This suggests the relevance of what Ong calls "graduated citizenship," or the differential treatment of national populations. The calculation to invest in and insert groups differently within the process of global capitalism "further fragments citizenship for people who are all citizens of the same country" (Ong 2006: 84). The challenge for migrants is to find a sense of belonging while pushing for expanded forms of citizenship in this emerging context.

Methodology and Site Selection

Studying migration and the context of reception in a city such as Santa Cruz, with a population of well over one million, presents certain methodological difficulties. How does one set out to know and describe such a diverse and changing place? I approach the issue by focusing on specific neighborhoods with high migrant concentrations, and by exploring broader forces that shape and influence migrant integration at neighborhood and municipal scales.

The research strategy I used included analyzing census and other population data to determine the sections of the city most affected by in-migration. I also participated in volunteer projects and community meetings to observe forms of participation and community events. I interviewed migrants of varied origin and social class, and leaders of public and civic organizations, including neighborhood associations, to gain insight into the context of reception and relations between migrants and other social groups. Combining these sources allowed me to explore migrant integration and demographic change from multiple perspectives.

To examine migrant integration dynamics, I conducted structured interviews with migrants living in the urban periphery of Santa Cruz, as well as migrants living in

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central parts of the city. For the peripheral areas, I selected Districts 8, 10, and 12 as representative of living conditions in outlying areas where migrants are highly concentrated. Taking into account the socioeconomic variation within districts, I selected neighborhoods in two *unidades vecinales* of varying income level in each district, based on census data.[74]

Districts 8, 10, and 12 are located outside of the city's fourth ring, part of an unplanned and enlarging urban space that shows rising social, economic, and political influence in the city (PNUD 1995). Between 1976 and 1992, the percentage of Santa Cruz residents living outside the fourth ring grew from 5 to 43 percent. By 2001, this figure jumped to 64 percent, or approximately 700,000 people. 70 percent of the city's population age 15 and under live outside the fourth ring, suggesting an area in the process of formation (PNUD 2004: 84)). Much of the housing in the area has been self-built by residents and legal title is often lacking (Feldis 2002). These conditions suggest the failure of modernist, rational planning efforts amid the realities of mass urban migration over the past three decades (Goldstein 2004; Limpias 2003).

To gain access to residents of these outlying districts, I participated in a volunteer program with the *Centro Integrado de Justicia* (CIJ), located in District 8, or the Plan Tres Mil. Funded by the national Ministry of Justice, the agency offers free legal services, renters' rights, and conflict mediation programs to city residents, especially those of populous outer areas such as the Plan Tres Mil.[75] To assess legal needs in the surrounding community, one of its volunteer projects, *Acceso a Justicia* (Access to Justice), organized a house-to-house survey in three neighborhoods adjacent to the CIJ office. I joined the survey team and was allowed to add a set of questions on migration and community relations. The team surveyed 86 respondents

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[74] Districts are made up of unidades vecinales (UV), the smallest territorial planning unit. Residents often recognize two or three distinct neighborhoods within a UV.
[75] Interview with Daphne Maymura, Director of Centro Integrado de Justicia, April 10, 2007.

in the *unidad vecinal* 160 of Plan Tres Mil during two months; 46 percent of the respondents were migrants.

I expanded on the Acceso a Justicia survey to develop an interview questionnaire that focused more fully on experiences of migration. The questionnaire I used included closed questions, such as length of residence in Santa Cruz, household size, occupation, and open-ended questions concerning allegiances, affiliations, civic activities, and views of community relations and regional divisions. Going through neighborhood leaders I met during volunteer work at the CIJ, I developed a "snowball" sample of highland migrants in four neighborhoods of the Plan Tres Mil.[76] To broaden the perspective, I added two neighborhoods of Districts 10 and 12. Using the same strategy, I developed a second sample of migrants from the lowlands region in the same neighborhoods. I also interviewed a smaller sample of highland migrants with professional qualifications living in relatively prosperous areas near the city center. Skilled highland migrants and those from the lowlands belie the common stereotype of the poor, marginal Andean migrant. They also make up an important part of migration flows into Santa Cruz.

I conducted 50 interviews overall, aiming for roughly equal numbers of males and females and age diversity.[77] I asked participants to respond freely to the questionnaire without giving answer prompts. I recorded the interviews, and later grouped responses into categories for analysis. The selection of interview participants may have introduced certain biases. For instance, the JV leaders might have introduced me to especially active or outgoing members of the communities.

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[76] I also developed contacts with JV leaders in Districts 10 and 12 through *Fundación Desafío*, an NGO that works on popular education, and *Fundación Hombres Nuevos*, a Catholic educational and social services agency that runs youth programs in District 8, Plan Tres Mil.

[77] Saul Rioja, a recent graduate of the Universidad Autónoma Gabriel Rene Moreno and resident of Plan Tres Mil served as my assistant during this phase of the research. There was some overlap between the 50 interview participants and the 86 respondents of the Accesso a Justicia survey.

However, there is no reason to expect that their answers might differ substantially from those of other residents.

To supplement the migrant interviews, I conducted semi-structured interviews with eight leaders of juntas vecinales in neighborhoods where I interviewed migrants. Finally, I had conversations with leaders of citywide federations of juntas vecinales and *subalcaldes* (sub-mayors) in the districts under study.[78]

Visits to plazas and markets in the focus neighborhoods and trips across the city on mini-buses offered opportunities to observe how residents navigate the city, daily mobility, and how language and behavior shift in different areas, such as the use of indigenous languages. I noted the ways different people used the term "migrant" and who identifies as such. "*Migrante*" and "*colla*" (an epithet for people of Andean origin) are loaded terms and may be used to keep people in a subordinate position, even second and third generation residents of Santa Cruz. Many newcomers from the highlands refer to themselves as "*gente del interior*" (people from the interior) and less often as *andinos* (Andeans).

As much of the information from interviews collected during the research process is potentially sensitive, I replaced the names of individual respondents with pseudonyms, and I conducted all research in accordance with human subject protocols.

Demographic Change in the City of Santa Cruz

Santa Cruz has experienced a massive demographic shift in the past three decades that shows little sign of abating. The following discussion draws on figures from the national census, collected by the *Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas* (INE).[79]

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[78] The mayor appoints *sub-alcaldes* to represent the municipality in each district.
[79] National census data is available at http://www.ine.gov.bo.

The city of Santa Cruz has grown to its current population of around 1.5 million as a result of migration from within and outside the department (PNUD 2004). Between 1976 and 1992, its population grew at an average annual rate of 6.4%, the highest of any city in the country (CODEPO 2004). This growth rate slowed to 5.1% between 1992 and 2001 (INE 2001). Population growth has not been uniform across the city and has affected different areas with varying intensity. The city's outlying areas have grown most rapidly, stemming from natural population increases, relocation of long-term residents in search of inexpensive housing, and recent migrant settlement. A pattern of slight population decrease in the city center contrasting with accelerated growth in outer areas appears in the 1992 census data and continued through 2001. The decreasing population in the city center stems from rising costs of housing and services in this area and the desire among some to move to newer residential enclaves outside of the 2nd ring (Limpias 2003).

As Table 4.1 illustrates, population growth patterns diverge in the three parts of the city moving from center to urban periphery.

Table 4.1: Population Growth by Rings

Rings	Total Population			Population growth rates (%)	
	1976	1992	2001	1976-1992	1992-2001
Within 2nd ring	103,934	92,252	77,005	-0.76	-1.95
Between 2nd and 4th ring	136,962	280,357	328,796	4.57	1.72
Outside of 4th ring	13,786	324,669	707,781	20.15	8.42
Total	254,682	697,278	1,113,582	6.42	5.06

Source: INE 1976, 1992, and 2001

This pattern of demographic change comes into sharper focus by examining the level of urban district. Figure 4.1 maps the city's 12 districts, which the

municipality recognized as administrative units in 1995. Districts 11 and 1-4 fall largely within the fourth ring, while Districts 5-10 and 12 are located outside this perimeter.[80]

Table 4.2 shows changes in population by urban district. In the period from 1992 to 2001, growth was most pronounced in Districts 6 and 8, followed by 10 and 7. In contrast, three of the more central districts had negative growth during this period. District 12 was not counted in the 1992 Census, as it was not formally consolidated as a district until 1995. The data show that the population growth in outer districts has contributed heavily to the city's overall growth during the past two decades.

Figure 4.1: Map of Urban Districts, Santa Cruz de la Sierra

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[80] Districts 11, 2, and 4 are located entirely within the 4th ring, while a small part of Districts 1 and 3 fall outside of it. The Plan Director also established districts 13-16 for future urban growth, which are currently considered rural; these are shown but not labeled in Figure 1.

Table 4.2: Population Growth by Urban District

Districts	Population		Population change	Population change (%)	Average Annual Population Growth Rate (%)
	1992	**2001**			
11	92,252	77,005	-15,247	83.47%	-2.20%
1	98,677	115,551	16,874	117.10%	1.62%
2	83,897	79,705	-4,192	95.00%	-0.58%
3	42,980	50,601	7,621	117.73%	1.67%
4	85,641	82,939	-2,702	96.84%	-0.36%
Total in central districts	403,447	405,801	2,354	100.58%	0.064%
5	52,253	88,600	36,347	169.56%	4.56%
6	37,885	113,578	75,693	299.80%	7.40%
7	53,771	103,015	49,244	191.58%	5.31%
8	51,988	148,704	96,716	286.04%	7.23%
9	49,063	77,592	28,529	158.15%	4.09%
10	48,871	94,961	46,090	194.31%	5.39%
Total in outer districts	293,831	626,450	332,619	213.20%	5.90%
District 12	No data	81,331	81,331	No data	No data
Total in outer districts including Dist. 12		707,781	413,950		6.50%
Total in city, excluding Dist 12	697,278	1,032,251	334,973	148.04%	3.61%
Total in city, including Dist 12	697,278	1,113,582	416,304	159.70%	4.15%

Source: INE 1992, 2001

The 2001 census recorded a total of 427,610 residents born outside of the city, or 38.2 percent of the city's total population. Between 1996 and 2001, the city received an estimated 129,800 new residents. This means that 30 percent of those born outside the city of Santa Cruz arrived within the last five years.

Table 4.3 shows the distribution of the population born outside of the city by urban district. The data suggest that migrants have settled in every district of the city but in varying magnitudes. In particular, District 8 stands out as having the largest total number of migrants as well as the largest share of migrants in the city. Districts 8 and 12 have the highest proportions of migrants from outside the department among their total migrant populations. Migrants are overrepresented in Districts 4, 8, 9, 10 and 12, as they exceed the citywide figure of 38 percent.

Table 4.3: Migrant Populations by District

Districts	Internal migrants					International migrants	
	Total	% District pop.	% Migrants by district	Distribution by place of birth (%)		Total	% Total pop
				Within Dept.	Outside of Dept.		
11	26,606	35.7	6.2	25.2	74.8	3,442	4.6
1	42,875	37.8	10	23.6	76.4	2,730	2.4
2	26,494	33.8	6.2	31.8	68.2	2,351	3
3	17,749	35.6	4.2	35.9	64	694	1.4
4	34,792	42.8	8.1	22.3	77.7	1,901	2.3
5	28,703	32.8	6.7	32.4	67.6	2,306	2.6
6	39,765	35.4	9.3	30	70	1,142	1
7	35,463	34.8	8.3	26	73.9	643	0.6
8	59,465	40.5	13.9	17.8	82.2	895	0.6
9	31,896	41.7	7.5	22.3	77.7	973	1.3
10	41,223	44.1	9.6	29	71	1,156	1.2
12	34,722	43.3	8.1	15.2	84.8	571	0.7
T. Rural	7,857	36.4	1.8	53	47	630	2.9
Total	427,610	38.2	100	25.5	74.5	19,434	1.7

Source: INE 2001

The following table adds to the analysis by showing the proportion of migrants in each district by department of origin. While newcomers from every department have spread across the city, there is a tendency for migrants from particular places of origin to concentrate in certain areas. For example, more than 20 percent of all

migrants from the Santa Cruz Department reside in Districts 6 and 10. District 8 has high concentrations of migrants from the highland departments of La Paz, Oruro, and Potosí. In addition, the largest concentration of migrants from Chuquisaca is in District 12.

Table 4.4: Distribution of Migrants by Department of Origin

Districts	Migrants' Department of Birth (%)								
	Santa Cruz (Dept.)	Chuq.	La Paz	Cbba.	Oruro	Potosi	Tarija	Beni	Pando
1	9.31	7.79	10.77	10.75	13.68	8.29	10.04	11.21	8.68
2	7.75	5.01	5.73	4.51	4.29	3.88	7.51	9.91	12.19
3	5.87	4.09	3.27	2.42	2.56	2.37	10.82	4.32	4.06
4	7.13	9.94	9.22	9.79	8.32	7.44	8.66	4.54	6.83
5	8.52	4.94	6.03	5.11	4.2	4.49	6.27	11.44	10.99
6	10.93	6.85	8.33	8.13	7.19	8.96	7.78	13.48	11.17
7	8.48	6.48	8.52	8.11	10.21	8.05	8.05	8.82	8.59
8	9.71	12.36	15.31	15.74	19.94	20.78	11.26	11.93	8.77
9	6.56	10.03	7.56	8.25	6.86	7.59	7.09	6.01	5.63
10	10.98	12.06	8.75	10.7	8.61	10.57	7	4.27	4.99
11	6.17	5.44	7.62	5.38	5.94	5.3	8.65	6.57	10.25
12	4.84	13.16	8.28	10.09	7.72	10.85	5.59	5.94	6.93
T. Rural	3.75	1.83	0.59	1.03	0.47	1.43	1.28	1.55	0.92
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Migrants	108,021	47,744	66,287	76,217	27,655	36,534	17,233	42,989	1,083

Source: INE 2001

The following two tables focus on migrants to the city of Santa Cruz who arrived between 1996 and 2001, termed "recent migrants" in the census (INE 2001). Table 4.5 shows the department of origin of recent migrants to Santa Cruz, indicating that almost one fourth originate in Santa Cruz department, while more than half are from the highlands.

Table 4.5: Recent Migrants by Department of Origin, 1996-2001

Department of Origin	Internal Migrants	
	Total Number	**%**
Lowlands	45,210	34.8
Santa Cruz (Department)	31,598	24.3
Beni	13,316	10.3
Pando	296	0.2
Highlands	84,631	65.2
Cochabamba	27,658	21.3
La Paz	25,077	19.3
Chuquisaca	13,543	10.4
Potosí	6,816	5.3
Tarija	6,042	4.7
Oruro	5,495	4.2
Total	129,841	100

Source: Censo de Población y Vivienda de 2001 (INE 2001)

Table 4.6 presents data on recent migrants and their regions of origin. As in Table 4.3, which gave data for migrants by birth, District 8 stands out as having the highest total number of recent migrants. Districts 6, 10 and 8 have the highest proportion of recent migrants from Santa Cruz department, while District 8 has the highest proportion from the altiplano and valleys regions, both of which are in highland Bolivia.

Table 4.6: Recent Migrant Population by Urban District, 1996-2001

Districts	Total	%	Santa Cruz (Dept.)	Altiplano	Valleys	Lowlands	Total	%
				Internal Migrants			**International Migrants**	
			Distribution by Region of Origin (%)					
11	9,515	7.22	6.44	8.59	6.9	6.57	2,278	17.78
1	12,642	9.59	8.62	10.27	9.27	11.39	1,680	13.11
2	8,398	6.37	7.41	5.78	5.25	9.58	1,415	11.04
3	4,792	3.64	5.17	2.73	3.4	3.61	471	3.68
4	11,331	8.6	6.68	9.71	10.1	5.13	1,241	9.69
5	8,663	6.57	7.87	5.79	5.18	10.42	1,384	10.8
6	12,084	9.17	11.22	8.13	7.29	13.65	794	6.2
7	10,202	7.74	7.8	8	7.2	8.85	517	4.03
8	18,556	14.08	10.4	16.1	15.15	12.31	825	6.44
9	9,708	7.37	7.06	6.9	8.45	5.99	700	5.46
10	12,244	9.29	10.44	9.1	10.08	4.65	900	7.02
12	10,858	8.24	5.91	8.12	10.55	6.08	540	4.21
T. Rural	2,795	2.12	4.96	0.79	1.19	1.76	68	0.53
Total	131,788	100	100	100	100	100	12,813	100
%	100		24.34	28.8	36.39	10.48		

Source: INE 2001

In 2006, the Dutch-funded NGO *Fundación del Programa de Alivio de Pobreza* (Foundation for Poverty Alleviation, PAP) conducted a survey to assess urban poverty levels in the city of Santa Cruz. The PAP survey measured poverty in terms of Unsatisfied Basic Necessities (including access to basic services, health and education levels, housing materials, and overcrowding). To complement this measure of poverty, the survey also examined household economic capacity. The data are disaggregated by district and unidades vecinales within districts (PAP 2006).

Table 4.7 shows poverty levels of migrants and non-migrants in Districts 8, 10, and 12, the areas where I conducted migrant interviews. The table also shows poverty

in the city as a whole.[81] PAP divided poverty levels into four categories, including 1) basic needs met, (i.e., non-poor, or *necesidades basicas satisfechas*), 2) at the poverty line (*umbral de pobreza*), 3) poor (*pobreza moderada*), and 4) very poor (*indigente*). In District 10, poverty levels for both migrants and non-migrants are similar to poverty in the city as a whole. In Districts 8 and 12, however, poverty levels for migrants and non-migrants are higher than the city as a whole. In District 8, poverty appears to be partly attributable to migrant status, as migrant poverty level is higher than that of non-migrants and the district total. In District 12, however, poverty does not appear attributable to migrant status, as migrants are similar to non-migrants and the district total in terms of poverty level.

Table 4.7: Poverty Levels of Migrants in Three Urban Districts (%)

Poverty level	Santa Cruz city	District 8			District 10			District 12		
		Migrant	**Non-migrant**	**∑**	**Migrant**	**Non-migrant**	**∑**	**Migrant**	**Non-migrant**	**∑**
Basic needs met	31.6	8.1	7.7	7.8	24.3	18.6	20.8	10.2	6.9	8.1
At poverty line	39.3	38.3	49.3	46.4	42.5	48.8	46.5	38.5	41.1	40.2
Poor	27.9	51.3	41.4	44	32.3	31.8	32	49.6	50	49.8
Very poor	1.2	2.4	1.6	1.8	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.8	2	1.9

Source: Elaborated from PAP (2006) data

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[81] In District 8, PAP surveyed 3,549 individuals, 2,413 in District 10, and 3,831 in District 12. The percentage of migrants in survey samples for the three districts was 26%, 37.9%, and 35%, respectively. PAP defined migrants as those born outside the city of Santa Cruz.

Social and Economic Profiles of Migrants

To reiterate, migration to Santa Cruz continues as a major feature of the city's evolving social and spatial form. Migrants in Santa Cruz have often been stigmatized as poor, unhygienic, and contributing to chaotic urban growth. In particular, highland migrants are viewed as expanding into and appropriating urban space in marginal areas and therefore troubling to the premise of an orderly, planned city with cosmopolitan aspirations. This view elides a more complex reality, in which migrants from both the highlands and lowlands are forming new communities in outlying areas, and newcomers are not necessarily poorer than long-term residents of these areas as shown by census analysis.

Now that recent population shifts have been examined, the following sections will focus on the data gathered in qualitative interviews with migrants. The aim is to situate experiences of migration within the changing social, political, and economic context of Santa Cruz, and to explore migrants' aspirations and impediments to gaining full citizenship, and how these dynamics affect various groups in specific parts of the city.

The interview strategy involved grouping respondents into three categories, 1) highland migrants living in peripheral areas of the city, 2) migrants from rural areas of Santa Cruz department and the lowlands living in peripheral areas of the city, and 3) highland migrants with professional qualifications living in relatively prosperous areas near the city center. "Highland migrants" refers to those from the altiplano and valleys region of the country. The 'highland' and 'lowland' sample each have 20 participants, while the 'skilled highland' sample has 10 participants.

Specifically, I examine the social and economic background of the migrants, their length of residence in Santa Cruz, how they selected their destination

communities, and their ongoing ties to communities of origin. I consider

organizational membership, participation in neighborhood development efforts, and

the extent to which this is associated with length of residence. I also explore attitudes

toward regional autonomy, how increasing region divisions affect migrant reception at

the local level, and how the three interview groups differ with respect to these issues.

Table 4.8 presents demographic characteristics of the interview respondents.

Table 4.8: Demographic Characteristics of Migrants, n=50		
	Number	**Percentage**
Sex		
Male	28	56
Female	22	44
Age		
18-29	24	48
30-49	20	40
50-65	6	12
Family size		
Live alone	4	8
1-4	19	38
5-10	27	54
Languages spoken		
Spanish only	34	68
Spanish and Quechua	11	22
Spanish and Aymara	2	4
Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara	3	6
Place of Origin[82]		
Highlands		
Altiplano	19	38
Valleys	11	22
Lowlands	20	40
Length of residence in Santa Cruz		
0-5 years	9	20
6-19 years	21	40
20 or more years	20	40
Total	50	100

Source: Interviews by author, 2007

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[82] Bolivia is often divided into three geographic regions: the Altiplano includes the departments of La Paz, Potosí and Oruro, the Valleys include Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and much of Tarija, while the lowlands include Santa Cruz, Beni, and Pando. The Altiplano and Valleys are considered Andean, or highland.

The interview respondents' social and economic background reflects patterns in the census data for migrants in Santa Cruz. For example, roughly half of respondents are aged 18 to 29.[83] This reflects 2001 census data that shows a strong concentration between ages 15 and 29 for migrants in Bolivia in general and for migrants to Santa Cruz who primarily arrive seeking work opportunities (PNUD 2004).

In terms of place of origin, more respondents are from Santa Cruz Department than any other department. But respondents from the highland region outnumber those from the lowlands (60 percent originate in altiplano and valleys), as is true in the census. Among the respondents from the lowlands, one fourth are from the *valles cruceños*, a relatively poor area in the Santa Cruz Department surrounding the colonial town of Vallegrande, which has a long history of sending migrants to the city of Santa Cruz (PNUD 2004).[84]

Roughly one third of interviewees speak Quechua or Aymara in addition to Spanish in the home. All of these are highland migrants, except for two skilled highland migrants who speak Spanish and Quechua at home. All respondents from the lowlands speak only Spanish at home. Santa Cruz has been exclusively Spanish speaking since the colonial period, in contrast to Andean Bolivian cities where Spanish-Quechua or Spanish-Aymara bilingualism is common (Albo 2000). In this sense, speaking an indigenous Andean language can be viewed as a marker of Andean identity in Santa Cruz (Blanchard 2006). Census data shows the percentage of Quechua and Aymara speakers in the city of Santa Cruz held steady from 1976 to 2001, with roughly 12 percent for Quechua and 3 percent for Aymara. This indicates

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[83] All interview respondents are aged 18 and over.
[84] These respondents are from Vallegrande and Manuel Maria Caballero provinces.

a strong increase in speakers of these languages, as the city's total population quadrupled in this period.[85]

Respondents in the three interview groups vary by length of residence in the city of Santa Cruz. 20 percent of all respondents have lived in Santa Cruz for five years or less. 60 percent have lived less than 20 years in the city, corresponding with the period since the advent of neoliberal economic policy.[86] As discussed in previous chapters, economic restructuring starting in the mid 1980s has contributed to regional economic growth in Santa Cruz, which has lured large-scale migration. Those living in Santa Cruz for more than 20 years arrived in a previous wave of migration, when the government began to incorporate the eastern lowlands in the national economy in the 1950s and 1960s (Gill 1987; Eckstein 1983). As with more recent migration flows, many came from impoverished areas of the highlands (ibid).

The following table shows the number and percentage within each interview group by length of residence. Those living in Santa Cruz for five years or less fit the census definition of recent migrants (but arrived between 2002-2007 rather than 1996-2001 as recorded in the census).

Table 4.8a: Proportion of Interview Group Respondents by Length of Residence

Years	Highlanders	Lowlanders	Skilled highlanders
0-5	4	3	3
	20%	15%	30%
6-19	8	7	5
	40%	35%	50%
20>	8	10	2
	40%	50%	20%

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[85] The city's population grew from 254,700 in 1976 to 1,113,100 in 2001 (INE 2001).
[86] This is comparable to the 2001 census figures for migrants in Santa Cruz, in which 30 percent of all migrants arrived within five years (INE 2001).

The table shows that recent migrants are evenly distributed across the three interview groups. (Note: percentages sum by column). The lowland sample has the highest proportion of respondents living in Santa Cruz more than 20 years, or 50 percent, and the lowest proportion of recent migrants, or 15 percent. In contrast, only 20 percent of skilled highlanders have lived in Santa Cruz for more than 20 years.

Table 4.8b shows the proportions within the length of residence categories, and it reinforces the sense that the lowland sample has more long-term residents. (Note: percentages sum by row). Among those living in Santa Cruz 20 years or more, 50 percent are lowlanders, while only 10 percent are skilled highlanders. The recent arrival of the skilled highlanders might be expected, as many of them work in hydrocarbon and finance firms and recently relocated to Santa Cruz through employment.

Table 4.8b: Proportion of Length of Residence categories by Interview Group

Years	Highlanders	Lowlanders	Skilled highlanders
0-5	4	3	3
	40%	30%	30%
6-19	8	7	5
	40%	35%	25%
20>	8	10	2
	40%	50%	10%

Although not shown in the tables, the possession of a national identity card and birth certificate is a potential indicator of recognition and inclusion—or lack thereof—by the state. Migrants in this study have not crossed international boundaries, and one might expect them to possess such documents, but this is not always the case. Eight percent of respondents said they did not have—or a family member did not have—a birth certificate or national identity card, and 18 percent have errors in these documents. Those missing documents are all highland migrants living in peripheral

areas, while errors in documents affect both highlanders and lowlanders living in peripheral areas.

Lacking a birth certificate or identity card, or holding a document with errors, can create problems when applying for jobs, voting, and other aspects of daily life, and it suggests the weak presence of the state in certain places. Finding out how to obtain an ID card or to correct errors in an official document can be a difficult process for recent migrants. Postero (2007: 9) has pointed out that national identity cards show membership in the nation state, much like a passport. She observed that for a Guaraní man who previously lacked one, being issued an identity card symbolized a "radical break from the past and a wholly new relationship with the state."

Table 4.9 shows respondents' reasons for moving to Santa Cruz and choosing specific destination neighborhoods, their housing types, plans to stay, and visits to hometowns. The clustering of migrants from the same village in urban neighborhoods marks many Latin American and Andean cities. This pattern has been associated with ongoing connections between the city and countryside, community obligations in places of origin, and traditions of mutual aid and reciprocity. For example, Albo *et al.* (1981) documented strong links between migrants in the city of La Paz and nearby altiplano communities.[87] While migrants in Santa Cruz show a certain degree of concentration by communities of origin, close ties to hometowns appears to be less common among respondents. For example, although visits to hometowns at least once a year are common, very few respondents belong to migrant hometown associations. More broadly, Santa Cruz lacks a visible social or political movement that represents migrants per se. This situation may stem from the fact that migrants have arrived in Santa Cruz from across the country, and many neighborhoods are heterogeneous. The

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[87] In another example, Altamirano (1984) and Paerregaard (1997) have described dense rural-urban connections among migrants in Lima, Peru as contributing to the "Andeanization" of Lima.

Table 4.9: Migrant Settlement Patterns and Social Networks, n=50

	Number	**Percentage**
Reasons for moving to SC		
Family ties	15	30
Job opportunities in SC	20	40
Lack of jobs in origin	3	6
Instability in origin	1	2
Studies	5	10
Amenities	5	10
Health	1	2
Arrival in neighborhood		
Friends/relatives in area	18	36
Affordable/preference	22	44
Other	4	8
No reply	6	12
Neighborhood of residence		
Low economic capacity	41	82
Moderate economic capacity	2	4
Moderate to high economic capacity[88]	7	14
Housing Type		
Owned	34	68
Rented	13	26
Caretaker	3	6
Plans to stay		
Stay in Santa Cruz	30	60
Return to origin	5	10
Move internationally	11	22
Undecided	4	8
Visits to hometown		
No	10	20
Infrequently	8	16
Once a year	18	36
Frequently	14	28

Source: Interviews by author, 2007

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[88] These categories are based on the PAP (2006) study of urban poverty in Santa Cruz.

nature of the ties to communities of origin could also be affected by the social fragmentation that stems from discrimination and racism encountered in Santa Cruz, as well as from the ruptures of migration itself (Cottle and Ruiz 1993).

The first panel of Table 4.9 shows reasons for moving to Santa Cruz. Based on the primary reason given by each respondent, I organized the responses to this open-ended question into seven categories. Family ties and job opportunities in Santa Cruz stand out as the most frequent responses. Another reason given was political instability in place of origin, which prompted one highlander to move. The category "amenities" refers to those who did not explain their choice in terms of economics, health, or politics, but rather preferred living in Santa Cruz. Overall, migrants appear to be motivated by aspirations for a better economic future in Santa Cruz, discontent with the attenuated livelihood potential and blocked opportunities in places of origin, and reuniting with family members.

The second panel of Table 4.9 shows reasons for choosing the destination neighborhood in Santa Cruz. Affordability and preference stand out as grounds for selecting the destination neighborhood or zone (*zona,* the term often used in Spanish), while the importance of having friends or relatives from places of origin living in the neighborhood is also noteworthy. Other reasons included one respondent who was relocated to the Plan Tres Mil by the municipality after her home was flooded, another whose housing was arranged by a sindicato (trade union), and a third who had a friend in the neighborhood from a different place of origin.

Roughly two thirds of all respondents own their houses. This seems unusually high for migrants, but in the outer neighborhoods of Santa Cruz, many newcomers buy simple lots and gradually build on them. In some cases, families live in one room at first and add rooms as their savings allow.

More than half of respondents said they planned to stay in Santa Cruz, and they were twice as likely to consider moving internationally as returning to their community of origin. In terms of hometown visits, the largest group, 36 percent, reported visiting their "pueblo" once per year, and 28 percent reported doing so "frequently" (more than once per year). Many explained that they visit for the anniversary *fiesta* of their pueblo each year, especially those from smaller, rural communities. Although not shown in Table 4.9, slightly over half, or 56 percent, said they own property, or have family members in Santa Cruz who own property, in their hometown.

Participation, Institutional Connections, and Local Development

This section focuses on respondents' membership in social organizations, the kinds of civic activities they participate in, and their attitudes toward the municipality and engagement local development. These are important elements in the practice of citizenship at the local level, a theme of this chapter. Migrants in Santa Cruz have been affected by broader national trends in which civic participation has been "rescaled" from the national to the local level through political decentralization and popular participation. Juntas vecinales are place-based civil society organizations that negotiate with and petition municipal governments for development funds, and in this way serve as important "support structures of citizenship" (Roberts 1996).

Table 4.10: Local Organizational Membership, n=50

	Number	%
Membership in organization		
Yes	22	44
No	28	56
Types of organizations		
Trade union/gremio	11	44
Junta vecinal board	3	12
Other community or religious org	5	20
Student org		
Migrant residents assoc	2	8
	4	16
Participation in neighborhood development through a JV		
Yes	17	34
No	33	66
Municipality attends to community		
Yes	16	33
No	33	66
Not sure	1	2

Source: interviews by author, 2007

Table 4.10 shows that slightly less than half of respondents are members of a social organization. The second panel of the table lists the types of organizations to which respondents belong.[89] Trade unions and *gremios* (guilds), which typically represent informal service workers, figure most prominently. In addition to membership in these organizations, 34 percent of respondents participate in neighborhood development efforts through a junta vecinal. These participants do not necessarily view themselves as junta vecinal members, but they often get involved in general meetings open to all neighborhood residents, or they contribute labor to community projects organized by the juntas.

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[89] The list of participants in types of organizations in the second panel of Table 10 totals 25 exceeds the 22 respondents who are organization members. This is because some belong to more than one organization.

Participation in local development in Bolivian cities is primarily organized through juntas vecinales (JV's). The Popular Participation legislation (1994) officially recognized the juntas as development actors and charged them with applying for local development funds from the municipality. Many of the JV's formed when the communities they represent first came into existence. In Districts 8, 10, and 12, the oldest juntas date to the early 1980s.

The primary responsibility of the juntas is to obtain *obras*, or public works for the neighborhood. These include street lighting, paved streets, a square or park, electricity, or a sewage system. While JV's play a vital role in accessing public resources in poorer communities, in affluent areas of the city they are often overlooked as residents tend to be less involved in neighborhood issues, and they do not need to band together to receive adequate basic infrastructure and services. Only one respondent in the skilled highland sample participated in neighborhood development through a JV. In response to this question, another skilled highlander recalled being invited to serve on the advisory board of his condominium, but he lacked time to do so.

In contrast, almost half of the highland and lowland sample respondents participated in neighborhood development efforts through JV's. They do so mainly by attending monthly general assembly meetings or working voluntarily on community projects such as setting up a soccer field or constructing a new classroom for the local school. Only three interview respondents currently sit on a JV directing board (*mesa directiva*). The directing boards are elected by community residents (both renters and homeowners), typically include 12 to 14 members, and meet once every two to four weeks. Many respondents spoke favorably of the role of the juntas in community development and in advocating for the neighborhood to the alcaldía.

Others were less willing to participate in neighborhood development efforts, citing disillusionment with projects that never came to fruition, and the tendency for the juntas to become tied to political party interests. In fact, many neighborhoods have two rival juntas, one allied with the opposition Podemos party and one known to support the national government.[90] In this way, the juntas parallel local and national political cleavages at the neighborhood level.

Table 4.10a shows the relationship between participation in neighborhood development decisions through juntas vecinales and length of residence among interview participants. The table shows that the highest proportion of participants in neighborhood development have lived between 6 and 19 years in Santa Cruz, while only one participant has lived in Santa Cruz five years or less. These data suggest that local participation is associated with length of residence.

Table 4.10a: Participation in Neighborhood Development and Length of Residence

		Length of Residence (Years)			
Participation		0-5	6-19	20>	Total
Yes	Responses	1	9	7	17
	% By length of residence	6%	53%	41%	100%
	% Within length of residence group	10%	45%	35%	34%
No	Responses	9	11	13	33
	% By length of residence	27%	33%	39%	100%
	% Within length of residence group	90%	55%	65%	66%
Total Respondents		10	20	20	50
	% By length of residence	20%	40%	40%	100%

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[90] Following the recent disarray of traditional political parties in Bolivia, Podemos has emerged as the main center-right opposition party to the MAS, and is allied with the Civic Committee in Santa Cruz in taking a pro-regional autonomy stance.

To test if there is interference from the skilled highland migrants, who are less likely to participate in local development and include a higher percentage of recent migrants, Table 4.10b shows a cross tabulation excluding skilled highlanders. The table shows that the results are similar and participation is associated with length of residence.

Table 4.10b: Participation in Neighborhood Development and Length of Residence (Excluding Skilled Highlanders)

Participation	Length of Residence (Years)			
	0-5	6-19	20>	Total
Yes Responses	1	8	7	16
% By length of residence	6.2%	50.0%	43.8%	100.0%
% Within length of residence group	14.3%	53.3%	38.9%	40.0%
No Responses	6	7	11	24
% By length of residence	25.0%	29.2%	45.8%	100.0%
% Within length of residence group	85.7%	46.7%	61.1%	60.0%
Total responses	7	15	18	40
% By length of residence	17.5%	37.5%	45.0%	100.0%

Researchers have observed that the juntas vecinales act as intermediaries between citizens and the state (Lazar 2008; Postero 2007). In heterogeneous communities of Santa Cruz, the juntas also are potential intermediaries between migrants and long-term residents. Fernando Prado, an architect in charge of planning for the municipality from 2002 to 2006, noted that given the structure of local development, the juntas must rally broad support in order to petition the municipality for funds. "In my experience, I found that the cambas and collas have interests that coincide, in most cases. They accept each other because they need each other's help, so that water, public transport, and other basic needs will arrive. They might joke and

call one another 'collas,' but their experience doesn't fit the divisiveness they see on the TV news," recalled Prado.[91]

Many of the junta vecinal leaders interviewed agreed with Prado's assessment. A JV leader in Disrict 12 noted, "Outside of the fourth or fifth ring, we live same way, collas, cambas. The divisions come between us and the people in the first or second ring, the people in the center."[92] This implies that structural economic inequalities are perhaps more salient than the rift between newcomers and long-term residents, or between highlanders and lowlanders. Recognizing this schism detracts from the regional claims advanced by traditional Cruceño institutions, in which Santa Cruz is seen as more prosperous and peaceful than the conflictive highlands (Dabdoub 2001). The JV president in an outlying neighborhood of Plan Tres Mil, himself a migrant from Cochabamba with a wife from rural Santa Cruz, noted that long-term residents often welcome newcomers and view them as an asset to the community. "Having more people enter the zone gives us more neighbors and less open land. We are a dispersed unidad vecinal [neighborhood] and the houses are distant from one another. The newcomers help us to fill in the open land, and help us in obtaining street lighting, more schools, transport, and opening up the future in favor of the entire community."[93] This view seems reasonable given that revenue sharing between central and local government, as well as between districts and neighborhoods, is based on population size.

Prado also noted that mayors and city councils gained new importance as sites of economic activity with the advent of popular participation. Municipal elections became hotly contested by political parties, newly aware of the troves of voters in the

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[91] Interview with Fernando Prado, former Director of Planning for City of Santa Cruz (*Oficial Mayor de Planificación Urbana*), September 27, 2007.

[92] Interview with Delfin Perez, Junta Vecinal Secretary of Youth and Sports, Villa Fatima II, District 12, November 10, 2007.

[93] Interview with Luís Amurio, JV President, UV 227, August 20, 2007.

densely populated outer sections of cities such as Santa Cruz. Whereas the political parties previously focused attention on national elections, local politics grew in strategic importance with the redistribution of fiscal resources.[94] These dynamics add potential political strength to residents of peripheral areas.

Despite these changes, perceptions of whether the municipality (*alcaldía*) attends to the needs of one's neighborhood or zone varied between participants in the three groups. In comparison to the skilled highlanders, respondents in the highland and lowland samples emphasized that the alcaldía does not pay adequate attention, or had "forgotten about" their zone. According to Don Humberto Irineo, a street vendor, "The zone is completely forgotten. I come from the interior [the highlands] and that is how I see it. There are places in the provinces with better conditions." He added that it is possible to make a complaint through the *Comité de Vigilancia* (or Oversight Committee) that represents the Plan Tres Mil, but it must be made in the same year as the city's annual operating budget. "In many cases, the Committee doesn't have capacity to make the complaints," he observed.[95]

Reflecting the growing influence of party politics on local development, several residents of Barrio Urkupiña in the Plan Tres Mil noted that municipal officials did not attend the Plan's anniversary celebration in 2007. "This year they decided not to come because supposedly the Plan residents support the MAS, so the authorities didn't attend," observed Dina Ortiz.[96] Another resident of the Plan Tres Mil said of the local officials, "they showed us their backs" (*nos ha dado la espalda*). Bolivian President Evo Morales attended the Plan's anniversary celebration that year and gave a speech in which he promised national investment in market infrastructure and roads

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[94] Local elections have ocurred in Bolivia since 1985, with the Law of Municipalities. Before this, mayors were appointed by the president (Mayorga et al. 1997).
[95] Highland respondent, aged 57, of Villa Fatima II, District 12.
[96] Lowland respondent, aged 18, of Barrio San Isidro in Plan Tres Mil

in the Plan Tres Mil. This may explain why some municipal officials and Civic

Committee leaders who oppose the central government stayed away. Showing support

for the national government is antithetical to the political project of the Civic

Committee and proponents of regional autonomy.

Blurring the Boundaries: Migrants' Responses to Civic Regionalism

In many parts of the world, social actors have mobilized regional politics and

regional identity to delimit and symbolize space and groups of people (Harvey 2000;

Paasi 2003). In Santa Cruz, the resurgence of regional sentiment stems from long

standing grievances with the central government, as well as a view of distinctive social

and economic heritage. Such a view has roots in what Radcliffe and Westwood

(1996) have described as "racialized imaginative geographies," or the association of

particular social and cultural groups with specific places within the national territory.

Orlove (1993) has suggested that in Andean societies, the division of national space

between urban and rural, or modernity and backwardness, involves a corresponding

racial distribution that locates people of European descent in cities and people of

indigenous origin in the countryside. This tendency raises the question of the extent to

which such social geographies are being reproduced in the Santa Cruz urban

landscape.

In this section, I examine migrants' views on social and spatial boundaries and

how they affect the process of integration. As an expression of regional identity

formation, I also examine migrants' attitudes toward regional autonomy claims.

Proponents of autonomy have made demands in opposition to the central government

and stressed their difference from the western highland part of the country. Do

migrants feel included in this project, and do they support it? In exploring this

question, I also look at perceptions of discrimination, views of urban space, and how

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Table 4.11: Indicators of Regional Identity Formation and Inclusiveness

	Number	Percentage
Experienced discrimination		
Yes	17	34
No	33	66
Perceive divisions in urban space		
Yes	19	38
No	21	42
Latent	4	8
No response	6	12
Regional divisions affect community		
Yes	23	46
No	22	44
No response	5	10
Support for autonomy		
Yes	21	42
No	12	24
Mixed	10	20
Indifferent	1	2
Provincial or indigenous autonomy	6	12
Support for national government		
Yes	19	38
No	17	34
Mixed	12	24
Indifferent	2	4
Autonomy would increase discrimination of outsiders		
Yes	14	28
No	23	46
Uncertain	12	24
Attended a Civic Committee rally		
Yes	16	32
No	34	68

Source: Interviews with author, 2007

increasing regional divisions affect social interactions at the local level. The following table summarizes the responses in these areas.

As shown above, the majority of respondents have not directly experienced discrimination in Santa Cruz, either in employment, housing, or access to public services. Looking within the groups, however, 60 percent of highlanders have directly felt discrimination, in contrast to only 15 percent of lowlanders and 20 percent of skilled highlanders. Ramona Rivera, in the highland sample, noted she has experienced anti-"colla" bigotry more sharply in the past few years, saying, "hatred of people from the interior is growing" in the polarized political climate.[97] Humberto Martes has noticed that when applying for professional jobs, he must produce more documents than long-term residents. He has also heard accusations of 'collas coming to take away jobs from cruceños' while selling books as a traveling salesman.[98]

Respondents in all groups recognized connections between social exclusion and specific places in the city. When describing the city in general terms, respondents across the three groups pointed out the limited amount of public space and recreational areas in Santa Cruz. In particular, several respondents in the lowland and skilled highlander samples found parks such as the Parque Urbano and Parque Arenal to be deteriorated and dangerous, and they try to avoid these places. Some noted that newly arrived highlanders often congregate in Parque Arenal and in the plaza beside the old central bus terminal (*ex-terminal*), marking them as less desirable and possibly unsafe.

Conversations about places in the city often led to discussions of perceptions of spatial divides. As with other open-ended questions in interviews, I did not prompt respondents with answer choices and coded their narratives in later analysis. The category "latent" shown in the second panel of Table 4.11 refers to those who

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[97] Highland respondent, aged 24, of Barrio Urkupiña, Plan Tres Mil.
[98] Skilled highland respondent, aged 35, District 5.

perceived spatial divisions between long-term residents (cruceños) and highland migrants (collas), but felt these to be implicit, rather than overt. The table shows respondents were more likely to see divisions between cruceños and collas if we include "latent" along with "yes" responses. Specifically, three highlanders recalled being given dirty looks in the city's central plaza, ("*me han mirado feo*"). Elizabeth Flores, in contrast, said that social relations are fluid and there are no set barriers or divisions. She added, "There are few places in Santa Cruz with only one type of person."[99] Flores went on to explain that she had never visited fashionable areas such as Equipetrol, which others described as unwelcoming. Several respondents suggested that physical divisions in the city are also related to class differences, so that if one has sufficient economic status, the divisions can be crossed more easily.

Interview respondents had varying opinions of whether regional political divisions affect social relations in their communities. Five highlanders who live in Urkupiña, a heavily Andean-origin section of the Plan Tres Mil, agreed that regional divisions do not affect neighborhood interactions. In contrast, respondents from the mixed areas of Plan Tres Mil and District 10 noted occasional verbal altercations and rivalries that stem from political divisions. According to interviewees, in some cases, these have spilled over to disputes in the junta vecinal, and have included accusations of corruption, misuse of funds, and connections to political parties. Isidro Quispe noted that officials in the subalcaldía of District 10 are active in the newly formed *Autonomía Para Bolivia* (APB) party, which also represents the departmental government. He added that many of the municipal posts, including in jobs in hospitals and schools in the district, have gone to those active in this party.[100] Almost half of the skilled highlanders also felt that regional divisions affect community relations.

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[99] Lowland respondent, aged 23, barrio 18 de Enero in District 10.
[100] Highland respondent, aged 35, barrio 18 de enero, District 10.

Several stressed the influence of local media outlets to drum up support for regionalist positions and "intensify" hostility toward the central government.

The question of regional autonomy divided interview respondents sharply by interview group. Table 4.11 shows that in terms of support of autonomy, the "Yes" responses outnumber "No" responses. Almost one third of the respondents, however, voiced a "mixed" view, or else favored alternative forms of autonomy currently being promoted by the national government. Looking at responses within the interview groups, as shown below in Table 4.11a, the vast majority of poor highlanders opposed regional autonomy and several supported alternative forms such as provincial or indigenous autonomy. The MAS government and some indigenous organizations have proposed provincial and indigenous autonomy as an alternative means of distributing national resources and sovereignty (Pacto de Unidad 2006; García Linera 2008). These proposals are also perhaps aimed to diffuse the regional autonomy movement. Several poor highland respondents feared that regional autonomy could cause the nation to split apart. The poor highlanders who favored regional autonomy noted the difficulty of traveling to the capital La Paz for *tramites* (paperwork) and requesting *items* (budget line items for services or salaries) from the central government.

The majority of lowlanders supported regional autonomy as a means of increasing the department budget and keeping more resources in Santa Cruz. Several stated that Santa Cruz contributes more than it receives in return from the central government.[101] None of the lowlanders supported the MAS proposals of provincial or indigenous autonomy. Showing how autonomy tends to be broadly defined and can be widely interpreted for political purposes, Edit Negrete stated that achieving autonomy for Santa Cruz will be beneficial in order to defend private property rights.

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[101] This sentiment echoes rhetoric used by the Civic Committee and the Prefectura.

She added, "Autonomy will provide more for the region. The soy, sorghum and sunflower crops will be more productive with more of our resources to invest. Without autonomy, the government will take over our property."[102] Those opposing autonomy also showed malleable understandings of its meaning, as suggested by two highlanders who worried they would need a passport to enter Santa Cruz.[103]

Others had more nuanced views of autonomy. The majority of skilled highlanders agreed with decentralizing state functions to the regional level, but disliked the way the autonomy campaign has been carried out. Several cited the lack of policy information provided by regional leaders and their refusal to cooperate with the national government to pursue a long-term resolution to the conflict. Three skilled highlanders also qualified their support for autonomy with provisions for "*apoyo solidario*" (solidarity support) for departments that voted against autonomy in the 2006 referendum, including Oruro and Potosí. One respondent criticized the prefectura's declaration of de facto "*Autonomía al Andar*" (autonomy on the march) and the naming of the pre-autonomous council. He added that the autonomists have condemned not only MAS supporters, but also made dissidents of those who advocate a more moderate and conciliatory approach with the central government.[104]

In November 2007, several prominent local intellectuals and community leaders who oppose MAS but who had expressed some criticism of the regional autonomy movement were publicly denounced as "traitors to the region" signs posted in the main plaza of Santa Cruz. These events suggest that as the tug of war over autonomy between the departmental and central governments progresses, it is increasingly more difficult to find middle ground and reconciliation.

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[102] Lowland respondent, aged 26, barrio San Antonio, Plan Tres Mil.
[103] The rumor of a requiring "passports for collas" in Santa Cruz was disseminated in some media reports.
[104] Fernando Aliaga, skilled highland respondent, aged 34, Casco Viejo, District 11.

Table 4.11a shows support for autonomy among respondents in each interview group. The responses included "Yes," "No," "Mixed opinion," "Indifference," and "Support for other forms of autonomy."

Table 4.11a: Support for Autonomy by Migrant Interview Group

Do you support autonomy?		Interview Group			
		Poor highlanders	Poor lowlanders	Skilled highlanders	Total
Yes	Responses	4	13	4	21
	% Yes	19%	62%	19%	100%
	% Within interview group	20%	65%	40%	42%
No	Responses	9	1	1	11
	% No	82%	9%	9%	100%
	% Within interview group	45%	5%	10%	22%
Mixed	Responses	0	5	5	10
	% Mixed	0%	50%	50%	100%
	% Within interview group	0%	25%	50%	20%
Indifferent	Responses	1	0	0	1
	% Indifferent	100%	0%	0%	100%
	% Within interview group	5%	0%	0%	2%
Other forms	Responses	6	1	0	7
	% Other	86%	14%	0%	100%
	% Within interview group	30%	5%	0%	14%
Total	Responses	20	20	10	50
	% Responses	40%	40%	20%	100%
	% Within interview group	100%	100%	100%	100%

Here we see that the lowland and highland samples vary widely in their support for autonomy, with the majority of poor highlanders opposed and most lowlanders supporting. In addition, the large majority (86 percent to be precise) of those favoring alternative forms of autonomy are poor highlanders. Respondents in the skilled highland and lowland groups are more likely to have a mixed opinion of autonomy than poor highlanders, who are often strongly opposed.[105] Furthermore, the lowlanders show stronger support for autonomy than the skilled highlanders. Figure 4.2 compares support for autonomy by interview group.

Source: Interviews with author

Figure 4.2: Do You Support Autonomy? (%)

The Santa Cruz Civic Committee has held three mass rallies, or cabildos, to demand recognition of regional autonomy since 2005. These events were staged

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[105] The relationship between "support for autonomy" and "interview group" is significant, using a Pearson chi square test, with a p value of less than .015. In searching for significance, I found that the relationship between "support" and "length of residence" was not significant. The relationship between "support" and "region of origin" was borderline significant with a p value of .083. See Appendix Tables 1 and 2.

around the towering Christ statue on the Monseñor Rivero Avenue, a central location that many cruceños view as traditional and symbolic (Blanchard 2006). In addition, the Civic Committee organized a smaller cabildo in the Plan Tres Mil in January 2007. The cabildos are massive affairs and full of spectacle; one was billed as having a million people in attendance (*Cabildo de un Millón*), and many employers have given workers time off to attend.[106] However, Table 4.11 shows that only about one third of respondents have attended one or more of these events. Many cited lack of time or the expense of transport, and some mentioned fears of violence that could be sparked by the politically charged rhetoric. One lowlander said that he attended the cabildos and enjoys the "*ambiente de fiesta*" (festive atmosphere), despite his indifference to the autonomy campaign. He added, "*La gente esta en busca de diversión. Es eso nomás*." (People seek fun and enjoyment, just that.) The highland respondents who opposed autonomy have avoided the cabildos, and only three have attended such an event.

Janeth Perez, a junta vecinal leader from the San Antonio neighborhood of Plan Tres Mil, recalled that during the cabildo of January 2005 in protest of rising prices of government-subsidized diesel, she and other junta leaders were encouraged to bring residents of their communities out to the event. The issue of rising diesel prices was possibly intended to unite elite interests in agro-industry with the popular classes, whose transport costs were increasing. The Civic Committee had offered to send dedicated mini-buses to transport people, and she had arranged for 100 residents to attend. "But when we arrived, it was all changed. It was no longer about the diesel, and only about the demand for autonomy, the referendum vote. This wasn't what we wanted, and they hadn't consulted with us."[107]

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[106] The name is something of an exaggeration; the main local media outlets claimed the largest cabildos were attended by at least 200,000 people, and some came by bus from Santa Cruz provinces.
[107] Interview with Janeth Perez, JV president of UV 160-161, Plan Tres Mil, March 10, 2007.

Support for autonomy appears to be strongly associated with place of origin, with respondents from the lowlands more likely to support it than either poor highlanders or skilled highlanders. This suggests that the leaders of the autonomy movement have been largely successful at designing the campaign to appeal to cruceños' sense of regional pride. But there are exceptions to the highland-lowland divide in autonomy sentiment, and some highland respondents voiced support for autonomy. This stance does not necessarily entail a blind embrace of regionalist demands. Some may adopt the mantle of autonomy in the hopes that it will afford opportunities for acceptance and social mobility, while remaining skeptical about the promises and guarantees made by regional leaders. The skilled highland respondents perhaps best illustrate such a position, as many support autonomy up to a point, but also express ambivalence about the way the campaign is proceeding, the implications of openly agitating against the government, and the intense regional polarization it has sparked. Although the autonomy campaign includes an often explicitly anti-highland dimension, it seems to be possible for people of highland origin, Andean Cruceños, to express support for it and to be included in its ranks.

The rising regional tension in Bolivia, however, appears to be diminishing the possibility for compromise, shown in the way that pro-autonomy groups have publicly labeled critics as "traitors" and in some cases relied on violence and racial fear, casting those opposed to autonomy as invasive outsiders. Differing opinions and dissent are important mainstays in a political democracy. Newcomers to Santa Cruz can potentially find a way beyond the dichotomy, thereby blurring the boundaries between regional autonomy and the centralist Andean state.

Uniting a Divided City? Becoming Camba and the Politics of Inclusion

In the context of demographic change and rapid urban growth, some observers have pointed to an emerging process of "ethno-genesis" in Santa Cruz (Mirtenbaum 2001; Prado et al. 2005). This notion refers to a new social group with its own cultural characteristics. It includes those displaced or deliberately relocated from their places of origin, and the children of these migrants, the first generation of native-born in a new locality.

Traditional cruceño society has created as its "other" the *colla* Andean Bolivian. The term colla is used to refer to anyone from the Andes, including criollos (whites), mestizos ("mixed" race), but is most often and explicitly used for those identified as cholo (urban indigenous), Quechua or Aymara (Blachard 2006; Gill 1987; Stearman 1985). From the Santa Cruz regionalist perspective, collas are often viewed through the prism of "a half-century of conquest" of the eastern lowlands, starting with the March to the East program in the 1950s. Regional elites, leaders of public discourse, and the media outlets they largely control, have portrayed collas as culturally conservative and tied to "irrational" traditions of collectivism (Nación Camba 2004; Mansilla 2004). Other commentators have considered collas as more reliant on central government bureaucracy than cruceños (Fernández 1984). These views intensified in the 1980s with the growing influx of Andean migrants in Santa Cruz, who were newly empowered to vote in municipal elections and join in the political process through the Law of Municipalities (1985) and Popular Participation (1994). Perhaps in response to these developments, proponents of regionalism

emphasized regional identity against collas and in defense of the cruceños, or cambas.[108]

Despite these divisions, the construction of *lo cruceño* as something pure, uniform, and monolithic masks a diverse panoply. The interview participants have integrated in many different ways in the city, and a large percentage in all three groups identify more closely with Santa Cruz than their places of origin. Furthermore, many feel that it is possible to become camba. When asked to elaborate on this notion, several explained that they don't see themselves as taking on all features of native "cambas" but instead as blending the disparate elements of their experience. Many viewed being camba as a "*sentimiento*," or feeling, that is open and malleable. Echoing this view, in a speech given in July 2007 in Montero, an agricultural center located about an hour north of Santa Cruz, the department prefect (governor) Ruben Costas said, "*Un cruceño es quien ama y trabaja por Santa Cruz.*" (A cruceño is someone who loves and works for Santa Cruz.) The implication is that place of birth and ethnicity are less determining factors in integration than attitude, allegiance, and affiliation. In this sense, migrants have raised challenges to notions of identity imagined in terms of "boundedness and containment" (Paasi 2003: 480; Barth 1969).

Table 4.12 shows respondents' views on identity, becoming "camba," and whether children of migrants follow or reject their parents' customs and ways of life.

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[108] The term 'camba' was once a derogatory term used for indigenous peons in lowland Bolivia, but it has become a marker of regional identity (Pruden 2003).

Table 4.12: Regional Identity and Becoming Camba n=50

	Number	Percentage
Identify with Santa Cruz		
Santa Cruz	18	36
Place of Origin	16	32
Bolivia	12	24
Both SC and origin	2	4
No response	1	2
Possible to become camba		
Yes	33	66
No	14	28
No response	3	6
Children of migrant follow parents traditions		
Follow	2	4
Reject	6	12
Unite the two	14	28
Children decide	22	44
No response	6	12

Source: Interviews with author, 2007

The third panel of this table shows responses to the question of how migrants' children balance their parents' traditions and ways of life with new ones they encounter in destination communities. I asked this question of all interview participants, regardless of whether they have children of their own. The most frequent response was that it is a decision left up to the children themselves. Alexander Flores, from barrio San Antonio in Plan Tres Mil, said that "the child will develop a form of thinking, and without stopping being colla from the highlands, he will also adopt the camba sentiment, for defense and for survival… to live well." Another frequent response was the view that migrants' children would "unite the two traditions." Although the country's east and west, or highlands and lowlands, appear increasingly incompatible on the national stage, in some cases at the local level there is recognition of interdependence and commonality.

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the reception of migrants of various backgrounds in Santa Cruz and the ways citizenship is formed in a society in the midst of rapid social and demographic change. My larger argument is that migrants have experienced varying degrees of inclusion at different scales. The interviews with migrants suggest that at the local level, there is often a sense of commonality and shared goals between migrants of various social and economic backgrounds in striving for community improvements and access to basic services.

Representatives of juntas vecinales have also suggested that migrants and longer-term residents collaborate at the neighborhood level and often view their interests as coinciding. It is possible to engage with and petition the alcaldía through the mechanisms of Popular Participation. As we saw in the section on local participation, there is also a widespread perception that public authorities do not take outlying communities into consideration, and that much of the funding and support needed in these largely unplanned communities does not arrive. In this sense, there appears to be a higher level of integration within neighborhoods than between residents of peripheral urban areas and the municipality and powerful, traditional Santa Cruz institutions. Elite-led regional territorial and identity claims tend to gloss over this underlying divide.

The project of civic regionalism in Santa Cruz has contradictory effects for migrants in Santa Cruz. Civic Committee leaders and elites who promote regional autonomy have begun to present these claims as open, inclusive and popular, in order to gain support beyond the upper and middle classes. To some extent, they have been successful on this score. According to national voting data, in the July 2006 autonomy referendum and election of constitutional assembly representatives, the "Yes" vote for

autonomy won with over 70 percent in Santa Cruz department (CNE 2006).[109] To

increase this effort, the Civic Committee and Prefectura have staged cabildos in low-

income areas, such as Plan Tres Mil. They have also promised greater resources to

satisfy a range of citizen demands, including health care, education, roads and bridges,

all supported by rising natural gas revenues. Despite these efforts to increase popular

support, less than half of all interview respondents favored greater regional autonomy.

Furthermore, respondents were highly divided in their support by place of origin, with

lowlanders much more likely to favor autonomy than highlanders.

Underlying the demand for autonomy is opposition to the MAS government

and its pursuit of a strong developmental and redistributive state. Autonomists

support enhancing regional power, while seeking to detach the region from national

regulatory and electoral pressures (see Ferguson 2005). This approach also aims to

preserve elite privilege and control. The ongoing dispute over regional autonomy has

heightened entrenched racial and ethnic categories, in which indigenous peoples are

associated with the rural highlands, while the criollos, or "whites," live in cities

(Orlove 1993). In discussing regional identities in Ecuador, Radcliffe and Westwood

(1996) have referred to these distinctions as "racialized imaginative geographies" that

juxtapose backwardness with progress in various parts of the Andes and South

America. Civic regionalist commentators in Santa Cruz, such as H. C. F. Mansilla

(2007), invoke notions of progress and backwardness as linked to space and national

territory in suggesting that Andean society has culturally conservative tendencies

while lowlanders are more receptive to change and progress. Urban migrants, and

particularly poor Andeans, unsettle these categories by creating new social

geographies.

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[109] In the same referendum, the MAS won 26 percent of the vote in Santa Cruz department for the
constitutional assembly (CNE 2006). The MAS vote could be interpreted as dissent against the
regionalist ideological stance or as a sign of growing MAS support in Santa Cruz.

While interview respondents are divided in their support of regional autonomy, there has been a lack of organized opposition to the autonomy campaign. Those who have marched in support of the MAS party and against autonomy have mostly been campesinos from the agricultural zone north of the city of Santa Cruz, such as Yapacaní and San Julian, also deeply transformed by Andean migration. The political possibilities of an urban oppositional movement have been challenged by various factors, including the lack of strong social ties among migrants in a city in which newcomers have arrived from nearly every corner of the country. Having witnessed the violence unleashed on campesino protesters, these migrants may fear reprisals that would result from mobilizing against the regional project. Also, some of the migrants interviewed see benefits of autonomy for the region as a whole, and they want to be included in opportunities for prosperity. As new identities emerge in Santa Cruz, many newcomers are less likely to consider themselves as "migrants," but rather as "people who have migrated."

Table A1. Support for Autonomy and Length of Residence

			0-5	6-19	20>	Total
Do you support autonomy?	Yes	Count	3	11	7	21
		% within Yes	14.3%	52.4%	33.3%	100.0%
		% within length of res	30.0%	55.0%	35.0%	42.0%
	No	Count	4	2	5	11
		% within No	36.4%	18.2%	45.5%	100.0%
		% within length of res	40.0%	10.0%	25.0%	22.0%
	Mixed	Count	2	3	5	10
		% within Mixed	20.0%	30.0%	50.0%	100.0%
		% within length of res	20.0%	15.0%	25.0%	20.0%
	Indifferent	Count	0	1	0	1
		% within Indiff	.0%	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within length of res	.0%	5.0%	.0%	2.0%
	Other forms of autonomy	Count	1	3	3	7
		% within Other forms	14.3%	42.9%	42.9%	100.0%
		% within length of res	10.0%	15.0%	15.0%	14.0%
	Total	Count	10	20	20	50
		% within Total	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	100.0%
		% within length of res	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table A2. Support for Autonomy and Region of Origin

			Region of origin				
			altiplano	valleys	lowlands	exterior	Total
Do you support autonomy?	Yes	Count	4	4	13	0	21
		% within Yes	19.0%	19.0%	61.9%	.0%	100.0%
		% within Region of origin	22.2%	36.4%	65.0%	.0%	42.0%
	No	Count	6	4	1	0	11
		% within No	54.5%	36.4%	9.1%	.0%	100.0%
		% within Region of origin	33.3%	36.4%	5.0%	.0%	22.0%
	Mixed	Count	4	1	5	0	10
		% within Mixed	40.0%	10.0%	50.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within Region of origin	22.2%	9.1%	25.0%	.0%	20.0%
	Indifferent	Count	1	0	0	0	1
		% within Indiff	100.0%	.0%	.0%	.0%	100.0%
		% within Region of origin	5.6%	.0%	.0%	.0%	2.0%
	Other forms of autonomy	Count	3	2	1	1	7
		% within Other forms	42.9%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	100.0%
		% within Region of origin	16.7%	18.2%	5.0%	100.0%	14.0%
	Total	Count	18	11	20	1	50
		% within Total	36.0%	22.0%	40.0%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within Region of origin	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

CHAPTER 5

MIGRATION, INFORMAL WORK, AND STRUGGLES FOR PUBLIC SPACE

IN SANTA CRUZ

Introduction

The growth of the urban informal economy in Bolivia, and in Latin America more generally, has been attributed to the failure of economic policy initiatives to stimulate sufficient job growth to match the rapid increase in the urban labor supply. As import substitution, protectionism, and state ownership reached their limit in the late 1970s and early 1980s, economic restructuring initiated under pressure of the International Monetary Fund and similar international agencies required that Latin American nations follow a different economic logic (Perreault and Martin 2005; Portes and Roberts 2005). The ascendance of the neoliberal model reduced the public sector, liberalized trade, deregulated work arrangements, and decreased governmental responsibility in providing social protections, a pattern seen almost universally Latin America (Pérez Sáinz 2003). In Bolivia, where neoliberal reforms began in the early 1980s, there is little doubt that this period saw large growth in the informal economy as a rising proportion of the population searched for subsistence outside the formal sector (Conaghan, Malloy and Abugattas 1990; Benería and Floro 2006; Kohl and Farthing 2006).

The implementation of neoliberal policy initiatives has impelled cities and regions into closer engagement with the global economy, with important consequences for social, economic, and spatial organization in cities (Roberts 2005). Researchers have called attention to the reorganization and relocation of production and consumption activities along with changes in the nature of work, including increases

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in flexible, precarious and informal employment (Castells 1989; Benería 2001; Roy 2002). Urban specialists have linked these symptoms with heightened fragmentation of urban social life and increasing social inequality (Madanipour 2003; Fainstein 2006; Kudva 2006; Sassen 2006). Researchers have also explored the ways these changes are altering urban landscapes and reshaping spatial relations in cities (Zukin 1991; Harvey 2001; Mitchell 2003).

This chapter examines the intersections between migration, the informal economy and conflicts over public space in Santa Cruz, Bolivia as a window into the dynamics of highland migrant integration and exclusion in this city and the forces shaping them. The growing informal economy and the massive demographic shifts in the city relating to migration is raising questions about the appropriate uses of urban public space, as well as questions regarding the type of city Santa Cruz strives to be. Specifically, I ask how migrant insertion into the local economy, in particular in the informal economy, is leading to conflicts over public space in Santa Cruz. Related to this issue, what sorts of collective actions are used to defend rights to the use of urban public space, and what are the key points of contention? As a starting point, I explore theoretical connections between the informal economy and urban public space, two areas that have tended to remain separate in the literature. In the empirical sections that follow, I examine informal commerce in Santa Cruz and how the location of this activity is causing conflicts over uses of public space. I then analyze local planning policies to reorganize market networks and consider how competing perceptions of these policies reflect unresolved tensions over urban growth, demographic change, and migrant integration.

In this analysis, I argue that the organizations charged with managing urban growth and development—municipal officials and planners—and traditionally powerful Santa Cruz civic institutions, such as the Civic Committee and the *Cámara*

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de Industria, Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (the Chamber of Commerce, Services and Tourism, CAINCO), attempt to regulate the most visible aspects of the informal economy through a new municipal plan to reorganize market networks. I also suggest that these groups seek to break up the power of informal vender associations, or gremios, through the municipal plan by reorganizing the largest markets and relocating the venders.

Traditional and established Santa Cruz civic groups have witnessed the rise of new forms of commerce, services, and finance in the city over the past two decades from diverse origins. While traditional elites and local officials recognize informal commerce as an important "safety net" for the poor, they view the gremio associations and the vendors they represent as threatening to their notion of what belongs in urban public space, and stigmatize them as out of place and provoking urban disorder.

Methodologically, I pursued several avenues of inquiry to examine these questions. To investigate recent shifts in the local economy, I gathered data from the 2001 national census and the *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (PLOT), a recent comprehensive plan for the city of Santa Cruz (GMSC 2004a). To uncover official views of public space, I reviewed municipal ordinances (GMSC 2004b) and a report on the new municipal plan for markets (Salek 2007). I interviewed gremio association leaders, local officials, and two city council members (one current and one former member) who also hold positions as gremio federation leaders. I also visited the four largest municipal markets and observed interactions among vendors, and between vendors and customers, and I organized two group interviews with 30-35 members of two different gremios in Los Pozos, the city's second largest market.[110]

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[110] Gremio leader and Santa Cruz city council member Gricelda Muñoz invited participants in the two group interviews.

To narrow the scope of the study, I focused on informal commerce, including market and street vendors, as one type of activity in a much broader informal economy. I chose informal commerce because it is a highly visible occupation and one that has grown considerably with the arrival of Andean migrants to Santa Cruz. Furthermore, it features strong forms of collective organization, and it has become the target of municipal policies aimed at regulating informal activities in public spaces more broadly. In this sense, market and street vendors have become a flashpoint for issues surrounding the growth of the informal economy, in-migration, and demographic change.

This analysis contributes to broader discussions in planning theory and practice on the spatial dimensions of social exclusion and struggles for public space in local contexts (Mitchell 2003; Madanipour 2003; Kudva 2006). It also raises questions regarding processes of informalization and "reformalization," and the spatial implications and political challenges of regulating informal work by public authorities, planners, and members of civil society. Similarly, it sheds light on the effects of planning policies on the lives of recent migrants and informal workers, on potential efforts to support workers who are detached from formal structures, and to foster social cohesion at the local level. The experience of Santa Cruz regarding conflicts over public space and informal commerce is not unique, and these findings resonate with struggles over the right to access urban space to pursue livelihoods in many Latin American cities including Mexico City, Lima, Quito, and Bogotá (see Cross 1998; Bromley 1997; Hanley in progress).

Perspectives on Informal Employment

The term 'informal economy' refers to a broad range of activity that dominates the economy in many developing cities. It is often used to mean income-generating

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activities that are not enumerated nor regulated by the state in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated (Castells and Portes 1989: 12). Informal activities are relationships that are outside the criminal economy, but fall in a continuum between legal and illegal activities. The products may be legal, but the process through which they are prepared may not be fully legal, for instance when businesses do not pay taxes or are not registered (ibid). The term 'informal sector' has been found inadequate as it is not a 'sector' in the sense of a specific industry group, and so 'informal economy' is used to encompass the diverse group of workers operating informally, or under varying conditions of informality (Benería and Floro 2006).

Keith Hart (1970) first coined the term informal sector to describe the activity of petty entrepreneurs in Ghana working outside the formal labor market who were largely self-employed. Hart's key thesis was that workers, previously described as marginal, were entrepreneurs in their own right (Cross 1998). In 1972 the International Labor Organization's (ILO) employment mission to Kenya proposed that the informal sector was not marginal but could be profitable and efficient. From this study, the ILO developed a widely used characterization of the informal sector that included ease of entry, small-scale enterprises, family ownership, and use of labor-intensive technology, with a distinction between home-based work and street work (ILO 1972; Castells and Portes 1989; Brown 2006). This initial conceptualization of informality emerged as cities across the developing world experienced rapid levels of population growth and large-scale rural-to-urban migration. Since the 1970s, many studies have examined the prevalence of the urban informal economy in the South and North (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989; de Soto 1989; Benería and Roldán 1987; Pérez Sáinz 2003; Biles 2008).

In an assessment of previous research, Rakowski (1994) proposed two principal approaches in conceptualizing the informal economy. The structuralist approach has argued that informal employment is an integral part of the global economic system because it functions to suppress costs of labor. For example, analyses of subcontracting relationships in industries such as apparel and electronics showed that the formal and informal sectors were often highly interconnected. Instead of absorbing informal sector activities—as predicted in earlier studies (e.g. ILO 1972)—the formal sector relied on the informal as a way to increase competitiveness and profits (Benería and Roldán 1987; Castells and Portes 1989). Neo-Marxist and dependency theorists, who have linked informal employment to capital accumulation and restructuring within the global economy, have influenced the structuralist perspective (Kudva 2006). The dynamics of global integration exert downward pressure on wages and, in addition to deregulation, liberalization, and privatization, result in the erosion of incomes, social services, and benefits, leaving many workers with no alternative but to create their own jobs (Benería 2001; Biles 2008).

The second approach, known as the legalist approach, is most associated with Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. Rather than stemming from the logic of capitalism, de Soto (1989) argued that informality is a response to excessive and inefficient government regulation. He stressed that informal workers find it impossible to comply with unreasonable bureaucracy, and that the sector would thrive with less regulation, strengthening of private property rights and reduced state intervention. This literature has provided a justification for the dismantling of regulatory barriers throughout Latin America during the past two decades (Biles 2008). Following this approach, the World Bank and related development agencies have advocated the promotion of small-scale enterprises, self-employment, and informal entrepreneurship as a strategy for generating economic growth in developing

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countries and income for the poor, often targeting women (Arbona 2000; Gill 2000; Roy 2002; Benería 2003).

In practice, the informal economy is characterized by self-employment but also precarious wage employment, increasing casualization of labor, and activities and processes that may not be fully legal or regulated (Benería 2003, Chp. 4). Mapping the informal economy—either the numbers of people involved or their economic output—is difficult and imprecise. Informal workers often pursue activities that do not fit researchers' categories, and much economic activity goes unrecorded. Despite the difficulties in measurement, the numbers of people working informally are widely agreed to be vast and growing. In Latin America, where labor markets have been deeply transformed since the 1980s, most observers agree on "the diminishing centrality of formal employment and the growing reliance on informal work by a large proportion of the population" (Benería 2003: 111; Pérez Sáinz 2003). In Bolivia, the majority of population is engaged in informal activities with recent estimates reaching a level above 65 percent of the working population (Benería and Floro 2006: 201).

Analysis of the informal economy has distinguished between two types of informalized activities: those linked directly or indirectly to industrial and service work in more formal settings, and those representing survival activities organized at the household and community level (Benería 2003). The former are connected to profit-oriented operations, include a range of self-employment and wage work, and involve micro-enterprises and subcontracting arrangements both in high- and low-income countries. Survival activities, on the other hand, represent more precarious forms of self-employment with weak or no links to formal production processes and have limited possibilities for capital accumulation (ibid). These informal activities are the most visible in the landscapes of developing cities and are the focus of this chapter.

While it is often assumed that small-scale and informal entrepreneurs are self-employed, researchers have pointed to instances in which they are employed by others. For example, Bromley (1997: 128-129) identified three types of street vendors in Cali, Colombia. These included outworkers employed by others on a piecework basis; dependent workers (that is, those who are dependent on others for renting stalls, renting equipment or accessing credit); and the independent, truly self-employed. He suggested that these relationships form a continuum of wage-work to self-employment, and found that self-employment is less common than might be expected. In addition, unpaid family labor and part-time employment also characterize employment relationships in informal commerce (Brown 2006).

Less studied are the ways in which urban space and territory intersect with work and laboring practices in the informal economy. Kudva (2006) noted that research on the informal economy and on the effects of spatial planning have tended to remain separate. She advocated "explicitly" bringing urban space into the debates on informality, including analyzing how spatial attributes serve to enable and constrain informal workers and the poor more generally (167). This chapter will explore this lacuna by focusing on the spatial and political implications of expanding informal commerce and in-migration in the local context of Santa Cruz, Bolivia.

The Politics of Public Space and Informal Vendors

Public space refers to the material location where social interactions and public activities of all members of "the public" occur (Fraser 1990; Howell 1993).[111] But questions of what comprises this space and who has access to it are often points of

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[111] This materiality distinguishes public space from the related concept of the public sphere in the sense that theorist Jurgen Habermas developed as a universal, abstract sphere in which democracy occurs (see Mitchell 2003: 134). Public space, as many geographers have emphasized, is material and forms a place or a ground from which political activity can occur (also see Ruddick 1996).

deep contention (Arefi and Meyers 2003; Mitchell 2003; Staeheli and Thompson 1997; Madanipour 2003).

Following Marxist philosopher Henri Lefebvre, Mitchell (2003) noted that public space can be conceived as the product of two competing ideologies. One view emphasizes order and treats public space as a site of control. Accordingly, it is often associated with authoritarianism and use of repression to maintain order and stability. This vision contrasts with an unmediated view, which conceptualizes public space as the site where the voiceless can make demands, as a medium for the contestation of power, and as the space in which identity is shaped and experienced. This distinction highlights the difference between the "official status" of a space and the actual ability of various individuals and groups to access it (Arefi and Meyers 2003).

Much like democracy itself, the unmediated view envisions public space as a process, rather than a complete project, and one that is in a state of flux between those who seek to curtail it and those who seek to expand it (Ruddick 1996; Mitchell 2003). Public space is rarely guaranteed; in most cases it must be actively claimed through social struggle (Mitchell 2003). Public spaces are places within which political movements or marginalized groups can stake out territory, enabling their visibility (Springer 2009). In this way, public space is essential to the functioning of democratic politics (Fraser 1990). Despite its democratic possibilities, social scientists have examined the exclusion of various groups from public space, including women (Massey 1994), ethnic minorities (Ruddick 1996), and homeless people (Mitchell 2003). But it is precisely the public quality of public space that offers the possibility for excluded groups to make themselves seen and demand inclusion (Springer 2009; Staeheli and Thompson 1997).

Focusing on Western, developed cities, scholars such as Mitchell (2003), Zukin (1991), Harvey (2001), and Fraser (1990) have emphasized ways that neoliberal

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governments attempt to control public space in order to limit the challenge of democratic social power to dominant economic interests and policy goals. Mitchell (2003) has pointed out that in the U.S. in recent decades, the very success of struggles for inclusion by women, African Americans, gays, and the homeless, has led to a backlash that aims to reconfigure public space in a way that curtails the threat of alternative or unruly publics (also see Staelehi and Thompson 1997). In this context, corporate and state planners have created "disneyfied" spaces based more on a desire for security than interaction and entertainment more than democratic participation (Zukin 1991). These trends lead to the constriction of public space, even though various social movements continue to struggle for its expansion, thereby asserting a "right to the city" (Mitchell 2003).

Similarly, in cities of the global South, it is often the poor and those without property who are cast as transgressors of public space and as threatening to the existing order (Springer 2009; Brown 2006; Goldstein 2004). As in industrialized cities, the objective of neoliberal urban policies has been to "mobilize city space as an arena both for market-oriented economic growth and for elite consumption practices" (Brenner and Theodore 2002: 368). Accordingly, urban managers and members of the elite and middle classes often view the unsanctioned presence of informal economic activities in public space as unwelcome and potentially harmful for attracting investment, tourism and cultivating an image of prosperity.

In particular, the visible presence of informal street vendors calls attention to persistent unemployment in neoliberal economies (Cross 1998). Much like the homeless, although they are very much in the public view, street vendors in many cases are not considered a legitimate part of the public (see Mitchell 1997). Municipal authorities in multiple developing cities have shown increasing concern with alienation among elite and middle class consumers who feel that informal economic

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activities have led to the "privatization" of public space.[112] On this basis, vendors and other informal workers have been banished from public gathering places in order to reclaim these spaces for (a segment of) "the public" (Springer 2009; Cross 1998; Hanley forthcoming). Researchers have suggested that vendors are often viewed as an indicator of urban ill health and their presence points to the need for local governments to regain control of civic spaces. The frequent removal of vendors from public space suggests the exclusionary manner in which the "public" is often defined and imagined.

As with analysis of the broader informal economy, scholarly and government interest in street vending has mostly focused on its economic causes and effects. There is growing concern, however, with questions of political organization (Sanyal 1991; Cameron 1991; Cross 1998) and spatial dimensions (Kudva 2006). For example, Cross (1998) observed that the crisis-driven growth of informal employment and the neoliberal governmental approach prompted local officials in Mexico City to take action against the vibrant growth of street vending in the mid-1980s. He argued that despite repeated efforts of state intervention to reduce the number of vendors and ban them from certain areas, the vendors organized to defend themselves against forced relocation and successfully took advantage of patterns of patronage that pervade the Mexican political system. In Cross's account, vendor union leaders were often able to find "patrons" within the political system who agreed to support the union leaders in exchange for the ability to mobilize vendors on their behalf.

Similarly, in a recent study of collective organization and popular protest in the city of El Alto, Lazar (2008) examined the ways that street trader unions create a sense of collectivity among their members in an environment—the informal economy—

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[112] Ironically, while urban planners and managers have excoriated the "privatization" of public space by street vendors and other informal workers, they typically laud forms of privatization such as the use of public-private redevelopment partnerships. I am grateful to Mildred Warner for this point.

often characterized as one of competition between individuals. Lazar is concerned with the way street trader unions represent themselves as collective political subjects with the capacity to confront and negotiate with the state. Using a case study, the author emphasized the ways that fish sellers are positioned between the rural and the urban in chains of production and distribution of goods. The economic position of informal vendors as intermediaries between rural producers and urban consumers has translated into considerable economic power in urban Bolivian society. This analysis adds to our understanding of how informal vendors have engaged in organized and pragmatic struggles to improve their conditions.

Hanley (in progress) has explored the case of Quito, Ecuador, where efforts to attract private sector investment to rehabilitate the historic urban center since the mid 1990s has led the municipal government to renegotiate the use of public streets and sidewalks with informal vendors. As in other Latin American cities, vendors in Quito's historic center have organized against the threat of removal by forming active associations, emphasizing their right to work, and negotiating with local political interests. Part of the negotiations included the legalizing and formalizing of street vendors by local authorities in exchange for relocation to new municipal markets where vendors could purchase and finance stalls through an agreement with a local bank. Such arrangements have enabled to the local government to promote the historic center of Quito as an international tourist destination. However, Hanley cites evidence of a lack of transparency in the process despite ongoing efforts to encourage participation among the vendor associations.

Informality, Social Exclusion and Contested Urban Space in Santa Cruz

Informal work in Santa Cruz encompasses a diversity of economic activities spanning small-scale production, home-based industrial work, construction, and

services such as car washing, shoe shining, watch mending, phone or internet access, public transport, and a wide array of commerce in food and produce, cosmetics and clothing, and herbs and medicines. Informality is perhaps most visibly (and controversially) reflected in the expansion of open-air markets and street vending that has spread onto adjacent sidewalks, in some cases engulfing any nearby available space. Some observers have referred to the "*mercadización*" (uncontrolled expansion of markets) of the city, and local residents have used terms like *invasión* (invasion) and *avasallamiento* (usurpation) of public space in the local media (Andia 2002: 23). Through the use of such terms, informal vendors—many of whom are highland migrants—are portrayed as a threat both to urban public order and to local and regional traditions. On the website of *Nación Camba*, a right-wing civic-regionalist group, one writer referred to:

> "These collas who do not respect our customs, who think they can do whatever they want here…who convert out city into a market crushing onto the sidewalks, who close the streets without our consent to celebrate festivals that are not ours, who invade our lands. Santa Cruz is neither a trash bin nor a handkerchief for wiping tears for anyone, nor is it to be sacrificed (García Paz 2005)."

> ["Estos collas que no conocen ni respeten nuestras costumbres, que creen que aquí pueden hacer lo que les da la gana, nos roban, nos matan, convierten nuestra ciudad en un mercado aplastándose en las aceras, cierran las calles sin nuestro consentimiento para celebrar festividades que no son nuestras, invaden nuestras tierras. Santa Cruz no es un basurero ni un pañal de lágrimas de nadie, y no es para sacrificarlo.]

This view shows that hostility toward Andean migrants by some longer term residents of Santa Cruz is based not only on cultural or economic factors, but also has spatial dimensions. In particular, the streets, sidewalks, and open spaces surrounding

large urban markets have become sites where 'traditional Santa Cruz' and newer 'migrant Santa Cruz' meet and collide.

The concept of social exclusion needs clarification due to the variety of contexts in which it has been used. For some, the question of poverty remains paramount, while for others social exclusion makes sense in a broader perspective of citizenship and integration into the social context. In this sense, social exclusion is not necessarily equated with poverty or economic exclusion, although it often causes wider suffering and deprivation (see Roberts 2002). Writing on European cities, Madanipour (2003) perceived social exclusion as a multidimensional process, which can take place in economic, political, and cultural arenas. He emphasized that such forms of exclusion often have spatial manifestations, such as in deprived inner city or peripheral areas. In the past, the spatiality of social exclusion has led to attempts to dismantle pockets of deprivation, without attacking the factors that contribute to deprivation or the forces bringing them together in particular places.[113]

Drawing connections between the production of urban space, everyday practices, and economic activities requires a dynamic understanding of space. This entails concentrating on the processes that produce the built environment as well as how urban space is organized and how spatial practices are controlled and regulated (Olpadwala 2000; Massey 1994). In many cases, a combination of formal rules and regulations, informal signs and cues, and fears and desires regarding openness or restriction influence our spatial behavior, and make us aware of limitations or barriers to access to particular places (Madanipour 2003). In this sense, space is more than a neutral background; rather, it plays a central role in the interaction, integration and segregation of urban society.

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[113] See, e.g., Peter Marris's (1974) classic work on the problems underlying policies of slum clearance, and on the "futility of manipulating change by the logic of physical design" (p. 49).

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Patterns of Labor Informalization

Reflecting conditions at the national level, official data suggest that the informal economy, including micro-enterprises, domestic service, and self-employment absorbs a large part of the workforce of the city of Santa Cruz, accounting for roughly two thirds of the city's employed population (INE 2001). Showing a spatial expression of employment differences, self-employment is more concentrated in the peripheral and poorer areas of Santa Cruz than in more affluent central areas, but it is prevalent throughout the city (ibid). Despite the common stereotype in Santa Cruz that recent migrants are confined to the most degraded and informalized parts of the economy, a recent UN report found that a higher percentage of recent migrants work in salaried occupations as compared to the population as a whole for the department of Santa Cruz (PNUD 2004: 75).

Writing on the Santa Cruz urban economy in the 1980s, Rojas Rosales (1988) emphasized that in commerce and small-scale manufacturing, informal employment arrangements predominate over formal ones. The author noted that informal work involves productive units that are not highly capitalized and use labor without contracts and often through unpaid family arrangements. Furthermore, key segments of the urban economy—ranging from construction and transport services, as well as productive activities in food and beverages, wood products, garments, leather and metals—have increasingly informalized. Such activities often compete openly with formal counterparts in the same industry while absorbing labor from formal sector. Based on these observations, and echoing structuralist perspectives on informal employment (Castells and Portes 1989; Benería 2003), Rojas Rosales concluded that informal workers are not merely "leftover" parts of the urban labor market of Santa

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Cruz, but rather provide essential services for the city and in many ways subsidize portions of the formal, capitalist sector (ibid).

In the period since Rojas Rosales made these observations, processes of labor market informalization and urban spatial expansion have intensified in Santa Cruz. Drawing on evidence from Delhi and Ahmedabad in India, Kudva (2006) has suggested that urban growth is being supported by increased informalization of labor markets in these cities. A similar relationship is at work in Santa Cruz, as the enlarging informal economy appears to be altering the urban landscape. For example, the shifting of production from centralized places of employment to smaller, decentralized sites, including micro enterprises and workshops in residential areas, as well as home-based work, is producing a form of urban growth that reflects rising social segregation (ibid). This process also involves the conversion of public spaces, such as parks, plazas, and streets, into market places and sites of informal commerce (Benería and Schaller n.d.).

Informal Commerce in Santa Cruz and Gremio Associations

Although they have long faced social and political marginalization, informal vendors have gained political influence in the city of Santa Cruz during the past two decades. This influence reflects their growing numbers, strong organizational capacity, and increasing opportunities for capital accumulation in the urban economy (Rojas Rosales 1988). Urban Andean merchants have organized self-governing associations, or *gremios* (guilds), to defend their interests to the municipality. Beginning in the 1990s, the gremios have gained a political niche in the municipal government through representation on the city council. Although comprised of both migrants and non-migrants, the gremios and the large urban markets they occupy are

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often viewed in the popular imagination as "colla" (Andean) spaces in the city (Gustafson 2006).

Gremio associations emerged as part of the trade union movement in highland Bolivian cities (Lazar 2006). As collective organizations, gremios represent both formal and informal sector workers, but they are generally associated with the informal service sector and particularly informal commerce.[114] Although scholarly research on gremios is limited, particularly on Santa Cruz and the lowlands, Rojas Rosales (1988: 108) noted they appeared in Santa Cruz shortly after the 1952 revolution, most likely brought directly by highland migrants. As a representative structure organized into citywide federations and national confederations, the gremios have become a bastion in the fight of informal vendors against municipal control of public space. They are legally recognized by the municipality and represent vendors in negotiations with local residents and mediate and resolve conflicts between individual affiliates (Andia 2002; Lazar 2006). Several observers have emphasized the strong organizational capacity of the gremios (Andia 2002; Rojas Rosales 1988; Salek 2007). In Santa Cruz's largest market, La Ramada, 60 gremios are present. A recent study found that 94% of the venders at La Ramada are members of a gremio. Furthermore, these 94% of respondents all stated that their organizations have elected leaders and functioning statutes (Andia 2002).[115]

Andia (2002) observed that labor migration flows, particularly those from the Andean highlands, have sparked a regionalist and at times racist stance by elites and civic leaders in the city. He linked this stance with heightened political and social

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[114] Other occupations in the informal economy, such as artisans and drivers, are often organized into trade unions called "*sindicatos*" in Bolivian cities. On the role of gremios and sindicatos in local associational life and in recent popular mobilizations in highland Bolivian cities, see Lazar (2006; 2008), and Albro (2006).

[115] Andia (2002) conducted the survey in September 2001 among venders at La Ramada, with a sample of 300 venders, stratified by sector.

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exclusion of highland migrants, especially those involved in small-scale commerce, in many cases self-employed. These workers become visible targets for anti-migrant sentiment, as shown in the quotation cited earlier from the Nación Camba. Largely excluded from social expression and political participation, these migrants have experienced a "postponed citizenship" and lived as "second-class members of society" (ibid: 25).

These dynamics began to change with the mayoral election of Percy Fernandez in 1991. Percy Fernandez sought to expand access to the political process to all of the city's residents, and to treat newcomers in the same manner as traditional *Cruceños*. Immigrant merchants began to have an imprint on local politics. Representing swelling ranks, the gremios strengthened and solidified their organizations to become recognized local political actors. However, Percy Fernandez's administration did not make concrete advances in relations with the gremios or with issues related to public markets. In Andia's view, the mayor's office tended to view local citizenship as the sum of individuals within the city, and did not forge connections with collective organizations such as the gremios. This could explain why "the same people who benefited from gains in health care and paving roads were ignored when they brought up collective problems related to public markets or conflicts over urban land" (ibid: 26, my translation).

In 1995, a change in the city's politics took place. Johnny Fernandez unexpectedly defeated Percy Fernandez in the municipal elections (the two are not related). The son of a Cochabamba beer magnate and populist political figure, Johnny Fernandez campaigned on his strong connections with popular organizations, many of which had long been excluded from traditional local political parties. Among these was the federation that comprised most of the gremios in the city at that time, led by Jesus Cahuana, himself a migrant from the highland city of Oruro. With the

appointment of Cahuana to the city council in 1996, the gremios began to play a direct role in local representative politics.


The Problematic of Large Public Markets

According to a census taken in 2000 under the auspices of the city council, there are 22 municipal markets with 20,000 vendors, 30 private markets, as well as numerous informal markets, known as *asentamientos* in Santa Cruz. The census estimated a total of 35,000 vendors, or *gremialistas,* in the city's markets (Andia 2002). Updating this information in 2007, the *Oficialía Mayor de Planificación* (Municipal Planning Agency) recorded 34 municipal, 18 asentamientos, and 36 private markets, with a total of 88 markets (Salek 2007). The first two categories include informal work, while the third is entirely formal.

Municipal markets are located on public property, owned by the municipality, and they serve as important market hubs for the entire city. These markets figure prominently on city maps and most of the city's dozens of minibus lines organize their routes to stop at several of them. The municipal markets include a range of economic activity such as formal merchants and shopkeepers, self-employed merchants and vendors, and waged and unpaid family work arrangements, as well as both fixed and ambulatory vendors who circulate around the edges of the markets. There are different kinds of market stalls including metal constructions that can be locked up at night and open wooden stalls. Many of the stalls feature vegetables and other produce, but some sell cosmetic products and other consumer goods. Along the streets bordering the markets are formal shops and shopping centers selling clothes, wholesale dry goods, electronic equipment, and meat. People of all social classes in Santa Cruz tend to shop at the municipal markets, even the wealthy, although they also

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complement their market shopping with produce and other goods from the growing number of supermarkets.

Private markets are owned by private firms, mostly based in Santa Cruz, and are similar to North American supermarkets; thus, they are not informal. The informal asentamientos have little or no municipal control. They are often formed spontaneously and nameless but have fixed locations. The asentamientos include self-employment and some waged and unpaid family work that is unregistered and informal. They primarily serve the residents who live in nearby communities and offer goods that are comparable to the municipal markets but on a smaller scale. The variety of employment arrangements in the three categories of markets illustrates the increasingly fluid boundaries between formal and informal activities, as noted in the literature (Benería 2001; Pérez Sáinz 2003). Figure 5.1 shows the proportion of the three types of markets in the city.

Source: Salek (2007) Municipal Market Plan

Figure 5.1: Proportion of Municipal, Private, and Informal Markets in Santa Cruz, 2007

Reflecting the rising income inequality and socio-economic segregation in Santa Cruz, the three types of markets are not distributed evenly across the city. Figure 5.2 shows the total number of municipal, private and asentamiento markets in each of the 12 urban districts. Figure 5.3 maps the locations of these markets in the city, and also shows a proposed wholesale market, or *Mercado Mayorista,* where producers will be able to sell directly to consumers.

Source: Salek (2007)

Figure 5.2: Number of Markets by Urban District, 2007

As shown Figure 5.3, the vast majority of municipal and private markets are located in the centralized and more prosperous Districts 1-4 and 11, with a smaller number in intermediate Districts 5 and 6. District 11, in the city center, has the largest number of both municipal and private markets. In stark contrast, the informal asentamientos are concentrated in outer Districts 7-10 and 12, indicating a lack of market infrastructure in the urban periphery. The poorest districts, 8 and 12, have only

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
Source: Salek (2007)

Figure 5.3: Map of Market Locations in Santa Cruz

asentamientos. District 12, the most recently established, has only two asentamientos. District 5, which is far from the center but houses many newer affluent and "gated" communities, lacks municipal markets but has several private ones. Meanwhile, the largest municipal markets, La Ramada, Los Pozos, Abasto, and Mutualista, are all located in central zones within the fourth ring.

The large municipal markets experience multifaceted problems related to overcrowding, lack of cleanliness and hygiene, conflicts between established vendors

and the newly arrived, competing pressures for land, and encroachment of vendors onto areas officially designated as public space. Several of these markets were formed in the early 1970s when city planners began implementing the city's first comprehensive plan, known as the Plan Techint. The Plan Techint envisioned self-contained neighborhood units and a decentralized supply system, enclosed by concentric ring roads and a green belt (Palmer 1979). Although the ring roads continue to influence the city's urban form, the decentralized supply system never materialized, and the markets expanded along with rapid urban growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the local government did not intervene when the municipal markets began to grow, the problems have compounded. Absent effective intervention, expanding informal commerce in public spaces is generating social conflict in the opinion of many residents. For instance, pedestrians often find sidewalks filled with vendors' wares impassible. Disputes erupt between formal shopkeepers and informal merchants selling similar items from the front sidewalk. Another set of problems relates to hygiene and contamination, such as food vendors cooking on gas stoves on the street and discarding cooking oil onto the sidewalk or median strip.[116] Public transport, also largely informal and not regulated by the municipal government, converges around the largest central market areas, exacerbating congestion, air and noise pollution (Salek 2007).

Andia (2002) linked these problems to insufficient municipal funds to invest in upgrading the municipal markets, as well as lacking administrative policy towards them. As a city council member, Jesus Cahuana sought to rectify this situation when he became president of the *Comisión de Industria y Comercio*, a commission of the city council. In 1998, the commission developed the *Macropolítica Municipal de*

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[116] Nadine Salek, Municipal Planning Agency, City of Santa Cruz, interview with author, July 24, 2007.

Mercados, which proposed the construction of district-level markets and wholesale produce markets at three of the city's main entry points.[117] Several years earlier, the municipal government had passed an ordinance (*Ordenanza Municipal* 21/90) allowing usufruct ownership of market premises, in which vendors would exercise ownership for 30 years, at which point ownership would revert to the municipality (GMSC 1990). According to Cahuana, the usufruct system enabled some US\$ 50 million of investment in market infrastructure while it was in effect, improving working conditions for vendors.

But critics have faulted the system with weakening municipal control over markets and adjacent public spaces (Salek 2007: 15) and noted that it allowed the re-sale of usufruct rights to other vendors, creating a "disorganized and chaotic situation."[118] Furthermore, Cahuana has been rebuked for acting "in the interest of the gremios—and even worse, a specific sector of gremios—rather than for the general interest of the city" (Andia 2002: 32).

In Andia's analysis, two factors are at work in the municipal government's approach toward the public markets, namely a perception and an ideological factor. First, it recognizes that it has a physical and social problem on its hands, in which expanding markets occupy space, annex neighboring areas, worsen congestion, and thwart efforts to create rational, orderly urban growth. There is also an ideological issue at play, relating to the elite civic powers in the city and their opposition to "unhygienic" and "informal" uses of public space, as well as to the rising political power of the gremios and other associations of informal workers.

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[117] Jesus Cahuana, President, *Federacion Unica Departamental de Trabajadores Gremiales, Comerciantes Minoristas, Artesanos y Vivanderos de Santa Cruz*, interview with author, December 10, 2007.

[118] Lorgio Ardaya, Office of Consumer Protection, interview with author, July 24, 2007.

The ideological issue is rarely made explicitly. However, one view maintains that under Mayor Johnny Fernandez, leaders of the growing urban informal economy, including the gremios and the informal transport sector, created alliances with political parties "to support the interests of markets, street commerce, and illegal occupation of public land" (Prado et al. 2005: 164). These alliances have drawn criticism as a form of "patronage politics" in which "electoral votes are exchanged for favors in the use of public space that benefit the interested parties, while creating conflicts for the city at large" (ibid). The gremios continue to exert pressure on the local government and can mobilize their members in large demonstrations, but they are often stigmatized as uncooperative, conflictive and causing disorder.[119]

A rival view holds that the municipal government has lacked the ability and the will to make concrete improvements in the city's markets. Cahuana noted that the municipal budget relies on fines levied on street vendors, and that the current administration deliberately keeps the rules unclear in order to extract higher rents. Moreover, the new municipal plan to reorganize market networks does not recognize the authority of gremio leaders and has rarely sought their input. "When we organize marches and mobilizations, we do so to remind the municipality of its obligation to improve market infrastructure," explained Cahuana.[120] In the context of public sector retrenchment and the diminished role of the state in social provisioning, informal commerce offers a viable source of livelihood for many urban residents.

The Municipal Plan to Reorganize Markets and Market Networks

The Santa Cruz city government, again under Mayor Percy Fernandez since 2002, has retaken initiative on limiting the growth of urban markets and curtailing

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[119] Nadine Salek, interview with author, July 24, 2007.
[120] Jesus Cahuana, interview with author, December 10, 2007.

informal economic activities in public spaces. In 2007, with support from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Oficialía Mayor de Planificación prepared a diagnostic report on the proliferation of markets and informal street vending. Based on the report, it has begun to implement the *Plan Municipal para la Nueva Red de Abastecimiento, Mercados, Ambulantes y Asentamientos Comerciales en el Espacio Público* (Municipal Plan for a New Supply Network, Markets, Ambulatory vendors, and Commercial Activities in Public Spaces). The plan aims to reorder the city's market and supply system (Salek 2007).

The report lists factors contributing to the growth of informal commerce, citing poverty and lack of employment alternatives, insufficient skills needed to access the formal economy, tax avoidance, lack of "identification with and commitment to the city," customer preference to buy certain goods informally, and weak institutional control by the local government (Salek 2007: 4). The report states that informal commerce may be "invasive" and even "illegal," but it recognizes that the vendors pursue livelihoods and dignity, and therefore the municipality should find "mechanisms to resolve the problem through economic, social, and urban policies" (ibid: 5).

The Municipal Plan proposes a three-part approach to address these issues, as outlined in Figure 5.4 taken from the diagnostic report. The first part involves decentralizing the largest public markets and creating new district-level markets in the outer districts. Ambulatory vendors concentrating in the largest central markets would be "relocated" to stalls in the new district markets. The second part includes improving the internal functioning and administration of markets, organizing officially sponsored outdoor fairs for specific products, and creating centers for the sale of foods. The third part involves designing a new food distribution network, and it includes creating a wholesale produce market where producers can sell directly to

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consumers, and providing technical assistance to gremio members in areas such as health and hygiene. Overarching goals of the plan include decongesting the principal municipal markets, rotundas and avenues, enhancing the city's supply system and market infrastructure through spatial planning, and developing clear norms and regulations regarding the markets and their surrounding areas (ibid: 22-5).

Promote local production	Diffusion and citizen education	Private markets as part of the network

INFORMAL VENDORS and MARKETS in public space

MARKET Functioning and Administration

Laws and Ordinances	NETWORK of supplies	Urban Land

Human Development	Reorganization of Public Transport	Economic Development

Source: Salek 2007

Figure 5.4: Diagram of the Municipal Plan for the New Market Network

In this way, the plan seeks to formalize segments or the retail sector that are informal and to bring these informal activities under the city's regulatory structure. According to Lorgio Ardaya, Director of the municipal Office of Consumer Protection which overseas enforcement of public space regulations, "the central feature of the

new plan is that the new district markets will house those who were dedicated to using public space for commercial activities."[121]

Much of the Municipal Plan—including the proposed wholesale and district markets—draws on the Macropolítica Municipal de Mercados, developed when Cahuana headed the municipal commission on public markets, but not implemented. According to Cahuana, the main difference is that the new plan "does not recognize the gremio leadership." He added that rather than using the system of usufruct ownership rights for vendors, private firms will be encouraged to invest in infrastructure development through a bidding process.[122] Vendors must accept "whatever price, whatever location, and whatever dimensions" these developers demand for their premises.[123] Furthermore, while the plan advocates an "integral approach" to improving the city's commercial and distribution system though multiple interventions, it had not, at the time of my research in 2007, specified how the new district markets will be allocated, their specific locations, or how the relocation of ambulatory vendors will be carried out.

Responses to the Municipal Plan and Competing Views of Public Space

Responses to the unfolding Municipal Plan reveal different perceptions of urban public space and the way these perceptions relate to the challenges posed by the expanding informal economy in Santa Cruz. The following discussion draws on a series of individual interviews and two group interviews conducted during my research in 2007. Many of the vendors interviewed are not inherently opposed to the Municipal Plan and would consider moving to new locations sanctioned by the municipality under certain conditions. They are often critical, however, of the

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[121] Lorgio Ardaya, interview with author, July 24, 2007.
[122] This point is confirmed in Salek (2007).
[123] Jesus Cahuana, interview with author, December 10, 2007.

program's non-participatory structure and the manner in which they feel it is being

imposed on them. A female member of the *Asociación 8 de Enero*, a gremio based at

the central Los Pozos market with 360 members, stated that

> "We have unified five federations of gremios. Only the head of the
> federation attends the meetings [with the municipal government]. The
> membership base is not informed. They don't consult with us about the
> project. We don't know very much about it" (August 24, 2007,
> interview with author.)

> ["Nosotros hemos hecho una unificación de cinco federaciones.
> Solamente la cabeza de la federación va a las reuniones. La base no
> sabe. No nos consultan sobre el proyecto. No lo conocemos bien."]

Other gremialistas worried that relocating away from the city center, and its

high pedestrian flow, would hurt their sales. A female member of the *Asociación 8 de*

Marzo, also based at Los Pozos with 400 members, responded that

> "We won't be able to sell anything, so what will we live on? They
> should accommodate us well; if not, we cannot move" (August 24,
> 2007, interview with author.)

> ["No vamos a vender nada, ¿de que vamos a vivir? Ellos tienen que
> acomodarnos bien, o si no, no podemos ir."]

A male member of the same gremio stated,

> "They are going to build a new municipal market. We don't think
> we'll stay here forever. Mayor Percy Fernandez has offered us a place
> [in the new market] and we are waiting for it. But I hope they don't
> relocate us too far away, in the middle of nowhere. We have
> capacitated ourselves, and they can't just send us away, just like that.
> Now, if they give us a place near the third or fourth ring, yes, we'd
> accept it. But only if there is transport available on the main road. If
> not, we'll fight until who knows when" (ibid).

> ["Se va a construir un mercado municipal. No pensamos quedarnos
> aquí para siempre. Nos han ofrecido el Señor Alcalde Percy
> Fernández, nos esperamos. Pero que no nos lleva al quinto infierno,
> que al bobi nos come. Ya nos hemos capacitado, ya no nos puede
> llevar por así nomás. Ahora si nos dé acá en el 3 anillo o el 4 cuarto

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anillo, si aceptamos. Pero siempre y cuando que haya las movilidades alrededor en una avenida. Si no, tendremos que pelearnos, hasta cuando."]

Underscoring this view, Jesus Cahuana, the gremio federation leader and former council member, noted

"Percy Fernandez built a market called Miraflores in the zone of Villa Primero de Mayo, for political reasons, in the early 1990s. Right now, it is empty. It cost $400,000 in investment. Why? There is no vehicle nor foot traffic. It's like new, but it's falling down. People who don't know the basics of commerce, they just do whatever they want" (interview with author, December 10, 2007).

["El Percy Fernandez construyó un mercado que se llama Miraflores en la Villa Primero de Mayo, por cuestiones politicos, en principios de los 90. En este momento, esta vacío. 400 mil dolares de inversión. Por qué? No hay tráfico de vehículos ni peatonal. Está nuevito, pero está cayendose. La gente que no conoce el rubro de comercio, hace lo que le da la gana."]

These testimonies reveal an understandable concern with livelihood strategies among informal vendors. If forced to relocate far away from the city center, they may sell less, and a long commute could cut into meager earnings. There is also a spatial dimension to these livelihood concerns, as shown in the above statement on the acceptability of relocating to the relatively central third or fourth ring, or the infeasibility of a poorly situated new market. Although few urban planners and managers recognize it in local poverty alleviation programs, urban space can be seen as an important resource for livelihood, affording crucial access to customers and suppliers.

While prioritizing livelihood strategies, many vendors recognize the need for a system of rules regarding access to urban public space. Asked about what happens

when new arrivals, such as recent migrants, want to join a gremio in Los Pozos,

another member of 8 de Enero commented,

> "Now there is no more space. Each association has its members and
> there are nine associations here. There can no longer be disorder in the
> streets."

> ["Ya no hay espacio. Cada asociación tiene sus números, sus socios.
> Nueve asociaciones hay acá. Ya no puede hacer el desorden de las
> calles."]

Vendors also noted that recent migrants might not always be aware of the municipal

regulations in place regarding the use of public space, such as displaying authorization

and blocking pedestrian passageways.

Currently, Griselda Muñoz serves as the director of the *Federación de*

Gremialistas, and is an elected city council member under Mayor Percy Fernandez.[124]

She often has served an intermediating role between the municipality and the

gremialistas. According to Muñoz,

> "The municipality has not constructed a single market in 20 years, it
> hasn't constructed absolutely any infrastructure. All of the markets
> exist because of the resources of the merchants" (Interview with author,
> August 8, 2007).

> ["El gobierno municipal no ha construido ningún solo mercado en los
> últimos 20 años, no ha construido absolutamente ninguna
> infraestructura. Todo los mercados que existen son con los recursos de
> los mismos comerciantes."]

She adds:

> "What is missing is a markets policy or a policy on the use of public
> space by the municipality that permits the decongesting of the older
> markets and the construction of new ones, that the new markets have
> defined spaces with set schedules for work, and guidelines on what

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[124] Gricelda Muñoz and Jesus Cahuana represent different federations of gremios and are members of
different political parties. Muñoz is a member of the center-right *Agrupacion Ciudadana Siglo XXI*,
while Cahuana belongs to the center-left *Union Cívica Solidaridad* (UCS).

should be sold, what you can sell in the *Casco Viejo* [city center] and what things you cannot sell. Now they sell anything, there is no order, and this stems precisely from the political problems and from corruption" (ibid).

["Falta una política de mercados y de uso de los espacios públicos para el gobierno municipal que le permita los asentamientos antiguos descongestionarlos en las construcciones de nuevos mercados, y que los nuevos asentamientos ya tenga áreas destinadas y definidas con horarios con tiempos de trabajo, inclusive actividades que puedan hacer, qué cosa se pueden vender en el Casco Viejo y qué cosas no se pueden vender. En este momento se vende de todo, no hay un ordenamiento, y justamente esto se viene a raíz de la cuestión política y la corrupción."]

In Muñoz's view, the gremialistas are willing to collaborate with the municipality on the Plan Municipal, but she questions the underlying motives behind it and the lack of channels for participation in its design. She also has some of her own ideas and priorities on how to improve the conditions of market venders.

"The majority of us have educated our children in the streets. If you go to the Ramada market, where my association is… You'll see that we've educated our kids in the streets, and I know from my own experience that this is not an adequate place for them to do their homework and to learn. It would be a good idea if a private company—because the mayor's office will never be able to do this, they can't even supply municipal guards—or an NGO or foundation could construct spaces near the markets where children could do their homework seated on chairs, at desk, as they should be" (ibid).

["La mayoría de nosotros hemos educado a nuestros hijos en las calles. Si Ud. va al mercado la Ramada donde está mi sindicato… Hemos educado a los hijos en las calles, y yo veo de mi propia vivencia que no es un lugar adecuado para hacer las tareas y aprender. Sería bueno que alguna empresa privada – por que la alcaldía nunca lo va a hacer porque ni guarderías municipales tiene – alguna ONG o una fundación podría hacer cerca de los mercados lugares donde los niños puedan hacer sus tareas sentados en sillas y mesas como corresponde."]

Muñoz proposes that through a local economic development program, market vendors' children could be taught certain skills to create value added products, enabling them to have capacities and livelihoods outside of informal commerce. In addition, she feels that public authorities should gain familiarity with local informal production processes and linkages between informal and formal production and markets, so that they can support the vendors in more effective and creative ways, rather than considering relocation as the only solution.

Ordenanza Municipal and "Official" Conceptions of Public Space

The municipal government's views and policies on uses of public space are demonstrated in the Plan Municipal de la Nueva Red, and in an ordinance on public space developed in 2004, the *Ordinanza Municipal de Espacio Publico* 050/2004.[125] The ordinance lays out categories of economic activities permitted in public spaces, rights, norms and regulations, and enforcement procedures. Vendors are required to register and to pay operation fees, visibly display authorization, follow technical specifications on amount of space used, and they can be fined for not complying with guidelines. The *Oficina de Protección al Consumidor* (Office of Consumer Protection), under the municipality's *Oficialía Mayor de Defensa Ciudadana* (Office of Citizen Defense), is charged with enforcing the regulations (GMSC 2004a). As in other cities, the Bolivian national government has left the regulation of street trading in the hands of the Santa Cruz municipal government. Neither the national nor local government requires sales tax from vendors with small amounts of capital.[126]

Close examination of the municipal ordinance suggests how the local government conceives of public space, and how it views appropriate uses of public

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[125] This ordinance was in the process of being re-approved by the city council in 2007.

[126] As of 2004, the amount was 12,000 Bolivian pesos, or roughly U.S. $1,700. Decreto Supremo No. 27924, December 20, 2004.

space. According to the text of the ordinance, the municipality must "guarantee equality of opportunities in accessing public space and the smooth functioning of activities in such spaces… without causing harm to pedestrians or vehicular traffic flow" (ibid: 4). It outlines a series of objectives on the uses of public space, including "protecting the environment… improving the quality of public space through its rationalization and designation of compatible uses according to established zones… recuperating and preserving public spaces so that areas of circulation, green space and public ornamentation complete their functions… prioritizing collective interests of citizens above individual interests, and ordering activities in public space under aesthetic and functional conditions approved by the Oficialía Mayor de Planificacion" (ibid).

The ordinance includes a definition of public space that has a legal and a socio-cultural dimension. Legally, public space is understood as a "public dominion" meant for "satisfying collective urban needs," which "transcend individual interests of the city's inhabitants and are subject to regulation by public administration" (ibid: 5). From a socio-cultural perspective, "public space has the role of enabling social interaction, communal expression, and the construction of citizen identity" (ibid). The ordinance states, "in this city in particular, with its history of migrant reception, a diversity of people live together who leave their mark on the urban landscape" (ibid: 6).

Accordingly, the municipality recognizes that urban public space must encompass multiple uses, including those of diverse cultural and ethnic origins, such as selling a range of products and services. However, it reserves the right to set limitations on the infringement of green space, impeding traffic flows, and activities considered unhygienic or unsanitary, including certain forms of food preparation. In certain public places, such as the central *Plaza 24 de Septiembre*, informal commerce

is barred, except for shoe shiners and coffee sellers. Drawing on European modernist city planning traditions that have influenced many Latin American cities, municipal planners value a rational approach to separating uses according to appropriate zones (Hardoy 1992; Goldstein 2004). This approach also seems influenced by the planning ethos of U.S. suburbia (see, e.g., Zukin 1991). Furthermore, efforts to preserve "open space" and "green space" may be aimed at purposes such as preserving recreational opportunities for elites, separating land uses, and maintaining property values, rather than enhancing the social contact and guaranteeing access to public space for all citizens.[127] In Santa Cruz, notions of public order and spatial aesthetics have led to a desire to 'tidy' and 'control' public space, while overlooking the realities of mass urban migration, the challenges of urban poverty, and the well being of the populace.

Adopting a language of inclusiveness, the ordinance states the priority of "collective" interests above those of individuals in "preserving public spaces for all to enjoy." But the municipal government seems to contradict this position in its efforts to limit the popular-collective gremio organizations. Moreover, the municipality shows an elevated concern for the "*patrimonio paisajisto*" (landscape patrimony) and the "*imagen urbana*" (urban image), perhaps to attract foreign investment, tourism, and global economic connections, while projecting symbolic qualities of civic life, stability, and "modernity" (GMSC 2004a: 4; Hardoy 1992). Such a vision is not unique to Santa Cruz. In fact, it is a predominant way of seeing public space in developing cities under the continuing sway of neoliberal policy regimes (see Arefi and Meyers 2003; Springer 2009).

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[127] This point is made by Mitchell (2003: 143) in discussing U.S. cities, but it also seems applicable to Santa Cruz.

Implications of Competing Views of Public Space

Regarding the uses of public space in the city, the municipal government emphasizes notions of aesthetics and public order to promote an image of a modernizing and cosmopolitan city. The ordinance on public space and the Municipal Plan advocate for "collective urban needs" while condemning certain economic activities as inappropriate and based on "individual gain" (GMSC 2004a: 5; Salek 2007). From the standpoint of vendors and their organizations, however, they are demanding a right to work and to livelihood. They see this as part of their rights as citizens, and as a legitimate part of the city's "collective interest." Moreover, they are exerting this right in the context of deteriorating labor market conditions and reduced access to social protections for the poor (Benería and Floro 2006; Gill 2000). Although street vending in public space offers individual gain, the potential for poverty reduction through the use of urban public space for livelihoods can be considered a wider social benefit, alleviating some of the negative effects of economic distress in the absence of a broader social welfare system.

The strategy being pursued by the municipality is to relocate informal vendors to specific commercial zones in return for granting them official recognition. However, the designated new market areas are likely to be located away from the busy city center, depriving vendors of customers and easy access to suppliers. As with much economic activity, spatial location is crucial for the viability of micro-enterprises operating in urban public space (Brown 2006). Amid the increasing privatization of urban space through private shopping centers and gated communities, public space becomes a vital resource for the poor, albeit one whose use is not encouraged by local public policies. The Municipal Plan seeks to restrict economic activities in public space, and it uses negative terms such as "avasallamiento"

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(usurpation) and "invasión" (invasion) to describe it. In this way, the relocation of vendors can be seen as a tool of exclusion by the municipality through its failure to recognize them as legitimate petitioners of public interests.

The discourse of avasallamiento is used in other contexts in Santa Cruz to refer to something anomalous, disordered, and unwanted, suggesting that street vendors are not merely considered a nuisance but also a threat to public order and local tradition. Specifically, the term avasallamiento has been used to characterize both urban migrants moving into certain parts of the city (Andia 2002), and rural migrants who have made land claims in the lowland region, threatening agribusiness interests (Gustafson 2006; Urioste and Kay 2005). In this sense, the concept of avasallamiento relates to Mary Douglas's (1966) notion of dirt as matter out of place, laden with connotations of danger when it is perceived as transgressing boundaries. The fact that urban migrants have formed gremio associations and made claims to the municipality has added to the tension surrounding issues of access and use of public space. As members of mobile communities, highland migrant vendors in particular are viewed as "out of place" both socio-geographically, by residing in Santa Cruz and through their specific uses of public space in the city.

The critical question is the extent to which public authorities and urban elites seek to limit and exclude the activities of largely migrant vendors, and the poor more broadly, and how the vendors contest these policies. According to Cahuana, the Municipal Plan is simply a "political issue," rather than an outright effort to discriminate against highland migrants.[128] But it seems clear that battles over territorial control of urban space are a key arena in which the issue of migrant integration plays out in Santa Cruz.

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[128] Jesus Cahuana, interview with author, December 10, 2007.

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Conclusions

This chapter has highlighted some of the ways in which migration flows and increasing economic informality have a direct bearing on patterns of urbanization and struggles for public space in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. It has also considered the linkages between these processes and municipal policy responses. While the local economy has shown a rise of informality across economic activities, this chapter has concentrated on informal commerce as a key area due to its public visibility. As Kudva has emphasized in an analysis of urban informality in Delhi and Ahmedabad in India, there is a dialectical relationship at work between social and spatial structures and development. Urban spaces contain and circumscribe social structures, while these spaces are also the product of societies that enable and shape their construction (Kudva 2006). Exploring this dialectical relationship is useful for moving beyond deterministic arguments about the nature of society and space (Soja 2000; Harvey 2000). It is also useful for analyzing the dynamics of employment and the everyday struggles faced by informal workers.

The city of Santa Cruz is increasingly linked to the global economy through policies implemented at the regional and national scale in the 1980s and 1990s. These policies include privatization of state firms, trade liberalization, and the growth of export commodities such as cotton, sugar, and increasingly soy and natural gas (Benería and Floro 2006; Prado et al. 2005; PNUD 2004). As a result, Santa Cruz is affected by economic policies that take place beyond the scope of its political control. At the same time, local politics mediate the effects of these global connections.[129] This opens up political spaces for opposition to dominant policy regimes at the local level.

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[129] See Fainstein (2006) for examples of local mediation in global cities.

The Santa Cruz city government has proposed the Plan Municipal de la Nueva Red as a means to improve distribution networks and the functioning of markets, reduce harmful congestion and resolve protracted conflicts over uses of public space. It seeks to regulate and standardize land use practices and uses of public space, while suppressing certain activities deemed undesirable by authorities. However, the result of such a policy approach may be a widening gulf between formal and informal sectors of the local economy. The Plan Municipal seems in part aimed toward pursuing a more cosmopolitan and even "global city" status for Santa Cruz. This is achieved through redistributing market networks and relocating some vendors away from central zones of the city. While similar approaches have been taken in Latin American cites such as Mexico City (Cross 1998), Lima (Cameron 1991), and Quito (Hanley forthcoming), in the case of Santa Cruz the expansion of informal commerce has been associated with cultural differences relating to the influx of highland Andean migrants.

The relocation of vendors from the central municipal markets to new district markets appears aimed at diminishing the concentrated power of the gremios. Local authorities view the gremios as having political leverage that could threaten their interests, such as by making Santa Cruz less attractive for multinational investment. Business elites and established institutions such as the Santa Cruz Civic Committee and the regional Chamber of Commerce (CAINCO) share these concerns, perhaps fearing the gremios could form an alternative center of power to challenge their public agenda, which includes pursuing departmental autonomy and boosting export trade (Prado et al. 2005; Soruco 2008). Moreover, the gremios represent large numbers of low-income highland Andeans who seek a foothold in the local economy, but who in some cases are perceived as unwanted outsiders (Andia 2002).

The gremios, in turn, have extended their influence into the formal, representative political sphere of the city of Santa Cruz. First through the figure of Jesus Cahuana, and currently Gricelda Muñoz, gremio leaders sit on the Santa Cruz city council. They may use this influence to negotiate and maintain an economic niche in central urban areas, such as nearby Los Pozos and La Ramada markets. Meanwhile, although they are heavily composed of highland migrants, and many would identify as indigenous Quechua and Aymara, the gremios do not seem to be framing their demands based on ethnicity. In this way, the gremios potentially serve as an associational form for collective action that bridges difference through including both migrants and longer-term residents who have also been excluded from formal employment.

By recognizing the relationships between the economic survival of individuals and organizations in the informal economy and urban policies regarding the regulation of land use and commercial activity, city planners and local officials will be better prepared to resolve conflicts over public space. Rather than using a top-down approach to suppress and remove informal economic activities, participatory planning strategies may lead to innovative ways to regulate and support these activities, such as those suggested by Gricelda Muñoz. They may also provide common ground in the conflict between seemingly irreconcilable visions of urban public space where these activities take place. This process involves incorporating citizens into policy making and learning from informal workers' perspectives on priorities for change. In the absence of such an approach, the central parts of the city might be zoned and regulated mainly for elites, and emptied out of the people whose labor contributes to the building of the city.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION: FOSTERING INTEGRATION IN THE 'CITY OF RINGS'

"In [some] places, the nation may maintain the envelope of citizenship, but the substance has been so changed or at least challenged that the emerging social morphologies are radically unfamiliar and force a reconsideration of the basic principles of membership."

-Holston and Appadurai (1999, p. 2)

In this dissertation, I have investigated the processes of migrant integration and exclusion occurring in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. I have also examined how internal migration is affecting regional identity formation in Santa Cruz and the lowlands region. In this concluding chapter, I revisit these questions in light of the research findings. I also discuss the implications of these findings for policies of urban development and migrant integration.

As this study has explored, the history of Santa Cruz has been characterized by conflict between social groups competing to shape the destiny of the city and region. Rather than passive observers, most urban residents, including migrants, have been active participants in the organization and operation of the city. Public and civic authorities have attempted to order communities through urban design and planning, municipal ordinances, decentralizing resources and authority, and other measures aimed at creating a rational and well-managed city. Migrants have in some ways challenged this order by enlarging the city's physical and social parameters in their efforts to gain access to its opportunities and its lure of prosperity. They have pushed for greater services and expanded participation, and in the process, they have

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influenced the way the government has organized itself as it has tried to respond to their living in the city.

In many societies, structures of racism and inequality that have shaped the development of national social and political hierarchies hinder the incorporation of new immigrant arrivals (Holston and Appadurai 1999). As Harvey (2001) noted, in a world of transnational capitalism, commodities flow more easily than the bodies of the displaced. This insight has guided much analysis of international migration (e.g. Sassen 2002; Portes 1999), but it is often overlooked in cases of internal migrants who have traversed different types of barriers and who may face social exclusion in their own country.

Migrants are often considered as alien to the nation and even to the city where they arrive. As such, they often must prove their belonging, and in the process frequently draw on community ties and seek to foster their own membership as citizens in the new context (Roberts 1996). But to gain inclusion does not necessarily entail a blind embrace of the nation and all it stands for. Migrants might feel ambivalent about such inclusion, as their faith in institutions such as the nation state "has been tempered by a long experience of subordination and violence, and [they] recognize the heterogeneity that inclusive political communities strive to mask beneath a homogenizing ideal of citizenship" (Goldstein 2004: 20).

Rethinking Regions and Social Exclusion

In order to approach the processes of migrant integration and social exclusion in Santa Cruz, I first explored the development of Bolivia's lowlands, or Oriente, and its formation as a region. This history includes the rise of the regional elite, which came to set the region's political and economic goals in the post-revolutionary period. Uneven development between regions—spurred by natural resource endowments but

also by deliberate state locational policies—created the conditions for the consolidation of the regional elite. Uneven regional development has influenced labor migration flows and also complicated the reception of migrants in destination areas. In particular, by promoting a strong place-based identity and regional loyalty that aimed to transcend class differences, institutions such as the Santa Cruz Civic Committee increasingly viewed the national government's development program as conflicting with regional interests. This despite the fact that the state provided a broad range of support to regional producers including infrastructural investment, subsidized credit, and even assistance in meeting labor demand starting in the late 1950s (e.g. Sandoval 1983; Gill 1987).

The historical enmity toward the highland Andean part of the country, and the view that the lowlands share a distinct social heritage, is deeply rooted in the Oriente. Cruceño historian José Luís Roca (1980: 9) drew on this sentiment in asserting that Bolivia's history is based on a "*lucha de regiones*" (struggle between regions). Contemporary regionalists have revived this argument in order to reposition lines of contention away from class or gendered forms of oppression and into the realm of territorial and regional differences.

One of the regionalists' main grievances is the neglect by the central government, which they argue is more concerned with the needs of highland Bolivians than those of the Oriente. This view makes sense up to around 1940. This dissertation has argued, however, that the Oriente has been anything but abandoned since the 1950s. Perhaps this view persists because its proponents benefit from using it to rally the unity of cruceños. To justify doing so, they must gloss over the significance of the revolution of 1952 for Santa Cruz (Soruco 2008).

The demand for autonomy provides a focal point for the current regional opposition the state. In claiming greater political and administrative control at the

regional scale, the demand pits lowland agribusiness and landholding elites against the central government, the MAS party, and the popular social movements that favor increasing national sovereignty over natural resources. But the Civic Committee and the Prefectura, the main institutional proponents of autonomy, increasingly draw support from middle class and even many low-income cruceños who feel that the resources they produce are not sufficiently reinvested in the region. Soruco (2008) observed that autonomy has become an "empty signifier," that is used to create cohesion around particular demands, such as reproducing the conditions that support the elites, as well as more universal, or popular demands. The latter include middle classes who want less centralized bureaucracy, more investment in the region, and better access to public sector employment organized in La Paz, as well as low-income groups concerned with blocked social mobility, increasing migration, and competition for land and jobs between "cambas" and "collas."[130] These dynamics suggest that migration to the region is related to intensifying regional identity claims in the Oriente, and that this in turn raises challenges to migrant integration.

The rise of regions is not unique to Bolivia. As noted in the Introduction, geographers and regional planners are calling attention to the growing importance of regions and region-specific identities, which are conceived as geographically and economically relevant units beneath the nation state where particular forms of governance, sovereignty, and market oriented development can thrive (Soja 2000). Scott (1998: 11) has argued that regions are becoming "the basic framework for new kinds of social community and for new approaches to practical issues of citizenship and democracy." In some cases, however, special development zones or "city-regions" such as Singapore are promoted by growth elites or imposed by authoritarian

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[130] Ernesto Laclau (2005) used the term "empty signifier" in his analysis of left and right wing forms of populism.

regimes to capitalize on resources, geographic location, and competitive advantage (Ong 2006). The formation of the European Union has led to a "Europe of the Regions," in which many long-standing regional claims and identities are being reasserted (Brenner 2004). Catalunya in Spain, the Northern League in Italy, and Scotland and Wales in Great Britain are some important, though less conflictive examples. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has had more violent and disruptive effects.

This raises the question of what factors influence certain place-based political movements toward being inclusive and progressive while others are exclusionary, inward looking, and regressive. Harvey (2000) has sought to distinguish between closed, sectarian localisms that are defined against "outsiders," as opposed to localisms and "place making projects" that recognize trans-local interconnections. The latter have the potential to be progressive and emancipatory, while the former tend toward exclusion and xenophobia. The distinction points to the importance of probing how elites have produced particular visions of place, and how these visions derive their power (Castree 2004; Paasi 2003). Radcliffe and Westwood (1996) observed that dominant categories of race and space are rarely fixed, and rather can shift in relation to the political and social context in which people create affiliations to place.

Through its treatment of historical and current regional divisions in a resource-rich developing country, this dissertation aims to contribute to the evolving literature on regions and uneven development. Concerns raised in the present study about the exclusion of those perceived as outsiders, even when crossing regional rather than national boundaries, point to ongoing questions and gaps in the literature on regions. Future research might grapple with relationships between space and power, citizenship and ethnic pluralism, and control over natural resources.

Integration and City Space

Along with the autonomy movement that has hardened regional boundaries, the urban setting of Santa Cruz presents challenges for migrant integration. Migrants arrive in a city redesigned in the 1950s and 1960s by modernist planners who envisioned an orderly environment in which residential, commercial, and industrial functions would be clearly separated (Palmer 1979; Prado et al. 2005). Influenced by the Garden City approach to design, the planning and architectural schemes developed in the Plan Techint were encoded in the Plano Regulador of 1972, and updated in 1978 and again in 1995. Santa Cruz became the only city in Bolivia to have a design based on closed concentric rings (Limpias 2003).

Rapid population growth and urban spatial expansion quickly overwhelmed these carefully devised plans. In particular, the municipality proved unable to control rampant land speculation and the growth of new settlements in areas designated as green spaces or public domain (Limpias 2003). The Plano Director Ampliado of 1978 incorporated much of the newer settlements into the city boundaries, serving as a "last gasp" of modernist planning before urban development efforts were largely taken over by real estate interests and the private sector.

Using the oil and gas royalties as a catalyst, members of the Santa Cruz elite and professional class starting in the 1950s launched a "collective regional project" that transformed Bolivia's poorest region into the wealthiest in a span of less than 20 years (Boisier 1999: 51). Urban elites led the shift that moved Santa Cruz from the periphery to the center of national economic and political life, while mobilizing civil society toward cohesive urban and regional development objectives.

But the idealized model of urbanism envisioned by cruceño planners did not foresee the accelerated population growth that started in the 1970s, and could not

adequately address the enormous demand for housing, employment, and municipal services created by massive urban migration. The utopian city built in the 1960s and 1970s was perhaps more appropriate for an advanced economy of salaried workers than for a developing city with a burgeoning commercial and informal economy.

According to a recent UN report on Santa Cruz, traditional civic institutions such as the Civic Committee, the Committee on Public Works, the Chamber of Commerce (CAINCO), the agribusiness chamber (CAO), and the service cooperatives have played a central role in the development of the local and regional economy. But these organizations are "scarcely representative of the majority of the population and tend to conceive of human capital development in the region as a byproduct of economic growth" (PNUD 1995: 40). Given this shortcoming, the collective regional project that flourished in the 1950s and 1960s was outpaced by the structural transformations of the 1980s and 1990s, including growing social complexity, urban economic restructuring, and demographic change. In this way, "the region lacked a political project that was able to integrate the demands of various actors and confront the weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the regional development model" (ibid: 41). Migrants in Santa Cruz are faced with integrating into a society marked by multiple fissures and unresolved obstacles to fostering greater cohesion.

Using structured interviews with migrants from highland and lowland areas living in both peripheral and central parts of the city, I examined the integration process from the perspective of migrants themselves. Close ties to communities of origin, as well as social and economic connections in the destination areas have been shown to serve as an important resource for migrants in many Latin American and Andean cities (Albo et al. 1981; Altamirano 1984; Roberts 1995; Lazar 2008). Among the interview respondents in this study, more than half visit places of origin, but most do so once a year, often for their town's anniversary fiesta. There is a degree

of concentration in Santa Cruz neighborhoods by region of origin, but a large number of respondents selected their destination community for its affordability or other amenities, rather than for proximity to relatives and friends from the same place of origin. Many Santa Cruz neighborhoods with high migrant concentrations are also characterized as highly heterogeneous, often with residents from across the country living together. This heterogeneity facilitates integration in the urban setting, but also makes it difficult for close networks based on place of origin to form, as seen in the small number of interview respondents that belong to migrant hometown associations.

Across Latin America, marginality and social exclusion are being reconceptualized as a denial of citizenship rights (Dagnino 2003). This condition entails the exclusion of poor urban residents from full membership in the city and nation, and a denial of the political, economic, and social rights that are supposedly guaranteed by such membership (Caldeira and Holston 1999; Roberts 2002; Goldstein 2004). In many cases, formal inclusion in the nation is not sufficient to the needs of poor urban residents, particularly urban migrants, who may be officially recognized as citizens but do not enjoy full social and economic rights (Sassen 2002). For example, many arrive in communities with inadequate basic services, insecure property tenure, and they find it necessary to provide their own employment through informal services and commerce. Many lack official identity documents, further impeding the exercise of basic citizen rights, such as voting, finding employment, or collecting a pension.

The 1994 Law of Popular Participation has been framed as an attempt to create a more inclusive national polity and expand citizenship. It has been accompanied by measures to recognize indigenous people as members of and contributors to the Bolivian national fabric (Van Cott 2000; Kohl 2003; Postero 2007). While much of the research on popular participation has focused on indigenous and rural communities, many of which were previously unrecognized by the state, this study

suggests that urban migrants have also benefited from the program as a means to forge links to neighborhood associations and to local government. In some cases, particularly among those who have lived more than five years in Santa Cruz, interview respondents have expanded their decision making power with respect to local development planning in their own communities.

Furthermore, due to the way that popular participation has been structured, migrants living in the urban periphery of Santa Cruz, far from the traditional centers of power, often have coinciding interests with long-term residents. The challenge for residents of the urban periphery is to "scale up" their demands to address the frequently inattentive national government through the channels created by popular participation (see Smith 1992). Such efforts, even if they are not framed explicitly in terms of migrants' rights, will help establish a legitimate urban presence for newcomers to the city.

Similar to popular participation, demands for regional autonomy represent new ways of imagining citizenship in relation to the Bolivian state. While the autonomy campaign has caught the attention of many who study Bolivia, the meaning of regional autonomous claims for migrants in lowland communities is not well understood. Interviews with migrants on their perceptions of autonomy indicate that support is associated with place of origin, with respondents from the lowlands more likely to favor it than either poor highlanders or skilled highlanders. This suggests that the autonomists have largely succeeded in appealing to cruceños' sense of regional pride. But there are exceptions to the highland-lowland divide in autonomy sentiment, and some highland respondents also favor greater regional autonomy. This stance does not necessarily entail a blind embrace of regionalist demands. Some may adopt the mantle of autonomy in the hopes that it will offer opportunities for acceptance and social mobility, while remaining skeptical about the actual promises and guarantees

made by the regional leaders. The skilled highland respondents illustrate such a position, as many express hesitant support for autonomy, but also show ambivalence about how the campaign has been carried out, the implications of an all out "regional rebellion" against the national government, and the intense rivalries it has sparked.[131] Although autonomy has an anti-highland dimension in its calls to prioritize lowland interests, it appears possible for people of highland origin—Andean Cruceños—to express support for it, and to be included in its ranks.

What is troubling about the heightened regional tension in Bolivia that compromise seems to be increasingly elusive. This is shown in the way that pro-autonomy groups have publicly labeled critics as "traitors" and in some cases resorted to violence and racial fear, casting those opposed to autonomy as invasive outsiders. The incidents of violence and the silencing of opposition represent the dark underside of autonomy, while the festive public cabildos that seek to unify cruceños suggest its more open, inclusive face. In Bolivia as elsewhere, differing opinions and dissent strengthen the building of democracy. Newcomers to Santa Cruz can potentially find a way beyond the dichotomy and unsettle the sharply drawn boundaries between the autonomy and the centralist Andean state.

This study also examined migrant insertion into the urban economy of Santa Cruz, in particular in the informal economy, and how the specific location of informal economic activities has brought migrants into conflict with long-term residents and local institutions. I found that municipal officials and planners and the traditionally powerful Santa Cruz civic groups seek to regulate the most visible parts of the informal economy through a municipal plan to reorganize market networks. While these groups are anxious about the threat of contamination and lack of hygiene posed by informal vendors, they often couch these concerns in the language of orderly, urban

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[131] See *La Rebelión de las Regiones, Pulso Semanario,* July 14-20, 2006, p.12.

development. This is evidenced in the plan to decentralize the largest markets and to create new district level markets. Motivating the plan is perhaps also an effort to weaken the power of informal vendor associations, or gremios, which defend the interests of vendors to the municipality and are associated with the city's growing migrant presence.

The municipal government has recently entered the fray to promote its vision of aesthetics and public order, as well as an image of a global city aspirant. A recent ordinance on public space and the new market plan advocate for prioritizing "collective urban needs" while condemning certain forms of informal commerce as disorderly and based on "individual gain." From the standpoint of the vendor associations, however, they are exerting their right to work and to access public space, which is also part of the city's "collective interest." Moreover, they exercise this right amid persistent high unemployment and state retrenchment in providing social protections. Although street vending offers individual gain, the collective potential for poverty reduction through the use of public space for urban livelihoods can be considered as a wider social benefit.

A question for further examination is the extent to which public authorities seek to suppress the activities of largely migrant vendors, and the poor more broadly, and how these policies are contested. Recent research conceptualizes public space as the site where the politically voiceless can make demands, as a medium for the contestation of power, and as the space in which identity is constructed and experienced (Springer 2009). This work also calls attention to the difference between the "official status" of a space and the ability of various individuals and groups to access it (Arefi and Meyers 2003).

There is currently a division within the municipality on how to address conflicts over informal commerce and public space. Some officials support relocation

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and removal of vendors, while others, such as the city counselor and gremio leader Gricelda Muñoz advocates for the rights of informal workers. According to Jesus Cahuana, also a gremio leader and former council member, the municipal market plan is simply a "political issue," rather than an explicit effort to discriminate against highland migrants who predominate in the city's gremios. But it seems evident that battles over territorial control of urban space is a key arena in which unresolved tensions over urban growth, demographic change, and migrant integration will continue to play out in Santa Cruz.

Policy Recommendations for Urban Growth and Migrant Integration in a Post-liberal World

This dissertation has called attention to the rising importance of Santa Cruz and the eastern lowlands region in Bolivia's political economy. In the 21st century, Bolivians increasingly look to agribusiness, eco- and ethno-tourism, and natural gas extraction for their livelihoods. The majority of these activities occur in the lowlands. The Bolivian economy is becoming tropical rather than Andean. Bolivian natural gas—nearly all of which is located in the eastern lowlands—generates millions of dollars in annual revenue that is sharply disputed between the national and regional governments. Soy production takes place at the extractive frontier of an export-oriented economy. India's Jindal Steel will soon exploit the massive iron ore deposits located at El Mutún near Puerto Suárez in the far eastern part of Santa Cruz department (Heredia 2007). All of this will likely lead to continued rapid urban growth in Santa Cruz and elsewhere in the Oriente.

The experience of Plan Techint and the Council of Regulatory Planning created a precedent for public involvement in local planning in Santa Cruz the 1950s and 1960s. The focus of this venture must be retooled for current realities. Rather

than pursuing orderly concentric patters of growth, self-contained neighborhood units, and other idealized planning concepts, the local planning agencies can foster livable and accessible communities. Several prominent cruceño architects, including Victor Hugo Limpias, have advocated increasing population densities within the city. Since the 1970s, the pattern of growth has created "*bolsones de tierras baldías*" (empty pockets) and "*lotes de engorde*," or empty lots used for speculation. By placing progressive taxes on empty lots, the municipality could more effectively regulate land use and discourage rampant property speculation. Combining this measure with the creation of an affordable housing program in central areas of the city would help to raise density levels in the core and mitigate the tendency toward population dispersal. It would also help avoid the growth of massive slums that are isolated from formal parts of the city.

The vexing issue of informal economic activities in public space stems from complex problems relating to insufficient formal job provision. Gremio leader and city council member Gricelda Muñoz has suggested that rather than simply banishing or relocating vendors, the municipality could provide support in the form of educational centers for children of vendors, who otherwise must spend much of the day in the streets. Through targeted local economic development programs, market vendors' children could learn skills to create value added products and manage small businesses, offering capacities beyond commerce. Furthermore, the district level markets might be beneficial for some sellers and consumers, but vendors should not be forced to move into the new sites. Many vendors fear that they will not make ends meet if located far from centralized foot traffic. Although few planners and urban managers recognize it when designing poverty alleviation programs, urban space can be considered an important livelihood resource. Moreover, encouraging vendors' input and participation in designing future centers of commerce that preserve green

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space while enabling livelihoods will provide added perspective from those who are most affected.

To foster participatory approaches to problems surrounding urban growth and social cohesion will require strengthening institutional capacity and promoting democratization at the local level. As suggested in the UN study of human development in Santa Cruz, it will be difficult for national and regional governments to recognize growing social complexity and incorporate it into government practice if this is not first achieved at the local level (PNUD 1995). The Law of Popular Participation has expanded the framework for local participation through specific channels sanctioned by the government. Following this ethos, local and regional civic bodies such as Civic Committee could reach an expanded constituency by holding popular elections. In doing so, the committee, which has long been considered by its supporters as the "moral government of cruceños," would become a more representative and democratic body. By reaching out to previously excluded groups, including much of the city's extensive migrant population, it might be encouraged to address pressing urban issues, rather than focusing on confronting the central government in an ideological struggle for power.

Finally, enhancing municipal decentralization through the popular election of district subalcaldes, replacing their appointment by the city council, would further advance the democratization of local politics. Osvaldo Peredo, the city council member who represents District 8, the Plan Tres Mil, suggested that municipal decentralization, or "*distritalización*," would be the most effective policy to support and encourage migrant integration.[132] He explained that the measure would enable local government to be more representative, and that sections of the city with a substantial migrant presence could elect subalcaldes that better understand their

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[132] Interview with author, August 8, 2007.

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concerns and aspirations. Currently, many of the subalcaldes do not reside in the districts that they represent, and their offices are considered mere extensions or branch offices of the municipality. Following the logic of pursuing greater autonomy in the face of political and economic centralization, a more fully decentralized local government might be more responsive to expanded and substantive forms of citizenship for newcomers and long-term residents alike.

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