


# WEST JAVA



THE DAR UL-ISLAM MOVEMENT IN WEST JAVA (1948-62):  
AN EXPERIENCE IN THE HISTORICAL PROCESS\*

Hiroko Horikoshi

The *Dar ul-Islam* (Islamic State) movement, commonly referred to as the DI, which terrorized the mountainous areas of West Java between 1948 and 1962, has received comparatively little analysis despite the impact it had on the newly independent Indonesia. Such Western scholars as Nieuwenhuijze and Kahin<sup>1</sup> offered ideological and economic explanations for the movement while it was still alive. Long after it was over, Jackson and Moeliono suggested that the course of action taken by the three Sundanese villages of West Java, which they studied with regard to their affiliation to the DI, derived from their adherence to a general Indonesian cultural ethos, *bapakism* (unquestioning loyalty and obedience of inferior to superior), rather than from any specific political orientation.<sup>2</sup> On the Indonesian side there is the regional government report on the DI in 1954<sup>3</sup> and Pinardi's journalistic biography of the leader of the movement, Kartosuwirjo.<sup>4</sup> In general, however, the Indonesian sources have tended to be hostile to the leader and the movement largely because of the atrocities committed by the DI in the villages and difficulties caused for the newly independent government, and perhaps also because of the latter's embarrassing inability to suppress the movement promptly.

An unsatisfactory aspect of all these materials is their failure to recognize the movement as one that was born in an attempt to realize Islamic ideals in a time of political chaos and revolutionary war and one that had strong popular support at least at the initial stage of its development. The movement only gradually lost its popular support in the final course of the Republic's struggle for independence as the DI almost imperceptibly crossed the threshold where most *ulama* (religious scholars) halted, at least temporarily, in favor of that independence.

The hope for an Islamic state is something that no Moslem may allow to be extinguished (*kena padam*). To pursue this goal is every Moslem's duty. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of

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\* This paper is based in part on field research sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and the National Science Foundation.

1. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (1950), pp. 169-183; and George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 326-331.
2. Karl D. Jackson and Johannes Moeliono, "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java," in R. William Liddle (ed.), Political Participation in Modern Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series No. 19, 1973), pp. 1-57.
3. Departemen Penerangan, Republik Indonesia Propinsi Djawa Barat (Jakarta: 1954).
4. Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964).

ulama hoped for the proclamation of a Negara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State) when the Republic was about to be born.<sup>5</sup> They saw it as a logical consequence of the fact that more than ninety percent of the population was, at least nominally, Moslem and they believed that Islam provided an alternative comprehensive basis of government to the old colonial system. Such hopes were particularly high in West Java and above all in Banten and Priangan where the political and sociological role of the ulama had long been conspicuous. Twice during the course of the Revolution the ideal of an Islamic state had some chance of realization in this region; once after the *hijrah* (retreat) of the Republican armed forces from West Java following the Renville Agreement of February 1948, and again after the fall of the Republic in December of that year. Smail reported that late in the Revolution armed conflict between secular and *santri* (committed Moslem) elements was the most striking feature of the political struggle in rural areas of West Java.<sup>6</sup> In the end, however, while the majority of ulama and santri communities indeed hoped for an Islamic State of Indonesia, they opted for the independent Republic rather than the DI. Furthermore, it is unlikely that even Kartosuwirjo himself, at least initially, intended to lead the movement as far as it eventually went. He adjusted and altered his plans until finally he was left with no alternative but to pursue his initial goal by means of a civil war against the Republic.

The DI movement was basically the result of three factors, to be discussed in turn in the first section of this article: (1) the long-standing failure of Islamic political parties to achieve an Islamic state or to give united leadership to the Islamic community; (2) the chain of historical events centering around the nation's rise to independence; and (3) the personal ambition and charismatic leadership of the DI leader, Kartosuwirjo. The second section will give an ethnographic account of the experience of the village Cipari, West Java, during the Revolution, and its subsequent relations with the DI movement. This village, where the writer spent one year, is not exactly a typical village in West Java since it is the kampung where Kiai Yusuf Tauziri grew up and where he remained during the period under consideration.

Kiai Yusuf's family had been active in Islamic politics since the time of the Sarekat Dagang Islam.<sup>7</sup> Later, accused of being involved with the Afdeling B of the Sarekat Islam (SI)<sup>8</sup> after the Cimareme Affair in Garut in 1919,<sup>9</sup> his father and brother were imprisoned for

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5. B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 15-34.
  6. John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1964), p. 128.
  7. The Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association) was founded in 1911 in Bogor, West Java, by Raden Mas Tirtodisurjo who had founded a similar organization, Sarekat Dagang Islamyah, in Batavia in 1909, and another, also called Sarekat Dagang Islam, in Solo, Central Java, in 1911; see Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1970), pp. 89-90.
  8. The Sarekat Dagang Islam changed its name to Sarekat Islam in 1912 when it was reorganized by H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto; see *ibid.*, p. 92.
  9. The Cimareme Affair was a small incident in which a certain Haji Hasan and his sons made armed resistance to Dutch tax-collections. In the course of the incident, the authorities uncovered a secret movement, referred to as the Afdeling B (Section B) of the Sarekat Islam, which aimed at overthrowing the Dutch. It was

over three and a half years along with most other ulama in Garut. His uncle, Haji Adra, who headed the Afdeling B in Garut between 1918 and 1919, went into exile in Singapore until independence. Kiai Yusuf himself served on the Central Council of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)<sup>10</sup> between 1931 and 1938. During this period he met Kartosuwirjo and became one of his mentors. He is sometimes held to have been responsible for Kartosuwirjo's mystical inclinations.<sup>11</sup> The relationship lasted for several years after independence. In fact, Kiai Yusuf was the real spiritual leader of the DI movement during its first phase, and he supported it financially and militarily as well.<sup>12</sup> But soon after the DI turned against the Republic, he discontinued his support, initiating a conflict which was to culminate in a large-scale attack on his village in 1952. The ethnohistorical account below, given by the villagers, the local ulama and the *kiai* (Islamic notables) suggests their views and understanding of what happened to them during these years, the most spirited and yet among the most troubled in the nation's recent history.

#### Party Politics and the Genesis of Kartosuwirjo's Utopian Project

The modern Islamic political movement, initiated toward the end of the first decade of this century, was able to increase its membership very rapidly, incorporating various smaller groups and leftist elements, under the charismatic leadership of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto. During the party's peak period in the late 1910s attitudes towards the colonial government became increasingly militant. Von der Mehden tells us that at the party's third congress in Surabaya in 1918 "Tjokroaminoto showed the temper of the congress by implying that non-parliamentary means might be used if demands were not met."<sup>13</sup> The following year's Cimareme Affair and the uprising in Toli-Toli, Sulawesi, however, crystallized colonial fears, resulting in increased pressure on Indonesian organizations. Tjokroaminoto was detained in relation to the Afdeling B Affair, damaging his and the SI's reputations. In 1921, the Commu-

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initiated by Haji Ismael in 1917, and, according to my informants who took part in it, was much more extensive than officially reported, involving even the Sultanate of Cirebon. This underground group planned to ship Russian arms into Java through the port of Cirebon. For the Cimareme Affair, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 71-125. For Afdeling B, see William A. Oates, "The Afdeling B: An Indonesian Case Study," Journal of Southeast Asian History (March 1968), pp. 107-17.

10. The Sarekat Islam changed its name to Sarekat Islam Indonesia in 1923 and became Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia in 1929; Van Niel, The Emergence, p. 92, and Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 144.
11. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 148.
12. Describing the relationship between Kiai Yusuf and Kartosuwirjo, Nieuwenhuijze says: "Leadership of the movement, initially in the hands of the *kiyahi* . . . was gradually assumed by a Muslim politician, S. M. Kartosuwirjo . . . and [he] sometimes acted in rivalry with the original leader." "The Dar ul-Islam," pp. 174-75.
13. Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 63.

nists and their followers, who composed a large part of the SI, were expelled by the party.

There were other factors, too, in the SI's decline. The Dutch tried to block the party's political activities by manipulating puppet organizations such as the Sarekat Hijau (Green Association) in Priangan, which harassed local cadres and generally discouraged popular participation.<sup>14</sup> Newly founded organizations like the Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) and the Partai Nasional Indonesia (1927) vied for the SI's rural and urban constituents as well. Internal disputes led to the expulsion of Muhammadiyah members.<sup>15</sup> As a result of all this, the movement, which claimed two million followers shortly after 1912 and over three million in 1919, had completely lost its mass following by the end of 1924.<sup>16</sup>

The loss of a large section of its followers and Tjokroaminoto's death in 1934, in turn, intensified internal conflicts among the party's leaders. One after another, factions critical of the central party leadership were purged from the party. In 1933 Sukiman, Wiwoho, and their followers were disciplined for disclosing the central administration's mismanagement of the Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumiputera (Pawnshop Employees' Union).<sup>17</sup> In 1936, the issues of how to respond to the government's interference in matters of Islamic law (marriage and inheritance) and whether or not to accept a subsidy from the colonial authorities to alleviate the party's financial crisis, divided the party leadership between those who favored cooperation and those who opposed it. Fearing further paralyzation of the party's activities, Haji Agus Salim, then the chairman of the Party Council, proposed the adoption of a cooperative policy and the creation of the Komite Barisan Penyedar (Committee of the Front for Building Consciousness). Another faction, led by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (a younger brother of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto) rejected Salim's proposal and expelled him and twenty-nine of his followers from the party leadership in February 1937. Thereafter, the PSII for a while maintained with dogmatic rigidity rather extreme Islamic theocratic doctrines of noncooperation with the colonial authorities.<sup>18</sup>

Kartosuwirjo's early political life coincided with the long, bitter decline of the once-powerful Islamic movement. He started his political career in 1923 by joining the Jong Java (Young Java) youth organization while still in medical school in Surabaya. When the Islamically oriented faction of this organization broke away in 1925 to form the Jong Islamieten Bond (Young Islamic League), he followed suit. Because of his leanings toward radical leftist activism, he was

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14. The Sarekat Hijau was a loose cluster of organizations with no real connection between them. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 200, and McVey, The Rise, pp. 295-96.
  15. The Muhammadiyah was a reformist Moslem organization founded by Haji Achmad Dachlan to provide socioeducational assistance to Moslem communities. Van Niel, The Emergence, p. 85.
  16. Ibid., pp. 105, 156-57, and 209-10.
  17. Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumiputera was founded in 1916 and led by the central Sarekat Islam; see Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 139, n. 150; McVey, The Rise, p. 43.
  18. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), p. 226, n. 92; and Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 138-46.

expelled from the medical school and was taken in by his foster father, Tjokroaminoto, whom he served as private secretary between 1927 and 1929. In 1929, however, he fell ill and retreated to his wife's village in Bojong, Malangbong, West Java. In the same year he served as the PSII commissioner for West Java and in 1931, at the age of 26, became general secretary of the party, a position he held until 1936.<sup>19</sup> At the party congress in 1936, at which Salim and Roem proposed to establish the Komite Barisan Penyedar, he was elected vice-president under the leadership of Wondoamiseno. He proved to be such an ardent advocate of uncompromising doctrinal radicalism that at the congress' request he wrote a brochure on the subject of hijrah (retreat). While the issue of hijrah meant no more to most of the party than a terminological dispute over the party's policy towards the colonial government, Kartosuwirjo took it seriously to mean the actual practice of what Muhammad had done in Medina after A.D. 622.<sup>20</sup> He proposed to begin by creating a Suffah Institute,<sup>21</sup> but the 1938 congress ended without any action being taken on the matter. By the time of the 1939 congress in Bandung, the PSII had already shifted towards the cooperative "parliamentary route" by joining the Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Gapi, the Political Federation of Indonesia) along with seven of the most important nationalist organizations, and Kartosuwirjo's proposal was called an anachronism and rejected.

Kartosuwirjo and his supporters, including Kamran, then head of the party's youth section, and Kiai Yusuf, thereupon established a faction called Komite Pembela Kebenaran (KPK, the Committee for the Defense of Truth). A small number of members of the central executive committee then accused Kartosuwirjo of misusing contributions from Sumatra and, in a rather obscure fashion, expelled him from the party.<sup>22</sup> This expulsion was formally confirmed at the party congress in Surabaya in January 1940.<sup>23</sup> In March of that year the KPK, sometimes called the PSII-II, emerged as a new political party.<sup>24</sup> On March 24, 1940, Kartosuwirjo founded his Suffah Institute, a commune equipped with a modern *pesantrèn*<sup>25</sup> at Bojong, Malangbong, the native village of his Sundanese wife, Wiwiek Ardiwisastra.

As a political party, the KPK was successful only in West Java.<sup>26</sup> At its first congress, held in Babedahan, Garut, in 1940, only six former PSII branches attended: Cirebon, Cibadak, Sukabumi, Pasanggrahan, Wanaraja and Malangbong. There Kartosuwirjo proposed a total hijrah, requiring every member of the party to contribute 2,500

19. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 423-24; and Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, pp. 20-23.

20. Pinardi, Kartosowirjo, pp. 24-25; and Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 146-48.

21. Suffah refers to "an institution at the time of the Prophet at which a number of young men were instructed by the Prophet himself in order to propagate Islam." Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 340.

22. Interviews with Kiai Yusuf. 23. Benda, The Crescent, p. 226, n. 96.

24. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 268.

25. Pesantrèn are the traditional Islamic dormitory schools.

26. Kartosuwirjo's claim that at every PSII branch there was a KPK (Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 26) is an overstatement, while Noer's (The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 149) statement that the KPK branches were all in Central Java does not coincide with my informants' claims.

*kencuring* (unit of currency) and to move to the Suffah. Kiai Yusuf disagreed with this and offered a counterproposal--investing the money in land so that the harvest could be used to support the training of future ulama at the Suffah.<sup>27</sup> Kiai Yusuf did not think that the time was ripe for a total hijrah. For many ulama, moving to a commune was almost impossible, since they had their regular religious and social services to perform in their respective villages. This disagreement was the beginning of the split between the leaders of the KPK.

Kartosuwirjo went ahead with his project, but it was not uniformly successful. Not all the people who joined the commune and pooled their wealth to support the Suffah were prepared for the kind of life they were to lead. Many of them were old and previously wealthy landlords: they could not tolerate the egalitarian way of life, the hard labor, and the poor diet and medical services available. On the other hand, the commune's *pesantrèn* successfully adopted unorthodox methods and offered, besides regular religious classes, Dutch, astronomy and militant Islamic doctrines. Up until the Japanese invasion this *pesantrèn modèren* attracted not only many santri from the area but even some from outside Java.<sup>28</sup> Kiai Yusuf supported the *pesantrèn*, at least indirectly, by sending two of his sons and a nephew as trainers and trainees. The threat of a Japanese invasion thereafter kept the colonial authorities' attention away from these activities. It was left to the Japanese occupation government to ban the KPK. The Suffah was discontinued, and many members returned to their villages, much poorer than before they moved to Malangbong.

Discouraged and disgusted by what he saw as the disunity and opportunism of the established Islamic leaders, Kartosuwirjo now began to build a militant rural base in West Java. The Japanese occupation of Indonesia over the next three years offered him exactly the kind of opportunity he needed to prepare for the realization of his vision of the ideal State.

#### The Chain of Historical Developments Centering around the Nation's Independence

The Japanese occupation, lasting from March 1942 to August 1945, contributed significantly to laying the basis of the later DI in two respects. On the one hand, it reinvigorated the Islamic State concept among Islamic leaders and, on the other, it gave certain Indonesians an opportunity to obtain basic military training.

Having recognized the de facto authority of the ulama and kiai in the rural areas, the Japanese, on occasion, favored these Islamic groups at the expense of the intellectual and urban nationalist elite. As a result, the expectations and political ambitions of many hitherto rather other-worldly and aloof rural Islamic leaders grew rapidly. Yet at the end of the occupation the balance of power altered decisively in favor of the politically more experienced nationalists. As a result, by the time of the Japanese surrender, nationalist and Islamic forces were more aware of their antagonism than previously, and the concept of the Islamic State became a highly visible issue between them.<sup>29</sup>

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27. Interviews with Kiai Yusuf and Ajingan Fudori.

28. Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, pp. 26-27.

29. Benda, *The Crescent*, pp. 169-94.

Equally important for politicizing the masses and increasing their hope for independence was the number of opportunities given to get military training, to which most Indonesians had had no access during the Dutch period. In mid-1943 Heihō (Auxiliary Troops) were initiated as part of the Japanese army and in October the Pembela Tanah Air (Peta, Defenders of the Fatherland) was established.<sup>30</sup> Then in the last year of the occupation, largely in response to local pressures, the Japanese authorities agreed to provide military training for Islamic groups in the form of the Hizbullah (Army of Allah), as a subsidiary of the Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, Council of Indonesian Moslem Associations), the Japanese-sponsored federation of Islamic organizations.

During the Japanese occupation Kiai Yusuf's political and religious influence in southeast Priangan increased. The Japanese built a sulfur plant in the town of Wanaraja, where the kiai was then residing, and a road from the town to a village on Mt. Telagabodas where the Japanese engineers were settled. As a result, the town's commercial life was invigorated, allowing Kiai Yusuf to expand his influence throughout the region and paving the way to the later formation of the Hizbullah. Recognizing Kiai Yusuf's influence, high-ranking Japanese officers made frequent visits to his *madrasah*.<sup>31</sup> After the Japanese promise of ultimate independence for Indonesia, the number of the kiai's followers and attendance at his *pengajian* (religious lectures) grew considerably, including people from as far as Sukabumi and even some urban nationalists from Bandung. When the Hizbullah was organized in West Java in early 1945, Kiai Yusuf headed the local branch, called Tentara Dar ul-Salam, or Esa Selamat (United Defense Force), which recruited its members from Cicalengka, Ciparay, Majalengka, Sukabumi, Pameungpeuk, Bungbulang, Cikajang and Wanaraja. The group was large enough to form a battalion. Every Friday morning, Japanese instructors from Garut marched into the square in front of Yusuf's madrasah and gave military training until the time for the noon prayers; on Thursdays, pengajian meetings were often turned into opportunities for Japanese and Indonesian propagandists to campaign.

As for Kartosuwirjo himself, his activities during the Japanese period were constructive and cooperative in the sense that he worked with prominent nationalist leaders on matters of national significance, transcending the exclusive and parochial concerns he had previously displayed. During mid-1943, as a committee member of the Majlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI, Great Indonesian Islamic Council),<sup>32</sup> he agitated for the establishment of a network of ulama throughout Java and the creation of an Islamic treasury for administering the collection and distribution of *zakat* (obligatory Islamic alms tax) to aid the needy and alleviate the distress caused by wartime economic dislocation. This new Islamic welfare organization, known as Bait al-Mal, was probably the public project most enthusiastically received by the Islamic community during the early Japanese period. But it was brought

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30. Anderson, *Java*, pp. 20 and 25-26; and Smail, *Bandung*, p. 14.

31. A *madrasah* is a place where adult Moslems attend pengajian given by ulama and kiai. It is also used by village children and santri students to practice *ngaji* (Quranic recitations). It differs from the more systematic Islamic education given in the pesantren.

32. Benda, *The Crescent*, p. 90 and pp. 143-46. MIAI was a loose Islamic federation established five years before the occupation. It continued to exist marginally until Masyumi replaced it in 1943.



to an unfortunate halt when the Japanese saw in it a threat to their control. After this setback, Kartosuwirjo served as Masyumi commissioner for West Java and at the same time joined the Hōkōkai shortly after its establishment in March 1944.<sup>33</sup> During his participation in the Hōkōkai organization, he worked with other leading Islamic and nationalist leaders including Sukarno, Hatta, Mansur, and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso at its Jakarta headquarters.<sup>34</sup> Toward the end of the occupation, he acted as a Hōkōkai guerrilla-training supervisor in Banten,<sup>35</sup> while at the same time he headed the local Hizbullah in Malangbong, the site of his former Suffah Institute. It is of importance to note that his constant travels during this period contributed to establishing a network of connections with West Java rural ulama who were later to support the DI. Many of the trainees in his local Hizbullah became his *anak buah*, followers, and subsequently formed the core of the DI organization.

### The Early Revolutionary Period

As far as the formation of the DI is concerned, the two most relevant developments during the early phase of the Revolution were: the mushrooming of irregular armed groups and the process of their absorption into the Indonesian national army; and the failure of the Republican leaders to negotiate the total sovereignty of the Republic free from Dutch control.

Shortly after the proclamation of independence by President Sukarno on August 17, 1945, the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People's Security Corps) was formed for the maintenance of law and order. It was, however, nothing more than a loose territorial network largely composed of former members of the Seinendan (Youth Corps), Keibōdan (Vigilance Corps)<sup>36</sup> and Peta. Though formally an organization structured hierarchically from the residency level down to the kampung, it was not an army. The Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR, People's Security Army), which replaced the BKR on October 5, 1945, on the other hand, was intended to be an army of full-time soldiers organized for national defense, particularly against the threat posed by Allied landings on Java in that month.<sup>37</sup> Parallel to the creation of a national army, however, and especially during the violent months between October 1945 and mid-1946, many paramilitary youth organizations, generally called *badan perjuangan* (resistance organizations), sprang up spontaneously to participate in the Revolution by seizing power and weapons from the local Japanese forces. Most of them were irregulars quite outside any central control.

In West Java, these included the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo, Indonesian Socialist Youth) led by Sutoko, the Barisan Banten (Wild Buffalo Legion) led by Rachmat Sulaiman, the Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (Service of the Indonesian People of

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33. *Ibid.*, p. 153; Anderson, *Java*, pp. 27-30. Hōkōkai was a mass movement initiated by the Japanese to mobilize and control the population.

34. Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 31.

35. Benda, *The Crescent*, pp. 179, 186, 280, n. 26, and 285, n. 57.

36. Anderson, *Java*, pp. 26-27. Seinendan was a militant, politicized scout organization to assist the authorities, while the Keibōdan was intended as an auxiliary police force to help maintain order and security. Both were formed on April 29, 1943.

37. Smail, *Bandung*, pp. 76-78.

Sulawesi) led by Karundeng, the Pemuda Indonesia Maluku (PIM, Moluccan Youth of Indonesia) led by Pellupessy, the Hizbullah, and the newly created Sabilillah led by Kamran, Kartosuwirjo's right-hand man.<sup>38</sup> These badan perjuangan were heavily concentrated around Bandung, where Allied troops were stationed, and by mid-November, 1945, they coordinated themselves into the Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan (MDPP, Resistance Leadership Council Headquarters). Upon its own initiative the MDPP was transformed late in February 1946 into the Majelis Persatuan Perjuangan Priangan (MPPP, Council of the United Resistance of Priangan), coordinating some sixty-one regional politico-military groups.<sup>39</sup> The MPPP, headed by Sutoko and Kamran, held jurisdiction over its coordinated military units, which still remained as irregulars outside the national army. Meanwhile, Colonel Nasution, Commander of the Third Division of the regular army, had been pressing the badan perjuangan forces to permit unification and absorption into official armed forces. Yet in view of the limited number of arms available in West Java, he felt that a screening of these troops was essential, so that only the best qualified would be incorporated into the army.<sup>40</sup> The process of absorption, however, was severely hindered by Nasution's defeat at British hands. He was compelled to abandon Bandung on March 24, 1946, and it took a long time for the MPPP-formed Resimen Tentara Perjuangan (Resistance Army Regiment), composed of its best-qualified soldiers, to be fully incorporated into the Third (Siliwangi) Division.

Obviously, these developments left many high-spirited, unsophisticated guerrilla fighters outside the nationalist army. Many of these irregulars, feeling little rapport with the often Dutch-trained and Dutch-educated Siliwangi officers, even preferred to remain outside. The major badan perjuangan thus continued to dispose of considerable numbers of soldiers. Even among the Siliwangi troops themselves there were men who were disillusioned about their prospects within the national army. To a greater or lesser degree, all these groups were potentially open to Kartosuwirjo's appeals at the time of the initial formation of the DI.

Kartosuwirjo's activities during this early revolutionary period were fairly typical of badan perjuangan leaders. Though more than disappointed by the absence of a Negara Islam in Sukarno's Proclamation of Independence, in the face of the Allied landings on Java he nevertheless moved his best cadres in Hizbullah to Bandung. Since Kamran, who headed the West Java Hizbullah, was his right-hand man, he held a firm grip on the provincial Hizbullah movement. When the wartime Masyumi organization was transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945, he became its secretary,<sup>41</sup> and, in the following year, its commissioner for West Java.<sup>42</sup> He also worked closely with Hasjim, then head of the Hizbullah section of the central Masyumi leadership. Between 1945 and 1947, by resisting Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin's

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
38. Team Penerangan Umum, Badan Penelitian-Penjurusan Sedjarah Djawa-Barat, Sedjarah Djawa Barat Suatu Tanggapan (Bandung: Pemerintah Daerah Djawa-Barat, 1972), Tambahan p. 8.

39. Smail, Bandung, p. 144, n. 108, adds that the MPPP was also commonly understood as Markas Pimpinan Perjuangan Priangan (Headquarters of the Resistance Leadership of Priangan).

40. Ibid., pp. 129-45.

41. Anderson, Java, pp. 219-20.

42. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, pp. 31-32.



"rationalization" efforts, Kartosuwirjo successfully kept rural Sabillillah and urban Hizbullah units under his control.<sup>43</sup>

The year 1946 ended without any conclusive results from the negotiations between the Dutch and the Republic. The Republican leadership was divided, while the British were anxious to withdraw their troops from Indonesia and the Dutch were gradually building up their strength. Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Union of Resistance) movement, which had demanded an unconditional transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, disintegrated after the abortive coup of July 3.<sup>44</sup> Probably never having fully trusted the Republican leaders' capacity to win full independence through diplomatic means, Kartosuwirjo had his suspicions confirmed by the weakness the Republic demonstrated in the ill-famed Linggajati Agreement (initialed on November 15, 1946, ratified by the Indonesian Parliament on March 5, 1947, after much internal debate, and signed by both governments on March 25, 1945).<sup>45</sup> The fact that during the subsequent two months Sjahrir, faced with the threat of all-out war, made further concessions to the Dutch appears to have convinced Kartosuwirjo that armed struggle was inevitable if real independence was to be achieved. It is significant that when, after the fall of the third Sjahrir cabinet, the new Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, offered him the position of Second Vice-Minister of Defense on July 3, 1947, Kartosuwirjo pointedly declined it and returned to Malangbong to strengthen the Hizbullah units in Priangan for the expected Dutch attack.<sup>46</sup>

The war that broke out on July 21, 1947, resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Dutch. In West Java all the major cities fell into their hands. Though the Republican army had prepared for the attack, their lightly armed troops had no choice but to retreat to the mountainous areas of the interior where they hoped to recoup their strength and wage prolonged guerrilla warfare. After several weeks both sides agreed to a cease-fire in response to UN pressures, but the Dutch continued to reoccupy areas where they had large economic interests. By August 29, when the Dutch established what was generally called the Van Mook Line, supposedly defining the position they had held at the time of the cease-fire, the Republic was left holding a large part of the traditionally food-deficient province of Central Java, the Banten residency at the western tip of West Java, a portion of East Java, half of Madura, and the poorest part of Sumatra.<sup>47</sup>

In view of the virtual rout of the Republican forces in West Java, Kartosuwirjo initiated a conference in November 1947 at Mt. Cupu, located on the border between the regencies of Garut and Tasikmalaya. Backed by Masyumi, the conference resolved to establish a Dewan Pertahanan Ummat Islam (Moslem Community Defense Council) in Garut to coordinate the available local Hizbullah and Sabillillah units, and a Majelis Ummat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Moslem Community Council) in Tasikmalaya to administer the movement.<sup>48</sup> Ignoring the cease-fire, Kartosuwirjo and his Hizbullah forces intended to recapture the Dutch-held territories in South Priangan.

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43. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 113.

44. Anderson, Java, pp. 370-403.

45. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 196-206.

46. Ibid., pp. 196-212.

47. Ibid., pp. 213-21.

48. Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam," p. 175; Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p. 112.

The lack of effective United States support for the Indonesian cause and the weak military position of the Republic resulted in critical concessions on the part of the Republic when negotiations were resumed. By the Renville Agreement, signed on January 19, 1948, the Republic's territory was reduced to less than one-third of the area of Java. As bad as this was for the Republic, it was even worse for the people of West Java. The TNI troops there had to be evacuated to Republican-held territory, leaving the main Sundanese areas in Dutch hands. The loss of the Siliwangi Division, popularly regarded as a Sundanese army despite the fairly large number of non-Sundanese troops in it, made the local population feel like *anak tiri* (stepchildren), abandoned by the Republic.<sup>49</sup>

Kahin has estimated that some 35,000 regular troops in all obeyed the hijrah (evacuation) orders while about 4,000 remained behind;<sup>50</sup> the local people say today that the actual ratio between the two in West Java was about four to one. It appears that both the TNI (regular army) and the irregulars took spontaneous actions to resist the hijrah. At least one battalion of the TNI is said to have remained out of uniform near each of the major cities of West Java to assist the activities of the irregulars. They included, for example, the Sugiharto battalion, and Brigade I/Tirtayasa.<sup>51</sup> A large number of Hizbullah, whether members of the Resimen Tentara Perjuangan or not, also remained, and almost none of the Sabilillah abided by the Renville terms.<sup>52</sup> Several other units, including two Pesindo battalions led by General Fatah, also evaded evacuation.

The Dutch followed up their military success by establishing a puppet Pasundan government for West Java on February 26, 1948. It is important to bear this in mind, for the DI movement was initiated not only for the military defense of West Java in defiance of Renville, but also to challenge, in the name of Islam, reimposed Dutch colonial rule symbolized by Pasundan.

On February 10 and 11, 1948, what is now seen as the first "DI conference" was held at the village of Pangwekusan, in the district of Cisayong, Kabupatèn Tasikmalaya. It appears that at this stage of its development, the DI's leaders did not wish so much to call for the immediate establishment of an Islamic State as to organize and coordinate all the remaining armed forces under their control. The movement that emerged out of the meeting was a loose coordination of various Islamic and non-Islamic groups somewhat resembling the structure of the old MPPP. The name DI may have been used at the time but it has been suggested that the letters DI did not then refer to Dar ul-Islam but to Daerah I (Region One)<sup>53</sup> of the movement, whose primary goal was to recapture West Java from the Dutch. This suggestion is supported by the presence of such non-Islamic groups as Pesindo at the conference. The Islamic organizations represented at the meeting included Masyumi, the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPII, Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement,

49. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 32.

50. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 234.

51. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, p. 271, and Tambahan p. 18.

52. Smail, Bandung, pp. 51-52.

53. Boland, The Struggle, p. 57. According to Kiai Yusuf, DI referred at the time to the primary area of defense where large numbers of Indonesian troops were concentrated, whereas D II referred to Dutch-controlled areas with scattered resistance forces.

an affiliate of Masyumi), Hizbullah and Sabilillah. The organizational structure of the resistance movement tentatively drawn up at the meeting and confirmed at a second conference held two months later at Cipeundeuy shows: (1) that the movement was independent of Masyumi, one of the major parties represented in the Republican cabinet responsible for the implementation of Renville; (2) that administration of the movement was to be under the leadership of the Majelis Islam (MI, Islamic Council); and (3) that the Tentara Islam Indonesia (TII, Indonesian Islamic Army) was to be formed to consolidate the local security forces.<sup>54</sup>

It seems that the movement's status vis-à-vis the Republic became the key issue of a debate which developed during subsequent months among its member groups. The defense of West Java as a regional countermove against the puppet state of Pasundan was strongly supported by all groups, but the Holy War concept was generally acceptable only to the Islamic forces. But, in addition, the idea of establishing a Negara Islam, abandoning the unitary Republic, was beyond what most of the Islamic groups under Kiai Yusuf's influence were seeking. This ideological disagreement was partially resolved by the regional Hizbullah and Sabilillah and such non-Islamic irregulars as the Pesindo from Cirebon returning to their respective areas to concentrate on local efforts against the Dutch, while maintaining loose ties to the DI as a sort of coordinating body of the resistance. By the time the TII was formed only one Hizbullah group, that of Tasikmalaya led by Oni (later to become Prime Minister of the DI), remained with Kartosuwirjo. The latter now took further steps towards the formation of an Islamic State by convening a third conference in May at Cijoho. A Dewan Fatuz (Supreme Council) along with ten ministries was formed and a Qanun Azasi (Constitution) was to be prepared to form a Jumhuriyah (Republic) headed by an Imam (Chief) based on the Quran and the Al-Hadith.<sup>55</sup> By then the movement was clearly headed for the establishment of Kartosuwirjo's Negara Islam. On May 5, 1948, he proclaimed himself Imam. Though no longer recognizing the unitary Republic, the DI "government" remained pro-Republic rather than pro-Dutch. Meanwhile, its Islamic army controlled the larger part of the mountainous countryside of West Java where the Dutch had few economic interests.

The resumption of Dutch aggression on December 19, 1948, and the disintegration of the Republican government in Java following the ignominious capture of its leaders marked a turning point for both the Republic and the DI movement. During the subsequent months, the DI, a movement which had hitherto not opposed the Republic, began to show open signs of aggressive antagonism to it.<sup>56</sup> Aroused by the Dutch onslaught, rural kiai and ulama, who had once been loyal to the Republic, now joined the DI movement or supported its operations, since the DI now formed the real core of popular resistance. As is common in troubled times, bandits in many areas of West Java began to cluster around the fringes of DI-held territory to exploit the local villagers in the DI's name.

In any event, as the number of its followers increased, the DI's tactics became more uncompromising. When the Siliwangi fought its way back into West Java early in 1949, they often encountered unexpected opposition from the DI. Units moving through the mountains at night

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54. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, pp. 273-74.

55. Ibid., p. 273.

56. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 329-30.

to avoid Dutch attacks, and ignorant of the change in the DI's attitude toward the Republic, accepted invitations to share meals with DI soldiers and were subsequently captured along with their weapons. As some of my informants suggested, the DI's opposition to the Siliwangi may be attributed to Kartosuwirjo's fear that a successful Siliwangi operation in West Java might help to restore the Republic's authority in West Java, thus jeopardizing his initial hope of retaining the DI's autonomy and its territorial jurisdiction over the regions under its military control.

It looks as if the DI's formal proclamation of a Negara Islam on August 7, 1949, in the village of Cisampak, Kecamatan Cilugalar, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya, was the result of careful consideration on Kartosuwirjo's part.<sup>57</sup> As a consequence of the Rum-van Royen Agreement of May 7, the Republican government had been restored to Yogyakarta in July. On August 1, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the Dutch and the Republic, and mounting guerrilla pressures on, and civilian non-cooperation with, the Dutch brightened considerably the prospects for a total transfer of sovereignty. Finally, international pressures forced the Dutch to agree to discuss the terms of transfer with the Republic at a Round Table Conference planned for later that month at The Hague. Events were moving very rapidly and the DI had to make momentous decisions.

Kartosuwirjo's proclamation of a Negara Islam on August 7, 1949, suggests that it was probably a direct reaction to a letter sent to him two days earlier by Natsir, Minister of Information in the Republican cabinet, expressing the government's desire to prevent a definite break.<sup>58</sup> It had long been apparent that Kartosuwirjo was strongly against the formation of a federal state of the kind the Dutch were proposing (which would have allowed them to manipulate the component states against Yogyakarta). But whether the proclamation was meant to be more than a claim for territorial autonomy, as a component state alongside the Republic in some larger federation--as "a state within the State"--once the formal transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch was accomplished, is not clear. In any case, Kartosuwirjo's proclamation won him still more support from local Islamic groups, and by the time the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch actually took place on December 27, 1949, the DI controlled most of the mountainous areas of southwest Java from Banten to Priangan.

If Kartosuwirjo and his DI really aimed to form no more than a member state in a larger federation, however, the chance to achieve this was completely closed when the Republic moved to create a unitary state by dissolving all the Dutch-created states and dismantling the federal system.<sup>59</sup> Kartosuwirjo and the DI were left with no alternative but to continue their resistance to the secular Indonesian state.

After the proclamation of the unitary Republic on August 17, 1950, a whole range of local elements, disturbed by the settlement of 1949-50, emerged to disrupt the new status quo. Ultracolonialists, including some intelligence agents and military officers determined to discredit the Republic, used federalist sentiment and Sundanese ethnicity for their own purposes, and carried out terrorist operations in Bogor, Purwakarta, Subang, Indramayu, Majalengka, Kuningan and around Bandung.

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57. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, pp. 273-74.

58. Boland, The Struggle, p. 59.

59. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 446-69.

Dissatisfied with the failure of the Sukarno-Hatta government to include West Irian as part of the Republic and to reduce the debts assumed from the Dutch, extremist groups such as the Gerakan Sakit Hati (Wounded Heart Legion) in Cirebon caused many disturbances in West Java. Among all of these, the most significant, however, was the DI, which survived for another decade, and expanded its zone of operations from north Banten, Bogor, Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bandung and South and East Priangan to Sumedang and the towns around Cirebon.<sup>60</sup>

### Kartosuwirjo and His Followers

Practically everyone I interviewed said two things about the DI movement. One was that the goals of the DI were just, but that its means were against *ajaran agama* (religious teachings). They also agreed that without the benefit of Kartosuwirjo's aggressive character, his ambition and his capacity to win loyal support, the DI could not have lasted as long as it did. In this section, I will examine Kartosuwirjo's leadership and his followers' loyalty.

Oddly enough Kartosuwirjo had very little Islamic education. He never attended a pesantren. (He studied Islam mostly from Dutch books,<sup>61</sup> and later Sufism from several kiai in Priangan including Mustafa Kamil, Kiai Ramli, and Kiai Yusuf.<sup>62</sup>) Despite these deficiencies and his urban background, he had the qualities to become a charismatic rural leader. His sharp mind, eloquent tongue, and above all striking personality overshadowed his weak voice and small, unprepossessing figure. His speeches tended to be uncompromising and *berat* (heavy), often appealing to his audience's conscience. He evidently possessed the invaluable quality, typical among Java's *jago* ("champions") of being *gagah* (translated in a colloquial sense as "having guts"). According to the local people I spoke to, men who are *gagah* fear nothing but God, and are strongly convinced of their cause (*yakin*). They tell the truth even to the authorities without any fear of the consequences. Such a charismatic man inspires awe (*sekan*) in his followers, who are themselves prevented from acting by fear of possible threats to their lives. While such a personality may be unusual in a culture that emphasizes harmony, obedience and avoidance of conflict, it is still an integral aspect of that culture, and, indeed, is the more powerful because of it. Where *gagah* behavior is associated with a high cause, it commands great respect and obedience. In rural Java high causes have traditionally been based on the values of communal peace, prosperity and social justice, and expressed either in indigenous (Ratu Adil, Just Prince) or Islamic (Imam Mahdi, Savior) idioms.

Kartosuwirjo's charismatic behavior and his uncompromising advocacy of Islamic ideals seem to have fitted comfortably in with the peasants' age-old messianic hopes such as those evoked by the Joyoboyo prophecies.<sup>63</sup> One of his closest followers reported that Kartosuwirjo

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60. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, pp. 276-77.

61. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 28.

62. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 148.

63. The medieval king Joyoboyo prophesied the appearance of a just prince after a time of distress and oppression. See Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), p. 42; and Justus M. van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," Comparative Studies in Society and History, I, 4 (1959), pp. 299-323.



had propagated the message that he had received an order from God to become the Imam of the World Caliphate.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, from the time of the establishment of the Suffah until his execution, he was always addressed by his followers as "Imam" rather than "Kiai."

Though Kartosuwirjo may have exploited rural cultural traditions, there is little doubt about his sincerity. Not much is known about how he developed his hatred for colonialism but, as Pinardi has pointed out, his considerable intellect gained sophistication as a result of his apprenticeship to Tjokroaminoto.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, his retreat to Bojong, Malangbong, following his illness, had much to do with his later radicalism. The village was located just off the major highway from Tasikmalaya to Bandung and it was primarily used by Dutch planters in East Priangan. He therefore had ample opportunities to observe the contrast between the deprived rural villagers and the Dutch estate-managers. His active participation in the establishment of MIAI's Bait al-Mal campaign throughout Java during the Japanese occupation suggests a conversion from the role of politician to that of a leader of a social movement. The fact that it was only by means of arms that the Japanese threw the Dutch out of Indonesia probably confirmed his growing conviction that only through revolutionary means would the kind of society he envisioned become possible. His sincerity about the Islamic cause is also reflected in the kind of life he led at his Suffah Institute. Following the example of Muhammad in Medina, he always dressed simply and took part in menial labor, though only for short periods. As a dedicated Sufist, he spent many hours in self-discipline and communication with the supernatural.

Many local ulama and villagers attributed his ability to recruit followers among poor and unsophisticated peasants to his mystical powers. His mysticism is important above all because it is clear that stories of his miraculous qualities contributed to the continuation of his movement. Local people described Kartosuwirjo's followers as *orang kecil* (literally, "little people," but contextually referring to people who are poor, without any position or influence), *orang bodoh* ('uneducated'), *orang merah* (communists) and *orang Jawa* (Javanese), as if to say that no sensible Sundanese Moslem would be found among them. In fact, however, the DI was composed quite differently. Kartosuwirjo's leading advocates, the so-called DI ministers, were largely men he had known since the time of the KPK and the Suffah Institute. These included such colleagues as Kamran and Ateng Setiawan, and such leading students as Zainal Abidin, Tomi, Oni, Bakar (the DI's Bupati of Garut) and Sujadi (Minister of the Treasury). The majority of them were Sundanese from Garut and Tasikmalaya with strong Islamic backgrounds. The group of *satria*, responsible for protecting the top leaders from external dangers, was made up of soldiers trained as members of Kartosuwirjo's Hizbullah during the Japanese occupation, including Haerudin, Busaeri, Subirman, Sasmoyo, Adung and Dawan.<sup>66</sup> According to Pinardi and local villagers I interviewed, the ordinary TII troops included common peasants, as well as bandits from as far off as Central Java.

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64. Pinardi, *Kartosuwirjo*, p. 41. "Imam" refers to both the head of an Islamic state and the prayer-leader of a mosque. By contrast "kiai" and "ulama" refer to religious preachers and teachers.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 23 and 33.

66. Interviews with a former DI member and an ex-TNI intelligence officer.

Ibrahim Adjie claimed that rumors about Kartosuwirjo's magical powers may have been fostered by his remoteness from the majority of his followers.<sup>67</sup> Judging from the examples given of such rumors, it seems likely that the DI's central leadership welcomed and even manipulated them by shielding Kartosuwirjo from, and making him almost inaccessible to, his guerrilla fighters in the field. Kartosuwirjo was seldom seen by his followers and he did not allow his photograph to be taken. It was even believed that one had to go through seven layers of three hundred protecting soldiers before being able to reach the Imam. His whereabouts were known only to his closest associates. Eventually he was believed capable of disguising himself, of vanishing with the speed of light and of remaining immortal. This was the explanation given as to why he was never captured by his pursuers for over a decade. Some of these rumors offered detailed descriptions of such miraculous events as making generals fly into the air before followers skeptical about the holy cause. Moreover, the fact that the DI was believed to be engaged in a Holy War encouraged many devout Moslems to join, since, according to Islam, death in such a war guarantees entry into Heaven.

The interpretation of Kartosuwirjo's "miracles" by nonfollowers suggests something about the cultural and religious ideas that foster belief in magical power among the population in general. Among many Sundanese Moslems, miracles are regarded as possible if a person has one of several qualities. The first is a special power secretly granted by God to a dedicated Sufi saint whose state of total purification from worldly matters allows him to ascend to the *alam gaib* (invisible realm) and see God through the eyes of his heart. This power, *ma'unat*, is legitimate and sanctioned by the individual's religious superiority. The second is the miraculous power granted to an ordinary Moslem who, as a result of *hikmat* (or *himmah*, God's favor and reward) earned by daily reciting the Asmaulhusna (ninety-nine names of God), finds temporary escape from worldly limitations during times of immediate crisis. This special power, *wibawa*, is God's blessing for the individual's religious efforts but differs from the kind of transcendental power possessed by individuals with *ma'unat*. The third type (which derives from a syncretic mixture of indigenous and Islamic beliefs) comes from control of Islamic *jinn* (spirits). Miracles performed on this last basis are illegitimate and identified as magic: they do not involve God's power nor the individual's religious superiority. They are merely the result of techniques for creating an illusionary effect before spectators. Local people concluded by saying that the combination of these three qualities in one person is possible, but the miracles caused by Kartosuwirjo simply to prove his power belonged to the last category, and were therefore false and illegitimate. Furthermore, they added, many of Kartosuwirjo's miracles were really to the credit of Ardiwisastra, his father-in-law!

The stories of his power to curse disloyal members also served to intimidate prospective DI deserters. Such rumors were given weight by repeated reports of people who "dropped out" of the movement being hunted down and executed. As the movement dragged on into the 1960s, many DI followers were willing to surrender to the TNI, but they were afraid that however they might try to hide themselves, Kartosuwirjo would find them and place a *kutuk dewa* (curse of God) upon them.

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67. General Ibrahim Adjie was the military commander of West Java who led major campaigns against Kartosuwirjo in the early 1960's.

However sincere his goals may have been and whatever the methods he adopted to ensure the loyalty of his followers, Kartosuwirjo failed in one important respect that eventually turned most communities against his movement. He permitted the TII to carry out brutal massacres such as those at Cibugel, Ciinjuk, and Cikurahan. At his court trial Kartosuwirjo later said that he himself had been greatly annoyed by these brutal acts committed by his followers,<sup>68</sup> admitting in effect an inability to control the activities of his followers. This may have been one consequence of his inaccessibility. As the movement spread, the DI's Islamic courts failed to function, Islamic proscriptions against the persecution of *kafir* (unbelievers) were disobeyed, and discipline was not enforced. Many of the terrorist attacks upon villages during the first half of the 1950s were not organized to achieve any sophisticated political ends. This lack of sophistication is exemplified by such a statement as: "Just as the young coconut which does not have the capacity to bear fruit must be burned down to its roots, so this must also be done to those kafir, Communists and villagers who refuse to accept the DI's sovereignty."<sup>69</sup> Burning down villages and throwing corpses into the fire were seen as acts of *pembersihan* (purification), out of which a new and ideal state was to grow. By the late 1950s the DI appeared to be little more than a terrorist organization completely cut off from popular support. This situation was to lead the movement to its eventual downfall.

#### The End of the Movement

In 1948, when the DI first began, it was legitimate in the eyes of many Indonesians, since it was not against the Republic. When the Republic destroyed the 1950 federal system just as the DI was rapidly gaining in strength, however, the movement became a cancer within the newly reborn Republic. Between October 1950 and February 1951 Kartosuwirjo sent two secret letters to Sukarno appealing to him to establish an Islamic State.<sup>70</sup> Since the Republic remained a secular state, however, the DI sought separation from direct Republican control over its territory, as Kahar Muzakkar was to do in South Sulawesi and Daud Beureu'eh in Aceh.

The DI's continued expansion through most of the decade derived not only from its own strength but also from other factors which weakened the Jakarta government. First of all, sentiment for a Negara Islam, the DI's fundamental aim, was still pervasive among Islamic political parties. The Masyumi, which held cabinet posts between 1950 and 1953, feared in particular that a direct drive against the DI would result in a decrease in its electoral support, and therefore favored a settlement through peaceful negotiations.<sup>71</sup> Nor was the army, though frustrated by the constraints imposed by the political parties, eager to fight fellow Indonesians.<sup>72</sup> From the military point of view, the period between mid-1951 and 1953, when no other major rebellion was going on, would probably have been the best time for settling the conflict by force of arms. However, this was exactly the period in which

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68. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

69. Author's interview notes.

70. Boland, *The Struggle*, pp. 60-61.

71. Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 210-12.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 412.

The DI's strength was at its peak and the Masyumi's voice against a repressive drive most effective. As the Masyumi lost power to a coalition of nationalists and left-wing groups after mid-1953, however, rebellions in other parts of the archipelago distracted both the government and the army from attempting to organize a united front against the DI.

In the next decade Indonesia underwent both political and economic decline, and in Priangan the virtual absence of internal security caused by the DI insurgents contributed to the general deterioration of social conditions. Refugees from the fertile Priangan hills and plains flooded the major cities, thereby increasing the urban population along with the number of administrative problems. A sudden drop in agricultural productivity and a virtual cessation of commodity flows between regions, resulting from disruptions of the transportation system, worsened the already inflationary conditions in DI areas. The possibility of destroying the DI began to emerge only after the political climate in Jakarta changed in the early 1960s when Guided Democracy was put into effect.

In the new system the government's power under Sukarno's leadership greatly increased, since it was no longer dependent upon parliamentary backing. What is more, by the turn of the decade, Masyumi, which had been the strongest opponent of a military campaign to destroy the DI, had been declared illegal as a result of its involvement with the regionalist rebellion of 1958. The crushing of this made it possible for the first time to turn all the state's resources against the DI. These changes in the distribution of political power and the restoration of internal security in other regions put the DI in a weaker position vis-à-vis Jakarta than ever before.<sup>73</sup>

The Siliwangi then launched its Operasi Bratayudha and after 1961 generated effective civilian cooperation in the form of *pagar betis* (literally, a fence of human legs).<sup>74</sup> The foot of each rebel-held mountain was surrounded by a massive number of villagers with torches in their hands, while the army and members of the Organisasi Perlawanan Rakyat (People's Defense Organization) waited for the DI members to surrender. Many were captured by this method. Lured by the promise of clemency for those who voluntarily turned themselves in to army posts, many more openly deserted Kartosuwirjo. By the beginning of 1962, the strength of the DI had become very small. People like Kamran and Oni were long dead, and Kartosuwirjo himself was in critical condition after being wounded by a bullet on April 24. He was finally captured on June 4, 1962, under circumstances that are still not altogether clear.<sup>75</sup> Through a radio announcement from Bandung and Jakarta, Kartosuwirjo then ordered General Abdullah of the TII to surrender. The surrendering TII members left a deep impression upon spectators. Clad

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73. *Ibid.*, pp. 520-38; and Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI, 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 32-46.

74. Team Penerangan Umum, *Sedjarah*, p. 290.

75. The army claims that he was captured on Mt. Goger in Central Priangan by the elite Kujang units of the Siliwangi (Team Penerangan Umum, *Sedjarah*, Tambahan p. 23). Boland writes that he was discovered by an army patrol on Mt. Geber between Bogor and Cianjur (*The Struggle*, p. 62); and my informants reported that he was captured on Mt. Haruman near Leles in the district of Garut by one of the pagar betis operations.

in black uniforms, the soldiers descended with dignity from the hillside DI territory. From their point of view, they surrendered only because of the Imam's orders. The Siliwangi, headed by General Ibrahim Adjie, too, played their part by treating the surrendering soldiers with compassion.

The government handled the case with particular caution, in the hope of restoring peace and order in the region. All the DI/TII members who surrendered at military posts were immediately released and most of those who were captured by the pagar betis were granted presidential amnesty. Kartosuwirjo was interrogated for two months following his capture while he recuperated from his wound. Around mid-August, together with five of his followers who had been imprisoned earlier on charges of attempting to assassinate President Sukarno in the Idul Adha Affair of May 19, 1962,<sup>76</sup> he was brought before a military court. The trial lasted for four days and on August 18 all were convicted and sentenced to death. Kartosuwirjo was then secretly executed on September 12.<sup>77</sup>

Boland, comparing Kartosuwirjo with Kahar Muzakkar (shot to death in February 1965), says that he did not enjoy as much popular support after his death,<sup>78</sup> but that some people, particularly among the spirited young men, expressed both sympathy for his tragic end, and admiration for his uncompromising devotion to the cause. Some former DI members who returned to their own villages were ostracized by other villagers and, finding this intolerable, eventually moved away to cities or to villages in North Priangan around Limbangan and Malangbong, an area where the DI formerly had strong support and where orthodox religious fanaticism is still very much a part of life.

#### Cipari's Involvement with the DI and the Revolution

Kiai Yusuf knew Kartosuwirjo for almost twenty years before they came into conflict. Both families were in close contact because of their common interest in *perjuangan politik* (political struggle). Kartosuwirjo's father-in-law, Ardiwisastro, was himself a well-known figure in PSII circles in West Java. Kartosuwirjo's wife, Wiwiek, was also a militant activist and very close friend of Kiai Yusuf's younger sisters, who headed the women's section of the GPII in Garut. When Kartosuwirjo was expelled from the party, Kiai Yusuf also pulled out and supported indirectly both the KPK and Kartosuwirjo's Suffah Institute. But after that, the kiai was never active in party politics again.


Following the Dutch invasion of Priangan in 1947, Kiai Yusuf and his Hizbullah played a leading role, along with Kartosuwirjo, in organizing the defense of the area. Members of his family were also present at the conference held on Mt. Cupu in November 1947. For about a year between the TNI's hijrah and the return of the Siliwangi, Kiai Yusuf assisted Kartosuwirjo both financially and militarily, as did many ulama in Priangan. Support of the DI movement at that time was viewed as part of the continuing struggle for full independence from the Dutch, rather than an opportunity to take advantage of the power

76. Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p. 290.

77. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 18.

78. Boland, The Struggle, p. 68.

# CIPARI



vacuum created by the evacuation of the Republican forces for the creation of an Islamic state. It was when the DI clearly moved toward the establishment of a Negara Islam at the expense of the Republic that Kiai Yusuf withdrew his support. He felt that to fight against the Republic for the creation of an Islamic State would be futile. His withdrawal, however, meant that the village of Cipari where he had his headquarters became a prime and constant target of the DI.

During the first half of 1949, therefore, his Hizbullah division fought against the Dutch and defended the village against the DI at the same time. In the eastern part of Garut, Dutch garrisons were found at Cibatu, Bakanloa and Sadang (respectively seven, one, and four kilometers from Cipari), while the DI's operations stretched from the edge of the mountains surrounding the River Cimanuk to Cicalengka and as far as Bandung.

#### One Day in 1949

Not long after the burning of South Bandung in the spring of 1946, the town of Wanaraja, where Kiai Yusuf had lived, was also burned down by a group of leftist irregulars led by a man called Kosasih, who called themselves the Pasukan Pangeran Papak (Prince Papak's Troops). Kiai Yusuf and his family were forced to return to his native village of Cipari about three kilometers northeast of the town. Following the hijrah of the Republican forces in 1948, Kiai Yusuf had only a few followers with him. Most of the village youngsters who had been trained by the Japanese and had joined the TNI after the Proclamation of Independence had left for Yogyakarta, and his largest Hizbullah unit was fighting alongside Kartosuwirjo in the mountains against the Dutch. After he clashed with Kartosuwirjo, many of Kiai Yusuf's Hizbullah supporters opted to remain with the DI rather than return to the village (among them were two of his cousins). In mid-1948, therefore, Kiai Yusuf's remaining Hizbullah unit consisted merely of young boys barely old enough to hold guns, and some *pangongsi* (refugees from mountain villages exposed to the DI) from Sindangheula.

Not knowing the real sympathies of the village, the Dutch soldiers stationed in Bakanloa, about one kilometer south of Cipari, gave the villagers military training for the purpose of "self-defense" against the DI. The village even made a deal with a Dutch officer in Garut to send them arms and ammunition in a small truck. So ignorant were the Dutch of Yusuf's real feelings that, when Pasundan was established, he was offered the post of Minister of Religious Affairs, which he declined on the excuse of "failing health."

When the second Dutch attack opened and the Siliwangi returned to West Java at the beginning of 1949, Cipari was better prepared. TNI soldiers returning to the village were reported to the Dutch as wandering santri students attending the village pesantren. Kiai Yusuf headed the newly strengthened Hizbullah and from his headquarters in Cipari organized military operations coordinating all the available forces within the area of Cibatu, Pasanggrahan, and Sukawening. Their target was the garrison in Cibatu. The operations, led by the professional soldiers from the Siliwangi, always took place at night.

For a long time the Dutch could not identify the leader of the guerrilla operations nor locate his headquarters. After years of dealing with the Dutch, Kiai Yusuf and his family had learned to deceive them by feigning submissiveness. Even after the Dutch had learned the

name of the leader, Kiai Yusuf could still pass a Dutch officer on the street without being questioned. As the fighting increased and when a warrant for his arrest was issued, however, Kiai Yusuf literally went underground. A dry spot was chosen in one of the banana gardens and a hole was dug creating a seven-square-foot underground room. The hole was covered with dry grass and not even the villagers were told of its exact location. The kiai and Professor Musadaad,<sup>79</sup> one of the best known of the kiai's disciples, stayed there during the daytime only to come out after dark. Another hole was dug right underneath a wooden bunk bed for their emergency use. Weapons, stolen or purchased from the Dutch, left by the Japanese, or brought back by the TNI, were kept with one of the widows of the village, since she would be the last to be suspected of hiding such things.

The Dutch frequently made inspections in Cipari, but in the particular month when the incident to be related below occurred the Dutch had good reason to keep away, giving its inhabitants time to prepare another attack. The village had just suffered from a smallpox epidemic and several people had bandages on for over a month. To take advantage of the situation, Kiai Yusuf ordered villagers to keep their bandages on long after they had recovered, and put out a sign at the village entrance saying, "Smallpox in this village, stay away." It was eleven days before the military operation was to take place, letters with orders had been sent out, and the weapons had just been cleaned, when suddenly and unexpectedly the Dutch came to inspect the village.

Normally they would come in through the village gate but on that particular day six Dutch officers and one Ambonese entered the village from a path through the rice fields. "I [Kiai Yusuf's sister] was chatting with my sister-in-law at her house near the gate of the village. It was already toward the end of the day and the people were busy bathing their children and cooking meals. Then suddenly I saw my brother-in-law holding his arms above his shoulders and followed by six Dutch officers. I knew that my brother-in-law had a green TNI uniform in a *sarong* wrapped around his shoulders. I dashed out of the house and greeted the Dutchmen as usual in a most friendly tone and tried to lead them to my sister-in-law's house while she went out to my brother, the Kiai's, house, to warn him of the coming of the Dutch, but all was in vain."

Kiai Yusuf had been taking that day rather easy and was outside his hiding place. By his house in front of the mosque he heard someone shouting, "The Dutch have come to Cipari," which he mistook for Cipari Babakan (the next village to the east of Cipari). Thinking he still had time to call for his son who was a TNI returnee, he ran across the yard to his hiding place. But according to his sister, the Dutch had already spotted him. "When I reached my house, I saw two of my brothers, Professor Musadaad, my mother and sisters all inside. No one was allowed to enter. So I walked around the house trying to do something about it. The Dutch searched for documents and weapons as proof of our plotting an attack. They confiscated six typewriters, all the documents, and seven weapons. I ordered my nephew to go quietly and quickly to the widow's house and hide the remaining twenty weapons and ammunition in the graveyard and the fish ponds. I was always told by my brother the Kiai that if something happened to him and he could not continue the perjuangan, then I had to continue it on his behalf. About

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79. Professor Musadaad is presently a lecturer at the Institut Agama Islam Negara (IAIN, National Islamic University) in Bandung.



thirty years before, in 1919, when my father and my eldest brother were arrested by the Dutch in connection with the Cimareme Affair, my brother the Kiai carried on my father's work. Now it was my turn. When the Kiai and the leading members of the family were about to be taken away, the children of the village who had lost their parents during the DI and the Revolution wept and cried: 'Don't wait until tomorrow but let them return home this evening.' My brother was kind and always took care of these orphans, fed them and gave them clothes. The prayers of such innocent children are always heard by God."

At the Dutch garrison at Bakanloa, the men were treated well and with respect. "I [the Kiai's nephew, a TNI returnee] was the first to be interrogated by the Dutch. I told them that the confiscated weapons were in the village only to be used for defense against DI attacks and not against the Dutch. God must have been there with us, because, my Lord, the weapons which had been cleaned and polished that very morning now looked rusty with red spots everywhere and they were dusty inside as if they had indeed not been used for a long time and probably would not be in the near future either. God indeed helps us, because when the Dutch tried to read the confiscated documents, the ink of the paper was smeared and the writing was hardly comprehensible.

"Fortunately Dr. Musadaad could speak fluent Dutch and he chatted with the Dutch officers. They gave us meals and allowed us to go ahead with our evening prayers. Then around nine o'clock, shortly after the prayer, there was a telephone call from Garut ordering the station to release all of us immediately. It was a sheer miracle. Even Kiai Yusuf had thought that he would never return home alive. According to later information, someone had apparently informed the kiai's supporters in Garut, who in turn pressured the Dutch headquarters there into releasing Kiai Yusuf. The kiai was a fair man and he never judged people on their ethnic character but on their individual merits. He helped the Japanese at the time of their capitulation and stopped the people from massacring some Chinese when the Dutch colonial authority collapsed. So among his followers there were Japanese, Chinese and Dutch nationals. But what is strange indeed, on that particular day who could have passed word of the kiai's arrest to Garut? In those days nobody walked at night for fear of the DI, and the only telephone near Bakanloa was located at the military post itself. God must have done something about it, for it simply does not make sense to us.

"We were sent home before midnight, and I will never forget the surprised look on my family's faces when they saw us back. We all thanked God for His help and we swore that we would continue with our perjuangan for *da'wah* Islam (the spreading of Islam). The Dutch not only returned all the weapons and documents they had confiscated but also promised to provide the village with guards against any DI attack.

"In the fall of that year, only several days after the Round Table Conference was completed in which the Dutch agreed upon the total transfer of sovereignty, we invited those Dutch military officers from Bakanloa to attend Lebaran [the end of the fasting month, marking the beginning of the new Islamic year] celebration in the village. For the first time since the breakdown of the Renville Agreement, all the members of the TNI in Cipari put on their military uniforms and sang our national anthem in front of the mosque. The Dutch were very surprised to find out that there were so many returned TNI members in the village. We were very proud and these sympathetic Dutch officers enjoyed sharing meals with us for the last time before they had to leave for home."

The release of Kiai Yusuf was probably related to the Dutch fear of peasant resentment. Antagonizing the peasants at a delicate time would have been the last thing the local Dutch military officers wanted in the face of the weakening Dutch position in West Java. To the villagers, who had little knowledge of the change in the international climate in favor of the Republic, however, the entire event was beyond their comprehension. To them the release of Kiai Yusuf by hitherto formidable Dutch officers was a sheer miracle, proof of God's blessing on the kiai and his followers, whose courage and dedication in the course of their perjuangan derived from their fundamental faith itself.

#### April 17, 1952: The DI Attack on Cipari

Cipari experienced a total of forty-six DI attacks between 1949 and 1958, out of which seventeen inflicted serious damage. In those days it had become the custom for the people from nearby villages as well as from the mountains to seek refuge in the Cipari mosque every day after late afternoon prayers. Some of them brought their stoves, cooked meals there, stayed overnight and returned home only in the morning. For several months shortly after independence, the Siliwangi stationed a company in Cipari to protect what was obviously a DI target. As the frequency of DI attacks increased throughout Garut, the mosque-madrasah building in Cipari came to accommodate thousands of people. The most serious attack on the village took place, however, on April 17, 1952, after the Siliwangi pulled the company back from the village. It was then that the DI made their last serious attempt to finish off Kiai Yusuf and the village once and for all.

"My house was then located right on the road leading into Cipari, and every evening we used to hide at the mosque in Cipari. That particular day, however, I [local ulama, Kiai Yusuf's maternal cousin] had a meeting at Cimahi and did not come home until late afternoon. I was changing my clothes when my wife quietly said that there was a patrol right outside the house. It did not take me long to realize that it was not an ordinary patrol from the Kecamatan police station but a troop of DI/TII soldiers sneaking in to surround the village of Cipari. I pulled my wife back and we hid ourselves behind the curtains and watched their movements. It was very unusual for the TII to come down so early in the evening and approach the village from the south, because they usually descended from the mountains north of Cipari. I was late in going to the madrasah that day and for just that reason we escaped the attack."

In Cipari the mood was different. Kiai Yusuf's sister recalls: "It was before the Isa prayers around seven thirty in the evening, when we heard that the DI were already near Cipari. Most of the people who moved into Cipari every evening to seek refuge were already in the building since the late afternoon prayers, but because we lived so near the madrasah we were still in our houses. My sister, who tended to get frantic at any unusual sight in those days, starting crying out that the DI was here, jumping here and there without knowing what to do. I did not believe it at first because it was too early in the evening for the DI to come down, but when I saw the house across the yard on fire and heard an alarming trumpet, my doubts vanished. My mother, who was then eighty years old, climbed out of the window with two of her grandchildren and rushed across the yard to the madrasah. I helped my frightened sister and we made it safely. There I learned that my brother-in-law had already been shot to death by the TII and thrown into one of the burning houses. I had to calm down his frightened

children. They told me that he was late coming home from the pengajian in a nearby village and that when he rushed out of the house on hearing the trumpet, he was immediately shot by the TII. Four other villagers were killed in the same way, including one of my cousin's sons.

"My brother, Kiai Yusuf, was already at the top of the mosque tower. It was Divine *takdir* [providence] because I recalled that when my brother erected the mosque-madrasah complex in 1933, the architect's sketches did not include the tower. Yet for some reason my brother insisted on adding a tall tower between the mosque and the madrasah sections. Only God knew that this particular tower would come to save thousands of people twenty years later. The TII's tactics of burning houses was also beneficial because it made the defense from the madrasah much easier than otherwise.

"The major trouble was that we had only seven weapons besides the kiai's Canadian pistol. The five Japanese carbines left by the Siliwangi company when they were pulled out, and the two *dorlok* [locally produced handmade shotguns] were not very efficient. But we had plenty of grenades. One of my nephews, a former Peta soldier and then an active member of the Siliwangi, was away from the village on duty in Jakarta and I missed him badly. But my brother's personal guards were incredibly calm and skillful, and they gave me confidence again. Those soft-spoken, humble and ignorant refugees from Sindangheula were even braver than my brother. They looked as if they had nothing to fear. Some of them who survived still live in the village and whenever I get angry at them, I calm myself by remembering how grateful we were to them that particular evening. Unlike the members of the TNI, these private soldiers receive no pension and today I always try to help them whenever they have any financial problems.

"The battle lasted until three o'clock in the morning, shortly before the *subuh* [dawn] prayers. During the night the three thousand TII soldiers made three advances. My brother stood at the top of the tower throwing grenades at the advancing TII soldiers on the ground. His shadow against the flames was seen from far away like in a wayang play. All the windows in the madrasah were shattered by bullets and many people inside the building suffered cuts from the flying glass. Bohim, one of the kiai's private soldiers, was bleeding from his forehead but still continued firing his weapon. I went around the building and helped the wounded. Aisa from Sindangheula was shot, the bullet passing through her and the baby she was carrying when she walked through the madrasah. Both of them were killed instantly.

"Because of the constant firing, two of the weapons had broken down and only five remained in working order. Soon afterward, one more broke down. Oyoh, another of my brothers' guards, ran out of ammunition and decided to sacrifice himself to save my brother. He said that it would be his last contribution to the community. He grasped a grenade and despite other people's efforts to stop him, he dashed out of the building, approached some TII soldiers, threw a grenade and was shot to death by other TII soldiers before he could return to the building.

"There were enough grenades, but ammunition was in short supply, so my brother ordered his soldiers to shoot only at those of the enemy who were actually advancing. Each TII attack lasted from two or three hours. Then they rested for about a half an hour before the shooting started again. We wished that somehow the TNI would come and rescue us before the TII took over completely and destroyed us all. I heard

later on that the TNI was already at the corner of the highway about a mile from the village but could not break through the encircling TII lines.

"Inside the madrasah people continued to pray for God's help and the children kept crying from fear, hearing the shooting which sounded like an endless thunder. The most fearful moment came for all of us when the TII attempted to break down the western wall of the mosque. Because the west is our *kiblat* [the direction of prayers towards Mecca], the wall had no windows and hence no place from which guns could be fired. It provided a convenient hiding place for the TII to work their entry through the wall. The wall, however, was too thick for them. Its stone foundation went as high as a meter and a half and God did not *mengizinkan* [allow] it to happen. They threw a grenade at the wall but it only made a tiny hole through which no one could crawl or shoot. We had three more casualties. Bulu tried to throw a grenade at the TII but missed. The grenade hit a window and bounced back killing the man instantly. Two other soldiers were shot by the TII.

"Despite all their efforts, the TII failed to finish us off. On our side only four soldiers and seven civilians were killed. It was nothing but a remarkable work of God. We had only seven weapons and the TII had a thousand. When morning prayer time approached, and the sun was about to rise, the TII began to retreat. Only when all the TII had gone to the mountains did people in the madrasah come out for the first time. The nightmare that had lasted eight hours was over. The sun was already high and they saw the ashes of their burned homes. They had lost food, clothes, shelter and everything else. Fortunately, my house was only half burned and my storage room was intact. My brother had warned me to save food at several places so that if one stock was burned, we would still be left with others. I ordered my daughters to prepare meals for all the survivors. Everyone was hungry but they could not eat much. It took us a while before we overcame the fear and shock of the night. Some of us had lost our beloved ones and had to pick their bones out of the ashes for burial.

"A convoy from the Red Cross arrived from Garut bringing us food and clothes, and by late afternoon Governor Sanusi of West Java along with [Armed Forces Chief of Staff] General Simatupang arrived from Jakarta to express their grief and to show their respect and surprise at our soldiers' courage. A German doctor who came along with the convoy gave us medicine and took care of those who were seriously wounded."

Within several days life returned to normal. But dozens of dead TII soldiers were found in the fish ponds and sawah and for a long time people would not work in the fields, for fear that they might stumble over a severed leg or head. Nor could people sell fish from the ponds for, according to the tenets of Islam, fish taken from a pond where a corpse has rotted may not be eaten or sold.

The DI never again attacked Cipari with the same fury as on that night, but an ineradicable fear still remains among the women and children. Some old women complain that even now they become frightened when they hear steps outside their house in the middle of the night. Kiai Yusuf moved back to Wanaraja, and his madrasah and living quarters were restored with the help of his followers. His courage and bravery have made him a focal figure and hero of the local folklore concerning that period. People believe that he must have achieved the state of *marifa'at*, the highest possible state of holiness for a Sufi, and acquired supernatural powers. Every Thursday he still gives a pengajian

to a public audience, and people from the mountains and from far away come to attend. It appears that most of these hundreds of attendants come not so much to learn from the depth of his lectures but rather to gain spiritual merit from being in the presence of the kiai, whom they consider far closer to the Divine than they themselves.

The tower of the mosque has been left as it was on that night, and stands as a symbol of a recent historic milestone for the villagers. It has become a custom for villagers returning home after a long journey or after working as seasonal migrant laborers to climb the tower first, to strengthen their communion with the recent past, Nature, their native village, and, ultimately, the Divine.